In the Shadow of Perón: Juan Atilio Bramuglia and the Second Line of Argentina’s Populist Movement 9780804779630

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In the Shadow ofPeron

In the Shadow of Peron Juan Atilio Bramuglia and the Second Line ofA'Jlfentina)s Populist Movement

RaananRein Translated from the Spanish by Martha Grenzeback

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STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2008 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rein, Raanan, 1960[Juan Atilio Bramuglia. English] In the shadow of Peron :Juan Atilio Bramuglia and the second line of Argentina's populist movement I Raanan Rein ; translated from the Spanish by Martha Grenzeback. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-o-8047-5792-8 (cloth: alk. paper) r. Bramuglia, Juan Atilio, 1903-1962. 2. Argentina-Politics and government-1943-1955. 3· Argentina-Politics and government-1955-1983. 4· Peronism-History. I. Title. F2849.B69R45 2007 982.06092-dc22 [B] 2007035756 Typeset by Thompson Type in ro/12 Sa bon

In the Shadow of Peron was originally published in Spanish in 2006 under the title juan Atilio Bramuglia: Baja la sombra delUder. La segunda linea de liderazgo peronista © 2006 Ediciones Lumiere.

Contents

Acknowledgments, vii Introduction,

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1. The Second Line of Peronist LeadershipThe Role of the Intermediaries, I I

2. From Socialism to Peronism: The Case of Juan Atilio Bramuglia, 6I 3. The Third Position and the Price of Success,

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4. The First "Peronism Without Peron": Bramuglia and the Union Popular, I 56 5. The Controlled Rebellion: Bramuglia's Last Tango, I84

Notes,

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Bibliography, Index,

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Acknowledgments

During the years that I was gathering material for this book, I had the benefit of assistance and good advice from librarians, archivists, colleagues, and many friends in different countries. Although I cannot mention them all here, I would like to express special appreciation to Raul Garda Heras and Monserrat Llair6 of the University of Buenos Aires; Maria Fernanda Arias and Mario Serraferro of the Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (UADE); William Ratliff of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; the late Robert Alexander of Rutgers University; Julio Cesar Melon of the Universidad de Mar del Plata; Miguel Unamuno, director of the Archivo General de la Naci6n (Argentine National Archives); Fabian Bosoer of the daily Clarin; Bramuglia's children, Carlos and Lita, and his nieces, Cristina and Maria Graciela; and a long list of other people, some of them now deceased, who gave generously of their time to supply me with interviews and testimony for this research (see the list included in the bibliography). At various stages of research and writing I have received assistance and encouragement from Silvia T. Alvarez, Jorge Bernetti, Torcuato Di Tella, Carlos Escude, Horacio Gaggero, Noemi Girbal, Beatriz Gurevich, Sandra McGee Deutsch, Jose Moya, Mariano Plotkin, Adriana Puiggr6s, Leonardo Senkman, and Saul Sosnowski. The Walovnik, Fried, and Bichman families of Buenos Aires have always opened their doors and hearts to me for periods of fruitful and enriching research in Argentina. Tel Aviv University has been my second home. I would like to thank my colleagues in the History Department and the Institute of Latin American History and Culture, especially Tzvi Medin, Rosalie Sitman, Gerardo Leibner, Tzvi Tal, Efraim Davidi, and Miri Eliav-Feldon, and my many students there, especially Uri Rosenheck, Tamar Groves, Atalia Shragai, and lnbal Ofer.

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Acknowledgments

My wife, Monica Rein, deserves special thanks, even more this time than for my previous books, if that is possible. Without her, this particular odyssey would not have been possible. Our children, Orner and Noa, are a constant source of pride. This book was completed during a stint at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, as Dean's Research Professor. I would like to thank my colleagues in the History Department there, particularly Jeffrey Lesser and Susan Socolow. I am also grateful to Jeff, Eliana, and their children, Gabriel and Aron, who were exceptional hosts. The original text of this book was published in Spanish by Ediciones Lumiere in Buenos Aires under the title Juan Atilio Bramuglia: Baja la sombra del Hder. La segunda linea de liderazgo peronista. I am grateful to my Argentine publisher, Daniel de Anchorena, a dear friend and a true intellectual, for his continued support. Finally, this is the fourth book that Martha Grenzeback has translated for me. Now, as always, I owe her a profound debt of gratitude.

In the Shadow ofPeron

Introduction

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Peronism is one of the most important and fascinating phenomena to arise in Argentina since the Republic's establishment in the early nineteenth century, for at least two reasons. First, Peronism is not a closed chapter of Argentine history. In one form or another it is still a vital, significant force in national politics. Observers of Argentine politics, especially during the presidential elections that have taken place since the 1983 return to democracy, might have felt they had gone back in time a few decades, to the 1940s and 1950s. At moments it seemed almost as though Juan Domingo Peron and his second wife, Evita, were still competing for tenancy of the presidential palace in Buenos Aires. The other, more significant, reason that Peronism is so important is that it is highly relevant to the debate on several central issues of Argentine history. One question that haunts everyone interested in the history of this country is, of course, how the Republic for which many were predicting a bright future instead sank into a morass of financial, political, and social crises in the last half century. How did one of the primary destinations for European emigrants at the turn of the nineteenth century become a country that loses many of its best and brightest citizens to the United States and the Old World, where they seek a better future? In an effort to deal with the "Argentine enigma," both historians and those less concerned with identifying connections and contexts for events, people, and processes have tended to point an accusing finger at General Peron and the populist movement he led. His demagogic and irresponsible social and economic policy in 1946-55, they claim, was what brought Argentina to the brink of destruction. Many believe that the corruption that characterized his regime, the restrictions on the opposition's activity, and the contempt for human rights have all left an indelible imprint on the Argentine political system.

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Introduction

In recent years, however, a growing number of historians have been uncomfortable with this simplistic explanation. Although different aspects of Peron's regime can certainly be criticized, they are unlikely to constitute a satisfactory explanation for Argentina's prolonged downslide. Such explanations, no less than the essays of Peronist fanatics, merely tend to reinforce the myths about Peron and hinder the identification of continuities and breaks between the "Peronist decade" and both the preceding and succeeding eras. Historical writing on Peronism is strongly tinged with political bias. Peronism divided Argentine society into two warring camps. To members of the working class, Peronism represented a real improvement in their living conditions, the opportunity to participate in the political system and the administration of the state, and a new collective pride and self-confidence. Consequently, they remained loyal to Peron throughout the eighteen years of his exile, from his overthrow in the military coup of September 1955 until his triumphant return to Argentina in I973· In contrast, for many members of the middle and upper classes and for most intellectuals, the Peronist decade was a traumatic experience-not so much because of the repression and censorship that some of them suffered (which were minor by comparison with the horrors of the following decades), but because Peronism was not compatible with their self-image as Argentines and the way they saw the process of their national history from the achievement of political independence up until the middle of the twentieth century. They were shocked to realize that they had lost not only control of the political and social processes in the country, but also their understanding of those processes. Some of them saw Peronism as an aberration or temporary insanity that could not be understood or analyzed in rational terms. Even the later historical essays on Peronism written by Argentines, like the works of other writers and thinkers, were often either apologias for Peron and panegyrics to his charismatic leadership or indictments denouncing the "tyrant's crimes." Both types served as ammunition in the political struggles of the second half of the twentieth century. The continued interest in the period of Peron's rule has also been linked with the search for an origin, for some idealized inaugural stage in the process of forming the Argentine social consciousness, or for the genealogy of some mythical good intentions on the part of the state, to counter the profound disillusionment with Argentine institutions. There is no doubt that this phenomenon has something to do with the 1990s trauma caused by the high social price of Carlos Menem's neoliberal policy. The political situation has also favored the almost obsessive preoccupation with Peronism. Both Menem and the former president, Nestor

Introduction

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Kirchner, have claimed to be following in the footsteps of the legendary leader, and the media have compared the measures and policies of both these men with the historical Peronism of the 1940s and 19 sos. The failure of another Radical president (Fernando de la Rua) also contributed to the interest in Peronist politicians and their leadership abilities and capacity for mobilizing the masses. Accordingly, Peronism is one of the most researched topics of not just Argentine history, but also Latin American history. The scholarly attention it has received over the last half-century probably rivals that given to the Cuban and Mexican revolutions. The copious academic bibliography on its different aspects includes a vast array of books and articles published in Argentina and elsewhere, in Spanish and other languages. Popular culture and nonacademic writings also reflect the continuing fascination with Peronism, evidenced in films and documentaries, exhibitions and theatrical works, and even a dance theater show, all of which refer in some way to Peronism and its imprint on Argentine society. Surfing the Internet, we find innumerable sites, links, and references relating to Peronism. Interest does not decline with time. On the contrary, in the last five years people seem to have been talking about Peronism more than ever. While I was in the process of researching and writing this book, people kept asking me questions-notably, do we need another book on Peronism? Why a political biography? And who was Juan Atilio Bramuglia anyway? Was he politically significant enough to merit a biography? Historians have scorned the biographical genre for the past several decades, considering it outmoded. 1 The growing influence of the socialscience proclivity for seeking out models and explanations that may somehow govern social behavior, as well as the use of statistics and data processing, fostered a condescending attitude toward biography writing. Biography came to be seen as an anachronistic pursuit that was appropriate to the Romantic period and the glorification of political leaders and strategists, not to a twentieth-century democratic republic. Alexis de Tocqueville once wrote that in periods of monarchic or aristocratic government the course of events tends to be seen as the result of the actions or omissions of a nation's most distinguished figures, whereas in periods of democratic government the inclination is to see history as a consequence of anonymous processes that are beyond the control of eminent individuals. The wide-ranging development of social history also encouraged this disdain for biographies; although they were always popular with the general public, they were ignored by "professionals." Nowadays, however, biography is commonly seen as an important aspect of historiography,

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Introduction

and the increasing interest in the genre is expressed, among other ways, by the publication in recent years of Biography, an interdisciplinary academic journal. Barbara Tuchman's remark that "biography is useful because it encompasses the universal in the particular" 2 is currently accepted by many. Biographies or life stories and histories are often used in sociology and anthropology "for the purpose of reconstructing the personal experiences that interconnect individual 'l's' who interact in families, groups, and institutions." 3 Juan Atilio Bramuglia was undoubtedly the most eminent and talented minister in Juan Peron's first administration. This assessment was shared by contemporary foreign and Argentine observers, both Peronists and anti-Peronists. The United States ambassador George Messersmith characterized him as "one of the two most outstanding members of the Argentine cabinet." British diplomats, with characteristic arrogance, described him as "a reasonably sensible man for an Argentine." Moshe Tov, an Argentine Jew turned diplomat in the foreign service of the State of Israel, wrote in his memoirs that "Bramuglia was an intelligent, studious man, skilled in the conduct of business, simple in manner, and discreet in his relations with people." 4 As minister of foreign affairs, Bramuglia made such a reputation for himself that he was talked of as a possible successor to Peron. In fact, as this book will show, some thought Bramuglia was a little too successful in the foreign ministry, which led to his removal in August 1949. Peron could not tolerate being overshadowed by someone else and amended the constitution to allow himself a second presidential term. Following the overthrow of the self-proclaimed justicialist leader in September 1955, Bramuglia was the first to try to establish a "Peronism without Peron," by founding the Union Popular (Popular Union) party. Bramuglia sought to take advantage of the deposed president's geographic alienation from the Argentine political arena, imposed by the so-called Liberating Revolution, to launch an independent political career of his own. However, we will see later that he would fail in this attempt. Most political biographies are about the lives and accomplishments of "winners" who are generally considered to have contributed to the shaping of their eras. Bramuglia's biography, in contrast, describes a person who, in the final analysis, was a failure. Although writing about the losers of history may constitute an expression of empathy for them, what interested me most here was Peronism's failure to engender a reformist party with social-democratic roots that could have contributed to the development of a strong, stable, democratic political system in Argentina. This failure had tragic consequences for Argentine society in general in the second half of the twentieth century.

Introduction

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Accordingly, this book is a history of lost opportunities, of a leader and political vision whose potential was never fulfilled. This biography is not intended to document every move Bramuglia made in the course of his multifaceted career or to probe the secrets of his personality, the forces that motivated him, his hopes and fears, or his psyche. My goal is more specific: to shed new light on different aspects of Peronism in the 1940s, 1950s, and 196os. Thus, I consciously decided to set aside the private persona and concentrate exclusively on Bramuglia's political activity, his dealings with his contemporaries, his image, and other public aspects of his life. This decision was also influenced by objective constraints. As political life and leadership have become democratized, they have ceased to be the exclusive preserve of a narrow elite, and the biographical chapters dealing with the childhood and youth of national luminaries have dwindled. This formative period, which psychoanalysts believe is when every adult's personality develops-including those who will later occupy positions of leadership-is more difficult to document than any other time of life. In the case of statesmen from the lower socioeconomic classes, usually no one has taken the trouble to document their family history or genealogy, to delve into the relationship between their parents, to preserve letters or school records, to understand the importance of early traumas or the first acts of rebellion-leaving the historian with very meager material. As a result, the first chapters of many biographies merely describe the social and economic background of the subject of the book. Bramuglia's modest family origins certainly seem to put his biography into this category. A self-made man, the son of Italian immigrants who left home in the 188os as a result of political problems arising from their anarchist activities, Bramuglia was born in 1903 in Chascomus, in the province of Buenos Aires. Orphaned at a very young age, he had to work for his living from the age of nine while continuing his education first at school and later at university, where he eventually completed a doctorate in law. 5 We have no solid documentation relating to the first years of his life, which is one reason that I have preferred to concentrate on the political aspects of his public activity. Another reason for giving priority to the public rather than the private persona is that in Bramuglia's case, as with many political leaders, the two spheres are difficult to separate. This is partly because some people, especially those who have achieved eminence, themselves lose the capacity to discriminate between their private and public lives and end up identifying completely with the public one. Over time, the private "I" is eroded, and ultimately the public persona is almost all that is left. Even

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Introduction

in my conversations with Bramuglia's children and other relatives it was difficult to get a sense of the father, the husband, the family man. 6 My original objective was, in fact, a prosopographic project-that is, to focus not on one person, but on a group/ in this case the group that formed the second line of Peronist leadership, in an attempt to illuminate the complexity and heterogeneity of the Peronist movement so as to understand it better. That initial purpose was thwarted by the insuperable obstacle of a limited array of sources. Among the prominent figures of the second line of Peronist leadership who caught my attention, only Bramuglia had a significant personal archive, among other reasons because he himself was aware throughout his career of the importance of what he was doing. The relatively rich archival material he left as a result is an invitation to researchers to write on the role he played and his contribution to Argentine politics. Angel Borlenghi, Domingo Mercante, Miguel Miranda, and Jose Figuerola, in contrast, did not leave posterity any comparable resources, at least not in a form accessible to researchers. The reason may be that they never created archives; or that papers were confiscated from their houses following Peron's overthrow in September 1955; or, perhaps, that they themselves decided to destroy or conceal documents when the harsh anti-Peronist campaign intensified. This issue is linked to a broader problem faced by many researchers who seek out the primary sources that are essential for studying different aspects of the politics, society, and culture of that period of Argentine history. As an illustration, when my wife, Monica Rein, was at the Education Ministry researching the educational system under Peron's administration, 8 a former official told her how he himself, in the first days of General Eduardo Lonardi's presidency, had destroyed hundreds of documents, throwing shreds of paper from his office window. Locating textbooks required serious detective work, and many of the copies found were lacking pages that had been ripped out on the instructions of teachers and principals during the Liberating Revolution. Mariano Plotkin had a similar experience while researching the Eva Peron Foundation, which had played a major role in mobilizing marginalized social sectors and creating Evita's charismatic image. He, too, had great difficulty finding the documents he needed to analyze the internal organization, structure, function, and finances of the Foundation. 9 The bulk of Bramuglia's personal archive is at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University in the United States. When I first discovered that the archive had been sold to a U.S. academic institution, I was dismayed. After all, I thought, this archive was part of the Argentine national patrimony and should remain in Argentina. However, once I had my first opportunity to visit the Hoover Institution and was in a position

Introduction

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to compare my experience there with my efforts to gather documents from repositories in Argentina, I realized that there were undoubtedly also certain advantages to the archive's location at Stanford, where it was well protected and its documents were excellently maintained, catalogued, and accessible to any researcher. The main obstacle, obviously, is that such researchers must have the funds to travel to California, no simple matter in Argentina at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Robert Gittings once asserted that "a fruitful field lies in biography of an obscure person, who by some fortune is connected with important events or institutions, and whose history throws an unexpected, revealing light on these." 10 This is even truer in the case of someone who has been, for the most part, erased from the collective memory, despite having been well known to contemporaries and having played a role in processes and events of cardinal importance in the history of his country. Bramuglia's public persona is thus something of a litmus paper, a historical prism through which various subjects now at the forefront of Peronism research can be examined. These include, notably, regional studies on the characteristics of the movement in various provinces, 11 the second line of Peronist leadership and the different roles it played,U and the efforts to establish a Peronism without Peron.U Bramuglia first aroused my curiosity while I was writing my doctoral thesis almost twenty years ago. At that time I was analyzing the complex relationship between the regimes of Peron and Francisco Franco, and in the process I discovered documents in which Bramuglia, at the time foreign minister, expressed his reservations concerning Argentina's excessive identification with the Spanish dictatorship and, in particular, his opposition to Eva Peron's tour of the Iberian Peninsula in June I947. 14 Even so, I was not interested in the individual as much as I was in his potential use as a means for examining an era, a society, and various historical issues. Accordingly, this book does not merely analyze a public figure, but also examines a central phenomenon in twentieth-century Argentine history-Peronism-both as a social and political movement and as an ideology, or at least as a conception of the world. In this book I have opted for an analytical narrative focus, examining first the years of the military government (r943-46), then the Peronist decade (r946-55), and finally the period of the Liberating Revolution (r955-58) and the presidency of Arturo Frondizi (r958-62). As for the structure of the book, after reviewing different interpretations of the Peronist phenomenon I analyze the concept of populism and challenge the commonly held notion of a direct, immediate link that supposedly existed between the charismatic leader and the masses. The first chapter seeks to divert attention from Peron and Evita, who have been the subject

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Introduction

of many biographies and analyses, and to focus instead on other figures who occupied key positions in the second line of the Peronist leadership. These figures came from various social and political backgrounds (working class, new industrialists, military, nationalists, etc.), and their roles in the mobilization of support for the leader, the coalescence of the Peronist coalition, and the shaping of the justicialist doctrine in those years have yet to be illuminated. It would seem that many historians have fallen for the populist rhetoric concerning the direct connection that purportedly existed between Peron and his followers. Although initially Peron did eschew institutionalized partisan channels when he addressed different social sectors, particularly the urban working class, this did not stop him from establishing other avenues for mobilizing popular support. Accordingly, Chapter r focuses on the contributions of Angel Borlenghi, Domingo Mercante, Miguel Miranda, and Jose Figuerola, and the following chapters concentrate on Bramuglia. My analysis of the second line of the Peronist leadership seeks to reveal the complexity of Peronism as a social phenomenon and to show how the internal struggles within the Peronist bureaucratic state, arising despite Peron's charismatic, personalist leadership, affected the development of different policies and prevented consistency in decision making. The second chapter covers Bramuglia's ideological and political roles in shaping the doctrine of early Peronism and in creating the coalition that carried Peron to power. Specifically, it examines Bramuglia's activities in the Secretarfa de Trabajo y Prevision (the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, created by the military government at the end of November 1943 by a decree drafted by Bramuglia himself) and his decisive influence on the transmission of Peronism to major sectors of the labor movement, especially the important railroad union, Union Ferroviaria. In December 1944, Peron managed to get Bramuglia appointed as federal interventor in the province of Buenos Aires, a key district in the electoral race to the presidency. Within a few months, the coalition of Peron's supporters began to come together under Bramuglia's leadership, mobilizing the political support of unions and workers and attracting sympathizers from the middle class, who understood that Peronism promised a larger public administration-meaning more jobs. Bramuglia also managed to talk political figures from the Union Civica Radical (UCR, Radical Party) into joining his provincial government. They would play a crucial role in enlisting middle-class support for Peron's presidential candidacy. The third chapter of the book addresses the significance of the Third Position in international politics. Indisputably, Peron and Bramuglia had

Introduction

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different understandings of this approach to nonalignment in an international arena defined by the Cold War. Aware of the importance of good relations with the superpower of the north, Bramuglia sought a path that would permit Argentina to pursue an independent foreign policy while avoiding confrontation with the United States. For this, as well as for other things, he had to pay a high political price. Nevertheless, the focus of this chapter is Bramuglia's successful performance as mediator between the Eastern and Western blocs, led by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, during the Berlin crisis of 1948. This crisis, seen as a threat to peace and European stability, aroused fear of a new armed confrontation on the Old Continent. In his capacity as president of the United Nations Security Council, then meeting in Paris, the Argentine foreign minister seized the opportunity to play a significant role in the world arena. This chapter analyzes the enormous gap between the considerable international prestige Bramuglia earned through his diplomatic activity and the deafening silence with which the Peronist communication media responded to that popularity. Peron could not bear the idea of being eclipsed by anyone. Forced to submit his resignation, Bramuglia was replaced by the young Hipolito Paz. The last two chapters of the book examine Bramuglia's unsuccessful attempt to institutionalize a "Peronism without Peron" and to reshape the Peronist identity. These chapters trace the foundation and development of the Union Popular from 1955 to 1962-that is, the period of the Liberating Revolution and Arturo Frondizi's presidency up to Bramuglia's death in September 1962. This part of the book points out five possible explanations for this political failure. The two most important were Peron's systematic struggle (conducted from wherever his current place of exile happened to be) to torpedo Bramuglia's efforts to build an independent party, and the Argentine elites' distrust of any political party that waved the banner of social reforms-an intransigent attitude that saw reformist populism as the first step toward revolutionary socialism. The subsequent governments of the Argentine Republic were unable to create political and legislative conditions that would allow neo-Peronism to develop as an institutional, democratic channel for the desires of broad sectors of the population. In this way, they contributed to the failure of the Union Popular-an organization that could well have promoted the establishment of a strong, stable, democratic political system in Argentina and, paradoxically, might also have helped to preserve the old general's leadership.

CHAPTER ONE

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership The Role ofthe Intermediaries

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The Peronist regime and the doctrine that it espoused under the name justicialismo ("justicialism") have been the subject of many conflicting interpretations based on different ideological premises-interpretations that more than once have served specific political agendas. The multiple definitions of Peronism have often obfuscated rather than clarified the unique characteristics of the Peronist regime. Peron himself, in his memoirs, ridiculed the different labels that had been applied to his administration: "Some called me a fascist, and others a nazi, and some even said that I was a communist and a nazi, as though one could be a nazi and a communist at the same time." 1 Chronologically, the first interpretation of the regime and its ideology was the view of Peronism as nazi-fascism. This interpretation emerged during the last stages of the military regime established in June 1943, in which Peron had become the dominant figure and established an alliance with broad sectors of the working class. When "the people's colonel" took power, the equation of Peronism with nazi-fascism was the view most widely accepted among his opponents. This equation was reinforced by the international context of the time, since the ideological dichotomy of fascism versus democracy prevailing at the end of World War II and in the early postwar period necessarily influenced the perception of events on the national level. 2 Accordingly, liberals, socialists, and communists saw Peronism as a local strain of nazi-fascism, or "Creole fascism." The influence of nationalist ideas and groups-such as the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista-on early Peronism, the personalist nature of the movement, and the clearly anti-Marxist and antiliberal accents in the Peronist discourse all contributed to the idea that Peronism and fascism were basically the same thing.

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The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

In the wake of the "Liberating Revolution" (Revoluci6n Libertadora) that deposed Peron's regime, this view predominated. Peronism was presented as xenophobic nationalism and Peron-e! Conductor or el Lider-as the equivalent of il Duce, Mussolini. Peron himself never concealed his admiration of the Italian leader, or his desire to follow in the latter's footsteps-while avoiding his mistakes. 3 The Argentine scholar and jurist Carlos S. Fayt was one of the first to offer a systematic presentation of the argument that Peronism was simply the Argentine version of Italian fascism. He gave six reasons for this view: the fact that Peronism, like fascism, prioritized action over doctrine; that it extolled the virtues of order, hierarchy, and discipline; that it rejected both liberalism and Marxism; that it identified the movement and the doctrine with the nation and with the ruler and his wishes; that it rejected class war and sought the gradual institution of a corporative regime; and, finally, that it promoted an expanding conception of state goals and the subordination of the individual to such objectives as the greatness and unity of the nation. 4 Although certainly many superficial resemblances can be found between fascism and Peronism, such a focus does not do much to elucidate the social and political realities of postwar Argentina or the significance Peronism had for broad social sectors in the 1940s and 1950s (and later). Unlike the fascist regimes that sprang up in Europe between the two world wars, which were backed primarily by the impoverished middle classes, war veterans, and business groups, Peron's regime found its basic core of social support in substantial sections of the working class and the organized labor movement (which led such researchers as Seymour Lipset to develop the questionable definition of Peronism as "fascism of the left" 5 ). At the same time it gradually alienated itself from such traditional forces as the landowners, parts of the army and the bourgeoisie, and, ultimately, the Catholic Church. 6 During the Peronist decade, the Argentine working class enjoyed improvements in wages, working conditions, health services, welfare, and education undreamed of by the workers of fascist Italy, who had resisted the rise of Mussolini's movement. Peron's first government included people with socialist backgrounds and trade union experience, such as the interior minister, Angel Borlenghi, and the foreign minister, Juan Atilio Bramuglia.? It was Peronism's solid grounding in the working class that allowed it to survive even the fall of Peron's regime in I955· One characteristic of European fascism between the two world wars was its expansionist, imperialistic aspirations. This tendency did not appear in Peron's Argentina, although the Argentines had always considered themselves entitled to a leading position in South America, and various Latin American leaders and opponents of the regime made unfounded

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

accusations that Argentina was pursuing subversive activities in the region. 8 The inter-American system was very important for the United States, and Washington kept a vigilant eye on any activity originating in Buenos Aires, especially in the light of the suspicions aroused by Argentina's neutrality in World War II, which many interpreted simply as support for Nazi Germany. These accusations that Peron's government was intervening in the internal affairs of neighboring countries have, however, been refuted by the conclusions of North American diplomatic analysts, as we will see in Chapter 3· Argentina, for its part, did not conceal its desire to forge closer ties with the countries around it in order to diversify its import and export markets and thereby reduce its dependence on the hegemonic economic powers. 9 Some observers cited the economic agreements that Argentina signed with other Latin American countries as evidence of its expansionist ambitions, although such assertions have no basis. There were no sinister motives behind the credit extended to neighboring countries; such accords were signed mainly because, in the aftermath of World War II, Argentina was the only Latin American country in a position to grant these credits. Obviously, of course, the Buenos Aires government hoped that trade and credit agreements would enhance its political influence, as does any country when signing treaties of this kind. 10 Nor was the central role played by the feminine leader at Peron's side, Evita, consistent with fascism's "macho" style.U Evita served as a liaison between Peron and the working class, and besides founding the Partido Peronista Femenino (the women's branch of the Peronist party) as a means of integrating women into the political process, she helped recruit marginal groups to the Peronist cause through the Eva Peron Foundation. 12 Peron presented "justicialism" as an ideology representing a synthesis of four aspirations: idealism, materialism, individualism, and collectivism. He claimed that European fascism contained an excessive mixture of idealism and collectivism, without leaving any room for individualism or a healthy dose of materialism. Some researchers, too, resisted applying the fascist label to Peronism because they saw it as the imposition of a concept relevant to Europe in the interwar period on a Latin American movement and society. In other words, it reflected a Eurocentric viewpoint that sought to impose European concepts foreign to Latin American social and political realities. In the context of this view of Peronism as fascism, some researchers have claimed that Peron's regime was totalitarian. The emphasis here was on the appearance of active participation by the masses in the shaping of political life. Sociologists such as the Italo-Argentine Gino Germani claimed that democracy was based on true participation by

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

the masses in the political process, whereas Peronism, like every form of totalitarianism, created only the illusion of such participation, instilling in many the deceptive feeling that they had become a deciding factor in public affairs.U This interpretation also assumes that the working class was divided when Peronism arrived on the scene, that only uneducated workers with no class consciousness supported Peron, and that the proletariat's role in the events that brought Peron to power was completely passive-assumptions that cannot be substantiated by empirical facts. The totalitarian paradigm, too, is problematic with respect to the Peronist regime. The Peronist regime did begin to develop totalitarian ambitions, expressed in the political indoctrination of citizens through the education system and the regime's efforts to attain ideological hegemony.14 Peron maintained an authoritarian conception of politics, often considering his opponents as "enemies" rather than leaders of a legitimate political opposition, 15 and the last years of his government were characterized by a general drift towards a semicorporative state. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the fact that Peron was put in power by free and fair elections such as had never been seen before in Argentine political history. What is more, throughout the ten years of his government Peron punctiliously held regular elections for president, the national congress, the provincial governors, and other offices. On each occasion Peronism proved victorious at the polls, gradually increasing the slim majority it had won in 1946 to about two-thirds of the vote in the presidential election of November 1951. Thus, from an electoral standpoint, Peronism enjoyed democratic legitimacy. It should be mentioned, too, that at least formally Peron respected the republican institutions of the state, including the congress and the judicial system. 16 In fact, many of the social and political attributes of a pluralistic society were preserved to one degree or another. Opposition parties continued to operate in Argentina, particularly the UCR, which always had a few representatives in parliamentY Although these parties were kept on a short leash, Argentina could not be described as a single-party state in those years. Freedom of speech, too, was subject to various limitations, and Peronism gradually began to take over the various communication media. 18 Yet newspapers and other publications continued to appear, notably the venerable La Naci6n, which never did come under the control of the regime. 19 Although human rights were violated in Peron's Argentina, the abuses never approached the wholesale brutality of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia-or, ultimately, post-Peronist Argentina. There were no executions and no disappearances, although torture of political prisoners was reported and some people fled the country in fear for their lives. Obviously, the fact that Peron was elected president in the wake of the world war and the defeat of fascism encouraged him to

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15

preserve some of the conventions of democracy, particularly the institution of parliamentary and presidential elections.

