India and Europe in a Changing World: Context, Confrontation, Cooperation 9819911133, 9789819911134

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India and Europe in a Changing World Context, Confrontation, Cooperation Edited by Rajendra K. Jain

India and Europe in a Changing World

Rajendra K. Jain Editor

India and Europe in a Changing World Context, Confrontation, Cooperation

Editor Rajendra K. Jain Centre for European Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-99-1113-4 ISBN 978-981-99-1114-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

1

Introduction Rajendra K. Jain

2

India and Germany Rajendra K. Jain

3

Between Brexit and Boris: The New Dynamic in Indo-UK Relations Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

1 19

65 91

4

India and France B. Krishnamurthy

5

Modi’s India and the European Union: A Perceptions Study James Ling and Idesbald Goddeeris

121

The Italian Non-Connection: India’s On and Off Relations with Italy, 1947–2021 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

151

6

7

India and Spain Rajendra K. Jain

167

8

India and Portugal Rajendra K. Jain and Patryk Kugiel

223

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CONTENTS

9

India and the Netherlands Sakti Prasad Srichandan

261

10

India and Sweden: A Rollercoaster Relationship Manasi Singh

291

11

India and Austria Rajendra K. Jain

327

12

India and Central Europe Rajendra K. Jain

387

13

India and the Baltics Rajendra K. Jain

445

14

How European Think Tanks Think About India: A Perceptions Study, 2008–2017 Lourens van Haaften and Idesbald Goddeeris

483

India’s Trade and Economic Relations with Western Europe Anna Wróbel and Karina J˛edrzejowska

509

15

16

Indian Foreign Direct Investment in Western Europe Anna Wróbel and Karina J˛edrzejowska

527

17

Migration and Indian Diaspora in Western Europe Sheetal Sharma

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Index

565

Notes on Contributors

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is a Visiting Fellow at the Ananta Aspen Centre, India, South Asia practice head for the Eurasia Group and Editor of the magazine Quadplus. He writes on political, security and economic issues. He was formerly Foreign Editor of the Hindustan Times for 20 years and member of National Security Advisory Board of the Government of India (2011–2015). He is a member of the Asia Society Global Council and Aspen Institute Italia and an advisor to the Council of Environment Energy and Water and Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation. Idesbald Goddeeris is Professor of History at the University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Belgium. He teaches courses on colonial history, history of Poland and history of India, and is also Director of the History Programme. His research mainly focuses on the relationship of Belgian (and Western European) society with other cultures, inter alia via migration, transnational mobilization and postcolonial identities. He was formerly a Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics (2009) and the University of Pennsylvania (2014). He has also lectured at a number of universities, including Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Kinshasa. For many years, he worked on the Cold War and published, inter alia, Solidarity with Solidarity: Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980–1982 (Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series) (2010). Rajendra K. Jain was formerly Professor and Chairperson at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Visiting Professor, Warsaw University (February–May 2022). He has been Director, Europe Area Studies Programme, JNU, and the first Jean Monnet Chair in India (2010–2015). He has also been Adjunct Research Professor, Monash European and EU Studies Centre, Monash University, Melbourne (2010–2015). He was formerly Visiting Professor, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya (2010), and Visiting International Fellow, Monash Europe, and EU Centre, Melbourne (2009). He was Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow at the University of Constance (1992–1993, 1994) and Visiting Fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London (1993), and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen (1995), Germany. He has been Visiting Humboldt Foundation Professor at Freiburg, Leipzig and Tuebingen universities and at the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris (2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013). He was Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) Professor of Contemporary India, Leuven University (2015). He is the author/editor of over 35 books and has written over 150 articles/book chapters. He has travelled extensively in Asia, Europe and North America and has lived in the United States (5 years) and Germany (3 years). He has most recently edited Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception and Misperception (Palgrave, 2019), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World (Palgrave, 2020) and India, Europe and Asia: Convergence and Divergence (Palgrave, 2021). Karina J˛edrzejowska is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. She is a graduate of the University of Manchester (M.Sc. Globalization and Development, 2008), Warsaw School of Economics (M.A. in Finance and Banking, 2007) and an M.A. in International Relations from the Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University, 2005. Since April 2017, she is a Governing Board Member and Treasurer of the World International Studies Committee (WISC). She is co-editor of The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020). B. Krishnamurthy is former Professor and Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies and Director, Centre for European Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India. He has been Visiting Scholar at the Paris 13 University, University of Warsaw and Aarhus

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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University. He has published Indo-French Relations: Prospects and Perspectives (New Delhi: Shipra, 2005); Changing World Order: India, EU, and US (New Delhi: Shipra, 2009); and European Convention on Human Rights: Sixty Years and Beyond (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2012). Patryk Kugiel is the Head of the International Economic Relations and Global Issues Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw. He is a specialist on South Asia and international development cooperation. His research in PISM focuses on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, the security situation in South Asia, United States and EU policies towards the region, implications of India’s rise on the global order as well as the development cooperation policy of Poland and the EU. He is the co-editor of India-Poland Relations in the 21st Century: Vistas for Future Cooperation (Vij Books, 2014) and India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy (Routledge, 2017). James Ling completed a Master in European Studies: Transnational and Global Perspectives at the KU Leuven, Belgium, in 2015. He also holds a Bachelor in Law from the University of Sheffield, UK. He is currently based in Brussels, working in EU environmental affairs, but remains an avid India watcher. Sheetal Sharma is Assistant Professor, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module on Society, Culture and Social Change in Europe. She was previously Lecturer at the Institute of Technology and Management, Gurgaon, India. Her research interests include social and cultural issues in contemporary Europe and India and their historical roots, multiculturalism and diversity, the methodology of the social sciences, and gender issues and the empowerment of women. She has written a number of book chapters and journal articles and is the author of Legal Profession and Women: A Study in Professions and Gender (2006). Manasi Singh is Assistant Professor at Centre for Security Studies, School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat, India. She holds a Ph.D. in European Studies from JNU. She was a Visiting Researcher at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), the Freie University Berlin and the University of Bonn. She previously taught international

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relations at the University of Delhi and has work experience in print journalism. She was briefly associated with the UN Millennium Campaign and spent two years working in the non-profit sector. Her research interests include the EU’s politics and external relations, global governance and multilateralism, regional security in South Asia and India’s foreign policy. Sakti Prasad Srichandan is Assistant Professor at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has done his M.Phil. and Ph.D. in European Studies from JNU. His research interests include India-EU relations, European security and migration issues, and Indian foreign policy. He has been associated with many international research institutions. He has authored two books and contributed research papers on European issues and Indian foreign policy in academic journals. He is also a regular contributor of commentaries in mainstream Indian print and digital media. Lourens van Haaften is Assistant Professor, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen. He holds a Ph.D. in History from KU Leuven, Belgium, in 2021. His Ph.D. dissertation project was part of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie European Training Network ‘Global India’. He obtained a research master Modern History at Utrecht University in 2015. He worked for a period at the Dutch Advisory Council for International Affairs (The Hague) and as a trainee at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (Brussels). Anna Wróbel is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. She holds a Ph.D. on the policy of liberalization of international trade in services. A Member of the Polish Association of International Studies, she is also the co-editor of The Dragon and the (Evening) Stars: Essays on the Determinants of EU–China Relations (in Polish) (2013) and The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).

Abbreviations

AAPbD AECI AFD AFP AICEP AIIMS AP ASEAN ASEM ASSOCHAM BEL BICS BIPA BIT BITA BJP BNU BPO BRICS CAD/CAM CBI CCA CCIP CDTI CDU

Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Spanish Agency for International Cooperation Agence Française de Développement (French Agency for Development Agence France Presse Portugal Global Business Development Agency All India Institute of Medical Sciences Associated Press Association of South East Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India Bharat Electronics Ltd. Brazil, India, China, South Africa Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement Bilateral Investment Treaty Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Bharatiya Janata Party Banco Nacional Ultramarino Business Process Outsourcing Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing Central Bureau of Investigation Commercial Cooperation Agreement Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology Christian Democratic Union xi

xii

ABBREVIATIONS

CEECs CERT CII CNES COP CPI CPI-M CPLP CSU CTBT DEA DIPP DJ DRDO DTTA EADS EC EEC EFTA ESM EU EUPOL FDI FF FICCI FOCs FPÖ FTA GDP GDR GITA GSLI GSP HAL HCL HCQ HDC HDW HIC HSL HT IAEA IANS

Central and East European countries Computer Emergency Response Team Confederation of Indian Industry Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales Conference of Parties Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries Christian Social Union Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Department of Atomic Energy Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Dainik Jagran Defence Research and Development Organization Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company European Commission European Economic Community European Free Trade Area Electronic Support Measurers European Union European Union Police Mission Foreign Direct Investment French Franc Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce Foreign Office Consultations Freedom Party of Austria Free Trade Agreement Gross Domestic Product German Democratic Republic Global Innovation & Technology Alliance Global Services Location Index Generalized System of Preferences Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Hindustan Computers Ltd. Hydroxychloroquine High Defence Committee Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft Health Innovation Centre Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. Hindustan Times International Atomic Energy Agency Indo-Asian News Service

ABBREVIATIONS

IBC IBCC ICAO ICCR ICJ ICMR ICT ICWA idD IGCs IGNOU IIMC IL&FS IPISH ISA ISRO IT ITEC ITES J&K JAP JBC JDC JNU JSTC JWG KfW L&T LCCI LeadIT LPD LRMRASW LSD LSE LTTP MDL MEA MFA MGBES ML MMRCA MoD MoHFW

xiii

Indian Business Chamber Indian Baltic Chamber of Commerce International Civil Aviation Organisation Indian Council for Cultural Relations International Court of Justice Indian Council of Medical Research Information and Communication Technology Indian Council of World Affairs Portuguese Platform for Defence Industries Inter-Governmental Consultations Indira Gandhi National Open University India International Marketing Centre Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services India Portugal International Startup Hub International Solar Alliances Indian Space Research Organisation Information Technology Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Information Technology Enabled Services Jammu and Kashmir Joint Action Plan Joint Business Council Joint Defence Committee Jawaharlal Nehru University Joint Science and Technology Committee Joint Working Group Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Larsen and Toubro Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Leadership Group for Industry Transition landing platform docks Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare Lok Sabha Debates London School of Economics Light Tactical Transport Procurement Programme Mazagaon Docks Ltd. Ministry of External Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mobile Ground Based ELINT System Military List Medium MultiRole Combat Aircraft Ministry of Defence Ministry of Health and Family Welfare

xiv

ABBREVIATIONS

MoU MRO MTCR NASSCOM NATO NCI NCPA NGO NICCT NIEO NIIT NPT NRI NSG ODA OECD OEEC OGMA PAAA PIO PNE PPP PSU PTI R&D RBI RCEP SAARC SASNET SEK SIDA SIPRI SMEs SPD SPÖ SS SSA STEM SWJN TCS TOI UCTAD UfC

Memorandum of Understanding Maintenance Repair Overhaul Missile Technology Control Regime National Association of Software and Service Companies North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nordic Centre in India National Centre for the Performing Arts Non-Governmental Organisation Netherlands-India Chamber of Commerce and Trade New International Economic Order National Institute of Information Technology Non-Proliferation Treaty Non-Resident Indian Nuclear Suppliers Group Overseas Development Assistance Organisation of Cooperation and Development Organization for the European Economic Cooperation OGMA in Portugal Politische Archiv des Auswartiges ¨ Amtes Person of Indian Origin Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Public Private Partnership Public Sector Units Press Trust of India Research and Development Reserve Bank of India Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Swedish South Asian Studies Network Swedish Krona Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Small and Medium Enterprises Social Democratic Party Austrian Socialist Party Second Series Social Security Agreement science, technology, engineering, mathematics Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Tata Consultancy Services Times of India United Nations Conference of Trade and Development Uniting for Consensus group

ABBREVIATIONS

UN UNICEF UNIDO UNMOGIP UNSC US V4 WHO WMD WTO

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United Nations United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Security Council United States Visegrad 4 World Health Organisation Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Organization

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 15.1 15.2

Sources of EU news EU news: frames EU news: focus of centrality EU news: focus of domesticity Visibility of EU officials Visibility of EU institutions French, German and UK news: frames Indian attitudes towards the rest of the world Number of publications by country Disciplinary angles of publications by year Relation between disciplinary angles and countries Relation between themes and countries India-West Europe trade in goods, 2021–2022 India-Western Europe trade in services, 2021–2022

128 131 133 134 136 137 140 142 487 490 491 494 515 523

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table

2.1 2.2 4.1 4.2 4.3

Table Table Table Table Table Table

4.4 5.1 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2

Table 8.3 Table 9.1 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table Table Table Table Table Table

10.3 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5

India-Germany trade, 2004–2005—2021–2022 German arms exports to India, 1999–2021 India-France trade, 1996–2022 India-France trade in services, 2015–2019 Equity inflows from France to India, 2000–2001 to 2019–2020 French arms transfers to India, 1960–2020 Leaders’ Twitter followers India-Spain trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 Spanish arms exports to India, 2013–2020 India-Portugal trade in goods, 1996–1997—2021–2022 Portugal’s arms exports to India, 1998–1999, 2005–2014 Portuguese arms exports to India, 2015–2020 India-Netherlands Trade, 1996–1997—2020–2021 Value of Swedish actual exports of military equipment to India, 2018–2020 Value of Swedish actual exports of military equipment to the top 10 countries, 1993–2020 India’s Trade with Sweden, 2017–2018—2021–2022 India-Austria Trade, 1990–1995 India-Austria Trade, 1997–1998 to 2021–2022 Austrian FDI in India, 2000–2019 Austrian arms exports to India, 2004–2010 Austrian arms exports to India, 2013–2020

42 48 102 102 104 106 144 188 194 242 246 247 275 304 304 305 358 358 363 366 367

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LIST OF TABLES

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 15.1

Table 15.2 Table 15.3 Table 15.4 Table 16.1 Table 16.2 Table 16.3 Table 17.1

India-Central Europe Trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 Indian FDI in Central Europe, 2006–2019 Central European FDI in India, 2006–2019 Czech arms exports to India, 2013–2020 Hungary’s arms exports to India, 2013–2016 Poland arms exports to India, 2013–2020 Slovakia arms exports to India, 2013–2020 India-Estonia trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 India-Latvia Trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 India-Lithuania Trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 Estonian arms exports to India, 2013–2020 Lithuanian arms exports to India, 2013–2020 India-Western Europe trade in goods (Exports), 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 India-Western Europe trade in goods (Imports), 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 India-Western Europe trade in services (Exports), 2010–2020 India-Western Europe trade in services (Imports), 2010–2020 Country-wise FDI equity inflow to India from April to June 2022 India: Inward foreign direct investment position by country, 2010–2020 Indian FDI in Western Europe, 2010, 2015–2020 (position by country at year end) Population and percentage of Indian diaspora in West European countries

408 412 415 419 422 425 429 463 466 468 470 471 516 517 521 522 533 534 539 550

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Rajendra K. Jain

Europe has been a major factor in Indian consciousness for over 500 years, ever since the arrival of the Portuguese, the Dutch and later the British. The Indian encounter with Europe has been unprecedented in human history as no comparable rich and complex civilization had such a long period of direct European domination. The period of British rule was a ‘complex’ kind of contact: ‘In the first instance everything pertaining to the master was just wonderful, just because it pertained to the master. Everything native was inferior just because it was native. Then came a reaction when everything native was to be considered marvellous and time-tested while everything European was alien, unorthodox and therefore bad’ (Rao, 1983: 149). Indian elites asserted the importance of basic Indian values and ideas and criticized the arrogance of the Western rulers, and passionately questioned Western analysis and assessments regarding India’s history, intellectual heritage and cultural and religious identity. European ideas and values profoundly influenced the English-educated elite, which sought to emulate the West, trying to adopt and adapt

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_1

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Western value systems—the rule of law, a free press, the legal system, a professional civil service, modern universities and the Westminister parliamentary institutions to the Indian milieu (Singh, 2005). Indian social, political and even religious values began to be influenced by the liberalism of the West and by the advent of science and technology in industrial Europe. West European scholars, Indira Gandhi acknowledged, contributed to the process of India’s self-discovery to a considerable extent and bolstering its self-confidence. ‘But for Europe, India would not have understood itself’ (Gandhi, 1983: 88). Two centuries of British colonialism led to large-scale plunder of India—‘the classic European colony’. Europeans came because in those fabled days of Golconda it was the richest country in the world. They left it ‘one of the poorest’ (Gandhi, 1983: 86). Between 1765 and 1938, the resources drained from India by the United Kingdom alone were estimated to be as much as $45 trillion by current value (Patnaik, 2018). The economic policies of the British Raj, in the midst of severe droughts, produced famines that claimed the lives of over 13 million Indians between 1876 and 1902 alone, and possibly 30 million overall (McQuade, 2017; Tharoor, 2016, cited in Tharoor & Saran, 2020: 70). Before the British arrived, India generated 27% of global GDP in 1700, and by the time they left, India’s share had been cut to just 3% (Hickel, 2015, cited in Tharoor & Saran, 2020: 70). However, unlike China, India did not nurse ‘memories of real or imaginary past wrongs done to them by others’, but retained memories of ‘the positive things’ that may have occurred in the past history of British rule (Venkataramani, 1990: 35). Indian perceptions of modern Europe have been the result of a specific historical experience of a cultural and colonial encounter with the West and a selective admiration of Europe (Jain, 2014: 34). After independence, India’s world view was considerably influenced by its colonial experiences. Its policy of non-alignment and its planned economy fostered a misperception that it was not ‘an attractive partner in the political, economic or strategic scheme of things’. The Europeans found India ‘inconvenient, objectionable and not necessary’ (Dixit, 2019: 51–52). European political attitudes were also coloured by the fact that India was not part of the Western world and was close to the Soviet Union (Sibal, 2019: 62). India confronted an image problem in Europe, which was largely one of the mindsets coupled with a reluctance to understand India or take it seriously.

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With the West refusing to provide infrastructural or defence technology, India turned to the Soviet Union as ‘the alternate and the second option’ (Dixit, 2019: 52). Owing to historically ties with the AngloSaxons, India was not able to relate to Europe as a whole. As a result, interaction between India and non-English-speaking Continental Europe remained thin. Thus, Europe occupied ‘a very prominent place in Indian thinking and the collective influence of the West was visible in politics, economics and security’ (Jaishankar, 2020a: 160). However, despite the broad network of post-colonial economic, social and political linkages, Cold War pressures ‘prevented excessive closeness’ with the West’. India’s engagement with the West was ‘heavily Eurocentric and did not cater adequately for the new American primacy’ (Jaishankar, 2020a: 80).

A Third Option? Against the background of Europe’s quest for a distinct political identity and independent role in the management of world affairs, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the mid-1960s first realized the economic, political and strategic significance of developing a strong relationship with major West European countries. This was the beginning of a conscious policy to build closer relationships with individual European countries and the European Union as a collectivity. In the early 1980s, Europe was ‘astir to assert its independent voice’ (Gandhi, 1983: 89). Given the stalemate in Indo-US relations and the perceived over-dependence on the Soviet Union, New Delhi regarded Europe as an attractive and viable ‘third option’ in giving some space vis-à-vis the United States (Ram, 2002: 2). Britain was perceived as less than ‘an independent and objective’ European voice. France and Germany were central to India’s evolving political and economic relations with Europe (Ram, 2002: 3). Indira Gandhi during her second term (January 1980–October 1984), a former diplomat argues, began to explore the possibility of some common action by middle powers such as Europe and India on East–West and North–South questions (Gonsalves, 1990: 206). However, Europe, another analyst asserts, was never really an option vis-à-vis the United States. It had always been ‘the dependent variable’ and never ‘a real independent variable’ in global strategic affairs (Raja Mohan, 2002: 62). In recent years, New Delhi seems to be again looking at Europe as a third option. With Indo-US relations having noticeably improved in recent

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years, Jaishankar recently remarked, the ‘third option’ that Europe has long represented on strategic issues has grown in importance (Jaishankar, 2020a: 118).

Changes in the 1990s With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India accorded greater priority to the West as a market, source of technology and foreign direct investment. Harsh economic realities, the loss of assured markets in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the increasingly competitive international economic environment moved the West much higher in the Indian foreign policy calculus. Europe too no longer looked at India through a Cold War prism. India became economically more interesting in the wake of its economic reforms and liberalization. The opening up of the large, untapped Indian market provided a new basis for a new relationship with Europe, which perceived India as an emerging regional and global player with considerable economic and political potential. Thus, Europe, which had hitherto been ‘an elusive partner’, became more receptive and open to forging a mutually beneficial relationship (Ram, 2002: 3). In the early 1990s, India’s approach towards Western Europe, according to the then Foreign Secretary, was influenced by three factors. Firstly, that apart from the United Kingdom, France and Germany should also become the focus of attention of India’s European policies in terms of expansion of bilateral relations. These three countries were chosen because the first two were permanent members of the UN Security Council and the last one was becoming ‘an increasingly influential force’ in the UN and other multilateral political and economic fora. Secondly, New Delhi should cultivate Belgium, Holland, Portugal and Spain for establishing ‘a substantive equation’ with the European Economic Community. Thirdly, making a careful assessment of India’s relations with countries like Switzerland, Austria and the Scandinavian countries and ‘calibrating them to become responsive to India’s economic and technological requirements’ (Dixit, 1996: 274–275). India, thus, pursued a twin-track policy towards Europe: concentrating on the expansion of bilateral relations with larger and more important European countries and structuring greater economic coordination between the European Community and India (Dixit, 1996: 275).

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Engaging the European Union India recognized the importance of the nascent European Economic Community (EEC) (Jain, 2019, 2021) and was among the first developing countries to establish diplomatic relations with it in March 1962. Indian initial attitudes towards the European Community reflected ‘the fear of the unknown’ as well as hope that as it became economically strong and powerful, it would not grow into ‘a self-centred inward-looking economic giant’ (Swaminathan, 1973, 30). Nehru was apprehensive that if the Common Market became an inward-looking regional grouping and transformed itself into a rich man’s club, the gap between the developed and developing countries would become wider (Jain, 2015)—a concern shared by his daughter, Indira Gandhi (Gandhi, 1973, 4). Despite these concerns about the Community, India did not really press its political criticism since its interests in the Community were essentially economic, not political. India’s relations with the European Community remained low key and South Asia remained a region of peripheral interest for Brussels. Until détente made gains in the early 1970s, Europe was perceived as the region most vulnerable to incidents and misperceptions which could spark global tensions. In the 1980s, the EEC was perceived as a major economic force with a voice in the management of the world economy and an important factor in world affairs. In the early 1990s, India urged an overhaul of its cooperation agreement with the European Union and an upgraded political dialogue. New Delhi had a problem refashioning its relationship with a new Europe. From a policy point of view, India continued to look at Europe through ‘an economic lens and did not see it as an independent political actor’ (Menon, 2021: 193).

Modi and Europe Since Narendra Modi became prime minister in May 2014, seven distinguishing features characterize Indian foreign policy towards Europe, which have been primarily driven by his aspirations for national renewal and the desire to accelerate the country’s modernization and sustainable development.

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Firstly, a rediscovery and a ‘more vigorous engagement’ of Europe (Jaishankar, 2020a: 102) has been the hallmark of Modi’s foreign policy.1 The Brexit vote and Britain’s imminent departure from the EU also led to ‘a re-evaluation of India’s overall European policy’ (Pal Chaudhuri, 2021: 22). A stronger partnership with the West was expected to yield ‘considerable political benefits and economic gains’ (Jaishankar, 2020a: 123). As ‘a region full of capabilities, resources and best practices’, Europe is considered ‘a natural partner for a more ambitious India’ (Jaishankar, 2020c). Secondly, Modi has re-energized the old India-EU matrix. For decades, Indian diplomacy considered it more productive to focus on individual countries rather than the European Union, except on purely trade issues. The renewed focus on Europe is the result of changing geopolitics, India’s own priorities, Europe’s growing relevance in the post-Brexit era, China’s expanding footprint in the continent and the search for alternatives to the loss of the UK as the traditional gateway to Europe (Jain, 2020b: xiv). Brexit compelled India to revisit, re-examine and rethink its own policies towards Europe and search for alternatives to Britain. New Delhi has sought to engage ‘all the 27 EU members’ because it was desirable to have ‘all the stakeholders with you as much as possible’ since the Union was ‘a collective enterprise’ (Jaishankar, 2021b). Europe, which in the past had tended to be seen as an undervalued partner, is now part of a 1 Between 2015 and June 2022, Modi travelled to 11 European countries, including Germany (6 times; 2 for multilateral meetings) and France (six times), UK (4 times; 3 for multilateral meetings) and Switzerland (twice; once for Davos). Between November 2019 and June 2022, Foreign Minister Jaishankar visited 14 European countries: the V4 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia), three Southeast European (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) and five West European countries (Germany, Denmark and France [twice], Italy, The Netherlands and the UK). His predecessor, Sushma Swaraj, had visited nine European nations (two Southeast European [Bulgaria and Malta] and seven West European [Germany, Italy [twice], France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain]) between August 2015 and February 2019. President Ram Nath Kovind travelled to two Nordic (Iceland and Sweden), five Southeast European (Slovenia, Croatia, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Greece), one Central European (Czech Republic) and one West European country (Switzerland) between May 2015 and September 2019. In a span of three years (October 2016 and August 2019), Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu visited 10 European countries—the three Baltic republics, two CEECs (Poland and Hungary), three Southeast European (Serbia, Malta and Romania) and two West European countries (France and Belgium). These visits in seven years may not seem significant; but the sustained engagement is unprecedented.

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growing conversations in an expanding list of areas from the economy, technology, standards, best practices, development, defence, security and the Indo-Pacific. India seems to have become a demandeur seeking to harness EU’s capabilities to provide value addition to its modernization efforts. The recent resumption of negotiations on a Broad Trade and Investment Agreement and the emergence of new dialogue formats like the Trade and Technology Council—the first one which Brussels has set up after the United States—illustrate the broadening partnership. Thirdly, Indian foreign policy towards Europe has transcended the traditional focus on the Big Three (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). Spain became the third important pillar of India’s outreach to Europe. Madrid was chosen because it was the fifth largest economy in Europe and was recovering well from the Eurozone crisis, because it could make a more meaningful contribution to India’s development, because it was more willing to cooperate and collaborate with India, and because ‘the political cost’ of accessing technology and best practices from Spain was low (Bagchi, 2017). Fourthly, another dimension of India’s re-connect with Europe has been greater engagement with sub-regions of Europe—the Nordics, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltics. By enhancing sub-regional engagement, Modi had made the country ‘think “scale” in a range of domains’ (Jaishankar, 2022d). Building on his experience in Gujarat, Modi was keenly interested in initiating sustained engagement with the Nordic countries in areas that are cutting-edge concerns—renewable energy, innovation, technology, skills, etc. These areas highlighted his conviction that these countries would have an important role to play in India’s transformation. He zeroed in on Denmark which was invited to participate in the entire water management sector and share its expertise and technology. To that end, he ordered the Ministry of External Affairs to find a way out of the diplomatic hurdle of relations having been frozen because of Denmark’s refusal to extradite Kim Davy who was responsible for the Purulia arms drop (1995) (Bagchi, 2018). Efforts to combine Nordic strengths with Indian developmental needs led to two summits with the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) in Stockholm (April 2018) and Copenhagen (May 2022). The Modi government’s outreach to Europe includes a renewed focus on Central, East and Southeast Europe and the recognition, especially of the Visegrad 4, as a region of promise and potential. This re-engagement was spearheaded by Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, who had earlier served

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in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The spate of visits to these countries in recent years is primarily driven by a desire to develop new points of influence in Europe and to treat Central Europe as an autonomous element within Indian foreign policy rather than a mere footnote of its relations with other great powers (Pal Chaudhuri, 2021: 24). New Delhi’s engagement with the Baltics graduated from a visit by Minister of State M. J. Akbar in May 2017 to a visit by VicePresident Venkaiah Naidu to the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in August 2019. The opening of embassies in Estonia (December 2021) and the decision to establish one in Lithuania (April 2022) reflects the desire to increase the diplomatic footprint and collaborate in their niche areas like IT, e-Governance and cyber security. Sixthly, India has also begun recently to explore new geographical spaces and configurations. In an innovative engagement, the MEA and the Confederation of Indian Industry recently organized the first IndiaNordic-Baltic Conclave (5 November 2020) with ministerial participation from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland and Latvia on renewable energy and clean technologies and the factories of the future, on Artificial Intelligence and blockchain-led transformation, supply chain and logistics, and fintech (Jaishankar, 2020b). Seventhly, New Delhi has enlarged the traditional notion of strategic partnerships and has been willing to conclude them with small European countries in their niche areas. It has concluded ‘a green strategic partnership’ with Denmark, which focuses on areas of common interest such as digital cooperation, climate change, and mobility and connectivity agreements. This partnership is stated to be ‘a template’ for India’s emerging cooperation with Europe (Jaishankar, 2021a)—a template which was followed in forging a ‘water’ strategic partnership with The Netherlands in 2021. India now has six strategic partnerships in Europe, including those with France (1998), Germany (2000), the United Kingdom (2004) and the European Union (2004).

The War in Ukraine Three days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine (February 2022), Foreign Minister Jaishankar characterized the situation in Ukraine as a result of ‘a complex chain of circumstances over the last 30 years’ (Jaishankar, 2022a: 8). It had its roots in post-Soviet politics, the expansion of NATO, and dynamics between Russia and Europe and Russia and the

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West broadly (Jaishankar, 2022b). India initially refrained from publicly condemning Russia in view of the 22,500 students stuck in vulnerable zones in Ukraine, the substantial dependence on Russia for military hardware and concern over closer China-Russia ties. New Delhi’s abstention on resolutions in the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council did not imply support for Russia. India subsequently emphasized the importance of the ‘UN Charter’, ‘international law’ and ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of states’. New Delhi ‘unequivocally’ condemned killings in Ukraine’s Bucha and supported calls for an independent investigation into the ‘deeply disturbing reports’. The ‘global order, it added, is anchored on international law, UN Charter and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states’ (BBC, 2022). The Indian economy suffered collateral damage as a result of higher energy prices, foodgrain and fertilizer shortages, food inflation and the disruption of various supply chains as a result of the imposition of sweeping economic sanctions against Russia. In the wake of recurrent Western criticism to align its foreign policy with their preferences towards the war in Ukraine, Jaishankar responded candidly: Somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems, that if it is you, it is yours; but if it is me, it is ours… .I am one fifth of the world’s population, I am today the fifth and sixth largest economy in the world, forget the history, civilization bit, everybody knows that. I think I am entitled to have my own side. I am entitled to weigh my own interests, make my own choices, and my choices will not be cynical and transactional but they will be a balance between my values and my interests. There is no country in the world which disregards its interests. (Jaishankar, 2022c)

In a changing world and the emergence of new players and new capabilities, he added, the world can no longer ‘be that Eurocentric as it used to be in the past’ (Jaishankar, 2022c). Despite Western public statements, there is greater understanding of where India is coming from on the Ukraine; its stance did not fundamentally affect its relationship with major powers.

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Chapter Outline In Chapter 2, Rajendra K. Jain examines initial relations between India and Germany which remained tenuous because of Nehru’s nonalignment, the period of benign neglect from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s and the post-Cold War era. It examines the nature of the Indo-German strategic partnership and the progress under six InterGovernmental Consultations so far, including the four (2015, 2017, 2019 and 2022) since Modi came to power. It goes on to deal with mutual perceptions and misperceptions. It discusses economic and trade relations as well as the nature, scope and potential of defence cooperation and arms transfers. In conclusion, the chapter argues that a more meaningful Indo-German strategic partnership will require a realization in Berlin that India’s rise is good for Germany. India and the United Kingdom, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri argues, have had close but unsubstantive relations for much of independent India’s existence. While blamed on the colonial period, troughs in relations had more to do with differing foreign policy priorities and weak economic linkages. The first phase of relations from 1947 through to the 1960s saw disagreements over Kashmir, Diego Garcia and other foreign policy issues even while soft power ties remained strong. The 1970s until the 1990s saw relations reach a nadir as India turned economically inwards and geopolitically towards Moscow, while the UK invested in the European Common Market and later the EU. Economic reforms triggered Indian investment flows to the UK in the 1990s and 2000s and renewed British interest in India as a market, including education. The fallout of Brexit and India’s increasing closeness to the West, however, marks the beginning of a new partnership in areas like technology, immigration, finance and services. Political and economic relations between India and France from 1947 to the present as well as arms transfers is the focus of the chapter by B. Krishnamurthy. Indo-French priorities and preferences, he argues, converge on a number of regional/international issues, including the quest for strategic autonomy, multilateralism, a rules-based international order, a multipolar world, the Indo-Pacific and share common concerns about the rise of China. Based on a sample of 183 articles from three media outlets—Dainik Jagran (most popular Hindi daily), the Hindustan Times (English daily) and India Today (a weekly)—for a period of 11 months (1 June 2014

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until 30 April 2015), James Ling and Idesbald Goddeeris seek to examine Indian perceptions of the European Union after Modi came to power. The EU confronts a twofold ‘image problem’ in India in terms of disapproval with the dominant perception being that of general indifference. Perceptions, however, are not set in stone. The vital element, they argue, is the political will of leaders. When interests align and cooperation increases, they conclude, the importance of the European Union for India will increase and the prevalent indifference and negativity might partially be overcome. In the next chapter on the Italian ‘non-connection’, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri maintains that despite historical exchanges going back to Roman times, independent India and post-war Italy had tenuous bilateral relations. This reflected their relative economic weaknesses, differing views regarding the Cold War and the existence of other external priorities. Italy looked to the Mediterranean and the nascent European Union, and India to the Anglophone Western countries and larger Asian neighbours. A number of Italian firms, notably Fiat but also ENI and Snam Progetti, made a mark in India’s closed economy but otherwise trade and investment were negligible. India’s economic growth rates from 1991 onwards saw a burst of economic diplomacy from the mid-2000s onwards. But Italian firms and goods have had only limited success, struggling against Asian competitors in the Indian vehicles market and finding India’s high tariffs on textiles, wines and agricultural goods daunting. Even today the two countries have yet to create a sufficiently large set of mutual interests to give bilateral ties its own internal impetus. Trade policy has largely been subsumed into the EU-India relationship and Rome has taken its cue on foreign policy issues like nuclear tests, Kashmir and the like from Brussels. This has also meant bilateral relations are often held hostage to relatively minor issues such as Italian Marines case that paralysed relations from 2012 to 2020 or the Agusta helicopter scandal. Yet increased tourism, a successful Indian diaspora and better cultural relations indicate soft power relations are on the right trajectory. Geographical and cultural distance coupled with weak economic links and marginal political interaction led post-war Spain to neglect India while New Delhi traditionally preferred to be prioritized in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Chapter 7 examines the vicissitudes of political relations during the Cold War and the gradual transformation of the relationship since the early 1990s to the present. It discusses Spain’s outreach to Asia with its Asia–Pacific plans since the 2000s to enhance

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the economic, political and socio-cultural relations as well as visibility in the region. The chapter examines economic/trade relations and evaluates the nature and scope of defence cooperation. It deals with Indian and Spanish perceptions of each other, cultural relations, the state of Indian studies in Spain, how Spain has figured in Indian scholarly literature and the teaching of Spanish language. It examines the momentum in IndoSpanish relations under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, especially after his May 2017 visit. Relations between India and Portugal in the post-war era were tense over the status of Portuguese colonies in India. Democratization in Portugal and the end of Cold War constraints facilitated improved ties. Chapter 8 examines the evolution and dynamics of political relations. It goes on to assess economic relations as well as arms transfers by Portugal to India. It highlights the transformation of the relationship from estrangement to a pragmatic partnership anchored in democratic values and economic potential. During its presidencies of the EU, Portugal has sought to improve bilateral relations as well as elevate New Delhi’s relations with the Union to a higher level. Thus, in June 2000, it organized the first EU-India summit in Lisbon and was instrumental in organising the first-ever virtual summit between India and all of the EU-27 leaders on 8 May 2021. In Chapter 9, Shakti Prasad Srichandan examines the political economic and cultural relations between India and the Netherlands during the Cold War and post-Cold War era. It chronicles the widening and deepening of relations though the primary focus remains on trade and investment. The chapter concludes with reflections on the challenges and prospects of Indo-Dutch relations. The bonhomie between India and Sweden during the Nehru era, Manasi Singh argues, was largely the result of the personal rapport and shared ideals. Relations remained close and cooperative in the 1980s under Indira Gandhi. The 1986 Bofors howitzer scandal, however, led to the fall of the Rajiv Gandhi government three years later. India’s nuclear tests in 1998 further put the relations on a backburner until the early 2000s. The visit of Prime Minister Goran Persson (2004) proved to be an ice-breaker as both countries sought to forge new ties. Since 2014, bilateral ties have been on an upward trajectory both bilaterally and multilaterally with two Indo-Nordic summits (2018 and 2022). The chapter goes on to examine the trade, economic, cultural and arms transfers to

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India and concludes with reflections on the convergence and divergence in India-Sweden relations. Chapter 11 deals with Nehru’s perceptions of Austria prior to the Second World War, New Delhi’s role in the Austrian Peace Treaty, relations during the 1960s and the 1970s and attitudes towards the New International Economic Order. It examines relations since the 2000s and discusses the staunch Austrian opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal until Vienna finally relented at the very end. The chapter examines in detail economic relations and discusses mutual perceptions. In conclusion, the chapter argues that despite the absence of any direct political or strategic interests, relations are low key without intense political dialogue. The next chapter critically assesses the transformation of India’s relations with Central Europe—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—from being an adjunct of Indo-Soviet relations during the Cold War to the rediscovery and rebuilding of relations with the region almost from scratch since the early 1990s. It also deals with the dynamics of trade and economic relations and examines the nature and scope of defence cooperation and arms transfers from Central Europe to India. It evaluates how the combination of Brexit, the rise of China and India’s expanding geo-economic interests in Europe has led the Narendra Modi government to more proactively engage Central Europe. The next chapter examines political, economic and cultural relations between India and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 to the present. After a brief discussion of Jawaharlal Nehru’s perceptions of the Baltics, the chapter examines Indian perceptions of the turmoil in the Baltics and their movement for independence. Subsequent sections describe political relations and examine economic and trade relations as well as arms transfers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to India. The establishment of Indian embassies in Estonia and Lithuania reflects the desire not only to enhance bilateral ties, but also to tap their expertise in IT, e-Governance and cyber security. Based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of articles published on India by 62 European think tanks during 2008–2017, Lourens van Haaften and Idesbald Goddeeris examine the role played by European think tanks in providing evidence-based information and analyses about Indian foreign policy and by acting as brokers of ideas to politicians, diplomats and civil servants. The India-focus of European think tanks,

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they argue, has increased considerably. This increase has been accompanied by a dominant meta-narrative that portrayed India as an emerging global power in a multipolar world and emphasized its economic progress and military capabilities. Using network analysis software, the chapter explores the large diversity in the themes of the articles on India by European think tanks and concludes that geographical patterns largely determined the disciplinary scope of the studies, the choice of themes and the consequent perceptions of India. The next two chapters by Karina J˛edrzejowska and Anna Wróbel examine trade and foreign direct investment between India and the fifteen countries of ‘old’ EU-15, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Chapter 15 examines trade in both goods and services while Chapter 16 focuses on the volume, composition and major trends of FDI including portfolio investment and remittances between India and West Europe. The concluding chapter highlights the nature, causes and evolution of Indian migration in eight European countries—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. It examines the Indian diaspora’s efforts to retain their identity and discusses the degree of social and political integration in the host countries.

Conclusion India’s relations with each European country has its own dynamic and quality. Since May 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has ‘strenuously sought to make up for previous indifference and neglect. And he has done so in a purposeful manner rather than as a bureaucratic ritual’ (Jaishankar, 2022d). He has, in fact, been ‘trawling through different parts of the EU with clear agendas, packaged in a way that gave a sense of purpose and strategy’ (Bagchi, 2018). In an increasingly turbulent world with China’s growing assertiveness, the European Union looked towards a like-minded partner like India with similar values, international outlook and adherence to international law which were compatible with Europe’s own perspectives and interests and to maintain a rules-based world order (see Borrell, 2020; Jain, 2020a). Despite political differences with China and shared values with India, the Europeans will continue to have a more extensive economic relationship

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with China than with India. Even though China’s quest for equal status with the United States is likely to be ‘at Europe’s and India’s expense’ (Sibal, 2017), Europe can neither economically decouple from China nor is it willing to join an ‘against China’ camp. Nevertheless, in the trinity of determinants identified by the EU in March 2019 (European Commission, 2019: 1)—‘namely [negotiating] partner, [economic] competitor and systemic rival—the last dimension is gradually becoming the dominant political narrative’ (Gokhale, 2020, emphasis added). Despite the impressive rise of Asia and an increasingly multipolar world, India maintains that the West still continues to be of extreme importance since the major markets, capital and technology are there. Global institutions continue to be ‘anchored in its mores as standards are largely set there. The global commons are largely regulated by the West and its invisible influence is perhaps even more potent than its visible form’ as well as ‘the principal intermediaries’ in any regional negotiation (Jaishankar, 2020a: 126–127). Europe is considered ‘irreplaceable’ in India’s determination to achieve the goals it has set itself (Kovind, 2018).

References Bagchi, I. (2017, May 21). Time for India to look beyond US, China and Japan. TOI. Retrieved January 31, 2018 from https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes. com/Globespotting/87165/. Bagchi, I. (2018, September 19). Europe in Modi’s foreign policy. NEAR Jean Monnet Network Lecture at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. BBC. (2022, April 6). Ukraine: India strongly condemns Bucha civilian killings. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61006169 Borrell, J. (2020, July 10). In a world of disorder, Europe needs partners (Blog). Retrieved July 16, 2020, from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquart ers/headquarters-homepage_en/82725/In%20a%20world%20of%20disorde r,%20Europe%20needs%20partners Dixit, J. N. (1996). My South Block years: Memoirs of a foreign secretary. UBSPD. Dixit, J. N. (2019). Perceptions and misperceptions in India and Europe. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian images of the European Union: Perception and misperception (pp. 47–61). Palgrave Macmillan. European Commission. (2019, March 12). Joint Communication, EUChina—A strategic outlook. JOIN(2019) 5 final. Retrieved May 17, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/com munication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf

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Gandhi, I. (1973, September 15). Interview of Prime Minister with Bild Zeitung. German News. German Embassy. Gandhi, I. (1983, June 18). Address to the Dialogue Congress West EuropeIndia at the Austrian College, Alpbach. In O. Molden (Ed.), Dialogkongress Westeuropa—Indien des Österreichischen College in Alpbach (pp. 83–90). Österreichisches College. Gokhale, V. (2020, July 13). The sum and substance of the EU’s China dilemma. The Hindu. Retrieved July 16, 2020, from https://www.thehindu. com/opinion/lead/the-sum-and-substance-of-the-eus-china-dilemma/articl e32060289.ece Gonsalves, E. (1990). India and Western Europe. In A. K. Damodaran & U. S. Bajpai (Eds.), Indian foreign policy: The Indira Gandhi years. Radiant. Hickel, J. (2015, November 27). Enough of aid—Let’s talk reparations. The Guardian, cited in Tharoor & Saran, 2020, p. 70. Jain, R. K. (2014). India and Europe: Towards a new narrative. In M. Cremer & S. Mors (Eds.), The dwarfing of Europe: A dialogue between Brazil, India, China and Europe (Vol. 2, pp. 33–44). European Cultural Foundation. Jain, R. K. (2015). Jawaharlal Nehru and the European economic community. India Quarterly, 71(1), 1–15. Jain, R. K. (2019). Initial Indian perceptions of the European Union: The 1940s to the early 1960s. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian images of the European Union (pp. 1–46). Palgrave Macmillan. Jain, R. K. (Ed.). (2020a). India and the European Union in a turbulent world. Palgrave Macmillan. Jain, R. K. (2020b). Introduction. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), India and the European Union in a turbulent world (pp. vii–xv). Palgrave Macmillan. Jain, R. K. (2021). India and Britain’s first application to join the European Community, 1961–1963. India Quarterly, 71(1), 59–77. Jaishankar, S. (2020a). The India way: Strategies for an uncertain world. Harper Collins. Jaishankar, S. (2020b, November 5). Remarks by foreign minister at the India-Nordic-Baltic CII Enclave. Retrieved May 12, 2021 from https://mea. gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33165/eams+remarks+at+the+india++ nordic++baltic+cii+conclave Jaishankar, S. (2020c, October 31). Sardar Patel memorial lecture. Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/ 33158 Jaishankar, S. (2021a, April 29). Inaugural address of the international relations conference, 2021, organised by Symbiosis School of International Studies.

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Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/33827/Keynote_Address_by_Foreign_Secretary_at_the_Inaugural_ Session_of_the_International_Relations_Conference_2021_organised_by_Sym biosis_School_of_Internat Jaishankar, S. (2021b, September 2). Remarks at the Bled Strategic Forum. Retrieved October 15, 2022 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= efM2_W1hq-c Jaishankar, D. (2022a, February 21). Interview with Fabrice Nodé-Langlois. Le Figaro, p. 8. Retrieved October 15, 2022 from https://www.eoiparis.gov.in/ docs/16455324461645528346Article%20Le%20Figaro%20-%20Interview% 20EAM%20(English)-converted.pdf Jaishankar, S. (2022b, February 22). Interaction at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI). Retrieved October 15, 2022 from https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=HICIjdZBL3Q Jaishankar, S. (2022c, June 3). Remarks at the Globsec 2022 Bratislava Forum. Retrieved October 20, 2022c from Republic World, https://youtube.com/ watch?v=2R1z5_KBH2Y Jaishankar, S. (2022d). ‘Foreign policy: Vision and achievements’. In Bluecraft Digital Foundation, ed., Modi@20: Dreams meet Reality. New Delhi: Rupa. Kovind, R. N. (2018, June 19). Address by the President of India at the event organized by Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens. Retrieved September 22, 2022 from https://mea.gov.in/SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/30010/Address_by_President_at_the_event_organised_ by_Hellenic_Foundation_for_European_and_Foreign_Policy_in_Zappio_Ath ens_June_19_2018 McQuade, J. (2017, September 27). Colonialism was a disaster and the facts prove it. The Conversation. Menon, S. (2021). India and Asian geopolitics: The past, present. Allen Lane. Pal Chaudhuri, P. (2021). India and Central Europe: From the margins to the centre in three stages. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), India and Central Europe: Perceptions, perspectives, prospects (pp. 13–27). Palgrave Macmillan. Patnaik, U. (2018, November 19). How much money did Britain take away from India? About $45 trillion in 173 years, says top economist. Business Today. Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://www.businesstoday.in/lat est/economy-politics/story/this-economist-says-britain-took-away-usd-45-tri llion-from-india-in-173-years-111689-2018-11-19 Raja Mohan, C. (2002). India, Europe and the United States. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), India and the European Union in the 21st century (pp. 58–69). Radiant. Ram, A. N. (2002). India and the European Union in the new millennium. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), India and the European Union in the 21st century (pp. 1–24). Radiant.

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Rao, P. V. N. (1983, June 18). Address at the opening ceremony of the ‘Dialogue Congress West Europe-India’, Austrian College, Alpbach. In P. V. Narasimha Rao, A role of persuasion: Thoughts on a nation, a people, and the world to which they belong (pp. 147–152). External Publicity Division, MEA. Sibal, K. (2017, October 12). India-EU summit signals progress but no big results. Economic Times. Retrieved February 1, 2018, from https://econom ictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-eu-summit-signalspr ogress-but-no-big-results/articleshow/61044221.cms Sibal, K. (2019). India and the European Union: Perceptions and misperceptions. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian images of the European Union: Perception and misperception (pp. 61–78). Palgrave Macmillan. Singh, M. (2005, July 8). Address by Prime Minister in acceptance of a honorary degree from Oxford University, London. Retrieved November 12, 2022 from https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details. php?nodeid=140 Swaminathan, T. (1973). An Indian looks at the European Community. Politique Etrangere, 26, 29–38. Tharoor, S. (2016). An era of darkness: The British empire in India. Aleph Book Company. Tharoor, S., & Saran, S. (2020). The new world disorder and the Indian imperative. Aleph. Venkataramani, M. S. (1990). The evolution of Indian images of American political motivations. In S. R. Glazer & N. Glazer (Eds.), Conflicting images: India and the United States. The Riverdale Company.

CHAPTER 2

India and Germany Rajendra K. Jain

India was one of the first countries (after the Western Allies) to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany. This had been ‘an administrative act triggered by a request of the Western powers without any political debate’ (Das Gupta, 2018: 114). India had inherited a certain position at the end of the war, which was later formalized (Dutt, 1959, cited in Das Gupta, 2018: 2). On 1 January 1951, India terminated the state of war with Germany (Indian Military Mission, 1950: 15). Diplomatic relations between New Delhi and Bonn were established in May 1951. Both Chancellor Adenauer (1949–1963) and Jawaharlal Nehru—as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister for seventeen years (1947–1964)— were strong personalities who played a dominating role in the formulation and implementation of their country’s respective foreign policies. While the Chancellor understood non-alignment’s ‘anti-colonial impulse’, he apprehended that the non-aligned movement would serve ‘the purpose of the expansionist policies’ of the Soviet Union and China (Schwarz, 1997:

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_2

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253). Temperamentally and ideologically, a meaningful political rapport between Jawaharlal Nehru and Adenauer was unlikely. Since the early 1950s, Nehru regarded the German problem to be inextricably linked with Cold War situation. The German problem, he felt, was ‘almost insoluble’ (Nehru, 1952a: 65) and deemed it advisable to avoid doing anything which would tend to finalize/confirm the division of Germany (Nehru, 1952b: 661–662). He did not therefore appreciate the rearmament of Germany and West German integration with the West since it was likely to lead to greater tension because of increased Soviet fears (Nehru, 1955a: 340). In Nehru’s view, the German question was closely linked with ‘the bigger question of evolving a system of security in Europe’ since there could be ‘no security without settling the German problem and no settling the German problem without adequate security’ (Nehru, 1955b: 304). He considered the German peoples’ desire for unity to be ‘natural’, but felt it should be attained by ‘peaceful methods and peaceful negotiations’ (Nehru, 1956a: 283). Adenauer was no admirer of a ‘neutral’ India.

Nehru Visit, July 1956 Nehru—whom Adenauer regarded as ‘the spiritual leader of the nonaligned world’—had been portrayed to the Chancellor as ‘a brilliant man, highly educated and witty’ and as basically being ‘pro-Western’ (Adenauer, 1967: 179). The Chancellor acknowledged that his ‘knowledge of Asian problems was not too great’ (Adenauer, 1967: 182). In their conversations in July 1956, the two leaders differed considerably in their assessment of the Soviet Union. The Chancellor insisted that the Soviet Union continued to be ‘very expansionist’ (Adenauer, 1967: 193f) and if the Communists gave up their idea of world domination, some satisfactory settlement was possible in Europe. The Prime Minister explained that in the light of the recent events in Poland and Hungary, the question of world domination by Communists did not arise (Nehru, 1956c: 536; Adenauer, 1986: 187–189). Nehru considered the Germans’ desire for reunification to be ‘natural’ and inevitable. The reunification of Germany, he acknowledged, was necessary for a stable peace in Europe, but this could not ‘be brought about by threats or coercive methods’ (Adenauer, 1986: 191). In their discussions, Adenauer and Nehru dealt with each other respectfully. ‘With great skill they both put forward their assessment of

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the international situation’, and did ‘everything to avoid head-on collisions’ (Schwarz, 1997: 253). Neither of the two leaders ‘understood one another, nor they did not want to understand one another’ (Schwarz, 1997: 254). Nehru, however, felt, ‘We did not convince each other, but I think we did influence each other to some extent and certainly we understood each other’ (Nehru, 1956b: 445).

The Berlin Crisis 1961 Three days after the GDR began constructing the Berlin Wall (13 August 1961), Nehru told the Lok Sabha that the ‘world’s greatest problem’ related to Germany and the city of Berlin. Whether one liked it or not, he added, it was ‘a geographical fact that there are two German states existing now: one in west Germany... and the other is East Germany’. He wondered ‘how the geographical fact of two States’ was going to ‘cease to exist by any other process except by agreement or war’ (Nehru, 1961a: col. 2406–2407). The ‘real difficulty’, he felt, was that ‘behind these two Germanys are two opposing forces, two alliances, two blocs and until that is removed, the tension between the two is lessened, they are not allowed to come together’ (ibid., cols. 2408–2409). On 28 August, he reiterated that access to the 2.5 million people of the city of West Berlin should be full and continue as before. It was quite absurd to have a kind of ‘a Great Wall of China’ dividing the city into two since it caused tremendous misery. It was very odd, he concluded, that barriers should be put in the way of movement and cause ‘infinite misery’ to large numbers of people (Nehru, 1961b: 360).

India-China War, 1962 On 27 October 1962, Nehru wrote to Adenauer informing of the Chinese invasion and drew the Chancellor’s attention to the seriousness of the situation without mentioning any military assistance, sought sympathy and support (Bulletin, 1962: 1739). In his response to Nehru’s letter, Adenauer expressed ‘great concern’ about the developments in the Himalayan front. He considered the Chinese invasion as ‘a serious threat not only to India but to the free world as a whole’ (Adenauer, 2006: 178f; German News, 1962, 10 November: 1). Bonn was disinclined to supply weapons, but expressed its willingness to discuss possible nonmilitary aid to India to meet the Chinese aggression (Lübke, 1962: 1;

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Schröder, 1962: 7). Bonn subsequently provided 10,000 sets of winter outfits (including sweaters, combat dresses, sleeping bags and blankets) for one division of 10,000 Indian soldiers valued at DM4 million in early December 1962 (Das Gupta, 2004: 308).

Benign Neglect, 1965–1990 The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s was a period of German indifference towards India and Indo-German relations stagnated. Drought of two successive years had plunged India into a prolonged period of industrial stagnation. Economic restrictions led to declining interest of German companies in India. The Federal Republic leaned towards Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War because of its friendly attitude towards the German question and displeasure over Indian responses towards the Berlin crisis (1961). Development aid and the supply of arms to Pakistan became a balancing act for Bonn’s India policy. Bonn did not learn any lessons that it had backed ‘the wrong horse’ in the 1965 war and continued to supply arms to Pakistan much to the annoyance of India (Das Gupta, 2004: 461). India’s relations with the Federal Republic took a turn for the better when the ‘Grand Coalition’—the first post-war coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD)—came to power on 1 December 1966. Kurt George Kiesinger was the first West German Chancellor to visit India (20–22 November 1967). The visit marked the turning point in the political relations between the two countries. During the plenary session talks on current global issues, both sides took extreme care to avoid even the slightest impression of seeking to impose their own positions on the other side. When ‘problems were touched upon where both held different opinions, each side explained its concerns and asked for understanding of respectively held positions—without explicitly asking for a comment from the other side’ (PAAA, 1967). After the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), India was increasingly viewed as pro-Soviet. The lack of political similarities also fostered ‘indifference’ towards India and lack of interest in Asia led to a period of benign neglect. During the Cold War, West Germany insisted on an unfettered and inalienable right of self-determination for the German people. The FRG was quite restrained and reluctant to get enmeshed in the Kashmir issue

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and merely expressed the hope that ‘a just and lasting solution acceptable to both sides’ would be reached (Brentano, 1960: 6). On Kashmir, Germany observed ‘strict neutrality’ (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [hereinafter cited as AAPbD], 1966: 999; Kiesinger, 1967: 1).

Ostpolitik and Détente in Europe Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which had been facilitated by the onset of Super Power détente, sought to overcome the wasteful stalemate of the Cold War and seek provisional solutions when permanent solutions could not be found. India welcomed the Federal Republic’s efforts at détente in Europe as well as the Ostvertr¨age (Eastern treaties)—the FRGUSSR Treaty (12 August 1970), the FRG-Poland Treaty (7 December 1970) and the Berlin agreement (3 September 1971) (Giri, 1971: 41). These ‘historic treaties’ marked ‘a new realism’ (India, MEA, 1971: 1).

Bangladesh Crisis, 1971 As the situation in East Pakistan deteriorated in early 1971, India urged Bonn to cease economic and military assistance to Pakistan. On 14 May 1971, Indira Gandhi’s letter to Chancellor Brandt stressed the ‘gigantic problems’ which Pakistan’s actions in East Bengal had created for India and the influx of about 3 million refugees and spoke of the grave security risks India was facing as a result of this huge influx. When Foreign Minister Swaran Singh visited Bonn (9–10 June 1971), he characterized the influx of 5 million refugees as a ‘civilian invasion by our neighbour’. This had imposed heavy financial burdens, created socio-economic tensions and posed a threat to the peace and security of the region (AAPbD, 1971a: 954; Germany, Foreign Office, 1971: 88). The two sides concurred that ‘an early solution’ was necessary (AAPbD, 1971a: 956). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met Chancellor Brandt three times during her visit to the Federal Republic (10–12 November 1971) as part of a six-nation tour. The refugee problem, she told the Chancellor, was posing a heavy burden on India, posed social and administrative problems and endangered its security (AAPbD, 1971b: 1702). ‘The solution lies with Pakistan’, she insisted, which necessitated ‘the release of Mujibur Rahman and the resumption of negotiations with the representatives of

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the Awami League by the Pakistan central government’ (PAAA, 1971, cited in Raghavan, 2013: 231). Mrs. Gandhi acknowledged that India was supporting the Mukti Bahini with the bare/indispensable minimum support (AAPbD, 1971b: 1703). The situation, she repeatedly observed, was extraordinarily serious and ‘akin to war’. Bonn concluded that India ‘no longer seems inclined to avoid the conflict with Pakistan’ (PAAA, 1971, cited in Raghavan, 2013: 231). The Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the truce in the Bangladesh war. New Delhi sought West German good offices in persuading the European Economic Community in favour of an early recognition of Bangladesh (AAPbD, 1972a: 63).

Recognition of the GDR On 2 October 1972, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh personally delivered Indira Gandhi’s letter of 1 October to Brandt announcing that India would recognize the GDR on 8 October: ‘In the opinion of the Government of India and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR does not in any way prejudice the desire of the German people for unity should they wish to achieve it by peaceful means and through bilateral negotiations’ (Bulletin, 1972, 10 October: 1708; German News, 1972, 15 October: 3). While extending diplomatic recognition to the GDR, India maintained close and constant consultations with FRG and also made it clear that its decision was without prejudice to any future decision of the two German States to seek reunification through peaceful means (India, MEA, 1973: 41).

Helmut Schmidt, 1974–1982 Chancellor Schmidt’s perspective was transatlantic; he was ‘not interested in India at all’. Schmidt met Morarji Desai once for an hour during his stopover at Frankfurt Airport (21 June 1979). His advisers ‘almost forced him to meet his Indian counterpart. They did meet, but this was of no use’ (Rothermund, 2012: 5). After the 18 May 1974 Pokhran peaceful nuclear test, ‘the whole world was against India’. For decades, efforts were made ‘to deny any nuclear commerce to India through a global non-proliferation architecture that was painstakingly created’ in its aftermath (Kakodkar & Gangotra, 2019: 91, 99). Ambassador Günter Diehl cabled back an analysis stressing that

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Mrs Gandhi wished to use the test for domestic political purposes and that she was willing to pay the price for joining the group of nuclear powers (AAPbD, 1974: 1001–1002; Wikileaks, 1974). The Germans were greatly perturbed by the first breach in non-proliferation efforts since the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force. The initial West German reaction to India’s peaceful nuclear test was muted; the first public expression of ‘regrets’ was published in a brief article appearing in the 30 May issue of the official Bulletin. The NPT repeatedly came up in bilateral meetings since the 1980s. The Federal Republic was critical of the imposition of Emergency by Indira Gandhi on 25 June 1975. During his visit to India in January 1976, Bahr did not announce any increase in development aid. The March 1977 elections, which brought the Janata Party under Prime Minister Morarji Desai to power, had opened up new perspectives in Indo-German relations. The Germans noticed ‘greater open-mindedness’ than in the past. For instance, Vajpayee stated that friendships should not be exclusive. Where ‘tilts’ had arisen, they must be rectified (AAPbD, 1977: 512).

The Kohl and Rajiv Visits Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 16-hour stopover visit on his way back from Japan and Indonesia in November 1983 marked a welcome renewal of conduct at the highest level between the two countries. The visit gave some momentum to Indo-German ties. After Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination on 31 October 1984, Rajiv Gandhi became the youngest Prime Minister of India. The German Foreign Office perceived the new government’s programme as ‘conservative, moderate and designed to save time and survive’ (AAPbD, 1984: 1451). Rajiv Gandhi visited Germany for a week in June 1988—seventeen years after that of his mother Indira Gandhi. After establishing a broad industrial base, India, he told his hosts, sought German cooperation in select spheres in order to increase productivity and efficiency, reduce costs and improve quality (Gandhi, 1988: 164). A major achievement of Rajiv’s visit was the promise to establish a ‘fast track’ channel for expeditious clearing of joint venture proposals in India similar to the one he had promised to set up with Japan. The ‘fast track’ mechanism had been found very useful by German businessmen and enhanced confidence amongst German investors in India. Another important result was the decision to

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maintain political dialogue at various levels as well as ‘regular’ meetings between the two foreign ministers.

Sikh Extremism Since the early 1980s, India frequently expressed concern about the activities of Sikh extremists and Khalistani activists at various levels with the Federal Republic (AAPbD, 1985b: 1106). New Delhi gave a series of demarches and protest notes to the Federal Republic that it tolerated demonstrations by Sikhs for an independent state of ‘Khalistan’. During these demonstrations, the Indian flag was burnt and the Khalistan flag was hoisted. There was also a so-called Consulate of Khalistan in Cologne and a professed Consul General who issued ‘Khalistan passports and Khalistan money’. Such behaviour, New Delhi urged the Germans, was contrary to international law (AAPbD, 1985a: 1016, footnote 3). New Delhi continued to urge the FRG to cooperate in curbing activities of those who misused its territory and hospitality to incite violence, terrorism and separatism in India (India, MEA, 1987: 98). In February 1986, Genscher assured Foreign Minister Bali Ram Bhagat that the FRG would not relax its efforts in that regard (AAPbD, 1986: 211).

The Post-Cold War Era The unification of Germany (1990) had raised questions, expectations and anxieties about Germany’s role and responsibilities in the post-Cold War and towards the East, the West and the South. Germany had discovered its own Third World next door, namely Eastern Europe, which had greater priority for resources, technology transfer, capital and financial flows (see Jain, 1993). In the 1990s, Germany sought to make its development policy more efficient, people-oriented and strive to alleviate poverty as well as address its structural causes. To that end, Economic Cooperation Minister CarlDieter Spranger outlined five new policy criteria, viz. respect for human rights, popular participation in political decision-making process, certainty of law and the rule of law, creation of a ‘market friendly’ economic system and development-orientation of government activities (Germany, Ministry of Economic Cooperation, 1991: 2–3). The Federal Republic went on to reduce economic aid to India by 25%, that is from $225

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million to around the $182 million, on account of India’s ‘excessive’ defence expenditure. The German conviction that Indian economic reforms launched in 1991 at a time of a balance of payments crisis would endure and would open new economic opportunities in trade, technology and investments led to an upswing in relations with India.

Rao’s Visit, 1991 Within three months of becoming Prime Minister, the first country P.V. Narasimha Rao visited was Germany—the powerhouse of Europe. Before going, his Private Secretary remembered, Rao ‘read all the briefs given to him... he planned for it six weeks in advance’ (Satpati, 2018: 260). Chancellor Helmut Kohl somehow came to ‘a personal decision that India’s economic reforms might work, and that Narasimha Rao provided Germany a new post-Cold War opening in Asia’ (Rana, 2016: 2). During their meeting on 6 September, Kohl expressed the desire to bring India ‘closer’ to Europe and assured him that the Germans could do so without competing with other European countries which New Delhi had traditionally maintained close ties (AAPbD, 1991: 1193). Economic reforms, Rao assured the Chancellor, were ‘irreversible’. Kohl accepted the Indian suggestion to establish an Indo-German advisory group and assured Rao that Berlin would seek to keep its financial cooperation commitments at ‘roughly’ the same level in the future as well (AAPbD, 1991: 1193). Kohl then went on to reiterate the wish he had told Rajiv Gandhi: ‘I want India to be successful. I want you [Rao] to be successful’ (AAPbD, 1991: 1194). The Prime Minister urged German industry and business leaders to ‘look at India once again’ even though German capital had many competing claims. A small board, he said, had been created in his office to give rapid decisions on major investment projects. He assured them that the time taken for approval of an investment decision was being reduced from 36 months to six months. Rao’s visit had two concrete results: the decision to establish a IndoGerman Consultative Group (IGCG) and the institutionalization of annual Foreign Secretary-level talks between the two countries.

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Helmut Kohl in India, 1993 As part of a five-nation Asia trip, Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited New Delhi for five days (18–22 February 1993)—his third visit in nine years to accept the Jawaharlal Nehru Prize for International Understanding for his role in the unification of Germany and the creation of a new Europe. The Chancellor felt that it was the German Government’s perception that though there may be difficulties, they were convinced that the liberalization process was now ‘irreversible’ (India, MEA, 1993: 59). At the end of the official talks, the two leaders jointly met the Chancellor’s 20-member delegation of primarily leading German businessmen. Kohl informed them that he and the Indian Prime Minister had agreed on an ‘agenda for action’ and that they would meet in Bonn next year to review its implementation. In ‘an unscripted move’, Rao invited German businessmen to send him a memorandum with all their suggestions on investment and business conditions in India, and promised to respond (Rana, 2016: 32). In March 1993, the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce, Düsseldorf sent a 20-page memorandum entitled ‘Proposals on Economic Policies and Procedures of the Government of India’. It outlined demands for automatic approval for projects on the basis of a negative list, single-window clearance of matters relating to land, power and other infrastructural facilities and their improvement, a flexible exit policy and protection of intellectual property rights, especially in respect of pharmaceuticals (Matter, 1993: 18). It also called for liberalization of the pharmaceutical and chemical industry, removal of the phased manufacturing programme obligations for units established prior to the new industrial policy, increasing the prescribed payment limits for automatic approvals of technical collaborations and an amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act (Hindustan Times , 1994). Three days before Rao’s arrival in the Federal Republic on 2–5 February 1994, India’s 25-page memorandum in reply was well received by Germany as ‘a token of India’s serious intent to carry forward liberalization’ (Rana, 2016: 35).

Germany’s Asia Concept, 1993 Germany’s first Asia strategy (22 September 1993) (Germany, Foreign Office, 1993) stressed the opportunities the opening of Asian markets provided for German companies. India, it noted, was ‘opening up more

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to the world economy’ and identified Japan, China and India as ‘major political powers’ (p. 1). It acknowledged that Germany was already using the ‘reasonably priced engineering capacities’, especially in software in India (para 2.3). It identified Japan, China Korea, the ASEAN states as ‘foremost partners’, and ‘principally’ India in South Asia, ‘but also Pakistan’ (para 4). New Delhi welcomed the identification of India as one of the countries with whom mutually beneficial partnership ought to be developed (India, MEA, 1995, 10 July: 166). German interest in India began to wane around the mid-1990s primarily because of slowing down of the reform process, short-lived coalition governments of Prime Ministers H. D. Deve Gowda and I. K. Gujral after the elections of 1996 and 1998, and because other investment and trade destinations in Asia, especially China, were more attractive.

Irritants In the early 1990s, there was increasing European sensitivity about human rights violations in India because of growing media attention in the wake of the resurgence of insurgency—Kashmir (which began in 1989), Punjab (which peaked in 1991) and Assam in the northeast. Like other European countries, Germany too raised human rights issues as a result of growing domestic pressure and criticism by NGOs and sensitive parliamentarians in the Bundestag. New Delhi resented the tendency, especially amongst some Opposition SPD parliamentarians, to lecture India on its actions in Kashmir and the detention of prisoners under Indian security laws. In the post-Cold War era, nonproliferation became an increasingly contentious issue in India’s relations with the West, including Germany. India maintained that its refusal for over a quarter century to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty was because of its discriminatory character. The West had generally failed to recognize India’s legitimate national security concerns (being situated between two nuclear weapon powers with an ongoing relationship of nuclear weapons cooperation). Germany reacted to the May 1998 nuclear tests with ‘unusual sharpness’. It expressed its displeasure by cancelling a scheduled round of discussions on development cooperation aid for which an Indian delegation had already arrived in Bonn for the three-day annual ODA talks. The Federal Republic was the first country to freeze development aid worth DM300 million to India (The Hindu, 1999, 14 May). Development aid talks scheduled for early 1999 were ruled out. However, disbursements of funds in the

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approximately DM2 billion ‘pipeline’ were not stopped. Germany felt that the tests ‘blatantly undermined the international regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons’, ‘threaten and undermine the process of disarmament and the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether’. The Federal Republic urged both India and Pakistan to immediately announce ‘a cessation to all further testing of these weapons, renounce their nuclear weapons programmes and sign and ratify, unconditionally, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’ (Siebert, 1998: 1). India engaged in persistent diplomacy to moderate Germany’s stance. A visit by National Security Adviser Brijesh Mishra (February 1999) was followed by that of Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh (30 September–1 October 1999). Bonn’s position changed gradually as a result of the change of government in Germany, growing awareness and consequent recognition of India’s role in Asia and the world, economic opportunities offered by India and the Clinton Administration’s serious efforts to improve relations with New Delhi. This eventually paved the way for Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s visit to India in May 2000 when he said that sanctions would no longer be at the ‘centre’ of discussions (Katyal, 2000). It also came amidst changing public perceptions in Germany about India’s new technological prowess in the information technology sector as reflected in the Green Card proposal and expectations of the contribution that Indian software engineers could make in helping Germany catch up with the ‘new economy’.

Kashmir In the post-Cold War era, Germany continued to adopt a neutral stance on the Kashmir issue and did not make any value judgement nor sought to pose as a mediator. The Federal Republic preferred a solution on the basis of the Simla Agreement and did not favour multinational involvement to resolve the issue (Rühe, 1996). In their official statements on terror attacks in Kashmir, German officials did not use the words ‘crossborder terrorism’ though Foreign Minister Fischer in mid-2000 remarked that there would be no peace if there is ‘armed infiltration or terrorism, cross-border terrorism’ (cited in Katyal, 2000). After the Pokhran nuclear test, Germany often stated that there was ‘a permanent threat of war’, including a possible nuclear dimension, between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (Ischinger, 2001).

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The Kargil War, 1999 Germany was candid in its criticism of Pakistan’s role in the Kargil War. It criticized Islamabad’s ‘irresponsible’ behaviour to ‘change the status quo, which could not solve the problem by force and armed conflict’ (Katyal, 1999; The Hindu, 1999). The German Ambassador was equally categorical: ‘If we look at the location, the equipment and the logistics involved, it is quite difficult to believe there was no involvement’ (Dieckmann, 1999). Like the rest of the European Union, the Federal Republic took a forthright stand on the Kargil War and demanded that Pakistan must end its transgression of the Line of Control; this was the ‘first important step’ to reduce tensions. Foreign Minister Fischer appreciated India’s ‘exemplary restraint’ in not crossing the Line of Control during the tense face-off with Pakistan (Fischer, 1999).

Manmohan Singh, 2004–2014 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while seeking to recast India’s relationship with the United States, regarded Germany and Japan as countries could make a significant contribution to India’s transformation and modernization. Four themes became important during his two terms as Prime Minister—the widening and deepening of the strategic partnership, joint efforts for membership of the United Nations Security Council, two ministerial-level Inter-Governmental Consultations (2011 and 2013) and enhanced political exchanges. Strategic Partnership The ‘Agenda for the Indo-German Partnership for the 21st Century’ (18 May 2000) described India and Germany as ‘natural partners’. It resolved to expand and intensify their relationship into ‘a new strategic partnership’. It resolved to have ‘regular and frequent’ exchange of visits at Heads of State/Government level and annual meetings of foreign ministers. It acknowledged ‘differing opinions’ on global disarmament and non-proliferation. It resolved to enhance security dialogue, cooperation in science, research and technology as well as cultural relations (Germany, Foreign Office, 2000). The joint statements of 23 April 2006 (Singh, M., 2006a) and 30 October 2007 (India, MEA, 2007) resolved to deepen their strategic partnership based on shared democratic values and basic

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common interests. Next year, another statement sought to expand the strategic partnership further (India, MEA, 2007). The launch of biennial Intergovernmental Consultations since 2011 marked a major upgradation of institutional linkages. In the wake of rising powers, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle in mid-2012 outlined the concept of ‘transformative powers’ (Gestaltungsm¨achten) (Westerwelle, 2012, cited in Heiduk, 2015: 132). In a 2012 strategy paper—‘Shaping Globalization—Expanding Partnerships—Sharing Responsibility’—Berlin acknowledged the emerging powers as ‘new players with a voice in the conduct of world affairs’ and sought to enhance the India-EU strategic partnership as ‘promising instruments for cooperation with the new players in globalization’ (Germany, Foreign Office, 2012: 5, 9). The new players, it added, were ‘becoming new partners with whom we and our traditional partners hope to develop innovative policies to address global issues and build alliances for their implementation’ (Germany, Foreign Office, 2012: 6). Strategic partnership, India maintains, does not merely signify defence or counterterrorism, but ‘a very broad-based cooperation’ and ‘strategic cooperation’ in many diverse areas (India, MEA, 2011) like science and technology, and education. Over the years, the partnership has broadened to include politics, economics, climate change, energy, counterterrorism, maritime security, science and technology, migration, civil society, culture, renewable energy and urbanization. Though political and strategic consultations have increased in recent years, the primary focus of the strategic partnership remains economic. There has been growing cooperation in security and counterterrorism, but this offers ‘little more than a forum for the exchange of views and best practices in terms of their substance’ (Heiduk, 2015: 140). Membership of the UN Security Council India joined three other aspirants—Brazil, Germany and Japan—with scope for future representation to one or two African countries to jointly work and support each other. The Group of Four (G4) became ‘the most vocal coalition’ pushing hard the case for six new permanent members (Murthy, 2020: 81–82). At their meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Heads of State of Germany, Japan and Brazil (the G4) stated that the UN

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Security Council must reflect the realities of the international community in the twenty-first century; that it must be ‘representative, legitimate and effective’; and that it ‘must include, on a permanent basis, countries that have the will and capacity to take on major responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security’. The G4 asserted that they are ‘legitimate candidates for permanent membership in an expanded Security Council support each other’s candidature’. Africa, they added, must be represented in the permanent membership in the Security Council (India, MEA, 2004). So far there has not been much progress in the G4 quest for membership of the UN Security Council. Indo-US Nuclear Deal and After Chancellor Angela Merkel was initially non-committal about the IndoUS nuclear deal. Germany, she said, would prefer to wait till the US Congress decided, and then ‘we will see in the Nuclear Suppliers Group’ (Merkel, 2006: 40). Three years after the India-specific waiver1 in the NSG guidelines on 6 September 2008, there has been a gradual dismantling of the technology denial regimes. After the US Congress approved the deal on 1 October 2008 and the United States took the lead in devising civil nuclear cooperation with India, American allies, including Germany, relaxed their own controls on high-tech exports to India (Saran, 2016: 195). Three years later, Berlin modified its export control legislations and removed India from the list of countries subject to restrictions for the export of dual-use items and technology a week before Chancellor Merkel was to visit New Delhi on 31 May 2011. With the NSG waiver and with New Delhi having harmonized its export control lists with the NSG, the change cleared the decks for German companies like Siemens AG to export critical and sensitive civil nuclear safety equipment to India (Roche, 2011).

1 At the NSG waiver meeting, Germany was ‘a less than convincing or decisive chair. Some resentment of what this meant for India came out in the text Germany proposed from the chair for the press release at the end of the inconclusive August meeting. This text spoke of the complexity of the issue, of the need to consider non-proliferation aspects in greater detail and to decide on NSG policy toward India, thus opening up new and varied issues for consideration and making a positive decision less likely’ (Menon, 2016: 75).

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A Strategic and Global Partnership, 2007 Since Angela Merkel’s election as Chancellor in November 2005, Manmohan Singh apart from his visit in April 2006 visited Germany for the G8+5 Summit at Heiligendamm in June 2007. Four months later, during Merkel’s return visit, a joint statement on the ‘Further Development of the Strategic and Global Partnership’ was signed on 30 October (India, MEA, 2007). The ‘special partnership’, it stated, had led to growing cooperation in global affairs and ‘substantial expansion’ in the bilateral engagement in multiple fields. The two countries would now seek to enhance the scope of their partnership with a view to strengthen it, ‘based on shared principles, common perceptions and interests’ (para 1). The core of the partnership, it stated, was trade, investment and education (para 5). The joint statement came in the wake of a doubling of trade within three years. The two sides agreed to work towards increasing trade to e 20 billion by 2012. It underlined the priority areas of energy, environment and sustainable development cooperation (para 8). In conclusion, the two sides agreed to strengthen their ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (para 18). Intergovernmental Consultations, 2011 and 2013 The commencement of Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGCs) was a major landmark in Indo-German relations since the Federal Republic conducted them only with a select group of countries. Unlike earlier exchanges were episodic and hastily prepared, the IGC was structured and broad-based, and amenable to integrated functioning and monitoring when ministers would arrive at decisions and jointly convey these to senior officials of both countries on the same day. At the first IGC (2011), three MoUs and an agreement were signed.2 During the visit, Merkel was also conferred the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for the year 2009.

2 MoU on cooperation in the field of vocational education and training, MoU on

research cooperation between the Indian Council of Medical Research and Helmholtz Association of National Research Centres, MoU between Department of Science and Technology and Leibnitz Association for Organizing Indo-German symposia on frontiers of science and technology and a cooperation agreement between the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Kolkata and Deutsches Elektronen Synchrotron, Hamburg.

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The second IGC (Berlin, 11 April 2013) led to the conclusion of six agreements, including the promotion of teaching of German language as a foreign language in India, the establishment of a new jointly funded programme of e7 million entitled ‘Indo-German Strategic Partnerships in Higher Education’ (IGSP) to facilitate joint research projects for the next four years, including the introduction of Bachelor of Education programmes for German language with the long-term intention of providing high-skilled workers. Agreement was reached on a soft loan of e1 billion for strengthening the ‘Green Energy Corridor’ over the next six years (2014–2019). Other agreements related to cooperation in civil security research, enhanced agricultural cooperation on plant variety protection, conservation of plant genetic resources and the establishment of a JWG on Quality Infrastructure. New Delhi also sought German cooperation in taking up a pilot project on skill development in the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. The second IGC led to the signing of four intergovernmental MoUs and an additional ten documents on its sidelines. Agreement was also reached to establish a High Technology Partnership Group at the Foreign Secretary level, which would focus on deepening cooperation in enhanced trade in high technology and issues related to export control and nonproliferation.

Modi and Germany Warming-Up to Modi After the British, the Germans were the first Europeans to warm up to Narendra Modi and end the decade-long EU boycott after he had won his third successive term as Chief Minister of Gujarat in December 2012. The rising star of Indian politics and most likely prime ministerial candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the national elections scheduled for May 2014 was invited for lunch at the residence of Ambassador Michael Steiner in New Delhi on 7 January 2013, which was attended by most of the EU-28 ambassadors, when he, along with several EU diplomats, was invited for lunch on 7 January 2013. When Modi was elected in 2014 with a simple majority in the Lok Sabha in several decades, Berlin perceived him as someone who could bring about ‘major change in Indian economic policies’. But it was clear

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that he could not ‘work wonders’. The system was, however, ‘complicated’.3 Angela Merkel was, however, the last head of state to make the obligatory congratulatory call to him. Hannover Visit, 2015 Though Modi regarded the West, including Europe, to be crucial to India’s modernization and sustainable development, he visited Germany in April 2015 to inaugurate the Hannover Messe where India was again a partner country and in which 350 Indian companies, 120 CEOs and 14 States participated. He described Germany as a country which could contribute in terms of capital flows, technology and best practices as well as advancing the Make in India initiative (Modi, 2015a). He described Germany as ‘a valued partner’ and ‘an enduring symbol of technology and innovation, quality and productivity’ (Modi, 2015b). During the Hannover Messe, three Government-to-Government Letters of Intent were signed in the fields of renewable energy, urban development and skill development. Besides these, 23 business-to-business/semi-governmental MoUs/Letter of Intents were signed between various PSUs/business associations/companies in the areas of heavy electronics, solar and wind energy systems, machine tools, electrical sector, small, micro- and intelligent grids, renewable technologies, etc. Building on Germany’s role as India’s leading trade, technology and investment partner in Europe, Merkel and Modi drew up a roadmap to strengthen the strategic partnership and make Germany a partner of choice in India’s flagship initiatives such as ‘Make in India’, ‘Clean India’, Digital India’ and ‘Skill India’ (India, MEA, 2016: 108). Inter-Governmental Consultations During Modi’s tenure as prime ministers, four cabinet-level Intergovernmental Consultations (IGCs) have been held in 2015 (third), 2017 (fourth), and 2019 (fifth), and sixth (May 2022). At the third IGC in early October 2015, New Delhi’s expectations were that Germany’s acknowledged competences in manufacturing, skilling, high technology, clean energy, water and waste management,

3 Interview with a senior official of German Foreign Office, Berlin, 4 May 2018.

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etc., would provide a robust foundation for enhanced partnerships in a range of priority areas (India, MEA, 2015a). The joint statement underlined the importance of freedom of navigation in international waters, the right of passage and other maritime rights in accordance with accepted principles of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. One significant outcome was the establishment of a dialogue between the Policy Planning Departments of the foreign ministries of the two countries. In order to attract greater German investment, India committed to set up a Fast Track System for German companies in the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which was expected to be fully operationalized by March 2016 (India, MEA, 2015b). At the fourth IGC (29–30 May 2017), the two countries signed 12 MOUs/agreements in areas like cyber policy, development initiatives, sustainable urban development, skill development, digitalization, railway security and promoting vocational training. The joint statement reflected similar views on a number of issues, including Afghanistan, terrorism, UN reform, etc., and the resumption of negotiations of the India-EU Bilateral Investment and Trade Agreement. Berlin agreed to provide e1 billion in financial and technical assistance towards urban development in the cities of Kochi, Coimbatore and Bhubaneshwar under the initiative of Smart Cities. Discussions to enhance collaboration continued in the Working Groups for collaboration in water management, waste management/circular economy and climate change (India, MEA, 2017). India and Germany sought to strengthen cooperation in the field of Artificial Intelligence and digital transformation and broadening the digital dialogue at the fifth IGC (31 October–1 November 2019). Both sides reiterated their strong support for a rules-based international trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its centre. Against this backdrop, all efforts, they urged, should be made to restore the full functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system. It stressed the need to take action for climate and sustainable development. A new Track 1.5 strategic dialogue was established which would involve key stakeholders to engage annually in an open exchange of views and ideas to enhance mutual understanding of national, regional and strategic interests and to work out recommendations for joint engagement and action on individual policy areas. It was mutually agreed that a regular dialogue would be conducted between the Defence Ministers of the two countries, at least once every two years (India, MEA, 2019).

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The sixth IGC, initially scheduled for 2021, was delayed as were meetings of most dialogue formats, owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. The IGC, which did a comprehensive stock-taking of bilateral relations, was held with the new government under Chancellor Olaf Scholz on 2 May 2022. Amongst the most significant outcomes was the signing of a new Joint Declaration of Intent on the Indo-German Partnership on Green Urban Mobility wherein the German side expressed its readiness to provide additional concessional finance of e1 billion to support improvements of green urban mobility infrastructure and services and strengthen capacities of national, state and local institutions to design and implement sustainable, inclusive and smart mobility solutions in Indian cities. The IGC led to the signing of 22 MoUs/Agreements/Joint Declaration of Intent on a variety of themes including the launch of a new annual Track 1.5 Strategic dialogue at Foreign Secretary/State Secretary level and cooperation, amongst others, in Artificial Intelligence, smart cities, skill development, start-ups, and scientific and technological research cooperation.

Indo-Pacific The German Indo-Pacific Guidelines (September 2020) sought to strategically expand cooperation in trade, investment and development, and strengthen political relations towards a more intense security cooperation. Berlin’s key interest in the region is the avoidance of unilateral dependencies, open sea routes and open markets as well as free trade with the region which constitutes 20% of its trade (e420 million in 2019) (Germany, Foreign Office, 2020: 9). The key German goal is a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Berlin does not endorse ‘containment and decoupling strategies’ and perceives the ‘ASEAN-centric security structure’ to be a valuable framework for involving key actors (Germany, Foreign Office, 2020: 11). In order to strengthen security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, the German guidelines seek to expand security and defence cooperation in the region through a variety of means, including strategic dialogues, staff meetings, training, port visits, maritime exercises in the region and other forms of maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific (Germany, Foreign Office, 2020: 36). Berlin has expressed its willingness to promote multilateral

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approaches and, above all, strengthen ASEAN in consolidating a multipolar region embedded within a multilateral, rules-based system (Maas, 2020: 3). The German guidelines criticized powers seeking to unilaterally alter the status quo and even referred to China as an emerging power that was ‘calling into question existing rules of the international order’, but also envisaged ‘the possibility of cooperation with China on issues like climate change’ (Duchatel & Mohan, 2020). Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy sought to engage with the region with ‘a functional, not a realist outlook’ and reflects greater German interest in the region without ‘directly confronting Beijing’ (G. Singh, 2020). New Delhi welcomed Germany’s Indo-Pacific guidelines and noted the ‘high degree of convergence’ between the two countries. India looks forward to working with Germany in advancing ‘practical cooperation’ in the Indo-Pacific (Shringla, 2020).

Perceptions and Misperceptions There are three dominant images of India in German literature, mass media and attitudes of the general public which have persisted till today amongst Germans despite the unlimited access to knowledge and information in the digital age. The oldest image—the romantic India image—has its origins towards the end of the eighteenth century. The negative images of India arose at the same time as the romantic India image. A modern, more contemporary and more positive image of India emerged most recently at the turn of the millennium. Since the end of the eighteenth century, German perceptions of India were strongly influenced by the idealistic view projected by German poets and thinkers. Building on older notions of the enlightened East, this image evolved as a result of the translation of Sanskrit works. Johann Gottfried Herder is generally recognized as the chief contributor of this imaginative, ‘mythical image’ of India (Wilson, 1955, 1964). This was not really about India but about how images of India were reflected in German Orientalist debates at various points in German history, including debates about German identity and ‘Germanness’ (Germana, 2009: 11– 12). The romantic India image was ‘omnipresent’ in the German public sphere in the 1960s, especially until 1989 in West Germany (Brandt, 2016: 98). This period was marked by self-introspection and self-criticism of their own societies and the quest for spirituality (Lütt, 1998: 40–42).

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This was also the period of the generation of the flower children and the hippies who were attracted to ashrams, meditation music, yoga and gurus like Rajneesh or Osho. This was followed by the growing popularity of Ayurveda, yoga and Bollywood movies, which were extremely popular amongst female viewers. Since the late 1950s, a ‘negative’ image of India was projected by various religious and humanitarian organizations as well as development agencies established at the time, whose main purpose was to provide relief and assistance. To that end, they projected India as being full of catastrophes, poverty, disease and hunger, of oppression and human rights abuses (Das, 2003: 40). Since the 2000s, a more positive, modern image of India emerged which perceived India as ‘an emerging economic powerhouse India with impressive growth rates; the IT superpower India whose Green Card holders are welcome in Germany; also, the nuclear Power India—a country that will be in the front row in a new world order’ (Sommer, 2005: 121). To a large extent, greater and serious economic reportage of emerging opportunities in reforming India helped remove many of the traditional cliches and stereotypes about India and generate positive images of great business opportunities. Germany’s reputation in India is ‘marked by German machines and cars, but football players in Formula One drivers, beer, bread and chocolate. This is not wrong, but not so multifaceted’ (Bastian, 2017: 118). There is widespread admiration for ‘Made in Germany’ products and symbol, which is ‘the synonym for the highest quality and cutting edge technology’ (Singh, M., 2006b: 1741–1742). Some misperceptions were perhaps unconsciously encouraged and cultivated amongst Europeans. Amongst them was that India was not an attractive partner because it was a pro-Communist country and politically a very uncertain entity (Dixit, 2019: 53). The Germans often felt that Indian public opinion did not fully understand West German integration with the Western alliance and India’s policy of non-alignment was sometimes not appreciated in West Germany largely because of differences in the geopolitical situation of the two countries (Scheel, 1970). The Indian public was aware of the division of Germany, but had very little knowledge of the actual character of East and West Germany (Voigt, 2008: 682). The different images and perceptions are largely the result of different geopolitical, socio-economic and cultural milieu that shapes one’s outlook

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and opinions. A basic reason for the limited knowledge that the people of the two countries have of each other is due to the fact that Germany and India are not a priority for each other in a multipolar world (Bastian, 2017: 118). The three images that have been discussed above can coexist simultaneously in different cross-sections of German society or a particular image may subsume the other two at particular points of time. In the ultimate analysis, ‘the question is not what we can see, but rather what we want to see... It depends on the viewer and his or her very personal motivations to highlight individually preferred aspects of India’ (Brandt, 2016: 101).

Economic and Trade Relations Rourkela has been Germany’s most significant industrial project in India. By the beginning of 1964, the Federal Government’s direct and indirect commitments to Rourkela had reached approximately DM1.8 billion, including refinancing credits, which was roughly comparable to the total West German capital assistance commitments to Africa (White, 1965: 19, 103). From 1951 to 1990, India had a consistent trade deficit with the Federal Republic of Germany. From a modest trade deficit of DM93.3 million in 1951, it grew tenfold to DM981.8 million in 1958, when West German exports were five times its imports from India. During the 1970s, trade increased from DM831.8 million and crossed DM2 billion in 1978 with India’s trade deficit being of DM506.6 million. Trade increased by more than 50% in 1981 to DM3.528 billion. New Delhi’s trade deficit was above DM1 billion throughout 1984–1988 and was at its highest in 1986 when it released nearly DM2 billion (DM1959.8 million). IndoGerman trade increased from DM5.241 billion in 19904 to DM8.607 billion in 1997, but declined in 1998 to DM8.101 billion. Indo-German trade during 2000–2001 amounted to US$3.667 billion with India having a small trade surplus of US$147.9 million. Bilateral trade increased from US$3.816 billion in 2001–2002 to US$4.511

4 Beilage zu Statistiche Beihilfe zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank, Reihe 3, Zahlungsbilanzstatistik, Nr. 4, April 1989, pp. 10–11; Statische Beihilfe zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank, Reihe 3, Zahlungsbilanzstatistik, Nr. 4, April 1992, pp. 10–11.

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Table 2.1 India-Germany trade, 2004–2005—2021–2022 (in million dollars) Year 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

Indian exports

Indian Imports

Total trade

Deficit

2,826.25 3,586.12 3,984.81 5,121.53 6,388.54 5,412.89 6,715.18 7,942.79 7,246.20 7,515.81 7,537.34 7,092.87 7,181.61 8,687.80 8,902.43 8,290.90 8,124.93 9,883.34

4,015.35 6,023.63 7,552.64 9,884.83 12,006.02 10,818.18 11,891.37 15,601.13 14,325.79 12,932.41 12,787.86 12,088.37 11,583.67 13,295.71 15,161.08 13,691.11 13, 643.02 14,968.10

6,841.60 9,609.75 11,537.45 15,006.36 18,394.56 16,231.07 18,606.55 23,543.92 21,571.99 20,448.22 20,325.20 19,181.24 18,765.28 21,983.51 24,063.51 21,982.01 21,767.95 24,851.43

−1,189.10 −2,437.51 −3,567.83 −4,763.30 −5,617.48 −5,405.29 −5,176.19 −7,658.34 −7,079.59 −5,416.60 −5,250.52 −4,995.50 −4,402.06 −4,607.91 −6,258.65 −5,400.21 −5,518.09 −5,084.76

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce. (2021). Trade statistics. Retrieved June 11, 2021 from https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/default.asp. https://tradestat. commerce.gov.in/eidb/iecnt.asp

billion in 2002–2003 and amounted to US$5.463 billion in 2003–2004 with Germany having a trade surplus of US$374 million (India, DIPP). Trade rose from US$6.842 billion in 2004–2005 to US$20.325 billion in 2014–2015 and US$24 billion in 2018–2019. Bilateral trade declined to US$21.98 billion in 2019–2020 and further declined to US$21.768 billion in 2020–2021. However, it increased to US$24.85 billion in 2021–2022. During these years, India had a consistent trade imbalance which was at its peak of US$6.26 billion in 2018–2019 (see Table 2.1).

Foreign Direct Investment Initially, German companies did not regard India as a country where safe investments could be made. During 1957–1958 to 1967–1968, private capital inflows were negligible or negative (Reserve Bank of India, 1969: 114–115). During 1979 and 1980, total West German investments in India amounted to DM170 million and DM205 million, respectively

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(Indo-German Economy, 1982: 20). West German FDI increased to DM244 million in 1981 and amounted to DM375 million in 1990. In 2000, German FDI in India was $86.39 million. This increased fourfold to $343 million in 2007 and doubled to $788.78 million 2008. German FDI in India declined marginally to $599.93 million in 2009 and increased nearly threefold to $1.484 billion in 2011, but declined to $729 million in 2012 and rose to $1.015 billion in 2013. During 2014– 2017, German FDI in India was above $1.1 billion. Thereafter, it declined to $732.16 million and $653.87 million in 2018 and 2019, respectively (India, DPITT, 2021: 2). Germany has been the ninth largest foreign direct investor in India. German FDI in India from April 2000 to June 2022 was US$13.68 billion, accounting for 2.26% of FDI into India (India, DPIIT, 2022). At present, there are about 1,600 Indo-German collaborations and about 600 joint ventures in operation. Indian investments in Germany are also estimated to be more than e6 billion. There are more than 215 Indian companies operating in Germany, mainly in the IT, automotives and pharma biotech sectors (India, MEA, 2016: 110–111).

Development Assistance German development assistance initially began in 1953 in the form of a small technical assistance programme primarily in the form of training in Germany. Until the 1960s, Germany was unwilling to provide bilateral aid to India and preferred to provide it mostly through multilateral agencies like the Aid India Consortium (established in 1958). Large-scale public West German assistance to New Delhi began only after the Indian government was on the brink of defaulting on its obligations to private West German firms for the Rourkela steel plant. During 1958–1990, Germany provided a total development assistance of DM13.3 billion comprising of financial assistance (including credits and grants of approximately DM11.1 billion, technical assistance of around DM0.8 billion, and eight from non-governmental agencies, churches, etc., amounting to DM1.4 billion (Inter Nationes, 1991: 2). In September 2000, the Federal Republic decided to resume development assistance to India, which had been frozen after the 1998 nuclear tests. Berlin announced DM100 million for 2001 with the aim

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to normalize development cooperation in a phased manner (TOI, 2000: 5). The annual development cooperation talks in October 2016 committed of e1 billion in development assistance.

Defence Cooperation and Arms Transfers During the 1950s, German engineers led by Dr. Kurt Tank along with Indian designers successfully designed the HF-24 Marut, a twin-engine supersonic fighter bomber. Ten days after China invaded India and in the light of the precarious foreign exchange situation, Finance Secretary Lakshmi Kant Jha on 1 November 1962 made the following requests to the FRG: (a) use of DM189 million out of the DM470 million financial aid agreement initialled on 4 August 1962; (b) an additional foreign exchange assistance of DM400 million ($100 million) on a purely non-commercial basis for a period of two years for weapons deliveries to India; and (c) assistance for 25,000 winter combat suits and associated sets of combat boots, woollen clothing, underwear, blankets, etc. (AAPbD, 1962a: 1898, footnote 6). Eventually, the combined Indian requests for arms and ammunition increased to DM500 million. The Foreign Office informed the Indian authorities through the German Embassy, New Delhi, that ‘pure arms deliveries are only possible on a commercial basis at Bundeswehr prices, but not against credit ’. Moreover, given the difficult German budgetary situation, delivery requests of about DM500 million against credit were ‘illusory’ (AAPbD, 1962b: 1902). To its surprise, the Foreign Office discovered in April 1963 that India had already been constantly procuring mortars, machines, and anti-tank weapons as well as ammunition from the Ministry of Defence, whose estimated value was between DM3.5 million (Haftendorn, 1971: 130) and around $8.8 million (SIPRI, 1971: 311). In the 1960s, the Federal Intelligence Service had a general travelling around the world offering second-hand arms without the knowledge of the Chancellery or the Foreign Office (Das Gupta, 2015). With the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan War in April 1965, both adversaries were secretly offered arms: India was meant to receive 28 decommissioned Seahawk submarine sub-sonic Hunter jets while Pakistan was promised and subsequently transferred 90 second-hand F-86 K Sabre fighter jets via Iran (see Jain, 2022). In June 1966, German authorities allowed

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Merex GmbH to sell the planes to Tirenna AG, an Italian company based in Rome (AAPbD, 1969: 355, footnote 6; Der Spiegel, 1967: 20–23). Merex leased a cargo ship, Billetal, which sailed from the tiny German port of Nordenham, passed through Italian territorial waters, sailed through the Suez Canal and landed in India (Gervasi, 1981: 50– 51 cited in Feinstein, 2011: 24). These were reportedly sold for DM3.5 million as well as aircraft cells, jet turbines and on-board cannons for an additional DM750,000 (Der Spiegel, 1974). After extensive negotiations, on 11 December 1981, the Indian Government signed a contract with Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft and AEG-T for the purchase of two submarines and material packages for another two submarines to be constructed in India. The German shipyard had set up production facilities and provide the whole range of tooling for the manufacture of the sophisticated submarines. The first of the two submarines (named by the Navy INS Sishkumar and INS Shakunth) were commissioned in Kiel in September 1986 and arrived in Bombay in February 1987. The other two were to be constructed at the Mazagaon Docks and were likely to be ready in 1991. The first Indian-built submarine was not launched until 1989, having taken more than twice as long and cost twice as much as each German-built boat (Yule & Woolner, 2008: 321).

Defence Cooperation Agreement, 2006 India and Germany signed a short Defence Cooperation Agreement on 6 September 2006 consisting of eight articles (text in Bhasin, 2007: 1753–1755). It established a High Defence Committee (HDC) and four sub-groups focusing on ‘Strategic Defence Cooperation’, ‘Defence Technical Cooperation’ and ‘Military-to-Military Cooperation’. The HDC was to conduct ‘a strategic dialogue’ at the level of Defence Secretary/State Secretary, German MoD regarding ‘the strategic situation and current defence policy matters’ (Article 2). The HDC, which met annually (2007–2012), then more or less biennially (2014, 2016, 2019 (virtually), ensures ‘a regular strategic dialogue’ and approves programmes which entail ‘about 30–40 projects per year’ (Germany, Embassy in India, 2021). New Delhi’s efforts seek to make it more attractive for German companies to come and invest in India as part of the Make in India programme.

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The 2006 defence agreement was followed in 30 October 2007 with an agreement on ‘Mutual Protection of Classified Information’. The 2006 defence agreement failed to live up to expectations of facilitating a significant increase in defence cooperation or arms sales since France’s Rafale was awarded the contract for the $10 billion MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) tender. The Germans encountered difficulties in entering the lucrative Indian arms market partly because the French offers tended to be comparatively more attractive comprehensive package deals even though the German product was superior. Limited arms sales to India were also the direct result of a restrictive arms exports policy. Moreover, since India did not have a status equal to that of the EU Member State or NATO partner, ‘the bar to increased exports was higher’. Reduced German arms exports to India were the result of German companies having difficulty in connecting with Indian decision-makers as well as difficulties in being able to connect between the military-to-military and MoD to MoD.5

German Arms Transfers to India The first major defence platform that India acquired from the Federal Republic in the 1980s is Type-209/1500 submarines. Two of these, as stated earlier, were built in Germany and the other two were assembled in India from kits. Germany had also supplied 14 Dornier Do-228 light transport aircraft on maritime reconnaissance aircraft in a $280 million deal. These were later manufactured under German license by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Since then, the FRG has not supplied any major, high-value weapons platforms to India. German exports have largely been of parts and components for armoured vehicles and ships, especially submarines as well as ammunition and in some cases small arms and light weapons. Germany supplied 14 MAN 28/33 diesel engines installed in seven Project-17A frigates produced in India and for the production of anti-submarine corvettes being built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers in Kolkata. The Germans had also supplied diesel engines for six French Scorpene submarines, the first of which was delivered only in 2017 though the contract was signed in 2005; the remaining being delivered by 5 Interview with a senior official of the German Ministry of Defence, Berlin, 18 May 2018.

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2021–2022. They also supplied diesel engines for offshore patrol vessels being manufactured in India. Since 1990, German companies have been involved in the constant upgradation of the HDW submarines and the integration of technological enhancements like torpedo launching tubes. New Delhi has placed repeat orders for sonars, torpedoes and a variety of components for the submarines and other naval vessels.6 In terms of value, German arms exports were rather modest. There were e32.4 million in 1999 and 2000 and were a nominal e5.8 million in 2001. Thereafter, during 2002–2019, except for four years (2003, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2014), German arms exports have been in the region of e100 million or thereabouts. In 2020, German arms exports to India amounted to e48.56 million, which declined to e32.99 million in 2021 (see Table 2.2). Defence Enhanced Industrial Cooperation Agreement, 2019 The 2006 umbrella defence cooperation agreement and the 2007 agreement on classified information laid the foundation of the ‘Agreement on Enhanced Defence Industrial Cooperation’, which was ready in 2018 but was signed in February 2019 when Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman visited Germany. The idea of such an agreement was originally proposed by the Germans in 2016 after the Germans had lost out on several major contracts for submarines, choppers and MMRCA fighter aircraft. In November 2019, the two countries agreed to conduct a ‘regular dialogue’ between the Defence Ministers of the two countries, alternately in India and in Germany, at least once every two years. This would prove useful in ironing out wrinkles that may emerge at the level of officials in defence negotiations. Defence ministers’ meetings have not yet taken place so far because of the Covid-19 pandemic. The 2019 defence industrial cooperation agreement is the beginning of a process which should in principle facilitate things and persuade the Germans psychologically more positively and proactively engage in future defence deals. The agreement to hold a meeting of defence ministers of the two countries once every two years is also a very significant development because it completes the institutional edifice of defence cooperation. Joint development of weapon systems is still far off. ‘With India, we are

6 Interview with senior official of the Indian Embassy, Berlin, May 2018.

Parts for warships Parts for helicopters Parts for submarines, frigates, sonar systems and echo sounder system Anti-tank weapon manufacturing equipment and ballistic measuring systems Parts for magnetic self-protection systems, communication devices, torpedo simulator, torpedo assembly system Parts for helicopters Parts for tanks Hull penetrations, underwater locating devices, parts for submarines NBC protective clothing, construction blueprints for NBC protective ventilation system Gyroscopes for sea gravimeters, parts for radio equipment, at that the recording equipment and torpedo test stands Fire control systems for submarines and on-board of weapon control systems Underwater locators, parts for frigates and submarines Tractor units, engines and transmissions Parts for tanks and mine clearance equipment Manufacturing equipment for anti-tank missiles, gearboxes and helicopter parts Parts for multipurpose helicopters Marine NBC protective ventilation systems, carbon protective clothing, parts for C-measuring equipment Fire control systems, weapon control systems, test and adjustment equipment and parts for fire systems, weapon control and target monitoring systems Parts for tanks and armoured vehicles Guidance and navigation equipment and parts for submarines, underwater locating devices, guidance and navigation equipment Ring laser gyro systems, sensors for guided missile warning systems, that a processing equipment, static converters, electronic equipment, measuring and testing equipment, components, assemblies and parts of positioning and navigation systems, equipment for electronic reconnaissance, protective and countermeasures, measuring and test equipment, transmitting and receiving systems, that a processing equipment and electronic equipment

1999

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

Goods/per cent of total value

German arms exports to India, 1999–2021 (in million euros)

Year

Table 2.2

21.9

41.5 5.3

53.0 21.3 12.3 58.2 11.3 9.6 7.6 42.9

83.3 7.0 39.4 26.9 12.4 3.0 29.7 27.2 16.9 13.1

%

50.85

103.0

40.09

106.08

5.8

32.4

32.4

Total value

48 R. K. JAIN

2009

2008

2007

2006

Year

Command and weapon deployment systems, cable connectors and parts for combat ships, mine combat modes, submarines sonar systems, echo sounders, command and weapon deployment systems steering and navigation equipment On-board weapon control systems, laser warning receivers, test and adjustment equipment and parts for fire control systems, target monitoring and target tracking systems Parts for military aircraft, helicopters, engines and on-board equipment Parts for torpedoes Parts for tanks, trucks and tractors Submarine tube system and parts for fire control systems, on-board weapon control systems, fire control systems and maritime test systems Parts for tanks, armoured vehicles and trucks Sonar and guidance systems, echo sounding systems, sonar alarm transmitters and parts for submarines, destroyers, minesweepers, sonar and early warning systems, underwater location devices and sonar alarm transmitters Parts for fire control equipment, on-board weapon control systems and fire control systems Submarine periscope systems, test equipment, adjustment equipment and parts of fire control systems, on-board weapon control systems, target acquisition systems, target range measurement systems and target monitoring systems Echo-sounder systems, hull penetrations and parts for frigates, corvettes, submarines, combat ships, command systems and eco-sounder systems Communication equipment, navigation equipment, test equipment, cathode ray tubes and parts for electronic equipment, positioning equipment, navigation equipment and steering equipment Parts for combat aircraft, helicopters, training aircraft, on-board equipment and engines Parts for tanks and land vehicles Laser range finders, sniper detection systems, testing and adjustment equipment and parts of fire control systems, weapon aiming devices, gun aiming devices, on-board weapon control systems, target distance measuring systems and target tracking systems Production drawings (blueprints) for parts of small arms, production documents for warheads, cables, chain parts, vehicle parts, communication system parts, spectrometer parts, technology documents for underwater vehicles, torpedo parts, guidance system parts, sonar equipment, aircraft parts, simulator parts

Goods/per cent of total value

67.92

51.87

89.98

107.86

Total value

INDIA AND GERMANY

(continued)

13.4

4.2 21.0 18.3

9.5

23.6

7.4 46.2

38.3 36.4

9.9 6.9 49.9 15.3

14.7

14.9

%

2

49

2012

2011

2010

Year 9.9 8.1

Image intensification equipment and parts of thermal imaging devices Hull penetrations and parts for submarines, landing ships, mine-hunting boats, ships, diesel engines, underwater location devices Target range measurement systems, fire control systems, testing and adjustment equipment and parts of fire and parts of fire control equipment, on-board weapon control systems and location detection identification device Parts for tanks, armoured vehicles and land vehicles Underwater location devices, hull penetrations and parts for submarines, destroyers, landing ships, radar systems, patrol boats, ships and underwater tracking devices Magnetic self-protection system, communication equipment, navigation equipment, steering equipment, test equipment, cathode ray tube and electronic equipment parts, communication equipment, location equipment, navigation equipment, steering equipment and control equipment Manufacturing equipment and maintenance equipment for engine parts, ammunition parts, armoured parts, handgun parts and aircraft parts Missile detection systems and parts for torpedoes, missiles and missile defence systems Parts for tanks, armoured vehicles, trucks and land vehicles Technology for armoured parts, ship parts, electronic parts and documents for weapon parts, radar system parts, target system parts, aircraft parts, hunting weapons, vehicle parts, test stands and detection equipment Sonar systems, hull penetrations and parts for submarines, frigates, minesweepers, ships and tracking devices Rifles with KWL number, submachine guns, revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, sport rifles, sports pistols, silencers, weapon sights and parts for rifles with KWL number, submachine guns, revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, sport rifles and sports pistols Communication equipment, navigation equipment, measuring equipment, cathode ray tubes, power supplies and parts for electronic equipment, communication equipment, helmet displays, navigation equipment, assemblies and power supplies Laser rangefinder, sniper locating systems, measuring and testing devices for periscope systems and parts for fire control systems, gun control systems and target rangefinder systems 15.7

17.3

23.1 20.9

29.0 25.7 15.1

10.8

11.0

20.9 14.8

22.7

%

(continued)

Goods/per cent of total value

Table 2.2

97.19

90.06

96.86

Total value

50 R. K. JAIN

2015

2014

2013

Year 6.9

Data for printed circuit boards, technology for handgun parts, ammunition parts, missile parts, land vehicle parts, sonar system parts, aircraft parts, electronic parts, vehicle protection parts, camera parts, thermal imaging equipment, weapon target parts, ion mobility spectrometer parts, technical documentation, radar parts, periscope parts, navigation equipment, training documents and databases Torpedoes and parts for torpedoes, missiles and launch systems Technology for border security systems, surveillance system parts, technical documents for handgun parts, fuse parts, launcher parts, barrel weapon straightener parts, circuit boards, navigation parts, land vehicle parts, marine parts, aviation parts, electronic parts, test bench parts and databases Target range measurement systems, test equipment, adjustment equipment and parts of fire control systems, on-board weapon control systems, target range measurement systems and target location devices Communication equipment, navigation equipment, components, control elements and parts for electronic equipment, communication equipment, location equipment, steering equipment, navigation equipment, test equipment, control equipment and power supplies Sonar alarm transmitters, shock absorbers, hull penetrations and parts for submarines, frigates, minesweepers, ships and underwater location devices Underwater location devices, hull penetrations and parts for submarines, corvettes, ships, minesweepers and underwater location devices Engines and parts for attack helicopters, training aircraft, helicopters and engines Night vision devices and parts for reconnaissance systems Cathode ray tubes, travelling wave tubes and parts for communication equipment, location equipment, navigation equipment and steering equipment Diesel power generators and parts thereof Fire control systems and parts thereof, adjustment equipment, on-board weapon control systems and target range measurement systems Underwater location devices, hull penetrations arts of submarines, aircraft carriers, frigates, combat ships, transport ships, ships and underwater location devices Ammunition for hunting weapons, sporting weapons revolvers, pistols, shotguns and parts for howitzer ammunition Target range measurement systems, test equipment and parts of fire control systems, on-board weapon control systems, target assignment systems, target monitoring systems and test equipment

153.65

21.26

107.77

Total value

INDIA AND GERMANY

(continued)

12.8

32.1

35.4

7.3 6.2

16.7 15.5 11.5

27.8

5.0

5.5

7.0

46.3 20.8

%

Goods/per cent of total value

2

51

Hull penetrations and parts for submarines, combat ships, frigates, patrol boats, ships, underwater location and location devices Border security system technology, gun part technical documentation, ammunition part technology, warning equipment technology, land vehicle part technology, marine equipment technology, aircraft equipment technology and electronic part technology Parts for main battle tanks, armoured vehicles and canon mounts Communication equipment, measuring equipment, test equipment, travelling wave tubes, cathode ray tubes, navigation equipment and parts for head-up displays, communication equipment, signal analysis equipment, broadband direction finders, measuring equipment, test equipment, installation location equipment, a navigation equipment and steering equipment Parts for torpedoes, missiles, firing equipment and test equipment Parts for image intensification equipment and infrared equipment Submarine diesel engines, hull penetrations, and parts for submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers, combat ships, submarine electric motors and underwater location devices Parts for main battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers, armoured vehicles and trucks Target range measurement systems, test equipment and parts for fire control systems, on-board weapon control systems, target acquisition systems and radar systems Submachine guns, revolvers, hunting rifles, sport rifles, self-loading shotguns, sports pistols, sport revolvers, magazines, weapon sights and parts of machine pistols, machine guns, sniper rifles, revolvers and sports pistols Hull penetrations and parts of submarines, frigates, destroyers, patrol boats, combat ships, ships’ underwater location devices and control devices for location devices Military equipment technology Pigment dispersion for tent goods, flame retardants for camouflage nets, fuel cell systems and parts for fuel cell systems Parts for combat aircraft, attack helicopters, aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, engines and on-board equipment Parts for battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers, armoured vehicles and land vehicles Parts for torpedoes, missiles, firing equipment, torpedo defence systems and missile defence systems for aircraft

2016

2019

2018

2017

Goods/per cent of total value

(continued)

Year

Table 2.2

6.2 53.7

6.4

11.9 9.2

52.5

5.8

30.3 11.4

3.9 3.8 36.5

4.5 4.2

13.0

54.0

%

92.9

96.76

131.10

104.685

Total value

52 R. K. JAIN

Target range measurement systems, test equipment and parts for fire control systems, weapon aiming devices, on-board weapon control systems, target assignment systems, target range measurement systems, target monitoring systems and submarine periscopes Parts for combat aircraft, attack helicopters, aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, engines and on-board equipment Underwater location devices, hull penetrations and parts for submarines, combat ships, frigates, utilities, submarine diesel engines and underwater location devices Target ranging systems, testing equipment and parts for fire control systems, shipboard weapons control systems, target ranging systems, target surveillance systems and radar equipment (Military List 5) Underwater detection devices, hull penetrations and parts for submarines, battleships, ships, underwater detection devices and hull penetrations (Military List 9) Communication equipment, travelling wave tubes, cathode ray tubes, navigation equipment and parts for communication equipment, equipment for electronic warfare assemblies, locating equipment, navigation equipment, steering equipment, power supplies and encryption equipment (Military List 11) Parts for battle tanks, armoured vehicles, trucks and land vehicles (Military List 6) Forgings and work in progress (Military List 16) Target ranging systems and parts for fire control systems, shipboard weapon control systems, target detection systems, target assignment systems, target monitoring systems and locating devices (Military List 5) Hull penetrations and parts for submarines, battleships, ships and underwater detection devices (Military List 9) Software for military equipment (A0021/10.3%) Decoy and parts for rockets, launch equipment, missile defence systems for aircraft (Military List 4) Technology for military equipment (Military List 22) Parts for combat aircraft, airplanes, helicopters and ground equipment (Military List 10) Communication equipment, encryption equipment and parts for electronic equipment, communications equipment, travelling wave tubes, location equipment, navigation equipment and steering equipment (Military List 11/4.6%) Total

Goods/per cent of total value

10.3 8.5 5.6

12.8

7.4 17.2 13.7

17.7

28.5

28.6

5.5

7.6

14.9

%

1762.032

32.986

48.561

Total value

Source Germany, Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Rüstungsexportberichte der Bundesregierung 1999–2019, at http://www.bmwi.de; Details provided in https://www.waffenexporte.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2021-09-11-GPD-Indien-%C3%9Cbersicht-Waffenexporte-nach-Indien.pdf (accessed 5 December 2019); Germany, Ministry of Economy and Energy, Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2020, Rüstungsexportbericht 2020 (Berlin, June 2021), p. 117; Rüstungsexportbericht 2021 (Berlin, August 2022), p. 121

2021

2020

Year

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54

R. K. JAIN

still at the phase where we need to connect the people rather than to list 10 joint projects’.7 Only a gradual building of confidence and trust will eventually lead to joint research projects and joint development.

