India, China and the Strategic Himalayas 1032609729, 9781032609720

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INDIA, CHINA AND

THE STRATEGIC

HIMALAYAS

This book analyses strategic discourse on the Himalayas from the perspective of India’s interests. Home to many communities, cultures, natural resources and political boundaries, it is the geopolitical landscape of the Himalayas between India and China that dominates other narratives and discourses. The traditional notion of Himalayas as India’s frontiers and buffer is challenged by China. Despite various mechanisms to address border resolution there are violations and transgressions from China. Why and how it is increasing its footprints in Nepal. Why are there newer territorial claims in Bhutan? This book examines India’s responses to the new emerging challenges in the Himalayas. How the statist discourse on strategic interests incorporates people’s discourse. It provides a nuanced understanding of India’s strategic undertakings, diplomatic initiatives and development framework. The strength of the book lies in providing indepth analyses of the Himalayas from experts from the region, academics, military officials and foreign policy experts. This book will be a valuable addition to existing knowledge on the Himalayas between India and China. Scholars and practitioners interested in International Relations, Strategic Studies, Himalayan Studies and South Asian Studies will find it useful. Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal is Chairperson at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

INDIA, CHINA AND

THE STRATEGIC

HIMALAYAS

Edited by

Sangeeta Thapliyal

KNOWLEDGE WORLD

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd

New Delhi

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Sangeeta Thapliyal The right of Sangeeta Thapliyal to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Bhutan)

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 9781032609720 (hbk) ISBN: 9781032609737 (pbk) ISBN: 9781003461357 (ebk) DOI:10.4324/9781003461357 Typeset in Adobe Caslon Pro by KW Publishers, Delhi

Contents

List of Figures and Maps

vii

Acknowledgements

ix

Contributors

xi

Introduction Sangeeta Thapliyal

xvii

1.

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers: An Adjunct of the

China Dream Rajiv Narayanan

2.

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security

Imbroglio for India Nishant Bhardwaj

25

3.

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the

Lens of Offensive Realism Haans J. Freddy

59

4.

China’s Strategy in the Northeast India P.R. Shankar

5.

The “Arunachal” Factor in Sino-Indian Relations Nani Bath

1

77

109

vi | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

6.

Sikkim where India-China Meet: Reflections on

Chinese Encroachment Ananta Swarup Bijendra De Gurung

7.

China Overrun: The Case of Bhutan I.P. Khosla

8.

From Guidance to Consultation: India’s Policy

Towards Bhutan Mathew Joseph C.

9.

History and Perceptions: India–Nepal Relations Sangeeta Thapliyal

144

161

192

213

10. The Stability of Instability: Chinese Engagements in

Nepal and Implications for India Nihar R. Nayak

230

11. China’s Upstream Activities: Water Concerns, Tensions

and Cooperation Amit Ranjan

256

List of Figures and Maps

Figures 1.1 Weiqi Board and China 1.2 CPC’s Cycle of National Rejuvenation

6 17

Maps 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3A 1.4 1.5 2.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11

9 10 11 12 13 17 41 78 79 81 83 84 85 86 87 90 92 95

The LAC Western Sector Central Sector Barahoti Sector McMahon Line Chinese Heartland & Periphery Karakoram Highway International Land Border Northeast States and Neighbouring Countries Northeast India, Military Geographical Features Sikkim Tibet Border Arunachal-Tibet Border Brahmaputra River Course Indo-Myanmar Area Bay of Bengal Area The Five Fingers Dams on Brahmaputra in Tibet Approaches to Sikkim

viii | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16

Approaches to Arunachal Pradesh Disputed Areas in Arunachal Pradesh Disputed Areas with Bhutan Approach Through Myanmar Bangladesh

96

97

98

100

101

Acknowledgements

This book takes forward the existing discourse on the strategic Himalayas. It deals with Himalaya as a geographic entity and the Himalayas as consisting of various communities and cultures. China’s aggressive postures and India’s fortitude in dealing with it had once again brought the Himalayas to the centre stage of discussion.The contributors and I were on the same page on the necessity to publish a book dealing with the subject of ‘India, China and the Himalayas’ which had gripped the attention of the academia, media and the society at large. Instead of dealing with the conflict, the book highlights discourse on the strategic importance of the Himalayas between India and China and how it has impacted on India’s policies and approaches. I acknowledge the contributions of the subject experts in bringing forth finer points and nuances on the subject. With gratitude I convey my special thanks to Ambassador Savithri Lakshmanan for innumerable discussions and her valuable suggestions on the book. I am thankful to Ms Kalpana Shukla and Mr Sushannta Gayen from KW Publishers for undertaking the publication of the book.  Sangeeta Thapliyal

Contributors

Prof. Nani Bath, a recipient of IPSA Young Political Scientist Award (2013), is a Professor in the Department of Political Science, Rajiv Gandhi University, Itanagar. He did his BA (Hons.) in Sociology from University of Delhi, and Masters from Jawaharlal Nehru University in International Politics. He has written articles for books and journals, and contributes regularly in local newspapers. His books include Electoral Politics in Arunachal Pradesh (Pilgrims, 2019), Voices from the Border: Responses to Chinese Claim over Arunachal Pradesh (eds), with Gurudas Das and C.J. Thomas (Pentagon, 2015), and Party Politics in Arunachal Pradesh (Himalayan, 2016). Dr. Nishant Bhardwaj is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Satyawati College, University of Delhi. He has obtained a PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has been awarded Junior Research Fellowship from UGC and Doctoral Research fellowship from ICSSR during his Doctoral research period. At present his work interests ranges over fields like International Political Economy, Globalisation in relation to the Global South, gauging the paradigm shift in non-traditional security threats, international economic order and structural violence. He has presented research papers in various international seminars and conferences, for which he was invited by St. Petersburg State University, Russia and University of Turin, Italy.

xii | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Dr. Ananta Swarup Bijendra De Gurung is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at SRM University, Sikkim. He is a PhD in Indo-Pacific Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His areas of research relate to international relations theory, security and strategic studies in Southeast Asia with a particular focus on Vietnam. His research interest also lies in understanding the security implication of the border states between India and China in the Eastern Himalayas. Dr. Haans J Freddy is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. He teaches Political Thought, International Relations and Foreign Policy. His research interests include topics related to international relations, strategic studies, maritime studies and political theory. He has published several articles on international relations in edited volumes and journal and has authored two books and is currently working on “Sanctions a Tool of War”. Prof. Mathew Joseph C. is Professor at the MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Before joining Jamia Millia Islamia he was with the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies (DSRS), University of Jammu. Mathew completed his PhD from the South Asian Studies Division of the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He specialises in South Asian Studies and International Relations/Studies. Apart from many research articles in various peer reviewed journals, his major publications include Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan  (Nirala Publications, 1999), Deshadeshanthara Rashtreeyavicharam (Oruma Publications, 2015), a co-edited volume titled Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context  (KW Publishers, 2004) and two edited volumes titled Understanding Pakistan: Emerging Voices from India (Manohar Publishers & Routledge, 2015 & 2017) and Pakistan and the Muslim World (KW Publishers, 2019). Ambassador Inderpal Khosla (Retd), was educated at St. Stephens College, Delhi University and Emmanuel College, Cambridge. I.P. Khosla joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1960. Thereafter he served in Algiers,

Contributors | xiii

where he helped to establish the Embassy, in Myanmar and in a number of neighbouring countries. He was India’s Representative in Bhutan, thereafter serving as High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Ambassador to Afghanistan and Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. After retirement from service in 1996 he has written extensively on India’s relations with its neighbours as well as on security issues. His book of memoirs Underdogs End Empires recount many of the lessons learned from his career. Maj. Gen. Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM (Retd), Head CS3, USI of India, retired after over 37 years of distinguished service, as the ADGMO, in Army HQ. An Alumni of DSSC Wellington and DSCSC Mirpur, Dhaka, during his service he commanded 16th Light Cavalry (one of the oldest Cavalry unit of India), 1st Armoured Brigade and 2 Mountain Division opposite China. He has had the opportunity to serve as the Defence Attaché in the Embassy of India Dushanbe, Tajikistan during the turbulent period post 9/11 from October 2003 to March 2007 and as the Additional Director General of Military Operations (B) for the last three years of his service. His key areas of interest areas include, China, its Grand Strategy, Neighbourhood Policies, and the PLA; Evolving trends in the Indo-Pacific Region; Future World Order, the Nation State and Regional Multilateralism; Future Military Strategies, Force Modernisation and Force Structuring. He has many articles and papers published in Indian Journals and magazines (including web editions). He has presented his papers in several Indian and international Seminars / Webinars. He has edited three books, From Contest to Co-operation: A Vision of Shared Prosperity in the Indo-Pacific Region, IndiaUzbekistan: Partnership in Regional Peace and Stability, and India China: Building Strategic Trust. Dr. Nihar R. Nayak is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. His area of expertise is Domestic Politics in Nepal and Bhutan, Climate Change impacts in the Himalayas, Energy, and Political violence (Maoist Conflict) in South Asia. Dr. Nayak

xiv | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

has completed PhD in International Politics from JNU. He was Visiting Fellow to PRIO, Oslo, in 2006 and 2007. He did a special course on Peace Research in International Summer School from Oslo University in 2007. He has been Visiting Faculty to the Center for the Study of Nepal, Faculty of Social Science, Banaras Hindu University in 2011. He has been Guest Faculty to LBSNAA, Mussoorie from September 2006 to June 2011. Dr. Nayak has both national and international publications including the book Strategic Himalayas: Republican Nepal and External Powers. He recently published a monograph on Political Changes in Nepal and Bhutan: Emerging Trends in Foreign policy in post 2008 period published by MP-IDSA in September 2021. Dr. Amit Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. His latest books include: Urban Development and Environmental History in Modern South Asia (with Ian Talbot) (Routledge, 2023), and Contested Waters: India’s Transboundary River Water Disputes in South Asia (Routledge, 2020). He is also the author of India-Bangladesh Border Disputes: History and Post-LBA Dynamics (Springer, 2018). Amit has edited the following books: India in South Asia Challenges and Management (Springer, 2019), Partition of India: Postcolonial Legacies (Routledge, 2019) and Water Issues in Himalayan South Asia: Internal Challenges, Disputes and Transboundary Tensions (2019). His papers review essays and book reviews have been widely published in journals. Lt Gen P. R. Shankar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM is a retired Director General of Artillery. He is double MPhil and an alumnus of National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, DIAT Girinagar, DSSC Wellington, Army War College Mhow, Naval Post Graduate School Monterey and National Defence College, New Delhi. He has vast operational experience having served extensively in the North East along the LAC and in CI situations. He writes extensively on defence and strategic affairs @ www. gunnersshot.com with a focus on China. He has contributed significantly to modernisation of Artillery. He is currently a Professor in the Aerospace Department of IIT Madras where he is into applied research.

Contributors | xv

Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal is Chairperson at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University ( JNU). Before joining JNU, she was Professor in the Department of Strategic Studies, Jammu University and has worked in Observer Research Foundation, Delhi Policy Group and IDSA. Prof. Thapliyal is an alumnus of JNU and Madras Christian College. Presently she is in the Advisory Committee of the Nepal India Chambers of Commerce and Industries, Kathmandu, G.P. Koirala Foundation, Kathmandu, editorial board member of the Journal of International Affairs, published by the International Relations and Diplomacy Department in Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu and Journal of International Studies, JNU. She is Vice President of the Association of Asia Scholars, New Delhi. Prof. Thapliyal has been a recipient of ICCR Professor Chair in the University of Valladolid, Spain; Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute affiliation to York University, Toronto; Visiting Fellow at Uppasala University, Sweden. She is alumni of International Youth Leadership Programme, State Department, USA, Asia Scholarship Foundation, Bangkok and Regional Centre for Security Studies, Sri Lanka.

Introduction Sangeeta Thapliyal

Time and again, the Indian Himalayas come alive with the sound of battle cries defending the borders from the Chinese forces. The recent skirmishes in Galwan will go down in the history of India–China relations as one of the bloodiest killings of army men on both sides. Chinese Army’s advances in the Leh region of north- western Himalayas began in early 2020, escalating clashes that disturbed the peace and tranquility of the region until both the countries agreed to sit for talks at the military, diplomatic and political levels. This is one of many instances in Indian Himalayan history that China has challenged India through military advances followed by political claims. In this background, the current book seeks to understand how the Himalayas have become a prisoner of IndiaChina relations and have been confined to this geostrategic narrative. This narrative has overshadowed sociocultural aspirations of the mountain people, hampered economic development of the region and ignored their historical antecedents. The splendid Himalayas have captivated people for centuries. It is the spiritual abode of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Its strength and might has evoked the spirit of valour and courage, and it has inspired many poems, lyrics and songs. Standing at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and China, the Himalayas has been instrumental in the interactions between people. It is the abode of many cultures, languages and ethnicities. A storehouse of water, it is home to many rivers traversing nations. The use of Himalayan passes as transit routes for people’s movement led to the flow of ideas, cultures and traditions from one region to another.

xviii | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Not all interactions were peaceful, as history is replete with instances of Himalayan passes serving as entry points for invading armies of Greeks, Turks or Mongols. Nepal and Bhutan’s armed clashes with the neighbouring Indian kingdoms led to wars with the British Indian army. The British tried to keep the Himalayan states within its reach through armed conflicts or treaty arrangements. Many states were autonomous, but the British directed their external relations.This was regarded as essential in order to secure their imperial interests from any potential threats from Russia or China. A peaceful and stable Himalaya was also essential for trade purposes. The British had commercial interests in Tibet through the Himalayan passes from Nepal, Bhutan and the other Himalayan kingdoms of India. Military missions, such as led by George Bogle in 1774 or Samuel Turner in 1783, were sent to explore possibilities of trade with Tibet, and for this access through the Himalayan passes was a must. In fact, during the war in 1773, the British defeated Bhutan and gained control over mountain passes to enter Tibet. With such historical experiences and geo-political narratives, India framed its policy towards the Himalayan states, ensuring that the peripheral states were free from foreign influences. The Himalayas’ strategic relevance has grown as a result of geopolitical changes in the region. In the west, the newly formed Pakistan claimed the Himalayan state of Jammu & Kashmir. In 1947, the Pakistani regular army and tribal mercenaries attacked Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan occupied a significant area of landmass which they call as ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ and ‘Gilgit Baltistan’. In January 1948, India rebutted the advances militarily and also took the Pakistani aggression to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Disturbing political changes were taking place towards the north of India. By 1949, the Chinese Communists had completely seized political power in the country. Despite being the first non-socialist country to establish diplomatic ties with China and not oppose it’s suzerainty over Tibet in the UNSC, India was cautious in its approach. PM Nehru in his letter to Krishna Menon wrote, “It is true that we recognise Chinese suzerainty but at the same time we recognise Tibetan autonomy and the two went together so far as we were concerned.”1 India was perturbed with the Chinese military entering Tibet. Protesting against the disturbing developments, India had

Introduction | xix

sent protest notes to China, which the latter considered as interference in its domestic politics at the behest of foreign influences. Various facets of Indian foreign policy can be seen. The government was somehow convinced that issues could be resolved peacefully through negotiations. Seeped in liberal thoughts and philosophy, the romanticists or the idealists believed in the power of dialogue, and within this spirit, India signed an agreement on trade and intercourse with China in April 1954 based on the principles of panchsheel. Through this India recognized Tibet as a region of China and gave up its special consular rights in the border towns of Yatung and Gyantse. Some consider that it was a diplomatic disaster for India and missed opportunity to trade off “between India relinquishing its interests in Tibet and accepting it as a region of China, and the Chinese accepting 1914 border agreement between Tibet and India.”2 Others like Dorothy Woodman write that Nehru was “an idealist and romanticized policy towards China, whatever government was in power, he was the victim of his own trustfulness.” 3 However, she does not absolve him of his failure to initiate discussions on the border at an early stage and bargain with Chou En-Lai. On the other hand, India was defending panchsheel at home and abroad. The Indian readjustment of China policy may be seen in its response to Nepal, which was disturbed by the developments in its north. On April 30, 1954, Matrika Prasad Koirala, Prime Minister of Nepal, explained to Nehru that his country recognized China’s suzerainty over Tibet but “our relations with Tibet remained the same in spite of the presence of the Chinese there and we are still dealing directly with Dalai Lama and not with the Chinese and to our belief Tibet was still autonomic.”4 Nehru responded, “the statement you made about Tibet was rather unfortunate and must no doubt have irritated the government of China greatly. Your statement was not in keeping with the facts of the situation because there can be no doubt at all the Tibet is under Chinese sovereignty and it has ceased to be autonomous.”5 Explaining the 1954 agreement with China, Nehru wrote, “That, I think is a good agreement, which will give lasting peace on our long border and which recognizes facts as they are.”6

xx | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

During foreign minister DR Regmi’s visit on May 8, India had submitted an Aide Memoire that underlined for coordinated efforts in foreign policy and matters relating to international affairs. Out of seven provisions, the fourth stated, “in particular matters relating to the relations of Nepal with Tibet and China, consultations will take place with the Government of India.”7 In fact, Nehru clarified this in his letter to PM MP Koirala that, “the Chinese are very difficult people to deal with and the presence of an experienced representative of India will be helpful. The fact that we have entered into an agreement with China will also be useful model.”8 Soon Nepal and China began negotiation through their ambassadors in New Delhi. In July 1955, they had signed an agreement based on the principles of Panchsheel. The realist foreign policy experts have a cautious approach in their response to the developments in Tibet. They were acutely aware of their military limitations after inheriting a sizeable smaller defence force, defence industry and resource allocation for defence or development. Within the constraints, India took some measures to consolidate its security in the Himalayas. The Government of India established North and Northeast India committee under the chairmanship of Major General Himmat Singhji. The committee had recommended reorganization and redeployment of the military in the Himalayas, efficient communication network and intelligence. Yet another committee, led by Major General SPP Thorat was setup to assess the security needs and requirements of Nepal. It gave recommendations to reorganise Nepal’s Army and suggested setting up of checkpoints on its border with Tibet. Nepali and Indian officials monitored the checkpoints jointly. India had also sent military missions on Nepal’s request to reform and modernise its Army.9 China’s occupation of Tibet was one of the defining points in India’s policy and approach towards the Himalayas. The Chinese threat was such that the Himalayan states signed treaties of peace and friendship with India, which included clauses related to security considerations. India had signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Bhutan in 1949 and with Nepal in 1950. Nepal and India agreed to inform each other if there was any disagreement with a neighbouring country, and Bhutan agreed to be assisted by India in its

Introduction | xxi

foreign policy. In both the Treaties, India had agreed to provide transit rights to the signatories for purchase of arms and armaments. Signatories agreed to keeping the borders open, allowing their citizens to travel without a visa and give national treatment to each other’s citizens. These measures were considered essential for the security and stability of their country. PM Nehru had expressed his concerns in the Parliament and in his communication to people concerned. In his cable sent to Indian representative in Lhasa he wrote, “Our interests now within Tibet are limited and our chief concern is proper maintenance of our frontier line. This we have made quite clear to the Chinese Government and on that there can be no yielding…We are particularly concerned with our border State like Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal and in no event will we tolerate any intrusion into these States.”10 India had taken upon itself to keep the Himalayan region secure and let it not fall prey to China’s control or influence. Diplomatic engagements were maintained through visits to each other’s countries. Between June 1954 and January 1957, Chou En-Lai had visited India four times and Nehru visited China twice in October 1954 and 1956. The Asian-African Conference in Bandung, held in April 1955, provided an opportunity to India and China to be together on the framework of solidarity among the newly independent countries from the colonial rule. India supported China’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. These measures did little to ease China’s advances in the Himalayas. China became more active in the world politics and took steps on the Himalayas that were adversarial to India’s strategic interests. One such move was the construction of roads from Xinjiang to Tibet through Aksai Chin. The situation became complex when the Dalai Lama and his supporters sought asylum in India. Another troubling development was the Chinese maps depicting territories of the Indian Himalayas as their own, to which India had submitted protest notes. Following the initial response that those maps were obsolete, China directly challenged the entire Himalayan border. There were claims and counter claims on the border from both sides. These conflicting claims were the precursor for strained relations, and the forces of the two countries met in a fierce battle in 1962. The Himalayan

xxii | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

borderland became the salient feature for conflict between the two after 1962. China had taken control over 32,000 square miles of territory in Arunachal Pradesh and 14,000 square miles of Aksai Chin in Ladakh. To make the matters worse, China developed closer relations with Pakistan and gave them military and political support. In 1963, Pakistan ceded to China 5180 square kilometres of Karakoram tract in Hunza-Gilgit region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Thus, three actors were drawn into the territorial quagmire in the northwestern Himalayas. China and Pakistan built Karakoram highway through this territory, which was opened in 1979, serving as the only land link between the two countries.The highway is crucial for China to approach Gwadar port in Karachi. One of India’s strategic moves was to develop friendship with the Soviet Union. India had looked towards the Soviets after the disconcerting developments in the region, such as the US arms supplies to Pakistan, Pakistan’s military alliances or the Tibetan uprising in 1959. The war further pushed India towards the Soviets for military equipment, planes and helicopters as they were prepared to accept payment in the Indian currency.11 By this time China’s relations with India and the Soviets had deteriorated. As a part of its strategy, China challenged India’s strategic interests. One such move was to aid and abet Naga and Mizo insurgents in India’s northeast. Following the 1962 war, the Himalayan borders were blocked, as were border trade and visits to Kailash Mansarovar via the Himalayan routes. India took measures to strengthen its security in the borders by deploying more troops on the Himalayas. In October 1962, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) was established to monitor the Himalayan borders. In 2004, India adopted ‘one border one force’ policy and accordingly ITBP was given responsibility to guard 3488 km of border with China. In May 1963, Special Services Bureau was set up and renamed as Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) in January 2001. It is deployed to guard India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan.12 These forces are placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Special Frontier Force, originally Establishment 22, was set up around the same time in Chakrata, Dehradun. It is said that the force was set up with the help of American CIA. It is directly under the cabinet secretariat. The force was trained by the Indian army officials in mountain warfare. Initially,

Introduction | xxiii

Tibetan exiles were recruited in the service, but now has Gorkhas too. The force was deployed in the India–Pakistan war in1971.13 One of the impacts of the Sino-India war was that the Himalayan countries were looking towards India to consolidate their armed forces. The threat from China was real. India sent Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) to Bhutan in 1963. It has Indian army personnel to train the Royal Bhutan Army. IMTRAT is headquartered in Haa district, in northwestern Bhutan.14 It also provides medical and canteen facilities to the local populace. To develop infrastructure, India established DANTAK under Border Roads Organisation and it is working in Bhutan since 1962. DANTAK has been extensively involved in constructing roads, bridges and helipads in Bhutan. Its headquarters are in Deothang, in Samdrup Jongkhar district in southeastern Bhutan. India has also set up a Military Hospital in Thimpu.15 In 1962, India had sent an Indian Military Liaison Group to Nepal for training, reorganizing the Army besides assisting in availing training opportunities in the Indian military establishments and procurement of arms and equipment. The Group informed the army Headquarter about the military requirements of Nepal Army, whereas the Defence Attaché at the Indian embassy in Kathmandu informed the ministry of Defence. In January 1965, India signed Arms Assistance agreement with Nepal according to which it agreed to take care of the requirements of Nepal army on reorganization and modernization through arms and equipment and in case of any shortfall the government of United States and United Kingdom would fill in the gap with whom it had already signed arms assistance agreement in 1964.16 The Sino-India war demonstrated China’s potential to militarily intervene in South Asian affairs. China’s growing relationship with Pakistan and emergence as an arms supplier during India-Pakistan war in 1965 revealed its readiness to assist against India. Chou en Lai had visited Pakistan in 1964 and supported their demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. In March 1965, Ayub Khan visited China and secured Chou’s assurances of support to Pakistan in the event of an Indian aggression. The Sino-India war had brought in China as an influential extra-regional power in the India-centric South Asia. China attempted to cultivate Nepal and found a willing partner.

xxiv | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

In 1960, King Mahendra seized political control by dissolving the elected government. Apprehending Indian support for Nepal’s democratic forces, the King forged friendship with China and signed agreements, notably one for the construction of a road linking Kathmandu with Kodari pass near Tibet. Through the boundary treaty signed in 1961, China resolved border demarcation issues with Nepal and also the disagreement on Mount Everest. At the same time China laid claims on the territories of India and Bhutan. China was the first country to accept Nepal’s proposal on declaring itself as a Zone of Peace. It has been involved in some small development and infrastructure projects in Nepal, a few of them in the Terai region adjoining India. It also entered the defence sector, which had traditionally worked closely with India. This was a means of challenging traditional military relations with India. On the other hand, China did not resolve its border dispute with Bhutan. In its drive on developing good relations with the neighbours, the Janata government broke the ice with China. Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in February 1979. Statements from both sides highlighted their resolve to solve the vexed issue of border demarcation. The Sumdorong episode was a game changer in the border dispute. In 1984, India had constructed an observational post on the bank of Sumdorong Chu (river) in Arunachal Pradesh. It was manned in the summer and left vacant during the winter. In the summer of 1986, Indian soldiers saw that the Chinese soldiers had built a helipad there. China refused to pay heed to Indian concerns, which led to troop deployment from both the sides. In the meantime, India granted full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh in December 1986. The issue was diffused through political dialogue. Indian external affairs minister visited China in 1987 and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988, which led to the setting up of a Joint Working Group ( JWG) for border talks comprising foreign secretaries. 17 Till 2005, the JWG had held 15 meetings. The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement signed in 1993, Agreement on Military Confidence Building Measures in 1996 and Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence Building Measures in 2005,   were some decisions taken by the JWG to maintain status quo in the border until it was resolved. There

Introduction | xxv

was emphasis on respecting the Line of Actual Control and maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas. The 2005 agreement stressed on bilateral mechanisms to avoid strains under various identified situations, such as violation of land boundary, air space or prior information in case of military exercises close to the border.18 Other working mechanisms on border talks were the Special representatives level talks as a dialogue mechanism. 19 It started in 2003 and has had 22 talks so far. It was set up to explore political settlement to the boundary issue. A working mechanism for consultation and coordination (WMCC) of border negotiations was established in 2012 during its 15th meeting. There have been 23 rounds of negotiations thus far. The mechanism, which includes members of the diplomatic and military services, is led by a joint secretary level official from India and Director General level official from China representing their respective external affairs ministries. While border negotiations were ongoing, there was concerted effort to develop relations in other spheres. Some of the developments were the opening of mountain passes such as Nathu La, Shipki La and Lipulekh for trade purposes. Bilateral trade between the two countries has expanded significantly. China is India’s largest trade partner, and in 2019, despite border skirmishes, trade crossed $125 billion. Indian imports from China were to the tune of $97.5 billion which was 30 per cent higher than 2019 and exports were $28.1 billion.20 India primarily imports electrical and mechanical machinery, telecom, organic chemicals and fertilisers where as it exports iron ore, cotton, copper, diamonds and gems. There have been various discourses on Chinese aggressive postures in the Himalayas and the reasons for it to keep the issue alive. According to one school of thought, India has begun to improve its infrastructure and connectivity in the Himalayas. Defence minister Rajnath Singh had informed Rajya Sabha that work was going on in 61 strategically important projects out of which construction on 42 roads was complete.21 Projects are undertaken to construct highways, tunnels or bridges in the IndiaChina border region. A 272-km long rail link from Udhampur-SrinagarBaramulla through a 21-km tunnel cutting the mountains in Banihal is under construction. Three phases of the project are complete and the

xxvi | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Banihal-Baramulla and Jammu-Udhampur-Katra sector is operational.22 Another important rail project in the pipeline is linking Bilaspur-ManaliLeh. Border Roads Organisation has identified five road construction projects in Ladakh, including widening of existing roads and construction of tunnels.23 Five emergency landing strips have been identified in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. In the northeastern Himalayas, Indian railways is constructing Dimapur-Kohima Railway Project in Nagaland, TeteliyaByrnihat Railway Project and Sivok- Rangpo rail link in Meghalaya, Jiribam-Imphal Railway Project in Manipur, and Bairabi-Sairang Railway Project in Mizoram.24 The Chinese military considered such development projects as a potential threat. India has advance landing ground in Daulat Beg Oldi that was built in 1962. India made the airstrip operational in 2008, and a motorable road from Leh to Daulat Beg Oldi was operational in 2019. These projects particularly perturbed China. The area close to Aksai Chin is closer to the road that links China with Pakistan and is possibly one of the reasons for China to target Indian territory in the eastern Ladakh.25 In April 2013, ITBP found Chinese camp inside the Indian territory and in response it had also set up a camp 300 meters away from them. The tension had considerably heightened but was resolved through political negotiations. Both the sides agreed to withdraw after dismantling their structures. But in June 2020, Ladakh was in news again as the soldiers from the two countries clashed after China constructed structures in Galwan in Ladakh. China has laid new claims on the Indian territory. A statement issued by the Chinese foreign ministry has accused India of “unilaterally building roads, bridges and other facilities in the Galwan Valley region” and said, “The Galwan Valley is located on the Chinese side of the LAC in the western section of the Sino-Indian border.”26 India has constructed a bridge in area between the Galwan-Shyok river confluence and the LAC. However, China has asserted new claims over entire Galwan valley, up to the confluence of Galwan and Shyok rivers.27 The two parties are attempting to negotiate at the diplomatic and military levels. There have been 16 rounds of negotiations till date. Armies are still locked at multiple points. There are reports of Chinese settlements inside the Indian territory in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.28

Introduction | xxvii

China has been trying to challenge India in major trijunctions. In 2017, one such incident took place at Doklam in northwestern Bhutan, on the trijunction with Sikkim in India and Tibet. Bhutan had protested against China’s construction of a road in Doklam and the intrusion of its soldiers. The protest letters alleged that the Chinese activities violated the peace agreement between the two countries signed in 1998. The Chinese involvement also violates the 2012 agreement reached with India. According to a statement issued by the ministry of external affairs, “The two governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the tri­ junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.” 29 China has also laid new claims on the Sakteng sanctuary in eastern Bhutan, close to west Kameng district of Arunachal Pradesh. Tactically, it aims to claim parts of Bhutan that are strategically sensitive for India. These aggressive postures seem to challenge India’s traditionally close relations with Bhutan. China does not have an embassy in Bhutan and has made it a precondition for resolving border dispute. Bhutan’s minister for Trade and Industry, Lyonpo Om Pradhan stated in the National Assembly that, “the Chinese government had made proposals that the border negotiations be based on the establishment of bilateral trade and diplomatic relations.”30 The other narrative on the Chinese aggression is that it is concerned about America’s move in the Indo-Pacific and India joining the Quad. It does not see it as an economic grouping but as a strategy to counter China in the South China Sea. As a result, China is trying to hurt India in the Himalayas. The 3488-km long Himalayan border with China is difficult to cross, especially when vast tracts of land are inhospitable and desolate. Infrastructure development has not been easy in the challenging terrain. Following the 1962 conflict with China, succeeding governments were concerned that expanded infrastructure and transportation would allow China free access to India. India’s narrative on the Himalayas has been strategic. Since the Himalayas had been neglected for years, there has been movement of people from the

xxviii | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

hills to the plains. The development paradigm has also been such that it did not help the natives of the land. Since Uttarakhand has become a state, 734 villages have become ghost villages. The natives of the mountains have been the eyes and ears of the government against the Chinese. Similarly, it was the locals who had noticed Chinese movement in Leh or Pakistan’s intrusion in Kargil. A stable, developed Himalayas would provide added strength to defend the borders. It would offset large-scale out-migration from hills. Similarly, too much of in-migration has threatened ethnic composition, culture and traditions of the Himalayan societies leading to tensions. The government should try to economically develop the region keeping into consideration the local requirements. Every state has its own socio-cultural sensibilities, which must be dealt accordingly. The strategic framework has overshadowed the people’s aspirations. The Himalayan societies are an important component in defending the states’ borderlands. A well-laid Himalayan policy that takes into consideration society, culture, ecology and economy is imperative for a strong Himalayan borderland. This book examines the geo-strategic importance of the Himalayan region, India’s policy and approach towards it and how it is responding to the new emerging challenges. It brings in voices of military experts, diplomat, academicians and researchers to discuss developments in the Indian Himalayas and also the Himalayan countries of Bhutan and Nepal. It was done primarily to understand how China is challenging India’s close relations with the Himalayan countries. China’s growing presence in Nepal is concerning. It is no longer a buffer between India and China. Prime Minister KP Oli’s government in Nepal was heavily tilted towards China. Was it Oli’s personality, India’s own diplomatic shortcomings or the success of China’s diplomacy that had resulted in foreign policy changes? China hasn’t resolved border issues with Bhutan and had challenged India’s stated role in representing Bhutan for negotiations. Can the Himalayas still be considered as India’s frontier? Is the concept of buffer still relevant? How do strategic, economic and technological changes impact the traditional notions of looking at Himalayas as a frontier? How do changes in the region impact India’s policies and perceptions, such as China’s BRI, CPEC or Nepal wanting to be a land link or bridge between its two neighbours.

Introduction | xxix

Rajiv Narayanan succinctly discusses China’s strategic policy and approaches. Analysing the history of border disputes, he says that the narrative of the middle kingdom syndrome of China is directly challenged by a rising, liberal and democratic India. Hence it employs a strategy of unrestricted warfare to restrict India. By breaching the Himalayan frontiers, China tries to gain strategic influence and space in South Asia. Haans J. Freddy has explained China’s territorial ambitions within the realm of offensive-realism theory. He predicts that the rising ambition of China will clash with India and there would be growing conflagration between the authoritarian and democratic states. The border conflict in the western front had become complex, with the China-Pakistan alliance. The alliance that had begun soon after the US imposed arms embargo on Pakistan following the war with India in 1965.The vacuum of military supplies was filled in by China. The economic sanctions of US were best utilized by China. Pakistan had not only given a portion of Karakorum valley to China in 1963, but also started an economic and military relationship. Through China Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement signed in 2013, both the countries have agreed to build infrastructure projects in Pakistan.Thirty-seven economic zones have been identified to be established across all the districts in Pakistan.31 By constructing a network of roads, rails and port in Gwadar and Karachi, China will get maritime access to Arabian Sea. Transportation network from Pakistan will be linked to China and Central Asia. China is involved in construction of hydropower projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India has raised objections to CPEC as it runs through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Nishant Bhardwaj has discussed the strategic importance of GilgitBaltistan for Pakistan and China. After taking over from India, Pakistan took use of Gilgit-Baltistan’s geostrategic location, such as utilizing its transit potential for China to reach Gwadar and Karachi ports. It is a ready partner of China to open the second front in case of armed conflict with India. By engaging with Pakistan in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, China is becoming third player in a bilateral border dispute. Nishant writes that till India accepts the Chinese interpretations of the demarcation, it would

xxx | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

continue to keep alive the border dispute. He suggests that India should develop military alliance with the US in order to build leverage over China. P.R. Shankar has described the geostrategic importance of northeast for India’s security. He highlights the reasons for China’s interests in the region as well as the possible emerging scenario. According to him, China will try to foment instability in the northeast which has two fold advantages. It would help China in expanding its claims over Tibet. Any kind of instability would tie down India in the region and retard its development, as the region is important in the overall Act East Policy. Nani Bath highlights that the Himalayas are secure and stable when the people living are secure. Underlying the strategic interests of Arunachal Pradesh, he has propounded that apart from military, the people of the state have also contributed to the state’s security. In this India-China border dispute, he has highlighted the feelings and emotions of the people of Arunachal Pradesh. Despite ethnic differences or geographical location within the state, the people are emotionally and culturally integrated with India. This should provide confidence to the Indian government in their perception towards the state. India should relook at its security-centric perception and policies towards the state. People-centric development projects should be prioritised over army-centric development agendas. Uttarakhand is the newest Himalayan state. The government has constructed a 900-km Char Dham road connecting Rishikesh with Yamunotri, Gangotri, Badrinath and Kedarnath. It has proposed another road from Pithoragarh to Lipulekh for Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. There were reservations on environmental issues on the construction of Char  Dham road but the Supreme Court cleared the project due to its military importance. Military requirements are a prerequisite for national security, but the development projects should include welfare of the native population as well. Development of the Himalayan region while keeping the needs of the natives in mind will help in the development of a stable and secure Himalayan region. Echoing similar sentiments, Ananta S B De Gurung writes that the development of infrastructure in Sikkim would fulfill strategic interests of the Government while also enabling tourism during peacetimes. This would

Introduction | xxxi

be favourable for the people of the state and the security forces. Looking at Beijing’s confrontationist approach, Ananta argues that by its forceful postures China has broken a mutual agreement signed in 2004, under which China recognised Sikkim as part of India. China will not hesitate to shift its position again. As a result, India cannot put its guards down on Himalayan security and trust China. China will open many fronts and engage India in the Himalayas backed by its salami slicing strategy, to gain access to the contested territory. There are reports of Chinese building a bridge in Pangong lake in Ladakh or a village in Arunachal Pradesh that falls within the Indian territory. It is its way of legitimising its claims in those areas and continuing to push the LAC. The current book addresses the Himalayan states of Bhutan and Nepal. Bhutan does not have an embassy in China, nor does China have an embassy on its soil. Their ambassadors in New Delhi are accredited to each other. In 1959, China claimed 300 square miles of Bhutanese territory, and in 2020, it claimed Trashigang, which borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s claims in the eastern and western sectors are in trijunctions where India, China and Bhutan meet. China essentially seeks to strengthen diplomatic relations with Bhutan through new boundary claims or coercive methods in border talks. According to I.P. Khosla, China has not deviated from its middle kingdom philosophy, which is to replace the current system with one made in and for China. He traces Bhutan’s history and argues that Bhutan has traditionally and continues to have close links with India. China’s claims on the land are completely based on Tibet’s assertion that it occupied Paro valley through proxy. Mathew Joseph has analysed the trajectory of India’s relations with Bhutan, which has changed over the years from giving ‘guidance in her foreign policy’ to that of ‘consultations’ in conducting her foreign relations. In contemporary times, Bhutan’s relations with India have evolved in the background of China’s involvement in Tibet. This was reflected in the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1949, as well as economic assistance by India. Even though India had followed a different trajectory in its relations with Nepal and Bhutan, China’s concern was shared by both Himalayan countries. India tried to consolidate its relations with Bhutan and Nepal by signing

xxxii | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

friendship treaties, keeping the border open and helping in their economic development, infrastructure development and military modernisation. China’s geostrategic concerns emanate from the geographical proximity of the Himalayan states to Tibet. There have been examples of Khampa rebels from Nepal in the 1960s and the Karmapa escaping from China to India through Nepal in 2001. China has been pressurising Nepal to deny transit facility to the Tibetans. Tibetan refugees in Bhutan have been quiet and have not engaged in anti-China political activism. The Chinese presence in Nepal is growing as a result of stronger political, military, trade, infrastructure and cultural ties. After the overthrow of Monarchy in Nepal, China is developing relations with the political parties. It was involved in bringing the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) led by KP Sharma Oli and the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist Centre) led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal together. The Chinese presence further strengthened after the Madhesi-led movement against the new constitution had blocked borders with India. It was largely assumed as backed by India. Not just political parties, but also popular feelings, urged Nepal’s government to seek an alternative transit route through China to  reduce reliance on India. Even if such public perceptions are not permanent, they were powerful enough for Nepal to negotiate several agreements with China on transit and infrastructure development. Nepal joined the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative in 2017. One notices a change in Nepal’s approach towards China. It no longer has the security concerns that existed in the 1950s. In fact, the Nepali elite believes that India has not been able to come to terms with the 1962 war and, as a result, brushes aside any suggestion on cooperation. India and Nepal had policy of special relationship. During the Panchayat period both King Mahendra and his son Birendra tried to follow a policy of equal relationship with their neighbours. King Birendra even suggested that Nepal be declared as a Zone of Peace. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli wanted to redefine Nepal’s foreign policy by becoming a transit link between India and China. It aims at taking benefits from the economic developments in both the neighbouring countries. Nepal is also aware that the Indian market is most attractive for the success of any Chinese project in Nepal.

Introduction | xxxiii

Sangeeta Thapliyal examines Nepal’s relations with its neighbours through historical events and experiences. Prithvi Narayan Shah, the first King of modern Nepal, was also the architect of its neighbouring policy. His advice for subsequent rulers and political elite is documented in Dibya Upadesh, which provides a glimpse of his assessment on managing relations with neighbours. Nepal’s wars with both its neighbours, treaties negotiated, and changing domestic and regional politics have all contributed in shaping the country’s perception of its neighbours and strategic interests. Nihar Nayak is of the opinion that China’s presence in every sector is increasing in Nepal because of India’s failure to maintain friendly and equal partnership. He writes that competition between India and China on Nepal is evident, and that it would try to take advantage of this by maintaining equidistance. There is a change in the Himalayan political landscape. China is challenging India’s position in the Himalayas and has found Nepal as a willing partner defying geographical, geopolitical and geostrategic realities. Nepal’s threat perceptions have changed. It wants to be a trans-Himalayan link between India and China, benefitting from their economic and technological advancement. India has also increased its economic engagements in Nepal. A 69-km-long Petroleum pipeline connecting Motihari in Bihar to Amlekhganj in Nepal was inaugurated in 2020. During Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s visit to India in April 2022, agreements pertaining to economic cooperation and infrastructure links were signed. Both the PMs flagged off a railway link from Jayanagar in Bihar to Kurtha in Nepal, launched RuPay card in Nepal, inaugurated 132 KV Solu corridor power transmission line and signed a few agreements related to cooperation in solar power cooperation, railways and petroleum. The two countries also exchanged joint vision on power exchange.32 Many foreign policy experts and media outlets link Indian projects in Nepal as an achievement to counter China. By linking India’s projects in Nepal as a strategy to counter China, one unduly gives emphasis to the latter. The book concludes with a chapter on China’s water interests in the Himalayas. Amit Ranjan links China’s territorial interests in the Himalayan region and Tibet with the availability of water resources. The region is a

xxxiv | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

storehouse of glaciers, rivers and streams and has great hydropower potential, and China has staked claims over those areas with water resources. China is making inroads in Nepal and Pakistan through the development of hydropower projects, which not only expands its influence in South Asia but also has the potential to become a debt trap.

Notes 1.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s letter to VK Krishna Menon, August 18, 1950,

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series 2, volume 15, August 1950–October 1950, part 2.

B.R. Deepak, India and China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict (New Delhi: Manak Publication, 2005), p. 151.

Dorothy Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers: A Politial Review of British, Chinese,

Indian and Russian Rivalries (London: Barry and Rocklife The Cresset Press, 1969), p. 303.

PM Matrika Prasad’s letter to PM Jawaharlal Nehru written on 30 April 1954,

in MP Koirala, A Role in Revolution (Nepal: Jagdamba Prakashan, 2008), pp. 291-292.

Ibid., p. 295. Ibid.

Koirala, n. 4, p. 298. Ibid., p. 296.

India, on Nepal’s request, had sent Indian Military Mission to Nepal in 1952. Later Indian Military Training and Advisory Group and Indian Military Liaison

Group were sent in 1959 and 1961. Later on Bhutan’s request India had sent Indian Military Training team to Bhutan in 1963.

10. Cable to Indian Mission, Lhasa, 6 September 1952, JL Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series 2, Vol. 19, July 16, 1952–October 18, 1952.

11. Nisha Sahai Achuthan, Soviet Arms Transfer Policy in South Asia, 1955-1981 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1988), pp. 32-35.

12. SSB was declared a Lead Intelligence Agency for Indo-Nepal ( June 2001) and assigned the Indo-Nepal border. Later, SSB was also assigned Indo-Bhutan border (March 2004). In March 2004, SSB received the President’s Colours (March 2004)

Introduction | xxxv

in recognition of the keystone role in national security, since its inception. Available at http://www.ssbrectt.gov.in/about_ssb.aspx, accessed on October 16, 2021.

13. Man Aman Singh Chinna and Krishn Kaushik, “Special Frontier Force: Why is

a covert group now under the spotlight?” Indian Express, September 13, 2021, at

https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/what-is-special-frontier-force-vikas­

battalion-6578568/. Also refer “The Monks Tale”, in William Dalrymple, Nine Lives (London: Bloomsbury, 2009).

14. For information on IMTRAT refer website of Indian Army, http:// i n d i a n a r m y. g o v. i n / S i t e / Fo r m Te m p l e t e / f r m Te m p 2 L M L M 5 C . a s p x ?

M n I d = d a T i 7 E r u G OW U g 7 N E 3 L 0 a c w = = & Pa re n t I D = I Z 3 1 + S s a U w z y SVFXOY04ew==, accessed on October 16, 2021.

15. VK Atray, “Project Dantak: Builds friendship & goodwill between India & Bhutan, Aviation and Defence Universe,” October 24, 2018, at https://www.aviation­

defence-universe.com/project-dantak-builds-friendship-goodwill-between-india­ bhutan/, accessed on October 16, 2021.

16. Sangeeta Thapliyal, Mutual Security: The Case of India-Nepal (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1998), pp. 94-102.

17. Prabhash K Dutta, “India-China tension: Sumdorong Chu military standoff that

took 9 years to defuse,” September 14, 2020, at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/ story/india-china-tension-sumdorong-chu-military-standoff-that-took-9-years-to­ defuse-1721734-2020-09-14, accessed on October 16, 2021.

18. “Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of

Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,” signed in New Delhi, April 11, 2005, at https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6539/

Protocol+between+the+Government+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+ Government+of+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+Modalities+for+the+

Implementation+of+Confidence+Building+Measures+in+the+Military+Field+ Along+the+Line+of+Actual+Control+in+the+IndiaChina+Border+Areas, on July 23, 2021.

accessed

19. Nayanima Basu, “India, China special representatives talks key to keeping the

peace, should continue: Experts,” The Print, May 26, 2020, at https://theprint.in/

xxxvi | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

india/india-china-special-representatives-talks-key-to-keeping-the-peace-should­ continue-experts/429373/, accessed on July 23, 2021.

20. Ananth Krishnan, “India’s trade with China corsses $125 billion, imports near %100 billion,” The Hindu, January 15, 2022.

21. Devangana Nag, “Massive boost to infra along India-China border; Connectivity on 59 strategically important roads achieved,” Financial Express, March 15, 2021.

22. Expansion of rail network in Jammu and Kashmir and Northeast, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, February 2021, p. 3.

23. “Major Road Projects launched in Ladakh to be constructed by BRO,” Ministry

of Defence, Government of India, October 1, 2021, at https://pib.gov.in/

PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1760110, accessed on July 23, 2021.

24. Expansion of rail network in Jammu and Kashmir and Northeast, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, February 2021, pp. 7-9.

25. Nirupama Subramanian, “Explained: The strategic road to DBO”, Indian Express, June 16, 2020, at https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/lac-stand-off-india­

china-darbuk-shyok-daulat-beg-oldie-dsdbo-road-6452997/, accessed on June 20, 2020.

26. Ananth Krishnan, “China lays claim to entire Galwan Valley,” The Hindu, June 19, 2020, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/chinas-galwan-valley-claims­ mark-shift-from-past/article31867941.ece, accessed on June 19, 2020.

27. Ibid.

28. “New Satellite Images Show Second Chinese Settlement in Arunachal: Report”, The Wire, November 18, 2021, at https://thewire.in/security/new-satellite-images­

show-second-chinese-settlement-in-arunachal-report, accessed on November 25, 2021.

29. “Recent Developments in Doklam Area,” June 30, 2017, Press Release, Ministry of

External Affairs, India, at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28572/recent+

developments+in+doklam+area, accessed on July 15, 2017.

30. Lyonpo Om Pradhan has the distinction of leading the first Bhutan-China border talk.

31. Ahsan Abbas and Saira Ali, “Nine proposed priority SEZs under CPEC and SEZ Act: An approach to industrial development,” Working Paper No. 016/2017, Centre

of Excellence for CPEC, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Pakistan.

Introduction | xxxvii

32. List of Projects launched, documents exchanged and announcements made

during the official visit of Prime Minister of Nepal to India, Ministry to External

Affairs, Government

of

India, April

2, 2022, at https://www.

mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?35145/List+of+Projects+launched+

documents+exchanged+and+announcements+made+during+the+official+visit+ of+Prime+Minister+of+Nepal+to+India, accessed on July 23, 2021.

1

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers

An Adjunct of the China Dream

Rajiv Narayanan

Introduction

Xi Jinping’s aggressive assertiveness in furthering CPC and China’s ‘core interests’ have caused the USA and West to be fixated on him and failing to grasp the strategic continuum for achieving the China Dream since Dr Sun Yat Sen. While Mao did not abide by Dr Sun Yat Sen’s strategy of utilising investment by the West and US for China’s growth, the foundation for the same was created by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao for Xi Jinping to be aggressive. While the West remembers Deng Xiaoping’s famous 24-character foreign policy dictum of ‘Tao Guang Yang Hui (TGYH)’—‘hide your ambitions and disguise your claws’1 or Keeping a Low Profile, it misses its deep implication that China should develop its economic, commercial and financial strength, and not concern itself much with International affairs (till it reached a certain level of Comprehensive National Power—CNP). Xi opines that China’s CNP has become strong enough for it to aggressively claim a leadership role in world affairs. The crux of the Chinese Strategy is to re-establish the Middle Kingdom, the China Dream of national rejuvenation—a world order based on Chinese characteristics for China’s sustained prosperity.Towards that end the current push seems to establish a Unipolar Asia under China, dealing with the West and USA—its version of Great Power/Great Country relations. Michael

2 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Pillsbury, in his book The Hundred Years Marathon, has also similarly opined that the marathon strategy that China’s leaders are pursuing today is largely a product of lessons derived from the Warring States period. These have never been translated in English and are very popular and extensively studied in China.2 China under Xi is determined to show the developing and the under­ developed nations that a contrarian model to the Western narrative exists for economic and overall growth—socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era. A rising, liberal and a democratic India poses a direct challenge to this narrative—proverbially the second sun in the Asian sky. China would thus continue to attempt to isolate India in the region and beyond. It would aim to undercut India’s economic growth from within, using its ‘deep connections’ and create socio-political and socio-economic turmoil to subvert India’s steady rise. At an opportune moment, in the immediate to medium term, it would attempt to cause a politico-military embarrassment for India. It is under this overarching strategy it utilises the undefined Line of Actual Control (LAC), its border with India, to exert geo-political and geostrategic pressure on India concurrent to gaining operational advantage on ground. This it achieves through its strategy of salami slicing—two/ three steps forward and one step back, thereby creating new normals across the LAC. The aim is to ensure that India also abides by China’s dictates in the region; thus it would not be in its overall interests to resolve the issue in any hurry. This paper examines the LAC in the broader framework of the strategic importance of breaching the Himalayas for China to actualise its Dream in the region and achieve its national rejuvenation, where India stands in China’s calculus, highlight the Indo-China border dispute, and way ahead for India. 

The China Dream and National Rejuvenation

The China Dream was enunciated in a book by Col Liu Ming Fu China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Era, where he argues that China should displace the United States as world leader.3 Just after becoming General Secretary

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 3

of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in late 2012, Xi announced “The Chinese Dream,” which he said, is “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Xi’s Chinese Dream was described as achieving the “Two 100s”: • the material goal of China becoming a “moderately well-off society” by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, and • the modernization goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic4 Xi Jinping appears to view the coming decades as a ‘strategic opportunity’ for China to establish a ‘Pax Sinica’ in Asia—the fruition of phase one of The China Dream and the great rejuvenation of the nation, though he has given some new timelines during the 19th Congress on the route to his China Dream (at some variance to the previous), to become • a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020; • a “basically modernised socialist nation” by 2035 and • a “rich and powerful socialist nation” by 2050.5 Many economists opine that these new timelines reflect some financial and economic stress within China. Xi Jinping has again stressed on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the growth engine for China, within which the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC) has been nominated as its flagship. Significantly, BRI’s implementation schedule runs almost parallel to the Chinese politico-economic vision spelt out by Xi as follows: • Phase I: Mobilisation 2013-16 • Phase II: Planning 2016-21 • Phase III: Implementation 2021-496 China’s world view is steeped in antiquity and based on ancient classics, like Shujin’s Classics of History. It views that the ruling power has a ‘mandate from heaven,’ which it loses when the heavens unleash a natural calamity. The other contenders of power can make a bid for suzerainty. The economic crash of 2008 that resulted in the weakened economies of USA and the West is

4 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

seen by China as that natural calamity and seeks now for itself a major role at the World Stage to subsequently replace USA. The worrisome aspect is that these classics define the Middle Kingdom in five distinct geographical zones emanating outwards from the seat of power as follows: • The Capital (Han Heartland?) • The Royal Domains (Yunnan and Manchuria?) • A Pacification Zone (Sinkiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia?) • The Zone of Allied Tributaries (Nations in East, SE, South and Central Asia? Africa?) • The Zone of Barbarians (Balance World?)7 All Allies Tributary states are considered as supplicants to China and the relationship is maintained only for its benefits, the concept of Tianxia. China seems to be assiduously following this concept of ‘Tianxia’, as articulated by the philosopher Zhao Tingyang in 2005.8 The term ‘Tianxia’ opens itself to different interpretations since Mandarin has no alphabets but characters, and the meaning changes based on pronunciation and intonation. Thus, the word could be interpreted as—‘Under-Heaven’ or ‘Empire’ or ‘China’, thereby implying a ‘Unified Global System with China’s superior characteristics on top’9. To achieve this, the strategy is for gaining geopolitical space in Asia with ‘Neighbourhood Diplomacy’, which appears to be centred on commercial penetration through infrastructure, investments in strategic assets, digital outreach, surveillance, fiscal control and other projects, via the BRI, and selling a short-term ‘economic dream’ to the underprivileged nations on its periphery. Commercial penetration is the precursor to the ‘strategic equity’ that would be squeezed out from these nations later due to the debt trap caused by these unviable projects. Thus, China would gain geopolitical and geostrategic space needed to achieve the China Dream of becoming a ‘Great Power’ now by 2050 –a Unipolar Asia centred around China. Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Djibouti and Gwadar in Pakistan seem to be examples of such geo-economic squeeze for geo-strategic gains.

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 5

China appears to be moving towards ‘an integration of the Comprehensive National Power (CNP)’ of the ‘Neighbourhood’ with itself, in a step by step approach—an umbilical economic and security connect that would not be easily disrupted, a reshaping of the regional economic and security architecture with ‘Chinese Characteristics’. To that end, it appears to be utilising its doctrine of Unrestricted Warfare10 (literally ‘War Beyond Rules’ or ‘Beyond­ limits Combined War’ or warfare in all domains be it Military, Transmilitary, and Non-military) to denude the CNP of the developing nations of the region, thereby making it easier to coerce and integrate them with Chinese economy. Concurrently within the region it is also applying the concepts of its ancient game of ‘Weiqi’11 or Go—an ‘encirclement game’. This game, along with the URW aptly sums up its strategy and operational art. The game entails ‘multiple battles’ over a wide front, while concurrently ‘balancing the need to expand’ with the need to ‘build protective clusters.’12 These are best managed along its neighbourhood, along its maritime and continental borders. Hence, the push for the same in South East Asia and South Asia, by China. This strategy encompasses the idea of ‘the Strategy of Common Imitation’. The strategy of common imitation is regarded in Game Theory as the key to the formation of a stable institution, since it is argued that a common imitation of the best strategy given by the leader and abided by the players will lead to a stable equilibrium.13 It implies that these small under-developed nations in the neighbourhood would perforce abide by the ‘Strategy of Common Imitation’, i.e. follow China’s lead and abide by its decisions—the key to China’s neighbourhood policy. Concurrently, it aims to restrict space for competing nations, especially India, to isolate this region and continue with its creeping assertiveness on strategic territorial space based on specious historical claims.

India in China’s Calculus

The Chinese grand strategy for establishing itself as the sole superpower globally is based on its ancient game of Weiqi, the game of encirclement, to expand its sphere of influence. This is coupled with neo-economic

6 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

colonisation through the BRI.The URW would weaken the target countries thereby enabling Chinese stranglehold and the People’s Liberation Army would expand its footprint along both the continental and maritime spread of Chinese influence to defend its interests well beyond its frontiers.This is the concept of Forward Defence’ as enunciated by the Academy of Military Sciences in its Science of Military Strategy 2013.14 In Weiqi, the key strategy on the board is to defend one’s flanks (Refer Figure 1.1) even as the aim is to present challenges to the opponent in his side of the board. Therefore, for China, securing Western Pacific and East Asia, South East Asia, Southern Pacific and its Island nations, South Asia, and Central Asia is the key to ensuring its success in achieving its national rejuvenation towards attaining its dream of re-establishing the ‘Middle Kingdom’. Figure 1.1: Weiqi Board and China

The main competitors in the region, as viewed from China are, South Korea and Japan in East Asia, Indonesia and Vietnam in South East Asia, Russia in Central Asia (due to its close economic linkages to the region) and India in South Asia. Of these, a rising liberal democratic India poses a direct challenge to its strategy. India views the emerging global order to be multipolar, even within Asia, which runs contrary to China’s vision of

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 7

a unipolar Asia under its hegemony. The Chinese view of a ‘Community of Common Destiny, first stated by Hu Jintao for China’s immediate neighbours, and now reframed as Community of Common Destiny for Mankind by Xi Jinping.15 China has grasped that unless India is isolated, it could attract likeminded nations of the region, which would be supported by USA and the West, limiting its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Hence, it is imperative for China to gain strategic influence and space in South Asia by breaching the Himalayan Frontiers, and suppress India’s rise from within using its strategy of URW. With Pakistan, its long time close ally, it has supported its use of terrorism to counter India, both in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North East. It has named and pushed China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as its flagship for the BRI, which however is now facing major hurdles due to Pakistan’s economic implosion, and its slow slide towards total economic dependence on China—non-economic colonisation. While it may not have been in a position to come out in full support of Pakistan during its wars with India, but the recent events along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with China, and the Line of Control (LOC), with Pakistan do indicate that in future India would be faced with a two-and-a-half front war. Concurrently, China seems to be making headway with Nepal under the rubric of BRI, supporting the Nepalese Government’s recent specious claims on Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipulekh, and publication of the new map.16 However, there seems to be a major rethink in Nepal about the damage to its regional and global image, by appearing to kowtow to Chinese strategy at a time of widespread global anti-China sentiments. As such, the new textbooks that were prepared in haste giving the new map of Nepal, showing the three contentious claims within its boundary, have been withdrawn.17 China’s usurpation of its territories and establishment of a post on its land in the Lapcha-Limi region of Humla may have come about at a very inopportune moment for Nepal.18 Bangladesh has for long followed a strategy of balancing its relations between India and China.19 However, China’s recent outreach for six sistercity alliance20 and US$ 1 billion loan for a comprehensive management and

8 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

restoration project on the Teesta river,21 at a time when there is an on-going stand-off with India on the LAC, has India concerned. The economic woes of Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Maldives, due to the Chinese economic outreach via the BRI does provide the opportunity for China to secure its ‘String of Pearls’ around India, thereby isolating it. Yet, slippages abound. Both Sri Lanka and Maldives have become more cautious of China for the moment, while China’s incursion into Nepalese territory appears to have caused it to reconsider. In the words of Michael Pillsbury, China is playing a marathon to replace America as the Global Superpower by the end of the 21st century.22 It would thus not be much concerned by these setbacks. China comprehends India as its main challenger in the region, and thus needs to isolate it and curb its rise. This it would do by using its URW strategy within India to curb its rise, its neo-economic colonisation of other nations through its BRI outreach, over medium to long term. The LAC would be utilised as a pressure point to contain India’s attempts to partner with other nations, especially USA and the West, to counter it. It would also encourage secessionist movements in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East, since it would expand its territories and influence, while forever curbing India politically and militarily. It is in the light of these factors that decision makers in India need to view the border issue with China. China is not keen to resolve the LAC at any time soon unless India is ready to submit itself to Chinese hegemony.

India-China Border Dispute

China has settled border disputes with all its neighbours, except Bhutan and India. Despite 22 rounds of talks held between the Special Representatives from both countries (the SR mechanism was institutionalised in 2003 after former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China led to the agreement),23 no tangible result has been attained, be it in delineating the LAC, or reaching an understanding over disputed areas. Since 1993 a series of agreements and mechanisms have been signed to maintain peace and tranquility on the Border. In fact, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2013 was seen as a signal of thaw on the border

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 9

issue. These initiatives notwithstanding, the border confrontations have continued, bringing troops from both sides to precarious face-offs, with the current round having the potential to escalate into a conflict. There is a strong perception in India that China deliberately postpones the resolving of the border dispute and uses it as leverage against India. Further, it needs to be understood that the LAC has never been defined, delineated and demarcated. Define means point-to-point details are jointly written, delineated means these points, and the line joining them, are clearly marked on a large-scale map (to avoid ambiguity), and demarcated means this delineation on map is jointly surveyed and marked on ground by numbered boundary pillars. India has over 4050-kilometre-long border with China (includes the borders with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir—POK), and about 3900 kilometre of LAC (see Map 1.1 below). Map 1.1: The LAC

Source: The Economist.

The LAC has different connotations in each sector. In the Western Sector, which has multiple lines—Johnson Line of 1865 (accepted by India) that encompasses the entire Aksai China, the Foreign Office line of 1873, the Macartney-Macdonald Line, to where the LAC rests today (see Map 1.2).

10 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Map 1.2: Western Sector

Source: The Discoverer.

But what is the veracity of the Chinese claims? According to Shiv Kunal Verma,24 it is specious. His analysis is based on the 1842 Treaty of Chushul, which ended the Dogra-Tibetan War. He states that the Chinese had accepted the Kuen Lun Mountains as the border, which was marked by Johnson in 1865—In 1878, when the Chinese once again established their control over Sinkiang, they created a customs post north of Shahidula implying

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 11

that they considered the Kuen Lun as outside their jurisdiction. 25 These areas are uninhabited, and as such claims would be based on control of the ancient caravan routes through the region. Historically, this vested in the Kingdom of Ladakh, which has been independent since the tenth century BCE.26 In the Central Sector, the LAC runs along the crest of the Himalayas, the watershed. It is the least disputed Sector and differences exist in mainly four areas, viz Spiti, West of Shipki pass, Nilang-Jadang and Barahoti. Given that all of these are south of the crest line, the Chinese claims are shaky at best, given the universally accepted watershed concept. The disputed areas are under Indian control (see Map 1.3). The main claim is in Barahoti, well across the watershed, which was used as a grazing ground (see Map 1.3A). Map 1.3: Central Sector

Source: Claude Arpi.

12 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Map 1.3A: Barahoti Sector

Source: Claude Arpi.

The Eastern Sector has the famous McMahon Line (see Map 1.4) based on the 1914 Shimla Convention (between British India, Tibet and China), dividing Tibet and British India, drawn on a very small-scale map, with minimum mapping survey in the region, and has no clear definition except that it follows the watershed. With Britain getting involved in the World War 1 immediately thereafter, no attempt was made to delineate and demarcate the boundary. India accepts the McMahon Line as the international boundary between China and India, with minor modifications in interpretation in accordance with the international norm of the ‘Watershed Principle’, which was the intent of the Chief British negotiator, Sir Henry McMahon. Although the then Chinese authorities did not sign the Convention, they objected specifically only to Article 9 of the said Convention that laid down the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet (viz proposed boundary between China and Tibet, which ipso facto implies acceptance of boundary between Tibet and India). Other than that, the Chinese Authorities made it amply clear, on several occasions, that they did not

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 13

object to any other Article, including that which showed the McMahon Line. Map 1.4: McMahon Line

Source: CIA Papers, Frontline. Hindu.

