Indian Politics and Political Processes: Ideas, Institutions and Practices 9781032499833, 9781032562148, 9781003434443

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Indian Politics and Political Processes

Indian Politics and Political Processes explores the key ideas, foundations, continuities, major shifts and challenges to the state and democracy in modern India. The book presents an in-depth analysis of recent issues and challenges confronting the Indian state and politics. Presenting a comprehensive account of the major trajectories of Indian politics, this book introduces the readers to the existing literature and enables them to think critically about major issues and institutions of politics and democracy. The chapters engage critically with the historical antecedents, major debates, and recent developments. The book also elaborately deals with issues such as populism, religious movements, minority rights, health, and the environment, which are often ignored or side-lined in the available literature on Indian politics and political processes. The book will be useful to the students, teachers and researchers pursuing courses in political science, South Asian Studies, and international/global politics and economics. It will also be an informative read for those interested in contemporary South Asian politics. Mithilesh Kumar Jha teaches political science at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati. He earned his PhD in 2014 from the University of Delhi. Dr. Jha’s research interests are political thought, theory, and Indian politics. His noted publication is Language Politics and Public Sphere in North India: Making of the Maithili Movement (2018). His articles and review articles have appeared in journals like EPW, Studies in Indian Politics, Contributions to Indian Sociology, Seminar, The Book Review, and LSE Review of Books. He has been a recipient of the Charles Wallace Fellowship and ICSSR Fellowship for data collection abroad for his research in 2012. Kamal Nayan Choubey teaches political science at Dyal Singh College of Delhi University. He has completed his PhD from the Department of Political Science, Delhi University. He is the author of the book, Jaatiyon ka Rajneetikaran: Bihar Mein Pichhdi Jatiyon ke Ubhar ki Dastan (2008); Jungle Ki Haqdari: Rajneeti aur Sangharsh (2015); he has co-edited Bhartiya Neetiyon Ka Samajik Paksh (2017) and Bhartiya Gram Shrikhna (3 volume, 2019). He has edited two volumes of Dalit Gyan Mimansa (2022). He also did a Post-Doctorate from Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML, Delhi) on the experience of PESA and FRA (2012–2014). He has completed a Major Research Project with Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR) Delhi on the role of Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram in tribal areas. He is a member of the editorial team of the reputed journal Pratiman (published by CSDS, Delhi) and published articles in journals like Economic and Political Weekly, Studies in Indian Politics, Social Change. He has translated many well-known academic books from English to Hindi, including Will Kymilika’s Contemporary Political Philosophy and John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.

Indian Politics and Political Processes Ideas, Institutions and Practices Edited by Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-49983-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-56214-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-43444-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443 Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To Om Prakash (1977–2021)

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction

x xi xii xvii xix 1

MITHILESH KUMAR JHA AND KAMAL NAYAN CHOUBEY

SECTION I

Indian Constitution, State and Emerging Trends33   1 Indian Constitution: Antecedents, Philosophy and Basic Features

35

OM PRAKASH

  2 State, Society and the Nation

53

MOHINDER SINGH

  3 Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People

75

ADITYA NIGAM

  4 Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements

95

MANINDRA NATH THAKUR

  5 Regulating the Electoral Domain: The Election Commission of India UJJWAL KUMAR SINGH AND ANUPAMA ROY

115

viii  Contents SECTION II

Political Processes I: Changing Dynamics of Institutions and Political Parties129   6 Indian Judiciary: Changing Role and Dynamics of the Supreme Court of India

131

INDRAJEET KUMAR JHA

  7 Indian Parliament: Changing Contours and Challenging Future

156

MEENAKSHI GOGOI AND MITHILESH KUMAR JHA

  8 Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond

174

HEMANT DOGRA AND MITHILESH KUMAR JHA

  9 Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being: A Rights-Based Perspective

197

HIMANSHU JHA

10 Elections and Voting Behaviour: Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Trends

221

SUMIT KUMAR SARMA AND MITHILESH KUMAR JHA

11 The Congress Party and the Indian Party System

237

RAJESH KUMAR

12 Bharatiya Janata Party: Electoral Dominance or Ideological Hegemony?

259

MITHILESH KUMAR JHA

SECTION III

Political Processes II: Contested Determinants of Indian Politics275 13 Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India

277

SATAKSHI MALVIYA AND SHAMIK VATSA

14 The Middle Class in India: Politics, Economy and Culture ASHUTOSH KUMAR

296

Contents  ix 15 Understanding Tribal India: Constitutional Rights, Issues and Challenges

318

KAMAL NAYAN CHOUBEY

16 Gender and Indian Politics

342

RASHMI GOPI

17 Secularism in India: Theories, Practices and Controversies

364

ANURAG PANDEY

18 Local Self-Government: Panchayats and Municipalities

387

SMITA AGARWAL

SECTION IV

Political Processes III: Site of Concerns and Challenges to Indian Democracy407 19 The Idea of Minority: An Indian Story

409

HILAL AHMED

20 Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance in India

436

PAHI SAIKIA

21 Discourse on the Environment and Development in India

463

MEENAKSHI GOGOI

22 The Politics of the Public Health System in India

480

SKYLAB SAHU

Index494

Figures

9.1 Expenditure on Social Services (in Crores) 9.2 Year-Wise MGNREGS Allocation by the Central Government (in Crores) 9.3 RTI Continuum 22.1 Health Expenditure by Countries, as a Percentage of GDP

199 211 214 486

Tables

4.1 6.1 8.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 12.1 12.2 12.3 19.1

Forms of Religious Movements 111 Collegium System and NJAC 134 Federal Versus Unitary Government 175 Right-Based Legislations: A Snapshot 201 Welfare Regime Institutional Change 201 Snapshot of Welfare Schemes 203 RTI: Contrasting Before and After Picture 216 Changes in the Total Number of Seats, Electorates, ­Contesting Candidates, Voting Percentage, Number of ­Polling Stations and Expenditure Incurred since 1951–52 222 Results of Parliamentary Elections, 1952–84 224 Congress Versus BJP Contest 225 Voting Percentage Caste/Communitywise, 2004 230 Change in Vote Share of Different Social Groups Between 1999 and 2004 230 Literacy Level Among Different Caste Groups Since 1961 234 Electoral Performance of the BJS in Lok Sabha Elections (1952–80)262 BJP Electoral Performance in General Elections (1984–2004) 265 BJP Electoral Performance in General Elections (2009–19) 268 Muslim Representation in the Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 430

Notes on Contributors

Smita Agarwal teaches political science in the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi. She received her PhD from the same department. Her research interests are in international relations, gender development and governance. Hilal Ahmed works on political Islam, Muslim politics of representation, and politics of symbols in South Asia. Ahmed did his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (2007). His first book Muslim Political Discourse in Postcolonial India: Monuments, Memory, Contestation  (Routledge 2014), explores these thematic concerns to evolve an interdisciplinary approach to studying Muslim politics. His volumes, Siyasi Muslims: A story of Political Islam in India (New Delhi, 2019) and  Democratic Accommodations: Minorities in contemporary India (with Peter R. deSouza and Sanjeer Alam, 2019) further elaborate on these themes and make a modest attempt to explain the discursively constituted nature of contemporary Muslim political discourse in India. His recent work includes Companion to Indian Democracy: Resilience, Fragility, Ambivalence  (with Peter R. deSouza and Sanjeer Alam, Routledge, 2021). Ahmed is also currently working on a book project on the politics of Muslim political representation in postcolonial India. He is also editing a Hindi Reader of Sudipta Kaviraj’s writings. Ahmed is the Associate Editor, South Asian Studies, Journal of the British Association of South Asian Studies. He was a Visiting Fellow at Victoria University Wellington (2013–14), Visiting Asia Fellow, University of Dhaka (2011), and Visiting Professor at the University of Pune (2011). Ahmed writes for academic journals, newspapers, and websites in English and Hindi. Hemant Dogra is a PhD scholar in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, India. His MPhil dissertation analyzed the state’s response to regional movements in India with special reference to the regional movements in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. His research interests include identity-based, conflict-related politics in Jammu and Kashmir, centre-state relations, and federalism in India.

Notes on Contributors  xiii Meenakshi Gogoi received her PhD from the Centre for Political Studies, JNU, Delhi. She has contributed to national and international journals like Social Change, Gauhati University Institute of North-East India Studies Journal, The Discussant (Journal of the Centre for Reforms, Development and Justice, Delhi), and Socrates. Her recent book chapter titled ‘Anti-Dam Resistance in India and Gandhian Principle of Non-Violence’, is published in an edited book, Reassessing Gandhian Thought (Shivalik Prakashan, Delhi, 2020). She has worked as a teaching assistant and reviewer in the NPTEL (National Programme on Technology Enhanced Learning) online courses like Western Political Thought, Indian Political Thought, and Introduction to Political Theory held by IIT Guwahati, January–April 2019–2020. Her areas of interest include political theory, the Indian political system, and political thought. Her doctoral research is on eminent domain, people’s resistance, the question of land acquisition, sovereignty, and dam projects. Rashmi Gopi joined the Department of Political Science, Miranda House, the University of Delhi, as an assistant professor in 2015. She has done her undergraduation, postgraduation, MPhil, and PhD in political science at the University of Delhi. She specializes in gender studies. Her other research areas of interest are political theory and theories in international relations. She has published articles in international and national journals on varied subjects like masculinity and nation, Ayurveda tourism, ragging, masculinity and India’s foreign policy, pedagogical questions in political science and citizenship, and globalisation. She is the author of Constructions of Masculinity in Three Political Spheres (2017). Himanshu Jha teaches in the Department of Political Science at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, Germany. He holds a PhD from the National University of Singapore, where he held prestigious Singapore’s president fellowship. His research primarily focuses on institutional and policy change, public policy, governance and development, politics of accountability, state capacity, and bureaucratic rationality. Himanshu’s most recent book, titled Capturing Institutional Change: The Case of the Right to Information Act in India, explores the why, how, and what of institutional change using a historical institutional lens. Building on the current body of work, he has further probed the institutional progression of the right to information and its deepening at the sub-national level. Indrajeet Kumar Jha is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, ARSD College, University of Delhi. He did his MPhil and PhD at the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi. He has also been a doctoral research fellow in the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) during his PhD. He has also translated various articles into Hindi for the Economic and Political Weekly Reader and the e-resources of Delhi University. He is currently working on his book titled “Non-Party Politics in India”, which is an extension of his MPhil thesis.

xiv  Notes on Contributors Ashutosh Kumar is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Punjab University, Chandigarh, India. He has a specialization in Indian politics, particularly in the politics of Punjab. He is the author of Electoral Dynamics in the Indian States (2021), Electoral Politics in Punjab: Factors and Shifts (2020), How India Votes: A State-by-state Look (2018), Rethinking State Politics in India: Regions within Regions (2017), and Globalisation and Politics of Identity in India (Co-edited) (2008). He has published many papers in national and international journals, edited books, and participated in many national and international seminars. Rajesh Kumar teaches political science at Delhi College of Arts and Commerce, University of Delhi. His research interests lie at the intersections of political theory, postcolonial theory, international relations, and Indian politics. He works on Kant and Gandhi’s studies, and citizenship, identity, migration, and constitutionalism. Satakshi Malviya is a research scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi, India. She is currently working on surveillance and the modern democratic state. Before joining the Department of Political Science, she completed her bachelors’ degree in political science from Delhi University’s Dyal Singh College and a master’s in political science from the Hindu College, University of Delhi. Aditya Nigam is a professor at the Centre for the Studies of Developing Societies (CSDS). In particular, he is interested in theorizing the contemporary experience of politics and democracy in the non-West – the non-West being the ground for ‘doing theory’, rather than a field for application or testing of frameworks developed elsewhere. He also works with the CSDS’s Indian Languages Programme and its Hindi journal Pratiman. He comments regularly on contemporary political issues on the blog, kafila. online. He is the author of  The Insurrection of Little Selves: The Crisis of Secular Nationalism in India  (2006),  Power and Contestation: India Since 1989,  with Nivedita Menon (2007),  After Utopia: Modernity, Socialism and the Postcolony (2010), Desire Named Development (2011) and Decolonizing Theory: Thinking Across Traditions (2020). Anurag Pandey teaches political science at the Dyal Singh College University of Delhi. He has contributed numerous articles for various national and international refereed journals and has authored some books. His prominent publications include Communalism and Secularism in India: An Analysis (JAAS, USA), From Circumstantial Bias to Hindutva: Communal Riots and Political Journey of Hindu Nationalism in Gujarat (Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Harvard, USA), Rashtirya Swayam Sevak Sangh: Popular Myths and Locked Minds (International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research). Dr. Pandey is also an editorial board member of various international peer-reviewed journals and referee/guest editor of

Notes on Contributors  xv Sage Open. He is a member of the American Political Science Association and American Society for Public Administration, USA. Om Prakash was an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Zakir Hussain College, Delhi University, India. He received his MA, MPhil, and PhD from the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi. He completed his PhD in 2009 on the theme of dialogue and democracy with reference to the Indian state and Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). His other research interests were Indian politics and political economy. Anupama Roy is a professor at the Centre of Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Her research interests straddle legal studies, political anthropology of political institutions, political ideas, and gender studies. She is the author of Gendered Citizenship: Historical and Conceptual Explorations (2005), Mapping Citizenship in India (2010), and Citizenship in India (2016). She has also co-edited Poverty: Gender and Migration in South Asia (2006). Her research articles have been published in national and international journals, and she has been a visiting scholar at universities in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany. Skylab Sahu is currently working as an assistant professor at Miranda House, University of Delhi. She received her PhD from the Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bangalore. Her specialization and areas of interest cover gender studies, Indian politics, and political theory. She has published her research articles in edited books and several national and international refereed journals such as Studies in Indian Politics, Sociological Bulletin, Indian Journal of Social and Economic Development, Journal of Health Management, Indian Journal of Political Science, and the Indian Journal of Social Work. She has authored two books: Gender, Sexuality, and HIV/AIDS: Exploring Politics of Women’s Health in India, published in 2015, and Gender, Violence, and Governmentality: Legal and Policy Initiatives, published in 2020 by Routledge. Pahi Saikia is an associate professor of political science in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati. Before joining IIT Guwahati, she served as a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada. She received her PhD from McGill University Canada. Her recent publications include journal articles in Political Psychology, South Asian History and Culture, and a book titled India and Myanmar Borderlands: Ethnicity, Security and Connectivity, published by Routledge in 2019. Her primary areas of specialization are international relations and comparative politics. Sumit Kumar Sarma teaches political science at HPB Girls’ College, Golaghat, Dibrugarh University. He received his MA and MPhil from the University of Hyderabad (UoH) and completed his PhD from the Department

xvi  Notes on Contributors of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Guwahati. His academic interests are electoral politics, state-society interaction, and changing political behaviour in the north-east and India in general. Mohinder Singh teaches at the Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India. His area of specialization is Political Thought and Theory: India, Western, Global South; History of political concepts in modern India. Earlier, he was a fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla (2008–10). He has co-authored Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth-Century Asia and Europe (with Margrit Pernau, Helge Jordheim, et  al.) (2015). He has published many research papers in reputed national and international journals. Ujjwal Kumar Singh is a professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, India. He has been writing on a range of themes, including democracy and social movements, law and democracy, and political institutions in India. He is the author of Political Prisoners in India (1998) and The State, Democracy, and Anti-Terror Laws in India (2007). He has also co-edited Towards Legal Literacy: An Introduction to Law in India (2008) and Human Rights and Peace: Ideas, Laws, Institutions, and Movements (2009). His articles have appeared in several national and international journals. He has been a visiting fellow at universities in India, Australia, China, and Germany. He was the ICCR Rajeev Gandhi Visiting Chair Professor in Contemporary Indian Studies at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia, in 2012. Manindra Nath Thakur is an associate professor at the Centre of Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. His area of interest is social science research method, Marxist theory, Indian politics, religion and politics, and new religious movements. He co-edited Democracy on the Move: Reflections on Moments, Promises, and Contradictions (2013; with Dhananjay Rai). He has contributed articles in many national and international journals.   Shamik Vatsa is a researcher at the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi, working on Indian politics. He is pursuing MPhil at the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi. He completed his bachelor’s degree in political science from Delhi University’s Dyal Singh College and a master’s in international relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi.

Acknowledgements

This book is the result of collective and collaborative efforts. We are grateful to all the contributors for accepting our invitation and contributing to this volume. They have not just contributed their chapters but consistently provided valuable suggestions to improve this volume further. We are grateful to each of them. A few chapters in this book have been published earlier. We are thankful to the respective editors and publishers for permitting us to include them in this volume. All these chapters have been revised and updated by their respective authors. We have had a great experience working on this volume. We are thankful to each contributor for enriching our understanding of Indian politics and political processes. We would also like to express our gratitude to our teachers and mentors – M. P. Singh, P. K. Dutta, Nivedita Menon and Ujjwal Kumar Singh – for their constant support and guidance. Ashutosh Kumar, Manindra Nath Thakur, Aditya Nigam, Hilal Ahmad and Mohinder Singh have not only contributed to this volume, but also always encouraged us to make it more comprehensive and meaningful. We thank them sincerely. We would also like to express our gratitude to colleagues and students in our respective institutions – Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati, and Department of Political Science, Dyal Singh College, University of Delhi – for their support and encouragement. We are grateful to Amit, Brinda and the other editorial team members at Routledge for their support and critical suggestions at the various stages leading up to the publication of this book. We have been able to work on this volume because of the trust and confidence we receive from our family members. We express our sincere gratitude to them for believing in us and supporting our endeavours. We dedicate this book to the loving memory of our colleague – also a contributor to this volume – Dr Om Prakash (1977–2021). His dedication and commitment to teaching and research have been a source of inspiration for us in our academic pursuits. He was an inspiring teacher and mentor whom we lost to the ruthless COVID-19 pandemic.

xviii  Acknowledgements We have made a sincere attempt to cover various aspects of Indian politics and political processes. However, we are well aware of its limitations and shortcomings. Nonetheless, we sincerely hope that this book will provide updated analyses and interpretations of various key themes and institutions concerning Indian politics and political processes, particularly the post-2014 general election. Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Aug 2023 Kamal Nayan Choubey

Abbreviations

AAP Aam Aadmi Party ABSU All Bodo Students’ Union ABVP Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad ADCs Autonomous District Councils AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam AICC All India Congress Committee AIMMM All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat AIMPLB All India Muslim Personal Law Board AITC All India Trinamool Congress BAMCEF Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation BJP Bharatiya Janata Party BJS Bharatiya Jana Sangh BKD Bharatiya Kranti Dal BLD Bharatiya Lok Dal BMMA Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan BMS Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh BSP Bahujan Samaj Party CA Constituent Assembly CAA Citizenship Amendment Act CBCI Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India CEC Chief election commissioner CNI Church of North India CNTA Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act Congress (O) Congress Organization Congress (R) Congress Requisition CPI  Communist Party of India CSDS Centre for the Study of Developing Societies CSI Church of South India CSSs Centrally sponsored schemes CTA Criminal Tribes Act CWH Critical Wildlife Habitat DK Dravida Kazhagam

xx  Abbreviations DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam DNTs De-notified Tribes ECI Elections Commission of India EMBs Electoral management bodies ENP Effective number of parties ERDL Explosive Research and Development Laboratory FD Forest department FDI Foreign direct investment FRA Forest Rights Act FRM Fundamentalist Religious Movement GDP Gross domestic product GST Goods and services tax HSAA Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act IAC India Against Corruption INC Indian National Congress IPC Indian Penal Code ISCs Inter-state Councils ITDP Integrated Tribal Development Project JD (U) Janata Dal (United) JD Janata Dal JFM Joint Forest Management JUH Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind MADA Modified area development approach MARG Marketing and Research Group MCC Model Code of Conduct MFP Minor forest produce MGNREGA  Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act MGNREGS  Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme MKSS Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan MLAs Members of Legislative Assemblies MNF Mizo National Front MPs Members of Parliament NCEAR National Council for Applied Economic Research NCM National Commission for Minorities NCMEI National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions NDA National Democratic Alliance NDC National Development Council NDFB National Democratic Front of Bodoland NES National Election Studies NGT National Green Tribunal NHS National Health Service NIC National Integration Council NITI National Institution for Transforming India

Abbreviations  xxi NNC Naga Nationalist Council NPs National parks NRM New Religious Movement NSCN(IM) National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) NWMI Network of Women in Media, India OBCs Other Backward Classes OTFDs Other Traditional Forest Dwellers PAs Protected Areas PESA Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act PHCs Primary health centres PRIs Panchayati Raj Institutions PVTGs Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups RJD Rashtriya Janata Dal RPA Representation of the People Act RPI Republican Party of India RRM Radical Religious Movement RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh RTI Right to Information SAs Scheduled Areas SCs Scheduled Castes SP Samajwadi Party SRC States Reorganization Commission STs Scheduled Tribes SVEEP Strategic Voter’s Education and Electoral Participation TAC Tribal Advisory Committee TDP Telugu Desam Party TMC Trinamool Congress TSP Tribal Sub-plan UCC Uniform Civil Code UHC Universal health coverage UP Uttar Pradesh UPA United Progressive Alliance VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad WHO World Health Organization

Introduction Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey

The liberalization of the economy in the 1990s brought about major changes in the politics and state in India. The structural adjustment programme, privatization and globalization of the Indian economy paved the way for new aspirations and changed the country’s political discourse. The 2014 general election and the massive win of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have led to the unprecedented consolidation and mobilizations of voters in many decades. The growing aspirations of the people, particularly the middle class, have put enormous pressure on the state’s institutions. In these contexts, one needs to study the dynamism of Indian politics through and also beyond its constitution, legislation and political institutions. They continue to play a pivotal role in Indian politics. However, to develop a broader understanding of Indian politics and its processes, one must engage with the ‘grassroots movements’ and civil society organizations (Chatterjee, 2004). This volume explores the key ideas, foundations, continuities, major shifts and challenges to the state and democracy in modern India. Indian politics has been a fascinating area of scholarship since the beginning of our republic. Initial studies focused on the constitution, laws, institutions, followed by the studies on parties, leaderships and ideologies. Still, some others have explored ‘non-party’ political formulations and social movements. However, most of these studies hardly capture the major shifts and transformations in the functioning of the state and politics in India, particularly since the 1990s. The growing faith in institutions such as the Supreme Court, Election Commission of India (ECI) and Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have been the outcome of the political process started in the 1990s. Another significant development has been coalition governments, which strengthened the core objective of India’s federal polity based on the principle of ‘self and shared rule’. Two major alliances of political parties – National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) – alternatively provide much-desired political stability at the centre after the brief preclude of uncertainties and anxieties. Political alignments, re-alignments and pragmatism began to matter more in understanding and explaining Indian politics and its various dynamics. There have been a significant rise and the dominance of the BJP and the gradual decline of the Indian National Congress DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-1

2  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey (INC). Democracy is often equated in India with the regular conduct of the free and fair election. Elections have become a legitimizing mechanism for the ruling class, and the market began to dominate the economic and political life of the nation. An active and vibrant civil society organizations and social movements in have shaped the politics in the country in a very distinct ways. They have played an important role in the enactment of legislation such as the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006, Right to Information Act (RTI) 2005, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005, National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013, and the Right to Education Act (RTE), 2009. These enactments have heralded a ‘right-based framework of governance’ in the country. The Nature and Ideology of the Indian State Since the 1990s but more specifically since the 2014 general election, the nature and ideology of the Indian state have shifted decisively from a ‘secular, left-of-the-centre’ state revolving around the politics, programmes and the ideology of the Congress party towards a ‘Hindu majoritarian, right-ofthe-centre’ state revolving around the politics, programmes and the ideology of the BJP – a hegemonic force in Indian politics today. Rooted in liberal constitutional ideals of democracy, the post-independent Indian state is committed to establishing an inclusive and representative form of government, protecting the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of the citizen and promoting socio-economic development of the people, particularly the marginalized communities. The objective of the post-independent Indian state has been to ‘wipe each tear from each eye’ (Nehru (2011 [1947]), Tryst with Destiny, August 15, 1947). So we have a powerful, development-oriented, interventionist state with an uncompromising commitment to a liberal institutional governance framework. The assessments of the Indian state by scholars such as Palmer (1962), Morris-Jones (1964), Rudolph and Rudolph (1967 [1999]) and Kothari (1970b) are rooted in this liberal – democratic institutional framework of the Indian state even when they engage with the questions of caste, religion, tradition and modernity. The Indian state, in such analyses, also appears to be an agent of modernization. Hence, it was an ‘interventionist state’ in the analysis of Rudolph and Rudolph (1987). The best articulated and widely discussed interpretation of the functioning of the Indian state in the initial decades after independence was Kothari’s argument about a ‘congress system’. It was a Congress-dominated system run by an elite committed to modernizing the society and bringing about socioeconomic transformations (Kothari, 1970a). The Marxist analyses of the Indian state have been based on examining its class character. Although it was difficult to identify the hegemony of a particular class on state structure given the relative autonomy of the Indian state, these scholars argued about a coalition of dominant classes, including the landed elites, and how state machinery operates to further their

Introduction  3 interests. Pranab Bardhan (1984) identified capitalists, rich farmers and the bureaucracy as the constitutive of India’s dominant classes. Similarly, Achin Vanaik’s (1990) assessment of India as ‘bourgeois democracy’ is based on a dominant coalition model in which the agrarian bourgeoisie plays a significant role. This role of the landed elites, rich farmers and agrarian capitalists, was also highlighted by Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), who called them ‘bullock capital’, and Varshney (1995). Indira Gandhi and her rhetoric of Garibi Hatao in the 1970s ushered in a new era of state politics in India. The decades of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the gradual decline of the Congress party in many states in India. However, it remains a dominant force at the centre. Indira Gandhi emphasized state socialism through the centralization of power, which led to clashes between institutions such as the Parliament and the Judiciary, an eventual declaration of Emergency in 1975, and the first non-Congress Janata government formation at the centre. These changes led to the reassessment of the Indian state and democracy. The growing tensions between the state and society paved the way for new kinds of social movements. Rajni Kothari (1984) began to argue about the ‘non-party political formulations’ for the deepening of democracy in the country. There was a newfound confidence in social-grassroot movements and civil society organizations as guardians and harbingers of democratic change. In such analyses, the state was seen as not only weak but also obstructive in its democratic progress. Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) capture these tensions in their widely referred formulations of ‘command’ and ‘demand’ polity. Here, ‘demand’ polity refers to societal pressures exerted through elections on state politics, whereas ‘command’ polity refers to the prevailing hegemonic status of the state over society. Atul Kohli (1991), while putting forth his thesis of ‘crisis of governability’ highlighted the growing decay in India’s democratic institutions. Similarly, Frankel and Rao (1990) argued that one of the marked distinctions of India’s politics since independence had been the growing influence of formerly lower caste groups in Indian politics vis-à-vis attempts by the upper castes and middle class to protect their interests. This thesis of the rise of lower castes in Indian politics is further developed by Jaffrelot (2003) in his argument on the rise of Other Backward Class (OBC) leadership in Indian politics as ‘India’s silent revolution’. Sudipta Kaviraj (1989), in ‘A Critique of the Passive Revolution’, argued about the rotational decline and dominance of India’s capitalist classes, the landed elites and the bureaucraticmanagerial elite within the overall framework of the passive revolution of capital. The structural adjustment programmes, also known as economic reforms, or ‘reforms’ of the 1990s, ushered in a new phase of Indian politics (Gupta & Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). There emerges a near consensus on the withdrawal of the state from ‘the commanding heights of the economy’. Its excessive control and regulation were seen as a major blockage in realizing India’s proper economic growth and development potential. The state’s role

4  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey has changed into a ‘regulator’ and ‘facilitator’. The growing literature on the state in India have studied its welfare politics, compulsions and impact of coalition governments and the growing importance of state-level provincial politics. Many commentators have begun to argue that the theatre of politics has shifted to states ushering in the significance of state politics in Indian politics (Manor, 2016; Yadav & Palshikar, 2009). Thus, the focus of study has shifted towards state’s chief ministers and regional parties (Roy et al., 2017). As the Modi government came to power at the centre in 2014 and repeated its victory in 2019 with a bigger margin, one observes a growing concern about the nature and ideology of state and liberal democracy in India (Ganguly, 2020; Jaffrelot, 2021; Khosla  & Vaishnav, 2021). These concerns have been echoed by domestic and foreign observers such as Freedom House and V-Dem Institute on the state of democracy in the country. They have begun to categorize India as an ‘ethno-electoral democracy’, ‘illiberal democracy’ or ‘majoritarian turn’ in Indian democracy. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), along with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), farms bills enactments and repeal, manner and context of the abrogation of Article 370 related to Jammu and Kashmir, and the ways in which Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 and sedition charges are levelled against the dissenters have raised concerns about the nature and functioning of state and democracy in India. However, other developments in recent years seem to suggest that the Indian state is expanding and reaching out to the targeted groups more effectively by harnessing technology. Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile (JAM) trinity appears to be a game changer in the delivery of services. To a great extent, direct benefit transfer has effectively tackled the problems of middlemen in the delivery of welfare programmes to the poor. Akhil Gupta (2012) has rightly observed that ‘one could hardly accuse the state of inaction towards poor: it would be difficult to imagine a more extensive set of developmental interventions in the fields of nutrition, health, education, housing, employment, sanitation, and so forth than those found in India’. Nayar (2009) has also argued about the ‘myth of shrinking state’ in India, considering the extensive role it continues to play in the lives of its citizens. Politics around welfare programmes has led to a new assessment of voting behaviour based on ‘patron – client relations’ (Evans & Heller, 2018). Apart from Hindutva and hyper-­nationalism, Modi’s government’s success are also because of its effective delivery of welfare programmes to the poor. Yamini Aiyar (2019) has articulated how Modi’s success in recent years has been through the consolidation of welfare programmes. The Indian state has entered a phase of what many commentators have argued ‘development deadlocks’ (Chandra, 2015; Ruparelia et  al., 2011; Nielsen & Oskarsson, 2016). Chandra has highlighted the growing significance of industrial capital, which ‘sets the terms to which other political formations can only respond’. She has rightly argued how the ‘patronage-based

Introduction  5 relationship between the state and private sector’ that characterized the preliberalization Indian economy continues to survive in the post-­liberalization phase (Chandra, 2015). From special economic zones to land acquisition and transfer to profit-making private capital to outright selling of public sector undertakings to private capital for effective management, state in India is driven by the formula of ‘state has no business to be in the business’, often repeated by the present Prime Minister Modi. This has, however, faced enormous resistance and protests from various segments of the Indian population – civil rights organizations, non-governmental organizations, the National Alliance of People’s Movement (NAPM), tribals in Odisha and Jharkhand and even several mainstream political parties such as Trinamool Congress. In this regard, year-long anti-CAA protests across the country and sustained farmer agitations that forced the government to repeal three farm laws signify the growing tensions between the state – facilitating industrial growth and development – and their resistance at the societal level. These shifts have initiated a debate about the nature of Indian democracy. Federal Structure: From Greater Federalization to Centralization In the post-1990 era, there has been greater federalization of the Indian polity. However, since 2014, this trend is said to have reversed, and there has been more centralization of power. A crucial judgment by the Supreme Court in the S. R. Bommai v. Union of India case (1994), fragmentation in the party system and the adoption of economic liberalization policies have been among the important factors for the greater federalization of India in the post-1990 era. However, this process has been reversed to a great extent after the 2014 general election and the formation of the Narendra Modi-led BJP government at the centre. It is noteworthy that the roots of the post-independence Indian federal structure can be traced back to the Government of India Act, 1935, enacted by the colonial government. After independence, moderate features of the 1935 Act were incorporated into the new Constitution of 1950. Due to Partition, certain elements related to the centralization of power gained prominence, primarily expressed through the idea of planning. However, in the 1967 general election, though the INC saved its power in the centre, it lost Legislative Assembly elections in many states. It transitioned from a planned development model to a ‘cooperative bargaining’ model (Dhavan & Saxena, 2004; Saxena, 2020). In the context of the journey of the Indian Constitution, the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala case (1973) has an important place. In its judgment, the Supreme Court of India clarified that the Parliament of India could not change/amend the ‘basic structure’ of the Indian Constitution, and there is no doubt that the federal structure is one of the most crucial parts of the basic structure doctrine. However, it is also true that most amendments made to date have affected the federal system in India (Saxena, 2020, p. 2).

6  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey Indian federalism has witnessed a few crucial and concurrent changes in the 1990s. First, the transformation of the one-party system into a multiparty system gave regional political parties more power. The period of the coalition government, with the combined effects of Bommai’s judgment (1994), slowed down the misuse of Article 356 by the central government. Also, the central government’s intervention in the state-level legislative process has decreased in the post-1990 era, and compared to the previous era, there is a sharp decline in the governors’ exercise of power to reserve a provincial bill for considerations of the president (Singh  & Saxena, 2013). Second, from 1991 onwards, India formally adopted the policies of economic liberalization and a market-oriented economy and gradually shed the mixed economy model adopted after the Independence (Pai, 2013; Singh & Saxena, 2011). Indeed, economic liberalization had gradually started in the previous decades, but the formal change happened after the economic crisis of 1990. These neoliberal policies have significantly changed the ‘political economy of Indian federalism. These policies have created a situation where union government have started to give importance to the needs and demands of market forces and civil society institutions. In the post-1990-era coalition governments, it became imperative to consult with state governments about centrally sponsored schemes (Saxena, 2020, p. 4). Interestingly, Dua and Singh (2003) have argued that there is a mutual reinforcement between federalism and neo-economic reforms, and that they together augment the autonomy of state governments and the domestic/global private sector. It is also important that economic liberalization ended the states’ total dependence on the union government for resources, and different states can cater to their investment needs from diverse sources. In other words, states started to proclaim their rights in the conduct of foreign policy to expand their economy through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) investment. (Singh  & Saxena, 2013). Third, with the enactment of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in the Indian Constitution in 1992, the framework of Panchayati Raj and municipalities was adopted. They have added a third tier in the Indian federal structure and consolidated multi-level federalism (Saxena, 2020, p. 3). After the 2014 general election, the BJP got a full majority on its own, and the NDA formed the government at the centre under the leadership of Narendra Modi. The NDA returned to power again after the 2019 general elections with a majority. However, now that the country is headed by its first single-party, the BJP, with a parliamentary majority, the evidence suggests that while India is not becoming a unitary state, it also does not appear to be moving closer to ‘co-operative competitive federalism’ (Swenden, 2020, p. xviii). Although the Modi government has emphasized the idea of ‘co-operative federalism’ as its primary goal, there are many examples that underscore that states’ powers have been curtailed. Many decisions by the Modi government have underlined some important changes in the federal structure of India. In this context, a few crucial points are as follows. First, the replacement of the Planning Commission with the National Institution

Introduction  7 for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog in 2015 has had substantial implications for shared rule and the nature of cooperative federalism in India. The cabinet resolution of 1 January 2015, which led to the birth of NITI Aayog, declared the ‘shared vision of national development priorities, sectors and strategies with the active involvement of the state in the spirit of co-operative federalism’ as the central objective of NITI Aayog. It is often accused of using NITI Aayog to coordinate a strategy among BJP-led state governments show non-BJP ruled state governments in poor light. Second, another significant change in the structure of tax reforms is the shift from the value added tax (VAT) to the goods and services tax (GST), which seeks to make India a common national market, with the GST Council comprising the union finance minister as the chair and state finance ministers as members, with two-third votes for the states block, thus enshrining the spirit of co-operative federalism. Third, most significantly, the enactment of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019, an abrogation of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution (an asymmetrical provision), has reorganized the federal structure in India. Indeed, it underlines that the Parliament and central government can change the constitutional provisions related to a particular state without consulting it. It is a clear example of central unilateralism. Fourth, the Congress-led government formed the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, despite states’ concerns that it would undermine their constitutional powers such as maintaining law and order. Fifth, although the BJP-led government, since 2014, has upheld some crucial asymmetries (such as the Fifth Schedule and Sixth Schedule), it has been attempting to use the president’s rule to dismiss politically hostile state governments such as Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh. In a nutshell, one could argue that the central government is not necessarily acting in a cooperative manner. However, the federal balance of forces is still sustained, as in some states, regional parties have held their ground and stymied the extension of the BJP in parts of southern, eastern and western India. Federalism in India has been both competitive and collaborative, and the need of the hour is to strengthen cooperative and intergovernmental relations (Saxena, 2020, p. xxiii). The new issues – ranging from water laws and the environment to land rights, climate change, energy policy, the conflict between development and the environment, urban governance, fiscal governance, fiscal equalization, metropolitan governance and designing an immigration and integration policy – are what form part of the governance deficit. Party System and India’s Political Processes Political parties are modern institutions and play a significant role in modern democracies. It functions as a mediating link between the state/government and citizens/society. Parties influence the decisions and policies of the government, keeping in mind the demands and aspirations of citizens. The Indian

8  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey party system is a dynamic system with the existence of multiparty representing all spectrum of ideology from the extreme left to the extreme right and is based on social cleavages in the society – caste, class, region, religion, language and ethnicity. These parties remain a key link between the citizens and the government (Bhambri 1968; Diwakar, 2017; Suri, 2005; Palshikar et al., 2014). The party system in India has evolved from a one-party dominating system to a vibrant and highly competitive multiparty system. However, many scholars argue that there is again a new phase in the party system in India with the hegemonic status of the BJP, particularly after its decisive victories in 2014 and the most recently held 2019 elections (Chhibber & Verma, 2019; Palshikar, 2018; Vaishnav & Hintson, 2019). However, it cannot be claimed conclusively that the BJP has acquired the status of a system-defining party, as the Congress did in the initial decades after Independence. The party system in India can be divided into the following four phases. In the first phase (1952–67), characterized as a ‘Congress system’, there was absolute domination of the Congress party both at the central level and in most of the states. However, the inner functioning of the Congress party was based on consensus through accommodating various interest groups. In the second phase (1967–1989), a shift in party politics emerged as a serious challenge to the Congress party in various states, and the party system at the state levels gradually moved towards bipolarization of the state party system. In the third phase (1989–2014), there has been a pattern of fragmentation (mainly out of the Janata Party – the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), the Samajwadi Party (SP), the Janata Dal (United), the Janata Dal (Secular) and the Biju Janata Dal – but also out of the Congress – the Nationalist Congress Party, the All India Trinamool Congress and the Yuvajana Shramika Rythu Congress) and the growth of the multiparty system in India. There was political instability due to the coalition governments, as no party could get the majority on its own. Later, two major blocks – NDA and UPA –) provided much-needed political stability. This phase also coincided with the systematic decline of the Congress party, both in terms of vote share and seat share (Hasan, 2002; Sridharan, 2017; Yadav, 1999). The fourth phase (since 2014) witnessed the revival of oneparty domination and the hegemonic status of the BJP. Indeed, the BJP is the first non-Congress party to have won a majority on its own in 2014 and repeated it with a bigger margin of victory in the 2019 general election. It is also in power in more than half of the Indian states. In recent decades, both its geographical expansion and its ability to attract every segment of Indian society, including the OBCs, SCs and STs, have been phenomenal. To a great extent, it has managed to bridge the caste and other social cleavages, with the notable exception of the Muslim minority, by mobilizing the population around the issues of Hindutva, nationalism and development/ welfarism. The BJP’s electoral and ideological hegemony since the general election of 2014 is well established (Chhibber & Verma, 2019; Palshikar, 2018; Vaishnav & Hintson, 2019).

Introduction  9 Yadav and other scholars have argued about the development and normalization of what they consider a ‘post-Congress polity’ in India since 1989. They see Congress primarily as a spent force and should leave the opposition space for the other parties to challenge the BJP, which Congress fails to do. There is traction for such an argument. However, it is yet to be seen which of the other political parties or party formulations could replace the Congress. Even in its worst performance, Congress enjoy 19 per cent of the vote share. However, it won only 44 seats in the parliament (2014 general election). If one compares it with the BJP in the 2009 general election, one finds that the BJP had about 18 per cent of the vote share. However, it won 116 seats. This was due to the concentration of its vote share in the Hindi belt, or north-western India, whereas Congress votes were spread across the country. Hence, even with a 19 per cent vote share, it won only 44 seats. Other than that, many scholars have also argued about the significance of the ideology that Congress party represents, even in its humiliating electoral defeats. The volatility of electoral politics in India has many possibilities. Many regional opposition parties share the ideological moorings of the Congress party, but lack all India’s reach. Thus, Congress has a vital role in India’s electoral democracy in the foreseeable future. The evolution of the party system in India can be argued to have coincided with the democratization and state-building processes. One of India’s party systems’ defining features is that they reflect the social complexities and cleavages along caste, religion, ethnicity and regional lines. This has paved the way for the growth of the multiparty system in India. As we have already discussed, the party system in India is characterized by its different phases of evolution. At present, the party system in India is dominated by the BJP. Indian political parties and party systems are still evolving. Newer political formulations are still taking place, and the latest entrant in the political process is the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in 2013. Moreover, despite their various challenges and deficiencies, political parties provide ample choice to the Indian electorate. They have also played an important role in ensuring that the party in power is accountable to the people and that social conflict and tensions are resolved within the parliamentary framework of discussion, accommodation and compromise. Zoya Hasan (2002) has rightly argued that Indian political parties neither fit into the liberal democratic model of party systems in the USA or Europe nor India’s traditional social divisions or hierarchies. Indian political parties display numerous contradictory features. They tend to blend or mix ‘different forms of modern democratization and participatory politics with indigenous practices and institutions.’ The country’s many challenges and ills of ­democracy can be more effectively addressed by reforming the political parties. However, to a certain extent, politicians and general public feel that party reforms are inconsequential even when the Law Commission and ECI have put forward a report for reforming the structure and functioning of political parties.

10  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey Law Commission on Party Reforms The 170th Report of the Law Commission states that, If democracy and accountability constitute the core of our constitutional system, the same concepts must also apply to and bind the political parties which are integral to parliamentary democracy. The political parties form the government, man the Parliament, and run the country’s governance. It is, therefore, necessary to introduce internal democracy, financial transparency, and accountability in the working of the political parties. A political party that does not respect democratic principles in its internal working cannot be expected to respect those principles in the governance of the country. It cannot be dictatorship internally and democratic in its functioning outside. (Law Commission of India, n. d., Para 3.1.2.1) Source: http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch4.htm

The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) and Party Reforms In its report submitted in 2002, the National Commission for Review of the Working of the Constitution also recommends certain reform measures for the political parties. It recommended ‘compulsory registration of every political party or pre-poll alliance’. Moreover, for such registration, the following rules should be imposed: allegiance to the fundamental constitutional values; open door to all citizens irrespective of any distinctions based on caste or community; 30 per cent reservation for women in organizational positions of the party; compulsory maintenance of accounts and annual audit of the funds; and mandatory declaration of assets and liabilities by the candidate for filing nomination for Parliament or State Assembly elections. Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20150405034150/

Public Institutions and the Challenges of Governance Although elections and their analysis cover much of the public debates in the country, the role of public institutions in responding to the growing developmental and governance challenges is critical. However, for decades, the study of India’s public institutions’ nature and functioning remained at the margin of academic scholarship. Since the liberalization of the economy, there have been unprecedented changes in Indian society and the economy. How does

Introduction  11 the state function? What should be its role in the 21st century? How to make India a ‘high capacity’ state? What are its developmental and governance challenges? What is or should be the role of public institutions? How do they function or do not function? Questions of this kind have received less attention than they deserve. One of the reasons for that is, perhaps, a continuous cycle of elections in the country and government machinery seems to be ever in ‘election mode’ in one or the another part of the country. In contrast to the post-liberalization understanding of the ‘withdrawal of the state’, we observe the changing role of the state. Rudolph and Rudolph (2001) have correctly called this a shift from ‘interventionist to a regulatory state’. This regulatory state is far more decentralized, particularly after the passing of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, with panchayats and municipalities, despite their limited power and resources, becoming the third tier of the government. With a weak central government and political instability due to coalition governments from 1989 to 2014, the gravity of Indian politics has shifted towards regional or state politics with the increasing focus on identity politics and the question of representation. Institutions such as the Supreme Court, Election Commission of India (ECI), Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India have obtained much of the steam in the eyes of the general public. They were operating largely in a context when the executive or legislature at the centre was relatively weak or unstable. However, the recent victories of the BJP in national and provincial elections have shifted the focus back to national politics (Kapur et al., 2017; Palshikar, 2018; Chhibber & Verma, 2019). The market-driven economy and the rising middle class, with their growing aspirations, demand a new role for the state and its governing structure. These demands often echo in the euphoria of ‘New India’. The Modi government, through structural changes such as replacing the Planning Commission with NITI Aayog and greater devolution of funds to the states (from 32 to 42 per cent through the 14th Finance Commission), stresses upon ‘Team India’ and ‘Cooperative Federalism’ and has attempted to fulfil their aspiration. Its policies such as Make in India, Digital India, PM Gati Shakti, start-ups and the Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile trinity are conceptualized to herald a new dawn. However, how far these structural changes and policy measures have been able to achieve the mandated goal is not very clear. There emerges a greater centralization of power in the Prime Minister’s Office, which undermines the Cabinet system of government and erodes the Parliament’s power to question the government and hold it accountable. A weak opposition combined with a plying media, once a relatively robust fourth pillar of India’s democracy, raises serious concerns about the emerging trends in Indian democracy. So do the big tech companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, by amplifying certain groups, parties and ideologies while restraining others. There has been apprehension about the influence and ‘interference’ of new social media in India’s democratic processes. Regulating them and ensuring a level playing field for all the political parties would be another challenge for the Indian state.

12  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey A large section of the Indian population – nearly 265  million poor – depends on the Indian state to meet their most basic needs. Providing employment and, more importantly, quality jobs that the youth of the 21st century demand are the major challenges, besides sustaining growth and protecting the environment. Despite consensus around private capital, big industries have failed to create the required jobs. The Indian state has reduced the number of personnel in the bureaucracy, police and army. Thus, the creation of jobs is going to be a major challenge for the country. Another challenge is growing urbanization and stress over natural resources – land, water and energy. Contestation over them is set to affect the political dynamics in the country in the near future. Are our institutions ready and capable of tacking such challenges? In contrast to popular perception of the ‘crisis’ or ‘credibility issues’, scholars agree that performances of India’s public institutions have been somewhat mixed. They have shown remarkable tenacity in fighting natural disasters or pandemics, running highly effective space programmes, conducting censuses for 1.3 billion population or even conducting regular elections in a free and fair manner for more than 911  million eligible voters (2019 general election). However, when it comes to providing basic services such as health and education or even managing law and order, their performance has been far from satisfactory. Kapur and Mehta (2006) and Kapur et al. (2017) examine the performance of selected public institutions over a decade. Together, these two volumes provide an in-depth analysis of the evolution and functioning of public institutions in India and the challenges they confront. Similarly, recent works of Pai (2020) provide a detailed and critical analysis of major public institutions, including major structural changes implemented in recent decades. Mathur (2013), while highlighting the importance of public institutions in the country, examines policymaking in India as not just a ‘rational decision-making and technical optimality’ exercise but an arena of ‘conflict and contestation resolved through processes of negotiation and compromises’. The book by Kapur and Khosla (2019) is India’s first comprehensive study of regulatory frameworks. It examines – how the development of regulation in India has altered the nature and functions of the state; how it is reshaping the relationship between business and the state; how it has called for the refashioning of established legal principles; and how it has raised new questions about the relationship between technical expertise and the rule of law. They examine the inadequacy of existing regulatory and administrative framework and the challenges of governing and regulating sectors such as securities markets, banking, telecom, energy, the environment, food and big data. Thus, the challenges that India faces in the 21st century are very different. Whether the Indian state and its public institutions develop the capacity to tackle them remains an open-ended question. India may take legitimate

Introduction  13 pride in the functioning of its institutions such as the Supreme Court, ECI, Comptroller and Auditor General and the institutions of local self-government. However, these institutions are not free from the structural constraints and other malaises that characterize other public institutions in India. The Supreme Court asserted its independence in the 1970s and has become the most powerful court globally by acquiring powers not envisaged by the framers of the Indian Constitution. It has acquired the power to review even constitutional amendment acts through the judicial innovation of ‘the basic structure doctrine. It asserted this independence once again when in 2015, it struck down Clause 124A of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, as unconstitutional. Thus, by retaining the collegium system of judicial appointments, it refuses to shed its autonomy. Through the mechanism of judicial activism, Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and a liberal interpretation of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) of the Indian Constitution, it tried to fill the vacuum created by other organs of the Indian state. However, its primary role of adjudicating has been questioned when there are 31  million case backlogs in the Indian judiciary. In the Supreme Court alone, this number is close to 65,000. Thus, in the backdrop of such huge case backlogs, venturing into the domains of the legislature and executive has been seen by many commentators as ‘judicial overreach’. Similarly, with all its power, the Supreme Court has failed to adjudicate pressing issues such as the legitimacy of electoral bonds, the constitutionality of abrogation of Article 370 or the passing of CAA. These developments have led to many apprehensions among critical observers about the promises and delivery of the Supreme Court of India on important matters (Kapur et al., 2017; Pai, 2020). The ECI is truly a professional and widely respected institution in the country, admired worldwide. It has not only conducted elections regularly in a free and fair manner but also initiated major reforms and proactive initiatives to reach out to the last remaining voters. Since the 1990s, beginning with T. N. Seshan, the ECI has forced the candidates to declare their assets and criminal cases pending against them to bring about transparency and ‘clean’ politics in the country. Its initiatives such as Systematic Voters’ Education and Electoral Participation (SVEEP), 2012, ‘none of the above’ and Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), 2013 have enthused technology in managing electoral politics in the country. Similarly, its monitoring of model code of conduct violations and electoral campaign expenditure by the parties and candidates, setting the limits, has made it one of the most trusted public institutions in the country. Although there are recent allegations of partisan biases against the ECI, it has maintained a high degree of confidence among the common people. However, despite these achievements, the ECI has failed to tame the criminalization of politics and enforce transparency in election funding – two of the major concerns for Indian democratic politics and processes (Kapur et al., 2017; Pai, 2020; Singh & Roy, 2019). The functioning of the Indian Parliament and state legislatures – the ­quality of debate, continuous disruptions, the manner in which the legislation is

14  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey enacted and their inability to hold the government accountable – have raised serious concerns about the abilities of these representative bodies to raise the voices of the people effectively. Criminalization of politics and defections has also eroded the sanctity of the Parliament. The present Modi government, using its brute majority and taking the ‘money bill route’ on key legislation, has done little to change this depressing mood in the country about the Indian Parliament. Disruptions have replaced discussions and debates. India’s other institutions, such as the governor’s office, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Income Tax Department are not free from partisan charges. Bureaucracy, courts and police at lower levels are far more compromised. Moreover, in the absence of their effective functioning, there has been the rise of musclemen politicians and public representatives in the northern states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP), with their ‘Robinhood’ image of addressing the issues concerning people when state institutions have failed. Thus, the scale of criminalization of politics is in direct proportion to the capacity of the state institutions. There are various reasons for the underperformance of public institutions. Understaffing, a financial burden and resource crisis ails day-to-day administration in the country, from the lower judiciary to police, bureaucracy and basic services such as health and education. Their autonomy and professionalism are also compromised due to undue manipulation and interference by the politicians and how they treat the personnel of these institutions through patronage and punishment. Therefore, instead of developing professionalism and constitutional propriety, the top officials have developed an attitude of not irking the political bosses. Many of them join the politics or government or seek post-retirement lucrative postings and benefits. In such circumstances, professionalizing these institutions and preparing them for 21st century challenges would be a daunting task (Kapur et al., 2017; Pai, 2020; Mathur, 2013). Secularism: An Idea Under Severe Attack India is a multicultural and multi-religious society, and religion and cultural idioms play a crucial role in society. Secularism is often termed as an alien idea for Indian society. However, it is crucial to note that Indian secularism does not follow a strict absence or separation of religion from politics, like in the USA or in France. Instead, it emphasizes equal respect and opportunity for individuals of all religious identities and therefore rejects any discrimination on religious grounds. The word ‘secularism’ was included in the ‘Preamble’ of the Indian Constitution after the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976. However, the Indian Constitution has many provisions that underline the Constitution’s resilient secular basis and a consensus among most of these provisions emerged during the freedom struggle. Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion, descent, caste, sex or place of birth. Article 25 declares that every citizen of India has freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess

Introduction  15 and practice their religion, ‘subject to public order, health and morality’. Articles 25 to 28 provide freedom of conscience and unrestricted acceptance of religion, conduct and propagation. Article 29 states that the state shall not impose any culture on any minority religious communities other than their own culture. Article 30 provides that minority religious communities will have the right to establish and administer their own educational institutions, and the state will not discriminate against any educational institutions run by minority communities in providing any assistance to them. The idea of secularism has faced many challenges and criticism in the post1990 era. Indeed, the contestation started in the 1980s for various reasons, particularly due to the emergence of the Ram Mandir movement. The BJP – Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh RSS used it to mobilize Hindus, and in this process, their leaders also severely attacked the idea of secularism. The Rajiv Gandhi government opened the gates of Babri Masjid, and he also promised to build Ram Mandir. It overturned the Supreme Court judgment in the Shah Bano case to satisfy conservative Muslim organizations. In this judgment, the Supreme Court directed Shah Bano’s husband to give her alimony. Many conservative Muslim organizations opposed this decision, and the government passed an Act to overturn the Supreme Court judgment. Many people criticized this decision. However, the BJP – Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh leadership used to term Indian secularism as ‘pseudo-secularism’, which, according to them, was based on the appeasement of minorities, particularly Muslims, and demanded the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) for all communities of the country. Later, in the 1990s, majoritarian politics led to the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992. It is worth mentioning that a very engaging debate has emerged among the Indian intellectuals and social scientists in the 1990s about the limitations and uniqueness of Indian secularism. Ashis Nandy contends that this ‘modern Western rational-scientific secularism’ introduced in India by Nehru has failed to eliminate or separate religion from politics, and hence, this form of secularism cannot guide moral or political actions. Instead, it opens space for religious bigotry and communalism, the ideas which Nehruvian secularism claims to eliminate entirely from the public domain. Secularism has failed as an ideology, and religious bigotry and communalism can only be fought by following the path shown by Gandhi (Nandy, 1985). T. N. Madan has also stated that both religion and politics have equal importance, and therefore, it would be unfair to separate them from each other. Supporting the views of Gandhi, Madan says that Gandhi’s ideas emphasize the confluence of religion and politics, and at the same time, he believes in Sarva Dharma Sama Bhava (Equal Respect for All Religions), which also promotes inter-religious tolerance. Secularism in South Asia can only be successful if we take both religion and secularism seriously. Religion should not be criticized just because it has superstition, and secularism should not be treated as only a tool to fight communalism, nor should it be used for any other benefit (Madan, 1987). Partha Chatterjee argues that secular terminology is inadequate and incapable of countering

16  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey Hindu majoritarianism, and instead, he proposes the idea of ​​religious tolerance. He said that due to religious fanaticism, tolerance among various religious communities is eroding, and that is why there is violence, mobilization of masses on religious grounds and so on. Secularism has failed to establish tolerance among the people, due to which Hindu majoritarianism is spreading its roots in India (Chatterjee, 1994). Rajiv Bhargava strongly denies the criticism of secularism and argues that Indian secularism should not be compared to the Western notion because Indian secularism is different from the ​​Western concept of secularism. Bhargava (1994) says that in the Indian model of secularism, the state maintains a ‘principled distance’ between religions. Although the debate in the second part of the 1980s and 1990s enriched the academic arguments related to the limitations, challenges and uniqueness of Indian secularism, the march of communal and majoritarian politics was successful in turning secularism into a negative word for a large section of the Indian population. Majoritarian politics was one of the critical factors in making Narendra Modi an acceptable face in the BJP; he combined communal politics with the populist idea of ‘development’. In post-2014 general election, some crucial trends emerged in the context of Indian secularism. First, the success of the majoritarian politics of the BJP has created a situation where other parties have also been compelled to develop their version of Hindutva. Many scholars have described it as ‘soft Hindutva’, which is also dependent on the majority religious symbolism. Second, secularism has been successfully turned into a negative word by the supporters of majoritarian politics and a large part of the media. Third, the minority groups, particularly Muslims, have been targeted to mobilize the Hindu ‘majority’ in many parts of the country, particularly during the election. Fourth, in recent years, renewed criticism has also started regarding secularism’s practice and ideological positioning. For example, Abhay Kumar Dubey (2019) has pointed out that the ignorance and arrogance of secular ideologies resulted in the weakening of secular principles and politics in India. He underlines that the supporters of secularism did not focus on the changing nature of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh politics, and they saw some caste-based identity politics as the solution to majoritarian politics. There is no doubt that challenges to the idea of secularism in Indian politics have increased in the recent years. However, it is also true that not only the Preamble but many other key articles of the Indian Constitution clearly express the secular nature of the Indian state. So not only the Indian state but also different political parties must behave according to the spirit of the Constitution and protect the secular ethos of the country. Caste Politics: Increasing Differentiation and Interaction with Hindutva Initially, caste was considered a negative and contradictory aspect of understanding the workings of a modern phenomenon like democracy because

Introduction  17 caste is a traditional institution and representative democracy is a modern phenomenon. However, many scholars and theorists have gradually started to present various theoretical tools to understand the role of caste in Indian politics. To describe the dynamic relationship between caste and the representative democracy, Rudolph and Rudolph (1967) used the term ‘modernization of tradition’, which implies the changing nature of the traditional organization of caste due to the interaction with modern ideas like democracy, which contributed to the success of political democracy. Rajni Kothari emphatically argues that those who complain about ‘casteism in politics’ are either conceptually unclear about the nature of politics or the nature of the caste system. It is not the casteism in politics but the politicization of caste. In this process, both the forms of caste and politics are brought nearer, and changes occur (Kothari, 1970b). The democratic processes in India gradually politicized many marginalized groups, and these groups started to assert their claims over political power. In South India, many states experienced an anti-caste solid movement in the pre-independence era, which resulted in the emergence of backward castes in a state like Tamil Nadu much before North Indian states. In North India, Ram Manohar Lohia played a crucial role in the mobilization of backward castes, and during the anti-Emergency movement, many backward caste students participated in the JP movement. After the Emergency, when non-­Congress governments were formed, many leaders from marginalized sections got representation. In the 1980s, due to the rule of the Congress party in the centre and different states, although leaders from these sections did not get leading roles, their numbers increased in the Legislative Assemblies in states like Bihar. Similarly, Ambedkar’s movement did not result in the formation of a successful party in the early decades of independence. However, later, his ideas played a pivotal role in social resistance against caste discrimination and the mobilization of Dalit castes behind the Bahujan Samaj Party in the 1990s (Vora, 2004). The implementation of Mandal Commission recommendations by V. P. Singh’s government in August  1990 played a vital role in the mobilization of castes coming under the category of OBCs in many states, particularly in UP and Bihar. It led to the emergence of strong OBC leaders such as Lalu Prasad Yadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav and Nitish Kumar in these states and increased the representation of backward castes in representative organs. The term ‘mandalization of politics’ was used to describe the emergence and strengthening of the position of the OBCs in the politics of North Indian states. Yogendra Yadav termed the phenomenon of the increase in participation and representation of the marginalized castes as ‘second democratic upsurge’ (Yadav, 1999). Though he accepts that this upsurge was limited to the Hindi belt, it was a mere catching-up of north India of the south. Christophe Jaffrelot has seen the emergence of the process of mobilization of OBC castes that started in the 1960s and termed their emergence in the 1990s in North Indian states as ‘Silent Revolution’, which according to him,

18  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey represents a genuine ‘democratization’ (Jaffrelot, 2003). Similarly, Javeed Alam (2004) underlines that the rural, poor and marginalized sections have adopted democracy as a means to express their voices more than the urban middle class and upper-caste people. In 1993, in the UP Legislative Assembly election, the SP and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) pre-election coalition defeated the BJP, which was expected to win the election based on the communal polarization after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Scholars like Rajni Kothari (1994) argued that caste identities could be an effective means to defeat communal politics. However, this did not happen for various reasons: First, due to different compulsions, political parties like the BSP allied with the BJP in UP; second, the BJP started the process of ‘social engineering’ and tried to expand its influence in the OBCs castes; third, OBCs parties have started to focus on caste majoritarianism and ‘populist’ issues, rather than the issues related to actual social change (Vora, 2004); and fourth, most of these parties turned into the fiefdom of one person/family, and they primarily focussed on dominant caste (for example RJD and SP on Yadavs). These limitations played an important role in expanding the BJP among OBCs and Dalit castes. The BJP’s strategy has been to focus on both the ‘Hindutva’ politics and caste arithmetic at the grassroots level. They played a crucial role in the historic success of the BJP in the 2014 general elections. Indeed, in the years after the 2014 general elections, certain aspects of the relationship between caste and politics have become more pronounced. The key features could be underlined in the following points. First, the BJP strengthened its attempt to create a social alliance of many OBCs and SCs castes, particularly the non-Yadav backward castes and nonJatav Dalit castes in UP, and the experiment has been successful in many elections. Second, Abhay Kumar Dubey has strongly criticized the leadership of parties such as SP and BSP for largely turning into parties of one dominant caste and overlooking the political aspirations of other smaller castes. Similarly, Badri Narayan (2021) argues that the BJP manages to mobilize caste communities quite effectively only because they take advantage of the gaps created by other caste-based parties, and that the BJP mobilized the ‘left-out castes’ and manages to gain electorally. Third, another key development is that, like in the pre-2014 era, the different political parties have tried to cater to the support of different castes by raising issues like the inclusion of a caste within a particular group. The reservation is increasingly being considered as a way to mitigate the negative consequences of poorly thought-out development initiatives. Both the ruling and opposition parties have focused on this strategy, which gives them ample opportunities to overlook the issues of fundamental economic changes (Palshikar, 2018). Fourth, is the increase in the number of smaller caste parties, which primarily claim to represent the interests of one caste. The leadership of such parties argues that the interests of their castes have been overlooked in the larger category of backward castes or Dalits because the parties that claimed to represent the interests of

Introduction  19 all groups were largely dominated by one caste. Many of these parties are bargaining with state or national-level parties for respectful representation of their castes in electoral politics. Indeed, caste is a relevant category to understand the changing nature of Indian politics, and politics has also changed castes and provided opportunities for marginalized castes to assert their claims on political power. However, it is also true that marginalized castes have turned into the parties of one person or one family in many parties that claim to represent politics. Also, the developments of Indian politics in the last three decades have underlined that caste-based parties are not the remedy for communal politics, which has shown the capacity to use different caste identities for its majoritarian political agenda. However, one cannot deny that the politicization of castes has created a sea change in the democratic politics of India, and it has provided representation to marginalized sections of society, and the process is still continuing. Gender: Growing Mobilization and Awareness for Equality The nature of the struggle for women’s rights has changed over the years. During the anti-colonial struggle, the Gandhian movement increased the participation of women in public life. Many women activists also raised issues related to social reforms of many anti-women practices and demanded political rights for women. In the early decades of the post-independence era, a fierce debate emerged regarding the Hindu Code Bill, which was prepared by then Law Minister, B R Ambedkar. Many conservative forces opposed this bill. Indeed, Ambedkar wanted to reform the ‘personal laws’ of all religions, but due to opposition to the Hindu Code Bill, he resigned from the Nehru Cabinet in 1951. Later, the Nehru government passed the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Rege, 2013). The famous 1974 report called Towards Equality played a crucial role in raising concern about the different issues related to women’s rights. With the help of data, this report underlined the marginalized and continuously deteriorating condition of women in the social, economic, and political spheres. Indeed this report played a crucial role in setting the agenda for women in the coming decades. Indeed, in the 1970s, women participated in the anti-Emergency movement and many grassroots movements like the Chipko Movement. In the post-Emergency era, women’s organizations mobilized women and other concerned sections using two methods. First, they supported the struggle of workers, tribals and other marginalized sections and tried to make their struggle more gender-sensitive. Second, many autonomous women’s organizations emerged, which worked on women’s specific issues, such as anti-rape laws and sexual harassment at workplaces. The issue of UCC and women’s reservation in legislative bodies also emerged, and in the following

20  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey decades, both these issues raised many complex questions within the women’s movement (Roy, 2010). Women’s organizations have been demanding UCC for many decades because the personal laws of almost all religions treat women as a secondary category. However, in the late 1980s, the Hindu right-wing organizations started to raise the issue of UCC as an example of Muslim appeasement, which compelled many women’s organizations to reconsider their views on this issue. Indeed, this issue remained a hotly debated topic in the post-1990 era, and still, Hindu right-wing forces raise this issue to mobilize the Hindu majority. Many feminist organizations began to treat this issue more cautiously. They support the idea of the UCC but do not want to strengthen the agenda of targeting minorities on this issue (Menon, 2012). The question of women’s reservation in the Parliament and Legislative Assembly has also been a contested issue, which re-ermerged in the late 1980s and remained an important topic of debate since then. It is interesting to note that, till the 1980s, women’s organizations never demanded such reservations in unequivocal voices. Indeed, this idea was not supported by the women’s organizations during the anti-colonial struggle, and even the Committee on the Status of Women in India, which prepared the Towards Equality report, rejected this idea with the majority. This issue emerged in the late 1980s, and many women’s organizations supported the idea of 33 per cent seat reservations for women in the Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies to ensure proper representation of women. It was first introduced in the parliament in June 1996 as the 81st Constitutional Amendment but could not be passed due to the severe opposition by SP and Janata Dal leaders. After that, the bill was introduced many times but could not pass due to strong opposition, particularly from backward caste leaders. They demanded a separate sub-quota for backward castes, Adivasis and Dalit women in the women’s reservation. It is noteworthy that the bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha as the 108th Constitutional Amendment in 2010 but could not be passed by the Lok Sabha (Hasan, 2018). It has been argued that the basic reason behind the opposition to women’s reservation is the fear of male MPs that they would lose their dominance. On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the demand for sub-quota is just and must be incorporated within the proposed women’s reservation in the legislative bodies (Menon, 2012). It is also crucial to note that the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments have granted 33 per cent reservation to women in panchayats and municipalities. The experience has shown that thousands of women became active in politics due to this provision. Initially, some were dependent on their husbands/fathers, but later they started to work independently. In the post-1990 period, the quest for a more gender-just society increased, and women’s organizations demanded various legal reforms to make the public and private lives of women more equal and secure. Apart from the

Introduction  21 issues mentioned earlier, the feminists also raised the issues of the right of women to enter places of worship, strict laws against sexual harassment at the workplace, access to assisted reproductive technologies, property rights and the right to love and sexual desires. After the Nirbhaya case (2012), the rape laws were made more stringent due to the pressure of different sections of society. The feminists have also advocated for the rights of lesbians, gays and the third-gendered people. In the post-2014 era, women’s politics continues to work around these issues. However, the right-wing version of women’s rights has also emerged more vociferously. Although it was present earlier, too, it was at the margin of the discourse. Many right-wing women’s organizations have started to criticize feminist activists and their ideas by claiming that they are inspired by Western thinkers and have no regard for Indian values. This version of women’s rights focuses more on Hindu religious values and tries to establish an unproblematic combination between Hindu traditions and some modern values (such as women’s rights to get an education and choose a career and life partner). Another crucial development is that the Modi government passed a law to declare ‘triple talaq’ illegal (Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019). This decision was questioned by various Muslim organizations, who claimed that such a law interferes with their religious matters. However, some Muslim women’s organizations also welcomed this decision. A Class Conundrum and Indian Politics The relevance of class to explain the dynamics in Indian society has been a contested issue. For example, Llyod and Susan Rudolph have argued in their analysis of the political economy of India in the late-1980s that class politics is not a strong determinant factor of political action in India. Class politics is marginalized in India because political parties do not get their electoral support or policy agenda from different classes or the organized representatives of workers or capital (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987). In contemporary politics, categories such as caste, religion, language and ethnicity play more crucial roles than class. However, it is also noteworthy that class is a crucial category for understanding the social life of any society, and it provides distinct insights into social reality. Indian society can be categorized into the following classes: working class, organized capital/big business, middle class and agrarian class. It is also true that there is an overlap between these classes; for example, a substantial number of the middle class could be included in the agrarian class or the working class, and many working-class members could be included in the middle class or agrarian class. Rudolph and Rudolph have mentioned that in India, the organized working class which is a potential actor in politics, faces diverse problems (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987, p. 24). In this context, it is now an established

22  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey fact that a large proportion of Indian labour power works in the informal sector. They do not have any security under labour laws and very little access to social security. According to Barbara Harris-White (2003, p. 5), 83 per cent of the total population works in the informal sector. Like in other parts of the world, economic liberalization in India resulted in the informalization of labour, which led to the decline in the proportion of workers of the organized sector in total labour power. Since the condition of the Indian ‘working class’ is diverse, it is hard to develop a common political class consciousness. It is also true that employment in a secure formal sector can create a privileged ‘labour aristocracy’ which will work for its safety and extension of security. A key obstacle to forming a radical proletariat is that the persons doing jobs in the formal sector work with the ambition of being ‘Petty Bourgeois’ (small capitalists). Workers are also mobilizing themselves in the formal sector, but this process is prolonged. Indeed, it would not be wrong to say that the workers have not been able to influence Indian politics with their identity as the ‘working’ class (Harriss, 2010). Organized capital has no clear or visible role in electoral politics, but undoubtedly it influences the politics and policies of the country. It is true that in the post-independence era, few private industries benefited due to the regulation of industries. However, the license and regulation system did not imply that the whole business was under the control of the state. In the age of globalization, the influence of industrialists has increased. However, it is also argued that only a few capitalists have benefitted from it. Overall, the influence of this class over the Indian state has increased, and the dependence of the political parties on this class for electoral donations has strengthened their position. The Indian middle class is really important due to its size and role in opinion-making on different issues. There is much internal differentiations within the middle class. In the Indian context, the middle class can be divided into three parts: first, the intermediary class whose members have capital and have influence at the local level. John Harriss has termed them as ‘pettybourgeois’. Second is the dominant section of the middle class; according to Fernandes and Hellar, those people are part of the dominant sections who have the professional capacity or accumulate cultural capital, and occupy posts of authorities in different sections. According to Deshpande, this section of the middle class expresses the hegemony of the ruling block of Indian society (Deshpande, 2003, pp. 139–142). This section of the middle class is dependent primarily on its cultural capital; in particular, it can use the English language and the cosmopolitan ways of upper castes. Fernandes and Hellar have described the members of this section of the middle class as ‘new middle class’. D. L. Sheth (1999) has also used this term to explain the increasing number of OBCs and SCs in the middle class. The third and largest part of the middle class is the subordinate middle class, which includes those salaried

Introduction  23 workers who have some educational capital but cannot use authority over other workers (Fernandes & Heller, 2006; Harriss, 2010). The fourth class is the agrarian class, which is also diverse and politically influential. India is still primarily an agricultural society, and it has presented a distinct class differentiation for an extended period. On the one hand, there are landless labourers in this class, and on the other hand, there are dominant peasants who give employment to landless labourers. Many observers have argued that the land reforms and the Green Revolution improved the condition of the agriculture sector, which led to class differentiation in rural areas. From that period onwards, it has been accepted that the political weight of those farmers who received the benefits of the modernization of agriculture increased. For example, Rudolph and Rudolph have termed them ‘bullock capitalists’ and underlined that their dominance has increased in Indian politics. This category includes those farmers who have land from 2.5 acres to 15 acres. They argue that this situation underlines that the agriculture economy is not class-based but divided into small groups (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987). However, John Harriss has emphasized the following points regarding the condition of the agricultural class at present: first, the differentiation and polarization of agrarian classes have almost stopped; second, the land is not the main basis for status and power, and it does not limit the possibility of livelihood of poor people; third, the dependence of poor people has decreased, but they have very little influence in the political arena (Harriss, 2010, pp. 145–6). The key changes in all the classes mentioned earlier in the post-2014 era could be expressed through the following points: First, due to policy disinvestment and ‘labour reforms’, the working-class population of both formal and informal sectors is facing grave challenges. The formal sector faces the danger of informalization, and informal sector workers have become more vulnerable due to the policy of giving more rights to employers. Second, though the overall influence of organized capital has increased, only a few capitalists have received the greatest benefits from the increasing privatization of government assets. In this sense, the centralization of capital has increased in the post-2014 era. Third, though the middle class is a very differentiated group, and the tendency to include new groups in the class continued, the one important section of this group has moved towards consumerism and is attracted towards right-wing ‘Hindutva’ politics. Fourth, the different segments of agrarian class face diverse kinds of problems. However, the small and landless peasants face an existential crisis, which has increased in the post-2014 era. With the support of other sections of the agrarian class, the rich farmers forced the Modi government to cancel its decision to implement three new farm laws. The Parliament passed these laws in 2020, and due to continuous protests of farmers outside Delhi and other parts of the country, the Modi government was forced to cancel them (Jha, 2022). Indeed, this example underlines the political weight of the agrarian class.

24  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey Chapters’ Outline This volume presents an in-depth analysis of various issues and challenges confronting the Indian state and politics since the 1990s, including the recent shifts in the post-2014 general election. It provides a comprehensive understanding of the Indian government and politics for undergraduate and postgraduate students and others interested in developing a critical understanding of Indian democracy and its recent developments. The contributors in the volume have first engaged with the available literature on their selected topic before presenting their own argument and interpretation. These chapters introduce the readers to the growing literature on a particular subject and help them develop a critical understanding of the Indian political process. This volume is divided into four sections, apart from an ‘Introduction’. The first section of the book includes chapters related to the philosophy and basic features of the Indian Constitution, the nature of the Indian state, institutions like the ECI and some key emerging trends such as populism and religious movements. Chapter  1 discusses the role and functioning of the constitution in modern democracies and critically engages with the making and politico-historical antecedents of the Indian Constitution, its philosophy and salient features. Chapter 2 presents a general overview of the nature and characteristics of the Indian state since Independence and critically examines the significant transformation it went through in the post-liberalization era. Chapter 3 aims to provide a historical understanding of the emergence of the idea of ‘populism’ and theoretical discussions related to it and also analyses the Indian experiences to understand the diverse expressions of populism. Chapter 4 deals with the nature of the resurgence of religion and religious movements in contemporary India and underlines that we need to understand religion through the religious movements. Chapter  5 discusses the constitutional powers of the ECI and emerging trends regarding its work of conducting free and fair elections. The second section consists of chapters related to the changing dynamics of institutions like the judiciary, parliament, and political parties. The chapters of this section present a comprehensive study of federal polity in India, right-based welfare laws, elections and voting behaviour, the present condition and the prospects of the INC and the growing hegemony of the BJP. Chapter 6 analyzes the SC’s jurisdiction, power and functioning since its inception. It also examines the recent debates surrounding judicial appointments in the context of the NJAC Act 2014 and increasing criticism of the collegium system. It discusses the changing role of the Supreme court over the years. Chapter 7 similarly examines the changing role of the Indian parliament. It discusses the composition, functions, and historical evolution of the Indian parliament over the last seven decades. Its role as a legislative and representative body representing the will and aspirations of the Indian citizens is critically analyzed. This chapter also examines the thesis on the ‘decline’ of the Indian parliament in the context of changing dynamics of Indian

Introduction  25 democracy. It argues that even when its function as the representative body has been satisfactory, its capacity to hold the executive accountable has been continuously declining. Chapter 8 examines the Indian model of federalism and its operational reality since Independence and explores the relationship between the nature of the party system and the functioning of Indian Federalism. Chapter 9 examines the emerging welfare regime in India through the lens of the rights-based approach. In this context, it evaluates the evolution and implementation of rights-based legislation such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, and the Right to Information Act, 2005. Chapter 10 discusses the trajectories and contemporary trends of electoral politics and voting behaviour in the country since the first general election in 1952. It examines the changing nature of elections and voting behaviour in India, emphasizing mainly the post-1990s development. Chapter 11 discusses the Congress Party and its position in the Indian party system and analyses how the two have evolved over the last seven decades. It also analyses the party’s dismal performance in recent years and discusses the prospects of its revival. Chapter 12 examines the phenomenal rise of the BJP in Indian politics. It underlines that the BJP’s rise in recent decades is the result of its ability to form a rainbow alliance with every segment of the Indian population and also its ability to successfully combine the ideologies of Hindutva, nationalism and welfarism. The chapters included in the third section of the book evaluate a few contested developments in Indian politics. These chapters present a detailed study of caste politics in India, the middle class in Indian politics, the tribal question, issues related to gender politics, contestations around the idea of secularism and the experiences and emerging trends of local self-government in India. Chapter 13 provides a comprehensive theoretical understanding of the relationship between caste and politics. It evaluates the changing dynamics of the role of politics in the caste after Independence and explores the complex development in recent years regarding the interaction between majoritarian politics and the politics of caste. Chapter 14 considers the historical processes of middle-class formation in modern India and evaluates its gradual expansion with the emergence of ‘new’ segments within it after independence. The chapter also focuses on the changing political preferences of the different sections of this class. Chapter 15 presents a critical evaluation of the colonial and post-colonial administration of tribal areas. Apart from evaluating the efficacy of the constitutional provisions and laws such as the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), 1996 and the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006, it also focuses on the different kinds of problems and challenges faced by tribals in contemporary India. Chapter 16 attempts to highlight the growing significance of the gender question in Indian politics by analysing the works and contributions of previous activists and organizations. It underlines that the issues ranging from child marriage to recognition of the third gender have affected the way we understand diverse family arrangements and their impact on Indian politics. Chapter 17

26  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey examines the status, controversy and various theories and criticisms of the concept of Indian secularism. Apart from this, the chapter also explores the concept and features of secularism in India and evaluates the ideological and authentic structures of Indian secularism. Chapter 18 discusses the trajectories of local self-government bodies in India. These institutions have gained significant importance after the passing of the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts to the Indian Constitution. A special focus of this chapter is to understand the post-2014 developments that have reshaped the working of these institutions. The fourth and concluding section of the book provides a comprehensive analysis of some of the key challenges to Indian democracy. The chapters included in this section deal with the concept of minority, the politics of ethnonationalism, the discourse of environment and development and the politics of the public health system in India. Chapter 19 tries to understand the postcolonial Indian debates on the idea of the minority in the backdrop of constitutional principles. It presents a comprehensive analysis of the diverse issues and debates related to the idea of the minority from the early decades after Independence to the second decade of the 21st century. The objective of Chapter 20 is to examine the historical conditions, causes and dynamics of ethnonational demands with a special focus on the states located in North-East India. It tries to present a comprehensive understanding of the causes, viability and outcome of such demands in India. Chapter 21 examines the discourse on the environment and development, examining its various issues and concerns broadly. It discusses the Acts or environmental laws in the post-colonial state at different points of time to prevent the environmental degradation and whether these laws have succeeded in preserving the environment. Chapter 22 discusses the diverse issues related to the politics of the health system in India. During the post-Independence era, the Indian state adopted a blended model of healthcare whereby public and private service providers participated in healthcare provisioning. The chapter underlines that while private healthcare facilities are growing across the country, it is imperative that they should provide healthcare within an affordable limit and also share the responsibility of ensuring healthcare to the poor, especially during the pandemic. Contemporary Trends and Issues Indian state and political process are undergoing major changes in the recent decades in terms of ideology due to the continuous decline of the Congress Party and the near-hegemonic status of the BJP and a vibrant pro-active civil society along with a politicized and aspirational citizenry. The conventional formula of making sense of Indian politics through caste, class, gender and minority rights, along with the questions of representations, social justice or secularism, have been found inadequate to understand these phenomenal changes in the Indian political processes. They remain important but not adequate to understand the social and political mobilizations in the country

Introduction  27 in recent decades. Amit Ahuja (2019) demonstrates how marginalized groups and their mobilizations have undermined the concept of ‘bloc voting’ and instead vote for a variety of parties. The electoral success of the BJP in the recent years, particularly in UP and Bihar, its consolidation of support among all the segments of Hindu society, and gradual decline or dissemination of parties like the RJD in Bihar, the SP and the BSP in the UP make this point even more apparent. Ahuja also argues that it serves the marginalized groups better when they vote for different parties rather than en bloc to one party. This is as much true for other groups like peasants, tribals or minorities. Other welcoming developments in the recent decades have been a vibrant and assertive civil society even when the opposition parties are weak, and there is the absolute dominance of the BJP. In this era of information and communication technology, the capacity of civil society groups to elicit i­nformation and knowledge production far exceeds the state (Kapur et al., 2017). Debates surrounding demonetization, GST or farm bills enactment and eventual repeal are testimony of increasing assertiveness of the civil society groups. So were the formulations and enactments of legislations such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Forest Rights Act (FRA), the RTI Act, the Right to Education Act (RTE), the Right to Food Act (RTF) and so on during the UPA I and II. They signify the important role of civil society groups in the Indian political process. One may also observe a growing discomfort with the constant cycle of elections in the country. Thus, the ruling party, including Prime Minister Modi, emphasized the idea of combining the general and assembly elections in the manner they were conducted in the first two decades after Independence. There is merit in the argument as it would save enormous time and resources that could be spent on building and augmenting state capacities. However, opinion is divided on its feasibility and constitutionality. Similarly, there is a debate on changing the nature of governance from a parliamentary model to a presidential system like the USA to ensure government stability and effective governance. However, it is contrary to the idea of ‘responsibility’ which the framers of the Indian constitution put greater emphasis on. Similarly, in his recent work, E. Sridharan (2020) examines the feasibility of moving away from the first-past-the-post system towards a proportional election system to ensure an inclusive government and fair representation of every segment of the population, including the minorities. The irony of first-past-the-post is that a party’s seat share is not in proportion to their vote share. A  few examples may make this point clearer: (a) the BJP won the clear majority in the parliamentary election in 2014 with just 31 per cent of the vote; (b) the BJP in the 2009 general election won 116 seats with 18 per cent of the vote share; however, the Congress with 19 per cent of the vote share managed to win only 44 seats in the Parliament in 2014 election. Thus, the seats that a party may get are not representative of their vote share, and there is merit in the argument favouring proportional representation. However, the transition to such a system is difficult and requires a consensus

28  Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey among the political parties and constitutional amendments. These are not very compelling propositions today, but they have the potential to alter the very nature and dynamics of India’s political processes. References Ahuja, A. (2019). Mobilising the marginalised: Ethnic parties without ethnic movements. Oxford University Press. Aiyar, Y. (2019). Modi consolidates power: Leveraging welfare politics. Journal of Democracy, 30(4), 78–88. Alam, J. (2004). Who wants democracy? Orient Longman. Bardhan, P. (1984). The political economy of development. Oxford University Press. Bhambri, C. P. (1968). Ideology and political parties in India. Economic & Political Weekly, 3(16), 643–646. Bhargava, R. (1994). Giving secularism it’s due. Economic  & Political Weekly, 29(28), 1784–1791. Chandra, K. (2015). The new Indian state: The relocation of patronage in the postliberalisation economy. Economic & Political Weekly, 50(41), 46–58. Chatterjee, P. (1994). Secularism and tolerance. Economic  & Political Weekly, 29(28), 1768–1777. Chatterjee, P. (2004). The politics of the governed: Reflections on political society in most of the world. Columbia University Press. Chhibber, P., & Verma, R. (2019). The rise of the second dominant party system in India: BJP’s new social coalition in 2019. Studies in Indian Politics, 7(2), 131–148. Deshpande, S. (2003). Contemporary India: A sociological view. Penguin Books. Dhavan, R.,  & Saxena, R. (2004). The rewriting of Indian federalism: Constitutional amendments, statutory changes, and executive power revisited. Typescript PILSARC. Diwakar, R. (2017). Party system in India. Oxford University Press. Dua, B. D., & Singh, M. P. (2003). India’s federalism in the new millennium. Manohar Publications. Dubey, A. K. (2019). Hindu-ekta banam gyan ki raajniti. Van Prakashan. Evans, P., & Heller, P. (2018). The state and development (WIDER Working Paper 2018/112, UNU-WIDER). www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/ Working-paper/PDF/wp2018-112.pdf Fernandes, L., & Heller, P. (2006). Hegemonic aspirations: New middle class ­politics and India’s democracy in comparative politics. Critical Asian Studies, 38(4), 495–522. Frankel, F., & Rao, M. S. A. (Eds.). (1990). Dominance and state power in India: Decline of a social order. Oxford University Press. Ganguly, S. (2020). An illiberal India? Journal of Democracy, 31(1), 193–202. Government of India. (2019). The Muslim women (protection of rights on marriage) act, 2019. Ministry of Law and Justice. Gupta, A. (2012). Red tape: Bureaucracy, structural violence, and poverty in India. Duke University Press. Gupta, A., & Sivaramakrishnan, K. (Eds.). (2011). The state in India after liberalization: Interdisciplinary perspectives. Routledge.

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Section I

Indian Constitution, State and Emerging Trends

1 Indian Constitution Antecedents, Philosophy and Basic Features Om Prakash

Introduction Constitutions are historical documents that speak to the past, make structural and normative arrangements for the present and outline a vision of future society. The roots of constitutional government are quite ancient and can be traced to the writings of the Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle. In the middle ages, the charter of Magna Carta (1215) alluded to constitutional principles of limited government. Thereafter, the French and American Revolutions and the ideas of John Locke (1632–1704) and Montesquieu (1689– 1775) mark a more systematic development of a constitutional government.

Box 1.1  Constitutional Government The idea of constitutional government is associated with the political theory of John Locke. Amongst Locke’s famous works, The Second Treatise of Government (1690) discusses the notion of natural rights. According to Locke, individuals possess a set of natural rights to life, liberty and property that are so fundamental to human beings that no other individual, including themselves, society or authority, can ­override or violate them. Thus, the state founded by individuals through social contract is to act in a manner that natural rights are not violated. Natural rights, therefore, set the limit on the power of the state (Ch. 11, On Extent of Legislative Power, pp. 70–1). Montesquieu, on the other hand, worked out a scheme of separation of powers to restrain the abuse of state power. According to him, a system of government can be prevented from being despotic only when different bodies exercise legislative, executive and judicial power and when each of these bodies is bound by the rule of law. Montesquieu’s theory had an enormous impact on the framers of the constitution of the USA. DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-3

36  Om Prakash In the Indian context, the origin and development of a constitutional government can be linked to the consolidation of British rule and subsequent developments in the anti-colonial struggle. In fact, the colonial experience and the developments within the anti-colonial movement(s) determined both the nature and content of what was to become the Indian Constitution. However, before we delve into the details of the development of the Indian Constitution, let us first understand what a constitution is and what the basic functions that it performs. The historical trajectory of the development of constitutional government has given it a specific meaning, which is basically classical liberal in origin. The Constitution, therefore, is seen as (a) the supreme law of the land, (b) a framework of government, and (c) a set of laws that grant and limit the power of government. As the supreme law of the land, the constitution sets a broader parameter within which other laws shall be framed. No law that contravenes the constitution is held to be valid within a constitutional system. Second, the constitution establishes a general framework for organizing and operating a government; it establishes institutions through which society would be governed. Third and perhaps one of the most important functions of the constitution is to outline the limits on the exercise of power by the state and government. The state, in modern times, is the most powerful organ of society that administers justice and punishments; it is likely that under some conditions, the institutions of the modern state may become exceedingly coercive against all or some sections of society. Constitution or constitutional arrangements, under these circumstances, put a check on this coercive tendency of the state, its institution, and those who wield its power. In this very sense, the constitutional government sometimes runs contrary to the logic of democratic government. Democratic government postulates the supremacy of the will of the people. This quite often means the will of the majority. Constitutionalism restrains the imposition of the majority opinion, particularly when you have a dissenting minority. The constitution, therefore, protects the interests of the minority against the tyranny of the majority (Bhargava, 2008, p. 14). In the Indian context, the Constitution assumes another important role, besides all the three mentioned earlier. The Indian Constitution is seen to commit itself to bring about a normative order, a transformative role that scholars have characterized as ‘social revolution’. This is perhaps a hallmark of post-war liberalism based on the idea of a welfare state that saw an expansion in the role that the state played in society (Chaube, 2009, pp. 35–6). However, according to Granville Austin (1966 [2008], p. X), this is particularly an impressive feature of the Indian Constitution. Alluding to this feature of Indian Constitution, Rajeev Bhargava writes that it provides ‘peaceful, democratic means with which to bring about profound social transformation’ (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 15). Gautam Bhatia also appreciates this expanded transformatory role of the constitution in the Indian context, of not only restraining the state through civil rights of citizens but also addressing the social hierarchy. According to his understanding, in India, ‘freedom and equality were not merely suffocated

Indian Constitution  37 by at despotic government’ but also traditional social structures like caste and other religious practices’ (Bhatia, 2019, p. XXV). Functions of the Constitution The constitution fulfils some important functions in society. Let us briefly discuss some of the primary functions of a constitution. 1. The constitution outlines the political boundaries of a state and establishes who belongs to the political community. So it serves as both a physical boundary marker and identifier of state citizenship. Article 1 of the Indian Constitution declares that India, that is, Bharat, shall be a union of states (Bakshi, 2015, p. 6). It then goes on to discuss the details of the territorial aspect of the Indian Union in Part I of the Indian Constitution. Furthermore, in Part II of the Indian Constitution various aspects of Indian citizenship are discussed (Bakshi, 2015, pp. 10–13). 2. Constitutions often identify the nature and source of political authority. The Indian Constitution identifies the source of political authority as the people of India. It also declares that India is a sovereign, democratic and republic in which the concepts of secular and socialism are incorporated. So the Constitution clearly identifies India as a democratic republic; in republican tradition, the head of the state is elected in India. It is also important to recognize that, unlike some of the commonwealth nations, namely Canada before 1982, the framing of the Indian Constitution was a sovereign act. The Indian Constitution was authenticated by the Chairman of the ­Constituent Assembly, Dr Rajendra Prasad, and was not submitted to the British Parliament for technical approval (Chaube, 2009, p. 19). 3. Constitutions are an important source through which the rights of the people and citizens within a state are entrenched. It quite often also ­ ­enumerates the duties of a citizen. Part III, IV and IVA of the Indian Constitution mention important civil, political, economic and social rights available to the people and citizens within the territory of India. Part IVA explicitly mentions fundamental duties. However, many provisions within Part III also come with an implicit assumption of duties. 4. Constitutions are known to set up the institutions of a state, chiefly the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the state. It also outlines the framework of interactions between these institutions. The constitution also spells out the manner in which people running the institution are to be chosen, primarily through elections in a democracy, and rules governing the process of selection. 5. Constitutions also provide the power-sharing arrangement between the union and its constituent parts. One can clearly identify the different characteristics of such power-sharing arrangements in India and the USA. Unlike in the USA, power is quite centralized in the hands of the Union in the constitution of India.

38  Om Prakash 6. Constitutions quite often commit the state to a set of normative, social, economic and political goals. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution clearly outlines these goals in terms of social, economic and political justice; liberty; equality; and fraternity. Besides these, the Fundamental Rights chapter in Part III of the Indian Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV also enumerate important goals and tie the Indian state to them. 7. Last, constitutions, more so in the Indian context, reflects the social history of the times in which they are framed. It gives the readers who are generations distant from the founding moment opportunity to peep into the sociological history burdened with hierarchies and conflicts and the manner in which they were addressed. For example, when we look at the Article 15(2) of the Indian Constitution, amongst other constitutional provisions, it states, No citizen shall, on the ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to . . . access to the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads . . . maintained wholly or partly out of state fund or dedicated to the use of public. A careful reading of the constitutional text mentioned earlier informs us about the social structures in which the Constituent Assembly of India was embedded and the approach that it took to address the hierarchies emanating from those structures. The Antecedents of the Indian Constitution Scholars who have studied the Indian Constitution generally agree that colonial rule and developments within the anti-colonial movements are the two most prominent influences and inspirations that shaped the Indian Constitution. Besides, the influence of Western European liberalism, American and the French Revolution on the Indian Constitution cannot be overlooked, as can the influence of socialist revolution in USSR and the indigenously grown socialist ideology under Gandhain influence. It is quite commonly said that the Indian Constitution is a heavily borrowed document. Ideas and provisions in the Constitution have been sourced from various other constitutions around the world. The Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution are an inspiration from the US Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy from the Constitution of Ireland. The structure of governance has been extensively incorporated into the Government of India Act, 1935. K. Hanumanthaiya, a member of India’s Constituent Assembly, expressed his dissatisfaction in a poetic manner with the nature of the constitution being drafted by saying, ‘we wanted the sound of veena or sitar but here we have a music of the English band’. Some jurists and constitutional experts take an even stronger view of the colonial origins of the Indian Constitution. According to them, there is a

Indian Constitution  39 continuity underwritten by the colonial regime and the constitutional regime that was established in India in 1950. B. N. Rau, the constitutional advisor in the Constituent Assembly, is among those who believe that the moment of Independence in India was mere transference of power. The Constituent Assembly of India was set up through the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 and not independently proclaimed by the Indians. Second, those who see more of a continuity, argue that the influence of the Government of India Act, 1935, is so deep on the Indian Constitution that in the post-colonial period as well, the Indian Constitution should be interpreted in the light of the Government of India Act (Bhatia, 2019, p. XXI). Some of these fears were expressed in the Constituent Assembly of India, and Ambedkar was aware of them. Ambedkar dealt with these criticisms by arguing that in the Constitution of India, there are expressions and provisions that have acquired universal salience over a period of time. In fact, he expressed that all constitutions ‘in their main provision must look similar (CAD, Vol 7, I, 37)’. Ambedkar further defended the incorporations of administrative details in the Indian Constitution from the Government of India Act, 1935, arguing that while he would not have liked incorporation of detailed administrative provisions in the Constitution, the Constitution ideally should not carry such administrative detailing. But he goes on to express the ‘necessity’ of such incorporations because, according to Ambedkar, Indian society lacked ‘constitutional morality’. Therefore, the administrative detailing cannot be left open-ended for future legislature. He writes, ‘constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realize that our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic’. Box 1.2  Some Prominent Inspirations for the Indian Constitution Australian Constitution British Parliamentary Tradition Constitution of Canada Constitution of Ireland Constitution of Soviet Union (USSR) Constitution of the USA French Constitution Weimar Constitution of Germany

Concurrent list and joint sitting of both the houses of legislature Parliamentary form of government and single citizenship Quasi-federal form of government, residual powers of the central government and centre’s power to appoint governors in provinces Directive Principles of State Policy Fundamental duties, planning commission and idea of social, economic and political justice in the preamble Preamble, judicial review, fundamental rights and separation of powers between legislature, executive and judiciary The ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity in the preamble Emergency powers and suspension of fundamental rights during emergency

40  Om Prakash Bipan Chandra et al. stress on the nationalist roots of the Indian Constitution. According to them, the antecedents of the Indian Constitution can be traced to decades before 26 January 1950. Its origin, according to him, are deeply rooted in the struggle for independence from Britain and movements for responsible constitutional government in the princely states (Chandra et al., 2000, p. 31). They strongly disapprove that the Indian Constitution is a gift of the British or that it is just the culmination point of a series of Government of India Acts, from 1861 to 1935. They underline that constitutional and administrative reforms within the colonial regime were an outcome of the contest between the Indian National Movement and the colonial concessions. The nationalist aspirations expressed through concrete political initiatives in the freedom struggle always exceeded and were far more advanced than the concessions granted in the Government of India Act (Chandra et al., 2000, p. 31). By 1918, as highlighted by Chandra et al. in their book, the demand for self-determination of the Indian nation was invoked in line with international pronouncements supported by global leaders like the American President Woodrow Wilson. When the Indian aspiration was not met by the Government of India Act, 1919, and the British government also declared that the ‘timing and pace’ of further reforms would be decided by the British government alone,1 the Indian response was the non-cooperation movement led by Mahatma Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi’s message in 1922 that ‘Swaraj would not be a gift of the British Parliament but must spring from the wishes of the people of India as expressed through their freely chosen representatives,’ is also viewed as an affirmation in the national movement of a strong resolve to counteract British control and clearly affirm the will of self-determination. The roots of fundamental rights that were incorporated into the Indian Constitution can also be traced to India’s freedom struggle. A series of political developments in the 1920s culminated in demand for protection of the rights of ‘important minorities’ and a scheme for the Constitution of India as ‘national demand’ passed by the Central Legislative Assembly. The ‘allwhite’ Simon Commission, appointed in 1927 by the British Parliament to recommend constitutional reforms in India, however, overlooked the national demand. Instead, the British Secretary of State, Lord Birkenhead, challenged Indians to produce a constitution on which there was a general agreement amongst all Indian people. This was the context in which the Motilal Nehru Committee Report to ‘determine the Principles of Constitution for India’ was prepared in 1928. Chandra et al. write eloquently about the Nehru Committee Report, The Nehru Report laid special emphasis on securing fundamental human rights for the people of India. These included the right to ‘the freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion,’ ‘the right of free expression of opinion, as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and to form associations or unions,’ equal

Indian Constitution  41 rights for men and women, the right to form unions, and the right to free elementary education . . . distribution of provinces should be on linguistic basis (Chandra et al, 2008, p. 43). Ten of the nineteen rights mentioned in the Nehru Committee Report were incorporated into the Constitution of Free India. The subsequent events of boycott of the Simon Commission and the launching of a mass civil disobedience movement in 1930 became a benchmark in India’s freedom struggle. M. N. Roy, one of the founding members of the Communist Party in India, was the first leader to systematically argue about the framing of the Indian Constitution by an elected Constituent Assembly.2 However, both Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National Congress made it a mainstay of the demand for India’s freedom struggle in the 1930s. Jawaharlal Nehru’s role in propagating the idea of a Constituent Assembly elected by the people of India has also come to special mention in several historical and contemporary writings. In his autobiography, Nehru critically observes that many within the Congress party have not fully grappled with the meaning of the Indian Constituent Assembly. He further elaborates that the Constituent Assembly ‘should be elected on a very wide mass basis, drawing its strength and inspiration from the masses’ (Singh, 1941, p. 259). This message was further entrenched in the resolution of the Indian National Congress against the Government of India Act, 1935, at its Faizpur session in 1936. The resolution read, The Congress reiterates its entire rejection of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the constitution that has been Imposed on India against the declared will of the people of the country. . .. The Congress therefore repeats Its resolve not to submit to this constitution . . . but to combat it both inside and outside the legislature. . . . The Congress stands for a genuine democratic state. . .. Such a State can only come into existence through a Constituent Assembly. elected by adult suffrage and having the power to determine finally the constitution of the country. (Singh, 1941, pp. 14–5) Recent writings on the Indian Constitution argue that there may be a dialectical relationship between colonial constitutionalism, the nationalist struggle for independence and the Indian Constitution. The British constitutionalism was an imposition from above that prompted surging demand for further constitutional reform by the Indian masses. Finally, the 1950 Indian Constitution is embedded with multiple influences, drawing from the colonial constitution, contingent political practices emerging from the Indian people’s encounter with bouts of constitutional reforms initiated by the British, several draft provisions and constitutional aspirations reflected in works by Tilak, Motilal Nehru Committee Report and M. N. Roy’s Draft Constitution of 1944 (De, 2016). There has equally been aspirational borrowing from

42  Om Prakash other constitutions in the constitutional text, something which Austin (1966 [2008]) calls ‘borrowing and adaptation’. The Cabinet Mission, Constituent Assembly and Partition of India The Government of India Act, 1935, was an advance over previous constitutional reforms in the sense that it provided for a better power-sharing arrangement. However, as mentioned in the previous section, by the 1930s, the Indian National Congress was becoming more insistent on the Constitution of India framed by an elected Constituent Assembly. The Faizpur Congress resolution quoted earlier makes this position amply clear. One of the important measures of the Government of India Act, 1935, was the abolition of dyarchy in the provinces and the establishment of an elected government at provincial level. The Congress participated in the provincial election of 1937 and included the agenda of the Constituent Assembly to frame the Indian Constitution in its election manifesto. It won majority in 7 out of 11 provinces and subsequently pressed its demand for the Constituent Assembly and the withdrawal of the Government of India Act, 1935. The resolution proposed and adopted in various provincial legislatures effectively demanded ‘repeal of the Government of India Act 1935 and its replacement with the Constitution for free India framed by an elected Constituent Assembly’ (Narang, 1940, p. 16). During the course of the Second World War, Austin writes, ‘the mood of Indian people became increasingly of self-assertion, of reediness to take destiny into their own hands . . . in such a mood Indian would accept only a constitution drafted by themselves’ (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 2). Sensing the Indian mood and in order to seek wartime cooperation from India, Sir Stafford Cripps, a prominent Labour Party member of the British War Cabinet, was sent to India to negotiate on the future of India under the British Empire. The Cripps Mission, as it is popularly known in the history of modern India, promised the right to ‘self-determination’ to India after war. India could opt out of the British Commonwealth with some conditions to safeguard British economic interests. The much-popularized Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of the adult franchise was also promised by the Cripps Mission proposal (Bandyopadhyay, 2004, p. 440). However, the Cripps Mission proposal was rejected by the Indian National Congress as it subsequently passed the famous resolution of ‘Quit India’, thus opening up a full-scale confrontation with the British. The 1930s saw a rising antagonism between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. The Muslim League under Jinnah’s leadership blamed the Congress and provincial governments for measures that were inimical to the interests of the Muslims. Gandhi mediated between Jinnah and the Indian National Congress to bring about some rapprochement. However, Jinnah, in this period, was taking hard-line measures, putting partisan demands, including seeking recognition from the Congress that the League was the sole representative of the Muslims in India. The Indian National Congress at its Wardha conference clearly characterized the Muslim league

Indian Constitution  43 as a communal organization whose political activities were ‘anti-national’. The Muslim League, on its part, celebrated the resignation of the Congress Ministry in the provinces in 1939, calling it the ‘Day of Deliverance and Thanksgiving’. The League was now increasingly pressing for the demand for a separate nation for Muslims, arguing that Muslims are not a minority within a united India, but a separate nation with the right to have separate ‘homeland, territory and state’ (Ahmed, 2005, p. 136). It is in this environment of confrontation between the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and the British that the Cabinet Mission, under Sir Pethick-Lawrence, came to India in 1946. The objective of the Cabinet Mission was to explore the possibility of a transfer of power and to institute a Constituent Assembly to facilitate the process of constitution making in India. One of the major obstacles towards this end was the growing schism between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Failing to bring rapprochement between the Congress and the League, the Cabinet Mission announced a future plan for India, which came to be widely known as the Cabinet Mission Plan. At the core of the Cabinet Mission Plan was a provision for a Constituent Assembly constituted partly by an election from the provincial legislature and partly by representation from the princely states. Under this plan, the Constituent Assembly was to be summoned by the governor general, and the draft constitution prepared by the Constituent Assembly had to be submitted to the British Parliament for enactment. However, the most controversial aspect of the Cabinet mission plan was the grouping of India into three geographically distinct regions, one of which would be predominantly Hindu, another one predominantly Muslim, and in the third province, in which the two communities would be roughly equal. According to the Cabinet Mission Plan, in terms of drafting the constitution, the central government’s power would be confined to defence, communication and foreign affairs (Austin, 1966 [2008], pp. 4–5). The Cabinet Mission proposal was seen by the Congress as a clear concession by the British to the Muslim League, yet the Congress decided to work on the proposal with its reservations. The Congress was hopeful about the Constituent Assembly being convened under the Cabinet Mission proposal but sternly opposed to the grouping of regions on religious lines. The Muslim League too was only somewhat satisfied with the Cabinet Mission proposal and hoped that it brought them closer to recognition of the demand for Pakistan. Austin writes that the truce between the League and the Congress was ‘long enough to see the Constituent Assembly elected under the terms of one portion of the Cabinet Mission Plan’ (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 5). It is pertinent to note that the Constituent Assembly of India was indirectly elected. The Provincial Assemblies were elected on the basis of the limited franchise in December 1945. About 29 per cent of the adult population voted to choose the members of the Constituent Assembly of India (Khanna, 1981 [2013], p. 11). The Congress fore-shook its long-held political position that the Constituent Assembly of India should be elected on the

44  Om Prakash basis of an adult franchise. Austin argues that Congress agreed to the indirect election proposal of the Cabinet Mission because they thought the preparation for a general election would have long delayed the creation of the Constituent Assembly (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 5). Provinces were allotted seats in the Constituent Assembly according to the proportion of their population, adhering to the principle of one representative for every 10-lakh person population. Further, differentiations were made in every province to ensure a fair allocation of seats to each religious community in proportion to their population (Sekhawat  & Sekhawat, 1990, p.  57). Overall, in the Assembly, 292 members were elected by the provincial legislatures. The Cabinet ­Mission Plan had recommended 93 seats in the Constituent Assembly to be allocated to the princely states. The method of choosing the representative of the princely states was to be finalized in consultation between the Assembly and the princely states. Later, it was decided between the states and the negotiating committee of the Constituent Assembly that at least 50 per cent of the seats allocated to the princely states shall be chosen through election, and the remaining 50 per cent the princes could nominate their representatives (Constituent Assembly of India, 1947a). Four seats in the Constituent Assembly of India went to the chief commissioner’s province. So the total membership of the Indian Constituent Assembly in 1946 stood at 389. The Congress held a comfortable majority in the elected seats of the Constituent Assembly. Its share was 208 out of 292 seats in the British India provinces and the chief commissioner’s province. The Muslim League had 73 seats. However, the differences between the Congress and the Muslim League kept growing as the latter boycotted the meetings of the Constituent Assembly. Jinnah and the League were now single, aggressively pursuing the goal of convening a separate Constituent Assembly for Muslim-dominated regions. On the other hand, Congress went ahead with the session of the Constituent Assembly. K. M. Munshi, a member of the Constituent Assembly and of the Congress party, argued that the session of the assembly ‘could be’ halted due to the absence of any section of its members. The assembly, according to him, was not a conference of representatives of certain groups but represented the population of India as a whole. Thus, the withdrawal of any group from the whole does not negate the existence of the whole that reflects the sovereign will of the Indian people. It is amid such apprehensions that the meeting of the Constituent Assembly of India was convened in December  1946. The Leagues’ boycott of assembly eventually culminated in the partition of India. This also meant that the membership of the assembly was reduced from 389 to 299 as many of its members went to Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly: Nature, Composition and Decision-Making The Congress, despite the boycott of assembly by the League, went ahead, and the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly of India was convened

Indian Constitution  45 on 9 December 1946. Dr Sachchidananda Sinha, the oldest member in the assembly, was chosen as its temporary chairman before Dr Rajendra Prasad was elected the President of the Constituent Assembly of India on 11 December  1946. Dr  Bhimrao Ambedkar was appointed as the chairman of the Drafting Committee through a resolution of the Constituent Assembly on 29 August  1947. The Constituent Assembly worked through the committees. Overall, there were 22 committees of the Constituent Assembly but the eight major committees played significant role in the Constitution making (Khanna, 1981 [2013], p.  12). These were committees on rules, steering, advisory, drafting, union subjects, union constitution, provincial constitution and states.

Box 1.3  Constituent Assembly: Eight Committees and Their Prominent Members Rules Committee Steering Committee States Committee

Drafting Committee Advisory Committee (Fundamental Rights Sub-committee; Minorities Sub-committee)

Union Subjects Union Constitution

Provincial Constitution

Chairman: Rajendra Prasad, Members: Jagjeevan Ram, K. M. Munshi, A. K. Ayyar Chairman: Rajendra Prasad, Members: ­Vallabhbhai Patel, K. M. Munshi, Mrs G. Durgabai, Satya Narayan Sinha Chairman: Jawaharlal Nehru; Members: Vallabhbhai Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, N. G. Ayyangar. This committee negotiated with the (states negotiating committee) princely states. Chairman: B. R. Ambedkar, Members: K. M. Munshi, N. G. Ayyangar, A. K. Ayyar, ­Muhammad Sadulla, T. T. Krishnamachari. Chairman: Vallabhbhai Patel; Fundamental Rights Sub-committee Chairman: J. B. Kriplani. The minorities subcommittee was chaired by H. C. Mookerjee. In this subcommittee, members from all prominent religious groups as well as the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, were represented Chairman: Jawaharlal Nehru; Members: K. M. Munshi, Govind Ballabh Pant, N. G. Ayyangar, B. L. Mitter Chairman: Jawaharlal Nehru; Members: B. R. Ambedkar, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, K. M. Munshi, A. K. Ayyar, K. T. Shah, S. P. Mookerjee, K. M. Panikkar, Govind Ballabh Pant Chairman: Vallabhbhai Patel; Members: K. N. Katju, Ujjal Singh, Satya Narayan Sinha, Hansa Mehta, S. Nagappa

Source: For more comprehensive list, see Granville Austin (1966 [2008], pp. 333–6).

46  Om Prakash It is no doubt that, in its composition, the assembly was overwhelmingly dominated by the Congress party. Even before the partition, the Congress party had a built-in majority of 69 per cent in the Constituent Assembly amongst the elected members. After the partition, when the Muslin League members were out of the assembly, the majority of the Congress party jumped up to 82 per cent. The addition of the member from the princely states did not alter this situation much (Sekhawat & Sekhawat, 1990, p. 65). The overall composition of the Constituent Assembly after the partition was 229 from the British India provinces and 70 from the princely states. While Congress’s dominance in the Constituent Assembly was empirically given, Granville Austin calls the Indian Constituent Assembly a microcosm, a miniature representation of all the viewpoints that existed in India at the time of Independence. Austin stresses that there was a plurality of viewpoints within the Congress party that ranged from ‘revolutionary to reactionary’, and not only that, but the leaders holding these diverse viewpoints hardly held themselves back from freely expressing their opinions in public. According to Austin, this made the Congress-dominated Indian political system distinct and different from other ‘monolithic’ political systems (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 9). Most commentators on the constitution-making process in India argue that Nehru, Patel, Azad and Rajendra Prasad were the four most prominent personalities of the Congress party, with a palpable influence on the assembly. It is equally important to underline that the plurality of opinions in the Constituent Assembly also derived from the differing vantage points from which these four leaders approached the issues at hand. Besides this, the principle that the Indian National Congress adopted for the nomination of members to contest for the Constituent Assembly inherently ensured that diverse shades of opinion were represented. The elected members of the Constituent Assembly were to be chosen by the electorates comprising the Provincial Assembly members. When the Provincial Assembly elections were being held in 1945, the central leadership of the Congress party left the responsibility of choosing candidates to the Provincial Congress, and very minimal interference in this task was made by the central leadership. The only important qualification laid down by the central leadership for candidate selection to the provincial legislature was that the candidate should have a record of active work in the Independence movement. The non-interference from central leadership ensured that the members of the provincial legislature came from diverse ideological and social outlooks, yet they had a record of active participation in the national movement. Similarly, when members of the Constituent Assembly were being elected, the central leadership of the Indian National Congress gave considerable autonomy to the Provincial Congress in choosing their representatives, with a few exceptions. Recognizing the enormity of task of constituting a federal political arrangement, provinces generally choose candidates who can unflinchingly represent provincial interests in the Constituent Assembly (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 13).

Indian Constitution  47 As an exception to this policy of free hand to the provinces, however, the Indian National Congress insisted that ‘the persons with exceptional ability’ find a place in the Constituent Assembly and that the minority community beyond Muslims and Sikhs also find adequate representation in the Constituent Assembly. Thus, ensuring that community of Adivasis, Parsis, Anglo Indians, Scheduled Caste and women were all represented in the Constituent Assembly. What is even more significant is that all these communities were given representation from the pool of ‘general’ category seats. Structurally as well, the Cabinet Mission proposal, which laid the foundation of the Indian Constituent Assembly, secured minority representation; thus, pluralism to some degree was also interwoven in the very foundation of the Constituent Assembly. Flexibility of approach, pragmatism or perhaps, a liberal agnosticism on the part of the leadership in dealing with the princely states, encouraged the states to willingly join the Assembly and participate in its proceedings, openly airing their views and even contrarian opinions (Constituent Assembly of India, 1947a). As alluded to in the discussion earlier, it can be safely construed that right from its structural foundation to the principle of candidate selection for the Assembly ensures that the character of the Constituent Assembly remains diverse and heterogenous, yet without losing a national outlook. Adivasi voices, such as Jaipal Singh Munda, leading women voices, such as Sarojini Naidu and Hansa Mehta, members from Christian and Anglo-Indian community, such as Frank Anthony, the Parsi voice, represented by Hormasji Pherozeshah Modi, were all inducted into the Constituent Assembly from various provinces and on general category seat. It is even more significant that the services of constitutional law experts like Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar or K. M. Munshi, whose political position can easily be classified as ‘sharply opposed’ to that of the Indian National Congress, were also utilized and they came to the Assembly with Congress support. M. R. Jayakar and Syama Prasad Mukherjee, holding leadership positions in the Hindu Mahasabha, were also present in the Constituent Assembly on the Indian National Congress’s ticket. Somnath Lahiri was a Marxist voice in the Constituent Assembly of India, although socialist ideology ran deeper in the Indian National Congress. As K. Santhanam, a Gandhian voice in the Constituent Assembly, aptly puts it, ‘there was hardly any shade of public opinion that was not represented in the Assembly’ (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 13). Decision-Making in the Assembly: Consensus and Accommodation Granville Austin brings out the complexity of the decision-making process in the Constituent Assembly of India. Decision-making by consensus remains the outstanding feature of the Indian Constituent Assembly. However, the manner in which the consensus was arrived at, through the free exchange of ideas, often contradictory in content, makes this process even more remarkable. The role of prominent leaders of the Constituent Assembly that Austin

48  Om Prakash refers to as ‘oligarchy’ within the Constituent Assembly, which included Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Maulana Azad and Rajendra Prasad, was instrumental in bringing about the synthesis of opposing viewpoints. According to Austin, the difference of opinion within the oligarchy was also common, and in that case, each of them sought the support of other members of the Assembly, thus avoiding the arbitrary imposition a singular will. On some issues, like the formation of linguistic provinces, there were sharp differences of opinion within the Assembly, despite the convergence of views of the oligarchy. In such cases, the decision was tactically postponed till as late as 1956, thus avoiding a hurried imposition of the will of the oligarchy or any section of the assembly. Expert opinion on constitutional provisions and administrative details were also incorporated into the decision-making process of the Constituent Assembly. Thus, the epistemological character of the decision-making process in the Constituent Assembly of India needs to be equally emphasized. Although the opinions of experts such as A. K. Ayyar, N. G. Ayyangar and Bhimrao Ambedkar and other notable leaders of the assembly gained salience, it was ensured that the rank and file converged on the expert opinion through open exchange of ideas and persuasive techniques (Austin, 1966 [2008]). In Austin’s opinion, decision-making by consensus, amidst intense social cleavages and incongruent social and cultural interests, has been India’s original contribution to the world. The stress on consensus and unanimity or near unanimity in taking decisions elevates the means by which decisions are made to an importance much higher than that of the decisions ­themselves (Austin, 1966 [2008], p.  311). Another important ideal in the decision-­ making ­process of the Constituent Assembly, according to Austin, is the art of accommodation, sometimes of uncomplimentary or even mutually contradictory goals. Accommodation, unlike compromise, writes Austin, allows for coexistence of mutually conflicting principles without concession or without any party giving up on the desired end that conflicts with the interest of the other parties. The language issue in the Indian Constitution, according to Austin, was settled by compromise. Accommodation, on the other hand, sees conflicting principles at different levels of value, existing together yet separate enough so that the concept can operate freely within its own sphere without conflicting with another operating in a separate sphere. The federal features in the Indian Constitution, according to Austin, are one amongst other good examples of the principle of accommodation. Federal and unitary system of governments are mutually incompatible; one can have either of them, say the American and the British constitutional experts. Austin writes, ‘the Indian Constitution is either depending on the circumstances’ (Austin, 1966 [2008], p. 319). To summarize the content of the decision-making process in the Constituent Assembly of India, as discussed in detail by Granville Austin, one can

Indian Constitution  49 safely imply that the Constituent Assembly adopted complex and differentiated decision-making principles, process and strategy. A crude majoritarian principle of decision-making was generally avoided, and so was the imposition of the will of the notable members that Austin refers to as the oligarchy. Deliberative procedure and consensual and unanimous decision-making were preferred goals of the framers of the Indian Constitution. Although the means by which decisions were taken in the Constituent Assembly were generally deliberative and consensual, the normative mandate of the Assembly was clearly outlined. Making the mandate of the Constituent Assembly manifest, Jawaharlal Nehru said on 22 January 1947, ‘the first task of this Assembly is to free India through a new constitution, to feed the starving people, and to clothe the naked masses, and to give every Indian the fullest opportunity to develop himself according to his capacity’ (Constituent Assembly of India, 1947b). According to S. K. Chaube, the best and most crisp reflection of the mandate of the Constituent Assembly is put in the Preamble of the Constitution. The Preamble, thus, is a guide for the executive and the judiciary in the interpretation of law. The Preamble or the Spirit of Indian Constitution Box 1.4  Indian Constitution: The Preamble WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a [SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the [unity and integrity of the Nation] IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION. Source: Government of India, Constitution of India, 26 November 2021.

The words ‘socialist and secular’ and ‘the unity and integrity of the nation’ were added to the Indian Constitution by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment. Although the 42nd Constitutional Amendment became controversial and many provisions introduced in the Constitution through this amendment were later replaced by the 43rd and the 44th Amendment to the Indian Constitution, the cluster of words introduced in the preamble through the 42nd

50  Om Prakash amendment remained intact. It thus reveals the wider acceptability of these normative ideals in the period following their induction into the Constitution of India, although debates and contention around the ideal of ‘socialism and secularism’ have persisted since Independence. Democratic deliberation and contention have also helped in the framing of these ideals in a contextspecific manner and adaptation to Indian society. If we reflect on the text of the Preamble, it outlines the character of the state in India, the purpose of building a common political order and also the nature of the Constitution itself. The Indian Constitution, unlike many other constitutions of the world, is neither proclaimed in the name of God nor is it seen as granted by a ‘benevolent, native or foreign king or a dictator’ (Chaube, 2009, p. 23). The Indian Constitution is proclaimed in the name of the people of India and not given to the Indian people by any external authority. The preamble envisages a ‘sovereign democratic republic’ to which the ideals of ‘socialist and secular’ were subsequently incorporated. The state is endowed with the purpose of securing to its citizens a just social, economic and political order, liberty of thought and expression, equality of status and opportunity and the promotion of fraternity and individual dignity. Thus, the Preamble incorporates the liberal and the socialist or social democratic goals together. It is important to note that the India Independence Act, 1947, of the British Parliament empowered the Constituent Assembly to frame the Constitution of India. However, the final draft of the Constitution was not submitted to the British Parliament but was brought into operation by the signature of the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Dr Rajendra Prasad. In comparison to the constitutions of the other common wealth nations, like that of Australia or Canada, it is a great advancement in the autonomy and sovereignty of the Indian Constituent Assembly. The democratic republican character of the state, as emphasized in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, distinguishes it from dynastic rule or even democracies headed by dynasties like the UK. The Romans distinguished the republic as the rule of the people, as opposed to the dynastic rule. A democratic republic means that the head of state is chosen through the process of election. Some elaboration on the concept of ‘fraternity’ as mentioned in the Preamble will not be out of place before we close the discussion here. Ambedkar emphasized a great deal on the moral worth of fraternity. It has been pointed out that the addition of this ideal in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution was at his insistence, even though the concept was missing in the objective resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehru at the beginning of the session of the constituent Assembly (B. Shiva Rao, p.  510). In a wider elaboration, Ambedkar contrasted his understanding of the term ‘fraternity’, as part of the trinity of values of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ inspired by the French Revolution on the one hand and as mentioned in Buddhist philosophy on the other. However, in the context of the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, Ambedkar writes, ‘the need of fraternal concord and goodwill in India

Indian Constitution  51 was never greater than now and this particular aim of the new constitution should be emphasized by special mention in the preamble’. Another time, in his concluding speech in the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1949, Ambedkar explained in greater detail what he meant by fraternity. He said, Fraternity means a sense of common brotherhood of all Indians. . . . It is a principle which gives solidarity to social life. It is a difficult thing to achieve. . . . (This is because) in India there are castes. The castes are anti national. In the first place because they bring about separation of social life. They are anti national because they generate jealousy and antipathy between caste and caste. But we must overcome all these difficulties if we wish to become a nation in reality. For fraternity can be a fact only when there is a nation. Without fraternity, equality and liberty will be no deeper than coat and pant (Ambedkar, 1949/1990, p. 180–181). Fraternity, therefore, is pivotal to resolving conflict and antipathy not only in the context of caste antagonism but also other social conflicts like those based on religion and class. In Ambedkar’s analysis, it is also a key concept that brings about reconciliation between liberty and equality when poised in a conflictual manner. Summing Up The Indian Constitution outlines a system of government and a polity based on not only the negative liberty of the citizens but also the transformative role of the state in overcoming socio-economic barriers that prevent the ­millions of Indian citizens from exercising their rights and liberties. Notes 1 The Preamble of the Government of India Act, 1919, laid down, ‘And whereas timing and manner of each advance in constitutional reform can be determined only by Parliament, upon whom responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of Indian people’ (Singh, 1941, p. 255). 2 M. N. Roy, it is said, was of the view that the ‘demand’ for the Constituent Assembly should not be ‘submitted’ to the imperialist administration, which then would have the privilege of accepting or rejecting that demand. According to Roy, the demand for the Constituent Assembly should rather be a firm declaration of the sovereign will of the Indian people. It is a notice to imperialism to liquidate (M. N. Roy as quoted in Narang, 1940, pp. 32–33).

References Ahmed, R. (2005). Congress and the Muslim league. Pakistan Journal of History & Culture, 26(2), 2026–2032. Ambedkar, B. R. 1949/1990. ‘Reply to the Debate’, Nov. 25. The Constitution and the Constituent Assembly: Some Select Speeches, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi.

52  Om Prakash Austin, G. (2008 [1966]). The Indian constitution: Cornerstone of a nation. Oxford University Press. Bakshi, P. M. (2015). The constitution of India. Universal Law Publishing. Bandyopadhyay, S. (2004). From Plassey to partition: A  history of modern India. Orient Longman. Bhargava, R. (Ed.). (2008). Politics and ethics of the Indian constitution. Oxford University Press. Bhatia, G. (2019). The transformative constitution: A radical biography in nine acts. Harper Collins. Chandra, B. et al. (2008). India since independence. Penguin. Chaube, S. K. (2009). The making and working of Indian constitution. National Book Trust. Constituent Assembly of India. (1947a). Constituent assembly debates (proceddings) (Vol. I). https://­indiankanoon.org/doc/323093/ Constituent Assembly of India. (1947b). Constituent assembly of India debates ­(proceedings) (Vol. II). www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/ volume/2/1947-01-22 De, R. (2016). Constitutional antecedent. In S. Choudhry, M. Khosla, & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Indian constitution. Oxford University Press. Khanna, H. R. (2013 [1981]). The making of Indian constitution. Eastern Book Company. Locke, J. (2017 [1690]). The second treatise of government. Digireads.com Publishing. Narang, J. G. (1940). Constituent assembly and our demand. Minerva Book. Sekhawat, V.,  & Sekhawat, V. (1990). Indian constitution: Model, designing and summation. Indian Journal of Political Science, 51(10). Singh, G. N. (1941). The idea of Indian constituent assembly. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 2(3), 255–272.

2 State, Society and the Nation Mohinder Singh

Introduction In the 1990s, Indian politics underwent multifaceted transformations, of which the following ones have been considered the most significant by political and social science scholars: the liberalization of the economy; the democratic upsurge of the ‘lower’ castes in politics; the rise of the communal politics of Hindu nationalism; and a marked transformation in Indian foreign policy. The impact of these events on the Indian polity has been so deep that some scholars have called the transformation brought about by them the ‘reinvention’ of India, the original invention being during the anticolonial nationalist movement culminating in the foundational moment of the making and adoption of the Constitution in the last years of the 1940s (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000). Why reinvention within half a century of Independence? Further, what was the impact of these events on the nature of the Indian state generally and on the state – society relationship in particular? In some ways – but not in all, as the caste question is specific to Indian politics – these transformations reflected wider global events: the end of the Cold War and the disintegration and demise of the Communist bloc; globalization and the neoliberal turn in the economy; and the revival of ethnic and religious nationalisms in different parts of the world. In parallel to these developments, important new developments occurred in the study of the state, particularly in the disciplines of political science and anthropology. The anthropological studies of the state or uses of the ethnographic method in political science scholarship brought into light the phenomena of ‘experience of the state’ or ‘seeing the state’ by different sections of society. One of the important aspects of this phenomenon, pointed out by several studies, is that the experience of the state is different for different sections or varies across castes, classes, gender and tribal and other marginal groups (Corbridge et al., 2005; Fuller & Benei, 2001, pp. 1–30). In other words, the same act of the state could affect different sections of society differently, making them view the state from very different perspectives. For instance, the construction of a large dam over a river might benefit the rich farmers in the neighbouring regions while adversely affecting the livelihoods DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-4

54  Mohinder Singh of the communities displaced by the same dam. One of the leading factors behind such an orientation in state research is the greater appreciation of the positive governmental functions of the state, in contrast to understanding the state as a mere site of sovereign power. Largely owing to the influence of the works of Michel Foucault, the state is no longer seen as a site where political power is concentrated and exercised in its legal, juridical or sovereign functions, which are primarily negative or prohibitive in nature. Whether the state’s sovereign power is interpreted in universalist terms as a legitimate expression of popular sovereignty, as in the case of liberal-­ republican approaches to the state or as an instrument of class domination seeking to hide its true nature, as in the case of Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, both these approaches understand the state primarily in unitary and negative legalistic terms. In some of his later works, Foucault traces the emergence of another dimension of political power, which he called ‘governmentality’ or the governmental aspect of state power. Governmentality Governmentality refers to the positive dimension of the power of the modern state in its orientation, objectives and target. Governmentality is oriented towards the enhancement of the productive capacity of the population itself. Towards this objective, the government actively performs some positive functions, particularly related to health, wellbeing and the survival of the population. Such functions became the defining features of the modern state insofar as the macro-economic management of the economy became an important marker of society’s well-being and healthy growth. The concept of governmentality was theorized by Michel Foucault, who argued that while the pre-modern states were primarily characterized by the ruler’s minimalist concern with the maintenance of their territories, rule by law and the collection of taxes, it is the addition of governmentality to the earlier powers of the state that characterized the modern state. The governmentality dimension of the modern state is common to its various forms in the last two centuries, particularly in its relationship to the economy – whether it is the liberal laissez-faire state of the 19th century, the interventionist welfare state of the mid-20th century or the neo-liberal state of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This is also broadly true of the colonial and postcolonial states during this period. The governmental power of the state is exercised through several tools and techniques of governance developed in the last two centuries – the census, surveys and other techniques of knowing and classifying the population. This approach has been influential in the studies that sought to understand and explain the state through a focus on governance. It also helps to explain the continuance of government

State, Society and the Nation  55 welfare functions in the post-‘welfare state’ situation, with a very different approach to welfare, needless to add. The framework of governmentality emphasizes the overall increase in the powers and functions of the state and its reach into the nooks and corners of society. One of the most significant changes this perspective has brought to the study of the state and of state – society interactions is that the state is now seen not just through the law enforcement or taxation agencies but also through agencies of wider governance as well. Another distinguishing feature of the modern state is that political power is exercised in most states in the name of ‘the people’, thus making the consent or support of the people necessary for the stability of any regime. This is true as much for the democratic states as for the non-democratic states of different kinds, insofar as the legitimacy and stability of the state, in the last instance, is dependent upon the active or tacit consent of the people. This, however, does not mean that the modern states are serving the ‘true’ interests of all the people. This is a complicated question, not just because it leads to another question as to who decides what the ‘true’ interests of the people are, but also because it seems to underline the significance of the role of ideology and hegemony and the uses of the various instruments – whether open propaganda or subtler forms of influencing opinions. A related question then is whether the state is an instrument of the dominant groups in a society or whether it has autonomy and reality of its own, a question that has been central to some of the key debates on the nature of the post-Independence Indian state. These debates and the question of the autonomy of the state structure and its institutions will be taken up in the next section. The figure of the people is a complex one and needs to be broken down into parts, as it relates to the modern state in multiple ways. As a unitary figure, that is, the people as ‘one people’ – as expressed in the formulation ‘We, the people’ in the Preamble of the Constitution of India – is both the foundational source of the state’s sovereignty and the figure representing the historical and cultural community of the nation with a proper name, for example, India. The historical form of the modern state is that of the nation state, and the way the discourse of nationalism operates at any given time in the public and political spheres impacts on the nature of the state as well. On the other hand, in the system of representative democracy – taking the Indian example again – executive power is exercised on a temporary basis by the majority of the people’s representatives, who are, in turn, indirectly accountable to the people through the entirety of the representatives forming the two houses of the Parliament. The other side of representation is that the processes of representation also fragment the putative unity of ‘the people’ insofar as actual representation manifests the people in their societal reality as differentiated, classified and hierarchized in terms of religious, linguistic and regional communities on the one hand and in terms of caste, class, gender and other social divisions on the other. At the same time, the politics of representation also offers opportunities

56  Mohinder Singh for various historically disempowered groups to politically organize themselves and assert their claims to a share in political power as well. In addition, the state’s policies of governance, through its techniques of enumeration and classification, produce differentiated people targeted as several population groups. This vast social field of the people, as differentiated into multiple identities, is produced by both existing historical social divisions and modern governmentality processes. This social field serves as the primary site of interaction between citizens and the state. However, despite the interaction, neither of the two entities is directly or transparently visible to each other, and their relationship remains dynamic and constantly changing. In addition, compared to the pre-modern political formations, the modern state is far more abstract in nature. Political power is supposed to manifest itself in the person or the body of the king or other figureheads in pre-modern political formations. In the practices of the modern state, on the contrary, either such figure-heads are eliminated altogether, as in several republican forms of state wherein the head of the state is elected on a temporary basis or reduced to nominal figures, as in the case of monarchical democracies. The modern state is characterized by this separation of the natural person and the office of the head of the state (Skinner, 1989). As discussed in the beginning of this section, the state becomes visible or experienceable to the people through its agencies, functions or effects. This exercise in the clarification of the basic theoretical concepts will be useful in understanding the transformation in the nature of the Indian state and the state – society – nation relations attempted in the rest of the chapter. The State, Society and Political Economy One of the influential ways in which social scientists have studied the nature of the Indian state is by analysing its political economy. This approach, known as the political economy approach, has been used by Marxist and non-Marxist social scientists for studying both the pre and post-liberalization Indian state. Both these perspectives have characterized the liberalization of the economy – started officially in 1991 but in fact traceable to the previous decade – as a decisive rupture in the history of the post-Independence Indian state (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000, pp. 143–230). In the political economycentred approaches to the Indian state, scholars have considered primarily three issues: the role of the state vis-à-vis economic planning and the broader question of development; to what extent the dominant social classes exercise control over the state and to what extent the state is autonomous; how does the state relate to the poor and marginalized sections of society; and how do these sections see or experience the state. Needless to say, the three issues are interrelated. In contrast to the relatively simplistic Marxist analyses of the Indian state in the early decades after Independence, including those by the communist parties, that tended to reduce the role of the state to being a mere instrument

State, Society and the Nation  57 of capitalist class rule, the more sophisticated approaches that emerged since the 1980s recognized the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis social classes. The latter approach, sometimes referred to as neo-Marxist, can be found in the works of Pranab Bardhan, Achin Vanaik, Partha Chatterjee and Sudipta Kaviraj. The class character of the Indian state in the works of these scholars is analysed in terms of a coalition of dominant classes instead of a single dominant class. The main function of the Indian state in these analyses is that of mediating and managing conflicting class interests while maintaining its relative autonomy. The Indian state until the 1980s managed to mediate the conflicting class interests within the dominant coalition of the industrial bourgeoisie: rich farmers or agrarian bourgeoisies and (in some analyses) the bureaucratic elite (Bardhan, 1984; Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14; Corbridge & Harriss, 2000, pp. 143–172; Das, 2013). Another important point in some of these analyses – emphasized particularly in the neo-Gramscian analyses of Chatterjee and Kaviraj – is that dominance does not necessarily translate into hegemony. Following Antonio Gramsci’s original analysis, a dominant class is able to exercise hegemony – and thereby achieve relatively greater stability for its dominance – only by successfully exercising intellectual leadership by controlling the structure of common sense at the social level (Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14; Kaviraj, 1989, pp. 2429–2444). This way, the ruling class (or the coalition of classes) is able to present its particular class interests as the universal interests of the entire society, which is what the establishment of hegemony amounts to. According to Chatterjee, it is the postcolonial developmental state in India that was considered as representing the universal interest, particularly in its role as the guide and controller of the planning process. The state, in other words, stood for the universal interest or the interest of the entire nation. Furthermore, the post-Independence political and intellectual leadership at the helm of the state was also able to derive the legitimacy of its universalist claims from the foregoing anti-colonial movement (Chatterjee, 1998). Marxist analyses generally followed the historical narrative of the transition from a pre-capitalist society to a modern capitalist society. This transition narrative maps comfortably onto the narrative of transition from traditional to modern society or the narrative of modernization, a set of conceptual vocabulary preferred by much of non-Marxist social science in the second half of the 20th century. Both Kaviraj and Chatterjee contrast the story of the postcolonial Indian strategy of transition to a modern capitalist society with the classical historical model of the bourgeois democratic revolutions in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. In those historical cases of transition to modernity, the bourgeoisie led the processes of transition by actively establishing their hegemony at the level of civil society, thereby eliminating the pre-capitalist social classes and their cultural residues successfully. Although the transition in the paradigmatic case of Western Europe did not happen without help from the state, the active transformation at the level of civil society was important, something that made this case an

58  Mohinder Singh example of an ‘active revolution’ (Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14; Kaviraj, 1989, pp. 2429–2444).