PERONISM AS A POPULIST MOVEMENT

Researchers have, of course, put forward additional and even more dubious interpretations presenting Peronism as a type of Bonapartism, comparing Peron's leadership with that of the German prime minister Otto von Bismarck in the second half of the nineteenth century or, later, claiming that Peronism was a phase in a national, popular process tending toward the establishment of national socialism. Nevertheless, the most relevant interpretation of Peronism would still appear to be the view that identifies it with the populist movements of Latin America. Populism is one of the most nebulous concepts in the modern political lexicon, for various reasons. First, populist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have worn different aspects in different places (the narodniki of Czarist Russia, the late nineteenth-century U.S. agrarian movement, and the primarily urban Latin American populism). Second, whereas socialists and communists of the twentieth century usually thought it important to indicate their ideological and political identity through the names of their parties, the populists did not. It is we-historians, sociologists, and political scientists-who must identify and classify populist movements as such. Of course, the lack of a coherent, systematic ideology such as liberalism or Marxism does not make the researcher's task any easier. The long, zigzagging careers of many populist politicians compound the problem, especially in the case of charismatic leaders who changed their policies, strategies, and ideological principles over the course of several decades. However, what makes it even more difficult to differentiate populist movements from other political formations is that the word populism has frequently been employed as a derogatory term that both right-wing and left-wing politicians throw at each other when they want to accuse their rivals of conducting policies in which considerations of short-term popularity outweigh those of "the good of the nation" or "the interests of the state." Manifestly left-leaning researchers have also tended to adopt simplistic definitions that do nothing to elucidate the phenomenon, reducing it to manipulation on the part of the leaders and irrationality on the part of the followers or presenting it as synonymous with demagoguery and corruption. According to Dale Johnson, for example, populism was little more than the skillful demagoguery of bourgeois elites appealing to "certain non property holding sectors of the middle class, workers, and

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the enfranchised sectors of the urban mass who are able to control labor and popular organizations." 20 Experts in this field have been stumbling periodically over the concept of populism for more than four decades. In the r96os, Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner wrote: "There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity, or does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies?" [Emphasis in the original.]2 1 In fact, the roots of Latin American populism, like those of European fascism, can be found in the same political, social, and cultural phenomenon known as the entry of the masses into politics. 22 In post-World War I Latin America, rapid urbanization, the development of importsubstitution industries, the transportation and communication "revolutions," and the expansion of the state apparatus-all processes that had taken place in Europe some time earlier-began to create a new economic and social environment that provided fertile ground for the development of new ideas and new leadership. The lives of millions of people changed enormously, giving rise to great expectations of expanded political participation for the entire population, improved living conditions for the working class, and a less distorted distribution of wealth. In most Latin American countries in the early r9oos, however, the old oligarchies continued to rule, promoting, in cooperation with the economic metropolis (Britain or the United States), an economy based on agriculture and raw materials for export, and in general refusing to relinquish their monopoly on political rule or the privileges they had enjoyed in one way or another since the Latin American republics had gained their political independence in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Authoritarian regimes of various types were striving to defend oligarchic interests against the "dangers" of political democratization and social radicalization. The unfulfilled expectations of the masses began to give rise to social ferment. 23 Historian Michael Conniff divides the classic populist movements in Latin America into two periods. Those that emerged between the two world wars presented primarily political demands and sought a legitimate, representative government. These movements instituted a politics of the masses, but did not raise any significant social issues. In Argentina the prime example was the Radical Party under the leadership of Hipolito Yrigoyen, who came to power in 1916. 24 The populist movements after World War II, in contrast, faced different economic and social conditions engendered by local industrialization processes. These newer move-

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I7

ments typically transferred their focus and resources from agriculture to industry and sought to increase the working class's share of the national Income. The new populist leaders tended to embrace greater authoritarianism in their efforts to impose the economic and social solutions necessary for national development. They struggled to mobilize voters by means of the mass media, recognizing that working-class support was crucial and that improving workers' economic conditions was the price they had to pay for it. The populist movements of this second period, like those of the first, crossed class lines, although most of their power derived from the support of the urban working class and the national industrial middle class. The prime example of this in Argentina was, of course, the Pemnist movement, a coalition (or counterhegemonic bloc, if you will) including that part of the army that advocated industrialization as a way of ensuring national greatness, various sectors of the middle class, some of the national bourgeoisie, and, of course, most of the working class. Accordingly, Di Tella's working definition of populism still holds true: "a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass urban working class and/or peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these sectors. It is also supported by non-working-class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology." 25 That ideology represented the protests of the excluded, marginal groups who wanted power in society to be redistributed in favor of the majority. Solving the "social problem" by politically and socially integrating the masses as a means of preventing revolutionary ferment among them was the very core of Latin American populism in general and Peronism in particular. 26 Of course, this did not yet constitute a real ideology. The populist doctrines were eclectic and often contained contradictory elements. This ideological confusion stemmed, first of all, from the fact that the populist movements were broad coalitions representing virtually all social sectors except the traditional elites and the revolutionary opposition. Peronism, as a populist movement, offered nonviolent solutions to some of the main problems of Argentine urban society. It rejected the oligarchy on one hand and the socialist revolution on the other, proposing a reformist middle way that stressed statist values: relatively wide state control of social and economic affairs to prevent distortions and ensure progress, yet without challenging the principle of capitalist private property. As in most populist movements, nationalism was a central component of Peronism, as were a certain dose of anti-imperialist rhetoric and efforts to achieve a greater margin of economic independence. At the same time, Peronism promised social solidarity in order to contend with the alienation engendered in the working class by modern

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industrial capitalism, particularly among the migrants who poured into Buenos Aires and other large cities from the interior of the country. Peronism glorified work and workers (Peron himself rejoiced in the sobriquet of "First Worker," and customarily participated in mass assemblies in his shirtsleeves), recognized the workers' trade unions and encouraged their expansion, and took steps towards rehabilitating various aspects of popular culture and folklore that had previously been viewed with contempt by the European-oriented elites. That is, a new symbolic hierarchy of society was established. After all, the symbolic expressions of social integration and political incorporation were no less important than their material, concrete manifestations. In their discourse, the populist leaders assigned new meanings to key words and concepts of their respective political cultures. Peron radically changed the connotations of words previously used to denigrate different groups, such as descamisados ("shirtless"), to the point of converting them into the essence of a new Argentine collective identity. 27 Like most populist leaders, he incorporated in his discourse colloquialisms and other elements of popular culture: Buenos Aires slang, verses from Martin Fierro, and direct or indirect allusions to familiar tango lyrics. In mass meetings, Peron attacked the established elites and the "antinational" oligarchy, thereby boosting his followers' sense of dignity and self-esteem. According to the sociologist Alvarez Junco, "by convoking them as 'a people' and describing them as 'the backbone of the country,' the populist leader gives them a sense of community and a set of beliefs that protect them against the helplessness engendered by modern life, and against the annihilation of the religious view of the world and the traditional ties and ways of life." 28 Certainly the working class's great and enduring loyalty to Peronism can be attributed to this combination of material improvement in workers' lives and the fostering of a strong sense of symbolic dignity, of being an important and inseparable part of the Argentine nation.

THE DIRECT BOND BETWEEN THE CHARISMATIC LEADER AND THE MASSES: A RECONSIDERATION

Like every populist movement, Peronism revolved around a charismatic leader. The concept of charisma derives from a Greek word usually translated as "gift of grace." The term is commonly defined as a special quality, power, or talent that gives its possessor various abilities, the first of them being the power to evoke passionate popular support for a mission or for the possessor's own guidance in human affairs. 29

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

19

The greater part of academic research on this subject since World War II has been based on the ideas of the German sociologist Max Weber. Weber made a distinction between three types of legitimate authority: one based on rational grounds, the second on traditional grounds, and the third on charisma. According to Weber, charisma is a particular (and elusive) quality that sets its possessor aside from ordinary people, who treat the charismatic individual as though he or she were endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional attributes. These attributes cannot be attained by an ordinary person and are considered to be divine or miraculous in origin. The individual displaying these attributes is therefore treated as a "leader." 30 According to most research, charismatic authority is usually manifested at times of crisis, when many people feel they are losing their ability to cope with their situation; consequently, they look for a leader who will lead them down a clearly defined path and provide solutions for economic or social difficulties or problems related to their collective identity. 31 Charismatic leadership is not necessarily authoritarian. 32 Recognition on the part of those subject to authority is the crucial factor in charismatic leadership, 33 which imparts a degree of democracy to any relationship between a charismatic leader and the masses. At least initially, the endowment of the charismatic leader with authority is a voluntary act. In the case of Argentina, there is no question that, once installed in the presidential palace, the charismatic leader-Peron-manipulated his authority in order to retain power and to ensure his own political survival. Nevertheless, in his relationship with the people, the charismatic leader is also dependent on the masses; he is constantly spurred to continue the process of incorporating marginal sectors into the political community, which gave Peronism an emancipative character. Under these circumstances, the leader must also repeat his triumph in order to justify and perpetuate his charismatic charm. This dynamic corresponds to another populist attribute of Peronism: its constant drive to renew its mandate from the people. Peronism was an electoral movement that encouraged citizens to participate in politics, mobilizing new groups that had not previously been involved in public life. In Peron's ten years of rule, the right to vote was extended to the entire population; a Peronist women's party was established, and in the presidential election of November 1951 women voted for the first time. Adult schools, which operated in the evenings and taught basic skills such as reading and writing, provided channels for mobilizing illiterates and semi-illiterates. Indoctrination in the schools facilitated the political socialization of children and young people, as did the youth organization for secondary-school pupils, Union de Estudiantes Secundarios

20

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

(UES). The Eva Peron Foundation built housing for single-parent families, and the elderly also received special attention. All these measures were designed to ensure the continued endorsement of the charismatic leadership. The tensions and ambiguities inherent in the contradiction between the authoritarian appropriation of the public will and the inclusion in the political community of groups formerly excluded were evident in Peronism, as in most populist movements. Nearly all research on charismatic authority emphasizes the direct bond between the leader and the masses; but this approach, in my view, is inadequate, and should be reassessed with respect to Peronism. Madsen and Snow, for example, have written an important book that transfers the focus from the charismatic leader himself to the masses who support and empower him. They define the concept of charisma as: an influence relationship marked by asymmetry, directness, and, for the follower, great passion. Asymmetry means that the leader has profound influence on attitudes and behavior of the following but that the opposite is not true; the following does provide the all-important empowering responses ... , but its other influence on the leader is muted. Directness means the absence of sig-

nificant mediation of the relationship, by either formal structures or informal networks [my emphasis]. 34

Edward Shils, in an earlier but no less important work, characterized populist movements as those that recognize the supremacy of the people over every other standard and desire a direct relationship between the people and their leader, unmediated by institutions [my emphasis]. 35 Many of the works that speak of the direct relationship between the leader and the masses also refer to the "irrationality" of the masses' devotion. This irrationality is attributed to actors who "did not correctly see what their 'true' self-interests were, for reasons of emotionality [or] false consciousness" -as though the "true" interests of any particular social group can always be determined. 36 This issue takes us back for a moment to the debate engendered by Gino Germani's research concerning worker support for Peron. For a long time most historians tended to argue that Peron's support came mainly from "new" workers-that is, those who had recently migrated to the capital from the interior provinces as a result of the industrialization-particularly of import substitutesand urbanization of the 1930s. According to this argument, such workers held traditional views, were accustomed to paternalist authoritarianism, lacked class consciousness, and were averse to revolutionary views. This uneducated mass, supposedly motivated by irrational considerations, fell an easy prey to Peron's charisma. The magic of mass rallies,

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

21

in which individuals lose their sense of independent judgment, and the unending roar of slogans were enough to ensure these workers' support for Peron. Veteran workers, in contrast, being primarily European-born, better educated, and possessed of a greater class consciousness, apparently maintained their loyalty to the left-wing parties. 37 A series of revisionist studies have questioned the validity of this interpretation. Veteran trade union leaders played a prominent role in the rise of Peronism. In contrast to the confederation of labor unions, Confederacion General de Trabajadores (CGT)-which a few months before the June 1943 revolution split in two (CGT-1 and CGT-2) as a result of ideological and personal differences-the working class itself was not divided (at least not between "new" and "veteran" workers). What is more, the working class's role in Peron's rise to power was not passive. Not only new and nonunionized workers, but also most of the organized labor movement gradually came to support Peron in the years 1943-45-motivated by concern for their own interests, not Peron's. Support for him came from all the working sectors and meshed with the reformist project that some labor leaders had begun to develop in previous years. 38 Just as the argument concerning the division of the working class does not help us understand the broad support Peron enjoyed in 1945-46, in my view the notion of a direct and unmediated bond between the charismatic leader and the masses does not help us understand the development of the Peronist movement and doctrine. My own research indicates that the various historians studying Argentina have fallen into the trap of believing the Peronist rhetoric concerning this alleged bond and have ignored almost completely the intermediary role of people from various social and political sectors who contributed, in their respective ways, to the mobilization of support for Peron, the structuring of his leadership, and the development of the justicialist doctrine. Although admittedly Peron did not use well-established party and institutional channels to mobilize support and to transmit messages to the masses in the years 1943-46, it cannot be said that he dispensed with mediating agents and was able by himself to create a direct and sustained bond with the masses and rally them for his own purposes. Although Madsen and Snow, like Edward Shils and others, do see a point at which the relations between the charismatic leader and the masses are mediated, in their view this point comes only later, during the "routinization" of charisma: "routinization involves the gradual transformation of charisma from a direct, concentrated, and emotionally intense relationship to an indirect, dispersed, and less passionate one." 39

22

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

They argue that the first stage in this process involves the appearance of intermediary roles between the leader and his followers, which Weber called "the charisma of office": The emergence of such intermediary roles ... occurs gradually as the leader finds it more and more difficult to maintain frequent and direct ties with his or her following. It is a development which flows from success, from the need to deal with a large and scattered movement. With such a transformation, and especially if the charismatic leader becomes head of state, the ability of any such leader to maintain a direct tie with his or her following is very much diminished. 40

I contend, however, that these intermediary roles do not emerge as a result of success, because success is not possible without these intermediary roles. Accordingly, the view that the intermediaries and the way they built up power and prestige in their own right became a relevant issue only after Peron was sworn in as president in June 1946 (and some claim only after his overthrow in September 1955) will hinder any understanding of the process that shaped Peronism as a movement and a doctrine in the three years between June 1943 and Peron's ascension to power in June 1946. Some researchers of populism see Peron in the guise of a nineteenthcentury caudillo, perhaps as a result of propaganda disseminated by the enemies of Peronism during Peron's rule, which portrayed his regime as a new edition of the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas. 41 However, the image of Rosas, the Restaurador de las Leyes ("Restorer of the Laws"), cannot reasonably be transplanted to the situation and conditions of a society in the throes of post-World War II modernization. The direct bond with the masses that was possible in a proto-urban, preindustrial society was no longer possible in the Argentina of the 1940s. For the masses to be moved by the charismatic leader's rhetoric and thereby induced to vote him into power, they had to be prepared first by intermediary agents, which in Peron's case were neither the veteran parties nor the organizations already deeply rooted in local political life, but rather a variety of relatively new persons and organizations that emerged shortly before his rise to power, and, after he assumed the presidency, assorted government agencies. Historiography, which has devoted so many pages to Peron and the woman at his side, Evita, has so far hardly mentioned the role played by the second line of Peronist leadership. Such personalities as Juan Atilio Bramuglia and Angel Borlenghi served as important liaisons in the mobilization of working-class support and in the definition of the social content of Peronism; Colonel Domingo Mercante

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

23

helped Peron maintain his hold on both the Argentine army and the labor unions; the industrialist Miguel Miranda promoted Peronism among the new national industrialist bourgeoisie; and the ideological background Jose Figuerola had brought from Spain helped him strengthen the nationalist and corporativist orientations of the justicialist doctrine. As time passed, Peron himself fell for his own rhetoric and began to believe that he did not need any help to mobilize mass support. He saw himself as the incarnation of the will of the people, which went above and beyond all persons and institutions. He gradually got rid of most of the people who had played important roles in his rise and the consolidation of his power, including Bramuglia, Mercante, Figuerola, and Miranda, and surrounded himself instead with yes-men who had no independent support bases or mobilizing ability of their own-what Guido Di Tella once described as the "very personalist, arbitrary practices that had cost him [Peron] so much ... in terms of respectability and public acceptance ... the inevitable characteristic of a charismatic leader who cannot tolerate any competition whatsoever." 42 In my view, this behavior probably contributed to a certain detachment on Peron's part from what was happening in society. More than that, it was one of the factors in the atrophy of Peronism in power and its conversion from reformist populism to authoritarian populism, leading ultimately to the overthrow of the regime. 43 In this connection, a distinction should be made between two kinds of intermediary bureaucracy: representative bureaucracy, in which functionaries enjoy status and prestige in their own right and belong to different social sectors; and purely technocratic, functional bureaucracy, in which functionaries have no ties with different sectors or any real power of their own, but serve merely as tools in the hands of the leader for the purpose of ruling the people. When a regime is based on this second type of bureaucracy, it is cut off from its original social base, and the masses grow increasingly alienated.

THE SECOND LINE OF PERONIST LEADERSHIP

One way to prove my argument concerning the existence of mediators between the charismatic leader and the masses even in the early stages of this movement is by means of a sort of "collective biography"-in other words, thorough research on the "second line" of Peronist .leadership, which permitted Peron's victory in the elections of February 1946 and helped establish him in power, besides shaping the justicialist doctrine.

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

I will provide a few brief examples to show the importance of such research, before focusing, in the following chapters, on a single figure, Juan Atilio Bramuglia. The justicialist ideology was eclectic in nature. This eclecticism was, of course, due partly to the heterogeneity of the Peronist coalition and the need to respond to the demands of different social sectors, 44 but it was also a function of the different influences of some of the major figures who were close to Peron in the crucial years of 1943-46, especially in the National Department of Labor and Social Welfare. This is not to imply that Peron did not have views of his own or that he was under the sway of those around him. However, Carlos Fayt was not far off the mark when he wrote: Endowed with an uncommon mental receptivity, [Peron] understood immediately what his advisors explained to him, and he had the sense to let things be done, signing the decrees that his advisors prepared ... During this period, which was crucially important for the development of social legislation and key in recruiting the workers' movement, Peron followed nearly to the letter the suggestions of his advisors, repeating the concepts and ideas that they gave him in his speeches to the delegations who visited him or at the functions he attended. 45 Accordingly, in the following pages I will examine these advisors' ideological contributions and political function, hoping to fill-to some extent, at least-this historiographic void and to show, among other things, that the Peronism of the 1940s and 19 50s was more heterogeneous and complex than its monolithic image suggested. Before focusing on Bramuglia and his contribution to Peronism in the years 1943-49, I will outline the roles played by four other important figures in the second line of Peronist leadership: Borlenghi, Mercante, Figuerola, and Miranda.

ANGEL GABRIEL BORLENGHI: MINISTER FOR (ALMOST) THE DURATION

While most of the second line of Peronist leadership was gradually removed from the scene as Peron confronted various economic and political problems, Angel Borlenghi somehow managed to retain his position as minister of the interior from June 1946 to June 1955, a survival record unsurpassed in any ministry-not only under the Peronist regime, but also in the political history of the country. What was the secret of Borlenghi's political staying power? Perhaps the fact that he himself

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

25

never dreamed of aspiring to the leadership, and so did not present a challenge, or threat, to Peron's leadership gave him some immunity; or perhaps his absolute fidelity to a certain ideology and political leadership protected him. The answers are unclear, partly because of the conspicuous lack of documents relating to this man's political career. When the so-called Liberating Revolution began in September 1955, Borlenghi was out of the country. The security forces that burst into his home at 464 Talcahuano Street in Buenos Aires destroyed every document they found there, as well as those held by his family. 46 Peron himself, while in exile, thanked Borlenghi for his contribution to Peronism, emphasizing his "modesty and wisdom which demonstrated his true, authentic grandeur." 47 Son of Italian immigrants, Borlenghi was born in March 1906 in the Nueva Pompeya neighborhood of Buenos Aires. He began his political career in his teens, in 1922, in a socialist center in Buenos Aires and was soon trying to unionize the commercial employees, who worked in deplorable social conditions. It was not easy, especially because these workers had no "class consciousness" and their working-class affiliation was questioned. Self-taught, gifted with an uncommon memory, and so diligent that he sometimes worked more than eighteen hours a day, within a few years Borlenghi had become the secretary-general of the Confederacion General de Empleados de Comercio (the commercial employees' union), which had tens of thousands of members all over the country. Under his leadership, it became one of the most important unions in the nation in the 1930s. From this position, Borlenghi began to establish contacts with different members of the national congress-Conservatives, Radicals, and Socialists-as well as with the successive presidents, Agustin P. Justo, Roberto M. Ortiz, and Ramon Castillo, and presented various petitions to the legislative power in his efforts to promote different social laws. His activity contributed to the enactment of the Ley del Sabado Ingles (a law prohibiting work on Saturdays after 1:00 p.m.) and the Ley de Indemnizaci6n por Despido (a severance-pay law that included advance notice of dismissal, paid vacation, sick leave, compensation for industrial accidents, etc.). 48 The enactment of this second law was celebrated with a mass assembly at the Teatro Maravillas on July 19, 1934. National legislators from different parties spoke at this event: Octavia Cordero for the UCR, Carlos Curelli for the Partido Democrata Nacional (National Democratic Party), and Silvio Ruggieri and Alfredo Palacios for the Socialists. However, Borlenghi devoted his greatest efforts to getting a retirement law for his union passed. From 1932 on he continued to campaign

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

for this demand, which he put before any other plan or cause. During this period, Borlenghi also became one of the most prominent leaders of the CGT. Around the middle of that decade, the Socialists took over the key positions in the organization. Borlenghi was part of the brand-new executive board, and was confirmed in his position by the CGT congresses of 1936 and 1938. He was the speaker at the inaugural session of the congress of December 1942. In spite of his union and political activism, however, the Socialist Party never put his name on the ballot. All Borlenghi's efforts in this direction failed, a circumstance that both wounded the feelings of the energetic union leader and determined his future strategy. Prominent figures of Argentine socialism, such as Senator Mario Bravo, the Dickmann brothers, and Deputy Silvio Ruggieri, applauded the struggle waged by Borlenghi and his "starched collar" comrades in the commercial employees' union. Nonetheless, the Socialist Party's executive committee kept the parliamentary door closed to the prominent members of the younger generation of Socialists. The fact that Borlenghi was self-taught did him no good in the "party of doctores," either. According to various observers and researchers, Borlenghi never enjoyed the party's trust, for a number of reasons. One possible strike against him was the fact that his name had appeared on a manifesto that led to the formation of the Independent Socialist Party (although he claimed that his signature had been included without his consent}; another was his large herd of eager and uncontrollable personal followers; and yet another was the fact that he did not comply with the code of austerity adopted by the other Socialist leaders. Instead, he dressed elegantly (in union circles he was known as a dapper Dan, or "el planchado"), his office was carpeted, and he was considered a womanizer. 49 Whatever the reasons, the conduct of the Socialist leadership left people like Borlenghi and Bramuglia feeling disappointed, bitter, and distrustful of the veteran leaders of the party. In 1942 two factions were competing for the leadership of the CGT: one headed by the railway man Jose Domenech and the other by the municipal unionist Francisco Perez Leir6s, who enjoyed the support of the Communists. The central committee was appointed in the midst of fierce disputes; when it met in March of 1943, it found itself with separate candidate lists from each of the two factions. Borlenghi was on both slates, but neither achieved the necessary majority. The conflict intensified, and because agreement could not be reached, the workers' confederation split in two, into CGT I and CGT 2. At the decisive moment, Borlenghi was with CGT 2, with Perez Leir6s and the Communists. After the coup d'etat of June 4, CGT 2 submitted a proposal to the new interior minister, General Alberto Gilbert, suggesting a mass dem-

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

onstration of worker solidarity in the Plaza de Mayo. At the same time, Borlenghi and Perez Leiros approached the government demanding freedom of association, the release of prisoners, and severance of relations

with the Axis countries. The military government rejected the proposal and closed down CGT 2. Borlenghi and Perez Leiros moved into the opposition. On November 8, a workers' delegation made up of railway workers and representatives of other unions, including Borlenghi, met with Peron in his capacity as head of the National Department of Labor and were in general favorably impressed by him. A month later, Peron met with a delegation of the commercial employees in his office at the new Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare. "Ask me for everything you need," he told them, and Borlenghi mentioned his old battle for the pension fund, which had been partially sanctioned by the national congress. "All right. We will promulgate Law 11.729."50 This promise reconciled Borlenghi to Peron, but it was only after the promise had become a decree-law that the relationship between the two men was sealed and Borlenghi's loyalty to Peron and the nascent Peronist movement was assured. As Colonel Mercante told the story: We also had to contend with the resistance of a few unions. For example, we could only get Borlenghi to commit himself after getting him retirement pensions for the Commercial Employees, an old union ambition. I even pretended that we were going to take over the Confederation of Commercial Employees, because the guy wanted to capitalize on his move towards us, without making a political commitment. When the [union] pension [law] came out, [Borlenghi] had to hold a ceremony in front of the Secretariat of Labor, which he attended with his entire staff and thousands of grateful employees. 51

In the early stages, Borlenghi did not conceal his disagreements with the military regime. At his meeting with President Ramirez he questioned Argentine neutrality in the war and emphasized that the workers wanted greater collaboration with the other American countries. The union of commercial employees also noted its differences with the regime's union policy. Nevertheless, Borlenghi very quickly became convinced that Peron represented a real chance for improving the conditions of the Argentine working class. Accordingly, during a meeting with Communist leaders in February 1944, he asserted that "with this government or any other, he was not disposed to abandon the fight for immediate gains." 52 Borlenghi's contribution to the mobilization of worker support for Peron was decisive. He enlisted that support by using the trade union he headed, his ties with other labor leaders, and, later, the daily paper he controlled: El Laborista, rechristened-significantly-El Lider, once

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

the Partido Laborista (Labor Party) had, willy-nilly, been incorporated into the new Peronist Party. After all, initially Peron did not intend to create a political system based on the support of the working class; nor did the unions show any inclination to accept Peron's claim to the country's leadership. There is no doubt that Borlenghi played an active role in the complex, tortuous political struggle that, on one hand, won popular support for the Peronist cause and, on the other, convinced Peron that he needed to adopt a progressive social policy. Borlenghi was almost always present at Colonel Peron's meetings with union leaders throughout 1944. From then on, Borlenghi helped Peron to explore the divisions between the left-wingers and to attract to his cause strong union leaders with Socialist affiliations. 53 Borlenghi also played a decisive role in organizing the CGT's first demonstration of support for Peron, on July 12, 1945. Although the ceremony marking the establishment of the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare in November 1944 had been modest, this time the display of forces was impressive. Some of the participants were already carrying signs saying "Peron for President." Others shouted over and over: "Neither Nazis nor Fascists: Peronists!" In the speech he gave on this occasion, Borlenghi said: The Revolution of June 4th, with all its mistakes, is just in time to go down in History as the achievement of a complete work of social justice. And in this respect the working class affirms that it need have no constitutional scruples concerning the powers of the de facto government to issue laws benefiting the workers. In 1930, when a de facto government was established and slowly delivered itself into the arms of the oligarchy, did the consitutionalists come along to say that that government did not have legislative powers?54 At the end of the event, the demonstrators marched to the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare and demanded to see the secretary. Peron appeared on the balcony, smiling and euphoric. Nonetheless, not all the members of the commercial employees' union approved this proceeding, and Borlenghi had to face some mutiny in the ranks. Dissatisfaction was particularly evident among some members from the interior of the country, who objected to supporting Peron, and among some activists in the capital who identified with the position of the Socialist Party. Some also complained that Borlenghi was managing the union like a dictator. Throughout 1945, Borlenghi and Bramuglia pressured the beleaguered military cabinet for the application of wage increases, the redistribution of earnings, and improvements in the social security system. Time and again they reminded Peron that the government would have a wider margin for maneuver if legislation regulated the legal rights to organize and negotiate. As we have seen, this was not the first time that the commer-

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

29

cial employees' union had helped draft legislation for the government. Deputies Juan Solari and Eduardo Araujo left the drafting of the law on retirement funds largely in the hands of union officials. At the Fourth National Congress of Commercial Employees (August 30-September 4, 1945), the delegates unanimously approved a resolution that asked the workers' movement to exert a permanent influence on the solution of economic, political, and institutional problems, in order to keep fighting for immediate general improvements and a more ambitious exercise of rights and freedoms that would permit the creation of the political, economic, and, accordingly, institutional conditions for greater social justice. 55 Their demands were, therefore, to restore electoral democracy and the freedom to organize and negotiate. Under Bramuglia's influence, the strongest union in the country at the time, the Union Ferroviaria (UF, the railroad workers' union), pressured Peron and the government with the same demands. During an audience with Peron on August 27, 1945, the railroad workers again demanded that he recognize the unions as legal entities, arguing that they could not get their petitions to management resolved. The companies clung to their prerogatives every time the unions' legal right to organize was asserted, denying the unions' basic rights to exist and to represent the workerseven though the unions enjoyed the support of most of the workers in the field. 56 The railroad workers stressed that free collective bargaining was not an issue that would be resolved by the mere existence of a network of labor courts (such as those established by decree in 1944); management would have to be compelled to recognize legal unions. The combined pressure from the two largest trade unions forced Peron to issue the decree of October 2 that extended full rights to the unions, including the right to participate in politics. This was a green light to form the party that would ultimately triumph in the elections of February 1946. Toward the end of the year, the railway workers and commercial employees became the first two certified unions in Argentine history. According to Jeremy Adelman, Borlenghi had long admired the British system of industrial relations and had thoroughly studied the actions of John L. Lewis, the architect of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Borlenghi's plan envisioned unions strong enough to negotiate independently with their employers while maintaining a loose connection with a political party that could guarantee the system's political defense. 57 The October 2 decree was the last straw for the authorities, convincing them that they should get rid of Peron. Once he was ousted and arrested by his military comrades, the union leaders began meeting to prepare a defense for Peron and themselves. According to Luis Gay, a