From the time of the signing of the Shimla Convention on July 3, 1914, till January 23, 1959, when PM Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Nehru, the Chinese never raised any formal objections to the McMahon Line, although they had many opportunities to do so. In his letter27 Prime Minister Zhou, for the first time ever, made the following points to Nehru; first, that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and that no treaty or agreement had been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and the Government of India; second, that the McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibetan Region of China; third, Zhou admitted that the Tibetan local authorities had signed the Convention but were dissatisfied with the ‘unilaterally drawn’ line. Nevertheless, Zhou asserted that ‘the Chinese government finds it necessary to take a realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line.’28 The specious Chinese claims are based on collection of tax, especially from Tawang. However, the governance of these regions South of the

14 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Himalayan watershed was never vested with Lhasa, but with the locals themselves. Thus, the tax was more an indemnity rather than a result of any temporal authority. Even the religious connect based on the birth of the sixth Dalai Lama does not hold much water since the Chinese are not ready to accede to the Kailash-Mansarovar region, which is much more revered in India for millennia, to be handed over in exchange. Much water has flowed down the Indus since then, with border war of 1962 leading up to the current standoff in Eastern Ladakh. The responses of India and China thereof has completely negated the rapprochement process that began in 1993 and subsequent Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The 1993 Bilateral Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA) was a political milestone post-independence, which created an expert group of diplomatic and military personnel to ‘advice on the resolution of differences between the two sides on the alignment of the LAC’. What needs to be understood also is the fact that it took nine years from the Sumdorong Chu / Wangdung incident of 1987 for the treaty to be agreed upon. It is opined that in 1987, China felt that Indian military was far too strong for its PLA. Further India’s economic woes of early 1990s and China’s speedy economic recovery despite the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 made it feel more comfortable signing the accord, since it still needed more time to build up its CNP to be able to resolve the border issue with its PLA giving a fait accompli to India. Thus, the September 7, 1993, Agreement effectively delinked settlement of the boundary from the rest of the relationship and delinked it also from the maintenance of peace on the border. Both countries also formally renounced the use of force to settle the issue. It also spoke of CBMs to be mutually agreed to in the future, including restrictions on air activity and limits of size of military exercises near the LAC and possible redeployment of forces. CBM measures would be based on the concept of ‘mutual and equal security’ rather than on parity or other simple formulas. Two portions of BPTA have yet to be implemented or discussed in detail by the two counties. One is the provision that “military forces in areas along the LAC will be kept to the min level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries.” The other is the provision for “mutual and equal security,”

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 15

which has not yet been discussed conceptually or explored or implemented by China and India, even though it provides a theoretical basis for mutual and reciprocal security, which could prove valuable as technology, trade and travel, and new military capabilities and increased military presence on both sides of the border make accidents and mistakes more likely, as in the ongoing standoff. What followed in 1996 was the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC.The primary objective of these measures was a commitment to the maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border. The Declaration of Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation was signed in 2003 in which The Joint Working Group ( JWG) that was set up and functional at a purely bureaucratic level was upgraded to a meeting of Special Representatives (SR), thereby providing much desired political impetus for resolution. These agreements led up to the adopting of the ‘Political Guidance Principles for the Settlement of Boundary Question’ signed in 2005. The exchanges between training institutions, participating in sports and including cultural activities formed other CBM’s. A comprehensive push on promoting bilateral military relations remained on track following the visit of the then Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, to China in May 2006. The visit led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that called for the institutionalization of frequent exchanges between the officials of the Defence Ministries and the armed forces through an Annual Defence Dialogue, in addition to developing an annual calendar for joint exercises and training programmes. These agreements did not prevent China from aggressively building infrastructure along the LAC, since Indian attention was diverted towards the Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in J&K. Further, a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) was also established in 2012 as an institutional mechanism for consultation and coordination for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas, as well as to exchange views on strengthening communication and cooperation, including between their border security personnel. It was to be headed by the Joint Secretary in MEA along with Army representatives. In AprilMay 2013, following a three-week-long confrontation at Depsang valley in

16 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Ladakh, two sides signed Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) to address tactical problems and to prevent their escalation. All the committees/groups have held numerous meetings. While the other groups mainly focus on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border, the SR meeting does discuss political resolution methodologies of the boundary question. Despite the SRs meeting numerous times (22 times), there has been very little forward movement/change in their respective stance regarding the boundary. The current standoff has put paid to all the rapprochement efforts in place since 1962. It seems to appear that China wants to reset the clock back to 1950s,29 when the main desire was to cut India to size, as then India under Nehru was emerging as the leader of the Third World, the post that Mao desired for himself, as per Bertil Lintner.30 Today, India is re-emerging as a leader amongst the nations of the Global South, and much respected in the North, which would not be amenable with China. It is also apparent from the lack of any many meetings of the various committees/groups set up since 1993 that the Chinese have no intentions of resolving the border dispute with India and would aim to use it as a pressure point for geo-political and geo-strategic coercion.

Way Ahead for India

In the words of Brahma Chellaney, Mao considered Tibet to be China’s right-hand palm, with five fingers—Nepal, Bhutan and the three Indian territories of Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh—that China was also meant  to ‘liberate.’31  It was Stuart Reynolds Schram, an American  physicist,  political scientist  and  sinologist,  who first quoted Mao’s speech of 1939 to refer to his claim of Tibet being the palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal being its five fingers.32 The current Chinese push to breach the Himalayan frontiers, along with its hard line stance in Ladakh, underlines this Strategic Continuum of thought in the Communist Party of China of providing depth to the core Chinese Heartland of China by securing its periphery (see Map 1.5 below). While the outreach to Pakistan is more to use it as a cat’s paw against India, it is Nepal that needs to worry about China’s gradual hold on it and its territories.33 A similar gradual push is being made in Bhutan also, though

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 17

it has never had any relations with China and has been very vary of the Chinese attempts to suppress Tibetan culture.34 Map 1.5: Chinese Heartland & Periphery

Source: CBSA, USA

The Chinese scholars had long spoken of overcoming 100 years of humiliation and the great renewal of the nation, alluding to the 18th Century ‘Opium Wars’ with the West that greatly debilitated the nation and the subsequent subjugation during the Japanese War in the 20th Century. The cycle of rejuvenation is best ascribed by the Figure 1.2 below,’ Figure 1.2: CPC’s Cycle of National Rejuvenation

18 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

“There can be no Imperialists, there can be no communist bandits, there can be no Japanese, there can be no brigands ruling like princes. There can only be one. The Sky cannot have two suns,’’ stated   Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, while battling the Japanese and the Communists in the 1930s. Extrapolating from it according to Mao and CPC, there cannot be two suns in Asia—China and India—for China’s national rejuvenation. As such it has long been CPC’s policy to embarrass India politically and militarily. It did achieve it to some extent with the 1962 War, but it now considers that a rising, liberal and democratic India in the 21st Century poses a direct challenge to its vision of a Pax Sinica in Asia. To that end, keeping the border issue alive enables it to use it as a pressure point to force India to accept Chinese policies. The position of respective countries on the border issue is divergent and rigid to a large extent. India bases its claim on the tripartite Shimla agreement of 1914, signed by the representatives of British India, Tibet and Qing Emperor of China. However, China is averse to it and wants to have a fresh agreement. Given that the 1914 agreement offered an alignment for the boundary between India and Tibet that could be delimited and demarcated along a watershed, there is a lack of a Chinese designated claim line based on factual evidence. China has at various points since the 1950s, claimed portions of India across the Himalayan watershed, but has not provided evidence for it. Having absorbed Tibet since the 1950s, as one of its province, China seeks to claim portions of India across the Himalayan boundary, based on the spiritual (not temporal) influence of Tibet in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, while India is averse to it. These intractable positions would take generations to resolve, yet there are portions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) where the claims are negligible and can be resolved as an early harvest project. Across the three sectors of the LAC, the contentious issues are in Eastern Ladakh (Western Sector), and in Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern Sector), while the Central and Sikkim Sectors have negligible issues. One school of thought has been a package deal, with India giving some concessions in the Eastern Sector and China reciprocating in the Western Sector; but such a deal would be a longdrawn affair.

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 19

The early harvest exists in the Central Sector and in Sikkim. Thus, while talks could go on for the Western and Eastern Sectors, China and India should aim to resolve the border issue in the Central Sector and in Sikkim by defining, delimiting and demarcating the LAC in these sectors. This would provide a stable base for similar functional incremental options to resolve this contentious issue by moving on to areas where there is no/ limited divergence of opinion. It would also provide a clear indicator about China’s intent, should it resist this and insist on resolving the issue only on its terms over the entire LAC. To resolve it militarily, it would need a major military victory for either side, which is something that would not be feasible and may not be economically viable for both countries. Hence, concurrent to talks with China, India must exert pressure across several domains, as it is doing now, to force China to come to the table with the intent of resolving this contentious issue. This can only be possible if the cost of continuing its present strategy of creeping aggression on the LAC with India would be economically, politically and diplomatically unviable for its continued growth and sustenance. The options for India were stark, even before the present standoff— compete with China or cooperate and accept its policies. Given the situation today, India has no option but to compete. For this India needs to reach out to the region and beyond to setup an alternate narrative and protect its core national interests. India also needs to enhance its own CNP to ensure that its rise is secure from such external threats and internal dissonance. To achieve the same, it would need a modern integrated armed force, with restructured Higher Defence Organisation along with a multi-domain comprehensive internal security architecture. This would provide India with the secure foundation for its unhindered economic growth. India would need to carefully construct its geo-political and geo-strategic framework within the region, utilising geo-economic outreach with likeminded middle powers. It should provide the alternate narrative for economic growth for the countries of the region that do not place the smaller nations in a debt trap—something that Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Maldives and Myanmar are facing in their geo-economic dealings with China. Mere

20 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

blocking of economic projects by China in these developing countries would not suffice, and India, along with like-minded middle powers and the USA, must provide for this alternate economic outreach. It would need to establish a multi-domain architecture with like-minded nations of the region and beyond, which would be a net security provider—an alternate narrative to China’s model. It is this that would restrict and limit China’s mercantile outreach, which it uses to gain influence through the debt trap and thereby curtail its growth. Only then would it be amenable for any adjustments to resolve the border issues with India.

Conclusion

China under CPC has been on a single-minded path of ensuring national rejuvenation and re-establishing its Middle Kingdom of yore, but with a difference. The ancient Middle Kingdom was limited to East Asia, and sometimes to portions of Central Asia, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. In a globalised world, which it has worked insidiously to be a part of and be its global supply chain hub, it wants to extend this to all of Asia and then beyond to the world, which is the China Dream. This is the emerging threat that Asia faces: subservience to China and all economic activities for the economic well-being of China. A veritable neo-economic colonisation, through geo-economic squeeze via its BRI strategy. In this, it is concentrating on its neighbourhood, in line with strategy of its ancient game—Weiqi /Go, wherein the flanks need to be secured even as threats are placed for the opponent in his sphere(s) of influence. In its neighbourhood calculus India has always been the main threat, through the 1950s. The use of the undefined borders of India with Tibet was strategically used by the CPC, post annexation of Tibet in 1950, to humiliate India politically and militarily in 1962. Subsequently, despite signing many agreements since 1993, China was more keen to build up its CNP and PLA to coerce India to accede to its specious claims, which are not sustained historically. As such they are untenable as per extant International norms. It needs to be noted that as early as in 1939, Mao Tse Tung had clearly

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 21

enunciated CPC’s plans to breach the Himalayan Frontiers when he likened Tibet to being the palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal being its five fingers. To dominate India, China would not only have to encircle India—String of Pearls, but also breach the Himalayas to dominate India’s neighbourhood. Thus, claims on the LAC serve a strategic purpose of using it as a pressure point to coerce India. A rising liberal and democratic India is its prime threat in Asia, and it would be loathe resolving the border issue, since it would then limit its reach beyond the Himalayas. China’s strategy has now reached the point of diminishing marginal utility, as is evident by the current standoff, Indian military’s firm response and the political will. Thus, should China be willing, there are areas along the LAC where resolution is feasible despite the intractable positions in other sectors—Central Sector and Sikkim. These should be resolved as an early harvest project. This would provide a stable base for similar functional, incremental options to resolve this contentious issue by moving on to areas where there is no/limited divergence of opinion in other Sectors. It would also provide a clear indicator about China’s intent, should it resist this and insist on resolving the issue only on its terms over the entire LAC, which is more likely to be the case. It is imperative that India should force China’s hand by adopting a multidomain pressure, making China’s stand on the LAC economically, politically and diplomatically unviable. To accomplish this, a modern integrated armed force, with restructured Higher Defence Organisation and a multi-domain comprehensive internal security architecture and an integrated Higher Decision Making Architecture would be required. This would provide India a secure foundation for its unhindered economic growth, enable it to be a net security provider partnering with other like-minded nations and curb China’s neo-economic colonisation in the region. It would force China to come to the table and resolve the contentious border issue based on extant International norms and not on specious historical claims.

Notes 1.

“Foreign Policy under Den Xiao Ping,” Facts and Details, at factsanddetails.com/ china/cat2/sub7/entry-5540-.html

22 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

2.

Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Strategy to Replace America as

3.

Hughes, Christopher R,  “In Case You Missed It: China Dream,” The China Beat,

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

the Global Super Power (St. Martin’s Griffin, Reprint edition, 2016), p. 34. April 5, 2010.

Xi pledges ‘Great renewal of Chinese nation,’ at English.news.cn, November 29, 2012.

KC Singh, “Will China’s ‘dream’ be a nightmare for India,” Asian Age, October 30, 2017, p. 6. Ibid.

Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World (Penguin Books, Second Edition, 2012), p. 305.

Zhao Tingyang赵汀阳, The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World

Institution (TianxiaTixi: Shijiezhiduzhexuedaolun天下体系：世界制度哲学导论), Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005, translated in English and republished by

9.

China Renmin University Press in October 2011. Pillsbury, n. 2, pp. 17-30.

10. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).

11. Tony Han, “Weiqi: The Surrounding Game”, The World of Chinese, August 19, 2014. 12. Keith Johnson, “What Kind of Game is China Playing?,” Wall Street Journal, June

2011, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230425930457637401353 7436924.

13. Zhang Feng, “The Tianxia System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia,” China Heritage Quarterly, No. 21, March 2010.

14. The Science of Military Strategy, Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing 2013.

15. Jacob Mardell, “The ‘Community of Common Destiny’ in Xi Jinping’s New Era,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-community­ of-common-destiny-in-xi-jinpings-new-era/.

16. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “Nepal’s parliament approves new map including territory

controlled by India,” The Economic Times, June 18, 2020, at https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/nepals-parliament-approves-new­

map-including-territory-controlled-by-india/articleshow/76440967.cms?from=mdr,

accessed on September 20, 2020.

Breaching the Himalayan Frontiers | 23

17. PTI Kathmandu, “Nepal Stops Distribution Of School Textbook With New Map,” Huffington Post, September 23, 2020, at https://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/nepal­

school-textbook-new-map_in_5f6ada66c5b629afbe984aaa, accessed on September

25, 2020.

18. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, ET Bureau, “China encroaches into Nepal territory, constructs 9 buildings,” The Economic Times, September 21, 2020, at https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-encroaches­

into-nepal-territory-constructs-9-buildings/articleshow/78227097.cms, accessed on

September 25, 2020.

19. Rajiv Bhatia, “Bangladesh’s India-China balancing Strategy,” Gateway House, March

7, 2019, at https://www.gatewayhouse.in/bangladesh-foreign-policy/, accessed on

January 25, 2020.

20. Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, “Chinese proposal to Bangladesh for sister-city alliance,” Raisina Debates, ORF, June 12, 2020, at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/

chinese-proposal-bangladesh-sister-city-alliance-67725/, accessed on September 25, 2020.

21. Shubhajit Roy, “Explained: China twist in the India-Bangladesh Teesta river

challenge,” Indian Express, August 26, 2020, at https://indianexpress.com/article/ explained/china-twist-in-teesta-river-project-challenge-6563398/,

September 25, 2020.

accessed

on

22. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2015).

23. Nayanima Basu, “India, China special representatives talks key to keeping the peace, should continue: Experts,” The Print, May 26, 2020, at https://theprint.in/india/india­ china-special-representatives-talks-key-to-keeping-the-peace-should-continue­ experts/429373/, accessed on September 29, 2020.

24. Shiv Kunal Verma, “Stones of Silence: Ladakh and Beyond,” The Sunday Guardian, September 26, 2020, at https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/stones-silence­ ladakh-beyond, accessed on September 27, 2020.

25. Ibid.

26. “History of District Leh-Ladakh”, Union Territory of Ladakh, at https://leh.

nic.in/about-district/history/#:~:text=The%20ancient%20inhabitants%20of%20

Ladakh,leaving%20its%20imprint%20in%20Ladakh, accessed on September 29, 2020.

24 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

27. “Letter from PM Zhou Enlai to PM Nehru, 23 January 1959”, Digital Archive International History Declassified, at digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org

28. RS Kalha, “The McMahon Line: A hundred years on,” IDSA Comments, July 3, 2014.

29. Sutirtho Patranobis, “China makes it official, wants to revert to 1959 LAC India

has rejected many times,” The Print, September 29, 2020, at https://theprint.

in/diplomacy/china-makes-it-official-wants-to-revert-to-1959-lac-india-has­

rejected-many-times/512584/#:~:text=Former%20Indian%20ambassador%20to%20 China,They%20are%20going%20by%20that.%E2%80%9D, accessed on September 29, 2020.

30. Bertil Lintner, China’s India War (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018).

31. Brahma Chellaney, “China’s five-finger Punch”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 20, 2020.

32. Schram, Stuart R.  China and the Underdeveloped Countries: The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 257-258.

33. Chaudhary, n. 18.

34. Dawa Norbu, “Bhutan,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, at https://www.britannica.com/ place/Bhutan, accessed on September 20, 2020.

2

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India Nishant Bhardwaj

Pakistan considers Gilgit-Baltistan is a crucial region because of its strategic location, ancient history of trade routes and the presence of natural resources. Gilgit-Baltistan rests at a unique junction of the Asian continent, bridging regions of South Asia, Central Asia and China. The economic linkages formed in these regions during the era of silk-route trade give an account of the historical importance of this region. The strategic importance of this region has increased exponentially for both Pakistan and China after the construction of Karakoram Highway (KKH) in the late 1970s. This development also altered the regional security balance, as it brought Pakistan and China closer to each other, and this land link combined the Pakistan-China threat for India. With the establishment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is essentially an extension of the existing KKH, the Chinese presence in Gilgit-Baltistan has grown. The emphasis of this chapter will be on discussing the strategic relevance of Gilgit-Baltistan to both Pakistan and China. It would explain the region’s involvement in strengthening the Pakistan-China relationship. Gilgit-Baltistan traces its boundary along the North and North-West of Leh district of Jammu and Kashmir, while the North-Eastern boundary of Leh and Gilgit-Baltistan connects India with the Aksai Chin area across the LAC, which India lost to China in the 1962 Sino-India war.The geographical proximity of this province becomes evidently imperative for India’s security.

26 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Therefore, this chapter will further investigate the security concerns that have affected India historically during Siachen conflict, Kashmir insurgency and the Kargil war. It will further analyse the changes in the regional security dynamics after the commencement of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Finally, the chapter will elucidate the post-Galwan conflict paradigm shift in the security atmosphere of this region, and what options does India have to counter Sino-Pak two-front threats, in which the geo­ positioning of Gilgit-Baltistan is an imperative element to be considered. The present day Gilgit-Baltistan was assimilated into the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir during Gulab Singh’s Reign in the 19th century. During the partition of the Indian sub-continent, Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir decided to remain independent initially. In the immediate months after partition Pakistan made an illicit move and sent hordes of armed tribesmen to raid and occupy Kashmir. While India was negotiating with the Maharaja over the terms of accession, the army regulars and tribesmen occupied western and northern parts of the state. After occupation, Pakistan named western part of the state as ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ and Northern parts as the ‘Northern Areas’. In 1970, the ‘Northern Areas’ (present-day Gilgit-Baltistan) were separated from the so called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’. This region is nestled between the western Himalayan and transHimalayan ranges. It is surrounded by China’s Xinjiang province to the east and north-east, Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor to the north, Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa to the west, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to the southwest and to the south by India’s Jammu and Kashmir. The strategic importance of this geographical position is immense for the balance of power of Central Asia and South Asia, as the three great mountain ranges of Hindukush, Karakoram and the Himalayas meet in this region.1 In 1892, E. F. Knight wrote about Gilgit-Baltistan as the roof of the world where three empires- Great Britain, Russia and China meet and had regrettably said, “Had we not sold this magnificent country, a great military cantonment would no doubt have long since been established here. This would not only have been most advantageous from a strategic point of view,

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 27

but would have avoided much of the sickness and mortality which thin the ranks of our white army in India.”2 Even prior to Knight’s assessment of this region, Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu was highly interested in extending his influence into Gilgit-Baltistan, mainly with the aim to control trade routes.3 Troops under two of his generals penetrated the mountains. General Zorawar Singh led campaigns towards Ladakh and Baltistan, while General Nathu Shah occupied Gilgit for the first time in 1842.4 These historical facts and observations by the travellers clearly depict the strategic importance of Gilgit-Baltistan. The geopolitical significance of Gilgit-Baltistan for India can also be estimated from this fact that this is the only area that provides direct land access to Afghanistan and rest of energy-rich Central Asia through Wakhan corridor. Furthermore, this region shares borders with Afghanistan, China and Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, and it sits on the routes to China and Central Asia. The region is rich in water resources. Indus River, along with its three tributaries Gilgit, Shyok and Astore, flows from this region. Hunza is another major river which emanates from this region.5 Whoever controls this region will have access to extensive water resources. Moreover, the Karakoram Highway, which passes through GilgitBaltistan, is a crucial strategic link between Pakistan and China and it has been used for supply of military equipment from China to Pakistan. Additionally, this region is also rich in numerous natural resources, including copper, gold, uranium and gems,6 which could be exploited by Pakistan with Chinese infrastructure assistance, providing Pakistan with more reasons to keep control over this territory.7

Historical background of Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan shares borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Xinjiang province of China. Only a few miles separate it from the Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.8 The geo-strategic location of Gilgit-Baltistan has assumed its own strategic importance in the Himalayan region, in the Pamir-KarakoramHindukush tri-junction, where the huge landmasses of five nations meet.

28 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

This massive land area is of great historical importance and is also known as the Northern Areas, a place where many pathways of culture and civilizations have intermingled, a delta of multiple faiths and cultures: Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and Islam. Hence, a diverse number of languages such as Burushaski, Gojali, Balti, Ladakhi, Khowar, Shina, etc., are spoken in the region. Also, the presence of cross-border linkages between multiple ethnic and religious groups makes this frontier province a complex whirlpool of geopolitics.9 The northern areas, in particular of Jammu and Kashmir, have been in focus as an important milestone on the famous Silk route in the pre-colonial period. These trade routes were instrumental in the exchange of goods, cultures and ideas and also facilitated invasions, which began right from Alexander’s campaign and went on till Mughals settled in India. In the 19th century this silk route also became the flashpoint of colonial confrontation between the British empire and the Tsarist Russia, where Russia wanted to expand southwards to gain access to the Arabian Sea and the British wanted to limit their expansion to the north of the Indus river, to create a geographical border between the two empires.10 Although the ancient history of this region is unknown, the contemporary historians have referred to the indigenous people of Gilgit region as ‘Dardic People’. 11 Gilgit-Baltistan has also been known as ‘Dardistan’, and the people residing in this region were known as ‘Dards’. Dardic language belongs to the Indo-Aryan group of languages.12 G. W. Leitner, an Anglo-Hungarian orientalist, was the one who coined the term ‘Dardistan’. According to him, “Dardistan served as the cradle of the ‘Aryan’ race and an area that contained answers to numerous ethnographical and linguistic questions of that time.”13 Dardistans remained ‘terra incognito’ in its early history. Gilgit was the home of Palola/Patola, people who practiced Buddhism and interacted with the rulers of Kashmir and the emperors of China from the sixth to the eighth century.14 On the other hand, “Baltistan, the land of Balti people was well known as little Tibet or Tibet-i-Khurd in the medieval literature.”15 Tibetans were also active from the 8th century. Except for a few Tibetan inscriptions there is no evidence that Baltistan was under Tibet’s control until the end of the 9th century.

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 29

Later history suggests that many immigrants from Kashmir and adjoining areas penetrated this untrodden region and perhaps ruled the state. By the end of the second decade of the 19th century, Kashmir’s control was passed from the Afghans to the Sikhs. During the reign of Afghans, “the authority over the peripheral regions of the state had eroded and, thus, the Sikh rule was initially confined to Srinagar and the surrounding Kashmir Valley, whereas the Jammu region was given to his Dogra Minister, Raja Gulab Singh, as a jagir by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1820.”16 Subsequently, Zorawar Singh who was a general under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, along with his superior Gulab Singh subjugated the Raja of Skardu during their Ladakh conquest and made him pay homage to the Sikh King. Furthermore, Kohistan and Astor were also brought under the sovereignty of Ranjit Singh by his Governor of Srinagar, Sher Singh.17 Gulab Singh captured Ladakh in 1836 with the support of Zorawar Singh and the approval of Ranjit Singh after cementing his power in the Jammu region. He subsequently strengthened his dominance by seizing Baltistan in 1840 and appointing Mohammad Shah as a vassal of Gulab Singh over Baltistan.18 Meanwhile, in 1842 Colonel Nathe Shah captured Gilgit and the adjoining areas of Dardistan. He was the Commander of Sheikh Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, who was appointed as the Governor of Kashmir by Maharaja Ranjit Singh.19 In an autobiography written by Raja Ali Sher Khan, ruler of a principality in Baltistan, he has mentioned about the assistance provided by him to Colonel Nathe Shah, General Zorawar Singh and Maharaja Gulab Singh in capturing Gilgit, Skardu and Srinagar.20 Assessment of these claims gives a clear indication that new linkages were established in the 19th century under the rule of Maharaja Gulab Singh among Jammu, Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan.

Consolidation under Dogra Rule

The forces of East India Company defeated the Sikh Khalsa Army at Subraon on February 10, 1846. After the defeat of the Sikh Army, the Treaty of Lahore was signed on March 9, 1846. According to this treaty British forced Sikhs to pay Rs 1crore as war indemnity and cede the territory between Sutlej and Beas to the British. The then Prime

30 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Minister of the Sikhs Lal Singh, seeing the huge war indemnity offered the mountainous parts of the Kingdom, including Jammu and Kashmir, as a bargain. The British then made an offer to the Dogra ruler of Jammu, to reign as an independent ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, if he agrees to pay the indemnity amount. British then decided to keep the territory between the Beas and the Ravi (including Kangra) and reduced the deal amount to Rs 75 lakh.21 Accordingly, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was created with the formalisation of the ‘treaty of Amritsar’ in 1846. With the promulgation of this treaty, Gulab Singh became the absolute sovereign and was named as the Maharaja of Kashmir, ruling over the regions of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, along with Gilgit-Baltistan.22 Even after handing over the control of Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh and accepting his suzerainty over this Kingdom, the developments in other parts of India, particularly Central Asia,compelled the British to intervene in this region. By the 1860s, British were alarmed at the growing influence of Russians at the northern frontier of Jammu and Kashmir, and they persuaded the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to bring Yasin and Chitral under his control to limit the Russian advances. Contemplating the Russian threat, the British installed the Gilgit Agency in 1877, with Major John Biddulph as the first Political Agent. In 1881, the Agent was withdrawn but was reinstated in 1889 due to the growing Afghan influence in Chitral, along with the constant increase in the Russian military activities in Central Asia.23 Meanwhile, the Dogra suzerainty was accepted by the Ruler of Chitral in 1878 and started paying tribute to the Dogras every third year.24 With the onslaught of the Russian revolution, the British fear grew regarding their advancements and a possible clash between the two Empires. Consequently, Britishers forced the Maharaja to lease the Gilgit wazarat to them for a period of 60 years. The Gilgit lease was signed between the Maharaja and the British on March 26, 1935, this agreement provided the viceroy of India to directly assume control over the military and civil administration of this Gilgit wazarat. Maharaja could neither raise an objection to this forced move of the British, nor was he in a state to resist.25 Hence, regardless of being a part of the Maharaja’s kingdom, Gilgit and

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 31

the surrounding areas of Baltistan, including the state’s vassals, came under the virtual administration of the British from 1935 to 1947. The Maharaja’s nominal authority was maintained by displaying his flag at the Agency’s headquarters and the manner in which certain state officials were appointed in Gilgit.The only significant jurisdiction left to the Maharaja was the power to grant mining license and leases.26 With the official announcement of the end of British rule in India in 1947, the lease of Gilgit also lapsed and British were impelled to pass the Gilgit Agency back to the Maharaja. As a result, the British decided to hand over the administrative control of all areas of Gilgit Agency, including Hunza, to the state government of Jammu and Kashmir with effect from August 1,1947.27 On July 19, 1947, the Maharaja nominated Brigadier Ghansara Singh as Governor of these districts under the Gilgit agency in order to restore the Maharaja’s authority. Brigadier Ghansara Singh arrived in Gilgit July 30, 1947, along with Major General H.L. Scott who was the Chief of the Kashmir state forces,. At that time Gilgit Scouts, which was under the command of Major William Alexander Brown, assured both the Brigadier and the Chief of Staff that Gilgit Scouts would serve the state and offer their total allegiance if their demands regarding the service conditions were approved.28 At the time of transfer of power over Gilgit from the British to the Maharaja, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Beacon was the Political Agent. The moment Brigadier Ghansara Singh took over the administration of the Gilgit agency as the Governor, the entire functioning of the office came to halt. This happened because most of the British officers stationed in Gilgit had already opted for Pakistan and there were no replacements from the Maharaja’s office to fill the vacated work positions. To aggravate the existing situation the civil administration also refused to work till they were promised higher salaries. The situation deteriorated even further when he got to know that all the stores had been spent or distributed and there are no consumables left. To bring some help to the ill-fated Governor, General Scott left for Srinagar on August 2, 1947.29 For the next more than two months, Governor Ghansara Singh was ineffectual: he kept on sending letters and telegrams to the Prime Minister

32 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

and Foreign Secretary at Srinagar, to inform them about the miserable state of affairs in Gilgit and adjoining areas. All was in vain; no substantial help or significant assistance from Srinagar was provided to ameliorate conditions in Gilgit. Ghansara Singh then delegated the same mission to General Scott, asking him to deliver a message to Maharaja Hari Singh. General Scott then presented a charter of demands to the Maharaja in order to draw his attention to the chaos in Gilgit but it yielded no results. It seemed like the administration at Srinagar was too busy dealing with the problems of valley and the unrest in Poonch to spare a thought over this far land. No administrative or military efforts were made to consolidate Maharaja’s authority over this region. A company of the state forces 5th Kashmir Light Infantry (KLI), which was under the command of Durga Singh situated at Bunji, around 34 miles from Gilgit was replaced by two companies each of Muslim and Sikh troopers under leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Majeed Khan. On the other side, there were around 500 Gilgit Scouts troopers under the command of Major Brown, who along with another British officer Captain A.S. Matheson had agreed to serve the state. Major Brown was a British officer who was appointed as the commandant of the Gilgit Scouts. He volunteered to superintend the transition between the British and the Maharaja. He was also in command over a few Muslim officers of the Kashmir State army and the 6th KLI of the Gilgit Scouts. Right before the Pakistani invasion, he secured the help of these army officials to establish Pakistan’s control over Gilgit.30 After Pakistan invaded Jammu and Kashmir with the help of armed tribesmen, the Maharaja fled to Jammu and signed an instrument of accession with India, which resulted in a clear chaos in Gilgit. Seeing this as an opportune moment Major Brown and Gilgit scouts surrounded the Governor’s house and took him under protective custody.31 In order to save the lives of the non-Muslim residents of the town, the Governor surrendered. This further dissolved the 6th KLI at Bunji, and communally charged troops attacked each other, killing all the Sikh troops.32 A provisional government was formed in the newly independent ‘People’s Republic of Gilgit and Baltistan’ after the arrest of the governor on October 31, 1947.33

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 33

The so-called independent state lasted for 16 days and there is little doubt that Major Brown was playing to Pakistan’s tunes. The self-proclaimed government was headed by Rais Khan, a local along with the support of Major Brown, Captain Ihsan Ali and Captain Mirza Hassan from the state forces and Wazir Wilayat Ali. As it became evident that Indian forces weren’t advancing, Major Brown hoisted Pakistan’s flag on November 4, 1947 at the Gilgit Scout lines.34 The new Governor of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sir George Cunningham instructed Major Brown to restore order.35 Eventually, the enclaves of Hunza and Nagar, earlier designated as the vassals of the Maharaja of Kashmir also acceded to Pakistan.36 Many scholars often exaggerate the role of Major Brown and Gilgit Scouts when it comes to the developments that took place in Gilgit. For Pakistan this version of the story suited best as it supports their case that the people of Jammu and Kashmir wanted to accede to Pakistan. Hence, it was essential for Pakistan to portray that Gilgit Scouts were leading the rebellion to give it an indigenous colour. Their narrative advocates that the local inhabitants and his troops who were in favour of joining Pakistan moved Major Brown to lead the rebellion. India believes the British favoured Pakistan to gain control of a strategically crucial region and promotes conspiracy theories. However, a careful analysis shows how the Maharaja’s indifference also alienated the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, despite all the requisitions of help and support nothing was provided for this region. There was discontent among the people regarding the Maharaja. According to some records, Major Brown joined rebels as the last resort. He used to present the daily reports to the Governor and took steps to prevent the rebellion and disperse the rebel elements.37 It should also be considered that Gilgit Scouts was not a homogenous force. Its platoons comprised men from different principalities of the region, who owed allegiance to their respective rulers but professed their loyalty to the Maharaja.38 Simultaneously, troops working under the Gilgit Scouts were also divided on sectarian and ethnic basis, and they moderately armed to take on the much more organised and better armed state forces. Their generic apolitical outlook regarding their future with the state also became evident in their demands submitted to Governor Ghansara Singh, which

34 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

were related to pay and service conditions.39 It becomes evident that they initially didn’t intend to revolt from the fact that they were demanding long term benefits of gratuities and pensions. Also, the local people as well as the Gilgit Scouts were not communally charged against each other.40 This is likely why the governor chose Gilgit Scouts over the Muslim-dominated 6th KLI to protect Gilgit. The invasion of Baltistan started after the annexation of Gilgit. Gilgit Scouts led by Captain Ihsan Ali, along with 6th Kashmir Light Infantry and 1,200 troopers from Chitral were involved in the invasion. Lt. Colonel Sher Jung Thapa led state forces to defend Skardu, and despite being entirely disconnected from the rest of the state or Indian forces continuously defended it for over six months. However, Pakistani forces supported the rebels in capturing Zojila Pass in May 1948, which helped them to infiltrate across Drass, Kargil, and further points to threaten Leh. Finally, the Indian Army deployed Tanks to push infiltrators from Zoji La to secure Leh.41 Despite Lt. Colonel Sher Jung Thapa’s heroic resistance at the fort of Skardu for so long, Indian forces couldn’t provide any assistance to relieve Skardu from Pakistan. Indian Army’s attempts to relieve Skardu were foiled by the infiltrators. Troops of two Gorkha platoons who were sent to provide reinforcements to Colonel Thapa were ambushed. Indian Air Force (IAF) provided some help by dropping some supplies but that also fell short because the garrison was also providing refuge to a huge number of non-Muslim population. Apart from the limited air-supply, IAF didn’t provide much help to Colonel Thapa stand his ground.42 Finally, the last standing Skardu garrison, led by Colonel Thapa, also fell on August 14, 1948, consequently control over Baltistan and adjoining areas passed on to Pakistan.43

Geo-strategic Importance of Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan is a landlocked province between the three Asian nuclear states—India, China and Pakistan. Situated in the middle of Karakoram range, Hindukush and Pamir range in the north and western Himalayas in the south, the strategic positioning of this makes it even more significant for all three nations. Pakistan and China demonstrated their will to explore the strategic border they share in the Karakoram range between

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 35

Gilgit-Baltistan and Xinjiang by constructing Karakoram highway in 1979 and created a corridor from Kashgar to Arabian sea via Gwadar.44 Simultaneously, Gilgit-Baltistan can also be seen as a pass-way for the Asian sub-continent to reach Central Asian markets. Countries like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are rich in uranium, cotton, oil and gas resources. The future project of installing a gas pipeline between Iran and China is also scheduled to pass through this mountainous region.45 Gilgit-Baltistan can also be seen as the connecting link not only between Pakistan and China, but also as an extension to the West Asia. The very fact that the boundaries of Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and India coincide at Gilgit-Baltistan, provides a unique geo­ strategic value to this region. It is through this area that the Karakoram Highway passes providing Pakistan extended land access to Central Asia. Gilgit-Baltistan has been integral with regard to India’s communication network in the trans-Himalayas. Even Lord George N. Curzon, in the early 20th century, recognised the strategic importance of the Himalayan frontier from Gilgit-Baltistan to India’s northeast. Britishers considered this Karakoram-Himalaya wall as fragile and guarded these mountain passages to protect the Indian subcontinent and trade sea lanes. The British were wary of the fact that Russians could reach India through the mountainous passes of Karakoram, Hindukush and Pamirs. A direct land access to India could provide them access to the port facilities and they might end up diverting the sea trade by using overland routes to Europe. The British feared that Russians could reach India through Karakoram, Hindukush, and Pamirs. With direct land access to India, they might use overland routes to Europe to divert naval trade. British wanted to protect their monopoly over the sea routes, and Russia’s access to the Arabian Sea would have threatened its control in the region. This threat sparked the ‘great game’ in the mountainous terrain of Gilgit-Baltistan.46

Land of Strategic Passes and Communication Lines

The imposing geographical features and high daunting peaks47 did not prevent the region from becoming a hub of communication, cultural

36 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

interaction and overland trade. Important land routes- Leh (Ladakh)Yarkand-Kashgar crossing Khardung La pass over the Karakoram range, and Gilgit-Hunza-Kashgar across the Khunjerab and Mintaka passes, pass through this region. Whereas the Leh-Yarkand route, which used to be the main artery of trade and communication between India and Central Asia, remains closed since 1949, the Gilgit-Kashgar route has been developed into the Karakoram Highway, allowing China direct land access through Pakistan.48 Covering an area of about 28,000 sq. miles (about 73,000 sq. kilometres) Gilgit-Baltistan has seven districts—Gilgit, Skardu, Hunza Nagar, Ghizer, Diamer, Ghanche and Astor, with a total population of about two million. Gilgit-Baltistan being the part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was under the authority of the Maharaja of the state. As mentioned above, the British feared the expansion of Russians towards the south of the Karakoram, hence to save their own interests, the British persuaded the Maharaja to hand over the frontier of Gilgit to them.The British government was sure that if Russia moves further south,the forces of Maharaja would be unable to hold them and they would reach the necks of the British in India. Considering the threat, the British took over the Gilgit agency on March 29, 1935, for 60 years.49 Furthermore, being located in the middle of Chinese western Xinjiang Province, Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, and India’s Jammu and Kashmir, the region possess an enormous geo-strategic relevance. The construction of Karakoram Highway and its completion in 1979 brought both China and Pakistan closer in terms of connectivity and trade, and now this road plays a key role in CPEC, serving as the starting point of this huge project. This is gaining significance since the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan determines an essential part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a multimillion dollar development project which is heralded as a ‘game changer’ for Pakistan and the whole region. Moreover, Gilgit-Baltistan is home to the mighty Indus and most of its major tributaries, hence it plays a vital role in fulfilling Pakistan’s large hydel power ambitions.

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 37

The region bordering Gilgit-Baltistan has been a flashpoint of conflicts and geopolitical upheavals, historically from the Anglo-Russian face-offs, to the major Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The US-led proxy war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan led to the mass mushrooming of jihadi extremist elements in Afghanistan and that further ushered the rise of the demand of separatism and terror in the sub-Asian region. Although the so-called Afghan Mujahideen were trained in camps across Afghanistan, it was the camps in Pakistan Occupied. Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, where many of them acquired the skills in guerrilla warfare. Terrorist camps mushroomed in Muzaffarabad, Kotli and Balakot, which hosted terrorists either returning from Afghanistan for rest and recuperation or for advanced training.50 This next door conflict brought the threat of extremism right next to the Northern frontier of India. As Pakistan was assisting the US in the proxy war against the Soviets, the control of establishing training camps and imparting training to the mujahideens was in the hands of Pakistan. In 1989, as political disturbance started simmering in the Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan exploited the situation and offered help to the separatist groups active in Indian Kashmir and as the war was coming to an end in Afghanistan, Pakistan channelled those trained militants to Kashmir and fuelled the proxy war there. The geographical proximity of PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan played an eminent role in providing Pakistan an edge to infiltrate terrorists in Indian Kashmir. The strategic eminence of this region was noted during the Siachen conflict, and was highlighted even more in 1999, when Pakistan army infiltrated in Kargil. Pakistan’s President General Parvez Musharraf ’s military plan to attack the Indian supply lines and to cut off Ladakh and Siachen in order to establish a new status quo in the region would not have been possible if Pakistan had been denied control over Gilgit-Baltistan in 1947 war. Pakistan scaled the Kargil mountains with the support of troops from the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and military bases from Gilgit-Baltistan. The goal was to disguise a military operation as infiltration and therefore avoid closer examination by Indian security agencies and the international world. Pakistan used the cover of winter to transfer troops unnoticed across the Line of Control (LoC) and establish a 168-kilometre-long  line of

38 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

checkpoints. These included high positions that allowed Pakistan to target artillery fire on the main road used to send supplies to Siachen. Pakistan army was assisted by the cadres of Al Badr, LeT and other militant groups, which aided the regular troops in occupying key ridges and mountain summits to monitor and cut down the movement of Indian defences.51 This war brought global scrutiny on the terrorist groups operating out of POK, and the state’s complicity in supporting and sustaining them against India remained short-lived, as the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, on the advice of then US President Bill Clinton’s, ordered the withdrawal of the troops and the restoration of status quo at the Line of Control. From a security standpoint, the situation has become adverse for India, especially after the construction of Karakoram Highway, as China has been consistently providing diplomatic, military, logistics, physical and financial support to Pakistan to enable it to consolidate its grip over the strategic frontier area of Gilgit-Baltistan. Furthermore, this region connects Pakistan and China via an 885-kilometre-long route that traverses the rough terrain of the Karakoram range. It was constructed in 1978 and was first named as ‘friendship highway’ and then was renamed as Karakoram Highway. It was constructed by  the  Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), who also employed the  engineers from the Pakistan Army Corps along with the participation of an estimated 10,000 Chinese Engineers and Labourers52 without paying any royalty to the people.53 Initially Karakoram Highway connected Kasghar in Xinjiang with Havelian in the Abottabad district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This strategic move was initiated by China with a broader vision of connecting with Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Africa, in order to achieve its economic goals.54 It can also be viewed as a strategic seed planted by China, the fruits of which would be enjoyed by both Pakistan and China with the completion of CPEC. Along with the KKH, China has also assisted Pakistan to construct a network of feeder roads in Gilgit-Baltistan linked with the KKH. For instance, the feeder road that connects the Shaksgam, Shimsal and Raskam valley, further links Gilgit with Hotan, which is a crucial military base of China. Hotan is situated at a strategic cross section of Hotan-Golmud and Tibet-Xinjiang Highways. The Hotan-Golmud highway is important

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 39

here because it not only connects Xinjiang to Qinghai province and central China, but has also reduced the distance between Gilgit and Golmud by almost half. This infrastructural development can help Chinese forces move and deploy their troops faster across the north and north-eastern frontiers of Ladakh. Similarly, another feeder road running along southern end of Xinjiang connects Gilgit with Aksai Chin reducing the previous distance between the two regions by 1200 kms.55 These infrastructural developments have helped Pakistan and China to connect military establishments of West Tibet to Xinjiang and Pakistan. Consequently, the KKH and its network of feeder roads have provided China and Pakistan enhanced military grip around India’s northern frontiers, compromising India’s security, which was also seen during the Kargil war. Road connectivity between Pakistan and China through the KKH, also safeguards its strategic and political interests vis-à-vis India. KKH passes through the Pakistan occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and it brings the armies of India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan within the striking distance. The completion of the KKH provided Pakistan with a strategic upper hand over India, which it didn’t have in Gilgit-Baltistan since 1947. This highway provided Pakistan with an enhanced access to the remote areas of Gilgit-Baltistan. With the commencement of this highway the communication and transportation network in these untrodden areas was drastically improved, favoring Pakistan to exert its military presence along the northern frontier of India. This highway has tremendously helped Pakistan to consolidate its military bases next to the LoC, and also accentuates the ability of its army to launch any offensive action in the Ladakh region of India. Similarly, further expansion of feeder roads along Qala Panja, Mintaka and Wakhjir passes ensures a connection of Gilgit-Baltistan with Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In 1996, China built some concrete base suspension bridges in Yasin, Gupis, Tangir, Darel and Shigar valleys to consolidate the linkages with the KKH. The Darel and Tangir bridges provide an alternate supply link to the KKH via the right bank Indus road, and such alternatives can ensure an uninterrupted movement even during an air interdiction.56

40 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

China’s trade route strategy is a striking feature of its camouflaged geo-strategy, which it applied to enable itself and Pakistan to utilise KKH to contain and limit the political influence of India in the region.57 Taking into account the Soviet-Afghan war, the same KKH was used by China and USA to establish listening posts in Gilgit-Baltistan and also to move military reinforcements and manpower from Xinjiang to help the mujahideens fighting against the Soviet army from early to mid­ 1980s.58 During that time, China not only provided logistical support to the Afghan mujahideen, but also channelled its Uighur Sunni Muslims into the struggle alongside the Afghans. Given this historical tradition, it is clear that the Chinese would utilise this territory to its maximum extent if necessary. The connectivity provided by the KKH allowed China to exploit Pakistan territory as another front against India (presence in Gwadar) and has also used Pakistan as a deterrent to keep a check on India’s growth.59 The accord signed between Pakistan and China in 1966 gave Pakistan access to the Chinese weapons through the KKH.60 Chinese military aid has helped Pakistan to sustain its wars on the eastern front with India and carry on this low-intensity conflict.61 Since the commencement of KKH till the 1990s China has been the primary source to fulfil Pakistan’s military needs. However, the supply of weapons and other army supplies still continue to happen via KKH. To ensure this constant supply of arms and ammunition, China has specifically not ratified the mutual reduction of military forces and disarmament on the border, and the border arms reduction treaty with Pakistan.62 Therefore, such accords continue to allow Pakistan and China to have weapons trade without any hindrances, mostly out of sight of the outside observers. Simultaneously, Pakistan also serves as a good market for China’s weapons exports, especially due to the hostile relations between India and Pakistan. Therefore, it can also be assessed that it is strategically and economically advantageous for China to keep the security situation between India and Pakistan volatile to keep India engaged with its security and divert resources towards developing an advance market system to challenge China economically.

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 41

Security imbroglio following CPEC

In the present economic (and geo-strategic) context, with the initiation of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, project KKH is again going to play an exclusive role by linking Gilgit to Gwadar port. CPEC is a $46 billion package which includes projects which majorly falls into two categories: power and transportation. Around $12 billion are planned to be invested in developing transport infrastructure, including rail link connecting the deep sea port of Gwadar with Kashgar in Xinjiang, spanning over a distance of 2000 miles. It also includes widening of the KKH, which is a part of the CPEC. A 335-kilometre long section of the KKH has been upgraded by the China Road and Bridge corporation at the cost of $510 million and Khunjerab to Raikot section has been upgraded by the National Highways authority of Pakistan. This upgradation also includes developing Gwadar airport and extending the existing highways, for example Karachi-Lahore section.63 (See Map 2.1) Map 2.1: Karakoram Highway

Source: Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan.

42 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

A number of energy projects worth $34 billion are also planned, which include construction of pipelines to transport oil and gas to Kashgar; completing the much awaited Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline; and various wind, coal and hydro energy plants to generate around 10,000 megawatts of energy to support Pakistan’s growing industrial and domestic requirements.64 Development of Gwadar port is the main project for China, it would provide Beijing a reliable and long term access point in Arabian Sea (hence Indian ocean), which would be used by China to link its trade with Gulf and Africa. Currently, Gwadar port is only being developed as a commercial port. Although, in the future it can be transformed into a port with navy facilities for the Chinese Navy. If such a development happens, which is not so unrealistic, it would drastically challenge India’s security in the Indian Ocean and would also increase Sino-Indian maritime competition. As per China’s first official defence white paper, published in early 2015, the “traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”65 In order to strengthen the defence of Gwadar, Pakistan finalized a deal worth $6 billion in August 2016 with China to purchase eight modified  diesel-electric  attack  submarines, supposed to be delivered by 2028. This purchase is associated with the CPEC development programme and is one of Pakistan’s largest weapons deal. Possession of such advanced submarines by Pakistan would definitely add extra load over India’s marine security concerns.66, 67 With the official inauguration of the CPEC project in 2015, GilgitBaltistan has come in limelight again. China has been working on expanding and consolidating its inroad network in the region under the guise of other developmental projects under CPEC. However, it is not just Pakistan that benefits from the CPEC effort, as Kashgar in Xinjiang, the project’s beginning point, is attracting significant investment for China’s comparatively underdeveloped eastern region. Simultaneously, Pakistan is also drawing up a plan to develop advanced military infrastructure to accommodate a whole brigade in Gilgit-Baltistan, in order to secure its defence for the multi­ billion dollar economic corridor, further enhancing the strategic relevance

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of the region. For ensuring the security of CPEC, land has been allocated to Pakistan Army in Diamer district, for setting up ‘headquarters’.The proposed facility will be located at Thak Das near Chilas and will have the capacity to facilitate a brigade of 5,000 personnel, as per the Dimaer district Deputy Commissioner Usman Ahmad.68

Changing security dynamics post-Galwan

However, the security dynamics of the region have taken a critical turn after the clash between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh. The deadly clash on June 16, 2020, brought India and China to the brink of war, as this is the first skirmish since 1962 where India has suffered a great deal of casualties. In late May, Chinese forces began to intrude into Indian territory, with incursions ranging up to 3 kilometres. Similar Chinese incursions and force buildup in the Galwan valley finally led to the deadly clash between the two forces. On the other side, China’s aggressive manoeuvres in the eastern Ladakh sector can be linked with the increased infrastructural development that India has been pursuing since last few years to enhance its troops ability to consolidate their hold and defence standing in the region, especially in Galwan, Despang plateau and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) also known as Sub Sector North (SSN). This section lies to the east of the Siachen Glacier and is of immense strategic significance given its proximity to the Karakoram Pass and China’s NH 219 passing through Aksai Chin. China’s National Highway 219 (G219) connects Xinjiang to Tibet, was originally built in 1957, and got upgraded 2013.This highway is 179 kilometres long and passes through the disputed Aksai China region. Therefore, the development of infrastructure has raised alarms for China, as this sector runs parallel to China’s crucial G219 highway. Domination over the SSN is crucial for the security of Siachen glacier lying between Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani side and Saser ridge close to the Chinese claim line. Hence, we can assess that securing SSN is imperative for the protection of Ladakh. In 2019, Border Roads Organisation (BRO) finalised the link between Leh and DBO by making an all-weather road and completing 430 metres long Col. Chewang Rinchen bridge across Shyok

44 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

river, this infrastructural development has reduced the travel/deployment time from Leh to DBO by half. China views this development from India as suspicious as per its own security, as this road connection would enhance India’s capability to deploy its troops rapidly in case of any conflict. On the other hand, Galwan river overlooks the DSDBO road due to its high altitude ridge line, losing control of this region to India would affect Chinese dominance in that region. China’s military assertion is also linked with the consolidation of the security of Aksai Chin. Simultaneously, China’s military intrusions can be attributed to the political decision to revoke J&K’s special status on August 5, 2019, which transformed Ladakh into a Union Territory. This political act has made both China and Pakistan suspicious that India may be planning to seize control of areas under their authority and alter the regional status quo. The repeal of Article 370 and the division of the state of J&K into two Union Territories, Ladakh and J&K, have placed this territory under the direct administration of the Indian government. This political gesture, combined with infrastructure development and the Modi government’s stand over PoK, seems to be a cause for concern in both China and Pakistan. In the wake of these clashes between India and China, Pakistan has also started playing its cards to counter and engage India from the other side to make it a two-front security situation. An additional force of around 20,000 troops have been deployed along the LoC to match-up the Chinese reinforcements in the LAC region in the east. The level of army mobilisation is even more intense than it was post-Balakot air strikes by India. Alongside, it also amplified its radar surveillance to keep a check on Indian air defence movements. According to a US intelligence report, Pakistan provided information regarding the movement and positioning of Indian troops to China prior to the June 16 Galwan clash.69 This build up should be seen as a strategic move by Pakistan to overwhelm Indian defence at a time when China was aggressively deploying its forces in eastern Ladakh along LAC, while committing intrusions as well. The additional military standoff from the Pakistani side created extra pressure on the Indian military to stand prepared for a dual threat.

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It had also been reported that China came in contact with the terrorist group Al-Badr (Pakistan based terror group with a history of violent activities in J&K) to destabilise internal security in J&K by inciting violence. In this regard, Deputy General of J&K Police Dilbag Singh also stated that intelligence reports have hinted that Al-Badr has been revived for operations in the valley.70 Such signs of collaboration turned to be more worrisome with growing tensions on the LAC, while PLA increasing its concentration across eastern Ladakh,71 apart from Uttarakhand, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim.72 India has also kept the airbases in Gilgit and Baltistan under constant monitoring. Following the Sino-India clash, the Pakistan Air Force increased its operations along the Ladakh border. It conducted air exercises from its Skardu base in Gilgit. These aerial exercises were performed by Pakistan’s J-17 Thunder fighter aircraft. According to PTV, Pakistan’s state-owned media platform, the then Pakistan Air Force Chief Marshal Mujahid Anwar Khan visited air base at Qadri, Skardu on July 25, 2020, right after the Galwan clash, to assess the rapid deployment and operational capabilities of their fighter aircrafts and combat systems. Pakistan’s media quoted Air Chief Khan as saying that, “the aggressive military procurements by the enemy are not going unnoticed and necessary measures are in place to ensure the balance of military power in conventional domain as well.”73 Along with heightened Pakistan’s aerial activity, China had sent a refueller aircraft to Skardu in the third week of June 2020 as a follow-up action immediately after the Galwan clash.74 China also increased its aerial activities adjoining eastern Ladakh, furthering the possibilities of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) using the airbases in Gilgit-Baltistan. The landing of a Chinese Air Force IL-78 tanker at the Skardu airbase at the end of June 2020 provided additional evidence of Chinese aerial involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan. The PLAAF has multiple air bases in and around Tibet, with Hotan housing the most combat assets. These bases could be used in a warlike situation with India. However, the geo-positioning of this airbase at an altitude of 4,000 feet creates an impediment for the fighter aircrafts to take off with a complete payload of weapons and fuel.75 Therefore, in conflict situations Skardu airbase can be utilized by the PLAAF to launch attack over Ladakh.

46 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

There are a few more factors which should be considered to evaluate the interoperability between the PAF and the PLAAF. Since 2011, under Shaheen series, both the air forces have been conducting joint air exercises, which has improved their interoperability substantially. Reports have also suggested that PAF pilots have gained the know-how of PLAAF aircraft during those exercise sessions and are capable of flying them too. PLAAF pilots also have direct access to the PAF radar systems and air defence controllers, further accentuating their tactical expertise. Furthermore, the PAF’s use of Chinese-made aircraft such as the IL-78 tanker and the airborne early warning and control (AWACS/AEW&C) equipped ZDK­ 03, also known as the Karakoram Eagle,makes it even more conducive for PLAAF to work in collaboration with them.76 It is in these areas that PAF support could be provided to the PLAAF. Another way of helping PLAAF would be to increase PAF activity near the north western sector of Ladakh to engage IAF resources, which can add extra baggage on Indian defence system in active conflict with China. PAF’s Falcon 20 electronic intelligence (ELINT) could also be utilised by it to provide crucial inputs to the PLAAF along with extending the services of its IL-78 tankers and AEW&C aircraft to the latter.77 Moreover, the geo­ stationing of Skardu airbase, almost 100 kilometers from the Indian airbase at Leh makes it immensely strategic for both PLAAF and PAF, consequently adding up as another threat to Indian defence system. Alongside, Beijing is also helping Pakistan to install multiple surface-to-air missile launch sites and missile defence systems in the region, 78 further challenging Indian Aerial operations and offensive ability. To outflank Indian augmentation of its air force by the inclusion of Rafale fighter jets, China has taken a step ahead and has started working in upgrading Pakistan’s JF-17 thunder fighter jets. The advanced version of JF-17 Block-III features technologies from China’s advanced fifth generation JF-20 fighter jet. The modified JF-17 aircraft is installed with many commercial off-the-shelf technologies, which includes an upgraded holographic head display with a wider angle, integrated with the main cockpit’s display, replicating the one used in Chinese J-20, on top of that an

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 47

upgraded missile approach warning system has also been installed, already in use by J-20, J-16 and J-10 Chinese fighter jets.79 According to Military Watch Magazine, the JF-17 Block III is a fighter aircraft that is set to revolutionize Pakistan’s aerial superiority over India. The inclusion of Advanced Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, already puts it above most of the Indian fighters, apart from SU­ 30MKI which uses Bars Passive Electronically Scanned Array radar. When paired with modern long-range missiles like the PL-15, which has a range of 150 kilometres, the AESA radar easily outflanks any counterparts now in Indian service, giving the PAF a strategic advantage. This appears to be a well-planned strategy to sustain the pressure on the Indian air force, which, despite the addition of Rafale fighter jets, still possesses a large number of ageing MIG-21 Bisons.80 Apart from military engagement in Gilgit-Baltistan, China is also taking other steps to consolidate its foothold in the region. China is involved in the construction of Diamer-Bhasha dam project. The Pakistan government signed Rs 442 billion contract with a joint venture of a Chinese state-run firm and a commercial arm of Pakistan’s military for the construction of the Diamer-Bhasha dam.81 The Chinese state-run firm China Power holds 70 per cent and the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), a commercial arm of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, owns 30 per cent share in the consortium that will build the dam.82 Control over the construction of Diamer dam will enable China to bring People’s Liberation Army troops to Gilgit-Baltistan to strengthen Pakistan’s military. The upgrading of the road network in the name of facilitating the construction of the dam will help China move logistics to Gilgit much faster, which could be a game-changer against India in case of a two-front war with Pakistan and China.

Way Forward for India

Since the 1962 Indo-China war, China became the second geopolitical adversary of India along with Pakistan. However, China’s actions towards India were getting hostile right after India took the decision to provide

48 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

asylum to the Tibetan refugees. India undermined the Chinese threat and paid for that negligence with a huge price in 1962. Then onwards it can be seen that whenever India has suffered whenever it has downplayed the prospect of the ‘Sino-Pak’ dual threat to its security. Contrarily, whenever India has acted over plausible security risk from both the ends, it has come out with a strategic win, e.g. in the 1971 war. Until 1962, both Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister V.K. Menon believed that Pakistan was the greatest threat to India’s security, which highlighted India’s inadequate strategic reaction in the India-China war. On the contrary, Indira Gandhi considered the prospect of Chinese support for Pakistan in the event of a conflict in 1971. As a result, she pursued the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union to ensure India’s defences and, lead India to a magnificent victory. Mistakes and lessons from the past are still relevant. There is an overt fixation on the threat from Pakistan while being somewhat complacent towards China, despite its incursions in east and Ladakh. The possible reason could be that all the recent standoffs prior to Galwan, like Despang, Chumar and Doklam were resolved without much altercation. Diplomatically, the meetings between PM Modi and President Xi Jinping at Wuhan (April 2018)83 and Mamallapuram, Tamil Nadu (October 2019)84 could be seen as reasons why Indian strategists feel nothing of such sort could be on the cards. Given the way China had stationed its troops over the eastern Ladakh sector, the Sino-Indian standoff which began in March 2020 appeared to go on for a long winter. The Galwan clash has moved the needle of Sino-Indian relationship towards greater competitiveness and confrontation. India needs to fundamentally recalibrate its China policy, strengthen its position while evaluating its every action from a cost-benefit analysis. War is not something that can be afforded, especially on two fronts as the economy recovers from the Covid-19 shock. India must go further with a multifaceted approach to fight and neutralise this dual threat to achieve long-term stability. So, at first, deescalation must be pursued gently. However, China has increased its personnel and equipment presence throughout the western Ladakh sector, forcing India to match Chinese steps, making de-escalation difficult. The

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 49

scale and intensity of Chinese actions indicate that they intend to stay until their aims are realised. These goals can be hypothesised by evaluating state-sponsored media reports from Beijing, which point to India halting infrastructure construction in Ladakh. This contradicts Indian intentions of matching the Chinese build-up to gradually lessen the PLA’s operational advantage in that area. Following the clash, the Indian response was not one of capitulation to Chinese pressure; instead, several sources confirmed that Indian army engineers completed bridge building work within 72 hours of the tragedy. Indian actions of holding ground represent a controversial position, yet such efforts are necessary for long-term security. Given the ground realities in which Beijing asserted control over the whole Galwan river valley, threatening the status quo it imposed during the 1962 conflict, de-escalation would require a continuous effort while consolidating our defence postures. Henceforth, it is evident that India must remain engaged, while it’s constantly trying to also indulge with the Chinese counterpart in military level negotiations. India and China have met multiple times since May 5, 2020, when the face-off first broke into a clash through various levels of engagement. There have been multiple military, diplomatic and senior corps commander-level meetings. On the other hand, India also needs to understand China’s psyche behind all these maneuvers. Despite all the muscle-flexing that China has conveyed through its state-controlled media, China is a rational strategist. China’s real intentions behind such incursions on the Indian side disturbing the status quo are not to initiate an upfront war. Resolving the border dispute with China is one of India’s strategic compulsions so that it doesn’t have to be on toes regarding the Sino-Pak dual threat; however, keeping the LAC destabilised and undemarcated is more favourable for China, because a probable looming threat over India would serve more to China than a decisive war. Therefore, Beijing’s intentions here are to keep India engaged with these border skirmishes, downplaying its regional stature and eventually forcing it to accept Chinese cartographic demarcation. Chinese analyst, Yun Sun, Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center,  writes in  War on the Rocks, “The trick for Beijing is to maintain

50 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

the struggle on the ground without triggering a war, of course. It’s a long process of friction and attrition. The tactical objective of returning to the occupation line by the end of the 1962 war could be one move to inflate China’s negotiation position and force India to accept the fait accompli.”85 Therefore Indian security strategists need to understand the behavioral pattern of China and respond accordingly. While maintaining its military stand, India has been proactively reflective about prioritising diplomatic solutions as the only way out. Simultaneously, the Indian government has also given a free hand to the Army to tackle the ground situation as needed; special allocation of funds had been sanctioned bypassing the regulatory framework for faster procurement of emergency defence requirements. Indian Air Force, also increased its combat patrols to augment tactical support to the armed forces, special mountain corps were deployed at the LAC. Galwan clash also led to the change in the rules of engagement, as the field commanders can now use firearms to counter “extraordinary circumstances/hostile action” from the Chinese side, deviating from the bilateral agreements signed between India and China in 1996 and 2005. Immediate defence deal responses were also noted after the clash, as the Defence Minister of India scheduled his visit to procure the crucial S-400 missile defence system from Russia. This move can also be attributed to the fact that China already has an anti-aircraft system, hence the urgency to secure such security gaps was displayed.86 Restoration of pre-Galwan status quo although has been the primary aim of India, but one and half years after the deadly clash, the situation has taken complex turns. Even after 16 round of India-China military commander level talks, Beijing is insisting over consolidating the new status quo instead of de-escalation/retreating. Another domestic development from the Chinese side is going to have long-term ramifications for IndiaChina border dispute. In October 2021, Chinese legislature had passed a ‘land border’ that declares the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China as “sacred and inviolable”. This law will provide the PLA a legal framework for sanctioned use of force to quell border disputes.87 Although, some dis­ engagement has happened at the northern and southern banks of PangongTso lake, along with Gogra and Galwan valley but the ‘Hot-Spring’ area,

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 51

Despang and Demchok still continue to be the bone of contention, leading to intensified troops deployment from both sides.88 Apart from resolving these short-term issues that appeared to have made the Sino-Indian relations hostile, India must also be resolute to bring a pragmatic change in its security and foreign policy especially towards China. China has been rising exponentially and has achieved the status of a ‘great power’ with the size of its economic output, hence it is going to act like one in the region by overshadowing the rise of other regional powers. India being its strategic rival should also accept this reality and must revisit its inclination towards ‘strategic autonomy’, a derivative of the Cold War era non-alignment policy. China through his aggressive actions has indirectly given India an opportunity to reconsider its foreign policy posture of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, as such equidistant diplomatic maneuvering to be in all the camps is unsustainable. So far India has given undue prominence to its policy of strategic autonomy by not aligning overtly with other major power coalitions to counter-balance China just to keep the Dragon appeased. However, these tactics haven’t reaped the desired outcomes from China, India’s neutrality is not considered as sacrosanct by Beijing, which is why the focus needs to be on building firm strategic/economic coalitions to further India’s growth at the regional level at least. The other policy alternative been pursued by India is to promote economic interdependence with China to eradicate the geopolitical threat, also seems to be futile. The economic interdependence trajectory has been in the favor of China, as they have out-paced India’s manufacturing sector and have pushed India into a trade deficit year after year. Despite the fact that India’s exports to China increased by 21 per cent in 2021, we are still far from achieving a trade balance. The current situation provides India with an opportunity to abandon “strategic autonomy” in favour of strengthening the trend of aligning its own interests with the US, as well as steer towards a closer military orientation as well. India also needs to shake off its ambivalent attitude towards the quadrilateral alliance (India, US, Australia and Japan), the grouping of four Indo-Pacific democracies and use the framework to simultaneously increase

52 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

its strategic interests and build leverage against Beijing. India’s reticent stand and activity in the quadrilateral  has been counter-productive, this alliance needs to exploited both economically and militarily to counter China. So far, India’s position has neither persuaded China of India’s strategic neutrality nor has it aided India in leveraging the framework or developing an Indo-Pacific charter. The quadrilateral may also help India’s interests by bolstering its ‘Act East’ policy, giving India a stronger foothold in the Indo-Pacific and assisting it in countering China’s String of Pearls strategy, boosting the IndoUS strategic partnership, and deepening India’s strategic ties with Australia. In this way, the Chinese threat can be neutralised, and alongside Pakistan would also settle down. Going ahead India should extend its outreach to the Shia people of Gilgit-Baltistan, who have been denied representation and basic civil rights for decades, and have also faced sectarian violence and state-sponsored genocide during the Zia regime. Their hostility has grown, especially since the start of CPEC, which has delivered no development to the region’s indigenous inhabitants. India could also express its concerns at UN forums in order to target and undermine Pakistan.