Civil Society Civil society, a concept that refers to the sphere between family and the state, is historically coeval with the emergence of capitalist market economy. Historically, civil society, a sphere of market-mediated exchange of commodities and services, indicates the emergence of modern bourgeois society. In addition, civil society is also historically linked to the emergence of the modern democratic public sphere as a sphere of formation and exchange of free public opinion, mediated by print media initially and later by other kinds of public media. In the conceptualization of modern normative political theory, civil society indicates a successful transition from feudal to capitalist society or from traditional to modern ones. This is how the classical theorists of civil society, including Hegel, Marx and Gramsci, have theorized it. In the more recent theorizations of civil society in the last decades of the 20th century, civil society also included in its domain the activities of nongovernmental and non-political organizations and social movements that raise political issues and create mobilization around them outside the conventional fora of political parties and pressure groups.

In the case of the Indian story, by contrast, the bourgeoisie’s dominance in civil society was never strong enough to establish its hegemony. The Indian bourgeois instead opted for a historical compromise with the ‘traditional’ or feudal elements in society, that is, the landed classes. The task of carrying out the transition of society was shifted to the state and its bureaucracy. Following Gramsci, the neo-Marxist approach in the 1980s and 1990s termed the Indian case of the state leading the transition from above as ‘passive revolution’, since civil society was not the central site of the active transformation of common sense for the establishment of the hegemony of the bourgeois (and by implication, of the modern; Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14; Kaviraj, 1989, pp. 2429–2444). In the Nehruvian strategy of planned economic development with the state at the helm of economic affairs, the Indian state was able to protect its relatively weak capitalist class with the strategy of import-substitution and protection from foreign competition, while at the same time it was able to preside over capital accumulation, with a state-controlled public sector investing in heavy or capital goods industries and infrastructure, transport and telecommunications, mining, banking and insurance industries (Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14). This model of economic development was historically in consonance with the global trends favouring interventionist states under the post-Second

State, Society and the Nation  59 World War influence of Keynesian economics. The accompanying strategy of political development included the adoption of a representative democracy with a universal adult franchise and a commitment to government spending on public welfare sectors like health, education and infrastructure. This meant that the state was committed to looking after the basic needs of sections of society adversely affected by the processes of capital accumulation (Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14). From the level of global discourse on development involving global agencies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, from the 1970s onwards, there was a marked emphasis on efforts by governments to implement measures to alleviate absolute poverty in the developing countries, even as the processes of globalization and liberalization were under way around the same time (Sanyal, 2007). While the Marxist analyses focused on the relationships between the state, the economy and the social classes and thus on the metapolitics of class dominance and hegemony, political scientists of liberal and pluralist persuasions, such as Rajni Kothari, Morris Jones, Rudolphs, Atul Kohli, Francine Frankel, M. S. A. Rao and others, tended to place much more emphasis on the importance of the domain of politics (or political system) and the role of political parties, without, however, necessarily ignoring the role of the social classes. Kothari’s influential model of ‘the Congress system’ (or ‘one dominant party system’) explained post-Independence Indian politics in terms of the centrality of the processes of consensus building, creating conditions for both systemic stability and manageable state – society relations. According to this model, the Congress Party – electorally dominant at both the Union and the state levels until the 1960s – functioned like an umbrella organization, including in its capacious arms a wide variety of ideological positions ranging from the left to the right, while broadly maintaining a centrist consensus. In addition, the party could also accommodate the perspectives and demands of the opposition parties and pressure groups, which were otherwise not in a position to acquire power (Das, 2013; Kothari, 1999). In this analysis, the party system performed an important function of mediating between the state and society through the processes of demand (or interest) articulation and aggregation. From the 1970s onwards, this system fell into crisis due to the increased demands and expectations caused by the processes of deepening democracy and the limits of the state’s capacity to address these beyond a point. In the decade of the 1970s, the increased pressures of democratic demands, rival political parties and the social movements led to what Kothari termed a crisis of political institutions (Das, 2013; Hasan, 2002). The obverse of deinstitutionalization was a combination of increased personalization, populism and authoritarianism, all united in the figure of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and culminating in the declaration of Emergency in 1975, a watershed moment in the history of Indian politics. In his work in the early 1990s, Atul Kohli takes up the theme of deinstitutionalization or institutional decay and personalization of politics

60  Mohinder Singh and diagnoses a full-fledged ‘crisis of governability’ caused by the twin processes (Das, 2013; Hasan, 2002). Deinstitutionalization and the ‘Crisis of Governability’ The argument about deinstitutionalization was developed by Rajni Kothari to refer to the twin phenomena of the decline of institutions like the political party and other state and civil society institutions, on the one hand, and of the personalization of power by the leader, on the other. Historically, it referred to Indira Gandhi’s populist and authoritarian style of leadership in the early 1970s, whereby she sought a direct connection with the masses, weakening institutional mediation. In his book, Democracy and Discontent, Kohli developed the argument further, showing through his empirical studies how the decline of democratic political institutions in the 1980s India, including that of the organizational apparatus of the Congress Party, had led to a fullfledged ‘crisis of governability’. Susanne Rudolph and Lloyd Rudolph’s (1987) important analysis, In Pursuit of Lakshmi, also explains Indian polity in terms of the centrality of the state in what they called a regime of ‘command polity’ until the 1980s. They termed the Indian state as a powerful ‘third actor’ in politics beyond capital and labour, traditionally considered the two main actors in class politics. The centrality of the state makes class politics marginal in India. Since the state controlled a variety of national resources, including public sector investments, it tended to be the centre of attraction for diverse demand groups (Das, 2013; Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987; Sinha, 2016, pp. 1–8). In an argument similar to Kaviraj’s and Chatterjee’s theme of ‘passive revolution’, the Rudolphs also attribute the centrality of the state and the marginality of overt class politics in civil society to the simultaneity of state-led industrialization and full-fledged representative democracy. Again, in a way similar to the post-1970s Marxist analyses, the Rudolphs also emphasized the increased importance of the landed class in Indian politics after the Green Revolution. For the Rudolphs, the politically important landed class was constituted by the middle-level landowning self-cultivating class and not so much by the large landowners. The master key for the explanation of Indian politics until the last decade of the 20th century was the conflict between a ‘demand polity’, in which the demands from various social groups were expressed in terms of electoral pressures, and a ‘command polity’, in which the state’s centrality and dominance over society held sway (Sinha, 2016, pp. 1–8). Another influential analysis of the Indian state and politics during this period was by Francine Frankel and M. S. A. Rao. The crucial element in their analysis is the distinction between public institutions of the state apparatus – the bureaucracy, judiciary and other such public institutions

State, Society and the Nation  61 of cultural capital formation like the key educational institutions – and the political institutions of the representative democracy. The story of Indian politics is accordingly told as that of the tussle between the entrenched privilege of the upper caste and classes in the public institutions on the one hand and the growing presence of the lower caste and class groups in the democratic political institutions on the other hand. In Frankel and Rao’s analysis too, the processes of politics are given a prominent place (Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14; Das, 2013; Hasan, 2002). As mentioned earlier, the decade of the 1990s began with a torrent of history-changing events, not just in India but at the global level. The liberalization of the Indian economy was one of those events. The process of economic liberalization got underway officially with the announcement of the first budget of the newly elected Congress government under Prime Minister P. V. Narsimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. Economic liberalization involves structural adjustment of the economy from a mixed economy to a market economy. The multipronged strategy of liberalization involved removing the bureaucratic and other shackles on the market processes generally and on the flow of capital particularly, along with the gradual withdrawal of the state’s investments in the public sector and its commanding role in the planning process. Eventually, in the second decade of the 21st century, the planning commission itself was abolished altogether. To what extent liberalization has affected the role of the state is a matter of debate. Most scholars, however, agree that the Indian state became more ‘hospitable to capital’, even though their respective evaluations of this hospitability might differ. Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Neerja Gopal Jayal summarize this shift in the position of the Indian state in these words: The essence of this transformation is that the market, rather than the state, will command the leading heights of the economy. But the state will remain an important actor. State power will be used to restructure society to make it more hospitable to market relations. An entire gamut of legal regimes that govern property, labour, and natural resources will have to be restructured to make them hospitable to capital. (Jayal & Mehta, 2010, p. xviii) This characterization entails the loss of some amount of autonomy for the state compared to the preceding period. The Rudolphs characterized this transformation in terms of a shift from an interventionist state to a regulatory state (Sinha, 2016, pp. 1–8). The Marxist analyses of the ­post-liberalization Indian state also underscored the notable ascendancy of the power of the corporate capitalist class relative to the landed elite compared to the ­pre-liberalization regime (Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 3–14). The previously mentioned characterizations of the Indian state caution against the assumption of the erosion of the power of the state under the

62  Mohinder Singh twin impacts of liberalization and globalization. The real story is more about the shift in the power of the state. The transition to a free market economy and the rigours and hardships it entails for various sections of society often requires a strong state. Similarly, with regard to the welfare measures, the liberalization of the economy did not simply mean their demise, but the approach to and the content of the welfare measures underwent significant transformation. Instead of the state being responsible for investing in the infrastructure of welfare like health, education and public distribution systems, the post-liberalization governance and policy models favour schemes of direct transfer of benefits and cash to the poor and the marginal sections of society. Again, as mentioned earlier, such schemes for the continuance of a modicum of welfare measures were necessitated by democratic pressures as well as sanctioned by the global discourse of development (Chatterjee, 2010; Sanyal, 2007). In India, some of the progressive legislation such as the annual employment guarantee schemes for the poor and the Right to Information Act were passed a decade after the onset of liberalization during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) (2004–2014). For the orthodox supporters of liberalizing reforms, the economic reforms of the 1990s were slow, partial and incomplete insofar as they did not carry out pro-market labour reforms and did not end the subsidy regimes for farmers, which were seen as a distortion of the market principle (Corbridge  & Harriss, 2000). In addition, the policy of the minimum support price for agricultural products also distorted the functioning of the market. The latter two issues were hoped to be addressed by passing a set of ‘farm laws’ in the Parliament in 2020. However, in the face of the massive movement against these laws, the Union Government repealed them in early 2022. Both the subsidy schemes for agricultural inputs and the regime of minimum support price had a strong class-based backing of the politically and electorally powerful rich and self-cultivating middle-level farmers, particularly in the Green Revolution pockets. The most significant societal backing for economic liberalization, apart from industrial and financial corporates, came from what is termed as the ‘new middle class’, referring to both the managerial and bureaucratic elites and the aspirational and globally oriented sections of society engaged in the large service sector of the economy and to white-collar employees generally. The opening of the economy and the enlargement of the service sector in turn increased the demographic expanse and political significance of the new middle class. We may now briefly return to the theme of civil society, already broached earlier in the discussion. Historically, the reference point for the modern political theory is the rise of modern civil society in Western countries (see textbox on ‘Civil Society’). Several social scientists have come to question the assumption of a similar trajectory of capitalism, state and civil society relations in the postcolonial countries. Partha Chatterjee, for instance, has questioned the adequacy of the concept of civil society for understanding contemporary politics in non-Western countries. According to Chatterjee’s

State, Society and the Nation  63 recent theorization, the political domain in India is split between civil society and what he calls ‘political society’: Civil society in India today, peopled largely by the urban middle classes, is the sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois civil society and represents the domain of capitalist hegemony. If this were the only relevant political domain, then India today would probably be indistinguishable from other Western capitalist democracies. But there is the other domain of what I  have called political society, which includes large sections of the rural population and the urban poor. These people do, of course, have the formal status of citizens and can exercise their franchise as an instrument of political bargaining. But they do not relate to the organs of the state in the same way that the middle classes do, nor do governmental agencies treat them as proper citizens belonging to civil society. Those in political society make their claims on government, and in turn are governed, not within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual, and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct political negotiations. The latter domain, which represents the vast bulk of democratic politics in India, is not under the moral-political leadership of the capitalist class. (Chatterjee, 2010, p. 8) Chatterjee makes the conceptual distinction between civil society and political society by using two threads of argument. The first is that civil society is the domain of the middle class – primarily urban – and of the language of legality, rights and citizenship; whereas political society is a domain constituted by the population groups consisting primarily of rural Indians and the urban poor. In contrast to civil society, it is a domain of contingent negotiations that often blur the boundaries between legality and illegality. In other words, political society is constituted by population groups targeted by governmental welfare schemes negotiating with political parties and government agencies for benefits that are often related to the survival of these marginal sections of society. Thus, the state remains an important actor in political society as well. The second thread, which is a more recent extension of the concept, distinguishes civil society as the domain of the hegemony of the corporate capital. Political society, in contrast, is where a large and informal sector of non-corporate capital holds sway (Chatterjee, 2010, pp.  7–13). The latter domain of non-corporate capital is populated by the landed classes and petty local producers and traders. The two domains are in turn connected through the imperative of reversing the adverse effects of the hardship and dispossession liberalized market-driven capitalist development leaves in its wake. These adverse effects are sought to be offset through various governmental policy measures in our political society (Chatterjee, 2010, pp. 7–13). Social

64  Mohinder Singh scientists like Princely States like Corbridge et al. in their co-authored book, Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India, too, concur with Chatterjee’s contention about the presence of the large sector of informal or ­non-corporate capital and about the domain of equally informal political society with a presence of some kind of ‘shadow state’ therein. These scholars broadly agree with the analytical usefulness of political society but not entirely with Chatterjee’s detailed characterization of it. For them, the actors and processes of political society interact with the domain of civil society. In other words, for these scholars, the two domains do not have a watertight split, as seems to be the case in Chatterjee’s theorization. Instead, the boundaries between the two domains are ‘elusive’ (Corbridge et al., 2005, pp. 190– 216). With the theorization of political society, Chatterjee, Corbridge and others have also moved away from the historicist assumption of the Western historical transition as a normative model of transition from pre-capitalist (or ‘traditional’) to full-fledged capitalist (or modern) society. Indian State in Relation to Caste, Religious Communities and the Nation Historical Background

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, other than the structural transformation of the relationship between the economy and the state, the other two relevant themes for understanding the changing nature of the statesociety relationship in India in the last couple of decades are: ‘lower-caste’ assertions in politics and the ascendancy of Hindu nationalism providing a challenge to the secular character of the Indian state. A discussion of these themes will help us understand the state-society interaction in terms other than those of political economy and social classes. It will also bring into focus the questions of identity, cultural recognition, social justice and representation as important dimensions of Indian politics. Since the historical roots of the politics of both caste and religious communities in India are common, a brief historical survey of their colonial origins will be helpful. Recent scholarship has traced the roots of modern forms of caste and religion-based community identities to the colonial apparatuses of law and governmentality and to the avenues of political representation that have opened up gradually since the beginning of the 20th century. In addition, and in close relation to these apparatuses, the knowledge about India produced by orientalist and Indological discourses also contributed to the assumptions that underlay the colonial representation and classification of Indian society. Tracing the colonial genealogies of the civil society and community in India, Gyan Prakash has argued that the colonial regime’s inability to constitute a civil society in India was manifested in its application of the rule of ‘colonial difference’, according to which the state-society relationship in India was viewed very differently than in the case of European states, where

State, Society and the Nation  65 liberal political philosophy provided the model of state-society interaction. The foundational assumption underlying colonial power and knowledge apparatus was the perception of Indian society as consisting of religious communities, races, castes and tribes. These entities are supposed to act on the basis of collective, and not individual, interests and affiliations, as they are supposed to frequently invoke collective bonds and rights based on the ties of kinship and religion. In other words, the Indian social order gradually comes to be constituted in the image of the supposedly primordial communities of ascription. These communities were largely newly homogenized modern constructs produced by multiple factors, including the new legal system recognizing the autonomy of communities based on personal laws and the institutional practices of bureaucratic enumeration and classification (Prakash, 2002, pp. 27–39). The colonial legal system was also based on the assumption that India was constituted by religious communities, and the two largest religious communities were Hindus and Muslims. Thus, a unified and highly homogenized legal apparatus was established with provisions for different legal codes for personal laws for religious communities. One of the features of these codes was that they were based on privileging the textual authority of the scriptures. Such a privileging of scriptural authority had the impact of homogenization in a world where multiple systems of legality operated based on dynamic relationships between textual authority and different local, non-textual customs (Nair, 1996, pp. 19–38). The colonial census, beginning in the last quarter of the 19th century, also enumerated Indian people on the basis of religion and caste. In this way, new communities with inflexible boundaries and relatively more discrete identities began to gradually take shape (Prakash, 2002, pp. 27–39). These legal and administrative arrangements had or have had important consequences for the restructuring of the social spaces in India. One of the decisive consequences was the possibility of imagining horizontal mobilization of religious communities, which would in turn make the caste question an important but difficult to resolve question for the predominantly upper caste Hindu social reformers and early nationalist leaders. The parallel leadership of the non-Brahman Shudra and ‘untouchable’ castes in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, beginning with Jyotirao Phule and continuing with Periyar and Ambedkar, critiqued the caste Hindu reformers and nationalist leaders for either ignoring the caste question altogether as a question of historical injustice or for paying lip service at the most. From the first decade of the 20th century, the colonial state, along with some princely states, began to create institutional arrangements for protective discrimination in educational and administrative institutions in favour of the socially disadvantaged caste communities. By the 1930s, the notion of the ‘depressed classes’ (later Scheduled Castes [SCs]) became well entrenched in constitutional and political discourses. Both the non-Brahmanical Shudra castes (later Other Backward Classes [OBCs]) and the ‘depressed classes’ began to perceive the state and

66  Mohinder Singh law as the protectors of their interests and well-being against the oppressive and hierarchical social order of castes. Around the same time, that is, beginning with the first decade of the 20th century, there was competition for political representation as the provincial government institutions began to be opened for the Indian elected representatives. On the demand of the Muslim League, Muslims were officially recognized as a political minority and ‘separate electorate’ was officially granted in the Constitution of India Act of 1909. As the colonial government was considering the minority status and a ‘separate electorate’ for the ‘depressed classes’ along similar lines in the next round of constitutional reforms a decade later, Indian National Congress and Hindu Mahasabha (formed in 1915) strongly opposed this proposal, fearing that the Hindus’ demographic majority would be lost. Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar strongly pursued this demand throughout the next decade, and the question was eventually resolved in the historic Poona Pact (1932) between Gandhi and Ambedkar, which agreed on the system of reserved constituencies within the general electorate instead of a separate electorate for the ‘depressed classes’ (Tejani, 2007, pp. 199–233). Meanwhile, the idiom of minority and majority became entrenched in the political language as the events of these formative decades cast a long shadow on Indian politics of the subsequent decades. Caste and the Nation State

The Constitution of Independent India did away with the system of ‘separate electorate’ for political representation but kept the system of reserved constituencies for the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) communities in Parliament and State Assemblies. These provisions were included as a temporary measure initially but have been legislatively extended every ten years since then. In the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution, untouchability was abolished and made a crime. The Constitution also included provisions for reservations in government employment and in admissions to government educational institutions for SC and ST communities, thus creating a structure of exception to the classic individualist ‘equality of opportunity’ doctrine of the liberal political theory. The provisions were meant to create a level playing field for the historically disadvantaged with an orientation towards a more substantive conceptualization of equality. Thus, the Constitution, in some ways, laid the foundations for the Indian concept of social justice, whereby the state and the political processes were expected to play an active role in ameliorating caste-based inequalities. This idea of social justice would play an important part in Indian political discourse in the subsequent decades. The Constitution also continued with the separate system of personal laws for religious communities inherited from the colonial state; albeit, in the Directive Principles of State Policy, the provision for the Uniform Civil Code or one system of personal laws was kept as a recommendation for the future state to adopt. As part of its commitment to secularism, the Fundamental

State, Society and the Nation  67 Rights chapter of the Constitution also included special provisions for linguistic and religious minorities to establish their own educational institutions to protect their respective cultures. Although the word ‘secular’ was added to the Preamble of the Constitution in 1976 as part of the 42nd Amendment, it is the Fundamental Rights chapter that contains the core provisions regarding secularism. Thus, the citizenship regime envisaged in the Constitution is based on the recognition of both individuals and communities (Jayal, 2013, pp. 1–24). The Constitutional provisions of equality and non-discrimination, coupled with protections for the rights of minorities and the weaker sections, were significant milestones in Indian history insofar as they manifested the commitment of the Constituent Assembly to a secular state and for formal equality tweaked with a vision of substantive equality. The real hope of the Constituent Assembly, however – as expressed by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Dr Ambedkar, on the eve of the adoption of the Constitution – lay in the processes of politics that would unfold under the new democratic framework. Dr Ambedkar’s hope was that democratic politics would gradually affect change at the social level as well. In what ways did the democratic politics – both electoral and outside the institutional avenues in the public and political spheres – affect the social order, and to what extent did they challenge the established social hierarchies? And to what extent did they change the nature of the Indian state, insofar as no state exists in a vacuum and the nature of state power reflects social power? For the first three decades, the social dominance of the upper castes reflected their pre-eminence in the political domain as well. However, by all social science accounts, the nature of caste in India has been significantly affected by democratic politics. By the decade of the 1970s, most political scientists and sociologists – including Rajni Kothari, the Rudolphs, Louise Dumont, M. N. Srinivas and others – recognized that democratic politics was gradually transforming caste from a structural and hierarchically operating institution to a more horizontal principle of political mobilization. Castes were acquiring a hybrid form that combined features of modern associations or pressure groups with ascriptive identity groups (Jodhka, 2010, pp. 154–167). By the decade of the 1970s, the landed middle castes and the OBCs had become significant forces electorally and were exercising or sharing power at the level of state governments. By the early 1990s, the SC communities registered a significant presence in terms of an increase in political representation. The winning of the elections in the electorally largest state, Uttar Pradesh, by the alliance of the Samajwadi Party (a party predominantly supported by the OBC castes) and Bahujan Samaj Party (with SC communities as its predominant mass base) under the leadership of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati made the political presence and visibility of these caste groups nationally spectacular and a force to reckon with in future politics. In other states as well, important political leaders from OBC and SC (also Dalit) communities emerged and became significant players in several states as well as national level politics.

68  Mohinder Singh Most scholars agree that what has been called the ‘second democratic upsurge’ in Indian politics since the 1990s has significantly altered the nature of political representation of the historically disadvantaged caste groups and ensured their greater presence and visibility in politics. Yet at the same time, scholars have also raised questions about the extent of this presence at the social level. Yogendra Yadav, for instance, argues that while there is a significant increase in descriptive representation, that does not necessarily translate into substantive representation. Substantive representation means that representation must ensure the pre-eminence of the transformative and redistributive agendas that are central to the programmes and rhetoric of the political organizations striving for social justice (Yadav, 2010, pp. 347–360). Some scholars have termed this form of limited representation as a form of ‘political Sanskritization’ whereby ‘Dalit parties and candidates have canvassed majority opinion rather than articulating alternatives’. Even the most successful Dalit political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party, ‘works within the system’, forming pragmatic alliances that help secure power while diluting its transformative agenda’ (Gorringe, 2008, pp. 132–133). Along the same lines, another critical issue that came into light in the wake of the OBC empowerment and was raised by several scholars is whether the middle castes and OBCs have become the new oppressors of the Dalit communities. Another set of scholars, grounding their research in the ethnography of the Indian state and politics, have raised another important set of interesting questions. For instance, the recent works of Lucia Michelutti and Jeffrey Witsoe study the politics of the North Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar with a view to understanding the experience and perception of state power and politics by newly empowered caste groups. As a matter of fact, both have predominantly studied the perspectives of the Yadav caste in the two states. Their work shows that the increased presence of the hitherto subaltern groups in politics has brought with it a new vocabulary of democratic politics as well as their own ways of perceiving and experiencing the state power (Michelutti, 2008; Witsoe, 2011). An important aspect of contemporary Indian politics dominated by these caste groups, according to these scholars, is that their political vocabulary and approach to politics are substantially different from the political language of what Chatterjee has marked as the domain of elite politics in civil society. In general, Michelutti’s and Witsoe’s works are in consonance with the argument about the increasing predominance of the domain of political society. For Michelutti and Witsoe, this domain is dominated by the figures of the middlemen or the political mafias, figures who, in certain circumstances, may be openly conducting illegal business in the precincts of the Vidhan Sabha (Law Making Assembly)! This is not to say, Witsoe asserts, that the earlier modes of politics were sanely free from corruption or illegality. What the new openness about such practices has shown is that it was the same story all along, except that the facade of hygiene was successfully

State, Society and the Nation  69 maintained earlier. What such scholarly interventions have shown is that the experience of the state in India is ‘intimately connected with the experience of caste’ (Witsoe, 2011, p. 74). Furthermore, the continuation of the earlier modes of social dominance as well as the dominance of upper castes in the administrative apparatus of the Indian state came in contradiction with the democratic aspirations of the newly assertive caste groups. Witsoe (2011, p. 75) describes the resolution of this contradiction through a ‘hybrid mode of governance’: The specificities of what could be meaningfully termed ‘postcolonial governmentality’ in India are reflected in the ways in which these techniques of governance – exercised in relation to development discourse – are combined in practice with relations of dominance and subordination articulated in relation to caste, forming a hybrid mode of governance wherein the exercise of violence outside of the legitimated routines of ‘the state’ is a standard aspect of political life. It is therefore not surprising that caste identities have profoundly shaped the ways in which people imagine the state, and vice versa. On the other side of the caste coin – beyond seeking representation in the mainstream of Indian politics – scholars such as G. Aloysius (1997), Gail Omvedt (1994), Anupama Rao (2009) and others have traced another tradition of what has come to be known as ‘Dalit politics’ (Gorringe, 2008). This is a parallel and more radical tradition that can be traced back to leaders such as Phule, Periyar and Ambedkar in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Foundationally based on the critique of the underlying assumptions and practices of caste-Hindus dominated Indian nationalism, this political tradition seeks to expose the fundamentally exclusionary nature of Indian nationalism and raises substantive questions of the widespread and persistent anti-Dalit violence at the social level. As Aloysius pointed out, for the Dalit critique, Indian nationalism was a ‘nationalism without nation’ insofar as its foundational imagination not only excluded the Dalit cultures from the symbolic and cultural representations of the nation but also left the ‘social question’ of caste unresolved (Aloysius, 1997). According to this line of Dalit critique, if a nation was primarily a matter of feeling or sentiment of oneness, as Ambedkar maintained, then Indian nationhood could not be adequately imagined without radically transforming the caste-based social order (Gorringe, 2008). Anupama Rao’s (2009) recent study, The Caste Question, traces the long continuity of this tradition by a variety of political and cultural movements led by what she calls Dalit radicals, deriving their politics fundamentally from the radical Ambedkarite critique of the exclusionary and discriminatory social order and its legacy of violence. This tradition of Dalit politics is based on efforts to construct alternative identities for the people based on ‘Dalit visions’ of an egalitarian society (Gorringe, 2008; Omvedt, 1994).

70  Mohinder Singh Religion, Cultural Diversity and the Nation State

Nationhood is usually associated with the ‘sentiment of oneness’, as Ambedkar pointed out. Nations usually make claims to oneness on the basis of the unity of their cultures and a sense of common destiny. The unity of culture can in turn be further grounded on the basis of language, religion, ethnicity or some other common civilizational features. The institutions of both the state and civil society, such as education, art, cinema and culture, play a crucial role in instilling and cultivating ideas of nationhood and national identity. The Constitution of the state and political processes also make important contributions towards the same objectives. Different notions of national identity affect the citizens’ sense of belonging to the national collective differently. For instance, exclusivist notions of national identity tend to alienate some sections of the population, whereas more pluralist notions of national identity tend to be more accommodative of diversity within the population, including the groups that are in the minority – ethnic, religious, regional and linguistic (Khilnani, 2010, pp. 192–204). It is for these reasons that nation states pay a great deal of attention to the choice of emblems and symbols, such as flags, national songs and other such emblems. Similarly, for the same reasons, there are also regular contestations over the representations of the nation’s past and history in school textbooks and other cultural products. In the 19th century, Indians had to make the claim to Indian nationhood against the colonial regime’s denial of the same on the ground of its immense diversity. However, the ground or the cultural content of Indian nationhood and national identity has remained fiercely contested since the nineteenth century, the main contest being between the pluralist and secularist imaginations of Indian nationhood and the Hindu nationalist imagination (Khilnani, 2010, pp.  192–204). Since its inception with the formation of the Hindu Mahasabha (1915) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, 1925), Hindu nationalism has been critical of the imagination of India as a secular nation. Hindu nationalism identified the Indian nation exclusively with Hindu culture and Hindu history in opposition to a composite and pluralist imagination of secular nationalism in the Gandhian, Tagorean, Nehruvian and leftist strands of Indian politics. Although this contest around Indian culture, history and national identity has been continuing in the public sphere for the last hundred years, in the political sphere, Hindu nationalist politics had remained relatively marginal until the decade of the 1990s. On the eve of Independence, India also faced all these questions for the inauguration of the newly independent nation-state. The Constituent Assembly debated threadbare the questions of cultural diversity and national identity, along with other primary questions. The newly promulgated Constitution sought to reflect a pluralist-secular vision of national identity through several of its provisions, but most importantly in the provisions regarding the protection of rights of minority communities – both religious and linguistic. The RSS, representing the majoritarian Hindu nationalist perspective, had

State, Society and the Nation  71 opposed the provisions for secularism in the Indian Constitution as well as the legislative efforts to reform the personal laws of the Hindus through the Hindu Code Bill (1950s), which was eventually passed as a series of legislations from 1955 to 1958. The reform of the personal laws of the majority community and not those of the minority communities by the national legislature has been one of the key political issues in the arsenal of Hindu nationalist politics since the 50s. As other critics of the practices of Indian secularism have also pointed out, this has remained one of its major anomalies. However, it can be read in different ways. Some critics have read it as an example of a close identification of the Indian parliamentarians in the 1950s with the majority community (Chatterjee, 1998, pp. 345–379). The right-wing Hindu nationalists have, on the other hand, interpreted it as one of the signs of ‘minority appeasement’ inherent in Indian secularism. Dubbing secularism in India as ‘pseudo-secular’, the Hindu nationalists have been demanding the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code as one their main political agendas. The Problem of Majoritarianism The problem of majoritarianism in contemporary politics arises when the numerical social majority in a nation state is sought to be given primacy, dominance or greater say in the political decisions affecting the entire society. Such a social majority is usually categorized in terms of one or other of the ethnic criteria like language, religion, race or region. This is different from the principle of political majority. The office of political power in modern representative democracies is occupied temporarily for a given period of time. After serving the assigned duration, the ruling party or a coalition of parties is supposed to vacate the office for the next claimant. In first past the post systems of parliamentary democracies, like in India, the party (or the coalition of parties) having the majority of the members of the lower house of the parliament can rule for the fixed period of time. This is the principle of political majority. The tendency to conflate the principle of temporary political majority with a more durable or permanent dominance of a majority ethnic group over other groups in society – so frequently observed in contemporary politics in all parts of the world – leads to the problem of majoritarianism. In party politics, Hindu nationalism was represented by the Jan Sangh until 1980, the year in which it was renamed as the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) after the split of the Janata Party. The decades of the 1980s and 1990s saw a resurgence of Hindu nationalist politics as the BJP emerged as one of the key players in Indian politics. Some important national-level events in the 1980s gave a big impetus to the agendas and politics of Hindu nationalism,

72  Mohinder Singh which were taken up with great vigour in the public sphere by the BJP and other Hindu nationalist organizations such as the RSS and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. In the wake of the secessionist disturbances in Punjab, the assassination of Indira Gandhi, and the anti-Sikh violence that followed the assassination, the Congress Party itself began to cater to Hindu nationalist sentiments. Another important event that added to the arsenal of Hindu nationalist politics was the opening of the lock on the Babri Masjid. The latter was a case of the successful revival of a long-pending agenda in Hindu nationalist politics. In the 1990s, the BJP was successful in forming government at the Union level twice, leading coalitions of parties both times. During both these stints – the second time for the full five years beginning in 1999 – the pressures of coalition politics ensured that the three core agendas of the BJP’s Hindu nationalist politics, namely the disputed structure of the Babri Masjid; the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution dealing with special provisions for the state of Jammu and Kashmir; and the inclusion of ‘Uniform Civil Code’ in the Constitution, were kept out of the ‘common minimum programme’ of the coalition governments. Thus, the famed ‘centrism’ of Indian politics was maintained during these stints. However, in its second coming to power, with a full majority twice in 2014 and 2019, the BJP, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi – with the backing of the RSS – is not shying away from implementing all its major agendas, with critical implications for changing the nature of the Indian state as well. The BJP has managed to implement two of its ‘core agendas’. The construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya on the site of the demolished Babri Masjid is underway, and Article 370 has been abrogated, with a constitutional challenge to it pending in the Supreme Court. The third of its core agendas, that is, the legislation of the Uniform Civil Code, appears to be impending. The declared intention of the Hindu nationalists for decades has been to change the Indian nation state from a secular to a Hindu nation. However, to what extent it is intended to be formalized through a constitutional amendment is unclear and remains to be seen. One of the key steps towards such formalization was taken in the form of the recent Citizenship Amendment Act (2019), wherein one of the criteria for application for Indian citizenship is based on religious grounds. The passing of this Act saw widespread agitations against it, and multiple challenges to its constitutional validity are pending in the Supreme Court. Summing Up This chapter has tried to assess the nature of the Indian state from three different perspectives: the political economy perspective; the perspective of caste; and the perspective of cultural diversity and national identity. The primary focus of the chapter is on the post-1990s changes in the nature of the Indian state from these perspectives. In addition, the chapter also tried to analyse the state in terms of its visibility to different sections of the Indian population. As we have shown, most scholarly analyses of Indian political economy, the

State, Society and the Nation  73 politics around the question of caste, and the politics of religion and cultural diversity emphasize the role of democratic politics in shaping and, from time to time, transforming the nature of the Indian state in important ways. In other words, the processes of democratic politics since the 1950s have provided an important constraint on the functioning of the Indian state. There are, however, other constraints within which the state has to function. These latter include the fact of social dominance of classes, castes and communities as important constraint on the state. In addition, particularly in the analysis of the political economy of the state, the changing patterns of its relations with the global capitalist economy have been a crucial factor as well. The Indian state can be seen to be working within these – often contradictory – constraints or pressures, seeking to simultaneously balance interests and pressures from several directions. Another important question that is often asked by students of the Indian state – particularly in relation to political economy analyses – is whether the Indian state is autonomous of the dominant interests, and if so, to what extent. On this question, several critical analyses of Indian political economy show that post-liberalization, the Indian state has become ‘more hospitable’ to the interests of the capitalist classes. Yet due to democratic pressures, the state could not turn a blind eye to the poorest sections of the population and, from time to time, came up with different schemes to provide direct benefits in terms of cash, kind or state-funded employment guarantee schemes. In relation to castes and religious communities too, the transformation in the nature of the state is dependent on the contradictory pressures of democratic politics on the one hand and the assertion of the powers of socially dominant communities on the other. Since the 1990s, the time of the ‘second democratic upsurge’, the Dalit and OBC castes have been able to secure greater participation in political power and challenge the domination of the upper castes at the social level, albeit to a limited extent. In addition, these caste groups have been able to get legislation for more effective legal protection of the Dalit communities from violence from the dominant sections. With regard to the relationship of the state with the religious communities, the rise of Hindutva majoritarianism – again beginning in the 1990s – has challenged the secular-pluralist framework of the Constitution with its own majoritarian agenda, particularly since 2014. Bibliography Aloysius, G. (1997). Nationalism without a nation in India. Oxford University Press. Bardhan, P. (1984). The political economy of development. Oxford University Press. Chatterjee, P. (1998). Secularism and tolerance. In R. Bhargava (Ed.), Secularism and its critics. Oxford University Press. Chatterjee, P. (2002). Developmental planning and the Indian state. In Z. Hasan (Ed.), Politics and the state in India. Sage Publications. Chatterjee, P. (2010). The state. In N. G. Jayal  & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford companion to politics in India. Oxford University Press.

74  Mohinder Singh Corbridge, S., & Harriss, J. (2000). Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu nationalism and popular democracy. Polity Press. Corbridge, S., Williams, G., Srivastava, M.,  & Veron, R. (2005). Seeing the state: Governance and governmentality in India. Cambridge University Press. Das, S. (2013). Introduction. In A. Vanaik & S. K. Das (Eds.), Political science: Vol. 1. The India state. Oxford University Press. Fuller, C. J., & Benei, V. (Eds.). (2001). Everyday state and society in modern India. Hurst. Gorringe, H. (2008). The caste of the nation: Untouchability and citizenship in South India. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 42(1), 123–149. Hasan, Z. (2002). Introduction: The political career of the state in independent India. In Z. Hasan (Ed.), Politics and state in India. Sage Publications. Jayal, N. G. (2013). Citizenship and its discontents: An Indian history. Harvard ­University Press. Jayal, N. G., & Mehta, P. B. (2010). Preface to the student edition. In N. G. Jayal & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford companion to politics in India. Oxford University Press. Jodhka, S. (2010). Caste and politics. In N. G. Jayal & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford companion to politics in India. Oxford University Press. Sanyal, K. (2007). Rethinking capitalist development, primitive accumulation, ­governability and post-colonial capitalism. Routledge. Kaviraj, S. (1989). A critique of the passive revolution. Economic & Political Weekly, 23(45–47), 2429–2444. Khilnani, S. (2010). Politics and national identity. In N. G. Jayal & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford companion to politics in India. Oxford University Press. Kohli, A. (1990). Democracy and discontent: India’s growing crisis of governability. Cambridge University Press. Kothari, R. (1999). Politics in India. Orient-Longman Limited. Michelutti, L. (2008). Vernacularisation of democracy: Politics, caste and religion in India. Routledge. Nair, J. (1996). Women and law in colonial India: A social history. Kali for Women. Omvedt, G. (1994). Dalits and the democratic revolution: Dr  Ambedkar and the Dalit movement in colonial India. Sage Publications. Prakash, G. (2002). Civil society, community, and the nation in colonial India. Etnográfica, 6(1), 27–39. Rao, A. (2009). The caste question: Dalits and the politics of modern India. Permanent Black. Rudolph, L., & Rudolph, S. (1987). In pursuit of Lakshmi: The political economy of the Indian state. Chicago University Press. Sinha, A. (2016). A distinctive Indian political economy: New concepts and a synthesizing framework. Studies in Indian Politics, 4(2), 1–8. Skinner, Q. (1989). The state. In T. Ball, J. Farr, & R. Hanson (Eds.), Political innovation and conceptual change. Cambridge University Press. Tejani, S. (2007). Indian secularism: A social and intellectual history. Permanent Black. Witsoe, J. (2011). Corruption as power: Caste and the political imagination of the postcolonial state. American Ethnologist, 38(1), 73–85. Yadav, Y. (2010). Representation. In N. G. Jayal & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford companion to politics in India. Oxford University Press.

3 Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People Aditya Nigam

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the origin of the idea of ‘populism’ and the complex debates related to it. The label ‘populism’ has acquired unprecedented currency lately and is used to indiscriminately describe such a wide range of political figures and political tendencies that it seems to have lost all conceptual meaning. In the best of times, it was a slippery concept that has been linked to democracy at the one end (Arditi, 2007; Canovan, 1999; Eatwell  & Goodwin, 2018; Urbinati, 2019) and fascism (Finchelstein, 2017) and authoritarian anti-pluralism and extreme majoritarianism (Muller, 2017; Urbinati, 2019) at the other. In the Western European context, in recent times, it has been noted that ‘the dominant tendency in scholarly literature has been to identify and analyse the rise of populism . . . as a phenomenon exclusively of the Right’ (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). In between, there are a range of other theorists and scholars who see populism as the democratic ‘excess’ that escapes the attempt of liberal-­ representative institutions to rein it in (Arditi, 2007; Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018) or at any rate, as a term that liberal elites deploy in denunciations of this democratic other (Rancière). In more recent times, it has been used to refer to a whole range of negative tendencies associated with the rise of forces that combine a fascist kind of anti-political demagoguery with the rhetoric of the (national) ‘underdog’ oppressed by an elite (usually with international links). Nadia Urbinati (2019, p.  112), however, suggests what is new in the 21st c­ entury with respect to populism is that ‘scholars and citizens have started conceiving it not only as a symptom of decline of representative institutions but also as an opportunity for rejuvenating democracy’ – even though, she underlines, the term continues to be employed more polemically than analytically. The range of possible meanings, in other words, is quite unbelievable. The way the term is used these days to describe everyone from a Donald Trump, a Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or a Narendra Modi, on the one hand, to the late Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa or even Bernie Sanders or Podemos and Syriza, on the other, defies all logic. What possible common DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-5

76  Aditya Nigam denominator can one find between such diverse figures and political formations? The only common denominator across all these tendencies that one can think of, is the idea of ‘the people’ or the ‘underdog’ that they invoke, even if in completely different ways. Margaret Canovan, one of the pioneers of the study of populism, in fact, underlined this aspect in one of her early essays. As distinct from the patriot/ nationalist, the socialist and the liberal, she posited the populist: ‘To some, the basic datum of politics is “the people” and the man who sees the political world in these terms is the populist’ (Canovan, 1984, p. 313). It seems to me, however, that there is hardly any form or mode of modern politics that does not, in some fashion, invoke ‘the people’ and popular sovereignty. In her later writings, however, Canovan has underlined her contention that populism is really a response to contradictions within liberal democracy, where the democratic impulse is constantly subverted by its increasing reliance on ‘pragmatic’ and ‘technocratic’ elites (cited in Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, p. 48). Indeed she suggests that as long as we have liberal democracies, populism will continue to follow it like a shadow (Canovan, 1999, cited in Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, p. 48). Though this way of putting it narrows down the meaning considerably, any view that understands the phenomenon primarily in terms of its invocation of ‘the people’, willy-nilly makes it into a feature of politics as such. It is perhaps for this reason that Ernesto Laclau claims that ‘populism is, quite simply, a way of constructing the political’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 11). The problem is that such a view can simply lead to the concept becoming utterly vacuous and, therefore, meaningless. As the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen (2018) put it sometime ago, ‘Populists may be authoritarians, ethnonationalists, nativists, Leftists, Rightists, xenophobes, proto-Fascists, Fascists, autocrats, losers from globalization, moneyed provocateurs, conservatives, socialists, and just plain unhappy or frustrated or bored people – anyone, from the crazed to the rational, from the racist to the tolerant’. However, there is something else at work here. This infinite malleability of the concept and its easy transferability across widely differing contexts conceals something else – the denigration or denunciation of the popular. This is what leads Laclau to see a ‘strong element of ethical condemnation’ in the widespread dismissal of populism; as something that ‘has been part of the discursive construction of a certain normality, of an ascetic political universe from which its dangerous logics had to be excluded’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 19). The Denigration of the Popular There was a time, in the 1960s and the 1970s, when populism was seen as a problem of ‘backward’ or ‘developing’ societies with an ‘incomplete’ democratic evolution. It was seen as being tied to attempts to resist modernization and industrialism (Urbinati, 2019, p. 114). Populism was a problem either of agrarian societies with predominantly peasant population or it belonged to

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  77 Latin American societies that had not yet fully evolved as democracies (for a discussion of this scholarly literature, see Laclau, 1979, pp. 144–153). Marxists in general (with rare exceptions) saw populism as tied to the appeal of a ‘vague’ or ‘nebulous’ idea of ‘the people’ – as opposed to the more ‘precise’ and ‘scientific’ idea of class. At a more common-sense level, however, ‘populism’ was always a simple term of abuse, used by elites of all sorts, for whoever sided with the ‘underdog’ – the excluded, the marginalized and the exploited. In more recent times, in the era of the rise of Donald Trump in the USA and xenophobic right-wing politics in Europe, the term has now come to envelope practically all kinds of politics – as underlined in Roger Cohen’s passage cited earlier. Perhaps this itself should alert us to what is going on here. When one attacks millionaires like Donald Trump or Ross Perot in the USA or Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (Urbinati’s examples) as populist, it is not to them and their wealthy, elite backgrounds that one is referring to but rather to the popular support that they are, for some reason, able to gather around them. Urbinati suggests, quite plausibly, that popular identification with these leaders was perhaps precisely because their supporters ‘were looking for someone who was successful but held the same values as theirs’ (Urbinati, 2019, p. 119, emphasis added). This reference to their ‘holding the same values’ gestures to the often small-town, provincial support base who indulged in what, during Trump’s campaign, was called ‘locker-room talk’. Citing C. Mudde, Urbinati goes on to say that for these reasons, ‘millionaires like Berlusconi, Perot and Trump fit populist anti-establishment rhetoric as they “can be considered more authentic representatives of the people than leaders with a more common socio-economic status” ’ (Urbinati, 2019, p. 119). While this seems largely correct, what remains problematic from the point of view of my argument here is that this way of looking at populism shifts the focus almost entirely to the popular aspect, that is to the support base, as though that were the defining element in this phenomenon. It is almost as if all that Trump or Berlusconi or a Bolsonaro and a Modi can be held guilty of, is ‘pandering to the masses’, who remain the real villains. We cannot go into a detailed examination of this right-wing phenomenon here but I suggest that it is critical to separate out these kind of elite interventions and see them for what they are – a part of what I will call, following G. M. Tamas and Enzo Traverso, the ‘post-fascist constellation’ (Tamas, 2000; Traverso, 2017; see in particular, El-Ojeli, 2018). Traverso, in particular, has suggested that this is a phenomenon where many organizations displaying allegiance to fascist ideas and practices are still undergoing a mutation, for they realize that if they still advanced such arguments, they would not get a hearing today (Traverso, 2017). In this sense, there is a fundamental difference between say the populism of a Lalu Yadav, a Mayawati, a Mamata Banerjee or an Arvind Kejriwal and right-wing proto-fascist movements of the kind represented by the elite leaders mentioned earlier.

78  Aditya Nigam Free Lunch If the denigration of the popular is central to the designation of something as populist, as Laclau and Rancière suggest, we can also see how that denunciatory mode continues to operate in our contemporary discourse. With just a little further probing we can see, for instance, how neoliberal orthodoxy had made this term into a very special kind of invective, which basically rejected any demand to provide what it called a ‘free lunch’ to ordinary people. ‘Free lunch’, neoliberal theologians would have us believe, was all about subsidies, cheap public health and education, or in countries like India, subsidized electricity or free water being simply scandalous in their language. Schemes like rice at ₹2 a kilo that some southern state governments in India introduced at different times – or midday meals for school children – would qualify as madness to the neoliberal ideologue.

All this, we must remember, while endless free banquets for the corporations and capitalists continue – in the form of tax holidays, suppression of labour rights, hire and fire, unlimited access to government-acquired forest and agricultural land and of course, plunder of crores of rupees of people’s savings through banks that are eventually written off, not to mention bailouts in times of crises. Neoliberal ideology provided immaculate theoretical and philosophical justifications as to why such endless free banquets for capital were necessary for humanity’s common good, while even small subsidies to the poor constituted populism. ‘Populism’ was the label used when you gave to ordinary people; it was ‘tough medicine’ or a ‘bitter pill’ when you gave to predatory capital. All this was justified in the name of an economic theology at the centre of which was capital – misleadingly called ‘market’, for the market actually never operated on its own and all these measures including land acquisition and clearing of forests reveal the very visible hand of the state in enabling the banquet loot. It is, therefore, not surprising that for a number of theorists and scholars, ‘populism’ represented a revolt against existing representative-parliamentary oligarchy (or plutocracy), that is equally misleadingly called democracy. Jacques Rancière underlines that the institution of parliamentary representative practices in Europe historically, was meant to control rather than facilitate the advance of democracy (Rancière, 2006). ‘Democracy’, in the reading of this group of political philosophers, is fundamentally about the claim of equality, which was kept in check by limiting representation to the ‘qualified’, that is, educated property owners. Just in case we need to be reminded, universal suffrage was not a reality in most parts of Europe till the early decades of the 20th century and was achieved though prolonged struggles.

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  79 Nor should we be surprised that the Nazi jurist and thinker Carl Schmitt (1992) saw in the rise of ‘mass democracies’ (and fascism and Nazism), the revolt against the liberal-representative system. In a very different way, Schmitt put his finger on the key issue at stake. Parliamentary institutions, he argued, were based on the centrality of the idea of free and reasoned deliberations, which assumed among other things, ‘willingness to be persuaded’ and ‘freedom from selfish interests’ (Schmitt, 1992, p. 5). However, the rise of ‘mass democracy’ had ‘made argumentative public discussion an empty formality’, for parties no longer faced each other ‘discussing opinions’ but ‘as social or economic power groups calculating their mutual interests and opportunities for power’ (Schmitt, 1992, p. 6). Schmitt celebrates the crisis of parliamentary institutions and rise of ‘mass democracy’ for altogether different reasons: the arrival of the ‘propaganda apparatus’ of the party and the mass media, with its appeal to passions of the masses opened the way for the Nazis’ accession to power. His account, nevertheless, tells us of the deep antagonism between the elite institutions of representative parliamentary system and the ordinary masses that made possible their fascist/Nazi mobilization. A strong element of the liberal denigration of the popular or the mass provides the sub-text, so to speak, of this story of the rise of fascism as well. However, this denigration or denunciation of the popular has roots that go way back to the 19th century in Europe – a point that Laclau (2005) discusses at length.

The Idea of ‘the People’ and Modern India Interestingly, in our own history in India, we do not really find such derision in the references to ‘the people’ or the popular, in modern times. In fact, terms like ‘the masses’ or even ‘the people’ are very recent. To this day, there are few terms in most of the Indian languages, to the best of my knowledge that come anywhere near ‘masses’ in the negative sense that it acquires in much of early European social theory. Terms like jan or janata (janagan in Bangla) or awam (plural of aam, or the common/ ordinary in Urdu) or lok are terms with largely positive connotations and almost all of them are reworked and re-deployed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in order to meet the requirements of modern politics. Lok is a good example of such a term, which has a very long history and can mean a range of things from ‘folk’ to ‘this-world’ or simply ‘world’ but is then deployed in a very modern sense to connote the ‘people’ and ‘popular’ as in loktantra or lokapriya, where it points to the emergence of an entirely new condition. Similarly, neither the Urdu term hujoom (crowd or multitude) nor the Hindi word bheed actually carry the negative charge that ‘the mass’ carries – except in some relatively very recent coinages like bheedtantra

80  Aditya Nigam (to translate ‘mob rule’). However, it should be underlined that often, this too can carry a very wide range of meanings – including simply unruly behaviour. Thus Gandhi, for instance, uses the term ‘mobocracy’ [in English], in one of his articles but actually means just this. The context is interesting. Gandhi was so perturbed on seeing the huge and somewhat unruly mass of people who had turned up to see him during the Non-cooperation Movement that he referred to it as mobocracy. Occasionally, he would also refer to some of the mass movements under the Congress leadership as ‘mobs’ – though his stance towards these ‘masses’ was not one of adversity but rather that of a teacher (Amin, 1995, pp. 12–13). In the accounts of the Great Rebellion of 1857, arguably the first big ‘mass movement’ of modern times, we hear of the sipahis, the rajas and the praja or riyaya in most collective actions that constitute it. Or we hear of the Muslims and Hindus, who believed that their religion was under threat from the Christian white man (Roy, 1994). Colonial accounts however, for understandable reasons, keep referring to ‘mobs’ and ‘crowds’ in much the same way as we find in standard European historical accounts. Even in much later mass movements like the Swadeshi movement in the first decade of the 20th century or the Non-cooperation and Khilafat movements in the early 1920s, we do not seem to have use of terms that even approximate the term ‘crowds’ and ‘masses’. In the context of social boycott during the Swadeshi movement, for example, Rabindranath Tagore uses the term lok-sammati to refer to the popular consensus or sanction behind the boycott (Sarkar, 2010). Lok-sammati is a very benign term, considering how critical Tagore was of social boycott programme. New terms like janata, mazdoor and kisan enter the vocabulary, alongside use of caste-specific ‘samaj’ categories. But there is none of the pejorative connotation of the kind that we associate with ‘crowds’ and ‘masses’ in European social theory. Perhaps, modern Indian explanations1 should caution us against wanting to see or understand our history purely in terms of the idea of the ‘masses’ and ‘the popular’ as they occur in modern politics in the West. I have already indicated that the persistent denigration of the popular in European social theory leads Laclau to draw the longer connection between it and the c­ ontemporary discourse on populism and it might be useful to quickly recapitulate it. Laclau connects this denunciatory mode with discussions around the idea of ‘the masses’ or ‘mass society’ in 19th-century Europe, which were critically linked to ‘the crowd’ and ‘crowd psychology’. We can think of a range of 19th-century theorists from Le Bon and Hippolyte Taine to Gabriel Tarde in this tradition. This debate spills into the early decades of the 20th century

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  81 and among the important representatives of this tradition of thinking, we have Ortega y Gasset (1994) and his celebrated book Revolt of the Masses. William Kornhauser identifies two distinct ways of thinking about mass society, where he identifies this particular trend with an aristocratic or conservative critique of mass society. The second trend that he calls the democratic critique is represented, among others, by Hannah Arendt in the 20th century. The democratic critics too retain principal elements of the conservative critique, he argues, especially their central preoccupation with the tyranny of the majority and the threats to freedom posed by ‘the masses’, but we cannot go into that question here.

Mass Society Both the aristocrats and the democrats agree that the rise of mass society has something to do with the breakdown of the class system, the breakdown of distinctions and the loss of the exclusive position enjoyed by the elite till that time. The breakdown of community ties and that greatly valourized process of individuation that was expected to lead to ‘man’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity’ – in other words, to the rise of the disengaged, autonomy-seeking, rational subject – was precisely what led to the emergence of the figure of the mass man. And this mass man, both the conservatives and democrats agreed, was not quite the autonomous rational subject, who desires freedom and who would become the ideal citizen, the bearer of rights. He is rather the character who becomes available for all kinds of fascist and totalitarian mobilizations for he does not want to be free but rather, seeks to transfer his agential authority to some figure of authority – the Fuhrer, Il Duce or the vanguard party. Masses, in the tradition of democratic criticism too, are not any less threatening to democracy and individual liberty, because they lend themselves to totalitarian mobilizations of all kinds.

If we try to think of mass movements in societies like ours in these terms, we would obviously be wide off the mark. For such widespread breakdown of community and the emergence of the atomized ‘mass man’ certainly does not constitute the dominant experience here. Class distinctions and the place of aristocratic nobility here were, of course, never anything like what they were in Europe. A proper history of mass politics in our society is yet to emerge but we can tentatively say that largely because of the context of nationalist mobilization under colonial rule, a different relationship was carved out between the nationalist elites and the common folk, given that the lot of the former was thrown together with that of the latter. Lower caste movements present a complicating dimension in this relationship but do not do much to change the overall dynamic of that relationship. Communal riots are perhaps

82  Aditya Nigam the only context where ‘crowds’ acquire a negative connotation but that is very different from the issue at hand. Revolt Against Liberal Democracy Our recent experience, globally, shows that electoral representative liberal institutions have been hijacked by capital, this time despite universal suffrage. A study by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page (2014, p. 577), for instance, raised serious doubts about the USA’s claims to being a democratic society, in the face of evidence that indicated that ‘policy-making is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans’. The study also acknowledged that ‘it is well established that organized groups regularly lobby and fraternize with public officials, move through revolving doors between public and private employment, provide self-serving information to officials, draft legislations and spend a great deal of money in election campaigns’ (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 567, emphasis added). This has been largely made possible by the capture of the institution called the political party. To be sure, one aspect of what is being called ‘populism’ is the revolt of the lower orders or the losers of neoliberal globalization. However, there is another aspect that is often missed in such representations: the recent rise of right-wing movements labelled populism, have equally to do with manoeuvres by capital, often involving relaying of specific narratives through privately owned corporate media. While all this may sound like the stuff of conspiracy theory, the point is by now very well established that when governments decide to bail out banks and corporations at the expense of ordinary salaried people (which led to Occupy Wall Street protests in the USA), or whether they write off thousands of crores of rupees of bank loans of corporations in India, they act in the strategic interests of capital, whatever the formal explanation that may be advanced for the same. We now also have evidence of more direct interference by capital in the political process in India – whether it concerns the direct involvement of a section of corporate capital in the appointment of ministers in the central Cabinet (as seen in the Radia Tapes affair during the United Progressive Alliance government), or the passage of three farm laws by the current National Democratic Alliance government (in the year 2020), first, as ordinances under the pandemic cover and then as formal laws in parliament – to mention just two cases.2 When such direct and indirect interference in the political process ceases to deliver the desired outcome because of mass discontent, other ways of political intervention also come into view. Again, the role of the corporate media in the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, leading to the electoral victory of Jair Bolsonaro, or the mass mobilization against the Left-wing populist regime of Hugo Chavez are quite well known – as is the role of the Big Media in the run-up to Modi’s prime ministership in India. I do not mean to suggest any causal connection here; nor am I arguing that the corporate media is the only or even the determining factor in all cases. I simply want to highlight

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  83 how, in many of the cases of what are now being presented to us as instances of populism, the not-so-hidden hand of capital is quite apparent. In other words, I wish to reiterate what is problematic about these forces is not that they lean toward the popular but that they represent a moment in the class struggle, which today has come to mean the war declared by capital on practically every other section of the population. But there are other longer-term and more significant reasons why the revolt against liberal democracy (hijacked by Capital) might be channelled in conservative rather than radical directions. In their recent book, Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (2018) examine the rise of what they call ‘national populisms’ (i.e., right-wing populisms) in the West, drawing on a large number of empirical studies of shifts in electoral behaviour.

The Idea of ‘National Populisms’ The idea of ‘national populisms’ was presented by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (2018). Their characterization of these national populisms – which they treat sympathetically, focusing on the voters – as revolts against liberal democracy is set against longer term electoral – political trends. Of course, this long-term of about thirty-forty years is still the short-term from our point of view but their study does underline the deeply conservative nature of the rural and small town, White working class that feels both marginalized with globalization in economic terms and threatened by immigration in cultural terms. Eatwell and Goodwin underline that over this longish period, a sort of ‘de-alignment’ vis-à-vis traditional parties had set in among these less privileged voters in particular. To anyone perceptive to emerging trends, the slow rebellion building up would have been evident. The obvious question that arises here is why the anger against neoliberal globalization should manifest itself in the anger against the left-of-centre social democratic parties and left-wing ideas more generally? One of the answers that emerges from the book is that this eventuality is connected to another divide that has emerged across the West in more recent times – the divide between the college and university degree holders and those without degrees. The small-town white working class constitutes a predominant section of the latter group. This formal divide corresponds to an ‘ideological’ divide, where the first group (which also includes the ‘millennials’) is more cosmopolitan in its outlook, more alert to questions of gender and patriarchal oppression, racism, multiculturalism, climate change and everything else that the provincial white man of the second group sees as threatening to ‘our way of being’ – characterized by the male-dominated patriarchal family and the suspicion, if not hatred, of the non-white immigrants. Eatwell

84  Aditya Nigam and Goodwin also point out that this is why the cosmopolitanism of the relatively well-to-do, university-educated degree holders becomes threatening and it is so easily linked to the left (actually the new left, as the authors are at pains to underline; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, see in particular, Chapter 6). Eatwell and Goodwin cite a study by Italian scholar Pietro Ignazi who was among the first to have noticed a gathering backlash against the wide acceptability that ideas and practices associated with the new left had gained. These radical causes included ‘the sexual and student revolutions, campaigns for civil and women’s rights, opposition to nuclear weapons and Vietnam war, support for immigration and rising ethnic diversity, environmental campaigns and the promotion of identities and organizations that transcended the nation-state’ ­(Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, pp. 233–234). Way back in 1992, Ignazi called that backlash a ‘Silent Counter-Revolution’ and noted that ‘a mounting sense of doom in contrast to post-materialist optimism, has been transformed into new demands, mainly unforeseen by the established conservative parties’ (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, p. 236). These were accompanied by ‘calls for tough law and order, control of immigration and the reassertion of traditional values’ (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, p. 236).

Populism and the Nirgun People If what I have been arguing is right, then it brings us now to the question of what precisely populism is. If we hold on to the idea that at least a certain kind of mass movements and political formations that are clubbed as populism actually represent an elite/corporate intervention in the domain of the popular, how can we distinguish between movements/formations that can be called populist and those that I have called ‘post-fascist’? Let me make the distinction I have in mind clearer through a comparison of Arvind Kejriwal and Narendra Modi. Modi’s emergence as an all-India figure in 2013–2014 actually followed the breathtakingly tumultuous rise of Arvind Kejriwal and the Aam Aadmi Party on the political firmament and was quite clearly backed, if not orchestrated, by corporate capital and the big media controlled by it. His rise was relatively smooth and well crafted, with global PR firms engaged in giving him a complete image makeover and large sections of the secular but economically right-wing intelligentsia playing a significant role in dressing him up as the prospective, non-sectarian Prime Minister figure. Interestingly, while this section of the intelligentsia left no stone unturned in trying to set up Modi in his new avatar as the secular messiah of development, the very emergence of this figure on the scene activated the most virulent sections of Hindu right – ones which operated on the fringes, even of organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  85 Modi’s popular appeal at that level was inseparable from his image as the Chief Minister of Gujarat who had presided over the anti-Muslim carnage of 2002. This is not the place to enter into an elaborate discussion of the Modi phenomenon but it is necessary to underline that there was nothing here of what have been identified as characteristics of populism – most fundamentally the anti-systemic character of its discourse.3 A well-orchestrated attempt had sought to portray him, completely disingenuously, as the humble tea seller and the ‘outsider’ – very clearly as a counter-point to the figure of Arvind Kejriwal whose appeal was precisely that he was an outsider and did not belong to the political class. All this, coupled with the unprecedented scale of money that was poured into the campaign and the virtually total media ‘capture’ that became evident in the run up to the 2014 elections, should remind us that this was not a bunch of outsiders making a bid for power against all odds but a rise sponsored by the powerful ruling bloc. It should therefore alert us to the pitfalls of extending the category of ‘populism’ to describe the Modi phenomenon, if that term has to have any meaning at all. It is also important to stress here that while Kejriwal came in, almost literally, from nowhere, Modi had long been part of the RSS that not only draws inspiration from the Nazi experience but whose early links with Italian fascism too have been explored by scholars (Casolari, 2000). Further, Modi had personally participated in the Babri Masjid demolition campaign and presided over the state government of Gujarat from October  2001 to May 2014, during which the infamous anti-Muslims pogrom of 2002 had taken place. In other words, his fascist inspirations and his being an insider of fairly longstanding are pretty obvious.4 I want to underline here that no theorization of ‘populism’ has ever taken any Indian movement as its reference point, though many scholars studying Indian movements or political phenomena/figures like Lalu Prasad Yadav or Hindutva and lately the India against Corruption (IAC) movement and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), have often applied the category to these phenomena, in my view, without much serious thought.5 Interestingly however, unlike many other social science or philosophical concepts, ‘populism’, we have already noted, was not quite a European or even Euro-American category till very recently – largely because, for a very long time populism was seen by theorists as a sign of ‘backwardness’, of an incompleteness of democratic transformation in a manner of speaking.6 Thus the term has been used to translate the Russian term narodnik, which referred to a political current that based its opposition to Tsardom and its idea of emancipation on a generic notion of ‘people’ and ‘people’s will’. The only other formation that was called – and which called itself – populist was the People’s Party in the United States of America in the late 19th century. The People’s Party was decidedly anti-corporate and left wing in its orientation and its social base was largely agrarian. The term, however, actually entered the social sciences and acquired greater significance, in the context of many Latin American movements and regimes, through the 20th century,

86  Aditya Nigam even though some connection can clearly be made between them and certain strains in the 19th-century European phenomenon of mass democracy and its rebellion against the elitism of ‘representative democracy’. A combination of the endless elasticity of the concept on the one hand and its problematic relationship to the experience of mass politics in India has led to serious difficulties and often, gross misrecognition, when applied unthinkingly to phenomena here. While generally sympathetic to the characterization of the AAP as a populist force, in this chapter, I wish to specify a certain specific sense of the term that is key to understanding the AAP phenomenon. I argue, drawing on the preference for Nirgun over Sagun bhakti that many lower caste movements have often exhibited, that like the metaphysical categories of God/Iswara/ Brahman, the metaphysical category of ‘the people’ (and therefore, by extension, ‘nation’, the ‘people-nation’) too remains liberatory only as long as it is understood as ‘attribute-less’ and ‘empty’. As soon as we begin to give form and content to this entity – as for instance in the discourse of Hindutva nationalism and it becomes Sagun (Hindu, upper caste, etc.), it loses its character as an inclusive ‘national-popular’.

Nirgun and Sagun It needs to be stated here, in parenthesis, that while the distinction between Nirgun and Sagun Brahman is a more generic distinction in Indian philosophy and goes back to the Upanishads, it recurs quite significantly in the Advaita Vedantic discourse of Shankara. However, it has been argued quite forcefully and plausibly by Rajdev Singh (1998) for instance, that the lower caste Sant tradition of bhakti differs quite significantly from this high philosophy tradition insofar as it is invested in it precisely for the possibilities that it provides for liberation. To that extent, this tradition also moves into a different exploration of the idea of Nirgun. To cite Singh: It is not possible that the Sants were unaware of the theoretical principles (tattvavad) of the bhakti that assumes the Sagun ­character of Brahma but they were certainly very well acquainted with its practical forms. They had seen how the parabrahma of the Sagun bhakts got imprisoned in the bonds of caste, religion, etc. Ram and Krishna became kshatriyas while Parasuram remained a Brahmin. Temples remained the patrimony of special classes and castes. (Singh, 1998, p. 79; all translations from this work are mine)

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  87 To the extent that the worshippers of the Nirgun Ram (i.e., not the son of Dasarath and the prince of Ayodhya but the abstract indefinable One) saw their Ram as compassionate, he was unlike the Nirgun Brahman of Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta. He had at least this one quality, but then, as Singh says citing Kabir, This Nirgun Ram of the Sants is beyond the three qualities (trigunateet). The three qualities known as Sattvik, Rajasik and Tamasik are his maya. That supreme figure of Ram can only be reached by those who can rise above these three and recognize the fourth category. (Singh, 1998, p. 73) This Nirgun of Kabir’s, is in fact, different from both Agun and Sagun (Singh, 1998, p. 74). It is worth noticing that here Nirgun is not the opposite of Sagun but one which transcends the Agun and Sagun binary. This fourth category beyond the three qualities is what yields this notion of a Nirgun but nonetheless compassionate Ram.

While ‘populist’ elements or interpellations may be present in diverse kinds of discursive formations, for a movement or formation to be populist, our distinction between the Nirgun and the Sagun would suggest, it is necessary that it retain this Nirgun character. The search for what Antonio Gramsci called the ‘national-popular’ of such a kind seems to be, this chapter argues, fundamental to AAP’s invocation of nationalism as well. In this sense, the term Nirgun could be said to refer to what following Ernesto Laclau, I have elsewhere called the ‘empty signifier’ character of both, the category of ‘corruption’ and the figure/sign called ‘Anna Hazare’ in the early phases of the movement. For the ‘people’ routinely invoked in the struggle against the deliberately widely defined, all-encompassing demon of ‘corruption’ was precisely such an attribute-less people. Thus the name India Against Corruption and the deployment of nothing but the national tricolour flag as the flag of the movement, signifying an attempt at defining a certain nationalpopular. It was striking that at no point during that phase did the movement develop its own insignias, flags or logos – it saw itself as the embodiment of the people-nation itself. Unlike the category of the ‘empty signifier’, however, that of Nirgun is not a mere descriptive-analytical category here but underscores an ethical – normative imperative as well, insofar as it underlines the emancipatory possibilities that it opens up.7 In that sense, it allows us to see populism as much more than a set of empirical traits that can then be used to ‘identify’ specific phenomena or movements as populist. Its insistence on an internally unspecified and therefore, potentially ‘one’ [united] people,

88  Aditya Nigam allows for a division of the political space between the people at one pole and the ‘enemies of the people’ at the other in the manner suggested by Ernesto Laclau in his studies of populism. Sectarian differences and the search for the enemy within the people is, therefore, incompatible with what I would like to insist is fundamental to such a discourse. The category of Nirgun serves another purpose here – to delineate what I  have on earlier occasions referred to as the post-ideological character of AAP’s discourse.

Post-ideological Moment Since a lot of misunderstanding has proliferated around the use of this term, it is necessary to state some things clearly and put things in perspective. It is wrong to understand the term either in the m ­ id-20th-century, Cold War sense of the ‘end of ideology’ or Francis Fukuyama’s late 20th-century celebratory idea of ‘end of history’. In a sense, both these moments reflected a certain smugness in Western societies, which seemed to believe that they had solved all crucial problems of politics and therefore done away with the need for ideology. If the self-­ presentation of Western societies as ‘the free world’, as standard bearers of ‘cultural freedom’, was crucial to the ‘end of ideology’ moment, the second moment of the ‘end of history’, was seen as the final vindication of that self-image – marked as it was by the collapse of Soviet bloc socialism. In both instances, the ‘end’ was the same – the supposedly final victory of liberal democracy over socialism and the affirmation of the ‘values’ represented by Western democracies. In sharp contrast to this, what I  refer to as the post-ideological moment belongs to another conjuncture altogether. This is the conjuncture inaugurated by the late-2010 developments in Tunisia that played out over 2011 as the Arab Spring came into full bloom, leading finally in September 2011 to the Occupy Wall Street movement. Hamid Dabashi rightly saw the Arab Spring as announcing the beginning of the end, not only of the debilitating burden of post-coloniality but also alongside it, of the great 20th-century ideologies – socialism, nationalism, Islamism. With Occupy Wall Street, it was the rejection of that last great ideology that had so far positioned itself as the ‘beyond’ of all ideologies – namely liberalism and its late 20th-century overgrowth, neoliberalism. Unlike the earlier moments, it was not a time of affirmation of the virtues of the dynamic ‘free world’ of capital as opposed to the vices of an immobile socialism that had been historically invalidated. It was that epiphanic moment when young people who were born and brought up in the post-socialist world of Capital’s Consumption Utopia, suddenly turned against it proclaiming, ‘we are the 99 per

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  89 cent’. The way the 2008 financial crisis had been created and the way the key players – the banks – were bailed out on public money, while ordinary people suffered, had illuminated, in a flash, what a farce the ‘democracy’ of the so-called ‘free world’ had always been. This was the post-ideological conjuncture then – the moment of liberation not just from the dead weight of 20th-century socialism but also from other ideological grand narratives as well, including the theology of neoliberalism that had long installed corporate capital as the new God to be propitiated for the greater good of humanity. There was no longer any certainty either way. With this post-ideological conjuncture, we were now truly on uncharted waters. The rise of IAC and the AAP belongs to post-ideological moment where old labels like ‘left’ and ‘right’ or ‘secularism’ and ‘communalism’ no longer made sense, at least not in the old way. At any rate, in a world where the left had been pursuing policies indistinguishable from those of the economic right (e.g., the privatization of water in Kerala or land acquisition for private capital in West Bengal, both under the rule of the Communist Party of India [Marxist]), there was little to distinguish the left from the right. Its rise also belongs to the conjuncture where the old, Congress style ‘secularism’ had revealed itself to be utterly counter-productive, serving only to provide the fodder for Hindutva’s campaigns, where the majority – minority framework no longer worked except to entrench Hindutva’s anti-minorityism. With respect to ‘secularism’ and minority rights too, therefore, Kejriwal and the AAP adopted a stance that has doggedly refused to take the BJP’s bait of forcing a Hindu – Muslim divide. Though it has come in for a lot of criticism from secular/radical quarters on this issue, the AAP held on, by and large, to its position of adherence to a Nirgun idea of ‘the people’ that remains ‘transcendent’ (in the sense of not being available to experience) and which Kejriwal has refused to bring down and fix to its earthly traits.8 Further, the AAP and Arvind Kejriwal fashioned their discourse by drawing on elements from very diverse and disparate sources. While IAC’s and later AAP’s focus was on corruption, Kejriwal had elaborated his vision of swaraj in a manner that was quite eclectic and where there was just one lodestar that mattered: the Gandhian insistence on the interests of the last person. In this sense too, Kejriwal’s stance is post-ideological par excellence. For it makes no argument that invokes any larger cause such as that of the ‘nation’, ‘state’, ‘class’ or ‘development’ in order to deny the concrete Aam Aadmi their due. Rather, the nation is the embodiment of the Aam Aadmi and can only flourish as long as the latter flourishes. It is a vision that for this reason is deeply suspicious of ‘experts’, ‘planners’ and policymakers whose decisions are routinely based on privileging one or the other of these large, abstract entities upheld by ideologies of various kinds.9

90  Aditya Nigam My purpose in deploying the category of Nirgun is precisely because I want to insist on what, in my view, distinguishes populism from a post-fascist rightwing movement – that is to say, the definition of ‘the people’ as without attributes, even if it is recognized that they are internally heterogeneous or disparate. It does not necessarily insist on the ‘one-ness’ of ‘the people’; it may not even depend on establishing a ‘chain of equivalences’ in the manner Laclau talks of it as a precondition to the production of the ‘empty signifier’. Populism and Populist Interpellation One more principal issue remains that needs to be discussed briefly. In setting aside some specific kinds of right-wing proto-fascist mobilizations as part of the post-fascist constellation, I do not intend to imply that we are therefore left with ‘populist’ movements of the purest waters, uncontaminated by any right-wing or divisive, xenophobic content. On the contrary, all movements and ideologies, to the extent that they concern themselves with the popular, also have to deal with social heterogeneity and all the fault-lines that run through society potentially affect all popular movements as well. Indeed, as the recent experience of the AAP has shown, the real world of politics operates on a different logic and at that level, there is no impermeable border that separates the two; a slide from a resolutely Nirgun insistence on the people to a more Sagun version is an always-present possibility. In fact, this is true even of the most radical of movements and recent scholarship has alerted us to the fact that historically, the slide from a left-wing Marxist position to fascist one has often taken place.10 Antonio Gramsci talked of the ‘crisis of hegemony’ as being marked by the ‘passage of troops of many different parties under the banner of a single party’ whereby a new party is seen to ‘better represent and resume the needs of the entire class’ (the ruling class; Gramsci, 1971, p. 211). Classically, a populist movement is likely to emerge in this moment of breach but it clearly is not what serves the interest of the ruling class, which might have other plans as I indicated in the earlier discussion. The point that must be borne in mind is that these are times of immense uncertainty and churning where diverse kinds of competing discourses are in the fray, which always opens up multiple possibilities of constitution of the identity of the people, along different lines. Moreover, a movement that is not predicated on any Sagun notion of the people but is constituted along a different idea such as corruption, can also be normed in a majoritarian way and can, given certain conditions, take not-so-benign forms. Over and above this, when it operates in an already volatile situation, it cannot but be open to different kinds of manoeuvres. How does this work? In order to understand this, in an early article Laclau (1979) deploys the category of ‘interpellation’, borrowed from Louis Althusser. It is well known that Althusser developed this idea in his work on ‘ideology’ and ‘ideological state apparatuses’, where he basically argued that

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  91 ‘ideology’ constitutes individuals as subjects. In Laclau’s paraphrase, individuals ‘are transformed by ideology into subjects, that is to say, they live the relation with their real conditions of existence as if they themselves were the autonomous principle of the determination of the relation’ (Laclau, 1979, p. 100, emphasis added).11 There are, says Laclau (1979, p. 102), ‘different types of interpellations (political, religious, familial, etc.) which coexist whilst being articulated within an ideological discourse in a relative unity’. Let us note however, for our purposes, that each of these have a different resonance and meaning in our context and so there might be, at any point of time not one religious or political or nationalist interpellation available and of course, unlike in the Althusserian scheme, subjectivities need to be seen as dynamic and as being reshaped at different moments. In what way, asks Laclau (1979, p. 102), is one interpellation articulated with another? In other words, how do these different interpellations become part of a unified ideological discourse? A ‘unified ideological discourse’, he cautions us, must not be seen as internally logically consistent for ‘the ideological unity of a discourse is perfectly compatible with a wide margin of logical inconsistency’; what is critical is the ability of each interpellative element to fulfil a role of condensation with respect to the others (Laclau, 1979, p.  102). This is a crucial point in the argument. Even contradictory elements can come together into a unified ideological whole, when different elements enter into a relationship with each other, such that one evokes the other. Clearly, this is not a logical operation. Drawing upon another set of categories from Althusser, those of ‘displacement’ and ‘condensation’, Laclau distinguishes between two kinds of situations. In periods of stability, the social formation tends to reproduce its relations following traditional channels and manages to neutralize its contradictions by displacements; in a period of generalized ideological churning, however, there is a crisis of confidence in the ‘natural’ or ‘automatic’ reproduction of the system and the unity of the dominant ideological discourse falls apart (Laclau, 1979, pp. 102–103). In the situation of the falling apart of the dominant ideological discourse as mentioned by Laclau all the sectors present in the struggle will try to reconstitute a new ideological unity. This is a situation we have seen in our example of the crisis of the dominant hegemonic formation represented by the UPA government and emergence of first, the IAC movement, followed very soon by the Modi – Hindutva formation backed by corporate Capital. This is a moment of decisive struggle. If one recalls here the period in the runup to the 2014 elections, it is easy to see how the presence of the AAP and its anti-corruption discourse evoked, so many other elements that it was possible for a wide range of different people to ‘own it’. That was a moment of ‘condensation’ in a manner of speaking where the anti-corruption discourse becomes the interpellation that ‘comes to be the chief organizer’ (Laclau, 1979, p.  104) of all others – the anti-displacement struggles, the struggles against land acquisition, the aspiration of clean governance and even ‘clean capitalism’.

92  Aditya Nigam Summing Up A populist or a popular-democratic interpellation is in itself neither left wing nor right wing but can be articulated, in principle with any ideological discourse. Thus, when the Modi-Hindutva formation made its entry around the second half of 2013, the anti-corruption discourse no longer remained the organizing element, inserted as it was into a Hindutva ideological discourse. To paraphrase Laclau once again, the popular-democratic interpellation has no precise ideological content but is rather the domain of ideological struggle between contending forces (see Laclau, 1979, pp. 108– 109). If we accept this understanding, it should not be difficult to see that even when we set the more rabid post-fascist formations or movements aside, populism still remains something of a terrain of struggle and contestation where diverse ideological tendencies contend, especially when crises of hegemony open up the space for posing fresh challenges to the dominant order. Notes 1 I am merely presenting this as an observation here and not offering an explanation as to why this might be so. There is no doubt that in the deeply hierarchical Hindu society of earlier times, caste/varna-specific terms of derision and denunciation are available aplenty. But the moment at which terms like jan, janata or lok or awam acquire their modern connotations is also the moment of the birth of nationalism under colonial rule, where the lot of the elite had been thrown along with that of the ‘masses’, upon whose ‘awakening’, depended on the success of the nationalist project. One can only speculate at this point that this might have been one reason why such a denunciatory mode is absent in our modern Indian languages. 2 Though opposed almost unanimously by the farmers, the laws have been pushed to facilitate contract farming that has no other justification other than favouring agribusiness corporations. However, due to continuous opposition of the farmers and pressure of electoral politics, the Modi Government took decision in November 2021 to repeal these laws. 3 It needs to be stated that ‘system’ here should not be understood to mean what Marxists understand by it. It is not ‘capture of state power’ or the ‘capitalist economic system’ that these movements often refer to when they talk of the system. Rather, they refer to an ensemble of practices that have become entrenched and which essentially work for the rich, which like good democrats, most populist leaders believe can be changed while remaining within the democratic framework. 4 Ashis Nandy, who had interviewed Modi many years ago, wrote in the wake of the Gujarat violence that the interview had left him in no doubt that ‘here was a classic, clinical case of a fascist’. He told a friend that ‘for the first time, I had met a textbook case of a fascist and a prospective killer, perhaps even a future mass murderer’ (Nandy, 2002). 5 It will be evident that my argument in this chapter diverges fundamentally from the reading presented by Partha Chatterjee (2020) recently – both on his understanding of populism as well as his ‘half century’s continuous history of populism in India’ (Chatterjee, 2020, p. 86). Most attempts to deploy the category of populism in the Indian context, I  maintain, are a case of ‘application’, where the actual situation on the ground shows great divergence from the classic situations

Populism and the ‘Nirgun’ People  93 of populist movements. Once again, a detailed discussion on this matter is not really possible within the confines of this chapter. 6 For an excellent path-breaking critique of such positions, see Laclau (1979). ‘Populism’ has only very recently been owned up as a possible European phenomenon as well (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Arditi, 2007). 7 While superficially this might look like a ‘universalism’ of sorts, the difficulty with most modern abstract universalisms is that they are really never ‘empty’ or ‘attribute-less’ as many critiques of recent decades have been at pains to point out. 8 This position, in a way recalls some of the ways in which Gandhi, for example, would preach the virtues of universal religion – where ‘Hinduism’/Sanatan Dharm and Islam were rendered by him as mere manifestations of that common religion. In terms of practical politics though, some recent moves by the AAP indicate that the strains of taking on the ruling party are clearly telling on it and a shift towards a more pronounced Hindu-orientation is evident. It has in the process, shown a tendency to slide towards a majoritarian position that has not augured well with respect to the rights of the Muslims, on which it has tended to compromise. However, in discursive terms, it still seems to hold on to its anti-corruption plank which it links to its stance of providing free water and electricity and cheap and quality public education and health to all citizens. 9 I should state here that in a more generic sense, I see the question of ‘ideology’ as such (as distinct from specific ideologies) itself as a closed system where no new questions can be raised and all answers are always already present within ideology. By and large, ideology fulfils, as Louis Althusser insisted, a practical rather than a knowledge function. Many people on the left who criticized the AAP for steering clear of ideologies, seemed to understand ideology as the guarantor of ‘principled politics’ against opportunism. For others still, it seems to act as the guarantee against being swayed by the ignorant masses. 10 In India, the recent dissipation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist)’s support base and the desertion of its masses and middle to lower rung leaders to the BJP in West Bengal is a fact only too recent to have entered scholarly writing but is nevertheless, quite well acknowledged by political commentators. 11 The concept of ‘interpellation’ as well as the essay ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, have been the subject of a lot of debate and it is not possible to recount all that here. For the sake of our discussion here, it is Laclau’s rendering and use of the concept that is relevant here. I  should also state here that though the discussion in Laclau’s early writings is still framed in relatively rigid in ­Marxist terms, despite significant departures from Althusser, I do not necessarily stay with that part of Laclau’s discussion of ideology, social formation and class struggle either.

References Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Amin, S. (1995). Event, metaphor, memory: Chauri Chaura 1922–1992. Oxford ­University Press. Arditi, B. (2007). Politics on the edges of liberalism: Difference, populism, revolution, agitation. Edinburgh University Press. Canovan, M. (1984). “People”, politicians and populism. Government and Opposition, 19(3), 312–327. Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people: Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

94  Aditya Nigam Casolari, M. (2000). Hindutva’s foreign tie-up in the 1930s: Archival evidence. ­Economic & Political Weekly, 35(4), 218–228. Chatterjee, P. (2020). I am the people. Columbia University Press. Cohen, R. (2018, July  13). It is time to depopularize “populist”. The New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/opinion/populism-language-meaning.html Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). National populism: The revolt against liberal democracy. Pelican Books. El-Ojeli, C. (2018). Keywords: Post-fascism. Counterfutures: Left Thought and Practice Aotearoa, 6, 100–118. https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/counterfutures/article/ view/6384 Finchelstein, F. (2017). From fascism to populism in history. University of California Press. Gilens, M., & Page, B. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups and average citizens. Perspectives on Politics, 12(3), 564–581. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks (Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith, Eds. & Trans.). International Publishers. Laclau, E. (1979). Politics and ideology in Marxist theory. Verso. Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. Verso. Mouffe, C. (2018). For a left populism. Verso. Muller, J.-W. (2017). What is populism? Penguin Books. Nandy, A. (2002). Obituary of a culture. Seminar. www.india-seminar.com/2002/ 513/513%20ashis%20nandy.htm Ortega y Gasset, J. (1994). The revolt of the masses. W. W. Norton and Company. Rancière, J. (2006). Hatred of democracy. Verso. Roy, T. (1994). Politics of a popular uprising: Bundelkhand 1857. Oxford University Press. Sarkar, S. (2010). The Swadeshi movement in Bengal 1903–1908. Permanent Black. Schmitt, C. (1992). The crisis of parliamentary democracy. The MIT Press. Singh, R. (1998). Nirgun Rambhakti aur Dalit Jatiyan. Vani Prakashan. Tamas, G. M. (2000, June 1). On post-fascism. Boston Review. http://bostonreview. net/world/g-m-tamas-post-fascism Traverso, E. (2017). Post-fascism: A mutation still underway – interview with ­Gregory Marin. Verso Books Blog. www.versobooks.com/blogs/3130-post-fascism-amutation-still-underway Urbinati, N. (2019). Political theory of populism. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 111–127.

4 Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements Manindra Nath Thakur

Introduction Many social and political movements have emerged in contemporary times having definite links – direct or indirect – with various religions. One finds religious vocabularies heavily influencing political language. The resurgence of religion, or as Derrida calls it, ‘the return of religion’, has influenced and continues influencing the social, cultural, economic and political structures. Scholars have different opinions about this ‘return of religion’ on democracy. Scholars like Mark Juergensmeyer have argued that there is an advent of a new Cold War. It is not between the nations but religious nationalism and the secular state (Juergensmeyer, 1993). Similarly, David Elcott and his coauthors have argued that the politics of religious identity is always exclusionary as it intends to exclude individuals and communities from citizenship, political representation and the process of public policymaking. Therefore, it works against the basic principles of democracy (Elcott et  al., 2021). In contrast, Bryan McGraw has argued that it is not fair to look at religion with suspicion as a source of instability in liberal democracy. Instead of being a severe threat, it could be democratically constructive (McGraw, 2010). Pradip Chhibber has made a similar point in the specific context of India by rejecting the most prevalent opinion among the social scientists that religion and democracy are antithetical to each other. He presents an opposite viewpoint that there is a positive association between religion and democracy due to plurality within religious communities (Chhibber & Shastri, 2014). What is common in these approaches to this issue is their focus on religious fundamentalism. This could be due to the hypervisibility of the identity politics of religious communities. However, the ‘return of religion’ is a more complex phenomenon and this overemphasis on fundamentalism does not allow us to comprehend this complexity. It ignores the interconnections between religion, spirituality and political economy. I would like to argue that the religious landscape is not constituted merely of the fundamentalist movements; there are many more forms of religious movements and they are important in terms of their consequences for democracy. It is needless to say that understanding of the role of religion will remain quite limited if DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-6

96  Manindra Nath Thakur all the other religious movements are not studied together. This paper aims at mapping these religious movements, which constitute a significant part of the religious landscape of the contemporary world. I would like to suggest that there are three trends in religious resurgence: (a) fundamentalist religious movement (FRM), (b) new religious movement (NRM) and (c) radical religious movement (RRM). There are differences in these categories in terms of the socio-economic profile of the people they attract, the ideology they propagate and the strategy they adopt. The chapter will differentiate these movements based on their nature, state response, impact on society, economy and politics. In short, this chapter aims to demonstrate that the religious landscape is not merely constituted of FRMs and any research on religion will remain lopsided if this categorization is not considered. It should be noted that these three kinds of movements have different consequences for democracy in contemporary times precisely because of the differences in their features. Religion, Class and Politics Before discussing the three types of movements and their relation to democracy, consider some religious movements. Generally speaking, religions have a more extended history than democracies. It would be a question to ask if religion has remained the same despite the historical evolution of societies in terms of their political economy and sociopolitical constitutions. No one would disagree that religions have been continuously present during the social evolution. It has defied the speculation of philosophers and political thinkers of modernity who predicted its demise with the rise of science. It disheartened the sociologists and political scientists who thought the process of secularization would initially push religion outside the public realm and finally make it redundant. There is a new consensus that it will stay with us. It is now widely accepted that secularization is a failed project and science is incompatible with religion as one thought at the beginning of modernity. A committee constituted for reviewing the future direction of social sciences wrote that religion should be considered the predecessor of social sciences. Interestingly, members of the committee were well-known Marxist scholars and Nobel laureates in science (Wallerstein, 1996).1 The literature in Marxist tradition shows a change in the attitude on religion over time. For instance, Terry Eagleton, a famous Marxist literary critic, has acknowledged the importance of religion and suggested that ‘radicals might discover there some valuable insights into human emancipation’ (Eagleton, 2009, p.  11). Similarly, another Marxist scholar Michael Löwy has examined the influence of religion on the radical politics of Latin America and acknowledged its positive role in transformative politics (Löwy, 1996). The emergence of liberation theology in Latin America has raised new dialogue on religion within the Marxist tradition (Gutiérrez, 1988).

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  97 This changing attitude has opened up the possibility for considering religion as a dynamic phenomenon in being responsive to the different time, space and modes of production. The question about the survival of religion in the changing world demands attention towards the changing nature of religion and its various aspects, that is, consciousness, rituals, texts, social laws and morality. Marx seems correct in suggesting that religion is primarily a form of consciousness (Marx & Engels, 1970). It exists both at the level of collective and individual consciousness. Human beings are born in the collective consciousness and acquire their consciousness in their evolution. The individual consciousness is based on experiences of individuals’ ‘being-inthe-world’ and ‘being-in-itself’ (Heidegger, 1978). The ‘being-in-the-world’ experiences relate to humans’ locations as caste, class, gender, race and so on. The ‘being-in-itself’ experiences are related to the spiritual aspect of human existence. The process of dialogue between these two forms of their experiences makes collective consciousness an ever-evolving phenomenon of which religion is a significant component. Individuals like Jesus, Buddha or Mohammad are notable persons whose consciousness significantly influenced the collective consciousness. Every human being has constantly been contributing to the collective consciousness. The difference is only in degrees and levels of contributions made by different individuals. Different aspects of religion are forms of manifestation of this dialogue in consciousness. The history of religions is a history of this dialogue. The survival of religion for centuries only proves that the collective consciousness remains forever and repeatedly manifests itself in different concrete forms. Religion contributes to ideology, a set of ideas based on religious beliefs. There is a difference in spiritual consciousness and religious ideology. The former is purely a form of consciousness of transcendence; the latter is a set of ideas to be followed and explanations of what exists, what is good and what is possible. Religion as ideology constitutes community by interpellating individuals. Interpellation is a process through which ideology works (Althusser, 2020). It involves convincing the person and installing a sense of obviousness. There are two processes at work simultaneously – one, answering the questions that humans use to explain the phenomena they encounter in their lives. For instance, death is a puzzle for humans and since childhood, they keep asking questions about it. All religions do explain the phenomenon of death. They have developed rituals based on their philosophy of death. We do not look for a logically sustainable answer for such complex questions every time. We are happy with answers that explain it to temporarily free us from the pain and agony we get due to the death of a dear one. This is how religion as an ideology recruits human beings as subjects. The process of recruitment to works operates through answering several such existential questions related to life, death and life after death. We start believing in these answers irrespective of they are true or false.

98  Manindra Nath Thakur I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ Source: Althusser (1971, p. 174).

Two, there are different sites of interpellation. There are several sites where ideology conducts this operation of interpellation, including classrooms, factory floors and family functions. The arguments, explanations and values propagated by ideologies get support in these institutions. Religious ideologies are nurtured directly and exclusively by some institutions specially designed for this purpose and also by other institutions indirectly and partially. It is the ideological interpellation that ensures the long-term survival of any ideology. The elasticity also ensures the long-time survival of religion and its ideological formation. Generally, we believe that religion is an orthodox system of ideas and does not change. However, the history of religion only suggests otherwise. There is hardly any religion that has not undergone several mutations. It is usual for religions to face protest movements that question their ideological contents. Such movements present new forms within the broader framework of the same religion. Let us understand how such transformations take place. One needs to remember that religion as an ideology does not exist in isolation from other forms of ideologies. Our social positions also raise a certain set of ideas that answers several questions we have regarding our social experiences apart from the existential questions we face as human beings. For instance, our social location as caste, class, gender, nation and so on, give us particular experiences and related consciousness, which eventually become part of the collective consciousness of that specific category. For instance, the working class forms an ideology differently from the middle class or capitalist class. The ideology of the working class would normally advocate redistribution of resources and argue for an egalitarian society. In contrast, that capitalist class ideology would argue for the legitimacy of social inequality. Similarly, nationalism would argue for unconditional commitment to the nation’s glory, creating narratives convincing for this. The class ideology has a particular characteristic related to the economic realm and distribution of resources. Other ideologies are non-class ideologies related to our cultural, religious, regional or linguistic locations. It is important to note that these class and non-class ideologies do not exist in isolation; instead, they exist together in articulation, providing different forms with different combinations (Therborn, 1999).

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  99 The process mentioned earlier of articulation between class and non-class ideologies produces ideological blocks, which means clusters of non-class ideologies have different class positions. For instance, we can see religions taking various forms depending on the articulation of class or non-class ­ideologies. The ideology of religious nationalism is a product of articulation between nationalism, religion and the ruling class ideology. The political and economic content of religious nationalism comes from its class component. It is possible to have another form of nationalism in which working-class ideology defines the term. Such an ideology would be more secular and less aggressive. The point is that there is a possibility of several new forms of articulation emergence and re-emergence of various forms of nationalism. Similarly, religious ideology can be articulating with different class ideologies and take new forms. I would like to argue that ideologies of different forms of religious movements are defined by their different class components. The above argument about the relation between religion and class opens up the possibility of exploring the dynamics of religion in time and space dominated by two themes, capitalism and democracy. The question we need to address is how religion has adjusted itself with these two simultaneously existing phenomena. The point to be noted here is that contemporary religious movements should be seen as different responses to religion’s challenges today. A cursory look at the history of Christianity makes it easy to comprehend the point. Max Weber has made an important point in his book ‘Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’ (Weber, 2012). He has argued that Protestant Ethics is the spirit of capitalism as it transforms religious ethics to suit the newly emerging economy of that time. Weber’s this point could easily be extended to argue that liberation theology in Christianity has emerged as a movement to accommodate the socialist spirit. In both cases, the basic tenets of Christianity remained the same despite the significant changes in the perspective. Such movements influence religion as a whole and there begins a series of major and minor adjustments. Similarly, with the advent of democracy as a widely accepted value for sharing power, it became a vantage point for re-evaluating religious institutions. One can study the struggle between Church and State from this perspective. The idea of secularism as minimizing the role of religion in the state’s affairs in the modern was the demand of democracy in the European societies. One can find a recent example of this pressure from democracy for differentiating between political and religious authorities in the Tibetan ­Buddhist community. There is an effort to change its original form of political organization to accommodate the demand for democratic participation in the decision-making processes. The 14th Dalai Lama has decided to remain only a spiritual head of the Tibetan government-in-exile and the people will elect the political leader. He thinks democracy is more in line with the belief system of Buddhism. Almost all religions have undergone such phases of stress and adjustments.

100  Manindra Nath Thakur Let us agree with the earlier argument that religion is not monolithic or static and there are changes in response to pressure from the political economy. It is not difficult to see that their religion may take several ideological avatars. I suggest three different religious movements mark the contemporary religious landscape with distinct characteristics. These movements should be considered responses to the current political economy as the changing forms of capitalism, democracy and their relationship have thrown new challenges to religion. I have attempted to differentiate these forms in their significant characteristics in the next section. Understanding the contemporary return of religion by differentiating in these three categories is important for comprehending the relation of religious movements with democracy and capitalism. It will help us appreciate the dual role of religion as one kind of religious movement contributes to the rise of authoritarian regimes and goes well with the contemporary form of capitalism. In contrast, the other form might challenge such regimes and their political, economic basis. There is a complexity involved in the relation between capitalism, democracy and religion, demanding a deeper exploration. FRMs: Religion and Identity FRM, the first category of these movements, is the most widely existing religious resurgence. Militant Sikhs and Hindutva forces in India, anti-abortion Roman Catholics in the USA, Haredim and Gush Emunim in Israel, Muslim Militants in Algeria and Egypt, Buddhists and Tamils in Sri Lanka, New Christian Rightists and Charismatic Protestants in North and Central America, Japanese neo-Shinto nationalists, Shi’ism of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, Jamaat-e-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat in South Asia and many other such religious movements may be classified as FRMs. It is the most common form of religious resurgence and the most widely studied among the three. Several studies taking into account the global nature of FRMs have been conducted in the last few decades (for example, see Marty & Appleby, 1991). One may notice that each fundamentalist movement is a product of its specific social, political and religious conditions; however, they share some common features. Let us ponder a little upon the origin and evolution of this concept. Some scholars trace the origin of this word in a series of pamphlets called ‘The Fundamentals of the Faith’ published in the USA in the 1920s. This was a document of the leading Conservative Evangelical Protestants, which emphasized the core of the Protestant truth against the liberal and progressive spirit of the age. Thus, the term first identified the consciously anti-modernist wing of Protestantism (Bruce, 2000). In Christianity, this word is used to believe that the apocalypse is imminent and we live in ‘end times’. As they are called, the premillennialists stress humankind’s sinful and precarious position and accuse the modern developments of usurping God’s powers. In contrast, advocates of Postmillennialism think that the judgment will follow the millennium. They take the evident success of modern people in

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  101 controlling and improving their environment as a positive thing and also tend to see life as good and getting better. However, generally speaking, in times of social crisis and economic depression, the more pessimistic premillennialist view tends to dominate. In periods of social optimism, such as in the USA in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the postmillennialist idea was more acceptable and attractive (Bruce, 2000, p. 10). So, initially, the premillennialists were called fundamentalists. Gradually fundamentalism became a synonym for the most conservative expression of any religious group. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the word was connoting group that emphasizes the purest practice from its religion, advocates following the distinctive way of life, rituals and social practices, or expected public policy to reflect religious beliefs. What are the core elements of the ideology of FRMs? At the core of FRM is a particular form of interpretation of religion that emphasizes the formation and consolidation of the religious community by following a defined code of conduct. In most cases, religious texts are taken as the nucleus of the religion. A code of conduct for the believers is constructed based on either these texts or some traditional social practices. The moral teachings, social laws or rituals prescribed by these texts and the tenets of the created codes of conduct are used to consolidate the community identity, further reinforced by the community’s common good and call for sacrifice from the followers. For instance, Bin Laden gave a call in the following words: ‘Fear God, O Muslims and rise to support your religion. Islam is calling on you: O Muslims, O Muslims, O Muslims’.2 Sometimes religion and nationalism together constitute the ideology of fundamentalism. This religious nationalism, as many scholars call it,3 takes different forms depending on the local religious and social factors. Let us take some examples to clarify the ideological nature of the FRMs. For instance, among the Jews, a strong movement for ‘return to Judaism’, which emphasized the observance of Halakah, the Jewish law, started in the 1970s. It stresses strict adherence to the mitzvot, the 613 injunctions listed in the Torah, which comprises 248 prescriptions and 365 prohibitions that regulate the believer’s life. One of the ultra-orthodox groups is Haredim, which connotes those who follow God’s words. It advocates that the mitzvot should be observed with strictness (Aldridge, 2007, p.  128). Compared to Judaism, fundamentalist movements in Christianity have a different milieu, as there is no major contradiction at the centre of the Christianity’s values or social laws and that of the modern democratic system. For instance, there are no mitzvot as in Judaism or Sharia as in the case of Islam that needs to be implemented. The rallying point for Christian fundamentalists is defined by their opposition to the values of secular humanism, cosmopolitanism and secular permissiveness. Perhaps this explains why one of the major issues of a significant Christian fundamentalist has been ‘anti-abortion’ and not of any fundamental change in the law of the land. Unlike the Christians, the Islamic fundamentalists challenge the political and cultural system introduced by the positional states under the

102  Manindra Nath Thakur modernization paradigm of development. They assert that society should be governed not by the modern laws and political system but according to Islamic principles. The idea is that instead of being ruled by the people’s representatives, society should be ruled by Umma, the faithful community. The Umma has to implement the Sharia law, that is, Islamic law. One of such movements in Islam is Jama’at al Tabligh, a society for conservative and propagation of Islam in mainly Hindu Subcontinent. One of the major components of the ideology of these groups is religious conversion. In the case of Islamic fundamentalism of Al-Qaeda type, religion is always brought to the forefront and other dimensions of the conflictual relationship are ignored. Consider Laden’s statement: This indicates the nature of this war. This war is fundamentally r­ eligious. The people of the East are Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the West, who were the crusaders. Those who try to cover this crystal clear fact, which the entire world has admitted, are deceiving the Islamic nation. They are trying to deflect the attention of the Islamic nation from the truth of this conflict. This fact is proven in the book of God Almighty and the teachings of our messenger; may God’s peace and blessings be upon him. Under no circumstances should we forget this enmity between the infidels and us. For, the hostility is based on creed.4 This shows that the ideology of fundamentalism revolves, broadly speaking, around three components: religio-cultural assertions, community consolidation and religious expansion. Sometimes, these assertions, in most cases, take a form of a political movement aiming to capture the state’s power, but it is not always the case. The Hindu fundamentalists in India believe that India is not becoming powerful due to the absence of nationalism. They attribute this absence to the minority communities’ commitment to their own culture and the crossborder community affinity. They argue that the minority community should consider India as their nation, which means they should show their commitment to the Indian culture, which predominantly, according to them, is Hindu culture. Some scholars have argued that Hinduism has been transformed into Hindutva (Basu, 2020). The former is a faith system, whereas the latter is an identity group. The transition is neither smooth nor complete. One of the important variables in Indian politics is linked with this game of transforming Hinduism into Hindutva, in which religion becomes an identity and constitutes a political community. Coming to the strategy these movements adopt to achieve their goal of consolidating the communities and mobilizing them, either to assert their identity at the social level or to make their presence felt at the political level, once again, we find some general trends along with their specificities, depending on

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  103 the particularities of their religion and region. One of the components of their strategy is to create or locate an enemy, which can serve the purpose of the reference point for them. This creation of the other and symbolically presenting it as an enemy helps these movements construct the ‘psychology of hate’. It generates a sense of fear and victory among the community ­members. Fear of domination brings them together and a feeling of success over the enemy gives them a sense of superiority and satisfaction. These movements attempt to attack the other religious communities’ symbols to satisfy the community ego as a strategy. For instance, in India, Hindutva forces destroyed the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, claiming that this was correcting the history. The argument is that since Muslim rulers had built the Mosque after destroying a temple, which already existed there, the destruction of the Mosque would restore the pride of the Hindu community. Another example of how fundamentalists try to consolidate the community, that is, by creating an identifiable enemy, may be seen in the case of Bin Laden, as he has projected the USA and the Western World as an enemy of Islam. Consider the following statements of Laden, which could be found in his speeches after 9/11: What the United States tastes today is a tiny thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years. But if the sword falls on the United States after 80 years, hypocrisy raises its head, lamenting the deaths of these killers who tampered with the Muslims’ blood, honour and holy places. They came out to fight Islam in the name of terrorism. . .. I swear by Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed, may God’s peace and blessing be upon him.5 These movements try to project their image of being a defender of the common good, which justifies their use of violence. Resorting terrorism is a very common culmination in the vision of the FRMs. The Hindutva forces killing the members of the Indian Christian community, Christian Identity activists’ bombing of the Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996, Kashmiri militants’ mindless killing of innocent people, the bombing of abortion clinics in American cities by the Reformation Lutheran Church are several examples of adoption of violence as their means to attract attention and community consolidation.6 Let us ask the question about the social background of the supporters of FRMs. It is not an easy question to answer as these groups generally aim at consolidating religious communities and taking various steps to conceal internal contradictions based on socio-economic inequalities within the community. A cursory glance at the profile of the followers of these movements may give the impression that they belong to different socio-economic strata of society. However, a careful content analysis of their demand and agenda may tell us another story. One should not be surprised to find that FRMs do not question the economic disparity and class basis of exploitation in society

104  Manindra Nath Thakur or among the community members. They simply ignore these questions. For instance, the fundamentalist movement in Kashmir ignores the exploitation of the weaving community and the small peasantry. Land reform or reform in the property regime is not on their agenda. Hindutva forces in India have always struggled hard to convince the masses that for them, Rama, the symbol of the religious community, is equally important to Roti, which symbolizes the well-being of ordinary people. There is hardly any disagreement that the right-wing parties in India have not attracted the poor and marginalized sections of society. Of late, one may argue that there is a rise of subaltern Hindutva as people from lower marginalized caste and class are finding representation in the parties advocating Hindu nationalism. However, it is difficult to say if this attraction is permanent as the government under the party’s rule is seen as compromising on the long-standing welfare politics. The same holds of Roman Catholic Traditionalism in America, Haredim in America and Israel (among Jews) and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria and Sudan; none of them raises questions regarding economic exploitation in their respective communities. Let us be sure this does not mean that they do not have any position on financial exploitation. In fact, instead of providing any economic explanation for the economic problem, they resort to cultural and political explanations. The real issues, however, remain hidden. Despite their consistent denial, it is clear that such movements conceal the class contradictions within the community and instead, they focus on the cultural exploitation of the community. The argument is that this would help them consolidate the community politically. Once the political power is achieved or they get a say in the decision making, the economic issues will be taken care of. However, the reality remains that these movements are highly hierarchical and status quoist. Some scholars have suggested that recruits to most of the FRMs are marginalized male elites (see for instance, Lawrence, 1990). Mernissi opines, particularly about Islamic fundamentalists, that they are not the ‘most wretched but those who have had some contact with West understand the horizons of possibility denied to them by the inequalities in the world system’ (Mernissi, 1993, p. 237). It does not require much research to say that the followers of Hindu militant outfits also do not belong to the Hindu society’s poor or Dalits (the untouchable caste).

Gandhi’s Talisman ‘I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man [woman] whom you may have seen and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  105 him [her]. Will he [she] gain anything by it? Will it restore him [her] to a control over his [her] own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to swaraj [freedom] for the hungry and spiritually starving millions? Then you will find your doubts and yourself melt away’. Source: Pyarelal (1958, p. 65).

In a survey of Christian Right Activists conducted in the USA, it is suggested that their foremost activists are rich white and their plan is power and money. Their leadership comes from college-educated white men.7 The picture may not be different, even in the Indian case. FRMs of various shades from other religions also have a similar background. For instance, the Hindutva movement in India is broadly associated with the upper caste, petty-bourgeois class and male dominance. It is not a place to go deeper into these issues; it would be sufficient for my purpose to successfully make the point that despite people from different strata of society, these movements are broadly upper class or elite based. These movements are primarily proestablishment and hardly offer any radical agenda for social change. They are explicitly patriarchal. Several examples can be cited to illustrate this point, right from Hindutva in India to Taliban in Afghanistan, all of which have tried to construct codes of conduct for women, which shows their commitment to pushing women out of the public sphere. The point to be noted is that when religion functions as an identity, it creates an ‘other’, projected as an enemy. This enemy becomes a target of attack as it is seen as overpowering by expanding its number, which plays a vital role in a democratic polity. The hate-mongering based on historical conflictual relations, differences and fear of being marginalized plays an essential role in consolidating the identity of a religious community. In this process, the community becomes internally authoritarian and externally aggressive. At times, the ruling class uses it to hide the economic contradictions and wins the support of marginalized sections to construct the majority needed for the government. Such movements do not work in favour of the poor and practice populism along with religious fundamentalism. NRMs: Religion and Spirituality NRMs, generally categorized as spiritual organizations, have emerged in the last three to four decades. NRMs have become a familiar part of the religious landscape by the twentieth century. These movements initially made their presence felt in the public sphere of the advanced capitalist societies. By now, such movements have made their presence felt in other parts of the world. They are available; in the Judeo-Christian tradition and Hinduism,

106  Manindra Nath Thakur Buddhism, Islam and others. According to one account, we can find around six hundred such movements in Britain and two thousand in America. These movements differ in their origins, beliefs, practices, organization, leadership, finances, lifestyles, attitudes towards women and children, moral questions and general concerns.8 For my purpose, I will only focus on their characteristics related to broad themes like social bases, strategy, political attitude and attitude towards political parties. Though their primary focus is on moral teachings regarding human behaviour towards fellow human beings and the natural environment, NRMs have developed several meditation techniques. They conduct camps for training their followers; their attitude towards politics is primarily believed to be neutral. However, in some cases, they are oriented towards right-wing parties. Contrary to the general perception, as these movements are pretty popular in the urban areas, among the middle, upper-middle and upper classes, they play an essential role in the political sphere. In some cases, they have a pretty explicit orientation towards rightwing parties. As there are several types of NRMs, it is tough to find a general pattern in the social background of the people who either join NRMs or are influenced by them. In the West, according to some analyses, those who have joined the better-known NRMs belong to the white and better-educated ­middle class. However, these should be considered as a very general trend. There are several NRMs, which have attracted the black and lower classes too. Although NRMs may attract people from several class backgrounds, their economic ideas are closer to the appreciation of capitalism. They advocate prosperity and most of these movements justify this approach. Several statements similar in nature are available in different NRMs: ‘I deserve the best’, ‘There is an exhaustible supply in the universe’, ‘God is unlimited’, ‘Shopping is unlimited’, ‘we have the right to celebrate the best the world has to offer’. These statements show the clear affinity of NRM towards prosperity and worldly facilities. In fact, in many cases, followers even claim that their adherence to NRMs has helped them achieve success in the capitalist system. It has also been argued that NRM’s spirituality motivates people to work. It introduces a ‘self-work ethic’, making the followers value their work as a spiritual discipline. Meditation and relaxation exercises taught by these movements help their followers concentrate on their work and help them work for long hours. ­Several industries and offices have introduced these techniques to improve the quality of work. Therefore, one may conclude that there is a general affinity between capitalist ethics and religious emphasis on austerity; these movements advocate worldly wealth. The activities of NRMs are generally oriented towards the individual. They do not mobilize people for mass action. They conduct mass meetings, but the individual’s discourses and activities remain centred. They preach morality related to an individual’s goodness and proper conduct towards fellow human beings. In societies, which have been stripped of these values, they restore such matters.

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  107 NRMs also conduct meditation and relaxation camps. They stress experiencing the self through these practices. Many people find these practices quite helpful in resolving stresses and other psychological problems generated by competitive, enterprise-culture capitalism. Music, Yoga and Reiki are used for relaxation. People who find their work adversely affected by guilt or failing marriage spend their weekends taking psychosynthesis or relationship courses. This makes them feel better and more capable of doing their job efficiently. In other words, NRMs pay attention to the individual’s personal life, to one’s inner self. They help one in performing better in one’s practical and material life. This does attract a large number of people towards NRMs. The relation between NRMs and politics, both in the narrow sense of state and government and in the broader sense of class struggle, is perhaps the least researched area. There is no direct connection between the two. If one goes by the NRMs’ indifference towards exploitative social relations and the problems of marginalized sections of society, one may conclude that they are pro-establishment. They do resolve some of the issues of alienation caused by the existing social and economic systems, but they do not go deep into such problems. They ignore the social roots of an individual’s alienation. Not only do they ignore it, but they also give a false solution to the problem. One can say that NRMs are popular mainly among people of the urban middle class and help them in solving their day-to-day problems without exposing the root of the problem. They do not mobilize the people to raise any joint resolving protest against the system and favour the status quo. RRMs: Religion and Socialism The third trend in the resurgence of religion is the emergence of the RRM. One of the most well-known examples of RRM is liberation theology in Christianity. Similar movements belonging to different religious traditions are emerging among the various oppressed sections of populations in various parts of the world. For instance, the Dalits’ voice is articulated in the stressed worship of B. R. Ambedkar in some parts of India. In fact, by the end of the twentieth century, the voice of the oppressed was being articulated in almost every religious tradition. This is throwing a major challenge to mainstream religion. Texts are being reinterpreted; claims and counterclaims are being made through the reorientation of rituals and religio-cultural signs and symbols. All this is done to radicalize the religious community to fight against exploitative structures of the society. Liberation theology is one such RRM that emerged in Latin America among the small communities of the poorest and the most petite literate men and women. It is now spreading all over the world. It has provided new impetus for articulating the radical voice within other religious traditions. It has become a symbol of protest against conservatism in religion. It may be interesting to look at the general characteristics of RRM, such as the social background of the followers and the social concerns of the movement, the

108  Manindra Nath Thakur strategy, authentic performances and means adopted by them and the political tone of the movement. Unlike the other two movements, this has a solid social base. Liberation theology is a pro-poor movement that reinterprets religious texts, challenges conservative understanding and has a definite affinity with the politics of radical transformation of society. What is the social background of the people adhering to RRM in general and liberation theology in particular? Alfred T. Hennelly, a historian of liberation theology, comments: For the first time in history, liberation theology has created an opportunity for the voice of the poor – the mute and invisible four-fifths of the world – to be heard clearly and loudly in every corner of the planet. It is a voice of intense urgency and a powerful challenge, especially to the Christian Church of the First World and theologians. They have not prioritized it over the past five centuries, even though it is the central concern of the Bible. For these four billion, human beings represent starkly and unambiguously the poor, the orphan, the widow and the stranger who was identified by the prophets, to whose suffering Jesus of Nazareth called his followers to respond as the ultimate test of their commitment and eternal destiny. (Hennelly, 1990, p. 31) This statement clearly shows that liberation theology’s social base lies among the marginalized sections of society. In general, the Christian church order has avoided the question of poverty and development. The church has defined its domain in faith and poverty and development are so-called secular issues and, therefore, beyond its realm. Liberation theology has raised the questions of underdevelopment, poverty, exploitation and justice, forcing the mainstream church to adjust its agenda. This social concern of liberation theology and its impact on the mainstream church becomes clear from comments of Pope John Paul II. He starts from a conservative position and arrives at the social concern for marginalized people. According to the Pope, ‘The church does not have a technical solution to offer for the problem of underdevelopment as such. . .. For the church does not propose economic and political systems or programs’ (Pope John Paul II, 1988, p. 521). This statement reflects the original attitude of the church towards economic and political issues. It represents the modern secular self-image of the mainstream church. However, the Pope accepts that given the worldwide dimension which the social question has assumed, this love of preference for the poor . . . cannot but embrace the immense multitudes of the hungry, the needy, the homeless, those without medical care and above all, those without the hope of a better future. It is impossible not to take account of the existence of these realities. (Pope John Paul II, 1988, p. 523)

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  109 Thus, the Pope accepts the issues thrown by liberation theology. The poor, hungry, needy, homeless people, without medical care and any facility, constitute the social base of this movement. The second characteristic of liberation theology is that instead of resorting to violence in the name of liberation, it believes in transforming religious ideology. For instance, in Nicaragua, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, liberation theology started questioning Catholic and Protestant mainstream churches and their doctrines. It was argued that these ideologies legitimized the conservative bourgeois regime and American imperialism. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference in Nicaragua tried to dissuade people from participating in the anti-imperialist struggle led by Sandino. In contrast, at one point in time, the dominant church honoured the Nicaraguan dictator Samosa with the title of ‘Prince of the Church’. Opposed to this, the liberation theology movement was mass-oriented (Kearney, 1986). Propagators of this movement, including the clergies, went to the remote area and organized people to solve their problems. Simultaneously, they taught them a new interpretation of the Bible. Consider the following passage from a letter by the bishop of Nicaragua: The heart of Jesus’ message is the announcement of the kingdom of God, a kingdom founded on the Father’s love for all humankind and in which the poor are held a special place. . .. Jesus tells us that the kingdom of God means liberation and justice because it is the kingdom of life. . .. To believe in this God is to give life to others, love them in truth and do justice. . .. We must be made to live a life of love and justice, forget about ourselves and consider what we can contribute. (Hennelly, 1990, p. 287) This passage gives an idea of the new meaning that has been attributed to traditional religious content. Therefore, this movement’s central strategy was waging an ideological war by giving new meanings to texts and images belonging to a religion. The third characteristic is that liberation theology has an overt commitment to radical politics. In Nicaragua, advocates of liberation theology, belonging to the church order, participated in the revolutionary process. On the one hand, it maintains its respect for secular authorities and does not advocate any type of theological state; on the other hand, it supports the active participation of the religious people in political activities. Given the social background of the people involved and the issues raised, liberation theology has a natural affinity with Marxist ideology. It has provided a new interpretation for Marx’s understanding of religion. For example, John ­Brentlinger argues that ‘A Materialist conception of spirituality is implicit in the tradition of classical Marxism and offers a basis for greater unity between progressive ‘communities of faith’ and secular progressives. Experience from the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua suggests that Marxists should rethink

110  Manindra Nath Thakur their motivations as revolutionaries’ (Brentlinger, 2000). Marxism, therefore, has a greater affinity to RRMs and arguments are made supporting revolutionary spiritualism. However, some Marxists argue that liberation theology is an unhappy marriage between religion and Marxism (see Alistair, 1990). The reason behind such arguments is their failure to see the class character of these movements, which has fundamentally changed their approach to religion. There is a rigorous process of re-interpretation of the fundamental texts of religion. When I feed the poor, they call me a saint, but when I ask why the poor are hungry, they call me a communist. —Dom Helder Camara, Archbishop of Recife in Brazil (one of the great prophets of Christian ‘liberation theology’, 2008) In the Indian context, several such transformations happened in the mainstream Hindu religion during the freedom struggle. For instance, the first wave of religious movements in the mid-19th-century India, led by Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Swami Dayananda and Swami Vivekananda, comprised of the initial efforts to link religion with transformative social change. Roy introduced several reforms in Hinduism and formed Brahmo Samaj; Dayananda simplified many rituals and called to go back to the Vedas through his organization Arya Samaj. Vivekananda attempted to reclaim spiritual aspects of Hinduism by founding Ramakrishna Mission, an organization dedicated to social service. Arya Samaj and Ramakrishna Mission are still surviving and pursuing the goals fixed by their founding fathers. Tagore argued in his extended essay titled ‘Religion of Man’ that the central concern of religion is the liberation of human beings and spirituality is its essence. In his ‘Hind Swaraj’, Gandhi emphasized a similar point by suggesting that compassion is the essence of religion. In his essay ‘Annihilation of Caste’, Ambedkar argued that there is a need to differentiate between ‘religion of principles’, the essential metaphysical basis of religion and ‘religion of rules’, which is mediated through power relations in society. He argued for reclaiming the former and questioning the latter. These thinkers agreed that religion had become a source of structures of domination. However, there is a possibility of transforming religion for human liberation by providing it with a new interpretation from the vantage point of the oppressed. This approach to religion seems to be the precursor of contemporary RRMs like liberation theology. Liberation theology or similar RRMs have a robust social basis among the marginalized sections of society. Such movements have firm pro-socialist commitments, ranging from active participation in liberation movements to passive support to the left political parties. RRM is different from FRM and NRM in its social background, strategy and political affinity and gives

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  111 Table 4.1  Forms of Religious Movements Religious Movements

Socioeconomic Basis

Ideology

Strategy

Relation with Politics

Politics of memory, Aiming at Nation and ethnic FundaUrban controllocating another identity along mentalist based, the ling the as enemy, with religious religious national state militancy, strong identity, interpremovements bourgeoipower, military-type tation of sacred sie, petty alternative organization, texts and use of bourgeoipolitical attracting attensymbols highsie, midparties tion by violent lighting differdle class act and mass ences with other demonstration communities, no challenge to the existing economic system (capitalist in most of the cases) No apparent Regular public New Well-off, a Appealing to relation qualities of species discourse, media religious section of with appearances, being enumerated movements the midpolitics, selling audio – in religious texts, dle class, no opposivideo cassettes emphasizing the particution to the and books, the moral appeal of larly the system, concept of the the sacred texts service a natural religious preacher and spiritual class affinity to as a symbol, philosophy the parties teaching techbased on niques of meditareligious tion, networking ideology of followers, helping them in case of any family, social or personal crisis Rural basis, Appealing to the lib- An alternative Radical Aiming at peasantry, eration discourse religious controlinterpretation of within religion, movements lower ling the religious texts, interlinking this income political new meanings to discourse with the group structures, symbols, milipromises tant opposition present probto the to exploitative lems of liberaalternative relations, party tion, alternative state and organization, system free from politics, mass mobilization exploitation affinity to radical political parties

112  Manindra Nath Thakur a different interpretation of religious morality, religious laws and religious texts. The class character of RRMs makes them radical without losing the essential aspects of religion. Summing Up Three forms of religious movements discussed earlier are responses to capitalism and democracy and their relationships in contemporary times. Though all these movements have religion as a common basis, they are quite different. The differences in these movements are the product of their social-economic base. Their class component defines their attitude towards capitalism and democracy. The FRM is a form of identity politics and it has an affinity towards neoliberal capitalism. It also favours the majoritarian democracy and authoritarian state. It undermines the class contradictions within the religious community. Unlike FRM, the NRM does not have any that directly relates. The middle class mainly constitutes the social base of this movement; the new middle class, which is a product of liberal phase of capitalism, is attracted to this form of a religious movement. The presence of this class defines its relationship with democracy and capitalism. The NRM has a deep ideological affinity to capitalism. Though this form of movement does not directly show any political inclination, there is no doubt that it closely links neoliberal regimes with authoritarian tendencies. The RRM is quite different from the other two and registers its protest against the neoliberal regimes and their authoritarian tendencies. Though this religious movement is mainly available in Latin American societies and within the larger rubric of Christianity, it is also present in other countries and religions. This movement advocates a different worldview and due to its class base, it has an affinity towards anti-capitalist ideologies. This chapter intends to show that religious movements should not be seen as a monolithic whole in the contemporary times. The nuanced differences must be understood as this differentiation has implications for religion, capitalism and democracy. Notes 1 This committee consisted of six scholars from social sciences, two from natural sciences and two from humanities. It was supposed to review the state of social sciences, their division into standard disciplines, their changing nature and the need of future modifications. 2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm 3 Juergensmeyer (1993) prefers the term religious nationalism to fundamentalism. Also see Aldridge (2007, p. 123). 4 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm 5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1585636.stm 6 One of the remarkable features of the fundamentalist movements is that they often combine a commitment to a selectively imagined past with an easy facility with

Forms of Contemporary Religious Movements  113 modern technology. Because the establishments the fundamentalists oppose control the major forms of communication and the main social institutions, the dissidents are often at the forefront of the exploring technologies and social structures. In Iran, the Shah controlled radio, television, press, army, schools and political institutions. Hence, the Ayatollah Khomeini spread his teachings by audio cassette and by loose networks created by enthusiastic supporters. Osama Bin Laden used fax machines and satellite telephones to control his international network of Islamic terrorists. The American Christian right built its networks with computerized direct mailing lists, toll-free telephones and its own Christian cable television networks. 7 www.sullivan-county.com/news/index.htm. 8 See, for example, some typologies of these movements having such differences, such as Wilson and Crosswell (1999).

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114  Manindra Nath Thakur Pope John Paul II. (1988). Pope John Paul II on the social concerns of the Church. Population and Development Review, 14(1), 211–217. Pyarelal. (1958). Mahatma Gandhi: The last phase (Vol. II). Navajivan Publishing House. Therborn, G. (1999). The ideology of power and the power of ideology. Verso Books. Wallerstein, I. M. (1996). Open the social sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian commission on the restructuring of the social sciences. Stanford University Press. Weber, M. (2012). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Dover Publications. Wilson, B.,  & Crosswell, J. (1999). New religious movements: Challenges and responses. Routledge.

5 Regulating the Electoral Domain The Election Commission of India Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy

Introduction Regulatory authorities are generally construed as autonomous ­bodies ­having the power to enforce rules to ensure conflict-free relationships within an institutional matrix to maintain the dynamism of a system. For some time now, especially since the 1990s, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has been seen as a regulatory body that performs a set of rule enforcement functions pertaining to the conduct of elections, thereby sustaining the vitality of the electoral system (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001). The ECI is often seen as an institution that reflects the wisdom of the constituent assembly. In the form of the ECI, the constituent assembly provided for a constitutional body to ensure free and fair election in the country. The ECI is also expected to guard against self-destructive tendencies within democracies by performing an oversight function over the conduct of elections (Thiruvengadam, 2018, p. 138). Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2005) consider the ECI a ‘referee institution’, while James Lyngdoh, former Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), sees the ECI performing the role of a ‘pitcher’ (Lyngdoh, 2004). Through much of its history of conducting elections, the ECI has been perceived as performing its task effectively, and all political parties have submitted to electoral outcomes. The general election in 1977, for example, in which the ECI urged the voters to ‘vote without fear’, brought it into the public arena as an institution performing its constitutionally mandated responsibility of conducting ‘free and fair’ elections. Surveys carried out from time to time have revealed the steadily increasing credibility of the ECI as a trusted institution. The increase in voter turnout over successive years, also referred to as a ‘democratic upsurge’ (Yadav, 1997, 1999), alludes not only to the processes of democratic consolidation but also to the new churnings that have emerged as an outcome of this consolidation. The expansion and entrenchment of the ECI’s powers of administering elections have, however, also been considered a case of administrative overreach and the ‘stretching’ of its ‘regulatory powers’ (Katju, 2009; McMillan, 2012). Questions pertaining to the limits of the ECI’s powers and its relationship with other institutions, especially Parliament and the Supreme Court, have subsequently been posed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-7

116  Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy In this chapter, we argue that the ECI can be seen as performing a range of overlapping functions, not all of which are regulatory. We argue that Article 324 constitutes the source of ECI’s powers and enhances its autonomy, making it a site of contestation between the ECI and different political regimes. This argument will be made across three thematically organized sections. The first section addresses the question of the pedigree of the ECI’s powers through a discussion of Article 324 in the constitutional architecture; the second section explores ‘legal exceptionalism’ during ‘election time’ and its manifestation in the Model Code of Conduct (MCC); the last section invokes ‘electoral integrity’ as a framework to see innovations in ‘voter education and awareness’. These themes, often seen through the lens of electoral ‘management’, have become an integral part of the deliberative content of elections. Indeed, they also represent the quest for ‘procedural certainty’ and ‘democratic outcomes’. Through these discussions, the article seeks to show how the ECI has become a significant actor in the shared space of democracy in India, actively engaged in framing the rules that constitute both the procedural and substantive aspects of electoral democracy in India. It also makes a case for the autonomy of the ECI to enable it to achieve its constitutional mandate. Article 324 and the Contest Over Autonomy Set up in 1950 with Sukumar Sen as the first CEC, the ECI was unlike other administrative institutions of the state such as the police, the bureaucracy, and the army, all of which reflected the structural logic of ‘rule and authority’ of the colonial state. The ECI has a different pedigree, which makes for a different set of rules of recognition and validation of its authority. Provided for by the Constitution of India, the ECI does not owe its existence to a law of Parliament.

Election Commission of India (ECI) and the Constitutional Provisions The Constitution makes the ECI pre-eminent in the domain of superintendence, direction, and control of elections (Article 324), but it simultaneously invests Parliament with the power to make laws to regulate all aspects of the conduct of elections (Article 327). Significantly, however, the power of Parliament under Article 327 has been made subject to ‘other provisions of this Constitution’, implicitly including Article 324, which makes the ‘superintendence, direction and control’ of elections the primary and primarily the responsibility of the ECI. This implies that unless the Parliament explicitly claims its powers of legislating on election matters, the ECI possesses an enormous repository of powers to frame rules to administer those aspects of electoral governance that have not been brought within the purview of a law of the Parliament.

Regulating the Electoral Domain  117 In a series of cases beginning with the judgement of a constitution bench of the Supreme Court in 1978, the court has decided that Article 324(1) may be construed as not merely vesting all residuary powers in the election commission but also envisaged as a ‘reservoir of powers’, ‘where law [was] silent’.1 The power of the ECI ‘as a creature of the Constitution’ entrusted with the responsibility of conducting ‘free and fair elections’ is not confined to ‘vacuous areas’, but is ‘plenary in nature’. This implies that it extends to all contingencies, unforeseen and unanticipated, with the word ‘election’ itself being a compendium embracing ‘the entire process of election’, consisting of ‘several stages’ and ‘many steps’ as pronounced in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002). Even when Parliament has the power to legislate on all matters concerning elections, the powers of the ECI in discharging its constitutional role are wide. The unfolding of electoral governance over the past decades has shown that the powers of Parliament and the ECI remain overlapping and therefore contested. The precise areas of dispute appear around the competing claims of Parliament and the ECI over, respectively, the power and the responsibility to govern the electoral domain. While these contending claims apparently relate to the first level of electoral governance, that is, the level of rulemaking, where Parliament is pre-eminent, the tension over unclaimed power/­responsibility manifests itself mostly at the second and third levels of electoral governance, that is, at the levels of rule application and rule adjudication. These tensions have unfolded in various domains of electoral governance, ranging from the institutional structure and composition of the ECI to the way an election is administered, that is, the preparation of electoral rolls, the nomination of candidates, the campaign, how the vote is to be cast and so on. The judiciary has buttressed the citizen’s right to vote by placing it alongside the fundamental right to freedom of expression (Article 19). It may be noted that the right to vote is a constitutional right of citizens derived from Article 326. The enhancement of the right to vote has been made possible through the recogntion of the citizen-voter’s right to know. The Supreme Court judgment affirming ‘the right to know’ of the citizen-voter came in the context of an appeal by the central government against a Delhi High Court judgment on 2 November 2000 which directed the ECI to seek information on the background, assets and capability of candidates contesting elections. The high court judgment came in response to a petition filed by the Association for Democratic Reforms asking for directions from the court for the implementation of the recommendations made in the 170th report of the Law Commission, which had reviewed the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951, and recommended that a candidate contesting elections must furnish the details of criminal cases against them and assets owned by them and dependent family members. Against the contention of the government and political parties in general that ‘non-disclosure’ of information was not a disqualification, and their subsequent attempt to make this assertion a law, the Supreme Court insisted that democracy could not survive ‘without

118  Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy free and fair elections, without free and fairly informed voters’. Arguing that votes cast by ‘uninformed voters’ would be ‘meaningless’, the judges construed the ‘casting of votes’ as a form of ‘speech and expression’, averring that ‘the voter speaks out .  .  . by casting the vote’. In order for the act of voting to be meaningful and fulfilling for both the voter and for the political community of which the citizen-voter was a part, they argued for enabling conditions which would ‘compel the “little man” “to think” “before making their choice of electing law-breakers as lawmakers” ’. By articulating the citizen’s right to know, and by implication the right to vote, the Supreme Court also widened the scope of the ECI’s powers under Article 324, which came to be envisaged as a ‘reservoir of powers’, ‘where law [was] silent’, giving scope for the exercise of residuary power in an infinite variety of situations.2 More importantly, the Supreme Court held that the right to know the antecedents of a candidate was a fundamental right of the voter ‘independent of statutory rights under the election law’: The attempt of courts should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights by a process of judicial interpretation. There cannot be any distinction between the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III of the Constitution and the declaration of such rights on the basis of the judgements rendered by the Supreme Court. (Judgement Today, 2003) Over the years, the ECI’s constitutional powers of superintendence and control of elections have become more pronounced challenging the competing claims of the political executive to limit them through its powers to legislate on it. Dipping into the ‘reservoir’ of powers which Article 324 of the constitution has vested in it, the ECI has marked out ‘election time’ as ‘special time’ (Gilmartin, 2009) to enable the unharnessed and uncoerced exercise of the sovereign act of voting by the citizen-voter. ‘Election Time’ and ‘Electoral Legal Exceptionalism’ Election times are distinct moments in the political lives of democracies. They are part of the political process, but they also stand apart because they have distinctive temporal rhythms (Thompson, 2004), and they open up spaces for democratic deliberation (Urbinati, 2000), which are structured differently from those that obtain in ‘normal’ times. Elections also constitute ‘special time’, which is characterized by a reversal/deferral in the normal/ordinary working of power to provide conditions for an unfettered exercise of popular sovereignty (Gilmartin, 2009, p.  248). Each of these different readings of ‘election time’ is concerned with the normative aspects of democracy. But they are fundamentally associated with the procedural frameworks of electoral governance, in particular the ‘legal doctrine of electoral exceptionalism’.

Regulating the Electoral Domain  119 The Legal Doctrine of Electoral Exceptionalism The legal doctrine of electoral exceptionalism proposes that ‘the electoral process may be subject to more stringent regulation than ordinary politics’ (Thompson, 2004). An extraordinary legal regime in election time is, therefore, considered conducive to the reinforcement of democracy since it suspends institutional sovereign power and releases popular sovereignty.