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

leading member of the old union guard who had helped Peronism get its start, resistance to the decrees governing social issues on the part of "the so-called powers that be-'powers that shouldn't be,' as they said in the street ... was what had rallied the workers of the entire Republic in practically a single front openly favorable to the social policy of the Revolution, including those workers who were still suspiciously waiting or entrenched in an attitude of passive hostility." 58 When the machinations to remove Peron from office began, Borlenghi sprang into action. On October 9 he and Jose Marfa Argaiia, among others, set up an "emergency committee" to mobilize their union. On the same day Borlenghi was with Peron when he bade his formal farewell to the Secretariat of Labor. A few days later, Borlenghi became a member of the Comite Nacional de Huelga (National Strike Committee), together with union leaders Silverio Portieri, Nestor Alvarez, B. Ugazio, and Luis Gay. The group decided that the unions would begin mobilizing on the 17th, "before noon." The strike progressed spontaneously. On the r6th and 17th, Borlenghi and the Comite members met with General Eduardo Avalos, commander of the Campo de Mayo garrison, and President Edelmiro Farrell to urge them to reach an agreement and avoid bloodshed. Two years later, in response to an accusation made against Borlenghi, Peron said: "The only thing I can tell you is that on 9 October, when I left the Secretariat of Labor, Borlenghi was at my side, and on the night of the 17th, when I returned to this house, he was also with me." 59 The officials of the Socialist Casa del Pueblo, who were betting heavily on the presidential candidates from the Union Democratica (Democratic Union), watched in distress as some of their best-known and influential activists, such as Bramuglia and Borlenghi, drifted away from the party of Juan B. Justo. Many called for sanctions against those party members who supported Peron. In this context, the testimony of Americo Ghioldi-an eminent Socialist leader who claimed to have taught Borlenghi the principles that the latter was defending so determinedly before Peron-is interesting, and reflects the frustration felt by the Socialist leaders: We socialists were concerned by the tactics that Peron was using to attract union leaders ... The case of Angel Borlenghi was fairly typical. For some time already we had been noticing that Borlenghi was becoming increasingly supportive of Peron, despite his socialist militancy. Doctor Groisman, sharing our worries, held a little meeting at his house to which Borlenghi was invited. I attended as well, and spoke vehemently with that comrade, explaining to him how we saw the process, and trying to move him from [his] position. 60

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31

In March 1944, Borlenghi made his last public appearance among the Socialists. Mario Bravo had passed away, and he was being buried amid socialist songs and political speeches. Borlenghi, too, stepped up to the improvised rostrum in the crematorium. A young Socialist nearby said to him, "You cannot talk here, because you have already 'gone over' to the enemy." Borlenghi ignored this comment, gave his speech, passed out copies of the text to the journalists there, and left. After the electoral victory of February 1946, Peron appointed Borlenghi minister of the interior, although it was unheard-of to give a union leader a position traditionally occupied by jurists. 61 According to Raul Margueirat, at the time when "ministries were being negotiated, Bramuglia wanted to be interior minister, and so did Borlenghi; the other ministries did not interest them. The interior ministry was a very powerful force. I think it was Eva's resentment of Bramuglia that made Peron give the ministry to Borlenghi; Bramuglia was asked to be foreign minister, and he was a brilliant minister." 62 The following years were notable both for the competition between Borlenghi and Bramuglia and for the cooperation between the two exSocialists in Peron's government. In the framework of the Proyecto de Historia Oral del Instituto Di Tella (Di Tella Institute Oral History Project) Oscar Albrieu was asked about the "groups that were active" at that time "in the upper echelons." In his response, he referred, among other things, to the fact that "Borlenghi also had his group, very close to Bramuglia's, who was in Foreign Relations." 63 In any case, most of the sources we consulted indicated that "for Peron the two ministers who were worth anything were Bramuglia and Borlenghi, since they were the two who talked in the cabinet; the others were all watching to see which way the wind was blowing." 64 As interior minister, Borlenghi assumed the role of "Peron's strongman," while eschewing the limelight. Some opponents dubbed him "Beria," alluding to the chief of the Soviet security and police apparatus under Stalin. Probably a few revolutionary-style declarations he made in 1947 to intimidate the opposition contributed to his image as a dangerous person who plotted behind the scenes. That year El Lider pointed out, with some exaggeration, that the Mexican Revolution had cost a million and a half lives. The article, inspired by Borlenghi, commented that this fact should not frighten anyone, because if the Peronist "revolution" caused the same number of deaths, "let it cost [those lives]. Revolution is no stroll in the park enlivened by gossip, anecdotes, and flirting." Accordingly, the daily Critica called Borlenghi "Angel dinamitero" ("blasting Angel"). 65

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership Borlenghi was to become a tool that Peron would use to close down the Labor Party that had been created immediately after the dramatic events of October 1945; it was incorporated into the Partido Unicode la Revoluci6n (Single Party of the Revolution), which would soon come to be called simply the Peronist Party. Borlenghi was one of the two people who competed for the leadership of the Labor Party in November 1945. Through the head of the commercial employees' union, Peron hoped to keep a close eye on this new political organism. However, Borlenghi lost the contest and instead had to settle for the editorship of the party newspaper. This incident was one of the indications of independence on the part of the Labor Party that Peron would not tolerate once he had won the elections. From the pages of El Laborista, Borlenghi encouraged a dissident movement within the Labor Party, one that espoused Peron's calls for unity and accused the party's executive committee of opposing democracy, Peronism, and the interests of the working class. The executive committee, in turn, condemned Borlenghi for his machinations "against the party" for the purpose of imposing unity "by force." In a similar manner, Borlenghi contributed to the effort to obtain political control of the CGT, although Peron's plan, beginning in November 1946, to place Borlenghi at the head of the organization did not succeed either. According to Luis Gay, the leader of the telephone workers' union, "I was confirmed as secretary-general, in my opinion, because the workers' movement wanted to vindicate the Labor Party, that is my impression and no one can convince me otherwise, because it was inexplicable ... that I could beat Peron's candidate, Borlenghi, without any effort." 66 Nevertheless, Borlenghi continued his efforts to ensure the loyalty of the workers' confederation. In fact, three months later Borlenghi was responsible for unseating Gay from the leadership of the CGT, on the pretext that Gay was conspiring with a delegation of United States unions (the American Federation of Labor) then visiting Buenos Aires to steal the working masses' support from Peron. 67 Following the abortive coup attempt led by General Benjamin Menendez in 1951, Peron authorized a series of institutional measures designed to strengthen the powers of the ministry of the interior, at the expense of those of the armed forces. A decree issued on November 13 created, within Borlenghi's purview, a new internal security body, the Consejo Federal de Seguridad (Federal Security Council), to coordinate the work of all the police forces on both the provincial and national levels. According to military historian Robert Potash, Borlenghi, who already controlled the 25,000 troops of the federal police, now assumed direct control of the Gendarmerfa Nacional (national police), a militarized

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33

border guard that had previously been under army supervision, and of the coast guard, a river and port police force that had been commanded by the navy. According to Potash, this step reflected both Peron's great faith in Borlenghi's loyalty and his effort to increase his government's invulnerability to potential dissatisfaction in the ranks of the military. 68 Borlenghi strove to Peronize the police forces and also helped create the false equation that Peronism and Argentine nationalism were the same. In a speech given at the Casa de Gobierno (Government House) on September 16, 1952, he said: "Our police must serve Peronism, because serving Peronism is serving the Nation. The police must be Peronist. We want Peronist police officers, because it is the best way for the population of the country to feel calm and secure; since the opposition, too, will not receive anything but justice and security from the police while it remains inside the law, something we hope they will understand some day." 69 Even Borlenghi, however, labored under the shadow of possible dismissal, despite his preference for working behind the scenes in order not to endanger his position in the government. A few years after he accepted the portfolio of the interior ministry, activists from various unions signed a petition for Borlenghi's dismissal, on the grounds that he was not loyal enough to Peronism. At a meeting with these leaders, Peron, visibly angry, maintained that his minister's attitude was impeccable. Only later did it emerge that the initiative for the petition had come from the Government Palace itself; Peron showed the letter to Borlenghi, promising that he would not use it, but remarking that he would file it away safely.7° Borlenghi also owed his long occupation of the interior ministry in part to his good relations with Evita. These were reflected in the letter that the First Lady sent to the deputy secretary of the Confederacion General de Empleados de Comercio, Jose M. Argafia, on March q, 19 52, when the commercial workers were celebrating the twentieth anniversary of their union with a tribute to its leader, Borlenghi. In the last paragraph of this message Evita lamented that she could not attend the celebration: "I would like to talk about so many things with the commercial workers! ... I would like to be with you all and be very eloquent tonight; my state of health will not allow me that satisfaction ... today I would like to be at your side, together with our leader, General Peron, and our comrade Borlenghi. I send you my heart and all my affection." 71 When Evita died, Borlenghi was effusive in eulogizing her: "Eva Peron! Martyr of labor, eminence of justice, saint of protection, heaven to the humble, sun of the defenseless, fairy godmother of the children." 72 From his position in the government, Borlenghi continued his efforts to attract socialist activists to the Peronist cause, with some success.

34

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

Following the triumph of Peronism, the Socialist Party had to fight to retain its position somehow as one of the main forces in the national political arena. Although they were not represented in the national congress, the Socialists continued the anti-Peronist struggle through other channels and were probably the most formidable and virulent opponents of the government/3 The Socialist criticism bothered the government, which tried to counter it by closing down La Vanguardia, 74 on one hand, and trying to woo those connected with it, on the other. When elections were held for the 1949 constitutional convention, the Socialist Party urged its members to cast blank ballots to show their opposition to the constitutional reform. This caused open conflict within the ranks of the party, and those activists who did not share the antiPeronist views began to publish Unidad Socialista, probably with state support. The internal divisions grew deeper at the general party convention in 1950, which featured a discussion of the reasons that Peronism enjoyed the support of the working classes/5 A number of Socialist leaders met at the home of Alfredo Palacios to prepare for a possible meeting between Palacios and Peron, the purpose being to obtain the release of several Socialist militants arrested on suspicion of involvement in Menendez's attempted coup. However, the political myopia of the Socialist Party leaders prevented the meeting from actually taking place, because they considered that it would have legitimized the Peronist regime. This led to the resignation of Dardo Cuneo, recently released from prison, from the party's executive board: Our indiscriminate opposition to Peronism forged an alliance with the habitual enemies of our movement. I could never have imagined that one day I would have to share jail time with that general who, learning that I was a socialist, treated me as a friend and ally, and during recreation time in the penitentiary would tell me how he had shot workers in Patagonia; and with the other general who, similarly, used to tell me that the immediate future of Argentine politics should belong to our Party and our men, because they were the right ones to "contain" -in the repressive sense-the demands of the working class; or with the priest who alluded to Peronist demagogy as a rejoinder conceived in the mold of Republican Spain. 76

Borlenghi was behind the effort to integrate Enrique Dickmann and his group of pro-Peronist Socialist Party dissidents into the ruling party. Dickmann, one of the most respected and veteran Socialist leaders, had already expressed doubts back in 1948 about his party's extremely hostile attitude toward Peronism. At the 36th party congress, he recommended to the participants that "each one act according to the situation and the dictates of his conscience." 77 In the early 1950s, after General

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35

Benjamin Menendez's failed coup and Peron's landslide victory in the presidential elections, the crisis in the Socialist Party deepened, eventually culminating in the meeting between Peron and Dickmann; by then the latter was one of the few survivors of the group that had founded the Socialist Party. When Peron received Enrique Dickmann, in early February 1952, the interior minister organized an audience that was also attended by the Socialist leader's son Emilio and Borlenghi himself. As a result, the release of various political and union prisoners was decreed, together with the reopening of La Vanguardia. At Borlenghi's suggestion, the president bestowed a medal on Dickmann for his university achievements-a medal that Dickmann had actually won almost 40 years earlier but never received because of his Jewish background. 78 Dickmann was expelled from the Socialist Party after that meeting with Peron/9 a circumstance that led him to found the Partido Socialista de la Revolucion Nacional (Socialist Party of the National Revolution), the members of which worked with or for official bodies. 8° For Peron, the gesture towards Dickmann was also one more opportunity to emphasize his own rejection of racism and anti-Semitism. 81 Contrary to what some have claimed, Borlenghi did not intervene in the conflict between Peron and the Catholic Church. 82 In fact, he was one of the government leaders most opposed to a confrontation with the Church. According to various sources, in November 1954, one day after Peron launched his attack against different clerics, Borlenghi met with Minister Alfredo Gomez Morales and commented on the inadvisability of Peron's proceeding: "Peron has really challenged the Church needlessly; at best this will not help, but only hurt." 83 Borlenghi, in any case, was forced to resign after the abortive coup of June 1955, which took place in the context of the continuing confrontation between Peron and the Catholic Church. It should be mentioned that one of the victims of the Plaza de Mayo bombing was his own sister, Emma Borlenghi de Gonzalez Leyra, struck down at noon on June 16 when she answered the CGT's call to assemble in front of the Casa Rosada (the presidential palace). One reason for the rebellion was the alleged order to burn the national flag-issued by Borlenghi himself to incriminate the Catholics. The interior minister had expressed the accusations during a midnight press conference held after the Corpus Christi celebrations of June rr, showing journalists the singed remains of a national flag. The Catholics responded by offering evidence, in turn, that it had been the police, acting on Borlenghi's orders, who had burned the flag to create a scandal and divert attention from the mass procession that the Catholics had managed to organize. 84 Admiral Anfbal

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

Olivieri, at the time minister of the navy, urged his colleague General Humberto Sosa Molina to tell the president that the only way to restore peace was to request Borlenghi's resignation from the interior ministry. 85 Peron, who was now trying to appease the opposition, dismissed those members of his government who were identified as anticlerical, such as the education minister, Mendez San Martin; the secretary-general of the CGT, Eduardo Vuletich; and the "Jew," Borlenghi. 86 Borlenghi was not Jewish, but was portrayed as such by the Catholic nationalists (one satirical leaflet dubbed him "Borlensky"). He was married to a Jew, Clara Maguidovich, and had named his brother-in-law, Abraham Krislavin, as his second-in-command at the interior ministry. 87 Borlenghi and Krislavin were behind the effort to bring Argentine Jews into the Peronist fold, a goal that led to the founding of the Organizacion Israelita Argentina (Argentine Jewish Organization), which tried in vain to rally the Jewish community to the Peronist cause. 88 It was also Borlenghi who conveyed to Peron his conviction that the Jewish Argentine Jose Ber Gelbard was the right leader to rally the business sector around Peron. 89 All these initiatives were part of Peronism's general inclination to promote the social and political integration of groups that had previously been marginalized. The main beneficiaries of this attitude were, of course, members of the working class, although it also affected various immigrant and ethnic groups, including Jews. Borlenghi handed in his resignation on June 29. 90 On July r he was arrested, but was released on the following day, after making a statement. He then left for Montevideo after being warned by the foreign minister, Jeronimo Remorino, that an attempt would be made on his life. Bidding farewell to a few friends and relatives, he departed with Peron's assistance. The next stop in his exile would be Havana. 91 Many opponents were relieved to hear that Borlenghi had been ousted; for them he symbolized the iron hand of the Peronist regime. The memoirs of Serafino Romualdi, a representative of the American Federation of Labor in Latin America since 1946, reveal a rather distorted and very negative image of Borlenghi that was fairly common in Argentine liberal and socialist circles: His career was filled with acts of treason to the Argentine labor movements [...] Borlenghi gave Peron the list of trade union organizations to be taken over, and the names of labor leaders that were to be jailed, exiled, beaten or ... bribed! [...] As Minister of Interior, Borlenghi had under his command the whole apparatus of the Argentine police. More workers were arrested under him in ten years than in the whole history of the Argentine labor movement, dating way back to the nineteenth century. Under his rule, the most savage tortures were inflicted on labor prisoners, and for the first time even women-a

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37

group of striking telephone workers-were subjected to the inhuman treatment of the electric needle. He [...] organized the Argentine Secret Police along the lines of the dreaded Gestapo. Borlenghi was the organizer of all the acts of destruction against La Prensa, the Jockey Club, the headquarters of the opposition parties, the People's House, the Juan B. Justo Library, down to the destruction of Buenos Aires churches and the residence of Church dignitaries-the last straw which prompted the Army to intervene and demand his elimination from the Government. 92 From the Caribbean island of his exile Borlenghi maintained constant communication with his union of commercial employees. During Peron's first years of exile, especially while he was in Venezuela, Borlenghi was also in close touch with the ex-president. After the Cuban Revolution, Borlenghi met Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who told him that Peron had unquestionably been the most advanced incarnation of political and economic reform in Argentina-although if he had had any significant influence on the traditional economic establishment these traditional forces would not have been in such a good position to overthrow the government. 93 In the early 196os, Che also mentioned the possibility of inviting Peron to settle in Havana. However, Peron never got to Cuba, and in 1961 Borlenghi had to leave the island under pressure from the Castro regime. When Francoist Spain refused to receive him because of his pro-Republic activism during the Civil War, 94 Borlenghi went to Italy for medical treatment, while his wife and daughter returned to Buenos Aires. On June 17, 1962, at the age of 56, he died in Rome in a municipal hospital. The minister accused of having provoked the conflict between Peron and the Church died as a good Christian in the Eternal City after receiving the sacraments. Thanks to Peron's good offices, his family was finally able to bury him in the La Almudena cemetery in Madrid. His funeral was held in 1963, in the Spanish capital, and was attended by the Perons. Peron apparently always felt a certain sense of respect and gratitude toward Borlenghi. Two years after his overthrow, Peron wrote from exile in Caracas to Borlenghi, in exile in Havana: My dear friend: I am just now finishing the last chapter of my book Los Vendepatrias, dedicated to all the comrades felled and persecuted by the canaille that afflicts our country. I wanted to dedicate it to you personally through this letter, since you have been one of our men most unjustly slandered, undoubtedly because you have also been the most useful and sincere servant of the People all your life. Although the struggle for the People carries with it these disadvantages, it nevertheless also offers immense satisfactions. After the sacrifices and poverty involved in our effort, we are beginning now to enjoy the satisfactions of public

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership recognition. It is precisely in these moments that I direct my gratitude to the men who, like yourself, gave everything for the Movement, motivated by no interest other than being loyal servants of the People and the Homeland. 95

After a few more paragraphs filled with praise and recognition of Borlenghi's contribution to Peronism-more than Peron's usual custom in his vast correspondence-he finished by saying, "That is the reason for this letter, which I hope will reach you as the sincere message of your constant friend and companion, who admiringly retains for you an indestructible affection and an inextinguishable gratitude." More recently, during the presidency of Carlos Saul Menem in the 1990s, permission was granted for Borlenghi's remains to be returned to Argentine soil, where they received public recognition from a Peronist government. 96

DOMINGO MERCANTE: THE HEART OF PERON?

Mercante is the only member of the second line of Peronist leadership who has aroused any scholarly and public interest in recent years-as a result of the publication of a book by his son, as well as various studies on his policies as governor of the province of Buenos Aires. 97 Born in Flores, Buenos Aires, in June 1898, Mercante was the son of a railroad machinist affiliated with the La Fraternidad union, so he had been familiar with union struggles from an early age. In 1916 he entered the Colegio Militar; after three years he was sent to the city of Cordoba, and subsequently to Goya, in the province of Corrientes. In 1924 he was stationed in Campo de Mayo, where he remained for 16 years. In the 1920s he had his first contacts with Peron, although they were sporadic and insignificant. It was in Mendoza, in 1941, that a deeper bond of camaraderie and friendship formed between the two officers. Later both coincided again in Buenos Aires, working under General Edelmiro Farrell in the inspectorate of mountain troops. Peron and Mercante were the key figures in the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU, Group of United Officers), a military lodge formed in March 1943 that facilitated contacts among officers in the garrisons of the federal capital. According to Mercante's son, "among the founding members Lieutenant-Colonel Domingo A. Mercante was number 1, while Colonel Peron had reserved for himself the last place, number 19, as the member in charge of coordination." 98 Much has been written about the GOU, which initiated the change of government in June 1943, and about its supposed pro-Nazi orientation.

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39

All its members had nationalistic ideas, shared a common contempt for a political system based on fraud, and favored a strong, interventionist state that would promote industrialization to guarantee the country's power and prestige. In addition, they supported continuing the policy of neutrality in the world war and feared the growing influence of communism on the working class. 99 After the coup of June 4, r943, when Farrell was appointed minister of war, Peron took over the secretariat of this ministry, and Mercante became chief military officer there. In this secretariat Peron established his first contacts with the workers' movement, even before he moved to the National Labor Department. Among the leaders of the GOU, Mercante was Peron's main ally in promoting labor policies. Although confronted by formidable obstacles, Mercante managed by dint of hard work to develop relations with union leaders. President Ramirez's repressive policy caused them even greater suspicion and distrust than what they had always shown toward the police, whom they considered reactionary and profascist. Mercante used the connections he had through his father and his brother Hugo (also a railway man, who worked in the port and was a member of the UF) to improve relations with the workers, especially those of the sector to which his family was linked. Mercante invited union leaders to discuss social and labor issues and arranged an audience for them with Peron. They left with the impression that despite the government's antiunion measures, someone in authority was ready to listen to them. In this respect special importance can be attributed to the relationship that Peron and Mercante established with Juan Atilio Bramuglia, political mastermind, expert on labor law, and key person for gaining the support of the UF. Mercante took part in the initiative to liberate the Communist union leader Jose Peter as part of an arrangement to end a strike at the meatpacking plants. This was the first time that these companies had ever agreed to sign a collective-bargaining contract. However, Peter, secretarygeneral of the Federacion de Obreros de la Industria de laCarne (Federation of Meat Industry Workers), was not disposed to support Peron's policies. Mercante then began working on promoting a rival union in the meat industry, headed by Cipriano Reyes. The task of rallying the support of the working class was easier for Mercante after he was named director-general of labor and direct social action in December r943, when the department was upgraded to a secretariat. His work was further facilitated by his appointment as interventor in La Fraternidad and the UF. According to his son, "The strike carried out by the railroad workers had become dangerous for the government as a result of the confrontations initiated by the railway workers and the

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

political inexperience of their interventors. 'OK,' Ramirez said to him [Farrell], 'if Peron can stop the strike, he will be welcome. Let me know what he wants.'"

The next day, Mercante went to Government House with a message from Farrell. Briefed by Peron, he let the President know that the war minister thought Peron should be appointed interventor in the UF and La Fraternidad and that it would also be a good idea to replace Colonel Carlos Giani in the "obscure National Department of Labor, completely ignored and lacking any political value, [a position] for which heMercante-offered his sincerest collaboration." 100 Ramirez immediately granted the wishes of his minister of war, but switched the appointments: Mercante would be interventor among the railway workers, and Peron would move to the "obscure" Labor Department. As Mercante's son later described it, "My father took over the intervention. He reinstated the dismissed leaders and ordered the release of the prisoners. The strike ended immediately." From then on, one of Peron's main tactics was undoubtedly to woo the UF. Mercante restored Domenech's circle to the leadership and cancelled the scheduled reorganization that threatened the future of the union. Both Peron and Mercante assiduously visited union offices around the country, personally assuring members that they were committed to extending benefits (such as paid vacations and health coverage) and social justice for workers. During those months, Mercante became one of Peron's loyal followers and an important link with the working class. A number of union bosses asserted, some months later, that "with Peron and Mercante Argentina is moving ahead" ("con Peron y con Mercante Ia Argentina va adelante"). On October 9 Peron was obliged to resign all his duties under pressure from both the Campo de Mayo garrison and the civilian opposition. Mercante was with him, and the following day both of them met with a delegation of unionists led by the telephone worker Luis Gay, who urged Peron not to abandon his leadership of the labor movement. The deposed officer requested permission from President Farrell to deliver a farewell speech to the workers, and Mercante began to coordinate a massive demonstration in front of the secretariat. The speech Peron gave on that occasion, transmitted by national radio, was described by his biographer Page as "one of the most effective of his entire political career." 101 Peron perfectly understood the anger that his speech aroused among his opponents in the army, and rumors about possible attempts on his life reached his ears. At this point, Mercante suggested that he write a letter to the minister of war, General Avalos, to ask for leave from his

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military duties and to inform him that he would be staying at a friend's ranch. Peron agreed. Just before they parted, however, Mercante said to him, "You're not going to leave the country, are you? We're going to keep on playing the game, right?" "You bet we are!" was Peron's categorical response. 102 Mercante was with Peron when the colonel was arrested on October 13 and tried to reassure him that not all was lost yet. In an effort to save their sociopolitical plan and both their political careers, he went out to encourage the labor leaders to take action. On the r2th he had already met with union leaders at the secretariat and discussed with them the possibility of calling a general strike. By the following day he was spreading the news of Peron's arrest through greater Buenos Aires, and on October I4 he was arrested himself and taken to Campo de Mayo, where he was confined in a small room guarded by a sentry. From the island of Martin Garcia, Peron sent a long letter to his "loyal friend," in which he wrote, among other things, "as soon as they give me my retirement, I'm getting married and to hell with it all." 103 General Avalos freed Mercante from Campo de Mayo on October I7 in order to use him as a liaison with Peron. Peron himself had also been transferred, at dawn, from the island of Martin Garcia to the Central Military Hospital in Luis Marfa Campos Street, as crowds were beginning to gather in the Plaza de Mayo demanding the release of the man who would later be president. Mercante maneuvered very skillfully throughout that dramatic day, until Peron greeted the multitudes from the balcony of the Casa Rosada. 104 This event marked the birth of Peronism as a movement and in subsequent years was celebrated as People's Loyalty Day (Dia de Ia Lea/tad Popular). 105 Under the new circumstances in the Argentine political arena, Peron officially declared his candidacy for the presidency. Pressure by Peron and by union leaders ensured Mercante's appointment as secretary of labor and social welfare, and during the following weeks Mercante worked feverishly with the provincial delegations throughout the country to mobilize support for the list headed by Peron. According to Felix Luna, "[t]he Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare ... was ready now, in October 1945, to be the driving force of the campaign that would take him [Peron] to the presidency ... [The Secretariat] was a supercommittee that in the Peronist faction compensated for the lack of daily papers, the improvisations of political organization, and the financial straits that plagued Peron's campaign." 106 The government ignored the complaints of non-Peronist unionists and opposition newspapers, which claimed that the secretariat was openly disseminating electoral propaganda. On December 20, in a ceremony

42

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attended by President Farrell, Mercante announced a new wage policy in the framework of Decree 33.302, which included a minimum wage and an annual Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's wages. Mercante put in a plug for Peron's candidacy by mentioning that the decree was the fruit of the former labor secretary's efforts. The employer associations quickly condemned the decree and urged businesses not to pay the bonus. This led to a wave of worker strikes and lockouts by employers. Because most commercial interests were openly supporting the Democratic Union, these conflicts further reinforced Peron's image as a defender of the working class and of those union leaders who suggested voting for Peron instead of the Socialists or the Communists-who by default became allies of the employers. According to various writers, after the events of October it was "increasingly clear that Mercante is creating his own sphere of political power" 107 within the Peronist movement, without challenging Peron himself. This was reflected in Mercante's decision to turn down Peron's offer of the top position in the secretariat of the presidency if Peron won. "He did not like jobs he supposed to be merely administrative." 108 The Secretariat of Labor also played a primary role in the creation of the Labor Party, which was headed by labor leaders such as Luis Gay, the telephone workers unionist; Cipriano Reyes, of the meatpackers' union in Buenos Aires province; and Luis Monzalvo, of the railway workers. 109 Unsurprisingly, this new party wanted Mercante as its candidate for the vice presidency. Peron, however, did not want a ticket composed exclusively of military men, nor did he want an overly proletarian image; he preferred to round out his coalition with some other element. To that end, and because he had always sought support from the Radical Party, he chose an experienced politician from the second tier of the UCR, Hortensia Quijano, who had already linked his political future with Peron's during the final stages of the military government. After rejecting the Alejandro Leloir (ex-UCR)-Juan Atilio Bramuglia (ex-Socialist) ticket that Peron had wanted at one point for the government of Buenos Aires province (see Chapter 2), the leaders of the newly formed Labor Party demanded that Mercante ("the second man of the Revolution") run for governor. It was a demonstration of the political support enjoyed by Mercante, who did not want to play second fiddle to the Lider forever.U 0 The Labor Party's petition was finally approved, after much debate and internal squabbling, partly thanks to pressure by Eva Peron. 111 In the elections of February 1946, the Domingo Mercante-Juan Bautista Machado slate for governor of Buenos Aires province enjoyed a resounding triumph over the Radicals, with 436,866 votes against

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43

289,291. In spite of this considerable difference, it did not achieve a majority in both chambers of the provincial legislature. The UCR had 21 senators, as well as a renegade Labor Party member, compared with 20 seats for the Labor Party and the UCR-Junta Renovadora. The lower chamber consisted of 47 deputies from the Labor Party and the Junta Renovadora, versus 35 Radicals and two dissident Laborites. 112 Whereas on the national level pro-government forces controlled the majority in both chambers, the political panorama on the provincial level dictated a different relationship between the governor and the Radical opposition, which maintained its majority in the senate until 1948. Instead of trying to purge the anti-Peronists, Mercante tried to work with the Radical opposition and on numerous occasions obtained its support. The opposition cooperated with Mercante's management and ensured the twothirds majority necessary to approve various projects. This was a notable achievement in a society that was so deeply divided politically. The provincial government also permitted greater freedom of the press than did the federal government. Whereas Peron typically pursued a policy of confrontation with the opposition, Mercante sought consensus. This tolerant approach, together with the progressive image that his administration had managed to project, boosted his popularity considerably. A number of disagreements emerged between Mercante's administration and the national government, deriving from both Mercante's personal leadership style and the characteristics of the province of Buenos Aires. These differences had to do with the 1946 financial reform and its consequences for the autonomy of both the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires and the province itself; the encouragement of agriculture and fishing at a time when the central government was focusing on the promotion of industry; and the measures-albeit very cautious, of course, and nowhere near true agrarian reform-favoring a more equitable distribution of land, while the central government proposed no progressive agrarian policy. 113 According to Blanco, "Governor Domingo Mercante's marked insistence on democratizing rural property ... raises the possibility that there may have been a political strategy to create client networks that would sustain a different political project from that of the national government." 114 Mercante was governor for two terms (1946-50 and 1950-52), and his administration is considered one of the most effective the province has ever known. He developed a new leadership style and seemingly was beginning to create his own social base for a possible future presidential candidacy. He promoted numerous public works, such as the construction of many working-class neighborhoods, schools, and roads; the water-treatment plant for the cities of La Plata, Berisso, and Ensenada;