Conclusion In the second half of the twentieth century, India and Germany were on opposite sides during the Cold War. Political relations during the Cold War remained ‘tenuous and pinched by mistrust’ (Sommer, 2017: 80). They had ‘oscillated between cooperation and confrontation’ (Das Gupta, 2009: 164). Both Adenauer and Nehru ‘lived on different planets. It was inevitable that the coolness at the highest level was also otherwise noticeable’ (Bode, 1964, cited in Das Gupta, 2004: 316). From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, Indo-German relations were marked by benign neglect in which India’s economic stagnation, Germany’s reduced official development assistance and Chancellor Schmidt’s greater interest in forging closer ties with China than India led to a dwindling of relations between the two countries. In the early 1970s, Indo-German relations had developed so far ‘without problems and without tensions’ with the primary focus being on economic cooperation. Political relations however were described as ‘good’, but without substance’. The relationship with India was generally said to be the result of ‘a certain German over-engagement’ in the political, economic and cultural spheres (AAPbD, 1972b: 522–523). For five decades, Indo-German relations have been close and friendly. India has been a major recipient of German development aid and the Federal Republic is India’s third most important trading partner. The Indo-German relationship has essentially been an economic one with a generally good, but never intense political dialogue. There have never been any direct conflicting political or strategic interests between the two countries. After ‘a phase of stagnation’ in the 1970s and early 1980s, India’s relations with Germany were ‘revived and invigorated’ as a result of Helmut Kohl’s visits to Delhi in 1983 and 1986, the economic opening under Rajiv Gandhi and later by the end of the Cold War (Germany, Embassy in India, 1994: 1). Despite Germany’s growing interaction with regional 7 Interview with a senior official of the German Ministry of Defence, Berlin, 18 May 2018.

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influential since the 1990s, they tend to remain largely peripheral to German economic and political interests since the foreign policy priorities of the Federal Republic of Germany have all along been Eurocentric and transatlantic. As India and Germany mark the 70 years of establishment of diplomatic relations, the commentariat feels that even after two decades of a strategic partnership there is a lack of ‘the momentum to leap forward’ (G. Singh, 2021). Policy-makers in both countries ‘frequently scratch their heads as to why this relationship falls short of the high expectations that are associated with it’ (Narlikar, 2021). To many observers, India and Germany are ‘like, chalk and cheese, naan and wiener, speaking different languages on different continents with few shared interests’. On a number of occasions, the trajectories have intersected (Raja Mohan & Ani, 2017: 100). There are, according to one observer, three structural obstacles to Indo-German relations—different threat perceptions and priorities, strategic divergences because of the two countries’ existing security alignments, and the relationship often suffers from mismatched capabilities—which suggest a modest future for bilateral strategic relations (Jaishankar, 2017: 72–74). The India-German relationship is a complex, incrementally increasing relationship with more overlapping than conflicting interests. Sustained political engagement and diplomacy has led to tangible results over a period of time with many small steps making a contribution. IndoGerman relations are certainly not on “auto-pilot”; everything that is achieved is the result of a continuous process of engagement and regular dialogue. Bilateral relations are on a steady course. Relations have not plateaued. The Indo-German relations is a relationship that will be built incrementally.

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Siebert, G. (1998, June 2). Statement by German Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. German Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (Mimeographed). Singh, G. (2020, October 1). Germany takes view of the Indo-Pacific. Raisina Debates. Retrieved February 4, 2021 from https://www.orfonline.org/exp ert-speak/germany-takes-view-indo-pacific/ Singh, G. (2021, May 27). India-Germany at 70: Four big ideas. Atlantic Files (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation). Retrieved June 11, 2021 from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-germany-at-70four-big-ideas/ Singh, M. (2006a, April 23). Address by Prime Minister at the inauguration of the Hannover Trade Fair. In A. S. Bhasin (Ed.), Indian foreign policy, Documents 2006. Geetika. Singh, M. (2006b, April 23). India-Germany joint statement. Retrieved June 11, 2021 from https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details. php?nodeid=308 SIPRI. (1971). Arms trade and the third world. Almquist and Wiksell. Sommer, T. (2005). The emerging power on the subcontinent. In FICCI, India & Germany shaping the future, commemorative volume celebrates the first contact establishment of Indian Germany 500 years ago (1505–2005) (pp. 121–129). Sommer, T. (2017). Vision Germany—India. In G. Singh (Ed.), Opportunity beckons: Adding momentum to the Indo-German Partnership (p. 80). Rupa. The Hindu. (1999, June 22). Pak. Bid to change status quo on LoC irresponsible. TOI. (2000, September 28). Germany resumes aid to India, $45 m. for 2001. Voigt, J. H. (2008). Die Indienpolitik der DDR, Von den Anfaengen bis zur Anerkennung (1952–1972). Boehlau. Westerwelle, G. (2012, June 13). ‘Asia’s new transformative powers’. Statement by Foreign Minister to the CDU/CSU Congress, Berlin. Cited in Heiduk, G. (2015). What is in a name? Germany’s strategic partnerships with Asia’s rising powers. Asia Europe Journal, 13(2), 131–146. White, J. (1965). German aid. Overseas Development Institute. Wikileaks. (1974, May 25). Indian nuclear testing, non-proliferation FRG wish to coordinate policy. Retrieved April 5, 2018 from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/1974STATE110850_b_html Willson, A. L. (1955, December). Herder and India: The genesis of a mythical image. PMLA, 70(5), 1049–1058. Wilson, A. L. (1964). A mythical image of India: The ideal of India in German romanticism. Duke University Press. Yule, P., & Woolner, D. (2008). The Collins class submarine story: Steel, spies, spin. Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Between Brexit and Boris: The New Dynamic in Indo-UK Relations Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

Introduction Brexit made the United Kingdom look more seriously towards India, initially as a trade and investment destination but laterally as a strategic partner. Boris Johnson’s prime ministership was particularly aggressive in seeking a new approach to India. This was in part because of its determination to distance the UK from the European Union but also because he sought to align the UK strategically with the United States, including in taking a more hostile approach towards China which automatically led to greater convergence with India. The new relations were helped by the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi that in its later years had resumed interest in a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA), moved dramatically closer to the US regarding the security threat posed by China and begun to see international partnerships on critical technologies as crucial to India’s economic

P. Pal Chaudhuri (B) Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_3

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rise. The last element, reflected in a bilateral roadmap on pharmaceutical and medical technology, provided a new and potentially game-changing element to the bilateral relationship.

Before Brexit In the decades before the Brexit vote, the UK had allowed its historical and cultural relations with India to atrophy. This was a direct consequence of Britain’s joining the European Union and a deliberate British shift of interest away from the Commonwealth states towards the rest of Europe. In the economic relationship, between 2000 and 2016, trade between the EU and India grew 300%, while UK-India trade figures remained largely static. Germany is India’s largest trading partner in Europe, far surpassing the UK. Bilateral trade stood at about $50 billion in 2021 of which $15 billion was goods, the rest being services. British goods exports represented only 1.1% of India’s total goods imports while the share of the services sector was three times that number. In comparison, German trade with India in goods alone was $22 billion the same year. UK-India investment is a more vibrant connection, but much of this was because of Indian corporate preferences and a legacy of the colonial economic relationship. India’s outward investment flows have shown a strong preference for English-speaking destinations—the common AngloSaxon legal system may have been as much an attraction as the language. This is most striking in the case of the UK. Indian direct investment in the UK, with the combined Indian firms generating revenues of over £50 billion, is greater than Indian investment in the rest of Europe combined (India, High Commission in London, 2022). The UK was cumulatively the single largest source of FDI into India up to at least 2017. If one removes capital flows from tax havens like Singapore, Mauritius and The Netherlands, by June 2022 the cumulative FDI from the UK was well behind the United States and had been overtaken by Japan. The United Kingdom was the direct source of only 5% of India’s total FDI though it is likely that a fair portion of the investment from the tax havens is of British origin. In 2021–2022, India received US$1,647 million as FDI from the UK. Cumulatively from 2000 to June 2022, India received US$32,181 million FDI from the UK (India,

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DPIIT, 2022: 2). The discrepancy between the trade1 and investment relationship indicates that India and the UK lack supply chain linkages, a sign that the two economies remain remarkably unintegrated despite a long-shared history (Pal Chaudhuri, 2011). Immigration, once a strong bond, began declining soon after the UK joined the European Community and reduced migration flows from the Commonwealth, the association of largely ex-British colonies of which India is the largest member. Britain saw about 70,000 migrants a year from the Commonwealth through the 1970s, mostly from India. Restrictions imposed afterwards saw Indian migration fall to 18,000 a year by the early 1980s. By the 1990s, less than 5,000 annually were becoming British citizens. The hunt for tech workers and highly skilled migrants in the 2000s pushed the figure up again, but the numbers kept below 20,000 a year. Obligated by treaty, the UK left its borders open to other EU citizens. Since the original EU member states were of comparable economic wealth, this did not mean much. When the EU included the poorer countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, this changed. Between 2004 and 2009, some 1.5 million EU citizens migrated to the UK. These EU migrants, epitomised by negative British memes about the ‘Polish plumber’, combined with the global financial crisis laid the basis for the rise of the anti-EU UK Independence Party which, in turn, forced Prime Minister David Cameron to promise a referendum on the UK continuing as a member of the EU. Indians are the second largest migrant population in the UK, but inflows of new full-fledged migrants peaked in 2007 and a few years back were overtaken by Polish migrants in absolute numbers (see Financial Times, 2015 on Indian migration to the UK). While the numbers of Indians being issued UK visas, whether as tourists, students or temporary workers, remained impressive, the paths by which such migrants could become UK citizens were increasingly limited—as was the case with all Commonwealth countries. Strategic relations in the pre-Brexit years were weak, largely because there was little UK military presence in Asia. In the South Asia region, the primary Western foreign power is the United States and the primary 1 On India-UK trade, see Demertzis and Ruth (2017); on UK and India investment, see United Kingdom (2017). For a comprehensive survey of the UK-India economic relationship, see Financial Times (2015) and Heald (2017).

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European strategic player France. When the presidents of the European Commission and European Council visited New Delhi in October 2017, India’s senior-most diplomat assured them that the only reason the London mattered to New Delhi was the large size of the Indian diaspora and the fact Britain had a veto in the United Nations Security Council.2

Anglosphere Delusions A number of the nativist British politicians and intellectuals who supported Brexit put forward the theory of an ‘Anglosphere’ foreign policy for their country as an alternative to the EU. A smaller number of them incorporated India in this thesis (Davis, 2018; Nalapat, 2011). The more practical argued for the revival of the Commonwealth or simply a set of FTAs with the United States, China, India and other major non-European economic partners. However, there is no evidence that the Indian government saw any of these culture-based worldviews as converging with its own hard-nosed strategic interests. As Indian views of British colonial rule range from ambiguous to strongly negative, there was little sense of cultural affiliation with the English-speaking world. The last Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh summarized what most educated Indians would see as the positive consequences of British rule in a speech at Oxford University in 2005. After noting the economic depredations of colonialism, Singh added that it was now possible for an Indian Prime Minister to assert that India’s experience with Britain had its beneficial consequences too. Our notions of the rule of law, of a constitutional government, of a free press, of a professional civil service, of modern universities and research laboratories have all been fashioned in the crucible where an age-old civilization of India met the dominant Empire of the day. … Our judiciary, our legal system, our bureaucracy and our police are all great institutions, derived from British-Indian administration and they have served our country exceedingly well. (Singh, 2005)

However, he made no mention of this leading to a common world view or lending itself to a convergence of foreign policies.

2 Private conversations with Indian and EU diplomats in December 2017.

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As far as the idea of an English-speaking strategic community is concerned, Indian foreign policy has been marked by alignments dictated by its interpretation of Asian geopolitics. India has paid almost no attention to whether the countries it is close to are influenced by British culture, by Anglo-Saxon political practices or an affinity to the English language. At least two of India’s closest international friends, the Soviet Union in the past and Japan today, are more important to New Delhi’s foreign and security policy than the UK, Canada and Australia. India remained politically close to the UK in the first few years after independence in 1947, largely out of legacy issues in the realm of defence and because New Delhi took a few years to understand the consequences of the Cold War and formulate a more independent foreign policy (Manu, 2012). From the late 1950s until today, New Delhi has looked either to Moscow or Washington, and their respective stances towards Beijing and contribution to its economic growth, to determine its most basic foreign policy alignments. In the past several years, it is US allies like Japan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates which have emerged as India’s primary strategic partners.

The Brexit Vote The Indian government saw the British decision to vote to leave the EU as a negative development. New Delhi had been comfortable with the status quo, despite its overall scepticism regarding the EU as a strategic player and unhappiness with British immigration policies. The potential benefits of Brexit, whether in immigration or trade, were theoretical and far outweighed by the comfortable relationship that already existed. At the economic level, the vote was seen as disastrous. India had become among the largest foreign direct investors in the United Kingdom, especially in the manufacturing sector. Indian companies preferred to use the UK as the gateway to access the larger European market. New Delhi saw the vote as weakening the economies of both the UK and the EU, two of its most important economic partners.3 At the strategic level, Brexit was seen as undermining the influence and strength of Europe as a whole, contributing to already high levels

3 Private conversations with Indian diplomats at the Indian High Commission to the UK, London, November 2018.

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of global instability and, insofar as it weakened the West-centred international order, helping China increase its international clout. A forerunner to the Brexit vote had been the abortive referendum on Scottish independence in 2014. The then Indian foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj, when asked about her opinion had expressed surprise and shock, saying ‘God forbid!’ She quickly took the more diplomatic stance that it was a domestic British issue and India had no opinion (Ghosh, 2014). The official Indian view on Brexit was a similar position of neutrality. It was explicitly stated in a starred question response in the Indian Parliament in January 2019. The Indian MEA stated, ‘India took no position on Brexit, for or against. It also made no attempt to influence the referendum or its aftermath in any way.’ The Brexit process, it stressed, ‘is essentially an issue that concerns the UK government and the European Union. However, the government of India is closely following the Brexit process’ (Swaraj, 2019). Whatever evidence that exists indicates that the large Indian-origin community in the United Kingdom was divided during the Brexit vote. The community, reflecting presumably the many decades of its existence in the UK, largely follows the voting trends of other Britons in their respective classes. Working-class Indians, for example, joined many of their white working-class brethren to vote in favour of leaving the EU. Their white-collar compatriots did exactly the opposite. There were a few prominent exceptions to the rule. For ideological reasons, two Conservative parliamentarians and later home secretary and prime minister, Priti Patel and Rishi Sunak, voted in favour of Brexit and became the most high-profile Indian-origin voices in favour of Brexit. The Indian Workers’ Association also voted for ‘leave’ as did some less welloff and more recent Indian immigrants because of resentment against official favouritism granted to EU immigrants (Duttagupta et al., 2016). But there is no evidence that these community viewpoints were in anyway influenced by New Delhi or vice versa.

Half-Hearted May The prospect of the UK leaving the EU increased London’s interest in closer relations with India. Brexit supporters argued that the British economy would prosper after severing its umbilical cord with the EU because it would be free to expand its economic relationships with the US, China, India and other large economies. This was laid out by the

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then UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech to the Conservative Party in October 2016 where she lists India among several other countries that the UK would seek to sign free trade agreements to compensate for the loss of access to the EU market (May, 2016). There were four elements to this initial attempt at developing a new post-Brexit India-UK relationship. The first was in the area of bilateral trade and investment, building on already strong relations. British officials cited studies indicating the existence of a ‘Commonwealth advantage’ that countries within the Commonwealth experience 19% cheaper trade costs (The Commonwealth, 2016a). But it is an advantage India also has with the United States and other imperial offshoots who are not Commonwealth members and may be more connected to linguistic and legal convergences. May visited the US, China and India in 2017 seemingly to signal to Brussels that London had trading partners other than the EU. If so, the message fell flat. India, as with all these countries, made it clear it would not be in a hurry to sign on the dotted line. New Delhi declined to consider a fast-tracked free trade agreement with the UK, preferring to wait for the terms of Brexit to be clarified (Business Standard, 2016). New Delhi, in any case, had become increasingly sceptical of the benefits of bilateral trade agreements in general, especially those without a strong service and immigration component. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his officials made it clear that a post-Brexit IndiaUK agreement would require the UK to open wider the door for Indian immigrants—something which May said was politically impossible for her (Rothwell, 2017; Safi, 2016). A Joint Working Group set up by both countries to explore a post-Brexit economic future initially foundered on the immigration issues (Khanna, 2017). As one Indian analyst said of her visit to India, ‘The visit did not result in a remarkable achievement, particularly on the immigration policy front. In fact, it appeared that in terms of the policy of immigration, Prime Minister May has prioritised her political survival, instead of economic interests’ (Suroor, 2022). These obstacles, plus India’s reputation for moving slowly on trade agreements, led the UK government to admit in early 2019 that India was not ‘a first-tier country’ for a post-Brexit trade agreement and ‘a lot more work would be required before Britain can start negotiating such a deal with India’ (Field, 2019).

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Second, London pressed India to consider investing more time and money in the Commonwealth. A post-Brexit UK’s interest in reviving the Commonwealth is self-evident. However, it is an institution New Delhi has long treated as largely symbolic, though its expulsion clause against non-democracies was seen as a useful if mild instrument with which to berate Pakistan and other South Asian countries regressing into military or one-party rule. A small group of Indian officials argue that the Commonwealth may be useful as India begins to expand its influence in Africa and the South Pacific, parts of the globe which take the Commonwealth seriously, but their views are not yet reflected in official policy. Even if they were, this school argued for India to move to supplant the UK as the dominant player in the Commonwealth and use the organization for Indian interests4 (Sonwalkar, 2018; The Commonwealth, 2016a, 2016b, 2017). Third, the UK’s primary interest at the time was to try and sell London as an overseas financial hub for India’s rising need for external investment and capital. The idea, laid out in visits by the then UK Chancellor, Philip Hammond, would be for the City of London to de-risk investments by investors like sovereign wealth funds and pension funds who are nervous about putting money for the long term in India. Hammond argued that ‘The UK is perfectly placed to be India’s financial partner of choice, helping it to raise the finance needed for its continued rapid growth.’ The slow but steady increase in sales in the London market of rupeedenominated masala bonds, of which 80% are raised in the UK, were seen an indication of what might be (see Economic Times, 2018a; UK, Treasury, Department of International Trade, 2017; Venkatesan, 2017).

Changing Strategic India What Britain struggled to sell was the fourth element: that India could gain strategic or military advantages from a post-Brexit UK. The assumption in India was that a UK in splendid isolation would have a smaller profile in Indian foreign policy. Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj indirectly explained why. ‘Britain is India’s gateway to the EU’, she said. This underlined the fact one of Britain’s key utilities for India was to be New Delhi’s lobbyist within the EU. While India has close ties with other EU

4 Private conversations with Indian officials in October 2017.

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countries, notably Germany and France, it tends not to see them as being able to represent its views within the EU. Partly, this is historical legacy, but it also reflects a belief that Britain thinks in a more realpolitik fashion than many European states which New Delhi finds frustratingly focussed on human rights and other post-modern concerns. All of this was gone with Brexit. In New Delhi, Britain continues to be seen as having little or no influence in Asia, India’s main foreign and security policy focus. Indian officials have been clear that the only European country seen as a major player in their region is France because of its territorial and military presence in the Indian Ocean5 (Business Standard, 2017; Rehman, 2015). In contrast, India’s strategic relations with the United States were on a steady upward trajectory and, somewhat more hesitantly, so are its security relations with Australia. India does not place the UK on the same level. British ministers have made a concerted effort to talk up the Asian role their new aircraft carriers will play and the recent expansion of British naval facilities in the Persian Gulf. When he was Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson admitted in New Delhi that ‘the deep social links between our societies have not always translated into a shared strategic outlook’ (Johnson, 2017). While Johnson’s reference was largely to the Cold War, any discussion with senior Indian officials would seem to indicate that this lack of strategic convergence remains largely true even today. Only Canada and New Zealand are treated less seriously as strategic partners among the English-speaking countries. As evidence of the UK’s strategic questionability, Indian officials also cited their experience in Afghanistan where London was seen as a vocal supporter of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban at any cost—an anathema to India’s view of the Afghan conflict (for a detailed account of the differences between India and the UK on this issue, see Paliwal, 2017: 260–265).

India Handles Brexit Nonetheless, there was a general sense of equanimity among Indian commentators about the consequences of Brexit for India and the rest of the world. The Indian government, as one observer noted, has published

5 Private conversations with Indian diplomats over 2017–2018.

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no policy paper on Brexit or even made a technical-legal study as to its consequences for the country. The broad sense was that the adjustments required would be largely on the British side of the fence and, other than a few Indian companies, relations between India and a preor post-Brexit UK would be largely the same. The sheer complexity and drawn-out nature of the Brexit debate in the UK helped dull public interest in India. The primary Indian response was to either joke about it or simply express befuddlement (Bhala, 2018; Narayanan, 2019; Pant, 2018; Sachdeva, 2018). The Indian government’s responses to Brexit revolved around the largely economic issues listed below. One, manage some of the administrative uncertainty revolving around Brexit. In response to a parliamentary question on the status of India-UK agreements during any transition phase after a formal UK Brexit from the EU, the foreign ministry noted that under the India-UK joint statement of April 2018, ‘it was agreed that both sides will ensure continued application of EU-India agreements to the UK during the transition period, and put in place arrangements to replicate relevant EU-India agreements beyond this period’ (Swaraj, 2019). India and the UK also began working through issues like market access and regulatory controls while the UK was wrestling with the Brexit debate to ensure a minimal disruption of trade in the event of an actual withdrawal. On this, the UK High commissioner Sir Dominic Asquith noted, ‘My team and ministers have been engaging in good conversations with their counterparts in the Indian commerce ministry’. Two Indian firms like Tata and Mahindra, who had expected at least a customs union between the UK and the EU, were less than happy when Prime Minister Boris Johnson opted for a hard Brexit in which there was not even a travel or customs agreement across the channel. For other Indian firms, things changed remarkably little. As a FICCI survey in 2016 highlighted, only 14% of Indian firms that had invested in the UK said they had set up shop there ‘mainly’ for the continental EU. Almost half stated that their primary interest was the British market and did not plan to develop separate operations in the EU even after Brexit. The remainder of the firms said they were interested in both markets. But half the respondents said they expected a decline in investment to the UK until the uncertainty surrounding Brexit came to an end (FICCI, 2016; Hindustan Times , 2016).

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On the trade front, though the UK is the market for about 3% and the EU about 17% of India’s exports, there was an initial sense that Brexit could in the long term be beneficial for India. While an immediate disruption was universally predicted, most economic and business analysts in India seemed to believe Indian exports could capture some of the space vacated by the EU economies. A Reserve Bank of India report noted that ‘the likelihood of Brexit in March 2019 could offer opportunities for Indian exporters if bilateral trade agreements are renegotiated’ (NDTV, 2019). There was a universal Indian assumption that a post-Brexit UK would be at a negotiating disadvantage when it came to a free trade agreement with India. A State Bank of India report on this prospect noted that in bilateral negotiations with the UK, India would not have to deal with the more cumbersome EU rules and regulations. In any case, at least one British analysis had argued that it would take at least seven years to negotiate a trade agreement with India given the latter’s past record of procrastination in this area (Economic Times, 2016, 2018b; Rajesh Kumar, 2019). Three, market forces were already making London an external financial centre for India. Despite the reservations of the RBI but thanks to increased flows of foreign capital flow to the Indian economy and some implicit encouragement from the British government, London officially overtook India’s financial capital Mumbai to become the top centre for trading the nation’s currency in early 2019. Average daily volumes for rupee trading in the UK soared to $46.8 billion in April 2019, a more than fivefold jump from $8.8 billion in 2016, according to a Bank for International Settlements survey. The comparable figure for Mumbai was $34.5 billion. Most of the trading was in dollar-rupee offshore non-deliverable forwards. Similar patterns of increased rupee trading—including spot, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps and other financial products—also jumped in Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States (Sircar, 2019). The Ministry of External Affairs, Indian officials maintain, is enthusiastic, but the RBI remains somewhat sceptical. The MEA has even urged the RBI to consider setting up an office in London to help ease the regulatory concerns of investors. Under May’s prime ministership, it seemed that a post-Brexit UK would be a more inward-looking Britain with further obstacles to Indian migration. The already difficult path facing Indian migrants desiring to

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be UK citizens would become even more tortuous and even the temporary visa system for students, resident businessmen and tourists would be made more difficult. The May government imposed restrictions on Indian students. This policy was partly a consequence of an attempt by London to force New Delhi to take back several thousand illegal immigrations it claimed were from India but who lacked any proper identification (Suroor, 2019).

Boris Takes Over Johnson took a different view of India. This partly flowed from his adoption of a hard Brexit approach, declining to allow the free movement of individuals and a customs union with the Union. The resulting economic damage made it ever more important for him to reach out to other non-European countries for trade and investment. India was an obvious choice, not least because of his seeming personal liking for the country. Johnson’s willingness to fold an immigration agreement into any FTA made the Modi government take up the issue with greater focus than before. Johnson also decided that on security policy he would align Britain even more closely with the United States which made it necessary for him to also take a stronger stance against China. While London continued to see close trade and investment links with China as economically important, Johnson agreed to demands by the US—and his own intelligence agencies—to ban Chinese telecom hardware in new 5G phone infrastructure. India was to follow suit soon after. This sort of thinking on China, however, also made it easier for London and New Delhi to collaborate strategically. Finally, and potentially one of major importance, was an agreement by both sides to develop a technology relationship that in its first phase would focus on pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Johnson is ‘the most pro-Indian prime minister we have had in decades’, said one British business consultant who had served in India, in a private conversation.

Downgrading the EU Johnson came to power in the middle of 2019 and spent much of the year squabbling with both his own party and the European Union over the language of the final agreement that would define the new relationship

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between London and Brussels. The two sides signed an agreement at the start of the next year. It reflected a sharp break between the two sides: a basic trade agreement, a British withdrawal from the European customs union and an end to the free movement of people. Several weeks later, Johnson made his first major foreign policy speech in Greenwich where he laid out a vision of ‘Global Britain’ that would now pursue foreign and economic policies that looked beyond Europe. Much of the speech was about the need for a much deeper and broader relationship with the US but also the opportunities that supposedly lay in Asia and elsewhere (Johnson, 2020). The speech had few numbers, and those who did try and add them up found it hard to see how the UK could compensate for the drop in trade and investments that it would suffer with the EU, no matter how far and wide it looked. Polls showed the British public less than enthusiastic at the idea of restoring Britain as a global military power and many indicated that they still identified closely with the EU and Europe as a whole. But Johnson had done one thing, it had shaken up a foreign policy that had been, as one analyst remarked, running on autopilot since the end of the Cold War ‘driven largely by outdated liberal assumptions and the interests of the City’. The City being a reference to the UK’s outsized and powerful financial sector. And India was a beneficiary. ‘Brexit has given the UK a compelling reason to reevaluate its relationship beyond its 27 neighbours—and India is in the spotlight’, wrote the then UK High Commissioner to India in an op-ed (Asquith, 2019b; Kundnani, 2022; Shapiro & Whitney, 2021).

Indo-Pacific on the Thames On the strategic side, in early 2021 the Johnson government put forward an integrated defence and foreign policy strategy for the UK that made the case that while the Euro-Atlantic remained London’s priority, the Indo-Pacific was central to British interests. A new British aircraft carrier made a long trip across the Indian Ocean all the way to Japan to highlight the country’s capabilities. The UK sent a deputy national security advisor to brief the Indian government on the new policy. While London’s greater interest in the Indo-Pacific was broadly welcomed, New Delhi remained sceptical given the strategy’s overall focus on trade and investment and wariness about calling out China. But the Integrated Review’s key element was to move Britain even closer in alignment with the United

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States, and with a few degrees of separation, much closer to India. As the review says, ‘the US will remain our most important bilateral relationship, essential to key alliances and groups such as NATO and the Five Eyes, and our largest bilateral trading partner and inward investor’ (Lucas, 2022; United Kingdom, 2021). Throughout 2021, the Johnson government took an increasingly more active security position against China as it revived the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Chinese telecom equipment was banned from future British telecom networks and Britain joined Japan in the creation of a next generation fighter project. This was noticed by New Delhi and acknowledged in a speech by the Indian foreign minister. The UK, he said, now sees itself as ‘a Euro-Atlantic actor with an increasing stake in the Indo-Pacific. This obviously makes it much more relevant to Indian strategic calculations’. Britain, he acknowledged, ‘had influence in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia’ and ‘even in the Indo-Pacific, greater visibility of a player like UK respecting a rules-based order only contributes to stability’ (Jaishankar, 2021). India took the opportunity during the joint statement issued by Johnson and Modi in April 2022 to embed all the code words that India treats as a commitment to working against Chinese assertiveness in the international and regional spheres. These included support for ‘an open, free, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region’ and ‘the centrality of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’, which are references to China’s unilateral takeover of a large swathe of the South China Sea (India, MEA, 2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and efforts by the Western governments to leverage Indian concerns about Russian military supplies, saw a number of countries including the UK offering to partner with India in key defence areas. Even before that, the Indian Navy had sounded out the UK about using the latest British aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, as a model for its next aircraft carrier but abandoned the talks over budgetary issues. The British then offered to partner India in the development of its next fighter, offering access to jet engine technology, and urged India to consider joining its fighter programme alongside Japan. Johnson, during his visit to India, proposed a joint collaboration in maritime propulsion for India’s smaller class of warships. None of these have yet to see fruition, partly because the Covid19 pandemic severely constrained India’s room for defence expenditure and partly because a number of rival offers, notably from France, were

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on the table and under evaluation. The two countries have agreed to a broader defence and security relationship, and Britain has streamlined its licensing rules for military hardware exports to India. One continuing weakness of such British defence proposals is the Indian view that there is little geopolitical value addition in working with the UK as compared to France and the US who are both seen as genuine Indo-Pacific players (BBC, 2022; Economic Times, 2022; Roy-Chaudhury & Brookes, 2022; Shukla, 2019; Thapar, 2022).

FTA Focus Johnson’s attempts to kick-start a new post-Brexit Indian policy were initially foiled by the Covid-19 pandemic and the travel restrictions that went along with it. He had to abandon plans to be India’s Republic Day guest in January 2021. Modi and Johnson had to settle for a virtual summit in May 2022, agreeing to restart negotiations for a bilateral FTA. A Covid-19 breakout in India meant that Modi had to give a Group of Seven summit hosted by Johnson in London a pass and it was not until the COP26 summit in Glasgow that November were they at last able to meet in person. Johnson ended up making his first state visit to India only in April 2022. Nonetheless, the relationship moved forward even if the traditional optics of summitry that should have accompanied the diplomacy had to come after considerable delay. The most active front of the bilateral relationship was the FTA negotiations. The Johnson government had gone on an FTA blitz after it formally ended its customs union with the EU, signing over 60 such agreements in less than two years. Most of them were little more than bilateral version of the earlier EU trade agreements. The one with India, however, was an agreement that was new in almost every way including its agenda. The Modi government had put a stop to all FTA negotiations soon after it came to power in 2014 because of concerns that many of India’s trade agreements were poorly negotiated and gave excessive market access to Chinese manufactured goods. Most dramatically, India walked out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership being led by the Southeast Asian countries because of these concerns. It revived its trade policy in mid-2021, focussing on bilateral agreements that provided market access for services, promoted digital commerce, preferably had a strong immigration component and had tight rules of origin requirements as a barrier to Chinese goods.

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British business and government pushed for traditional trade concerns like tariff reductions for certain products like whiskey and simplified trade procedures, but also sought convergence on data protection rules, investment protection and service access—especially for legal and financial services. India sought tariff concessions on textiles, leather goods and a few other items. But it had the greatest interest in issues like data standards, financial technology and Johnson’s willingness to include an immigration agreement. New Delhi also hoped that concessions by the UK for cross-border skilled workers visas, mutual social security payment exemptions and so on would then be used to secure similar understandings with the EU and possibly the US in future trade agreements. Reports indicated that the agreement was likely to cover about 65% of goods and about a third of services trade. During his visit to India, Johnson said of the FTA, ‘This could double our trade and investment by the end of the decade, driving down prices for consumers, and increasing wages across the UK by as much as GBP 3 billion’ (Chakraborty, 2020; India, MEA, 2022; Nandi, 2021; Outlook, 2022; Palit, 2020; Pattanayak, 2022; Roche & Mishra, 2021; Sidhartha, 2021). The two leaders had pledged to complete the FTA by October-end 2022, but Johnson’s subsequent fall from power, the short-lived prime ministership of Liz Truss and the surprise move of Sunak into 10 Downing Street meant that the FTA’s likely date of completion was shifted to March 2023.

Immigration Johnson took a different tack from May’s hardline anti-immigrant stance after he assumed power in 2019. Johnson argued only against the unfettered access that EU citizens had to settle down in the UK, believing Britain should adopt a points-based immigration system, similar to the variety that exists in Australia and Canada. He immediately reversed May’s restrictions on foreign students and other types of non-EU migrants and opened the door for highly skilled workers in particular. The British High Commission was quick to tout the new rules, saying they would ‘be better for students who will have a longer time after finishing their studies to look for a job in the UK. It will also be better for workers with a lower skill threshold. And it would result in less bureaucracy for those employees who employ non-EU workers’. It noted that the number of visas for Indian students and skilled workers had surged as a consequence Haidar, 2019; Roy, 2019). The Indian High Commission in the

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UK also concluded that this would be largely beneficial to Indian immigrants as it would put a premium on English language skills. ‘When we looked at them, we realized that wherever a points-based system had been introduced, Indians had benefitted’, said one Indian diplomat.6 Johnson’s shift has been attributed to his personal connections with India and he has touted himself as a ‘friend of India’. But it also reflected the view of even Nigel Farage, the ideological father of the Brexit movement, that immigrants from Commonwealth countries were preferable to those from continental Europe because of cultural affinities. Farage, founder of the anti-EU UKip, has gone as far as to say he would prefer Indians to continental Europeans. In an interview he said, ‘I have to confess I do have a slight preference. I do think, naturally, that people from India and Australia are in some ways more likely to speak English, understand common law and have a connection with this country than some people that come perhaps from countries that haven’t fully recovered from being behind the Iron Curtain.’ This was a nuance that Johnson seemed to have grasped. Johnson early on remarked that Indian skills could help sectors such as IT. ‘I’m not going to be dogmatic in refusing people with skill and talent in coming to the UK. … All I would say is we need to control it’ (Basu, 2019; Mason, 2015).

Technology In the run-up to the April 2022 summit, India and the UK put together a roadmap for the future development of their relationship. The focus of the roadmap, and the key element as far as the Indian government was concerned, was in technological cooperation, especially in vaccines, medicines and medical devices. There were other technologies as well, notably green energy, but the medical side was seen as the most important. After the Covid-19 pandemic India, the world’s largest vaccine maker, but a laggard in terms of research, began to seek international partners for funding, technology and markets for future products. The Astra Zeneca-Serum Institute of India-Oxford University collaboration that led to the mass production of the Covishield Covid vaccine was seen as exemplary case study that led to an inexpensive vaccines, zero patent hassles

6 Private conversation with Indian diplomats in November 2019.

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and export opportunities. Indian officials say Britain’s pharma sector is infused with a non-profit culture with many of the biggest firms having become foundations. In contrast, while American inputs are indispensable to India’s vaccine production, New Delhi’s experience with US Big Pharma has been bruising. The meat of the new Indo-UK relationship is medicinal. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar highlighted the ‘action plan on health and life sciences, that includes cooperation on vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics’. The bilateral roadmap puts down the ambitious target of ‘helping guarantee equitable global supply [of Covid vaccine] by April 2022’. As important is the long-term plan to align medical standards, institutions and people. Britain was a carefully considered choice by the Indian side: UK medical researchers are second in quality citations using the H index, number two in medicine Nobels, and its universities are seen as Europe’s best. Britain was also interested. Johnson, citing the Astra Zeneca success, had called for partners to fulfil his government’s plans to be able to ‘develop vaccines against emerging diseases in 100 days’ and be at the forefront emergency medical response in future. While India accepted it will have to work with many countries, the record of working with British pharma firms was seen as decisive. As the Indian foreign minister said, ‘It was very much in keeping with the times that we agreed on an action plan on health and life sciences, that includes cooperation on vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics. Some results of our on-going collaboration have already helped address the Covid challenge; its possibilities are obviously very much more’ (EFPIA, 2019; Johnson, 2021; Scimago Journal & Country Rank, 2022).

Conclusion Indian foreign ministry officials over the past few years in private conversations have cited the UK as a possible ‘transformational’ partner of India. This is a term used to describe countries that India believes have accepted that shifting the trajectory of India’s economic and strategic power is in their interests and is prepared to help move the graph even on a noncommercial basis. The US and Japan were the first two countries to receive this label, and the UK has been bandied around as a possible candidate though the political chaos of the last few months of 2022 has not helped London’s case.

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Brexit and the Johnson prime ministership helped change the otherwise staid and stale bilateral equation between the two countries. For a number of reasons, including the Covid-19 pandemic and Johnson’s erratic governing style, there was a sense of change in the air but not that much tangible happened. Britain, under some economic and political stress over its messy divorce from the EU, was focussed more on tangibles like a bilateral FTA and defence cooperation. New Delhi is hoping to see the UK to make even larger bets on India but only if it accepts that geopolitically this is in Britain’s interests to do so. As the Indian foreign minister explained in a speech in London, the UK has much to offer India ‘in terms of technology, resources, opportunities and best practices’ while the UK can gain from India as a ‘talent pool, a growing market, an incubator of fresh ideas and innovation or as a more influential player on the world stage’. Both sides, he noted, had undergone a ‘sea-change’ that ‘help us reimagine our ties today’. He underplayed the more traditional elements of bilateral relations, whether the FTA or immigration or sports, and argued for a more advanced relationship, one a ‘Global UK is probably more likely to do so than its previous incarnation, just as a New India is more forward looking than previously’ (Jaishankar, 2021).

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Jaishankar, S. (2021, May 6). India and U.K. in the post-Covid world. Address by Foreign Minister at Policy Exchange, London. Retrieved August 12, 2022 https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33849/Key from note+Address+by+External+Affairs+Minister+at+Policy+Exchange+London+ on+India++UK+in+the+postCovid+World Johnson, B. (2017, January 18). Keynote address by Foreign Secretary at the Raisana Dialogue, New Delhi. Retrieved August 12, 2022 from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-speechat-raisina-dialogue-new-delhi Johnson, B. (2020, February 3). Speech of Prime Minister in Greenwich. Retrieved August 12, 2022 from https://www.gov.uk/government/spe eches/pm-speech-in-greenwich-3-february-2020 Johnson, B. (2021, February 19). Prime Minister’s speech at the Munich security conference. Retrieved August 12, 2022 from https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-at-the-munich-security-confer ence-19-february-2021 Khanna, A. (2017, December 26). UK India ties grew in 2017 but postBrexit future concerns remain. Livemint. Retrieved August 12, 2022 from https://www.livemint.com/Politics/7xkHvJYTOXIKoszBkcIrDN/UKIndia-ties-grew-in-2017-but-postBrexit-future-concerns-r.html Kundnani, H. (2022, July 10). British foreign policy was on autopilot—Boris Johnson showed we have choices. The Guardian. Retrieved August 12, 2022 from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jul/10/british-for eign-policy-was-on-autopilot-boris-johnson-showed-we-have-choices Lucas, E. (2022, July 13). Will British security policy take a new turn after Boris Johnson. Foreign Policy. Retrieved August 22, 2022 from https://foreignpo licy.com/2022/07/13/britain-boris-johnson-foreign-policy-ukraine-russianato-defense-security-military/ Manu, B. (2012). The peacemakers: India and the quest for one world. HarperCollins India. Mason, R. (2015, April 22). Nigel Farage: Indian and Australian immigrants better than eastern Europeans. The Guardian. Retrieved August 12, 2022 from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/22/nigelfarage-immigrants-india-australia-better-than-eastern-europeans May, T. (2016, October 2). Theresa May—Her full Brexit speech to Conservative conference. Independent. Retrieved August 22, 2022 from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-confer ence-speech-article-50-brexit-eu-a7341926.html Nalapat, M. D. (2011). India and the Anglosphere. The New Criterion. Retrieved August 23, 2022 from https://newcriterion.com/issues/2011/1/india-theanglosphere

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CHAPTER 4

India and France B. Krishnamurthy

India was well known to the French people through the travelogues of François Bernier, Tavernier and Tavenot, who visited India during the Mughal period and have left behind their travel accounts. India remained an El Dorado in the imagination of the French to partake the incredible profits of the trade with India. ‘La Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales ’ (the French East India Company) was founded in 1664. Their experience in India made them to realize the need for generating resources here itself to fund their trade activities and this realization had resulted in the establishment of the French colonies in India.1 When India became free in 1947 and the Indian Union came into existence, 1 By the mid-twentieth century, the French were holding in all five settlements, namely

Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe, Yenam and Chandernagar, 50,938 hectares or 509 sq. kms with a population of 323,295 people as well as eleven loges or sites of their warehouses at Surat, Kasimbazar. Dacca, Patna, Jougdia, Calicut, Masulipatnam, Balasor and other such places, which covered an approximate area of four Sq. Kms. with 2,000 inhabitants. Les establishments francais de L’Inde, Notes Documentaires et Etudes, No. 735, serie France d’Outre-Mer–XXVIII Paris, 30 September 1947, p. 3.

B. Krishnamurthy (B) Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_4

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both the Indian and the French Governments handled the colonial issue in a mature way and resolved it out through peaceful negotiations. This development has ensured a close and cordial relations between the two countries in the years to come. The present chapter deals with the political and economic relations between India and France from 1947 to the present day. Mutual positive perceptions and remarkable convergences on many international politico-economic issues enabled both countries to develop cooperation and coordination in political, diplomatic, economic and security matters. The strategic partnership enhanced bilateral relations though certain divergences persisted.

Early Connections In response to Jawaharlal Nehru’s desire that France be represented in New Delhi, Christian Foucher, the then Consul General of France in Calcutta, announced in January 1947 that the French Government had agreed to the reciprocal opening of embassies. A French legation was subsequently opened in view of the provisional nature of the interim government in India (Neogy, 1997: 21–23) and Henri Roux was appointed as the first Chargé d’ Affaires, with the clear-cut instruction that he should seek to dispel antagonism over the colonial question and persuade Indian leaders that racial discrimination and prejudice against the colonized had always been alien to French culture and spirit (Boquérat, 2004: 16–17). However, the colonial issue remained a constant irritant in bilateral relations. The positive perception of Indian political leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru about France, that it is a ‘great’ country which had propagated the ideas of ‘Liberty, Equality and Fraternity’ among humanity, and their admiration of the French liberal and revolutionary traditions played a significant role in conditioning their behaviour towards France and French India (Gandhi, 1982: 152, 223). When the French National Assembly approved the merger of the French Indian colonies with the Indian Union on 15 August 1954 after a tumultuous discussion on the French India question,2 Nehru praised French leaders 2 Some 317 Deputies voted for the merger of the French Indian colonies with India, while 215 voted against it and 33 abstained from voting. Puthuvai Murasu, 15 August 1954.

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like Pierre Mendés-France and remarked that the Indo-French settlement of 27 October 1954 over the de facto transfer of the French Indian settlements to the Indian Union honoured both countries ‘as all fine settlements always do’ (Nehru, 1958: 462). The settlement came into effect on 1 November 1954 and the French Indian settlements de facto merged with the Indian Union. The agreement of October 1954 was again reiterated in the Treaty of Cession of the French Establishments of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam of 28 May 1956. With the de jure transfer of the French Indian settlements in 1962, the issue of French colonies was brought to a natural and mutually acceptable end (Krishnamurthy, 2007).

Nehru and Decolonization Though the French India problem was solved to the satisfaction of both countries, the colonial question of other Afro-Asian countries continued to cause frictions in Indo-French relations. In spite of his image as a crusader for the cause of the subjected people of Asia and Africa, Nehru maintained a low profile on Indo-China. French conflicts in Indo-China, he felt, had considerably disturbed Indian public opinion and expressed the hope that France, which has been so long associated with the cause of freedom, would help in establishing independence in Indo-China as well (Nehru, 1946: 558). Nehru assured the Asian Relations Conference (1947) of India’s wholehearted support to freedom movements in Southeast Asia. At the same time, when he was pressed by Vietnamese and other delegations to actively intervene on their part, he felt it would only enlarge the area of conflict and be therefore detrimental to their interest. In fact, Nehru personally intervened to prevent the Vietnamese delegation from criticizing France and ensured that it was not treated any worse than England, Holland and even the United States (Boquérat, 2004: 13). Nehru was adamant in not extending any support, even remotely, to colonial powers. The Indian Government denied Dutch and French aircraft flying to Indonesia and Indo-China to use Indian airspace in their efforts to restore colonial rule (Nehru, 1983a: 394–397). The Indian diplomatic intervention, all unofficial and from outside, in Indo-China was ‘on a large scale, comprehensive, and to a certain extent conclusive’ (Sardesai, 1968: 248) in reaching a negotiated settlement. Later, when the International Supervisory Commission was formed to oversee the developments in Indo-China, India was offered the chairmanship. This helped to raise India’s reputation in international affairs and there

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was wide appreciation of its commitment to value-based politics (Rao, 2009). Nehru’s attitude towards Indo-China was therefore one of ‘calculated circumspections’ rather than of ‘indifference or neglect’ (Sardesai, 1990: 78–101). Despite supporting the right of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence, India maintained a moderate stance and consistently proposed a peaceful approach and direct negotiations to find a solution. Nehru reacted cautiously in the case of Algerian independence from the French colonial yoke. India followed a cautious or passive attitude in the decolonization issue of Algeria (Chatrath, 1994: 18–19, 35; Rahman, 1969: 23). It was only after the French recognition of Algerian independence that Nehru announced the Indian Government’s recognition in an apparent attempt to maintain cordial relations with France, especially as the Indo-French Treaty of Cession (May 1956) still had to be ratified by the French Parliament (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 250).

Indian Non-alignment and French Un-alignment India and France are deeply wedded to the notions of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy or independence in foreign policy decisionmaking. Both exhibited considerable determination to take strategic choices without external inference and interference. Nehru’s nonaligned and Charles de Gaulle’s unaligned policies were evident in their approaches towards various international issues, especially in their relations with the United States. This led some scholars to term India as ‘France of Asia’ (Ayres, 2006: 1–2). French leaders claimed that their country remained ‘genuinely non-aligned’ though it had to keep away from the non-aligned movement due to geo-strategic compulsions and considerations (Time International, 1981: 11). This ideational unanimity apparently led leaders of both countries to hold similar views on many international politico-economic issues during the Cold War.

Nehru and De Gaulle Nehru and President Charles de Gaulle maintained a love-hate relationship and have developed severe reservations about each other. Nehru could not accept the fact that a general became the head of a republic while de Gaulle regarded Nehru as the one who snatched away the French

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Indian settlements from France. At a later stage both developed a sort of liking for each other. Nehru met de Gaulle twice in 1960 and 1962. On both the occasions, he regarded the French President’s behaviour as imperious and overbearing. The two leaders held discussions about several global issues such as East–West divide, disarmament, China, Sino-Indian relations, with the General hectoring during the conversation and the Premier listening passively.

The Sixties Kashmir France apparently sought to avoid taking sides with either India or Pakistan whenever the Kashmir issue was raised bilaterally by either country or debated in the United Nations since it felt that the matter was concerned primarily with the Commonwealth. However, like other Western countries, its overall stance remained favourable to Pakistan. Paris was criticized by both India and Pakistan whenever it appeared to take sides. For instance, in 1964, when Roger Seydoux, the French representative in the UN Security Council, favoured a proactive role for the UN in Kashmir, the Indian Embassy in Paris vehemently protested. Subsequently, during the Indo-Pak war of 1965, France supported the involvement of the UN to contemplate steps towards initiating negotiations to get to the root of the problem; India opposed to any such implicit link between a ceasefire and any international mediation on Kashmir (Boquérat, 2004: 19, 26). Indira Gandhi and De Gaulle, 1966 Indira Gandhi met General de Gaulle in 1966 while she was passing through Paris on her way to the United States. De Gaulle tried to impress on her that Pakistan was not capable of doing much harm to India and so it did not represent an excessively important factor for India. China, he maintained, too would not be a challenge to India in the near future as it needed at least three decades to attain its full strength, as was the case with India. The French President drew certain similarities in the position of France and India in the bi-polar international politics and proposed ‘... it would be in their interest to distance from the game played by the

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three world powers, viz., the United States, China and Russia’ (Boquérat, 2004: 26–27).

Bangladesh Crisis, 1971 The humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan had aroused the concern and contempt of prominent French intellectuals like Andre Malraux and the public opinion led the French Government to impose punitive sanctions on Pakistan in July 1971. A meeting of minds for a political settlement including the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from custody emerged when Mrs Gandhi met President Georges Pompidou in Paris on 11 November 1971. Subsequently, Pompidou wrote a letter on 18 November 1971 to President Yahya Khan demanding the release of Sheikh Mujib as part of a political settlement in East Pakistan. France tacitly supported New Delhi’s position on the urgency of a political settlement when the UN Security Council began its debate on 4 December 1971. While China, the United States and nine elected members of the UN Security Council supported a draft resolution which was detrimental to Indian interests, France along with the UK abstained. Paris continued to abstain on draft resolutions in the Security Council prejudicial to India and supported the UNSC Resolution 307 of 21 December 1971, which removed the issue from the Security Council’s agenda. India wished to sign a treaty of friendship with France somewhat similar to the one with the Soviet Union. Paris, however, did not seriously pursue the Indian proposal as it was likely to promote an image that India was pitted against its regional rivals—China and Pakistan (Boquérat, 2004: 27).

The 1998 Nuclear Tests and After When India conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, French leaders approached the issue sympathetically and opposed the imposition of economic and technological sanctions on India. In fact, they advocated enhanced civilian nuclear cooperation with India in order to help it in meeting out its ever-increasing energy requirement. The French have also helped in diluting the stringent stand taken by the European Union (EU) and in moderating its subsequent resolution regarding Indian nuclear tests (Krishnamurthy, 2005: Chapter 9).

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Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Energy Security France, as a ‘revisionist’ power, called for ending India’s nuclear isolation and advocated the reframing of the international rules of nuclear commerce to facilitate civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. In mid-2005, India and the United States signed an agreement leading to civilian nuclear cooperation. Though some EU member states opposed it, France supported the deal and hoped that it would lead to commercial sales of nuclear reactors to India. To that end, it expressed its willingness to supply nuclear technology and sell advanced nuclear reactors in order to help India in meeting out its energy requirements. The two countries signed an agreement on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (30 September 2008), which provided for the establishment of a 9,900 MW nuclear power plant at Jaitapur, Maharashtra, and the transfer of relevant technologies (Basu, 2019). The French firm Areva signed the first commercial agreement with India on civilian nuclear cooperation in February 2009 to set up six nuclear power plants and on the supply of nuclear fuel (The Hindu, 2009, 5 February). Recognizing its unblemished non-proliferation track record, France supported Indian membership of multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). France ‘actively supported’ efforts to build a consensus in support of Indian membership (India, MEA, 2010). The International Solar Alliance (ISA)—the first treaty-based international organization based in India—remains a major Indo-French initiative in response to climate change, which intends to provide a common platform for cooperation among sun-rich nations to ramp up solar energy, with the intention to contain global greenhouse emissions as well as to generate and exploit clean and cheap energy. Eighty-seven countries have so far signed and ratified the ISA Framework Agreement.

A Multipolar World Order The inclusion of India as a prospective pole in the emerging multipolar world by the Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine in 2000 indicated that France is a more credible partner in the construction of a more equitable world order through a new concert of major powers (Raja Mohan, 2016). Their mutual quest for a multipolar world order led an analyst to

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describe India as the ‘France of Asia’, an ‘ally of the United States which shares many values with Americans, but pursues its own course’ (Ayres, 2006: 1–2; Krishnamurthy, 2002: 134–137). Védrine defended his choice of India as a potential pole on the ground that India continues to be a popular democracy. He advised India to leave its Pakistan-centric foreign policy and to behave like a major power, expanding its orientation beyond South Asia (Védrine, 2000). Three years later, President Jacques Chirac took the personal initiative to have an ‘enlarged dialogue’ on questions of globalization and international governance between the G-8 and twelve leading developing countries, including India.

Membership of UN Security Council Unlike many other countries, France was among the first countries to recognize India’s growing economic and political potential and its ambition to play a more proactive role in world politics. While India remained a ‘good competitor’ for the UN Security Council permanent seat, France remained an ‘enthusiastic’ supporter of the Indian claim (Ayres, 2006: 1– 2). French leaders maintained that India should secure its ‘rightful place’ in the United Nations Security Council and that the UN reform cannot wait forever (India, MEA, 2008: 1). Both countries stressed the need to make the Security Council a more ‘representative and responsible’ institution commensurate with the present-day realities (India, MEA, 2016). In January 2015, the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York pushed for the expansion of the Security Council with the inclusion of Germany, Brazil, India, Japan, as well as a greater representation for African countries (France, MFA, 2020). François Delattre, the French Permanent Representative to the UN, reiterated this stance of France in 2019.

Strategic Partnership Over several decades, the Indo-French strategic partnership (1998) has significantly enhanced cooperation in fields covering civilian nuclear and defence cooperation, space, counter-terrorism, education, research and development in science and technology, culture, urban development, climate change, economic relations and people-to-people contacts. India’s strategic partnership with France proved successful, fruitful and mutually beneficial as it has already become ‘strategic’ and serves both the parties

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due to common security threat perceptions. It is widely described as being ‘truly strategic in its orientation’ (Pant, 2018). The Foundation for National Security Research graded India’s strategic partnerships on a 10-point scale for present performance, sustainability and potential of these partnerships for India in three areas of cooperation: political-diplomatic ties, defence ties and economic relations and methodically ranked them with a corresponding score out of 90 points. In the final ranking, Russia came out on top with 62 points, followed by the United States (58), France (51), UK (41), Germany (37) and Japan (34) (Foundation for National Security Research, 2011: 10). Thus, the Indo-French strategic partnership was rated as first among the European countries. While rating the Indo-French strategic partnership in the politico-diplomatic sphere at ‘seven on how substantial the support was, six on how sustained it was, and seven as regards its future potential’, the report noted that ‘France’s previous record of defence supplies at six on how substantial they suggested were, five on how sustained they were and six with regard to their future potential’. It suggested ‘a rating of four to India’s existing relationship with France but a higher rating of six for the potential’ in the case of economic cooperation. No opportunity, it concluded, ‘should be missed to widen and deepen the strategic partnership with France’ (Foundation for National Security Research, 2011: 12–13).

Modi and France, 2014–2022 In his efforts to open an outreach to Europe, the first visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Europe was to France (9–12 April 2015). Seven months later, Modi visited Paris (November 2015) to attend the inaugural leaders’ event at the COP-21 climate change summit when the International Solar Alliance jointly with President Francois Hollande was announced. Two years later, he visited France for the third time in June 2017 and described Indo-French relations as ‘deep-rooted’. A number of MoUs were signed on these occasions initiating cooperation and coordination in many fields, including trade, security and space research (India, Embassy in France, 2020). French President Emmanuel Macron invited Modi to participate in the G7 summit held in Biarritz, France on 26 August 2019, as ‘Partners of Goodwill—Biarritz Partner’, where, as the lead speaker in the session

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on digital transformation, Modi highlighted India’s success story in the sphere of digital and financial inclusion (India, MEA, 2020: 29). Modi again visited France in May 2022 to share his assessment with Macron on various regional and global issues such as the war in Ukraine, the aggravation of global food security, already impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, and developments in the Indo-Pacific as well as Afghanistan. Both leaders also took stock of ongoing bilateral cooperation in the economic, science and technological, and cultural sectors. Further strengthening the strategic partnership between the countries too was in the agenda (Modi, 2022).

The Indo-Pacific India and France share similar views about the Indo-Pacific, which has gained greater geo-strategic importance in recent years owing to its politico-economic potential and the over-arching role played by China in the region and in the South China Sea in particular. While New Delhi considers the Indo-Pacific to comprise the entire Western and Central Pacific and the Indian Ocean, Paris regards it to consist of an area spanning from Africa’s eastern façade to French Polynesia (France, Ministry for the Armed Forces, 2018). The two countries seek to uphold the Law of the Sea in the Indian Ocean region, secure the Sea Lines of Communication, respond to humanitarian disasters and promote sustainable blue economy smoothly synchronize their strategic thinking and follow up actions in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain (Krishnamurthy, 2021: 161–185). France regards its partnership with India as a ‘major pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy’. During his visit to New Delhi in April 2021, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Le Drian endorsed Modi’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI) (Le Drian, 2021, 13–15 April).

Economic and Trade Relations During 1951–1956, Indo-French trade remained to the tune of |200.3 million, which increased to |290.6 million between 1956 and 1961. It further rose to |360.7 million during 1961–1966. However, the share of France in India’s foreign trade represented only 1.3% of imports and 1.4% of exports (Chatrath, 1994: 110). Since 1976, India’s exports to France have risen from FF 1021 million to FF 1940 million in 1980 and imports from France went up from FF 1183 million to FF 1475

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million. Still, it was less than 0.5% of the French global trade. In 1980, France continued to be India’s eleventh supplier and sixth client (3.58% of India’s sales and 2.84% of its purchases) and India remained France’s 46th supplier and 45th client (0.30% of French exports and 0.26% of her imports). While French imports from India remained at FF 1490 million and French exports to India was valued at FF 1476 million in 1980, the figures for 1984 were FF 1882 million and FF 3362 million, respectively. France had been able to secure a place among the ten first clients and suppliers of India and the latter represented in 1984 the second French market in Asia, just after Japan. Indian exports to France which amounted to $716.17 million in 1996– 1997 increased to $4413.38 million in 2021–2022 (April-December). Indian imports from France increased more than fivefold from $698.80 million in 1996–1997 to $3817.49 million in 2021–2022 (April– December). The balance of trade remained generally in favour of India. In 1996–1997, it amounted to $17.37 million and rose to $595.89 million in 2021–2022 (April–December) (see Table 4.1). France ranks twentyfifth among countries from importing countries, with a 1% market share, and is New Delhi’s fifteenth largest customer. Indian exports of services increased from e1.715 billion in 2015 to e2.459 billion in 2019 while imports of services from France increased from e1.695 billion in 2015 to a little over e2 billion in 2019 (see Table 4.2).

Foreign Direct Investment France is the ninth largest investor with the presence of more than 1,000 French companies. From April 2000 to September 2020, its cumulative investment amounted to US$9.67 billion or 1.93% of the total FDI inflows into India. The highest FDI equity inflows are in the services sector (19.22%). Other sectors where FDI has been made include cement and gypsum products, air transport (including air freight), petroleum and natural gas and electrical equipment. Many of the big French groups have their subsidiaries in India. There are also a few joint ventures and some French companies have their liaison offices. Thirty-nine of the 40 CAC 40 (French Stock Market Index) companies are present in India in a wide range of sectors such as services, pharmaceutical-chemical, aerospace, agro-food, electronics, construction mechanics, electrical components and automobile. Well-known French

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Table 4.1 India-France trade, 1996–2022 (in million US Dollars)

Financial year

Exports

Imports

Balance of trade

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022 (Apr–Dec)

716.17 759.15 829.70 897.34 1020.01 945.00 1074.09 1280.88 1680.94 2079.59 2103.26 2599.64 3020.86 3819.83 5209.57 4558.11 4986.03 5108.29 4956.66 4633.40 5250.05 4900.27 5232.57 5097.81 4782.18 4413.38

698.80 784.98 719.60 711.81 640.81 844.25 1094.18 1090.23 1894.10 4113.30 4212.42 6265.76 4632.48 4192.17 3704.57 4332.78 4652.36 3691.89 4416.08 3730.31 5707.77 6524.16 6665.67 6168.82 4343.22 3817.49

17.37 −25.83 110.10 185.53 379.20 100.75 −20.09 190.65 −213.16 −2033.71 −2109.16 −3666.12 −1611.62 −372.34 1505.00 225.33 333.67 1416.40 540.58 903.09 −457.72 −1623.89 −1433.10 −1071.01 438.96 595.89

Source https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/default.asp

Table 4.2 India-France trade in services, 2015–2019 (in million euros) Year (Jan–Dec) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Indian exports to France

French exports to India

Total

Y-o-Y % of increase/decrease

1,715 1,775 2,563 2,459 2,463

1,695 1,463 1,739 1,928 2,004

3,410 3,238 4,302 4,387 4,467

−7.33 −5.04 +32.85 +1.97 +1.82

Source https://www.eoiparis.gov.in/page/india-france-economic-and-commercial-relations-brief/#:~: text=In%202020%2C%20the%20India%2DFrance,20.95%25%20to%20%E2%82%AC%204.23%20billion on 8/3/2021

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business houses and service sector establishments such as BNP Paribas, L’Oréal, Airbus, Dassault, Eurocopter, Safran, Thales, Bongrain, Danone, Crouzet, Gemalto, Alstom, Cermex, Legris Group, Hager, Legrand, Schneider Electric, Michelin, and Renault maintain their presence in the Indian soil. In between 50 and 70 SMEs, essentially in the mechanical and pharma-chemical sectors, are also present in India (India, Embassy in France, 2020). French equity inflows into India increased over four times from US$104 million in 2000–2001 to US$466 million in 2008–2009. They reached a peak of US$734 million in 2010–2011. They continuously declined for nine successive years thereafter before amounting to US$1.896 billion in 2019–2020 (see Table 4.3). There are more than 200 subsidiaries of Indian businesses, with e174 million FDI stock in France, where they employ more than 6,000 people. In 2020, nine investment decisions were taken by the Tata Group, HCL Technologies Ltd., Aurobindo Pharma and Mixe.Store creating 496 jobs, 39% more than in 2019. Investments are made in sectors like manufacturing, R&D, engineering, business services and consumer services. France remains the fourth leading European recipient in 2020, receiving 7% of job-creating investment from India (Business France, 2021: 94–95).

Development Assistance French development assistance has been limited in comparison with Germany. The Indo-French Economic and Technical Cooperation Treaty (1958) provided for a credit of FF 25 billion for procuring equipment from France. Paris joined the Aid India Consortium in 1961 when India launched its Third Five Year Plan (1961–1966). The French contribution amounted to slightly above 2% of the financial assistance sanctioned by the Consortium, AIC during the Plan period. The Government of France began extending development assistance to India in 1968. French aid is tied to imports of goods and services and has been restricted to a few low value technical cooperation projects. It comes mainly in the form of mixed credit with soft treasury loan and export credit at OECD consensus rates of interest. From April 1968 to March 2001, total French development assistance to India amounted to FF 15,443.86 million (India Budget, 2002–2003: 25).

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Table 4.3 Equity inflows from France to India, 2000–2001 to 2019–2020 (in million US dollars)

Financial year (April–March) 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 Cumulative inflows (April 2000 to September 2020)

USD million

Y-o-Y % changes

104 108 111 38 117 18 117 145 466 302 734 662 646 305 634 598 614 511 406 1,896 9,674

N.A. +3.5 +3.3 −65.6 +206.7 −84.2 +533.6 +23.7 +221.4 −35.1 +142.6 −9.7 −2.4 −52.7 +117.42 −7.32 +5.51 −27.87 −12.80 +379.22

Source India, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP). Retrieved August 11, 2022 from https://www.google. com/search?q=dipp+government+of+india+%2B+fdi+from+france+ to+india&rlz=1C1OKWM_enIN986IN986&oq=DIPP%2C+Govern ment+of+India+%2B+FDI+from+France&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j33i 160.48444j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

French development assistance is being channelized through the Agence Française de Développement (French Agency for Development [AFD]), which prioritizes for financing areas such as energy efficiency, renewal energy and urban infrastructure (pubic transport, water). Some of the major ongoing projects through AFD assistance are the Kochi Metro Project, the Bengaluru Metro Rail Project-II and preservation of bio-diversity. In 2015, AFD extended a credit line of e1 billion over the next three years to India’s Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL) for sustainable infrastructure and urban development projects launched by India for development of renewable sources of energy.

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The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated close cooperation between India and France. India dispatched nearly 2 million HCQ tablets and 36 MT of paracetamol (API) to France, when that country reeled under the first wave during 2020. This friendly gesture was reciprocated by France which sent 120 ventilators, 50,000 each of serological tests and nose/throat swabs to India, when latter had to face the much serious second wave in 2021. France also announced a loan of e200 million to India to help those most severely affected by the pandemic (India, MEA, 2021: 115– 116).

Defence Cooperation and Arms Transfers When India intended to diversify the sources of defence equipment, it instinctively turned towards ‘friendly’ France. Between 1955 and 1959, the French annually supplied major weapons worth $21.8 million. In the 1980s, annual French arms sales to India increased significantly and amounted to $1.403 billion. While they averaged $26 million between 1982 and 1984, French arms supplies to India peaked to $467 million in 1986, following the delivery of the Mirage 2000s. Between 1987 and 1991, they averaged $82.8 million. By the turn of the millennium, French annual military sales to India averaged from e300 million to e2 billion, making their defence industries the third largest weapons and armament system suppliers to India after Russia and the United States (Roger, 2007: 1–32). In late 2005, India signed a $3 billion deal to acquire 6 Scorpène SSK submarines (called Kalvari-class submarines) with Armaris (a subsidiary of France’s Thales group) and the French state-owned naval shipyard Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN). This deal remained one of the largest single defence materiel contracts signed by India till then (de Vergeron, 2006: 10). Again, India and France signed a e7.87 billion agreement in September 2016 for the supply of 36 Rafale high-precision Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) from Dassault Aviation SA in flyaway condition (India, MEA, 2016: 3). Between 2008 and 2017, Paris had sold defence equipment worth e13.411 billion to India (France, Ministry of Defence, 2019: 17) (Table 4.4). Armaments are also manufactured in India under the French license as well as under the framework of joint and collaborative projects such as the upgradation of fighter aircrafts, supplied earlier by the French companies

No. ordered

(6)

(330)

(40)

(230)

(7000)

(22,250)

18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Weapon description

PA6

MILAN

SS-11

SA-315B Lama

SA-315B

Diesel engine

Anti-tank missile Anti-tank missile

Lama Light helicopter Light helicopter

Air search radar SA-316B Alouette-3 Light helicopter

Palmier

Weapon designation

French arms transfers to India, 1960–2020

S. No.

Table 4.4

(1979)

(1979)

1972

1971

(1968)

1962

(1960)

Year of order

1983–1992

1984–2019

1974–1983

1977–2005

1973–1977

1963–2003

1962–1970

Year(s) of delivery

18

(22,250)

(7000)

(230)

(40)

(330)

(6)

No. Delivered

MILAN-2 and MILAN-2T version; ordered from French-FRG company; most produced under licence in India; incl. for BMP-2 IFV For 9 Vikram OPV produced in India

Part of ‘ADGES’ air surveillance network Some 35 assembled from kits and rest produced in India as Chetak Assembled from kits in India as Cheetah Most assembled/produced in India; Indian designation as Cheetah

Comments

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No. ordered

8

(30)

14

8

10

6

6

6

S. No.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

PA6

20PA6

PA6

PA6

PA6

PA6

TRS-2215/2230

PA6

Weapon designation

Diesel engine

Diesel engine

Diesel engine

Diesel engine

Diesel engine

Diesel engine

Air search radar

Diesel engine

Weapon description

(2004)

(2004)

(1999)

(1990)

(1990)

(1987)

(1983)

(1983)

Year of order

2007–2009

2008–2013

2010–2012

1996–2008

1998–2004

1989–1993

1984–2000

1989–1991

Year(s) of delivery

6

6

6

10

8

14

(30)

8

No. Delivered

(continued)

For 4 Khukri corvettes produced in India Most produced in India as PSM-33 and PSM-33 Mk-2 For 7 Sukanya OPV from South Korea; including production in India For 4 Kora corvettes produced in India For 5 Samar OPV produced in India For 3 Shivalik (Projekt-17) frigates produced in India; PA-6-STC version For 3 Sankalp OPV produced in India For 3 Shardul landing ships produced in India; 20PA-6B and 12PA-6 versions

Comments

4 INDIA AND FRANCE

107

No. ordered

6

8

19

10

(49)

16

17

18

19

20

(continued)

S. No.

Table 4.4

Mirage-2000–5

SA-315B Lama

GS-100

20PA6

Scorpene

Weapon designation

Air search radar Light helicopter FGA aircraft

Diesel engine

Submarine

Weapon description

2011

(2009)

2009

(2006)

2005

Year of order

2015–2020

2009–2010

2010–2016

2013–2014

2017–2019

Year(s) of delivery

(21)

(10)

(19)

8

2

No. Delivered

INR109–175 b deal ($2.3–2.6 b; offsets $593 m); Indian Mirage-2000H rebuilt to Mirage-2000-5; incl. 2 produced in France and rest in India; delivery planned 2015–2023

INR207–237 b ($3.2–4.5 b) ‘Project-75’ programme; produced under licence in India as Kalvari; delivery planned 2017–2022/2023 (delayed from 2012–2017) For 4 Saryu OPV produced in India Incl. 13 produced in India Cheetal version

Comments

108 B. KRISHNAMURTHY

No. ordered

20

36

8

10

33

S. No.

21

22

23

24

25

FGA aircraft

Light helicopter

Weapon description

MD-450 Ouragan

SA-315B Lama

FGA aircraft

Light helicopter

SA-316B Alouette-3 Light helicopter

Rafale

SA-315B Lama

Weapon designation

(1953)

(2018)

2017

2017

2013

Year of order

1954

2019–2020

2019–2020

2015–2016

Year(s) of delivery

(33)

(8)

(13)

(20)

No. Delivered

(continued)

|3 b ($48 m) deal; Cheetal version; produced under licence in India e7.8 b deal (incl. e5.2 b for aircraft e1.8 b for spare parts and e710 m for armament; 50% offsets incl. 20% as production of components in India); Rafale-EH |3.2 b deal; produced under licence in India as Chetak Cheetal version; produced under licence in India; delivery planned from 2021 Second-hand (but maximum only used 1–2 years by France); Indian designation Toofani

Comments

4 INDIA AND FRANCE

109

No. ordered

71

164 110 12

3

(50)

2 1836

(500) 2

(1800)

(1000)

26

27 28 29

30

31

32 33

34 35

36

37

(continued)

S. No.

Table 4.4

R-550 Magic-1

MILAN

AM-50 120 mm Diodon

Alizé SS-11

1953

Year of order

SRAAM

Anti-tank missile

ASW aircraft Anti-tank missile Mortar ASW sonar

(1979)

(1979)

(1970) (1974)

(1967) 1968

(1966)

(1961)

Light tank (1956) Fighter aircraft (1956) ASW aircraft (1959)

FGA aircraft

Weapon description

SA-316B Alouette-3 Light helicopter AS-30 ASM

AMX-13/75 Mystere-4A Alizé

MD-450 Ouragan

Weapon designation

1981–1990

1982–1984

1970–1975 1980–1981

1968 1970–1972

1968

1962

1957–1958 1957–1958 1961

1953

Year(s) of delivery

(1000)

(1800)

(500) 2

(2) (1836)

(50)

3

(164) (110) 12

71

No. Delivered

For 2 Leander (Nilgiri) frigates from UK Ordered after delays in production in India (due to technical problems) For Jaguar and Sea Harrier and probably Mirage-2000 combat aircraft

Probably for Hunter combat aircraft Second-hand $7.5 m deal

For use on aircraft carrier

Indian designation Toofani

Comments

110 B. KRISHNAMURTHY

No. ordered

8

40

4

(200)

(500)

(200)

9

S. No.

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

Mirage-2000

Super-530D

R-550 Magic-2

AS-30L

TRS-2100 Tiger-S

Mirage-2000

Agave

Weapon designation

FGA aircraft

BVRAAM

SRAAM

Air search radar ASM

FGA aircraft

Combat ac radar

Weapon description

1986

1984

(1984)

(1984)

(1983)

1982

(1982)

Year of order

1987–1988

1987–1989

1985–1994

1986–1989

1984–1985

1985–1986

1986–1992

Year(s) of delivery

(9)

(200)

(500)

(200)

(4)

(40)

(8)

No. Delivered

INDIA AND FRANCE

(continued)

For Mirage-2000 combat aircraft For Mirage-2000 and Sea Harrier and probably Jaguar combat aircraft For Mirage-2000 combat aircraft Mirage-2000H version; incl. 3 Mirage-2000TH trainer/combat version; Indian designation Vajra

|30 m deal; for 8 Jaguar International-IM (Maritime Jaguar) combat aircraft Mirage-2000H version; incl. 4 Mirage-2000TH trainer/combat version; Indian designation Vajra; option on 70 more produced under licence in India not used

Comments

4

111

No. ordered

4

(200) (4)

(10)

10

16

45

46 47

48

49

50

(continued)

S. No.

Table 4.4

PA6

Mirage-2000

ATLIS

BGL Agave

ATAS

Weapon designation

Diesel engine

Aircraft EO system FGA aircraft

Guided bomb Combat ac radar

ASW sonar

Weapon description

(2003)

2000

(1993)

(1992) (1993)

(1992)

Year of order

2014–2020

2004–2005

1994–1995

1994–1995 1996–1999

2000–2005

Year(s) of delivery

16

(10)

(10)

(200) (4)

4

No. Delivered

$312–353 m deal; Mirage-2000H version; incl. 6 Mirage-2000TH trainer/combat version; Indian designation Vajra For 4 Kamorta (Project-28) frigates produced in India

For 1 Delhi (Project-15) destroyer and 3 Brahmaputra (Project-16A) frigates produced in India BGL-1000 version For 4 Jaguar International-IM (Maritime Jaguar) combat aircraft

Comments

112 B. KRISHNAMURTHY

36

493

(14) (358)

(200)

(350)

(200)

51

52

53 54

55

56

57

ASM

ASM

BVRAAM

BVRAAM

APC/APV Turboshaft

BVRAAM

Anti-ship missile

Weapon description

Source https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

AASM

Storm Shadow/SCALP

MICA

Meteor

Sherpa Ardiden-1

MICA

SM-39 Exocet

Weapon designation

(2020)

2016

(2016)

(2016)

(2012) (2016)

2012

2005

Year of order

2020

2020

2020

2013–2017

2014–2020

2017–2020

Year(s) of delivery

(100)

(175)

(100)

(14)

(493)

(9)

No. Delivered

For LCH combat helicopter produced in India; produced under licence in India as Shakti Part of e710 m deal; for Rafale combat aircraft Part of e710 m deal; MICA-RF and MICA-IR versions; for Rafale combat aircraft Part of e710 m deal; SCALP version; for Rafale combat aircraft For Rafale combat aircraft

Possibly $150 m deal; SM-39 Block-2 version; for Scorpene submarines e950 m deal (offsets 30%); MICA-EM and MICA-IR versions; for Mirage-2000-5 combat aircraft

Comments

INDIA AND FRANCE

58

No. ordered

S. No.

4

113

114

B. KRISHNAMURTHY

as well as by the Russians (Krishnamurthy, 2005, see chapter 6; Racine, 2002: 169). In 2015, India and France resolved to intensify their collaboration in defence technologies, research and development. Their respective business enterprises were encouraged to enter into arrangements for co-development and co-production of defence equipment along with provisions for transfer of know-how and technologies. As a result of Modi’s meeting with the French defence industry leaders, a number of French defence enterprises announced their plans to set up technological and industrial projects in India (India, MEA, 2015, 10 April). Thus, there is considerable scope for collaboration with France in advanced military technologies (Gupta, 2021). Defence Exercises France and India have engaged in regular defence exercises of their three services through joint exercises and manoeuvres between their navies (Varuna), air forces (Garuda) and land forces (Shakti). The first bilateral naval exercise between the two countries was held in 1983. They were named ‘Varuna’ in 2001. The naval exercises have become an integral part of the institutionalized interactions that is getting developed between the two navies and reflect a convergence of interest in achieving their goals (Saint-Mézard, 2015: 7). The Garuda exercises are alternately held in France and India and are part of the global framework of bilateral cooperation and they aim at enhancing the inter-operability level of the crews in air defence and ground attack missions (France, Embassy in India, 2019a). The latest joint exercises between land forces, the ‘Shakti-2019’, was conducted during November 2019 and focused on counter-terrorism operations in a semi-desert terrain. This exercise was aimed at achieving inter-operability, to be acquainted with mutual operational procedures as well as combat drills, and to understand and exchange the best practices while functioning in such a situation (France, Embassy in India, 2019b).

Space Research Indo-French cooperation in space research began in early 1960s. Vikram Sarabhai and J. Blamont of France were closely associated with the Indian efforts, which led to the setting up of the UN-sponsored Equatorial Rocket Launching Station at Thumba. Joint scientific experiments and

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excellent support from French scientists and industry helped the Indian team led by Sarabhai to conceptualize a programme, which sought to use space technology for peaceful purposes. The 15 May 1964 agreement on space research cooperation led the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to embark on a programme of continuing cooperation involving exchange of scientists and exchange of scientific and technical information. The 1977 agreement facilitated the training of Indians in all the sectors of space technology; the sale of a launching stand by CNES and the gift of COTAL radar and a telemetry station to Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO); and the purchase by ISRO of the license of the Viking engine of the Ariane launcher. France remains a major supplier of components and equipment for the Indian space programme. In 2015, the space agencies of the two countries signed a programme for a reinforced cooperation to realize the third earth observation mission, earth observation applications and planetary exploration. A MoU on Kaband propagation experiment and a document to extend the utilization of Indo-French joint satellite, Megha Tropiques , for two more years were also finalized (India, MEA, 2015, 10 April). Three years later, a joint vision statement on space research resolved to deepen space cooperation in order to meet together the new challenges concerning planetary exploration or human spaceflight. Paris agreed to train medical support personnel for Indian astronauts, who were expected to be part of India’s forthcoming manned space mission. A space climate observatory was also launched apart from agreement on the TRISHNA joint mission and accommodating Argos in Oceansat 3 (India, MEA, 2018, 10 March). It was also resolved to cooperate at the international level to promote norms and best practices necessary for guaranteeing the safety of space missions (India, MEA, 2019). In 2020–2021, ISRO and CNES were working on finalizing an agreement to implement the TRISHNA infrared satellite project between 2024 and 2030 (India, MEA, 2021: 115–116).

Cultural Relations The Indo-French cultural cooperation agreement of 7 June 1966 sought to facilitate exchanges in the fields of education, letters, science and arts and provided for means necessary for a better mutual knowledge of

116

B. KRISHNAMURTHY

each other’s languages and civilization including the provision of scholarships, cultural exchange programmes and mutual patronage. The 1984 cultural agreement sought to encourage translation and publication of each other’s literary works; close cooperation between publishers in the two countries; participation in each other’s book fairs/exhibitions; and the promotion of French books in India and vice versa (India, MEA, 1984: 7). More than fifteen Alliance Françaises in different parts of India continue to do yeoman service for the spread of French language and culture among the Indians. According to a public opinion survey conducted by the Pew Research Organisation in March 2019, 49% of the French believed that India’s role has grown over the past decade and its stature has increased in advanced economies. Among the people with higher levels of education and income, this opinion is still higher and roughly 59% felt that this was so (Devlin, 2019). An estimated 10,000 Indian students were studying in France in 2019. The French Government seeks to enhance this to 25,000 by 2025. French institutes of higher learning are offering courses in English, especially in the field of business management, to attract Indian students. As a result, about 3,000 new Indian students go each year to France. An agreement on the mutual recognition of degrees, which was signed in March 2018, has entered into force (India, MEA, 2020: 151–152).

Conclusion The Indo-French strategic partnership (1998) has been a turning point in bilateral relations. Though Paris initially was hesitant, it subsequently assumed a stance favouring India on important issues like arms supply, civilian nuclear cooperation, tackling the international terrorism and membership of India in the UN Security Council. The strength of Indo-French relations is ‘anchored in the dialectics between compatible national interest and global convergence’ (Racine, 2016: 263–265). Both have managed to carve out and nurture a forward-looking partnership. There seems to be a bipartisan consensus in enhancing, which fosters a similar outlook on many international issues, including the IndoPacific, international terrorism, multilateralism and a multipolar world. The promotion of relations with France does not ‘require significant expenditure of domestic political capital’ on the part of the Bharatiya

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Janata Party (BJP) or non-BJP governments (Rej, 2021). India’s partnership with France facilitated an improvement in India-EU relations. Time and again, France has proven to be a friend in both ‘need’ and ‘deed’.

References Appadorai, A., & Rajan, M. S. (1988). Indian foreign policy and relations. South Asian Publishers (Reprint). Ayres, A. (2006, November 21). Is India emerging as France of Asia? Yale Global Online. Retrieved April 10, 2016 from yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id= 8452 Basu, N. (2019, August 23). Macron backing India on J&K shouldn’t be a surprise—The French have always stood by India. The Print. Retrieved June 12, 2020 from www.theprint.in/diplomacy/ Boquérat, G. (2004). France’s Political Interaction with India through the Quai d’Orsay” Archives (1947–1972). In M.-J. Zins and G. Boquérat, India in the Mirror of Foreign Diplomatic Archives. New Dehli: Manohar. Business France. (2021). Annual report 2020. Retrieved March 23, 2022 from https://investinfrance.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Annual-Rep ort-FDI-in-France-in-2020-by-Business-France-5.pdf Chatrath, K. J. S. (1994). India in the debates of French Parliament. Indian Publishers Distributors. Délégation Générale pour l’Armement. (2001). Rapport au Parlement. Paris, annexe 6, pp. 81–82, as cited by Racine, J.-L. (2002). The Indo-French strategic dialogue: bilateralism and world perceptions. Journal of Strategic Studies, 25(4), 169–70. de Vergeron, L. K. (2006). Contemporary Indian views of Europe. Seven Bridges Press. Devlin, K. (2019, March 25). A sampling of public opinion in India. Retrieved March 14, 2022 from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/25/ a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/ FACETS, French Advances cum Expertise in Technology & Science, Journal of CEDUST—Office of the Counsellor for Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Embassy of France, New Delhi, no. 1, 1989, p. 1. Foundation for National Security Research. (2011, November). India’s strategic partners: A comparative assessment. New Delhi. France, MFA. (2020). The Security Council of the United Nations. Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York. Retrieved October 10, 2020 from onu.delegfrance.org/.

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France, Ministry of Defence. (2019). France and Security in the Indo-Pacific 2019. Retrieved August 24, 2019 from https://www.defense.gouv.fr/con tent/download/532754/9176250/file/France_and_Security_in_the_IndoPacific_-_2019.pdf. France, Embassy in India. (2019a, July 12). Indo-French air exercise “Garuda VI” took place from 1st to 12th July 2019 at Mont-de-Marsan Airbase 118. Retrieved September 16, 2020 from https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-FrenchAir-Exercise-Garuda-VI. France, Embassy in India. (2019b, October 29). Indo-French joint army exercise ‘Shakti’. Retrieved September 16, 2020 from https://in.ambafrance.org/ Indo-French-Joint-Army-Exercise-Shakti-2019. Gandhi, M. (1982). The collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, LXXXV July 16, 1946–October 20, 1946. Delhi. Gupta, S. (2021, November 6). France to help India in advanced military technologies. Hindustan Times. Retrieved March 14, 2022 from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/france-to-help-india-inadvanced-military-technologies-101636198597760.html Heimsath, C., & Mansingh, S. (1971). A diplomatic history of modern India. Allied. India Budget (2002–2003). Retrieved March 7, 2022 from https://www.indiab udget.gov.in/budget_archive/ub2002-03/rec/annex2.pdf India, Embassy in France. (2020). India-France comprehensive economic and commercial brief . Retrieved March 8, 2021 from https://www.eoiparis.gov. in/page/india-france-economic-and-commercial-relations-brief/#:~:text=In% 202020%2C%20the%20India%2DFrance,20.95%25%20to%20%E2%82%AC% 204.23%20billion India, MEA. (1984, January). Foreign Affairs Record. New Delhi. India, MEA. (2008, January 25–26). Joint statement issued on the occasion of the visit of President Sarkozy to India. Retrieved 10 March 2015 from mea. gov.in/bilateral/multilateral-documents/ India, MEA. (2010, December 6). India-France: Partnership for the future. Retrieved 13 May 2016 from mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents India, MEA. (2015, April 10). Joint Statement issued by India and France during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to France April 9–11, 2015. Retrieved February 19, 2022 from http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-doc uments.htm?dtl/25053/IndiaFrance_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_ Prime_Minister_to_France_April_911_2015 India, MEA. (2016, January 25). Joint Statement issued by India and France on the occasion of the President Francois Hollande visit to country. Retrieved May 5, 2016 from mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents/

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India, MEA. (2018, March 10). India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, March 10, 2018. Retrieved June 4, 2021 from https://www.mea. gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29597/IndiaFrance_Joint_Vision_for_ Space_Cooperation_New_Delhi_10_March_2018 India, MEA. (2019, August 22-23). India-France Joint Statement on Visit of Prime Minister to France. Retrieved February 19, 2022 from https://mea. gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31755/IndiaFrance_Joint_Statement_ on_Visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_France_2223_August_2019 India, MEA. (2020). Annual Report 2019-20. New Delhi. India, MEA. (2021). Annual Report 2020-21. New Delhi. Krishnamurthy, B. (2002). Ally, but not Aligned: French Quest for Multipolarism in an Unipolar World. In V. K. Malhotra (ed.), The USA – Relations with India and Europe. Wisdom House. Krishnamurthy, B. (2005). Indo-French Relations: Prospects and Perspectives. Shipra Publications, New Delhi. Krishnamurthy, B. (2007). Jawaharlal Nehru and Freedom Movement in French India. Centre for Nehru Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry. Krishnamurthy, B. (2021). ‘India, Europe and the Indo-Pacific’ in R. K. Jain (ed.), India, Europe and Asia. Convergence and Divergence. Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 161–185. Le Drian, J.-Y. (2021, April 13–15). India—Visit by Jean-Yves Le Drian (13–15 April 2021). Retrieved July 1, 2021 from https://www.diplomatie.gouv/fr/ en/country-files/india/news/article/india-visit-by-jean-yves-le-drian-13-15apr-2021 Modi, N. (2022). Joint Statement issued during the visit of Prime Minister to France, 4 May 2022. Retrieved 14 August 2022 from https://www.narend ramodi.in/4-may-2022-india%E2%80%93france-joint-statement-during-thevisit-of-prime-minister-to-france-561666 Nehru, J. (1958). Jawaharlal Nehru’s speeches, vol. III, March 1953–August 1957 . The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Nehru, J. (1983a). Jawaharlal Nehru’s speeches, vol. 4, September 1957–April 1963 (2nd ed.). The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Nehru, J. (1946, December 26). Letter to Marius Moutet, the French Minister of Colonies and later of Overseas Territories. In S. Gopal (Gen. Ed.), Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru (2nd series, Vol. 1). New Delhi, 1984. Neogy, A. K. (1997). Decolonisation of French India—Liberation movement and Indo-French relations 1947–1954. Institut Française de Pondichéry.

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CHAPTER 5

Modi’s India and the European Union: A Perceptions Study James Ling and Idesbald Goddeeris

Introduction In many ways, the European Union (EU) and India strike one as being natural partners. Pluralistic, multilingual and multi-ethnic, both rigidly uphold principles of democracy under constant scrutiny from noisy media organisations and a rich civil society. As well as these core values, many

Originally published in Stosunki Miedzynarodowe—International Relations, vol. 51, no. 4, 2015, pp. 153–177. Copyright © 2015 Institute of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Warsaw University. Reproduced with the permission of the copyright holders. J. Ling (B) Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] I. Goddeeris University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_5

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key interests align—an economically strong India could be a lucrative market for EU companies, while the EU could be an invaluable source of investment for India. Furthermore, there are clear joint priorities in Asian security issues, particularly with regard to combating terrorism, and both share similar ideas with regard to sustainable development and effective multilateralism. For years India has been a shrinking violet globally, partly as a result of the ‘policy paralysis’ caused by weak coalition governments and a fractured ruling Congress Party. However, the elections held in May 2014 delivered new leadership—the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Narendra Modi, who claimed to offer a vision of a ‘stronger India, its place restored in the top tier of world powers’ (Kumar, 2015). Towards this end Modi has placed renewed focus on India’s foreign policy, spending more than 50 days of his first year on foreign trips and meeting upwards of 50 national leaders for direct talks (The Economist, 2015, May 23: 14). Top priority has been to reinforce India’s influence in South Asia, the policy of ‘Putting Neighbours First’ reflecting the realisation that to be a global power, India must first be a regional power. Modi made a statement of intent by inviting the leaders of all the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) nations to his inauguration ceremony. He has also made an effort to ‘meet the neighbours’, Bhutan being his first overseas visit, shortly followed by a trip to Nepal. Outside of India’s immediate neighbourhood, Modi has predominantly pursued an ‘Act East’ policy, making high-profile state visits to both China and Japan. India’s relations with Japan were upgraded to a ‘special strategic and global partnership’ (Khandekar, 2014), while Modi was able to extract significant investment from China. Alongside these primary strategies, Modi has been careful to keep close relations with other global powers such as India’s long-time ally Russia. When looking west, Modi has focused his attention on engagement with the United States, himself making a high-profile visit, before receiving President Obama in New Delhi. India’s increased global profile, in addition to Modi’s domestic focus on growth and development, seemed to have raised the potential for more cooperation with the EU (Mukherjee, 2015). And yet, in 2015 EU–India relations are at a particularly low ebb, the disappearance of a proposed summit in the spring of 2015 symptomatic of the partnership’s unfulfilled potential and lost momentum (Sachdeva, 2015: 5). Although the lack of an EU–India summit may be blamed on Brussels (the European

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Commission failed to communicate a proposed schedule to New Delhi), Modi himself has clearly shown little appetite for engaging with the EU during his first year. This is not a complete rupture with the past, since EU–India relations had also been neglected in the years before he became PM. India initiated diplomatic dialogue with the EU (back then the European Economic Community) in 1961, but it was the end of the Cold War that created new opportunities for the EU and India to work together. European and Indian visions of a democratic, rule-based multipolar world coincided, and in 2004 they became ‘strategic partners’—a title reserved for the EU’s most important global allies—with a Joint Action Plan being launched in 2005 (Sachdeva, 2015: 7). The ‘strategic partnership’ aims to improve ties with India through bilateral dialogue and cooperation in a whole host of areas, including: trade and economics—intellectual property rights, trade defence instruments, technical barriers to trade and customs cooperation; political cooperation—effective multilateralism, regional cooperation, disarmament and non-proliferation, combating terrorism and organised crime; social cooperation—promotion of human rights and the rule of law; and environmental cooperation—sustainable development, climate change, renewable energy and energy efficiency (Council of the European Union, 2005, September 7). However, after this initial flurry of activity, since the start of the 2010s the relationship has stalled, with cooperation in truly strategic areas, such as defence and civil nuclear programme, yet to emerge (Sachdeva, 2014a). Today, as the EU is India’s largest trading partner, trade and economics remain ‘the core of EU–India relations’ (Sachdeva, 2014a). A proposed EU–India Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (BTIA) could yet propel economic cooperation to new levels, however, into their 9th year negotiations remained deadlocked (European Commission, 2006). By exploring how the EU is perceived in India, this chapter will investigate whether disinterest in the EU is typical of Indian views more generally or merely a reflection of Modi’s preferences. Understanding how the EU is perceived internationally is a crucial first step in formulating coherent policies towards partner countries, a position recognised by the European Commission (Holland et al., 2007: 24). Within the current context of faltering EU–India relations, a greater appreciation of how India imagines the EU can potentially provide a spark to reignite more effective cooperation. Such knowledge pertaining to how the EU is understood beyond its borders can also help more clearly define Europe

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for itself, in a period in which domestic struggles—Euroscepticism, Migration, ‘Grexit’—raise questions about our current conceptualisation of ‘Europe’. Perception studies have become increasingly prevalent in the field of European Studies during the preceding decade. After an initial study of 2002 exploring EU perceptions in New Zealand (Holland et al., 2003), their number has proliferated, encompassing studies in Thailand, Australia, South Korea, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Most notable was the series coordinated by Martin Holland—‘The EU Through the Eyes of Asia’ (Holland et al., 2007; Holland et al., 2009), two volumes of impressive weight, which provide a wealth of analysis but have not been updated since 2009. Indian perceptions have, however, been somewhat neglected, reflecting a belief that China and East Asia receive a disproportionate level of consideration from within the EU, by both academics contemplating the ‘rise of China’ and policy-makers who court Beijing (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2011: 37). There is a small amount of literature that has focused on Indian perspectives, which this study will build upon. Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron conducted two studies, looking at Indian perspectives of Europe before and after the global financial crisis (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2006). A more recent study was conducted in 2009 by Rajendra K. Jain and Shreya Pandey at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and published in 2010 and 2012. This study in particular can prove to be an interesting source for comparison with the findings made in the current study, given the time that has elapsed since its publication. Another study worth mentioning is the one by S. A. Wülbers (2010).

Methodology While it is common for perception studies to be comprised of three elements—media evaluation, public opinion surveys and elite interviews— for the purpose of this study, it was decided to focus only on a media evaluation. This choice was made partly as a result of practical constraints, but it was also decided that media evaluation represents the central tenet of the trio. While perceptions depend to some degree on the worldview of actors and their belief systems, it is also accepted that the media is a major source for forming political ideas. This is particularly true when researching such distant regions as the EU and India as perceptions are less likely to be formed by personal relations, making

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media representations more influential. By selecting just a small number of news items from thousands, media organisations frame the world for their audience—therefore influencing both public opinion and elite perspectives. An image of how India perceives the EU will be built by evaluating a section of the online news media in India. This represents an update on previous perception studies, which have generally focused only on traditional media forms—print, radio and television. It seems logical in 2015 to conduct research of online media, online news having overtaken newspaper readership globally in 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2011). Although Internet access in India is far from complete, there are more new Internet users in India each year than in any other country in the world (Internet Live Stats, 2015), with 2013 data showing that online news media in India was already on the verge of overtaking print media (Comscore Press Release, 2013, October 1). The three media outlets researched for the current study were chosen primarily due to their high level of readership, they are three of the top six most visited online news sites in India (Comscore Press Release, 2013, October 1). A secondary consideration was to find a representative sample, which was achieved by incorporating diverse publications: a Hindi-language daily, an English-language daily and a weekly publication. The Dainik Jagran is India’s most popular daily print newspaper (Indian Readership Survey, 2014), and the articles for current study were taken from its English news website (post.jagran.com). The Hindustan Times is an English-language daily newspaper, whose website (hindustantimes. com) is the third most visited news website in India. And India Today (indiatoday.intoday.in) a weekly magazine is the fourth most visited news site in India (Comscore Press Release, 2013, October 1). For part one—the Indian perception of the EU—the research period ran for 11 months, from 1 June 2014 until the end of April 2015. This period was chosen to coincide with the beginning of Modi’s premiership—as argued in the introduction, his arrival has seen a profound change in India’s foreign relations, making this an appropriate moment to begin the research. A research period of 11 months will establish a representative picture of how India perceives the EU, such an extended period preventing one particular event or issue skewing the results. All articles which mentioned ‘European Union’ or ‘EU’ were included in the

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study, resulting in 50 articles from ‘post.jagran.com’, 86 articles from ‘hin dustantimes.com’ and 47 articles from ‘indiatoday.intoday.in’, creating a total sample of 183 articles for part one of the study. The study will make use of quantitative and qualitative elements in order to produce a more complete picture of Indian perspectives. Each article will be evaluated with regard to how it ‘frames’ the EU. Articles will be classified as having framed the subject as primarily an: economic, political, social or environmental actor. Economic actorness includes involvement in trade issues and disputes, anti-trust investigations and also the economic sanctioning of Russia—although this is clearly politically motivated, the choice of sanctioning reflects the EU’s preference for economic tools. Political actorness includes activity in traditionally strategic areas such as defence and civil nuclear programmes, as well as diplomatic activity such as the Iran nuclear talks. Social actorness includes the promotion or setting of social norms, through human rights promotion at home or abroad, or legislating on issues such as crime, drugs. Articles will also be evaluated for the tone in which they present the subject. A score of +1 will be attributed to an article that presents the subject in a positive light, for example: when the EU is recognised as an environmental leader by South Korea (India Today, 2015, January 12). Articles that describe the subject negatively, such as when the EU was criticised over its reaction to the migrant crisis (Sonwalkar, 2015a), receive a score of −1, with neutral articles scored as 0. To gain a more nuanced view of how the subjects are being presented, measures of centrality and domesticity were also incorporated. Centrality assesses how important the subject is within an article, whether it is the main focus of the article, a secondary or comparative focus, or a minor actor mentioned only briefly. The measure of domesticity records the geographical focus of an article, dividing articles into three groups; those referring primarily to issues about the subject, those referring to Indian issues, and those based on events in a third country. In order to paint the most complete picture possible, other data were also collected; article sources, the frequency with which relevant officials were mentioned, and the frequency with which EU institutions were mentioned.

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EU News Frequency and Sources The EU received a very low level of exposure in the chosen publications during the research period. 183 articles over 11 months gives an average of just 17 articles per month across the three websites. The level of coverage naturally varied between the sites, the Dainik Jagran (DJ) website—related to India’s most read newspaper—published, on average, less than 5 articles mentioning the EU per month. Although the Hindustan Times (HT) site, being generally more open to international news, was more inclined to publish news about the EU, it still averaged less than 8 articles per month. Interestingly, the EU is, therefore, less visible in the Indian media in 2014–2015 than in Jain and Pandey’s 2009 study. Although not perfectly comparable (the publications sampled are not identical, and their study was based on print media rather than online media), the 2009 study found, on average, 13 articles per month, per publication referencing the EU—more than twice this study. This general lack of media visibility is consistent with previous perception studies conducted elsewhere in Asia regarding the EU (Holland et al., 2007: 288). As concluded by Holland, this lack of visibility suggests to the public that the EU is insignificant and may contribute to a perception in India that the EU is a minor global power. The Indian perception of the EU will also be shaped to some extent by the articles’ authors. Contrary to the other outlets, the DJ news website attributed all of its articles to ‘Jagran Post News Desk – Jagran Post Editorial’, which accordingly appears here as the largest source of EU news. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of this, however, as a number of articles surfaced in the same form in other publications, with a different source credited. ‘India-EU FTA would require compromises by all sides: Merkel’ (Dainik Jagran, 2015a) was also published on the same day in The Economic Times, an Indian business daily, credited to the Press Trust of India (PTI) (Press Trust of India, 2015a) (Fig. 5.1). Over half of the articles were supplied by news agencies, although only a small minority originated from India-based agencies, with the Press Trust of India (PTI) and the Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) contributing a combined 11 articles. Western news agencies were, therefore, the dominant source of EU news, providing around half of the articles that appeared in the HT and India Today (IT). Reuters was the most prevalent, followed by the Agence France Presse (AFP), a

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Fig. 5.1 Sources of EU news

Paris-based agency, and the Associated Press (AP), from New York. This reliance upon Western news agencies reflects what Jain and Pandey describe as ‘the domination of Anglo-American imagery’ in the Indian media since India’s independence in 1947 (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 194; 2012: 332). This means that the Indian perception of the EU will be, to a large extent, conditioned by the British, and to a lesser extent French, perception. France and the UK currently harbour some of the most vocal Eurosceptic voices, the Front National in France and the UK Independence Party—already forcing a referendum on EU membership in the UK. Therefore, these British (or more accurately English) and French perceptions of the EU are unlikely to be positive ones given the current climate. Only a minority of the EU news featured in the HT and IT was written by their own correspondents, who contributed just under half of the articles in the IT and about one-fifth in the HT. The way in which both websites (and quite likely also the DJ) rely heavily on news agencies for their EU news rather than their own correspondents again suggests that the EU is perceived as relatively insignificant. This suspicion is compounded when one considers that none of the news organisations featured have a correspondent based permanently in ‘the capital of

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Europe’ (in fact the only permanent correspondent in Europe is the HT journalist based in London—a fact only likely to compound the domination of ‘Anglo-American imagery’; Jain & Pandey, 2010: 194; 2012: 332). As a result, only a very small fraction of EU news originates from Brussels itself. The Indian press is not unique in neglecting Brussels; in fact, journalists are ‘deserting’ Brussels, with the press pack shrinking by almost 60% in the 2000s (Charlemagne, 2015, March 15). Commentators have noted how this trend has resulted in a reduction and dilution of EU news, both in the Indian (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 195; 2012: 334) and European media (Charlemagne, 2015, March 15). This can, therefore, help explain why the EU lacks visibility in the Indian media; however, this ‘dilution’ of EU news may also impact upon perceptions in India. Correspondents who are based permanently in Brussels are likely to have a deeper understanding of the EU, which they are able to pass on to the public, an understanding that may even manifest itself in more positive reporting on the EU. It is, therefore, possible that the absence of journalists in Brussels may have a negative impact upon the way the EU is perceived in India and globally. This knowledge gap, identifiable in much of the coverage, is filled to some extent by the presence of articles supplied by ‘others’—usually experts, academics or social commentators. An article in the HT was written by Gulshan Sachdeva, a professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and ICCR chairholder at the KU Leuven in Belgium, titled: ‘In economic terms, the EU should matter a lot more’ (Sachdeva, 2014b). These articles tend to be more analytical in their coverage of the EU and Indo-EU relations, but they represent only a small minority of articles, contributing around 10% of the total coverage.

EU Frames The EU was described predominantly as an economic actor in 38% of articles, making it the most common framing. Many of these articles were with reference to the economic sanctions imposed by the EU upon Russia (Dainik Jagran, 2014a) and Russian countermeasures (Reuters, 2014). A number of further articles were written in reference to the stalled, yet ongoing, negotiations towards an EU–India Free Trade Agreement, with reports that talks may resume for the first time since May 2013 (Dainik Jagran, 2015b). Perception studies elsewhere in Asia have shown that the

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EU is most often perceived as an economic actor (Holland et al., 2007: 289), with the previous study on Indian perceptions also confirming that it is the EU’s status as an economic giant that most defines it (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 202; 2012: 335–336). The second most frequently applied frame was that of ‘social actor’, accounting for 25% of the total. The EU’s role as a legislator was often alluded to, with a particular preference in the Indian media for news about the information technology and online media sectors, reflecting the importance of these sectors in India—a large number of articles reported on the ‘right to be forgotten’ European Court of Justice ruling against Google (India Today, 2015, February 7). The EU was also presented as a legislator in other fields, with articles reporting on, inter alia, food safety rules, drug bans, and car safety laws. The EU was presented occasionally, within the frame of social actor, as a ‘normative actor’—acting in such a way to promote its own normative principles (Manners, 2002). This is visible in the EU’s promotion of international human rights and the rule of law in Pakistan—‘Pakistan executes 4 death row prisoners’ (India Today, 2015, March 31). The EU was framed as a ‘political actor’ in 21% of articles. This often presented the EU as a diplomatic mediator, such as with reference to the EU’s role in the Ukraine crisis (AFP, 2015) and in the Iran nuclear talks (India Today, 2015, April 3). This represents a small evolution in the way the EU is framed, with a higher percentage of articles framing it as a social or political actor in comparison with previous studies. Holland found how ‘perceptions of the EU as a political actor that is growing in importance, as a champion of international human rights […] remain very much in the shadows of public attention’ (Holland et al., 2007: 289). And in Jain and Pandey’s 2009 study, economic actor was the overwhelmingly dominant frame applied to the EU in the Indian media (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 202; 2012: 336). It is interesting to consider whether this change in the way the EU is framed is a result of an increased global presence as a political and social actor or rather a reflection of its diminishing position as an economic one. For there are evident contradictions with the way in which India perceives the EU mainly as an economic actor—despite the EU’s position as a major economic powerhouse and India’s largest trading partner, only two per cent of Indians consider that the EU countries are the leading economic power globally (Sachdeva, 2015: 10). Lisbonne-de Vergeron, writing about the Indian perception of Europe based on elite

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interviews, found that Europe’s reputation in India as an economic power had been damaged by the financial crisis, the crash having been seen to have exposed ‘latent weakness and stagnation in Europe’ (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2011: 20). When considering these changing perceptions, in addition to the overall reduction in visibility afforded to the EU compared to Jain and Pandey’s study, it is possible that the EU is being granted less coverage as an economic actor, meaning its framing as a political or social actor appears more common (Fig. 5.2). The least common frame attributed to the EU is that of ‘environmental actor’ presented as such in only seven articles, three per cent of the total. This finding is in contrast with Jain and Pandey, who found, in 2009, ‘environmental actor’ to be the second most common frame applied to the EU in the Indian media (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 202; 2012: 336). This perhaps shows only how environmental news tends to be concentrated on specific landmark events—the UN Climate Change Convention Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen happened to occur during Jain and Pandey’s research period. It is thus expected that the framing of the EU

Fig. 5.2 EU news: frames (Source Own calculation)

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as an environmental actor would increase later in 2015, in reference to the upcoming Paris conference.

EU News: Focus of Centrality The measure of centrality shows that the EU is the main focus in 44% of the articles, the figure being even higher in the HT and DJ. Some effort is made to explain EU issues, with two articles in the HT specifically addressing EU–India relations—‘EU pins hopes on Modi to boost ties with India,’ (Dasgupta, 2015) and ‘In economic terms, the EU should matter a lot more’ (Sachdeva, 2014b). The DJ also ran an article about the appointment of Donald Tusk as Council President, ‘EU needs longterm Russia strategy lasting years – Tusk’ (Dainik Jagran, 2015c). This focus of centrality contrasts with Jain and Pandey’s 2009 study, where the EU was more often than not a minor actor in news items (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 202; 2012: 335–336). This results in an interesting incongruence—though the EU is afforded very little coverage in the Indian media, when mentioned it is often as the central actor in a news item. The focus of centrality, therefore, somewhat contradicts the perception that the EU is considered insignificant by the Indian media. However, within these articles, where it was the central focus, the EU was portrayed more often in a negative manner—two articles of positive tone and eight negative. While the focus of centrality may, therefore, suggest that the EU is perceived as a main and significant actor, it also shows that this coverage may disproportionately spread the perception that the EU is a troubled or declining power (Fig. 5.3).

EU News: Focus of Domesticity The focus of domesticity reveals that EU-based events and issues command little attention in the Indian online news, accounting for only about one-quarter of the articles, a trend common across all the three sites. This would, somewhat contrary to the focus of centrality, again suggest that the EU is perceived as relatively insignificant and therefore not often worthy of media attention. A feature of the few items which did report on EU domestic issues was that they were often negative in tone, with two articles presenting the EU positively and eight negatively— EU-based news is, therefore, not only infrequent but also unflattering. The Mediterranean ‘migrant crisis’ and the EU’s reaction were the most

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Fig. 5.3 EU news: focus of centrality (Source Own calculation)

common topic amongst the EU-based news, articles such as ‘Europe’s migrant crisis: EU’s funds not enough, say critics’ (Sonwalkar, 2015a), being typical of the coverage. Reporting of this kind is an accurate reflection of a perception identified in previous research—that Europe is a declining power, facing a growing number of existential crises. Lisbonnede Vergeron, in her 2006 study, found that Europe is seen as outdated, inward looking and as having an image of being socially and culturally protectionist (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2006: 34, 40). That the Indian media focused so much attention on the migrant crisis in Europe would seem to represent a manifestation of these sentiments (Fig. 5.4). India-based news mentioning the EU also only represents about onequarter of the total coverage, although this was higher in the DJ (38%)— Jain and Pandey having previously recognised that the DJ tends to focus principally on domestic issues (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 198; 2012: 335). Articles based on Indian issues also often presented the EU negatively (three positive against eight negative), perhaps reflecting existing problems in India–EU relations—for example, as a long-time ally of Russia, India has been unwilling to cooperate with the EU’s policy of sanctioning Russia (Press Trust of India, 2015b). However, the most visible

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Fig. 5.4 EU news: focus of domesticity (Source Own calculation)

of these frictions was the trade dispute regarding the EU’s ban on the import of Indian mangoes. Although this was, on the face of it, a minor dispute—the EU market for mangoes is worth less than e8 million annually to India (Dainik Jagran, 2015d)—it gained a disproportionate level of coverage. In ‘India asks EU to lift mango import ban’ (Dainik Jagran, 2014b) the DJ portrays the EU as insensitive, accused of unilaterally imposing the ban without consulting or warning the Indian authorities. A reported disagreement between the EU and India, of potentially much greater magnitude, relates to the Italian marines who awaited trial in India. Having begun as a bilateral issue between India and Italy, it certainly impacted upon EU–India relations. The EU involved itself in efforts to end the crisis, efforts not always appreciated in India. In January 2015, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the repatriation of the marines, which was reported in the HT as being received with ‘disapproval’ by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (Sonwalkar, 2015a). Federica Mogherini, initially involved as Italy’s foreign minister, has since been appointed the High Representative of the European Union

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for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission—a de facto foreign minister. The HT reported that Mogherini’s experience with India on the Italian marines case was a major reason for the non-realisation of an Indo–EU summit during Modi’s visit to Europe. While diplomatically India and the EU strive to be partners, indeed strategic partners, incidents such as these are likely to contribute to a perception in India that the relationship is a fragile one. As these issues are allowed to grow, and in some cases become personal, it is unsurprising that the Indian media portray the EU as the troublemaker which in time contributes to a more clearly negative perception of the EU. The EU was mentioned most commonly, in 44% of articles, with regard to issues based in third countries. This was frequently with regard to the Ukraine crisis, Russian sanctions and Iranian nuclear talks, but it also included articles about ASEAN, Bangladesh, China, DR Congo, Israel, Pakistan, Palestine, South Korea and Sri Lanka. Interestingly, it was with regard to these third country issues that the EU was most commonly presented in a positive manner—8 positive articles against four negative. This positive portrayal occurred typically when the EU was acting as, in Holland’s words, ‘a champion of international human rights’ (Holland et al., 2007: 289), or perhaps alternatively as a ‘normative power’, for example, to condemn ‘Bangladesh Violence: Thirty-four people died in vote protest’ (India Today, 2015, January 24). Other articles, such as ‘South Korea is expected to launch the second largest Carbon Market in the world’ (India Today, 2015, January 12), which praises the EU’s carbon market as being the model, also presented the EU positively. The focus of domesticity, therefore, shows that although the EU may be perceived as having problems at home, it is capable of having a positive influence globally. It is interesting that this global influence is presented positively by the Indian media—Lisbonne-de Vergeron, in her perception study based on elite interviews, found that the way the EU stresses its values abroad ‘does not appeal to India’ (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2006: 7).

EU Institutions and Officials EU officials and leaders lack visibility in the Indian media, with 74% of EU news items failing to mention a single EU official. Federica Mogherini, the EU’s de facto foreign minister, featured in only 12 articles during the research period, equating to on average one mention per month.

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João Cravinho, the EU’s Ambassador in India, was mentioned even less frequently, in only eight articles. This would suggest that these individuals—in theory the faces of the EU in India—are perceived as relatively unimportant with little standing (Fig. 5.5). There is clearly confusion in the Indian media as to the role of the EU’s three Presidents. Each was at different times mentioned with regard to international issues, therefore overlapping with the role of Mogherini. There is also an innate problem of understanding with regard to the distinction between the presidents. This was best represented in the DJ, its article about the appointment of Donald Tusk as Council President being mistakenly accompanied by a picture of Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Commission. The labelling of Donald Tusk (or Jean-Claude Juncker) merely as the ‘new EU President’ underlines this problem of comprehension. This confusion has been recognised in previous literature, Lisbonne-de Vergeron, showing how Indians perceive the EU leadership to be overly fragmented, meaning that the EU struggles to communicate with a single, unified voice—a perception that is unlikely to have changed (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2011: 63). The EU institutions received considerably more attention than the officials who represent them, with at least one institution being mentioned in 41% of articles. The European Commission is, by some margin, the most visible of the EU institutions, contributing more than half of the total

Fig. 5.5 Visibility of EU officials (total mentions)

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mentions. It is interesting to note the increased visibility of other institutions, with both the European Parliament and Court of Justice of the EU being referred to on numerous occasions, in contrast to the research of Jain and Pandey, in 2009, when they received no coverage at all (Jain & Pandey, 2010: 201; 2012: 336). These findings are somewhat contradictory—with regard to EU officials, it seems that the Indian media continue to find the EU hierarchy a mystery, yet increased visibility of EU institutions would suggest an increase in comprehension. The relatively high level of visibility afforded to the Commission, in comparison with EU officials, is perhaps a reflection of the English perception of the EU. In the English press, the Commission is frequently described as resembling a ‘faceless bureaucracy, an army of anonymous eurocrats’ (in the words of the Commission itself!). Reference, therefore, to ‘The Commission’ can be an umbrella term used to prevent the need for more in-depth explanation of EU developments. That the Indian media mention the Commission three times more often than any single EU official would seem to confirm the prevalence of this perception—that the EU is a ‘faceless’ organisation, better known for its institutions than its people (Fig. 5.6).

Fig. 5.6 Visibility of EU institutions (total mentions) (Source Own calculation)

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The Indian Perception of France, Germany and the UK The EU’s three most populous Member States receive far more exposure in the Indian media than the EU itself, the articles published in the month of April 2015 alone eclipsing the number of EU news items across 11 months. The month of April was of course extraordinary, with Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Europe, which included stops in France and Germany, receiving much media attention—reporting of the visit accounted for more than one-third of the total sample of 221 articles. France was the most visible during the research period, being mentioned in 85 articles, Germany was the least visible—mentioned in only 62 articles, with the UK being mentioned in 74. Given that France and Germany received extra coverage due to Modi’s visit, it is somewhat surprising that their level of visibility is not far above the UK’s. It seems that the Indian media maintains a rooted interest in reporting UK news, although there is some debate in the literature as to the reasons for this. Jain and Pandey argue, as previously mentioned, that this merely reflects the residual ‘Anglo-American imagery’ in the Indian press, present since independence (Jain & Pandey, 2010, 2012: 332). Lisbonne-de Vergeron, however, contends that this interest is a reflection of contemporary rather than historical circumstance—it is the large Indian diaspora currently present in the UK that results in a high visibility of UK news in the Indian media (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2006). When reporting on French, German and UK news, the sites were, in comparison with their coverage of the EU, much more reliant on their own correspondents—with the DJ again, correctly or not, attributing all of its news to the ‘Jagran Post News Desk’. In the IT and HT about 60% of French, German and UK news was written by their own staff, maybe reflecting how France, Germany and the UK are seen as more significant actors, worthy of closer attention. This is, however, also naturally a result of the exceptional interest created by the visit of Modi to Europe, with both the HT and IT sending correspondents to follow Modi’s tour. As already mentioned, the HT has a permanent correspondent in London, reflecting the constant interest in UK news. As a result, the reliance on news agencies was reduced in both organisations, representing only around one-quarter of the IT’s coverage and a third of the HT’s.