The extraordinary nature of election time is characterized by both a bar on judicial interference provided by the Constitution and a corresponding juridical vacuum explicitly laid down in the RPA, 1951, for addressing issues that arise in the course of the conduct of elections. Before proceeding, it is necessary to explain the different rules or legal regimes at work during and after election periods. The RPAs of 1950 and 1951, which provide the statutory framework for the conduct of elections in India, identify offences which may be committed by individuals during elections. The MCC, on the other hand, introduced an innovation by providing a disciplinary regime for political parties, empowering the election commission to call political parties to order, thus making them accountable for the conduct of individual members. Moreover, while the legal frameworks pertaining to electoral offences and corrupt practices under the RPAs come into effect only after the electoral process is over, the MCC comes into play during election time, ensuring the direct disciplinary control of the ECI over political parties and offering a system of supplementary legality to plug the legal vacuum that exists during election time. It may be recalled that Article 329 puts bars on interference by courts in electoral matters, including election to either house of Parliament or a state legislature. Under the RPA of 1951, the power to decide election disputes is vested in the high courts, with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. It should be noted that while election petitions under the RPA must be made after the election process is over, and the MCC per se cannot be enforced as a law, corresponding offences under the Indian penal and criminal codes, and other laws, can be invoked to book individual offenders during the electoral process. While the MCC has no statutory backing, it has acquired supplementary legality. The ECI retains the discretionary power to implement it, invoking the RPA 1951 and the Indian Penal Code to enforce it, apart from sending notices and warnings to violators. The acceptance of the principles of the MCC by all political parties is often presented as a remarkable voluntary act of political morality and collective ethics. The appeal of the model code to a higher moral order becomes constitutive of the higher authority of the ECI as well as the exceptional powers that flow from it. While the genesis of the MCC was indeed in an agreement among political parties, its application has led to contests over both its content and the modalities of enforcement. The manner in which these

120  Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy contests have been resolved shows a distinct trajectory towards the entrenchment of the ECI. In the beginning, its role was that of a ‘referee institution’, which meant regulating the conduct of political parties according to the rules that the political parties had framed. However, now it has assumed the role of a rule-making and rule-enforcing body. It has taken away the power to determine the rules of fair play in the electoral game from political parties and the political executive. The process of this shift may be seen as having passed through two distinct phases: the post-internal emergency period (1975–1977) and the ECI’s initiative in 1979 to present its own version of the MCC; and the period from 1990 onwards, marked by the expansion of the powers of the ECI, leading to a period of consolidation of its powers in the following decades. In the course of this period of consolidation of the powers of the election commission, the MCC has emerged as an instrument of regulatory control but also one that enables the ECI to enforce the rules that it has authored. Not surprisingly, corresponding to the enhancement and consolidation of the powers of the ECI, the MCC has emerged as a terrain of contest where the political parties and the election commission have locked horns. In the prefatory note of the ECI’s narrative report of the 1977 general election, which took place after prime minister Indira Gandhi lifted the national emergency, CEC T. T. Swaminathan described the election as ‘historic’. The election established the credibility of the ECI as an independent, objective, honest and impartial agency, affirmed by the free and fearless way the electorate chose its representatives and the government (Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1977). Significantly, it was during this election that the MCC made its passage from a mutually agreed set of ‘dos and don’ts’ among political parties, to a means of restraining the party in power. James Lyngdoh, the CEC of India from 2001 to 2004, sees this change as one which enabled the ECI to assume the role of a ‘pitcher’ and ‘pitch into the party in power’ (Lyngdoh, 2004, pp. 69–70). Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta have categorized the ECI along with the Supreme Court as order-maintaining, referee institutions, exercising primarily the task of restraining other public institutions within a given framework of rules (Kapur & Mehta, 2005, p. 4). Yet the change indicated by Lyngdoh suggests the onset of a distinct trajectory towards the entrenchment of the ECI from its initial role of being a ‘referee institution’ regulating the conduct of political parties according to the rules which the political parties had framed, to one in which it assumed the role of a rule-making body itself. Far from being a referee, the ECI itself became an active player and, quite like the pitcher in a baseball game, the initiator of the electoral game. The transition to a ‘pitcher’s’ role in preference to that of a referee came about in the 1970s in a context of political and democratic deficit. The new role was reinforced through revisions in the MCC by the ECI in October 1979. More comprehensive than the 1974 Code, the 1979 MCC was divided into seven parts, with an entire part (Part VII) devoted to regulating the parties in power in the centre and in the states. The 1979 Code was modified from time to time in consultation with political parties and was reissued in

Regulating the Electoral Domain  121 December 1983 in the form of the document titled ‘Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of Political Parties and Candidates’. At the same time, however, the ECI has been wary of substituting the MCC with statutory law. The implications of a statutory model code would be that while the MCC would have the force of law, the ECI would draw its authority to enforce it not from the powers that devolve on it from Article 324 but from a parliamentary statute. In other words, a statutory MCC would allow the space of executive action on which the ECI has hitherto had exclusive control to be occupied by a statute, whose form and content would be controlled by the Parliament, with the ECI’s powers limited to its implementation. While a statutory model code could take the MCC from the domain of supplementary legality to explicit legality, such a law would constrain the ECI’s powers, especially its ability to take immediate action against violators. Supplementary legality invoked through the MCC draws from a notion of necessity that would be sustained as a source of effective electoral administration but outside the regime of electoral law. Educating Voters through Strategic Voters’ Education and Electoral Participation (SVEEP) Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) consider the principle of procedural certainty an essential guiding principle of electoral governance in societies which are ‘democratizing’ but equally valid for long-sustaining democracies where elections have become ‘routine’. The trust people have in the electoral system corresponds to the degree to which the body entrusted with the responsibility of administering elections can regulate electoral competition by ensuring procedural certainty. Apart from laying down the rules of the electoral game and organizing them with procedural certainty, questions concerning the appropriateness of the procedures designed to conduct elections and their ability to achieve the objective of democratic uncertainty in elections are also important. The evaluative frameworks for assessing the appropriateness of procedures concern themselves largely with the question of whether or not, and to what degree, the integrity of the electoral system is maintained. Comparative studies of ‘electoral integrity’ have identified certain standards to evaluate the degree of integrity achieved by electoral management bodies (EMBs).3 Electoral integrity scholars have emphasized the ‘standard of procedural performance’ as an important index for studying electoral practices in what they call ‘electoral authoritarian’ (Schedler, 2006) regimes as well as established democratic regimes (Norris et al., 2014). While arguing that electoral malpractices, voter fraud, poll violence and voter intimidation characterize electoral authoritarian regimes (e.g., in Cambodia, Thailand and Afghanistan, among others) and sustain the control of the ruling incumbent on elections despite the establishment of democratic institutions, these studies draw attention to the fact that malpractices may occur at different stages of the election Cycle and may also emerge from non-electoral political processes in specific regimes. Even among established democracies, there may be a range of

122  Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy challenges to electoral management despite the existence of ‘good rules’.4 Pippa Norris (2015, p.  3), for example, argues that the lack of integrity may have ‘serious consequences’, including diminishing legitimacy for political authorities and erosion of people’s satisfaction with democracy and confidence in political parties and the Parliament itself – all of which accumulate and result in ‘weaker electoral turnout’. The invocation of best practices is part of a tendency in election administration that sees the conduct of elections as efficient management, transforming election commissions into Election Management Bodies (EMBs). The EMBs are expected to manage elections as ‘enforcement enterprise’. One component of this enterprise in India is SVEEP, a ‘best practice’ which, however, the election commission describes as being distinct for having a ‘different character’ – which is one of ‘election development’ (Election Commission of India, 2013). As a voter education programme, SVEEP was expected, through what the ECI called officers with ‘a distinct social orientation and collaborative approach’, to enhance voter participation and diminish the ‘democracy deficit’ that had seeped into democracies across the world (Election Commission of India, 2013).

Systematic Voters’ Education and Electoral Participation (SVEEP) The ECI launched SVEEP in 2008 in a limited way in Jharkhand and then proposed to pursue it in its Diamond Jubilee Year in 2010 around the theme ‘Greater participation for a stronger democracy’. The ECI termed this initiative as one of ‘educating voters’. Apart from bridging the ‘knowledge gap’ among voters between what they ‘should know’ and what they ‘actually know’ about the electoral process, the ECI professed that it was its responsibility to ‘tread the last mile’ to remove indifference and apathy among voters. This was to be done by persuasion and motivation rather than compelling voters to vote through a law enforcing compulsory voting. To some extent, the emphasis by the ECI on voluntariness in voting can be seen, as in the case with the MCC, consonant with the ECI’s enhancement of its own powers of administering elections within the capacious frameworks of Article 324. At another level, however, in the absence of an explicit law enforcing mandatory voting, the ECI may be seen as interpreting its role of administering elections as also one of enhancing democracy by promoting voluntary civic engagement among citizens, with an emphasis on enhancing participation and eliminating exclusion. Yet SVEEP is also distinctive because it moves away from placing the ECI’s functions within a framework of enhancing the electoral space as an arena of political morality and couches them in idioms of efficient governance. It is possible that it is for this reason that SVEEP has not attracted criticism and political contestation, which both the MCC and the Right to Know did.

Regulating the Electoral Domain  123 SVEEP initiatives in different districts of the country have been listed on the ECI website under the category ‘best practices’. Some of them were nominated for and received the Prime Minister’s Award for Excellence in Public Administration. Jashn-e-Jamhuriat (translated as ‘celebrating democracy’) was one such innovation in Reasi district in Jammu and Kashmir, which won the Prime Minister’s Award for Excellence in Public Administration for the District Collector in 2015. The authors toured the district in the middle of December 2014 during the state assembly elections, almost six months after the parliamentary elections of April – May 2014. According to official ECI figures, voter turnout in the district for the parliamentary election in April – May  2014 had doubled from the previous election held in 2009, from 43 per cent to 81 per cent. Hitherto excluded groups (nomadic populations such as the Gujjars and Bakerwals, migrants and those displaced by conflict, women and persons with disabilities) were included in the electoral process through what the official SVEEP report for the district presented as ‘innovations’, leading to an unprecedented enhancement in their participation. The journey into the hills up to Mahore tehsil in the Pir Panjal range traverses a difficult terrain, which was, through much of the 1990s and into the 2000s, strategically located along the route taken by insurgent and extremist groups to cross from Doda or Poonch to regions in South Kashmir (Swami, 2001). In the upper hill areas, one came across groups of mostly men, but sometimes also women, belonging to Gujjar and Bakerwal communities, with their herds of goats. All of them, without exception, were carrying their electors photo identity cards. This was the first time that the Bakerwals and Gujjars had voted, and the distribution of electors’ photo identity cards, their registration as voters, and finally getting them to vote, was part of the bureaucratic initiative. Upon reaching Mahore tehsil, we travelled further up to village Sungri and attended a Jirgah of the Gujjars and the Bakerwals. In the presence of the block development officer, the chief agricultural officer, the junior engineer, the sarpanch and other members of the panchayat, a large number of men, women and children had gathered. There was palpable energy in the gathering and a great deal of display and performance of collective and associational power and solidarity. The people spoke passionately and honestly. They had voted, and indeed, through the vote they had spoken to show that they were citizens. They claimed to have voted every year – but this year it was different. This year they had voted with what they called jaddozahad (effort), jazbaat (passion) and shauk (interest). It was now time that their vote was honoured (kadra), and their species (naslein)/children were provided access to development (tarakki) and they were not deprived (marhoom) of hospitals, primary healthcare, schools, ration and employment. The voters wanted the local administration, ‘visitors’ from Delhi and through them the government in Delhi to be apprised of their needs – education, particularly schools for their children who trudged long distances to reach the nearest school, hospitals and employment opportunities. The calculus was simple – the vote was not an empty exercise of support to be renewed after

124  Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy five years. It was a promise extracted by the people from those who asked them for their votes. Summing Up The 1990s are often seen as a period when the state recast itself from an ‘interventionist’ to a ‘regulatory’ state, presenting a new configuration of power, in which the earlier contests among institutions (e.g., between the Parliament and the judiciary) paved the way for new forms of institutional rivalries. The relationship between the judiciary and the Parliament was an aspect of the ‘struggle over stateness’, manifesting the contestations that are inherent in state power. The outcome of these contests was aggregation of state power. By the 1990s, the move towards ‘market competition festered by the regulatory state’ saw a corresponding shift, which was experienced in the ‘conduct of politics’. Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph (2008, p. 279) note that the onset of economic reforms in India in 1991 paved the way for assertion by the regulatory institutions of the state, one of which was the ECI. This was also the period when the political field became decentralized and heterogeneous, with implications for the arrangement and distribution of political power. With the ‘displacement’ of a dominant party system by a multiparty system and regional parties and ‘the federal states gaining ground at the expense of the centre’, the balance of power shifted to favour the Supreme Court, the election commission and the President ‘at the expense of the Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet’. Indeed, the Rudolphs explain the new ‘regulatory roles’ of existing institutions as providing stability to the system through a ‘renegotiation of the balance of power’. This involved filling in the political space by playing their ‘constitutional roles as the regulatory mechanisms of democratic politics’ but in ways which were more ‘procedural than substantive’, ensuring procedural fairness in the ‘operation of a multiparty system and the formation and conduct of coalition governments in a federal framework’ (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001, pp. 129–130). Referring to the dynamism of politics brought about by the democratic upsurge, Yogendra Yadav has argued that the institutional apparatus of democracy has not actually strengthened in a way commensurate with it. Indeed, if the waning of people’s faith in representative, administrative and political institutions is any indication, it would appear that institutions have in fact considerably weakened. Yadav sees this waning of trust as an accentuation in the 1990s of ‘the simultaneity of involvement and alienation which has characterised the Indian electorate’ (Yadav, 2010, p.  187). On the other hand, while arguing that political mobilization may have ‘often exceeded institutionalisation’, affecting institutions adversely, Kapur and Mehta (2005, p. 4) suggest that it would be wrong to presume that there is a direct proportionality between the two and that Indian public institutions are ‘severely stressed and weakening’. The impact of political mobilization, they

Regulating the Electoral Domain  125 argue, has been uneven and variable, strengthening some institutions while weakening others. Indeed, pointing to the increase in ‘veto points’ within the government, Kapur and Mehta identify the emergence of ‘referee institutions’ like the election commission and the Supreme Court, as one aspect of the strengthening of institutions. The choice of the expression ‘referee institution’ for the election commission, as in the case of the expression ‘regulatory institution’ used to refer to the election commission by the Rudolphs and following them by Alistair McMillan, has significant implications. Both refereeing and regulating connote specific functions, but these may not be the roles that the election commission is expected to perform or even what it is perceived to be performing. Indeed, it is debatable whether the performance of the election commission, which is perhaps one instance where an institution has ‘exceeded’ the role it was expected to perform, may be appropriately labelled as a refereeing function. Far from being a neutral arbiter and rule implementing body, the ECI has become a prominent player in the electoral game by determining its rules, strengthening and reinforcing them where they appear to be weak, and plugging gaps by devising new rules, becoming in the process, as former CEC James Lyndoh remarked, a ‘pitcher’ in the football game. Lyngdoh’s remarks pertained not just to the change in the way in which the election commission perceived its own role in the electoral game but also to the new ‘defiance’ it assumed and exhibited in the period immediately after the emergency. If the emergency was the period in which all institutions suffered erosion, the period after the emergency can, in some senses, be seen as a period when institutions like the election commission recuperated and resurged, reinventing themselves by giving innovative interpretations to the powers that already existed in their inventory. The contestations around Article 324, the manner in which the MCC as an instrument of supplementary legality has evolved, and innovations such as SVEEP are indicative of a more expansive role the ECI plays within the shared institutional space of democracy. It is important for the ECI to continue to affirm the trust that it has elicited historically. The question of trust is related to how the ECI must conduct itself as an autonomous and impartial body with ‘plenary’ constitutional powers. The deployment of unhedged constitutional powers without political influence is important for eliciting trust in the electoral process and restoring electoral integrity. These include electoral finance; the strengthening of the deliberative aspects of the electoral domain through a stringent implementation of the MCC; and putting in place procedures for the appointment of the CEC and the ECs, which would go a long way in placing the ECI beyond suspicion. Notes 1 These judgments are Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, 1978 (SCC 405), Vineet Narain and Others v. Union of India and Another (1998 SCC 226), and Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms  & Another (SC 249/2002).

126  Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy 2 See Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms  & Another (SC 249/2002). 3 These standards include assessing whether they are capable to achieve the following goals: legitimacy, independence, impartiality and fairness, integrity and honesty, transparency and openness, efficiency and effectiveness, professionalism and public service. See the trilogy of books by Pippa Norris on the theme (2014, 2015, 2017). Also, the website, www.electionintegrityproject.com. 4 As set out in the agenda for research on ‘the hidden challenges of electoral integrity’ by Margarita Zavitskaya and Holly Ann Grant for the European Consortium for Political Research at https://ecpr.eu/Events/SectionDetails.aspx?SectionID=403&E ventID=94.

References Election Commission of India. (2013). Systematic voters’ education and electoral participation (SVEEP): Compendium of instructions. ECI. Gilmartin, D. (2009). One day’s Sultan: T. N. Seshan and Indian democracy. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 43(2), 247–284. Judgement Today. (2003). People’s union for civil liberties (PUCL) & another v. union of India and another. Judgement Today, 2(10), 529–533. Kapur, D., & Mehta, P. B. (Eds.). (2005). Political institutions in India: Performance and design. Oxford University Press. Katju, M. (2009). Election commission and changing contours of politics. Economic & Political Weekly, 44(16), 8–12. Lok Sabha Secretariat. (1977). Preface: Narrative report (Vol. I, pp.  81–82). Sixth General Election. Lyngdoh, J. M. (2004). Chronicle of an impossible election. Penguin Books. McMillan, A. (2012). The election commission of India and the regulation and administration of electoral politics. Election Law Journal, 11(2), 187–201. Mozaffar, S., & Schedler, A. (2002). The comparative study of electoral governance: Introduction. International Political Science Review, 23(1), 5–27. Norris, P. (2014). Why electoral integrity matters. Cambridge University Press. Norris, P. (2015). Why elections fail? Cambridge University Press. Norris, P. (2017). Strengthening electoral integrity. Cambridge University Press. Norris, P., Frank, R., & Coma, F. M. I. (2014). Measuring the quality of elections: A new dataset. PS: Political Science and Politics, 47(4), 789–798. Rudolph, L. I., & Rudolph, S. H. (2001). Redoing the constitutional design: From an interventionist to a regulatory state. In A. Kohli (Ed.), The success of India’s democracy (pp. 127–162). Cambridge University Press. Rudolph, L. I., & Rudolph, S. H. (2008). Redoing the constitutional design: From an interventionist to a regulatory state. In L. I. Rudolph & S. H. Rudolph (Eds.), Explaining Indian democracy: A  fifty-year perspective, 1956–2006, Vol. II: The realm of institutions: State formation and institutional change. Oxford Collected Essays (pp. 276–311). Oxford University Press. Schedler, A. S. (2006). Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition. Lynne Rienner. Swami, P. (2001). Through the Pir Panjal range. Frontline, 18(14). https://frontline. thehindu.com/other/article30251182.ece

Regulating the Electoral Domain  127 Thiruvengadam, A. K. (2018). The Constitution of India: A  contextual analysis. Bloomsbury. Thompson, D. F. (2004). Election time: Normative implications of temporal properties of the electoral process in the United States. American Political Science Review, 98(1), 51–64. Urbinati, N. (2000). Representation as advocacy: A study of democratic deliberation. Political Theory, 28(6), 758–786. Yadav, Y. (1997). Reconfiguration in Indian politics: State assembly elections 1993– 1995. In P. Chatterjee (Ed.), State and politics in India (pp.  177–207). Oxford University Press. Yadav, Y. (1999). Electoral politics in the time of change: India’s third electoral s­ ystem, 1989–99. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(34–35), 2393–2399. Yadav, Y. (2010). Political representation in contemporary India. In N. G. Jayal & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford companion to politics in India (pp. 347–360). Oxford University Press.

Section II

Political Processes I Changing Dynamics of Institutions and Political Parties

6 Indian Judiciary Changing Role and Dynamics of the Supreme Court of India Indrajeet Kumar Jha

The power of the court lies in the legitimacy it possesses, which depends upon a feeling among the people that its decisions are impartial, principled, objective, and just (Sathe, 2002, p. 22). After taking oath on 26 January 1950, Chief Justice Harilal J. Kania had said that the Court should interpret the Constitution with ‘enlightened liberality’ and administer the law with ‘goodwill and sympathy for all’ (Austin, 1999, p. 123). Although there have been 105 amendments to the Indian Constitution from January  1950 to January 2023, neither has there been any major or radical change in its outline, nor has the country adopted another new constitution. But since then, there has been a lot of change in the approach of the Supreme Court (SC) in interpreting the Articles of the Constitution. In fact, a study of the functioning and role of the SC in the last seven decades shows many ups and downs. The SC’s role in property rights and civil liberties was criticized in the early days of its establishment. The decision the Constitutional Bench of the SC gave in April 1976 on civil liberties during the Emergency became the subject of much controversy. The constitution bench ruled in the case of ADM Jabalpur vs. S. S. Shukla (1976 AIR 1207) that a person’s right to life cannot be upheld by a High Court (HC) under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution during a National Emergency. Thus the Court, in a way, gave tacit consent to the violation of civil liberties, including life and personal liberty in the state of emergency. But in the era of post-Emergency, the role of the Court changed significantly. At this time, the Court assumed a humanitarian face and tried to give justice a social meaning by taking it out of the legal guise. Public interest litigations started by the Court had an important contribution to this. But for the last few years, many questions have started to arise again regarding the role of the courts. Along with the issue of class bias in public interest litigations, there have also been allegations of nepotism and corruption against the judges. In such a situation it is a big challenge for the Court to once again establish its legitimacy. This chapter attempts to briefly analyze the jurisdiction, power and functioning of the SC since its inception till date and explain the changes in its role at different times. DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-9

132  Indrajeet Kumar Jha Indian Judiciary and Its Brief History Integrated Judiciary has been adopted in India and its structure is like a pyramid. The SC is at its top, the HCs in the middle and the District and Subordinate Courts at the bottom. The chairman of the drafting committee in the Constituent Assembly, B.R. Ambedkar presented an outline of the nature of Indian judiciary, in which he presented arguments in favour of adopting a uniform law and unified court system throughout the country to establish uniformity in the remedial process. Thus, despite adopting federal provisions, he described India’s judiciary as more in line with the Canadian system than the United States (Rodrigues, 2002, p. 482). If we look at the history of jurisprudence and the judicial system in India, its roots can be traced to ancient times. In ancient India, the task of providing justice lays with the king who had the power of punishment. In the Vedic and pre-Mauryan period, the legal courts functioned under the chairmanship of the king and were guided by the Vidhi Samhita or Smriti. The Arthashastra of Kautilya written in 300 B.C. has an important place in the history of Indian jurisprudence in which the third chapter deals with matters related to behaviour i.e. dispute. Kautilya’s Arthashastra was very influential in the Mauryan period. At that time there were two types of courts: courts dealing with civil matters were called Dharmasthiya and courts dealing with criminal matters were called Kantakashodhana. This system is visible till the time of Ashoka. Similarly, in the development of the judicial system, the influence of Islamic jurisprudence under the Mughal period is prominently visible, which were influenced by Islamic laws based on Quran and Shariat (Khanna, 2008, pp. 27–28). But the present day form of judiciary was developed during the British rule. Under the Regulating Act of 1773, the establishment of the Supreme Court of Calcutta was proposed, on the basis of which a letter regarding the establishment of the Supreme Court of Calcutta was issued on March  26, 1774. Thereafter King George III established the Supreme Court of Madras and the Supreme Court of Bombay on December  26, 1800 and December  8, 1823 respectively. In 1861, the High Court of India Act came into being, the purpose of which was to abolish the Supreme Court in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and establish High Courts in different provinces. Till 1935, these High Courts were functioning as the highest judicial institution in different provinces. A Federal Court was established in Delhi by the Government of India Act of 1935, which had the right to hear disputes arising between the federal state and the provinces and to hear appeals against the High Courts. After Independence, the Constitution of India was adopted on January 26, 1950 and with this the Supreme Court also came into existence, whose first meeting was held on January 28, 1950 (details can be find through the website of the SC). Structure and Autonomy of the Supreme Court Under Chapter Four of the Constitution, Article 124–147, describes the structure and powers of the SC. There is a provision for Supreme Court of

Indian Judiciary  133 India under Article 124 of the Constitution. Under the original Constitution, there was a provision of a Chief Justice and seven other judges in the SC. But under Article 124, Parliament has been empowered to increase the number of judges by law. The Parliament, exercising its jurisdiction, passed the Number of Judges of the Supreme Court Act in 1956 and increased the number of other judges from seven to ten, thirteen in 1960, seventeen in 1977, twentyfive in 1986 and thirty in 2008. At present, under the 2019 Act, the Supreme Court can appoint thirty-three other judges in addition to a Chief Justice. According to the provisions of Article 124(2) of the Constitution, all the judges of the SC are appointed by the President. According to this, the President shall appoint the judges of the SC in consultation with the judges of the SC and of the HCs of the states as he deems fit to consult. At present, the appointment of judges in the Supreme Court is done on the basis of the advice of a collegium formed by the Chief Justice and four other senior most judges. (See Table 6.1) In 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led NDA government passed the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act by the 99th Amendment to the Constitution (121st Constitutional Amendment Bill) for the appointment and transfer of judges of the SC and HCs. However, in October 2015, a five-judge constitutional bench of the SC struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act and NJAC by a majority of 4:1, citing a threat to the autonomy of the court and the collegium system was reinstated. According to Article 124(3) of the Constitution, only a person can be appointed as a judge who is a citizen of India and has been a judge of an HC for at least five years or has been an advocate of an HC for ten years or should be an eminent jurist in the eyes of the President. The judges of the SC can remain in office till the age of 65 years. In the meantime, he may resign from his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President. A Judge of the Supreme Court can be removed from his office only by an order of the President on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity, passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting. That resolution supported by a two-thirds majority of the members present should be placed before the President in the same session. According to the provisions of Article 124(4) of the Constitution and the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968, the process of removal of a judge from his post can be initiated in either house of Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha. If the proposal is brought in the Lok Sabha, then at least 100 members should approve it, and if it is brought in the Rajya Sabha, it should have the approval of at least 50 members. Then the proposal addressed to the President is given to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. Thereafter, the proposal is examined by a committee of three members, consisting of two judges of the Supreme Court and an eminent jurist. When the Committee, in its enquiry, finds that the judge is guilty of misbehaviour or incapacity, then the motion along with the report of the Committee is accepted for consideration in the House in which the motion is pending. If the motion is passed in each House by a majority of the total

134  Indrajeet Kumar Jha Table 6.1  Collegium System and NJAC According to the provisions of Article 124(2) of the Constitution, every judge of the SC shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Judges of the SC and of the HCs in the State as the President may deem necessary for the purpose. In the case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted. As per the earlier judgments of the SC, it was necessary that the consultation should be effective and involve an exchange of views and consideration of merits, but it was not necessary that there should be consensus (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 3 December 1981 – also known as First Judges Case). But on October  16, 1993, in the Supreme Court ­Advocates-on-Record Association and others v. Union of India (Second Judges Case), a nine-judge bench held that if the senior-most judge of the SC is fit to hold office, he should be appointed to the post of Chief Justice of India. Also, in the case of the appointment of other judges of the SC, consultation with the Chief Justice would mean consent. The Court had also laid down that the Chief Justice would consult the opinion of the two senior-most judges of the SC before giving his advice and the Cabinet shall take into account the advice of the Chief Justice while giving its advice to the President under Article 74. Again in the context of these appointments in 1998, on the consultation sought by the President under Article 143 (also known as the Third Judges Case), a nine-judge bench, while expressing its opinion, had given a provision for a circle or collegium consisting of five judges. According to this, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, which is given prominence in the process of consultation and in which the opinion of the judiciary is reflected, is formed on the basis of consultation with a collegium. This circle consists of the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most judges of the SC. It should also include the successor to the Chief Justice, if he is not among the four senior-most judges. Their views should be obtained in writing. Under this consultation, the court has also given many other instructions regarding the collegium system. At present, the appointment of judges in the SC is done on the basis of the advice of a collegium formed in a similar way. But since there is no provision for such a collegium in the constitution, there has been a controversy over it and that is why the demand for the establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission has also arisen in the last few years. In this context, the United Progressive Alliance government presented the Judicial Appointment Commission Bill (120th Constitutional Amendment Bill) in Parliament in 2013, which was also passed by the Rajya Sabha on September 5, 2013. But due to the change of government in 2014, this bill could not be passed in the Lok Sabha. Again in 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Partyled NDA government passed the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act by the 99th Amendment to the Constitution (121st Constitutional Amendment Bill). According to this act, the NJAC is responsible for the decisions related to the appointment and transfer of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. There is a provision of 6 members in this commission – the Chief Justice of the SC, the two senior-most judges, the law minister, and two ‘eminent persons’. One of these two persons should be from a Scheduled Caste, a Scheduled Tribe, an Other Backward Class, or a woman and both of them are to be selected by a three-member committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. In October 2015, a five-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act and NJAC by a majority of 4:1, citing a threat to the autonomy of the Court. The Act was declared unconstitutional and the collegium system was reinstated. In fact, questions were being raised from the day when the proposals regarding the formation of NJAC had come. Concerns were raised regarding the interference in the independence of the judiciary. Due to this apprehension, in April 2014, the then Chief Justice P. Sathasivam opposed any changes in the collegium system for the appointment of judges, stating that it was better (The Hindu, 24 April 2014).

Indian Judiciary  135 In December 2022, the issue of NJAC again heated up when presiding over Rajya Sabha for the first time as Chairman on the opening day of the winter session of Parliament, Vice-President Jagdeep Dhankhar criticized the role of the SC referring to its 2015 judgment striking down the NJAC Act and called it a ‘glaring instance’ of ‘severe compromise’ of parliamentary sovereignty and disregard of the ‘mandate of the people’. Before that the Law Minister Kiren Rijiju had also said that the Collegium system of appointing judges was ‘opaque’, ‘not accountable’ and ‘alien’ to the Constitution. The remarks expressed by the people holding constitutional posts attracted the displeasure of the SC. Such remarks have fumed the debates about the collegium system for the appointments of judges. However, many academicians and retired judges backed this collegiums system for the autonomy of the Judiciary. According to former Chief Justice of India U. U. Lalit Collegium system in India is the near-perfect model. Backing up the Collegium, CJI Lalit said, ‘we don’t have a system better than the Collegium system. If we don’t have anything qualitatively better than the collegium system, naturally, we must work towards making it possible that this collegium system survives’. He also stressed that there was no need for interference in the system (The Hindu, 18 February 2023).

strength of that House and by a two-third majority of the members of that House present and voting, then the representation is presented to the President, and if the President gives his approval to the representation, the judge is removed from office. The proceedings were first conducted in 1991–93 by Justice R.K. Ramaswamy and the committee also found the judge guilty but the resolution could not be passed in the Lok Sabha due to non-participation of the Congress party in the voting (Basu, 2021, p. 303). In fact, at the time of constitution-making, the framers of the constitution wanted to make sure that our judiciary is completely independent and competent in decision-making. They were of the opinion that in order to keep the light of the judiciary shining, the courts must be above reproach, free from coercion and from political influence (Austin, 1966, pp. 164–165). Therefore, the process of appointment and removal of judges has been made very transparent. Along with this, a ban has also been imposed on the judges of the SC to practice in any court after retirement (Article 124(7)). Apart from this, special provisions have also been made regarding the salaries and allowances of the judges. Under Article 125 of the Constitution, the salaries of the judges have been fixed and provision has been made that their salaries, leave and pension shall be determined by the Parliament and shall not be varied to their disadvantage during their term of office. Under Article 146(3) of the Constitution, it has also been ensured that the administrative expenses of the SC and the salaries, allowances etc. of the judges and other employees of the Supreme Court will be given from the Consolidated Fund of India, i.e. Parliament cannot vote on it. Jurisdiction and Power of the Supreme Court The SC of India has been given extensive powers. Given the nature and extent of its jurisdiction and powers, it appears to be more powerful than the

136  Indrajeet Kumar Jha judiciary of any other country (Basu, 2021, p. 304). The SC is also a federal court, an appellate court, and also the guardian of the Constitution. It is also a court of record, meaning its decisions are binding on all subordinate courts (Article 141). Records of its proceedings and decisions are kept and can be used as evidence. In Article 129 of the Constitution, the SC has been given the power to punish in case of contempt of its orders by describing it as a court of record. The SC has been given mainly three types of jurisdiction: (1) Original Jurisdiction, (2) Appellate Jurisdiction and (3) Advisory Jurisdiction. (1) Original Jurisdiction

Original jurisdiction means the power to hear and decide a dispute in the first place or in the first instance. Under this come those cases which can be started directly in the SC. In fact, the provisions of original jurisdiction are related to the federal functions of the court. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, the SC has been given exclusive original jurisdiction in the following cases: (a) disputes between the Government of India and one or more States, (b) the Government of India on the one hand and one or more States on the one hand and one or more States on the other, (c) between two or more States if the dispute involves a question of law or fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. But this jurisdiction of the Court does not extend to treaties or agreements made before the Constitution came into force. It is clear that this original jurisdiction of the court is related to disputes between different units of the federation. This jurisdiction of the SC is exclusive, that is, no other court can accept such suits related to the federal system in India for hearing. Thus under the federal system where a dispute may arise between the centre and a state or between different states, the SC has been given an important role. Here Article 131 also imposes two limitations on the exercise of this jurisdiction – First, under its original jurisdiction, the SC can hear only those cases in which the parties are units of the federation. That is, under the original jurisdiction, the SC cannot entertain any suit brought by a private citizen against the Government of India; Second, the case must necessarily involve a question on which the existence or extent of a legal right would depend. Jurisdiction of the SC can also be set aside in certain other matters such as water disputes between states (Article 262), cases referred to the Finance Commission (Article 280), and adjustment of expenses and pensions between the Union and the States (Article 290). Also, under Article 131, a state cannot claim compensation or damages against the Centre. The SC has original jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election of the President and the Vice-President and its decision is final. In 1969, V.V. Giri’s election for the post of President and G.S. Pathak’s election for the post of Vice-President were challenged in the SC, and Justice S. M. Sikri declared their elections valid (Sethi, 1995, p. 173).

Indian Judiciary  137 Apart from this, under Article 139A of the Constitution, the SC itself can transfer cases from one or more HCs to itself, if it involves substantial questions of law or of general importance. It can also transfer cases from one HC to another HC for the ends of justice. These also come under its original jurisdiction. (2) Appellate Jurisdiction

The SC is also the highest appellate court and appeals against the decisions of the HCs can be made here. There is a provision of the appellate jurisdiction of the SC from Articles 132 to 136 of the Constitution. Under this, the SC has three types of appellate jurisdiction: (a) appeals related to constitutional matters, (b) appeals related to civil matters, and (c) appeals related to criminal matters. (a) Appeal related to constitutional matters: Article 132 of the constitution provides for appeal related to constitutional matters. According to this, where a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is involved in a case and the High Court certifies that such question is involved, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (b) Appeal related to civil cases: Article 133 provides for appeals related to civil cases. According to this, an appeal shall lie to the SC from any judgment, decree or final order of the HC in a civil matter, if the HC certifies under Article 134-A that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and in the opinion of the HC the said question needs to be decided by the SC. (c) Appeal related to criminal matters: The provision of appeal related to criminal matters is in Article 134 of the Constitution. There are two types of cases under this – first, in which the certificate has not been received from the HC, and second, in which the HC has given the certificate. An appeal shall lie to the SC from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court if the HC has certified under Article 134-A that the matter is fit to be appealed to the SC. But in a criminal case, even if the necessary certificate has not been given by the HC, an appeal can be made to the SC in two cases – First, the HC has reversed the order of acquittal of an accused person in the appeal and passed the sentence of death. Secondly, the HC has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and has, in such a trial, convicted the accused person and sentenced him to death. Apart from these appellate powers, there is also a provision for special appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. According to this, the SC may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order passed or made in any suit or matter by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. Only the military court is excluded from this unlimited appellate power of the SC.

138  Indrajeet Kumar Jha (3) Advisory Jurisdiction

Advisory jurisdiction has been given to the SC under Article 143 of the Constitution. It provides that if at any time it appears to the President that any question of law or fact has arisen or is likely to arise, which is of such nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the SC upon it, the President can seek the advice of the SC. But here the President is not bound to follow the opinion of the SC. Nevertheless, according to the practice that is going on, the opinion of the SC is generally respected. Along with this, the SC can also express its inability to give its opinion when the President asks for opinion on any issue. Under this provision, the President has sought advice from the SC in many cases from time to time and the Court has given its opinion. This includes the constitutionality of the Kerala Education Bill in 1958, the Special Court Bill in 1978, the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal in 1992, the Ram JanmabhoomiBabri Masjid dispute in Ayodhya in 1993, in the context of the appointment of judges in 1998 (Third Judges Case), and in the context of holding elections in Gujarat after the dissolution of the Assembly in 2002, the opinion asked is important. But in some cases, the court has also expressed its inability to give advice. For example, in 1993, the Court expressed its inability to say whether there was a temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya. (4) Custodian of Fundamental Rights and Writ Jurisdiction

Under Article 32 of the Constitution, the responsibility of protection of ­fundamental rights given in Part III has been given to the SC. Under this, any person can directly file a petition in the SC in case of violation of fundamental rights. Under Article 32(2), the SC has been given writ jurisdiction for the protection of fundamental rights. Generally, this power of the court is seen as original jurisdiction only. But here D.D. Basu has distinguished it from the original jurisdiction. According to him, it is considered preliminary in the sense that the aggrieved party has the right to make a request by ­filing a petition in the SC. It does not need to come through an appeal to the SC. But even then it is different from the original jurisdiction because in these cases the dispute is not between the units of the union but between the aggrieved person and the agencies of the government. That is why the jurisdiction under Article 32 has no resemblance to the jurisdiction under Article 131 (Basu, 2021, p. 308). Under Article 32, the SC has the right to issue five types of writs: Habeas corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto and Certiorari. (i) Habeas Corpus: Habeas Corpus means the order to present the body. When a person is said to have been detained illegally, the court issues this writ. Under this writ, the detaining officer is ordered to physically present the detained person before the court and explain the reason for the detention. If the detention is found to be illegal, the person is

Indian Judiciary  139 set free at the same time. Protection is obtained from illegal arrest by this writ. (ii) Mandamus: Mandamus means ‘we order’. Mandamus can be sought against any authority, official, government or judicial body that fails or refuses to perform a public duty or a legal obligation. By this writ, the SC can issue orders to any officer to perform the duties assigned by the constitution and law. (iii) Prohibition: This writ is issued by the higher court to the lower court or tribunal. By this the inferior court or tribunal is forbidden to exceed its jurisdiction. This writ is issued only against judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. It is not issued against administrative agencies. (iv) Quo warranto: It means ‘by what authority’. This writ is issued against a person when he holds a public office without any legal authority. Under this, a demand can be made to clarify the legal position of a person in the context of his claim to hold a public office. (v) Certiorari: It means ‘dispatch for information’. This writ is also issued against judicial and quasi-judicial authorities, courts, and tribunals. When a tribunal acts without or in violation of jurisdiction and passes an illegal order, it can be set aside by issuing a writ of certiorari. Under Article 139 of the Constitution, Parliament may by law confer on the SC the power to issue such directions, orders or writs for purposes other than the protection of fundamental rights. Apart from these powers, the SC has also been entrusted with some additional judicial responsibilities. The Chief Justice of the SC and, in their absence, the senior-most judge of the SC acts as the President when the offices of the President and the Vice-President are vacant. After the death of the then President Zakir Hussain in 1969 when V.V. Giri resigned from the post of Vice-President to contest the presidential election, Justice M. Hidayatullah was acting President of India from 20 July to 24 August. Supreme Court and Power of Judicial Review Judicial review refers to the power of the SC under which it can repeal any law made by the legislature or any order issued by the executive if it is contrary (violation) to the provisions of the constitution, and it can also review or change its previous decisions. The doctrine of judicial review is a product of the American judicial system. For the first time in 1803, in the case of Marbury vs. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall of the US Supreme Court enumerated this power by interpreting the US Constitution. In this case, Justice Marshall called any such law made by the Legislature as unconstitutional which violates the provisions of the Constitution. Since then, this principle has been adopted in the US constitutional system and due to this principle, the US Supreme Court has gained immense power, due to which it is also being called the third house.

140  Indrajeet Kumar Jha The situation in India is different from this. While the American constitutional system is based on the principle of ‘Due Process of Law’, the principle of ‘Procedure Established by Law’ has been adopted in India. That is, here like American courts, the court does not have the right to decide whether a law is appropriate or inappropriate, but it can only examine the procedures. It is also worth mentioning that the SC has not been given the power of ‘Review’ directly in the Indian Constitution. The word ‘Review’ has been used only under Article 137 in which the SC has been given the power to review the judgments or orders pronounced by it. But there are some special provisions under the constitution from which the court gets the power of review. Especially under Articles 13, 32, 131–136, 143, 226, 245, 246, 251, 254 and 372, some such powers and responsibilities have been given to the judiciary, due to which the court gets the power of review. All these articles of the constitution are mainly related to three specific provisions: (1) the provision of fundamental rights protected by the court under the third chapter of the constitution, (2) federal provisions and the seventh schedule which divides the powers between the centre and the states and (3) Proclamation that all laws prior to 1950 would be invalid to the extent they conflict with the Constitution. Apart from these provisions of the Constitution, some decisions of the SC have also played an important role in expanding the power of judicial review. According to M.P. Singh and Rekha Saxena, the power of review of the Court has led to a substantial increase in the number of case laws over time. According to them, these case laws are mostly focused on the debate of the right to property, liberty and equality (Singh & Saxena, 2011, p. 152). Prior to the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, the right to property remained a major conflict point between the SC and the Parliament. By the 44th Amendment Bill, the right to property was removed from the category of fundamental rights and given the form of a legal right under Article 300A of the Constitution. It was only after this that the conflict between the Parliament and the SC came to an end. Case laws relating to life and liberty generally focus on preventive detention and infringement of life and personal liberty as provided under Article 21. In this context two cases of the SC are very important, in 1950 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950, SC 27) and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India in 1978, (AIR 1978, SC 597). According to Article 21 of the Constitution, ‘no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law’. In Gopalan’s case, the SC had expressed the opinion that by adopting the provision of ‘procedure established by law’, Article 21 of our Constitution has adopted the English concept of personal liberty and not the American concept of due process (Basu, 2021, p. 115). Before 1978, the SC of India was of the view that there is no protection in our Constitution against arbitrary legislation that violates individual liberty. That is, if the competent Legislature by making a law makes any provision related to depriving a person of his liberty in special circumstances and in a special manner, then the validity of that law cannot be challenged in the court

Indian Judiciary  141 on the ground that that law is unreasonable or it is against justice. According to Justice Chinappa O. Reddy, looking at the judgment in Gopalan’s case, it seems that even after the independence of the country, the judges were still under the influence of the old colonial jurisprudence (Chinappa Reddy, 2008, p. 29). But in 1978, in Maneka Gandhi’s case, a seven-judge bench of the SC overturned its 1950 decision of Gopalan’s case. In this case, the SC interpreted Article 21 of the Constitution in conjunction with Article 19 and for the first time adopted the principle of natural justice by emphasizing the reasonableness of the procedure (i.e. the procedure should not be arbitrary or unreasonable). The SC has held that the right to life as enshrined in Article 21 does not mean just being alive but also includes being able to live with human dignity. In this way, the court adopted the principle of ‘due process of law’ by establishing the validity of the laws made by the Legislature on the principle of natural justice (Sathe, 2002, pp. 110–111; Desai & Murlidhar, 2000, p. 160). This has greatly expanded the power of judicial review of the court. A large number of case laws emerged due to the power of judicial review of the SC, which are related to the constitutional amendments. In the Constituent Assembly there were some doubts and disagreements regarding the process of constitutional amendment and the power of the Parliament and the Judiciary in this regard. India has adopted a parliamentary democracy like Britain, and in the British parliamentary system the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is well established, and the Judiciary has limited work to do ‘judicial interpretation’. Though after 1977 the British Judiciary got the right to review some orders of the Executive, this also happened with the consent of the Parliament (Singh & Saxena, 2011, p. 151). Many members of the Constituent Assembly argued that the constitutional amendment procedure should be flexible like British parliamentary system. However, in the end, according to the preference of the Drafting Committee a mixed process of both simple and complex (related to the federal provisions) was adopted for the amendment of the constitution. As M.P. Singh and Rekha Saxena, referring to the debate in the Constituent Assembly, argue that on the issue of amendment the speeches of both Rajendra Prasad and B. R. Ambedkar reflected certain elements of judicial review from the federal perspective (ibid, p. 151). But probably no one had thought at that time that one day the Federal Court of India would turn into the most powerful court in the world. In other federal systems, the court only reviews laws and executive orders, but the SC of India today reviews constitutional amendments as well. This power of the court can be understood from the development of the principle of ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution. Judicial review and the principle of ‘basic structure’ of the constitution The ‘Basic Structure’ principle of the constitution originated from the background of the conflict between the SC and the Parliament on the right to

142  Indrajeet Kumar Jha property. On April  24 1973, the 13 judges’ bench of the SC delivered its judgment in the Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala case. The bench delivered its judgment by a 7:6 majority and overturned its 1967 judgment in the Golaknath v. State of Punjab case. In the Kesavananda Bharti judgment, the SC underlined that following the process of Article 368 of the Constitution the Parliament had the power to amend any part of the Constitution, but it could not change the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution (Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, 1973, 4 SCC 225). Indeed the whole conflict emerged in the context of debates related to the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. During the Nehru era, the SC never raised any serious objections and contested questions related to the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, and it accepted the validity of the amendments in the Constitution by the Parliament. The first case related to the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution came to the SC in 1951 in the Shankri Prasad case. Again in 1965, this case came to the SC in the Sajjan Singh case. Certainly, in the post-independence era, Nehru started to enact progressive laws to implement his socialist programs, and such laws were related to land reform and nationalization of the transportation system. However, under Articles 31 and 19(1)f of the Constitution the right to property was a fundamental right, so the SC had the right to review these laws and termed them invalid or unconstitutional. To avoid such conditions the Parliament passed the First Amendment in the Constitution in 1951 and added a new Schedule i.e. Ninth Schedule in the Constitution. The SC had no right to use the power of judicial review over the laws included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. So, the key purpose behind the creation of the Ninth Schedule was to exclude land reform laws passed under Nehru’s socialist program from the purview of judicial review. The validity of the First Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951 was challenged by the Sankari Prasad v. Union of India case. In this case, the most important question before the SC was whether Article 13(2) of the Constitution gave the Parliament the right to amend Fundamental Rights or not? The argument advanced by the petitioner in this suit was that the word ‘state’ in Article 13(2) of the Constitution includes Parliament and the word ‘law’ includes the constitutionamendment. Therefore, the Parliament had no right to make or amend any such law that might abolish or reduce the fundamental rights. In this case, Justice Patanjali Shastri underlined in his judgment that “although ‘law’ must ordinarily include constitutional law, there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law, which is made in exercise of legislative power, and constitutional law, which is made in exercise of constituent power”. This Court held that “in the context of Article 13, ‘law’ must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power, with the result that Article 13(2) does not affect the amendments made under Article 368”. Thus, the SC upheld the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights (Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union

Indian Judiciary  143 of India and Ors., 1951, AIR, 458, 1952, SCRR 89). Again, in the case of Sajjan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1965), the SC maintained the same position. It is also true that Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice J. R. Mudholkar expressed their doubts regarding the Parliament’s power under Article 368 of the Constitution to amend Fundamental Rights. However, a five-judge bench chaired by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar upheld the judgment of the Sankari Prasad case in its majority (3:2) decision (Sajjan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, 1965 AIR 845, 1965 AIR 933). It is obvious from this discussion that though there was no serious conflict between the Parliament and the SC during the Nehru period, gradually many changes started to emerge in Indian politics at the beginning of the 1960s. Various jurists also started to discuss how far the power of a two-third majority of the Parliament should be accepted as the sole basis of making all kinds of changes in the Constitution. Using such unlimited power, can any ambitious ruler not establish dictatorial rule by amending Article 368 of the constitution itself? The question related to the power of the Indian Parliament to amend the Constitution was also raised by Professor Dietrich Conrad, a German jurist, during his lecture in February 1965 at the Faculty of Law, Banaras Hindu University. Later, the same questions were raised by M.K. Nambyar in the Bar Association (Noorani, 2001; Baxi, 1997a). It is noteworthy that when this question again came before the SC in 1967, it changed its earlier views regarding the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution. An eleven judges bench of the Court, by a majority of six to five, came to the conclusion that Sankari Prasad’s case as well as Sajjan Singh’s case were not correctly decided. The majority held that the expression ‘law’ in Article 13(2) includes constitutional amendments as well. The Court, with a majority decision (6:5), adopted the principle of ‘prospective overruling’ and declared the first, fourth, and seventeenth constitutional amendments as null and void. Through this judgment, the SC overturned the government’s decision regarding the nationalization of the banks and ending the Privy Purse. The decision created a huge debate regarding the role of the Judiciary. On the one hand, the Government was supporting socialist programs, and on the other hand, it seemed that the SC had adopted a conservative stand and created obstacles in the implementation of progressive legislation. It the meantime the Congress party lost elections in many states in the legislative elections in 1967 and its seats were curtailed in the Lok Sabha. In this political scenario, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave the slogan ‘Garibi Hatao’ (remove poverty) in 1971, and decided to the common masses against the SC decision to overturn the constitutional amendments passed by the Parliament. In 1971 election Indira Gandhi led the Congress party, received huge support from the voters, and she formed the Government at the centre with a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. After that, the Parliament passed the 24th, 25th and 26th amendments to the Constitution, and through them, it put a limit on the SC power of judicial review.

144  Indrajeet Kumar Jha In 1973 in the Kesavananda Bharti case, the issues of the right to property and the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution again came to the SC. Kesavananda Bharti was a priest at Edneer Mutt, a Hindu monastery in the Kasargod district of Kerala, whose property was declared ‘surplus’ under the Kerala Land Reform Act. Kesavananda Bharti case was subjudice in the Kerala High Court, but during that period the Government decided through the 29th constitutional amendment to put the Kerala Land Reform Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. So, when the case was filed in the SC, it challenged the Kerala Land Reform Act and the constitutional validity of the 24th, 25th, 26th and 29th constitutional amendments. A thirteen-judge bench was formed to hear this case under the chairmanship of Chief Justice S. M. Sikri. The Bench considered this key question that whether the Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution or not, and if had this power then to what extent? In this case, all judges had consensus about the fact that the Parliament was the supreme institution, and under Article 368 had the complete right to amend the Constitution. However, there was a difference of opinion among the judges regarding the extent of this right. Six judges argued that the Parliament was a representative institution of the common voters, it must have the absolute right to amend the Constitution and even change it. On the other hand, there were six other judges, who accepted the supremacy of the Parliament, but they were not in the favour of giving it absolute power to amend the Constitution. They accepted the argument that the Parliament was a representative institution of the common masses, but they questioned that is it possible for a two-third majority of the Parliament to claim that it represents the people of the whole country. These judges claimed that since the two-third majority of the Parliament could not claim to represent the whole country, it would not be correct to give the Parliament absolute power to amend the Constitution. It is clear from the earlier discussion that on the one hand, six judges supported the Parliament’s absolute right to amend the Constitution, on the other hand, there were six other judges who argued in the favour of limited amendment power of the Parliament. Ultimately, Justice H. R. Khanna broke this balance and presented the principle of the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution. So, the thirteen-judge bench decided on the 7:6 majority that under Article 368 the Parliament had the power to amend any Article of the Constitution, but such amendments should not change the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution (Kesavananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala, 1973, 4 SCC 225). However, the SC did not define the ‘basic structure’, which resulted in making it an issue of continuous contestation. Indeed, as Upendra Baxi has argued that the ‘basic structure’ doctrine is nothing but a limitation on the absolute power of the Parliament, which came under the conditions prevailing in that particular context. According to him, the key fear behind the imposition of the ‘basic structure’ was that if the Parliament would get absolute power to amend the Constitution it could lead to the establishment of dictatorship in the country. Certainly, the imposition

Indian Judiciary  145 of the Emergency in 1975 and different incidents of that period underlined that such fear was not baseless. It should be noted that in 1975 the Allahabad High Court cancelled the Lok Sabha membership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the Raj Narain case. Indira Gandhi challenged this decision in the SC, and even when the case was subjudice the Parliament passed the 39th constitutional amendment act which removed the issues related to the election of the President, Vice-President, and Prime Minister from the sphere of judicial review. Indeed, this development compelled many judges, who had earlier opposed the idea of the ‘basic structure’ regarding the limitations of the absolute power of the two-third majority of the Parliament, now changed their opinion. It was the key reason behind the change in the views of Justice Y. V. Chandrachud who opposed the doctrine of ‘basic structure’ in the Kesavananda Bharti case. However, in Minerva Mills vs. Union of India (1980) case, Justice Chandrachud not only supported the ‘basic structure’ but also asserted that the judicial review and limited amending power is one of the basic features of our Constitution (Baxi, 1985, p. 87). Granville Austin argues that there is no conflict between the Parliament and Judiciary, rather both of them are presenting their competing claims to be the ‘main guardian’ of the Constitution. According to him, the Judiciary put forward its claim by presenting the ‘basic structure’ system in the Kesavananda Bharti case. He cites Upendra Baxi to underline that through the ‘basic structure’ the Judiciary created a new constitution for India’s future (Austin, 2000, p. 6). Though many scholars have questioned the imposition of the ‘basic structure’ doctrine over the power of the Parliament, Upendra Baxi has strongly supported the basic structure doctrine. Indeed he feels that it was an attempt to control the dictatorial tendencies of the Government, and so it seems to be a decision in the interest of the people of India (Baxi, 1985, pp. 66–67, 1997a, pp. 56–57). However, Raju Ramachandran has raised many questions on the ‘basic structure’ doctrine and claimed that there are many contradictions in it. For instance, India has adopted parliamentary democracy, and through its many decisions, the SC also declared it as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The most crucial principle of parliamentary democracy is the supremacy of the Parliament. So, the control of the basic structure doctrine over the supremacy of the Parliament is a contradiction in itself. He further argues about this contradiction by citing the example of secularism and socialism, which have been termed as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. In the S. R. Bommai case (1994) the SC underlined in its decision that since secularism is part of the basic structure, the use of Article 356 against the four BJP-ruled states was correct. Ramachandran questions that since socialism is also part of the basic structure, would it be correct to use Article 356 (President’s rule) against those state governments that have adopted a market economy (Ramachandran, 2000, p.  125)? He further argues that, if India decides to join a regional economic union that necessarily involves submission to the jurisdiction of supranational institutions, ‘sovereignty’, a

146  Indrajeet Kumar Jha basic feature is violated. Would the Court annul India’s joining such a union (Ramachandran, 2000, p. 129)? However, gradually the SC’s basic structure doctrine has got legitimacy. This fact emerged more strongly when in the year 2000 the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government formed a Constitution Review Commission, which was criticized by many opposition parties, including the Indian National Congress (INC) on the ground that the NDA Government wanted to alter the basic structure of the Constitution. On the other hand, the NDA leadership strongly denied these charges and assured that there would be no change in the basic structure. It clearly showed that those political parties, who had doubts regarding the basic structure, now accepted it as a legitimate doctrine. Indeed, now the key debate is on the issue that which provisions of the Constitution should be included in the basic structure. It is also noteworthy that in 2007 a nine-judge bench headed by Justice Y. K. Sabharwal clearly mentioned in a decision that after the Kesavananda Bharti judgment (April  24, 1973) all constitutional amendment Acts came under the power of judicial review of the court, even if these Acts were included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution (The Hindu, 2007, p. 1). Indeed the SC has hugely extended its power of review through the doctrine of the basic structure. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and Judicial Activism Judicial activism is an extended form of judicial review. Certainly, only after some time of the formal implementation of the Constitution, did the Judiciary start to assert its active role and it declared many laws and amendments passed by the Parliament unconstitutional. However, these interventions by the Judiciary were not considered activism, rather they were described as conservatism because it focused on the literal meaning of the several Articles of the Constitution and created obstacles in its progressive interpretations. Nevertheless in the post-Emergency era, when both Legislature and Executive became indifferent to their duties, a new form of the judiciary emerged. It passed many orders and directions to the Executive to secure the rights and interests of the common people. This role of the Judiciary was termed as judicial activism. By performing an active role, the SC turned the provision of locus standi very flexible. It observed that if the rights of a person were violated, and that person was not able to reach the Judiciary, any other person could inform the court about this violation and the court would accept it as litigation. As a result, many petitions were filed in the court regarding the rights of the poor, the exploited, and the deprived sections, as well as the negligence of the executive towards environmental problems and the illegal acts of the government officials, and while hearing it, the court issued effective guidelines and directions. Such litigations filed in the court are known as Public Interest Litigation (PIL). By accepting the PILs the Judiciary tried to underscore that

Indian Judiciary  147 justice is not only legal but it is also social and economic. It increased the prestige of the Indian Judiciary and it was argued that the Supreme Court of India had turned itself into the Supreme Court for Indians by introducing PILs (Baxi, 1988, p. 387, 1997b, p. 348). The term PIL was first used in the United States of America (USA), but the idea of PIL adopted in India was drastically different from the American tradition. In the USA, the government and private enterprises provide money for PILs. It does not focus on the harassment by the state, illegal acts of the government, and the rural poor people. In the USA PILs do not focus on any specific class or group interests, rather they give primacy to the interests without group issues like the environment and the participation of citizens in the government’s policy formulations. However, when the idea of PIL emerged in India, it had three key purposes: first, to ensure the access to judiciary for poor and marginalized people; second, to make the groups of people capable so that they can raise their voices against the problems of common masses caused by corrupt and helpless governance; third, to increase the participation of people in constitutional decision-making. Indeed, due to the nature of the PIL in India, Upendra Baxi preferred to mention it as Social Action Litigation (SAL) rather than the PIL (Baxi, 1988, pp. 388–390). The credit to initiate the PIL in India goes to Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer and P. N. Bhagwati. They made the provision of Locus Standi flexible and through this, they empower aware citizens, social activists, and organizations to file petitions against the violation of laws, exploitation of poor and oppressed people, and corrupt government officials, and on the issues of the larger importance of society etc. Indeed, they also created a system, where any person or organization could inform the judiciary only through postcards or telegrams. This system has been known as epistolary jurisdiction (Singh, 2008, p. 21; Singh & Saxena, 2011, p. 132). The Judiciary also made the provision that if no person or organization would inform the Court, and if it received information through media, it could take suo-motu action. The PILs could be filed in the Judiciary under the provisions of Articles 32 and 226, which give writ power to the Supreme Court (SC) and High Courts (HCs) respectively. Whereas the SC has writ power to protect Fundamental Rights, the HCs have such powers in the context of violations of both Fundamental Rights and other laws. It is noteworthy that there is not written provision regarding the PIL in the Indian Constitution, and gradually through the interpretation of the Constitution, the Judiciary acquired this right. Certainly, judicial activism is a more extensive form of the power to judicial review. It is only through the provision of judicial review that the court gets the power to actively issue different kinds of orders and directions. In addition, as discussed earlier in the chapter, two judgments by the SC also played a crucial role in the extension of this power: first, Kesavananda Bharti vs. the State of Kerala (1973) case, where the SC presented the doctrine of ‘basic structure’; and second, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) case, in which the SC interpreted Article 21 of the Constitution and underscored

148  Indrajeet Kumar Jha that right to life is not merely limited to physical existence but it includes life with human dignity. Since there was no clarity about the basic structure, the Judiciary extensively interpreted the Fundamental Rights in Part 3 of the Constitution, and also attempted through its decisions to give written form to many unwritten provisions. So, the Judiciary, which was formed on the basis of ‘procedure established by law’ gradually adopted the principle of ‘due process of law’ by supporting the idea of natural justice. Later, the Judiciary passed many orders and guidelines for the rights of under-trial prisoners, their right to get bail, speedy hearing of cases, and providing legal help etc. The SC also clarified that the Right to Life given under Article 21 also includes the right to clean air and water, and it also gives directions for the protection of the environment. S. P. Sathe argues that if there is a written constitution with a bill of rights, then the Judiciary cannot be a technocratic court. He asserts that many rights are included in the bill of rights, for example, equality before the law, equal protection of the law, individual liberty, the procedure established by law, freedom of speech, etc. All such rights are open in their nature and they acquire new meanings with the changes in society. It is imperative that to present the dynamic meaning of these rights in a changing context the Judiciary should play an active role (Sathe, 2002, p. 4). This is the basic reason behind the gradual change in the Indian Judiciary which resulted in making it an active Judiciary. The first PIL came to the SC in the Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (1979) case. In this case, the SC accepted that the early hearing of the cases was a part of the Article 21 of the Constitution, and ordered the release of 40,000 under-trail prisoners from the various jails of Bihar (Singh, 2008, p.  22; Desai  & Murlidhar, 2000, p.  168). Similarly in the Anil Yadav vs. the State of Bihar (1981) case, the SC ordered an inquiry of the charges against the police that it put acid in the eyes of 33 suspected criminals. It also directed that the victims should be provided proper treatment by the State Government in Delhi (Singh, 2008, p. 22). In the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) case the SC underscored that not giving minimum wages to the workers was equal to begar (forced labour) and declared it a violation of Article 23 of the Constitution. In this case, Chief Justice Bhagwati expressed the view that there was a need to move away from the traditional rule of locus standi, and focus on providing justice to the most marginalized sections of society (Sethi, 1995, p.  180). Similarly, in the Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1893) case, the SC directed the Haryana Government to identify hundreds of bonded labours working in the stone quarries, ensure their freedom, and take adequate measures to rehabilitate them (Singh, 2008, p. 24). Indeed the SC passed many orders and directions in different cases to ensure the accountability of the Government officials on issues related to the violation of the rights of marginalized sections of society and many other issues related to environment and pollution, which were overlooked by most of the stakeholders.

Indian Judiciary  149 One of the most important contributions of the PIL was that it led to the genesis of many new rights. For example, the right to the speedy trial of cases, the right against torture under police arrest, the right against sexual harassment, the right to shelter, the right to live a dignified life, the right to a clean environment, the right to get legal aid and many other rights came into existence due to the decision of the SC on many PILs. Overall, it hugely increased the prestige of the Judiciary, and scholars like Upendra Baxi described this contribution of the Judiciary as re-democratization (Baxi, 1997b, pp. 341– 359). Another scholar, S. P. Sathe, underlined that the Judiciary moved away from the Judiciary of landlords, princes, industrialists, or bureaucrats to the Judiciary of bonded laborers, unorganized laborers, under-trial prisoners, and people living in slums or roadside, and many other marginalized sections of the society (Sathe, 2002, p. 21). However, many problems have also emerged due to these PILs: first, it enhanced the work pressure on the Judiciary. The Courts are not getting time for the hearing of many cases, which resulted in an increasing number of pending cases. Second, Judiciary passed many orders, whose compliance has been very difficult for the Executive. In this context, we can take the example of the SC order in 2001 banning all non-CNG buses in Delhi. Since the implementation of this order was impossible, the Delhi Government broke this order and gave permission to non-CNG buses. Third, it has been argued that the role acquired by the Judiciary is against the principle of separation of power, and intervention in the jurisdiction of the Executive and Legislature. Fourth, many persons and organizations have been using PILs to get quick popularity in society and they have turned it into a business. It has created a danger to turn Public Interest Litigations (PILs) into Personal Interest Litigations. It is noteworthy that since most of the cases have been related to the unfulfilled responsibilities of Government officials, the Judiciary had to pass the order against them. On many occasions to avoid internal controversy and power tussle the Government or the Parliament or the legislative assemblies take the matter to the Judiciary. For example, rather than taking a decision to remove encroachments on public property, Government officials wait for orders from the Judiciary in this regard. Once the Judiciary pass an order on this issue they try to show that they are removing encroachments due to the pressure of the Court’s order. However, in the last few years, a new kind of controversy has been started regarding the role of PILs. As mentioned earlier, the idea of the PILs emerged to help those poor, illiterate, exploited, and marginalized sections of society, who were not able to file a case on their own in the Judiciary. But in the recent past many judgments by the SC have negatively impacted the lives and livelihood of the poor and marginalized people. For example, it dismissed the PIL related to the Tehri Hydro Power Plant Project and Konkan Railway in the 1990s and Narmada Valley Project in the 2000s and followed the principle of ‘judicial self restraint’. In 1992 the National Thermal Power Cooperation (NTPC) decided to establish a Super Thermal Plant. However,

150  Indrajeet Kumar Jha since tribals were living at that place for many generations, they filed a case against the plant and the potential displacement caused by the SC. The court dismissed the petition on the basis of the argument that the industrial development was in the national interest (Upadhyay, 2000, pp. 3789–3792). In 1999 a committee constituted by the SC gave directions to remove slums due to unhealthy conditions (Menon & Nigam, 2007, p. 75). Similarly, in 1996 the SC passed an order to remove those industries from residential areas, which were dangerous for the environment. This order led to the unemployment of lakhs of people working in the 98,000 industrial units. The SC in its order did not give them any alternative place or compensation (ibid, p. 75). One can find many changes in the decisions of the SC in the context of labour laws. For example, in 2003 two-judge bench of the SC approved the Tamil Nadu Government’s decision to dismiss 170,000 employees and declared strike and shutdown illegal. Prakash Karat termed it a violation of the constitutional rights to form unions and organizations (Karat, 2003). It is interesting to note that in the Asiad Workers’ Case 1982 [Peoples Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India and Other, 1982 AIR 1473, 1983 SCR (1) 456] the SC presented an extensive interpretation of Article 21 and included the right to livelihood in it and also underlined that not giving minimum wage would be considered as begar (forced labour) under Article 23. However, the same SC put limitations on locus standi provision and imposed many conditions on the PIL in the BALCO Employee Union case. The SC underscored that only those PILs would be accepted which would not be based on personal interest, but the interest of a large number of people from marginalized sections or where the judicial intervention would be necessary for the protection of democratic institutions and where the administrative decisions taken in the name of development would cause extensive damage to the environment [See, BALCO Employee Union (Reg.) vs. Union of India, 2002, AIR 350, 2002 SCR (5) Supplementary 511). The SC, while limiting the scope of PIL, set some criteria for it. Therefore, until now, the approach of the court seems appropriate. But many such judgments have also been seen where the SC adopted contradictory views regarding the issues of pollution and environmental protection. On the one hand, it ordered to close off many industrial units without providing any alternative to the workers, and on the other hand, it gave permission to many projects of big dams in the name of ‘national development’ (Bhushan, 2004, pp. 1770– 1774, 2007, pp.  163–176). Prashant Bhushan has emphasized that in the era of liberalization, the views of the SC regarding PILs have been changed drastically (Bhushan, 2004, pp. 1770–1774, 2009, pp. 32–37). In recent years the SC has faced many criticisms regarding changing nature of its decisions related to the PIL. It has been argued that these changes underline the impacts of class character in its decisions, which led to the continuous violation of the rights of the poor and the marginalized. According to Prashant Bhusan, the PILs were initiated to provide justice to poor and exploited masses, but now these PILs are used against these people on

Indian Judiciary  151 the pretext of issues like environmental protection, etc. (Bhushan, 2009, pp. 32–37). However, in the same time period, the SC also delivered many revolutionary and progressive decisions, which caused the charge against the SC that it was violating its judicial boundary. For example, the SC ordered to form a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in 2G spectrum allocation and black money in 2011, and again in September 2014, it cancelled the allocation of coal blocks. Similarly, in July 2011 in the NandiniSundar v. State of Chhattisgarh case the SC directly questioned the policy of liberalization and Development. It also declared two sections of the Chhattisgarh Police Act as unconstitutional and banned the recruitment of the SPOs (Special Police Officers). Supreme Court in crisis On January 12, 2018 in an unprecedented press conference, the four seniormost judges of the SC came in public with serious charges against the then chief Justice of India Deepak Mishra. In an unprecedented press conference – the four judges, justices J. Chelameswar, Ranjan Gogoi, Kurian Joseph and Madan B. Lokur, who were the senior most after the Chief Justice said that ‘things are not in order’ with what they described as ‘the administration of the Supreme Court’. Describing the press conference as an extraordinary event Justice Chelameswar said ‘sometimes administration of the SC is not in order and many things which are less than desirable have happened in the last few months.’ Unless this institution is preserved, ‘democracy will not survive’ in this country. They had raised mainly two major concerns – first was regarding the manner the CJI Misra was constituting benches for important and politically sensitive cases and second regarding the finalization of memorandum of procedure (MoP) for the appointment of Judges. Thus, judges who normally speak to the people through their judgements and orders, openly raised concerns regarding the functioning of the institution. The remarks assumed significance as the SC had taken up for consideration the issue of the alleged mysterious death of special CBI judge B.H. Loya on the same day, who was hearing the sensitive Sohrabuddin Sheikh encounter case. In a response to a question, Justice Ranjan Gogoi accepted that the press conference was prompted by issues surrounding the death of special CBI Judge B.H. Loya (The Indian Express, 12 January 2018). Ironically, one of the four judges and now the Member of Parliament, Ranjan Gogoi, soon after elevation as CJI, presided over benches which delivered a few pro-Government judgements. During his tenure of CJI a serious allegation of sexual harassment was made against him by a former employee of the Court in April  2019 and he had to face an in-house enquiry. The woman employee submitted documents substantiating her claims and wrote a letter to 22 other SC Justices. In what was termed as a ‘In Re: Matter of Great Public Importance Touching Upon the Independence of the Judiciary’, the person holding the highest judicial office in the land convened a special

152  Indrajeet Kumar Jha bench and sat as a judge in his own cause. This was clearly a violation of the Vishakha Case Guidelines of the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA), a body of over 6,000 lawyers practising in the SC, said the hearing was ‘in violation of the procedure established by as well as the principles of natural justice’ (The Hindu, 22 April 2019). Not only this, soon after his retirement from the Court, he accepted the offer of the Government to become a nominated Member of the Rajya Sabha, only confirms the worst fear that the four judges collectively expressed five years ago about democracy being in danger. During the tenure of the CJI Gogoi some pro-government judgements, which include the Rafale case and CBI Director case, created much controversy. In Rafale, relying on information submitted in a sealed cover, the judgment makes reference to a CAG report examined by the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. This was completely false as no such report existed. This led to a huge controversy and the Centre had since filed an application seeking correction of the judgment. In the case of CBI Director Alok Verma, the SC had to answer a straightforward legal question concerning the decision to divest CBI Director Alok Verma of his powers and functions. Not only did it take more than two months to resolve this straightforward question, once again resorting to sealed covers, but it subsequently directed the highpowered committee to consider allegations against Mr. Verma within a week. The committee, consisting of the Prime Minister, the leader of opposition in the Lok Sabha, and a Supreme Court judge nominated by the CJI, decided by a 2:1 majority to once again remove Mr Verma from office just two days after he was reinstated (James, 12 January 2019; Venu, 11 January  2019). This is also an unfortunate development that the practise to provide information from the government to the Court in ‘sealed covers’ has also grown. Apart from this, for the last few years, there are many cases pending in the Supreme Court in which quick action is expected, but the court has made a lot of delay in hearing these cases. These are such matters in which the decisions of the Central Government have been directly challenged. For example, petitions challenging the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir (2019), petitions challenging electoral bonds (2017), petitions challenging the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) which is widely criticized as a tool to quell dissent (2019), petitions challenging the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 which provides citizenship to only non-Muslims from three neighbouring countries (2019) etc. Though the pandemic of Covid 19 situation was also a major cause of this delay but the case challenging the electoral bond is pending since 2017. The RBI and the Election Commission of India also raised their concerns on the scheme of electoral bond. The former Election Commissioner S. Y. Quraishi called this reform very destructive and said it would lead to crony capitalism (The Hindu, 3 July 2018). Questions have also been asked about this Act being passed as a money bill, thus circumventing the Rajya Sabha. Still the Court refused to stay the scheme several occasions. It seems that Court is trying to evade these cases or trying to avoid

Indian Judiciary  153 any direct confrontation with the government. The ruling party seems to be benefiting directly from this tendency of the court. Summing Up What is interesting is that the decisions of the court appear to be more progressive in matters which do not appear to be directly related to party politics. For example, on August 24 2017, a 9 Judge Bench of the SC delivered a unanimous verdict in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and other connected matters, affirming that the Constitution of India guarantees to each individual a fundamental right to privacy. In September 2018, the Supreme Court partially struck down section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, decriminalizing same-sex relations between consenting adults. The Supreme Court struck down section 497 of Indian Penal Code and Section 198(2) of Criminal Procedure Code in September  2018 and decriminalized adultery. The Chief Justice Deepak Misra, while pronouncing the judgement, observed that any provision asserting husband as the master of the wife and treating women with inequality cannot be considered constitutional (The Indian Express, 28 September 2018). In February 2020 the SC directed the government to ensure that women officers in the Army be granted permanent commission (PC) as well as command postings in all services other than combat. But in cases where the ruling party or its interests are directly involved, the court seems to be a little reluctant to intervene. This tendency may be to avoid any direct confrontation with the government or may be due to the pressure of the dominant ideology of the majority or may also be due to the desire for a post after retirement. These could be mere speculations but have entered popular perception. Article 32 of the Constitution, to which B. R. Ambedkar had called the soul of the constitution, gives some specific responsibility to the court. This responsibility is to protect the rights of the citizens. But who threatens the rights of citizens? The biggest danger to it is from the state and the majoritarian politics. This simple fact is clear from Article 13(2) of the Constitution in which the state has been told about its boundaries. Therefore, instead of standing with the state, the court should try to protect the rights of the citizens. This increases the legitimacy of the Court, which is clear from the experience of the last 75 years. Although judges are not apolitical, yet their act should appear apolitical. This act of being apolitical prevails and it sustains and enhances their legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the court. According to S.P. Sathe, ‘the judges are required to take political decisions and the court performs the political function of legitimizing or censuring the act of the other organs of the government. To be ‘political’ in this sense and yet appear to be ‘apolitical’ in the eyes of the large number of people is the source of the court’s legitimacy’ (Sathe, 2002, p. 22). A Constitutional Court has to continuously strive to sustain its own social legitimacy. The court can sustain people’s faith only through impartial and

154  Indrajeet Kumar Jha principled decisions. The Court must be aware about the dominant public opinion but being essentially a counter-majoritarian institution, it often has to act against popular sentiments (Sathe, 2002, p. 24). Undoubtedly, the Indian Constitution has given extensive powers to the SC, and it acquired more power through the interpretation of the Constitution. Though in recent years many questions have been raised about the role of the Judiciary, it has been able to perform its role successfully and responsibly. References Austin, G. (1966). Indian constitution: Cornerstone of a nation. Oxford University Press (Indian edition 1972). Austin, G. (1999). Working a democratic constitution: A history of the Indian experience (6th impression 2009). Oxford University Press. Austin, G. (2000). The supreme court and the struggle for custody of the constitution. In B. N. Kirpal et al. (Eds.), Supreme but not infaliable: Essays in honour of the supreme court of India (5th Impression 2008) (pp. 1–15). Oxford University Press. Basu, D. D. (2021). Introduction to the constitution of India (25th ed.). Lexis Nexis. Baxi, U. (1988). Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India. In U. Baxi (Ed.), Law And Poverty: Critical Essays (pp. 388–415). N. M. Tripathi Private Limited. Baxi, U. (1997a). A  pilgrim’s progress: The basic structure revisited. Indian Bar Review, 24(1 & 2), 53–72. Baxi, U. (1997b). Judicial activism: Usurpation or re-democratization?. Social Action, 47(Oct–Dec), 341–359. Baxi, U. (1985). Courage Craft and Contention: The Indian Supreme Court in the Eighties. N.M. Tripathi Private Limited. Bhushan, P. (2004). Supreme court and PIL: Changing perspectives under liberalisation. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(18), 1770–1774. Bhushan, P. (2007). Public interest litigation: Supreme court in the era of liberalization, In B. D. Dua, M. P. Singh, & Rekha Saxena (Eds.), Indian judiciary and ­politics: The changing landscape (pp. 163–176). Manohar. Bhushan, P. (2009). Misplaced priorities and class bias of the judiciary. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(14), 32–37. Chinappa Reddy, O. (2008). The court and the constitution of India: Summits and shallows (U. Baxi, Foreword). Oxford University Press. Desai, A. H. & Murlidhar, S. (2000). Public interest litigation: Potential and problems. In B. N. Kirpal et al. (Eds.), Supreme but not infaliable: Essays in honour of the supreme court of India (5th Impression 2008) (pp. 159–192). Oxford University Press. The Hindu (2014, April 24). Collegium system best, says CJI, https://www.thehindu. com/news/national/collegium-system-best-says-cji/article5944563.ece The Hindu (2018, July  3). ‘Electoral bonds will lead to crony capitalism’: Reform very destructive, says former CEC. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ tamil-nadu/electoral-bonds-will-lead-to-crony-capitalism/article24315406.ece The Hindu (2019, April 22). Sexual harassment allegations: CJI violated procedure by hearing own case, say Supreme Court lawyers. https://www.thehindu.com/news/

Indian Judiciary  155 national/sexual-harassment-allegations-cji-violated-procedure-by-hearing-owncase-say-supreme-court-lawyers/article61559510.ece The Hindu (2023, February  18). Collegium system of appointment of judges near perfect model: Ex-CJI Lalit. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/collegiumsystem-of-appointment-of-judges-near-perfect-model-ex-cji-lalit/article66525094.ece The Indian Express (2018, January 12). Don’t want wise men saying 20 years from now that we sold our souls: top four SC judges. https://indianexpress.com/article/ india/supreme-court-top-judges-press-conference-jasti-chelameswar-ranjan-gogoicji-dipak-misra-madan-lokur-kurian-joseph-5021586/ The Indian Express (2018, September  28). Adultery is not a crime, SC scraps 158-year-old law. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/supreme-court-adulterylaw-section-497-5376499/ James, K. (2019, January 12), A Year After Four SC Judges’ Press Conference, Is Democracy Still in Danger?, The Wire, https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-judgespress-conference-one-year Karat, P. (2003). Supreme court in liberalised times. counter Currents.Org. https:// countercurrents.org/hr-karat090803.htm Khanna, Poonam S. (2008). The Indian judicial system. In Kamala Sankaran  & Ujjwal Kumar Singh (Eds.), Towards legal literacy: An introduction to law in India (pp. 27–44). Oxford University Press. Menon, N.  & Nigam, A. (2007). Power and contestation: India since 1989. Zed Books. Noorani, A. G. (2001). Behind the basic structure doctrine: On India’s debt to a German jurist, Professor Dietrich Conrad. Front Line, 18(9), https://frontline.­thehindu. com/other/article30159673.ece Ramachandran, R. (2000). The supreme court and the basic structure doctrine. In B. N. Kirpal et al. (Eds.), Supreme but not infaliable: Essays in honour of the supreme court of India (5th Impression 2008) (pp. 107–133). Oxford University Press. Rodrigues, V. (Ed.). (2002). The essential writings of B. R. Ambedkar (14th impression 2014). Oxford University Press. Sathe, S. P. (2002). Judicial activism in India. Oxford University Press. Sethi, V. (1995). The judiciary: Supreme court. In Mahendra Prasad Singh  & ­Himanshu Roy (Eds.), Indian political system: Structure, policies, development (pp. 167–184). Janada Prakashan. Singh, M. P.  & Saxena, R. (2011). Indian politics: Constitutional foundations and institutional functioning (2nd ed.). PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd. Singh, P. (2008). Public interest litigation. In Kamala Sankaran  & Ujjwal Kumar Singh (Eds.), Towards legal literacy: An introduction to law in India (pp. 21–26). Oxford University Press. Upadhyay, V. (2000). Changing judicial power: Courts on infrastructure projects and environment. Economic and Political Weekly, 35(43/44), 3789–3792. Venu, M. K. (2019, January 11), Modi-Led Panel’s Decision to Remove Alok Verma as CBI Chief Is Fundamentally Flawed, The Wire, https://thewire.in/government/ narendra-modi-alok-verma-cbi

7 Indian Parliament Changing Contours and Challenging Future Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha

Introduction Parliament plays a significant role in Indian democracy. The judiciary, executive, and parliament constitute the three main organs of the Indian state. The primary role of the parliament is to legislate. However, as importantly, it also functions as a representative body ensuring all voices and interests in the country are expressed freely. It holds the executive accountable and plays a critical role in the appointment of office of the president and vice president. The parliament of India has withstood various trials and tribulations of India’s turbulent democracy. Over the years, it has experienced changes not only in the nature and characteristics of the representatives but in Indian democracy itself. Of course, in recent decades, there have been growing discomforts with how this institution functions. The judiciary increasingly intrudes its domain on the one hand and the overbearing executive on the other. Many critics argue that not only has the quality of the debates in the parliament decreased, but it functions to merely confirms the executive’s proposals. In other words, there is little scope for constructive criticism and due diligence in legislating laws. Still, others would criticize the lesser number of days and time devoted to the legislative task. Disruptions characterize the functioning of the Indian parliament. For the makers of the Indian constitution, parliament was not merely an institution to legislate but a representative body reflecting the sovereign will of the Indian people. It abides by the constitutional norms and functions as a representative body for all sections of Indian society. There were differences of opinion in the constituent assembly about the nature and roles of parliament in Indian democracy – particularly on parliamentary or presidential forms of democracy. Ultimately, following the British model, the founding fathers of the Indian constitution settled for a parliamentary form of representative democracy. They laid down the firm foundation for the Indian Parliament in the Constitution. It provides a public platform for the states and India’s diverse population and territories to express their concerns and grievances freely without undermining national interests and priorities.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-10

Indian Parliament  157 This chapter discusses the composition, functions, and historical evolution of the Indian Parliament over the last seven decades. It emphasises post-1990s developments with a special focus on recent trends. The first section summarises the making of the parliament, its nature, and its role by examining constituent assembly debates on parliamentary and presidential forms of government. The second section examines its basic structure, composition and functions. The third section discusses the evolution of the Indian parliament since independence with a focus on post-1990s developments and recent debates. Indian Parliament: History and its Making The Constitution makers and the members of the Constituent Assembly made their best possible efforts to design a legislature or the parliament inspired by the British government to suit India’s specific circumstances. Their objective of establishing the legislature was not only to carry on with the Legislative functions of a sovereign democratic state but to socially and politically unite a diverse, ethnically plural country like India. The Drafting Committee of the Constitution took extreme care and caution in creating a legislature to suit the needs and demands of the people’s welfare, protect their rights, freedom and justice, and prioritize national interests. Under the new Constitution, the union parliament and the state legislatures were given powers enjoyed by the parliamentary bodies in representative federal democracies (Austin, 1966, p. 182). However, the Assembly did not support an authoritarian legislature to conduct legislative functions. There was a debate over having a second chamber of the legislature. After much deliberations, the upper house of the legislature or the parliament - Rajya Sabha came into existence. Moreover, there was not much interest in having too many political parties. The constituent Assembly focussed on having two main parties to carry on with the traditional idea of a parliamentary government (ibid). After the British announced the formation of Pakistan and the partition of India on 3 June  1947, the Provincial and the Union Constitution Committees took quick but significant steps towards framing the Constitution and establishing the legislature. It was decided to conduct elections for the lower house on the grounds of adult suffrage and territorial constituencies (ibid, p. 185) and found an upper house but not quite powerful that would surpass the powers of the lower house. Another significant step was taken to address the issue of separate electorates. Some Muslim and Sikh minorities desired the proportional representation system to elect the Council of the States and the House of the People to serve their community representation (ibid, p.  191). In another context, like the election of the lower house or House of the People, the proportional representation system was not favoured. B. R. Ambedkar did not support such a representation as he believed it would lead to fragmentation, and the cabinet demanded a majority party. However, for the Council of States, the Assembly voted to support proportional

158  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha representation (ibid, p.  191). Off late, the Draft Constitution followed the Union and Provincial Constitution Committee report. The functional representation in the upper house was removed. It was decided that the Council of States and the Legislative Councils could delay the passage of a bill for six months as sent to them by the lower house. In some cases, the issue had to be sorted out in joint sittings of the two houses. Again, all bills except the money bills must be passed by both houses (ibid, pp. 199–202). Regarding money bills, the lower house has the upper hand. The motive of the Constituent Assembly was to establish the legislature to put forward public opinions in governance. The goal of nation-building and to make people stand united as Indians made the Assembly delve into legislative powers and functions. In 1952, the Indian Parliament came into existence with the first elections held in the independent sovereign state after the enforcement of the ­Constitution and the Representation of the People’s Act (RPA), 1950–51. Its historical roots can be traced to the Indian Council Act of 1861. However, the functioning of the Parliament in the post-independence phase has little similarity with the activities of the colonial councils in the nineteenth century (Agrawal, 2005, p. 77). Parliamentary Versus Presidential Form of Government The Indian Parliament has a debatable history. There were several arguments, debates and discussions over the kind of government that would shape the future of India. There was a clash of opinions and views among many parliamentarians, leaders, and eminent people during the making of the Parliament. During the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD), it was found that B. R. Ambedkar favoured a parliamentary form of government. For him, a parliamentary government was suitable for a diverse country like India. It can accommodate the diversities together and provide them due representation (Shankar & Rodrigues, 2011, p. 3). He stated that such a form of government would be stable and accountable and could provide space for public opinion (ibid, p. 4). The significant concern was over the kind of particular government to administer India. The CAD focused on whether to have a parliamentary or a presidential form of government in post-independent India. The fear of an elite section ruling over the rest of the population was seen as a problamatic. The prevalence of the caste system and elites made people feel about one class’s domination over the other if the parliamentary form of government was established (ibid, p. 29). The Simon Commission (1927) was one of the earlier non-supporters of the parliamentary form of government in India. It gave credit to a stable party system as the significant reason for an effective parliamentary system in Britain (ibid). Some strong critics of the parliamentary form of government were C. Sankaran Nair, Syed Ahmed Khan, and Mahatma Gandhi. Historically, however, it was witnessed that a few of the parliamentary governance systems were found in the princely states of Mysore and Travancore. The freedom

Indian Parliament  159 fighters and reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy indicated the parliamentary system. Moreover, several organizations sprung up in the provinces of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras that functioned like the legislature of their times (ibid, p.  30). Some supporting agents of parliament, like professional and trade associations, worked towards strengthening freedom, rights or, more appropriately, the civic culture of rights, debates and discussions. Simultaneously, they organized forums to educate the political leaders on governance, indirectly making them act like the legislators (ibid, p. 30). Thus, it helped to garner support for the parliamentary government. The supporters of the British parliamentary form of government also favour similar kind of form of government for independent India. However, the nationalists stand was divided in their opinion. Some were in support of, and some opposed, the parliamentary form of government. Those who opposed feared that it would appear as the replica or the continuity of the British colonial powers. The Legislators would reinforce their hegemony over the people (ibid, pp. 30–31). ­However, no strong effort was made to create an alternative form of government that could appear better for governing independent India. Leaders like Nehru supported the Parliamentary form of government, whereas Mahatma G ­ andhi supported a loosely knit polity with the village as its primary unit (ibid, pp. 30–31). The believers of Socialism supported decentralization, linguistic pluralism and small-scale industries (ibid). The larger question was what form of government a newly independent country should adopt to maintain democratic principles and values. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel introduced the reports of the committees on the principles of a Model Provincial Constitution and the Principles of the Union Constitution. According to the Provincial Constitution Committee, the parliamentary form of government would be most suitable for India (ibid, pp. 34–35). On the contrary, the supporters of a Presidential form of government opined that it would be much better than the parliamentary form of government. For them, the president can prevail upon the unstable and authoritarian government with stability. People like Ram Narayan Singh and Brajeshwar Prasad favoured the presidential system of governance (ibid). A strong president was expected to bring efficiency and stability to governance. Others like Aziz Ahmed Khan stood against the parliamentary form of government though some supported a cabinet system, collective responsibility of council of ministers or the cabinet to the Legislature. Till the 1970s, this debate was continued there even after establishing a parliamentary form of government. People like B. K. Nehru supported a presidential form of government as the alternative to the parliamentary form of government. Scholars preferred political stability, and efficiency over representation. Others feared fragmentation, a hung parliament and an unstable government under the parliamentary form of government (ibid, p.  4). The supporters of the presidential form of government had the utmost faith in bringing discipline, stability and coherence while managing issues. Critics argued that parliamentarians would only focus on their short-term goal of representation or electoral prospects and not much about the national

160  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha interests under the parliamentary form of government (ibid, p. 5). Over the decades, loud shouting and unconstructive debates and discussions in the parliament had lowered the hopes of an effective parliamentary system of government. Moreover, the suspension of constitutional rights and paralyzing of the ethos of democracy during the Emergency (1975–77) declared by Indira Gandhi was severely criticized. It led to the overpowering of the legislature by the executive branch and curtailment of the legislative functioning. The Indian Emergency of 1975–77 suspended fundamental rights, curtailing citizens’ freedom. It also paralyzed the independent judiciary and led to the supersession of judges, forced arrests and detentions of political opponents student union leaders, and government officials, even without trials. The power of the Executive had overshadowed the power of the legislature. Another stand that contested the parliamentary system can be argued that the legislators sought election to influence the executive. The parliamentary system has focused more on politics than policy-making (Tharoor, 2020, p. 183). Therefore, the question was about retaining power and winning elections rather than policy-making. Composition of the Parliament and Its Functions The Indian Parliament comprises the Rajya Sabha (Council of the States), the Lok Sabha (House of the People), and the president. Article 79 states that there shall be a parliament for the Union of India (Kashyap, 1994, p. 198). The Lok Sabha is only subject to dissolution. If the Lok Sabha is dissolved and a national emergency occurs, Rajya Sabha functions as the parliament (Kadhir, 2016). The Rajya Sabha is a permanent house. It is not dissolved. Two-thirds of its members retire every two years. President is an integral part of parliament. The president, however, neither sit nor participate in the discussions of the two houses. His functions are to summon the two houses, ensure that sessions occur on time, prorogue the two houses, and dissolve the Lok Sabha (Kadhir, 2016, pp.  198–199). When circumstances arise, the president can take urgent decisions or immediate actions through ordinances. He addresses both houses after each general election to the House of Lok Sabha and also at the beginning of first session every year (Kashyap, 1994, pp. 198–199). Rajya Sabha The Rajya Sabha represents the states in the parliament. The elected members of the State Legislative Assemblies elect its members. The proportional representation system with a single transferable vote is used to elect the members. However, the states have no equal representation as the members from a particular state in the Rajya Sabha depends on their population size (ibid, pp. 199–200). The Rajya Sabha has a total of 250 members, out of which the President nominates twelve members. The states and union territories elect the other two hundred thirty-eight members (ibid). The election from

Indian Parliament  161 union territories takes place through an electoral college subject to the Representation of the People’s Act, 1950 (Khosla, 2012, p. 4). It is a permanent body, and its membership term is for a fixed term of six years. One-third of its members retire every second year. The vice-president is the ex-officio chairman of the house, and the deputy chairman is elected from among the members (Kashyap, 1994, pp. 199–200). Lok Sabha The people of the India directly elect the members of the Lok Sabha. The election to this house takes place through the constitutional principle of Universal Adult Suffrage as per Article – 326 (Khosla, 2012, p. 4). Citizens not less than 18 years old are eligible to vote in the election to the house. It consists of 552 members. 530 members are chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the states and twenty members are elected from the union territories (Kashyap, 1994, pp. 199–203). The president can nominate two members to the house from the Anglo-Indian community Seats in the Lok Sabha are also reserved for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The term of office for the members is five years (ibid). Three sessions of the Lok Sabha take place in a year: the budget session, monsoon session, and winter session (Kadhir, 2016). No person shall be excluded from the election or added to a special electoral role on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex as the constitution values conducting a free and fair election (Khosla, 2012, p. 5). The Lok Sabha can be also dissolved before the expiration of its term. Membership of the Houses: The qualification for membership to parliament are listed in Article 84. For the Rajya Sabha, a person must be a citizen of India and not less than 30 years, and in the case of the Lok Sabha, the person must not be less than 25 years of age. A person is ineligible to be elected as an MP if he is not a citizen of India, or declared to be of unsound mind by the court, or holds the office of Profit under Union or state government or any other office exempted by Parliament by law, or if a person is disqualified on the grounds of defection under the tenth schedule added to the constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985. Functions of the Houses Both the houses of the parliament have significant constitutionally sanctioned legislative powers and functions. They are responsible for making rules of procedure and conduct of business as per the constitution under Article 118 (Kashyap, 1994, p.  207). A  bill may originate in either house except for money and other financial bills (ibid). Both houses must pass a bill with or without amendment before receiving assent from the president. Both houses

162  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha must agree to pass the bill before being presented to the president (ibid, p. 208). If any disagreement occurs between the houses on any legislation, the president may summon a joint sitting of the houses to resolve the differences as per Articles 107–108 (ibid). However, Article 111 states that when a bill is passed and presented to the president for assent, the president shall either consent to the bill or withhold it. He may return the bill to both houses for reconsideration if it is not a money bill (ibid, p. 209). The money bill can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha and only on the recommendation of the president. Once the Lok Sabha passes the money bill, the Rajya Sabha has to pass or make recommendations to it within fifteen days. The Lok Sabha may or may not accept it. However, after the lapse of fifteen days, if the Rajya Sabha do not pass or recommend any changes to the bill it is deemed to be passed by both the houses (ibid, pp. 208–209). Even if the Rajya Sabha does not return the bill within fourteen days or no amendments recommended by the Rajya Sabha are acceptable to the Lok Sabha, the bill is deemed passed by both houses (ibid). The Rajya Sabha has neither power to introduce the money bills nor to refuse its assent, and also, the house cannot procrastinate for more than two weeks because (Agrawal, 2005, p. 79). In such matters, the Rajya Sabha is less powerful in comparison to the Lok Sabha.

Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its Members 1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament. 2. No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said, or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings. 3. In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law . . . Art 105. Constitution of India

Most members from both houses actively participate in legislative process. The primary function of the legislature or the parliament is to enact legislation. Its other important functions are constitutional and financial such as raising taxes, passing the budget, making amendments to the Constitution

Indian Parliament  163 and governmental powers (Nair & Jain, 2000; Agrawal, 2005, p. 83). Therefore, it can be argued that the cooperation and working together of the trio ­constituents – the President, Lok Sabha, and Rajya Sabha – are equally important to maintain the stability and efficiency of the parliament. A balanced functioning of the components is thus essential to uphold the values of constitutional democracy. Financial Bills: There is a distinction between money bills and financial bills. A  financial bill may be any bill that signifies revenue or expenditure. A financial bill provides for other matters besides matters specified in the Constitution for a money bill. It is divided into two categories. A) Bills which make provisions for any of the matters specified under Article 110 for the money bill but it does not deal solely with such matters. B) Bills contain provisions involving expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India as per Articles 110–117. The primary function of the parliament is to make laws or to legislate. Under Articles 245–246, the parliament make laws for the whole or any part of India. There is a distinction of legislative powers between the union and states as per the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. The Union and the states enjoy concurrent powers to legislate for entries mentioned in the concurrent list (Kashyap, 1994, p. 224). The parliament even makes laws to change the states’ names and boundaries or establish a new state as per Article 2,3,4 (ibid). It can also increase the number of Supreme Court judges and establish additional courts as per Articles 124 and 247. Moreover, the parliament make laws to legislate on matters in the union and concurrent list (ibid, p.  224). Under Article 368, parliament exercises constituent powers through which it is empowered to amend any part of the constitution. It has to ensure executive and financial control like control over the budget as per Articles 75, 114–116 and 265. The constitution has guaranteed provisions like the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Lok Sabha (ibid, p. 226). The parliament is a constitutional body that deliberates, discusses and debates national issues and interests, demands and people’s grievances. The executive and parliament share a relationship of cooperation. The executive should initiate and formulate legislative and financial proposals before the parliament. In return, the parliament is expected to discuss and scrutinize the proposals put forward by the executive (ibid, pp.  220–221). The executive is responsible and accountable to the legislature in a parliamentary government as per the constitution. The parliamentary surveillance of administration is performed by exercising procedural mechanisms like the question hour, motions, resolutions, discussions and scrutiny by the parliamentary committees (ibid).

164  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Parliamentary Committees There are two types of committees in the Indian parliament – standing and ad hoc. They play an important role in closely scrutinizing legislative business and holding government ministries and departments accountable for their acts of commission and omission. These standing committees are – 1. Financial committees: Committee on Estimates, Committee on Public Accounts, and Committee on Public Undertakings. 2. Committees relating to the day-to-day business of the House: Business Advisory Committee, Committee on Absence of Members from the Sittings of the House, Rules Committee, and Committee on Private Members’ Bills and Resolutions. 3. Enquiry committees: Committee on Petitions and Committee of Privileges. 4. Scrutiny committees: Committee on Government Assurances, Committee on Subordinate Legislation, Committee on Papers Laid on the Table, Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes  & Scheduled Tribes and Committee on Empowerment of Women. 5. Service committees, i.e., Committees concerned with the provision of various services, facilities, etc., to members: General Purposes Committee, House Committee, Library Committee, Joint Committee on Salaries and Allowances of Members of Parliament and Joint Committee on Offices of Profit. Financial committees are the most powerful standing committees in the parliament. Committee on Agriculture, Committee on Science and Technology and Committee on Environment and Forests were constituted in August 1989. In 1993, it was further institutionalized. Seventeen departmental-related standing committees – six working under the direction of the Chairman, Rajya Sabha and eleven under the Speaker, Lok Sabha – were constituted to strengthen the legislative control over the executive. These committees were further restructured in 2004. The number of Committees was increased from 17 to 24, and the membership of each was reduced from 45 to 31. Of the 24 Committees, 16 are by the Lok Sabha Secretariat, and 8 are serviced by the Rajya Sabha Secretariat. They are as follows: Lok Sabha   1. Committee on Agriculture   2. Committee on Chemicals & Fertilizers   3. Committee on Coal & Steel

Indian Parliament  165   4. Committee on Defence   5. Committee on Energy   6. Committee on External Affairs   7. Committee on Finance   8. Committee on Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution   9. Committee on Information Technology 10. Committee on Labour 11. Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas 12. Committee on Railways 13. Committee on Rural Development 14. Committee on Social Justice & Empowerment 15. Committee on Urban Development 16. Committee on Water Resources Rajya Sabha 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Committee on Commerce Committee on Health & Family Welfare Committee on Home Affairs Committee on Human Resource Development Committee on Industry Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law & Justice Committee on Science & Technology and Environment & Forests Committee on Transport, Tourism, and Culture

Each of these Standing Committees consists of not more than 31 members – 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha. A Minister is not eligible to be nominated to these Committees. These committees do not interfere in the day-to-day administration of the concerned ministries or the department. However, they provide important reports and input on their functioning to the parliament. Source: Fifty Years of Lok Sabha (1952–2002): A Statistical Profile, SecretaryGeneral, 2003; The Indian Parliament, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2012

Besides legislative power and functions, the Parliament also exercises judicial powers. It makes laws regulating the courts’ constitution, organization, jurisdiction and powers. Under the constitution, the parliament by law extends the jurisdiction or excludes a High Court’s jurisdiction from any union territory to establish a common High Court for two or more states and a union territory (ibid, p. 222). It also establishes an administrative tribunal for each state and two or more states. Moreover, the constitution empowers the parliament to create an all-India judicial service (ibid).

166  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Parliamentary Terms/Terminology Quorums: These refer to the minimum number of members required for the functioning of the house. Article 100(3) and (4) of the Indian constitution necessitates the presence of at least ten per cent of the total members of the respective houses of the parliament. Question hour: The first hour of every sitting in both Houses is normally devoted to Questions which are the most potent and effective device in the hands of the members. There are three types of Questions: Starred, Unstarred and Short Notice. A Starred Question is one to which a member demands an oral answer in the House, and Supplementary Questions may follow the answer to such a Question. For the Unstarred Question, the concerned Minister lays a written answer on the Table of the House. For each day during the Session of the parliament, 20 Questions are included in the List of Business for oral answers in both Houses. 230 Questions are listed for written answers in the Lok Sabha, whereas in the Rajya Sabha, up to 155 such Questions are listed. A Short Notice Question pertains to a matter of urgent public importance and can be asked on a shorter notice. Zero hour: The period immediately after the Question Hour is over and before the regular business as entered in the List of Business is taken up is referred to as the ‘Zero Hour’. During this period, members try to focus the House’s attention on recent public interest developments. The Government is, however, under no obligation to respond to the matters raised during the ‘Zero Hour’. Special Mentions: ‘Matters under Rule 377’ in the Lok Sabha or ‘Special Mentions’ in the Rajya Sabha. A member who wishes to bring to the notice of the House any matter which is not a point of order can do so if she/he has given notice thereof in writing to the SecretaryGeneral, and the Speaker has permitted her/him to raise such a matter in the House. Calling Attention: Calling Attention, an Indian procedural innovation, enables a member to draw the attention of a Minister to any matter of urgent public importance to which the Minister makes a brief Statement. Adjournment Motion: The primary objective of an Adjournment Motion is to draw the attention of the House to a recent matter of urgent public importance having serious consequences and regarding which a motion or a resolution with proper notice will be too late. The Adjournment Motion is an extraordinary procedure. If admitted, it leads to setting aside the normal business of the House for discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance.

Indian Parliament  167 No-Confidence Motion: The council of the minister is collectively responsible/accountable to the Lok Sabha. They are in power so long they enjoy a majority in the house. However, the Opposition Parties in Lok Sabha can move a No-confidence Motion to express the lack of confidence of the House in the Council of Ministers and such a motion, if adopted, results in the fall of the government. Private Member Bills: These can be introduced by a private member of the house who is not a minister. The introduction of this bill requires an advance one month’s notice and can be introduced and discussed only on Fridays. These bills have less chance of becoming law. Most of them lapse even without a debate. Only 14 Private Members’ Bills have been passed and assented to, of which seven Bills were passed and assented to during the First Lok Sabha, two each during the Second and the Fourth Lok Sabha and three during the Third Lok Sabha. Since the Fifth Lok Sabha, no legislative proposal ever Initiated by any Private Member could be given the form of law. Source: Kapur & Mehta, 2006; The Indian Parliament, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2012

Evolution of the Indian Parliament: Changing Roles and Dynamics In the past seven decades, the Indian parliament has undergone tremendous changes. It has truly performed its role as a representative institution. It has become more inclusive and representative by including the historically and socio-economically excluded sections of Indian society with the only exception of women who never crossed the ten per cent thresh-hold in the Indian parliament (Rai & Spary, 2019). There have been visible shifts in the composition of the Indian parliament regarding the social background and occupation of its members, the nature of its discourse, and legislative outcomes (Sen, 2022; Pai & Kumar, 2014; Dua et al., 2014; Shankar & Rodrigues, 2011; Mehra & Kueck, 2003). The Indian parliament of the 1950s and 60s was primarily dominated by urban-based English-educated upper castes, mostly lawyers. The term of their discourse was mainly English. There was a clear boundary between ‘national’ and ‘regional’ where the nation was seen or projected as progressive and regional as a den of ‘backwardness’ and ‘parochialism’. However, parliament has been remarkably successful in not only consolidating democracy in India but also in passing remarkable legislation like the Land Reforms Bill and schedule IX, linguistic reorganization of Indian states, and socio-economic restructuring of society. Congress party had considerable influence both inside and outside the Indian parliament. Rajni Kothari characterized it as a ‘Congress System’. However, there were many other parties

168  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha and independents playing important roles in parliamentary debates and legislative enactments. The parliament had established a solid foundation for legislative debates and various conventions and protocols. There has been a significant shift in the Indian parliament in the 60s with the increasing representation of farmers and their leaders. There began a more assertion of rural ‘village’ India and ‘farmers’ voice’. The language of discourse also shifted from English to numerous Indian languages. It also witnesses a growing tension between parliament and judiciary on the one hand and undermining of the parliament by the executive on the other. The decades of the 70s and 80s were fraught with these tensions resulting in the declaration of emergency and the beginning of Judicial activism through Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and Social Interest litigation (SIL). There were growing contestations between the parliament and the executive on the one hand and the supreme court on the other. Although such contestations had their genesis in the decades of the 50s and 60s, they manifested explicitly in the 70s. In Kesavananda Bharati’s judgement, the supreme court of India pronounced a new doctrine – basic structure doctrine and used it to restrain parliament’s power under article 368 to amend the Indian constitution. This power to review even the constitutional amendment, which requires a special majority in the light of the vaguely formulated concept of ‘basic structure doctrine’, was not bestowed on the judiciary in the original constitution. It has indeed become now the custodian of the constitution. It does protect the constitution from the majoritarian and short-term impulses of democratic politics. However, it left the question of ‘basic structure’ open-ended by the scope of interfering in the legislative and executive matters by the ‘activist’ judges. There were major turns towards ‘regional’ or state politics in the 90s. Political discourse shifted towards ‘identitarian’ politics, with Mandal and Mandir discourse polarising the public opinion in the country. Similarly, there was a clear ideological shift in the policies and programmes of the Indian state with the liberalization of the Indian economy. The earlier ‘left of the centre’ socialist restructuring of society with the state taking the ‘commanding height of the economy’ paved the way for a more capitalist-oriented free market economy. These developments had a transformative impact on the nature and functioning of the Indian parliament. There is merit in the argument about the theory of the decline of the Indian parliament initiated by Subhash C. Kashyap. This was also related to the popular perception that parliament was increasingly rendered irrelevant. The decline started in the 1970s. The biggest abruption was the declaration of emergency by Indira Gandhi in 1975. It is argued that it was declared to protect the personal position of Indira Gandhi rather than driven by any national interest. Many constitutional amendments – the 24th, 25th, and 42nd Amendments in particular were reflections of the executive’s near dominance of the parliament with very little or no scrutiny. This phase initiated a fall in Nehru’s articulation of the ‘majesty’ of parliamentary sovereignty.

Indian Parliament  169 Although contrary to popular perception, the professional and educational backgrounds of the members of parliament have increasingly improved; however, there has been a continuous decline in the nature and quality of parliamentary debate (Kapur & Mehta, 2006). There are various reasons for such a decline. First and foremost was the decline in the political parties and their multiplicity, which resulted in growing instability, hung parliaments, and coalition governments. Second, there emerged a new phenomenon of delegated legislation to unelected bodies and officials as much of the parliamentary sessions was wasted to disruptions, adjournments, and unruly behaviours of the members (Sen, 2018). Third, there was increasing mis/use of ordinances by the government to circumvent the parliamentary debate and scrutiny. This constitutional provision is meant for emergencies requiring urgent responses from the government and when parliament is not in session. They are valid for six months and are subject to parliamentary approval. However, during the coalition governments, a trend emerged of issuing ordinances on important matters to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. Many of these ordinances are even re-issued. This trend continues even when there have been relatively stable governments in the late 90s and 2000s and even with an absolute majority government since 2014. Fourth, there has been a drastic decline in the number of sittings of the parliament. According to one estimate, ‘the Lok Sabha met for more than 100 days annually during Nehru’s time. In 1956, it even met for 151 days. This number has come down to less than 90 days’ (Malhotra, 2002). Independent scholars have also come to similar conclusions about the lesser number of sittings of the Indian parliament and state legislature (Surya Prakash, 1995; Shankar & Rodrigues, 2011) Fifth, there have been increasing criminalization of politics. This trend emerged in the 70s and peaked in the 90s and 2000s. Roughly about onefourth of elected members of parliament have criminal cases pending against them, and half of them are of serious nature – i.e., for looting, murder, kidnapping, and rape. Even after the Supreme court, which makes it mandatory for the contesting candidates to declare details of the criminal cases pending against them, the presence of legislators with a criminal background is not on the decline. Studies have shown that the winnability of a candidate with a criminal background is 1.5 times more than a candidate with a non-criminal background. Thus, despite much outcry about the crime and politics, the winnability factor forces the political parties not to shy away from distributing tickets to candidates with a criminal background. However, the image of rule breaker themselves becoming rule maker enthuse little confidence among the public about the strength or the authority of parliament which is already in decline. Finally, there seems to be less incentive for the parliamentarians to do good work in the parliament or their constituency by the electorate. In an era of agenda-driven politics and personality cults under the strict discipline of party politics, there is little incentive for lawmakers to devote themselves sincerely to the legislative business of the house or to holding the

170  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha government and its ministries to account for their various acts of omission and commission. Post-2014: Changes and Challenges The Indian parliament has experienced a significant shift since the formation of BJP led NDA government in 2014. For the first time in three decades, a single party – BJP – has received a clear mandate from the people. It heralded a new dawn in Indian politics. It led to ideological and major structural and policy shifts in Indian politics. It is characterized by the formation of a stable government and a firm and decisive prime minister, Narendra Modi. In the last nine years, the parliament has witnessed a massive increase in productivity. The parliament has passed a record number of important and transformative legislations. Often, the parliament’s productivity rate in recent years has been well over a hundred per cent. The presence of members in the house has also increased. An initiative like PRS Legislative, Live Telecasts of the parliamentary proceedings, and journalistic and scholarly writings on the functioning of the Indian parliament has increased in recent years. However, they have little impact on the debate’s quality or duration. Often, important legislation has been passed without much debate or proper scrutiny. For example, the manner in which three Farm Acts, Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), electoral bonds, abrogation of Article 370, and the creation of separate Union Territory for Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh have been carried out have left not only the house divided, but there is a sharp division among the civil society groups on these legislations. Farm Acts have now been repealed. CAA is yet to be implemented. Electoral bonds were passed using money bills. Many of these are under judicial scrutiny. Thus, in discharging its legislative business, parliament works little on developing consensus across the ideological and party lines on matters of national importance. The ordinance route of legislation is still practised. The parliament has become increasingly an irrelevant body to check or control the executive (Prakash, 1995; Kapur & Mehta, 2006; Mehra, 2018; Malhotra, 2002). The opposition space is further marginalized not only in the body politic but inside the parliament as well. However, the opposition plays a critical role in safeguarding public interests and rights and holding the government accountable (Fartyal, 1971). A weak opposition is not a positive sign of the strength of the parliament. The other worrisome developments have been growing discomforts between the parliament and the Supreme Courts – particularly on appointing judges. In the considered view of the court, independence of the judiciary is paramount, and the collegium system is a way forward to maintain it. It struck down the NJAC Act 2014 because it gives the executive control over appointments and compromise judicial independence. It has led to delays in approving the collegium recommendations. The recent statements by the ministers and constitutional functionaries express the growing discomfort

Indian Parliament  171 between the two organs. However, in a welcome development CJI, Justice Chandrachud has pronounced that the Supreme court alone is not the sole custodian of the Indian constitution, but the parliament within the constitutional limits is an equal custodian of the constitution. In the constitutional scheme of things, parliament alone is empowered to amend even the constitution. However, these recent developments have little to do with parliamentary authority or sovereignty and more with the executive dominance of the other two important organs of the state. Summing Up As Morris Jones (1957) claimed in his classic study of the Indian parliament, India has adopted a Westminster model and made it its own institution. It truly reflects the changing nature and characteristics of the country and its democratic politics. However, one of the classical problems in studying Indian parliament is whether or not it can be studied independently from Indian democracy (Shankar  & Rodrigues, 2011; Kapur  & Mehta, 2006). The overall strengths and weaknesses of Indian democracy deeply shape its functioning. Thus, its assessment could not be separated from the evolution of Indian democracy. Both are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. As they are evolving, no study could have the final say on the nature and functioning of the Indian parliament (Mehra, 2018). The Indian parliament, nonetheless, is a sovereign body representing the people’s will. Its changing nature and dynamics reflect the changing attitude and aspirations of people. It does function as their representative body. However, delegated legislations, disruptions, adjournments, and unruly behaviours of the members erode the people’s trust in the institution. Its capacity to hold the government accountable is very low. It is unlikely to change soon. Another cause of concern is the inadequate representation of women. Despite their growing presence in local bodies, women’s representation in the Indian parliament has never crossed the ten per cent threshold. Similarly, there has been a sharp decline in the number of members from the Muslim and Christian communities. However, parliament is not merely a representative body. It is and must function as a legislative body which holds the government accountable. The free flow of ideas and strong opposition in the parliament are important in this direction. Their role is critical in safeguarding individual liberty, promoting socio-economic transformations, and protecting constitutional democracy. The Indian parliament has performed its representative role more or less satisfactorily. It is the authoritative voice of the people of India, ‘articulating their concerns and reflecting their aspirations’ (Malhotra, 2002). It helped in the consolidation of the country through the reorganization of states and by creating new states. It enacted major transformative legislations. It has seen top-class debates on domestic and foreign issues. Parliamentary debates do represent the cacophony of Indian opinion. It helps in understanding an

172  Meenakshi Gogoi and Mithilesh Kumar Jha issue from various positions. Thus, it is not correct, despite repeated obstructions and protests, as Shankar and Rodrigues (2011) argue, to buy the thesis of Kashyap (2004) and others about the decline of the Indian parliament. Although, there is growing discomfort among scholars and informed citizens alike about the functioning of the Indian parliament. However, many see it as the evolution of the Indian parliament reflecting the country’s democratization. Thus, the debate on the functioning of the Indian parliament ‘hangs between decline and democratization’ (Mehra, 2018). Another issue is whether or not the Indian parliament has successfully held the government or executive and its various ministries accountable. This is connected to a larger issue in legislative studies which finds legislative bodies over the decades losing out in power to the executive. The Indian Parliament has similar trajectories. It seems that over the decades, the members of parliament, with a few notable exceptions lack the will or motivation to hold the government accountable for its various acts of omission and commission. This should be a major cause of concern. The parliament is not only a forum for debates and discussions representing every shade of opinion. But it is and must function as an institution which holds the government account. References Agrawal, A. (2005). The Indian parliament. In D. Kapur & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), Public institutions in India: Performance and design (pp. 77–102). Oxford University Press. Austin, G. (1966). The Indian constitution: Cornerstone of a nation. Oxford University Press. Dua, B. D., Singh, M. P., & Saxena, R. (Eds.). (2014). The Indian Parliament: The changing landscape. Manohar Publications. Fartyal, H. S. (1971). Role of the opposition in the Indian parliament. Chaitanya Publishing House. Jones, M. (1957). India’s parliament. Allen and Unwin. Kadhir, P. (2016). Parliamentary system of India. Retrieved November 23, 2022, from www.thehindu.com/children/parliamentary-system-of-india/article61582208.ece Kapur, D., & Mehta, P. B. (2006). The Indian parliament as an institution of accountability (Democracy, Governance and Human Right Programme Paper No. 23). United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Kashyap, S. C. (1994). Our constitution. National Book Trust. Kashyap, S. C. (2004). Our parliament: An introduction to the parliament of India. National Book Trust. Khosla, M. (2012). The Indian constitution. Oxford University Press. Malhotra, G. C. (Ed.). (2002). Fifty years of Indian parliament. Lok Sabha Secretariat. Mehra, A. K (Ed.). (2018). The Indian parliament and democratic transformation. Routledge. Mehra, A. K., & Kueck, G. W. (Eds.). (2003). The Indian parliament: A comparative perspective. Konark Publishers. Nair, J., & Jain, U. C. (2000). Indian parliament: Privileges, powers, and functions. Pointer Publisher.

Indian Parliament  173 Pai, S., & Kumar, A. (Eds.). (2014). The Indian parliament: A critical appraisal. Orient BlackSwan. Prakash, A. S. (1995). What Ails Indian Parliament? An exhaustive diagnosis. Harper Collins. Rai, S. M., & Spary, C. (2019). Performing representation: Women members in the Indian parliament. Oxford University Press. Secretary-General. (2003). Fifty years of Lok Sabha (1952–2002): A statistical profile. Lok Sabha Secretariat. Sen, R. (2018). An analysis of disruptions in Indian parliament. In A. K. Mehra (Ed.), The Indian parliament and democratic transformation. Routledge. Sen, R. (2022). House of the people: Parliament and the making of Indian democracy. Cambridge University Press. Shankar, B. L.,  & Rodrigues, V. (2011). The Indian parliament: A  democracy at work. Oxford University Press. Tharoor, S. (2020). Time to imagine a presidential system. In S. Pai (Ed.), Constitutional and democratic institutions in India: A critical analysis (pp. 183–195). Orient Blackswan. Viswanathan, T. K. (Ed.). (2012). The Indian parliament. Lok Sabha Secretariat.

8 Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha

Introduction Federalism is a system of government characterized by the principle of ‘selfrule plus shared rule’ (Elazar, 1987, p.  12). This principle, when applied, means that the power is constitutionally distributed between different units of government. For instance, in the case of India, it is distributed between the centre and the states.1 Thus, a federal polity offers multiple units of government and guarantees each unit with a distinct set of activities on which it exercises full autonomy and control. On the contrary, a unitary system is characterized by the presence and dominance of a single unit of government. This kind of system might have local units of government; however, the local units of government are not constitutionally mandated. In contrast, a federal system provides constitutionally mandated multiple units of government with a fixed area of operation (see Table 8.1). Federal and Unitary Polities The word ‘federal’ is derived from the Latin word, foedus, which means agreement, pact or treaty.2 A federal State, like the USA, is formed by an agreement between its various constituent units. This is called the ‘coming together’ model of federation. However, federal countries like India do not represent the ‘coming together’ model of federation as there was no prior agreement between the federal units in constructing the Indian ‘State-nation’.3 India is an example of a ‘holding together’ model of the federation.4 In this model, a large and diverse country is divided into several federal units for administrative convenience and to give representation to culturally distinct groups. Federalism, in such countries, is a mechanism, and not an agreement, to manage ethnic conflicts and to accommodate territory-based cultural diversity without compromising the integrity and security of the nation. The Indian model of federalism is defined in various ways due to its peculiarity with respect to the conventional or classical models of federalism. For

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-11

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  175 Table 8.1  Federal Versus Unitary Government Federal Government

Unitary Government

• A federal polity offers multiple units of government and guarantees each unit with a distinct set of activities on which it exercises full autonomy and control. • The local units of government are constitutionally mandated. • Power and governing structures are truly decentralized. • Examples: the USA, Canada, India and Australia.

• A unitary system is characterized by the presence and dominance of a single unit of government. • The local units of government are not constitutionally mandated. • Power and governing structures are devolved, not decentralized. • Examples: the UK, China, France and Japan.

instance, Wheare (1951, p.  28) described India as ‘quasi-federal’, Appleby (1953) defined it as ‘extremely federal’, Jones (1960) used the term ‘bargaining federalism’, McWhinney (1966, p.  132) termed it ‘essentially unitary’ and Austin (1966, p.  187) called it ‘cooperative federalism’. These diverse descriptions of the Indian model of federalism by scholars illustrate the complex and flexible nature of Indian federalism. The complexity emanates from the presence of both unitary and federal features in the Indian ­Constitution. While introducing the Draft Constitution, Dr B. R. Ambedkar (1948) said: [India’s] Draft Constitution can be both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances. In normal times, it is framed to work as a federal system. But in times of war, it is so designed as to make as though it was a unitary system. However, as we will see in this chapter, Indian polity has evolved to become a genuine federal polity due to various changes in the political and economic spheres (see Box 8.1). Since Independence, India has witnessed significant changes in the functional and operational aspects of federalism. The political developments in the 1990s, especially the dawn of coalition politics and liberalization, have been considered a landmark, by many scholars of Indian politics, in strengthening the Indian federal polity. However, the return of a single dominant party, the assertion of muscular and Hindu nationalism, abrogation of Article 370 (an asymmetrical federal provision) and the global health emergency have raised serious concerns on the present state and the future of Indian federalism. But before we understand the evolution and the functioning of Indian federalism, the relationship between the party system and Indian federalism, and its present state, let us first understand its historical antecedents and the circumstances in which the Indian federal structure emerged and its distinctive features.

176  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Box 8.1  Key Features of a Federal Polity 1 Two sets of governments with each having separate and independent administrative and legislative powers 2 A written constitution 3 Governments having their independent tax bases 4 An independent judiciary

The Antecedents of Indian Federalism The roots and origin of Indian federalism can be traced back to colonial rule and the anti-colonial struggles. The colonial rule, which initially started with immense centralization of power, soon realized that the devolution of power to the provinces is vital to accommodate diverse aspirations and, more importantly, to govern a multi-ethnic and diverse country like India. At the same time, the growing assertion of the freedom movement put pressure on the colonial government for greater decentralization of power. Therefore, the federal structure during the colonial era, although highly centralized, gradually moved in the direction of greater devolution of powers to the provinces. In this regard, the Montagu Chelmsford Reforms in 1919, for instance, provided limited self-governance at the regional level. On similar lines, the report of Simon Commission in 1929 recommended a federal constitution and argued that only federal provisions could bring the diverse units together while retaining their internal autonomy. In addition, the Government of India Act of 19355 also provided an all-India federation and autonomy to the provinces in defined spheres. Even though the roots of Indian federalism lie in the colonial government, it was shaped immensely by the growing democratization and decentralization of the Indian national movement. The Indian National Congress recognized the importance of a federal polity for India as early as 1920. In the Nagpur session of the Indian National Congress in 1920, the party included reorganization of the Indian states on a linguistic basis as one of its political goals. In the same session, it was also recommended that the Provincial Congress Committee should be organized on a linguistic basis. In 1928, the Motilal Nehru Report recommended a federal set-up government for India. Federalism, therefore, emerged as a constitutional mechanism to decentralize power and to keep the divergent federal units together. The idea that an independent India would be a federal state with autonomous federal units was a settled question during the freedom movement. Hence, as early as December 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), while introducing the objective resolution in the Constituent Assembly, made it clear that the federal units of the Republic of India would be autonomous and exercise powers in the areas assigned to them, and possessed residuary powers (Nehru, 1946).

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  177 However, the exact nature of federalism and federal provisions was still not final and was immensely shaped by the sociopolitical context at the time of making the Indian Constitution. That is why there is a considerable difference between the federalism ‘imagined’ during the freedom movement and the kind of federalism that actually became part of the Constitution. The difference can be explained by the traumatic events that led to the partition of the country, the creation of Pakistan and communal violence leading to the partition and independence of the country. These events generated fear in the minds of the Constituent Assembly members of secessionist attempts and demands in the future. Hence, they thought that a more powerful central authority would contain such future developments. A strong central authority was also thought to be necessary to carry out the social revolution envisioned in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Articulating these concerns, Jawaharlal Nehru (1947) remarked: ‘it would be injurious to the interests of the country to provide for a weak central authority which would be incapable of ensuring peace, of coordinating vital matters of common concern, and of speaking effectively for the whole country in the international sphere.’ At the same time, to merge a large number of princely states, some kind of federal structure that promises autonomy and safeguards their interests was also required. Hence, there was a need for a constitutional arrangement that would not just accommodate the diverse interests and fears of the provinces but also ensure the integrity and security of the nation. This shifted the federal structure from the Gandhian notion of decentralized and federal India to a more centralized form of federal India (Austin, 1966, p.  186). India’s peculiar needs and concerns required a unique kind of federal provisions and polity. The traumatic events of 1947 and the pragmatic concerns of the Constituent Assembly members gave birth to a new model of federalism. The resultant federalism was, therefore, the product of many factors. While the cultural heterogeneity and multi-ethnic nature of India paved the way for a constitutional framework to retain federal features to provide autonomy to the federal units and safeguard their interests, the concerns for security, unity and administrative efficacy of the nation pushed for centralized federal provisions akin to the federal provisions of the colonial era. The following section discusses these provisions and features of the Indian model of federalism as enshrined in the Constitution, making it distinct among the conventional federal polities such as the USA, Canada and Australia. The Indian Model of Federalism The Indian model of federalism, as envisioned in the Indian Constitution, differs significantly from the conventional model of federalism. According to Wheare (1951, p. 5), the distinctive characteristic of a federal polity is two units of government of a country, that is, general (central) government and regional governments. They are independent of each other within their respective spheres. In contrast, in the Indian model, the relationship between the central and federal units is not characterized by independence

178  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha but by cooperation. Austin (1966), similarly, argues that the Indian Constituent Assembly was the first to embrace what A. H. Birch called ‘cooperative federalism’. This kind of federalism produces a strong central government; however, that does not make federal units weak or insignificant in the system. Cooperation between the units defines administration and governance practices, and regional governments are partially dependent on the centre for funds. Even though the constitution provides distribution of powers between the centre and the states, these powers are exercised jointly by them in practice. Therefore, the Indian federal structure is such that the cooperation between the units of government is critical for good governance. However, there is an inherent bias towards the union government in the Indian model of federalism. As argued in the last section, a strong centre was considered necessary by the Indian nationalists to carry forward the statebuilding and development-related tasks, as well as because of security-related concerns. It would not be wrong to argue that constitutionally, the union government has the upper hand in comparison to the state governments in all the spheres of governance. Even the term ‘federation’ finds no mention in the Constitution and the very first article of the Constitution describes India as a ‘union of states’ rather than the ‘federation of state’. However, with the historic judgements in Kesavananda Bharati case, 1973 and S. R. Bommai case, 1994, federalism has become part of the basic structure doctrine, which cannot be amended by the Indian Parliament. However, the centralizing provisions in Indian federalism have been abused to the extent that the spirit of cooperative federalism has never been fully realized. The cooperative features in the Constitution, like Article 263 which provided a provision for setting up of Inter-state Councils (ISCs) to give recommendations on inter-­ governmental issues, were never properly implemented. The centralizing provisions in the Indian model of federalism were critical in the aftermath of Partition; however, they make little sense in the contemporary times. The Indian Constitution, under the Seventh Schedule, provides clearly demarcated areas of governance through the Union List (which consists of areas that are under the authority of the centre such as national security, foreign affairs and interstate relations), State List (which consists of areas that are under the jurisdiction of states such as education, health, and law and order) and Concurrent List (includes areas where both centre and states can make laws). However, this division of powers gives the centre an upper hand in governance. First, the centre has a more significant number of areas of governance than the states. Second, there is an extensive list of concurrent subjects where both the units have the right to make laws, but the centre takes precedence in the case of conflict (see Box 8.2). On top of this, under extraordinary situations like an emergency, the centre is also constitutionally empowered to take over the subjects enlisted in the State List. Finally, unlike the USA, the residuary powers in India are also left with the centre.

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  179 Box 8.2  Division of Subjects Between Central and Federal Units of the Indian Government Lists

Important Subjects

List I, Union List (97 subjects)

Defence; atomic energy and mineral resources; C ­ entral Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation; foreign affairs; diplomatic, consular and trade representation; United Nations Organization; war and peace; foreign ­jurisdiction; citizenship; naturalization and aliens; extradition; passports and visas; railways; national ­ ­highways; maritime shipping and navigation; airways – aircraft and air navigation; posts and telegraphs; telephones; wireless; broadcasting; currency; coinage and legal tender; foreign exchange; Reserve Bank of India; Post Office Savings Bank; trade and commerce with foreign countries; interstate trade and commerce, banking, insurance, stock exchanges and future markets; patents, inventions and designs, copyright, trademarks and merchandise marks; establishment of standards of weight and measure; oilfields and mineral oil resources; petroleum and petroleum products; the Survey of India, the geological, botanical, zoological and anthropological surveys of India; meteorological organizations, Census; Union ­Public Service; All India Services; Union Public ­Service Commission, elections to Parliament, to the legislatures of states and to the offices of president and vice-­ president; the Election Commission; audit of the accounts of the union and of the states; constitution, organization, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court and high courts; interstate migration; interstate quarantine; duties of excise on the following goods m ­ anufactured or produced in India, namely (a) petroleum crude, (b) high-speed diesel, (c) motor spirit (commonly known as petrol), (d) natural gas, (e) aviation turbine fuel and (f) tobacco and tobacco products; corporation tax and so on Public order, police, prisons, reformatories, borstal institutions, local government; public health and s­anitation, hospitals and dispensaries, burials and burial grounds, cremations and cremation grounds; agriculture, including agricultural education and research; water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and ­embankments, water storage; land; fisheries; markets and fairs; ­moneylending and moneylenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness; betting and gambling; state public services; State Public Service Commission; taxes on animals and boats; capitation taxes

List II, State List (66 subjects)

(Continued)

180  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha (Continued) Lists

Important Subjects

List III, Concurrent List (47 subjects)

Criminal law, criminal procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure; preventive detention, marriage, and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; bankruptcy and insolvency; trust and trustees; civil procedure; lunacy and mental deficiency; prevention of cruelty to animals, forests, protection of wild animals and birds; drugs and poisons; economic and social planning; population control and family planning; commercial and industrial monopolies; combines and trusts; social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment, welfare of labour; education, legal, medical and other professions; relief and rehabilitation; charities and charitable institutions; registration of births and deaths; price control; factories; electricity; newspapers; books and printing presses

Source: Article 246, Seventh Schedule, Indian Constitution.

However, there are other provisions in the Indian Constitution that present a centralized character of Indian federalism. Indian federalism is said to be an indestructible union of destructible states. It means that the territorial integrity of the states can be violated, whereas that of the union remains intact or indestructible. The boundaries of the federal units can be altered by the Parliament through Article 3 of the Indian Constitution. It empowers the union government to alter, merge and redraw the boundaries of any existing state/s even without the approval of the concerned state/s. More importantly, the central government can do so with a simple majority in the Parliament. Therefore, the power to create new states or dissolve the existing states lies entirely with the Indian Parliament. The recent reorganization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories, that is, the union territory of Ladakh and the union territory of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, illustrates this point. This federal provision was one of the reasons for characterizing Indian federalism as ‘quasi-federalism’. However, the same Article 3, as Tillin (2019, p.  20) argues, has also contributed to the further federalization of the Indian polity by creating new states to protect and safeguard linguistic groups, ethnic groups and backward regions. The states also do not enjoy financial autonomy. They are heavily dependent on the centre for resources and funds. The economic reforms of 1991 have brought changes in giving states some fiscal autonomy to generate funds from sources other than the centre. However, the states continue to be ­fiscally dependent on the centre. Nevertheless, the Constitution provides an ­independent institution of the Finance Commission under Article 280, which

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  181 is appointed every five years. The main task of the Finance Commission is to propose a formula for the distribution of taxes collected by the centre to the states. The latest Fifteenth Finance Commission has recommended the share of states in central taxes to be 41 per cent (Finance Commission, 2020, p. 11). Another controversial and debatable provision that can threaten federal units’ autonomy is Article 356 of the Constitution. Through this provision, the central government can usurp the jurisdiction of the states. The president of India can overtake the executive and legislative powers of the states in case of failure of constitutional machinery by imposing an emergency in a state. Hence, the elected government can be suspended, and the president can directly control the state’s administration through the state’s governor. While expressing his views on such provisions in the Constitution, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (1949) argued that such provisions should never be put into operation unless in a rarest of rare situation and shall remain as a dead letter. However, since Independence, the Article has been the most misused Article of the Constitution – used more than 100 times. The office of the governor, who is the nominal head of the state, has also been a controversial aspect of Indian federalism. Article 153 provides governor for each state. As the governor is appointed by the president (Article 155), they are considered as a nominee of the central government. Even though the governor is expected to work as a non-partisan and on the advice of the council of ministers headed by the chief minister (Article 163), the advice of the council of ministers is not binding and the governor can act in their own discretion. Therefore, the office of the governor has been misused by the central government to interfere in the matters of the state government and to use the office for partisan purposes. Part 15 of the Indian Constitution contains provisions related to All India Services. As of now, there are three All India Services: Indian Administrative Services, Indian Police Services and Indian Forest Services. However, under Article 312, the Parliament is empowered to create a new All India Service for which a resolution has to be passed by the Rajya Sabha with the support of two-thirds of the members present at the time of voting. Therefore, the introduction of any new All India Service requires states’ cooperation. Moreover, these services provide a bridge between the central and state governments as they are common to both the governments and offer strong and effective links between the two. The members of these services are recruited and trained by the centre; however, they are allocated to different states for service. They serve centre only on deputation and this provision gives sense of participation to the states at the national level. Another remarkable feature of Indian federalism is that it provides asymmetric devices that offer different levels of autonomy to regions with a distinctive identity or history of centre – region conflict. For instance, Article 371A for the state of Nagaland, Article 371G for the state of Mizoram and other provisions in the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Indian Constitution.