44

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the Sarandi Viaduct; the Instituto Tecnologico de Bahia Blanca (which subsequently became the Universidad Nacional del Sur); the Mar del Plata Provincial Hotel; the La Plata airport; the Children's Republic amusement park; and other projectsY 5 Mercante gathered around himself a group of Laborites, UCR-Junta Renovadora members, former members ofFuerza de Orientacion Radical de la Joven Argentina (FORJA, Force of Radical Orientation of the Young Argentina)-a national-populist, anti-imperialist movement116 that had emerged in mid-1935 from among those disillusioned with the UCR-and various others who had no political history but "were born into public life with the military coup of '43." His best-known associates included Arturo M. Jauretche, president of the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires, 117 and Arturo Sampay, public prosecutor of the province and later also president of the commission to study proposals for reform of the national constitution. In the legislative elections of March 1948, Peronists achieved a significant success in Buenos Aires. They won the majority in both houses of the provincial legislature and enjoyed a landslide victory in the municipal elections. 118 A few months later, in December, the Peronists won 66 percent of the vote in the election of delegates to the constitutional convention, with Governor Mercante topping the list. In 1949, Mercante's career reached its apogee when he presided over the constitutional convention convoked to reform the 1853 constitution. At this point he had an opportunity to demonstrate his personal style and leadership qualities. According to Page, Mercante maintained cordial relations with Moises Lebensohn, leader of the Radical delegates. The two men met frequently, and the governor committed himself to respect the Radicals' right to present their points of view without interruption, keeping his word until the Radicals decided to leave the convention and boycott its sessions. 119 Mercante was among those who, against Peron's wishes, facilitated the adoption of Article 40, which limited compensation for the expropriation of public services. However, taking his cue in part from the opposition of the president of the supreme court and possibly from a misunderstanding with Peron, Mercante did not support changing the article that prohibited presidential reelection. Until some time after the formal opening of the convention, Peron appeared to oppose reforming that article. According to Mercante's son, Peron said, "No, Mercante; after me, you. After that, if I can, I will return." It is not clear whether this was some kind of trap. In any case, one day before delegates voted down the prohibition on reelection of the holders of the national executive power, Mercante

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45

announced at a press conference that this clause of the 1853 constitution would not be revised, and Peron apparently got angry. Evita was one of the most zealous advocates of abolishing the constitutionally imposed limitation ("We must make him President forever"} and when the moment came to debate the issue, several Peronist delegates proposed an amendment to Article 77 that would allow the reelection of the president and vice president.l2° Once the new constitution had been approved and Peron's reelection for a second term made possible, the two soldiers-cum-politicians quickly parted ways. According to various rumors, Mercante had ambitions of being Peron's successor. A number of writers mention the specific "Mercantist" project he tried to implement in the province, which Peron torpedoed. The new national constitution did not sanction successive reelection for governors, but it did authorize the provincial governors elected in 1946 for four years to extend their terms by two years in order to synchronize them with the national government. This was done in several provinces, such as Santa Fe, Catamarca, and Corrientes. Mercante, however, expressed opposition to the automatic extension of his mandate as governor, explaining that the people had elected him for four years and no more. Accordingly he decided to call new elections in order to legitimize the extension of his term until 1952. These elections, which took place on March I2, 1950, were considered a test of strength for both Lieutenant-Colonel Mercante and Peronism. Eva Peron played a central role in the electoral campaign, calling on the people to vote for Peronism and emphasizing repeatedly that Mercante was simply the faithful executor of Peron's political plan. On one occasion, she said: ... next to the distinguished leader, the sole, indisputable Chief, General Peron, we must point out another man, whom I have seen take risks for him: Colonel Mercante. How much pride we all feel in knowing that the man who during uncertain times was at the side of the workers' leader is, in assuming the highest authority in Buenos Aires, fulfilling the ideals of General Peron by carrying out his extraordinary work. 121

Peronism increased its share of the vote in these elections, earning more than 63 percent: 486,549 versus the 282,343 received by the UCR, this time with Ricardo Balbin as candidate for governor. It should be mentioned that around the end of 1949 the Peronist bloc had expelled Balbin from the Chamber of Deputies for disrespect toward the President of the Republic. During the electoral campaign he was followed

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

constantly by the police, and on election day itself, he was arrested immediately after casting his ballot. Mercante tried to convince Peron that it was inappropriate to jail the Radical leader, from whom, said the governor, "we should seek support, not war." Peron responded: "No, Mercante, they started making war, and we are going to take this to its ultimate consequences ... If the President of the Republic does not earn respect, the country may end up in chaos ... let's not talk any more about it." 122 Balbin remained in prison for nine months, until he was pardoned by Peron in early 1951. 123 Was the Peronists' electoral triumph attributable to Mercante's popularity? Was this a confirmation of his status as possible successor to Peron? The answer is not at all clear. Peron, however, did not want to take any political risks, particularly now that "the party was over" and the government faced economic difficulties that could arouse social discontent. Mercante lost the internal support of the Peronist Party, but at no time did he consider an open confrontation with the president. Was this because of his loyalty to Peronist ideals or his personal commitment to Peron? Or was it a case of political realism and the recognition that he could not compete with the charismatic president who was so popular with the masses? A few weeks after the electoral victory of March 19 50, Mercante's name was suggested for a possible Peron-Mercante presidential ticket in the next elections. However, Peron had not the slightest interest in this idea, and the growing support for Evita's candidacy for vice president sidelined Mercante and others who had been considered. The story of the cabildo abierto ("open meeting") at which the multitudes called on the First Lady to accept the vice presidency has been told many times, and her speech of renunciation is common knowledge. 124 Ultimately, Quijano was again proposed as Peron's running mate for the November elections .125 Even before Peron's reelection, however, Mercante's name could no longer be mentioned by the press, the radio, or the fledgling television network. At the end of his second term as provincial governor in 1952, "the heart of Peron" was already persona non grata in his own party. His successor, Carlos V. Aloe, made various accusations against him (for example, that he had tried to exploit the railway workers' strike in late 19 50 for his own ends), investigated his ex-ministers and close collaborators, and imposed an iron-hand policy in the province. 126 The new governor ordered, among other things, the destruction of all bronze and wooden plaques and any inscription bearing Mercante's name or dates associated with his governorship. A year later, on April 30, 1953, Mercante was expelled from the governing party for alleged obstructionism,

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47

disloyalty, and unethical conduct, as well as for sowing confusion and encouraging the circulation of false rumors. Aloe, for his part, faithfully carried out the instructions handed down from the presidential palace and would never represent a challenge to Peron. The younger Mercante relates that his father was under "obsessive vigilance." Aloe once called Mercante's wife and daughter to tell them that the pater familiae was involved in political activity and this could be dangerous for all of them" an explicit threat." 127 Following the overthrow of the regime by what came to be called the Liberating Revolution, Mercante, like most of the leaders of the Peronist era, was investigated and arrested on September 23, 1955. General Lonardi quickly ordered the release of his "fellow artilleryman" after a few hours. Nonetheless, all the members of the Mercante family had to appear before "investigation commissions" in the city of Buenos Aires and in the province, facing charges of corruption. According to the daily Democracia, "well-informed sources say that [Mercante] is alleged to have accumulated large sums of money from his stock in the local dailies of Bahia Blanca and Punta Alta, and in the ORLA advertising agency owned by his daughter and an influential person linked to the newspaper sector of this city [La Plata]. It is estimated that the benefits received from this exceed $5 million." 128 It was also claimed that Mercante's son had made a long trip to Europe, supposedly in the capacity of a provincial official, with a large sum of money. The newspaper added that in his last days as governor, Mercante had sent his son off, "who reportedly fled with a suitcase containing five million pesos obtained from an official bid for a public contract." Ultimately, however, the commissions did not make any charge against him. A few days before Aramburu replaced Lonardi as president, Mercante, fearing a wave of repression against Peronists, left for Uruguay. His son, at the time a 28-year-old law student, remained in Argentina and was arrested and taken, on November 20, to the Olmos prison in La Plata, where he remained confined for a year and a half without being formally charged. The alleged reason for his arrest was that the carpenter of the provincial administration had supposedly built shelves in his house with wood paid for with public funds. During Frondizi's administration, a judge declared that the arrest had been politically motivated and dismissed all charges. 129 During the years of the military regime (1955-58), Mercante lived in Montevideo. In September 1957, he returned to Peronist activity by publishing a joint declaration with Alejandro Leloir, ex-president of the Peronist Party, who was still in prison. Their declaration complained that the country was undergoing "one of the most difficult stages of

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

civil life." A few weeks later, while Peron was considering an ad hoc political alliance with Frondizi on the eve of the presidential elections, John William Cooke met with Mercante in the Uruguayan capital and told him that the exiled leader wanted him to contact activists to sound out their views on the contemplated alliance and report back. Mercante expressed his consent without hesitation. In the 196os, Mercante tried to return to politics in the ranks of the neo-Peronist Union Popular, though with scant success. His death on February 21, 1976, spared him from witnessing the brutal dictatorship that was imposed some weeks later.

MIGUEL MIRANDA: MOBILIZING THE SUPPORT OF THE NEW INDUSTRIALISTS

Miguel Miranda served as an important link with a group of new industrialists who saw Peronism as an opportunity for economic growth that would foster national development and modernization-together with handsome profits. During the period 1946-48, Miranda was dubbed "the economic czar" because of his central role in designing contemporary economic policy. Son of a Catalonian anarchist and an Aragonese mother who had emigrated to Argentina at the end of the nineteenth century, Miranda was born in Buenos Aires in 1891. Like Bramuglia, Miranda began working for his living from a very early age. Although he had little formal education, he was intelligent, energetic, and self-confident, and began slowly to make his way, revealing a talent for business administration and a good eye for economic opportunity. He was working for the Bunge y Born grain company when he realized the potential for the industrial development of import substitution in Argentina, left his job, and opened a small metalwork factory. This independent company was his main base for accumulating capital, which he then reinvested in various businesses, gradually diversifying his interests and properties until he had become a very powerful and influential industrialist and financier. Miranda is an example of an industrialist who emerged under the "protection" that the great worldwide economic depression and World War II offered local producers. Among his colleagues he enjoyed great respect and appreciation as a self-made man who practically lived in his factory and was on good terms with his workers. On the eve of the revolution of June 1943, besides being a major entrepreneur in the sheet-metal field, Miranda owned substantial interests in fishing and canned food companies, as well as in the rapidly developing

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49

airline industry. 130 He was a member of the executive board of the Union Industrial Argentina (UIA, Argentine Industrial Union), president of the C.imara Argentina de Cromo-hojalater!a Med.nica (a manufacturers' organization), secretary of the syndical section of the union of fish-canning manufacturers, and vice president of the Asociacion de Fabricantes de Dulces, Conservas y Afines (another manufacturers' association). At that time Miranda was worried about the repercussions that the end of World War II was likely to have for Argentine industry once the United States and the European powers returned to their peacetime production lines. He feared that Argentine industry would fall into the same decline it had suffered in the aftermath of World War I. His vision was an industrialized Argentina able to supply most of its own needs and exporting its products to compete on world markets. When Peron first rose to prominence in the military government, Miranda viewed him much as his colleagues in the UIA did-with aversion, distrust, and disapproval.1 31 However, Miranda began to revise his opinion under the influence of his friend Rolando Lagomarsino (another son of Spanish immigrants), a hat manufacturer who was one of the first industrialists won over by Peron and his ideas. Moreover, beginning in August 1943 the military government had adopted a policy that favored industrialists, namely by extending generous credit and publishing the first law of its kind for promoting and protecting national industry, making declarations about state protection of industry, and establishing an industrial credit bank, all to ward off possible industrial breakdown in the postwar era. 132 Miranda and Peron first met in 1944, when Miranda was serving on the board of directors of the Industrial Credit Bank. Peron was impressed by Miranda's eagerness to industrialize the country as a means of ensuring its prosperity and raising the people's standard of living. "This is possible only by industrializing the country," Miranda used to explain, "since experience has already shown that by raising cows and planting wheat we will never achieve that goal." When Peron created the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra (National Council for Postwar Affairs) to define economic development priorities, he invited Miranda to serve on it. Miranda, in turn, was impressed by the colonel's personality and leadership ability. The open, direct style common to both men and their shared views on the economic road that Argentina should take, including their focus on promoting economic independence, became the basis for frequent contact and a relationship that played an important role in integrating the (small) sector of new industrialists into the Peronist coalition that Peron was beginning to build around himsel£. 133 Whereas people like Bramuglia and Borlenghi served as bridgeheads in mobilizing the support of the working class in the years 1943-46 and ensuring the continuation

so

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of that support afterward, Miranda was expected to play the same role with respect to Argentine businessmen and industrialists.l3 4 Public figures like Miranda were supposed to convey a number of messages to certain middle-class sectors, including the idea that only Peron could fend off the danger of revolution by the increasingly radicalized working class and trade unions 135 and that the interests of the national bourgeoisie would be well served by an economic policy that promised to impose tariff barriers against certain imports, guarantee a labor movement willing to negotiate, institute fiscal and monetary measures that promoted growth, and offer easy access to government credit under preferential conditions. Peron himself delivered a speech in October 1944 that sought to reassure businessmen and industrialists who were worried about his social policy. We do not support the worker against healthy capital, he said, nor the owners of monopolies against the working class. We encourage solutions that will equally benefit labor, trade, and industry, because our sole interest is the good of the state. 136 Researchers are still debating the function played by the industrialists in Peron's ascent to power. Horowitz and Kenworthy give them little weight in the original Peronist coalition; 137 Di Tella, Lucchini, and Murmis and Portantiero tend to exaggerate their role. 138 Personally, I tend to agree with Brennan, who emphasizes that many industrialists had serious doubts about whether the Union Democnitica would be as accommodating to the interests of their sector as the military government born in 1943, and they assumed that Peron would continue in the line of the latter. 139 These industrialists included not only Miranda and Lagomarsino, but also Jose Oriani of the Federacion de Industriales Papeleros; Eduardo de Elizalde, head of a large vegetable-oil company; Aquiles Merlini, president of the Camara Metalurgica; Alfredo Fortabat, owner of Lorna Negra, the largest consortium of producers of construction materials; and others. 140 The UIA enthusiastically supported the establishment of the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra in August 1944, with Peron as its president. The objective of that body was to prevent a serious economic breakup once the armed conflict was over, with a special focus on industry. At the end of that year, the UIA praised Peron for having established collective bargaining between industrialists and workers, thus eliminating "the dangerous professional agitators of the past." Nonetheless, industrialists as a social class certainly did not support Peron at the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946. In fact, they were divided among Peron's few supporters, a somewhat larger, neutral group, and a majority of detractors united with the anti-Peronist forces. Once the election results of February 1946 were known, however, several industrialists moved to the pro-government faction. The most notable ex-

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

ample was Luis Colombo, ex-president of the UIA. In general terms, it appears that in the following years Peron's regime managed to forge an alliance between the industrialists who manufactured certain light consumer products and the labor movement, with both groups contributing their support to the continued expansion of the domestic market. Like many other politicians with limited knowledge and understanding of economic matters, Peron was convinced that a person who had managed his own business affairs successfully would be competent to manage the finances of the nation. Accordingly, he wanted to grant Miranda wide powers and authority. Miranda, it should be stressed, was portrayed in an exaggeratedly negative way by the opposition. His economic policies contributed significantly to the controversy generated by the Peron"ist regime. 141 Even before Peron took office, economic reorganization began. As already mentioned, August 1944 saw the establishment of the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra, in which Jose Figuerola was the moving spirit; and, after Peron's electoral victory, the central bank was nationalized and Miranda was appointed its president (March 1946). Under the influence of Miranda (who soon came to be called "the financial wizard"), controls were imposed on the exchange rate and the supply of credit. To prevent a distorted allocation of the national income, assist the weaker sectors, and expand the domestic market, Peronism saw a need for state intervention to regulate social and economic relations among the different social classes. The regime therefore took steps early on (in May 1946) to institute a state monopoly on exports and imports through the medium of the Instituto Argentino para la Promocion del Intercambio (IAPI, Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade), which was also under Miranda's control.1 42 The IAPI bought local agricultural produce cheaply and sold it abroad at much higher prices, channeling the profits into industrial development and some of Peron's social policies. Thus, the entire industrial sector, employers and workers-skilled and unskilled alike-all benefited from this policy. According to the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado, the IAPI represented "the most comprehensive attempt yet made in Latin America to bring exports under the control of the State." 143 In the UIA internal elections of April 1946 Miranda headed the proPeron faction, but the recently elected president's opponents carried the day. A few months later, following the intervention of the UIA, Miranda and Rolando Lagomarsino, who had been appointed minister of industry and trade, established the Asociacion Argentina para la Industria y el Comercio (Argentine Association for Industry and Trade) as a competing industrialist union that cooperated with the new regime. This organization, gradually expanding, failed to achieve its goals and was

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

superseded in I95I by the Confederacion General Economica (General Economic Confederation), which grouped under one roof industrialists, landowners, and merchants, favoring those manufacturing sectors that used national primary materials and those activities creating products intended for popular consumption. In July r947, under attack from different economic sectors, Miranda resigned his position as head of the central bank and the IAPI, although he was immediately appointed to a new job, of recent creation and ministerial rank: president of the Consejo Economico Nacional (National Economic Council). This appointment reflected Peron's confidence in him. Orlando Maroglio, at that time considered to be a supporter of Miranda, took over the offices that the latter had vacated. Miranda handled the negotiations with the British and the nationalization of the public services that were controlled by foreign capital, signed bilateral economic agreements with various countries, and promoted the industrialization process. 144 As a number of researchers have pointed out, one of the government's main problems was setting a clear order of priorities among the numerous projects it was promoting simultaneously. Consequently, when economic difficulties arose, all these projects, most of them incomplete, were held up. Bad administration and corruption also contributed. Miranda, as head of the Argentine delegation that negotiated with the British, and Wilfred Eady, his counterpart, signed the agreement that bears their names on September r7, r946. 145 This agreement covered various matters, including beef sales, payment issues, and how Argentina was to use its sterling balance. The agreement reached with respect to the railroads was the option preferred by Miranda, who did not want to buy them, with their obsolete equipment. His idea was to establish a joint company that would assume control of the existing companies; those companies would, in turn, receive shares in the new corporation. This idea, however, was rejected by all the factions: nationalists, Radicals, Socialists, and Conservatives. Some preferred nationalization and accused the government of giving in to the dictates of British interests, believing that the joint company would actually promote those interests. Peron could not allow it to be thought that he was reneging on his own promise of economic independence, so he abandoned the idea of the joint company and ended up buying the railroads with the blocked pounds sterling. Miranda had to renegotiate the conditions of the agreement, and after a few weeks of bargaining a new treaty was signed. The Argentine government paid rso million pounds sterling for the railroads and real estate associated with them. Peron received a short-term political dividend when he was able to announce that the railroads "are ours." Peronist propaganda emphasized that this measure symbolized the end

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53

of Argentine dependence on foreign capital. The opposition, for its part, would criticize the government and accuse Miranda directly of having paid an exorbitant price for an infrastructure that was obsolete and that would require substantial investment to be modernized. Certainly this purchase was the beginning of an enormous, continuous erosion of the national budget as a result of operating deficits. Miranda suffered another setback when he tried to attract foreign investment for the exploration and exploitation of Argentine petroleum reserves. Foreign Minister Bramuglia also favored this idea, but the more nationalistic ministers vetoed the initiative and defended the position of the government-owned oil company, Yacimientos Petroliferas Fiscales. 146 Generally speaking, Miranda moved rapidly from hostility to the United States to a more friendly attitude, once he realized that closer relations with the Americans were essential to the success of the Five-Year Plan. According to Ambassador George Messersmith, [W]hen he first assumed his position as head of the Central Bank, he was quite unfriendly, or at least deeply critical of the Unites States in many respects ... It is obvious that he is completely changed in his attitude and is now friendly and one of the principal exponents in the present Argentine government of close collaboration with the United States. His strength in the Argentine government lies particularly in the fact that it is generally accepted that he has no political ambitions. 147

A year later, the number two diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires, Guy W. Ray, seemed less certain of Miranda's enthusiasm for the United States, although he agreed that the president of the National Economic Council "realizes that cooperation with the United States, at least up to a point, is necessary." 148 It is very clear that Miranda's economic policy represented a challenge for the United States and a "dangerous" model of development for other countries in the region. Consequently, from 1948 on, the U.S. embassy did its best to remove Miranda from the Argentine government. Foreign Minister Bramuglia, as we will see in Chapter 3, joined this effort in the vain hope of thereby improving relations with Washington. As McDonald and Dorn have shown, Ambassador James Bruce, together with Guy Ray and various British diplomats, worked to move the Peronist government away from its statist economic policy. 149 The ambitious Five-Year Plan accelerated the rate of inflation, although Miranda believed he would be able to control it and that it would not impede development. For a couple of years it appeared that the plan was indeed promoting growth and prosperity. During that time full employment was achieved, the situation of the working class improved, industrial production was accelerating, Argentina was gradually acquiring

54

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

its merchant marine, and air transport was developing. However, anumber of problems soon arose-notably the dwindling of foreign-exchange reserves and the obstacles to finding a satisfactory alternative to the long-standing complementary economic relationship with Great Britain. Among the government ministers criticism of Miranda intensified, and he was accused of neglecting heavy industry; of directing the economy irresponsibly, without any real plan; of relying on intuition rather than on the advice of economic experts; and of yielding to pressure from various sectors. For his part, Miranda always insisted that his program was "not the fruit of improvisation but rather the result of long and mature reflection." 150 At that time Arturo Jauretche, president of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, had already become one of Miranda's defenders. As he saw it, Miranda had carried out the national projects that FORJA had advocated for years: nationalization of the central bank, control of foreign trade, foreign-exchange regulation, redistribution of income, consolidation of the domestic market, nationalization of public services, industrial development. Years later, he said: "That was a national economy experiment ... An economic policy of our own was created that, by overcoming the inferiority complexes implanted by colonialism, gave us faith in ourselves." 151 Miranda was among those gambling on the possibility of a third world war between the Western powers and the Soviet Union and its satellites, an eventuality that Argentina could exploit to give new impetus to its economic development. Happily for the world, however, the Cold War did not reach the point of armed confrontation in the second half of the 1940s. Argentina found itself trapped in an impossible triangular trade relationship with the United States and Great Britain. The South American country exported meat and grain to England, but it could not acquire the raw materials and equipment it needed for its modernization and industrialization plan. It had to buy those from the United States using its dwindling dollar reserves, because the Americans were not interested in buying agricultural or cattle-industry products. As long as Argentina was able to convert its English pounds into U.S. dollars, it could overcome this problem; but in 1947 the British, struggling with their own economic problems, announced the inconvertibility of the pound. Even worse, Argentina did not benefit from the Marshall Plan. 152 The United States flooded Western Europe with low-priced wheat and other grains, while Miranda was confronted with the sight of silos and elevators bursting with grain for which there was almost no demand. The country's disappointment was enormous, especially because various U.S. officials had let Argentina understand that it could increase agricultural

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

55

exports to the countries included in the Plan. In a memorandum sent to the U.S. ambassador in mid-1948, Guy Ray said he was "convinced the Argentines were fully justified in expecting that the substantial quantities [of agricultural products acquired within the framework of the Marshall Plan] would be purchased here." 153 In the face of these new circumstances, the government's first move was to reconsider all its political-economic orientations. However, even if it was going to devise a new economic plan, rapid action was essential to show the public both the seriousness of the situation and the government's firm determination. To relieve internal pressure, in January 1949 the government found a scapegoat in the person of the president of the National Economic Council. He had already been made the object of malicious stories and rumors of corruption and accused of shady practices, and the regime believed that his removal would be welcomed by the public. In addition, a rumor was circulated to the effect that Miranda had incurred the displeasure of both the armed forces and Evita. The council was dissolved and replaced by two offices, the secretariat of the economy and the secretariat of economic affairs (which became the ministry of finance), both represented in the cabinet. In the first, Peron placed Roberto Ares, a foreign ministry expert on international trade, and in the second Alfredo Gomez Morales, an economics professor who was then serving as undersecretary of commerce. Gomez Morales also took over the presidency of the central bank in place of Orlando Maroglio, thereby becoming the key figure in Argentina's economic policy. The IAPI remained under Ares' supervision, and a friend of his, Jose Constantino Barra, replaced Rolando Lagomarsino as minister of industry and trade. The only member of the original economic team who retained his post was Ramon Cereijo, the minister of the treasury. Forced out of the leadership and fearing arrest, Miranda fled to Uruguay with the help of the Spanish embassy. 154 He passed away in 1953, at the age of 62. Shortly before his death, rumors circulated to the effect that Peron, wanting to return to a policy of growth and full employment in which income would be redistributed in such a way as to give the working class a renewed sense of its importance, was ready to summon Miranda back to the top level of economic leadership. 155

JOSE FIGUEROLA-THE LEGACY OF THE PRIMO DE RIVERA DICTATORSHIP

One reason for the lack of any in-depth research on the second line of Peronist leadership and its political role and ideological contribution is the dearth of documentation. In some cases, such as that of Angel Borlenghi,

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

documents did not survive due to the political upheavals in Argentina or because there was no tradition of preserving such documents as part of the national heritage. In other cases, including that of Jose Figuerola, considerable material is apparently still in the hands of family members and not easily accessible to researchers. 156 Unlike the other figures mentioned here, Figuerola was not suited to serve as a link with any particular social or professional sector, but he brought with him valuable experience and made an important contribution to the development of the Peronist doctrine. Jose Miguel Francisco Luis Figuerola y Tresols was born in Barcelona in 1897. At the age of 21 he already had a bachelor of arts degree and a doctorate in law, and took a strong interest in labor relations and the social order. He soon became an expert in this field, working as a professor of corporate law and labor legislation at the University of Barcelona. During the 1920s he served as bureau chief under Eduardo Aunos, the labor minister in the Spanish dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, a military regime that was not typical of Europe between the world wars. This dictatorship was characterized by, among other things, its cooperation with the trade union federation (Union General de Trabajadores) affiliated with the Spanish Socialist Party, and it set up comites paritarios, government-sponsored mixed juries, to arbitrate labor disputes. 157 Figuerola also acquired a reputation as an enthusiast for statistics and an expert on social legislation. For a time he was Spain's representative in the International Labour Organization in Geneva. He was also sent to Italy to study the organization of Mussolini's labor programs. After the fall of the Spanish dictatorship in 1930, Figuerola emigrated first to Paris and then, shortly thereafter, to Argentina. His decision to move to that distant country was probably influenced by the ties his father had established there toward the end of the nineteenth century. In Buenos Aires he was, among other things, an official of the Compaiifa Argentina de Electricidad (Argentine Electricity Company, CADE, the successor of CHADE, or Compaiifa Hispano-Argentina de Electricidad), which had been established with Spanish capital. 158 Shortly after his arrival, he joined the National Department of Labor as head of its statistics division and chief of professional organization. 159 Although this department had existed since 1907, it had little power until Peron arrived in 1943· Figuerola, with his extensive training in management, statistics, and social and labor legislation, quickly won Peron's trust. The demographic figures he showed Peron persuaded the latter that the potential power of the urban working class was the key to political success, and Peron enlisted Figuerola in the task of developing his social and labor programs. With the help of Figuerola and Bramuglia, Peron turned the Labor Department into a secretariat with the status of a government

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57

mm1stry, a center of influence that was to be his springboard into a career in civilian politics. Figuerola himself saw the colonel as a leader who could implement the social doctrines in which he had believed for

many years, especially the promotion of the state as arbitrator between workers and employers in the interests of "social cooperation." Figuerola met Peron for the first time on October 27, 1943, when the latter took charge of the National Department of Labor. That same day, the Barcelonian recorded, Peron asked him to undertake the drafting of the plan designed to revitalize the Department ... Thus arose the plan creating the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare. He accompanied me to the statistics department offices, examined the files containing the basic data from our studies ... and we then went to my office, where the meeting continued until two-thirty the following day ... what impressed Colonel Peron the most were the diagrams of the working family's food deficit. 160

A report by the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires at the end of 1943 described Figuerola as a "highly competent statistician, his political beliefs are a curious mixture of nearly all types of authoritarianism." 161 Figuerola did indeed show an evident sympathy for the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War and for the Franco regime that emerged in the wake of that conflict. 162 When the Civil War broke out in July 1936, he was decidedly on the side of the insurgents. Jose Ignacio Ramos, one of the first members of the Falange Espanola and, from 1937 on, cultural and press attache at Francoist Spain's embassy in Argentina for some 50 years, established a close and lasting friendship with Figuerola. Ramos did not hesitate to call him a true Falangist, although Figuerola did not officially belong to the movement. His loyalty to Franco's Spain and the fact that in the second half of the 1940s he served as an important link between the two countries led the Spanish ambassador, Bulnes, to describe him as "a scout for Spain in this country." 163 Joseph Page, Peron's biographer, described Figuerola in a rather exaggerated, idealized way, writing of his special relations with the Lider: For ten years he investigated labor problems in Argentina. Amassing statistics, grinding out technical analyses and honing his skills, Fieguerola was the quintessential Hispanic, Catholic intellectual. Serious and disciplined, he reserved several hours each day for the study of Greek and Roman classics, music and meditation. His private library housed ten thousand volumes. Polar opposites in many ways, Peron and Figuerola were drawn together by the magnetism of reciprocal needs. The colonel recognized that Figuerola was a walking encyclopedia of data and ideas. The dour emigre saw in Peron the vehicle for translating into action his own social theories. 164

Peron had apparently been influenced by Figuerola's recent book, La colaboraci6n social en Hispanoamerica (1943), which outlined his