Notes 1.

Andre Burstin, “Gilgit-Baltistan essential link of the Pakistan china strategic axis”, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, January 30, 2013, at http://

www.esisc.org/upload/publications/briefings/gilgit-baltistan-essential-link-of-the­ 2. 3. 4. 5

6.

pakistan-china-strategic-axis/Gilgit-Baltistan.pdf, accessed on September 2, 2020.

F. M. Hassnain, British policy towards Kashmir, 1846-1921:  Kashmir in Anglo-

Russian politics (New Delhi: Sterling, 1974), p. 61.

P. Stobdan, “North-West Under the Maharaja”, in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Pakistan

Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot (New Delhi: Siddhi Books, 1995), pp. 39-40.

M H Khan, “History of Baltistan”, Baltistan Research Translation, Lok Virsa, Islamabad, 1987, pp. 79-80.

M. Ismail Khan, “Gilgit-Baltistan: Melting Water Towers of the Indus”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2014, at http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/1412­ IndusPapers-IsmailKhan.pdf, accessed on September 2, 2020.

“Mineral sector of Gilgit-Baltistan region”, at http://www.gilgitbaltistan.gov.pk/

DownloadFiles/InvestmentPotential/Minerals.pdf, (Accessed September 15, 2020).

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 53

7. 8. 9.

Bharat Verma, Indian Defence Review Jan-March 2011 (Bengaluru: Lancer

International, 2011), p. 138.

V. D. Chopra, India’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2006), p. 189.

K. Warikoo. (ed.), Other Kashmir, society culture and politics in Karakoram (New Delhi: The Pentagon Press, 2014), p. viii.

10. P N Jalali, “The Gilgit dimension of the Kashmir frontier,” in K Warikoo (ed.), Himalayan Frontiers of India (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009), p. 37.

11. Karl Jettmar, “Ethnological Research in Dardistan 1958”, Proceedings of the

American Philosophical Society Vol. 105, No. 1, February 1961, at http://archiv. ub.uni-heidelberg.de/propylaeumdok/2134/1/Jettmar_Ethnological_research_in_ Dardistan_1961.pdf, accessed on September 12, 2020.

12. The term “Dardistan” was coined by G. W. Leitner, an Anglo-Hungarian orientalist

who visited the Northern Areas in the 1860s and recorded his findings in his book Dardistan in 1866, 1886and 1893. According to Leitner, Dardistan served as the cradle

of the ‘Aryan’ raceand an area that contained answers to numerous ethnographical and linguistic questions of that time (Leitner 1893: 168).

13. W. G. Leitner, Dardistan in 1866, 1886, and 1893, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 1996, p. 168.

14. Alok Bansal, “Gilgit a critical appraisal,”Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Manekshaw Paper No. 37, 2012, pp. 3-4.

15. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

16. Jasjit Singh (ed.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot (New Delhi: Siddhi Books, 1995), pp. 39-40.

17. Khan, n. 5, pp. 78-79. 18. Ibid.

19. Hassnain, n. 2, p. 27.

20. Khan, n. 5, pp. 87-95.

21. Balraj Madhok, A Story of Bungling in Kashmir (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1972), pp. 5-7.

22. N N Raina, Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoeuvres 1846-1980 (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers), 1988, p. 3.

23. Singh, n. 16, p. 22.

54 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

24. Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India,

Pakistan and the Kashmiri People (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1996), p. 16.

25. Singh, n. 16, pp. 31-36.

26. Amar Singh Chohan, The Gilgit Agency 1877-1935 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1984), p. 220.

27. Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 7.

28. Hassnain, n. 2, pp. 150-152. 29. Ibid., pp. 152-153. 30. Ibid.

31. Afsir Karim, “Strategic dimensions of the trans-Himalayan frontiers,” in K Warikoo (ed.), Himalayan Frontiers of India (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009), p. 60.

32. Hassnain, n. 2, pp. 155-157. 33. Singh, n. 16, p. 41.

34. Hassnain, n. 2, pp. 157-158.

35. Narendra Singh Sarila, The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), pp. 333-334.

36. Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistani Army (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 1999), p. 20.

37. Bansal, n. 14, pp. 9-12.

38. Ahmed Hassan Dani, History of Northern Areas of Pakistan: up to 2000 AD (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2001), p. 327.

39. Ibid., pp. 335-336.

40. S N Prasad and Dharam Pal, History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48), Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 280-281.

41. Singh, n.16, p. 62.

42. Madhok, n. 21, p. 73; P C Lal, My Years with the IAF (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986), pp. 64-65.

43. Mahajan, Debacle in Baltistan (New Delhi: A. K. Corporation, 1973), pp. 124-125.

44. Jeremy Garlick, “Deconstructing the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pipe

Dreams Versus Geopolitical Realities,” Journal of Contemporary China, 27(112), February 15, 2018, pp. 519-520.

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 55

45. H. Senge Sering, “Expansion of Karakoram Corridor: Implications and

Prospects,”Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Occasional Paper No. 27, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 3-4.

46. Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha International, 1994), p. 358.

47. S Saini, Shaheen and Showkat Dar, “Geopolitical Significance of Gilgit Baltistan

of J&K State,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 2(5), 2013, pp. 50-53.

48. K Warikoo, Other Kashmir, Society Culture and Politics in Karakoram (New Delhi: The Pentagon Press, 2014), p. 126.

49. “Gilgit Lease 1935,” Ministry of States Index, (Secret), File No.: 29-R(S), National Archives of India.

50. Priyanka Singh, “Militant Training Camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir: An Existential Threat,” Strategic Analysis Special Issue: India–Pakistan Relations: 10 Years After Kargil, 33 (3), 2009, p. 334.

51. Warikoo, n. 48, pp. 310-311.

52. Annka, Qammer Abbas, “FWO: National pride of Pakistan”, The News, June 5, 2016,

at

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/125354-FWO-National-pride-of-

Pakistan, accessed on October 2, 2020.

53. Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2007), p. 190.

54. Sering, n. 45, p. 9.

55. Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 190, 202.

56. Ibid., pp. 201-202. 57. Ibid., p. 197.

58. Rahman, n. 24, pp. 213-214. 59. Sering, n. 45, p. 17.

60. Ispahani, n. 55, p. 199.

61. S. Frederick Starr, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (New York: M E Sharpe, 2004), p. 143.

62. UN

General

Assembly,

“Agreement

between

Russia,

Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China on Confidence Building in the Military

Field in the Border Area”, United Nations Peacemaker, April 26, 1996,

56 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

a t htt ps://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/960426_ AgreementConfidenceBuildingMilitaryFieldinBorderArea.pdf, accessed on

December 15, 2022.

63. Rakistis, Clause, “A Path to the Sea: China’s Pakistan Plan”, World Affairs Journal, Fall 2015, at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/path-sea-china%E2%80%99s­ pakistan-plan, accessed on September 12, 2020.

64. Ahmed, Nadia B, and Mushtaq Ur Rasool Bilal, “Monsoons, Hydropower and Climate Justice in Pakistan’s River Communities”, in Randall S. Albate (ed.), Climate Justice: Case Studies in Global and Regional Governance Challenges, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, 2016, p. 486.

65. White Paper, “China’s Military Strategy”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, at http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/

white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm, accessed on December

15, 2022.

66. Claude Rakistis, “Pakistan’s pivot to China”, Defence Journal Vol 18 (11), June 2015, at https://www.proquest.com/openview/481ee33ff9cc1e3eeebf481b8cda303f/1?pq­ origsite=gscholar&cbl=616545, accessed on December 15, 2022.

67. Pakistan’s pivot to China (2015), Pakistan Defence, at https://defence.pk/pdf/ threads/pakistans-pivot-to-china.409208/, accessed on November 21, 2016.

68. Mir, Shabbir, “Pakistan Army to establish HQ in Diamer district to ensure CPEC

security”, The Express Tribune, February 17, 2016, at https://tribune.com.pk/

story/1049121/cpec-security-pak-army-to-establish-hq-in-thak-das, accessed on

September 15, 2020.

69. Eurasian times Desk, “US Report Hints At Pakistan’s ‘Direct Hand’ In India-China Border Clash at Galwan Valley”, The Eurasian Times, August 12, 2020, at https:// eurasiantimes.com/us-report-hints-at-pakistans-direct-hand-in-india-china­ border-clash-at-galwan-valley/, accessed on September 20, 2020.

70. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Darkening mood in Delhi over China”, Observers Research Foundation, July 3, 2020, at https://www.orfonline.org/research/darkening­

mood-in-delhi-over-china-69006/, accessed on September 20, 2020.

71. Manu Pubby, “Pakistan moves 20,000 soldiers to Gilgit-Baltistan LoC”, The Economic

Times, July 2, 2020, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/

pakistan-moves-20000-soldiers-to-gilgit-baltistan-loc/articleshow/76718059. cms?from=mdr, accessed on October 22, 2020.

Gilgit-Baltistan and the Sino-Pak two-front Security Imbroglio for India | 57

72. Ajai Shukla, “Chinese troops now stepping up activity near Arunachal Pradesh”, Business Standard, June 30, 2020, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/

current-affairs/chinese-troops-now-stepping-up-activity-near-arunachal­ pradesh-120063000061_1.html, accessed on October 22, 2020.

73. Pawan Bali, “Pakistan carries out military drill at base near Leh amid India-China standoff ”, The Asian Age, July 26, 2020, at https://www.asianage.com/world/south­

asia/260720/pakistan-carries-out-military-drill-at-base-near-leh-amid-india-china­ standoff.html, accessed on October 22, 2020.

74. Times Now Bureau, “Pakistani airbases in PoK under India’s radar after China’s air activity increases along LAC”, Times Now, June 28, 2020, at https://www.

timesnownews.com/india/article/pakistani-airbases-in-pok-under-india-s-radar­

after-china-s-air-activity-increases-along-lac/612967, accessed on October 22, 2020.

75. Namrata Agarwal, “India outguns China at LAC, better trained army, lethal IAF fighters in dominating position”, Zee News, July 25, 2020, at https://zeenews.india.

com/india/india-outguns-china-at-lac-better-trained-army-lethal-iaf-fighters-in­

dominating-position-2298176.html#:~:text=The%20PLAAF%20runs%20and%20 operates,full%20weapons%20load%20and%20fuel.%E2%80%9D, October 22, 2020.

accessed

on

76. Mandeep Singh, “The Nexus Between The Air Forces of China & Pakistan: Should India Be Concerned?”, Delhi Defence Review, July 6, 2020, at http://

delhidefencereview.com/2020/07/06/the-nexus-between-the-air-forces-of-china­ pakistan-should-india-be-concerned/, accessed on October 22, 2020.

77. Ibid.

78. Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, “PoK missile sites, with China help: Report”, Telegraph India, October 8, 2020, at https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/india-china-clash­

pok-missile-sites-with-china-help-states-report/cid/1794130, accessed on October

22, 2020.

79. Liu Xuanzun, “Upgraded JF-17 fighter jet makes maiden flight, equipped with J-20

tech”, Global Times, January 1, 2020, at https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1175376. shtml, accessed on October 22, 2020.

80. Press Trust of India “With Chinese aid, Pakistan kicks off construction of dam in

PoK”, The Hindu, July 16, 2020, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/

with-chinese-aid-pakistan-kicks-off-construction-of-dam-in-pok/article32098662. ece, accessed on October 22, 2020.

58 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

80. Dave Makichuk, “China’s upgraded JF-17 fighter jet on course,” Asia Times, January 2, 2020.

81. Ibid.

82. Media Centre, “India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 28, 2018, at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases. htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan, accessed on November

10, 2020.

83. Media Centre, “2nd India-China Informal Summit”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 12, 2019, at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.

htm?dtl/31938/2nd+IndiaChina+Informal+Summit, accessed on November 10, 2020.

84. Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic assessment of the Ladakh Clash”, War on the Rocks, June 19, 2020, at https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment­ of-the-ladakh-clash/.

85. Pranab Dhal Samantha, “Rajnath Singh’s Russia visit: India to urge Russia to

rush delivery of S-400 system,”The Economic Times, June 22, 2020, at https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rajnath-singhs-russia-visit-india-to­ urge-russia-to-rush-delivery-of-s-400-system/articleshow/76501432.cms.

86. Udayavir Ahuja, “China’s new border law: A concern for India,” Observer Research

Foundation, November 18, 2021, at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ chinas-new-border-law/.

87. “China adopts land borders law”, Xinhua, October 23, 2021.

3

Understanding the Galwan

Conflict Through the Lens of

Offensive Realism

Haans J. Freddy

Introduction

At a time when the world is grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic, China has not mellowed down its aggression in matters concerning its neighbours or other countries. While speaking about offensive realism, John Mearsheimer presented a very pessimistic view of China’s rise and how it would affect and pose serious challenges in the Asian region. As China gets more strong, Mearsheimer’s prediction that it will announce its own Monroe Doctrine, limit the United States (US) military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and use force to settle territorial disputes with its neighbours appears to be coming true. Additionally, Mearsheimer also argues that Beijing’s ambitions will cause alarm amongst its neighbours, would eventually seek a US-led coalition leaving Asia in an ever-looming state of conflict or one that would lead to war.1 In recent years, such prediction seems to be becoming a reality as there have been a rise in terms of tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its neighbours, more particularly with India, which in its most recent confrontation showcased such a trend that was present in Doklam previously and now in Ladakh. On June 16, 2020, a clash between the Indian and Chinese soldiers broke out near the Galwan valley that resulted in the loss of lives of twenty Indian

60 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

soldiers and unknown number of Chinese soldiers.2 It has brought to the forefront the question of whether China’s rise would be a peaceful one. Against this backdrop, the current intensification of territorial disputes in the Ladakh region, where China has pushed its territorial claims, raises several questions. What would it be like, for example, Among them, what would it be like if there is an escalation of military conflict between these two countries. As Thucydides foresaw that the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta would inevitably occur, will there be a historical replay between India and China? This article examines the notion of offensive realism and its application over the issue of China’s rise, the clash between the Chinese and Indian armed forces in Ladakh that resulted in casualties on both sides. Following the violent clash and the de-escalation of tensions in the Galwan valley, this essay will attempt to answer the following questions: what are China’s options, can it afford to escalate the conflict into a full war against India and what will be its possible consequences? A brief examination of the China threat theory and the Chinese Salami Slicing are all used to explain that China has been and will continue on a path of aggression that threatens peace or status quo in the region.

The Theory of Offensive Realism

In the international relations theory, realism occupies a prominent position. Realism and its tenets are based on the notions that the international system exists in a state of anarchy, that nations seek power in order to survive and major powers dominate the international system. Morgenthau and Waltz, who had brought the concept of realism to the fore of international relations theory, have been followed by many, and John Mearsheimer has added to its tenets the idea of offensive realism. Mearsheimer draws on the structural conditions and the offensive nature of the state to explain his theory. Offensive realism emphasizes on the fact that states are opportunistic in terms of maximising their power. Thus, this means that states in their relentless pursuit of power, more particularly great powers, are more inclined to look for situations that afford them the opportunity to grow their power and are willing to act accordingly. Offensive realism has its attention on the behaviour of great powers whose

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 61

ultimate goal is to attain hegemony. To become a hegemon, a state must satisfy three crucial conditions: (i) achieve hegemony at the regional level, (ii) accumulate wealth and land power and (iii) develop nuclear weapons. These conditions if achieved points towards the accumulation of power, and power is accumulated by war, blackmail, bloodletting, bleeding and bait strategies that are often used for this purpose.3 Many in the west seemed to buy the argument that with the end of the cold war there would be a marked change in the way great powers would interact with each other and there would be little chance that there will be any security competition among great powers.4 In the words of Francis Fukuyama (1989), the end of the cold war has brought with it the end of history seems to be one perspective where there may not be intense competition between states whilst regional and internal conflicts may be prevalent.5 The assertion of Fukuyama is suggestive that there would no longer be security competition or military rivalry among great powers. Such was the optimism that was displayed among some realists during the 1990s that resulted in the article ‘Realists as Optimists.’6,7 However, offensive realists advise otherwise.8 Power for realists is the single most important component of international politics. According to realists, great powers are the main actors in international politics, and they focus on accumulating economic and military power in relative terms. Competition in these terms will continue to exist and international politics will be a ruthless business where states are motivated to act the way in which they are, due to fear. Great powers fear each other, and it is that fear that motivates them to accumulate more power in order to achieve the status of a hegemon.9 Offensive realism’s argument that states compete and are engaged in an unending pursuit of security competition is based on five assumptions.10 First, great powers are the main players in the anarchic international system where the absence of a central authority that is above states is missing. Second, all states possess some offensive military capability to a certain degree that can be used to inflict harm on another state. Third, states are fearful of each other and are often suspicious of other states’ intentions. Most states want to be sure whether the other states are working towards altering the balance of power or are satisfied

62 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

with the prevailing status quo. Fourth, states seek survival and work towards maintaining their territorial integrity and autonomy within their domestic political order. Finally, states are capable of devising wise strategies that help in maximising their chances of survival.11 Offensive realism’s core idea is based upon the premise that a state’s security is achieved through the maximisation of power. However, this straightforward idea has contradictions that arise from realists themselves. For example, defensive realists argue that too much power and too much military power would bring with it challenges to the state’s security as other states would also seek to balance against the other state’s rise. Although the theory of realism has a long history and has been widely used by eminent scholars such as E.H. Carr, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, it lacks foundation. Hans Morgenthau who had offered the ultimate causation that appears in his classical realism is noumenal and falls outside the purview of science that can investigate and prove that assumption.The primary pitfall with Morgenthau’s argument that the animus dominandi (desire for power) that motivates humans to act in certain ways falls short of logical derivation, and Morgenthau also failed to explain how that assumption can be tested scientifically. Mearsheimer while rejecting these arguments, asserts that it is the search for security that is present in the anarchical international system. While all states have the capacity to cause destruction to a certain extent, the motivation to amass power is to ensure security against a possible attack.12 Kenneth Waltz on the other hand based his arguments that seemed more scientific through his idea of neo-realism. Waltz in his ‘Theory of International Relations’ argues that anarchy rules the functioning of world politics. This would imply that there is no authority above that of the state, and therefore resulting in a self-help system where states would have to make their own arrangements for their security through the proliferation of arms and making alliances. Therefore, neo-realism points towards international anarchy that can be evaluated.13 While power remains the main currency of international politics, it is offensive realism that offers a systematic explanation to why the international system is filled with intense and dangerous competition.14 Douglas Lemke argues that the threat of conflict is always present in an anarchical system due

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 63

to the frequent power transfers that accompany the uncertainty of intentions. It is this factor that makes states intent on survival to seek more power.Therefore, in order to survive states must pay ceaseless attention to the balance of power and must be prepared to seize any opportunity that would contribute to the increase of power. A state can be satisfied only when its power is capable of making it a hegemon, and it is only and only when this criterion of sufficient power is met can the state’s survival be guaranteed. Thus, states are constantly on the lookout for possible opportunities that would help them to eliminate their rivals, bring them under their control or subjugate them.15 Mearsheimer’s departure from Waltz’s assumptions in terms of offensive realism is that states possess the insatiable desire for power, whereas Waltz emphasizes that it has limits to such a desire. His disagreement with Waltz can be seen on the question of how much power do states desire. He further clearly points out that defensive realists opt for maintaining and preserving the existing balance of power rather than attempting to increase it. While, offensive realists point out that status quo powers can be rarely found and that the international system provides avenues for states to accumulate power at the cost of its rivals.16 Mearsheimer emphasizes on the elements of national power that can be used in measuring state power and distinguishes state power into two categories: (i) military and (ii) latent power. Military power for Mearsheimer is the core of effective state power when it is compared to the military forces of other states. He also emphasizes that power should be defined in military terms since force is the ultimo ratio and basis for offensive realism. According to Mearsheimer, it is land power that is above the sea, air and nuclear power, and the state which has the most formidable army is the most powerful state. Latent power can be determined by a state’s capacity to build a powerful army. A state’s wealth and population are those that can be translated into military power.17 While states are compelled to maximize their power for their survival or for their security, the way out of this security dilemma is to become at least a regional hegemon. Great powers will make every effort to become a global hegemon, but there are insuperable challenges to attaining it. This is simply because of the fact, according to Mearsheimer, that it is unreachable and the best option for great powers is therefore to become a regional hegemon.18

64 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

John Mearsheimer in his ‘Tragedy of Great Power Politics’, while explaining the theory of offensive realism, uses China as an example to prove that great power conflict would be inevitable. He argues that one of the key foreign policy issues that the United States (US) is facing is how China would engage with the world given the fact that its ever-increasing economy coupled with military capabilities seem to be giving it the potential to become a force to reckon with.This argument seems to be plausible since many in the US believe that bringing the Chinese into a democratic system and also into the global capitalist model would not only ensure China’s engagement with the global economy but also promote China’s transition into a democracy. The belief is coupled with the hope of engaging with China and its wealth and economy to promote global peace.19 However, Mearsheimer warns, however, that this notion is doomed to fail, as China if it becomes an economic superpower, will seek to utilise its economic strength to strengthen its military capabilities as well. This may result in China dominating not only north east Asia as Mearsheimer says but also many countries in South Asia and South east Asia. It is possible that neither the west nor China’s neighbours would simply stand by and watch such growth, but would instead seek to contain or balance China through appropriate alliances, resulting in an intense security competition between its rivals and the ever-looming threat of great power war would be inevitable.20 It is therefore important to put to test whether the rise of China conforms to the assumptions of John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism. The test would therefore be to determine whether China is displaying revisionist tendencies and acts aggressively against its neighbours or is acting like a status quo power.21 Mearsheimer also predicts that the rise of China would be accompanied by hegemonic, aggressive and expansionist behaviour that would ultimately lead to a major conflict between the US and China.22 One of the ways in which China’s strategic behaviour can be assessed is by evaluating its grand strategy and military behaviour.23 China’s strategic behaviour is consistent with the concepts of offensive realism. China’s military spending, grand strategy, and military development appear to support the offensive realism argument. Although its constitution prohibits hegemony, its strategic actions do not necessarily reflect the concepts

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 65

expressed in its laws or expressions. Despite its official statements that it does not want hegemonic status, there are many evidences that point towards that direction. 24 China’s exceptional military investment after the post-Cold War period is credible evidence that it follows an offensive realist grand strategy. Its military expenditure fulfils the criteria that states would not feel secure until they establish regional or global hegemony, and in this regard, China has made every effort to establish its relative power positioning in terms of regional hegemony. In this context, while the liberal argument might suggest that China seeks to have a peaceful environment that would contribute to its economic advancement through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), its military expansion will definitely invite hostile reaction from other great powers. While China claims of desiring a peaceful international environment in terms of its pursuits, it does not hesitate to use force when its interests are at stake25—an argument that this article attempts to demonstrate. While the above-mentioned points clarify to a large extent that the Chinese are not interested in being a status quo power,China’s posture regarding Taiwan also testifies to its revisionist and hegemonic goals in the area and worldwide.26 Although there is much reference given to western perceptions of the China threat there has to be newer assertions that point towards China being an aggressive state in the neighbourhood. Such an evaluation would be important given the fact that China’s ever-increasing deployment of its military along the borders of India, and the increase in terms of its naval presence in the south China sea can all be seen in the context of having the potential for escalation of conflict in the region. China’s constant claims and releasing of maps that show territory as having been historically part of China have often caused tensions between countries in the region. Particularly with India, these claims are present in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh regions where Chinese claims to territory have resulted in one war and frequent stand-offs between the two counties’ armies. Therefore, what is important here is that China poses serious threats to those nations that are in its neighbourhood.

66 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

In context of the recent stand-off between the armies of China and India, which resulted in an armed clash, this article seeks to provide a few observations about what might happen next.

Interpreting the Galwan Conflict

Stand-offs between the Indian and Chinese armies are not rare. The frequency with which these instances happen between the two armies suggests that they do not merit significant consideration. However, the conflict in question between India and China near Pangong-Tso lake that began in May 2020 escalated to an extent where the two armies got involved in a violent clash in the Galwan valley.27 The confrontation in the Pangong Tso lake resulted in full scale mobilization of troops on both sides along the LAC. It was initiated by the Chinese that sought to obstruct the construction of a road at Fingers 3 and 4 and also in view of the construction of the Darbuk-Shyloh and Daulat Beg Oldi Road (DSDBO). The Darbuk-Shylohand Daulat Beg Oldi road comes very close to the LAC and China has been objecting to this road.28 Although there have been border tensions between India and China, but this one has been significant as it raises important questions here in this context. Why did this conflict happen? What are its implications and how would India respond? Would China risk a war with India at this juncture? Is this attempt by China part of the salami slicing or part of its two-step­ forward and one-step-backward policy? What are Chinese motivations for this standoff ? How would this situation affect India’s relations with China? Among the various reason for this standoff, seems to be the DSDBO road that is 255 km and is situated at a height of 13,000 to 16,000 feet, and one that took over two decades to complete by the Border Roads Organization (BRO). Daulat Beg Oldi has the highest air strip in the world and in the year 2013, India landed its newly acquired Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 transport aircraft at the DBO, thus eliminating the need for helicopters to paradrop supplies to army formations that are deployed along the disputed frontier. The DSDBO runs almost parallel to the LAC and gives the Indian military access to the Tibet-Xinjiang highway that passes through the Aksai Chin area, which China occupied in 1950 that led to the war in 1962. It

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 67

has additional strategic reasons where the DBO is in close proximity to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) that has been opposed by India.29 A careful observation or examination of the situation ever since India and China signed agreements to maintain peace and tranquility in the LAC has been broken by the Chinese since 1993. While this is in principle a violation of the Panchsheel Agreement where it was agreed mutually to respect each other’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and mutual non­ aggression,30 but it seems that the Chinese have set aside the agreement on the basis of their territorial claims as belonging to them. The India-China Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) of 1993 is important in this context as both sides agreed to term the disputed border as the LAC. However, after 22 rounds of talks between the two countries, there was no mutual agreement in terms of delineation of the boundary. China’s persistent interference in India’s boundaries has been a source of concern for India, and its intrusions beyond the LAC have produced periodic standoffs and stress in the relationship between the two nations.31 Chinese actions in Galwan and its constant nibbling away of land in the border areas that it shares with India has been a major irritant between the two countries. China has been steadily extending land towards Indian borders until they are pushed back. This it does in the context of reclaiming the Middle Kingdom, and in the 1950s Mao stated that Tibet is the palm and detached from it are five fingers that include Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal which it must reclaim.32 In this context it must be noted that the idea of Chinese nationalism has brought an assumption that there are six wars that the Chinese would wage in the next fifty years. Maria Hsia Chang and Amy Joseph’s33 ‘Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism’, discusses the defeat of imperial China by the British Opium war, which resulted in the loss of provinces between 1840 and 1842. Consequently, from a Chinese perspective, China is not yet a unified great power, and China must fight the following six wars of unification. The six wars of unification would seek to unite (i) Taiwan 2020-2025, (ii) Spratly Islands 2025-2030, (iii) Southern Tibet or Arunachal Pradesh 2035-2040, (iv) Senkaku and Ryukyu Islands 2040-2045, (v) Outer Mongolia 2045-2050, (vi) lands lost

68 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

to Russia 2055-2060.34 While these claims may be plausible for the Chinese it seems to be an over ambitious assertion to the world. What is important in this context is to note that China wants to settle all of these disputes on its terms and has been engaged in gradually expanding its efforts in this regard. In the Himalayas and in Ladakh the latest incursions are not similar to those that have occurred in the past. Ashley J. Tellis argues that this time there has been a premeditated approval to the military for its actions from the top. These incursions have been additionally coupled with a massive buildup of military infrastructure and building of modern military equipment in the side that is controlled by the Chinese. It is once again interesting to note what China’s intentions are at this time to initiate a conflict in the Ladakh region, which escalated to the point that was not seen for over 45 years. Is China attempting to divert global attention away from its mishandling and the widespread international dissatisfaction with its role in the spread of the Coronavirus?35 It is in this context that the chapter poses the question ‘What Now?’ It will be interesting to determine what we may infer through this particular incident. Will China risk a war with India? In response to the question will China risk a war with India, we can at least assume that it will not for the time being. Some of the reasons for this could be that China is beset with too many problems on too many fronts beginning from the slowing down of its economy following the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic. Additionally, recurring waves of the Coronavirus outbreak have come to Beijing. This would surely shift China’s focus to its own issues for the time being. In addition, the international community holds China accountable for the global pandemic, which has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, due to the anger and dissatisfaction with China’s management of the sharing of knowledge about the virus. In an interview, Gordon Chang remarked that the Coronavirus effect has forced China to experience deep constriction, which it is unable to accept, and that China’s confrontational behaviour has caused other nations to react unfavourably towards China. He also suggested that China’s aggressive moves indicate possible weakness. As a result of the implementation of the new security law in Hong Kong, countries including the United Kingdom and the United States have

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 69

raised concerns. China’s dealings in the Xinjiang region and the crisis in the South China Sea demonstrate China’s current constraints. The addition of Australia to the US has seems to have compounded its problems in the region. Due to the Coronavirus pandemic and countries’ displeasure with China’s handling of the problem, many countries are beginning to withdraw their companies from China and are engaged in talks with possible venues for investments in other countries. This would result in some economic regression for China. While these events are occurring, the Galwan incident has triggered an anti-China sentiment in India prompting some of the trade unions in India to encourage the ‘Boycott China’ movement in the country. On the military front China although boasts of one of the most advanced militaries in the world, a recent Harvard University report 36 suggests that China would not be able to win a war with battle hardened Indian army and would be a difficult one, as India has key under appreciated conventional advantages that reduce its vulnerability to the Chinese threats and attacks that are not properly recognised. India has rich experience in war beginning from the Sino-Indian war in 1962, the Kargil war in 1999 and the two wars with Pakistan. Additionally, India has been dealing with insurgent movements in its country and has been successful in managing these conflicts. However, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 left the Chinese with a bloodied nose and the Vietnam war in 1979 has been its last such engagement. This puts it in a disadvantaged position in terms of its battle preparedness.37 On the other hand, the visit of Rajnath Singh, Defence Minister of India, to Moscow on June 22, 2020, in the eye of the storm raises eyebrows on what India might be calculating at this time to counter the Chinese offensive against India. The Defence Minister was expected to be meeting the top brass of the military of Russia to discuss expanding military cooperation between both the countries. As events continued to unfold in the region with massive military buildup by the Chinese in the Pangong Tso area and tensions continued to escalate, following the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Moscow, the meeting between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and China Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on September 10, 2020 seemed to be bringing

70 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

about some agreement between the Chinese and Indian sides. The meeting resulted with the release of a joint statement by both the Foreign Ministers that included the following points: • The two Ministers agreed that both sides should take guidance from the series of consensus of the leaders on developing India-China relations, including preventing differences from becoming disputes. • The two Foreign Ministers agreed that the current situation in the border areas is not in the interest of either side. They agreed therefore, that the border troops of both sides should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions. • The two Ministers agreed that both sides must adhere to all existing agreements and protocols on China-India boundary concerns, maintain peace and calm in the border regions, and refrain from actions that could worsen the situation. • Regarding the India-China boundary issue, the two parties agreed to maintain dialogue and communication through the Special Representative system. They also agreed in this context that the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China border affairs (WMCC), should also continue its meetings. • The Ministers agreed that as the situation eases, the two sides should expedite work to conclude new Confidence Building Measures to maintain and enhance peace and tranquility in the border areas (Ministry of External Affairs 2020).38 At this juncture it would be interesting to examine what the Chinese narrative is with regard to these developments. Prior to the Foreign Ministers’ meeting that was arranged following the SCO summit, the Global Times published an article in which it was reported that India has placed a great deal of hope in the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers to solve the problem before winter sets in. It also stated that both sides would like to avoid conflict and settling the matter on diplomatic terms seems to be the best option. However, it also noted that neither country is likely to make any concessions and that India’s nationalism will prevent the situation from being resolved without specific concessions, while China’s sovereignty will not be

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 71

compromised.39 It further said that the onus lies on India as it had made provocative moves in the Line of Actual Control (LAC) against which the Chinese had shown great restraint, which helped in preventing the situation from escalating, while adding that India would have to face the consequences if China were to undertake strong counter measures (Hui 2020).40

Conclusion

When it comes to territorial disputes, it seems to be a habitual behaviour of the Chinese to make claims over territory with countries it shares its borders with where there is availability of natural resources that would contribute to its ambitions of achieving hegemony, and with those countries where such resources are available, it makes investments to an extent that those countries are caught in a debt trap, which subsequently makes these countries either to concede to Chinese demands or give away territory for lease as it happened in the case of Sri Lanka (Hambantota). Such leasing of ports would without a doubt contribute to China’s strategic interests. However, with the rise of negative reactions from many countries that are poised to take on China in terms of the global pandemic it would be too early or a miscalculation on the part of China to engage in a military offensive with India or with any other areas that it is making its claims. While neither India nor China would like to engage in war, the Galwan incident has resulted in a number of deaths not witnessed in over 45 years, and has brought with it a deterioration of the relationship between India and China. While Chinese officials both in India and China continue to assert that the onus is on India, the challenge has arrived and it is best to stand up against it; if India cannot stand up now, it never will be able to so in the future. Thus, India needs to be prepared for at least a limited war in the future, and a failure to do so would have significant consequences in terms of its influence in the region. On the other hand, a former Chinese Diplomat Yuan Nansheng stated that it would be a diplomatic disaster to confront multiple countriesen  même  temps and it is against the basic rule of Chinese diplomacy. He touched upon history to emphasize that overestimating one’s capabilities would have devastating consequences.41

72 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

What is more significant is that the Galwan conflict between India and China seems to be one that is indicative of an emerging trend of rivalry between great powers and emerging powers. Realists and more frequently offensive realists have concentrated on explaining great power competition and rivalry. However, these recent conflicts between great powers and emerging powers seem to be frequent and ever increasing. This may also be a problem that comes with the problem of accommodating rising powers that T.V. Paul speaks about. Paul asserts that in international relations accommodation involves a complex process where status adjustment, sharing of leadership roles that come with institutional membership and privileges and the acceptance of spheres of influence, are received by a rising state. This kind of acceptance is rarely seen with established powers42 and, in particular, China, which sees India as a peer competitor in the South Asian region, is seemingly taking every action towards preventing India from being an important player that will have the capacity to influence in the politics of South Asia. What follows is that there is the emergence of this great power-emerging power or rising power conflicts. These types of conflicts have the potential to build strategic alliances between one emerging power and another greater power whose relationship with the greater power is marked by great power rivalry. This may be done in order to preserve its security from any form of great power aggression. Such a scenario among states may bring great powers once again to engage in rivalry with the intent of securing their hegemonic status by supporting emerging powers. As great power rivalry between the US and China has been growing, the likelihood of conflicts between a great power and an emerging power or smaller power has increased. These situations may also result in the creation of alliances between two great powers to counter another great power in the world. This is evident through the Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation that has developed into a de facto alliance. Thus, in conclusion it seems that the Galwan conflict fulfils the tenets of offensive realism and is also indicative of the fact that there may be a growing conflagration between democratic states and authoritarian states in the coming years.

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 73

Notes 1.

2.

Xiaoting Li, “Applying Offensive Realism to the Rise of China: Structural Incentives and Chinese Diplomacy Towards Neighboring States,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 16(2), 2015, pp. 241-271.

Ashok Pathak, ‘Nathu La September 1967and Galwan Valley June 2020: Lessons and Future Strategies for India,’ 2020, p. 4, at IB-252_Nathu-La-September­

1967-and-Galwan-Valley-June-2020-Lessons-and-Future-Strategies-for-India.pdf 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

(claws.in), accessed on December 4, 2020.

Brandon Valeriano, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Testing Aggressive Power Politics Models,” International Interactions, 35(2), 2009, pp. 179-206.

John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company., 2001), p. 1.

Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest, 16 (Summer

1989): 3-18.

Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” Security Studies, 5(3), 1996, pp. 122-163. Mearsheimer, n. 4. Ibid.

Ibid., p. 2.

10. John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Smith

Steve (eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 78-79.

11. Ibid., p. 79

12. Glen H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay,” International Security, 29(1), 2002, pp. 149-173.

13. Dominic D.P. Johnson and Bradley A. Thayer, “The Evolution of Offensive Realism: Survival Under Anarchy from the Pleistocene to the Present,” Politics and Life Sciences, 35(1), 2016, pp 1-26.

14. Arash Heydarin Pashakanlou, “Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism,” International Relations, 27(2), 2013, pp. 202-225.

15. Douglas Lemke, (2004) “Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power

Transition Perspective,” in T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortman, (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 2004), pp. 52-75.

74 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

16. Snyder, n. 12.

17. Brian C. Schmidt, “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, 33(3), 2005, pp. 523-549.

18. Christopher Layne, “The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global

Hegemon,” in Colin Elman and Michel A. Jason, (eds.), The Realism Reader (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 197-204.

19. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 4.

20. Ibid., p. 4.

21. Ibid., p. 42.

22. John Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105(690), 2006, pp. 160-162.

23. Kuzuhiko Noguchi, “Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China’s Strategic Behaviour in the Asia-Pacific,” Asia Pacific Review 18(2), 2011, pp. 60-85.

24. Ibid., p. 63.

25. Ibid., pp. 65-70. 26. Ibid., p. 75.

27. Anashwara Ashok, “Galwan Valley Flashpoint: A New Low in India-China Relations.”, CLAWS, 2020, at https://www.claws.in/galwan-valley-flashpoint-a­

28.

new-low-in-india-china-relations/ accessed on December 26, 2020.

Zainab Akhter, “Understanding the India-China Standoff in Ladakh”, Stawa,

2020,

at

https://stawa.org/understanding-the-india-china-standoff-in-ladakh/,

accessed on June 26, 2020.

29. Nirupama Subbramanian,“Explained:The Strategic Road to DBO”,The Indian Express, 2020, at https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/lac-stand-off-india-china­

darbuk-shyok-daulat-beg-oldie-dsdbo-road-6452997/, accessed on December 23, 2020.

30. C. Arpi, “India, Tibet, Xinjiang: Tales of China’s Broken Promises”, Indian Defence Review, 2020, at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/india-tibet-xinjiang-tales­ of-chinas-broken-promises/, accessed on June 29, 2020.

31. N.S. Brar, “Frontiers and Borders: Breaking the Logjam on the Northern Border”, Indian Defence Review, 2020, at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/frontiers­

and-borders-breaking-the-logjam-on-the-northern-border/, accessed on December 23, 2020.

Understanding the Galwan Conflict Through the Lens of Offensive Realism | 75

32. Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury, “Chinese Intrusion in Ladakh has Created a Challenge

that must be Met”, The Indian Express, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/ columns/resolve-and-prudence-india-china-border-dispute-galwan-valley­ ladakh-6462309/, accessed on June 29, 2020.

33. Maria Hsia Chang and Amy Joseph, Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism’(London: Routledge, 2001).

34. Geoff Wade, “China’s Six Wars in the Next 50 Years”, The Strategist, 2013, at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-six-wars-in-the-next-50-years/,

on June 29, 2020.

accessed

35. Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2020, at https://

carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Himalayan_Border_Standoffs1.pdf, accessed on June 29, 2020.

36. Frank O’Donnell and Alex Bollfrass, “The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, 2020, at https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/

files/2020-03/india-china-postures/China%20India%20Postures.pdf, accessed on

November 10, 2022.

37. Ibid.

38. Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Press Statement—Meeting of External

Affairs Minister and the Foreign Minister of China”, 10 September 2020 at

https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32962/Joint_Press_Statement__ Meeting_of_External_Affairs_Minister_and_the_Foreign_Minister_of_China_ September_10_2020, accessed on September 28, 2020.

39. Yang Sheng, “China-India FM Meeting: Last Chance for Peaceful Solution”, Global Times, September 10, 2020, at https://globaltimes.cn/content.1200556.shtml,

accessed on September 28, 2020.

40. Zhang Hui, “Indian Troops First to Cross LAC: Blame for Border Issues Lies with New Delhi”, Global Times, September 2, 2020, at https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202009/1199709.shtml, accessed on September 28, 2020.

41. Katsuji Nakazawa, “China’s World: Warrior Overreach Draws Comparison to Imperial Japan”, Nikkei Asian Review, 2020, at https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor­ s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-China-s-wolf-warrior-overreach-draws­ comparison-to-Imperial-Japan, accessed on September 28, 2020.

76 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

42. Thazha Varkey Paul, “The Accommodation of Rising Powers in World Politics”, in Thazha Varkey Paul, (ed.), Accommodating Great Powers: Past, Present and Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 3-32.

4

China’s Strategy in the

Northeast India

P.R. Shankar

Northeast India comprised seven sisters namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. Later, Sikkim and North Bengal were co-opted as part of Northeast India. This area is strategically located since it shares international borders with Tibet, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal. It comprises a majority of India’s international boundaries as can be seen in the Map 4.1.1 This region is connected with the rest of India only through a narrow 22-kilometre-long corridor in North Bengal, popularly known as the “Siliguri corridor” or the “Chicken’s neck”. The region accounts for 7.9 per cent of the total land of the country.2 China evinces great interest in the region. This is borne by the fact that the area has witnessed many SinoIndian military clashes—the 1962 war, 1967 clash at Nathu La, 1975 incident at Tulung La and the 2017 attempted encroachment at Doklam. Chinese interest in the Bay of Bengal has increased off late in order to offset its Malacca Dilemma.

International Boundaries and Borders

The borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal are delineated and largely settled. The Tibetan border with China is yet to be settled. The Sino-Indian boundary generally follows the Himalayan crest line

78 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

or the watershed principle. The 220 km Sino-Indian Border in Sikkim is based on the 2003 “Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Expanding Border Trade”3 and “the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, in which the Sikkim-Tibet border was agreed upon and later jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.4 The Sino-Indian Border in Arunachal Pradesh is based on the McMahon Line.5 The overall border agreement and management is based on the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question” of 2005.6 The recent face-offs in Eastern Ladakh and Sikkim and China’s attempt to alter the status quo and LAC unilaterally is in complete violation of all agreements and leaves the boundary nebulous. Map 4.1: International Land Border

China’s Strategy in the Northeast India | 79

Geography

Geographically, Northeast India is crowned by the Himalayan range and its dominating peaks like Everest, Kanchenjunga, Chomolari and Namcha Barwa to name a few (see Map 4.2 below). About 70 per cent of the region is hilly. The topography of the Eastern Himalayas is generally rugged and vast areas remain inaccessible. The Eastern Himalayas are steep and gain height rapidly from the Bay of Bengal. In about 200 km the Eastern Himalayas rise to about 18,000 feet from the foothills, which are at mean sea level (see Figure 4.1). They have poor soil stability making it difficult to traverse and build roads. The Himalayan crest line is largely in High Altitude areas. After Namcha Barwa the Himalayas start losing height and turn southward at the north eastern most corner of Arunachal Pradesh. They extend towards the southernmost tip of Mizoram where they are known as the Patkai-Naga Hills and Lushai Hills. The mighty Brahmaputra and its tributaries flowing down from the Himalayas dominates the Assam plains. There are four plains in the Northeast— the plains of Brahmaputra and the Barak Valleys in Assam, the Tripura plains and the plains of the Imphal Valley in Manipur. The southern part Map 4.2: Northeast States and Neighbouring Countries

80 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

of Northeast comprises low hills and malarial jungles encompassing the states of Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and areas of South Assam and Eastern Arunachal Pradesh. The Brahmaputra and Barak Valleys are separated by the Meghalaya Plateau and Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao (erstwhile Mikir and North Cachar Hills).7 The region receives sufficient rainfall from the South West Monsoon. Figure 4.1

Demography

According to the 2011 census, Northeast India has a population of approximately 45 million, which is 3.1 per cent of the country’s total population.8 The major religions are Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and Buddhism. Buddhism is predominant in Sikkim and Tawang tract of Arunachal Pradesh. Tribals constitute 27 per cent of the population of the Northeast (less Assam). The states other than Assam and Sikkim are largely tribal. The tribal population of the region has more than 125 distinct tribal groups.9 The tribes have major ethnic issues of identity and ideology, which have spawned numerous insurgencies, with demands ranging from absolute sovereignty to greater political autonomy. The

China’s Strategy in the Northeast India | 81

Naga insurgency is the oldest one with links that can repeatedly be traced to China.10 The other insurgency with links to China is the ULFA.11 The issue of significance is that the tribes of the Northeast share close historic, cultural and ethnic ties with tribes in China. Most of the tribes have Tibet- China Burmese ancestry.12

Military Geography

The military geography of Northeast India is dominated by the Himalayan crestline. The crest line largely defines the LAC between India and Tibet. It has a number of peaks above 20,000 feet in height. The major peaks can be seen in the Map 4.3. To the north of the crest line is the Tibetan Plateau and to the south lie the plains of Assam and North Bengal. In all eventualities, China has to traverse the open Tibetan Plateau to reach its objectives which mainly lie in the plains’ areas. Hence, understanding the terrain is important. For better understanding, the area can be studied in its parts which are Tibet, The Line of Actual Control (LAC), The IndoMyanmar Area and Bay of Bengal. These are described in succeeding paragraphs. Map 4.3 : Northeast India, Military Geographical Features

82 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Tibet

Tibet is a vast windswept tableland at an average height of around 14,800 feet. It is the highest plateau on earth and is referred to as ‘Roof of the World’. Its snow-capped peaks and glaciated regions contain the largest volume of ice outside the Polar Regions. Its melting snows sustain major river systems flowing into India and neighbouring countries.Indus,Ganges, Sutlej and Brahmaputra flow into India. The Salween and Irrawaddy flow into neighbouring Myanmar. Tibet is also known as the ‘Water Tower of the World’. Tibet is served by three major highways—Western Highway cutting across Aksai Chin, Central Highway coming down from Gormo and the Eastern Highway from Chengdu—all converging on Lhasa. Of these, the Central Highway is the lifeline of Tibet sustaining close to 80 per cent of the traffic from mainland China. The capacities of these highways are augmented by subsidiary axes besides laterals and link roads. The Qamdo-Bangda-Nagqu provides a good link between the Eastern and the Central highways. The Rail link to Lhasa was laid over permafrost and commissioned a decade ago. It is already operational beyond Lhasa up to Shigatse. In future there are plans to extend it to Kathmandu in Nepal. Two other rail projects are also in the pipeline to Yatung in Chumbi Valley, and to Nyingchi in the East. Over the years, a number of large capacity airports have either come up, or have been upgraded in Tibet. More airports of differing specifications and capacities are under varying stages of construction. Some of these airports in inhabited areas of Tibet may have civilian usages. Those closer to the border and in uninhabited areas, are meant for military purposes. An oil pipeline from Gormo to Lhasa has been functional since 1977. Latest reports indicate that its up-gradation and further extension is in the offing. A web of communication networks, with their hub based in and around Lhasa–Nagqu, spread westward to Ngari and to Nyingchi in the east. Satellite stations, optical fibre highways and Geo-spatial Information System (GIS) are either already in place or are in advanced stages of completion. All these are essential for the Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to wage a modern war. Thus, the matrix to sustain PLA’s stated

China’s Strategy in the Northeast India | 83

concept of prosecuting ‘Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions’, is in place.

Line of Actual Control (LAC)

The Sino-Indian LAC in the Northeast consists of two distinct segments separated by Bhutan in between. The Sikkim-Tibet border lies to the west and the Arunachal Pradesh-Tibet border along the disputed McMahon Line to the east. The Sikkim-Tibet Border. It is a stretch of 220 km (Map 4.4). Starting from Nepal it first runs eastwards before turning south along the crest line to terminate at the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction. Thereafter, the crest line swings upwards to form the Chumbi Valley. In the North, the Tibet Plateau extends into India in the Giagong area north of Lachen ridgeline and provides a very good approach as it flows down along the Teesta River. China has good road links up to the border town of Yatung in the Chumbi Valley also. There are roads leading up to Nathu La and Jelep La, the two traditional passes in this area which have an elevation of over 14,000 feet. Both passes offer very good approaches towards Gangtok. The narrow Chumbi Valley, between the Indian and Bhutan borders, is a strategic Chinese salient because it overlooks and is proximate to the ‘Siliguri Corridor,’ which connects North Eastern states to the rest of India. China has multiple approaches to the Siliguri corridor through the road network in Sikkim. Map 4.4: Sikkim Tibet Border

84 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Arunachal-Tibet Border. The second and the larger segment of the Eastern Sector lies entirely in Arunachal Pradesh (Map 4.5). It starts from the Bhutan border in the West, runs east along the McMahon Line, which is based on the watershed principle. At the end it turns southwards to terminate at the tri-junction of India-Myanmar-China borders. There are a number of passes on the watershed. Many of these passes, at altitudes ranging from 13,000 to 16,500 feet, have military significance. Each of the important passes is either connected by a link road from the Eastern Highway or a road head close by. The network of the roads closer to the LAC is comparatively better developed opposite the Kameng Sector/Tawang Tract at the western end. The road network is also well developed opposite Kibithu. The areas in between are less developed. On the Indian side the state of Arunachal Pradesh is a broad belt of some 350 km, from the foothills of Assam to the snow-capped McMahon Line. The strategic Kameng Sector lies in the western extremity of the state. The important passes in the Kameng Sector are Khenzemane, Bum La and Tulung La. There are other minor passes that can be used in conjunction with these. These passes were extensively used by the Chinese in 1962 and form the main approaches into India in the Kameng Sector. The approaches lead to the town of Bomdila through the Sela massif at 14,000 feet and then to the lower foothills of Assam. In the Map 4.5: Arunachal-Tibet Border

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rest of Arunachal Pradesh (also known as RALP in military parlance) there are a number of passes. The approach to these passes from the Chinese side is better. On their own side, these passes descend into the various valleys (often very narrow) that comprise RALP. These valleys are based on the tributaries of Brahmaputra namely Subansiri, Siom, Siang, Dibang, Dau, Delai and Lohit. The most important route is the one along the Lohit River. Cross movement between these valleys is severely restricted by the high intervening ridges. The area has loose subsoil conditions, and hence road building and movement along many of these valleys is difficult. The Brahmaputra River originates in the Mansarovar area of Tibet and is called Tsangpo Yarlung there (Map 4.6).13 It flows Eastwards till the Namcha Barwa Peak and swings south in a loop around it known as the great bend. It enters India through Kepang La near Tuting. It    is known as the Siang / Dihang till it hits the plains. South of Pasighat it is known as the Map 4.6: Brahmaputra River Course

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Brahmaputra. The map below shows the drainage of the Brahmaputra basin. The river gathers most of its water from tributaries South of the Himalayan crest line. The main tributaries, are the three Ss (Siom, Subansri and Siang), three Ds (Dibang, Dau and Delai), Lohit, and Teesta. The River is a great obstacle for military operations in Tibet as well as on the Indian side. It is also a source of future friction in Sino-Indian ‘Water Wars’ as part of the ecological warfare strategy China employs against India.

Indo–Myanmar Area

The Lushai-Patkai hills straddle the Indo-Myanmar border between the Brahmaputra and Chindwin Valleys (Map 4.7). They descend into the Arakan-Yoma range in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. These are a series of parallel ranges with valleys almost at sea level and heights up to 1,000 m. This area is densely wooded and malarial in nature. Movement is best through valleys. Climate is hot and humid with heavy rainfall in monsoons. It is very difficult to conduct military operations. Movement from India to Myanmar is across the grain of the ground and can be undertaken only through specified openings and existing roads and tracks. Map 4.7: Indo-Myanmar Area

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Bay of Bengal

The  Bay of Bengal  as it affects the Northeast encompasses Bengal, Bangladesh and the long coastline of Myanmar (Map 4.8). The North Andaman Islands are prominent in this part of Bay of Bengal. The important ports are Kolkota, Chittagong and Sittwe. Deep water ports can be developed at Sonadia and Matarbari in Bangladesh and at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar.   This part of the Bay of Bengal influences the landlocked part of the North East, Indo-Myanmar area and the Yunan Province of China. Map 4.8: Bay of Bengal Area

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Chinese Political Aims And Strategy Overview

It is well established that China’s overall aim is to become a superpower.This is often expressed as ‘Rejuvenation of the Chinese Dream’. To achieve this, China has embarked on a methodical and well laid out plan to strengthen its “comprehensive national power”14 in all dimensions—economic, military, technological and diplomatic. Its Grand Strategy  is to replace the United States’ as the prime global power.15 It has embarked on realisation of this ambition in multiple ways. In this context, China sees India as a major competitor and will do everything to put it down or exploit its fault lines to achieve its regional and global ambitions. Putting India down helps it achieve global domination. The Chinese political aims and strategy as applicable to the Northeast is a subset of its global and regional strategy as it applies to India. Conversely, Northeast India offers many opportunities to achieve its global and regional ambitions. These need to be understood in its constituent parts.

Outline of Chinese Strategy Specific to Northeast India

At the outset, it must be understood that China will adopt a combination of hard and soft approaches to tackle India. Two major aspects of achieving its ambition of becoming a superpower concern India. First, China will do its utmost to keep India down while embarking on its hegemonistic territorial expansion. Keeping India down is an important part of China’s strategy. In the long run, China will attempt to ensure that India does not become an unsurmountable competitor. It also establishes China’s regional supremacy, which is a precursor to it achieving global supremacy. Second, China can become a superpower only if it can control the seas. Hence it will endeavour to get an entry into the Indian Ocean to control it. These two aspects of dealing with India have a significant bearing on the strategy which China adopts in the Northeast India. Consequently, China’s strategy in the Northeast India has five components. First, it will continuously attempt to approach India overland through Tibet to advance

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its claims. It will also use the land border to keep India off balance. There are plenty of approaches in the North East India from where it can do so. It can do this directly or indirectly through a third country to further its political and strategic aims. Second, it will endeavour to get an access to North Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh and Myanmar as part of its two ocean strategy. Third, it will endeavour to destabilise India by supporting insurgencies in the North East. Fourth, China will weaponise waters of the Brahmaputra. Lastly, China will employ its well established salamislicing tactics to achieve its objectives. These will be discussed in detail in succeeding paragraphs.

The Overland Strategy

It is now emerging that Mao considered Tibet to be China’s right-hand palm, with five fingers—Nepal, Bhutan and the three Indian territories of Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh (Map 4.9).16 The Chinese statements superficially indicate that these areas are to be liberated. The underlying intent is to usurp them. It is significant to note that that out of these five fingers, two are sovereign nations bordering India. The other three are an integral part of India. Most importantly, barring Ladakh all these areas are part of Northeast India. Further, Chinese intent has been amply demonstrated in these areas at various points of time. The 1962 Sino-India War was fought in the Tawang Tract and in the Lohit Valley. The 1967 incident at Nathu La was along the Sino-Indian Border in Sikkim. Despite the 2003 MoU between India and China, which recognises Sikkim as part of India, it has repeatedly tried to nibble areas along the border. Further after the 2003 MoU, China has started claiming the entire Arunachal Pradesh as part of South Tibet. The 2017 Doklam incident involved China, India and Bhutan. Even in the 2020 face off in Eastern Ladakh, repeated efforts were made to intrude in North Sikkim at Naku La. China has also laid claims and occupied parts of Nepal and Bhutan illegally. Overall, China has an aggressive posture in the Northeast and adopts a proactive military and political strategy to achieve its aims.

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Map 4.9: The Five Fingers

Two-Ocean Strategy

In order to be a global power, China must be a two-ocean power spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans overcoming the Malacca Dilemma. While it is in the process of consolidating its hold in the South China Sea and making forays in other parts of the Western Pacific, China’s entry and foothold in the Bay of Bengal and the larger Indian Ocean is still nebulous. Chinese designs to have unhindered access and connectivity between the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans have been put into action. Accordingly, China is in the midst of a massive shipbuilding programme.17 The People’s Liberation Army Navy will shortly expand to have more ships than the US Navy. China’s long-term aim in the Indian Ocean is to project power as also to protect its merchant and energy fleets operating in its SLOCs. In order to project power, as per its two ocean strategy, it should also have alternate routes accessing Indian Ocean, either side of India. China must also have extensive port and base facilities in the Indian Ocean. Gwadar is being developed in the Arabian Sea to India’s west. Chittagong and Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal are on the Chinese radar. The Chinese are building a container port facility and seeking extensive naval and commercial access in Chittagong. In Myanmar, the port of Kyaukpyu is being upgraded to a deep sea commercial and naval base. The

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Kyaukpyu port is part of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, which will link the port with Yunnan Province of China with road, waterway, and pipeline links from the Bay of Bengal. These developments will have a significant strategic impact on the Northeast. The Two-Ocean Strategy, if successful as per designs will turn India’s strategic flanks and bring China to its doorstep. It has great ramifications.

Destabilising North East

Northeast India has suffered insurgency since the 1950s. Insurgencies have affected almost all states in the region. The Chinese history of supporting the insurgencies—Naga, Mizo and Manipuri by training and arming them is well documented. China started supporting Naga rebels (NSCN) immediately after 1962 war, till as late as 1976. It has also supported the Mizo National Front and the Manipuri PLA.18 The support has been due to ideological motives (communist), ethnic similarity and physical proximity between the Northeast and China. These facts have not changed but been dormant. The support to insurgents waned after the 2003 agreement with China. However, in the past decade it has resurfaced.19 There have been reports lately that China not only provides arms, support and refuge to older Northeast groups like ULFA, but has also threatened India with a rise in insurgency there.20, 21 In the current context, China knows that the Northeast is not only crucial to India’s Look East—Act East policy, but fully securing the region is an incomplete and challenging task. In addition, apart from old instabilities and insurgencies, the cauldron of tribes and ethnicities and their issues are such that it takes very little imagination and some funding to stoke a social issue into an instability in a democracy like India. Further, all neighbouring countries also suffer from the same kind of instabilities with spill overs in India and vice versa. Keeping the Northeast in a state of constant instability is not a difficult proposition for China. This will also enhance China’s prospects and further its larger strategies. It will aid China in expanding/attaining its overland claims along Tibet and also progress its Two Ocean strategy. Significantly, it will shackle India in the Northeast and slow its development in an effort to keep it down, if not out of the region.

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Water Weaponisation

China is constructing or has constructed     fourteen dams on the Brahmaputra. There are more to be built elsewhere on the Tibetan plateau. Their locations can be seen in Map 4.10. China has recently announced that it will construct another mega dam in Tibet during the 14th five-year plan.22 The new dam in Medog County is to be very near the LAC (as close as 30 km across) in the ‘great bend’. In the future, China might announce some more out of the blue. As lower riparian states, India and Bangladesh have reason to worry. Chinese dam construction across Brahmaputra, will have an adverse effect on ecology, seismic activity, water flow in India and Bangladesh. China is deliberately weaponising water. The volume of water flowing in the Brahmaputra valley might not reduce and there might not be any major effect on its non-availability. However the flow in the Siang/ Dihang Valley  between Tuting and Pasighat will be reduced/affected  due to any Chinese dam in the immediate upstream area in Tibet. This can be offset by a dam in the upper reaches of the river in India to ensure that there is adequate and regulated water flow in Siang. This will also    ensure that the ecology is not adversely affected due to undue water variability.23  In

Map 4.10: Dams on Brahmaputra in Tibet

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peninsular India, the most significant implications include the danger of severe earthquakes due to induced seismic activity, local temperature changes and subsequent mud/earth slides, and a shift in monsoon activity. China can and will exploit these big ecological repercussions in concert with other military choices. Similar to how China attempted to alter the status quo of the LAC in Eastern Ladakh when India was severely impacted by the coronavirus, it can utilise an ecological calamity to launch a military operation to achieve its broader goals.

Chinese ‘Salami-Slicing’ Tactics

In any strategy adopted by the Chinese, they will employ their now famous and well established ‘Salami Slicing’ tactics.24 China’s ‘Salami Slicing’ has three stages. First, create  a dispute on an agreement/status or stake claim. Second, violate the status, either physically or legally or by disagreement. Third, physically alter or create a law to alter the status legally or by force in favour of the Chinese. That is deemed as the permanent or desired end state at that stage. This pattern is evident in the way the Chinese have asserted sovereignty in the South China Sea. Here they disputed that the South China Sea is not part of the global commons and staked claim on it through the nine dash line. Thereafter, they built artificial islands around the Paracel Islands by disregarding international law. Lastly they enacted and proclaimed laws in the form of Air Defence Identification Zones, which convey sovereignty to China and have finally claimed an EEZ around the Islands. It has permanently altered the status of the Sea as being sovereign to China. Similar tactics have been used to alter status quo in its favour along the LAC. All Chinese claims along the LAC or in pursuit of Mao’s Five Finger Plan is at some stage of ‘Salami Slicing’.

Chinese Military Objectives and Implications

In the long term, China will try to usurp Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh as also Bhutan and Nepal as per Mao’s Five Finger Plan. However, Chinese military objectives in the North East will be an extension of its overall global Sino-Indian strategy to eventually coincide with the longterm plan. Each likely objective has different implications and outcomes

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depending upon the option exercised by China. Further, each objective could be approached in isolation or in combination with others. Some of these approaches and objectives will posit an implied threat rather than an applied threat. The manifestation of Chinese military moves will span a spectrum commencing from ‘salami slicing’ nibbling actions to outright war. The outcomes sought from each objective will depend upon the overall Sino-Indian strategic situation and the Chinese aim specific to the option it exercises. All direct objectives in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh will impinge upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. These objectives are historical in nature and largely stand identified based on past Chinese actions or claims and the prevalent terrain conditions. The indirect approaches through Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar are insidious in nature and continually pose a destabilising threat to the North East. More often than not, these objectives will be approached in conjunction with one of the direct threats or work to achieve a direct effect. The indirect threats through neighbouring countries have the danger of landing on India’s doorstep without any effort. This has to be recognised and understood.