182  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha The Indian model of federalism, in terms of constitutional design, is ‘centre heavy’ and based on a model of administrative and fiscal interdependence between the centre and the states (Tillin, 2019, p. 41). It does not offer much protection to the states against the intrusion of the centre. However, with the dawn of coalition politics, the limited institutional safeguards provided in the Constitution have also asserted themselves in the favour of the states. In this sense, federal relations are significantly determined by the changes in the electoral balance within the party system. In order to understand how the constitutional provisions operate in the Indian federal polity, we need to look at the changing nature of the party system and its impact on Indian federalism, in general, and union – state relations, in particular. Indian Federalism Before Multiparty Coalition Era Since Independence, India has observed various manifestations of federalism. It has evolved over the years. And this evolution process is very far from complete. Due to the flexible nature of Indian federal design in the Constitution, the electoral landscape and the nature of the party system have strongly influenced and shaped the way federal relations have unfolded in the country over the years. Therefore, a single-party dominant system would shape the functioning and operation of federalism in a qualitatively very different way as compared to the one in a multiparty system. The federal design in the Constitution is such that it makes the functioning of federalism not just dynamic but also significantly dependent on the nature of party system. The politics in India from the first general elections till 1989 (except for a brief period between 1977 and 1980 and post-1967 decline of the Congress Party at the regional level) was characterized by single-party dominance (Swenden, 2021). However, this period can be divided into two phases, that is 1951–67 and 1967–89. The first phase was marked with one-party dominance both at the centre and at the regional level, and in the second phase, there was one-party dominance just at the centre and political fragmentation at the regional level. The functioning and the operational realities of the Indian model of federalism in both phases were not identical. The first phase (1951–67) was comparatively smooth in terms of intergovernmental relations with marginal union – state conflicts, which were also contained through the organizational fold of the Congress Party. The accommodative and plural character of the ‘Congress system’ provided a structure for coordination, mediation, bargaining, conflict articulation and resolution at different levels, which through consensus building accommodated the concerns of the federal units (Kothari, 1964, p. 1166). However, there were instances of imposition of president’s rule under Article 356 and dissolution of state governments, for instance, in Punjab (1951), Andhra (1954) and Kerala (1958), which showed how federalism could be eroded by invoking Article 356, especially in states which are ruled by political parties different from the one ruling at the centre. In total, the Article was invoked nine times

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  183 during this period (Rajashekara, 1964, p.  142). Compared to the second phase (1967–89), it was significantly less. Another remarkable success, in terms of federalism, of this phase was that the assertion and demands for linguistic states were accommodated by linguistically reorganizing the states. Therefore, the first phase was characterized by cooperation and interdependence as the ruling party governing the centre and the states was the same. Apart from the ‘Congress system’, there were other mechanisms like the National Development Council (NDC), which fostered cooperation by providing a common platform to states where they could negotiate with the centre regarding allocation of funds. The NDC was set up in 1952 to review the working of the national plan as laid down by the Planning Commission and to enable states’ participation in the formulation of the national plan. In the otherwise centralized planning and development, the NDC provided a platform to the states to put forward their views, concerns and difficulties in the implementation of the national plan. However, when the equilibrium provided by the ‘Congress system’ got disturbed after 1964 with the emergence of non-Congress governments at the regional level, the centre – state relations took a more conflictual turn. The ‘Congress system’, which was prominent in the first phase, started to fall apart as several non-Congress parties began to form governments at the regional level in the second phase (1967–1989). However, the Congress Party remained dominant at the centre. With the growth of regional parties, this phase saw a rise in regional assertions for state’s rights, greater autonomy and economic independence, which provoked the centre and eventually resulted in growing tensions in centre – state relations. The cracks in the ‘Congress system’ were further deepened by internal power tussle within the party, leading to a split of the party in 1969. Hence, the combination of centralization of power within the Congress Party and in the centre – state relations led to the erosion of Indian federalism. There was also a steep rise in the use of Article 356 of the Constitution, especially in the states governed by parties other than the one at the centre. Even the Janata Party, which ruled for a brief period, that is, 1977–79, used this provision and imposed president’s rule often to topple the regional governments ruled by the Congress Party. This period also saw intense and violent regional movements for greater autonomy and even secession, for instance, in Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and so on. The federal spirit was only strengthened when a new government under Rajiv Gandhi in 1984 had no option but to accommodate some of the regional demands for autonomy and decentralization as it became necessary for the territorial integrity of India. The centralizing tendencies in the entire phase were at their peak, which can be confirmed by the number of times Article 356 was invoked, the rise of regional movements for autonomy, secession and the imposition of national emergency under the Indira Gandhi regime, which had no space for federalism. However, the national elections of 1989 marked the most explicit turning point in centre – state relations. For the first

184  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha time since Independence, no party was able to secure a majority in the Lok Sabha and hence, the single-party dominance system shifted to a multiparty coalition system. Indian Federalism During the Multiparty Coalition Era The 1989 general election has been a landmark in terms of the functioning and practices of Indian federal polity. There had been a major shift in the nature of centre – state relations from the previous phase of centralized federalism. It was the first election since Independence in which no party was able to obtain the majority to form government at the centre. The political vacuum at the centre led to a new era in Indian politics in which the accommodation of regional actors, parties and interests at the national level had become important. Furthermore, the multiparty coalition government at the national level became a regular feature of Indian politics (Singh, 2002, p. 562). In this phase of coalition politics, the Congress was no longer the only pole around which the politics revolved. The new party system was defined by multipolarity. Hence, coalition politics was the main feature of Indian politics from 1989 to 2014 as no single party was able to secure the majority to form government at the centre. The shift from a single-party dominance to coalition politics led to the federalization of Indian polity. Apart from the dawn of coalition politics, other internal and external factors during this period also sharpened and accelerated the process of federalization of Indian polity. According to Mahendra P. Singh and Douglas V. Verney (2003, p. 7), the change in the federal structure of India was brought by a chain of events between 1989 and 1992, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, implementation of the Mandal Commission report, the rise of Hindu nationalism and the switch from the centrally directed economy to a market economy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the socialist argument for a centralized form of federalism and the idea of centrally directed economic and developmental planning suffered setbacks. There was growing consensus for liberal and open economies. The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that the Government of India could no longer rely on the Soviet Union for financial assistance that it received in the past to recover its centrally directed economy. At the same time, the global trends also indicated decentralization and empowerment of regional and local units, which were considered vital parts of the democratization process. The 73rd and 74th amendments of the Indian Constitution were brought for further decentralization of Indian polity and to strengthen the third tier of Indian federalism. Since these amendments give constitutional sanction to the local self-­government institutions, India has evolved into a multi-federal polity. The implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations also contributed to the federalization process. The agitation around the implementation led to a new democratic upsurge and the rise of traditionally disadvantaged groups in the political sphere. It further added to the growing political fragmentation in India as

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  185 many new caste-based regional parties were formed during this time, for instance, Samajwadi Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal, Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya), and so on. The social categories of ‘Dalits’ and ‘OBCs’, therefore, found new political meaning and importance that reshaped the patterns of political mobilization and electoral fragmentation. However, the demolition of Babri Masjid and the rise of Hindu nationalism undermined caste politics by politicizing the category of religion. In terms of party politics, ethno-nationalist mobilization helped the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to grow as the only alternative to the Congress at the national level. All these events added to the process of federalization. However, the role of coalition politics and economic reforms have been considered exceptional in shaping the post-1990s trajectory of Indian federalism. A significant feature of Indian politics till the 1990s has been a dominant centre with relatively weaker states. In this period, the balance of power was entirely tilted towards the centre. However, with the advent of multiparty coalition governance, the dominance of the centre started to wither away, and states came forward to occupy a prominent position in shaping the politics at the national level. There was also a shift in the way regional parties were seen. They were not seen as a threat to national security or impediment to nation-building or national development anymore, as was the case in the earlier phase. Therefore, they started to gain legitimacy and played a decisive role in the making and unmaking of government at the national level. This helped state governments and regional parties gain self-­confidence and assert themselves at various levels. However, the assertion of states and regional parties from the 1990s was different in nature from the assertion in the earlier phases. The new assertion of states was not marked by aggressive and confrontational attitudes but was within the framework of the Constitution. The relatively weaker position of the central government, as it relied heavily on the regional parties, and the new form of regional assertion elevated the centre – state relations to new heights and inaugurated a new phase of cooperative federalism. In the new phase of cooperative federalism, states and regional perspectives were represented more in the national decision-making. The states, therefore, got a more significant say in the national-level decision-making, which was not the case in the earlier phases. It was due to the increase in vote share of regional parties, their representation in both the houses of the Parliament and at the cabinet level increased significantly. For instance, in the general election of 2009, the regional parties were able to secure 28.4 per cent of the vote share (Buwa, 2011, p. 940). It was significantly more than the general elections prior to 1989; for instance, in the general election of 1984, the vote share of regional parties was around 11 per cent. The rise of regional parties at the national-level governance led to the regionalization of national political discourse. In the earlier phases, regional-level governments worked at the whims of the centre and the relationship between the two was characterized by patron – client relationship. However, due to the rise of regional

186  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha parties at the national level and the consequent coalition politics, the regional parties were able to shape the national political discourse by bringing a regional perspective to it. The shift in discourse worked in further strengthening the regional parties, both at the regional and national levels, and therefore, it also strengthened Indian federalism. In addition to the regionalization of national political discourse in this period, there was also the federalization of national politics. This means that the results of national elections were on the lines of the regional-level results. The political competition at the national level reflected the politics at the regional level. Therefore, the performance of the state government became an essential determinant of national-level electoral behaviour. However, that does not imply that the national election results were an exact copy of the state election result but were ‘derivative’ of the political choices at the state level (Yadav & Palshikar, 2009, p. 59). This further made regional parties and politics at the regional level significant at the national level. The assertion of regional parties was also seen in the field, which is exclusively in the domain of the centre, that is, foreign policy. With the dawn of coalition politics, there was a departure from the prime-minister-centric foreign policy model (Jha, 2004). The office of the prime minister was no longer the sole actor in shaping foreign policy. There was an increasing involvement and participation of diverse actors in foreign policy-making. The states started asserting themselves in the sphere of foreign policy decision-making whenever they felt that any particular foreign policy is impinging on the state’s interests. In 2011, for instance, the West Bengal government’s objection to the quantum of water sharing in the Teesta Water-sharing Accord with Bangladesh led to the postponement of the Accord. Similarly, in 2012, a significant number of states expressed their concerns and protested against the centre’s move to bring foreign direct investment (FDI) into the multi-brand retail sphere. The presence of regional parties at national-level governance has given states notable space to assert their rights and share their concerns concerning foreign policymaking. In the cases of conflict, the centre had to negotiate with states and give them considerable space to shape foreign policies as otherwise, the regional parties, if part of the central government, could pose challenges to the stability of the central government. In 2013, for instance, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam left the United Progressive Alliance-II (UPA-II) coalition when it had disagreements with the central government’s stand on US-sponsored resolution on Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council (Basu, 2016, p. 222). Therefore, the interests of the concerned states became a critical determining factor in shaping foreign policy. The increasing influence and assertion of states and regional parties created conditions for judicial activism, which also led to a paradigm shift from centralized to decentralized reading of the Constitution (Swenden & Saxena, 2021, p.  27). The Supreme Court of India in the multiparty coalition era gave landmark judgments to safeguard the federal structure of India. Bhatia (2003) argues that in the cases related to federal structure and centre – state

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  187 relations, there is a gradual shift in the nature of Supreme Court judgments from centralist to autonomist thrust. For instance, the Supreme Court of India provided a judicial safeguard to the state governments against the arbitrary use of Article 356 in the S. R. Bommai Judgment, 1994. It was a historic judgment in harmonizing the centre – state relations as it made clear that the use of Article 356 is not outside the purview of judicial review. The Court also restored the dismissed governments of Meghalaya and Karnataka by declaring the imposition of president’s rule in the two cases as unconstitutional. Also, in 1996, for the first time, a high court, Allahabad High Court, declared the imposition of president’s rule in Uttar Pradesh as unconstitutional. The critical intervention and activism of judiciary, especially against the imposition of president’s rule in the sates, have consolidated the federal structure and strengthened the federal spirit. Moreover, the other safeguards provided in the Constitution to restrict the centre from interfering in the affairs of the state, such as the president, governor and the Election Commission, also became more active against the centre’s transgressions (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001a, p. 130). With judicial activism, the assertion of the president, another institutional safeguard to protect states, was also seen in this period. For instance, the Indian president in 1997 returned the recommendation of the Cabinet to impose president’s rule in Bihar for reconsideration (Sadanandan, 2012, p. 7). Hence, there was a sharp decline in the imposition of the president’s rule under Article 356 after the 1990s. Even though these safeguards were always there in the Constitution, they were never realized under the dominant single-party system. This clearly shows how institutional safeguards provided by the Constitution are not sufficient to challenge the centralizing tendencies of the union government. The emergence of coalition politics created a new political environment that empowered states to challenge the arbitrary use of power by the centre by invoking these constitutional safeguards. The provision for constituting Indian State Council under Article 263 was also exercised in the phase. It was constituted as a permanent body in 1990 with the aim of resolving interstate disputes by the means of cooperation and coordination. These developments, therefore, led to an understanding that the states can no longer be crushed down or expected to operate at the dictates of the centre. Hence, after the emergence of coalition politics, federalism moved away from centralized and confrontational to non-centralized and cooperative federalism. Another critical factor, as argued above, which influenced the practice of Indian federalism was the economic reforms of 1991. The reforms played a significant role in altering the centre – state dynamics and interstate relations. The economic liberalization demolished the centralizing Licence or Permit Raj of the union government. It gave more autonomy to the states in the financial sphere by empowering them with investment-attracting and resource-raising autonomy. Therefore, the states did not need to rely entirely on the centre for funds but got some autonomy to attract funds from other sources. Lawrence Sáez (2002, p.  158) argues that the economic changes

188  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha have played a greater role than the political changes in shaping the federal set-up of India. He further argues that with the opening of the economy, there is a shift from cooperative federalism to competitive federalism. Federalism is defined as competitive when states have more autonomy to pursue their political, fiscal and policy goals without the interference of the centre (Sharma  & Swenden, 2018, p.  56). The economic changes have increased the states’ competition, which first appeared during the fiscal competition for FDI and provided a decentralized and competitive fiscal environment. Therefore, the nature of intergovernmental competition has transformed from vertical to horizontal competition between the states, where the states compete among themselves to attract funds by using various means such as innovation and policy initiatives. Rudolph and Rudolph (2001a, 2001b) argue that the economic reforms not just led to the decentralization of the command market to a federal market economy, but, more importantly, it provided new patterns of the shared economy between the government units for financial decision-making. It has facilitated larger economic sovereignty for the states. This has clearly affected the dynamics of centre – state relations in the economic sphere. Even though it has empowered states by creating a horizontal competitive environment, not all the states have benefitted from the economic reforms. Many would argue that it has added to the existing inter-regional economic disparities. However, the economic reforms and the coalition politics have put limitations on the role of the centre vis-à-vis states and restricted it from intervening in the states as it used to do during the Licence or Permit Raj and has eventually acquired a new role of a regulator to ensure transparency, accountability and ‘fiscal discipline’ (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001a, p. 136). Similarly, Cohen (2001, p. 97) argues that the empowerment of marginalized groups by implementing the Mandal Commission’s recommendation and liberalization has contributed to a ‘federal revolution’ and the federalization of the Indian polity. The ‘federal revolution’ has weakened the centre’s power and provided new opportunities at the regional level for growth, political participation and social reforms. Therefore, under the new federalism, states have become active actors in economic regulation. These political and economic changes in the 1990s have determined and defined the centre – state relations and functioning of Indian federalism in a multiparty coalition era. The changes have shifted the extremely centralized federalism to a cooperative, competitive, multilevel and decentralized federalism. Nevertheless, more importantly, these changes have given birth to a new political culture and political commitment to federal spirit. Also, it is the combination of multiple factors, dawn of coalition politics, economic reforms, assertion of regional parties and activism of institutional safeguards which created conditions for federalization of Indian polity. However, with no major institutional and structural change that can guarantee the strengthening of federalism and the flexible nature of the Indian model of federalism, the functioning of Indian federalism remains dependent on the political processes,

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  189 especially electoral politics. Therefore, the possibility of re-­centralization with the re-emergence of a dominant party system still remains. Indian Federalism: Contemporary Debates After a quarter century of hung verdicts at the national level, the general elections of 2014 and 2019 brought significant changes in the electoral politics and the nature of the party system in the country. In both the elections, people gave an absolute majority to a single party, (BJP), after more than two decades of coalition politics. It has led to a discussion about the re-emergence one-party-dominant multiparty system in India. The BJP, therefore, is no longer dependent on the regional parties to prove its majority in the Lok Sabha. In addition, since 2014, the party has also gained electorally in many states. Considering the history of Indian federalism under one-party dominance, the new developments in the party system post-2014 elections suggested the re-centralization of Indian federalism. However, the change in the party system was not the only reason to suggest political centralization. The political ideology of the BJP, which is based on the assertion of Hindu nationalism and the majority culture, has also raised serious concerns over the centre – state relations, especially centre’s relationship with culturally distinct groups. However, the election manifesto of the BJP for 2014 elections promised harmonious centre – state relations where national development will be ‘driven by the states’ and ‘Team India’ will include the prime minister and chief ministers as ‘equal partners’.6 The new government brought significant reforms with the aim to facilitate cooperation between the units of government. The first reform in this direction was replacing the Planning Commission with the NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India Commission) in 2015. The government argued that the Planning Commission had contributed to the centralization of power, and the NITI Aayog will work to undo that by bringing states to a common platform to work in the national interest. This, according to the government, will further the process of making Indian federalism cooperative in character. It was a significant move as it replaced the Planning Commission which was characterized by a centralized approach towards planning and development. It was also becoming an irrelevant institution in the age of competitive and cooperative federalism. Therefore, there was a need for an institution that could foster a bottom-up approach towards planning and offer a platform for intergovernmental cooperation. The new institution of NITI Aayog provides such a platform with its governing council comprising representatives from all the federal units. However, the governing council has remained inactive due to its ad hoc nature. It becomes active only when an issue is brought to it. Therefore, it has not evolved as a platform for regular engagement and participation of the representatives from federal units in order to form better and inclusive policies, share experiences and concerns. Similarly, the NITI Aayog, in 2018, provided a mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation

190  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha by constituting regional councils like the Himalayan States Regional Council, subgroups of chief ministers and inter-regional forums like the NITI Forum for North East.7 However, these councils also remained inactive and insignificant in bringing any change in the centre – state relations. The role of chief ministers in the new institution is also limited to the subcommittees whose recommendations are not binding on the central government. For instance, the recommendations of a subcommittee of chief ministers on centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) have not been implemented (see Box 8.3). Therefore, contrary to the government’s claims of enabling state’s engagement, in practice, the NITI Aayog has ignored the state governments in many of its programmes. In its ‘Aspirational Districts Programme’, for instance, the states were not consulted during the selection of the districts as well as in policymaking. Additionally, these programmes have been used for electoral and political purposes as the government takes the entire credit for such welfare programmes.

Box 8.3  Some of the Recommendations of the Subgroup of Chief Ministers on Rationalization of CSSs, 2015 1 It recommended some priority sectors in which CSSs need to be implemented such as poverty elimination, drinking water, Swachh Bharat Mission and housing for all. 2 The priorities of the union government should resonate with the priorities of the state governments. 3 The existing CSSs should be restructured and their number should be reduced to a maximum of 30 schemes. 4 Schemes in the National Development Agenda should be classified as ‘core’ and optional’. Core schemes would have compulsory participation by states, whereas amongst the optional schemes, states could choose some or all of them. 5 The NITI Aayog should take up monitoring and independent evaluation of CSSs as there is a need to transit from monitoring expenditure to monitoring outcomes. 6 The NITI Aayog should create an appropriate platform for the states and the centre for mutual interaction in a problem-solving mode. Source: NITI Aayog (2015).

Moreover, the NITI Aayog does not have financial and resource distribution powers, which means the financial powers of the Planning Commission are now transferred to the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, decisions related to resource allocation to the states are now entirely taken by the centre. However, at the time of the Planning Commission, the NDC provided

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  191 an institutional mechanism for the states to plan resource allocation with the centre. With no financial power, the institution of the NITI Aayog has remained unimpactful and insignificant in bringing any visible transformation in the centre – state relations. The present vice-chairman of the NITI Aayog, while acknowledging this, has said that some role of the NITI Aayog in the allocation of development expenditure to states would promote cooperative and competitive federalism.8 Rather than enabling cooperation and competition, Sharma and Swenden (2018, p. 74) argue, the NITI Aayog has enabled centralization. The power to determine the agenda, composition of the regional councils and the terms of the interstate competition for financial assistance has remained with the centre. In a similar vein, Aiyar and Tillin (2020, p. 128) argue that these reforms have failed to decentralize intergovernmental relations, and the federal criticism of the Planning Commission is yet to be realized by the NITI Aayog. In the sphere of fiscal federalism, new taxation reforms have been introduced with the promise of furthering competitive and cooperative federalism. The reforms have brought significant changes in the Indian taxation system by amending the Seventh Schedule, which distributes power between the centre and states through the Union and State Lists. In terms of taxation, both state and centre governments were given powers to tax in separate spheres. However, the 101st Amendment of the Indian Constitution introduced the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2016, which affected the little financial autonomy that the states enjoyed as earlier, they could determine the percentage of sales tax according to their needs. Nevertheless, the states can play a proactive role in the GST Council in determining the terms and distribution of taxation. They can also oppose any proposal of the centre in the council. As for any proposal to pass, the centre requires the support of at least 19 states, whereas to reject any proposal of the centre, at least 12 states need to vote against it. However, without the centre’s approval, the states cannot pass any proposal. This gives the centre a veto in the Council as it enjoys one-third of the vote share in the GST Council. The structure of the GST Council provides enough safeguards to dismiss the centre’s proposal as without the cooperation of the states of as many as 19 states, the centre cannot pass its proposal. Moreover, during disputes between the governments, the GST Council is empowered to resolve them by establishing an appropriate mechanism. This certainly enhances cooperative federalism as cooperation among the constituent units is critical for any bill to pass. The recommendations of two finance commissions, 14th and 15th Finance Commissions, during Modi’s government, have also pushed for greater fiscal autonomy to the states. In the 14th Finance Commission, there was a 10 per cent increase in states’ share, from 32 per cent to 42 per cent, in the indivisible tax pool. Even though the government agreed to increase the share, the states did not receive the expected amount. To abstain from giving the desired funds to the states, the centre has increased cesses and surcharges, which are not part of tax devolution. Moreover, the centre has restructured the flow of funds

192  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha from the centre to the states. It has stopped funding some of its schemes, and for other schemes, the centre has asked the states to pay 50 per cent of the expenditure. In this way, the centre has refrained from sharing funds to the states without tampering with the recommendations of the Finance Commission (Thakur & Ghosh, 2022). In the political sphere, there has also been a rise in the politicization of the office of the governor. The office of the governor has often been used to impose the centre’s will and rule the states and attack their autonomy. As soon as the new government came to power in 2014, it appointed governors in as many as nine states by removing the governors appointed by the previous UPA government. The office of the governor has been used to impose the will of New Delhi. This was especially felt in the regional units governed by the opposition parties, such as the union territory of New Delhi, Kerala, Jammu, Kashmir, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and so on. There have also been cases of imposition of president’s rule to topple a legitimate government, and all of them were imposed on the states governed by the non-BJP government. Out of the four times in which the president’s rule was imposed, the most critical and controversial one was in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was later reorganized into two union territories by abrogating a crucial asymmetrical feature of Indian federalism in the form of Article 370. In the case of Uttarakhand, where president’s rule was imposed in 2016, the Supreme Court intervened and questioned the authority of the union government to impose president’s rule before the conduct of floor test. However, in the case of abrogation of Article 370, more than a dozen petitions have been filed but the Supreme Court is yet to take a decision on the constitutional validity of the government’s move. In addition, there is also a growing centralization within the party structure of the BJP. This can be seen in the nature of election campaigning for regional-level elections which are contested with the prime minister as the main or prominent face of the party rather than its chief ministerial candidates. In many cases, the chief ministerial candidates are not even disclosed, and the elections are fought by just projecting the works and vision of the prime minister. Another feature of the Modi government has been its unilateral and centralized decision-making. There have been instances where the central government took crucial decisions without involving the concerned federal units. This goes against its electoral promise of cooperative federalism and an active and equal role of states in the national decision-making. The decision to abrogate Article 370 was taken without the involvement of the stakeholders. Similarly, the demonetization move came as a shock to the federal units and deeply affected the states’ revenues (Sharma & Swenden, 2018, p. 60). Even during the start of the ongoing global health emergency, the decision of nationwide lockdown was imposed without consulting the opposition but, more importantly, without consulting the states who were to implement it. The unilateral centralized approach followed by the centre during the first

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  193 lockdown led to mismanagement, massive exodus, police brutality and confusion. However, there was a shift from the unilateral centralized to unilateral decentralized approach to manage and contain the COVID-19 pandemic in the later stage, which revealed the importance of states and local bodies in containing such emergencies. In the later stage, there was relatively more autonomy and space for the states to ‘strengthen the healthcare facilities, manage the localized lockdown and implement social security measures to mitigate the impact of the pandemic’ (Sahoo, 2020). The Modi government has also given much emphasis on the idea of ‘oneness’. The idea of ‘oneness’ has gained legitimacy as it is portrayed as an essential factor for India’s progress, development and security. Major political policies and decisions of the central government are now tied with this idea which gives further legitimation to not just the idea of oneness but also to the centralization. For instance, the GST was introduced with the slogan of ‘one nation, one tax’. The proposal for simultaneous elections for both union and state assemblies was also articulated through the slogan of ‘one nation, one election’. This emphasis on oneness, as also argued by Aiyar and Tillin (2020, p. 132), has only ‘sought to legitimize a slow movement towards centralization as a necessary condition for development’. BJP’s win with a bigger mandate in 2019 only shows the legitimization of this idea. Singh (2019) argues that the Indian model of federalism is moving towards ‘national federalism’. In this type of federalism, the ‘national governance agenda’ is of utmost importance, and all the units of the government work together as partners to achieve the agenda, which is basically set by the centre. Furthermore, the autonomy and sovereignty of the federal units have no intrinsic value. These appear to be major trends in the functioning of federal politics in India in recent years. Summing Up The Indian federal polity is still evolving even though constitutionally, there has been no significant change in the characteristics of federalism. However, the interaction of the Indian model of federalism with the processes of democratization has brought significant changes in the centre – state relations and the functioning of the Indian federal structure. Among these processes, the nature of the party system has been a critical determining variable. As the Indian party system transformed from a single party to a multiparty coalition system, the nature of Indian federalism also transformed from a highly centralized and confrontational model to a decentralized, competitive and cooperative model. In this regard, post the 1990s, political processes and developments have been a landmark for setting a discourse for competitive, decentralized and cooperative federalism. In the absence of adequate structures and institutions which could facilitate and foster intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration, the coalition politics and the making of coalitions provided informal mechanisms for interaction, consensus building

194  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha and cooperation between different political parties. Even though the main objective of these mechanisms was not to strengthen federalism, they resulted in strengthening federalism and better centre – state relations. Therefore, the future of Indian federalism, in terms of its functioning and practice, continues to be shaped by the electoral landscape and the nature of party system. The contemporary trends in Indian politics illustrate this aspect of Indian federalism. However, with no significant change in the Constitution with respect to federalism, the Indian Constitution continues to carry both unitary and federal features. An ideal situation for Indian federalism would be to balance the two. While a strong central government is critical in a country like India which is marked with cultural heterogeneity and inter and intrastate disparities, this does not mean the state governments should be weaker than the central government. The state governments need to be equally strong and assertive, especially in the areas assigned to them by the Constitution, and possess sufficient autonomy to design governance according to their needs. Even though the states have acquired a more assertive and active role over the years, their autonomy continues to be threatened by the centre, for instance, through the governor’s office or by imposing Article 356, which is against the spirit of federalism. The misuse of these provisions can be stopped by assertion and activism of the existing institutional safeguards and, more importantly, by bringing new constitutional safeguards. At the same time, the challenges posed by global issues, like climate change, require combined efforts from the different units of government. The collaboration and cooperation among the units of government are imperative to deal with such global issues. The cooperation is, therefore, required at multiple levels: vertical (between centre and states), horizontal (interstate), as well as between the states and the local bodies. To realize the goals of cooperative and multi-level federalism, there is a need to strengthen the existing intergovernmental institutions like ISC or chief ministers’ subgroups under the NITI Aayog and to create new intergovernmental bodies for cooperation, coordination and collaboration between different units of government. The experiences from the pandemic also shed light on the crucial role that such institutions can play during global emergencies. There is a general consensus that such emergencies cannot be tackled with centralized governance and decision-making but require coordination, collaboration and cooperation at multiple levels. The intergovernmental institutions can, therefore, be an important institutional innovation that can facilitate multi-level federalism and cooperative federalism. Notes 1 In this chapter, states (with a small ‘s’) indicate the federal units of India, whereas State (with a capital ‘S’) indicates the central state. 2 www.britannica.com/topic/foedus. 3 In the construction of the ‘nation-state’, the political boundaries of the state mirror the cultural boundaries of the nation. However, in societies marked with cultural

Federal Polity in the Multiparty Coalition Era and Beyond  195 heterogeneity, the construction of a nation-state is ineffective and counterproductive. Therefore, a ‘state-nation’ model which allows multiplicity of nationalities to coexist under a single democratic roof is more suitable and successful (Stepan et al., 2011). 4 However, considering the force which was used to integrate regions that resisted incorporation, Louise Tillin (2019, p. 23) argues, there was also an element of ‘putting together’. 5 www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1935/2/pdfs/ukpga_19350002_en.pdf. 6 www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/01830/BJP_election_manif_1830927a. pdf. 7 www.niti.gov.in/content/overview. 8 www.theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2019/02/04/niti-aayog-role-allocating-­ developmental-funds-states.html.

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196  Hemant Dogra and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Rajashekara, H. M. (1964). Nehru and Indian federalism.  The Indian Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 135–148. Rudolph, L. I., & Rudolph, S. H. (2001a). Redoing the constitutional design: From an interventionist to a regulatory state. In  A. Kohli (Ed.), The success of India’s democracy. Cambridge University Press. Rudolph, L. I., & Rudolph, S. H. (2001b). Iconisation of Chandrababu: Shared sovereignty in India’s federal market economy. Economic & Political Weekly, 36(18), l541–1552. Sadanandan, A. (2012). Bridling central tyranny in India: How regional parties restrain the federal government. Asian Survey, 52(2), 247–269. Sáez, L. (2002). Federalism without a centre: The impact of political and economic reform on India’s federal system. SAGE Publications. Sahoo, N. (2020). COVID-19 and cooperative federalism in India: So far, so good. ORF. www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/covid19-cooperative-federalism-india-so-fargood-65429/ Sharma, C.,  & Swenden, W. (2018). Modifying Indian federalism? Centre – State relations under Modi’s tenure as prime minister. Indian Politics and Policy, 1(1), 51–81. Singh, A. K. (2019, May). An emerging national federalism. Seminar, 717. www. india-seminar.com/2019/717/717_ajay_kumar_singh.htm Singh, M. P. (2002). Towards a more federalized parliamentary system in India: Explaining functional change. Pacific Affairs, 74(4), 553–568. Singh, Mahendra P., & Verney, Douglas V. (2003). Challenges to India’s centralized parliamentary federalism. The Journal of Federalism, 33(4), 1–20. Stepan, A. C., Yadav, Y., & Linz, J. J. (2011). Crafting state-nations: India and other multi-national democracies. Johns Hopkins University Press. Swenden, W. (2021). Foreword. In R. Saxena (Ed.), New dimensions in federal discourse in India. Routledge. Swenden, W., & Saxena, R. (2021). Policing the federation: The supreme court and judicial federalism in India. Territory, Politics and Governance, 10(1), 12–31. Thakur, N.,  & Ghosh, K. (2022). Why GST has taken five long years to open old wounds of centre – state relations.  Outlook. www.outlookindia.com/business/ why-gst-has-taken-five-long-years-to-open-old-wounds-of-centre-state-relationsnews-50290 Tillin, L. (2019). Indian federalism. Oxford University Press. Wheare, K. C. (1951). Federal government. Oxford University Press. Yadav, Y., & Palshikar, S. (2009). Principal state level contests and derivative national choices: Electoral trends in 2004–09. Economic & Political Weekly, 44(6), 55–62.

9 Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being A Rights-Based Perspective Himanshu Jha

Introduction India is experiencing an uneven development trajectory where the mainstream narrative often describes it as ‘shinning’ and ‘whining’ in the same breath. India’s arrival as a major economic player in the global economy, accompanied by steady economic growth, stands in stark contrast to the laggard socio-human development indicators. For example, between 1980 and 2010, the country experienced an average growth rate of 6.2 per cent, as compared to the world economy, which grew at a rate of 3.3 per cent.1 Between 2010 and 2018, the average growth was 9.2 per cent. India’s share of global gross domestic product (measured in terms of constant 2005 purchasing power parity international dollars) more than doubled from 2.5 per cent in 1980 to 5.5 per cent in 2010 and further rose to 7.9 per cent by 2019. The growth trajectory has placed India in the group of newly industrialized emerging nations such as Brazil, Russia, India and China, which together have a major share of the global gross domestic product. India is also part of the G20, a group of countries involved in economic and political decision-making, especially after the financial crisis and the current global economic slowdown. There is little doubt that India has steadily grown economically since the early 1990s and has joined the club of emerging economies. Compare these upward trends with the existing socio-economic realities. Official poverty estimates show that 29.8 per cent of India’s population lives below the poverty line (which has come down from 37.2 per cent in 2004– 2005; Press Information Bureau, 2012). Another estimate by the World Bank reports that 87.4 per cent of India’s population lives in poverty, calculated on the basis of under $5.5 a day. The Tendulkar Committee estimates that 37 per cent of the total population is poor, while the Abhijit Sen Committee pitches the figure at 77 per cent. Variation in poverty figures notwithstanding, a large chunk of India’s population still lives in poverty despite economic growth. On account of basic human development indicators as defined by the United Nations Development Programme, namely health, education and

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-12

198  Himanshu Jha economic well-being, India’s Human Development Index was 0.645 in 2019 with a ranking of 131 out of 189 countries, down from 119 in 2010. Life expectancy at birth in India was 69.7 years in 2019 (an improvement from 69.4  years in 2018) as against 81.1  years in Norway, 81.9  years in Australia, 74.9 years in Sri Lanka, 73.5 years in China and the global average of 69.8 years (Government of India, 2021). The distribution of wealth is highly skewed, exacerbating the economic divide. According to World Inequality Lab Report 2020, the top 1 per cent own 20 per cent of total wealth in 2019 (Yang, 2020). According to a Credit Suisse (2018) report on wealth distribution, the top 10 per cent of India’s population own 77.4 per cent of total wealth, while the bottom 60 per cent own merely 4.7 per cent. The Global Hunger Index, 2020, ranks India 94th out 107 countries categorized in the ‘serious hunger category’. About 14 per cent of India’s population is undernourished, and 37.4 per cent of children have stunted growth. Even though India experienced rapid economic growth between 1990 and 2005, malnutrition fell by only 2 per cent, from 24 to 22 per cent. Compare this with Bangladesh, which has shown improvement of 10 per cent (from 36 to 26 per cent) and Sri Lanka, 6 per cent (from 27 to 21 per cent) during the same period (IFPRI, 2005). Addressing the Paradox: A Balancing Act of the State What are the socio-political repercussions of these inherent socio-economic contradictions? In the socio-political realms, resurgent political formations and repeated social upheavals are forcing new expectations and demands on the state. There is little doubt that amidst these pulls and pressures, the Indian state at this juncture is faced with a delicate balancing act as it strives to reconcile its commitment to a neoliberal economic policy with ambitious commitments to social development. This is further complicated by the leakages and corruption that act as a drain on social expenditures. In this light, the state strives to maintain a balance between the changes in the two paradigms that have taken shape in the political and economic policy realms since the turn of the 1980s, that is, the new economic policies and the need for welfare policies. The dilemma of two conflicting paradigms makes it necessary to reconcile the resulting contradictions with regard to needs, commitments, political will and finances. As a result, policymakers have kept in mind the ‘welfarist’ considerations that are both politically and socially advisable, while simultaneously designing economic policies in line with the considerations of new social compulsions. This is evident from the increase in total expenditure on social sectors that could have only been possible with the widening of the economic base due to recent economic growth. Total expenditure towards the social sector has witnessed a constant increase over the years (Economic Survey of India, 2011–2012 to 2018–2019).

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  199

Figure 9.1  Expenditure on Social Services (in Crores) Source: Economic Survey of India, 2011–12 to 2018–19.

A corresponding increase in allocations can also be seen in the flagship programmes of social welfare. Welfare policies in India are carried through and implemented by a well-worked-out system of schemes and programmes at both the central and state level. The total number of centrally sponsored schemes decreased from 188 in 2002–3 to 147 in 2011–12. Since 2014, the centrally sponsored schemes have been further reduced to 66 and rationalized into 28 schemes categorized into two umbrella categories, namely (a) core of the core schemes (six schemes) and (b) core schemes (29 schemes; Department of Expenditure, 2019; see Box 9.1).

Box 9.1  Core of the Core and Core Schemes A Core of the core schemes  1 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme   2 National Social Assistance Programme   3 Umbrella Programme for Development of Minorities  4 Umbrella Programme for Development of Other Vulnerable Groups   5 Umbrella Programme for Development of Scheduled Tribes   6 Umbrella Scheme for Development of Schedule Castes

200  Himanshu Jha B Core schemes   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana Blue Revolution Border Area Development Programme Environment, Forestry and Wildlife Green Revolution Infrastructure Facilities for Judiciary 1Jal Jeevan Mission/National Rural Drinking Water Mission Jobs and Skill Development Mission for Protection and Empowerment for Women Modernisation of Police Forces National Education Mission National Health Mission National Livelihood Mission – Aajeevika National Programme of Mid-Day Meal in Schools Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Rurban Mission Swachh Bharat Mission Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin) Umbrella Integrated Child Development Service Urban Rejuvenation Mission: AMRUT and Smart Cities Mission White Revolution Rashtriya Pashudhan Vikash Yojana Saksham Anganwadi and Poshan 2.0 (Umbrella Integrated Child Development Service – Anganwadi Services, Poshan Abhiyan, Scheme for Adolescent Girls and National Creche Scheme) 27 Mission Vatsalya (Child Protection Services and Child Welfare Services) 28 Mission Shakti 29 Prime Minister Formalisation of Micro Food Processing Enterprises Scheme The Emerging Rights Framework: A Case of Institutional Change Keeping the above arguments in mind, the current focus of the Indian state to move beyond the previous institutional framework of the welfare regime governed by the targeted schemes and programmes, marking a shift from the social policy approach to ‘social citizenship’ is an institutional change. Increasingly, since 2004, the state has reaffirmed its commitment towards rights-based development, granting legal rights to the citizens (see Table 9.1).

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  201 Table 9.1  Right-Based Legislations: A Snapshot Right to Information Act, 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (later changed to Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act [MGNREGA], 2005) The Forest Rights Act, 2006 The Right to Education Act, 2009 National Food Security Act, 2013

Provides citizens with a legal regime to access information from the public authorities (or state). Provides 100 days of guaranteed work to the rural poor on demand. One-fourth of the work is reserved for women. Recognizes rights of the forest-dwelling tribal communities and non-traditional forest dwellers on forest resources. Free and compulsory education for ­children between 6 and 14 years. Ensuring citizens right to access and afford sufficient quantity and quality of food.

Table 9.2  Welfare Regime Institutional Change Old

New

Characterized by ‘charitable approach’ towards welfare view of state as a benevolent provider

Redefining the democracy – development – citizenship linkages from ‘social policy’ approach to ‘social citizenship approach’ towards rights-based development Shift from ‘end-user beneficiary’ perspective to ‘citizens’ with legal rights

Welfare through the framework of need-based schemes/programmes; citizen as a ‘beneficiary’ Clear demarcation between ‘civil/political’ rights and social/economic rights

The Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution in new ways; former nonjusticiable (Directive Principles of State Policy) has become justiciable

This is illustrated in the change in government lexicon from ‘needs-based logic’ towards a more rights-based approach. Therefore, one is inclined to argue that there is an institutional change in the welfare regime in India in terms of redefining the citizenship-state linkages on at least four counts (see Table 9.2). First, the Supreme Court rulings and new interpretation of the Constitution have resulted in crossovers between Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights, which were previously nonjusticiable (Corbridge et al., 2013, p. 104). Second, the legality of rights has changed the concept of welfare from an ‘end user’ or ‘beneficiary perspective’ to one of citizens with legal rights. Third, welfare is now legally enforceable and demandable with a well worked out legal system (targeted goals versus due focus on elaborately

202  Himanshu Jha worked out means and processes) focusing on equity, non-discrimination, transparency, accountability and participation (the core of rights-based development). Hence, citizens can now demand rights and accountability from the state. Fourth, the programmatic framework of ‘welfare’ can be withdrawn, but the legally supported welfare regime cannot be withdrawn. It is pertinent to point out that the shifts in the welfare paradigm continue even with the change of government in the centre. In combination with the existing rights-based legislation (discussed above), a plethora of welfare schemes entailing the direct transfer of goods and services to citizens were introduced. This is what has been termed as ‘new welfarism’ that focuses on tangible economic benefits for the poor, such as financial inclusion through bank accounts, cooking gas, toilets, electricity and housing (Anand et al., 2020). These policy schemes form part of the ‘core and core and core schemes’ discussed above and provide both continuity and variation to the existing welfare architecture. From 2014 onwards, the National Democratic Alliance regime introduced and expanded the welfare schemes. Notably, in 2014 and 2015, the state introduced approximately 45 schemes, focusing on the financial inclusion of the citizens, universal pension coverage, agriculture, women’s and child development and micro-entrepreneurship. Table 9.3 provides a snapshot of the selected programmes. Towards Social Citizenship The current juncture of renewed emphasis on welfare considerations by the Indian state marks a departure from the previous institutional framework of the welfare regime governed by the targeted schemes and programmes. Moving beyond the existing institutional framework of extending welfare provisions through schemes and programmes, an alternate trend is perceptible in a move towards adopting a right-based approach by the Indian state, driven by the logic of deepening democracy and the citizens right to development. Even the schemes and programmes are operationalized and implemented within the broader framework of rights-based development. Indeed, this thinking towards inclusive development renders a new meaning towards citizenship in terms of what Marshall (1950) refers to as ‘social citizenship’. Marshall defines citizenship in terms of not only civil and political rights but also extensive social-economic and cultural rights (see Manza & Sauder, 2009). Citizenship, it is argued, can be divided into civilpolitical and social rights, where civil is the right to protection and liberty by legal provision; political is the right to participate in governance in terms of elections and so on; and the third is social, a ‘whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security[,] to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being’ (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992, p. 8). All three have to be ensured as significant elements of

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  203 Table 9.3  Snapshot of Welfare Schemes Scheme

Focus

Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana

A national mission with the main objective of financial inclusion and access to financial services for all households in the country Small deposit saving scheme for every girl child to secure their future Financial support to the micronon-corporate business enterprises Life insurance cover for all Indian citizens Accidental Insurance to all Indian citizens Pension scheme aimed at workers engaged in the private unorganized sector Rural and urban housing Social, cultural, economic and infrastructural development in model villages Insurance cover to support farmers for failed or damaged crops Expanding irrigation coverage and promoting efficient use of water Poverty alleviation Drugs and medicine at affordable costs Encourage and support domestic industry and manufacturing Promote sustainable cleanliness LPG connections to the women of BPL households

Pradhan Mantri Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana Pradhan Mantri Mudra Yojana Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana Atal Pension Yojana Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana Pradhan Mantri Janaushadhi Yojana Make in India Swachh Bharat Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana

citizenship in any liberal democracy. Citizenship in England was institutionalized along the lines of these three aspects of citizenship, as they are interdependent and reinforce each other. Social citizenship in liberal democratic regimes is summarized as ‘promoting economic efficiency, reducing poverty, social equality and integration, elimination of social exclusion, promoting social equality and promoting autonomy’ (Jenson, 2012). In post-social citizenship, the idea of ‘social investment’ is viewed as a nuanced understanding of citizenship in terms of policy choices where state investment in the future such as children’s well-being, education and equality of women, is advisable as the market might lead to distortions in the realization of rights under social citizenship (Jenson, 2009). The concept of social citizenship itself faces challenges such as the labour market where welfare is targeted at the labour force, consumerization when beneficiaries of social policies are increasingly seen as consumers and pluralization in the form of emerging demands from social groups and communities (Evers & Guillemard, 2012). This necessitates

204  Himanshu Jha the expansion of social citizenship to include ‘new political and cultural challenges that demand collective choices’ not only to address the question of ‘how much’ but to also give due diligence to ‘what’ needs to be secured and entitled and ‘which’ policies to formulate and implement to meet new challenges (Evers & Guillemard, 2012). Yet another dimension of welfare and citizenship is discussed in terms of ‘social opportunities’ (Dreze & Sen, 1995). A middle ground is explored between the two extremes of promoting markets and competition and opponents of liberalization. Rejecting the narrow view of two extremes around welfare, economic development is seen as expanding social opportunities which enables an individual to engage with the opportunities presented in the economy which they otherwise fail to participate in fully due to lack of education or poor health. The question is not ‘more or less government’, but ‘rather it is a question of the type of governance to have’ (Dreze & Sen, 1995). This can be traced to Sen’s earlier exposition on ‘capabilities’, which considers income-based approaches towards welfare as insufficient. Instead, Sen emphasizes two central concepts of functions and capabilities, where the former is related to freedom to achieve well-being and the latter relates to the capabilities of individuals to achieve well-being (Sen, 1999). Indeed, some aspects of Marshall’s social citizenship found expression in the formative years of welfare institutionalization in Western countries, especially in Europe, in the form of social policies. However, in the case of postcolonial countries such as India, it has followed a different trajectory, establishing patterns of welfare that have redefined democracy-citizenship linkages in new ways. The post-Independence focus on economic development and enlarging the economic pie put welfare second in terms of policies. The belief was that ‘trickle down’ of development would take care of the ‘have nots’ eventually, the logic which governed most of the earlier efforts of national building, where ‘duties’ of citizens were paramount over ‘rights’ of citizens (Jayal, 2013). This resulted in the creation of a welfare regime which was governed by targeted schemes and policies for special categories, an essentially a needs-based system of welfare as ‘charity’-view of the state as a benevolent provider (Jayal, 2013). Rhetoric for welfare, however, was significantly strong in the Constitution, in the form of what Jayal (2013) calls a constitutional compromise between fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy. After the 1991 economic reforms, legislation on social and economic rights was experimented with and finally promulgated by the Parliament. This marked a departure from the previous regime of welfare. Similar initiatives in welfare as constitutional provisions have emerged elsewhere in countries such as Brazil and South Africa. Interestingly, the development of India’s welfare regime poses a paradox. Rights-based welfare did not find expression in mainstream policymaking when socialist rhetoric was at its peak, whereas welfare as a right is very much part of the policy mainstream when neoliberalism is at its peak.

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  205 However, questions have been raised about the availability, accessibility, affordability and financing of this institutional shift in the welfare architecture. Change in the Welfare Regime: Causalities and Explanations What explains the state’s move towards introducing institutional change in the welfare regime in India? Four broad arguments are offered. First, through various forms of protest, the social movement or people’s movement put pressure on the state around a common issue. Second, the politics of popular protest and its ability to effectively negotiate with the available political opportunity structure brought about institutional change. The third argument departs from the first two and suggests that the agency of a dense, interpersonal elite network drove the demand for change. All three arguments propose that social pressures played a consequential role in this case of institutional change. The fourth view presents an alternative lens of ideas and slow-moving socio-political processes to explain institutional change in the welfare regime. It is argued that the push for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) and the Right to Information (RTI) Act came from the grassroots in the form of a social movement. The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), which spearheaded the movement, initially took up the issues of land and minimum wage. In explaining institutional change in the information regime in India, Roy and the MKSS Collective (2018) posit the primary role of the people’s movement or the social movement. The state yielded to popular demand in the form of protests or amplified political contestation, eventually leading to institutional change. Similarly, Hasan (2018) applies the lens of social mobilization to three empirical cases – the right to employment and the right to food; the anti-­ corruption and Lok Pal movement; and legislative reservations for women. This view holds that the post-liberalization polity in India witnessed the state’s withdrawal from key areas such as health, education, and employment and, at the same time, a burgeoning of the aspirational middle class that benefited from economic reforms. The central focus of the ruling parties was on appeasing this class; those on the periphery were left out. This gap was eventually filled by political mobilizations outside the state that represented the interests of the classes on the periphery. Hasan (2018) reinforces the social movement narrative by suggesting that the social mobilization spearheaded by the MKSS was the starting point for the demand for both the right to work and the RTI. Hasan’s study focuses on these social mobilizations and examines the ways they negotiate, demand and pressurize multiple layers of the state. This aspect of ‘power and protest’2 influences the policy agenda of the parties in power. Hasan (2018) argues that when the United Progressive Alliance government came to power, with support from the left, the change in political regime entailed ‘new institutional arrangements’ and served as a window of

206  Himanshu Jha opportunity for social mobilization. This took concrete shape in the form of the National Advisory Council and postulates that political mobilization and social movements are important processes in facilitating the travel of ideas and bringing them to a point when a political opening, such as the change of government, can bring about shifts that are discontinuous from the past, and at the same time, in some cases, can reverse it. However, these ideas are not always transformed into legislation – the MGNREGS is rights-based legislation, but the right to food is merely a policy. This difference is crucial – in a policy framework, citizens are mere beneficiaries, but rights are entitlements that citizens can demand. The political leadership supported the enactment of the MGNREGS, which helped proponents thwart elite opposition within and outside the state. On the other hand, the National Food Security Act lacked political backing and ended up merely as a targeted scheme and not a rights-based legislation – the change in political priorities, especially during the second term of the United Progressive Alliance government, influenced the policy trajectory as well. In explaining the social-political processes behind the RTI Act 2005, Sharma (2015) problematizes the dominant social or people’s movement by exploring the role of elite networks. He argues that after liberalization, the state retreated and the bureaucratic order changed – the elite, which dominated the bureaucracy, moved to other spaces, such as the private sector. The greater democratization of higher bureaucracy and the support for the RTI Act of the urban, well-educated, high-caste elite – no longer vested in the state – helped in promulgating the RTI Act (Sharma, 2015, pp. 146–151). This process is understood in terms of a small, intimate, dense network of urban, upper-caste, upper-­middleclass, politically connected professionals acting together to further common interests. The leadership of this network is embedded in the ruling elite. Alternatively, Chopra (2011) suggests a dynamic process of statecraft, which entails state and society constituting each other in a mutually empowering relationship. Chopra argues that the boundary between state and society are porous, are shaped by the act of policymaking. It is within this symbiotic relationship between state and society that the promulgation of MGNREGS can be located. MGNREGS, in this sense, was a result of multiple actors working from both within and outside the state. Yet another view argues that the transitions in the welfare regime from programmes to rights are an evolving process that is long-drawn and slow-moving (Jha, 2018, 2020; Ruparelia, 2013). Here, the democracy – development linkages are significantly tied to these transitions. As democratic politics has deepened and become more varied and multifaceted, so have been the demands and expectations from both within and outside the state towards economic and social well-being, transparency and accountability. This has resulted in new ways of thinking about the state and citizenship centred around rights. Ruparelia (2013)

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  207 argues that India’s ‘new rights agenda’ is directly related to ‘slow burning’ processes since the 1980s, such as high socio-legal activism, uneven development and ‘expanding popular foundations of its federal democracy’. The role of the state and the ideas within it also play a consequential role in transforming state thinking. For example, in the case of the RTI Act, Jha (2020) argues that this right was a result of an incremental, slow-moving process of ideas emerging endogenously from within the state since Independence. Social actors did play a role; however, had the ideas within the state not moved favourably towards granting citizens access to information, the state would have dealt with the same social actors in a different way. This argument also stresses the proactive role of the judiciary. The discussion above suggests various ways in which scholars have approached the question of capturing institutional change in the welfare regime in India. It must be pointed out that as there is a division between the fundamental rights and directive principles of the state policy, there was a similar division of opinion on the same among the framers of the constitution (Jayal, 2013). This divide is illustrated in the early Constituent Assembly debates. Some members convinced about the well-being of the oppressed and minorities favoured the inclusion of economic and social rights as ‘fundamental’, where as a contrary opinion influenced by the global human rights discourse of the time favoured a more pragmatic approach with a view of welfare as directive to ‘state policies’ (Jayal, 2013, p. 151). The framers envisioned Directive Principles as complimentary to Fundamental Rights, but more often than not, both these constitutional principles evolved as adversarial to each other. This is evident from numerous judicial cases where whenever the violation of directive principles was invoked, courts invariably viewed it as infringing upon the fundamental rights of the citizens (Jayal, 2013, p. 58). Thus, it is also pertinent to examine the processes, which led to these judicial interpretations and how the political and social processes interplayed between the three institutions of governance, namely, the judiciary, the parliament and the executive. The relationship between the judiciary and parliament and executive over the years has turned tumultuous to say the least where one is viewed to be infringing on the other. It is in this context that further examination of shift from ‘non-justiciable’ to ‘justiciable’ needs to be undertaken. Another related issue which is hitherto ignored in the analysis of the new rights-based agenda in India is the role of public interest litigation, what has been termed as ‘social action litigation’ (Baxi, 2010). In this case, the judicial arm of the state has provided the ‘constitutional space’ to the citizens, which in turn redefines the state-citizenship linkages in new ways (Baxi, 2010). Hence, it is pertinent to consider the Supreme Court judgments across time to examine the internal workings and dynamics of these significant orders. A deeper examination reveals that the rights-based legislation can be traced to these judicial pronouncements based on the Indian Constitution (Jha, 2020; Ruparelia, 2013).

208  Himanshu Jha Similarly, on the lines of what Polanyi (1944) terms as the double movement, the Indian state has pursued a certain neoliberal path of economic development, albeit in a limited manner, and has experienced steady growth since the mid-1980s (as discussed above). At the same time, growing socio-economic disparities and newly emergent demands have put pressure on the state to think afresh about addressing these development issues. Ruparelia (2013) discusses similar issues which have led to the emergence of the new rights agenda. Ruparelia argues that economic growth exacerbated the socio-economic divide, which resulted in ‘fierce social reactions’ against these disparities, and additionally, the post-Congress setting of multi-polar regional political configurations resulted in increased electoral participation of excluded groups. Apart from the internal factors, it is important to take into perspective the changing discourse over rights-based development internationally. This has found expression in many ways, starting from the paradigm shift in the rights discourse intensely focusing on human development. That human development is now quantifiable across indicators around health, livelihood, employment and education and the subsequent rankings on the basis of Huthe man Development Index has international ramifications for a state’s initiatives around welfare. For instance, India’s ranking in the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme as compared to other countries of similar standing is often discussed in Parliament, policy and bureaucratic circles, civil society groups and the media. This shapes and reshapes the policy imperatives and discourse, which then eventually form part of the state policy declaration. Additionally, the signing of the international covenants on rights has shaped our domestic policy choices as well. For instance, India is a signatory to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Millennium Declaration (see Box  9.2). These international declarations often serve as a reference point for advocacy groups both within and outside the state to shape policy demands and choices around these lines. Even though the push for rights-based policies can be traced to endogenous factors, the international context provides the reference point or demonstration effect to initiate similar changes in the existing policy regimes. Box 9.2  Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals In September  2000, heads of 180 countries gathered at the United Nations to sign the Millennium Declaration and agreed to work towards eight Millennium Development Goals: • Eradicate extreme poverty • Achieve universal primary education

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  209 • • • •

Promote gender equality and empower women Reduce child mortality Improve Maternal Health Combat Human immunodeficiency virus infection/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, malaria and other diseases • Ensure environmental sustainability • Global partnership for development   In September 2015, these goals were further expanded as 17 Sustainable Development Goals to include: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

No poverty Zero hunger Good health and well-being Quality education Gender equality Clean water and sanitation Affordable and clean energy Decent work and economic growth Industry, innovation and infrastructure Reduced inequality Sustainable cities and communities Responsible consumption and production Climate action Life below water Life on land Peace and justice strong institutions Partnerships to achieve the goal

Source: www.un.org/millenniumgoals/; www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/ envision2030.html.

The change in the welfare regime is indicative of the gradual endogenous process within the state, which is ideational in nature (for such arguments, see Jha, 2020). The early seeds of which are perceptible in the constituent assembly debates itself, in which some key actors, such as B. R. Ambedkar, J. B. Kriplani, B. Das and Dr P. S. Deshmukh, when they voiced their objection to the sub-committee on Fundamental Rights of the Constituent Assembly, which suggested the divide between ‘fundamental’ and ‘directive’. There was a vehement drive during Indira Gandhi’s to further intensify this divide, especially during the emergency. However, continuous and

210  Himanshu Jha long-drawn judicial verdicts over the years have finally settled this divide as being complementary to each other (Jayal, 2013; Jha, 2020). These verdicts impacted the state’s thinking, and from within the state apparatus, there was a commitment and a resultant push to amalgamate directive principles as fundamental rights. Take the case of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The act was passed in 2005 as a legal guarantee to work. Nevertheless, numerous policy experiments on livelihood and employment preceded the Act, such as the Rural Manpower Programme (1961), Crash Scheme for Rural Employment (1971–1972), Drought Prone Areas Programme (1972), Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (1977), Food for Work Programme (1977), National Rural Employment Programme (1980), Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (1980), Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (1993), Employment Assurance Scheme (1994), Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana, Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (2001–2002) and Food for Work Programme II (2005). This is illustrative of a gradual change in the state’s thinking regarding these rights. In the subsequent sections, I will examine the implementation of two selected Rights-based legislation, namely the MGNREGA and the RTI Act, 2005. Implementation of the Rights: Case of MGNREGA and the RTI Act Let us start by examining the cumulative budget allocations for the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). There has been a steady increase in the total budget allocation by the central government since its inception. However, the new rights regime, which emerged as part of the welfare policy complex, has been questioned from the point of view of resources available to implement the policies. Indeed, the total increase in the allocation for MGNREGS implementation since its inception has been meagre 1–2 per cent. The current government has come under severe criticism for cutting down on the MGNREGS allocation by 35 per cent, especially during the time of the pandemic when demand for rural jobs is at its highest. In the case of MGNREGS, initially the ‘fiscal conservatives’ raised doubts. Regarding its financing, the National Advisory Council provided a note to the central government suggesting the financing of the programme by increasing the tax-gross domestic product ratio. Even though this strategy has not been implemented by the central government, MGNREGS’s central allocation has steadily increased over the years from an initial ₹31,021 in 2005–2006 to ₹111,500 crore in 2020–2021 (see Figure 9.2 for year-wise MGNREGS allocation). Along with the transition in the welfare regime, there is a related change in the financial provisions from the resource-based system to the needsbased system. Under this logic, the available resources do not govern policy

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  211

Figure 9.2  Year-Wise MGNREGS Allocation by the Central Government (in Crores)

choices, but rather resources are contingent on the policies dictated by the right-based approach. For example, the introduction of the National Food Security Bill has raised some valid questions about the resources available to finance the provisioning of food grains under the Bill, resulting in the addition of Rupees 23,000 crore over and above the existing food subsidy of rupees 90,000 crore. In spite of these resource availability uncertainties, the state went ahead to pass the Bill in the Parliament as there was a need to address the burgeoning problem of food security and malnutrition in India. Similarly, on the Supreme Court’s directive to initiate the mid-day meal scheme (following the People’s Union for Civil Liberties petition), states expressed their inability to finance the scheme, citing bankruptcy. However, within a few years, the annual expenditure to finance the mid-day meal scheme rose from zero to more than ₹5,000 crore. In this case, the policy choice was not governed by the resources available but by the needs-based system. Additionally, the widening of the economic base is also directly linked to the resources available for the policies under the new rights regime. Economic growth has resulted in a steady rise in total central government expenditure on social services and rural development – from 13.38 per cent of the total budget expenditure in 2006–2007 to 25.4 per cent of the total budget expenditure in 2018–19 (Economic Survey of India – Various Years). MGNREGS is a demand-driven programme aimed at providing at least 100 days of employment to the rural poor. The poor can demand and obtain work through this scheme. Between 2017 and 2020, 2,325.15 crore people were provided employment. This demand-driven programme is one of the world’s largest social protection programmes, where the rural

212  Himanshu Jha poor can gain employment and generate household incomes, especially during the lean season. MGNREGS’s mitigating role and its social protection significance for the rural poor were evident during the COVID19 pandemic, providing support to a large number of migrant workers (inbound from urban to rural areas). In 2020–21 (till 31 December 2020), 292.62 crore person days were generated under MGNREGS, which is 47 per cent more than in the previous year (Department of Rural Development, 2021). During the pandemic, the highest ever allocation of ₹101,500 crore was made for the MGNREGS for the years 2020–21 (Ministry of Rural Development, 2020), half of which was already spent by the states till August 2020. Moreover, there was a considerable demand and supply gap – the states were not able to provide work in proportion to the work demanded (Irava, 2020). However, the implementation of the programme is uneven across states and is hobbled by corruption and leakages. For example, Pooja Dutta et al. (2012), based on data from the National Sample Survey Office 2009–2010, found that even though the demand for work in the poorer states is substantial, it remains unmet in the poor states. The low participation rate in a state with a substantial below poverty line population is bad news for MGNREGS as an effective instrument for poverty alleviation. A related issue is the reach and targeting of the programme to the intended beneficiaries. Shankar et al. (2011) studied the two sub-national states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh by randomly selecting 942 households from three villages in every district in the two states. This study revealed that the poor were being targeted much better in Andhra Pradesh than in Rajasthan. What explains this uneven implementation and why are some states better implementers of the programme? A strand of scholarly literature points towards the role of political will and commitment (Chopra, 2019; Maiorano, 2014; Manor & Duckett, 2017). A related view holds that the political participation of an individual plays a determining role in better MGNREGS provisioning. According to this view, politicians tend to favour those citizens who are politically active and connected, hence MGNREGS is better targeted in these pockets (Chau et al., 2018). Another viewpoint holds that ideas within the tecno-bureaucratic elite holds the key to the successful MGNREGS implementation (Mukherji & Jha, 2017; see Box 9.3). For instance, the success of the right to employment in Andhra Pradesh depended heavily on the capacity of the sub-national state to insulate a committed rural development bureaucracy from powerful farmers who had a clear interest in thwarting the programme. This argument stresses the role of state capacity in working out an architecture that checks corruption and leakages. In addition, a strategic synergy was established with the social activists to successfully regulate the implementation at the grassroots level. This explains why, in some cases, the state is able to transcend clientelism successfully and trump the exploitative nexus on the ground.

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  213 Box 9.3  MGNREGS Helps Farmers in Ganjam District, Odisha Ganjam district lies on the coastal belt of Odisha, boasting fertile lands bestowed with good rainfall. During the monsoons, the entire district glows lush green with its paddy fields. However, it is quite a contrast during the rabi season. While most of the villagers are involved in agriculture, the lack of adequate irrigation facilities is pushing many of these farmers to work as seasonal manual labourers under MGNREGS to supplement their income. Realizing that lack of irrigation was causing farmers to lose the rabi season, the district administration launched a scheme for constructing open-dig wells under MGNREGS. Padma Charan Gauda, a 60-year old farmer of Humma village in Ganjam block, asserts that the well constructed under MGNREGS has changed his life altogether. Padma has a small farm of 2.5 acres that supports a family of 12 members, including 4 grandchildren. He found it impossible to cater to his family’s food needs from the single paddy crop of the monsoon. In 2016, he received help from MGNREGS for building a dug well measuring 15 feet in diameter. The cost of this well was ₹1.56 lakh, and it generated 394 person-days of employment. After the dug well was built and operational, Padma Charan could grow vegetables like ladyfinger, brinjal, maize and pumpkins in his field. There was a significant increase in his income, which enabled him to take care of his joint family with dignity. Expressing immense pleasure, Padma Charan said, ‘The dug well has turned out to be a life saviour for me. Whenever I see this dug well, I feel happy in my heart.’ In addition to his own farm, Padma Charan also provides water for critical irrigation to his neighbours’ paddy. Source: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (n. d., p. 5–6).

Right to Information Act, 2005 Like MGNREGS, the institutional progression of RTI is also a case of glass half-full. If we imagine the RTI regime in terms of a continuum, one end is represented by the information givers, that is, the administration, and the other end is the information seekers, citizens who submit RTI applications. Hence, one end of the continuum is driven by the ‘supply’ and the other end by the ‘demand’. The space between the two ends can be regarded as the new and emerging space for accountability (for the use of RTI and the relationship between the two, see Jha, 2018a). The relationship between the two is often tumultuous. The RTI Act, since its inception, has come under severe scrutiny and questions have been

214  Himanshu Jha

Figure 9.3  RTI Continuum

raised regarding the slow and tardy process of its implementation in terms of slow disposal of cases by the information commissions at the state and central levels, reluctance to provide information, inefficiencies in handling the number of cases and non-compliance. There have been three failed attempts to amend the RTI Act: the first in 2006, the second in 2009 and the third in 2012 (mainly regarding the file noting[s] of the bureaucrats on executive files). The most recent amendment is the RTI Act amendment bill of 2019, which changes the provisions on the appointment and salaries of the information commissioners at the central and state levels. This, many argue, takes away the autonomy of the implementers of the RTI regime. A recent report reveals that several information commissions – nodal agencies to implement the law at the central and state level – are either defunct or operating at a reduced capacity (Satark Nagrik Sangathan  & Centre for Equity Studies, 2020). In addition, there is a huge backlog and a pendency of cases, which results in poor quality orders from the information commissions. The appointment of retired bureaucrats as the information commissioners at the central and state levels is yet another symptom of problematic implementation. There is a likelihood that such appointments will compromise the quasi-judicial position of the information commissioners, who will hesitate to rule against their own genus and shield the bureaucracy. Indeed, the penalty imposed against government officials for non-compliance has been historically low. In 2018–2019, only 3 per cent of all violations resulted in a penalty (Satark Nagrik Sangathan & Centre for Equity Studies, 2020). Despite these diluting attempts, the RTI has been extensively used. According to a modest estimate, 32  million RTI applications were filed between 2016 and 2018 (Transparency International India, 2019). Approximately 4–6  million RTIs are filed every year. Significantly, the central authorities received 1.37 RTI applications in 2018–2019, an increase of 11 per cent from the previous year (Central Information Commission, 2020). Clearly, the state can dilute or blunt the law, but it cannot countermand the legal rights of citizens to access information from the public authorities. Indeed, RTI has been instrumental in exposing both grand and petty corruption, putting vital information in the public domain and resulting in greater transparency in the affairs of the state. An important aspect of the rights regime is the crossover between different acts. The RTI Act, for example, is incorporated in

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  215 MGNREGA with a specific provision for self-disclosure by the Gram Sabha (Section  17 of NREGA). RTI is often used to expose the anomalies in the implementation of MGNREGS that revealed corruption in the muster rolls, payment of wages and in issuing job cards (see Box 9.4.

Box 9.4  Empowering Poor: Ensuring Service Delivery at the Grassroots In a case from Jharkhand, a woman day labourer was able to galvanize the otherwise unrelenting local administration into granting her $700 to build a new house under the government scheme by filing an RTI application (with the help of a local activist) which asked the details of the money granted so far. In a similar incident in Jharkhand, a day labourer who was entitled to the widow pension was granted a pension after filing the RTI appeal to the local authorities. In another case from the tribal populated Kalol taluka in Panchmahal district in Gujarat, an anomaly in the local governance was exposed where the village official (known as the deputy mamlatdar) had nominated Saturday as the day for issuing ration cards. As the demand for rations was more, it proved to be an irritant for the local population. The legal basis for the Saturday rule was challenged through an RTI application, which exposed the fact that this was a self-nominated rule applied by the local official, which ultimately led to the improvement in public service delivery. A group of inspired villagers from Bahraich district in Uttar Pradesh filed an RTI query to ask the administration about the lack of roads and drains in the villages and why no funds were distributed under the Indira Awas Yojana Scheme (rural housing scheme). Additionally, they also asked for the list of allotments under the Indira Awas Yojana Scheme. This resulted in immediate response action from the local administration, where the work started in all the 32 villages of the district. Source: Polgreen (2010).

RTI is also instrumental in putting vital information into the public domain. For example, a response to an RTI query revealed that the government has borrowed ₹41,746 crore in foreign loans to handle the COVID-19 pandemic. Other details of this loan disbursement are also in the public domain thanks to RTI. This could not have been possible in the pre-RTI period. In this sense, RTI presents a contrasting ‘before’ and ‘after’ picture (see Table 9.4).

216  Himanshu Jha Table 9.4  RTI: Contrasting Before and After Picture Before – Opaque Governance

After – Open System

Official Secrets Act, 1923, a colonial legacy and amended to an even stronger version in 1967; driven by the logic that information is key to protect state interests and national security; norm of secrecy embedded within the state; supported by other laws such as the Civil Services Conduct Rules (1964) and Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Indian Evidence Act (1872) and the manual and office procedures of the Government of India Made stronger in 1967 following amendment after Indo-China war (1962) and Indo-Pak war (1965) to include ‘espionage’ and sharing of information as cognizable non-bailable offence Executive powers (against the Parliament) not to share information even stronger under Section 5; governance carried out in complete secrecy; Clause 6 of Official Secrets Act – information of any government office is official information

• Under RTI Act citizens have the right to know and demand information from the public authorities • Information clearly defined in the act

• Public authority clearly outlined, with prescription to proactively disclose (information) • Procedural mechanism for implementation with response time of 30 days • Two tier option for appeals • Section 22 of the RTI Act states the supremacy of the act in case of direct conflict with Official Secrets Act and other acts • Widespread use; approximately 2 million application filed annually despite attempts of dilution by the state • Instrumental in exposing ‘grand and petty corruption’

What are the patterns of RTI use? Who are the users of RTI? There is a view of RTI use by activists within the confines of the state structures that limits the extent of this significant right. In a way, this facilitates the state’s inherent aversion to scrutiny and part with vital information about its inner workings. This precludes common citizens from using RTI and their reliance on activists (for such accounts, see Sharma, 2013; Webb, 2010). A more favourable argument about the use of RTI holds that the RTI regime has resulted in the emergence of a ‘core’ of RTI users termed as ‘agents of accountability’ (see Jha, 2018b). This category engages regularly with the law, is a technical expert on legal provisions and seeks information regularly from public authorities on a range of issues. The quantum of RTI applications filed by this category is large compared to that of one-off users or organizational users. The RTI use by the ‘core’ has resulted in the emergence of a category of ‘agents of accountability’ seeking intermediaries (popularly known as ‘RTI activists’). The ‘agents of accountability’ are different from the scholarly work on local intermediaries acting as a conduit between the modern state and traditional society (for such discussions

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  217 on local intermediaries, see Krishna, 2006; Manor, 2000; Mitra, 1991; Reddy  & Haragopal, 1985; Rosenthal, 1977). RTI, in this case, has provided the opportunity and structure for these agents to seek accountability from the state. Unlike the local elites and the ‘intermediaries’, whose legitimacy stems from their engagement with the state, the legitimacy of these agents of accountability emanates from seeking accountability from the state. By seeking accountability, the agents of accountability often question the state and have indeed exposed scams and irregularities in government programmes (Krishna, 2006; Manor, 2000; Mitra, 1991; Reddy & Haragopal, 1985; Rosenthal, 1977). According to a district-level study based on the sub-national state of Bihar, RTI is mostly used to access information about individual entitlements, developmental works and public policy schemes at the local level (Jha, 2018, 2019). It is no surprise, then, that the agents of accountability have faced severe backlash from the embedded exploitative (and corrupt) nexus on the ground. Till date, at least 90 agents of accountability have been killed, 360 harassed or threatened, and 7 have committed suicide (attackonrtiusres.org). Summing up Three points are discernible. First, the rights-based welfare approach redefines the state-citizenship linkages in new ways, whereas the schemes can be withdrawn or have a propensity to be selectively distributed to specific target groups. The rights-based programmes cannot be withdrawn, and in the case of non-provisioning beneficiaries, they can approach the judiciary. These rights represent a crossover between the directive principles of state policy as policy recommendations and the fundamental rights provided in the Indian Constitution. Second, a rights-based framework can coexist with scheme-based policies. The rights-based legislation provides a broader umbrella for citizen well-being and social protection and can be dovetailed with policy schemes that provide a robust welfare architecture. This, in a way, provides multiple pathways for policy continuity and, at the same time, provides space to pursue new policy paths. Third, the evolution and implementation of welfare rights and public policies point towards the exigency of the role of the state and the uptake of policy ideas within the state’s policy apparatus. These socio-political processes are long-drawn and slow-moving, pointing towards the incremental role of ideas. In this light, it is pertinent to take the state, ideas and historical policy paths seriously. Notes 1 Although the growth rate for the first time dropped below 6 to 5 per cent in the fiscal year of 2012–2013 as compared to the previous year’s rate of 6.2 per cent. In 2009–2010, the growth rate was 8.6 per cent and 9.3 per cent in 2010–2011. The growth rate dropped again in 2019 to 4.18 per cent on account of the pandemic,

218  Himanshu Jha which slumped to negative figures for the first time in history. The Economic Survey of India various years Government of India. 2 Adapted from the rich and insightful literature on social movements.

References Anand, A., Dimble, V.,  & Subramanian, A. (2020, December  22). New welfarism of Modi government represents distinctive approach to redistribution and inclusion. Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/ national-family-health-survey-new-welfarism-of-indias-right-7114104/ Baxi, U. (2010). The judiciary as a resource for Indian democracy. Seminar, 615. www.india-seminar.com/2010/615/615_upendra_baxi.htm Central Information Commission. (2020). Annual report 2020–21. Central Information Commission of India. https://cic.gov.in/sites/default/files/Reports/­EngAR2020-21.pdf Chau, N. H., Liu, Y., & Soundararajan, V. (2018). Political activism as a determinant of strategic transfers: Evidence from an Indian public works program. IZA DP No. 11277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103631 Chopra, D. (2019). Accounting for success and failure in policy implementation: The role of commitment in India’s MGNREGA.  Development Policy Review,  37(6), 789–811. Chopra, D. (2011). Policymaking in India: A dynamic process of statecraft. Pacific Affairs, 84(1), 89–107. Corbridge, S., Harris, J., & Jeffery, C. (2013). India today: Economy, politics and society. Polity Press. Credit Suisse. (2018). Global wealth report 2018. Credit Suisse. Department of Expenditure. (2019). Lok Sabha unstarred question no. 4657. Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance. http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaques tions/annex/171/AU4657.pdf Department of Rural Development. (2021). Lok Sabha, unstarred question number 30. Department of Rural Development, Ministry of Rural Development. Dreze, J., & Sen, A. (1995). India: Economic development and social opportunity. Oxford University Press. Dutta, P., Murgai, R., Ravallion, M., & Van de Walle, D. (2012). Does India’s employment guarantee scheme guarantee employment? Economic  & Political Weekly, 47(16), 55–64. Evers, A.,  & Guillemard, A. M. (Eds.). (2012).  Social policy and citizenship: The changing landscape. Oxford University Press. Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. (n.d.). Sankalan II: 101 stories of rural transformation. Ministry of Rural Development. https://nrega.raj.nic.in/ pdmn/view_document.aspx?fname=Book7.pdf Government of India. (2021). Economic survey of India 2020–21. www.indiabudget. gov.in/budget2021-22/economicsurvey/index.php Hasan, Z. (2018). Agitation to legislation: Equity and justice in contemporary India. Oxford University Press. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). (2005). Global hunger index 2004–05. IFPRI.

Policy Paths to Welfare and Citizen Well-Being  219 Irava, V. (2020). Rural livelihoods during the Covid-19 pandemic: Deep dive on MGNREGS. Accountability Initiative. https://accountabilityindia.in/wp-content/ uploads/2020/08/mgnregs.pdf Jayal, N. G. (2013). Citizenship and its discontents: An Indian history. Harvard University Press. Jenson, J. (2009). Lost in translation: The social investment perspective and gender equality. Social Politics, 16(4), 446–483. Jenson, J. (2012). Changing perspectives in social citizenship: A cross-time comparison. In A. Evers  & A. M. Guillemard (Eds.), Social policy and citizenship: The changing landscape. Oxford University Press. Jha, H. (2018a). Emerging politics of accountability.  Economic  & Political Weekly, 53(10), 47–54. Jha, H. (2018b). State processes, ideas, and institutional change: The case of the right to information act in India. Pacific Affairs, 91(2), 309–328. Jha, H. (2019). Emerging politics of accountability: Sub-national reflections from Bihar. In M. Sekher & R. Carciumaru (Eds), Including the excluded in South Asia? Power, politics and policies. Springer. Jha, H. (2020). Capturing institutional change: The case of the right to information act in India. Oxford University Press. Krishna, A. (2006). Politics in the middle: Mediating relationships between the citizens and the state in rural North India. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients and policies patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press. Maiorano, D. (2014). The politics of the Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee act in Andhra Pradesh. World Development, 58, 95–105. Manor, J. (2000). Small-time political fixers in India’s states: ‘Towel over armpit’. Asian Survey, 40(5), 816–835. Manor, J., & Duckett, J. (2017). The significance of political leaders for social policy expansion in Brazil, China, India and South Africa. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 55(3), 303–327. Manza, J., & Sauder, M. (2009). Inequality and society: Social science perspectives on social stratification. Norton. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class: And other essays. Cambridge University Press. Marshall, T. H., & Bottomore, T. (1992). Citizenship and social class. Pluto Press. Ministry of Rural Development. (2020, June 8). PIB press release. https://pib.gov.in/ PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1630332 Mitra, S. K. (1991). Room to maneuver in the middle: Local elites, political action, and the state in India. World Politics, 43(3), 390–413. Mukherji, R.,  & Jha, H. (2017). Bureaucratic rationality, political will, and state capacity: MGNREGS in undivided Andhra Pradesh.  Economic  & Political Weekly, 52(49), 53–60. Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation. Beacon Press. Polgreen, L. (2010, June 28). Right-to-know law gives India’s poor a lever. The New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29india.html Press Information Bureau. (2012). Poverty estimates 2009–10. Planning commission of India. Government of India. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=81151

220  Himanshu Jha Reddy, G. R., & Haragopal, G. (1985). The pyraveekar: ‘The fixer’ in rural India. Asian Survey, 25(1), 1148–1162. Rosenthal, D. (1977). The expansive elite: District politics and state policy making in India University of California Press. Roy, A., & The MKSS Collective. (2018). The RTI story: Power to the people. Roli Books. Ruparelia, S. (2013). India’s new rights agenda: Genesis, promises, risks.  Pacific Affairs, 86(3), 569–590. Satark Nagrik Sangathan  & Centre for Equity Studies. (2020). Report card of information commissions in India 2019–20. https://snsindia.org/wp-content/ uploads/2020/11/Report-Card-2020.pdf Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press. Shankar, S., Gaiha, R.,  & Jha, R. (2011). Information, access and targeting: The national rural employment guarantee scheme in India.  Oxford Development ­Studies, 39(01), 69–95. Sharma, A. (2013). State transparency after the neoliberal turn: The politics, limits, and paradoxes of India’s right to information law. Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 36(2), 308–325. Sharma, P. (2015). Democracy and transparency in the Indian state: The making of right to information act. Routledge. Transparency International India. (2019). State transparency report 2019. https:// transparencyindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/STR-Final-Report-2019.pdf Webb, M. (2010). Success stories: Rhetoric, authenticity, and the right to information movement in north India. Contemporary South Asia, 18(3), 293–304. Yang, L. (2020). What’s new about income inequality data in Asia. Issue Brief 2020– 8. World Inequality Lab. https://wid.world/document/whats-new-about-incomeinequality-data-in-asia/

10 Elections and Voting Behaviour Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Trends Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha

Introduction Elections are integral to the functioning of participative liberal democracy. The conduct of free, fair and regular elections has been the main marker of its success. The elections help elect representatives in the legislative bodies and reflect society’s attitude and values towards the political system or establishment. In other words, the voting behaviour and turnouts provide a glimpse of the strengths and weaknesses of a democratic system. Any study on elections and voting behaviour in India is challenging given the vast geography and large population. The diverse character of the population in terms of region, religion, caste, language and ethnicity makes studying electoral behaviour in India an even more challenging task. The federal set-up of the polity and the dynamics of state politics further complicate the problem. As per the Election Commission of India Report, 2019,1 in the last general election (2019), there were 900 million eligible voters, which made it the largest election in the world. Of the total voters, 15 million were first-time voters who had attained the eligible age of 18 years in 2019. These figures sharply contrast the first general elections of 1951–52, wherein only 173 million had participated in the election out of the total population of 360 million. The voter turnout in 1951–52 was merely 45.7 per cent as against 67 per cent in 2019. At the same time, there has been a significant increase in the number of candidates contesting elections to the lower house. Table  10.1 presents the changes in the total number of seats, electorates, contesting candidates, voting percentage, number of polling stations and expenditure incurred since 1951–1952. The free and fair elections at regular intervals speak volumes about the legitimacy of elections in India. A chronicle of events since 1952 (the year the first elections were held) speaks volumes about the working of Indian democracy and its success and major failures. Being an indispensable part of democracy, political participation has been restricted to elections and voting. However, gradually, elections have acquired a central place in the Indian political system and voter’s consciousness. Elections in India have been rightly regarded as the ‘festival of democracy’. Largely, poor, unrepresented DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-13

General Elections

Year

No. of Seats

No. of Electorates

No. of Candidates

Voting Percentage

No. of Polling Stations

Expenditure Incurred (in Crore)

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th

1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984–1985 1989 1991–1992 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

489 494 494 520 518 542 529/542 541/542 529/543 534/543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543

173,212,343 193,652,179 216,361,569 250,207,401 274,189,132 321,174,327 356,205,329 400,375,333 498,906,129 511,533,598 592,572,288 605,880,192 619,536,847 671,487,930 716,985,101 834,101,479 897,811,627

1,874 1,519 1,985 2,369 2,784 2,439 4,629 5,492 6,160 8,749 13,952 4,750 4,648 5,435 8,070 8,251 8,026

44.87 45.44 55.42 61.04 55.27 60.49 56.92 63.56 61.95 56.73 57.94 61.97 59.99 58.07 58.19 66.38 67.40

196,084 220,478 238,031 243,693 342,918 373,910 436,813 506,058 580,798 591,020 767,462 773,494 774,651 687,402 830,866 919,452 1,035,919

10.45 5.90 7.82 10.95 14.43 29.86 37.07 81.51 154.22 359.10 597.24 626.41 900 1,114 846.67 3,426 55,000

Source: Compiled from the General Election Statistical Reports (1951–2019).

222  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha

Table 10.1 Changes in the Total Number of Seats, Electorates, Contesting Candidates, Voting Percentage, Number of Polling Stations and Expenditure Incurred since 1951–52

Elections and Voting Behaviour  223 and marginalized groups and communities have acquired voice and play an active role in the transformation of the society, politics and country’s economy through the wise exercise of their vote. Over the decades, voters in India have become more politically aware and have exercised their vote far more intelligently. Electoral campaigns are marked with intense political debates, symbolic processions and the increasing use of electronic technologies by major political parties. Visual symbols have acquired a greater significance in the country. Voters identify the candidate with the help of the symbols allotted to them. Specific issues regarding ideology or policy are debated as all parties make almost similar promises to eradicate poverty and unemployment, combat corruption, preserve national unity and so on (Kohli, 1991). The voters in India have displayed their maturity and correct judgement by voting in and voting out governments at the centre and states. Political parties may ignore the voters and their concerns at the cost of their own peril. Elections and Voting in India Elections are public festivals in India. India has conducted elections regularly since the first election in 1951–52. Till 1967, both the Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections were held simultaneously.2 There were not many ingredients for election studies during the Nehruvian period marked by relative stability. The period designated as ‘Congress System’ by noted political scientist Rajni Kothari (1964) witnessed a robust organizational unity within the Congress Party despite factions within it based on caste, language and region. The ‘Congress System’, as termed by Kothari (1964), played the dual role of political and social mobilization of the masses by organizing a ‘political society’ and placing political demand at the higher level. Several studies of this period (Brass, 1965; Sirsikar, 1970; Weiner, 1967) have vividly demonstrated how the ‘system’ operated and influenced the politics in India. The Congress System ended after the general elections of 1967. It suffered significant electoral setback in many states even though it managed to get majority seats in the general election to form government at the centre. For the first time, many states formed non-Congress governments, and the possibility of a non-Congress government at the centre grew. This phenomenon of a growing challenge to the ‘Congress System’ drew the attention of political scientists and journalists, which led to a proliferation of election studies in the late 1960s (Kondo, 2003). The Emergency of 1975 can be considered a point wherein the Congress Party’s complete ‘destabilization’ occurred. As a consequence of the Emergency, the Congress Party headed by Mrs. Gandhi lost the general election in 1977, paving the way for the formation of the first non-Congress government at the centre. This decade also saw several fundamental changes in the socio-economic structure of the Indian society as a result of the rise of the Backward Classes, Dalits and other marginalized groups. These groups found a space to assert themselves and their concerns. Such assertions had a deep impact on the nation’s political life as they made

224  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Table 10.2  Results of Parliamentary Elections, 1952–84 Year of Election 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984

Name of the Party

% of Votes

Indian National Congress Socialist Party Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party Indian National Congress Praja Socialist Party Communist Party of India Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Swatantra Party Indian National Congress Jana Sangh Swatantra Party Indian National Congress Congress (O) Bharatiya Jana Sangh Indian National Congress Janata Coalition Communist Party of India (Marxist) Indian National Congress Janata Party Janata Party (Secular) Indian National Congress Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Party

45.0 10.6 5.8 47.8 10.4 8.9 44.7 9.9 7.9 40.8 9.4 8.7 43.7 10.4 7.4 34.5 41.3 4.3 42.7 19.0 9.4 49.6 7.7 7.0

Source: Election Commission of India.

the hitherto backward and marginalized communities’ equal stakeholders in the reign of power. These fundamental transformations in the country’s sociopolitical life have been aptly captured by Kohli (1991), who finds that the social conflict of the period impacted the ability of the ruling party to maintain a perfect social balance. Table 10.2 indicates the sheer dominance of the Congress Party in Indian politics till 1984. However, by the end of the 1980s, Congress’s dominance began to degrade. The party has not yet recovered from this continuous decline. The decline of the Congress Party has led to the proliferation of coalition politics and government both at the centre and in states. This constant change in the government and the rise of multiparty polity attracted the interest of academicians and journalists alike, leading to a renewed upsurge in election studies. This period is also marked by the rapid transformation of the party system, leadership style and electoral issues. These developments have brought election studies and voting behaviour to the centre of political studies (Brass, 1990; Kondo, 2007). The preceding decade saw a rapid decline of the Congress Party and the rise of coalition politics. It is not to say that the Congress Party altogether

Elections and Voting Behaviour  225 Table 10.3  Congress Versus BJP Contest

a. By Community 1996

Caste Hindu Hindu OBC Dalit Adivasi Muslim Others All

1998

Congress

BJP

Others

N

Congress

BJP

Others

N

33 34 54 60 76

64 54 34 32 08

3 12 12 08 16

32 35 57 54 85

65 58 34 43 12

3 7 9 3 3

44

47

9

628 405 391 314 89 28 1,855

43

52

5

459 436 214 245 68 34 1,456

b. By Class 1996

Rich Upper Middle Middle Poor Poorest All

1998

Congress

BJP

Others

N

Congress

BJP

Others

N

33 37 45 49 54 44

61 56 45 41 38 47

6 7 10 10 8 9

203 469 394 505 304 1,875

43 38 43 46 44 43

53 58 50 44 49 51

4 4 7 10 7 6

210 385 349 349 232 1,503

Source: Lokniti-CSDS (1996, 1998).

ceased to be effective, but it lost the status of being the ‘pole’ around which Indian politics revolved. The ‘rainbow coalition’ of the Congress Party consisting of various castes, communities and classes was challenged by the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the national and regional levels. BJP’s rise to power has been a significant development of the 1990s. In the 1990s, it emerged as the single largest party in three general elections of 1996, 1998 and 1999. However, its failure to attain the required number of seats (273 out of 543) compelled it to form a coalition with regional players to form the government. The party’s presence was limited to the ‘Hindi Belt’ states of northern India and mainly the upper-caste, upper-class urban voters. A look into the NES of 1996 and 1998 (Table 10.3) reveals how a shift of alliances occurred in the decade. It also allows us to construct a reliable class and community index of voters. The elections in India witnessed a massive participation of the general public. The growing number of voters in each election (see Table 10.3) also indicates India’s increasing importance and the legitimacy of the system. Such growth has made more people involved in politics with questions like who would win the elections or form the new government. This included many actors such as politicians, political analysts, and the media. Understanding

226  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha the voting behaviour of such many voters involve an in-depth analysis of elections at all levels. Existing literature (Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989; Suri, 2019) suggest that elections and voting behaviour in India are determined by a host of socio-economic and cultural factors which differ from region to region as well as from elections to elections. This chapter examines the changing nature of elections and voting behaviour in India, emphasizing the post-1990s development. History of Election Studies in India Study on elections and voting behaviour in India directly influences how actual politics have evolved in India. All kinds of elections, especially the Lok Sabha elections and State Assembly elections, profoundly influence how politics is carried out in India. The development of the subject has also influenced election studies in academia, especially in the USA. Michigan and Columbia University election studies in the 1930s and the 1940s profoundly influenced election study in India (Kondo, 2007). In addition to focusing on traditional elements of elections such as candidates, political parties and political issues that prevail in almost all democratic nations, there are issues specific to India such as caste, religion, region and language. In the following sections, we look into how the working of politics has impacted election studies in India. Regarding the study of elections and voting, it should be highlighted that the first institutional opinion poll in the early 1950s was conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion under the aegis of its founder Eric de Costa. The institute conducted a series of surveys on India’s economic and political issues. It published the findings of its surveys in its journal Monthly Public Opinion Studies, which set the terms for election study in India. Another notable study of this period was Report on the Indian General Elections by Richard Park and S. V. Kogekar. Like other studies of the period, it was a descriptive study and focused on the state-wise study of electoral processes. Along with the earlier-mentioned national-level surveys, a few local-level studies were also conducted to understand the voting pattern and behaviour. Among them are the V. M. Sirsikar study of Poona Lok Sabha constituency during the general elections of 1967 and Kini’s study of Nagpur constituency. Though the sample size was not very large, both the studies brought to light important aspects of voting, such as the role of leadership and the significance of party organization. It also brought to light that voters who are more exposed to politics exhibit volatility in voting. In the next decade, Bashiruddin and Eldersveld conducted a national survey of the 1967 and 1971 general elections, which was used to conduct a cross-country study of voting behaviour and attitudes of Indian voters. Another important work of the period was 1977’s work Electoral Politics in the National Metropolis by Maheswari, who studied polling in four metropolis constituencies in Delhi. Some notable finding of his work was that people in rural areas come out in larger numbers to vote than the voters in urban

Elections and Voting Behaviour  227 constituencies, and upper-class voters of Delhi are indifferent to the political process. One should also mention Blair’s (1979) work here – Voting, Caste, Community, Society: Explorations in Aggregated Data Analysis in India and Bangladesh. He used the aggregate data analysis method instead of the oftused survey method. He believed that aggregate data was a better option as it made the study less reliant on actual elections. However, a disadvantage of the method was that it was more concerned with the behaviour of the individual rather than the population. At the institutional level, election studies were undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi, since the 1960s. CSDS has been studying general elections in India under the National Election Survey (NES) project. The first study was conducted in 1967 to understand the voting behaviour and opinion of Indian voters and their impact on the electoral outcome. Moreover, the all-India-level survey study was instrumental in understanding people’s responses to the democratic process of voting. The NES, in its study, made use of long survey questionnaires with more than 300 questions. The survey involved face-to-face interaction with the respondents and was based on a research instrument developed by CSDS, NES. The questionnaire involved questions on election issues and a wide array of political processes in a democratic society – attitudes, values and opinions. At the same time, extensive background variables were used to understand the social profile of the respondents. The survey involved a large number of respondents and a good number of field investigators, data collectors, translators and supervisors, making the study a massive exercise. Among the studies conducted by foreign institutions, MIT Centre for International Studies under the MIT Indian Election Data Project started in 1968. The study was conducted by Myron Weiner and John Osgood Field on behalf of MIT. The primary focus of the work, which was published as Studies in Electoral Politics in the Indian States, was on elections of state assemblies in more than 3,000 constituencies (Field  & Weiner, 1977). The exciting aspect of the study was the conduct of a pilot study to ensure that relevant variables and questions were included in the survey. The Post-1990s Development in Election and Voting Behaviour

Since the late 1980s, election studies involved a series of opinion polls conducted by several emerging media houses and agencies. Most notable among them is the study conducted by Prannoy Roy in association with the Marketing and Research Group (MARG). In this study, an exit poll of 77,000 voters was conducted immediately on the day of the poll. The study could accurately predict Congress winning the polls and made Roy a well-known figure in the election study circle. During the next decade, the growth of electronic media provided a fertile ground for conducting pre-poll and post-poll opinion polls and surveys. Psephology became the buzzword in the study of Indian politics.

228  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Kumar and Rai (2013) have identified three major factors that contributed to the growth of election studies in the 1990s. First, a sense of curiosity about the results of polls before the actual counting of votes. Second, such polls and surveys could provide the political parties with an understanding of the voters’ voting behaviour. Such information is crucial in candidate selection and campaigning. Third, such studies provide significant material to academia and media in understanding and analysing elections to make a more detailed and comprehensive study of elections. This also proves to be useful in forecasting election results. The onset of the 21st century saw a rise in the number of private agencies engaged in the conduct of opinion polls and surveys. Notable research agencies such as AC Nielsen, CVoter and ORG MARG and a few organizations like the Centre for Media Studies also got involved in conducting opinion polls and surveys. Pre-poll and post-poll election-related shows debated the results of polls along with the prediction of the polls. With the proliferation of news channels and internet-based news portals, there has been a significant rise in pre- and post-election polls since the general elections of 2004. Another important feature of the period was the hiring of agencies by political parties to conduct poll-related studies to understand the opinion and attitudes of the voters during the elections. Such market surveys proved to be a helpful tool in mapping political constituencies. The survey findings helped the parties in the distribution of tickets, campaigning and understanding the attitude of voters towards the party and the opposition (Ghose, 1996). Yogendra Yadav (2007) believes that the growing importance of the surveys is due to the failure of party mechanism in understanding the voters and when the political process fails, market enters to fill the vacuum. The objectivity of the surveys in knowing the ground realities proved to be a helpful tool for all political parties. Thus, a large number of political parties and politicians began to use polls and opinion surveys to prove their popularity. At the same time, misuse of such poll findings has been observed by studies conducted by the Centre for Media Studies (Kumar & Rai, 2013). They have become a money-making commercial enterprise rather than a professional exercise. Most of the time, the polls pretend to be national while they are limited to a very small number of samples. Ghose (1996) suggests that power brokers often use such surveys to make an impact within the party and amongst the voters. Well-established institutions like the CSDS, which had earlier discontinued election studies in the mid-1980s, began such studies in a big way in the mid-1990s. Under the Lokniti programme, a project for comparative democracy, along with the coming together of a number of political scientists from around the country, the National Election Study (NES) was conducted in 1996. The study consisted of three phases: pre-election, mid-campaign and post-poll. Under the NES, a series of studies were conducted during the 1996, 1998 and 1999 general elections in which the same set of respondents was interviewed. The findings of the surveys could find required exposure with

Elections and Voting Behaviour  229 the involvement of media houses such as the Hindu, India Today, Frontline and the Economist in the late 1990s. With the onset of the 21st century, the NES set into the third generation of election study. During the 2004 NES survey, the respondents were interviewed after the polls but before the declaration of the results. This time the sample was enlarged, and probability sampling at the state level was used. A better form of representativeness was sought by reducing the sample size at the primary sampling unit – the polling station – to avoid the cluster effect. At the same time, questions about local political issues were included. It was also important due to the introduction of many new innovative practices like administration of ‘split sample’ with five sets of questionnaires given to the sampled voters and a range of themes covering economy, communalism, democracy and security, as well as in this survey, substitution of respondents was not allowed (Rai & Kumar, 2013). The National Election Survey (NES), which began in the early 1990s, introduced several changes in election methods and research practices, which paved the way for many findings related to voting behaviour and democracy. The surveys also highlighted the political opinion and attitude of the vast masses of general voters. Besides, several state-level surveys during the same period portrayed the voting behaviour of people at the regional level. The history of election studies in India has gone through various stages of development. In each stage, beginning from individual- and institutional-level local surveys to the nationwide surveys conducted as a part of the NES, there have been profound changes in how election study is conducted. The next section explores voters’ participation and attitude towards elections. Voting Behaviour in India As discussed in the previous section, election study and opinion polls have come a long way in India, especially in the previous two decades. These surveys are rich in information on the behaviour, attitude and preference of the voters. A study conducted by CSDS in 2004 revealed the changing character of the voters towards the significant communitarian groups in India. A noteworthy element in the 1990s has been the decline of the Indian National Congress which is evident from Table  10.4. The support for the Congress has declined from 45 per cent in 1952 to just 26 per cent in 2004 and mere 19.19 per cent of popular votes in 2019. The party has lost much of its base in West Bengal, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu and has become a weak party even at the national level. Even during the 2004 election, in which the party was able to form an alliance government at the national level, it won seats only in 26 states out of 35 states and union territories. In big states such as Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar and Tamil Nadu, the party managed to win only 27 seats out of 220 seats (Hardgrave & Kochanek, 2007). The main reason for its decline is the inability of the party to attract new voters along with the continuous withering away of support

230  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Table 10.4  Voting Percentage Caste/Communitywise, 2004 Caste/Community UPA Alliance

NDA Alliance

Left BSP SP

N

UPA Congress Allies NDA BJP Allies Upper Caste Peasant proprietors Upper OBC Lower OBC Dalit Tribal Muslim Sikh Christian Others Average/Total

24 37 36 36 37 42 53 26 54 27 36

21 23 23 23 28 35 37 25 39 22 26

03 14 14 13 09 07 16 01 15 05 10

56 47 39 39 23 33 11 47 21 30 36

43 25 21 21 12 26 07 18 06 16 22

13 22 18 18 11 07 04 29 15 14 14

9 4 4 10 10 08 07 08 11 23 8

1 1 3 3 21 Neg 03 05 1 03 5

3 3,552 3 1,907 8 4,516 8 3,602 03 3,632 Neg 1,697 16 2,227 03 559 – 767 01 113 5 22,567

Source: Yadav (2004). Note: Neg means less than 1.

Table 10.5  Change in Vote Share of Different Social Groups Between 1999 and 2004 Caste/Community UPA Alliance

NDA Alliance

Left BSP SP

Others

UPA Congress Allies NDA BJP Allies Upper caste Peasant proprietors Upper OBC Lower OBC Dalit Tribal Muslim Sikh Christian Others Average/Total

6.8 9.1 4.0 3.5 1.3 –5.1 –1.9 9.6 –6.3 –11.5 2.5

3.9 –4.1 –0.9 –0.9 –2.2 –11.6 –4.1 8.4 –21.2 –5.2 –1.9

2.1 –6.5 –5.5 –1.0 –1.0 13.2 –8.3 –7.8 –0.5 –1.9 4.9 –5.6 –1.1 –4.5 2.1 4.4 –5.2 2.6 –7.8 –0.3 3.5 –2.6 –3.3 0.7 –1.3 6.5 –1.0 4.8 –5.8 –0.3 2.2 –3.7 1.0 –4.7 –2.4 1.4 –10.3 6.5 –16.8 8.4 14.9 –6.9 –6.2 –0.7 1.5 –0.4 9.7 –5.5 –1.8 –7.0 4.4 –4.9 –1.6 –3.3 0.0

0.5 –0.1 0.4 1.6 3.9 -0.1 0.8 3.6 1.0 1.0 1.2

2.3 3.2 –0.9 0.5 1.6 0.2 4.9 2.5 0.4 1.3 1.2

–2.1 –2.0 0.0 –0.1 –2.9 6.3 2.3 –14.0 10.3 –6.6 –0.1

Source: Yadav (2004).

of the party from its traditional vote base. Table  10.5 shows the continuous decline in the support base of the Congress Party during the 1999–2004 period. For a long time, the Congress was dependent on a rainbow coalition of the upper caste, the Scheduled Caste (SC), the Scheduled Tribe (ST) and minority votes (Heath and Yadav, 1999). However, since the mid-1980s, there has been an erosion in the party’s traditional vote bank. The upper caste tilted towards the BJP, the SC towards the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the minorities towards the regional parties, which cropped up during the period

Elections and Voting Behaviour  231 (Yadav, 2004). Another notable drawback of the century-old party was a lack of or weak leadership. With the death of Rajiv Gandhi, the party failed to provide a suitable replacement with a pan-India image. Besides, the party has been marred with allegations of corruption, increased criminalization and lack of transparency, which became a deciding factor in the alienation of voters from the party. Table 10.5 suggests that during the late 1990s, the party’s support increasingly came from the poor, women and marginalized communities such as the Dalits, tribals and minorities. The above-average performance of the Congress in the 2004 election, according to Yadav (2004), cannot be attributed to any change in the social composition of the party or the participation of new voters but the balanced alliance which worked in its favour. Another noteworthy feature in Indian politics has been the spectacular rise of the BJP in recent decades. Over the last 70 years, the Hindu nationalist movement, since the Jana Sangh days, has been increasing its popularity and support base in terms of the vote share from a mere 3.1 per cent in 1952 to an all-time high of 37.36 per cent in 2019, almost 18 per cent higher than its nearest rival, the Indian National Congress (19.41 per cent). The BJP grew rapidly since 1989 by mobilizing the Hindu voters to build Ram Temple in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh by destroying the disputed Babri Masjid (Hardgrave  & Kochanek, 2007). The ethnoreligious mobilization of voters was able to win seats for the party. However, it was limited to only upper-caste and class-dominated pockets and, thus, failed to garner enough seats to form a stable government. In 1996, the party became the single largest party in the parliament. It went on to form the government, which lasted only for 13 days as it was unable to find support from other parties and suffered a humiliating fall. Taking lessons from the past, the party toned down on its religious rhetoric and came forward with new socio-economic agendas to gain more alliance partners. The strategy of a broad-based coalition government worked for the party. It was able to form the government in 1998, which did not last long as intra-party conflict and limited base of the coalition led to the fall of the government. The coalition politics had favoured the party. Eventually, the party, along with 24 parties, formed the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government in 1999, which became the first non-Congress government to complete a full term in office. The party in office initiated a series of economic reforms, most notably, opening up a series of public sectors for private players. At the same time, the party took a balanced religious approach towards minorities, keeping in mind the secular credentials of its alliance partners. Boasting a vibrant India with the slogan ‘India shinning’, the party, confident of being re-elected, went for early elections in 2004. However, with support from left parties under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi, the Congressled United Progressive Alliance managed to win the election and form the government in 2004. However, in the recent past, since the 2014 general election, the BJP has become a dominant political outfit in India. Political commentators saw the win and the leadership-based political campaign of the party as a dramatic

232  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha event in Indian politics (Palshikar  & Suri, 2014). The party’s campaign revolved around one central figure of Mr  Narendra Modi, the three-time chief minister of Gujarat. For the first time, the elections took the form of a presidential election with more focus on candidates than parties. This personcentric election provided the much-needed impetus to the party as it made local issues look less important. The role of Modi in single-handedly changing the party’s fortunes in the last two general elections cannot be underestimated. However, a host of other factors too were responsible for the party’s resurgence. This also points to the changing voting behaviour of the voters. A large number of observations about the results of the last two general elections emphasized more on short-term factors such as the role of leadership, party campaign, welfare schemes, media, money and muscle power (Suri, 2019). Most of the studies conducted immediately after the elections suggest that electoral victories depend on the strategic planning of parties and individual leaders to draw voters towards them. However, a look beyond the short-term factors is a must if we are to understand and explain the longterm attachment or attraction of voters towards a party. A  look into the gradual structural changes that have taken place in the Indian polity since Independence may help us in understanding the recent electoral success of the BJP. Such an approach will also explain the change and continuity in the attitude and behaviour of Indian voters. Mitra and Singh (1999) suggest that electoral politics has played a vital role in bringing about social and democratic changes. The approach is helpful and provides us with a two-way strategy to analyse changes in the polity. In the two-way relationship, we can either look at electoral politics bringing about social change or take social change as a prime determinant in electoral outcomes. In order to understand the outcomes of elections held in the last two decades, along with the rapid rise of the BJP, we take the second view – social change as a determinant of the electoral outcome. The objective here is to find a plausible link between social change (including economic) and electoral patterns in a developing democracy with deep non-political linkages such as caste, community and religion. The Indian experience has shown that as democracy deepens, economic relations go through changes along with associated social changes that empower the lower strata of the society, giving birth to an elite class from the lower caste and class. This newly empowered elite has not shied away from joining hands with other social groups sharing the spoils of power and negotiating the terms of power-sharing to their benefit. Besides, the rise in literacy level, development of communication and information technology, greater political awareness accompanied by a growing dissatisfaction towards political parties have made the voters more mature and practical. They no longer agree to be identified by the identity imposed on them based on their birth. The changing nature of voters, leaders and the polity itself are all products of the same evolving process. Suppose one looks into the various reports and data produced by governmental and non-governmental sources on several socio-economic indicators

Elections and Voting Behaviour  233 such as health, education, political awareness and employment. In that case, we find a tremendous change since Independence. The pace of change has also gained greater momentum since the adaptation of liberalization in the 1990s. To better understand the change, we can take the example of changing literacy rate among various caste groups in India since 1961 (Table 10.6). Table 10.6 clearly indicates how the literacy levels for different caste groups have significantly improved over the years. The literacy rate for the SCs and the STs stood at 12 and 11, respectively, in 1961, and there was hardly any graduate from the community. By 2019, the literacy rate stood at 67 and 65 per cent, respectively. Schemes like the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan have led to an increase in the gross enrolment ratio of students at all levels. Along with the increase in educational level, the regular elections at both national and local levels have led to significant changes in rural India. Micro-level studies of society and polity indicate the changing perception of authority and dignity in many parts of the country (Price, 2006). The land reforms carried out in the early years of Independence brought about drastic changes in social relations by undermining the positions of the traditional landowning classes. The phenomenon led to the upward mobility of the non-dominant castes, which challenged the existing power-holding classes leading to social tensions in villages (Suri, 2019). The opportunity provided by caste-based reservation has led to a significant increase in the number of the SCs and the STs in government employment in the last 50  years. After implementing the Mandal report, which focused on the backward socio-economic condition of a plethora of castes and classes, reservation benefit was extended to backward classes (Jaffrelot, 2003). In the 1990s, there was a significant rise in backward classes’ educational and employment levels. The representation of the SCs and the STs in government jobs increased from 13.17 per cent and 2.25 per cent, respectively, in 1965 to 17.49 per cent and 8.49 per cent, respectively, in 2016. The figures are roughly proportional to their share in the population. At the same time, the representation of backward classes in services constitutes around 20 per cent, which is almost half of their share in population (GOI, 2018). The SCs, the STs and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) have also made their presence felt in economic spheres. As per the Ministry of Micro, Small  & Medium Enterprises’ record, the SCs own around 10 per cent of micro, small and medium enterprises. Summing Up These data suggest that social, political and economic relations have undergone tremendous changes since Independence. Today’s India has moved much ahead of the social cleavages that existed during the time of Nehru or even Rajiv Gandhi. The changes in social order directly impact electoral politics. In the election campaigns when the message of a ‘new’ India was delivered by Modi, it attracted the new young voters from the lower strata

Level of Education 1971

1996

2019

Caste

Illiterate School Education Graduate Illiterate School Education Graduate Illiterate School Education Graduate

Upper Intermediate caste Peasant OBCs Service OBCs SCs STs

36 72 – 79 88 89

Source: Suri (2019).

58 27 – 21 12 11

 6 01 – – – –

25 39 46 44 51 66

54 47 46 49 43 31

21 14 08 07 06 03

15 20 26 28 33 35

39 47 45 46 47 46

46 33 29 26 20 19

234  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha

Table 10.6  Literacy Level among Different Caste Groups Since 1961

Elections and Voting Behaviour  235 of the society (Chhibber & Ostermann, 2014; Suri, 2019). At the same time, Mr Rahul Gandhi sought to overemphasize the importance of caste. He made some hurried visits to temples and portrayed his own caste credentials as the upper caste (Suri, 2019). The leaders of the middle castes, whose rise led to the fall of the Congress system, like the Yadavs in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, took caste identity as rigid and unchanging. Most of these new-age leaders thought themselves to be the monarchs of the plebeians. However, the rise of the BJP in their strongholds has brought an end to their fiefdoms of caste affinities. In the last three decades, under the banner of Hindu nationalism, the BJP has attracted the more backward section of the OBCs. This section for long had little political representation as it stood sandwiched between the powerful OBCs and politically important SCs. The BJP recognized their political strength and provided them with a platform to fulfil their aspirations. This coming together of a plethora of Hindu castes and communities under the political banner of the BJP forces us to rethink the existing theories of caste – class cleavages that have been long used to explain the electoral politics in India. Most studies by early political scientists such as the Rudolphs, Kothari and Weiner mainly focused on the role of the dominant caste in politics. These scholars recognized the political importance of caste as a social group in India and showed how the practice of democracy had transferred it. Noted Indologist and social scientist duo, Rudolph and Rudolph, identified the role of caste as an equalizer, which could end the existing caste hierarchy and the privileges associated with it. Another prominent social scientist, Rajni Kothari, found that caste was no longer apolitical as it had become a deciding factor in voting. Kothari believed that there had been a slow but steady degeneration of the caste system, which paved the way for the emergence of the dominant elite from different classes and castes. The emergence of the ‘dominant’ castes and their role in politics led to new forms of integration between society and politics, which was much different (Kothari, 2010 [1970]). Notes https://eci.gov.in/files/file/13601-2-highlights/. 1 2 At times, even before 1971, state elections were not held with Lok Sabha elections due to premature fall or dissolution of government in a few states.

References Blair, H. W. (1979). Voting, caste, community, society: Explorations in aggregate data analysis in India and Bangladesh. Young Asia Publication. Brass, P. (1965). Factional politics in an Indian state: The congress party in Uttar Pradesh. University of California Press. Brass, P. (1990). The politics of India. Cambridge University Press. Chhibber, P.,  & Ostermann, S. (2014). The BJP’s fragile mandate: Modi and vote mobilisers in 2014 Indian general elections. Studies in Indian Politics, 2(2).

236  Sumit Kumar Sarma and Mithilesh Kumar Jha Chhibber, P., & Petrocik, J. R. K. (1989). The puzzle of Indian politics: Social cleavages and the Indian party system. British Journal of Political Science, 19(2), 191–210. Field, J. O., & Weiner, M. (1977). India’s urban constituencies. In J. O. Field & M. Weiner (Eds.), Electoral politics in Indian states. Manohar Publishers. Ghose, S. (1996, February). Psephology, surveying the masses: Politicians redefine the grassroots contact as they resort to opinion polls to read voter’s mind. Outlook. GoI. (2018). Annual report, 2017–18. https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/DOPTPG-AND-TRAINING-ANNUAL-REPORT-2017–18.pdf Hardgrave, R. L.,  & Kochanek, S. A. (2007). India: Government and politics in developing nation (7th ed.). Cengage Learning. Heath, A., & Yadav, Y. (1999). The united colours of Congress: Social profile of Congress voters, 1996 and 1998. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(34–35), 2518–2528. Jaffrelot, C. (2003). India’s silent revolution: The rise of the low castes in North Indian politics. Permanent Black. Kohli, A. (1991). Democracy and discontent: India’s growing crisis of governmentality. Cambridge University Press. Kondo, N. (2003). Indian parliamentary elections after independence: Social changes and electoral participation. Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO. Kondo, N. (2007). Election studies in India (Discussion paper). Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO. Kothari, R. (1964). The congress “system” in India. Asian Survey, 4(12), 1161–1173. Kothari, R. (2010 [1970]). Introduction. In R. Kothari (Ed.), Caste in Indian politics (pp. 3–24). Orient BlackSwan. Kumar, S., & Rai, S. (2013). Measuring voting behaviour in India. Sage Publications. Lokniti-CSDS. (1996). National election study. Lokniti-CSDS. Lokniti-CSDS. (1998). National election study. Lokniti-CSDS. Mitra, S. K., & Singh, V. B. (1999). Democracy and social change in India: A crosssectional analysis of the national electorate. Sage Publications. Palshikar, S., & Suri, K. C. (2014). India’s 2014 Lok Sabha elections: Critical shifts in the long term, caution in the short term. Economic & Political Weekly, 49(39), 39–49. Price, P. (2006). Changing meanings of authority in contemporary rural India. Qualitative Sociology, 29(3), 301–316. Sirsikar, V. M. (1970). The rural elite in a developing society: A  study in political sociology. Orient Longman. Suri, K. C. (2019). Social change and the changing Indian voter: Consolidation of the BJP in India’s 2019 Lok Sabha election. Studies in Indian Politics, 7(2), 234–246. Weiner, M. (1967). Party building in a new nation: The Indian National Congress. University of Chicago Press. Yadav, Y. (2004). The elusive mandate of 2004. Economic  & Political Weekly, 39(51), 5383–5385. Yadav, Y. (2007). Invitation to a dialogue: What work does “fieldwork” do in the field of elections? In A. M. Shah (Ed.), The grassroots of democracy: Field studies of Indian elections (pp. 345–368). Permanent Black.

11 The Congress Party and the Indian Party System Rajesh Kumar

Introduction The origin and evolution of the Congress Party parallel the history of the national movement for Indian Independence. The party’s growth was stewarded by towering leaders such as Gandhi, Nehru and Patel, and it made significant contributions by lending leadership to the freedom struggle and to the project of nation-building after Independence. The party’s dominance was so preponderant till the 1960s that the Indian party system would come to be known by its reference. It claimed to represent the various sections of Indian society for more than two decades after Independence and ably managed the intra-party competition as if it were one big family. The opposition existed but with no real effect – most of it was engineered from within the Congress, but that which was successfully managed also. The electoral contests were mostly between the Congressmen and their former colleagues from the party who had joined another or formed a new outfit altogether. The latter half of the 1960s, however, brought many challenges for the Congress, after which the decline of its dominance began. In the present context, it appears to be struggling to regain its position in Indian politics. In this chapter, I will discuss the evolution of the party from a mass-based nationalist movement to emerging as a ‘system’ in the two decades following Independence. I will examine the reasons for its dominance in the general and state elections, evaluate its influence on the Indian party system and assess its performance in recent years, when the debate on the prospects of its revival continues unrelentingly. The Congress ‘System’ in Indian Politics When the Indian democratic experience got a decade and a half old, studies on the nature and role of its party system appeared, which characterized it as a one-party dominant system. This conception developed in the 1960s, mainly in the works of Rajni Kothari and W. H. Morris-Jones. The formulation which perhaps captured this understanding most appropriately was DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-14

238  Rajesh Kumar the term ‘Congress system’, used by Kothari. If the Congress Party became the main reference point for the study of the Indian party system, one could imagine its influence over the politics of India. This section will discuss how the party came to be recognized as a ‘system’ as such and its implications. The term ‘Congress system’ does not imply that India was a one-party state. It was used by Kothari to describe the nature of the Indian party system, which was dominated by the Congress, although there were more than two parties competing for votes in the national and state elections. The Indian party system provided a choice between various alternatives to the electorate, as is the case with multiparty systems. The Indian experience, however, could not be characterized as a multiparty system because one party dominated the system, even though numerous parties existed. It would, therefore, not fit well with the conventional typology of the party system – one, two or multiparty systems, used by Duverger (1954 [1963]) – which was otherwise helpfully employed in the studies of party systems in different contexts. The Indian party system could be described as ‘one-party dominance’ system, which is different from what is known as a one-party system. Structurally, as Kothari explains, this system is a competitive party system in which the competing units play ‘dissimilar roles’: as a ‘party of consensus’ or as ‘parties of pressure’, which function on the margin (Kothari, 1964, p. 1162). The parties of pressure operate both inside and outside of the margin, through various factions of the party of consensus and the opposition parties or groups, respectively. The opposition parties cannot provide an alternative to the ruling party; they can only pressurize, criticize, censure and influence it by generating public opinion inside the margin and can exert ‘a latent threat’ – that the ruling party could be displaced from power if it digresses much from the ‘balance of public opinion’. The concept of the ‘margin of pressure’, which includes the factions within the ruling party, acting as an ‘in-built corrective’ mechanism, and the opposition parties, which provide the latent threat, is important for the one-party dominant system. The sensitivity, flexibility and responsiveness of the margin of pressure determine the success of the entire system by evolving and maintaining a ‘consensus’ around the dominant party. In India, the Congress, with its elaborate network of factions which provided the competitive mechanism, emerged as the party of consensus, hence the name ‘Congress system’ to characterize the party system. The system provided the space where ‘an intricate structure of conflict, mediation, bargaining, and consensus’ developed within the framework of the Congress, which also ensured the active involvement of the central leadership in the structure (Kothari, 1964, pp. 1163–1164; Kothari, 1970). The Congress was a plural organization with internal competition and flexibility, which made it more representative, and it was also ready to absorb groups and movements from outside, preventing other parties from gaining in strength. The role of the opposition parties was limited. They contributed in maintaining the internal power structure of the Congress by posing a latent threat, and their electoral performance showed a relationship to that of

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  239 the Congress: their gains were mostly at the local and regional levels, where the latter lost ground. The opposition parties were thus parties of pressure mainly and helped maintain the system overall. The Congress was founded in 1885 during the national Independence movement and it got a mass base in the 1920s and 1930s, which contributed to its legitimacy as a party of consensus even in the post-Independence era. Its organization was well-knit, with a hierarchy of levels organized along district, Pradesh and all-India formations, and showed a strong commitment to goals (Kothari, 1964, p. 1166). The role of central leadership, and that of Nehru, helped nurture the Congress system, which gave the Congress Party a dominant presence in Indian politics.

The Congress Party: Formative Years The party was formed in 1885 when the idea of an Indian nationalist movement opposed to British rule had taken shape. Allan Octavian Hume, a British retired civil servant, played a key role in the formation of the party and became its first general secretary. The first session of the party was held in Bombay, which was attended by 72 delegates from Indian provinces and presided over by W. C. Banerjee. The name ‘Indian National Congress’ was given by Dadabhai Naoroji. According to Hume, the party was meant for educated Indians to come together and demand representation in the government. One view was that the party would function as a ‘safety valve’, which would allow airing of grievances by the Indians but, in effect, prevent any genuine threat to the British Indian government. The party, however, proved important for organizing nationalist leaders toward a common cause for Indian Independence and for forming public opinion on the matter. The party became a mass-based organization subsequently, with Gandhi’s efforts at mobilizing people at the grassroots. It was under the patronage of the party that the nationalist movement moved from demanding a ‘dominion status’ for India, as it did in the early 20th century, to ‘Poorna Swaraj’ in 1929 and finally securing it in 1947.

In the first three general elections until 1962, the Congress Party got about 45 per cent of the votes and about 75 per cent of the seats. The opposition parties of this phase included the Communist Party of India, the Socialist Party, the Praja Socialist Party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the Swatantra Party and so on. However, their influence was limited and easily overshadowed by the Congress (Miwa, 2006, p. 98). The states showed the same pattern as in the national elections, except for the 1967 elections. At the national level, the Congress continued its dominance by securing more than 40 per cent of the votes until the fifth general election in 1971. In some ways, the party’s

240  Rajesh Kumar dominance continued till 1977, after which it began to decline as the party system got more competitive (Saha, 2021). Kothari’s study presents a contrast to the typology developed by Maurice Duverger. Duverger has discussed three types of party systems – one party, two-party and multiparty systems – based on the number of parties in the political system (Duverger, 1954 [1963], pp. 206–280). He argued that there existed a connection between the type of electoral laws of the polity and its party system. An electoral system based on single-member-district simple plurality works in two-party systems, while the system of proportional representation encourages ‘multipartyism’ (Saha, 2021). India had a multiparty system at the national level despite its simple plurality electoral system – an experience contrary to Duverger’s expectations. The ‘Congress system’ formulation developed by Kothari shows how the Indian experience was different, since the Indian political system overwhelmingly reflected the dominance of Congress even as multiple parties competed for people’s votes. MorrisJones developed a similar analysis as that of Kothari (which he acknowledges) and described the Indian party system until the 1960s as ‘dominance coexisting with competition’, but one which did not show any ‘trace of alteration’ (Morris-Jones, 1978, p. 217). The Indian experience showed the possibility of competitive politics without a shift in power. The dominant influence of the Congress Party cannot be understood to be limited only to the electoral mandate, governance and ‘managing’ the ­centre-state relations. The theoretical understanding of the party system also reflects the influence of the Congress system, the pivot of which was the party. Giovanni Sartori (1976) developed his typology by including both ideological and numerical factors and argued that the criterion by which parties should be counted was their effect on party competition. He argued that the size of the parties competing for power is as important as their number, and that the important thing to consider is the ‘relevance’ of parties in relation to the formation of governments and whether their size has any bearing on their prospects of capturing or sharing political power. On this criterion, parties could be understood as ‘major’ or ‘minor’, depending on whether they are government-oriented or peripheral. The relationship between the ‘relevant’ parties – characterized either by cooperation and consensus, or by conflict and polarization – suggests the nature of the political party system. Sartori (1976, pp. 192–201, 216) put forward the model of ‘predominant party system’ to characterize the Indian party system until the 1960s, acknowledging Kothari’s concept of ‘parties of pressure’ which was developed in the context of the Indian case (Miwa, 2006, p.  99). A  predominant party system is a competitive system in which parties other than the major party are allowed to exist, but they are not necessarily effective competitors of the predominant party. The predominant party system thus gets defined in terms of the characteristics of the ‘Congress system’ model, which works through the mechanism of the relationship between the ruling party and opposition parties (Miwa, 2006, p. 214). In some ways, then, Sartori’s classification, too, acknowledges the Congress Party’s contribution to theory-building.

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  241 Sartori’s Classification Giovanni Sartori’s famous work, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, was published in 1976. He used indicators such as the number and size of relevant parties, their ideologies and the intensity of the ideological context to categorize party systems. He discussed seven types of party systems in the book: (a) one-party system, (b) hegemonic party system, (c) predominant party system, (d) two-party system, (e) moderate pluralism, (f) polarized pluralism and (g) atomized party system. He categorized the one-party system and hegemonic party systems as ‘non-competitive’ and the rest as ‘competitive’. The transition from ‘non-competitive’ to ‘competitive’ system involved ‘system breakdown’, by which he meant ‘basic changes’ that would cause alteration of the rules of the game. While discussing the predominant party system, Sartori mentions the concept of ‘parties of pressure’, which Kothari used to describe the features of the ‘Congress system’. The relationship between the ruling party and the opposition parties, which defined the Congress system, is one of the defining features of the predominant party system also (see Kothari, 1964; Miwa, 2006; Sartori, 1976, Chapters 5 and 9).

Kothari’s analysis of the Indian party system as ‘Congress system’ sought to capture the specifics of Indian politics. The one-party dominance system did not mean the lack of inter-party and intra-party competition; it suggested only that the competition was moderated by a ‘consensus’. This had two dimensions. First, historically, the Congress played a key role in the national Independence movement, deriving support from major sections and interest groups in Indian society. Due to this, the party got legitimacy as the party of choice for governance in the post-Independence period also. Second, the historical consensus was mediated by the party system of India, in which one party, the Congress, dominated. The Congress became the ‘centre’ around which Indian politics was organized; opposition was allowed at the margins within the Congress and outside it. The Congress system worked to gain legitimacy by directing efforts at social transformation through government intervention and by resolving the sources of disaffection. The democratic background of the party and Nehru’s leadership helped this aspect of the system work. Kothari drew attention to the factions within the Congress that shaped the opposition and competition in the party system as well as to the legitimacy factor that sustained this. Importantly, for this reason, the Indian party system showed one-party dominance without slipping into authoritarianism, which was the case for many countries with a one-party system. The formulation ‘Congress system’ has remained an influential reference point for all studies on the Indian party system ever since. While Kothari

242  Rajesh Kumar spoke about national-level politics mainly, other studies developed the analysis of state-level elections but within the same framework of the Congress system. As a result, state-level party politics was considered a mere appendage to national politics, which was dominated by the Congress, or only as a matter of details (such as for Kothari). The influence of the framework continued during later years also – most analyses emphasized either the decline of the Congress or the arrival of the post-Congress polity (Yadav & Palshikar, 2003, p. 11). Kothari himself revisited the Congress system thesis almost a decade after formulating it (Kothari, 1974). He opined that some modifications were required in it but the basic idea served to characterize the Indian party system in the seventies and perhaps beyond as well (Kothari, 1989; Yadav & Palshikar, 2003, p. 11). The experience, however, shows the limitations of the Congress system thesis.

The Congress ‘System’ The political scientist Rajni Kothari used this phrase to describe the nature of the Indian party system in the first two decades since Independence, which is also called the First Party System of India (1947–67). It refers to the one-party dominant system in the Indian context and is supported by the impressive electoral performances of the Congress Party in national and state elections.

The Congress System Breaks: The Phase of Convergence in Indian Politics The formulation of the Congress system was used to describe the nature of Indian politics in the period from 1947 to 1977, as if Indian politics could be captured in a singular and static image (Yadav & Palshikar, 2003, pp. 12–13). The formulation, however, may have presented only a partial understanding of politics in India. First, it made sense if it was meant to describe the party system at the national level, for large parts of India remained out of its ambit. For example, in states such as West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Punjab, the party faced early opposition; or even when in power, the party was not dominant, as in Odisha, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Assam. In the ex-princely states also, the Congress system was weak, which Kothari also accepts. Second, the Congress system worked on the principle of ‘consensus’, which also gave the system its legitimacy. But the party was not a ‘catch-all’ party as assumed: its political class came from a common social background, and members from the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), peasants and workers remained at a distance from power. The consensus was hegemonic and limiting. Third, the formulation may suggest that the Congress system was a continuous and long-term phenomenon, but it was not. It

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  243 describes the early phase of political mobilization, and at the national level mainly. Moreover, the formulation was sustained due to the party’s organization in the states as well as the charisma of the leaders like Nehru, which is one of the reasons why it worked well for two decades following Independence and not beyond. With all its limitations, the Congress system formulation made sense for understanding the politics of India. The first four general elections, from 1952 to 1967, demonstrate the working of this system when the Congress was the predominant political force. This phase is called the First Party System of India. The period from 1967 to 1989 characterized the Second Party System, which showed the beginning of the decline of the monopoly of the Congress Party. The Congress won the 1971 elections with an overwhelming majority, but it was not the same old party. The rise of the middle castes or Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in the 1960s, which has been called the ‘first democratic upsurge’, is believed to have led to the transition to the Second Party System (Yadav, 1999, p. 2394). The first two party systems were similar in the sense that the predominance of Congress showed continuity. The party’s vote share remained in excess of 40 per cent, and it was the party of choice in most cases at the national as well as regional levels since the opposition was regionally fragmented. And Indian politics revolved pretty much around the Congress Party, even though the 1967 elections made visible the early signs of a transition. The 1967 elections exposed the Congress Party’s inability to accommodate dissent within itself, due to which many groups broke away to form state Congress parties (Yadav  & Palshikar, 2003, p.  25). The party competition got weak and the opposition parties formed coalitions at state level. The Congress Party got a ‘second life’ when Indira Gandhi was able to mobilize people across regional and social groups on the issue of poverty. Her victory over the opposing bloc in the party as well as over the electoral competitors in 1971 and 1979–80 brought the Congress system back into the Indian party system (Yadav & Palshikar, 2003, p. 27). There was a careful reconstitution of the social coalition, which the Congress Party led, but this time it was done at the level of states. The lower strata of OBCs were mobilized by Devaraj Urs in Karnataka; a coalition of Koli Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi and Muslims came up in Gujarat, replacing the Patidars; and an alliance between the Brahmans and SCs was formed in Uttar Pradesh. This exercise was successful: it cut across all social groups and masked interstate differences (Yadav & Palshikar, 2003, p. 27). State-level caste coalitions meant that the mobilization of voters took place mostly along populist agendas and that the elections would become plebiscitary in nature. The state-specific reconstitution of social coalitions shows how the social composition of the candidates and voters and the voting behaviour changed in the Second Party System. The Congress system was redefined in the 1980s under Rajiv Gandhi, who brought the issues of technology and globalization to political discourse. The party was able to attract new social groups, mostly from the urban and

244  Rajesh Kumar middle-class sections, which reshaped its political agenda as well. The relationship between the Congress and regional parties got transformed with the party’s efforts to resolve the Punjab, Assam and Mizo disputes. However, this phase did not last long, and this phase of the Congress system appeared to be a closed system; the party was insulated from all pressure from inside and outside, and the avenues of feedback and learning were blocked. The system was brought down gradually, but perhaps most notably by the corruption scandals that rocked the elections of 1989 (Yadav & Palshikar, 2003, p. 28). The infamous Bofors scandal was exposed in 1987–1988, and there were indications that the Congress Party would face problems in the 1989 elections. But it was in 1991 that the Congress system suffered its demise, when it could not get a majority despite the sympathy wave which followed the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The party managed to form a minority government at the centre though, but it was no longer a force to reckon with; it suffered a series of defeats in the assembly elections between 1993 and 1995 (Yadav & Palshikar, 2003, p. 28). It is also worth noting that the Congressled minority government at the centre could barely survive its term, and by using questionable means. This was subsequently challenged in the courts, due to which the image of the party suffered. The 1989 elections laid the groundwork for the transition to a new party system – the Third Party System of India. The Congress and the opposition tried the same social alliances as in the previous phase and the electorate got mobilized on the issue of corruption yet again. However, this period of Indian politics was different in the sense that regional leaders such as Devi Lal and Biju Patnaik got to play a big role in national politics. We see the rise of the likes of the Bahujan Samajwadi Party and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal, and the Samata Party and the Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar. Among these, the Bahujan Samajwadi Party got recognized as a national party, while other parties formed strong bases in the states, but their world views were not regional, which distinguished them from other regional parties such as the Akalis or the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Yadav, 1999, p. 2395). This development brought alternatives to the party system and brought an end to the one-party dominant system. During this period, the social basis of politics got transformed also; for example, Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and OBCs and SCs in Bihar would impact the electoral outcomes. Reservation in jobs for the OBCs (based on the Mandal Commission report), rath yatra of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for the mandir (which resulted in the demolition of the Babri Masjid) and the forex reserve crisis (which resulted in the liberalization of the Indian economy) emerged as issues which lent speed to the reworking of political alignments. The electoral contests in this phase saw greater participation as well as intense politicization of voters, especially from those belonging to the SCs and lower ‘middle’ castes, due to which this phase has also been described as the ‘second’ democratic upsurge in Indian politics (Yadav, 1999, p. 2397; Yadav, 2000). More women voted during this phase, registering their political participation,

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  245 and in terms of voter participation, rural constituencies outgrew urban constituencies. The increased participation of voters, mostly from underprivileged social backgrounds, brought a change in the political vocabulary as well. Issues of caste and social justice became prominent in the electoral discourse, but, oddly, they did not lead to linkages with other issues of time, such as the mandir issue or the policy of liberalization. Significantly, though, this period also saw politics shaping caste identities (Yadav, 1999, p. 2398). States emerged as the effective unit of electoral choice during this period (Yadav, 1999, p. 2399). In the 1990s, people voted in parliamentary elections as if they were choosing a state government. Political loyalties, social identities and opinions were determined at the state level now. This was in part due to the participatory upsurge in the elections which challenged the inherited hierarchies and questioned the received conceptual frameworks, which proved inadequate for understanding the democratic processes in a poor, non-­ Western society like India, designed as they were over the experiences of Western societies. The rise of regional parties ensured that regional leaders would get to play bigger roles. Politics in this phase would , therefore, be characterized by coalitions of parties emerging at both national and regional levels. The outcome of the party system in this phase was to produce coalition and/or minority governments at the national level, whereas the trend of a two-party system appears to have evolved and matured in many states (Saha, 2021). We see a minority government led by the National Front in 1989, the main component of which was the Janata Dal, with the BJP and the left extending outside support; a minority government led by the Congress in 1991 (which became a majority government by orchestrating defections); a coalition government of the United Front – comprising 13 parties, with the support of the Congress and the left in 1996; and a coalition government led by the BJP in 1998. This phase shows the shift from the one-party majority rule of the earlier decades to multiparty coalition and/or minority governments at the national level (Saha, 2021). The state-level political alignments show a contrasting picture. First, in many states, the decline of the Congress was accompanied by the rise of one other party. The Congress and the other parties formed governments on their own, resulting in a two-party system – this can be seen in states such as Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and Assam. Second, some states show a pattern of a bipolar party system, which is not strictly a two-party system but quite like it. The bipolar party system shows two poles, with one or more parties attached to each. This can be seen in Maharashtra, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura. We see a contest between the left front coalition and the Congress or Congress-led coalition in Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura. In West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee’s TMC broke away from the Congress and joined the BJPled alliance at the centre. The party system in the state remained unchanged but the weakening of the Congress meant that the TMC became one of the poles. Third, in a few states, we see a multiparty system in practice. This is

246  Rajesh Kumar correct in the cases of Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka and Bihar, where bipolar system did not exist till 1999 (Saha, 2021). The emergence of bipolar contests at the state level in this phase appears to support what is called Duverger’s law, according to which the first-past-thepost or the single-member-district simple plurality system (which is followed in India) results in a two-party system. More political parties gained entry to the Lok Sabha, but looking at the effective shares of votes or seats, only a few parties still mattered (Yadav, 1999). Voters appeared to be indecisive compared to the earlier party systems and voted in line with the ‘wave’. Swings between two elections, which were common earlier, became rare during this period. The composition of the Lok Sabha remained the same, although a greater number of seats changed hands between elections. The composition of the political elite changed as the OBCs made substantial gains but the presence of women did not increase appreciably, nor did the Muslims get substantial benefits (Yadav, 1999, p. 2397). Duverger’s Law Duverger’s law postulates that a two-party system would emerge in a first-past-the-post or a single-member-district simple plurality electoral system. In India, this law has been found to be working but only in the context of the states, not at the national level (see Diwakar, 2010; Yadav, 1999).

Effective Number of Parties (ENP) In 1979, Laakso and Taagepera developed a method for calculating ENP using the share of votes or seats secured by parties. The method is used to operationally define the number of parties in a political system in a way that considers their relative size as the parties vary substantially in their vote and/or seat share. This is helpful in evaluating whether the presence of many parties destabilizes a political system or not. If all parties had equal strength, the number of parties would equal the ENP. In any other case, the ENP would be lower than the number of parties (see Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). During this phase, the Congress Party suffered badly. In the Lok Sabha elections held between 1989 and 1998, the vote share of the Congress declined rapidly. The Congress got 39.5 per cent of votes in 1989, which was reduced to 28.8 per cent and 25.9 per cent in 1996 and 1998, respectively. In the earlier phases, when the ‘Congress system’ was strong, the opposition parties (the parties of pressure) used to get anti-Congress votes, but in the

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  247 1990s, in a role reversal of sorts, the Congress got the residual votes (Yadav, 1999, p. 2395). The party ceased to be in government in many states. It was replaced by the BJP in Delhi, Rajasthan and Gujarat. In Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the party remained present but only in name. It also faced desertion of its strong local units – in Maharashtra, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu – and it appeared to have failed in adapting to the demands of coalition politics, which had become a common feature of Indian politics by now. The BJP improved its vote share and its reach during this phase. The party’s vote share increased with every election since 1984, and it successfully expanded its base. In geographic terms, it registered its presence in Gujarat and Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, thus shedding the tag of a north Indian, Hindi heartland party. It also got a foothold in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. In social terms as well, it was able to expand its base. It was no longer an urban Baniya-Brahman party; it had carved a strong rural base with good support among the lower OBCs and STs. In political-ideological terms, the party won the support of many allies who were once uncomfortable with its Hindutva ideology. The National Democratic Alliance for the 1999 elections, for example, included the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the Paattali Makkal Katchi in Tamil Nadu and the Janata Dal (United) in Bihar and Karnataka. Powered by these developments, the BJP seemed set to capture the political space ceded by the Congress.