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

conception of relations between labor and the state. The book, which according to David Tamarin would serve in part as a manifesto for Peron's labor ideology, emphasized the need to formally integrate apolitical union organizations into the state structure and to control their activity in accordance with state guidelines. The text included a long, glowing description of Primo de Rivera's labor policies, in addition to an impressive display of statistics and analyses of the social situation in Latin America. What the book was in fact proposing was a corporative state along the lines of Mussolini's Italian model. 165 In 1944 Peron appointed Figuerola as secretary-general of the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra, which was supposed to shape Argentine policy in the period following World War 11-but which to some was nothing but a parallel government that Peron created during Farrell's presidency. The Consejo's activity, according to Figuerola, had two essential objectives: "A. An immediate, short-term objective of preventing the difficulties that might arise as a result of the state's transition from war to peace in the world order, for which critical measures must be adopted, mainly the creation of sources of work coordinating the activity of the State bodies ... B. Another, long-term objective consisting in coordinated planning oriented towards the national economic future." 166 The Consejo did indeed draft a socioeconomic plan calling for intensified agricultural and industrial production and determining which manufacturing industries required state protection. Similarly, measures were adopted to counteract inflation, stabilize prices, and establish both a minimum wage and salary scales for different occupational categories. When Peron moved into the presidential palace, he appointed Figuerola as secretary of technical affairs, a position in which he enjoyed the status of minister and was responsible for coordinating relations between the government offices and all the organizations connected to the federal government. The importance of Figuerola's contribution to the Peronist doctrine and Peron's social and economic policy does not seem to have been sufficiently appreciated by researchers. In August 1946, the U.S. ambassador, Messersmith, reported that perhaps no one else in the country was as close to Peron as Figuerola, who enjoyed the president's complete confidence. 167 The secretary of technical affairs drafted many laws and decrees and wrote several Peronist Party documents and a number of important speeches for Peron; he is also considered the architect of the five-year development and modernization plan that was implemented from 1947 on. Figuerola hoped to move ahead gradually: an initial goal was to collect precise data on the needs of the country, especially in the fields of transport, equipment, and energy. Next, the government had to evaluate

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

59

the capacity of various industries to produce the relevant goods and services. Finally, it would formulate a development strategy to increase productivity. Another objective was to create industrial zones in the interior so that all regions of the republic could have a similar level of modernization. This required the construction of new roads and energydistribution networks. At the same time, the plan called for improving human resources by modernizing the education and health systems. In fact, in October 1946 it was Peron and Figuerola who presented congress with this plan, in two volumes detailing the priorities of the new authorities in their efforts to modernize the country, guarantee economic growth, and redistribute national income in a less distorted fashion. From the theoretical perspective, all went well; however, for various reasons that had nothing to do with Figuerola's planning, the success of this ambitious Five-Year Plan was very limited. 168 Figuerola believed in state intervention to achieve social harmony between employers and employees. In his books, he called for interclass cooperation under the aegis of the government and criticized past employer inflexibility and trade union extremism. The solution he suggested included state intervention through legislation, social policy, and labordispute arbitration. 169 When the subject of reforming the national constitution of 1853 came up-partly in order to permit Peron's reelection-Peron gave Figuerola the task of composing a draft proposal for the new constitution. Figuerola spent the last months of 1948 on this project, but apparently his work was criticized by a number of Peronist leaders, and Peron was not enthused by the result either. Consequently, a parliamentary commission headed by Arturo E. Sampay, who was considered more progressive than Figuerola, laid the bases for the final version approved in 1949. 170 By now the influence of the "gal/ego" ("Spaniard") was arousing a considerable amount of jealous hostility. A slight alteration in the wording of one of the clauses of the constitution established that only native Argentines could serve as ministers of the national executive power. It appears that this subtle change may have been the result of political machinations by Eva Peron, who wanted to move Figuerola out of the president's orbit. 171 The Catalonian Figuerola was forced to relinquish his post and was replaced by Raul Mende, one of the First Lady's favorites. "Like Joseph Giollotin, I was a victim of my own work," Figuerola said years later. To the opposition, he was nothing more than another of "the squeezed lemons that Peron throws away when they have given all their juice." 172 Nevertheless, Figuerola remained loyal to Peron and Peronism even in the following years and was imprisoned by the authorities of the

6o

The Second Line of Peronist Leadership

Liberating Revolution as a result. In 1958, finally out of prison, he nearly paid with his life for that loyalty when a bomb exploded in a Peronist office where he happened to be working. 173 From 1963 on he was secretarygeneral of the Instituto Superior de Investigaciones Sociales and technical adviser to two trade unions, the Federacion Gremial de la Carne and the Sindicatos Unidos Petroleras del Estado. In the years 1965-66 he was parliamentary secretary in the Chamber of Deputies. 174 He died in Buenos Aires in 1970, before Peron returned to power in Argentina. It is curious to note that, in an interview just before his return to Argentina, Peron sought to disassociate himself from Figuerola, maintaining that he was unaware that Figuerola had been "the statistician of the Primo de Rivera cabinet." Answering a question posed by his biographer, Peron insisted that he had known nothing of Figuerola's existence "until the morning he came to say goodbye to me at the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare." 175 In conclusion, then, methodical study is needed on the personalitiessuch as Borlenghi, Mercante, Miranda, and Figuerola-who formed the second line of Peronist leadership, to improve our understanding of how the Peronist coalition was formed and the various inputs that shaped the justicialist doctrine. Such a study will allow us to question the collective memory that tends to unify and homogenize complex historical processes and will clarify some aspects of the populist phenomenon that has left its indelible mark on twentieth-century Argentine history: Peronism.

CHAPTER TWO

From Socialism to Peronism The Case of]uanAtilio Bramuglia

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The son of Italian immigrants (Hercules Bramuglia and Marfa de Seta), Juan Atilio Bramuglia was born January 1, 1903, in Chascomus, Buenos Aires province. His father was a railroad worker. Orphaned at a very young age, Juan Atilio moved with his siblings to the federal capital, where he attended high school at the Escuela Superior de Comercio in Martin Garcia Street. There he distinguished himself by his intelligence and participated actively in the debates on public education that took place in Argentina in 1918 and 1919. Forced to earn his own living from the age of nine, Bramuglia followed the family tradition and obtained a job with the railroad workers of Barracas, loading trains with wheat. He continued his schooling, however, and eventually attended university, qualifying as an attorney (University of La Plata, 1925) when he was only twenty-two years old. Still later he completed a doctorate in jurisprudence (University of Buenos Aires, 1942). 1 His specialization was labor law, and, among his other activities, he taught classes on that subject at the Facultad Nacional de La Plata. His career was the result of a constant dedication to study and work. At the beginning of the 1920s he joined the ranks of the Socialist Party in Section #3 of Barracas. Bramuglia visited Dr. Mario Bravo's office frequently and within a few years was looked upon as the older man's protege. 2 Bravo was a model for Bramuglia, as well as a source of inspiration and a political patron. Both lawyers harbored literary ambitions, and both wrote dissertations on labor law. 3 However, they followed different paths. Bravo's political career in the Socialist Party was meteoric, and just a few years after joining the party in 1905 he already held key posts and was a close associate of Juan B. Justo, the party's legendary leader. When the difficult "strike of the Centennial" took place

Juan Atilio Bramuglia in 1910, Bravo was already secretary-general of the party, and a few years later he was elected a national deputy; in 1923 he obtained a seat in the Senate. In the elections held five years later, he was a candidate for president. Bramuglia's progress was slower. He was a legal advisor to various unions, such as the Asociacion de Obreros y Empleados de la Union Telefonica, the Union Tranviaria, and the UF, and was the consulting attorney for the Confederacion Obrera Argentina and the CGT. Bravo had been an unpaid legal advisor to the UF from its establishment up until June 1930. As both the membership and the union's activities grew, however, the organization needed a full-time advisor. On Bravo's recommendation, the executive committee gave Bramuglia the job, which he held until August 24, 1943. When Bravo was editor of La Vanguardia in the late 1930s, the paper often consulted Bramuglia on questions of labor law. According to Dardo Cuneo, at the time a friend and coreligionist of Bramuglia's, the latter soon became "the political head of the Union Ferroviaria," and "the head and gray matter" of its leader, Jose Domenech. 4 Thus, the immigrant railroad worker's son who had begun his working life loading trains came to play a key role in the internal life and elections of the UF, the most important union of Argentina at the time-ensuring the reelection of Domenech and the group identified with the Socialist Party. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Bramuglia published newspaper pieces, notes, essays, and articles addressing different social problems, especially union issues. His social views in those years and his efforts to obtain pensions for the entire working class were reflected in his publications: La personalidad juridica de las organizaciones obreras [The Legal Personality of Labor Organizations] (1938), ]ubilaciones ferroviarias: La influencia de la acci6n sindical de los trabajadores en la formaci6n de !eyes [Railway Pensions: The Influence of Workers' Union Action on the Formation of Laws] (1941), and La prevision social argentina [Argentine Social Welfare] (1943). 5 The subjects of some of the lectures that Bramuglia delivered during the 1930s by radio on La Hora Ferroviaria [The Railway Hour], a Radio Portefia program, give an idea of the varied scope of his interests: "Matrimony-Its Historical Evolution," "Divorce among Salaried Workers," "Historical Evolution of Social Security," and "Pensions for Women over 22 Years of Age-An Indispensable Reform of Law 10.650."6 Bramuglia often protested the situation of the Argentine working class in a heterogeneous immigrant society: We have seen and keep seeing how many men, without benefit of any kind of trial whatsoever, have been expelled from the country or imprisoned and their homes

juan Atilio Bramuglia broken into, while the legal resources available fail to prevent arbitrariness, and our national press, which devotes entire pages to fabulous crimes or depraved discussion of enormous fortunes, takes no notice, beyond a few lines in the most mysterious or invisible parts of the paper, of the deportation or imprisonment of a worker. Nor, when it comes to the workers, is the right to assemble respected. We have been living this way for many, many years. The powers [of authority] have been in the hands of many men; to my knowledge no one anywhere has yet shown any permanent concern serious enough to eliminate such an abnormal, even illegal situation.? On various occasions he ridiculed those who claimed that "our nation enjoys social security." According to Bramuglia, "Frankly, you have to be completely ignorant of the legal, social, and political state of our country to make such an assertion." 8 He advised such people to learn from Europe's experience, "behind which civilization follows," that social security should form an integral part of the wage the worker receives for his or her work. Bramuglia was one of those responsible for expanding the railroad union's sphere of activity to realms that transcended demands for better wages and working conditions; he urged action to deepen the working class's national consciousness and to promote the political, social, and cultural integration of immigrants and their children in Argentine society. A long document that he sent to the executive committee of the UF in April 1937 advised the leaders of the union to expand and diversify union activities. Drawing on the ideas of Juan B. Justo, founder of the Argentine Socialist Party and its leader for many years, Bramuglia used concepts that some years later would appear in Peron's rhetoric. Previously, the union had been no more than a "resistance society," and its activities had been limited to strikes and the achievement of immediate goals, explained Bramuglia, but it should no longer be satisfied with this. He advised the UF leaders to undertake projects in the cultural sphere as well-to found popular libraries and teach workers to read and write. The organization's function should be to shape the workers, expand their cultural horizons, and deepen their consciousness so that the union did not become a body lacking a soul. It was necessary to create "spiritual unity" among the members of the working class-so heterogeneous in their origins and customs-to teach them to love the country where they lived: "A union's action to assimilate the foreign worker into the country," he maintained, "is immense and cannot be neglected." 9 At the same time, he went on, it was vital to expand and complement the spiritual world of native-born workers: to teach them about human solidarity, international dependence, and historical processes. Bramuglia therefore recommended educating them in both union and cultural matters and instituting schools where workers would be taught the national

Juan Atilio Bramuglia language, history, and geography. They would learn about the country's political and social institutions as well as labor and economic laws, the history of the labor movement in Argentina and the world, and such topics as cooperativism. His recommendations also included setting up professional training courses and scholarships, organizing lectures and concerts, sponsoring radio programs, and promoting publications on various subjects. A few years later, in his .Jubilaciones ferroviarias, he stressed the importance of developing a cultural plan for the workers. According to Bramuglia, without culture there is no material or spiritual strength ... true wealth lies in the enlightenment of the masses, and ... the Union Ferroviaria, like all corporate bodies, including the State, will be strong only through the knowledge of each of its components ... [I]f peoples are to be truly civilized and social change is not to occur solely as a consequence of bloody upheavals painful to humanity ... this cultural basis is necessary. 10

This document is valuable not only because it provides insight into Bramuglia's ideas and political thinking, but also because it shows the contributions that he and others of similar background made to the shaping of the Peronist doctrine. As we will see later, Peron's discourse made intensive use of concepts and ideas that derived partly from the Argentine left wing. This bolsters the thesis that stresses the diversity of the sources of justicialist thought, rather than simply the social basis of the movement. All that leftist-inspired discourse also influenced Peron's thought and the way he talked, which in turn helped the working class to accept the Lider and his ideas. Throughout his political career Bramuglia was averse to the various labels that some of his rivals hung on him; on a number of occasions he tried to present his sociopolitical creed in public. An example from this early period is the letter he sent in October 1941 to Ignacio Delfin Medina, editor of the nationalist daily La Fronda; it was published in that extremely right-wing publication a few days later. Bramuglia sent his letter in response to an item printed in that paper in which he was described as a member of the then-outlawed Communist Party. He insisted, "I am not a communist. Nor am I on record as a communist." 11 Although he was not one of those people for whom the word communist is a deep insult, his political aspirations made him sensitive to anything that might damage his public image. Consequently, he emphasized, "Profoundly Argentine, I do not take part in activities that go against the country where I was born." Bramuglia also objected to having been characterized as a descendant of an oligarchic Spanish family, since his

Juan Atilio Bramuglia

surname clearly showed him to be the offspring of Italian immigrants, whom he described: "Noble they were: if to be so they needed only to work and be honest, educate their children and honor the country where those children were born." His letter detailed, with unconcealed pride, his modest social origins and his status as a "self-made man" who owed nothing to anyone: "I have been working honestly since the age of nine, and since turning 13, the age at which I was orphaned, I have educated myself, qualifying as a lawyer at the age of 22." He continued this statement of social and political identity with a description of himself that transcended physical appearance alone: "Physically, I am taller than I am short; darker than I am light; and much uglier than handsome." 12 On the ideological level, Bramuglia clarified that he believed in democracy and had never been a communist, although his political path had intersected with socialism a number of times. He had been a member of the Socialist Party until the schism at the end of the 1920s, and he returned to militate in its ranks in 1931. Nonetheless, three or four years before writing the letter he had left the Socialists and no longer belonged to any political party. He wrote to the editor of the nationalist daily that he did not know whether in future he would participate in political struggles in Argentina, but if he did, he warned, "I tell you that I currently share the ideas of those who think social organization should be gradually transformed until happiness, however relative, has been achieved for millions of people to whom society is neither fair nor equitable." Although some Socialist and provincial publications rejected La Fronda's accusations in columns with titles such as "Rebuttal to a Lampoon" or "An Absurd Charge by La Fronda against a Son of Our City," the nationalist paper asserted, We have nothing to correct and everything to confirm. After additional verification of our information, it appears that Mr. Juan Atilio Bramuglia was a member of the Liga Argentina de los Derechos del Hombre [Argentine League of Human Rights], classified by Buenos Aires police as one of the collateral or dependent entities of the Communist Party, and as such the Special Department for the Repression of Communism "keeps tabs" on him as a militant of that ideology, confirmation having been made of his active participation as a speaker at the rostrums set up by different bodies that follow the plans of the Communist Youth Federation. 13 It is true that Bramuglia participated in different events benefiting the Spanish Republic during the civil war in that country and, subsequently, the Allies during World War II. For the nationalists of La Fronda and the federal police, that was enough to brand him a communist.

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The principles that Bramuglia laid down in his letter to La Fronda governed his activity throughout his public life and led him to join Peron's camp two years later. In the second half of the 1930s, Bramuglia wrote several radio plays based on historical subjects. Despite their questionable literary value, they reflected the dominant liberal historiography. Those who have tried to identify early Peronism with historical revisionism should note that until Peron's overthrow in September 1955, the justicialist movement never challenged the liberal reading of the national past. Only after Peron was forced into exile did historical revisionism and the glorification of Juan Manuel de Rosas, the nineteenth-century caudillo, become part of the ideological baggage of many Peronists. However, Bramuglia himself always identified with the liberal historiographic tradition. The titles of his radio plays included A Trip in the Medicis, Episodes from Sarmiento's Last Years and Death, Episodes of Governor Sarmiento, and Sarmiento and Urquiza. 14 In all these plays Bramuglia eulogized Sarmiento, describing him as a tenacious, determined man of courage and vision, while criticizing "Rosas the tyrant." When Bramuglia was awarded his doctorate in jurisprudence in 1942, a tribute to him was organized at the headquarters of the Union Ferroviaria and attended by lawyers, intellectuals, politicians, and delegates of the UF and the Union Tranviaria (urban transport union). On that occasion Bramuglia said: I have fought almost 12 years beside these humble workers. I have learned much at universities, but I have learned much more from the daily life's labor of the workers, living through the ups and downs of the most long-suffering class, all of them men who shape the grandeur and richness of our country ... Just as the Tiro Federal Argentino [shooting practice club] has a slogan saying "Here we learn to defend the homeland," in the labor unions we should display this other slogan, "Here we learn to gestate the greatness of the country." 15

In the early 1940s, Bramuglia was already a well-known figure, influential in the upper echelons of the labor movement. Despite his humble origins-or because of them-he was filled with the ambition to play an important political role and win the recognition and public attention that went with it. However, his road in the Socialist Party was blocked, as it was for other young people of his generation. Richard Walter, analyzing the Socialist Party in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, speaks of the '"continuity of leadership," which engendered strong tensions: According to party statutes, all affiliates periodically selected candidates for public office and chose party leaders. In practice, however, while lip service was paid to injecting new blood into positions of responsibility, essentially the same

Juan Atilio Bramuglia

set of names consistently appeared and reappeared on the executive committee, in editorial offices, and on candidate lists for local and national office. Once elected to Congress in the 1912 to 1914 period, for example, Socialists like Mario Bravo, Enrique Dickmann, Juan B. Justo, and NicoLis Repetto served as deputies or senators without interruption through the 1920s. Their names regularly topped Socialist ballots. 16 This was one reason that activists like Bramuglia and Borlenghi migrated toward Peronism in the 1940s. Bramuglia had always nourished the hope of becoming a candidate for Socialist Party deputy, and his inability to pursue a political career within the party left him very disillusionedP Nonetheless, for years he continued to talk of the man who had been his mentor. A journalist from the magazine Que Sucedi6 en Siete Dias who interviewed the brand-new foreign minister in 1946 wrote in his notes, "Mentioned Bravo several times in the course of the conversation." 18 After the 1943 coup d'etat, the UF tried to work with the new government as it had with the previous ones. This was an indication that, revolutionary slogans notwithstanding, Argentine unionism was fragmented and, for the most part, preferred negotiation and state protection. Like the two CGTs, the UF welcomed different measures proclaimed by President Ramirez, including promises to solve the housing problem and to end speculation in basic consumer goods; they also accepted the restrictive decree that governed the activity of professional associations, subject to recognition of their legal status as unions. 19 Nonetheless, on August 23, the government intervened in the two largest and most important train-related unions, the UF and La Fraternidad, which were considered the backbone of Argentine unionism. Founded in 1887, La Fraternidad was the union of the machinists and stokers. Those who worked outside the locomotives did not have an organization until October 1922, when they formed the centralized UF. 20 Benefiting from their strategic negotiating power in an economy historically dependent on agricultural exports, the railroad workers organized the most powerful union in the country. At the beginning of the 1940s they alone constituted more than a third of the union members affiliated with the CGT. The two railroad unions were thus in a position to paralyze the country, and military authoritarianism could not tolerate this potential threat. The government justified its intervention on the grounds that the leaders of the unions lacked legitimacy and that the strikes declared by the railroad workers were unacceptable. Among other objectives, the new military authorities were actually seeking ways to undermine the labor movement and, accordingly, wanted to divide the UF into four unions corresponding to the specialized sectors of railroad labor; this would

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weaken the CGT by reducing its largest affiliate. Predictably, this plan had the support of the train owners and managers, who for some time had been eager to weaken worker representation. The justification they gave was that this step would ensure better service for users and would promote both greater harmony in labor relations and less union activity with political and ideological overtones. The UF, however, saw it as a plot to destroy the twenty-year-old organization. Most of the union members saw it as "an arbitrary, reactionary, and clearly dictatorial measure." 21 At the same time, various sources indicate that the UF was grappling with internal problems on the eve of the June coup, and apparently some dissidents encouraged and welcomed the new government's intervention. 22 This is hardly surprising, given that the UF was still recovering from a deep schism that had occurred not long before. Around the middle of r938 the unionist faction had split off and founded the Federaci6n de Obreros y Empleados Ferroviarios (FOEF; Federation of Railroad Workers and Employees). Under the aegis of Antonio Tramonti (a founder of the UF and its leader from r922 until Jose Domenech's election as president in r934), the FOEF enjoyed official backing but was unable to supplant the UF. The friction between the two unions resulted in labor problems and interrupted services, in turn leading to pressure from the government, which now wanted the two unions to merge. This conflict did not end until February r940. 23 After the government's intervention in the UF, the interventor, frigate captain Raul A. Puyol, dismissed all the members of the executive committee, who were subsequently subjected to veiled accusations of "misappropriation of funds" and "violations of [union] statutes." The delegates to the CGT also resigned. Because both the secretary-general of the CGT and his second-in-command were railroad employees, the organization was left leaderless. Moreover, Puyol summarily dismissed the legal advisor, Bramuglia, taking advantage of an alleged "complaint by a widow who had been charged illegal fees for paperwork." 24 Appointed in his place was Luis Novatti, who throughout his brief term stressed the supposedly illegal actions of the Oficina de Tnimites (an administrative office) under Bramuglia's leadership. 25 Another key figure who was relieved of his post was secretary Rafael Kogan, who in his bureaucratic capacity had accumulated considerable power in the period from the establishment of the UF up to the mid-r940s. Nevertheless, the interventor's efforts to enlist worker support failed. In a flyer entitled A Month of Intervention in the Union Ferroviaria, "alarm and concern" were expressed over Puyol's methods, "which openly contradict the declared purposes of harmony and unification of the railroad family." 26 The signatories, identified by their locals rather than their namesout of fear of the new military government-objected to the people Puyol

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had placed at the head of the union, Domingo Santiago Diz and Bernardo Zugasti, "key actors in the attempt to divide the Union Ferroviaria in I938," as well as to the numerous interventors appointed for the various localsY At the same time, the manifesto emphasized, "Nor can we ignore ... the dismissal of comrades Rafael Kogan and Dr. Juan Atilio Bramuglia ... without any valid reason that might justify in the slightest such a serious measure. These comrades have long been active in the Union Ferroviaria, where they have never disappointed the confidence reposed in them. Yet the intervention has dismissed them regardless of the injustice and moral damage it caused." 28 These protests led to a series of contacts with other army officers, and in mid-October some of the more prominent leaders of the UF had an audience with Peron, Mercante, and other officials; two days later President Ramirez met with all the members of the former executive committee, as well as Bramuglia, although without Domenech. According to railway leader Juan Rodriguez, "we stayed all night and into the early morning. We resolved the problem there." 29 Before the end of October, Puyol was replaced by Domingo Mercante, a military officer with family ties to the railroad workers. Mercante accepted the resignations of Puyol's appointees and reinstated those who had been displaced during the short intervention. His first decisions were to reinstate the secretary-general, Rafael Kogan, and the legal advisor, Bramuglia, justifying this move on the grounds that "no complaint by any interested person concerning the actions of Dr. J. A. Bramuglia [has] come to my attention and no direct charge of any kind [has] been noted." Kogan returned to his old job, but Bramuglia rejected his appointment in the hope that the executive committee, elected by general vote, would make the necessary arrangements itself. 30 As a result, Bramuglia remained off the job until September I944, when the executive committee, finally resuming leadership of the UF, reinstated him. An investigation initiated by Mercante concluded that the charges against the ex-members of the executive committee were malicious and tendentious and that the railway leaders had fulfilled their administrative function honestly. Mercante appointed various key figures in the UF as advisors, including Luis Monzalvo, a Socialist militant who was active in establishing contacts with Peron and who had been a UF delegate to the CGT. At the same time, pressure increased to expel from the union the three Oficina de Tnimites employees-Carlos Duro, Isaac Alerino, and Hector Lorenzo-who had signed the document convicting Bramuglia. 31 A harsh manifesto signed by "members of the Union Ferroviaria" spoke of "the dark brains of these three wretched, vile, and miserable employees, forgetting how many favors and attentions they had received and exploited from Dr. Bramuglia, in order to stab him in the back later in the most

Juan Atilio Bramuglia cowardly and contemptible way, plotting as many tall tales and falsehoods as their sick minds could dream up." 32 Further on, the anonymous authors added: "The Union knows how much it owes to Dr. Bramuglia. The very life of the Union Ferroviaria was in his hands on several occasions, and just as often it emerged refreshed and with new energy to put an end to the tendentious actions of its secret enemies." Lorenzo and Duro apologized, saying that they had acted against their will, under pressure. In a letter to Bramuglia they claimed that Novatti had threatened to accuse them of bribery "by making us or considering us party to maneuvers that he thought had been committed ... and that would be grounds for criminal proceedings against us." 33 They related how Novatti had made them sign an affidavit, assuring them "that it would not be used for any reason to attack or discredit Dr. Bramuglia," of whom, they asserted in the letter, "we have formed a high opinion as a professional [who is] punctilious in his conduct towards those he represents." Upon learning that their affidavit was being used against Bramuglia, they said, they reproached Novatti and demanded the return of the paper they had signed, but in vain. They ended their letter by lamenting that "our forced stance may have been used in an attempt to sully his name." Nonetheless, both men lost their jobs in the UF. Some time later Isaac Pedro Alerino met the same fate. 34 Meanwhile, in August 1943 Bramuglia embarked on a crusade to defend his name and his honor-a crusade that would continue for years: each time he was appointed to a new function or aspired to a political position, especially after he became associated with Peron, his enemies would again disseminate "that slanderous rumor" based on the defamatory libel published in I943· Among other things, Bramuglia requested an investigation of his own actions in order to disprove the accusation and everything that had been notarized before the UP's notary public, Antonio J. Llach, on December r, 194 3. 35 In later years he would write letters to the editors of various dailies in an effort to "correct a great injustice, perpetrated in the murky waters" of Argentine politics. 36 During the short period of Puyol's intervention in the UP, accusations of every kind circulated against Bramuglia and union leader Jose Domenech, who, together with other union leaders, had allegedly corrupted the apolitical character of the CGT. The old tradition of political abstention was still strong in the workers' movement, and the relatively new participatory trend was not yet well established. In an unsigned, five-page document entitled Episodes in the Struggle for Union Independence within the General Labor Confederation and disseminated in August 1943, the anonymous authors focused much of their attention on Bramuglia:

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Although working in obscurity, the person who, along with Domenech, has contributed the most to divesting the CGT of the apolitical features and essence with which it was born, and which its architects strove so hard to accentuate and develop-that person, whose actions are so efficiently negative, is the lawyer Juan Atilio Bramuglia, head of the legal office of the Union Ferroviaria. In every circumstance he acted as Domenech's closest advisor, and when the inspirations of the Socialist Party left no impression on Domenech-the same inspirations that Bramuglia received from his colleague and best friend Mario Bravo-Bramuglia was responsible for achieving that influence himself, using his gifts of perseverance and persuasion. On many occasions, Domenech has been no more than the mouthpiece for Bramuglia's thinking, embodied in the notes and speeches dictated by the latter in the legal office of the Union Ferroviaria. 37 Certainly Bramuglia, like many other union leaders of the era, was convinced that the CGT needed to move with the times and abandon its syndicalist concepts and apoliticism in a country and a world that were grappling with the rise of fascism and an expansion of political and economic upheavals. To defend the interests of the working class and to show solidarity with the Spanish Republic or the victims of European fascism, he felt that unions needed to engage politically and collaborate with the political parties of the left, instead of merely fighting for a few specific benefits for workers in different sectors. He did not advocate adopting a revolutionary path but rather a multidimensional strategy that sought to improve the situation of the proletariat through a variety of political alliances.