The Direct Approaches

Sikkim. Despite the fact that Sikkim is one of Mao’s five fingers that China wants to usurp, it is not the terminal objective. The major and terminal objective in any military move in Sikkim is to severe the Northeast from the rest of the country by reaching the plains of North Bengal. If China can achieve this it will be the ultimate geostrategic victory. Every other action and objective in Sikkim has to contribute to this larger objective. To this end, China has multiple approaches into Sikkim. The base for any approach into Sikkim is Shigatse,which is approximately 125-150 km from the Giagong Plateau (see Map 4.11). The traditional avenue of approach into Sikkim emanates from Shigatse into the Chumbi Valley and thence through the Nathu La and Jelep La towards Gangtok and beyond into the hinterland. With development of communications in North Sikkim, the PLA can also approach the hinterland in Sikkim through Naku La and Giagong Plateau to follow the course of River Teesta from

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Map 4.11: Approaches to Sikkim

its head. All these four approaches ultimately lead to a confluence around Gangtok and continue to follow the course of River Teesta, southwards into the plains with the terminal objective being the Siliguri Corridor. The alternate approach is through the Chumbi Valley and Doklam to reach the North Bengal Plains to achieve the same objective of severing the Northeast. This is a shorter and more dangerous approach mostly in lower altitudes. This approach can and will be used in conjunction with encroaching into Bhutan as was evidenced in the Doklam Standoff in 2017. The greatest advantage the Chinese have in Sikkim is that once they have a foothold on the watershed, all further operations are downhill and can be carried out with reasonable ease. In addition, there is congruence between actions that begin at various positions on the watershed but converge at the aim. However, China’s primary challenge is that the Chumbi Valley has limited deployment space and hence cannot be utilised to its maximum capability against the Indian Armed Forces. Arunachal Pradesh. The military aim of China in Arunachal Pradesh is based on its version of history and the claims thereof. As per the China25 “in 1681, the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso ordered the

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construction of Tawang Monastery and since then, Tawang had been a political, religious, economic and cultural center of the Menyu area where the Tawang district is located and which was effectively administrated by the local Tibetan governments.The 6th Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso was born in Tawang and thereafter, the region has been considered as a sacred place by Tibetans.” As an extension the Tawang Tract is considered apliyal to be part of Tibet. Since Tawang is also a part of Arunachal Pradesh, the entire state is now claimed as ‘South Tibet’. Map 4.12: Approaches to Arunachal Pradesh

China has multiple military objectives in Arunachal Pradesh depending upon their immediate aim. They can approach along any disputed area as given in Map 4.13. However, in almost all cases, their first and most important objective will be to capture Tawang along the Bum La approach in conjunction with Khenzemane. The Lhasa-Shanan region, around 125-150 km away as the crow flies, serves as the starting point for such an approach. A successful offensive to conquer Tawang will allow China to unite all regions with direct ties to Tibetan Buddhism and solidify its grip on Tibet. If they are successful in seizing Tawang, they will also have taught India a valuable lesson. However, taking Tawang is a significant military endeavour fraught with danger, as the entire operation must be fought at high altitudes. Its chances of success are poor unless combined with other actions. The other

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actions could be to progress their military offensive as per the 1962 plan. At that time, they progressed operations astride the Lohit River through Kibithu to Walong and onwards into depth areas and plains of Assam. This is an option which is devoid of high altitudes and has many advantages. However, it entails overcoming successive ridgelines that can be well defended. Further, both these major options can be combined with minor offensives in other disputed areas in which they have shown interest26, 27 like Asaphila, Doka La, Chantze, Fishtail Area which lie in the Subansiri, Siang and Dibang Valleys. Map 4.13: Disputed Areas in Arunachal Pradesh

The Indirect Approaches

Bhutan. Bhutan and China have existing territorial disputes in the Western and Middle sectors at Doklam (269 sq. km), Jakarlung and Pasamlung (495 sq. km) (see Map 4.14). In its latest gambit, China has laid claim on the Sakteng Santuary, which is 100 km deep into Bhutan.  It is contiguous to the Tawang Tract. Chinese will claim it as part of South Tibet based on manufactured facts and will pressurise Bhutan to part with it. Of all territorial disputes, the Doklam and Sakteng claims have a bearing on Chinese plans and objectives in India and the Chinese are advancing their claims accordingly. The Doklam dispute and encroachment can be expanded into Bhutan in conjunction with any move into the Siliguri

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corridor. The claim on Sakteng Sanctuary, if enforced though a military move turns Tawang defences. If China overwhelms Bhutan and forces its way to Sakteng through Trashigang, then it is knocking at Nyukamdung, Dirang and Sapper at our rear. A combination of Doklam and Sakteng poses severe military threats to India.28 In any military calculation, Bhutan offers China an indirect and insidious approach to outflank Indian defences and get to our rear areas and plains without a fight. The Chinese strategy in Bhutan will be to force it to cede territory in Doklam in exchange for the disputed areas in the North or dropping its claims on Sakteng. In the recent talks held at Kunming,29 such a proposal was put forth. The Chinese will constantly endeavour to change the narrative to their advantage. India’s top priority in the North East is bolstering Bhutan’s capacity to defend itself and resist Chinese diplomatic and political pressure. Map 4.14: Disputed Areas with Bhutan

Nepal. The relations between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China are age old and deep rooted as per the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal.30 Nepal and China signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and a boundary agreement in 1960. In 1967, China began to construct the Prithvi Highway in Nepal and completed it in 1974. China helped Nepal in fighting against

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guerrilla Maoists. Nepalese security forces have also quashed anti-China voices among the 20,000 Tibetans in Nepal. In 2017, Nepal formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) under which China is developing airports, building roads and dams including the US$ 2.5 billion trans-Himalayan railway connecting Tibet to Kathmandu. China is also granting access to dry ports to relieve Nepal from overdependence on India.31  Militarily, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nepali Army have been holding joint exercises and military cooperation is increasing. They have elevated their “Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship” to “Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship for Development and Prosperity”. In sum, the trajectory of SinoNepali ties suggests that sooner or later, PLA presence in Nepal should be anticipated in one form or another under some pretence, as has occurred in Pakistan-occupied J&K. When viewed in this light, China’s strategy for the improvement of infrastructure in Nepal as part of the BRI is quite apparent. They wish to establish a military presence in the Terai region of India that is uncontested and unopposed. Even a little presence in the southern plains of Nepal, in conjunction with a big or minor drive towards the Siliguri Corridor via Sikkim, would be disastrous for India. Similar dangers exist for the central sector in Uttarakhand. Such an occurrence is highly probable in the future. Myanmar. China is seeking to push through the  China Myanmar Economic Corridor.32 The project envisages  road and rail  connectivity between Kunming and Kyaukpyu via Mandalay. It involves the multi-billion­ dollar deep seaport in Kyaukpyu which gives China a strategic opening on to the Bay of Bengal and eastern most parts of Indian Ocean Region. Myanmar has so far not fallen into the trap. Work has also not commenced on any project. To pressurise and destabilise Myanmar, China has recently started arming rebel groups.33  Myanmar had sought international help to ward off the threat. Currently all negotiations with Myanmar are in a limbo due to the instability there. However, China is fully supporting the military in Myanmar. As compensation for the assistance provided, China will exert pressure on Myanmar sooner rather than later to allow it to launch operations on the China-Myanmar  Economic Corridor. As soon as this occurs and China

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begins work on the projects, it will insist that the PLA protect the projects under some pretence. This will imply three things. First, it is harking back to the 1960s /1970s when Naga insurgency was fomented by China. China will in all probability re-energise the Naga insurgency as also the PLA in Manipur and Nagaland. It will also tend to destabilise Mizoram. Second, China can also pose a direct military threat from the East circumventing the Himalayas. Such an outflanking move enables direct air and logistics support to any offensive from the mainland (see Map 4.15). When seen in conjunction with any offensive operation along the Lohit River, it assumes significance.Thirdly, the Kyaukpyu port proposal seeks a direct entry into the Indian Ocean Region. As and when the project fructifies, China will get a permanent presence in Bay of Bengal and will be one step closer to its Two Ocean strategy. Map 4.15: Approach Through Myanmar

Bangladesh. Bangladesh and China established a strategic partnership during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Dhaka in 2016.34 China is Bangladesh’s biggest trading partner with bilateral trade worth US$ 12­ 14 billion. It is also part of China’s BRI. China is also investing heavily in

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Bangladesh’s economy. Recently there were media reports that Bangladesh turned to China for financial help with as many as nine infrastructure projects for a total of US$ 6.4 billion.35 It included a project on the Teesta River. Sino-Bangladesh military ties are also growing. China has modernised the Chittagong port. The details of modernisation have been kept under wraps.36 China has been vying and eyeing for a deep sea port at Sonadia in the Cox Bazaar-Chittagong area. A deep sea port in this area will give it a foothold in the Bay of Bengal as part of its Two-Ocean Strategy. The project at Sonadia has been shelved for the time being, and Japan has been awarded the project at Matarbari. However, the matter is not entirely resolved.37 The increasing relations between China and Bangladesh primarily favour China. It means that China will eventually be able to coerce Bangladesh into complying with its wishes. It is feasible that China may insist on a military or naval presence in Bangladesh if Bangladesh is compromised. This will amount to support for any northern push towards the Siliguri corridor. This is a very dangerous scenario for India, and it should be handled with diplomacy in advance. Map 4.16: Bangladesh

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Outline of Own Response

Northeast India is of vital importance to China. It will leave no stone unturned in its pursuit of success. There would be constant pressure on India to defend itself against direct and indirect Chinese threats and strategies. These must be resisted on numerous fronts, including the political, diplomatic, economic, and military. Chinese strategic theory is respectful of power and sensitive to humiliation. Both of these factors must be considered in our responses. The subsequent paragraphs provide a summary of the author’s response.

Political

India needs to develop internal strength in the North East in order for its people to be able to resist Chinese advances. In this regard, India must find ways to make the North East politically and economically relevant to the rest of India. The common feeling of alienation in the North East that it does not matter for the rest of India has to be eradicated. Constant dialogue and action to integrate the North East as a seamless part of India must be undertaken. Education, social and economic upliftment as also improvement in communication will go a long way to achieve this. Insurgencies need to be weaned away from their fissiparous roots. Ultimately, it will be the people who will thwart the Chinese designs and deny space for their strategies to succeed.

Diplomatic

China has made significant inroads into our neighbourhood. The task at hand is to firstly stem the tide and reverse it. Our ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Look/Act East Policy’ should have tangible results for our neighbours. Often India has been accused of being a big brother or a bully. There has to a clarity and consistency in our approach with neighbours. We have tremendous cultural, ethnic, social and religious links with all of them. There is a need to build on them and take all our neighbours along. They should have a greater reliance on India than on China. In addition, all our neighbours should be urged to strengthen their relations and links with QUAD nations through tangible action.

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Economy

The economic potential of the Northeast and neighbouring countries is phenomenal and is lying untapped. There has to be a different approach to economic development of the area, which needs to be viewed holistically. States need to develop linkages with neighbours so that economic activity is carried out at two levels—State and Central levels. As the region’s economy integrates and interdependence improves, the Chinese influence and threat will reduce.

Military

Fundamentally the Armed forces must be ready to counter the Chinese strategies at all levels from nibbling actions to full scale war at all times. All attempts at salami slicing must be nipped at the bud. In this regard, one of the first requirements is to improve communications and build infrastructure in border areas and in the hinterland to enable armed forces to respond to any situation as also switch forces speedily. Special attention must be paid to the development of airfields as also communications along and across the Brahmaputra River. India should develop intelligence deep in Tibet to know not only about Chinese intentions but also develop own offensive options. The armed forces must be modernised adequately to meet the Chinese threat squarely—within own areas as well as when neighbours are threatened. Very importantly, China must be made to look inwards at Tibet by development of hybrid/ grey zone options. A major part of thwarting Chinese designs is to ensure that the Chinese Two Ocean strategy does not succeed. To this end, Indian naval presence/ infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal must be upgraded. The Andaman and Nicobar Island chain must be strengthened. We should also take adequate steps to ensure that Chinese naval presence in the IOR is never permanent. This can be accomplished through a mix of military, economic, and diplomatic actions that prevent the establishment of permanent bases in Myanmar and Bangladesh.38

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Notes 1.

2. 3.

Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Border Management, International Land

Borders, at https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BMIntro-1011.pdf, accessed

on August 1, 2021.

NEDFI, General Information, North East Region Databank, at https://databank.

nedfi.com/content/general-information, accessed on August 1, 2021.

Ministry of External Affairs, Documents signed between India and China during

Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China, June 23, 2003, at https://www.mea.gov.

in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7692/Documents+signed+between+India+and+

China+during+Prime+Minister+Vajpayees+visit+to+China, accessed on August 1, 4.

5.

6.

2021.

Ranjit Singh Kalha, “Sikkim Tibet Border, An Historical Perspective”, Livemint,

July 4, 2017, at https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/n6zmZR8ytunvsV6FQk79UI/ SikkimTibet-border-an-historical-perspective.html, accessed on August 1, 2021.

Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, MacMahon Line. International Boundary, China-India, at https://www.britannica.com/event/McMahon-Line, accessed on

August 1, 2021.

Ministry of External Affairs, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters

and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, April 11,

2005,

at https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6534/

Agreement+between+the+Government+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+ Government+of+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+the+Political+Parameters+

and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+Boundary+ 7.

8.

9.

Question, accessed on August 1, 2021.

North Eastern Council Regional Plan (2017-18 to 2019-20), p. 5, at http://

megplanning.gov.in/circular/NEC%20Regional%20Plan%202017-18%20to%20 2019-20.pdf, accessed on August 1, 2021.

North Eastern Council Regional Plan (2017-18 to 2019-20), p. 4, at http://

megplanning.gov.in/circular/NEC%20Regional%20Plan%202017-18%20to%20 2019-20.pdf, accessed on August 1, 2021.

Ministry of Development of North East Region, Conflicts in the North East, p. 144,

at

https://mdoner.gov.in/contentimages/files/ARC_7thReport_Ch12.pdf,

accessed on August 1, 2021.

China’s Strategy in the Northeast India | 105

10. Jyothi Malhotra, “Naga Peace Deal can be a Feather in Modi’s Cap, But Watch

Out for China”, The Print, August 18, 2020, at https://theprint.in/opinion/

global-print/naga-peace-deal-can-be-a-feather-in-modis-cap-but-watch-out-for­ china/483823/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

11. Rajeev Bhattacharyya, “Why Has China Given Shelter to a Rebel Leader From

India’s Northeast?”, The Diplomat, February 26, 2020, at https://thediplomat.

com/2020/02/why-has-china-given-shelter-to-a-rebel-leader-from-indias­ northeast/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

12. G Jayachandra Reddy, “India and China Relations-Historical Cultural and Security Issues”, UGC Centre for South East Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, 2016, p. 290, at https://www.cseaps.edu.in/gjreddy/India%20and%20

China%20Relations%20-%20Historical,%20Cultural%20and%20Security%20 Issues.pdf, accessed on August 1, 2021.

13. PR Shankar, “Tsango Po Dams, Danger to India and Bangladesh”, March 18, 2021, at

https://www.gunnersshot.com/2021/03/tsangpo-dams-dangers-to-india-and.

html, accessed on August 1, 2021.

14. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates: The Future Security Environment, National Defense University Press, January 2000, Chapter 5, “Geopolitical Power Calculations”, at

https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/part08.htm, accessed on August 1, 2021.

15. Robert D Blackwill, “China’s Strategy for Asia: Maximize Power, Replace America”, National Interest, May 26, 2016, at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas­

strategy-asia-maximize-power-replace-america-16359, accessed on August 1, 2021.

16. Anil Gupta, “Five Finger Dream of Mao Zedong”, January 28, 2021, at http:// www.indiandefencereview.com/news/five-fingers-dream-of-mao-zedong/; Brahma

Chellany, “China’s Five Finger Punch”, July 22, 2020, at https://www.aspistrategist. org.au/chinas-five-finger-punch/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

17. Robert D Kaplan, “China’s Two Ocean Strategy, p. 55 China’s Arrival: A Strategic

Framework for a Global Relationship”, Centre for New American Security, September 2000, at https://lbj.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/file/news/CNAS%20

China%27s%20Arrival_Final%20Report-3.pdf, accessed on August 1, 2021.

106 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

18. Subhir Bhowmick, “Insurgencies in the North East, Conflict, Cooption and

Change”, Working Papers No 10, East West Center, Washington, July 2007, p. 24, at

https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3540/EWCWwp010.

pdf, accessed on August 1, 2021.

19. Reddy, n. 12, p. 276.

20. Smriti Chaudary, “China Threatens To Support Separatists In North-East States

If India Plays the Taiwan Card”, Eurasian Times, November 1, 2020, at https://

eurasiantimes.com/china-threatens-to-support-separatists-in-north-east-states-if­ india-plays-the-taiwan-card/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

21. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “China supplying arms, providing hideouts to northeast militants

via Myanmar, India alleges”, The Print, December 7, 2020, at https://theprint.in/

defence/china-supplying-arms-providing-hideouts-to-northeast-militants-via­ myanmar-india-alleges/561891/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

22. Armaan Bhatnagar, “China plans dam on Brahmaputra: How it may impact India, Bangladesh”, Times of India, December 2, 2020, at https://timesofindia.

indiatimes.com/india/china-plans-dam-on-brahmaputra-how-it-may-impact­ india-bangladesh/articleshow/79528597.cms, accessed on August 1, 2021.

23. Shankar, n. 13.

24. P R Shankar, “Sino-Indian Logjam: Aim Gone Astray”, February 28, 2020, at

https://www.gunnersshot.com/2021/02/sino-indian-logjam-aim-gone-astray-by. html, accessed on August 1, 2021.

25. Jia Liang, “Tawang’s History Affirms China’s Sovereignty”, Global Times, April 13, 2017, at https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042333.shtml, accessed on August 1, 2021.

26. Saurabh Shukla, “Growing Intrusion by the Chinese Army on the LAC has Set the Alarm Bells Ringing in South Block”, India Today, October 16, 2012, at https://

www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/sino-indian-border-dispute-chinese-army­ intrusions-118767-2012-10-16, accessed on August 1, 2021.

27. V K Shrivastava, “Sino-Indian Relations, Indo-Centric Reflections on China’s

Military Capabilities, thoughts and Options in the Near Future”, Vivekananda International Foundation, 2016, at https://docplayer.net/55639915-Sino-indian­ boundary-dispute-and-indo-centric-reflections-on-china-s-military-capabilities­ thoughts-and-options-in-the-near-future.html, accessed on August 1, 2021.

China’s Strategy in the Northeast India | 107

28. P R Shankar, “China’s Future Moves, Insidious and Indirect”, July 13, 2020, at

https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/07/chinas-future-moves-insidious-and.html, accessed on August 1, 2021.

29. World News, “China Bhutan Hold Discussions To Resolve Border Dispute”, The

Hindustan Times, April 9, 2021, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/

china-bhutan-hold-discussions-to-resolve-border-dispute-101617987274048.html,

accessed on August 1, 2021.

30. Nepal China Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, February 2019, at https://mofa.gov.np/nepal-china-relations/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

31. Rishi Gupta, “India losing Nepal as China-Nepal relations strengthen”, Think China, August 11, 2020, at https://www.thinkchina.sg/india-losing-nepal-china­ nepal-relations-strengthen. Accessed on August 1, 2021.

32. Sutirtho Patranobis, “Too close for comfort: China to build port in Myanmar, 3rd in India’s vicinity”, The Hindustan Times, November 9, 2018, at https://www.

hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-myanmar-ink-deal-for-port-on-bay-of-

bengal-third-in-india-s-vicinity/story-Lbm4IwOMuqrNvXGv4ewuYJ.html, accessed on August 1, 2021.

33. World News, “Myanmar calls out China for arming terror groups, asks world to help”, The Hindustan Times, July 2, 2020, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india­

news/myanmar-calls-out-china-for-arming-terror-groups-asks-world-to-help/ story-fzb8ADXt1VgS9ofZMMWdWO.html, accessed on August 1, 2021.

34. Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, “Decoding China-Bangladesh Relationship”, Observer Research Foundation, June 27, 2018, at https://www.orfonline.org/expert­

speak/41935-decoding-china-bangladesh-relationship/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

35. Roshni Majumdar, “Should India worry about China’s influence in Bangladesh?”, India Today, August 24, 2020, at https://www.indiatoday.in/msn-it/story/should­

india-worry-about-china-s-influence-in-bangladesh-1714527-2020-08-24, accessed

on August 1, 2021.

36. Gopal Suri, “China’s Expanding Military Maritime Footprints in the Indian

Ocean Region (IOR), India’s Response”, Vivekananda International Foundation,

New Delhi, 2017, at https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/china-s-expanding­

military-maritime-footprint-in-the-indian-ocean-region-india-s-response_0.pdf,

accessed on August 1, 2021.

108 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

37. Sudha Ramachandran, “Bangladesh Buries the Sonadia Deep-Sea Port Project,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/bangladesh­

buries-the-sonadia-deep-sea-port-project/, accessed on August 1, 2021.

38. Gopal Suri, n. 36.

5

The “Arunachal” Factor in

Sino-Indian Relations

Nani Bath

The Background

Arunachal Pradesh, as its stands today, is a product of diverse factors, as diverse as the state itself. Historically, it was neither a part of British India nor was under the Tibetan administration. The tribal communities lived a life of their own, occasionally indulging in inter-clan feuds over land, forest and women. Hudson aptly describes the position of the area during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:1 But in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries the NEFA country was not really either Indian or Chinese; it was not even Tibetan, but a zone of independent primitive tribes, too small and unorganised to form “states”, but strong enough in their inaccessible mountain strongholds to resist absorption by their more civilised neighbours to north and south.

The Frontier acquired its independent identity when, in 1914, the North East Frontier Tract was created by separating some tribal areas from the then Darrang and Lakhimpur districts of the province of Assam. The Tract was designated to be administered directly and differently by the provincial governor, through the commissioner or Deputy British Commissioner.

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The area remained outside the purview of regular laws of the country and administered differently by passing regulations and framing procedures from time to time. Prior to 1914, having not assigned any specific nomenclature, the region was designated as a ‘non-regulated area’, the area which was to be ruled by summary legislation in the discretion of the governor. The powers under summary legislation authorised the then Lt. Governor of Bengal to prescribe a line called ‘Inner Line’ in each or any of the districts beyond which no British subjects can pass without an Inner Line Permit. Thus, the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 18732 came into existence that laid down such lines in certain districts of the province of Assam. The Regulation of 1873 for the first time separated some tracts inhabited by tribal people from the districts of Assam and British authority. In 1874, the Chief Commissioner’s province of Assam (comprising some of the eastern districts of Bengal) was constituted. The Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation, 1880 was adopted and extended “to any tract inhabited or frequented by barbarious or semi-civilised tribes ... under the jurisdiction of the Chief Commissioner of Assam.” Under this Regulation, the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract was created in 1882, which was placed under the authority of the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, assisted by Assistant Political Officer posted at Sadiya. With the appointment of Francis Jack Needham as the Assistant Political Officer, an exclusive administrative officer was designated for the frontier tribes, who had been handled by the officials in adjacent areas on an ad hoc basis. The territory was considered as an extension of the great Tibetan plateau that remained as a buffer zone to thwart any Chinese influence in the eastern frontier of Bengal. The British India government did not define its ‘Outer Line’, although ‘Inner Line’ was prescribed at the local level with definite physical demarcations. The ‘Outer Line’ was allowed to remain fluid with definite intent, with an objective to allow its agents to pursue forward policy as per their strategic and political requirements. Up to the ‘Inner Line’ the British administrative jurisdiction was extended on regular basis. Between the ‘Inner Line’ and ‘Outer Line’, the British government “claimed sort of sovereignty.”3 They had political control over these areas. Beyond the Outer

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Line “lay the territories of the tribes over which they did not acknowledge any paramount power.”4 A formal delimitation of the international boundary in this area, which meant proper demarcation of ‘Outer Line’, became necessary because of “the sudden activity of Chinese military forces in the immediate vicinity of the tribal areas.”5 There were reports of the Chinese officials actually entering the tribal territory and ‘summoning’ tribal leaders to appear before them. As a counter measure, three expeditions were dispatched in 1911 an 1912: (i) The Miri Mission, (ii) The Abor Mission, and (iii) Mishmi Mission. Each Mission’s objectives were to survey the area in order to determine the “natural and traditional frontier” between Tibet and tribal area, to establish friendly relations with the tribal groups, and to inform them of “the fact that they were under us and must look to us for future rewards or punishment.”6 The outcome of these Missions was two-fold: first, “The boundary line incorporated in the 1914 Shimla Convention, later termed as McMahon Line, was largely based upon findings of these and other expeditions.” 7 Secondly, significant changes were incorporated in the frontier administrative system. The tribal area was reconstituted into three frontier tracts by 1914, namely- Western Section of the North East Frontier Tract, Central Section of the North East Frontier Tract and Eastern Section of the North East Frontier Tract. Measures for the further strengthening of political and administrative grip over the tribal areas were initiated when, in 1942, Japanese forces had made an attempt to penetrate into Assam through Manipur and Naga hills. The construction of Ledu or Stilwell road in 1942-43 increased the strategic significance of the northeastern border. It was agreed that administrative jurisdiction will be gradually expanded to previously ungoverned territories. In 1944, an anthropologist Fuhrer Haimendorf was sent to the un­ administered areas, inhabited by the Apatanis and Nyishis, which was “intended to prepare the ground for the extension of administrative control.”8 J.P. Mills was given the responsibility of “making good the McMahon Line”, and “to fill the political and administrative vacuum … between Assam and

112 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Tibet.”9 In 1944, Mills set up an Assam Rifles post at Dirang Dzong in the Tawang tract, South of the Sela, and prevented the Tibetan officials from collecting taxes. In fact, British administration was extended from Walong in the east to Dirang Dzong in the west. The British India administration did not intend to disturb the customary laws, traditions, customs, usages, conventions and social practices of the tribal communities. Even after the extension of administration and the expression of political control over the areas, the existing traditional forms of village administration were allowed to be functioned without much interference. With the consolidation of its position in Assam and extension of its administrative jurisdiction in the hill areas, the British Administration in India, however, felt the necessity of certain interference in the ways of administration of justice prevalent among the tribal communities. Their intention was to regulate and control heinous crimes like murder, rape and slavery; crime against the state was never to be tolerated. Thus, the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, which consolidated and amended the three sets of rules for administration of justice (1914),10 was issued. According to this Regulation, both civil and criminal cases11 of certain nature are adjudicated in accordance with the tribal code of conduct by the village authorities, appointed by the deputy commissioner of a district. The Ahom12 rulers were neither interested in the day-to-day affairs of the tribal communities nor in their land. Ahom kings simply wanted to protect the people of the plains from the raids of the tribals. Some of the Ahom rulers, in fact, attempted to establish good relations with frontier tribes. For example, Nyishis of the present day Arunachal Pradesh were allowed to levy ‘posa’, a kind of tribute,13 by Pratap Singh, one of the Ahom rulers. At the later stage the right to ‘posa’ was also conceded to the Akas, Adis and the Miris. Some scholars have contended that the payment of ‘posa’ was an indication of acknowledgement of the territory inhabited by these tribes as an ‘independent territory’ by the Ahoms. G. Burman writes that the NEFA tribes, in time, came to lie under the general influence and patronage of the Ahom kings, who adopted an overall policy of conciliation towards the tribes, supporting it by a display of force whenever it could be effectively employed.14

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After India’s independence, a specially designed administrative system15 was introduced with an aim to bring them quickly at par with other advanced communities of India. Nehru’s India retained the erstwhile British policy of exclusion, also known as ‘non-interference’ and ‘go slow’ towards the tribal communities of Arunachal Pradesh. Except for what is called ‘Forward Policy’, the administration had not penetrated deep into this sensitive area and the McMahon Line remained largely undefined. The official position was not to bring out any change to disturb the cultural and social life of the tribals. The administration designed its administrative policies based on Pt. Nehru’s famous Panchsheel, the five principles for tribal development16. Customary laws and traditional self-governing institutions were allowed to be functioned with minimum administrative interference. According to experts, at least two factors have led to the continuation of such a policy—the first being its strategic location and geo-political significance of the area vis-à-vis China. Secondly, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister, was seriously interested to protect innocent tribal people from the negative influence of Naga separatist movement and anti-national sentiments espoused by Christian missionaries in the Naga and Mizo hills. In a speech delivered at a Conference in 1952, he appreciated the humanitarian works of the missionaries but “politically speaking,” he said, “they did not particularly liked the change in India. In fact, just when a new political awareness dawned on India, there was a movement in North-Eastern India to encourage the people of North-East to form separate and independent states. Many foreigners resident have supported this movement.”17 The Union of India administratively controlled the territory through the governor of Assam, who acted as an agent of the president of India since 1950. For a brief period of time, 1947-50, the administrative authority remained with the Government of Assam. When the constitution of India came into force, all the hill areas (including the North-East Frontier Tract) were simply designated as “Tribal Areas”. The areas under North-East Frontier Tract were included in Table B under paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. However, provisions of the Sixth Schedule were never extended to the territory. The Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh was formed in 1972 (by Section 7 of the North Eastern Areas Re­

114 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

organisation Act, 1971), and it ceased to be a tribal area within the State of Assam. Thereafter, the provisions of the Sixth Schedule also ceased to be applicable to Arunachal Pradesh.18 In September 1986, there were reports of Chinese troops intruding into Wangdong in Sumdorang Chu river valley in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh, which was considered an integral and indivisible part of India according to McMahon Line of 1914. It revived the old psychological fear of 1962 Chinese aggression. Moreover, after the Seventh Round of border talks in 1986, it became increasingly clear that the solution to the border problem was not in India’s favour. A bill in the parliament was enacted in December 1986 to establish Arunachal Pradesh as a state. It can be argued that Arunachal Pradesh was granted statehood even when its people were seemingly happy with the scheme of the Union Territory. All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union (AAPSU), the apex students’ body of the state, strongly objected to granting of statehood till Arunachal Pradesh attains a “desired level of political and economic development.”19 It is no wonder that China condemned India of “violating Chinese territorial sovereignty” and “gravely injuring feelings of the Chinese people” by granting statehood to Arunachal Pradesh. The constitution 55th Amendment Act that grants statehood to Arunachal Pradesh also provides ‘special responsibility’ to the governor with regards to law and order in the state, under Article 371(H) of the constitution. The Article adds,“....and in the discharge of his functions in relations thereto, the Governor shall, after consulting the Council of Ministers, exercise his individual judgment as to the action to be taken”. Some of the opposition Members of Parliament raised objection to the special power to be conferred to the governor. Members of Parliament from the Upper House like Mustafa Bin Quasim (CPI-M) and others had argued that the provision of special power to the governor was not justified, as it would enable the Governor to interfere in the affairs of the state government. The then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, replying to the Members of the House, expressed that this provision was necessary because of ‘very sensitive’ location of Arunachal Pradesh and assured that the special power would not be used to encroach upon the autonomy of the state.

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‘Nationalising a Frontier Space’

India inherited an undefined and ‘unaccepted’ boundary in the Eastern Himalayas from the British India, where present Arunachal Pradesh is located. The claims and counter claims between India and China, on the question of legality of McMahon Line, has placed state’s politics and economic development as ‘hostage’ to geo-politics and ‘military strategy’. The Government of India, therefore, has ‘nationalised’ the frontier state through multiple strategies. Sanjib Baruah, thus, argues, “The goal of nationalising a frontier space has been the major trust of Indian policy vis-à-vis Arunachal Pradesh.”20 China invaded Tibet in 1950 when 40,000 personnel of Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) crushed unarmed Tibetan guards. The Republic of India became apprehensive and reacted immediately, probably over­ reacted, by making a territorial adjustment of Arunachal Pradesh, then called North East Frontier Tracts. In 1951, the plain portions of NEFA were transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the Government of Assam by a Notification.21 Sensing the sinister intention of communist China the economic and infrastructure development of the territory was given a due impetus. The Community Development Programme was introduced, for the first time in 1952, in Arunachal Pradesh with one community project. The Community Extension Service Block was extended a year later, in 1953. In the first FiveYear Plan period, there were only five such Blocks, which increased to 41 Blocks during the third plan period. Analysing the effects of China’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh, J. N. Choudhury writes: China’s extravagant claim on Indian territory south of the McMahon Line in 1959 immediately influenced the shaping of the Third Five Year Plan (1962-66). In addition to normal budget for road building, an extra-allocation of Rs 20,800,000 was provided in the plan out of the total allotment of Rs 71,500,000 for the plan period. The performance in terms of expenditure registered a higher mark over the first and second plans as a total expenditure of Rs 73,239,000 was

116 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

incurred by the end of the plan period outstripping the allotment by Rs 1,739,000.22

The 1914 Agreement on McMahon Line did not alter the ground realities for the inhabitants of the Frontier areas, along the Line on both sides. The communities had usual social and economic contactsbarter, matrimonial alliances, etc. Even India’s independence, the social and economic contacts continued without any hindrance. The bonhomie between India and China with the slogan of Chini-Hindi-Bhai-Bhai did not last long. On October 20, 1962, Mao’s China attacked India, probably to ‘teach Nehru a lesson.’ It was the Sino-India war of 1962 that changed the ground situation, and the McMahon Line became live all of a sudden. The changed situation created an atmosphere of hostility that resulted in division of families and clans into two hostile political camps- India and China. All contacts were stopped, and the independent economies, through barter system, were converted into dependent ones. The inhabitants remained dependent on government supplies through air sorties. Toni Huber finds that many of “the transient frontier groups became divided between India and China after 1962, and now live separated on either side of the contested international border.”23 After the 1962 war, the development agenda for the state saw a major change having political and policy implications. The Nehru-Elwin’s ‘Go­ slow policy’ was held responsible for India’s defeat at the hands of Peoples Liberation Army of China. After occupying certain strategic parts of Bomdila and Walong, it was feared that the Chinese troops would descend on the Assam Valley. The Assamese were enraged over this possibility and strongly criticized the tribal policy followed in the Administration of NEFA. The people of NEFA had to abandon their native homes and become refugees in Assam. They too joined the agitation against the Nehru-Elwin’s policy in NEFA.24 It was realised that the lack of road communication and other infrastructure in the state contributed to India’s defeat in the war. Nehru himself appeared to have recognised that the so-called A Philosophy for NEFA 25 required a second look.

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It was during this period that the NEFA Administration designed its administrative apparatus to bring the areas and its people closer to the mainstream of political life in the country by introducing modern governmental institutions. The first step initiated was to appoint a fourmember committee, popularly known as D. Ering Committee, constituted for considering expansion and development of local self-government. The Ering Committee submitted its Report in January 1965 with certain politically and administratively significant recommendations. The Committee, apart from suggesting a four-tier organically linked popular bodies, had made some miscellaneous recommendations keeping in view the future development of North East Frontier Agency. At the village level, there should be a village council, to be elected or selected as per their customary laws. Above the village council, there should be Anchal Samiti at the circle level. At the district level, over the Anchal Samities, there should be Zilla Parishads. The Committee finally suggested the creation of an Agency Council at the state level. The functioning of the Agency Council would be to advise the Governor in the administration and development of NEFA. Based on the recommendations of the Ering Committee, North East Frontier Agency Panchayati Raj Regulation, 1967, was promulgated by the President of India.26 Going back to the initial years of India’s independence, Nehru was neither interested in withdrawal of ‘Inner Line’ nor was in favour of ‘forced integration’ of the people of NEFA. He would give the instance of “our bitter experience in Nagaland” as an argument against such attempts of forceful integration.27 He maintained this position in spite of strong protest from socialist leaders like Ram Manohar Lohia, who was opposed to the government’s policy of ‘segregation’.28 In the aftermath of the 1962 war, Nehru’s policy came under severe criticism both inside and outside the parliament. Thereafter, the frontier was ‘nationalised’ in a variety of ways. For the critics, the idea of ‘nationalising a frontier space’ would mean to “multiply the area of association and contact with the outside world and not to keep [the tribals] within their narrow circle”.29 On one occasion, the opposition members of Parliament advocated for the settlement of 10,000 farmers from

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Punjab in NEFA “both to further the assimilation of tribals and to dissuade the Chinese from coming again”.30 Ostensibly to avoid outside interference, the state administration, then under the Government of India, did not permit the operation of institutions managed by the Christian missionaries of any denominations. However, Hindu missionaries, such as Ramakrishna Mission, Vivekananda Kendras and Sarda Mission were allowed inside the territory with active support from the administration.31 Most of the school teachers from Assam were replaced and teachers from States like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh were recruited. The administrative machineries were geared up to promote the essence of cultural practices and social ethos of the different tribal communities. Cultural aspects of various tribal groups were highlighted in school textbooks. Stories about the national leaders, like Gandhi and Subash Chandra were popularised through hymns and songs. In order to instill a sense of patriotism and to exploit the martial tradition of the frontier tribes, the Government of India raised “home guards units of frontier tribes called Lok Sahayak Sena” after the Chinese aggression. It was received enthusiastically by the people, who were “natural experts in patrolling and reconnaissance tactics,” and they received regular training in military discipline and in the use of arms under army officers.32 Importantly, strategic strategists and political authorities recognised that the wide and sparsely populated terrain necessitated the resettlement of people in the empty border areas because it “will help to strengthen our frontiers and their defence.”33 It was also felt that the settlement of outsiders in NEFA would help in developing the pockets that were lying unused and unoccupied by the local population. From a strategic point of view the Administration presumed that “the presence of stretches of vacant land along the border is strategically not desirable and the last emergency had highlighted this problem.”34 Around 14,888 (2,748 families) Chakmas and Hajongs were settled in the then three districts of NEFA—Lohit, Tirap and Subansiri during 1964­ 69.35 Initially, the Chakmas were settled in three districts of North Eastern Frontier Agency, Lohit District (Chowkham), Subansiri District (Hollongi, Dirgha area), and Tirap District (Nao-Dihing Valley). At present there are

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44,276 Chakmas in Changlang district, 4,962 in Namsai district and 2,077 Chakmas in the Papum Pare district. Hajongs are concentrated only in Dayun sub-division of Changlang district, numbering 2,415 persons.36 In the line of this strategic thinking, 200 families of ex-Assam Rifles37 were settled in “virgin unoccupied, un-administered and remote border area (Vijaynagar) under planned scheme of India”38 from 1967-71. Sharma writes that the Gorkhas, at times, were settled forcefully in the area by the government to “safeguard India’s interest in the wake of the Chinese invasion of 1962.”39 They were settled under the Settlement Proposal submitted by NEFA Administration to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, and subsequently approved by Government of India,40 which reads: With this progressive execution of various development Scheme throughout NEFA, the need for evolving some scheme for populating and simultaneously developing those pockets that are lying unused and unoccupied by the tribal population has been under consideration of this administration for some time. It has been the feeling that this constitutes a necessary complementary step forward towards the development of self-sufficient and selfsustaining economy in NEFA. Besides, the presence of such vast stretches of vacant land also has a strategic aspect, which cannot be lost sight off. Recent emergency highlighted this problem and has confirmed our earlier feeling on this question. It has been decided, therefore, to seek the approval of Government of India to two sets of model schemes to serve as the pattern for planning and execution of specific scheme….

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs the objectives and considerations of the Scheme were:41 (i) The North East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh) as a whole is comparatively thinly populated; the overall density of population being about 11 persons per sq. mile. (ii) A population vacuum near the border may result in attempts by hostile neighbour to take advantage of the situation.

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(iii) A settled community along the border will be a positive deterrent against the temptation of infiltration from across the border. (iv) The actual presence of a settled community along the border would further reduce the scope of any border dispute. (v) A progressive community will boost up the morale of the local inhabitants and inspire greater zeal for accelerated economic progress. (vi) The settlement of people belonging to mixed community in NEFA may help towards emotional integration of NEFA people with the rest of the country. On the similar pattern as the model scheme approved for settlement of ex-Assam Rifles families in Vijayanagar, 190 families of ex-servicemen were resettlement of near Seijosa in Kameng district of North East Frontier Agency.42 Seijosa is located in the foothills of Assam-Arunachal boundary, at a distance of 74 km from Tezpur, a town of Assam. It was informed by the erstwhile North East Frontier Agency Administration that 2,000 acres of land would be available for resettlement of ex-servicemen in 1968. The Indian government authorised the relocation of 75 families at a cost of Rs. 24.23 lakh. In September 1970, an additional 115 families were relocated at a cost of Rs. 28.83 lakh. However, the settlers deserted the area because of unsuitability of land for cultivation and other geographical factors. The Supreme Court of India was clearly in favour of settlement of exAssam Rifles families in Vijaynagar region of Arunachal Pradesh. The Assam Rifles Multi-purpose Cooperative Society filed a writ with the Supreme Court requesting that the defendants follow the programme approved by the Government of India, for settling retired Defence Personnel. The Court ruled that “the region constitutes part of Indian territory and is located on the Indian border with China and Burma. It is in the public interest and for the benefit of the public that settlement of Indian citizens should be encouraged in this area and the area should be suitably developed.”43

Tawang and the McMahon Line

The geo-strategic location of Arunachal Pradesh for India and China is immense. China presents both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ evidences to lay

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its claim over Arunachal Pradesh. The positive evidence “relates to the Buddhist Lamaist connection to the Tawang monastery and the Tawang tract with the Drepung monastery (Gelugpa sect) in Lhasa.”44 The negative evidence is that it questions the “right of Tibet to conclude a border agreement with British India in 1914.”45 Additionally, the PRC is lured by Arunachal’s rich land, forest, and water resources. Arunachal Pradesh has an estimated hydropower potential of more than 75,000 megawatts (MW), which is almost one third of India’s total hydropower potential. More than 40,000 MW have been allotted to India’s central public sector undertaking and independent power producers, which is sufficient to fulfil the energy demand of the state and supply to energy-deficient Southeast Asian countries. It’s a fait accompli and China knows it well that Tawang or for that matter any part of Arunachal Pradesh cannot be separated from India either by force or through persuasion. Yet, China insists on claiming around 90,000 sq. km area because “it is an integral part of its Tibet’s policy.”46 China perceives that its “strategic control of Tibet could not be taken for granted unless and until they controlled Tawang.”47 Writing for the New York Times, Robert D. Kaplan notes that one of the areas in the Chinese state whose inhabitants have “resisted China’s pull” is Tibet. This is a direct threat to China’s ‘aggressive ambitions’ to have full control over the Tibetan plateau which has abundance of copper and iron ore and accounts for much of China’s territory. He further notes, “This is why Beijing views with horror the prospect of Tibetan autonomy,”48 and “stridently committed to bringing all elements of Tibetan culture under Chinese control,”49 China’s argument is that the Arunachal Pradesh, particularly Tawang, is part of Greater China’s ‘lost territories’, being part of Tibet.50 Dai Bingguo, who served as China’s boundary negotiator with India from 2003 to 2013, was quoted as saying, “The disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is inalienable from China’s Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction.”51 The Tibetan narrative on Tawang maintains that Monyul was historically a part of Tibet, and the “historical relationship between Mon

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and Tibet began in 127 BC during the reign of Ngytri Tsenpo, the first king of Tibet.”52 Roughly the area under the present Tawang and West Kameng districts was known as Monyul in Tibetan terminology. It means the ‘land of Mon’, the lower land. Traditionally, it was divided into three administrative centres, referred to as dzongs-Talung Dzong, Dirang Dzong, and Tawang Dzong or Gyanghar Dzong. These dzongs were the centre for settlement of disputes and store house of grains collected as taxes from the people. The grains were then transported to Tsona in Tibet, which served as the administrative headquarters of Monyul.53 One of the reasons why China is obsessed with Tawang is that the Tibetans have historical, religious and emotional attachment with the Tawang Monastery. It was established by Mera Lama in 1680 as “a Gelugpa outpost in the 17th century sectarian wars between Tibet and Bhutan, at the initiative of the fifth Dalai Lama.”54 The Tawang monastery had the authority to collect taxes from Monpa villages in and around Tawang by “decree of the Dalai Lama’s office, and with an administration linked to the Tibetan government.”55 The monastery used to depute monks as dzongpons for the purposes of collection of taxes and settlement of local disputes. Nyman writes that the “Tawang region was governed by the Trukdri, a council of six, seated in Tawang, which included the Dzongpöns of Tsöna and the Abbot of Tawang.”56 Giving a Chinese perspective on Tawang, the Global Times (Chinese state media),57 notes that Tawang is known as the pearl of South Tibet and is a holy land to Tibetans. As early as the 7th century, Tawang had been under the jurisdiction of a local government of the Tibetan Empire. In 1861, the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso ordered the construction of Tawang Monastery and since then, Tawang had been a political, religious, economic and cultural centre of the Menyu area where the Tawang district is located and which was effectively administered by the local Tibetan governments. The 6th Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso was born in Tawang and thereafter, the region has been considered as a sacred place by Tibetans.

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Alexander Mackenzie58 referred to the Tawang Raja as “a tributary of Lassa”, capital of Tibet. The 1838 report of Capt. Pemberton on Bhutan referred to Tawang as “a tract of country dependent on Lhasa and forming an integral portion of Tibet territory.”59 F.W. Bailey, who was a part of the British armed intervention of 1904 into Tibet, described Monyul as the “comparatively low-laying district of Tibet which is governed by the Lamas of Tawang.”60 Nyman notes that “Tawang proper north of the Se La constituted an integral part of Tibet, while the rest of the region, being a monastic fief, can only partially be considered as a full-fledged district of Tibet.”61 The British did not recognise any paramountcy power over the tribes of north-east India but, Alaister Lamb said, “Tawang was undoubtedly Tibetan territory.”62 In a quest to “create and maintain a buffer zone to protect the northern borders of British India”63 a military expedition was organised against Tibet in 1903. The expedition was successfully led by Colonel Younghusband which resulted into signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904. The Treaty entails certain trading rights and a guarantee against concessions to foreign powers to Britain, and it “established a precedent for direct Anglo-Tibetan relations and it provided the means for the future prevention of the extension of Russian influence.”64 The Chinese Revolution of October 1911 overthrew the Qing or Manchu dynasty (1644-1911), and led to the foundation of Republic of China. In 1913, in the midst of the “chaos that reigned in China in 1910s,”65 the 13th Dalai Lama declared Tibet’s independence from China on February 13, 1913. The British thought that it was a right time to secure a buffer between China and India. On May 23, 1913, an invitation was sent by the British India’s foreign office to the Chinese government for a tripartite convention, involving British India, Tibet and China. They met at Shimla on October 13, 2013, and the ‘McMahon Line’66 was established on March 24, 1914 for the government in England, the Shimla Conference was not just to “regulate the status of Tibet and to define its borders,”67 but it was needed to “keep Chinese power away from the borders of India.”68 The British government was interested more in setting up effective machinery in Tibet for “keeping

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the Chinese out on the one hand and the Russians on the other.”69 Taking advantage of the “confusion in the Chinese government,” the British evolved a strategy to “keep Russian influence in Tibet at bay.”70 The British wanted the conference,“worried by a possible new Chinese attempt to restore the lost suzerainty over Tibet.”71 The Tibetans attended “willingly” and the Chinese did it “under constraint.”72 Since Tibetans were looking for an opportunity to get recognition as an independent country at the international level, the conference was “a most-welcomed development” for Tibet.73 The British India lacked the time and resources to initiate any kind of activities in the Monyul, and the region remained neglected after the Shimla Convention of 1914. Three factors have been attributed for the neglect: due to the transfer of McMahon from India; the “financial stringency”; and the outbreak of the two World Wars of 1914-19 and 1939-44.74 It was in 1935 that Frank Kingdon-Ward, a British explorer and botanist, entered Tibet through the Tawang Tract with no approval from the Lhasa authorities. When Tibetan officials learned of his illegal presence in Tibet, they ordered his arrest. Kingdon Ward, however, claimed that he had sought permission from the Tibetan official (Dzongpon) in charge of Tawang, and accordingly he was authorised to enter Tibet.75 The Assam Government,dated November 13,1935,clarified the status of Tawang—“As regards the connection of Tawang with Tibet, the Governor­ in-Council believes that Tawang is more or less independent territory, but holds some indirect allegiance to Tibet.”76 Ward gave a disturbing report:77 While the main (Himalayan) range might be de jure frontier, there would be no doubt that the de facto frontier lay much further south since the Tibetan Government, through Tsona dzong and Tawang, was actively … administering the whole of Monyul, while the influence of Tibetan church extended almost to the edge of the Assam plains- that is, into territory which had nothing to do with Monyul except propinquity.

H. McMahon negotiated for inclusion of Tawang in the southern side of the McMahon, which actually was located in the Tibetan side of the

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watershed. McMahon noted on July 8, 1914 that “the object of including Tawang was to secure (a) a natural watershed frontier, (b) access to the shortest trade route into Tibet and control of the monastery of Tawang which had blocked the trade by this route in the past by undue exaction and oppression.”78 It was also believed that Tawang Monastery’s influence could have a negative impact on the future British rule south of Se La.79 British India decided to integrate the Monyul region for strategic reasons, but the “final demarcated line demonstrates that British India respected the customary boundary between Tibet and the local indigenous people.”80 The Political Officer in Balipara Frontier Tract, Captain G. Lightfoot, visited Tawang in April 1938. He was the first British officer to do so after the 1914 border Agreement. Claude Arpi 81 writes that Captain Lightfoot was not authorised to find out the presence of the Tibetan administration in the area. He was primarily concerned with the question of the boundary with Bhutan. He, however, took advantage of his presence in Tawang to “inform the local representative of the Tsona Dzongpons that the area was Indian and the Monpas were British citizens.” He was told by the Government of Assam that there could be “no possible doubt that the IndoTibetan boundary was definitely determined (by the McMahon line)” with an assurance that “his presence in Tawang with an escort would itself be an assertion of British authority.”82 The Indian administration was not extended to Tawang even after four years of India’s independence. In 1950, Communist China moved into Tibet, and a year later, in February 1951, Major Ralengnao Bob Khathing “commanded a force of 200 soldiers and re-established India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh, much to the annoyance of Jawaharlal  Nehru.” 83 Colonel Khathing issued orders prohibiting the residents of Tawang from paying tax and tribute to the Tibetan Dzongpens. There are reports suggesting that the expedition was undertaken by Major Khating and his team without the permission of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Arunachal Pradesh, then called North East Frontier Tract, was under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs. After the Chinese invasion of Tibet, “a dying Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel got the ball rolling to protect India’s borders”84 and took the initiative to set

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up a North and North-East Border Defence Committee under Maj Gen Himatsinghji.85 Having had a bad experience in Kashmir the Committee took an immediate decision to extend the Indian administration to the areas south of the McMahon Line. The then Assam Governor Jairamdas Daulatram “ordered the young Naga officer to march to Tawang and take over the administration.” The order was given in January 1951 “in consultation with the Himatsinghji Border Defence Committee.”86 There are, however, other scholars who maintain that Tawang had no or little political relations with Tibet. The pre-1951 Tibet’s connection with Tawang and its adjoining areas can only be termed as ecclesiastical and no political jurisdiction, whatsoever, was extended to the areas.87 It is claimed that the Khrai or grain tax paid to the Tawang monastery by the villagers was “actually a voluntary support extended by villages to lamas who were drawn from Tawang.”88 Pandit Nain Sing of the Trigonometrical Survey of India, who visited the Tawang Monastery in 1874-75, noted that, “The Tawang Monastery is entirely independent of the Dzonpon (of Tsona) and of the Lhasa Government.”89 The temporal authority of Tawang Monastery and the existence of private estates in the areas were well indicated by Lonchen Satra, the plenipotentiary of Tibet during McMahon Line negotiations.90 T.S. Murty, who participated in the 1960 talks with the PRC delegation, said that “The Chinese did not provide any evidence to show that Tawang monastery was in the “possession” of the Tibetan government and not merely affiliated for some purposes to a Tibetan monastery.”91

Visa Policy: China’s inconsistency and New Delhi’s Insincerity

The People’s Republic of China does not follow a uniform policy on visas for the residents of Arunachal Pradesh. “There were previous occasions,” C. Raja Mohan writes,“when China gave visas, denied them, and occasionally encouraged citizens from Arunachal to travel without visas.”92 Initially, China did not grant visas to the Indian citizens from Arunachal Pradesh on the ground that “people from Arunachal were citizens of China and hence did not require visas to travel there.”93 Gegong Apang, who was serving as the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, was denied visa saying that he ‘being a Chinese’ did not require visa to

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visit his ‘own country’.94 In 1981, the then speaker of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, TL Rajkumar, was denied a Chinese visa since he represented a ‘disputed territory’. Rajkumar was travelling to China, as a member of Indian Parliamentary Delegation, to participate in an Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development. However, on intervention of the Government of India and other member countries, he was granted a stapled visa.95 Ganesh Koyu, a 52-year-old IAS officer, who was serving as secretary of panchayati raj, textiles and handicrafts in the Arunachal government, was denied visa in 2007, which “obviously stems from China’s refusal to accept Arunachal Pradesh as part of the Indian territory.” Being a resident of Arunachal Pradesh, Koyu was considered a ‘Chinese national’.96 A committee consisting of Chow Pinhthika Namchoom, Member of AP legislative Assembly, Tape Bagra, Secretary (Health), Tajom Taloh, Secretary (Agriculture), Tasso Butung, Agriculture Development Officer, and Egam Basar, Horticulture Development Officer were invited to attend 8th China International Vegetable Sci-Tech Fair from April 19-24, 2007. In the initial letter of invitation, 48 members from India were asked to participate in the fair. Subsequently, a letter issued by the Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Weifang People’s Government, did not include the list of five delegates from Arunachal Pradesh.97 It was in 2008 that China started the practice of issuing what is called ‘stapled visas’98 to people from Jammu and Kashmir. This practice was widely viewed as China’s questioning India’s sovereignty over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the “Indian authorities asserted that if anyone was allowed to leave the country’s borders with a stapled visa, it would mean violating India’s sovereignty.”99 It was a tacit way of recognising “Pakistan’s sovereignty over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir while questioning India’s sovereignty over J&K.”100 The practice of issuing stapled visa was extended, in January 2009, to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh when China issued a stapled visa to a student of National School of Drama, New Delhi, Riken Ngomle. He was allowed to visit Beijing on a stapled visa by the Indian immigration authorities. In 2014, however, China denied him a visa. Another student from National School

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of Drama, Goge Bam, was allowed to travel to Beijing in September 2016 on a group visa. Yet another student, Palin Kabak was denied a visa in 2019. In January 2011, stapled visas were issued to weightlifter Yukar Sibi and Indian Weightlifting Federation joint secretary Abraham K Techi. They could not fly to China as they were stopped by the immigration officials at New Delhi IGI Airport because they did not have a normal visa issued by the Chinese Embassy. Again in July the same year, the five-member Indian karate team from Arunachal Pradesh was issued stapled visas by the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. The karatekas missed the tournament since they were stopped at New Delhi’s IGI Airport by the immigration officials. Tage Rita, who was scheduled to fly to Kunming, China, was stopped from boarding the flight by immigration authorities at Kolkata airport. It happened in April 2011. She was on an ‘incentive trip’ to China, as part of a 53-member delegation from Tupperware company, and was issued stapled visa by the Chinese Embassy. She says, “if the Government of India is not suspicious of our trips to China, officials from the Intelligence Bureau would not have shadowed us.”101 In 2012, China refused to grant visa to Group Captain Mohanto Panging from Arunachal Pradesh. He was an IAF Sukoi-30 MKI fighter pilot, posted at Tezpur air base, Assam as Chief Operations Officer. It was part of the confidence-building measures between the militaries of the two countries. Three days before the scheduled departure, he was informed that “something is wrong with grant of visa to you” without any elaborations. The scheduled visit, however, proceeded without Captain Mohanto and 14 other members.102 Similarly, a lady member of the Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan from Arunachal Pradesh was denied a visa by Chinese authorities in the same year. She was part of an Indian youth delegation, consisting of around 100 members, to participate in the 10-day Youth Exchange programme, which was to be hosted by the All China Youth Federation. Tilling Yamer, who was told about the denial of visa when she was boarding a bus for the airport, recalls that she was taken to a ministry where she sought an explanation from Indian officials. She was politely told that “India has to swallow such

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‘diplomatic humiliations’ so that the trade between the countries are not jeopardized.”103 The contentious issue of issuing stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh surfaced again in 2013. Two young women archers from the state, Mihu Maselo and Yumi Sorang, were prevented at the IGI Airport from leaving for China to take part in the upcoming Youth World Archery Championship. Three years later, Bamang Tago, manager for the Indian badminton contingent, was denied visa to travel to Fuzhou for the China Super Series Premier badminton tournament. An environmental activist from the state, Phupla Singpho, was to attend a conference on biodiversity at Kunming University in October 2017. He had applied for a visa in the Chinese Embassy through a travel agency but was denied with no official explanation. There are also instances of issuing of stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh, who are not indigenous to the state those from outside the state but either born or employed in the state. Pemba Tamang, an Indian Army pistol shooter, who ordinarily resides in Arunachal Pradesh, was issued stapled visa. He, however, was stopped by the Indian immigration officials from boarding a flight to Beijing. A student, Sooraj Sharma, who hails from Delhi but born in Aalo, West Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh, was issued a stapled visa by the Chinese Embassy. On June 29, 2012, he was not allowed to travel by the Indian immigration at the IGI Airport, New Delhi. He was informed about the “Indian government’s policy of not allowing people with stapled visa to travel to China.”104 It is not that the Peoples Republic of China only denied visas to the Indian citizens from Arunachal Pradesh or issued stapled visas to them. There were occasions when indigenous residents from the state were granted stamped visas without any glitches. The Fourth UN Conference on Women held in Beijing was attended by four ladies from Arunachal Pradesh in 1995. Komoli Mossang, Jarjum Ete, Dipti Bengia and late Biny Yanga were issued regular visas by the Chinese Embassy for the event.105 The then minister (Industry, Textiles and Handicraft), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Tsering Gurmey, was issued a visa to fly from Kolkata to Guangzhou in November 2005. He was accompanied by his wife, Rinchin Drema. They

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were even permitted to visit Tibet, a place where no foreigner is allowed to travel without an additional permit called Tibet Travel Permit (Tibet visa). Surprisingly, the Government of India and its intelligence wing (Intelligence Bureau) had launched a discreet inquiry about the purpose and intent of their visit. The cabinet secretary, Government of India wrote a letter to the chief secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, seeking information regarding their visit to China.106 He was, however, denied a visa to visit Guangzhou again during 2011-12. In September 2006,Vishal Pah Nabam was granted a Chinese visa, along with a student to visit Chanchun, capital city of Jilin province of China. The student (his wife’s brother), Taba Konia, was pursuing a degree in medicine at Jilin University. Two years later, in 2008, BJP MP Kiren Rijiju, who was part of an official group of MPs to attend the Olympic games in Beijing, was granted a visa. Marpe Sora, teaching Computer Science at Rajiv Gandhi University, was granted a visa to visit Beijing, Shiangyang and Shanghai in 2007. While many have hailed the grant of regular visa to an Arunachal-born academician as a step towards “a possible prelude to China ultimately accepting Arunachal Pradesh as party of India as they did in case of Sikkim,”107 there are reports indicating that “Sora’s passport was issued in Guwahati and he had submitted an affidavit mentioning his address in the city.”108 By March 2012, it was indicated that China has discontinued the policy of issuing stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir. The indication, even though indirectly, came when the Deputy Director General of China’s Foreign Ministry Li Kexin said “Have you seen any such reports (of issuance of stapled visas to Kashmiris) in recent times?”109 There is no change in China’s policy vis-à-vis Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman’s office said that “its policy that Arunachal Pradesh is a ‘disputed area’ remains unchanged. China’s position is consistent and clear about the China-India border issue including the disputed area of Eastern section and the Indian side is aware of it.”110 Some Chinese scholars see the issue of a stapled visa as a “pragmatic” step to allow people of Arunachal to visit China. Rong Ying, a Senior Research Fellow at the state-run China Institute of International Studies, expressed his views

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saying that “Certainly we have to take the reality into consideration as it is a disputed area and also we have to be pragmatic if people wants to travel to China.”111 On the issue of stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh, there has been a very subtle reaction from the Government of India. A statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs says,112 We have unequivocally conveyed to the Chinese side that a uniform practice on issuance of visas to Indian nationals must be followed, regardless of the applicant’s ethnicity or place of domicile. Ministry had also issued a travel advisory on 12 November 2009 cautioning Indian citizens that Chinese paper visas, stapled to the passport, were not considered valid for travel out of the country.

Strong words, however, have come from the leaders and representatives of Arunachal Pradesh. Kiren Rijiju (present Minister of State Sports and Youths Affairs, GoI) then opposition BJP leader, said “The government can’t convince China to issue normal visas to Arunanchalees, nor does it allow us to travel on stapled visas. It is a tragedy. We are completely sandwiched.” 113 He had suggested strong retaliatory action against China by issuing stapled visa to people belonging to Tibet Autonomous region, Xinxiang, Gansu and Qinghay provinces, where separatists’ movements are going on.114 The Union Minister (Defence)115 advocated that India should give stapled visas to Tibetans in reaction to China’s issuance of such visas to the inhabitants of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.116 The then Congress member of parliament, Ninong Ering, sought apology from the Chinese Embassy. Urging the Government of India to “take serious action against it so that the people of the state do not suffer in future,” he highlighted the seriousness of the issues and says, “the problem has serious concern as China is an emerging prominent place for international sports.”117

Conclusion

Neeru Nanda, writing about the degree of integration of the Monpas to the Indian republic, states that the “Monpas need no further integration.”118 To her, it was Elwin’s philosophy for NEFA that enabled the young Monpa

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to state confidently, “We are neither the people of Gyaser (Tibet) nor the people of Gyakhar (India). We are Mon.”119 Yet, they are able to “adjust comfortably within the many identities that India represents.”120 The question of integration and the idea that Niru espoused vis-à-vis the Monpas may evenly be applied across the ingenious tribal communities in the state. They are thoroughly (emotionally and culturally) integrated into the concept of India, regardless of ethnic variances, numerical variations, or geographical regions. Rarely would one encounter a villager in Arunachal Pradesh who would not speak Hindi and sing national songs. The author has come across some villagers in one of the most remote places in the state, who did not know that Pema Khandu was the chief minister, but could communicate in Hindi and sing some patriotic songs. Very often it has been observed that Arunachalees express the feeling of nationalism in a somewhat ‘negative way’. They have a deep attachment with Indian culture and civilisations in a positive way. In a negative way, they tend to believe that China is the number one enemy, and that the Chinese are the worst people on this planet. Nehru-Elwin’s pre-1962 ‘philosophy and panchsheel’ and the policy of ‘nationalising a frontier space’, post 1962, are primarily responsible for the nationalistic fervor of the people of Arunachal Pradesh. However, a new discourse is becoming popular among the new generation young Arunachalees, the discourse that the Government of India is “not doing enough”: (i) to counter Communist China’s incursion into Indian territory, south of McMahon Line; (ii) to address the issue of stapled visa; and (iii) to lessen the trust-deficit, which means New Delhi’s failure to trust the ‘nationalism’ of the people of state. The retention of Article 371(H), entrusting ‘special responsibility’ to the governor, is seen more as an instrument to control and regulate the antinational activities of the people of the state, which the Government of India might be anticipating. A comparable constitutional provision exists for the state of Nagaland (Article 371A (1) (b)), which has a lengthy history of internal unrest. Since Arunachal Pradesh has been a highly tranquil state with no signs of extremism or secessionism, drawing parallels between Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh contributes significantly to the ‘trust­

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deficit’. Politically speaking, it violates the basic federal principles that bind the state and the centre towards harmonious relationship. There were two Resolutions passed by the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (2013 and 2020) urging the Union Government to expeditiously amend the Article 371(H) of the constitution at par with the provision of Article 371A (1). The Resolutions demanded special constitutional protection in respect of religious and social practices, customary laws and rights of ownership and transfer of land and its resources. The ‘new discourse’ is inclusive of peoples’ strong resentment over the settlement of the Chakmas, Hajongs and ex-Assam Rifles personnel on strategic considerations. These categories of outsiders were settled in a territory that enjoys unique legal protection, and with no consultations with the representatives of indigenous communities. Arunachal Pradesh is one of the four states in India that is protected by the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873. The Regulation provides that an official permit, Inner Line Permit, is required to be obtained even by the fellow Indian citizens to enter the state. Second, at the time of settlement of outsiders/refugees the state was under direct control of the president, through the Governor of Assam. There were no elected representatives of the host communities, who should have been consulted prior to the settlement. Infrastructure development in the initial days of NEFA was Chinacentric rather than people-centric. The road construction programme, in particular, was based on the strategic calculations of Indian army. It seemed that no developmental initiatives could take place without a nod from the military establishments. Chaudhury (1983: 269) aptly describes the situation then: The NEFA administration originally projected an ambitious programme to carry over the roads already built, to point close to the international border to facilitate movements of men and material, but owing to opposition from the Army who had in the meantime taken control of the forward areas, the project was reviewed in New Delhi and dropped. The Army reportedly argued that the roads, if extended very close to the frontier, might hold potential prospect for the enemy

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who could use them to their advantage. It was finally decided not to have roads within 30 miles of the border.121

The changing political and strategic factors have necessitated a change in the Government of India’s vision of the Indian Army and prescriptions for the development of the new Arunachal Pradesh. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the state in 2008, he announced a major package to “address the critical infrastructure and connectivity requirements” of Arunachal Pradesh. A major part of the package was for the construction of 24,000-km trans-Arunachal Pradesh Highway, connecting the west and the east- from Tawang to Kanubari. It is altogether another matter that the proposed highway could not be completed till the day because of corruption at the local level. The Rs 1,000 crore project to refurbish the seven advanced airfields, called advanced landing grounds, was initiated in 2009. All these airfields have been made operational by the Indian Air Force. These are Passighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro, Along and Vijaynagar. The Sela Tunnel Project, considered to be an important project to enhance border connectivity for the Indian Army, is part of the Balipara-CharduarTawang road. It will ensure all-weather connectivity and cut across 4170 m (13,700 ft) Sela Pass, minimising travelling time by approximately one hour. From the perspective of national policymakers and strategists, traves of an Army-centric development plan are still discernible. Evidently, the primary objective of the Sela Tunnel Project, is to “ensure that the Chinese are not able to monitor traffic movement in the area,” and it is “designed in such a way that all army equipment, including tanks and Vajra howitzers, can pass through them, away from the praying eyes of the Chinese.”122 The BJP government is proposing the Arunachal Frontier Highway, another ‘strategic’ project, a 2,000-km road that runs almost parallel to the McMahon Line. It has the potential to “provide a huge boost to the Army’s capability to move from one valley to another.”123 The Government of India has undertaken number of initiatives for the socio-economic improvement of the residents inhabiting the border areas.The initiatives include the Border Area Development Programme.124 However, these initiatives have failed to reach the intended beneficiaries because of

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the local politics and corrupt practices. So long as the accountability and transparency are ensured, any kind of border management programmes will not be beneficial to the borderland communities. The Communist China sees red whenever the Dalai Lama visits Arunachal Pradesh. With the advancing age of the Dalai Lama, China’s nervousness also grows because it is widely speculated that he may anoint his successor from Tawang or any part of Mon region of the state. Arunachal Pradesh continues to be in ‘strategic spotlight’ with no hope of bonhomie between India and China in the near future.