Party Systems in India Scholars have identified four distinct phases in Indian politics based on the electoral performance of parties, voting preferences and emerging patterns. Accordingly, it can be said that India has had four party systems since Independence: the first (1947–67), the second (1967–89), the third (1989–99) and the fourth (2014–). In his 1999 article, Yogendra Yadav discussed the first three phases of the party system as three distinct electoral systems in India (see Yadav, 1999). Milan Vaishnav and Jamie Hintson (2019) have argued that the fourth phase has crystallized in India following the 2014 and 2019 general elections. The First Party System saw the Congress dominate in both national and state elections from 1952 to 1967. This phase is also described as the ‘Congress system’ or one-party dominant system. In the second phase, the Congress remained predominant at the centre (apart from 1975 to 1977), while the opposition parties consolidated their position at the state level. The third phase refers to the era of multiparty coalitions, characterized by the fragmentation of the party system and also of the electorate. The rise of the BJP in the 2014 general elections, in which it won a single majority of seats, is argued to be the beginning of the Fourth Party System in India.

248  Rajesh Kumar The Third Party System of India showed the following broad trends (Saha, 2021). First, the Congress was dislodged from the position it occupied during the first two phases of the party system: it was no longer the pivot around which Indian politics got organized. The Congress system appears to have given way to a ‘post’-Congress system also. The party won several assembly elections, but it ceased to be all too important for political calculations. Second, the party system showed a trend towards greater federalization – at the national level, the National Front government of 1989 comprised parties with strong regional bases. The trend was present in the 1980s but the new phase saw a deepening of this trend. At the national level, we see coalition or minority governments which could not prove to be stable, but at the state level, the bipolar party system appears to be maturing. Third, political mobilization made appeals to social cleavages such as caste and religion. Fourth, coalition politics took deep roots. The parties formed pre-election ‘alliances’ hoping to form stable governments, which, in most cases, were majority coalitions, minority coalitions or single-party minority governments. The Congress Party, which overwhelmed a fragmented opposition at the state level in both the Lok Sabha and assembly elections till the 1960s and early 1970s – except for the 1967 elections in some states – now rarely determines the outcome. It was one of the many parties at the state level and functioned in accordance with the rules of the system, rather than shaping it. The pattern of party competition at the state level shows the consolidation of a two-party system or its variant, a bipolar system. The bipolarity at the state level was not uniform: it was the Congress against the BJP allies in some states, whereas in others, it was the Congress against the left or the Congress against the regional party pattern, as in states such as Punjab, Haryana, AP, Assam and those in the north-east (except Tripura). At the national level, the party system showed three pre-election alliances, which included several small or regional parties in their structure. The conventional understanding was that Indian democracy appeared to be in a rapid decline and was perhaps about to collapse during this period – a view which reflected the signs of election fatigue and a disinterest in politics. On this view, this phase was characterized by the eruption of some of the maladies inherent in our political and social system. One could see an ‘endemic multiplication’ of political parties and the fractionalization of the political space; the rise of parties with a regional or caste-community social base; the politics of ideology giving way to a politics of identity and political corruption; and crisis of governance and political instability becoming a new norm. This was only a view from the top, however, and misread the situation on the ground (Yadav, 1999, p. 2393). This phase was rather characterized by a fundamental transformation of Indian politics, the basis of which was anchored in the process of social change. The voters exercised choice, but differently. The structure of choice, which is inherent in the system of elections, had changed, so had the size and composition of the people who participated. Many voters came from the lower social-economic strata, with

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  249 their own worldviews, and voted as groups, not as individuals. The voters had a large basket to choose from, and they also made rejections frequently. These developments led to the disintegration of the Congress system eventually. The rise of state parties, which made the electoral system more competitive; an increase in the participation of voters, mostly from the excluded sections of society; and the emerging leadership challenges in the Congress Party showed signs that a new party system would emerge in which the BJP would dominate, and Indian politics would revolve around it. The Decline of the Congress Party: A ‘Post’-Congress System? The 2014 general elections were significant for various reasons. The BJP-led alliance claimed the single-party majority government in three decades. The results were so overwhelming that the BJP was said to have emerged as the new central pole of Indian politics, much like the Congress of the First Party System. The election verdict prompted mixed reactions from the observers of the Indian party system. Some felt that not much changed in 2014 since the vote shares of the main parties remained the same; others thought that the magnitude of the BJP victory may point to the consolidation of a new social bloc behind it, without disrupting the long term electoral pattern (Tillin, 2014). Other responses were more emphatic. E. Sridharan (2014) argued that the election verdict was ‘dramatic, possibly even epochal’, while some opined that it could be the beginning of the phase of a new party system led by a new dominant party (Vaishnav & Hintson, 2019). Suhas Palshikar agreed that the 2014 elections were ‘extraordinary’ and ‘critical’ since the BJP became the first party to have won a majority in the Lok Sabha in the post-Congress era since 1989. The Congress may cease to be the ‘reference point’ in the analysis of Indian politics, he reflected (Palshikar, 2014b). The mixed views suggest that many believed that the 2014 elections were an aberration. The cautious analysis of the 2014 elections was put to rest by another resounding victory of the BJP-led alliance in 2019. Between the two elections, significant political changes took place at the level of states also, and the repeat of the single-party majority government at the national level proved just one thing – that the trend shown by the 2014 elections was likely to continue, and a new, fourth phase in the Indian party system had begun (Vaishnav, 2019). The 2014 and 2019 elections show a structural break from the previous party system. While one of the main features of the Third Party System was the absence of a pivot party, the BJP appears now to have emerged as one. The BJP won 282 out of 543 Lok Sabha seats in 2014, with its National Democratic Alliance allies getting another 53 seats. It came even stronger in the 2019 elections, garnering 37.4 per cent of the vote and capturing 303 seats on its own, losing some in the Hindi belt but gaining in eastern India. The factors such as anti-incumbency, an economic slowdown and the opposition showing signs of a stronger resolve to stop it – because of which it

250  Rajesh Kumar was not expected to win the 2019 elections – did not work against it at the national level. The performance of the BJP at the state level is noteworthy, too. The party had chief ministers in 5 states in 2014, which grew to 12 states by mid-2019. Its National Democratic Alliance allies control another six states, which supports the view that the BJP is the new central pole around which Indian politics revolves today. The rise of the BJP contrasts with the decline of the Congress. The Congress, which once was the central pivot of Indian politics and headed the government of the United Progressive Alliance at the national level from 2004 to 2014, got just 44 Lok Sabha seats in 2014. This was its worst electoral showing since Independence (Vaishnav  & Hintson, 2019). The Congress’s defeat in the 2014 general elections suggests that the party failed to retain its vote share of the previous polls in 2004 and 2009 and that the social profile of its voters has become blurred (Palshikar, 2014a). Most sections of society, except for the Muslims, have likely deserted the party. When compared to its performance in 2009, the party lost over 9 per cent of its voters (Palshikar, 2014a, p. 59). The social character of the party was lost also: the party not only received less than 20 per cent of the vote, but it also did not receive more votes than any other social grouping (Palshikar, 2014a, p. 62). This suggests that the decimation of the party was bigger than what the vote share revealed: the Congress remained as faceless in 2014 as it was in 1998–99. In the assembly elections of 2018, the party did manage to wrest three states, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, from the BJP but could not expand on it in the 2019 general elections, which were held only a few months later. In Rajasthan, for example, it got 100 out of 200 assembly seats but drew a blank in the parliamentary elections of 2019 (Vaishnav & Hintson, 2019). The Congress Party was able to improve its tally marginally, from 44 to 52, in the 2019 general elections, but this was not sufficient to arrest its decline. In a conversation organized by the Centre for Policy Research, and published in Seminar, Rahul Verma discusses the problem with the party (Aiyar et al., 2021). The first problem is that the party shows signs of stagnation with a vote share of 19–20 per cent, although it got more seats in 2019 as compared to 2014. The increase in seats has come from the South, so in some ways, the Congress Party is now a regional party, which has a presence only in a few states. Second, the bargaining power of the party has declined. It contested fewer seats than ever before: it fielded candidates on 423 seats only, in contrast to the BJP’s 431. Third, in 2019, the party managed to come first and second in 262 seats, which is less than its performance in 2014, in which it secured the position in around 269 seats. In the 2014 elections, some 40 per cent of the Congress candidates lost their deposits, something which we did not see even in 1977 or 1989. The party failed to secure even 15–16 per cent of votes in more than one-third of the seats it contested. This shows that the Congress organization has become defunct. Fourth, in some states, such as West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Gujarat, the party’s performance is of much concern. The party once ruled these states, but

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  251 for almost 30 years, it has remained in the opposition. From 2014 to 2019, it ceded more space to other parties. For example, it lost its position as the principal opposition party in Tripura and Odisha. And the base vote of the party has shrunk below 20 per cent in 2019, from about 25 per cent between 1989 and 2014. The analysis of past elections shows that the party has failed to revive in a state where its vote share fell below 20 per cent. Zoya Hasan argues that the decline of the Congress can be traced to the Congress Party’s inability to consolidate its victory in the 1971 general elections and 1972 assembly elections. The political crisis following the party’s handling of the Babri Masjid and Shah Bano issues contributed to a decline in its vote share, as the party ended up displeasing both Hindus and Muslims. In addition, many regional parties that have formed governments at the state level are breakaways from the Congress, such as the TMC in West Bengal, the Nationalist Congress Party in Maharashtra and Yuvajana Shramika Rythu Congress in Andhra Pradesh. Ideologically also, the Congress has tried to imitate the BJP rather than distinguish itself (Aiyar et  al., 2021), which makes its revival even more complicated. The fourth phase of the party system in which the BJP dominates – some have called it ‘the BJP-dominant system’ (Palshikar, 2018) – is not just about the party’s electoral performances. The dominance is also due to the BJP’s organizational resources which combines well with its charismatic leadership. The party controls the conventional and social media to its advantage, and the political discourse appears to have taken an ideological turn, with the median voter supporting the party’s vision (Verma & Ali, 2021). It also commands financial resources like none; it receives the highest ‘donations’ from corporate and individual donors. According to a report submitted to the Election Commission, the BJP received roughly ₹750 crore from companies and individuals in 2019–2020, which is five times more than what the Congress got (The Indian Express, 2021). All these make the BJP a formidable force in Indian politics, more than it being an organization dominating the elections of the Fourth Party System. The electoral ascendance of the BJP has gradually shaped ‘a new hegemony’ in India (Palshikar, 2018, p.  36). The Fourth Party System of India, the second dominant party system, is more than just a party system. This also contextualizes the rise of a new set of ideas and sensibilities that would provide ideological support to the dominant party system and affect Indian society significantly. The Congress did not only lose the electoral space to the BJP, the process of which began in 1989, but it also lost the ability to command any control over the narratives that provided the reference points for political contestations. In 2014, the BJP emerged as the dominant party not just in terms of the seats it won in the elections; its political presence also expanded in many states; its support came from a cross-section of society; and it had the ability to set the agenda for political debates. The state-specific issues were replaced by an ‘all-India imagination’, supported by a careful cultivation of ‘the Modi factor’ during the elections, which was a departure

252  Rajesh Kumar from the politics of the previous decade and a half. The implication is that the Congress has lost the ability to come back strongly soon, and any coalition led by the Congress would also remain weak and ineffective (Palshikar, 2018, p. 33). This means that the opposition would remain in disarray, giving the BJP or an alliance led by it a free hand in setting the political tones. The BJP has succeeded in circulating new values that stand in contrast with the foundational values on which Indian democracy rests; instead of a coexistence of democracy, nationalism and diversity, new binaries such as democracy versus nationalism and nationalism versus diversity have been advanced in the public discourse (Palshikar, 2018, p. 41). That is, the electoral rise of the party is also shaping a new political culture. Some studies suggest that the Fourth Party System could be a new political system for India. Jaffrelot and Verniers (2020, p. 141) argue that the BJP’s rise to power and the consolidation affirmed by the 2019 elections have transformed not only the party system of India but the political system itself. The democratic credentials of the Indian state have taken a beating in several indices. Also importantly, at the same time, the national level and state level trends diverge during this phase. While the BJP dominates at the national level, it faces challenges in the states which make it difficult for it to sustain its hegemony. The Future of the Congress Party The Congress Party has seen its influence in Indian politics wane faster than anyone could have imagined. Who would have thought that the party would win only 44 parliamentary seats in the 2014 general elections and lose the state elections of 2015–16 as well? It could not improve its performance in the 2019 general elections either, nor did it show signs of revival in the assembly elections for Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Tamil Nadu, held in 2020–21. The decline of the Congress Party continues, and there seems little to suggest that it will stop anytime soon. The future of the party is, therefore, an open question. The problem seems to be deeper than it appears. The Congress Party has also failed in taking its leaders along, some of them being senior members of the party and loyalists to the Gandhi family. The less than satisfactory performances of the party in the general elections of 2014 and afterwards, the dwindling support base, the organizational problems within and the reluctance of the party high command to address these issues with sincerity, brought together some Congress veterans who questioned the top leadership and pleaded for strengthening the party organization. In August 2020, 23 senior members of the party wrote a letter to interim party chief Sonia Gandhi in this regard, and the demand for an overhaul within the party has intensified ever since, with the dissenters continuing to debate party positions over political issues as well as the party’s performances in the elections. These leaders have come to be known as G-23 in the Congress Party. The humiliating performance of the party in the 2019 general elections, wherein the party

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  253 president Rahul Gandhi lost from Amethi, a constituency nurtured for long by his father and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, following which he resigned and his mother Sonia Gandhi became interim chief of the party, seems to have triggered their open dissent. While the G-23 leaders claim themselves to be well-wishers of the party and declare their intention for its revival, some observers feel that they will have little impact for two reasons. First, the dissenters themselves do not enjoy a sound electoral support base, and they cannot improve the prospects of the Congress in the upcoming assembly elections in Bengal and Assam. Second, it is a long-entertained hypothesis that without a Gandhi at its helm, the party will disintegrate faster. If this is correct, the demand for democratizing the organizational structure may be unnecessary and unworkable, and not in the interest of the party. But even if the dissenters are believed not to have any significant impact so far as electoral performance of the party is concerned, the Congress should take the desertion of its leaders seriously. The party cannot hope to revive unless the younger lot are given more say in its running, given that the electorate comprises the aspirational youth mainly, who could easily identify with the leaders of their generation. Recently, two long-time loyalists of the Gandhi family, both young leaders with good support bases in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, left the Congress to join the rival BJP. A similar situation has built up in Rajasthan, which could be averted with sincere negotiations over powersharing. The hypothesis that the Gandhi family is the glue that holds the Congress Party together has some truth, but if the desertion of its promising leaders continues this way, there will be little left behind in the party to hold on to. It is perhaps not enough to be a Gandhi to lead the Congress’s regeneration. The leader from the family must possess similar charisma as the leaders of the past, whose stewardship brought the Congress system new leases of life. As I have discussed in the previous sections, the system has worked three times in the past – when it was led by Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, who secured massive majorities in at least two general elections, supported strongly by their charismatic personalities. In the present context, however, the revival of the party requires a leader from its rank and file who can hold the party organization together as well as get the electorate to rally behind the party. The leader’s personality and charisma will matter, as it did earlier, but for a turn around in the party’s prospects, the leader’s acceptance should primarily come from the members of the electorate, keeping the democratic spirit in mind. The Congress Party can revive itself, or so we can hope, because it continues to occupy the political imagination of Indian people, although it has considerably lost electoral space to the BJP. Most of the schemes of the BJP-led governments are nothing but renamed versions of the schemes started by the Congress; the schemes may no longer be named after a Gandhi, but they carry the same spirit as before. Some of the schemes which were faulted by the BJP when it was in the opposition during 2004–14, such as the Aadhar-Unique

254  Rajesh Kumar Identification Authority of India system, have been put to use more extensively since 2014, when it came into the government. This is not to evaluate the schemes, but rather to suggest that the Congress’s legacy may prove to be too big to be dismissed altogether. Summing Up The Congress Party, with a history of leading the national movement for Independence, has had a formidable presence in Indian politics. Its electoral performance in the national and state elections in the first two decades since Independence was enviable and, because of its dominance, the Indian party system would be characterized as the ‘Congress system’. It claimed to represent the various sections of Indian society for more than two decades after Independence and ably managed the intra-party competition as if it were one big family. The opposition existed but with no real effect – most of it was engineered from within the Congress, but that which was successfully managed also. The electoral contests were mostly between the Congressmen and their former colleagues from the party who had joined another or formed a new outfit altogether. In the first three general elections until 1962, the Congress Party got about 45 per cent of the votes and about 75 per cent of the seats. The opposition parties of this phase included the Communist Party of India, the Socialist Party, the Praja Socialist Party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the Swatantra Party and so on. However, their influence was limited and easily overshadowed by the Congress. The states showed the same pattern as in the national elections, except for the 1967 elections. At the national level, the Congress continued its dominance by securing more than 40 per cent of the votes until the fifth general election in 1971. In some ways, the party’s dominance continued till 1977, after which it began to decline as the party system got more competitive. Kothari’s analysis of the Indian party system as ‘Congress system’ sought to capture the specifics of Indian politics. The one-party dominance system did not mean the lack of inter-party and intra-party competition; it suggested only that the competition was moderated by a ‘consensus’. The formulation ‘Congress system’ has remained an influential reference point for all studies on the Indian party system ever since. While Kothari spoke about nationallevel politics mainly, other studies developed the analysis of the state-level elections but within the same framework of the Congress system. The influence of the framework continued during later years also – most analyses emphasized either the decline of the Congress or the arrival of the post-Congress polity. The Congress system formulation may not have brought an accurate understanding of Indian politics. It made sense for the party system at the national level because not all of India was part of this system. The party faced early opposition in states such as West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  255 and Punjab, and it was not dominant in Odisha, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Assam even when in power. The Congress system formulation worked on the principle of ‘consensus’, which was hegemonic and limiting. Also, the Congress system was not a continuous and long-term phenomenon, as the formulation suggested. The period from 1967 to 1989 characterized the Second Party System, which showed the beginning of the decline of the monopoly of the Congress Party. The Congress won the 1971 elections with an overwhelming majority, but it was not the same old party. The rise of middle castes or OBCs in the 1960s is believed to have led to the transition to the Second Party System. The 1989 elections laid the groundwork for the transition to a new party system. This period of Indian politics was different, however. Regional leaders such as Devi Lal and Biju Patnaik got to play a big role in national politics. We see the rise of the likes of the Bahujan Samajwadi Party and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, the TMC in West Bengal, and the Samata Party and the Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar. This political development brought alternatives to the party system and brought an end to the one-party dominant system. The Third Party System was consolidated with the 1991 elections. This phase saw coalition and/or minority governments at the national level, whereas the trend of a two-party system appears to have evolved and matured in many states. We see a minority government led by the National Front in 1989, the main component of which was the Janata Dal, with the BJP and the left extending outside support; a minority government led by the Congress in 1991 (which became a majority government by orchestrating defections); a coalition government of the United Front – comprising 13 parties, with the support of the Congress and the left in 1996; and a coalition government led by the BJP in 1998. The state-level political alignments tell a different story. In many states, the decline of the Congress was accompanied by the rise of one other party, while in some states, bipolar contests became the norm. The emergence of bipolar contests at the state level in this phase appears to support what is called Duverger’s law, according to which the first-past-the-post or the singlemember-district simple plurality system (which is followed in India) results in a two-party system. More political parties gained entry to the Lok Sabha but looking at the effective shares of votes or seats, only a few parties still mattered. The Congress Party suffered badly. In the Lok Sabha elections held between 1989 and 1998, the vote share of the Congress declined rapidly. The Congress got 39.5 per cent of votes in 1989, which was reduced to 28.8 per cent and 25.9 per cent in 1996 and 1998, respectively. In the earlier phases, when the ‘Congress system’ was strong, the opposition parties (the parties of pressure) used to get anti-Congress votes, but in the 1990s, in a role reversal of sorts, the Congress got the residual votes. The party ceased to be in government in many states. It was replaced by the BJP in Delhi, Rajasthan

256  Rajesh Kumar and Gujarat. In Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the party remained present but only in name. It also faced desertion of its strong local units – in Maharashtra, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu – and it appeared to have failed in adapting to the demands of coalition politics, which had become a common feature. The BJP improved its vote share and its reach during this phase. The party’s vote share increased with every election since 1984, and it successfully expanded its base. The rise of state parties, which made the electoral system more competitive; an increase in the participation of voters, mostly from excluded sections of society; and the emerging leadership challenges in the Congress Party showed signs that a new party system would emerge in which the BJP would dominate, and Indian politics would revolve around it. Indian politics entered the phase of its Fourth Party System with the resounding victory of the BJP in the 2014 elections. The 2014 and 2019 elections show a structural break from the previous party system. While one of the main features of the Third Party System was the absence of a pivot party, the BJP appears now to have emerged as one. The BJP won 282 out of 543 Lok Sabha seats in 2014, with its National Democratic Alliance allies getting another 53 seats. It came even stronger in the 2019 elections, garnering 37.4 per cent of the vote and capturing 303 seats on its own, losing some in the Hindi belt but gaining in eastern India. The Congress won just 44 Lok Sabha seats in 2014. The party’s defeat – its worst ever performance – suggests that it failed to retain its vote share in the previous elections in 2004 and 2009 and that the social profile of its voters has become blurred. The signs of stagnation were visible for the party as it got a vote share of 19–20 per cent, even though it got more seats in 2019 as compared to 2014. During this phase, the party became a regional party in effect, with a presence in only a few states. The dominance of the BJP in this phase is not restricted to the party’s electoral performance. The dominance is also due to the BJP’s organizational resources, which combine well with its charismatic leadership. The party controls the conventional and social media to its advantage and shapes the political discourse ideologically. It also receives most ‘donations’ from the corporate and individuals. The Congress Party’s unsatisfactory performance in the 2014 elections and afterwards brought together some Congress veterans who questioned the top leadership and pleaded for strengthening the party organization. The group of these leaders have come to be known as G-23 in the Congress Party. The party cannot hope to revive unless the younger lot are given more say in its running, given that the electorate comprises mainly aspirational youth. Recently, two long-time loyalists of the Gandhi family, both young leaders with good support bases in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, left the Congress to join their rival, the BJP.

The Congress Party and the Indian Party System  257 In today’s circumstances, it is perhaps not enough to be a Gandhi to lead the party’s regeneration. The leader of the party must possess similar charisma as the leaders of the past, whose stewardship brought the Congress system new leases of life. The appeal and acceptance of the leader must come from the members of the electorate, keeping the democratic spirit in mind. References Aiyar, Y., Hasan, Z., & Verma, R. (2021, May 21). The future of the congress party. www.india-seminar.com/2019/720/720_conversation.htm. Diwakar, R. (2010). Party aggregation in India. Party Politics, 16(4), 477–496. Duverger, M. (1963 [1954]). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state (N. Barbara & N. Robert, Trans.). Science Editions. The Indian Express. (2021, June 10). Report on corporate and individual ­donations: BJP got Rs 750 crore in 2019–20, more than 5 times what congress got. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/report-on-corporate-­individual-donationsbjp-got-rs-750-crore-in-2019–20-over-5-times-what-Congress-got-7351667/. Jaffrelot, C., & Verniers, G. (2020). A new party system or a new political system? Contemporary South Asia, 28(2), 141–154. Kothari, R. (1964). The congress “system” in India. Asian Survey, 4(12), 1161–1173. Kothari, R. (1970). Politics in India. Orient Longman. Kothari, R. (1974). The congress system revisited: A decennial review. Asian Survey, 14(12), 1035–1054. Kothari, R. (1989). Politics and the people: In search of a humane India (Vol. I). Ajanta Publications. Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979). “Effective” number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1), 3–27. Miwa, H. (2006). The transition of party system in India: From polarized pluralism to moderate pluralism. Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 18, 96–116. www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jjasas1989/2006/18/2006_18_96/_ pdf/-char/ja. Morris-Jones, W. H. (1978). Politics mainly Indian. Orient Longman. Palshikar, S. (2014a). The defeat of the congress. Economic  & Political Weekly, 49(39), 57–63. Palshikar, S. (2014b, May 22). A new phase of the polity. The Hindu. www.thehindu. com/opinion/op-ed//article62115530.ece. Palshikar, S. (2018). Towards hegemony: BJP beyond electoral dominance. ­Economic & Political Weekly, 53(33), 36–42. Saha, A. (2021, May  21). The Indian party system 1989–99. www.india-seminar. com/1999/480/480%20Anindya%20Saha,%20The%20Indian%20party%20 system%201989-99.htm. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge University Press. Sridharan, E. (2014). India’s watershed vote: Behind Modi’s victory. Journal of Democracy, 25(4), 20–33. Tillin, L. (2014). Indian elections 2014: Explaining the landslide. Contemporary South Asia, 23(2), 117–122.

258  Rajesh Kumar Vaishnav, M. (2019, May  23). Modi owns the win and the aftermath. Hindustan Times. www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/modi-owns-the-win-and-the-aftermath/ story-vUQF8BSnT21wSrNm8U7bHM.html. Vaishnav, M.,  & Hintson, J. (2019). India’s new fourth party system. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/08/19/ india-s-new-fourth-party-system-pub-79686. Verma, R., & Ali, A. (2021). The central force behind India’s fourth party system. Economic & Political Weekly, 56(10). www.epw.in/node/158078/pdf. Yadav, Y. (1999). Electoral politics in the time of change: India’s third electoral system, 1989–99. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(34–35), 2393–2399. Yadav, Y. (2000). Understanding the second democratic upsurge. In F. Frankel, Z. Hasan, & R. Bhargava (Eds.), Transforming India: Social and political dynamics in democracy (pp. 120–145). Oxford University Press. Yadav, Y.,  & Palshikar, S. (2003). Party system and electoral politics in the Indian states, 1952–2002: From hegemony to convergence. Journal of Indian School of Political Economy (Jan–June 2003), 15(1 & 2), 5–44.

12 Bharatiya Janata Party Electoral Dominance or Ideological Hegemony? Mithilesh Kumar Jha

Introduction The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a dominant and hegemonic force in India’s electoral politics today. This dominance is both political and ideological. The BJP has now emerged as a ‘system-defining party’. In other words it has assumed the one pole of Indian politics like the Congress used to assumed for many decades after Independence. BJP’s electoral performances in the recent decades have been phenomenal. Although, BJP has been consistently improving its electoral tallies since its formation in the 1980s; its victories in 2014 and 2019 general elections and in many state assembly elections have led to a new debate about the nature and functioning of party system in India (Chhibber & Verma, 2019; Palshikar, 2018; Vaishnav & Hintson, 2019). Many have also begun to argue about and envision a post-Congress polity in the country (Palshikar et al., 2014). After 1984, it was for the first time in three decades that a single party has achieved majority on its own in the lower house of the parliament – Lok Sabha – under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014. BJP’s even more reassuring victory both in terms of number of seats and vote share in 2019 general election has led many scholars to argue that party system in India is moving towards a one-party dominant system. They often like to equate it with the existence of ‘Congress system’ during the first two decades after Independence. This chapter studies the rise of the BJP as the dominant political force in the contemporary Indian politics. It tries to do so by discussing its historical legacy, ideology, leaderships and electoral performance since its formation in 1980. The first section discusses in some details the historical and political context of the emergence of Hindu nationalism both during the colonial and post-colonial India which the BJP claims to represent. It discusses who are its ideological predecessors? What are the major ideological commitments of the party? The second section is the study of BJP’s electoral performance during 1980–2004. It analyses the strategies and major campaigns of the party around the issue of Ram Janmabhoomi and secularism. The functioning of the party in this period exhibited its militant as well as a moderate face represented respectively by Lal Krishna Advani (b. 1927) and Atal Bihari Vajpayee DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-15

260  Mithilesh Kumar Jha (1924–2018). Ideological coherence dedicated and disciplined workers helped the BJP consolidate its support base and in becoming the single largest party in the Lok Sabha in 1996. It has successfully negotiated and formed alliances with many political parties. The BJP has the distinction of completing the first full term non-Congress and a coalition government (1999–2004) under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. BJP’s ascendency to electoral victories was halted with the debacle of India shining campaign in 2004. The third section discusses the challenges and growth of BJP through its victories in 2014 and 2019 elections. Prime Minister Modi and Amit Shah have led the party to decisive victories and its ideological domination in Indian politics. The BJP during this period has not only expanded geographically, but also its support base now cut across different segments of Indian population including the religious minorities. Finally, the concluding section asses the position of the BJP as a ‘hegemonic’ or a ‘dominating’ force in Indian politics. It is explicit that the BJP now sets the agenda both in the national as well as in various assembly elections. Its stated objective of heralding a ‘new India’ has met with wide popular support as well as apprehension in equal measures. It has to perform both in the field of development and also in governance to respond to ever aspiring and main support base of the party – Indian middle class. The party faces many challenges from intelligentsia as well as civil society organizations. However, it also presents a major challenge to other political parties, particularly the Congress. Ideological Inheritance and the Formation of the BJP The BJP was formed in April 1980. The immediate reason for its formation was demand from the Janata Dal (JD)1 leadership to do away with the ‘dual memberships’ of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) members. The BJS – from which the BJP derives its ideological and organizational strengths – since its inception in the 1950s had a strong link with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).2 In 1977, when the BJS officially joined other political parties under the leadership of Lok Nayak Jayaprakash Narayan (JP; 1902–79) to form the JD, they had already achieved steady rise in the Indian politics (Baxter, 1969). The BJS had formed government as a coalition partner in many states such as in Bihar, Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. In the general election of 1977, the BJS emerged as the second largest party in the Janata coalition and two of its leaders were ministers. However, the JD because of ideological differences and factionalism collapsed after the 1980s general election in which Indira Gandhi bounced back to power with resounding victory. The JD needed ideological coherence and organizational restructuring and it was with these intentions that its leadership demanded the leaders and members of the BJS to severe their ties with the RSS to remain part of the JD. However, the leaders of the BJS decided to float a new party and thus the BJP came into being in the 1980s with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as its founding president.

Bharatiya Janata Party  261 The BJP claims to represent the ideology of Hindu nationalism or Hindutva is not a new development in Indian politics. Imagination of Indian nation on the basis of the religious, cultural and socio-political beliefs of the Hindu majority community was embedded in the socio-religious reforms movements in India since the second half of the 19th century (Chakrabarty & Jha, 2020; Diwakar, 2017; Hasan, 2001; Jaffrelot, 2010). Policies, programmes and practices of the Arya Samaj, founded by Dayanand Saraswati in 1875, clearly exhibited such imagination. Sanatan Dharma Sabha, Bharat Dharma Mahamandal and later Hindu Mahasabha gave it a much more coherent and organised political expressions. Hindu Mahasabha operated within Congress as a subgroup until the 1930s. It severed its ties with the Congress when Mahatma Gandhi and other leaders of the Congress undertook a broader and plural brand of politics. The ideology of Hindu nationalism became much more prominent when V. D. Savarkar (1883–1966) became the president of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937. It earnestly began to mobilize public opinion for a Hindu Rashtra. Savarkar provided a more systematic and philosophical basis to Hindu nationalism on the basis of Hindutva.3 It required other religious communities to respect and show allegiance to Hindu culture and religion. It regarded Hindus as one who considers India both as their fatherland (pitra-bhumi) as well as holy land (punya-bhumi). Such conceptualization of nationalism paved the way for questioning the loyalties of other religious communities – particularly Christians and Muslims – as their holy land is not in India. This remains an unresolved tension in the imagination of Hindu nationalism on the basis of Hindutva which is based on blood ties and territory. However, for all practical purposes, these two terms – Hindutva and Hindu nationalism – basically used to refer to define Indian nationalism in terms of beliefs, culture and religious practices of the majoritarian Hindu community. The BJP as a political party derives much of its inspiration from the RSS (Anderson & Damle, 2019). The RSS, since its formation in 1925 and with its various affiliates both in pre- and post-Independence India such as Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP, 1949), Vishva Hindu Parishad VHP (1966), Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS, 1955), Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram VKA (1952) and Seva Bharati (2003), has become the most popular cultural organization in the country, particularly under the leadership of its second head known as Sarsanghchalak M. S. Golwalkar (1906–73) or Guruji.4 He focused on the mobilization of Hindu community. Its shakhas and various training programmes geared towards inculcating the value of martial race among the Hindu brethren. However, despite its popularity, it remains a cultural and apolitical organization. In fact, it refused the V. D. Savarkar’s invitation to align with Hindu Mahasabha to politically work for a strong Hindu nation. However, on the eve of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 by a Hindu fanatic Nathuram Godse (1910–1949) and subsequent ban on its functioning, the RSS decided to join hands with Hindu Mahasabha leader Syama Prasad Mukherjee (1901–53) in 1951 to form the BJS. The BJS

262  Mithilesh Kumar Jha Table 12.1  Electoral Performance of the BJS in Lok Sabha Elections (1952–80) Year

1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 (as a part 1980 (as a part of of Janata Party) Janata Party)

Seats won 3 Vote share (%) 3.1

4 5.9

14 35 22 90 6.4 9.3 7.3 –

14 –

Source: Diwakar (2017).

was opposed to both the Congress and the left and positioned itself as the nationalist right-wing party in Indian politics. Its organizational structure resembles the functioning of the RSS (Graham, 1987, 1990; Hasan, 2001; Lahiry, 2005). The party was dependent on the Sangh for support and most of its members and leaders were loyal to the RSS. It became much more explicit after the death of Syama Prasad Mukherjee in 1953. The BJS politics revolved around the issues of Hindu interests, making Hindi the national language, abolition of cow slaughter, Swadeshi, national security and strong stand against Pakistan. The BJS had steady rise in its electoral performance both in terms of number of seats as well as vote share (see Table 12.1). However, with its support base limited to upper-caste Brahmans and Baniyas in Hindi-speaking northern and north-western states, politically, it remained a marginal force in Indian politics till it joined the JD in the 1970s. The JD helped in facilitating the BJS to become a mainstream political party in Indian politics. It won 90 out of 238 seats won by the JD in 1977 general election. The BJS was also a major constituent partner in forming Janata governments in various states such as Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. It was, perhaps, as a result of their association with the JD that the BJS managed to broaden their ideology and since the formation of the BJP in 1980 their policies have been characterized by a flexibility although its core remains that of the Hindu nationalism or Hindutva. After the formation of BJP, they claimed to inherit the ideological legacy of the JD. Initially, the BJP strived towards distancing itself from the legacies of both the BJS and the RSS to project its broad-based liberal outlook and to forge alliances with other political parties to provide alternative to the Congress. And in that spirit, it included leaders in the party who had no previous association with Hindu nationalism or the RSS. Ram Jethmalani (1923–2019), a prominent lawyer; Shanti Bhushan (b. 1925), minister of justice in the Janata government; and Sikander Bakht (1918–2004), a member of the Congress (O) were such leaders included and were given prominent positions in the party. However, later in the mid-1980s, after the debacle of 1984 election in which party won merely two seats a shift occurred tilting the Party towards the ideology and organizational strategies of the BJS and the RSS. The BJP, a right-wing political party, is largely inspired by the ideology of Hindu nationalism and Hindutva and is based on the culture ethos and practices of the majority Hindu communities in India (Suri, 2005). It’s ideology

Bharatiya Janata Party  263 is shaped by the philosophy of Deendayal Upadhyaya’s (1916–68) Integral Humanism that avoids the binary of capitalism and communism and embrace Savarkar’s theory of Hindutva. Integral humanism believes that a man is constitutive of body, mind, soul and intellect which defines his completeness or wholeness. Moreover, a good social set-up or a society should satisfy individual’s spiritual as well as material needs. It also defines nationalism in organic sense and argue that it should be a decisive factor in national politics. It thus regards society and nation superior to state and politics. The core ideology and philosophy of the BJP could be summed up in following terms which is also known as the five core commitments (Pancha Nishthas) of the party (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2004): 1. Nationalism and national integration 2. Gandhian socialism 3. Democracy 4. Positive secularism, that is, sarva dharma samabhava 5. Value-based politics Although there was some objection to inclusion of Gandhian socialism as a core commitment of the party as many argued that Deendayal Upadhyaya philosophy encompasses Gandhian philosophy of Sarvodaya and Antyodaya and need not be mentioned separately. However, its founding president Atal Bihari Vajpayee prevailed and Gandhian socialism remains one of the stated core commitments of the party. One could study the functioning, policies and programmes of the BJP in the light of these five core commitments. Nationalism and value-based politics distinguished the BJP from the other political parties in the 1980s and the 1990s. It was seen by the large number of middle class in India as ‘a party with difference’. The BJP, combined with its ideological coherence and flexible strategies, has capitalized on this image which is reflected in its steady and sustained rise in Indian politics. The party has also shown flexibility in embracing liberalization, privatization and globalization to bring about economic prosperity and development (Nag, 2014; Singh & Saxena, 2008). In the recent decades BJP’s ideology is characterised by the combination of Hindutva and developmentalism (Hasan, 2001). In fact, development seemed to triumph over the politics of Hindutva during 2014 election campaign in BJP’s attempt to reach out to cross sections of Indian society. It yields rich electoral dividend for the party. Such changes are reflected in the slogans like sabka saath, sabka vikas or sabka saath, sabka vikas, sabka viswas. BJP in the 1980s–2000s: Ideological and Organizational Consolidation This first phase of ideological and organizational consolidation of the BJP can be further divided into two phases. In the first, between its formation

264  Mithilesh Kumar Jha in 1980 and 1986 when Vajpayee was the President it struggled to decide on whether to continue with the legacy of the JD or to reclaim the ideology of Hindu nationalism as represented by the BJS and the RSS. This struggled continued one way or another till 2014. The second phase started with L. K. Advani becoming the party president in 1986. He restored the ties between the BJP and the RSS and appointed many leaders from the RSS as secretaries of the Party. Together, these two phases, thus exhibited two faces of the BJP – moderate face represented by Vajpayee which helped the party forge alliances with various regional political parties; and militant face represented by L. K. Advani which helped the party in its ideological and organizational consolidation and expansion. Under the leadership of Vajpayee, the BJP started its political journey in the 1980s by emphasizing JD’s legacy and Gandhian socialism. It tried to shed many of its controversial stated policies and programmes. To seek wider support and greater acceptability among the mainstream political parties it sought to present the liberal and the moderate face of the BJP. The party managed to forge alliances with many regional parties subsequently. It also initiated a new debate in the country on secularism. Secularism as an ideal is article of faith in the Indian constitution. All political parties in India must clearly express their allegiance to Indian constitution and thereby abide by the value of secularism. However, the ways it had been followed and practiced by the Congress party, many saw it as a tool for minority appeasement and blatantly anti-majority community. The BJP under the leadership of L. K. Advani characterized Congress’s policy of secularism as ‘pseudo secularism’. In contrast to Congress policy, they asserted BJP’s commitment to ‘positive secularism’ which meant sarva dharma samabhava (equal respect for all religions) and did not discriminate between majority and minority community. Shah Bano case during the Rajiv Gandhi tenure provided ample opportunity to the BJP to criticize Congress’s policies on secularism.5 Similarly, the BJP also mobilized public opinion on the issue of Uniform Civil Code mandated by Article 44 of the constitution, abrogation of Article 370 that gives Jammu and Kashmir special status in Indian republic. Another, issue that helped the BJP was controversy surrounding Bofors gun.6 Huge corruption charges was labelled against the Rajiv Gandhi government and that became a huge election issue during the 1989 general election (Malik & Singh, 1992). After Advani took over the charge of the party in 1986, he played a decisive role in improving the electoral prospect of the BJP. The BJP managed to raise the corruption involved in Bofors gun procurement and presented itself as an anti-corruption crusader. It helped the BJP to present its image as ‘a party with difference’. It should be considered in the context of the 1980s and the 1990s when the Congress was on decline and various splintering groups of the JD could not provide the viable alternative to the Congress. The BJP, in such a context with its disciplined organization and ideological coherence, provided as the possible alternative to the Congress. The BJP is still seen by many political parties as communal, and, therefore, it has remained

Bharatiya Janata Party  265 somewhat an isolated force in the Indian politics. However, since 1984, the BJP experienced steady growth in its electoral performance. The BJP consistently increased its seat and vote share (see Table  12.2). However, these were not enough to form the government at the centre. And therefore, in the circumstances of coalition era political instability it sought political alliances with the regional and socialist parties. The BJP was the first to sought political alliances and formed National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1998. Congress realized the reality of alliance much later in the early-2000s when it formed the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). However, many of the constituent parties of the NDA were apprehensive of its communal outlook, which cost the BJP dearly. In their alliance with the BJP, these parties feared that they might lose their secular votes, particularly from the minorities. This led many parties such as the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), the National Conference (NC), the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) to desert the NDA later. Although in the initial years the BJP suffered, subsequently, it forged strong alliances with the regional parties and also increased its own electoral performances (see Table 12.2). It became the single largest party in the lower house of the parliament after 1996 general election. It led the first full-term non-Congress coalition government at the centre between 1999 and 2004. Advani’s Rath Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya in September 1990 helped the BJP garner the majority votes. The BJP formed governments in Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh during 1989–91 (Diwakar, 2017, p. 84). It was largely the result of Ram Janmabhoomi agitations and mobilization of Hindu community. Ayodhya movement was perhaps the biggest mass movement in the history of independent India. The construction of Ram temple in Ayodhya, since then remains the central issue in BJP’s electoral manifestoes. It helped the BJP consolidate the ideological space once occupied by the Congress Party and the factionalism of the splintering Janata parties. It immensely benefitted the BJP to consolidate its ideological position in Indian politics. It supported, along with the Communists, the V. P. Singh government; however, after 1989 election, it withdrew its support in 1990, when Lalu Prasad Yadav government in Bihar, a constituent partner of the V. P. Singh government, arrested L. K. Advani to prevent his Rath Yatra to Ayodhya. It was perceived as a hardliner Hindutva party. This image of the party got further hardened after the demolition of the 15thcentury mosque, Babri Masjid, in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992. In response, Table 12.2  BJP Electoral Performance in General Elections (1984–2004) Years

1984

1989

1991

1996

1998

1999

2004

Seats Won Vote Share (%)

2 8

85 11

120 20

161 20

182 26

182 26

138 22

Source: Diwakar (2017, p. 81).

266  Mithilesh Kumar Jha BJP’s governments in the state of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh were dismissed by the Narsimha Rao government at the centre. It further hardened the Hindutva image of the BJP. However, in the national politics the BJP followed the strategy of accommodation and compromise to get new alliances partners. L. K. Advani, despite his good rapport with the RSS and immense popularity within the BJP, seen as a Hindutva hard liner; the BJP projected Vajpayee as the Prime Ministerial candidate to ensure broad based support. Later it helped the BJP in forging alliances with various political parties. In this phase party experienced various ups and downs. It found it difficult to find political alliances. The party’s support base remains limited to upper-caste Brahmans and Baniyas, and geographically, it was still dominant only in the North and north-western Hindispeaking provinces. Many regional or state parties joined and moved out of the NDA coalition led by the BJP for fear of losing their secular votes. Vajpayee became prime minister three times: in 1996 for 13 days; for 13 months in 1998; and for a full five-year term in 1999 until 2004. It was under the Vajpayee government that India became a nuclear power country after the Pokhran test in 1998. It also successfully fought the Kargil War against the intruders from Pakistan. Vajpayee’s attempts to forge peace with Pakistan and his Kashmir policy were widely appreciated. He was the key to form and lead alliances with other political parties. However, there was on and off tussle between the moderate policies of the Vajpayee and the RSS. Vajpayee had a towering presence within and outside the party. Nonetheless, the BJP, according to the political scientist E. Sridharan (2005) followed a threeprong overlapping strategies between 1989 and 2004 to expand its political base. First, it worked on gaining maximum support in the regions with maximum number of assemblies and Lok Sabha seats. Second, it tried to displace or become the main competitor of Congress in states like Rajasthan, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. All these states now see government formations alternating between the Congress and the BJP. And finally, through alliances with regional or caste/ethnicity-based political parties, it sought to expand its base beyond the Hindi-speaking states to South and North-East India. All these strategies worked effectively for the BJP in the subsequent years. However, for the 2004 general election, the party launched the ‘India Shining’ debate, which proved to be disastrous for it. Phase of Transition: The Rise of the BJP as a Dominating Force in the Indian Politics After the debacle of 2004 when BJP’s number of seats came down to 138 from 182 in 1999 and vote share to 22 per cent from 26 per cent, there was lot of soul searching and revisiting the party’s connection with the RSS. Within the party it was believed that the BJP during the Vajpayee government in its attempt to garner popular support and alliances with the other political parties compromised with the core ideology of Hindutva and Hindu

Bharatiya Janata Party  267 nationalism. However, very little course correction was done and its performance was more or less repeated in 2009 general election under the leadership of L. K. Advani. It won 116 seats in the Lok Sabha and its vote share came further down to 19 per cent. This dismal performance of the party was partly result of its misreading of the public mood in the country which resulted in the debacle of ‘India shining’ campaign. The BJP was so confident of its victory, largely driven by the assembly elections results in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat, that they preponed the Lok Sabha election by six months. Such dismal performance of the BJP was also the result of Congress forging alliances with the ideological compatible political parties and forming the UPA. In the 2004 Lok Sabha election, the UPA won 222 seats with the Congress alone winning 145 seats. The Congress Party formed the government with the outside support of the left parties. Some of the popular and progressive legislations during the UPA-I like National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, later renamed as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the Right to Information Act (RTI) and the Right to Education (RTE) helped it expand its social base among the poor and marginalized sections of Indian society. And in 2009, more or less, the result of 2004 was repeated with UPA’s increased tally of 262 seats; out of it, the Congress alone won 206 seats. It received the support extended from outside by many other parties and the UPA-II was formed. During this period, many allies of the BJP in the NDA deserted it. However, after its unprecedented victory in 2014 with a clear majority on its own winning 282 seats in the Lok Sabha (Wallace, 2015), the BJP not only bounce back to the power at the centre. But it has also initiated a new debate about the beginning of new phase of party system in India. It was first time in nearly three decades that a single party was given full majority. The last time such electoral outcomes happened was in 1984 when Congress after the assassination of Indira Gandhi was given absolute majority by the people of India. However, 2014 victory of the BJP was the result of a combination of factors. First, there were anti-incumbency and huge corruption charges against the UPA-II. Many analysts also accused the UPA-II for policy paralysis. Second, the BJP declared Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister candidate. His rise from humble background to becoming Chief Minister of Gujarat for fifteen years, combined with his focus on effective governance and economic development, gave the BJP added advantage. Third, the party focused on the positive campaigning such as ‘minimum government, maximum governance’, new liberal economic reform with slogans like ‘government has no business to be in business’, decisive and strong leadership and so on. The BJP strategically avoided focusing on its core but controversial issues such as the construction of Ram Temple in Ayodhya or Uniform Civil Code or the abrogation of Article 370 during the campaign of 2014 general election. The party’s focus on more development was reflected in the slogans like sabka saath, sabka vikas (support from all, development for all), toilets over temples and acchhe din aanewale hain (good days are coming). The BJP

268  Mithilesh Kumar Jha Table 12.3 BJP Electoral Performance in General Elections (2009–19) Year

2009

2014

2019

Seats won Vote share (%)

116 19

282 31

303 37

Source: Election Commission of India.

managed to appeal to every sections of Indian society and recorded its best electoral performance. Congress’s loss in terms of number of seats it won has been huge. It was Congress’s worst ever performance, winning only 44 seats. The BJP, since 2014, has been almost on a winning spree. It has won the majority of the assembly elections. The party has now managed to have a strong foothold in the north-east and partially in the South as well. Its 2019 victory in the Parliament election has been even more spectacular. The BJP is no longer a Hindi heartland and Brahman-Baniya party. One of its remarkable features since the 1980s has been its ability to reinvent and readjust itself. It has not only maintained its relevance among its core supporters but also brought within its fold many new groups and communities. It has successfully mobilized the aspirational middle class in post liberalized India and also managed to form a formidable alliance among the non-upper-caste OBCs, SCs, STs and even religious minorities (Hasan, 2001; Mehta, 2022; Palshikar et al., 2017; Yadav & Patnaik, 2022). Its ability to form a social cohesion among these communities has led many commentators to argue that caste-based identity politics has run its course in Indian politics. The BJP managed to successfully build a powerful narrative around nationalism and development. Another strategy that helped the BJP expand beyond Hindi-speaking regions is its ability to forge alliance. Alliances helped the BJP in not just consolidating its position among its core area of influence but also in making its presence felt in newer geographies. It went ahead with forming political alliances with regional or state parties much before the Congress did and other political parties realized the value or necessity of alliances during the uncertain decades of the 1980s and the 1990s. And it is through these alliance with the regional/state parties that the BJP has managed to expand its footprint in newer territories and also among newer social groups, particularly among the OBCs and the Dalits. Oliver Heath (1999) has analysed the regional expansion of the BJP in the following terms. He classifies three categories of states according to the sphere of BJP’s influence. In the primary states he keeps Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Traditionally, a strong base for the BJP, the party has retained its prominent position in these states. In the secondary states he keeps Karnataka, Bihar, Maharashtra, Goa, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Assam, Punjab and Haryana. In these states BJPs growth has been phenomenal. And finally, in the tertiary states, Heath keeps states such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu,

Bharatiya Janata Party  269 West Bengal and the north-eastern states. One could make some slight modification in the list of these states for the BJP in the light of its recent electoral performances. The first, primary category of states still hold more or less true. From the secondary states, Karnataka, Assam and Odisha could be now safely put among the first-category states, that is, primary states for the BJP. Among the tertiary states, BJP’s growth in the recent years has been phenomenal in most of the north-eastern states, particularly in Tripura, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. It has eventually replaced the left parties and the Congress as the main opposition party to the ruling AITC in West Bengal. According to Heath, there have been decline among the upper castes support to the BJP. Since 1991, there have been 10 per cent decline in upper castes support to the BJP. However, this is sufficiently compensated by the increasing support the BJP has received from the OBC, SC and ST  communities. Thus, the BJP has now obtained a cross section of support base both socially and geographically. Increasingly, the party is striving towards maintaining its core support base both in terms of social demography and geographical territory. The BJP under the leadership of Narendra Modi and Amit Shah has achieved many milestones. It is now the largest political party in the world in terms of membership. It has become a formidable ideological and political force in Indian politics. Clean image, trustworthy and decisive leadership of Narendra Modi combined with the organizational strength of the RSS and effective electoral campaign strategies of the party have made the BJP a dominant and some would argue a ‘hegemonic’ and ‘system defining’ party in the country. It is under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and Party President Amit Shah that the BJP has come back to power in New Delhi with resounding victory in 2019. Their decisive and aggressive campaign strategies are based on the twin ideology of Hindu nationalism and development. And its electoral fortune is the result of a number of factors going BJP’s way. It has a strong and decisive leadership, its organizational and economic resources are matchless, and it has effective control over media narratives. The BJP started its 2014 campaign with a crusade against the black money and equating the Congress with corruption. Its many leaders expressed about the idea of the Congress mukt Bharat (India free from the Congress) by creating a new India with the slogan of sabka saath, sabka vikas, sabka vishwas. However, in 2018 state assembly elections, the BJP has suffered a major setback in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh. The Congress also did well in Gujarat and managed to form government in Karnataka for a brief period with JD (Secular). Besides undertaking various new initiatives in terms of welfare programmes such as Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana, Jan Dhan Yojana, Mudra Loan schemes, Ayushman Bharat, Make in India, abolition of triple talaq, abrogation of Article 370, National Register of Citizens and the Citizenship Amendment Act, the BJP government has also taken many bold and far-reaching measures/decisions such as demonetization and goods and services tax in order to bring about transparency, formalize economy and curb black money. However, growing unemployment combined with

270

Mithilesh Kumar Jha

agrarian crisis and economic slowdown are major challenges before the BJP government. There is growing unease among its many allies. Although there is better and effective coordination among the various frontal organizations of the BJP and the RSS such as ABVP BMS and BJYM, there is growing tension amongst its erstwhile allies such as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), the Janata Dal (United) (JD (U)) and the Shiv Sena. However, the party under the leadership of Amit Shah and Modi has sustained its expansions both among the new social groups such as the OBCs, STs and SCs and in the newer territories, particularly in East and North-East India. In other words, today, the BJP resembles the catch-all characteristic of the old Congress with only difference in its ideology of right of the centre instead of Congress’s left of the centre.

Ideological Matrix from Left to Right

Summing Up The rise of the BJP since the 1990s has been spectacular in Indian politics. It has far-reaching implications on Indian politics and democracy both ideologically and in terms of governance. The party has undergone a dramatic geographical and political expansion and many transformations. From its orthodox, restricted and localized presence in a few northern and northwestern states in the 1980s and the 1990s to its territorial and pollical expansion through making new allies, the party has established itself as the main political force in Indian politics with mass national following. In the early decades after Independence, the BJS provided a limited but solid ideological and social foundation for the BJP. Janata experiment provided the BJS the muchneeded political acceptability among the mainstream political parties. After its formation in 1980, Vajpayee and Advani provided inspiring leadership to the party and its image of ‘the party with difference’ garnered electoral dividend in many states and in general elections too. The combined leadership of Modi and Shah besides a more effective coordination between the RSS and

Bharatiya Janata Party  271 the party has made the BJP a formidable force in Indian politics. For the first time in 25 years, the BJP has achieved absolute majority of seats in the Lok Sabha on its own in 2014 and repeated it again with even more seats in the general election of 2019. Thus, the BJP has truly become a national party and formidable force in Indian politics (Mehta, 2022; Yadav & Patnaik, 2022). In recent years, many scholars have begun to argue about the BJP becoming a system-defining ‘hegemonic’ party. And with its rise, there has been a tectonic ideological shift in the Indian politics towards right of the centre. Scholars such as Palshikar (2015) and Jaffrelot (2010) have characterized this phase of politics in India as ‘democracy with majoritarian sensibilities’. Since the 1990s, there has been a steady rise in BJP’s support base both in term of social – demographic profile of its supporters and also in terms of territorial – geographic expansion. It is no longer a Brahman-Baniya ‘Hindi Belt’ party. In fact, there has been gradual but continuous decline of upper-caste support base to the BJP and increasing support among the OBCs, SCs, STs and even religious minorities. However, these new supporters pose a challenge to the BJP. In terms of its support base, it relies on non-upper-caste groups. It also provides them representation. However, its leadership still comes from the upper castes. In order to sustain its support base, the BJP needs to give more leadership positions to these groups and communities. Organizationally also, there is a challenge of coordination between the party and the RSS and its numerous affiliates. Although in terms of organizational strength, its ability to mobilize men and resources has been formidable, according to scholars like James Manor, it has been largely a myth. And it is true that the RSS remains the major source of BJP’s organizational strength. Another challenge before the BJP is to maintain cordial relationships with its allies. Besides its ideological clarity and decisive and dedicated leadership and followers, it is with the support of its allies that the BJP has made inroads among newer social groups and territories. Its growth, particularly in secondary and tertiary states, is the result of its alliances with the regional or state parties. However, as the BJP grows from strength to strength, its former allies are turning out to be its adversaries, be it the AITC, the National Conference, the TDP, the JD (U), the Shiromani Akali Dal and now the Shiv Sena. BJP’s recent electoral success, particularly at the national level, could be sustained only when it truly obtains the support and trust of every groups and communities. To do that, it needs to move beyond its rhetoric of development and perform. It needs to take the allies and other opposition parties on board on major socio-political and economic issues confronting the nation. The BJP is now truly a dominant party in Indian politics. Its functioning, policies and decisions could have far-reaching implications on the very nature of democratic politics and state in India. It must ensure transparency, accountability and inner-party democracy to strengthen constitutional democracy in the country. Developmentalism with Hindu nationalism so far remains the trump card for the BJP. However, its ability to tackle complex challenges of governing

272  Mithilesh Kumar Jha a vast, plural and diverse country like India shall determine its future prospects. Now, the BJP is truly a dominant national party and a formidable challenge to the Congress and many state/regional parties. Its phenomenal growth has made the possibilities of third front as a viable alternative to the Congress or the BJP more or less redundant in contemporary Indian politics. Although many scholars have argued that the BJP has become the ‘hegemonic’ and system-defining party in Indian politics, it could be, in my assessment, premature as yet. First, it is true that Congress’s loss is huge in terms number of seats it won in 2014 and 2019 general elections. These have been exacerbated due to its organizational weakness and leadership crisis. However, its vote share has not changed much. In fact, the Congress has increased its vote share and number of seats in 2019 elections marginally from 19.31 per cent to 19.5 per cent. Although not enough, it is not so insignificant to write it off. The BJP has also toned down its clarion call of Congress mukt Bharat that it so jubilantly emphasized during the 2014 and many assembly election campaigns in its aftermath. Considering its recent performances in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Karnataka, it would be incorrect to dismiss the Congress. Contrary to popular perception, the BJP has cut into the votes of other regional and national parties, particularly the left and the Samajwadi Party. Second, the BJP has so far capitalized on its image of ‘the party with a difference’. It has managed to articulate most effectively the aspirations of the middle class. Its support base so far has been based on its perception and promises. Its assessment is yet to be done on the basis of its performance, at least at the national level. That alone will determine the status of the BJP as a ‘hegemonic’ or ‘system-defining’ party in Indian politics. Notes 1 The JD was a conglomeration of various political parties from different ideological backgrounds with JP as their leader. Its constituent members were the Bharatiya Lok Dal, the BJS, the Socialist Party and the Congress (O). These parties have very little in common except their opposition to Indira Gandhi led Congress. The JD experiment collapsed in 1980 and resulted in various splintering groups which dominated the politics in many states and at the national level in the 1980s and the 1990s. 2 A right-wing Hindu cultural organization formed in 1925 by K. B. Hedgewar with its headquarters in Nagpur. 3 To know more specifically about the notion of Hindutva, see Savarkar (1969 [1923]). 4 See Golwalkar’s (2000) Bunch of Thoughts, first published in 1966; and also his work, We or Our Nationhood Defined (1939) to understand the vision and politics of the RSS. 5 Rajiv Gandhi government, in 1985, took the legislative route to reverse the Supreme Court judgment that gave maintenance right to Shah Bano, which many among the minority community thought as against the Muslim Personal law. This act of Rajiv Gandhi government was projected by the BJP as Muslim appeasement policy of the Congress.

Bharatiya Janata Party  273 6 Bofors gun was procured by Rajiv Gandhi government for strengthening national defense which helped India during the Kargil War in 1999. However, the corruption charges refused to die down and prolonged investigation over decades failed to prove any charges. It helped many parties improve their electoral prospects.

References Anderson, W., & Damle, S. (2019). The brotherhood in saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Hindu revivalism. Penguin. Baxter, C. (1969). The Jana Sangh: A biography of an Indian political party. University of Pennsylvania Press. Bharatiya Janata Party. (2004). Constitution and rules. BJP Publication. Chakrabarty, B.,  & Jha, B. K. (2020). Hindu nationalism in India: Ideology and politics. Routledge. Chhibber, P. K., & Verma, R. (2019). The rise of the second dominant party system in India: BJP’s new social coalition in 2019. Studies in Indian Politics, 7(2), 131–148. Diwakar, R. (2017). Party system in India. Oxford University Press. Freeden, M. (2003). Ideology: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. Golwalkar, M. S. (1939). We or our nationhood defined. Bharat Publications. Golwalkar, M. S. (2000 [1966]). Bunch of thoughts. Sahitya Sindhu Prakashan. Graham, B. D. (1987). The Jana Sangh and bloc politics, 1967–80. The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 25(3), 258–266. Graham, B. D. (1990). Hindu nationalism and Indian politics: The origins and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge University Press. Hasan, Z. (Ed.). (2001). Parties and party politics in India. Oxford University Press. Heath, O. (1999). Anatomy of BJP’s rise to power: Social, regional and political expansion in 1990s. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(35–36), 2511–2517. Heywood, A. (2017). Political ideologies: An introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. Jaffrelot, C. (2010). Religion, caste and politics in India. Primus Books. Lahiry, S. (2005). Jana Sangha and Bharatiya Janata Party: A comparative assessment of their philosophy and strategy and their proximity with the other members of the Sangha Parivar. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 66(4), 831–850. Malik, Y. K.,  & Singh, V. B. (1992). Bharatiya Janata Party: An alternative to the congress (I)? Asian Survey, 32(4), 318–336. Mehta, N. (2022). The new BJP: Modi and the making of the world’s largest political party. Westland. Nag, K. (2014). The saffron tide: The rise of the BJP. Rupa Publications. Palshikar, S. (2015). The BJP and Hindu nationalism: Centrist politics and majoritarian impulses. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(4), 719–735. Palshikar, S. (2018). Towards hegemony: BJP beyond electoral dominance. ­Economic & Political Weekly, 53(33), 36–42. Palshikar, S., Kumar, S., & Lodha, S. (2017). Electoral politics in India: The resurgence of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Routledge. Palshikar, S., Suri, K. C.,  & Yadav, Y. (Eds.). (2014). Party competition in Indian states: Electoral politics in post-congress polity. Oxford University Press. Savarkar, V. D. (1969 [1923]). Essentials of Hindutva. Veer Savarkar Prakashan. Singh, M., & Saxena, R. (2008). Indian politics: Contemporary issues and concerns. Princeton Hall of India Pvt. Ltd.

274  Mithilesh Kumar Jha Sridharan, E. (2005). Coalition strategies and the BJP’s expansion, 1989–2004. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 43(2), 194–221. Suri, K. C. (2005). Parties under pressure: Political parties in India since independence. Project report on state of democracy in South Asia. Lokniti, Centre for the Study of Developing Society. Vaishnav, M., & Hintson, J. (2019, September 5). The dawn of India’s fourth party system. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wallace, P. (2015). India’s 2014 elections: A Modi-led BJP sweep. Sage Publications. Yadav, B., & Patnaik, I. (2022). The rise of the BJP: The making of the world’s largest political party. Penguin Books, Viking.

Section III

Political Processes II Contested Determinants of Indian Politics

13 Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa

Introduction Societal churnings are based on material exchange among individuals and communities that may additionally at times also gain social values. Caste is the most basic identity of Indian society, which generally determines individual position in society and works as a crucial basis for community mobilization. Therefore, any study on Indian politics is incomplete and incomprehensible without a dedicated study of caste – by far the most dominant social identity that people in India hold. The caste identity attained at the ‘accident of birth’ of a person determines their sociopolitical situation in our society and sets their life contours, including but not limited to their economic and political prospects. In this context, we set out to study the interface of caste and politics in India and learn the changing nature of caste politics in India’s contemporary history. Understanding Caste: A Sociological and Political Perspective When we hear the term ‘caste’, we often think of something traditional, which we only refer to if asked in any official application forms. Caste or jati is a defining feature of the Hindu social order that tells about the traditional identity that is still relevant in India for marriage or affirmative action. However, this is the limited understanding of caste; therefore, it is important to understand caste in various disciplines. The history of the Indian caste system takes us back to the Rig Veda, where Hindu society is divided into four varnas: Brahmans (the priests), Kshatriyas (the warriors); Vaishyas (the tradesmen) – these three are dvijas or twice-born category – and the Shudras (servants). The untouchables are not part of this society and are considered ‘outcasts’ (Jaffrelot, 2010a, 2010b). The Indian caste system thrives on a belief in the caste hierarchy, which reflects (im)purity of castes and fixed occupation and maintains ascriptive social stratification and endogamous marriage norms that maintain this social arrangement (Ghurye, 1991). Although it is important to note here that while caste and caste system are a function of the Hindu social order, other religious communities in India DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-17

278  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa have not remained untouched by it. The cultural impact of caste as a social practice can be witnessed among almost all religions of India. Islam and Christianity do not have a hierarchical system like caste, but Indian Muslims or Indian Christians follow a caste system where this hierarchy is visible. Other religious groups have adopted the cultural impact of the hegemonic social practice. However, this should not be confused with the presence of sects within these religions. For example, it is noteworthy that Shia and Sunni are the two sects in Islam and not the castes. Sociology and social anthropology brought out various conclusions regarding the Indian caste system: one, caste was seen as an integral part of Indian Hindu society and through caste categories, colonial rulers had tried to make sense of India; two, ‘caste was both an institution and an ideology’ as institutionally, caste was a structure of social stratification in the social and economic spheres where statuses and positions were organized and ideologically, it was a value system that legitimized this structure of social inequality; three, caste was viewed as ‘an epitome of traditional society and a closed system’ in which occupational specialization or division of labour made generations of individuals to hold on to similar kind of occupation (Jodhka, 2010). Louis Dumont, an eminent social anthropologist and Indologist, studied the caste system through the method of structuralism in which he lays emphasis on attributes of caste and says that caste was an ideology whose essential value is ‘hierarchy’ which is not a form of stratification but a special form of inequality that structures the superiority of pure over impure (Dumont, 1998). It is important to note that ‘hierarchy’ was an essential element in the caste system. It positions the castes from high to low and inspires the low Hindu castes to follow high castes’ norms or practices to upgrade their position. This idea was systematically presented by M. N. Srinivas, who has popularized the concept of ‘Sanskritization’. Sanskritization is the process by which low Hindu castes or tribes ‘change their customs, rituals, ideology and way of life’ toward high or upper or twice-born castes for upward mobility in the caste hierarchy (Srinivas, 1962). With this understanding of caste, it was seen as an impediment to the progress of independent India. The framers of the Indian Constitution realized that ‘caste’ and the notion of ‘equality’ are two problematic binaries that cannot be adjusted together. Thus, they rejected ‘caste’, which represents traditional Indian society, for the sake of ‘political democracy’, which is the modern value for the newly established nation state. This rejection is clearly reflected in the words of B. R. Ambedkar, the chairman of India’s Constituent Assembly, he writes under the head ‘Caste and Nation’: ‘You cannot build anything on the foundation of caste. You cannot build up a nation; you cannot build up a morality. Anything you will build on the foundation of caste will crack and will never be a whole’ (quoted in Shah, 2004, p. 74). Equality of status and opportunity were seen as important ingredients to undo the discrimination of the past faced by Indian people due to the caste system and provide these historically disadvantaged groups a fair chance

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  279 on equal terms to participate in democracy. The Constitution of India was drafted to successfully provide a shield to the masses to fight the obstacles in their life brought in by their ascriptive identity ‘caste’. Article 15 of the Constitution is placed under Part III, ‘Fundamental Rights’ (Right to Equality), which states that ‘The State shall not discriminate against any citizens on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them’. The project to modernize India aimed at getting rid of traditional, that is, ‘caste’. However, these commendable aims and achievements have not meant an end of caste in the sociopolitical life of India. Instead, caste has become a much more active institution today than it ever was in the past, for which electoral process and competitive politics are deeply responsible (Jodhka, 2010). The sociologists and political scientists initiated the task of understanding caste by viewing it above its monotonous traditional understanding and capturing the gradual changes in it. The western ideas and modern technology introduced by the British raj/imperialism had initiated the transformation in caste – strengthening it – from the above and outside (Rudolph, 1965, pp.  976–977). M. N. Srinivas (1962) argues that rather than disappearing with the process of modernization, a ‘horizontal consolidation’ in caste was taking place. As the modern technology of communication like the electric telegraph, free press, printing and postal services of vernacular newspapers and books and transportation like railway and bus enabled caste representatives or leaders living in different parts of the country to exchange their ideas and issues and conduct conferences, they form cooperatives and increase solidarity (Srinivas, 1962, pp. 74–75). Llyod I. Rudolph (1965) argues that this transformation in caste from above and outside and from below and within. This consolidation reincarnated caste in a modern form as the ‘caste associations’, which become a carrier of internal cultural reform and external social change (Rudolph, 1965, pp. 981–982). Why did caste not disappear? What did the caste associations do? Caste associations did two important things: one, they united the similar castes by bringing together dispersed and isolated jatis or subcastes and strengthen and organized them into one thread; two, it has elevated caste consciousness, broke the ascriptive occupational ties, educated the low and middle castes to participate into politics effectively and gain decision making voice and power in the state at different government levels (Rudolph, 1965, p. 982). Membership in these caste associations is based not only on ‘birth’ but also on voluntary ‘choice’, which blurred the line between natural and voluntary associations (Rudolph, 1965, pp. 982–984). At the same time, natural associations based on ethnicity, language, religion and locality have not been completely assimilated or dissolved but played a decisive role in politics. Rudolph and Rudolph (1967) believed that caste in this new form as caste associations was an agent of modernity in a traditional society like India and it has contributed to the success of political democracy by setting up the stage for ‘communication’, ‘representation’ and ‘leadership’. In this process of self-transformation, caste has become the means to level the inequalities

280  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa produced by hierarchy by destroying its moral basis. Also, caste has become the defining feature of modern Indian society. Political scientist Rajni Kothari (1970) in his celebrated work Caste in Indian Politics discusses caste organizations or what he calls ‘caste federations’, which seems somewhat similar to Rudolph’s (1965) ‘caste associations’. Kothari, however, presents a more extensive theoretical framework to analyse the unique Indian phenomenon regarding the interaction of the modern democratic system and traditional caste system and he uses the term ‘politicization of caste’ to describe it. The Politicization of Caste Why is it necessary to understand caste in relation to politics? This is an important question that demands further understanding of caste and its interaction with politics. Generally, this interaction is understood in negative terms, especially in the context of electoral politics and stated as ‘casteism in politics’. But Rajni Kothari (1970) argues that those who complain of ‘casteism in politics’ are conceptually unclear about the nature of politics or the nature of the caste system. It is not the ‘casteism in politics’ but the ‘politicization of caste’. In this process, both the forms of caste and the forms of politics are brought nearer to each other and changes take place (Kothari, 1970, pp. 4–5). He argued, By drawing the caste system into its web of organization, politics finds material for its articulation and moulds it into its own design. In making politics their sphere of activity, caste and kin groups, on the other hand, get a chance to assert their identity and to strive for positions. It is important to note that there was neither the total transformation of the caste system through its involvement in politics nor was the complete polarization between the caste system and the political system. Instead, in the political system, it was a change in the context and level of ‘political operation’ and in the caste system, it was ‘a shift in the critical criteria of social awareness’; further, such awareness is mobilized and organized through structural differentiation (Kothari, 1970, pp. 6–7). For instance, the declining importance of ‘pollution’ in defining caste hierarchy and diminishing in the caste roles defined in ‘jajmani system’ did not reflect the destruction of the caste system but a shift in social awareness. How did politics and caste come nearer? Kothari (1970, pp.  13–14) explains that in the process of modernization in India, new institutions offered a liberal education, economic opportunity, administrative patronage and positions of power and the new leadership drove the articulate sections of society into the modernist network. In doing so, leadership received the basis of support which expanded from urban to rural areas and from one caste to another (Kothari, 1970). Here, it is clearly visible that the democratic politics of necessity tends towards the involvement of traditional structure

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  281 and its leadership. Kothari further clarifies that two results followed simultaneously: first, caste system provided ideological and structural bases to the leadership for political mobilization; two, the leadership was forced to create opinion, take decisions as per the consensus drawn at local level, articulate political competition on traditional lines and in turn, organize caste for economic and political purposes. In the interaction between caste and political institutions, other than the power struggle, there was also a struggle for the distribution of economic benefits. There was caste consciousness, which shows that the traditional components of the caste system got involved in this new process of change. Kothari (1970, pp. 14–19) explains that this transforming process involves three notable stages. One, the struggle for power and benefits was first limited to the ‘entrenched caste’, in which the group consisted of individuals from higher castes who united on ‘common social and intellectual endowments’ and not on ‘political mobilization’. Leadership and access to governmental patronage were limited to this group which was the first to respond to new educational opportunities. However, this struggle led to the rise of a feeling of antagonism and deprivation in other high castes whom Kothari called ‘ascendant caste’; thus, the first encounter polarized the caste structure and gave rise to a ‘bilateral structure’ of caste politics – the entrenched versus ascendant, may involve subcastes. Two, this bilateralism was followed by another power struggle and demands for benefits, in which inter-caste competition was supplemented by intra-caste competition and the process of politicization. Here, competing groups had to develop more support bases and the competition started ‘within’ the entrenched caste followed by the ascendant caste. This is called the stage of ‘caste fragmentation’ or ‘factionalism’ where new organizational forms such as ‘caste associations’ and ‘caste federations’ develop on various basis in the new complex power structure of the caste system. This stage also marked the beginning of mobilization of lower castes into politics for further factionalized support base. Three, this struggle in the third stage leads to the weakening of older identities of caste and generating politicized values, which coincides with the changes appearing in society through the impact of education, technology, urbanization and so on. These changes lead to the emergence of new criteria of self-fulfilment, new craving for material benefits, more expanded networks of relationships, the structure of particularistic loyalties gets overlaid by a social and political participation and greater awareness of individuals to modern education and modern system of social communication. Here, caste provides politics the structure of ‘division and new forms of integration’ or accommodations, where caste identities themselves take to new forms in which diminishing the importance of its ‘ritualistic and ascriptive bases’. It leads to the emergence of a more diverse form of organization giving rise to ‘highly mobile and cross-cutting loyalty structure’ in politics.

282  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa Kothari draws a critical point that due to secular involvement in the modern period, caste and communal ties as by themselves is inadequate for building stable support. He underlines the following reasons for this situation: first, where castes are large, they are heterogeneous and where they are small, they are numerically low. Second, ‘too close an identification with one caste alienates other castes’. Third, the involvement of all significant sections of the community is an important condition for political parties to gain stability. And finally, the politicization of caste makes for outward-looking and upward-moving orientation and this results in the phenomenon of multiple memberships and overlapping identities. All these reasons lead to a result, which is highly secular for the polity as well as the society at large (Kothari, 1970, p. 20). Kothari points out the prevailing impression that political parties and electoral politics have ‘resuscitated and re-established the legitimacy’ of the traditional institution of ‘caste’ this has given rise to the ‘disintegrative tendencies’ that will disrupt the ‘democratic and secular framework of Indian polity’. He believes that though this impression of caste – politics interaction is exaggerated, it is often true. What is not true is ‘inference is drawn from it’, that is, ‘politics gets caste-ridden’. However, as per him, reality is the reverse of what is stated. ‘It is not politics that gets caste-ridden; it is caste that gets politicized. He further says that it is precise because the operation of competitive politics has drawn caste out of its apolitical context and given it a new status and ‘caste system’ as hitherto known has got eroded and has begun to disintegrate (Kothari, 1970, p. 20). Kothari believes that the political system can only stabilize if its procedures and symbols are internalized and traditionalized as no society can survive without traditions. So, the crucial challenge of modernity is not the ‘destruction of tradition’ but ‘the traditionalization of modernity’ itself. Indeed, Kothari’s explanation has played a crucial role in understanding the role of caste in Indian politics. The following sections will describe the interaction between caste and politics and changing dynamics between them. The Politics of Caste and Non-Congressism: Trajectory from 1952 to 1967 From first general election to 1967 election, there was clear hegemony of the Indian National Congress (INC). In this period at the leadership level the Congress Party was primarily dominated by the upper castes, but it also developed a unique style of consensus build by giving space to new social communities within the fold of party and government. Rajni Kothari has used the term ‘Congress system’ to describe the functioning of Indian politics and particularly the Congress Party in this period. The Congress system, however, could not face challenges from the backward caste leadership in the

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  283 South Indian states, particularly in Tamil Nadu. In North India, leaders such as Ram Manohar Lohia and Charan Singh started to mobilize the backward castes against the dominance of the Congress Party. Before moving forward, it is crucial to note that in the history of independent India, constitutional affirmative actions were always in place for the Dalits (Scheduled Castes, SCs) and the Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes, STs). However, there were no such provisions for the other backward classes because the Indian state was yet to reach a consensus on who constituted the other backward classes. The concept of ‘class’ itself was elusive (and probably still is) to the Indian socio-economic realities. However, the Indian Constitution empowers the president to constitute a commission to consider the necessary steps to improve the conditions of the socially and educationally backward classes.

Powers of the President as Outlined in Article 340 of the Indian Constitution 1. The president may by order appoint a commission consisting of such persons as he thinks fit to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the union or any state to remove such difficulties and to improve their condition and as to the grants that should be made for the purpose by the union or any state the conditions subject to which such grants should be made and the order appointing such commission shall define the procedure to be followed by the commission. 2. A commission so appointed shall investigate the matters referred to them and present to the president a report setting out the facts as found by them and making such recommendations as they think proper. 3. The president shall cause a copy of the report so presented together with a memorandum explaining the action taken thereon to be laid before each House of the Parliament.

The first backward class commission post-Independence, thus, appointed on 29 January  1953, was the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, named after its chairman Kaka Kalelkar (a former disciple of M. K. Gandhi). The Commission relied on caste to define the ‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBCs). It constituted mostly those caste groups that were ‘above’ the untouchables but ‘below’ the upper castes and the intermediate castes. The Commission

284  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa submitted its report in 1955 and identified 2,399 castes (about 32 per cent of India’s total population) that constituted primarily of peasant – proprietors making the OBCs (Jaffrelot, 2010a, 2010b). The Commission identified that the agenda of any affirmative actions should not be equality of opportunity but equality of outcomes when it comes to the implementation of their recommendations. On the other hand, the Nehru Cabinet rejected the recommendations of the Commission based on the memorandum submitted by the then home minister, G. B. Pant. In his submission, Pant argued that as the government’s planning (Nehru-Mahalanobis) for the country’s future course tends to follow a ‘socialist order’ which would inherently make the entire question of caste disappear (Weiner, 2001). This period nevertheless initiates the conversation about the viability of the OBCs in electoral politics, especially because they constitute a vast part of India’s population. The two themes that overran the development of discourse in the next three decades were, thus, relative deprivation and heavy industrialization-led economic model.

Kaka Kalelkar Commission On 29 January  1953, the president of India appointed a Backward Classes Commission, with Kaka Kalelkar as its head. The Commission was given the task of determining the criteria to be used in determining whether any group of people may be considered socially and educationally backward. It was also to make a list of these types of classes. The Commission was also tasked with looking into the situations of all such socially and educationally backward classes, as well as the challenges they faced in carrying out their duties. The four criteria suggested to determine backwardness were: low social status in the caste system, a lack of educational advancement, a lack of diversity in government service and inadequate representation in the spheres of commerce, industry and trade. Caste was used as the primary criterion for compiling a list of backward classes. The Commission believed that promoting the socially and educationally inferior sections would alleviate the issues of a casteridden society. Despite the fact that the Commission lacked sufficient data on castes, it advocated caste reservations of at least 25 per cent in Class I, 33.5 per cent in Class II and 40 per cent in Class III and IV services for the backward castes. In the sectors of medical, scientific and technical education, it recommended a 70 per cent reservation. The Commission also suggested the establishment of a special ministry dedicated to the care of the poor.

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  285 Here, it is also important to note that the land reform, though not implemented whole heartedly, created a small landowning backward castes such as Jat, Yadav, Kurmi and Lodh in states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Some of these castes had land and economic resources before land reforms. Due to this they not only move forward in education, but also grab the opportunities emerged from the mixed economy development in the country. The members of these communities wanted their share in the political power, but the Congress ruled governments could not give them proper representation. Non-Congress leaders like Ram Manohar Lohia focused on these groups. Lohia was one of the most prominent socialist leaders of the country, who played a crucial role in the formation of the Congress Socialist Party in 1934. After Independence, the Congress Socialist Party made itself an independent party and Lohia became the axis of non-Congress politics. Lohia supported the recommendations of the Backward Classes Commission (1955) regarding reservation to backward castes. He argued that the caste system was the most important cause of the material and spiritual degeneration of the country and that the caste system could be abolished only when backward castes are given special and preferential treatment. According to him, three characteristics distinguish India’s ruling classes – high caste, English education and wealth. The combination of any two of these three makes entry into the ruling classes easier. Backward castes, Dalits, depressed Muslims and Christians, tribals and women constitute more than 85 per cent of the country’s total population, but they do not have adequate representation in different spheres of the public life. He underlined that this imbalance must be set right by giving 60 per cent reservation to these sections. According to him, ‘caste restricts opportunity, restricted opportunity constricts ability, constrained ability further restricts opportunity, when caste dominates; opportunity and ability are restricted to ever-narrowing circles of the people’. He also emphasized that the fight for equality will necessarily have to mean a struggle against the entrenched ruling class and all that it stands for, namely caste (Shepherd, 2021). It is also noteworthy that Lohia made a serious effort to mobilize nonCongress political forces to challenge and defeat the dominant Congress Party. He wrote letters to Ambedkar to make an alliance, but due to the unfortunate death of Ambedkar in 1956, these talks could not materialize. Instead, Lohia’s political party Samyukta Socialist Party groomed many leaders from marginalized sections and played an essential role in politicizing backward castes. In 1967, his efforts showed some results and the Congress lost elections in many state assemblies. After the death of Lohia in 1967, his followers continued to mobilize nonCongress forces and also challenged the dominance of upper cates in many states particularly in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In this period, Charan Singh emerged as a strong Jat and peasant leader in Uttar Pradesh. Though he was

286  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa part of the Congress till 1967, he raised the peasants’ concerns. He challenged Nehru’s development model because it was biased against the agriculture sector and that it favoured industry and the urban sector. He attempted to combine the interests of middle and backward castes and the prosperous peasantry in making a forceful plea for decentralization and emphasis on the rural sector. Charan Singh fought for the cause of other backward castes even though his caste Jat primarily consisted of wealthy farmers, who were the primary beneficiaries of the ‘Green Revolution’ (Vora, 2004). After the death of Lohia, he became a key figure of non-Congressism and opposition to the dominance of upper castes. It is also noteworthy that the situation of South India was very different from North India. Indeed a non-Brahman movement was started in the first decade of the 20th century in the Madras province. Justice Party was formed in 1917 and a more radical section of this movement emerged as the self-respect movement of E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker (Periyar). In 1944, a new party, Dravida Kazhagam (DK), was formed by merging the self-respect movement and the Justice Party. After Independence, C. N. Annadurai formed the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in 1949. All these parties and social movements created an awareness in the minds of non-Brahman castes, which resulted in the formation of the DMK government in 1967. As a party, the DMK emphasized the rights of non-Brahman, opposed Hindi and the dominance of the North Indians, and supported and implemented reservation for non-Brahmans (Vora, 2004). It is also important to underline that in 1972, a famous cine actor, M. G. Ramachandran, revolted against the DMK leadership. He floated a new party called the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Since then, the DMK and the AIADMK have been dominating the Tamil Nadu politics. The Period of Post-1967 to 1989: Gradual Expansion of Politicization of Castes The landmark elections of 1967 pointed out the success of politics of backward castes in defeating the Congress in eight states. The then nonCongressism umbrella of Lohia brought backward castes and opposition parties together as the Congress symbolized upper-caste power. Eventually, this coalition of parties and backward castes was short-lived and Congress regained its strength by 1971–1972. The backward caste politics and antiCongress struggle led to the formation of ‘Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD)’ in 1974, formed through the coalition of Lohia’s Socialist Party, Charan Singh’s Bharatiya Kranti Dal and other smaller parties. In this period, in the antiEmergency struggle, many disparate parties joined hands such as the BLD and the Jana Sangh to form the Janata Party, which came to power at the centre in 1977 by defeating the Congress (see Menon & Nigam, 2007; Vora, 2004). The Janata Party brought many lower- and middle-caste peasants/farmers into the Parliament (Corbridge, 2000). Moreover, the Janata government

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  287 appointed the Mandal Commission to look into the OBC reservation questions in government services. However, the Janata Party experiment was failed as diverse interests and contestations within Janata Party’s segments arose, primarily due to predominant upper-caste, right-wing Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh, which had paved the way for the return of the Congress at the centre in 1980. Indeed, the visibility of the significant presence of backward castes and Dalits was evident in all the parties, even in the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP; formed in 1980), but at the level of key leadership posts, the upper castes were dominant (Menon & Nigam, 2007; Vora, 2004).

Mandal Commission The Mandal Commission was established on 1 January 1979, by then Prime Minister Sri Morarji Desai. Bindheshwari Prasad Mandal led the Commission, former chief minister of Bihar and a Member of Parliament from Bihar at that time. The National Janata Party initiated and advocated for the Mandal Commission. The Mandal Commission was established to identify socially, economically and educationally inferior castes and classes in the country. People from these castes and classes were supposed to be classed as OBCs. It suggested for a 27-per cent reservation in government posts and public sector enterprises. The goal is to provide a social lift to the other underprivileged groups. The OBCs were to be identified among Hindus and non-Hindus who were not members of the advanced castes or the SCs/STs. The Mandal Commission looked at 11 factors such as men and women’s education, their ages at the time of marriage, their social status, the number of men and women who work on daily labour, women and men who studied up to primary school and up to 10th grade and their property value in comparison to the state average. In 1980, the report was submitted. It recognized roughly 5,000 castes as belonging to the OBC category. Unfortunately, the Mandal Commission’s recommendations from 1980 were not quickly implemented because the administration had changed. However, in 1990, Prime Minister V. P. Singh of the Janata Dal adopted OBC reservations following the Commission’s recommendations.

Another significant development of this period was the formation of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) by Kanshi Ram on the birth anniversary of Ambedkar in 1984. Though in his life, Ambedkar tried to mobilize marginalized sections, particularly the Dalits. However, due to his untimely death, his

288  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa plans could not materialize. In the pre-Independence era, Ambedkar, with the inspiration of Jyotiba Phule and other social reformers of marginalized sections, tried to create awareness among Dalits and ensure their rights. He formed many organizations such as the Labour Party and the Scheduled Castes Federation. By the mid-1950s, he started thinking of forming a party of all the exploited and oppressed and not merely the Dalit castes. The Republican Party of India (RPI) came into being in 1957 after his death. The RPI has not emerged as an autonomous political force of any significance and has never secured more than two or three seats in the state assembly. The proportion of votes that all factions of the RPI together secure does not go beyond 2–3 per cent. The RPI is a faction-ridden party and has failed to put up an impressive show. In this sense, the formation of the BSP by Kanshi Ram was a crucial step to mobilizing the Dalits outside Maharashtra. Kanshi Ram argued that the Bahujans, who comprise 85 per cent of the population (Dalits, 15 per cent; backward castes, 52 per cent; tribals, 7.5 per cent and minorities, 10.5 per cent), lack representation. Moreover, 15 per cent of the population (comprises upper castes – Brahmans, 3.5 per cent; Kshatriyas, 5.5 per cent and Vaishyas, 6 per cent) enjoys the monopoly over power. The BSP aims to end this ‘inequality of representation’ and gradually strengthens its base in the northern states of Punjab, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Haryana. Notably, caste politics and shift in power acquisition were remarkably carried forward at the state-level Samajwadi Party (SP) and the BSP in post1990 politics of the Uttar Pradesh (see Vora, 2004, pp. 271–273).

Kanshi Ram Kanshi Ram (15 March 1934–9 October 2006) was an Indian politician and social reformer who dedicated his life to promoting social equality and upliftment of the Bahujans. Other names for him included Bahujan Nayak, Saheb and Yugpurush. He entered politics to give the Bahujans and the Dalit Samaj equal clout in society. Kanshi Ram created the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (DS-4), the All India Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) in 1971 and the BSP in 1984. Mayawati, whom Kanshi Ram gave the BSP leadership, served as the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh for four terms. After completing his education in 1957, Kanshi Ram worked at the Explosive Research and Development Laboratory (ERDL) in Pune. This job later became a cause for his successful political career. Kanshi Ram quit this job after witnessing how the company’s management illtreated his senior colleague Deena Bhan because he protested against the ERDL’s management’s decision to cancel the holiday in Babasaheb

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  289 Ambedkar’s Jayanti. Dina Bhan was later dismissed from his job and soon after that, Kanshi Ram quit too. Thus, Kanshi Ram realized the need to have a social movement against caste justice and caste injustice in society. He is profoundly remembered for his several contributions to Indian politics. His understanding of the exploitative caste system is easily summarized in his infamous statement: ‘Why should a caste demographic whose numerical strength is 15 per cent make rules for the majority caste communities whose numerical strength are 85 per cent? Why should the Bahujan community not get proper political representation in independent India?’

At the centre, Janata Dal (JD; formed by the merger of Janata Party fractions in 1988) came into power in 1989 under the leadership of V. P. Singh. This government had further strengthened the backward caste politics as it has accepted the Mandal Commission’s recommendations to give 27 per cent reservation to the OBCs in government services in 1990. The coalition led by the JD, called the ‘National Front’, also comprised of parties from the southern states. In many states, such as Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, regional parties were formed on non-Brahmanical lines to oppose the humiliating and exploiting system of varna hierarchy. It is crucial to underline that many leaders from Backward castes secured important place in politics, particularly in the parties claiming to follow the ideals of Lohia and Jayaprakash Narayan. Even in the Congress, the representation of the Backward Caste leaders increased. For example, in Bihar Legislative Assembly, the number of Yadav legislators was the highest after the 1985 Legislative Assembly elections. The Congress, however, gave the chief minister post to an upper-caste leader (Choubey, 2008). Indeed, in this period, one can underline the phenomenon of the expansion of the politicization of many backward castes. In South Indian states like Tamil Nadu too, they secured leadership space. The events of the 1990s created a situation that helped backward castes secure leadership in North Indian states. The Period of 1989–2014: ‘Mandalization’ of Politics In the 1990s, many crucial changes happened in the Indian politics. Scholars have summarized these changes using the terms mandir, market and Mandal (e.g., see Yadav, 1999). Mandir underlines the emergence of the politics of religious polarization through Ram Mandir movement by the RSS and the BJP, which resulted in the demolition of Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992. Market expresses the changes that occurred due to the policies of

290  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa globalization and liberalization at the economic front by the Indian government, which made a considerable impact on the socio-economic life of India. Finally, the term Mandal denotes the emergence of the OBCs in politics due to the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations by the V. P. Singh government in August  1990. Indeed, when Prime Minister Singh implemented the recommendations of the Mandal Commission, the youths of the upper castes started a violent movement against it, which led to the polarization of the backward castes, particularly in states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which made a huge impact on the political scenario of North India. This phenomenon was termed as ‘Mandalization of politics’. The implementation of Mandal Commission recommendations (in detail later) helped the electoral participation of Indians overcome this plateau. Yogendra Yadav (2000) called this the second democratic upsurge. Therefore, the first general election, which allowed the universal adult franchise to Indian citizens, was considered a regular political expression and eloquently called the ‘first democratic upsurge’ by some. The pattern in participation of India’s electorate in general elections since Independence is simple to understand. We see that the participation rate in elections starts to rise since the first election and then reaches a constant, which is continued till the 1989 midterm elections. Yadav argues that this second democratic ‘upsurge’ essentially meant a participatory upsurge among the socially and historically deprived, whether seen in terms of caste hierarchy, economic class, gender distinction, or the rural – urban divide. This upsurge, however, was limited to the Hindi Belt of the country, which is why he signified it a mere catching up of North India with the South (Yadav, 2000). After a few years of Independence, the voting pattern in India was always skewed towards its urban centres, that is, the urban voters turned up in larger numbers than the rural population, but this changed post the 1970s (Yadav, 2000). However, the participatory urge is always higher towards the closest democratic tier to the citizen, that is to mean that more people would participate in panchayat elections than they do for state elections and even lesser during general elections, although in more developed societies, the observed trend is opposite of this, that is, citizens participate more in union elections than local body elections. Javeed Alam (1999) welcomes this backward caste politics as it drastically altered the composition of the electorate in favour of the backward sections in 1996. He thinks that an appeal to caste in the case of backward caste is far from being casteism; rather, it is an extension of democracy and it is an attempt for the unification of similar castes for mobilization for power in order to overthrow the very foundations of the hierarchical structure of varna relations (Alam, 1999). As students of political science, we need to understand the difference between ‘voting’ as a mechanical and mundane act that citizens go through every five years and if it is a meaningful collective action. The second democratic upsurge also signified the need for many underprivileged communities

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  291 to assert a mode of collective action where they felt this exercise makes a difference and is not merely a mundane act that one feels the need to do once every five years. The chances that a Dalit believes that they make a difference with their vote are the same or more of an upper-caste Hindu. Since this upsurge is limited to the Hindi Belt of India, specifically the northern parts of the country, it should be noteworthy to see the compositions of elected representatives in these states prior to this upsurge. In that data, however, we see that the number of elected representatives hailing from ‘backward classes’ had been rising much before 1989 (Jaffrelot, 2010a). One might think that Mandalization would have always happened irrespective of the legislative action taken by the state. This, however, is a false notion because apart from Janata government’s inability to sustain power, its affirmative action policy could never substantiate itself because it was a heterogeneous coalition. Since the 1960s, India’s historically silent majority, the lower castes, which account for more than two-thirds of the population, has become increasingly outspoken. Lower-caste politicians already rule India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, as well as Bihar and lower-caste presence in national politics is increasing inexorably. According to Jaffrelot (2003), this tendency represents a true ‘democratization’ of India, with the social and economic consequences of this ‘silent revolution’ certain to intensify in the coming years. An argument can be made that a mere silent revolution was not enough. In the absence of policy measures, this 20 per cent increase could have easily eroded off in a few decades and might as well been a one-off development for these communities. Another critical point to remember is that this ‘silent’ increase in numbers of OBC representatives only comprised of the affluent among the OBCs. It did not include those castes that were still downtrodden and troubled by society. Since the implementation of Mandal Commission’s recommendations in 1990, the internal structure of Indian democracy has changed dramatically. Even as the elites retreat from active involvement, the less privileged groups are pushing forward to play an important role in democratic processes. Javeed Alam (2004) discusses how the poor vote in every election to pick their representative and what voting patterns suggest about the connections between regional voices and national unity, as well as between community politics and the notion of citizenship. The author argues in Who Wants Democracy? (Alam, 2004) that the struggle between the elites and the masses has resulted in the birth of democracy in India. The masses were promised benefits and better living circumstances in exchange for handing on power to the elites. However, democracy in India is no more a gift from on high; its entire existence and survival now rest on the downtrodden and exploited politics. Rajni Kothari (1994) has underlined the importance of the politics of caste identities and argued that they can work as in impressive instrument to counter communal and majoritarian politics of the RSS – BJP. Kothari presented his argument in context of the 1993 Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly

292  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa election. The SP-BSP pre-election coalition successfully defeated the BJP, who used it religious identity to mobilize Hindu votes in its favour. After Babri Masjid’s demolition in December  1992, the BJP was hopeful of benefiting from the communal environment. However, the defeat of the BJP and the role of Lalu Prasad Yadav in combating BJP’s politics in Bihar in the 1990s led to an understanding that the OBCs’ politics could counter communal/religious identity-based politics. There have been many discussions regarding what is now known as the secularization of caste. Caste in traditional India operated under a religious framework and belief system that prioritized purity and contamination. It now acts as a political pressure group. Sheth (1999) argues that caste has changed its character in the post-liberalization era, especially in the urban sphere. Today, individuals might feel more connected to one another based on their role in the neoliberal ecosystem rather than the sense of community that one’s caste identity had a few decades ago. This is not to say that caste exploitation or atrocities have disappeared and they have in fact, remained intact if at all changed forms, but the argument Sheth (1999) is making is about the emergence of a ‘new middle class’, which needs to be seen in a different analytical framework. Caste political parties and caste organizations have sprung up in contemporary India. They are attempting to persuade the government to meet their demands. Secularization of caste is the term used to describe this shift in caste’s position (Sheth, 1999). The doctrinaire modernizer suffers from significant xenophobia when it comes to the nexus between caste and politics. One may begin by asking if caste is vanishing. Certainly, no social system can vanish in that manner. What shape does caste take under the influence of modern politics and what shape does politics take in a casteoriented society? Caste Politics in Post-2014: Convergence with Hindutva Politics? In the general election of 2014 the BJP got tremendous success in many states of North India. Many scholars have argued that the process was started by the mid-1990 by the BJP. The limitations of the Backward Castes and Dalit politicians also helped the BJP establish its hold in many OBC and Dalit castes. According to Badri Narayan (2021) the BJP manages to mobilize caste communities effectively only because it takes advantage of the gaps created by other caste-based parties. Parties such as the SP and the BSP tend to focus more on a few castes among the broader caste groups of the OBCs and the SCs. Their policies help in the upward social mobility of these specific castes only while the BJP mobilized the ‘left-out castes’ and managed to gain electorally. Narayan (2021) calls this vertical mobilization model of BSP and SP versus the horizontal mobilization of the BJP. The problem of one party claiming to be the champion of only one or two castes among a group of several others in a huge state like Uttar Pradesh or Bihar gives BJP an advantage

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  293 because they can then bring all of them in their Hindutva umbrella. This is one of the primary reasons why the party is not able to perform so well in southern states because they simply have no ‘left-out castes’ to mobilize. Many scholars have criticized caste-based politics. Some of these criticisms started before 2014 but after 2014 Lok Sabha elections these criticisms became more vocal. Earlier Zoya Hasan (2001) critiqued SP’s over-emphasis on the upward mobilization of a few castes and communities among the OBCs in the state has led to what she calls the ‘Yadavization of police’ in the state. She has also severely criticized the BSP for forming coalition governments with BJP in Uttar Pradesh (Hasan, 2001). Rajendra Vora has underlined that since many backward leaders focused on populist issues rather than issues related to basic social-economic changes, the politics of marginalized castes turned into a caste majoritarianism. Second, Abhay Kumar Dubey has used Vora’s arguments to underline the limitations of the parties such as the SP, the BSP and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). He argues that many OBC and Dalit parties tuned into the parties of one caste. For example, the SP in Uttar Pradesh and the RJD in Bihar predominantly became the parties of Yadavs, the BSP turned into a predominant party of the Jatavs (Dubey, 2019). However, it is also noteworthy that the leaders and supporters of these parties have rejected the argument that their party primarily belong to one caste. Suhas Palshikar has underlined that the tendency to demand reservation has increased and different political parties also find such demands less problematic. Indeed, It is easier for governments and political parties to talk about reservations than to make significant and positive change in the socioeconomic situation of the society (Palshikar, 2018). More and more, claims for OBC reservation are based on the logic of contemporary economic backwardness, rather than historic social injustice-shaped backwardness. The logic and meaning of reservation are distorted at this point. Various groups and officials appear to be leaning toward the idea of tying reservations to economic disadvantage. The major concern in both the Patel and Maratha uprisings has been present economic hardships. As a result, a claim for reserve based on economic disadvantage is considered valid (Palshikar, 2018). Another trend is the emergence many caste-based parties, which claim to represent a particular caste, mostly extremely Backward Castes or marginal Dalit castes. The formation of caste-based parties started before 2014 but it became stronger after 2014 general elections. These parties have bargained with other regional or national parties to get more seats. The success of the BJP in states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar could be attributed to its alliance with these caste-based parties. The Vikassheel Insaan Party and the Hindustani Awam Morcha in Bihar and the Azad Samaj Party or the Apna Dal in Uttar Pradesh are only a few examples of this phenomenon. The convergence between the RSS and the BJP and many castes of the OBCs and the SCs also underlines the weakness of the ideology of ‘social justice’ (with an integral

294  Satakshi Malviya and Shamik Vatsa relationship with secularism). It underlines the capacity of the right-wing forces to use marginalized sections for their majoritarian politics. Indeed, caste’s politicization has reached a new and more complex stage after 2014. The parties with support basis of the OBCs or the SCs are now facing the challenge to prove that they are not the representative of one dominant caste but also ready to give space to other smaller caste of the category. The emergence of numerically smaller caste-based parties could be termed as a positive development because it could lead to the further democratization of weaker castes in the larger groups of the OBCs or the SCs. Summing Up There is no doubt that the caste has been working as an inescapable basis for the democratic politics in India. The BJP has been trying to create a majoritarian base for its politics, but it has also focused on caste arithmetic and worked hard to mobilize marginalized castes in its fold. It is also evident from the earlier discussion that the politicization of castes has mobilized OBCs and SCs to assert their claims on the power structure of the Indian polity. The recent trends have further underlined the deepening of politicization of more marginalized caste groups of the OBCs and the SCs. However, it is also clear that many political parties and leaders are not focussing on the real issue of the social and economic transformation in society. Instead, they are satisfied by getting the votes of backward and Dalit castes by raising some populist issues. Promise to include a caste within the OBC, SC or ST  category, or installing statues of the famous personalities of different castes and emphasizing on the identities of castes or giving them nominal representation have taken the place of issues of economic transformation and social change. The contours leading up to the debate around the need to have a caste census, whether constitution of a third backward commission is necessary or not and with increasing privatization the scope of caste accommodation in private sector are a few issues to look forward to for students interested in caste and politics in India. The need to form an egalitarian society where one gets according to their need cannot be done with addressing the caste question and would of course require a dedicated attempt at annihilation of caste. Therefore, it becomes important to study and develop a deeper understanding of caste and caste politics in India. References Alam, J. (1999). Is caste appeal casteism? Oppressed castes in politics. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(13), 757–761. Alam, J. (2004). Who wants democracy? Orient BlackSwan. Choubey, K. N. (2008). Jatiyon ka rajnitikaran: Bihar mein pichhdi jatiyon ke ubhar ki dastan. Vani Prakashan.

Changing Dynamics of Caste and Politics in India  295 Corbridge, S. A. (2000). Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu nationalism and popular democracy. Polity. Dubey, A. K. (2019). Hindu ekta banam gyan ki rajniti. Vani Prakashan. Dumont, L. (1998). Homo hierarchicus. Oxford University Press. Ghurye, G. S. (1991). Caste and race in India. In D. Gupta (Ed.), Social stratification (pp. 35–48). Oxford University Press. Hasan, Z. (2001). Transfer of power? Politics of mass mobilisation in UP. Economic & Political Weekly, 36(46–47), 4401–4409. Jaffrelot, C. (2003). India’s silent revolution: The rise of the lower castes in North India. Orient BlackSwan. Jaffrelot, C. (2010a). Caste and politics. India International Centre Quarterly, 37(2), 94–116. Jaffrelot, C. (2010b). Religion, caste, and politics in India. Primus Books. Jodhka, S. S. (2010). Caste and politics. In N. G. Mehta (Ed.), The Oxford companion to politics in India (pp. 154–167). Oxford University Press. Kothari, R. (1970). Caste in Indian politics. Orient Longman. Kothari, R. (1994). Rise of Dalits and renewed debate on caste. Economic & Political Weekly, 29(26). Menon, N.,  & Nigam, A. (2007). Power and contestation: India since 1989. Zed Books. Narayan, B. (2021). Republic of Hindutva: How the Sangh is reshaping Indian democracy. Penguin Books, Random House India Private Limited. Palshikar, S. (2018, August 1). The new reservation. The Indian Express. https://indi anexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/maratha-resevation-protest-maharashtrapatidar-quota-stir-5285330/ Rudolph, L. I. (1965). The modernity of tradition: The democratic incarnation of caste in India. American Political Science Review, 59(4), 975–989. Rudolph, L. I., & Rudolph, S. H. (1967). The modernity of tradition: Political development in India. Orient Longman (Indian reprint 1999). Shah, G. (2004). Caste and democratic politics in India. Orient BlackSwan. Shepherd, K. I. (2021). The Shudra: Vision for a new path. Penguin Books, Random House India Private Limited. Sheth, D. L. (1999). Secularization of caste and the making of a new middle class. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(34–35), 2502–2510. Srinivas, M. (1962). Caste in modern India and other essays. Media Promoter and Publishers. Vora, R. (2004). Decline of caste majoritarianism in Indian politics. In R. Vora & S. Palshikar (Eds.), Indian democracy: Meaning and practices (pp.  271–298). Sage Publications. Weiner, M. (2001). The struggle for equality: Caste in Indian politics. In A. Kohli (Eds.), The success of India’s democracy (pp.  193–225). Cambridge University Press. Yadav, Y. (1999). Electoral politics in the time of change: India’s third electoral system, 1988–1999. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(34–35), 2393–2399. Yadav, Y. (2000). Understanding the second democratic upsurge. In Z. H. Francine Frankel (Ed.), Transforming India: Social and political dynamics of democracy (pp. 89–119). Oxford University Press.

14 The Middle Class in India Politics, Economy and Culture Ashutosh Kumar

Introduction India has witnessed the phenomenal rise of the middle class in recent decades, especially since the economic reforms in the 1990s. The middle class is considered as the fastest growing segment of urban India’s population. However, there does not seem to be much concurrence among the analysts about the various segments of the middle class, especially the ones that actually constitute/represent this social, economic and political category. Sifting through the academic literature on the nature and composition of the Indian middle class, one finds that academics have treated the middle class as a ‘notoriously loose’/‘indeterminate social category’ which has a ‘questionable explanatory value’ (Deshpande, 2003, p.  129; Joshi, 2001, p.  1). The heterogeneous/ indeterminate character of the middle class in terms of its economic profile becomes clear when, unlike the usage of the rich or poor class in the singular form, it is often used in the plural form by the analysts. In economic terms, India is supposed to have the presence of an upper middle class, a lower middle class and also a middle class without any prefix like the one in Western societies.1 These three strata reflect different levels of cultural and political choices as well as have different kinds of anxieties in their everyday and associated lives. The middle class is thus viewed as an intermediary social stratum between the ‘rich and powerful and the poor and powerless’ (Lange & Meier, 2009, p. 6). The lower middle class has a significant segment which is on the borderline and can easily get relegated to the lower classes, as happened during the pandemic in India. The lower new middle class households comprise that segment which is in a precarious situation. Having experienced gradual upward mobility, they know that even a minor economic shock can push them back to poverty. They generally come from socially disadvantaged groups and single-earner families and sometimes they engage in multiple economic activities. (Jha & Pushpendra, 2022, p. 25)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-18

The Middle Class in India  297 In social terms, the heterogeneous nature of the emergent middle class becomes apparent with the emergence of a range of new social categories into the Indian middle class. These social categories remain divided broadly in ethnic and spatial terms and also in terms of their overall orientations and choices, be it in the domains of politics, economy or culture. The discussion in the chapter explains why it has become possible to argue in terms of middle ‘classes’2 rather than the middle class as a single homogenous class category in contemporary India. The Argument The chapter3 discusses how the origin and evolution of the Indian middle class can be historically traced back to colonial policies and practices. However, its rise both in terms of numbers and power and influence has been a much more recent development in an independent India. The economic and political transition experienced in recent decades in particular has led to the emergence of the ‘new’ amorphous middle classes in India, as the traditional homogenous ‘old’ middle class has been in the process of fading away in terms of numbers (Fernandes & Heller, 2006; Jha & Pushpendra, 2022; Patel, 2011; Rajagopal, 2011). The chapter argues that the rapidly shifting economic, cultural and political choices and concerns of the rising new middle class, especially its urban professional segment, have distinctly influenced the way politics and economics have of late been taking concrete shape. Such an argument remains contentious considering the relative lack of presence of the ‘new’ middle classes in numerical terms when considering the whole population. Also, its long-perceived apathy towards politics gets in the way.4 The latter is arguably a distinct disadvantage in an increasingly vibrant electoral democracy like India, marked by a high level of participation and contestation involving newly mobilized/politicized under-classes who form the majority. Since Indira Gandhi’s days, poverty has been a political issue and the parties have tried to mobilize the poor masses as a voting category. One possible way of demonstrating the growing significance of the middle class, the chapter suggests, can be to explore the rise of a rightward shift in the nature of politics and economy in ‘new’ India, being relentlessly affected by the ascendant Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with the former’s active support. This has been most visible since the emergence of the BJP as the ‘second dominant party’ since the 2014 Lok Sabha election (Palshikar, 2017). The Middle Class in Colonial India Having a longer view of the evolution of the middle class in India reveals that unlike in an independent India, the middle class in colonial India was much more homogeneous in social, spatial and economic terms.5 It consisted

298  Ashutosh Kumar largely of people belonging to upper-caste/twice-born and forward-caste Hindus, aristocratic Muslims, Parsis and other high-status professional/service communities. The middle-class people were mainly situated in the urban spaces that had come up with the advent of the colonial variant of modernity (Joshi, 2010, p. 18). This ‘native’ middle class, a product of the modern education system as conceived by Macaulay, was very much a creation of the colonial regime to cater to its administrative needs. The education system to be introduced was aimed ‘to form a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect’ (Macaulay quoted in Jodhka & Prakash, 2016, p. 27). As such, the colonial intent was to set up schools and colleges so that they could produce a mass of educated people, who were meant to serve as the pillars of the empire. While mastery of the imperial language became the ‘master key’ to enter into the hallowed category of ‘brown sahibs’, inability ‘to converse in their mother tongue’ became the hallmark of ‘some highly intelligent baboos’ (Bankim Chandra Chatterjee quoted in Varma, 2010, p. 63). Distinctiveness of Colonial Middle Class The Indian middle class as it came up in colonial India was distinct from its ‘authentic’ counterpart in the imperial western countries in at least three respects, as pointed out by academics writing on the subject (Beteille, 2007, p. 952; Chatterjee, 1993; Deshpande, 2003, p. 146; Joshi, 2001, pp. 7, 22, 2010, p. 18; Nandy, 1995, p. 197). Let us discuss them one by one. First, the colonial middle class did not have an historic opportunity to turn into an industrial middle class like its counterpart in Western societies. This was due to the structural constraints imposed on India’s economy by the colonial state’s policies and practices that did not allow the country to experience a transition from a feudal agrarian economy to an industrial economy. Instead of being a ‘manufacturing class’ in Western countries, the ‘native’ Indian middle class was arguably itself culturally ‘manufactured’ by the British government primarily, as observed earlier, to serve its imperial interests, especially in running the administration.6 Second, the colonial middle class, unlike its Western counterpart, failed to detach itself ‘from its past history and existing social contexts’ and, in some cases, even ‘championed traditions’ (Jodhka & Prakash, 2016, p. 29). Instead of breaking with the traditional past, the middle class continued to retain their inherited caste, community and gender-based privileges. They also showed an attachment to retaining most of the pre-modern social and cultural beliefs and prejudices. At the same time, as is evident even in independent India, they also sought to de-legitimize the language of caste in the realm of politics while leading the nationalist movement, as it helped them mask the caste-based indignities and exploitation inherent in society historically. It helped that the colonial regime also did not wish to change all the

The Middle Class in India  299 pre-existing social realities or pre-existing structures of social relations (Jodhka & Prakash, 2016, p. 29). Third, despite being ‘culturally manufactured’ by the colonial regime to help it generate its cultural hegemony and also being ‘in a position of subordination’ under the colonial regime, it did not deter the nationalist ‘non-state’ middle class segment from putting up resistance against the colonial domination. The nationalist segment of the nascent middle class did it by creating its own ‘new cultural politics’. Its resistance to the ‘relation of subordination’ to the British ‘was to be premised upon its cultural leadership of the indigenous colonized people’, as it claimed ‘inner spiritual, culturally sovereign realm’, autonomous of the colonial state and its practices (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 36). At the same time, the colonial middle class competed along Western standards in the ‘outer’ realm of politics and economy. By undertaking such an endeavour, it was able to provide ‘the base line for a critique of modernity as well as of tradition’ (Nandy, 1995, p. 197). It explains why more than the usual sociological markers such as status, education, income and occupation, as was the case with the middle class in the then Western society, it was the ability to be ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ that essentially characterized the distinctive nature of ‘native’ middle class in colonial India. Joshi (2001, p. 7) suggests that the cultural entrepreneurship enabled of colonial middle class to acquire prestige and a position of leadership in the society rather than its economic or professional standing. It also explained the middle class’s critical influence in colonial India, despite being microscopic in size, mainly concentrated in three presidencies cities, namely Calcutta, Madras and Bombay (now known as Kolkata, Chennai and Bombay, respectively) in early colonial India. Later, the new capital city of Delhi and some other cities such as Allahabad, Lahore and Patna also joined the list as provincial capital cities developed in size and infrastructure. The port cities like Kochi also developed as trade centres.

Box 14.1  How the Middle Class in Colonial India Was Distinct from Its Counterpart in the Western Countries? • First, given the lack of industrialization, the middle class was not a ‘manufacturing class’, like in the then Western countries. It was rather a product of the colonial regime policy to serve its imperial interests. • Second, the Indian middle class, unlike its Western counterpart, failed to detach itself completely from its traditional past and the inherited caste, community and gender-based privileges. It also retained most of the pre-modern social and cultural beliefs and prejudices.

300  Ashutosh Kumar • Third, despite being a product of the colonial regime, the non-state segment of the middle class resisted the relation of subordination, premised upon the former cultural leadership. It rather claimed Indians to have an ‘inner spiritual, culturally sovereign realm’, autonomous of the colonial regime. At the same time, it competed with the imperialist class along the Western standards in the ‘outer’ realm of politics and economy.

Significance of the Colonial Middle Class Thus despite remaining a ‘microscopic minority’ (The Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2010, p. 7), the Indian middle class in colonial India stood out for its literary and cultural orientations. Also, while the ‘state-segment’ of the class helped in running the colonial administration, the ‘non-state segment’ was actively involved in the nationalist movement in the leadership role. One important exception was the business/mercantile segment belonging to traditional merchant castes that had emerged in late 19th century colonial India as a part of the native middle class. The latter remained ‘largely devoid of political traditions’ even with the ‘advent of mass nationalism and the capture of the Congress leadership by Gandhi’ (Markovits, 1985, pp. 35–36). Compared to other British colonies, the anti-colonial movement in India had been successful in convincing the British fairly early to accord certain rights of political representation to Indians and also ‘rights to organize a diverse range of cultural and civil associations and vernacular public spheres’ (Hansen, 1999, p. 32). The core leadership of Congress, right since its inception and even during the Gandhi-led ‘mass-based grassroots form of mobilization’ days, was overwhelmingly drawn from the minuscule ‘old’ middle class that virtually ‘created Indian nationalism’ and contributed a great deal in the process of shaping important ideas and practices of early modern India (Deshpande, 2003, p. 143; Fernandes, 2007, p. 18; Joshi, 2010, p. 15).

Box 14.2  Significance of the Colonial Middle Class in India • It stood out for its acquisition of modern education, cultural values and professional skills. • It showed exemplary literary and cultural orientation and made significant contributions. • Its state segment provided frame to the colonial regime. • The nationalist segment shaped the idea of Indian nationalism. • The leadership during the nationalist movement came mainly from the middle class.

The Middle Class in India  301 The Middle Class in Early Independent India After Independence, the same nationalist middle-class, which had occupied the leadership role in the nationalist struggle was entrusted with the reins of political power. The familiar ‘social world’ of the traditional old middle class continued to be overwhelmingly represented in the inherited as well as newly created political and state institutions in early independent India. What continued to be known, as ‘high culture’ remained essentially the culture of the Indian middle class even after independence. It continued to be overwhelmingly represented by upper castes namely Brahmans, Baniyas, Khatris and Kayasthas in varying degrees in the north India and Brahmans in the southern states (Bhatia, 1994, p. 34). In the southern states Brahmans were overwhelmingly employed in the state sector employment so much so that it created great degree of resentment against them among other communities which was manifested into self-respect movement followed by Dravida movement and parties like DK/DMK and AIADMK in the state of Madras. However, by the 1970s in the post-land reforms/green revolution period the members of the dominant middle peasant castes like Jats, Patidar Patels, Marathas, Lingayats, Reddys, Kammas, Rajus, Naidus, Vokkaliga, Naiars who have been called ‘bullock capitalists’ by Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) also joined the ever-growing bureaucracy in large numbers though the elite castes still retained their disproportionate share (Jodhka & Prakash, 2016, p. 100; Joshi, 2001, p. 7; Patel, 2011, p. 51; Sheth, 1999, p. 2502). These peasant communities’ members also joined the trade and business that for long was overwhelmingly represented, as mentioned earlier, by traditional merchant castes like Banias, Khatris, Aroras, Vanniars. Even members from the lower castes like Nadars and Ezhavas have registered their presence in the world of business (Damodaran, 2008). Acquisition of modern education, cultural values and professional skills continued to be the pre-dominant form of mobile social capital. The acquired cultural capital enabled the middle class bureaucracy to become the ‘governing class’ in as Indian developmental state extended its overarching role. Viewing themselves as ‘progressive Indians’, the Indian middle class claimed ‘the legitimate right to represent interests of the subject population, as leaders of the common masses’ (Jodhka & Prakash, 2016, p. 55). A ‘claim’ that received acceptance by the wider masses as the bureaucratic/professional middle class in addition to undertaking the task of state building/institution building also took upon itself with the help of the intelligentsia the mammoth task of nation building by ‘producing the Indian people as a national people through reform and education’ (Hansen, 1999, p. 47). As a part of the democratic project of consensus building around the then founding values of the nascent democracy, reflected very much in the preamble of the India’s Constitution, the Indian middle class while acting as an agency in the Gramscian sense, mediated with a large number of diverse social – political forces unleashed in the aftermath of decolonization.

302  Ashutosh Kumar In the economic domain, the governing elite constituting middle class became the ‘sanctioned actor/favoured agent’ of state-led growth and development under the planned economy with emphasis on heavy industries (Rajagopal, 2011, p. 4). Such an idea was in consonance with the formulation of modernization and political development theorists engaged in the ‘area studies’ in the fifties and sixties who contended that the ‘modernising elite’ with middle class roots would be supportive of moderate democratic electoral parties. Facing stiff opposition to the government economic and social policies from the conservative elements within his own party and also from the right-wing opposition parties like the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and Swatantra Party, the then Congress prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru turned towards the techno-bureaucratic middle class elite mostly inherited from the colonial era with whom he shared close linguistic – cultural affinity and also his vision for the realization of his dream of building a modern India of ‘planned cities, industries, factories and big dams’ (Khilnani, 1997). An iconic figure then and even now for a sizable segment of the middle class despite the adverse social media blitz against him in recent years, Nehru candidly admitted in his autobiography: ‘my politics had been those of my class, the bourgeoisie. Indeed, all vocal politics then (and to a great extent even now) were those of the middle classes’ (Nehru, 1998, p. 57). The critical developmental role being entrusted to the state bureaucracy could also be attributed to the influence of colonial political culture that had purposely projected the political class, especially at the provincial level, as ‘susceptible to particularism’. As the political class was perceived to be facing enormous ‘sectional pressure’ in a diverse society like India, it was therefore considered best to restrict its ‘real function’ as barely ‘advisory’ in nature, while the ‘task of policy formulation’ (and also its implementation/supervision aspects) was to be best left to the trusted bureaucratic – managerial middle class elite which was professionally trained to remain impartial and rise above the narrow sectional interests since the colonial days. It was this colonial cultural legacy that promoted and nurtured the idea of ‘the expansion of state authority’ under the nascent democratic regime (Jayal, 2001, p. 53). The fabled ‘steel frame’ of the British Raj which was headed by the all India services officers, many of them Indians at the time of Independence, was thus rechristened and retained, peopled initially by the same ‘old’ middleclass stock along with the later addition of new entrants having not so privileged a pedigree, but the same cultural capital. Retention of an ‘overdeveloped’ state apparatus, ostensibly now for developmental purposes and for the nation-building rather than maintenance of law and order purposes, enabled the middle-class professionals in the government services as well as in public sectors to join as a constituent of the ‘ruling class alliance’. While explaining the class character of the nature of Indian State, Bardhan (1989) referred to the professionals in public sector as a constituent dominant class. While the middle class professionals were in possession of ‘cultural capital’,

The Middle Class in India  303 the rich peasantry and the industrial/mercantile classes were in possession of ‘physical capital’ (Bardhan, 1999; Deshpande, 2003; Kaviraj, 1986; Rajagopal, 2011, p. 13; Vanaik, 1990). Intelligentsia was referred as the ‘third dominant class’ in the ‘dominant ruling coalition’ in India under the development planning model, the other two constituents being the industrial bourgeoisie and the rich capitalist farmers (Beteille, 1989). White-collar workers in public and private sectors, educated professionals, politicians in the law-making bodies and trade union leaders were viewed as constituting this intelligentsia (Rudra, 1989). Significantly, while observing ‘the rise of the intelligentsia’, Rudra also underlined its expansion and ‘a certain maturation’ in its making.

Dominant Coalition Ruling class alliance of the proprietary classes which were beneficiaries of the subsidies under the state-directed development planning model in the name of development • Rich peasantry (land) • Industrial class (capital) • Professionals in public sector (cultural capital) Source: Bardhan (1999).

Growth of the Middle Class in Late Independent India The late-independent India was witness to an expansion of the middle class. New categories were added in the ‘old’ middle class under the developmentplanning model to fulfil the socialist promises. The newly entrant segments differed from the existing colonial class in terms of their social composition and orientations. The growth in size as well as in influence, which had commenced in early independent India itself, could be attributed to the following factors. First, the government of independent India in order to fulfil the developmental needs of the country opened state funded institutions of higher learning especially in the disciplines of science and technology and management like IIMs, RITs and IITs along with a large number of CSIR laboratories. A large number of government schools, colleges and universities were also opened.7 The introduction of affirmative policies like free education and other state sponsored facilities like scholarships, free tuitions, hostels for poorer children also witnessed greater enrolment in these institutions. Introduction of the Indian languages as medium of instruction especially at the school level enabled the non-privileged sections of the society to have far greater access

304  Ashutosh Kumar to modern education and later compete for the white-collar employment in expanding public sector under the statist model of development. State-led actions of welfare based on ‘protective discrimination’ (read reservations in the higher education sector and public employment, among others) also led to a manifold expansion in the spread of education even among the hitherto excluded marginal sections of the society. As a result, the middle class in India not only grew in numbers but also became far more representative in both social and spatial terms. Second, new opportunity structures in rapidly urbanizing and modernizing India allowed for social and economic mobility. A sizable number of people belonging to non-elite peasant castes, mostly inhabiting village India, until now immobile both in spatial and professional terms, moved to the fast growing semi-urban/moffassil towns and cities, taking up white collar professions in rapidly expanding public sectors and gradually adopting modern cultural attributes that entitled them to claim membership of the hitherto exclusive middle class (Srinivas, 1966, p. 90). Third, the process of agrarian transition in the form of land reforms and pro-market green revolution in many states of India saw the emergence of a new breed of capitalist farmers. The newly rich landed peasantry now had the means to turn towards urban life and industry and also to invest in their children’s higher education, the latter as a result moving to urban India. As a result, a distinct rural Indian middle class emerged, with roots in agricultural development (Sinha, 2009, p. 198). Fourth, growth of the urban/professional middle-class segment is also to be attributed to the introduction of policies of neo-liberal economic reforms leading to primacy of market relations and a culture of consumerism that began in real earnest in the late 1980s India which saw first the shift to pro-business and then to neo-liberal reforms (Lange  & Meier, 2009). The reforms have continued unabated since then and have been implemented in an incremental manner with every successive regime change. The continuing process of economic transition has led to the rise of a distinct ‘new’ middle class replacing the tiny ‘old’ middle class, arguably its precursor in social and cultural terms.

Factors Responsible for the Expansion of India’s Middle Classes • Spread of modern education using Indian languages rather than English. • Opportunity structure created after new jobs came under the welfare state. • Land reforms followed by Green Revolution led to economic empowerment among the peasant middle/intermediate castes. • Rise of rural middle class. • Market-oriented economic policies of reforms

The Middle Class in India  305 Measuring the Indian Middle Class While there is wide agreement about an impressive growth in the size of the middle class, efforts to precisely measure it remain cumbersome due to the fuzziness of the social category itself. The newly created heterogeneities within castes are the result of varied levels of income, lifestyles, tastes, occupations and education unlike the colonial or even early independent India, when the members of a particular caste were more or less equal in terms of status and lifestyle (Sheth, 1999, p.  2504). Interestingly, Rajagopal (2011, p. 3) refers to the ‘historical interlude’ of the emergency (1975–77), which separated two different phases of the Indian middle class, ‘the former being under the hegemony of the state and the latter, increasingly assertive, but disenchanted with erstwhile forms of politics, defining itself through cultural and consumerist forms of identity’. He suggests that by the 1980s, a ‘newly fashioned investing middle class was acquiring a life of its own’ (Rajagopal, 2011, p. 3). One possible way of enumeration of the Indian middle class may be by self-identification of the people considering the fact that a sense of middleclass belongingness is always more ‘a state of mind’ than a matter of actual economic status. Joshi (2010) has used the term ‘middle class-ness’, a feeling of belonginess. Kapur et  al. (2017) have also argued in favour of selfidentification as a distinct measurement strategy to enumerate the Indian middle class. In a survey across India in 2014, they found that almost half of their respondents identified themselves as part of the middle class. It seems to be fashionable even for the rich to identify themselves as middle class in India as revealed in successive post-poll Lok Sabha election surveys conducted under the National Election Studies (NES) conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi.8 The much more credible and acceptable alternative has been to measure the presence of the Indian middle class on ‘objective’ basis. Quantifiable in nature, it is based on the criteria of the possession of cultural (education) and material capital. As per the standard criteria used for CSDS-NES survey purposes, the class variable has always been defined in terms of the economic assets and income of an individual (Sheth, 1999, p. 2509). The numbers estimated so far by analysts greatly vary due to the usage of different criteria that are not merely economic but also sociological or a combination of both.9 It falls between 100 and 250 million (Sridharan, 2004) to 200–250 million (Sanghvi, 2005) to 300–350 million (Brosius, 2010; Fernandes  & Heller, 2006; Harris-White, 2003; Joshi, 2010; Saxena, 2010; Tharoor, 2005), the exact number depending on the criteria used for enumeration. Based on the National Council of Applied Economic Research survey data, Shukla (2009) has estimated that in 2001–2, ‘middle income households’ were around 6 per cent of all India population that grew to 13 per cent in 2009–10. Using higher education as the definer of group identity put one eighth of the population in India into the middle class category (Kapur, 2010, p. 147). As per Suri and Verma (2017, p. 29) estimate, the size of the

306  Ashutosh Kumar Indian middle class has increased at least three-fold since the implementation of the new economic policy of reforms in 1991. National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCEAR) in its study of middle class has calculated that India’s middle-class population would touch 267 million by 2026.10 Even as one concedes the problem with the definition (lower/upper) and the varying criterion (income/occupation/consumption/education/values) used to identify the middle class in India, in terms of its sheer numbers India’s middle class is one of the largest in the world next only to China.11 It is now bigger in size than the entire population of most of the advanced capitalist countries of Europe and is almost as big as the US population.12 It is also the fastest growing segment of India’s population. As per the available projections, while India’s population is likely to increase approximately by 30 per cent between 2005 and 2025, the middle class population will increase almost ten times during the same period (Saxena, 2010, p. 2).13

How to measure the Middle Class • Self-perception • Income • Occupation (white-collar jobs) • Education • Consumption

The Ideological Shift: Culture Among the emergent segments of the ‘new’ middle class in the post-reform India, it has been the rise of its urban segment based in the mega/fastgrowing cities and employed mostly in the private information technology/ service/managerial/commercial sector, which has received much attention in India studies. The rise of the ‘metropolitan’ middle class14 has been considered as one of the most striking features of a ‘reforming, performing and transforming’ India. This ‘new’ middle class segment in ‘new’ India has come closely to identify as well as represent the significant social and cultural shifts that has of late also been visible across the globe (Beinhocker et al., 2007). The major shifts in the social – cultural stances are quite explicit in comparison to the predominantly liberal middle class of early independent India. The Indian middle classes, especially urban based, have shown growing proclivity towards ‘aggressive consumption’.15 They have increasingly come to define themselves through cultural and consumerist forms of identity rather than their age-old community-based identities. These age-old identities do retain their salience but in a much-muted form. By adopting a consumerist culture, these classes have made a major social – cultural shift from the

The Middle Class in India  307 old world’s characteristic of India’s middle class – ‘modesty and understatement’ (Saavala, 2010).16 What has enabled the ‘new’ middle class including its salaried segment go for consumerism, is the ready availability of disposable income at its disposal as India became one of the fastest growing economies in the world following the implementation of economic reforms in the early nineties. In not so distant ‘socialist’ past, there were serious constraints on income and discretionary spending. Also, there existed a ‘huge moral anxieties’ in popular consciousness. There was this Gandhian insistence on old-world simple living and being duty-bound to use one’s privileged position for the common good. The ‘old’ Indian middle class abhorred any idea of being part of a ‘consumer society’ as ‘inappropriate’ and self-serving (Haynes et al., 2010; Mathur, 2010, p. 211; Trentmann, 2010, pp. 35–36). Interestingly, the neo-rich middle class ‘penchant to ape the west’ and taking to ‘buying culture’ and also its ‘muddle-headedness’ and ‘hypocrisy’ has come for sharp criticism from the middle-class intelligentsia itself. Also the rich middle class’s growing apathy, self-righteousness and reckless consumerism have come under critical lens in the recent decades (Ahmad & Reifeld, 2002, ‘Introduction’; Fernandes & Heller, 2006, p. 3; Kumar, 2011, p. 14; Varma, 2007). The Ideological Shift: Economics In ideological terms, the upper middle class vouches for the benefits of the rolling back of the state if not abdicating its commitments from the social and economic sectors. It toes the line of the ascendant corporate capitalist class in extending uncritical support for sweeping reforms like reduction in direct taxes, deregulation, privatization, efficient public service delivery and greater access to consumer goods. Viewing itself as ‘primary agent’ of the market forces, the upper middle class unabashedly pursues a ‘good life’ marked by professional mobility, security, luxury and market-based wider choices.17 To cater to the material desires of the growing urban middle class, even the relatively smaller cities of contemporary India are getting dotted with multiplexes, exclusive clubs, community centres, self-enclosed townships and segregated residential complexes (Deshpande, 2003, p. 150; Sitapati, 2011, p. 42). Eager to exploit the new opportunities presented before it in the form of bourgeoning information technology and knowledge-based service sectors18 that have coincided with the dismantlement of the licence-quota regime, disinvestment of the public sector assets and opening of the market, the Indian middle class has emerged as a votary of doing away with what it has come to view in recent years as remnants of a thoroughly corrupted and inefficient model of planned economy of ‘socialist’ India (Harriss, 2010, p. 150). Looking at the economic reforms that have been carried out in the last three decades, despite the uncritical and enthusiastic support from the upper middle class, it has been mostly the soft reforms like in the aviation, insurance,

308  Ashutosh Kumar telecom, taxation related to salaried income, banking, service sectors that have been implemented. These reforms are in the sectors that concern the upper and middle-middle classes and as such it has been easier to implement them without worrying about the electoral cost. However, ‘hard’ reforms like in the farming and power sectors have remained non-implemented. Two main factors may explain the successive regimes’ proclivity to desist from ‘hard’ reforms. First, it is not only fear of reprisals from the lower and lowermiddle classes but also the resistance from the sizable presence of the ‘statesegment’ of the middle-middle and the lower middle class employed in the public sector. The numerically stronger but less privileged segments of the middle class favour moderate reforms as opposed to ‘hard reforms’ like cutting the public sector employment or relentless privatization/disinvestment of public assets. They still need state employment as well as state supported public institutions of higher education and public hospitals. Unlike their more privileged counterparts, the lower Indian middle class living on the brink can hardly afford to send their wards to foreign/private schools and colleges or avail the services of extremely costly private hospitals. This explains why both in NES 2004 and NES 2009 surveys while 25 per cent and 21 per cent of middle-class respondents respectively were pro-privatization, a larger percentage, that is, 46 per cent and 48 per cent of respondents held only moderate view on privatization. A  total of 37 per cent of the middle-class respondents in NES 2014 had supported privatization whereas 35 per cent opposed it. A significant 28 per cent had no opinion on the issue (CSDS Data Unit).19 Land owning agriculturalists producing cash crops for the market who would fall in the rural middle-class category in the post-green revolution era have also been adversaries of hard reforms in the farming sector, as it would mean a huge dent in the state subsidies. When the BJP government got the three farming sector reform bills passed in 2020, it had to face months long movement by land-holding farmers mostly from Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh. The opposition parties like the Congress, which was till recently votary of farm sector reforms when in power at the centre also reversed its stance over the issue. Arguably, if despite the great hardship some of these ‘reforms’ have caused for the underclasses like say demonetization, the they have continued unabated in an incremental manner irrespective of the regime change, it is partly due to the crucial support provided by reformist ‘new’ middle class acting as a ‘buffer class’ to affluent entrepreneurial class of Indian industrialists, businessmen, corporate czars (Kumar, 2009, pp. 738–739; Sinha, 2009, p. 196). That the Indian middle class has had a much more influence than widely perceived is best illustrated in the way the two coalition making parties namely the Congress and the BJP have been undertaking the market reforms measures when in power.20 Many of the state level parties including the ‘social justice’ parties receive critical political and material support from the new generation of regional business groups/agrarian rooted capitalist entrepreneurs. Of late, Indian states have witnessed regional leaders themselves

The Middle Class in India  309 or their family members being in business thus showing how business and politics intersect in contemporary India (Sinha, 2019). The Ideological Shift: Politics A distinctive ideological shift has also been visible in the political orientations of the Indian middle class. There has been evidence of the Indian middle class growing inclination towards and support for illiberal majoritarian politics as opposed to the liberal secular politics it avowed for long (Ghosh, 2011, p. 156). The political-cultural role of the middle class in gradually shifting of the middle ground towards the right-wing ideology in India that started in the momentous decade of the 90s and its unmistakable electoral preference for the Hindutva nationalist parties has been well recognized and commented upon and has been revealed in the CSDS surveys also (Prabhu, 2020).21 It is to the credit of articulate middle class intelligentsia that is moving towards conservatism and right-wing politics that the concepts like secularism, development, citizenship, minority rights or nationalism have increasingly come under contestation and reformulations in contemporary India (Jayal, 2009). The post-2014 India has witnessed the emergence of the BJP as the ‘second dominant party’, reminiscent of the ‘Congress system’ at least in electoral terms. The party has been aggressively pursuing illiberal majoritarian politics combined with its relatively better record in service delivery to reap electoral dividends across the states in India including the northeast and south where it had negligible presence earlier (Palshikar, 2017; Ziegfeld, 2020). As Yadav (1999) suggests, BJP rise in the last three decades has been ‘accompanied by the emergence of a new social group that was defined by an overlap of social and economic privileges’. Despite being an artefact of state led economic policies, both entrepreneurial as well as professional middle classes gradually started drifting away from the Congress, disenchanted with its continued rhetoric of a socialist and bureaucratized state. The new middle class, for the introduction of identity, blames the Congress, which remained in power for more than five decades at the centre and patronage based clientelistic politics (Das, 2012). It was the ‘Gujarat model’ of economic growth and Modi call for ‘minimum government and maximum governance’ that enamoured the middle class to go for the BJP in a big way in the 2014 elections and after. How to make sense of the visible shift, given the middle class‘s tighter embrace of Western pro-democratic ideas/values in the not so distant past? Arguably, both the ongoing processes of economic liberalization and cultural nationalism, with their sometimes ‘contradictory but often surprisingly complementary agendas’ for the ‘reinvention’ of the lost greatness in ‘new India’ can be described as ‘vehicles’ for meeting simultaneously the material and cultural interests and aspirations of the middle class (Bhatt, 2006, p. 136). Also, such a uncritical support for the party and its politics may also be viewed as the ‘backlash’ of the elite castes middle class against the indeterminate processes of middle/lower castes and minorities assertion in the

310  Ashutosh Kumar recent years, which is viewed as threatening their avowed dream of a ‘harmonious, perfectly organized great nation-state’ (Demerath et al., 2006).22 Insistence on pan-Indian cultural – religious nationalism as well as speedier reforms thus has served as ‘antidote’ to the ascendant ethnic politics at regional level (Bhatt, 2006, p. 136). There is apparently a little recognition or apprehension among the rising middle class that the ongoing cultural politics of Hindutva itself is divisive in nature (Hawley, 2001). The Indian middle class’s growing religiosity is another factor that explains its support for the politics of cultural nationalism. The latter has been attributed to ‘a growing sense of alienation and feeling of threat vis-à-vis the West’. This is especially so in case of the Indians settled abroad, looking for cultural rootedness and aspiration to make India great again (Hansen, 1999; Saavala, 2010, p. 151; Varma, 2007). The growing political weight of the middle classes disproportionate to their actual numbers was clearly visible as early as in the 2004 parliamentary elections when the BJP had launched its ill-fated ‘India shining’ campaign.23 It aimed at identifying the concerns and feelings of the resurgent Indian middle class with that of the entire country. The Congress on its part in its 2004 manifesto stated that ‘the middle class of India is the proud creation of Congress’ and that the policies of the party if voted to power were to be in ‘sync with their aspirations’.24 Symptomatic of changing times, the 2009 elections witnessed both parties’ campaigners targeting the middle classes through internet marketing campaigns and their manifestos making promises to broaden and deepen economic reforms, providing incentives and environment for increased foreign direct investment, tax reforms, continuation of privatization, though in selective form. The stated aim now became also to make India ‘a global manufacturing hub’ by enabling Indian products, services and entrepreneurs to dominate the domestic as well as the global market, creating world-class infrastructure for the cities.25 The texts of the manifestos of the two coalition making parties at the centre in the last four parliamentary elections at least in part very much read like global funding agencies’ agenda papers (Kumar, 2013). It has been the same story in the 2014 and 2019 elections as well as far as the economic agenda has been concerned. Etching to connect to the middle classes, right since the 2014 elections, both polity-wide parties and their leaders including Narendra Modi and Rahul Gandhi have been active on new social media like Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook. The parties’ campaigns are also designed and executed with the help of the tech-savvy highly qualified middle-class youth acting as campaign managers like Prashant Kishore. Following the national parties’ leaders, even the ‘home-grown’ leaders from the state parties are not behind in their attempt to woo the mobile phones holding middle classes from semiurban locales.26 Such efforts on the part of the parties presents a puzzle as the Indian middle class does not enjoy much demographic weight and also has not been much visible in the electoral arena,27 the two factors crucial for an electoral democracy like India.28

The Middle Class in India  311 The Indian middle-class influence is derived from its possession of ‘advanced professional credentials’ and/or ‘accumulated cultural capital’ that enables its members to occupy ‘positions of recognized authority’ in the government, corporate sector, media and judiciary. Its hold over Indian institutions, both political and cultural, enables the entrepreneurial class in gaining ‘moral – political sway’ while pursuing its reformist agenda (Fernandes  & Heller, 2006, p.  500).29 This was very much evident in the ‘India against corruption’ movement30 spearheaded by ‘saintly’ Anna Hazare in 2011 that paved the way for the formation of Aam Aadmi Party, a middle class party that has twice defeated the BJP and the Congress in the last two assembly elections.31 Demanding the institution of a strong Jan Lokpal to ‘cleanse’ the system riddled with corruption at higher places under the Congress led coalition government, the movement had a distinctive urban middle class support base and also showed the class long-term penchant to look for legal solutions to institutional/political problems. The Lok Satta Party, another middle-class party founded in 2006 in undivided Andhra Pradesh by a former civil servant, had raised the demand for electoral reforms, bringing in right to information act, anti-corruption measure to check the entry of corrupt politicians in law making bodies. The upper middle class focus on eliminating corruption is related to their realization as to how it has been corroding the state institutions and services. Also, it has remained a serious impediment in the ongoing process of neo-liberal market-oriented growth that is propelled by infusion of global capital with which the rising middle class interests are crucially linked. Summing Up Considering the historical processes of middle-class formation, the chapter refers to the political and economic processes that have led to the expansion of the Indian middle class and the emergence of ‘new’ segments within it in contemporary India. As a result, there is no singular social category present in contemporary India that enables us to define the Indian middle class as ‘an entity or essence’ (Beteille, 2001, p.  77, 2007, p.  951; Brosius, 2010, p. 14). While discussing the heterogeneity of the Indian middle class in economic terms and also in terms of social origin and cultural attributes, the chapter explains how its economic, social – cultural and political concerns and choices have for long been influencing the way politics and economy has taken shape in India, more so in in the last three decades. Notes 1 Drawing from the National Council of Applied Economic Research data, Sridharan (2004) identified three categories of the middle classes in India using income criteria: elite middle class, expanded middle class and broadest middle class. Rudra (1989) also made a distinction between the ‘elite’ and ‘mass’ fractions of the middle classes in India, underlining an ‘intelligentsia versus lower and middle-middle class split’.