THE SECRETARIAT OF LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE: A LABORATORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION

On November 23, 1943, a decree was passed transforming the Labor Department into a national secretariat answering to the president's office and enjoying all the powers of a ministry. The secretariat would be responsible for supervising the enforcement of labor legislation and would centralize all state social action. Accordingly, it incorporated not only the National Labor Department, but also various divisions and functions of bodies such as the Direcci6n Nacional de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social (the national public health and social welfare authority), the Caja Nacional de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Civiles (national retirement and pension fund), the Camara de Alquileres (housing authority), and the Junta Nacional para Combatir la Desocupaci6n (a national committee to combat unemployment). The new secretariat had regional

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branches all over the country. The decree was drafted by Bramuglia and Figuerola, each man representing one of the trends that combined to strengthen state intervention in labor relations. Bramuglia was part of a union movement that sought legislative protection, whereas Figuerola's political thought reflected the views of a state elite inspired by a program of corporativist affiliation. Shortly afterwards, Bramuglia urged a group of UF members, headed by Luis Monzalvo, to cooperate with Peron and to encourage the union rank and file to do the same. 38 According to Jose Domenech, ex-president of the UF and ex-secretary-general of the CGT, an early Peronist who soon began to distance himself from the movement, "The UF was the foundation of Peronism in the country. Because, I have to say frankly, telling the absolute truth, 99% of the leaders of the UF all became Peronists ... Bramuglia was the boss, let's put it that way, the boss who advised all the other members of the executive committee and all the executive committees and brought them all in to Peronism." 39 In other words, it was largely thanks to Bramuglia that the UF, probably the most powerful union in Argentina at the time, supported Peron. The railroad workers were the first workers to join what would become the Peronist movement, and it was their leader, Domenech, who, in December 1943, originally dubbed Peron "the First Worker"-although turbulence continued in the railroad workers' union, and in 1945 a number of demonstrations were mounted against Peron and the union leaders. As a result, the anti-Peronist Comando Ferroviario (Railroad Commando) was formed, and the Fraternidad de Maquinistas (the locomotive engineers' union) left the CGT. 40 Nevertheless, the majority supported the UF's close cooperation with Peron and the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare. It is not surprising that, following his early withdrawal from the fledgling movement, Domenech tended to downplay his previous friendship and collaboration with Bramuglia and the role that the latter had played in the UF. In an interview years later, he claimed that "Bramuglia was nothing more than the legal advisor on specific legal questions, but he did not intervene, we absolutely did not allow him to intervene in any way in union matters." At that time it was important to Domenech to stress that he had never been a Peronist, "not in the beginning, not at the end," and on various occasions he would insist, "I did not dub Peron ... First Worker ... because I never shared his nazi-fascist ideas, which have done so much harm to the spirit of the Argentine people." 41 Domenech maintained that most of the UF leaders submitted to Peronism "for money" and because of "personal corruption," and that he, too, had been offered "ministries and embassies that I never accepted." He considered Bramuglia and other leaders as opportunists, traitors to

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the cause, deserters who sought certain perks and benefits through their proximity to power, and for which they were ready to renounce their convictions and ideals. Nonetheless, he also acknowledged the existence

of ideological motives when he affirmed that "these people surrendered in the certainty that they were going to make the Argentine Republic into a paradise on earth." The fact is that the railroad workers-members of one of the most privileged and well-organized unions in Argentina-demonstrated their support for Peron on numerous occasions: in 1944 in front of the Secretariat on February 5 (2,ooo workers); in the Plaza de Mayo on March 20; in a speech given over the radio by Luis Monzalvo on May r (in which he said, "the national Government can be absolutely certain that all the railroad workers, to a man, are unconditionally at its side"); at the reception that the UF and La Fraternidad organized for Farrell and Peron to celebrate the anniversary of the June revolution, which was attended by almost s,ooo union members. It was on that occasion that Peron acknowledged that "the railroad workers will always have the glory of having been the first to understand and support us." 42 Bramuglia himself, having some years previously lost any hope that the Argentine Socialist Party could change social and political reality and mobilize the working class, made the initial contacts with Colonel Peron and helped establish the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, which very soon began to operate as a workshop that hammered out labor and social welfare legislation. Juan Rodriguez offered a picturesque description of how the secretariat was established, emphasizingperhaps with some exaggeration-the role played by the UF leaders in general and Bramuglia in particular. Describing a meeting with Peron, he said, There we broke up the Department of Labor and created Labor and Social Welfare, the decree for which was drafted by Doctor Atilio Bramuglia. Extraordinary, that decree ... thus was born Labor and Social Welfare. Created by us, that is, inspired by us and also created because Bramuglia, who was our legal adviser, made the decree; he did it on the spot, with 50 employees in the Casa de Gobierno, with stenographers and everything; because it's presidential paper; look at the mentality he hadY

In the secretariat, Bramuglia held the position of director-general of social welfare. At the same time he was spokesperson for the Caja Nacional de Ahorro Postal (National Postal Savings Fund) and interventor in the Caja Nacional de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Civiles (the national pension fund). 44 It should be mentioned that the internal opposition of some UF members to this policy of rapprochement with the military government gave rise to another defamation campaign against the lawyer

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from Chascomus when he was appointed director of social welfare. In fact, the fourteen-page pamphlet, entitled Evidence of Irregularities and Shady Dealings Involving Most of the Members of the Former Executive Committee of the Union Ferroviaria and Its Legal Advisor, Dr. juan Atilio Bramuglia, Documented by the Intervention of Frigate Captain (SR) Don Raul A. Puyol, was published and distributed for political purposes after Puyol had left his post. 45 Bramuglia's supporters responded by sending telegrams to the president of the Republic to express their satisfaction at Bramuglia's appointment and stressing the "upright and honest conduct he displayed in the many years that he served the Union Ferroviaria."46 Bramuglia advocated a basic, general pension law for employees of industry and trade. During those months he clashed with Angel Borlenghi and the commercial employees, who at the time were taking a fairly narrow view of the issue and were interested in obtaining the pension law exclusively for themselves. 47 In contrast, Ramon J. Circano, the president of the Instituto Nacional de Prevision Social (Social Security Institute); Carlos Desmaras, its secretary-general; and Bramuglia, who was also a prominent member of the Consejo de Posguerra, wanted to institute a modern social security system for all the branches of labor in the nation-that is, the same fund for everyone. 48 Bramuglia reformed the Ley de ]ubilaciones Ferroviarias (Law of Railroad Retirement) at that point and carried out legal studies on and implemented revisions to Law No. 4349 governing national civilian personnel, including all workers paid by the hour. He created and shaped the Estatuto y Ley de ]ubilaciones de los Periodistas (Statute-Law for Journalists' Retirement), helped draft the retirement law for commercial employees, and played a significant role in the creation of the lnstituto Nacional de Prevision Social. According to Felix Luna, the military government adopted a series of measures and signed around 2o,ooo decrees between 1943 and 1946 in its efforts to modernize the structure of the state, confront the problems arising from the war, and diversify national production. However, the government's most important work was carried out in the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, notably the expansion of the retirement system to safeguard the futures of two million workers who lacked any provision for their old age. 49 Bramuglia's most important achievement in the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare was the enactment of decree-laws that expanded the retirement system to different sectors of the working class. At the same time, the secretariat helped resolve labor conflicts in numerous sectors, and wage increases were obtained for many workers. The secretariat also pressed for a law of preventive medicine based on the contemporary Chilean model, as part of the development of a "social medicine." In the personal sphere,

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Bramuglia soon showed Peron that he was loyal, industrious, and efficient not only in legislative matters, but also in mobilizing political support for Peron's leadership.

Historians have not paid enough attention to the ideological influence of ex-Socialists on Peron. Although documentary evidence is scarce, people such as Bramuglia and Borlenghi appear to have been a channel for transferring to the Peronist leadership ideas and concepts that had been gestating in the Argentine left wing since the end of the nineteenth century among intellectuals belonging to the generations of 1894, 1918, and 1930. Historical research has stressed the influence of Peron's training first as a soldier, then as an officer in military institutions. It was there that he first learned the authoritarian and hierarchical concepts of nationalism, national unity, leadership, and organization, which he would later translate from the military sphere to politics. 50 Another rich vein of discussion focuses on the influence of Catholic social doctrine on his ideas concerning social justice. 51 Some of the ideas of the extreme right-nationalist, Catholic, antiliberal, and antimarxist-were also integrated into Peron's ideology and politics. 52 A number of researchers consider the members of FORJA, an organization created in 1935 and characterized by populist, anti-imperialist nationalism, as the main forerunners of Peronist nationalism. 53 However, other facets of Peron's world vision-those aspects that put the people in the center and identified them with the nation, that emphasized social justice, that criticized the oligarchy, and that promoted the aspiration to economic independence-were based largely on concepts that had been forged by the Argentine left wing in various debates since the beginning of the century and that had been expounded by people such as Justo, Dickmann, Ugarte, and Palacios. This was not an aggressive, militaristic, xenophobic, chauvinistic nationalism, but rather an ideology that sought to include all social sectors in the country's political, economic, social, and cultural life. It was a more dynamic conception of what the nation was, a conception that reflected social and demographic changes rather than an abstract, static idea that represented the past and some supposed national essence. The presence of people with socialist backgrounds, such as Bramuglia and Borlenghi, in the First Worker's immediate entourage may have been an additional, not exclusive, channel for the integration of these concepts in the ideological body that was developing into a "Peronist doctrine." 54 Peron learned from the union leaders who had been his companions since the last months of 1943, showing the passion and speed that were characteristic of the way he thought and acted. He adopted some of their assumptions and principles and used a language familiar to many workers and union leaders. One such leader explained, "When we realized

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that the jargon we used at the STP [Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision] was the same as always, that we could talk in our own way, in our socialist, revolutionary language, we felt very comfortable there." 55 When Bramuglia moved to the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare he took a group of experts with him: friends of his such as Carlos Desmaras, of Radical origins, and Eduardo Stafforini, a Conservative whom the Socialist leader Alfredo L. Palacios singled out as his first disciple and who gave the embryonic Peronist movement's incoherent mixture of ideas the name "justicialism." 56 Stafforini also seems to have been the source of the "Twenty Truths" of Peronism, as well as other important documents. Desmaras, another graduate of the law faculty at La Plata and an expert in labor law, met Bramuglia at the Inter-American Conference on Social Security in Santiago de Chile in September 1942. 57 The son of French immigrants, Desmaras had been a Radical militant from the age of 18 up to the military coup of 1943. He used to say that more pensions had been granted during the two years of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare than in 50 years of the congress. 58 The Secretariat granted legal union status to hundreds of labor syndicates and sanctioned a wealth of legislation that satisfied various worker demands, giving them the rights they had been seeking for years: wage increases, rent control, plans and low-interest loans to construct housing, and, most important, pension funds for many workers. The new measures and policies turned Argentina into one of the most socially advanced countries in Latin America in those years. It was not surprising that most workers preferred Peron to their own traditional leaders. Bramuglia never concealed his pride in these achievements, thereby attracting criticism from the leaders of the Socialist Party where he had received his political education. As later pages will show, the UF legal advisor and future foreign minister was a favorite target for the rancor of the Socialist Party. What irritated party officials the most were the Peronist efforts to appropriate and take credit for most of the country's social legislation. In July 1947, Bramuglia gave a master class to inaugurate the labor legislation chair at the faculty of law and social sciences of the University of Buenos Aires. He was introduced by the university's interventor, Dr. Carlos Maria Lascano, who described him as a champion of the renaissance that the country was enjoying in this field. The holder of the brand-new chair analyzed the history of labor legislation in the Republic, beginning with the first labor code, by Joaquin V. Gonzalez (which was never enacted). Until 1944, he noted, however, the legislation process was slow, meager, and inadequate: "We need only compare it with all the legislation of the world to see that Argentina was the most backward country in labor matters ... and it is the opposite from 1944 onward." 59

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These words-characterized by the Socialist paper La Vanguardia as "simple vulgarities and unmistakable panegyrics to the regime of which he is a part and to which he owes his elevation" 60 -elicited a polemical reaction from the ex-legislator and university professor Alfredo Palacios, who responded in an essay entitled "Socialism and the Counterrevolution." 61 He asserted that the appearance of La Vanguardia in 1894 marked an era of social transformation and that "the foundation of the Argentine Socialist Party was the beginning of a true bloodless revolution that abolished traditional principles incorporated in the Civil Code and created a new system of laws." Later he demanded recognition for the members of his party because "as politicians, they initiated labor legislation; as teachers, they taught it; and as scholars they proposed scientific bases for the organization of labor." As concrete examples, he pointed to various initiatives that had become law: the eight-hour work day, a severance law, immunity to garnishment for low salaries and wages, work from home, payment of wages in the national currency, Sunday as a day off, etc. 62 In his commentary Palacios quoted a few paragraphs from La prevision social argentina which Bramuglia himself had published in 1943 and in which he had acknowledged the Socialist Party's influence on the development of Argentine society. Bramuglia's response was not long in coming, and the debate attracted a great deal of public interest, because it involved two important political figures who had been on cordial terms of mutual respect in the years preceding the military coup of June 1943. Bramuglia began by explaining that he had received Palacios's essay from a friend, since he himself did not read newspapers like Argentina Libre. 63 Reading the essay had given him much pain, he said, "the same deep pain that I felt when you, in the national Senate in 1942, made the regrettable error of encouraging with your voice and supporting with your vote the reform of Law 10.6 so, as a result of which some retirees and pensioners had only two pesos a month to live on." 64 Bramuglia went on to share memories from his own childhood, when he "was nine years old, worked 13 hours a day, and earned 15 pesos a month"; when he took part in a strike, he said, he only understood "why many years later." He finished up with an anecdote about an illiterate old creole "from whom I learned to disregard the contempt of the learned." Palacios was not going to let Bramuglia have the last word in this strongly personal debate. He published a response reaffirming his previous position: "Remember that to keep that child from being exploited I fought for two years without rest to obtain the law governing the employment of minors." 65 Palacios mentioned Bramuglia's Socialist past and his praise of the legislators in his party, and how he himself had

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been referred to as a man to whom the country "owes ... so much good in the political, social, and intellectual spheres." The debate did not continue, because the foreign minister and professor of labor legislation was out of the country at the time, at the Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro. In the years 1945-48, the Socialists lost no opportunity to attack Bramuglia and to reiterate that he had forgotten his old political friendships and ideological convictions. 66 More than once they mentioned that in March 1944, upon the death of Mario Bravo, to whom Bramuglia had been so much attached, they had waited for him in vain throughout the hours of the wake and the interment. His absence, however, was probably due to the treatment he knew he was likely to receive. As we saw, Borlenghi did attend and met with hostility from several people at the funeral. However, it was in congress that Bramuglia made the comments that most irritated the Socialists. Toward the end of 1946 the foreign minister announced to the entire parliament that moving from Socialism to Peronism was progress. To attack Bramuglia, Argentina Libre again invoked the figure of the man who had been his mentor: Dr. Mario Bravo always listened to him with almost the tenderness of a father and with the pure emotion of a poet ... he loved Dr. Bramuglia very much; he had practically raised him in his law office and believed he had inspired him with a little of his own spirit. He infused him with socialist ideas and civic enthusiasm. He acknowledged him as a protege in front of the Union Ferroviaria, where Bramuglia received a warm welcome on Bravo's account. Bravo pinned great hopes on this young man, who was painfully sensitive to the misfortunes of the country. And as his hopes were great so was his disappointment when one afternoon, perhaps the most painful of his final afternoons, he learned from the daily press that his beloved disciple had joined the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, becoming a major collaborator of "this thing that was carrying us to fascism." 67

PREPARING THE WAY FOR PERONISM IN THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES: BRAMUGLIA AS FEDERAL INTERVENTOR,

1945

The year 1945 was crucial in the history of modern Argentina. In the course of that year the populist coalition was consolidated under the charismatic leadership of Colonel Peron, an alliance that ensured victory

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in the presidential elections at the beginning of 1946. The new Peronist movement changed the nature of social relations in Argentina and left its stamp on Argentine political culture. The second half of the twentieth century in Argentina was marked, to a large extent, by conflicts over the Peronist movement and the agenda that it sought to impose. In this section we will examine some of the events of that decisive year and try to shed new light on two questions: the first concerns the process by which Peronism took shape in the province of Buenos Aires; 68 the second concerns the role that key figures in the second line of Peronist leadership played in mobilizing political support and shaping the new movement's doctrine, with an emphasis on Bramuglia's contribution. In December 1944, the military government of General Edelmiro Farrell and his vice president, Juan Peron, appointed Bramuglia as federal interventor in the province of Buenos Aires, 69 a key position given the province's preeminence in the national political arena/ 0 The largest of the country's provinces (with a surface area close to that of Italy), it is also the richest (its land is considered among the most fertile in the world) and the most heavily populated (in the mid-1940s it was home to more than a quarter of Argentina's total population). The accelerated industrialization that began in the mid-1930s increased the province's importance. The province had jurisdiction over the industrial belt that grew up around the city of Buenos Aires, which is a federal territory; accordingly, control of Buenos Aires province had always been vital for all Argentine leaders, and the Farrell-Per6n military government was no exception. In fact, this province was the political key to the electoral campaign that sought to win the presidency of the Republic. Bramuglia was the fifth interventor appointed since the military revolution of June 1943, replacing General Juan Carlos Sanguinetti, who had held the job for scarcely five months. These frequent changes indicate upsets in the governmental policy, defined some nine months later by the influential daily El Dia of La Plata, the provincial capital, as "a legalistic adherence to principle and an initial nationalistic reaction in various tones [that were] replaced [subsequently] ... by an abrupt transition to electoralism." 71 Bramuglia's appointment was actually part of the preparations that the de facto government, now a year and a half old, was making on both the national level and the provincial level. This reassignment of positions had several aspects. First, it signified the departure of the most nationalistic elements of the government, after their international policy on the world war had proved a failure and Argentina's resulting isolation had to be overcome.72 Thus, in early January 1945, the foreign minister,

So

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General Orlando Peluffo, resigned, followed by several federal interventors identified as "notorious nationalists." 73 Second, their withdrawal indicated that Peron had become the strong man of the government. At that time he already held the positions of vice president, minister of war, and secretary of labor and social welfare; now, with rivals such as Peluffo gone, his position within the cabinet was even more solid. Conscious of the importance of Buenos Aires province, Peron could now put one of his loyal supporters at its head. 74 Finally, Bramuglia's appointment reflected the military government's desire to achieve constitutional normalization in some respectable way; accordingly, it had begun to remove various military men from the civilian positions they had been holding. 75 This was the stage at which the army was beginning to retreat and move toward holding general elections. Nonetheless, in late 1944 and early 1945, Peron denied that he had any intention of running for the highest office. Asked about this possibility in an interview granted to Chilean reporters, he answered, "It is the first I've heard of it. I am a professional in the first place, for the rest I am an amateur ... My situation here is completely temporary. I guarantee you that in the Ministry of War I am a technician." To the question as to whether he would be willing to govern the Republic, he answered, "If there were no alternative. In these matters I am among those who claim that no man can escape his destiny. If destiny compels me ... but they would have to ask me; I am not going to make a move." 76 Peron's evasive answers concealed an ambitious political plan, however, and Bramuglia's appointment as interventor in the province of Buenos Aires, one of the ten most important positions in national politics, was additional proof of this for anyone who still needed it. There had been only a single case in the history of twentieth-century Argentina, that of Hipolito Yrigoyen in r9r6, when a candidate had won the presidential elections without winning in the province of Buenos Aires-the province that largely defined the political profile of the entire nation/ 7 Peron was determined to conquer the country's most important province.

A NEW SOLDIER OF THE REVOLUTION

Bramuglia's appointment was welcomed by the labor movement in general, and by the workers of Buenos Aires province in particular, who identified the new interventor with the activities of Peron's Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare-the office that since November 1943 had been working to improve wages and labor conditions for the working class. Historians Baily and Kenworthy both assert that for the CGT, one

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of Peron's most popular moves in those months was to appoint Bramuglia as interventor in the province. 78 Another factor that increased the young lawyer's popularity was his status as a native of the province, since he had been born in Chascomus and had earned his law degree from the University of La Plata. Within a few months a heterogeneous coalition of Peronist supporters began to take shape in the largest and most important province of the country. Besides working to reinforce and expand the pool of workingclass followers of Peronism and to win over middle-class supporterswho realized that the Peronist project promised a larger public administration and therefore an immediate surge in job creation-Bramuglia managed to coax political figures from the Radical Party to join his provincial government. Their job was to mobilize middle-class support for Peron's presidential bid. As soon as Bramuglia's appointment was announced, the local bosses of La Fraternidad, the UF, and other labor organizations adopted the necessary measures to express their support for the new interventor. A welcome was prepared by the Concentracion Social de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, which, under the leadership of Manuel Anglada, affiliated many labor associations of different sectors and tendencies. In a telegram to Bramuglia they expressed their certainty that the work begun at the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare would be completed by the provincial government/ 9 Bramuglia chose a team of three ministers to work with him, giving Francisco Arturo Sainz Kelly the interior ministry portfolio, Ricardo Riguera the ministry of finance, and Victor Enrique Rivarola the public works portfolio. It should be noted that Sainz Kelly was one of several journalists who had become part of Bramuglia's circle since the days that the head of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare had orchestrated the enactment of the decree-laws establishing the Professional Journalist's Code and the retirement and pension system for the journalists' union. Riguera was a lawyer and a doctor of jurisprudence whose employment history was similar to Bramuglia's: head of the legal counseling department for the retirement fund established by Law rr.289 and consulting attorney for La Fraternidad and the UF. Following the revolution of June 1943, Bramuglia arranged his appointment as interventor in the retirement fund of Law rr.rro and the journalists' retirement fund, and later as director of the Instituto Nacional de Prevision Social, representing the government. 80 Riguera's appointment had additional significance, since he was an activist with the UCR, the largest and most important political party in Argentina until the emergence of Peronism. Both Peron and Bramuglia

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wished to establish a coalition that would include Radicals in addition to representatives of the working class, in order to attract votes from the middle classes and achieve a certain kind of political legitimacy. In fact, Peron also tried, much as his friend Farrell had before him, to reach an agreement with the Radical leadership before the presidential elections. Although he did not manage to attract the most influential members of the party, he was fairly successful with many of the second-string members. In the province of Buenos Aires, Bramuglia's task was to secure the support of local militants. From the outset the new interventor projected a moderate, responsible image, thereby inspiring goodwill even in circles that expressed reservations concerning the military government and Colonel Peron. Upon assuming his duties, he presented himself as a local native of humble origins, characteristics that enabled him to understand the genuine needs of the working class. Bramuglia promised social improvements and an open-door government; to the middle class and the liberal professions he vowed to be a friend to freedom of the press and an enemy to police harassment. He also sought to reassure Catholic circles; dismissing the anticlerical views that had been imputed to him, he declared that he and his family were Christians and mentioned that he had received congratulations on his appointment from many religious organizations in the province. It should be noted here that Juan Atilio Bramuglia was initiated as a Freemason in 1922, joining Union Justa Lodge No. 35r. 81 Moreover, as a member of the Socialist Party, Bramuglia had not married his wife, Marfa Esther Ayala, in a church ceremony-party statutes did not allow religious marriage-nor did he have his children baptized, which clearly indicated his secular outlook, at least until he went into politics. As a father, Bramuglia opposed his wife's idea of sending their daughter, Miriam Esther (Lita), to a religious school and sent her to a public school instead. 82 During the 1930s, when Bramuglia talked about "faith," he meant the ideal of justice: "There is, then, a deep faith in every soul. Faith in the social justice of the future, yet not imposed by the fear of the great beyond, but by man's right to demand the place he deserves among humankind." Faith, according to Bramuglia, did not inhere solely in the Christian ideal, but also "in the ideas or thoughts that expand the road or widen the horizon." 83 However, in the 1940s he underwent a church marriage ceremony and gradually began to include Catholic themes and elements in his political discourse. His inauguration as interventor reflected the new times. Crowds thronged the Plaza San Martfn in front of the La Plata Government House, with many workers among them. The importance that the Pero-

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nists attributed to Bramuglia's new position was indicated by the imposing presence of many distinguished guests, including Vice President Peron, the chief of the federal police, the president of the supreme court, and the top brass of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare. The event was a show of support and sympathy for the secretariat, in recognition of its achievements on behalf of the proletariat, and thus, by extension, for Peron and Bramuglia, who were identified with the institution. Rafael Armando Ferrer, secretary of the employee association of the Swift meatpacking plant in Berisso, made a speech in the name of the workers in which he declared that "the revolution of 4 June has been the beginning of a new era of social justice" and thanked Peron, Bramuglia, and Mercante, "the efficient promoters of Argentine social justice." Bramuglia's speech on this occasion was a work of art that combined national and social concepts based on ideological currents that had been developing for several decades in the Socialist Party. It was a mixture of the ideals of liberty, civil equality, and social justice, framed in a moral conception in which all sectors of the population enjoyed equal opportunity and took an active part in the shaping of society, imbued by a common sense of national belonging. Bramuglia justified the 1943 coup d'etat, which had ended the fraud and political corruption of the "infamous decade" (1930-43), and underlined the importance of liberty in Argentine tradition, while explaining that "liberty, to deserve the name, must eradicate poverty, which dishonors the Nation." 84 He presented his audience with both a democratic vision of well-being and a political commitment to the new regime: "I declare that I have faith ... in the democratic institutions of our people. No political extremism has ever dominated my opinions, for such extremism absorbs the individual and erases his personality. My sole political creed is embodied in the revolutionary proclamation, synthesis of Argentine aspirations." He reminded his listeners that the workers' struggles to improve their conditions were not alien to him: "I have militated all my life alongside the Argentine working class in the fight to achieve better living conditions and I am with the revolution because it fulfills and satisfies my spirit, by creating, as it has, a new Argentine social consciousness." 85 At the public's insistence, Peron also took the floor, saying, A new soldier of the Revolution has arrived as a delegate of the Executive Power to undertake the government of the province of Buenos Aires. He is one of its humble sons, hardworking and virtuous, as I have been able to confirm in the year that he worked at my side with excellent results. Dr. Bramuglia has come to the province of his birth to take the helm and to demonstrate that humble laborers are generally the most capable executors of work for the people.

Juan Atilio Bramuglia CONSOLIDATING WORKING-CLASS SUPPORT

During his term of office, Bramuglia was very active, taking many tours through the province, holding interviews with different sectors of the public, making many speeches, and approving various legislative initiatives. 86 It was not an easy time for the interventor. In the province of Buenos Aires, as in other areas around the country, 1945 was a year of political and social agitation, which intensified as World War II drew to a close. This agitation took the form of demonstrations, strikes, and clashes at the University of La Plata, as well as of tense labor relations, especially at the Berisso meatpacking plants. Both the initiatives he undertook in the course of his work and a series of speeches he made reveal certain clear characteristics, two of which are particularly evident: first, Bramuglia was an enthusiastic defender of the military government and its social policy as implemented by the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare; as such, he completely identified himself with Peron. As long as the "people's colonel" remained firmly at the helm, Bramuglia would enjoy ample room for maneuver. Once Peron's authority was undermined in SeptemberOctober 1945, Bramuglia's leadership of the province ended as well. Second, given his Socialist past and the growing resistance shown by the parties of the traditional left-Socialists and Communists-toward Peron and his "demagogic" policy (these groups saw the military government as a native version of fascism), Bramuglia was constantly having to justify his support for the vice president's camp. Both the Socialists and the Radicals who cooperated with the administration were dubbed "collaborators" by the opposition, a term that associated them with the French who had assisted the Nazi occupation forces. Toward the end of March 1945, on the eve of the government's decision to declare war on Germany and Japan, Bramuglia began a speech at Ingeniero White with a greeting in the name of President Farrell and Colonel Peron. Of the latter, he said, "As all the Argentine working masses know, he is always with them in their concerns and their worries." In this speech he emphasized the dramatic change that had taken place in the field of social legislation since Peron had assumed the functions of secretary of labor and social welfare. Before the 1943 revolution, basic laws protecting the rights of the working class were lacking, and some of those that existed were dead letters: "We have not invented the social question; the revolutionary movement did not invent it. It existed and was completely ignored by the previous caudillist governments. The revolutionary government has tried to correct those profound Argentine ills, and now the Argentine working masses can say that they are protected by the state, as they should be."