Notes 1. 2.

G.F. Hudson, “The Frontier of China and Assam: Background to the Fighting,”

China Quarterly, No. 12 (October-December, 1962), p. 203.

The original purpose for the British to come to Assam was to restore order and

to drive out Burmese invaders. However, they later realised that the tea plant was native to the area and discovered oil, coal and other minerals. They found the area

attractive for capital investment. It was also realised that for economy to grow there

was a need for peace and order in the area. Some of the tribals used to conduct raids in the villages of Assam plains, in retaliation of plain traders, who ventured into the tribal territory exploited natural resources (killing elephants for ivory, feeling trees

for timber, etc). The Regulation aimed at restricting the non-natives’ entry into tribal

territory. As per Section 3 of the Regulation, any outsider shall be required to obtain 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

a permit called “Inner Line Permit” to cross the Inner Line.

Bose, M.L., History of Arunachal Pradesh (New Delhi, Concept Publishing House, 1997), p. 121. Ibid.

Leo E. Rose and Margaret W. Fischer, The North East Frontier Agency of India

(Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California, 1967), p. 21.

Robert Reid, History of the Frontier Area Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941 (New Delhi, Spectrum, 1997), p. 238. Rose and Fischer, n. 5.

Christoph von Fuhrer Haimendorf, Himalayan Barbary (London: John Murray, 1955), p. viii.

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9.

Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (Dehradun, Natraj Publishers, 2020), p. 59.

10. They were: (1) Rules for Administration of Justice in Central and Eastern Section, (2) Rules for Administration of Justice in Lakhimpur Frontier Tract and (3) Rules for Administration of Justice in Western Section. In 1937, the Rules were modified and

issued under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the following forms: (1) Rules for Administration of Justice in Sadiya Frontier Tract, (2) Rules for Administration of Justice in Lakhimpur Frontier Tract, and (3) Rules for administration of Justice in Balipara Frontier Tract.

11. The village authorities, till today, try any cases involving the following offences within their jurisdiction: Theft, Mischief, Simple hurt, Criminal trespass/house trespass and Assault or using criminal force).

12. The Ahoms are a Shan descent invaded Brahmaputra Valley (Assam) in 1228 A.D. and ruled here for 600 years.

13. The items included salt, cotton cloths, iron hoe, etc. Later, during British period, it was substituted by cash payment.

14. Savitri G. Burman, “NEFA-the Land and Its People,” India Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4, October-December, 1963, p. 336.

15. The unique administrative system was known as ‘Single Line Administration’. The Deputy Commissioner (Political Officer before 1965) was vested with the chief

administrative authority within the district. He acts as the executive head of the

District looking after development, Panchayats, local bodies and civil administration. He also remains the District Magistrate, who is responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

16. Jawaharlal Nehru envisaged Panchsheel (five principles) for tribal development. Please see ‘Foreword’ by Jawaharlal Nehru, to ‘A Philosophy for NEFA’ by Verrier

Elwin, Shillong, 1969. The principles are as follows: “(i) People should develop along the lines of their own genius”. “(ii) Tribal rights in land and forests should be respected”.“(iii) The government of India should try to train and build up a

team of their own people to do the work of administration and development”. “(iv) The government should not over-administer these areas or overwhelm them with a multiplicity of schemes”. “(v) The government should judge results, not by

statistics or the amount of money spent, but by the quality of human character that is evolved”.

The “Arunachal” factor in Sino-Indian Relations | 137

17. The Tribal People of India, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1973, p. 4.

18. The Arunachal Pradesh Code, Vol. I, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, 1982, p. 2.

19. S. Datta, “Student Movement in Arunachal Pradesh,” in A.K. Baruah (ed.), Student Power in North East India (New Delhi: Regency, 2002), p. 217.

20. Sanjib, Baruah, Durable Disorder Understanding the Politics of Northeast India (New Delhi: Oxford, 2005), p. 35.

21. The plain portions of the Balipara Frontier Tract, Tirap Frontier Tract, Abor

Hills District and Mishmi Hills District were transferred to the administrative

jurisdiction of Assam vide Notification No. TAD/R/35/50/109, February 23, 1951).

22. J.N. Choudhury, Arunachal Pradesh: Frontier Tract to Union Territory (Shillong, Cosmo Publications, 1983), p. 269.

23. Tony Huber, “Micro-Migration of Hill Peoples in Northern Arunachal Pardesh: Rethinking Methodologies and Claims of origin in Tibet,” in Toni Huber and Staurt Blackburn (eds.), Origin and Migrations in the Extended Eastern Himalayas (Boston: Brill, 2012), p. 100.

24. The Arunachal Review, 1998.

25. Authored by Verrier Elwin, the book contains the policy framework for future

development of Arunachal Pradesh. All administrators religiously followed the framework suggested in the book.

26. The introduction of Panchayati Raj, in Arunachal Pradesh, preceded the universal adult franchise. The first general election to the Lok Sabha in the state was held

1977, and the first general election to the Legislative Assembly a year later. Till 1977, Arunachal Pradesh was represented by one member in the Lok Sabha, to be

nominated by the President of India from among the ‘Schedule Tribes’ of the area by the Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Representation of People Act, 1950.

27. Choudhury, n. 22, p. 264.

28. On November 12, 1958 he decided to make a symbolic protest by trying to cross the ‘Inner Line’ without obtaining valid permit. He was arrested and brought down to the town of Dibrugarh in Assam, where he was set free.

29. Elwi, n. 16, p. 295. 30. Ibid.

138 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

31. At present there are 37 educational institutions run by the Vivekananda Kendra, Arunachal Pradesh Trust, 2 by the Sarda Mission and 3 by the Ramakrishna Mission (with a hospital).

32. J.N. Choudhury, Arunachal Through the Ages, Shillong ( Jaya Choudhury), 1982, p. 268.

33. An official communication from PN Luthra, advisor to the Assam governor, to

Political Officers of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). No. RR.17/64, dated Shillong, the 21st April 1965.

34. Ibid.

35. The White Paper on Chakma and Hajong Refugee Issue, Government of Arunachal Pradesh (1986).

36. The Special Survey on Chakma-Hajong Population (2010-11, Government of Arunachal Pradesh).

37. As per the 2011 Census there are 1,866 persons spreading over ten villages.

38. Webpage of All Settlers’ Welfare Association, at http://www.aswa.org.in/history, accessed on September 2, 2020.

39. Dinesh Sharma, “Arunachal PRC Issue: History of Gorkha Settlement in Vijaynagar,” at https://medium.com/@oyeketa/arunachal-prc-issue-history-of-gorkha-settlement­ in-vijaynagar-246b5a370e73, accessed on October 2, 2020.

40. Vide Letter No. 210(11)/63 NI dated 22nd January 1964 and Secretary, Development, NEFA, Shillong Letter No. PC 42/63 dated 16/17 August 1963.

41. Resettlement of Ex-servicemen near Seijosa, Public Accounts Committee (1977-78), Sixth Lok Sabha, Twenty First Report, pp. 7-8.

42. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs the scheme provided for a grant of Rs. 2,550 per family for purchase of live stock including a pair of pigs, three cows and one unit of poultry for every family. This was to enable the settlers to set up subsidiary occupations like piggery, poultry, etc. The NEFA Administration sanctioned grants (in cash and kind) to each family in this regard.

43. Assam Rifles Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society vs Union Of India & Another (1990 AIR 111, 1989 SCR (2) 853).

44. Sujit Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” Strategic Analysis, 45

Vol. 32, No. 4, July 2008, p. 557. Ibid.

The “Arunachal” factor in Sino-Indian Relations | 139

46. Wasbir Hussain, “China’s Arunachal Fixation,” at http://cdpsindia.org/views/ chinas-arunachal-fixation/, accessed on October 5, 2020.

47. Ibid.

48. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” The New York Times, April 19, 2010.

49. Ibid.

50. Jeffrey Reeves, “Arunachal Pradesh: A Crux of Sino-Indian Rivalry,” Small Wars,

at https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/773-reeves.pdf, accessed on December 26, 2020.

51 “Concession on Tawang can resolve India-China border dispute,” Hindustan Times, at

https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/concession-on-tawang-can­

resolve-india-china-border-disp, accessed on October 10, 2020.

52. Tsewang Dorji, “Tibetan Narrative on Tawang– A Historical Approach,” at https:// tibetpolicy.net/tibetan-narrative-on-tawang-a-historical-approach,

October 10, 2020.

accessed

on

53. Swargajyoti Gohain, “Embattled Frontiers and Emerging Spaces Transformation of

the Tawang Border,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 52 No. 15, April 15, 2017, p. 88.

54. Ibid. 55. Ibid.

56. Lars-Erik Nyman, “Tawang—A Case Study of British Frontier Policy in the Himalayas,” Journal of Asian History, 1976, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1976, p. 152.

57 Jia Liang, “Tawang’s history affirms China’s sovereignty,” Global Times, at https:// www.globaltimes.cn/content/1042333.shtml, accessed on October 10, 2020.

58. The North-East Frontier of India (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1989), p. 16. 59. Nyman, n. 56.

60. Quoted in Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers No More (New Delhi: Aleph, 2018), p. 215. 61. Nyman, 56.

62. Alastair Lamb, The McMahon Line: a study in the relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914, Vol. I (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 310.

63. J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2010), p. 9. 64. Lamb, n. 62, p. 12.

65. Berlil Lintner, India’s China War (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 40.

140 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

66. Henry McMahon, then foreign secretary to the ‘government of India, was the

chairman of the conference, assisted by Archibald Rose and Charles Bell (British Political Representative to Sikkim). The Tibetan plenipotentiary was Lonchen

Shatra Paljor Dorje. He was assisted by Trimon Norbu Wangyal and Khen-chung

Tenpa Dhargyal. Ivan Chen (or Chen Yifan) with his assistant Wang Haiping represented China. As per the Article 9 of the Convention, Tibet was divided into

“Outer Tibet” and “Inner Tibet”. “Inner Tibet” was to remain under the jurisdiction

of the Chinese government and “Outer Tibet” was given autonomy. The People’s Republic of China turned Outer Tibet into Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965 and the areas in Inner Tibet were merged with adjacent Chinese provinces.

67. Lintner, n. 65.

68. Karunakar Gupta, “The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy,” The China Quarterly, July-September 1971, No. 47, p. 522.

69. Maxwell, n. 9, p. 46.

70. J.J. Singh, The McMahon Line—A Century of Discord (Noida: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2019), p. 163.

71. Nyman, n. 56, p. 152. 72. Gupta, n. 68.

73 Norbu Tsering, “The Simla Convention of 1914-an appraisal”, at http:/www.phayul. com, accessed on September 20, 2020.

74. Lobsang Tenpa, “The Centenary of the McMahon Line (1914-2014) and the

Status of Monyul until 1951-2,” The Tibet Journal, Autum/Winter Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, 2001, p. 63.

75. Gupta, n. 68, p. 526.

76. I.O.R.: Pol. (External) Dept.: Collection 37/File 28. No. P.Z. 9019/1935, quoted in Gupta, n. 68, p. 545.

77. A.G. Noorani, Indo-China Boundary Problem 1847-1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 200.

78. quoted in Gupta, n. 68, p. 545.

79. Alstair Lamb, The China-India Border (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 150.

80. Tenpa, n. 74.

81. http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2012/10/1962-mcmahon-line-saga.html, on October 28, 2020.

accessed

The “Arunachal” factor in Sino-Indian Relations | 141

82. Maxwell, n. 9, p. 56.

83. Sidharth Mishra, “Forgotten: The man who won us Tawang,” The Pioneer, March 10, 2012, 20: 21.

84. Claude Arpi, “Tawang: The Land of Mon”, at https://claudearpi.blogspot. com/2017/12/the-land-of-mon.html, accessed on December, 2, 2020.

85. Himatsinghji was the then deputy defence minister. Deputy prime minister, Patel was assisted by Girija Shankar Bajpai, the MEA’s Secretary General.

86. Claude Arpi, “The man who brought Tawang under India,” The Poineer, September 10, 2015.

87. Sujit Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” Strategic Analysis, 32: 4, p. 563.

88. Neeru Manda, “Tawang and the Mon in their Borderlands: A Historical Overview,” in . Mayilvaganan, Nasima Khatoon and Sourima Bej (eds.), Tawang, Monpas and

Tibetan Buddhism in Transition: Life and Society along the India-China Borderland,

(New Delhi: Springer, 2020).

89. Bose, n. 3, p. 140.

90. Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic of

China on the Boundary Question, 1961, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p. 280.

91. T.S. Murty, Paths of Peace: Studies on the Sino-Indian Border Dispute (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1983), p. 174.

92. C. Raja Mohan, “China’s stapled visa unstaples its stand on Arunachal,” The Indian Express, at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinas-stapled-visa-unstaples-its­ stand-on arunachal/738446/, accessed on October 23, 2020.

93. Ibid.

94. Onkar Singh, “BJP MPs demand verifying Chinese intrusion,” rediff.com, at https:// www.rediff.com/news/2003/May, accessed on October 25, 2020.

95. Telephonic interview, on October 14, 2020.

96. “China denies visa to IAS officer from Arunachal,” Financial Express, at https:// www.financialexpress.com/archive/china-denies-visa-to-ias-officer-from­ arunachal/200132/, accessed October 28, 2020.

97. Personal interview with Tasso Butung, on October 23, 2009.

98. It is called ‘stapled visa’ because stapler is used to fasten the paper which is attached separately with a passport. In a normal practice a stamp is put on one’s passport in

142 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

order to know why and which country one is visiting. When a traveller is issued Stapled Visa, the stamp is put on an additional paper instead of the passport.

99. Asgar Qadri, “Story Behind a Stapled Chinese Visa,” at https://india.blogs.nytimes.

com/2013/11/08/story-behind-a-stapled-chinese-visa/, accessed on October 26,

2020).

100 C. Raja Mohan, “China’s stapled visa unstaples its stand on Arunachal,” The Indian Express, at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinas-stapled-visa-unstaples-its­ stand-on-arunachal/738446/, accessed on October 21, 2020.

101. Telephonic interview, on October 15, 2020. 102. Telephonic interview, on October 10, 2020. 103. Telephonic interview, on October 12, 2020.

104. “My Stapled visa to China,” The Arunachal Times, July 12, 2012.

105. These women represented the Arunachal Pradesh Women Welfare Society, an

apex women organisation in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, as a part of Country Women’s Association of India.

106. Personal interview with Tsering Gurmey, at his official residence, Itanagar, on October 11, 2020.

107. The Arunachal Front, December 9, 2007.

108. The Arunachal Front, December 12, 2007.

109. Manish Pratim Bhuyan, “Not Issuing Visas to Kashmiris Anymore,” Outlook India,

at https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/not-issuing-stapled-visa­

to-kashmiris-anymore-china, accessed on October 24, 2020.

110. J M Varma, “No change in our Arunachal policy: China”, Outlook India, at https://

www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/no-change-in-arunachal-policy-china/708,

accessed on October 22, 2020.

111. “China says no change in its Arunachal Pradesh Policy,” The Economic Times, January 17,

2011,

at

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/

china-says-no-change-in-its-arunachal-pradesh-policy/articleshow/7304065. cms?from=mdr, accessed on October 27, 2020.

112. “India’s response to stapled visas for Arunachal sportsman,” NDTV, at https:// www.ndtv.com/india-news/indias-response-to-stapled-visas-for-arunachal­ sportsman-444829, accessed on October 27, 2020.

113. Sandeep Dikshit, “Arunachal Archers with stapled visas prevented from leaving for China,” The Hindu, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/arunachal-archers­

The “Arunachal” factor in Sino-Indian Relations | 143

with-stapled-visas-prevented-from-leaving-for-china/article5226118.ece, accessed on October 28, 2020.

114. The Independent Review, October 12, 2013. 115. He was then the BJP president.

116. The Arunachal Times, December 2, 2013.

117. The Arunachal Pioneer, November 24, 2016.

118. Niru Nanda, “Tawang and the Mon in their Borderlands: A Historical Overview,” in M. Mayilvaganan, Nasima Khatoon, Sourina Bej (eds.), Tawang, Monpas, and

Tibetan Buddhism in Transition: Life and Society along the India-China Borderland” (New Delhi: Springer, 2020), p. 41.

119. Ibid. 120. Ibid.

121. Choudhury, n. 22, p. 269.

122. “Modi govt moves with Arunachal Frontier Highway, among India’s ‘toughest’ projects yet, China in mind,” The Print, at https://theprint.in/defence/modi-govt­

moves-with-arunachal-frontier-highway-among-indias-toughest-projects-yet­ china-in-mind/1232207/, accessed on November 28, 2022.

123. Ibid.

124. The Ministry of Home Affairs, GoI, describes the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) as a “comprehensive approach to Border Management. The programme aims to meet the special development needs of the people living in

remote and inaccessible areas situated near the international border and to saturate

the border areas with the essential infrastructure through convergence of Central/ State/BADP/Local schemes and participatory approach.”

125. Mohan Guruswamy, “China and Arunachal Pradesh: Time to Understand the

History”, The Citizen, at https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/

index/4/19107/China-and-Arunachal-Pradesh-Time-to-Understand-the-History, accessed on November 2, 2020.

6

Sikkim where India-China Meet

Reflections on Chinese Encroachment

Ananta Swarup Bijendra De Gurung

Introduction

Sikkim shares a 204-220 km (approx) long land border with China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Though Sikkim and Tibet have been recognised as mutual territories by India and China in 2003-04, the recent encroachment by China at Naku La in Sikkim (2021, 2020, 2017), Pangong Tso, and Galwan region of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh (2020) cast a shadow on the peaceful coexistence agreements, once again revealing the disputed and ill-defined nature of Sino-India borders. While there are opportunities to build confidence between the two nuclear powers of South Asia in the form of border trade, for instance via Nathu La, which opened in 2006-07, the bilateral trade remains neglected and limited through the high altitude border trading point on both sides. Geo-economic potentials have suffered in the light of geopolitical objectives. It is thus imperative to understand why there are instances of border incursion in Sikkim especially when China has recognised Sikkim’s de-jure status. The chapter argues that the Chinese aggressive posture in Sikkim is a part of a larger Chinese strategy to open multiple fronts against India at different flanks in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean in the hope to stretch India’s resources thin and make substantial gains in the contested territories. By doing this, Beijing

Sikkim where India-China Meet | 145

also anticipates exposing the limits of India’s commitment towards small powers in South Asia to command their unconditional allegiance.

Sikkim: From Protectorate to Indian State

Since 1814, Sikkim’s strategic significance has attracted the interest of the East India Company.1 In 1849, under the pretense of torture of two British officials, British Government of India troops pushed advanced on Tumlung, then the capital of Sikkim, and assumed effective control over much of the kingdom.2 The status of Sikkim later as a British ‘protectorate’ was confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1890.3 The treaty also sought to settle the border between Tibet and Sikkim which was vehemently opposed by the Tibetans. The unyielding attitude of the Tibetans, however, resulted in Younghusband mission to Lhasa in 1903 that lasted until 1904. And as it is evident from the account of Younghusband himself that the mission was carried through Sikkim into the forbidden land, Tibet.4 This also suggests the viability of Sikkim for the British as a region of great value. The consequence of the aforementioned mission and the subsequent Lhasa Convention 1904 was the recognition of Article 1 of the AngloChinese Treaty of 1890 by Tibet that demarcated the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet.5 When India finally emerged as an independent nation in 1947 it was clear from the mood of the Congress leaders that India would continue the British policy at varying degrees so far as Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan were concerned. New Delhi’s policy after 1947 in the case of Sikkim reflected a level of intervention considered consistent with India’s political and security requirements in the border area.6 The Government of India gradually took over the rights exercised by the British in Sikkim. The instability during the second half of the 1940s in the kingdom of Sikkim went a long way in deepening this role of India. The instability was grave enough to make the monarchy accept Indian support in terms of maintaining order and smoothly run the Sikkimese administration. By 1950, India had already started negotiating new treaties with the kingdom of Sikkim and Nepal. The new India-Sikkim Treaty of 1950 outlined the status and relationship between the two sovereign nations.7 The same treaty consolidated India’s

146 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

suzerainty over Sikkim. The last Chogyal (King) of Sikkim, Palden Thondup Namgyal (1923-1981), attempted during the 1960s and the early half of the 1970s to forge a unique worldwide identity for his country in order to emphasise and define its status as a sovereign entity.8 An important milestone in Sikkim-India bilateral history was the Sikkim Agreement signed in 1973. Following the tripartite agreement/ Sikkim Agreement in 1973 among the Government of India, the Chogyal, and Kazi Lhendup Dorji (leader of the democratic design in Sikkim) a new constitutional arrangement was worked out under the label of ‘democratization’.9 The single most important contribution of the 1973 agreement was the recognition of ‘one man, one vote’ by the three parties that later became the foundation of democratic Sikkim.10 The two treaties ensured that Sikkim would continue to have very limited internal autonomy and exterior affairs (military and communications) directed by India. The 1975 referendum two years later confirmed the merger with India and abolished the monarchy in Sikkim.11 Since then, Sikkim has become the 22nd state to join the Indian Union. The preceding summary is in no way an attempt to oversimplify or neglect the complexity of the decades-long history of the Sikkim-India union, but rather acknowledges its difficulties. However, the current discussion should be sufficient to provide context for the subsequent argument.

Sikkim’s Strategic Importance

Sikkim is one of India’s strategically located Northeastern states, as it borders the most powerful and assertive northern neighbour in South Asia: the People’s Republic of China (PRC). First, Sikkim’s strategic significance is not only accentuated by its proximity to the Siliguri corridor: the infamous chicken neck (only 17 km at its narrowest), but Sikkim has numerous high altitude passes that act as important natural corridors. For example, Nathu La, Cho La, and Jelep La in East and Naku La, Kongra La in the North Sikkim. Sikkim is also labelled as one of the five fingers in the Chinese policy circle. The control of these passes, thus, is of utmost significance, especially when India’s security is pitted against a prosperous, emboldened, and assertive China.The show of bellicose attitude by China in Sikkim and

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along the entire stretch of the contested Himalayan region only reiterate the fact that China had just shelved Mao’s Five Fingers policy but had not abandoned it in reality. India cannot allow China to reduce the status of Sikkim and the other disputed points in the Himalayas into a new buffer zone in the strategic Himalayan game. Therefore, any southward push by China should be met with firm resistance and resilience. Second, Sikkim is also the only Indian state situated closest to the strategic Doklam Plateau, which is encircled by Sikkim (India), Chumbi Valley (TAR of China), and Ha Valley (Bhutan). Doklam (Dzonkha, Bhutanese) or Donglang (pinyin, Chinese) is a heavily contested territory between China and Bhutan. India and China clashed over Doklam in 2017 when the former attempted to extend a road and beef up military presence. India intervened on behalf of Bhutan invoking a treaty commitment first signed in 1949 that was reaffirmed in 2007. The 1949 Treaty of Friendship lets India guide Bhutan’s foreign policy over border sovereignty and discusses matters of foreign and defence affairs.12 Though the standoff has been deescalated since, it is reported that China has quietly deployed new troops and made substantial territorial gains by constructing a 12-km-long stretch from Yatung in Chhumbi Valley to Doklam after both the countries agreed to withdraw their troops.13 However, if it weren’t for Indian troops who were based just across the border in Sikkim, Beijing would have changed the status quo ante of the plateau region entirely and claimed territories further south of Doklam. Among others, this would mean a loss of strategic trust between India and its South Asian partners, especially Bhutan and Nepal. India and its neighbourhood policy cannot afford to suffer from a trust deficit at this critical juncture, especially when China has upped its South Asian diplomacy. India must therefore prioritise the defence of Sikkim, vigilance against bullying, and backing for its neighbour’s claim against China. This will reassure India’s neighbours that it is committed to sustaining peace and stability in the area and reduce fears of abandonment. Third, Sikkim should not only be recognised as an epicenter for crossborder trade but one of the routes to the Kailash and Mansarovar in Tibet via Nathu La. The Government of India should encourage such cross-border pilgrimage tourism. It could well become the most viable source of revenue

148 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

for Sikkim.14 This can facilitate infrastructural buildups and communication linkages that will not only meet the development deficit but also better connect Sikkim with the mainland, hence lessening prejudices of merger and marginalisation. If Beijing can invest in all-weather roads and railways fanning the farthest reaches of its territory and across the Himalayas (case in point, Qinghai-Tibet railway, restored Karakoram Highway improving connectivity between China and Pakistan, proposed Sino-Nepal Railway), New Delhi should seriously think of investing in fast-paced infrastructure development in its border region, ceteris paribus. India’s Project Sampark that launched six new bridges in Jammu and Kashmir in 2020,15 Atal Tunnel an all-weather passageway at Rohtang in Himachal Pradesh that was personally inaugurated by Prime Minister Modi in the same year,16 and Sela Pass tunnel which is set to grant all-weather access to the Indian forces in Arunachal Pradesh, another theatre of India-China conflict,17 are all indicative of this strategic thinking. Three more bridges are proposed for Himachal Pradesh, 29 for Arunachal Pradesh, and eight for Sikkim.18 As there are no fresh strategic project ideas in Sikkim on the scale described above, it appears that Sikkim has failed to draw similar attention to the geopolitical policy of New Delhi, despite the fact that it is one of the most significant strategic border states in the Eastern Himalayas. The government along with the strategic communities of India should give serious second thought to the deficit. Recalibrated strategic project policies in Sikkim would mean New Delhi will be able to hit two targets with one arrow; first, act as strategic roads facilitating quicker troops movement in the event of a border conflict, and second, be an enabler of tourism at times of peace, building social capital and ushering economic development. It could be a win-win situation for all the stakeholders—the people of Sikkim, the Government of India (GoI), and the security forces. Fourth, Sikkim is also an area where Indian troops have a geo-strategic and tactical advantage.19 And as Indian military strategy is heavily dominated by ground forces managing threats20 it gives Indian troops the much-needed offence-defence vantage point from an elevated position on account of an actual war. A similar high-ground advantage was exploited by Pakistan during the Kargil War (1999). The elevated position of the Pakistanis meant

Sikkim where India-China Meet | 149

that Indian troops had to attack from below to recapture the occupied highaltitude Indian posts.21 Though the war was won, such a tactical disadvantage made the Indian counteroffensive much costlier. Drawing a parallel, the topography and climate of the Kargil region and the Sikkim border are not so dissimilar. Thus, on account of advancing troops from below, similar advantages can be repeated and exploited, which will serve as a deterrence, causing the adversary to reconsider their decision to undertake the costly venture. Therefore, the logic dictates that India should defend its position, not concede the natural strategic edge present in Sikkim to its benefit.

Chinese Encroachments in the Himalayas

The number of aggressions in the disputed border of the Himalayas has shown an uptick in the recent Sino-India bilateral history though their economic relations have improved manifold. For instance, China’s encroachment at Naku La in Sikkim (2021, 2020, 2017), and Pangong Tso and Galwan region of Ladakh (2020). Similarly, the Chinese intrusion was also reported in the disputed territory of Tsari Chu in Arunachal Pradesh in 2020 that is claimed as an extension of Tibet. The incursions have not only occurred on the Indian border regions but China had openly laid claims to the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, which lies in Bhutan’s eastern district of Trashigang during the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) meeting in June 2020.22 China has also made an inroad in the remote Nepalese border villages of Humla in September 2020 and the Daulakha district in 2021. In addition to the border states of Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Ladakh, Bhutan and Nepal are special treaty partners that India considers to be within its sphere of influence. The security of these areas is tantamount to India’s security. What is ironic is the fact that British officials had constantly warned about the possibility that the Chinese might expand their control from Tibet into neighbouring areas decades ago.23 The warnings have come full circle to haunt India. Sino-India border dispute at Ladakh was first reported in 1959.24 This was also an important year for Beijing as it had put an end to the popular uprising inside Tibet by force and transferred effective control of Lhasa to the Chinese. And it is only after the Chinese occupation of Tibet, in

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1950s, that India and China came to share the now disputed border.25 In 1962, India and China fought a border war in India’s northern and eastern front. The Chinese declared a ceasefire within just over a month of war and withdrew but had captured large swaths of territories inside India. Thus, by the end of the war, the Chinese occupied Aksai Chin in northern India and had already advanced several kilometers inside the eastern front by crossing the McMahon Line into Arunachal Pradesh. The next important episode between India and China took place in 1967 when the Chinese forces opened fired at the Indian patrol party at Nathu La in East Sikkim. Though Sikkim wasn’t a formal state of the Indian Union until 1975, it was then a ‘protectorate’ inherited from the British. During the 1967 Nathu la and Cho La standoff, India and China had inflicted several casualties on both sides. The incident mentioned above occurred prior to the Pangong Tso and Galwan skirmishes in May-June 2020, which are considered as one of the most serious clashes involving the troops of India and China after 1962. The only difference is that the 1967 Sino-India clash cannot be legally claimed to have occurred inside the territory of India per se, whereas the recent scuffles involve territories just west of Aksai Chin claimed under the sovereign jurisdiction of India. One important objective that these sporadic Chinese interventions achieved is to leave no doubts in India’s policy and academic circle about Chinese intentions. The fundamental idea behind these incursions is to showcase that no strategic space in the Himalayas is beyond China’s prowess. Furthermore, these encroachments reveal China’s revisionist objective, which casts a shade on the bilateral peace agreements between China and India. China’s activities underscore the vulnerability of India’s Sikkim border states, even though China and India jointly acknowledged Sikkim and Tibet as shared territories in 2003-2004. Since then, India has agreed to put a leash on anti-China protests by Tibetans in India, while China has removed Sikkim as an independent country from its foreign ministry website. But Beijing’s aggressive stance in Sikkim’s Naku La in 20 January 2021, once again reveals that it pays only lip service to a joint statement signed by A. B. Vajpayee and Wen Jiabao regarding the status of Sikkim and Tibet as well as mutual non-aggression, which is one of the five pillars of the bilateral

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peaceful coexistence treaty that they agreed upon in the 1950s. The clash at Naku La, some 750 miles from Galwan, was reported amid the ongoing rounds of military talks regarding deliberation and disengagement of troops to diffuse tension from eastern Ladakh. Naku La, which is one of the most sensitive areas in North Sikkim, was also a site of a similar confrontation between India and China in May 2020 where troops of both countries sustained injuries though no shots were fired. During the 2017 Doklam standoffs, the intense conflict in north Sikkim was mirrored in the Naku La sector, resulting in multiple injuries on both sides. Following the resumption of communication between local commanders by the established protocols, the forces at Naku La disengaged mutually on each occasion shortly thereafter. This indicates that China is willing to readjust its stance and withdraw recognition of Sikkim when opportunities present themselves. Chinese government’s mouthpiece Global Times confirms this by emphasising that India has already overplayed the Dalai Lama card, therefore, readjusting its stance regarding Sikkim is not entirely implausible in the future.26 Though a military hotline has been established with the Chinese side in North Sikkim (Kongra La) since August 2021 to ensure real-time communication and avoid future confrontation, it is too early to comment on the efficacy especially when Beijing contemplates a revisionist agenda vis-à-vis Sikkim. Thus, blindly trusting the ‘Dragon’ in the strategic space of Sikkim and the Himalayas, in general, can reap the folly that Nehru once committed. This may as well be one of the important factors because of which border trade at Nathu La (East Sikkim) failed to launch itself since its inception in 2006-07. Not to mention there were over 75 Chinese troops intrusions in northern Sikkim during 2007, which exemplify internalised strategic mistrust between the two countries.27 Further, as per the official May 2012 revised items list by the Commerce and Industries Department, Government of Sikkim, there are only 20 goods that are imported and 36 items exported between the two countries via Nathu La.28 Despite the immense potential, the limited numbers of items traded after more than a decade expose that India and China were inclined towards the geopolitical game of mutual recognition of claimed territories viz. Sikkim and Tibet, rather than establish

152 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

trade route via the high pass. Moreover, the onset of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has dealt a severe blow to the already meager trade via Nathu La. It is a reminder of the idea that economic interdependence spillovers into greater prosperity and rapprochement to mitigate security dilemmas at the bilateral level is not necessarily accurate. The sporadic border incursions in Sikkim indicate the same logic. New Delhi as a consequence is beginning to rethink its approach to improve strategic assets in the state. Such strategic rethinking has found resonance in the Indian Army who on June 23, 2021, published the Request for Information for its Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle under ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ programme that will replace the old infantry vehicles to ensure a swift deployment in the high-altitude areas of Sikkim and Ladakh to fast-track Indian response on account of aggression from across the border.29 The Indian Army has also expressed its desire to raise an additional armoured brigade in Sikkim that will supplement the one currently deployed in the north and east Sikkim.30 Once complete, the beefing up of army personnel will effectively contribute to area denial, anti-access, and most significantly monitor the sensitive region. Regular surveillance and monitoring have additional benefits. It can lead to considerable border preparedness by quickly formulating a course of action by being able to distinguish between actual threats and a false alarm. Sikkim’s strategic importance grows manifold especially when Nathu La is designated as one of the five venues of Border Personnel Meetings (BPMs) between the Indian and Chinese Army. The BPMs point in Sikkim was formally established in 2013. The meeting is organised several times a year to discuss and resolve localised border issues. BPMs act as confidencebuilding measures and a vital communication channel in the event of border standoffs to prevent severe flare-ups and reduce tensions between the two nations. However, despite these mechanisms, the Chinese Army continues to violate Indian territory. In the Indian media, it has been reported that the transgressions along the entire Himalayan border rose to 426 in 2017 from 273 in 2016.31 Though the actual figures may be less than what has been reported there is no denying that there are instances of transgressions in Sikkim.32

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The strategic communities should understand that these infringements in Sikkim areas aren’t isolated incidents that reflect Beijing’s interest to effectively control the so-called five fingers (Sikkim, Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Nepal, and Bhutan), but is a grand strategy to establish regional hegemony in South Asia and most significantly test the resolve, capabilities and determination of India. The interventionist foreign policy pursued in relation to India, in particular, and in Southeast Asia, in general, echoes this. It hints at China’s desire to settle no less than a primus inter pares in Asia. Besides, it’s an open secret that the Chinese view of Asia has always been hierarchical with China at the zenith.33

Why do Chinese Incursions Occur?

A great power’s grand strategy is often intertwined with a state’s perceived or actual rivalry with another state.34 The argument holds especially when juxtaposed in the backdrop of Sino-India strategic competition in South Asia. Towards this, China conceived of a long-range Himalayan policy right from its inception, while it wasn’t till the closure of the 1950s and early 1960s that India began thinking in terms of an integrated policy approach that dealt with the entire eastern Himalayan region. 35 Since then, ties between the two countries have been difficult and occasionally explosive.36 The tussle for geostrategic upper hand and regional dominance has given rise to protracted conflicts in the form of border skirmishes between India and China. The sabre-rattling in the border region (Sikkim, Ladakh, and Arunachal Pradesh) is Beijing’s message to India that heated strategic competition can fetch costly repercussions. Chinese media articles since mid-2010 have regularly warned that China might ‘teach’ India a lesson.37 In 1979, China launched a brief military campaign against Vietnam during the third IndoChina War to teach them a lesson as well. The closest possible comrade of the time and a country that shared socialist ideology analogous to China did not deter China from launching a punitive offensive. Perhaps, the repeated incursions in the Himalayan region are timely signs that revisionist Beijing is not willing to just hold on to rhetoric against India, but is eager to put the mouth where its money is.

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The control of strategic passes scattered in Sikkim, Ladakh, and border areas of Nepal and Bhutan can also bestow China with capabilities to bend its competitor’s interest per Chinese will. By expressing this intent, Beijing sends at least two significant messages. First, Beijing is an effective, dependable counterbalance that is constantly within reach due to India’s aggressive mentality. Second, the Bhutan-China and Nepal-China border dispute negotiations will only be beneficial for all sides if they are conducted bilaterally, without the involvement of a third party (read India). A parallel policy is followed by China with other claimants (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia) in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. One crucial point that China wants to highlight through intermittent border incursions, is the repercussion of siding with India.The target audience is preferably the small powers of South Asia. This is precisely the reason why China carefully maps India’s close relationships with its neighbours. At the same time, China does not shy from employing the ‘carrot and stick’ tactic in the strategic vicinity. By doing so China wants to issue a tacit warning to the neighbours of India that in the event of an actual conflict, they would not be able to bank on New Delhi’s all-out support. The message that Beijing wants them to take note of is that an insecure and incapable India cannot risk war on their behalf disrupting the region-wide credibility of India. An added message China relays to India, its neighbouring countries, and the world is that new China is willing to risk all-out hostilities to secure its interests from the Himalayas of South Asia to oceans in the entire IndoPacific. For example, Beijing has already rejected the July 12, 2016, ruling at the Hague that invalidated its overarching claims on the entire SCS to emphasise a forceful point of ‘incompliance’. The involvement of offshore powers like America and its regional allies could not deter Beijing’s position in the SCS. By choosing to reject the Hague ruling China has risked heavy international condemnation while retaining its claims at all costs and reiterating to the international community that Beijing will forcefully secure its interests if push comes to shove. The newfound confidence possibly finds its resonance in the Himalayan region as well.This strategy of China could go a long way in the race to win regional allies in the Indian periphery rendering New Delhi’s regional diplomacy obsolete. Beijing would then become the

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sole net security and economic guarantor and fulfil its long ambition of dominating South Asian geopolitical and geo-economic space. Another important but related reason is that China is jockeying for a fait accompli in the Himalayas vis-à-vis India. This is largely done to undermine India’s advantageous position in the region. And if achieved, China can easily dictate the terms of its bilateral relations from the position of power not only with India but all the small powers scattered in South Asia. Additionally, the popular views in China that “India views China as its primary threat while China sees India as a secondary challenge” would stand justified.38 China would win a propaganda war in denying India a position as the primary strategic competitor in South Asia. Such a position would demoralise India’s immediate neighbours who look towards India as a strategic counterweight in the event of growing Chinese assertiveness and dent the status/influence of a nuclear weapons-capable country in its backyard. In the event of this unlikely scenario, small powers in the region will be forced to choose sides and become plausible vessel states in the geopolitical great games of India and China, which will prove detrimental to the former’s interests. Beijing is also determined to open multiple fronts against India at different flanks in the Himalayas backed by the salami-slicing tactic. The practical aspect of the policy is to gradually occupy the contested territory where the victim of the tactic has to either accept the new territorial statusquo or risk military confrontation with a larger and well-resourced country (read China).39 Some security analysts argue that “China has given up on its salami-slicing in favour of a more aggressive approach in and around its periphery”.40 Whatever be the case, China has successfully employed the policy and has made significant gains in the contested waters in SCS of Southeast Asia. For example, China was able to build numerous artificial islands in Johnson Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, etc. in SCS which is capable of stationing fighter planes and offer docking facilities for its warships significantly contributing to Beijing’s strategic foothold in the region. The moves of China were hardly met by force other than Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) conducted by America and its allies. Taking a cue from its unrestrained actions in the SCS, China seems to be making similar

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moves to advance when possible and agreeing to de-escalate in principle when required in the Himalayan border while constantly changing facts on the ground as the Galwan and Doklam incidents seem to suggest. In addition, China not only gives the impression that it relies on gains made from nibbled territories on land, but it also banks on winning regional allies by aiding to build strategic ports of the peripheral countries and later lease it for themselves in the maritime domain. For example, the Hambantota international port in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Chittagong and Mongla seaports in Bangladesh. The Chinese move to open multiple nodes of confrontation in the Himalayas, as exemplified in the preceding discussion, and to maintain a strategic presence in the oceanic fringes is a deliberate attempt to divert India’s attention on multiple issues at once in an effort to deplete New Delhi’s resources, thereby facilitating Beijing’s efforts to gain access to the disputed territories. Lastly, China is plausibly testing the waters in the Himalayan borders to gauge the reaction of India and reformulate its policy to achieve unhindered rise. The natural course of action for any rising/revisionist power (read China) then would be to carve a dominant position for itself. Though neither China nor India would deliberately embrace the ‘Thucydides trap’, it may be impossible for them to totally avoid it. China and India would deploy every logical strategy at their disposal to erase impediments on their road to becoming the most powerful regional actor in the near term and global participants in the long term, according to this inference. Beijing and New Delhi might as well begin with each other by the virtue of being their closest competitor. Therefore, distrust and misunderstandings between the two strategic rivals will no doubt flare towards periodic confrontations, short of war.

Conclusion

The border in the Himalayan region is far from pacified, a fact that frequent incursions by China suggest. Therefore, it is imperative for India to know the full facts of its boundaries and assess them from the prism of defence and security. Emphasis should be placed on a rational and coherent Himalayan and neighbourhood policy that does not negate the

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geopolitical determinants of its foreign policy but improves its strategic position vis-à-vis China. Sikkim, like other border states, can play a significant role in this Himalayan strategy to protect India’s interests in the region. India should also resolutely affirm that Sikkim along with Nepal and Bhutan are no more tributary states of the once-powerful Qing Empire, and any intentions to change the status quo will be with suitable Indian resistance.

Notes 1. 2. 3.

4. 5

S. C. Sen, “Sikkim-Where Feudalism Fights Democracy,” Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee/Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 8 (3/4), 1975, p. 346.

N. Ram, “Sikkim Story: Protection to Absorption,” Social Scientist, 3 (2), September

1974, p. 63.

Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 2001), p. 169.

Frank Younghusband, “The Geographical Result of the Tibetan Mission,” The

Geographical Journal, 25 (5), May 1905, p. 483.

“Convention between the United Kingdom and China Respecting Tibet, Signed

April 27, 1906,” The American Journal of International Law, 1 (1), January 1907, p.

79, at https://www.jstor.org/stable/2212341?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A8d 07f9fba785c832ef999af504fe3a79&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, accessed on July

6. 7. 8. 9.

19, 2021.

Leo E. Rose, “India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship,” Pacific Affairs, 42 (1), Spring, 1969, p. 33.

Nirmal Chandra Sinha, “The Sikkim Agreement 1973,” India Quarterly, 29 (2),

April-June 1973, p. 155.

Jackie Hiltz, “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s,” Bulletin of Tibetology, 39 (2), 2003, p. 67.

N. Ram, “Sikkim Story: Protection to Absorption,” Social Scientist, 3 (2), September 1974, p. 57.

10. “Agreement between the Government of India, the Chogyal of Sikkim and the

Leaders of the Political Parties of Sikkim,” India Quarterly, 30 (1), January 1, 1974, pp. 71-72, at https://www.jstor.org/stable/45070093?read-now=1&refreqid=excel

sior%3Aab4ebd599a5edeaebc61e06c6b65bd82&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents,

accessed on July 19, 2021.

158 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

11. Ranjan Gupta, “Sikkim: The Merger with India,” Asian Survey, 15 (9), September 1975, p. 786.

12. Mohammad Badrul Beena, “The Doklam Stalemate: The Tri-junction Between Bhutan, China and India,” World Affairs, 23 (1), January-March 2019, p. 64.

13. Joel Wuthnow, Satu Limaye and Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Doklam, One Year Later:

China’s Long Game in the Himalayas,” Texas National Security Review, June 7, 2018, War on the Rock, at https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/doklam-one-year­

later-chinas-long-game-in-the-himalayas/, accessed on July 16, 2021.

14. Vibha Arora, “Roots and Route of Secularism in Sikkim,” Economic and Political Weekly, 41 (38), September 2006, pp. 40-66.

15. Nikunj Deep Singh, “Strong border infrastructure and border strategic policy,” Observer Research Foundation, October 24, 2020, at orfonline.org/expert-speak/

strong-border-infrastructure-and-bolder-strategic-policy/, accessed on July 20, 2021.

16. Ajith Athrady, “Atal Tunnel: PM Modi opens tunnel route to tense China border, attacks Congress,” Deccan Herald, New Delhi, October 3, 2020, at https://www.

deccanherald.com/national/atal-tunnel-pm-modi-opens-tunnel-route-to-tense­ china-border-attacks-congress-896703.html, accessed on July 20, 2021.

17. Debjit Sinha, “Sela Pass Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh to give defence forces better

access near China border! Key factors,” Financial Express, New Delhi, February 8, 2019, at https://www.financialexpress.com/infrastructure/sela-pass-tunnel-in­

arunachal-pradesh-to-give-defence-forces-better-access-near-china-border-key­ facts/1481551/, accessed on July 20, 2021.

18 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Unabating tension with China spurs India’s border

infrastructure efforts,” Observer Research Foundation, July 2, 2021, at https://

www.orfonline.org/research/unabating-tension-with-china-spurs-indias-border­ infrastructure-efforts/, accessed on July 20, 2021.

19. “Sikkim: Chinese and Indian troops ‘in new border clash’,” BBC News, January 25, 2021, at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55793112, accessed on September

13, 2021.

20. Arzan Tarapore, “The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethinking Doctrine or

Risk Irrelevance,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India, August

2020, pp. 1, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tarapore_Ground_Forces_in_ Indian_Military.pdf, accessed on September 14, 2021.

Sikkim where India-China Meet | 159

21. Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Airpower at the 18, 000: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War,” Carneige Endowment for International Peace, 2012, p. 7, at https://

carnegieendowment.org/files/kargil.pdf, accessed on September 14, 2021.

22 Sudha Ramachandran, “China’s Bhutan Gambit,” The Diplomat, July 23, 2020, at

https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/chinas-bhutan-gambit/, accessed on July 16, 2021.

23. Warner Levi, “Bhutan and Sikkim: Two Buffer States,” The World Today, 15 (12), December 1959, pp. 492-493.

24. Leo E. Rose, “India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship,” Pacific Affairs, 42 (1), Spring 1969, p. 40.

25. Rajiv Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, 64 (2), Spring/Summer, 2011, p. 55.

26. “China can rethink stance on Sikkim, Bhutan,” Global Times, China, July 5, 2017, at globaltimes.cn/content/1055088.shtml, accessed on March 21, 2019.

27. Jayadeva Ranade, “Nathu La and the Sino-Indian Trade: Understanding the

Sensitivities in Sikkim,” IPCS Issue Brief, No. 182, Institute of Peace and Conflict

Studies, March 1, 2012, p. 4, at www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09228, accessed on July 18, 2021.

28. “Border Trade at Nathula,” Commerce and Industries Department, Government of Sikkim, 2019, at https://sikkim.gov.in/departments/commerce-and-industries­ department/border-trade-at-nathula, accessed on June 6, 2021.

29. Abhishek Bhalla, “Army Looks at replacing old combat vehicles in Sikkim, Ladakh

amidst Chinese aggression,” India Today, New Delhi, June 24, 2021, at https://

www.indiatoday.in/india/story/army-to-replace-old-combat-vehicles-in-sikkim­ ladakh-1818847-2021-06-24, accessed on September 7, 2021.

30. Rahul Bedi, “India boosting defences along north-eastern border with China,” JANES, USA, February 18, 2021, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news­

detail/india-boosting-defences-along-north-eastern-border-with-china., accessed on September 7, 2021.

31. “India, China hold border personnel meet at Chusul at Ladakh,” The Times of India, New Delhi, May 1, 2018, at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india­

china-hold-border-personnel-meet-at-chusul-in-ladakh/articleshow/63990171.cms,

accessed on September 9, 2019.

160 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

32. Mihir Bhonsale, “Understanding Sino-India Border Issues: An Analysis of Incidents in the Indian Media,” ORF Occasional Paper, 143, February 2018, p. 10, at https://

orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ORF_Occasional_Paper_143_India­ China.pdf, accessed on September 9, 2021.

33. Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past be its Future?” International Security, 28 (3), Winter, 2003/2004, pp. 149-150; David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, 27 (4), Spring 2003, p. 66.

34. Andrew Scobell, Edmund J. Burke, Cortez A. Copper III, Sale Lilly, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Eric Warner and J. D. Williams, “China’s Grand Strategy: Trends,

Trajectories, and Long-Term Cooperation,” RAND Cooperation, Santa Monica, 2020, p. 6, at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/

RR2700/RR2798/RAND_RR2798.pdf, accessed on July 17, 2021.

35. Manorama Kohli, “Indian Foreign Policy: A Geopolitical Perspective,” India Quarterly, 46 (4), October-December, 1990, p. 34.

36. Zhiqun Zhu, “China-India Relations in the 21st Century: A Critical Inquiry,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 24 (1/2), June-December 2011, pp. 1-2.

37. Jayadeva Ranade, “Nathu La and the Sino-Indian Trade: Understanding the

Sensitivities in Sikkim,” IPCS Issue Brief, No. 182, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, March 1, 2012, p. 2, at www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09228, accessed on July

18, 2021.

38. Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Assessment of India,” Texas National Security Review, March 25, 2020, at https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/chinas-strategic­ assessment-of-india/, accessed on July 18, 2021.

39 Srini Sitaraman, “China’s Salami Slicing Tactics and the Latest India-China Border

Standoff,” Security Nexus Perspectives, Security Nexus: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, May 2020, p. 1, at https://apcss.org/wp-content/

uploads/2020/06/N2502_Sitaraman_Salami_Slicing_China.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2021.

40. Tobias Burgers and Scott Romaniuk “Is China done with Salami Slicing?,” The Diplomat, May 1, 2021, at https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/is-china-done-with­ salami-slicing/, accessed on July 21, 2021.

7

China Overrun

The Case of Bhutan

I.P. Khosla

Introduction

The sovereignty and independence enjoyed by Bhutan today are due largely to four antecedents in a history that goes back over four centuries, and a story—part mythology and part history—that goes back more than twice as far: first, the foundation laying of the state, on secure ground prepared nearly a thousand years earlier, by a strong-willed and charismatic leader; second, the building of the state through successful pursuit of pragmatic policies by later generations of leaders; third, topography; and, fourth, and last but not least, the wisdom of a monarchy established early in the twentieth century. From the perspective of realist international relations (IR) theory, Bhutan should not long have survived several critical junctures that it faced during its history. One was the several invasions from Tibet, most notably one ordered and led by the Mongol warlord Lhazang Khan in 1714, at the head of combined Mongol and Tibetan armies; another was the advent of British overlordship to the south in the eighteenth century and dominance of the entire Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth; and, finally, after World War II, the emergence of India and China as neighbours who, by the late 1950s, were mutually hostile. Just the figures will illustrate the discrepancy in size for this last: China to the north has 250 times the area of Bhutan,

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over 1,800 times the population and nearly 5,000 times the Gross National Product; India to the south has nearly 90 times the area, nearly 1,800 times the population and over a thousand times the GNP. And Bhutan is landlocked, completely surrounded by these two neighbours. No other state in the world is so positioned, except Nepal which is several times larger than Bhutan and therefore not quite comparable. Other countries, in Asia, in Europe, Africa and Latin America are landlocked by only two other countries, but these are all friendly neighbours. Realist IR owes its origin to the Melian dialogue, which is the classic exposition of the theory. In the year 416 BC the Athenians and Spartans were at war, the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian War and Melos, an island, wished to remain neutral. The Athenians thought this as a strategic disadvantage, so tried to persuade them to be their ally; their dialogue on this continued for some time. When the Melians continued to refuse, saying the Athenian demand was unjust, given that they were neutral in this war, the Athenians, who were of course, far more powerful, said, “the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”1 When the Melians continued to refuse, the Athenians attacked them with a force of three thousand ( the entire male population of Melos was only around three thousand). The Melian men were all killed, the women and children taken into slavery. It is not, however, in this stark form that realist IR is propagated today; nevertheless national power and state self-interest are the invariable determining factors in relations between states, whichever version of realism one accepts. Even a moderate commitment to that theory would suggest that Bhutan would have by now accepted major compromises with its independence. Bhutan’s continuing independence, with barely any compromise, four centuries after it was founded requires another theoretical foundation.2 This is the theory of social constructivism. The theory starts with the realist position that it is indeed the material forces of power and interest which matter in the relations between states, but these factors are not somehow determined objectively and by forces beyond our control. It is

China Overrun | 163

actually the ideas that states and their leaders have about their own and others’ power and interest that determine the meaning and content of such factors. A number of factors, other than just the measurement of numbers relating to power and interest, go into the formation of these ideas, such as history, culture, the impact of one or more leaders at a particular time and, of course the image of the external world, which are hostile forces and which can be expected to be friendly. And ideas are self-reflexive in that they may change over time quite quickly, unlike material forces. This also means that as states interact with one another they may change their ideas about each other in a dynamic process; to define the elements that constitute the relations between states at a particular time may also mean giving these elements a history and a background of culture, including religion as an important input, among other things. In Bhutan’s self-image this theory fits perfectly since it lacks military might and economic strength so cultural selfidentity is the means to security. For instance Bhutan’s Eighth Development Plan (1997-2002) explicitly states, “for Bhutan lacking military might or economic strength, cultural identity is the means to give security.”3 The story of Bhutan, part history and part mythology, goes back to before the middle of the seventh century AD, a time when its rulers came from the Kamarupa area of Assam.4 Undocumented stories tell of Bhutan’s cultural exchanges with its southern neighbours in the fifth century AD, of Indian palaces and temples built around that time and of an Indian king of Bumthang, in central Bhutan. Even if much of this story telling is based on mythology, there was undoubtedly a flow of people and ideas between Bhutan and its southern neighbours at that time, given that Pragjyotisa (present-day Guwahati) was then a centre of high culture based on Buddhist learning and teaching which had close contacts with Bhutan and from where it is likely that the very first waves of Buddhism entered Bhutan.5 Nevertheless, looking at present-day Bhutan and its interests and national self-identity, there is no doubt that the ancient Indian connection has had little lasting impact of significance. That interest and self-identity is closely connected to Tibet, for by the 8th century a large number of Tibetans, including Tibetan monks, had entered western Bhutan, settled there and begun to propagate Buddhism. This was

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the early establishment of early contours in what was to be a close ethnic and cultural-religious link between the two. Two events of consequence followed during the next nine centuries.

Guru Padma Sambhava and Ngawang Namgyal

The coming of Guru Padma Sambhava provided secure ground for the foundation laying of the state. Trisang Detsen, the 38th Emperor of Tibet (late 8th century AD), invited Acharya Shantarakshita, the saint and scholar from Nalanda University, to Tibet to help in the propagation of Buddhism there, which was not going as successfully as he wished. When the Acharya arrived, he encountered overwhelming obstacles in various forms by a variety of spirits and suggested to the Emperor that he invite Guru Padma Sambhava, his brother in law from Nalanda University and a powerful Tantrik, to come and overcome these spirits. This was done, the Guru arrived and duly dealt with all the spirits, “he used his spiritual power and miracles to subdue all the human and non-human forces that were antagonistic to Buddha’s teachings and the dharma.”6 He also provided the groundwork for the continuation of Buddhism in the region, based on Lamaism and its hierarchy. After a few years, he also visited Bhutan numerous times and constructed the Lamaist organisation to assure the long-term survival of Buddhism there. Though this part of the story can be classified as part story and part mythology, the Bhutanese “generally accept Padma Sambhava’s multiple visits to Bhutan as historical fact and a great deal of their religious and cultural life are enactments or celebrations of these events.”7 Thereafter, for 900 years, Buddhism continued to spread through Bhutan and this brings us to the second event of consequence: the gradual dominance of the Kagyu school. The Nyingma school, which had been brought by Padma Sambhava, gradually pushed into central and eastern Bhutan, while the Kagyu (sometimes also called Kargyu), founded much later in the 12th century, came to dominate western Bhutan. Note here that the influence of the Gelukpa, Tibet’s major school founded much later in the 14th century, and whose head is the Dalai Lama, remained insignificant in

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Bhutan. Over the course of the years, the Drukpa Kagyu sub-school came to dominate Bhutan and was eventually accepted as the official school. During this entire period, though the religious link between Bhutan and Tibet was close, it was by and large restricted to a specific school. During the 12th and later centuries, in particular, there were large number of lamas who came to eminence, started their own sub-schools, established monasteries, sent other lamas out to propagate their versions of the faith and many of these came to Bhutan. But, for all that, it was the Kagyu who gradually established their ascendance over western Bhutan over those centuries. However, military and political power was concentrated in the hands of a number of local chieftains, each of whom ruled one or other valley. This changed with the arrival of Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal in Bhutan in 1616, the strong willed and charismatic leader that was needed for the construction of the state. Thereafter the cultural and religious links between Bhutan and Tibet continued, though it was largely confined to the Ralung monastery north of Bhutan, centre of the Kagyu school of Buddhism; but Bhutan emerged as a distinct political and military entity, at war almost continuously for a hundred years with one regime after another in Tibet. The story begins with a dispute about reincarnation. Pema Karpo (1527­ 1592), then head of the Drukpa Kagyu school based in Ralung monastery also known as the Grand Lama because his learning was so profound, had two competing reincarnations, and one of them, Ngawang Namgyal, lost. Born and brought up in Tibet, his grandfather was the prince-abbot of the Drukpa Kagyu school, and trained his grandson to aspire for a great future as a Buddhist leader. Meanwhile, his father had established a number of monasteries in the valleys of Bhutan and converted large parts of the population, especially in western Bhutan, to the Drukpa faith; there were also a number of Bhutanese monks who were staying in Ralung for religious discourses, and who travelled back and forth, spreading the word. He developed close relations with them and they, in turn, had good contacts in Bhutan. So he was assured of support and a warm welcome in Bhutan if he would be obliged to leave Tibet. When Pema Karpo died the hierarchs of the school went out to seek his true reincarnation and, of course, there

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were several claimants, one of them being Ngawang Namgyal. He had one chief rival, who was supported by the local Tibetan authorities as well as by the Tsangpa ruler of Tibet. But he refused to give way, and with the rivalry showing no sign of abatement year after year,, he sought voluntary exile in Bhutan in the year 1616, where he was welcomed, the ground having already been prepared for some years. This journey into Bhutan, called ‘turning the horse southwards’ in Bhutanese lore, is often proclaimed by later biographers and historians as a preordained course of history, predicted even by Padma Sambhava, and would become a major theme in Bhutanese cultural creations.8 Once there, he gradually expanded his rule to cover most of what we know as modern Bhutan in terms of territory. Of course, his Tibetan adversaries did not leave him alone and there were repeated invasions from the latter, starting with one in 1617, the year following his entry into Bhutan, then again, inter alia, in 1634, 1639, 1644 and 1649. According to legend he defeated them all with a combination of wily tactics, sheer fighting ability and magical powers. Once he arrived in Bhutan, Ngawang Namgyal proved to be much more than a religious leader. He began with the unifying all the Drukpa Kagyu monasteries of western Bhutan under his leadership, and then gradually using both war and the resources of the spirit brought all the monasteries of central and eastern Bhutan under his control before setting up a civil and religious institutional hierarchy to ensure permanence. In each of the important valleys, once he had secured religious and spiritual control, he built a dzong, each one a massive stone structure, used for both the religious and civil administrative machinery, and from where the valley was governed. This chain of dzongs, dotting the landscape from one end of Bhutan to the other, is the heart and muscle for the continuation of Bhutan as a unified and independent political and religious entity, and are till today one of the main attractions for visitors. He also codified a legal system and established two branches of government, the religious headed by a Jey Khenpo, under whom there were the abbots and monks of individual monasteries; and the civil, headed by the Druk Desi, under whom were the provincial governors, a system which

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endured till 1907, when Bhutan became a monarchy. True there were rivalries, disputes, plots and counterplots over the next centuries as one or more claimants to be recognised as the true reincarnation fought for power, and as one or the other Druk Desi (who had to be elected once every three years) fought for control over the resources generated by the lay economy. But the larger feature of continued unity overshadows these struggles. Today, it is generally acknowledged that the founder of Bhutan, its architect as well as builder as a unified and independent entity, was Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal.9 What is of great importance when we consider Bhutan’s external policy in light of social constructivism is that in the circumstances (of his almost lifelong rivalry with Tibet and the many invasions from the latter in order to subjugate Bhutan’s independence) it should not be surprising that “One of the principle foreign policy objectives: of Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal was to do away with or ward off Tibetan influences—especially political, social and cultural. During his rule he made every effort to make Bhutan distinctly different from Tibet. He brought about changes in religious ceremonies, dress and in court etiquette. Efforts were even made to minimise linguistic similarities.... All this was done to strengthen the independent status of the kingdom he was creating. And the rulers of the country have to this day furthered and strengthened this policy”.10 It may be useful to give some background to this to assess the depth of the antagonism between Tibet and Bhutan. The first invasion was in 1617, repelled with the help of local chieftains who were not yet under his control but, nevertheless, wished to help him. And after this first invasion he was all the more determined to establish Drukpa Kagyu rule over all of Bhutan. The second invasion came in 1634. The Tibetans came in large numbers and even succeeded in occupying one of the important dzongs, Simtokha. Then there were explosions in the dzong, caused by some of the ammunition there catching fire, but which the Tibetans mistook for the work of spirits or Bhutanese deities, and they fled in terror. In 1639 came the third invasion ordered by the Tsangpa11 ruler of Tibet, which was also overcome, although by this time the Tibetans were wary of Ngawang Namgyal’s magical powers and not quite as aggressive as earlier.