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The Indian media framed France as an economic actor in more than 50% of the articles. This was mostly in reference to the deal struck between Modi and French President François Hollande for the purchase by India of 36 Rafale jet planes—‘India to buy 36 Rafale jets from France’ (Dainik Jagran, 2015e). The deal was the main focus of 13 articles, India and France having been in protracted talks regarding the deal, originally for the purchase of 126 planes, for over three years. A number of other articles framed France as an economic actor; reporting on the announcement that France will invest two billion euro in India and that French National Railways will assist India’s high-speed rail project (Dainik Jagran 2015f). France was framed as a political actor in around 25% of the articles, reflecting a number of further agreements made during Modi’s visit—with regard to visas (Sonwalkar, 2015b) and nuclear energy (India Today, 2015, April 10). Germany was also presented as an economic actor in 50% of articles. Again, much of the coverage was of course related to Modi’s visit to Germany, a trip about which the Indian Ministry of External Affairs declared ‘business is 1st in order of priority’ (India Today, 2015, April 12). A number of articles were dedicated to the ‘Hannover Messe’, an industrial trade fair, which Modi attended to front the ‘Make in India’ investment campaign (India Today, 2015, April 13) (Fig. 5.7). Another article reported on Modi’s roundtable meeting with top business CEOs and attendance at the India–German business summit (India Today, 2015, April 12). Germany was framed both as a political actor and as social actor in around 20% of articles, with a slightly higher frequency of environmental actorness, in comparison with France and the UK, reflecting how climate change and renewable energy cooperation featured as a higher priority in Germany (India Today, 2015, April 12). It is intriguing that both France and Germany were presented predominantly as economic actors. France is generally perceived as India’s key strategic partner in Europe, with strong cooperation in strategic political areas such as defence and civil nuclear programme, while Germany is frequently perceived as the commercial hub of Europe. It seems likely that the long awaited, and well documented, Rafale jets deal contributed largely to France’s framing during this period. The way in which the UK was framed was noticeably different to France and Germany, with only around one in five articles portraying the UK as an economic actor. The HT reported Prime Minister David Cameron’s offer to ‘Make in India’, in effect a rival bid to sell jets to

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Fig. 5.7 French, German and UK news: frames (Source Own calculation)

India (Sonwalkar, 2015c). The UK was far more frequently, in around 40% of articles, framed as a political actor, reflecting the dominant issue in the UK at the time—the upcoming general election to be held on 7 May 2015 (the timing of the election was the primary reason why Modi’s Euro-tour did not stop in London) (Chaudhury, 2015). Interestingly, a section of this coverage focused specifically on the role of the Indian diaspora in the election, the HT reporting on how Indians were likely to vote (Sonwalkar, 2015d), how the parties were trying to ‘woo’ the Indian community (Sonwalkar, 2015d), and the increasing number of Indian parliamentary candidates (Sonwalkar, 2015f). This, therefore, confirms, to some extent, Lisbonne-de Vergeron’s observation that much of the Indian media’s interest in the UK is due to the diaspora rather than historical reasons. An interesting side-story was the portrayal of the Eurosceptic sentiment present in the election campaign, the HT reporting how anti-EU sentiment could be a positive for India—UKIP leader Nigel Farage declaring his preference for Indian migrants over Europeans (Sonwalkar, 2015g). Such rhetoric is likely to be popular in India as there is

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growing frustration about UK visa rules for students and post-study work (Sonwalkar, 2015f). This follows a trend present in previous literature, a 2011 Indian perception study, again by Lisbonne-de Vergeron, found that Indians perceive Britain to be a peripheral figure in Europe with little influence, in direct contrast to France and Germany. This allows Britain to retain close cooperative links with the rest of the world, particularly the Commonwealth nations such as India. Lisbonne-de Vergeron noticed, therefore, a possible conflict arising in British foreign policy between further European integration and its linkages with Commonwealth partners (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2011: 34), a debate which the Indian media seem to have picked up on. It is interesting to note that reporting of this Eurosceptic sentiment in the UK was chiefly to be found in the HT— the only site to have a permanent correspondent in London—perhaps confirming how this can result in more negative perceptions of the EU arriving in the Indian media.

Conclusions Figure 5.8, from the Pew Research Centre’s 2014 Global Attitudes Survey, makes for interesting reading (although it is worth clarifying that the survey took place before Russia’s annexation of Crimea). With only 34% of those surveyed holding a favourable opinion of the EU, the Union finds itself sandwiched between China and Iran in the Indian league table of agreeable world powers. It is, on the face of it, a remarkable finding. And yet, as this study has shown, on closer inspection it is perhaps not a complete surprise. During the 11-month research period, there were, across the three sites, only 13 articles that presented the EU in a positive light, with the Indian media far more likely to focus on negative issues related to the EU. When the Indian media reported on European topics, it confounded the previously found perceptions about Europe being in decline, with the EU often depicted at the centre of crises such as ‘Grexit’ and Mediterranean migration. When reporting on bilateral EU–India issues, the EU was also often portrayed unflatteringly, and very rarely presented convincingly as an ally or partner of India. Of further interest is the percentage figure not displayed on the Global Attitudes survey graphic—the EU had the highest percentage (41%) of respondents who had ‘no opinion’ of it at all, more than any of the other global powers. The results of this study would also seem to corroborate

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Fig. 5.8 Indian attitudes towards the rest of the world (Source Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey)

this finding. Although negative portrayals of the EU outnumbered positive ones in the Indian media, there were far more articles of neutral tone, totalling 82% of the total sample. This could reflect a general tendency for the Indian media to report in a very objective manner, resulting in many neutral portrayals. It seems therefore that the Indian media, much like the respondents of the Global Attitudes survey, often have no opinion of the EU at all. It should also be remembered that the EU generally had a very low total level of visibility in the Indian media—mentioned in 17 articles per month on average, across the three sites. From the readers’ point of view, visibility and publicity generally equate to importance, therefore while the EU gains such little coverage in India it is likely to remain relatively insignificant. It is clear then that the EU has an image problem in India. The above findings suggest that this problem is twofold, encompassing both disapproval and general indifference. The disapproval may reflect a lack of mutual knowledge between India and the EU. While the results of this study show that Indian understanding of the EU remains insufficient, there is also evidence to suggest that many misperceptions about India are to be found in Europe. Sachdeva recently reflected upon how ‘stories

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related to poverty, human rights abuses, rape, the rise of right-wing politics or exotic stories concerning tribal issues, yoga etc. are relatively more prevalent in the European media’ (Sachdeva, 2015: 41). Such rhetoric may create a harmful feedback loop, with the Indian media retaliating by spreading negative views of Europe. It would be of great interest to conduct a reverse perception study—of how India is perceived in Europe—in order to substantiate or disprove these thoughts. However, more than the occasional disapproval, it is the indifference towards the EU that represents the dominant perception in India. EU structural problems are contributing to this perception. EU relations are in competition with India’s bilateral interactions with individual Member States rather than complimentary to them. Indian dialogue structures with the EU Member States are very similar to the ones used by the EU, with India preferring to engage with individual Member States due to simplicity (no need for EU consensus) and speed of negotiations (Wülbers, 2010: 20)—note how Modi was able to sign 18 agreements during his short time in France (India Today, 2015, April 10). At a political level, India’s tactic is, therefore, to move beyond the complex EU structure and strike bilateral initiatives with key power centres in the EU such as France and Germany (India Today, 2015, February 19). This also reflects a perception that France and Germany hold the real power in Europe, even at the EU level, shown by how Modi could be seen petitioning Merkel to reopen negotiations towards the proposed EU–India free-trade agreement. While the Indian government so openly favours interaction at Member State level, the EU’s profile will clearly suffer. The indifference shown to the EU is also caused by the lack of visibility afforded to its officials, due to its fragmented and alien hierarchy. This is despite specific measures undertaken by the EU, such as the creation of the High Representative position by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, aimed at providing the EU’s foreign policy with a single, recognisable figurehead (Jain & Pandey, 2010, 2012: 332). The Indian media did show a level of appreciation for the role filled by Mogherini, and she was the most visible of the EU officials. However, being mentioned in, on average, only one article per month means that she is unlikely to be a household name in India. It should not be underestimated how the role of individual personalities can influence perceptions in India. Modi’s omnipresence in Indian politics has allowed him to gain celebrity status far beyond that

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of leaders in recent history—‘A Modi election delivered a Modi government’, the Indian media mostly fawn (The Economist, 2015, May 23). The media ‘fawning’ continued when other world leaders visited New Delhi, especially at the arrival of US President Barack Obama in January 2015. Although Twitter followers, shown in Table 5.1, may be something of a crude measure and an unfair direct comparison, as a reflection of public profile, they are telling. That the average Indian cannot recognise an EU leader can to some extent explain the sombre state of EU–India relations. Modi has looked to reassert India’s presence on the world stage by engaging the other global heavyweights; meetings with Russian, Chinese and Japanese leadership, huge public events in the United States. These are much more effective at projecting an image of strength to the Indian people than meeting with relatively low-profile (at least in India) EU officials. The research has also shown that the Indian media is to some extent responsible for the indifference felt towards the EU. The almost total absence of Indian journalists in Brussels is a contributing factor—for the EU to be recognised as globally significant and have its image projected positively, it requires journalists to have a reasonable comprehension of the EU as an actor. The EU itself clearly recognises this and has taken tentative steps to improve understanding—an in-depth article on the EU– India relationship titled ‘EU leaders pin hopes on Modi for bettering ties’ was published by the HT from a writer in Brussels on invitation from the EU (Dasgupta, 2015). However, there is ‘chicken-egg’ conundrum at play here—the Indian media largely ignore the EU because it is perceived as insignificant by the Indian public, while the Indian public perceive the EU as insignificant because the Indian media largely ignore it. Table 5.1 Leaders’ Twitter followers

Barack Obama Narendra Modi David Cameron François Hollande Donald Tusk Jean-Claude Juncker Federica Mogherini João Cravinho Source Twitter.com

63,000,000 14,000,000 1,150,000 1,070,000 285,000 179,000 159,000 1,200

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Looking to the future, there are a number of ways in which the Indian perception of the EU may be improved. Clearly, an increase in mutual understanding would be of benefit to both sides—an interesting avenue is the potential role for the Indian diaspora in Europe to act as bridge between the two partners. The Indian diaspora in the United States may act as a model, the increasingly influential Indian caucus ensure that politicians and the public more frequently hear and understand the needs of India (Wülbers, 2010: 33). The most receptive audience may well be found in the UK, where a record number of Indian-origin candidates (10) won parliamentary seats in the 2015 election (Press Trust of India, 2015c). As well as increasing political leverage, such a trend may help contribute to better mutual understanding between India and the EU. However, beyond increased understanding, the most effective way for the EU to raise its profile and popularity in India is through expanded visible cooperation—actions speak louder than words. Modi has already shown this, his election victory was built upon his reputation—rightly or not—as a ‘do-er’ during his previous tenure as Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat. It now seems likely that a high-level EU–India summit will take place in the first half of 2016 (IANS, 2015), offering an ideal opportunity to deepen cooperation and showcase the strength of the partnership. It is important, however, that the summit results in concrete and communicable outcomes that allow the Indian media to present the EU positively and as a significant partner. Progress towards the BTIA would clearly send the strongest message. It has been suggested that negotiations towards the BTIA could be completed in areas where agreement is possible, leaving more troublesome aspects to be finalised subsequently (Sachdeva, 2015: 41–42). A high-level summit would also create the necessary conditions for the EU and India to rectify some of the negativity in relations, for example: by finding an acceptable solution to the Italian marines case. Perceptions are not set in stone. The crucial factor that will determine EU–India relations in the coming years is the political will of the leaders on both sides. Should interests align and cooperation expand, the EU’s importance to India will increase and the indifference and negativity currently identifiable in India may be, at least partly, forgotten.

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Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Cutaneous Medicine and Surgery: Incorporating Medical and Surgical Dermatology, 40(2), 235–258. Mukherjee, B. (2015). India and the European Union: Future perspectives. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?24797/India+and+the+ European+Union+Future+Perspectives Pew Research Center. (2011). The state of the news media 2011. Project for Excellence in Journalism. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.stateofth emedia.org/2011/overview-2/ Press Trust of India. (2015a). EU FTA would require compromises by all sides – Merkel. Economic Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-04-14/news/611 42284_1_india-eu-fta-indian-it-investment-agreement Press Trust of India. (2015b). European Union seeks India’s help on Ukraine. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindus tantimes.com/india-news/european-union-seeks-india-s-help-on-ukraine/art icle1-1318296.aspx Press Trust of India. (2015c). Record number of Indian-origin MPs elected to UK parliament. The Times of India. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/nri/other-news/Record-number-of-Indian-ori gin-MPs-elected-to-UKparliament/articleshow/47207051.cms Reuters. (2014). Russia bans all US food in sanctions response. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustantimes.com/ world-news/russia-bans-all-us-food-eu-fruit-and-veg-in-sanctions-responsenato-fears-invasion/article1-1249165.aspx Sachdeva, G. (2014a). EU-China and EU-India: A tale of two strategic partnerships. Strategic Analysis, 38(4), 427–431. Sachdeva, G. (2014b). In economic terms the EU should matter a lot more. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustan times.com/comment/analysis/in-economic-terms-the-eu-should-matter-alot-more/article1-1279158.aspx Sachdeva, G. (2015). Evaluation of the EU-India strategic partnership and the potential for its revitalisation. Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/534987/EXPO_STU(2015)534 987_EN.pdf Sonwalkar, P. (2015a). Europe’s migrant crisis: EU’s funds not enough, say critics. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www. hindustantimes.com/world-news/europe-s-migrant-crisis-eu-s-offer-of-morefunds-not-enough-say-critics/article1-1341108.aspx

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Sonwalkar, P. (2015b). French visa for Indians in 48 hours. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustantimes.com/indianews/french-visa-for-indians-in-48-hours/article1-1336331.aspx Sonwalkar, P. (2015c). Cameron offers to “Make in India” Eurofighter Typhoon. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustan times.com/world-news/cameron-offers-to-make-in-india-eurofighter-typ hoon/article1-1342139.aspx Sonwalkar, P. (2015d). Indians in UK do not vote as a bloc: GP Hinduja. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustan times.com/world-news/indians-in-uk-do-not-vote-as-a-bloc-gp-hinduja/art icle1-1339621.aspx Sonwalkar, P. (2015e). New India dynamics in UK poll manifestos. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustantimes.com/ world-news/new-india-dynamics-in-uk-poll-manifestos/article1-1337714. aspx Sonwalkar, P. (2015f). UK now realises Indian votes matter: Swraj Paul ahead of polls. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/uk-now-realises-indianvotes-matter-swraj-paul-ahead-of-polls/article1-1332993.aspx Sonwalkar, P. (2015g). UK poll surprise: Anti-immigrant party prefers Indians to Eastern Europeans. Hindustan Times. Retrieved August 5, 2015, from http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/poll-surprise-antiimmigrant-ukip-prefers-indians-to-eastern-europeans/article1-1340242.aspx The Economist. (2015, May 23). Special Report: India. Wülbers, S. A. (2010). The paradox of EU-India relations: Missed opportunities in politics, economics, development cooperation, and culture. Lexington Books.

CHAPTER 6

The Italian Non-Connection: India’s On and Off Relations with Italy, 1947–2021 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

India’s relations with Italy have been marked by the problems that afflict any middle powers who are geographically separated. While Indian and Italian officials like to cite how their civilisations were trading partners in ancient times, in modern times their economic relationship has been tangential to both countries and dominated by one or two companies or commodities. Post-war Italy’s foreign policy was defined by its membership in the Atlantic Alliance and, more recently, by its membership in the European Union and Rome had little incentive to define an independent India policy. The attitude of India was broadly similar with a diplomatic focus on the great powers and its immediate neighbourhood. However, this lack of bilateral ballast has meant that relatively small disputes, the most recent example being the case of the Italian marines which froze ties for nearly a decade often held the larger relationship hostage. It has also meant that there are no long-standing and deeply rooted sources of

P. Pal Chaudhuri (B) Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_6

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friction either. Economic developments in the past few years point to the possibility of a more stable and diversified relationship going forward.

Fascist Italy and Colonial India The pre-World War II relationship between India and Italy is almost farcical in how little the Indian nationalist leadership and Italy’s elite understood each other. Neither side had much knowledge of the other, were highly influenced by marginal individuals and refracted their opinions about the other largely through domestic prisms. In the 1920s and 1930s, most Italians took the broader European view that British colonial rule was a civilising influence in Asia and Africa, including India. The rising Italian Fascist movement, however, tended to see any movement that was opposed to the Anglo-American world order in a favourable light and therefore embraced the nascent Indian nationalist movement. Their opponents were pro-British and, therefore, tended to be sceptical of Indian nationalism. The results would often seem counter-intuitive. Anti-Fascist liberals would describe Mahatma Gandhi as ‘a rotten egg’ and ‘beardless marabout’ and self-rule as a path to starvation and ruin for India. The most laudatory Italian biography of Gandhi was written by a Fascist ideologue in 1931 and among his strongest supporters was the Fascist philosopher R. Farinacci who hailed him as the ‘liberator of the Hindu people’ and compared him to the heroes of the Italian Risorgimento, Guiseppe Garibaldi and Guiseppe Mazzini (Prayer, 1991: 255). This, in turn, led early Indian nationalists such as litterateur Rabindranath Tagore as well as Gandhi to hold meetings with Benito Mussolini, though both came to recognise the true face of the Italian dictator. There was greater convergence of interests between Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and the Fascist regime and the latter allowed Bose to broadcast propaganda over their radio stations. Again, it is notable that the most influential Indian nationalist movement in Rome during this time was the Ghadar Party simply because one of their members, Mohammad Iqbal Shedai, had become a confidante of Mussolini’s brother and coloured the government’s views on all things Indian. But the overriding Italian perspective of India was ignorance, encapsulated by a 1930 speech by an Italian foreign minister about how contemporary India was divided between an ‘old feudal theocracy of Buddhist castes

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and the new bourgeoisie adhering to Islam’ (Grandi, 1985: 284 cited in Prayer, 1991: 254).

Cold War Divide Italy expresses support for India’s achieving independence in 1948, but Rome had little sympathy for Nehruvian nonalignment and socialist economic philosophy. There were other reasons for Italy’s overall antagonism to independent India, especially in the first decade of India’s independence. As a defeated Axis power, the postwar Italian government functioned under a ‘limited sovereignty’ system with a foreign and defence policy dictated by the former Allied powers. In any case, after 1948 Italy was ruled by a Catholic-led government that was violently anti-socialist and had a worldview strongly influenced by the Cold War. The then-Italian system had little understanding and little sympathy for India’s attempts to carve out a neutral space between the United States and the Soviet Union. Italian governments were openly derogatory of Nehru’s statements at the 1955 Bandung Conference where he laid out the principles for what was to become the Nonaligned Movement (Butalia, 1986: 132). A more anachronistic source of Italian resentment was India’s strong anti-colonial stance. Post-war Italy had sought to retain control over some of its African colonies, most notably Libya. A Western proposal was put before the 1947–1948 United Nations General Assembly allowing for the joint administration of the colonies by Italy, France, Britain and the United States. India, along with China and Russia, led the campaign against the proposal. France and Britain then sought to divide Libya between them, but a UN resolution was passed in November 1949 calling for the creation of an independent Libya. While Rome was a relatively passive onlooker in much of this, there was considerable popular resentment in Italy against India’s role and Nehru’s repeated statements denouncing colonialism would often attract negative Italian commentary. Relations improved after the Socialist Party took power in Italy in 1963 and the United States itself took a more nuanced view of India and Nehru in the context of the Cold War. Nehru’s first visit to Rome was in March 1936 on his way back to India from Europe. He made his first visit to Italy as prime minister in 1953 and made a second trip in July 1955. Nonetheless, Italy was guardedly supportive of India during its 1962 conflict with

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China and provided civilian assistance during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war (Butalia, 1986: 133). Italy’s viewpoint, however, was often decided by the ideology of the government in Rome or the larger sentiment of the Western powers. The conservative government in power during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war took its cue from Washington and was both supportive of Pakistan and critical of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty that was signed then. Italian media, like much of the West, was highly critical of the Indian nuclear test in 1974, and Italy was quick to sign up for the technology sanctions that followed. This lack of an independent view of India was evident again when Italy declared that the West’s provision of arms to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not pose a threat to India (Spadolini, 1981: 1). The primary focus during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s three-day visit to Italy in November 1981 was on political issues. She urged industrialised countries to reduce arms expenditure and thereby assist in the reconstruction efforts of developing countries (Gandhi, 1981: 1). New Delhi took much of this in stride. Italy’s views were largely restricted to rhetoric. The odd high-level Italian visit was sometimes farcical. The visit of Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi to India in November 1986 was symbolic of shallowness of the then bilateral relationship. The high point of the Craxi visit was a family visit to the ashram of the Indian spiritual leader Sathya Sai Baba. The latter warned Craxi that persons close to him were unreliable even while blessing the entourage and giving them ‘power rings’ to wear. The answer was prophetic but also obvious as Craxi was already enmeshed in corruption scandals. In 1993, charged with murder and large-scale corruption, Craxi would resign and then flee to Tunisia to avoid criminal conviction (Priddy, 2009). India also understood that Rome was guided by the policy stances taken by the Western powers, most notably the US, and so Indian diplomatic efforts were better aimed at influencing Washington. Italy did not aspire to have the sort of foreign policy of France, a member of the Atlantic Alliance that often beat its own path when it came to India.

Early Economic Relations After Italy applauded India on its independence, the two countries negotiated a basic trade agreement in 1952 which was formalised, after some expansion of its terms, in 1954. Bilateral trade was modest and ran largely

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in Italy’s favour with India running a substantial deficit most years. The primary bulk export of Italy to India was fertiliser while India’s main exports were manganese and iron ore. However, in the 1950s and 1960s large swathes of the Indian economy, including its mining sector, were controlled by American and British firms who often ensured that trade between India and Italy never grew beyond a certain point. In March 1970, when the Indian parliament briefly debated the perennial trade deficit with Italy, India had imported Rs 350 million worth of goods from Italy the year before and exported Rs 170 million. The real import of these figures was how insignificant each country meant for the economy of the other (Butalia, 1986: 112). By the mid-1960s, fuelled by the profits and capacities they earned from Italy’s postwar economic boom, Italian firms began stepping up their investments into India. While the Indian government espoused an increasingly socialist economic line, these firms seem to have concluded that this did not pose a real threat to the operations of foreign companies. Many of them also found opportunities in partnering with the increased number of Indian state-owned enterprises created by the nationalisation policies of the time. While the automobile manufacturer Fiat is the best known of the Italian firms who set up shop in India, it was followed by other firms like tyre maker Pirelli, office equipment maker Olivetti and fertiliser firm Montecatini. The most influential Italian company to try and enter the Indian market was the oil and gas giant, ENI. Nehru and ENI’s founder Enrico Mattei met in 1955. While there are no records of what they discussed, Mattei’s record of successfully taking on the Anglo-American domination of the petroleum sector in Italy to create ENI is likely to have been on Nehru’s mind. The Italian firm signed a $100 million credit agreement in 1961 to explore for oil in the Gujarat region of Kutch. But the agreement, which was signed in secret to avoid pushback by the British and American firms which then controlled the Indian hydrocarbon sector, triggered a media and public outcry and the agreement was eventually abandoned (Butalia, 1986: 123). Italy joined the Aid India Club as a donor nation in 1962, largely at the behest of the US which had come to see India’s economic progress as a crucial element in its response to perceived communist Chinese aggression. Italy was a reluctant contributor and after an initial contribution of $53 million in 1962, its contribution declined to $36 million by 1965. However, the aid it provided was earmarked for oil and gas projects and tied to the purchase of Italian products or the use of services provided by

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Italian firms. By 1965, India had used only 0.2% of the |641 million aid that Italy had provided. Italy also had a small bilateral aid programme, most of it to provide export credits for imports from Italy (Akita, 2014: 228). In 1981, Italy made firm commitments of $120 million ($100 million in supplies and $20 million in soft credits) annually to finance projects mainly in petroleum, chemicals, leather and shipbuilding in India (TOI , 1981: 1).

Attempt at Economic Revival India’s regression into trade protectionism and increased hostility to foreign investment through the 1980s meant that its economic relations with much of the world remained at a low-level equilibrium. Italy, already a marginal economic partner with India, concentrated its foreign and trade policies with the rest of the European Union and, to some degree, the Mediterranean and West Asia. Both countries had their own domestic political issues: India struggled with twin insurgencies in Kashmir and Punjab, Italy with a long and bloody war with entrenched organised crime networks. India began a process of liberalising its economy in 1991 which made it increasingly open to international investment and trade. While a number of Western and Asian countries took up the opportunities this created, such as the United States and South Korea, there was little interest from Italian firms. It was to take nearly another decade before Indo-Italian trade began to shift to a higher gear. From the late 1980s, the balance of trade shifted to India’s favour as the export basket became more diversified. In 2006, bilateral trade passed e5 billion for the first time, crossing e7 billion in 2010 and has remained at roughly this level since. Italy is normally the fourth or fifth largest Indian trading partner in the European Union while India generally represents about one per cent of Italy’s exports (India, Embassy in Rome, 2016). Italy similarly represents a steady 1.2–1.3% of India’s total trade, holding steady even during the disruption of the 2020–2021 COVID-19 pandemic (India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2022). Investment lagged the increase in trade by a few years, with Italian investment into India not passing the $1 billion a year mark until 1997. But the figures were skewed. Much of this initial investment increase was the consequence of only one firm, the automobile manufacturer Fiat, which sought to revive its fortunes in the Indian car market in the 1990s.

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When Fiat’s initial capital investments began to come to a close and it shifted to a marketing partnership with Tata Motors, Italian investment figures began to flag again, dropping from $135 million in 2000 to $4.7 million in 2002. Between 1991 and 2004, of the $447 million of FDI from Italy into India, over 57% was in the transportation sector and almost all of this came from Fiat (India Today, 2012). Since then, Italy’s investments have more than doubled and the variety of firms more diversified, though transportation remains dominant. By 2017-end, Italian FDI into India had reached $2.72 billion, spread over 736 firms, but Italy remained only the seventeenth largest foreign investor. Indian outward FDI to Italy was less than $30 million (India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2019). After India’s 1991 reforms, Italy tried repeatedly to leverage political relations to provide momentum to trade and investment. This proved a struggle, not least because of the rapid turnover of Italian governments. Two months after Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giora visited India in 1988 his government had fallen. In 1995 Rome sent the Italian president, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, on the first head of state visit between the two countries which partly underlined the lack of stability at the executive level (UPI Archives, 1995). In the mid-2000s, the two governments made another effort at the highest levels to deepen relations. Prime Minister Romano Prodi visited New Delhi in February 2007 while Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to Italy for both the Group of Seven summit and a bilateral visit in 2009 (Unione Industriale di Torino, 2007).

The Enrica Lexie Case This attempted resurrection of the bilateral relationship went off the rails, however, over a maritime incident in which two Indian fishermen were shot and killed by Italian marines on an Italian-flagged oil tanker, the MB Enrica Lexie, off the coast of Kerala on 15 February 2012. The Indian Navy intercepted the ship and detained the two marines who were then arrested on shore. Soon after, Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna told his Italian counterpart Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata that the fishermen, whom the marines seemed to have mistaken for pirates, were unarmed and had not posed a threat. But when murder charges were filed against the marines in May, Italy withdrew its ambassador from New Delhi. In Italy, the marines fate became a major cause celebre which attracted considerable

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domestic political attention. The Indian government, on the other hand, was unwilling to intervene when a judicial process was still on going for its own domestic compulsions. At the end of the year, the Kerala state court allowed both the marines to temporarily return home for Christmas. The Italian government initially said they would not return, an act which would have fatally ruptured the bilateral relationship. In March 2013, despite many protests in Italy, Rome reversed its decision and sent the marines back to India. By then there were strong signs that both governments were eager to get past the incident and begin the process that the 2007 Prodi visit was supposed to have initiated. Officials began speaking of having the marines, if convicted, serving their sentences in Italy or reaching some sort of compromise (Hornby & Bhattacharjya, 2013). The slowness of India’s judiciary process began to tell on the Italian system, however. By April 2014, Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini said Italy would seek international arbitration, a statement that elicited a protest from India. Under Rome’s urging, the European Parliament passed a resolution in January 2015 describing the marines’ detention without charge as ‘a serious breach of human rights’ (European Parliament, 2015). In Italy, banners displaying the names of the two marines were draped publicly in many cities and the Italian Football Federation released two official T-shirts with the two names during the 2014 football World Cup. The Ferrari team had Italian Navy ensignia on their racing cars during an Indian Grand Prix, and the company explicitly linked the decals to the imprisoned sailors. Italy upped the stakes when plans for an EU-India summit to coincide with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s tour of Europe in April 2015 fell through because of reported resistance by Mogherini who had by then become the EU’s High Representative for External Relations. Mogherini had earlier told the European Parliament, ‘It’s good for everyone to be fully aware of how much of an impact the unresolved dispute of the two Italian Navy officials can have on relations between the EU and India. It is putting them to the test’ (Busvine, 2015). In June that year, Italy submitted the dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Five years later the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the marines were entitled to immunity for their acts as they were serving military officers at the time but the Indian victims were entitled to compensation for what they had suffered. The Indian

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Supreme Court closed the case in June 2021 (Associated Press, 2021; Bar & Bench, 2020).

Leonardo Blacklist Another source of bilateral friction was a 2016 decision by the Indian government to blacklist the Italian arms manufacturer Leonardo, earlier known as Finmeccanica, for corrupt business activities. A number of other foreign defence firms were blacklisted at the same time for similar reasons. The blacklist was in response to charges the company had paid kickbacks to win a |36 billion AgustaWestland helicopter deal in 2012 and followed a corruption investigation launched in Italy in 2013. New Delhi had cancelled the contract in 2014 as a consequence. This and other scandals led Finmeccanica to change the company’s name. The blacklist affected both sides. Leonardo lost all access to the Indian defence market for several years. The Indian Navy, on the other hand, was dependent on Leonardo for a number of key weapon systems including torpedoes for its submarines, naval guns for its warships and the radar on its aircraft carrier. While it was able to find some alternatives, often more expensive, like an Israeli radar for its carrier it struggled to find a new torpedo for its latest Scorpene-class conventional submarines and Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. In 2021, the Modi government lifted the ban on Leonardo in part because of the defence problems that this was posing (Unnithan, 2021). But the move was also part and parcel of the larger attempt to rebuild the Italian relationship and launch a new post-Brexit European policy. Modi went to Rome (October–November 2021) at about the same time for the G-20 summit that included a three-day state visit (news18.com, 2021).

Indian Diaspora Italy is home to the largest Indian diaspora in continental Europe, a fact largely unknown to both Indians and Italian. There are over 200,000 Indians in Italy, nearly seven times the Indian population in Spain, the second-largest first-generation continental diaspora. While this is dwarfed by the millions who reside in English-speaking countries, the Indian diaspora in Italy has some unique characteristics. One of them is that an overwhelming majority of Italian Indians are from a specific community, Jat Sikhs, and largely from Punjab. Most of them work in the dairy and

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agricultural sectors of northern Italy (Aiyar, 2014; putting the migration to Italy in a larger context see Thumbe, 2018). The first Indian arrivals, who came in the 1960s, were largely Roman Catholic Malayalis from Kerala who came as theology students. This group has become more sizeable with a few from this community also working as domestic workers in the Rome area. A few thousand Indians also came to work in Italy’s leather workers and from 1985 to 1992 the figures show 43,000 came to Italy thanks to the European Union’s liberal refugee and asylum policies. As many of these were Punjabi Sikhs, they helped pave the way for the migration wave that followed. Sizeable Indian migration to Italy only begins after 1992 and is driven by Punjabi Sikhs ensconcing themselves in the farm and dairy sectors of Italy, especially in Lombardy. Their dominance in the making of buffalo mozzarella, a popular Italian delicacy, has earned them the name ‘bergamini’ (cow-milkers) by Italians. Studies indicate that within two decades a remarkable 90% of the workers in Italian dairy farms were of Indian origin. A newer generation of Indians, however, include students seeking higher education and Indian entrepreneurs who see opportunities in the country’s small and medium-scale industry sector. One of the high-value economic areas where people-to-people exchange has become well developed is fashion, a strength of both India and Italy. Students from India’s metropolitan cities and elite educational institutes are attracted by Italy’s specialised fashion and design-focused post-graduate courses and luxury brand management courses. Many more come just for internships and summer jobs to get exposure to Italian luxury designer brands and designers in Italy. High-level visiting Indian officials, reflecting the rising social prominence of the Indian diaspora in Italy, now regularly make it a point to meet a cross-section of Indians residing in Italy (Chaudhury & Duttagupta, 2020; Press Trust of India, 2021).

Relations Today Shifting the marines case to the UN tribunal, along with the increasingly regular and lengthy trips, the marines made back to Italy for medical and family reasons, provided enough political space for both governments to resume where they had left off in 2012. Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni was able to visit India in October–November 2017 and during

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his meeting Modi, the two sides announced a ‘new beginning’ to their relationship. If anything, there was even more areas of convergence for India and Italy after the decade-long impasse between Romano Prodi’s (February 2007) and Gentili’s (2017) state visits. The impending withdrawal of Britain following the Brexit referendum meant India had begun looking in earnest for new partner countries within the EU. Italy was seen as a prime target for the Modi government’s new European policy, one that had New Delhi look beyond its traditional continental partners, France and Germany. Modi had already made a state visit to Spain—a rarity for an Indian leader, held a unique Nordic summit and his foreign ministry had begun preparations for a Visegrad plus summit before the COVID19 pandemic put such diplomacy on hold. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, attending the Italian government’s Mediterranean Dialogue in Rome on December 2019 highlighted India’s interests in the Mediterranean and the Gulf region. Italy, for its part, saw an opportunity in the Indian market given its strengths in manufacturing were a good match for India’s economic requirements. One area of convergence was renewable energy and India’s ambitious green transition plans. As an Indian diplomat noted, ‘Italy’s manufacturing prowess complements India’s desire to become a trustworthy node in the global supply chain’. Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Manlio Di Stefano, in a meeting with Jaishankar told him Italy had ‘identified India as a priority country’ (India, Embassy in Rome, 2019; India, MEA, 2020). India and Italy began fast forwarding their economic relations. The Modi government’s ambitious climate agenda was a special focus. A memorandum of understanding on cooperation on energy was signed in 2017 aimed at seeing how Italy could benefit from India’s plans for smart cities and smart grids, its desire to build electrical storage, natural gas infrastructure, biofuels and make a push for green hydrogen. India invited Italy, as it had done Germany and other governments, to help create a green energy corridor in some place in India. A virtual economic summit laid out a five-year bilateral economic partnership plan that laid out a more concrete roadmap in the above sectors in terms of investment, collaboration and trade. A high-level economic dialogue meeting in November 2020 brought together some 60 leading businessmen and industry representatives with a special focus on automobiles, advanced manufacturing, energy transition, railway and other infrastructure, food

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processing and information technology (India, Embassy in Rome, 2020, 2021; Mishra, 2020). Modi gave his imprimatur by visiting Italy in late October 2021 and meeting Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and announcing a strategic partnership in green transition (India, MEA, 2021, October 30) that would incorporate all that had been discussed and more. Italy had by then joined two of India’s nascent multilateral groupings, both aimed at promoting North–South cooperation in the climate space and the International Solar Alliance the Coalition for Disaster Resilience Infrastructure. Italy does not have a strong geopolitical perspective on Asia. However, India has found Italy receptive to the idea of endorsing the Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept while avoiding any commitment on any military response to Chinese assertiveness. An Indian diplomat publicly said, ‘We encourage Italy to lend support to an India-centric EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ though the sense is Rome will go along with a larger EU policy on this front. But India and Italy held discussions on supply chain diversification, something that often means a reduced economic dependency on China. Another element of a more positive approach to Europe is a restarting of the stalled EU-India free trade agreement, further delayed by the two-year COVID-19 pandemic. Indian officials say that they have found Italy to be a more constructive partner about the trade agreement than other major European economies, including a readiness to discuss some immigration and mobility issues (India, MEA, 2021). The core of a new relationship between India and Italy is economics, with Italy’s industrial base being a better fit with the requirements of a Modi government seeking to expand India’s relatively small manufacturing sector than many other Western countries. While Italy has less to offer in the other elements of the Indian economic story, notably digital technology and pharmaceuticals, there are other sectors like green energy where Italy is being able to make inroads. If the present plans announced by the two governments even partially succeed, the two countries will have established what has been missing between the two of them since 1947—a diversified and sustainable economic relationship. India doesn’t expect its overriding strategic and security concerns regarding China and the broader Indo-Pacific will be a priority for Italy, but hopes that Rome will be sufficiently convinced to support a larger EU policy that takes these concerns seriously.

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References Aiyar, P. (2014). Punjabi Parmesan: Despatches from a Europe in crisis. Penguin India. Akita, S. (2014). The aid-India consortium, the World Bank and the international order of Asia 1958–1968. Asian Review of World Histories, 2(2). https://brill.com/view/journals/arwh/2/2/article-p217_5.xml?language= enfile:///Users/pramitpc/Downloads/[22879811%20-%20Asian%20R eview%20of%20World%20Histories]%20The%20Aid-India%20Consortium,% 20the%20World%20Bank,%20and%20the%20International%20Order%20of% 20Asia,%201958-1968.pdf Associated Press. (2021, June 15). India closes criminal case against 2 Italian marines. Retrieved January 12, 2022 from https://apnews.com/article/eur ope-india-shootings-85a446cca1ae0685513e1325ffe5d158 Bar and Bench. (2020, July 6). Ivan, Italian marines case: The Permanent Court of arbitration has rightly limited the ‘Sovereignty of India’, not its ‘Sovereign Rights’. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.barandbench.com/ columns/italian-marines-case-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration-has-rightlylimited-the-sovereignty-of-india-not-its-sovereign-rights. Busvine, D. (2015, March 16). EU-India summit off as Italian Marines case rankles. Reuters. Retrieved January 13, 2022 from https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-india-eu-idUSKBN0MC1CB20150316 Butalia, B. (1986). Indo-Italian relations since 1947. International Studies, 23(2), 107–141. Chaudhury, D. R., & Duttagupta, I. (2020, March 23). After UK, Italy hosts biggest Indian diaspora in Europe. The Economic Times. Retrieved July 22, 2022 from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nat ion/after-uk-italy-hosts-biggest-indian-diaspora-in-europe/articleshow/747 64808.cms Das, R. G. (2021, June 17). Opening remarks by Secretary (East), MEA at the India-Japan-Italy trilateral webinar on the Indo-Pacific organised by the Embassy of Italy, the Japan Institute for International Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.mea. gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33924/secretary+easts+opening+rem arks+at+the+indiajapanitaly+trilateral+webinar+on+indopacific+june+17+2021 European Parliament. (2015, January 15). Resolution on the case of the two Italian ‘maro’. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0013_EN.html Gandhi, I. (1981, November 10). Speech at a banquet, Rome. Cited in B. K. Joshi, ‘Rome honours Indira.’ Times of India, 11 November. Grandi, D. (1985). La politica estera italiana dal 1929 a! 1932. Rome.

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Hornby, C., & Bhattacharjya, S. (2013, March 22). Marines’ return to India stirs anger in Italy. Reuters. Retrieved January 11, 2022 from https://www. reuters.com/article/india-italy-marines-idUSL6N0CDG3G20130322 India Today. (2012, May 2). Tata motors ends distribution alliance with Fiat. India Today Online. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.indiat oday.in/business/corporate/story/tata-motors-fiat-distribution-alliance-ends100907-2012-05-02 India, Embassy in Rome. (2016). Trade and economic relations. Embassy of India, Rome, Italy. https://www.indianembassyrome.gov.in/page/trade-andeconomic-relations/. India, Embassy in Rome. (2019, December 9). Press Release, Visit of External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar to Rome. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://indianembassyrome.gov.in/news_letter_detail.php?id=30 India, Embassy in Rome. (2020, November 4). India-Italy high level dialogue on economic relations. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://indianemb assyrome.gov.in/news_letter_detail.php?id=45 India, Embassy in Rome. (2021, July 9). 21st India-Italy Joint Economic Commission held through the virtual platform. Press Release, 12 July. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://indianembassyrome.gov.in/news_letter_det ail.php?id=60 India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. (2019). Agreed minutes of the 20th session of the India-Italy joint commission for economic cooperation held in New Delhi, on February 26th–27th, 2019. Retrieved July 22, 2022, from https://commerce.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/20thsession-of-India-Italy-JCEC-26th-27th-Feb-2019.pdf India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. (2022, April 9). Export-import data bank, country-wise data for Italy. Retrieved June 22, 2022 from https://tra destat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/iecnt.asp India, MEA. (2020, November 7). Transcript of special briefing by JS(EW) on India-Italy virtual summit. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www. mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/33183/transcript+of+special+briefing+ by+js+ew+on+india++italy+virtual+summit+november+06+2020 India, MEA. (2021, June 17). Secretary (East)’s opening remarks at the IndiaJapan-Italy Trilateral Webinar on Indo-Pacific. Retrieved, January 15, 2022 from https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33924/secret ary+easts+opening+remarks+at+the+indiajapanitaly+trilateral+webinar+on+ind opacific+june+17+2021 Mishra, P. (2020, November 28). India and Italy have defined a working plan for the next five years. Sunday Guardian. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/india-italy-definedworking-plan-next-five-years

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News18.com. (2021, October 29). PM Modi meets Italian counterpart Mario Draghi ahead of G20. Retrieved January 14, 2022 from https://www.news18.com/news/india/pm-modi-meets-italian-counte rpart-mario-draghi-ahead-of-g20-summit-4380437.html Prayer, M. (1991). Italian fascist regime and nationalist India 1921–45. International Studies, 28(3), 249–271. Press Trust of India. (2021, October 29). Prime Minister Modi interacts with people of different communities in Rome. Business Line. Retrieved January 14, 2022 from https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/prime-min ister-modi-interacts-with-people-of-different-communities-in-rome/article37 246330.ece Priddy, R. (2009, January 28). Sathya Sai Baba blessed Italian prime minister. Blog https://robertpriddy.wordpress.com. Retrieved January 14, 2022 from https://robertpriddy.wordpress.com/2009/01/28/sathya-sai-baba-ble ssed-italian-prime-minister/ Sahai, P., & Lum, K. D. (2013). Migration from Punjab to Italy in the dairy sector: A quiet revolution. CARIM-India Research Report, European University Institute. Retrieved January 14, 2022 from https://www.mea.gov.in/ima ges/pdf/PatternsofMigrationfromPunjabtoItaly.pdf Spadolini, G. (1981, November 11). Remarks at a joint press conference with Indira Gandhi, Rome.Pak arms no threat to India. Times of India. Thumbe, C. (2018). India moving: A history of migration. Viking. Times of India. (1981, November 12). Italy offers $120 m. aid to India. Unione Industriale di Torino. (2007, January 22). What is in store for the future of Indo-Italian relations. Retrieved January 11, 2022 from www.ui.torino.it Unnithan, S. (2021, November 14). In a graphic: Undoing an Italian blacklist. Retrieved January 14, 2022 from https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-ins ight/story/in-a-graphic-undoing-an-italian-blacklist-1876645-2021-11-14 UPI Archives. (1995, February 10). Italian President in India to boost ties. Retrieved July 22, 2022 from https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/02/ 10/Italian-President-in-India-to-boost-ties/8428792392400/

CHAPTER 7

India and Spain Rajendra K. Jain

Historically, India took its culture and commerce east for centuries whereas Spain was looking west since the fifteenth century. In the twentieth century, both countries were looking inwards to deal with the challenges of nation-building. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had bitterly opposed and condemned the fascist Franco regime. He visited Spain in 1938 during the Spanish Civil War to lend his moral support to the Spanish Republicans who were valiantly fighting against General Franco. Since the establishment of democracy in Spain in 1978, the two countries have generally neglected each other for decades. It is only recently that the two are seeking to rediscover or discover each other.

India and the Spanish Civil War Jawaharlal Nehru regarded the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) as part of a global conflict, a conflict between the forces of democracy and fascism (Nehru, 1937d: 296) and fascism and nationalism (Nehru, 1937c: 654).

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_7

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It involved ‘larger interests’ of India in which its own freedom was at stake (Nehru, 1937a: 702). He perceived the struggle of Republicans in Spain against General Francisco Franco to be akin to India’s anti-imperialist struggle against British rule. He viewed the Spanish war as an example of the organic nature of world conflict (Damodaran, 1997: 117). Nehru’s anti-colonialism became ‘a struggle not only against capitalism and imperialism, but also against fascism and war’ (Louro, 2018: 2). In December 1936, Nehru expressed the desire to ‘give some effective assistance to our comrades in Spain, something more than sympathy, however deeply felt’ (Nehru, 1936, cited in Damodaran, 1997: 86). Nehru spent five nights in Barcelona (see Nehru, 1940) in June 1938 and was witness to nightly aerial bombardment. During his visit, he was treated like an official representative of an independent country and met a number of Republican politicians including Foreign Minister Julio Alvares del Vayo and President Manuel Azana as well as General Enrique Lister and La Passionara. He went within five kilometres of the front and met volunteers of the International Brigades. On his return from Spain, he said in Paris that India considered the Spanish struggle to be of ‘vital importance in the world struggle for freedom’ (Nehru, 1938a: 10). In January 1939, Nehru even said that the war in Spain was not a civil war but ‘a war between Italian and German troops on the one hand and Spanish people on the other’ (Nehru, 1939, 10 January: 11). Nehru made several pleas for foodstuffs, financial and material support to Republican Spain, which helped ‘indirectly our own cause and enhance the prestige and position of India in the world’ (Nehru, 1937b: 708–709; 1938b; n.d.). The Congress’ humanitarian aid to Republican Spain was motivated by both moral concerns and diverse political considerations, which bestowed ‘legitimacy upon donors and enhanced their identity as actors on the international stage’ (Framke, 2016: 71). The Spain-India Committee based in London organized cultural events to raise funds and donated an ambulance to Republican Spain. Nehru’s daughter, Indira, who were studying at Oxford at the time, often helped organize these events and even spoke at some of them (Dasgupta, 2016, 22 May) and urged English and Indian leftists to help rescue Spanish children (Oritz, 2019: 449). The Congress’ Foreign Department raised Rs 50,000 to send to Republican Spain, and the Congress sponsored a medical mission including an ambulance to Barcelona (Oritz, 2019: 448–449). About |18,000 was donated by the Indian Red Cross Society to Spain (Framke,

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2016: 72). While Nehru spoke of a ‘hundred or more’ Indians fighting in Spain (Nehru, 1937c: 654), others maintain that only six Indians made their way to Spain in 1937 to join the International Brigades.1 Indian political humanitarianism in Spain became ‘a tool for anti-colonial emancipation’ (Framke, 2016: 73). At the end of an exhausting Civil War, when the Republican Government was overthrown by General Franco with the military support of the Axis Powers, ‘the one intolerable and pervasive philosophy of life— Communism’ was replaced by ‘a regime as unprogressive as it illiberal’ (TOI, 1950a: 6).

Membership of Spain in the United Nations In December 1946, the resolution of Oscar Lange, the Polish Representative to the United Nations, was approved in the UN General Assembly recommending that all members of the United Nations immediately severe diplomatic relations with Spain and that it be barred from membership of participation in any organization or agency established by a brought into relationship with the UN. During the debate on 3 December 1946, the Indian representative, Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, stated that the severance of diplomatic relations would probably not be effective because of the lack of unanimity thereon and because without diplomatic relations, the United Nations would not be able to exercise ‘positive political pressure’ to facilitate the liberalization of Franco’s regime than in the imposition of economic sanctions, which, she maintained, the Spanish people would be willing to endure for the sake of establishing a democratic government (Pandit, 1946: 8; Johnson, 1952: 691). When the UN General Assembly returned to the Spanish question in 1949, the Latin American resolution calling for the resumption of relations failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority for it to be adopted. India was among the 15 countries which voted against the resolution (TOI, 1949: 5). However, the Latin American nations again proposed a joint resolution in the fall of 1950, that the establishment of diplomatic relations and exchange of ambassadors did not necessarily imply any judgement regarding a government’s domestic politics and 1 These were Gopal Mukund Huddar (under guise of John Smith to mask his Indian identity), Mulk Raj Anand; three doctors (including Atal Menhanlal, Ayub Ahmed Khan Naqshbandi and Manuel Pinto) and a student named Ramasamy Veerapan (Kasturi, 2017).

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urged the General Assembly to revoke the appropriate provisions of the 1946 resolution. This time the resolution was adopted by a decisive majority. India was among the 12 countries which abstained (Johnson, 1952: 705; TOI, 1950c: 1). No nation, the Times of India editorially argued, could be forced to remain in a state of complete isolation and that if a move towards a liberal democratic regime is to be encouraged, the first step had to be the establishment of relations with Madrid (TOI, 1950d: 6). Spain joined the United Nations in 1955.

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Prior to Independence, Spain maintained Consul Gonzalo Sebastian de Erice O’Shea in Bombay (India Quarterly, 1946: 287). India had no diplomatic relations with Spain and had no intention in the existing circumstances (Pandit, 1946). General Franco had been ‘smarting under the uneasy isolation’ since the end of the war and Spain was regarded as ‘the citadel of reaction’ where ideas of political freedom, religious toleration and social welfare were suspect (TOI, 1950a: 6). In an Explanatory Memorandum to the Lok Sabha, the GoI argued that some sort of representation in the Iberian Peninsula was necessary, and therefore, it had decided to appoint a Consul-General in Barcelona. Several Members of Parliament raised objections about ‘the dubious nature’ of the administration in Spain and its head of the State being a dictator though the opening of a Mission would not in any way mean that one was favouring the idea of dictatorship or that one was welcoming it (Chaudhuri, 1955: col. 765; Gurpadaswamy, 1955: col. 765, 767). This, Nehru argued, did not involve ‘normal recognition’ of the Spanish Government and that in the past the GoI’s stance had been that ‘if the government is a functioning government, we should deal with it as such, and not play any stress on our liking its political and economic structure are not’. For the present, India had a Consul-General in Spain to look after certain commercial and other interests, and there was no proposal for recognition (Nehru, 1955: col. 773). The leftist H. N. Mukerjee (CPI or CPI-M) had earlier dubbed it as ‘quasi-diplomatic relations’ with Spain (Mukerjee, 1952: col. 1615). Initially, the GoI approached the Spanish Government for the appointment of an Honorary Consul at Barcelona. However, the Spanish Government indicated that they would prefer the appointment of a career diplomat (Chanda, 1953: col. 841), India did not appoint one.

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After desultory negotiations for over two years, India and Spain decided to establish diplomatic relations at the Embassy level on 25 May 1956 (TOI, 1956a: 1). India was glad to have recognized Spain (which had become a member of the UN)—a country which it had ‘not long recognised for other reasons’—irrespective of whether ‘we had disagreed in the past or at present with Spanish policy’ (Nehru, 1956: col. 594). Nehru explained the decision by pointing out that years had passed and that it would not be right ‘in the present circumstances’ not to have recognized the Government of Spain and exchange missions (Nehru, 1957: col. 4830). Next month, India announced that the Ambassador to France Sardar H. S. Malik would be concurrently accredited as Ambassador to Spain (TOI, 1956b: 1). On 29 June, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) announced that Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, High Commissioner in London, was concurrently accredited as Ambassador to Spain. She later presented her credentials to General Franco on 2 November 1958 (TOI, 1958: 1). The Indian Mission in Madrid headed by a Charge d’Affaires opened in 1958. The Maharaja of Jaipur Sawai Man Singh II was appointed as India’s first resident Ambassador to Spain in 1965 and assumed charge in November 1965 (India, MEA, 1966: 55). Spain opened a Honorary Consulate in Bombay in 1953–1954 (raised to a Consulate General in 1958) and opened its Embassy in New Delhi in 1956.

Differences Over Colonial Territories There were some differences between India and Spain over the legal status of the Spanish Overseas Provinces. In November 1960, India, along with seven other Afro-Asian countries, co-sponsored a resolution in the UN General Assembly formally listing six overseas possessions of Spain and twelve under Portugal, as non-self-governing Territories. This was a direct attack on the position long held by Spain and Portugal that they had ‘overseas provinces’ and no colonies and were, therefore, exempted from the obligations under the UN Charter (TOI, 1960: 9). India welcomed Spain’s willingness to accept the provisions of the United Nations Charter (Menon, 1960b: 416). With Spain giving way and acceptance of its colonies, it was ‘a great advance in the colonial position’ while Portugal stood totally isolated (Menon, 1960a: col. 1842).

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In the early 1960s, the Spanish Press adopted a somewhat ‘unfriendly approach’ primarily because of the fundamentally different attitudes of Spain in India towards colonial issues. The anti-Indian bias generally seemed to abate. However, in August 1963, the Spanish Government announced that its possessions in Equatorial Africa would receive a measure of autonomy (India, MEA, 1964: 59).

Foreign Minister Bravo’s Visit, 1972 Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1956 until the early 1970s, the relationship between India and Spain was mostly a ‘formal’ one with relations being ‘rather distant’ (de Aristegui, 2013). With the exception of several Latin American countries, with which Spain maintained strong cultural ties, and the Arab countries, which were heavily influenced by Franco’s refusal to recognize Israel, Spain had ‘little contact with the rest of the world’ (Riddel, 1976: 203). Since 1970, Spain began to reintegrate itself with the international community after being cloistered for nearly three decades by ending its international isolation and making friends with political forces in Europe which had hitherto regarded it as untouchable (Singh, 1970b: 10). In a clear overture of friendship towards the Afro-Asian countries, Spain cast its vote with them on the rotation question at the United Nations (Singh, 1970a: 6). In continuance of its ‘outward-looking’ foreign policy, the first-ever visit of a Spanish Foreign Minister, Lopez-Bravo, took place from 13 to 21 December 1972. Discussions during the visit showed ‘essential similarity’ of their approach on many international issues and of their overwhelming desire for peace and détente (India, MEA, 1972: 422). A trade and economic cooperation agreement was signed on 14 December 1972, but it did not stipulate a clearing system under which trade would take place. The quantum of trade was therefore contingent on normal commercial considerations (George, 1973: col. 155). In an effort to enhance the meagre trade of $5 million trade at the time (TOI, 1972: 9), it was also decided to set up a Joint Commission comprising of representatives of the two governments to identify projects for collaboration. During the visit, the two countries decided to extend the agreement on cooperation in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes of 27 March 1965 for a further period of five years. Since 1962, India

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reportedly purchased uranium concentrate from Spain since its terms were more favourable than those offered by other uranium suppliers on the world market (Hoffmann, 1962: 20; Foreign Affairs Record, March 1965: 58).

The Royal Family and India For several decades, neither India nor Spain had much interest in each other; only the Spanish Royal family was interested in India and showed special affinity (Malik, 2008). King Juan Carlos I and Princess Sofia spent part of their five-month honeymoon in India in 1962, and in 1965 in the company of the Greek shipping magnate Alex Goulandris (Powell, 1996: 25, 29). The Royal couple paid a brief private visit to India in January 1966. Accompanied by Foreign Minister Pedro Cortina y Mauri, Prince Juan Carlos and Princess Sofia came on an official visit to India on 21–25 February 1974. King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia paid an official visit in 1982 and in October 2012. Queen Sofia paid a private visit to India 14–20 January 1994. Queen Sofia also attended the funeral of Mother Teresa in August 1997. As keen students of Indian philosophy, Queen Sofia and her sister Irene made many visits to India. Queen Sofia’s mother—Queen Mother of Greece Frederica2 —and her daughter Princess Irene spent a considerable amount of time in Madras (Chennai). In 1976, Queen Sofia and her children visited India as Queen Frederica was reportedly in delicate health. Crown Prince Filipe (now King Felipe VI) visited India in October 1997 to inaugurate Exponentia, the Spanish industrial fair. Two years later, he visited Jaipur and Agra in August 1999. Accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Economy Rodrigo Rato, in February 2001, he led a Spanish delegation to the Indian Engineering Trade Fair India Expo where Spain was a partner country. Crown Prince Felipe and Princess Letizia visited India in November 2009, when he inaugurated the

2 She was extremely interested in studying Indian culture. She met Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan in Athens during an international conference of world religions in June 1966. In December 1966, she met Sri Sankaracharya of Kanchi. Since then, she had been a regular visitor and attended programmes organized by the Kanchi Mutt (Naravane, 2013).

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Cervantes Institute in New Delhi and engaged in an investment seminar in Mumbai.

The General’s Demise Prior to the death of the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, the Indian media carried a number of stories on the sorry state of affairs in Spain. While Franco had given Spain the longest period of public order it had known for 150 years and made possible the economic transformation of the last decade, political life remained ‘virtually stagnant’ and it was just as isolated from the mainstream of Western Europe as it was at the end of the disastrous civil war (TOI, 1973: 8). A number of articles appeared about a restive Spain by the Times of India’s London correspondent (Singh, 1974a: 4; 1974c: 6; 1975b: 8). Spain had taken ‘a great leap backward’ by shelving plans for liberalization, but a change would become inevitable when General Franco dies (Singh, 1975a: 10). The Spaniards were becoming ‘infected with the mode of freedom and liberty’ prevalent in Portugal after the coup in April (Singh, 1974b: 4). The Times of India’s Paris correspondent argued that Spain’s new leader could not ignore the economic and political compulsions which called for greater flexibility in dealing with the critics of the regime (Padgaonkar, 1975: 8). General Franco—‘Europe’s most durable dictator’ (TOI, 1975a: 9)— died on 20 November 1975. Two days later, Prince Juan Carlos was installed as Spain’s first king in 44 years. The legacy the Caudillo left behind was ‘not of a strong and united country sharing common ideals but of some Spaniards pitted against other Spaniards in the pursuit of rival aims, policies and ideologies’ (Singh, 1975c: 8; TOI, 1975b: 8). The new King’s balanced first public speech seeking to liberalize the rigidly authoritarian regime and his description of his role as a ‘moderator’ in Spanish political life, allusion to Spain’s future in Europe were welcomed. His statement of the need to preserve the ‘unity of the Kingdom in the state’ as well as respect for ‘additional particularities’ would to a certain extent ‘reassure the Basque and the Catalan autonomists’ (TOI, 1975c: 8). The results of the general elections in Spain, which brought the Centre Democratic Union (CDU) led by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez to power, reflected the electorate’s maturity, but showed beyond ‘a shred of doubt that the vast majority of the Spanish people wish to make ‘a clear break with the Francoist past’ (TOI, 1977: 8).

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Visit of King Juan Carlos I, 1982 For long, Spanish foreign policy primarily focused on Europe, North Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The loss of its only Asian colony, Philippines, in 1898 and cessation to the United States would signal ‘the end of any significant Spanish presence in Asia’ (Pardo, 2014: 166). Subsequently, its key foreign policy focus was on Europe and North Africa until the end of the Second World War. Postwar contacts with Asia were minimal. During the Cold War, Franco’s anti-communism and alignment with the United States enabled Spain to establish or reinitiate diplomatic as well as economic relations with most members of this bloc as well as with non-aligned countries, including India and Indonesia (Pardo, 2014: 167). A process of gradual increase in mutual awareness and exchange of visits began in the 1970s. This process had two key features of Spanish foreign policy towards Asia, which has continued until today, namely non-intervention in political issues largely because of a lack of political and security interests in the region and a geographical focus on the dynamic economies of East Asia and India (Pardo, 2014: 167). Political contacts began to pick up in the 1980s. The Spanish Secretary of State visited India in 1980 and Foreign Secretary R. D. Sathe returned the visit in February 1981. Four years after his visit to China, King Juan Carlos I visited India in January 1982 and was the chief guests for the 33rd Republic Day parade. The visit did not lead to the signing of any concrete agreements, but mutual interest in each other, the Indian president remarked, had been enhanced ever since he became the Head of State and Spain embarked upon ‘a bold and dynamic programme of democratising the political, social and intellectual life’ of the country. He acknowledged that while no problems divided them and many links united them, ‘the growth of lasting ties between nations demands positive cooperation in various fields of activity’ (Reddy, 1982: 19). Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (1982–1996) attended Indira Gandhi’s funeral in 1984. A parliamentary delegation led by Lok Sabha Speaker Balram Jhakar visited Spain in 1987. A Spanish parliamentary delegation reciprocated the visit next year.

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Rajiv Gandhi’s Visit, 1988 Madrid’s foreign policy became closely aligned since its membership of the European Economic Community in 1986. There were no high-level visitors of compatible status from India to Spain. Thirty-two years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Spain in 15–17 July 1988. He held three rounds of talks with his counterpart and had wide-ranging talks on the domestic situation and the entire gamut of Indo-Spain relations as well as regional and international questions. An interesting highlight of the visit was that a tripartite meeting between the prime ministers of IndiaSpain and France (Michel Rocard, who was vacationing in Spain) was held on 18 July 1988. It was decided to intensify political dialogue. Spanish leaders reiterated their strong endorsement of Six Nation Initiative and promised support for the Action Plan on Disarmament. The visit led to a consensus on reviving the agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy which had lapsed in 1977 and to explore joint venture cooperation in fisheries and pharmaceuticals. It was also decided to expedite the pending agreements on tourism as well as science and technology (Rao, 1988: 247; Tewari, 1988: col. 169). The MEA described the visit as ‘timely’ in the context of Spain’s membership of the European Economic Community and significant economic progress achieved by it which had opened up prospects of fruitful economic and commercial exchanges between the two countries (India, MEA, 1989: 34). Such was the state of relations that the daily El Pais wanted ‘the non-existence of economic contacts’ to be entered into the Guinness Book of Records. Trade was insignificant. This prompted Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to state that India’s trade was ‘a mere quarter of one per cent of Spain’s total trade’ (cited in Khergamvala, 1988). During the visit, Foreign Secretary Eric Gonsalves told the El Pais that Spain could no longer ‘afford to continue neglecting India in its diplomacy’. Other members of the Indian Prime Minister’s delegation were quoted as having remarked that relations between the two countries were good, but only ‘because they don’t exist’ (Higueras, 1988, cited in Palarea, 2015: 4). The visit did not lead to more intensive political and economic interaction between the two countries.

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The 1990s Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao paid a visit to Madrid en route to the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro on 10 June 1992. Next year, accompanied by Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (Jose Claudio Aranzadi Martinez) and Minister of Education and Science (Javier Solana Madariaga) and a large business delegation, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez paid an official visit to India from 7 to 10 February 1993 to reciprocate the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1988) and the transit visit of P. V. Narasimha Rao (June 1992). During the visit, three agreements were signed on cooperation against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and organized crime; avoidance of double taxation; a (third) cultural exchange programme for 1993–1995, and an agreement on prisoners’ exchange was initialled (India, MEA, 1993: 52). Rao highlighted the common views relating to adherence to the UN Charter and combating terrorism and noted that the full potential in bilateral trade, transfer of technology and investment was far from realized (Rao, 1993: 446–447).

Foreign Office Consultations Foreign Office consultations (FOCs) began in 1994, but did not have any fixed rhythm. After a meeting in Madrid in December 1988, ‘informal’ consultations were held in December 2003 and September 2005 during the visits of the Spanish MFA Secretary of State and that of Jose Eugenio Salarich, Director-General for Asia–Pacific Region, respectively. The second round of Foreign Office consultations took place in Madrid on 15 May 2006 after a gap of eight years between Secretary (West) Shashi Tripathi and Rafael Dezcallar, Secretary in the Spanish MFA. On this occasion, the Spanish Government expressed its keen desire to institutionalize FOCs, which was agreed under an MoU on Institutionalization of Political Dialogue signed during the visit of Prime Minister Zapatero in July 2006. Two years later, another round of informal discussions took place in 2008 during Dezcallar’s visit to New Delhi.

Spain’s Outreach to Asia in the 2000s Geographical and cultural distance coupled with low economic links and marginal political interaction led postwar Spain to largely neglect Asia.

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The high growth of Asian economies in the 1990s did not tangibly alter the situation. It was only at the turn of the millennium that Prime Minister José Maria Aznar (1996–2004) initiated the first-ever Asia strategy to enhance the economic, political and socio-cultural relations with the Asia–Pacific in the first ‘Asia–Pacific Framework Plan 2000– 2002’—(Plan Marco Asia Pacifico 2000–2002). The conclusion of the Plan, which was subsequently extended until 2004, was that Spain was ‘fundamentally absent’ from the Asia–Pacific (Pardo, 2014: 171). Since New Delhi was not prioritizing ties with Spain, Madrid, according to José Eugenio Salarich, Director-General of Foreign Policy for Asia and the Pacific (2004–2010)—who was ‘more or less permanently confined to life on an airplane’ during these six years—sought to proactively engage Pakistan in the hope that it would induce India to definitely ‘reshuffle its priorities’ towards Spain (Interview with Salarich, cited in Heiberg, 2019: 248, 10). Like Aznar, Prime Minister Zapatero in ‘a highly personal, ideologically driven departure’ believed that the time was ripe ‘to move beyond certain ‘givens’ of Spanish foreign policy and explore uncharted waters’ (Powell, 2009: 520). He published two, more detailed Asia action plans—Plan de Accion España hacia Asia y el Pacifico 2005–2008 and the Plan Asia Pacifico 3 2008–2012. These plans had five key principles: non-intervention in regional politics, geographical focus on East Asia and India, prioritization of economic exchanges, joint policy implementation between public and private actors, and an increase in mutual knowledge at the societal level (Pardo, 2014: 171). Non-intervention did not, however, preclude participation in the UN-approved, NATO-led war in Afghanistan (since 2002), where its troop strength peaked to over 1,500 as well as EUPOL Afghanistan (since 2007) to train Afghan police forces. During his two terms in office (2004–2011), Zapatero visited India once in 2006 while he visited China four times (2000, 2005, 2010 and 2011). Like other EU Member States, Spain too had a China-fixation in its Asia policy since it was a much more significant trade and investment partner than India. In 2008, Zapatero emphasized the importance of Asia: ‘The [Asian] continent is an important centre of gravity in both political and economic terms. If our country wants to be truly global, if it does not want to miss out on the global economy, it must get involved in Asia, where we have arrived relatively late’ (Zapatero, 2008). Spain could not ‘afford to be absent in an area where its friends are in competition’ (Salanch, 2008). A major hurdle was ‘the serious imbalance between

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the resources that are assigned to Asia and what was at stake for Spain’ (Esteban, 2014). A major objective of the three Asia plans was to enhance economic as well as socio-cultural exchanges in education, culture and science with Asia. Scientific cooperation sought to enhance recognition of Spain’s scientific capabilities and prowess and encourage joint scientific research. Since at the turn of the millennium, the Asian continent remained ‘relatively unknown’, the Action Plans acknowledged that Spain had ‘an image deficit’ among Asians and therefore sought to enhance the image of Spain in Asia as a means to make Spanish companies and products better known in the region (Pardo, 2014: 173–174). To that end, they also sought to lay the foundation for more meaningful economic exchanges by concluding agreements such as the avoidance of double taxation. The network of Cervantes Institutes—similar to the British Council and the Goethe Institute/Max Mueller Bhavans—became the primary instrument to promote the learning of Spanish language and the widening and deepening of socio-cultural relations. By 2011, they were established in seven East and Southeast Asian countries and India. In the early 2000s, low-key political exchanges continued. Foreign Minister Yashwant Singh met his counterpart Ana P. Vallelersundi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2003. After a long hiatus, an Indian parliamentary delegation visited Spain in May 2003. Two ministers—Minister of State for Tourism Renuka Chowdhury and Minister of State (Overseas Indians’ Affairs)—visited Spain in October 2004. India did not adequately appreciate the promise and potential of Spain, which was registering high rates of growth before the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Spain has not been generally regarded in India as a major actor in the formulation of the Union’s foreign and security policy. New Delhi traditionally prioritized the ‘Big Three’ (France, Germany and the UK).

Zapatero’s Visit, 2006 As one of the countries hardest hit by the Eurozone crisis, Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero’s Government (2004–2011) adopted a more geo-economic foreign policy and began to look to Asia, especially China, to save it from its troubles (Prislan & Torreblanca, 2011: 54). Despite the lack of bilateral irritants and contentions, political contacts between India and Spain have been sporadic. On the occasion of the 50th

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anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Zapatero visited India in July 2006—13 years after that of Prime Minister Gonzalez in 1993. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos and Minister for Industry, Tourism and Trade José Montilla and a 60member business delegation. During the visit, three MoUs were signed on the institutionalization of bilateral political dialogue at various levels commensurate with the expanding bilateral relationship and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty on criminal matters (text in Bhasin, 2007: 1798– 1807), and a technological cooperation pact between the Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI) and its Indian counterpart, the Technology Development Board. They agreed to work towards closer cooperation in the defence sector, including the possibility of joint research and development. On this occasion, the two leaders reiterated their strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations (India, MEA, 2006). Though Zapatero somewhat ambitiously spoke of ‘an explosion’ in the Spanish presence on the Indian subcontinent and guaranteed the ‘unconditional and enthusiastic’ support of his government to promote it (El Mundo, 2006 cited in Palarea, 2015: 24). The results were, however, rather modest.

Visits of President Patil and King Carlos The Indian president’s visit was preceded by the visit of the Spanish Deputy Prime Minister in early 2009. In April 2009, the first Indian head of state visited Spain. Seven areas, viz. infrastructure, agriculture, tourism, cooperation in Latin America, renewable energy, SMEs and research and development in S&T were identified as focus areas for strengthening bilateral cooperation. Three MoUs on agriculture and allied fields, tourism cooperation and renewable energy were signed during the visit. In April 2012, Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna visited Spain for discussions with his counterpart Jose Manuel Garica-Margallo. Accompanied by five ministers (foreign affairs, defence, industry, energy and tourism and infrastructure and transport), King Juan Carlos I of Spain paid the first Head of State visit to India from 24–27 October 2012. A number of agreements were signed including on defence cooperation, road and road transport, high-speed railway, and co-production of films. The visit led to an agreement to establish a Joint Commission to oversee trade and economic relations.

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Modi and Spain The coming to power of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister by an absolute majority in several decades and his ambitious agenda for reform aroused considerable interest in Spain and led to serious attention being given to all-round development of the relationship. In 2014, India and Spain established a framework for annual political dialogue with the participation of Secretary (West), MEA and the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the Spanish side.3 In order to engage the new government, Foreign Minister José Manuel García-Margallo visited India on 27 April 2015 after a gap of 43 years. The two ministers acknowledged their shared interests and responsibilities in addressing a broad range of international issues, including peace and security, free and fair trade and ‘an open, just, inclusive and rule-based international order’. They acknowledged the importance of early conclusion of negotiations on the EU-India Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement. Both ministers exchanged views on the ‘Make in India’, ‘Digital India’ and ‘Clean India’ initiatives of the Government of India, which had the potential to significantly enhance the possibilities of bilateral economic cooperation. They recommended an early summit meeting at prime ministerial level (India, MEA, 2017b). The Modi Visit, 2017 A prime ministerial visit could not take place in 2016 because of the lack of a functional government in Spain since the political stalemate in the aftermath of the December 2015 elections. A second election in June 2016 led to a minority government before the requisite parliamentary support could be found for a stable government in October 2016. An additional difficulty was the inability of the caretaker government to appoint a new Spanish Ambassador to India after the incumbent resigned in December 2015. Prior to his visit, Modi had met Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey, on 15 November 2015 and discussed cooperation in counter-terrorism, railway modernization, defence manufacturing, renewable energy and marine security. 3 Foreign Office consultations: second (28 March 2014), third (2 March 2015), fourth (16 March 2017), fifth (3 April 2018) and sixth (21 July 2020) (virtually).

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Apart from visiting two leading strategic partners (France and Germany), Modi visited Spain—three decades after Rajiv Gandhi visited the country—for two days primarily to forge a new relationship with Spain, which was recovering well from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. It signified an opportunity ‘to recalibrate India’s approach to European geopolitics’ (Rajamohan, 2017). Spain was one of the Tier 2 countries which represented ‘the real low hanging fruit of India’s foreign policy’ since they were ‘not only more willing to cooperate and collaborate with India. Their contribution to India’s development could probably be ‘more meaningful’. Importantly, ‘the political cost’ of accessing technology and best practices from Spain was low (Bagchi, 2017). The nearly 60-para joint statement—the longest and most comprehensive one ever issued since the establishment of diplomatic relations— had four key components: cooperation in political and security affairs, economic cooperation, cooperation in multilateral, regional and global affairs and people-to-people contacts, and science and technology and innovation. It welcomed efforts to enhance defence cooperation and the progress in negotiations on the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.4 After its support for membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Spain expressed continued support for Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. The three robust paragraphs on terrorism stressed zero tolerance to terrorism. In an implicit reference to Pakistan, the joint statement called for restrictive measures against States and entities which encourage, support, finance terrorism, provide sanctuary to terrorists and glorify terrorism. Madrid urged the recommencement of negotiations on the India-EU Broad Investment and Trade Agreement (BTIA). The formulation on the South China Sea in the joint statement was bold and implicitly criticized China’s unlawful conduct there. The opening of an Indian consulate in Barcelona5 in the near future was also announced. Modi got

4 An agreement on collaboration in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was signed on 27 March 1965 (India, MEA, 1965b: 57). 5 Until then, India has a Honorary Consulate in Barcelona and Santa Cruz de Tenerife where most of the Indian community lives.

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support from Rajoy for his various economic and social initiatives (India, MEA, 2017b). During the visit, seven agreements/MoUs were signed.6 During 2018 there were several high-level meetings at multilateral settings. Foreign Minister Josep Borrell Fontelles met Sushma Swaraj at the UN Ministerial Week in New York on 24 September 2018. On 19 October, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez met Vice-President M. Venkaiah Naidu on the sidelines of the 12th ASEM summit in Brussels and Modi on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires on 1 December 2018. Foreign Minister Josep Borrell addressed the Raisana Dialogue in January 2019. Next month, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Spain to discuss bilateral, regional and global issues of mutual concern. The Spanish Government conferred upon her the Grand Cross of the Order of Civil Merit for India’s swift response through Operation Maitri in rescuing 71 Spanish nationals from Nepal in April 2015 in the wake of the disastrous earthquake (India, MEA, 2019). Foreign Minister Jaishankar met his Spanish counterpart Arancha Gonzalez Laya on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on 16 February 2020 and spoke with her twice during the early phase of the pandemic. The Spanish Foreign Minister thanked him for the supply of 2,500 kg of Hydroxychloroquine and other medicines to Spain at the peak of the crisis. Madrid reciprocated by sending seven tonnes of medical supplies to India in April 2021, when it confronted the second wave of COVID-19. Modi had a telephonic conversation with Pedro Sanchez PerezCastejon on 4 April 2020 on the global challenge posed by the COVID19 pandemic; the two leaders agreeing that the world needed to define a new, human-concentric concept of globalization for the post-COVID19 era (India, MEA, 2020). On 23 December 2020, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar had a virtual meeting with his counterpart Arancha Gonzalez Laya in which they undertook a review of bilateral ties and possibilities of cooperation in the post-COVID-19 scenario.

6 These were MoUs on technical cooperation in civil aviation, organ transplantation, cyber security, renewable energy, and between the Foreign Service Institute and the Diplomatic Academy of Spain as well as agreements for transfer of sentenced persons and visa waiver for holders of diplomatic passports.

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2021–2022 Developments Minister of State for External Affairs and Culture, Meenakshi Lekhi, visited Spain from 14 to 17 September 2021. Madrid welcomed GoI’s approval of the $2.5 billion contract to procure 56 C-295 aircraft from Airbus Spain, forty of which would be manufactured in India had ‘qualitatively enhanced’ bilateral relations. The contract marks the first ‘Make in India’ in the aircraft sector. The two sides resolved to expedite negotiations for the conclusion of a civil nuclear agreement at an early date (India, MEA, 2021a). Modi met Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Rome on 31 October 2021. The two leaders welcomed the growing bilateral trade and investment ties and resolved to expand bilateral cooperation in new areas like e-mobility, clean tech, advanced materials and deep-sea exploration (India, MEA, 2021b). During Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares’ visit on 15 June 2022, the entire gamut of bilateral relations was reviewed. The two foreign ministers stressed the need to hold regular meetings of bilateral institutional mechanisms and early finalization of MoUs/Agreements under negotiation in various sectors. During the meeting, the ministers signed the Joint Declaration of Intent on cooperation in cultural and academic fields (India, MEA, 2022).

UNSC Reform The first time that India made a reference to the need for the United Nations Security Council to be more representative ‘without going into details’ was in February 1993 (Singh, 1993: 62). More than two decades later (April 2015), the two countries affirmed the desirability of reforming the United Nations, including its Security Council, to strengthen its ability to address contemporary global challenges more effectively through concrete outcomes (India, MEA, 2015: para 7). Two years later, Spain, belonging to the Coffee Club, did not offer clear support for India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The two countries merely acknowledged the need for ‘a comprehensive reform’ of the United Nations, including its Security Council and ‘shared their views’ on how to expand its membership

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to make it more representative of the contemporary geopolitical realities and effective, credible and responsive to the existing challenges to international peace and security (India, MEA, 2017b). The ‘greatest spoiler’ in India’s quest for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council is the coalition of 30-odd countries in the ‘Uniting for Consensus’ (UfC) group. Among its active members are two European countries (Italy and Spain) which have reservations about Germany’s candidature. They staunchly reject the G4 move for enlargement of permanent seats as undemocratic, advocate only the addition of non-permanent seats and insist on consensus rather than majority vote (Murthy, 2020: 84). Thus, while India and Spain recognize the need for reform of the United Nations, they do not share similar visions of the expansion and reform of the UN Security Council.

NSG Membership Initially, Spain had reservations about the Indo-US civil nuclear deal. General Marcos Rodriguez Cantero, Disarmament Affairs Deputy Director in the MFA, reiterated concerns about the potential negative impact of the agreement with India on the larger framework of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and regional stability in South Asia. Spain also pointed to the need to reach out and better harness India into the global nonproliferation regime without ‘undermining NSG guidelines’. In internal EU discussions, Madrid had argued for flexibility and understanding of the American initiative (Wikleaks, 2005). India formally sought Spain’s support during Prime Minister’s Zapatero’s visit to New Delhi in July 2006, but the joint communique made no mention. Subsequently, Spain accepted the outcome of NSG deliberations to grant India a waiver on 6 September 2008. Spain nevertheless maintains that all countries, including India, should accede to the NPT and adhere to its principles. Even though ‘an ad hoc formula’ for India has been found following the Indo-US nuclear deal, it stressed that it could not abstain from demanding that India and other countries in a similar situation join the NPT (Torres, 2009). Negotiations between the two countries for a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are still on-going. Madrid supported India’s membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and the

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Australia Group (2018) and has expressed continued support for India’s membership of the NSG (India, MEA, 2017c).

Separatism in Spain As early as 2009, the MEA declined to make any comments on the relations of the Basque and Catalonia about a referendum as these were ‘internal issues’ of Spain. Four days before the Catalan parliament proclaimed independence from Spain, India refrained from making any comment; it again reiterated that it was an internal issue of Spain. An Indian official reaction to the declaration, which came three days later, noted the ‘negative global reaction’ to this development. Neither Europe nor the world, it added, would benefit from instability. As a country that values and fosters unity in diversity, New Delhi urged that ‘issues of identity and culture are best addressed within the constitutional framework and with respect for national integrity’ (Raveesh Kumar, 2017). This stance was in consonance with India’s long-standing position with respect to secession and self-determination. During decolonization, India’s position was that self-determination only applied territories under alien or colonial domination. Championing self-determination in independent states would only lead to chaos and strife (Sreenivasan, 2017). It was a salutary reminder to India as to what could go wrong when regional grievances in a federal political and economic union were allowed to fester (Dehejia, 2017).

Economic and Trade Relations Prior to Independence, India had been importing considerable quantities of saffron, almonds, quicksilver from Spain and exported raw cotton in jute, shellac, oilseeds, hides and skins, and pepper. During 1949–1950, Indian exports declined to |3.1 million while imports stood at |3.4 million. Trade talks between the two countries were held for the first time in September 1949 (Sri Prakasa, 1950: col. 1063). In October 1950, a Spanish trade delegation led by Jaime Alba held discussions on improving bilateral trade arrangements (India, MEA, 1951: 22; TOI, 1950b: 4).7

7 The JCEC has so far met ten times. The eleventh meeting of the Joint Commission took place in Madrid in January 2018.

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Trade increased to |47.4 million in 1962–1963 (India, MEA, 1965a: 69). In the 1960s, a Spanish business delegation visited India in 1964. A trade delegation consisting of the representatives of the Metals and Minerals Trading Corporation (MMTC), the State Trading Corporation and the engineering industry visited Spain for 12 days in June 1965 to explore the possibilities of expanding and diversifying trade between the two countries. The 1972 Indo-Spanish Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement primarily sought to increase the volume of trade between the two countries. It established a governmental Joint Committee/Commission on Economic Cooperation. Its meetings were initially envisaged to be held annually, but they were held infrequently: the second (New Delhi, 1981), third (Madrid, October 1986), fifth (Madrid, May 1997) and sixth (New Delhi, February 1999). Spain established a Trade Office in Mumbai in 1985. In the early 1980s, India had an adverse balance of payments with Spain. This imbalance increased from |628.1 million in 1981–1982 to |899.1 million in 1983–1984 (Sangma, 1985: col. 156). In 1987 twoway trade amounted to $220 million and marginally rose to $225 million in 1988 (TOI, 1989: 12). In the 1990s, Spain was turning towards Asia and India since there was a slump in Latin America, its traditional market in the Arab world which had been affected by the fall in oil prices. In 1992–1993, trade rose to $282.31 million, with India having a trade surplus of $115.69 (Mukherjee, 1994: cols. 128–129). Trade rose significantly from $635.41 million in 1996–1997 to $5.863 billion in 2018–2019, but declined to $5.559 billion in 2019–2020. Trade declined to $4.750 billion owing to COVID-19 in 2020–2021, but then jumped back to $6.778 billion in 2021–2022. India has had a consistent trade surplus with Spain, which rose from $214.59 million in 1996–1997 to $2.332 billion in 2019–2020 and stood at $2.672.46 billion in 2021–2022 (see Table 7.1). In 2007, Spain opened an Economic and Commercial Office as well as a Tourism Office in Mumbai in 2007. A Centre for Industrial and Technological Development was opened in New Delhi in 2006. A notable change has been the launch of the India-Spain Innovation Programme (SIP) has approved 25 joint research projects mostly in biotechnology, renewable energy and nanotechnology with a strong focus on the involvement of SMEs.

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Table 7.1 India-Spain trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 (in millions of US Dollars) Year

Exports

Imports

Total

Balance

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

425.0 441.98 499.34 547.95 666.25 677.01 810.49 1002.58 1389.37 1605.66 1878.66 2293.59 2538.15 2029.26 2565.29 2999.27 2865.75 2884.41 3148.12 3237.11 3424.99 3995.11 4182.49 3945.44 3238.52 4725.45

210.41 160.98 214.28 139.88 142.15 168.78 177.12 258.78 389.55 573.46 627.41 995.64 1023.80 1095.53 1487.58 1809.78 1815.66 1843.42 2005.20 1646.02 1968.77 1663.37 1680.50 1613.17 1511.92 2052.99

635.41 602.96 713.62 687.83 808.40 845.79 987.61 1261.36 1778.92 2179.12 2506.07 3289.23 3561.95 3124.79 4052.87 4809.05 4681.41 4727.83 5153.32 4883.13 5393.76 5658.48 5862.99 5558.61 4750.44 6778.44

+214.59 +281.00 +285.06 +408.07 +524.10 +508.23 +633.37 +743.80 +999.82 +1032.20 +1251.25 +1297.95 +1514.35 +933.73 +1077.71 +1189.49 +1050.09 +1040.99 +1142.92 +1591.09 +1456.22 +2331.74 +2501.99 +2332.27 +1726.60 +2672.46

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce

The JCEC has so far met ten times; the most recent meeting being held in Madrid in January 2018. In February 2015, the India-Spain CEOs Forum was established under the JCEC. Its first formal meeting was held in Madrid in May 2017. Global Innovation & Technology Alliance (GITA) along with the Spanish Centre for Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI) instituted the India-Spain Program of Cooperation on Industrial Research and Development, a bilateral framework for providing financial support to collaborative R&D ventures between Indian and Spanish industry and academia.

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External Assistance After Spain joined the European Economic Community in January 1986, it expressed its willingness to offer concessional finance linked to participation in projects of mutual interest. During March 1988, the Spanish Government confirmed that it would be prepared to extend a soft credit window that would cover around 40% of the total project/import cost involving Spanish firms, with 20 years maturity with a grace period of eight years at an interest of 2% per annum. The balanced of 60% was to be met by buyer’s credit. In 1988, the Spanish Government provided a government-togovernment soft loan of US$46 million for partly financing (52.2%) the acquisition of three phosphoric acid carriers at a cost of US$87.3 billion by the Shipping Corporation of India from Astileroes Espanoles, Spain. This loan was repayable in 20 years with a moratorium of nine years at an interest of 2% per annum. The balance cost of 47.8% was met by export credit (India, Ministry of Finance, 1990: 105).

Foreign Direct Investment Spanish FDI in India Spain has been a late entrant into India’s growth story. The sovereign debt crisis led Spain to prioritize India as an important opportunity for Spanish companies searching for new markets outside the Eurozone. In the wake of liberalization, Spanish companies’ investments in India were rather modest. From a meagre |3.3 million in 1991, Spanish FDI in India rose to |19.2 million in 1992, peaked to |98 million in 1993 and declined to |20.2 million in 1994 (Sahi, 1994: cols. 63–64). From 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1997, cumulative Spanish investment in India amounted to |157.80 million (Sinha, 1998: col. 102). Spanish investment flows in India have been irregular. In terms of stock, in 2011 Spanish investment in India reached e358 million, and in 2015, this stock increased to e803 million (India-Spain Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation, 2018: 6). Spain was the sixteenth largest investor in India; its cumulative FDI from April 2000 to June 2022 amounted to US$3,593.98 million, being 0.59% of total inflows (India, DPITT, 2022). Upto June 1986, there were 22 Indian industrial collaborations approved with Spain of which three involved financial tie-ups (Hindustan

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Times, 1986). A total of 208 Spanish companies have subsidiaries, joint ventures, projects or liaison and purchasing offices in India. Investments are mainly concentrated in infrastructure (Albertis and Grupo San José), renewable energy (Gamesa), automotive components (Antolín, Gestamp, Special Ingots), container terminal (Dragados), water desalination (Abengoa in Chennai) and single brand retail (InditexZara/Mango). Indian investments are mainly in the sectors of metallurgical industries, renewable energy, automotive, ceramics and infrastructure mainly in highways, transmission lines, tunnels and metro stations (India, MEA, 2019: 2) and Smart Cities (Eptisa for Jaipur and Udaipur). Indra’s technological solutions are used, among others, to manage and control 80% of Indian air space and in the Mumbai, Kolkata and Delhi underground systems. Railways is an area for significant potential in the future.8 Indian FDI in Spain Cumulative Indian FDI in Spain from April 2000 to August 2022 amounted to US$601 million (India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, 2022). There are about 50 Indian companies in Spain mainly in software & IT services, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and logistics. India is among the top 30 investors in Spain globally and among the top five from Asia (India, MEA, 2019: 2). Indian companies are present in Spain through 100 subsidiaries, including Telco, TCS, Ranbaxy and Infosys in fields such as IT, automobiles, pharmaceuticals and road maintenance. NIIT Technologies, Tech Mahindra and Wipro have been successfully operating in Spain in the IT industry. Together they account

8 In 2016, the Spanish company Talgo undertook a trial run of its lighter and faster trains to prove that they could cut travel time between Mumbai and Delhi from 17 to 12 hours. Talgo brought a locomotive engine and nine train wagons to Mumbai at its own cost and the firm began its demonstration in May, hoping to show the Indian authorities that Talgo trains could travel faster without the need to overhaul India’s ageing rail tracks. In July, Talgo reached a record speed on India’s railways during the second phase of its trials, when a convoy sped at 180 km/hour on an 84 km stretch of track in northern India, covering the distance in 38 minutes (Hindu Business Line, 2018). Adif, a state-owned company, provided experts for electrification, telecommunications, traffic management and systems integration for the design of other major railway lines (Palarea & Sengupta, 2017: 19).

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for the creation of 10,000 jobs and a very significant amount of indirect employment. The presence of Indian-owned companies has increased through the subsidiaries of foreign companies established in Spain and purchased by Indian companies like Arcelor Mittal and purchase of Spanish companies (Hispano Carrocera by Tata, and the Elsamex Group, bought by the Indian firm IL&FS). Moreover, some Indian companies have begun direct investment processes in Spain in sectors with a high technological content and high value-added, such as Suzlon in the renewable energy sector and the Ranbaxy company in the pharmaceutical sector (Palarea & Sengupta, 2017: 21).

Combatting Terrorism On 8 February 1993, India and Spain signed a one-page, two-paragraph joint declaration on cooperation in combatting terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. It stipulated mutual assistance between the two governments in investigation and prosecution of criminal activities in both countries that affect their interests and those of their nationals. It urged consultations to conclude a formal agreement in the future (text in India, MEA, Treaties Series Database, 1993). In the wake of the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, Foreign Minister Josep Pique of Spain, which held the rotating Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2002, phoned Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh on 14 January and condemned terrorism in all its forms. He urged India to favour ‘with generosity and sense of historic opportunity’ the resumption of talks with Pakistan, to reduce tensions (Xinhua, 2002). Madrid had played ‘a helpful role’ in including several terrorist organizations operating in India in the EU blacklist that was drawn up in May 2002 during the Spanish Presidency of the EU. Spain had also been ‘an outspoken supporter’ of the Indian initiative in the United Nations to negotiate a Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism. The Spanish Presidency of the EU had taken a forthright position on the India-Pakistan situation, demanding that Pakistan stop cross-border terrorism against India permanently and close down terrorist training camps (India, MEA, 2002b). Home Minister L. K. Advani signed an extradition treaty on 20 June 2002 to ensure that Spain was not used as a transit point by terrorists and drug traffickers and because underworld smugglers like Abu Salem as

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well as other criminals were in Spain (text in India, MEA, Indian Treaties Database, 2002).

Defence Cooperation The first Indian defence delegation visited Spain as early as 1963 (Chavan, 1963: col. 2421). In the late 1970s, there was a scandal over the sale of obsolete Centurion tanks to Spain.9 Exploratory talks on cooperation in defence science and technology were held when a high-level defence delegation led by V. S. Arunachalam, Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, and K. Sanathanam, Adviser to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), visited Spain in the second week of July 1988 (Panigrahi, 1988: col. 165) a few days prior to the arrival of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The Spanish Government had shown interest in Indian capabilities in defence-related research and development. At this time, however, Spain was not perceived as a major generator of defence technologies but it had industrial capabilities in certain fields including aeronautics (Sharma, 1988: 9). A Spanish defence delegation visited Indian laboratories and institutions of applied research defence installations shortly thereafter to work out specific fields of cooperation (Khergamvala, 1988; TOI, 1988: 9). No major results ensued. With India being one of the biggest arms importers, Spain looked with keen interest in the Indian market. The Spanish Defence Ministry proposed the inclusion of India in the Military Instruction Cooperation Programme and identified India as one of the nine countries with which to promote negotiations for the establishment of bilateral meetings on armament and equipment (Spain, MoD, 2012: 84, 87). A MoU on Defence Cooperation was signed on 26 October 2012 to facilitate defence cooperation by exchanging defence-related experience, information, encouraging visits of personnel, collaboration in defence industry and other similar areas of cooperation during the first-ever visit of Spanish

9 Ninety obsolete and unserviceable Centurion tanks were sold in December 1977 to a Spanish firm for $2 million for cannibalization and recovery of quality steel in the forging plants against import permission by the Spanish government. However, though the shipping documents listed Barcelona at the port of destination, some foreign firms diverted the cargo to South Africa. After the news surfaced in February 1979, the GoI called off the sale of the remaining 190 Centurion tanks in June 1980 (Patil, 1981: col. 110; Singh, 1981: cols. 281–283).

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Defence Minister Pedro Morenés as part of the King of Spain’s delegation. A MEA official acknowledged some ‘minimal’ on-going defence cooperation, but provided no details (Ghanshyam, 2012: 1649). A 16-member delegation from the National Defence College visited Spain from 20 to 25 May 2012. Next year, Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal N. A. K Browne paid an official visit to Spain (7–12 April 2013). During the visit of Spanish Defence Minister Pedro Morenés to India on 4–5 March 2015, the two countries signed an Agreement on Mutual Protection of Classified Information on 5 March 2015 (entered into force on 27 September 2016), which provided the framework for bilateral cooperation in the areas of defence, development of technological cooperation and agreed to initiate a dialogue on defence cooperation between the Ministries of Defence of the two countries. Nine months later, the State Secretary of Defence Pedro Arguelles Salaverria visited India (27–28 September 2015).

Arms Exports to India During 2013–2020, Spanish arms exports to India increased from e12.054 million in 2013 to e14.093 million in 2014. They declined to e8.776 million in 2015, doubled to e17.904 million in 2016. Arms exports sharply declined to e5.585 million in 2017 and further declined to e3.506 million in 2018. They nearly doubled to e6.653 million in 2019, but fell again to e1.939 million in 2020 (see Table 7.2). Intelligence Cooperation On the occasion of the signing of the Indo-Spanish Extradition Treaty in June 2002, arrangements were agreed upon for information sharing and cooperation between the security agencies of the two countries to counter the activities of extremist Islamic terrorist organizations (India, MEA, 2002a). Spain opened an intelligence office in New Delhi in September

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Table 7.2 Spanish arms exports to India, 2013–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

2013

ML 4 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 Total ML 4 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 16 ML 22 Total ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 16 Total ML 3 ML 4 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 Total ML 3 ML 4 ML 5 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 16 Total ML 2 ML 3 ML 4 ML 5 ML 10

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses in Euros

2 2 7 4 15 2 1 2 2 5 1 13 2 3 8 5

690,235 8,854,374 4,570,741 10,951,203 25,066,553 690,235 1,674,840 120,000 6,691,345 423,858

18 1 2 1 1 2 3 10 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 11 1

18,192,191

9,600,278 6,527 527,717 10,532,974 7,124,973

Value of actual exports Euros

3,764,733 35,295 8,253,687 12,053,715 3,326,721 20,812 10,521,713 223,887 14,093,133 6,527 2,156,382 359,423 6,236,623 16,801 8,775,756

45,773 7,483,216 500,000 2,968,777 10,997,766 3,693,779 350,592

45,772 2,932,360 47,030 14,878,824 17,903,986 595,300

1,200,000 15,000 5,250

3,838,082 16,506 1,730,781

5,264,621

5,585,369 3,098,479 350,592

1 4

18,944

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Year

2019

2020

Military list category ML 11 ML 15 ML 22 Total ML 3 ML 4 ML 5 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 22 Total ML 4 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 15 ML 17 ML 22 Total

No. of licenses issued 2 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 2 14 3 4 3 2 1 1 14

Value of licenses in Euros

Value of actual exports Euros

2,205,101

39,892

2,205,101 835,400 1,439,300 120,000

3,507,907 835,400

501,200 3,372,241 91,861

501,200 3,369,046 1,833,576

6,359,602

6,652,822 1,439,300

6,081,707 58,812,063 1,046,587 14,200 28,832 65,983,389

113,600

485,305 14,200

1,938,805

Categories of Military Equipment Supplied ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components therefor ML 2: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches), projectors specially designed or modified for military use and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor ML 3: Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially designed components therefor ML 4: Bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missile and components specially designed for them ML 5: Fire control, surveillance and warning equipment, and related systems, test and alignment and countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 6: Ground vehicles and components ML 7: Chemical agents, ‘biological agents’, ‘riot control agents’, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials ML 9: Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels

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Table 7.2 (continued) ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 11: Electronic equipment, ‘spacecraft’ and components, not specified elsewhere on the EU Common Military List ML 13: Special armoured vehicles (e.g. armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components, etc.) ML 15: Imaging or countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 16: Forgings, castings and other unfinished products the use of which in a specified product is identifiable, by material composition, geometry or function and which are specially designed for any products specified by ML1 to ML 14, ML 16, ML 9, ML 10, ML 12 or ML 19 ML 17: Miscellaneous equipment, materials and ‘libraries’, as follows, and specially designed components therefor ML 18: Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List ML 22: ‘Technolgy’ for ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List Source EEAS (2022) https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf753/state/analysis

2006 primarily in response to its efforts to increase its own counterterrorism efforts10 after the Madrid bombings in March 2006 (Wikileaks, 2007). In November 2016, Lt. Gen. V. G. Khandare, Director-General Defence Intelligence Agency—responsible for providing and coordinating defence and military intelligence to the Indian armed forces—visited Spain for a meeting with Centre for Armed Forces Intelligence, the Spanish counterpart of the Defence Intelligence Agency, to enhance existing cooperation and mutual understanding between the two countries in the field of defence intelligence (India, MEA, 2017b:1–2). Modi’s Visit and After During Prime Minister Modi’s visit in May 2017, the two Prime Ministers tasked their Ministers of Defence to deepen the bilateral dialogue established in 2015 in order to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation.

10 Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel de Moratinos, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee in New York on 28 September 2006, had expressed interest in further developing bilateral cooperation in the context of the threat posed by international terrorism to both countries.

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They welcomed the recent entry into force of the Agreement on Classified Information which together with the Joint MoU on Cooperation in Defence of 2012 established the basis for strong defence cooperation between the two countries. Both leaders welcomed efforts to further cooperation between defence industries, including co-development and co-production agreements and technological cooperation. In particular in the advanced aerospace sector, it included the participation of the Spanish defence industry in the Make in India programme for the Indian defence market and third country exports (India, MEA, 2017c). India signed a White Shipping Agreement with Spain in order to enhance its maritime domain awareness in its areas of interest (India, MoD, 2018: 34); it was operationalized in 2018 (India, MoD, 2019: 36). Negotiations on an Additional Agreement on defence R&D were concluded in 2018 (India, MEA, 2019: 163), but a formal agreement has not yet been signed. A defence industry conference was held in Madrid in April 2018. The Spanish Defence Minister participated in the Aero India 2019 held at Bengaluru on 20–24 February 2019. JWG on Defence Cooperation The Secretary of State for Defence Pedro A. Salvaverria visited India on 27–28 September 2015, which was followed by the first meeting of the Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation in New Delhi on 27 November 2015. The second meeting was held on 23–25 January 2017 at Madrid, which identified areas to further expand defence cooperation, including partnerships in defence industry (India, MoD, 2017: 173). The Indian delegation was led by Defence Secretary and Joint Secretary (Navy) to participate in the meeting. The two countries held ‘a very constructive and fruitful’ third JWG meeting on defence cooperation in New Delhi on 26 November 2018 (India, MoD, 2019: 202). Security Policy Dialogue In April 2015, India and Spain agreed to launch a regular security policy dialogue between the two foreign ministries ‘to assess, strategic security challenges, exchange points of view and enhance cooperation on bilateral and multilateral level’ (India, MEA, 2017b). The inaugural security policy dialogue was held on 21–22 September 2015 with the Indian

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delegation being led by Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security Affairs. The second round was held in New Delhi on 23 May 2017 with Political Director of the Spanish MFA Enrique Mora. During Modi’s 2017 visit, the two countries resolved to continue the dialogue and cooperation on terrorism between the concerned ministries and the security dialogue in order ‘to share best practices, experiences and reinforce and speed up cooperation on the ground’ (India, MEA, 2017c). A MoU on cyber security was also signed on 31 May 2017. Submarines and Naval Systems The Spanish state-run Navantia was part of the $3.75 billion contract for building six Scorpene submarines at Mazagaon Docks Ltd. (MDL) by a consortium led by DCNS, France. The Scorpene was jointly developed by DCNS (France) and Navantia, which was involved when its construction began at MDL since 2009. It continued to be involved and made trips to MDL. Additional deals were signed with Thales and MBDA (which has a 40% stake in the Spanish company Inmize Sistemas which was established to integrate the experience and technology of major Spanish companies in the field of guided weapons) for systems and weapons. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) entered into a technical collaboration and licensing agreement with Indra Sistemas—the Spanish electronic warfare systems company—in October 2007 for the delivery of shipborne Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system called ‘Sanket’ that intercepts, analyses and identifies radar signals and displays all the tracking information on the monitor. BEL had received orders for the supply of ten Sanket Mk III systems for the Indian Navy (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2018). BEL had also signed transfer of technology agreement with Indira Sistemas for Mobile Ground Based ELINT System (MGBES) (Sitharaman, 2018). Navantia’s S-80 class submarine is one of the five bidders for the acquisition of the six next-generation non-nuclear submarines in a project worth about $8 billion. The submarines are to be constructed in India under the ‘Make in India’ programme with a domestic manufacturing content of not less than 65%. To that end, the GoI has appointed MDL and Larsen & Toubro as national strategic partners to implement the project in cooperation with one of the five foreign companies. The Indian Navy floated and awarded a $2.6 billion domestic tender for construction of four landing platform docks (LPDs) to Larsen &

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Toubro (L&T), Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering, and ABG Shipyard. State-owned Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (HSL) would build two LPDs based on that design and the winning company will build two. To that end, Larsen & Toubro tied up with Navantia of Spain, while Pipavav Defence teamed up with France’s DCNS and ABG Shipyard partnered with Alion of the United States (India Defence Market Report, 2014: 147). These companies are working jointly on building four Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) like INS Jalashwa for amphibious military operations and disaster relief for the Indian Navy (Luthra & Rai, 2013). In 2020, a contact between Sener Marine and the public sector Goa Shipyard Ltd. was signed for the integration of its CAD/CAM system FORAN for the design and production of new frigates. The Indian Navy also uses technological solutions of Indra for its satellite communications. Aircraft In the early 1980s, Casa of Spain had offered to start a manufacturing line for its aircraft at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. for feeder lines and other roles (Patil, 1981: col. 124). However, the aircraft was found unsuitable for Vayudoot. The terms and conditions offered by the Spanish company were not found to be acceptable by Vayudoot (Patil, 1988: col. 6). Spain (CASA) was one of the four partner countries offering the EADS Eurofighter combat aircraft for India’s tender for 126 fighter jets, which ultimately went to the French Rafale. In the first tender for six refuelling Aircraft, EADS’s Airbus 330 (military version), for which the lead country was Spain, emerged as the lowest bidder, but this tender was cancelled in 2009 and a fresh tender was issued. The Ministry of Defence while evaluating the bids for conclusion of a contract for the acquisition of ‘AA’ Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare (LRMRASW) aircraft enhanced the financial bid of EADS CASA, Spain to cater for 20 years product support cost (India, MoD, 2019: 260). On 24 September 2021, New Delhi formalized the acquisition of 56 Airbus twin turbo-prop aircraft in a deal valued at $2.5 billion under its Light Tactical Transport Procurement Programme (LTTP). Of the 56 aircraft, the first 16 would be manufactured at the final assembly line in Seville, Spain and delivered in a ‘fly-away’ condition within 48 months of the signing of the contract. The remaining 40 would be manufactured

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and assembled in India by Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. within 10 years of the signing of the contract. All the aircraft would be equipped with indigenously developed electronic warfare suites (Roche, 2021). An additional six C-295MPA military patrol aircraft for the Coast Guard had been selected for purchase but had not yet been ordered by the end of 2020; delivery being planned during 2021–2024 (SIPRI Arms Trade Register, generated online on 9 May 2021). In 2020, Indra concluded a contract for the supply of system navigational aid for 37 Indian airbases as part of the on-going modernization of the base infrastructure in the country. Several overseas defence companies including Expal of Spain are/were in talks with private Indian companies to provide cutting-edge technology for multiple Indian ammunition programmes (FICCI, 2018: 13). Training and Port Calls The Indian Air Force avails of courses offered by Spain (India, MoD, 2017: 127). Indian military personnel were trained on a basic course for explosive ordnance disposal in March and April 2021 at the Miguel de Cervantes base in Marjayoun, Lebanon, by Spanish experts comprising a theoretical training in handling, transporting and storage of explosives, identification of different types of ammunition along with a range of practical exercises mainly focused on mine clearance (Spain, MoD, 2021). There have been several calls by Indian ships at Spanish ports. Four Indian naval ships of the Western Fleet led by FOC-in-C (West) Vice Admiral D. K. Joshi visited Cartagena port from 11 to 14 July 2012 on their overseas deployment to the Mediterranean Sea. In June 2018, two ships of the Spanish Navy, Juan Carlos I and Blas de visited Mumbai and conducted joint exercises with the destroyer INS Chennai and the frigate INS Tarkash. The INS Tarkash made a port call at Cardiz as part of Western Fleet’s overseas deployment in 2019. The Spanish Navy’s frigate Álvaro de Bazán and five Indian ships (the second largest contingent after the United States) took part in Operation Ocean Shield (which ended in December 2016) to curb piracy in the Indian Ocean.

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Perceptions and Misperceptions Indian Perceptions of Spain During the Cold War, Indian mainstream English dailies like the Times of India often wrote about developments in Spain and a number of editorials and op-eds were published, most of which were by Indian correspondents based in London. In recent decades, Spain rarely figured in news stories and if they did, they primarily related to either sports or cultural events. Most reporting on Spain in the Times of India was through its London-based correspondents. Thus, the British prism tended to colour and condition the Indian elite’s perceptions of Spain. The world over Spain tended to be generally viewed as a land of siesta and fiesta. For decades, Spain was perceived as ‘the land of the Inquisition, the Counter-Reformation, royal absolutism, Jesuit theology, closed-mindedness, traditionalism, reaction, and ultimately, the culmination of all these ills, Franco-style fascism’ (Wiarda, 2000: 30). Until Franco’s death in 1975, the general image of Spain was usually of a country dominated by ‘the unholy trinity of army, oligarchy, and reactionary church and unalterably backward’ (Wiarda, 2000: 31). The lack of historical and linguistic connections fostered ‘a vague, albeit friendly, perception’ of Spain among Indian elites (Palarea, 2015: 8). Spaniards were predominantly perceived by Indians who claimed to know something about Spain as ‘friendly and hospitable people who know how to enjoy their free time’. These images were accompanied by traditional stereotypes such as bullfighting, flamenco, tapas and paella. Spanish sports luminaries like Pau Gasol, Rafael Nadal and Fernando Alonso were also known (Palarea, 2015: 8–9) or more recently badminton champion Carolina Marin. Generally speaking, Indians do not particular envisage Spain as a country with a high quality of life or a modern system of social services and infrastructure (Palarea, 2015: 9). Mutual indifference and neglect as well as an information deficit clouded mutual perceptions in the postwar era. For decades, apart from the well-worn cliche that ‘the rain in Spain is mainly in the plains’, to most Indians the country was evocative of little more than bullfighting and the flamenco (Ramachandaran, 1997: 10) or its sports teams. These were the only things about which Asians had any knowledge about Spain whatsoever (Bustelo, 2006: 81, cited in Pardo, 2014: 170). To a certain extent, Spain is admired in India ‘as bastions of culture and civilized living’ (Malone, 2011: 16). More recently, India perceives Spain as ‘a key

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partner to foster relations with the European Union, Europe as a whole and throughout the Mediterranean’ (Varma, 2017). A number of stories appeared in the Indian media about Spanish travails and tribulations during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. One leading commentator referred to the severe social implications of pension freezes, withdrawal of welfare benefits and a freezing of governmentfunded construction. Spain, he advised, ought to use the opportunity to push through badly needed domestic reforms like its grossly rigid labour laws which were not unlike those of India (Pal Chaudhuri, 2010). What began as a problem affecting the smaller peripheral economies of Ireland, Greece and Portugal was now buffeting Spain and Italy (Saran, 2011). Indian banks did not have any exposure to bonds issued by Greece, Spain and Portugal (Meena, 2012; Mukherjee, 2011). Indian political elites were more critical of the European Union’s predicament in the sovereign debt crisis. Apart from Greece, Portugal and Spain, several other countries were perceived to be on the ‘verge of bankruptcy’. In recent news stories, Spain’s innovation and technological capabilities have been highlighted, e.g. the purchase of a latest-generation Spanish ice-breaker ship for polar expeditions. In the 2016 Elcano Royal Institute Barometer about Spain’s image abroad, 400 online Indian respondents gave a positive portrayal of Spain as a modern, tolerant and economically rich country (Palarea & Sengupta, 2017: 9–10). Five years later, the Elcano Barometer revealed that Spain was considered rich by 88% of Indians, a majority of Indian respondents reiterated these perceptions of Spain as a modern (63%), democratic (74%), rich (88%), secular (56%) and tolerant (86%) country (Royal Institute Elcano, 2021: 23). Fifty-six per cent Indians—double that of China—considered it very important to maintain good relations with Spain. The more positive responses of Indian respondents when compared to those of China and South Korea seemed to be the result of the tendency to give positive answers to satisfy the interlocuter than by awareness of the ‘rather scarce’ relations between India and Spain (Royal Institute Elcano, 2021: 31–32). Spanish Perceptions of India Indian and Spanish perceptions of each other were severely constrained by ‘the absence of a meaningful and sustained historical encounter’ between the two countries (Ganguly, 2017: 192). It was characterized by mutual

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indifference and limited by the dominant dimension of the relationship between India and Britain in the Indian Press and scholarly literature. Cultural dimensions prior to, during and in the aftermath of Muslim domination in both in India and Spain never became the ‘subjects of prolonged and detailed study. Even individual chronicles of travellers and missionaries were subsumed under the Indo-Portuguese geopolitical chapter (Ganguly, 2017: 192). Whatever little that appeared in Spain about the historical or social reality of India was largely influenced by ‘the phantasmagoric imagination of the romanticist variety or Orientalist approaches’ (Ganguly, 2017: 193). During the 1940s and the 1960s, the Spanish Press was critical of various Nehru’s domestic and foreign policy pronouncements, especially his anti-Portuguese stance on the liberation of Goa. Nonalignment was equated with ‘neutrality’. Overall, the Spanish Press was deeply impressed by Nehru’s Asian personality and was considered as ‘the missing link’ between the East and the West (Ganguly, 2017: 197–198). Nehru’s support for Republican Spain during the Civil War conditioned India’s perceptions on policy towards Spain since 1947. After Nehru’s demise in 1964, almost all national Spanish dailies portrayed a balanced image of Nehru’s contribution in the postwar era and how this ‘irreparable loss’ signified the silencing of the Third World voice of dialogue between the two blocs (Ganguly, 2017: 204). During the Nehru era, the Spanish Press’ reaction was certainly prejudiced by the fear of the spread of communism, India’s refusal to join the Western bloc, imperial rivalry against the British and solidarity with Portugal (Ganguly, 2017: 207). For long, Spain shared exotic European perceptions of India. India was perceived as ‘an exotic country and was identified in people’s minds with yoga, Hinduism, spirituality and tandoori chicken’. In the late 1990s, Spain discovered that India is much more than these exotic images. It began to appreciate India as a rapidly growing economy with a large middle class and an emerging power. The vision of China and the vision of India are now getting ‘balanced’ in Spain. India began to be seen as not only as a regional power but as a country which is playing a bigger role in international affairs (Sanz, 2008). India is difficult to understand from the European culture because ‘several centuries coexist at the same time’ in India. It is ‘a traditional country, the cradle of great religions’, but also very modern in which there have great socio-economic advances (Moreno, 2012).

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Spain exhibits a reciprocal lack of knowledge about India. Among Spaniards, including political, economic and social figureheads, barring a few notable exceptions, there is no accurate picture of what Indian cultural, economic and political life involves. Here too there is a superficially positive evaluation and the stereotypes of the country include spirituality, hospitable people and sacred cows, but poverty and underdevelopment also tend to prevail (Palarea, 2015: 9). Indian Studies in Spain The study of both classical and contemporary India in the Spanish educational system has been absent. India studies have enlarged at a few universities in Spain, the Cervantes Institute11 in New Delhi, Casa Asia in Barcelona and Casa de la India in Valladolid, Instituto de Indologio in Madrid, student exchange programmes. In recent years, postgraduate programmes in Indian culture and art (University Complutense de Madrid) and a diploma in languages and culture of India and Iran (University of Salamanca) have been offered. However, a graduate programme with a specialization in India from the University of Valladolid and the postgraduate degree in Economics and Business of China and India from the Alcalá de Henares University stopped being offered a few years ago (España India, 2020: 178). Published annually in English since 2014 by the Spanish Association for Indian Studies, Indialogs: Spanish Journal of India Studies is the first electronic journal that focuses exclusively on the India and is the main academic network on India in Spain. The University of Valladolid has become the primary centre for India studies in Spain. It has hosted a ICCR Chair in Hindi since 2004 and a Rabindranath Tagore Chair of Contemporary Indian Studies—the only such chair in Spain—since 2019 after a MoU was signed in December 2018. Valladolid University also has a number of agreements with Indian universities and institutions (Ahmedabad, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi University, Visva Bharati, Shantinekan as well as DC Kizhakemuri Foundation (Kerala) and Sister Nivedita University (Kolkata). In recent years, Casa Asia in Barcelona has offered courses in Hindi by a private 11 During 2014–2015, the Cervantes Institute accepted 4,300 students for its language courses, which was the highest in all such Institutes the world over (Palarea & Sengupta, 2017: 28).

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tutor. Sanskrit is taught at the University of Salamanca, Complutense University, the University of Santiago de Compostela or the University of Barcelona and as an optional subject in the University of Murcia and the Language Centre of the University of Valladolid (a 40-hour course) (España India, 2020: 190). These programmes have contributed to bridging gaps in mutual perception although ‘a balanced multi-sectoral bilateral enhancement of ties still remains conditioned by the nature of regional and geo-strategic realities for both nations’ (Ganguly, 2017: 194).

Spain in Indian Scholarly Literature Articles on contemporary Spain have been rare in the two leading Indian scholarly journals on international affairs—India Quarterly (the journal of the Indian Council of World Affairs published since 1945) and International Studies (published since 1959 by the Indian School of International Studies and later by Jawaharlal Nehru University. Writing in 1946, G. A. Johnson argued in India Quarterly that it was obviously impossible for a Latin bloc to emerge without a change of regime in Spain (Johnson, 1946: 141). Seventeen years later, the doyen of Indian Europeanists, Girija K Mookerjee, argued that the antiCommunist Press in Spain and Portugal strove hard to find excuses for the invasion, partly owing to their hostility to India, and, partly due ‘to internal and international considerations. Some would even find in the conflict between the two great countries of Asia, hopes of coming changes in the stalemate in the Cold War. There was also an element of perverse pleasure in India’s misfortune in all this, for many of the commentators saw in the discomfiture of India, a vindication of their own views of India’s policy and action; and some were glad, because they had resented the so-called superior moral tone of Indian preachings on foreign policy’ (Mookerjee, 1963: 92). M. S. Rajan argued that some aligned countries like Portugal, Spain and Romania had been treated as ‘invited guests’ or ‘observers’ at nonaligned conferences. He questioned the merits of such an invitation on the basis of interest alone and wondered whether they were ‘mere Trojan Horses’ in the non-aligned movement (Rajan, 1980: 45). However, Baral and Mohanty (1991: 30) argued that there was no proof that the trio did in fact perform such a role.