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To those who accused him of collaboration, as though a foreign regime were occupying the country, he tried to explain his ideological creed: Unfortunately, a piece of propaganda that intrudes upon our demonstrations from every corner of the country, especially the civilian ones, discredits them by the application of a word that has been misused everywhere else in the world. People call us collaborators ... People say collaborators to us who want social justice for everyone once and for all, because we want the working class to live in greater comfort, because it has a legitimate right to live with dignity, and because we want, finally, in a realistic, profoundly democratic sense, true democracy; because we want to be governed by the rule of law, a rule of law that was taken away from us not by the revolutionary movement, but by them, with deceit and constant public disorderY

During his months as interventor, Bramuglia fought to improve conditions in inadequately lighted and ventilated workshops and factories where hygiene was abysmal. He tried to legislate retirement rights for workers in various sectors and to achieve full employment. His objective was to use the laws applied in the federal capital to implement the new social policy in the province, because "beyond the Riachuelo, throughout the vast territory of our people, the industrial masses completely lack protection." 88 Among other achievements, Bramuglia managed to maintain his firm base of support among the railway workers unionized in La Fraternidad and the UF, which traditionally had played a central role in the organized labor movement in Argentina. Accordingly, he cooperated with Joaquin de Vedia, secretary-general of the UF in the province of Buenos Aires, and assigned great importance to the inauguration of institutions intended to promote the well-being of this sector, such as the opening of the Hospital Regional Ferroviario (Railroad Regional Hospital) in Punta Alta, in March 1945. 89 At the same time, Bramuglia was acquiring followers among the workers of other unions. His mediation in the worker-employer conflicts at the meatpacking plants of Berisso, Ensenada, and Avellaneda was much appreciated by the unionists, as their leader, Cipriano Reyes, wrote in his memoirs. 90 This mediation arose in response to a plan devised by industry bosses to dismiss thousands of workers. Bramuglia maintained a very close relationship with the Sindicato Aut6nomo de los Obreros de la Industria de la Carne (the meat-industry workers' union), which was headed by Reyes. Peron and the secretariat backed the striking workers and recognized the legality of their struggle, since the employers' action contravened existing labor agreements. The strike in Berisso, a town that contained perhaps the greatest concentration of industrial workers in Argentina at the time, concerned

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Bramuglia a great deal, because it quickly spread beyond the meatpacking plants. Two weeks later the textile workers joined in, after the secretary of their union was dismissed, and on April 17 there was also a commercial shutdown in the city in solidarity with the meatpackers. 91 After three weeks of strong-arm tactics, an agreement was reached with the meatpacking plants, and the previous status quo was reestablished. This compromise was considered a victory for the workers, and Bramuglia saw it as a personal achievement as well. 92 He promised the employers state compensation to cover the losses caused by the strike and to prevent thousands of workers from losing their jobs. However, in the following months agitation continued in the meatpacking sector, with workers' meetings, work stoppages, and negotiations mediated by Peron, Mercante, and Bramuglia, mainly because of conflicts over the payment of wages during the first twenty days of the strike and the arrest of various workers. In the second two weeks of August the tension in the meatpacking industry intensified. Bramuglia was clearly siding with the unions, claiming that the employers' arguments were "motivated by the deliberate intention of confusing the workers' opinion and hindering a solution of the problem." The reaction was not long in coming: In the following days, the companies published a prominent paid announcement arguing that the interventor's official communique was "characterized by charges that were as inaccurate as they were serious." 93 Bramuglia also worked to improve the situation of rural workers and small farmers in the spirit of the Estatuto del Peon (Farm Laborer's Statute) adopted by the military government, which attacked the traditional dependence on the patron (boss). 94 However, he did not attempt to implement agrarian reform in the province-nor did Peron as president, at any time during the following decade. The subject was an underlying theme in the rhetoric of both men, however. During a visit to Gral. Pinto, Bramuglia announced an extensive program to give land to those who worked it, noting that people who rented out their land were not the useful landlords that Argentine lands needed. 95 He claimed that the region was being strangled by a belt of latifundios (large estates) that obstructed its development. He added, further, that the latifundios constituted a regressive stage that should be wiped out at all costs since the danger was greater when it involved a city or a town. It was a long, reasoned speech against latifundism, which according to Bramuglia hindered agrarian progress, affected the demographic figures of the provinces, and engendered social injustice. He defended private ownership on a social basis: "The State protects and recognizes private property as long as it fulfills its natural function of tending to the common good. The inverse

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of this principle is property as an anarchic factor and creator of class struggle. On Argentine land, rural property ownership will no longer be the means for exploiting the rural population, just as industrial ownership will not be a basis for exploiting the proletarian classes." These were fighting words, although Peronism was not a revolutionary but a reformist movement; and this rhetoric of agrarian reform never resulted in any meaningful action during the few months that Bramuglia was federal interventor in the province or during Peron's presidential term. 96

EDUCATION AND ITS SOCIAL FUNCTION

Bramuglia invested effort in expanding the provincial education system to accommodate more pupils. Early on, at his inauguration as interventor, he declared his commitment to the expansion of "elementary, secondary, and vocational education so that no one is deprived of its benefits and no one fails to meet its obligations, since what gives definitive structure to the life of the collective is the education of man for the community: of man for citizenship." 97 Around that time awareness was increasing about the magnitude of illiteracy in Argentina and the obstacle that it presented to development and modernization, as well as to the normal functioning of the army. According to statistics published in February 1945, of Argentina's total 1943 population of ro,r6o,4oo, r,68o,8oo, or r6.6 percent, were illiterate. 98 At the beginning of March, with the start of the new school year, Bramuglia inaugurated a campaign to eradicate the problem, explaining in a speech broadcast over the radio that "the defeat of illiteracy would constitute a major human victory. As long as we are still encountering illiterates, all the resources invested in education for the Province will have been inadequate because we will not be able to create the citizen we are looking for: a citizen made for and oriented towards the great Argentine necessities." He promised to work to reduce school dropouts and to instill perseverance; he underlined the national significance of expanding the education system and extolled the liberal forefathers Sarmiento and Rivadavia. 99 It should be noted that in his speeches Bramuglia often mentioned national icons of the liberal historiography-a historiography that placed these two men in the pantheon of heroes. 100 To Bramuglia, Peronism represented an extension of the national liberating epic. Accordingly, he would speak of "the need to take our inspiration from the spirit of Argentine independence, reinforcing the principles of social justice."101 Indeed, in its initial stages, Peronism did not distance itself from

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the legacy of liberal historiography; only after Peron's overthrow did a process of historical revisionism begin to gain ground, in which Rosas was elevated as a national hero while Rivadavia was categorized as a traitor to the country. 102 To eradicate illiteracy, Bramuglia announced a plan to build seven hundred country schools in the province that very year, even if they had only one, two, or three classrooms. 103 The idea was to ensure that the children of the province did not have to go far from their homes to gain access to basic education. Bramuglia also felt certain that any change in the system would depend on improving conditions for teachers: namely, engineering a change in both their self-image and their public image, as well as raising salaries to prevent them from having to seek other sources of income and to attract a higher caliber of personnel to the teaching profession. In a speech to a group of teachers at the Teatro Argentino in La Plata in mid-March, Bramuglia explained, "The situation of teachers in our country has always been precarious. We have watched them struggle with poverty and contend with political persecution. We have also watched them suffer the corresponding humiliation and go through all the barriers to justice. It is always time to honor them, encourage them, and give them the basic essentials to confer complete professional dignity upon them." 104 In order to give teachers this professional, economic, and social dignity, Bramuglia, in coordination with Peron, took steps to institute a minimum monthly salary of 200 pesos for the 14,500 or so teachers in the province. 105 Bramuglia repeatedly mentioned the importance of the human factor in national progress, declaring the need to expand the entire education system, as well as to increase training in the industrial sector and agriculture and fishing. The goal was twofold: first, to try to reduce the flow of migrants to the large cities, particularly the greater Buenos Aires area; second, to integrate young people in the project of development and modernization that was to lead the country to economic independence. The same logic would be applied later when the Peronists were in power. 106 The interventor emphasized the social function of school: through education, genuine equality of opportunity could be guaranteed, because access to education was not supposed to be a privilege limited to the moneyed urban sectors. The school was also a melting pot that helped establish solidarity between Argentines from different regions and different social and ethnic backgrounds. At the same time, he presented the school as a bulwark of democracy, because "permanent respect for freedom of education should be the sole basis for school life." Bramuglia also tried to maintain a dialogue with the students of La Plata. A few days after taking office, he met with student representatives,

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who asked for authorization to reopen the student centers. The new interventor explained that he would remain firm in his commitment to freedom of thought, of expression, and of assembly, and that he would intercede for them with the national and university authorities. 107 However, the liberalization of the government's attitude toward the universities did not diminish the students' opposition to the military regime. On the contrary, in the course of 1945 the institutions of higher education became prominent bulwarks of resistance to the de facto government and to Peron, demanding a rapid return to democracy. 108 Mid-March saw disturbances at the University of La Plata. Student demonstrators clashed with the police, who threw tear gas and made several arrests; Bramuglia interceded on behalf of the detainees, seeking their release. 109 Nonetheless, a month later the students returned to the attack, trying to take over the university and confronting the police. The government resolved to end the agitation and appointed Dr. Benjamin Villegas Basavilbaso as interventor. The removal of the previous university rector, Dr. Ricardo Labougle, and the institution of the federal intervention were viewed as an accomplishment by the students. The new interventor promised to organize elections for university posts as soon as possible.11° Speaking to a group of about a hundred wives of political prisoners at the end of March and in April, Bramuglia promised that those prisoners who were under the control of the provincial government would be released and that he would intercede with the interior minister on behalf of those who were detained by the national executive power. When he resigned his post, after some ten months, he could say with pride, "There were political and social prisoners in the province of Buenos Aires when I arrived. I am leaving the province of Buenos Aires with neither political nor social prisoners. I never took anyone prisoner ... I have not contributed to anyone being harassed or tortured in any way. I have never closed down a newspaper or prevented a meeting. Nor have I closed down premises of any kind." 111 In Argentina in those days, there is no doubt that this was indeed an accomplishment. Although many interpreted the neutrality of the military government during World War II as an expression of sympathy for the Axis, Bramuglia, who sympathized with the Allies and was considered a partisan of the democratic institutions, stressed continental solidarity in his speeches after the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (February-March 1945) in Chapultepec, Mexico. In May 1945, he took part in various ceremonies marking the Allied victory, some of them initiated by him. For example, he organized the singing of a Te Deum in the cathedral of La Plata, and in a speech delivered at Punta

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Alta he asserted that "hundreds of millions of men are today singing the joyful hymns of the new age," and went on to speak of the "victory of civilization ... [the] victory of man over the negation of life." 112 Bramuglia's activities reverberated throughout the province, among other reasons because the La Plata daily El Dia (founded in 1884), although criticizing Peron and the de facto government, customarily provided detailed coverage of the interventor's activities, praising his personality and accomplishments on the editorial pages. On June 4, 1945, for the anniversary of the military coup, it published an article praising the interventor's measures to reduce the tax burden; the plan to implement the government's promises and balance the budget; the campaign against illiteracy; the great investment in hospital buildings; the increase in teachers' salaries; and the construction of school cafeterias, a boys' boarding school, and the union building in Berisso, among other projects. 113 El Dia's endorsement of Bramuglia is worth mentioning; the Argentine press in mid-1945 was not inclined to support the emerging Peronist camp. The major dailies in the federal capital and almost all the traditional organs of the interior provinces were hostile to the de facto government in one way or another.11 4

FORGING A POLITICAL ALLIANCE WITH RADICAL AND SOCIALIST DISSIDENTS

At the same time that he was working to promote the well-being of the province's inhabitants, especially those in the neediest sectors, Bramuglia was also taking steps to form a broad political front. To that end, he tried to attract activists of the Radical Party, seeking to promote in the province the same plan that Peron had been elaborating for several months on the national level: mobilizing the support of significant sectors of the UCR. Peron did not conceal his purpose, which was already apparent in a speech he gave in May 1944 to a group of military officers: The Radical Party is the great force that lasts and is powerful. But its leadership is antiquated and it sees itself as a movement to expel the generals. We foresee a revolution like our own, which will allow young men access to leadership positions. It is a usable force, if we can channel it in such a way as to cooperate with our enterprise. We are taking care of it and we are confident of success.11 5

To implement his plan, Peron sought to reach an agreement with the Radical Cordoban caudillo, Amadeo Sabattini, to whom he eventually offered the post of interior minister. The caution shown by Sabattini during the first year of the military government and his defense of neutrality

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contributed to the sense that he might become a good ally for Peron. 116 The culminating moment of all these maneuvers arrived in mid-1944, when Peron and Sabattini met personally. Peron offered to call elections and reserve all the effective positions from vice president on down for Radicals; he thought that the president should be an army man. However, Sabattini insisted that the candidate for president should be a Radical, too. The result was that no agreement was reached, and Sabattini went into voluntary exile in Uruguay for several months. Contacts with other members of the intransigent wing of the Radical Party did not prosper either. None of the nationally prominent party figures was willing to support Peron. Those Radicals who did join the Peronist ranks arrived by way of FORJA; others were persuaded by federal interventors loyal to Peron. The movement also attracted a number of Radical revisionist (Junta Renovadora} leaders and some politicians from the interior who were prominent locally but unknown on the national level. Accordingly, Peron concentrated his attention on the working class, although he never abandoned for a minute his efforts to seduce the militants of Radicalism, to whom he always presented himself as heir to the mantle of Hipolito Yrigoyen. In Buenos Aires province, Bramuglia promoted Peron's policy at full tilt, making the most, on one hand, of his own image as a moderate, pro-Allies, civilian politician and, on the other hand, of the turbulence that had characterized the provincial Radical Party since the early 1940s, deep in the "infamous decade." The unionist faction (followers of the tradition associated with former president Alvear) controlled the party machine, generating discontent among some of the Radicals because of its conservatism and its readiness to participate in elections, a move that was seen as legitimizing the fraudulent Conservative regime. When the military revolution took place, the revisionist Radicals of Buenos Aires province conveyed their "patriotic emotion" to General Rawson in a note signed by Ricardo Balbfn, Oscar Alende, and Alejandro Leloir, Yrigoyenists who had been in open conflict with the UCR authorities since Yrigoyen's ouster. These, as well as a few Alvearists who since the 1943 revolution had felt that their party was at a dead end, were now the main targets of Bramuglia's courting efforts. 117 Shortly after assuming his duties as interventor, he embarked on a series of meetings with Radical activists, including Balbfn and Leloir, in order to enlist their support. 118 Various party leaders in the province were quick to warn that Bramuglia's efforts could conquer the party from within. In May and June, the engineer Ernesto C. Boatti, president of the UCR executive committee in the province of Buenos Aires, described Bramuglia's political plan. The interventor, he said, was collecting all the Radical Party members in the

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district (except for those who had occupied political or public positions before June 4, 1943) who would be willing to support the political ends of the government. Once this groundwork was accomplished, continued Boatti, the stage would be set to register enough citizens to take over the party management and, later, to impose the presidential formula for which this plan had been designed. According to Boatti, the publication of the Estatuto de los Partidos Politicos (Law for Political Parties) proved his theory, because it allowed public functionaries to register and militate in political parties. It also authorized the provincial ministries to dismiss employees without restriction-meaning that people could be pressured to join the Radical Party and to vote in a certain way in internal elections. In addition, the increase in the number of public positions in the province could be a means of encouraging many people to support the government: "This is how they are planning to take over the Radicalleadership." 119 A month later, after General Farrell had promised that free elections would be announced before the end of the year, the UCR decreed that any members who accepted posts from or collaborated with the current government would be expelled from the party. The repeated threats indicate the concern felt at the various levels of Radical leadership in the province and the city of Buenos Aires; to some degree, these Radicals obstructed the efforts of Peron and Bramuglia.l2° Similar steps were taken by the leaders of the Socialist Party, who watched with anguish as some of their most prominent militants, such as Angel Borlenghi, secretarygeneral of the commercial employees' union, cozied up to Peron. Bramuglia was a popular target for Socialist hostility in those months, owing to the growing number of Socialist unionists who were joining the new Peronist movement-a trend that culminated with the establishment of the Labor Party following the events of October 17, 1945· An account by Pedro Otero, then a leader of the Union de Obreros y Empleados Municipales (Municipal Workers' Union), reflects this phenomenon: When we saw that scads of comrades, such as Bramuglia, Freyre, an infinite number of comrades in the management of the PS [Partido Socialista], were following it, well, then, we can't be wrong. One or two of us might be mistaken, but not So% of the leaders in the PS ... I can say that So% of the leadership has joined the Peronist movement ... Who is going to argue that Bramuglia was no socialist, if [he was] in the party since he was in short pants. If Peronism had existed [earlier], Mario Bravo would have embraced it, as Enrique Dickmann did later. 121

In April 1945 Perez Leiros was already busy trying to "unmask" Bramuglia. He criticized the union leaders who had supported Yrigoyen, Uriburu, Ortiz, and Castillo, and, referring to Bramuglia, recalled:

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On June 9 or IO, 1943, in Dr. Mario Bravo's study, a senior official of the present government made me a proposition, suggesting a joint action of the two CGTs (No. r and No. 2) to fight relentlessly against the revolutionary government. Naturally I roundly rejected any cooperation with elements who served and are serving all governments. This same person is the person who for a long time fawned on "leaders of my sort" and, as though he were a leader himself, he had the nerve to suggest joint action in 1942 to get the CGT, which at the time was not divided, to support the candidacy of General Agustin P. Justo for the presidency of the Republic. 122 The person to whom I allude is now claiming to be the leader of the workers' movement, and it is even said that he led a candidate for the presidency of the Republic to believe that his leadership or influence would get the labor movement to support him. If that support works the way it did for Yrigoyen, Ortiz, and Castillo, the outcome is obvious. 123 In mid-August, Bramuglia decided to reorganize his provincial cabinet. He gave the interior portfolio to Dr. Ramon del Rfo, a physician and revisionist Radical leader from the southern region of the province; he put Luis R. Longhi, formerly the public prosecutor, in charge of the finance ministry; and the ministry of public works went to Alejandro Busquet, a revisionist Radical leader from Bollvar, who was the provincial chief accountant and had a seat in the Buenos Aires senate. Thus, the revisionist branch of the Radical Party contributed two of its most representative figures, del Rfo and Busquet, to the provincial government. Another Radical politician, Dr. Antonio Rodriguez Jauregui of Pergamino, minister of public works under the governorship of Jose Luis Cantilo in the 1920s and president of the Consejo Nacional de Educacion (National Council of Education) during Yrigoyen's second presidential term, was on the list of possible candidates for the finance ministry, although ultimately Bramuglia chose Longhi. 124 The new ministers' swearing-in ceremony was graced by the conspicuous presence of the leaders of "collaborationist Radicalism," Salvador Cetra and Alejandro H. Leloir, with whom Bramuglia had coordinated most of his measures to attract Radicals to the emerging Peronist bloc. When the provincial chief of police, Enrique Martinez Pena, resigned, he was replaced by Alberto H. Reales, who had acted as a Radical leader in the city of Dolores and had occupied a seat in the national Chamber of Deputies (1940-43). 125 It can be said that the "revisionist" Radical core effectively had "control" of the government during the last stage of the intervention. The interventor's efforts to mobilize the political support of Radical dissidents in the province mirrored, as it were, Peron's program in the national sphere. At the beginning of August the post of interior minister was assumed by Hortensia Jazmfn Quijano, a leader of the second line of

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Radicals in Corrientes. An Alvearist, he would later serve as vice president to Peron until his death in 1952. 126 Alonso Irigoyen resigned from the ministry of finance, and his place was taken by Armando G. Antille, a Yrigoyenist Radical leader from Santa Fe who had been Yrigoyen's legal counsel during the difficult days of 1930. The UCR in Santa Fe immediately adopted a resolution to expel Antille from the party. When the foreign minister, Dr. Cesar Ameghino, resigned, he was replaced by Dr. Juan I. Cooke, another former Alvearist, who had been a deputy for Buenos Aires until the coup d'etat of June 1943. His support for the Allies during World War II was supposed to help the de facto government improve relations with the United States. The president of the UCR committee in the province of Buenos Aires, engineer Boatti, took steps to get Cooke ejected from the party. September saw the first publication of a daily newspaper evocatively titled La Epoca, which sought to reconcile the Yrigoyenist tradition with Peron's policy and to present Peron as Yrigoyen's true heir. All these efforts bore fruit in October 1945, when the newly formed Union Clvica-Junta Reorganizadora (soon shortened to Junta Renovadora), under the leadership of Quijano, Antille, Leloir, and others, propelled the "people's colonel" back into the political arena. The Junta would form part of the Peronist coalition that confronted the Union Democratica in the elections of February 1946. The political tension intensified in the month of August. The civilian opposition, heartened by the new global state of affairs created by the Allied victory and the end of the war, pressed for the transfer of political power to the Supreme Court and began to unify its forces in preparation for the elections promised by the military government. 127 At the end of that month the UCR committee agreed to join an electoral union "with the democratic parties" against the fledgling Peronism.

BRAMUGLIA RESIGNS

The civilian opposition's growing offensive against the military regime, focused largely on the figure of Peron, increased the military's sense of unease about the vice president and his political ambitions. It was inevitable that this antigovernmental campaign and the atmosphere in civilian society should have some sort of repercussions in the barracks. Amadeo Sabattini encouraged the commander of the powerful Campo de Mayo base, General Eduardo Avalos-until recently a close friend of Peron's and no enemy to his policies-to seek the vice president's ouster in exchange for a place on the Radical Party's future presidential ticket. On September 24 the government put down a military uprising in Cordoba

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led by General Arturo Rawson-the same who ascended to the presidency in the aftermath of June 4, 1943, but had to resign after two days. One of the first victims of the military resistance to Peron was Bramuglia, who had been so successful as interventor. Under pressure, he resigned on September 19, some nine months after his appointment, and after long conversations that day with Peron and the interior minister, Quijano. 128 In a letter to Quijano, he did not mention the reasons that led him to tender his resignation, merely writing, "I submit to Your Excellency my ineluctable resignation of the post of federal interventor in the province of Buenos Aires, a mission with which I was opportunely honored by the National Executive Power. Wishing Your Excellency success in managing the government in your charge, I reaffirm my faith in the future of our homeland in these singularly historical times." 129 Bramuglia himself called a press conference at the governor's residence in La Plata. He declared that he was leaving the government but would maintain his solidarity with the June 4 Revolution, General Farrell, and Colonel Peron. Bramuglia had decided to quit his post as a result of pressure put on Peron, who had no alternative but to sacrifice the interventor, hoping thus to placate his rivals. This is substantiated by the fact that scarcely three weeks before he left his post Bramuglia had asked the president of the UF for an unpaid, indefinite leave of absence from his job as legal advisor "since this situation is continuing for what I consider an excessive length of time for normal operations in the Oficina de Tn1mites [Office of Administrative Affairs] and I do not wish to compromise it in any way." 130 Bramuglia submitted his resignation on a day of great political agitation. The opposition mounted a show of force that same day, in a "March for the Constitution and Liberty" calling for "transfer of power to the Supreme Court and immediate elections." 131 More than 2oo,ooo Argentines marched from the elegant Barrio Norte area to downtown Buenos Aires, united by this slogan. For a short time the post of interventor was occupied by the minister of the interior Ramon del Rfo, only to be transferred again to Alberto H. Reales, a loyal follower of foreign minister Cooke. Peron was not enthusiastic about this appointment, although he felt obliged to accept it. On October 9, under pressure from Campo de Mayo, he also had to give up the positions of national vice president, minister of war, and secretary of labor and social welfare; on October 13 he was arrested and transferred to Martin Garda Island. Four days later he was released as a result of mass worker demonstrations, and announced his candidacy in the next presidential elections. Peron's return to the center of the political stage meant another change in the Buenos Aires provincial government,

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and on October 26 Brigadier General Ramon A. Albariiio took over the position of interventor. 132 As for Bramuglia's role in the dramatic events of October, Evita apparently entered into open conflict with him during the weekend of the 13th and 14th. According to various sources, when Peron was imprisoned on Martin Garda Island, she was determined not to lose her man and believed the moment had come to make her case in legal form. She went around to the houses of various Peronist attorneys asking for a writ of habeas corpus, which would give Peron the option of leaving the country. Bramuglia was one of those who responded with a firm negative, because he did not believe that leaving the country was the solution. Although Evita's attitude was understandable from her emotional perspective, it was unacceptable from a political perspective, and Bramuglia saw the course she proposed as a grave mistake. He rebuked her: "The only thing that interests you is going to live with the Colonel somewhere else, and for this you are appealing to the men of the movement, when what we should do is keep Peron and get people together to defend him before giving up this battle as lost." 133 But Evita protested, insisted, insulted. Although ultimately Peron was released and returned to the center of the political stage, the episode apparently left the future First Lady with a certain sense of resentment toward Bramuglia. Raul Margueirat, chief of protocol and a confidant of the Perons, related that "Eva asks Bramuglia to file a writ of habeas corpus so that he would have the option of leaving the country, and Bramuglia tells her that they could not do it because if Peron left, the movement was finished. But [Roman] Subiza, with all his usual bad intentions, made Eva believe that Bramuglia wanted Peron to be a prisoner." 134 The role played by Evita in the mass demonstrations of October 17, as we know, was much less significant than that attributed to her for decades by the Peronist and anti-Peronist mythologies. 135 More research needs to be done on the role played by Bramuglia, who took refuge in the home of a friend in the Caballito neighborhood for a few days, and on his meetings and contacts during that time. According to Carlos Bramuglia's testimony, the brother of Peron's first wife, Aurelia Tizon, came to Bramuglia's house on October 17, and the two decided that young Carlos, then fifteen years old, should go with Tizon to the military hospital to talk to Peron, who was in bed there. They told him about the latest events, and Peron dictated to Carlos Bramuglia his conditions for the composition of a new government. 136 Contrary to what Evita's biographers say, Bramuglia's son maintains that in fact the friction between Bramuglia and Evita dated back much further, to the second half of the 1930s. The UF was interested in broad-

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casting a program on Radio Portena. Bramuglia, who had written radio plays about Sarmiento for that station, had contacts with the owners. During his negotiations with them, he met the young actress, and apparently their relations were soon tense rather than friendly. 137

AN ARCHITECT OF THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

In the electoral campaign, too, Bramuglia was at Peron's side, this time as president of the Junta Nacional de Coordinacion, a body that coordinated the political parties and organizations supporting the colonel's candidacy. As such he had to draft agreements between the different groups, constantly maneuvering between unionists, former Radicals, and Conservatives, and emphasizing the need to work together. Many observers have failed to appreciate this work, either overlooking or overdramatizing the internal conflicts within the newborn Peronist movement. Thus, for example, according to Mercante's son, Working for Peronism, although arduous and chaotic, was child's play compared with working for the opposition. Peronism had a leader, a final word. The Union Democratica, in contrast, dominated by a large group of Radicals, had members from other parties, all arrogant and full of ambition ... Such a varied coalition had only one battle plan: "down with nazi-fascism, death to the dictatorship, and free elections" ... Peronism as such had spent two years fighting for recognition of workers' rights ... and seemed more united than the opposition group. 138

In reality, the Peronist camp was no less heterogeneous and suffered from similar divisions and internal conflicts, particularly between the two recently created parties, the Labor Party and the UCR-Junta Renovadora. These were not the only problems faced by the Junta Nacional de Coordinacion. At the end of January, some thirty days before the elections, the Junta studied a gloomy memorandum from Bernardo Sierra. The first paragraph described a "difficult and extremely serious" situation that made normal participation in the elections impossible. 139 The memo enumerated legal obstacles and material and organizational problems. Sierra recommended the establishment of a "30-member civilian committee with full dictatorial powers to direct Colonel Peron's political movement nationally, transcending the political parties that support it," with Bramuglia as its president. He also recommended drafting a decree-law that would extend, to at least February 5, the deadline for submitting candidate lists to the federal judges around the country, and suggested seriously considering postponement of the national

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elections to the first Sunday in April, leaving provincial elections to the last Sunday in May. Sierra also called on authorities to print millions of ballots for voters, something that had not been done in the past. Not all Sierra's recommendations were accepted, but his report reflected the difficulties experienced by the Peronist camp and the Herculean labor that Bramuglia faced. Reading the telegrams and letters that went in and out of his office on the first floor of 366 Cerrito Street during those weeks of the electoral campaign, we begin to appreciate his contribution, achieved through the prestige he enjoyed among the different groups that supported Per6n. 14°Consequently, it is difficult to accept Torre's argument, based on testimony from Luis Gay, that "the coordination committee ended in failure." 141 However, it cannot be denied that in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Tucuman, Jujuy, Santiago del Estero, San Luis, and Catamarca, Laborites and Junta Renovadora members competed separately in the elections, a move that also had its advantages in mobilizing popular support. The conflict between the Labor Party and the Junta Renovadora in Buenos Aires province was linked to Bramuglia's own political career. 142 Although in his various speeches as interventor he had assured his listeners that he was joining a cause in which he believed and that "once our institutions are operating normally I have no interest in playing a public role and at that point I do not expect to do so," 143 his successful performance as interventor in Buenos Aires province and his high standing in the labor movement led many to consider him a natural candidate for governor in the February 1946 elections. It was also the position that he most desired. It should be noted, too, that many ambitious politicians have begun their ascension from the provincial level, and that the governorship of Buenos Aires often served as a springboard to positions at the national level. The Labor Party, which arose from the events of October 17 and played a significant part in the formative stage of the Peronist coalition, expressed its intention of placing the ex-federal interventor at the head of the Buenos Aires provincial government. Because this plan also reflected the Labor Party's ambitions to play a central role in Argentine politics, it sparked one of the party's most serious conflicts with Peron and the Junta Renovadora. The provincial congress of the Labor Party proclaimed Bramuglia as a candidate for governor, with Major Alfredo Arrieta, husband of Eva Peron's sister Elisa Duarte, as his running mate. 144 Peron rejected this plan because he had in mind for this key post a politician from the Junta Renovadora, Alejandro Leloir, "a landowner with an old family name, with whom he hoped to infiltrate a province with Radical and Conservative loyalties" 145-and also because, apparently,

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he was not keen on the idea of Bramuglia in the governor's mansion, where he could build a political power base of his own. Under these circumstances, Bramuglia had no choice but to decline the offer-twice, because the Laborite congressmen rejected his refusal the first time. 146 Peron, for his part, promised the Labor Party leaders that if he won the election he would give Bramuglia a portfolio in his cabinet; therefore, they should choose another candidate for governor. 147 Apparently Peron was convinced that he could now be sure of Leloir's candidacy. However, the Laborites would not yield, and their leader, Cipriano Reyes, proved intransigent. When Bramuglia failed to arrive at the convention that was to declare him as candidate, the delegates proceeded to approve a ticket consisting of Mercante and Machado as candidates for governor and deputy governor, respectively (see Chapter r). The Junta Renovadora called on Peron to intervene, and he requested a change of ticket, to Leloir-Bramuglia. Nonetheless, the authorities of the Labor Party ratified their decision on February 12, twelve days before the elections, claiming that the democratic standards of the party could not allow any substitution of candidates. Peron had no choice but to accept the Laborites' decision. 148 The leaders of the Labor Party felt that Bramuglia had let them down. According to Cipriano Reyes, the outgoing interventor had asked him to come to his home in the capital at r682 Juncal Avenue to talk about confidential political matters. This meeting took place on January 21 at ro o'clock, in the presence of a few Labor Party leaders. Reyes describes the conversation that ensued: "-Well, Cipriano, I want to make a gentlemen's agreement with you all, and especially with you ...You have been able to appreciate my performance as federal interventor in the province of Buenos Aires ... I would like to be governor of the province ... if you do not have a candidate for the job. But my problem is that I must honor a previous commitment I made to Colonel Peron, that while I head the Consejo [Junta] de Coordinacion I cannot accept any elected position. The solution, if acceptable to you, would be for you gentlemen to name me as the Labor Party's candidate for governor at your party convention." Actually, we liked Bramuglia's personality (he had a great deal of prestige at the time) enough to run him as a candidate. We knew his personal, intellectual, and political ability. "-We have not yet considered who our party candidate for governor will be. For our part, we have no objection, but ultimately this is a decision for the party convention. With our support, talking to the delegates in advance, the matter could be favorably resolved." "-I am very grateful to you all for that personal position," he answered us ... But now, in all fairness, I will tell you that there is a problem that you must get around, and that is with respect to the word of honor I gave to Peron. He has

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offered me, as payment for the mission that I am fulfilling, a minister's portfolio (I think it will be the interior ministry), which does not interest me. I want to be governor of Buenos Aires. The Colonel does not need to know of this meeting and this gentlemen's agreement." 149

On the morning of the 22nd, Bramuglia telephoned Reyes to ask how things were going with his candidacy. "Don't worry," the unionist responded. That same day the Labor Party convention announced Bramuglia's candidacy for governor of the province. The delegates from Avellaneda had suggested his name. The other delegates, especially those from La Plata, supported the motion and asked all the delegates at the convention to stand and approve the nomination with unanimous applause, which they did. They called Peron's department from the convention (at the Eden Palace movie theater in La Plata), as they had previously arranged with Bramuglia. Reyes told Bramuglia about the nomination, and Bramuglia, with Peron at his side, feigned surprise at the news and said it was impossible, because he had promised the colonel not to accept any elected post. Reyes then spoke with Peron and explained to him that the Labor Party leaders had not known of any prior commitment and the convention was waiting at that very moment to hear Bramuglia's speech accepting his nomination for governor. It appeared that Peron would not now raise any obstacle, and Bramuglia promised to go to the Eden Palace to express his appreciation-in vain, since he never appeared on that night or the following ones. A few days later the leaders of the Labor Party were surprised to learn that Bramuglia had gone to the Junta Renovadora convention in the town of San Martin, where the Leloir-Bramuglia slate was approved. The daily newspapers stated that this was a joint ticket for the Junta Renovadora and the Labor Party of Buenos Aires province. Indignant and disappointed, the Labor Party reconvened their convention and, in a rebellious attempt to maintain their autonomy, voted for a separate ticket, Mercante-Machado.U 0 Vicente Garofalo, who had been the one to propose Bramuglia's candidacy, now moved to void it unanimously. The assembled delegates did so and nominated in Bramuglia's place Domingo Mercante, who had originally been the Labor candidate for national vice president. 151 Throughout the electoral campaign, Bramuglia gave speeches that featured social-progressive themes. On February 12 the Labor Party convened its members in a big public assembly, where it announced its candidates for president and vice president. On this occasion, too, Bramuglia's speech reflected his socialist past: We represent the true national unity ... This can be seen ... in the significant trajectory of our democratic and revolutionary ideals. In the essence of our

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higher aspirations, in the service of the community and the country ... We are not motivated by the desire to perpetuate a policy that is so evident in the ranks of the oligarchic opposition, nor by the fear of losing positions. It is precisely in the ranks of unfettered, demagogic capitalism that fear has become entrenched and they are roused by the loss of perks and situations. Blind and deaf, they neither see nor hear the voice of the Republic. Rejected by the citizenry, they desire only to hang on. They live the drama of power. They want it and know they are losing it. Accordingly they are afraid and they begin to miss the privileges that they maintained at the expense of the public like the prerogatives of Roman consuls. 152

In contrast to the historians, Bramuglia's contemporaries saw clearly the importance of the role he played in the Junta Nacional de Coordinaci6n de los Partidos Politicos Revolucionarios. On May 7, 1946, a ceremony was held to pay tribute to Bramuglia "for his efficient work" during the electoral campaign. In the presence of the senators, deputies, and governors-elect of both camps, Labor and Junta Renovadora, speeches were made in praise of his person and his contribution to the Peronist victory. Hector Maya of Entre Rios spoke in the name of the governorselect: "Dr. Bramuglia has to his credit that quality, the quality of having been one of the great, among the greatest who made the triumph of 24 February possible, and I confidently expect that Dr. Bramuglia will play a still greater role in the future." 153 Luis Gonzalez of the UF also spoke at this event. According to him, "Bramuglia came to be, for us, the spiritual father of the Argentine labor movement." During the military government, he said, the workers gave Bramuglia the title of "Argentina's Number One Civilian." After the electoral victory, Bramuglia played an important part in unifying the political forces that had supported Peron's candidacy, thereby contributing to the demise of the Labor Party. On April 5, 1946, a manifesto was published in the daily papers. Signed by a "Junta Provisoria Pro-Unidad" ("Pro-Unity Provisional Committee"), it proclaimed, The Junta Renovadora, the Labor Party, and all the independent entities have fulfilled their original purpose. Their members, since the triumph, understand instinctively that they must pour the content of their experiences into a solid party unity, to begin without any loss of time the second part of this historic cycle, preparing and structuring the movement within a solid shared organization ... This is why we who take responsibility for this manifesto believe that it is not logical for kindred forces to continue developing their activities separatelyY 4

The names of Alberto Teisaire, Bramuglia, and Alejandro Leloir headed the list of signatures, an indication of the importance of the manifesto and Peron's political intent. The initiative met with fierce opposition from the Laborite leaders.