312  Ashutosh Kumar 2 Even in an earlier study on the subject, Misra (1961) used the term ‘middle classes’, which consisted of industrial, commercial, landed and educational segments. 3 The chapter draws extensively from the author’s earlier published works (Kumar, 2009, 2013). 4 The perceived apathy of the Indian middle class has been attributed to its overwhelming concern with economic rather than political issues, though it is more correct to say about the middle and upper middle classes (Saxena, 2010, p. 6). 5 The variance, if any, was to be found within such a homogenized, hegemonized and socially exclusive middle class in colonial India, then it was in terms of its members’ varied professional choices. As Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, the Bengali novelist, sarcastically put it, the native ‘baboos’ were ‘like Vishnu’ in the sense that they had ‘ten incarnations, namely clerk, teacher, Brahmo, accountant, doctor, lawyer, magistrate, landlord, editor and unemployed’ (quoted in Varma, 2007, p. 5). These ‘baboos’ ‘diligently cultivated the self-image’ of being a superior class (Sarkar, 1983, p. 67). 6 In a volume edited by Ahmad and Reifeld (2002), there are essays undertaking comparative analysis of the middle class in India, Germany and France. 7 India had only 20 universities and 385 colleges as late as in 1939 (Misra, 1961, p. 304). The number stood at 967 universities and around 5,000 colleges in 2020. www.ugc.ac.in/oldpdf/consolidated%20list%20of%20all%20universities.pdf. 8 In CSDS-NES’ 2004 and 2009 surveys the following question pertaining to the respondent’s subjective self-identification was asked: ‘there is quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Some people say they belong to the middle class, others . . . working class, yet others say they do not belong to either of these classes . . . to which class would you say you belong?’ In NES 2004 postpoll survey, 41.5 per cent said they belonged to middle class. The figure was 38 per cent (11,227 out of 27,189 respondents interviewed) in NES 2009. However while taking into consideration the objective criteria like the economic assets and income of an individual in NES 2014, 35 per cent of the 22,303 sampled respondents were identified as belonging to the middle class. In NES 2019, 24,235 sampled respondents across India were asked the following question: ‘many people talk about class nowadays and use terms such as lower class, middle class or upper class. In your opinion, compared to other households, the household you live in currently belongs to which class?’. As high as 56 per cent of respondents identified themselves as belonging to the middle class (CSDS data unit). So the trend has persisted. 9 Jodhka and Prakash (2016, pp. 116–121) has presented an overview of the ways the size of the Indian middle class has been estimated by analysts using different criteria. Like in the case of Sridharan (2004), academics have mostly used a combination of income and (non-manual) occupation for enumeration purposes. 10 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/indias-middleclass-population-to-touch-267-. 11 The people living in urban India constituted 31.6 per cent of the overall population as per the Government of India census held in 2011. In 2019, as per the World Bank estimate, 34 per cent of Indians lived in urban areas, whereas the figure was 60 per cent for China. https://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/ paper2/data_files/india/Rural_urban_2011.pdf; https://data.worldbank.org/indi cator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=CN. 12 In Europe and the USA, however, almost the entire society belongs to middle class. That explains as to why in the West the term popularly used is middle-class ‘society’ and not middle-class ‘people’ (Gupta, 2008). 13 Based on the National Council of Applied Economic Research as well as Indian government’s National Sample Survey database relating to household income

The Middle Class in India  313 and spending, McKinsey Global Institute has projected that middle classes would grow to 41 per cent (583  million) of India’s population by 2025 (Beinhocker et al., 2007). 14 Leela Fernandes (2007) has used the term ‘metropolitan’ middle class to denote the upper middle class having urban roots; 53 cities in India as per the 2011 Census had a population of one million or above. https://censusindia.gov.in/2011provresults/paper2/data_files/india2/1.%20data%20highlight.pdf. 15 Taking into cognizance the dramatic leap in the level of consumption, MacKinsey has forecasted that India by 2025 is likely to consume four times as much as it did in 2005, giving it a distinction of being the fifth largest consumer market in the world (Trentmann, 2010, p. 36). 16 ‘What makes urban middle class discourse on consumer culture more complex is that many people draw rhetorically on Gandhian ideals of frugality and asceticism but present the centrality of consumer culture in their own life with equal ease’ (Mathur, 2010, p. 226). 17 Further, symptomatic of changing times, it is not the once coveted low paying but high status civil services like the Indian Administrative Service but high-paying corporate sectors jobs that enjoy iconic status for the aspiring ‘new’ middle class youth passing out from elite institutions like IITs and IIMs. Interestingly, Sinha (2009, p.  200) suggests that ‘the consumption of US popular culture implicitly promotes support for western-style democratic institutions’. 18 The service sector grew by 34.4 per cent in the three decades following the reforms, accounting for more than 50 per cent of India’s annual gross domestic product. The figure is most likely to go up further under ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’. 19 Question asked during the survey was: Now I will read out few statements. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with – Government should allow foreign companies to freely invest in India without too many restrictions? 20 Arguably, the left parties, as a result of their ideological opposition to market model of economic growth is supposed to have lost the ‘support of some of the most vocal and articulate voices of dissent and protest it relied on in the past’ which came from the middle class intelligentsia (Chandrasekhar, 2011, p.  27). The decline of left parties in West Bengal (and Tripura) may partly be attributed to its loss of support among the Bengali Bhadralok who have shifted to the BJP as has been evident in the recent assembly election (Arnimesh, 2021). 21 CSDS-NES data covering all the Lok Sabha elections since 1996 have consistently shown that the urban middle class has remained a significant ‘social bloc’ of the BJP. The party, as per the survey data, has consistently ‘secured more votes among the upper caste, upper class, educated voters and men and within urban areas than among the less privileged counterpart in each of these categories’ (Yadav, 1999; Sheth, 2009, p. 73; Yadav & Palshikar, 2009, p. 39). 22 The BJP government at the centre introduced 10 per cent quota for the economically weaker people belonging to general category in 2019. 23 The campaign promoted ‘incredible India’ as the future global superpower of the 21st century, a country of unrestricted opportunities and achievement, with a citizenry proud of populist slogans such as ‘made in India’ and ‘there is no better time to be an Indian’ (Brosius, 2010, p. 1). 24 Palshikar (2009, p.  10) has argued that the Congress made an attempt in the 90s to ‘redefine the social contract and forge a policy framework that depended only on the middle classes’, which implied ‘an exclusion of the poor from policy considerations’. 25 For viewing the full text of the manifestos of the Congress and the BJP released in 2019 elections visit: https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/english.pdf; www.bjp.org/en/ manifesto2019.

314  Ashutosh Kumar 26 Equally significantly, the two polity-wide parties when in power have not tampered much with the anti-market populist policies like caste/community based reservations in the public sector employment and centrally funded institutions of higher learning and budgetary subsidies for ‘non-merit’ goods and services. The aim is not to unduly annoy the recipient ‘plebeian’ segment of the Indian middle class that remains intrinsically linked to/dependent on still very large state sector (Bardhan, 2005, p. 4996). 27 In comparison, the rural segment of the new middle class leading the numerically strong middle/lower castes and also having their ‘own’ state level/regional parties have been far more successful in capturing/sharing political power at the state level (Kumar, 2013). 28 In what can be termed as a ‘classic example of the democratic upsurge levelling off’, the NES 2009 survey data revealed a ‘slight increase’ in the turnout among middle class as well as upper class voters when compared to the corresponding figures in 1996, 1999 and 2004 surveys (Kumar, 2009, p. 50). 29 Referring to Gramsci, Deshpande argues that the middle class undertakes the task to build hegemony. The elite fraction of the middle class specializes in the production of ideologies whereas its mass fraction ‘engages in the exemplary consumption of ideologies thus investing them with social legitimacy’ (Deshpande, 2003, p. 141). 30 The movement presented a glimpse of the Indian middle class ability to ‘set the terms of reference of Indian (political) society’ (Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008, p. 19). 31 ‘The politics of Aam Aadmi does not include the poor or their concerns. It is a politics of and by the middle classes and it signifies a sea change in the cultural and political life of independent India’ (Baviskar & Ray, 2011, p. 2).

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15 Understanding Tribal India Constitutional Rights, Issues and Challenges Kamal Nayan Choubey

Introduction A comprehensive understanding of Indian tribals and issues related to their lives and politics is an exceedingly complex task because tribal communities are highly diverse and face different issues and challenges. The Indian tribes, however, can be broadly classified into three categories: one, those tribals who are living in the northeastern part of the country (coming under the Sixth Schedule of India); two, tribal communities residing in the other parts of the country (covered under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution) and finally, those communities which are neither living in the Sixth Schedule Areas nor the Fifth Schedule Areas. It is important to note that the provisions of the Sixth Schedule do not cover all tribal areas of the Northeast, and there are many areas in the rest of the country that are not part of the Fifth Schedule. It should also be noted that the tribal population is highly diverse. Though many tribals live in rural areas and depend upon forest land and its resources, a small proportion also lives in urban areas. The proportion of the urban population is very high in the northeastern states. Furthermore, a small proportion of tribals live a primitive life, that is, they are still living as hunter-gatherers. So whenever we attempt to understand the situation of tribals in India, we must focus on the situations and problems of these distinct groups. As per the 2011 Census, the Scheduled Tribes (STs) constitute 8.6 per cent of the total population of the country, and their population is estimated at 104  million. There has been a substantial increase in the population of STs. In 1961, their population was 30.1  million, 6.9 per cent of the total population. The reason behind the growth of this population was natural growth and the inclusion of new groups in the category of STs. More than three-fourths of the tribal population reside in central India that is, Madhya Pradesh (14.69 per cent), Chhattisgarh (7.5 per cent), Jharkhand (8.29 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (5.7 per cent), Maharashtra (10.08 per cent), Odisha (9.2 per cent), Gujarat (8.55 per cent), Rajasthan (8.86 per cent) and West Bengal (5.6 per cent). The northeastern states comprise about 13 per cent of

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-19

Understanding Tribal India  319 the total tribal population in the country. The remaining 6 per cent resides in southern and northern India, including Andaman and Nicobar Islands. However, the proportion of the tribal population is indeed higher in northeastern states (Mizoram, 94.4 per cent; Nagaland, 86.5 per cent and Meghalaya, 86.1 per cent), and a union territory, Lakshadweep (94.8 per cent) than most of the central Indian states (Chhattisgarh, 33.6 per cent; Jharkhand, 26.2 per cent; Odisha, 22.8 per cent; Madhya Pradesh, 21.1 per cent; Gujarat, 14.8 per cent; Rajasthan, 13.5 per cent and Maharashtra, 9.5 per cent; Ambagudia & Xaxa, 2020, pp. 3–4). This chapter aims to present a comprehensive understanding of tribals in India and various aspects related to their life, livelihood, and politics. It makes an attempt to encompass the diversity of the tribal communities and their various problems related to livelihood and development. It covers the developments since the colonial period, and discusses key events, legislations, and policies related to tribals, but largely focuses on the events after 1990 and underlines that the post-2014 general election era represents the continuities of the previous trends of overlooking tribal rights, but a new trend has emerged, where Central Government tried to weaken the laws like FRA. Before moving forward to understand the changing policies of colonial and post-colonial states about tribal communities in India, it would be helpful to understand the contested debates regarding the definition and identification of tribals. There has not been any consensus regarding the definition of ‘tribes’ among scholars. According to Virginius Xaxa, while studying Indian tribals, the British anthropologists focused on their total separation from the larger Indian society. On the other hand, the Indian anthropologists or sociologists focused on a connection between tribal communities and the larger Indian society. They have argued that tribals have been in a constant cultural transition towards the larger Indian society. N. K. Bose has termed it as Hindu ways of tribal assimilation and G. S. Ghurye has termed tribals as ‘backward Hindus’. However, all Indian sociologists have not accepted such views. Xaxa, for example, underlined that there could be some similarity between tribal ways of life and the Hindu religion. However, one can find similarities between their religion and African tribals’ religion. So based on this similarity, it would be correct to call them Hindus. Indeed, tribals’ relationship with Hindus has been a contested issue, and organizations like Akhil Bharatiya Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (tribal wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) have also termed them as Hindus, and they have continuously opposed their conversion to Christianity by Christian missionaries. In contemporary times, there has been debate over whether tribals or Adivasis are indigenous people of India. Many tribal activists have underlined that tribal communities are actual indigenous people of the country. However, organizations like Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram have opposed this kind of understanding. Xaxa has argued that it would not be factually correct to call tribals indigenous people in every parts of the country. However, it is also true that

320  Kamal Nayan Choubey in contemporary India, many tribal communities have adopted this identity to assert their rights (Choubey, 2015a, 2021; Xaxa, 1999). Historical Background: Emergence of Categorization and Impact on Tribal Life It is a fact that pre-colonial rulers also intervened in forests for occasional hunting and some resources like timber but during the colonial rule, the intervention increased immensely. In this sense, tribal communities, both in the northeastern part of the country and central India, were living more or less an autonomous community life based on their cultural and social norms. The colonial rule made an unprecedented impact on the life of tribal communities. The census created the category of tribes, made a complex set of rules for tribal areas and established a legal framework to ensure the unhindered exploitation of forest resources. Colonial historians have argued that the British rule established ‘the rule of law’ in India, made many protective measures for tribal communities and saved India’s forests from obliteration. However, various Indian thinkers have rejected this argument. According to them, the Britishers changed laws based on their interests. Sometimes, they change laws in opposite direction and made their forest policies to accomplish their imperial interests. Making laws to protect the interests of tribals was also an attempt to soothe the rebellion in tribal areas and present a paternalistic face of colonial rule (Choubey, 2015a; Gadgil & Guha, 1992). Indeed, one can quickly identify two layers of processes in the colonial period vis-à-vis the tribal population. First, through the census, the colonial state formally created a distinct category of ‘tribes’. The meaning and features of the ‘tribes’ had been changed during different censuses. However, primitive and isolated lifestyles and animism (a different pattern of worship than Hinduism) were regarded as key features to define tribes. Indeed, even before the inclusion of the category of tribe in the census, the colonial administration enacted the Scheduled Districts Act in 1874. Through this Act, the idea of two kinds of tribal areas emerged: in the first kind of area, tribal people lived in total isolation from the rest of the country, and in the second kind, the tribal population was partially attached to the ‘mainstream’ society. The colonial rulers made their policies on this understanding. Finally, they named these areas as ‘Excluded Areas’ (for the northeastern part) and ‘Partially Excluded Areas’ (for the many tribal areas of the rest of the country) through the Government of India Act, 1935. To establish this kind of system, colonial rulers used the argument of ‘tribal welfare’. This system helped them enormously to establish their control in these areas. They, however, also systematically criminalized many tribal groups, who were included in the category of ‘criminal’ tribes. The colonial mindset played an essential role in this process and colonial administration was convinced that tribes of certain geographical conditions had ‘criminal’ tendencies (Choubey, 2014b, 2015a).

Understanding Tribal India  321 Second, to enhance their imperial interests, they tried to establish their monopoly over forests. For this purpose, they used the principle of ‘eminent domain’ (i.e., the principle of state’s sovereignty for all lands coming within its geographical area). They established a Forest Department (FD) in 1864. Subsequently, they enacted the Forest Act, 1865, and to overcome the deficiencies of this Act, a new law, the Indian Forest Act, 1878, was enacted. In 1927, they made specific changes to the 1878 Forest Act, and it came to be known as the Forest Act of 1927. Of its 84 clauses, 81 clauses were taken from the 1878 Forest Act. Through these Acts, colonial rulers tried to establish their dominance over forests and their resources (Choubey, 2015a; Gadgil & Guha, 1992, pp. 123–134). There was a provision in the Forest Act of 1878 that after declaring an area as ‘forest’, the property rights of forestdwelling people would be recognized. However, those claiming their rights needed to present written proof in favour of their claims. If they could not give this kind of proof, forest officials declared them ‘encroachers’ of forest land. In making new ‘forests’, local people’s rights were not appropriately settled in various places. Thus, they lost their land rights and became dependent on their area’s forest officers’ whims. Through this Act, the customary rights of local communities on forests and their resources became ‘concessions’, dependent on the whims of FD’s local authority (Gadgil  & Guha, 1992; Singh, 1986). In the beginning, the Britishers exploited forests for the ships of their naval forces and later for railway sleepers. Later, they increased the exploitation of forests to get more profit. However, it was not an entirely one-sided process, and tribes revolted against the arbitrary intrusion of colonial forces. Due to these revolts, the Britishers made specific laws and gave some rights to local communities. The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (CNTA), 1908, is an example of such laws. The fundamental purpose of the CNTA was to pacify the effects of Birsa Munda’s revolt. The CNTA, apart from other things, made provision that the land of tribals could not be transferred to non-tribals. In Bastar, after the 1910 tribal revolt, the Britishers reduced reserved forest areas (Choubey, 2015a; Gadgil & Guha, 1992; Sundar, 1997, pp. 135–155, 2009). The colonial rule prepared a framework for categorizing tribes and governance of tribal areas and forest land, which impacted the post-colonial thinking about tribal issues. Indian Constitution and Tribal Life The Constituent Assembly members accepted the need to preserve the uniqueness of tribal culture and their ways of life. However, they also accepted integrating tribes into Indian society while preserving their cultural uniqueness. As a member of the Constituent Assembly, tribal leader Jaipal Singh Munda raised the question of Adivasi identity and their rights on land and resources of tribal areas (see Box 15.1).

322  Kamal Nayan Choubey Box 15.1  Jaipal Singh Munda (1903–70) Jaipal Singh Munda was a famous tribal leader and a member of the Indian Constituent Assembly. Before joining politics, he was a famous hockey player, and in the 1928 Olympics, held in Amsterdam, he was the captain of the Indian hockey team. Munda became active in politics in 1938–39 and became the president of Adivasi Mahasabha in 1939. In 1948, he formed the Jharkhand Party and played a crucial role in the Constituent Assembly. He raised the concerns of tribal communities and emphasized the need to recognize cultural and economic rights. Later, he intensified the struggle for a separate state of Jharkhand for the Adivasis. His conception of Jharkhand was much broader than the present-day Jharkhand and included the tribal areas of many states. He joined the Congress after the 1963 election to fulfil the dream of a separate state for the Adivasis, though he could not succeed in this endeavour. A week before his death, he expressed the desire to leave the Congress and revive the Jharkhand Party to struggle for a separate Adivasis state. For the Adivasis, Jaipal Singh Munda is an important figure because he emphatically expressed tribals’ economic and cultural autonomy within and outside the Constituent Assembly.

The Indian Constitution gives tribal people all fundamental rights as India’s citizens, but it also gives them some specific rights to ensure their socio-economic and cultural security (see Box 15.2).

Box 15.2  Key Provisions for the STs in the Indian Constitution The Indian Constitution includes the provision of their statutory recognition as STs (Article 342) by the president’s approval after consultation with the governor of the concerned state and the parliament. It can also include or exclude any tribal community from the list of STs. Indeed, the STs of India (and some other groups, which are not part of this category) have adopted the word Adivasi (original inhabitant) to express and assert their identity, which is very close to indigenous people’s idea. The Constitution also provides proportional representation in the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies (Articles 330 and 332, respectively), and 47 Lok Sabha seats are reserved for the STs. It

Understanding Tribal India  323 makes provision to restrict ordinary citizens’ rights to settle in tribal areas and acquire property there (Article 19(5)). There is a provision for reservation in jobs and appointments for the STs (Articles 16(4) and 335). In the Directive Principles of the Constitution, there is a provision regarding promoting the weaker section by including the educational and economic interests of the tribes. Also, there are special provisions for the tribal people in the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution, which will be discussed separately later in the chapter. Article 338A of the Constitution has a provision for the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. This provision was made after the 89th Constitutional Amendment; earlier, there was a united commission for both the SCs and the STs. This Commission has the power to investigate and monitor all matters relating to the safeguards provided to the STs under the Constitution. According to Article 339, the president can, anytime or expiration of 10 years after the commencement of the Constitution, appoint a commission to report on the administration of the Scheduled Areas and the welfare of the STs (Constitution of India, 2008).

A total of 693 communities are included in the list of STs, and many communities are still demanding their inclusion in this list. However, there are no clear criteria to include a particular community in the STs, which has led to the exclusion of many communities from the category. It should also be noted that the Indian Constitution has accepted the validity of the Forest Act of 1927 and the concept of ‘eminent domain’. Article 31A, Subsection 2a(iii) has recognized that colonial forest laws would affect independent India (Constitution of India, 2008, p. 20). Another crucial point is that land reforms, though minimally implemented in the country’s various parts, were not implemented in the forest areas. According to the Forest Policy of 1952, the state should use the forests for national development. The policy underlined that no village could claim the ownership of natural resources based on its location near that forest (Government of India, 1952). Although Nehru underlined the importance of the policy of ‘Panchsheel’ for the Adivasis, in most cases, the interests of the tribal communities were overlooked and violated by the Indian state. Indeed, the extraction of forest resources for the ‘national development’ and later on, demarcation of huge forest areas as Protected Areas (PAs), including National Parks (NPs), tiger reserves and so on, led to the displacement of thousands of tribal families. Moreover, even if they were not displaced, they were forced to face many restrictions in their day-to-day life.

324  Kamal Nayan Choubey Box 15.3  Panchsheel In 1960, Jawaharlal Nehru formulated the following five principles for the policy to be pursued vis-à-vis the tribals: 1. People should develop along the lines of their genius, and the imposition of alien values should be avoided. 2. Tribal rights in the land forest should be respected. 3. Teams of tribals should be trained in the work of administration and development. 4. Tribal areas should not be over administered or overwhelmed with a multiplicity of schemes. 5. Results should be judged not by statistics or the amount of money spent but by the character that is evolved. Virginius Xaxa (2005) argues that Nehru’s Panchsheel reaffirms the points already present in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Also, he criticizes Nehru for not making these ideas as basic pillars of the government’s policies.

Sixth Schedule: Key Provisions and Experiences

The colonial rulers administratively termed the many hilly tracts of the northeast as ‘wholly excluded areas’. The different ethnic communities also claimed autonomy from the future Indian nation state through various colonial administration representations. The Constituent Assembly of India set up the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minority Rights, which formed two subcommittees to consider the tribals of northeast India and other parts of India, respectively. Gopinath Bordoloi was the president of a subcommittee formed to consider the situation of tribal and excluded areas of the Northeast Frontier and recommend a proper system for their governance. This subcommittee was known as the Northeast Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committee, which tried to balance the ‘political’ autonomy of local tribal communities and integrate them with other areas of the country. The Sixth Schedule applies to the specific areas of the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. The Constitution describes these areas as ‘tribal areas’. The Sixth Schedule makes a provision for creating Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). It also provides that if there are different STs in an autonomous district, the governor of the state, through public notification, may divide the area or areas inhabited by them in autonomous regions. Paragraph 4, Sub-paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule, gives the executive and

Understanding Tribal India  325 legislative functions of the district and regional councils. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 4, the Sixth Schedule vested the administration of justice in the district and regional councils. It gives them the power to make rules regulating the constitution of village councils and courts. In addition, they exercise the powers and the procedure to be followed by an appellate body above them. Consequently, district councils formulate their own rules for administering justice within the limits of governor’s rules. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution gives the district councils legislative powers on the following subjects: (a) the allotment, occupation or use, or the setting apart, of land, other than any land which is a state reserve forest for agriculture, grazing and other purposes in the interests of the inhabitants of any village, subject to the Assam government’s power to acquire land for public purposes; (b) the management of unreserved forests; (c) the use of any canal or watercourse for agricultural purpose; (d) the regulation of shifting cultivation; (e) the establishment of village and town committees; (f) the appointment or succession of chiefs or headmen; (g) marriage and (h) social customs. Since the social customs have come under the district and regional councils’ powers, traditional community organizations have turned into a subordinate of the district council. Furthermore, the appointment and succession of chiefs became the power of the district council (Chaube, 1973; Constitution of India, 2008; Government of India, 2014). The district council’s executive powers extend to the construction and management of primary schools, markets, cattle pounds, ferries, fisheries, roads and waterways in the district and the prescription of the medium and manner of primary education. It has no legislative or regulatory power over these subjects. It could set up village councils or village courts and appellate courts to trial cases between parties, all of whom belong to the STs of the areas but are not involved in offenses punishable by death, transportation for life or imprisonment for not less than five years. Regional councils could also be set up within the autonomous district; they would also have the same powers, excluding the district council’s powers in those respects. There are, however, many issues related to jurisdiction and revenue, which create a situation of conflict between regional councils and district councils. The Sixth Schedule’s provisions have, to some extent, satisfied the political aspirations of many local communities in northeast India. There have been some limitations on the working of ADCs: First, under the Sixth Schedule, a maximum of one-fourth of the district council could be nominated by the state government. The purpose of this provision is to provide representation to minorities. This provision, however, was frequently misused for narrow political gains. For example, in the late 1970s, the Congress formed the Mizo District Council Committee with two nominated members. Second, there are ample examples where the district councils were not taken into confidence in the development planning within their boundaries. Third, minorities always feel unsafe and marginalized within the jurisdiction of district councils because most community members generally

326  Kamal Nayan Choubey work according to the majority community’s wishes. Fourth, district councils also resist necessary reforms in social customs, and in this sense, they work as a protector of conservative outlook in these societies. Fifth, S. K. Chaube (1973, p. 108) has argued an evident paradox of the district councils’ working. Their attention was diverted to mini-states’ politics and pretensions. However, there is no doubt that the provisions of the Sixth Schedule have been desirable to different tribal organizations of other parts of the country. The supporters of this Schedule have been arguing that it gives local communities autonomous group rights to live their life according to their customs, manages their socio-economic life and prevents outside intervention in their resources, including forest resources. Like Adivasi Mahasabha of Bastar, many organizations have been demanding the Sixth Schedule status for the whole Bastar area. Though the Sixth Schedule has not achieved its full potential, it has still successfully created an autonomous space for tribal communities. Fifth Schedule and Its Experiences

As mentioned, the Constituent Assembly of India set up the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minority Rights, which formed two subcommittees to consider the tribals of northeast India and other parts of India, respectively. The subcommittee, which considered all other parts except northeast, was headed by A. V. Thakkar. The Thakkar Subcommittee recommended that the cultures of these tribal communities be protected, but they should also be integrated with the larger society. The basic philosophy of the provisions of the Fifth Schedule is to protect tribal communities from unhindered external intervention by non-tribal people and to ensure their integration with the mainstream society. The Constitution describes the areas coming under the Fifth Schedule as Scheduled Areas (SAs), and the president may by order declare any area as SAs. Clause 2 of Para 6 of the Fifth Schedule provides that the president may at any time (a) direct that whole or any specified part of SA shall cease to be SA or part of such area and (b) increase the area of any SA in a state, after consultation with the governor of that state. The following states have SAs: Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Himachal Pradesh and Gujarat. There are many critical provisions for protecting the interests of tribals in the Fifth Schedule Areas. First, according to Clause 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule, the governors of states can deny the implementation of laws passed by the Parliament or the Legislative Assembly of any state, or the governor of a state can direct that these laws can be implemented in SAs only after due amendments (Constitution of India, 2008, pp. 254–255). Second, the governor of SAs must submit a report annually or whenever required to the president regarding the administration of these areas. Then the union government

Understanding Tribal India  327 may give directions to them about concerning issues. Third, according to the provisions of the Fifth Schedule, a Tribal Advisory Committee (TAC) would be established in all states having SAs. The president can directly establish them in states with no SAs but a substantial population of STs. The core task of TAC is to advise on such matters about the welfare and advancement of the STs as may be referred to them by the governor. Fourth, the governor has the power to make regulations after consultation with TAC for the ‘peace and good governance in the SAs, to prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of STs in the SA, to regulate the allotment of land to the members of STs in such areas and to regulate the business of moneylending. Fifth, the governor can amend any existing Act of the Parliament or State Legislative Assembly with the president’s assent. Indeed, the provisions of the Fifth Schedule have never been thoughtfully implemented and remained showpieces in the Constitution. In addition, in the history of independent India, no governor ever used these constitutional provisions (Sharma, 2010). On the one hand, this has resulted in the imposition of all kinds of laws in the SAs, on the other, the Indian state has exploited the resources of these areas for ‘development’ purposes, which has created severe problems of displacement and dispossession of rights for the tribals of SAs. The governor’s annual report turned into a ritual, and due to control by the ruling party of the state, the TAC has not been able to present a strong criticism of state policies. Indeed, the Fifth Schedule’s provisions have been overlooked and violated, which has resulted in the social, economic and cultural deprivation of tribal communities (Choubey, 2014b). PESA: A Radical Law for Fifth Schedule Areas

As evident from the earlier-mentioned analysis, the provisions of the Fifth Schedule have been blatantly and deliberately violated or overlooked by the different state governments. However, a new kind of consciousness about rights emerged in these areas due to the democratization and mobilization of grassroots organizations in the 1970s, particularly after the Emergency. Many grassroots organizations started their active work in these areas and contested the imposed ‘development’ model. The Chipko Andolan, which was started in 1973, and the Narmada Bachao Andolan of the 1980s were prominent examples of this type of struggle. To describe these activities, Rajni Kothari (1984) has used the term ‘non-party political process’ (for Narmada Bachao Andolan and Chipko Andolan, see Baviskar, 1995; Guha, 1989, respectively), because they started their work outside party politics. The Maoists also started their activities more systematically in forest areas around 1980, and their activities spread in many forest areas after that. It played an essential role in making forest communities more conscious of their forest land rights and resources (Navlakha, 2012; Shankar, 1999). The continuous dispossession of forest-dwelling communities also played the

328  Kamal Nayan Choubey role of a critical catalyst (discussed in detail in the next section of the chapter). All these factors made a clear impact on the forest policy of the Indian state, and the 1988 Forest Policy of the Government of India made a fundamental change in its previous approach (Government of India, 1988). It underlined that local communities should be given an essential role in forest management. In 1992, the Parliament passed the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments to give the Panchayati Raj and municipalities constitutional status, and they came into effect in 1993. It was mentioned in these amendments that the Parliament would pass a separate law for Fifth Schedule Areas, which would be sensitive to the local conditions of these areas (Article 243 (M)(b); Constitution of India, 2008, p. 126). Though the Constitution mentioned the need for a separate law for the extension of the provisions of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, neither the central government nor any state government initiated the process to follow this constitutional provision. However, many states with SAs started the process of the election of panchayats without considering the actual constitutional mechanism. Many grassroots tribal organizations, particularly the Bharat Jan Andolan, an organization formed by B. D. Sharma on 2 November 1991, worked hard to mobilize tribals in favour of separate Panchayati Raj law for Fifth Schedule Areas. Due to their constant mobilization, the Government of India formed a committee in June 1994 to formulate a separate law for decentralization in Fifth Schedule Areas. Dileep Singh Bhuria headed this committee, and it submitted its report in January 1995. The tribal organizations pressured the government to pass a law based on Bhuria Committee’s recommendation. Finally, the Parliament passed the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) on 24 December 1996. This law was termed hamara kanoon (our law) by the tribals in many parts of the SAs (Choubey, 2014b, 2016; Sharma, 1998). The PESA presents a framework of gaon ganrajya (village republic/selfrule) for the SAs, and it has often been described as a ‘Constitution within Constitution’. The uniqueness of this law is that it attempts to bring together two entirely different worlds in a single frame: one is a simple system of tribal communities governed by their respective customs and traditions, another is the formal system of the state governed exclusively by law (Dandekar & Choudhury, 2010, p. 5). The PESA envisages the gram sabha as the basic unit of Adivasis’ community life, defined as a habitation or a group of habitations or a hamlet comprising a community, managing its affairs by following traditions and customs and all adult people are members of a gram sabha (Section  4(b) (c); Government of India, 1996). It directs the state government that the Panchayat Act for SAs shall be in consonance with customary laws, social and religious practices, and traditional management practices of resources (Section  4(a); Government of India, 1996). The PESA makes the role of

Understanding Tribal India  329 gram sabha very extensive: it is competent to preserve the traditions, customs, cultural identity, community resources, and the traditional mode of dispute resolution (Section 4(d); Government of India, 1996). Its approval is necessary to implement various social and economic development plans taken up by the panchayat for implementation at the village level. It has the right to identify or select the persons for the poverty alleviation programme (Sections  4(e) and 4(f); Government of India, 1996). The gram sabha or panchayat at the appropriate level would be consulted before the land acquisition; its prior recommendation would be necessary for any grant of mining of minor minerals, and it has the power to prevent the alienation of the land in SAs and take appropriate action to restore any unlawfully alienated land to an ST. The gram sabha or panchayat at the appropriate level has ownership over Minor Forest Produce (MFP); power to enforce prohibition, or to regulate or restrict the sale and consumption of any intoxicant; control over moneylending and institutions and functionaries in all social sectors (Sections 4(i), 4(j), 4(k), 4(l) and 4(m); Government of India, 1996). It gives reservation to all groups mentioned in the Constitution according to their proportion in the panchayat and underlines that the reservation for the STs would not be less than one half of the total seats and all seats of chairpersons at all levels would be reserved for the STs (Section 4(g); Government of India, 1996). In many states, the rights of the gram sabhas have been made less influential by state level PESA laws passed after the enactment of central PESA. For example, according to Section 4(i) of the central PESA, the gram sabha or panchayat at the appropriate level shall be consulted before acquiring land for development projects and before the resettlement or rehabilitation of affected persons in SAs. The Andhra Pradesh Act, however, has made the provisions for consulting the mandal (block) parishad, the Jharkhand Act has no provision in this regard, the Gujarat Act provides that taluka panchayats be consulted and the Odisha Act says that the district panchayat should be consulted before acquiring land. Only Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh have made provisions that before acquiring land for development projects, the gram sabha will be consulted. The experience of the implementation of the PESA has been very gloomy. In some states, elections were conducted based on the PESA, and the STs got representation at the panchayat level. However, its more crucial provisions have been avoided or rampantly violated. The provision of PESA regarding the consultation with gram sabha on land acquisition and rehabilitation has proved to be a significant obstacle for the corporate houses because most of the time, tribals, through the gram sabhas, have refused to give their lands for ‘development’ work. At those places where the gram sabhas were opposing land acquisition, the corporate houses, with the administration’s active help, tried to create a façade regarding the whole process of consultation (Dandekar & Choudhury, 2010, pp. 6–8).

330  Kamal Nayan Choubey The PESA has been indiscriminately violated in the name of the military campaign against left-wing extremism. One crucial example of this is the Salwa Judum campaign in Chhattisgarh. In the name of controlling the Maoists, the Chhattisgarh government armed one section of the tribal people and compelled the tribals of more than 640 villages to shift in camps. Due to the terror of Salwa Judum, thousands of people ran away into the forests of Andhra Pradesh (Sundar, 2006, 2016). In this process, no state authorities ever tried to know the wishes of the gram sabha, which was a clear violation of the PESA. The strong non-ST groups and the officials of different departments of the government, particularly the FD, violate provisions of the PESA to serve their interests in the form of control over government funds or forest resources. Though it has been welcomed as a revolutionary law, many scholars criticized the PESA for romanticizing the role of gram sabhas. For instance, according to Nandini Sundar, the concept of Adivasi society that the PESA embodies is essentially a static one. This society has somehow survived colonialism and capitalism and retains strong community ties at the hamlet level (Sundar, 2009, p. 201). The PESA makes a provision for gram sabha autonomy, but there is no provision to ensure non-ST  minority groups’ interests within a village. All posts of the head of panchayats are reserved for the STs, which is detrimental for the political aspiration and mobility of non-ST groups, particularly the Dalits. However, despite many internal contradictions and drawbacks in its implementation, this law has enormously created a sense of empowerment in the tribal communities of Fifth Schedule Areas. They are not only using this law to assert the autonomy of the gram sabhas, but they have been using this law to oppose ecologically harmful mining in their areas. Indeed, in many areas, tribal villages have established shilalekh (writing on a big piece of stone) and mentioned the key provisions of the PESA. In this sense, the PESA has played a critical role in making tribal people in the Fifth Schedule Areas more aware of their rights (Choubey, 2015b, 2015c). It should be noted that the violation of the PESA continued in the post-2014 general election era because like previous governments the Modi Government also focused on the same kind of economic and development policies, which are primarily based on extraction of the natural resources. For such policies, laws like Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (CNTA) and PESA are obstacles in the way of the expansion of developmental measures. However, in many tribal areas of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh a Pathalghadi movement emerged in 2017. In this movement stone inscriptions of the key tribal rights given by the Constitution and the sections of the PESA were established in different villages, and the villagers declared that the government officials could not enter or do any kind of work without the permission of the gram sabha (Roy & Singh, 2022). Though this movement was curbed, but it underlined that the tribal people are highly dissatisfied with the attitude of the Government on the issues related to their life and livelihood.

Understanding Tribal India  331 The Forest Rights Act: Main Provisions and Experiences

The problems of forest-dwelling communities have increased after Independence. Many new areas were made ‘forest’, but the right of the people, who were living there from time immemorial or from many generations was not settled. It led to the extension of the FD and its controlling power on the lives of local communities. Forests were hugely exploited in the name of ‘national development’. The post-colonial Indian governments continued the colonial policy of ‘scientific forestry’. Through this policy, industry-friendly trees were planted at the cost of mixed forests, which caused enormous disadvantages for both forests and wildlife. After 1970, the Indian state made several laws to improve the situation of wildlife. These laws increased the control of the state over the lives of forest-dwelling communities (Choubey, 2015a; Gadgil & Guha, 1992, 1995; Pathak, 1994). In 1972, the parliament passed the Wildlife (Protection) Act, which has given the state powers to create National Parks (NPs) and sanctuaries. It restricted human activities in these areas, especially in NPs, and made a provision that people residing in the NPs should be relocated. The parliament passed the Forest Conservation Act in 1980, which, apart from other things, clearly underlined that no forest land would be diverted for non-forest use (Government of India, 1972, 1980). The irony is that these laws have been used to restrict and control the activities of local communities; however, their other provisions were not implemented properly. For example, very few villages of the NPs were relocated. It should also be noted that for the sake of ‘development’ and fulfilling the interest of corporate capital, forest lands were hugely diverted for non-forest uses. Due to the pressure of many grassroots movement mentioned in the previous section, the government presented a new forest policy in 1988, which mentioned the need to involve local communities in the activities of the FD. The government started the Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme in 1990, which was based on the basic philosophy of the 1988 Forest Policy. The idea behind JFM was to increase the cooperation between FD and local communities about the issues related to forest management. It was meant to reverse the earlier hostility between villagers and forest staff and enable villagers to manage their resources. Nevertheless, FD was not ready to give its power to local communities. It used JFM to divide village communities and, hence, dominated these communities (CSD, 2004; Jeffery & Sundar, 1999). Indeed, JFM offered nothing concrete to solve the problems faced by forest-dwelling communities. Due to the earlier-mentioned developments, the forest-dwelling communities were facing some serious problems related to their very existence and livelihood. Lakhs of people were compelled to live as ‘encroachers’ of forest land due to the non-settlement of their rights on forest land. There were thousands of forest villages in forest areas and the people of these villages had been living without minimal citizenship rights due to the non-recognition of their forest land rights (CSD, 2004, p. 18; Government of India, 1990).

332  Kamal Nayan Choubey Tribal people, living in forest areas or villages near forest areas, had no legal rights over forest produces. They were dependent on the arbitrary actions of FD officials. As mentioned earlier, FD officials were not ready to give them the status of equal partners. It is the fundamental reason for the failure of JFM, a programme started by the Indian government to increase the role of local communities in the protection of forests. During our discussion on the PESA, it was mentioned that in the late 1970s, a consciousness emerged at the grassroots level about local communities’ rights over forests and other natural resources. Many movements were organized for this purpose, and PESA’s enactment was also a result of such a movement. The PESA, however, was related to Fifth Schedule Areas, and it was not related to the ‘encroacher’ status of the many forest-dwelling communities. Many such communities were facing the problem of eviction by FD. Many grassroots tribal organizations collectively attempted to enact a law to resolve the existential problems of the so-called ‘encroachers’ of forest land and demanded the recognition of forest-dwelling communities’ rights over forest land and its resources. The Forest Rights Act (FRA), enacted in 2006, was essentially a result of an extensive movement by tribal organizations of the different tribal areas of the country to ensure the rights of forest-dwelling communities over forest land and its resources. It gives many rights to forest-dwelling STs and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (OTFDs). The following are some necessary rights given to forest-dwelling communities by the FRA. First, it recognizes that every nuclear ST and OTFD family would get ‘patta’ of maximum 4 hectares of ‘encroached’ forest land and makes a provision for the ‘joint patta’ for both husband and wife. The cut-off date for the STs was set as 13 December 2005, when the Forest Rights Bill was introduced in Parliament. According to the FRA, OTFDs must prove that they have been residing or dependent on forest land for the last three generations and 75  years from 13 December 2005. Second, it gives these groups rights to non-timber forest products and the right to manage the forest. Third, it accepts the right to habitat and habitation for Primitive Tribal Groups. Fourth, Section 5 of the FRA is related to the duties of the holders of forest rights. It makes right holders empowered to protect the wildlife, forest, and biodiversity (Choubey, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, pp. 116–180; Government of India, 2007). Before the enactment of the FRA, the process of using forest land for non-forest purposes was entirely centralized. According to the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, the Forest Advisory Committee can take a decision in this context, but there is no representation from local communities. After the enactment of the FRA, the ‘prior informed consent’ of the gram sabha has become necessary. Fifth, the FRA has made a crucial provision about PAs (NPs, sanctuaries, tiger reserves, and so on). According to its provisions, a participatory committee of wildlife experts, members of non-governmental organizations and representatives of the local community can decide whether a particular space of PAs should be human-less or not. Suppose the Committee would give its report in favour of

Understanding Tribal India  333 making that space an inviolable space. In that case, that area will be declared as a ‘Critical Wildlife Habitat’ (CWH). The communities living in that area will be relocated, and the government would provide them an alternative place to resettle (Government of India, 2007). It should be noted that the PESA is only for Fifth Schedule Areas, but the FRA is for the forest areas of the whole country. The PESA is related to the village community life in the Fifth Schedule Areas and gives them autonomy, whereas the FRA is related to forest land and its resources. Both these laws give local communities significant powers in matters related to land acquisition or forest land diversion. The implementation of the FRA, however, has not been satisfactory. The private property rights over the socalled ‘encroached’ forest land have been primarily implemented, and they have ensured stability in the lives of many families of forest-dwelling communities, particularly the ST families. The OTFD families have been facing many problems to provide the necessary proof of living on a particular forest land for three generations or 75 years. So in many places, OTFDs could not get rights for forest land (Choubey, 2015a). Interestingly, FRA’s community rights have largely been unimplemented or partially implemented because they challenge FD’s dominance. So the FD created many obstacles in their implementation. Third, though the FRA talks about making CWH in NPs and other PAs to create human-less space for animals, the FD violated this provision. In many cases, it tried to displace tribals without settling their rights or taking their consent or without any scientific study (Choubey, 2015a, 2017). It is a fact that there are many limitations of the FRA and it is not implemented correctly. However, many examples underline that local communities have used it (and the PESA in the Fifth Schedule Areas) to assert their rights over forest land and its resources. The most prominent example is related to the Supreme Court judgment (2013) in the Niyamgiri case. In this case, the Dongria Kondh tribal community opposed the mining of the Niyamgiri mountain by claiming that the mountain is a sacred place for them. They also claimed that as per the provisions of the PESA and the FRA, the government cannot approve any proposal of mining without their consent for doing the same. In its judgment, the Supreme Court directed the state government on the basis of the provisions of the PESA and the FRA to consult with the gram sabha of concerned villages before permitting mining on Niyamgiri hills. In their meetings, all gram sabhas rejected the proposal of mining. There are many such examples, yet, undoubtedly, the forest-dwelling communities have not received their rights as promised in the FRA. They are still struggling for the proper implementation of the FRA in a different part of the country (see Choubey, 2015a, 2021). A key development in post2014 general election is that the Modi Government tried to make the FRA less effective through amendments in the 1927 Indian Forest Act in 2019 (Mohanty, 2019). However, due to the opposition of many tribal organization, including the ABVKA it did not move forward in this direction. Indeed,

334  Kamal Nayan Choubey this underlines that the proper implementation of the FRA has not been in the agenda of the Modi Government (NEWSClICK, 2019) Development Initiatives and Miscellaneous Challenges Faced by Tribals From the earlier discussion, it is evident that post-Independence India followed a path that was neither isolationist nor assimilationist. On the one hand, it tried to integrate tribes into Indian society, on the other, it also attempted to safeguard their distinct social and cultural identity. Virginius Xaxa termed it as a discourse of ‘integration – midway between isolation and assimilation’ (Xaxa, 2012). Soon after Independence, the government started block-level multipurpose development projects in tribal areas. These were a supplement to community development projects for the comprehensive development of rural areas. Later, the Verrier Elwin Committee (1960) reviewed these projects and recommended reducing the number of projects. Based on its recommendation, these activities mainly concentrated on four activities, that is, economic development, education, health and communication. However, a significant change occurred during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (started in 1974): the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP) and the Integrated Tribal Development Project (ITDP) were introduced. The Plan had a different budgetary head for TSP and ITDP. This strategy’s main objective was to create a clear path to end existing exploitation in the tribal areas and enhance development. It recommended the following programmes: integrated credit-cummarketing services, marketing of agricultural products and MFP, supply of essential consumer commodities, redemption of past debts through legislative and executive orders and so on. It also emphasized the prevention of land alienation, restoration of alienated land, abolition of bonded labour, review of excise and forest policies and so on. It also underlined the need to prioritize land reforms and irrigation and improve cultivation methods. TSP’s main components were the ITDP, modified area development approach (MADA), clusters and primitive tribal groups. Each ITDP comprised blocks, talukas or the whole district with 50 per cent or more tribal population. The MADA areas comprise smaller pockets of tribal concentration, having a minimum total population of 10,000 with the ST population of 50 per cent or more. A  total of 74 tribes were identified who required special care for their development at the planning and implementation levels (Xaxa, 2012). Though the TSP has ensured a separate budgetary allocation for the tribal areas, it has not been able to bring about any perceptible improvement in these areas. The resources allocated for tribal development have been far from adequate. With this budgetary allocation, the process of expropriation of tribal resources also continued, which led to the dispossession of tribal people in many areas of the country, particularly those living near a forest and dependent on its land and resources. We can find that compared

Understanding Tribal India  335 to the country’s overall situation, the condition of tribal areas is less than satisfactory. There have been many explanations for the lack of development in tribal areas. First, it is argued that programmes made for them generally do not reach them due to their geographical isolation. Second, it has been argued that, generally, there has been inadequate allocation for tribal development. Third, even in the case of better allocation of funds, the ineffective implementation of programmes due to lack of infrastructure and corruption at the administrative level has led to the continuous backwardness of tribal areas. Fourth, the tribal people do not have actual ownership over their resources because of which they could not get the benefit of the mining or extraction of resources from their areas. As discussed in previous sections, the laws such as the PESA and the FRA, which provide certain rights over forest land and its resources, have not been appropriately implemented. Indeed, postIndependence India’s whole development model has led to the displacement of tribal people in many areas. According to the studies conducted about the displaced people in 13 states of India, out of all the displaced people, the proportion of the STs (i.e., 30.7 per cent) was much higher than their proportion in India’s population (Government of India, 2014, p. 259). Fifth, many supporters of the modern idea of development based on industrialization and resource extraction have argued that opposition by tribal communities to ‘development’ measures (i.e., big industries, mining and so on) is responsible for their inadequate development. It is argued that their traditional way of living is responsible for their backwardness. However, it is also a fact that with mining and industrialization, many persons from outside came in the urban or semi-urban places of the tribal areas, resulting in depriving tribals of the fruit of development came in these areas. It is important to note that different tribal communities face various problems related to violence, under-representation, social stigma and so on. Following are some of the crucial challenges faced by various tribal communities. First, many tribal communities are part of the ST category in one state but are excluded from this category in other parts of the country. This situation makes many communities vulnerable to different kinds of exclusions from state policies. Second, de-notified tribes (DNTs) still face discrimination and are still suspected of being ‘habitual criminals’ in many countries.

Box 15.4  De-notified, Nomadic and Semi-nomadic Tribes The recent history of DNTs can be traced back to the Criminal Tribes Acts (CTA) of 1871 and 1911. Between 150 and 200 communities were deemed to be ‘hereditary criminals’, subject to surveillance,

336  Kamal Nayan Choubey confinement and gross discrimination. The CTA was removed from the statute books in 1952 on the recommendation of the All India Criminal Tribes Inquiry Committee (1949), and since then, ‘criminal tribes’ came to be known as ‘de-notified tribes’ instead. Even though the law has been repealed, the identification of these communities as ethnic groups having criminal antecedents continues to this day, leading to everyday discrimination in terms of access to education and jobs, as well as brutal violence by neighbouring communities and police personnel. Traditionally, de-notified, nomadic and semi-nomadic communities practice a range of occupations and are remarkably internally diverse. Scholars have classified them into four broad categories: (a) pastoralists and hunter-gatherers, mainly shepherds, cowherds and hunters of small game; (b) goods and service nomads, such as blacksmiths, stone workers, weapon makers, salt traders and basket makers; (c) entertainers, including dancers, acrobats, snake charmers, monkey trainers and wrestlers; and (d) religious performers, ascetics, devotional singers, minstrels and astrologers. Hunter-gatherers and pastoralists have been affected by the growing restrictions on access to grazing grounds and forests, the degradation of natural resources and the increasing privatization of common property resources. One major issue that has been raised concerning the de-notified and nomadic communities is the lack of proper enumeration and classification, which has made the planning and implementation of welfare schemes difficult. Some of these communities have been listed as STs, others as Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes (Government of India, 2014, pp. 57–59).

Third, in many Maoist-violence-affected areas, tribals have faced violence and counter-violence by the Maoists and state forces. Salwa Judum is an example of such violent displacement of tribals in the name of curbing Maoism in the Bastar area of Chhattisgarh. It was started in 2005 and both the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party supported it. Many states gave arms to thousands of tribal youths to counter the Maoists. This whole process resulted in displacement and killing of thousands of innocent tribals. Later, in 2011, the Supreme Court declared Salwa Judum illegal. However, the tribals in many Maoist-affected areas are still facing continuous violence. In Bastar and other tribal areas, militarization affected the lives of tribals and led to the criminalization of tribal communities. In many Fifth Schedule Areas, the paramilitary forces used the land to establish their camps, and in most of the cases, these camps became permanent (see Dandekar & Choudhury, 2010; Government of India, 2008; Sundar, 2016).

Understanding Tribal India  337 Box 15.5  Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups Certain tribes have been characterized as Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs; earlier known as Primitive Tribal Groups) on the basis of their greater ‘vulnerability’ even among the tribal groups (although the precise contours of their vulnerability have not been clearly defined). PVTGs, currently including 75 tribal groups, have been identified as such on the basis of the following criteria: (a) forest-dependent livelihoods, (b) pre-agricultural level of existence, (c) stagnant or declining population, (d) low literacy rates and (e) a subsistence-based economy. As per the 2001 Census, these 75 PVTGs had a total population of 2,768,322. The majority of the PVTG population lives in the seven states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Odisha has 13 PVTGs, the largest number for any state. The vulnerability of the PVTGs primarily stems from the loss of their traditional livelihoods, habitats and customary resource rights through the gradual exploitative intrusion of the market and state into their areas in the form of industrial projects, conservation efforts, tourism, forest bureaucracy and so on (Government of India, 2014, pp. 59–60).

Fourth, though there is provision for the reservation of seats for the STs in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, one can find their inadequate representation not only in the formal political institution but also in the rank of party leadership. Usually, tribal leaders get assigned to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, and apart from few regional parties (like Jharkhand Mukti Morcha), they are unable to get a prominent post within the national parties. Fifth, there are many states where the proportion of the tribal population is very low: Uttarakhand, 2.9 per cent; Kerala, 1.5 per cent; Bihar, 1.3 per cent; Tamil Nadu, 1.1 per cent and Uttar Pradesh, 0.6 per cent. It is challenging for tribals to get representation in these states and impact state machinery through their mobilization. These tribal areas have no special provision (like the Fifth Schedule), so they cannot assert and protect their rights. For example, there is some mobilization in the Sonbhadra area of Uttar Pradesh to extend the Fifth Schedule in the whole Kaimur area (i.e., Sonbhadra and some other districts of Bihar and Jharkhand). However, it has not been done. Similarly, the Bhuria Commission (1995) had recommended enacting a separate law for the urban areas. However, this recommendation has not been implemented yet (Choubey, 2015b). On many occasions, the state governments with Fifth Schedule Areas have changed the legal status of a rural area to urban area to avoid the provisions of the PESA.

338  Kamal Nayan Choubey Sixth, tribals are also facing imposition of cultural norms by different organizations for the past many decades. From the colonial period onwards, Christian missionaries have been trying to spread the influence of Christianity in tribal areas. From 1952, the Akhil Bharatiya Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram has also started its work in tribal areas. They also try to spread the values and rituals of Hinduism among the tribal people. Indeed, both these organizations have created a danger for the tribal culture and their religious values (Choubey, 2019). Seventh, the Indian government has created a category of PVTGs. The communities are included in this category based on their forest-dependent livelihood, pre-agricultural level of existence, stagnant and declining population, low literacy rate and subsistence-based economy. Some of them still live as hunter-gatherers, while others indulge in jhum cultivation (shifting cultivation). The critical challenge in the context of these communities is to protect them from the onslaught of ‘development’ measures, which have posed a grave danger to their habitat and livelihood sources. It is also a conundrum for policymakers whether to leave them in their existing situation or introduce them to the modern lifestyle. Eighth, a small proportion of the STs is living in urban areas. Many people from the ST category are in administrative services, academics and other white-collar jobs. They are facing discrimination from other dominant castes at the workplace. Although there are important laws (e.g., the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes [Prevention of Atrocities] Act, 1989) and institutions (National Commission for Scheduled Tribes) to protect them, they are still facing discrimination. Undoubtedly, there are diverse challenges for different tribal communities. To ensure the overall development of tribal communities, it is necessary to weed out these problems. It is obvious that such problems existed before the 2014 general elections, but the Modi Government did not try to resolve these problems, and in many cases, these problems have become more complicated. Summing Up Tribals are one of the most marginalized sections of India, and they are facing diverse problems. Though there are many crucial constitutional provisions to protect their rights and ensure their representation, they are still on the margins and facing displacement, violence and continuous marginalization. Indeed, most of the problems related to tribal rights have their genesis before 2014 general elections, but the Modi Government has made them more complex. Rather than ensuring the proper implementation of the laws like PESA and FRA, it has been making attempts to weaken these laws, particularly the FRA. There is a need to ensure better implementation of key constitutional provisions and laws such as the PESA and the FRA, which give them the right to live an autonomous life and ownership over forest land and its resources. It is also imperative to focus on the problems of the tribals who are living in

Understanding Tribal India  339 the urban areas and facing different kinds of exploitation. In other words, there is a need to create a more decentralized structure for the welfare and development of tribal communities. References Ambagudia, J., & Xaxa, V. (2020). Situating tribal politics in India. In J. Ambagudia & V. Xaxa (Eds.), Handbook of tribal politics in India. Routledge. Baviskar, A. (1995). In the belly of the river: Tribal conflict over development in Narmada valley. Oxford University Press. Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD). (2004). Endangered symbiosis: Evictions and India’s forest communities, report of the Jan Sunwai, July 19–20, 2003. CSD. Chaube, S. K. (1973). Hill politics in Northeast India. Orient BlackSwan. Choubey, K. N. (2014a). The forest rights act and the politics of marginal society. NMML Occasional Paper: Perspectives in Indian Development (New Series 31). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Choubey, K. N. (2014b). Law as a site of contestation between state and the margin: A  comparative study of the experiences of two progressive laws (PESA and FRA) [Unpublished Final Report of the Post-Doctoral Project]. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Choubey, K. N. (2015a). Jungal ki haqdari: Rajneeti aur sangharsh. CSDS-Vani Prakashan. Choubey, K. N. (2015b). Enhancing PESA: The unfinished agenda. Economic  & Political Weekly, 50(8), 21–23. Choubey, K. N. (2015c). The public life of a “progressive” law: PESA and gaon ganarajya (village republic). Studies in Indian Politics, 3(2), 247–260. Choubey, K. N. (2016). The state, tribals and law: The politics behind the enactment of PESA and FRA. Social Change, 46(3), 355–370. Choubey, K. N. (2017). Turning the tide in forest rights. Economic  & Political Weekly, 52(1), 21–23. Choubey, K. N. (2019). Adivasi jeevan aur vanvasi kalyan ashram. Paratiman: Samay, Samaj, Sanskriti, 7(14), 75–95. Choubey, K. N. (2021). Forest governance, tribal rights and state: A study of third layer of federal structure in India. In R. Saxena (Ed.), New dimensions in federal discourse in India (pp. 106–119). Routledge. Constituent Assembly. (2008). Constitution of India (4th ed.). Central Law Publications. Dandekar, A., & Choudhury, C. (2010). PESA, left-wing extremism and governance concerns and challenges in India’s tribal districts. Institute of Rural Management. Gadgil, M., & Guha, R. (1992). This fissured land: An ecological history of India. Oxford University Press. Gadgil, M., & Guha, R. (1995). Ecology and equity. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Government of India. (1952). Resolution on the national forest policy. Manager of Publications. Government of India. (1972). Wild life (protection) act. Ministry of Law and Justice. Government of India. (1980). Forest (conservation) act. Ministry of Law and Justice. Government of India. (1988). National forest policy. Ministry of Environment and Forest.

340  Kamal Nayan Choubey Government of India. (1996). The provisions of Panchayats (Extension to the scheduled areas) act, 1996, no. 40 of 1996. GoI. Government of India. (2007). Scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers (recognition of forest rights) act, 2006. Ministry of Law and Justice. Government of India. (2008). Development challenges in extremist affected areas: Report of an expert group to Planning Commission (2008). Planning Commission of India. Government of India. (2014, May). Report of the high level committee on socioeconomic, health and educational status of tribal communities of India. Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India. Guha, R. (1989). The unquiet woods: Ecological change and the peasant resistance in the Himalaya. Oxford University Press. Jeffery, R.,  & Sundar, N. (Eds.). (1999). A new moral economy for India’s forest: Discourse of community and participation. Sage Publications. Kothari, R. (1984). The non-party political process. Economic & Political Weekly, 19(5), 216–224. Mohanty, P. (2019, August  7). Draft indian forest (amendment) bill 2019: Arming state to undermine the rights and wellbeing of tribals. India Today. Retrieved July  1, 2021, from www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/draft-indian-forestamendment-bill-2019-arming-state-to-undermine-rights-and-wellbeing-of-trib als-1578054-2019-08-07 Navlakha, G. (2012). Days and nights in the heartland of rebellion. Penguin Books. NEWSCLICK. (2019, September  14). Modi govt’s stand on FRA eroding tribal rights. NEWSCLICK. Retrieved July  1, 2021, from www.newsclick.in/ Modi-Govt-Stand-FRA-Eroding-Tribal-Rights Pathak, A. (1994). Contested domains: The state, peasants and forests in contemporary India. Sage Publications. Roy, A., & Singh, U. (2022). Pathalgadi movement, self-governance, and the question of “weak statehood”. In D. Nubert, H.-J. Lauth, & C. Mohamad-Klotzbach (Eds.), Local self-governance and the varieties of the statehood: Tensions and cooperations (pp. 117–137). Springer. Shankar, P. (1999). Yeh Jangal Hamara Hai: Dankaranya ke Krantikari Andolan ka Ithihas. (Translation From Telgu: Pasandi Nirmala, Hindi ed., 2006). New Vistas Publications. Sharma, B. D. (1998). The little lights in tiny mud-pots defy 50  years of anti“panchayat” raj. Shayog Pustak Kutir. Sharma, B. D. (2010). Unbroken history of broken promises: Indian state and the tribal people. Freedom Press and Sahyog Pustak Kuteer. Singh, C. (1986). Common property and common poverty: India’s forests, forest dwellers and the law. Oxford University Press. Sundar, N. (1997). Subalterns and sovereigns: An anthropological history of Bastar, 1854–1996. Oxford University Press. Sundar, N. (2006). Bastar, Maiosm and Salwa Judum. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(29), 3187–3192. Sundar, N. (2009). Framing the political imagination: Custom, democracy and citizenship. In N. Sundar (Ed.), Legal grounds: Natural resources, identity, and the law in Jharkhand (pp. 188–215). Oxford University Press. Sundar, N. (2016). The burning forest: India’s war in Bastar. Juggernaut.

Understanding Tribal India  341 Xaxa, V. (1999). Tribes as indigenous people of India. Economic & Political Weekly, 34(51), 3589–3585. Xaxa, V. (2005). Politics of language, religion and indentity: Tribes in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 40(13), 1363–1370. Xaxa, V. (2012). Tribes and development: Retrospect and prospect. In D. Nathan & V. Xaxa (Eds.), Social exclusion and adverse inclusion: Development and deprivation of Adivasis in India. Oxford University Press.

16 Gender and Indian Politics Rashmi Gopi

Introduction Whenever a teacher asks about the meaning of gender in the classroom, the most repeated response is that sex is biologically constituted, whereas gender is socially constructed. This binary compartmentalization between sex and gender is the way we have engaged with the concept of gender. The story of seeing things in binary does not stop with sex and gender. But further, the concept of gender is seen as binary. It is a product of predominant socialization trends wherein, from families to friends, schools to society at large, they make us believe that gender can be only of two types, namely man and woman. These boxes are fixed and final. These boxes are given to us by virtue of being divine, natural or both; we cannot challenge them. To make sense of gender, we need to look at our lives closely and critically. Why are people expected to be exclusively masculine or feminine? Gender is both a part of the world we live in as well as a way of understanding that world (Geetha, 2006). Various theories have evolved over the years to understand this binary world of gender (of man and woman). Predominantly to understand gender, four schools of feminism are discussed, namely liberal feminism, traditional Marxist feminism, radical feminism and socialist feminism. Some of the liberal theorists, such as Mary Wollstonecraft, J. S. Mill and Betty Friedan, believe that, in principle, human nature is the same for men and women, and therefore, they must be given similar sets of rights in the public domain. Here, the priority is the public domain (Jaggar, 1983). For Engels and traditional Marxists, human nature is a historical product, always determined by the mode of production. To understand and address exploitation in society, class identity is the main entry point of analysis. In this case, the experience of bourgeois women will be different from that of proletariat women (Jaggar, 1983). For radical feminists such as Mary Jane Sherfey, Susan Brownmiller and Susan Griffin, systematic reflection on the political significance of human reproductive biology is central to understanding the subordination of women. Biology (as a problem or as a solution) determines everything. This perspective is also tagged as biological determinism (Jaggar, 1983). For socialist feminists DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-20

Gender and Indian Politics  343 such as Gayle Rubin, Nancy Chodorow, Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, history is a struggle to control material, sexual and emotional production. Here, procreation is part of political economy (Jaggar, 1983). Other schools of feminism, such as postmodernists, post-colonialists, black feminists and Dalit feminists, highlight the constructedness and plurality of both sex and gender.1 The plurality of gender is presented not only as ‘third gender’ but also as variations within categories of man, woman and ‘third gender’ based on other social markers such as class, caste, race, religion and region and so forth (theory of ‘intersectionality developed by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw will be helpful in understanding these complexities). The works of Judith Butler, Partha Chatterjee, bell hooks, Sharmila Rege, Fatima Mernissi, Uma Chakravarti, Prem Chowdhry and Saba Mahmood explore the complexities of sex and gender beyond the binary.2 Therefore, today, when we try to understand the concept of gender, we need to recognize that gender is contextual, fluid and changing. We need to question the supposed qualities tagged as feminine and masculine. For example, is physical strength an exclusive quality carried only by bodies marked as ‘male’? Why is physical strength displayed by bodies marked as ‘female’ and ‘third gender’ predominantly problematized? Why are Serena Williams (Luckel, 2017) and Dutee Chand (Abraham, 2019) a point of problem and discomfort? It is, thus, clear that the present subordination of women, some men and ‘third gender’ occur not solely from the unchangeable biological differences (sex), but from social and cultural discourses that ensure the material and ideological subordination of women, some men and ‘third gender’ (gender). There are differences of opinion among feminists regarding the alliances that can be forged across women, men and ‘third gender’ to address hierarchical and exploitative relationships. Like in the theoretical discussion given earlier, feminists in India at large have questioned sex-differentiated work, the sexual division of labour, sexbased violence and the suppression of plural sexualities and desires. Feminists in India have challenged the idea that the realm of ‘biology’ is natural and fixed. Therefore, the feminist agenda in India has been to bring these issues into the realm of the ‘political’. In this process, the social-cultural constructedness is highlighted to argue that these things can be changed. In India, like in the rest of the world, feminists belong to different schools of thought. At times, we have seen the collaboration of activists and academicians in India to engage with gender questions, and at other times, we have seen the compartmentalization of the two. The theory and practice of feminism have equally enriched the engagement with gender questions in India. Here, in this chapter, we are tracing gender discourses in three main phases: the pre-Independence era; from 1947 to 1990; and from 1991 onwards. Of course, these phases witness continuities and changes in dealing with issues of gender identities. For the purpose of convenience of understanding, these phases have been followed, keeping in mind the major

344  Rashmi Gopi contextual shifts from a colonial society to a mixed economy based on a state-led constitutional democracy to a neoliberal market-driven contemporary political economy. History of Gender Question in India By the early 20th century, countries subjected to imperialism (direct colonization or indirect economic exploitation) started movements of resistance inspired either by Western liberal economies/democracies or the Russian Revolution. India was no different, with different strands of nationalism, some with a top – down approach to reorganizing the state and others with popular grassroot mobilizations. Nationalist movements questioned what it meant to be a man or a woman, their relationship and the role of women as mothers. Predominantly, ideals were imagined, constructed and shaped by men in nationalist movements. However, women were not merely passive recipients. Women interpreted, communicated and subverted the ‘new woman’ of nationalists to challenge patriarchy. Both nationalists and communists in colonial societies were not ready to give primacy to ‘the woman’s question’. Women in itself are not a monolithic category, but all women experience patriarchy with different degrees, and thus feminists during this period (this fact is true even now) came from different personal backgrounds: Some were educated elite daughters and wives of intellectuals, professionals, officials, merchants and social reformers, and some were illiterate poor peasants, factory workers, artisans and traders. Rassundari Devi reflected outward conformity to patriarchy but had a passionate sense of her individuality and of the wrongs done to women. She questioned why young and uneducated girls are married off to faraway places. She questioned enforced widowhood. She raised these questions not only at a personal level but at large. She questioned why the husband had to be a master, even when he was a likeable person. Pandita Ramabai started women’s organizations, campaigned for education and medical training and set up charitable projects, including girls’ schools, orphanages and widows’ homes. Although committed to nationalism, she converted to Christianity, which angered some Hindu nationalists. The lives and contributions of Swarnakumari Devi, Ramabai Ranade, Sarla Devi, Annie Besant, Sarojini Naidu, Begum of Bhopal, Rokeya Sakhawat, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru highlight how the gender question was dealt with during nationalist movements in India (Rowbotham, 1992). The public image and personal lives of male social reformers had contradictions. Raja Ram Mohan Roy was a well-known public figure and was even heralded as ‘Father of Modern India’. However, his personal relationships reflect a different picture. He had been married thrice, and there was rarely any companionship shared by Ram Mohan with his wives. After the death of his father, Ram Mohan shared a bitter relationship with Tarini

Gender and Indian Politics  345 Devi, his mother, to the extent that there was a court case going on between the two. What was/were the real reason/s for this embittered relationship was not known as Tarini Devi’s version was not recorded anywhere. The issues which were discussed in 19th century India by social reformers and nationalists were the issues discussed by the British government (sati, child marriage, widowhood, polygyny and prohibition of education). However, there is no official narrative about women’s work and occupations, values and emotional lives, health and physical well-being (Forbes, 1996). Indians divided the whole colonial experience into two spheres, namely home and the world. The home was the inner, spiritual and harmonious sphere of women, untouched by external politics and impurities. Male social reformers and nationalists wanted to preserve this sphere as purely traditional by reclaiming a golden past. The world was the external world of commerce, competition and politics by men. Here, social reformers and nationalists were ready to learn from European experiences (Chatterjee, 1986). The golden age was a mere rhetorical device to hide the realities of Indian society. The acceptance of the golden age was widespread, but the reason for the fall differed. Some traced the fall to wars and invasions, some to the coming of Smritis and some to the coming of Muslim rule. Both the ‘golden age’ and ‘dark age’ were problematic for historians, but the concepts proved useful in the development of an ideology legitimizing social reforms (Chakravarti, 1998). In the early years of movements for women’s rights in India, the difference between the sexes was differently reared and treated. This led to the non-questioning of the public – private division. Over time, this difference was seen as a reason for women’s subjection, and later efforts were made to make the role of mothers socially relevant. Later, as women themselves joined campaigns and formed their own organizations, the uniqueness of being a mother was stressed to demand women’s rights to speech, education and emancipation. The first half of the 20th century saw a symbolic use of the mother as a rallying device, from feminist assertions of women’s power as mothers of the nation to terrorist invocations of the protective and ravening mother goddess to the Gandhian lauding of the spirit of endurance and suffering embodied in the mother. Gandhi’s emphasis on the ennobling qualities of motherhood subdued the most fearsome aspects of erotic femininity. For Gandhi, the sexes were different and complementary, and this established a complex reading of Gandhi by feminists. Feminists feel that Gandhi’s vision curtailed the scope for women to claim rights on the basis of equality and sameness with men (Kumar, 1993). Thus, in this section, we have seen how in colonial India, initially upper caste, upper-class men led organizations in alignment with the British government and touched upon women’s issues. Gradually, women by themselves (from different regions and backgrounds), instead of solely depending on men to lead, started engaging with women’s questions in India.

346  Rashmi Gopi From 1947 to 1990: Gender Matters in India Ambedkar understood that women in India are pushed to the periphery of the power structure on the basis of their caste, class and gender identities. The tool used by powerful men in society is the patriarchal interpretation and selective implementation of holy texts in ‘personal laws’ to exclude women from power structures. Therefore, Ambedkar wanted to reform ‘personal laws’ of all religions to liberate women. However, he got very limited support for this endeavour from other nationalist leaders. In the background of partition and the newly acquired independence of the Indian nation state, it was felt that it would be appropriate to immediately focus on reforming the majority community’s ‘personal laws’, that is, of Hindus, to send the message to minorities that they can also follow the suit in coming years on their own volition rather than through coercion. It is interesting to note here that the ‘Hindus’ included Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs. These religions emerged as a critique of Hinduism, but in the birth pangs of a nation, they became an integral part of what they opposed. Ambedkar began the task of reforming Hindu personal laws with two basic assumptions. First, the ‘Hindu woman’ has to be seen as a rights-bearing, politically equal citizen as an individual and not merely as the bearer of the ‘honour’ of the family, kinship, community and nation. Second, the domain of dignified life is not limited to the public sphere but that of the private sphere as well. In 1948, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, as Prime Minister of the interim government, entrusted the task of codifying the diverse systems and practices of Hindus to Ambedkar, which later came to be known as ‘Hindu Code Bill’. It had the following sections: a succession of property; laws of maintenance; marriage, divorce, adoption and guardianship; and the minorities. In this Hindu Code Bill, Ambedkar supports property rights for women as wives and daughters. He introduces the concept of civil marriage (in place of sacred marriage), wherein intercaste and inter-religious marriages are possible. Ambedkar pushes for the option for divorce by women stuck in bad marriages. Ambedkar includes women’s agency in matters of adoption and guardianship. These provisions were strongly opposed by conservatives in the Parliament. Ambedkar resigned from Nehru’s cabinet in 1951 when Parliament stalled his draft of the Hindu Code Bill. Later, by changing certain provisions of the Hindu Code Bill drafted by Ambedkar, the Nehru government passed the Hindu Marriage Act; Hindu Succession Act; the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act; and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (Rege, 2013). In India, immediately after Independence, the woman’s question got submerged in the Nehruvian vision of development. Until the report called Towards Equality came in 1974, the questioning of the Indian state on gender issues was weak. Women movements in the 1970s of India highlighted both the cultural, regional and religious diversity of Indian women and the economic devastation experienced by Indian women. Intersectionality in the oppression of Indian women became visible and vocal. The presence of

Gender and Indian Politics  347 democratic political spaces in India, despite undemocratic social and economic structure, opened the possibility to articulate, organize and mobilize women for alternative ideas. Even today, Indian feminists deal with the existence of boundaries between private and public domains (Rowbotham, 1992). The most important point of departure between pre- and post-Independence feminist movements is the shift in imagining women as daughters and working women rather than solely as mothers. In this shift, women were looked upon for their productive capacities and not merely for their reproductive roles. This shift widens the scope of issues covered by feminists in India: from the time of birth as a girl to the cycle of pain, fear and rejection are traced. The focus on working women brought to light class-consciousness among women to organize and mobilize themselves and the growing need to engage with workplace politics. In post-Independence feminist movements, various issues are focused on: from sex-determination of the foetus, various forms of sexual assaults, dowry deaths, misuse of artificial reproductive technologies, misuse of traditional rituals and customs to oppress women, for protecting the environment, for equal political representation and economic rights (Kumar, 1993). One of the first movements to raise women’s issues in post-Independence India was the Telangana movement of 1948–50. The basic issue raised in this movement is land reform to benefit poor peasants. However, this movement also raises the issue of wife beating. The attitude towards women remains one of benevolent paternalism wherein women are denied the right to join guerrilla warfare. The exceptional women who managed to be part of the guerrilla movement later confessed how lonely they felt because women were never accepted as equals to men. Another example is that of the Sarvodaya movement in Uttarakhand, inspired by the leadership of Vinoba Bhave and Sunderlal Bahuguna, Mira Behn and Sarla Behen, to protest against alcoholism in the region. From 1966 to 1970, radical communist ideas triggered Naxal movements in West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. In these movements, women play an important role in the assassinations of individual exploitative landlords and capitalists. Similar to movements on the radical left, within the socialist movement too, new movements take shape. The most interesting ones being the Shahada movement led by Bhil women against wife beating, alcoholism and anti-price rise agitations in Maharashtra, and Self-Employed Women’s Association and Navnirman in Gujarat. The points of convergence and conflict between the Uttarakhand and Shahada movements are important to be noted. Both movements question alcoholism. However, the difference in social structure and attitudes towards women is clearly visible. As in Uttarakhand, being a traditional caste society and driven by Gandhian philosophy, the women’s movement here could not challenge the private/public distinctions, ideal domesticated housewife image and property equations. On the other hand, women from the tribal community of Bhil influenced by socialist ideas in Shahada could easily challenge private/ public distinctions and passive projection of motherhood/wifehood. In the

348  Rashmi Gopi 1970s, women in rural areas of Shahada raised issues related to drought and famine. This inspires women in urban areas of Maharashtra to raise their voice against price rises also. In 1973, Mrinal Gore of the Socialist Party and Ahilya Rangnekar of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) mobilize the women of the city against inflation. Soon after, the movement spread to Gujarat, which, under the leadership of Jai Prakash Narayan, focuses on reforming and limiting state power. The call by Jai Prakash lead thousands of middle-class women to join the movement. Similarly, in Gujarat, inspired by Gandhian philosophy, Ela Ramesh Bhatt organizes women workers in Ahmedabad under the Self-Employed Women’s Association, calling for freedom from exploitation, assurance of regular work and access to opportunities for advancement. In the 1970s, the women of the Maoist movement formed the Progressive Organisation of Women and traced two primary structures of women’s oppression as the sexual division of labour and the culture that rationalizes it. The coming together of the anti-caste Dalit movement and feminism happened in Maharashtra with the formation of the Mahila Samta Sainik Dal. It highlights the fact that religion and the caste system are major agents of women’s oppression in India. There is constant tension amongst various streams of feminism regarding equality versus the difference approach. There is a tension between the desire for equality, which opposes sex-based differentiation, and the sex/gender-based celebrations of essentialized femininity. By the late 1970s, the question was how to organize women. Should women have their separate movement, raise their feminist voice within other mass movements or start a separate movement and then connect with others? Another problem is how to organize women in India, where there is a lack of ideological homogeneity (Kumar, 1993). The Chipko movement began in 1973 in the state of Uttar Pradesh (now in Uttarakhand). Women participants, largely influenced by Gandhian ideology, used non-violent techniques of protest. This movement highlighted women’s strength and solidarity with the environment. It compelled the government to relook at its tree-felling policy, forest policy and the impacts of development on the environment. An ordinary woman like Gaura Devi worked with Chandi Prasad Bhatt and Sunderlal Bahuguna to make it a subaltern movement, a movement from below. It inspired ordinary women to come together and raise their voice against development policies of the state that harmed the powerless communities and the nature at large (Pathak, 2020). In contemporary India, the resurgence of the women’s movement and its forms need to be seen as (a) the crisis of state and government in the 1970s leading into the emergency; (b) the post-Emergency call in favour of civil rights; (c) the increasing number of women’s organizations in the early 1980s and the arrival of women’s issues on the agenda; (d) the mid-1980s, marked by the rise of fundamentalists; and (e) the 1990s, with the insurrection of the marginalized communities in response to the state, government and society at large. One of the turning points was the discourse on women’s issues,

Gender and Indian Politics  349 especially through the Mathura rape case of 1979–80. The Supreme Court’s release of two policemen involved in the rape of a minor tribal girl brought to the forefront many crucial aspects of women’s oppression, namely the class and caste matrix in the oppression of women and the issue of the answerability of public servants and the judiciary in achieving the constitutional guarantees. The agitations against dowry and dowry-related violence got maximum coverage in the media. This issue raised the question of whether the term ‘victim’ justifies women’s experience. It initiated a version of activism that asserted women’s agency in social change. In most cases of dowry harassment, the term ‘survivor’ was used for the same reason. One of the amendments in the Criminal Law, Section 498A, passed in the background of the agitation, covered for the first time a definition of cruelty which included not just physical but mental cruelty as well. In 1985, the Forum against Sex Determination and Sex Pre-selection was formed in Bombay. The Forum talked about the entire spectrum of new reproductive technologies. It formed wider alliances, started surveys and filed public interest litigation. The population policy of the Indian state, political violence and its impact on women’s lives got attention during this time. People’s disappointment with the nature and pace of India’s development was sought to be offset by successive governments by playing the ‘communal card’ with each community to win their support. The act of appeasing a particular community came to a height in the Shah Bano case. While upholding a Muslim woman’s right to the legal remedy of maintenance, which is not available to them under Islamic personal law, the court observed that it was high time for the government to think of a uniform civil code. Following this, Muslim fundamentalists organized themselves for a fight with the government, accusing it of interference with Muslim personal law. Similarly, the Hindu community also started to claim a glorious past. This became evident when, in September 1987, in Deorala, a village in Rajasthan, Roop Kanwar, a young bride was burnt to death while sitting atop the funeral pyre of her dead husband, while several thousand people watched and celebrated the event. If violence against women was the central focus of activists during this time, then the marginalization and impoverishment of the majority of women within the transforming economy became the entry point for academics into the movement. The subjects raised were the sexual division of labour, the invisibility of women workers in the informal sector and women in the stereotype of being objects and subjects of consumerism (Agnihotri & Mazumdar, 1995). One of the significant signposts for feminists in India is the Indian Constitution. The Indian Constitution provides various provisions through which both the equality of women with men and women’s specific differences from men are incorporated. Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution secure equality for women before the law and emphasize their protection against discrimination. Articles 39, 42, 46 and 47 of the constitution protect the educational, economic and health-related rights of women. Article

350  Rashmi Gopi 51(A) emphasizes renouncing practices that are derogatory to the dignity of women. Different sections under Article 243 ensure the political participation and representation of women, especially from marginalized communities, in local governing bodies. Other than the constitutional guarantees, with changing context, crimes against women that are recognized by the Indian Penal Code (IPC), special laws and special initiatives have been taken. The following boxes are a brief glimpse into various constitutional provisions for gender justice in India. Later legal provisions and special initiatives are also given in the box.

Constitutional Provisions for Bringing Gender Justice in India • Equality before law (Article 14) • The state not to discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them (Article 15 (1)) • The state to make any special provision in favour of women and children (Article 15 (3)) • Equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State (Article 16) • The state to direct its policy towards securing for men and women equally the right to an adequate means of livelihood (Article 39(a)); and equal pay for equal work for both men and women (Article 39(d)) • To promote justice, on a basis of equal opportunity and to provide free legal aid by suitable legislation or scheme or in any other way to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities (Article 39A) • The state to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief (Article 42) • The state to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation (Article 46) • The state to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people (Article 47) • To promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women (Article 51(A) (e)) • Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every

Gender and Indian Politics  351 Panchayat to be reserved for women and such seats to be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat (Article 243 D(3)) • Not less than one-third of the total number of offices of chairpersons in the Panchayats at each level to be reserved for women (Article 243D (4)) • Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipality to be reserved for women and such seats to be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality (Article 243T (3)) • Reservation of offices of chairpersons in municipalities for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the legislature of a state may by law provide (Article 243T (4)) Source: www.legalserviceindia.com/helpline/woman_rights.htm; www.legalservice india.com/legal/article-3932-new-labour-codes-2020.html

Legal Provisions for Bringing Gender Justice in India Although women may be victims of any crime such as murder, robbery or cheating, the crimes that are directed specifically against women are characterized as crimes against women. These are broadly classified under two categories. 1. The crimes identified under the IPC a. Rape (Section 376 IPC) b. Kidnapping and abduction for different purposes (Section 363–373) c. Homicide for dowry, dowry deaths or their attempts (Section 302/304B IPC) d. Torture, both mental and physical (Section 498A IPC) e. Molestation (Section 354 IPC) f. Sexual harassment (Section 509 IPC) g. Importation of girls (up to 21 years of age) 2. The crimes identified under the special laws Although all laws are not gender specific, the provisions of laws affecting women significantly have been reviewed periodically and

352  Rashmi Gopi amendments carried out to keep pace with the emerging requirements. Some acts which have special provisions to safeguard women and their interests are: • The Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (amended in 2016) • The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 • The Code on Social Security, 2020 • The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 • The Family Courts Act, 1954 (amended in 1984) • The Special Marriage Act, 19543 • The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 • The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (amended in 2005) • The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 • The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (amended in 1995, 2017) • The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 • The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 • The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 • The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 (amended in 2013, 2018) • The Factories (Amendment) Act, 1986 • The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 • The Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 • The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 • The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 Source: www.legalserviceindia.com/helpline/woman_rights.htm; www.legalservice india.com/legal/article-3932-new-labour-codes-2020.html

Special Initiatives For Women • • • • •

National Commission for Women, established in 1992 Reservation for women in local self-government (1992) The National Plan of Action for the Girl Child (1991–2000) The National Policy for the Empowerment of Women, 2001 The Nirbhaya Fund, 2013

Source: www.legalserviceindia.com/helpline/woman_rights.htm; www.legalservice india.com/legal/article-3932-new-labour-codes-2020.html

Gender and Indian Politics  353 In spite of the various laws and initiatives mentioned earlier, the degree of gender-based violence in India is ever increasing. Thus, in this section, we have seen how gender issues in India have taken the help of the state and its agencies in addressing violence, discrimination and inequalities. However, at times, feminist activists and academicians have questioned the patriarchal nature of the Indian state and its agencies. Post-1991: Gender Discourses in India The post-1991 India is different from the earlier decades. The decade 1989– 1999 brought a paradigm shift in India’s electoral system due to three main factors, namely mandir, mandal and market (3 Ms) (Yadav, 1999).4 We can see that all three Ms brought changes not only in electoral politics but also in gender discourses in India. The fourth ‘M’ could be added to this, that is, discourse around ‘masculinity’ in India. The specific interest in studying men and masculinities arose at the conjuncture of three major developments (Chopra et al., 2004). The primary push has come from the particular historical combination of feminist studies with feminist politics, carrying on the theory of marginal and subaltern genders that produced gay and lesbian studies. This path broke with the presupposition of masculinity as a given structure of power, proposing ‘powerless masculinities’ as decisive for knowing the gendered world. The second impetus has been the discourse around human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome. The questions that arose from the patterns of the spread of the disease among all-male groups instigated the authors to interrogate their assumptions of heterosexuality as an intelligible orientation that defined and fixed male sexuality. The third thrust can be located in the relationship between academics and activists. While academicians uncovered the subalternity of the female gender, activists and policymakers tried to redress this subalternity. Arranging empowerment and redressing powerlessness made it clear that gendersensitive policy cannot exclude the involvement of men from the strategies of empowering women. How men’s inclusion is to be encouraged requires a better understanding of how men view themselves, in relation to women and in relation to other men (Chopra et al., 2004). Society recognizes the existence of multiple masculinities and femininities but refuses to question the constructedness of these two categories themselves. Feminists in India have highlighted how notions of femininity and masculinity are constructed, fluid and plural. Masculinity is not necessarily about all men. The constructed notions of masculinity are appropriated by persons identifying themselves as male, female or others. These trends have been located in political parties, Ayurveda tourism and the act of ragging. The primary argument is that there is a constant effort to homogenize concepts of masculinity and femininity to project a particular hegemonic masculinity5 of Hindu men as the norm, be it in politics, in economic spheres or in educational institutions (Gopi, 2017).

354  Rashmi Gopi In the post-1991 era, many issues were raised in the women’s movements in India. Some of them were political representation, personal laws versus gender justice, the right of women to enter places of worship, sexual harassment at workplaces, assisted reproductive technologies, property rights and the right to love and sexual desires. The other two significant events of this time that mark a revival of gender discourses in India are the Nirbhaya case and the recognition of the third gender. The demand to institute reservations for women in the Parliament marks a radical change of perspective because, ever since the 1930s and even into the 1970s, most women’s organizations and even the Indian National Congress resisted and openly rejected proposals for reserved seats. It is with the coming of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments that introduced 33 per cent reservations for women in local self-government institutions that the demand for women’s reservation in the Parliament and state assemblies gained momentum. She highlights the fact that the 1990s had been the decade of the liberalization, privatization and globalization of the Indian economy; the anti-reservation for Other Backward Classes agitations; and the rise of lower-caste parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party. This was also the decade that witnessed the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the ensuing riots and the rise to dominance of a Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition that is currently in power at the centre. It is against this background that the 81st Women’s Reservation Bill for one-third reservations for women was first tabled in the Parliament in 1996 and was soon stuck in the demand for special quotas for women of the Other Backward Classes and minorities (quota within quota debate). It is now clear that gender oppression is not merely a remnant of tradition but fully modern, and that patriarchal power is manifested in multiple contemporary forms, both in public and private spheres. Women’s subjugation is not merely due to community traditions and colonialism. But due to the contemporary coalition between capitalism, the caste system, communalism and patriarchy, feminism, which highlights this nexus, has become a visible and inevitable part of Indian politics. Caste, communalism, class and gender issues are interlinked in the modern construction of the Indian state and they have to be addressed together to end the subjugation of women (John, 2000). In the light of the enforcement of the triple talaq law in 2019 in India, the practice and reformation of personal laws in India became a hot topic of discussion. The history of personal laws in India is embedded in India’s colonial past. Both Hindu and Muslim personal laws were introduced in the early 20th century to protect the private sphere of the household from the British colonial state. These personal laws were largely retained by the Constitution at the time of Independence. Consequently, personal laws are nothing but tools to sustain native patriarchy. The primary argument for bringing in triple talaq law was that Muslim personal laws are regressive and they disempower women. It has been a long-time political project in post-Independent

Gender and Indian Politics  355 India that personal laws should be replaced with a uniform civil code to establish gender justice. However, it is a fact that, till today, personal laws derive their authority from the secular state. The following box summarizes the main points of the triple talaq law.

Triple talaq, also known as the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, was passed by the Indian Parliament as a law on 30 July 2019 to make instant triple talaq a criminal offence. The law also makes triple talaq a cognisable and non-bailable offence. According to Clause 3 in Chapter 2 of the Act, ‘any pronouncement of talaq by a person upon his wife, by words, either spoken or written or in electronic form or in any other manner whatsoever, shall be void and illegal’. Clause 3 also states that, ‘whoever pronounces Triple Talaq upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and fine’. According to Clause 7 (c) in Chapter 3, No person accused of an offence punishable under Triple Talaq law shall be released on bail after the Magistrate, on an application filed by the accused and after hearing the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq was pronounced, is convinced that there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to the accused. In Clause 6 in Chapter 3 of the Act, it states that ‘a married Muslim woman shall be entitled to custody of her minor children in the event of pronouncement of talaq by her husband, in such manner as may be determined by the Magistrate’. Source: www.business-standard.com/about/what-is-triple-talaq-law.

Religions have been a tool of selected men to control women and the larger society. However, the coalition of the state with the patriarchal practices of the religion punishes a woman who chooses to marry a person from a different religion. This coalition of the state with patriarchal religion is an assault on constitutional morality based on equal treatment and autonomy of women, upheld in the Indian Constitution. Goolrukh Gupta, who married a non-Parsi Zoroastrian, appealed to the High Court of Gujarat to allow her to practice Parsi Zoroastrian traditions. In 2012, the High Court observed that as she had married a non-Parsi under the Special Marriage Act, 1954,

356  Rashmi Gopi she was deemed to have adopted the religion of her husband. The individuality of a woman after marriage has been diluted. Here, the High Court displayed complete disregard for Goolrukh’s fundamental right to freedom of religion as is guaranteed in the Constitution. In 2017, the Supreme Court of India overruled the High Court of Gujarat verdict and directed the fire temple in Valsad, Gujarat, to allow her entry (Economic & Political Weekly, 2017). Despite the Supreme Court taking a significant and progressive stand on issues like triple talaq and pushing for reform in personal laws, we also have courts going to the other extreme where the religion and marriage of women are involved. In the recent case of Hadiya from Kerala, wherein she voluntarily converted to Islam and married a Muslim man, Hadiya’s father approached the High Court of Kerala to dissolve her marriage as it was a case of love jihad. The High Court of Kerala’s cancelled Hadiya’s marriage and forced her, an adult, into her parents’ custody. This shows up the judiciary’s patriarchal mindset where the court takes upon the role of protector and provider of the hapless woman. In March  2018, the Supreme Court of India restored Hadiya’s marriage. The judgments of the high courts in both the Goolrukh Gupta and Hadiya cases have subverted the autonomy of women (Economic & Political Weekly, 2017). The different power structures in society come together to define the gender experience of a person. In these two cases, we saw how women’s body and mind are controlled in the name of protecting the honour of religion. The feminists have engaged with the harmful impact of the narrative of ‘love jihad’ on Hindu women. They emphasize that protecting ‘women’s honour’ is rooted in seeking c­ontrol of women and their bodies. The invocation of fear of elopement and conversion of ‘innocent’ Hindu women and related concerns with maintaining Hindu female purity gives Hindu male authority to reassert itself in a publicpolitical domain in more forceful ways (Engage, 2020). It also highlights how the question of sexuality and sexual desires are political in nature. The documentaries made on the theme of exploring sexual desires have received both appreciation and apprehension in India due to the particular context of connection with the global neo-liberal capitalist economy and rising Hindutva in the domestic domain (Kapur, 2006). By the 1990s, we could also see how women’s sexual desires and pleasures were also brought to public debate. The politics of desire in Hindi cinema has also dealt with homosexual desires. Today, we can see that Hindi cinema has travelled a long journey in expressing plural sexualities and sexual desires. The journey from Deepa Mehta’s film called Fire (released in 1998) to Alankrita Shrivastava’s Dolly Kitty Aur Woh Chamakte Sitare (released in 2019) speaks about persons as sexual beings, irrespective of gender (Srinivasan, 2011). These movies reflect the contextual reality of India wherein feminists have raised the need for sexual democracy in India. Religion and gender equations are complex. On 28 September 2018, the Supreme Court of India lifted the ban on women’s entry (between the ages of 10 and 50) to the Sabarimala Ayyappa Temple in Kerala. Women’s entry

Gender and Indian Politics  357 into the Sabarimala temple was banned by the High Court of Kerala only in 1991. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court in 2006 on the basis that the ban on women’s entry is against the constitutional provisions of fundamental rights. In 2018, five members of the Supreme Court’s constitutional bench underlined the equal rights of women in the temple by a majority verdict of 4:1. The Sabarimala Temple has undergone a standardization process to align the temple rituals with the Brahmanical order, thus replacing plural traditions of worship with an ‘authentic’ Brahmanical tradition. Institutions like the Devaswom board also authorized knowledge in Brahminical tantric practices as authentic and legitimate. Legal precedent in colonial and post-colonial courts has played a significant role in the creation of this situation wherein not only women between the ages of 10 and 50 are discriminated against but also persons belonging to lower castes and other religions (Roopesh, 2018). Therefore, we can observe that the Sabarimala case is not only a gender question but also about the appropriation and homogenization of temple spaces and rituals by the hegemonic masculinity of upper-caste Hindus. Another issue, in recent times, that has grabbed the attention of feminists in India is sexual harassment. When we speak about sexual harassment, we need to recognize and discuss women who have been historically marginalized and silenced. For a less-educated lower-caste woman from an economically backward background, inhumane working conditions are ignored in the battle for survival. Economic vulnerability, lack of job security, stigma, isolation and family pressures are significant reasons why most women do not complain about sexual harassment. However, certain steps should be taken to address sexual harassment. It is important that both the complainant and the accused should have a fair chance to explain their versions of the events. Similarly, there is a need to address and make visible concerns of the contractual workers in the platforms like the Internal Complaints Committees. Lastly, in order to build a safe and secure workplace, there is a need to train the Internal Complaints Committee and Local Complaints Committee members to be sensitive to people’s voices and investigate in a fair manner (Vijayalakshmi, 2018). The Network of Women in Media, India (NWMI) states that it stands in absolute solidarity with all those who have bravely spoken up about their experiences of sexual harassment within the Indian media. NWMI strongly condemns the rampant sexism and misogyny in Indian newsrooms that not only allows sexual harassment to go unchecked but also promotes a culture of silence, victim blaming and moral policing. NWMI also issues nine-point guidelines to be followed to control and prevent sexual harassment (NWMI, 2018). Thus, we could see how sexual harassment is experienced by women belonging to different social backgrounds. Yet the time has not come when legal provisions recognizing sexual harassment of men and ‘third gender’ in India have been acknowledged and addressed. One of the images that are essential for the nation is that of motherhood (we have seen how it has been used in the time of anti-colonial struggles).

358  Rashmi Gopi In recent times, assisted reproductive technologies, which ‘enable’ every woman to become a mother, have come under critical scrutiny from both the government and feminists. In 2016, the Government of India banned foreigners from having children through surrogate mothers in India. The government allowed only altruistic surrogacy for heterosexual married infertile Indian couples. What is needed is a legal framework that takes care of the needs (economic, physical and emotional) of all the parties involved in surrogacy services. The emergence of unregistered clinics, increased involvement of middlemen, decreased bargaining capacity and lower pay for surrogate mothers are some of the possible repercussions of the new ban. We need a grounded legal approach as the need of the hour which embraces an understanding that the women acting as surrogate mothers are not merely desperate poor women, but women who are dignified actors in this whole process (Bhattacharjee, 2016). In the case of surrogacy issues, we need to move from a ‘reproductive rights’ approach to a ‘reproductive justice’ approach. The low costs, the availability of highly qualified English-speaking medical doctors, women willing to work as surrogates and the lack of legal regulation surrounding surrogacy arrangements are factors that contributed to India’s flourishing fertility industry. In August 2019, a revised version of the 2016 bill on surrogacy was passed by the Lok Sabha. Arguably, the intent of this bill was to prevent the oppression embedded in the idea of ‘rent a womb’, while simultaneously strengthening cultural nationalism. Caste is a significant parameter for understanding surrogacy practices in India. It is called ‘the Brahmanization of surrogacy’, creating new roles for lower caste women while confining them within the frame of ‘non-valuable breeders’ for the embryos of ‘valuable’ women. Significantly, such practices articulate with earlier Indian eugenic discourses and more recent Hindu nationalist arguments on caste supremacy, which construct oppressed castes as unfit to reproduce. Therefore, there is a need to emphasize reproductive justice for women who are part of the surrogacy process (Gondouin et al., 2020). In December 2021, the Rajya Sabha passed both the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill, 2021, and the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2020, in the absence of the opposition. The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill had earlier been passed by the Lok Sabha but was referred to a select committee by the Rajya Sabha. The Bill will now be sent back to the Lok Sabha for approval. The issue of downplaying of the commercial aspect of surrogacy, the need for surrogate mother to be a blood relative and the exclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual+ community from the purview of these bills are points of concern. The attempt by B. R. Ambedkar to bring reforms to Hindu personal laws (we have discussed this in an earlier section of this chapter) as a stepping stone towards establishing gender justice through the uniform civil code is an unfinished project even in 2022. From time to time, the government and women belonging to different religious backgrounds have approached courts to make personal laws egalitarian. Even if we update reforms in Hindu

Gender and Indian Politics  359 personal laws, restricting the property rights of Hindu women, the prejudice to maintaining patriarchal practices is evident. The fact is that in recent times, patriarchal reading of the ‘rights of daughters as coparceners’ has been done. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act (HSAA), 2005, tries to undo the gender inequality built into much of Hindu personal law. It deems a Hindu daughter to be a coparcener (just like a son) – joint owner and interest holder – in the ancestral property of her father from the date of her birth. In the Prakash v. Phulavati case (2016), the Supreme Court stated that a daughter could not make any claims with respect to her father’s ancestral property if the father had died without a will prior to 20 December 2004 (the date on which the HSAA was tabled as a bill in the Rajya Sabha), and therefore, a suit for partition filed prior to the HSAA coming into effect would have to be decided according to the pre-amendment law. In Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar case (2018), however, the Court observed that even if the suit for partition by a daughter was filed prior to 2005, it would have to be decided in accordance with the HSAA. The three-judge bench in the Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma case (2020) was set up to resolve the contradictory interpretations of the Court in the Prakash and Danamma cases. In the Vineeta Sharma case, the Court has maintained that irrespective of the date on which the father died, with effect from 2005, daughters would be entitled to a share in the coparcenary property as sons. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Vineeta Sharma case is based on a conservative understanding of the Hindu joint family and coparcenary property, but nevertheless, one that leads it to a reformist outcome in the case. If the Supreme Court’s approach to the interpretation of the HSAA is any indication, it is likely that reform will be gradual and will try to accommodate the concerns of women within the traditional framework of Hindu law. A critical evaluation of the Hindu personal law per se is not anticipated in the near future (Kumar, 1993). The event that revived gender questions amongst ordinary citizens in India, beyond engagements by academicians and activists, is the Nirbhaya case. This case reflects a presumed battle between two Indias: the first is the new and modern India, and the second is the old and backward one. In contrast to Nirbhaya, who was represented as highly individuated and ‘Westernized’, her male assailants were described as a group of migrant workers who lived in a local slum. Like her assailants, Nirbhaya’s family migrated from a village in the North Indian State of Uttar Pradesh. Nirbhaya’s family was part of the Kurmi community, a lower-caste group with agricultural origins; her attackers also belonged to lower-caste groups. Her family also belonged to a lower-income group than that of the attackers. However, international and national media reports ignored these similarities and highlighted an exaggerated set of differences. The media’s Nirbhaya represents a female subject who is relatively empowered in comparison to her predecessor: She exerts herself, struggling to survive while demanding rights and justice. This case reflects the aspirations of a new kind of ‘Third-World’ female subject. It reproduces the kind of politics Giorgio Agamben’s politics – a kind of politics where state

360  Rashmi Gopi violence and violation exist alongside, yet remain implicit and intertwined with, bio-political and disciplinary rationalities. To the extent these ‘rights’ are secured through increasingly punitive sanctions against the working class and the disenfranchised, legal intervention poses real dangers to justice (Roychowdhury, 2013). What we see in the discourses around the Nirbhaya case is not only gender construction of girls and women in general (the kinds of clothes, relationships, spaces and time appropriate for girls/women) but also stigmatization and criminalization of poor migrant male workers who are struggling to find a foot in the highly consumerist metropolitan cities of India. Simultaneous to the extreme binary-opposition narratives of good girls/ bad boys, urban/rural and rich/poor created by the Nirbhaya incident, a major challenge to the binary definition of gender in India happens. In April 2014, the Supreme Court of India recognized hijras, transgender people, eunuchs and intersex people as a ‘third gender’ in law. This legal recognition is a big leap in challenging the predominant gender narrative based on heteronormativity. However, it is only the first step. The social stigma is still intact. The third gender in India experiences stigmatization, marginalization, sexual abuse, human immunodeficiency virus infection, infringement of civil rights and harassment while accessing health services. The public services for the third gender are still very scarce and inadequate for the heavy demand from potential users in India (Diehl et al., 2017). There is a long way in India to actualize a dignified life for persons irrespective of their gender identities. The legal recognition of attached rights for third genders such as the right to marry, adoption, property inheritance and the right to fight sexual abuse and assault is required at the moment. It is equally important to recognize power dynamics within the third gender to address exploitation within the community. The coming of the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the significance of engaging with gender questions. There are increasing cases of domestic violence, dropouts from school, exclusionary educational practices, mental health issues, a digital divide, unemployment, class divide and desperation. This pandemic has touched the lived experiences of all genders. The increasing discrimination faced by the third gender highlights the long path to a dignified and inclusive society. The Bulli Bai app case brought to the forefront the threats of the virtual world based on gender and religion. It also highlighted the need to engage with notions of masculinity, community and mental health in addressing gender questions. Therefore, we have seen in this section that, in recent times, gender questions on the plurality and fluidity of gender identities and sexuality, sexual violence and harassment (in both actual and virtual worlds), the significance of sexual desires and pleasures for all persons, the politics of personal laws, the power of assisted technologies in reinforcing sex/gender stereotypes and the havoc of the COVID-19 pandemic have re-established the significance of gender discourse in Indian politics.

Gender and Indian Politics  361 Summing Up The gender discourse in India has been a culmination of events happening at personal, local, national and global levels. The predominant idea of gender is binary and a product of social meanings attached to the biological body, which has been challenged in various contexts. There are different schools of thought on understanding gender. Some locate the origin of gender in individual capabilities, some in the production sphere, some in reproduction, some in the intermingling of various social markers. Intersectionality and the complexities of intersectional identities are crucial in exploring gender experiences in India. That project is ongoing. We have to understand that gender is not binary. Gender is plural and fluid (there are many ways of being a man, a woman or a human being). It is high time that we questioned honour-based hierarchies constructed in gender. The plurality of genders is acceptable, but the hierarchization and homogenization of the same are not. In India, we have seen how the journey to engage with gender began solely with the ‘woman’s question’ during the colonial period, and later expanded the terrain of gender to include issues of men and masculinities, third gender and multiple sexualities. Gender and sex are both products of social and cultural discourses. There is a politics of power marking gender identity in every society, and India is no exception. The process of understanding the concept of gender is knowing oneself better and the world at large. Gender is simultaneously a mirror to one’s internal self as well as the outside world. This process will make one realize the constructedness of traditions, rituals and norms. It will make one’s life unsettled on many levels. But the life of questioning and challenging what is given as natural or divine is more meaningful than the bliss of ignorance. Notes 1 In Western philosophy, postmodernism, also spelt post-modernism, is a late 20th century movement characterized by broad scepticism, subjectivism or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power. Black feminism is a philosophy that centres on the idea that ‘Black women are inherently valuable’, that Black women’s liberation is a necessity not as an adjunct to somebody else’s but because of the need as human beings for autonomy. Black feminists raise the intersectionality of class, race and gender. Dalit feminism is a feminist perspective that includes questioning caste and gender roles among the Dalit population and within feminism and the larger women’s movement. 2 In some theories, sex is seen as the foundation for gender. In some others, gender is seen as the foundation of sex. In recent times, feminist theories have highlighted the fact that sex and gender are intertwined and that they mutually constitute each other on a daily basis. 3 The Special Marriage Act, 1954: In January 2021, in a significant judgment affecting inter-faith couples seeking to get married under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the Allahabad High Court has ruled that it would be optional and not mandatory for them to publish a notice about their intended marriage.

362  Rashmi Gopi 4 The demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992 in the name of building a Ram mandir (temple) on the same site, as it is claimed as the birthplace of Lord Ram, is seen as the turning point of ascendency of Hindutva forces in Indian politics. This act raises questions about the secular credentials of India both at national and global levels. The Mandal Commission submitted its report in 1980 and recommended a 27 per cent reservation quota for Other Backward Classes, resulting in a total of 49.5 per cent quota in government jobs and public universities. V. P. Singh, the Prime Minister at the time, tried to implement its recommendations in August  1990, which led to large-scale protests, thus bringing caste to the centre stage of Indian politics. The adoption of liberalization, privatization and globalization as the economic model for India in 1991 changed the character of citizens as consumers forever. The initial faith in the market to solve all problems and the subsequent failure of the market to do so are still redefining Indian politics. 5 Hegemonic Masculinity is a concept developed by R. W. Connell in his work Masculinities (1995). Connell borrows the term hegemony from Antonio Gramsci and applies it to gender relations. Hegemony denotes the unequal social relations that empower certain groups of men and their model of masculinity as the only way of being a man, such that there appears to be no other way of being a man. Hegemonic masculinity thus not only stratifies public life but also private life. The successful maintenance of hegemonic masculinity clearly depends, as Connell puts it, on the ability to impose a definition of the situation, to set the terms in which events are understood and issues discussed, to formulate ideals and define morality.

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17 Secularism in India Theories, Practices and Controversies Anurag Pandey

Introduction Religion has been influencing human life in one way or the other since the beginning of human civilization. Religious individuals have faith in a ‘supreme power’ by which they satisfy and fulfil their emotional needs. Therefore, it is said that religion, as a broad attitude, affects all the tendencies of human life – be they personal, family, social or political. With the expansion of religion, the concept of secularism also came into existence. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘secularism’ means ‘free from religion or non-spiritual or cosmic or worldly idea’. Secularism is a modern phenomenon and theory, which emerged in Western society. Secularism is considered to be associated with the era of Renaissance, which played an important role in the formation of the modern state. Before this era, the interference of religion (church) in the political affairs of the state had increased a lot and the feudalistic form of the states had also encouraged this intervention. After some time, Europe and many Western states witnessed the Industrial Revolution. This development played an important role in the demise of feudal state and liberal state came into existence. In this liberal state, a detailed discussion on justice, liberty, equality and rights of individuals started. This era is considered to be dominated by negative liberal ideas, where state was minimal state and the interests of capital and the bourgeoisie were paramount. Precisely, in this newly formed liberal state, the role of ‘Religion can be defined as a system of state was just to maintain beliefs and values with associated rituals law and order. This state to give these beliefs and values a concrete followed the principle of form. When these beliefs and values are laissez-faire, which argued held in common and rituals are performed for a complete separation in congregation it gives rise to a sense of of government from the commonality and a religious community economic sector. It clearly comes into existence’ (Engineer, 2003a). meant that no business shall be done by the state DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-21

Secularism in India  365 but the capitalist class or private players. In this state, the principle of noninterference existed. This meant that the government shall have no right to interfere in economic life of any individual – so no tax and no welfare activities. The negative liberalism focused more on individual liberty and rights and avoided the notion of welfare state. In this new liberal state and its various activities, the intervention of religion was not conducive. This caused implementation of the ‘principle of separation’ of religion from the state. In this new phase, the concept of Minimal state is a state with the least posself and community was sible amount of powers. The term is used recognized as the imporin political philosophy where the duties of tant and main creator of state are limited to maintaining law and modern nation state and order and securing the borders of the state. builder of human hisSuch state follows laissez-faire economy, tory with various politiwhich means ‘leave individual alone and cal institutions and not free market policy’. In short, state does not God. Therefore, secuhave any right to interfere in the economic larism became a part of life of any individual, so no collection of the state’s activity as an tax and, therefore, no welfare activities by effective theoretical disthe state. course of modern intellectualism. This doctrine came into existence in the Renaissance. As a result, science and logic began to gain importance in every person’s private and public lives rather than religion and superstition. George Jacob Holyoake coined the term ‘secularism’. In 1851, Jacob defined secularism as ‘a major tool in the promotion of human welfare by material means and the service of others as the ideal Renaissance  is a French word which of life’. He criticized the means ‘rebirth’. This refers to the era in orthodox dimensions of European civilization which was marked religion and held that secuby the revival of classical learning and larism does not mean being wisdom. In this era, the erstwhile emoan atheist or anti-religious. tional thinking was replaced with logical He put a question mark on thinking and reason. The Renaissance the religious structure of witnessed many new insights and conany civilized society and tributions in diverse fields of social and asked, ‘What a poor perpolitical lives, which include new scienson has to do with such tific laws, new forms of art and archiorthodox religion, which tecture and new religious and political starts itself by calling poor discourses. individuals as poor and inferior creature and finally

366  Anurag Pandey a helpless makes them slave?’ A poor person finds themselves in a weaponlocked world, where power is God and poverty is a chain (Holyaoke, 1896). But later, Charles Bradlaugh attempted to give a new dimension to the idea of secularism and presented a complex nature of secularism, believing that a secularist should be a fanatic atheist. This theoretical approach of Bradlaugh was also adopted by Marxists, socialists and communists (Rectenwald, 2013). Therefore, according to the Western view, ‘The doctrine of secularism is the philosophy in which traditional religions and spirituality are disregarded and human beings are taught to be more concerned for their earthly interests and needs’. The idea of secularism negates both theism and atheism because they can neither be accepted nor fragmented through scientific methods. Neglect of religions and adopting neutrality or indifference is the basis of Western secularism. Thus, it can be said that secularism is an idea which supports the complete separation of literature, religion and state of the Western world, in which religion is a personal matter of individuals and the work of the state is to maintain distance from religion to implement various political or state-related activities. Globally, two major concepts of secularism are found, namely: 1. American concept of secularism 2. French concept of secularism According to the American concept of secularism, ‘state shall neither be guided by the religion and nor it shall interfere in the religious affairs of any individuals’. In the US, complete separation of state and religion is found, where religion is a personal matter of the individual and the state does not nurture/support any religion. In short, the US state has no religion. On the other hand, in French secularism (also known as laïcité), interference of religious institutions in any activity of the state is completely prohibited and the foundation of French secularism is the idea of ‘direct division between religion and politics’. But, at the same time, French secularism justifies reasonable interference of state in religious matters. Reasonable interference demands that the state should treat all religions equally while interfering in religious matters. Secularism in India Contrary to the US and French secularism, Indian secularism does not follow strict absence or separation of religion from politics, but it means equal respect and opportunity for all

Secularism in the US can be defined as the freedom of religion;  laïcité  or French secularism is regarded as freedom from religion.

Secularism in India  367 individuals, irrespective of their religious identities; therefore, it negates any kind of discrimination or favour on religious grounds. While Western secular state disregards religion and spirituality from politics, the Indian state is tolerant of all religions and treats them equally, which means state shall have no religion. In fact, both Western and Indian views tend to impart a negative and emotional form of secularism, respectively. However, despite this difference, both adopt scientific approaches and support human welfare in a broad sense by intellectual and scientific measures. Thus, both the views do not give patronage to any religion in any state affair or its functions. In other words, it can be said that both Indian and Western models of secularism support the religionless form of the state. In a broader sense, secularism is a kind of humanist biography that keeps politics, administration and law separate from religion, community and sects and motivates humans to become fully self-reliant for their personal and social welfare instead of being dependent on supernatural or divine powers. In Indian tradition, religion has been regarded as an elaborated concept and has been associated with duty-bound justice and morality. This is one of the important reasons for inclusion of the word secularism in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution through the 42nd Amendment. The secular state is based on the principle that the subject of the state is interrelationship between individuals, not the relationship between individual and God. India is a multicultural country and to establish unity and brotherhood among various communities, the values of secular state were placed in the Constitution. This means that the state, without any discrimination, will protect all the communities equally, irrespective of their religious affiliation. Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits any discrimination on the basis of religion, descent, caste, sex or place of birth. Article 25 declares that every citizen of India is entitled to freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess and practise their religion, ‘subject to public order, health and morality’. Articles 25–28 provide for freedom of conscience and free acceptance of religion, conduct and propagation. Apart from this, Article 29 of the Constitution of India makes provision for the minority religious communities that the state shall not impose any other culture on any minority religious communities other than their own culture. Article 30 provides that minority religious communities will have the right to establish and administer their own educational institutions and the state will not discriminate against any educational institutions run by minority community/ies in providing any kind of assistance to them. It is necessary to clarify here that Indian secularism in any form is not negative but positive; in other words, it advocates a rational intervention in religious matters, that is, in the social system, if a particular ritual or worship method of public health or morality is against or is not an integral part of the religious system and violates any method of social, economic or political regulation, the state shall interfere in such matters (Bhargava, 2006). At the end, it can be said that the concept of secularism is broad but not universal, that is to say, it is a relative concept that varies according to country and situation. Therefore, no single definition of the concept of secularism

368  Anurag Pandey can be given, nor can any one form of secularism be suitable for all states. Whosoever in the world has adopted the concept of secularism, it has been adopted as per the circumstances/situations or needs of that country. For example, in Western and European societies, secularism arises due to conflict between the church and state, on the other hand, in a multicultural society like India, it has its origins in establishing a sense of mutual harmony and brotherhood among various religious communities. Therefore, it can be said that the tradition of Indian secularism nurtures all religions in a positive way. Constituent Assembly and the Question of Secularism After Independence, India was surrounded by many issues/problems and efforts were being made to find a positive solution to all those issues and problems so that it could establish itself as a powerful nation. The biggest question before the country was the formulation of a strong Constitution. The task of framing the Constitution was done by the ‘indirectly elected’ Constituent Assembly. Indirect because the universal adult franchise was not used to establish and form the Assembly. Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha was appointed its first chairman and after some time, Dr Rajendra Prasad was elected the second chairman with Harendra Mukherjee as the deputy chairman. The Constituent Assembly also formed various committees in which the Draft Committee was prominent. Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar was appointed as the chairman of this committee. The Constituent Assembly discussed a wide range of issues, among which the issue of secularism was an important subject. Members of the Constituent Assembly had diverse views on secularism. Although there was no direct discussion on the question, ‘what would be the nature of secularism in India?’, there was much discussion and debate on ‘what should the secular state be like?’ In the Constituent Assembly, mainly three views were presented and discussed on this issue. These three views are mentioned as follows (Jha, 2002, pp. 3175–3180). 1. The first idea was based on the concept suggested by some members of the Constituent Assembly that India should be declared a democratic secular state. These members were not fully satisfied with many other provisions, including fundamental rights (which supported secularism in the state’s tendencies and functioning). They demanded that the word ‘secular’ should be included in the Constitution. Among them, Mr. K. T. Shah was prominent, who strongly favoured the inclusion of the word ‘secular’ in the original Constitution in November – December 1949. A proposal to this effect was also presented in the Constituent Assembly by him several times. 2. There was another group of members in the Constituent Assembly who rejected the earlier-mentioned view and demanded that religion should

Secularism in India  369 find a place in public life, although they did not directly oppose secularism as secularism was important for a multicultural country. Therefore, these members indirectly tried to link the this proposal to religious grounds because they considered India to be a religion-based and religiously connected nation. These members were apprehensive about inclusion of the word secular in the Constitution. Their main reason of opposition was that the inclusion of the word may affect various religious activities and the religious life of an individual. Majority of these members were from the minority community, prominent among them were Frank Anthony, who was from the Anglo-Indian community, and Kazi Karimuddin, Z. H. Lari, Begum Aijaz Rasool and B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur were from the Muslim community. These members expressed their concerns because of the fear of the probable dominance of Hindu culture in public life, which may affect the cultural values of other religions in independent India. Therefore, these members did not openly advocate the inclusion of the word ‘secular’ in the Constitution and demanded acceptance of the importance of religion in public life. 3. The third group chose the middle path in the earlier-mentioned debates. They rejected the religious prejudice of the second group and did not support the advocacy of inclusion of the word ‘secular’ of the first group in the Constitution. They opposed the inclusion primarily because they believed that adding the word secular in the Constitution is not necessary and many provisions of a secular state have already been protected by various provisions in the proposed Constitution. For example, first, the provision of fundamental rights and second, the Preamble of the Constitution which says ‘no financial help will be provided by the state for any religious activity/ies, no fund for religious education institutions and in any institution which propagates religion’. Therefore, this group did not advocate inclusion of the word secular. The prominent names in this group are Jawaharlal Nehru and Bhimrao Ambedkar. In this way, the Constituent Assembly tried to choose a middle path by incorporating all the ideas on secularism. And this is one of the important reasons that the secular nature of Indian state not only protects the rights of the individual but is also committed to protecting the cultural rights of all communities. The Constituent Assembly is  a body After Independence, the which is assembled with an aim to word ‘secular’ was not written draft or revise a constitution. and explained in the Indian Constitution, although the framers of the Constitution declared India a secular state and made some statutory provisions to ensure the protection of the culture of religious and linguistic minorities. All citizens

370  Anurag Pandey were given the right to freedom of religion in Articles 25–28. In Articles 29 and 30, provisions are made to protect and preserve the unique identity and culture of linguistic and religious minorities. In 1976, through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, the word ‘secularism’ was added in the Preamble of the Constitution. Alexander Owics says, ‘Secularism is an integral part of the core of the Constitution of India, and it means equal freedom for all and a sense of respect for all religions’ (Ghadai, 2019, p. 2). Right to Religious Freedom (Articles 25–28) The Indian society is known as a religion-based society, primarily, because religious freedom has been ensured in the Constitution for the citizens. Articles 25–28 of the Constitution provide religious freedom. It means that these Articles recognize and protect the religious rights of an individual. These Articles also make provision that the state shall have no inclination towards any particular religion and will treat all religions as equal. In other words, it can be said that the state shall not have any religion of its own nor will the state establish any religion. The religious rights of every individual are equally protected by the Constitution without any discrimination. The right to freedom of religion is enshrined in Articles 25–28, which provides religious freedom to all citizens and ensures secularism in India. According to the Constitution, there is no official state religion and all religions should be treated fairly and neutrally by the state. Article 25 guarantees to all people Article 25 states that all individuthe freedom of conscience and als are equally entitled to freedom freedom to preach, profess, of conscience and the right to freely practise and propagate any reliprofess, practise and propagate gion of their choice. The right their religion subject to public order, of publicity does not include the health and morality.  Article 26 of right to preach any individual, the Constitution testifies that all as it violates the right to congroups can manage their own affairs science (Bansal, 2020a). in the matters of religion. Article 26 of the Constitution provides the rights of all religious sects and creeds to manage their religious affairs under public order, health and morality to establish institutions for charitable or religious purpose and to possess, acquire and manage property in accordance with the law is guaranteed under Article 26 (Bansal, 2020a). These provisions do not reduce or curtail the power of the state to acquire property/ies which belong to different religious sects. The state is empowered to regulate any economic, political and secular activity associated with religious observance.

Secularism in India  371 Article 27 guarantees that no person can be Article 27 of the Constitution provides forced to pay taxes to Freedom from paying taxes for promotion promote a particular reliof any particular religion. gion or religious instituArticle 28 of the Constitution protion. Article 28 prohibits vides freedom to attend the religious religious education in instruction/s or religious worship in cerstate-funded educational tain educational institutions. institutions and prohibits such educational institutions from compelling any of its members to receive religious education or participate in religious activities without their approval (Bansal, 2020a). Cultural and Educational Rights The cultural and educational rights are ensured through Articles 29 and 30, which protect the rights of cultural, linguistic and religious minorities by enabling them to preserve their heritage and protect them from any kind of religious discrimination (Bansal, 2020b). Article 29 empowers community or individuals to preserve, develop and profess their specific language, script and culture. Thus, state protects such communities from imposition of any external culture on them. This provision empowers the state to prevent and protect these communities or individuals against imposition of any external or dominant culture. It also discourages any kind of discrimination based on religion, descent, caste, creed, language and so on in any educational institutions run or funded by the state (Bansal, 2020b). Article 30 empowers all religious and linguistic minorities to set up and run educational institutions of their choice in order to maintain and develop their own culture. The state shall not discriminate in granting financial assistance to any institution which is run and administered by any Article 29 specifies that there would religious, linguistic or cultural be no discrimination (by state, indiminority. vidual, group or any institution) on Although the term ‘minorthe ground of religion, race, caste, ity’ is not defined in the Conlanguage and so on. stitution, it is interpreted by Article 30 provides that all minorithe Supreme Court, which ties (religious or linguistic) shall have claims that the minority is a the right to establish and administer term which is not defined in the educational institutions of their the Constitution and in the choice. absence of any precise definition, it must be held that a

372  Anurag Pandey minority community means a community which is numerically less than 50 per cent. But then the question is not fully answered, for part of the question has yet to be answered: ‘namely 50 per cent of what’. It is 50 per cent of the entire population of India or 50 per cent of the population of a state forming part of the union (Wadhwa, 1975, pp. 6–7). The Court said that a bill is passed by a State Legislature which extends to the whole of the state, the minority must be determined by reference to the entire population of the state (Wadhwa, 1975, pp. 6–7). It is clear if the term is used in connection with an Act of Union, minority will be determined in terms of nation as a whole. Therefore, to claim this right, it is necessary that the educational institution is established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority in any state or union (Bansal 2020b). Secularism in Indian Politics: The Viewpoint of Politicians India got independence in 1947, but the tragedy and pain of Partition with the circumstances arising out of spread of communal violence in many parts of the country were the biggest challenge before the country for maintaining its secular image. This period was an era of turmoil for India and due to communal violence and mobilization of religious groups on religious lines, some political parties and leaders wanted to make India a Hindu nation. But thanks to the foresight of many members of the Constituent Assembly and the framers of the Constitution, India was not influenced by the views of those leaders who were indulged into mobilization of masses on religious grounds (the religious nationalists) and was successful in maintaining the secular nature of the country. Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar’s trust on secularism and democracy played a very important role in maintaining this image. The legacy of secularism in India is also known as the ‘Gandhi – Nehru heritage’. Both believed in pluralism and wanted to develop India as a secular state, but both had very different views of secularism. Gandhi was a religious figure in his personal and public life and was against the separation of politics and religion as he wanted politics to be based on moral values and ​​ supported the sacred relationship between politics and religion. G ­ andhi’s understanding at this point was that ‘there can be no politics without religion’. He emphasized the importance of religion in politics in his speech where he contends, If I seem to take part in politics, it is only because politics today encircle us like the coils of a snake from which one cannot get out no matter how one tries. I wish to wrestle with the snake. I am trying to introduce religion into politics. (Gandhi, n.d.)

Secularism in India  373 On the other hand, Nehru wanted to keep religion and politics separate. He wanted to make India a secular country, where state and religion are separate entities. He considered religion to be a private matter and was opposed to its congregation in politics. Nehru believed that the state should be without any inclination towards religion or its principles (Joshi, 2007), because he believed that without the secular state, India cannot achieve equality and political/economic independence; therefore, he supported the idea that state should treat all faiths and religions equally and provide them equal opportunity without any kind of discrimination (Gopal, 1983, pp. 330–331). However, both the leaders considered secularism as a powerful means of establishing harmony and brotherhood among different religions in a multicultural country like India. But the incidents of communal violence that took place after or on the eve of Independence forced Gandhi to rethink his views on religion and politics and he felt that his principles could give communal forces an opportunity to misuse religion in politics and India can be inclined towards religious fundamentalism. Therefore, during the 1940s, Gandhi himself began to regard religion as a personal matter of the individual (Joshi, 2007). Gandhi said that, I do not expect India of my dreams to develop one religion that is to be wholly Hindu or wholly Christian or wholly Mussalman, but I want it to be wholly tolerant, with its religions working side by side with one another. (Prabhu, 1947, p. 257). On the other hand, Nehru said that we have not only to live up to the ideals proclaimed in our Constitution but make them a part of our thinking and living and thus build up a really integrated nation. That does not mean absence of religion but putting religion on a different plane from that of normal political and social life. Any other approach in India would mean the breaking up of India. (Gopal, 1983, pp. 330–331). It is not that these were the only views about the nature of secularism in India. There were few other leaders as well who had different opinions on it; among them, the thoughts of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya and Atal Bihari Vajpayee are prominent. Their ideas are different from the principles of secularism as proposed by Nehru and Gandhi. Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya opposed the doctrine of Western secularism. He did not consider the proposed idea of secularism suitable for Indian society and state and supported the idea of sarva dharma samabhava as

374  Anurag Pandey the basic principle of secularism. He was against the Nehruvian secularism and called it a borrowed Western concept. For him, the secular state in the Western sense can be interpreted as a cosmic or worldly state, but the Indian public wants to attain Dharmrajya or Ram Rajya and, therefore, the idea proposed by Nehru cannot be suitable for Indian circumstances. (Upadhyaya, 2006). The foundation of Indianness cannot be achieved only by one-sided progress because Indians have considered earthly and otherworldly progress both as complementary and integral to each other. But for otherworldly advancement, he says, imposition of one type of opinion by the state will be inappropriate and biased. Therefore, it will have to create an environment in which all the opinions and views can grow (Upadhyaya, 2006). He says that the concept of the word dharma is not synonymous with the English word religion. Dharma is different from religion and has a wider meaning. Without dharma, it is impossible to imagine the existence of any individual. He further says that we, as Indians, understand that our state and society cannot afford religion, but dharma; therefore, all the words such as irreligious, secular and religionless neither express the ideal of our state nor justify the concept of secular state (Upadhyaya, 2006). Difference Between Sect and Religion Deendayal Upadhyaya said that the synonym of the English word religion in India is sect and the believers of one particular sect are called sampradaya or community. In India, we have various such sects, for example, Shaiva sect, Vaishnava sect and so on. Therefore, neither the earlier nor the present-day Indian state could belong to any one of these sects. The vision of the state should be the same for all communities. Therefore, Deendayal Upadhyaya maintains the view that the state should be non-communal rather than communal. This was his concept of an ideal Indian state and such a state shall be a Dharmrajya, paving the way for the secular and spiritual progress of life without having any kind of prejudice or hatred towards any community. Therefore, he supported the idea of India being a non-communal state and opposed the idea of secular state (Upadhyaya, 2006). Former prime minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, also considered the Indian secularism as a concept which has been imported from the West. According to him, India has separated religion from politics like the West. Vajpayee also believed that dharma is not synonymous with the English religion, and according to him, even if a person does not believe in religion, they can still be a follower of dharma. According to him, dharma has two meanings: dharma in the first sense means dhatu, which means handling or saving an object, which keeps that object in its original form, and in the second sense, dharma means duty. Therefore, dharma has special importance in our social life. On the other hand, religion means faith or belief, and as long as a person is attached to a faith or belief, they will be considered a believer of a

Secularism in India  375 religion related to that same faith or belief. Therefore, while dharma can be considered a way of life, religion is a matter of faith (Bajpai, 1992). Here, he defines the concept of religion with the sects or panth and advocates for the use of the term panth-nirpekshta in place of secularism. He also considered Gandhi’s sarva dharma samabhava an essential element for Indian secularism and was a supporter of this notion of secularism. Sarva dharma samabhava means ‘equal respect for all religions without discrimination’ (Bajpai, 1992). Politics of Religion and Secularism in India: A Brief Summary India after Independence witnessed the uninterrupted rule of the Congress, which provided political stability for over 45  years. This political stability was single-handedly propelled by the Congress. The powerful presence of the Congress, under the leadership of Nehru, during the 1950s and the 1960s, greatly discouraged religion-based political organizations and political parties (such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS] and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh [BJS]) and they failed to make any impact on Indian politics. Nehru, no doubt, tried to maintain communal harmony but many Congressmen during his term were victims of religious bias. Indeed, many leaders of the Congress sympathized with Hindu communal organizations and held negative views about the Muslims (Engineer, 2003b, pp. 135–139). Congress, Muslim Political Elites and Hindu Nationalists in Indian Politics Congress and Use of Religion

After Nehru and during the first phase of Indira Gandhi’s regime (before the Emergency period), Congress’ politics moved around the use of religion for political purposes. During the Nehruvian era and the first phase of Indira Gandhi as prime minister, the Congress strictly followed the principles of secularism and this very secular nature of party made the Muslims and other disadvantaged groups its loyal voters. The Congress government assured the Muslims that it would not interfere in their personal laws. The BJS criticized this declaration as an instance of the appeasement tactics of the Congress and attacked it as conceding to the politics of demand by the Muslims. It declared Nehruvian secularism to be pseudo-secularism because it favoured people of one religion and neglected the claims of the majority religion. Therefore, the BJS during this period tried to project the Congress and the Muslims as a threat to India and the ‘Hindus’. But the BJS was not successful in mobilizing the ‘Hindus’ on religious grounds, primarily because the religion-based politics with communal ideology and organizations was unacceptable in many parts of India because of the strong presence of cadre-based Congress Party and its influence among the masses during the 1950s and the 1960s.