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The solitary article on Spanish domestic politics by Frank S. Riddel was published in India Quarterly a year after the death of El Caudillo. The General’s ‘overriding purpose became, and remained, the preservation of his power, which equated with national interest’ (Riddel, 1976: 192). An article in 2004 discussed how Latinos started trading with India from the middle of the sixteenth century and continued to do so for the next three centuries. In passing, it mentioned how cotton (from Bombay, Gujarat and Sindh), spices from the Malabar Coast, and diamonds and rubies from Vijayanagar went to Spain and Peru through Manila (Carlisle, 2004: 21). During 1959–2020, International Studies published a solitary article dealing with Spain. In an extensively researched article, M. S. Venkataramani (1962) critically evaluated the Roosevelt Administration’s responses to the Spanish Civil War and the role of American Socialists. In another article in the same journal, B. Ramesh Babu argued that, strictly speaking, Spain and Portugal were not nation states. They were, he maintained, ‘mercantile colonizers who set sail across oceans in search of Christians and spices armed with the Bible in one hand and sword in the other’ (Babu, 2006: 293). Strategic Analyses —the journal of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses—since its inception until 2020 published only one short article on Spain and NATO (Mitra, 1982). Spain has almost never been mentioned even in passing in scholarly books on Indian foreign policy. This is not unusual given the fact that even Europe is rarely mentioned or discussed in virtually all books on Indian foreign policy even by practitioners of Indian foreign policy or veteran diplomats. There have been very few books in English published on Spain in India. In addition to a volume on India in Spanish literature in the early 1990s (Jardiel, 1992), a comprehensive volume on six decades of India-Spain cultural encounters containing 36 chapters (32 in Spanish and four in English) was published in 2017 (Dhingra et al., 2017).

Teaching of the Spanish Language Spanish was a relatively late entrant among foreign languages being taught at Indian universities and colleges with the leading position being that of Russian, French and German. The Department of Modern European Languages (later renamed as the Department of Germanic and Romanic Studies in 1988) of the University of Delhi was one of the first

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departments to initiate teaching of Spanish at the University level in the 1960s. Established at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in 1971, the Centre of Spanish Studies (currently called the Centre of Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and Latin American Studies) was the first university to offer fulltime courses in Spanish. The students who completed courses at the new later became teachers of Spanish and Hispanic Studies are different in universities which led to the establishment of full-fledged departments of Spanish at Delhi University and at the English and Foreign Language University, Hyderabad (Dhingra & Ansari, 2017: 145). A MoU was signed in 2007 to promote Catalan language and culture at Jawaharlal Nehru University. A tremendous boost to Hispanic studies and the growth of employment opportunities for language specialists, including Spanish, was the result of the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991. The Cervantes Institute, a non-profit language and culture Institute funded by the Spanish Government, began teaching Spanish language with the opening of a Avula Cervantes in 2005–2006 in the building of the School of languages, JNU; this was shifted in 2007 to its own building in the heart of the capital. Teaching of Spanish language via distance learning by the Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) began in 2009 and the next year Doon University, Dehradun, began offering B.A. and M.A. courses in Spanish (Dhingra & Ansari, 2017: 145). In 2006, twelve Indian universities and the Ramakrishna Mission Institute, Kolkata were teaching Spanish language, literature and culture at degree level (Sharma, 2006). Spanish is currently offered throughout India at both public and private universities.12

12 These include Jamia Millia Islamia (New Delhi), Jadavpur University (Kolkata), Indian Institute of Technology (Delhi), Indian Institute of Management (Indore), Vellore Institute of Technology (Velllore), Benaras Hindu University (Benaras/Varanasi), Mumbai University (Mumbai), Hyderabad Central University (Hyderabad), Savitribai Phule University of Pune (Pune), various centres of English and Foreign Language University (Lucknow and Shillong), Swami Ramanand Teerth Marathwada University (Nanded, Maharashtra) and Aligarh Muslim University (Aligarh). The private universities which offer Spanish include Amity University (NOIDA and Jaipur), G.D. Goenka University (Gurgaon) and Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham (Coimbatore). Mahatma Gandhi International University (Wardha, Maharashtra), approaches teaching Spanish through Hindi (Dhingra & Ansari, 2017: 145–146).

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Cultural Ties There was hardly much cultural exchange between India and Spain until the signing of a cultural agreement on 18 September 1982 (text in India, MEA, India Treaties Database, 1982). It was only four years later that the first-ever programme of cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries was signed on 31 January 1986 for the period 1986–1988 was signed (Foreign Affairs Record, January 1986: 29). Even its implementation was rather tardy except for scholarships provided by the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) and AECI (the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation). A considerable number of cultural activities were organized outside the cultural exchange programme. Indian cultural troupes sponsored by the ICCR regularly visited Spain. Casa Asia and Casa de la India—a remarkable public–private enterprise—have been playing a catalytic role since 2009 in promoting greater understanding and increasing Indian presence more than what India has done the other way. In 2004–2005, 19 professors were teaching Hindi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Modern Indian History and Indian Civilization in Madrid (India, MEA, 2005). In 2016, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation has signed seven agreements with Indian universities— Hyderabad, Jaipur, Pune, Varanasi, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jamia Millia Islamia and Delhi University. A unique effort by India has been the use of a Public Private Partnership (PPP) model for the Casa de la India (India Cultural Centre), which has been provided a building by the Municipality of Valladolid. In 2005, the ICCR contributed US$50,000 as a one-time grant for the renovation of the building. The building of the Casa de la India was inaugurated by on 11 November 2006 by Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma. ICCR has also provided annual programme support to Casa de la India of an amount of e25,000 annually. This was raised to e50,000 for 2008–2009 and 2009–2010. It has also gifted a bust of Tagore and other object d’art to Casa India. Since 2004, the ICCR has also deputed a professor to teach Hindi at Valladolid University (India, Embassy in Spain, 2011, April). Introductory Sanskrit, Indian classic language and modern Hindi are also taught at the Universities of Salamanca, Barcelona, Complutense (Madrid) and Santiago de Compostela, and there are opportunities to learn Hindi in

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big cities through private teachers and companies (Palarea & Sengupta, 2017: 29). On 3 July 2014, Casa de la India and the ICCR signed a MoU to promote Indian culture in Spain. Under the MoU, the ICCR agreed to provide an annual grant of e75,000 or 25% of the organization’s budget, whichever is less (Lok Sabha, 2015: 101–102). The MEA considers this Centre to be ‘an extremely imaginative partnership’ where the local government has provided the building and facilities. India contributes in cash to some of the establishment costs as well as a certain amount of money. Activities are being undertaken through other resources, namely locally through the provincial and Central government (Lok Sabha, 2016: 35). Since 2001, Casa Asia (primarily funded by the MFA) has organized a variety of cultural and academic activities in Barcelona and Madrid to showcase contemporary Indian art, culture and academic lectures to an Spanish audience. After the first India-Spain seminar at Valladolid in February 2005, a series of Indo-Spanish Tribune/Dialogue Forums were organized by Casa Asia and Casa de la India in cooperation with the Indian Council of World Affairs.13 This Tribune with India was one of the four such forums that Spain has worldwide (China, Japan and the United States). However, these formal encounters did not lead to the launch of bilateral cooperation projects and lacked appropriate follow-up action. During Modi’s visit to Spain in May 2017, Spain expressed the desire to organize a Year of Spain in India in 2020 to enhance mutual understanding in the fields of culture, science, economy and interaction between our civil societies. However, owing to the continuing COVID-19 during 2020 and 2021, this should take place in the near future. Bollywood The Bollywood blockbuster ‘Zindagi Na Milegi Dobara’ (‘You Only Live Once’) (2011), which was almost entirely shot in Spain and full of the Tomatina festival in Buñol, Valencia and bull run scenes, was seen by 70 13 The first (Barcelona, 15–16 December 2005), second (New Delhi, October 2006), third (Valladolid, 16–17 October 2007), fourth (New Delhi, 16–17 October 2008), the fifth (Madrid, 14–15 October 2010), and the sixth (New Delhi, 21–22 March 2012).

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million viewers in India. It led to a surge of Indian tourists to Spain—a country which until recently was never a popular choice for Indians. The organization of the International Film Academy Awards in Madrid (July 2016) gave a boost to tourism as it was watched by over 840 million views worldwide, including 350 million in India. Tourism For nearly six decades, there were no direct flights between India and Spain though the two countries had signed a civil aviation agreement (January 1986) and a bilateral air transport agreement (April 1987) providing for direct air links between the two countries by national carriers. Iberian Airlines had started flights to Bombay in May 1986, but stopped them after 22 months. Air India began direct flights between Delhi and Madrid operated by Air India began on 1 December 2016. The number of Spanish tourists in India marginally increased from 11,427 in 1980 (Khan, 1983: cols. 285–286) to 14,266 in 1986 (Syed, 1987: col. 103) and 25,506 in 1996 (Jena, 1997: col. 31–32). During 2007 and 2008, more than 51,000 Spanish tourists visited India, though this declined to 47,500 in 2009 (India, Embassy in Spain, 2011). About 17,000 Indians visited Spain 2003, twice as much as compared to the previous year (Notario, 2015: 16). In 2019, 240,000 Indian nationals visited Spain while about 100,000 Spaniards travelled to India (Spain, MFA, 2021).

Diaspora The Indian community forms a small percentage of the immigrant population of Spain and the third largest among people of Asian origin. The earliest Indian settlers were Sindhis who came from the subcontinent at the end of the nineteenth century and settled in the Canary Islands. In the 1950s and the 1960s, many Indians travelled to Spain from Africa while others came directly from India. According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the resident Indian origin population in Spain increased from 9,000 in 2001 to 54,387 in 2020. Indians at present are mainly concentrated in three cities, namely Madrid (8,000), Barcelona (53,000), Valencia (5,000), Canary Islands (8,000) and Malaga (1,000) (India, MEA, 2021c: 3).

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Conclusion Until recently, Spain represented for India ‘a relatively unknown country’ in the south of Europe playing ‘a very minor role’ in its foreign policy priorities (Palarea, 2015: 4). Spain and India have limited shared geopolitical or multilateral interests and there are no bilateral irritants. Unlike France and Germany, Indo-Spanish relations continue to be characterized by the lack of high-level political visits and the width and depth of mutual consultations. There is much to be addressed in building more robust civil society linkages. India-Spain trade and investment relations have not reached their true potential. The two are only beginning to gauge the mutual potential. The various bilateral framework agreements concluded so far have to be filled in with both substance and detail. Both India and Spain confront a visibility problem. For Madrid, the challenge is to extend Spanish cultural action beyond the capital to other locations in the country. Both need to develop greater expertise about each other. India is keenly interested in learning and benefitting from the Spanish capabilities, expertise and experience in infrastructure development, transportation, renewable energy and tourism.

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CHAPTER 8

India and Portugal Rajendra K. Jain and Patryk Kugiel

Introduction Portugal is one of European countries with the longest presence and contacts with India in modern times. The Portuguese engagement with India began in 1502 when they established their first trading centre at Kollam, Kerala. During his second visit to India, Vasco da Gama forcefully expelled the Arab traders from Calicut and paved the way for Portugal’s control over the region. Three years later, on 25 March 1505, Francisco de Almeida was appointed as the Viceroy of India by the Portuguese Empire. In 1510, the Portuguese defeated the Bijapurs, which had ruled Goa and annexed it to the Portuguese empire. In 1530, the capital of the

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] P. Kugiel International Economic Relations and Global Issues Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_8

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Portuguese State of India was shifted from Calicut to Goa. They subsequently acquired several territories in Gujarat, including Daman (1531) and Diu (1535). The Portuguese ruled in South India for nearly 160 years before they were defeated by the Dutch in 1660. The colonial past became a major irritant in Portugal relations with India during the Cold War. The India-Portugal relationship witnessed a remarkable turnaround since the 1990s. In recent years, Portugal has emerged as a growing partner in Europe. This chapter examines the evolution of relations between the two countries and highlights key elements of their growing partnership.

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations India and Portugal decided to establish diplomatic relations when Krishna Menon, Indian High Commissioner in London, met the Portuguese Foreign Minister José Caeiro da Mata in Paris in July 1948 (TOI, 1948: 6). The Portuguese Legation opened in New Delhi in January 1949. The Ministry of External Affairs was keen that the completion of the exchange of diplomatic representatives be done expeditiously since the question of the future of the Portuguese possessions in India required ‘early settlement in a friendly manner’ (India, MEA, 1949: 12). An Indian Legation was opened in Lisbon in November 1949 (India, MEA, 1950: 10). An Indian Consul General was stationed in Panaji and a Portuguese Consul in Bombay.

Portuguese Colonies in India In 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru felt that Goa was ‘a small pimple’ on the beautiful face of India and that it would not ‘take much time to pinch’ after India gained independence (cited in Mendes, 2007: 549). However, Indian expectations that like the French, Portugal would ‘similarly and gracefully withdraw’, led to a situation for which there was no ‘rational explanation’ (Pandit, 1956: 437). On 27 February 1950, the Indian Minister at Lisbon formally initiated negotiations to settle the future of the Portuguese possessions of Goa, Daman and Diu in India by presenting an Aide Memoire to the Portuguese Government (India, MEA, India, 1951: 13). Portugal under Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (1932–1968) refused to hold any meaningful discussions regarding Portuguese possessions in India since he argued that

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they were an integral part of Portugal. The overseas empire was central to the nationalist self-image of Portugal because it ‘added a mythical dimension to the country.… avoiding the painful necessity of confronting our [Portuguese] smallness’ (Lourenco, 1978, cited in Reis & Oliveira, 2017: 631). The myth of empire was developed by the Estado Novo regime led by Salazar around the slogan that ‘Portugal was not a small country’ (Reis & Oliveira, 2017: 632). On 14 August 1950, Nehru announced that Portugal had rejected the proposals to hold discussions on Portuguese colonies in India. On 6 December 1950, Nehru told the parliament that ‘during these years we have reasoned, argued and used peaceful methods, all without results’ (cited in Mendes, 2007: 551). Nehru considered the continuance of colonial rule in India as ‘an anachronism’ and asserted that an independent India could not have ‘these islands and footholds of foreign authority are joining of surrounded by her own territory’ (Nehru, 1951: 1). When several notes requesting commencement of negotiations for the transfer of Goa, Daman and Diu to India failed to elicit any response and Lisbon took several measures to strengthen its hold on these territories, the Government of India (GoI) felt no useful purpose would be served by continuing the Legation at Lisbon. It was therefore closed down on 11 June 19531 (TOI, 1953: 1). The Portuguese Embassy in New Delhi was closed in August 1955. All diplomatic and consular links were finally severed on 1 September 1955. Since the French and Portuguese enclaves were ‘so small’, India’s freedom struggle was primarily directed against the British. India took it for granted that when British rule ceased in India, the other enclaves would also be freed and did not envisage any difficulty in that regard (Nehru, 1962: 59). Nehru expressed the desire to continue to ‘pursue, with patience and firmness, the path of conciliation and negotiation’ with Portugal to cooperate in the ‘peaceful consummation’ of Indian efforts 1 Kewal Singh, former Ambassador to Portugal, later reminisced that his talks with Prime Minister Salazar were ‘always most distressing’ since he regarded Portuguese territories in India were actually metropolitan Portugal. When he met Dr Salazar in the last week of May 1953, his replies were as usual ‘extremely abrupt and negative’. In a response to Nehru’s offer to maintain Portuguese culture in Goa, Salazar arrogantly said it was his hope that ‘Portuguese Goa would continue to exercise a civilizing influence over the whole of India’. Within a couple of days, he got Nehru’s reaction that it was ‘obvious that the twentieth century could not talk to the seventeenth century’ and that I should close the Indian diplomatic mission and return to India’ (Singh, K., 1990: 10).

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to resolve the issue (Nehru, 1954, 25 August: 50). There was, Nehru asserted, ‘nothing more scandalous on God’s earth today than Portuguese occupation of Goa, historically, factually, religiously if you like or from any point of view.… we will tolerate no nonsense about Goa from wherever it comes, big or small Power’ (TOI, 1955: 11).

The ICJ and the Right of Passage The area of Dadra and Nagar Haveli spread over 491 square km and landlocked between Gujarat in the north and Maharashtra in the south was liberated by pro-Indian, underground elements (Azad Gomantak Dal ) on 2 August 1954. Indian forces successfully prevented Portuguese forces to re-enter the enclaves to restore their authority. Portugal’s admission into the United Nations (14 December 1955) ironically ended up being favourable to ‘a reactionary retrenchment by the Portuguese regime into its core legalist argumentation for being an empire2 in denial’ (Reis, 2013: 256). Barely a week after being admitted to the United Nations, Portugal filed an action against India in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague on 22 December 1955 in an attempt to compel India to recognise Portuguese sovereign rights over Dadra and Nagar Haveli, including the right of access of Portuguese troops across Indian territory (Fisher, 1962: 5). In the ‘Right of Passage’ case before the ICJ, the GoI decided to contest the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain Portugal’s application3 (India, MEA, 1960: 11). On 23 September 1957, Attorney-General M.C. Setalvad stated in the ICJ that militarily the Portuguese territories could become a part of India within two days, but India did not wish a settlement in that manner. The Portuguese application for a right of passage including its armed forces across independent India under international law, Indian Attorney-General M.C. Setalvad argued, was only meant to

2 In 1952, the Portuguese Constitution was amended to state that Portugal no longer had colonies; the territories concerned were now to be designated províncias ultramarinas [overseas provinces] and to be regarded as integral parts of a unitary pluri-continental state (Reis, 2013: 256). 3 The GoI filed six preliminary objections. The ICJ overruled four of the objections by a majority decision and joined the remaining two on merits.

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‘re-subjugate’ the people of Indian race in a region were already freed themselves from Portuguese rule (TOI, 1957: 1). The GoI submitted its counter-memorial to the ICJ on 25 March 1958 (TOI, 1958: 1), to which the Portuguese Government submitted their reply on 25 July 1958. The oral hearings began at The Hague on 21 September 1959 and ended on 6 November 1959. The ICJ ruled (12 April 1960) that India had acted correctly and in accordance with her international obligations and that there could be no question of India being obliged to permit passage of any kind in the present circumstances (India, MEA, 1961: 15). After the judgement, the United Nations became the principal arena of contest between India and Portugal as Portugal became the ‘prime target of anti-colonialism as the only state not willing to grant independence to overseas territories’ (Reis, 2013: 261).

The Liberation of Goa On 19 December 1961, in Operation Vijay, Indian armed forces liberated the Portuguese pockets and re-united them with India on 20 December 1961. New Delhi, explained President Rajendra Prasad, had been compelled to take action to end Portuguese colonialism on the mainland after fourteen years of patient negotiations. The issue, he added, had been precipitated by ‘acts of flagrant aggression by Portugal including firing upon our merchant shipping, the killing of our nationals and intrusion into our territory’. While some countries had engaged in ‘illinformed criticism’, the rest of the world applauded this action (Prasad, 1962: 45). The takeover of Goa was seen as ‘the end of an epoch and the beginning of another for Goa and for India’. With this move, Nehru expressed with great satisfaction—‘this question has been settled; this anachronism, can I call it of history, has been removed and the independence of India has become complete’ (Nehru, 1962: 60). Goa, Defence Minister Menon subsequently remarked, was ‘important to India in the sense that it was what could be said ‘unfinished business’—the ending of imperialism and the establishment of national unity’. The Americans, he felt, would not do ‘anything to knock sense into their ally [Portugal]’ (Menon, 1968: 8). The liberation of Goa provided the impetus for anti-colonial movements in Portugal’s African colonies (Faleiro, 2012: 12). The Indian military intervention was ‘an indication that Portugal paid a price in other than diplomatic terms for its resistance

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to the norm of decolonization and its increasingly marginalized status on the international stage’ (Reis, 2013: 263). In retrospect, it gave prominence to the concept of colonialism as a ‘continuing aggression’ (Ruys, 2018: 95).

Normalisation of Relations After the liberation of Goa, Indo-Portuguese relations remained tense for more than a decade. After four decades of a fascist regime, the authoritarian Estado Novo regime was overthrown by a military coup by left-leaning officers in April 1974. This facilitated conditions for a normalisation of ties with India. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi subsequently sent a message to Foreign Minister Mario Soares that New Delhi would be willing to consider the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Portugal if the latter showed ‘tangible change’ in its attitude towards Goa and ‘repressive’ policies in Africa (TOI, 1974a: 5). New Delhi welcomed the revolutionary changes in Portugal and was following with interest the negotiations which had been started with the leaders of the liberation movements of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, and the pledge given by the new Portuguese Government for granting early independence of the colonies (Singh, S., 1974a: 274). Soares responded on 13 September and expressed the desire to re-establish diplomatic relations with India (TOI, 1974b). Ground work for reaching an agreement had been done two weeks prior to the meeting of the two foreign ministers in New York by Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal and his Portuguese counterpart. On 24 September 1974, Soares and Singh met in New York and resolved that steps should be taken to re-establish diplomatic and consular relations. Lisbon agreed to recognise the full sovereignty of India over the former Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, which had become integral parts of the territory of India. The two foreign ministers also agreed that steps should be taken for the promotion of the Portuguese language and culture and for the preservation of historical-religious monuments in Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. They agreed to hold, in the immediate future, meetings between the representatives of both countries in order to implement the agreement relating to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and for concluding a cultural agreement (India, MEA, 1974a: 258). The next day, Soares acknowledged that the breaking off of relations with India was a consequence of a conflict which could have been avoided

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had there been ‘a minimum of flexibility’ by Portugal (Soares, 1974: 1). Swaran Singh also appreciated Portugal’s decision to liquidate its colonial empire and re-establish diplomatic relations with India (Singh, S., 1974b: 250). In October 1974, Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh spent two days in Lisbon on his return journey from New York and had extensive talks with Prime Minister Colonel Vasco Dos Santos Gonsalves and Foreign Minister Soares, who warmly welcomed his suggestion to establish embassies after lack of diplomatic relations for 21 years (Singh, K., 1990: 10). The Indian Embassy in Lisbon was re-opened in June 1975 and the Portuguese Embassy in New Delhi a month later.

Soares’ Visit Foreign Minister Soares arrived in India on a six-day visit (27 December 1974–2 January 1975). On 31 December 1974, the two countries signed a seven-article treaty recognising India’s sovereignty over Goa, Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and related matters (India, MEA, 1974b). Diplomatic relations, which had been broken off, were immediately resumed (India, MEA, 1975: 18). India was also encouraged by the more democratic approach of the new Portuguese government towards its former colonies in Africa, which led to the grant of independence to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in 1974 and Angola in 1975. However, due to internal challenges in Portugal (political transition, the economic situation and integration with European structures), bilateral engagement with India remained on a back seat. Efforts were made to enhance economic and trade links. An Indian trade delegation visited Lisbon in February 1976 in order to identify export possibilities on both sides.

The 1980s In November 1981, Foreign Minister Andre Gonsalves Pereira visited India. Economic cooperation was sluggish and people-to-people interactions limited. Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Portugal in April 1984 and met Prime Minister Mario Soares and Foreign Minister Jaime Guma. The two sides resolved to treat the past as a closed chapter and increase

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bilateral cooperation and give greater content to bilateral economic and cultural cooperation (TOI, 1984: 9). Prime Minister Mario Soares visited India in 1984 to attend Indira Gandhi’s funeral. Subsequently, Portugal joined the European Economic Community in 1986 which led to faster economic growth and political stability. In February 1989, President R. Venkataraman met Soares on the sidelines of Emperor Hirohito’s funeral. As Portugal reoriented its foreign policy towards Europe and away from Asia, the relations remained ‘stagnant until the 1990s’ (Xavier, 2016: 89).

The Post-Cold War Era With the end of Cold War and economic liberalisation in India, two countries were ready to open yet another chapter in relations (Xavier, 2016: 90). The first indication of a new beginning in relations was a state visit by President Venkataraman to Portugal in March–April 1990. Indian diplomats perceived the visit as ‘highly successful’ as this led to strengthening of relations between the two countries in several fields (India, MEA, 1991: 46). Return of Gold Ornaments A few days before the liberation of Goa, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU) functioned as the principal commercial bank in the territories and also had in its safe custody articles kept by the Goans. A few days before the liberation of Goa, BNU shifted the gold ornaments and lockers of the people to Lisbon without informing them. In an effort to resolve the issue, a delegation of the State Bank of India visited Lisbon in May 1984 to finalise the agreement. In June 1987, the Portuguese Government had suggested some amendments to the draft agreement which had been agreed to by the GoI (India, MEA, 1989a: 18; 1989b: 20). The return of gold ornaments was regarded as ‘a major hurdle’ in improving India’s bilateral ties with Portugal (India, MEA, 1991: 46). On 14 February 1991, a protocol between the Banco Nacional Ultramarino and State Bank of India was signed whereby Portugal agreed to return securities and gold ornaments valued at about |980 million kept by the people of Goa in the BNU before the liberation of Goa. The gold, which belonged to about 6,000 Goan families, was returned to India on 30 July 1991 (Sharma, 1991: 9).

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High-Level Visits Accompanied by a 48-member press delegation, President Mario Soares paid a 11-day visit to India (25 January–4 February 1992) and was a chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations. As the country holding the EEC rotating presidency, Portugal assured to extend full support to Indian efforts to get its ‘due share’ in an integrated market in the wake of New Delhi’s sweeping reforms. Measures to open its economy to foreign investment were a good sign that would contribute to India getting the place it deserved in an increasingly interdependent world economy. The level in bilateral relations, he regretted, was ‘far from adequate’ and that there was ‘a long way to go’ in enhancing economic relations (Soares, 1992: 32). Foreign Minister João de Deus Pinheiro (along with those of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) visited India in March 1992 as part of the EC Troika (India, MEA 1993a: 71). Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao arrived in Lisbon on 15 June 1992 on a nine-hour visit making a ‘transit visit’ on his way back from Rio de Janeiro. In a 45-minute conversation with President Soares, the two sides reviewed economic and cultural relations and the upgradation of India’s relations with the European Economic Community (TOI, 1992a, 1992b: 15). Three years later, accompanied by a 11-member business delegation of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) and Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited several European countries including Portugal in July 1995. The visit led to the signing of a protocol on consultations between the two foreign ministries (India, MEA, 1995b: 177). The two ministers outlined an agenda to commence negotiations in Lisbon for concluding an agreement for avoidance of double taxation and an air services agreement in New Delhi in September 1995. New Delhi agreed in principle to allow Portugal to open a consulate general and a cultural centre (a branch of Fundação Oriente) in Goa apart from a protocol to foster cooperation between their universities. The Portuguese consulate opened on 18 April 1994. Foreign Minister Jaime Gama visited India from 6 to 11 February 1997, when an air services agreement was signed between two countries (text in India, MEA, 1997: 21–34).

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In 1998, President K.R. Narayanan visited Portugal from 10 to 14 September. He held discussions with President Jorge Sampaio and Prime Minister Antonio Guterres and he also visited the EXPO ‘98 Exhibition in Lisbon (India, MEA, 1999). The visit led to the signing of a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between Portugal and India. The first-ever nine-member parliamentary delegation led by Antonio de Almeida Santos, President of the National Assembly, visited India from 15 to 22 December 1998. Portugal as the rotating presidency of the European Union was the prime mover behind the organisation of the India-EU summit in June 2000 (Guha, 2000: 15) and the initiation of the process of summitlevel dialogue (Vajpayee 2000: 240). The Vajpayee visit was followed by the opening of representative offices of Banco Nacional Ultramario in Mumbai and in Panjim, Goa, in October 2000.

Kashmir In 1991, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva had stated that Kashmir should be resolved bilaterally between India and Pakistan (Sharma, 1991: 9). In January 1992, President Soares expressed opposition to terrorism in Punjab as well as Jammu and Kashmir and condemned terrorist activities (TOI, 1992a, 1992b: 13). During Foreign Minister Mukherjee’s visit to Portugal in July 1995, the Foreign Ministers emphasised the importance of peaceful, bilateral dialogue in resolving disputes and expressed their total rejection of terrorism. The Portuguese Foreign Minister expressed support for the resolution of the Kashmir issue through peaceful and bilateral dialogue and welcomed the measures adopted by India to re-establish the democratic process in Kashmir; Portugal has always regarded Kashmir as an integral part of India (India, MEA, 1995b: 177). The Portuguese government expressed concern at the Pulwama terrorist attack in Kashmir by the Jaish-e-Mohammed. The Portuguese Government reiterated its strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and called for maximum containment, an urgent resumption of dialogue and active cooperation between the parties, to prevent military escalation, reduce tensions and preserve peace, security stability (MENA Report, 2019).

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The 2000s During Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to Portugal from 31 March to 1 April 2000, an agreement for economic and industrial cooperation was signed. During the bilateral summit (28–29 June 2000) between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Prime Minister Antonio Guterres, four agreements were signed—an investment promotion and protection, avoidance of double taxation, cooperation in science and technology, and one on economic and industrial cooperation. Vajpayee and Portuguese Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso met at New York on 23 September 2003 on the margins of the 58th UN General Assembly and resolved to strengthen economic cooperation by setting up a joint commission (India, MEA, 2004b: 81). The Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Manohar Joshi, led a 12-member parliamentary delegation from 25 to 28 May 2003 to Portugal. A MoU on cooperation between the Chamber of Commerce level cooperation between FICCI and AICEP (Portugal Global Business Development Agency) was signed (India, MEA, 2008: 78). President Silva’s Visit, 2007 Accompanied by three ministers4 and a 60-member business delegation, President Anibal Cavaco Silva visited India from 10 to 17 January 2007 in order to boost political and economic cooperation. An extradition treaty,5 a cultural exchange programme and an educational exchange programme were signed during the visit (India, MEA 2008: 78). With Portugal holding the rotating EU presidency for the second time, Prime Minister Jose Socrates visited India in December 2007 for the eighth India-EU summit. Despite deep historical connections and

4 Minister of Culture Isabel Pires de Lima, Minister for Economy and Innovation Manuel António Gomes de Pinho, Foreign Minister Manuel Pinho and Culture Minister Isabel Pires de Lima. 5 India first sought to conclude an extradition treaty with Portugal after the arrest of Abu Salem—a prime accused in the Mumbai blasts case—in Lisbon September 2002 since in the absence of an extradition treaty, it had taken over three years to get him back. The extradition treaty, initialed on 11 January 2007, was signed after India accepted two main conditions insisted upon by Portugal, namely that the extradited person would not face either a death sentence or life imprisonment beyond 25 years (TOI, 2007c). See text in Bhasin, 2008: 2141–2153.

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strong economic and people-to-people ties, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urged both sides to ‘rethink our historical links and build a strong and contemporary relationship’. The level of trade—at $397 million—was ‘far below’ the potential. He therefore urged that greater use needed to be made of the rapid growth of India and the expansion of the European Union to ‘actively’ enhance trade and investment and encourage greater business-to-business interaction (Singh, M. 2007: 2154). Socrates stressed that opportunities existed in tapping unexplored opportunities in areas like tourism, IT, oil and gas, and renewable energy. Portugal, he added, supported Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group since it was ‘high time the international community acknowledged that India has given enough guarantees of the prudent use of the nuclear energy for civil purposes’ (Socrates 2007: 2156–2157). Relations lost momentum in subsequent years, especially as Portugal was hard hit by the 2008 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the economic crisis that ensued.

Membership of the UN Security Council The Portuguese Foreign Minister extended support to India’s claim to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as and when the Council is expanded. He mentioned Japan, Germany, Brazil and India as deserving candidates. Though the EU has not taken a formal position, Prime Minister Antonio Guterres extended unequivocal support to India’s campaign for a berth in the UN Security Council. After the Indo-Portugal summit, Guterres told newsmen that ‘India’s case for a permanent seat deserves our sympathy’. Later, in response to a query, he clarified that this sympathy would translate into actual support (India, MEA, 2001: 11; Badrinath, 2000). Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Luis da Costa supported India’s inclusion as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council on 11 July 2018 (Economic Times, 2018, 12 July) and 21 September 2022 (Livemint, 2022).

The Abu Salem Saga The early 2000s were embroiled with the extradition of Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari, who was sought after under over 40 charges, including his involvement in the Mumbai bomb blasts in 1993, which killed over 300 people. He had fled India in 1997 and was arrested in 20 September

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2002 in Lisbon by Interpol on charges of travelling with forged documents. His extradition hit three main roadblocks because of the lack of an extradition treaty, the need for Indian agencies to satisfy the Portuguese authorities that Abu Salem was an underworld don, and Lisbon had to be convinced that in the event of Salem’s conviction in India, he would not be awarded the death penalty (The Tribune, 2002). New Delhi therefore submitted a requisition for Salem’s extradition in accordance with the Portuguese legal system in nine criminal cases in December 2002. On 17 December, Home Minister L. K. Advani gave an assurance that if extradited by Portugal for trial in India, Salem would not be given the death penalty or imprisoned for more than 25 years (Indian Express, 2022). Following a long legal battle, the Portuguese High Court approved Abu Salem’s extradition in February 2004. The GoI expressed its appreciation for the excellent cooperation of the Portuguese Government and the efficiency of the Portuguese judicial process which had accepted and upheld the veracity of its claims in this case (India, MEA, 2004a). After losing additional appeals, Abu Salem was extradited to India from Portugal on 11 November 2005, where he was convicted. The extradition treaty (2007) proved to be ‘a relevant bilateral confidence-building measure’ (Xavier, 2016: 90). It was also seen as a positive example of cooperation in fight against international terrorism. Yet, assurances given to Portugal in the early 2000s stirred some controversies in India again in 2022, when the Supreme Court declared that Abu Salem would need to be released after he had served 25 years in prison (that is, by 2030) (Indian Express, 2022).

The Modi Years, 2014–2022 After Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister, Indo-Portuguese relations significantly improved as a result of the more proactive foreign policy of the new Indian leadership and the rediscovery of Europe. In November 2015, Prime Minister Antonio Costa—the son of Orlando Costa who used to live in Goa until he was 17 years old—became the first Indian-origin Head of Government in the Western world (India, Embassy in Portugal, 2021). He proudly admits his Indian roots, holds an official Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card and was personally interested in strengthening links with India. During his ‘working’ visit to India from 7 to 12 January 2017, Costa was a chief guest at the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas at Bengaluru, where he

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was awarded the prestigious award for Overseas Indians—the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award. In Delhi, he met Indian leaders including Modi, participated in the Vibrant Gujarat Summit in Gandhinagar, and made a private visit to Goa to see his ancestral home. Costa was accompanied by a large delegation of ministers and businessmen. Eight MoUs were signed relating to defence, agriculture, marine research, IT and electronic, start-ups and renewable energy. The visit also led to the signing of a joint declaration on cooperation in third countries (text in India, MEA, 2017a; 2017b). In the first-ever stand-alone bilateral visit by an Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi visited Portugal on 24 June 2017. He was somewhat surprised that despite deep historical connections and strong economic and people-to-people ties, no Indian Prime Minister had ever visited Portugal. He acknowledged that Portugal had emerged as one of the most vibrant European ecosystems for entrepreneurship (Modi, 2017). The visit led to the signing of eleven MoUs in different fields, including those of space, nanotechnology, biotechnology, public administration and governance reforms, avoidance of double taxation, culture, youth and sports, and higher education. The two sides also established a new joint fund of e4 million for joint research in science and technology, with a contribution of e2 million each. The two prime ministers launched the India-Portugal Start-up Hub, a web portal to connect start-ups from two countries (India, MEA, 2018: 121). The year witnessed also intensive exchanges between ministers (mostly of science and technology, education) with special focus on boosting cooperation on oceans, outer space and economic cooperation. Prime Minister Costa, who has just been re-elected for the second term in October 2019, again visited India on 19–20 December 2019 to take part in the second meeting of the International Gandhi Commemoration Committee in commemoration of 150th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, which India wanted to celebrate globally for two years. Costa met Modi (re-elected to the post in May 2019), and for the first time, the idea of special EU-India summit during 2021 Portugal’s presidency in the EU was discussed. Modi congratulated Prime Minister Antonio Costa on his resounding performance in the parliamentary elections in Portugal and expressed his desire to continue deepening ‘the warm and time-tested relationship’ with Portugal (Modi, 2022).

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Rebelo in India, 2020 On 13–16 February 2020, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa paid the state visit to India, including stops in Delhi, Mumbai and Goa. He was accompanied by three ministers, a parliamentary delegation and a large business delegation. A total number of 57 new agreements/MoUs were signed during the visit giving a strong impetus to bilateral relations (India, MEA, 2021: 119). These included MoUs on diplomatic training and exchange of information; a joint declaration on migration and mobility partnership; a cooperation agreement on maritime transport and port development; an agreement on audio-visual co-production; a MoU for diplomatic exchanges and training between Indian Foreign Service Institute and the Portuguese Diplomatic Institute; a MoU for cooperation in the field of industrial and intellectual property rights; a MOU between Invest India and Start-Up Portugal as well as a dozen MoU between and regional authorities private actors on projects in key areas like oceanography, robotics, assessing plastic levels in the Arabian Sea and the use of drones for disaster management (India, MEA, 2021: 119). The outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, however, put on hold most of the initiatives.

Covid-19 On 5 May 2020, Modi had a telephonic conversation with Antonio Costa regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. They agreed to hold a special EUIndia summit during the Portuguese presidency in the European Council, which was to be held in January 2021. They agreed that in the context of COVID-19 pandemic and new international challenges the EU-India summit ‘is more important than ever’ and vowed to ‘join forces so that the vision of a safer world, based on shared prosperity and the defence of democracy, prevails’ (Fonseca, 2020). On 14 October 2020, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and his Portuguese counterpart, João Gomes Cravinho, reviewed bilateral ties, including follow-up on the outcomes and agreements of the Portuguese President’s state visit in February 2020 to India. They also discussed cooperation related to the COVID-19 crisis, including cooperation in repatriation of 120 Indian citizens, lifting of the export ban on export of 2.5 million HCQ tablets to Portugal as well as supplies of 15 tonnes of sanitary equipment such as protective gloves (India, MEA, 2021: 119).

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Portugal and the India-EU Summit, 2021 With Portugal assuming the EU presidency, Lisbon sought to enhance the untapped potential of India-EU ties as it felt that Portugal could play ‘an essential role’ in bringing India and the European Union closer together in the aftermath of Brexit (Costa, 2021: 127). In the wake of increasing tensions between China and the United States as well as the EU, Lisbon found itself caught between conflicting great power interests (Pinto Arena, 2022: 1) and felt that this provided greater opportunities to expand relations with India. Portugal wanted to recalibrate EU policy towards Asia, where too much attention had historically been focused on China. India was perceived as ‘a key player’ for the EU in Asia that was not being given ‘enough attention’. The Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council wanted to be ‘remembered as the one that rebalanced relations with Asia’ (Portugal, MFA, 2021b). Moreover, as a maritime nation, it saw much sense in stronger European engagement in the Indo-Pacific and strongly supported the Franco-German push towards the European strategy towards the region. Portugal played ‘an important role’ in turning the EU towards the Indo-Pacific, where India, not China, plays the role of a key European partner (Xavier, 2021: 104). Portuguese diplomacy worked at three levels—shaping a political mandate, conducting a strategic debate as well as facilitating a normative alignment of the EU with India. A key highlight of the Portuguese presidency was a special India-EU summit in Lisbon with the presence of all 27 heads of state of EU Member States. This was the only second such meeting after the one with President Joe Biden. The idea, first discussed by two prime ministers in May 2020 (Fonseca, 2020), was confirmed subsequently. In March 2021, the two prime ministers held a phone conversation to review the preparations for the first-ever India-EU leaders’ meeting (Business Standard, 2021). In early April 2021, Secretary of State of Internationalisation, Eurico Brilhante Dias, visited New Delhi to chair the fifth session of the Portugal-India Joint Economic Commission and finalise preparations of the bilateral summit as well as the EU-India leaders’ meeting (Portugal, MFA, 2021a). The meeting took place on 8 May 2021, but eventually in an online format. Modi had to cancel his trip to Europe due to the surge in COVID-19 infections in Spring 2021. Nevertheless, the EU-India summit, organised for the third time under the Portuguese presidency, proved a great success. It was also an example of the skilful use of

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EU instruments for strengthening of the bilateral relationship of a EU member state with India. The leaders’ summit in Porto (May 2021) was ‘an unprecedented political signal’ that confirmed India as a priority among Europeans and vice versa (Xavier, 2021: 105) and ‘a key event for geopolitical balance’ in Europe’s relationship with Asia (Branco, 2021). The summit was possible because of the pre-Presidency work done by Lisbon since 2017, including an ‘unprecedented number’ of visits and contacts between António Costa and Narendra Modi that was crucial ‘to create comfort and political trust between Portugal and India and, with that, credibility to the European approach to India that culminated in Porto’ (Xavier, 2021: 107). Bilateral relations benefited also from the fact that other Portuguese politicians were elected to important international positions in this period. Especially important was that former Portuguese Prime Minister, responsible for first EU-India summit, António Gueteres was elected as Secretary General of the UN in 2017. He visited India in 2016 while lobbying for his candidature, and in 2018, he visited India as UN Secretary General for the Mahatma Gandhi Global Sanitation Convention when he met with Indian President and Modi.

India Joins Lusophone Countries India’s association with the Lusophone (Portuguese speaking) countries (inhabited by 260 million people in Africa, Europe and Asia) was first discussed during the 2007 bilateral summit in Delhi, when ‘avenues for trilateral cooperation’ with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) (which was established in 1996) with special reference to hydrocarbons in Angola were discussed (Singh, 2007) since these were countries where Lisbon continued to ‘enjoy disproportionately high influence and where India seeks to pursue its new external interests’ (Xavier, 2016: 88). During Costa’s visit to India in December 2019, Modi conveyed India’s decision to apply for Observer status in the CPLP. The Portuguese Prime Minister welcomed the decision and felt that the CPLP countries would welcome New Delhi’s recognition of the geostrategic, political and cultural importance of ‘a space that spans all continents and has a population of around 260 million’ (MENA Report, 2019). In September 2021, Minister of State for External Affairs Meenakshi Lekhi visited Portugal and met the Executive Secretary of the Community of Portuguese

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Language Countries (CPLP) Zacarias da Costa. This was the first such high-level interaction after India joined as an Associate Observer in July 2021 (India, MEA, 2022: 139).

Economic and Trade Relations Discussions in the first week of December 1976 led to the initialling of the first-ever draft trade agreement on 7 December 1976 (India, MEA, 1976: 358). The agreement on trade and economic, industrial and technical cooperation was finally signed on 15 April 1977 (India, MEA, 1977: 62). Boosting trade, however, was contingent on first enhancing cargo shipping links between the two countries. The first session of the IndoPortuguese Joint Economic Committee (Lisbon, November 1981) first devoted itself to resolving this problem before considering the nature and quantum of commodity exports (Pereira, 1981: 7). Bilateral trade continued to be one-sided and in India’s favour with Indian exports accounting for over 70% of the trade turnover. The 1990s Trade and economic cooperation between India and Portugal was marginal during the Cold War. Indo-Portuguese trade apparently failed to pick up until the long-pending issue of the return of gold ornaments was resolved in mid-1991. Economic reforms in India and development of Portugal coupled with improved political ties paved the way for more meaningful engagement. President Soares’ visit to India in 1991 led to the signing of MoUs between FICCI and the Bombay Chambers of Commerce and the Portuguese trade association. This led to the first meeting of the Joint Business Council in Lisbon in May 1993 which stressed that the diversification of the trade basket was imperative for an increase in bilateral trade (India, MEA, 1993b: 193). Subsequent JBC meetings were held in New Delhi (April 1995) and Lisbon (May 1997). Indo-Portuguese trade, which was less than $30 million in the 1980s, rose to $76 million in 1990 and $90 million in 1992. The balance of trade was overwhelmingly in favour of India: in 1992, India exports stood at $68 million while imports were less than one-third ($22 million) (The Observer, 1993). Trade declined to $71 million in 1993 (Acharya, 1995). In 1994, Indian exports to Portugal were US$80 million while imports

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were one-tenth of that ($8 million) (India, MEA, 1995a: 107). India had been identified as a priority market by Portugal since 1994. In order to encourage exports, the Portuguese government provided a guarantee of $100 million (Palha, 1995). Given the narrow range of Portugal’s industrial production, there was limited potential for an increase and diversification in Indian imports. Major Indian imports from Portugal consisted of pulp and waste paper, organic chemicals, artificial resins, plastic materials, machinery except electric and machine tools, transport equipment, etc. The 2000s Bilateral trade increased manifold over the last two decades, from US$158.68 million in 2000–2001 to US$951.10 million in 2020–2021 (see Table 8.1). India’s trade surplus with Portugal increased nearly sixfold from US$134.71 million in 2000–2001 to US$723.18 million in 2020–2021. Indian exports grew steadily from US$ 146.7 million in 2000–2001 to US$ 526.84 million in 2010–2010 and to US$ 837.14 million in 2020– 2021. Indian imports grew from a meagre US$12 million to US$85.37 million 2010 and to US$ 113.96 million in 2020–2021. The fastest growth in trade was recorded after 2015. Interestingly, Portugal was one of a few countries with which trade has not decreased in 2020–2021 due to global pandemic COVID-19. Indian exports grew by almost US$ 100 million, from US$745 million in 2019–2020 to US$837 million in 2020–2021 and total trade increased from US$886 million to US$951 million, respectively. However, that only represented an increase from 0.11 to 0.14% share in total India trade. During 2021–2022, bilateral trade reached $1.356 billion, with India having a trade surplus of over $1 billion. Bilateral trade, though limited, is diversified and complementary. Major items exported from India include textiles and apparels including ready-made garments; agriculture products; metals; chemicals; plastic and rubber; footwear; machinery and appliances; leather and its articles; vehicles and other transport materials. On the other hand, Portugal sells to India mostly machinery and appliances; metals; minerals; plastic and rubber; chemicals; textiles and apparels; leather; paper and pulp; wood and cork; optical and precision instruments.

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Table 8.1 India-Portugal trade in goods, 1996–1997—2021–2022 (in million US Dollars) Year

India’s export (% in total)

India’s import (% in total)

Total Trade

Trade Balance

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

87.8 (0.26%) 111.4 (0.32% 106.3 (0.32%) 124.6 (0.34%) 146.7 (0.33%) 147.7 (0.33%) 162.21(0.30%) 169.9 (0.26%) 223.2 (0.27%) 260.9 (0.25%) 366.9 (0.29%) 495.9 (0.30%) 440.4 (0.24%) 374.6 (0.21%) 526.8 (0.21%) 525.3 (0.17%) 528.5 (0.17%) 627 (0.20%) 636.4 (0.20%) 589.6 (0.22%) 669.6 (0.25%) 747.3 (0.25%) 743.2 (0.22%) 744.8 (0.24%) 837.1 (0.28%) 1,191.8 (0.28%)

8.4 (0.02%) 15.6 (0.03%) 9.3 (0.02%) 8.6 (0.02%) 11.9 (0.02%) 14.0 (0.02%) 14.9 (0.02%) 13.9 (0.02%) 18.9 (0.02%) 30.2 (0.02%) 30.5 (0.017%) 35.7 (0.02%) 56.9 (0.02%) 71.0 (0.02%) 85.4 (0.02%) 303.6 (0.06%) 378.2 (0.07%) 339.9 (0.07%) 145.0 (0.03%) 102.5 (0.02%) 141.1 (0.03%) 190.1 (0.04%) 132.8 (0.03%) 141.8 (0.03%) 114 (0.03%) 163.5 (0.03%)

96.2 127.0 115.6 133.3 158.6 161.8 177.0 183.7 242.1 291.1 397.5 531.6 497.3 445.6 612.21 828.8 906.6 966.9 781.4 692.1 810.8 937.4 876.0 886.6 951.1 1,356.3

−79.4 −95.9 −97.0 −116.0 −134.7 −133.8 −147.16 −156.0 −204.3 −230.6 −336.5 −460.2 −383.5 −303.5 −441.5 −221.6 −150.2 −287.0 −491.4 −487.1 −528.5 −557.2 −610.4 −603.0 −723.2 −1,027.3

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Export–Import Data Bank

Yet, despite the progress achieved, Portugal remained a marginal partner for India. Its position among India’s main partners deteriorated from 58th place in 2000–2001 to 67th in 2005–2006, 74th in 2010–2011 and distant 80th place in 2015–2016, and moved somewhat upwards to 72nd position by 2020–2021. Portugal’s share in India’s export dropped from 0.34% in 2000–2001 to 0.21% in 2010–2011, but increased marginally to 0.28% in 2020–2021. Its share in India’s import remained minimal—stagnating between 0.02% at the beginning of the twenty-first century and 0.03% in 2020–2021. These low numbers made

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politicians from both states to double efforts at untapping the potential for trade and launching new initiatives to boost economic cooperation. Joint Economic Commission and Other Mechanisms A Joint Economic Committee established under the agreement on trade, economic, industrial and technical cooperation (1977) held its first and only meeting in November 1981. Its initial mandate was to review existing trade relations, closely examine all those areas in which trade could be expanded in the future as well as explore possibilities of joint ventures in third countries. The Joint Economic Committee was elevated to a Joint Economic Commission in 2000 with a view to enhance economic cooperation. The third session of the Joint Commission was held in New Delhi on 12 December 2006. The fourth meeting of the Joint Commission was held after a gap of eleven years in Lisbon on 30 May 2017, which discussed the roadmap for boosting bilateral and third country trade and investment cooperation (India, MEA, 2018: 121). Four years later, the fifth meeting of the Joint Commission took place in New Delhi on 8–9 April 2021. Another institutional mechanism was the Joint Business Council (JBC) formed by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP) from Portugal, whose meetings were held infrequently. The first meeting of the JBC was held in Lisbon (24 May 1993) while the third one was held in New Delhi on 5–6 January 1999. The most recent meeting of the JBC was held in 2017. The Portugal-India Chamber of Commerce was launched in Lisbon on 17 November 2006. Additional mechanisms included a joint Research Fund and two platforms of business associations launched in 2017: the Portugal-India Business Hub (a diaspora hub for expanding Indian business ties with Lusophone countries). In June 2017, the India-Portugal International Startup Hub (IPISH) was launched during Modi’s visit to Portugal, a joint mechanism between Invest India and Startup Portugal for start-up partnerships. Several other business activities (like an automotive summit held in Delhi on 13 February 2020) were designed to boost cooperation in selected areas (India, Embassy in Portugal, 2021). A social security agreement (SSA) was signed on 4 March 2013 in New Delhi. Four years later, after the completion of the relevant constitutional

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and legal formalities, Lisbon informed New Delhi that it was ready to bring the SSA into force. The social security agreement came into force on 8 May 2017. The SSA was likely to reduce the cost of doing business abroad and promote more investment flows between the two countries. Recruitment of Workers Portugal became the first EU member state with which India signed a dedicated labour mobility agreement on 13 September 2021 and the first such agreement signed by Portugal with a non-EU country. The agreement provides for the recruitment of Indian workers through a government-to-government mechanism to facilitate the legal and safe labour migration flows between the two countries and established procedures for the admission of Indian citizens to carry out a professional activity, under an employment contract, in Portugal. During the duration of the employment contract, Indian workers would benefit from all the rights guaranteed by Portuguese law. From the moment of entry into force, and whenever an employer wishes to hire an Indian worker, it must communicate this intention to the Employment and Vocational Training Institute (IEFP), which would transmit it to the Indian authorities. These will carry out a selection process, at the end of which the employment contract will be signed and the recruited worker will be granted a visa, allowing him/her to travel to our country and carry out a professional activity here (The Portugal News, 2021).

Foreign Direct Investment Indian FDI in Portugal in 1992 and 1993 amounted to a meagre $330,000. Portuguese investment in India simply did not exist or was insignificant (Palha, 1995). During 1985–1995, Portugal’s share in FDI approved in India was less than 1% while Indo-Portuguese collaborations were around 10% in areas like rubber, pharmaceuticals (a 1,200 tonne penicillin plant by SPIC in collaboration with Atracipan of Portugal), iron ore export (S.V. Dempo and Siderurgia National of Portugal), ship repair (Western India group and Lisnave group of Portugal at Mormugao Port), etc. (Acharya, 1995: 23). Portuguese FDI, though small, had doubled in 2016–2017. As of March 2021, total Portuguese cumulative FDI inflow between 2000 and 2021 stood at US$104 million (India, Ministry of Commerce and

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Industry, 2021). This was 0.02% of total FDI in India and placed Portugal at the 51st position among investors in the country. In 2017, Portuguese investment in India stood at US$49 million. The bulk of Portuguese FDI in India mostly occurred in recent years (India, Embassy in Portugal, 2021). Major Portuguese investments in India include: Martifer in the metals sector; EFACEC in industrial machinery; Vision-Box’s US$ 8 million contract with Indian airports for installation of facial recognition biometric security/screening systems for paperless ‘DigiYatra’ travel; the investments of the Petrotec Group in oil industry distribution and retail areas; Soprefa/Portind in the shoe component sector in Ambur; the joint venture between Visabeira and the Birla Group to establish 5,000 km of optical fibre networks in Odisha and West Bengal; Altice Labs’ contract with Andhra Pradesh State Fibernet Ltd on FTTH (fibreto-home); and Martifer Solar’s joint venture Inspira Martifer Solar, engaged in solar projects in Mahabaleshwar (350 KW) and Gujarat (25 MW). Indian investments in Portugal touched US$350 million in 2021 (India, MEA 2021: 119). Some significant deals in recent years included the US$ 150 million acquisition by Aurobindo Pharma of Generis, the Portuguese pharmaceutical company, in 2017; over US$50 million of investments by the MGM Hotel Group in three hotels in the Algarve and one in Madeira; ongoing investments worth US$ 165 million (e150 million) by the Mumbai-based real estate developer Sugee Group; and several smaller investments by Zomato (e11 million), Tata Elxsi (e2 million), Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Iberoamerica (IT and software services); and a WIPRO IT. Last year, Indian companies, the Sugee Group and BILITI Electric, set up a production unit in Portugal to produce three-wheeled electric vehicles with a quick swappable battery system (India, MEA, 2022: 140).

Arms Cooperation and Defence Collaboration Table 8.2 indicates that while licenses for military equipment for several EU Military List categories were issued, actual exports for a miniscule amount of e5,700 were made in 2013. Export of military equipment by Portugal increased to e78,970 in 2015 (see Table 8.3). While two licenses for e19.439 million were issued in 2017, no exports took place. However, in 2018, more exports

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Table 8.2 Portugal’s arms exports to India, 1998–1999, 2005–2014 (in US dollars) Year

No. of licences Issued

Value of licences in Value of actual Dollars export

1998 1999 2005

$1,760,135 $2,049,000 e31,669

2006 2011 2012 2013 2014

e108,085 e209,140 e 541,323 e24,000 e5,700

Military list Category

Material Aeronautica Alouette III Honos FA

e5,700

7 13 11 11 [RImp communications and equipment systems]

Source: Portugal, Annual Report on Imports and Exports of Military Goods and Technologies, 1998: 33; 1999: 34; 2005: 34; 2006: 36; 2011: 12; 2012: 12: 2013: 18, 28; 2014: 37 Brief Descriptions of EU Common Military List Categories ML 7.Chemical or biological toxic agents, ‘riot control agents’, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials. ML 11.Electronic equipment, not controlled elsewhere on the EU Common Military List, and specially designed components therefor. ML 13.Armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components.

(e22,603,271) against licenses of e21,956,097 were made. Despite the issue of several licenses, no exports of military equipment took place in 2019 and 2020. Visits The first defence delegation to visit Portugal was a 16-member National Defence College group led by Major General Abhijit Guha from 17 to 22 May 2009. A number of Indian naval ships have made several goodwill visits to Lisbon: the INS Tabar (18–21 April 2004) on her maiden passage from Kaliningrad, Russia to Mumbai. Next year, the INS Tarangini made a goodwill visit to Lisbon from 17 to 19 June 2005. Two battleships of the Western Fleet—INS Delhi and INS Beas —visited

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Table 8.3 Portuguese arms exports to India, 2015–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military List Category

No. of Licenses Issued

2015

ML 7 ML 11 Total ML 11 ML 10 ML 6 ML 10 Total ML 10 ML 10

2 2 4 1 2 1 4 5

2016 2017 2018

2019 2020

Value of Licenses in Euros

Value of Actual Exports Euros

660 113,395 114,055 92,150 19,438,858 80,000 21,876,097 21,956,097 1,452,803 357,495

640 78,330 78,970 56,010

22,603,271 22,603,271

Source European Union, External Action Service (2022). https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/ sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf 753/state/analysis (accessed October 9, 2022) Categories of Military Equipment Supplied ML 1.Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components therefor. ML 6.Ground vehicles and components ML 7.Chemical or biological toxic agents, riot control agents, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials ML 10.‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 11.Electric equipment, not specified elsewhere on EU Military List, and specially designed components therefor

Lisbon from 8 to 11 July 2009. The INS Tarangini made a second friendly port visit to Lisbon from 4 to 7 June 2018. MoU on Defence, 2017 A MoU in defence cooperation was signed during visit of Prime Minister Costa visit to India on 9 January 2017. The MoU is an enabling framework which seeks to foster bilateral defence cooperation including highlevel, working-level and educational and research-oriented exchanges. It also envisages exchange of views in various areas including security challenges, maritime security, UN peacekeeping operations as well as defence industries (MENA Report, 2017).

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Defence Collaboration A 16-member Portuguese delegation led by the Portuguese Platform for Defence Industries (idD) participated in DEFEXPO-2018 in Kancheepuram during 11–14 April 2018. The delegation interacted with officials of the Ministry of Defence, including the Defence Secretary, Indian defence Public Sector Units (PSUs), and participated in business-to-business (B2B) meetings organised by FICCI. Air Marshal Kuldeep Sharma visited Lisbon during 2–7 September 2018 and held discussions with Portuguese aerospace company OGMA regarding Maintenance Repair Overhaul (MRO) facility for Indian Embraer aircrafts and interacted with Portuguese defence companies interested in exploring business opportunities under the Make in India programme. A MoU between FICCI and the Portuguese Platform for Defence Industries was signed on 17 July 2018 for promoting cooperation in the defence industry. India perceives Portugal as a potential defence partner which is openminded on tech-transfer and keen to partner India’s ‘Strategic Partnership Initiative’ and ‘Make in India’ (India, Embassy in Portugal, 2021). Thus far, India used to send five of its Embraer aircrafts to OGMA in Portugal for repair and maintenance. From July 2019, Portugal agreed to authorise Airworks Pvt. Ltd. (Bengaluru) to undertake repair and maintenance of all Embraer aircraft in India. A MoU was signed in 2017 between Estaleiros Navais De Peniche (ENP), a leading Portuguese ship-building company, and Goa Shipyard Ltd. (GSL) to collaborate in ship building as well as exploring business opportunities in third countries, especially in the African market. Another MoU between Veda Defence (Delhi based) and the Portuguese technology company UAVision was signed in February 2020 to manufacture drones for the Indian Air Force and exporting to other countries. A MoU between CeiiA (a Portuguese engineering and aviation technology company) and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) was also signed for collaboration in training, exchange of visits and cooperation in aviation systems. India is also considering purchase of Embraer KC 390 aircraft provided there is cooperation under the Make in India initiative. Two meetings of the Joint Working Group on Defence have been held so far— New Delhi (13 February 2020) and the second was held virtually on 28 September 2021.

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Scientific Cooperation The first scientific and technological cooperation protocol was signed during the visit of Minister for Science and Technology, Jose Mariano Gago, to India in December 1998. Two additional protocols were signed specifying the mechanisms for undertaking joint research projects in identified areas of mutual interest and a MoU for cooperation in ocean science and technology (Aich, 2009: 122). A Joint Science and Technology Committee (JSTC), which was established in 1998, makes a biennial call for research proposals and selects about 15 joint research projects in areas of mutual interest like ocean science, biotechnology, materials science, IT, nanotechnology, chemical sciences and engineering sciences. Portugal is only one of the four countries with whom India launches joint research projects every two years. The second meeting of the Joint Commission on Science and Technology (New Delhi, 19–25 March 2007) approved the Programme of Cooperation for 2007–2009. At the third meeting (Lisbon, 1–3 July 2010), the cooperation programme for 2010–2012 was finalised. A meeting of the Joint Science and Technology Committee was held from 13 to 14 March 2017 wherein proposals for joint funding of research in cutting-edge areas were approved and announced. In order to promote collaboration in cutting-edge technology, India and Portugal agreed in June 2017 to set up a new joint science and technology fund of e4 million. Modi expressed a desire to learn from Portuguese expertise in nanotechnology, marine sciences and oceanography as well as engage with Portugal in the Atlantic International Research Centre, both in space and in ocean science fields (Modi, 2017). The two prime ministers launched the India-Portugal start-up hub, web portal to connect Indian and Portuguese start-ups, as follow-up to the India-Portugal start-up partnership announced during Prime Minister Costa’s visit to India in January. Under this framework, 423 joint research proposals have been submitted in August 2020, in response to the inaugural call for proposals, which also includes COVID-19-related research (India, MEA 2021: 119).

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Cultural Relations The first cultural agreement envisaging wide-ranging cultural exchanges in the academic, linguistic, art, sports and other fields was signed in Lisbon on 7 April 1980. This, however, provided ‘merely’ the outline; it needed to be complemented by a concrete of concrete cultural exchanges in various fields in the next couple of years (Narasimha Rao, 1981: 321). On 6 November 1981, the first detailed cultural programme covering a wide spectrum of activities in the field of education, science, art, culture and mass media for a period of two years with effect from 1 January 1982 India, MEA, 1981: 322) was signed during the visit of Foreign Minister Pereira, who also announced that a cultural centre would be opened in New Delhi. Several cultural exchange programmes were subsequently drawn up and implemented. In April 2005, the cultural exchange programme for 2005–2007 was finalised. The Festival of Portugal in India was inaugurated in April 1995. In July 1995, ministers of the two countries decided to set up ad hoc committees in New Delhi and Lisbon with the association of their respective Ambassadors to conceptualise and plan joint cultural projects and programmes for commemorating the 500th anniversary of Vasco da Gama’s historic voyage of discovery to India. Due to popularity of Bollywood movies and dances, several private dance studios have sprung up in Portugal. Under a recent scheme of incentives offered by the Portuguese government, over a dozen Indian films have been shot there including the 2019 blockbuster ‘War’. There is a dedicated diaspora radio station ‘Swagat’, regular broadcast of Indian content on RTP and SIC (TV broadcasters), and popular Indian TV channels are also available in Portugal. The Instituto Camões (Portuguese Cultural Centre) in New Delhi (inaugurated on 14 February 1991 by the Foreign Minister Durão Barroso) promotes Portuguese culture in India. The Institute focuses on the teaching and dissemination of the Portuguese language and culture, by conducting courses specific to the market needs. The Centre also boasts of a reference library having over 6,400 volumes available for consultation (Portugal, Embassy in India, 2020). The Centre for Indian Studies in the University of Lisbon was inaugurated on 22 April 2016 by Foreign Minister Augusto Santos Silva. It is the first such centre dedicated to the study of India in Portugal. It also has a Hindi language programme.

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A number of cultural events were organised to celebrate India@75 in Portugal, including the launch of ‘Little Guru’ app for learning Sanskrit, a virtual global conference on Hindi Day and an International Ayurveda Day. On 12 October 2021, the ‘Gandhi Citizenship Education Prize’— an initiative of the Ministry of Education which targets students from primary and secondary education for imbibing the important teachings of Gandhi through annual theme-based projects promoting the development of essential skills of citizenship—was conferred by Prime Minister Antonio Costa to 30 winning schools at the Hindu Temple of Lisbon, in a ceremony that also included the Portuguese Minister of Education Tiago Brandão Rodrigues (India, MEA, 2022: 140).

Diaspora Due to strong historical ties, Portugal has one of the biggest groups of Indian diaspora in Europe. This community is estimated to be about 120,000–90,000 people of Indian-origin and another 30,000 Indian nationals (India, Embassy in Portugal, 2021b). The Indian diaspora in Portugal is very diversified and represents a fair share of people belonging to main religions (Hindus: 45,000; Sikhs: 35,000; Muslims: 20,000; Ismailis: 5,000: Goan Catholics: 15,000). The biggest ethic groups are Punjabis (35,000) and Gujaratis (40,000). There were two major historical streams of Indian migration to Portugal. A smaller number of Indians arrived from former colonies in Goa, Daman and Diu before 1961 (see Chanda, 2015). A larger number of Indians arrived in the 1970s from Portuguese colonies in Africa (mostly of Gujaratis from Mozambique and Angola) after they gained independence. In recent years, there is increasing labour migration (both legal and illegal), especially of Sikhs and migrants from Punjab. During COVID19, there was a rise in illegal migration as Portugal was popular because of ‘the work opportunities, an open migration policy, and better chances of obtaining residency here due to liberalised policies of the Portuguese Government’ (India, Embassy in Portugal, 2021b). The number of Indian migrants to Portugal is likely to increase further after the signing of the bilateral labour mobility agreement on 13 September 2021. This instrument, after its ratification and entry into force, will facilitate legal and safe labour migration flows between the two countries and will establish the procedures for admission of Indian citizens

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to work, under an employment contract, in Portugal (Portugal, MFA, 2021c). The presence of a strong Indian diaspora acts as India’s soft power asset (Kugiel, 2017) in Portugal and facilitates the promotion of Indian culture, religions and traditions. This translates into growing popularity of yoga, Indian spirituality, Ayurveda, Indian cinema and music. There are over ten places of religious worship of various Indian religious communities (mosques, temples and gurudwaras), a vibrant annual cultural calendar of festivities and celebrations organised/sponsored by around 15 diverse diaspora associations, several yoga studios, more than a hundred Indian restaurants, Indian dance and performing arts schools, museums and art galleries with sections on India, specifically Goa. Tourism The imprint of diaspora and cultural links is visible in number of tourist exchanges. The number of Portuguese tourist arrivals to India grew from 54,439 in 2016 to 66,378 in 2017 and 74,492 in 2018 (which was 0.71% of all foreign arrivals to India in 2018) (India, Ministry of Tourism, 2019: 19). Interestingly, 46% of all Portuguese arrivals in India were from members of the Indian diaspora (India, Ministry of Tourism, 2019: 42). India’s share in total outbound departures from Portugal stood at 3% in 2016. In 2019, the number of arrivals from Portugal stayed at similar level, 74,743 (0.68% of all), of which 35% were members of Indian diaspora (India, Ministry of Tourism, 2020: 12, 44). Portugal is also becoming a more attractive tourist destination for Indian tourists. In 2020, the number of Indian tourists visiting Portugal fell drastically to 7,812 owing to year of lockdowns caused by COVID-19 (India, Ministry of Tourism, 2021: 91).

Conclusion Indo-Portuguese relations are generally characterised as ‘excellent relations anchored in 500 years of shared history, cultural ties and shared values of democracy and pluralism’ (India, MEA, 2021: 118). In recent years, the two countries have deepened and diversified their bilateral relations in key areas such as defence, scientific research, multilateral cooperation, COVID-19 management, migration and mobility, IT and start-ups, economic and commercial partners (India, MEA, 2021: 119).

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In political terms, Portugal looks at India as like-minded, democratic partner in key area of Asia. Portugal has supported India’s bid for a permanent membership in the UN Security Council as well as of major non-proliferation regimes (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime). Lisbon occasionally supported Indian candidates to certain international positions against the expectations of its closest partners in the EU. For instance, in 2018, Lisbon supported the Indian nominee (Dalveer Bhandari) to the International Court of Justice against the British one (Christopher Greenwood). Relations between India and Portugal have undergone a major metamorphosis from a tense and hostile one during the Cold War era to an amicable and promising partnership in recent years. New Delhi perceives Lisbon to be a promising partner in areas of defence, ocean and scientific cooperation. Shared history and strong human bonds will facilitate fruitful cooperation in future. Indo-Portuguese relations highlight how Lisbon overcame its colonial past and used its shared, yet difficult, history to foster closer cooperation with New Delhi. It shows how a EU member state holding the EU presidency has played an important and positive role in enhancing EU-India cooperation. Portugal had in fact presided/co-organised three out of 14 EU-India summits, including the first one (in June 2000) and the last one (in May 2021) and, in the process, widened and deepened its own bilateral relationship with New Delhi. Portugal was also able to rebalance the EU’s Asia engagement and bolster relations with an Asian strategic partner. It reflects how personalities matter in foreign policies. It is hard ‘to find today a European leader who has more access and political confidence in New Delhi than Antonio Costa’ (Xavier, 2021: 106). The personal chemistry between Modi and Costa gave political momentum to enhancing bilateral relations.

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Modi, N. (2022, 31 January). PM congratulates Prime Minister of Portugal H.E. Antonio Costa on re-election. Retrieved September 12, 2022 from https:// pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1793890. Nair, V.M. (1974, 26 November). Portugal keen on close links with India. The Statesman. Nehru, J. (1951, 1 October). Statement in parliament. TOI, ‘Transfer of foreign enclaves to India, dilatory tactics adopted by France & Portugal,’ 2 October 1951. Nehru, J. (1954, 25 August). Statement in the Lok Sabha. In India, MEA, Annual Report, 1954–55. New Delhi. 1955 Nehru, J. (1962a, 14 March). Statement in Lok Sabha introducing the Constitution Amendment Bill. Foreign Affairs Record, March 1995. Palha, L. (1995, 5 April). Remarks by Portuguese Minister of State for Trade at the second meeting of the India-Portugal Joint Business Council organised by FICCI and ASSOCHAM. Hindustan Times, ‘Portugal offers to fund joint ventures’, 6 April 1995. Pandit, V. L. (1956). India’s foreign policy. Foreign Affairs, 34(3), 432–440. Pereira, G. (1981, 30 October). Interview of Portuguese Foreign minister, Bombay. In S. T. Almeida, ‘Foreign minister impressed by Goa’s progress. TOI, 31 October 1981. Pinto Arena, M. C. (2022), Portugal’s challenging relationship with China under Tense US/EU-China Relations, The International Spectator: 1–18. Portugal, Embassy in India. (2020, 9 December). Portuguese Cultural Centre. Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://novadeli.embaixadaportugal. mne.gov.pt/en/the-embassy/portuguese-cultural-centre/what-we-do. Portugal, MFA. (2021a, 7 April). Eurico Brilhante Dias visits India. Retrieved May 22, 2022 from https://portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/en/communica tion-and-media/news/eurico-brilhante-dias-visits-india. Portugal, MFA. (2021b, 13 May). Portuguese Presidency wants to rebalance relations with Asia. Retrieved May 22, 2022 from https://www.2021portugal. eu/en/news/portuguese-presidency-wants-to-rebalance-relations-with-asia/ Portugal, MFA. (2021c, 14 September). Portugal and India sign agreement on recruitment of Indian workers. Retrieved May 22, 2022 from https://por taldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/en/communication-and-media/press-releases/por tugal-and-india-sign-agreement-on-recruitment-of-indian-workers. Prasad, R. (1962, 12 March). Farewell address by President to Parliament. Foreign Affairs Record. Reis, B. C., & Oliveira, P. A. (2018). The power and limits of cultural myths in Portugal’s search for a post-imperial role. The International History Review, 40(3), 631–653. Reis, B. C. (2013). Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization (1956–1974). Portuguese Studies, 29(2), 251–276.

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TOI. (2007). 12 January). Portugal sign extradition treaty. Vajpayee, A.B. (2000, 28 June). Remarks at a joint conference with Prime Minister António Guterres, Lisbon. In India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Selected Speeches, vol. 3, April 2000-March 2001. Publications Division, 2002. Xavier, C. (2016). The Lusophone Potential of Strategic Cooperation between Portugal and India. Nacao e Defesa, 142(2016), 87–104. Xavier, C. (2021), Do Porto para o Indo-Pacífico via Bruxelas e Nova Deli, Relações Internacionais, June 2021, vol. 70, pp. 103–108.

CHAPTER 9

India and the Netherlands Sakti Prasad Srichandan

Introduction India and the Netherlands share a relationship that spans more than 400 years. Dutch sailors sailed eastward in search of spices, which brought them to the shores of India. In 1602, the United East India Company was established in the Dutch Republic and to further its interests in Indian subcontinent, it established several governorates—Dutch Coromandel (1608), Dutch Surat (1616), Dutch Bengal (1627), Dutch Ceylon (1640) and Dutch Malabar (1661) (De VOCsite, 2021). To acquire more trading posts and to safeguard the posts already under its control, the Dutch was in perennial conflict with other colonial powers like Portugal, France, Denmark and Britain, and by mid-1825, the Dutch had lost all territories in India. The Netherlands revived its trade relations with colonial India, when Phillips, a subsidiary entity of Royal Philips of the Netherlands started its operations in Kolkata in 1930 (Elcoma, n.d.), which was followed by Unilever, an UK-Dutch company which

S. P. Srichandan (B) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_9

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established Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company, as a subsidiary in 1931 (HUL, n.d.). Though India-Netherlands relations have developed and diversified over the years, trade and investment remain the cornerstone of the relationship.

Dutch Colonialism In the immediate aftermath of independence, India’s relations with the Netherlands were shaped and overshadowed by the Dutch Government’s attitude towards Indonesia. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s dislike for colonialism and imperialism was manifested in his support for Indonesia’s struggle for independence. Nehru considered Indonesia’s struggle akin to India’s own struggle for independence from the British Raj. In his correspondence with the President of UN Security Council, Nehru raised the Dutch attacks in Indonesia (termed as ‘police action’) for its alleged failure to implement the Linggadjati agreement (Nehru, 1947a: 378). He requested both countries to settle their differences peacefully just as India and Britain did (Nehru, 1947b: 634). So attached was Nehru to the cause of Indonesian independence that he mobilized international opinion through western governments and press (Nehru, 1948a: 144–145). Though Indonesia gained independence on 27 December 1949 following three years of intermittent negotiations (Nehru, 1950: 386), the status of the Western New Guinea (West Irian), remained contested (Nehru, 1954: 418). In 1952, the Dutch incorporated this and named it as Netherlands New Guinea, whereas Indonesia claimed it as an integral part. Between 1954 and 1957, Indonesia made repeated attempts at UN to press the Netherlands to negotiate the issue (Nehru, 1957a: 629). India considered West Irian as an unfinished business akin to Portuguese Goa (India, MEA, 1957: 205; India, MEA, 1960: 267). Nehru welcomed the transfer of the West Irian to the UN on 15 August 1962 (Nehru, 1962a: 629). After years of dispute, West Irian was finally transferred to Indonesia in May 1963 and in a plebiscite in August 1969, people voted to remain with Indonesia. India was criticized in the West for double standards. In some cases, it supported anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements and in another instance it preferred to judge each case on its merits and supported the status quo in the name of peace. Thus, though New Delhi was very vocal in its opposition to the Dutch rule in Indonesia, it was less critical of

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the French in Indo-China and the British in Malaysia (Malone, 2011: 253).

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations The Dutch Government appointed a diplomatic representative to India even before its attainment of independence and opened its embassy in Delhi in August 1947 (India, MEA, 1949: 11). The Netherlands was the third country after the United States and China to establish diplomatic ties and its ambassador was present in the Indian parliament when Nehru proclaimed independence (Netherlands, 2022a, 2022b). However, India did not send a diplomatic representative immediately and its representative in Paris continued to represent it in the Netherlands. The Indian leadership viewed this hurried approach of the Netherlands as an act of anxiety in view of India’s sympathy and unconditional support for Indonesia’s independence (Nehru, 1947c: 442). Due to sympathy and solidarity with Indonesian cause, Nehru initially did not warm up to the Dutch Government’s moves for an early exchange of diplomatic representatives. At one point of time, Nehru even thought of not sending an ambassador to the Netherlands and asking the Dutch Government to withdraw their ambassador from Delhi (Nehru, 1948b: 225). He was non-committal about the desire of the Dutch Prime Minister desire to visit India (Nehru, 1962b: 621–622). While India was eager to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Indonesian Republic, the Dutch Government did not wish New Delhi to establish relations with Indonesia at that stage (Nehru, 1947d: 546–547). An Indian Embassy was opened at The Hague on 15 August 1949. The presence of India’s diplomatic envoy in The Hague proved beneficial during the discussions for Indonesia’s independence (India, MEA, 1950: 12). By January 1953, the Netherlands also established consulates in Bombay, Cochin, Calcutta and Madras (India, MEA, 1954: 65).

Nehru’s Visit, July 1957 Nehru visited the Netherlands after nearly a decade since bilateral relations had remained tense owing to differences over Indonesia. The visit, however, did not lead to any tangible outcomes, but provided an opportunity for enhancing mutual understanding (Radio Netherlands Archive,

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1957). Nehru acknowledged that he was greatly influenced by the Dutch struggle for freedom, which also gave a fillip to similar movements in Europe (Nehru, 1957b: 664). Nehru was impressed with agricultural cooperatives and the general development of agriculture and the organizations of the small famers in the Netherlands. The prime minster toured Holland’s water engineering projects and envisaged projects for land reclamation from sea in western India, north-western India and Saurashtra (Nehru, 1957c: 666). One positive outcome of the visit was that the Dutch expressed interest in helping India for accelerating the reclamation of saline soils in the Bhal area along the Saurashtra coast of Bombay State with financial and technical assistance (India, MEA, 1960: 35). The idea to set up the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing (formerly Indian Photo-interpretation Institute) came up during this visit (India, IIRS, n.d.).

India-China War, 1962 Princess Beatrix of Netherlands was on a visit to India during the IndiaChina war. In a letter to the Dutch Prime Minister J.E de Quay, Nehru thanked Prime Minister J.E de Quay for sympathy and support in India’s determination to resist the Chinese invasion. Interestingly, the Dutch played a crucial role in persuading Indonesia to support India’s position and refraining it from supporting China (Nehru, 1962c: 662). The Dutch Press was also sympathetic to India at this time. It regarded China as a risky country, and Pakistan was criticized for attempting to exert pressure on India by deliberately developing Chinese ties (India, MEA, 1964: 57–58).

Kashmir While bilateral engagements were gathering pace, two events emerged as irritants in the bilateral relations. After several drafts were informally put forward by Jordan and the Netherlands, a resolution adopted at the UN Security Council on 5 November 1965 highlighted the Kashmir issue (India, MEA, 1966a: 324). In November 1965, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, visited the Netherlands as Nehru’s personal envoy to convey India’s position on the Indo-Pakistan war (India, MEA, 1966b: 53). The Dutch Government favoured dialogue between India and Pakistan to defuse tension in Kashmir while sharing India’s concerns for terrorist activities in

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the Valley. Under an extradition treaty, the Dutch government arrested and handed over Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front leader Amannulah Khan who had taken refuge in the Netherlands (TOI, 1990: 1). The Dutch also highlighted the allegations of human rights violation cases in the Valley (TOI, 1993a: 13).

Bangladesh Crisis, 1971 The Netherlands initially regarded the Bangladesh crisis as an internal matter of Pakistan. But with changing circumstances the perception of the Dutch government also changed. The World Bank Pakistan Aid Consortium (comprising of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US) resolved not to provide any new aid except food aid to East Pakistan on humanitarian grounds. However, they agreed to continue disbursing aid against existing commitments. Gradually, domestic Dutch public and parliamentary opinion grew critical of Pakistan leading to the suspension of further economic aid. Pakistan’s unilateral suspension of debt payments also did not go down well in countries like the Netherlands (Raghavan, 2013: 98; 162). However, on 20 December 1971 when Dutch authorities seized a cargo of spares and components for India awaiting transshipment at Rotterdam under the Firearms Act, New Delhi lodged a protest (India, MEA, 1972: 67).

The 1974 Nuclear Tests Dutch officials felt that India’s peaceful nuclear explosions of 18 May 1974 would have an adverse impact on disarmament efforts but were uncertain the degree of how much since very few countries were willing to speak against India. The Soviet-US Threshold Test Ban Agreement signed in July 1974 had also complicated matters for countries like the Netherlands (Wikileaks, 1974). While New Delhi sought to convince other nations that its tests were for peaceful purposes, the Dutch perceived them with ‘ominous potential’ as it was not possible to make a distinction between a peaceful nuclear explosion and those for military purposes (Wikileaks, 1975).

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High-Level Visits Bilateral relations were strengthened with high-level visits at regular intervals. Some significant Indian visits were those of Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan (1961) (India, MEA, 1962: 55), Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1985) and President R. Venkataraman (1988). During Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, issues such as trade, industrial collaboration, transfer of technology and the cleaning of Ganga and making it a national waterway were the main focus. Both sides also discussed regional issues like Indo-Pakistan relations, American arms supply to Pakistan and its nuclear programme as well as a variety of multilateral issues including aid and trade with the European Economic Community (EEC), East– West relations and disarmament. The Netherlands proposed a coordinated system to meet the demand for irrigation and navigation, flood management and prevention of soil erosion, construction of terminals, wharfs and nodal points, as well as the purification of the Ganga. The Dutch suggested the launch of a pilot project along Allahabad-Patna sector (TOI, 1985a: 1; 1985b: 1). Notable Dutch visitors to India included Queen Juliana (1961), Prince Bernhard (1970), Prince Claus (1981), Prince Bernard (1982), Prime Minister R. F. M. Lubbers (1987), and Prince Claus and Crown Prince Willem Alexander (1991). When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared the Emergency (1975), the Netherlands neither suspended nor reduced aid to India (Wikileaks, 1975). Indians, Foreign Minister Van Der Klaauw remarked, viewed the world with a mixture of realism and philosophical irrelevance. There was, he acknowledged, understanding of India’s approach towards regional and global issues (Wikileaks, 1978). He was, however, perturbed about the likely impact of a change of government in India on Pakistan’s nuclear programme (Wikileaks, 1979). During his 1987 visit, Prime Minister Lubbers emphasized the need of enhancing economic relations, especially establishing long-term programme of financial and technical development support which would improve prospects of industrial and technological cooperation. He also announced a development grant of |5500 million for dredging Indian rivers in order to make them navigable, the modernization of the fleet as well as for training and management (TOI, 1987a: 9). By the end of the 1980s, India had emerged as the most important market for Dutch

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exports to Asia after Japan with the Netherlands becoming the fifth largest investor in India (TOI, 1987b: 11).

The Post-Cold War Era Accompanied by an economic delegation comprising top management executives of 21 industrial and banking companies, Lubbers paid a second visit to India in 1993 in order to strengthen economic relationships and expand the Dutch presence in the Indian market by taking advantage of new opportunities created by India’s economic reforms launched in the early 1990s (India, MEA, 1994: 50–68). In a long ‘request list’, he sought, among others, a reduction in customs duty, the liberalization of consumer goods imports, removal of licensing, a clearer policy on disinvestment, full convertibility of rupee and reduction in capital gains tax (TOI, 1993b: 15).

The 1998 Nuclear Tests On 11 and 13 May 1998, India again tested nuclear devices. While the majority of EU member states expressed concern about the tests, the Netherlands imposed economic sanctions and froze all direct economic assistance, including government-to-government loans and project support and stopped arms export licenses (UN, 1998; India, MEA, 1999). However, a year after the tests, Prime Minister Wim Kok visited India from 20–25 November 1999. Though many economic restrictions imposed after the nuclear tests were lifted within the next few years, restrictions on military exports remained (India, MEA, 2000: 61–62).

The 2000s Coming out of the shadows of nuclear test and sanctions that followed, the 2000s saw major changes in Dutch policy towards India. Rebuilding trust and mutual development were the major priority areas. Despite a stagnating economy in the Netherlands and the EU in general, trade and investment cooperation with India grew at a positive rate. For India, the Netherlands remained one of the top trading and investment partners.

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After the tsunami, India and the United States created a Core Group with Japan and Australia, which was subsequently joined by the Netherlands and Canada, to coordinate the initial phase of operations and work with the United Nations for a better response (India, MEA, 2005: 98). Regular high-level exchanges also had gave a boost to India-EU relations when the fifth India-EU summit was held at The Hague in 2004 during the Dutch EU Presidency. Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende visited India in 2006 and underlined the importance of sustaining the momentum of growing bilateral relations, characterized by substantial trade and investments (India, MEA, 2006: 85). In October 2007, Queen Beatrix paid a second State visit to India with economic relations as the main focus.

Indo-US Nuclear Deal Implementing the Indo-US nuclear deal was a real challenge as it involved getting support from a number of recalcitrant countries like the Netherlands. Dutch officials initially termed the deal as ‘worrisome’ (Wikileaks, 2005a) and raised objections for domestic political consumption (Wikileaks, 2005b). They were concerned that it would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Wikileaks, 2005c) and had reservations about the extent to which New Delhi would honour its commitments under IAEA safeguards (Wikileaks, 2006a). The Netherlands subsequently became ‘favorably inclined’ towards the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement provided the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were not adversely affected. The Dutch realized that India would never give up its fissile material programme and the Indo-US nuclear deal had the potential to keep New Delhi within the non-proliferation regime and would place safeguards on Indian civilian facilities (Wikileaks, 2006b), while bringing an overall improvement in India’s strategic relationship with the West (Wikileaks, 2006c). The Dutch were worried about granting privileges to India, a nonNPT nation, and yet to accept obligations like others. Without completely ruling out support in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Dutch sought more information from the United States and wanted India to first complete safeguard agreements with the IAEA. The Dutch were primarily concerned about permitting India for reprocessing and enrichment. The non-ratification of the CTBT by both India and the United States and

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the potential spillover on India’s military programme were other concerns (Wikileaks, 2007a). India sent envoys to 54 countries including the Netherlands to convince them concerned about its commitment to the agreement. The Dutch wanted to consult domestic parties especially the Left (Wikileaks, 2008a). As a result of coordinated American, Indian and allies’ diplomatic efforts the India Safeguards Agreement was adopted by the Board of Governors on 1 August 2008. The Dutch, however, backed Austria’s action to establish an ‘adequate’ safeguards agreement and sought clarifications on two key issues. First, in the preamble, the Dutch felt that the option to take ‘corrective measures’ did not imply that New Delhi could suspend the agreement due to a lack of fuel. Second, in Article 4, the link between safeguards and another key agreement did not provide a basis for the termination of the agreement (Dutch MFA Senior Advisor for Nonproliferation and Nuclear Affairs Ceta Noland, cited in Wikileaks, 2008b). The Dutch opposed the draft NSG exception for India primarily because they wanted the inclusion of Hyde Act conditions, which would have provided for suspension of the agreement in the case of a weapons test. Apart from maintaining the integrity of the NPT, the issue was a domestic political concern for the Dutch. They had not only received negative coverage in the Dutch press, Questions had also been raised in Parliament (Wikileaks, 2008c). The main opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal came from the NSG ‘Group of Six’ comprising Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland which did not have big stake in nuclear trade. On 28 August 2008, the US Ambassador to India David Mulford hosted a lunch for the heads of mission of the ‘Group of Six’, which had proposed most of the amendments at the NSG Extraordinary Plenary in Vienna on 21–22 August 2008. The sixty-plus amendments to India’s exception, he told the envoys, had ‘shocked’ the United States and provoked ‘a sense of betrayal’ in India (Wikileaks, 2008d). India, he warned, could walk away and that attitude was likely to adversely affect their bilateral relations. The Dutch Chargé d’Affaires Jeroen Roodenburg wanted India to ‘renew or reiterate its unilateral testing moratorium in the form of a fresh political statement’ (Wikileaks, 2008d). After Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s, public statement of India’s disarmament commitments like the voluntary moratorium on testing satisfied the NSG.

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Eventually, ‘these small states with large egos chose to avoid the US wrath by going along with the US- shaped consensus decision’ (Menon, 2016: 50–51).

Human Rights The Netherlands has been a consistent critic of the human rights situation in India since the early 1980s. In 1982, about 20 Dutch Committees and Groups working on India, joined by seven main political parties in the Netherlands, issued a Declaration on the human rights situation in India. While expressing shock at the violation of human rights, the Indian government and other authorities were criticized for failing to enforce laws on human rights, especially against Harijans, tribals and other oppressed minorities. The Declaration also blamed the involvement of police and other officials for rising cases of atrocities (The Other Side, 1982). Though a number of political parties were involved in this Declaration, the Dutch government never pressed hard this issue in its bilateral engagements with India. During Prime Minister Lubbers visit to India in 1993, the Dutch expressed concern about human rights violations in Kashmir, which could potentially be exploited by terrorists. India highlighting Pakistansponsored terrorist activities and established the National Human Rights Commission to deal with human rights issues (TOI, 1993a: 13). The Dutch wanted to include political clauses like human rights and child labour in the deliberations during the 2007 EU-India Summit (Wikileaks, 2007b). In 2017, ahead of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the Netherlands, in a reply to the question raised by Joel Voodewind of the Dutch parliament, foreign minister Bert Koenders said: ‘The (Dutch) government is seeking a permanent dialogue with India on human rights and the role of non-governmental organizations, either bilaterally or in EU and multilateral relations. The Netherlands emphasizes the importance of respect for human rights for everyone, including religious and other minorities, for a well-functioning rule of law and the promotion of sustainable development’ (TOI, 2017). In recent years, the Dutch have been critical of India’s human rights situation. For instance, when the Indian Government froze the bank accounts of Amnesty’s offices in India, the Dutch government felt that it could be ‘very difficult’ for human rights NGOs to do their work in India (Netherlands 2022a).

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Other Global Initiatives India and the Netherlands have supported each other’s global initiatives. The Netherlands backed India’s admission to the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Netherlands became a member of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) in May 2018 and in May 2020 it ratified the revised Framework Agreement of the International Solar Alliance (ISA). The Dutch expressed support for cooperation between the International Energy Agency (IEA) with India and China, even though they were not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Dutch, however, felt the admission of the two Asian giants could possibly undermine the work and standards of the OECD (Wikileaks, 2008e). The Dutch Government also joined the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (India, MEA 2021a). On 25 January 2021, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took part in a virtual Climate Adaptation Summit hosted by the Dutch government and the Global Commission for Adaptation, where India was one of the co-conveners (India, MEA 2021b: 123 and 155).

Membership of the UN Security Council During Lubbers’ 1993 visit to India, the Netherlands was non-committal about India’s aspirations for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Foreign Minister Pieter Koojimans even declined to comment on it saying it was too early to say or indicate which country would meet the criteria (TOI, 1993a: 13). The Dutch also joined Mexico’s ‘group of friends for the reform of the UN’ had 11 heads of the government as members. The Dutch favoured an inclusive formula to involve countries like India and Egypt for the reform debate (Wikileaks, 2005d). The G4 (India, Brazil, Germany and Japan) supported each other’s bids for permanent seats at the expanded UN Security Council and pushed the case at different forums and engagements. The Dutch did not wish that the process of UN reform fail. They were prepared to support the G4 resolution, as an alternative to the failure of the whole process which might be the ‘last opportunity for UNSC reform in a decade’ (Wikileaks, 2005e). However, in a remarkable policy shift in 2012, the Netherlands expressed its support for India’s bid for a permanent membership in an enlarged UN Security Council (India, MEA 2013: 194).

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The Modi Years, 2014–2022 While Indo-US relations considerably improved in the twenty-first century, its relations with Europe did not appreciably improve despite continuous high-level engagement. Under Modi, India’s ties with European powers saw new vigour, though the same momentum could not be noticed with the European Union (Sidhu, 2015). Outlining renewed foreign policy priorities, Foreign Minister Jaishankar (2020: 10) remarked: ‘It is time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support’. India needs both the United States and Europe to confront a rising China. Relations with Europe under Modi, C. Raja Mohan (2018) remarked, had witnessed an ‘upward trajectory with Europe back at the centre of India’s global consciousness with his outreach to Europe is likely to emerge as a major contribution to India’s foreign policy’. Though France, Germany and the UK attracted the most engagements, the Netherlands in recent years has gained more attention from the Modi government especially after Brexit. During Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s visit to India on 5–6 June 2015, a roadmap for bilateral cooperation and an action plan to capitalize the advantages of both countries in areas like trade and investment, agriculture, dairy, infrastructure, ports, inland waterway, smart cities, skill development, Clean Ganga Mission, etc., was agreed upon (India, MEA 2016: 113). In 2017, Modi visited the Netherlands, marking the 70th anniversary of the diplomatic relations between the two countries. The visit was significant because it came after a gap of 13 years and also witnessed the holding of a high-level CEOs roundtable. Europe was India’s biggest trading partner and 20% of India’s exports to Europe entered through the Netherlands (Rutte cited in The Hindu, 2017). Terming the Netherlands as India’s ‘natural partner’, three MoUs on social security, water cooperation and cultural cooperation were signed. The two leaders also reaffirmed their resolve for a climate change accord and partnering for renewable energy (Economic Times, 2017). In May 2018, Rutte visited India with a high-level group that included over 130 Dutch companies/institutions and around 200 trade representatives. Discussions on a wide variety of regional and international issues including terrorism, cyber security, agriculture and food processing, water

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and waste management, spatial planning, cooperation in international organizations, people-to-people and connectivity were held. Modi also met Rutte and Queen Maxima of the Netherlands on the sidelines of the G20 in Buenos Aires on 1 December 2018 (India, MEA 2019a: 158). In October 2019, King Willem-Alexander and Queen Maxima embarked on their first five-day State visit to India, accompanied by a large contingent of Dutch businessmen, including over 122 Dutch companies/institutions and around 250 business representatives (India, MEA 2020: 26). During the visit, 51 MoUs and agreements were inked between Dutch and Indian partners. The delegation’s main focus areas were water, agri-food, healthcare, technology and the maritime sector. The Netherlands was India’s partner country for the Technology Summit at New Delhi held in October 2019. Solar energy, hydrogen, biofuels, energy transition and e-mobility were the main subjects of the virtual Dutch Trade Mission conducted in February 2021. Modi and Rutte held a detailed review of the whole spectrum of bilateral ties at a virtual summit on 9 April 2021, and resolved to form a ‘strategic partnership on water’, upgrading the joint working group on water to ministerial level. Expanding bilateral collaboration, the two sides also agreed to establish a fast-track mechanism to boost bilateral trade and deepen engagements in areas like water management, agriculture, food processing, smart cities and urban mobility, among others (Economic Times, 2021a). The summit also highlighted common approaches in dealing with challenges like climate change, terrorism and pandemics and similar perspectives towards the Indo-Pacific supply chains and global digital governance (Business Standard, 2021). In the backdrop of 75 years of India’s independence, and establishment of diplomatic relations between India and the Netherlands, President Ram Nath Kovind visited the Netherlands from 4–7 April 2022. The visit was significant because it came after more than 30 years by a head of the state from India. Both countries announced cooperation in the field of ports, maritime transport and logistics, biotechnology, Cosmos Malabaricus Project and Shared Cultural Heritage Programme (India, MEA 2022). With Russia’s aggression in Ukraine endangering European security and India’s stand on the issue in divergence with its European countries, the visit was watched carefully by parties concerned. Apparently like many European powers, the Dutch were also not happy with India’s neutral

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stand on the Ukrainian crisis, but did not want to spoil its booming relations with India as evident from carefully crafted statement issued on the eve of President Kovind’s visit, which stated that New Delhi’s good relations with both Russia and Ukraine opened opportunities for mediation (Netherlands 2022a).

Economic and Trade Relations The Netherlands was the first European country to establish the Dutch East Indian Company. After India got independence, these ties remained stagnant because of economic policies except for the presence of oil companies and a multi-billion dollar cooperation programme started in the sixties (Jeurissen, J.H.H. cited in TOI., 1996a: 8). In terms of India’s trade with Western Europe, the Netherlands was nearly on par with France and Italy. A trade agreement was signed on 3 April 1956 and exports from India to the Netherlands steadily increased. A joint Indo-Netherlands Committee for Economic Cooperation was established in the early 1970s, which was instrumental in giving approvals to industrial collaborations in areas like electrical and electronic industries, power transformers, gas condensers, etc. (India, MEA 1984a: 203–204). Since the 1980s, the Netherlands evinced increasing interest in developing economic relations with India as a result of India’s liberalized import policies and necessity for new technologies to modernize the Indian economy. Cooperation also diversified to include areas like postal services, agriculture, dredging, harbour works, water management, communications, food processing, purchase of the ‘Flycatcher’ air defence radar system (TOI, 1986: 23) and telecommunications. In 1993, India and the Netherlands signed a protocol to create the India International Marketing Centre (IIMC) in Rotterdam, the world’s biggest port city, in order to boost Indian exports. It would allow small and medium-sized exporters to showcase their products and connect out to the European single market’s 350 million consumers (TOI, 1993c: 15). During his visit in 1996, Foreign Trade Minister Van Dok-van Weele expressed the hope India would pursue liberalization in banking and insurance sectors, reduce tariffs on capital goods and open more sectors for foreign direct investment (TOI, 1996a: 17). The Dutch contributed |4,320 million for cooperation programme in 1996, including a debt

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reduction allocation of |1,510 million to support India’s economic reform agenda (TOI, 1996b: 17). By 1998, bilateral trade had reached US$ 1.5 billion with the Netherlands becoming the sixth largest trading partner and the eighth largest source of investment in India (India, MEA 1999). Since India’s liberalization policies in the early 1990s, trade with the Netherlands has moved on a consistent upward trajectory with an occasional declining trend observed in few years. The Netherlands remains among the top trading partners of India with positive balance of trade in favour of India (Table 9.1). Table 9.1 India-Netherlands Trade, 1996–1997—2020–2021 (in million US Dollars) Year 1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021

Export

Import

Total Trade

Trade Balance

852.37 802.39 763.53 885.76 880.09 863.88 1,047.91 1,289.11 1,604.86 2,474.78 2,674.55 5,249.08 6,348.69 6,397.56 7,677.56 9,151.25 10,565.02 7,995.59 6,324.72 4,725.10 5,069.69 6,261.14 8,812.84 8,366.11 6,472.82

415.46 445.19 464.19 470.90 437.53 466.47 385.74 535.56 791.46 1,049.55 1,158.40 1,926.73 1,914.95 2,130.00 1,853.10 2,618.50 2,379.09 3,138.92 2,802.90 1,859.90 1,895.71 2,512.63 4,062.80 3,390.97 3,317.72

1,267.83 1,247.58 1,227.72 1,356.66 1,317.62 1,330.35 1,433.65 1,824.67 2,396.32 3,524.33 3,832.95 7,175.81 8,263.64 8,527.56 9,530.66 11,769.75 12,944.11 11,134.51 9,127.62 6,585 6,965.4 8,773.77 12,875.64 11,757.08 9,790.54

436.91 357.2 299.34 414.86 442.56 397.41 662.17 753.55 813.4 1,425.23 1,516.15 3,322.35 4,433.74 4,267.56 5,824.46 6,532.75 8,185.93 4,856.67 3,521.82 2,865.2 3,173.98 3,748.51 4,750.04 4,975.14 3,155.10

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2021)

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There has been positive growth in trade from 1996–1997 till 2012– 2013. Since 2014–2015 till 2016–2017, the total trade witnessed a downward swing due to a decline in both exports and imports. Two-way trade increased from US$ 8.77 billion in 2017–2018 and to US$ 12.87 billion in 2018–19 before declining again in 2019–2020 and 2020–2021, when it was US$ 9.79 billion. There has been a negative growth in India’s trade with the world in 2019–20 (-6.64%) and 2020–21 (12.92%) due to global pandemic. In sync with this negative trend, India’s trade with the Netherlands was -8.69% (export -5.07% and import -16.54%) in 2019–20 and -16.73% (export -22.63% and import -2.16%) in 2020–21. Though India’s trade with the Netherlands has seen different phases of positive and negative growth, India has enjoyed a surplus trade with the Netherlands throughout as evident from Table 8.1. In India’s total trade with the world, the share of Netherlands was 1.14% (2017–2018), 1.53% (2018–2019), 1.49% (2019–2020) and 1.43% (2020–2021). In 2020–2021, India’s exports amounted to US$ 6.47 billion and imports at US$ 3.37 billion. The total trade was US$ 9.79 billion and trade balance stood at US$ 3.15 billion in favour of India. The Netherlands was India’s twenty-first largest trading partner in the world and the fifth largest trading partner in Europe, after Germany, Switzerland, the UK and Belgium in 2020–21 (India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2021). In recent years, India’s major exports to the Netherlands comprised of mineral fuels and mineral oils, organic chemicals, electrical machinery and equipment and parts, apparel and clothing accessories, etc. Major imports from the Netherlands consisted of animal or vegetable fats and oils, mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, organic chemicals, pharmaceutical products, miscellaneous chemical products, iron and steel, etc., (India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2021). India continued to record a modest positive balance and trade showed satisfactory growth despite the global economic downturn in 2008. The Eurozone crisis has had little influence on India-Netherlands trade and investment flows. With 16 nations, including the Netherlands, India has signed and implemented ‘comprehensive’ Social Security Agreements (SSAs) to improve working conditions for professionals. In 2009, India and the Netherlands signed the Bilateral Social Security Agreement allowing export of social security benefits, thereby encouraging the mobility of

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skilled human resources between the two countries. India also participated in negotiations on a Labour Mobility Agreement with Netherlands (India, MEA 2011: 119). The Amending Protocol incorporating the ‘country of residence’ principle in the SSA was signed during Modi’s visit to the Netherlands in 2017. It gave equity and fairness to the SSA (India, MEA 2018: 261).

Foreign Direct Investment India and the Netherlands signed the Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (BIPA) in 1995 (India, MEA 1996: 181). Unlike other countries, the Netherlands did not pursue policies that politicized issues like the child labour and the attempt to enforce protectionist measures. The Dutch presence in India was mostly concentrated in the banking, electronics, infrastructure and petroleum sectors (India, MEA 2000: 83). The Netherlands had also attracted investment from India and many joint ventures developed in third countries. From 1996 to 2010, Indian investments in the Netherlands amounted to US$ 11.46 billion. During 2000 to 2011, with US$ 5.62 billion, the Dutch became the fifth largest country for FDI inflows into India. A fast-track business visa scheme was launched with effect from 1 August 2011 to boost Dutch investment in India and growing business inflows (India, MEA 2012). Both countries adopted the Protocol for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and for the prevention of fiscal evasion (India, MEA 2013: 194). Total FDI inflows from Netherlands into India saw a steady rise with US$ 2.6 billion in 2015–2016 to US$ 3.3 billion in 2016–2017. This declined to US$ 2.8 billion in 2017–2018 but grew to US$ 3.8 billion in 2018–2019, and stood at US$ 6.5 billion in 2019–2020. With FDI inflows of US$ 2.8 billion, the Netherlands was India’s fifth largest investor in 2020–2021 (India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2021). The services sector (16%); computer software and hardware (14%); trading (8%); chemical (8%) and automobile industry (6%) are some of the top sectors that attract most investment. From April 2000 to December 2020, the Netherlands was India’s fourth largest investor, accounting for 7% of total investment inflow of US$ 36.28 billion. With US$ 1.22 billion in overseas direct investments in 2020–2021, the Netherlands emerged as the third biggest destination for foreign investment by Indian enterprises (India, MEA 2021c: 9).

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Over 200 Dutch firms operate in India, including big multinationals and corporations such as Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips, Akzo Nobel, DSM, KLM and the three big banks–ABN AMRO and Rabobank. In the Netherlands, there are around 200 Indian enterprises operating, including Wipro, TCS, Infosys, HCL, Tata Steel, Sun Pharmaceuticals, LT Foods, United Phosphorus Limited and Tech Mahindra. Indian companies have made major acquisitions in the Netherlands including Anglo-Dutch Corus by Tata Steel; Vredestein Banden by Apollo Tyres; Theodoor Gilissen Bankiers by Hindujas; Bilthoven Biologicals by the Serum Institute of India and Leisure Group by OYO Hotels and Homes. There are a number of organizations that are active in promoting IndiaNetherlands trade and investment such as the Netherlands-India Chamber of Commerce and Trade (NICCT) and the Indian Business Chamber (IBC). India and the Netherlands have established #StartUpLink to assist entrepreneurs from both nations with everything from conception through mentorship, incubation and investment (Anupam, 2019). The India-Dutch Financial Corridor intends to connect Dutch financial institutions with Indian enterprises and Dutch businesses interested in doing major projects in India (Free Press Journal, 2020).

Development Assistance Since the early 1960s, as a member of the Aid India Consortium, the Netherlands provided development assistance to India. One notable characteristic of this credit was that the interest rate, which was set at 3%, was lower than that of the World Bank (India, MEA 1966a: 53). During the 1966 food crisis in India, in many European countries notably in the Netherlands, apart from governmental support, public contributions were raised spontaneously to assist India (India, MEA 1967: 45). India was the largest recipient of Dutch economic assistance (India, MEA 1982: 23) and by 1982, the Dutch financial assistance to India amounted to over 2,600 million Guilders (about |9.75 billion). The Netherlands was one of the few countries which surpassed the UN target of 0.7% of GNP for development assistance (India, MEA 1983: 21). The Dutch Government’s development assistance is constituted with one third of the amount under the Dutch Financial (Export) Credit and the remaining two third under the General Purpose Loan. The Dutch assistance has been largely used for water supply for irrigation in Bihar (India, MEA 1970: 151); removal of city-kept cattle (Khatals) of Calcutta

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and Howrah (India, MEA 1978: 78); imports of fertilizers and other items; agricultural refinancing programmes; and rural drinking water supply schemes in the States of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Kerala (India, MEA 1984b: 277–278). There was also a debate in the Dutch Parliament regarding whether chemical fertilizers reached small farmers as one news report appeared that only the rich farmers benefitted out of it which led to an uproar (TOI, 1985c: 21). One important aspect of Indo-Dutch cooperation is that, the Netherlands was the first country to have agreed to the mechanism of pre-financing whereby payments for project financing are made in advance rather than on the basis of reimbursement (India, MEA 1989: 17). The Netherlands has also been declared a reciprocating country for the purposes of Wealth Tax Act1 (India, MEA 1990: 74–75).

Cultural Relations Indo-Dutch cultural relations are characterized by people-to-people contact, visits of academics and journalists as well as exchange of students’ and women delegations. In 1960, the Royal Tropical Institute of Amsterdam established an Extraordinary Chair for modern Indian languages and literature at the University of Amsterdam. To enhance understanding of India, the first ever Long-Term Chair for the study of Contemporary India became functional at Leiden University in 2011. The Indian Cultural Centre at the Hague (called the’Gandhi Centre’) also fosters cultural cooperation. Regular cultural and educational exchanges have taken place between the two countries. For the first time, a cultural agreement was signed between the two nations in May 1985. Collaboration and exchanges in education and research, art and culture, literature and mass media and the formation of cultural institutions have been the cornerstone of IndoDutch cultural cooperation. The Know India Programme; the Tracing the Roots Programme; the India Corporate Internship Programme; and other initiatives have all helped to improve and strengthen people-to-people connections.

1 If a firm operates through a ‘Permanent Establishment’ in another nation, commercial earnings of an Indian or Dutch enterprise shall be taxed solely in the country in which it is a resident.

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The Netherlands was included in the electronic Tourist Visa (e-TV) programme on 15 August 2015 and the number of daily non-stop flights was raised, significantly increasing business and tourism flows and peopleto-people relations between the two countries.

Diaspora In Europe, after the UK, the second-largest people of Indian descent resides in the Netherlands. It is host to estimated 235,000 Indian diaspora members, including 200,000 members of the sixth generation Hindustani-Surinami population who have fully blended into Dutch culture and are eligible for Overseas Citizens of India Cards. Between 1873 and 1916, indentured labourers from British India came to Surinam, who became known as Hindustanis. Most Indians became small farmers after their indenture and settled in Surinam (Choenni, 2013: 41). Despite the fact that their forefathers departed India about 150 years ago, the Hindustani-Surinami minority maintains strong cultural ties with the country and actively promotes cultural collaboration between India and the Netherlands through established institutions. The rest are NRIs/PIOs, most of them are business people, knowledge workers, professionals and students. There are approximately 3,000 Indian students pursuing studies in various Dutch universities and they are among the top three non-EU foreign students in the Netherlands in terms of numbers (India, MEA 2019b: 4).

The Indo-Pacific In 2020, the Netherlands published its Indo-Pacific strategy, which emphasizes that, like Europe it has major economic and geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific and that key challenges confronting the region include those of climate change, international security, cybersecurity, maritime security, global value chains, global health, poverty, migration, human rights and the international legal order. ‘These challenges, it argues, can only be effectively tackled in conjunction with this region’. Identifying India as a vital partner to cooperate with in order to achieve a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, it calls for ‘closely working’ with countries in the region like India, to promote effective multilateralism and to strengthen the international legal order (Netherlands, 2020).

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Investment Disputes Foreign investors Deutsche Telekom, Nissan Motor Co, Vodafone and Cairn Energy have filed a number of legal disputes/arbitrations against the Indian government under different Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPAs) over issues ranging from retrospective taxation to payment disputes (India, MEA 2019b: 268; Reuters, 2020). One such legal dispute which attracted maximum attention and affected India’s image as investment friendly destination was one related to Vodafone International Holdings under the India-Netherlands BIPA. In 2007, Vodafone International Holdings (VIH), a Dutch-based company bought 100% shares amounting to US$ 11.1 billion in CGP Investments (Holding) Ltd. from Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd. CGP, had already a stake of 67% in Hutchison Essar Limited (HEL), an India-based company. So VIH in essence now got control over HEL. In September 2007, the Indian tax authorities issued a notice and raised a demand of |79.9 billion as capital gains and withholding tax from Vodafone, which later ballooned to over |200 billion (Economic Times, 2014). Vodafone first challenged the notice at Bombay High Court arguing that this was contrary to the principles of equitable and fair treatment enshrined in the agreement which the GOI maintained that tax issues were not covered under the BIPA. After getting an adverse order from the High Court, it appealed to Supreme Court of India, which passed order in its favour. Vodafone challenged this tax demand by invoking an arbitration proceeding under the Netherlands-India BIPA (TOI, 2014). In September 2020, the Arbitral Tribunal gave a verdict against India. New Delhi challenged this arbitration court’s verdict in Singapore by arguing that taxation is a sovereign decision, not within the scope of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), and therefore, outside the jurisdiction of international arbitration (Business Standard, 2020). It was argued that this move would send a wrong signal to foreign investors. Since the overall controversy involved the India-Netherlands BIPA, the investors’ confidence especially those from the Netherlands were clearly at stake. In October 2021, GOI notified a fresh set of rules to settle such disputes. Taxes would be refunded without interest if already levied under the controversial 2012 retrospective tax law. Further the refund will be subject to companies withdrawing all legal proceedings and indemnifying the government against any future claims (Mint, 2021). Vodafone had filed

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an application to settle its long pending retrospective tax dispute under these rules (Economic Times, 2021b).

Conclusion The relations between India and the Netherlands have entered a diverse and dynamic period. For the Netherlands, India is ‘a Delta country’ (India, Embassy in The Netherlands: 2021) where it is cooperating with a dozen states. The two countries are cooperating in a variety of fields, including the Ganga Action Plan, food processing, agriculture, electric mobility, exploration and uses of outer space for peaceful purposes, smart and sustainable ports, decarbonization and energy transition agenda, counter terrorism and cybersecurity, water management, shipping and inland waterways and urban development and smart cities (India, Embassy in The Netherlands 2021). ‘WAH’ or water, agriculture and health have been identified as the three most important sectors for both nations, where Dutch expertise can make a meaningful impact in India. Prime Minister Modi characterized relations with the Netherlands as one of the ‘very few such countries with whom we have this kind of momentum of high-level visits’ (Modi 2018). Largely, because of economic interests as well as personal dynamism of leaders. Brexit has also contributed to strengthening of this partnership in recent years. While the UK focuses on retaining its India-based investments and enterprises, the Netherlands has sought to capitalize on Brexit prospects by positioning itself as the most promising gateway to the European Union. Thus, an ecosystem for closer cooperation has already been developed between the two countries.