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The fourth invasion came in 1644, two years after the Mongols had defeated and ousted the Tsangpa ruler of Tibet and placed the Dalai Lama there, ushering in the rule of the Gelukpa school, which was to continue till 1959. Ngawang Namgyal did at first try to make peace with the new rulers in Lhasa and to this end sent emissaries to the Dalai Lama, but the latter did not want peace; he wanted the entire Himalayan region to follow the Gelukpa faith and Bhutan was one of the main obstacles to this ambition; he therefore wanted Bhutanese subjugation, which was categorically refused. Ngawang Namgyal retaliated by expelling the Gelukpas from Bhutan. Here note that “it is easy to overlook the influence that more than a century of militancy between Bhutan and Tibet had on broader events of the period 1616 to roughly 1736 ... at a time when Bhutan and Tibet were competing for influence throughout the Himalayas.”12 This 1644 invasion was led by both Mongol and Tibetan troops making it considerably more formidable. Here again the invasion was overcome, the Tibetan leaders arrested and the ordinary soldiers allowed to go back to Tibet. The Dalai Lama, on the other hand, was convinced that his forces had been defeated because there were too few of them. He meticulously prepared the situation before sending in a considerably bigger detachment of forces, including both Tibetans and Mongols, against Bhutan in 1648. A night attack, unknown terrain, and a less-than-courageous leader destroyed the Tibetans once more, and this time they fled without their armour, prompting Ngawang Namgyal to comment that “the Tibetans have no prudence. They will come again but they cannot do any harm.” A hint of invincibility there.13 Ngawang Namgyal died in April 1651, and the day is still observed in Bhutan as his death anniversary but nothing was announced at the time; it was said that he had entered into ‘retreat’ according to Buddhist custom. For years this was accepted and his legacy continued undisturbed. However, in the first decade of the eighteenth century it finally had to be announced and soon disputes broke out over his succession. Rival reincarnations competed for the honour of succeeding him and the civil authorities in different valleys established some degree of autonomy. One such effort, by the head of the Paro valley ended up in an appeal to the Tibetan ruler for help and the

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latter, of course, jumped at the chance, sending in their forces in 1730 in what would be the last Tibetan invasion of Bhutan. On this occasion Paro became, in effect, a separate entity, more or less seceding, though elsewhere fighting continued since the Bhutanese were not about to give up easily. And, again, the Tibetans found the Bhutanese warlike nature too much for them, so negotiations started and it was agreed that the Tibetans would withdraw, and while Paro would retain its autonomy for the time being, but would eventually return to a united Bhutan. We will see ahead how the Chinese used this invasion to try to show that Bhutan had always been under Tibetan control and hence, at one level, Chinese suzerainty. Another consequence of the past battle was three decades of improved relations between Tibet and Bhutan.

The Entry of the British

And by that time there was news of a new force entering the picture from the South: the British, and here we find the Bhutanese pursuing pragmatic polices that helped them further establish and consolidate their independence. This new force, armed with cutting-edge guns, was not going down easily. The first clash with the Bhutanese occurred in 1773 when the East India Company negotiated an agreement with the King of Cooch Behar for military support in exchange for a certain sum of money. The Bhutanese had for some time exercised a loose suzerainty over Cooch Behar, installing or removing the King of their choice, ready to intervene militarily wherever needed. In the war that ensued the Bhutanese fought valiantly but were defeated and a treaty was signed under the terms of which the British relinquished control over all the areas they had conquered, which they considered inhospitable and incapable of yielding any revenue, in effect restoring Bhutan to its pre­ war borders. In exchange, the Bhutanese gave the British five Tangun horses, very sure footed in mountainous terrain, as well as the rights to cut timber from their forests without payment of duties, the exchange of criminals held by either side and, most importantly for the British, duty free rights to trade.

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In subsequent decades the British and the Bhutanese tried to expand their relations and to understand each other. There was a trade agreement of 1778, several British missions, and attempts by the British to penetrate into Tibet through Bhutan for trading purposes which were only partially successful. On balance relations continued amicably. However within Bhutan the situation turned grave with disunity between rival civil heads of the valleys, rival reincarnations and fighting breaking out between different factions. In the result the Bhutanese local authorities along the Assam border with British India developed a considerable measure of autonomy. Frequent cross-border raids from Bhutan into Assam in particular led to armed clashes in 1828.  In 1836, there were other clashes, including one involving a considerable number of troops from both sides. In 1841, the British replied by annexing the Assam boundary, known as the Duars, in exchange for a yearly payment of Rs 10,000 to Bhutan. Bhutan’s internal issues, however, persisted, as did events with the British over the border. In 1864, an expedition led by Ashley Eden was dispatched to gather information and execute a treaty that would place ties on a solid footing for the future. According to his own report, the Bhutanese treated the Eden mission poorly, and we have no other source on what actually happened; they made him wait for days before he was given an audience with the civil head or Desi or even the council heading the administration; he and his party were pushed through crowded streets and the crowds threw rubbish on them; Jigme Namgyal, the Tongsa governor and one of the most powerful men in Bhutan, rubbed wet flour on his face at their meeting and eventually Eden was held hostage subject to his signing a humiliating treaty under which the Assam duars were to be returned to Bhutan. It is not known how far his report on the mission, which is the only extant source, reflected reality. We might assume that the British, having recognised the value of holding all of the duars, were simply waiting for the opportunity to gain them through war; this was Jigme Namgyal’s opinion. According to this viewpoint, the report was created to incite  conflict, however, some historians believe that the British had no such ambitions and that the behaviour of Jigme Namgyal was at the root of the problem. In any event, the report was far more than sufficient cassus belli as far as the

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British were concerned, then on a trail of victory throughout their Indian dominions. The Governor-General signed a proclamation of war in November 1864 and British Indian troops advanced into Bhutan along four fronts.The Bhutanese fought better than the British expected with Jigme Namgyal’s men driving the British out of their camp in Dewothang at one point during the conflict, a vital strategic foothold and therefore a major setback for the British. It took two months and significant reinforcements for them to reclaim this.. The British were furious at this setback; seemingly the Bhutanese with bows and arrows proved to be better fighters than the British with the latest in gunpowder. Later, they annexed Dewothang in revenge, which they didn’t really want. Jigme Namgyal was also the one who, towards the end of the war in mid­ 1865, most strongly opposed any settlement insisting that despite reverses the Bhutanese should continue fighting. Finally, as the year advanced without any signs of Bhutan recovering lost ground, he agreed to peace and a treaty was signed on November 11, 1865, the Treaty of Sinchula, under which all the duars were annexed to British India in return for a subsidy to be given by the British to Bhutan. The treaty also provides that Bhutan agrees ‘to refer to the arbitration of the British Government all disputes with, or causes of complaint against the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British Government ...,’ which was the beginning of the transactional system by which Bhutan determined its relations in the future with its southern neighbour. Of course topography stepped in here; the British realised that the terrain of Bhutan was not suitable for the kind of cash crops they were really interested in, cotton or tea or opium, so they had determined that they would not venture to take or keep territory beyond the foothills, and those became the boundaries of British India and Bhutan. This treaty signified Bhutan’s definitive shift towards the south. Since the middle of the 18th century, it was evident that the expansion of British authority in India would lead to their dominance over the entire subcontinent and that there would be no balancing force to the North. Now, there was no alternative to accepting their overlordship and arbitration in Bhutan’s

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external relations in the 1860s. Bhutanese security henceforth depended upon their continued benevolence. However, for some years now after 1865 Bhutan’s internal affairs remained in turmoil. Jigme Namgyal attempted unsuccessfully to construct a more cohesive structure under his leadership; many parties petitioned the British authorities for assistance,, claiming that Jigme Namgyal was in touch with the Tibetan and Chinese authorities, that being known as the main British bugbear. But the latter turned down the temptation to interfere. Jigme Namgyal died in 1881 and was succeeded by his second son Ugyen Wangchuk who used both diplomacy and war to gain control over all of Bhutan by 1885. He quickly realised that for the continuation and consolidation of Bhutan’s independence and distinct identity he needed British support. On the other hand, for the British, his taking control over all of Bhutan was a blessing since it meant a greater measure of peace along their border with Bhutan as also fewer approaches by various Bhutanese contenders for help. When Ugyen Wangchuk aided the British in their dealings with the Tibetans in the early 20th century and followed the Younghusband force into Lhasa in August 1904 while wearing his raven crown, the relationship received its final consolidation. The closest possible relations now developed between the two sides and that final consolidation was reinforced by the British when John Claude White, Britain’s political officer in Sikkim, visited Bhutan in 1905 to confer the order of the Knight Commander of the Indian Empire on Ugyen Wangchuk. He was received very warmly, and he in turn ensured that Sir Ugyen Wangchuk was invited in 1906 to Calcutta to meet the Prince of Wales on his very first visit to India. A close friendship between these two individuals developed. “It was through this relationship that the Tongsa Penlop (Ugyen Wangchuk) was able to secure the support of British India to establish a hereditary monarchy in Bhutan, building the foundations for peace, tranquillity, and development”.14 It has been the policy on both sides since that time that the Bhutanese ruler and the British (later Indian) senior official dealing with Bhutan should be close friends, a necessary supplement to the close politicostrategic ties between the two countries.

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Claude White persuaded both the Bhutanese leaders and, particularly, the British rulers of India that a hereditary monarchy was the ideal succession mechanism for Bhutan’s independent sovereignty. Ugyen Wangchuk was crowned King of Bhutan, or Druk Gyalpo, at a ceremony held in Punakha in December 1907, with him sitting in the middle, John Claude White on his right, and Jay Khenpo, the religious head, on his left. Thus, a monarchy was established that was wise enough to realise the strength of the upcoming power to the South.

Consolidation of relations with the British; Indo-Bhutan relations

The next step came with the further consolidation of relations between British India and Bhutan with the Treaty of Punakha, on January 8, 1910. This was actually only a supplement to the Treaty of Sinchula, as two articles of the latter were amended. One related to the subsidy payable to Bhutan, now increased from Rs. 50,000 per annum to Rs. 1,00,000. The other was more important and provided, under Article VIII, ‘that the British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations’. So far as relations with states to the South were concerned it was already covered by the provision in the same article for British arbitration, which remained in place; this new para was inserted because the British had concerns about Tibetan or Chinese interests in Bhutan. Chinese interest in Bhutan had fluctuated from dormant to active, and the early twentieth century saw an active phase. In 1890 the Tibetans had proposed to the Chinese Emperor that the latter should appoint the governors of Tongsa and Paro as chieftain and vice-chieftain of Bhutan, which of course was a non-sequitur since no one in Bhutan was listening. But then in 1907 the Amban of Tibet wrote to the Bhutanese leaders that “the Bhutanese are the subjects of the Emperor of China, who is the Lord of Heaven”; and he sent 20 soldiers to Paro with a local Tibetan leader. So the British may have had some cause to worry.15 In the succeeding years, the close relations between the British and the Bhutanese continued and strengthened. Successive kings of Bhutan were

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decorated by the British, given honours when they visited India and pampered as far as possible. King Ugyen Wangchuk was succeeded by his son Jigme Wangchuk in 1926, and as the date for the independence of India drew near, there was apprehension in Bhutan as to whether independent India would honour the kind of relationship that Bhutan had with the British, and also whether the Tibetans might take advantage of the changeover to press their claim. The latter didn’t happen. As for the former, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru met a Bhutanese delegation in 1948 and assured them that independent India would follow the relationship established by the British. This was then formalised in a Treaty of August 8, 1949, which included, in Article II, exactly the same wording as Article VIII of the one signed at Punakha in regard to the Government of India exercising no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan, while Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations. After the war with Bhutan in 1865, in addition to annexing all the Duars the British had also taken over 32 sq. km of land near Dewathang, where they had been routed by the Bhutanese; this was now returned to Bhutan by India as a gesture of goodwill. In succeeding years, under first JIgme Dorji Wangchuk (1952-72), then Jigme Singye Wangchuk (1972-2006, when he voluntarily abdicated), and lastly Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, relations between India and Bhutan remained cordial and friendly, but with some concerns of slight magnitude. One of these was about the interpretation of Article II of the 1949 Treaty. As Bhutan’s influence on the international arena grew, it began to view this as an impediment or at least a slight hurdle to establishing a complete international presence. This was not an issue for several years after 1949; in 1962, with Indian sponsorship, it joined the Colombo Plan; in 1969, it joined the Universal Postal Union; and in 1971, it joined the United Nations. People, including some representatives of other nations, argued that Bhutan could not be considered entirely sovereign, that it was an Indian protectorate or only partially independent, and that its membership in the United Nations was questionable.16 Over the years, and especially since the early 1970s, Bhutanese officials in their interaction with Indian

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officials, have made it clear that this article means that if Bhutan wishes, it will decide whether or not to consult India on any particular matter relating to its external relations, and then, having received India’s advice, will then decide whether or not to accept it; while on the Indian side the interpretation is that on all matters relating to external relations it will be consulted and then its advice followed. This latter was, of course, an extreme interpretation for as Bhutan expanded its external contacts and presence in international organisations, it would have been impossible to consult India on each and every issue. And, in fact, India did help Bhutan acquire an increasingly important role on the international stage, introducing it as an independent, sovereign state to those reluctant to believe it, emphasising to the most doubtful that even small states have the right to take part as equals in international conferences and that size and power are not all that matter on that stage. Eventually Indian spokesmen said it was only important matters which were covered by this article, and left it at that. During the years that I spent as India’s representative in Bhutan (1974-77) and in the many conversations that I had with the King and his ministers this article was rarely discussed since it was not considered controversial; the Bhutanese did consult us on important matters and we never expected them to do so on the many other issues that arose during their international contacts. In sum, its interpretation is not important here; In conclusion, its interpretation is irrelevant here; what matters is the actual state of affairs, as the treaty has never prevented Bhutan from conducting its international affairs. Nevertheless it is true that during the last three decades of the twentieth century there was more than one occasion when overzealous Indian officials tried to put the brakes on Bhutan’s expanding international relations and contacts. There seemed at times to be a misplaced fear in India that Bhutan, like the similarly placed landlocked Nepal, would try to ‘play the China card’; as well as the feeling in Bhutan that India was being overprotective without adequate reason. This problem was ultimately resolved in the new millennium when, in response to Bhutanese concerns, India agreed to repeal Article II of the 1949 Treaty. This was done by the signing of a new India Bhutan Treaty of 2007

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to replace that of 1949, and while the new Treaty is more or less the same in other respects, it did delete Article II and in replaced with the provision that the two governments “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other”. Another more severe concern was Bhutan’s attempt, once the 2007 Treaty had been signed, to bypass India completely in an important foreign relations matter. Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Yozer Thinley met the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, where both had gone to attend a United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. This was done without any previous intimation to or consultation with India. In what was widely seen as a somewhat belated response India withdrew all subsidies on cooking gas and kerosene supplies to Bhutan, in July 2013, leading to a tripling of their prices and considerable public distress; and this was done between two rounds of Bhutan’s national election, then under way. The party of Jigme Yozer Thinley lost that election. The opposition Peoples Democratic Party, which had campaigned for much stronger ties with India, and even accused Thinley’s party of jeopardising relations with India, won. In the event India later clarified that the withdrawal of subsidies was only a procedural matter that happened to have occurred at that time, and the subsidy was restored once the election was over.17 Subsequent analysis showed that local issues probably had a greater impact on the election result than did ties with India. However the general impression remained that India had tried to interfere in a domestic matter, as a reminder to Indian decision makers that it is best to tackle foreign policy issues without getting into neighbourhood politics.

Driglam Namzha

Yet another matter of Bhutanese concern was one where India showed great sensitivity to Bhutan’s core interests. In Bhutan, Nepalese settlers, later called Lhotsampas in Bhutan, were allowed in from the nineteenth century. This was encouraged by the British

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companies working in the country and Bhutan also used the labour to clear jungles for cultivation. By 1932 there were 60,000 of them. In 1946, as their numbers continued to climb, a violent protest against their working conditions broke out, which was briefly quelled but served as a portent of what was to come. In the 1980s, there were approximately 200,000 Lhotsampa because of the high demand for labour in infrastructure projects, beginning with roads and subsequently hydroelectricity. There was no question that they, or the vast majority of them, considered Nepal as their home. The Bhutanese had, until the 1970s and even the early 1980s, allowed Nepalese language in schools, the functioning of Sankrit pathshalas (schools) and even the construction of Hindu temples. By the late 1980s, Bhutanese were more concerned at the growing numbers and the consequences this could have on their cultural and national identity, so all this was reversed. It was decided that all of them (the Lhotsampas) must adhere to the Bhutanese lifestyle to show their loyalty and a new policy and a new set of behavioural rules was promulgated, known as driglam namzha. This can be summarised as ‘one nation, one people.’ “This policy sought to preserve and enhance Bhutanese cultural identity and bolster Bhutanese nationalism. The policy mandated wearing national dress for formal occasions and required the Lhotsampas to undertake months of training in Drukpa traditional etiquette and dress as mandatory requirements for employment. It was accompanied by a shift in language policy, requiring use of the official language, Dzongkha, in schools and offices. In 1989, teaching Nepali as an optional language in schools was prohibited.”18 As far as the Nepalese were concerned Driglam Namzha sought to erode their cultural identity. By early 1990, violent protests had broken out among the Nepalese people in southern Bhutan; the Bhutanese flag was burnt in several places, Bhutanese officials were attacked and their dress was torn off, in some areas the census records were sought to be destroyed. The Bhutanese armed forces were brought in to quell all this and quickly did so, using, according to many observers, far more violence than necessary. As a result Nepalese from Bhutan started streaming into adjacent Indian territory and there was a widespread perception that a large scale eviction by the Bhutanese

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forces was also under way. Some 120,000 to 130,000 entered India at that time. India demonstrated, by its actions, a degree of sympathy for the Bhutanese action. In addition, India did not want the upset Lhotsampa from Bhutan to make contact with Nepalese-origin individuals in the Darjeeling hills, as this would have only exacerbated the situation. Therefore, Indian security forces allowed the Lhotsampa into India, then loaded them into trucks and drove them to the Nepalese border and pushed them into Nepal. Later, measures were also taken by the Indian security forces to ensure that they were not able to find their way back to Bhutan, since by May 2007, they seemed ready to launch a fresh struggle to draw the attention of the international community by marching back to Bhutan. According to some reports, India stopped them at the Indo-Nepal border using several hundred paramilitary forces.

Opening up

During the years 1949-58, Bhutan remained an isolated Shangrila; there were no roads into Bhutan, no vehicles there, hardly any contacts with the outside world; Bhutanese monks visited Buddhist sites in India; there were some Bhutanese students in Indian schools; the King and Queen had visited India once in the 1950s; and that about summed up the extent of Bhutan’s contact with the external world. The change, the opening up of Bhutan to the outside world, was initiated with Jawaharlal Nehru’s landmark visit to Bhutan in 1958. In late September he set off on the visit, accompanied by his daughter Indira. It took him more than two weeks on ponies and then yaks to cross the Chinese-held Chumbi valley and reach Paro, where the Bhutanese royal family, ministers, monks and a large gathering greeted him. For those two weeks and more he was completely out of touch with events in India and the world; when the press met him on his return and queried him on events that had happened he could not say anything, not about Algeria or about the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union because, as he himself explained, he had not read any newspapers for the last two weeks and had only received occasional radio messages from Delhi.

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As for Indo-Bhutan relations the visit sparked bilateral discussions about Bhutan’s economic development, which it was agreed would have to be initially entirely paid with Indian finances. In 1959 work began on a road to connect Thimphu and Paro with West Bengal. Then, in 1961 a five year plan for Bhutan was launched; this was followed by subsequent five year plans, and now we are seeing the ongoing 12th Plan 2019-24. For the first two plans India contributed 100 per cent of the expenditure, then this declined on a sliding scale to 90 per cent for the third, 77 per cent for the fourth, then a dramatic drop to 30 per cent for the fifth; thereafter it has remained at around 25 per cent as Bhutan’s own income sources expanded. As for the purposes for which this aid is given, the main aim is socio­ economic development in key areas, human resource development, capacity building. India provides training facilities for Bhutanese civil workers at its own expense. Significantly, India has granted Bhutan help in areas where the resulting talents may be applied in sectors that would eventually export to the Indian market, a circumstance that benefits both nations. Note that this was not under India’s guidance; it was the Bhutanese themselves who decided what steps to take and at what speed, whether they needed help, which was of course always given willingly by India. During this process there were of course, changes in the way the Bhutanese did things; traditional beliefs underwent change; the school books were all Indian, to which many Bhutanese did object; attitudes towards family and religion changed and, what was more, this was all done at an unprecedented speed. However, these were the unavoidable pangs of development. The development of Bhutan’s hydropower potential forms the core of bilateral economic cooperation. This catalyst has provided the resources by which Bhutan has achieved the highest per capita income in South Asia. Bhutan extends 140 km from North to South. From the rugged northern high mountain ranges to the southern plains, from altitudes of 7,000 metres in the North to 200 metres in the South, with river valleys running north to south, often narrow, with the water rushing tumultuously down, the terrain is ideal for run-of-the river hydro-electric projects. The first project taken up was at Chukha in the West, a 336 MW project which went on stream in 1986; India provided 60 per cent of the funds required as

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grant and 40 per cent as loan, repayable over 15 years at 5 per cent interest. For the next two projects, the 60 MW Kurichhu and the 1020 MW Tala, the same terms were offered and adopted. But already, as the Chukha project came on stream and the income from there started flowing into Bhutan, the change was startling. Thimphu, the capital, had at most a dozen vehicles at any time of day in its streets during the mid-seventies; within a few years Range Rovers and other costly vehicles abounded; there were already traffic jams on the unprepared road system of the capital; new buildings and shops came up, with products and price levels never before seen. Hydropower quickly took centre place in Bhutan’s development. As one knowledgeable writer put it “hydropower development represents the backbone of Bhutan’s socio-economic development. Power exports are the largest revenue for the government in the form of taxes and dividends from hydropower companies, representing more than 40 per cent of national revenue and 25 per cent of GDP. Hydropower infrastructure development also contributes with 25 per cent through the construction sector. Overall, the revenues from power exports are the primary source for the government for socioeconomic development that includes health, education and agriculture ... by 2008, Bhutan had the highest GDP per capita in South Asia”.19 There were concerns, of course. The major concerns were project delays and cost overruns. In July 2006, India and Bhutan signed a framework agreement planning out the future in this sector, under which India agreed to provide the necessary technical and financial support to develop, as also to import 5000 MW of power by the year 2020. This was, in 2009, rather optimistically, raised to a total generating capacity of 10,000 MW by that year. Ten projects totalling just over 10,000 MW had been identified and some work has also started on each of them, but most of them were still in the planning stage. Later, this aim was reduced to 3,000 MW in a more practical manner. But by 2019 even this lower target had not been achieved—the total then was 2326. There is also the fact that it is still largely Indian technical and engineering personnel that are involved in the planning and execution of the projects. Even at the managerial level it has been Indians who were

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given the responsibility for decision taking. This has generated the view among the Bhutanese that India has not done as much as it could have to train Bhutanese citizens in these professions and that India prefers to keep power rather than gradually transfer it over. In addition, only Indian enterprises have been assigned the most crucial or technical tasks when the private sector has been involved. Work assigned to Bhutanese firms is limited to the provision of rocks and sand and does not require technical expertise. Then there were concerns about specific projects. For example, for the Punatsangchhu I project the date for commissioning was fixed at 2015; this had to be postponed to 2019; meanwhile its cost had gone up from Rs. 3,815 crore to 9,396 crore. Also the site chosen had a geological fault, which was pointed out by the Geological Survey of India; but the Indian consultants, aware of the problem, nevertheless went ahead with the selection of that very site, leaving the project with later problems and convincing the Bhutanese that Indian experts were not, after all, the best choice. Most of the projects had cost overruns and delays and many had technical issues.

Chinese claims on Bhutan

There has been a history of Chinese claims on Bhutan, asserting that it is part of China’s domains, based entirely on Tibet’s claims, and all rather vague in substance, though sometimes quite assertive. Based on Tibet’s occupation by proxy of Paro valley, the Tibetan ruler Polhane had claimed to have some kind of suzerainty over Bhutan. This suzerainty was thought to have passed on to Tibet’s Chinese overlord. Chinese representatives in Lhasa often asserted that Nepal, Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan all formed parts of the Chinese empire, and building upon this claim, Chinese emperors even granted office to Bhutanese officials, including the Deb Raja. All this had no importance as far as the Bhutanese were concerned.They didn’t think such actions were in any way proof of suzerainty. “There are records of Chinese interventions in Bhutan in 1830, 1876, 1885, 1889 and 1905. In February 1910, the Manchu government of China laid claim to Bhutan along with Nepal and Sikkim. Direct contacts between the two countries were also recorded under the Guomindang regime in 1940,

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1943 and1947. However, none of these contacts was politically substantial nor they proved any kind of subordination”.20 In 1930, in the original version of ‘The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party’, Mao Zedong wrote that, “the correct boundaries of China would include Burma, Bhutan, Nepal …” although the later editions left out these claims. After the revolution and subsequent integration of Tibet a claim on Bhutan was made in 1954 when China “published a map in ‘A Brief History of China’ where a considerable portion of Bhutan, including other countries, was included as a pre-historical realm of China. This was in fact the beginning of Bhutan-China conflict. Another map published in 1958, in the China Pictorial magazine claimed a large tract of Bhutanese land in the Trashigang area in the East and substantial parts of North-West Bhutan; later in the year, China occupied about 300 sq. miles of Bhutanese territory in North and North-eastern Bhutan. Chinese claims on Bhutan resurfaced in 1960 when it openly declared that, “Bhutanese, Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united family in Tibet. They have always been subject to Tibet and to the great motherland of China. They must once again be united and taught the communist doctrine.”21 After the Dalai Lama fled to India in December 1959 and given the tension between India and China, Bhutan closed its border with Tibet and withdrew its representatives from Lhasa. For some years thereafter there was no increase in tension along the border. Graziers, some of whom were certainly military personnel, would often cross over from Tibet during the summer months at the well-known watershed line along the north-western parts of the border, but these crossings were not allowed to escalate; the graziers would plead that the border was unknown to them and the local Bhutanese authorities would allow them to go back. Clearly, given the state of the problem and its potential for escalation, it was only a matter of time before direct contacts between the two would have to be established.

China-Bhutan Relations

China and Bhutan had no regular diplomatic contacts until Bhutan invited the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi (along with several other

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Ambassadors there) to the coronation of the fourth King in 1974, which was attended by their charge d’affaires. Several other contacts followed— meetings between their Ambassadors as well as other officials in New York where both had representatives, as well as meetings in New Delhi. The Chinese were, of course, wanting to establish full diplomatic relations and it was equally clear that the Bhutanese were reluctant to go that far too soon. Over the years, several other levels of contacts have been established between the two. Bhutan sent table tennis teams to China, starting in 1977; then a sports delegation went from Bhutan in 1990 for the Beijing Asian Games. A member of the royal family went there for the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995. Bhutan’s Foreign Secretary, the speaker of the National Assembly as well as other officials have been visiting China regularly. In between all this, in 1979, there was a major incursion by Chinese troops into Bhutan. While that incursion was not permanent the Bhutanese National Assembly debated the matter and decided that direct talks with China should be initiated. Discussions were initiated between their respective representatives in New Delhi and New York, preparations made for direct talks about the border and India kept fully in the picture. The first formal meeting was held in Beijing in April 1984 at the level of Ambassador. Thereafter, with some gaps, these border talks have been held between the two sides annually. From the 6th round in 1989, the level was raised to Foreign Minister. Over the years, Over the years, and as a result of the negotiations, the disputed territory has decreased from 1,128 sq. km to 269 sq. km according to the announcements made from time to time by the two sides. Meanwhile, in 1996, the Survey of Bhutan had reported that the Chinese were constructing roads and started logging operations in the areas under discussion. Bhutan expressed its concern over these developments at the 11th round of talks 1996. The Chinese at that time had proposed that the two sides sign an agreement of friendship between them. But since the Bhutanese delegation had no authority to do so, it was postponed to the 12th round of talks in Beijing on December 8, 1998. On that date, Bhutan

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and China signed an “Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity in Bhutan-China Border Areas”. This was an important step not only for border talks but also for the global relation between the two countries, which signed their first ever intergovernmental agreement. Bhutan and China agreed.22 China’s broad approach during these talks has been to offer a package deal as opposed to negotiating sector by sector. The latter would require taking into account the documents and history of each area, whilst the former refers to a political agreement. Bhutan’s agreement to cede 269 sq. km to China in the Northwest in exchange for 495 sq. km in the centre sector was the key component of the Chinese package. For some years it seemed that progress was being made. The King of Bhutan had even informed the National Assembly in 1996 that only three areas in the western sector were still under negotiation, 89 sq. km in Doklam; 42 sq. km. In Sinchulumpa and 138 sq. km in Shakhatoe, a total of 269 sq. km. Then, after the 15th round of talks held in 2001, Chinese Vice Minister Wang Yi said that the border issue had, ‘by and large been resolved’ and even the Bhutanese delegation expressed optimism. The Bhutanese official organ ‘Kuensel’ announced on November 3, 2001, that ‘the discussions are close to final resolution.’ However it became clear within months that the positions of the two sides were actually far apart, for there was a security issue involving the close proximity of the Northwest areas to Indian territory. In June 2002, the Bhutanese Home Secretary led a team to China to attend the first of a technical group to help sort out the problems. In addition, officials said China’s reference to the “package solution” is to the old proposal for the Doklam area, which Bhutan has rejected, owing to India’s concerns that it comes too close to its strategically sensitive “Siliguri corridor.”The 24th session of China-Bhutan border negotiations was held in 2016; since then, they have been delayed for a variety of reasons, including the Doklam issue. Much will rely on when and how the next round of boundary negotiations is held. In June 2017, the Chinese decided to increase the pressure on Bhutan. They began to build a road in Doklam, a disputed area in the northwest

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and one which is close to the Indian border near the Chumbi valley. In response Indian troops intervened, forcing the Chinese to stop the building activity. There then followed a standoff between the Indian and Chinese troops. Bhutan requested China on June 29 to maintain the status quo as of June 16 by the terms of their 1998 agreement. The following day, India’s Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement expressing grave worry over China’s attempt to change the status quo. Then on August 5, China issued a press release in which it referred to the Convention signed in 1890 between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, adding that under the terms of that convention the road building was in its own territory, that Indian troops had trespassed, and “must immediately and unconditionally” withdraw. The statement added that the issue was between China and Bhutan, and India had no right to interfere in it. The Doklam standoff ended on August 28, 2017, when the two sides agreed to disengage, though the terms of that disengagement were not very precise, the Indians claiming an agreement to disengage, the Chinese saying they had decided to pull back because weather conditions were not conducive to road building. In June 2020, the Chinese stepped up the pressure again. At a meeting of the Global Environment Facility on June 2nd and 3rd China claimed that Sakteng, deep inside Bhutanese territory on the Eastern side, and which borders West Kameng and Tawang districts of India, was disputed. This was a first; China had so far not laid claim to Sakteng. Chinese Foreign Office spokesman Wang Wenbin followed this up on July 21st, claiming that “the middle, eastern and western sectors of the border are disputed’ thus throwing open the entire Tibet-Bhutan border for negotiation and negating any progress that seemed to have been made. He added that China had proposed a package proposal, and, for good measure, that “China is opposed to making an issue of such disputes at multilateral forums”. The fact that the middle and eastern sectors had not so far been in dispute did not seem to faze the spokesman. Bhutan also issued a statement saying that the 25th round of talks on the border could not be held due to the Coronavirus pandemic and “all disputed areas will be discussed during that round.”

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In retrospect this should have been anticipated. China has never really veered from the Middle Kingdom mentality, which entails overturning the system and replacing it with one made in and for China, despite all the talk about improving the system. “A powerful, assertive China wishes to see Bhutan more connected with Tibet through roads, through trade, through cultural and people-to-people contact, and in the joint harnessing of water and other natural resources. This is its version of a China-controlled Tibetcentric Himalayan region that resonates with Chinese interests. Needless to say, the new China is not loath to take on India in this regard. It wishes to control the Himalayan piedmont”.23 More information on this is provided further.

BRI and the Middle Kingdom

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China’s proposals on the economic integration of the entire region from East Asia across the whole of Asia and into West Europe. Africa and Latin America have not been left out. This is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was subsequently elaborated in a document released by China’s National Reforms and Development Commission in March 2015, envisaging the resumption of globalisation in a new guise and with Chinese characteristics. The central objective of the BRI is to construct a large and unified market of worldwide dimensions, on the same lines as seemed to have been the aim of the Washington Consensus, except that this includes cultural exchanges and integration to enhance mutual understanding throughout that market. China has promised assistance in the building of massive infrastructure projects, roads and railways and bridges, ports and seaways supplemented by a communications network so that trade as well as financial integration go hand in hand. But politics will take the lead here. The BRI is both China’s announcement of its arrival on the world scene as a global power from being until now only a regional one, as well as a Chinese plan to build a new world order which will replace the US led world system. It is also the centre piece of Chinas foreign policy, having been inscribed in the report to the 19th National Congress delivered by Xi Jinping

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on October 2017. And it has been included as an amendment in the Party constitution so that the Party is now committed to it. As Bruno Macaes puts it, ‘the Belt and Road is the Chinese plan to build a new world order replacing the US led international system. If it succeeds, it is very likely that we shall use the name to refer to the new arrangements, much as we use ‘west’ as a shorthand for the existing order’.24 As Martin Jacques, one of the leading experts on present-day China, points out, there will be several implications of joining the Chinese initiative. ‘The Chinese live in and through their history to a degree which is quite different from other societies.’25 This means that they see the world not as others see it—in the context of the interplay of power and politics, but in civilisational terms, with China occupying the place of the Middle Kingdom. This embodies and gives life to China as a civilisation state. Deep down, Chinese leaders do not view their nation as a participant in a system of nation-states governed by a widely acknowledged set of laws and diplomatic conventions, such as the notion that all governments are (subject to the realities of power) in some sense equal. They continue to refer to their nation as the Middle Kingdom and it is the concept of the civilisation state that serves as a constant reminder that today’s China is that Middle Kingdom ‘occupying, as the centre of the world, a quite different position to all other states’.26 The BRI is ‘a means to achieve … the elevation of China to the Centre of the World Stage’ as was declared in the first part of a new six-part documentary series that aired on China Global Television Network in August 2017, and which was titled ‘Chinese Dream Powers Approach to Major Country Diplomacy.’27 This basically means it will conceive its relations with other states, especially the smaller ones, in tributary terms, as the first Chinese Emperors did as far as relations with their Asian neighbours were concerned. The superiority of Chinese culture will be taken for granted; and all others will be expected to pay tribute to this culture and civilisation. Furthermore the Han Chinese, despite the reality that racial mingling has been frequent throughout their history, view themselves as a single race and racial hubris will add to this. Again, in the traditional Chinese system, the sole source of power was the state; it did not share power with any other entity or person, so that

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the division of powers within the system, which we are so used to, did not exist. Their government (here meaning the Party) is therefore not at all responsible to the people; there are no competing sources of authority such as is commonly assumed to exist in the international system of states, no church, or nobility or expanding business class or media or, above all, the people. This is entirely a top-down exercise of power, in every sphere and the thinking of Confucius is actively applied even today and not just for forms sake. This Confucian ethos does not require the Party to be answerable to the people; there is no space here for democratic functioning as is usually understood. It is the people who have to be loyal and to follow the moral and other precepts laid down by the state—here, and in the present day, of course, the Party. “It is reasonable to surmise that the mandate of Heaven still operates.”28 The Middle Kingdom mentality means that ‘as China draws countries and continents into its web, as is happening already with Africa, they (those countries) will not simply be economic supplicants, but also occupy a position of cultural and ethnic inferiority in an increasingly Chinese ordered global hierarchy.’This is especially so in relations with its neighbours where China’s behaviour and conception of the region is bound to be heavily influenced by the legacy of the tributary system and its character as a civilisation state.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that China’s real aim in its contacts with Bhutan as well the concessions, the pressure tactics, in the border talks is the establishment of diplomatic relations. A diplomatic presence in Bhutan will give China the instruments to begin influencing Bhutan. And this is precisely what the Bhutanese do not want for it will be an immediate threat to the core of their security which lies in cultural strengths.They have spent four centuries widening the gap between their cultural essence and that of Tibet, and in strengthening the first; they will not easily give up that effort by allowing ingress to the Chinese, whose devotion to the Middle Kingdom mentality is now being seen more widely. But diplomatic relations between the two will come about eventually and this should be at a pace determined by the Bhutanese themselves.

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For India, there will be a delicate path to traverse in this matter. There is the necessity of being generous, in regard to all of Bhutan’s dealing with the outside world, to expeditiously carry out projects, notably in the hydropower industry, which only serves to bond the two countries closer together, and for an astute diplomacy that respects Bhutan’s special identity. There is, even more importantly, the need to stand up to China’s threats to Bhutan as well as for India to show by the friends it keeps that it is determined to resist encroachments by whatever means are available. Any weakness in this regard will be seen as a sign by Bhutan.

Notes 1.

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin Books, 1972),

2.

The third main IR theory, liberal internationalism, is not considered here since (in

p. 402.

general) it only applies in specific cases where states and institutions bargain to secure the best possible outcomes for themselves, a bargain which can only happen

between roughly equal states. However, this could conceivably be applied to the very unequal relations between Bhutan and the British, since the heart of the theory is

that transactions between states such that each state benefits, govern international

relations and of course Bhutan did give up some part of its sovereign decision making in return for security from the south and a substantial cash subsidy, a typical 3.

liberal internationalist transaction.

Quoted in Medha Bisht, “Bhutan: India Bhutan Relations in the Next Two

Decades,” in Rumel Dahiya and Ashok K.Behuria (eds.), India’s Neighbourhood,

Challenges in the Next Two Decades (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

2012), p. 43.

See, for more details, Nirmala Das, The Dragon Country (A History of Bhutan)

(Mumbai: Orient Longman, 1974), p. 2.

Karma Phuntso, The History of Bhutan (Gurugram: Random House, 2015), p. 73.

Geshe Ngawang Samten, “Guru Rinpoche and Buddhism in Tibet,” Journal of Bhutan Studies, Vol. 34, Summer 2016, p. 52. Phuntso, n. 5, p. 90. Ibid., p. 217.

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9.

See A.C. Sinha, Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan, Tradition, Transition and Transformation (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 2001), pp. 54-59.

10. From ‘Bhutan—The roar of the thunder dragon by Lyonpo Om Pradhan (Thimpu, K-Media, 2012), p. 14 .

11. This was the last autonomous dynasty of Tibet, 1565-1642, which was replaced by the Dalai Lama, placed there by the Mongol overlords.

12. John Ardussi, Formation of the State of Bhutan (Brug gzung) in the 17th century

and its Tibetan antecedents, reprinted from Christoph Cüppers (ed.) 2005. Proceedings of the Seminar on The Relationship Between Religion and State (chos srid zung brel) in Traditional Tibet; Lumbini 4-7 March 2000. Lumbini International Research Institute, Monograph Series, vol. 4, p. 11.

13. Phuntso, n. 5, p. 247.

14. Marien Gallenkamp, “The History of Institutional Change in the Kingdom of Bhutan: A Tale of Vision, Resolve and Power”, Working Paper No. 61, Heidelberg

Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, Heidelberg University, April, 2011, p. 7.

15. Phuntso, n. 5, pp. 526-7.

16. Some of the doubts are outlined Saklani, U. and Tortajada, “India’s development

cooperation in Bhutan’s hydropower sector: Concerns and public perceptions”, Water Alternatives 12(2), 2019: 738-9.

17. See Economic Times, July 15, 2013; AH Malik and NA Sheikh (2016). “Changing

Dynamics of Indo-Bhutan Relations: Implications for India,” Inter. J. Polit. Sci. Develop. 4(2): 48.

18. Dhurba Rizal, “The Unknown Refugee Crisis: Expulsion of Ethnic Lhotsampa from Bhutan”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 2004, p. 156.

19. Cecilia Tortajada and Udisha Saklani, “Hydropower-based Collaboration in South Asia”, Energy Policy, 117, (2018), p. 320.

20. Thierry Mathou, “Bhutan-China Relations, Towards a new step in Himalayan

Politics”, in The Spider and the Piglet, Proceedings of the First Seminar on Bhutan Studies, Centre of Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2004, pp. 391-2.

21. See Tashi Choden and Dorji Penjore, “Economic and Political Relations between

Bhutan and Neighbouring Countries”, Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2004, p. 75.

22. Mathou, n. 20, p. 400.

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23. Nirupama Rao, in the Indian Express, July 11, 2017.

24. Bruno Macaes, Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order (Gurugram: Penguin, 2019), p. 5.

25. Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World, the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the end of the Western World ( London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 197.

26. Ibid., p. 201.

27. Cited by Michael Clarke, “The Belt and Road Initiative, Exploring Beijing’s

Motivations and Challenges for its New Silk Road”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 84-102, fn 12.

28. Jacques, n. 25, p. 425.

8

From Guidance to Consultation

India’s Policy Towards Bhutan

Mathew Joseph C.

India’s policy towards her Himalayan neighbours is largely shaped by the way the British Indian Empire dealt with them during the period of Raj. The fears and security concerns of the British Indian Empire largely determined the colonial policy towards Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. The British had different policies for each of these countries. The British were always worried about the foreign presence in Tibet, the traditional buffer between China and the British India. They looked at the Himalayan states and Tibet as part of a security cover in which Tibet was considered as the outer cover and the Himalayan states were considered as the inner cover. The British were not completely opposed to foreign influence in Tibet, but not at all in favour of external influence in the Himalayan states. This “double rampart” security system helped the British India to manage her northern frontier.1 The Indian Union, the successor state of British India also by and large followed this policy. In 1975, the Himalayan state of Sikkim merged with Indian Union and became a state within the Union.2 The other two Himalayan states, Nepal and Bhutan have followed a different trajectory. The India-Nepal relations are governed by the IndiaNepal Treaty of 1950 and the relations between India and Bhutan are governed by the India-Bhutan Treaty of 2007, which is an updated version of the India-Bhutan Treaty of 1949.

From Guidance to Consultation | 193

The India-Bhutan relations evolved in the context of the interactions between the English East India Company and the Bhutanese ruling establishment in the late 18th century. The East India Company was keen to establish and develop trade relations with Tibet and China after its consolidation of power in Bengal.The expansionist tendencies of the Gorkha kings in Nepal created hindrances in realising this. The traditional trade route between India and Tibet passed through Nepal. Due to the opposition of Nepal this trade route was not available for the British. This situation compelled the British to explore a new trade route. The alternate route to Tibet via Bhutan and Chumbi Valley was considered seriously. In order to get this route opened for trade the British had to develop relations with the ruling establishment of Bhutan. The Bhutanese involvement in the succession row in the principality of Cooch Behar provided an opportunity for the British to deal with the Bhutanese. One of the parties in the succession row dispute sought support from the East India Company, while the other party received backing from the Bhutanese establishment. The divergent positions of the British and the Bhutanese resulted in an armed conflict between the British and the Bhutanese. The British emerged victorious in this conflict and the both of them signed a treaty on April 25, 1774.3 This treaty resulted in the transfer of territories of Bhutan captured by the British and ensured freedom to conduct trade by both the Bhutanese and the British. Also, the treaty allowed the British to cut timber from the hills. This treaty regulated the interactions between the Bhutanese and the British till the annexation of Assam in the British Indian Empire in 1826. When Assam was annexed,the Assam Duars also automatically came under the control of the British. It was not accepted by Bhutan and repeatedly challenged. Finally, the Assam Duars were conquered by the British in 1841.4 Further deterioration of relations between the British and the Bhutanese was the result of this move. The border skirmishes continued unabatedly and it led to a war (Second Anglo-Bhutanese War) between the British and the Bhutanese in 1864-65. This war came to an end with the signing of the Sinchula Treaty on November 11, 1865.5

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The Sinchula Treaty established British paramountcy over Bhutan. Earlier, the British achieved this in Sikkim by signing the Tumlong Treaty between the British and Sikkim in 1861.6 These two treaties without any doubt placed both Sikkim and Bhutan within the British sphere of influence. According to Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh, The various changes, both external and internal, which the 1865 Treaty had brought about in Bhutan, was well suited to the British concept of a buffer state: a buffer zone with its own autonomous government to which they owed little or no responsibility, but over which they exercised considerable influence in respect to foreign relations and trade.7

In the course of the 19th century, the relations between British India and Bhutan had undergone major changes due to the emerging geopolitical rivalry between Britain and Russia in Central Asia. The Chinese strategic thinking about Tibet and the Himalayan region involving Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan also experienced some changes. The increasing Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia and the Chinese forward policy in Tibet and the Himalayan region compelled the British to take a pro-active position vis-à-vis Tibet and the Himalayan region. The British involvement in the establishment of the hereditary monarchy in Bhutan is a good example of this. The Tibet expedition under Gen. Francis Younghusband in 1904 was a clear indication of British concerns regarding the changing nature of Himalayan geopolitics. In the expedition, Gen. Younghusband was assisted by Ugyen Wangchuck, the Penlop (governor) of Tongsa in Eastern Bhutan. The close relations developed by him and the British led to establishment of the hereditary monarchy of Wangchuck dynasty in 1907 8 and Ugyen Wangchuck became the first king of Bhutan. After the establishment of a hereditary monarchy in Bhutan, the British pitched for the revision of the Sinchula Treaty. The political officer of Sikkim Charles A. Bell conducted discussions on behalf of the British over the amendment of the Sinchula Treaty of

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1865. According to Bell, the British desired to govern Bhutan’s external connections without interfering with the kingdom’s internal affairs. This was meant to prevent Chinese operatives and influence from entering Bhutan.9 After a series a discussions the Sinchula Treaty was revised and signed on January 8, 1910 at Punakha.10 The major change that happened in the Punakha Treaty of 1910 was the revision of the Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty. The Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty reads as follows: The Bhootan Government hereby agree to refer to the arbitration of the British Government all disputes with, or causes of complaint against the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British Government, and the British Government hereby engage to enquire into and settle all such disputes and complaints in such manner as justice may require, and to insist on the observance of the decision by the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar.11

The Article VIII of the Punakha Treaty reads as the following: The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations. In the event of disputes with or causes of complaint against the Maharajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred for arbitration to the British Government which will settle them in such manner as justice may require and insist upon the observance of its decisions by the Maharajas named.12

With the conclusion of the Punakha Treaty, Bhutan in effect became like Sikkim. Bhutan lost her external sovereignty. The only difference between Sikkim and Bhutan was, the former was officially a protectorate of the British while the latter was not. Bhutan was not a part of the British Empire, yet for all intents and purposes,  Bhutan was completely under

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British authority. In 1924, however, it was decided that, “Bhutan, though under British suzerainty was outside India and was not a native Indian state.”13 This clarification by the British helped Bhutan to remain outside British India and thereby keep her independence in the context of the British withdrawal from South Asia. In 1947, the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent. The British Indian Empire was divided into two independent countries: Indian Union and Pakistan. The native states were given a choice to either join with the Indian Union or Pakistan. This was not applicable to Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan as they were not considered as native states. Soon after the British withdrawal, the successor state of British India, the Indian Union entered into a Standstill Agreement with Bhutan. As a goodwill gesture, without much delay, India returned an area called Diwangiri to Bhutan.14 During the Anglo-Bhutanese War of 1864-65, the British conquered 32 sq. km of Bhutanese territory in the southeast. After acquiring this land Bhutan changed its name into Deothang/Dewathang. A new treaty replacing the Punakha Treaty of 1910 was signed between India and Bhutan at Darjeeling on August 8, 1949.15 This treaty known as the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship between Government of India and Government of Bhutan (India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, 1949) determined the relations between India and Bhutan till it was revised and a new treaty signed in 2007. Over all the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, 1949, has ten Articles. One can see a linier connection between this treaty and previous treaties. This connection ensured a sort of continuity in the relations between Thimphu and New Delhi. The emerging political scenario in China due to the imminent victory of the revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party and its fall out in the Himalayan region must have compelled both India and Bhutan to ensure some continuity in the relations between them from the colonial period. Among the ten articles in the treaty, Article II is about the nature of relations between the two countries. The article reads as follows: “The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external

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relations.”16 This article clearly places India in the role of a guide for Bhutan in her relations with the outside world. It presupposes that Bhutan as a country is not capable of making wise and independent decisions about her external relations and needs an experienced country like India to advice and monitor in conducting her foreign relations. One can identify the mentality of the erstwhile British colonialists in the drafting of the treaty. The Chinese policy towards Tibet in the 1950s created anxieties all over the three Himalayan countries. The Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1950 affected the Mahayana Buddhist areas of the Himalayan region in a big way. Tibet is considered as the spiritual capital of Mahayana Buddhism and the atrocities committed by the Chinese there had its repercussions in the entire Himalayan region including Bhutan. The resistance of Tibetans towards the Chinese occupation culminated in the uprising of 1959. This uprising was brutally confronted by the Chinese. As a result of this the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama and his followers were forced to flee to India. As a response to the developments in Tibet, Bhutan decided to cut her relations with Tibet in 1960 and closed the border. Tibet’s accession to China drew the frontiers of India and Bhutan closer to China. Bhutan traditionally followed a policy of isolationism. The inward looking nature of the Bhutanese society created the conditions for this policy of isolationism. The Chinese expansionism that manifested in the annexation of Tibet put pressure on Bhutan to rethink and change about her policy of isolationism. Bhutan decided to open up in the early 1950s. This shift in Bhutanese thinking was wholeheartedly supported by India. In 1954, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, the third king of Bhutan visited India. In return, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Bhutan in 1958. As part of his visit Prime Minister Nehru made an important statement at Paro. This statement is considered to be a brilliant articulation of India’s policy towards Bhutan. Following is Prime Minister Nehru’s statement: Some may think that since India is a great and powerful country and Bhutan is a small one, the former might wish to exercise pressure on Bhutan. It is, therefore, essential that I make it clear to you that our wish is that you should remain an independent country and

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taking the path of progress according to your will. At the same time, we two should live with mutual goodwill. We are members of the same Himalayan Family and should live as friendly neighbours, helping each other. The freedom of both Bhutan and India should be safeguarded, so that no one from outside can do any harm to them.17

India’s policy of non-involvement in the internal affairs of Bhutan was clearly underlined by Prime Minister Nehru throughout the aforementioned statement. This declaration diverged significantly from the language of Article II of the 1949 India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship. The colonial mindset, which is clearly evident in the language of the treaty,is absent from Prime Minister Nehru’s statement. The people of Nepali origin started a pro-democracy movement in Bhutan in the 1950s. The Bhutan State Congress (BSC) that led this movement demanded the abolition of feudal practices, democratisation of the administration and granting civil and political rights for all Bhutanese citizens.18 This political pressure from inside and the turbulent situation around the country compelled Bhutan to shed the age-old policy of isolationism. As a result, land reforms were initiated and feudal practices like forced labour were banned. A consultative body called Tshogdu was established. Apart from these measures, Bhutan started Five Year Plans with the support of India. The first Five Year Plan got started in 1961.19 These socio-political and economic reforms initiated in the country reflected in the external behavior of Bhutan. As part of coming out of the policy of isolationism, Bhutan began interacting with the outside world in a vigorous manner. In this Bhutan got complete endorsement from India. In order to make her presence in the international community more visible, Bhutan took membership in the Colombo Plan in 1962, joined the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1969, in the United Nations Organisation (UNO) in 1971, in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and became one of the founding members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. In 2004, Bhutan joined the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

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Most of the time, Bhutan supported India on international platforms, but occasionally fought to defend her sovereignty. Bhutan has diplomatic ties with 53 nations, including India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Japan, Singapore, Kuwait, Thailand, Finland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, etc. Beginning in 1984, Bhutan began a  direct dialogue with China regarding their disputed border.20 However, even after the standoff at Doklam in 2017 between Bhutan and China, Bhutan refused to establish direct diplomatic relations with China. As mentioned earlier, Bhutan has engaged with China since 1984 regarding their border dispute. This was in consultation with India. India welcomed the dialogue between Bhutan and China to show the outside world that Bhutan is free to engage with India’s strategic adversary. Bhutan always informed India about the developments in the dialogue with China. China on the contrary used this dialogue to portray that India has no locus standi in the external behavior of Bhutan. However, the experience of BhutanChina relations from 1984 till now proves that the nature of their relations is directly proportional to the atmospherics of India-China relations. The response of the people of Nepali origin in Bhutan towards the “Bhutanisation” drive initiated by Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the fourth king, in the late 1980s was on expected lines. The various aspects of the “Bhutanisation” drive, which included the Citizenship Act of 1985, the census conducted to identify the “illegal immigrants” and the promulgation of Driglam Nam Za in 1989, was opposed by the people of Nepali origin who mainly belonged to the Southern Bhutan region. This wedge between the ruling establishment and the people of Nepali origin later developed into an ethnic conflict. This ethnic conflict between the people of Nepali origin and the Ngalong-dominated Bhutanese state resulted making of more than one lakh people of Nepali origin refugees. Most of these refugees (around 90,000) were accommodated in the eight refugee camps spread over the Jhapa and Morang districts of eastern Nepal.21 The organisations of the Bhutanese refugees and the political parties that sprang up from them demanded their repatriation to Bhutan with honour. However, Bhutan paid little attention to this and instead accused them of being anti-nationals. Soon the issue of Bhutanese refugees developed into a

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bilateral issue between Bhutan and Nepal. The Bhutanese refugees wanted India to be involved in the negotiation regarding the repatriation of them from Nepal to Bhutan. India did not allow her to be dragged into this issue and maintained that it is a bilateral issue between Bhutan and Nepal. India’s position actually helped Bhutan to prolong the issue for a long time and finally resolved in a manner best suited for Bhutan. The counter-insurgency measures of the security forces in India’s North-East region in the 1990s compelled many of the cadres of the insurgent organisations like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), etc., to take refuge in the dense forests of Southern Bhutan. Slowly these organisations established their training camps there and started carrying out attacks in North-East India. India periodically alerted Bhutan about these attacks and the existence of the training camps within the territory of Bhutan. During the period 1991-94, the Indian army was allowed by Bhutan to carryout counter-insurgency operations in Southern Bhutan.22 These efforts were not very successful. This was followed by a peace offensive by the King Jigme Singye Wangchuck himself. He initiated dialogues with the different insurgent groups to persuade them to leave from the Bhutanese territory. The insurgents did not listen to the king and continued their operations from the territory of Bhutan. Bhutan had no choice but to conduct a counterinsurgency operation. The Royal Bhutanese Army’s (RBA) counterinsurgency campaign codenamed “Operation All Clear” in December 2003 was largely successful in flushing out insurgents from the soil of Bhutan.23 India wholeheartedly supported Bhutan in this regard. The most important development that happened in the political history of Bhutan in contemporary times was her decision to transform from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy with multi-party democracy. Many observers opined that democracy and constitutional monarchy were gifts from an enlightened monarch to his country. On the contrary, it is evident that his judgement was affected by the current events surrounding Bhutan. According to Pavan K. Verma, India’s Ambassador to Bhutan

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during the period of transition, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck embarked on the path of constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy due to the following reasons: The answer quite simply is that Jigme [Singye] Wangchuck had the political incisiveness, rarely seen in monarchs, to pre-empt history. He knew that in a rapidly globalizing world, Bhutan could not sustain its isolationist path; he also knew, looking at developments in neighbouring Nepal, that sooner or later there would be a democratic challenge to an absolute monarchy. In view of this, he chose to anticipate the inevitable by initiating change himself. In doing so he also created the most sustainable milieu for the perpetuation of his own dynasty.24

Bhutan’s transition to constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy roughly coincided with the revision of the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, 1949. For quite some time sections of Bhutanese establishment have been raising this demand. Finally, the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, 1949 was revised when the fifth king of Bhutan King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck visited India in February 2007. The new treaty was signed on February 8, 2007, by the then External Affairs Minister of India, Pranab Mukherjee and King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck and it came into effect on March 2, 2007.25 The revised treaty significantly changed the colonial tone in the language of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, 1949, and made major changes in the Articles. This change is evident in the way Article II of the new treaty is drafted. A comparison of the wordings of the Article II of both the treaties (1949 Treaty and 2007 Treaty) would be very illustrative of this fact. Article II of the 1949 Treaty reads as follows: “The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.”26 Whereas the Article II of the 2007 Treaty reads differently in this manner:

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In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.27

A close reading of the Article II of both the treaties will give an idea of how the India-Bhutan relations evolved since 1949. The colonial hangover of guardianship and guidance has given way to the principle of cooperation and sovereign equality. This is a major change in the nature of the relations between India and Bhutan. This change has given Bhutan absolute responsibility and freedom in conducting her foreign relations. Similarly, the Articles VII and VIII are also making the 2007 Treaty distinctively different from the 1949 Treaty. 28 These two Articles underlined the responsibility of both the governments to promote cultural and economic cooperation between them. The revision of the 1949 Treaty or the signing of the new treaty in 2007 did not apparently change the nature of the relations between India and Bhutan. The tone and tenor of the 2007 Treaty has created ample space for interpretations by both the policymakers in India and Bhutan. The Indian side believed that the nature of India-Bhutan relations continued as it existed earlier despite the change in the language of the Treaty. On the other hand, based on the language of the Treaty the Bhutanese policy makers assumed that Bhutan has been freed from the guardianship of India in terms of her foreign relations. Both the assumptions were not accurate. The 2007 Treaty has given more space for the policy makers in Bhutan to craft her foreign policy conduct.This was not understood and accepted by Indian policymakers, and Bhutan’s belief that it would obtain complete independence from India in determining its foreign policy was also not correct. Democratic reforms from “above”29 were carried out in Bhutan after the signing of the India-Bhutan Treaty in 2007. The first democratically elected government came to power in Bhutan in 2008 under the leadership of Jigmi Y. Thinley as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley served in the

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former dispensations in Thimphu for long. He and his party—the Druk Pheunsum Tshogpa (DPT)—favoured better relations between Bhutan and China. He and his Chinese counterpart Premier Wen Jiabao met at the sidelines of the Rio+20 Summit in Brazil on June 21, 2012.30 This meeting opened avenues for more direct interactions between Bhutan and China. India viewed this bonhomie between Bhutan and China very cautiously. The King was also not very happy with the emerging closeness between Bhutan and China under the leadership of Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley. The unhappiness of the King towards Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley and his party due to his pro-China tilt led to the defeat of DPT in the elections conducted in 2013. In the elections conducted in 2013, the opposition party during the time of Prime Minister Thinley—the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)— became victorious. Its leader Tshering Tobgay assumed the office of the Prime Minister. He and his party were very sensitive to the security concerns of India. In reality, the PDP administration has reversed the pro-China slant of the preceding DPT administration. When the Doklam incident occurred in 2017, China’s unhappiness with Bhutan’s PDP government became obvious. Doklam (Donglang in Chinese) is a strategic location near the trijunction of India, China and Bhutan. This area is located almost in the middle of Chumbi Valley that belongs to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Ha valley in Bhutan and the Indian state of Sikkim. Doklam’s closeness to the strategically significant Siliguri corridor which connects the North-East of India to the mainland of India makes it important in the larger India-China strategic competition. 31 Bhutan and China were conducting border dialogues between each other since 1984 and made substantial progress when the Doklam crisis happened. In the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan, China is in a militarily weak position as Indian and Bhutanese troops occupy higher regions when compared to the location of Chinese troops. In order to augment her position militarily China has been increasing troop presence in the region and started the construction of a road in the Doklam area. This was noticed by the Bhutanese troops and it was informed to India. Soon the Indian troops along with the Bhutanese troops objected to the road construction activities. This led to a two­

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month long standoff between Indian and Chinese soldiers since June 16, 2017. Though the military standoff ended on August 28, 2017,32 it sparked considerable controversy among Bhutanese policymakers and the general population. Regarding the military stalemate, the vast majority of cyberspace commentary voiced dread and alarm. Some participants in the cyberspace debate even questioned Bhutan’s excessive dependence on India.33 They wanted Bhutan to deal directly with the Chinese to end the tense situation in Doklam. In his opinion piece titled “Bhutan is neither a ‘vassal’ nor a ‘protectorate,’” Tenzing Lamzang, the editor of the Bhutanese, a prominent newspaper in Bhutan, clearly refuted the Chinese claim over Bhutan as her vassal state earlier and mention of Bhutan being a protectorate of India by some journalist accounts.34 The relatively open atmosphere under democracy in Bhutan created spaces for people to voice their opinion regarding the Chinese incursion into Bhutan’s territory. Also, the revision of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007 provided ample freedom to the Bhutan government to deal with the border dispute between Bhutan and China independently. However, the Bhutan government under Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay did consult regularly with India in dealing with the Chinese in the context of the Doklam crisis. In the third general election that took place in Bhutan in 2018, the incumbent party, the PDP, was voted out in the preliminary round and in the final round a new political party called Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT) under the leadership of Lotay Tshering came to power. The DNT leader Lotay Tshering took over as the Prime Minister of Bhutan soon.35 Many in the strategic circles thought that the new Prime Minister would take a neutral position with regard to Bhutan’s relations with India and China. However, in contrary to what many people thought, Prime Minister Lotay Tshering reasserted Bhutan’s traditional policy of aligning firmly with India and paid his first foreign visit to India after assuming office.36 In the course of the first official visit of Prime Minister Tshering to India during December 27-29, 2018, his Indian counterpart Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced many important development assistance

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packages as a gesture of good neighbourliness and “neighbourhood first” policy of India.37As part of it, India agreed to give Rs. 4500 crore as assistance to the implementation of the 12th Five-Year Plan of Bhutan (November 1, 2018—October 31, 2023) and a transitional Trade Support Facility of Rs. 400 crore over a period of five years. Besides, India and Bhutan “reiterated their commitment to jointly develop 10,000 MWs of hydropower generating capacity in Bhutan …”38 Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s return visit to Bhutan on August 17-18, 2019, was also marked with the announcement of many important economic packages. Both the prime ministers underlined the importance of increasing cooperation in the hydropower sector and agreed to connect the India’s National Knowledge Network (NKN) and Bhutan’s Druk Research and Education Network (DrukREN). According to the joint statement released after the visit of Prime Minister Modi both the countries “reaffirmed their shared security interests and reiterated their commitment to maintain close co-ordination on matters affecting each other’s security and national interests.”39 The above mentioned part of the joint statement assumes special significance in the context of the Doklam crisis happened in 2017. This part also suggests that the Bhutan government is still very much dependent on India despite the revision of the 1949 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007. Nonetheless, a minority segment of the Bhutanese elite contends that Bhutan must engage with China to resolve the boundary dispute between the two nations by utilising the advantages afforded by the India-Bhutan Treaty of 2007. Certainly, this part is not pro-Chinese. They are known as Bhutanese nationalists. Bhutan’s rising civil society space is increasing the exposure of this segment. China has made new claims over the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in Eastern Bhutan in June 2020. This happened in a virtual meeting of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) that took place in early June 2020.40 The meeting was convened to discuss about the funding for environmental projects all over the world. One among these projects was the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary located in the Trashigang Dzongkhag (district) in Eastern Bhutan. It was opposed by the representative of China citing that the

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Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary is located in the disputed territory.41 Bhutan and China carried out 24 rounds of discussions regarding the boundary disputes from 1984 to 2016.The dispute regarding Sakteng was never raised by China in any of these boundary discussions. This is nothing more than an attempt to exert pressure on Bhutan so that Bhutan is compelled to make concessions in the strategically significant Doklam region in western Bhutan. Of late, it was reported that China has already constructed a village called Pangda within two kilometers of the Bhutanese territory near the Doklam area.42 Indian media reported this as it emanated from the tweet of Shen Shewei, a senior producer working with the Chinese CGTN News. Later the concerned tweet was deleted by Shewei.43 The Bhutanese government and many influential members in the Bhutanese civil society denied the news reports regarding the establishment of a Chinese village within the territory of Bhutan. The Bhutanese Ambassador to India categorically denied the reports regarding the Chinese village in Bhutan’s territory.44 However, the report that appeared in the South China Morning Post subsequently suggests that the Chinese is active in the Bhutan-China border near Doklam.45 Bhutan would not like the news of the construction of a village by the Chinese within the territory of the country to blow out of proportion. The aggressive posture of the Chinese in their dealings with Bhutan is viewed by observers in the larger context of the India-China rivalry in the Himalayan region. Many believe that the tensions developed between India and China along the border have provoked China to make illogical claims over a sizable part of the territory of Bhutan. As and when the India-China border issue is normalized,the Bhutan-China border dispute will also be resolved. According to the latest news, China has constructed three villages near the Bum La pass which is very close to the tri-junction between India, China and Bhutan in western Arunachal Pradesh.46 This is part of the Chinese strategy to make claims on western Arunachal Pradesh and parts of eastern Bhutan. The sudden appearance of Chinese villages in the western and eastern border areas of Bhutan is definitely part of a well thought out plan to trouble both Bhutan and India in their respective borders with China.