376  Anurag Pandey After the death of Nehru, K. Kamaraj became the president of the All India Congress Committee (undivided, hereafter AICC) and introduced the Kamaraj Plan. He proposed in the plan that six Congress chief ministers and six senior Cabinet ministers must resign to work for strengthening the organizational structure of the Party. Kamaraj was instrumental in bringing Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri for prime ministerial candidate in 1964. After the death of Shastri, many Congressmen favoured Indira Gandhi over Morarji Desai and she became the prime minister of India in 1967. K. Kamaraj was credited as the kingmaker in Indian politics because of his role in these two successions, and he stepped down as AICC president in 1967. The Congress hegemony in elections faced its first major challenge in 1967 when a united opposition formed a coalition named Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD, with the BJS). The SVD won control over many states of the Hindi Belt areas. The BJS tried to capitalize the political situation in its favour to communalize the state and administration (Jaffrelot, 1996, pp. 222–223). Indira Gandhi, the then president of the Congress, had to face the challenges by the majority of the party leadership. This led the division of the Congress Party into two camps, one which opposed Indira Gandhi with Kamaraj as its main figure and the other which supported her. This conflict resulted in a split in the Congress in 1969 and the formation of two political parties, the Congress Organization (Congress [O]) and the Congress Requisition (Congress [R]). The Congress (O) was headed by the old guard (K. Kamaraj) and the Congress (R) by Indira Gandhi. It was a period of fight between these two groups to become the main Congress. The Indira faction Congress (R) was declared as the true Indian National Congress by the Election Commission of India (Engineer, 2003b, pp. 135–139). Indira Gandhi, to become popular among the masses and to weaken the Congress (O), adopted populist policies like nationalization of banks and the slogan garibi hatao (remove poverty). This populist policy appealed to the masses and the Congress headed by Indira Gandhi became the main Congress Party. The Jana Sangh failed to utilize such political situation and allied itself with anti-Congress (R) political parties, such as the Congress (O) and the Swatantra Party (consisted mostly former princes and rulers). They opposed the populist policies of the Congress (R) and the nationalization of banks because they stopped the privy purses of princes and rulers, mostly belonging to the Swatantra Party. This anti-Congress (R) coalition tried to weaken the Congress (R) and Indira’s position. The Bangladesh War of 1971, which caused the crisis in Indian economy, provided them a fertile ground to oppose Indira Gandhi. Insufficiency of essential goods, price hike and corruption made the people annoyed with the government. In such circumstances, Jayaprakash Narayan took the lead in organizing people’s movement against the Congress, which benefited the anti-Congress (R) alliance to oppose Indira Gandhi. The law and order situation became unstable in many places of the country and more particularly in Bihar and Gujarat. At the same time, the Allahabad High Court gave a judgment in 1975 of unseating Indira Gandhi

Secularism in India  377 in an election petition filed against her. Also, during that period, Jayaprakash Narayan appealed the police and armed forces not to follow the government’s orders if unconstitutional. Mrs Gandhi declared Emergency and in the 1977 election, the Congress was defeated by the Janata Party. This caused the formation of first non-Congress government at the centre by the Janata Party (with Jana Sangh, the predecessor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a political party affiliated with the RSS, which merged with the Janata Party). But it could not run for long and due to some ideological differences, the Jana Sangh formed a new party in February 1980, which is today known as the BJP (Engineer, 2003b, pp. 135–139). The Congress won the next general election. But after the Emergency of 1975, Indira Gandhi paid attention towards the Hindu vote banks, more particularly of the Hindi Belt (northern India) for the following reasons: First, after the Emergency, the traditional vote bank of the Muslims pushed away from the Congress due to the atrocities committed against them during the Emergency. The Congress faced defeat in the 1977 parliamentary election primarily because of the Muslims’ anger, though the Congress won the 1980 election but with the reduced number of seats, since the Muslims massively were not convinced. Second, due to the rise of some powerful regional parties in the South (South India was also the traditional vote bank of the Congress), Indira Gandhi was not very much sure about her South Indian vote bank also. Both the changes in Indian politics bound her to think the alternate votes, thus she moved towards the Hindu vote bank of North India. The Meenakshipuram incident, Hindu Kalash Yatra and so on put testimony to the fact that she wanted to identify herself as a Hindu leader to win support of the Hindus to maintain her power (Engineer, 2003b, pp. 135–139). After the Emergency, a dramatic change in Indira Gandhi’s tactics was also witnessed: Before the Emergency, she was playing the Muslim card and after the Emergency, she started paying attention to mobilize the Hindus. After Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi also used religion for political ends. The Shah Bano movement1 and laying foundation stone of Ram Janmabhoomi temple are its examples. While the former distressed the Hindus, the latter annoyed the Muslims. And then, Narasimha Rao drove the last nail in the coffin of the Congress by remaining a passive spectator during the demolition of Babri Mosque (Engineer, 2003b, pp. 96–97). Muslim Political Elites and Use of Religion

Besides the use of religion by the Congress, the non-secular behaviour and increasing (sometimes communal) demands of the Muslim elite2 further show the trend of using religion. For example, the Muslim National Front, formed by Sulaiman Sait and Zulfikar Ullah of the Muslim League, Salahuddin Owaisi of Ittehadul Muslimeen and others, demanded official status for Urdu under Article 347 of the Constitution, Muslims should be freely given arms licences, no ban on cow slaughter, no restrictions on the flow of

378  Anurag Pandey funds from the overseas Muslims for Indian Muslims, the Bangladeshi and some Pakistani, who have come over to India, should not be sent back and so on (Jog, 1994). In 1947, the Moplah community of Kerala demanded the foundation of a Moplah district for the Muslims (which was accepted in 1969) and Majlis-e-Ittehadul-Muslimeen of Andhra Pradesh made a formal request in the late 1960s that a separate state for all Indian Muslims should be carved out of the East Coast between Visakhapatnam and Madras (Robinson, 1979, pp. 78–112). In a convention held on October 1994, the Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims (formed by Syed Shahabuddin of the Janata Dal; Saiyid Hamid, former vice-chancellor AMU; and Maulana Mohammad Shafi Moonis, vice-president of the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat) demanded to consider all the Indian Muslims as backward and they should be given the privilege of reservation (Wright, 1997, pp. 852–858). What is more, their stand on Shah Bano case, Babri Mosque issue (the establishment of Babri Masjid Action Committee), Syed Shahabuddin’s call to Muslims to boycott Republic Day (since this confronting attitude from both the sides led to the sharpening of communalism and communal attitude), the opposition of Uniform Civil Code and so on stipulates that ‘the Muslim elite appears to be least interested in guiding the community on healthy and secular lines. It does not want to educate the community in secularism and commitment of the modern man to the basic values of democracy and socialism. This is why the community is turning to medieval thinking, slogan and solidarity’ (Shakir, 1975, p. 175). In India, most of the Muslims belong to the backward classes and they do not have a strong middle class among them and due to this, the high surge of Islamic fundamentalism can escalate the Muslim political elites their political prospects with much less efforts. The use of religion can bring political goods to them much faster. Secular expressions have hardly any emotional appeal (Shakir, 1975, pp. 169–175). In short, the Muslim elite ‘is an elite dogmatic in religious attitude, narrow in social matters, parochial towards social change and separatist in outlook’ (Shakir, 1975, p. 169). Thus, the Muslim elite want to increase their bargaining power by misusing religious sentiments on emotional issues by creating the dogma of separate Muslim identity among the Hindus. But they do not realize that this environment is adding to the Hindu psyche that all Muslims are fundamentalists and is playing an effective role in communalization of the majority population. The Hindu Nationalists

The use of religion by the Hindu nationalists for political purposes got pace only during Indira Gandhi’s regime (though they were in existence after Independence but were very less effective). The BJP with its sister organizations (the RSS, Vishva Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal and so on) used religion for its own purpose to get power by oscillating between a moderate and a militant approach to politics (Jaffrelot, 1996). After the 1984 parliamentary election,

Secularism in India  379 the BJP adopted a militant approach to politics. The Shah Bano movement, increasing demands of Muslim political elite and the Ram Janmabhoomi issue provided an opportunity for the BJP to adopt a militant approach to politics. The Rath Yatra of L. K. Advani and demolition of Babri Mosque, attack on minorities and more particularly the Muslims, blaming the Congress policies as pseudo-secularist for appeasement of Muslims, defining Hindus as true secular and Muslims as violent, demanding Uniform Civil Code, attacking Article 370 (which gives special status to Kashmir) and so on testify the fact. Savarkar and Golwalkar’s theory of Hindutva is the basis of BJP’s ideology. It attempts to attain the supremacy of Hindus and wants to establish a nation based on Hindu culture. It affirms that the Hindus originally are the creators of the Indian culture and, therefore, Hinduism is superior to any other faith in India. Thus, the Sangh Parivar strictly follows this ideology of Hindutva, branding the Muslims and the Christians as aliens, who are disloyal to India. The peak of their communal attitude was witnessed on 6 December 1992, when Babri Mosque was demolished and in the Gujarat massacre of 2002, when for almost one month, Muslims were physically attacked. Thus, primarily due to this political situation, the Party created its influential position in India. Indian Secularism and Its Critics The main critics of the idea of secularism are T. N. Madan, Ashis Nandy and Partha Chatterjee. They broadly believe that ‘secularism is an unacceptable modern concept in a multi-religious nation like India’ because it separates religion from politics or the state; religion in India is deeply ingrained and cannot be separated from public life. Secularism in India is a borrowed concept from the West and imposed on Indian people. Ashis Nandy, who is one of the critics of the modern version of secularism, states that Nehruvian secularism, which separates the state and religion, is an idea imposed on the Indian public, primarily because the public sphere is viewed as a barren wasteland of anomie, a place where everyday ethics and morals are rarely applied. Many of the difficulties we have observed in India are a result of a lack of principles that offer an ethical framework for public life. Therefore, it is a part of the modern Western package whose inclination is towards scientific development, nation-building and development. Nandy further states that accepting this concept of secularism means that the country wants to develop new dimensions to establish a justified-looking ‘domination’ in the name of progress and modernity. It wants to provide modern ideologies to the public as a new idea to establish and to protect them from the use of violence. In a nutshell, what Nandy is trying to convey is that we have failed to create an ethical framework that is adequate for our public life or realm. The European Enlightenment produced everything: great thinkers, great innovators, great social reformers and great scientists, even in the social sciences and humanities. On the other hand, India has not produced even

380  Anurag Pandey one philosopher, be it in science, humanities or social studies, who could prioritize non-violence, which is an important component of public life. As a result, modernity, contemporary thinking and progress have been rejected by the Indian society. This is why Nehruvian secularism can never prosper in India because many Indians have prioritized violence (Nandy, 1995, pp.  35–64). Nandy contends that this ‘modern Western rational-scientific secularism’ introduced in India by Nehru has failed to eliminate or separate religion from politics, and hence, this form of secularism cannot guide moral or political actions. Rather, it opens space for religious bigotry and communalism, the ideas which Nehruvian secularism claims to eliminate completely from public domain (Nandy, 1995, pp. 35–64). According to Nandy, the best possible option is the non-modern, presecularism phase, where religious values and its basic principles were dominant force in society. In this system, different religions were accommodated through tolerance. Indian secularism has failed to bring the masses closer. Finally, Nandy incorporates Gandhi’s anti-modernism and anti-secularism ideas and says that true tolerance can be achieved only by the confluence of religion and politics as conveyed by Gandhi. Secularism has failed as an ideology and religious bigotry and communalism can only be fought by following the path shown by Gandhi (Nandy, 1995, pp. 35–64). Similarly, T. N. Madan has also stated that both religion and politics have equal importance and, therefore, it would be unfair to separate them from each other. Supporting the views of Gandhi, Madan (1987, pp.  747–759) says that Gandhi’s ideas emphasize the confluence of religion and politics and at the same time, his ideas are based on sarva dharma samabhava, which also promotes inter-religious tolerance. In his words, ‘Secularism in South Asia can only be successful if we take both religion and secularism seriously, religion should not be criticized just because it has superstition and secularism should not be treated as only a tool to fight communalism, nor should it be used for any benefit’ (Madan, 1987, pp. 747–759). Partha Chatterjee argues that secular terminology is inadequate and incapable of countering Hindu majoritarianism, and instead, he proposes the idea of ​​religious tolerance. He says that due to religious fanaticism, tolerance among various religious communities is eroding and that is why there is violence, mobilization of masses on religious grounds and so on. Secularism has failed to establish tolerance among the people and because of this Hindu majoritarianism is spreading its roots in India (Chatterjee, 1994, pp. 1768–1777). Indian secularism has failed to protect the rights of the minorities. India needs some other ideology instead of secularism. Here, Chatterjee (1994, pp. 1768–1777) gives the concept of tolerance and recommends the inclusion of the politics of representative democracy among various groups so that the conditions for internal reforms could be created without reformist interventions of state, which can create a strong path for mutual tolerance among various groups.

Secularism in India  381 Rajeev Bhargava’s Viewpoint and Response to the Criticism

Rajeev Bhargava strongly denies the criticism of secularism and states that Indian secularism should not be compared to Western notion because Indian secularism is totally different from the ​​Western concept of secularism. Bhargava says that in Indian model of secularism, the state maintains a ‘principled distance’ between religions. Here, Bhargava talks about contextual secularism, which means that either the state interferes in certain matters or refrains from interfering, therefore, the state uses these two principles to do justice to the values ​​of religious freedom, personal freedom and equality of citizenship (Bhargava, 2006). After this, Bhargava talks of political and moral secularism. Moral secularism, however, is far from the ground reality, in which Bhargava believes that people of all religions themselves embody the values ​​of secularism, which arouses mutual trust on its own and people recognize each other’s beliefs, traditions and so on, but it is a far-fetched idea which is based on ethical or moral principles. This is why, Bhargava prefers political secularism over moral secularism (Bhargava, 2006). Bhargava divides political secularism into three distinct versions: (a) hypersensitive secularism that separates religion from politics, (b) ultra-­procedural secularism, which also advocates separation of religion from politics and (c) contextual secularism. However, both (a) and (b) cannot advocate the principled distance theory of secularism. According to Bhargava (2006), contextual secularism allows to keep a principled distance Indian secularism did not create a strict wall of between ‘politics and separation but suggested a ‘principled distance’ religion’. between religion and state. Bhargava adopts this contextual secularism and says that only through principled distance, dignified life of individuals can be protected and ensured, religious discrimination can be eliminated, religious bigotry can be prevented, and violence on the basis of religion can be prevented and can be controlled. In the end, Bhargava (2006) says that the reasons which provide grounds for the critiques of Indian secularism need to be curbed from social and political discourses to have a society which is free from bigotry. Bhargava opines that principled distance is not just a policy for differential treatment. It provides some special exemptions and requires the intervention of state in certain religions more than the other religions. However, the state has to consider the historical and social conditions of all the prominent religions. Further, to promote the specific values of some religions, more interference of the state is required in these religions than the others. Bhargava (2006) also points out the importance of advancement of values in maintaining social equality.

382  Anurag Pandey He further clarifies this notion by citing the example of caste hierarchies among the Hindus and says that if the aim of the state is to end the caste hierarchies, the state shall interfere in the Hindu religion and not among Islam and Christianity. On the other hand, Bhargava says, ‘for the advancement of the value of religious liberty, state can intervene in Christianity and Islam more than Hinduism’. In terms of religion, he further says, the state can neither completely exclude religious considerations nor keep a strict neutral stance (Bhargava, 2006). In short, the issue of political secularism is the thrust of Bhargava’s discussion. He says that criticisms of secularism are based on ethical and moral arguments which are conveyed through relatively homogeneous Western societies at a religious level, which project a model of secularism which clearly favours a particular religion, namely Christianity, as an accepted universal model. Precisely, Bhargava (2006) points out that instead of anchoring our analyses in the doctrines of certain Western states, we should learn from the normative practices of non-Western countries, which face highly social and culturally diverse pluri-religious societies. Amartya Sen on Indian Secularism

Amartya Sen also responds to the ideologues who criticize Indian secularism. Sen says that it is not justified to call India a Hindu model of Pakistan. While Pakistan is a declared Islamic country, where rules, laws and so on are based on Islamic principles, in India, we do not have any Hindu model. The Indian state has no religion of its own and has no inclination towards any religion. This is the reason the Indian state treats all religions equally (Sen, 2005; Sen et al., 1996). Indian secularism has also been criticized by the Hindu nationalists, calling it pseudo-secularism which has always favoured the Muslims and has hurt Hindu sentiments. Sen denies this criticism outrightly and says that these allegations have been made so that people from majority religion can be mobilized in the name of religion to achieve political and electoral gains by Hindu nationalists (Sen, 2005; Sen et al., 1996). The second criticism states that Indian secularism places the identity of the group above the national identity. Sen also rejects this argument and says that Indian secularism encapsulates both identities, a person can be religious as well as nationalist. To prove his point, Sen cites the example of Gandhi and says that Gandhi was religious in his private life and nationalist in his public or political life, and he never allowed any contradiction in his both lives (Sen et al., 1996). In response to Ashis Nandy’s claims of secularism being anti-modern, Sen says that it is not easy to define modernity. It is true that a tolerant society was established in medieval India, as Hindu – Muslim communities existed with few formats of consent, but post-Independence India witnessed lack or absence of such models, and primarily because of this, we see a kind

Secularism in India  383 of distance between various communities; and to bring these communities closer, modern models of consent continue to be discovered. Moreover, if incidents of violence have increased among communities in the modern era, it does not mean that secularism has failed, but to stop this violence, the concept of secularism is primary requirement and a much-needed philosophy (Sen et al., 1996). Some critics allege that Indian secularism rejects the cultural identity of the country because Indian culture has been synonymous with Hindu culture from the ancient period. Sen says that it is a narrow idea to consider India’s culture as just Hindu culture, because the culture of the country is made up of all cultures, and because of this nature of India, it is regarded as a multicultural country, which respects all cultures (Sen et al., 1996). Summing Up Contrary to the Western thought, Indian secularism does not support the complete separation of religion and politics, rather it runs on the principle of rational distance between religion and politics. This means that India’s sociopolitical decisions and so on will be kept away from religious interference. In short, the state will not have any religion nor will it give protection to any particular religion. Constitutionally, India has no state religion and the Indian state does not promote any form of discrimination on the basis of religion, but socially, India failed to implement secular principles in our civic life. Abhay Dubey in his recently published work presents the dichotomy of secularism in India. He points out the rise of Hindu nationalism in India and says that it is a defeat of secular politics and secular ideology. It is because the liberals in India failed to see the dangers of Hindu nationalism and its rise. He also points out the arrogance of secular ideologues which resulted in the weakening of secular principles and politics in India. (Dubey, 2019). On the other hand, Badri Narayan (2021) in his recently published work on Hindutva politics says that the track record of the RSS and its social services with mobilization techniques among the OBC, Dalit and Adivasi communities has paid political dividends for the BJP. Especially after 2014, it has become a common phenomenon for many people to point out that the violence of Hindutva politics is not relevant since it is more inclusive than ‘secular’ politics. In the world of politics, there is a new phenomenon called subaltern Hindutva, which promotes the empowerment of the subaltern by bringing them into the Hindutva fold (Narayan, 2021). Now, certain questions arise, for example: Can  Hindutva empowerment  exist without  escalating  public violence, or at  the very  least the threat of it? What is its nature and ontology? What if it did not guarantee impunity for anti-minority violence? And here, Narayan (2021) points out that the secular parties are being dismissive of Hindutva empowerment.

384  Anurag Pandey Here, we must also understand that winning elections does not mean that the secular ideology and principle provided by the Constitution are dead. Now, the focus should be on uniting all secular forces, ideologues and organizations to teach people the true meaning of secularism and secular principle, although difficult but not impossible. No doubt the incidents of communal riots in India, the use of religion by political parties for political or electoral purposes, political mobilization on religious grounds based on sensitive or emotive issues and growing mistrust and hostility between/among different religions hurt India’s secular character. The rise of extremist parties and organizations in Indian politics has only served to increase the problem further. These types of incidents are a blight on the secular nature of Indian state and ironically, no institution or party seems to be serious about resolving this. Apart from this, many extremist parties are also notorious for mobilizing electorates on religious ground and that is why the Supreme Court of India had to give a judgment in January 2014, when it completely banned the use of religion, caste, community identity and so on in elections (Rajgopal, 2017a). The Court had to do this because the misuse of religion strikes our daily life, our thinking, our multicultural tradition, the constitutional ideals of the country and the secular character of the state and society. Apart from this, another decision of the Supreme Court needs to be mentioned here. The decision has come on the issue of triple talaq prevalent in the Muslim religion, in which the Court gave an important decision keeping in mind the secular structure of India. On the one hand, considering the secular structure and constitutional ideals of India, the Court told the political parties that they should not disturb the religious sentiments of any religion, on the other, the Court said that personal law of any religion cannot be considered above fundamental rights which are ensured by the Constitution of India. Therefore, to protect the fundamental rights of Muslim women, the Court banned the triple talaq and, at the same time, suggested the government to bring a law in this regard so that the fundamental rights of Muslim women can be protected (Rajgopal, 2017b). In both these decisions, the Court seems to be protecting the constitutional values ​​and secular image of India. In the end, the question arises whether the society and social structure of our country also view secularism and constitutional values and traditions in this way as the court is suggesting or is our society suffering from any prejudice about secularism. The irony of our country is that we have got a very modern state, but our society is very traditional and conservative in nature, where secularism is sometimes narrowly understood and caste, religion, linguistics and faith-based issues become prominent by avoiding secular – democratic structures of the Indian state. The Indian state is secular and the society needs to imbibe the values ​​and ideals of secularism, only then, India, which is a multicultural country, will move towards building an ideal society in its real sense.

Secularism in India  385 Notes 1 The Shah Bano case is an example of using religion for political purpose and the Muslim political elite’s concern towards their separate identity and opposition of Uniform Civil Code in secular India. Shah Bano was divorced by her husband Mohd Ahmed Khan. After paying ₹200 per month as maintenance for two years, Mohd Khan stopped paying her the maintenance. Shah Bano went to court to seek further relief and won the case. But after the judgment of the court, almost all Muslim organizations and persons came together to oppose the decision, viewing it as against their sacrosanct Shariat. Because of this pressure, the then government passed a bill in 1987 (under the Muslim Women [Protection of Rights on Divorce] Act), which says that the Muslim divorced women could get maintenance only during Iddat. For an analytical study of Shah Bano case, see Engineer (1987). 2 For example, Jamaat-e-Islami appealed to the Muslims in 1952 not to participate in the first general election as it would not establish Islamic nation in India. Besides this, the Muslim League, Jamiat- Ulema-e-Hind, the Deeni Taleemi Board, Majlis-e-Mushawarat, Majlis-e-Ittehadul-Muslimeen, Anjuman-i Taraqqi-i Urdu, Al Ummah and so on spread their narrow ideas among the Muslims. Some Islamic institutions like Farangi Mahall in Lucknow, Darul Uloom in Deoband, Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama in Lucknow and Darul-Uloom-Manzar-e-Islam in Bareilly are widening the gap between the Hindus and the Muslims. For more, see Upadhyay (2003).

References Bajpai, A. B. (1992, January 1). The concept of Indian secularism. Berkely Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/quotes/ atal-bihari-vajpayee-on-the-indian-concept-of-secularism Bansal, N. (2020a, June 6). Right to freedom of religion. Legal Bite: Law and Beyond. www.legalbites.in/right-to-freedom-of-religion-articles-25-28/ Bansal, N. (2020b, June 6). Cultural and educational rights (Article 29–30 explained). Legal Bite: Law and Beyond. www.legalbites.in/cultural-and-educational-rightsarticles-29-30/ Bhargava, R. (2006). Political secularism: Why it is needed and why we need to learn from its distinctive Indian version. SSOAR. www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/han dle/document/17587/17587_1.pdf;jsessionid=ECE84026CCB075BEC49B4932BB 530816?sequence=1 Chatterjee, P. (1994, July 9). Secularism and tolerance. Economic & Political Weekly, XXIX(28), 1768–1777. Dubey, A. K. (2019). Hindu ekta banam gyan ki rajniti. Vani Prakashan. Engineer, A. A. (1987). Shah Bano controversy. Orient Longman. Engineer, A. A. (2003a, June 30). Religion and communalism. Counter Current.org. www.countercurrents.org/comm-engineer300603.htm Engineer, A. A. (2003b). Communal challenge and secular response. Shipra Publications. Gandhi, M. K. Religion and politics. www.mkgandhi.org/momgandhi/chap18.htm Ghadai, B. (2019, January). The preamble of the Indian Constitution. Odisha Review. http://magazines.odisha.gov.in/Orissareview/2019/Jan/engpdf/4-6.pdf Gopal, S. (1983). Jawaharlal Nehru: An anthology. Oxford University. Holyoake, G. J. (2011 [1896]). English secularism: A  confession of belief. www. gutenberg.org/files/38104/38104-h/38104-h.htm

386  Anurag Pandey Jaffrelot, C. (1996). The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925– 1990s (pp. 222–223). Penguin Books, Viking. Jha, S. (2002, July 27–August 2). Secularism in constituent assembly debates (1946– 50). Economic & Political Weekly, 37(30). Jog, B. N. (1994). Threat of Islam: Indian dimensions. Mumbai Unnati Prakashan. Joshi, P. C. (2007). Gandhi – Nehru tradition and Indian secularism. Mainstream Weekly, XLV(48). www.mainstreamweekly.net/article432.html Madan, T. N. (1987, November). Secularism in its place. The Journal of Asian Studies, 46(4). Nandy, A. (1995, Spring). An anti-secularist manifesto. India International Centre Quarterly, 35–64. Narayan, B. (2021). Republic of Hindutva: How the Sangh is reshaping Indian democracy. Penguin Books. Prabhu, R. K. (1947). M. K. Gandhi, India of My Dreams. Navjivan Publishing House. Rajgopal, K. (2017a, January 3). Seeking votes on religious basis a corrupt act. The Hindu. www.thehindu.com/news/national/Seeking-votes-on-religious-basis-a-cor rupt-act-SC/article16977220.ece Rajgopal, K. (2017b, August  23). Supreme Court set aside instant “talaq”. The Hindu. www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-sets-aside-instant-tripletalaq/article19538599.ece Rectenwald, M. (2012, August  31). Secularism and the cultures of nineteenthcentury scientific naturalism. The British Journal for the History of Science. www. cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-for-the-history-of-science/article/abs/ secularism-and-the-cultures-of-nineteenthcentury-scientific-naturalism/3F6655169 ADBF69052E72D431FD6AFFD Rectenwald, M. (2013), “Secularism and the Cultures of Nineteenth-century Scientific Naturalism,” The British Journal for the History of Science. Volume 46. Issue 02. June. p. 233. Robinson, F. (1979). Islam and Muslim separatism. In D. Taylor & M. Yapp (Eds.), Political identity in South Asia (pp. 78–112). Curzon Press. Sen, A., Basu, K., & Subrahmanyam, S. (1996). Secularism and its discontents. In K. Basu  & S. Subrahmanyam (Eds.),  Unravelling the nation, sectarian conflict and India’s secular identity. Penguin Books. Sen, Amartya (2005). The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. Shakir, M. (1975). The Muslim political elite. In Z. Imam (Ed.), Muslims of India. Orient Longman. Upadhyaya, D. (2006). Laukik, dharmhin, dharmrahit, dharmnirpeksh, ahharmik, adharmi, nidharmi athwa asampradayik. Panchjanya. https://deendayalupadhyay. org/lokik_hindi.html Upadhyay, R. (2003). Islamic institutions in India: Protected movement for separate Muslim identity? www.saveindia.com/islamic_institutions_in_india.htm Wadhwa, K. K. (1975). Minority safeguards in India: Constitutional provisions and their implementation. Thompson Press. Wright, T. P. (1997, September). New demand for Muslim reservation in India. Asian Survey, 37(9), 852–858.

18 Local Self-Government Panchayats and Municipalities Smita Agarwal

Introduction Present times have increasingly seen a shift in governmental structure from centralization to decentralization that has thereby brought local governance discourses to the centre stage. This shift is predominantly the result of the lack of effective participation of people, thereby making government plans unsuccessful. As a result, new schemes were thought, designed and practised that finally led to decentralization. Decentralization is a scheme of governance where institutions are created and other factors collide so that decisions are shifted to the lowest level in order to ensure the participation of people. It is an attempt to design new structures whereby collective actions can be ensured through both citizen – citizen participation and citizen – state interaction. James Manor defined decentralization as a process whereby functions, resources and decision-making processes are gradually transferred to the lowest level and officials are elected to run this governance structure. Decentralization occurs through different types of initiatives that comprise fiscal decentralization, de-concentration and devolution (Manor, 1999, p. 5). Of these, devolution is the most effective means of decentralization, which includes the transfer of tasks and functions with matching resources, as well as appropriate decision-making powers to the lowest level, along with the institutionalizing of democratically elected bodies, which are often perceived as independent of higher-level authorities. The aim of this chapter is to acquaint students with local governance in India. This would comprise of a brief history of local governance in India; their constitutional status with key features would be discussed next; and then their actual work would be discussed, followed by ways ahead to make their work more effective.

Decentralization occurs through different types of initiatives that comprise fiscal decentralization, de-concentration and devolution. Of these, devolution is the most effective means of decentralization,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-22

388  Smita Agarwal which includes the transfer of tasks and functions with matching resources, as well as appropriate decision-making powers to the democratically elected bodies at the lowest level. (Manor, 1999)

History of Local Governance in India: A Brief Summary India has a long history of rural local governance in India. Historical evidence points to the existence of rural local governance by the name of panchayats in ancient India. When the British came to India equipped with the idea of ‘civilizing mission’, they destroyed the rural polity and tried to experiment with a new modern model of centralized democratic structures. One such case was the introduction of the modern, responsible elected form of parliamentary government in India. However, unlike the modern, elected government that was functioning in England, the British introduced a half-responsible government whose main function was to carry out administrative functions while policies were made elsewhere in Britain. In order to strengthen this administration, local bodies were established in major towns as early as 1687. The Madras Municipal Corporation that came into being 1687 was based upon the British model of a town council with nominated members only. This body was empowered to levy taxes for building halls and schools. With the passage of time, the sphere of activity of this corporation and similar bodies set up in other major towns increased and their administrative power widened (Mathew, 2002, p. 94). A great shift occurred in 1870 when local government bodies underwent a sea change after Lord Mayo, the viceroy, got a resolution passed by his council that strengthened the process of decentralization by bringing about administrative accountability and linking it to getting the demands of the people fulfilled. While Lord Mayo is credited with defining the structure of local governance in India in its modern form, Lord Ripon in 1882 brought about a structural transformation in this structure of local bodies. The objective of Ripon’s policy was two-fold. On the one hand, the resolution provided that ‘adequate resources which are local in nature and are suited for local control should be provided to local bodies’, while on the other hand, the resolution aimed at creating institutions of self-governance by changing the composition of local boards and including more non-official members or Indians in both rural and urban governance. These non-official members must be elected and given real responsibilities to discharge the functions of local governance. This reform was considered the ‘Magna Carta’ of local democracy in India. In later years of British rule, the status of local governance changed as focus shifted to the creation of a centralized government structure. Despite the British government’s making ardent efforts for local governance, their main aim was to increase their revenue rather than

Local Self-Government  389 actually bring in the participation of people. On the other hand, Gandhi, in his struggle against the British, had conceptualized the central role of rural local governance in the making of the new India. His focus was rural because he had fully grasped the reality of India’s rural population in majority. He saw this as an alternative to central government structures that were like a pyramid and did not ensure effective public participation. In his well-laid-out idea, Gandhi saw panchayats as village republics. This was central to village swaraj. The government of the village will be conducted by the panchayat of five persons annually elected by the adult villagers, males and females, possessing minimum prescribed qualifications. These will have all authority and jurisdiction required. Since there will be no system of punishment in the accepted sense, the panchayat will be legislature, judiciary and executive combined to operate for its year of office. Any village can become such a republic today without much interference even from the present government whose sole effective connection with the village is the execution of village revenue. Here there is a perfect democracy based upon individual freedom. The individual is the architect of his own government. (Gandhi, 1942) Following Independence, when Indians drafted their own constitution despite the presence of a history of decentralization and its idea being in front of them, the constitution makers opted for a centralized government structure, thereby pushing local governance to the periphery. This was because Ambedkar saw traditional Indian villages as a sink of localism based on ignorance and narrow-mindedness that fostered communalism. This, according to many, would not help India become modern. As a result, local governance was included only in Article 40 of the Indian Constitution and List II Entry 5 in the Seventh Schedule. The entry empowered the state legislature to legislate with respect to all mattersrelating to local government, including the Constitution and the establishment of local authorities. The Constitution also empowered the state legislatures to confer such powers upon local authority, including the power to levy taxes which the state could levy under the state list. In spite of such direct and indirect powers, no substantial steps were taken to give village panchayats a role in social transformation and the implementation of development programmes. Post-Independence till 1990: A Wavy Trajectory of Local Governance in India India’s development strategy after Independence followed a centralized mechanism through the Planning Commission that made plans. Very soon, following this model of development, India started facing problems. As a

390  Smita Agarwal result, a new short-term alternative was conceptualized through the idea of the Community Development Project. This project was launched in 1952 in some districts of India like Shantiniketan, Baroda and Nilokheri with the aim of delivering central plans, but it failed. This was because again, people’s participation was missing, and this project lacked a constitutional guarantee that made implementation centralized at the block level. A study team, headed by Balwantrai Mehta, a Member of Parliament, was set up in 1957 to suggest means of ensuring the same. Broadly, the team suggested India take the path of decentralization whereby public participation in development work had to be organized through elected representatives and it would be based on the following: (a) ‘administrative decentralization for effective implementation of development programme and (b) control by elected bodies for this decentralized administrative system’ (Dsouza, 2002, p. 374). The recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta team gave an impetus for constituting Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in all states. In this scheme, the National Development Council affirmed the basic principle of democratic decentralization and left it to the states to work out the measures suitable for each state. During this stage, the term ‘Panchayati Raj’ symbolized a structure of governance. It led to an organic linking of people from Gram sabha to Lok Sabha. It was meant to represent a local body within a geographical area. After this, Rajasthan was the first state to inaugurate Panchayati Raj after Balwantrai Mehta’s report. Jawaharlal Nehru, while inaugurating the panchayat at Nagaur, hailed it as ‘the most revolutionary and historical step in the context of new India’ (Mathew, 2002, p. 96). Democracy at the top cannot be successful until it is built from below. A sense of enthusiasm was generated amongst the rural people who were actively participating in their day-to-day affairs. As a result, during 1964–65, younger and enthusiastic leadership emerged through the PRIs in the Indian political scenario. As a result of this participation, accountability mechanisms were strengthened, such as the attendance of teachers in the primary school had increased and pradhans (elected representatives of panchayat samiti) were becoming responsive towards the demands of the people by stopping corruption or making office staff listen to people.

Balwantrai Mehta Committee Recommendations (1957) • It recommended three-tier local institutions. • Elections should take place at the level of panchayats, with indirect elections taking place at the panchayat samiti and Zila Parishad. • One women member should be nominated. • These institutions should focus on planning and development. • An adequate transfer of power and duty should take place to enable these institutions to carry out their activities.

Local Self-Government  391 This enthusiasm could not be sustained for long as there was reluctance in passing funds to these institutions by both the centre and state. Second, according to George Mathew, elections to the panchayats were a farce for it was like a change in permutation and combination, where traditional rivalries came to the forefront that obstructed the functioning of panchayats which gave state government to delay the elections (Mathew, 2002, p. 96). This zeal got the final blow when politics marred the situation and, after Nehru’s death and a change of leadership, stripped all powers from the Community Development Ministry; it first reduced it to a department and finally merged it under the Food and Agriculture Department. This further marginalized the role of panchayats. Along with this came the next blow when new schemes integrated with district areas were launched. Later, the Community Development Programme was widened to include rural development. Thus, it marked the end of both ‘community’ and ‘panchayats’ as agents of change and agencies of development. With the change of leadership at the central level under Indira Gandhi’s regime, greater forces of centralization were unleashed, crushing all autonomy and decentralization. The next phase, starting from 1966–67 to 1977, saw no discussions on decentralization by the central government. On the other hand, with new political leadership gaining control in different states, new experiments were undertaken on the decentralization front. The Ashok Mehta Committee was set up to enquire into the working of the PRIs and to suggest ways to strengthen them after the new political regime was set up in 1977. It marked a turning point in the concept and functioning of Panchayati Raj. It launched second-generation panchayats. First generation panchayats were in the Nehruvian era.

The Ashok Mehta Committee (1978) suggested the following: 1. A two-tier panchayat system was suggested. 2. All development activities should flow through the block-level organization. 3. Panchayat samiti is a key unit of decentralization, and in most cases, it is coterminous with the block. 4. One women member was to be nominated. 5. Panchayati raj organization to have compulsory taxing power (Mathew, 2002, p. 98).

Second-generation panchayats started with the setting of panchayats in Bengal on the lines of recommendation given by the Mehta Committee. West Bengal, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh either revised their existing panchayats or enacted new acts in theory to accept

392  Smita Agarwal the Ashok Mehta Committee. Thus, in this phase, panchayats developed into political institutions. This was largely due to the intervention of various political leaders of different states. This committee, for the first time, suggested that panchayats be given a working place in the constitution whereby it would be compulsory for all development plans to go through them. The rise of panchayats during the 1970s gave more powers to the local bodies; they evoked more enthusiasm both in implementation and functioning. Various models were implemented, and a few success stories also emerged. One such was the West Bengal pattern of rural governance, where the government created institutions and mechanisms for the participation of the people (Kumar, 2006). Despite innovative methods being adopted by states, a need was felt for giving this measure constitutional status. The success of this approach demanded political will, people’s awareness and the building of healthy conventions and traditions through the use of constitutional and legislative changes, which can bring a transformation in society. The working of second generations revealed that the first two factors were present, but the third factor was missing that had thwarted the successful working of panchayats. This momentum was again brought to a standstill when political factors took control of the situation. The new Indira government changed the whole political discourse by bringing the poverty removal agenda to the forefront. With the quick change of leadership and the changing in international scenario, the decentralization agenda again came to the forefront in 1988 when a subcommittee of the Parliament for the Ministry of Rural Development under the chairmanship of P. K. Thungon made recommendations for strengthening the Panchayati Raj system. It also recommended giving constitutional status to panchayats. It was against this background that on 15 May the constitution (64th Amendment Bill) was drafted and introduced in Parliament. It was modelled on the recommendations of L. M. Singhvi’s draft bill and Ashok Mehta Committee’s report. Although the bill was welcomed by all shades of opinion present in the Parliament, it was opposed on a flimsy ground for following a uniform pattern for all the states which had up till now recommended different patterns of decentralization in their states. Second, it was seen that the Parliament, by enacting this bill, would be taking away an agency of the state under whose purview this matter fell. There was an outcry from both political parties and intellectual citizens. In response to this widespread criticism, a committee headed by S.R. Bommai was appointed by the National Front. The report that was submitted stressed the lacunae of the earlier bills and later bills that were re-drafted to include the findings (Mathew, 2002, p. 99).

Local Self-Government  393 G. V. K. Rao Committee (1977) • It recommended the Zila Parishad as a body for implementing functions of decentralization. • It suggested regular elections for these institutions. P. K. Thungon Committee (1985) • Constitutional status to be given to local self-government. • Reservations should be given to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in local self-government. • Panchayats should be given financial autonomy. L. M. Singhvi Committee (1991) • • • •

Local self-government should be given constitutional status. They should be given adequate financial autonomy. Nyaya panchayats should be setup to mediate conflicts. Elections in self-government institutions should be held regularly.

After trying to satisfy every grievance, the 64th Amendment Bill was tabled in the Parliament. It was passed with a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha, but in the Rajya Sabha, it failed to meet the mandatory requirement by two votes. This fate was meted out not because of serious differences but mainly because of a political scenario in which opposition parties with a majority in the Rajya Sabha did not want the ruling party to gain from this amendment in the next general elections (Sivaramakrishnan, 2000, pp. 41–42). The National Front government introduced the 74th Amendment Bill (a combined bill on both panchayats and municipalities) on 7 September  1990 during its short tenure, but it was never taken up for discussion. By this time, the political atmosphere was charged with giving constitutional status to local bodies. All parties declared in their manifestos that they supported constitutional amendments to strengthen panchayats. In September  1991, the Congress government under Narasimha Rao introduced the 72nd (Panchayats) and 73rd Amendment (Nagarpalikas) Constitutional Amendment Bills. These two bills were referred to a Joint Select Committee of the Parliament. The Lok Sabha passed the two bills on 22 December 1992, while the Rajya Sabha passed them the next day. By the time the Parliament passed the two bills, their sequence had changed to the 73rd and 74th Amendment

394  Smita Agarwal Acts, respectively. Following their ratification by more than one-third of the states assemblies, the president gave his assent on 20 April 1993. They came into force as the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, in April 1993, and the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992, on 1 June 1993. These amendments to the Constitution brought about fundamental change not only in the realm of local government but also in India’s federal character. The 73rd Amendment Act: Key Mandatory Provisions

• Gram sabha: Article 243A mandates the setting up of a Gram sabha that will consist of all the registered voters residing in the demarcated territory. This body will then have the power to pass laws as devolved to them. • Constitution of panchayats: Article 243B states that all rural areas will have three-tiered Panchayati Raj systems, except in those areas that have a population below 2 million. • Elections: According to Article 243C and E, there would be direct elections at the panchayat level while the chairperson of the panchayat would be indirectly elected amongst the directly elected officials. These elections would be conducted every five years unless dissolved due to a special scenario wherein fresh elections would be conducted within a span of six months and they will continue till the end of the early five-year period. • Reservations of seats (Article 243D): Thisarticle mandates that • Not less than one-third of the total number of seats will be reserved for the SCs and STs in every panchayat. • Amongst the one-third of the seats reserved, there shall be one-third of seats for women belonging to the SCs or, as the case may be, STs. • Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the SCs and STs) of the total seats will be reserved for women to be filled by direct election in every panchayat. • These seats shall be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a panchayat. • The act also provides for the reservation of one-third of the total number of offices of chairpersons in the panchayats at all levels for women, including women from SCs and STs. • Election commission (Article 243K): It states that an independent state election commission would be set up and have the power supervise and manage elections for local bodies. This commission will function like the Election Commission of India that manages state assembly and parliamentary elections. • The State Finance Commission (Article 243I): The State Finance Commission would be established every five years to review the financial position of local bodies and recommend the principles that should govern the allocation of funds and taxation authority to local bodies.

Local Self-Government  395 • District planning committees (Article 243ZD): It mandates the constitution of district planning committees to consolidate the plans prepared by both rural and urban local bodies. This would help in coordinating and facilitating the available resources in a planned manner. This is an essential prerequisite for each tier of the Panchayati Raj system to prepare plans for its areas, and these will be merged with plans of municipalities by the district planning committees. It needs to be underlined that the Constitution does not provide for district planning committees to prepare district plans on their own, but to ‘consolidate’ local area plans drawn up at lower tiers in both rural and urban areas of each district (a different provision of the Constitution covers district planning for metropolitan areas). • Specific provisions for Tribal and Scheduled Areas: Article 243M provides that the 73rd Amendment Act provisions shall apply to states of Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram or hill areas of Manipur may be extended to Scheduled Areas only by Act of the Parliament. • The Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996: Enactment of ‘the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996,’ was a step taken by the Government of India to provide for the extension of the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution relating to panchayats to the Fifth Schedule Areas with certain modifications as provided under Article 243M(4)(b) of the Constitution. This legislation has not only extended the development, planning and audit functions to the Gram sabhas in the Fifth Schedule Areas but has also endowed them with the management and control of natural resources and adjudication of justice in accordance with traditions and customs. The 74th Amendment Act: Key Provisions

• Constitution of municipalities (Article 243Q): This article states that different types of urban local bodies would be set up in different areas depending on the population of the area. These are as follows: (a) a nagar panchayat (by whatever name called) that is meant for areas undergoing transition from rural to urban, (b) a municipal council for a smaller urban area and (c) a municipal corporation for urban areas having a large population based on the provisions of this act. • Composition of municipalities (Article 243R): All seats in a municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the municipal areas. Each municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies, to be known as wards. The legislature of a state may, by law, provide for the representation in a municipality of (a) persons having special knowledge or experience in municipal administration, (b) the members of the House of the People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the state representing constituencies which comprise

396  Smita Agarwal wholly or partly the municipal area and (c) the members of the Council of State and the members of the Legislative Council of the state registered as electors within the municipal area. • Constitution and composition of wards committees (Article 243S): There shall be constituted wards committees consisting of one or more wards within the territorial area of a municipality having a population of 3 lakh or more. The territorial area of the ward and the manner in which the seats will be filled will be decided as per the provisions laid down by the state legislatures. • Reservation of seats (Article 243T): Seats shall be reserved for the SCs and STs in every municipality, and the number of seats so reserved shall be in proportion to their population in the area of the municipality. This provision also grants a minimum of one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the SCs and STs) of the total seats for women to be filled by direct election in different constituencies of municipalities on a rotation basis. The act also provides for the reservation of one-third of the total number of offices of chairpersons in the municipalities at all levels for women, including women from SCs and STs. • Duration of municipalities (Article 243U): Every municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting. • Powers, authority and responsibilities of municipalities (Article 243W): Subject to the provisions of the constitution, the legislature of a state may, by law,  endow the municipalities they are supposed to govern as institutions of self-government. They are supposed to perform the following functions: • They are expected to prepare plans for economic development. • They can implement schemes entrusted to them as per the matters listed in Twelfth Schedule. • They can create committees to carry out the responsibilities conferred upon them, including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth schedule. • Power to impose taxes by and funds of the municipalities (Article 243X): The legislature of a state may, by  law, authorize or assign powers to municipalities to levy and collect appropriate taxes. It can also provide for grants-in-aid to municipalities to carry out the functions. • Finance commission (Article 243Y): The finance commission constituted under Article 243 shall also review the financial position of the municipalities and make recommendations to the governor. The governor shall cause every recommendation made by the commission under this article together with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken thereon to be laid before the legislature of the state.

Local Self-Government  397 • Committee for metropolitan planning (Article 243ZE): Every metropolitan area shall have a metropolitan planning committee to prepare a draft development plan for the complete area under its jurisdiction. • Every metropolitan planning committee shall, in preparing the draft development plan: Consult the municipalities and panchayats in the metropolitan area and recommend the nature of investment required in the area. While making these recommendations it can consult organizations recommended by the governor and forward it to the government of the state concerned. Issues in the Working of Local Governance in India Local governance in India has not followed a uniform pattern across the country; some states have tried to institutionalize decentralization while others have shown reluctance. Before 1993, India had only two levels of government. This amendment not only created local self-government but also left major decisions on the transferring of powers, functionaries and finances to state legislatures. With zeal to study the new era in Indian politics, various scholars carried out studies after the adoption of these provisions in the country in various states. A close reading of these studies reveals the following problems with regard to the working of local governance. Operational Issues for Local Governance

This issue is the result of ambiguity arising due to the lack of a clear demarcation of functions between the three tiers of local governance. As a result, there is a lack of co-ordination and a paucity of funds. With development as the main aim for local government, it has curtailed the autonomy of these institutions as it has virtually converted them into governmental agencies. This problem gets all the more aggravated as the functions assigned to the panchayat and the panchayat samiti overlap, creating confusion and leading to passing responsibilities to each other without any of them performing. The higher authority tries to overpower the lower, as the three tiers do not operate as functional authorities. These problems are further accentuated as state governments have transferred limited powers to them. A Problem With the Transfer of Power to the Local Bodies

Despite the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules of the Indian Constitution enumerating powers to the local bodies, their transfer of power has been limited by the state government. This is due to the provision of the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts that left it to the state legislatures to decide on the manner in which transfer of powers would take place at the lower level. Reports1 have shown that there is reluctance on the part of the state legislature to

398  Smita Agarwal make local bodies autonomous. A study carried out by the Planning Commission2 showed a terrible state of affairs with regard to all state governments’ transferring power to local bodies. As a result, local bodies have by and large become mere implementing agencies for the state and central governments’ schemes. The Existence of Parallel Institutions to Local Bodies

Researchers have found out that in order to stall local bodies as institutions of self-government, state governments have created parallel institutions and transferred powers that should have been delegated to local bodies. This has resulted in greater control by the state. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, the Janmabhoomi Programme that was started was a clear case for surpassing local bodies. In the case of urban local bodies, this problem is more rampant where parallel bodies promoted by state authorities to protect their political interests have taken over most of the areas of urban management. At the same time, the existence of traditional institutions at this level further jeopardizes their agenda for bringing about social transformation. These institutions are under the control of village elites who exercise political clout in larger state politics and follow their own laws of justice. For example, in Maharashtra, there are ‘Gavki’, customary village councils in Karnataka and Khap panchayats in Haryana who function in parallel to the village panchayats. They are controlled by the socially dominant caste and work like kangaroo courts, where judgments are based on inequality and the exclusion of the lower caste. The biggest thing is that they are very effective in areas where women or Dalits are in power. These institutions uphold traditional caste system values and prohibit the intermingling of various castes. Even the politicians protect these institutions as being ‘social’ and see it as a disaster for the law and order situation of the area if they were abolished (Mathur, 2013, pp. 126–130). Bureaucratic Indifference Towards Panchayats: A Lack of Accountability and Functionaries

Three central tenants of decentralization are the transfer of funds, functions and functionaries. Research and studies have shown that in order to subvert the working of panchayats, the state governments have failed to transfer adequate functionaries that could assist the panchayats in carrying out their functions. Filed work experiences show that all the panchayats are understaffed because of how it reduces the functional autonomy of local bodies. At the same time, states, in order to restrain the functioning of local bodies, keep key administrative and technical positions with government officials. Second, since lack of demarcation of functions within different tiers of the local bodies has led to a lack of proper cooperation and co-ordination between the people and the officials such as block development officers and district

Local Self-Government  399 officers. Again, the officers fail to discharge their developmental duties more efficiently and sincerely. This is because most of the time, officers who are panchayat functionaries are on deputation from the state level. They have long enjoyed autonomy and thus refuse to be accountable to elected representatives. As a result, they create hindrances by creating parallel structures of power with panchayat institutions or by showing a lack of co-ordination with them. This situation is further aggravated when state legislatures interfere in the workings of local governance by ordering the annual transfer of officials affected by the state. Financial Inadequacy for Local Bodies

The availability of independent funds is a prerequisite for the functioning of local bodies as mediums of decentralized bodies. For this to happen, local governments could either raise their own revenue by having independent taxation powers or receive inter-governmental transfers. The 73rd Amendment recognized both forms of public finance but did not recognize the fixed source of revenues. The power of local bodies to tax was dependent on the state legislature’s mandates. While inter-governmental transfers were dependent on the directives of the State Finance Commission, which could be set up only when state legislatures wanted. Apart from these provisions, Article 280 (3)(bb) of the Constitution also gave the Union Finance Commission to make recommendations to the President on the measures needed to augment the consolidated fund of a State to supplement the resources of the panchayats in the State. This would be based on recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State. As a usual practice, it was seen that most of the state legislatures had been reluctant to do either of them. As a result, local bodies are so dependent on the state’s finances that they cannot even hire their own independent staff, let alone take up big development projects. Third, most of the funds that could have been allocated to panchayats have been transferred to parallel institutions. For example, development activity is a key premise for local governance and within it its foremost functions are self-employment and economic development, but institutions like the Housing Development Finance Corporation, both at the central and state levels, invariably deal with subjects which have now been assigned to the PRIs. Fourth, whatever minimal amounts of funds that are transferred to local bodies are tagged as funds which take away the autonomy to spend as per their own particular needs. Whatever gets transferred for any one activity is also not complete. For example, if funds are transferred to local bodies to build a tank, this construction work would require a lot of co-ordination as local bodies do not have all the activities and funds assigned to them to do so. As a result,

400  Smita Agarwal the per capita total expenditure of panchayats remains abysmally low in all states, leaving few of them. Local Bodies: An Extended Arm for Political Parties

It is becoming clear that local bodies are increasingly being viewed as organizational arms of political parties ruling the centre or state. As long as the local bodies are serving the interests of governments at the state level, they enjoy functioning; else, there is a lack of commitment to make these bodies attain self-governance. Social Exclusion and Inclusion of Disadvantaged Group in Local Bodies

One of the important benchmarks of the 73rd and 74th Amendments was the compulsory representation of socially disadvantaged groups such as women, SCs and STs. These amendments brought about a revolution as it boosted India’s image when all over the country women came to occupy one third of the seats in these institutions, which took the tally to 1.4 million elected women representatives. However, various research conducted after the implementation of reservation for women found that women acted as proxy candidates (Buch, 2005) for men in their family. They were rubber stamps where actual decisions were taken by the men of their family. They lacked knowledge and experience in carrying out the functions of panchayats. In some cases, when women wanted to exert their influences, social constraints restricted them. This was further aggravated due to lack of experience and training, and in most cases, male ego in the form of scorn, abuse and so on stopped them. This got further compounded in the case of women belonging to lower castes. At the same time, research shows that women as leaders in these local bodies have made other women come forward and address their grievances, especially pertaining to domestic violence. Further, women as leaders have brought forward issues pertaining to women. For example, according to research by R. Chattopadhyay and E. Duflo (2001), female sarpanches/pradhans significantly make greater investments in drinking water, which is seen as a practical gender interest for women. They also show that SC sarpanches/pradhans are more likely to invest in public goods in SC hamlets, thereby making them empowered as segregation of households based on caste is a normal phenomenon in the villages of India. These changes tend to challenge social constraints enforced through caste and gender, thereby affecting the economic status of these groups in the larger scenario. The working of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act has shown that it has been successful in empowering the disadvantaged sections of society, comprising of lower caste and women. In order to stall this process, and under the influence of elites, state governments have devised new obstructive laws that are becoming detrimental to their progress. For example, the Rajasthan government has prescribed a minimum qualification of Class VIII

Local Self-Government  401 for the general constituency, while for the SC constituency, it is Class V. Official records show that women and SCs in India are denied opportunities to study because of the social structure of society. In this case, obviously, these regressive laws will further hinder them from coming forward. Similarly, the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 2015, mandates having basic educational qualifications and a toilet to be eligible to contest elections in panchayats. If educational qualifications are not the criteria for people contesting Parliament or state legislature elections, then why shouldthese qualifications come at the local level? Data shows that these kinds of legislation will certainly hinder disadvantaged sections especially women and Dalits, who are restrained from pursuing education due to socio-economic backwardness and gender discrimination (Rajagopal, 2015). Another discriminatory state law that barred women from standing for election was the two-child norm, where women could lose their seats if they had more than two children. The question that needs to be asked is: Do females have the right to decide how many children they should have? Why such regressive laws here? In the case of SCs and STs, their exclusion can still be seen. A recent study by Mathew and Baviskar (2009) maps out various forms of discrimination practised against members/leaders of panchayats, such as not allowing panchayat leaders to sit on the chair (Sainath) or making them proxies of upper caste or physical violence against those leaders who try to be assertive is still in practice. Social exclusion can also range from the passing of a no-confidence motion against assertive leaders or not allowing them to carry out their ­functions so that they appear incapable, which is still the norm. Undemocratic Composition of Local Bodies Due to Delay in Elections

In many cases, state governments shows reluctance in setting up election commission that can aid the elections at this level. As a result, there are long delays in holding elections. At the same time, the indirect election of most of the members to panchayat samiti and Zila Parishads only increases the possibility of corruption and bribery. Strengthening Local Bodies for Deepening Democracy By enacting the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts, India has shown its commitment towards deepening democracy. However, after the implementation of these Acts, a few hurdles came to the forefront. These could be resolved by learning from practices followed by different states within the country. Some of these suggestions are discussed as follows. Greater Devolution of Functions and Functionaries

The 73rd Amendment Act laid down the broad structure; it was left to the states to strengthen the pace of decentralization. Various research conducted

402  Smita Agarwal after 10 years of the implementation of this act points out to the fact that states have not been honest in carrying out the process of transferring functions to these institutions. This they have done by either creating parallel institutions or delaying transfers. This problem could be resolved if states show their commitment to transferring these functions. Along with the transfer of functions, a dedicated staff for the local government would enhance the capacity of these bodies. It is usually seen that staff associated with these bodies are mostly on deputation who do not take these bodies seriously. Also, due to a lack of experience of working closely with elected representatives, they see them in a bad light. As a result, they do not like taking orders from them and try to stall their work. A committed staff for local governance with training can overcome the lack of intersectoral co-ordination that was found in most of the studies. This can help make panchayats an epicentre for development work at the centre. As this body could help in the convergence of the efforts of various line departments on one hand and, on the other hand, voice the public’s interest, which would be both beneficiaries and participants of these plans. Integration of National Plans With Local Body Plans

States could activate direct democracy and channelize the demands of the people by making Gram sabhas the node of planning. This could be a bottomup approach where plans passed by Gram sabha are ultimately aggregated by state and then central plans. This could reverse the top – down model followed by the national plans. The national plans have several objectives which can be achieved only in the long run, whereas district plans reflect the immediate needs of the people, which may sometimes overlook the long-term needs. There is already provision for setting up of both a district planning body and a metropolitan planning body. If these bodies could be integrated with state plans and then further integrated with national plans, then it could reflect the immediate needs of people and make these bodies channels of people’s voices. Presently, there is a top – down model reflected in the Five-Year Plans announced by the central government. A healthy institutional interaction between the different tiers of governance would lead to a more judicious use of the limited resources available. Greater Fiscal Autonomy

One of the biggest hurdles to the creation of a decentralized structure of governance in India has been the lack of fiscal autonomy for the local bodies. Various studies have pointed to the existence of parental agencies to bypass the funds or too much dependence on the centre and state for funds or lack of independent taxation power as some of the reasons for their dependence. In order to bridge this gap, the following could be done. First, some states have given the power to panchayats to collect taxes on public work in agricultural

Local Self-Government  403 and residential area. If this is extended nationwide, it could enhance their performance. Second, the setting up of a state finance commission that could draw out the division of resources clearly could reduce their dependence on the centre and state to argue its resources. Third, demolishing parental agencies that act as the biggest barrier in local bodies’ quest for finances could solve the argument of limited resources. Fourth, integration of Member of the Legislative Assembly and Members of Parliament Local Area Development funds with local bodies could boost their resource spending ability independently. Greater Accountability for Elected Representatives

With the passage of time, it has been seen that the delaying of elections to these local bodies is not a rare phenomenon any more. Local bodies need to be made accountable. This could be done by way of internal audits. This is dependent a lot on the periodic meetings of Gram sabhas, as these Sabhas could be used to discuss what people want and what elected representatives are doing. By way of example, some kind of voluntary committee consisting of active citizens could be constituted that could meet at fixed intervals and inspect the work done by Gram sabhas. Public display of expenditures and open access to official documents could enhance the transparency of these institutions. All activities carried out by panchayats have to be approved by Gram sabha. This could be another tool to increase the accountability of these bodies. Periodic Training of Elected Representatives

Decentralization has tried to bridge the divide between elected representatives and the people. However, various studies have shown that this move has also given an opportunity for a novice to enter the domain and lead the people. However, sometimes social constraints seen through illiteracy and other times a lack of experience lead them into a web of dependency. As a result, they are seen as non-performers. This is because field work experiences show that elected representatives at this level have to cater to demands that go beyond prescribed administrative functions for them. Also, at the same time, the complicated integration of administrative functions makes their dependency either on officials or on experienced leaders greater. This could be minimized if periodic training could be given to them that could acquaint them with the workings of it. Political Commitment to Decentralization

The 73rd and 74th Amendments provided an outline for a decentralized institution, filling up this outline was left it to the states. As a result, various studies have shown that in India, different states depict different models of

404  Smita Agarwal decentralization. This difference is largely the result of state political leaders’ enhancing the capacity of these bodies. Also, it was seen that without a strong political will, an autonomous local authority, even if there is one, will always be at loggerheads with higher authorities who will take no time to weaken them. Autonomous local bodies work only when the official staff that is there with them believes that for democracy to be actualized, we need to work with the people rather than for them. This would require a reorientation of both the bureaucrats and senior politicians at the central and provincial levels away from a system which is based on centralist control and populist tendencies. This is clearly seen when state legislators order large-scale transfers of staff associated with local bodies, thereby diminishing administrative accountability. A  series of changes would therefore be required in the administrative arrangements for programme planning and implementation in respect of the schemes and programmes transferred to the PRIs for implementation. Post-2014 Progress Recent studies show that after the 73rd Amendment Act, elections to these institutions have taken place regularly. Bihar in 2006 passed an amendment to the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act that has increased the reservation of women in these institutions to 50 per cent. Following this, many states have adopted and amended their respective constitutions. After reservation of seats were given to women in panchayats, various studies mapped that women were acting as proxy candidates and their household male members were taking decisions; in 2015 an article published in The Hindu newspaper stated that this perception cannot be linked only to sex of the representative; rather, it should be situated in the intersectional perspective of access to public sphere, the caste to which she belongs, the expectations of the voters and distance of the panchayat from the block- and Zila-level headquarters. These factors if collide in a favourable situation for women, they will become capable leaders. The situation has also involved with training sessions being imparted to elected women representatives, who are now more confident in carrying out this role. Despite the constitutional mandate provided for representing women, SCs and STs in the panchayats, research shows that in many panchayats there is exclusion which is faced by this section, while in certain other states they have become included and are participating actively (Baviskar & Mathew, 2009). One ray of hope that has been fulfilled is that, as per the Ministry of Panchayati Raj annual report, most states have effectively devolved 29 subjects of the Eleventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution to the PRIs; however, the financial autonomy has been slow. As a result, these institutions are still dependent on finances from the centre and the states.

Local Self-Government  405 Summing Up The step taken by the government of India to give constitutional status to PRI is indeed a revolutionary one. It has helped to reduce the distance between the representative sand represented. It has also led to a deepening of participation by providing reservations to women, SCs and STs. The need of the hour in order to make these institutions more robust requires greater devolution of financial autonomy so that these organizations are not dependent on grants in aid from the centre and state and can act effectively to bring governance closer to the people. Notes 1 www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/decentralisation_india_challenges_oppor tunities.pdf. 2 http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp11/wg11_demo.pdf.

Bibliography Alok, V. N. (2014). Measuring devolution to panchayats in India: A  comparison across states empirical assessment – 2013–14. Sponsored by Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India. Indian Institute of Public Administration. www.iipapu ducherry.in/assets/pdf/Devolution_Index_Report_2013-14.pdf Baviskar, B. S., & Mathew, G. (Eds.). (2009). Inclusion and exclusion in local governance: Field studies from rural India. Sage Publications. Brahmananda, T. (2018). Review of 73rd amendment act: Issues and challenges. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 64(1), 103–121. Buch, N. (2005). Women and panchayats: Opportunities, challenges and support. In L. C. Jain (Ed.), Decentralization and local governance. Orient Longman. Chattopadhyay, R.,  & Duflo, E. (2001). Women’s leadership and policy decisions: Evidence from a nationwide randomized experiment in India. Institute for Economic Development. Dsouza, P. R. (2002). Decentralization and local government. In Z. Hasan, E. Sridharan, & R. Sudarshan (Eds.), India’s living constitution: Ideas practices and controversies. Permanent Black. Gandhi, M. K. (1942, July 26). My idea of village panchayat. Harijan. Jayal, N. G., Prakash, A., &Sharma, P. (Eds.). (2006). Local governance in India: Decentralization and beyond. Oxford University Press. John, M. E. (2007). Women in power? Gender, caste and politics of local urban governance. Economic  & Political Weekly, 42(39). www.epw.in/journal/2007/39/ special-articles/women-power.html Kumar, G. (2006). Local democracy in India: Interpreting decentralization. Sage Publications. Lele, M. K. (2001). Local government: Conflicts of interests and issues of legitimisation. Economic & Political Weekly, 36(51), 4702–4704. Manor, J. (1999). Political economy of democratic decentralization. World Bank.

406  Smita Agarwal Mathew, G. (2002). Panchayati Raj in India: An overview. In G. Mathew & Institute of Social Science (Eds.), Status of Panchayati Raj in the states and union territories of India 2000. Concept Publishing Company. Mathew, G., & Baviskar, B. S. (2009). Inclusion and exclusion in local governance: Field studies from rural India. Sage. Mathur, K. (2013). Panchayati Raj, Oxford India short introductions. Oxford University Press. Singh, S. (2016). The local in governance: Politics, decentralization, and environment. Oxford University Press. Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2000). Power to the people? The politics and progress of decentralization. Konark Publishers. Reports Chaudhuri, U.,  & Sud, M. (2015). Women as proxies in politics: Decision making and service delivery in Panchayati Raj. www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/ current-issues/article7761306.ece The Hindu. (2014, March 11). ZPTC MPTS elections on April 6. The Hindu. www. thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh//article60385657.ece The Indian Express. (2012, October 8). Khaps say marry them young, Cong sees conspiracy. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/ khaps-says-marry-them-young-cong-sees-conspiracy-against-government/ Planning Commission. (2006). Report on the working group on democratic decentralisation  & PRIs. https://niti.gov.in/planningcommission.gov.in/docs/aboutus/ committee/wrkgrp11/wg11_demo.pdf Rajagopal, K. (2015, December 10). Supreme court upholds Haryana panchayat law. The Hindu. www.thehindu.com/news/national/Haryana-law-on-minimum-qualifi cation-for-panchayat-polls-valid-says-Supreme-Court/article60274721.ece United Nations Development Programme. (2012). Decentralization in India: Issues and challenges (Discussion Paper). www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/decen tralization _india_challenges_opportunities.pdf

Section IV

Political Processes III Site of Concerns and Challenges to Indian Democracy

19 The Idea of Minority An Indian Story Hilal Ahmed

Introduction The term ‘minority’ is an important political concept in the Indian context. However, it is always seen in relation to an imaginary idea of a ‘majority’ – as if ‘majority’ is a self-evident manifestation of the essence of India, while minority is something that is outside of it. Interestingly, the Constitution of India does not rely on this commonsensical understanding. It evokes two fundamental principles to define minority: the impermanency of minority (and for that matter majority) and the multiplicity of minorities. The first principle very categorically stresses the fact that minority is a numerical expression. So any particular social group cannot be termed as an absolute and fixed minority. The second constitutional principle goes one step further. It reminds us that it is necessary to identify the multiplicity of identity markers, so that we think of the idea of a minority in a plural sense. In this sense, the region, language and culture also become significant indicators to categorize minorities. Undefined ‘Minority’ and Secular Institutions The assertion that ‘Indian communities constitute a specific form of nationality’ continued to function as a powerful political impulse, especially after the creation of Pakistan. For Nehru, unity in diversity was the way out; for Gandhi, appreciating the diversity was the solution; for Ambedkar, the annihilation of societal foundationalism was the response; and for the Communist Party of India (CPI), revolutionary nationalization of diversity was the ultimate answer. These futuristic resolves stemmed from various politicalideological positions. To trace the expressions of these perspectives, we shall look at the first watershed moment of independent India, the election of the Constituent Assembly (henceforth, CA), where a group of political leaders debated for nearly three years on the provisions of a constitution that was to govern the independent state.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-24

410  Hilal Ahmed The following three broad arguments relevant to our discussion can be drawn from these debates: • Diversity is a positive virtue primarily because it contributes to the unity and integrity of the country; hence, the institutions created for dealing with diversity must recognize unity as a principle. • There are various kinds of differences that make India a diverse country; hence, there is a need to classify these forms of diversity and evolve an institutional set-up to manage them. • Sociological diversity of India symbolizes the ‘live together’ attitude of Indian communities. This tendency is very crucial for national building and state formation. Hence, institutions must facilitate this process. The Republic of India was constitutionally defined as a unit that was to be made up of legally recognized territorial and cultural fragments. In order to uphold unity as a fundamental principle for institutional make-up, the Constitution proposes two kinds of mechanisms: (a) the institutions must be created on an overtly secular basis so as to maintain an imaginary dividing line between religion and public institutions; and (b) certain specific institutions must be created to address diverse group interests. It is hoped that these institutions will help in dissolving centrifugal tendencies and facilitate the participation of communities and groups in the nation-­ building project. The creation of these two kinds of institutions was actually an outcome of interesting discussions in the CA on the very idea of minority. The idea of minority in colonial India, as it is well known, was not conceptualized in the standard British political theory tradition. Minority – Majority in ­colonial India was not entirely related to the numerical strength of a group in a legislative body. There were other considerations as well. Minority meant religious groups, depressed classes and tribal communities. The problems associated with the notion of minority were recognized in the CA, especially after the formation of Pakistan. A resolution was moved in the CA by T. T. Krishnamachari on 16 November 1949, which read: ‘That in Part XVI of the Constitution, for the word minorities wherever it occurs, the words “certain classes” be substituted’. This suggestion was incorporated in the final draft of the Constitution in a different form. The term ‘minority’ was not elaborated or defined, yet it was used as an unspecified expression with regard to the distinctiveness of a group. On the other hand, the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Scheduled Tribes (STs) as administrative categories were introduced as certain classes. Two key ideas emerged from this distinction: social justice for some groups and cultural distinctiveness for other groups.1 This legal-constitutional scheme transformed terms such as minority, SCs and STs into secular administrative categories to respond to various forms of

The Idea of Minority  411 sociological and cultural diversities. For instance, if a social group is culturally/ religiously/linguistically distinct and numerically inferior, it might be recognized as a minority; if a social group had experienced caste discrimination and/or untouchability in the past, it would be included in the ST list; and the indigenous communities or tribes are to be officially recognized as STs. Since minorities, SCs and STs (and later the Other Backward Classes [OBC]) are conceived as open secular administrative templates, no social group, technically speaking, would become a permanent constituent of these official secular classifications. This relative openness of legal-constitutional categories contributes to the revival, production and reproduction of competing political discourses in different contexts. This revised constitutional interpretation also outlines two features of minority groups: the distinctiveness of minority group in relation to majority culture (Articles 29–30) and the diversity of minorities, which means recognition of various religious as well as linguistic communities as minorities (Articles 25, 26 and 350). The first feature very categorically stresses upon the fact that minority is a numerical expression. So any particular social group cannot be attributed to an absolute and fixed minority. For instance, Sikhs in India are a religious minority but a majority in the state of Punjab. This sociological and spatial dimension makes minority a highly fluid category. The second feature suggests that all communities and individuals carry a multiplicity of identity markers. So this situation makes the notion of minority a plural concept. In this sense, the region, language and culture also become significant indicators and aspects to be taken into account to categorize minorities. These features of the newly created official category called minority did not correspond to the debate on political representation in the 1950s. The demand to provide reservation to religious minorities in the Parliament (and State Assemblies) and in jobs was rejected by the CA. Similarly, the proposal to have proportional representation for minorities was also not accepted. The final draft of the Constitution provided reservation only for the SC and ST groups, while minorities were given safeguards to protect distinctiveness – cultural, religious and educational.

Debate on Political Representation of Minorities During the period of Constitution making, the political representation of minorities emerged as a contested issue. Jayaprakash Narayan wrote a letter to Nehru describing the possible problems of the proposed Indian electoral system based on a single-member constituency. Narayan was particularly concerned about the ‘exclusion of minorities’. He argued that opposition parties had favoured a three-member

412  Hilal Ahmed constituency with the cumulative vote as the first choice and a singlemember constituency as the second (Palat, 2019, p. 240). However, Nehru did not accept this proposal. He did not merely defend the single-member constituency as the most effective mode for ensuring democratic participation of people as voters but also brought in the question of political education. Rejecting the proportional representation system, he said: I could understand a complete system of proportional representation by a single transferable vote and plural constituencies. That is physically impossible as it is very intricate. .  .  . If we introduced proportional representation that would make it absolutely impossible, both from organizational point of view, and that of the voter who will not understand its intricacies. (Palat, 2019, p. 240) There was another, rather informal, proposal to ensure the representation of minorities in legislative bodies. It was suggested by the Uttar Pradesh (UP) government that 143 two-member constituencies must be created for the State Legislative Assembly consisting of 430 seats. While each of 90 such constituencies were to have a seat reserved for the SCs, the other 53 constituencies were unreserved to facilitate the return of some Muslims, if possible (Palat, 2019, p. 240). Nehru opposed this move. He argued: ‘I am entirely opposed to any two-member constituency, except where a seat is reserved for the Scheduled Caste or Tribe. I think this will be contrary to the Cabinet decision and, in any event, undesirable. The UP government should be so informed’ (Palat, 2019, p. 240). Nehru’s reluctance to recognize minority representation is important here. He seems to make a clear distinction between the idea of minority representation during the British Raj where minority was a fixed sociological category and the post-colonial constitutional arrangement that conceives minority as a fluid, impermanent category. Thus, in this framework, the citizens belonging to religious minorities are to be treated as rights-bearing members of the state and, at the same time, the state is committed to protect the religious distinctiveness of these citizens when they assert their religious identities of being Muslims, Christians or Sikhs.

An important question arises here: If the rights of minorities are primarily concerned with the protection of cultural/religious distinctiveness, what are the possible ways by which the socio-economic and educational backwardness of members of officially recognized minorities groups could be addressed? This question is important because the Constitution makes

The Idea of Minority  413 provisions to identify the backwardness of social groups and encourages the state to design appropriate policies to tackle the same. While the Nehru government of the 1950s also showed a great interest in the issue of socioeconomic backwardness, the actual institutional response was at variance with this interest. The report of the First Backward Classes Commission, 1955, is a revealing example of this point. The commission, popularly known as the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, intended to identify the backwardness of the non-SC and ST communities. The Commission’s response to Muslim backwardness, especially in relation to caste-based social stratification among Muslims, is very interesting. The report identified the internal divisions among Muslims but does not give adequate attention to crucial sociological differences in the wider context of affirmative action. It lists the relative marginalization of those who are socially/culturally treated as inferior in a somehow mechanical manner, simply abiding by the Nehruvian policy of non-interference in the affairs of minorities (Government of India, 1951, p. 27). The Presidential Order, 1950 (that has been amended twice), is another relevant example, which actually restricts the entry of Muslim and Christian castes into the SC list. The Order says: ‘the castes, races or tribes or parts of, or groups within, castes or tribes . . . shall, in relation to the States to which those Parts respectively related, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes’. However, this general definition of the SCs is further clarified. The next paragraph of the Order notes: ‘no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste’ (emphasis added, Government of India, 2007b, p. 139). Here, it is clear that in order to avail of the benefit of reservation, the members of the identified SCs would have to stay within the Hindu fold.2 The socially backward Muslims and Christians are not entitled to reservation.3 In other words, conversion to Christianity and Islam by the weaker sections of the Hindus is officially identified as a serious challenge to the very nature of affirmative action policies. National Integration and/or Minority Distinctiveness The Nehru government’s bold step to amend the Hindu family law was a radical move in the mid-1950s. The government enacted the Hindu Code Bill but no such legislative initiatives were proposed to reform the Muslim Personal Law.4 Nehru was severely criticized for encouraging a new form of Muslim appeasement.

Minority and Majority Communalism In the open session of the All India Congress Committee on 11 May 1958, Nehru responded to these criticisms.

414  Hilal Ahmed He said: The communalism of the majority is far more dangerous than the communalism of minority because it wears the garb of nationalism. We have thus communalism ingrained in us and it comes out quite quickly at the slightest provocation and even decent people begin to behave like barbarians when this communalism is aroused in them. (Noorani, 2003, p. 316) This distinction between minority and majority communalism is important. It underlines Nehru’s assertion that the distinctiveness of a minority is a constitutional commitment; hence, institutions should be able to deal with the anxieties and aspirations of minorities, which might take a communal overtone. At the same time, Nehru also gave another very important explanation. He sought to clarify the distinction between constitutional adherence to the unity and integrity of the Indian Republic and the notion of Indianization – an idea that had been propagated by Hindu nationalists, mainly by the Jana Sangh in the 1950s. This clarification had certain institutional manifestations as well. The Nehru government was keen to establish certain new forms of institutions to implement what was rhetorically known as ‘unity in diversity’.

By the early 1960s, the idea to have a specific institution to deal with the question of national integration emerged as a political necessity. The creation of National Integration Council (NIC) in 1961 was an obvious outcome. The official and stated objectives for which the NIC was constituted were not entirely related to the problems and anxieties of the religious minorities. The official statement of the National Integration Conference, 1961, defines national integration as: ‘National integration is a psychological and educational process involving the development of a feeling of unity, solidarity and cohesion in the hearts of the people, a sense of common citizenship and a feeling of loyalty to the nation’. Yet the ‘grievances of minority’ were given a priority and it was suggested that the NIC ‘should give early consideration to the setting up of machinery for the examination and redressal of grievances of minorities’. It is important to note here that the proceedings of National Integration Conference, 1961, as well as agenda items discussed by the NIC focused primarily on the problems of integration with regard to linguistic minorities. The issues of religious minorities were discussed under the heading of ‘communalism’ (The National Integration Conference, 1961).

The Idea of Minority  415 This kind of consultative institutional response by the state to deal with the relative marginalization of minorities also encouraged minority groups to set up similar kind of community institutions. The formation of the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat (AIMMM) – an umbrella organization that was set up by the Muslim Leaders’ Consultative Convention held on 8–9 August 1964 in Lucknow – was a significant development in this regard. The purpose of the AIMMM was to provide a platform to different Muslim groups and represent the collective Muslim concerns at the national level. Moreover, the notion of peaceful coexistence of different communities, especially the minorities, was also highlighted by the AIMMM in order to define the Muslim issues as secular national issues. However, despite this unequivocal stand, the AIMMM was seen as a Muslim separatist body in the early 1960s. In the later decades, the scope of the activities of the AIMMM as a Muslim pressure group expanded, especially in the 1980s. The formation of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in 1972 and the coalition of Muslim organizations on Babri Masjid, the Babri Masjid Movement Coordination Committee, in 1987, worked closely with the AIMMM and recognized it as a Muslim representative body (Ahmed, 2014). The organizations and institutions established by the Christian minority groups are also very relevant to elaborate this point. It is worth noting that the Church union movements led to the formation of two main bodies – the Church of South India (CSI, formed in 1947) and the Church of North India (CNI, formed in 1965). This process began in the mid-1940s when ‘selected delegates of the Catholic Church in India met in Madras to deliberate on some of the challenges they envisaged in the context of the future independence of India’ (Abreu, 2009). This led to the formation of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India (CBCI) in 1944.5 The organization finally shifted to New Delhi in 1962. Responding to the broad idea of national integration from the point of view of Christian minority, the CBCI made a conscious attempt at craving out an acceptable space for the religious and social affairs of the Christian communities within the constitutionally recognized secular framework. Two broad objectives were outlined by the CBCI in this regard: (a) to promote advocacy on national issues; make representation to government, liaising with the central government and ministries/departments of the centre; influence government policies for nation-building and development of peoples and (b) to ‘network with other Christian Churches . . . organizations . . ., associations of civil society and people of other religions and all people of good will to work for peace and harmony, for probity in public life, for promotion of human rights and Gospel values’.6 The invocation of the India-specific secularism to defend the rights of religious minorities by the AIMMM and the CBCI, thus, underlines an interesting legal-constitutional form of minority politics. Secularism is not referred to here as a division between religion and politics. Instead, the term secular

416  Hilal Ahmed is used by the minority pressure groups to emphasize the constitutional principles, which govern the discourse of minority rights. This strategic constitutional position allows them to criticize those legislative moves and executive decisions that go against the interests of minorities. At the same time, secular is also employed to highlight the political principle of unity in diversity. The minority organizations work hard for achieving political acceptability as legitimate stakeholders in the public sphere. By emphasizing unity in diversity, they raise group-specific concerns as national issues. Unlike the Muslim and Christian consultative minority organizations, which preferred to function as legitimate pressure groups in the 1960s, the Sikh response to national integration was more political. Two crucial developments need to be highlighted to understand the shaping of the Sikh minority discourse as a political phenomenon in the first two decades after Independence. First, the partition of India (which affected the demographic profile of the Sikh community in Punjab in a significant way). Second, the reorganization of the Indian states on a linguistic basis (which legitimized the demand for an independent Punjabi-speaking state). The partition of India, in an actual territorial sense, was the partition of Punjab and Bengal – the minority-dominant provinces of British India. The Sikhs, who were recognized as a minority for the purpose of separate political representation in British India, did not have that privilege after becoming a constitutional minority in the 1950s. On the contrary, the Partition affected the population profile of the Sikh community in Punjab in an unprecedented manner. The emigration of Muslims from the Indian side of Punjab and the massive influx of Sikh refugees from Pakistan led to the concentration of Sikh population in a few western districts of the Indian Punjab. This demographic shift had some wider implications. It encouraged the Sikh leaders, especially the Akalis, to argue for an exclusive Sikh majority province within the framework of Indian federalism. However, it was not an easy task. In post-Partition India, there was no scope for religion-based identity politics. Such moves were described as communalism. Recognizing the dominance of this political correctness of the 1960s, the Sikh leadership employed the distinctiveness of minority language as a tool to articulate political demands (Brass, 1974, pp. 183–185). Hence, the demand for a separate Punjabi-speaking province in actual terms was aimed at carving out a Sikh majority state.

States’ Reorganization Commission and Demand for a Punjabi Suba The overlapping between religion and politics was intimately linked to the process of reorganization of the Indian states in the 1950s.

The Idea of Minority  417 The States Reorganization Commission (SRC) that was set up in December 1953 is very relevant here. The SRC recognized the inherent problems with ‘one language, one state’ principle. The report of the SRC argued that such a principle ‘is neither justified on grounds of linguistic homogeneity, because there can be more than one State speaking the same language without offending the linguistic principle, nor practicable since different language groups .  .  . cannot always be consolidated to form distinct linguistic units’ (Government of India, 1955, p. 45). This is the reason why the SRC recommended that ‘it is neither possible nor desirable to reorganize States on the basis of a single test of either language or culture; a balanced approach, which takes all relevant factors into account, is necessary’ (Ibid, p. 254). When the States Reorganization Act, 1956, was enacted, language emerged as the determining criterion of territorial reshuffling of the country. As expected, the reorganization of states on linguistic distinctiveness could not solve the question of linguistic minorities – partly because the boundaries of the states could not align with the multilingual universe of the state population and partly because the issue of linguistic standardization continued to produce language elites, who transformed the question of linguistic difference into a political issue. The reorganization of states on linguistic basis in 1956 provided an institutional logic to the demand to have a Sikh-majority state in India. It is important to note that the Akali Dal submitted a detailed memorandum to the SRC for demanding a Punjabi-speaking state. Four broad arguments were outlined in this regard. First, the creation of Punjabi Suba would resolve language controversies and enable the imparting of education in the mother tongue. Second, the proposed state would be financially viable and empower the state government to use the natural resources in a judicious manner. Third, the creation of such a state would strengthen the defence of the north-western border. Fourth, the Punjabi Suba would ‘secure for the country a contented Sikh community’ (Ibid, p. 140). The sequence of these arguments is very interesting. The memorandum seems to follow the political correctness of the 1960s as well as the principles outlined by the SRC. The demand for a Punjabi state is posed strictly on linguistic basis. This is followed by an economic argument (that the proposed Punjab would ensure better planning and economic progress) and a political argument (the proposed state would help India to defend its borders). The religion comes at the last instance – primarily because this goes against the post-Partition political wisdom.

418  Hilal Ahmed The political apprehension that asserting Sikh distinctiveness without Punjabi language might weaken the case for Punjabi state cannot be entirely ruled out here. These arguments, nevertheless, could not impress the SRC. The Commission categorically argued: The case, for a Punjabi-speaking State falls firstly, because it lacks the general support of the people inhabiting the area, and secondly, because it will not eliminate any of the causes of friction from which the demand for a separate Punjabi-speaking State emanates. The proposed State will solve neither the language problem nor the communal problem and, far from removing internal -tension, which exists between communal and not linguistic and regional groups, it might further exacerbate the existing feelings. (Ibid, p. 146)

Though the SRC did not accept the demand for a separate Punjab state, the struggle for Punjab state intensified in the 1960s. The Sikh politics led by the Akalis, under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh, continued to demand a Punjabi-speaking state, evoking the principles of linguistic distinctiveness of Punjabi. The competitive electoral politics reshaped this discourse in an interesting manner. The post-Nehru Congress found it advantageous to redesign the boundaries of Punjab for maximizing political benefits (Dhillon, 1974, pp. 362–373). Finally, as per the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966, a new Hindi-speaking state, Haryana, was carved out, while the areas where nonPunjabi Pahari-speaking communities used to live were merged with the state of Himachal Pradesh. Although this move was criticized as a form of Sikh communalism by the Hindu minority elite of undivided Punjab, the evocation of language provided political – institutional acceptability to the new state. The spread of the minority organizations such as the AIMMM and the CBCI, on the one hand, and the creation of a Sikh majority state, on the other, underline an interesting trajectory of minority discourse. The minority elite overwhelmingly accepted the vocabulary of ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘distinctiveness of language’ to carve out a space for minority institutions. The thin dividing line between the assertion of distinctiveness (even in a purely democratic sense) and fear of separatism was always appreciated to respond to the official policy discourse. Although the state through institutions such as the NIC continued to adhere to the constitutional position on minority and did not propose to designate any religious or linguistic group as permanent minority, the idea that the minority could only be understood in religious terms got consolidated.

The Idea of Minority  419 The Politicization of Minorities and Hindu Nationalism Anti-Congressism emerged as a powerful political idiom in the late 1960s. This political metaphor was mainly evoked to call upon all the non-Congress parties to create a broad electoral coalition. Anti-Congressism, nevertheless, was also envisaged as a social alliance of minorities, OBCs, SCs and STs. These segments of Indian society were considered to be pro-Congress. The opposition parties led by the socialists wanted to reconfigure the social basis of Indian politics and it was inevitable for them, therefore, to propose an alternative political package for these groups. The rhetoric of anti-Congressism worked very well in the 1967 elections. The Congress lost nearly 60 seats in Lok Sabha (though it won 283 seats). It also suffered a major setback in the states. Non-Congress governments were established in Bihar, Kerala, Odisha, Madras, Punjab and West Bengal. This political defeat of the Congress was very symbolic. Although the Congress formed the government at the centre and Indira Gandhi eventually became the prime minister, the social basis of electoral politics began to reconfigure in favour of non-Congress parties. It was clearly reflected in the early years of the 1970s when veteran socialist leader J. P. Narayan began a nationwide anti-corruption movement. This led to the declaration of national Emergency in 1975 by the Congress government. In the backdrop of the JP movement, an assertive minority politics also began to take shape. The AIMPLB was established in 1972 to assert the legal distinctiveness of Shariat. Although the AIMPLB was simply a coalition of various Muslim sects representing different Islamic schools of jurisprudence, who had come together to protect the Shariat Application Act, 1937 (a colonial law which ensures that in civil matters, such as marriage, divorce, adoption and distribution of property, Muslim communities be governed by their religious laws), the creation of AIMPLB transformed the Muslim Personal Law into a political issue (Ahmed, 2018). Around the same time, the Imam of Jama Masjid of Delhi emerged as a key Muslim leader. He started issuing statements in favour of political parties, which were called ‘election fatwas’ by the media. This ‘fatwa politics’ was nurtured initially by the Congress and later by the non-Congress opposition parties (Ahmed, 2014). Around the same time, a new radical Akali politics began to take shape. The Akalis, who dominated the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and were at the forefront of the Punjabi Suba movement, continued to question the dominance of the centre. They evoked the minority rights discourse to represent themselves as custodians of the Punjabi language/Sikh religion. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 (later in 1978) was an outcome of this Akali anxiety. The working committee of the Akali Dal in October 1973 adopted the resolution with seven objectives, which aimed to establish the ‘pre-eminence of the Khalsa’ (Kumar, 2004). This radical Sikh and Muslim politics combined with anti-Congressism during and after the national Emergency period. In the 1977 elections, the

420  Hilal Ahmed Congress was defeated by the newly established Janata Party and the first non-Congress government at the centre was established. The Janata Party, which had evoked the persecution of minorities as one of the main political arguments against Indira Gandhi’s Emergency regime, established the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) in 1978.

National Commission for Minorities From the time of its formation in 1978 till May 1993, the NCM was a non-statutory entity. It is noteworthy that in 1992, the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) Act in 1992 was passed by the Parliament, which led to the establishment of the NCM in May 1993, which is now a statutory body. It is noteworthy that the Government of India notified five religious communities: Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Zoroastrians (Parsees) as minority communities. This list was amended in 2014 when Jains were also notified as a minority. To make sense of the political significance of the situation of NCM from 1978 to May 1993, one must have to understand the technical distinction between the statutory bodies and non-statutory bodies. A statutory body derives its powers from a law passed by the Parliament, while a non-statutory body comes into existence by executive order. The statuary bodies are also different from the institutions called constitutional bodies. The constitutional bodies derive their authority from the Constitution itself. In other words, constitutional bodies are formed by the Constitution and help the government to run properly. The NCM is not a constitutional body. The creation of the Minorities Commission should also be seen in relation to the commissions constituted for the SCs and STs. It is worth mentioning that the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and National Commission for Scheduled Tribes were not created as two distinct constitutional bodies. The SC/ST  Commission was initially established by the notification of the government in 1978. However, in the course of time, it evolved into a constitutional body. The Minorities Commission had a different trajectory. Despite a number of constitutional interventions, the Minorities Commission could not find a constitutional status. The attempt of giving NCM a statutory status was opposed by the BJP as an act of political appeasement of religious minorities, in general, and the Muslims, in particular. L. K. Advani’s speech in the Parliament in 1992 is a revealing example of this political anxiety. Opposing the National Commission for Minorities Bill, 1992, Advani said: This kind of Bill is addressed in name of the course to the Christians, to the Parsis, to the Sikhs, etc., but actually, it is addressed

The Idea of Minority  421 only to one section. . . . You are going to commit a similar kind of monumental and historical blunder by passing this Bill. (Mahmood, 2015, pp. 71–72) The NCM is working to protect the interests of the minorities. Some of its crucial works are as follows: evaluate the progress of the development of minorities under the union and states; monitor the working of the safeguard provided by the Constitution and in laws enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislatures; make recommendations for the effective implementation of safeguards for the protection of the interests of the minorities by the central government or state governments; look into specific complaints regarding deprivation of rights and safeguards of the minorities and take up such matters with the appropriate authorities; undertake studies against issues concerning minorities and suggest appropriate measures to the governments and so on. The NCM has many crucial powers, few of them are as follows: summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of India and examining them on oath; requesting the discovery and production of any document; receiving evidence on affidavit; requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and documents and so on.

The success of the Congress in the 1980 elections at the centre and the disintegration of the Janata Party in a span of three years reshaped the nature of minority politics in the 1980s. Around this time, the Sikh politics in Punjab found a new radical overtone. The politics of Sikh distinctiveness, which was clearly manifested in the Punjabi Suba movement of the 1960s, further intensified and eventually transformed into a new form of political separatism. It was asserted that the Sikhs as a distinct cultural-religious and political group constitute a nation. Since they formed a majority in the state of Punjab, the argument goes, they should have an independent Sikh nation state called Khalistan. To achieve this objective, a radical Sikh politics emerged and took a violent form. A number of terrorist events took place in the country, especially in North India.

Operation Blue Star To counter Sikh militancy in the state of Punjab, ‘Operation Blue Star’, a military operation to retake religious shrines, which the militants had occupied, was launched by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. The

422  Hilal Ahmed Indian Army stormed the holiest Sikh religious place of worship, the Golden Temple at Amritsar, to flush out the terrorists. In the process, they killed many militants. Although ‘Operation Blue Star’, as it was called, was successful in getting armed militants out from the Golden Temple, it had multifarious political outcomes. The anger in the Sikh community, at what was seen as a desecration of the Golden Temple, caused the Sikh bodyguards of the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to assassinate her on 31 October 1984. This resulted in massive communal riots, some would say a pogrom, across the country but mainly in Delhi where more than a thousand people, mainly Sikhs, were killed. The post-Indira election wave of sympathy, caused by the assassination, helped the Congress under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi to register an impressive victory in 1984. The Congress contested election on 491 seats and won 404 seats with a voting percentage of 49.10.

Around this time, two important political events took place – the Shah Bano controversy and the opening of the Babri Masjid for the Hindus.

Shah Bano Controversy Shah Bano, a 62-year-old Muslim woman and mother of five, was divorced by her husband in 1978. She filed a case against her ex-husband for maintenance. In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled in her favour and underlined the need for a common civil law in the country. This judgment created a stir in the country. The AIMPLB and other Muslim organizations launched a nationwide agitation against the Supreme Court ruling and for the protection of Muslim Personal Law and Shariat. Unnerved by the large protests on the street, the Rajiv Gandhi government, in an act of appeasement of the Muslim minority, introduced a bill in the parliament against this judgment, which later became the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (DeSouza, 2015). It was seen by progressive groups as a regressive step acceding to the demands of the conservative and orthodox sections of the Muslim community. Concessions were made to patriarchy over the claims of gender justice. This was a landmark moment in the politics of the majority – minority relationship in India where the Congress was accused of pandering to minority elites over the interests of minority women and thereby undermining the secular law that called for equal rights.

The Idea of Minority  423 The other landmark event in the majority – minority politics of India took place on 2 February 1986, following a verdict of a local court in Faizabad. Based on the court’s orders, the disputed site of the Babri Masjid was opened for Hindu worship. This was the beginning of a new politics of Hindu victimhood, leading to the growing politics of what has become a category in the public sphere of Hindutva. The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP, formed in 1980 from the old Jana Sangh and Janata Party), which fought the election on 224 seats in 1984, but won just two seats, found a new lease of life. The party led a nationwide campaign to build a Ram temple on the site of Babri Masjid. The old argument of the Jana Sangh that India should become a Hindu nation primarily because it has a Hindu majority was reworked by the BJP in the wake of the Ram temple movement. Echoing the colonial construction of Indian history, it now asserted that the Muslims, despite being a minority in medieval India, ruled over the Hindus and humiliated them. The desecration of the Ram temple in Ayodhya by Babar to build Babri Masjid symbolized that historical dishonour. The Hindus in independent India, despite being a majority, are hence marginalized since they are not given an opportunity to rebuild a Ram temple on the very site of the Babri Masjid because of the politics of Muslim appeasement in the name of minority rights. The countrywide movement for Ram temple, however, did not provide sufficient electoral support to the BJP in the 1989 elections to form an independent government at the centre. The Congress managed to secure maximum seats; yet the Janata Dal and the BJP formed the government with the support of the left parties. The short-lived V. P. Singh and Chandrasekhar-led coalition governments in the early 1990s could not stop the BJP to capitalize on the growing radical Hindu politics based on a sense of historical grievance. As a result, on 6 December 1992, the Babri Masjid was demolished by kar sevaks, who were mobilized by the BJP, VHP and other rightist Hindu organizations in Ayodhya. The demolition of the mosque, interestingly, redefined the institutional discourse on minorities in a significant way. In the backdrop of these political developments, the Minorities Commission as an institution primarily concerned with the affairs of minorities was also transformed. Two important institutional changes are relevant to underline this transformation. As an official entity, the Minorities Commission was attached to the Ministry of Home Affairs since its inception in 1978. However, in 1985, the newly created Ministry of Welfare was given the responsibility of the Commission. This was an important change. For the first time, technically speaking, the marginalization of minorities was officially understood in terms of social backwardness. The second significant structural change was introduced in 1988. The government decided to amend the 1978 Resolution regarding the creation of the Minorities Commission. The amended notification removed the word ‘linguistic minorities’ from Para 2 of the 1978 Resolution. The Minorities Commission, which was created to safeguard the interests of all minorities, linguistic as well as religious, eventually became an institution concerned

424  Hilal Ahmed entirely with religious minorities (Mahmood, 2016, p.  39). This official demarcation between linguistic and religious minorities paved the way for an elaborated definition of religious minorities in later years. Redefining Minorities: Backwardness and ‘Minority Within a Minority’ The institutional apparatus that evolved after 1992 with regard to minorities has three important features: (a) the distinctiveness of minorities is to be understood primarily in relation to the wider agenda of social justice and backwardness; (b) the state officially recognized five religious groups as religious minorities at the national level; (c) the official category called minority was also unpacked and ‘minorities within minorities’ were also identified and recognized. In 1992, the NCM Act was passed, which led to the establishment of the NCM in May 1993. The NCM became a statutory body. A Constitution amendment bill was introduced in 2004 to provide constitutional status to the NCM by inserting a new article (Article 340A) in the Constitution. However, like previous legislative attempts of this kind, this bill could not become a law. The creation of a Ministry of Minority Affairs, which was carved out of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment in 2006, can also be seen as an extension of this kind of institutional response. The ministry was created ‘to ensure a more focused approach towards issues relating to the notified minority communities’. This new institutional structure also responded to the internal diversity of minorities. In fact, an attempt has been made to look at the internal configuration of minorities so as to identify the minorities within minorities. The inclusions of a section of Muslims and Christians in the OBC list are significant examples in this regard.7 These institutional changes had far-reaching political implications. The official recognition to minority backwardness was politically employed to demand secularization of affirmative action policies. For instance, the Pasmanda Kranti Abhiyan, a nationwide campaign launched in 2013, asserted that Para 3 of the Constitution (SCs) Order, 1950, should be amended, ‘so that Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians are duly included in the SC list and they are not discriminated against on the basis of religion under Article 341 of the Indian Constitution’. This demand is justified for evolving a more egalitarian politics of identity. It has been argued that ‘Muslim politics often talks of electoral alliance between Muslims and Dalits, and/or Muslims and backwards. On the contrary, the Pasmanda politics attempts to create sociopolitical unity between Dalits and Dalits; between backwards and backwards, irrespective of their religion as Hindus or Muslims’ (Pasmanda Kranti Abhiyan, n.d., p. 8). The most interesting response to the internal diversity of a religious minority has come from the women’s groups. The Bhartiya Muslim Mahila

The Idea of Minority  425 Andolan (BMMA), a leading Muslim women’s organization, has been campaigning against the prevalent divorce practice amongst many Muslim communities in India, known as ‘triple talaq’ (uttering word talaq by husband three times in one go to divorce his wife), for a long time. Although the BMMA subscribes to the position taken up by the Supreme Court in triple talaq case that this practice must be legally abolished, the organization finds one universal common civil code (Uniform Civil Code, UCC) for all religious groups a politically motivated project. The BMMA wants gender-just Islamic reforms and they are not reluctant to invite the state to initiate the process; yet the organization does not wish to give up the distinctive Muslim identity as a minority in the name of UCC. (BMMA, 2016, p. 5). This discussion brings us to two fundamental questions: • Does the act of defining religious minorities at the national level in the post-1992 period symbolize a departure from the established constitutional principle, which does not offer any fixed interpretation of the term minority? Or is it an extension of the principle – an attempt to fill up the emptiness of the official category called minority? • Minority politics, especially Sikh and Muslim politics, employed two interesting modes to carve out a space for itself. During the 1960s, minority politics was played out in the name of language (Punjabi Suba, protection of Urdu and so on), whereas in the 2000s, the minority debate shifted to social justice arguments evoking backwardness as a criterion to protect distinctiveness. This shifting character of minority politics makes the question of representation very relevant. In other words, we must ask: What are the emerging forms of minority representation? Law and the Debate on ‘Minority Status’ The tension between constitutional principles and post-1992 legal developments with regard to defining minorities may further be unpacked by reinvestigating two technical issues: (a) Who constitutes a minority? and (b) What should be the spatial location of a social group to be considered as a minority? Indian courts have responded to these questions in an elaborate manner. The famous DAV College case of 1971, for instance, very clearly offers us a broad legal principle to recognize a minority. Discussing the interrelationship between Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court conceptualized ‘distinctiveness’ as the decisive legal criterion. The Court also discussed the spatial location of a social group to support its own interpretation of religious and/or linguistic distinctiveness. It was argued: ‘It is undisputed, and it was also conceded by the State of Punjab, that the Hindus of Punjab are a religious minority in the state though they may not be so in relation to the entire country’ (1971 AIR 1737, 1971 SCR 688). The observation that a minority should always be recognized at the level of the state has actually evolved into a legal principle in later years. For

426  Hilal Ahmed instance, in the T. M. A. Pai case, the Supreme Court once again asserted that ‘with regard to a state law, the unit to determine a religious or linguistic minority can only be the state’ (T. M. A Pai Foundation & Ors v. State of Karnataka & Ors, 2002). The notification of a few ‘national religious minorities’ by the central government is not seen as a deviation from the established legal principles, especially by the statuary bodies like the NCM. In an official note to the Ministry of Home and the Nodal Ministry, dated 30 July 1997, the NCM clarifies: ‘On the contrary, all intrinsic aid to the interpretation of the Constitution, as also the up to date judicial trend, point out that religious minorities – like religion based Scheduled Castes – can be treated as specific identities entitled to special protection by the state’ (cf. Mahmood, 2016, pp. 129–130). It is important here to note that this legal interpretation of minority Is not exclusively carved out by the NCM. ‘Religious minority’ as a legitimate category of backwardness at the national level was also recognized by the Supreme Court in the famous Indra Sawhney case of 1992. The Court not merely expanded the scope of the term reservation but also made it clear that a religious minority could also be treated as a ‘backward class’ of citizens (AIR 1993 SC 477, 1992 Supp 2 SCR 454). The relationship between distinctiveness and backwardness as two determining principles to define a religious group as a constitutional minority, we must note, is not a fully resolved legal issue. There is a strong possibility that distinctiveness might be understood primarily in terms of the numerical inferiority of a community in a particular geo-cultural context. Hence, the spatial location of a group becomes a significant point of reference for the judiciary to identify a minority at the state level. On the other hand, backwardness is a much broader concept, which points towards various national-level processes of social exclusions. In this case, a community of backward communities living in different spatial locations may also be interpreted as a minority with reference to the national population of different social-religious groups. For example, the Muslims in the state of Bihar constitute a distinct religious community; therefore, they are recognized as a state minority. At the same time, the Muslims are also recognized as a national minority by the NCM Act, 1992, as their overall ‘development’ at the national level has been an important policy concern. But this kind of straightforward connection between distinctiveness and backwardness cannot be made with regard to other minority groups. In fact, the overlapping of distinctiveness and numerical inferiority is questioned by the Rajasthan High Court in the Vijay Shanti Educational Trust case, 2001 (which was mainly about the status of Jains in Rajasthan as a religious minority). In its judgment, the court discussed the NCM Act, 1992, and the notification issued by the central government to conclude that the recognition of minority status is an open question. However, the court also pointed out that there was a need to have a legislative initiative in this regard (State of

The Idea of Minority  427 Rajasthan and Ors v. Vijay Shanti Educational Trust on 21 September 2001, equivalent citation: RLW 2003 [4] Raj 2568). The backwardness criterion is also redefined in recent years. The official commissions set up by the government in the 2000s (headed by Justices Rajinder Sachar and Ranganath Misra) strongly recommended that the concept of ‘national minority’ should be unpacked so as to qualify the meanings of backwardness of a religious group. Following this principle, it is argued that some sections of minorities, especially Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians, must also be included in the SC category. In other words, distinctiveness of a religious group is not recognized as a determining factor to treat it as a backward community; instead, a religious minority as a distinctive social group is further divided into subgroups (such as Dalits and women), who are separated from other members of that group and treated as backward. These policy recommendations have not been given any serious legislative considerations in the Parliament so far. Nor do we have any judicial explanation that can legitimize the claims made by Muslim and Christian Dalits. There are various petitions pending before the Supreme Court and high courts that question the legal validity of the Presidential (SC) Order, 1950, which we have discussed in the previous sections. The reservation in minority-run institutions introduces us to another complexity with regard to the overlapping between distinctiveness and backwardness. Two examples are relevant here: the St. Stephen’s case of 1992 and the debate on the minority status of Jamia Millia Islamia. In the St. Stephen’s case, a few basic questions were asked: Is it legitimate for a minorityrun institution to reserve seats for its own community? What would be the status of the non-reserved seats in such a scenario? Would the existing reservation policy be applicable in minority-run and managed institutions? The Supreme Court justified the community-based reservation in this case: ‘The minority institution has a distinct identity and the right to administer with continuance of such identity cannot be denied by coercive action. Any such coercive action would be void being contrary to the constitutional guarantee’ (St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, 1991, Writ Petition [civil] 1868 of 1980). The distinctiveness of a minority as a principle is also evoked in the Jamia case. Jamia Millia Islamia (university) was established in 1920 by a section of Muslims as a ‘nationalist’ educational institution. It became a central university in 1988. The university continued to function as a secular institution; yet its minority character has always been a contested issue. The creation of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) in 2004 gave a new twist to Jamia’s minority status debate. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA)-I government established the NCMEI to respond to the promises it had made in its manifesto. This specific body was formed primarily to protect the rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

428  Hilal Ahmed The Jamia Teachers’ Association and the Jamia Old Boys Association filed petitions in 2006 to NCMEI demanding that at least 50 per cent students from the Muslim community should be admitted. It was also argued that appropriate action should be taken against the vice chancellor and registrar of the university for non-implementation of the mandate of the Jamia Millia Islamia Society. Responding to these arguments, the NCMEI in its judgment said: ‘(We) . . . have no hesitation in holding that the Jamia was founded by the Muslims for the benefit of Muslims and it never lost its identity as a Muslim minority educational institution, hence, Jamia is a minority educational institution’ (NCMEI, Case No. 1443 of 2006). It is obvious from these facts that the minority status of Jamia is a complicated issue. The 1988 Act tells us that Jamia is open to all, and it is bound to follow the reservation policy of the Government of India. The NCMEI judgment, however, gives a different interpretation. It recognizes Jamia as a Muslim minority institution. Since the 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act ensures that the minority institutions are exempted from following the national reservation policy, it becomes possible for Jamia to provide reservations to Muslims.8

Sachar Committee The Sachar Committee was formed in March 2005 by the then prime minister, Manmohan Singh, to study the social, economic and educational conditions of the Muslims in India. Former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, Rajinder Sachar, was the chairperson of the Committee, which submitted its report in November 2006. The Sachar Committee report underlined that the conditions of the Indian Muslims were below that of the SCs and the STs. In its recommendations, it emphasized various measures to enhance the education among Muslim communities and to improve their socio-economic conditions and to provide them better representation in political and administrative institutions. Indeed, it brought the pathetic conditions of the Indian Muslims to the national attention. However, its recommendations were not implemented by the successive governments (Government of India, 2007a).

The Christians in the St. Stephen’s case and the Muslims in the Jamia case are interpreted as national minorities by relying entirely on the principle of cultural distinctiveness. It simply means that the principle of backwardness is not considered to be applicable to the minority-run institutions. In other words, the subgrouping of national minorities, with regard to socioeconomic backwardness proposed by the Sachar Committee (Government of

The Idea of Minority  429 India, 2007a) and the Ranganath Misra Commission (Government of India, 2007b), is not taken into consideration. This poses an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, there is a demand to expand the scope of the SC category so that Muslim and Christian Dalits may get the benefit of reservation. On the other hand, there is no reservation for Muslim and Christian Dalits in the Muslim and Christian ‘minority’ institutions such as Jamia and St. Stephen’s. It is apparent that defining a religious minority at the national level is an unsettled issue. The judiciary as well the Parliament must offer a solution to the tension between the principle of distinctiveness and the principle of backwardness.

Ranganath Misra Commission The Government of India constituted National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities on 29 October  2004. Former Chief Justice of India, Ranganath Misra, was the chairperson of the Commission, so it is also known as Ranganath Misra Commission. It submitted its report to the Government of India on 21 May 2007. It made the following key recommendations: first, give 10 per cent quota to the Muslims and 5 per cent to other minorities in government jobs and in the seats of higher education (graduation and above); second, reserve 8.4 per cent quota out of existing OBC quota of 27 per cent for religious minorities, mainly the Muslims; third, permit the Dalits who convert to Islam or Christianity to avail of reservation benefits under the SC reservation quota. Its recommendations have not been implemented by the UPA or National Democratic Alliance governments.

Formal and Informal Forms of Minority Representation This brings us to our second broad observation: the nature of minority politics and the question of political representation. It is important to point out that the representation of minorities in legislative bodies is often analysed primarily with reference to Muslim representation in the Lok Sabha or the state assemblies. This interpretation of minority representation can be regarded as limited for two reasons. One, this kind of generalization does not allow us to examine the difference between the colonial forms of political representation and the postcolonial legal-constitutional specificities related to the idea of a minority. As a result, the minority question turns into Muslim question! Second, the political representation is always understood with regard to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies where direct elections are held. It is argued that political parties do not give tickets to minorities to contest elections and

430  Hilal Ahmed hence they do not get effective as well as adequate political representation. This overemphasis on ‘ticket distribution’ and apathetic attitude of political parties fails to capture the relationship between minority communities (read religious minorities) and their political processes. Let us take the representation of the Muslims to elaborate on this point. The dominant debate on Muslim political representation, as it is well known, is all about the decreasing number of Muslim Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and Members of Parliament (MPs). It is assumed that if an opportunity is given, the Muslim voters would eventually vote for a Muslim candidate, and the region, caste, class, gender and party affiliation would not affect their electoral choices. This imaginary correlation between Muslim voters and elected MLAs and MPs is entirely incorrect. The shrinking presence of Muslim legislative members in assemblies and Parliament does not reflect the nature of Muslim political participation. For instance, there are only 23 Muslim MPs in the present 2014 Lok Sabha, which is the lowest Muslim representation in the House since 1952 (Table 19.1). But it does not mean that this ‘lack of adequate numbers’ determines the Muslim participation in politics.

Table 19.1  Muslim Representation in the Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 No.

Year

Total Elected Members

Muslims Elected

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII

1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

489 494 494 520 518 542 529a 542 529b 534c 543 543 543 543 543 543 543

21 24 23 29 30 34d 49d 46d 33 28 28 29 32 36 30 23 27

Source: Author created. Notes: a Elections were not held in Assam (12) and Meghalaya (1). b Elections were not held in Assam (14). c Elections were not held in Jammu and Kashmir (6) and countermanded in two seats in Bihar and one in UP. d Including Muslims elected in by-elections.

The Idea of Minority  431 To understand the nature of minority representation, therefore, it is essential to look at the other modes in which concerns of Muslims are articulated. The Muzaffarnagar riots of September 2013, in which more than 50 Muslims were killed and around 50,000 displaced, is a good example to demonstrate this point. At the time of the riots, the Congress-led UPA was in power at the centre and there was a majority government led by the Samajwadi Party (SP) in the state. There were a total 64 Muslim MLAs in the Vidhan Sabha (State Legislative Assembly), out of which 40 belonged to the SP.9 This powerful Muslim presence in the assembly (which is almost 15 per cent) is not at all insignificant if we compare it with the share of the Muslims (19 per cent as per Census 2011) in the overall population of the state. The political configuration in Muzaffarnagar, in terms of Muslim legislative presence, also reflects a very similar pattern. The district was represented by two Muslim MLAs, one Muslim MP and two MLAs from non-BJP parties. These MLAs had won the 2012 assembly elections very comfortably. The Election Commission statistics show that all of them secured more than 30 per cent votes in their respective constituencies. If this is the case, then the question arises: Why did these elected representatives fail to act effectively during and after the 2013 anti-Muslim riots? The argument that if Muslims are represented by the Muslims, the magnitude of targeted violence against them would decrease simply cannot be substantiated in this case. This failure of political efficacy points towards the structural logic of representation in the India context. The representation of the Muslims, therefore, needs to be unpacked at least in two ways: formal form of representation and an informal form of representation. The elected Muslim representatives – MLAs and MPs – who may or may not be elected exclusively by Muslim electorates characterize the formal form of representation. This form corresponds to the constitutional principle that electorates residing in a territorially defined constituency constitute a homogeneous community (of voters), whose political interests are identical and, therefore, it should be represented by its own member(s) (Ahmed, 2016). Unlike the formal electoral representation, the informal representation was not depending upon the participation of common Muslims (and non-Muslims) as voters. In this case, the representativeness is evaluated differently: influential individuals and religious, civic and cultural organizations are recognized as stakeholders to reach out to the concerned Muslim community. In the case of Muzaffarnagar, the formal form of representation could not work for two possible reasons. First, the compulsions of competitive politics (party line and so on) could not allow the Muslim MLAs to act exclusively as Muslim representatives. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the elected Muslim representatives did not evoke any grand imagination of Muslimhood. They responded to their immediate constituency – the community of Muslims they identify themselves with. In other words, the Muslim heterogeneity in UP prevailed over the imposed Muslim homogeneity.

432  Hilal Ahmed But, at the same time, the informal form of representation functioned differently. The Muslim social-religious organizations – particularly the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind (JUH) – emerged as a legitimate stakeholder in postriots reconstruction work. Immediately after the riots, the JUH organized a number of relief camps for affected Muslim families. The organization also went for a massive national and international funding drive. It approached the UK-based Islamic charity, the Indian Muslim Federation, to purchase a piece of land. This land was redeveloped with the help of local Muslims to construct low-cost houses for riot victims. However, this was not the pure donation; the owners of these houses were asked to repay the part of the cost of these houses in interest-free instalments. The informal support received by the JUH in rehabilitating the riotaffected Muslim families shows that such religious-civic organizations also function as a representative.10 This kind of ‘informal form of representation’ operates at the bottom level of society and often receives a favourable state recognition. In a broader sense, it may be argued that this informal form of representation of minorities through civic and religious organizations is not an antithesis to the formal form of political representation. Instead, this form of representation is deeply embedded in the collective/community right given to the minorities in the Constitution. Summing Up This brief story of the politics of minority accommodation in postcolonial India introduces us to four different political trajectories. First, the complex relationship between institutions and politics remains a decisive factor, which shapes and nurtures the minority discourse. The realization that there should be a clear distinction between contextually constituted political minorities and the fixed census categories such as Hindu, Muslim and Sikh forced the political elites of the 1950s to evolve a well-thought-out constitutional position. The two constitutional principles: (a) minorities should always be defined on a contextual basis and (b) the criterion for the identification of a minority should remain open and ever-evolving, paved the way for the evolution of a specific conception of secular politics. Although the political elite started addressing the electorates as minority and majority, the actual expressions were never delinked from the established colonial idioms of politics: Hindus as majority and Muslims/Sikhs/Christians as minority. As a result, sociological categories – religion, caste and language – strengthened as the markers of self-identification in political terms. Second, the assertion of minorities within a minority underlines another aspect of the minority politics in India. The marginalized groups within the minorities, especially the religious minorities, have to survive in a hostile anti-minority environment. At the same time, the minority elite do not allow these groups to question the internal hierarchies and power structure. Interestingly, the gender and

The Idea of Minority  433 caste minorities within religious minority communities in India have come up with a nuanced position. They have refused to give up their religious identities by proposing democratic and egalitarian interpretations of religious texts and traditions. At the same time, constitutional principles and values are also invoked to argue for gender justice and affirmative action for backward subgroups. Third, the overlapping between the distinctiveness of language/ religion and the backwardness of religious communities has been a very significant political issue for minorities in India. The minority elite emphasized the distinctiveness of language, for instance, Punjabi and Urdu, to carve out a space for religion-based politics in the early decades. In later years, however, a new form of politics began to take shape. The political correctness of the 1990s allowed the minority elites, especially the Muslim and Christian leaders, to assert the marginalization and backwardness of their communities in a more direct fashion. Finally, the minority discourse in India has produced a very different form of political representation. Indian constitutional democracy which adopted the parliamentary form of government based on the ‘first-past-the-post system’ does not recognize proportional representation for any kind of minority. However, the demographic profile of minority groups in certain parts of India (e.g., Sikhs in Punjab, Christians in Nagaland and Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir constitute a majority) affect the logic of representation in a significant way. These groups are able to achieve adequate formal political representation in state assemblies in these regions, but their political presence at the national level remains a highly debatable issue, particularly with regard to the Muslims. However, there is another form of minority representation. The community organizations, non-governmental organizations and self-help groups run by the minority communities function as a link between the state and various segments of minority communities. This kind of ‘informal form of representation’ of minorities actually complements a more direct form of political representation. Acknowledgement This chapter is based on the third chapter of the book, Democratic Accommodations: Minorities in Contemporary India (by deSouza et al., 2019). It is a revised and updated version. Notes 1 The Report of the Advisory Committee on Minorities (1947) classified minorities into three groups: A, B and C. Group ‘A’ consisted of Anglo Indians, Parsees and Plains’ Tribesmen in Assam. These groups accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of the population. Group B consisted of Indian Christians and Sikhs who accounted for more than 0.5 per cent but did not exceed 1.5 per cent. Group C consisted of Muslims and SCs who constituted more than 1.5 per cent of the total population (Constituent Assembly of India, 2014).

434  Hilal Ahmed 2 It is important note that the Constitutional validity of this Order has been challenged. The Supreme Court has yet to decide this issue. However, in Soosai v. UOI 1985 (Supp) S.C.C. 590 case, the Supreme Court accepted that the conversion from Hinduism to Christianity did not affect the caste status of a person. 3 It is important to clarify that this religion-based restriction is only for the SC category. Muslim and Christian communities can be included into the fold of the STs and the OBCs. 4 For an elaborated discussion on this debate, see Williams (2006). 5 It is important here to note that the CNI and CSI were not Catholic organizations. These were Protestant bodies, which were earlier part of the Anglican Church. 6 www.cbci.in/about_us.aspx 7 CBCI’s documents on Dalit Christians, which we discussed in the previous section, also underline the dilemma of minorities within minorities. 8 The 93rd Amendment Act inserted a new clause in Article 15(2) of the Constitution. It says: ‘Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30’. 9 It does not mean that the SP was the only party that provided opportunity to the Muslims to fight election on its tickets; there were Muslim MLAs from the Bahujan Samaj Party, the Congress and the Peace Party. 10 The India Exclusion Report 2015 also underlines the inability of civil society organizations to make effective intervention in the post-riot scenario (Hassan, 2016).

References Abreu, S. (2009). The making of a Christian minority.  Seminar, 602.  www.indiaseminar.com/2009/602/602_savio_abreu.htm Ahmed, H. (2014).  Muslim political discourse in postcolonial India: Monuments, memory, contestation. Routledge. Ahmed, H. (2016).  Representing Muslims in postcolonial India:  Constitution of a discourse. In S. Bandyopadhyay (Ed.), Decolonisation and the politics of transition in South Asia (pp. 348–374). Orient BlackSwan. Ahmed, H. (2018). The politics of Shariat. In A. S. Rathore  & G. Goswami (Eds.),  Rethinking Indian jurisprudence: An introduction to the philosophy of law (pp. 95–103). Routledge. BMMA. (2016). No more talaq talaq talaq: Muslim women call for ban on an unIslamic practice. BMMA. Brass, P. (1974). Language, religion and politics in North India. Cambridge University Press. Constituent Assembly of India. (2014). Constituent assembly debates (Vol. 5). Government of India. DeSouza, P. R. (2015). Politics of the uniform civil code in India. Economic & Political Weekly, 50(28), 50–57. Dhillon, G. S. (1974). Evolution of the demand for a Sikh home land. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 362–373.

The Idea of Minority  435 Government of India. (1951). The report of the first backward classes commission. Government of India. Government of India. (1955). The report of state reorganization commission. Government of India. Government of India. (2007a). Prime minister’s high level committee report on social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community in India. Sachar Committee Recommendations-English.pdf. www.minorityaffairs.gov.in Government of India. (2007b). Final report of the national commission of the religious and linguistic minorities. Government of India. Hassan, S. (2016). Survivors of mass communal violence in Muzaffarnagar: Profiles of loss, dispossession, and recovery. In India Exclusion Report 2015 (pp.  189– 205). Yoda Press. Kumar, A. (2004). Electoral politics in Punjab: Study of Akali Dal. Economic & Political Weekly, 39(14–15), 1515–1520. Mahmood, S. (2015). Religious difference in a secular age: A minority report. Princeton University Press. Mahmood, T. (2016). Minorities commission 1978–2015: Minor role in major affairs (2nd ed.). Universal Law Publishing. Noorani, A. G. (Ed.). (2003). The Muslims of India: A documentary record. Oxford University Press. Palat, M. K. (2019). Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Vol. 15). Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund. Pasmanda Kranti Abhiyan. (n.d.). Pamphlet in Hindi. The National Integration Conference (September–October, 1961). Government of India. https://mha.gov.in/sites/ default/files/NICBackG-1710113.pdf Peter Ronald deSouza, Hilal Ahmed, Mohd. Sanjeer Alam. (2019). Democratic Accommodations: The Minority Question in India, Bloomsbury. Williams, R. V. (2006). Postcolonial politics and personal laws: Colonial legal legacies and the Indian state. Oxford University Press.

20 Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance in India Pahi Saikia

Introduction Political development theorists have focused on states as organic wholes, while the emphasis has been mostly on institution building, such as political parties. In the Indian context, it was not until the late 1960s and 1970s when major works by Myron Weiner (1968) and Iqbal Narain (1976), among others, focused on state politics. Increasing participation of sub-state categories, regional identities and communities became the unit of analysis. Micro-level empirical studies on hitherto dormant identities, decentralized institutional structures, gender and power hierarchies and other socio-political phenomena have begun to shape the internal dynamics of the political processes in India. There has been emphasis not so much on administrative or institutional structure but on the political process in the changing sociocultural contexts. It is, therefore, important to unravel the political processes within states and explore comparative theoretical frameworks across states to conduct thematic studies on a range of subjects, including subjects such as statehood and separatism in India using different levels of analysis. Since the late 1970s, India has been witnessing a number of ethnonationalist movements at the sub-national level. The goals and aspirations of these movements varied from complete separation from India to pressures for more representation or decentralization to the creation of federal states within India. Sub-national constructs and the ideological endowment of many of these movements have been intrinsically tied to regional ethnic identity, where contentious politics becomes the vehicle to alter the existing discrepancies in inter-group relations. The responses of the Indian state to competing claims of sub-nationalism, particularly those related to the alteration of internal territories, have been inconsistent. While the demands of some sub-national groups have been adequately accommodated, others have encountered obdurate constraints. Why is the Indian state reluctant to cave in to separatist demands made by sub-national groups? What are some of the major causative factors that can explain the emergence of subnational movements? What are the possible outcomes of the bargaining processes that take place between the elites at the state level and the central DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-25

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  437 government? This chapter tries to address these questions in the context of Indian politics. The Argument The chapter discusses the theoretical concerns of the conditions, causes and dynamics of ethnonationalist mobilization. The chapter provides a brief historical analysis of state-building and sub-national separatist movements. It provides an analysis of sub-nationalist aspirations in North-East India, their responses and dynamics. This chapter argues that ethnonational identities and regional forces have shaped the political processes in India. The chapter shows how emerging discourses of internal boundary redrawings, decentralization and participation, for instance, in the marginal zones of North-East India since the late 1980s, 1990s and 2000s contributed to such processes. Varying state responses led to the design of multi-level governance and institutions. In some cases, these methods led to the incorporation of political elites, and in others, they proved to be counterproductive. Instead of preventing subregional tensions, these methods polarised groups and added to disparities and power asymmetries. Theoretical Concerns: Conditions, Causes and Dynamics of Ethnonationalist Mobilization Conditions and Causes

Ethnonationalist mobilization can be defined as a process when groups mobilize around an ethnic identity or interests to achieve collective claims. Collective goals may encompass increased participation in the bureaucracy, enhanced political representation, socio-economic power and privileges, cultural rights or control over a piece of territory. Ethnonationalist mobilization may take the form of internal wars, insurgencies or separatist violence. The enriching body of scholarship on ethnic mobilization has vigorously debated the phenomenon by deploying major approaches to primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. The concept of primordialism as described by Geertz (1973, p. 7) is: The assumed ‘givens’ of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves.

438  Pahi Saikia Primordialists believe that ethnic identities are static and certain categories are always socially and politically relevant because they are rooted in ancient history, and as such, animosities between two conflicting groups are based on ancient hatreds. In the context of Southeast Asia, ethnic immutability is best explained by scholars who consider the Vietnamese nation as inward looking place profoundly oriented towards the traditional past, a self-contained village enclosed within a thicket of bamboo and thorny plants, bounding its people as distinct, isolated community within its specific character and customs, communal house and a place of worship for the guardian spirit. (Anh, 2003, p. 102) The mere existence of primordial ethnic identities, however, is not sufficient for groups to engage in conflicts. Scholars like Crawford Young take issue with primordialism, seek to undercut the pervasiveness of the approach and argue that the segments which make up the cultural mosaic, be they tribes, jatis or language groups, are quite likely to change structure and boundaries and do not constitute the primordial ‘givens’ of social life (Young, 1976). Ethnicity is socially relevant in most countries and gains political relevance when the primordial symbols are used as instruments to create political alignments. The intensity of the politicization of ethnic identities may vary across time and space (Fearon, 2004, p. 2). Constructivists and instrumentalists advance their understanding of ethnonationalist mobilization by examining situational causes. Constructivists emphasize that pre-existing resentment can lead to ethnic upheavals in countries experiencing economic or political transitions. Changing power relations, electoral incentives and patronage networks in transitioning societies provide new windows of opportunity for manipulation of ethnic symbols. Examples can be drawn from Poso in Indonesia before the elections to the local governing bodies in the early 2000s, where competing elites manipulated patronage networks to incite violence between the Christian and Muslim communities. Other instances of instrumentalist interpretation can be drawn from India, where scholars have conducted studies on Hindu – M ­ uslim violence using local-level units of analysis (Brass, 2006). Apart from these approaches, the role of other factors pertaining to political and economic interests, grievances and capability of sub-national ethnic groups, the involvement of external actors, including the involvement of neighbouring countries, is important to examine ethnonationalist mobilization. As far as grievances are concerned, the focus is on relative deprivation that hinges on both economic deprivation and cultural subservience of ethnically different marginal groups by dominant ethnic groups. Michael Hecter’s work on internal colonialism shows how cultural factors

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  439 (Welsh  language and unorthodox form of Christianity) shored up uneven economic distribution, determined ethnic voting in the Celtic nations and gave rise to ethnopolitical mobilization. Ethnic conflict may be accentuated by stiff competition between ethnic groups to exploit the same set of valuable resources (Olzak, 1992). Ethnic geography can also contribute to ethnic insurgencies. Scholars argue that rough (mountainous) terrain and cross-border sanctuaries at times work in favour of ethnic insurgents. Ethnic groups inhabiting a region that is in close proximity to a porous frontier area of a country are in a more advantageous position to challenge and bargain with the government than those living in the interior regions. Frontier areas provide easy and continuous access to material resources through external linkages. If the group is close to the borders where most of the insurgent bases are located, it gives them ample opportunity to evade the coercive powers of the state by planning and conducting operations outside the geographical boundaries of the state. The government, in turn, is incapacitated because its forces cannot impose regulations on rebel activities beyond the limits of the territorial borders of the state. This condition not only shapes the tactics and extractive potential of the insurgents but also influences the responses of the government. Border territories facilitated Karen insurgent operations on the Thailand – Burma border; National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) rebels along the Myanmar – Nagaland border; and many more ethnic insurgencies in South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Box 20.1  How Do Primordialism and Constructivism Create the Conditions for Ethnonationalist Mobilization? • Ethnonationalist mobilization can be defined as a process when groups mobilize around an ethnic identity or interests to achieve collective claims. • Primordialists believe that ethnic identities are static and certain categories are always socially and politically relevant because they are rooted in ancient history, and as such, animosities between two conflicting groups are based on ancient hatreds. • Constructivists emphasize that pre-existing resentment can lead to ethnic upheavals in countries experiencing economic or political transitions. • Ethnic groups inhabiting a region that is in close proximity to a porous frontier area of a country are in a more advantageous position to challenge and bargain with the government than those living in the interior regions.

440  Pahi Saikia Responses and Dynamics of Ethnonationalist Movements

In some contexts, the mobilization dynamics of ethnonationalist movements may be deduced from ethnic cleavages, while in others, they are a combination of ethnic identity, political ideology and individual incentives. Ethnically homogenous groups provide a strong resource base to leaders, for instance, in insurgencies, who tend to ‘inculcate a sense of membership and construct an ethnic identity’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 846). The leadership has an incentive to draw on the societal resources: the solidarity networks and narratives of the ethnic kin group. Although social processes of organization and recruitment vary from one context to the other, scholars have broadly identified the processes of socialization and ideological indoctrination of civilians as effective mechanisms of organizing the rebellion. Ideological and political indoctrination of militants in the rural areas of Peru during the Sendero Luminoso rebellion and Nepal during the Maoist insurgency can be cited as examples where social dynamics typically mould the identities and actions of individual rebels. Other examples can be drawn from the process of recruitment and indoctrination in the border areas of India and Pakistan; the indoctrination of refugees inhabiting the Pakistan – Afghanistan border; and Muslim separatists in southern Thailand. The dynamics of insurgency can be understood by taking into account the counterinsurgency operations aimed at containing insurgent violence. Some examples of counterinsurgency operations can be drawn from South Asia, particularly India. The Indian government often treated ethnic insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab and the North-east as problems of political chaos, which could be mended through the implementation of heavy-handed policies aimed at controlling the law-and-order situation in the country. The state governments and the central government failed to deeply analyse the causes that led to the rise of insurgencies in these states. Another important dynamic is the creation of multi-level institutions. In the 1990s, boundary redrawings and multi-layered governing structures were important mechanisms to respond to ethnonationalist claims in North-East India. Alfred Stepan (2001, p. 327) argues that multinational states address the self-determination claims of cultural minorities through the ‘institution of asymmetric autonomy’. A national minority, as Kymlicka (1998, p. 133) argues, ‘is given special (i.e., asymmetrical) autonomy to realize on a sub-state level what the dominant group enjoys on a state level – self-determination as a ruling majority’. Asymmetrical provisions have been of primary importance in dealing with fissiparous separatist tendencies in India since independence. Scholars argue that India adopted a pragmatic approach to constitutional and political asymmetries in relation to some states and tribal tracts in the North-east and some mainline states. Constitutional asymmetries characterize some border states in the north-western and north-eastern regions, that is, Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland and Mizoram (Saxena, 2012).

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  441 Asymmetrical arrangements were made during the process of state reorganization and integration of the north-eastern region of India. Article 371 was constituted to pacify some of these groups (in Assam, Mizoram and Tripura) by providing special powers to make laws on customary rights, social practices, ownership and transfer of land and restrictions on the settlement of migrants in the tribal areas. District councils were constituted under this provision to make laws based on the Sixth Schedule under Article 371. The creation of the Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council in Goalpara district in 2005 is an example of power devolution aimed at addressing the ethnic demands of Rabhas in Assam. For policymakers, this was the most pragmatic solution.

Box 20.2  How Do States Such as India Respond to Separatist Movements? • Ethnically homogenous groups provide a strong resource base to leaders, for instance in insurgencies, who tend to ‘inculcate a sense of membership and construct an ethnic identity’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). • In the 1990s, boundary redrawings and multi-layered governing structures were important mechanisms to respond to ethnonationalist claims in India’s Northeast. • Asymmetrical arrangements were made during the process of state reorganization and integration of the north-eastern region of India. • District councils were constituted under this provision to make laws based on the Sixth Schedule under Article 371. The creation of the Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council in Goalpara district in 2005 is an example of power devolution aimed at addressing the ethnic demands of Rabhas in Assam.