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Nehru, J. (1947a, 29 July). Cable to President of Security Council. National Herald, 1 August 1947a. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 3, New Delhi: JNMF, 1985. Nehru, J. (1948a, 6 December). Letter to premiers of provinces, New Delhi. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 8, New Delhi: JNMF, 1989. Nehru, J. (1948b, 21 December). To V.K. Krishna Menon. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 9, New Delhi: JNMF, 1990. Nehru, J. (1950, 31 August). To A. Soekarno. JN Collection. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 15, New Delhi: JNMF, 1993. Nehru, J. (1954, 18 May). India and International Situation. Statement in Parliament, 18 May 1954, delivered in continuation of the statement of 15 May 1954. Parliamentary Debates (House of the People), Official Report, 1954, Vol. V, Pt. II, cols. 7647–7672. Extracts. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 25, New Delhi: JNMF, 1999. Nehru, J. (1957a, 8 November). The Question of West Irian. Note to N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, and M.J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, New Delhi, 8 November 1957a, JN Collection. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 40, New Delhi: JNMF, 2009. Nehru, J. (1957b, 8 July). Speech at a dinner hosted by the Dutch Prime Minister, Treveszaal Hall, The Hague, AIR tapes, NMML. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 38, New Delhi: JNMF, 2006. Nehru, J. (1957c, 9 July). Press Conference. The Hague, AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 38, New Delhi: JNMF, 2006. Nehru, J. (1962a, 22 August). In the Rajya Sabha: Border Situation. Motion. Rajya Sabha Debates. Vol. 40, Nos. 9–16, 17 t0 29 August 1962a, cols 2876– 2882, 2981–3002. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 78, New Delhi: JNMF, 2018. Nehru, J. (1962b, 23 February). For R.K. Nehru. Archealogist from Holland. Note for the SG, MEA. It was marked to the FS also. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 75, New Delhi: JNMF, 2018. Nehru, J. (1962c, 21 November). To J.E. de Quay: Dutch Support. Letter to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands. SWJN, Series 2, vol. 79, New Delhi: JNMF, 2018. Netherlands. (2020, 13 November). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia. Retrieved on January 4, 2022, from https://www.government.nl/documents/publications/2020/ 11/13/indo-pacific-guidelines Netherlands. (2022a, 1 April). India: A major power that prefers to take a neutral stance. Retrieved on April 4, 2022a, from https://www.government.nl/lat est/news/2022a/04/01/state-visit-india-netherlands

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Netherlands. (2022b, 5 April). Speech by His Majesty the King at the state banquet on the occasion of the state visit by Shri Ram Nath Kovind, President of India. Retrieved on April 8, 2022b, from https://www.royalhouse.nl/documents/speeches/2022b/04/05/speech-by-his-majesty-theking-at-the-state-banquet-on-the-occasion-of-the-state-visit-by-shri-ram-nathkovind-president-of-india Radio Netherlands Archives. (1957, 8 July). Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s remarks on his arrival in the Netherlands. Retrieved on March 26, 2022, from https://www.radionetherlandsarchives.org/speech-by-indianprime-minister-jawaharlal-nehru-in-1957/ Raghavan, S. (2013). 1971 A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh. Harvard University Press. Reuters. (2020, 24 December). India challenges Vodafone arbitration ruling in Singapore—source. Retrieved on July 8, 2021, from https://www.reuters. com/article/india-vodafone-group-arbitration-idINKBN28Y0FW Sidhu, WPS (2015, 27 April). Narendra Modi enegages Euroep, sans the Union. Retrieved on July 8, 2021, from https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/h17 gtBQPTDj2vgpb2hPEeN/Modi-engages-Europe-sans-the-Union.html. The Hindu. (2017, 27 June). Netherlands is India’s natural partner: Narendra Modi. Retrieved on October 28, 2021, from https://www.thehindu.com/ news/national/netherlands-is-indias-natural-partner-narendra-modi/article19 155200.ece. The Other Side. (1982, October). Dutch declaration on human rights in India. Retrieved on March 28, 2022, from http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/a8210a. pdf. TOI. (1985a, 26 October). Dutch may help clean Ganga. TOI. (1985b, 27 October). PM airdashes to meet Gorbachov. TOI. (1985c, 6 December). Princely Dutch gesture to India. TOI. (1986, 1 January). Dutch radar for Indian army. TOI. (1987a, 4 March). Rs 550 cr. Dutch aid for shipping. TOI. (1987b, 1 October). Indo-Dutch economic ties can be increased. TOI. (1990, 19 May). Order on Amannulah’s arrest. India Pakistan clash at UN. TOI. (1993a, 29 October). Dutch call to defuse tension. TOI. (1993b, 28 October). Dutch PM favours custom duty cut. TOI. (1993c, 5 October). Trade Centre planned in Rotterdam. TOI. (1996a, 30 June). India emerging as economic super power. TOI. (1996b, 19 October). Netherlands urges further liberalisation. TOI. (2014, 4 March). Government to Vodafone: Indo-Dutch BIPA pact doesn’t cover taxation. Retrieved November 21, 2021, from https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/industry/telecom/government-to-vodafone-indo-dutchbipa-pact-doesnt-cover-taxation/articleshow/31358382.cms?utm_source= contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

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TOI. (2017, 3 July). Dutch govt in ‘dialogue with India on human rights. Retrieved November 21, 2021, from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ articleshow/59429941.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium= text&utm_campaign=cppst UN. (1998, 15 May). Press Release DCF/332: Disarmament conference members condemn Indian nuclear tests. Retrieved on March 4, 2022, from https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980515.dcf332.html. Wikileaks. (1974, 6 September). Government of Netherlands positions on key issues at 29th UNGA. Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State. Retrieved on March 4, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cab les/1974THEHA04417_b.html. Wikileaks. (1975, 7 November). USUN Unclassified Summary No. 50. Retrieved on March 17, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975USUNN 05746_b.html. Wikileaks. (1978, 1 November). Dutch Foreign Minister’s visit to India, Japan and South Korea. Retrieved on March 24, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/1978THEHA06176_d.html. Wikileaks. (1979, 28 September). Secretary’s Bilateral with Dutch Foriegn Minister Van Der Klaauw: India and Pakistan Nuclear Development, UN Plaza Hotel, September 26, 1979. Cable from the Secretary of State to the US Embassies at Islamabad and The Hague. Retrieved on March 24, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979STATE256020_e.html. Wikileaks. (2005a, 29 July). S37–05: Netherlands: Response to Demarche to UAE entity diverting goods. Retrieved on March 24, 2022, from https://wikileaks. org/plusd/cables/05THEHAGUE2080_a.html. Wikileaks. (2005b, 18 October). Netherlands/NSG: U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation. Retrieved on March 26, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cab les/05THEHAGUE2829_a.html. Wikileaks. (2005c, 17 August). Netherlands: MFA official on Iran/IAEA, Africa, maritime security. Retrieved on March 26, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/05THEHAGUE2271_a.html. Wikileaks. (2005d, 8 February). Netherlands/UN reform: Dutch will play important role in reform debate. Retrieved on March 28, 2022, from https://wik ileaks.org/plusd/cables/05THEHAGUE363_a.html. Wikileaks. (2005e, 19 July). Netherlands/UNSC Reform: Dutch could support G4 resolution despite reservations. Retrieved on March 28, 2022, from https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05THEHAGUE2018_a.html. Wikileaks. (2006a, 4 December). Scenesetter for A/S Boucher’s December 6 visit to The Netherlands. Retrieved on March 29, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/06THEHAGUE2546_a.html.

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Wikileaks. (2006b, 11 December). Netherlands: U/S Joseph’s June 21 visit to The Hague. Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State and others. Retrieved on April 2, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/06THEHAGUE1425_a.html. Wikileaks. (2006c, 11 December). Netherlands: Boucher’s December 6 visit to the Hague focuses on Afghanistan. Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State and others. Retrieved on April 2, 2022, from https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06THEHAGUE2587_a.html. Wikileaks. (2007a, 30 July). Netherlands/Nuclear suppliers group: Dutch “Very Worried” about US-India nuclear treaty. Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State, US Embassy at New Delhi and Consulates at Chennai, Kolkata and Mumbai. Retrieved on April 5, 2022, from https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07THEHAGUE1424_a.html. Wikileaks. (2007b, 30 November). Netherlands/EU: Views on November 19–20 (GAERC). Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State. Retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 07THEHAGUE2001_a.html. Wikileaks. (2008a, 23 July). India dispatches envoys to 54 Capitals, Embassy Hosts 41 NSG Member Representatives. Retrieved on April 7, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NEWDELHI2019_a.html. Wikileaks. (2008b, 7 August). Netherlands/IAEA: Dutch want more deliberation on India proposals. Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State and others. Retrieved on April 8, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/08THEHAGUE672_a.html. Wikileaks. (2008c, 14 August). Netherlands: Dutch oppose draft NSG exception for India. Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State, NATO EU Collective and Nuclear Suppliers Group. Retrieved on April 8, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08THEHAGUE686_a.html. Wikileaks. (2008d, 28 August). Ambassador alerts “Group of Six” envoys that relationships with India at stake in ccivil nuclear initiative. Cable from the US Embassy at New Delhi to the Secretary of State and others. Retrieved on April 12, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NEWDELH I2319_a.html. Wikileaks. (2008e, 26 February). Netherlands/IEA: Dutch on China, India membership. Cable from the US Embassy at The Hague to the Secretary of State and others. Retrieved on April 14, 2022, from https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/08THEHAGUE179_a.html.

CHAPTER 10

India and Sweden: A Rollercoaster Relationship Manasi Singh

Introduction India is revamping its foreign policy in tune with the changing global realities and has thus embarked on a path of multialignment.1 In its quest for strategic autonomy and in order to consolidate its position in the competitive global market, India has reached out to countries with which it shares significant political and economic complementarities. Europe, likewise, has begun coming to terms with a rising India. In this context, the Nordic region presents an untapped potential in India’s evolving Indian foreign policy priorities. Relations between India and Sweden have deep roots in

1 Multialignment is characterized by an emphasis on engagement in regional multilateral institutions and the use of strategic partnerships to advance India’s core interests and values in international relations (Hall, 2016).

M. Singh (B) School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_10

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history and today, find an opportune context to build a robust partnership at the international stage. The looming uncertainty and geopolitical disequilibrium caused by COVID-19 crisis have made it imperative for both India and Sweden to leverage their respective strengths, cement the bilateral cooperation and strengthen the international multilateral framework. Mutual economic interests have emerged as the driving force of IndiaSweden relations, and the two sides are also coming on board in key areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as UN’s 2030 Agenda, economic growth, innovation and climate change. Over the years, trade, investment and business collaborations have seen promising upward trends with a list of MoUs signed in critical areas like green technologies, renewable energy, smart infrastructure, urban development, education, defence, space and sustainable development. The pandemic has opened up new vistas for enhancing bilateral collaboration in fields of healthcare innovation, science and technology and research and development. The Joint Action Plan (2018) has spearheaded the momentum of strategic convergence between the two countries. What becomes clear is that in view of the rising strategic significance of Asia, Europe and the Nordic region has begun to acknowledge the need to invest more in research and dialogue formats with India to gain a better understanding of its aspirations as an emerging power. Sweden with its expertise in innovation and technology finds India a critical partner to jointly respond to global challenges. Investments and R&D collaborations form the pivot of the bilateral relations but both sides also share a strong commitment to an open and inclusive order anchored in multilateral norms and framework. This chapter looks at the evolving trajectory of India-Sweden relations and prospective areas of engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. The first section looks at the Cold War period when the leadership in both India and Sweden played a formative role in bringing the two countries closer to each other. The leaders’ personal rapport and shared ideals aid the foundation of this relationship. The second section examines the developments in the aftermath of Cold War when the changing international political economy had given a context to revive the IndoSwedish ties that had suffered a setback with the 1987 Bofors kickbacks row. The third section focuses on the developments after Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014. Since then, there has been a growing thrust on scaling up business and investments between both the countries

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and several MoUs have been signed in medical innovation, urban development, renewable energy, polar science, etc. The fourth and fifth sections look at the trade and cultural relations, respectively. The sixth section analyses the convergence and divergence in India-Sweden relations and the last section gives concluding arguments.

The Cold War Era India and Sweden established formal diplomatic ties in 1949 although trade and business connections had been established in the 1920s. The Cold War and the ensuing superpower rivalry brought the two countries together for their shared democratic values and adherence of neutrality. During the 1950s, the diplomatic relations received a fillip with the appointment of Alva Myrdal as Sweden’s first ambassador to India in 1955. Both Myrdal and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shared a commitment to social welfare and egalitarianism and advocated transcending myopic nationalism to develop a neutral global axis of non-aligned countries to fend off another world war through nuclear disarmament. Their closely aligned vision proved beneficial for forging a close India-Swedish association. Alva Myrdal later received the Nobel Peace prize in 1982 for her work in nuclear disarmament in the United Nations, and she credited Nehru’s ideals of global peace and welfare for influencing her to work in this field. Nehru visited Sweden in 1957 and the two countries signed a trade agreement. Two years later, Sweden’s Prime Minister Tage Erlander visited India. During the visit, the Indian Prime Minister hailed his Swedish counterpart for his able leadership and achievements of his government in introducing reforms related to social security and standard of living (Nehru, 1959). The two leaders having served more than a decade in office, shared a camaraderie built on a common vision to develop a democratic, free and progressive society. Inspired by Sweden’s exemplary model of social democracy, Nehru envisioned the same welfare state model for India as well. Sweden under Social Democrats transformed into the world’s most advanced ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare state, noted for its high standard of living, excellent labour relations and a high degree of social and economic equality (Vivekanandan, 1979). Following Erlander’s visit to India, the Swedish government instituted two scholarships to be awarded to young Indians for studies on Sweden (Nehru, 1960). In 1959 at the UN General Assembly, India along

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with Sweden and Yugoslavia sponsored a resolution on ‘Co-existence’, calling upon states to strengthen international peace and settle disputes by peaceful means within the framework of the Charter (India, MEA, 1959). The India-Sweden bonhomie continued even after the Nehruvian era with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s participation in the Stockholm Conference in 1972, which marked an important milestone in global environmental cooperation. The two countries showed alacrity to strengthen existing industrial and technical relations and proposed setting up a Joint Commission on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation (India, MEA, 1973). The idea crystallized with the visit of Swedish Foreign Minister Krister Wickman to India in November 1972. This was the first Joint Commission set up by India with a developed country in Western Europe, and its task was to assess issues relating to exchange of data between private or government enterprises of India and Sweden notably in the fields of technology and science. Subsequently, Alva Myrdal, who was now Sweden’s minister for disarmament, again visited India in 1973, along with her husband, noted economist Gunnar Myrdal. They held talks with Indian officials on the problems of disarmament, humanization of the laws of war and economic and technological cooperation between the developed and developing countries. These frequent bilateral visits kept the momentum alive in India-Sweden relations and diplomatic relations between the two countries have been characterised by frequent high-level interactions between their senior officials. During her visit to Sweden, Indira Gandhi met her Swedish counterpart Olof Palme and both the leaders enjoyed good personal relations and had become strong voices against apartheid and the Vietnam War. In fact, due to their socialistic worldview, both Gandhi and Plame had difficult relations with the United States (Katju, 2013). Palme had visited India in 1953 as a student leader and spent some days in the remote areas of India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu. The poverty and misery left a deep impact on his mind and influenced his ideas of international solidarity and supporting the developing countries (Vivekanandan, 2016: 17). Palme, although a staunch critic of oppressive regimes, surprisingly did not make any reference to India’s Emergency in 1975 in his public speeches (Vivekanandan, 2016: 75).

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The Six-Nation Initiative Driven by socialist ideas and a common vision of global peace, security and development, India-Sweden bilateral relations remained strong and cooperative during the 1980s. In 1984, India and Sweden called for universal nuclear disarmament and launched the ‘Six-Nation Initiative’ along with Argentina, Mexico, Greece and Tanzania. The Delhi Declaration (1985) adopted by these participating countries made a fervent appeal outside the Cold War blocs in support of nuclear disarmament and towards a towards comprehensive nuclear test ban. During the tenure of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, bilateral ties continued to flourish as Gandhi inherited a legacy of long and close association with Olof Palme which boosted confidence in diplomatic exchanges.

The Bofors Scandal and After In 1986 the howitzer deal signed between Swedish arms manufacturer Bofors and the Indian government created a huge controversy over accusations of kickbacks. Palme was assassinated in 1986 and a deeply moved Rajiv Gandhi who drew a parallel of this between this incident and the assassination of his mother Indira Gandhi (Lelyveld, 1986), declared a day of mourning (Subramanian, 2020). Rajiv Gandhi visited Stockholm in 1988 and to save him from embarrassment, the Swedish government called off the Bofors investigation, according to a declassified CIA report revealed in 2016 (Firstpost, 2017). The much-publicized scandal, however, led to the fall of Rajiv Gandhi’s government in 1989.

Post-Cold War Era The end of the Cold War brought massive transformations in global political economy and India and Sweden, like many other countries, faced a severe economic crisis characterized by a substantial decline in GDP and increasing unemployment. Sweden abolished all quotas in 1991 and following this move, India’s exports surged from |880 million in 1991, to |3.96 billion in 1994 (Jain, 2013). As Sweden became a member of the European Union in 1995, it embarked on a series of reform measures including liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) and deregulation of the Swedish capital market (Heyman et al., 2019). As part

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of the deal for it joining the EU, Sweden re-introduced quotas, and Indian exports fell to Rs |2.08 billion by 1997 (Jain, 2013). India too adopted structural reforms in response to the fast-changing international economic landscape. As a result, the country witnessed swift expansion of its economy with business and investment opportunities emerging in new sectors. Fuelled by the demands of a fast-growing middle class, India embarked on the path of rapid development and urbanization, driving economic growth and social transformation. Over the years, new avenues of investments have emerged in the field of health care, digital business models, fast-moving consumer goods and e-commerce, smart cities and green technologies. In 1993, the State visit of King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden to India marked the first high-level exchange between the two countries since 1988. Interactions between the Swedish business delegation and their Indian counterparts discussed prospects for enhancing bilateral economic and ‘commercial relations’ (India, MEA, 1994).

Pokharan Tests and Non-Proliferation Bilateral relations took a nosedive after India conducted its second nuclear tests in 1998 at Pokhran. The Swedish representative to the UN at that time, Lars Norberg, described the move as a serious blow to regional and global security and to international nuclear disarmament (Norberg, 1998). Sweden along with the United States, Australia, Canada, Germany and Japan imposed sanctions on India and strongly urged India to reconsider its nuclear policies and to adhere to both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without conditions. Sweden suspended large amounts of funds in development aid to India (Diamond, 1998). Historically, Sweden has been an ardent advocate of non-proliferation and disarmament and has produced diplomats and politicians like Hans Blix, Rolf Ekeus and Henrik Salander, who have chaired various UN commissions on monitoring, verification and inspection. Former Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh had also initiated the process leading to the European Union’s strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The cooling-off period took some time as the international community began to acknowledge India’s moral, political and legal standing as a rule abider and its

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conduct as a responsible power. India’s ‘no first use nuclear doctrine’ has become the cornerstone of India’s diplomatic, military and political policy in the international arena (Roy, 2018). While the rest of Europe and the United States went ahead exploring India’s immense post-economic reforms potentials, the Swedish leadership kept on mulling the pros and cons of the stance they had taken (Trigunayat, 2018). India’s nuclear tests in 1998 further put the relations on a backburner and for a long time India and Sweden avoided each other.

The 2000s Although the Bofors scam and India’s nuclear tests put relations on a backburner, both India and Sweden began attempts to make up for missed opportunities. In 2000, the two countries signed a bilateral investment treaty for the promotion and protection of investments. To advise political leadership on both sides, the business community of the two countries established the India-Sweden Business Leaders’ Roundtable in 2003, a platform for business leaders to collaborate and jointly address bottlenecks in the fields of research, innovation, investments, financing, trade, business, industrialization and regulatory issues. The visit of Prime Minister Goran Persson to India in 2004 proved to be an icebreaker and the two countries sought to renew the old ties and move beyond the Bofors-induced sourness. This was followed by the second visit of King Carl XVI Gustaf to India in 2005. The visit focused on Delhi and Bengaluru and sectors devoted IT and telecom and demonstrated Sweden’s commitment to enhance bilateral ties in economic as well as S&T sectors (India, MEA, 2006).

Indo-US Nuclear Deal India got the strategic space to manoeuvre at the world stage and the rapprochement with the West culminated in the Indo-US nuclear deal and waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008. Sweden supported India in its membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Foreign Minister Carl Bildt even welcomed the India-US nuclear agreement as Stockholm had now identified its relationship with India and the United States as its top priorities outside of the European Union (Bergenäs, 2010). The NSG waiver granted a special concession to India to engage in international commerce in civilian nuclear

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technology and equipment. The waiver came through after intense and complex negotiations reconciling the different requirements posed by certain key member countries (Saran, 2017). While most of the major supplier countries, such as the UK, Russia, France, Germany, Canada and Australia, were in favour of the waiver, it was an uphill task to mobilize consensus and take on board other member countries, such as Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, who wanted some additions and conditions included in the American proposal (Varadarajan, 2008). New Delhi undertook a series of diplomatic efforts to reach out to the NSG members for their support. Washington too had sent out a strong message to the countries about the high value attached to its strategic ties with India (Menon, 2016). Given the high stakes, the foreign ministries of NSG member countries were reluctant to play a spoilsport to the deal. Domestic lobbies such as the nuclear-vending industries and other business interest groups within NSG member countries were also instrumental in sealing the deal. Swedish firms were interested in arms sales to India while Japanese firms like Hitachi and Toshiba were partners of US companies General Electric and Westinghouse that were keen to sell nuclear reactors to India (Mistry, 2014: 204). Following the waiver, a delegation of Swedish atomic companies visited India in April 2009 and held talks with the Indian officials to explore possibilities of cooperation in nuclear technology and safety management. During the visit, the Swedish envoy to India Lars-Olof Lindgren remarked that there was a huge potential for bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear technology solutions (Financial Express, 2009). Sweden depends on nuclear power for nearly 50% of its energy needs and the government, therefore, lifted a three-decade ban in February 2009 on building new nuclear reactors, in a bid to curb its greenhouse gas emissions (Hindustan Times , 2009). At the India-Sweden virtual summit held in March 2021, both sides pledged to support and strengthen cooperation in areas like global export control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Sweden expressed support for India’s membership of the NSG and welcomed the latter’s accession to the international export control regimes including the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) (Sweden, Government Offices, 2021).

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Modi Years, 2014–2021 In 2017, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Germany, France, Portugal and Spain. In the context of shifting geopolitics and China’s growing assertiveness, India has sought to renew its focus with key players in Europe (Chaudhary, 2017). As the world becomes increasingly competitive, congested and contested, India and Europe have come on board as ‘natural allies’ to provide leadership in addressing collective action problems and strengthen advocacy for multilateralism. There is a growing recognition within Europe to overcome its strategic marginalization in Asia and seek greater convergence with India on some of the pressing issues of global governance such as climate change, terrorism, connectivity and maritime security. Both sides are keen to take the India-EU strategic partnership beyond the logic of trade and commerce and thus identify areas where shared values can be transformed into convergent interests and priorities. India-Sweden ties have been on an upward trajectory in recent years with official visits from both sides seeking to expand cooperation in diverse areas including in trade and investment, innovation and culture. In 2015, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Sweden and both sides inked several agreements related to polar and ocean research, boosting trade, cooperation in the field of micro, small and medium enterprises and sustainable urban development. During this visit, Prime Minister Stefan Löfven described India as a ‘natural claimant’ for a seat in the UN Security Council and also supported India’s entry into MTCR (India Today, 2015). Löfven’s Visit, 2016 Prime Minister Löfven’s visit to India in 2016 for the ‘Make in India’ industrial fair in Mumbai, opened up new vistas of business and investments. His visit was instrumental in establishing the India-Sweden Business Leaders Round Table (ISBLRT), creating a robust framework for bringing the business communities of both countries close. In fact, sensing the immense economic potential India offers, Löfven emphasized on business and innovation and carefully avoided mentioning tolerance, human rights, minority issues, gender equality, which are key to Sweden’s feminist foreign policy but could cause uneasiness for India.

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India-Nordic Summit, 2018 In 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sweden to attend the first India-Nordic summit. This visit came 30 years after the last visit by an Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 and marked New Delhi’s engagement with the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway) which have made a global mark for their high standards of human development, gender equality, low employment renewable energy consumption and clean technology. Sweden has set an example as a moral superpower for renouncing the nuclear option under pressure from the women’s movement in the 1950s, and the Norden has been at the forefront of advancing progressive causes (Ramachandran, 2018). India’s foreign policy for long had been preoccupied with western Europe, however, to attract more investments and spur innovations and economic growth; India has begun to tap the unexplored potential of the Nordic and Baltic regions. India’s Nordic outreach is also significant as it breaks with the past tradition of bilateral-level engagement with individual countries and also shows the Nordic states’ willingness to engage with other actors as a group, which improves their collective bargaining power (Rajiv, 2018). The discourse in the Nordic countries has also shifted towards building a strong partnership with India which becomes imperative in view of the changing global context. The Nordic countries have supported India’s candidacy for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council as well as its application for membership of the NSG. This marks a visible shift in their position and comes as recognition and acceptance of India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear actor (Pant, 2018). During this visit, Modi emphasized the role of science, technology and innovation as cornerstones for India’s diplomatic engagement. India aims to expand mutually beneficial collaboration with the Nordic states in areas like cutting-edge technologies, environmental conservation, maritime infrastructure and development, military technology and engineering products, agriculture and food processing, health and biotechnology. During Modi’s visit, India and Sweden signed a Joint Innovation Partnership to deepen the collaboration on sustainable development. The partnership provides a framework for future cooperation on cross-sectoral issues with multi-stakeholder/agency participation from both countries to jointly tackle societal challenges including innovation-driven challenges. The partnership is based on the principles of co-funding, co-development

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and co-creation, towards mutual benefits, making full use of the two sides’ complementary strengths (Sweden, Government Offices, 2018). The Second India-Nordic Summit, 2022 The second India-Nordic summit, which was to be held in 2021, was postponed due to the pandemic-induced global lockdown. The summit was later held in May 2022 at Copenhagen and was clubbed with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s bilateral trips to Denmark, France and Germany. The second Nordic summit took place amidst global efforts to steer post-pandemic economic recovery and the security crisis created by the conflict in Ukraine. The joint statement signed by India and the Nordic countries highlighted the importance of a rules-based international order, strengthening collective cooperation on global health issues, climate change and blue economy (India, MEA, 2022). India’s interactions with the Nordic countries have witnessed an upswing in recent years, with both sides finding greater alignment of interests in sectors like clean energy, innovation, education, etc. Through its Nordic diplomacy, New Delhi is also keen to step up its engagement in the Arctic region and has also unveiled a draft Arctic Policy. The region is rich in hydrocarbons, minerals and offers research and resource opportunities for climate change, energy security, maritime cooperation and environmental monitoring.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation India and Sweden have had an MoU since 1986 in space research and the two countries have been holding dialogues in the field of space technologies, ground station networks and R&D and innovations. The Swedish Institute of Space Physics (IRF) is collaborating with Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) on India’s Venus orbiter mission ‘Shukrayaan’ (The Hindu, 2020). India has begun investing significantly in science diplomacy and has taken the lead in initiatives like International Solar Alliance (ISA) and Global Innovation and Technology Alliance (GITA). Indian and Sweden have joined forces on issues of common interest such as developing smart and sustainable cities, clean technology, digitalization and smart grids. While on the Indian side, GITA is the implementing partner for smart cities and smart grids, the Swedish Innovation Agency, Vinnova

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and the Swedish Energy Agency are leading the joint call on Smart and Sustainable Cities and Smart Grids, respectively, on the Swedish side. India’s Swachh Bharat Mission (Clean India Mission) that was launched in 2014 also offers opportunity for Swedish companies to invest in clean technology projects. Sweden has taken the lead in waste water treatment and is at the forefront of global innovation for securing sustainable water supplies (Swedishcleantech.com). In 2017, Swedish Greentech start-up, Spowdi, was handpicked to participate in the India-Sweden Innovations Accelerator programme. Spowdi had developed the first-ever mobile solar-powered microirrigation system that could help small-hold farmers and contribute towards reducing carbon emissions (The Print, 2021). The two countries were at the forefront at UN Action Climate Summit 2019, forming a Leadership Group for Industry Transition (LeadIT) to decarbonize heavy industries. The initiative supported by World Economic Forum is a public–private partnership including several developed countries and corporations, aiming to expand its outreach across different geographies to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 (The Times of India, 2019). In March 2021, India and Sweden held a virtual summit to explore additional possibilities of bilateral collaboration and identify specific areas of scientific research and seek mutually beneficial partnerships. Since the launch of the Joint Innovation Partnership, Swedish funding agencies have committed more than SEK 160 million funding for joint research and innovation projects with India (Swedishscienceinnovation.blog, 2021b).

Covid-19 The two sides also signed an MoU in February 2019 for collaboration in the field of health care with major focus on strengthening public health, medical research, control of infectious diseases and for future collaborations in the new thematic areas of ‘Elderly Care’ and ‘Mental Health’ (India, MoHFW: 2019). Under the framework of this MoU, India and Sweden have announced several initiatives to address challenges in India’s healthcare sector and scale up solutions. One such initiative is the India-Sweden Healthcare Innovation Centre (HIC) set up in collaboration between the Swedish Trade Commissioner’s Office, AIIMS Delhi and AIIMS Jodhpur. The Centre aims to boost start-ups,

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funding and networking in healthcare delivery. The tripartite venture has also tied up with knowledge partners like AstraZeneca and NASSCOM to promote sustainable healthcare innovations. In 2021, this initiative called for start-up proposals on COVID-19 management (Economic Times, 2021, 17 August). It also launched an upskilling programme to equip and train doctors and paramedics. The India-Sweden HIC receives strategic guidance from Government of India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), the Government of Sweden’s Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and the Embassy of Sweden in India (Economic Times, 2021, 28 October). To accelerate digital solutions for healthcare needs in developing countries, Swedfund, Sweden’s development finance institution, committed $15 million to HealthQuad II, an innovation fund seeking to contributed with initiatives such as setting up treatment centres, facilitating the efficient movement of medical supplies, teleconsultations and fundraising for medical costs (Swedfund, 2020).

Defence Cooperation and Arms Transfers India is the world’s second-largest arms importer after Saudi Arabia and for long, has relied on Russia for its defence procurement which constitutes over 60% of its currently used weapons systems (SIPRI, 2021). However, with the shifting global order and growing bonhomie between Russia and China, India too has diversified its partnerships for military purchases with its deals with United States, France and Israel. The Modi government has set an ambitious target of achieving a turnover of $25 billion, including exports of $5 billion, in aerospace and defence goods and services by the year 2024 (Pandit, 2021). Sweden’s export policies limit the countries where it can trade with and thus the Swedish defence industry finds India, being the largest democracy in the world, a convenient partner and a lucrative market to tap (Rajagopal, 2018). Sweden and India signed an MoU on defence cooperation in 2009. The Swedish aerospace firm, Saab, has been pitching for India’s Make in India drive by offering to manufacture its advanced Gripen fighter jets in India. In 1976, India had signed the first contract with Saab for Carl-Gustaf M2 weapons system and in 2005 inked another licensing contract for M3. Saab has been helping India’s Ordnance Factory Board

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Table 10.1 Value of Swedish actual exports of military equipment to India, 2018–2020 (SEK million)

Table 10.2 Value of Swedish actual exports of military equipment to the top 10 countries, 1993–2020 (SEK million)

2018

2019

2020

789

893

558

Source Sweden, Government Offices 2021a

S.No

Recipient country

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

United States Norway Brazil Netherlands South Africa India Germany Pakistan Thailand UK

Total value 21,201 17,150 16,042 13,092 12,928 12,504 11,272 11,117 10,047 10,018

Source Sweden, Government Offices 2021a

to indigenize the product and is now planning to co-produce its nextgeneration 84 mm Carl-Gustaf M4 under the ‘Make in India’ programme (The Hindu Business Line, 2016). In 2020, India was granted 23 export licences by Sweden and was the sixth-largest country to receive Swedish military equipment such as rocket-propelled grenade ammunition and a large number of components for military equipment worth SEK 558 million (Table 10.1) (Sweden, Government Offices, 2021). India remains among the top ten countries receiving Swedish military equipment (Table 10.2) and also the thirdlargest country receiving licence for export of dual-use products such as bioreactors, electronic products and technology, medical equipment, software, sensors, etc. (Sweden, Government Offices 2021a).

Economic and Trade Relations India’s trade share with Europe has been on the rise although China and the United States are the first and second-largest trading partners of India. In 2020, the pandemic led to a decline in EU exports to and imports

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from India by 16% and 17%, respectively, compared with 2019, resulting in a trade deficit of e0.9 billion. Although the trade balance improved compared with 2019 (a deficit of e1.4 billion), it did not return to the levels of 2010 to 2018 when EU trade balance with India recorded a surplus (European Commission 2021). EU FDI in India amounted to e75.8 billion in 2019, which is significant but way below EU foreign investment stocks in China (e198.7 billion) or Brazil (e318.9 billion) (European Commission, 2021). Among EU member states, the majority of India’s trade is with Germany, the UK, France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. New Delhi’s trade with Sweden is still below one per cent. In 2021–2022, India’s registered a growth of 2.82% in its total trade with Sweden from the previous year (2020–2021) (Table 10.3). India is Sweden’s nineteenth largest export market and the third-largest trade partner after China and Japan in Asia (India, MEA, 2021). The main Swedish exports to India are communication equipment, motor vehicles, paper and pulp products, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and engineering products. The main items of Indian exports are apparels, textiles, chemical products, food products, and semi-manufactured and manufactured goods (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2018). Sweden and India signed a treaty for prevention of tax evasion in 1997, which was amended in 2013. In 2000, the two sides also concluded a bilateral investment treaty for the promotion and protection of investments. In 2008 the global economic downturn had severely hit Sweden. However, it made a rapid recovery owing to the prudent fiscal and monetary policies adopted by Anders Borg, the Swedish Finance Minister who Table 10.3 India’s Trade with Sweden, 2017–2018—2021–2022 (in million US dollars) 2017–2018 1 2 3 4 5 6

Export %Growth Imports % Growth Total Trade % Growth

771.50 1,464.47 2,235.97

2018–2019

2019–2020

2020–2021

2021–2022

792.23 2.69 1,326.85 −9.40 2,119.08 −5.23

748.42 −5.53 1,114.48 −16.01 1,862.90 −12.09

763.84 2.06 1,004.76 −9.84 1,768.60 −5.06

747.88 −2.09 1,070.57 6.55 1,818.45 2.82

Source India, Ministry of Commerce. https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/iecnt.asp

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was also elected as Europe’s best Finance Minister in both 2010 and 2011 (Sajjanhar, 2012). On 26 October 2021, India and Sweden celebrated the eighth Innovation Day, hosted by the Embassy of India in Sweden, the Sweden-India Business Council (SIBC), the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Start-Up India and India Unlimited. The online event themed ‘Accelerating India Sweden’s Green Transition’ exchanged ideas on using technology to introduce climate-friendly solutions (Siddiqui, 2021). In November 2021, both countries kickstarted a campaign called ‘Time for India’ which seeks to increase bilateral trade and investments. The campaign comprised a roadshow of Indian and Swedish delegates who travelled from Stockholm to Luleå to Göteborg to Malmö and back to Stockholm. This initiative sought to explore business opportunities and facilitate collaboration in key sectors and markets of the Indian economy.

Development Assistance The focus of Sweden’s international development cooperation has been on the following key themes: poverty reduction, democracy and human rights, environmental protection scientific cooperation, gender equality and conflict. In 1975, Sweden became the first country to meet the UN target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its allocation has remained consistently above this threshold since then (OECD, 2021). Sweden was actively involved in development issues during the period of decolonization. Being an unaligned power, Sweden did not relate its aid programme to strategic concerns of a political or a military nature (Palmlund, 1986, p. 110). India has also been an important cooperation partner for Sweden and has received development assistance in projects on family planning, health, environment and human rights. Sweden along with Norway supported the family planning programme in India during the late 1960s. In 1972, a development credit and grant agreement was signed between the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the International Development Agency (IDA), a World Bank organization and the governments of Sweden and India (Engh, 2002). However, following the 1975 Declaration of Emergency in India, SIDA withdrew its support to this India Population Project. In 1985 both countries signed an agreement on development cooperation under which Sweden agreed to give bilateral aid of SKR 350 million (approximately |500 million) per annum to India

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during 1985–1986 and 1986–1987. The aid was allocated for general import of goods and services from Sweden and for imports in the energy sector, financing local projects such as social forestry projects in Tamil Nadu, Orissa and Bihar, a groundwater project in Kerala and a drinking water scheme in Rajasthan. Sweden had been helping India for long in the health sector and financed projects like the National Malaria Eradication Programme, the National Leprosy Control Programme and the National Tuberculosis Control Programme. Executed and administered by the World Health Organisation (WHO), Swedish aid was meant for the supply of essential drugs, medical equipment, research support and programme monitoring and evaluations (India, MEA, 1985). Since 1998, the SIDA has been working in areas such as environmental protection, social development, democracy and human rights and forging new partnerships between Swedish and Indian NGOs, and with multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank. However, India’s long-standing development cooperation policy underwent dramatic policy changes in the early 2000s as India had set a minimum ceiling for incoming aid ($25 million), which drove out several smaller donors (Chaturvedi, 2012). India wanted to be perceived primarily as an aid donor and not as a recipient of foreign assistance and would only accept official aid that is untied and provided by five selected countries of the European Union (Fuchs & Vadlamannati, 2013). In 2003, at the annual budgetary announcement, Finance Minister Jaswant Singh stated: ‘A stage has come in our development where we should now, firstly, review our dependence on external donors and extend support to the national efforts of other developing countries’ (India, Ministry of Finance, 2003). India also declined humanitarian assistance from the UN and SIDA during the tsunami in 2004. Since India suspended ODA from Sweden in 2003, SIDA channelled humanitarian aid via consolidated appeals, multilateral funds and NGOs (Bynander et al., 2005). As Sweden began to phase out development cooperation with India during 2005–2009, it moved to a strategy for selective cooperation with India primarily focusing on the environment and climate sector. Sweden’s development assistance strategy for India since then has been geared towards knowledge exchange and collaboration between actors in both countries (Sweden, Government Offices, 2009). Swedish companies such as IKEA are also supporting education projects for school children in India (Sweden, Government Offices, 2018).

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Foreign Direct Investment Sweden has a long history of investments in India with Ericsson and Swedish Match doing business in the country since early twentieth century. Over the years, more than 150 Swedish companies including ABB, Volvo, Astra Zeneca, Atlas Copco, Sandvik, SKF, IKEA and H&M have established their footprints in India. The key sectors of business and investments include IT and electronics, health care and pharmaceuticals, automotive vehicles, retail consumer goods & services, etc. Swedish companies are now exploring emerging opportunities in investments in sustainable technologies in sectors like environment and energy to promote green growth. From April 2000 to March 2021, FDI inflow into India from Sweden was US $1.8 billion and amounted to 0.34% of the total FDI inflows in India (India, DPIIT). Swedish companies have established their global hubs with R&D, sales and manufacturing, etc. in India. Moreover, there is an influx of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) companies making inroads into the growing Indian retail market. The sectors that have received the largest shares of Swedish investments in India are automobile industry (33%), industrial machinery (15%), miscellaneous mechanical & engineering industries (10%), electrical equipment (7%) and metallurgical industries with (5%) (India, MEA, 2019). Volvo, ABB, Atlas Copco, Ericsson, Alfa Laval, SAAB, Autoliv, Sapa, Astra Pharmaceuticals, Electrolux, Quinn Hotels Sweden, Scania, Perstorp, H&M, IKEA, Ericsson, Spotify, Truecaller, Recipharm and Securitas are among the top investing Swedish companies. Indian IT companies such as TCS, Wipro, Infosys and L&T Infotech have also been investing in Sweden since 2000 onwards. Indian investments in Sweden are notable in industrial sectors such as bioeconomy with Aditya Birla Group’s acquisition of Domsjö Fabriker in viscose fibre, Wipro’s acquisition of Hydrauto Group AB in hydraulic cylinders and Bharat Forge in ImatraKilsta AB in automotive. Indian telecom company Altruist Technologies purchased Swedish Telecom company Teligent, HCL Technology has acquired IT operations of Volvo Trucks and Crompton Greaves acquired Emotron which develops electric motors in Helsingborg. Indian investment in Sweden is currently in the range of US$ 700–800 million. Indian pharmaceutical and biotech companies like Dr. Reddys, Biocon, Kemwell and Cadila Pharma have been collaborating with Sweden (India, MEA, 2019).

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The bilateral agreement in healthcare sector has resulted in a spate of collaborations between pharmaceutical companies in both countries, such as India’s leading pharma company Cipla has tied up with Meda, a Swedish generics manufacturer, to jointly work on clinical development, trials, registration, formulation, marketing and sales of designated generic molecules. The other Indian pharmaceutical companies like Biocon, Sun Pharma, Cadila and Kemwell have also tied up with Swedish companies (India, MEA, 2017). To keep pace with the globalizing economy and digitalization of industrial sectors, Sweden adopted its Export Strategy in 2015. Geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, rising trade protectionism and a climate of uncertainty generated after Brexit over EU’s foreign trade and cross-border investments, made it imperative to develop an integrated approach on export and investment promotion. In a fast-changing global order characterized by new players and configurations, it is pragmatic to explore emerging markets in order to retain and enhance international competitiveness. For Sweden, Asia presents a lucrative investment zone given increasing demands of higher standards of living and better welfare services (Sweden, Government Offices, 2019). Sweden has also been at the forefront of promoting sustainable production, procurement and consumption.

Cultural Relations For centuries, Sweden has been trading and importing various goods especially tea, silk, arrack and porcelain from China and India. Spices like cinnamon, cardamom, clove, pepper and saffron have been an important part of Scandinavian cuisine since the Vikings and their descendants discovered them (The Local, 2019). The history between India and Sweden could be traced to 1731 when the Swedish East India Company was founded in Gothenburg. In 1913, Rabindranath Tagore became the first non-European to be awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. Over the last century, a number of other distinguished Indian nationals/persons of Indian origin have won the Nobel Prize in different categories. In 2014, a bust of Tagore was installed in the university town of Uppsala to mark the 100 years of the award of Nobel Prize to him (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2022). In the mid-1950s, a small bronze statuette of Buddha seated on lotus was discovered from an excavation conducted on the island of Helgö, west of Stockholm. The statuette,

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popularly known as ‘Helgö Buddha’, is dated to around 1,400 years ago and is thought to be from Kashmir (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2022). There is also some similarity in the Hindi and Swedish languages, such as ‘samband’ means connection in the Swedish language and ‘sambandh’ means relation or connection in Hindi too. This vocabulary has now become a part of many business and cultural events between the two countries where the ‘India-Sweden samband’ has been emphasized (Sanand, 2020). For instance, Sweden-India ‘Startup Sambandh’ initiative has been launched by Invest India and Founders Alliance in Sweden for higher cooperation among start-ups. The online platform serves as a go-to-market guide for Swedish entrepreneurs, acquainting them with resources regarding the Indian start-up ecosystem (India, Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, 2022). Today, the growing business and trade links between India and Sweden is vital in promoting tourism and cultural exchange. Owing to burgeoning traffic between the two countries, Air India launched a direct flight between Delhi and Stockholm in 2017. India and Sweden have been facilitating international exchange and partnerships to attract international talent and contribute to global sustainable development. During the official visit of the King of Sweden to India in 2019, the Swedish Institute, a public agency, along with the Swedish embassy and KTH Royal Institute of Technology (Stockholm), in collaboration with India’s NITI Aayog, organized TEKLA workshops for Indian girls between the age of 11 and 15 to involve more young women in STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) fields. The Sweden Alumni Network India was formed in 2019 to support long-term collaboration between the two countries. The network includes more than 400 alumni who have studied in Sweden or participated in a Swedish Institute Leadership Programme (Swedish Institute, 2019). Despite the ongoing pandemic, there has been a steady increase in Indian students choosing to study in Sweden. While in 2019, 3526 students had applied for admission in Swedish educational institutions, this figure rose to 6811 (India Today, 2020). Academic Chairs on Indian studies have been established at prominent Swedish Universities like Lund, Gothenburg and Uppsala. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET) at Lund University have jointly started an initiative called ‘The South Asia Initiative’ (SAI). It provides a platform for research and analysis on the region which is mired in complex political relations and security challenges, and

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at the same has tremendous economic potential. The initiative aims to study Europe’s engagement with South Asia and with a focus on India and dynamics connected to India’s rise, and to develop Swedish expertise on the region. Similarly, the Nordic Centre in India (NCI) was established in 2001 with the objective to facilitate cooperation in research and higher education between the Nordic countries and India. The consortium comprises leading universities and research institutions in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. There are ongoing research collaborations Indian and Swedish academic institutions. Some of these include KTH (Royal Institute of Technology), Karlstad University, Uppsala University, Blekinge Institute of Technology, Linkoping University on the Swedish side and IIT Chennai, IIT Guwahati, Vellore Institute of Technology, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar and BHU Varanasi (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2022). Sweden and India have taken a number of initiatives to help both sides come together and understand each other better. The ‘Almedalen festival’, a seminar series, is organised by Uppsala University and the Indian embassy in Stockholm, to discuss sustainable solutions for cities and its communities. It aims to connect India’s urban needs, innovative spirit and entrepreneurial energy with Sweden’s ideas of sustainability and resilience, and the business models of the larger Nordic region (Embassy of India, Sweden, 2019). Sweden excels in research incubation and innovation whereas India’s advantage lies in its entrepreneurial spirit to build new technologies in the most cost-effective manner (Mehra, 2019). Similarly, India Unlimited was founded in 2013 to promote cross-cultural ties between India and Sweden. It has organized several events in Stockholm and Gothenburg showcasing the diversity of Indian cultural, economic and social life including an exhibition of works by Rabindranath Tagore and Satyajit Ray; business seminars, film festivals and ‘Namaste Stockholm’, ‘Namaste Gothenburg’ and Stockholms Kulturfestival to discover the Swedish and Indian cultures (India Unlimited).2

2 For more information, visit http://indiaunlimited.se/main/about/.

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Indian Diaspora The Indian diaspora in Sweden is estimated to be over 40,000 that includes around 35,000 Indian nationals. Most of them are professionals and around 10,000 are estimated to be working in IT sector (India, MEA, 2021). Sweden has had a long tradition of labour immigration. The general perception of immigration has, however, changed in recent years as the flows to Sweden came to be dominated by asylum seekers. In 2008, demographic challenges in the labour market forced the government to rethink its strategy on immigration. Sweden, therefore, adopted a new immigration policy that sought to improve opportunities for immigrants with skilled labour to get residence in Sweden. In order to promote cross-border mobility and tap the global market, from 2008 onwards Sweden allowed recruitment of labour from a third country if certain fundamental conditions, such as, for example, terms of employment, were fulfilled (Duttagupta & Chawla, 2008). India thus could immensely benefit from this the new immigration policy, providing the skillsets and talent especially in engineering and manufacturing sectors. In 2012, India and Sweden signed a social security agreement that allows Indians working in Sweden, and vice versa, to pay pension fees in two countries (The Local, 2012). The move provided big relief to Indian workers in Sweden by avoiding double taxation. Till December 2017, 16,891 work permits were granted to Indians and number of Indian travellers to Sweden for business and leisure has also gone up significantly in recent years (India, MEA, 2019). In recent years, Sweden has become an attractive destination for Indian students. At present, more than 2,000 Indian students are studying in different Swedish institutions. However, as student visas are not coterminous with the duration of courses, they face problems in getting visa extension. This especially becomes a huge burden for those students who have taken a bank loan to pursue studies.

Contestation and Cooperation India and Sweden have come a long way though the shadow of Bofors scandal keeps lurking. Days before the official visit of former president Pranab Mukherjee to Sweden in 2015, the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN) had published an interview where Mukherjee had made a reference to Bofors issue. The newspaper alleged that the MEA had

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requested it to retract that statement as the controversy might affect the state visit (Ramachandran, 2015). The two countries had a minor diplomatic row in 2012 when Sweden sought clarification from India on reports of Swedish weapons purchased by India including a Carl-Gustaf M3 anti-tank rifle, being found in Myanmar (Hindustan Times , 2012). This caused a serious violation of the EU arms embargo against Myanmar since 1996. In 2019 it came to light that Pakistan had deployed Erieye, an airborne early warning and control system procured from Saab, a Swedish defence company. India protested by lodging an official complaint with the Swedish government at that time (Basu, 2019). On another occasion, Saab lost out on a multi-billion-dollar deal with India for a very shortrange air defence missile system. It alleged that India favoured Russian firm Rosoboronexport (Philip, 2019). Saab’s AT4 anti-armour weapon has been selected by the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force through a competitive process (The Hindu, 2022). Kashmir Just before the state visit of Swedish King Carl XVI Gustaf to India in December 2019, Sweden had urged the Indian government to lift all restrictions placed in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and involve Kashmiris in the political solution of the long-standing dispute (Haidar, 2019). In response to criticism over human rights violations in Kashmir, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar told his Swedish counterpart Ann Linde that the right to life is the most basic human right (Roy, 2019). Swedish armed forces have been a part of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) since its inception in 1949. But following the 1972 Simla Agreement when India rejected the role of this UN mission, Sweden has maintained a delicate balance and never pushed India on the matter. On the abrogation of Article 370, Stockholm chose to follow the EU stance that India and Pakistan should deal with the matter on a bilateral basis. Issues like human rights, tolerance, minority issues, gender equality are key to Sweden’s feminist foreign policy. Therefore, there was a discomfort between the two sides when the former Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström had tweeted about the situation being ‘worrying’ in J&K (Wallström, 2019).

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Human Rights Sweden and other Nordic nations have a long history of challenging the human rights status quo and pushing new norms in international relations (Ingebritsen, 2006). It became the first country in 1766 to introduce freedom of the press and was also the first to snap bilateral relations with South Africa during the apartheid regime (Carlson-Rainer, 2017: 83). There have been 50 resolutions on various topics related to human rights in the UN General Assembly from 2015 to 2020. The voting records show that India and Sweden voted the same way on 15 of these resolutions. Both countries supported resolutions on: extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the right to food; the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation; the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and strengthening the role of UN in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization (Tjäder, 2022: 10). In 2021, a report released by Sweden-based Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute described India as an ‘electoral autocracy’ (Biswas, 2021). Sweden and India have consistently expressed an interest in cooperating more in multilateral institutions on human rights issues but their approach differs. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar recently told the Human Rights Council that ‘gaps in the implementation of human rights should be addressed in a fair and just manner, with objectivity, non-selectivity, transparency and with due respect to the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and national sovereignty’ (India, MEA 2021a). In India, there is a view that human rights can be realized within the framework of national legislation while Sweden has been a staunch advocate for international cooperation on human rights and views the issue as an international concern.

Prospects New Delhi and Stockholm have had a long roller-coaster relationship and over the years, there has been greater strategic convergence specially in the fields of green technologies, renewable energy, smart infrastructure, health care and defence. The partnership has witnessed a sharp upswing in the last few years with six interactions at Head of State/Head of Government between 2015 and 2021 (India, MEA, 2021).

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While there is significant political will to boost the Indo-Swedish climate action partnership, Swedish stakeholders struggle to understand India’s contemporary policy choices and preferences on climate cooperation (Nordenstam, 2021: 20). India’s upcoming G20 presidency in 2023 and Sweden’s EU presidency in 2022 can be leveraged to push for an accelerated clean energy transition globally. Sweden is also going to be the ISA member in 2022 and as both the EU and the European Investment Board have signed cooperation deals with ISA, New Delhi could use this opportunity to draw more supporters for his global climate diplomacy and shape a joint agenda on climate change. Innovation is at the core of the India-Swedish partnership and there lies ample scope for exchange of ideas, technology, trade and investment. The two countries are also exploring avenues to intensify collaborative efforts on sustainable development and both the countries were instrumental behind establishing LeadIT (the Leadership Group on Industry Transition) at the UN Climate Summit in 2019. India-Sweden relations also assume significance from the point of view of accelerating cooperation between India and the Nordic region and also to cement India-EU ties. The COVID-19 pandemic has further opened up possibilities for bilateral cooperation and the two sides strongly believe in finding technology-driven solutions to such global challenges. The Sweden-India Business Council (SBIC) has been coordinating with Indian NGOs and corporate community to help with medical supplies. The Swedish Chamber of Commerce and Industries (SCCI) has launched an initiative called Kraftsamla (which means ‘to join forces’ in Swedish), to coordinate local efforts supporting lives and livelihoods with outreach to employees, families and communities. Additionally, the chamber has been assisting migrant workers as well as women and children on issues such as mental health and trauma counselling (Jaisinghani, 2021). According to the Business Climate Survey 2021–22, despite the shocks and uncertainty caused by the pandemic, India and Sweden are making rapid strides in business and investment and Swedish companies have invested about US $2 billion in the period 2015–2020. Investments of another USD one billion are likely to follow over the next two years (Swedish Chamber of Commerce India, 2021). The survey3 provides an 3 The survey is undertaken every year by SCCI, along with the Embassy of Sweden in India, the Consulate General of Sweden in Mumbai, and Business Sweden.

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assessment of business climate in India and seeks to expand opportunities for Swedish investments. India and Sweden find themselves at a juncture where there is a growing strategic significance of their bilateral relationship and ample scope to provide leadership at global level. COVID-19 provides a new trajectory to this strategic cooperation on a number of well-founded mutually beneficial priorities while expanding the scope and extent of ‘India-Nordic’ strategic engagement and complimenting the overarching architecture of India–EU partnership (Bhattacharya, 2021). India has so far been slow to pick up and design a regional policy with respect to the Nordics. Given the Nordic and the wider Baltic Sea regions’ proximity to Arctics as well as Russia, India can more meaningfully invest in improving its relations with the countries in these regions (Aspengren, 2018). While there remain limited opportunities for Stockholm to position itself as a strategic partner for India, there lies a considerable scope to augment complementarities in research, development and innovation. For India, enhanced engagement with Sweden and Nordic region as a whole can be helpful in drawing lessons in economic development, good governance, social welfare structure and strengthening democratic credentials.

Conclusion Recent geopolitical developments such as an expanding Chinese presence in Europe, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and deepening Russia-China ties have pushed various European powers towards the Indo-Pacific as they seek newer partners, especially in Asia. Even during the pandemic, India remained proactive in engaging virtually with ‘like-minded’ nations and in a departure from its traditional policy of focusing on major European powers, New Delhi has begun engaging with smaller nations, especially from the Nordic and Baltic regions. Addressing the First IndiaNordic-Baltic Conclave, Foreign Minister Jaishankar stated that India will work with Nordic-Baltic countries for a greener, smarter, digital and innovation-led future (India, MEA, 2020). India’s engagement with the Nordic-Baltic region thus holds significance in the emerging new diplomatic dynamics in the Eurasia region (Pandeya, 2020). Historically, India and Sweden have been working together on issues such as decolonization, anti-apartheid movement, promoting development partnerships, environment, peacekeeping and disarmament. The changing international environment has made it imperative for India to

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leverage its soft power. Over the past few years, India has significantly invested in its public diplomacy overtures through engaging business communities, enhancing academic and cultural exchange and promoting intellectual dialogue. At the virtual India-Sweden summit recently held in March 2021, the two countries reiterated their strong commitment to multilateralism and peace and security. India and Sweden emphasized the need to continue the strategic dialogue and reaffirmed their commitment for a deepened engagement on issues of mutual strategic interests, including cyber security, climate change, science and technology and innovation, trade and investment. Both countries have had a long history of partnership and cooperation and despite the slowdown caused by the pandemic, Swedish companies are upbeat about the prospects of investments. In wake of uncertainty over the future world order, it is desirable that India and Sweden make a more nuanced assessment of each other’s ambitions and aspirations and come together to strengthen existing linkages. By boosting economic ties and collaborations in technology and innovation, both countries can mutually benefit in sustainable development.

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CHAPTER 11

India and Austria Rajendra K. Jain

Introduction The history of Indo-Austrian relations over the past 200 years is a chronicle of personal encounters and quest for trade for Indian spices and precious stones.1 Austria was not among the generally known European

1 Between 1715 and 1723, 34 ships, financed by different European international syndicates, sailed from Ostend in the Austrian Netherlands to the Malabar or Coromandel coast, Surat and Bengal. With mutual rivalry adversely affecting profits, the Austrian Emperor chartered the Ostend East-India Company in December 1722, which possessed factories at Cabelon on the Coromandel coast and Banquibazar in Bengal. The company continued its India operations in India until the middle of the eighteenth century.

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_11

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colonial powers.2 A number of Austrian missionaries, researchers3 and adventurers visited India and sought to forge links in their own ways. Austria Indologists contributed to the rediscovery of India’s cultural heritage. Political contacts between Austria and India began towards the end of the nineteenth century when the then Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand came on a three-month visit in 1893 to India and travelled overland from Bombay to Calcutta (India, National Archives, 1893). At the end of the nineteenth century, Austrian economic and consular presence in India had become quite significant. Lloyd Triestino4 had settled in India and Austrian diplomacy was represented by three professional offices. At that time, about 4,000 Austrians lived in the country (Peterlik, 1995: 2). In the interwar period, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel stayed in Vienna for some time. Subhash Chandra Bose initially arrived in Vienna for medical treatment, but lived for much of his time between 1933 and 1938 in Vienna, and Austria in general and married Emilie Schenkl in 1937 (see Pelinka, 2017: 81–108). He established the India-Central European Society in Vienna for the promotion of commercial and cultural relations between India and Central Europe. Before the end of the Second World War, as ‘the former capital of a continental power with no tradition of colonialism, Vienna ‘hardly had much in common’ in India. Austria had ‘no real interest’ in India (Pelinka, 2017: 83).

2 For a couple of years in the eighteenth century, the Austrian flag flew over Indian territory. Unable to secure Emperor Joseph II’s support for his venture to establish new colonies in India, William Bolt, a civil servant of the Austrian-East India Company, raised private capital for his enterprise. In 1777, along with 20 soldiers, he established trading posts in India (Malabar coast, 1778) and Nicobar Islands (1778–1782). However, his attempt to colonize the islands and establish tobacco plantations failed in a couple of years and the ‘colony’ ceased to exist (India, Embassy in Austria, 2022; Singh, 1999). 3 For instance, Father Josef Tieffenthaler became known as the ‘Father of Modern Indian Geography’. Not only was he a cartographer (the first exact cartographic recording of the middle Ganges river including its confluents is attributed to him) but also an internationally renowned Sanskrit scholar and taught at the Jesuit College in Agra (1740– 1770) (Austria, Embassy in India, 2022). 4 It was originally founded as an insurance company in 1833 called Österreichischer Lloyd. In 1836, the company went into shipping and became one of the world’s biggest shipping companies which managed most of Austria-Hungary’s overseas trade and passenger travel until 1918.

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There were 2,186 Germans and Austrians living in British India in late August 1940. A number of Austrians were interned in British India during the Second World War. Most of them were employees of foreign multinational enterprises (Lubinski et al., 2018: 3).

Nehru and Austria Prior to the Second World War Nehru, who had first visited pre-war Vienna in 1909 with his uncles, described it as ‘charming and graceful, full of beauty and historical associations’. It was ‘the home of music of the gentler variety, of waltzes and comic operas and songs’. The Viennese possessed ‘a peculiar and very happy mixture’ of the Germans and the Italians. They had somehow managed ‘to get many of the good qualities of both, and life seem to flow, at the top at least, with a charming grace’ (Nehru, 1935: 783). Nehru’s fondness for Vienna was evident when he described it as ‘a very beautiful place’ and ‘the home of music’. The Viennese were delightful people but their country was unfortunately having ‘a terrible time at present’ (Nehru, 1933: 501). The First World War had, however, hit Austria very badly. Since then, it had ‘gone down and gasped for breath’; it was leading ‘a precarious life in the shadow of an ever-impending tragedy’ (Nehru, 1935: 783) after Chancellor Englebert Dollfuss had suspended parliamentary government in March 1933. Prior to Independence, Nehru occasionally wrote about Austria. In 1926, for example, he considered Austria to be ‘an attractive country’ for industrial training and a cheap place to live in. He expressed the desire that more Indian students could take advantage of these opportunities (Nehru, 1926: 250). Countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland Austria and the Balkan States, he felt, could be crushed easily by any one great power. They, however, retain their independence because of the rivalry of others (Nehru, 1931: 557). Nehru was depressed by the detailed account of the Austrian bloodshed in early 1934. He was pained to see what ‘an awful and bloody place’ the world had become and how barbarous had man been transformed into when he wanted to protect his vested interests (Nehru, 1934: 243). A month after Germany’s annexation of Austria on 13 March 1938, one had witnessed what ‘a brutal and unscrupulous fascism’ could do (Nehru,

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1938a: 739). Austria, like Spain, was an example of ‘the blurry weaknesses of the new order of unabashed and brutal gangsterism’ which fascism sought to impose upon the world (Nehru, 1938b: 741). When he was asked in Paris what steps India took against the Anschluss , Nehru replied that Indians could not take ‘any effective steps’ though there were many demonstrations. They did not have ‘any effective means’ to help Austria. Foreign affairs were not in India’s hands; it could only express its opinions (Nehru, 1938c: 22). Britain’s policy of appeasement had facilitated Hitler’s annexation of Austria (Nehru, 1938d: 181; 1939a: 231). When Chamberlain publicly stated that he would not intervene in Austria, it was an invitation to Hitler to march in (Nehru, 1939b: 259) and crush democracy (Nehru, 1940: 330).

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Indian Military Mission in Berlin acted as the Liaison organization between the Government of India and the Allied Control Council in Germany. It had two key functions: to safeguard the interests of Indian nationals in Germany and Austria and to maintain ‘a watching brief’ on the military, political, economic and industrial situation in the two countries (Nehru, 1948: 534). The second Allied Control Agreement (1946) permitted Austria to establish diplomatic relations with United Nations Member States without restriction. Diplomatic relations with India, a UN member since 1945, were established in May 1949 at Legation level by Jawaharlal Nehru and Austrian Chancellor Leopold Figl. Dhirajlal Desai, the Minister in Switzerland, was concurrently appointed as the new Minister in Vienna because of ‘the imperative need for economy in expenditure’ (Nehru, 1952a: col. 356). Austria had set up a Consulate in Calcutta and Madras (Chennai) in 1953 followed by one in Bombay next year. In 1949, an Austrian Legation was set up in Delhi and Baron Carl Pereira was appointed as its Charge d’Affaires on 25 December 1949 (TOI, 1949b: 9). His term was rather short as he was killed in an air crash at Pathankot. He was succeeded by Kurt H. J. Enderl in November 1950. Arthur Lall was appointed as the first resident Indian Ambassador to Austria on the recommendation of Homi J. Bhabha, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, since owing to his prior experience in atomic energy

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matters in the United States, he would be useful in dealing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (Nehru, 1959: 328). He presented his credentials in June 1959.

Austrian Peace Treaty After the Second World War, Austria had been divided into four zones of military occupation—American, British, French and Soviet. In January 1947, the provisional Indian Government officially stated that it would not send a delegation to the conference on the Austrian peace treaty since it did not wish to express its views on either the German or Austrian problem, but reserved the right to do so at a later date (TOI, 1947a: 7). Two months later, the Times of India editorially commented that there were two contrary viewpoints regarding Austria before the Four Powers’ Foreign Ministers, viz. reparations and frontiers. On both these points, the Soviet Union was diametrically opposed to the three Western Powers. It regarded the claims by Yugoslavia ‘on specious grounds’ sections of Styria and Carinthia from ‘an Austria already small enough’. These issues, however, failed in comparison with the formidable problems of Germany (TOI, 1947b: 4). Initially, Nehru was reluctant to enmesh himself directly in European questions such as the question of Austrian independence even though he expressed his full sympathy for the cause of the Austrians. On 11 July 1952, Clemens Wildner, Head of the Political Section in Austrian Foreign Ministry, met Nehru and pleaded for Indian support and suggested that India should sponsor some resolution in the United Nations. Austria, Nehru replied, was something much more than ‘a small country of Europe’. India, he added, was greatly interested in Austria functioning as ‘an independent and sovereign country’. Austria, he felt, had unfortunately got entangled in the conflict among the Great Powers and was ‘suffering’ as a result. The Austrian question was no longer considered by the Great Powers on merit but as a part of the international tug of-of-war for position. New Delhi, he added, ‘did not interfere in Europe’. It would, in fact, be ‘unusual’ for India to take a leading part in the European question. If New Delhi took the initiative and sponsored a resolution in the United Nations on Austria, he added, it would ‘undoubtedly take such leading part in indirectly aligning itself with a particular group of nations. However, in case any matter came up before the United Nations it would give its opinion and vote on merits. He concluded: ‘Whatever opportunity offered itself in the United Nations or

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elsewhere, we shall gladly support the cause of Austria’s independence and sovereignty. If any diplomatic activity of ours can help in this, we are prepared to consider it’ (Nehru, 1952b: 585–587). A month later, Charge d’Affaires Kurt H. Ender asked Nehru if the Indian Charge d’Affaires or the next Ambassador to Moscow could informally raise this question with the Soviet Government as there was some indication of a possible favourable response from the USSR. The question of Austria, Nehru responded, was linked up with the ‘larger issues in Europe’, especially that of Germany and that there was little hope of any solution until there was some improvement in the international situation. He felt that as long as there was fear of war in Europe, each major power would like to hold on to what it had gotten for strategic or other reasons. As a result, logic and reason on merit would not come into consideration (Nehru, 1952c: 667). New Delhi, he added, would not ‘normally’ approach the Soviet Union since it did not interfere with European matters, and it would not take any initiative unless there was some definite hope of result. However, it might be possible ‘quite informally and almost incidentally’ to mention this matter at Moscow, ‘provided circumstances appear favourable’ (emphasis added). He assured Ender that when the new Ambassador, K.P.S. Menon, was in Moscow and there was ‘some improvement’ in the situation, he ‘might make some informal reference in the course of talks’, but this would have to be ‘left to his judgement as to how and when this should be done, if at all’. He pointed out that if Austria raised the question in the United Nations, it would become ‘much more difficult for us to raise the question in Moscow’ (Nehru, 1952c: 668). Nehru continued to be concerned about Austria—‘this small and unfortunate country’—which had suffered greatly because of the political rivalries among the Great Powers. By itself, ‘it means little to either, but, as a possible base for action in case of war, it has importance’ (Nehru, 1953: 546–547). On 20 June, Foreign Minister Karl Gruber met Nehru at Bürgenstock near Lucerne, Switzerland where the Indian prime minister had arrived for a conference of Indian envoys in Europe and the United States. K.P.S. Menon, then Indian Ambassador in Moscow, was also present at the meeting. Gruber requested Nehru to sound out Soviet leaders for an early termination of Austrian occupation and for the restoration of Austria’s independence as a neutral state and its determination to steer clear of military entanglements with the West (Gehler, 2005: 108–109; Stourzh,

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1980: 178; Vivekanandan, 2016: 148). At that time a paper which was endorsed by Bruno Kreisky, then State Secretary in the Austrian Foreign Office, had been presented by the Austrians to the Indians in which Gruber and Kreisky let the Indian Government know that a militarily neutralized Austria might, jointly with Switzerland, form a zone that would keep the important position of the Alps out of the reach of military considerations (Stourzh, 1980: 81f, 87). K.P.S. Menon subsequently met Foreign Minister V. Molotov twice with personal messages from Nehru and put forward the idea of Austrian neutrality as the way to a treaty (Kreisky, 1957). Moscow’s initial response was sceptical. Molotov stated that a neutrality declaration would be useful, but not enough since declarations are ‘made today and revoked tomorrow’ (Kreisky, 1957, cited in Barker, 1973: 191; Stourzh & Mueller, 2018: 203). The reaction of Soviet leaders was one of ‘dragging their feet’ (Gehler, 2005: 109). After ten years of opposition to an Austrian treaty, Moscow eventually agreed to sign the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May after the Austrians leaders agreed to maintain a neutral status similar to that of Switzerland. ending the occupation and restoring Austrian independence. To Indian commentators, Moscow’s willingness to sign a peace treaty in April 1955 was to a certain extent the result of its near-complete efforts to establish the Warsaw Pact (on 15 May 1955) It signified that a withdrawal from Austria need not interfere with its strategy of ‘an east European shock absorber against an attack from the West’ (Mulgaonkar, 1955: 6). The treaty was facilitated by ‘a sudden and encouraging reversal of attitude’ by the Soviet Union, the Times of India editorially opined, by abandoning its insistence on the settlement of the German problem before the Austrian treaty could be signed. This, it felt, had been replaced by apprehensions that German rearmament could lead to the absorption of Austria and greater German influence in the Balkans (TOI, editorial, 1956a, 16 April: 6). The Austrian peace treaty removed ‘one troublesome question from the long list of the problems of Europe’ (Nehru, 1955b: 183). India’s constructive role in influencing the Soviet decision to include the Austrian peace treaty earned Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru great sympathy of the Austrians, especially Bruno Kreisky. Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr acknowledged his gratitude during his visit to India in March 1981, when he appreciated Nehru’s efforts and thanked Ambassador Menon who was ‘actively involved in that initiative’ (Pahr, 1981: 74–75). Kreisky later

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reminisced: ‘Now... in a retrospective way I have the impression that Nehru made a tremendous contribution for us in being ready to accept his role as a mediator because in doing so he confronted the Soviets for the first time with our idea of neutrality’ (Kreisky cited in Vivekandan, 2016: 149).

Nehru Visit, 1955 Two years before Nehru’s visit, Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan arrived in Austria in July 1953 for a State visit. Nehru arrived in Vienna on 26 June 1955 for a two-day state visit accompanied by his daughter Indira. Austrian President Theodor Körner described Nehru in glowing terms as a statesman who was ‘continuously giving new impulses to world politics by fruitful ideas and one who, above all, is a tireless fighter for freedom and understanding among nations’ (TOI, 1977: 7). The next day Chancellor Julius Raab sought Nehru’s help in securing admission to the United Nations. He assured his host during his visit to Moscow that Austria was one of the countries whose admission the Soviets would support. India, he added, would be glad to support Austria’s admission to the UN. Vienna, Raab added, would incorporate the concept of neutrality in its constitution after foreign troops left Austria. Austria, Nehru responded, could contribute a great deal to peace by creating a good atmosphere in Europe (Nehru, 1955a: 239–241). Austria was admitted to the UN on 14 December 1955 by the UN General Assembly. Three years later Foreign Minister Leopold Figl visited Delhi from 4 to 10 March 1958.

The 1960s and 1970s Foreign Minister Kreisky visited India from 8 to 12 November 1963. The two countries had a similar approach towards many international issues. In this context, they welcomed the conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty as an important step towards the relaxation of international tensions, and towards further agreements on questions connected with the problem of disarmament (India, MEA, 1963b: 249). The visit, the MEA stated, had enhanced the interest of the Austrian Government in strengthening economic ties with India and had brought about a better appreciation of India’s democratic system and the problems faced by it on account of the Chinese aggression (India, MEA, 1964: 52).

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Other visits during the 1960s were those of Finance Minister R. Kamitz (January 1960), Minister of Law A.K. Sen (1962–1963) and Minister of State for External Affairs Lakshmi N. Menon (23–26 June 1965). The Austrian policy of ‘permanent neutrality’ (and non-membership of any military alliance in refusal to permit the establishment of military bases on its soil) and India’s policy of non-alignment facilitated closer cooperation on a number of international issues. Austria, in fact, has been a permanent invitee (with observer status) at the non-aligned summit meetings since the Lusaka summit in 1970.

The Bangladesh Crisis, 1971 Austria was one of the six countries Indira Gandhi visited in October 1971 as a reciprocal visit—the second visit by an Indian Prime Minister sixteen years after her father had visited Austria. She urged both publicly and privately for the immediate need for a political settlement to the Bangladesh crisis. She highlighted the burden of looking after an influx which was the size of Austria’s own population and the consequent ‘very real threat’ to Indian security and stability (Gandhi, 1971a: 733). The situation had arisen because the legitimate grievances of the people of East Bengal had not been attended to in time (Gandhi, 1971b: 739). Chancellor Kreisky publicly drew a rather cautious line towards the Bangladesh crisis partly because it was fielding a candidate for the office of UN Secretary-General and did not wish to alienate the support of Pakistan and the Muslim bloc countries. Privately, in an hour-long conversation with Indira Gandhi, Kreisky stated that a solution had to be found in accordance with the wishes of the people. When Mrs Gandhi remarked that the democratic process in the area would be in peril unless a satisfactory solution was found, the Austrian President asked if this would be before or after Pakistan started a war. The Chancellor was sympathetic to India’s point of view and acknowledged that the problem had been created by Pakistan (Singh, 1971: 1). On 28 October, Kreisky acknowledged that his capacity to see ‘all aspects’ of the problem was limited. Making remarks in his capacity as Chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party, he stated that the situation in Bangladesh was ‘complicated’ and ‘serious’ and that there was a danger of the breach of peace. War, however, he added, ‘would not solve the problem’. There was not much that Austria could do since it was ‘small and

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the problem was too far away from it, not in the geographical sense but in the sense of being able to comprehend it’. The refugee problem, he maintained, could only be solved through international effort, not bilaterally. He said he had received a letter from President Yahya Khan which constituted ‘controversial presentation of the problem’ (TOI, 1971: 1 and 11).

Vajpayee’s Visit, 1978 Kreisky was dismayed by Indira Gandhi’s declaration of Emergency in June 1975 and imprisonment of Jayaprakash Narayan—the founder of the Indian socialist movement. However, the Chancellor refrained from any public criticism. He channelled his critical responses through the Socialist International. After the arrest of George Fernandes, Chairman of the Indian Socialist Party, in June 1976 he addressed several joint telegrams (along with Olof Palme and Willy Brandt) to Indira Gandhi (Vivekanandan, 2016: 149–151). A year after the Janata Party came to power in March 1977, Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Austria in May 1978. Austria’s policy of ‘active neutrality’, he remarked, had made it a bridge between the two power blocs (Vajpayee, 1978a). Indo-Austrian relations had an ‘unblemished and happy record’ (Vajpayee, 1978b). India, he told newsmen, could ‘never forget’ that during the dark days of the Emergency, Kreisky had raised his voice against repression in India and extended his moral support to those who were fighting for the restoration of fundamental freedoms (Vajpayee, 1978c). He praised the heritage of Vienna and Austria as ‘the quintessence of Europe’s glorious traditions in art and literature’. As the ‘crucible of Europe’, it had maintained an identity which had gained international recognition. He assured the hosts that the Janata Party’s victory at the March 1977 elections was ‘a triumph of democratic values over authoritarianism’; the fundamental freedoms had been restored (Vajpayee, 1978c: 205). Foreign Minister Pahr urged an increase in trade and an intensification of industrial relations as well as science and technology. He urged a more frequent exchange of official visits and those of businessmen, teachers and journalists (Phar, 1978).

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New International Economic Order Bruno Kreisky—often called ‘the poor man’s Willy Brandt’ (Singh, 1970: 8)—was among the earliest Western statesman to focus on the imbalance in iniquities in the international economic system. Along with Chancellor Willy Brandt of Germany and Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden, he was part of the Social Democratic trio who were generally perceived to take a liberal and progressive outlook towards developing countries. Thus, in 1958 Kreisky took the initiative of launching a campaign to bridge the gap between the rich, developed and poor developing countries. Four years later, he organized an international Conference for Economic Cooperation and Partnership in Salzburg and Vienna. Attended by 36 developed and developing countries. The conference adopted a Declaration of Cooperation for the Furthering of Economic Development, which endorsed Kreisky’s idea of a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the South. The first one led to the UN Declaration of the First Development Decade. In their quest to obtain a legal commitment from the developed countries to certain economic rights and duties of States to foster economic development of all countries, the developing countries pushed for the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States by the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1974. Five European countries and the United States voted against its adoption while Austria was among the ten countries which was among the dissenters and abstainers. During the Third General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) held in New Delhi in 1980, Chancellor Kreisky give a much talked about address on cooperation with Third World countries. Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Vienna twice in 1980 to participate in preparatory meetings in the context of the proposed mini-Summit meeting on international economic cooperation. Bilateral talks also took place during the visit. Rao appreciated the ‘leading role’ being played by Austria in the context of the North-South dialogue under Chancellor Kreisky. However, the much talked about North-South dialogue had ‘so far produced little more than rhetoric’ (Rao, 1981: 73). Austria expressed its willingness to participate in the creation of a NIEO that granted a just share of benefits to poor countries (Pahr, 1981: 74). Willy Brandt, World Bank President Robert S. McNamara as well as the leaders of Austria, Mexico and Canada convened a Heads

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of Government meeting in Cancun in October 1981 to persuade developed countries to define the priorities and take the first steps on the agenda of North-South cooperation. At the conference, Sweden, Austria and Canada were willing to go to some extent in implementing the Brandt Report. The conference’s prescription for fostering development in the South was the adoption of free market principles by the developing countries and the opening up of their economies to global competition. In June 1983, Chancellor Fred Sinowatz extended support to enhance economic cooperation with the Third World and reform of North-South relations. It was imperative, he stated, to seek ways to bridge the gap between industrialized countries and ‘the nations of the third and fourth worlds’. In the long run, he added, without such a compromise, security and prosperity could not be ensured in the industrialized countries either (Sinowatz, 1983b: 9). Next year, the Austrian Chancellor proposed twostage global economic negotiations, the first limited to specific financial and monetary matters, the other on the comprehensive demand for a New International Economic Order (TOI, 1984: 8). Permanent Euroneutrals like Austria were ‘entrenched in the opposite camp of the industrialized, rich developed countries’ to which demands of the South were addressed regarding the NIEO. The European neutrals also frequently voted with the West on colonial issues in the UN General Assembly (Neuhold, 1979: 302).

The 1980s and the 1990s A few days after Indira Gandhi won an overwhelming victory in the January 1980 elections, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky visited India to address the third UNIDO conference and hold bilateral meetings. On this occasion, the Indian prime minister recalled the Chancellor’s acquaintance and friendship with Nehru since the Conference against Imperialism in Brussels in 1927. It was natural, she added, for Austria located as it was in Central Europe with its ‘sad experience’ of Nazi domination followed by conflicts of the post-war era to assume ‘the position of an alert and positive neutrality’ (Gandhi, 1980: 1). As ‘a permanent neutral country’, Kreisky responded, Austria’s views and interests coincided with those of the non-aligned countries (Kreisky, 1980: 2). There were several meetings between the Indian and Austrian foreign ministers in the early 1980s. In the course of a preparatory meeting for the 1981 North-South Summit Conference, Foreign Minister Rao was

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in Vienna in November, where bilateral talks with Foreign Minister Pahr also took place. In May 1982, Pahr made a stopover in New Delhi. The two Foreign Ministers met again in September 1982 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The recession in the early 1980s led to the defeat of the Austrian Socialist Party in the 1983 elections and the resignation of Kreisky— ‘the longest serving West European statesman’. He had, the Times of India editorially remarked, had guided the fortunes of the small Central European country with such ‘remarkable skill’ that it was respected by both the East and the West (TOI, editorial, 1983: 8).Sinowatz, the new Chancellor, filled the shoes of Kreisky well—‘Austria’s towering leader for 13 years and acknowledged elder statesman of Europe’. He spoke of Indo-Austrian political relations being ‘extremely cordial’, but economic relations were far below their potential (Sinowatz, 1983a: 9). Kreisky was awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Prize for International Understanding in 1983. Accompanied by four Ministers, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Austria for the second time from 17 to 22 June 1983 as part of a fivenation European trip to enhance economic links. Much of her time was spent in explaining the situation in Punjab and Assam; these two issues dogged her at every press conference (Sharma, 1983: 8). In Austria, she inaugurated the Indo-West European Dialogue Congress in Alpbach (Molden, 1983). The two leaders also met in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly when Sinowatz took up Mrs. Gandhi’s invitation to world leaders to attend an informal summit in New York on important political and economic issues. Indira Gandhi and Sinowatz met for the third time in a year in New Delhi when the Austrian Chancellor was in India from 24 to 30 March 1984. Despite apparent differences between the two countries—India being non-aligned and Asian, while Austria was neutral and European, one a developed and the latter a developing country—the two countries ‘think similarly on disarmament and détente, on strategies of international development and global negotiations’. She appreciated Austria’s willingness to increase the size of IDA and to promote more constructive North-South cooperation (Gandhi, 1984: 90–91). After Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, her son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, sought to ‘save’ the country from destabilization since his mother’s ‘strong centralization efforts triggered centrifugal forces, which led to large-scale unrest, protests and strikes’, particularly in

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the states of Punjab, Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Austria, MFA, 1984: 49). Vice-Chancellor Steger visited India in 1985 when he opened the first session of the India-Austrian Mixed Commission, whose establishment had been agreed upon by an exchange of notes on 4 February 1983. The first Joint Commission identified a number of possibilities for expanding mutual warning traffic and cooperation, especially in the electricity, steel production and mining sectors (Austria, MFA, 1983: 402).

The 1990s The year 1990 saw the visit of Foreign Minister Alois Mock (February 1990), Vice-President of the Federal Council Herbert Schambeck (November 1990) and the third meeting of the India-Austrian Joint Commission was held in April 1990. Indo-Austrian relations entered ‘a new, dynamic phase’ with India’s policy of liberalization launched in 1991 (Peterlik, 1995: 2). The assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 17 May 1991 had led to the loss of ‘an internationally respected figure who had had an integrative effect at domestic level’. The domestic political situation, according to the Austrian MFA, remained stable despite ‘gains by the Hindu fundamentalist BJP’, which is now the second strongest party at the federal level and held an absolute majority in India’s largest state (Austria, MFA, 1991: 231). Major visits during 1995 included those by Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Schallenberg (January 1995), Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee (11–13 July 1995) and a parliamentary delegation led by Lok Sabha Speaker Shivraj V. Patil.

1998 Nuclear Tests Austria was critical of the 1998 nuclear tests by India, which, the Austrian MFA stated, had received ‘unanimous international condemnation’. These tests adversely affected its efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and had ‘a negative effect’ on India-Chinese relations, which were already burdened by unresolved territorial questions (Austria, MFA, 1998: 90). As a member of the EU Troika, Austria played ‘a central role in formulating and representing’ the position of the European Union towards the nuclear tests (Austria, MFA, 1998: 150).

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‘Undoubtedly, behind the commitment to symbols of power’, the New Delhi correspondent of Die Presse wrote, ‘lies the humiliation of a country that 50 years ago broke new ground and got stuck in the swamp of poverty’ (Imhasly, 1998a). Vajpayee’s government, he wrote two days later, might need that support when global sanctions start to hurt, especially as restrictions on financial transfers become more stringent (Imhasly, 1998b).

The First Presidential Visit, 1999 Fifty years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, President K.R. Narayanan was the first head of state to visit Austria in November 1999. The visit led to the signing of an agreement on promotion and protection of investments. The agreement—one of the first such agreements that Austria had signed with an Asian country—was expected to enhance mutual flow of investment, technology, trade and services between the two countries. The visit also led to the signing of the long-stalled convention (which had been under discussion since 1989) and a protocol on the avoidance of double taxation5 and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to income.6 The Indian President described Austria as ‘a strategic link’ for India in its relations with the European Union (Hindustan Times , 1999, 9 November). There seems to have been some discussion on a proposal to institutionalize consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries. President Thomas Klestil expressed the hope to enhance political, economic and cultural cooperation with the biggest democracy in the world (Neues Volksblatt, 1999).

5 The agreement largely provided for lower rates of taxation vis-à-vis the prevalent rates in the two countries—10% on dividend, interest, royalties and fees for technical services against 20% prevalent in domestic law. The agreed would cover in the case of India income tax including any surcharge thereon and in the case of Austria the income tax and corporation tax (Assam Tribune, 1999; Der Standard, 1999; Wiener Zeitung, 1999). 6 The first agreement on the avoidance of double taxation of income was signed on 24 September 1963 (India, MEA, 1963b: 183).

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The Rise of the Freedom Party The 1990s began with Austria in a state of political turmoil. The Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ), once the model of stability and success, had fallen on bad times with Kreisky’s death. Chancellor Sinowatz and the former Foreign Minister went on trial for fraud and misuse of power. They had also been accused of infringing the country’s neutrality by selling arms to Iran during the Cold War. The two main political parties were resorting to populist vote-getting measures which confirmed Austria’s drift away from democratic socialism towards more conservative politics (Naravane, 1990: 17). By the end of 1999, in a centre-page op-ed, a commentator noted the ‘rising chill of a new xenophobia’ in Austria, which was haunted by the fear of the foreigner and the anti-immigrant agenda with the rise of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) led by Jörg Haider (Ramachandran, 1999: 12). The rise of the FPÖ was the result of the breakdown of the cleavages and loyalties, political volatility, declining exceptionalism after Austria became a member of the European Union in 1995. The FPÖ stood for opposition against ‘the consensus-oriented, cartel-like political culture’ established in post-1945 Austria (Pelinka, 2002: 7–9). The swearing-in of a new conservative far-right coalition government under Haider had predictably set ‘a cat of a different colour among the pigeons of the Western democratic world’ (Gangadhar, 2000; TOI, editorial, 2000: 12).

Post-Cold War Era In the post-Cold War era, Austria was critical of India on a variety of issues. Punjab, Kashmir and Assam were either called ‘traditional crisis areas’ or areas of ‘severe ethnic-religious conflicts’ (Austria, MFA, 1990: 185). However, with the return to normalcy in Punjab in 1992, it no longer figured in the MFA’s annual reports, which continued to censure human rights violations in Kashmir by Indian security forces (Austria, MFA, 1993: 232). The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was initially characterized as ‘Hindu fundamentalist’ (Austria, MFA, 1991: 231), but was later termed as a ‘Hindu nationalist’ party (Austria, MFA, 1993: 231). Benito Ferrero-Waldner visited India (October 1996) and two years later in November 1998 during the Austrian Presidency, she led the EU troika to Delhi.

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Draft Asia Strategy (1997) Though Asia had been declared a priority region for Austria in 1994 at a time when the European Union had adopted its Asia Strategy, the MFA developed its own ‘Draft Asia Strategy’ in the course of 1997.7 Vienna’s relations with Asia, it stated, had traditionally been politically unproblematic, if only because of the lack of a colonial past. Despite numerous efforts in recent years, Austria as a country has ‘an extremely low degree of familiarity’ among the people of Asia. The ‘confusion with Australia is legendary, Vienna and Salzburg are better known as music cities than Austria itself, and Austria as a highly developed industrial country has so far hardly been able to extend this reputation beyond specialist circles’ (Austria, MFA, 1997: 16). The Strategy recognized that it was ‘illusory to assume that Austria, as a small country, could build up a nationwide or even large-scale presence with the limited means at its disposal in a huge continent like Asia’. When cultivating its image, Austria would inevitably have to limit itself both sectorally and geographically to selected focal points in order to be able to have a more intensive effect there (Austria, MFA, n.d.: 16). It also highlighted the potential nuclear proliferation with regard to the nuclear emerging countries Pakistan and India increased the risk (Austria, MFA, 1997: 6).

Relations Since the Turn of the Millennium The ‘particularly dynamic economic growth’ in India had put it among the ‘top ten’ globally, indicated the emergence of ‘an additional economic centre’ in Asia even though it was still combatting problems like a backward agricultural system and widespread poverty (Austria, MFA, 2001: 34). In early 2000s, Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner urged that Austria needed to shift its focus to Asian markets like India and Japan, which would continue to be ‘an important economic player and a factor of political stability’ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2003, 20 May). China and India,

7 It is not exactly known why the Asia Strategy remained a draft, but with Austria’s accession to the EU on 1 January 1995 and the numerous Asia activities and documents by Brussels, there was ‘no sense of duplicating on Austria’s part’ (Austrian Embassy, email New Delhi, 2022, 22 September).

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according to the Austrian MFA, had evolved as ‘regional power houses and global actors’ besides Japan (Austria, MFA, 2006: 67).

Plassnik’s Visit, 2007 Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik visited India in March 2007. She regarded Pakistan and India as ‘key countries’ to stability in Asia and important partners in the international security architecture (Plassnik, 2007a). In an effort to enhance the political, economic and cultural visibility of Austria in India, it had opened five additional visa offices and two new Austrian Economic Chamber marketing offices a few months prior to her arrival. In order to enhance the presence and visibility of Austria, she also opened the Austrian Cultural Forum in New Delhi. However, she was not supportive of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal (Plassnik, 2007b).Austria took note of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) ‘doing well and developing at an enviable pace’. Their economic and geostrategic importance was constantly increasing along with their willingness and determination to contribute to shaping international politics (Spindelegger, 2011). The visit led to the signature of a science and technology agreement and an exchange of notes on closer cultural cooperation (Plassnik, 2007a).

Kashmir The Kashmir dispute, according to the Austrian MFA, dates back to the division of British India into India and Pakistan. The ‘predominantly Moslem Kashmir, on the border between the two states, would have been a candidate for integration into Pakistan, but the then Maharaja, a Hindu, declared the accession of his principality to the Indian Union’. The resulting conflict led to the division of Kashmir along an eastwest armistice line, but with renewed armed conflicts in 1965 and 1971 (Austria, MFA, 2002: 36–37). The militancy in Jammu and Kashmir was characterized by the Austrian MFA as a ‘separatist movement’ which led to ‘difficulties’ on the border with Pakistan (Austria, MFA, 1990: 75–76). Clashes between ‘militant separatist groups’ and the army/police were ‘a daily occurrence’ (Austria, MFA, 1992: 83). In 1994, India was ‘still accused’ of human rights violations in Kashmir. However, New Delhi released imprisoned opposition politicians and preparations were underway for the holding of elections

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in the Kashmir, which had been held in abeyance since 1990 (Austria, MFA, 1994: 87). The abduction of five Western tourists and the murder of one hostage by a terrorist group in Kashmir in June 1995 made international headlines. India, the MFA noted, continued to be accused of human rights violations in Kashmir, but the signing of an agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross allowing its representatives regular visits to Kashmir constituted ‘an important step’ towards improving the humanitarian situation (Austria, MFA, 1996: 90). The problem of Kashmir, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky remarked, had remained unresolved for a long time and wondered what Austria or the EU could do to resolve the matter. Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee responded that the problem had to be resolved bilaterally as provided for in the Simla Agreement. The position of the European Union that terrorism in Kashmir should not be supported from outside, he added, was essentially sound and Vienna could add its weight to this position (India, MEA, 1995a: 165; 1995b). The Kashmir conflict escalated in the Kargil War (1999), which ‘almost led to a fourth war’ between the two countries which in view of the nuclear potential of the states involved, was ‘a highly disturbing situation’ (Austria, MFA, 1999: 37). The subsequent talks, it noted, ‘like almost all the other negotiations since 1947’ did not lead to any results. India, it added, ‘refuses to consider mediation through a third party’ (Austria, MFA, 2001: 37)—something which New Delhi was totally opposed to. After the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, India held the ‘Pakistan-based Moslem Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-eMohammed groups responsible and demanded their suppression’. With the large-scale mobilization of over a million troops on both sides after the attack on the Indian parliament (13 December 2001), ‘the danger of open hostilities between the two nuclear powers again became a realistic scenario’ and the ‘rhetoric of both sides at times contained no absolute assurance that nuclear weapons would not be used’ (Austria, MFA, 2002: 46). Austria never used the term ‘crossborder terrorism’. It used words like ‘the terrorist attacks Islamist groups were launching against Indian targets’ without mentioning that they were based in Pakistan. The process of détente between India and Pakistan came to ‘a standstill’ after the ‘attack’ on the financial metropolis of Mumbai in 2008 (Austria, MFA, 2010: 77) with no mention of the number of people killed.

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Two Presidential Visits, 2005 and 2011 President Narayanan’s visit was reciprocated six years later when the firstever visit by an Austrian President took place. Heinz Fischer accompanied by the Minister of Economics and Labour (Martin Bartenstein) and two Chief Ministers (Tyrol and Salzburg) visited India 16–21 February 2005. The joint statement issued during Fischer’s visit highlighted the need to keep up the momentum of exchanging high-level visits, expanding and deepening cooperation in power, environment, health infrastructure, biotechnology, information technology, engineering and transport, intensifying cooperation between universities and research institutions, expanding direct air-links between the two countries, condemning terrorism and a dialogue on UN related. The two sides recognized that the bilateral economic interaction was ‘far below its potential’ (India, MEA, 2005). During the visit to documents were signed—an agreement on Infrastructure Cooperation in Health Sector and a MoU on Development of Collaboration between the Post-Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh and the Medical University Innsbruck. The second Indian presidential visit took place after a gap of 12 years when President Pratibha Patil visited Austria (October 2011) accompanied by a 45-member business delegation. President Fischer strongly supported India’s place in a reformed UN Security Council. He said that ‘We recognize that the world is changing fast and that the current composition in the Security Council does not reflect the realities of the new world order currently emerging. Your country deserves to play a bigger role in the Security Council’ (India, MEA, 2019: 1). During her visit two agreements were signed: MoU between Ministry of Railways and the Austrian Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology as well as an MoU between the Department of Science and Technology and the Austrian Science Fund.

Foreign Office Consultations Foreign Office consultations have been infrequent. After Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe visited Vienna in February 1981, there was a long gap: the next round being held after more than a decade in June 1992 when Acting Foreign Secretary H. Gleissner visited India. New Delhi proposed regular consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries

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when Foreign Minister visited Austria in July 1995. These were held at a lower level five years later in October 2000, but subsequent rounds were held irregularly: second (July 2003), fourth (New Delhi, 23 May 2006) and fifth (Vienna, February 2011).

Reform of the United Nations India and Austria have discussed the need to reform the United Nations, including Security Council. Vienna concurred that the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council should give due recognition to regional factor as well as criteria (e.g. size of country, its commitment to democracy, etc.) (India, MEA, 1995: 162). Austria expressed support for India’s membership for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council. It is convinced that India should play ‘a key role’ in the UN framework. It was crucial, the Austrians reiterated, to make the UN Security Council more representative and effective including through expanding its membership. The two countries agreed to ‘closely work together’ in this regard (India, MEA, 2005). During President Patil’s visit to Austria in October 2011, President Heinz Fischer expressed support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council: ‘We recognize that the world is changing fast and that the current composition in the Security Council does not reflect the realities of the new world order currently emerging. Your country [India] deserves to play a bigger role in the Security Council’ (India, MEA, 2019).

Indo-US Nuclear Deal Given its strong anti-nuclear identity, Austria has historically had a ‘nuclear allergy’ and an aversion to nuclear power. Since the 1990s, it has been a fervent activist for disarmament, a passionate advocate of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been reinforced by a small, close-knit group of officials in the Foreign Ministry who were primarily responsible for the pursuit of a strong anti-nuclear stance (Maitre & Lévy, 2019). Vienna did not consider nuclear energy to be ‘an efficient, clean and sustainable form of energy’ (Austria, MFA, 2008a). Ever since the Bush-Manmohan Singh joint statement (18 July 2005) announcing a framework for nuclear cooperation, Austria regarded it as ‘a tectonic shift’ though it recognized New Delhi as responsible and did

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not indulge in proliferation. Nevertheless, the Indo-US nuclear deal was tantamount to a recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state, but this is a mere acknowledgement of reality. However, Vienna wondered that if India was willing to continue its unilateral moratorium on testing, would New Delhi be willing ‘to go the extra mile and ratify the CTBT?’ (Kmentt, 2005) India anticipated that the incoming EU troika members (Austria and Finland) were likely to be ‘a problem’, but seemed confident that France and the UK would be able to persuade other EU Member States for an NSG agreement (Narayanan, 2005). Three months later, Vienna was categorical that it was one of the EU Member States which was ‘most skeptical’ of nuclear energy, had ‘questions and reservations’ about the Indo-US agreement and was concerned about the ‘overall impact on credibility’ of international nonproliferation regimes (Wikileaks, 2006). In March 2007, Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik stressed that the international non-proliferation regime ‘must not be undermined’ (Plassnik, 2007b). Vienna was apprehensive that the Austrian Government would face domestic criticism since the Indo-US nuclear deal represented ‘a double standard’ on proliferation (Mayr-Harting, 2008). In an attempt to persuade Austria, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon visited Vienna on July 18. However, ‘pushed by long-standing principle and short-term political calculations’, Austria, with Norwegian support, sought support from ‘like-minded’ countries to agree to a statement of concerns8 about the terms of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which was to be approved on 1 August. A consensus EU statement was agreed just minutes before delivery primarily because of Austrian resistance (Wikileaks, 2008b). Such a statement was felt to be counterproductive and expected to impede subsequent approval of an exception in the NSG (Wikileaks, 2008a). In late July, the MEA identified Austria and New Zealand as the most difficult countries in the NSG (Menon & Nayar, 2008).

8 Austria expressed three specific concerns about the text: (1) lack of a definition of

what ‘corrective measures’ India might take in the event of a disruption of foreign fuel supplies; (2) the possibility that linking the safeguards to other agreements might mean that they are not applicable in perpetuity; and (3) the link of entry-into-force with a later Indian decision and the lack of inclusion of a list of facilities that would be covered (Wikileaks, 2008a).

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Austria was a reluctant supporter when the IAEA approved of the Safeguards Agreement with India on 1 August 2008. The agreement, it felt, would bring ‘significant parts’ of the Indian civil nuclear programme subject to the control of the IAEA, which could ‘carry out comprehensive controls in India for the first time as a result of this agreement’. However, it stressed that specific Indian civil nuclear facilities that were to be subjected to IAEA control ‘must be defined quickly and in a legally binding manner’ (Austria, MFA, 2008a). On the eve of the NSG plenary on 21–22 August 2008, an Indian commentator dubbed Austria as ‘obsessively anti-nuclear’ (Bagchi, 2008a: 1) and ‘an ayatollah into the bargain’ (Bagchi, 2008b: 11). At the plenary, Austria led the ‘Group of Six’ (Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland), who along with 10–15 other States, strongly opposed the US draft on the Indian exception and put forward 50-plus ‘killer amendments’, which were inconsistent with their claim to support the Indo-US initiative, arguing that their guidance was issued in cabinet decisions and that any change would require new guidance (Wikileaks, 2008c). In a statement, the ‘like-minded’ described themselves as ‘strong supporters and defenders’ of the NPT9 —‘the most successful arms-control instrument the world has known’ (text in Vardarajan, 2008b). On 21 August 2008, Ulrike Lunachek, a prominent leader of the Green Party, protested outside the NSG meeting and criticized the government for not taking a tough stance against the exemption (Varadarajan, 2008a). India’s NSG waiver had been politicized ahead of Austria’s elections scheduled for late September 2008 and the government risked losses if it compromised on its vocal non-proliferation stance. Ultimately, Chancellor Werner Faymann, who was above domestic electoral considerations, took the decision to support the exemption. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called and asked German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to speak to Foreign Minister Plassnik on the issue (Mistry, 2014: 193). On the first day of the plenary (5 September), Austrian officials bristled over the testing clause: ‘You think we should go house-to-house to explain that this means a nuclear test?’ (cited in Bagchi, 2008c: 14). Austria was ‘the last’ among the 45 Member States of the NSG to join 9 Austria acceded to the NPT in 1969. The Austrian MFA described it as ‘the most comprehensive and important multilateral instrument of nuclear arms control’ (Austrian MFA, 1993: 149).

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the consensus granting India an exception for nuclear exports to India on 6 September 2008. Its vote was influenced, among other things, by India’s formal declaration that it would abide by NSG guidelines and its moratorium on nuclear tests (Austria, MFA, 2008b, 6 September). The ‘real opposition’, as Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and key India’s negotiator later recounted, came from the ‘mini-Six’ ‘all of whom had no interest in nuclear trade and smaller stakes in relations with India’. They treated the NSG as a stage on which they could play out their chosen roles. They postured and dissimulated in their conversations with the Indian delegation and were clearly unreliable. At the end of the process these small states with large egos chose to avoid U.S. wrath by going along with the U.S.-shaped consensus decision—one more instance of their saying one thing and doing another, pushing disarmament for others while basing their own security on the cover provided by U.S. nuclear weapons and NATO. (Menon, 2016: 73–74)

Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Michael Spindelegger expressed deep concern about long-range ballistic missile tests by India and Pakistan in April 2012. The continuation of the nuclear arms race in South Asia, it felt, would be ‘a threat to stability in Asia, but also a risk for world peace’ (Spindelegger, 2012).

Relations Under Modi The BJP under Narendra Modi was elected with an absolute majority in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The Modi Government’s key focus was on fostering economic development, facilitating FDI, improving India’s infrastructure and promoting good governance. Modi’s ‘Make in India’ sought to position India as ‘a global workbench’ (Austria, MFA, 2014: 144–145). In order to more proactively engage the Modi government, Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz along with the President of the Austrian Economic Chamber Christoph Leitl, the Second President of the Austrian National Council Karlheinz Kopf and a large business delegation of more than 50 representatives of Austrian companies visited India in February 2016. There were more than 500 Austrian companies already active in India; of these, 130 had also established local subsidiaries (Kurz, 2016).

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In June 2017, Chancellor Christian Kern met Modi on the sidelines of the SPIEF in St. Petersberg, Russia. Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl met Sushma Swaraj on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. Three years later, to mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, his successor, Karin Kneissl, visited India in February 2019 and held discussions on a number of global issues, including migration and terrorism as well as expansion of bilateral economic ties. The repealing of Article 370s of the Indian Constitution—which had granted special rights and autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir—on 5 August 2019 had ‘triggered the escalation of the Indo-Pakistani conflict’, impacted bilateral relations, which are ‘again marked by threats that also include military options’ (Austria, MFA, 2019: 84). The revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir also led to the item ‘The India-Pakistan Question’ being ‘re-featured’ on the UN Security Council’s agenda in August 2019 for the first time in more than thirty years (Austria, MFA, 2019: 93). In recent years, two rounds of consular consultations have been so far held (the most recent one on 23 October 2019) with a view to further liberalize the visa regime to make it easier for more tourists, businesspeople, professionals and officials to travel to each other’s countries. During 2014–2021, two agreements have been signed between India and Austria: a MoU on cooperation in the fields of culture and the arts (February 2016) and a protocol Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation (February 2017). Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar had a telephonic conversation with the Austrian Minister for Europe and International Affairs Schallenberg on 11 May 2020. They exchanged experiences on combating COVID-19 and agreed to continue the dialogue on preventing and fighting COVID-19 (India, MEA, 2021: 105). On 26 May 2020, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had a telephonic conversation with Austrian Federal President Alexander Van der Bellen. The two leaders reiterated their shared desire to further strengthen and diversify India-Austria relations in the post-COVID-19 world. The Indian Prime Minister highlighted the opportunities for enhanced cooperation in sectors like infrastructure, technology, research and innovation, SMEs, etc. (India, MEA, 2020).

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A preparatory meeting of the India-Austria Joint Economic Commission was held on 29 September 2020. The meeting discussed ways to reinvigorate the JEC mechanism and make it more result-oriented. After a decade, the sixth Foreign Office consultations between Additional Secretary (Europe and COVID-19) and Director General for Political Affairs in the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs were held on 18 March 2021 in virtual format (India, MEA, 2021, 23 March). It reviewed various elements of bilateral relations, such as political, economic and commercial relationships, as well as cultural and intellectual ties. The Indian delegation was led by Dammu Ravi, who is the Additional Secretary (Europe and COVID-19), while the Austrian delegation was led by Ambassador Gregor Koessler, Director General for Political Affairs at Austria’s Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. During India-EU Leaders’ Summit in May 2021, the incumbent Federal Chancellor of Austria, Sebastian Kurz vocalized Austria’s ‘full solidarity with India’ along with the clear desire to ‘strengthen all partnership between the EU and India’ (India, MEA, 2022: 121). During the second wave of COVID-19 pandemic in May–June 2021, Austria extended bilateral assistance of 1900 oxygen cannulas, 396 oxygen cylinders and 5,521 vials of Remdesivir (India, MEA, 2022: 121). Within a few weeks after being sworn-in as the new Federal Chancellor of Austria Alexander Schallenberg, had a brief interaction with Prime Minister on 1 November 2021, on the sidelines of COP26 in Glasgow (India, MEA, 2022: 120).

Schallenberg’s Visit, March 2022 A month after he had met S. Jaishankar at the Munich Security Conference, Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg arrived in India on a three-day visit (19–21 March 2022). A key objective of the visit was ‘to put Austria more firmly on India’s political and economic map and vice versa... As the tectonic shifts we are now seeing in Europe will have longterm consequences for our businesses, we need to look for new markets and reliable partners’. When asked that India-Austria bilateral trade barely topped $1 billion, he gave it an optimistic spin and said that it reflected ‘the enormous potential’ regarding greening the economy, transition of energy markets, infrastructure, hydropower and railroads (Schallenberg, 2022a).

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The discussions between the two foreign ministers covered the entire spectrum of bilateral relations, including political, economic and commercial relationships, as well as cultural and academic ties. It went on to say that the two sides discussed the COVID-19 pandemic and post-pandemic recovery, including vaccines. Regional and global themes, such as neighbourhood policy, terrorism and India-EU relations, the war in Ukraine, UN reform and India’s priorities during its term on the UN Security Council, among others, were also discussed (India, MEA, 2022). As part of the ReFocus Austria10 initiative, Schallenberg was accompanied by a business delegation of 16 representatives from 12 Austrian companies in the areas of renewable energies, environmental technologies, engineering services, mechanical engineering and communications. In view of the enormous geopolitical shift underway, the Asian market would play ‘a much more important role for the domestic economy’ (Schallengberg, 2022b, 22 March). Interestingly, Jaishankar met Schallenberg for the third time in five months in Bratislava in June 2022 where they discussed the Afghanistan issue and held talks on the Indo-Pacific apart from reviewing the progress in bilateral relations since the March visit (ndtv, 2022).

Jaishankar’s Visit, January 2023 For the first time in more than seven decades, the Indian and Austrian foreign ministers met for five times in 2022 clearly suggesting that serious efforts were underway to enhance bilateral relations. After a gap of 27 years, Foreign Minister Jaishankar arrived in Vienna on 31 December 2022 for a three-day visit to mark the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. During the visit, five agreements were signed, namely a long-overdue agreement on visa exemption for holders of diplomatic passports, a MoU for cooperation in culture and arts for 2022–2026 and an arrangement allowing family members of diplomatic missions to take up gainful employment.

10 Launched in September 2021, ReFocus Austria is part a global business initiative of the Austrian Government’s Comeback Plan for economic recovery during and after the pandemic. The focus of activities is on seven future-oriented areas: renewable energies, emobility, sustainability, digital transformation, infrastructure, urban technology and tourism (see Austria, Ministry of European and International Affairs, 2022).

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New Delhi, Jaishankar stressed, perceived Austria as ‘a serious and consequential partner’, whose experiences and capabilities were relevant to India’s modernization and progress. He expressed the hope that the existing trade of US$2.5 billion and the presence of 150 Austrian companies in India should grow ‘more substantially’. To that end, he assured Austrian companies that actively contribute to India’s national priorities of all possible support. Approaches towards regional and global politics, he stated, were ‘similar’, but there were differences of opinion since ‘obviously we are located in different regions and we have our particular compulsions’. He urged a return to dialogue and diplomacy in case of the Ukraine conflict and highlighted the concerns of the Global South about the ‘knock-on effects of the conflict in terms of accessibility and affordability of fuel, food and fertilizers’ (Jaishankar, 2023a). Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg expressed a desire for ‘more trade, more investment, more exchange, more people-to-people contact’ (Schallenberg, 2023a). India, he remarked, was ‘a voice of peace and reason’ in the context of the Ukraine conflict and that it carried ‘a very strong weight when it comes to multilateralism, democracy, defending a rules-based international system’ (Schallenberg, 2023b). For the first time, during the visit, Jaishankar also held a joint meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Alexander Schallenberg, the Czech Republic, Jan Lipavský and Slovakia, Rastislav Káˇcer under the Slavkov Trilateral format. The discussion focused on India-EU relations, respective neighbourhoods and the Ukraine conflict. Migration and Mobility The initialling of the Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement—likely to be signed in the first quarter of 2023 and to come into effect a few weeks thereafter—is the first such agreement that Austria has concluded with any country with which it has a visa regime and only the second with a non-OECD country. The agreement is expected to bring 800 highly qualified Indian professionals annually to Austria with the so-called Red-White-Red Card.11 It also provides greater opportunities for student exchange and temporary job opportunities for young

11 This is significant since it is more than half of the 1,500 residence permits along with the EU Blue Card that Austria had granted in 2020 (Wiener Zeitung, 2023a).

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people such as the introduction of a new ‘Working Holiday’ programme (Kronen Zeitung, 2023; Die Presse, 2023). Vienna regarded the migration and mobility agreement to be of ‘great strategic importance’ as it would facilitate the repatriation of illegal Indian asylum seekers whose number had jumped from 600 in 2021 to 18,00012 in 2022 (Schallenberg, 2023a) because Serbia had permitted Indians to enter Austria without a visa. The number was likely to significantly decline since Serbia had imposed a more restrictive policy since January 2023 under Austrian pressure. The Indian Foreign Minister stressed that New Delhi promoted legal mobility and migration and was against illegal immigration (Der Standard, 2023). The pace of repatriation would, however, depend on validation that the illegal asylum seekers were Indian citizens and the degree of preparations on the Austrian side (Jaishankar, 2023b). Some sceptics, however, felt that the number of 800 Red-white-Red cards would difficult to achieve through the government since existing laws enable Indians13 to apply for a two-year work and residence permit which are issued to non-EU countries in occupations where there is a shortage of skilled workers. In 2021 only 479 Indians in Austria had availed of the opportunity among 36,350 cases that were filed (Wiener Zeitung, 2023b).

Economic Relations Several months prior to Independence, Nehru favoured the recruitment of eminent German and Austrian scientists even though the cream had already been taken away by the United States and other countries. He felt it would be worthwhile to explore possibilities of the recruitment since capable scientists were available at relatively small salaries (Nehru, 1947: 418). 12 According to the asylum statistics for November 2022, 16,800 Indians had applied for asylum in Austria between January and the end of November 2022. By this time, the Ministry of the Interior had decided nearly 10,200 cases. Of these, 6,530 had been hired because the applicants had evaded the procedure. In 2022, according to the Interior Ministry, 300 Indian nationals were repatriated, and there was ‘very good cooperation with India on return issues’ (Wiener Zeitung, 2023b). 13 According to the Austrian Department of Labour, at the end of 2021, a total of 8,662 Indian citizens with a valid residence permit were living in Austria. Most of them were employed in catering (1,093), education (440), and computer science (433) (Wiener Zeitung, 2023b).

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The first trade agreement between India and Austria was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1949 (valid till 30 June 1950) by Khub Chand, Head of the Indian Military Mission in Berlin and Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber (India, MEA, 1949). It was extended by an exchange of letters on 27 November 1950. One of the first major orders India placed with Austria was for 20,000 tons of tin plate from the Untied Austrian Steel Works (TOI, 1949a: 7). Another trade agreement (initialled on 19 July 1952 and signed on 9 December 1952) (India, MEA, 1952) stipulated nearly 60 items for Austrian exports and 32 items of Indian imports. Under the agreement, machinery and industrial products were traded for Indian tea, coffee, spices and jute goods The agreement also stipulated that the Austrian Government would encourage Austrian firms and nationals to place their technical skill and experience at the disposal of India, which required technical assistance in setting up individual industries (TOI, 1956b: 11). The 1952 trade agreement stipulated the establishment of a Mixed Commission which would meet ‘whenever agreed upon’ (Article 2); it met for the first time in Vienna in November 1953. The agreement remained in force till 31 December 1958 as its validity was extended several times through exchange of letters on (5 May 1954, 29 December 1955, 26 August 1957). All payments both ways were to be made in Pound Sterling through the Bank of England. Another trade agreement was signed on 31 October 1963 (India, MEA, 1963a). On 4 February 1983, an exchange of letters established the IndiaAustrian Joint Commission, which held its first meeting in December 1983 with the Austrian Vice-Chancellor Norbert Steger participating. The Austrians had offered a financial package for the Vijayanagar steel plant14 and for the modernization of the Rourkela steel plant. The meeting also identified nine commodities for export to Austria and 23 sectors where joint ventures could be set up in third countries (The Hindu, 1983). The agreement on bilateral economic relations and economic, industrial, technical and technological cooperation (12 February 1999) specified 12 areas for long-term cooperation (Article 3), six key areas for development and expansion of infrastructure (Article 4), ten ways to 14 On the new coal reduction process called KR process developed by an Austrian firm Voest Alpine AG, which had shown encouraging results in tests on low-grade Indian coal with a ash content up to 40%.

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promote economic-industrial, technical and technological cooperation (Article 5), and recognized the utility and necessity of increasing the involvement of small and medium enterprises in enhancing bilateral cooperation (Article 10). The agreement also set up a ‘Joint Committee’, which replaced the earlier Joint Commission (which had since met irregularly since its inception and had last met in New Delhi in April 1997). In August 1999, the long-stalled agreement on the avoidance of double taxation was finally initialled. The 15th Joint Economic Commission was held in New Delhi in July 2017. Trade The pre-war adverse balance of trade with Austria continued into the 1950s. During 1949–1950, Indian imports from Austria were |5,747,000 and exports amounted to |5,219,000, i.e. an adverse balance of |528,000 (Karmarkar, 1951: col. 3079). During July 1951–June 1952, Indian imports were |10 million and exports |6 million. The deficit widened further during July 1952 to June 1953 with imports rising to |21.3 million and exports to |4.4 million (Karmarkar, 1954: col. 1667). Trade increased four-fold from |101.30 million in 1975–1976 to |371.20 million in 1980–1981 (Financial Express, 1982). Bilateral trade rose to |1,627.5 million in 1988–1989 (Das Munshi, 1989: col. 227). Since the 1980s, bilateral trade witnessed annual growth rates ranging from 10 to 50%. Indo-Austrian relations entered a new-dynamic phase with the beginning of India’s economic liberalization in 1991. Indian exports to Austria rose since 1991. In 1994, India exported twice as much to Austria as it imported. The reasons for the decline lay primarily in the devaluation of the Indian currency in 1991, which made Austrian exports more expensive and imports from India cheaper, but also in the ever-increasing diversification of the Indian export basket. India-Austrian trade increased from $252 million in 1990 to $309 million in 1995. During 1990–1995, India had a trade surplus, with the highest one of $101 million in 1994 (see Table 11.1). India-Austrian trade for the first time crossed the $1 billion in 2008– 2009 and was $1.433 billion in 2017–2018. During the 2010s and early 2020s, it has fluctuated around $1 billion, with India having a trade deficit with Austria, which peaked to $739 million in 2011–2012 (see Table 11.2).

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Table 11.1 India-Austria Trade, 1990–1995 (in millions of US Dollars) Year

Exports

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

126 122 132 151 179 172

Imports

Total

Balance

126 88 103 85 78 137

252 210 235 236 257 309

+34 +29 +66 +101 +35

Source International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1997 , p. 110

Table 11.2 India-Austria Trade, 1997–1998 to 2021–2022 (in millions of US Dollars) Year

Exports

Imports

Total

Balance

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

94.41 85.17 77.58 75.17 81.02 76.33 81.11 106.38 117.15 132.47 132.01 183.41 490.67 252.74 593.70 341.82 328.58 336.47 363.10 339.83 383.16 460.03 483.16 455.59 453.07 564.32

140.10 83.13 59.64 66.59 69.32 77.82 164.21 201.67 262.34 344.02 456.84 585.94 701.64 789.37 817.07 1081.12 929.22 828.77 815.92 827.11 908.34 973.33 716.43 629.74 623.10 825.13

234.51 168.30 137.22 141.76 292.10 154.15 245.32 308.05 379.49 476.49 588.85 769.35 1192.31 1042.11 1410.77 1422.94 1257.80 1165.24 1179.02 1166.94 1291.50 1433.36 1199.59 1085.33 1076.17 1389.45

(−) 45.69 (+) 2.04 (+) 17.94 (+) 8.58 (+) 11.70 (−) 1.49 (−) 83.1 (−) 95.29 (−) 145.19 (−) 211.55 (−)324.83 (−) 402.53 (−) 210.97 (−) 536.63 (−) 223.37 (−) 739.30 (−) 600.64 (−) 492.30 (−) 452.82 (−) 487.28 (−) 525.18 (−) 513.30 (−) 483.16 (−) 174.15 (−) 170.03 (−) 260.81

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce

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Austrian calendar-wise trade figures put trade with India at a higher level. Bilateral trade in 2010 was e1.138 billion (Indian exports e483.1 million and imports e654.9 million). Trade increased to e1.412 billion in 2015 (Indian exports e711 million and imports e701 million) and e1.946 billion in 2019 (Indian exports e1,021 million and imports e922 million), and e2.038 billion in 2020 (Indian exports e898 million and imports e1,140 million) (Austria, Federal Economic Chamber, Statistical Yearbook 2017: 63, 65; 2021: 63, 65; 2022: 63, 65; India, MEA, 2016: 3). India’s principal exports to Austria consist of textiles and clothing, tea, leather and leather goods, basic chemicals, floor coverings and engineering goods while the imports have been of machinery, iron and steel, synthetic fibres, viscose, rayon fibre, transport equipment and scientific instruments. Export Credits Austria has been extending financial assistance to India since 1962–1963. The financial credits extended by Austria have been in the form of government credits and suppliers’ credits for financing the imports of capital goods, machinery, raw materials and services of Austrian origin.15 From 1 April 1951 to 31 March 1966, i.e. the first three Five-Year Plans, Austria authorized |84.9 million; of this only half, i.e. |47 million was utilized by India (India, Ministry of Finance, 1966: 168–171). Apart from extending government-to-government credits of about $700 million from 1962–1963 to 1974–1975(Hindustan Times , 1978), Austria also extended a number of credits for specific projects.16 In 1980, two bilateral financial aid agreements, one for Austrian Schilling (AS) 127 million and one for AS 27 million, were signed, with which India was once again provided with loans on favourable terms for the purchase of investment goods in Austria (Austria, MFA, 1980: 313). 15 The major items of equipment imported under Austrian credits included iron and steel items, equipment of power projects, gas cylinders, railway and chemical plant equipment, roller and ball bearings, microscopes and injection moulding machines. The terms of Austrian credit have gradually softened over the years both in terms of the period of repayment and rates of interest (India, MEA, 1980: 36). 16 These included the Surulia power plant in Tamil Nadu, a pelletisation and beneficiation plant in Goa, a fertilizer project near Baroda, and turbines for an electrical plant in West Bengal.