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Both Bhutan and India must cautiously evolve a joint strategy to counter the illegal advancement of China towards the south. India’s policy towards Bhutan has three distinct phases: the first phase starts from early contacts between the British and the Bhutanese till the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent; the second phase begins in 1947 and ends with the revision of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007; and the third phase begins with the revision of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007 till date.  The first phase encompasses a long time during which British India and Bhutan engage in conflict and peace. After the Anglo-Bhutanese War, they signed the Sinchula Treaty in 1865, which had a significant influence on their future ties. The Punakha Treaty of 1910 further refined the relationship between British India and Bhutan, which lasted until the British exit from the Indian subcontinent. The second phase (1947-2007) witnessed the relationship between Independent India, the successor state of British India, and Bhutan. In this period the colonial legacy continued in the relationship between them to a great extent. The provisions of the 1949 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty are the reflection of that. In the first and second phases, initially British India and subsequently Indian Union acted as a guardian to Bhutan in her external relations. The internal administration of Bhutan was completely left to Bhutan herself. In the second phase one can see the Indian Union trying to help Bhutan to come out of complete dependence on India on external relations. From the 1960s onwards, India encouraged Bhutan to take memberships in international organisations as mentioned earlier. The third phase (2007 onwards) began with the revision of the 1949 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty. The Article in the 1949 Treaty that placed the Government of India as a guide to the Government of Bhutan in conducting her foreign relations has been reframed in the revised treaty in the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect. This reframing allowed ample space for Bhutan to have meaningful consultations with India in conducting her foreign relations as the security of both the countries is closely linked. From 2007 onwards, India’s role in her relations with Bhutan transformed from giving guidance in her foreign relations to be available for consultation in conducting her foreign relations.

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This represents a significant shift in the character of India-Bhutan relations. This change in India’s involvement altered the view of some sections in the international community regarding the sovereignty of Bhutan. In the post-2007 period, Bhutan is enthusiastically paving her independent course in the conduct of foreign policy while preserving its longstanding connection with India and India’s security concerns. The daily life of a small landlocked state such as Bhutan, situated between large states such as India and China, requires a tremendous deal of balancing. Bhutan strives to maintain equilibrium in its relations with India and China despite provocation from the latter.

Notes 1.

For details of this “double rampart” policy, see Dawa Norbu, “The Europeanization

of Sino-Tibetan Relations, 1775-1907: The Genesis of Chinese ‘Suzerainty’ and Tibetan ‘Autonomy’,” The Tibet Journal (Dharmashala), Vol. 15, No. 4,

2

pp. 28-74.

“Sikkim Votes to End Monarchy, Merge with India,”The New York Times, April 16, 1975, at https://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/16/archives/sikkim-votes-to-end­

monarchy-merge-with-india.html, accessed on November 12, 2020.

3.

Laxman Singh Rathore, The Changing Bhutan (New Delhi: Jain Brothers, 1974),

4.

Neil Fraser, Anima Bhattacharya and Bimalendu Bhattacharya, Geography of a

5. 6

7.

8. 9.

p. 45.

Himalayan Kingdom: Bhutan (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2001), p. 10.

A. C. Sinha, Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan: Tradition, Transition and Transformation (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 2001), p. 101. Ibid.

Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh, Himalayan Triangle: A Historical Survey of British India’s

Relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765-1950 (London: The British Library, 1988), p. 330.

Parmanand, The Politics of Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect (Delhi: Pragati Publications, 1992), p. 78.

Cited in Peter Colliester, Bhutan and the British (London: Serindia Publications,

1987), p. 166.

From Guidance to Consultation | 209

10. Kapileshwar Labh, India and Bhutan (New Delhi: Sindhu Publications, 1974), pp. 174-75.

11. Manorama Kohli, India and Bhutan: A Study in Interrelations 1772-1910 (New Delhi: Mushiram Manoharlal, 1982), p. 211.

12. Ibid., p. 214.

13. Labh, n. 10, p. 201.

14. Mathew Joseph C., Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan (New Delhi: Nirala Publications, 1999), p. 43.

15. A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan, India’s Foreign Policy and Relations (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p. 172.

16. Kohli, n. 11, pp. 217-18. 17

Appadorai and Rajan, n. 15, p. 173.

18. Leo E. Rose, The Politics of Bhutan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 110-11.

19. Bikrama Jit Hasrat, History of Bhutan: Land of the Peaceful Dragon (Thimphu: Education Department, Royal Government of Bhutan, 1980), p. 135.

20. Keshav Mishra, Rapprochement Across the Himalayas: Emerging Indo-China Relations 21

in Post Cold War Period (1947-2003) (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2004), p. 106. Joseph C., n. 14, p. 149.

22. Interview with King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, The Statesman (New Delhi), May 30, 2004.

23. Dipankar Banerjee and Bidhan S. Laishram, “Bhutan’s ‘Operation All Clear’:

Implications for insurgency and security cooperation,” IPCS Issue Brief, No. 18, January 2004, at https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09020?seq=1#metadata_info_

tab_contents, accessed on November 14, 2020.

24. Pavan K. Varma, “How democracy took roots in Bhutan,”The Hindu (New Delhi), April 1, 2015.

25. See “Revised Indo-Bhutan Treaty comes into effect,”Outlook (New Delhi), March 5, 2007, at https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/revised-indo-bhutan-treaty­ comes-into-effect/455657. Accessed on November 15, 2020.

26. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Treaty of Perpetual Peace and

Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan,” at https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5242/treaty+or+perpetual+p, accessed on November 15, 2020.

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27. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty,” at http://mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf, accessed on

November 15, 2020.

28. The Article VII of the 2007 Treaty reads as follows: “The Government of Bhutan

and the Government of India agree to promote cultural exchanges and cooperation

between the two countries. These shall be extended to such areas as education, health, sports, science and technology.” The Article VIII of the Treaty reads

as follows: “The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree to continue to consolidate and expand their economic cooperation for mutual and long term benefit.” See Ibid.

29. See Mathew Joseph C., “Bhutan: ‘Democracy’ from Above,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 19, May 2008, pp. 29-31.

30. Kuenzang Choden, “Prime Minister meets Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao,” The Bhutanese, June 22, 2012, at https://thebhutanese.bt/prime-minister-meets-chinese­ premier-wen-jiabao/ Accessed on November 17, 2020.

31. See Raj Chengappa, “India-China Standoff: All you need to know about Doklam Dispute”, India Today, July 7, 2017, at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover­

story/story/20170717-india-china-bhutan-border-dispute-doklam-beijing-siliguri­ corridor-1022690-2017-07-07, accessed on November 17, 2020.

32. See Ashok Sajjanhar, “The Doklam crisis ends: A diplomatic victory for India”, Raisina Debates, August 30, 2017, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-doklam-crisis-ends-a-diplomatic­ victory-for-india/, accessed on November 18, 2020.

33. See Akhilesh Pillalamarri and Aswin Subanthore, “What Do the Bhutanese People

Think about Doklam?”, The Diplomat, August 14, 2017, at https://thediplomat.

com/2017/08/what-do-the-bhutanese-people-think-about-doklam/, accessed on

November 18, 2020.

34. See Tenzing Lamzang, “Bhutan is neither a ‘vassal’ nor a ‘protectorate’”, The Bhutanese (Thimphu), July 20, 2017, at https://thebhutanese.bt/bhutan-is-neither­ a-vassal-nor-a-protectorate/, accessed on November 18, 2020.

35. Tshering Palden, “Dr. Lotay Tshering is Prime Minister,” Kuensel (Thimphu), October

30,

2018,

at

https://kuenselonline.com/dr-lotay-tshering-is-prime­

minister/, accessed on November 20, 2020.

From Guidance to Consultation | 211

36. Tshering Palden, “PM on a three-day state visit to India,”Kuensel (Thimphu), December 28, 2018, at https://kuenselonline.com/pm-on-a-three-day-state-visit­ to-india/, accessed on November 20, 2020.

37. See Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Press Statement on the State Visit of Prime Minister of Bhutan to India (December 28, 2018), at https://

mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30853/IndiaBhutan_Joint_Statement_

during_State_Visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_Bhutan_to_India_December_28_2018, accessed on November 20, 2020.

38. Ibid.

39. See Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on the

State Visit of Prime Minister of India to Bhutan (August 18, 2019), at https://www.

mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31739/Joint_Statement_on_the_State_ Visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_India_to_Bhutan, accessed on November 23, 2020.

40. Nitin A. Gokhale, “China Crafts New Row in Bhutan Wildlife Sanctuary Bordering India,” The Quint, June 30, 2020, at https://www.thequint.com/news/

china-crafts-new-dispute-bhutan-sakteng-wildlife-sanctuary-bordering-india, accessed on November 23, 2020.

41. Ibid. Also see Manoj Joshi, “In China’s Territorial Claims in Eastern Bhutan, a

Message for India?,”The Wire, July 10, 2020, at https://thewire.in/external-affairs/

china-bhutan-india-territory, accessed on November 23, 2020.

42. See Vishnu Som, “China Sets Up Village Within Bhutan, 9 km From Doklam

Face-Off Site,” NDTV, November 20, 2020, at https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/

china-sets-up-village-within-bhutan-9-km-from-doklam-face-off-site-2327563, accessed on November 28, 2020.

43. Ibid.

44. “Bhutan Ambassador refutes China’s claim of setting up village inside Bhutanese territory,” The Print, November 20, 2020, at https://theprint.in/world/bhutan­

ambassador-refutes-chinas-claim-of-setting-up-village-inside-bhutanese­ territory/548782/, accessed on November 28, 2020.

45. Liu Zhen and Kunal Purohit, “Near the China-Bhutan-India border, a new village is drawing attention to old disputes,” South China Morning Post, December

6, 2020, at

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/

article/3112712/near-china-bhutan-india-border-new-village-drawing­

212 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

attention?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_content=article&utm_

s o u r c e = Tw i t t e r & f b c l i d = I w A R 1 j T J V h r t r q w 9 M _ 5 a l 4 R 1 D 6 w _ G s S _

mZS1xCNYckUOsTzRbBDOmXnMOJXTs#Echobox=1607243079, accessed on December 10, 2020.

46. Vishnu Som, “Exclusive: China Sets Up 3 Villages Near Arunachal, Relocates Villagers,”

NDTV,

December

6,

2020,

at

https://www.ndtv.com/india­

news/exclusive-china-sets-up-3-villages-near-arunachal-pradesh-relocates­ villagers-2334869, accessed on December 10, 2020.

9

History and Perceptions

India-Nepal Relations

 Sangeeta Thapliyal

Nepal’s geo-strategy and relations with its neighbours is well documented in the historical narratives of India and Nepal. Writings from India have often described Nepal as a frontier, buffer or strategically important for the security of the Indo-Gangetic plains. The colonial and post-coloinial narratives were constructed on the strategic interests interspersed with commercial interactions. Nepal’s narrative on its geo­ strategic location and relations with its neighbours is well documented in Prithvi Narayan Shah’s  Dibya Upadesh  (Divine Counsel).  He had realised the vulnerability of Nepal’s landlocked location between British India and China and had advocated a cautious foreign policy. Despite his caution on not to engage in war with the British; Nepal and India had armed conflicts mainly to stop the territorial expansion of Nepal towards the other Himalayan states. The Anglo-Nepal war of 1814 was one of the defining moments in India Nepal relations, the remnants of which continue to have an impact. This article highlights two episodes from Nepal’s history, mainly how Prithvi Narayan Shah described the strategic location of Nepal between India and China in his Dibya Upadesh and the impact of Anglo-Nepal war.

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Prithvi Narayan Shah’s Geo-strategic Understanding

Prithvi Narayan Shah was a great warrior, strategist and the founder of Gorkha rule in Nepal. A King from a small principality of Gorkha, he defeated the other Himalayan kingdoms and principalities and brought them under his rule. The defeat of Kathmandu valley laid the foundation of modern Nepal. He did not rest on his laurels and moved further to expand his territory with certain success and failures. Some of his thought processes on governance, statecraft, society and external relations are reflected in his Dibya Upadesh. These were not meant as sacred verses but as guiding principles for the future rulers. Acutely aware of the geopolitics of the time period, he adopted a cautious approach towards his neighbours. He said, “this country is like a Yam (gourd) between two rocks.”1 Modern terms used in social sciences like ‘landlocked or landlinked’ were not in use then but the statement does reflect closeness to being landlocked like a Yam, a root vegetable, caught between two big rock-like neighbours India and China. His approach towards the neighbours was that, “one has to maintain friendship with the Emperor of the sea (English Emperor) in the south. But he is very clever. He is occupying Hindustan. He is eyeing the plane area (of Nepal also). When Hindustani (Indian) people will wake-up (not tolerate them) he may find difficulty to stay there. He might have been searching a safe fort and there is every possibility that he may come here at any day. Therefore, we have to find out our Sandhisarpan (weak points) and we also have to change them into the strong forts. We have to create obstacles on the way they try to enter into. Mind it they may arrive here anytime.”2 Probably his experiences with Kinloch expedition, 1767, shaped his views. Jaya Prakash Malla, King of Kathmandu, had sought help from the British to thwart Gorkha attack. Captain George Kinloch, along with this forces, was sent to help Kathmandu, but was unable to defeat the Gorkhas in the hills. On his retreat the Captain took control of Bara, Parsa and Rautahat in the Terai. This consolidated Shah’s distrust towards the British.3 Shah was not averse to developing relations with the neighbours but understood the complexities of the then existing times. He was aware of

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the physical distance from China, with whom the country hardly had close socio-cultural relations.  However, he was cautious of India where the East India Company had taken over the kingdoms by various strategies. The company that had entered India for commercial purposes was controlling the political space. This made him wary of the Company and he perceived them as a potential enemy that could later try to move towards Nepal. For this Prithvi Narayan Shah suggested the country to not only remain vigilant but also suggested strategies to counter the British. Being a brilliant strategist he advocated identification of geographical vulnerable points and upgrade their security so that the British could not take advantage of them. He was building a scenario in impending warfare and said, “Do not go there (down) to fight with them. Let them come here (hilly region) and fight with them. If we could do so, they can easily be beheaded at the crossings of the Chure Hills.”4 Nepali Army was adept in mountain warfare and he was giving directions on the choice of terrain for any impending armed conflict. One of the strategic moves by Shah was to construct strong forts in strategic points in order to stall any movement of forces from the South. “This is a Thakhat (suitable place/natural fort) of Nepal. If they get this fort they will win over all the Four Emperors of the world. In fact, this state itself is a fort created by the God thouself. It does not need any human touch on it. Prepare seven strong forts in these places namely Shivapuri-1, Phulchouki-1, Chandragiri-1, Mahadevpokhari-1, Palung-1, Dapcha-1 and Kahule-1.”5 The King of Nepal suggested having strong army consisting of Thakuris, Magars, Gurungs and Khas. The strength of the empire was a ‘regular standing army, something never seriously experimented in the region’.6 He proposed providing soldiers with agricultural land, which would provide them with a sense of social security and inspire their loyalty to the King. In order for the Army to repel any prospective onslaught from the south, he advised placing weapons and ammunition in each of the seven designated forts, as well as constructing iron gates with a gun and five troops at each crossing.7 This, he believed, could provide protection for the nation. Understanding the commercial interests of the East India Company, the King warned his people to not let them enter Nepal for trade purposes.

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The company was interested in trade routes from Nepal to Tibet. The Kinloch mission had further strengthened Shah’s suspicion of the company’s motives.8 “If the foreign traders are permitted to enter into Nepal, they will make Kangal (poorest of the poor) to the local people.”9 He wasn’t, however, averse to doing trade with India. He urged people to sell herbs and clothes to India and earn money but be cautious to stall money flow from Nepal to India. He encouraged people to weave textiles. “Do not permit to the local people to use foreign cloth. Always train to the domestic weaver by showing the sample of the cloths and ask them to weave similar cloth. If we could do so the cash of the country will not flight (go abroad),”10 he said. Shah was aware of the importance of trade with Tibet and the lucrative trade business of the Malla Kings with Tibet. In fact, easy accessible trade route from Kathmandu to Tibet was one of the reasons to capture the valley. Malla Kings earned revenue by minting coins for Tibet. Shah, after capturing the valley, substituted the then existing Malla coins with silver coins, which created complexities in trade and exchange leading to halt of trade for nearly five years.11 He thus advised that it was through friendship and cordial relations Nepal could continue trade with Tibet.12 Prithvi Narayan Shah’s judgment and wisdom on country’s location, relations with the neighbours, awareness of own strengths and weaknesses and to how to utilise strengths to overcome weaknesses is visible in his Dibya Upadesh. He cleverly tries to engage with the neighbours, propounds signing friendship treaties without putting the guards down.

Nepal’s Territorial Expansion

Shah died in 1775, and his policy pronouncements started to waiver. His reign was followed by power struggles amongst his heirs, minor kings under regents, and the office of Prime Minister gaining control over the internal and external policies of the country. Nepal’s territorial expansions and commercial interests led to investment on large army. In the north, the Gorkhas invaded Tibet in 1788 and 1791 to settle their unresolved trade-related issues. In fact, the Tibetans had sought assistance from the British but it was turned down. Cornwallis had sent a letter to Panchen Lama in Tibet on February 29, 1789, explaining that any

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military intervention by the British would have an adverse impact on their commercial interests with China. The cost of sending military to Shigatse would have been financially high and not worth against the Gorkha with whom they did not have strained relations.13 The war stopped when China sent its forces in support of Tibet. They also mediated between Tibet and Nepal that led to signing of the Treaty of Kerung on June 2, 1789.14 The Treaty resolved the issue of currency for trade between the warring parties. Tibet accepted currency minted by Gorkha kings at a rate of one new coin equalling to two old coins. Nepal relinquished its rights over Kuti, Kerung, Jhangagadhi, Takldakhar and the territory up to Dhaking pass. It also relinquished its rights over Khasa and fixed its border till Tatopani, which is the present border of Nepal. The Treaty defined Nepal’s borders with Tibet. Gorkha forces also were in conflict with Sikkim, Tibet and India. Nepali forces took over Sikkim in the east, Doti region in the far west of the country and thereafter expanded westward defeating Kumaon, Garhwal and reaching Kangra valley where they were defeated by the forces of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. These developments in the north disturbed the strategic calculus of the British as they considered the Himalayas as a buffer between India and China and did not want any political or territorial disturbances that could impact on commercial accessibility to the Tibet. This culminated in the Anglo-Nepal war in 1814, defeating the Nepali forces and stalling their territorial expansion. Nepal’s military adventurism has been described as a result of Gorkha valour, brave Gorkhas, efficient warfare tactics. In fact, motto of the Nepali Army and the Gorkha regiments in the India is Kayar Hunu Bhanda Marnu Ramro  (Better to die than to be a coward).  No doubt they were one of the finest warriors and that led the British to recruit them in the British Indian Army, but just bravery was not the only token for Nepal’s previous victories.  Rose establishes that Bahadur Shah had made contacts with Karmapa Lama who was visiting Nepal from Tibet in 1788. Nepal utilised its contacts with many political and religious groups in Tibet to gain access to those whose interests coincided with theirs. This helped Nepal to wage an armed conflict against Tibet.15

218 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

On Gorkha conquests of Kumaon and Garhwal, Joshi and Joshi16 write that one of the reasons for Nepal’s territorial expansion to capture economically lucrative areas was to sustain their large standing army. Nepal captured these areas not only through their military strategies and bravery but also covert diplomacy. During their westward expansion they were halted by a conglomerate of seven kingdoms, known as the Palpa alliance. 17  The region under the alliance was rich in mineral resources like copper and zinc, had fertile land and was also an important trade route. Kingdom of Palpa was the leader of the alliance. When the Gokha army was unable to break the alliance of 7 kingdoms, then one of their diplomatic tactics was to lure the King of Palpa into an alliance. Mahadatta, the ruler of Palpa, married his daughter to Bahadur Shah,18  the uncle of minor King Rana Bahadur. They agreed to split the six states between themselves. By doing so, the Gorkhas were able to break the Palpa alliance and took control over Jajarkot, Rising and Ghiring, whereas Palpa took over Argha, Khanchi and Gulmi. This helped ease the Gorkha forces to move their conquests further west.19 Joshi writes that letters written by the Gorkha King Rana Bahadur to Kanaknidhi, an influential minister of Kumaoni origin in Palpa, establishes the fact that Gorkhas had made contacts with him to defeat Doti. Through Kanaknidhi they acquired support of Harshdeva, Gadadhara and Ramanarayana, influential Brahmins from Kumaon in defeating Doti. This Letter written to Harshdeva in the month of Sravan 5 of VS 1847 ( July 1790 CE), “informs about exchanges of several letters between the King and his confidants in the context of military operations in the western front. Significantly, it reads that on the recommendation of Kanaknidhi Tripathi the King entrusted the affairs of the western front to Harshdeva.”20 Similar tactics were used to breach alliance between Doti and Kumaon and later in taking over Garhwal. “Before invading Garhwal the Gorkha enlisted some dominant Garhwalis who were hostile to the Garhwali Chief Sudarshan Shah. The most important was the famous painter, poet Moolaram who gave valuable information about the weaknesses of Sudarshan Shah to the Gorkha.”21 The narrative establishes that the brave Gorkhas, adept in military warfare, used diplomatic  manoeuvering  to control stronger kingdoms like Doti, Kumaon or Garhwal.

History and Perceptions | 219

Anglo-Nepal Relations

Gorkha rule over these areas came to an end through an armed conflict with British Indian forces in which Nepal lost one-third of its territory and was compelled to sign a treaty of Peace at Suguali on December 2, 1815, ratified in 1816. Anglo-Nepal war and the subsequent signing of the Treaty in Sugauli was a major turning point in India’s relations with Nepal. It had established Nepal as a nation-state. The territorial boundaries of Nepal with India was defined.  Nepal had to give away territories that it had taken over through armed aggressions. River Kali is recognised as Nepal’s boundary with India in the west, whereas river Mechi in the east with Sikkim. Nepal had to give away Terai areas in the South.22 The Treaty established representatives from British India and Nepal to reside at each other’s court. It established British residency in Nepal in which the Indian embassy is located now. Like other Himalayan states, Nepal had internal autonomy but its external relations were curtailed and were in correspondence with the British interests such as any despite with Sikkim had to be resolved through the British mediation, Nepal was not allowed to employ Europeans, Americans or British subjects in its Durbar. Through this strategy the British confined Nepal to the Himalayas. One of the after developments of the Anglo-Nepal war was the recruitment of Gorkhas in the British Indian Army. The British could get excellent soldiers and also weaken Nepal army by attracting their soldiers or youth.23  Initially the recruits were those who remained in India due to injury, or were disbanded soldiers or prisoners in the war. Later young aspiring men were smuggled from Nepal. Initially Nepal had resented the clandestine operations by the British to recruit Gorkha youths in the Indian army or the presence of Resident in Kathmandu.24  Significant changes were seen in Nepal’s domestic and foreign policy during the time of Prime Minister Jang Bahadur. It is said that he was impressed by the industrial development and military might of England during his visit to the country in 1880.25 He realised that it wise to have friendly relations with them and accommodate Nepal’s interests.  He extended support to the British during the Sepoy’s  mutiny  or the first

220 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

war of independence in 1857, and had also commanded 9,000 strong men. In recognition of Jang Bahadur’s services the British conferred him with “Insignia of a Knight Grand Cross, Military Division of the Order of Bath.”26  Later it was Prime Minister Bir Shamsher who accepted the British demand  for Gorkha recruitment in the Indian Army through official notifications in 1885 and 1888. In turn, he received the British government’s backing to become the country’s prime minister after killing Maharaja Ranodip Singh.27 Contrary to the Dibya Upadesh of Prithvi Narayan Shah cautioning Nepali kings towards the British, the Rana Prime Ministers had developed close relationship. The Nepali ruling elite looked towards the British for support and legitimacy for their rule. One of the major influencing factors was the domestic political compulsions that influenced Nepali political elite to look towards British India for support. The monetary benefits were an added advantage. Nepal earned Rs 100,000 as annual subsidy for its contribution in the first world war, and Rs 200,000  as annual subsidy in the second world war.28 The treaty signed with the British in 1923 further moved Nepal away from neutrality.  The Treaty contained provisions that established close understanding on security interests between Nepal and the British. They agreed to share information if their relations were strained with those countries that shared common borders with them (Article 3) and would not allow their territory to be misused against the security interests of the other (Article 4).29 Similar provisions are reflected in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship that was signed between Nepal and independent India on June 31, 1950, where it was reiterated that  both the signatories would inform each other if any friction or misunderstanding occurred with the neighbouring states.30 The treaty was signed in the backdrop of communist China’s forces entering Tibet and it had disturbed the line of security for both India and Nepal. Nepal was going through political turmoil and did not pose itself as a strong line of defence. The treaty contained provisions related to security and economic interests of the two signatories. They agreed to share information not only with each other on any eventuality or crisis, but also resolve them through consultation. India gave transit

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facilities for Nepal’s imports of arms and armaments from a third country. The peace treaty allowed citizens of one country to reside in another country and participate in economic activities. No restriction was imposed on the movement of people to cross border or participate in economic activities. This special relationship was based on realpolitik and mutual interests as was the call of the time.31 Similarly,  Nepal continued Gorkha recruitment with the Indian and British armies. Economic incentives, employment to ablebodied men were some of the factors in the decision making apart from the Indian and British interests to continue with the military recruitment. Nepal was also going through political instability within the country where people were protesting in support of democracy and political reforms. Many from Nepal had participated in India’s freedom movement against the British and the Indian political leaders had reciprocated and extended support to the pro-democratic forces and political reforms. The close relationship thus evolved was special based on mutual trust and benefits.

Nepal’s Changing Narratives on Geo-strategy

The period of special relationship was under strain when monarchy became politically active in Nepal side-lining the democratic forces. King Mahendra had dismissed political parties and brought in Panchayat system in the country. Nepal changed the emphasis on its foreign policy and propounded policy of ‘non-alignment’ and equal friendship for all’ and ‘diversification’.32 It signed agreements with China on road construction from Kathmandu to Tibet, withdrew certain facilities from Indians which was granted through the Peace treaty of 1950.  The government of the day took advantage of India’s strained relations with China. The Nepali political elite was suspicious that the democratic forces may get support from India. To avoid imprisonment and other actions by the state many Nepali political leaders had moved to India. Nepal’s  apprehensions heightened when Sikkim joined India in 1975. A few years before that India had helped in the formation of Bangladesh. Nepal’s response to the events was by declaring itself as a zone of peace. A new terminology trans-himalayan linkage between its neighbours was introduced in the last decade. Nepal has responded to the growing economic

222 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

development of its neighbours. The new thrust is a mix of economic benefits along with geopolitics. To illustrate this further Nepal has been issuing statements that it would develop economic relations with both its neighbours. The country has suffered ten years of people’s war by the Maoists and, now that peace has prevailed, wants to develop its economy. Geographically, Nepal has easy accessibility to the Indian plains. Both the countries have open borders, socio-cultural similarities, free trade and infrastructural linkages. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had emphasised on Highways, Information and Technological linkages for Nepal’s economic development during his first visit to Nepal in 2014. This was reciprocated by Nepal and projects on hydropower, rail and road linkages were signed. Agreements on broad gauge railway line were signed linking JanakapurJaynagar and Jogbani-Bardiabas. Work is in progress, and during PM Sher Bahadur Deuba’s visit to India in 2022, a 35 km rail link between Jayanagar in Bihar with Kurtha in Nepal was inaugurated.33 Direct bus service has started linking Kathmandu with Delhi, Varanasi and Patna. India has constructed transmission lines linking up with Nepal, signed agreement allowing Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) to sell its surplus energy under Cross Border Trade of Electricity to India. Nepal has started selling power to India from June 2, 2022, and in that month earned Rs 1.72 billion by selling 178.19 million units.34 In its new foreign policy thrust Nepal showed readiness to take advantages of the economic developments that would come by through the Chinese led Belt and Road Initiative and became its part in 2017. Within its fold Nepal has signed agreements on infrastructure development, road and rail links with China. They have agreed to open seven more passes for trade purposes. In 2014, Nepal and China had opened road from Rasuagarhi through Kerong pass. China and Nepal have signed an agreement to bring a rail link from Xigaze to Kathmandu. The rugged Himalayas are no more a barrier in the north. There is air connectivity and direct flights operating between Nepal and China.35 Nepal’s move towards China has been more political than economic. It coincided with Nepal government’s strained relations with India especially in the wake of the border blockade by the Madhesis in 2015. China tried to

History and Perceptions | 223

fill in the vacuum and signed various infrastructure agreements, and was seen actively engaging with the leaders of various political parties,especially with the left forces for a unified alliance. China was considered responsible for the formation of Nepal Communist Party (NCP) in 2018 which came through a merger of Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). They were again actively involved to stall the new party from breaking up in 2020.36  China is also backing Nepal’s idea of trans Himalayan links and has supported Nepal’s new foreign policy thrust. In 2016, President Xi Jinping had said that Nepal could be a link between India and China.37 It is an attempt to breach closer socio-economic relations and making a space for themselves. In the words of foreign minister of China Wang Yi, “Nepal stands as a natural beneficiary for cooperation and development from China and India. I think this is a logical desire that should be supported by both China and India.”38  China is trying to project a pro-active stance in Nepal’s economic development and urging India to join in the efforts. However, without addressing each other’s strategic concerns in the Himalayas, would it be possible for India and China to cooperate on defining new economic paradigm? It remains to be seen whether Nepal will continue to create bilateral infrastructure links with its neighbours, or if it will be able to break through and act as a bridge between the two. The country desires to move from landlocked to landlinked.Will modern Nepal be able to maintain neutrality or equidistance with its neighbours. It never had. Historical experiences have shaped country’s foreign policy, perceptions and attitudes. The Anglo-Nepal war of 1814 and the subsequent developments during the British period has certain elements, which still persist in the relations with India.

History shapes Nepali nationalism

The Nepalis are proud to have never been a part of the British Empire. This narrative has greatly influenced country’s nationalism. As with other Himalayan nations, the British did not directly control Nepal, but by the Treaty of Sugauli in 1815, they established a residence in Kathmandu. Their independence to have ties with any other nation or to employ any

224 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

European in the palace was curtailed. Nepali Kings had internal autonomy to rule. Prithvi Narayan Shah had mentioned India as Muglan that ascribes India as a land that was ruled by the Mughals. Till date there are  writers in Nepal calling India as Muglan. Nepalese have a sense of pride in their military prowess and how they had won territories and expanded in those areas which are now part of India. They had lost some of those territories after the 1814 war but in their collective memory the British took away territory which rightfully belonged to them. This had given rise to the voice for greater Nepal but it never could gather strength. My experiences in Nepal as a Thapliyal hailing from Garhwal have broadened my perspective. Other than Royal Nepal Airlines, only Indian Airlines operated to Nepal in the nineties. Airports were generally not so crowded and the personnel at the immigration counter in Kathmandu airport had time in hand to talk with the passengers entering Nepal. Immigration officials would talk to me in Nepali and on realising my Indian and Garhwali identity would tell me how Uttarakhand was part of Nepal. Officials on the counters changed but year after year the story remained the same. Once in a while someone in Nepal does remind Garhwalis that it was a part of Nepal, albeit for ten years. It is ingrained in their national consciousness that the Gorkha kingdom was large and is robbed of its rightful inheritance. The shift in my experience came somewhere around early 2000. One official at the  immigration counter looked at my passport, then at me, and said with a smile, ‘Indian passport bana liya’ (you have made Indian passport). Interestingly this happened more than once and I would ignore it as an innocuous statement till one day when a Nepali friend from the foreign service showed me a room full of stacks of files and said that all those were fake passports. That is when the reality hit me. It is very difficult to change the mindset of the people. This sense of nationalism was evident throughout the Kalapani problem. The history of Kalapani issue begins with Nepal’s westward territorial expansion and the Treaty of Sugauli, which was signed in 1814 following the defeat of Gorkha forces in the aftermath of the Anglo Nepal war. The treaty had defined India’s borders with Nepal. Kali river in the west of Nepal bordering Kumaon was

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considered as the boundary between the two countries. According to article 5 of the Treaty, “The Rajah of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claims to or connection with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitant thereof.”39 The treaty had divided villages of bordering area of Kumaon and Far Western Nepal. Out of the nine villages in the Dharchula subdivision of Pithorgarh district, two villages, Changru and Tinker were given to Nepal. However both the countries have different assertions on the source of the river. Nepal asserts that river Kali originates in Limpiyadhura hence the entire area of Kalapani and Lipulekh belong to it. India asserts that origin of the river is at Kalapani where Lipugad meets Mahakali. ‘Thus the areas west of Kali river, including Kalapni, Lipulkeh, and Limpiyadhura and the villages of Gunji, Nabi and Kuti are an integral part of India.’40 Of these Lipulekh pass has been used the most by the Bhotiya people who have been involved in trans-Himalayan trade with Tibet. The pass is the shortest route to Mansarovar and has been used by the pilgrims and traders since time immemorial. Lipulekh pass was recognised as a trade and pilgrims route by India and China in the agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet signed in 1954. In 1992, through a protocol of entry and exit procedure for border trade, India and China had recognised Lipulekh as one of the border trading points. Twist in the story came when India and Nepal had signed the Treaty on Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project in Mahakali river in 1996. The Treaty had described Mahakali as a boundary river between major stretches of the two countries and the opposition party, mainly the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN (UML), had raised objections on the status of the river. They asked for the withdrawal of Indo-Tibetan Border Police force from Kalapani.41 Nepal again asserted claims over Lipulekh after India and China had identified Lipulekh pass as an additional border personnelmeeting point between the Indian army and the People’s Liberation Army, in 2014. During PM Narendra Modi’s visit to China, both the countries had agreed to expand border trade at Lipulekh. Nepal raised objection on the agreement highlighting the territory as disputed. Laying claims on the territory Nepal objected to India’s new map published in December 2019

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and later the construction of road from Dharchula to Lipulekh pass in Pithoragarh district of Kumaon. PM KP Oli had raised an objection to the new map showing Kalapani as part of India and laying claims over it. If one observes the time and context, Nepal had raised claims on Lipulekh when the government in power had strained relations with India and was also shaky at home. PM KP Sharma Oli was faced challenges on a myriad of issues from his own party members and the opposition. People were questioning his performance to meet covid-related challenges. He tried to deflect the opposition by alleging that the opposition to his government was at the behest of India.42 At this juncture he raised the issue of Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Even though many political leaders within Nepal understood it as a political upmanship by PM Oli against his opponents, they had no choice but to give support to the call for regaining territory. The territorial issue had touched the nationalistic emotions of the Nepalis, which was still raw from the hardships faced due to the border blockade with India. PM Oli upped the game by redrawing a new map of the country showing Kalapani area with in Nepal. His popularity had grown manifold within the country especially among the hill people, cutting across the political and ideological lines. The issue of nationalism often takes form of anti-India posture. It would be difficult to pinpoint when the seeds were germinated, but the words of caution and the distrust dates back to the Dibya Upadesh.

An Assessment

Many in India get baffled with anti-India feeling kind eruptions in Nepal. To understand Nepal and its relations with India, it would be pertinent to understand its historical events and how they have shaped the present national consciousness. The recent political discourse within Nepal established that the past experiences of communities have shaped their national identities and their outlook towards neighbours. Depending on their interests, time and context, a community within a group of communities becomes the forebearer of nationalism. Not only did the post-current constitution scenario in the country reveal fragmented responses from the populace, but also fragmented

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nationalism among communities. The hill people, especially from the dominant communities, became the torchbearers of Nepali nationalism in which the madhesis and janjaties did not find a place. The ‘othering’ of the people from the Terai was based on their socio-cultural links with the Indians across the border and their protest was suspected to be getting support from India, and thus against the national interest. The discourse ignored the contribution of the madhesis and janjaties in raising the national consciousness for an inclusive nation-state. It is easy to construct narratives that are far from reality, such as India is ready to grab land or water of Nepal. Even though this is far from reality and Nepal is earning foreign exchange by selling hydropower to India but within the domestic political domain of the country such far from reality narratives are constructed to create Nepali nationalism. It is an easy strategy to counter political opponents in their race for power. Responding to them would translate in knee-jerk reactions. Like any other country Nepal’s past has shaped its present perception towards itself and the others. Recognising and respecting the historical events that have shaped Nepali national consciousness and their perceptions towards India may help in negotiating some of the dilemmas inherent in bilateral relations. After all perception is an important component in establishing relations.

Notes 1.

Prithvi Narayan Shah’s Dibya Upadesh, Nepal Law Commission, Kathmandu, p. 9.

3.

L.F. Stiller S.J., Prithvi Narayan Shah in the light of Dibya Upadesh (Ranchi: Catholic

2.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

Ibid.

Press, 1968), pp. 35-36.

Dibya Upadesh, n. 1, pp. 9-10. Ibid., p. 10.

BK Joshi and Maheshwar P Joshi (ed.), Unfolding Central Himalaya: The Cradle of Culture (Almora: Almora Book Depot, 2017), p. 117. Dibya Upadesh, n. 1, pp. 9-10.

Rishikesh Shaha, Modern Nepal: A Political History, 1769-1955, vol. 1 (New Delhi:

Manohar Publishers, 2001) p. 31.

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9.

Dibya Upadesh, n. 1, p. 11.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

11. Stiller, n. 3, pp. 48-49. 12. Ibid.

13. Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley: University of California, 1971), p. 40.

14. V.K. Manandhar, Cultural and Political Aspects of Nepal- China Relations (New Delhi: Adroit Publisher, 1999), pp. 11-14.

15. Rose, n. 13, pp. 35-36.

16. BK Joshi and Maheshwar P Joshi (ed.), Unfolding Central Himalaya: The Cradle of Culture (Almora: Almora Book Depot, 2017), p. 117.

17. Palpa Alliance consisted of Palpa, Jajarkot, Rising, Ghiring, Argha, Khanchi and Gulmi.

18. He was the younger son of Prithvi Narayan Shah and uncle of Rana Bahadur Shah. Bahadur Shah was responsible for the expansion of the Gorkha rule towards the west of Kathmandu.

19. Joshi and Joshi, n. 16, p. 118. 20. Ibid., p. 121.

21. Ibid., pp. 125-26.

22. For the text of the Treaty in Yogi Narharinath and Narendra Mansingh Basnayet, Itihas Prakasma Sandhi Patra Sangraha (Kathmandu, 1964), pp. 13-18.

23. S.K. Jha, Uneasy Partners: India and Nepalese Relations (New Delhi: Manad Publication, 1975), p. 10.

24. Sangeeta Thapliyal, ‘Gorkha Recruitment in the Indian Army: Two Hundred Years’, in B.K. Joshi and Maheshwar Prasad Joshi, Unfolding Central Himalaya: The Cradle of Culture (Almora: Almora Book Depot, 2017), pp. 177-191.

25. Adrian Sever, Nepal under the Ranas (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1993), pp. 72-74.

26 Purushottam Banskota, The Gurkha Connection (New Delhi: Nirala Publications, 1994), pp. 53-55.

27. Nicholas Manserg and Panderel Moon (eds.), “The Future of Gorkhas: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India”, India Office, 7 March 1947, in India: The Transfer of Power 19427 (London: H.M. Stationery Office 1980), pp. 885­ 8.

History and Perceptions | 229

28. Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas (Britain: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 85.

29. For text of the Treaty refer Yogi Narhari Nath and Narendra Man Singh Basnayet, Itihas Prakasma Sandhi Sangraha Patra (Kathmandu, 1964).

30. Ibid., pp. 35-37.

31. Sangeeta Thapliyal, “India and Nepal Treaty of 1950: the Continuing Discourse”, India Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2012.

32. Leo E Rose and Roger Dial, “Can a mini state find the happiness in a world

dominated by protagonist power?”,  The Annals of American Academy, Vol. 386, November 1969, p. 92.

33. Harshit Sabarwal, “PM Modi, Nepal›s Deuba inaugurate Jaynagar-Kurtha railway service”, Hindustan Times, April 2, 2022.

34. “Electricity Authority says it earned Rs 1.72 billion in June by selling power to India”, The Kathmandu Post, July 1, 2022.

35. Sangeeta Thapliyal, “Nepal’s Transhimalayan Linkages with China”, Scholar Warrior, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, India, Spring, 2017, pp. 50-51.

36. Sangeeta Thapliyal, “Political Developments in Nepal and the Chinese Involvement”, USI Journal, United Services Institution, New Delhi, January-March

2021.

37. “Nepal can be a bridge between China and India: Xi Jinping”, Economic Times, March 21, 2016.

38. Sutirtho Patranobis, “China firms up connectivity projects with Nepal, asks India to join in”, Hindustan Times, April 18, 2018.

39. For text of the treaty of Sugauli refer Yogi Narharinath, n. 22.

40. Nrip Singh Napalchyal, “Indo-Nepal Boundary Issue and the Nepalese Brinkmanship”, Dev Bhoomi Media, June 19, 2020.

41. Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, “Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal water conflict”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 34, no. 9, March 1999, pp. 553-564.

42. “‘India Wants to Overthrow My Govt’: Nepal PM KP Oli Alleges”, HW News, June

28,

2020,

at

https://hwnews.in/news/national-news/india-wants-to­

overthrow-my-govt-nepal-pm-kp-oli-alleges/140032/.

10

The Stability of Instability

Chinese Engagements in Nepal and

Implications for India

Nihar R. Nayak

Introduction

The geophysical location of the Himalayas makes it important not only in the Asian politics but also in the global politics. It works as an axis of Asia by connecting South Asia, Central-Northern Asia and the South East Asia. Its varied topography and climatic conditions has worked both as a facilitating and disjointing system between major civilisations of Asia. Therefore, since time immemorial, ‘stability’ in the Himalayan region has remained the central issue to all the countries that are part of the region. Historically, many military expeditions, conflicts, treaties and agreements have been undertaken to keep the region stable, both in terms of bilateral relations and domestic politics. In the contemporary world, the stability factor in the Himalayan region has reached its zenith as the two Asian giants—India and China attempt to dominate the global politics. As they strive to establish a new world order, their mutual suspicion develops due to their structural disparities and internal fault lines. In this framework, both nations view stability in the periphery (or immediate neighbourhood in India’s case) as the first line of defence to protect the core. While stability is a shared concern for both nations, their divergent approaches and perceptions of how to maintain stability with their

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common neighbours have led to instability in those countries.This has baffled smaller countries in South Asia. For instance, while China interpreted the monarchy as the stable institution in Nepal, India felt that constitutional monarchy with multi-party system would ensure better stability. In the postmonarchy period, while China has been trying to establish a single party communist government by unifying major Marxist-Leninist-Maoist parties of Nepal, India, on the contrary, has been trying to consolidate multi-party democracy under an inclusive new constitution. In this race for stability, Nepal witnessed a series of political transitions since its emergence as a buffer between India and China in 1950. From India’s point of view, Nepal is a special neighbour which shares an open border with deepening civilisational linkages. Other than that, India has been suspicious about Chinese expansionist programme, which has been guided by Mao Tse Tung’s policy of “Tibet as palm and five Himalayan kingdoms as the fingers.” The Chinese occupation of Tibet is so embedded in the Indian consciousness that China might attempt to integrate other countries in the Himalayan region. Keeping that in mind, in the postindependence period, India continued the British frontier policy with Himalayas as the formidable defence barrier. India integrated its frontier policy with the security of Nepal and Bhutan. The 1949 and 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Bhutan and Nepal served as a deterrent. Not only Nepal, but also other nearby nations are accorded a unique place in India’s neighbourhood strategy due to their intensifying cultural ties and close proximity. India expects its near neighbours to take its sensitivities into account when negotiating with extra-regional powers.

Strategic Himalayas

The strategic importance of the Himalayas (broadly known as Hindu Kush Himalayas, which connects eight countries) is highlighted in both conventional and non-conventional aspects. Both aspects are equally import to human security of Asian region. From the non-conventional security point of view, the Himalayas have been the major sources of Ten Asian Rivers and largest deposit of snow after the Arctic and the North Pole. Therefore, it is called the Third Pole because it holds the largest

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reserve of fresh water outside the Polar regions. These rivers have been contributing towards growth and prosperity of Asian civilisations since time immemorial because of their perennial flow caused by snow and monsoonal rains. That provides irrigation, power and drinking water for over 250 million people who live in the Himalayan region and another 1.65 billion living downstream of these rivers.1 There is also an intrinsic linkage between the Indian Ocean and the Himalayas. The Himalayas regulates the South Asian monsoon, which supports livelihood of millions of people in South Asia. It also prevents cold waves from the Central and Northern Asia to the South Asian sub-continent. The Himalayas has been a major source of economic life for eight Hindu Kush Himalayan countries—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan—as an attractive tourist destination, deposits of precious minerals and herbs for medicinal purposes. From the conventional security point of view, since time immemorial, the Himalayas has protected the Indian sub-continent against military expeditions from central and northern Asian rulers due to high elevations, rough terrain and hostile climatic conditions. The significance and vitality of the Himalayas to the Indian subcontinent is also mentioned in various Indian religious books, including the Vedas and Puranas. The Himalayas was one of the geo-cultural identifications of India in the ancient history. The Vishnu-Purana-makes it clear that the Himalayas formed the frontier of India. It states that the country south of the Himalayas and north of [Indian] Ocean is called Bharat, and all born in it are called Bharatiyas or Indians.2

In fact, various ancient and modern historical evidences suggest that Himalayas was considered as a ‘formidable defence barrier’ to protect the large empires like Maurya and Gupta from the challenges across the Himalayas. These empires had used the Himalayas as the northern frontiers and adopted special security and trade policies with the neighbouring countries.3 A similar policy was adopted during the British India. The BritishIndia policy of recruiting Gurkhas in the Indian security forces sent a clear

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message to the smaller countries of the subcontinent to feel ownership of the region and lend their support to protect both cultural and territorial unity of the region. Since India inherited the British Indian territory, independent India continued with the same policy. The Himalayas figured strongly in India’s northern defence and foreign policy. Describing the importance of the Himalayas to protect India’s northern frontier, former PM of India Jawaharlal Nehru said in parliament on December 6, 1950: “from the time immemorial the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent frontier … we cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India”.4 Unfortunately, the relevance of the Himalayas as a formidable defence barrier was drastically reduced after the Chinese occupation of Tibet that brought a landmark change in the Himalayas security system. The buffer between the two biggest civilisations of the world shrank drastically. China’s border expanded up to the Indian border leading to border dispute. China was not a signatory to the McMahon Line as per the 1914 Shimla Convention between British India and Tibet. While the Republic of India inherited the British India land and accepted the McMahon Line as the legal border, China rejected the same by stating that Tibet was never independent. China had established first direct road link between Kathmandu and Lhasa by constructing Arniko Highway in 1963. The impregnable barrier is under challenge after Nepal joined the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) in May 2017. China has also declared setting up of China-Nepal multimodal trans-Himalayan connectivity network. Under this project, China will set up railways, highways, transmission lines and integrated check posts at the China-Nepal borders. China’s ambitious trans-Himalayan policy synchronises with Nepal’s aspirations of reducing dependence on India and re-tuning India-Nepal bilateral relations by bringing changes in the 1950 Treaty, other bilateral agreements and the open border arrangement. The changing dynamics in the Himalayan region and structural changes in India-Nepal relations will weaken India’s guard in the northern frontiers.

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China: Readjusting Nepal Policy

The geopolitical changes in the 1950s enhanced Nepal’s strategic importance as well as vulnerability. From Chinese point of view, Nepal emerged as a cultural buffer between Tibet and India. Taking lessons from the Khampa uprising, China remained concerned about three things: (i) geo-cultural closeness between India and Nepal, (ii) open border arrangement and India’s influence in Nepali polity, and (iii) western powers’ presence in Nepal. China managed its anxiety or security concerns by having a good relationship with the royal regime, which was considered as a guarantor to its “peripheral stability” in the Himalayan region. The abolition of monarchy in Nepal in May 2008 and anti-China protests in Nepal in August 2008, forced China to readjust its southern periphery policy with geo-political changes. Moreover, China’s “go global policy” and western development policy reinforced it’s Nepal policy.

Left-party Unity

In the absence of monarchy, China preferred the merger, consolidation, and continuation of the left political parties in power in Kathmandu. Ideologically, China felt comfortable to work with left parties since the Nepali Congress was mostly perceived as a pro-India party. In fact, in the post-Maoist insurgency period, China took a cautious step to engage with the then UCPN-Maoist party since its leaders took shelter in India during the insurgency period. China was the first country that welcomed merger between two left parties of Nepal—the UCPN-Maoist and the CPN­ UML—in May 2018. In a statement, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said, “As a good neighbour and friend to Nepal, China supports Nepal’s independent choice for the social system and development path that suits its own national conditions and we welcome the merging of the two parties.”5 It is widely believed in Nepal that China played a vital role in that merger. Not only that, China ensured the unity of the NCP (the newly formed Nepal Communist Party) during its internal crisis from April to August 2020. China’s Ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi held a series of unofficial

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(without informing MoFA) meetings with senior Nepal Communist Party leaders, President Bidya Devi Bhandari and cabinet ministers to keep the party unity intact. In an interview to media, Bishnu Rijal, deputy chief of international relations department of the NCP, observed that “Beijing is concerned over disputes in the ruling party. They [Chinese] have been advising us [NCP] to remain united and not indulge in disputes. They have also suggested that top leaders take into account the people’s verdict, peace and development.”6 In the post-merger period, the Communist Party of China (CPC) established party-to-party relationship with the NCP by signing a MoU in September 2019. The MoU incorporated five points—exchanging high-level visits between the two parties, sharing the communist ideology and experiences, giving continuity to the ideological training that is being conducted at present, extending the training to lower levels and sharing experiences regarding the development models of the two countries.7 However, this was not a one sided effort. Ideologically, the left parties— the Maoists and Communists—felt comfortable with China. From the Maoists point of view, China is a role model for rapid socio-economic development. From former UML’s point of view, China could be used to counter India’s influence in Nepal. Therefore, the rhetoric of left party leaders against India helped China to identify the left parties as the long term partner in Nepal.

Investments and Aid

China has stood at the top in terms of FDI pledges to Nepal for the last six consecutive fiscal years. According to Department of Industry, Government of Nepal, Nepal received over 90 per cent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) commitment from China during the first quarter of the fiscal year 2019-2020 (that began in mid-July). Of the total FDI pledges of $95 million, China alone pledged $88 million during the first quarter. This represented nearly 93 per cent of the total foreign investments committed to Nepal. Britain replaced India in the second place with FDI pledge of $1.85 million followed by India with $1.76 million in the third position.

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FDI pledges from China during the first quarter of the current fiscal year stood at 7.79 times higher than the amount the Chinese investors pledged during the same period of 2018-2019 fiscal year. In the first quarter of the 2018-2019, China pledged total FDI of $11.3 million. In the first quarter of the 2019-2020, overall FDI commitment to Nepal was $42.63 million. Expressing optimism towards increase in Chinese investment in Nepal, Pashupati Murarka, former president of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, said, “We have got a few big investments from China in the areas of hydropower project and cement projects. But, large Chinese investment is still low in manufacturing sector except in cement.”8 The Chinese investors’ confidence in Nepali market doubled after President Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit in October 2019 that came immediately after his Mamallapuram informal summit with PM Modi. That was the first official visit by a Chinese president in 23 years to Nepal. Around 20 deals were signed and nearly $492 million in financial aid was pledged in economic assistance for Nepal over the next two years. Separate deals for construction of a trans-Himalayan railway link to Tibet and a tunnel were reached. During his visit, President Xi remarked, “It is important that we adopt a strategic and long-term perspective and draw up a blueprint for our bilateral relationship to take it to a new height in this new era.”9 Since 2006, China has constantly increased its annual aid assistance to Nepal. China had agreed to provide RMB 800 million (nearly $128 million) to the Himalayan nation as a grant assistance for the financial year 2015­ 2016.This was Beijing’s biggest annual grant to Kathmandu, an over five-fold increase from its previous annual grant of RMB 150 million. The decision to hike annual grant was taken during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Kathmandu visit in December 2014 following India’s move to provide Nepal with a line of credit worth $1 billion.10

People-to-People Relations

Given the political uncertainty, China diversified it policy towards Nepal from earlier state-to-state level to people-to-people relations. In the postmonarchy period, China upgraded its development programmes in the 15

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bordering districts keeping in mind the growing influence of India and western countries in the Constitution making process in Nepal. In this regard, China proposed to undertake special development projects. In 2014, a deal was signed between two countries. China agreed to provide 10 million Yuan ($1.63 million) annually from 2014 to 2018 to help Nepal develop its northern districts bordering China’s Tibet Autonomous Region. Chinese aid was spent in health, education and road sectors to improve the livelihood of the residents in those districts. China reviewed the strategy in 2019 by providing direct developmental support to the local bodies in the 15 districts. This proposal was made during Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to Beijing in 2016. Under the agreement, China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) would provide developmental and logistic support to the northern districts for another five years. As agreed, Nepal government permitted the CIDCA to provide development assistance and create capitals in the 15 northern districts of Nepal to meet their developmental needs. The Chinese side had also agreed to provide material support like dozens, solar lights, blasting equipment, construction materials for schools and libraries, among other.11 It is worth mentioning here that while the entire country was in dire need of development funds, China focused only on those 15 bordering districts. This implies that China’s support was solely driven by security imperatives rather than improving socio-economic conditions of the marginalised groups of Nepal. Most importantly, China vociferously opposed the idea of ethnicity based federalism since the time that was proposed by the Maoists in the mid-1990s. In June 2012, a month after Nepal’s Constituent Assembly failed due to differences on the issue of federalism, Ai Ping, a senior Chinese party official, visited Nepal. During that visit he met with senior leaders, including Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda. During the meetings Ai Ping had strongly expressed China’s reservations on ethnic federalism. A very senior Maoist leader had told The Hindu newspaper in India, “their message was China prefers a unitary Nepal, but if federalism has to happen, it should not be based on ethnicity.”12 Ai Ping was very concerned about the number of provinces in northern parts of Nepal. He advised Nepali leaders

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to keep minimum number of provinces in the northern part of the country for security reasons.13 Therefore, China was least concerned about social discrimination in Nepal under monarchical system. Despite its opposition to one of the core demands of the indigenous groups, China’s engagement with Nepal is considered as benign and friendly. In the post-Constitution period, China further expanded its people-to­ people relations by signing a MoU between the Social Welfare Council Nepal (SWCN) and China NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE), an umbrella body of Chinese NGOs, to enable Chinese NGOs to work in Nepal. According to the MoU, “a majority of Chinese NGOs are interested to work in the fields of agro-based livelihood, health care, education, disaster management and skill training, among others.”14 The MoU was signed at a time when the government drafted the National Integrity Policy to limit activities of NGOs and INGOs, as some of them were found ‘trying to break communal harmony and proselytising Nepali’. The Chinese presence in the rest of the Himalayas in terms of military infrastructure and connectivity projects could be more challenging to India than China’s direct engagement with Nepal. It is pertinent to mention that on October 18, 2020, one article in the Global Times had warned that “if India takes the move to support ‘Taiwan independence’, China has every reason to support separatist forces in Northeast Indian states such as Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. China could even support the resurrection of Sikkim.”15 Apart from that, China could engage left-wing extremist groups of India for creating more disturbances in central parts of the country. In 1962 India-China conflict, Nepal remained neutral. Even during Doklam and the 2020 India-China face off in Ladakh, Nepal asked both countries to maintain peace in the Himalayas and resolve the conflict bilaterally. Despite improvement in Chinese engagement with Nepal, the latter will remain neutral in case of escalation of border conflict between India and China. At the same time, Nepal will adhere to the principal of not allowing its territory to be used by any external forces against India. Most importantly, a comparative study on Chinese engagement in South Asia indicates that Nepal figures in third position in its South Asia

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policy after Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. China does not see much economic profit through Nepal until Indian market is connected with China via Nepal. In this scenario, India needs to focus more on improving relations with Nepal and express confidence in the bilateral relations. Any judgemental policy to neutralise Chinese influence in Nepal could be counterproductive.

India-Nepal Relations

India-Nepal relation is the most complex one in the region. It is a combination of cooperation and conflict. While the tension in the relationship has been mostly reflected at the state level, the people-to­ people relations have always been friendly and peaceful. The topographical proximity has created a dependency factor. The Himalayas has long been considered a vital security guarantor to India’s northern frontier in the context of traditional and non-traditional security threats. Radio Peking’s announcement in November 1949 to liberate Tibet16 forced India and Nepal to sign the Peace and Friendship Treaty in July 1950. By entering in to this agreement, India created a northern frontier defence mechanism to protect Nepal and its own territory against further Chinese aggression. Although there are asymmetries, both the countries acknowledge that they are equally dependent on each other. While Nepal is dependent on India for its rapid economic growth and development, India needs a politically stable and peaceful Nepal to take care of its security concerns. At the same time, a deeper relationship reassures each other’s support during crisis periods and indirectly they stand as each other’s security provider. That is the reason why Nepal finds a special position in India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy.17 Moreover, India-Nepal relation is embedded with common geography, history, culture, people-to-people relations and diplomatic relation. Independent India’s relationship goes beyond formal ties, which started in June 1947. The open border has made the relationship special in the region. The 1950 Treaty formalised the relationship further. It recognised each other’s sovereignty, dependency as equal partners, and guaranteed multi­ dimensional and people-to-people relations.

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Political Relations

India played the key role in major political transitions in Nepal since 1950. It facilitated 12-points agreement between the Maoists and seven political parties in December 2005. Frequent high level political exchanges had consolidated the Indo-Nepal relations. In the post-conflict period, except Jhalanath Khanal, all the PMs of Nepal paid official visits to India at different points of time. Immediately after assuming office, PM Modi undertook his second foreign visit to Nepal in August 2014. Politically and culturally, the August 2014 visit was a huge success. Modi visited Nepal on three different occasions from 2014 to 2018. Similarly, Prime Minister Oli and former Prime Minister Dahal visited India twice on different occasions from 2016 to 2018. During these visits a number of bilateral agreements were signed.

Economic Engagements

India is the largest trading partner of Nepal and a major transit route for doing business with third countries. Around 65 per cent of Nepal’s annual trade is with India. The bilateral and transit trade through India have increased in recent years due to implementation of GST in India, operationalisation of ICPS and railways connectivity to Birgunj and Biratnagar, agreement on using Vishakhapatnam port for transit trade and Motor vehicle agreement (MVA) under the BBIN. While India maintains status quo as the largest trading partner, it slipped into second position as an investor in Nepal by end of 2020. China replaced India as the top investor in Nepal for the sixth consecutive year since 2013. Surprisingly, since the Maoist conflict, Nepal has not received major investments from India in manufacturing sector. It was only in the 1990s that Indian MNCs like Dabur, Asian Paints, and Unilever entered Nepal to set up joint ventures ( JVs), or as wholly owned subsidiaries. While manufacturing sector still accounts for 20 per cent of the total Indian FDI in Nepal, energy sector is still neglected.18 Even in the 2017 Kathmandu Investment Summit, India committed mere $317 million in comparison to $8.3 billion by China.19

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Even in the last decade, India’s official development assistance to Nepal as a significant development partner has not increased as promised. China overtook India in 2015. China’s ODA has been growing steadily from $19 million in 2010-11 to $38 million in 2014-15. In 2014-15, India’s ODA in Nepal was $22 million.20 However, India committed a fund of $250 million in grant and $750 million soft loan for earthquake reconstruction projects. In 2014, India committed two lines of credit ($100 million and $250 million) and $1 billion to be utilised in financing development projects of Nepal’s choice.21 Other than this, India has committed to be a key development partner in hydro, railways, waterways, highway, police training centres, hospitals, transmission lines, ICPs and service sectors in Nepal. Unfortunately, many of these projects were not delivered on time. No doubt the Chinese economic engagement with Nepal has increased. It appears larger than India’s because just one decade earlier China had limited role in Nepal’s socio-economic development. On the other hand, India has constantly engaged in these sectors since 1952. If we compare Chinese investments, trade and ODA with that of India in the last five years in Nepal, China seems to be at the top. But a cumulative assessment of external contribution to Nepal’s overall development reflects India as the largest development partner.

Security Cooperation

Modern India-Nepal relations stand on five pillars—geography, common history and culture, deepening people-to-people contacts, formal diplomatic relations and security cooperation, including military-to­ military relations. In the last seventy years of diplomatic relations, despite the absence of a formal bilateral military pact, military cooperation has been the most steady and least susceptible to diplomatic conflicts. In reality, it has played a role in reviving formal diplomatic relations during times of crisis. In January 2016, the troops of both nations apparently played an important role in removing the border blockade by the antiConstitution agitators. As per the 1950 Treaty, India has been supplying military equipment to the Nepal Army (NA). The NA has been trained and equipped by India

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since 1952 and was even briefly manning joint check posts on the northern border.22 Till today, the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu has the biggest military mission, including Pension and Welfare Wings at four major Gurkha recruitment centers. In a unique arrangement, both the countries confer honorary general position on to each other’s Army chiefs. Other than that, every year thousands of Nepali Gurkhas join Indian Army under the tripartite agreement. India and Nepal also have robust security bilateral institutional mechanisms starting from Joint Commission at Foreign/External Affairs Ministers level to regular meetings between border security forces. During these meetings, both the countries reiterate their commitment to address each other’s security concerns. Every year, since 2009, armies of both the counties meet for annual bilateral military exercise called Surya Kiran. The objective of this joint exercise is to ensure better coordination between armies of both the countries in disaster management, anti-terrorism operations and strengthening of the bilateral relations.

People-to-people Relation

India-Nepal’s People-to-people relation (P2P) is unique because it is not supported by the state. The volume and quality of P2P relations indicate that it is mostly driven by culture, geography and people themselves. Linkages between pilgrimages, exchange of priests and marital relations, Nepali participation in India’s freedom struggle, Gurkha regiment in the Indian Army and use of open border, etc., make the relationship unique. India provides about 3,000 scholarships under 12 schemes to Nepali students to study in India.23 This is highest amongst the foreign countries offering scholarships to Nepali students per year. Besides, India has been a job destination for Nepalese since the colonial time. As per one estimate, more than five lakh Nepalese work and live in India. Despite these positive things, the bilateral relationship lost warmth since September 2015. Nepal strongly protested India’s interventions while writing the new Constitution. Just two days before the promulgation of the Constitution, India had sent the then foreign secretary S. Jajashankar to Nepal as a special envoy to the Indian prime minister. India had expressed

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its disappointment to the Nepali leaders regarding their failure to adopt a broad based Constitution by accommodating the concerns of the people of the Tarai region.24 Since Nepali leaders did not address India’s concerns, India did not recognise the new Constitution upon its promulgation on September 20, 2015. Nepali leaders felt that India was against the new Constitution. India’s non-cooperation in clearing the no-man’s-land at the India-Nepal border, which was illegally occupied by the Madhesi protestors, further deteriorated the relationship. The border blockade ended after six months upon a friendly and peaceful intervention by the armies of both the countries. As the relationship was improving due to high-level political engagements in the post-Constitution period, the following developments pushed the relationship to a low level: India’s silence in not holding dialogue with Nepal on the border disputes, delay in submission of the EPG report, issuing of a new political map by India in November 2019, and issuing of a new map by Nepal against India’s cartographic changes.

India-Nepal Border Disputes

India and Nepal have been trying to resolve their border disputes (redemarcation of the border pillars and negotiations over Kalapani and Susta disputed borderlands) since 1981.The issue is one of the major contentious issues, which has negatively impacted the bilateral relationship on several occasions. The issue has been dragging on over the last 40 years perhaps, and it gives a readymade electoral issue for the left parties to garner public support by raising anti-India sentiment,25 which has been Nationalism in Nepal by Prithvi Narayan Shah.26 With the adoption of the multiparty and democratic system in Nepal in the early 1990s, some left (including the Maoists) party leaders used this issue to grab public attention and become popular. These leaders tactfully presented a distorted version of the facts related to the border issues, which easily enrages the public sentiments against India. For example, a large number of border pillars were displaced or destroyed due to either change of river course or non-maintenance of that. On the contrary, the left leaders presented it before the public that India displaced those pillars and

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encroached Nepali territory. The extra-regional forces, who are inimical to India, added fuel to this fire. The issue was once again used by Prime Minister Oli to regain his control over the NCP leadership, who were challenging his authoritarian style of functioning of the party and the government. Just six days (on May 2—the second NCP secretariat meeting) before the inauguration of the Lipulekh-Mansarovar route by Indian Defence Mistier, Rajnath Singh, Prime Minister Oli managed to save his resignation demand from the top five leaders of the NCP. He could manage to abort the crisis by declaring Bamdev Gautam as the next Prime Ministerial candidate and again over the Chinese advise to keep the party united. While Prime Minister Oli was experiencing turmoil, he manipulated the Lipulekh issue to divert the public attention and regain his control over the party. However, Prime Minister Oli failed to keep the NCP intact. The Maoists and the Madhav Kumar Nepal’s faction of the CPN-UML came out of the NCP and supported the Nepali Congress to form a new government under the leadership of Sher Bahadur Deuba in July 2021.