State-Building and Sub-national Separatist Movements: A Brief Historical Account India’s ascendency and integrity as a newly decolonized power were severely challenged in the 1950s when Kashmir became a disputed site on India’s western frontier and when Phizo organized local armies seeking exit and sovereignty from India on the eastern frontier. Meanwhile, Jharkhand and Manipur asked for full-fledged states within India. While these battles were afoot, the Telugu-speakers in the old Madras Presidency resolutely fought for a separate Andhra, whose creation in November 1956 irrefutably opened the

442  Pahi Saikia floodgates for new demands from the Marathis, Gujaratis and Punjabis, some even opting out of India, for instance, the Mizos in the Northeast. Geostrategic concerns compelled India to refute the exiting calls while also clenching more securely the peripheral sub-nations such as the Mizos and Nagas. Concurrently, India’s paternalistic orientations and fear of cataclysmic effects displayed in the centre’s reluctance to decentralize its authority and institute assuasive accommodation to other sub-national minorities. Predominance of Congress regime rather than infeasibility perhaps facilitated the centre’s eschewing of a compromising approach on such demands. However, instead of containing sub-national claims, excessive interference and overly centralizing inclination corroded the efficacy of important state institutions, which, in turn, bequeathed more rigid and belligerent responses on the part of sub-regional minorities. The territorial aspirations of the Bodos in Assam and the hill people of the Kumaon – Garhwal region of Uttarakhand are essentially linked to these approaches, more precisely, to the diminishing capacities of India’s centralized institutions to guard the cultural and developmental concerns of sub-regional minorities against the preferences of the ‘dominant regional elites’, the caste Assamese and the Babushahis, respectively. Sub-national anxieties in Telangana or in undivided Assam are just a few examples that heightened due to similar considerations and ultimately culminated in the Jai Telangana (Victory of Telangana) movement in 1969 or the Udayachal movement in 1966, respectively. State-building in India, therefore, witnessed a critical phase of agitations for provincial linguistic autonomy, which the nationalist elite feared would rise to a crescendo and end up splitting the newly consolidating country into irreplaceable portions. On that account, Nehru remarked, Disruptionist tendencies had come to the fore; to check them . . . India is to be strong and firmly established on secular ideals of peace, stability and economic development, rather than revive primordial identities of caste and language . . . if India is enfeebled, all her component elements grow weak. (Guha, 2007, p. 181) Similarly, the JVP Committee commented that ‘language was not only a binding force but also a separating one, so every separatist tendency should be rigorously discouraged’ (Guha, 2007, p. 183). The JVP Committee was set up to look after the calls made by the Marathi, Gujarati, Telugu, Oriya, Kannada and Malayalam speakers to the Congress for provincial linguistic autonomy (Guha, 2007, p.  183). Despite all these apprehensions, the elite succumbed to sub-national pressures such as the one in Andhra, created by Potti Sreeramulu’s indefinite hunger strike, ensuing street demonstrations, strikes and massive violence triggered by Sreeramulu’s death in 1952. B. Sriramulu described the events in Andhra in these words, ‘Sporadic disturbances reached the climax on 16 December, 1952, wagons were looted, trains

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  443 were stopped, hartals, picketing, emotional speeches took place throughout Andhra Province and particularly in the notable towns like Vijayawada, Nellore, Tirupathi and Bellary, unmindful of the police fear’ (Mitchell, 2009, p.  190). The cascade of disruptive events amounted to forced compliance by the state to separate the Telugu-speaking districts of Madras state, simultaneously leading to the formation of the States Reorganization Commission to placate more energetic forms of language nationalism unleashed in the adjoining provinces. The central government formally announced the creation of an integrated state of Andhra Pradesh (Vishalandhra) on 19 December 1952 to be formed by the amalgamation of several districts such as Guntur, Nellore, East Godavari, Cuddapah in Telengana, coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema sub-regions. The Delta, well-irrigated and fertile, is the most prosperous and wealthy of the three sub-regions; Rayalaseema is a dry, infertile area, subject to frequent droughts and famine. The nine districts that comprise Telangana are relatively socio-economically backward (Forrester, 1970, p. 5). The Telangana region was under Nizam’s rule for a long time, while the latter two sub-regions were part of the British administration for more than a hundred years. The Andhra region benefited from the British administration, particularly from the large-scale irrigation schemes that harnessed the Krishna and Godavari rivers for agriculture. The Circars became the most prosperous part of the Telugu country and the rice bowl of Andhra, enjoying the benefits of a stable and enlightened administration and developing not only economically but socially and politically at a far faster rate than the Nizam’s Dominions. What were some of the probable causes of the demand? Besides language, important social and economic issues such as wide disparities in agrarian relations, tenancy problems, forced unpaid labour (vetti) and exploitative feudal practices were shored up weightily during the course of the sub-national movement in the Telangana region during the early state-building phase in India. Box 20.3  State Building and Sub-nationalist Aspirations in India • Geostrategic concerns compelled India to refute the exiting calls while also clenching more securely the peripheral sub-nations such as the Mizos and Nagas. • The territorial aspirations of the Bodos in Assam and the hill people of the Kumaon – Garhwal region of Uttarakhand are essentially linked to these approaches, more precisely, to the diminishing capacities of India’s centralized institutions to guard the cultural and developmental concerns of sub-regional minorities against the preferences of the ‘dominant regional elites’, the caste Assamese and the Babushahis, respectively.

444  Pahi Saikia • State-building in India, therefore, witnessed a critical phase of agitations for provincial linguistic autonomy, which the nationalist elite feared would rise to a crescendo and end up splitting the newly consolidating country into irreplaceable portions.

Sub-national Separatist Movements in North-East India: A Brief Account Examples of sub-national separatist movements can be drawn from NorthEast India. Historically, North-East India emerged as a political and geostrategic construct in the periphery. In the British colonial discourse, the north-east appeared as a territorial unit of the frontier region. Pre-colonial historical linkages through trade networks, religious links, language ties, as well as culturally significant mobility, traversed the north-east frontiers and left a deep impact on post-colonial historical narratives. The formation of post-colonial borders severed pre-colonial ethnic ties, mobility and socio-political interactions of ethnic communities across the borders in India’s Northeast. Few attempts were made by British administrators to understand the inter-communal tribal/ethnic clashes or to identify objective methods to manage conflicts between the Naga and Kukis in the hills of Manipur and Nagaland; the Myanmarese Singphos and Nagas in the Naga Hills; or the Abors, Chins and Khamtis and their counterparts residing in the hill districts of Assam, Lushai Hills and the tracts of Arakan. The British administration divided the tribes of undivided Assam mainly for administrative convenience. The transition from colonial to post-colonial political leadership only preserved the colonial ‘frontier’ policies of control and separation of ties between ‘frontier’ and ‘non-frontier’ tribal categories. Cross-border ethnic ties and inter-tribal disputes in India’s eastern frontiers complicated state-building and post-colonial designs to settle disputes in the borders. These regions became isolated and were accorded a marginal standing in post-­colonial statebuilding. The distribution of power and governance created asymmetries by the imposition of military control, which evoked sub-national resistance. At the same time, giving recognition to one language defined ethnic communities and raised problems for numerically smaller language groups in India’s northeast. The period witnessed the political mobilization of Nagas, Mizos and Meiteis, among others, in the north-east when they organized and affirmed their rights to territorial and cultural autonomy. Some of the demands for autonomy date back to the pre-Independence period when the Nagas, for instance, submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1928 expressing their opinion on the proposed administrative reforms in the Naga Hills. The Naga Club resisted the proposal for the inclusion of the Naga Hills within the Reformed Scheme of India. In February 1947, the

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  445 government of India constituted a sub-committee of the Constituent Assembly called the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Subcommittee which recommended that the areas where the plains and hill tribes inhabited should be incorporated under a form of autonomy called the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which provides legislative, administrative and cultural autonomy and those occupied by the plains tribes (such as the Bodos) in Assam were classified as tribal blocks and belts. These provisions were also meant to preserve the traditional customs, collective rights, cultural practices and discrete identities of these ethnic groups.

Box 20.4  Historical Background of Sub-nationalist Aspirations in North-East India • Historically, North-East India emerged as a political and geo-­ strategic construct in the periphery. • The transition from colonial to post-colonial political leadership only preserved the colonial ‘frontier’ policies of control and separation of ties between ‘frontier’ and ‘non-frontier’ tribal categories. • In February  1947, the government of India constituted a subcommittee of the Constituent Assembly called the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-committee which recommended that the areas where the plains and hill tribes inhabited should be incorporated under a form of autonomy called the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which provides legislative, administrative and cultural autonomy and those occupied by the plains tribes (such as the Bodos) in Assam were classified as tribal blocks and belts.

Sub-nationalist Aspirations: Assam Unlike other federal units, undivided Assam failed to meet the linguistic criteria on the basis of which the States Reorganization Commission, 1955, demarcated India’s internal boundaries. The newly created province of undivided Assam included not only the hill districts (including Khasi and Jaintia hills, Garo hills, Lushai/Mizo hills and United Mikir and North Cachar hills) but also the former princely states of Tripura and Manipur, which were ethnically different and were kept outside the purview of the administration of colonial Assam. Post-colonial Assam maintained the multi-ethnic boundaries of colonial Assam. Integrating these diverse regions into a single territorial space was complicated, and in October 1960, it took a violent turn when the Assam Official Language Act, 1960, was passed by the Legislative Assembly of Assam and Assamese was declared the official language of Assam.

446  Pahi Saikia Assam experienced turbulent phases of mobilization and violence over language issues, natural resource revenue sharing dilemmas, political dominance, immigration and other socio-economic grievances. Sub-national aspirations in Assam can be traced back to colonial mapping practices, the introduction of vernacular press and literary writings that shaped the Assamese nation and the formation of cultural boundaries and which found expression in inter-communal relations in the 1920s when the idea of a separate Muslim nation gained popularity among the Muslim population in Eastern Bengal. Contentious politics emerged on the question of territorial remapping and separation of boundaries between Assam and Eastern Bengal, particularly the separation of Sylhet from Assam. The issue remained unresolved until 1947, when the boundary commission decided to separate the Muslim majority districts of Sylhet from Assam. In the 1960s, the political discourse of Assam was engulfed in a state-wide agitation on the issue of language. Riots occurred between Assamese and Bengalis. The Bengalis asked for equal treatment of their language. Meetings and protests were organized at various places in the province. In May 1961, the movement intensified and led to police firing. Assam was engulfed in another violent phase of sub-nationalism from 1979–85 due to the Assam agitation. The roots of the movement can be traced to socio-economic grievances of the Assamese people and the contestation over electoral lists. The agitation ended after the signing of the peace accord on 15 August 1985, between the student leaders and the Government of India. Assam also experienced a violent secessionist movement led by the United Liberation Front of Assam, seeking independence from Assam. The United Liberation Front of Assam resisted the constitutional laws of the country. The movement went through various phases of political mobilization. In the early 1990s, there were extreme forms of violence, including civilian deaths and destruction of public properties, which ultimately led to a loss of support and sympathy that the organization earned during the initial years of mobilization. For decades, violence and counter-violence by the Indian security forces marred normal functioning, civilian peace and shattered the political economy of Assam. In October  1986, the Bodo Security Force, later renamed the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), was formed and demanded complete separation from India. It resorted to armed struggle to achieve this goal. In March 1987, another section of Bodos organized a separatist movement in Assam under the leadership of Upendranath Brahma, the President of the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU). Due to his charismatic leadership, Brahma was later called the Bodofa, meaning ‘Father of the Bodos’. The ABSU movement called for a separate state of Bodoland within India, raising slogans such as ‘Divide Assam 50:50’. The Bodos claimed that they were resisting the majoritarian policies of the Assam government. Prior to the ABSU movement, in 1967, Bodo nationalists led by the Plain Tribals Council of Assam

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  447 called for the creation of an autonomous territorial unit called Udayachal. The leaders proposed that Udayachal should have the status of a Union Territory, which would ensure the Bodos greater autonomy and relative independence in terms of political decision-making. Although the Plain Tribals Council of Assam led the movement, its efforts in this direction soon declined when the members moved away from ethnonationalist goals and formed a political party to contest the elections of 1977 to the State Legislative Assembly (Saikia, 2011, p. 56). The first phase of the ABSU movement witnessed various incidents of arson and killings, explosions and destruction to life and public properties and lasted till 1993. The state and central governments responded with counterinsurgency measures. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, and the Assam Disturbed Area Act, 1989, were implemented to counter the insurgency. When these efforts proved to be ineffective, the Congress-led central government opened the doors for dialogue and proposed a partial form of territorial autonomy in 1993. The first Bodo Accord was signed between the agitating groups and the government of Assam on 20 February 1993. The accord failed to meet the demands for statehood. This led to a second phase of violent mobilization by the Bodo Liberation Tigers. After years of violence and counter-violence, in February  2003, both sides decided to sit down for negotiations. On 10 February 2003, the Memorandum of Settlement on Bodo Territorial Council was signed. The governance structure of 2003 was based on increased powers of self-governance. In the subsequent elections held to the newly constituted Bodo Territorial Council (an autonomous administrative unit set up in accordance with the deal), people voted to power the members of the Bodo People’s Progressive Front (Hagrama), the party comprising of members and ex-members of the Bodo Liberation Tigers. However, internal divisions among the Bodo leadership led to discontent and violence in Bodoland in 2008, 2012 and 2014. In August 2008, violence took place between Bodo and non-Bodo people in the district of Udalguri in Assam. The violence took a communal turn when Muslims were attacked in Chirang district. Rioters from each community burned houses. People were displaced and took shelter in relief camps (Saikia et al., 2016, p. 136). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that the 2008 Bodoland violence in Western Assam displaced nearly 215,000 (IDMC, 2011). Violence erupted again in July 2012. The British Broadcasting Corporation reported that fighting took place between indigenous Bodo tribes and Muslim settlers in Kokrajhar and Chirang districts. More than 170,000 people were displaced from their villages (BBC, July 26, 2012). On 23 December 2014, unidentified gunmen killed non-Bodos in remote villages in Bodoland. Those killed belonged to tea garden labourers. Meanwhile, the NDFB leaders, led by Ranjan Daimary, agreed to negotiate with the government of India. Negotiations were held with several Bodo organizations while keeping intact the territorial integrity of the state of Assam. The NDFB and other Bodo groups submitted several memorandums

448  Pahi Saikia in September 2014, September 2015, October 2017, August 2018 and finally, the NDFB, ABSU and the United Bodo People’s Organization signed the deal for negotiations on 27 January 2020 with the Government of Assam and the Government of India. Among other provisions, the 2020 Bodo Accord had the objective of providing legislative safeguards for tribal land rights and ensuring accelerated development of the tribal areas.

Box 20.5  Rise of Sub-nationalist Aspirations in Assam • In 1967, the Plain Tribals Council of Assam called for the creation of an autonomous territorial unit called Udayachal. The leaders proposed that Udayachal should have the status of a Union Territory, which would ensure the Bodos greater autonomy and relative independence in terms of political decision-making. • In March  1987, another section of Bodos organized a separatist movement in Assam under the leadership of Upendranath Brahma, the President of the ABSU. Due to his charismatic leadership, Brahma was later called the Bodofa, meaning ‘Father of the Bodos’. • On 10 February 2003, the Memorandum of Settlement on Bodo Territorial Council was signed. • The NDFB and other Bodo groups submitted several memorandums in September  2014, September  2015, October  2017, August  2018 and finally, the NDFB, ABSU and the United Bodo People’s Organization signed the deal for negotiations on 27 January 2020 with the Government of Assam and the Government of India. Among other provisions, the 2020 Bodo Accord had the objective of providing legislative safeguards for tribal land rights and ensuring accelerated development of the tribal areas.

Sub-nationalist Aspirations: Mizoram The Mizos consist of a number of tribes, such as Lushei, Hmar and Paite, among others. Mizo is a collective identity used to refer to these tribes. As Pum Khan Pau notes, The term Zo comprises a conglomerate of Indo-Burma borderland tribes who lived in a contiguous territory and believed in the myth of a common origin called Khul or Chhinlung or Sinlung (a cave whose whereabouts remains a mystery). Today, Chin, Kuki, Lushai (Mizo), Zomi etc. are all interchangeable referents for the same Zo people. (Pau, 2018, p. 15)

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  449 Present day Mizoram came to be known to the British as the Lushai Hills. The British formally annexed the Lushai Hills into their colonial possessions in 1871 and 1872. There was a mass conversion of the Mizo tribes to Christianity during the British period. The Young Lushai Association, a quasichurch youth organization, later named the Young Mizo Association, was formed in 1935 during the British period. These associations helped crystallize a collective Mizo identity. The spread of Christianity and English education brought socio-economic mobility to the Lushai Hills. The Mizos sought separatism from the Indian Union after India’s independence. A combination of political and cultural factors necessitated Mizo sub-nationalist aspirations. Lack of development, rising expectations and relative discrepancy between the rising educated middle class in the hill districts and the politically dominant caste Hindus of Assam led to ethnic divisions and separatist mobilization in the Lushai Hills. Mizos expressed grievances against perceived dependence and socio-economic neglect by the Assam government in the 1960s. Prior resistance was shown against the attempts made by the government of India after independence to integrate the Mizos in the Lushai Hills into the Indian Union. The efforts of integration by political elites in the centre were met with a certain degree of adherence by some groups, led by Mizo Union, a political party formed in 1946 to secure a rightful place for the common Mizos in the society and governing institutions that were so far being dominated by traditional chiefs of the Lushai Hills. The Mizo Union came up with the proposal to the Indian government that they preferred to remain as an integral part of India provided the Indian government fulfilled the aspirations of the Mizos. However, it was clearly mentioned in the proposal that if the state failed to accomplish the stated goals within the next ten years, then the Mizos would have the option of either forming an independent state or joining the Chin Hills and forming a separate province within the neighbouring country of Burma. Integration was strongly resisted by a section of Mizos, particularly the traditional elites (chiefs) who wanted to safeguard their prior positions. Mizoram was finally constituted under the Sixth Schedule with two district councils entrusted with substantial legislative, executive and judicial powers of autonomy. The actual functioning of the district councils, however, proved to be ineffective and very little was achieved in terms of providing tangible benefits to the Mizos. Mizo grievances were aggravated by a severe famine, which devastated vegetation and crops and further deteriorated the situation of the Mizo economy. The government failed to provide adequate relief and access to basic amenities to the people living under miserable famine conditions. These aggravated feelings of isolation and negligence by the government towards the people of Mizoram. The Mizos demanded the formation of a separate state for the Mizos inhabiting the areas comprising present Mizoram and parts of Manipur, Tripura and Assam. The crisis faced by Mizoram during this period resulted in the formation of a local political party named

450  Pahi Saikia Mizo National Front (MNF) that launched the separatist movement. The movement became increasingly violent towards March 1966, when the MNF rebels were engaged in violence, which prevented the government security forces from entering Mizoram. The government airlifted several battalions of the Indian army and other paramilitary forces to take control of the law and order situation in the district. The government imposed sanctions on the movement of the rebels and declared Mizoram as a disturbed zone on 2 March 1966. In the mid-1970s, an effort was made by the MNF and the government to start a dialogue. Due to peace initiatives taken by the church and other civil society groups, the MNF signed the historic peace accord in 1986 with Rajiv Gandhi and accepted the formation of a separate state for the Mizos within the Indian Union. The formation of Mizoram led to the dissatisfaction of ethnic minorities like the Hmars in Mizoram. The Hmars waged an armed struggle against the government of Mizoram and demanded an autonomous district integrating Hmars residing in neighbouring states of Assam and Manipur. Other groups like Brus have also made similar demands. Ethnic violence between the Mizos and the Brus in southern Mizoram resulted in the displacement of nearly 15,000 to 50,000 people to Assam and north Tripura in 1997. The tensions emerged when the Bru National Party demanded an Autonomous District Council based on the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution for the Reangs in southern Mizoram. To summarize, Mizoram, therefore, represents a case where the insurgent leaders were accommodated in the democratic space in India. After the declaration of Mizoram as a full-fledged state, Laldenga, the former leader of MNF, was appointed as the Chief Minister of the state in 1986. The government remained relatively inclusive and accommodated the interests of different social groups in the state. However, smaller ethnic groups such as the Maras, Chakmas and Lais expressed their grievances about a lack of proportionate representation in the state institutions. Autonomous District Councils under the Sixth Schedule have been provided to such groups that represent their identities, political interests and ensure the distribution of natural resources such as land and forests.

Box 20.6  Rise of Sub-nationalist Aspirations in Mizoram • The term ‘zo’ comprises a conglomerate of Indo-Burma borderland tribes who lived in a contiguous territory and believed in the myth of a common origin called Khul or Chhinlung or Sinlung (a cave whose whereabouts remain a mystery). Today, Chin, Kuki, Lushai (Mizo), Zomi and so on are all interchangeable referents for the same Zo people (Pau, 2018). • The Young Lushai Association, a quasi-church youth organization, later named the Young Mizo Association, was formed in 1935

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  451 during the British period. These associations helped crystallize a collective Mizo identity. • The Mizos demanded the formation of a separate state for the Mizos inhabiting the areas comprising present Mizoram and parts of Manipur, Tripura and Assam. • The MNF launched the separatist movement. The movement became increasingly violent towards March 1966, when MNF rebels were engaged in violence. • Due to peace initiatives taken by the church and other civil society groups, the MNF signed the historic peace accord in 1986 with Rajiv Gandhi and accepted the formation of a separate state for the Mizos within the Indian Union. • Autonomous District Councils under the Sixth Schedule have been provided to such groups that represent their identities, political interests and ensure the distribution of natural resources such as land and forests.

Ethnopolitical Mobilization in Nagaland The term ‘Naga’ is highly contested and is used to refer to a number of subtribes residing in the eastern and western parts of Nagaland. Each Naga tribe has its own dialect and distinctive customary practices and institutions. The Nagas practised head hunting and were known for inter-tribal warfare. The Nagas share interethnic linkages with other Naga sub-tribes living within and outside the territorial boundaries of India. In India, besides Nagaland, Nagas live in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The construction of a separate ethnic identity of the Nagas dates back to British colonialism when the Inner line policies were followed by the colonial administrators to control incursions and the movement of people from the hills to the valley of undivided Assam. The British first came into contact with the Naga tribes in 1832 when they encountered raids by the Angami tribes. The Angamis resisted British efforts to build roads between Assam province and Manipur through the Naga Hills (Changkiri, 1998, p.  29). The British developed commercial interests in tea plantations. Naga Hills was lucrative for British interests. The inner line policies adopted by the British administrators were meant to promote colonial commercial interests and to protect their subjects from the raids and incursions of the Nagas. These policies resulted in the geographical and cultural isolation of the Nagas from the rest of British India. The Nagas were allowed self-governance and internal autonomy with collective rights. Nagas came under the influence of Christian missionaries. The spread of Christian missionaries enabled the establishment of schools and hospitals in the Naga Hills. A section of the growing middle class among the Nagas,

452  Pahi Saikia including the pastors, village headmen, teachers and colonial government servants, became conscious of their collective identity and the interests of the Nagas. As a result of such consciousness in 1918, socio-political organizations such as the Naga Club were formed. The Naga Club mobilized the Nagas on ideas of a Naga nation and nationalism, which laid the foundation of a political ideology against the integration of the Naga Hills within India. In 1929, the Naga Club submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission at Kohima asking the British government to exclude the Nagas from the Reformed Scheme of India. In the Government of India Act, 1935, the Naga Hills were declared as excluded areas to be administered and controlled by the Governor of Assam. In the post-Independence period, the Naga Hills became sites of contestation between Naga armed ethnonationalist groups and government forces. The Nagas were led by the Naga Club, which later became the Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) in 1946. The NNC signed a nine-point agreement for substantial autonomy with the government of India in June 1947. Due to emerging differences with the government of India, the NNC, under the leadership of Phizo, declared a referendum for the independence of the Naga inhabited areas from India. The Nagas therefore boycotted the process of democracy in the 1950s and continued their armed struggle. The Indian government responded by sending its armed forces and by crushing the Naga armed rebellion in 1957. Some Naga leaders negotiated and asked for a separate state within India. Thus, Nagaland was recognized as the 16th state of the Indian Union in 1963. Since the formation of statehood, many Nagas have participated in the Indian political process while those asking for independence have remained opposed to it (Baruah, 2007). Phizo took exile in London, and the hardliners continued their struggle. Although the initial peace processes failed, the talks led to the peace deal called the Shillong Accord, signed between the Naga leaders and the Government of India in 1975. The accord laid down the unconditional acceptance of the Indian constitution by Nagaland and the surrender of arms by the Naga insurgents. The majority of the Naga nationalists were indeed not in favour of the agreement, which ultimately led to the formation of the NSCN in 1980 for further pursuance of the independence movement. Nagaland was once again (after 1958) declared as a ‘Disturbed Area’ and made the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, applicable in the state. The insurgency and counterinsurgency continued with killings, kidnappings, torture of suspects and summary executions. However, in 1988, the NSCN split into NSCN (I-M), which drew most of its support from the Tangkhul tribe based in Manipur, and NSCN (Khaplang), led by Konyak Nagas and mostly based in Burma. Both these groups were involved in conflict. The NSCN (Isak-Muivah [I-M]) faction entered into a ceasefire agreement with the government of India in July 1997. The ceasefire talks were held outside India in Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland, among other countries. The Church played a major

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  453 role in the initiation of the ceasefire agreement. Since then, ceasefire deals have been extended, but the Konyak group has not entered into any sort of agreement until 2001. Despite the talks, peace did not prevail in Nagaland. Internecine conflicts and violence took place between the two factions of the NSCN. Negotiations continued between the government of India and the NSCN (I-M) in May 2003 and December 2004. In 2008, the NSCN (I-M) submitted their demand for a separate constitution for Nagalim, including other matters related to taxation and the preservation of cultural rights. The government showed its unwillingness to accept the demand for a separate constitution and territorial separation. Due to emerging differences on the issue of territory and integration of Nagas in Nagaland and the neighbouring states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, the talks remained inconclusive. The conflicting demands of different sections of Nagas, as well as the claims of the NSCN (I-M) of the territories in the border states, such as Assam, were also major hurdles that stand in the way of any solution to the protracted conflict in Nagaland. In 2014, the NSCN (I-M) entered into another round of negotiations with the Government of India. Civil society groups such as the Naga Mothers Association were extended the proposal to participate in the talks. Recently, the Naga accord has been signed between the NSCN (I-M) and the government of India. On 3 August 2015, the Naga Peace Accord was signed between the BJP government at the centre and the NSCN (I-M). The terms of the framework of agreement signed between the two parties were not revealed to the public. The NSCN (I-M), however, released the confidential framework of agreement in 2020. The organization demanded the removal of R. N. Ravi as the interlocutor of the Government of India. Differences emerged between the signing parties on the issue of a separate constitution and a flag for Nagalim. Therefore, since the terms of the accord are yet to be finalized by both the parties and other Naga civil society organizations, constructive peace therefore remains to be established in Nagaland.

Box 20.7  Ethnopolitical Mobilization in Nagaland • In the Government of India Act, 1935, the Naga Hills were declared as excluded areas to be administered and controlled by the Governor of Assam. • Nagaland was recognized as the 16th state of the Indian Union in 1963. • In 1988, the NSCN split into NSCN (I-M), which drew most of its support from the Tangkhul tribe based in Manipur, and NSCN (Khaplang), led by Konyak Nagas and mostly based in Burma.

454  Pahi Saikia • The NSCN (I-M) faction entered into a ceasefire agreement with the government of India in July 1997. • In 2008, the NSCN (I-M) submitted their demand for a separate constitution for Nagalim, including other matters related to taxation and the preservation of cultural rights. On 3 August 2015, the Naga Peace Accord was signed between the BJP government at the centre and the NSCN (I-M).

Sub-nationalist Aspirations: Manipur Manipur has been experiencing insurgent violence since the 1960s. Manipur became a full-fledged state in 1972. The state is located in the border areas between India and Myanmar. The population of Manipur is mostly comprised of Meitei-speaking people (about 65 per cent) inhabiting the Imphal valley. Naga tribes and Thadou Kukis, inhabiting mostly the hills, constitute about 34 per cent of the population. Like other states in India’s Northeast, Manipur has been known for political instability since the 1960s. Since the 1990s, the state has gained attention for various security reasons, including flourishing contraband networks, a history of local insurrections and insurgent politics. The state of Manipur also became the cornerstone of the international political economy due to its potential for connectivity and access to international markets via Imphal, Moreh and Tamu. Sub-nationalist aspirations in Manipur have roots in the British colonial annexation. Meitei rulers ruled Manipur in the pre-colonial period, which can be traced back to 33 ad. The Puyas or written chronicles during the Meitei kingdom, provide rich accounts of the history of the Meitei people and Manipur. Traces of state formation can be traced back to the 14th and 16th centuries. The Meiteis came under the influence of the Vaishnavism form of Hinduism in the 1690s. In 1762, the Meitei kingdom signed a treaty of friendship with the East India Company, which allowed the British to have access to trade. In return, the British provided military support to the Meitei kingdom against attacks by Burmese troops. By the 1900s, the British became the de facto rulers of Manipur. The 1920s and 1930s were marked by the rising consciousness of the Meitei middle class that laid the foundations of later political mobilization. The British indirectly controlled the hills and deployed the hills tribes (Kukis) as labourers from time to time. The British period was also marked by inter-tribal warfare and incursions in the Naga and Kuki hills. Repeated incursions and encounters between the British colonizers and the ethnic tribes in the hills of Manipur resulted in a series of administrative policies and the imposition of taxes to control the Kuki hills. In May 1917, Kukis, led by the

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  455 village chiefs, rebelled against forced labour and the imposition of taxes by the colonial government. This led to the Anglo-Kuki war in Manipur. Between 1930 and 1932, the British were engaged in wars with the Naga tribes as well. The later part of the 1940s and 1950s thus witnessed ethnic mobilization of the Nagas and Kukis in the neighbouring hills. These groups were highly influenced by ethnic kins in the neighbouring Naga Hills and Lushai Hills, the Naga National Council of Nagaland and the Mizo Union in Mizoram. Meanwhile, people protested in the valley due to rising prices and food shortages. On 12 December  1939, a group of Manipuri women protested against the princely state of Manipur and the British officials. The revolt, popularly known as Nupi Lan (women’s rebellion), was met with stiff resistance by the police. In August 1947, just before the British left the Indian subcontinent, the king of Manipur signed the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement. Accordingly, on 14 August 1947, the interim Manipur State Council started functioning. The hill-based tribal population was disgruntled when state power and institutions were exclusively vested in the hands of the Manipuri elite. The question of the merger of Manipur with India was an important cause of concern for the hill leaders. They feared that they would remain as subjects after the transfer of power to the Manipur State Durbar and the merger with the predominantly Hindu state of Manipur. The Kuki National Assembly, along with the Naga leaders (the Naga National League), instead sought the creation of a separate union of hills in Manipur. Conflict took place in the valley on the issue of control over political power. Meitei ethnonationalism emerged against the backdrop of a deep sense of alienation and neglect of a historically and culturally rich kingdom where the Manipuri people exercised their power and suzerainty. The political apathy of the central government on the issue of Kabaw Valley, lack of economic development, stiff counterinsurgency measures and the occupation of Kangla fort, the historical capital, by the state army and other contingent factors like the Manipur Land Revenue Regulation (1960), which put restrictions on the Meiteis to purchase land in the hills, subsequently contributed to the rise of militant nationalism in Manipur. The United National Liberation Front was formed to lead the movement of Meitei sub-nationalism. In 1978, the People’s Liberation Army was formed to fight against the Indian state. In the 1970s and 1980s, Manipur witnessed the formation of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, formed in 1977 under the leadership of Rajkumar Tulachandra, and Kangleipak Communist Party, formed in 1980. Sub-nationalist violence continued and in 1980, the government of India imposed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 in Manipur. The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, the People’s Liberation Army and the Kangleipak Communist Party were banned in 1981. President’s rule was imposed in Manipur in 1981 and again in 1992 and 1993. Human rights violations took place due to the counterinsurgency operations in Manipur. Counterinsurgency also intensified the violence of insurgent groups in Manipur. In the 1990s and 2000s, the state was engulfed

456  Pahi Saikia in intensive ethnonationalist violence. Insurgent groups in Manipur targeted Indian security forces. Meanwhile, the government of India called for negotiations with the insurgent groups in 1995 and again in 2000. The insurgent groups refused to take part in the negotiations unless the issue of self-determination was addressed. Insurgent violence, counter-insurgent operations, and extra-judicial killings continued in the valley, which resulted in the Malom massacre on 2 November 2000 when the Indian security forces killed 10 unarmed civilians. Irom Sharmila, a peace activist, showed resistance against the violation of human rights, the AFSPA, and went on hunger strike on 5 November  2000. Due to pressure from civil society groups, in 2017, the Supreme Court of India ordered an official enquiry into several cases of extra-judicial killings in Manipur. As far as the hills are concerned, the Nagas and Kukis have continued their struggle for separate territories since the 1950s when they formed insurgent organizations such as the Kuki National Army, Kuki National Front and the United Kuki Liberation Front. The Kuki National Army’s objective was to integrate the Kuki areas comprising the districts of Churachandpur, Senapati, Chandel, Tamenglong, parts of Ukhrul in Manipur and parts of Nagaland, Assam and Burma. The demand for a separate state for the Kukis was in competition with the demands for Greater Nagaland made by NSCN (I-M). The differences led to tensions and resulted in violence in the 1990s between the two groups. Violence between the Nagas and Kukis continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Negotiations with the government of India took place in 2008. Three rounds of talks were held between February and November  2008. In August  2008, the Kuki insurgent organization signed an agreement in Delhi with the Government of India and the government of Manipur to suspend their activities. The key issues of separate territory are yet to be addressed on the negotiating table. The armed ethnonationalist groups in the hill and the valley thus continue to assert their identity. In the hills, there is intensive political competition between the traditional village authorities of each tribe and sub-tribe. Socio-economic development and infrastructural projects in Manipur have suffered due to intensive competition for control over centrally sponsored funds and the illegal taxations that characterizes the state’s parallel economy. The funds that are collected through illegal taxation are often routed through the village authorities and the Hill Tribal Council. To conclude, in the midst of Meitei, Kuki and Naga insurgent violence, Manipur witnessed democratic elections until recently when the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government took office in March 2017.

Box 20.8  Rise of Sub-nationalist Aspirations in Manipur • In August 1947, just before the British left the Indian subcontinent, the king of Manipur signed the Instrument of Accession and the

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  457 Standstill Agreement. Accordingly, on 14 August 1947, the interim Manipur State Council started functioning. • In 1978, the People’s Liberation Army was formed to fight against the Indian state. • Sub-nationalist violence continued and in 1980, the government of India imposed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 in Manipur. The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, the People’s Liberation Army and the Kangleipak Communist Party were banned in 1981. • Irom Sharmila, a peace activist, showed resistance against the violation of human rights, the AFSPA, and went on hunger strike on 5 November 2000. • Violence between the Nagas and Kukis continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In August 2008, the Kuki insurgent organization signed an agreement in Delhi with the Government of India and the government of Manipur to suspend their activities. • Socio-economic development and infrastructural projects in Manipur have suffered due to intensive competition for control over centrally sponsored funds and the illegal taxations that characterizes the state’s parallel economy. • In the midst of Meitei, Kuki and Naga insurgent violence, Manipur witnessed democratic elections until recently when the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government took office in March 2017.

Sub-national Aspirations: Tripura Sub-national movements also took place in Tripura, which has contiguous borders with Bangladesh, Assam and Mizoram. Tripura is known for its rich Tripuri kingdom ruled by the Manikya dynasty. The present state has two historically distinct geographical areas – the western plains and the hilly east and north-eastern regions, which created an ethnic divide between the Hill Tipperah and the Chakla Roshnabad of the low-lying plain areas and a relatively peaceful merger into the Indian Union in 1949. Tripura remained a union territory until 1971, when it acquired statehood under the North-­Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971. During the Manikya rulership, both skilled and unskilled Bengali settlers from unpartitioned East Bangladesh were initially brought in by the Manikya rulers to help them run the administration and to increase the revenue by practising wet rice cultivation. The Manikyas controlled much of East Bengal’s Comilla region during mediaeval times. Their governance was marked by fairness and balance in the handling of ethnic aspirations. In the post-colonial phase, as long as tribals had enough land and the Bengali population was limited to certain urban or semi-urban pockets or rural areas around the capital,

458  Pahi Saikia land alienation of tribals did not emerge as a major problem (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 294). Subsequent waves of migration took place during the civil war in Bangladesh in 1971, which ultimately led to significant changes in the demographic composition of the state. The Manikyas allowed the indigenous tribal people who follow traditional beliefs and who have indigenous tribal origins, mostly residing in the hilly regions, to preserve their rights in the protected hilly areas. This later became the forerunner of the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council in 1979. The Council attained greater autonomous powers under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution in 1984 due to rising demands of the indigenous people for ethnic autonomy. Communists and the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti, a political party formed by tribal youth leaders for constitutional and legal protection of their land rights and other privileges since the 1960s, led the indigenous people. The fears of the indigenous communities were not unwarranted. An increasing flow of migrants during the Congress regime gradually outnumbered the indigenous tribes in local economic activities and politics of the state. Tripura’s glorious history has therefore been marred by ethnic tensions and violence since the 1960s between the Bengali-speaking migrant community, who are a majority, and the Kokborok-speaking Tripuri people, whose numbers have diminished to barely 30 per cent of the state’s population. It is important to note that there are smaller tribal communities like the Reangs and Mizos, mostly inhabiting the border regions of Tripura, who have been opposed to the greater autonomy demands of the Tripuri tribes. Tripuri tribal groups led an ethnic movement called the ‘Sengkrak movement’ in 1967, against the Congressled state government’s support for Bengali settlers for coercive occupation of tribal land. In the 1980s, the indigenous tribal groups formed militant organizations such as the Tripura National Volunteer, the All Tripura Tribal Force and the National Liberation Front of Tripura, whose main demand was an ‘independent Tripura’. The Bengali-speaking people formed rival militant groups like the Bengal National Liberation Front to defend the Bengalispeaking people from the ethnic violence perpetrated by the tribal groups. In the past few decades, the state has witnessed some of the most gruesome forms of ethnic violence. Armed organizations like the Tribal National Volunteers laid down their arms in the late 1980s when they decided to form an alliance with the Congress party and enter state-level politics. Counterinsurgency operations and internal divisions within the tribal insurgent groups enfeebled the militancy towards the middle of 2000. Further, an accommodative approach in the form of creating an autonomous tribal zone in 2011 and other peaceful strategies adopted by the government have toned down the violence to a great extent. In Tripura, violence continued even after the asymmetrical autonomy provisions were made for the indigenous groups in Tripura. The Tribal National Volunteers, followed by the All Tripura Tiger Force and the National Liberation Force of Tripura, continued their violence throughout

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  459 the 1990s and 2000s. Their agenda is to drive out the Bengali settlers. The leadership has been opposing the majoritarian policies and power controlled by the Bengali settlers in Tripura. The leadership of these armed organizations urges their communities to look forward to tribal states like Mizoram, where politics, culture, economy and society are dominated by the tribesmen (Bhaumik, 2007). Despite insurgent violence, the state government of Tripura, led by the Communist Party of India-Marxist political party, has been able to bring stability to the state. The Communist Party of India-Marxist government lost its power and the Bharatiya Janata Party won the elections in 2018. In August 2019, the state government of Tripura, the central government and the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the insurgent organization, signed a tripartite accord to bring peace and end the insurgency.

Box 20.9  Rise of Sub-nationalist Aspirations in Tripura • Tripura is known for its rich Tripuri kingdom ruled by the Manikya dynasty. The present state has two historically distinct geographical areas – the western plains and the hilly east and north-eastern regions, which created an ethnic divide between the Hill Tipperah and the Chakla Roshnabad of the low-lying plain areas and a relatively peaceful merger into the Indian Union in 1949. • The Manikyas allowed the indigenous tribal people who follow traditional beliefs and who have indigenous tribal origins, mostly residing in the hilly regions, to preserve their rights in the protected hilly areas. • The Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council attained greater autonomous powers under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution in 1984 due to rising demands of the indigenous people for ethnic autonomy. • Tripura’s glorious history has therefore been marred by ethnic tensions and violence since the 1960s between the Bengali-speaking migrant community, who are a majority, and the Kokborok-speaking Tripuri people, whose numbers have diminished to barely 30 per cent of the state’s population. • Tripuri tribal groups led an ethnic movement called the ‘Sengkrak movement’ in 1967, against the Congress-led state government’s support for Bengali settlers for coercive occupation of tribal land. • In August 2019, the state government of Tripura, the central government and the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the insurgent organization, signed a tripartite accord to bring peace and end the insurgency.

460  Pahi Saikia Responses and Dynamics The Government of India adopted mixed techniques to contain, prevent and manage ethnonationalist conflicts in different parts of India, including the north-eastern states. Because of the dangers of spillover or the spread of ethnic conflicts within and across India’s strategic boundaries, the government often responded to most fighting groups asking for ethnic autonomy or separation with severe repression. However, the government also adopted some accommodative measures. Some of these measures are as follows: First, territorial autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution allows a substantial amount of autonomy to the groups demanding greater autonomous powers to manage their administrative, economic and political affairs within the confines of the Indian territories. A prominent example in this direction is the creation of the Bodo Territorial Area District on 7 December  2003. Second, the autonomy of tribal ethnic minority groups in Assam, such as the Misings, Deoris and Rabhas: The creation of the Mising Autonomous Council (1995), the Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council (1995), the Tiwa Autonomous Council (1995), the Deori Autonomous Council (2005), the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council (2005) and the Sonowal Kachari Autonomous Council (2005) were meant to provide political autonomy and power within existing state structures. In some cases, these mechanisms proved to be counterproductive and created a divide between ethnic groups within newly created multi-level structures. Third, executive power-sharing arrangements adopted at the state level after the Bodo accord in 2003 when the Bodo People’s Progressive Front, a newly formed political party, joined hands with the Congress party in the state in the state assembly elections of 2006.

Box 20.10  How did India respond to ethnonational claims in India’s Northeast? • Territorial autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution affords a substantial amount of autonomy to the groups demanding greater autonomous powers to manage their administrative, economic and political affairs within the confines of the Indian territories. A prominent example in this direction is the creation of the Bodo Territorial Area District on 7 December 2003. • The creation of the Mising Autonomous Council (1995), the Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council (1995), the Tiwa Autonomous Council (1995), the Deori Autonomous Council (2005), the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council (2005) and the Sonowal Kachari Autonomous Council (2005) were meant to provide political autonomy and power within existing state structures.

Politics of Ethnonationalism and Multi-Level Governance  461 Summing Up Ethnonationalism and separatist violence remain as important subjects of enquiry into ethnicity and nationalism. As we examined in this chapter, scholars approach the complexity of these issues from diverse perspectives. Some of the prevailing approaches to the study of ethnonationalism are informed by historical conditions, others by social constructivism and contingent factors. The chapter offered diverse perspectives on the dynamics of ethnonationalism while drawing evidence mostly from North-East India. The discussion informs us that structural conditions and exogenous political, economic and symbolic networks are equally indispensable to understanding the causes and dynamics of ethnonationalist separatism in India’s northeast. While delineating the conditions under which nation building, development of state institutions and regime transition lead to mobilization of identities, the chapter draws from theoretical underpinnings focusing on comparative analysis and the international spread of ethnic strife and politics. Additionally, the task has been to uncover the processes under which state policies exacerbate or alleviate violent ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, a discussion on the goals of mobilization broadens the perspective on the ramifications of ethnic conflict on inter-group, state – society and majority – minority relationships. References Anh, N. T. (2003). Village versus state: The evolution of state-local relations in Vietnam until 1945. Southeast Asian Studies, 41(1). https://kyoto-seas.org/ pdf/41/1/410107.pdf Baruah, S. (2007). Durable disorder: Understanding the politics of Northeast India. Oxford University Press. Bhaumik, S. (2007, July 1). Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, co-option & change. Research report, East West Center. https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/ server/api/core/bitstreams/45471990-933f-4ea7-99fe-02c9e7e4b9ff/content Bhaumik, S. (2009). Troubled periphery: Crisis of India’s North East. Sage Publications. Brass, P. R. (2006). Forms of collective violence: Riots, pogroms, and genocide in modern India. Pennsylvania State University Press. Changkiri, L. A. (1998). The Angami Nagas and the British, 1832–1947. Spectrum Publications. Fearon, J. D. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 275–301. Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity. International Organization, 54(4), 845–877. Forrester, D. (1970). Subregionalism in India: The case of Telangana. Pacific Affairs, 43(1), 5–21. Geertz, C.. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. Basic Books. Guha, R. (2007). India after Gandhi: The history of the world’s largest democracy. Harper Collins.

462  Pahi Saikia Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2011). Ethnic violence and internal displacement in north-east India, Norwegian Refugee Council. Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva. Kymlicka, W. (1998). Is federalism a viable alternative to secession? In P. Lehning (Ed.), Theories of secession (pp. 111–150, 133). Routledge. Mitchell, L. (2009). Language, emotion, and politics in South India: The making of a mother tongue. Indiana University Press. Narain, I. (1976). State politics in India. Meenakshi Prakashan. Olzak, S. (1992). The dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict. Stanford University Press. Pau, P. K. (2018). Transborder people, connected history: Border and relationships in the Indo-Burma borderlands. Journal of Borderland Studies, 35(2), 1–21. Saikia, P. (2011). Political opportunities, constraints, and mobilizing structures: An integrated approach to different levels of ethno-political contention in northeast India. India Review, 10(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2011.548237 Saikia, P., Chima, J. S., & Baro, A. K. (2016). Limits of ethnofederelism and local political autonomy arrangements: Continuing violence in the Bodoland Territorial Districts of Assam. India Review, 15(1), 136–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/14736 489.2015.1092744. Saxena, R. (2012). Is India a case of asymmetrical federalism? Economic & Political Weekly, 47(2). Stepan, A. (2001). Arguing comparative politics (pp.  327–328). Oxford University Press. Weiner, M. (1968). State politics in India. Princeton University Press. Young, C. (1976). The politics of cultural pluralism. University of Wisconsin Press.

21 Discourse on the Environment and Development in India Meenakshi Gogoi

Introduction The term ‘development’ means improvement in all aspects of human life. It emphasizes the continuous changes in human beings’ ways of living and survival modes at different points in time. The history of development has depicted the use of nature and its resources by humans to satisfy their various needs and wants. In ancient times, people and communities lived near rivers and coasts and survived on forest resources, hunting and fishing. The early stages of development witnessed human skills in creating bronze and iron products and rearing domestic animals for survival. Before the arrival of the Industrial Revolution, there was the age of traders, artisans and the exchange of goods. The Industrial Revolution saw an advanced period of inventions and the emergence of urbanization. It was the age of steam engines, the use of coal to generate energy for running industries, machines to produce goods and, at the same time, the migration of people to faraway towns and cities in search of jobs (Ossewaarde, 2018, p. 8). Later stages of development witnessed population growth, increased production and consumption of goods that resulted in more agricultural lands to cultivate staple crops. It simultaneously led to the gradual exploitation of natural resources due to increased human needs and wants. With time, the interdependence between man and nature accelerated, resulting in the enormous use of natural resources to the extent of causing environmental degradation. In contemporary times, both industrially developed and developing countries are experiencing more or less similar issues and concerns about environmental degradation. The challenge today is to balance development and the environment. As human needs and wants are unending and keep rising, it is imperative to take sustainable development seriously. In the case of India, the repeated interventions of the post-colonial state to make use of the forest or natural resources have resulted in an imbalance between sustainable development and the environment at different points in time. The aggressive forms of development have led to air and water pollution and the enormous acquisition of land for developmental projects,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-26

464  Meenakshi Gogoi whether public or private sector projects. The signs of environmental degradation began to appear in the 1970s and 1980s when the state framed laws to protect the environment from degradation. The state’s effort to balance controlling the environmental crisis and creating sustainable development has been much more on paper than brought it to significant success. Overall, this chapter examines the continuity and changes in understanding the discourse on the environment and development in India over the years. The first section examines the discourse on the environment and development through various issues and concerns revolving around it. This section examines the constitutional provisions regarding protecting and conserving the environment and why that matters. What is the stand of the judiciary in this context? It examines the reasons, consequences and state concerns revolving around the environment and development in the initial years of the post-colonial phase. The second section examines the stateframed forest laws and how far such state laws have preserved the environment. How did the forest dwellers deal with such laws? How can we understand the growth of environmental and anti-development resistance movements? The third and final section examines the present discourse on the environment and development since post-1990 onwards with reference to the post-2014 changes in environmental laws. This section examines the new ecological policies framed by the state to keep a balance between development and the environment and how far such policies have been successful. Environment and Development in India: Major Issues and Concerns

The post-colonial state’s endeavour towards rapid development and economic prosperity has come along with the consequences of environmental degradation. The installation of heavy industries and their operation has led to causing air pollution. The disposal of industrial waste and sewage into rivers and canals has polluted the rivers and coastlines. The dumping of garbage, industrial waste and non-disposal of e-wastes has, over the years, drawn attention to the imbalance between the environment and sustainable development. The population growth factor also contributed to the consequences of the environment. The rise in the population has led to an increase in consumption patterns, production of energy and demands for urbanization, resulting in the further depletion of substantial natural resources. The poor and marginalized tribal communities’ dependence on forest resources such as fuel and fodder for their livelihood is also causing a scarcity of natural resources. At the same time, the state’s enthusiasm to build various developmental projects is not limited. The outcome is that different development effects have occurred that mainly affect the sustenance of a clean and safe environment. The concept of sustainable development has emphasized the optimum utilization and limited exploitation of natural resources to the extent that

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  465 resources must be preserved to be utilized by future generations. However, the rapid exploitation of natural resources and ongoing development projects are hurdles to maintaining sustainable development in contemporary times. In the initial years of post-colonial India, the state prioritized nation building and development, which resulted in a mixed response. Some of the significant tasks led by the state then were building dam projects, bringing rapid industrialization and enhancing agricultural productivity. However, simultaneously, such economic prosperity and development steps led to severe environmental problems and concerns. For instance, the Hirakud and Damodar valley projects led to the submergence of enormous lands, forest resources, endangered species and sociocultural sites, such as temples and heritage sites, and displacement of the large-scale population from their habitats. At the same time, other environmental problems occurred, such as soil degradation and air and water pollution.

Box 21.1  Sustainable Development The term ‘sustainable development’ draws attention to the overconsumption and depletion of natural resources on the earth. This concept was defined in the Brundtland report, titled Our Common Future, in 1981. It aims at optimum utilization of natural resources, minimizing the use of resources and conserving natural resources for future generations to meet their wants. It emphasizes balancing the people’s needs and development. In general, the term focuses on a balanced development in social, economic and environmental aspects.

In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a food crisis in the state, which led to the launch of high-yielding variety seeds, the use of chemicals and fertilizers, and new technology to increase food production and thereby tackle the problem of food scarcity in the state. However, this led to degradation of soils due to excessive use of chemical fertilizers, degradation of groundwater and soil quality, which led to health hazards, the decline in crop diversity, waterlogging, salinity and so on (Vyas & Reddy, 1998, pp. 48–49). Simultaneously, the problem of population explosion was rising in Haryana, Punjab and other irrigated regions, which further led to the exploitation of forest resources and the decline in forest cover, reservoirs and biodiversity (Vyas & Reddy, 1998, pp. 48–49). There was a lack of proper irrigation; industrial and land use policies heightened the problem of environmental damage. It is argued that environmental concerns have started to grow from the 1960s onwards across the globe. The Stockholm Conference was a testimony to that. This United Nations (UN) conference focused on ‘human

466  Meenakshi Gogoi environment’, which emphasized the possible threat to the human species due to rapid environmental degradation globally (Singh Sharan, 2007, p.  751). It focused on the relationship between humans and the environment. It emphasized the importance that freedom and a good life can be retained only in an improved environment, so humans must protect and preserve the environment (Singh Sharan, 2007). This conference sent a message across the globe that all countries should protect humankind from environmental disasters. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was one of the heads of the states representing India at this conference, and she also delivered a speech on environmental concerns. The Indian Constitution and the Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Issues

In the Indian context, the Constitution has played a significant role in protecting and creating awareness among people about the environment. It has put forward some constitutional measures to tackle the environmental problems. The constitutional provisions legal actions of both the centre and state governments aim to protect the environment. There are provisions in Articles 47, 48 and 49 which refer to dealing with problems and giving directives for such causes to the Indian government (Singh Sharan, 2007). For example, the Directive Principles of State Policy specifically mentioned the need to protect health hazards; Article 47 said that the state must restrict or protect hazardous activities and remove unsanitary conditions (Ahmed, 2001, p. 369). The 42nd Amendment, 1976, included specific provisions to protect the environment by inserting Article 48A, which requires the state to safeguard the environment, wildlife and protect forests (Ahmed, 2001, p. 369). Again, the fundamental duties, as stated in Articles 51A (g), asked citizens ‘to protect and improve natural environment comprised of forests, lakes, rivers, wildlife’ (Ahmed, 2001, p. 369). Despite constitutional provisions to protect the environment, there was a lack of serious effort in the government’s actions to deal with the environmental issues and problems. Along with the constitution, the judiciary has also time and again intervened in the issues concerning environmental damage and issued verdicts to highlight the necessity of safeguarding the environment and emphasize the need for why citizens and states need to improve the environment. For example, in the Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar case, the Supreme Court clearly stated that under Article 21, the right to live is a fundamental right, and it includes the right to enjoy pollution-free water and air to enjoy life (Ahmed, 2001, pp.  366–367). Thus, the Court hinted at the need for a quality life dependent on a quality environment to live in. Again, in the Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India case, the Supreme Court gave the verdict by upholding the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, about human rights, the right to life and liberty and the pollution-free air and water offered by the Constitution under Article 21 (Ahmed, 2001, p.  367). At different

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  467 time intervals, the Supreme Court has thus directed the state to protect the environment as per constitutional norms. Environmental Laws in the 1970s–80s

At the national level, Mrs  Indira Gandhi’s regime took some significant steps to formulate laws to conserve a clean, pollution-free environment and protect wildlife like tigers and endangered species. From 1970 onwards, much emphasis was made on dealing with environmental issues and problems, particularly air and water pollution – for example, the introduction of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. The Act aims to prohibit the use of polluting substances and fuels and makes it mandatory for industrial plants operating in a pollution control area to seek the state’s permission before installing it (Iyer, 2011, p. 42). The state focused on reducing carbon emission levels by setting air quality standards to control pollutants, thereby safeguarding human health and the environment from degradation. Some of the other essential Acts relating to the environment passed during the late 1970s and 1980s, such as the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Rules formulated in 1982; the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, to regulate traffic and transportation of hazardous waste; the Factories Act, 1987; the Atomic Energy Act, 1982; the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Amendment Act, 1987; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; and the establishment of Central Pollution Control Boards in both the centre and state governments to deal with the issues of air and water pollution (Iyer, 2011, pp. 40–42). Therefore, apart from the steps taken by the government, the judiciary also made substantial efforts in their own space and constitutional rights to control the environmental crisis through directives given to the executives to abide by constitutional norms while dealing with matters of human lives and environmental concerns. However, such laws and state policies need to be continuously evaluated and reviewed to cope with the changes in climate and environmental issues and problems that keep occurring at different intervals of time. The state has to face challenges in controlling such environmental pollution to a certain extent. The state has made efforts to preserve the forest areas from deforestation and overexploitation of forest resources. But at the same time, forcible land acquisitions are also taking place to set up development projects like dams, special economic zones, mining or the establishment of heavy industries. The loss of ecology in state-protected areas and the displacement of many tribals or forest dwellers have always questioned the state’s developmental model, which forcibly displaces them from their habitats and submerges the endangered wildlife species, trees and forest resources. It further leads to deforestation that harms the quality of the environment and destroys the relationship between humans and nature.

468  Meenakshi Gogoi Scholars’ Perspectives on Environmental Concerns and Development

The prospects of development cannot be simply ignored because of environmental concerns and problems. Eminent scholars, like Ramachandra Guha in his text, Environmentalism, have emphasized the environmental concerns of developed and developing countries. He provides two case studies of India and Brazil regarding environmental degradation, its issues and concerns, through which he addresses the discourse on the environment and development in these countries. For him, in the Indian context, the environmentalism of the poor is understood through the plight of the poor peasants, tribals, fisherfolks and pastoralists who are facing the consequences of development and environmental problems. They have launched several environmental movements or protests to protect the environment and preserve their forest rights (Guha, 2014, pp. 149–150). Similarly, he focuses on the plight of the urban settlers and indigenous people who opposed increasing pollution, burning of forests and environmental degradation. He examines in detail the efforts and the role of the Green Party, the Penan community, the destruction of the Amazon rainforest by settlers, agriculture and industrial mining, the struggle of the Brazilian green movement, the Ogoni tribe against the oil drilling by the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate, Royal Shell in Nigeria, the Narmada dam protests in India against the Sardar Sarovar Dam, which would destroy the forest areas and submerge historical sites, temples and uproot some 250 villages (Guha, 2014, pp. 149–159). Therefore, Guha emphasizes the negative consequences of development in Brazil and India and their serious repercussions, which failed to protect and conserve the environment. Moreover, the developmental efforts of the state have always been contested and criticized because they compromise environmental concerns. In her text, In the Belly of the River, Amita Baviskar examines the impact of development policies, particularly on the lives of poor people and the environment. She used the theoretical approach of ‘Ecological Marxism’ to explain the conflict over natural resources and how popular grassroots struggles or collective resistances of tribal communities, fisherfolk, labourers and peasants occur in different parts of India (Baviskar, 1995, p. 20). These struggles are against developmental projects.

Box 21.2  Ecological Marxism ‘Ecological Marxism’ is also known as ‘eco-Marxism’. It emphasizes that capitalism uses natural resources to fulfil its goals of economic development or profit-seeking. It explains the Marxist doctrine of ­anti-capitalism with ecology. The eco-Marxists uphold that just like capitalism exploits the proletariat, it similarly destroys nature or

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  469 leads to its overexploitation, resulting in environmental degradation, widespread industrialization, air pollution, water pollution, climate ­ change, deforestation and so on. Thus, it highlights the various environmental issues and ecological conflicts caused by capitalism which are faced by different communities, and their struggle with capitalists’ developmental projects. It, therefore, emphasizes the unsustainable use of the environment in contemporary times across the globe.

Baviskar (1995, p. 20) studied the processes that impoverish tribal people and destroy their natural habitat and argued how the tribal lives could serve as an example of an alternative paradigm of development based on harmony between nature and culture. She highlighted that contrary to the widespread assumptions of the state bringing industrial expansion, increasing food production, generating employment and income, it has led to wide-scale poverty and starvation deaths in the initial years of post-colonial India. Baviskar questioned the state’s developmental agendas, which crushed people’s lives and communities. She further argued that the Narmada Bachao Andolan fought against a dominant state-led development model. Regarding health concerns due to environmental degradation, Jairam Ramesh has pointed out that the environment is not an elite or uppermiddle-class breathing issue. Still, it has become a health concern for every man (Ramesh, 2010, p.  15). He argued that climate change had brought severe health issues in India. For example, the industrial and vehicle disposal or dumping of chemical waste and municipal sewage into rivers and the growing public health risks like respiratory illness (Ramesh, 2010). He draws attention to the non-implementation of the laws enacted by the Parliament adequately while dealing with issues relating to the environment. In this context, he raised concerns over the inadequate enforcement of acts such as the Water Act, 1974; the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972; and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (Ramesh, 2010). Vandana Shiva, in her text, Earth Democracy, emphasized the tribals’ right to assert their rights to protect their lands and forests. The term helps describe how these communities reclaim their rights to the shared resources, livelihood, dignity, and identity (Shiva, 2006, pp.  1–5). Shiva has highlighted the term ‘earth democracy’ to critique the capitalist endeavour of snatching away the tribals’ forests and other natural resources. However, it can be argued that such an understanding also appears to make sense of how different tribal communities are fighting for their right to livelihood against capitalist and state development endeavours at the same time. The concern over increasing exploitation of natural resources is prevalent, and the fear of the vast scarcity of resources soon. Summing up the views mentioned earlier, it can be argued that the discourse on the environment and development cannot be studied in isolation. Both these terms are interrelated. The negative consequences of development

470  Meenakshi Gogoi are leading to the effects of environmental degradation. There is a severe imbalance between sustainable development and the environment, which undoubtedly dominates the entire discourse. Ecologists and environmentalists have again addressed indigenous ways of using natural resources and managing the environment. However, during the colonial period, maximum exploitation or use of forest resources took place to build developmental projects and manufacture forest goods. Again, such activities have been expanded further in the post-colonial state’s endeavour to fulfil developmental goals at a rapid pace. While discussing creating a balance between development and the environment, Gandhian views cannot be ignored. Mahatma Gandhi emphasized an ecological model that focused on the limitation of wants or how one should have wanted enough for oneself (Moolakkattu, 2019). He talked about simple living and high thinking without stressing multiplying wants. He drew attention to achieving an ecological balance relevant in contemporary times when environmentalists speak about maintaining sustainable development and the environment. He pointed to the harmonious interrelationship between man and nature. Thus, to retain a quality, safe and clean environment, human wants and overconsumption should be limited. Gandhian views, therefore, highlight the relevance of human ecology that focuses on human beings and their environment as an integrating whole (Moolakkattu, 2019).

Box 21.3  Ecology and Environment Ecology refers to a holistic environment between man and nature. It explains the interrelationship between living organisms and their surrounding environment. It was first coined by the German zoologist Ernst Haeckel, who used the term oekologie to explain the relationship of animals to the organic and inorganic environment. The concept of environment focuses on living organisms and their physical surroundings. It describes the interactions and interdependence between the individuals within a population.

State and Forest Laws in India

Before the 1980s, the state paid specific attention to the maximum utilization of forest resources for the national interest, promoting development and improving India’s economic position. The 1952 Resolution recommended a forest policy to protect the national interest over the local people’s demand for forest resources. The primary concern was to utilize forest raw materials for building industries, defence and domestic

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  471 purposes (Haeuber, 1993, p. 59). The policymakers stressed the balanced use of forest resources and land to prevent soil erosion, check deforestation and allow timber and fuelwood as resources to be shared by local people like tribals for survival. However, the practice of food gathering and grazing was allowed until it led to the depletion of forest resources. The state classified the forests into national and village forests to protect them from overutilization of forest resources. Therefore, it brought the forests under the state’s forest department control to preserve forests from local access without state permission (Haeuber, 1993, pp. 59–60). Such activities of the state also curtail the traditional rights of the tribals dependent on forest resources protected under the Scheduled Areas. Hence, the critics demanded a revised state forest policy. It recommended a policy that should be environmentally conscious. It specifically mentioned that the new policy should focus on increasing forest land, demarcating forested areas and afforesting areas cleared for developmental projects (Haeuber, 1993, pp.  60–63). However, the National Commission on Agriculture pointed out that local people are not responsible enough to maintain forests and their resources, leading to overexploitation of forest resources. Instead, it is recommended to create categories like reserved forests to protect forest areas from the local people. A more concerning step for the protection of the environment took place when, for the first time, a National Committee on Environment and Planning and Coordination was established in 1972. It acted like an apex advisory body on matters related to environmental protection (Motilal  & Nanda, 2006, p.  293). Besides, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth FiveYear Plans have focused on maintaining a balance between development and the environment. Some of the essential goals of these Five-Year Plans were to increase environmental concern among citizens, stress on using ecological principles in land use, agriculture, mineral extraction, fisheries, energy production and to focus on sustainable development, along with planning made on significant sectors such as industry, science and technology, agriculture, energy and education to improve and protect the environment (Motilal & Nanda, 2006, p. 294). Moreover, the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, came into existence to protect and provide a safe environment. To reduce the exploitation of natural resources, it prohibited clearance of forests without the consent of the centre (Haeuber, 1993, p. 67). The classification of forests made state governments establish firm control over the village forests. The state used the power of sovereignty to claim any land as village forest other than reserved forest only to restrict local people’s use of forest resources. However, in the 1980s, a transition was seen in the attitude of the post-colonial Indian state when it focused on safeguarding the traditional rights of tribal communities. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980, was framed to protect the traditional rights of tribal communities over the forest’s lands.

472  Meenakshi Gogoi From 1980 onwards, the state became more conscious about environmental protection and preservation than before. The Tiwari Committee focused on environmental concerns. It stated that previous environmental laws were unsuitable because there were no specific environmental policy objectives and procedures for reviewing laws (Ahmed, 2001, p. 373). A new draft policy on the forest framed emphasized the environmental issues and concerns. It stated, ‘the principal aim of forest policy is to ensure environmental stability and ecological balance vital to life forms sustenance like human, animal and plant’ (Haeuber, 1993, p.  70). In 1986, the Environment (Protection) Act was passed, inspired by the Stockholm Conference to protect the environment and prevent human health, animals, plants, and property (Ahmed, 2001, p. 373). Its objectives were to enact laws on environmental protection, coordinate the activities of regulatory agencies, and punish those who damage the environment and human health (Ahmed, 2001, pp. 373–374). The National Forest Policy, 1988, was introduced. It aimed at the preservation and restoration of ecological balance, to conserve the natural heritage, to avoid soil erosion, to create afforestation and to meet the needs of fuel, fodder and minor forest products for tribal communities dependent on forest resources (Motilal & Nanda, 2006, p. 295). The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change constituted the National Forest Commission on 7 February 2003, to review the workings of the forests and wildlife sector. A National Forestry Action Programme was introduced to bring one-third of the country’s area under forest cover and reduce the level of deforestation (Motilal & Nanda, 2006, p. 296). Finally, a new forest bill came into existence known as ‘The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, to legally recognize the traditional rights of the tribal communities (Kothari, 2005). The Forest Rights Act, 2006, was executed, but the state did not adequately implement it. The state has been acquiring lands, including forest lands, for private companies in the name of development and public purpose. It resulted in people’s resistance movements against the developmental projects by the state. For example, in Jharkhand, despite laws such as Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, and Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act, as well as the Fifth and Sixth Schedules provisions provided by the Constitution to protect the tribal rights to use natural resources and land, the state government is violating such laws by acquiring lands and transferring them to corporations for development (Barla, 2017, p.  378). The Chipko movement, the Tehri Dam movement, the Narmada Bachao Andolan and the resistance in the Niyamgiri hills by Gondh tribals against the Vedanta mining project in Odisha are some of the most famous environmental and anti-dam movements in recent times. Some other protests have been launched against the Rungta Mines and Kashang Hydroelectric Projects in Himachal Pradesh (Kothari, 2005). The role of the state government is criticized in making amendments to the existing laws to build such developmental projects. For

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  473 example, the Jharkhand government made amendments to the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and the Santhal Paragana Tenancy Acts, which eliminated the rights of Gram sabhas and permitted corporations to take over the tribal lands; the Maharashtra government issued notification of village rules that provided rights of forest management to government committees and not to the Gram sabhas; and the Polavaram Project of Andhra Pradesh predicted submergence of 2 lakh hectares of forest land, 85,000 families and 100 habitats of tribals (Karat, 2016). Over the years, it has been seen that developmental projects are criticized by the tribal communities, poor and underprivileged sections of society because the exploitation of natural resources mainly threatens them with destruction of forests, loss of livelihoods and forcible land acquisitions for developmental projects, whether state-sponsored or private sector projects. First, they are hugely dependent on these resources, and the state has curtailed their forest rights. Second, they suffer from displacement, rehabilitation, and resettlement issues due to forcible land acquisitions by the state for dams and special economic zone projects. On the other hand, such developmental projects deeply affect the environment by causing deforestation and submergence of natural heritage consisting of deep forests, trees, flora and fauna. Moreover, the displaced people migrate to big cities and towns in search of livelihoods, indirectly affecting development. Thus, the cravings for more wants from nature, as well as its exploitation, is accelerating in the name of development. A  harmonious relationship can only exist between nature and man by limiting the wants of nature. It is imperative to conserve natural resources from being overexploited. To stop the unwanted consequences of the environment, environmental policies need to be adequately implemented to achieve at optimum utilization of natural resources for sustainable development. Both the state and citizens from different sections of society should cooperate to protect the environment. However, despite challenges and imbalances between sustainable development and the environment on the domestic front, the Indian state has made a position internationally by its stand on environmental issues and climate change. At the Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change in 1989, its perspective was appreciated. Mahesh Prasad, the then Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, drew attention to climate change as a global problem. He advised reaching out to make agreements to defeat the climate change problem and devising mechanisms to ensure international participation to deal with it (Sadat, 2014, pp. 97–98). India’s position and participation were enhanced at the UN on climate change and negotiation, which was also seen during the UN Framework on Convention on Climate Change initiation at the UN. The following section will deal further with India’s domestic laws, making an effort to fulfil its international obligations of mitigating greenhouse gases, restricting air and water pollution and dealing with other issues relating to climate change from 1990 onwards to contemporary times.

474  Meenakshi Gogoi Post-1990 Environmental Laws in India

The phase of the 1990s also witnessed the exploitation of forest resources; rapid increase in mining; cash cropping; increasing use of pesticides and fertilizers to boost floriculture was damaging to the environment; increasing fishing and aquaculture; use of trawlers to increase fish exports; and the state’s attempts to mechanize harvesting were threatening the livelihoods of poor fisher folks who were dependent on traditional methods of fishing (Kothari, 1995, p. 924). However, some improvements in the environmental concerns were also seen. The state displayed interest in ecological issues and concerns by participating in international conferences like the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The state back home introduced the National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995, to act with more seriousness on the cause of environmental protection, like providing strict liability for damages arising from hazardous substances; establishing a National Environment Tribunal to deal with the cases occurring from harmful substances effectively; and also providing compensation to people who have lost their property or any environmental damage (Ahmed, 2001, p.  380). The state was trying to prevent hazardous activities such as the storage of chemicals, avoid such acts in coastal regulation areas and thereby protect the environment, particularly in Delhi or other industrial estates. The National Environment Appellate Authority Act was passed in 1997. The act’s objective was to provide an environmental appellate authority to hear appeals and restrict areas where any industries, operations or processes should not be subjected to regulation under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The following years saw the emergence of the National Environment Appellate Authority in 1998, the National Environmental Tribunal, the National Environment Appellate Authority, and the National Environment Laws (Amendment) Bill, 1999. It was initiated by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (Ahmed, 2001, pp. 380–386). The stand of India on reducing greenhouse gases was recommendable. India ratified the UN Framework on Convention on Climate Change on 1 November 1993, and started taking significant steps like preparing inventories of greenhouse gases in 1991, 1996 and 1998 under the Asia Least-Cost Green House Gas Abetment Project (Sadat, 2014, p. 100). India’s methodology, inspired by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1996 guidelines for this exercise, worked out the third greenhouse gas inventory preparedness to give better results (Sadat, 2014). The Initial National Communication project was introduced after receiving Global Environment Facility funding in India. The state took other significant steps like the Indian planning process, including environmental concern as one of the primary targets to fulfil, particularly in the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year Plans (1992–1997, 1997– 2002, 2002–2007 and 2007–2012). These plans addressed implementing

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  475 renewable energy and introducing coal bed methane projects and policy (Sadat, 2014, p. 103). Again, the Biodiversity Bill, 2000, was passed by the Parliament inspired by the Convention on Biological Diversity at the Earth Summit (Ahmed, 2001, pp. 380–386). The objective of the bill is to make sustainable use of biodiversity and conserve it, respect local knowledge related to biodiversity and share benefits with them, declare areas, such as biodiversity heritage sites, and protect and rehabilitate threatened species (Ahmed, 2001). Some other acts, like the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, were formulated. It established a national Bureau of Energy Efficiency, which aims to improve energy efficiency by leading to standards or benchmarks for industrial energy use (Ahmed, 2001). Similarly, the Electricity Act, 2005; the New and Renewable Energy Policy, 2005; the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006; and the Energy Conservation Building Code, 2007, were passed (Sadat, 2014, pp. 102–104). Another bill, known as the National Environment Laws (Amendment) Bill, 1999, was under consideration and the Draft of the National Environment Policy, 2004, was introduced. It focuses on the fair assessment of governmental policies on the environment, introduces macro-economic policies such as subsidies on chemicals to control ecological damage, reviews environmental policies and makes policies environment-friendly. It focuses on the need for equity in how benefits are derived from natural resources, making people participate in decision-making, introducing regulatory mechanisms, and building partnerships between communities and official agencies (Kothari, 2004, pp. 4723–4727). However, critics argued that the policy was not implemented in time and that there was no alternative model of development to emphasize people and the environment (Kothari, 2004). In 2008, a new National Action Plan on Climate Change was introduced, which addressed the problem of climate mitigation and adaptation. This plan focused on some key areas to deal with such issues. It emphasized renewable energy, energy efficiency and agriculture and focused on eight missions to deal with climate change issues. They are national solar mission, national mission for enhanced energy efficiency, task to create sustainable habitat, national water mission, national mission for sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem, the mission for a green India, sustainable agriculture, mission on strategic knowledge for climate change, to have a better understanding of the climate change, climate science, its impact and challenges (Sadat, 2014, p. 104). India paid attention to the carbon markets proved to be significant in reducing greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol Conference inspired the Clean Development Mechanism projects. The Clean Development Mechanism proved to be beneficial in promoting investment for sustainable projects in India. The goal of the Clean Development Mechanisms is to achieve sustainable development and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Sadat, 2014, pp. 102–104).

476  Meenakshi Gogoi On 18 October 2010, the National Green Tribunal (NGT) was established under the National Green Tribunal Act 2010. It was formed for the effective and fast disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and conservation of forests, to seek compensation for damages caused to human beings and their property because of the violation of environmental laws (Bhargav, 2011). The NGT was established to hear all civil cases concerning environmental issues and problems relating to the implementation of specific laws only, such as the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; and the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (Bhargav, 2011). The tribunal’s purpose is to observe any violation of these specific laws or any government decisions under these laws that are challengeable. The NGT aims to protect the environment and manage sustainable development. Simultaneously, from 1990 onwards to contemporary times, the Supreme Court introduced some of the new directives and reservations to deal with the environmental issues and problems than before. In 1995, a new Supreme Court ruling stated that the environment encompasses a ‘hygienic and ecological balance’ and enjoyment of human lives is possible only through protecting and preserving a clean atmosphere (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011, pp.  917–918). Therefore, the Supreme Court has emphasized the right to life and the preservation of the environment. For example, the Court asked the brick kilns in Delhi to be closed to stop air pollution. In 1996, it directed the state to form an authority under the Environment Protection Act, 1986, to protect ecologically damaged areas (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011, pp. 917–920). The Court’s strenuous efforts towards protecting the environment also led to the closing of some industries in Delhi, illegal mining, fining tanneries, banning clearing of forests and introducing coastal zone protection to safeguard the environment from being polluted. In 2010, a new measure called ‘polluters pay’ was imposed on the polluters to pay fines for creating environmental pollution and make them pay compensation to the citizens who suffered from ecological changes (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011, pp. 917–921). The Court thus made significant efforts to develop awareness of human rights, the right to life, and environmental rights of a citizen. A  good, pollution-free environment is necessary for all citizens to enjoy a quality life. The green benches were introduced to hear out environmental cases in recent times. Although the state and courts take steps to conserve ecology and the environment, the state lacks proper implementation of environmental laws like anti-pollution laws to be firmly enforced by state bodies. There is an imperative need to reuse and recycle discarded commodities like plastic waste. The commercial utilization of fly, ash, blast furnace, iron ore and recovery of e-waste is necessary (Lahiry, 2017). The effluents from tanneries, power plants, textiles, jute units, and chemical waste disposal in the River Yamuna and along the

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  477 stretch of river Ganga from Kanpur to Kolkata are another significant cause of water pollution. There is an imperative need to reduce industrial pollution like dust, smoke, fumes and toxic gas emissions from highly polluting industries like thermal power plants, coal mines, cement, iron, steel, petroleum and chemicals (Lahiry, 2017). Today, both industrially developed and developing countries face environmental degradation challenges like climate change, depletion or overconsumption of natural resources. The 2011 Green Economic Report from the UN Environment Programme stated that many countries suffer from environmental damage amounting to up to 10 per cent of their annual production (Ossewaarde, 2018, p. 4). Presently, governments across the globe are focusing on sustainable development to conserve natural resources for future use and protect the environment from further degradation. Globally, world leaders are committed to sustainable development goals for 2030 (Ossewaarde, 2018, p. 4). Post-2014 Environmental Laws

Following 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance government brought new environmental and forest laws changes that civil society groups criticized. They claimed that by threatening tribal rights to forests, these laws are meant to pave the way for the private sector to carry out developmental projects. In March  2019, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change proposed amendments to the Indian Forest Act, 1927. It recommended an increase of powers to the forest authorities to develop extensive afforestation, involve the private sector, and increase penalties to protect the forest resources. In 2018, the central government introduced a report on leasing wasteland to the private sector with the hopes of re-greening it. The Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006, was presented by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, which governs the environmental clearance regime in developmental projects (Aggarwal, 2019). The central government also launched an online system with standard guidelines to promote green clearance and study environmental impacts of developmental projects to ensure a hassle-free environmental clearance process. For example, the standard environmental clearance guidelines were introduced for 25 industrial sectors, including coal mines, oil and gas exploration, and hydropower projects (Ghosal, 2018). Moreover, the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 2011, was replaced by the Coastal Regulation Zone, 2018, to open up India’s 7,500 km of coastline to heavy infrastructure development to boost the real estate tourism sector, which is arguably threatening the lives and livelihood of the fishermen (Aggarwal, 2019). Therefore, it can be argued that the changes in environmental and forest laws post-2014 are meant primarily to boost development, and sustainable development goals are yet to be achieved.

478  Meenakshi Gogoi Summing Up The discourse on the environment and development has focused on the state’s efforts to control and protect the environment. However, the constant urge for rapid growth has created an imbalance between environmental concerns and sustainable development. Since the 1990s there has been an increase in legislation to preserve and protect the environment. However, environmental issues and concerns are still a state priority. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the post-1990 phase has witnessed a drastic change in the position of the Indian state both domestically and globally, taking concrete steps to work towards balancing the environment and developmental goals by framing various laws/acts to conserve a high-quality environment. Over the years, the judiciary has been seen to uphold constitutional values to protect the right to life and create a clean, suitable habitat for humans to live in. Today, the environment is a global concern, and every state needs to amend laws or introduce new legislation to maintain a balance between environmental and developmental goals. References Aggarwal, M. (2019). What does a second NDA term entail for India’s environmental policies? https://thewire.in/environment/what-nda-indias-environmentclimate-emergency Ahmed, F. (2001). Origin and growth of environmental law in India. Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 43(3), 358–387. Barla, D. (2017). Acceptance speech for the Ellen L. Lutz indigenous rights award, 2013. In A. Vajpeyi (Ed.), India dissents (pp. 378–386). Speaking Tiger Publishing Private Limited. Baviskar, A. (1995). In the belly of the river. Oxford University Press. Bhargav, P. (2011). Everything you need to know about the national green tribunal (NGT). www.conservationindia.org/resources/ngt Ghosal, A. (2018). Four environmental rules diluted in 2018 that will have an impact next year and beyond. www.news18.com/news/india/four-environmental-rulesdiluted-in-2018-that-will-have-an-impact-next-year-and-beyond-1984047.html Guha, R. (2014). Environmentalism. Penguin Books. Haeuber, R. (1993). Indian forestry policy in two eras: continuity or change? Environmental-History Review, 17(1), 49–76. Iyer, R. (2011). Law and policies pertaining to environment (Course 2). Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India and National Law University, Delhi. Karat, B. (2016, December). Rights for the rightful owners. The Hindu. www.the hindu.com/opinion/lead/Rights-for-the-rightful-owners/article16806197.ece Kothari, A. (1995). Environment and new economic policies. Economic & Political Weekly, 30(17), 924–928. Kothari, A. (2004). Draft national environment policy 2004: A critique. Economic & Political Weekly, 39(43), 4723–4727. Kothari, A. (2005, August). Bungle in the jungle. Seminar, 552. www.india-seminar. com/2005/552/552%20ashish%20kothari.htm

Discourse on the Environment and Development in India  479 Lahiry, S. (2017). Environmental concern amidst industrialization. www.downtoearth. org.in/blog/environment/environmental-concern-amidst-industrialisation-57349 Moolakkattu, J. S. (2019). Mahatma Gandhi and the environment. www.teriin.org/ article/mahatma-gandhi-and-environment Motilal, S., & Nanda, B. (2006). Human rights, gender and environment. Allied Publishers Private Limited. Ossewaarde, M. J. (2018). Introduction to sustainable development. Sage Publications. Ramesh, J. (2010). The two cultures revisited: The environment development debate in India. Economic & Political Weekly, 45(42), 13–16. Sadat, A. (2014). India’s treaty practice in climate change. Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 56(1), 95–105. Shiva, V. (2006). Earth democracy. Zed Books. Singh Sharan, R. (2007). Politics of environment and development in India. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 68(4), 751–758. Sivaramakrishnan, K. (2011). Environment, law, and democracy in India. The Journal of Asian Studies, 70(4), 905–928. Vyas, S. V., & Reddy, V. R. (1998). Assessment of environmental policies and policy implementation in India. Economic & Political Weekly, 33(1–2), 48–54.

22 The Politics of the Public Health System in India Skylab Sahu

Introduction Health is a human right which ensures healthcare to all, irrespective of any social and economic differences. The right to health makes the state obliged to respect, protect and fulfil certain factors which can ensure access to this right by all (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12, Part III, Sahu, 2015). Constitutionally, the Indian state is committed to providing healthcare to its citizens under the Directive Principles of State Policy, but the provision of healthcare is not a fundamental right. Health is a human right that ensures healthcare to all, irrespective of any social and economic differences. The Supreme Court of India has declared health as one of the essential rights extended under Article 21, ‘the right to life’ of the Indian Constitution. As Indian society is diverse in nature and several communities are at different levels of development, due to socio-economic factors, a large number of people remain dependent solely on the public sector to meet their basic health needs. Health as a basic need determines the quality of life and influences and determines the poverty level of people. The out-of-pocket expenditure can make people sell their assets and can affect the level of the household economy drastically, in effect, making people poor. The Indian state is a signatory of the Alma Ata Declaration in 1978, whereby it agreed to provide healthcare to all. The Indian state also formulated national health policies (1983, 2002 and 2017). The most recent health policy reiterates the state’s commitment to universal healthcare for all. The Indian state has been making financial allocation, establishing infrastructures and allocating personals to ensure healthcare for all. This chapter critically analyses the health politics and politics of healthcare in India. It intends to understand how far the state ensures the accessibility, availability and the quality of the healthcare to people in India. The second section of the chapter provides an assessment of the achievement of the Indian state towards the health of the Indian population and some persisting issues as well as new health challenges with which the state deals with. The third section focuses on health politics and argues how it DOI: 10.4324/9781003434443-27

The Politics of the Public Health System in India  481 largely remained a gift of the ruling elite in India, a situation completely distinct from Britain, where health politics was largely a mass demand of the public. The fourth section provides a comparative and broader picture of the accessibility and availability of public healthcare in India and also critically assesses the budgetary allocation made by the state. Moreover, it critically captures the role of private healthcare in the state. It further argues how the state faces challenges, especially during some pandemic or epidemic, and prepares. Finally, in conclusion, it argues that despite the inadequacies, the state can take some steps towards ensuring universal healthcare and be better prepared to tackle any health pandemics. The Trajectories of Diseases in India Health is a developmental issue and is used as a vital indicator of human development. Overall, the growth of a national economy depends upon the condition of people’s health (Conger  & Donnellan, 2007). During the post-Independence era in India, health was provided as a welfare measure to people. The government formulated policies and programmes to ensure the provision of healthcare to all. In a populous country like India, the provision of healthcare facilities to all citizens is a difficult task unless the state intervenes. Since Independence, the Indian state has been extensively involved in addressing numerous health problems and has taken the initiative to eradicate several diseases. Attempts have also been made to prevent certain health problems1 or provide immunization ensuring prevention. There have been achievements in this arena. For instance, life expectancy for both males and females has increased and the death rate has decreased drastically over the past few decades.2 Polio, small pox, cholera and plague have been eradicated or controlled properly. There have been further achievements. Life expectancy has increased to 70.8 in 2019 (WHO, 2021), and India’s maternal mortality ratio has declined from 130 per 1 lakh births in 2014–2016 to 122 per 1 lakh live births in 2015–2017. The infant mortality rate has also substantially reduced, from 26.5 in 1991 to 27 in 2020 (Statista, 2020). However, there are various challenges as well. For instance, although life expectancy has increased as a sign of improvement in the health sector, there remains a necessity to ensure adequate healthcare to elderly people and there is an urgent need to reduce the maternal mortality rate and children’s mortality rate. Similarly, there have been some old and new health issues or diseases that have been greater health challenges. The people of Indian state continue to face a number of other health issues, including malaria, flu, cancer, tuberculosis, and others that are a source of concern. Apart from these, a new epidemic, human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immune deficiency syndrome, that emerged in the late 1980s, has put forth an enormous challenge before the state. It has been dealing with non-communicable diseases (NCDs), which have been a major health burden.

482  Skylab Sahu Recently, some new diseases and epidemics such as dengue, chikungunya, flu and, most importantly, the COVID-19 pandemic have affected the population adversely, demanding urgent attention from the state. The World Health Organization (WHO) recently came up with the concept of universal health coverage (UHC) through a service coverage index comprising of 16 indicators across four programme areas: reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health; infectious diseases; NCDs; and health service capacity, access and health security. As per the service coverage index, UHC improvements were seen in all 11 countries of the WHO Southeast Asia region, including India, excluding Maldives. In India, as per 2010, the UHC index was more than 40 per cent, and in 2015, the UHC increased to 56 per cent. The data indicates that India has to cover 44 per cent of the population to provide universal care service coverage index. It shows that millions of people in the region still do not have sufficient access to essential health services. More than 48 per cent of NCD deaths occur in people before the age of 70, the highest proportion of premature deaths in the world. Cardiovascular disease, cancers, diabetes and chronic respiratory disease contribute to more than 80 per cent of NCD deaths in the region (World Health Statistics, 2019). Outlook on the Politics of Health in Independent India India, after Independence, intended to develop the country under a socialist and liberal democratic framework. Being a nascent liberal country, it relied upon a few socialist principles, which were expected to bring relief to all, mainly to the downtrodden and vulnerable classes, castes, genders and so on. Nehru’s idea of ‘development for all’ became the slogan for the policymakers, who had less confidence in the ‘Gandhian development model3 and who strongly believed in large-scale industrialization-led development. It is noteworthy that Indian democracy and development have been gifted by the elites rather than earned through struggle by the masses (Kohli, 1997). In the case of development planning and design, it was the elites who decided the pattern of development that was implemented at the grassroots level. Local knowledge of development was hardly appreciated or accounted for. The policymakers mostly believed that the poor were less resourceful and that their livelihoods depended on the free social security measures and different types of subsidies. Thus, the state, under the leadership of Congress, took up the responsibility of implementing social security measures such as education, food security through public distribution and health. The development discourse established the state as the legitimate agency having the power to carry out development policies and plans. The state carried out macro surveys (census) to categorize the population in order to identify the vulnerable groups and to extend welfare measures to them. It carried out demographic surveys to examine the patterns of death rates, birth rates and maternal mortality rates and so on. People below the poverty line were defined, and people

The Politics of the Public Health System in India  483 belonging to different tribes, castes and sexes were also categorized. After this exercise of surveillance, the state worked out strategies such as public distribution under social security measures to look after the people in general and the poor and vulnerable in particular (Sahu, 2015). On the one hand, the state decided on the provision of healthcare to the majority of the people (mainly the poor), and on the other hand, it allowed the participation of private actors in delivering healthcare facilities to the people. Private health services in the health sector, however, remained beyond the reach of the poor. Thus, a large number of people from the lower as well as lower middle classes largely became dependent on the public healthcare system, which was either free or relatively cheaper. The responsibility of the state to provide health was a huge task, although it was aimed at provisioning healthcare to all. In contrast, Great Britain was among the first few countries to have undertaken welfare measures for all their citizens. The welfare measures encompassed education, health and old-age pensions for the citizens of the country. After the end of the First World War, Britain faced the Great Depression as a result of which people’s socio-economic conditions deteriorated. By the 1930s, the poor socio-economic condition had started to affect people’s health adversely. There were several factors that made people across classes feel the need for accessible and better quality public healthcare facilities. Followed by the Beveridge call for a comprehensive health system, the political parties of the country also felt the need for the same. In Britain, the healthcare system was then demand-driven and the state, in response to the growing demand, had to supply health services through welfare policies (Baru, 1998). The policymakers of the Labour Party introduced the National Health Service (NHS) after great deliberation with the Conservative Party in England. With the NHS, healthcare for all was ensured regardless of the ability to pay. In order to satisfy the lobby group of the British Medical Association, the Labour Party also allowed for the prevalence of private practice along with the public health system. It was believed that the Labour Party won the election in July 1945 by securing a thumping majority of 399 seats, due to its willingness4 to implement the ‘Beveridge call for a comprehensive medical care system’, namely the NHS (Grand & Vizard, 1998). Provisioning of healthcare is a welfare need, and scholars argue that health and the other welfare measures are inevitable to prevent collapse of capitalism. Welfare policies were generally adopted by capitalist states in order to contain the potential resistance and challenges to that capitalist state from the underprivileged section of the society. Therefore, to strengthen the capitalist state itself, welfare policies were formulated for different sections of the population, especially for underprivileged people (Gramsci, 1971). Gough (1979) indicated that the famous economist Keynes had advocated a middle path that would emerge from a synthesis of laissez-faire (a completely

484  Skylab Sahu free economy) and tyrannical socialism. In that case, capitalism and planning could be made compatible in terms of a welfare state. However, the welfare state did not imply volunteerism or socialist measures for policymakers. Rather, the welfare state was seen as an outcome of the capitalist crisis and viewed as a necessary step for the survival of the capitalist state (George & Wilding, 1976). Nico Poulantzas portrayed the state as a unified social formation, capable of diluting class tensions through the spread of political rights and welfare benefits (Heywood, 2005). Welfare policies were largely designed to dull the sharp edges of popular resistance around redistributive issues. Welfare was used as an important instrument by the state, both to preserve itself and to gain legitimacy. Gramsci (1971) mentioned that the state, in order to preserve its legitimacy, needed to come up with welfare policies such that several interest groups other than that of the ruling party could be addressed. In the process, the ruling party would retain the legitimacy to rule. However, the Marxists perceived the class character of the modern welfare state as operating in the long-term interest of capitalism and thus perpetuating a system of unequal class power. India has modelled5 its health welfare measures after the British pattern. If one compares, health system in Great Britain was demanded by the people, whereas in India, it was a state-led or the ruling party-led initiative. When the majority of them were poor and from rural backgrounds, economic development became the first priority of the people, rather than achieving good health for all. It was also true that it was very difficult for many to access healthcare when health expenditure was excessive. In such a situation, the mortality rate was high and the situation of death due to prevailing diseases was grim. Therefore, the Congress elites in India took up the responsibility of providing healthcare to people under the guiding principles of the Bhore Committee report.6 Therefore, people did not get an opportunity to express their needs relating to health. In that situation, the state legitimized certain needs as important as opposed to other needs. Healthcare in India is still not considered a driving electoral mobilizer as compared to the older democracies such as the UK and the USA. The election manifestos of the two prominent parties, that is, the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, have included health since the late 1980s and mentioned healthcare for all as a primary duty of the state. However, health never became a major issue of debate or concern for the prominent political parties in the country. The Indian state formulated three National Health Policies (1983, 2002 and 2017) that have been promulgated by the respective governments during the past 70 years of India’s independence. Two national policies were introduced under the Congress regime and one, the National Health Policy, 2017, during the rule of the Bharatiya Janata Party. National policies are often preceded by the commitments of political parties, documented in the manifestos. The vision of the state’s policies remains to ensure healthcare to all.

The Politics of the Public Health System in India  485 The Blended Healthcare System in India: The Public and Private Conundrum The Indian state adopted a blended model of healthcare whereby public and private service providers participated in healthcare provisioning. However, private participation in healthcare, at least for two decades after independence, remained comparatively less in comparison to the public sector. Hospital services until the mid-1970s were mostly in the public sphere. Until the late 1980s, the medical education was monopolized by public sector, after which the private sector grew rapidly, but even today, 75 per cent of outturn of medical graduates are from public medical schools. For the healthcare system, the three-tier medical care system was established in independent India with more emphasis on primary health centres. The Alma Ata Conference (1978) defined primary healthcare as the means of provisioning universal healthcare accessible and acceptable to people. The primary health centres (PHCs) were declared as the entry stage of any healthcare system in a rural area, where people could get healthcare facilities, irrespective of their ability to pay. It was also decided that one PHC would cater to the health needs of 30,000 people in plain areas and another 20,000 people in hilly, tribal and backward areas. Followed by the first-level referral hospital or PHC (the community health centre), finally, there is provision for one civil hospital per district. The PHC system works towards educating people about prevailing health problems and methods of preventing and controlling diseases. It also works for maternal and child care, including family planning, immunization against major infectious diseases, and control of endemic diseases. It is further designed to provide treatment for common diseases and injuries, and last but not least, it provides the essential drugs. It also works towards provisioning preventive knowledge of safe water and basic sanitation. The ethos of PHC is to ensure an equitable health service that intends to distribute the health services in such a manner that they can be shared equally by all the people, irrespective of their ability to pay. Rich, poor, rural and urban people should have access to the PHCs (De Maeseneer et al., 2007).

In February 2018, the Government of India changed and transformed the existing sub-centres and PHCs into 150,000 health and wellness centres. The role and function of these centres remained similar to the roles of community health centres and public health. Source: https://pmjay.gov.in/about/pmjay.

486  Skylab Sahu The Indian state established All India Institute of Medical Science institutions across the country to enable access to quality tertiary healthcare services to people living in previously underserved areas. However, India still continues to face challenges regarding the availability of health infrastructure and personal or healthcare providers. In India, there is one government allopathic doctor for every 10,189 people, one government hospital bed for every 2,046 people, and one state-run hospital for every 90,343 people (National Health Policy, 2017; Sharma, 2017). Comparatively, in the USA, there is one bed for every 350 patients, while in Japan, it is one for every 85. India is lagging behind even at the global level. As in India, the ratio of doctors per 1,000 people is 0.7 and the ratio of nurses is 1.5 per 1,000 people, which is abysmally lower than the global average of 2.5 doctors and nurses per 1,000 people as determined by the WHO (Sharma, 2017). As per the National Health Profile 2019, there were 713,986 total government hospital beds available in India, which was about 0.55 beds per 1,000 population. In comparison to India, Sri Lanka, which is a neighbouring country with a better health system, has 3.7 beds per 1,000 population, and China, which is equally a populous country like India, has 4.2 beds per 1,000 population, while the WHO recommends 5 beds per 1,000 population (Patnaik & Sharma, 2020). As far as the allocation of fund for health sector is concerned, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan spend less than 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare, public spending is higher in Maldives, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and, to some extent, Nepal (Figure 22.1). The health expenditure in

Figure 22.1  Health Expenditure by Countries, as a Percentage of GDP Source: The World Bank (2019).

The Politics of the Public Health System in India  487 India is less than Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives. In Maldives, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, the government health spending is the highest in the region: The government is responsible for over 70 per cent of healthcare financing in Bhutan and Maldives and 43 per cent in Sri Lanka (where out-of-pocket payments are mainly made by richer households). Maldives and Sri Lanka are the only countries in the region that have achieved Sustainable Development Goals mortality rate targets and have life expectancies of over 75 years and nearly universal immunization. In India, private out-of-pocket expenditure dominates the cost of financing healthcare. The effects remain adverse on many family incomes. Healthcare is essentially considered a public good and therefore requires state regulation as it cannot be left to be solely regulated by the market (Srinivasan, 2020). In the context of the rise of the coronavirus, people visualize how public health emergencies can bring down not just national but global economies. It is further felt that the public health system is in dire need of greater investment. In the backdrop, the Government of India has made a budgetary allocation for 2021–2022, the budget outlay for health and well-being made was ₹223,846 crore as against ₹94,452 crore budget expenditure made in last year. It shows an increase of 137 per cent (Ministry of Finance, GoI, 2021). The budget, thus, has a responsibility to plan the nation’s stand on public expenditure in the health sector for the next five years. It is hoped that the GDP expenditure on health will increase with the increase in the budget. While raising the budgetary allocation of the health budget to fulfil its duties towards the achievement of UHC within the coming five years (Narayana, 2021). In India, regional health inequalities are mainly a result of differences in the level of economic development and access to healthcare facilities across regions or states. Many a time, when both the state and the central government fail to make healthcare accessible, the blame game between the union government and the various state governments erupt, as public health is a state subject. However, health being an essential service, public good and non-profit sector, it is required to be provided as a vital welfare measure to people, and hence there is a necessity for the union to provide financial and other support to make healthcare accessible, especially in undeveloped regions lagging in healthcare. Geographic distribution and availability of human resources have also been challenges. With over 80 per cent of the health workforce working in urban and semi-urban areas, large parts of the rural areas of the country face immense shortages. Although various attempts, including incentivizing rural health jobs, have been made in the past, they have had limited success7 (Thakur, 2017). During the time of Independence, the presence of a proportion of private hospitals, clinics and nursing homes was insignificant. However, these institutions started to grow during the 1970s. In the 1970s, private hospitals were mainly confined to urban areas. The cutback in public spending combined with government subsidies has resulted in the growth of the private

488  Skylab Sahu sector at secondary and tertiary levels of care. Post mid-1970s, the state provided various incentives such as concessional land and tax breaks for the setting up of private hospitals, and it also provided exemptions for import duty. ‘The private pharmaceutical industry also received considerable State support for its growth through process patent laws, subsidised bulk drugs from public sector companies and protection from MNCs’ (Duggal & Nandraj, 2020). In the 1990s, public investment stagnated and the public health sector was not given adequate attention. Under the structural adjustment programmes, the Indian state also experimented with reforms in the health sector by introducing user fees and also encouraged public – private partnerships and thus contracted out services (Duggal & Nandraj, 2020; Sahu, 2015). In the 1990s, the private health sector, including the hospital sector, expanded rapidly. In India, concessions and subsidies were given by the government for the import of medical equipment in the 1980s onwards, and the amount of imported and subsidies increased till the late 1990s (Baru, 1998, 2013).8 Although the concentration of the private hospitals across Indian states was an urban phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s, in some states, private sector health services have grown in both peri-urban and rural areas. In some of the states, such as Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana, the presence and the gradual growth of the private health sector have penetrated to rural and peri-urban areas. In these states, the proportion of private beds is higher than public beds, whereas in most other states, such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa and West Bengal, there was less growth in the private sector during the 1980s and 1990s (Baru, 2013). However, after the 1990s till 2020, there was a mushrooming growth of private super specialty hospitals, especially in urban areas, and private hospitals and clinics in peri-urban and rural areas of almost all states. Along with the simultaneous growth of private healthcare, these facilities are getting costly and becoming non-accessible for the poor. In order to utilize the services of private hospitals, there is a need to regulate them in a much stronger manner. The private health sector is not a homogenous sector; it is diverse, including general practitioners and nursing homes. It constitutes two thirds of the medical human power in the country. In spite of this, there is hardly any regulation of the practice of this sector of health. However, regulation is inevitable and can be done easily, especially because the doctors who decide to set up their own clinics, as well as hospitals, nursing homes, polyclinics and so on, have to register with the area of the respective local authority. The medical professionals have to be registered with the Medical Council of India (a statutory body that sets the standard of medical practice, monitors their activities, checks any malpractices and regulates the professionals. The problem with this is that the controlling bodies are virtually non-functioning. The reason for this is not only lack of interest but also weak provisions in the various acts. They are also heavily influenced by the private health sector (Duggal & Nandraj, 2020). There is a need for adequate

The Politics of the Public Health System in India  489 regulation of the private sector to provide healthcare within an affordable limit and also share the responsibility of ensuring healthcare to the poor and to people in pandemic times or during any epidemics. Ayushman Bharat, a flagship scheme of the Government of India, was launched as recommended by the National Health Policy 2017, to achieve the vision of the UHC. This initiative has been designed to meet the Sustainable Development Goals and its underlining commitment, which is to ‘leave no one behind’. Ayushman Bharat is intended to provide a comprehensive, need-based healthcare service. This scheme aims to address the healthcare system (covering prevention, promotion and ambulatory care) at the primary, secondary and tertiary level. Ayushman Bharat comprises two inter-related components, including health and wellness centres and Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana. Under Ayushman Bharat, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana was launched in 2018 and an evaluative study was conducted to assess the implementation level through a survey of 2700 households across the states of Bihar, Haryana and Tamil Nadu and found the efficacy of Ayushman Bharat. The finding shows that partly due to supply-side constraints, only 9.84 per cent of the beneficiaries in Bihar, 12.41 per cent of the beneficiaries in Haryana, and around 59 per cent of the beneficiaries are aware of the scheme in Tamil Nadu. Even in Chhattisgarh the policy could not improve the access or financial protection to poor in the state (Garg et al., 2020). The finding indicates that a large number of people could not utilize and benefit from the scheme if they were aware of it (Sriee et al., 2021; Sharma, 2019). When the health infrastructure remains inadequate, then it fails to cater to health needs of the population both at a normal time and also in the event of health emergencies or health epidemics such as dengue, acquired immune deficiency syndrome and coronavirus. Baru stated that in the second week of a national lockdown imposed in response to COVID-19, given the resource constraints of both the central and state governments, it was clear that government hospitals alone were not able to manage the pandemic. In such emergency situations, she argued that some individual private sector companies have come forward with offers of creating capacity and making it available to COVID-19 patients. There is a need for a comprehensive national policy to ensure that private healthcare capacity is made available to the public. Some states, such as Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, have already roped in the private sector to provide free treatment. The central and state governments have to take responsibility for providing universal health services free of charge and accessible to all. This will necessitate governments to not merely work towards expansion of capacity within the public sector, ‘but also to tap on available capacity in the private sector’ (Baru, 2020).

490  Skylab Sahu Summing Up The Indian state has been making financial allocations, establishing infrastructure and allocating personals to ensure healthcare for all.  However, despite the state’s policy-level commitment to its implementation, it has not been successful in providing people with universal healthcare. The political parties have addressed the issue in a much more general and casual manner. As a result, although the election manifesto covered health as a concern, the issue of health could not be translated into a national agenda and hence remained an agenda under cover. Most importantly, there is hardly any difference across the various parties’ approach to health issues and both the ruling party and the opposition have not taken much mileage over the issue. Most importantly, the public sector’s expenditure in terms of GDP in India has hardly been more than 2 per cent so far. As far as the steps taken by the state government are concerned, though it took various health measures, the accessibility, availability and quality of healthcare remained a challenge. It has been perceived that in countries where health expenditure per GDP is higher, health infrastructure is adequate, and provisioning of health personnel is adequate, the health indices of the population of those countries remain better. However, in India, the ratio of doctors per 1,000 people is 0.7 and the ratio of nurses is 1.5 per 1,000 people, which is abysmally lower than the global average of 2.5 doctors and nurses per 1,000 people as determined by the WHO. The paucity of resources was felt even more during the corona pandemic. In the backdrop of the pandemic, the government of India has allocated 129,394 crore rupees in 2020–2021, more than last year. It is hoped that the GDP expenditure on health will increase with the increase in the budget and that it will help the state to fulfil its duties towards the achievement of universal health coverage. In India, regional health inequalities are mainly a result of differences in the level of economic development and access to healthcare facilities across regions or states. Many a time, when both the state and the central government fail to make healthcare accessible, the blame game between the union government and the various state governments erupts, as public health is a state subject. However, health being an essential service and a public good and non-profit sector, it is required to be provided as a vital welfare measure to people, and hence there is a necessity for the union to provide financial and other support to make healthcare accessible, especially in undeveloped regions lagging in healthcare. Only then will the objective of the current national health policy to ensure healthcare be realized. Furthermore, the Indian state has to accelerate its implantation drive of various existing policies like the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana with adequate availability of doctors and health personnel, beds and other equipment. Health is an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution; hence, it should be considered as a fundamental right,

The Politics of the Public Health System in India  491 and accordingly, the gaps existing in terms of accessibility and availability should be bridged so that the state can achieve its own aim of ensuring universal healthcare to all in every situation. Notes 1 The epidemiological shift during the post-independence period shows that the Indian state could, to a large extent, control the spread of certain diseases like malaria. In 1951, there were 7.5 per cent of cases, which fell to 2.7 per cent and 2.2 per cent in 1981 and 2000, respectively. However, recent times have witnessed an increase in the incidence of malaria in a few states in India. A few diseases, including small pox, have been completely eradicated (National Health Policy, 2002). 2 In the year 1951, life expectancy in India was 36.07 years, which had subsequently increased to 64.6 years by the year 2000. As far as the crude death rate (per 1000 population) is concerned, in the year 1951 it was 25 per cent, which was reduced substantively to 8.7 per cent by the year 2000 (National Health Policy, 2002). 3 Self-sufficient village economy based on small-scale production and self-rule. 4 Winston Churchill was unwilling to support the ‘Beveridge call for a comprehensive medical care system’, namely the NHS which he felt was controversial. His unwillingness to pass any domestic bills during the war period prevented the immediate passage of the legislation (Leichter, 1979). 5 The Bhore Committee was influenced by the British health goal ‘healthcare for all irrespective of capacity to pay’. 6 From the people’s side, no demand for the healthcare system was made, and people were not associated in the central planning to decide the kind of health facility they wanted or required. 7 Adequate and holistic socio-economic development of rural areas may encourage health workers to voluntarily relocate to these areas (Thakur, 2017). 8 During this period, corporations such as Philips, Siemens, General Electric and Becaton, Dickinson and Company entered the Indian market. In India, the government allowed foreign health insurance companies to enter India in 1997, although there have been few players in the Indian market.

References Baru, R. V. (1998). Private health care in India: Social characteristics and trends. Sage Publication. Baru, R. V. (2013). Privatization of health services: A South Asian perspective. Economic & Political Weekly, 38(42), 4433–4437. Baru, R. V. (2020, April  3). Making the private sector care for public health. The Hindu. Conger, R. D.,  & Donnellan, M. B. (2007). An interactionist perspective on the socioeconomic context of human development. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 175–199. De Maeseneer, J., Willems, S., De Sutter, A., Van de Geuchte, I.,  & Billings, M. (2007). Primary health care as a strategy for achieving equitable care: A literature review commissioned by the health systems knowledge network. https://pure.itg.be/ files/2202299/2017phca0032.pdf Duggal, R., & Nandraj, S. (2020). Regulating the private health sector. www.cehat. org/go/uploads/Publications/regulationprivate.pdf

492  Skylab Sahu Garg, S., Bebarta, K. K., &  Tripathi,  N. (2020). Performance of India’s national publicly funded health insurance scheme, Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PMJAY), in improving access and financial protection for hospital care: Findings from household surveys in Chhattisgarh state. BMC Public Health, 20(1), 949. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-09107-4. George, V. and P. Wilding. (1976). “Ideology and Social Welfare”, London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul. Ghosh B. and Prabir De, (2005). India Infrastructure database, 2005: Vol I & II. Bookwell Publishers, New Delhi. Gough, I. (1979). The political economy of welfare state. Macmillan. Gramsci, A. (1971). Prison notebooks. In Q. Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith (Eds.), Selection from prison notebooks. International Publishers. Grand, J. L., & Vizard, P. (1998). The national health service: Crisis, change or continuity. In G. Howard & H. John (Eds.), The state of welfare: Economics of social spending. Oxford University Press. Heywood, A. (2005). Political Theory: An introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. Leichter, M. H. (1979). Comparative approach to policy analysis: Health care policy in four nations. Cambridge University Press. Kohli, A. (1997). Crisis of governability. In S. Kaviraj (Ed.), Politics in India. Oxford Publication. Ministry of Finance, Government of India (GoI). (2021). Summary of the budget 2021–22. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1693908 Narayana, D. (2021). Budget 2021–22 on health setting us back by a few years. Economic & Political Weekly, 56(9), 39–42. National Health Policy. (2002). National Health Policy 2002. https://www.nhm.gov. in/images/pdf/guidelines/nrhm-guidelines/national_nealth_policy_2002.pdf National Health Policy. (2017). National Health Policy 2017. https://main.mohfw. gov.in/sites/default/files/9147562941489753121.pdf, A., & Sahu, S. (2015). Gender, sexuality, and HIV/AIDS: Exploring politics of women’s health in India. Sage Publications. Sharma, A. (2020). The COVID-19 crisis: An opportunity to invest in equitable public health systems. Economic & Political Weekly, 55(47), 56–60. Sharma, N. (2019, September  3). Ayushman Bharat awareness 80% in TN, barely 20% in Bihar and Haryana. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.india times.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/healthcare/ayushman-bharat-awareness80-in-tn-barely-20-in-bihar-and-haryana/articleshow/70953467.cms Sharma, S. (2017, August  29). India’s public health system in crisis: Too many patients, not enough doctors. Hindustan Times. www.hindustantimes.com/indianews/public-health-system-in-crisis-too-many-patients-not-enough-doctors/story39XAtFSWGfO0e4qRKcd8fO.html Srinivasan, R. (2020). Health care in India: Vision 2020 issues and prospects. Planning Commission, Government of India. https://niti.gov.in/planningcommission. gov.in/docs/reports/genrep/bkpap2020/26_bg2020.pdf VishnuPriya, S. GV and G. R. Maiya. (2021). Coverage, utilization, and impact of Ayushman Bharat scheme among the rural field practice area of Saveetha Medical College and Hospital, Chennai. Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care, 10(3), 1171–1176. https://doi.org/10.4103/jfmpc.jfmpc_1789_20 Statista. (2020). Infant mortality rate in India from 2010 to 2020. https://www. statista.com/statistics/806931/infant-mortality-in-india/

The Politics of the Public Health System in India  493 Thakur, K. (2017, August 7). Mind the gap: Health workforce shortage. The Pioneer. www.dailypioneer.com/2017/columnists/mind-the-gap-health-workforce-shortage. html The World Bank. (2019). Current health expenditure (% of GDP). https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS?name_desc=false World Health Statistics. (2019). Monitoring health for SDGs. https://apps.who.int/ iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324835/9789241565707-eng.pdf World Health Organisation (WHO). (2021). Life expectancy in India. India. https:// data.who.int/countries/356

Index

Aam Aadmi Party 84, 86, 89 Abhijit Sen Committee 197 ABSU movement 447 accommodation 48 Adivasi Mahasabha 322 Adivasi society 330 Advani, L. K. 264, 266, 267, 379; Rath Yatra 265 Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minority Rights 326 Advisory jurisdiction 138 aggressive consumption 306 AIMPLB 419 Akhil Bharatiya Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram 319, 338 Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) 261 Alam, Javeed 290 Allahabad High court 187 All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 265 All India Congress Committee 413 All India Criminal Tribes Inquiry Committee 336 All India Institute of Medical Science 486 All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat (AIMMM) 415 All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) 415 All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) 8, 265, 269, 271 All Tripura Tiger Force 458 Alma Ata Conference 485 Alma Ata Declaration 480

Aloysius, G. 69 Al-Qaeda 102 Ambedkar, B.R. 45, 47, 66, 107, 132, 153, 157, 158, 175, 181, 278, 358 Amendment Act 404 American imperialism 109 American Revolutions 35 Anglo-Indian community 161 Annihilation of Caste 110 anti-CAA protests 5 anti-emergency movement 19 anti-Sikh violence 72 Apna Dal 293 Arendt, Hannah 81 Arthashastra of Kautilya 132 Articles of the Constitution 131 Arya Samaj 110, 261 Ashok Mehta Committee 391, 392 Assam Disturbed Area Act 447 Assam Official Language Act 445 Association for Democratic Reforms 117 Atlanta Olympic Games 103 Austin, Granville 47 – 48, 145 Autonomous District Councils 450 Ayodhya movement 265 Ayushman Bharat 269, 489 Azad Samaj Party 293 Babri Masjid 15, 72, 185, 251, 265; demolition campaign 85 Babri Masjid Movement Coordination Committee 415 Babri Mosque 103, 377 Backward Castes 289, 292

Index  495 Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 67, 68, 287, 354 Bakerwal communities 123 Balwantrai mehta committee recommendations 390 Banerjee, Mamata 77 Bar Association 143 Basu, D.D. 138 Baxi, Upendra 144, 147, 149 In the Belly of the River 468 Bengal National Liberation Front 458 Beveridge call 483 Bhagwati, P. N. 147 Bhan, Deena 288 Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) 239, 254, 270, 302; in lok sabha elections 262; members 260; politics 262 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 1, 71, 72, 244, 259, 265, 266, 269, 270, 272, 287, 308, 336, 484; electoral performance 265, 268; electoral performances 259; government 269; ideological inheritance and the formation of 260 – 263; led government 7; political party 261 Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD) 286 Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh 261 Bharat Jan Andolan 328 Bhargava, Rajeev 36 Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA) 425 Bhatia, Gautam 36 Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (466) Bhuria Committee 328, 337 Bhushan, Prashant 150 Big Media 82 Biju Janata Dal 265 Biodiversity Bill 475 biological diversity 475 Biological Diversity Act 476 Birsa Munda’s revolt 321 Bodo groups 448 Bodo Territorial Council 447 Bofors gun procurement 264 Bofors scandal 244 Bommai’s judgment 6 Bose, N. K. 319

Brahmo Samaj 110 British: colonies 300; commonwealth 42; empire 42; model 156; parliament 40, 43; Raj 302, 412; rule 36, 132; war cabinet 42 British Medical Association 483 buddhist philosophy 50 Bulli Bai app 360 Bureau of Energy Efficiency 475 Cabinet Mission 42, 43, 44; plan of 1946 39, 43; proposal 43, 47 Canadian system 132 Canovan, Margaret 76 Carta, Magna 35 caste 66 – 69; associations 279; in Indian Politics 280; political parties 292; politicization of 280 – 282; politics 16 – 19 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India (CBCI) 109, 415 Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal 138 Central Bureau of Investigation 13 Central Legislative Assembly 40 Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 227 Chatterjee, Partha 379 Chelameswar, J. 151 Chhibber, Pradip 95 Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (CNTA) 321, 330, 472 Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) 115, 116, 120, 125 Chin Hills 449 Chipko Andolan 327 Chipko Movement 19, 348 Christian missionaries 451 Christian Right Activists 105 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 170, 269 civil society 58, 63, 64 civil society organizations 1 coalition government 260 Coastal Regulation Zone Notification 477 Cold War 53, 95 Collegium System 134 colonial legal system 65 ‘command polity’ 60

496 Index common minimum programme 72 Communist bloc 53 Communist Party of India (CPI) 89, 239, 409 Community Development Programme 391 Community Development Project 390 competitive federalism 188 Comptroller and Auditor General 1 Congress-dominated system 2 Congress government 61, 375 Congress mukt Bharat 272 Congress Party 8, 46, 59, 72, 182, 183, 237, 246, 248, 250, 252 – 254, 265, 283; policy 264; system 8 Congress system 182, 183, 242, 243, 248, 249, 282, 309; in indian politics 237 Congress system model 240 Conservative Evangelical Protestants 100 Consolidated Fund 163 Constituent Assembly 67, 70, 157, 158, 176, 177, 369 Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) 158 Constituent Assembly members 321 Constituent Assembly of India 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 325; functions of 37 – 39 Constitutional Amendment Act 354, 400 Constitutional Court 153 constitutionalism 36 Constitution Amendment Acts 6, 11 constitution-making process 46 Constitution of India 55, 66, 132, 153, 370 cooperative bargaining model 5 cooperative Federalism 11, 188 core schemes 199 Council of Ministers 163 Council of States 157, 158 COVID-19 193, 360, 482, 489 Criminal Procedure Code 153 Criminal Tribes Acts 335 Cripps Mission 42 Crisis of Governability 60 crisis of political institutions 59

A Critique of the Passive Revolution 3 Cultural and Educational Rights 371 Daimary, Ranjan 447 Dalit: communities 73; cultures 69; political party 68; politics 69; radicals 69; Samaj 288 Damodar valley projects 465 Decentralization scheme 60, 387 decision-making process 48 democracy 1, 39 de-notified tribes (DNTs) 335 depressed classes 65, 66 Dharmasthiya 132 Digital India 11 District planning committees 395 Dolly Kitty Aur Woh Chamakte Sitare 356 Draft Constitution 157, 158 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 186, 244, 286 Dubbing secularism 71 Dumont, Louis 67, 278 Duverger’s law 246 Eagleton, Terry 96 Earth Democracy 469 ECI 117, 121, 123, 125 ecological Marxism 468 ecology 470 economic liberalization 6 economic reforms 3 Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 246 Elcott, David 95 Election Commission of India (ECI) 1, 13, 115, 116, 152, 187, 221, 394, 431 elections 223 – 226; history of 226; time 118 electoral bonds 170 electoral exceptionalism 119 Encyclopaedia Britannica 364 Energy Conservation Act 475 Energy Conservation Building Code 475 enquiry committees 164 enterprise-culture capitalism 107 Environment Impact Assessment Notification 476 Ethnic conflict 439

Index  497 Ethnonationalist mobilization 437 European Enlightenment 379 European social theory 80 Explosive Research and Development Laboratory (ERDL) 288 Facebook 11, 310 Farm Acts 170 Federal Court 132 Federalism 174 Federal polity 174 – 176; features of 176 Fifteenth Finance Commission 181 Fifth Schedule Areas 333 Finance Commission 180, 191 Financial committees 164 Fire 356 First Backward Classes Commission 413 First Party System 247 First World War 483 foreign direct investment (FDI) 186 Forest Advisory Committee 332 Forest Conservation Act 331, 471 Forest Rights Act 2, 472 Forest Rights Act (FRA) 332 Foucault, Michel 54 Fourth Party System 252 fundamentalist religious movement (FRM) 96, 100, 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 fundamentalists 101 G. V. K. Rao Committee 393 Gandhi, Indira 59, 72, 120, 143, 267 Gandhi, Mahatma 40, 261 Gandhian development model 482 Garo hills 445 Ghurye, G. S. 319 Giri, V.V. 139 Godavari rivers 443 Gogoi, Ranjan 151 Golwalkar, M. S. 261 Golwalkar’s theory of Hindutva 379 Gondh tribals 472 goods and services tax (GST) 7, 191; Council 7, 191 Goodwin, Matthew 83 Government of India Act (1935) 5, 39, 40, 42, 176 grassroots movements 1

Great Rebellion of 1857 80 Green Revolution 60 Guardianship Act 19 Guha, Ramachandra 468 Hasan, Zoya 9, 251 Hennelly, Alfred T. 108 High Court of India Act 132 Hill Tribal Council 456 Himalayan States Regional Council 190 Hind Swaraj 110 The Hindu 404 Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 19 Hindu Code Bill 71, 119, 346 Hindu community 103, 261, 262, 265 Hindu fundamentalists 102 Hindu law 359 Hindu Mahasabha 66, 70, 261 Hindu majoritarianism 15 Hindu Marriage Act 19, 346 Hindu Minority 19, 346 Hindu nationalism 64, 71, 104, 259, 261, 262, 269, 271; politics 71 Hindu nationalists 71, 72, 378 Hindu reformers 65 Hindu social reformers 65 Hindu society 277 Hindustani Awam Morcha 293 Hindu Succession Act 19, 346 Hindutva 103, 104, 262 Hindutva movement 105 Hirakud valley projects 465 Housing Development Finance Corporation 399 Hussain, Zakir 139 ‘hybrid mode of governance’ 69 idea of secularism 99 Income Tax Department 14 India Independence Act 50 Indian caste system 277, 278 Indian Christian community 103 Indian communities 409 Indian Constituent Assembly 41, 44, 46, 47, 50 Indian Constitution 6, 7, 13, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 48, 50, 71, 131, 147, 154, 156, 171, 177, 180,

498 Index 181, 184, 194, 283, 321 – 334, 349, 389, 404, 480 Indian democracy 171, 291 Indian Federalism 6, 174 – 177, 176, 181, 186, 194; contemporary debates 189; multiparty coalition era 184 – 189 Indian federal polity 182 Indian Forest Act 333 Indian Judiciary 132 Indian middle class 297 Indian model of federalism 174, 177 – 182, 193; multiparty coalition era 182 – 184 Indian Muslim Federation 432 Indian National Congress (INC) 1, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 66, 176, 231, 239, 282, 336 Indian nationalism 69 Indian nationhood 70 Indian Parliament 13, 156, 157, 158, 160, 171; evolution of 167 – 170; history 157 – 158 Indian party system 238 Indian Penal Code (IPC) 119, 153, 350 Indian planning process 474 Indian politics 1, 21 – 23, 53, 64, 68, 69, 70, 184, 232, 259, 260, 262, 265, 266, 270, 271; dynamism of 1; processes 1 Indian polity 175, 184 Indian secularism 15, 71, 379 – 382 Indian social order 65 Indian society 65, 156, 370, 373 Indian state 64; democratic institutional framework of the 2; Marxist analyses of 2 Indian State Council 187 India political processes 7 – 19 ‘India shining’ campaign 267 India-specific secularism 415 Industrial Revolution 364, 463 Integral Humanism 263 Integrated Tribal Development Project (ITDP) 334 Internal Complaints Committees 357 International Monetary Fund 59 Interpellation process 97, 98 Islamic fundamentalists challenge 101

Islamic law 102 Islamic nation 102 Jama’at al Tabligh 102 Jamaat-e-Islami 100 Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind (JUH) 432 Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act 7 Janata Party 420 Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile trinity 11 Jan Dhan Yojana 269 Janmabhoomi Programme 398 Jashn-e-Jamhuriat 125 Jesus of Nazareth 108 Jethmalani, Ram 262 Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme 331 Jones, Morris 171 Joseph, Kurian 151 Judeo-Christian tradition 105 Judicial activism 146 Juergensmeyer, Mark 95 Justice Party 286 JVP Committee 442 Kaka Kalelkar Commission 283, 284 Kamaraj, K. 376 Kangleipak Communist Party 455 Kania, Harilal J. 131 Kantakashodhana 132 Kapur, Devesh 115 Kargil War 266 Kashang Hydroelectric Projects 472 Kejriwal, Arvind 77, 83, 89 Kerala Education Bill 138 Kerala Land Reform Act 144 Keynesian economics 59 Khan, Aziz Ahmed 159 Khanna, H. R 144 Khap panchayats 398 Kohli, Atul 60 Kothari, Rajni 60, 67, 280, 282 Krishna Iyer, V. R. 147 Krishna rivers 443 Kuki National Army 456 Kuki National Assembly 455 Kyoto Protocol Conference 475

Index  499 L. M. Singhvi Committee 393 Labour Party 483 Law Commission on Party Reforms 9, 10 legal and administrative arrangements 65 legal-constitutional scheme 410 Legislative Assembly 289, 403 Legislative Councils 158 legislative power 165 liberal theorists 342 liberation theology 107, 108, 109, 110; second characteristic of 109; social concern of 108 Locke, John 35 Lohia, Ram Manohar 283 Lok Sabha 161; elections 226, 246, 267; Secretariat 164 Lokur, Madan B. 151 Loya, B.H. 151 Lushai Association 450 Lushai Hills 449, 455 Lyngdoh, James 115, 120 Madan, T. N. 379, 380 Madras Municipal Corporation 388 Madras Presidency 441 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) 205, 206, 210, 215 Mahila Samta Sainik Dal 348 Mahore tehsil 123 Majoritarianism 71 Majoritarian politics 16 Make in India 11, 269 Mandal, Bindheshwari Prasad 287 Mandal Commission 184, 188, 244, 287, 289, 290 Marketing and Research Group (MARG) 227 Marxist: approaches 54; ideology 109; tradition 96 Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) 205 MCC 119, 120, 121 McGraw, Bryan 95

McMillan, Alistair 125 Meditation and relaxation exercises 106 Mehta, Pratap Bhanu 115 Meitei rulers 454 Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) 430 memorandum of procedure (MoP) 151 Michelutti, Lucia 68 Millennium Declaration 208 Ministry of Minority Affairs 424 Minorities Commission 420 Misra, Deepak 151, 153 MIT Indian Election Data Project 227 Mizo District Council Committee 325 Mizo hills 445 Mizo National Front (MNF) 450 Mizo Union 448 Model Code of Conduct (MCC) 116 Modi, Narendra 72, 84, 170, 267, 269, 310 modified area development approach (MADA) 334 Modi-Hindutva formation 92 Montagu Chelmsford Reforms in 1919 176 Motilal Nehru Committee Report 40, 41 Mudra Loan schemes 269 Mukherjee, Syama Prasad 47, 261, 262 Munda, Jaipal Singh 47, 321, 322 Munshi, K. M. 44 Muslim League 42, 43, 44, 66 Muslim minority 422 Muslim organizations 415 Muslim Personal Law 354, 413, 422 Naga Club 452 Naga Hills 451, 455 Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) 452 Naga tribes 454 Naidu, Sarojini 47 Nambyar, M.K. 143 Nandy, Ashis 379 Naoroji, Dadabhai 239 Narayan, Jayaprakash 260 Narmada Bachao Andolan 327, 472 Narmada dam protests 468 Narmada Valley Project 149

500 Index Narsimha Rao government 266 National Action Plan on Climate Change 475 National Advisory Council 210 National Alliance of People’s Movement 5 National Commission on Agriculture 471 National Commission for Minorities (NCM) 420 National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) 427 National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities 429 National Commission for Review 10 National Commission for Scheduled Castes 420 National Commission for Scheduled Tribes 323, 420 National Communication project 474 National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCEAR) 306 National Counter Terrorism Centre 7 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 1, 145, 146, 202, 249, 250, 265 National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 446 National Development Council (NDC) 183, 390 National Election Study (NES) 228, 305 National Election Survey (NES) 229; project 227 National Environment Appellate Authority Act 474 National Environment Laws 474 National Environment Tribunal Act 474 National Forest Commission 472 National Forest Policy 472 National Front 289 National Green Tribunal (NGT) 476 National Health Service (NHS) 483 National Institution for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog 6 National Integration Conference 414 National Integration Council (NIC) 414 Nationalist Congress Party 8, 251 Nationalist movements 344

National Janata Party 287 National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) 13, 133 National Liberation Front of Tripura 458 National Parks 331 National policies 484 National Register of Citizens 269 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 210, 267 National Rural Employment Programme 210 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) 439 National Thermal Power Cooperation (NTPC) 149 NDA coalition 266 NDA government 170 negative liberalism 365 Nehru, B. K. 159 Nehru, Jawaharlal 177 Nehru Committee Report 40, 41 Nehruvian secularism 379, 380 neo-liberal economic reforms 304 neoliberal policies 6 neo-Marxist approach 58 Network of Women in Media 357 new model of federalism 177 NITI Aayog 7, 11, 189, 194 Niyamgiri hills 472 NJAC Act 2014 170 No-Confidence Motion 167 non-Brahmanical Shudra castes 65 non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 481 non-cooperation movement 80 non-party political formulations 3 non-party political process 327 Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change 473 North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal 445 North-East India 266 NRMs 106, 107, 110, 111 NRMs: Religion and Spirituality 105 Occupy Wall Street 88 Occupy Wall Street movement 88 Odisha Act 329 Omvedt, Gail 69

Index  501 Operation Blue Star 421 – 422 Other Backward Class (OBC) 3, 233, 243, 411, 419; reservation 293 P. K. Thungon Committee 393 Palshikar, Suhas 293 Panchayati Raj 6, 328, 390; act 404; law 328; system 392 Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act laws 327, 329, 330, 332 Parliamentary Committees 164 parliamentary debates 171 parliamentary system 160 parliament: functions 160 Parliament of India 5 Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs 337 Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis 241 party systems 8, 247 passive revolution 60 Pathalghadi movement 330 People’s Democratic Party 270 People’s Liberation Army 455 Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board 475 PHC system 485 Phule, Jyotiba 288 Phule, Jyotirao 65 PIL 147 Planning Commission 6, 183, 389 PM Gati Shakti 11 Pokhran test 266 political parties 7 political power 56 political processes 70 political society 63 politics: lower castes in 53 populism 75, 76, 83, 90 populist Interpellation 90 Post-ideological Moment 88 Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana 489 Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana 269 Prakash, Gyan 64 primary health centres 485 Primitive Tribal Groups 332 primordialism 437 primordialists 438

Private Member Bills 167 process of recruitment 97 ‘protective discrimination’ 304 ‘Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’ 99 Provincial Assemblies 43 provincial bill 6 Provincial Congress Committee 46, 176 Provincial Constitution Committee 159 PRS Legislative 170 Public Interest Litigations (PILs) 149 In Pursuit of Lakshmi 60 Quorums 166 Quraishi, S. Y. 152 Quran 132 Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council 460 radical religious movement (RRM) 96, 107, 110 Rafale case 152 Rajya Sabha 160, 161, 162, 181 Ramachandran, Raju 145 Ramakrishna Mission 110 Ramaswamy, R.K. 135 Ram Janmabhoomi 259 Ram Mandir movement 289 Ram Temple 72, 265, 267 Ranganath Misra Commission 429 Rao, Anupama 69 Rao, P. V. Narsimha 61 Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 8, 185, 293 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 16, 70, 72, 260, 262, 266, 271 Rath Yatra 265, 379 Rau, B. N. 39 Ravi, R. N. 452 Reasi district 123 Referee institution 115 Reformation Lutheran Church 103 Regulatory authorities 115 religion 70 – 72, 364 Religious Movements 111 Renaissance 365 Report on the Indian General Elections 227 Representation of the People Act (RPA) 117

502 Index ‘reproductive justice’ approach 358 Republican Party of India (RPI) 288 reservoir of powers 117, 118 return of religion 95 Revolt of the Masses 81 Right-Based Legislations 201 Right to Education Act 2 Right to Information Act 2, 213 Rig Veda 277 Roy, Prannoy 227 Roy, Ram Mohan 110, 159, 344 RTI 205 RTI Act 210 RTI Continuum 214 Rudolph, Lloyd 124, 279 Rudolph, Susanne 124 Rural Manpower Programme 210 Sabarimala Ayyappa Temple 356 Sachar Committee 428 Salwa Judum campaign 330 Samajwadi Party 8, 67, 185 Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD 376 Sanatan Dharma Sabha 261 Sandinista Revolution 109 Santhal Paragana Tenancy Acts 472, 473 Saraswati, Dayanand 261 Sardar Sarovar Dam 468 Sartori Classification 241 sarva dharma samabhava 264 Sathe, S.P. 148, 149, 153 Savarkar, V. D. 261 Savarkar’s theory of Hindutva 263 Scheduled Castes (SCs) 161, 242, 410; communities 66 Schedule Tribes (STs) 66, 161, 242, 318, 410 Schmitt, Carl 79 Scrutiny committees 164 Secularism 16, 364, 379 secularism 366 – 370, 372 – 374, 375 Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India 64 Sengkrak movement 458 Sen, Sukumar 116 separatist movements 441 service committees 164

Shahada movement 347 Shah, Amit 269 Shah Bano Controversy 422 Shah Bano movement 377 Sharia law 102 Shiromani Akali Dal 271 Shiv Sena 271 Sikh community 417 Sikh minorities 157 Sikri, S. M. 136, 144 Simon Commission 40, 41, 158, 176, 452 Singh, V. P. 265 Sirsikar, V. M. 226 Sixth Schedule of the Constitution 325 Social Action Litigation (SAL) 147 social and political movements 95 social-grassroot movements 3 social revolution 36 Special Investigation Team (SIT) 151 Sridharan, E. 249, 266 Srinivas, M. N. 67, 278, 279 State Assembly elections 226 State Finance Commission 394 State Legislative Assembly 160, 337, 412 state-level legislative process 6 state-level political alignments 245 State Policy 66 state-society interaction 64 States Reorganization Act 417 States Reorganization Commission (SRC) 417 Stockholm Conference 472 Strategic Voters’ Education and Electoral Participation (SVEEP) 121 – 124 structural adjustment programmes 1, 3 Study of Developing Societies 305 Sub-national movements 457 Supplementary legality 121 Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) 152 Supreme Court of India 1, 11, 13, 115, 117, 118, 124, 125, 131, 152, 170, 186, 371, 426; judges 163; jurisdiction and power of 135 – 139; power of judicial

Index  503 review 139 – 141; structure and autonomy of 132 – 135 Sustainable development 465, 487 SVEEP report 123 Swaminathan, T. T. 120 Swatantra Party 302 Systematic Voters 13 system-defining party 259, 272 Tablighi Jamaat 100 Tagore, Rabindranath 80 ‘Team India’ 11 Tehri Dam movement 472 Telangana movement 347 Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 270 Tenancy Act 473 Tendulkar Committee 197 Thakkar, A. V. 326 Thakkar Subcommittee 326 theatre of politics 4 Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council 460 Tibetan Buddhist community 99 Tiwa Autonomous Council 460 Tiwari Committee 472 TMC 251 Towards Equality 19, 20, 346 Traditional Forest Dwellers 332 Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council 458 tribal communities 318 tribal Life 321 – 334 Tribal National Volunteers 458 Trinamool Congress 5 triple talaq law 355 Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti  458 Trump, Donald 77 Tryst with Destiny 2 Twitter 11, 310 UN Human Rights Council 186 Uniform Civil Code (UCC) 15, 20, 66, 71, 72, 264, 267 Union and Provincial Constitution Committee report 158 Union Constitution Committees 157 Union Finance Commission 399

United Bodo People’s Organization 448 United Nations Development Programme 197 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 1, 82, 91, 205, 231, 265, 427 United Progressive Association regime 62 universal health coverage (UHC) 482 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) 152 Upadhyaya, Deendayal 374 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 263, 374 valourized process of individuation 81 value added tax (VAT) 7 Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram 261 Verma, Alok 152 Vidhi Samhita 132 Vikassheel Insaan Party 293 Vishva Hindu Parishad 72, 261 Wardha conference 42 Weber, Max 99 Weiner, Myron 436 Welfare policies 483, 484 welfare programmes 269 Well-established institutions 228 Western counterpart 298 Western secularism _ 366 Western society 298, 299 Western World 103 Westminster model 171 WhatsApp 310 Wildlife (Protection) Act 330 Wilson, Woodrow 40 Witsoe, Jeffrey 68 Women movements 346 Women’s Reservation Bill 354 World Bank 59, 197 World Health Organization (WHO) 482 World Inequality Lab Report 198 Yadav, Lalu 77 Yadav, Mulayam Singh 67 Yadav, Yogendra 68, 124, 228 Yamuna River 476 Zero hour 166