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In 1981, an agreement for a loan of AS 52.541 million (Rs20.76 million), repayable over a period of 30 years including a 10-year grace period and carrying an interest rate of 2% for the import of capital goods from Austria was signed (India, MEA, 1981: 229). India utilized an Austrian loan of |20 million in 1980–1981 and |180.7 million in 1990–1991 (India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, 2008: 73). Up to 31 March 2005, the total assistance given by Austria amounted to AS 1680.89 million consisting of government credits for capital goods of AS1302.80 (including a credit of AS120 million signed in December 1991), food aid17 (AS6.48 million) and refinancing credit towards debt relief (AS 371.61 million) (India, Ministry of Finance, 2005: 5). In 2003, the GoI discontinued taking development assistance from bilateral development partners other than Japan, the UK, Germany, the European Commission, the United States and the Russian Federation. Austria has not provided any development assistance since the announcement of the new bilateral development cooperation policy on 20 September 2004 that ODA by Austria could be resumed if it committed a minimum of US$ 25 million for development cooperation assistance in India. Problems in Bilateral Trade In the late 1990s, the biggest obstacle in enhancing trade, a former Indian Ambassador to Austria put it, has been the lack of knowledge about our mutual markets. The problem was compounded by various tariff and nontariff barriers to easier access of Indian goods to the Austrian market. Another significant problem has been that Austrian trading companies’ preference to by Indian goods through German general importers instead of ordering them directly from Indian producers (Tiwari, 1999: 8–9) as they believe in quick delivery systems, whereby they can get consignments ‘just in time’ and in less than a week. The traditional links of Austrian companies with Germany facilitate this and ‘keeps them away from entering into direct negotiations with new and unknown partners in India’ (Senapati, 1998: 1).

17 Out of AS25.31 million, a part of the food aid amounting to AS 6.48 million was repaid and the balance of AS 18.84 million was written off by the Austrian Government and treated as grant (India, Ministry of Finance, 1992: 9).

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Since Austria lacks traditional industrial conglomerates, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been reluctant to shed their inhibitions about proactively engaging and deepening technological/financial collaboration with Indian partners because they lack the patience and financial resources to persevere in a challenging environment. Austrian companies, as a former Austrian Ambassador to India put it, are eager to clinch deals quickly without being interested in establishing ‘a long-term relationship because the geographical distance deters many small and medium-sized entrepreneurs from taking the risk of becoming active in a market that is so far apart. A different culture, different habits, a different mentality cause uncertainty in the face of the unknown’ (Peterlik, 1996: 2). The reluctance of Austrian companies to trade with distant countries like India is the result of a perception which tends to be reinforced by the media. The lack of an entrepreneurial tradition in Austria also tends to inhibit trade with new partners and seizing of opportunities in distant markets.18 As a result, Austrian companies seem unable to overcome their latent fears and prefer to prioritize in trading with geographically contiguous regions. India is perceived as a distant, difficult country. With the SMEs dominating the economy, they are intrinsically less adventurous and risk-taking and hesitant to formulate long-term strategies of engaging India more meaningfully. Austrian trade with India seems contingent on project deliveries for which export credits were made, but this often led to fluctuations in trade since Austrian firms tended to be overcautious in becoming financially involved in Indian ventures. The reluctance could be possible because of the relatively large bank exposure to Russia and other emerging market economies and preference for more promising markets like China, which had been a major beneficiary of Austrian export credits in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Handbuch fuer Entwicklungshilfe. Oesterreich, 307 Lieferung, April 1993 (Baden-Baden, 1993), pp. 28, 30–33).

18 Despite ‘a long tradition of rapid postwar growth, Austria has not always been a particularly favourable environment for entrepreneurial activity; even though there has always been a large number of private enterprises, the degree of corporatism was high up to the end of the 1980s, with many large firms in state ownership....The corporate and personal tax system in place up to the early 1990s did not aid the development of an entrepreneurial culture... [The] more general barriers to entrepreneurship... [are] regulation, market opportunities, financial arrangements and taxation’ (OECD, 1999: 82, 107–108).

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‘A lack of mutual knowledge and partly outdated ideas and cliches’, an internal paper highlighted, were ‘negative for a stronger development of mutual economic relations’. This information deficit, it stressed, ‘must be combated as a matter of urgency’ (Austria, Embassy in India, 1999: 1).

Foreign Direct Investment The first industrial collaboration between India and Austria was in 1956. India was the first country in Asia to choose the Stahlverfahren LinzDonawitz (LD) process. India first adopted the Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF)19 process at the one million tonne stage of the Rourkela steel plant.20 The involvement of Austrian companies began in the 1960s with Plasser and Theurer—a world leader in the construction and maintenance of railway tracks. This was followed in subsequent years by Boehler (special steels), ELIN (generators), Waagner Biro (caloric power stations), Voest Alpine (turbines), AKG (microphones) and AVL (motor testing equipment). By 1963, there were a dozen industries which had been set up in collaboration with Austrian companies and technical knowhow (Shah, 1963: 7). At the end of 1981, Western Europe accounted for 3,910 collaborations. Of these, Austria was represented with 48 such collaborations (Jha, 1983: 113). The first Indo-Austrian joint venture to go public and be quoted on the stock exchange was in 1989. In a span of less than two years after India’s liberalization, Austria concluded seven joint ventures and 15 cooperation agreements; this was more than what it had done in the previous five years (Kaufmann, 1992). By 1983, there were 58 Indo-Austrian joint ventures (mostly for technological cooperation) and only four involved financial contributions from Austrian partners (Singh, 1984: 16). Over the next decade, the number of joint ventures remained the same. By 1995, there were 180 cooperation projects between Indian and Austrian companies, including 19 The BOF steelmaking technology innovated in 1952 by Voest of Austria resulted in lower capital and operating unit costs of production and lower unit energy consumption. 20 Krupp and Voest Alpine Stahl set up the BOF plant in December 1959 under

a turnkey contract. The license agreement with Brassert Oxygen Technik AG—Voest’s Swiss subsidiary and its licensor of the process elsewhere in the world—was quite favourable ‘except that there was no guarantees for technological performance’. The design parameters proved inappropriate and the quality of training was poor (D’Mellow, 2010: 121).

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46 joint ventures (mostly for technological collaboration) (Austria, MFA, 1995: 413). About 250 Austrian firms were in constant business contact with India (Austria, MFA, 1996: 245). By the end of 1999, more than 300 Indian tourism managers had been trained by Austria (FerreroWaldner, 1996). As of 1999, there were about 50 Indo-Austrian joint ventures with a capital participation of about ATS 380 million. Apart from over 100 licensing agreements, about 300 Austrian firms were involved in bilateral import and export trade (Tiwari, 1999: 8). In 2016, more than 500 Austrian companies were active in India; of them 130 companies had established local subsidiaries (Kurz, 2016). Austrian FDI in India between 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1997 amounted to |562.20 million (Sinha, 1998: col.1o1). During 2000– 2012, it amounted to $184.19 million. The annual Austrian FDI in India in the 2010s has been modest and peaked to $65.66 million in 2016. From April 2000 to March 2022, the total Austrian FDI in India amounted to $532.2264 million (India, DPIIT, 2022) (Table 11.3). The total Indian overseas foreign direct investment in Austria from April 2000 to June 2021 was US$497.15 million (India, Department of Economic Affairs, 2021: 6). However, according to 2018 figures of the Austrian National Bank, cumulative Austrian FDI in India amounted to e532 million (up from e444 million in 2017) whereas Indian cumulative FDI in Austria was e128 million in 2018 (up from e127 million in 2017) (India, MEA, 2019: 4). Table 11.3 Austrian FDI in India, 2000–2019 (in millions of US Dollars)

Year

Amount

2000–2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total

184.19 24.36 33.18 13.06 65.66 47.34 29.22 28.88 425.90

Source dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_AnnualIssue_2017_Chapter61.B.pdf; dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/Chapter_3.2_1.pdf (accessed on 26 May 2021)

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Over 150 Austrian companies are based in India in sectors like engineering, road construction, railways, hydel power plants, water treatment and auto-components. Several Indian companies have also invested in Austria especially in fields of IT, medicare and auto-components. Both sides agreed to further intensify commercial engagements. Austrian business delegates expressed keen interest in investing in sectors such as renewable energy in India (India, MEA, 2022).

Development Assistance India has neither been a major recipient nor ‘a focal point’ (Austria, MFA, 1998, Austrian-Indian Relations: 27) of Austrian development assistance programme.21 In 2003 India declared that it would no longer accept tied aid since many small donors made unwarranted remarks about Indian domestic affairs. New Delhi also requested the 22-odd small donors, who gave relatively small amounts of assistance to route their assistance through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations and multilateral institutions.

Arms Transfers Austria has not been a major arms exporter to India. The SIPRI Arms Trade Register does not list any transactions of arms sales or transfers since 1950. Austria’s National Report on Conventional Arms Exports are only available for the period 2004–2010 while the European Union’s database provides information on Austrian arms exports to India from 2013 to 2020. The statistics provided by Member States to the European Commission are compiled differently by each Member State. No uniform standard is used and not all Member States report on the actual value of arms exports (EEAS, 2022). During 2004–2010, total arms exports to India amounted to e3,964,931. Austrian arms exports to India peaked at e700,318 in 2005

21 Since 1993, Austrian development assistance has been primarily concentrated on five key regions (Central America, the Sahel Zone of West Africa, the Great Lakes Region of East Africa, Southern Africa, and the Himalaya/Hindu Kush). In the Himalayan countries (where Bhutan had been a key country of focus), about 70% of Austria’s bilateral ODA was concentrated on these countries (Austria, MFA, 2000: 83).

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and were the lowest in 2008 (e389,070). In 2007, 2009 and 2010, they were under e600,000 (see Table 11.4). During 2013–2020, Austrian arms exports to India increased from e246,544 in 2013 to e3.244 million in 2014. They declined to e161,969 in 2015, increased to e463,307 in 2016 and have fluctuated since then. In 2020, against 13 licences for e1.261 million, actual exports were only e132,664 (see Table 11.5). In 2021, Indian imports of arms and ammunition, parts and accessories from Austria were a meagre US$34,690 (Tradingeconomics.com, 2022). There have been only a few military visits to Austria. Chief of Army Staff General Om Prakash Malhotra visited Austria in 1980. The Chief of Army Staff General N.C. Vij visited Austria in August 2004 and a 16member delegation from the National Defence College visited Austria in May 2012. The Chief Vigilance Officer attended a Central Vigilance Commission-sponsored vigilance related training programme at Laxenburg, Austria from 1 to 12 February 2016 at the International Anti-Corruption Agency. After a partnership agreement signed in 2019 between Tamil Nadubased Counter Measures Technologies Pvt Ltd. (CMT) and Glock, Austria, the polyframe Glock pistols will be produced in Tiruvallur district, which is part of the state’s defence industrial corridor planned by the Centre to supply Glocks only to the government and possibly to the Indian public (Hindustan Times , 2020).

Perceptions The Austrians, the Austrian Charge d’Affaires in India stated in 1950, have ‘always considered India as a dreamland, a country of exquisite art and rich culture’ and that the world had begun to look upon ‘free India as a “Mecca for political pilgrimage’” (TOI, 1950: 15). For most Austrians, India remains both an exotic and the mentally and physically distant land. The chief editor of Die Presse, Thomas Chorherr, urged India to improve its image in Austria and other European countries and felt that prospects for improving tourism in India lay in effective publicity abroad of its many attractions (TOI, 1969: 8). For over five decades, stereotypes reflected Indo-Austrian relations: that India is the non-aligned nation while Austria stands for a permanent neutrality. A former Austrian ambassador to India therefore stressed that it was high time for bilateral relations to go beyond cliches: ‘Austria

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Table 11.4 Austrian arms exports to India, 2004–2010 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

2004

ML 1 ML 3 ML 4 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 18 Total

10 25 1 5 41 9 9 3 22 17 66 5 88 24 38 11 73 28 42 1 77 11 23 1 35 7 23 2 32

733,324 56,725 54,500 122,707 967,256 715,960 52,809 33,840 802,609 348,564 139,819 50,968 539,351 365,404 82,663 200,852 648,919 454,954 138,680 6,676 811,594 301,073 709,190 2,500,000 3,510,263 540,550 131,235 37,318 709,163

675,384

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

675,384 700,318

700,318 317,770 118,733 39,699 476,202 310,747 70,150 190,511 571,408 56,222 120,593 6,676 389,070 268,046 308,070 576,116 532,986 43,447 576,433

Source Austria, MFA, 2004, Statistical Annex; 2005b, Statistical Annex; 2006, Statistical Annex; 2007, Statistical Annex; 2008c, Statistical Annex; 2009b, Statistical Annex Brief descriptions of EU Common Military List categories ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components therefor ML 3: Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially designed components therefor ML 4: Bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missile and components specially designed for them ML 18: Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List ML 22: ‘Technolgy’ for ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List

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Table 11.5 Austrian arms exports to India, 2013–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

2013

ML 3 ML 16 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 3 ML 6 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 3 ML 10 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 10 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 4 ML 10 ML 16 ML 18 Total ML 3 ML 7 ML 10 ML 16 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 10 ML 16

11 2 3 2 18 27 1 4 1 33 39 1 12 1 53 2 34 1 4 41 1 14 2 5 2 24 14 1 3 2 2 22 2 12 3 1

50,844 455,185 180,845 2,624,535 3,311,409 105,916 315,500 76,108 2,819,250 3,316,774 146,424 88,550 512,511 1,243,785 1,991,270 3,200 207,269 88,550 419,133 718,152 3,858 205,627 127,050 119,576 110,734 566,845 158,455 15,000 347,838 10,501 267,471 799,265 10,041 167,491 1,430,754 7,043

27,949

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

37,845 180,750 246,544 105,366 315,500 3,450 2,819,250 3,243,566 106,357 55,612 161,969 3,200 142,185 38,500 279,422 463,307 3,858 51,466 86,035 110,734 252,093 108,794 15,000 10,394 2,057 136,245 10,041 38,466 297,886 6,420

(continued)

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Table 11.5 (continued) Year

2020

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 10 ML 13 ML 16 ML 18 Total

2 20 2 1 3 1 4 2 13

19,720 1,635,049 198 21,000 1,111,466 18,000 31,125 79,167 1,260,956

17,255 370,068 198 12,353 18,000 22,946 79,167 132,664

Source EEAS (2022). Retrieved 2 November 2022 from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/23rd-ann ual-report-arms-exports-launched-today-289-eu-transparent-and-responsible-trader-arms_en Categories of Military Equipment Supplied ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components therefor ML 3: Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially designed components therefor ML 4: Bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missile and components specially designed for them ML 6: Ground vehicles and components ML 7: Chemical agents, biological agents, riot control agents, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 13: Special armoured vehicles (e.g. armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components, etc.) ML 16: Forgings, castings and other unfinished products the use of which in a specified product is identifiable, by material composition, geometry or function and which are specially designed for any products specified by ML1 to ML 14, ML 16, ML 9, ML 10, ML 12 or ML 19 ML 18: Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List ML 22: ‘Technolgy’ for ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List

is the home of Mozart and Schubert and India is a country of Maharajas, poverty and richness’ (Traxl, 1999: 14). For too long Indian perceptions of continental Europe have been viewed through the prism of the Anglo-Saxon media. The Western media displays a tendency to reinforce exotic images in the old cliches of India. Image-building ought to be a key foreign policy objective because both at the popular level and in the Austrian media where the dominant image of India has traditionally been one of a distant, backward, conflict ridden

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and poverty-stricken country constantly plagued by riots, natural disasters and epidemics despite its tremendous economic and scientific achievements. Somehow the continuous flow of bad news about the world’s largest democracy never seems to end. In recent years, India’s image had changed from that of a developing country with a certain level of poverty to one that is ‘very dynamic and active in new technologies’. It was also ‘developing very fast and taking up international responsibilities’ (Linhart, 2017). Although Austria is ‘a small country in the heart of Europe’, the Times of India editorially observed, ‘its location makes it a geographical and diplomatic bridge’ between the two ideologically divided parts of the continent. It added: ‘Austrian neutrality, like India non-alignment, is an article of faith and, as in India’s case, the non-partisan application of this principle has given Austria political and moral influence far greater than its size and strength would suggest’. Under Kreisky, Austria had acquired ‘a well-earned reputation as a humane mediator, even in some respects, and an arbiter of major East-West issues’ (TOI, editorial, 1984: 8). Despite the mutual influences between the European Union’s relations, it is indeed ‘unfortunate that the knowledge in one region about the other has, generally speaking, tended to remain relatively insignificant. Europe—apart from Great Britain and Portugal—know little about India, and India, though well informed about Great Britain, know little about the rest of Europe’ (Pelinka, 1998: 9). There seems to exist both ‘a knowledge gap’ and ‘a cultural gap’. Asian and European management cultures differ and these differences can often become obstacles to investment flows (Molden, 1983: 17). Similarly, there is no corresponding information and interpretation of contemporary India’s political problems and goals in Austria except some sections of the Austrian press. An additional problem is that the Austrian media is dependent on German TV productions, and the German print media has taken over a significant section of the Austrian papers.

Austria in Indian Scholarly Literature The first article to appear in the India Quarterly—the house journal of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)—made references about the establishment of the Austrian Treaty Commission in 1947 and the disagreements which bedevilled its deliberations (Mookerjee, 1949: 319– 310, 313–315). Eleven years later, Alfred Verdross examined the concept

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of neutrality and how it influenced Austria’s admission in the United Nations in December 1955 (Verdross, 1960). Three years later, the journal also reprinted the speech of Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky to the ICWA on ‘Trends in European Economy’ in which he argued that Austria, like other Euroneutrals (Switzerland and Sweden) because of its neutrality could participate in European economic integration (Kreisky, 1963: 340). The other leading international affairs journal, International Studies , carried several articles on Austria during 1959–2021. In its very first issue, it carried an article entitled ‘European Economic Integration and Asia’s Trade’ which stressed that one of the most compelling factors in Western Europe had been the desire to achieve closer political and economic integration. The Organization for the European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (including Austria) had been fairly successful in developing a cooperative approach to European economic problems in several fields, especially in reducing restrictions on intra-European trade and payments since its establishment in 1948 (Mookerjee, 1959). Two years later, another article dealt with the establishment of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (including Austria), India’s trade with EFTA and the impact of the EFTA on India’s trade (Ray, 1961). In 1966, another article stressed the importance of neutrality in preserving Austrian security in the context of East-West rivalry in Europe (Rewadikar, 1965). The next article on Austria was published a decade-and-a-half later on the Euroneutrals, which argued that Switzerland, Austria and Finland’s neutral status was legal whereas that of Sweden was basically political. Although four countries had acquired guest status at non-aligned gatherings, neutrality and non-alignment were essential ‘two different cups of tea’ (Misra, 1981: 30–31). Austria has provided the theme for another article by H.G. Pant (1965) which argued that the essence of Austria’s policy had been to protect independence and statehood from danger. Otherwise, since 1995 it had a pro-West bias besides having no tradition of neutrality. The latter concurred, but suggested that Austria must be very cautious in the observance of neutrality as it is carefully observed both by the East and the West (Pant, 1965, cited in Dua, 1988: 192–193). Another article dealt with Indo-Austrian cultural encounter (Chandra & Chandrika, 1990). There have not been too many books about Austria published in India. There have been two volumes published as a result of joint Indo-Austrian

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seminars on non-alignment and neutrality (Misra, 1982; Murthy & Shrivastava, 1990). On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Indo-Austrian relations, two events were held in New Delhi and Vienna, which led to the publication of a small occasional paper by the Diplomatic Academy (1999) which contained several articles dealing with various dimensions of relations between the two countries (Jain, 1999; Jankowitsch, 1999a; Palme, 1999). The last book on Austria was published two decades ago (Nair & Saran, 2002), which dealt with economic ties between India and Austria.

Cultural Ties Indology began to be taught at the University of Vienna in 1845 by Anton Boller who began teaching Sanskrit. An independent Chair of Indology was established in 1880 under Prof. Georg Bühler when Vienna became a centre for Indological studies. The Chair for Indology was interrupted for a brief period from 1938 to 1955, after which it became known as Institute for South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at University of Vienna (India, MEA, 2019: 5). Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore visited Vienna in 1921 and 1926. In 1932 Subhas Chandra Bose came to Vienna and established an India-Central European Society for the promotion of commercial and cultural cooperation between India and Central European countries. In the early 1980s, two conferences with the support of the Austrian Government were organized: a conference on economic development and socio-cultural changes in India since 1947 by the Austria-India Society with two Austrian universities (Austria, MFA, 1982: 45) and the IndiaWest Europe Dialogue Congress in Alpbach. A boost to tourism and trade was given by the launch of thrice weekly Vienna-New Delhi flights on 25 October 1997. In an effort to promote Austrian cultural heritage and culture abroad, the Austrian Cultural Forum was established in New Delhi in 2007. A MoU for the establishment of the first-ever short-term Chair of Indian Studies at an Austrian university was signed between the Indian Council of Cultural Relations and the University of Vienna in February 2011 and renewed in June 2016. There was no formal cultural exchange programme between India and Austria until February 2016 when an MoU on cultural exchange was signed.

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In 2018, nearly 200,000 Indians visited Austria (eturbonews.com, 2019). Over the years, over 80 Bollywood films have been partly shot in Austria, with the two most recent ones being ‘Tiger Zinda Hai’ (2017) and ‘Saaho’ (2019) (Öppinger-walchshofer, 2019). The number of Indians in Austria number over 31,000 with most of them being from Kerala and Punjab and work mostly in healthcare and self-employed sectors (India, MEA, 2019: 5).

Conclusion Despite the wide discrepancies between the two countries in size and population, three factors apparently brought India and Austria together in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Firstly, the Austrian policy of ‘permanent neutrality’ (non-membership of any military alliances and refusal to permit the establishment of military bases on its soil) and India’s policy of non-alignment facilitated closer cooperation on a number of issues. It looked to India for help and assistance when Austria was in difficulty or isolated. The two countries shared a lot in the non-aligned movement. However, they had different agendas and priorities regarding non-alignment. At the non-aligned summit at Lusaka (1971), Austrian diplomats had to negotiate the status of Austria without clear instructions. At the conference, India suggested that Austria be registered as a ‘guest’ (Jankowitsch, 1999b). Secondly, India’s constructive role in influencing the Soviet decision to conclude the Austrian peace treaty earned Nehru the great sympathy of the Austrians, especially Bruno Kreisky. Thirdly, Bruno Kreisky was among the earliest Western statesmen to focus on the imbalance and inequities in the international economic system. Along with Chancellor Willy Brandt of Germany and Sir Olof Palme of Sweden, he was part of the Social Democratic trio who were generally perceived to take a liberal and progressive outlook towards the developing countries. These three factors fostered sentimental bonds, but do not seem to have brought about any substantive changes to Indo-Austrian relations. In the post-Cold War era, these initial bonds were neither evident nor relevant in bilateral relations. In the post-Cold War era, the geopolitical milieu in and around Austria had undergone a dramatic metamorphosis. As a landlocked state with nine neighbours, Austrian foreign policy priorities have always been Eurocentric and these preoccupations were further reinforced by the events of 1989. As a country on the East-West divide,

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Austria has been exposed to a variety of challenges since the 1990s which were unknown and unheard of during the Cold War era. As a country with nine neighbours, it became increasingly preoccupied with the European Union and its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe. Since it became a member of the European Union (1995), Austrian business and industry for some years underwent a process of adjustment that EU membership entailed, which led to a neglect of other areas of the world. For decades, the Austrian elite, the political leadership and the corporate sector had neglected in Asia (except China), which remains largely peripheral to Austrian economic and political interests. Similarly, India has historically prioritized in the Big Four (the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy). This led to a neglect of other small European countries by both the GoI and the corporate sector. For instance, the first CII mission to Austria was on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1999. For decades, when Indian trade delegations went to the Federal Republic of Germany, they did not go to Austria. Thus, both India and Austria pursued a policy of benign mutual neglect. There have never been any direct conflicting political or strategic interests between the two countries. Indo-Austrian relations have been friendly without any ‘open problems’ (Kirchsleger, 1974, 16 April). They were described as ‘not burdened with any open problems’ (Austria, MFA, 1979: 318); a ‘problem-free’ relationship (Austria, MFA, 1980: 313). For most Austrians, India remains both an exotic and a mentally and physically distant land. As long as Austrian companies are hesitant to more proactively engage India, trade would be stagnant. The crossing of the $1 billion trade turnover in 2021 is not particularly spectacular. The priorities, compulsions and geographical milieus of India and Austria are not going to change in the near future. The primary focus of relations has been and will continue to be economic. The depth, intensity and density of economic relations will be a major factor conditioning the overall political profile in the relationship.

References Assam Tribune. (1999, November 9). India, Austria sign two agreements. Austria, Austrian Economic Chamber. (2017, May). Statistical Yearbook 2017 . Vienna.

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Schallenberg, A. (2023a, January 2). Remarks during a joint press conference with Jaishankar, Vienna. ANI, “‘I want more’: Austrian Foreign Minister on ties with India,” The Print. Retrieved January 4, 2023 https://theprint.in/ world/i-want-more-austrian-foreign-minister-on-ties-with-india/1294392/ Schallenberg, A. (2023b, January 2). Remarks during a joint press conference with Jaishankar, Vienna. Cited in R. H. Laskar, ‘India, Austria FMs back peaceful resolution of Ukraine conflict,’ Hindustan Times. Retrieved January 5, 2023 from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-austriafms-back-peaceful-resolution-of-ukraine-conflict-101672669697567.html Senapati, M. (1998, December). A new beginning. International Times: The Austrian Advantage, special supplement of The Economic Times. Shah, M. (1963, November 7). Remarks by Minster for International Trade to Foreign Minister Kreisky, New Delhi. Austrian team to visit India, Expanding trade relations. TOI. Sharma, L. K. (1983, June 29). Indian overtures to Europe. TOI. Singh, J. D. (1970, September 14). Socialist gains in Europe: Coincidence or trend? TOI. Singh, J. D. (1971, October 28). Austrians back PM, but not in public. TOI. Singh, S. (1999, November 10). Austria nursed ambition to colonise Nicobar. The Pioneer (New Delhi). Singh, S. K. (1984, July–August). Indisch-Österreichische Beziehungen: Aussichten und Perspektiven. Interview of Indian Ambassador to Austria. Indien (pp. 15–16). Indian Embassy in Germany. Singh, T. N. (1965, September 17). Statement by the Minister of Industry. Lok Sabha Debates, 3rd series, 12th sess., vol. 46, no. 24. Sinha, Y. (1998, July 10). Statement by Minister of Finance. Lok Sabha Debates, 12th series, 2nd sess., vol. 3, no. 19. Sinowatz, F. (1983a, June 11). Interview, Vienna. Cited in I. Malhotra, ‘Sinowatz filling Bruno’s shoes well,’ TOI, 12 June. Sinowatz, F. (1983b, June 17). Banquet speech in honour of Indira Gandhi, Vienna. Cited in L. K. Sharma, ‘India and Austria to work for peace,’ TOI, 18 June. Spindelegger, M. (2012, April 26). Press release, Spindelegger, Stop the nuclear arms race in Asia. Retrieved 21 May 2021 from https://www.bmeia.gv.at/ en/the-ministry/press/news/2012/spindelegger-stop-the-nuclear-arms-racein-asia/ Spindelegger, M. (2011, November 22). Austrian foreign policy: Taking stock in times of change—A positioning analysis. Address by Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister to the Foreign Policy and United Nations Association of

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Austria. Retrieved 23 May 2021 from https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-min istry/press/speeches/2011/address-by-vice-chancellor-and-foreign-ministerdr-michael-spindelegger-to-the-foreign-policy-and-united-nations-associationof-austria/ Stourzh, G. (1980). Geschichte des Staatsvertages 1945–1955: Österreichs Weg zur Neutralitaet. Verlag Styria. Stourzh, G. (1981). Towards the settlement of 1955: The Austrian State Treaty negotiations and the origins of Austrian neutrality. Austrian history yearbook (Vol. 17, pp. 174–187). University of Minnesota Press. Stourzh, G., & Mueller, W. (2018). A Cold War over Austria: The struggle for the state treaty, neutrality, and the end of East-West occupation, 1945–1955. Lexington Books. The Hindu. (1093, December 8). Austria offers aid for Vijayanagar steel plant. Tiwari, Y. M. (1999). Interview with Indian Ambassador to Austria. Indien Panorama (New Delhi), no. 1, pp. 7–10. TOI. (1947a, January 18). Talks on treaty for Austria. TOI. (1947b, March 2). A tremendous task. TOI. (1949a, December 24). Austrian tin for India. TOI. (1949b, December 27). Austrian envoy to India. TOI. (1950, November 12). Indo-Austrian trade pact to be signed. TOI. (1956a, April 16). Editorial, Austrian Treaty. TOI. (1956b, September 9). Indo-Austrian trade pact extended. TOI. (1969, July 8). India’s image in Austria needs brushing up. TOI. (1971, October 29). Remarks by Kreisky to Indian journalists, Vienna. TOI. (1977, June 27). Great world figure. Austrian tribute to Mr Nehru. TOI. (1983a, May 2). Editorial. Portugal and Austria. TOI. (1983b, December 8). Non-aligned move to end arms race urged. TOI. (1984, April 2). Editorial, A good visit. TOI. (2000, February 7). Editorial. Austria über alles. Tradingeconomics.com. (2022). India imports from Austria of Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories. Retrieved December 5, 2022 from https:// tradingeconomics.com/india/imports/austria/arms-ammunition-parts-access ories. Traxl, H. (1999, June 22). Interview of Austrian ambassador to India. TOI. Vajpayee, A. B. (1978a, May 21). Remarks by Foreign Minister at a press conference, New Delhi. Hindustan Times, May 22. Vajpayee, A.B. (1978b, May 22). Speech by Foreign Minister at a dinner in his honour by Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr, Vienna. Foreign Affairs Record. Vajpayee, A. B. (1978c, May 22). Remarks by Foreign Minister at a press conference, Vienna. TOI, May 23.

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Varadarajan, S. (2008a, August 23). Fixing a way round the code of Omerta. The Hindu. Retrieved 28 May 2021 from https://svaradarajan.com/2008/ 08/23/nsg-diary-finding-a-way-round-the-code-of-omerta/ Varadarajan, S. (2008b, August 26). NSG statement by the ‘Gang of Six’. The Hindu. Retrieved 28 May 2021 from https://svaradarajan.com/2008b/08/ 26/nsg-statement-by-the-gang-of-six/ Verdross, A. (1960). Austria, neutrality and the United Nations. India Quarterly, 16(1), 24–30. Vivekanandan, B. (2016). Global visions of Olof Palme, Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt: International peace and security, co-operation, and development. Palgrave Macmillan. Wiener Zeitung. (1999, November 9). Hoher Besuch aus Indien. Wiener Zeitung. (2023a, January 2). Österreich und Indien vereinbaren Migrations- und Mobilitätspakt. Retrieved January 5, 2023 from https:// www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/welt/2173418-Oesterreich-undIndien-vereinbaren-Migrations-und-Mobilitaetspakt.html Wiener Zeitung. (2023b, January 3). Ein Abkommen mit Fragezeichen. Retrieved January 5, 2023 from https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/ politik/oesterreich/2173466-Ein-Abkommen-mit-Fragezeichen.html Wikileaks. (2006, March 9). Remarks by Dorothea Auer, Austrian MFA Assistant Secretary-equivalent for Nonproliferation, and her deputy Alexander Kmentt, 8 March 2006. Wikileaks cable 06VIENNA722_a, 9 March 2006, US-India Civil nuclear energy: Austrian EU Presidency response. Retrieved 21 May 2021 from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06VIENNA722_a.html Wikileaks. (2008a, July 31). Cable 08VIENNA1095_a, 31 July 2008, Austrians promote joint statement of concern at IAEA India Safeguards Vote. Retrieved 21 May 2021 from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08VIENNA1095_a. html Wikileaks. (2008b, August 14). Cable o8UNVIENNA437_a, IAEA Board adopts India safeguards agreement. Retrieved 21 May 2021 from https://wikileaks. org/plusd/cables/08UNVIEVIENNA437_a.html Wikileaks. (2008c, August 26). Cable 08NEWDELHI2297_a, Special Envoy Saran says nuclear suppliers exception should stay within existing agreements. Retrieved 21 May 2021 from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NEWD ELHI2297_a.html Wikileaks. (2008d, August 28). Cable o8NEWDELHI2319_A. Retrieved 19 May 2021 from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NEWDELHI2319_a. html

CHAPTER 12

India and Central Europe Rajendra K. Jain

This chapter examines the political and economic relations between India and the Visegrad Four during the Cold War and discusses the vicissitudes of relations since the early 1990s. It assesses the proactive engagement of Central Europe under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It goes on to examine the nature of India-Central Europe defence cooperation and export of military equipment to India. After discussing various dimensions of cultural relations between the two countries, the chapter makes some concluding observations. This chapter uses the term Central Europe to denote the Visegrad Four, viz. Poland, the Czech Republic/Czechia,1 Hungary and Slovakia.

1 The official name of the country continues to remain as Czech Republic, but Czechia became the official shortened geographic name in 2016 (BBC 2016).

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_12

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The Cold War Era India established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia (18 November 1947), Hungary (18 November 1948) and Poland (30 March 1954). Hungary opened an embassy in New Delhi in 1951, but India upgraded its Legation to Embassy only on 1 December 1959. An Embassy was opened in Warsaw in 1957, but for seven years the Indian Ambassador in Moscow was concurrently accredited to Budapest and Warsaw rather than having a separate head of mission. After the Second World War, the governments of Eastern Europe, independent India’s first Foreign Secretary maintained, had turned out to be ‘instruments of Communist expansion’. And ‘where there were non-Communist elements, experience showed, as in Czechoslovakia, that they would be allowed to stay there long’ (Menon, 1950: 8–9). In its quest for security, the Soviet Union sought to establish ‘a regular Soviet belt, a cordon sanitaire’. Poland, Hungary, Finland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia—all were ‘links in this new iron girdle’ (Menon, 1950: 8, 10). Independent India accepted ‘the post-war hegemony of the Soviet Union over the countries of Eastern Europe as it accepted the Monroe Doctrine of US hegemony over Latin America’ (Mansingh, 1965: 145). There were marginal exchanges between India and Eastern Europe immediately after India gained independence, but began to pick up in the mid-1950s. India’s relations with these countries developed as ‘a necessary adjunct’ (Kaushik, 1985: 14) of Indo-Soviet relations. India’s reasons for forging closer relations with East Europe in the mid-1950s, included, among others, to keep Western pressures at bay to secure political support in world organizations on vital issues, and to diversify the sources of external assistance (Rajan, 1964: 304; Sondhi, 1963: 156). Trade with Eastern Europe provided India with an assured market for Indian manufactured and processed goods, which could not be easily sold in hard currency areas, the possibility of obtaining capital goods on a barter basis, and the determined effort by both sides to balance the trade (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 425). From 1992 until 2004, the Central and East European countries were ‘obsessed’ with admission in the EU and NATO. For a decade, they were preoccupied with these processes, which left them little time beyond the EU and transatlantic relations.

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Czechoslovakia In the mid-1950s, Czechoslovakia followed the Soviet lead in its outreach towards the Third World in order to regain economic opportunities, demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow by being an asset to Soviet foreign policy, and enhance the communist regime’s legitimacy (Muelenbeck, 2016: 19). As one of the largest developing countries and leaders of non-aligned countries, India became the object of special Czechoslovak attention. During his visit in June 1955, Jawaharlal Nehru found Czechoslovakia to be ‘a very unhappy country’ (Nehru, 1955a: 305) that communism in Central and East European Countries (CEECs) had been ‘imposed by Russian arms’. All CEECs, except Czechoslovakia and East Germany, were ‘backward socially and economically and standards were low’ (Nehru, 1955b: 268). During Prime Minister Viliam Siroky’s return visit in January 1958, the Panchshila or Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was endorsed. The two countries adjudged disarmament to be ‘the most urgent and vital problem of international concern’ (India, MEA, 1958: 1–2).

Hungarian Uprising, 1956 The political upheaval in Hungary, which began on 23 October 1956, was the result of economic problems—large-scale industrialization which led to lop-sided development, including food shortages and unemployment (Nehru, 1957: 80). Five key factors—economic deterioration, the reign of the Stalinists, the rehabilitation, Soviet troops and Titoism—were ‘instrumental in filling the powder keg’ (Rahman, 1956). In his first public reaction on 25 October, Nehru regarded the Hungarian uprising to be ‘a nationalist upsurge’ (Nehru, 1956a: 5) and a ‘powerful and widespread national uprising...against Soviet forces and interference’ (Nehru, 1956b: 452; 1956c: 456). Of the three resolutions of 8 and 9 November 1956 at the UN General Assembly, India voted against the first one because it called for elections to be held in Hungary under UN auspices. New Delhi abstained on the second resolution sponsored by the United States condemning Soviet actions in Hungary and calling for a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. India voted in support of the third resolution sponsored by Austria, which called for increased aid to Hungary. New Delhi had voted against

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US-sponsored resolution because it was different from a ‘fact-finding mission’. Nehru considered the proposal ‘not only unconstitutional but dangerous precedent for other countries’ (Nehru, 1956c: 462). India took ‘strong exception’ to the holding of elections in Hungary under UN supervision because it was contrary to the UN Charter and because it would reduce Hungary to ‘less than a sovereign State’. Foreign supervised elections would also set ‘a precedent which might be utilised in future for intervention in other countries’ (Nehru, 1956d: cols. 265–266). New Delhi’s staunch opposition to UN-supervised elections in Kashmir was widely known. The Indian vote was bitterly criticized in many countries including India. Nehru in a statement in the Rajya Sabha on 13 December stated that 25,000 Hungarians and 7,000 Russians had been killed in the fighting in Hungary. The damage to Budapest, Menon reported, was ‘heart rending’ and on a ‘wartime scale’ (Nehru, 1956e: 206–208). The UN General Assembly adopted 11 resolutions in all on the Hungarian question. India voted in favour of three, against one and abstained on seven. India abstained from voting on resolutions on Hungary in the UN General Assembly on the grounds that those resolutions which used language inimical to conciliation, those which were ideologically motivated, those which implied a non-independent status for Hungary, and those which tried to introduce UN personnel into Hungary without the explicit consent of the Hungarian government (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 429–430). Nehru’s overwhelming concern, however, was to ensure that no war emerged from the ‘powder keg of Central Europe’ (Mansingh, 1965: 155; Menon, 1956). Unlike the Suez crisis, where India adopted a high moral posture, New Delhi ‘temporized’ and was ‘ambiguous’ and not critical of the Soviet Union for invading Hungary (Dixit, 2003: 349).

India-China War, 1962 There was some degree of caution and uncertainty in the response of some of the East European countries in 1959 when the facts about the India-China border conflict came to be known. It was only after the first Tass Agency statement on the India-China border conflict that East European countries fell in line with the Soviet point of view. The Sino-Indian War undeniably put an additional strain on Indo-Soviet relations as well relations of the socialist countries with India (Hilger, 2017: 152).

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Prime Minister Janos Kadar expressed his ‘profound anxiety’ at the ‘tragic situation’ that had arisen on the Indian border. He urged Nehru to accept the Chinese proposal for negotiations (Kadar, 1962: 767–769). Initially, Hungary had an ambivalent attitude towards the Chinese aggression in 1962. It was only when Moscow’s attitude changed in favour of India that the CEECs passed resolutions at successive party meetings denouncing the Chinese action against India. These countries ‘stood’ by India and were thus deemed to be ‘important politically’ (Singh, 1964: 222). Poland did not initially fully support India’s stance on the 1962 IndiaChina War. It was only in 1967 after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s discussions in Moscow and Warsaw that there was ‘a perceptible change’ for the better in the Soviet and Polish approach to the Sino-Indian conflict (Reddy, 1967a: 1).

Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968 In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968), Indira Gandhi felt that peace in Central Europe remained fragile. An ‘establishment scholar’, however, acknowledged that though ‘an indignant public opinion’ demanded that the Government of India should follow the rest of the world in condemning Soviet aggression, it was also ‘widely felt’ that close Indo-Soviet relations were also vital (Appadorai, 1969: 174). This was characteristic of Mrs. Gandhi’s ‘selective application of ideology’ and her reluctance to apply ‘anti-imperialism to the Soviets over Czechoslovakia’ (Tharoor, 1982: 399). Unlike her father’s one-day stop-over, Indira Gandhi arrived in Prague for a four-day goodwill visit. She appreciated its prompt support for Bangladesh and the growth of the machine tool and electrical equipment industries in India (Gandhi, 1972a: 148). Détente in Europe, she remarked, indicated that while European nations were gradually realizing the incalculable harm of the arms race and the disastrous consequences of large-scale confrontation, the rest of the world was not at peace, with Asia being wrecked by vicious wars and an uneasy truce. (Gandhi, 1972b: 152; India, MEA, 1973: 49).

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Visits During 1960s and 1970s The first Indian prime ministerial visit to Hungary took place nearly a quarter century after the establishment of diplomatic relations. Indira Gandhi acknowledged that Budapest had consistently shown ‘political understanding’ towards India and stood by it when events in Bangladesh confronted New Delhi with an unprecedented challenge. She welcomed the spirit of reconciliation and appreciated the significance of the treaties signed by West Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland as well as the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (see Jain, 1993). During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the number of high-level visits, exchanges of parliamentary delegations and ministerial consultative, informative, working level talks between India and Hungary were extensive both in terms of level as well as covering practically every field of cooperation. During his two-day visit to Budapest, Rajiv Gandhi spoke about the rich cultural links between India and Hungary and his speech at the United Nations at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, where he put forward an action plan which sought the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2010. He appreciated Hungary’s support for India’s proposal for a new international economic order (Gandhi, 1988: 196).

India and Poland India’s relations with Poland during the Cold War were characterized by close but never intense political engagement. During his visit to Poland in June 1955, Nehru was extremely overwhelmed with sorrow and anger when he visited the Auschwitz concentration camp—the ‘most gruesome place’ where six million Jews had been done to death by the Nazis (Nehru, 1955c: 272). He found Poland to be imbued with ‘a feeling of self-confidence’ as well as ‘a sense of pride’ in their achievements. Relations between the two countries were described as friendly, with ‘no problems or controversies’ (India, MEA, 1955: 129). During his visit to India in March 1957, Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz sought to gain India’s support for the international recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line to stabilize Poland’s Western border with Germany. In order to secure Delhi’s trust and confidence, the Polish Premier supported India’s ‘full right’ to Kashmir and Goa and expressed the desire that a ‘successful

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settlement’ of the Kashmir question should be made without outside interference (Cyrankiewicz, 1957: 7). Rapacki Plan, 1957 Nehru appreciated Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki’s proposal (2 October 1957) to establish a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe encompassing Poland, the two German states and Czechoslovakia since anything that lessened tension and fear should be welcomed (Nehru, 1958a: 788–789). If the proposal was agreed upon, it would be ‘a great gain’ if the principle could be extended elsewhere. However, he felt that if ‘a parallel proposal’ relating to a large number of countries in Asia were to be made at this stage, it could come in the way of even ‘the limited Polish proposal being considered on its merits’ (Nehru, 1958b: 750). From a military point of view, the Polish proposal did not take ‘one very far’ or make much of a difference one or two other countries joined it (Nehru, 1958c: col. 1384) and possibly lead to the achievement of general and complete disarmament (India, MEA, 1961). Nobody, Nehru maintained, suggested that the acceptance of the Rapacki Plan would solve the major problems of Europe ‘either in a military sense or in any other sense’. But it was ‘a good first step’ which could lead to ‘a bigger step of making that area, or indeed any area, an area of ‘disengagement’ of nuclear weapons as well as other arms (Nehru, 1958d: 742). Recognition of Frontiers India was forthright in asserting that the eastern and southeastern borders of Germany should be defined in conformity with the post-war settlement and that the Oder-Neisse Line be universally endorsed. Nehru urged the unequivocal acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier because any talk or ‘even hinting at the possibility of a change’ would make the situation much worse (Nehru, 1961a: 232, 234–235) and be disastrous for mankind (Nehru, 1961c: 7). The whole atmosphere, Nehru told the Rajya Sabha, was ‘vitiated by the uncertainty in regard to frontiers’. ‘If anything is certain’, he added, ‘it is this, that any attempt to change that [German] frontier will lead to war’ (Nehru, 1961b: 435). India had, in fact, from the very beginning expressed its ‘open support’ to Poland’s boundaries in the West. New Delhi was pleased that the Warsaw Treaty

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(7 December 1960) had recognized this both ‘in fact and in law’ (Gandhi, 1973: 24–25).

Bangladesh Crisis, 1971 India appreciated the stand of most East European countries, including Poland, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic, which were among the first countries to recognize Bangladesh and favourably supported India in the United Nations on the freedom struggle in Bangladesh (Singh, 1972: 94–95). Warsaw supported India’s stand on the East Pakistan crisis in the United Nations (India, MEA, 1972: 15–16).

1990 Changes When Central Europe was in turmoil, Minister of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh visited East Germany, Hungary and Poland in June 1989. He recounted a discussion with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, who asked: ‘... tell me where was India all these ten years?’—a reminder of India’s neglect of the region during the Cold War era. The Indian Minister replied: ‘Mr. Walesa, I want to talk to you about the future, not the past’. As a former Ambassador to Poland, Singh admitted: ‘I knew we had absolutely no contacts in these countries, and frankly, because we did not expect those changes’ (Singh, 1995: 154). India did not anticipate the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Gujral perceived the ‘radical changes’ in Central and Eastern Europe to be the result of perestroika. The ‘reordering’ of Eastern Europe, he felt, was ‘epoch-making’ and generally welcomed the ‘reaffirmation of the democratic spirit’ (Gujral, 1990: 61). New Delhi welcomed the trends in the direction of democratization, political pluralism and the evolution of more representative systems and institutions reflecting popular aspirations. Clearly, the East European revolutions destroyed many impressions and delusions. The lesson, Gujral concluded, was that ‘successful socialism needs democratic party participation’ (cited in Crossette, 1990). The 1990s witnessed radical shifts in their perceptions and assessments of Indian domestic and foreign policy. New Delhi could no longer take their political and moral support on various international issues for granted since much prior to their accession, the CEECs had already realigned their foreign policy priorities with those of the European Union

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and its Member States. They were less appreciative of or openly critical of India’s stand towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty, human rights violations in Kashmir, the situation in Punjab and policies towards neighbours. They were critical of India’s 1998 nuclear tests and had divergent views on various international issues—Iraq (2003), Libya (2011) and Syria (post2011). In reality, Indian policy-makers viewed ‘East Europe’ through the Russian prism. With the withering away of the traditional bonhomie, India had to forge closer political ties with new elites. The Central and East European countries were described as ‘the “Third World” of the affluent West’.

The 1990s: Poland India faded into the margins of Polish foreign policy. In mid-1990, President Jaruzelski reassured the visiting Lok Sabha Speaker that Warsaw understood and appreciated India’s position on Kashmir and that any dispute should be solved bilaterally between India and Pakistan in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Simla Agreement (India, MEA, 1990: 147). However, President Walesa remained somewhat cool towards India given New Delhi’s friendly relations with the Soviet Union all these years (Talwalkar, 1990: 13). The visit of President Lech Walesa in 3–8 March 1994—the first visit by a Polish head of state in 33 years—made it possible to resume high-level political dialogue. Warsaw was sensitive to Indian concerns about Kashmir and agreed that outstanding issues between India and Pakistan should be settled bilaterally. At Geneva, however, Warsaw, like EU Member States, did not support Pakistan’s resolution introduced in the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1994 (India, MEA, 1994a: 57). Discussions led to agreement that India and Poland would exchange views on the restructuring of the United Nations Security Council. It was also decided to resume meetings of the Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, (not held since September 1990), but were now scheduled to be held later in the year (Khurshid, 1994: cols. 53–54). Poland and Hungary adopted a critical attitude towards India’s 1998 nuclear tests and expressed its concern about nuclear and missile proliferation and urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Budapest was also critical of the 1998 nuclear tests and urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other non-proliferation treaties.

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Reform of the UN The Czech Republic had lent support to India’s demand for the enlargement of the United Nations Security Council as early as February 1994 when President Havel visited India. The Czech Republic initially considered the reform of the United Nations to be ‘a thematic and long-term task’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2003b: 21). Despite the absence of a common EU position on UN reform, during the Spring of 2005 the Czech Republic was one of the early co-sponsors of the G-4 (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil) resolution for the enlargement of the UN Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. Prague also supported the re-tabling of the G-4 resolution at the UN in 2006. Prime Minister Paroubek reiterated that, as the world’s largest democracy with an active global role, India has all the credentials for permanent membership in an expanded Security Council (India, MEA, 2006). Poland had somewhat reluctantly supported India’s candidature for a permanent seat in an expanded in 2005. On several subsequent occasions, Warsaw reaffirmed its support, but tended to link it with wider structural reform of the United Nations and the evolution of a common EU position on UN reforms. For instance, in July 2011 Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski told Polish reporters that he viewed Indian UNSC membership in the context of wider reform of the United Nations which would make the European Union, as ‘a future superpower, also a permanent member of the UN’ (Kugiel, 2011, 1–2; PAP News Agency, 2011). Slovakia reiterated its support for India’s candidature for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India’s ‘permanent presence’ as the largest democracy in the world in an expanded UN Security Council would give it ‘greater legitimacy and enhance its effectiveness’ (India, MEA, 2004: para 11).

Outreach to Asia in the 2000s In accordance with the Policy Statement of August 1998 and the ‘Concept of Foreign Policy, February 1999’, the Czech Republic in order to overcome earlier neglect, Prague announced its intention to pay greater attention to relations with countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to regain market share and restore economic ties. India was acknowledged to

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have played ‘a prominent role’ in world organizations, the Indian subcontinent and ‘the whole of Asia’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 1999: 175), as ‘among the regional super-powers’ which also sought to play the role of ‘a super-power on a worldwide scale’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2001: 167). Recognition of the need to extend and diversify trade from an undue economic dependence on the West led the Czech Republic to draft an Asia Strategy.2 In response to the global financial crisis, the Export Strategy for 2012–2020 recognized India’s potential and China, India and Vietnam in Asia were among the twelve priority countries identified for major attention (Czech Republic, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2012: 16). The Conceptual Basis of Czech Foreign Policy for 2011 declared its intention to develop relations with India and Brazil ‘as international players with significant growth potential and increasing leverage in world politics’ (Czech Republic, MFA, 2011). Four years later, the Czech MFA came out with a new Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy (3 August 2015) noted that economic growth of emerging economies in Asia had bolstered ‘the global South’s claims to rule-setting regarding the global economy and international trade’. It recognized India as ‘the dominant economic partner’ in South Asia (Czech Republic, MFA, 2015). Given its preoccupation with the accession to the European Union and NATO from 1989 to 2004, Hungary turned away from ‘geographically or geopolitically distant areas of Asia, Africa, Latin American and the post-Soviet region’ (Hungary, MFA, 2011: 38). Budapest introduced the concept of ‘Global Opening’, which sought to revitalize ties with those parts of the world that had been accorded ‘lesser importance in Hungary’s foreign policy focus in recent years’ (Hungary, MFA, 2011: 9). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán launched the ‘Eastern Opening’ policy on 5 September 2010 which sought to salvage the crisis-ridden economy, reduce the economic dependence on the West by enhancing exports, and attract foreign direct investment from the rapidly growing Asian markets (Jozwiak, 2017: 2). The adoption of a Polish Strategy towards Non-European Developing Countries in November 2004—the first comprehensive document laying down foundations for further cooperation with non-European countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America—sought to deal with non-European 2 The draft entitled ‘The Czech Republic in Asia: Strategy for the Development of Relations with Regions and Countries of Asia’ (2006) was not published.

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relations in ‘a more consistent and comprehensive way’ (Kuzniar, 2009: 281). The key motivating factors behind the Strategy included poor internationalization of Poland’s economy, low trade, a persistent trade deficit with Asia, globalization, the growing importance of some non-European regions/countries, and the desire to maintain relative competitiveness (Fotyaga, 2007; Kacpercyzk, 2005: 190–191). China and India were identified as ‘priority’ states in Northeast and South Asia. The Strategy highlighted the positive factors contributing to greater cooperation with India, viz. a very large consumer market, substantial GDP growth rate, developed cooperation with the EU, gradual reduction of import tariffs, inclusion of India in the list of countries which were eligible for Polish government credits, and high intensity of bilateral economic contacts. However, the Strategy considered ‘the potential failure of negotiations on the disputed territory of Kashmir and the escalation of the conflict with Pakistan’ as ‘a major threat’ to the further development of bilateral cooperation (Poland, MFA, 2004: 22–23).

The Nuclear Suppliers Group When the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative came up in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2005, the Czech Republic acknowledged that while India had not expressed an intention to accede to the NPT, it had made a commitment to separate its civil nuclear programme from its military one. At the two extraordinary NSG sessions in June and August 2008, which led to the adoption of an exception for the export of nuclear items to India for exclusive use in its civilian nuclear sector, Prague supported India’s case. In July 2008, the Special Envoy of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Poland to seek support for a waiver of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Warsaw extended its unconditional support for India’s specific waiver at the NSG meeting that took place in August 2008 in Vienna. During the visit of Foreign Minister Janus Kubis in April 2008, Slovakia indicated its willingness to support India’s case at the NSG and expressed its understanding for New Delhi’s desire to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The MEA despatched Secretary (Economic Relations) to Slovakia as a special envoy of the Prime Minister. Slovakia subsequently supported India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting held in September 2008.

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The 2000s Poland In the early 2000s, the MEA continued to give an unduly positive spin to an otherwise lacklustre relationship and reiterated that political relations had been ‘problem-free’. There also seemed to be some degree of bureaucratic inertia or mutual lack of interest in regularly holding Foreign Office Consultations (FOCs). After the initial two FOCs in October 1996 and April 1997, the next two were held after a gap of five years each—February 2002 and August 2007. The fifth FOC was held in June 2008, but once again, the next two were held after an interval of four years—November 2012 and August 2016. FOCs have now settled down on a biennial rhythm with the eighth one being held in January 2018 and the ninth one on 10 August 2020 as a virtual meeting owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. Eighteen years after his predecessor, Prime Minister Leszek Miller’s visited India (15–18 February 2003). The visit led to the signing of three agreements on 17 February: an agreement on defence cooperation, an extradition treaty and an agreement on cooperation in combating organized crime. It was also decided to appoint a Joint Commission which would examine various possibilities and initiatives in fostering economic cooperation.3 President Pratibha Patil’s visit to Poland in April 2009 led to the signing of two agreements on cooperation in tourism as well as health care and medical science. Next year, the key objective behind Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s visit to India in September 2010 was to enhance trade and economic ties and set a goal to double trade by 2014. He reaffirmed Polish support for India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for 2011–2012. In order to enhance Poland’s brand awareness globally and as part of the Polish cultural offensive in Asia, Warsaw established a Polish Institute in New Delhi in June 2012. The Institute’s activities have, however, been curtailed in recent years due to budgetary cuts.

3 The intergovernmental commission on economics, trade, scientific and technological cooperation facilitates cooperation in the relevant fields replaced the one established in 1972 and held its first meeting in New Delhi in May 2008.

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Hungary To mark the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán visited India on 16–18 October 2013 with a 100-member delegation, including 80 businessmen. India, he stated, should think of itself not as a regional power but as a global power and to draw all the consequences and challenges that come with that role. With India’s ‘global role in mind’, Budapest had supported New Delhi’s candidature for a permanent seat to the United Nations Security Council (Orbán, 2013). Orbán’s visit led to the signing of four MoUs and two letters of intent.4 Slovakia India’s relations with Slovakia—the smallest country among the Visegrad Four—are relatively recent. For nearly a decade-and-a-half since it became independent in 1993, Bratislava was preoccupied with its neighbourhood. The relationship has been characterized by low key, irregular political interaction, nominal trade and marginal foreign direct investment. India established diplomatic relations with Slovakia immediately following the creation of the new republic. In 1994, the Slovak Republic upgraded its diplomatic representation in India to that of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and also established an Honorary Consulate in Calcutta. New Delhi opened a resident Mission in Bratislava in August 1995; till then, the Indian Ambassador in Prague was also accredited to the Slovak Republic. A small set-up under a Charge d’Affaires opened in June 1995. This was expanded when the Indian Ambassador arrived in November 1995 (Nayar, 1995). The first fact-finding mission to explore possibilities of cooperation between India and Slovakia was made by Foreign Minister Pavol Demes in mid-April 1992. He said that several items in the engineering and machinery sector of the Slovak Republic could find a ready market in India (TOI, 1992: 13). In February 1993, Minister of State for External 4 These were a MOU on Bilateral Cooperation in Traditional Systems of Medicine;

(2) MOU on Cooperation in the field of Sports; (3) MOU on Cooperation in the areas of Defensive Aspects of Microbiological and Radiological Detection and Protection; (4) Cultural Exchange Programme for 2013–2015; and (5) Letter of Intent on Revision of Air Services Agreement; and (6) Letter of Intent for Indo-Hungarian Strategic Research Fund (enhanced contribution of e 2 million each for 2014–2017).

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Affairs R.L. Bhatia arrived in Bratislava on the occasion of the inauguration of the Slovak Republic and appreciated its becoming an independent state in ‘a peaceful and constitutional manner’ (Bhatia, 1993). The first high-level visit from Slovakia was that of its Prime Minister Josef Moravcik in July 1994. He highlighted the strong industrial base that his country had inherited especially in defence and expressed great interest in fostering greater scientific and technological cooperation (India, MEA, 1994b: 123). The Slovak side reiterated that on the Kashmir issue it favoured the bilateral approach without the internationalization of the issue. The visit resulted in an agreement to set up a Joint Business Council and a Joint Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (hereinafter Joint Economic Committee). It also led to the signing of a MoU on scientific and technological cooperation and a protocol on annual Foreign Office consultations. Initially, the first three Foreign Office consultations were held annually (1994, 1995 and 1996). The fourth one, however, took place in 1999, but none have been held in the next two decades. The first high-level Indian visit to Slovakia was by President Shankar Dayal Sharma from 9–10 October 1996 (India, MEA, 1997: 59). The visit led to the signing of an agreement on cooperation in the field of science and technology as well as an air services agreement. Six years later, during Vice-President Krishan Kant’s visit to Slovakia (June 2000), Slovakia expressed support for India’s candidature for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. Accompanied by State Secretaries in the Ministries of Economy (Eva Simkova), Defence (Martin Fedor) and Foreign Affairs (Ivan Korcok), the first visit of President Ivan Gasparovic in December 2004 resulted in the signature of an economic cooperation agreement and a MoU between the National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. and the National Agency for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises as well as a cultural exchange programme for 2004–2007. After a gap of 14 years, Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma visited Slovakia from 22–24 March 2007 for wide-ranging discussions. During the visit, an agreement was reached to establish a joint working group on defence. The two sides shared similar perceptions on issues like UN reform, international terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Western Balkans (Sharma, 2007). The Slovak Foreign Policy Guidelines 2011 stated that Slovakia’s policy towards Asia would focus on improving economic and political dialogue

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with ‘the most important’ countries of the region, namely China, Japan, India, South Korea and Indonesia (Slovakia, MFEA, 2012: 7). The Report on Fulfilling Slovakia’s Objectives and Responsibilities in Foreign and European Policy in 2013 had a separate section on ‘Asia and the Pacific’, which expressed Slovakia’s efforts to seek opportunities to strengthen economic, scientific and technological cooperation in ‘the dynamically developing Asian continent’ (Slovakia, MFEA, 2014a: 13). Given the very low volumes of trade, the degree of political interest displayed by India in Slovakia has been limited. In recent years, it was visited mostly by Deputy Ministers of State for External Affairs to participate in a panel at the GLOBSEC Security Forum (April 2016 and May 2018). More frequent became contacts between line ministers (Commerce and Industry, Culture and Education Agriculture, Finance, Defence, Science and Technology, etc.). The visit of State Secretary led to the signing of the Action Plan for Cooperation between the Slovak Office of Standards, Meteorology and Testing and the Bureau of Indian Standards. He also opened the third Honorary Consulate of Slovakia in Bengaluru (after those in Mumbai and Kolkata). Slovakia stated that it paid particular attention to creating favourable conditions for developing the economic dimension of bilateral relations with the EU’s strategic partners in Asia (Slovakia, MFEA, 2014b: 6). India-Slovak relations are bedevilled by geographic distance, sketchy historical links and little people-to-people interaction. The degree and scope of India’s political interaction and engagement with Slovakia has to a large extent been conditioned by the relatively low level of economic trade. Since Slovakia is a relatively small market, trade flows cannot by themselves add substance to the economic relationship.

Modi and Central Europe Though Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a number of trips to Western Europe, he has not so far visited any Central and East European country. This has been in keeping with the perception of the region, which has been ‘long seen as an area of competing Russian and Western interests’ and a region which has ‘not always featured prominently in India’s foreign policy agenda’ (Jaishankar, 2018). There have however been eleven visits to Central and Eastern Europe during 2014–2019— Minister of State M.J. Akbar to the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in May 2017, President Kovind to Cyprus, Bulgaria and the Czech

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Republic (2–9 September 2018), Vice-President M. Venkaiah Naidu to Serbia, Malta and Romania (14–20 September 2018), and Vice-President Naidu to the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) (17–21 August 2019), and Foreign Minister Jaishankar to Hungary and Poland towards the end of August 2019. These visits have not been merely about showing the flag in countries which have been neglected for decades, but resulted in tangible results in terms of signing of MoUs and agreements. The heightened attention to Central and Eastern Europe seems to be more motivated both by the desire to access the special skills and technologies of the region as well as its desire to counteract growing Chinese influence in the region. Since 2014, there has been a spurt in the exchange of visits between the Czech Republic and India: three visits by Czech Foreign Ministers (December 2016, June 2017 and January 2020), the visit of President Ram Nath Kovind (September 2018) after a gap of 22 years, and the visit of Prime Minister Andrej Babi in January 2019 after a gap of 12 years. Moreover, several meetings were also held on the sidelines of important international gatherings.5 In January 2020, the Czech Foreign Minister expressed the hope that India, ‘a growing power and the largest democracy in the world, can and will be Europe’s firm ally in tackling the crucial challenges’ (Petricek, 2020). The visit of President Ram Nath Kovind to the Czech Republic led to the conclusion of five MoUs.6 India’s growth story and Czech technological expertise and manufacturing prowess, he stated, made them ‘natural partners’ (Kovind, 2018a). The two countries expressed the desire to further strengthen and develop ‘the strategic aspects’ of the bilateral relationship and concurred that further discussions may be useful 5 President Milos Zeman and President Pranab Mukherjee in Moscow on the margins of the Victory Day celebrations (May 2005); Prime Minister Babis and Vice-President M. Venkaiah Naidu on the sidelines of the twelfth ASEM summit in Brussels (October 2018); and probably for the first time Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek met Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar on the sidelines of the 74th session of the UN General Assembly (29 September 2019). 6 These were (1) MoU between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Czech Academy of Sciences on scientific and technological cooperation; (2) Work Plan for support of Indo-Czech projects for the years 2019-2022 in diverse areas of science and technology; (3) Agreement on Visa Waiver for Diplomatic Passport holders; (4) MoU between ELI Beamlines and Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in the field of laser technology; and (5) MoU on cooperation between the Haryana Agricultural University and the Czech University of Life Sciences.

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for ‘strengthening bilateral relations to a strategic partnership’ including through facilitating of temporary movement of professionals on both sides (India, MEA, 2018a). The two sides also had similar views on a variety of international issues including the comprehensive reform of the United Nations and terrorism. Prague reiterated its support for India’s claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. During his visit to India in January 2019, Prime Minister Babis expressed the desire to elevate relations with India to a strategic partnership. During the 2010s, Poland was perceived as ‘an important emerging economy not just in Europe but also globally’ and as its largest economic partner in Central Europe (India, MEA, 2017). It was positioned to serve as ‘a nerve centre or logistics and manufacturing hub between Asia and Europe, with its relatively low operating cost, being its most prominent appeal for global companies’ (India, Embassy in Poland, 2019). In Polish Foreign Policy Priorities , 2012–2016 (March 2012), Warsaw acknowledged that the position held by emerging economies would ‘continue to grow stronger’. But it noted that they were not ‘always willing to comply with human rights standards, employee and welfare rights or principles’ (Poland, MFA, 2012: 4). With American primacy being called into question, the world was becoming multipolar in which the ‘assertiveness’ of emerging economies was rising. The financial crisis, it noted, did not serve as a catalyst for an overhaul of international institutions to better reflect the current global situation. There was recognition that unless emerging powers had ‘more say’ about the decisions taken by international institutions, they would not be ‘prepared to assume greater responsibility for the direction in which the world is moving’ (Poland, MFA, 2012: 4). The importance of the Asia-Pacific region, it pointed out, was growing in the world. It was, therefore, essential for Poland ‘to build a positive image as an important EU Member’ (Poland, MFA, 2012: 20). Jaishankar’s Visit to Poland and Hungary, 2019 After a gap of 32 years, Foreign Minister Subramaniam Jaishankar visited Poland on 28–29 January 2019 against the background of the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and prior to the official launch of the direct flights between Warsaw and New Delhi by LOT Polish Airlines. He expressed gratitude to Poland, which as

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the monthly chair of the UN Security Council had been ‘more than helpful’ when China took the Kashmir issue to the Security Council (Bagchi, 2019). Jaishankar had, in fact, called up Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz on 6 August—a day before Home Minister Amit Shah announced in the Rajya Sabha the decision of the Government of India to strip Jammu and Kashmir of its special status and to reorganize the state into two Union Territories—that the move was an internal affair of India and sought to bring security to a region particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The Polish Foreign Minister responded that Warsaw stood ready, if necessary, to engage in preventing actions ‘impacting the security situation’ (Poland, MFA, 2019). As if atoning for previous neglect, Jaishankar expressed India’s readiness to engage more actively in Central Europe, which was likely to have a positive impact on the overall EU-India relationship. In a welcome change, he expressed India’s desire to engage with Poland in the Visegrad-4 format (India, MEA, 2019). India supported Poland’s candidature for a non-permanent seat for the years 2018–2019, while Warsaw expressed support for India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat for the years 2021–2022. Jaishankar visited Hungary from 25–27 August 2019. He addressed the opening session of the annual conference of Hungary’s Heads of Missions in Budapest on 26 August. The two ministers resolved to intensify bilateral cooperation in the fields of education, tourism and science and signed a Cultural Exchange Programme for 2019–2022. The Hungarian side announced their decision to join the International Solar Alliance (India, Embassy in Hungary, 2019a). The future Hungarian focus, Foreign Minister Szijjarto stated, would be on five main areas, viz. film production, digitalization, water management, solar energy and pharmaceuticals for strengthening cooperation with India. Indian companies, he added, comprised the fourth largest Asian investor community in Hungary (Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic adversely impacted activities and exchanges with Central European countries. The years 2020–2021 led to strengthened and broadened political, economic and defence engagement with the Czech Republic. During the COVID-19 crisis, Foreign Minister Jaishankar spoke with Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek (24 April 2020) and Jakub Kulhanek (30 April 2021). The Indian Foreign Minister twice met the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Peter Szijjarto, on the sidelines of Bled Strategic Forum (1–2 September 2021) in Slovenia

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and again on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York (22 September 2021). Foreign Office consultations were held virtually with Poland (10 August 2020) and Hungary (tenth in Budapest, 19 January 2021). India and Poland conducted the first Foreign Policy Dialogue in December 2020 and the second Policy Planning Dialogue was held virtually on 24 March 2021.

Economic and Trade Relations Nature of Trade During the Cold War, trade with Socialist countries enabled India to utilize idle capacities in various industrial sectors and start new exportoriented industries. It also facilitated the import of capital and other essential goods, including special supplies for industrial and ‘strategic programmes’, needed for the reconstruction of the economy. Moreover, trade with East Europe provided additional resources by way of credits and facilitated the reduction of expenditure of scarce hard currency. They also facilitated rapid progress in basic industries without which it would have been impossible ‘to conceive of a self-generating process of development’ (Dhar, 1972: 416). The rupee trade agreements were, in fact, novel since there was no precedent for organising trade relations on the principle of bilateral balancing of trade through the negotiation of annual trade protocols which specified the products to be traded and the amounts thereof; trade being channelled through government agencies. Trade with Eastern Europe, therefore, provided India with an assured market for Indian manufactured and processed goods, which could not be easily sold in hard currency areas, the possibility of obtaining capital goods on a barter basis, and the determined effort by both sides to balance the trade (Heimsath & Mansingh, 1971: 425). The introduction of trade in convertible currency, the fading away of traditional agencies like public sector units and state trading companies, and the shift towards more competitive, alternative sources of supply, however, put an end to a large portion of trade with East European countries. Following the far-reaching changes of 1990s, the rapid privatization of the economy, the disappearance of traditional markets and the infusion of ‘Western’ investments resulted in dissolution of Central Europe’s old commercial links with India. New trading links to replace them were slow to emerge.

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Czech Republic Czechoslovakia was the first Central European country with which India signed a trade agreement for exchange of commodities worth Rs.50 million on 29 March 1949. It was also the first CEEC to offer to render all possible assistance including technical personnel to build up new industries and improve existing ones in India. Czechoslovakia extended three long-term credits—Rs.231 million (24 November 1959), Rs.400 million (11 May 1964) and of Rs.300 million (5 November 1965)—for the delivery of machinery and equipment for about 60 large and mediumsized industrial plants in establishing important branches of heavy industry in India in the public sector. By 1965, Czechoslovakia had contributed nearly $100 million to India’s industrial development (Shastri, 1965: 43). India-Czechoslovak bilateral trade had increased nearly four-fold from Rs.207 million in 1960 to Rs.800 million in 1973, but declined to Rs.660 million in 1977 (India, MEA, 1981: 307), but rose again to Rs.2.450 billion in 1987. India-Czech Republic trade declined considerably with the fading away of balanced trade through annual trade plans for exports and imports and the collapse of state companies as the country moved towards a market economy, and the shift to trading in hard currency from 1993 onwards. India-Czech trade increased from US$ 91.98 million in 1996–1997 to $142.9 million in 2002–2003 and amounted to $199.84 million in 2003– 2004. Trade increased to $628.01 million in 2007–2008 and crossed $1,073 million in 2016–2017. It declined to $795.77 million in 2019– 2020 and $878.60 million in 2020–2021 and again crossed $1 billion threshold to reach $1,220.33 million in 2021–2022 (see Table 12.1). Hungary Hungary’s role in India’s economic development was limited during the Cold War. The most significant collaboration was the establishment of an integrated 200,000 tonne annual capacity aluminium complex at Korba at an estimated cost of Rs390 million, which started operations in 1973. By the mid-1980s, there were 55 projects set up in India with Hungarian collaboration. Indo-Hungarian trade increased from Rs31 million in 1960 to Rs359 million in 1979 and doubled to Rs710 million in 1981 (India, MEA, 1988: 329). Bilateral trade during the 1980s remained above US$100

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016

Year

35.85 25.41 34.30 33.79 38.39 41.08 57.42 88.02 88.00 96.87 102.66 180.28 183.30 177.76 215.77 271.85 251.40 387.08 378.56 488.59

56.13 42.33 44.13 39.45 36.41 38.63 85.48 111.84 175.34 260.38 353.71 447.73 491.87 562.45 676.78 718.88 644.26 517.97 517.87 507.89 91.98 67.74 78.43 73.24 74.80 79.71 142.9 199.84 263.34 357.25 456.37 628.01 675.17 740.21 892.55 990.73 895.66 905.05 896.43 996.48

31.04 35.64 35.53 31.70 42.66 46.99 48.26 91.87 108.10 84.16 103.80 230.41 439.69 269.68 212.85 316.00 323.74 343.62 349.26 345.13

Exports

Total

Exports

Imports

Hungary

Czech Republic

7.38 12.05 9.38 12.38 15.06 23.92 20.61 27.32 31.53 31.62 117.13 113.62 190.34 194.95 342.97 437.28 262.91 220.48 239.55 242.64

Imports

Exports

38.42 76.51 47.09 87.43 44.98 93.06 47.91 91.66 46.76 86.22 63.30 108.31 67.30 105.64 75.58 134.21 123.34 176.30 139.72 226.96 201.29 306.57 217.42 447.45 420.75 518.45 634.64 421.13 612.65 666.22 650.13 787.00 578.91 810.85 544.22 995.50 583.17 1050.79 591.90 1025.30

Total

Poland

28.78 32.70 33.81 38.49 42.63 31.39 38.84 49.05 90.37 107.81 117.23 189.46 266.12 387.29 386.04 624.25 863.25 622.57 635.60 569.66

Imports 105.29 120.13 126.87 130.15 128.85 139.70 144.48 183.26 266.67 334.77 423.80 636.91 784.57 808.42 1052.26 1411.25 1674.10 1618.07 1686.39 1594.96

Total

Table 12.1 India-Central Europe Trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 (in million US Dollars)

4.08 6.03 15.11 7.58 9.81 8.64 10.99 16.85 63.37 76.60 36.24 47.46 35.83 35.76 59.47 94.36 107.01 104.42 136.90 137.51

3.99 32.09 11.17 11.69 6.96 12.66 11.39 10.62 22.89 39.86 19.81 43.84 46.01 40.30 88.03 87.98 63.94 53.14 137.04 64.64

Exports Imports

Slovakia

8.07 38.12 14.93 17.57 16.77 21.30 22.38 27.47 46.75 61.27 56.05 91.30 81.84 76.06 147.50 182.34 170.95 157.56 273.94 202.15

Total

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533.59 405.36 429.13 496.35 485.48 628.23

539.25 669.54 258.84 299.42 393.12 592.10 1072.84 1074.90 687.97 795.77 878.60 1220.33

406.29 402.69 458.08 423.94 495.26 550.85

Exports

Total

Exports

Imports

Hungary

Czech Republic

218.78 270.84 241.15 187.68 218.92 293.67

Imports 563.91 677.13 699.23 611.62 714.18 844.52

Total

Imports

1197.81 690.98 1541.36 766.99 1572.80 793.39 1548.11 849.58 1652.67 706.35 2723.94 1124.79

Exports

Poland

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank

2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

Year

1888.79 2308.35 2366.19 2397.69 2359.02 3848.73

Total 146.15 152.46 145.96 138.42 155.97 171.13

68.53 95.20 57.42 54.84 35.58 101–86

Exports Imports

Slovakia

214.68 247.66 203.38 193.26 191.55 272.99

Total

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million and in some years even touched $200 million (India, Embassy in Hungary, 2019b). The major items of export from India before 1990 were tea, tobacco, pepper and other spices, de-oiled cakes, finished leather and shoe uppers, iron ore and pellets, cotton and jute goods, engineering goods, Maruti vehicles, and chemicals and chemical products. Imports from Hungary included steel and steel products, chemicals, machine tools, pulses, peas, newsprint and engineering goods, especially for railways and power projects. Indo-Hungarian trade, which was US$47 million in 1992 (Foreign Affairs Record, October 1993: 28) increased to $63.30 in 2001–2002 and $634.64 million in 2009–2010. It amounted to $677.13 million in 2017–2018, but declined to $611.62 million in 2019–2020 and recovered to $844.52 million in 2021–2022 (see Table 12.1). Poland Among the V4 countries, Poland is India’s most important trading partner. In 1996–1997, Indo-Polish trade was $105.29 million. By the turn of the millennium, it increased to $128.85 million in 2000–2001 and $266.67 million in 2004–2005. It amounted to $1,052.26 million in 2010–2011 and reached $2308.35 million in 2017–2018. It reached $2,359.02 million in 2020–2021 and amounted to $3848.73 million in 2021–2022. From 2013–2014 till 2021–2022, India had a trade surplus with Poland. The trade surplus increased from $372.93 million in 2013–2014 to $1599.15 in 2021–2022 (see Table 12.1). Slovakia Trade with Slovakia declined considerably primarily because of confusion over the division of the country, the transition from the earlier system of balanced trade in non-convertible Indian Rupees to payment in convertible currency from 1 January 1993. The primary reason for the low volumes of trade was ‘insufficient knowledge of each other’s capabilities’ and the fact that Slovakia had ‘pretty much closed itself to Indian businessmen’ (Saha, 2008) because of its extremely stringent visa regime, which eased somewhat after Slovakia joined the Schengen area. Indo-Slovak trade increased from a meagre US $8.07 million in 1996– 1997 to $16.77 million in 2000–2001 and $147.50 million a decade later in 2010–2011. It peaked at $273.94 million in 2014–2015. It declined to

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$202.15 million in 2015–2016, but then increased to $247.66 million in 2017–2018. It declined to $191.55 million in 2020–2021, but rose again to $272.99 million in 2021–2022 (Table 12.1). During most years, India had a trade surplus with Slovakia. This increased from $6.38 million in 2011–2012 $57.26 million in 2017–2018 and $69.27 million in 2021– 2022. Major Indian exports to the Visegrad 4 include textiles, garments, footwear, pharmaceutical products, organic chemicals, vehicles, automobile parts, machinery and iron and steel. Indian imports from the Visegrad 4 mainly consist of machineries and mechanical and electronic devices, power-generating machinery and equipment, vehicles and their parts, mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, chemical and connected industrial products, plastic, rubber, glass and glassware.

Trade in Services There are no detailed statistics of the volume of trade in services between India and the V4 countries in the 1990s. However, it can be assumed that the scale of this trade was very limited primarily because the V4’s share in international trade in services was marginal because of the low development of the services sector and because their primary focus was on the development of heavy industry. In 2017, the value of Indian exports of services to the V4 amounted to $227 million. The largest share was recorded in relation to Poland (45%; $102 million), followed by the Czech Republic (30%; $68 million), Hungary (19.8%; $45 million) and the Slovak Republic (5.2%; $12 million). Indian imports of services from V4 in 2017 amounted to $483 million. Among the Visegrad 4, the highest value of imported services was recorded in the case of Hungary ($273 million; 56.5%) followed by Poland ($119 million; 24.6%), the Czech Republic ($84 million; 17.4%) and the Slovak Republic ($7 million; 1.5%) (OECD, 2019, cited in J˛edrzejowska & Wróbel, 2021a: 278).

Indian FDI in Central Europe In case of FDI inflow, both to the V4 countries and India, the official numbers are often understated. This is because of the common practice of channelling investment through intermediary countries (e.g. because of tax optimization motives). This is the reason why the major investor in

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Table 12.2 Indian FDI in Central Europe, 2006–2019 (in million US Dollars) Year

Czech Republic

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total

31.0 57.6 35.4 68.1 38.9 42.5 12.7 89.0 168.2 190.9 97.1 91.6 126.0 147.6 1196.6

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Total V4

3.0

6.0 30.9 48.4 44.3 71.1 73.2 92.0 138.2 184.0 206.6 251.5 271.8 276.2 315.5 2009.7

0 0.3 −0.1 4.3 1.3

40.0 88.8 85.5 114.9 88.7 99.4 83.9 225.6 1987.6 2190.9 2545.6 3036.8 356.6 454.7

1.8 −1.8 −22.6 −16.3 −19.9 1637.5 1798.0 2200.4 2676.1 3182.7 – 11,438.9

−0.9 −1.6 −2.1 −4.6 −3.4 −2.7 −6.7 −8.4 −24.6

Source OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (OECD, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2019a, 2020)

India is Mauritius and why the number of Indian companies active in V4 differ depending on the database used (J˛edrzejowska & Wróbel, 2021b: 292). According to OECD figures, between 2006 and 2017, Indian FDI in Central Europe increased from $40 million to $3036.8 million. It was $356.6 million in 2018 and $454.7 million in 2019 (see Table 12.2). During the period 2006–2019, the most substantial Indian investments were made in Hungary, followed by Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The negative FDI positions ‘largely result when the loans from the affiliate to its parent exceed the loans and equity capital given by the parent to the affiliate’ (OECD, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics. Explanatory Notes: 4, cited in J˛edrzejowska & Wróbel, 2021b: 292). Czech Republic Indian companies invest in IT and BPO, pharmaceuticals, textiles, vehicles, auto-components, and food and packaging production. The main Indian companies operating in the Czech Republic include Infosys (Brno), LEEL (Prague), Tata Global Beverages (Jemnice), Cognizant (Prague), Samvardhana Motherson (MSSL Advanced Polymers, Dolní

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Redice), Varroc Excellence (Senov u Nového Jicín), Pricol (Klecany), Dina-Hitex (Bucovice), Glenmark Pharmaceuticals (Prague), Alok Industries/Mileta Horice (Horice), APAG Elektronic (Pardubice), and Cafe Coffee Day (India, Embassy in Czech Republic, 2020, July). According to Indian figures, from April 2000 to August 2022, Indian overseas direct investment outflows to the Czech Republic amounted to $290 million (India, Department of Economic Affairs, 2022: 2). Hungary Till 1989, about 25 Indo-Hungarian joint ventures were operating in India, primarily in the areas of pharmaceuticals and vacuum technology. With the changes in the Hungarian economy in the 1990s, most of these joint ventures had either been terminated or were indigenized leaving only a handful of Hungarian companies present in the Indian market (India, MEA, 2016: 2). From April 2000 to August 2022, according to Indian statistics, Indian Overseas Direct Investment outflows to the Hungary amounted to $33 million (India, Department of Economic Affairs, 2022: 3). Indian companies are attracted to Hungary due to its congenial business environment and locational advantages. India was the largest investor in Hungary in 2014 (e494.8 million), or a third of the total and more than double the second-biggest partner, China and more than triple Japan, the third-ranked partner that year (Kugiel, 2016: 32). In 2015, Indian FDI in Hungary increased to $1.5 billion. The most significant greenfield FDI was the e475 million ($510 million) Apollo Tyres factory in Gyöngyöshalász. At present, about 40 Indian companies have invested over US$2 billion and currently employ more than 10,000 Hungarian nationals (Chhabra, 2019; Szijjarto, 2020b). This includes nearly two dozen investments including by many IT majors (Tata Consultancy Services, Genpact, Wipro, Cognizant, Satyam Computers/Tech Mahindra) in Hungary. Poland In Poland, Indian companies have primarily invested in the business services sector. Companies such as Infosys BPO (Łódz), Mphasis (Wrocław), HCL Technologies (Cracow), Tata Consultancy Services (Warsaw), Wipro (Warsaw), Zensar Technologies (Gdansk), Genpact

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(Cracow, Szczecin, Lublin), and KPIT-Infosystems (Wrocław) have already opened their centres in Poland. The largest Indian greenfield investment in Poland is the Uflex food packaging film factory in Wrzesnia, launched in 2012. Other Indian companies operating in Poland include: Escorts (Farmtrac Tractors Europe—agricultural tractor factory in Mragowo), Sharda Group (fabrics and bedding), Videocon (cathode ray tube), Eurobatt (batteries, household appliances), Essel Propack (packaging production), Novo Tech (polymer products), Rishabh Instruments Pvt. Ltd. (electrical equipment), and VVF (soap factory in Racibórz) (J˛edrzejowska & Wróbel, 2021b: 295). Indian investment in Poland reached an estimated US$3 billion providing employment to over 25,000 Poles (India, MEA, 2021: 110). Slovakia Since the early 1990s, Indian companies had explored investment opportunities in auto accessories, tyre manufacturing and the spa and wellness sectors in Slovakia, but nothing concrete materialized until the early 2010s. Despite its advantages of having a good physical infrastructure, key geographical location, a skilled labour force and a member of the Eurozone, Indian investors have found Slovakia’s neighbours (Hungary and Poland), which provide larger markets and lower costs, have proven to be more attractive investment destinations (India, Embassy in Slovakia, 2020: 3). The most significant Indian investment in a greenfield project was in the automative sector since Slovakia—the ‘Detroit of Europe’. The Tata Group’s owned Jaguar Land Rover decided in August 2015 to an automobile manufacturing plant in Nitra with an investment of £1 billion or e1.4 over a five-year period (2016–2021) with a capacity of 300,000 cars per annum with a view to lower product costs while retaining EU market access and quality standards (Nathalie, 2015). The factory started production in October 2018. TCS had also invested in India, but overall, Indian FDI in Slovakia was less than 1 per cent of the total FDI (Ferencz, 2019). Slovak FDI in India is nominal. Slovak FDI in India from April 2000 to March 2022 amounted to US$18.8775 million; its overall ranking being 77th among investors in India accounting for 0.0032% of total FDI in India (India, Ministry of Commerce, DPIIT, 2022).

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Central European FDI in India Between 2006 and 2019, V4 FDI in India increased from $44 million in 2006 to $561.9 million in 2019. During this period, the largest investor in India was Poland with $2.527 billion, followed by the Czech Republic ($1.003 billion), Hungary ($322.2 million) and Slovakia ($61.4 million) (see Table 12.3). Czech Republic So far, about 30 Czech companies have invested in India. A major Czech investor in India is Skoda Auto, which entered the market in 2001 and currently maintains two manufacturing plants in the country (Kugiel, 2016: 30). Further investments include Doosan Skoda Power, Bonatrans Group, LIKO-S, Hamrik, Microelectronics, Stros, Eldis, Technicoat, Gearspect, Czech Aviation Training Centre (CATC), Chemoprojekt, Fermat Gropup, ComAp, Tatra Trucks, Hutni Projekt, Zetor, Lasvit, Flying Academy, Preciosa, ZKL, TAJMAC-ZPS, VH Services and Table 12.3 Central European FDI in India, 2006–2019 (in million US Dollars) Year

Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total

24.0 59.7 44.9 28.4 37.5 38.0 46.6 −0.6 45.5 48.7 68.7 80.7 196.7 284.3 1003.1

10.0 22.3 27.8 24.1 22.5 22.1 24.5 24.5 25.6 24.3 23.1 25.4 23.7 22.3 322.2

8.0 13.1 49.9 141.8 174.0 181.9 217.5 272.9 256.9 235.1 236.1 250.6 246.6 243.2 2527.6

2.0 3.0 1.6 … … … … 0.6 … 6.2 9.2 13.7 13.0 12.1 61.4

Total V4 44.0 98.1 124.2 194.3 234.0 242.0 288.6 297.4 328.0 314.3 337.1 370.4 468.5 561.9

Source OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (OECD, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2019b, 2020)

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Vitkovice-Fans (India, Embassy in Czech Republic, 2022). These investments have mainly been made in transportation, power, automotive, chemical and the steel sector. According to Indian figures, from April 2000 to June 2022, Czech FDI equity inflow into India amounted to US$ 97.7684 million constituting 0.0162% of total FDI in India during the period (India, DPIIT, 2022), being the 53rd largest investor in India. Hungary From April 2000 to June 2022, Hungarian FDI equity inflow into India amounted to US$ 25.3459 million constituting 0.0042% of total FDI in India during the period (India, DPIIT, 2022), being the 75th largest investor in India. Among the half a dozen Hungarian investments in India, the two largest are Richter-Gedeon Ltd. (pharmaceuticals) and the oil and gas company MOL. Hungarian companies have invested in India in the pharmaceutical sector (Richter-Gedeon Ltd.), IT (Tarant Hungary), energy (Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machinery Limited), transport (Cason Engineering Plc) and the waste water management (Organica Környezettechnológiák Zrt.). To date, the largest investment is in a factory producing semi-finished products for one of the largest Central European pharmaceutical companies Richter-Gedeon. The Hungarian company invested in a joint venture with the Indian company Themis Medicare Ltd. $20 million (India, Embassy in Hungary and Bosnia & Herzegovina, 2022). Poland Polish companies invested mainly in the processing industry. Among the largest Polish investors in India cited by the Polish Investment and Trade Agency are Can Pack (can manufacturing plant in Aurangabad), Torunskie Zakłady Materiałów Opatrunkowych (dressing materials factory at Madurai), Maflow (automotive air conditioning ducts), Polmor (company producing welded structures for rail vehicles) and Seco/Warwick (furnaces for metallurgical industry). There are also Polish companies in India involved in mining and gas and oil exploitation (Famur SA., Kopex SA, Geofizyka Torun) (PAIH, 2018: 32, cited in J˛edrzejowska & Wróbel, 2021b: 300).

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From April 2000 to June 2022, Polish FDI equity inflow into India amounted to US$ 692.5119 million constituting 0.1145% of total FDI in India during the period (India, DPIIT, 2022), being the 31st largest investor in India. Slovakia From April 2000 to June 2022, according to Indian figures, Slovakian FDI equity inflow into India amounted to US$18.8804 million constituting 0.0031% of total FDI in India during the period (India, DPIIT, 2022), being the 79th largest investor in India.

Defence Cooperation Czech Republic In the 1960s, several agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia for the setting up of facilities and plants in the public sector for meeting defence-related requirements.7 Since 1969, Tatra’s all-terrain trucks were imported from Omnipol Foreign Trade Corporation. From 1986 to 2012, India purchased 6,500 vehicles from the Tatra company. Allegations of bribery in February 2012 led to an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which closed the case in August 2014 on the grounds of insufficient prosecutable evidence. Despite the CBI’s closure of the case, Tatra still continued to be listed among firms from which only ‘restricted procurements’ were permissible on the basis of ‘operational urgency, national security and non-availability of other alternatives according to a Union Defence Ministry Circular of 19 February 2018 (India, Ministry of Defence, 2018). A defence cooperation agreement was signed with the Czech Republic on 22 December 2003. A Joint Defence Committee (JDC) was established in January 2006. In 2003, the Czech Republic exported e17.025 million of military equipment to India, which included e14.157 million (tanks, armoured

7 These included a boat manufacturing plant in Kanpur (1960), a 12,000 tonnes annual capacity steel forgings plant, Wardha (1965), and a 15,000 tonnes of finished iron castings plant at Jabalpur (1965) for manufacturing forgings used in vehicles manufactured for the defence services.

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R. K. JAIN

and other vehicles and specially designed components thereof) and e2.5 million (electronics, measuring equipment and specially designed components thereof (Czech Republic, MFA, 2004: 22). Czech arms exports to India declined sharply in 2005 to e3.477 million, but rose again in 2006 to e33.842 million and peaked to e38.226 million in 2007 (Czech Republic, MFA, 2006b: Table 1, p. 1; 2007: Annex 2, p. 2; Annex 5, p. 2; 2008: Annex 2, p. 2). Czechia’s export of military equipment to India amounted to e425,840 in 2013. This increased to e2.650 million in 2014 and further increased over four times to e12.638 million in 2015 and over e30 million in 2016. Arms exports declined marginally to e29.686 million in 2017. They further declined to e18.554 million in 2018 and e15.118 million in 2019 before increasing to e18.858 million in 2020. During 2013–2020, the overwhelming share was of Military List 6 category (ground vehicles and components) worth e108.369 million (see Table 12.4). Training has been a component of India-Czech Republic defence cooperation. Prague offered India training in its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence facilities as well as counter-improvised explosive devices (Kugiel, 2016: 28). Hungary Since Hungary had a relatively small defence industry, its defence cooperation with India was relatively modest during the Cold War.8 India and Hungary signed an agreement on defence cooperation on 3 November 2003, which established a Joint Defence Committee. After the its first meeting in April 2007, the JDC met annually until the eight one in March 2015; no meetings of the JDC have been held since then primarily because Hungary has not exported any military equipment to India since 2016. On 17 October 2013, a MoU between the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Ministry of Defence regarding cooperation in the

8 The first instance was the establishment of a 64-million capacity detonator (for use in border roads) factory in Hyderabad with a private sector company, Indian Detonators Ltd. (now IDL Ltd.). In the 1980s, Hungary supplied microwave equipment to Doordarshan as well as telecommunications equipment to the railways and the Department of Telecommunications (TOI, 1988: 10).

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Table 12.4 Czech arms exports to India, 2013–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

2013

ML 6 ML 10 ML 11 ML 15 ML 17 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 6 ML 10 ML 14 ML 15 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 6 ML 11 ML 14 ML 15 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 5 ML 6 ML 7 ML 11 ML 14 ML 15 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 1

6 1 1 5 3 2 18 2 2 11

2014

2015

2016

2017

3 8 4 30 3 2 24 1

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

2,008,345

242,707

54,504 59,467

53,653 42,789

87,340 2,209,656

86,691 425,840

38,600 523,337 153,311 788,843 244,872 2,452,637 4,201,600 123,124

418,368

100,531 2,131,222 2,650,121 311,032

23,203,452

1 6 2 39 5 1 2 38 1

2,771 2,706,661 80,621 26,116,629

3 9 2 61 1

55,579 3,226,007 82,396 32,996,750 1,381

17,187 29,572,670 42,911

2,428 1,606,546 79,765 12,638,192 1,748,432 34,432 16,708 26,120,119 1,153 19,051 34,093 49,248 1,916,393 79,534 30,019,163

(continued)

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Table 12.4 (continued) Year

2018

2019

2020

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

ML 3 ML 5 ML 6 ML 10 ML 14 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 6 ML 15 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 6 ML 7 ML 10 ML 16 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 2 ML 3 ML 6 ML 10 ML 15 ML 18 Total

2 1 29 1 34 4 1 22 1 13 41 5 3 21 1 1 2 5 40 6 1 5 34 3 1 3 53

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

40,616

48

29,578,604

29,671,329 8,429 6,457 29,686,263 6,825 39,418 18,367,685 20,528 119,313 18,553,769

6,457 29,627,058 22,144 15,353,856 244,654 15,620,654 67,718 15,013,910 42,731 2,055,430

11,295,609 5,750 2,037,359

718,625 17,898,414 278,797

1,779,278 15,117,996 271,204 179,931 129,061 14,865,728

92,930 21,460,150 605,052 7,810 6,429 22,451,168

3,411,679 18,857,603

Source EEAS. (2022). Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/ sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf 753/state/analysis Categories of Military Equipment Supplied ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories and specially designed components therefor. ML 3: Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially designed components therefor ML 4: Bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missile and components specially designed for them

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Table 12.4 (continued) ML 5: Fire control, surveillance and warning equipment, and related systems, test and alignment and countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 6: Ground vehicles and components ML 7: Chemical agents, ‘biological agents’, ‘riot control agents’, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 11: Electronic equipment, ‘spacecraft’ and components, not specified elsewhere on the EU Common Military List ML 14: ‘Specialised equipment for military training’ or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 15: Imaging or countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 16: Forgings, castings and other unfinished products the use of which in a specified product is identifiable, by material composition, geometry or function and which are specially designed for any products specified by ML1 to ML 14, ML 16, ML 9, ML 10, ML 12 or ML 19 ML 17: Miscellaneous equipment, materials and ‘libraries’, as follows, and specially designed components therefor ML 18: Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List ML 22: ‘Technolgy’ for ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List

areas of defensive aspects of microbiological and radiological detection and protection was signed. During 1992–1995, Hungarian arms exports to India reached e13.785 million. This doubled to e27.684 million during 1996– 2000. Hungarian arms exports to India were e5.880 million in 2001, but declined sharply to e623,100 in 2006 (Hungary, Export Control and Precious Metal Verification Department, 2018: 29). In 2013 and 2014, Hungary’s military exports to India amounted to e690,515 and e156,084, respectively. This more than doubled to e392,114 in 2015 (see Table 12.5). Since then, Hungary has not made any supplies of military equipment to India. Poland Defence cooperation between India and Poland began in the early 1970s when it supplied India with spares as well as technology for maintaining and upgrading several kinds of equipment, including tank recovery vehicles and Soviet aircraft (Bose-Harrison, 2010). During the 1971 war,

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Table 12.5 Hungary’s arms exports to India, 2013–2016 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

2013 2014 2015

ML 10 ML 10 ML 10 ML 11 Total ML 11

2 1 1 6 7 5

2016

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

1,621,546 546,070 546,070 416,420 962,490 416,000

690,515 156,084 392,114

Source EEAS. (2022). Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/ sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf 753/state/analysis Categories of Military Equipment Supplied ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 11: Electronic equipment, ‘spacecraft’ and components, not specified elsewhere on the EU Common Military List

India made bulk import of used Soviet-made T-55 tanks from Poland (Gupta, 2015). In the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, India received four Polnochny-class amphibious warfare vessel/landing ship tank from the Gdynia shipyard in two batches. India also received jet trainers in the 1970s and late 1990s.9 During the Kargil War (May–July 1999), India made some emergency purchases of spares for its Russian MiG aircraft from Poland (TOI, 2001). Bumar-Labedy has been supplying spares (including for instance torsion bars) for the T-72 tanks, which are also equipped with internal antiradiation liners by Zakady Chemiczne Jelchern SA. In April 1999, Bumar and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (BEML) signed a $32 million contract to produce and deliver 44 WZT-3M ARVs. These were to be assembled at BEML’s facility; they were handed over to the Indian Army in 2001 (Army-technology.com, 2020).

9 During the 1970s, the sudden deterioration of the De Havilland Vampires being used

by the FTW for advanced stages of jet training, 50 PZL TS-11 Iskra jet trainers were airlifted in AN-12 transport aircraft from Poland and inducted in the Indian Air Force between October 1975 and May 1976 (Bharat Rakshak.com, 2013). After their number dwindled to 30 aircraft, an agreement for the supply of another 20 Iskra TS-11 trainers was signed in 1999 (Hebbar, 1999).

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In early 2002, the Polish Finance Ministry had opened at $200 million credit line for selling Polish arms to India, which apparently facilitated the signing of two contracts.10 Other agreements signed were for Polish technical assistance to produce radars and supplying 650 assault parachutes to the Indian Army. On 17 February 2003, India and Poland signed a defence agreement, which broadly envisaged cooperation in the field of defence technology, research and development, training, peace support and combating terrorism (Fernandes, 2003; India, MEA, 2003b). Till Miller’s visit, the value of contracts signed with India reportedly amounted to $182 million, which included the ones for the modernization of the Drawa TR fire targeting systems valued at $72 million in 250 T-72 tanks (Warsaw Voice, 2003). An agreement to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on defence cooperation was reached during the visit of Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Poland in 2004. The first meeting of the JWG took place in April 2006, but no meeting has taken place since the seventh one in December 2013. The MoD signed a contract with Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. on 5 February 2004 for the delivery of 228 WZT-3M armoured recovery vehicles to the Indian Army under a two-year $202 million contract. Deliveries began in 2004 and were completed by 2007. However, on 5 June 2009, seven defence companies, including B.V.T. Poland, were blacklisted by India for allegations of bribery charges against a former DirectorGeneral of Ordnance Factory Board. In May 2017, India cancelled the $275 million contract. India has so far conducted only one military exercise with Poland in November 2011 when Indian and Polish special forces at the counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram. In 2008, Poland exported military equipment valued at e17.15 million for EU Common Military List category 6 (ground vehicles and components) and 10 (aircraft and helicopters). Next year, this increased to 10 A $73 million contract (1 March 2002) for the installation of thermal-imaging firecontrol DRAWA-T systems for 250 Soviet-made T-72 tanks were at the tank factory in Avadi, south India (Renik, 2002; Sherman, 2002: 2; Warsaw Voice, 2003). The credit line also facilitated another contract signed on 31 March 2002 for 80 WZT-3M ARVs produced by Bumar. Deliveries began in 2003 and were completed in 2004. The final batch of 40 ARVs were assembled in India from kits supplied by the Bumar-Labedy factory and were powered by the Indian-built V 46.6 diesel engine at BEML’s Avadi Engine Facility.

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e21.595 million for the above two Military List categories as well as category 1 (weapons and components) and 11 (electronic equipment) (Poland, MFA, 2010: 22). Polish arms exports increased from e7.685 million in 2013 to e8.130 million in 2014, but then declined to e6.187 million 2015 and further declined to e4.438 million in 2016. Polish arms exports to India increased to e6.755 million in 2017 and again to e7.155 million in 2018. In 2019, Polish arms exports amounted to e4.153 million, but declined to e1.677 million in 2020 (see Table 12.6). Slovakia The first major order that India gave to Slovakia was in 1993 for 35 VT-72B Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARVs) based on the T-72 main battle tank valued at $32 million. After the visit of Minister for Defence Mallikarjn Goud to Slovakia, India ordered 78 VT-72B ARVs in 1994, which were delivered in 1996–1997. An additional 42 ARVs were ordered in 1999 (delivered in 2001–2002) in a $30 million deal (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, generated on 27 November 2019). In 1995, India and Slovakia signed a MoU on Defence Cooperation (13 November 1995) (Kumar, 1997: 7). Apart from these orders, India did not purchase any significant military equipment from Slovakia. Though a working group on defence cooperation exists, but there is no meaningful cooperation in this field. On 26 March 1999, ZTS TEES Martin in cooperation with Unimpex Martin Company signed a contract for the supply of salvage tanks for disengaging stuck heavy military equipment worth $65 million to India (The Slovak Spectator, 1999). In 2005, Slovakia exported military material worth Slovak Koruna (Sk) 43.848 million (Military List 1, 6) to India. This declined to SKK 18.515 million (Military List 6) in 2006, SK 15.936 million (Military List 1, 6) in 2007 and SK 727,863 (Military List 6) in 2008. In 2009, Slovakia’s military exports amounted to e313,233, which increased to e627,550 (Military List 2, 6) in 2010 and e722,151 (Military List 6) in 2011. No exports were made in 2012 (Slovak Republic, Ministry of Economy, 2005: 18; 2006: 15; 2007: 12, 18; 2008: 17; 2009: 17; 2010: 16; 2011: 19–20). Slovak arms exports increased from e376,289 in 2013 to e511,092 in 2014 and e518,564 in 2015. They declined to e140,305 in 2016. No exports were made in 2017. However, in 2018, Slovakia’s arms exports

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Table 12.6 Poland arms exports to India, 2013–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

2013

ML 2 ML 5 ML 6 ML 7 ML 9 ML 10 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 2 ML 5 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 14 ML 15 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 2 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 13 ML 14 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 4 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 14 ML 18 Total ML 1

1 4 10

2,397 86,679 4,886,604

6 3 9 1 34 2 3 3 28 8 3 1 1 1 1 48 1 1 22 5 4 1 1 1 1 37 1 18 4 1 1 1 1 27 1

903,542 2,323,644 4,039,949 981,403 13,224,218 83,880 208,470 840,959 3,172,864 358,649 988,385 1,990,521 431,004 2,772 1,212,715 9,290,219 300 403 4,836,624 134,186 288,852 258 1,888,956 2,536,042 1,226,770 10,912,391 1,253,350 8,544,042 326,541 404,311 159,614 14,882 1,524,180 12,226,920 59,722

2014

2015

2016

2017

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros 2,397 42,139 3,574,723 121,103 841,603 1,252,700 1,691,970 157,970 7,684,605

772,616 1,767,531 388,150 1,270,995

3,930,396 8,129,688 40,802 478,782 229,166 3,751,665 1,686,190

6,186,605 71,620 3,514,174 287,449 405,065 159,911

4,438,219 7,536

(continued)

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Table 12.6 (continued) Year

2018

2019

2020

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses issued

ML 4 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 17 ML 18 Total ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 16 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 4 ML 5 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 11 ML 18 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 5 ML 6 ML 9 ML 10 ML 14 ML 18 ML 22

1 12 4 3

35,810 3,800,394 175,327 1,060,469

21 14 2 1 2 1 2 2 21 1 1 2 12 5 3 1 5 6 34

5,131,722 3,098,641 388,959 34,306 356,836 44,350 679,787 544,974 5,147,853 198,844 1,181,730 391,404 2,143,934 554,944 280,399 254,916 805,477 1,183,906 6,995,554

1 10 2 1 1

6,976 749,804 245,987 17,681 6,321

13

4,011,409

Value of actual exports Euros

6,318,564 140,767 254,478 13,464 20,500 6,755,309 3,057,149 28,578 8,837

4,060,222 7,154,786 1,181,730 197,962 1,412,999 246,034 356,207 757,332 360 4,152,624 1,888 258,263 1,352,864

6,441 44,880 12,681

(continued)

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Table 12.6 (continued) Year

Military list category Total

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

28

5,038,178

1,677,017

Source EEAS. (2022). Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/ sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf 753/state/analysis Categories of Military Equipment Supplied ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories and specially designed components therefor ML 2: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches), projectors specially designed or modified for military use and accessories, as follows and specially designed components therefor ML 3: Ammunition and fuse setting devices, as follows, and specially designed components therefor ML 4: Bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missile and components specially designed for them ML 5: Fire control, surveillance and warning equipment, and related systems, test and alignment and countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 6: Ground vehicles and components ML 7: Chemical agents, ‘biological agents’, ‘riot control agents’, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials ML 8: ‘Energetic materials’ and related substances ML 9: Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 11: Electronic equipment, ‘spacecraft’ and components, not specified elsewhere on the EU Common Military List ML 13: Special armoured vehicles (e.g. armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components, etc.) ML 14: ‘Specialised equipment for military training’ or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2 and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 15: Imaging or countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 16: Forgings, castings and other unfinished products the use of which in a specified product is identifiable, by material composition, geometry or function and which are specially designed for any products specified by ML1 to ML 14, ML 16, ML 9, ML 10, ML 12 or ML 19 ML 17: Miscellaneous equipment, materials and ‘libraries’, as follows, and specially designed components therefor ML 18: Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List ML 22: ‘Technolgy’ for ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List

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were e178,546, which declined to a meagre e8,862 in 2019. No exports were made in 2020 (see Table 12.7).

Cultural Ties India signed a number of cultural agreements with East European countries in the 1950s and the 1960s—Poland (27 March 1957), Romania (1957), Czechoslovakia (7 July 1959), Hungary (30 March 1962) and Bulgaria (1963). They provided the framework for the pursuit of cultural relations in agreed fields and disciplines. Broadly speaking, the emphasis and orientation in India’s foreign cultural policy has been on language, philosophy and performing arts. However, within the sphere of performing arts, a greater emphasis seemed to have been placed on dance-form than to the other arts (Dixit, 1979: 464). Indo-Slovak cultural links are relatively recent. The first cultural agreement between India and Slovakia encompassing culture, art, education, science, tourism sports and mass media was signed on 11 March 1996. A cultural exchange programme for 2004–2007 was signed on 13 December 2004. East European countries fell in ‘a category by itself’ in terms of cultural relations. The number of Friendship Societies dealing with India in these countries was perhaps the most numerous. Almost all important East European countries had separate Houses of Culture and Cultural Centres in India. These countries had taken particular interest in Indian linguistics and studies in selected spheres of Indian cultural and scientific activities (Dixit, 1979: 463). There are two cultural centres in Central Europe since 2011— Budapest (formally opened in November 2010; officially renamed in Amrita Sher-Gil Cultural Centre on 15 August 2014) and the Swami Vivekanand Cultural Centre, Prague (Indian Council of Cultural Relations, 2019: 17). The opening of a third cultural centre in Warsaw had been under active consideration in 2006, but the idea was subsequently dropped (India, MEA, 2012: 162). Central European countries have been responsive to the establishment of Chairs of Indian Studies in their universities. As of 31 March 2019, there are three ICCR Chairs in Poland—two for Hindi and Tamil at the University of Warsaw and one for Indian Studies (History) at Jagiellonian University, Krakow (2017–2018 to 2019–2020). There is a Chair for Hindi at ELTE University, Hungary since 1992.

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Table 12.7 Slovakia arms exports to India, 2013–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

Value of licenses issued

Value of actual exports Euros

2013 2014

ML 6 ML 6 ML 10 ML 22 Total ML 1 ML 6 ML 22 Total ML 6 ML 6 ML 1 ML 3 ML 6 ML 10 Total ML 2 ML 3 ML 6 ML 14 ML 18 Total ML 1 ML 3 ML 5 ML 6 ML 13 Total

6 10 1 1 12 1 7 2 10 4 2 1 2

1,116,462 1,148,062 380,000 50,200 1,578,262 2,157 1,732,837 2,376,344 4,111,338 754,245 170,516

376,289 99,892 375,000 36,200 511,092 2,157 516,407

2015

2016 2017 2018

2019

2020

2 5 1 1 1 1 2 6 3 1 1 1 1 7

4,149,500 2,120,255 541,638 6,811,393

10,000 7,026,666 256,997 7,293,663 306,683

518,564 140,305

160,522 18,024 178,546

8,862

8,862

18,000 1,393,448 20,630 9,032,424

Source EEAS. (2022). Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/ sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf 753/state/analysis Categories of Military Equipment Supplied ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories and specially designed components therefor ML 2: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches), projectors specially designed or modified for military use and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor ML 3: Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially designed components therefor ML 6: Ground vehicles and components

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Table 12.7 (continued) ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 13: Special armoured vehicles (e.g. armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components, etc.) ML 14: ‘Specialised equipment for military training’ or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 18: Production equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List ML 22: ‘Technolgy’ for ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List

Among Central European countries, the Czech Republic is the most favourable destination for Indian tourists (more than 100,000 annually) followed by more than 50,000 tourists to Hungary in 2019 (Szijjarto, 2020a). Approximately, 25,700 Polish tourists came to India in 2017. The resumption of direct Warsaw-Delhi LOT flights after a gap of 25 years in September 2019 is expected to help promote tourism and better people-to-people links. A number of Bollywood films have been shot in Central Europe. In the Czech Republic, films shot include ‘Rockstar’ (2011), ‘Ishkq in Paris’ (2013), ‘Bang Bang’ (2014), ‘The Ring’ (2016) and ‘Jab Harry Met Sally’ (2017). The first Bollywood film ‘Chehre’ (Faces)—an IndianSlovak-Polish production—was shot in Slovakia’s Tatra mountains in 2019 as the cost of filming in Slovakia was cheaper than in Austria. The shooting of several Indian films has also tended to give a boost to Indian tourism as well. After the conclusion of an educational exchange programme on 19 November 2014, Hungary offered 200 scholarships annually to Indian students under the framework of education cooperation within the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship programme (Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015), which seek to promote the study of foreign students in Hungarian higher education institutions’ graduate and postgraduate studies programmes in natural and life sciences, engineering, information science and economics. In return, India offers 35 scholarships for Hungarian students and research fellows who may study English and Hindi languages or other disciplines at the postgraduate and doctoral levels.

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Diaspora According to the recent assessment of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, by the end of 2018, there were 8350 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) in the V4, accounting for a meagre 0.02% of almost 31 million overseas Indians in the world and 0.3% in the EU28 (India, MEA, 2018). This included 4,600 in Poland, 2,400 in Czechia, 1,150 in Hungary and 250 in Slovakia. According to Eurostat, the total number of Indian citizens with residence permits in the V4 by end of 2018 stood at over 20,000 (22,374). This included: 13,934 in Poland, 4,461 in Czechia, 3,392 in Hungary and 587 in Slovakia (Eurostat, 2020, cited in Kugiel & Pedziwiatr, 2021: 317). This was five-fold increase in comparison with 2010, when the total size of Indi, cited in an community in the V4 was only 4,230 persons (Kugiel & Pedziwiatr, 2021: 311). Skilled Indian Migrants in Czechia In 2018, the Czech Government selected India for the Employee Card scheme. In 2018, Prague’s decision to create a special window to facilitate the movement of 500 long-stay visas for highly qualified Indian professionals w.e.f. 1 September 2019 was part of an extension of its economic migration programmes (Czech Republic, MFA, 2020: 20; India, Trade Promotion Council, 2018; Bagchi, 2018). New Delhi appreciated the Czech recognition of the need to enhance the mobility of Indian professionals and students into the Czech Republic to upscale the economic partnership (Kovind, 2018b).

Conclusion From the mid-1950s till the end of the Cold War, India’s relations with the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) were an adjunct of Indo-Soviet relations. Having been let down by the West, India turned to the Soviet Union in 1955 as a partner in economic and industrial cooperation. The CEECs followed suit after Moscow offered economic, financial and technical assistance for large public sector projects. There was no serious conflict of interest and almost identical views on most international issues. The CEECs also did not have any colonial hangovers and were indifferent to some of the issues that troubled West European

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lobbies when dealing with India such as human rights, Kashmir, treatment of minorities and so on (Sibal, 2019: 78). In the post-Cold War era, India and the CEECs viewed each other from opposite directions: the Visegrad 4 looked towards the European Union and India focused on its key partners in Western Europe. As Central Europeans aligned their foreign policy with those of the EU, India and the CEECs began to have divergent worldviews and differences on how they perceived the world and the challenges that confronted it. There was little that brought them together. Indian foreign policy took time to adjust to the changing realities in Central and Eastern Europe. For nearly a decade-and-a-half (1990–2004), Central European countries concentrated on gaining admission in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Their preoccupation with a ‘return to Europe’ and transatlantic relations left them little time or interest in India. New Delhi too showed little economic and strategic interest in the region given the radical transformation of the socioeconomic and geopolitical milieu in Central Europe. Mutual neglect for nearly two decades led to a sharp decline in political contacts as well as people-to-people ties. The CEECs began to rediscover India after they gained membership of the European Union in 2004 and more consciously after the 2008 financial crisis. India also took time to recalibrate its policies. Today, India and Central Europe have a convergence of views on issues like terrorism, reform of the United Nations and non-proliferation. There are also commonalities on a number of international issues, including multilateralism, terrorism, UN reform, support for Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and a rules-based order. There were, however, differences over Western interventions in Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), crises in Syria and Ukraine in which India had no geopolitical interest or stake. A long-standing complaint of all Central European countries has been the lack of regular high-level reciprocal visits by Indian dignitaries to the region. A prime ministerial visit to Central Europe has not taken place in four decades. Despite Foreign Minister Jaishankar having expressed a desire to ‘engage Poland in the Visegrad format’ in January 2019, a regional V4+ India summit is still proving to be elusive after the first-ever official interaction with the Visegrad 4 at joint secretary level took place in Bratislava (27 February 2015). In the future, the primary focus will continue to be on economy and trade. Different Visegrad Group countries will develop their relationships

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with India at different speeds, with varying levels of engagement and commitment and with different trajectories and results.

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CHAPTER 13

India and the Baltics Rajendra K. Jain

Amongst the Baltic States, Lithuania is the largest with a population of 3.6 million and a territory of 65,200 square km while Estonia—the smallest— with 1.55 million and 45,100 square km. Latvia had a population of 2.6 million and a territory of 63,700 square km. After a brief discussion of Jawaharlal Nehru’s perceptions of the Baltics, this chapter examines Indian perceptions of the turmoil in the Baltics and their movement for independence. Subsequent sections describe political relations and examine economic and trade relations as well as arms transfers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to India.