Border Negotiation

Officially, in 1981, both the governments had agreed to set the IndiaNepal Border Joint Technical Committee to re-demarcate the boundary pillars. The committee worked for 26 years. In the middle of its tenure, the two Prime Ministers directed the Committee to complete its task by 2003. “The Prime Ministers also directed the Joint Working Group of the Joint Technical-Level Boundary Committee to expeditiously complete its examination of the facts relating to the alignment of the boundary in the western sector, including the Kalapani area, and in other pockets, where there were differences in perceptions of the two sides.”27 The committee submitted its report in 2007 by signing at the technical level. The technical-level committee had prepared 182 sheets of maps of the India-Nepal border barring the two disputed territories—Kalapani and Susta. In fact, then Nepal’s Foreign Minister, Upendra Yadav, announced that strip maps of the India-Nepal boundary were complete except for those around two disputed areas.28 Yadav’s statement was strongly opposed

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by a group of lawmakers. The parliamentary Human Rights and Foreign Relations Committee in Nepal advised the government not to sign on the strip map unless the two disputed territories—Kalapani and Susta are resolved. The Nepal government in January 2009 declined to sign on the strip maps. Besides that, the then Home Minister of Nepal, Bamdev Gutam, made a statement that the Kalapani dispute to be discussed in a tripartite meeting between India-Nepal-China. He made this statement in 2008 after meeting a visiting Chinese delegation.29 Until July 2014, no negotiations happened on the border issues. Since both the countries had committed to resolving the issue bilaterally, the negotiation mechanism was re-opened by setting up a boundary working group (BWG) at the surveyors-general level to settle some boundary issues, such as construction, restoration and repair of boundary pillars including clearance of ‘No-man’s land’ and other technical tasks,30 during a threeday official visit of India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to Kathmandu.31 During this visit, the Joint Commission ( JC) “directed the Nepal-India Boundary Working Group to commence field works at the earliest.”32 Initially, the tenure of the BWG was five years, which was extended till 2022.33 The JC also “directed the Foreign Secretaries [FS] to work on the outstanding boundary issues, including Kalapani and Susta receiving required technical inputs from the BWG as necessary.”34 Interestingly, after eleven months of the formation of the BWG and FS level mechanism to resolve disputes on Kalapani and Susta, Nepal opposed India’s bilateral border trade agreement with China on Lipulekh in May 2015, which was not earlier officially listed as a disputed territory. Nepal claimed that the Lipulekh Pass, which was mentioned in the joint statement of 15 May 2015 during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China, is a disputed tri-junction in which Nepal has an equal share. The joint statement states: “…The two sides agreed to hold negotiation on augmenting the list of traded commodities, and expand border trade at Nathu La, Qiangla/Lipulekh Pass and Shipki La.”35 Nepalese media, academia, civil society and ruling and opposition party leaders had expressed concern over this development and demanded that China and India should withdraw the mention of Lipulekh in the joint

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statement. They also argued that such a mention tantamount to disrespect for Nepal’s sovereignty and a threat to its territorial integrity. Then Nepalese Prime Minister Sushil Koirala lodged a formal diplomatic protest against section 28 of the 41-point India-China Joint Statement. The issue had intensified public debate in Nepal at a time when India and Nepal have agreed to resolve the existing border dispute amicably through bilateral mechanisms in July 2014. The fact of the matter is that both China and India has been mentioning Lipulekh Pass as one of their border trading points since 1954. The agreement on trade and intercourse with Tibet signed in April 29, 1954, states that “traders and pilgrims of both countries [India and China] may travel by following passes and route: (1) Shipki-La pass … (6) Lipulekh Pass.” But the subsequent flare-up over the border, the 1962 war and the freeze that it resulted in disrupted India’s trade with Tibet. The relationship took a new turn with Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988. During the visit, both countries agreed to resume border trade and sign fresh agreements in this regard. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Resumption of Border Trade was signed in December 1991 during Prime Minister Li Peng’s visit to New Delhi. In an effort to strengthen border trade through the mutually agreed designated trading routes, India and China further signed a Protocol of Entry and Exit procedure for border trade in July 1992. Interestingly, Lipulekh pass was mentioned in both these agreements as a mutually recognised border trading point.36 From 1954 to May 202037 (till this report was written), China did not claim the Lipulekh Pass as a “tri-junction”. Had the Lipulekh been a disputed territory or part of Nepal, China would not have signed these MoUs with India. Moreover, why did Nepal not raise the issue of the disputed territory until 2015? Only some Nepalese scholars argue that China considers Kalapani area a disputed land. Lipulekh Pass is close to Kalapani, as a disputed land located along the India-Nepal border in Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand. As Nepal government claims, it had expressed its disagreement in 2015 through separate diplomatic notes addressed to the governments of both India and China over the Lipulekh issue, and India did not respond to

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that note while China responded to that immediately. India perhaps did not respond to that note because, first, India has been fully convinced that Lipulekh is part of its territory. Second, in August 2014, Nepal did not mention Lipulekh as a disputed territory. Only Kalapani and Susta have been mentioned in the official notes as disputed territory. Third, Lipulekh was not a “tri-junction”. It is located four kilometers down south-east of the Nepal-India-China border meeting point called Om Parvat. Last but not the least, during their bilateral visit to India, post-2015 Chinese leaders did not mention Nepalese concerns regarding the Lipulekh issue. The border dispute re-occurred on November 7, 2019, after India issues a new map on November 2. Nepal issued press comments in opposition to the inclusion of Kalapani on the revised map.38 The Press statement was issued in Nepalese. There was no reference to Lipulekh and Limphiyadura in the statement.39 Five months after claiming only on Kalapani, Nepal again strongly and suddenly protested against India’s inauguration of Lipulekh-Mansaowar route on May 8, 2020. From the Indian point of view, the reaction was sudden and surprising while the construction of this route was going on since 2007. Interestingly, while the Foreign Minister of Nepal was aware of construction, the same was not in PM Oli’s knowledge. In a press release, on May 9, 2020, Nepal claimed that it has “consistently maintained that as per the Sugauli Treaty (1816), all the territories east of Kali (Mahakali) River, including Limpiyadhura, Kalapani, and Lipulekh, belong to Nepal. This was reiterated by the Government of Nepal several times in the past and most recently through a diplomatic note addressed to the Government of India dated November 20, 2019 in response to the new political map issued by the latter,”40 while the November press release referred to only Kalapani. Reportedly, on both occasions (2003 and 2008), Nepal indirectly hinted that China should be included in the negotiations. China has, however, not made any statement on the Nepalese proposal. Despite India’s assurance to Nepal to resolve the issue through bilateral mechanisms, Nepal has persistently requested China to make its position clear or support Nepal in resolving the issue with India. The issue first came up during the China­

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Nepal border agreement in 1961. China responded to the matter by acknowledging it as a disputed land between India and Nepal. In May 2005, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again brought the issue of the 2004 India-China agreement on border trade before China. According to the Ministry’s May 10, 2005, press release, China responded that Chinese side always holds the view that the problem of Kalapani between Nepal and India should be resolved through friendly bilateral consultation and the Chinese side fully understands the concerns of the Nepalese side and respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nepal.41

External Influence

Nepal’s inaccuracy in defining the number of disputed border territories with India is shrouded in uncertainty. It indicates that Nepal’s position on Limphiyadura, Kalapani and Lipulekh Pass could be politically motivated and pushed by external forces. It would be worth to mention that the new map of Nepal (issued on May 19) did not mention Susta. Because Susta does not have strategic relevance for the extra-regional forces. It could be publically motivated, because, the leaders want to keep the issue alive for electoral and vote bank purposes as happened in the case of the 1950 Treaty. Border issues with India is a major election issue and often dominated the country’s foreign policy during the former CPN-UML and the Maoist regimes in Kathmandu. Further, ultra-nationalist groups on both the left and right of the political spectrum have been spreading antiIndia sentiments and demanding a greater Nepal to gain political mileage. While India has committed to address the matter amicably, Nepal’s ‘China card’—emphasis on China becoming a party to the dispute—has been one of the impediments to convening bilateral border dispute negotiations and has unnecessarily strained bilateral relations. The border issue has been also some extent pushed by extra-regional actors.42 The demand of a greater Nepal has reportedly been funded by external vested self-interest motivated groups, who want to disturb IndiaNepal relations by supporting border disputes. For example, during Madhesi protests at the borders from September 2015 to January 2016 and Nepalese protests against India over new border maps in November 2019, some twitter

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hashtags43 were being operated from other countries. One media report suggests that in 2008 the Nepalese government officially requested a visiting Chinese military delegation led by Major General Ei Hujeng to extend support in resolving the Kalapani dispute with India.44 If this continues, then Nepal will not have a stable and peaceful relationship with India.

China and India in Nepal: A comparison

India’s bilateral relationship with Nepal is far deeper and more intense than China’s. Since 1950, India has played a crucial role in major political transitions in Nepal. Prior to 2013, India was Nepal’s leading development and business partner in virtually all industries. India also welcomed the most Nepalese students in its educational institutions compared to all other nations. Ever since Nepal emerged as the buffer state between China and India, both the countries have factored in their respective relations with Nepal. Previously, Nepal took advantage of competition between the two large powers. But there were occasions when Nepal lost its relevance as ChinaIndia engagements improved. For example, in the post-election period, the new government in Nepal could not play the so-called ‘China card’ against India due to frequent meetings between PM Modi and President Xi Jinping. Despite its recent multi-layer engagement in Nepal, China still believes that India has better leverage in Nepal. There are occasions when China has suggested to the Nepali leaders to resolve differences with India. First, while Nepali leaders approached China to supply essential goods during economic blockade by India in late 1980s, China made such suggestion. Second, China did not intervene when India tried to bring the Maoists into the mainstream in 2005. Third, during Prachanda’s visit to China in October 2009 and 2010, the Chinese reportedly declined to intervene when he sought their assistance in creating a consensus between the major political parties of Nepal and supporting a Maoist-led national unity government in Kathmandu. Fourth, the Nepali proposal of trilateral cooperation has not been formally discussed between India and China at their bilateral meetings. Rather, both have reportedly agreed to have 2+1

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dialogue on Nepal.45 Fifth, once again China suggested to Nepal to resolve differences with India when Madhesi rebels blocked major trading points from September 2015 to February 2016.

Implications for India

Given India’s deep multi-dimensional relationship with Nepal, China’s expanded engagements in Nepal will not have any adverse impact on IndiaNepal relations. Chinese consolidation in Nepal is possible only if India fails to continue good relationship with Nepal. Historically, China has strengthened its relationship with Nepal when India has lost its sphere of influence in the south of Himalayas. For example, King Mahendra wanted a diversified FP, including establishing diplomatic relations with China, in response to India’s over emphasis on establishing multi-party democracy. China managed to cross through Himalayas by building Arniko Highway in 1963. Nepal sought Chinese support when India-Nepal relation reached its lowest point in 1989 due to unilateral border blockaded by India. In post-monarchy period, Nepal approached China in 2016 to use Chinese seaports/territory for transit trade to reduce dependency on India due to hardship faced by Nepali citizens during the undeclared border blockade by India. The newly elected government under the new Constitution adopted pro-China policy with the objective to maintain distance with India for its interference in the Constitution making process. Therefore, Chinese success in Nepal is dependent on India’s failure to maintain friendly and equal partnership with Nepal. Moreover, China has a deeper economic and diplomatic relationship with India than Nepal. China is the largest trading partner of India. One of the most pertinent implications could be competition for India with China in Nepal in almost all sectors. An absolute sphere of influence in the neighbourhood could be difficult. Nepal would try to take benefit from that competition by maintaining an equal distance with both the countries.

Notes 1.

Chelsea Harvey, “World’s “Third Pole” Is Melting Away,” E&E News, Scientific American,

at

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/worlds-third-pole-is­

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melting-away/#:~:text=The%20Hindu%20Kush%20Himalayan%20region%20 is%20sometimes%20referred%20to%20as,border%20between%20Nepal%20and%20 2. 3. 4. 5.

China, accessed on December 16, 2020.

Historical background of the Himalayan Frontier of India, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1959. Ibid.

Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, 1949-1953, Publications Division, Government of India, New Delhi, 1963, p. 252.

“China welcomes merger of Nepal Communist parties,” Business Standard, May 18, 2018, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/china-welcomes­

merger-of-nepal-communist-parties-118051800660_1.html, accessed on August

6.

17, 2022.

“In a series of meetings, Chinese envoy calls for unity among ruling party members,” The Kathmandu Post, May 2, 2020, at https://kathmandupost.com/ politics/2020/05/02/in-a-series-of-meetings-chinese-envoy-calls-for-unity-among­

7.

ruling-party-members, accessed on August 17, 2022.

“MoU signed between NCP (NCP) and CPC establishing bilateral ties,” The

Himalayan Times, September 24, 2019, at https://thehimalayantimes.com/ kathmandu/mou-signed-between-ncp-ncp-and-cpc-establishing-bilateral-ties/,

8.

9.

accessed on August 17, 2022.

“Over 90 per cent of total FDI to Nepal comes from China,” Xinhua, November

7, 2019, at http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2019-11/07/content_

75383734.htm, accessed on August 17, 2022.

“China, Nepal sign trade, infrastructure and security deals,” October 13, 2019, Al

Jazeera, at https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/13/china-nepal-sign-trade­ infrastructure-and-security-deals, accessed on August 17, 2022.

10. “Chinese annual grant to Nepal increases five-fold to $128 million,” March 18, 2015, The Hindustan Times, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/

chinese-annual-grant-to-nepal-increases-five-fold-to-128-million/story­ a0VgEkvRhTtQN2D81HgZwK.html, accessed on August 17, 2022.

11. “Chinese development agency to aid 15 northern Nepali districts,” The Kathmandu Post, March 30, 2029, at https://kathmandupost.com/national/2019/03/30/chinese­

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252 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

12. Prashant Jha, “The message from the north,” The Hindu, October 18, 2016, at https:// www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/The-message-from-the-north/article12548983. ece, accessed on August 17, 2022.

13. “AI PING’S VISIT Mandarin Mission,” July 9, 2012, Spotlight, Kathmandu, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 6, 2012, at https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2012/07/09/ai-pings-visit­

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14. “Chinese organisations silent after deal to make forays into Nepal,” The Kathmandu Post, October 29, 2018, at https://kathmandupost.com/national/2018/10/29/

chinese-organisations-silent-after-deal-to-make-forays-into-nepal,

August 17, 2022.

accessed

on

15. Long Xingchun “India to invite trouble playing Taiwan card,” The Global Times, at https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1203786.shtml, accessed on August 17, 2022.

16. Leo E Rose, “Nepal Strategy for Survival,” UCP, Berkeley, 1971, p. 184.

17. For details see Nihar R Nayak, “Nepal and Bhutan in India’s Security Architecture,” in Satish Kumar (ed), India’s National Security: Annual Review 2018, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, pp. 231-243.

18. “Nepal to push for more Indian investments”, The Kathmandu Post, August 9, 2018.

19 “Investment summit draws $13.51bn FDI commitment,” The Himalayan Times, March 4, 2017.

20. SL Narasimhan, “How Candid is China’s Good Neighbourhood Policy?”, Defence Aviation Post, January 9, 2017.

21. “Nepal-India Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, at 22 23

https://mofa.gov.np/nepal-india-relations/, accessed on August 17, 2022.

Ashok K Mehta, “Nepal quake and the Gorkha bond,” The Hindu, May 15, 2015.

Embassy of India, Kathmandu, at http://www.indianembassy.org.np/index1.

php?option=Xgc4cACnML2T1_DC21jA58Ttm2KiX8IXemmj5VvU8ug&id=

7cKojsLDqP5MqnsrwVgI8y6IKjP3Nnful4NzPKSVPus, accessed on August 17, 2022.

24. “PM Modi sends Jaishankar as special envoy to Kathmandu,” The Hindustan Times, September 17, 2015, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/pm-modi-sends­

jaishankar-as-special-envoy-to-kathmandu/story-zTMnE25HGLtIeS3r7zg2sK. html, accessed on August 17, 2022.

25. Bharat Bhusan, Nepal Always Had an Anti-India Undercurrent. So, Why the Fuss Now? The Quint, June 19, 2020, at https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/

The Stability of Instability | 253

india-nepal-tension-kp-oli-govt-modi-govt-new-delhi-diplomacy-kathmandu­

anti-india-sentiment?fbclid=IwAR27BEDNpQzeZEAi3C7pwYRyhNSJR7OY2 ye_K5kM-X7JFEt1kaBJOUWpmQo, accessed on August 17, 2022.

26. Amish Raj Mulmi, “Is this the end of the ‘special relationship’?”, The Kathmandu Post, at https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2020/06/11/is-this-the-end-of-the­ special-relationship, accessed on August 17, 2022.

27. “India-Nepal Joint Press Statement,” March 23, 2002, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7532/

India++Nepal+Joint+Press+Statement, accessed on August 17, 2022.

28. “India-Nepal strip maps raise questions over unresolved disputes,” IBRU

Centre for Borders Research, Durham University, January 26, 2009, at

https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=7460&rehref=

%2Fibru%2Fnews%2F&resubj=Boundary+news+Headlines, accessed on August 17,

2022.

29. Ibid.

30. “Press Release on the 5th meeting of Nepal-India Boundary Working Group

(BWG)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, at https://mofa.gov. np/please-find-the-press-release-on-the-5th-meeting-of-nepal-india-boundary­ working-group-bwg/, accessed on August 17, 2022.

31. “Nepal, India decide to set up boundary working group,” Business Standard, July 15, 2014, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/nepal-india-decide­

to-set-up-boundary-working-group-114071500357_1.html, accessed on August 17,

2022.

32. “Joint Press Statement on External Affairs Minister’s visit to Nepal, July 26, 2014, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at https://www.

mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23748/Joint+Press+Statement+on+ External+Affairs+Ministers+visit+to+Nepal, accessed on August 17, 2022.

33. “Nepal and India are unlikely to meet the 2022 deadline for completing bilateral

boundary work,” The Kathmandu Post, August 27, 2019, at https://kathmandupost.

com/politics/2019/08/27/nepal-and-india-are-unlikel y-to-meet-the­

2022-deadline-for-completing-bilateral-boundary-work, accessed on August 17, 2022).

34. “Joint Press Statement on the Visit of the Prime Minister to Nepal, August 4, 2014, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at https://www.mea.gov.in/

254 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23807/Joint_Press_Statement_on_the_Visit_of_the_ Prime_Minister_to_Nepal, accessed on August 17, 2022.

35. “Joint Statement between the India and China during Prime Minister’s visit to China, May 15, 2015, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at https:// www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25240/Joint_Statement_between_

the_India_and_China_during_Prime_Ministers_visit_toChina, accessed on August 17, 2022.

36. Nihar R Nayak, “Controversy over Lipulekh Pass: Is Nepal’s Stance Politically Motivated?”, IDSA Comment, June 9, 2015, at https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ ControversyoverLipu-LekhPass_nnayak_080615, accessed on August 17, 2022.

37. “Kalapani issue is between Nepal and India, says Chinese Foreign Ministry,” The Kathmandu Post, May 19, 2020, at https://kathmandupost.com/national/2020/05/19/

kalapani-issue-is-between-nepal-and-india-says-chinese-foreign-ministry, accessed on August 17, 2022.

38 Press Release, 6 November 2019 MoFA, Government of Nepal, at https://mofa.gov. np/%e0%a4%aa%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b0%e0%a5%87%e0%a4%b8-%e0%a4%b5%

e0%a4%bf%e0%a4%9c%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%9e%e0%a4%aa%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4 %a4%e0%a4%bf-%e0%a4%a8%e0%a5%87%e0%a4%aa%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%b2­ %e0%a4%ad%e0%a4%be/, accessed on August 17, 2022.

39. “Government finally comments on new Indian map but takes no firm

position,” The Kathmandu Post, November 6, 2019, https://kathmandupost.com/

national/2019/11/06/government-finally-comments-on-new-indian-map-but­ takes-no-firm-position, accessed on August 17, 2022.

40. “Press Release on Lipu Lekh,” May 9, 2020, MoFA, Government of Nepal, at

https://mofa.gov.np/press-release-regarding-lipu-lekh/, accessed on August 17, 2022.

41. Nihar R Nayak, “Controversy over Lipu-Lekh Pass: Is Nepal’s Stance Politically Motivated?”, IDSA Comment, June 9, 2015, at https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ ControversyoverLipu-LekhPass_nnayak_080615, accessed on August 17, 2022.

42. “Chinese Times

of

mouthpiece India,

June

says

18,

India

2020,

‘could at

face

military

pressure,”

The

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/

world/china/chinese-mouthpiece-says-india-could-face-militar y­

pressure-from-china-pakistan-or-even-nepal-if-border-tensions-escalate/ articleshow/76436899.cms?fbclid=IwAR3hAh1295aAIiyqW7NPe3L661

The Stability of Instability | 255

UjmwI8LIzfkHiqKspjCuxHowaY840BGzY&from=mdr, accessed on August 17, 2022.

43. #nepalpakstandtogether, #indiadisgracesnepalarmy, etc., a few examples.

44. Nihar R Nayak, “Controversy over Lipu-Lekh Pass: Is Nepal’s Stance Politically Motivated?”, IDSA Comment, June 9, 2015, at https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ ControversyoverLipu- LekhPass_nnayak_080615, accessed on August 17, 2022.

45. “China proposed 2+1 format for India talks”, The Hindu, June 26, 2018.

11

China’s Upstream Activities Water Concerns, Tensions and Cooperation Amit Ranjan

Himalayas is one of the world’s most water-rich areas, spans five Asian nations: Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. Some of South Asia’s most significant rivers and river systems, including the Indus, Ganga, Kali, and Teesta, originate and/or flow through the Himalayas. According to the 2011 population census, Himalaya region has 52.7 million people. This represents a population increase of around 250 per cent during the past 50 years (from 1961-2011).1 Geographically, the Hindu Kush range in Afghanistan and Hkakabo Razi in Myanmar are also considered as part of the Greater Hindu Kush Himalayan. There is no presence of Himalaya in Bangladesh, though Chittagong Hill Tracts transverse to the Himalayan belt2 and the country depends a lot on the rivers that originate in Himalayas such as Teesta and Ganga. In the main Himalayas, China, Pakistan and India are water stressed3 while Nepal and Bhutan are relatively water-rich countries. Among the five countries, China is upper riparian to many rivers and river systems such as Indus, Brahmaputra etc which after originating in the Tibet plateau flow into the Himalayan regions. As a water thirsty power, China is, often, accused for diverting waters from the transboundary rivers that originates from the Tibet plateau. Such diversion, as accused, is through multipurpose hydro

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projects in the upper stream of the transboundary rivers. Besides, China is also engaged in building multipurpose water infrastructure projects, such as water cleaning plants, irrigation projects, etc., in the friendly Himalayan countries. This chapter examines the impact of hydropower projects taken up by China on the lower riparian States. China’s claim on water-rich territories in bordering South Asian countries is also discussed. Finally, this chapter looks at the construction of water infrastructure projects taken up by China in the Himalayan South Asian states and analyses their impact. Inadvertently, several facts from the author’s past works have been included in this paper.4 Some of the projects mentioned in this chapter may be located in different mountain ranges but they have impact on the Himalayan areas.

China—A Water Thirsty Power

China’s water situation can be understood by two past official statements. In 2005, talking to journalists, the then Minister of Water Resources Wang Shucheng said “to fight for every drop of water or die, that is the challenge facing China.”5 Second, looking at the water condition of China, former Chinese Prime Minster Wen Jiabao said that it threatens “the very survival of the Chinese nation”.6 Physically, China receives about 2.8 trillion cubic metres of fresh water per year.7 With this supply China has to satisfy the water demands of a population of about 1.44 billion (2020). According to 2015 estimates, sector-wise distribution of the total available water in China is as follows: 13 per cent goes to domestic consumption; 21.9 per cent for industrial use; 63.1 per cent for agricultural activities and; 2 per cent flows freely to maintain environmental sustainability in the country.8 One of the major problems China has with the available waters is that the resource is unevenly distributed: Southern part of China has under 80 per cent of the country’s water resources, while most of the northern parts suffer stress and some even scarcity.9 China’s northern region has 47 per cent of population, 63 per cent of the cultivated land of the country and produces about 49 per cent of country’s industrial added value but it has only 16 per cent of the total water resources of China.10 Eight of the Northern

258 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

provinces such as Tianjin, Ningxia, Beijing, Shandong, Shanghai, Hebei, Henan, and Shanxi suffer from acute water scarcity, while Ganxu, Shaanxi, Liaoning and Jiangsu face a scarce situation.11 As early as in the early years of the twentieth century, Dr Sun Yat Sen thought about the productive use of accessible waterways as a solution to the country’s water problems. Later, after the successful communist revolution and establishment of Chinese Communist rule in China in 1949, Mao Zedong planned for water conservancy projects to resolve the country’s water issues.12 All such projects, however, could not satisfactorily address the water problems of northern China. In contemporary times, to tackle the uneven water distribution problem, China has planned for a massive supply side project called South-to-North Water Diversion Project/South-North Water Transfer Project or Nanshuibeidiao. The first phase of the project came into operation in December 2013. Its final goal is to supply about 44.8 billion cubic meters of water from water-rich regions of China to its water-scarce parts.13 It is estimated that the first phase has benefitted around 100 million Chinese people.14 Second, on demand side, in 2012, China introduced “Three Red Line” approach. The Chinese State Council issued a document called Opinions of the State Council on Applying the Strictest Water Resources Control System that called for a stricter water management “by capping annual water usage at 700 billion cubic metres for the overall economy by 2030, increasing irrigation efficiency, and protecting water quality”15 To study its impact, the World Resource Institute used water withdrawal data of 2001, 2010 and 2015 and found that the rate of water withdrawals has slowed from 5.1 billion cubic metres per year in 2001-2010, to 1.6 billion cubic metres per year from 2010-2015.16 In 2019, China set an aim to cap its water consumption to below 670 billion cubic metres by 2022 and revised to 700 billion cubic metres by 2035.17 However, by 2030 when China’s population is expected to reach around 1.45 billion, water demand is estimated to be about 818 billion cubic metres while total supply will be only around 619 billion cubic metres.18 The water shortage of 199 billion cubic metres is more than the 140 billion cubic metres of waters used for industrial purposes in China.19

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To hold urban water runoff for reuse, the Chinese are also constructing Sponge cities, a combination of nature-based solutions and grey infrastructure (conventional engineering with concrete and steel).20 The idea of a “sponge city” was first introduced by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 and officially launched in 2015 in 16 cities.21 Supply side management of waters including constructions on the transboundary rivers affect water flows in the lower riparian states. Further, China is also accused of transgressing the territory of bordering nations and laying claim to their land. Some of the places to which China lays claim and is accused for transgression are water rich. The Next section analyses the impact of the Chinese hydro projects on lower riparian countries. It also discusses China’s transgression and its territorial claims over water-rich areas.

Multipurpose Water projects, Territorial Claims, and Sino-India Tensions in the Himalayas

Like China, India is also a water-stressed Asian power. India’s per capita water availability was 1486 cubic meters in 202122 and the demand is expected to exceed the total supply by two times by 2030.23 About onethird of India’s fresh water supply comes from rivers originating in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in China. In India, some people also call Tibetan plateau as Himalayan plateau. One of the major rivers that flows from Tibet into India is Brahmaputra or Yarlung Tsangpo. Brahmaputra originates in Angsi glacier in the TAR and enters into the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. In Arunachal Pradesh it is known as Siang. Brahmaputra enters into Assam after crossing Pasighat. Out of the total length of 2,880 km, 1,625 km flows through the Tibetan plateau as the Yarlung Tsangpo, 918 km in India known as the Siang/Dihang and Brahmaputra, and 337 km in Bangladesh under name of the Jamuna until it merges into the Padma or Ganga near Goalando.24 China’s South-to-North Water Diversion Project, as mentioned above, concern many in India. India’s main worry is from the third line in this project, known as the Great Western Line, which is sub-divided into two— the Western and Greater Western Routes. The idea of the Greater Western

260 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Route was first conceived in 1950s and was proposed again in the 1990s by Guo Kai, a retired Chinese army general and prominent water engineer. Later in 2006, the idea found support from another Chinese engineer, Li Ling. In his work Tibet Water Will Save China, Li Ling envisaged a plan to divert waters from six rivers flowing in Tibet through canals and tunnels across Qinghai Tibetan plateau. The plan called for the construction of canals to transfer water from Rivers Yarlung Zangbo, Nu, Lancang, Jinsha, Yalong and Dadu.25 Li’s plan did not initially find support from the Chinese establishment at the time because of the huge difference between its cost and expected benefits.26 In later years however, it has gained traction among a number of Chinese scholars and hydrologists. Further, China is engaged on the development of many hydropower projects in the upper riparian of Brahmaputra or its tributaries. One of the major projects, China started in 2010 was Zangmu located in the Gyaca in Tibet. It is 510 Megawatt and got fully operationalised in October 2015. Zangmu is considered to be the world’s highest-altitude hydropower station. It has a capacity of producing 2.5 billion kWh of electricity annually. China’s Huaneng Group has built the Zangmu plant that comprises six units. 27 While Zangmu was being constructed, in January 2013, the Chinese State Council’s energy strategy for the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) identified three hydropower projects—Dagu, Jiacha and Jixu—on the upper stream of Brahmaputra.28 Among the three projects planned, Dagu (640 MW ) is bigger than Zangmu and lies 18 km upstream of Zangmu. Jiacha is 320 (MW ) is located in the middle reaches of River Brahmaputra. Jiexu (560 MW ) is 11 km upstream of Zangmu.29 About these three planned dams on the upper stream of River Brahmaputra, the then China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated during a press conference on February 4, 2013:30 China has always been responsible on the development and utilisation of cross-border rivers. We carry out the policy of placing equal importance on development and protection and take account of the influence on the downstream countries. The planned dams will not affect flood control, disaster mitigation and ecological environment in the downstream areas.

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China and India have maintained communication and cooperation on the issue of cross-border rivers. All such constructions in the upper stream of the River Brahmaputra has made a large section of media persons and scholars such as Brahma Chellaney31 argue that through all such hydropower projects China may divert and choke the River Brahmaputra’s water. They also consider China as a threat to India’s water security. Such hypothesis is primarily based on China’s water behaviour in Tibet from where water is transferred to produce power and meet the demands in the other parts of the country. Even hydropower projects are installed in Tibet to meet the power demand of China. The local Tibetan population accuse the Chinese leadership of exploiting their water resources at the cost of damaging their environment and displacement of local population. All such charges are, however, refuted by the Chinese leadership.32 About water availability in River Brahmaputra, citing data published by the Chinese researcher L Jiang and team, Ghosh (2017) shows that the total annual outflow from China is estimated to be about 31 billion cubic metres (BCM) while by the time the river reaches Bahadurabad, the gauging station near the end of the rivers’ sub-basin in Bangladesh, its outflow is about 606 BCM.33 Referring to the works of B Datta and Vijay P Singh,34 Ghosh writes that River Brahmaputra’s peak flow during the monsoon at Nuxia and Tsela Dzong, water measuring stations in Tibet, is about 5,000 and 10,000 cubic metres per second respectively while this is around 40,000 cubic metres per second in Gauhati and 50,000 cubic meters per second at Bahadurabad.35 During the lean season, the flow at Nuxia is about 300-500 cubic metres per second, while it is about 4,000 cubic metres per second at Guahati and 5,000 cubic meters per second at Bahadurabad.36 This means, as Ghosh observes, Brahmaputra becomes broader after entering into India when it is joined by tributaries such as Dibang, Lohit, Subansri, Manas etc.37 However, the Chinese activities in the upper stream have impact on waters in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Floods and pollution in the rivers of Arunachal Pradesh are often attributed to the Chinese upstream activities. China also lays its claim over Arunachal Pradesh and calls it a part of southern Tibet.

262 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

By laying such a claim, China also eyes on about 200 million cusecs of waters in the state.38 In the western sector of Sino-India border, China is accused for interference in the flows of River Sutlej, which the Chinese calls Langquen Zangbo. In 2000 severe flood affected people living in the catchment area of River Sutlej in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. In 2004 there was a rumour about a flood but it did not happen. Both times, China was accused of failing to provide information regarding the artificial lake formed in the upper stream. In 2006, the Indian media reported on the construction of a small hydropower station on the River Sutlej—raising concerns that it would disrupt the flow of water into India. At that time, the Chinese foreign ministry defended the use of the hydropower plant, claiming that it was necessary to meet the electricity demands of the local population. More importantly, the ministry countered that China had always adhered to the basic principles of fair and reasonable development of transboundary rivers while building such hydro structures.39 India also accuses China of intruding into the Indian controlled territory in the non-demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries in the Eastern and Western sectors . In the Western sector, maps of 1950s showed the Chang Chenmo Valley within India. In 1959, Zhou Enlai confirmed that a map published in 1956 was the correct alignment. It showed the Galwan and Chip Chap river valleys as parts of India.40 However, in their sixth meeting with Indian officials in June 1960 the Chinese claimed the two valleys as their territory.41 In 1959, the Chinese established a post at Samzungling at the head of the Galwan river.42 After the failed effort by India in 1961, Gorkha troops managed to reach the upper reaches of the Galwan Valley and established themselves on July 5, 1962. This cut off the Chinese post down river.43 A few days later, on July 10, approximately 70 Chinese forces surrounded the Indian outpost and then boosted their numbers to a battalion. The Chinese severed the station and intercepted the air-supplied columns deployed by India. On October 20, 1962, the post was wiped out by the Chinese, along with other posts set up in Chip Chap river valley up north.44 Years later, in the 1980s India began to re-establish itself along the LAC, but was constrained in areas

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like the Galwan Valley due to terrain. In the 1990s, the Chinese put claim on the entire Galwan valley.45 Since then there has been a number of intrusions made by the People Liberation Army (PLA) in the Indian controlled LAC. According to the government of India data, between 2016 and 2018 there had been 1025 Chinese transgressions into the Indian territory.46 Even India transgresses into the Chinese side of LAC. About Indian transgression, former Indian Army Chief and Union Minister of State for Transport and Highways, General V.K. Singh (Retd) said in a press briefing that “… none of you [journalists] come to know how many times we [India] have transgressed as per our perception [of the Line of Actual Control]. Chinese media does not cover it… Let me assure you, if China has transgressed 10 times, we must have done it at least 50 times.”47 All such previous Chinese transgressions and intrusions were short lived and did not result in a serious situation between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the LAC, as in June 2020. The 2020 Chinese incursion resulted in a conflict between the armies of India and China, in which 20 Indian soldiers and an undetermined number of Chinese men perished. Regarding the conflict, the spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, Zhao Lijian, stated that India had crossed the border, “provoking and attacking Chinese personnel, resulting in serious physical confrontation between border forces on the two sides.”48 On the other hand, a spokesperson from India’s Ministry of External affairs, Anurag Srivastava said “a violent face-off happened as a result of an attempt by the Chinese side to unilaterally change the status quo there. Both sides suffered casualties that could have been avoided had the agreement at the higher level been scrupulously followed by the Chinese side… We [India] remain firmly convinced of the need for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas and the resolution of differences through dialogue. At the same time, we are also strongly committed to ensuring India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”49 Chinese intrusions in 2020 had a bearing on water bodies of the region. It threatened India’s development of road to strengthen its position along River Shyok.50 In this region, China controls two-thirds

264 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

of the 134-kilometre-long endorheic Pangong Tso lake. During the 1999 Kargil war between India and Pakistan when Indian troops left their position in Ladakh, PLA captured them and built a 5-km-long track along the Pangong Tso lake.51 The 2020 intrusion was likely to push the PLA forward and control whole of the north bank of Pangong Lake. 52 The Chinese have also build-up the tanks and infantry forces in the South Pangong lake region of Eastern Ladakh.53 Other than India, there are territorial issues between Nepal and China in the Himalayas. China and Nepal share a border of approximately 1,414 km and transboundary rivers. China is accused of carrying out projects on the transboundary rivers such as Karnali, Kali Gandaki (near Tibet-Nepal border), Trishuli, Sunkoshi, Tamkoshi and Arun.54 As some of the SinoNepal rivers flow into India from Nepal and are a significant part of the Indian river system, it is anticipated that these projects will have waterrelated effects on India. For example, River Ganga, receives between 40 and 46 per cent of waters flowing into India from Nepal. Contribution from Nepali rivers rise to between 70 and 75 per cent during the lean season.55 Even Nepal may face problems due to projects in the upstream of the rivers flowing from China. To address Nepal’s water-related concerns, Nepal and China agreed under Article 7(3) of the Nepal-China Boundary Management System Agreement that, “In case a boundary river changes its course, necessary measures shall be taken by both sides or after mutual Agreement, by either side, to restore the boundary river to its original course.”56 The Agreement says that the two countries will inform the other side in advance if they are engaging in any industrial, agricultural, forestry or mining pursuits in the vicinity of the boundary line.57 On construction of hydro structures, Article 10 (1) of the agreement says: “Construction, administration and maintenance of the cross-border facilities are subject to consensus through consultation of both sides or the competent authorities of both sides.”58 In 2019, Nepal expressed concern after the river Arun began altering its flow in the Kimathanka region of the Sakhuwasabha district after China began constructing an embankment along the river on its side of the border without alerting Nepal beforehand. People in the village of Kimathanka

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were concerned that the construction could flood their entire community during the rainy season.59 China is also engaged in the territorial issues with Bhutan. The two countries share around 470 sq km of border between them. Some of the territorial disputes came into light in the 1950s when China published official maps showing Bhutanese territory as its part. China claimed an area of about 764 sq km covering the North West (269 sq km) and Central parts of Bhutan (495 sq km).60 In 1979, the Royal Government of Bhutan thought about direct negotiations with China on the boundary issue.61 After several rounds of talk in 2021, Bhutan and China decided to expedite their border talks and settle their disputes. Some of the areas claimed by China are water-rich. For example, during the 58th meeting of the Global Environment Facility Council in June 2020, China laid its claim over Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in Trashigang district of Bhutan calling it a “disputed” territory.62 In reaction, Bhutan handed over a demarche to the Chinese embassy located in New Delhi,63 as the two countries do not have diplomatic ties. Thimphu made it clear that Sakteng is a sovereign territory of Bhutan and there is no dispute over it.64 Afterwards, Beijing doubled its claim and included Bhutan’s “Eastern sectors” to the boundary dispute between the two countries.65 On the territory issue with Bhutan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China said “The boundary between China and Bhutan has never been delimited. There have been disputes over eastern, central and western sectors for a long time.”66 On the Chinese claim over Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, Tenzing Lamsang, the editor of Bhutan’s weekly newspaper The Bhutanese said, “All official Chinese maps have showed Sakteng as part of Bhutan. In 2014, China came out with its most ambitious map ever, with vast territorial claims, including India’s Arunachal Pradesh. But even in that map Sakteng park was shown as part of Bhutan.”67 Notably, the Saketang Wildlife Sanctuary area has three major rivers: Gamri chuu, Nyera ama chuu and Jomo chuu. These rivers are mainly fed by 104 lakes with seasonal rain and snowfall.68 Saketang and other territorial claims of China are near India’s borders with Bhutan and pose serious security-related challenges for India. For instance, if China manages to get its claimed territory near

266 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

Doklam in Bhutan, India’s chicken neck corridor—the only territorial link between India’s northeast and other parts of the country—would become vulnerable. Not only in the upper stream of transboundary rivers, China is also engaged in building hydro structures in the friendly neighbouring countries. The next section discusses such projects and their impacts on the host countries.

Chinese Cooperation over Water Projects in the Himalayan States

China is engaged in building hydropower projects in many South Asian neighbouring countries. One of them is Pakistan. China and Pakistan grew closer after the 1962 Sino-Indian war in which India faced defeat. In order to counter India’s influence in South Asia, Pakistan built close ties with China. China and Pakistan collaborated on the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project in 2013. Under CPEC, the two countries are involved in the development of infrastructure projects, the construction of industries, the improvement of living conditions, socioeconomic growth, and the provision of security in CPEC territory.69 In May 2015, during his visit to Pakistan, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged an investment of around US$ 46 billion in Pakistan. Of that, US$ 11 billion was for infrastructure, while US$ 35 billion was to be spent on energy projects.70 In 2017, the government of Pakistan and China signed a document where they agreed on a common long-term plan for the development of this corridor. The investment amount was increased to about US$ 62 billion. CPEC includes an investment in the Pakistan’s hydropower sector. In May 2017, China and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) under which the two sides agreed to invest about US$ 50 billion on “Indus Cascade” projects. It was then assumed that once all projects under “Indus Cascade” become operational, they would generate over 22,000 MW of hydroelectricity.71 The projects then agreed were:72 a. Bunji Dam:  MoU for construction of Bunji dam was signed between China’s Three Gorges Corporation and WAPDA of Pakistan in 2009. Its estimated installed capacity is about 7,100 MW.

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b.

c.

d. e.

Diamer-Bhasha: China agreed to fund it under the CPEC framework, however, in November 2017, Pakistan cancelled its deal over DiamerBhasha, citing the strings of tough and “nondoable” conditions attached to it.73 Dasu Dam: This 242-m-high dam is in the Kohistan district in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Its installed capacity is 4,320 MW. China’s Gezhouba Group Company Limited was the construction partner in this project and the lead donor to the project is the World Bank. Patan Dam: It is near the Patan village in Kohistan in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Its installed capacity is 2,400 MW. Thakot Dam: It is located in a tribal town in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Its installed capacity is 4,000 MW.

After the deal between Pakistan and China on Diamer-Bhasha was broken in 2017, Pakistan decided to crowd-fund the dam project, along with the Mohmand Dam. The initiative found overwhelming political support, but only PKR12 billion (US$ 103 million) were collected.74 In May 2020, Pakistan re-entered into a deal with China over the Diamer Bhasha Dam in Gilgit -Baltistan (GB), which India calls an illegally occupied territory by Pakistan. On May 13, 2020, Pakistan signed a deal worth PKR 442 billion (US$ 2.64 billion) with the Chinese state-run firm China Power for building 272 meters high Diamer Bhasha Dam. The total financial outlay of the dam is PKR 1,406.6 billion (US$ 8.3 billion).75 This project is on River Indus in GB and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and is likely to be completed by 2028. Under the new terms of deal, China Power will hold 70 per cent of share while the remaining 30 per cent will be with Frontier Works Organisation—a commercial arm of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.76 The Diamer Bhasha’s construction is expected to create about 16,500 jobs, irrigate around 1.23 million acres of agriculture land77 and generate 18.1 billion units of electricity annually.78 The second hydropower project agreed between China and Pakistan in 2020 is a dam at Kohala in what Pakistan calls Azad Jammu & Kashmir while India terms Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Kohala was listed under

268 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

the CPEC since August 2014. Kohala project is 1,124 MW project on the River Jhelum and was to be developed by Kohala Hydropower Company Private Limited. In 2019, differences between China and Pakistan cropped on Kohala.79 This was resolved after the Economic Coordination Committee approved additional release in Jhelum below Kohala dam. On June 25, 2020, a tripartite agreement for implementing the Kohala project was signed between China Three Gorges Corporation, the government of Pakistan side of Kashmir and Private Power and Infrastructure Board.80 The project is likely to cost US$ 2.4 billion. International Finance Corporation and Silk Road Fund are also sponsoring this project.81 The third hydropower project agreed upon by Pakistan and China was in July 2020 at Azad Pattan. It is located on the River Jhelum near the village of Muslimabad in district Sudhnoti on the Pakistan side of Kashmir, which India calls an occupied territory. This will be carried out by Power Universal Company Limited, which is owned and controlled by the China Gezhouba group. Gezhouba has entered into a special purpose joint venture with a Pakistani renewable energy developer, Laraib Group.82 The joint venture is called Azad Pattan Power Private Ltd Corporation, which will develop the project on the ‘build, own, operate, transfer’ model and transfer it to the government of Pakistan after 30 years.83 Both Kohala and Azad Pattan projects are likely to bring about US$ 4 billion in the form of investments, produce around 1800 MW of hydelpower and create 8,000 jobs.84 Nepal is the second country where China is building hydropower projects and other water related infrastructures. China is building hydropower projects on the River Budhi Gandak which is left side tributary of River Gandak. After the deal was made between the government of Nepal and China’s Gezhouba Group in November 2017, then Nepali government under Sher Bahadur Deuba had cancelled the US$ 2.5 billion deal.85 In September 2018, however, months after Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli came to power, the same Chinese business, Gezhouba Group, was awarded the contract to build the 1200 MW project.86 Nepal had also invited the Chinese state-run Three Gorges Corporation to build a dam on river Seti in Western Nepal. The Chinese firm wanted 75 per cent stake in

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this project.87 As a result of the failure of discussions between the Chinese company and the Nepali government in 2018, China withdrew from this project. Another Chinese company, Sinohydro, has participated in the projects in Nepal. Sinohydro has jointly developed 50 MW Upper Marsyangdi Hydropower Project with Nepali company Sagarmatha Power Company. Sinohydro is also a contractor for the under-construction 456 MW Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Project, the largest domestically funded hydel project in Nepal, and the 140 MW Tanahu Hydropower Project, a storagetype project.88 In Bangladesh, besides many water supply projects in Dhaka, China is engaged in implementing “Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project”. River Teesta originates from the Himalaya in the Indian state of Sikkim and flows towards the Indian state of West Bengal before crossing the boundary to Bangladesh. Around 113 km of the 315 km of the river lies in Bangladesh. To share its waters, India and Bangladesh reached an interim agreement in 2011 under which they agreed on a new percentage. The draft agreement says that 42.5 per cent of water would be received by India while Bangladesh would get 37.5 per cent. The remaining 20 per cent of water would be reserved for the sake of river navigability. This formula has not been accepted by the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee.89 Bangladesh’s Economic Relations Division had sought a loan of about US$ 983.27 million from China for the “Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project”. 90 A letter of intent was signed between the Bangladesh Water Development Board and the Chinese stateowned Power Construction of China (Power China) in September 2016 under which the Chinese company carried out a feasibility study and a master plan was prepared to implement the project.91

Conclusion

As mentioned in this paper, China needs more waters to quench its thirst and remain economically very competitive. To meet its water challenges, China is accused to have set its eyes on waters flowing in the Himalayan

270 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

region.. The Sino-India LAC in Eastern and Western sectors are waterrich regions. Control over them confers rights on water bodies in the region. China has reportedly encroached and occupied village land on the China-Nepal border in Nepal.92 China is accused of constructing infrastructure on the upper streams of Chinese rivers that drain into Nepal. China is in territorial disputes with Bhutan and has also made new claims. Further, as discussed in this chapter, China is engaged in the construction of hydropower and other water projects in its friendly neighbouring countries. These constructions have significantly aided the small countries to improve water infrastructure and also helped their economies. Analysts note, however, that they place aid-seeking nations in a position of significant debt, which, in the long run, may offer China an influence advantage over them. A 2017 study by the British Broadcasting Corporation, for instance, warned of “debt-trap diplomacy”. The report compiled a major database detailing virtually all of China’s aid to recipient countries. It cited more than 5,000 projects across 140 countries, and revealed that China and the US rivalled each other in terms of how much they offer to other countries.93 According to the traditional definition, aid given by the Western developed countries represents a direct grant, not a loan that needs to be repaid. It mainly aims to develop the aided countries. On the contrary, only 21 per cent of the money that China gives to other countries can be considered as traditional aid, rest is given in commercial loans that have to be repaid with interest. It is widely believed that Chinese aid projects, majorly, benefits China. The infrastructure projects, largely, engage the Chinese workers.94 In South Asia, the Chinese agreed to invest US$ 50 billion on five Indus Cascade projects mentioned above. According to Hasan Abbas, by the time the projects are finished, they will have cost approximately US$ 98 billion, which Pakistan will have to borrow and pay interest on. The interest on this borrowing will accrue at a rate of US$ 5 billion per year, and after 20 years, Pakistani taxpayers will be responsible for around US$ 200 billion.95 Thus, the present programmes that appear beneficial will have lasting effects on the economies of the countries receiving assistance in the future.

China’s Upstream Activities | 271

Notes 1.

2. 3.

Apollo, M., “Chapter 9: The population of Himalayan regions—by the numbers: Past, present and future”, in Efe, R. and Öztürk, M. (eds.). Contemporary Studies in

Environment and Tourism (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), pp. 143-159.

Himalayas, The Banglapedia: The National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, at http://

en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Himalayas,_The, accessed on August 12, 2020.

According to Falkenmark scale developed by Mallen Falkenmark water stress begins when the water availability is less than 1700 cubic metres per person per year, water scarcity starts at 1,000 cubic metres and acute water scarcity begins when availability is at 500 cubic metres per person. United Nations Human Development Report

4.

(2006) Beyond Scarcity : Power Poverty and Global Water Crisis. New York, p. 135.

Amit Ranjan, “China’s Water Problems”, Asian Affairs, 49 (4), 2018, pp. 645-658.

Ranjan, Amit, Water-Stressed Pakistan: Increasing Demand, Declining Availability, and Challenges of Management, Asian Survey, 59 (6), 2019, pp. 1116-1136.

Amit Ranjan, “China’s Hydropower Projects on River Brahmaputra”, ISAS Brief. August 6, 2020, at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/chinas-hydropower-projects­

on-river-brahmaputra/.

Amit Ranjan, “Is Pakistan Hurtling Towards a Debt Trap With a String of Hydropower Projects With China?” The Wire, July 21, 2020, at https://thewire.in/

south-asia/pakistan-china-hydropower-projects-cpec-debts.

Amit Ranjan, “China’s New Claim on Eastern Bhutan: Pressure Tactic or Message to India?” ISAS Insight, July 20, 2020, at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/chinas­ new-claim-in-eastern-bhutan-pressure-tactic-or-message-to-india/.

Amit Ranjan, “Development on China-Nepal Border: Concerns for India” ISAS Brief, July 1, 2020, at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/developments-on-nepal­

5.

china-border-concerns-for-india/.

Cited in Charlie Parton, “China’s Looming Water Crisis,” China Dialogue April

2018, at https://chinadialogue-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/content/file_

en/10608/China_s_looming_water_crisis_v.2__1_.pdf. Accessed on August 1, 2018,

6. 7.

p. 6.

Ibid.

Ministry

Resources

of

in

Water

Resources,

China,”

at

People’s

Republic

of

China,

“Water

http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/mainsubjects/

201604/P020160406508110938538.pdf. Accessed on April 12, 2018.

272 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

8.

9.

Ministry of Water Resources People’s Republic of China, a “2015 Statistic Bulletin on China Water Activities,” at http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/publs/201702/

P020170207383603707034.pdf. Accessed on May 21, 2018.

Ministry of Water Resources, n. 8.

10. “North South Divide,” China Water Risk, at http://chinawaterrisk.org/big-picture/ north-south-divide/. Accessed on August 1, 2018.

11. Charlie Parton, “China’s Looming Water Crisis,” China Dialogue, April 2018., at https://chinadialogue-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/content/file_

en/10608/China_s_looming_water_crisis_v.2__1_.pdf. Accessed on August 1, 2018.

12. Philip Ball, The Water Kingdom: A Secret History of China (London: The Bodley Head, 2016).

13. Lily Kuo, “China Has Launched the Largest Water-Pipeline Project in History,” The Atlantic, March 7, 2014, at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/

archive/2014/03/china-has-launched-the-largest-water-pipeline-project-in­ history/284300/. Accessed on April 21, 2018.

14. “Biggest water transfer project ever benefits 100 million in China,” Global Times, June 21, 2017, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1052749.shtml Accessed on

April 23, 2018.

15. Jio Wang, “Drop by Drop, Better Management Makes Dents in China’s Water Stress,” World Resource Institute, April 26, 2018, at https://www.wri.org/blog/2018/04/drop­

drop-better-management-makes-dents-chinas-water-stress. Accessed on August 28,

2020.

16. Ibid.

17. “China aims marked cut in water usage by 2020” Xinhuanet, April 20, 2019, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/20/c_137993295.htm. Accessed

August 31, 2020.

on

18. Debra Tan, Feng Hu, Hubort Thieriot & Dawn McGregor “Towards A Water and

Energy Secure China: Tough Choices Ahead in Power Expansion With Limited Water Resources” China Water Risk, at https://www.chinawaterrisk.org/wp-content/

uploads/2015/04/Towards-A-Water-Energy-Secure-China-CWR0415.pdf. Accessed on September 1, 2020, p. 20.

19. Ibid.

20. United Nations Water Development Report 2018, at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0026/002614/261424e.pdf. Accessed on May 12, 2018, p. 46.

China’s Upstream Activities | 273

21. Asit Kumar Biswas, and Kris Hartley, “Tackling the Challenges of Sponge Cities,” China Daily September 26, 2017, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/

opinion/2017-09/26/content_32491069.htm. Accessed on June 23, 2018.

22. Ministry of Jal Shakti, Government of India, “Per Capita Availability of Water,” March

2, 2020, at

https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1604871.

Accessed on August 12, 2020.

23. “Water scarcity: India’s demand may exceed supply two times by 2030,” The

Financial Express, August 31, 2019, at https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/

water-scarcity-indias-demand-may-exceed-supply-two-times-by-2030/1691788/.

Accessed on August 21, 2020.

24. Nilanjan Ghosh, “The Brahmaputra : floated myths and flouted realities” The Third Pole, December 18, 2017, at https://www.thethirdpole.net/2017/12/18/the­ brahamaputra-floated-myths-and-flouted-realities/. Accessed on July 18, 2020.

25. B.R. Deepak, India and China: Foreign Policy Approaches (New Delhi: Viz Books, 2016).

26. Ibid.

27. “Report: China Completes Tibet’s Biggest Hydropower Plant,” VOA October 13, 2015, at https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/report-china-completes-tibets-biggest­ hydropower-plant. Accessed on June 18, 2020.

28. Ananth Krishnan, “China gives go-ahead for three new Brahmaputra dams,” The Hindu, January 30, 2013, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/China­

gives-go-ahead-for-three-new-Brahmaputra-dams/article12323702.ece. on July 19, 2020.

Accessed

29. Ibid.

30. Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s

Republic of China in the Macau Special Administrative Region “Foreign Ministry

Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on February 4, 2013,” at http://www.fmcoprc.gov.mo/eng/gsxwfb/lxjzzfh/t1011493.htm. Accessed on July 18, 2020.

31. See Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2011).

32. Amit Ranjan, China’s Biggest Hydropower Projects Are on Tibetan Rivers, But Do They Benefit Tibetans? The Wire, October 21, 2021, at https://thewire.in/world/

china-tibet-dam-lianghekou-hydropower. Accessed on February 22, 2022.

274 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

33. Nilanjan Ghosh, “China cannot rob us of Brahmaputra,” The Hindu Business Line, November 27, 2017, at https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/china­

cannot-rob-us-of-brahmaputra/article9974000.ece. Accessed on December 28, 2019.

34. B.Datta and V.P. Singh, “Hydrology” In Singh V.P., Sharma N., Ojha C.S.P. (eds) The Brahmaputra Basin Water Resources (Dordercht: Springer, 2004) pp. 139-195.

35. Nilanjan Ghosh, “China cannot rob us of Brahmaputra,” The Hindu Business Line, November 27, 2017, at https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/china­

cannot-rob-us-of-brahmaputra/article9974000.ece. Accessed on December 28,

2019.

36. Ibid. 37. Ibid.

38. MPIDSA (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis) (2010), “Water Security for India: The External Dynamics”, at https://idsa.in/book/ WaterSecurityforIndia. p. 44. Accessed on March 21, 2019.

39. “China defends dam on Sutlej,” DNA, July 7, 2006, at https://www.dnaindia.com/ 40

world/report-china-defends-dam-on-sutlej-1040220. Accessed on June 21, 2020.

Manoj Joshi, “China’s Galwan Valley Gambit is Attempt to Extend Official Claim

Line, LAC Westward,” The Wire, June 18, 2020, at https://thewire.in/security/china­ galwan-valley-lac-indian-troops. Accessed on June 25, 2020.

41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid.

46. “1025 Chinese transgressions reported from 2016 to 2018: Government data” The Economic Times, November 28, 2019, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.

com/news/defence/1025-chinese-transgressions-reported-from-2016-to-2018­

government-data/articleshow/72262114.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on June 24, 2020.

47. “India has transgressed LAC more often than China: V.K. Singh”, The Hindu, February 7, 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/india­

has-transgressed-into-lac-more-times-than-china-says-v-k-singh/article33774108. ece. Accessed on July 19, 2021.

48. “India-China clash: 20 Indian troops killed in Ladakh fighting,” BBC, June 16, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476. Accessed on July 28, 2020.

China’s Upstream Activities | 275

49. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Official Spokesperson’s response to media queries on the situation in the western sector of the India-China

border,” June 16, 2020. https://mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/32761/

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50. Maroof Raza, “Water, status, territorial depth: How LAC intrusions fit into larger Chinese strategic designs,” The Times of India, June 9, 2020. https://timesofindia.

indiatimes.com/blogs/goodbooksbadbooks/water-status-territorial-depth-how-lac­

intrusions-fit-into-larger-chinese-strategic-designs/. Accessed on September 5, 2020.

51. Prasenjit Chowdhury, “China’s Lust for Water,” July 13, 2020. Deccan Herald. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/main-article/chinas-lust-for-water-860463. html. Accessed on July 21, 2020.

52. Manoj Joshi, “China’s Galwan Valley Gambit is Attempt to Extend Official Claim Line, LAC Westward,” The Wire, June 18, 2020. https://thewire.in/security/china­

galwan-valley-lac-indian-troops. Accessed on June 25, 2020.

53. Vishnu Som, “Major Chinese Tank, Infantry Build-Up In South Pangong As Standoff Intensifies” NDTV, September 4, 2020. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/

major-chinese-tank-infantry-build-up-in-pangong-as-standoff-intensifies-2290356.

Accessed on September 5, 2020.

54. Kosh Raj Koirala, “China not alter course of rivers flowing into Nepal” myRepublica, January 24, 2020. https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/china-not-to­ alter-course-of-rivers-flowing-into-nepal/. Accessed on July 28, 2020.

55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid.

60. Medha Bisht “Back to History: The Negotiation Phases,” IDSA, January 19, 2010,

https://idsa.in/idsacomments/Sino-BhutanBoundaryNegotiations_mbisht_190110. Accessed on July 12, 2020.

61. Thierry Mathou, “Bhutan China Relations: Towards a New Step in Himalayan Politics”.

Bhutan

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at

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62. Geeta Mohan “China now lays claim on Bhutan’s territory, Thimphu counters Beijing’s move,” India Today, June 29, 2020, at https://www.indiatoday.in/world/ story/china-now-lays-claim-on-bhutan-s-territory-thimphu-counters-beijing-s­ move-1695276-2020-06-29, accessed on July 1, 2020.

63. “China makes border dispute with Bhutan public, in apparent move to pressure India,” Scroll.in, July 6, 2020, at https://scroll.in/latest/966621/china-makes-border­

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7, 2020.

64. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury “Bhutan issues demarche to China over its bid to create border trouble,” The Economic Times,July 4, 2020, at https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/defence/bhutan-issues-demarche-to-china-over-its-bid-to­ create-border-trouble/articleshow/76779385.cms, accessed on July 9, 2020.

65. Suhasini Haider, “China doubles down on claims on eastern Bhutan boundary”,  The Hindu,  July 5, 2020, at  https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/days­

after-demarche-china-doubles-down-on-claims-on-eastern-bhutan-boundary/

article31993470.ece, accessed on July 5, 2020; The World Bank, “Aparna Subramani”,

at  https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/a/aparna-subramani, accessed on June 12, 2020.

66. Manoj Joshi “In China’s Territorial Claims in Eastern Bhutan, a message for India?” The Wire, July 10, 2020, at https://thewire.in/external-affairs/china-bhutan-india­ territory, accessed on July 11, 2020.

67. Anbarasan Ethirajan, “Why Bhutan’s Sakteng wildlife sanctuary is disputed by China” BBC, November 25, 2020, accessed on June 12, 2021.

68. Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, Royal Government of Bhutan, “Department of Forests and Park Services,” at http://www.dofps.gov.bt/?page_id=857, accessed on

69

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June 18, 2020.

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A. Salman, “Pakistan-China Economic Corridor: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” The

Express Tribune, May 3, 2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/880259/pakistan­

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71

72

Joydeep Gupta, “Indus Cascade a Himalayan Blunder,”The Third Pole, May 22, 2017,

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http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/15, accessed on January 18, 2020.

73. Liu Zhen, “Pakistan pulls plug on dam deal over China’s ‘too strict’ conditions

I latest blow to Belt and Road plans,” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2017, at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2120261/

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74. Adnan Aamir, “The Diamer-Bhasha dam project faces high costs, territorial

disputes and community opposition,” The Interpreter, July 14, 2020, at https://www.

lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/obstacles-remain-pakistan-dam-backed-china, accessed on July 29, 2020.

75. Khaleeq Kiani, “Rs 442 bn accord for construction of Diamer Bhasha signed,” May 14, 2020, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1556951, accessed on May 19, 2020.

76. Ibid.

77. Sannaullah khan, “Diamer-Bhasha dam ready for construction, PM Imran told,” Dawn, July 27, 2020, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1556374, accessed on August 20, 2020.

78. Kiani, n. 76.

79. Zafar Bhutta “Kohala Hydropower Project hits snag,” The Express Tribune, at https:// tribune.com.pk/story/2149706/kohala-hydropower-project-hits-snags, accessed on

June 16, 2020.

80. Nirupama Subramanian ( 2020, 16 July) “Azad Pattan: What is the PoK Hydel Project deal signed by Pakistan, China?” The Indian Express, July 16, 2020, at https:// indianexpress.com/article/explained/azad-pattan-pok-hydel-project-pakistan­ china-6507640/, accessed on July 17, 2020.

81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid.

84. “Kohala, Azad Pattan projects to produce 1800MW hydel power, 8,000 jobs,” The Express Tribune, July 10, 2020, at https://tribune.com.pk/story/2254233/kohala-azad-pattan­

projects-to-produce-1800mw-hydel-power-8000-jobs, accessed on July 12, 2020.

278 | India, China and the Strategic Himalayas

85. Ashok Swain, “It is Water Not China That Has Ruined Nepal’s Relations With India,” Outlook, April 7, 2018, at https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/it-is­

water-not-china-that-has-ruined-nepals-relations-with-india/310684, accessed on

April 12, 2018.

86. News 18, “Nepal to Award 1,200 MW Hydro Project to Chinese Company,” September 4, 2018, at https://www.news18.com/news/world/nepal-to-award-1200­

mw-hydro-project-to-chinese-company-1887953.html, accessed on September 6,

2018.

87. Brahma Chellaney, “Beijing is steadily increasing its clout in Nepal at India’s

expense,” Hindustan Times, January 25, 2017, at https://www.hindustantimes.

com/analysis/beijing-is-steadily-increasing-its-clout-in-nepal-at-india-s-expense/ story-aK7PYsIEUi9QBFff084OAO.html, accessed on July 23, 2019.

88. Xinhua, “Chinese company signs contract to develop Nepal’s largest water supply project,” September 30, 2019, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019­ 09/30/c_138437365.htm. Accessed on October 5, 2019.

89. Harun ur Rashid, “Liklihood of agreement on Teesta water sharing,” The Daily Star, June 30, 2018, at https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/likelihood-agreement-teesta­ water-sharing-1597378, accessed on July 25, 2019.

90. Jagran Chakma “Bangladesh leans to China for Teesta management amidst Indian neglect,” The Daily Star, August 10, 2020, at https://www.thedailystar.net/business/

news/bangladesh-leans-china-teesta-management-amidst-indian-neglect-1942561, accessed on August 25, 2020.

91. Ibid.

92. “China occupies Nepal village, land; deafening silence from Oli govt,” The Economic

Times, June 24, 2020, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/ world-news/china-occupies-nepal-village-land-deafening-silence-from-oli-govt/ articleshow/76539082.cms?from=mdr, accessed on June 29, 2020.

93. Chakma, n. 91. 94. Ibid.

95. Hasan Abbas, “Indus Cascade—A Disaster in the Making”, The Third Pole, July 5, 2017, at https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/07/05/indus-cascade-a-disaster-in­

the-making/, accessed June 24, 2018.