Nehru and the Baltics Jawaharlal Nehru does refer very briefly to the Baltics. Shortly after the Second World War began, he wrote that as a result of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty (28 September 1939), which partitioned Poland and gave the Soviet Union ‘a free hand’ in the Baltic States. The

R. K. Jain (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_13

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southeast of Europe lay beyond the reach of Adolf Hitler; the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea were ‘dominated’ by Russia (Nehru, 1939a: 191). By 10 October 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been induced to accept Russian garrisons at key points on their territories and they had also subsequently signed trade agreements. Soviet concern about an antiSoviet front had led Russia ‘to fortify herself to meet this menace and all her policy in the Baltic states points this way’ (Nehru, 1939b: 266). He described the Soviet-German pact as ‘a shock’; its timing ‘smacked patently of this opportunism’. However, it could be understood and partly explained in subsequent Soviet policy towards the Baltics, viz. that it wanted ‘to protect its north-western frontier from attack and everyone knew that this was the danger zone’ (Nehru, 1940a: 298). The invasion of the Baltic republics does not seem to have attracted Nehru’s attention (Damodaran, 1997: 204). The Baltic States were ‘more or less absorbed’ by the Soviet Union by 10 July 1940 (Nehru, 1940b: 74).

Turmoil in the Baltics The Baltics, according to Dev Murarka, confronted three intense problems. Firstly, they regarded themselves to have been illegally and unjustly incorporated into the Soviet Union as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (23 August 1939) and displayed clear aspirations towards independence. The Baltic Republics had been greatly incensed by Moscow’s pretensions that there was no secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact which placed the Baltic States in their sphere of influence. Secondly, the three Baltic Republics revealed ‘a growing fear and resentment of Russification’ since Slavic workers had been settling there in large numbers. This ethnic issue, Murarka remarked, was raised primarily in Latvia and Estonia and to a lesser extent in Lithuania. The root of the problem, he argued, was mainly ethnic since ‘the degradation and denigration’ to which the cultural language of these republics was subjected were deeply resented and fostered ‘permanent distrust towards Moscow and resentment against the Russians as a whole on a mass scale’ (Murarka, 1989: 11). Thirdly, unlike the Caucasus and Central Asia, the dispute in the Baltics was between the local inhabitants and the Slavs, especially the Russians but the Ukrainians and by law Russians as well (Murarka, 1989: 11). Thus, the Baltics feel that they have been dominated politically by Moscow against their will and ‘humiliated culturally and spiritually’. This

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had led to their determination to gain either the widest possible measure of political and economic autonomy and equality which would be indistinguishable from independence, or failing that, independence (Murarka, 1989: 11). The emergence of mass movements for change in 1988 was followed by the emergence of pro-independence majorities in each of the three Baltic Republics. In March 1990, Lithuania declared the reestablishment of an independent state followed by Estonia later in the month and Latvia on 4 May 1990—the last of the three Baltic Republics to do so (TOI, 1990b: 1). Moscow declared these declarations of independence to be illegal (TOI, 1991c: 11). Shortly after the crackdown by Soviet troops in Lithuania, ‘ominous’ conservative forces in the Soviet Union were said to be resorting to ever more harsh measures ‘to tame all three rebellious republics’ (TOI, 1991b: 14). Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania had been more assertive and precipitate in its methods to proclaim independence from Moscow. Its unilateral declaration of independence was contrary to Moscow’s insistence that the wishes of the Lithuanian people could be more clearly expressed within the framework of the Soviet Constitution. On the face of it, it seemed that Mikhail Gorbachev had not ‘merely abetted, and possibly aided, the disintegration’ of the Soviet bloc with his perestroika and glasnost. Instead of encouraging a Socialist renewal, the former had encouraged this disruptive trend while the latter had ‘focused attention on ethnic or regional injustices, revived memories of historical differences, and accentuated latent animosities’ (Das Gupta, 1990: 10). Moscow would therefore seek to do its utmost to limit the break-up of the Baltic region and ‘to stall the inevitable as long as possible’ (Das Gupta, 1990: 10). Gorbachov stood firm in the wake of Lithuania declaration of independence because he was convinced that ‘any concession to secessionist sentiment’ would have major repercussions not only in the two other Baltic States, but in other republics as well. The Lithuanian leaders, the Times of India editorially observed in April 1990, were in ‘peculiar position of having de jure but not de facto independence’. He reacted by implementing economic sanctions, including severing energy supplies, until Lithuania rescinded its declaration of independence. However, this demand of complete political surrender from Lithuania’s new leaders was something which they could not accept (TOI, 1990a: 10).

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There was limited coverage of events in the Baltic States and their quest for independence in national dailies with coverage in South Indian newspapers being scarce (Spitz, 1991).

Recognition On 3 September 1991, the three ‘breakaway Baltic Republics’ took the first step towards membership of the United Nations when Britain and France presented formal applications on their behalf (TOI, 1991e: 16). On 6 September 1991, the newly-constituted State Council passed a resolution formally recognizing the independence of the three Baltic States.The announcement ended almost five decades of Soviet occupation (Chandran, 1991a: 1). The next day, India accorded recognition to Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia as sovereign and independent republics, i.e. a month after it declared its independence. This was conveyed in a message of felicitations by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to the Presidents of the three Baltic States while he was on a trip to the Federal Republic of Germany (TOI, 1991f: 1). Two days later, when Minister of State for External Affairs Eduardo Faleiro sought to make a statement on the recognition, Saifuddin Choudhury (CPM) and several of his party colleagues protested and pointed out that making such an announcement when the Parliament was in session was against established conventions and practices. Somnath Chatterjee (CPM) even asked the government to apologize. The Minister replied that the decision was announced immediately after the constitutional requirements were fulfilled (TOI, 1991g: 9). The recognition of the Baltics shortly after the August 1991 revolution in the Soviet Union was one of the ‘most singular about-turns’ which removed one of the most contentious disputes that had plagued East–West negotiations for a number of years (Chandran, 1991c: 9). India welcomed the radical changes in Eastern Europe towards democratization, political pluralism and the evolution of ‘more representative systems and institutions reflecting popular aspirations’ (India, MEA, 1990: 34–35) and the movement towards democracy and a more liberal system of governance.

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Political Relations Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao met the Presidents of all the three Baltic Republics at Rio de Janeiro on 13 June 1992. India, he told them, had established diplomatic relations with all the three Republics and, ‘in due course’, would open embassies in their capitals (India, MEA, 1993a: 65). An Indian official delegation visited Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from 24 June to 2 July 1993 and held discussions with senior officials and ministers in the three countries. It initialled a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Estonia and Latvia and signed one with Lithuania. Memorandums of Understanding on counter trade were also initialled with Estonia and Latvia (India, MEA, 1994: 62). The first ministerial visit—‘a contact-building exercise’ (TOI, 1994: 7)—to the Baltics took place in August–September 1995 when Minister of State for External Affairs Salman Khurshid visited Estonia (27–29 August 1995), Lithuania (30–31 August 1995) and Latvia (31 August-2 September 1995). In Estonia, a protocol on Foreign Office consultations was signed with Estonia and Lithuania (India, MEA, 1995: 64–65). In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States extended their diplomatic links to other parts of the world, including China, India and Latin America. By the end of the 1990s, the MEA described relations with the three Baltic States to be ‘close and productive’ (India, MEA, 1999: 34).

India and Estonia India recognized Estonia on 22 September 1921, then a British colony, when it was admitted into the League of Nations. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, it was re-recognized by India on 9 September 1991. Diplomatic relations with Estonia were established on 2 December 1991 through its Embassy in Helsinki, Finland. Estonia initially had an Honorary Consul General in New Delhi (Kastur Lal Vig), who started functioning from September 1993. It subsequently posted a consular officer in the Finnish Embassy in New Delhi from September 2005 to July 2008. Estonia appointed its first-ever Ambassador to India with residence in Tallinn in 2009–2010 (India, MEA, 2010: 72). On 8 December 2010, the first Estonian Ambassador Peep Jahilo presented his credentials to the Indian President. Estonia opened its Embassy in New Delhi in March

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2012 headed by a Charge d’Affaires. The Embassy was formally inaugurated by the Estonian Foreign Minister on 13 February 2013. Estonia has Honorary Consuls in Mumbai (since May 1999) and Chennai (March 2018). The first high-level meeting took place in June 1992 on the sidelines of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro between Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Estonian President Lennart-Georg Meri. An Indian official delegation visited the Baltic Republics in June-July 1993 and initialled a trade and cooperation agreement and a Memorandum of Understanding on counter trade with Estonia (India, MEA, 1994: 62). Three months later, Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste (14–17 October 1993) signed a Declaration on Principles and Directions of Cooperation, an agreement on trade and economic cooperation, an agreement on technical and economic cooperation and a cultural, educational and scientific cooperation agreement (India, MEA, 1994: 62). Estonian President Lennart Meri’s visit in February 2009 led to the signing of an agreement to enhance cooperation in the field of science and technology—the first of its kind with any Baltic State—providing for the establishment of a joint committee to identify the areas of mutual cooperation and facilitate the exchange of scientists. Another agreement to establish a Joint Business Council to promote bilateral economic ties was also signed (Meri, 1999: 12). The 2000s Six years after the MoU on Foreign Office consultations (FOCs) (August 1995), the first round was held on 13–14 September 2001, when gene technology and IT were proposed as new areas of cooperation and discussions were held on the possibility of establishing a joint intergovernmental cooperation committee on trade, science, technology and culture. At the meeting, the Estonians handed over draft agreements of international air transport and science and technology cooperation (Estonia, MFA, 2001). Eight years after his predecessor, Minister of State for External Affairs Digvijay Singh visited Estonia from 20 to 22 November 2003 during which drafts of a bilateral investment promotion agreement, a double taxation avoidance agreement and visa-free regime for diplomatic/official passport holders were handed over to the Estonian authorities (India, MEA, 2004: 74). Next year, the Estonian-Indian Cultural Society started

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functioning and an Estonian-Indian parliamentary group was established towards the end of 2004 at the Riigikogu. At the third Foreign Office Consultations (3 April 2005), New Delhi expressed interest in enhancing trade, especially cooperation in the field of research and information technology (Estonia, MFA, 2015). Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet sought to strengthen relations with India as it was ‘one of the largest countries in the major force in world politics’ whose ‘political economic weight in the world’ was rapidly growing (Estonia, MFA, 2008). Subsequent rounds of FOCs were held on 24 November 2006, 8–9 October 2008, May 2012 and 26 August 2016. The tenth round was held on 7 February 2019 and the eleventh one on 25 November 2021. Foreign Minister Paet visited India in November 2008 and two years later when he urged the need to conclude an investment protection agreement as well as an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation between the two countries (Paet, 2010). Prime Minister Andrus Ansip’s private visit to India in July 2012 was followed two months later by that of Minister for Education and Research Jaak Aaviksoo. Next month, accompanied by a 25-member business delegation, Foreign Minister Paet, attended a business seminar organized by FICCI. There were several Indian ministerial visits to Estonia: Minister for Communication and Information Technology and Human Resource Development Kapil Sibal (19 September) and Minister of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises Praful Patel (3 October). At the end of February 2011, Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur visited Estonia and other Baltic Republics. Two years later, Sachin Pilot (Minister of State for Corporate Affairs) in April 2013 and Jayanthi Natarajan (September 2013) (India, MEA 2013: 65) visited Estonia. Cooperation in IT There has been deepening cooperation in information technology between India and Estonia. In 2014, an agreement to enhance academic and practical cooperation in IT, especially on e-Governance and cloud computing that would enable Estonian companies to offer their products and services in public and private cooperation projects, was also signed (India, MEA, 2014: 65). A group of 26 senior officers from the Central and State Governments visited Estonia from 22 to 29 August 2014 to

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participate in the training course on e-Governance solutions organized by the e-Governance Academy of Estonia (India, MEA, 2015: 85). During 2015–2016, several IT companies decided to establish their development centres in Estonia. In order to enhance IT cooperation, Ravi Shankar Prasad, Minister for Law and Justice and Electronics and Information Technology, visited Estonia in September 2016. During Minister of State for External Affairs M.J. Akbar’s visit to Estonia in May 2017, his Estonian counterpart emphasized that the most important direction of future cooperation between the two countries was IT and cyber security (Estonia, MFA, 2017). Sanjay Bahl, Director-General of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) as well as a business delegation visited Estonia in November 2017 to explore possibilities of cooperation in cyber security (India, MEA, 2018: 104). K.J. George, Minister of IT, biotechnology and science and technology of Karnataka visited Estonia on 26–27 August 2018. Two months later, the Government of Telangana and Estonia signed a MoU for cooperation in digital practices, e-Governance and related areas. In December 2018, Nagaland signed a MoU with Estonian e-Governance Academy to provide technical assistance and advice for establishing a similar institution in the state and to strengthen bilateral technical cooperation in the fields of IT and e-Governance. In August 2019, a MoU for cooperation in e-Governance and emerging digital technologies was signed between METIY and the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs & Communications. Since 2011, several officials and other private bodies from India have availed training programmes in the e-Governance Academy in Estonia (India, Embassy in Estonia, 2022). Detention of Estonian Ship Guards On 18 October 2013, Indian police in Tamil Nadu arrested 35 crew members, including 14 Estonian security guards, of the anti-pirate ship Seaman Guard Ohio, owned by the US maritime security company AdvanFort. On 30 December, the entire detained crew was charged with illegal refuelling, illegal handling of weapons and illegal entry into territorial waters. In January 2016, the Tamil Nadu trial court convicted 23 foreign nationals and 23 Indians, cited as co-accused, for illegally entering Indian waters with a huge cache of arms and ammunition (Vijay Kumar, 2016).

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This event subsequently led to the signing of an agreement on the transfer of sentenced persons on 15 November 2016 (effective from 1 March 2017) wherein a convicted Indian or Estonian citizen has the opportunity under the agreement to serve the sentence in his or her home country (Estonia, MFA, 2016). The Estonian guards were finally acquitted in a South Indian court in late November 2017, over four years after their initial arrest in October 2013. The 2010s Several meetings between India and Estonia took place on the sidelines of multilateral conferences. Prime Minister Taavi Roivas met Minister of State for External Affairs V.K. Singh on the sidelines of the ASEM summit in Milan (16 October 2014). On 30 September 2015, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj met her Estonian counterpart Mariana Kalijurand on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York. The Estonian Foreign Minister met Minister of State for External Affairs on two occasions: M.J. Akbar, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (21 September 2017) and V.K. Singh on 20 November 2017 on the sidelines of ASEM foreign ministers meeting in Myanmar. Vice-President Visit, 2019 and After Accompanied by three Members of Parliament, Minister of State (Information Technology (S.S. Dhotre), media and a delegation of 18 companies led by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu visited Estonia from 20 to 21 August 2019. The visit led to the signing of three MoUs—waiver of visas for diplomatic passport holders, for cooperation in cyber security and for cooperation in eGovernance and emerging digital technologies. Estonia extended support to Indian’s bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council and NSG membership (India, MEA, 2021). Next month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2019. Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu visited New Delhi in January 2020 as one of the keynote speakers at the Raisina Dialogue. In their discussions on UN reform, the visiting minister supported Indian membership of the UN Security Council and considered it important that the selection of permanent members ‘reflects today’s world’ (Reinsalu, 2020) and that

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India deserved ‘a permanent seat’. The Estonian Foreign Minister also met Modi who proposed that the two countries should consider bringing talented Estonians and Indians together through hackathons. In December 2020, the GoI decided to open a Resident Mission in Tallinn to enhance bilateral relations. The Embassy of India in Tallinn was opened on 28 December 2021 with a Charge d’Affaires Manoj Sharma. The first Indian Ambassador to Estonia, Ajaneesh Kumari, assumed charge of the Mission on 11 March 2022 and presented his credentials on 26 April 2022. Cyber security, digital transformation and cooperation in the UN Security Council were amongst the topics of discussion in Jaishankar’s telephonic conversation with Foreign Minister Eva-Maria Liimets on 21 May 2021. In their first in-person meeting after the COVID-19 pandemic, Indian and Estonian foreign ministers met on 17 August 2021 on the sidelines of the Indian Presidency of the UN Security Council and primarily discussed developments in Afghanistan as well as working together on maritime and cyber security. The eleventh round of Foreign Office consultations took place on 25 November 2021 with the Indian delegation being led by Reenat Sandhu, Secretary (West). Estonia was amongst the first countries in EU to recognize both Covishield and Covaxin vaccines (India, MEA, 2022a: 123). Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar met the Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2022.

India and Latvia India recognized Latvia as a sovereign and independent State on 7 September 1991. Diplomatic relations were established on 25 February 1992. Latvia opened an Embassy in New Delhi in January 2014. Latvia established its Embassy in New Delhi in January 2014 and the first Resident Ambassador of Latvia to India Aivars Groza presented credentials to President of India on 21 October 2014. However, the Indian Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, is concurrently accredited to Latvia.

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The first major visit was by Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis in October 1997. Four years later, the first round of Foreign Office consultations with Latvia was held on 27–28 June 2001.1 An agreement on setting up an inter-governmental commission on trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation was signed on 27 June 2001. Deputy Prime Minister Ainars Slesers and a large business delegation visited 24–29 November 2003. The first India-Latvia Joint Business Council was organized by FICCI on 27 November 2003 (India, MEA, 2004: 75). Minister of State for External Affairs Rao Inderjit Singh visited Latvia from 5 to 7 October 2005. Next year, Latvian Foreign Minister Artis Pabriks visited India from 21 to 25 March 2006. Latvia extended support to India’s candidature for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and was one of the co-sponsors of the G-4 resolution (India, MEA, 2006: 82). Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma visited Latvia from 27 to 29 March 2007. Amongst Latvian visits were Minister of Culture (2007 and 2016), Minister of e-Governance (2007) and Economics Minister (2010). Latvian Economics Minister visited India in 2010, followed by the visit of Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur who visited Latvia towards the end of February 2011. Two years later, Foreign Minister Edgars Rink¯eviˇcs visited India from 15 to 20 September 2013; an agreement on the prevention of double taxation and tax evasion was signed during the visit. Several meetings on the sidelines of multilateral meetings took place: Vice-President Naidu met Latvian President Valdis Zatlers in Brussels (4 October 2010), and Vice-President Hamid Ansari met President Vjonisin on the sidelines of the 11th ASEM Summit in Mongolia in July 2016. Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj met Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rink¯eviˇcs on the sidelines of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2017. President Raimonds Vjonisin and President Kovind had a brief interaction during President Kovind’s visit to Zagreb in Croatia in March 2019. On 4 October 2020, Vice-President Naidu met Latvian President Valdis Zatlers in Brussels.

1 Foreign Office consultations with Latvia were held on 4 May 2008 (New Delhi) and in February 2015 (New Delhi). The most recent (seventh) one was held in Riga in March 2019.

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The two foreign ministers met on several occasions on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly: Sushma Swaraj and Rink¯eviˇcs (2017) and Jaishankar and his Latvian counterpart (September 2019). Accompanied by an 18-member delegation, Prime Minister Maris Kuˇcinskis visited India from 2 to 6 November 2017 and discussed a wide range of bilateral issues with Modi. A protocol amending and supplementing the air services agreement was signed (India, MEA, 2017). Twenty-five years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the visit of Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister of Electronics and Information Technology and Law and Justice, to Latvia in September 2016 was the highest-ranking ministerial one that took place. A 12-member Indian Parliamentary delegation Lok Sabha Speaker Sumitra Mahajan visited Latvia from 13 to 17 June 2018. Vice-President in Latvia, 2019 and After As part of his Baltic tour, Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu visited Latvia on 19–20 August 2019. In a joint media statement with the Latvian President, the two leaders resolved to take the bilateral relations to a higher level with special focus on culture, education and economic partnership. The two countries sought to tap the immense opportunities to enhance trade and investment ties in sectors such as pharma, automotives, textiles, petro products, food processing, agriculture, dairy, transport and logistics, ICT, education and start-ups. India’s transformative growth and Latvia’s natural strengths, they concurred, complemented each other (Business Standard, 2019 20 August). ASSOCHAM led a business delegation for the first-ever India-Latvia Business Forum. After the talks, the two countries signed a cultural exchange programme and an MoU between ASSOCHAM and the Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI). On 26 September 2019, Foreign Minister Jaishankar met his Latvian counterpart Edgars Rink¯eviˇcs on the sidelines of the 74th session of the UN General Assembly in New York. On 14–15 January 2020, Rink¯eviˇcs visited India where he participated in the fifth Raisina Dialogue—his third visit to India; the previous being in September and November 2013. Foreign Minister Jaishankar and Foreign Minister Edgars Rink¯eviˇcs had a telephone conversation in February 2021. The Latvian Foreign Minister also participated in the first India–Nordic-Baltic Conclave (virtual format)

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in November 2020. Earlier, he participated at the fifth Raisina Dialogue and had a group interaction with Modi (January 2020). Agreements Amongst agreements signed by India and Latvia include an agreement on economic and technical cooperation (1995), a MoU for cooperation in the fields of culture, arts, education, science, mass media and sports (1995), an air services agreement (1997), an agreement on the Intergovernmental Commission on trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation (2001), an agreement on bilateral investment protection (2010), a health agreement (2012), an agreement on the prevention of double taxation and tax evasion (2013), and an agreement between Chambers of Commerce (2019).

India and Lithuania India recognized Lithuania on 7 September 1991 after acceptance of their independence by the former Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations were established a year later on 25 February 1992. Its first Ambassador, Jagannath Doddamani, residing in Warsaw, was accredited to Lithuania in 1994. India relocated its representation of Lithuania from Warsaw to Minsk, but after Lithuania’s accession to the European Union in May 2004, New Delhi again shifted it back Warsaw from Minsk (India-Lithuanian Forum, 2021). Lithuania established its Honorary Consulate in New Delhi in October 1994 and opened an Embassy in New Delhi on 1 July 2008 and its first Ambassador Petras Simeliunas presented his credentials on 8 April 2010 in its efforts to intensify relations with emerging powers. Lithuania has an Honorary Consulate in Mumbai and Bangalore (7 August 2014). Rajinder Chaudhary served as Honorary Consul of India in Vilnius since May 2018. The first high-level contact between India and Lithuania took place in June 1992 when Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao met President Vytautas Landsbergis during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Three years later, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius visited India in September 1995 followed by that of President Valdas Adamkus in February 2001. The visit was preceded by that of Minster of State for External Affairs Salman Khurshid to Lithuania in August 1995.

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Minister of State for External Affairs Vinod Khanna met the Lithuanian State Secretary Evaldas Ignatavicius on 10 September 2003 on the sidelines of the International Conference of New or Restored Democracies held in Mongolia. The first round of Foreign Office consultations was held in New Delhi on 8 March 2004 during which the two sides undertook a comprehensive review of bilateral relations and exchanged views of regional and international importance (India, MEA, 2004: 75). Minister of State for External Affairs Rao Inderjit Singh visited Lithuania from 3 to 5 October 2005; draft bilateral agreements on avoidance of double taxation, investment promotion and protection, and extradition were discussed. New Delhi thanked Lithuania for supporting the G-4 resolution on the reform of the UN Security Council. Interestingly, this was the second visit of a Minister of State for External Affairs in thirteen years after the establishment of diplomatic relations (Lithuania, MFA, 2005). Minister of State for Ministry of External Affairs Anand Sharma paid an official visit to Lithuania on 25–26 March 2007. The Lithuanian Government conveyed their intention to open a Consulate General in New Delhi headed by a Consul General, Algirdas Albertas Dambrauskas, with jurisdiction over the entire territory of India (India, MEA, 2008: 76). Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas and Economy Minister Dainius Kreivys, accompanied by a 30-member business delegation, visited India from 2–5 December 2009 to explore business and investment opportunities. The two ministers also participated in the Lithuania-India Business Forum in Mumbai. There have been several exchanges of parliamentary delegations. A three-member parliamentary delegation from Lithuania led by the Deputy Speaker of Parliament visited India from 12 to 18 November 2010. Two years later, a 25-member India-Lithuania Parliamentary Friendship Group was constituted in the Indian Parliament in November 2012. The Lithuanian Parliament also established a 34-member Group for Interparliamentary Relations with the Republic of India in their newly elected Seimas (India, MEA, 2013: 67). Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur, visited Vilnius in March 2011 on bilateral visit and again in July 2011 to attend a ministerial meeting of the Community of Democracies.

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Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius visited India to participate in the ASEM FMM 11 Summit on 11–12 November 2013. During his visit, a short-stay visa waiver agreement for diplomatic passport holders with Lithuania was signed (India, MEA, 2014: 67). Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Mantvydas Bekešius, and Vice Minister of Agriculture Saulius Cironka, visited India from 10 to 12 November 2014 to meet their Honorary Consuls accredited in South and Southeast Asian countries. The Vice Minister of Education and Science visited India from 28 November to 1 December 2014 along with an education delegation from Lithuania (India, MEA, 2015: 87). Minister of State for Agriculture Mohanbhai Kundariya visited Lithuania from 30 September to 3 October 2015. The two sides agreed to harness the significant potential for intensifying bilateral cooperation in agriculture, particularly in sectors like food and dairy processing. Prime Minister of Lithuania Algirdas Butkevicius visited India from 12 to 16 February 2016 leading a high-level business delegation to attend the Make in India week in Mumbai. He had bilateral talks with the Prime Minister on 13 February 2016 (India, MEA, 2016: 97). In July 2016, Vice-President Hamid Ansari met Prime Minister Algirdas Butkeviˇcius and discussed bilateral cooperation, situation in Europe and Brexit on the sidelines of the ASEM meeting in Ulaanbaatar. A MoU on cooperation in agriculture and allied sector was signed on 19 July 2016 by the visiting Vice Minister of Agriculture Saulius Jakimavicius. Marking the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Minister of State for External Affairs M.J. Akbar visited Lithuania in May 2017. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkeviˇcius reciprocated the visit in October 2017 (he had visited India earlier in November 2013) along with a 28-member business delegation. A MoU on Agriculture and Allied Sectors was signed in 2016. An extradition treaty was signed during the visit along with a protocol amending and supplementing the bilateral air services agreement. Naidu’s Visit, August 2019 Until Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu’s visit to Lithuania from 17 to 19 August 2019, the Baltic country had never received a Union Minister level or above (Linkevicius, 2017). Naidu stressed the centuries-old civilizational links between the two countries with Lithuanian being the

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oldest Indo-European language with strong links with Sanskrit. The two countries exchanged views on multilateral issues and to build on our existing cooperation at the United Nations and other multilateral fora. They concurred that the United Nations needed to be reformed to reflect the realities of today and address current global challenges (India, MEA, 2019). Foreign Office Consultations A protocol on bilateral consultations between the two MFAs was signed on 30 August 1995. However, regular consultations were held nearly after a decade in 2004. So far nine rounds of FOCs have been held so far on bilateral, regional and international issues: third (26 October 2006) and fourth (10 October 2008). During the consultations on 24 October 2013, when amongst other things, issues relating to bilateral political, trade and commerce, culture, education, exchange visits of political dignitaries, cooperation in multilateral fora such as UN Security Council, NSG, EU and pending agreements were discussed. During the seventh FOCs (15 November 2016), the Lithuanian delegation again urged New Delhi to open an Indian Embassy in Vilnius. The ninth FOCs (Vilnius, 5 March 2019) focused on bilateral relations, cooperation within international organizations and agreed to strengthen the legal framework for bilateral relations and exchanged relevant information about agreements that were under negotiation (India, Embassy in Lithuania, 2018). During the tenth round of FOCs (16 March 2022), New Delhi invited Lithuania to join the International Solar Alliance while the latter reiterated their request for opening of an Indian mission in Vilnius. Discussions were held on the need for greater mobility between both countries, including movement of students and professionals. To that end, New Delhi requested the Lithuanian side to recognize Covaxin and to consider a mutual recognition agreement on COVID-19 vaccination certificates. The Indian side took note of the ‘Start Up Visas’ and ‘Blue Card’ initiatives of the Lithuanian government to further facilitate the movement of business persons and professionals (India, MEA, 2022b).

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Multilateral Cooperation Lithuania has generally supported India at all international fora, including the expansion of the UN Security Council by additional permanent as well as non-permanent seats for developing countries. During his visit to India in February 2001, President Valdas Adamkus told the Indian Prime Minister in New Delhi that India was a very big country with an important voice in world affairs and Lithuania would like to see India represented in the expanded Security Council. However, Lithuania’s position on the latest G-4 initiatives were ambivalent and was often inspired by the US position. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linus Linkevicius reiterated their appreciation of India’s position on this matter during discussions with MOS (MJA) in Vilnius during May 2017. In 2020, Lithuania extended support to India for its non-permanent membership of the UNSC for the period 2021–2022. It has also supported India’s candidatures at ICAO, WHO and the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative & Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in 2020 (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020, Brief: 6). Developments, 2021–2022 Jaishankar met his Lithuanian counterpart Linas Linkevicius on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in February 2020 and held discussions on enhancing bilateral relations, especially trade (India, MEA, 2021: 109). On 3 July 2020, Jaishankar and his Lithuanian counterpart had a telephonic conversation and discussed challenges posed by the global pandemic as well as other relevant issues of global policy and regional security. On 21 September 2021, Jaishankar met Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergin in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister said that it would open an Honorary Consulate in Hyderabad in 2021 and expressed interest in developing relations in the fields of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and IT (Lithuania, MFA, 2021). On 27 April 2022, the Union Cabinet granted approval to the opening of a new embassy in Lithuania in 2022 (India, MEA, 2022c). Foreign Minister G. Landsbergis participated in the seventh session of the Raisina Dialogue in April 2022. In his meeting with Jaishankar, he discussed his country’s approach to the war in Ukraine and highlighted

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the need to diversify supply chains and boost trade amongst like-minded countries. Visits Indian visits have largely been those of Ministers of State. Thus, several Ministers of State of External Affairs visited Lithuania—Preneet Kaur (March 2011), Salman Kurshid (1995), Inderjit Singh (2005) and Anand Sharma (2007). High-level Lithuanian visits include those of Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius (1995), President Valdas Adamku (19–23 February 2001) and Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas (2009). There have also been several visits from members of the Lithuanian Parliament, Vice-Ministers of Agriculture and Education and Science (2014).

Trade and Economic Relations The Baltic States are relatively small economies with low levels of trade with India. India and Estonia The trade agreement of 15 October 1993 provided for commercial and non-commercial transactions in freely convertible currencies and the grant of most favoured nation treatment to each other. Valid for five years, it provided for promotion of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries on a long-term and stable basis (India, MEA, 1993b: 277– 278). The agreement also envisaged cooperation in the fields of science and technology, ecology, transport, tourism, communication, education of personnel and in other fields of mutual interest. India-Estonia trade increased from a nominal $3.27 million in 1996– 1997 to $97.81 million in 2010–2011. It grew more than threefold to $348.2 million in 2011–2012 and declined subsequently. It was $134.40 million in 2021–2022 (Table 13.1). India had a trade deficit of over $100 million during 2011–2012 to 2013–2014 and again was the maximum at $178.4 million in 2015–2016. However, it declined significantly to $10.2 million in 2021–2022. Major India exports include machinery and equipment, garments, knitwear, iron and steel articles of leather; saddles and harness, travel

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Table 13.1 India-Estonia trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 (in millions of US Dollars) Year

Exports

Imports

Total

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

3.11 2.89 5.26 6.50 3.30 3.88 4.31 5.98 10.24 13.86 28.24 68.63 49.31 28.92 52.91 116.48 91.88 79.13 68.09 63.68 97.50 80.33 64.32 65.44 51.83 62.10

0.16 0.02 0.64 0.85 0.32 6.42 0.68 0.24 0.72 9.02 25.98 10.72 15.55 32.94 44.90 231.74 219.90 115.30 118.06 142.04 102.47 60.54 108.21 54.06 59.96 72.30

3.27 2.91 5.9 7.35 3.62 10.30 4.99 6.22 10.96 22.88 54.22 79.35 64.86 61.86 97.81 348.22 311.78 194.43 186.15 205.72 199.97 140.87 172.53 119.50 111.79 134.40

Balance +2.95 +2.87 +4.62 +5.65 +2.98 (−)2.54 +3.63 +5.74 +9.52 +4.84 +2.26 +57.91 +33.76 (−)4.02 +8.01 (−)115.26 (−)128.02 (−)136.17 (−)49.97 (−)178.36 (−)4.97 (+)19.79 (−)43.89 +11.38 (−)8.13 (−)10.2

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce

goods, hand bags, coffee, tea, spices, footwear and pharmaceutical products. Major Indian imports from Estonia consist of iron and steel, fertilizers, electrical machinery, paper and paperboard, paper pulp, veneer, etc. (India, Embassy in Estonia, 2022). India’s trade in services amounted to e27.40 million in 2021 with imports (e15.60 million) being more than exports (e11.80 million) (India, Embassy in Estonia, 2022).

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Focus on Asia Since the early 2010s, Estonia’s focus on Asia appreciably increased. In a 2012 report ‘The Opportunities and Interests of Estonia in Asia until 2025’ prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu, the unicameral parliament of Estonia, stressed the need to give greater focus in Estonia’s policy towards Asian countries and better define its interests in the region. A foreign investment and export action plan for 2014–2017 called Made in Estonia 3.0 outlined the major economic goals of Estonia in Asian markets and explained strategies to attract greater Asian foreign direct investment and tourists. However, in 2012, the Riigikogu was not able to envisage how fast the impact of Asia in the context of global economy, politics and security would enter Estonian. In fact, the influence of China and other Asian countries in the coming years and decades may be ‘much more defining that we can estimate today’ (Mihkelson, 2020), he said. On 31 May 2012, Foreign Minister Paet, in a statement in the Riigikogu on Estonia’s Asia policy, stated that economic interests were increasingly related to the promotion of business and development activities in Asia (Paet, 2012). E-Residency Programme Estonia’s E-residency programme (launched in December 2014) offers digital signatures that are legally recognized across the EU. This initiative is seen as a boon for Indian nationals as it was expected to enable them to develop their businesses overseas through virtual means. There are an estimated 3,000 Estonian e-residents from India, who have established more than 500 companies (The Print, 2021). This had increased to 450 owing to the e-residency programme (Estonia, MFA, 2021). Approximately 3,000 Indians have so far become e-residents and set up nearly 700 companies in Estonia availing e-Residency and Start-up visas (India, Embassy in Estonia, 2022). Foreign Direct Investment Indian FDI in Estonia in 2013 was around e234,000 primarily in manufacturing industry, construction, accommodation and catering, real

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estate, professional, research and technical activity, and financial and insurance activity. In early 2013, there were 21 Indian companies operating in Estonia (Paet, 2013). Estonian investments in India amounted to e265,000 largely in the financial and insurance activity and real estate sectors. In November 2018, Reliance Industrial Investments and Holdings Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Reliance Industries, established a research centre for Reliance Jio in cooperation with the former Chief Information Officer Taavi Kotka that concentrates on software development and would provide consultancy for existing and future technology initiatives. Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) is also expanding its footprint to tap the IT skill-set of Estonians. By September 2019, more than 100 Estonian companies were operating in the Indian market (Kivi, 2019). Between April 2000 and June 2022, Estonian FDI in India amounted to $3.5423 million, constituting 0.0006% of total FDI in India (India, DPITT, 2022).

India and Latvia India-Latvian trade increased from $12 million in 1996–1997 to $299.51 million in 2010–2011. It declined to $205.97 million in 2013–2014 but declined for the next four years. Bilateral trade stood at $273.96 million in 2018–2019, increased to $384.79 million in 2019–2020 and declined to $152.36 in 2020–2021 and recovered to $267.57 million in 2021–2022 (see Table 13.2). Major Indian exports to Latvia included plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof; base metals and articles of base metals; textiles and textile articles; products of the chemical and allied industries; and vegetable products, etc. Major Indian imports from Latvia include base metals and articles of base metals; machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; wood and articles of wood; products of the chemical and allied industries; and optical instruments and apparatus (inc. medical); clocks and watches; musical instruments; etc. (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2021). India is seen as equivalent to the Chinese market with ‘good prospects for success’ since competition from the rest of the European market is minimal and demand is consistently increasing across the board in India (The Baltic Course, 2015).

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Table 13.2 India-Latvia Trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 (in millions of US Dollars) Year

Exports

Imports

Total

Balance

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

4.10 6.73 9.52 12.97 13.68 6.17 8.84 16.33 17.42 28.39 39.81 59.50 44.93 47.17 103.19 96.18 104.08 102.08 98.12 79.50 115.60 112.22 115.52 119.25 103.48 132.93

7.98 12.80 12.19 0.86 4.43 0.93 2.84 0.43 1.10 10.13 31.85 40.95 113.87 154.94 196.32 143.20 73.63 103.89 36.22 61.57 39.65 52.63 158.44 265.54 48.88 134.64

12.08 19.53 21.71 13.83 18.11 7.10 11.68 16.76 18.52 38.52 71.66 100.45 158.80 202.11 299.51 239.38 177.71 205.97 134.34 141.07 155.25 164.85 273.96 384.79 152.36 267.57

(−)3.88 (−)6.07 (−)2.67 +12.11 +9.25 +5.24 +6.0 +15.90 16.32 +18.26 +7.96 +18.55 (−)68.94 (−)107.77 (−)93.13 (−)47.02 +30.45 (−)1.81 +61.90 +17.93 +75.95 +59.59 (−)42.92 (−)146.29 +54.60 (−)1.71

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce

Foreign Direct Investment A bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement was signed on 18 February 2010. There is a lack of investments from both the countries and the current levels which are below their potential. Till 2013, though there were 87 registered Indian companies in Latvia, the total amount of investment was only about US$ 1 million. On the other hand, Latvian FDI in India was one-tenth of this (US $100,000). As of September 2013, there were about 60 Latvian-Indian joint ventures in Latvia in the sectors of software and manufacturing (Mitra,

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2013). Between April 2000 and June 2022, cumulative Latvian investment in India amounted to $498,200 or 0.0001% of total FDI in India (India, DPITT, 2022).

India and Lithuania An agreement on trade and economic cooperation was signed in July 1993. Bilateral trade between India and Lithuania reached a record high of US$ 367.15 million in the year 2016–2017 before decreasing to US$ 339.51 million in 2018–2019. In 2021–2022, bilateral trade stood at US$ 487 million (Table 13.3). Bilateral trade between India and Lithuania has increased from e 32.23 million to e292.69 million in 2008 as a result of export of a major consignment of fertilizers to India. Major Indian imports from Lithuania include edible vegetables, wood and articles of wood, textiles, plastics and articles thereof, electrical machinery and equipment, iron and steel, optical, photographic and measuring instruments, copper, zinc and articles thereof. India is one of the largest purchasers of fertilizers from Lifosa, Lithuania. Major Indian exports to Lithuania include: nuclear boilers and reactors, pharmaceutical products, fish, crustaceans and similar, organic chemicals, tobacco and manufactured tobacco, textile articles, iron and steel, plastic and articles thereof, miscellaneous chemical products and man-made filaments. An Indian Baltic Chamber of Commerce (IBCC) was formed in Vilnius in 2009 to enhance regional ties between India and Lithuania and other European economies. Since 2009, it established a representative office in Delhi in order to foster direct cooperation. An India-Lithuania Forum was inaugurated in September 2010. Foreign Direct Investment Indian investment in Lithuania includes an investment of about US$200 million by Indorama, a Lohia Group company, from their Thailand branch, in the Klaipeda Economic Zone in a plant to manufacture plastic resin. This investment has given visibility to India in Lithuania. The Indorama Group celebrated the 10th anniversary of its Orion Global Pet plant in Klaipeda Free Economic Zone in Lithuania, set up in 2006 with an initial capital of e150 million and production capacity of 274,000 tons

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Table 13.3 India-Lithuania Trade, 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 (in millions of US Dollars) Year

Exports

Imports

Total

Balance

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 2020–2021 2021–2022

3.65 2.41 3.61 9.70 8.69 6.41 10.09 17.92 30.60 33.45 40.61 59.18 60.26 66.39 83.30 134.89 147.43 104.94 103.23 88.09 95.99 103.84 127.38 110.76 163.66 330.85

0.48 0.29 0.20 10.32 1.09 0.95 5.59 10.80 17.64 28.96 20.16 9.65 572.67 72.69 125.45 203.37 45.91 53.70 111.91 214.35 271.16 189.38 212.13 262.09 321.05 200.92

4.13 2.70 3.81 19.72 9.78 7.36 15.68 28.72 48.24 62.41 60.77 68.83 632.93 139.08 208.75 338.26 193.34 158.64 215.14 302.44 367.15 293.22 339.51 372.85 484.71 531.77

+3.17 +2.12 +3.41 (−)0.62 +7.60 +5.46 +4.50 +7.12 +12.96 +4.49 +20.45 +49.53 (−)512.41 (−)6.3 (−)42.15 (−)68.48 +101.52 +51.24 (−) 8.12 (−) 126.26 (−)175.17 (−)85.54 (−)84.75 (−)151.33 (−)157.39 +129.93

Source India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce

per annum. It is the largest single line PET resin plant in Europe with the lowest carbon footprint (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 7). HCL Technologies has taken over the IT infrastructure services of Barclays in Vilnius employing over 500 people. About 60% of the headcount comprises of Lithuanian nationals and the remaining 40% from different nationalities from both within and outside of the EU. Their main customers HCL Technologies Lithuania UAB, a 100% subsidiary of HCL Technologies Ltd., started its operation in August 2016. It announced in December 2018 an expansion of its strategic relationship with Barclays, including becoming Barclays’ preferred partner for IT

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infrastructure services. HCL’s Operation Centre was formally inaugurated on 11 December 2019 in Vilnius, Lithuania (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 7). In September 2018, an Indian company, Tonbo Imaging, entered Lithuania by opening an office in Vilnius. The company develops advanced imaging and sensor systems for defence, security and intelligent transportation systems. The company plans to establish a research and development team of over 50 specialists in Kaunas, Lithuania (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 7). A dedicated Indian Chamber of Commerce was established in October 2018. Between April 2000 and June 2022, cumulative Lithuanian investment in India amounted to $952,100 or 0.0002% of total FDI in India (India, DPITT, 2022).

Arms Exports The Baltic countries have been modest exporters of military equipment to India in recent years. During 2013–2020, Estonia exported military equipment worth e1.692 million in 2016 and e337,891 in 2018. While licenses for e1.684 million and e2.178 million were issued in 2020, but no exports were made (see Table 13.4). Amongst the Baltic countries, Latvia did not supply any military equipment to India. Lithuanian arms supplies amounted to e1.619 million in 2013. This declined to a meagre e50,120 in 2016, but increased marginally to e56,708 in 2018 and halved to e28,970 in 2020 (see Table 13.5).

Cultural Relations For five decades, cultural contacts with the Baltic countries, until they declared independence in 1991, were largely through Moscow. There was a degree of appreciation of Gandhian philosophy of non-cooperation since each of these countries had their own movements in opposition to Moscow’s rule.

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Table 13.4 Estonian arms exports to India, 2013–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

No. of licenses issued

2013 2015

ML 14 ML 14 ML 15 Total ML 2 ML 14 Total ML 1 ML 6 Total ML 6 ML 6 ML 13

2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 3 4 1 1 1

2016

2017

2018 2020

Value of licenses in Euros 89,833 1,641,600 42,867 1,684,467 859,900 831,600 1,691,500 85,696 265,510 351,206 13,315 2,177,554

Value of actual exports Euros

859,900 831,600 1,691,500 85,696 252,195 337,891

Source EEAS, (2022). Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/ sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf 753/state/analysis Categories of military equipment supplied ML 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components therefor ML 2: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches), projectors specially designed or modified for military use and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor ML 6: Ground vehicles and components ML 7: Chemical agents, ‘biological agents’, ‘riot control agents’, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials ML 9: Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels ML 13: Armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components ML 14: ‘Specialized equipment for military training’ or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2, and specially designed components and accessories therefor ML 15: Imaging or countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor

India and Estonia India’s connections with Estonia date back to the seventeenth century. Seafarers of Estonian origin arrived on the shores of India at the end of the seventeenth century. Estonian seafarer A. J. Von Krusen

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Table 13.5 Lithuanian arms exports to India, 2013–2020 (in Euros) Year

Military list category

2013 2015 2016 2017 2018

ML ML ML ML ML

10 22 8 22 22

No. of licenses issued 1 2 1 4 1

Value of licenses in Euros 1,619,339 50,120 950 43,768 28,970

Value of actual exports Euros 1,619,339 50,120 950 56,708 28,970

Source EEAS, (2022). Retrieved October 12, 2022 from https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/ sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/64c1cfa7-bf1a-4300-8600-a0ec26bcf 753/state/analysis Categories of military equipment supplied ML 8: ‘Energetic materials’, and related substances ML 10: ‘Aircraft’, ‘lighter than air vehicles’, unmanned aerial vehicles, aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment and components, specially designed for modified for military use ML 22: ‘Technology’ for ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List

Stern visited Madras and Calcutta in 1797. The Pühhapäiwa Wahheluggemissed (Sunday Intermediary Readings ) of Otto W. Masing (1818) was the first written work in Estonian to refer to India. Estonia too took keen interest in the Sanskrit language and the language was first taught at University of Tartu in 1837. In the middle of the nineteenth century, several Christian missionaries visited India and knowledge about India gradually reached the Estonians. Writer Andres Saal made a significant contribution by publishing longer articles about the Indian epic Mahabharata, drama and folk wisdom in Olevik (‘The Present’) in 1912 (Estonia, Embassy in India, 2022). Sanskrit has been taught at the University of Tartu and in the Estonian Humanitarian Institute at the Tallinn University. Tallinn University also teaches Hindi, Indian culture, philosophy and history. While the Oriental Studies Department at Tartu University still exists, Sanskrit is not taught any more (India, Embassy in Estonia, 2022). On 20 December 2018, the University of Latvia reorganized the Centre of Indian Studies and Culture and the Complementary Medicine Centre into the International Institute of Indic Studies. Under the ITEC programme, 20 annual slots were offered to Estonians. This was later increased to 25 in 2010–2011 (India, MEA 2009: 81).

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A number of cultural troupes to Estonia were sponsored by the Indian Council of Cultural Relations. These include a Bihu dance group (July 2011), a Ranganiketan dance group from Manipur (June 2012) and a Kathak dance troupe in June 2018 (as part of Estonia’s celebrations of its centenary of independence). Several publications on the language have been published. In addition, several renowned Indian musicians and dancers have performed in Estonia. Estonian films have been showcased in film festivals in India and epic poems have been translated from Estonian into Hindi. Diaspora There are 1,504 Indian citizens in Estonia holding temporary or longterm residence permit. Of these, 119 persons were on study visa and 248 were on employment visa. They were largely engaged as professionals in ICT industry, business and hospitality sectors. There were nearly 119 Indian students pursuing studies mainly in postgraduate and doctoral programmes in educational institutions in Estonia (India, Embassy in Estonia, 2022).

India and Latvia A seven-member delegation led by Latvian Culture Minister Helena Demakova visited India from 27 May to 2 June 2006 when a cultural exchange programme for 2006–2008 was signed. An agreement on cultural exchange was signed in 2019. A Centre on Indian Studies and Culture was established in 2013 in the University of Latvia, which organizes yoga and Hindi classes as well as undertakes other activities to promote India. In January 2014, the first Study in Latvia Centre by seven leading Latvian universities2 was established at Chennai. This tie-up between both the countries also opened up opportunities for Indian students to avail of Latvian government’s scholarship. Latvia is one of the few European countries taking a keen interest in Ayurveda. 2 Riga Technical University, Turiba University, Liepaja University, University of Latvia, BA School of Business and Finance, Latvia University of Agriculture and Riga International School of Economics and Business Administration.

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An Ayurveda conference was organized by the University of Latvia on 30 April 2014. Two years later, Minister of State for Health and AYUSH, Shripad Yesso Naik, visited Riga from 15 to 18 May 2016. A MoU between the Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS), Ministry of AYSUH and the University of Latvia (19 August 2016) established an Ayurveda Chair was established at the University of Latvia in Riga in June 2018. The University of Latvia, in collaboration with the Arya Vaidya Pharmacy, Coimbatore, has been conducting a three-month diploma course in Introduction to Ayurveda since 2015. In December 2020, a MoU on research collaboration on Ayurvedic management of Type 2 diabetes was signed between the CCRAS and University of Latvia and Arya Vaidya Pharmacy, Baltics SIA Latvia (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2021). In August 2016, a new Centre for Baltic Culture and Studies was established at Dev Sanskriti Vishwa Vidyalaya, Haridwar, which has signed cooperation agreements with several universities in Latvia, including the Riga Technical University, the University of Latvia and Turiba University (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2021). A 10-member ICCR sponsored Gujarati Dance troupe ‘Saptak’ from 20 to 26 June 2014. They participated in the celebrations related to Riga being declared the Cultural Capital of Europe for 2014 and also performed in Liepaja, the first-ever Indian cultural event to be organized in this third largest city of Latvia (India, MEA, 2015: 87). Around 35 Latvians have availed of ITEC training slots in the last 12 years, mostly for the audit and parliamentary studies courses (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2021). Diaspora The Indian origin population in Latvia is estimated to be around 3,000. Many of them are in business and IT sectors. This includes nearly 2,000 Indian students3 studying mainly medicine and engineering in Latvia (India, Embassy in Sweden, 2021).

3 In 2017, there were 750 Indian students at the beginning of the academic year in Latvia (Eng.LSM.lv, 2017, 23 May).

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India and Lithuania Early Contacts There is considerable similarity between the Lithuanian and Sanskrit languages. In fact, amongst Indo-European languages, Lithuanian is grammatically closest to Sanskrit, which indicates possible close ancient links. Experts suggest that more than 100 root words (and 10,000 derivatives) may be common between the two languages (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020). Lithuanian is ‘a closest surviving sister to Sanskrit in Europe’ (Linkevicius, 2017). A compilation of 108 common words of Sanskrit in Lithuanian languages has been brought out by the Oriental Centre of the Vilnius University jointly with the Lithuanian Embassy. The first direct knowledge about India reached Lithuania through Lithuanian Christian missionaries who started serving in India in the sixteenth century. In the 1930s and 1940s, two Lithuanian travellers— Antanas Poska and Matas Salcius—spent several years studying Sanskrit and Indian culture and travelling in India. They met Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi. Antanas Poska published two volumes entitled From the Baltic Sea to the Way of Bengal (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 1). Sanskrit began to be taught at Vilnius University in the 1970s when Prof. Ricardas Mironas started teaching it in the Department of Philology. A separate centre of Indian studies was set up in the University in 1996. Minister of State for External Affairs Rao Inderjit Singh announced a grant of US$10,000 for promotion of Indian studies at the Centre of Oriental Studies of the Vilnius University in October 2005. A language laboratory, which was set up with this grant, was inaugurated in February 2007 (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 8). ICCR India Chair In January 2011, the first ICCR Chair of Indian Studies was established at the Institute of Humanities as a result of the MoU signed between the ICCR and Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius. The Visiting Professor was with the university for two years until June 2014. In December 2014, the ICCR signed an agreement with Vilnius University in December 2014 for the establishment of an ICCR Chair of Modern Indian Studies. The MoU lapsed because the nominated Indian

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professor could not take up the position. A new MoU for three academic years (2018–2019 to 2020–2021) was subsequently signed. Cultural Exchange Direct contacts between India and Lithuania were limited and maintained only within the space allowed by the erstwhile Soviet Union. This allowed India to carry out some cultural activities during Soviet times, but there was little interaction and exchange on a regular basis (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 1). Several cultural exchange programmes were signed for 2016–2018 during the visit of the Lithuanian Minister of Culture Sarunas Birutis (March 2016), followed by another one for the period 2019–2021. On the cultural side, eminent Kathak dancer Uma Sharma and her eight-member troupe performed in Vilnius on 2 June 2008 to an appreciative audience (India, MEA, 2009: 85). An 83-member orchestra of the National Philharmonic Society of Lithuania gave two performances at the National Centre for the Performing Arts (NCPA) in Mumbai in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of bilateral relations. A 10-member Vilnius University Folk Ensemble ‘Ratilio’ participated in the eighth International Dance & Music Festival organized by ICCR at Kamani Auditorium, New Delhi, on 13–15 January 2018. The group also performed in Bangalore and Trivandrum, with the assistance of ICCR. ITEC Under the Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation Programme (ITEC), since 1993, over 400 Lithuanian nominees have attended various courses in diplomacy, English, banking, mass communications, financial management, urban development management, IT, auditing, etc. (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 9). Diaspora The Indian community is around 1,000, including students. Many came to the erstwhile USSR to study and stayed back due to marriage or business. In recent years, some Indian IT experts came to Lithuania to work on IT projects. Fifteen Indian families work in the Klaipeda plant of the

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Lohia Group. The Indian yogic and New Age movements also bring their Indian teachers to work in Lithuania from time to time. The number of Indian students studying full time in Lithuania has increased from 37 in 2011 to 357 in 2014 and now stand at around 900 (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020: 19).

Conclusion India’s interaction with the Baltic States is minimal and the ties between them are still in the nascent stages. Some of the major challenges in this relationship other than insignificant trade could include geographical distance and high costs that affect the speed and time of enhancing their relations. It could further be challenged by the lack of people-to-people contact in terms of tourism which is hampered by visa difficulties and lack of awareness amongst people about each other’s cultural commonalities and differences. Language could also be a barrier in fostering better ties with each other. The establishment of Indian embassies in Lithuania and Estonia is likely to foster closer political, diplomatic, economic, educational and cultural ties between India and the Baltic States. A new geographical format devised by the MEA—the India-NordicBaltic Conclave under the theme ‘An Innovation-driven Partnership for Growth in a New World’—with ministerial participation from (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland and Latvia) held virtually and organized jointly by the MEA and the CII on 5 November 2020 highlights an innovative way to defining geographical spaces. All the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are strategically located with major ports in the Baltic Sea and serve as important hubs for trade and business. Notwithstanding their relatively smaller sizes, the Baltic countries have their own niche areas which pose good prospects for enhanced cooperation.

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CHAPTER 14

How European Think Tanks Think About India: A Perceptions Study, 2008–2017 Lourens van Haaften and Idesbald Goddeeris

Introduction The European perception of India has been studied extensively over the past few years (see, inter alia, Jain & Pandey, 2010, 2012, Ling & Goddeeris, 2015; Vergeron, 2006). Most of these studies focus on individual (or a limited number of) EU member states and work with limited time frames. This is not surprising, given the abundance of sources available for such research. As a consequence, however, the perception is often studied in a detailed way. This contribution aspires to offer a larger frame, working from a bird’s-eye perspective, and in this way compare different

L. van Haaften (B) Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] I. Goddeeris Department of History, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_14

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European countries, evolution over time in fields of interests and disciplinary approaches, and shifts in metanarratives. It will do so by analysing reports of European think tanks on India. In today’s diplomatic and policy-making processes, think tanks play a significant role by providing evidence-based information and analyses on foreign affairs and by acting as brokers of ideas to politicians, diplomats and civil servants. Their role in political processes and governance has received increased scholarly attention in the past years (Kelstrup, 2017, 2018; Köllner, 2011; Stone, 2004; Weaver & McGann, 2000). Think tanks are considered to be a significant actor by embodying an ‘institutional link between ideas, knowledge and public policies’ (Köllner, 2011: 2). Hence, studying reports of think tanks in writing about India provide an opportunity to identify living perceptions of India in the European Union. The present chapter is a based upon a desktop research1 conducted in 2019 that started from a list of think tanks with a focus on international affairs from all twenty-eight member states of the European Union. The absence of a workable definition of the phenomenon of think tanks posed a first challenge in this process. The term think tank is slippery or ambiguous because of the diversity in forms in which think tanks exist (Köllner, 2011: 2). The organisations often work on the boundaries of academia and politics. They can function as autonomous organisations as well as closely associated to political institutions. We solved this problem in a pragmatic manner. As the objective of this research is to gain deeper understanding of the EU perceptions of India, we aimed at a selection of think tanks that have a good outreach to the European institutions and represent views from across Europe. This was found in the selection of think tanks used by one of the European institutions, the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union in Brussels. The Central Library of the General Secretariat monitors think tanks and every month publishes a document with a review of their publications (Think Tank Review). It aims to provide EU policy officers with a selection of EUrelated think tank articles, but the reviews are also made available to a wider audience of interested professionals. The selection of the Think Tank Review covers over a hundred think tanks of different origins. We 1 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 722446.

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have used this list as a starting point for selecting 62 think tanks from all over Europe (see Appendix). American or other foreign think tanks with a department in Europe are excluded. Our selection of think tanks covers all member states of the EU, except Croatia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Republic of Cyprus and Slovenia, which all lack think thanks studying international affairs. After compiling the list of think tanks, we searched their websites for articles about ‘India’ in the ten-year period between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2017. We then gathered all articles about India, either as the main topic or in which India is a shared topic. Examples of the latter are articles comparing the rise of China and India or discussing India-Pakistan relations. All articles in which India was only a topic of minor interest were excluded from collection. Articles on the BRICS, for instance, have not been included unless a specific case of India was made. Finally, all articles with less than six pages were left out for this study, to keep only the substantial publications. This has resulted in a selection of 145 articles that were used for further analysis. They were written by 124 unique authors or combination of authors. We first collected metadata on authorship, date of publication, number of pages, publishing think tank and the country of publication. Subsequently, we took a closer look at the content of the articles and identified from which disciplinary background the articles were written, such as ‘geopolitics of trade’, ‘geopolitics of international security’, ‘foreign policy analysis’, ‘political economy’, ‘security studies’, ‘migration’, ‘energy’, etc. In a similar way, the articles were categorised for their main theme, like the ‘Europe—India partnership’, that was central in several studies, or ‘maritime security’. The categories were not created a priori, but chosen while studying the differences between articles. In adding these categories manually, the challenge was to find a right balance between being too general and too specific. A final tag was added to an article when India was described in a way that fits a particular metanarrative or stereotype image, like India as an emerging power or as a development country. This field was kept blank in the many cases that the article did not follow such a metanarrative. We used social network analysis as a tool for analysing the data and created projections of the network of relations between the most relevant metadata. For this, we made use of the network analysis software named

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UCINET.2 This quantitative approach is combined with a qualitative approach of deep-reading of the texts. As the total body of text covered over 5,700 pages, we concentrated mostly on introductions, conclusions and executive summaries. The dataset that was composed of the 145 articles is used to obtain deeper insight in the differences in the perceptions of India over time and space in European think tank publications in the period 2008–2017. We will answer several sub-questions. First, we want to see whether India is becoming more prominent on the European think tank agenda and therefore checked whether there is an increase in the number of articles published on this topic. Second, the study looks into the dominant themes, topics and disciplines in think tank studies and how this developed over time. Third, the research examines significant differences in think tank publications in different EU member states that could affect the perceptions of India in the national discourses. The structure of this chapter contains two sections. The first section will delve into the changes in think tank publications in Europe over time. The second section focusses on the geographical differences among member states in producing knowledge about India.

India’s Growing Weight at the European Think Tank Agenda In the ten years between 2008 and 2017, India has clearly transformed from a low-priority issue into a closely reviewed topic for European think tanks. Figure 14.1 shows the considerable increase in the number of publications over the years, from 5 in 2008 to 37 in 2017. In a relatively short period, the number of publications per year multiplied by a factor of seven. Not only has the total amount of articles increased, but also the number of countries contributing with think tank publications on India, more precisely from three countries in 2008 to 8 in 2016. In total, 12 out of the 28 member states’ house think tanks which wrote about India during 2008–2017.3 The growth in quantity was gradual, with the 2 Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G. & Freeman, L. C. (2002). Ucinet for Windows: Software for social network analysis. Analytic Technologies. 3 In the data set, we listed all the names of authors to see whether the field is dominated by a hand full of experts offering their services to different think tanks. This is hardly the case. The 145 articles were produced by 124 unique authors or combination

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sharpest increases in 2010, 2014 and 2016. In these years, the number of articles doubled or almost doubled from the preceding year. This first observation, however, namely that India has gained prominence on the European think tank agenda, comes with a disclaimer. In absolute numbers, the attention on India is dwarfed by the amount of publications about China. Unfortunately, those numbers are not available, but a scan of European think tank websites shows the dominance of China as a topic in the past fifteen years. In a policy brief of the Dutch think tank Clingendael of 2018 about India and Japan, Okano-Heijmans rightly observed: ‘Thinking on Asia in the European Union has long been about China, China and China…’ (Okano-Heijmans, 2018: 1) Put in this larger perspective, the interest in India looks more modest. But despite

Germany

2017

United Kingdom 2016

Belgium France

2015

Spain 2014

Poland

2013

Italy Pan-European

2012

Finland

2011

Netherlands Hungary

2010

Visegrád Denmark

2009 2008 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Fig. 14.1 Number of publications by country

of authors. Only eight authors produced more than one article, of which only four on a more structural basis, over five articles. Contributors with more than 5 articles as author or co-author are Gareth Price (6), Patryk Kygiel (7), Christian Wagner (5) and Anupama Sen (5). What furthermore stands out is that authors are from very diverse national backgrounds that not necessarily coincides with the think tank location. In several occasions, European think tanks also used the expertise of Indian academics. This shows that the work environment of think tanks is to a high extent internationalised.

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this nuance, the increase in attention for India by European think tanks is unmistakable and significant. The next question is obviously about the impetus for the increased focus on India from 2014 onwards. Think tank articles themselves often explain this by referring to the metanarrative of the changing power balance in the international system. After years of focusing on China, in what has been described as the ‘pivot to Asia’, attention has turned to other influential powers in the region. In particular, the focus on India has been brought on by the need for like-minded countries to become partners with the European member states in upholding the multilateral rule-based system based on democratic and liberal values. A further structural explanation is the impressive economic development of India that makes the country simply a more relevant economic and political actor in the international scene and partner for EU member states. Based on its growth records and its huge demographic numbers, India was already included in the so-called BRICS countries that were the centre of attention during the late 2000s. As a consequence of the economic problems in Brazil, geopolitical conflicts between Russia and the West, and the definite increase of power of China, it has become less common to conceptualise these countries as a group. India is now becoming a more important topic by itself. In sum, think tank authors themselves explain the increased attention for India as the result of changes in the dynamics of the international system and India’s economic development. A closer look at the content of the articles seems to confirm this. In the years 2016 and 2017, over two-thirds of the publications were from the perspective of geopolitics of trade, geopolitics of international security or foreign policy analysis, which is a first indication that the increase in attention is related to the growing perception of India as an important international actor. More concretely, the growth of articles can indeed be largely contributed to an increase in studies of India as a global actor and as a partner for the EU. In particular, the thirteenth EU-India summit in Brussels on 30 March 2016 appears to have been an important incentive for think tanks to turn their attention to India and pushed the numbers up. After years of stagnation of EU-India relations, with a deadlock in the free trade negations, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Commission President Claude Juncker and European Council President Donald Tusk announced at the summit in 2016 a ‘new momentum for the EU-India Strategic Partnership’. A few in-depth studies were published in advance,

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to provide an analysis of the potential for further partnership and trade negotiations, such as a study by the European Union Institute for Security Studies in 2012, or by the think tank of the European Parliament, published in 2015 (Peral & Sakhuja, 2012; Sachdeva, 2015). In the aftermath of the event, many more articles were published. Most of them explored potential for further cooperation, especially in the fields of cybersecurity and defence. The event was also clearly an incentive for several national-oriented think tanks to review EU-India cooperation on national opportunities and implications. In total, 27 of the 145 articles addressed specifically the issue of Europe-India relations. Eleven of them were published in 2016, which was 40% of the total publications in that year. In 2017, the topic of EU-India relations was, however, largely replaced by an interest in Modi’s foreign policy. Nine out of thirty-six articles in that year reviewed Indian foreign policy, a remarkable increase considering the low attention this topic received in the preceding years. But taking a closer look at the articles, it appears that the largest share was part of a special edition of the Chatham House Group’s journal International Affairs (see vol. 93(1), 2017). The objective of that issue was to get a clearer picture of India as a rising power, as part of the UK’s reorientation on international partners in the context of the looming Brexit. The incentive of the EU-India summit in 2016 and the increased focus on India as an international actor in 2017, however, do not explain the doubling of articles in 2014. This increase is obviously related to the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. That year, 33% of the articles focussed on domestic political developments. The election victory of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) also formed an occasion to write critical reflections on the political development in India, like, ‘India 2014: Return of the One-Party Dominant System’, ‘The BJP and State Politics in India: A Crashing Wave?’ ‘Modi’s Reform Agenda: Change You Can Believe In?’ (Chandhoke, 2014; Vaishnav, 2015; Verniers, 2015). In Europe the election result seems to have come as a surprise. One felt the need for interpretation of this development and for analysis of the consequences for the European continent. Also in the subsequent years, Modi and his government’s policy remained a frequent topic for European think tanks. Modi, with his charismatic and energetic style and active foreign policy, appears to be a factor in itself that contributed to the increased attention for India. This

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‘Modi-factor’ also fits well with the explanation that the increased attention for India stems from Europe’s search for like-minded countries as a partner to uphold the regimes for global governance. Modi’s ideological roots in Hindutva make the development of India’s domestic politics and foreign policy an urgent topic that is closely observed in Europe. This is, for example, reflected in the several articles that study Modi’s foreign policy in the context of India’s long tradition in non-alignment (Basrur, 2017; Giroir, 2017; Hall, 2017; Juhos, 2015 and many more). Although the above-described topics stand out in quantity in the total body of think tank articles, the increased interest in India is not fully absorbed by these topics or themes. The focus on India spans a wide spectrum of issues and themes. As Fig. 14.2 and 14.3 demonstrate, studies include social and cultural analyses, regional security issues, political economy of India, the development strategies, migration, energy and climate issues. The spectrum of issues has also become more differentiated over the years. This wider interest for India could well be a spin-off of the increased interest in India as a global actor or partner for the EU.

2017

Geopolitics and trade

11

2016

Geopolitics and international security Foreign policy analysis

2015

Domestic politics analysis

2014

Energy

1

Political economy 2013

1

2012

1

Cultural and social analysis Migration Climate and environment

2011

Social economic development

2010

Development economics

2009

1

2008 0

10

20

30

40

Fig. 14.2 Disciplinary angles of publications by year

Fig. 14.3 Relation between disciplinary angles and countries

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Geographical Differences in Thinking about India In this section, we will delve deeper in the different ways EU member states thought about India. The geographical spread of published articles shows strong variation in the quantity of contributions by member states. Germany (38), the United Kingdom (30), Belgium (26) and France (20) take the lead in producing studies on India. This is not surprising. The three largest countries of the EU house a large share of European think tanks, and Belgium stands out because of the many Brussels-based think tanks close to the European institutions. These four countries are followed by Spain (11), Poland (6), Italy (6), Hungary (3), the Netherlands (2), Finland (2) and Denmark (1). One think tank presents itself as pan-European and is responsible for two publications, and one study was published as collaboration between four think tanks from Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary, the so-called Visegrád Group. We must also take notice of the long list of EU member states with no publications on India at all. Think tanks in Sweden, Portugal, Ireland and Greece that were included in our selection published no substantial articles about India in the period 2008–2017. The absolute numbers of articles, however, are strongly affected by a country’s research capacity. Therefore, the mapped differences are a weak indicator for a country’s relative interest in India. It would have been interesting to compare the percentage of a country’s publication on India to the total amount of articles produced, but that information is not available. Instead, we can count the ratio of think tank articles per number of think tanks in a country. This changes the order significantly. The selection of this study included eight think tanks from Germany. They produced in total 38 articles, which gives a ratio of 4.8 articles per think tank. In this approach, Poland is surprisingly on the top of the list with a ratio of 6.0, followed by the UK (5.0), Germany, Spain (3.7) and France (2.7). The Brussels-based think tanks produced articles only with a modest ratio of 2.2. Significantly, the interest for India, at least in quantity, does not follow the usual fault lines within European Union politics, like North versus South and Central/East versus Western Europe. The dominance of the large countries in producing knowledge about India is to a certain extent counterbalanced by perspectives from Poland and Hungary in Central Europe and Italy and Spain in the South. Moreover, the geographical spreading per year (see Fig. 14.1) demonstrates that this pattern

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is quite consistent over the years. The Polish Institute of International Affairs published an article almost yearly since 2011. Spanish think tanks also regularly published about India. Importantly, the number of articles published by Brussel-based think tanks dropped sharply after 2009, in parallel with the deadlock in the strategic partnership, and began to increase again from 2013 onwards. Germany and France, in contrast, have been consistent contributors over the full period. Figure 14.1 shows one more trend. It appears that in the latest years also medium and small member states, like Hungary, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark are catching up with producing knowledge about the state of affairs in India. The geographical difference in relation to disciplines exposes a sharper distinction, as is visualised in the projection of Fig. 14.3. The graph represents the relationship between disciplines and countries. The size of the squares and circles reflects the quantity of publications, and the thickness of the ties mirrors the quantitative strength of the relationship. As already noted, the majority of the articles study India from the perspective of geopolitics of trade, geopolitics of international security and foreign policy analysis. These perspectives share the state-centred approach that is dominant in international relations studies. Italy, the Netherlands and Finland have exclusively contributed with publications from one of these perspectives. Spanish and Polish articles as well mostly fit these perspectives for, respectively, 90% and 67%. The UK at first sight seems to offer a more varied approach, but this can be contributed fully to the presence of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in the UK. As part of its strong focus on diverse regions in world, this institute has produced 10 articles on the particular subject of energy issues in India. Without these contributions, the UK perspectives would also be limited to geopolitics of trade or international security and foreign policy analysis. Only, Germany, France and to a lesser extent Belgium show convincingly a more diverse spectrum in research into India. These countries put more emphasis on the study of India from the angle of political economy and domestic politics analysis. Figure 14.4 shows these differences on an even more detailed level, as it visualises the relationship between the more detailed level of themes and countries. At a first glance, the centrality of the issue of Europe-India relations stands out, as this is connected with almost all contributors. The map furthermore shows the great variety in themes, which again can be mostly attributed to Germany, France and Belgium. A closer description of the content of the articles in the different countries will expose these fault lines more clearly.

Fig. 14.4 Relation between themes and countries

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The first case will be Poland. Based on the ratio articles per think tank, Poland is a relatively large producer of publications on India, although it must be noted that almost all articles were written by a single author.4 The publications had an explicit focus on the national interest, assessing the value of India as a partner for the West and in particular for Poland. The created a narrative pointed at a shared history of socialism in Poland and India and emphasised the growing ties between the countries (Kugiel, 2016b; Kugiel & Pedziwiatr, 2014). The general opinion in the articles was that there was a large potential for cooperation between India as an emerging global power and Europe, and that Poland had much to gain from this, but that the state of affairs in the EU-India dialogues was insufficient to shape this. This nationalistic perspective of ‘what’s in it for me?’ is also at the heart of a joint study by four think tanks of the Visegrád Group, i.e. Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The report of 2016 explored the opportunities for deeper cooperation with the BICS countries (thus excluding Russia from BRICS) (Kugiel, 2016a). The study emphasised the historical ties between communist Europe and India as a good basis for further cooperation and made an analysis of the present economic relations to identify opportunities. The governments were urged to invest more in an active foreign policy towards India in order to profit from India’s economic growth. On the one hand, this study shows that the Central European countries are catching up as far as writing about India. On the other hand, it is telling that the study only partly focussed on India. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, no further publications appeared in the researched period. The Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade in contrast did produce two further studies with a reflection to Modi’s foreign policy and Modi’s economic growth model. A closer look at Italian publications shows that India was absent from the national think tank agenda for the first period. From 2008 to 2013 no articles appeared; the first study was the previously mentioned article from 2014 on the results of the Lok Sabha elections. The other five titles are from 2015 and were composed as a part of a cooperation project between the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome and the Indian Gateway House in Delhi. The EU-India Think Tank Twinning Initiative, initiated by the 4 Slovakia and Czech Republic are counted in this number, but have only contributed with a joined study produced with Poland and Hungary. In the further charts, therefore, these two countries are not included.

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EU delegation in India to stimulate European and Indian think tanks collaboration, funded this project.5 ,6 The fact that at an external incentive of the twinning project was needed to move Italian think tanks to take up the subject of India suggests that India was not considered an urgent topic in Italy at forehand. The external funding by the EU also affected the choice for topics by the Italian think tank. The articles were exclusively addressed to the potential for EU-India cooperation, in the aftermath of the revitalisation of the strategic partnership earlier in that year. The papers identify the key bottlenecks for further EU-India cooperation and the need for further integration and coordination within the EU. The Spanish record of publications is older and more varied. Three out of the 11 articles focussed on India’s regional conflicts, on India’s role in Afghanistan and on India-Pakistan relations, all written in the period from 2009 to 2012 (Raman, 2009). In 2014, a study was presented on the changing relations between India and Latin America (Vishwanathan, 2014). From the Spanish national perspective this is a relevant topic, as Spain contains strong relations with Latin America as a legacy of its colonial past. Just like in Italy, the articles after 2014 in Spain were all focused on EU-India relations, emphasising the need for further cooperation from EU perspective. All articles were published in English (or published as a translation from Spanish), except one article from 2015 by the Real Instituto Elcano that was written in Spanish. This article reviewed Spanish-India relations through the national lens (Palarea, 2015). The Dutch studies exclusively focussed on India from an international security perspective. An exhaustive study from 2008 focussed on ChinaIndia relations. In 2017, an article appeared on India as part of a series assessing ‘great powers assertivitis’ (Spiegeleire, 2017). It frames India explicitly as a great power and concludes that the country’s increased assertiveness could lead to conflicts in the Asian region, which would directly affect the Dutch interests by endangering the supply chains of manufacturing that are crucial for Dutch trade. This international security angle is also dominant in a 2017 report and policy brief of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Katz, 2017). The text describes India as a ‘potential global great power’ on the one hand, while on the other

5 The initiative started in 2015 and was extended in 2018. See https://euindiathink tanks.com/ (accessed on 11 September 2018). 6 Six articles were by Patryk Kugiel at the Polski Instytut Spraw Mi˛edzynarodowych.

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hand considers India to be constrained by its internal ethnic and religious diversity that endangers the state with secessions. So far, it can be concluded that the countries with a medium or low number of contributions in think thank articles have mainly studied India through the lens of their national interest. Italy, Spain and Poland stand out with their contributions focusing on EU-India strategic partnerships. Studying the articles published in the United Kingdom gives a different picture. Besides the previously discussed studies of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies dealing with the developments in India’s energy sector, 20 articles appeared. These focused, without exception, on the emergence of India as an international actor. In 2010, an extensive study appeared at LSE Ideas on the question whether India was ‘the next superpower?’, part of a series on global power shifts. It described India as a remarkable economic success since its liberalisation in 1991 with one of the best performing economies in the world, lifting millions of people from poverty, and as an increasingly military factor due to its military investments. The article called for caution in assessing India as a superpower, as it still had ‘major developmental challenges’ being ‘still entrenched in the division of castes’, and the democracy as threatened by ‘corruption and nepotism’ (Kitchen, 2010: 4). The report further concluded that India would continue to ‘play a constructive international role in, among other things, the financial diplomacy of the G20, and it certainly has a soft-power story to tell as a model of liberal political and economic development’ (Kitchen, 2010: 5). These reservations about the image of India as a superpower hardly played a role in the series of articles published in 2017. In the introduction article of a special edition by the Chatham House Group, India was described as ‘a formidable economic force […] gaining in both political power and status’ (Chatterjee & de Estrada, 2017). Further emphasis was put on India being the largest democracy in the world and a nuclear power. In this perspective, India is pictured as an international actor of unambiguous strength. Reading the body of texts produced in the UK, three further remarks can be made. First, there was a strong interest in India as a soft or normative power. Three articles directly addressed this topic and several others indirectly focussed on India’s development agenda and engagement in Africa (Hall, 2017; Pant & Super, 2015; Price, 2011; Sidiropoulos, 2011; Taylor, 2012; Vines, 2010). Second, in 2017, the topic of Modi’s foreign policy was dominant, as was the question whether this deviated

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from India’s tradition of non-alignment and other continuities (Bajpai, 2017; Narlikar, 2017). Third, and perhaps most striking, the topic of EU-India relations was totally absent in the articles, even before the Brexit-referendum in 2016. This disinterest in EU-India strategic partnership is illustrative for the UK’s more intergovernmental orientation in foreign policy thinking. For the Brussels-based think tanks, on the contrary, EU-India relations are the centre of attention. Fourteen out of the 23 articles directly related to this topic. They plea in more or less the same words for deeper cooperation between India and the EU, stressing that India is a ‘rising power’ that is becoming ‘more influential in international politics and trade’ and that the EU and India are ‘natural partners’ (Gros, 2008; Kumar, 2008: 26). The Think Tank of the European Parliament wrote most comprehensively about India with publications on the Free Trade agreement (2013), the Parliamentary election (in 2014), the revitalisation of the EU-India strategic partnership (2015 and 2016), and an evaluation of Modi’s first year of governance (2015). The initiation of a new think tank specialised in South Asia in 2011, the South Asian Democratic Forum, contributed further to more diversity in Brussels thinking about India. In 2016 and 2017, working papers and policy briefs on the issues of water management, education and trans-Himalayan cooperation were published (Dentinho, 2016; South Asia Democratic Forum, 2017, Babalová, 2017). It is, however, Germany that stands out for its most diverse palette of perspectives on India in think tank publications. Interestingly, where other countries focussed predominantly on national interests, India as a foreign actor (UK) and the EU-India partnership (Belgium, Italy, Spain, Poland), German think tanks had a stronger focus on Indian domestic developments, political economy, corruption, education and other issues with a social and cultural dimension. For example, studies dealt with topics like India’s rising middle class, labour participation of rural women, corruption in the Indian energy sector, vocational training and education, the informal economy of India and many more (Faist et al., 2017; Förstmann & Gregosz, 2010; Jodhka & Prakash, 2011; Ranjana Kumari, 2013; Vij et al., 2017). All these articles share a non-state-centred approach and instead offer a society-centred angle. This different perspective affects strongly the image of India that pops up. It is more diverse and detailed on internal affairs and developments.

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In practice, this also means that a less flattering picture of India is created and development issues are stressed more often. The state-centred approach is not fully absent in the German studies on India, though. Several studies over the years targeted India as an international actor, especially with a focus on its status as a soft power. Again, the German general discourse seems to be less impacted by the image of India as a potential superpower and takes a more critical stance. For example, a report studying India’s potential as a partner in democracy promotion concluded that ‘promotion of democracy plays only a marginal role in Indian foreign policy’ and that ‘India thus remains a difficult partner in German and European politics in respect to the promotion of democracy’ (Dröge & Wagner, 2009: 5–6). Only two out of the 38 articles tackled the EU-India relationship, a remarkably low number for the EU’s most powerful member state. In 2016, a report was published on India’s potential for security cooperation in Afghanistan. This project was a collaboration between the German Global Public Policy Institute and the Delhi-based think tank Carnegie India, again funded by the EU. The other study that addressed the EUIndia partnership appeared in 2017. It offered a critical perspective on the objective to revitalise what was called the ‘troubled relationship’ between the EU and India. Although it acknowledged that India was strategically an important partner, it furthermore emphasised that trade between the EU and India since 2010 had ‘barely grown’, that the economic relations between Europe and India are ‘asymmetric’ and that this limited ‘the bargaining power of India’ (Felbermayr et al., 2016: 97). What matters for Germany also matters for France to a high extent. In France, only three out of the 19 studies dealt with EU-India relations. They were all published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies in the period 2008 to 2012 (Peral, 2010; Peral & Sakhuja, 2012; Wagner, 2008). This institute took a leading role in advocating a revitalisation of the partnership with India. Surprisingly, after the new momentum for the strategic partnership in 2016, the topic was no longer raised. One French study was made to address further potential for cooperation in the field of space, focussing specifically at the national French perspective (Lele, 2015). Just as in Germany, a majority of the French think tank reports took a more society-centred approach. The Institut Français des Relations Internationales, La Vie des Idées and the Institut de Relations Internationales

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et Stratégiques focused in 16 reports on issues like populism, social policies, religious freedom and issues as urbanisation (Chakrabarty, 2017; Guichard, 2016; Hasan, 2009). Also similarly to Germany, the French perception of India is far more diffused and critical than the one in other EU member states. Only 2 out of 19 articles followed the metanarrative of India as an emerging power, while the state of the democracy and welfare was problematised in several articles.

Conclusion This chapter sought to identify the geographical differences and chronological evolutions in the ways European think tanks wrote about India in the period 2008–2017, in order to get a deeper understanding of the different and changing perceptions of India in Europe. It can be concluded that the attention given to India in the period increased significantly, and that India became a more prominent topic on the European think tank agenda. This increase has come with a dominant metanarrative that represented India as an emerging global power, emphasising its economic and military development in recent decades and the international system that is shifting towards a multipolar world. India is perceived as a potentially like-minded country for the European member states that can become a partner in upholding the multilateral rule-based system that defends liberal and democratic values. India is also increasingly critically examined for potential superpower behaviour that could possibly endanger international stability. The study, however, also exposed the large diversity in think tank articles on India, in the disciplinary background of the studies, the themes that were addressed, and consequently in the perceptions of India that aroused from the texts. When these differences were studied in relation to the geographic origin of articles, some patterns could be identified. They do not simply follow fault lines in EU politics, like North versus South and Central/East versus West. It was concluded that the smaller contributors study India in many cases from a perspective that can be deduced to a matter of national interest. The Brussels-based think tanks dominantly focussed on India as a strategic partner, and the UK studied most extensively India as a rising international actor. The largest difference, however, was between the countries that produce articles with a predominantly state-centred focus, and France and Germany, which produce a large body of texts with a society-centred focus. These differences in research angles

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produce different images of India. In the first perspective, the emphasis is put on India as the emerging power, while the latter reveals more of the domestic affairs and India’s development issues. The diverging perceptions of India among member states seem to reflect to a certain extent national cultures of foreign policy thinking. The UK’s perspective on India is consistent with Anglo-Saxon intergovermentalism, while the society-centred focus of German think tanks fits well in the post-Second World War foreign policy culture highlighting on human rights and democratic values. This brings us to the conclusion that the knowledge of India produced by European think tanks, and the perceptions that were aroused in this process, is to a large extent shaped by the characteristics of the think tank culture in the particular countries. An interesting question for further research is to see whether this divergence in perceptions affects relations between Europe and India and the making of a common EU policy towards India. Another question is how Europe’s perceptions of India have developed after 2018. This study addressed a particular period in which India gained weight on the European think tank agenda. Yet, things have changes rapidly over the past few years. The EU and India have further developed their strategic partnership, Brexit has turned Europe-India relations upside down and provoked new challenges and dilemmas for European member states, and the increasing geopolitical instability have put Europe-India relations in a new perspective. It is worth examining whether these new circumstances have affected the major findings of this chapter.

Appendix Selection of European Think Tanks Studied in the Research Country

Think Tank

Pan-European

European Council on Foreign Relations European Union Institute for Security Studies Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche/The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies Bruegel Centre for European Policy Studies Egmont—Royal Institute for International Relations

Austria Belgium

(continued)

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(continued) Country

Bulgaria Czech Republic

Denmark Estonia Finland France

Germany

Greece Hungary

Ireland

Think Tank EU-ASIA Centre European Institute for Asian Studies European Parliament Think Tank European Policy Centre Foundation For European Progressive Studies Friends of Europe South Asia Democratic Forum Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies Centre for Strategic Research of Defence and Security Centre for the Study of Democracy European values Ústavu mezinárodních vztahu/Institute ˚ of International Relations (Czech Republic) Baltic Development Forum Danish Institute for International Studies Rahvusvaheline Kaitseuuringute Keskus/International Centre for Defence and Security Ulkopoliittinen instituutti/Finnish Institute of International Affairs European Union Institute for Security Studies Fondation Robert Schuman Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques Institut français des relations internationals La Vie des Idées Notre Europe—Jacques Delors Institute Bertelsmann Stiftung German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Global Public Policy Institute Hanns Seidel Foundation Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung/Heinrich Böll Foundation Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for International and Security Affairs Eλληνικ´o I´δρυμα Eυρωπα¨ικης ´ και Eξωτερικης ´ Πoλιτικης/Hellenic ´ Foundation for European Foreign Policy Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade MTA Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont—Világgazdasági Intézet/Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS—Institute of World Economics The Institute of International and European Affairs (continued)

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503

(continued) Country

Think Tank

Italy

Istituto Affari Internazionali Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale LUISS School of European Political Economy Latvian Instituet of International Affairs International Institute of Political Sciences Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen—Clingendael/Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendaels The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Polski Instytut Spraw Mi˛edzynarodowych/Polish Institute of International Affairs Contraditório Portuguese Institute for International Relations and Security The Romanian Centre for European Policies GLOBSEC CIDOB Barcelona Centre for International Affairs Fundación para las relaciones internacionales y el diálogo exterior/Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue Real Instituto Elcano/Elcano Royal Institute Utrikespolitiska Institutet/Swedish Institute of International Affairs Centre for Policy Studies Chatham House—The Royal Institute of International Affairs Fabian Society LSE Idea Oxford Institute for Energy Studies The Foreign Policy Centre

Latvia Lithuania Netherlands

Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Spain

Sweden United Kingdom

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CHAPTER 15

India’s Trade and Economic Relations with Western Europe Anna Wróbel and Karina J˛edrzejowska

Introduction As one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, India is an important trade and investment partner for Western Europe. Even though India’s trade and investment regulations continue to contain elements of protectionism, the size of its market and human capital potential make it an attractive economic partner for West European economies. This chapter seeks to provide an overview of trade relations between India and select West European countries since 1947. It analyses trade flows since 1991 when India launched a policy of economic liberalization. Most of the data is derived from the Government of India and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) databases,

A. Wróbel (B) · K. J˛edrzejowska Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] K. J˛edrzejowska e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_15

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as well as data from national statistical bureaus of the analysed economies will be used. This chapter deals with fifteen countries of the ‘old’ European Union, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which are major trade partners of India in Europe. The chapter provides a historical overview of trade and economic relations between India and West Europe and covers recent developments including Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter then goes on to examine trade in goods and services. In conclusion, the chapter makes some policy recommendations for future economic cooperation.

Evolution of Trade and Economic Cooperation The history of economic relations between India and West European countries dates back to the end of the fifteenth century when Portuguese traders began exporting goods from India to Europe. This facilitated India’s integration into the pre-modern global economy and increased interest of other European countries in the Indian subcontinent (Sachdeva, 2008: 342). Growing trade with India led to almost five centuries of exploitation of the Indian Ocean region by European imperial powers. The Dutch, French and English East India companies, as well as several representatives of Portuguese and German traders, were at the core of historical economic links between India and Western Europe. Until the nineteenth century, the composition of trade between the individual European countries and India was similar. Major exports included cotton and silk, saltpetre (potassium nitrate), sugar, opium and pepper. Key imports on the other hand comprised precious metals (mostly silver) and woollen goods (Datta, 1959: 314–321). West European states’ presence in the subcontinent was somewhat circumscribed by the advent of British colonial rule. As a result, the United Kingdom remained India’s major trading partner until 1947 (Muenchow-Pohl, 2012: 10; Prakash, 1998). Economic relations between independent India and Western Europe can be roughly divided into two major phases: from 1947 until the end of the Cold War and from the early 1990s onwards. While the former was one of development cooperation, the second one witnessed economic relations with Western Europe becoming more market-driven and equal (J˛edrzejowska, 2014: 99–102; Tripathi, 2021: 235).

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At the time of independence in 1947, most of India’s trade was either with Britain or its colonies and allies. As India’s geographical trade became more diversified, West Europe and Socialist countries became trading partners. However, owing to the colonial legacy, the United Kingdom remained India’s major European trading partner in the first few decades after independence. Subsequently, important trading partners in West Europe included France and West Germany as well as Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy. Since the early 1960s, India’s trade linkages with West Europe became considerably influenced by the process of European economic integration. India was among the first developing countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1962. This move provided a basis for the development of economic cooperation with EEC member states as well as secured access to the British market once the UK joined the European Community in 1973. Starting with the Commercial Cooperation Agreement (CCA) of December 1973, successive cooperation agreements between India and EEC were structured in a way that provided space for the development of bilateral economic cooperation between India and individual EEC member states (Sachdeva, 2008: 343–344). Moreover, as a developing country, India received several trade concessions from the EEC as part of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). This move influenced India’s export structure. Indian exports to Western Europe supported through preferential treatment included primarily agricultural products (cotton, jute, tea, spices), textiles, cotton and leather (Bywalec, 2020: 125; Tripathi, 2021: 236). The development of bilateral economic relations and the growing role of Indo-EEC cooperation led to West Europe being among India’s major trading partners until the 1980s. In the 1960s, West European economies accounted for almost 40% of India’s total trade. A major portion of this trade was with just two countries: the United Kingdom and West Germany. Trade with other countries subsequently became important as Belgium and France increased their economic presence in India. Other West European trading partners of the time included Netherlands, Italy and Spain (Sachdeva, 2008: 344). The end of the Cold War and economic liberalization marked the beginning of a new phase in India-West European economic relations as New Delhi transformed its centralized and autarkic economy. Many quantitative restrictions in foreign trade and capital turnover (mainly export

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and import licenses) were abolished, extremely high customs tariffs were reduced, fixed exchange rates were abandoned and trade procedures were made less bureaucratic. These changes resulted in a dynamic development of India’s foreign trade, which by the early twenty-first century increased almost four-fold (Bywalec, 2020: 126; Muenchow-Pohl, 2012: 19). With the rise of Asian economies, the relative share of West Europe in international trade declined. This was the result, inter alia, of the re-orientation of India’s economic policy towards Asian economies, and increasing competition from China in the European (and global) markets (Bywalec, 2020: 126). On the positive side, however, the last three decades witnessed a substantial change in the structure of Indian exports to Western Europe. Indian exports to the region consistently moved up the value chain, with the largest share now held by machinery and transport equipment instead of raw materials dominating Indian exports in the earlier period (Muenchow-Pohl, 2012: 11; Vadra, 2012). Indo-West European trade dynamics are discussed in detail in later sections of this chapter. The global economic crisis of 2007–2009 and subsequent changes in Indian economic and trade policies made it possible for India to avoid over-dependence on one large trading partner. While this seems to have hampered negotiations on the India-EU free trade agreement (FTA), it led to the further diversification of trade connections (Bywalec, 2020: 127). India’s trade with Western Europe has been hampered by the lack of a substantial cooperation framework like a FTA. Since the formulation of the Global Europe Strategy (2006), the EU has considered India as an important trade partner with which to conclude a preferential trade agreement. Negotiations started in 2007 but broke down in 2013. However, both sides have expressed their desire to revive the talks. Discussions resumed in 2016 focusing on key outstanding issues, such as improved market access for some goods and services, government procurement, and sustainable development (Felbermayr, 2017: 10). However, rising protectionism and the COVID-19 pandemic hindered any meaningful progress in this area. The lack of an India-EU FTA seems even more relevant in the context of numerous trade barriers continue to persist between India and Western Europe. In spite of three decades of reforms, India’s trade regime and regulatory environment remain rather restrictive. India’s economic protectionism can be seen as an element of broader global tendency, with

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a substantial shift towards self-reliance-oriented economic policies based on import substitution (Wagner, 2022: 30–31). India ranks 62 out of 190 nations on the Ease of Doing Business Index report (World Bank, 2022). In spite of a major improvement in this area, compared to the world average, India maintains relatively high tariff barriers that hinder trade with the EU Member States, especially regarding primary products and food. For instance, despite being the third largest spirits market in the world, India continues to apply a 150% tariff on imports of European spirits. In several sectors, average tariffs remain close to 10%. In addition to tariff barriers on imports, India resorts to a number of non-tariff barriers such as quantitative restrictions, import licensing or complicated and lengthy customs procedures. In short, together with China, India is the country with the most developed trade defence measures applied against EU imports (Felbermayr et al., 2017: 10–11). The milieu of India’s trade relations with Western Europe changed significantly with the British exit the EU in 2020. In addition to its historical ties with India, the UK was also a significant export market and investment destination for India within the EU. It had been the third most important trading partner in Western Europe (with Germany and Belgium holding first and second place, respectively). In order to keep the high trade volumes with the UK, India is currently negotiating a bilateral FTA with the UK (Tripathi, 2021: 234–237). The continuously declining GDP growth rate since 2017 also seems to be a factor leading to the desire to enhance economic relations with West Europe. For instance, in 2019–2020, shortly before the COVID19 pandemic broke out, economic growth amounted to just 5%–the lowest figure in over a decade. India was also among countries adversely impacted economically by the COVID-19 pandemic. GDP in the first quarter of 2020 fell by more than 23%. Economic output in during 2020– 2021 shrank by 7.3%. The economic slowdown not only contributed to deepening social inequalities, but also suppressed India’s demand for imported goods and weakened India’s position in global supply chains (Wagner, 2022: 29–30).

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India’s Trade in Goods1 Western Europe is India’s main trading partner. The combined share of 15 Western European economies in India’s trade was 11.9% in 2021– 2022,2 which is greater than its trade with the United States (11.5%) and China (11.2%). The total value of India’s merchandise trade with Western Europe reached $123.3 billion. This compares with $119.4 billion and $115.8 billion for the United States and China respectively. In 2021– 2022, India exported $68.3 billion worth of goods to West European countries. The value of imports from Western Europe, on the other hand, reached $55 billion. India’s trade balance with Western Europe is therefore positive. The importance of individual Western European economies in trade with India varies according to their economic potential. None of them have however made it into India’s top ten trade partners. The highest position in the ranking of India’s main trading partners in 2020–2021 was that of Germany—eleventh. India’s top twenty trade partners also include Belgium (ranked 14), the UK (ranked 17) and the Netherlands (ranked 19). The top fifty major trading partners also include Spain (38th place). Further ranked are Sweden (55th), Denmark (60th), Ireland (61st), Greece (62nd), Portugal (69th), Finland (72nd) and Luxembourg (151st). In 2021–2022, India recorded a positive trade balance with nine West European countries (Fig. 15.1, Tables 15.1 and 15.2). These are Belgium ($133 million), UK ($3,444 million), Netherlands ($8,065 million), Italy ($3,132 million), France ($858 million), Spain ($2,673 million), Denmark ($56 million), Greece ($778 million) and Portugal ($1,027 million). In contrast, there was a deficit in trade with Germany (−$5,085 million), Sweden (−$415 million), Ireland (−$448 million),

1 As there are no directly comparable sources of data for trade in goods and services, the analysis in the study was based on the Government of India data for trade in goods and the OECD data for trade in services. Therefore, the analysis period is different for these two dimensions of trade relations. In particular, the following databases were used: Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank (retrieved in October 2022), and the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services (retrieved in October 2022). 2 The data follows the financial year which lasts from April to the end of March of the consecutive year. Hence, 2021–2022 relates to the period between 1 April 2021 and 31 March 2022.

15

INDIA’S TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS …

515

Luxembourg Finland Portugal Greece Austria Ireland Denmark Sweden Spain France Italy Netherland UK Belgium Germany 0

5000

10000 Total trade

15000 Import

20000

25000

30000

Export

Fig. 15.1 India-West Europe trade in goods, 2021–2022 (in million US Dollars) (Source Authors’ own calculations based on Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce [2022])

Austria (−$261 million), Finland (−$532 million) and Luxembourg (-$53 million). Trade Dynamics India’s relations with individual West European countries differ in terms of trade dynamics in addition to the value of trade. Since the 1990s, and especially after 2001, trade with West Europe has grown significantly. The economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009 led to a slump in both Indian

284.3 344.3

2871.2 410.2

5784.3 690.7

5027.6 688.7

5 235.5 755.2

132.4

593.7

339.8

453.0

564.3 10,084.3 944.1

248.4

254.9

204.6

58.3

1470.5 174.3

81.0

54.4

1092.6 150.9

94.4

759.1 1893.0

6640.9 9883.3

4782.1 8124.9

4633.4 7092.8

5209.5 6751.1

2079.5 3586.1

1020.0 1907.5

93.6

59.38

933.7

1077.4 687.95 8180.7

546.3 563.22 4735.7

335.6 525.79 4217.7

364.8 270.34 4551.5

564.0 279.77 2519.0

113.4 103.18 1308.7

14.5

12.6

8.0

18.7

10.6

5.5

3.2

12543.6

6472.8

4725.1

7677.5

2474.7

880.0

852.3

1191.8

837.1

589.6

526.8

260.8

146.7

87.8

763.8

683.5

627.7

326.3

176.1

151.5

Sweden

44560.2

33469.9

India’s total export

8157.5 291808.48

8828.4 262291.0

7284.9 249815.5

5059.2 103090.5

2298.7

2046.9

UK

4725.4 1035.9 10461.2 421894.2

3238.5

3237.1

2565.2

1605.6

666.2

425.0

Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain

Source Authors’ own calculations based on Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce (2022)

1996– 1997 2000– 2001 2005– 2006 2010– 2011 2015– 2016 2020– 2021 2021– 2022

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy

Table 15.1 India-Western Europe trade in goods (Exports), 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 (in million US Dollars)

516 A. WRÓBEL AND K. JEDRZEJOWSKA ˛

185.6

142.5

515.9

472.8

428.5

589.1

888.7

140.1 2230.8

69.3 2870.0

344.0 4725.1

817.0 8609.8

827.1 8256.0

623.1 6940.6

825.1 9951.6

640.8

698.8

6023.6

1759.5

2830.3

93.3

56.3

22.0

16.4

414.4

551.5

259.2

161.9

72.0

20.28

876.2 5782.1 14968.1 299.9 1135.8

713.2 4343.2 13643.0 143.0

1002.3 3730.3 12088.3 111.0

1653.0 3704.5 11891.3

583.4 4113.3

207.3

199.7

5048.4

3862.0

4072.2

4256.0

1855.6

723.5

915.0

Italy

36.6

36.6

36.6

36.6

16.1

5.2

5.0

4478.1

3317.7

1859.9

1853.1

1049.5

466.4

415.4

164.5

113.9

102.5

85.3

30.2

11.9

8.3

UK

238.1 3167.9

371.5 2133.9

Sweden

50536.4

39132.4

India’s total import

2052.9 1450.1 7017.7 613052.0

1511.9 1004.7 4955.7 394435.8

1646.0 1484.8 5192.5 381007.7

1487.5 1619.3 5396.7 369769.1

573.4 1172.2 3930.3 149165.7

142.1

210.4

Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain

Source Authors’ own calculations based on Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce (2022)

1996– 1997 2000– 2001 2005– 2006 2010– 2011 2015– 2016 2020– 2021 2021– 2022

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland

Table 15.2 India-Western Europe trade in goods (Imports), 1996–1997 to 2021–2022 (in million US Dollars) 15 INDIA’S TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS …

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exports and imports. After a recovery in 2010–2011, trade volumes have stagnated since 2011 (Felbermayr et al., 2017: 34–35). Interestingly, Indian exports to Western Europe exceeded Indian imports from the region for the first time in 2010–2011, but in 2015– 2016 imports exceeded exports. According to the data in Tables 15.1 and 15.2, India again recorded a positive balance of trade with Western Europe in 2020–2021 and 2021–2022 apparently because of the COVID-19 pandemic and significant Indian exports of medicines and other medical products. After two pandemic years and a decline in trade in 2019–2021, the year 2021–2022 witnessed a significant increase in trade with West European countries. For example, Indian exports to Germany in 2021–2022 increased by more than 21% over the previous year, while imports, on the other hand, increased by 9.7%. The largest increases in trade were recorded for Greece (exports 97.22%; imports 109.73%); Belgium (exports 92.6%; imports 43.3%), the Netherlands (exports 93.7%; imports 34.9%) and Italy (exports 72.74%; imports 30.72%). Ireland and Luxembourg are an interesting case. With double-digit growth in exports (by 22.15% and 15.59% respectively), there was a more than 100% increase in imports of 175% for Ireland and more than 121% for Luxembourg. For the rest of Western Europe, the growth rate was also high and in double digits but nevertheless lower than the examples cited. Indian exports to Portugal grew by more than 42% and Portuguese imports by 55.4%. This is followed by relations with Spain (exports 45.9%; imports 35.79%) Sweden (exports 35.6%; imports 44.3%) the United Kingdom (exports 28.4%; imports 41.6%), France (exports 38.8%; imports 33.1), Austria (exports 24.5%; imports 55.4%), Denmark (exports 25.0%; imports 50.8%) and Finland (exports 21.1%; imports 22.8%). Composition of Trade The sectoral composition of India’s trade with West Europe appears fairly stable. For more than two decades, Indian imports from West European countries have been dominated by machinery and electrical products followed by stone and glass, chemicals, and metals. India exports mainly comprised textiles, chemicals, machinery and electrical products, stone and glass, and raw hides, skins, leather, and fur. The four largest sectors of imports two decades ago remain the most important today as well. On the export side, textiles continue to dominate, but the relative importance

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of vegetable products or leather products has declined significantly. India has become an important supplier of chemicals and machinery (mostly components) to Western Europe. These changes show that there has been some enhancement in exports (Felbermayr et al., 2017: 34–35). The share and position of selected product groups in trade with individual Western European countries are slightly different. For example, in 2021–2022, nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances were the most important item of Indian export to Germany ($1,419.3 million), the UK ($1,057.6 million), Sweden ($135.1 million) and Finland ($42.5 million). The largest share in exports to Belgium consisted of natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, imitation jewellery and coins ($2,740.37 million). In case of the Netherlands ($5,273.8 million) and France ($812,2 million) mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes constituted the major items of Indian export. For Italy, on the other hand, Indian exports in the iron and steel sector were the most valuable ($2,144.6 million). In contrast, in the case of Spain ($612.7 million) and Ireland ($231.3 million), organic chemicals predominated. Exports to Denmark, on the other hand, were dominated by articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted, or crocheted ($154.1 million). Mainly, aluminium and aluminium products were exported to Greece ($485.2 million). The highest value of sales to Portugal was recorded for cotton ($269.1).

Trade in Services Given the role of services in Indian exports (Wróbel, 2014: 135–148; WTO, 2021: 60) and the importance of this sector in West European economies, this section examines the trade in services, which is much lower compared to trade in goods. Yet, the relatively lower volumes of trade in services do not necessarily indicate that the numbers are low per se. Actually, the share of exports of services in India’s trade can be considered a rather uncommon phenomenon for a developing country. This development can be traced back to India’s economic reforms of the 1990s that focused on achieving international competitive advantage in service sectors. As a result, India became a major exporter of services based on the offshoring formula which include such sectors as telecommunications, financial services, transport and tourism (Bywalec, 2020: 133–137).

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According to the latest available data, the total value of India’s services trade with Western Europe reached $45.6 billion in 2020; this was more than twice as much as $21.9 billion in 2010. In 2020, the value of Indian exports of services to Western Europe amounted to $26.1 billion. Imports, on the other hand, reached $19.4 billion. India, therefore, has a positive balance in its services trade with Western Europe. According to the data in Table 15.3 and Table 15.4, between 2010 and 2020, India has only once recorded a small deficit in services trade of −$1.5 billion in 2018. The importance of individual West European countries in Indian services trade varies (Fig. 15.2). Among the West European countries, the most important partner for India in services trade is the UK ($12.2 billion). Germany ranks second ($7.9 billion), followed by the Netherlands ($5.7 billion), France ($5.4 billion), Ireland ($4.7 billion), Denmark ($2.4 billion), Sweden ($1.9 billion), Finland ($1.3 billion), Belgium ($1.0 billion), Italy ($0.6 billion), Greece ($0.6 billion), Spain ($0.5 billion), Austria ($0.3 billion), Luxemburg ($0.2 billion) and Portugal ($0.1 billion). The balance of services with individual Western European countries excluding Ireland (−$1.385 billion), Denmark (−$0.440), Italy (−$0.058 billion) and Greece (−$0.536 billion) is positive. India’s largest surplus in services trade in 2010 was with the Netherlands ($2.441 billion), UK ($2.220 billion), Germany ($1.979 billion) and Sweden ($1.092 billion). This is followed by Finland ($0.484 billion), France ($0.306 billion) Belgium ($0.345 billion), Spain ($0.090 billion), Portugal ($0.069 billion), Austria ($0. billion) and Luxemburg ($0.044 billion). Four categories of services, namely other business services, telecommunications, computer and information services, travel and transportation services, dominate trade in services between India and West Europe. Other sectors which play a significant role consist of royalties and licence fees, financial, insurance, government, personal, construction services and the cultural and recreation sector. There has been a significant growth in Indian exports of modern service categories classified as other services at the expense of more traditional sectors such as transport. For example, exports of transport services to the UK declined from $658 million in 2010 to $171 million in 2020. In 2020, the most important sector in Indian services exports to the UK was other business services ($5,087

590 619 2139 2773 52 1477 45 1808 138 640 6593 16874

538 490

2270 64

473 35 1631 110

371 6015 11997

2011

776 5712 14759

1824 2881 64 314 607 51 1716 87

598

129

2012

Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD (2022)

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Western Europe

2010 166 594 625 595 2129 3603 77 388 520 81 2513 112 262 795 3736 16196

2013 194 508 805 546 2320 3236 72 170 563 106 2009 120 323 841 4464 16277

2014 166 512 816 493 1894 3298 53 414 426 77 2017 98 434 763 5253 16714

2015 167 529 774 599 1955 3654 53 660 446 117 2341 103 487 787 4680 17352

2016 242 498 861 688 2989 4045 70 850 521 108 2717 123 613 890 5268 20483

2017 226 671 967 778 3134 4952 85 968 556 78 3845 143 566 1467 6313 20904

2018

Table 15.3 India-Western Europe trade in services (Exports), 2010–2020 (in million US Dollars)

241 639 1106 899 3020 5284 84 1357 677 114 3761 165 558 1627 8321 27853

2019

192 704 1009 909 2875 4950 75 1684 318 157 4102 123 328 1517 7212 26155

2020 15 INDIA’S TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS …

521

654 1052 1363 3037 129 700 82 1690 28 387 3224 12346

571 861

2824 136

604 65 1236 13

309 3336 9955

2011

478 3390 14104

1706 2507 186 1737 926 89 1169 23

144 682 1067

2012

Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD (2022)

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Western Europe

2010 155 437 1278 238 1558 2529 214 2020 595 104 1628 45 347 615 3330 15093

2013 124 331 1224 300 1859 2466 277 2611 593 114 1082 43 379 533 3752 15688

2014 158 337 1067 548 2017 2412 449 2670 551 178 907 42 353 596 4417 16702

2015 116 292 976 528 1619 2482 407 2955 610 224 1057 47 436 471 3631 15851

2016 140 347 1186 872 1996 3171 564 3315 597 233 1216 99 524 376 3263 17899

2017 168 437 1405 625 2492 3576 772 4033 651 139 1477 83 718 527 5498 22601

2018

Table 15.4 India-Western Europe trade in services (Imports), 2010–2020 (in million US Dollars)

186 392 1502 440 2595 3603 803 3431 698 131 1756 82 673 562 5582 22436

2019

141 359 1449 468 2569 2971 611 3069 376 113 1661 54 238 425 4992 19496

2020

522 A. WRÓBEL AND K. JEDRZEJOWSKA ˛

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Portugal Luxemburg Austria Spain Greece Italy Belgium Finland Sweden Denmark Ireland France Netherlands Germany UK 0

2000

4000 Total trade

6000 Import

8000

10000

12000

14000

Export

Fig. 15.2 India-Western Europe trade in services, 2021–2022 (in million US Dollars) (Source Authors’ own calculations based on Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce [2022])

million). This was followed by telecommunications, computer and information services ($1,000 million); travel services ($171 million),3 financial services ($345 million), charges for the use of intellectual property ($86 million) and insurance services ($46 million). Other business services were also the most important in imports from the UK ($2,418 million) followed by travel ($818 million), transport ($497 million), telecommunications, computer, and information services ($485 million); financial ($231 million), charges for the use of intellectual property ($160 million), insurance ($140 million). In 2020, India recorded a trade surplus with the UK for other business services ($2669 million), telecommunications, computer and information services ($515 million) and financial

3 Travel was the service sector most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, with exports from this sector worth $1,185 million in 2019. Imports, on the other hand, amounted to $1,760 million.

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services ($114 million). The deficit, on the other hand, occurred in travel (−$447 million), transport (−$326 million), insurance (−$105 million) and charges for the use of intellectual property (−$ 74 million).

Conclusions and Prospects Trade with Western Europe has been of great significance for India for centuries. Today Western European countries are an important economic partner for India in both trade in goods and services. Yet it appears that the full potential for the economic cooperation remains unfulfilled. Even if, in absolute terms, India’s trade with the EU has increased, some disturbing trends can be observed. India-EU trade has grown at a slower pace than India’s total trade possibly because of the slow growth of the Western European economies in the last decade. India still accounts for a relatively small share in European trade and investment. However, common strategic interests in connectivity, digitization, the maritime economy, shared capacity programmes in third countries or developing and strengthening regional structures in the Indo-Pacific open up many opportunities for fruitful cooperation (Wagner, 2022: 42). The high growth rates in trade turnover, which has been observed for the last three decades, may be intensified once the India-EU and IndiaUK FTAs are concluded and come into force. Global recession is likely to further slowdown this process. Nowadays, with the crisis of the World Trade Organization, the conclusion of FTAs seems to be the only way to increase trade with India’s main trading partners. This is reflected in the resumption of negotiations of the India-EU Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) and an intensification of trade negotiations with the UK. The entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has enhanced Indian interest in developing preferential relations with its major trading partners. Previous trade agreements concluded by the EU with Asian partners such as the Republic of Korea and Vietnam indicate that a trade creation effect is also to be expected in the case of the agreement with India. In the long term, the BTIA may even lead to a doubling of the value of trade (Felbermayr et al., 2017: 14). According to available analysis, both sides could see a large increase in trade in business services. In the absence of preferential trade relations between the EU and China, India could also more than double its exports of apparel, textiles and leather products.

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In turn, the European partners could increase exports of transportation equipment and machinery. Given the current scale of agricultural protectionism in the EU, India could see significant growth in exports of certain agricultural and food products. This includes, for example, India’s rice exports (Felbermayr et al., 2017: 15). The effects of the BTIA with the EU and the India-UK FTA will vary in different sectors depending on the extent of market opening and the depth of commitments. Some differences can also to be expected in the case of relations with individual EU Member States. Studies forecasting the future effects of preferential trade agreements with the EU and the UK show a different scale of the trade creation effect depending on the adopted scenario for the scale of trade liberalization. Due to the asymmetry of the degree of protectionism of the EU and UK markets on the one hand and India on the other, concerns are being formulated that in the case of trade in goods, European companies will gain greater export opportunities. This is because the customs duties on goods in the EU and the UK are much lower than those applied by India. In this situation, the growth rate of Indian goods exports to India may be lower than the scale of this indicator for exports from the EU. Given the potential of India’s services sector, greater symmetry in the distribution of benefits from future agreements may occur in this sector.

References Bywalec, G. (2020). Dynamics and determinants of trade exchange between the European Union and India. Optimum Economic Studies, 3(101), 123–139. Datta, K. K. (1959). India’s trade with Europe and America in the eighteenth century. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 2(3), 313– 323. Felbermayr, G., Mitra, D., Aichele, R., & Gröschl, J. (2017). GED Study. Europe and India relaunching a troubled trade relationship. Bertelsmann Stiftung. India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce. (2022). Export Import Data Bank. Retrieved October 10, 2022, from https://com merce-app.gov.in/eidb/iecnt.asp J˛edrzejowska, K. (2014). Economic transition in Poland and India: Not so different story? In V. Sakhuja, D. K. Upadhyay, & P. Kugiel (Eds.), IndiaPoland relations in the 21st century: Vistas for future cooperation. ICWA, Vij Books and Polish Institute of International Affairs, pp. 99–117. OECD. (2022). EBOPS 2010 - Trade in services by partner economy. Retrieved October 10, 2022, from https://stats.oecd.org/

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Prakash, O. (1998). European commercial enterprise in pre-colonial India. Cambridge University Press. Sachdeva, G. (2008). India and the European Union: Broadening strategic partnership beyond economic linkages. International Studies, 45(4), 341–367. Tripathi, D. (2021). Evaluating Brexit implications for India’s relations with the EU and the UK. International Studies, 58(2), 234–247. Vadra, R. (2012). Indo-German trade and investment: A fresh look. Journal of International Economics, 3(1), 57–68. von Muenchow-Pohl, B. (2012). India and Europe in a multipolar world. The Carnegie Papers. Wagner, C. (2022). India’s rise: On feet of clay? SWP Research Paper 2. Berlin. World Bank. (2022). Ease of doing business rank. Retrieved October 20, 2022, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ Wróbel, A. (2014). The Service Sector in Indian Economy. In J. Zaj˛aczkowski, J. Schöttli & M. Thapa (Eds.), India in the contemporary world, polity, economy and international relations. Routledge. WTO. (2021). World Trade Statistical Review 2021. WTO.

CHAPTER 16

Indian Foreign Direct Investment in Western Europe Anna Wróbel and Karina J˛edrzejowska

Introduction Bilateral capital flows constitute an important component of economic relations between India and Western Europe. Even though investment relations between India and most West European economies can be traced back to the time preceding India’s independence, it was only the liberalization of Indian economy in the early 1990s that provided the basis for enhanced flows of capital. Economic and financial liberalization allowed India to become an important player in global financial markets, as well as an important investor and recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). India’s rapid economic development together with its fast-growing internal market has contributed to a steady growth of capital flows from

A. Wróbel (B) · K. J˛edrzejowska Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] K. J˛edrzejowska e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_16

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the advanced economies of Western Europe. Simultaneously, India’s rising multinationals have sought investment opportunities in Western Europe. This chapter seeks to provide an overview of investment relations between India and select Western European economies. It discusses the evolution of West European FDI in India as well as the evolution of FDI outflow from India to Western Europe. It argues that there is still potential for greater investment engagement on both sides. The chapter is based on statistical analysis of FDI flows between the analysed parties extracted from the Organisation of Cooperation and Development (OECD) database, Government of India (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department for Promotion of Industry and International Trade) and Invest India, the National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency. Additionally, analyses provided by leading consulting providers such as Kearney and Ernst & Young have been used. The geographical scope of the analysis in the chapter is limited to fifteen countries of the ‘old’ European Union, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This selection is justified both by the fact that it encompasses major bilateral India’s investments in Europe, as well as the inclusion of the post-Brexit United Kingdom. The analysis is focused on India’s bilateral relations with the selected economies, and it refrains from including the European Union (EU) perspective, unless the EU institutional framework directly affects capital flows between India and Western Europe. The chapter is organized as follows: The section “West European Investment in India” looks at West European investment in India. It discusses the evolution of FDI flows from Western Europe to India and provides a general overview of their volume and composition since India’s independence until the most recent developments including Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. Next, it looks at selected investments by West European companies in India. The section “Indian Investment in Western Europe” follows the same structure with a focus on India’s investments in Western Europe. The final section concludes and makes some projections regarding the post-COVID-19 trends in capital flows between India and Western Europe.

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West European Investment in India India as an Investment Destination for Western Europe Similar to the initial development of India-West European trade, the advent of inward FDI from Western Europe to India can be traced back to the activity of the British East India Company in the early seventeenth century. While the Company can be regarded as the first foreign investor in India, this and subsequently other British entities constituted the prevailing part of European investment engagement in India until World War II (Charlie, 2014: 8). After World War II, the inflow of FDI to independent India has been subjected to the priorities of Indian economic policy. Independent India’s investment policy can be divided into three periods marked consecutively by: (1) India’s state-led development after independence, (2) gradual liberalization of Indian economy since 1991, and (3) intensification of the Government of India’s efforts to attract more FDI after 2014. This periodization applies also to Western European FDI in India. During the first period stretching from independence to the reforms of the early 1990s, Indian FDI policy can be described as lacking consistent direction and proper institutions. Despite Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s views that foreign investment should be regarded as ‘necessary to supplement domestic capital and secure scientific, technical, and industrial knowledge’, the Indian economy was inward-oriented and highly protected (Charlie, 2014: 8; Sahoo, 2016; Saha & Bhomwick, 2020: 8). India’s investment policy after 1947 did not allow for foreign companies to retain an equity share of more than 40%. Together with numerous bureaucratic hurdles, this made India unattractive for West European investors (Beena et al., 2004: 128). As a result, the inflow of FDI at the time was extremely limited. Japanese companies were, however, an exception as well as a few British businesses who were the only representatives of West Europe investing in India at that period (Charlie, 2014: 8). It was only during the early 1980s, following a serious balance of payments crisis, that the Indian government began to gradually relax its foreign investment policy. The changes in investment regulation, however, did not immediately result in enhanced interest of West European investors in India (Beena et al., 2004: 126). In the next period, following yet another serious balance-of-payments crisis in 1991, the comprehensive structural economic reforms included steps to attract FDI to supplement domestic resources without increasing

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sovereign debt. These included raising foreign equity caps in most sectors, diluting provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), and the introduction of the so-called automatic approval route for FDI. To improve the overall business environment for external investors, Indian reforms also included the dismantling of controls in the areas of industrial policy, taxation, export–import policy, dividend balancing, easing of competition controls, deregulating interest rates, opening capital markets and implementing trade policy reforms. The loosening of FDI restrictions and India’s accelerated economic growth resulted in a rapid surge of inflow of FDI, inclusive FDI from Western Europe (Beena et al., 2004: 129–130; Sahoo, 2016). After 1991, foreign investment followed a steep upward curve. While the share of FDI in India’s Gross Domestic Income was only 0.2% in 1990, it increased to 3.98% by 2001, while FDI as a per cent of Gross Domestic Product increased from 0.05% in 1990 to 0.90% in 2001 (Beena, 2004: 131). Between 1991 and 2001, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France were the major sources of FDI. Cumulatively, the EU-15 were among the largest foreign investors in India at the time with most investments concentrated in the intermediate goods and machinery and equipment sectors (Beena et al., 2004: 132–137). Since the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi came into power in May 2014, efforts to boost India’s attractiveness as an investment destination have intensified with the introduction of new flagship programmes like ‘Make in India’. In 2015, India moved ahead of the United States and China to become the top destination for FDI worldwide comparing to its fifth position in 2014 (Sahoo, 2016). Between 2000 and 2011, the European Union became the second largest investor in India with a share exceeding 20% of Indian inward FDI. The bulk of West European investment was in form of greenfield initiatives, especially the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, France, Italy, and Belgium. Between 2000–2010, West European companies have invested around US $200 billion in India with Germany, the UK and France collectively accounting for around 65% of total West European investment in India (Charlie, 2014: 4; Wagner, 2015: 610). Since the beginning of the millennium, West European enterprises accounted for almost half of all multinational corporations present in India. According to a 2014 study, European companies provided direct employment for around 1.5 million workers, with over 6 million further

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jobs having been created indirectly by the European presence in the Indian market. The UK, Germany, and France have been leaders in this area. Significant employment opportunities were also created by companies from Sweden, Belgium, Spain and the only non-EU Western European representative—Switzerland (Charlie, 2014: 27). All the above figures are not quite accurate and can be underestimated largely because many investors, including West European companies, have been using the so-called Mauritius route to make investments in the Indian market. Due to preferential tax treatment guaranteed by a double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA), it is easier and often more profitable to transfer inward investment to India through Mauritius-based entities. Singapore is another ‘intermediary’ for the investment capital coming to India. The same applies to the outward investment (Deloitte, 2021). Interestingly, however, there is growing evidence that due to India’s DTAAs with West European countries such as the Netherlands, Spain, and France, it is possible for investors willing to access Indian market to get similar benefits as when investing through Mauritius or Singapore. This fact is already reflected in the rising position of Dutch FDI in India (Jaiswal, 2018). The post-2014 India’s approach to FDI led to a further surge in West European investments. The improved investment climate and growing purchasing power also led to greater interest of European companies in India. This interest is well justified in India’s high position in major investment attractiveness rankings. For instance, in the Kearney Global Services Location Index (GSLI), India has occupied a top-tier position for many years (Kearney, 2021: 3–4). It is not however listed among top 25 investment destinations in the 2022 Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index (Kearney, 2022: 22). India remains an attractive destination for overseas investors. It is forecast to grow by 11% in 2022, making it the only economy in the world expecting to achieve a double-digit growth rate. It boasts a highly skilled young population, and it is becoming increasingly business friendly. As recently as 2014, India ranked only 134th out of 189 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings. By 2020, it had risen to the 63rd position (Smith, 2021).

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West European FDI Flows to India As of the end of 2021, Western Europe constituted the third major investor in India after Mauritius and Singapore (Table 16.1). The cumulative investment of the 15 West European economies between April 2000 and June 2022 amounted to US $117.8 billion. The combined share of the 15 Western European economies in FDI inflows to India during this period was 19.47%. For Mauritius and Singapore, it was 26.46% and 22.58%, respectively. The importance of individual West European economies in FDI inflows to India however varies depending on their economic potential and the intensity of their trade relations. Among the top 10 major investors in India included three West European economies: the Netherlands (US $42.3 billion), the United Kingdom (US $32.1 billion) and Germany (US $13.6 billion). The top 20 major investors in India also included France (ranked 11), Luxembourg (ranked 15), Spain (ranked 16), Italy (ranked 17) and Belgium (ranked 20). In the top 50 major direct investors in India were Sweden (ranked 22), Ireland (ranked 24), Denmark (ranked 28), Austria (ranked 37) and Finland (ranked 38). Further down are Portugal (51st place) and Greece (94th place). FDI inflows from Western Europe to India have fluctuated. After growing steadily from 2001 to 2007, FDI inflows from Western Europe to India stagnated during the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009. This was followed by a sharp increase until 2011. A year later, there was again a significant decline in FDI inflows to India from the EU-15 countries (Felbermayr et al., 2017: 43). Growth resumed in subsequent years (see Table 16.2). From 2015 to 2020, there was only a slight decline in the value of Western European investment in 2018. The COVID-19 pandemic introduced more uncertainty into the global economy. It has negatively impacted international trade, global value chains and capital flows. However, in the case of major West European investors in India, it has not automatically led to a reduction in investment. According to the statistics provided by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Dutch investment declined from US $6,500 million in 2019–20201 to US $2,789 million in 2020–2021. A year later, their value increased to US $4,620 million

1 The data follows the fiscal year in India which lasts from April to the end of March of the consecutive year. Hence, 2020–2021 relates to the period between 1 April 2020 and 31 March 2021.

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Table 16.1 Country-wise FDI equity inflow to India from April to June 2022 Ranking position among major investors in India

Country

1 2 3 4 6 9 11 15 16 17 20 22 24 28 37 38 51 94

Mauritius Singapore U.S.A Netherlands UK Germany France Luxembourg Spain Italy Belgium Sweden Ireland Denmark Austria Finland Portugal Greece Western Europe

Value of FDI inflow

Percentage of inflow

160110.7947 136653.2811 55615.2801 42339.2805 32180.5129 13680.3518 10313.6973 4139.7361 3593.9844 3204.8135 2590.8645 2155.1035 1343.3292 1072.0257 548.6889 531.9002 120.9068 9.1615 117824.3568

26.4648 22.5875 9.1927 6.9983 5.3191 2.2612 1.7048 0.6843 0.5941 0.5297 0.4282 0.3562 0.2220 0.1772 0.0907 0.0879 0.0200 0.0015 19.4752

Source Authors’ own calculations based on India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department for Promotion of Industry, and International Trade (2022)

in 2021–2022. In the case of FDI inflows from the UK, there was an initial increase from US $1,422 million in 2019–2020 to a level of US $2,043 million in 2020–2021, followed by a decline to US $1,647 million in 2021–2022. Germany is an interesting case, as it witnessed a spike in investment in India both in 2020–2021 and 2021–2022. Germany invested US $488 million in India in 2019–2020, US $667 million a year later, and US $728 million in 2021–2022. Inward FDI to India goes to ten sectors: the service sector2 (16%), computer software and hardware (15%), telecommunications (6%), trading (6%), automobile industry (6%), construction (infrastructure)

2 Services sector includes financial, banking, insurance, non-financial/business, outsourcing, R&D, Courier, technical testing and analysis and other services.

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Table 16.2 India: Inward foreign direct investment position by country, 2010– 2020 (in million US dollars) 2010 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Western Europe

344.7 706.8 720.8 1321.5 3884.3 17.4 73.5 2509.4 3512.8 538.5 1858.7 3881.0 19369.4

2015 427.9 744.5 121.9 5762.7 24132.8 12.8 72.9 5726.2 2645.6 4529.1 87.1 1739.2 17956.4 63959.1

2016

2017

2018

450.1 1303.9 820.8 188.7 5762.6 25177.6 12.4 44.3 6106.2 1761.4 9110.4

645.2 1499.2 1061.4 435.4 6543.5 28169.8 0.0 50.4 7373.6 3376.1 11444.0 69.6 1778.6 2909.6 17726.0 83082.4

717.9 1020.2 1418.7 490.0 6486.1 26085.4 0.0 175.2 6959.3 2074.7 12768.5 58.4 2041.4 2619.6 18597.1 81512.5

1361.9 2261.8 16223.4 70585.2

2019

2020

779.6 909.3 1758.0 2053.0 1468.4 1514.5 468.4 342.4 6805.2 11940.1 29293.4 26782.4 0.4 −1.6 133.7 159.5 6724.9 6916.5 3012.8 5934.5 13292.5 31239.4 52.8 55.2 1533.4 1841.9 2387.2 2299.3 20615.1 23681.0 88325.8 115667.4

Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD (2021)

activities (5%), construction development: townships, housing, builtup infrastructure and construction-development projects (4%), chemicals other fertilizers (3%), drugs and pharmaceuticals (3%) and metallurgical industries (3%) (India, Ministry of Commerce, DPIIT 2022). This division of funds is visible also in case of major West European investments in India. Select West European Investments in India One of the leading investors in India has been the UK. In the recent years, education, retail, consumer goods, life sciences, healthcare, and infrastructure have seen the greatest growth in capital inflows in the form of FDI from the UK. Between April 2000 and March 2022, the value of cumulative UK investment in India was US $31.9 billion. The chemical sector (other than fertilizers) accounted for the largest share of this amount at 18.5% (US $5.9 billion) followed by drugs and pharmaceuticals (13.76%; US $4.39 billion), services sector (13.28%; US $4.24),

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food processing industries (9.68%; US $3.09 billion) and petroleum and natural gas (7.37%; US $2.35 billion) (Invest India, National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency, 2022: 5). A number of UK corporations have a significant presence in India: Unilever (fast-moving consumer goods, FMCG), JCB (earthmoving and construction equipment), HSBC (financial services), GSK (dermatology, pharmaceutical and vaccines), Rolls Royce (aeronautics and defence industry), BP (oil and gas, renewables, and lubricant petrochemicals), Shell (gas and renewable energy) and Standard Chartered (financial and business services). Another significant West European investor in India is Germany. German investment goes to transportation, electrical equipment, metallurgical industries, services sector (particularly insurance), chemicals, construction activity, trading and automobiles. German investors in India include: Webasto (sunroofs manufacturing facility in Pune), Birkenstock (e-commerce), Bosch (Bosch Car Service facilities in Panchkula and Haryana), Bayer (Ethiprole manufacturing unit in Vapi), Von Wellx (two footwear plants in Uttar Pradesh), Siemens (digitization platform ‘Mindsphere’ and four application centres in Pune, Noida and Gurugram), Siemens Healthineers (innovation hub in Bengaluru), Blaupunkt (with cooperation with Indian Trigur Electronics investment in Trigur’s plant in Sonepat, Haryana), Deutche Bank (fintech startup Quantiguous Solution in Mumbai) and Liebherr (refrigerator manufacturing unit in Aurangabad, Maharashtra). Moreover, several German MNCs have announced further expansion in the Indian subcontinent. For example, Bosch Home Appliances plans to increase its investment in personalizing solutions, brand-building, strengthening its technology centre and UX studies, and setting up a refrigerator factory (Bureau, 2021). Since the liberalization of India’s investment policy, France has remained among leading European investors in India, even if its share in capital flows to India has been on decline in recent years. French investors are interested in cement and gypsum products, drugs and pharmaceuticals, R&D, industrial machinery and automobiles. Among French investors in India are ENGIE (800 MW of utility-scale solar projects and 280 MW of utility-scale wind projects across Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu), Groupe PSA (powertrain manufacturing plant in Tamil Nadu jointly with CK Birla Group), Roquette (manufacturing facilities in Pantnagar, Gokak and Viramgam), Groupe Renault (global vehicle design studio in Mumbai, jointly with

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Nissan India Renault KWID production facility in Chennai), Schneider Electric (28 factories, 48 sales offices and 53 distribution centres in India). Another European economy with a strong presence in India is Italy. According to Invest India, National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency Italian companies invested in automobiles sector (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, CNH Industrial plant in Pithampur), energy (three plants of Enel in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan), trading, industrial machinery and food processing (two manufacturing units of Ferrero in Maharashtra, three manufacturing plants of Perfetti in Rudrapur, Gurgaon and Chennai). Interestingly, one of the countries with the biggest increase in FDI to India has been the Netherlands. Currently, there are over 200 Dutch companies present in India, including major Dutch companies like Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips, Akzo Nobel, DSM, KLM and Rabobank (Embassy of India, 2021). Moreover, in recent years the Netherlands has started to serve as a gateway to India for other Western European investors (Jaiswal, 2018).

Indian Investment in West Europe West Europe as an Investment Destination for India Contemporary India belongs to major FDI exporters from the Global South. Indian companies are active both in developing and developed markets, with the values of outward investment increasing on the early basis. Yet, this development is a relatively new one, as Indian outward FDI became possible on the large scale only after the economic reforms in 1991, and it was not until 2001 that Indian outward investment flows have surged. Even though Indian companies invested outside India before independence, these investments were hardly noticeable in FDI statistics, and mostly directed towards other parts of the British empire, usually the British colonies in Africa. India’s early independence had not changed much in this regard with a limited number of Indian investments in developing regions (Joseph, 2019: 3). Examples of Indian investments between the 1950s and the 1970s include Birla’s activities in Africa and Southeast Asiaand the expansion of Tata and Kirloskar into Africa and Sri Lanka, or Ranbaxy setting up its first joint venture abroad in Nigeria. At the time, India’s restrictive inward-oriented economic policies prevented any

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large-scale investment outside the subcontinent (Athukorala, 2009: 9–10; Hansen, 2007: 9). The increase in India’s outward FDI flows started gradually in the late 1970s. Starting in mid-1970s limited liberalization of trade and investment policy regimes took place, including progressive loosening of import controls and increase in subsidies to exporters of manufactured goods (Athukorala, 2009: 11). Most investments at the time were made by manufacturing firms, and Indian companies were usually minority stakeholders in those enterprises. Almost 90% of investment went to other developing countries, the main destinations being Singapore, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. The only West European economy that recorded Indian investment at the time was the UK (Hansen, 2007: 9). Liberalization changed the milieu for both outward and inward FDI flows. With the growing competitiveness of Indian companiesled to growing engagements abroad. Indian companies initially primarily focused on developing countries. The share of FDI in high income developed economies was gradually growing, with Western Europe having a major share (Gudowski & Piasecki, 2020: 16–17). By the year 2000, investments in developed countries constituted over 60% of Indian outward FDI, with the UK being the major investment destination (followed shortly by the United States) (Hansen, 2007: 10–11). Indian outward FDI sharply increased since 2001, and—with a brief disruption caused by the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009— continues until today. Contrary to the earlier periods, the current phase in Indian outward FDI is driven mostly by mergers and acquisitions (M&A), whereas greenfield investments dominated earlier (Satyanand & Raghavendran, 2010: 2). This applies also to investment in West Europe, where M&A strategies have been popular with Indian pharmaceutical and software majors. These include the acquisition of RPG Aventis (France) by Ranbaxy Technologies, Tata Tea’s acquisition of Tetley Tea (UK) in 2000, or Tata Steels’ takeover of the Corus group in 2007, and Reliance Infocomm’s acquisition of Flag Telecom (UK). One of the most prominent cases of Indian M&As in Europe is that of Mittal’s acquisition of Arcelor in 2006 (Gröning, 2012: 170; Hansen, 2007: 12–14; Iqbal et al., 2018: 1–2). Singapore and Mauritius have become major destinations for Indian outward FDI. Nevertheless, most Indian investment is located in the developed world. Major West European destinations for Indian investment are the UK and the Netherlands (Rajan, 2009: 5; Pradhan &

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Sauvant, 2010: 6). India FDI in West Europe largely goes to the biggest economies. The five largest countries in terms of GDP (i.e. Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain) have accounted for around 60% of total FDI inflows into Europe in this century. This FDI concentration is also reflected in case of Indian investments (ESPON, 2020: viii). In the manufacturing sector, major Indian investments in West Europe is in pharmaceuticals and automobiles and automobile components industries, while services sectors FDI are dominated by telecommunication, financial, and software services (Joseph, 2019: 20). This is in conformity with the investment policies of most West European countries. Under the EU regulations, most West European countries are currently offering blended funding–a combination of tax benefits, cash grants, guarantees and loans–to provide capital to support investment and innovation, and facilitate growth. However, there are generally no policies that would be oriented directly towards India (Smith, 2021). It could possibly change when the conclusion of the India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) (Goswami et al., 2014: 16). The lack of a BTIA does not necessarily prevent Indian investors from receiving support for their Europe-based investments. For instance, the German government provides financing support for investment undertakings through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Bank). Indian investors can apply for these loans through their local banks in Germany, many of which are also active in India or have cooperative agreements with Indian banks active in Germany (e.g. ICICI Bank or State Bank of India) (Bertelsmann Stiftung et al., 2017: 48). As India’s investment relations in continental Western Europe are often driven by the investment incentives provided by the EU, but another story constitutes investment in the UK. Even after Brexit, the UK has the natural advantage of having a large domestic market, cultural diversity and historical ties to India. Moreover, the UK has also established an attractive investment climate. In particular, the British Government has pursued a strategy of building a strong knowledge and innovation capacity, which has been a driver for FDI into the food, pharmaceutical and ICT sectors which are important sectors for Indian investors (ESPON, 2020: 4). As a result, even without a bilateral investment treaty, the UK remains one of the biggest non-tax-haven investment destination for India (Poitiers et al., 2021: 19).

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Indian FDI Flows to Western Europe Tables 16.2 and 16.3 indicate that the value of Indian FDI in West European countries is many times lower than their investment in India (see Chart 1). In 2020, Indian investment in Western Europe was almost nine times less than West European investment in India. According to OECD data, Indian companies have invested US $13.1 billion in West Europe in 2020. West European companies, on the other hand, invested $115.6 billion in India during the same year. In 2019, inward investment was more than six times outward investment. In 2016, the difference was almost eleven times. Among West European countries, the most important destinations for Indian investors are the UK and Germany. This is followed by Italy, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. On the other hand, Denmark, Sweden, Greece, and Finland attract the least Indian investment (Table 16.3). Given the potential of Indian service companies, Indian FDI in Western Europe goes mostly to the services sector, followed by industry. Table 16.3 Indian FDI in Western Europe, 2010, 2015–2020 (position by country at year end) (in million US dollars) 2010 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Western Europe

2015

2016

252.5 140.3 75.7 −58.8 483.7

138.3 155.7 22.0

123.3 52.7 61.7

372.3

0.7 −276.6 161.4

0.8 −252.6 177.2 −1566.7 589.0 −21.8

527.0 2874.5 0.4 −470.1 364.4 −304.6 658.8 −20.0

187.1

−28.1 4353.5 5291.4

147.6 3916.7 3678.5

2017 328.6 178.7 5.3

2018 311.4 416.8 7.4

2019 403.3 325.8 5.5

2020 446.7 353.4 −5.9

492.9 411.0 330.4 494.5 3271.8 2632.2 2755.6 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.8 −796.4 −551.9 −399.9 −312.9 909.2 863.6 737.6 459.7 −419.8 −393.9 −346.0 −894.6 88.8 91.6 −712.2 409.9 22.8 35.5 56.2 72.4 296.2 371.0 424.6 102.3 104.7 −7.6 11.2 3.8 1830.5 10772.9 14359.9 11828.4 12133.9 6450.1 15256.5 18547.8 15422.0 13162.7

Source Authors’ own calculations based on OECD (2021)

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This reflects the general trend of Indian investment abroad. Between 1990 and 2009, outward Indian FDI mainly went to the industrial sector. In 2010, however, this trend has changed. The services sector remains the most important in the structure of India’s outward investment (Pradhan, 2017: 46–47). This is linked to the international competitiveness of India’s service sector. The structure of Indian investment in the services sector abroad has also changed. In the 1980s, Indian outward investment in the services sector consisted mainly of financial and insurance activities (68.5%), followed by accommodation and food service with 11.7% and IT and IT-enabled services (including software publishing), with 9%. Between 2010 and 2014, it was led by communication services (41.5%), followed by construction (11%), financial and insurance activities (7.7%), transportation and storage (7.5%), and IT and IT-enabled service with 7.3% share (Pradhan, 2017: 52). In the industrial sector, Indian companies invest abroad mainly in four sectors (basic metals and fabricated metal products; coke and refined petroleum products; pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical, and botanical products; and chemicals and chemical products (Pradhan, 2017: 49). Select Indian FDI in the Western Europe India is the second largest investor in the UK. According to Invest India, the National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency, there are 900 Indian-owned companies operating in the UK. Indian FDI is concentrated in hospitality, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, retail and wholesale, real estate and construction and food and beverage (Invest India, National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency, 2022a: 9). Among the leading Indian investors in the UK are the Hindujas (automotive, oil and specialty chemicals, IT and ITES, banking and finance, media, project development, trading, cyber security, power, real estate, and healthcare); HCL (IT services); Tata Consultancy Services (software and IT services); and Tata Steel (primary steelmaking). Moreover, Indian companies are steadily increasing their presence in the UK market. In fact, as of late 2022, further investments in the country were announced. Tata Steel, for example, has announced plans to invest £7 million in its Hartlepool tube works in north-east England. Ola Electric will invest US $100 million in the UK over the next five years in Ola Futurefoundry—a global centre for advanced electric vehicle engineering and design. The Essar Group has formed a joint venture with UK-based Progressive Energy, with which

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it will invest US $1.34 billion in a hydrogen production plant at its Essar Stanlow refinery complex (Indian Brand Equity Foundation, IBEF, 2022). In Germany, Indian corporations are increasingly looking for strategic investment targets in high-tech sectors. They have so far invested in four sectors which represent 97% of India-related revenues from the investments in the Federal Republic. These are: the metals and metal-processing industry (Hindalco Industries Ltd., Tata Steel Ltd., and Sona Autocomp Private Ltd.), the automotive industry (Motherson Sumi Systems Ltd., Amtek Auto Ltd. and Bharat Forge Ltd. and Tata Motors Ltd); the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, and the professional, scientific, and technical services sector (Tata Consultancy Service, Wipro Technologies, HCL Technologies, Infosys and Tech Mahindra). Indian companies are also present in the energy sector (Suzlon Energy, Kalyani Group), engineering services (KPIT Cummins, Rolta) as well as cement, calcined petroleum coke and power (Rain Commodities). Between 2010 and 2016, the highest concentration of Indian direct investment in Germany occurred in the three federal states of Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg which together attracted almost two-thirds of India’s FDI projects in Germany (Bertelsmann Stiftung et al., 2017: 28–30). Indian companies in France are present, among others, in the aerospace industry (development centre of Tech Mahindra in Toulouse), services (Tata Communications, Tata Consultancy Services, Tata Elxsi) steel industry (Tata Steel), plastics sector (Sintex Industries) and automotive sector (Motherson Sumi Systems). The Tata Group employs over 1,500 people in France (Invest India, the National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency, 2022b). In Italy, Indian corporations have invested in the automotive sector (Tata Motors,3 Mahindra Europe Srl), services (Tata Consultancy Services, Wipro), and textiles and apparels (Raymond). There is also a strong representation of Indian financial intermediaries in Italy, with the State Bank of India having its representative office in Italy (Ministry of External Affairs, 2014). In line with the growing investment ties between India and the Netherlands, Indian companies have made major acquisitions in the Netherlands. 3 Tata motors have acquired an 80% stake in Italian design and engineering company Trilix.

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There are over 200 Indian companies in the Dutch market today (Indian Embassy, 2021). Indian companies are present in the pharmaceutical sector (Dishman Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Sun Pharmaceuticals), software products and services (Nucleus Software), ICT and backoffice services (Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys Technologies, Tech Mahindra-Mahindra Satyam), chemicals (United Phosphorous), infrastructure financing (India Infrastructure Finance Company), steel (Tata Steel) and banks-public sector (State Bank of India). Major Indian companies in Belgium include Tata Consultancy Services, HCL, Wipro, Jindal Polymers, State Bank of India, ICICI, JBF Crompton Greaves DY Patil Group, JET Airways, Intergarden, Binani Group (Charlie, 2012: 36, 41). Further examples of Indian investors’ activity in the Netherlands include Hotel Company OYO Hotels and Homes acquiring Amsterdam-based vacation rental firm @Leisure Group, Tata Steel’s purchase of AngloDutch Corus, Apollo Tyres’ acquisition of Dutch tyre-maker Vredestein Banden or the purchase of the Dutch company Bilthoven Biologicals by the Serum Institute of India (Embassy of India, 2021).

Conclusions and Prospects A brief analysis of India-West European investment relations reveals that India remains a net FDI recipient from Western Europe, even though the gap between outflow and inflows has been gradually narrowing since the beginning of the century. Moreover, the trend in both inward and outward FDI is positive, with both West European engagement in India and Indian economic presence in Western Europe increasing almost every year. European Union and individual West European economies constitute an important location for Indian FDIs as well as a significant source of investment capital for India. It is worth noting that currently almost 50% of Indian investment is located in the developed world, with Western Europe accounting for a significant share of Indian companies’ outward investments. Given the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on global capital flows, Brexit, and the rising role of China in global trade and investment, it is not surprising that India and Western Europe are seeking to enhance mutual investment flows. The India-EU BTIA and the India-UK FTA, if and when they are concluded, should enhance improve prospects of further growth of mutual capital flows between India and West Europe.

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References Athukorala, P.-C. (2009). Outward direct investment from India. Working Papers in Trade and Development. The Australian National University, Working Paper No. 2009/14. Beena, P. L., Bhandari, L., Bhaumik, S., Gokarn, S., & Tandon, A. (2004). Foreign direct investment in India. In S. Estrin & K. E. Meyer (Eds.), Investment strategies in emerging markets (pp. 126–146). Edward Elgar. Bertelsmann Stiftung, E., & Young GmbH, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) (2017). Indian investments in Germany prospects for shared prosperity. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Retrieved October 20, 2022, https://www.bertel smann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/indian-investments-ingermany Bureau O. (2021). Bosch home appliances plans e100-m investment. Retrieved October 20, 2022, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/com panies/bosch-home-appliances-plans-100-m-investment/article33926114.ece Charlie, A. (2012). Overseas direct investment, Indian companies in the European Union. Reigniting economic growth. Europe India Chamber of Commerce. Charlie, A. (2014). European companies in India. Reigniting economic growth. Europe India Chamber of Commerce & European Business and Technology Center. Deloitte. (2021). India’s FDI opportunity through an investor’s lens—A survey report. Retrieved November 2, 2022, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/ dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/finance/in-fa-India’s-FDI-Opportunity-Del oitte-survey-report-noexp.pdf India, Embassy in Netherlands. (2021). Bilateral trade and investment. The Hague. Retrieved November 3, 2022, https://indianembassynetherlands.gov. in/page/overview-of-indian-economy/ ESPON. (2020). The world in Europe, global FDI flows towards Europe. Trends and patterns in extra-European FDI inflows towards Europe. Applied Research, Scientific Report. Luxembourg. Felbermayr, G., Mitra D., Aichele R., & Gröschl J. (2017). GED study. Europe and India relaunching a troubled trade relationship. Bertelsmann Stiftung. Goswami, R., Solomon, T. S., & Goyal, T. M. (2014). Enhancing investments between India and the European Union. The case of bilateral investments between India and Germany. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung & Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations. Gröning, P.-M. (2012). Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Indien. Strategische Partnerschaft oder freundliches Desinteresse? Münster, Haus Monsenstein und Vannerdat. Gudowski, J., & Piasecki, R. (2020). Foreign direct investment from emerging markets. Theory and practice. Comparative economic research. Central and Eastern Europe, 23(2), 7–19.

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Hansen, M. W. (2007). Outward foreign direct investment from India. Theory and Evidence. CBDS Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 8. India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department for Promotion of Industry, and International Trade. (2022). Quarterly Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflow from April 2000 June 2022. Retrieved October 20, 2022, http://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_Factsheet_June_2022. pdf India, Ministry of External Affairs. (2014). India-Italy relations. Retrieved November 2, 2022, http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Italy_ Dec-2014.pdf Indian Brand Equity Foundation, IBEF. (2022). Indian investment abroad Overseas direct investment by Indian companies. Retrieved October 20, 2022, https://www.ibef.org/economy/indian-investments-abroad Invest India, National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency. (2022a). Leveraging the India-UK opportunity towards a stronger legacy. Invest India, National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency. Retrieved October 20, 2022, https://static.investindia.gov.in/2022-07/INDIA-UK_REPORT_ 200622_1110%20V5.pdf Invest India, the National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency. (2022b). Retrieved October 20, 2022, https://www.investindia.gov.in/ Iqbal, B. A., Turay, A., Hasan, M., & Yusuf, N. (2018). India’s outward foreign direct investment: Emerging trends and issues. Transnational Corporations Review, 10(1), 1–10. Jaiswal, S. (2018, 20 April). Is Netherlands becoming the new ‘Mauritius Route’ for FDI flows into India? The Wire. Retrieved November 2, 2022, https://thewire.in/macro/is-netherlands-becoming-the-new-maurit ius-route-for-fdi-flows-into-india Joseph, R. K. (2019). Outward FDI from India: Review of policy and emerging trends. ISID Working Paper 214. Kearney. (2021). The 2021 Kearney Global Services Location Index. Retrieved November 2, 2022, https://www.kearney.com/digital/article/-/insights/ the-2021-kearney-global-services-location-index Kearney. (2022). The 2022 Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index. Retrieved November 2, 2022, https://www.kearney.com/foreign-direct-inv estment-confidence-index OECD. (2021). OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 2021. Retrieved October 20, 2022, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/ oecd-international-direct-investment-statistics_2307437x Poitiers, N., Bery, S., Chowdry, S.. & García-Herrero, A. (2021). EU-India trade relations: Assessment and perspectives. European Parliament: Directorate General for External Policies.

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Pradhan, J. P., & Sauvant, K. P. (2010). Introduction: The rise of Indian multinational enterprises: Revisiting key issues. In K. P. Sauvant & J. P. Pradhan et al. (Eds.), The rise of Indian multinationals (pp. 1–23). Palgrave Macmillan. Pradhan, J. P. (2017). Indian outward FDI: A review of recent developments. Transnational Corporation, 24(2), 43–70. Rajan, R. S. (2009). Outward foreign direct investment from India: Trends, determinants and implications. ISAS Working Paper No. 66. Saha, R., & Bhomwick, S. (2020). Foreign direct investments in Indian States. The SDGs Cornerstones. Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Sahoo, P. (2016). Opening of the Indian economy to foreign investors: Opportunities for Europe, Bruegel, Blog post. Retrieved November 2, 2022, https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/opening-indian-economy-for eign-investors-opportunities-europe Satyanand, P. N., & Raghavendran, P. (2010). Outward FDI from India and its policy context, Columbia FDI Profiles. Country profiles of inward and outward foreign direct investment issued by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment. Smith, B. (2021). How Europe, India and Africa are incentivizing foreign investment. Ernst & Young, 29 July. Retrieved November 2, 2022, https://www.ey.com/en_gl/tax/how-europe-india-and-africa-areincentivizing-foreign-investment Wagner, C. (2015). Western Europe. In D. M. Malone, C. Rajamohan, & S. Raghavan (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (pp. 607–622). Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 17

Migration and Indian Diaspora in Western Europe Sheetal Sharma

The Indian diaspora is one of the largest diaspora, spread over many continents. During the colonial era, Indians migrated to European colonies. In modern times, the nature of Indian migration has become more diverse, with the United States, Canada and the Gulf countries witnessing large scale migration. Indian migrants have historical connections with many European countries. The nature and composition of the Indian diaspora is quite diverse in Europe in terms of its number, history and contemporary dynamics. In a few aspects, there is a striking similarity. The Indian diaspora is the largest in the United Kingdom comprising about 2.5% of the total population. The size of the Indian diaspora reduces as we move eastwards towards the European continent. The present chapter focuses upon the Indian diaspora in the West European countries especially the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal,

S. Sharma (B) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1_17

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Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. It attempts to understand the genesis of the Indian diaspora in these countries. It raises a number of questions, including how it established itself in foreign land, the broad contours of their identity, and the degree of their integration in the host countries. The chapter seeks to identify the niche Indian diaspora has created for itself and how they are contributing both to the host and home country.

Introduction The growth of the Indian diaspora in West Europe can be categorised into several phases. Firstly, more than a century ago Indians went as plantation workers to European colonies spread all across the globe, including those in Africa, Caribbean islands, Fiji, and Mauritius. After India gained independence, a large number of Indians migrated to several European countries, especially to the UK.1 In recent years, the immigration of professionals and skilled workers is playing a key role in driving economic development in the long term and in addressing current and future demographic challenges in the EU (European Commission, n.d.). Secondly, from the beginning of the late 1970s the United States became one of the most attractive destinations for Indian migrants seeking better pastures abroad With Silicon Valley becoming one of the most sought after destinations for Indian professionals. The other sectors, such as medicine, research, management, businesses, hospitality, and manufacturing were equally attractive for those in search of better economic opportunities. With over three million at present, a lot of Indians have travelled to the US to fulfil their American dream in the last few decades (see Hanna & Batalova, 2020).

1 The presence of South Asians in the UK in general and Indians in particular can be traced back from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards. By the end of 1960, approximately 60,000 Indians and Pakistanis migrated to the UK to work. The majority of these migrants were from the Punjab and Gujarat, and a small number of these were Muslims and Parsis from India. An expanding population, and shrinking resources acted as push factors for people from the middle class, especially young professionals and semiskilled workers, who aspired to go abroad in search of better prospects. By 1971, in the UK, of a total population of 50.3 million, 700,000 were of South Asian origin mainly from India or Pakistan. Between 1991 and 2001, population of South Asians in the UK grew from a total of rather less than one and a half million to just over two million (Sharma 2015: 152–176).

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Thirdly, Indian migration to the Gulf includes migration of skilled and semi-skilled workers, labourers (working in the construction industry), nurses, hospitality staff, and a small percentage of professionals to the Gulf countries, mainly from south Indian states.2 Changing from the conditions of forceful migration of the previous century to voluntary migration of professionals in contemporary times, Indians constitute one of the most vibrant communities the world over. The Indian diaspora is contributing immensely to the development of the host country as well as their home country through trade, remittances3 and the promotion of foreign investment. From being perceived as ‘braindrain’ to recognition of contribution of diaspora, both to the home and host countries, there is ‘a change in the way diaspora is increasingly being acknowledged as a community playing significant role in socio, cultural, economic and political enrichment of countries of origin and destination’ (Singh, 2015: 52–83). With the largest number in the UK, followed by the Netherlands,4 to only a few thousand and hundreds in some and less than hundred in countries such as Macedonia, the Indian community is unevenly spread across the European continent. Table 17.1 presents the figures and percentage of the Indian population in West European countries. The image of the diaspora community in Europe is primarily associated with the Indian community present in the UK. Due to historical reasons and long colonial connections, this image has dominated the Indian mindscape. Indians are also present in other European and particularly West European countries. Beyond the UK, Indians are found in many European countries by the tens of thousands, notably in Germany (the high-tech sector) and

2 The India-Gulf region is the second-largest migration corridor in the world. Of the nearly 31 million non-resident Indians (NRIs), an estimated 8.5 million are working in the Gulf. Indians constitute over 30% of the expatriate workforce in the Gulf States, where the proportion of non-nationals in the employed population is among the highest in the world. (Calabrese 2020: It is a url webpage so no. 3 According to the World Bank, in 2020, India was first among the top five recipient countries for remittances inflows in current USD. India has been the largest recipient of remittances since 2008 India received remittances worth ($83 billion), China ($60 billion), Mexico ($43 billion), the Philippines ($35 billion) and Egypt ($30 billion) (World Bank, 2021). 4 The diaspora in the Netherlands consists of over 200,000 people of Indian origin, mostly migrants from Suriname who are descendants of those who migrated from India in the late nineteenth century on indenture contracts.

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Table 17.1 Population and percentage of Indian diaspora in West European countries

Country

Indian population

Total population

Percentage of total

United Kingdom France Germany Netherlands Belgium Italy Spain Portugal

1,764,000

67,530,172

2.61

109,000 185,085 240,000 20,636 203,052 69,988 81,393

65,419,732 83,517,045 1,709,713 11,539,328 60,550,075 46,736,776 10,347,892

0.16 0.22 14.03 0.17 0.33 0.14 0.08

Source Non-Resident Indians Online (2021a) and India, MEA (2021b)

Belgium (diamonds). The most fascinating developments of the Indian diaspora have however taken place in Spain and Italy over the past two decades (Tumbe, 2018). Notwithstanding the number or percentage of the total population, the socio-economic integration and interaction of the Indian diaspora exhibit interesting patterns.

The United Kingdom Indians constitute the largest ethnic minority in Britain.5 As per IndiaUK Bilateral Brief, 2021, the Indian Diaspora in UK is one of the largest ethnic minority communities in the country, including approximately 1.6 million British nationals of Indian origin and about 3,51,000 NRIs living in the UK equating to almost 2.5% of the UK population and contributing 6% of the country’s GDP (India MEA 2021a). The percentage of the Indian population has grown steadily and the population of people of Indian origin in Britain is projected to double by 2051 (UK, 2019). The Indian diaspora is a vibrant community replicating a miniature of diversity and heterogeneity of Indian society and culture. There is a wide degree of religious diversity among Indians in the UK, including Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. Punjabi is one of the

5 Asians make up just over 4.5% of the total UK population—about 3,078,374 out of nearly 67,806,970. Of these nearly 2.14% are Indians (Non Resident Indians Online, 2021b).

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most widely spoken languages in the UK. The second-largest Indian diasporic community is of Gujaratis, comprising mainly Hindus and Muslims, Ismailis, and Bohras. Other ethnic groups among the Indian diaspora in the UK include migrants from Kerala, Bengal, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh. Indians in the UK enjoy a dynamic socio-cultural life through associations and networks based on religious, regional, caste, and/or linguistic affiliation. Diaspora communities constantly engage in seeking ways to recreate and redefine their socio-cultural identities. A large number of temples, gurudwaras, and mosques have also been built in recent years. The religious places, cultural association, a celebration of festivities together have also become forums where ethno-cultural memories are retained through interaction and co-mingling with people from the same communities, regions or background.6 While adapting to modern life, Indians continue to follow and preserve their traditions, values, and identities. The Indian diaspora is essentially family-oriented. Family and kinship networks often operate on the basis of caste affiliations (Puri, 2007). A large number of marriages among the Indian diaspora are still arranged within the caste communities. At the same time, there are some associations7 that are engaged in eliminating elements of caste-based discrimination among the Indian diaspora in the UK. The modern-day means of communication such as social media, Facebook, and WhatsApp have revolutionised the way people bond with each other and with families back home in India. The first generation remains most nostalgic8 about their cultural and religious heritage. The second and third generations however represent cultural hybridisation. The younger generation is better integrated, speaks better English, and identifies more with the mainstream culture than the first generation. They are growing up and adapting to Western culture, while attempting to learn, at times reluctantly, about Indian values as well (Sharma, 2015).

6 For instance, South Hall is dominated by the Punjabi and Sikh communities, Tamils

are concentrated in North London, and Gujaratis live primarily in London and Leicester. 7 Such as ‘Voice of Dalit International’, ‘Dalit Solidarity Network UK’, and the ‘Federation of Ambedkarite and Buddhist Organisations (UK)’. 8 They watch Indian movies, listen to Hindi music and folk songs, and are keen to retain cultural and spiritual links with India. Many of them also believe in astrology, and also go for matching horoscopes for marriage purposes.

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France Indians in France include the migrants from India as well as people of Indian origin. At present approximately 109,000 Indians are living in mainland France largely originating from the French enclaves of Puducherry, Karaikal, Yanam, Mahe and Chandernagore. Moreover, there are also almost 350,000 people of Indian origin who live in the French Overseas Territories of the Reunion Island (280,000), Guadeloupe (60,000), Martinique (6,000) and Saint Martin (300) (India, MEA, 2020a: 4). The people of Indian origin living in French territories had migrated almost a century ago as plantation workers. There are more than 50 Indian community organisations active in France. Major communities constituting the Indian origin population originate from Puducherry and Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Punjab (India, MEA, 2020a: 4). The Indians in France are well settled and are mostly engaged in white-collar jobs working in the field of IT as skilled professionals contributing to the economy. The Indians are integrated into the French multicultural milieu and well assimilated into the French way of life. The Indian diaspora in the French Reunion Island has a distinct identity. The ancestors of the present generation of the Indian diaspora had come to the island as indentured labour after the abolition of slavery. The Indian diaspora has adapted to the French way of life, but they continue to uphold traditions, culture, language, value system, food habits, customs and religious practices over generations. Tamil is spoken and understood, there are many temples that dot the island, and many important festivals are celebrated. Bollywood songs and movies are popular among Indians and food still reflects Indian flavours. For them their nationality is French but their soul is Indian (Dutta, 2012). The Indian community in Reunion Island is well settled, educated and professionally very successful.

Spain The Indian community constitutes less than one per cent of the total population of Spain. According to the statistics released by the Ministry of External Affairs, the resident Indian population in Spain has gone up from a mere 9,000 in 2001 to 54,387 in 2020 (0.12% of the total population), and currently, there are approximately 70,000 Indians (India, Embassy in

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Spain, 2021). Among the Asian communities, the Indian diaspora is the third largest group, after the Chinese and the Pakistanis. The earliest Indian settlers in Spain were Sindhis. Originating from the western part of the Indian subcontinent, they started to settle in the Canary Islands around the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A substantial number of migrants of Indian origin9 from the Spanish colony in Africa settled in Spain during the 1950s and the 1960s. During the 1970s, traders from India started setting up their businesses, retail shops, trading houses catering to tourist populations (Singhvi, 2000). A number of businessmen from the Indian subcontinent got the opportunity to set up small businesses, kiosks, souvenir shops, restaurants during the Olympics in Barcelona in 1992. The main centres of the Indian diaspora are Barcelona, Canary Islands, Madrid, Valencia and Malaga (India, MEA, 2019: 3). The Indian community in Spain is peaceful, affluent and well respected. Indian migration to Spain has been quite distinct as compared to other countries, such as the United States. It is not just the upper caste, highly educated and qualified social groups that have travelled to Spain, but there are Indian workers across the levels of organisational hierarchy. For instance, from Punjab along with the Jat Sikhs, members of the Ravidassia community have also migrated, carving niches in the construction and catering sectors in the Catalonia region (Tumbe, 2018). Indian professionals are working in the IT, hospitality, services and banking sectors. Due to the presence of the Pakistani diaspora also in good numbers, the food from the Indian subcontinent is popular and easily available. There are shops selling Indian groceries and other products catering to the population from the subcontinent. Bollywood has also exploited the picturesque locations of Spain in the famous blockbuster movie released in 2011, ‘Zindagi Na Milegi Dobara’. Spain has also become a major tourist destination since then, attracting people to festivals such as La Tomatina and bull run (Spanish: encierro) organised during the festival of Sanfermines.

9 These migrants were descendants of Indian labourers from the former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea, also formally known as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, located on the west coast of Central Africa.

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Portugal In the population of more than 10 million in Portugal, Indians are less than one per cent, numbering approximately 81,000. Despite being small in number, the Indian community enjoys a special position in Portugal because of historical relations between the two countries. One can identify three streams of migration of the Indian community to Portugal. The first one is that of direct migration in smaller numbers from the Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman, Diu, before the liberation of Goa and after 1961 after its liberation. The second stream consists of the arrival of Indians in Portugal, mostly Gujaratis from Portuguese colonies in Africa, particularly Mozambique and Angola around 1975 during the period of decolonisation. More recently, some 20,000 migrants (mostly farm workers from Punjab and Haryana) have settled in Portugal (India, Embassy in Lisbon, 2019: 3). Despite the irritants of the past India and Portugal have had cordial relations since 1974. The Indian community is well established and includes the non-resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian origin (PIOs), who have primarily migrated for economic reasons and are doing brisk businesses. Their integration in the host country is smooth and are making a significant contribution to the economy. Indians have invested in the tourism and hospitality sector in Portugal. While adopting the Portuguese language and nationality, Indians have continued to maintain their distinct socio-cultural and religious identity. They are mainly living in the capital area of Lisbon and in Porto city in the north. The diaspora community is quite diverse including Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and even Sikhs in small numbers. While Gujaratis and migrants from Maharashtra are engaged in the trade, construction, tourism and the service sector, the migrants from Punjab have also recently entered the service sector. Indians are known as a peace-loving and humble community that has adapted itself to the Portuguese way of life. The cultural impact of the Indian diaspora in Portugal can be seen in the popularity of yoga, Indian spirituality, Ayurveda and the number of Portuguese tourists to India. There are over a dozen places of religious worship10 of various Indian religious communities (mosques, temples 10 Gujarati Hindus have built one of the largest temple cum community centre in Portugal. There are some gurudwaras and an ISKCON temple as well. The Ismaili

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and gurudwaras ), a vibrant annual cultural calendar of festivities and celebrations organised/sponsored by around fifteen diverse diaspora associations, several yoga studios, more than a hundred Indian restaurants, Indian dance and performing arts schools, museums and art galleries with sections on India, specifically Goa, streets named after and statues and busts of Mahatma Gandhi. These reflect ‘a vibrant India imprint’ in Portugal (India, Embassy in Lisbon, 2021).

Belgium Belgium was among the first European countries to establish diplomatic relations with India, within a month after India gained independence in August 1947. As compared to other European countries, Indians constitute a very small, yet significant, section of the Belgian population. There are around 23,000 Indians in Belgium (India, MEA, 2020c, February: 20). Belgium. They constitute a prosperous section of society and mainly engaged as professionals and software engineers in the IT sector. A significant number of Indians are engaged in the diamond business in the cities of Antwerp, Ghent, Liege and Brussels (Ray, 2019). The success story of Indians in the diamond business is remarkable. Initially, the traders from Gujarat started working with the Jewish community in the diamond business, and over a period of time, they started their own businesses. Gradually the Jews were pushed on the margins and Gujaratis began to dominate the diamond business. As Shantanu Guha Ray remarks: The growing Indian population has even turned the street’s celebrated kosher restaurants into numerous curry corners. There is also an iconic Jain temple, interestingly dedicated to the people of Belgium, and frequented by local Europeans and even Jews. …in Belgium, the Indians … blended well with the Jews, as both communities were religious and had qualities well suited to the diamond business, which required cross-border networking and plenty of wheeling and dealing. (Ray, 2020)

Indians in Belgium form a very closely-knit community and celebrate Indian festivals with fervour along with other members of the community.

community among the Muslims, is a closely knit community and have built Jamat Khana-cum- community centre.

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There are several Indian cultural associations in Belgium; the important ones are the Bhartiya Samaj, the Antwerp Indian Association and Shanti Darshan. There are a few temples and gurudwaras in Brussels, St. Truden and Antwerp. Due to their small number the Indians are not politically active, but have good relations with the local population, and are perceived as law abiding. Reflecting multicultural values, the Indian community in Belgium is very well-integrated, have good social standing, commendable economic and educational achievements. There are approximately 600 Indian students in various universities pursuing higher education (MEA, 2020c: 4).

Germany As many other continental European countries, the Indian community is also small in Germany. Comprising a little less than 200,000, they constitute 0.22% of the total population of Germany. This number includes both the NRIs and PIOs. Only about 10,000 people have acquired German citizenship due to restrictive laws during the 1960s and the 1970s. During this period, a substantial number of women from Kerala migrated to Germany to work as nurses in hospitals. In recent years, most Indian migrants are highly qualified working professionals in the fields of IT and banking. At present, there are also around 17,500 Indian students who are pursuing various courses in Germany (India, MEA, 2020b, January: 3–4).A large number of people from India have also applied for asylum in Germany. About 8,000 Indians have sought asylum in Germany because of its lenient refugee laws (Dey, 2018). Along with economic accolades, a few Indians have acquired political eminence as well. For instance, Dr. R. Gujjula was elected Mayor of Atlandsberg in 1993. Like other European countries, Indians in Germany have remained close to their socio-cultural and traditional roots. There are places of worship in all the major cities. The Indian Cultural Centre in Berlin is very active and organises many events regularly. Indians in Germany are a well-integrated community and have adapted to the western ways of life.

Italy Both India and Italy are ancient civilisations and have known, interacted and traded with each other for over 2000 years. There are more than

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200,000 Indians settled in Italy by the end of 2020 (Roy Chaudhury, 2020). Business opportunities, education, scope in small and medium scale enterprises and professional prospects attracted many migrants especially from Punjab. As first-generation migrants, the majority of them are engaged in agriculture, dairy farming, leather industry, construction and the service industry. A significant proportion of the Indian diaspora is concentrated in the regions in northern Italy like Lombardia, Piemonte, Veneto and Emilia Romagna regions, Central Italy like Florence, Rome and south Italy like Campania, Puglia and Calabria (India, MEA, 2014, July: 4). Since the early 1990s, Punjabis started finding opportunities in the cow milking sheds of small dairy farms spread across north Italy. The exodus of Italians from cow milking created the space and necessary background for Indians from Punjab to exploit and fill in an important gap in the market. By the early 2010s, this work has become something of ‘a Punjabi niche market’, with 90% of the workers in this sector estimated to be Indian. They are known as ‘cow-milkers’ or Bergamini. This quiet immigrant success story is an example of a ‘win–win’ employment situation for both the Italian economy and Indian migrants (Lum, 2012; Sahai and Lum, 2013). Indians have also set up fashion and apparel manufacturing businesses. Lately, the design and fashion industry has attracted a large number of students to super-specialised fashion and design-focused post-graduate courses and luxury brand management courses at the Domas Academy, the University of Florence and Politecnico Di Milano; these students also work as interns or take up summer jobs. Indians are economically successful, register high employment rates and educational achievements. Indians are well-integrated into the social fabric, and craft a fine balance between the ways of life of the host country and retaining their traditional practices.

The Netherlands The Netherlands hosts the second-largest Indian diaspora in Europe after the UK and the largest Indian diaspora community on mainland Europe, totalling around 235,000 comprising 35,000 Indians and a 200,000 Suriname-Hindustani community of Indian origin (India, MEA, 2018: 3– 4). The Suriname-Hindustanis (in Dutch: Hindoestanen or Hindostanen) are the descendants of the indentured labours who migrated from British

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India to the Dutch colony of Surinam from 1873 to 1916 and then from there subsequently moved on to the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s (Ellen Bal, 2012: 1). Popularly known as the Sarnami, the twice migrants speak a blend of Avadhi, Bhojpuri, and other Indian dialects, and it remains their main language. The Hindustanis identify themselves as Hindus and have faint memories of the stories narrated by their ancestors. The Hindustanis are an example of exceptional migration history, with unique socio, political and economic experiences (Bal, 2006). The first generation of Hindustanis, identified themselves as Surinamese to some extent but this association has faded with the second generation. Hindustanis identify with India on the basis of their historical links, and while they consider India as the source of their culture and religion, they also recognise their Surinamese and Dutch connections (Ellen Bal, 2012: 19). The community is economically successful, well-integrated with society and yet maintains its cultural distinctiveness. There are religious and cultural organisations and community leaders are keen to increase their strength. One can find interesting and intersecting patterns of Hindu identity and western culture among these Hindustanis. Most recent Indian immigrants include professionals and highly skilled workers in the field of information technology, engineering, management, medicine and pharma. With an attractive migrant policy, more than half of the immigrants have migrated during the 2010s for economic opportunities and job prospects as the number of Indian companies are growing in the region. Since 2005, Indians have topped the list of highly skilled migrants who were granted a first residence permit. Their number increased from 280 in 2005 to 855 in 2008, and the percentage of highly skilled migrants has increased to 29.5% in 2008 as compared to 17.4% in 2005 (Ellen Bal, 2012: 13). The Indian community is widely dispersed across the country. Having migrated from different parts of India, the category of new age migrants identifies itself as Indians but do not have a very strong cultural bonding. Only a few hundred, having similar regional, linguistic identity tend to organise themselves as a group. Although at a small scale yet, the Indians have their cultural centre, restaurants, a few shops selling Indian goods, and they also organise cricket competitions. The Indian Embassy has also played an important role in connecting with people of Indian origin and organising a number of joint activities. Indian Film Festivals, Food Festivals, Music and Dance Shows organised by local organisers

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are very popular and attended in large numbers by both the Indian and Suriname-Hindustani communities (India, MEA, 2018: 4). The socio-cultural interaction and exchanges have been very limited between two sets of Indians in the Netherlands. Thus, the Hindustanis, with their entirely distinct routes of migration, and cultural and identity formation, are also ‘strongly attached’ to the Netherlands. On the other hand, Indian immigrants who have settled are a highly diverse and dispersed group. The new group of Indian expats have no intention of staying in the Netherlands for more than a few years, or of becoming part of the Indo-Dutch community on ‘a more permanent basis’ (Ellen Bal, 2012: 105–119).

Conclusion In comparison to the other diaspora communities from developing countries present in Europe, Indian diaspora has certain distinctive characteristics. First, among the South Asians, the Indians have demonstrated excellence in almost every field and are economically, socially, politically very well established. Despite having differences and distinct linguistic, caste and community identities among themselves the Indian diaspora has a strong image when it comes to their achievements, contribution to the host society, their acceptance and integration with the new culture and many other parameters. As compared to other South Asian communities present in the UK, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, Indians in the western European countries, comparatively, have demonstrated excellence in the field of education and their achievements are better and of a higher quality than those of other South Asians. Indians have the highest employment rate among all social groups and diaspora communities. A number of Indians own big to medium-sized enterprises in these countries. Some industrial giants and hoteliers are listed as richest men in the world in the UK such as Lakshmi Mittal of ArcelorMittal. Notwithstanding the victim experiences that early Indian immigrants endured in foreign lands for many decades, they gradually developed ‘a new sense of identity that not only distanced them from their places of origin, but connected them closely to places where they had found a ‘home’ (Kumar, Pratap, 2015: 7). Indians have learned the language of host societies and have adopted well with the mainstream culture while

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internally retaining, reconstructing their identities, cultural practices, festivals and rituals. There is hardly any evidence of friction or uneasiness caused due to cultural practices of Indian diaspora in the host societies. Political participation: Indians in West European countries are quite successful politically as well. Being a decently established community, the Indians are playing a decisive role in the politics of some of the European countries, particularly the UK. The Indian community has made valuable contributions in politics and political participation, both in India and in Britain. In the present time the Indians display a high degree of political awareness, engagement and participation. Aligning with the major parties, for instance both conservatives and Labour ideologies in the UK, the political action groups are promoting voices of Asian communities, playing important role in strengthening bilateral relations between host and the home country, and mobilising ethnic communities for their rights and stance against marginalisation and discrimination. Unlike the other diaspora communities Indians are more focused upon policy advocacy, community interest, socio-political activism, foreign policy and informing national dialogue. Rishi Sunak who has served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the UK, is now the prime minister. Distinct diaspora regional communities in other West European countries too are active in uniting their people and representing their voices. During the time of COVID-19, the Indian diaspora played a crucial role in public healthcare delivery in the EU. The diaspora community is actively engaged in representing and addressing and the issues and concerns of people of their community. Through a number of organisations, they mobilise communities, though at times remain divided on caste, regional, or linguistic lines. But other than the UK where one can witness robust participation of Indian diaspora in the politics, the political participation of the Indians in other European countries has rather been limited and on the margins, with only few noticeable success stories. According to the World Migration Report 2022 with nearly 18 million people living abroad, India has the largest emigrant population in the world, making it the top origin country globally (International Organization for Migration, 2022: 25). In recent years, there has also been a rise in the number of applicants seeking asylum in the European Union. In 2019, the number of asylum seekers in the EU increased to 698,800, 11.7% more as compared with 2018. In 2020, 471,300 asylum applicants applied for international protection in the EU Member States (Eurostat, 2021). While most came from war-torn regions of Africa and parts of

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South America, India too saw a reasonable rise over 10 years: from 4,722 in 2008 to 51,769 in 2018 (Khandekar, 2019). In many West European countries, Indians have ventured into a number of mainstream domains. They have integrated well in the sociopolitical and economic establishments and have substantially engaged with the power bastions that are and were otherwise considered to be inaccessible for immigrants. However, social and cultural affiliations tend to determine contours of communities rather than nationality within the Indian community. Much of social life is still largely configured around regional, linguistic and cultural affiliations and then gets determined by professional association. India has historical links with West European countries. The European Union continues to be one of the largest trading partners of India and has opened up many opportunities for highly qualified and skilled professionals from India. With a strong skillset, professional qualifications, expertise and experience, Indians have been welcomed in most West European countries. Although there are country-specific factors determining migration, one can identify a general pattern across the countries in western Europe. The demographic deficit, ageing population, lack of workers and working population has made West European countries dependent upon professional workers from developing countries like India. Indians with their expertise in information technology, biotechnology, Artificial Intelligence, finance, hospitality, medical services, management and general skillsets are finding western European countries attractive destinations. The Indian diaspora frequently raises issues like equivalence and greater recognition of educational degrees obtained in India, direct air links from major cities, the opening up of branches of Indian banks; greater cultural engagement, simplification of visa rules, measures to reduce unnecessary harassment at customs and immigration in India, reduction of PIO card charges, improvement of consular services. Many of these demands are progressively being addressed with improvements in digital and physical connectivity. The diaspora is now perceived as a channel of cultural diplomacy and microcosm of the culture of home countries. The two-million plus Indian diaspora in Europe, with three fourths in the UK, represents a significant population in its size, spread and depth. (Singh, 2015).Indian immigration has considerably increased in recent decades. Equipped with a strong skillset and professional qualifications, Indians prefer to migrate to the West, including Europe. The contribution of the Indian diaspora

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in these countries is immense and its impact is quite visible upon the economic, social and cultural fabric of the host countries.

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Non Resident Indians Online. (2021a). Overseas Indian Population. Retrieved August 11, 2021, from https://www.nriol.com/indiandiaspora/statistics-ind ians-abroad.asp#neu Non Resident Indians Online. (2021b). Retrieved August 11, 2021, from https://nriol.com/indiandiaspora/uk-indians.asp Puri, N. (2007). British Hindus divided by caste. BBC News. Available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7156139.stm (accessed on September 11, 2021). Ray, S. G. (2019). The Diamond Trail: How India rose to global domination. Harper Collins. Cited in Ray 2020. Ray, S. G. (2020). In Belgium: Antwerp’s Indian heart glitters like a diamond. The Sunday Guardian. Retrieved August 14, 2021, from https://www.sunday guardianlive.com/news/belgium-antwerps-indian-heart-glitters-like-diamond Roy Chaudhury, D. (2020, March 23). Economic Times. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nat ion/after-uk-italy-hosts-biggest-indian-diaspora-in-europe/articleshow/747 64808.cms Sahai, P., & Lum, K. D. (2013). Migration from Punjab to Italy in the Dairy Sector: The Quiet Indian Revolution, CARIM-India RR 2013/10, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Retrieved August 12, 2021, from https://mea.gov. in/images/pdf/PatternsofMigrationfromPunjabtoItaly.pdf Sharma, S. (2015). South Asian Diaspora in the UK. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), The European Union and South Asia (pp. 152–176). KW Publishers. Singh, A. (2015). Indian Diaspora in the EU. In R. Chanda & P. Gupta (Eds.), India–EU people mobility: Historical, economic and regulatory dimensions (pp. 52–83). Cambridge University Press. Singhvi, L. M. (2000). Other Countries of Europe. Report of the High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (PDF). Ministry of External Affairs, pp. 133–156. The World Bank. (2021, May 12). Press Release. Defying predictions, remittance flows remain strong during COVID-19 crisis. Retrieved July 9, 2021, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/r2021/05/12/ defying-predictions-remittance-flows-remain-strong-during-covid-19-crisis Tumbe, C. (2018, July 29). How the recent Punjabi migration to Spain & Italy is a departure for the diaspora. Economic Times. Retrieved July 2, 2021, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/magazines/panache/how-therecent-punjabi-migration-to-spain-and-italy-is-a-departure-for-the-diaspora/ articleshow/65180012.cms?from=mdr UK. (2019, October 28). Indian ethnic group: Facts and figures. Retrieved August 11, 2021, from https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/ summaries/indian-ethnic-group

Index

A Aaviksoo, Jaak, 451 ABG Shipyard, 199 Abu Salem, 234, 235 Act East policy, 122 Adamkus, Valdas, 457, 461 Adenauer, Konrad, 19–21, 54 Advani, L.K., 235 AECI (the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation), 208 AEG-T, 45 Afghanistan, 37, 73, 100, 154, 353, 401, 454, 496, 499 Africa, 33, 41, 72, 93, 152, 229, 239, 251, 396, 397, 497, 536, 548, 553, 554, 560 Agence Française de Développement , 104 Agence France Presse (AFP), 127 Agenda for the Indo-German Partnership for the 21st Century, 31 AgustaWestland helicopter deal, 159

AICEP (Portugal Global Business Development Agency), 233 Aid India Consortium, 43, 103, 278 Airbus Spain, 184 Akbar, M.J., 8, 402, 452, 453, 459 Alba, Jaime, 186 Albares, Jose Manuel, 184 Alcalá de Henares University, 204 Alexander, Crown Prince Willem, 266 Algeria, 94 Allied Control Council, 330 Alonso, Fernando, 201 Álvaro de Bazán, 200 Amnesty International, 270 Anand, Mulk Raj, 169 Anglosphere, 68 Angola, 228, 229, 239, 251, 554 Ansari, Hamid, 455, 459 Anschluss , 330 Ansip, Andrus, 451 apartheid, 294, 314 ArcelorMittal, 559 Areva, 97 Argentina, 295

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Europe in a Changing World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1114-1

565

566

INDEX

Armaris, 105 Article 370, 313, 351 Artificial intelligence, 8, 37, 38, 561 Arunachalam, V.S., 192 ASEAN, 29, 39, 135 ASEM, 453, 455, 459 Asia, 11, 15, 22, 28–30, 67, 73, 77, 93, 101, 127, 152, 162, 238, 239, 253, 267, 292, 305, 316, 343, 362, 370, 373, 393, 396–399, 402, 404, 464 Asian Relations Conference (1947), 93 Asquith, Sir Dominic, 74, 77 Assam, 29, 339, 342 Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), 231, 456 Associated Press (AP), 128, 159 Astileroes Espanoles, 189 Astra Zeneca, 82, 308 Atomic Energy Commission, 330 Auschwitz, 392 Australia, 69, 73, 80, 81, 124, 268, 296, 298, 343 Australia Group (AG), 97, 182, 186, 253, 298 Austria, 4, 13, 14, 269, 298, 327–366, 369–373, 389, 430, 510, 515, 517, 518, 520–522, 528, 532–534, 539 peace treaty, 13, 331, 333, 372 Austrian Cultural Forum, 344, 371 Austrian Economic Chamber, 344, 350 Austrian Peace Treaty, 13, 331, 333, 372 Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ), 335, 339, 342 Austrian Treaty Commission, 369 Awami League, 24 Axis Powers, 153, 169

Ayurveda, 40, 251, 252, 473, 554 Azad Gomantak Dal , 226 Azana, Manuel, 168 Aznar, José Maria, 178

B Babi, Andrej, 403 Babu, B. Ramesh, 206 Bahl, Sanjay, 452 Bahr, Egon, 25 Balkenende, Jan Peter, 268 Baltics, 7, 8, 13, 402, 403, 445, 446, 449 Baltic Sea, 316, 446, 476 Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU), 230 Bandung Conference, 153 Bangladesh, 24, 135, 265, 335, 391, 392, 394 Bangladesh crisis, 1971, 23, 96, 265, 335, 394 Bank for International Settlements, 75 Bank of England, 356 Barcelona, 553 Barroso, José Manuel, 233 Bartenstein, Martin, 346 Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) process, 362 Basque, 174, 186 Bekešius, Mantvydas, 459 Belgium, 4, 14, 129, 265, 276, 305, 492, 493, 498, 510, 511, 513, 514, 518–520, 528, 530–532, 539, 542, 548, 550, 555, 556, 559 Bengaluru Metro Rail Project-II, 104 Berlin agreement (3 September 1971), 23 Berlin crisis, 1961, 21, 22 Berlin Wall, 21 Bernier, François, 91

INDEX

Bhabha, Homi J., 330 Bhagat, Bali Ram, 26 Bharat Electronics Ltd., 198 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 35, 117, 122, 342, 489 Bhatia, R.L., 401 Biden, Joe, 238 Bihar, 278, 307, 551 Blix, Hans, 296 blue economy, 100, 301 Bofors scandal, 312 Bollywood, 40, 250, 372, 430, 552, 553 Bolt, William, 328 Bombay Chambers of Commerce, 240 Borrell, Josep, 14 Bose, Subhash Chandra, 328 Brandt, Willy, 23, 336, 337, 372 Brandt Report, 338 Brazil, 32, 98, 234, 271, 305, 344, 396, 397, 488 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), 344, 485, 488, 495 Brexit, 6, 10, 13, 65, 66, 68–71, 73–77, 81, 159, 161, 238, 272, 282, 309, 459, 489, 501, 510, 528, 538, 542 British Council, 179 British Raj, 2, 262 Browne, N.A.K., 193 Bucha, 9 Buddhism, 152, 371 Bühler, Georg, 371 Bulgaria, 394, 402, 428 Bundeswehr, 44 Business Climate Survey 2021-22, 315 Butkevicius, Algirdas, 459

C Cairn Energy, 281

567

Calicut, 223, 224 Cameron, David, 67, 139 Canada, 69, 73, 80, 265, 268, 296, 298, 337, 338, 547 Canary Islands, 553 Cantero, Marcos Rodriguez, 185 Caribbean islands, 548 Carinthia, 331 Carlos I, King Juan, 173, 175, 180 Carlos, Prince Juan, 173, 174 Carnegie India, 499 Casa Asia, 204, 208, 209 Casa de la India, 208, 209 Catalonia, 553 Caucasus, 446 Central and East European Countries (CEECs), 389, 391, 394, 407, 431, 432 Central Asia, 446 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 417 Central Europe-India, FDI in India, 415 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 295 Central Vigilance Commission, 365 Centre for Armed Forces Intelligence, 196 Centre for Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI), 180, 188 Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), 115 Cervantes Institute, 174, 179, 204, 207 Chamberlain, Neville, 330 Chandernagore, 552 Chatham House, 489, 497 Chatterjee, Somnath, 448, 497 Chaudhary, Rajinder, 299, 457 China, 2, 10, 13–15, 19, 29, 39, 54, 65, 68, 70, 71, 76, 78, 95, 96, 122, 124, 135, 153, 154, 162,

568

INDEX

175, 178, 179, 202–204, 238, 263, 264, 272, 304, 305, 309, 343, 361, 397, 398, 405, 449, 464, 485, 487, 512–514, 530 China-Russia ties, 9 Chirac, Jacques, 98 Chorherr, Thomas, 365 Choudhury, Saifuddin, 448 Chowdhury, Renuka, 179 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 22 Christian Social Union (CSU), 22 Cironka, Saulius, 459 Clean Ganga Mission, 272 Clean India, 36, 302 Clinton, Bill, 30 Coalition for Disaster Resilience Infrastructure, 162 Coast Guard, 200 Coffee Club, 413 Cold War, 4, 10–13, 20, 22, 23, 54, 69, 73, 77, 94, 123, 153, 224, 240, 253, 292, 293, 295, 342, 373, 387, 392, 394, 406, 407, 418, 431, 510, 511 Commonwealth of Nations, 67, 81, 141 Communism, 169, 175, 203, 389 Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), 239 Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism, 191 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 30, 268, 296, 395 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN), 452 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), 8, 231, 306, 453 Conference of the Parties, 131 Congo, Democratic Republic of, 135 Congress Party, 122 Foreign Department, 168

COP26, 79, 352 Cosmos Malabaricus Project, 273 Costa, Antonio, 235–237, 251 Costa, Orlando, 235 Covid-19, 38, 47, 78, 79, 81, 100, 237, 238, 241, 249, 251, 252, 292, 315, 316, 351, 353, 399, 405, 454, 460, 510, 512, 513, 528, 532, 542 Covishield Covid vaccine, 81 CPI-M, 170 Cravinho, João Gomes, 136, 237 Craxi, Bettino, 154 Croatia, 455, 485 cross-border terrorism, 30 cyber security, 8, 13, 272, 280, 317, 452–454, 489, 540 Cyprus, 402, 485 Cyrankiewicz, Józef, 392, 393 Czaputowicz, Jacek, 405 Czechoslovakia, 8, 329, 388, 389, 391, 393, 407, 417, 428 Czech Republic, 6, 13, 354, 387, 396, 398, 403, 405, 407, 411–413, 415–418, 430, 492, 495, 502 FDI in India, 415, 416 outreach to Asia, 397 D Dadra and Nagar Haveli, 226 Dagens Nyheter, 312 Dainik Jagran, 10, 125, 127, 129, 132, 134, 139 Daman, 224, 225, 228, 229, 251, 554 da Mata, José Caeiro, 224 Dambrauskas, Algirdas Albertas, 458 Dassault Aviation SA, 105 Davy, Kim, 7 DCNS (France), 105 de Almeida, Francisco, 223

INDEX

decolonization, 228, 554 Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), 192 de Gaulle, Charles, 94, 95 Delattre, François, 98 Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, 35 del Vayo, Julio Alvares, 168 Demes, Pavol, 400 Denmark, 7, 8, 14, 261, 300, 301, 311, 476, 492, 493, 510, 514, 518–520, 528, 532 Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), 115 Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), 37, 42, 104 Desai, Dhirajlal, 330 Desai, Morarji, 24, 25 de Sousa, Marcelo Rebelo, 237 détente, 5, 23, 339, 345, 391 Deutsche Telekom, 281 Deve Gowda, H.D., 29 Dezcallar, Rafael, 177 Dhotre, S.S., 453 Dias, Eurico Brilhante, 238 diaspora, 11, 14, 68, 138, 140, 145, 159, 160, 243, 250–252, 280, 547–554, 557, 559–561 Diego Garcia, 10 Diehl, Günter, 24 Die Presse, 341, 355, 365 Digital India, 36 Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN), 105 disarmament, 30, 31, 123, 265, 266, 269, 293–296, 298, 316, 334, 347, 350, 389, 392, 393 Di Stefano, Manlio, 161 Diu, 224, 225, 228, 229, 251, 554 Doddamani, Jagannath, 457 Draghi, Mario, 162 dual-use goods, 33, 304

569

E EADS, 199 Ease of Doing Business Index, 513 East Asia, 124 Eastern Europe, 4, 7, 26, 373, 388, 394, 395, 402, 403, 406, 432, 448 East Germany, 389, 394 East Pakistan, 23, 96, 265, 394 e-Governance, 8, 13, 451–453 Egypt, 271 Ekeus, Rolf, 296 Elcano Barometer, 202 Elcano Royal Institute, 503 Electronic Support Measures (ESM), 198 El Pais , 176 Emergency (1975), 25, 266, 294, 306, 336 Ender, Kurt H., 330, 332 ENI, 11, 155 Equatorial Africa, 553 Equatorial Rocket Launching Station, Thumba, 114 Erlander, Tage, 293 Ernst & Young, 528 Estaleiros Navais De Peniche (ENP), 248 Estonia, 8, 13, 402, 403, 445–454, 463–465, 471, 472, 476 Estonian e-Governance Academy, 452 EU-India summit, first, 12 EU-India Think Tank Twinning Initiative, 495 EUPOL Afghanistan, 178 Europe, 1–9, 13–15, 20, 23, 27, 28, 36, 66, 67, 69, 77, 81, 82, 99, 100, 123, 124, 129, 130, 133, 135, 138, 139, 141–143, 145, 153, 158, 159, 162, 224, 230, 235, 238, 239, 251, 264, 272, 274, 276, 280, 291, 292, 294,

570

INDEX

297, 299, 300, 304, 306, 311, 316, 328, 331–334, 336, 338, 339, 351, 352, 362, 368–370, 387, 391, 394, 402, 405, 412, 414, 428, 430, 432, 446, 459, 468, 473, 474, 484, 486, 489, 490, 493, 495, 499–501, 509, 510, 512, 518, 520, 524, 528, 529, 537, 539, 542, 547, 549, 557, 559, 561 European Commission, 15, 68, 123, 135, 136, 305, 360, 364 European Council, 68, 237, 488 European Court of Justice, 130 European Economic Community (EEC), 4, 5, 10, 24, 123, 230, 231, 266, 511 European Parliament, 134, 137, 158, 489, 498 European think tanks geographical differences in thinking about India, 486, 492, 500 India’s growing weight in, 486 European Union (EU), 3, 5–7, 10–12, 14, 15, 31, 32, 35, 37, 46, 65–77, 79–81, 83, 96, 97, 117, 121–138, 140–145, 151, 156, 158, 160–162, 232–234, 236, 238, 239, 244, 245, 253, 267, 268, 270, 272, 295–297, 304, 305, 307, 309, 313, 315, 340–343, 345, 348, 352, 364, 369, 373, 388, 394–398, 402, 404, 414, 421–423, 427, 430, 432, 454, 457, 460, 464, 468, 471, 483–486, 488–490, 492, 496, 498–501, 510, 512, 513, 524, 525, 528, 530, 538, 542, 548, 560, 561 European Union Institute for Security Studies, 489, 499 Eurozone, 7, 234, 276, 414

extradition treaty, 233, 235, 265, 399, 459 F F-86K Sabre, 44 Faleiro, Eduardo, 227, 448 Farage, Nigel, 81, 140 Farinacci, R., 152 Fast Track System, 37 Faymann, Werner, 349 Federal Intelligence Service, 44 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 74, 231, 233, 240, 243, 248, 451, 455 Fedor, Martin, 401 Felipe VI, King, 173 Ferdinand, Crown Prince Franz, 328 Fernandes, George, 336, 423 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 342, 343, 363 Fiat, 11, 155–157, 536 Figl, Leopold, 330, 334 Fiji, 548 Finland, 7, 8, 14, 300, 311, 348, 370, 388, 449, 476, 492, 493, 510, 514, 515, 518–520, 528, 532, 539 Finmeccanica, 159 Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 496 Fischer, Heinz, 347 Fischer, Joschka, 30 Five Eyes, 78 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 530 Foucher, Christian, 92 Foundation for National Security Research, 99 Founders Alliance, 310 France, 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 11, 14, 68, 73, 78, 92–101, 103, 105, 114–116,

INDEX

127, 138, 139, 141, 143, 153, 154, 161, 261, 265, 272, 274, 298, 299, 301, 303, 305, 348, 373, 448, 492, 493, 499, 500, 510, 511, 514, 518–520, 528, 530–532, 535, 537–539, 541, 547, 552, 559 Franco, Francisco, 168–172, 174, 175, 201 Frederica, Queen Mother of Greece, 173 free trade agreement (FTA), 65, 71, 75, 162, 498, 512 French National Assembly, 92 French Overseas Territories of the Reunion Island, 552 French Polynesia, 100 FRG-Poland Treaty (7 December 1970), 23 FRG-USSR Treaty (12 August 1970), 23 Fundação Oriente, 231 G 5G, 76 G7, 99 G8, 34 G-20, 159 Gago, Jose Mariano, 249 Gama, Jaime, 229, 231 Gandhi, Indira, 2, 3, 5, 12, 23–25, 95, 154 Gandhi, Mahatma, 92, 152, 236, 239, 474, 555 Gandhi, Rajiv, 12, 25, 27, 54, 266, 295, 300, 339, 340, 392 Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, 46 Garibaldi, Guiseppe, 152 Garica-Margallo, Jose Manuel, 180 Gasol, Pau, 201 Gasparovic, Ivan, 401

571

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 511 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 26 Gentiloni, Paolo, 160 George, K.J., 452 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 21, 24, 394 German Foreign Office, 25 German Global Public Policy Institute, 499 German problem, 20, 333 Germany, 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 11, 14, 19–26, 28–34, 36, 37, 39–43, 45–47, 54, 55, 66, 73, 98, 99, 103, 138, 139, 141, 143, 161, 234, 265, 271, 272, 276, 296, 298, 299, 301, 305, 329–332, 337, 360, 372, 373, 392, 393, 396, 448, 492, 493, 498–500, 510, 513, 514, 518–520, 528, 530–533, 535, 538, 539, 541, 547, 549, 556, 559 Indo-Pacific Guidelines, 38 unification, 26, 28 Gestaltungsm¨achten, 32 Ghadar Party, 152 Giora, Giovanni, 157 Gleissner, H., 346 Global Attitudes Survey, 141, 142 Global Britain, 77 Global Europe Strategy, 512 Global Innovation and Technology Alliance (GITA), 301 GLOBSEC Security Forum, 402 Goa, 203, 223–226, 228–231, 235–237, 252, 262, 392, 554, 555 Goa Shipyard Ltd. (GSL), 199, 248 Goethe Institute, 179 Gonsalves, Eric, 3 Gonsalves, Vasco Dos Santos, 229 Gonzalez, Felipe, 175, 177

572

INDEX

Google, 130 Goulandris, Alex, 173 Greece, 14, 295, 492, 510, 514, 518–520, 528, 539 Green Card, 30, 40 Green Energy Corridor, 35, 161 Grexit, 124, 141 Group of Four (G4), 32 Group of friends for the reform of the UN, 271 Group of Seven, 79, 157 Groza, Aivars, 454 Gruber, Karl, 332, 333, 356 Guadeloupe, 552 Guha, Abhijit, 246 Guinea-Bissau, 228 Gujarat, 7, 35, 145, 155, 224, 226, 236, 245, 279, 311, 535, 536, 552, 555 Gujral, I.K., 29, 394 Gustaf, King Carl XVI, 296, 297, 313 Guterres, Antonio, 232–234

H Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), 298 Haider, Jörg, 342 Hammond, Philip, 72 Hannover Messe, 36, 139 HCQ tablets, 105, 237 Heiligendamm, 34 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 39 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 135 High Technology Partnership Group, 35 Hinduism, 203 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, 46 Hindustan Shipyard Ltd.(HSL), 199

Hindustan Times , 10, 28, 74, 125, 127, 298, 313, 341, 359, 365 Hirohito, Emperor, 230 Hitler, Adolf, 446 HMS Queen Elizabeth, 78 Hollande, François, 139 Holland, Martin, 123, 124, 127, 130, 135, 264 Hong Kong, 75, 124 Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, 45 Huddar, Gopal Mukund, 169 human rights, 26, 29, 40, 73, 123, 126, 130, 143, 265, 270, 280, 299, 306, 307, 313, 314, 345, 395, 404, 432, 501 Hungary FDI in India, 416 outreach to Asia, 397 uprising (1956), 389

I Iberian Peninsula, 170 ICCR, 129, 428, 473–475 Iceland, 7, 8, 300, 311, 476 India and Brexit, 6, 10, 13, 73, 161 nuclear tests (1998), 12, 29, 43, 96, 267, 297, 340, 395 India-Austria and Bangladesh crisis, 335 and Indo-US nuclear deal, 347, 348 and UN reform, 353 arms transfers, 364 collaborations, 362 cultural ties, 371 development assistance, 364 Draft Asia Strategy (1997), 343 economic relations, 355, 356 establishment of diplomatic relations, 330, 341, 351, 373 export credits, 359, 361

INDEX

FDI, 350, 363 Foreign Office consultations, 346, 352 in Indian scholarly literature, 369 joint ventures, 356, 362 perceptions, 365, 368 relations in the 2000s, 343 trade, 357 India-Baltics and Nehru, 445, 446 political relations, 445, 449 recognition, 448 turmoil in, 13, 445, 446 India-Central Europe and 1990 changes, 394 cultural ties, 428 diaspora, 431 economic and trade relations, 406 FDI, 411, 412 trade in services, 411 India-Central European Society, 328, 371 India-China war, 1962, 21, 264, 390 India-Czech Republic defence cooperation, 417, 418 economic relations, 387 FDI, 416 skilled migrants, 431 India-Estonia arms exports, 469, 470 cooperation in IT, 451 cultural relations, 469, 472 detention of Estonian ship guards, 452 diaspora, 472 diplomatic relations, 449 E-residency programme, 464 FDI, 464 focus on Asia, 464 trade and economic relations, 462 India-EU

573

Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), 7, 123, 145, 498, 512 Commercial Cooperation Agreement (CCA), 511 India-EU Leaders’ Summit (May 2021), 352 India-France arms transfers, 105, 106 cultural relations, 115 defence exercises, 114 development assistance, 103, 104 economic and trade relations, 100 FDI, 101, 103 space research, 99, 114, 115 strategic partnership, 98–100, 116 students, 116 India-Germany Agreement on Enhanced Defence Industrial Cooperation, 2019, 47 arms transfers, 46 defence cooperation, 46, 47 Defence Cooperation Agreement, 2006, 45, 47 development assistance, 43, 44, 54 economic and trade relations, 41 foreign direct investment, 42 High Defence Committee (HDC), 45 Mutual Protection of Classified Information, 46 India-Hungary arms exports, 421, 422 economic relations, 407 FDI, 412, 413 Jaishankar visit (2019), 403, 405 India-Italy Cold War era, 153 economic relations, 154 Indian diaspora, 159 Leonardo blacklist, 159

574

INDEX

marines case, 160 students, 160 India-Latvia agreements, 457 cultural relations, 455, 457 diaspora, 473 FDI, 466, 467 trade and economic relations, 465 India-Lithuania agreements, 458 arms exports, 471 cultural exchange, 475 diaspora, 475 early contacts, 474 FDI, 469 Foreign Office consultations, 458, 460 ITEC, 475 multilateral cooperation, 461 Naidu visit, 459 recognition, 460 trade and economic relations, 462 visits, 462 Indialogs: Spanish Journal of India Studies, 204 India-Netherlands and Dutch colonialism, 262 and human rights, 270 and Indo-Pacific, 280 and UNSC membership, 271 cultural relations, 279 development assistance, 278 diaspora, 280 economic and trade relations, 274 establishment of diplomatic relations, 263 FDI, 277 investment disputes, 281 Nehru visit (1957), 263 India-Nordic-Baltic Conclave (5 November 2020), 8, 316 India-Nordic summit (2018), 300

India-Nordic summit (2022), 301 India-Poland and NSG, 398 and UN reform, 396 arms exports, 424 Bangladesh crisis, 394 economic relations, 387 FDI, 412, 415 Jaishankar visit (2019), 404 recognition of frontiers, 393 India-Portugal and Goa, 227, 228 and India-EU summit, 232, 233, 238 and Modi, 235, 236, 243, 249, 253 and Portuguese colonies, 224, 225 and the ICJ and the right of passage, 226 and UNSC membership, 253 arms exports, 246 cultural relations, 250 defence collaboration, 245 diaspora, 251 economic and trade relations, 240 establishment of diplomatic relations, 228 foreign direct investment, 244 mobility agreement, 244, 251 normalization of relations, 228 post-Cold War era, 230 return of gold ornaments, 230 scientific cooperation, 249, 253 tourism, 252 India Portugal International Startup Hub (IPISH), 243 India-Slovakia arms exports, 429 economic relations, 401 FDI, 400 India-Spain Agreement on Mutual Protection of Classified Information, 193

INDEX

and Gandhi, Rajiv, 176, 177, 182, 192 and Modi, 181–184 and NSG membership, 185 and Royal family, 173 and terrorism, 177, 191, 198 and UNSC reform, 184 arms exports, 193, 194 cultural ties, 172, 208 defence cooperation, 180, 182, 192, 193 diaspora, 210 differences over colonial territories, 171 economic and trade relations, 186 establishment of diplomatic relations, 182 external assistance, 189 extradition treaty, 191 FDI, 189 Foreign Office consultations, 177 Indian perceptions of Spain, 201 Indian studies in Spain, 204 in Indian scholarly literature, 205 Innovation Programme, 187 intelligence cooperation, 193 JWG on defence cooperation, 197 Modi visit (2017), 181 security policy dialogue, 197 Spanish perceptions of India, 202 teaching of Spanish, 206, 207 tourism, 210 training and port calls, 200 visit of King Carlos I, Juan, 175 India-Spain CEOs Forum, 188 India-Sweden and human rights, 306, 314 and Kashmir, 313 and non-proliferation, 296, 298 arms transfers, 303 Cold War relations, 293 cultural relations, 309

575

development assistance, 306, 307 economic and trade relations, 304 FDI, 308 Indian diaspora, 312 Joint Action Plan (2018), 292 prospects, 314 scientific and technical cooperation, 301 India-Sweden Healthcare Innovation Centre (HIC), 302 India-UK FDI, 66 FTA, 71, 75, 524, 525, 542 immigration, 10, 67, 561 technology, 81 trade, 67, 74 India-West Europe composition of trade, 518 diaspora, 547, 548, 550 FDI flows to India, 532 Indian FDI flows to West Europe, 539 Indian investment in, 536, 539 migration, 561 perceptions, 2 trade and economic cooperation, 510 trade dynamics, 512, 515 trade in goods, 514, 524 trade in services, 519 Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), 34, 303 Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), 369, 370 Indian Cultural Centre at the Hague, 279 Indian diaspora in Belgium, 14, 555 in France, 14, 548 in Germany, 548, 556 in Italy, 548 in Netherlands, 548, 558, 559

576

INDEX

in Portugal, 251, 252, 547, 554 in Spain, 547, 553 in United Kingdom, 138, 140, 547, 550, 551 Indian Foreign Service Institute, 237 Indian High Commission, 80 Indian Navy, 78, 157, 159 Indian Ocean, 73, 77, 100, 510 Indian Parliament attack on (2001), 345 Indian Red Cross Society, 345 Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), 115, 301 Indian Workers’ Association, 70 Indira Sistemas, 198 Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), 127 Indo-China, 93, 263 Indo-French Treaty of Cession (May 1956), 94 Indo-German Chamber of Commerce, 28 Indo-German Consultative Group (IGCG), 27 Indo-German Strategic Partnerships in Higher Education (IGSP), 35 Indonesia, 25, 93, 124, 175, 262–264, 402 Indo-Netherlands Committee for Economic Cooperation, 274 Indo-Pacific, 7, 10, 38, 39 Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI), 100 Indo-Pakistan War (1965), 22, 44, 264 Indo-Pakistan War (1971), 154 Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), 22 Indo-Spanish Tribune/Dialogue Forum, 209 Indo-US nuclear deal, 13, 33, 97, 268, 269, 297, 347, 348 Indo-West European Dialogue Congress, Alpbach, 339

Industrial Disputes Act, 28 Inquisition, 201 INS Beas , 246 INS Chennai, 200 INS Delhi, 246 INS Jalashwa, 199 INS Shakunth, 45 INS Sishkumar, 45 INS Tabar, 246 INS Tarangini, 246, 247 INS Tarkash, 200 Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, 500, 502 Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, 206 Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 499 Instituto Camões, 250 intellectual property rights, 28, 123, 237 Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGCs), 10, 31, 34, 36 International Anti-Corruption Agency, 365 International Atomic Energy Agency, 331 International Brigades, 168, 169 International Conference of New or Restored Democracies, 458 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 226, 227, 253 International Development Agency (IDA), 306, 339 International Gandhi Commemoration Committee, 236 International Solar Alliance (ISA), 97, 99, 162, 271, 301, 315, 405, 460 International Supervisory Commission, 93

INDEX

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 158 Invest India, 237, 243, 310, 528, 535, 536, 540, 541 Iran, 44, 126, 130, 141, 204, 342 Ireland, 14, 202, 269, 298, 349, 492, 502, 510, 514, 518–522, 528, 532, 534, 539 Islam, 153 Israel, 69, 135, 172, 303 Istituto Affari Internazionali, 495, 503 IT, 8, 13, 40, 43, 81, 190, 234, 236, 245, 249, 252, 297, 308, 312, 364, 412, 413, 416, 450, 452, 461, 465, 468, 473, 475, 540, 552, 553, 555, 556 Italian Marines, 11 Italian Risorgimento, 152 Italy, 6, 11, 14, 134, 151–162, 185, 202, 265, 274, 305, 373, 492, 493, 496–498, 503, 510, 511, 514, 516–522, 528, 530, 532–534, 536, 538, 539, 541, 550, 556, 557 Socialist Party, 153

J Jahilo, Peep, 449 Jaipal, Rikhi, 228 Jaishankar, S., 3, 4, 6–9, 14, 15, 78, 82, 83, 161, 183, 237, 272, 313, 314, 316, 351–355, 403–405, 432, 454, 456, 461 Jaish-e-Mohammed, 232, 345 Jakimavicius, Saulius, 459 Jammu and Kashmir, 10, 11, 22, 23, 29, 30, 95, 156, 232, 264, 265, 270, 310, 313, 340, 342, 344, 345, 351, 390, 392, 395, 398, 401, 405, 432 Janata Party, 25, 336

577

Japan, 25, 29, 31, 32, 66, 69, 77, 78, 82, 98, 99, 101, 122, 124, 209, 234, 265, 267, 268, 271, 272, 296, 305, 343, 344, 360, 396, 402, 413, 487 Jawaharlal Nehru Prize for International Understanding, 28, 339 Jhakar, Balram, 175 Jha, Lakshmi Kant, 44, 362 Johnson, Boris, 65, 73, 74, 76–83 Johnson, G.A., 205 Jordan, 264 Joshi, D.K., 200 Joshi, Manohar, 233 Juan Carlos I , 200 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 136, 144, 488

K Kadar, Janos, 391 Kalijurand, Mariana, 453 Kaljulaid, Kersti, 453 Kamitz, R., 335 Kant, Krishan, 401 Karaikal, 91, 93, 552 Kargil War, 1999, 31, 345, 422 Karnataka, 452 Kaur, Preneet, 451, 455, 458, 462 Kearney, 528, 531 Kerala, 157, 158, 160, 204, 223, 279, 307, 372, 551, 556 Kern, Christian, 351 Khalistan, 26 Khandare, V.G., 196 Khanna, Vinod, 458 Khan, Yahya, 96, 336 Khub Chand, 356 Khurshid, Salman, 395, 449, 457 Kiesinger, Kurt George, 22, 23 Klaauw, Van Der, 266 Klestil, Thomas, 341

578

INDEX

Kneissl, Karin, 351 Kochi Metro Project, 104 Koessler, Gregor, 352 Kohl, Helmut, 25, 27, 28, 54 Kok, Wim, 267 Kopf, Karlheinz, 350 Korcok, Ivan, 401 Korea, 29, 524 Körner, Theodor, 334 Kotka, Taavi, 465 Kovind, Ram Nath, 6, 15, 273, 274, 402, 403, 431, 455 Kreisky, Bruno, 333–339, 342, 369, 370, 372 Kreivys, Dainius, 458 Krishna, S.M., 157, 180 KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 310 Kubis, Janus, 398 Kuˇcinskis, Maris, 456 Kulhanek, Jakub, 405 Kumari, Ajaneesh, 454 Kundariya, Mohanbhai, 459 Kurz, Sebastian, 350, 352, 363 Kutch, 155 L Lall, Arthur, 330 Landsbergin, Gabrielius, 461 Landsbergis, Vytautas, 457 La Passionara, 168 Larsen & Toubro (L&T), 198, 199, 308 Lashkar-e-Toiba, 345 Latin America, 169, 172, 175, 180, 187, 207, 388, 396, 397, 449, 496 Latvia, 8, 13, 402, 403, 445–449, 454–457, 465, 466, 469, 471–473, 476, 503 Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), 456

La Vie des Idées, 499, 502 Laya, Arancha Gonzalez, 183 LeadIT (the Leadership Group on Industry Transition), 302, 315 League of Nations, 449 Lebanon, 200 Le Drian, J.-Y., 100 Leitl, Christoph, 350 Lekhi, Meenakshi, 184, 239 Libya, 153, 395, 432 Light Tactical Transport Procurement Programme (LTTP), 199 Liimets, Eva-Maria, 454 Lindgren, Lars-Olof, 298 Line of Control, 31 Linkeviˇcius, Linas, 459 Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Karine, 124, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 141 Lisbon Treaty, 143 Lister, Enrique, 168 Lithuania, 8, 13, 402, 403, 445–449, 457–462, 467–469, 474–476, 503 Löfven, Stefan, 299 Lok Sabha, 21, 35, 170, 175, 209, 233, 340, 350, 395, 456, 489, 495 Lombardy, 160 London, 66, 68–73, 75–77, 79, 82, 83, 129, 138, 140, 141, 168, 171, 174, 201, 224, 551 Lopez-Bravo, 172 LOT Polish Airlines, 404 Lubbers, R.F.M., 266, 267, 270, 271 Lunachek, Ulrike, 349 Lund University, 310 Lusophone countries, 239, 243 Luxembourg, 6, 14, 485, 510, 514–518, 521, 522, 528, 532–534, 539

INDEX

M Macedonia, 549 Macron, Manuel, 99, 100 Madariaga, Javier Solana, 177 Made in Germany, 40 Mahajan, Sumitra, 456 Maharashtra, 97, 207, 226, 535, 536, 554 Mahe, 91, 93, 552 Make in India, 36, 45, 139, 181, 184, 197, 198, 248, 299, 303, 304, 350, 459, 530 Malaysia, 263, 537 Malhotra, Om Prakash, 365 Malik, H.S., 171, 173 Malta, 6, 403, 485 Man Singh II, Sawai, 171 Martinez, Jose Claudio Aranzadi, 177 Martinique, 552 masala bonds, 72 Mauri, Pedro Cortinay, 173 Mauritius, 66, 412, 531–533, 537, 548 Max Mueller Bhavans, 179 May, Theresa, 71, 75, 76, 80 Mazagaon Docks Ltd., 198 Mazzini, Guiseppe, 152 MBDA, 198 MB Enrica Lexie, 157 McNamara, Robert S., 337 Mediterranean, 11, 132, 141, 156, 161, 200, 202 Mediterranean Dialogue, 161 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), 46, 47, 105 Megha Tropiques , 115 Mendés-France, Pierre, 93 Menhanlal, Atal, 169 Menon, K.P.S., 332, 333, 388 Menon, Krishna, 224, 227 Menon, Lakshmi N., 335

579

Menon, Shivshankar, 5, 33, 270, 348, 350 Merex GmbH, 45 Meri, Lennart-Georg, 450 Merkel, Angela, 33, 34, 36, 143 Metals and Minerals Trading Corporation (MMTC), 187 Mexico, 271, 295, 337, 549 Military Instruction Cooperation Programme, 192 Mishra, Brijesh, 30 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 97, 182, 185, 253, 271, 297–299 Mittal, Lakshmi, 559 Mobile Ground Based ELINT System (MGBES), 198 Mock, Alois, 340 Modi, Narendra, 5–7, 10–14, 35, 36, 65, 71, 76, 78, 79, 99, 100, 114, 122, 123, 125, 132, 135, 138–140, 143–145, 158, 159, 161, 162, 181–184, 196, 198, 209, 235–239, 243, 249, 253, 272, 273, 277, 282, 292, 299–301, 303, 350, 351, 387, 402, 453, 454, 456, 457, 488–490, 495, 497, 498, 530 and France, 99, 100 Mogherini, Federica, 134–136, 143, 144, 158 Molotov, V., 333 Monroe Doctrine, 388 Montilla, José, 180 Mookerjee, Girija K., 205, 369, 370 Moratinos, Miguel Ángel, 180, 196 Moravcik, Josef, 401 Morenés, Pedro, 193 Morocco, 94 Mother Teresa, 173 Mozambique, 228, 229, 251, 554 Mukerjee, H.N., 170

580

INDEX

Mukherjee, Pranab, 231, 269, 299, 312, 340, 345, 423 Mulford, David, 269 Mumbai attacks (2008), 345 Mumbai bomb blasts (1993), 234 Munich Security Conference, 183, 352, 461 Murarka, Dev, 446, 447 Mussolini, Benito, 152 Myrdal, Alva, 293, 294 Myrdal, Gunnar, 294

N Naidu, M.Venkaiah, 183, 403, 453 Naqshbandi, Ayub Ahmed Khan, 169 Narayanan, K.R., 346 Narayan, Jayaprakash, 336 Natarajan, Jayanthi, 451 National Defence College, 193, 246, 365 National Democratic Alliance (NDA), 530 National Human Rights Commission, 270 National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency, 528, 535, 536, 540, 541 National Leprosy Control Programme, 307 National Malaria Eradication Programme, 307 National Tuberculosis Control Programme, 307 NATO, 8, 46, 78, 206, 388, 397 Navantia, 198, 199 Nehru, Jawaharlal and Austria, 329, 330 and decolonisation, 93, 94 and de Gaulle, Charles, 94 and Portuguese colonies, 224, 225 and the Baltics, 445, 446

Nepal, 122, 183 Netherlands, 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 66, 93, 231, 261–278, 280–282, 298, 305, 327, 349, 492, 493, 510, 511, 514, 518–520, 528, 530–532, 536, 537, 539, 541, 549, 550, 557, 559 New International Economic Order, 13, 337, 338, 392 New Zealand, 73, 124, 269, 298, 348, 349 NITI Aayog, 310 Noland, Ceta, 269 non-alignment, 2, 10, 19, 335, 369–372, 490, 498 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 29, 270, 307, 315, 364 non-proliferation, 24, 25, 30, 31, 35, 97, 123, 253, 268, 348, 349, 432 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 25, 29, 268, 347, 395 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), 280, 431, 550, 554, 556 Norberg, Lars, 296 Nordenham, 45 Nordic Centre in India (NCI), 311 Norway, 7, 269, 298, 300, 306, 311, 349 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 33, 97, 182, 234, 253, 268, 297, 398, 404, 432 O Obama, Barack, 122, 144 Oder-Neisse Line, 392, 393 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 29, 306, 307, 360 OGMA, 248 Omnipol Foreign Trade Corporation, 417 Operation Maitri, 183

INDEX

Operation Ocean Shield, 200 Operation Vijay, 227 Orbán, Viktor, 397, 400 Ordnance Factory Board, 303, 423 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 103, 271, 306, 411, 412, 415, 509, 521, 522, 528, 534, 539 Organization for the European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 370 Orissa, 307 O’Shea, Gonzalo Sebastian de Erice, 170 Ostend East-India Company, 327 Ostpolitik, 23 Overseas Citizen of India (OCI), 235 Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 493, 497, 503 Oxford University, 68, 81 P Pabriks, Artis, 455 Paet, Urmas, 451, 464, 465 Pahr, Willibald, 333, 336, 337, 339 Pakistan, 22–24, 29–31, 44, 72, 95, 96, 98, 130, 135, 154, 178, 182, 191, 232, 264–266, 270, 304, 313, 335, 343–345, 350, 395, 398, 548 Pakistan Aid Consortium, 265 Palestine, 135 Palme, Olof, 294, 295, 336, 337, 371, 372 Pandit, Vijay Lakshmi, 169–171, 224, 264 Pant, H.G., 370, 497 paracetamol, 105 Patel, Praful, 451 Patel, Priti, 70 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 328

581

Patil, Shivraj V., 192, 199, 340 peacekeeping, 247, 316 pension funds, 72 Pereira, Baron Carl, 330 Perez-Castejon, Pedro Sanchez, 183 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 158 Persian Gulf, 73, 78 Persons of Indian origin (PIOs), 309, 431, 554 Persson, Goran, 12, 297 Petricek, Tomas, 403, 405 Pew Research Centre, 141 Philippines, 124, 175, 549 Pilot, Sachin, 451 Pinheiro, João de Deus, 231 Pinto, Manuel, 169 Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering, 199 Pique, Josep, 191 Pirelli, 155 Plassnik, Ursula, 344, 348, 349 Pokhran peaceful nuclear test, 24 Poland, 6, 13, 20, 23, 329, 387, 388, 391–396, 398, 399, 403–406, 408–415, 421–424, 428, 431, 432, 445, 461, 468, 469, 474–476, 492, 495, 497, 498, 503 outreach to Asia, 398 Polish Foreign Policy Priorities, 2012-2016, 404 Pompidou, Georges, 96 Pondicherry, 91, 93 Portugal, 4, 12, 14, 171, 174, 202, 203, 205, 206, 223–246, 248–253, 261, 299, 369, 492, 503, 510, 514, 516–522, 528, 532–534, 539, 550, 554, 555 Portugal-India Business Hub, 243 Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP), 243

582

INDEX

Portuguese Platform for Defence Industries (idD), 248 Prasad, Rajendra, 227 Prasad, Ravi Shankar, 452, 456 Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, 235 Prince Bernhard, 266 Prince Claus, 266 Princess Letizia, 173 Princess Sofia, 173 Prodi, Romano, 157, 158, 161 Project-17A frigates, 46 Pulwama, 232 Punjab, 29, 156, 159, 232, 251, 339, 340, 342, 372, 395, 552–554, 557 Q Quay, J.E de, 264 Queen Juliana, 266 Queen Maxima, 273 Queen Sofia, 173 R Raab, Julius, 334 Radhakrishnan, S., 266, 334 Rafale, 46, 105, 109, 113, 139, 199 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 23, 96 Raisina Dialogue, 183, 453, 461 Raja Mohan, C., 3, 55, 97, 272 Rajan, M.S., 205, 388, 537 Rajasthan, 307, 535, 536 Rajneesh, 40 Rajoy, Mariano, 181, 183 Rajya Sabha, 390, 393, 405 Rao, P.V. Narasimha, 1, 27, 28, 94, 176, 177, 229, 231, 250, 337, 338, 448–450, 457 Rapacki, Adam, 393 Rapacki Plan, 393 Rato, Rodrigo, 173 Ravi, Dammu, 352

Real Instituto Elcano, 496, 503 ReFocus Austria, 353 Reformation, 201 refugees, 23 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 79, 524 Reinsalu, Urmas, 453, 454 Republican Spain, 168, 203 Reserve Bank of India, 42, 75 Rice, Condoleezza, 349 Riddel, Frank S., 172, 206 Rink¯eviˇcs, Edgars, 455, 456 Rocard, Michel, 176 Roivas, Taavi, 453 Romania, 6, 205, 403, 428, 503 Roodenburg, Jeroen, 269 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 206 Rosoboronexport, 313 Rotterdam, 265, 274 Rourkela, 41, 43, 356, 362 Roux, Henri, 92 Royal Tropical Institute of Amsterdam, 279 rule of law, 2, 26, 68, 123, 130, 270 Russia, 8, 9, 96, 99, 105, 122, 126, 129, 132, 133, 141, 153, 246, 272–274, 298, 303, 316, 344, 351, 361, 446, 488, 495 Rutte, Mark, 272, 273

S Saab, 303, 308, 313 Saint Martin, 552 Salander, Henrik, 296 Salarich, José Eugenio, 177, 178 Salaverria, Pedro Arguelles, 193 Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 224, 225 Sampaio, Jorge, 232 Sanathanam, K., 192 Sanchez, Pedro, 183, 184 Sandhu, Reenat, 454

INDEX

Sant’Agata, Giulio Terzi di, 157 Santos, Antonio de Almeida, 232 Sarabhai, Vikram, 114, 115 Sathe, R.D., 175, 346 Sathya Sai Baba, 154 Saudi Arabia, 303 Scalfaro, Oscar Luigi, 157 Scandinavia, 4, 309 Schallenberg, Alexander, 352, 354, 355 Schallenberg, Wolfgang, 340 Schambeck, Herbet, 340 Schmidt, Helmut, 24, 54 Scholz, Olaf, 38 Scorpene submarines, 46, 113, 198 Seahawk submarine sub-sonic Hunter jets, 44 Seaman Guard Ohio, 452 self-determination, 22, 94, 186 Sen, A.K., 335 Sener Marine, 199 Serbia, 6, 355, 403 Serum Institute, 81, 278, 542 Setalvad, M.C., 226 Seydoux, Roger, 95 Shah, Amit, 405 Shaping Globalization—Expanding Partnerships—Sharing Responsibility, 32 Shared Cultural Heritage Programme, 273 Sharma, Anand, 207, 208, 401, 455, 458, 462 Sharma, Kuldeep, 248 Sharma, Manoj, 454 Sharma, Shankar Dayal, 401 Shedai, Mohammad Iqbal, 152 Shipping Corporation of India, 189 Sibal, Kapil, 2, 15, 432, 451 Sikh extremism, 26 Sikorski, Radoslaw, 396 Silicon Valley, 548

583

Silva, Anibal Cavaco, 232, 233 Simeliunas, Petras, 457 Simkova, Eva, 401 Simla Agreement, 30, 345, 395 Sindh, 206 Singapore, 66, 75, 124, 281, 531–533, 537 Singh, Digvijay, 450 Singh, Jaswant, 30, 191, 233, 307 Singh, Kewal, 225, 229 Singh, K. Natwar, 394 Singh, Manmohan, 31, 32, 34, 40, 68, 157, 234, 239, 347, 398 Singh, Rao Inderjit, 455, 458, 462, 474 Singh, Swaran, 23, 24, 228, 229 Singh, V.K., 453 Singh, Yashwant, 179 Sinowatz, Fred, 338, 339, 342 SIPRI, 44, 200, 303, 364, 424 Siroky, Viliam, 389 Sitharaman, Nirmala, 47, 198 Six Nation Initiative, 176 skill development, 35–38, 272 Skill India, 36 Slesers, Ainars, 455 Slezevicius, Adolfas, 457, 462 Slovak Foreign Policy Guidelines 2011, 401 Slovakia, 6, 13, 354, 387, 396, 398, 400–402, 408–412, 414, 415, 417, 424, 428–431, 492, 495, 503 FDI in India, 414, 417 Slovenia, 6, 405, 485 small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 103, 180, 187, 351, 361 Smart cities, 37, 38, 161, 190, 272, 273, 282, 296, 301 Snam Progetti, 11 Soares, Mario, 228–232, 240

584

INDEX

Social Democratic Party (SPD), 22, 29 social security agreement (SSA), 243, 244, 276, 312 Socrates, Jose, 233, 234 South Africa, 304, 314, 344 South Asia, 5, 29, 67, 98, 122, 185, 311, 350, 397, 398, 498, 502, 559 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 122 South Asian Democratic Forum, 498 South China Sea, 78, 100, 182 Southeast Asia, 78, 93, 536 Southeast Europe, 6, 7 South Korea, 107, 124, 126, 135, 156, 202, 402 sovereign wealth funds, 72 Soviet Union, 2–4, 19, 20, 69, 96, 153, 331–333, 388, 390, 392, 394, 395, 431, 445–449, 457, 475 Soviet-US Threshold Test Ban Agreement, 265 Spain, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 159, 161, 167–187, 189–193, 196, 197, 199–206, 208–211, 299, 330, 492, 496–498, 503, 510, 511, 514, 516–522, 528, 531–534, 538, 539, 550, 552, 553, 559 outreach to Asia, 11 separatism in, 186 Spain-India Committee, 168 Spanish Association for Indian Studies, 204 Spanish Civil War, 167, 206 and India, 167 Spindelegger, Michael, 344, 350 Spranger, Carl-Dieter, 26 Sri Lanka, 135, 536, 537 Stahlverfahren Linz-Donawitz, 362 Start-Up Portugal, 237

State Bank of India, 75, 230, 538, 541, 542 State Trading Corporation, 187 Steger, Norbert, 340, 356 Steiner, Michael, 35 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 349 Strategic Analyses , 206 strategic partnership, 8, 10, 31, 32, 34–36, 55, 92, 98–100, 116, 123, 162, 248, 273, 299, 404, 488, 493, 496–499, 501 Styria, 331 Suez Canal, 45 Suez crisis, 390 Sunak, Rishi, 70, 80, 560 supply chain, 8, 9, 67, 161, 162, 273, 462, 496, 513 Swachh Bharat Mission (Clean India Mission), 302 Swaraj, Sushma, 6, 70, 72, 74, 183, 351, 453, 455, 456 Sweden, 6, 7, 12–14, 291–317, 337, 338, 370, 372, 454, 465, 473, 492, 503, 510, 514, 516–522, 528, 531–534, 539 Sweden-India Business Council (SBIC), 306 Swedish Chamber of Commerce and Industries (SCCI), 315 Swedish East India Company, 309 Swedish Energy Agency, 302 Swedish Innovation Agency, Vinnova, 301 Swedish Institute Leadership Programme, 310 Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 310, 503 Swedish Institute of Space Physics, 301 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 306, 307

INDEX

Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET), 310 Switzerland, 4, 6, 269, 276, 330, 332, 333, 349, 370, 531 Szijjarto, Peter, 405, 413, 430 T Tagore, Rabindranath, 152, 204, 208, 309, 311, 371, 474 Taliban, 73 Tamil Nadu, 294, 307, 340, 359, 452, 535, 552 Tank, Kurt, 44 Tanzania, 295 Tata Advanced Systems Ltd., 200 Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), 190, 245, 278, 308, 413, 414, 465, 540–542 Tata Motors, 157, 541 Tavenot, 91 Tavernier, 91 technology, 2–4, 7, 8, 10, 15, 26, 27, 30–33, 35, 36, 40, 65, 66, 76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 97, 98, 114, 115, 130, 154, 162, 176, 177, 182, 192, 198, 200, 233, 236, 248, 249, 266, 273, 274, 292, 294, 296, 298, 300–302, 304, 306, 308, 310, 311, 314, 315, 317, 336, 341, 344, 346, 351, 353, 369, 401, 403, 413, 421, 423, 450–453, 462, 465, 535, 558, 561 Technology Development Board, 180 terrorism, 26, 30, 32, 37, 116, 122, 123, 177, 180, 182, 191, 232, 235, 272, 273, 282, 299, 345, 346, 351, 353, 401, 404, 423, 432 Test Ban Treaty, 30, 268, 296, 334, 395 Thailand, 124, 304, 467, 537

585

Thales, 103, 105, 198 Third Five Year Plan (1961–1966), 103 Third World, 26, 203, 337, 338, 389, 395 Tirenna AG, 45 Trade and Technology Council, 7 Triestino, Lloyd, 328 Tripathi, Shashi, 177 TRISHNA joint mission, 115 Truss, Liz, 80 Tunisia, 94, 154 Tusk, Donald, 132, 136, 144, 399, 488 Twitter, 144

U UAVision, 248 UCINET, 486 UKIP, 140 Ukraine, 8, 9, 78, 100, 130, 135, 273, 274, 301, 353, 354, 432, 461 Ulmanis, Guntis, 455 UN 2030 Agenda, 292 UN Charter, 9, 171, 177, 390 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 37, 78 UN General Assembly, 9, 32, 169, 171, 179, 233, 293, 314, 334, 337–339, 351, 389, 390, 406, 453–456, 461 UN Human Rights Council, 9 United Arab Emirates, 69 United East India Company, 261 United Kingdom (UK) Conservative Party, 71 Independence Party, 67, 128 Indian diaspora, 138, 140, 547, 550, 551 South Asians in, 548

586

INDEX

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 307 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 337, 338 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 313 United Nations (UN), 95, 98, 153, 169–172, 184, 185, 191, 226, 268, 293, 331, 332, 364, 370, 394, 396, 404, 432, 448, 460 United States (US), 3, 7, 15, 31, 33, 65–71, 73, 75–80, 82, 93–99, 104, 105, 122, 144, 145, 153–156, 175, 188, 199, 200, 209, 238, 246, 263, 265, 268–270, 272, 294, 296–298, 303–305, 309, 331, 332, 337, 349, 355, 358, 360, 363, 388, 389, 408, 412, 415, 452, 461, 463, 466, 468, 514–517, 521–523, 530, 534, 537, 539, 547, 548, 553 Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group, 185 University of Salamanca, 204 University of Valladolid, 204, 205 UN reform, 37, 98, 271, 353, 396, 401, 432, 453 UNSC Resolution 307, 96 UN Security Council, 4, 31, 33, 68, 95, 96, 98, 116, 184, 185, 234, 262, 264, 271, 299, 300, 340, 346, 347, 351, 353, 395, 396, 399–401, 404, 405, 453–455, 458, 460, 461 Usackas, Vygaudas, 458, 462 US Congress, 33

V Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 25, 232, 233, 336, 341 Vallelersundi, Ana P., 179 Van der Bellen, Alexander, 351 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, 314 Vasco da Gama, 223, 250 Vayudoot, 199 Veda Defence, 248 Védrine, Hubert, 97, 98 Veerapan, Ramasamy, 169 Velliste, Trivimi, 450 Venkataramani, M.S., 2, 206 Venkataraman, R., 230, 266 Verdross, Alfred, 369, 370 Vibrant Gujarat Summit, 236 Vietnam, 124, 397, 524 Vietnam War, 294 Vig, Kastur Lal, 449 Visegrad, 7, 161, 387, 400, 405, 411, 432 Vjonisin, Raimonds, 455 Vodafone, 281 Voodewind, Joel, 270 Vranitzky, F., 345

W Walesa, Lech, 394, 395 Warsaw Pact, 333 Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), 97, 182, 185, 298 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 296 Weele, Van Dok-van, 274 West Asia, 156 Westerwelle, Guido, 32 West Europe, 14, 510–513, 515, 518, 520, 529, 537–539, 542, 548 West Irian, 262 Wickman, Krister, 294

INDEX

Wildner, Clemens, 331 Willem-Alexander, King, 273 World Bank, 265, 278, 306, 307, 337, 513, 531 World Health Organisation (WHO), 307 World Trade Organization (WTO), 37, 524 World War I, 329 World War II, 13, 175, 328, 329, 331, 372, 388, 445, 501, 529

587

Y Yanam, 93, 552 yoga, 40, 143, 203, 252, 472, 554, 555 Yugoslavia, 294, 331, 388

Z Zapatero, José Luis Rodriguez, 179 Zatlers, Valdis, 455 Zeman, Milos, 403