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A few weeks later, when the negotiations failed, Peron tried one last time to win over the Labor Party leaders. For this mission he chose Bramuglia, whose prestige among the union leaders remained untarnished. Speaking to the members of the central committee of the Labor Party, Bramuglia argued the advisability of granting full powers to the President-elect to begin reorganizing the Peronist forces. According to Luis Gay, when Bramuglia was asked what would happen if Peron did not accept the decision of the central executive committee, he replied with his word of honor that nothing was going to happen, that the committee's will would be respected. 155 However, in the face of the Laborite leadership's continued obduracy, on May 23 Peron read an announcement to his followers over the radio, officially dissolving the governing bodies of all parties in the Republic belonging to the Peronist movement and reorganizing all Peronist forces as the Partido Unico de la Revolucion Nacional (Single Party of the Revolution). After the fall of the regime in September 1955, Bramuglia, seeking to vindicate himself, tried to convince many that in the second half of the 1940s he had in fact opposed Peron's measures, which ultimately ousted the old union guard from the Peronist movement and the CGT. In an interview in Buenos Aires with American historian Robert Alexander on July 4, 19 56, Bramuglia stressed his alleged opposition to "the end of the Labor Party" and to the coercive unification of the political forces that had backed Peron's candidacy. 156 ·

CHAPTER THREE

The Third Position and the Price of Success

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Prevented from running for the governorship of Buenos Aires province, Bramuglia set his sights on the interior ministry portfolio following the Peronist victory at the polls. As Raul Carlos Desmaras told it, "When Peron won the elections in 1946 with the help of Bramuglia, who was the interventor in the province of Buenos Aires, both Bramuglia and my father thought they would be moving into the ministry of the interior (Bramuglia as minister and my father as assistant secretary)." 1 According to Raul Margueirat, then chief of protocol, "Bramuglia wanted to be interior minister and so did Borlenghi; the other ministries did not interest them. The interior ministry was a very powerful force. I think it was Eva's resentment of Bramuglia that made Peron give the ministry to Borlenghi." 2 Peron did not plan to give Bramuglia the other portfolio-laborthat he wanted, either, perhaps out of fear that it was a ministry from which the young labor lawyer would be able to consolidate his own political power within the movement. 3 Instead, he appointed him minister of foreign relations, believing that, in that role, Bramuglia would have difficulty in creating an independent support base or in earning enough prestige to eclipse the Lider himself. At the same time, the president-elect hoped that Bramuglia would manage to improve the regime's international image and Argentina's situation in general-all without endangering the status of the head of state at home. 4 Juan Rodriguez, who in later life tended to exaggerate the role that the Union Ferroviaria had played in the shaping of Peronism, described Bramuglia's appointment rather vividly: When Borlenghi shows up as Minister of the Interior, we go to see the President, who has just assumed his duties, and we tell him that if the commercial employees have a minister, we want one too. And we suggest Bramuglia as minister;

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so he appointed him minister of foreign relations ... we proposed him because it wasn't fair that we had risked everything for the movement, even for him personally, while the union of commercial employees hadn't, since their leaders were against it, yet he [Borlenghi] gets appointed minister. 5

To some extent Bramuglia rewarded this sort of worker support with new appointments at the ministry. In an interview with the magazine Que sucedi6 en 7 dias, he said that the new government's thinking "should be reflected in the Republic's activity abroad," and accordingly "men identified with revolutionary values" should be allowed to enter the diplomatic service. 6 He explained that it was "no longer enough to fill the delegations or missions with the decorative figures of a national stage that has been overtaken by revolutionary realism"-that is, it was time to appoint people who did not necessarily have the traditional surnames. One channel by which new functionaries of humble origin could be integrated was by appointing workers as attaches to embassies in Spanish-speaking countries? The dynamics of Peron's first government were recalled by Margueirat, who asserted that Bramuglia and Borlenghi were usually the only ministers to express their opinions at cabinet meetings. The other ministers were servile men who obeyed blindly, waiting to see which way the wind was blowing before they committed themselves to anything. 8 However, if Peron thought that putting Bramuglia at the head of Argentine diplomacy might prevent him from building up enough prestige and power to put him on the same footing as the president himself, he soon realized his mistake. Bramuglia, as we shall see, scored so many successes in the foreign ministry that, paradoxically, they led to his ouster in August 1949. This chapter reviews the characteristics of Argentine foreign policy during the years 1946-49 and examines the significance of the so-called "Third Position" in the international sphere, focusing on the role that fell to Bramuglia in the formulation of Peronist diplomacy. Unlike other leaders of his party and ministers in the new government, Bramuglia read the new international order intelligently, and accordingly favored rapprochement with the United States. The failure of his approach-due mostly, in my view, to the Washington diplomatic leadership's inflexibility and primary focus on U.S. economic interests-contributed at least as much to Bramuglia's removal from the foreign ministry in the San Martin Palace as did Peron's fear of the foreign minister's increasing prestige, or Evita's hostility.

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POLISHING UP ARGENTINA'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE

From the moment he entered the Casa Rosada, Peron invested a great deal of diplomatic and propagandistic effort in convincing his critics and adversaries at home and abroad that he was not a fascist leader. Many observers associated his regime with the fascist world that had gone down in flames at the end of the world war or considered it as one of the rotten fruits of the Third Reich's expansionist plans for nonEuropean countries. Those like Spruille Braden, U.S. ambassador to Argentina from May to September of 1945, who was soon appointed under-secretary of state for inter-American affairs (a post he held from November 1945 to June 1947), felt that the United States should not take a conciliatory attitude toward governments that included people like Peron. In an article published after Peron's victory in the democratic elections held in late February 1946, Braden wrote, "With the defeat of Germany, Argentina remains under the bare dictatorship of uniformed men who drink at the same fountain where drank Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. As long as the people of Argentina live under the heel of this dictatorship ... none of us can sleep soundly nights." 9 The Nation, a New York liberal progressive weekly, claimed at the beginning of 1946 that Peron's political strategy had been copied directly from his "Nazi mentor, Adolf Hitler." In another article, it explained to its readers that Peron's regime made anti-Semitism an integral part of its platform. 10 The stigma that plagued Peron derived from the Germanophile attitudes shown by the Argentine armed forces since the beginning of the century as well as Argentina's neutrality during World War II (decried by the United States) and its acceptance of Nazi war criminals and Third Reich collaborators on Argentine soil_H The Blue Book, which the U.S. State Department published on the eve of the Argentine presidential elections in February 1946 in the hope that it might help prevent Peron's election, stated that the Germans "possess today in Argentina the economic organization-industrial, commercial and agricultural-which they need to provide a base for the reconstitution of German aggressive power." 12 Accordingly, from the time he took office in June 1946, Peron strove to improve his image, especially in the United States. He understood early on that better relations with the Americans would be key to implementing his plan for industrializing and modernizing the country. 13

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At the end of World War II, the international panorama had changed. Emerging from the conflict as a dominant power, the United States tried to impose a new world order in the political and economic spheres. In both those spheres, Peronism was on a potential collision course with the United States: politically because of its nationalist rhetoric and the challenge its so-called Third Position posed to Washington's hegemonic ambitions in Latin America; and economically because its Five-Year Plan represented state intervention in socioeconomic activities and because it pursued bilateral transactions at a time when the United States was advocating open, liberal economies in the framework of a multilateral trade system. 14 Several factors weakened the Argentine position during the second half of the 1940s. One was the loss of power and prestige suffered by Great Britain, traditionally the main trading partner of the Argentine agricultural and meat sectors and their elites. Another was the meager attention that the United States was paying to Latin America in the context of a cold war with the Soviet Union and its new satellites. Haunted by the great fear that communism would make inroads through a Western Europe that was still suffering from the ravages of war, U.S. President Harry S. Truman (who had succeeded Franklin D. Roosevelt following Roosevelt's death in 1945) adopted the policy of "containing" communism. As part of this effort to prevent Soviet expansion, the United States extended aid for European reconstruction through the Marshall Plan announced in mid-1947. In this unpropitious climate for Argentina, Bramuglia had to design a foreign policy that would clear the regime of any suspicion of both its alleged nazi-fascism and its supposed hegemonic ambitions in South America. The main policy objectives were to change U.S. public opinion concerning Argentina, especially in Washington's decision-making circles; to break out of the diplomatic isolation suffered during World War II; and to maintain a certain autonomy for Argentine diplomacy in a world that was rapidly becoming polarized under the strong pressures of the Cold War. The Peronist government took pains to show that Argentina maintained an independent policy that did not answer to the dictates of foreign powers. In its socioeconomic policy, Argentina declared it would pursue a "third way," an alternative to both capitalism (or "individualism") and communism (or "collectivism"). This idea was supposedly mirrored in its foreign policy by a position that deviated from both the United States' international policy ("imperialistic capitalism") and that of the Soviet Union ("no less imperialistic communism"). The Third Position, claimed the proponents of justicialism, was not some vague message lacking any

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practical significance, but the ideological platform of a foreign policy serving the Argentine "national interest." 15 This policy emphasized the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, integration with neighboring countries, and closer cooperation with the Latin American countries. The Third Position, expounded in part in the "Message to the World" that Peron delivered on July 7, 1947, sought to offer a new ideological alternative in a bipolar world of diametrically opposed ideologies ("since it is unacceptable ... that humanity should be destroyed in a holocaust of leftwing or rightwing hegemonies"). Curiously, this speech was described by the New York Times as the "'peace plan' of Foreign Minister Juan A. Bramuglia." 16 Another objective of this policy was to satisfy the nationalists who had supported the government established by the military coup of June 1943 and the emerging Peronist movement, yet without provoking the wrath of the United StatesY As the balance of power within the Peronist movement and government fluctuated and the influence of one individual or another rose or fell, Argentine foreign policy in the second half of the 1940s oscillated between a nationalist, anti-imperialist discourse on one hand and, on the other, a focus on cooperation in the inter-American framework, rapprochement with North America, and the common defense of the Western world in the face of the communist threat. Thus, policy swung like a pendulum between nationalist confrontation and pragmatic negotiation, with Bramuglia a permanent advocate of practical realpolitik. Peron and his ministers repeatedly told North American diplomats that the Third Position was nothing but "a bit of political demagoguery for home consumption," 18 and did not mean that in the event of conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs Argentina would remain neutral. On August 1, 1946, the Argentine president had already declared publicly that his country was part of the American continent and would align itself with the United States and the other countries of the region in any future conflict; if war broke out between Washington and Moscow, Argentina would support the formerY Miranda told Ambassador Messersmith that in the event of a world war, Argentina would be at the side of the United States from the first moment. 20 Bramuglia, after emphasizing the government's anti-communist character, even suggested to the U.S. ambassador that the United States take the lead in the hemisphere and adopt "a more defined leadership in consolidating" its position in the Americas vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. 21 The American historian Arthur Whitaker has rightly described the Third Position as in fact an effort to increase the country's "bargaining

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power" or "possibility of negotiating" for nationalist purposes, taking advantage of the bipolar competition but without moving away from the Western bloc. 22 However, the Peronist foreign policy apparently failed to achieve its objectives in the short term. On the domestic front, Peronism lost the support of the nationalists, and its diplomatic failures gave the Radicals the pretexts they needed to attack the government. On the international front, it helped nourish U.S. suspicions of Peronism's supposed hidden agenda. Argentine relations with the United States developed in the shadow of a complex legacy. There is no need to go even as far back as the end of the nineteenth century to detect conflict in the relations between the countries; more recent examples include the ill feeling caused by Argentine neutrality in the world war and the resulting U.S. boycott of Buenos Aires, as well as the friction that characterized Ambassador Spruille Braden's sojourn in Argentina and his systematic campaign to defeat Peron's electoral ambitions. Peronist Argentina's first foreign-policy measure, the announcement on June 6, 1946, of the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union, also did not contribute to any improvement in the atmosphere between Buenos Aires and Washington. 23 Yet that same week the commander-in-chief of the Argentine army, General Von der Becke, was in the United States to discuss military relations between the two countries. Moreover, except for purely symbolic gestures, Argentine-Soviet relations were hardly fruitful until 1952. During Peron's first presidency, the two countries signed no trade agreement, because Moscow would have exploited such a treaty for political and propaganda purposes. Bramuglia, with his usual pragmatic caution, opposed this at the time to avoid sabotaging Argentina's overtures to the United States. 24 Bramuglia played the main role in various gestures designed to normalize relations with the United States and cultivated good relations with Ambassador George Messersmith, who replaced Braden as the head of the legation in Buenos Aires. With his moderation, pragmatism, and pro-American views, Bramuglia managed to win the confidence andesteem of the U.S. diplomat, meeting with him several times a week during some periods. 25 In a long, confidential report to the State Department, Messersmith described the Argentine foreign minister in these terms: Dr. Bramuglia is ... the outstanding member of the Argentine Cabinet. He is a man of humble origin and became a lawyer and was closely associated with labor movements for a number of years preceding the war. He is known to have been a reasonable and understanding and constructive element in the Argentine labor movement, definitely anti-Communist, and during the war he was openly

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friendly to the United States and the United Nations and exerted a constructive influence in labor circles in this sense ... the pro-democratic, and pro-United Nations, and pro-United States views of Dr. Bramuglia were well known when he became the Minister of Foreign Relations in June 1946. Since he has been Foreign Minister, there is, I believe, not a Chief of Mission of any country in Buenos Aires who is not convinced of the sincerity, broad-mindedness, vision, and understanding of Dr. Bramuglia, and who does not have respect for him as a man and as a Foreign Minister. Among the Chief of Missions of the American republics in the Argentine, there is, I believe, not one who does not have full confidence in the completely American attitude of Dr. Bramuglia, of his sincere efforts to direct Argentine policy into the inter-American system, and of his friendliness to the United States. 26

In the campaign to improve the Argentine image, Bramuglia was the right person for the job. The head of state had been shrewd in his choice of foreign minister. What the union lawyer lacked in international experience was, apparently, compensated for by his innate tact, his sharp itelligence, and his understanding of human nature. The image of Bramuglia that Messersmith tried to sell to the circles in power in Washington was that of a democratic, antifascist, anticommunist foreign minister, a reliable partner for a fruitful Argentine-U.S. dialog. James Bruce, Messersmith's successor at the U.S. embassy, was also very favorably impressed by Bramuglia and soon knew of the Peronist regime's desire to strengthen relations with the United States. However, one problem was the gap between the assessment of most of the accredited diplomats in Buenos Aires and that of the officials at home in Washington, who retained the most negative stereotypes of Argentina in general and of the Peronist government in particular. As for the economic aspect of Argentine foreign policy, at first policymakers tried to safeguard the path to industrialization by maintaining the old triangular relationship-that is, exporting to Europe, particularly Great Britain, to obtain the foreign currency needed to pay the United States for the goods and equipment necessary for modernization. This policy quickly failed, for various reasons. The two main ones had little to do with any mistakes made by the Peronist economic and diplomatic teams: First, England unilaterally declared the inconvertibility of the pound sterling, and second, the United States closed the European markets benefiting from the Marshall Plan to Argentine exports (preventing the European countries from using Plan dollars to buy Argentine products). The British measure, announced in August 1947, put an end to the triangular relationship between Argentina, England, and the United States. The British needed Argentina's agricultural and meat products, but did not have the products and machinery that Argentina needed for

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industrialization. Miguel Miranda once complained that Argentina expected "coal and raw materials" from countries like England, not "whisky and lipstick." 27 As long as European currencies, especially the pound sterling, could be exchanged for dollars, Argentina successfully managed its three-cornered trade. Shortly after World War II, however, most European currencies ceased to be convertible. Great Britain undertook to maintain convertibility when it signed the Eady-Miranda agreement in September 1946, but a year later its enormous trade deficit caused the British government to renege on its commitment. An analysis of Argentine-British relations in those years is beyond the scope of this chapter, but brief mention must be made of the trade negotiations between the two countries in early 1949, at the expiration of the Andes Agreement. The Argentine government was already facing a difficult economic situation, and, lacking dollars, hoped to increase the price of meat exported to England, as well as to ensure the supply of fuel and obtain a guarantee against possible devaluations of the pound. In an excellent, meticulous study, Carlos Escude has analyzed the negotiations that led to the signing of a new Anglo-Argentine agreement. 28 His assessment of the "diplomatic abilities" of the Argentine negotiators in general and the foreign minister in particular is very incisive: "Beyond Bramuglia's extreme ineptitude, all of the Argentine government suffered from improvisation and unprofessionalism, and was in no state to compete with the careful and expert British planning of negotiating strategy ... The sad course of the negotiations ... demonstrates flaws in the process of recruiting ministers (glaring in Bramuglia's case) and in the performance of the government's technical staff." 29 Escude's general argument concerning the failure of the mechanisms for recruiting leaders in Argentina and the defects of the "old-boy network (in all the governments) and the elitism (in conservative and authoritarian governments) [that] take precedence over any criteria of merit, to a much greater degree than in the advanced countries" is feasible. However, his argument concerning Bramuglia's performance is difficult to accept, particularly in view of the foreign minister's positive role in ending the crisis in the Argentine-British negotiations conducted by Miranda and his counterpart, Eady, in September 1946, and in getting the Andes Agreement signed in 1948. 30 Escude's assessment is based exclusively on British documentation, and therefore represents a certain perspective, inevitably influenced by English economic and political interests, as well as by the personal interests of Ambassador John Balfour-who wanted to make a good impression on his superiors in London-and by the cultural biases of His Majesty's officials. The assessments made in the English documents cannot be taken at face value;

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nor can we forget that, after all, sometimes the weaker side in a negotiation must resort to improvisation and creative zigzagging. In addition, many historians of Argentina's international relations do not put enough emphasis on the internal divisions in the government or on the various conflicts, rivalries, and perspectives that influenced the development of foreign policy and occasionally caused ups and downs in diplomacy. The British diplomats accredited in Buenos Aires, however, closely followed the changing balance of power within the Peronist government. Generally they pointed to a group of "moderates," such as Bramuglia, who favored a policy of gradual industrialization in cooperation with the country's main commercial partners, and a group of "extremists," such as Miranda, economic nationalists who rejected all foreign pressure or consideration of external factors when it came to Argentine industrial development. In a report prepared in April I948, American diplomat Guy W. Ray tried to map the various ministers' attitudes toward the United States. He mentioned Peron's desire to improve relations with the United States for practical reasons, and Bramuglia's support for this attitude. He said that the minister of war, Humberto Sosa Molina, and the minister of the navy, Fidel Anadon, were gradually becoming more willing to cooperate with the United States. That group contrasted with a nationalist bloc within the cabinet that showed hostility to any cooperation with the United States. In this second group Ray included the secretary of aeronautics, Brigadier-General Bartolome de la Colina; the minister of finance, Ramon Cereijo; the assistant secretary of information, Cipoletti; and the minister of trade and industry, Jose Barro. 31 Whether or not this categorization was valid, it should be remembered that Bramuglia was not alone in the Palacio San Martin, and that what might at times appear to be inconsistency in the foreign minister's policy in fact reflected the internal struggles in the Peronist leadership. The foreign minister himself had told Ambassador Balfour about the resistance he faced among some of his colleagues in the cabinet, who favored a "tougher" attitude. Balfour, for his part, explained to the Foreign Office how jealousy and personal rivalries within the Argentine government affected negotiations. The second external blow to the Peronist economic policy was the country's catastrophic exclusion from the Marshall Plan, which some researchers consider part of "a process of severe economic boycott and political destabilization" inflicted on Argentina by the United States between the years I942 and I949· 32 At the beginning of I948, the United States decided that dollars from the Marshall Plan could not be used to buy Argentine agricultural products. Just as for many years the U.S. government had blocked the import of grain and meat from Argentina

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in order to protect its own farmers, it now resolved to promote an increase in U.S. grain production. Together with what was produced in countries whose agricultural and meat products competed with those of Argentina, such as Canada and Australia, this surplus would be used to relieve the famine of Western Europe, where agriculture would need several years to recover from the destruction caused by the war. Argentina did not receive even a crumb from the cake. Washington's official excuse was that the prices of Argentine exports were prohibitive. 33 Peron made every effort to ingratiate himself with the United States and to persuade its representatives in Buenos Aires to oppose the discriminatory policy against the Argentine Republic. The president pinned great hopes on Bramuglia and his ability to win over the Americans. After all, it was the foreign minister who had managed, back in 1946, to unblock the dollars that Argentina retained in the United States from the years of the world war. Reports from the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires emphasized repeatedly that "Argentina's need for dollars is desperate. Every high-ranking official in the Argentine Government seems to be placing great hopes in the possibility of obtaining large quantities of dollars through the operation of the ERP ... the lack of dollar exchange is the consideration that overshadows almost everything else in Argentina's international financial dealings." 34 Ambassador Bruce explained to President Truman and to the administrator of the Marshall Plan, Paul G. Hoffman, that it was very much in America's interests for Argentina to maintain a stable economy and that this would strengthen the country's cooperation with the United States. 35 However, in June 1948, just when the Argentines believed they had achieved success, assuming from Bruce's remarks that the matter would soon be arranged, they discovered that Argentina would definitely not be allowed to participate in the Marshall Plan. 36 The administrators of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)-the U.S. government agency responsible for implementing the Marshall Planclearly stated that no purchases from Argentina were contemplated "in the near future," and that none of any kind would be made as long as they were in control; the European countries were told that it was ECA policy not to approve such purchases in Argentina, regardless of the price. Ambassador Bruce was furious and sent a forceful message to President Truman. After complaining about the "irresponsible" people at the ECA and their "atrocities," he said: [D.A.] Fitzgerald ... made the statement that he was going to use E.C.A. to "beat the Argentine to its knees" ... Furthermore, Fitzgerald gave instructions to the Army to purchase meat in any country except Argentina, no matter how much higher the price might be ... Furthermore, Fitzgerald although he would

The Third Position probably not admit it and no one likes to make a charge of liar, misrepresented prices [of Argentine exports]. For these reasons, it certainly would seem that Fitzgerald should not be allowed to remain in a public office. [Edward] Kunze, who created the latest disturbance, should go with him, as well as the dozen or more collaborators who helped them in their juvenile attempts to strengthen their own positions by agitating the situation ... The one and only thing I have asked the E.C.A. to do is to be fair to Argentina, and to lay off putting anti-Argentine propaganda in the press ... what you could do in the interest of anti-Communism in South America is to bring out the big stick on those boys and give them hell, and if you haven't got time to do that, just eliminate them from any future part in your party. 37

In response to Bruce's protests and the coordinated efforts of his supporters in Washington, the Truman administration announced it would consider buying goods from Argentina under the same terms as from any other country. Nonetheless, in practice the boycott continued through 1949 and 1950, while the ECA officials continued to pressure the authorities in Buenos Aires over their reluctance to submit to dictates concerning the promotion of multilateral trade. 38 In Argentina the subject gave rise to considerable bitterness and anti-American feelings. To a certain extent, the U.S. boycott was considered as Bramuglia's failure. The foreign minister's fate was sealed.

AT THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES: RIO AND BOGOTA

One of the conditions set for Argentina's international rehabilitation in the post-World War II period was the ratification of the Act of Chapultepec approved by the Inter-American Conference (to which Argentina was not invited because of its neutrality in World War II) and of the United Nations Charter signed in San Francisco. Accordingly, at the end of June 1946 Peron steered the two treaties into Congress for approval. The Act of Chapultepec provided that the American countries would join in an alliance to prevent and repress threats and acts of aggression against any one of them. For the Argentine nationalist groups, still euphoric from Peron's electoral triumph, ratification of these treaties was a betrayal of sovereignty and national honor. Organizations like the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista (Nationalist Liberation Alliance) began an agitation campaign under the slogan "jPatria si, colonia no!" ("Fatherland yes, colony no!"), designed to create a public climate hostile to the agreements and their ratification. The unanimous ratification of the acts in the Senate (where all members were Peronists) on August 19 triggered

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increasingly violent nationalist demonstrations against the "traitors" and "sellouts." Peron delegated Bramuglia to restore peace. In a radio broadcast on August 2I, Bramuglia asserted: "Argentine sovereignty has not been touched or compromised. The United Nations Charter and the Act of Chapultepec do not have that power." 39 The foreign minister's remarks were transmitted by all the broadcasting stations in the official state radio network, despite the efforts of some young nationalists to block them. 40 In his thirty-eight-minute discourse, Bramuglia tried to explain to the Argentine public the nature of the new government's international policy, which in general, he said, would not "violate the conception of our sovereignty, which we will always defend with our lives, should it be necessary, but that, at the same time, possess[es] the deep solidarity that is generated only in strong peoples." He went on to explain the meaning that the government assigned to the concept of sovereignty. In terms similar to those employed by the Socialists in bygone times-except for the reference to the Deity-he maintained: We have asserted that the sovereignty that Argentina defends and will defend is, besides what is delimited by its borders, its sacred banner, the whole country with its political, economic, social, and cultural aspects, the universal sovereignty of man, which it considers a divine tool for achieving better fortunes. Starting from the assumption that no country can or should be self-sufficient in its way of life, a country cannot isolate itself indefinitely in the shadows of absence and desertion either, when all the nations of the world are promoting the gathering of peoples in solemn convocation to form a single, great nation: Humanity, living on a single, great continent: the Universe.

On August 30, I946, the Chamber of Deputies overwhelmingly approved the agreements of Chapultepec and San Francisco. 41 The Radical opposition abstained from the vote, appearing divided, nationalistic, and hostile toward the United States. Many nationalists on the extreme right would begin to drift away from the Peronist movement at this point. In the meantime, for Ambassador Messersmith, this ratification "was the first definite step of any Argentine government for several decades to show clear intention to collaborate in the inter-American system." 42 It should be noted that Secretary of State James Byrnes, who resigned on January 8, I947, did not concur with Messersmith's assessment. Byrnes did not think that Argentina had fulfilled all the commitments that it, like the other American republics, had made at Chapultepec, such as the elimination of Nazi influences. Such "intolerant and unjust" accusations provoked a vigorous retort from Bramuglia, who asserted that Argentina had "acted to the same extent and proportion as all the

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other countries" of the hemisphere in fulfilling the obligations arising from the legal instruments it had signed. "I deny, moreover, the rule that there should be a supreme adjudicator over international affairs, and especially that this unilateral, biased adjudicator should hand down sentences, especially when it is an individual or several individuals and not a nation." 43 This categorical response garnered wide support from different political sectors in Argentina, including the nationalists. 44 In Washington, however, Bramuglia's statement was not well-received, and the Washington Post criticized it harshly in an editorial. 45 The opposition newspaper Argentina Libre also attacked the foreign minister's "irritated" assertions, saying, "Yesterday a campaign against Braden; today against Byrnes; tomorrow, perhaps, against Marshall." 46 Nonetheless, in early June 1947, a year after Peron had taken office, President Truman's administration acknowledged that Argentina had fulfilled the requirements for full membership in the inter-American system (including the de-Nazification of the country that the Act of Chapultepec demanded and that Bramuglia had pressed for from the outset). The new Cold War atmosphere warranted an effort to avoid dividing the hemisphere; accordingly the Peronist government was able to participate in the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security held in Rio de Janeiro from August 15 to September 2, 1947. The United States was trying to assert its hegemony in the Americas by means of a military treaty that would provide security for the whole continent. On this occasion Bramuglia demonstrated his diplomatic skill, expressing Argentina's concerns clearly and firmly while eschewing empty nationalistic rhetoric and quixotic, unproductive stances. Instead, he showed a willingness to cooperate with the AmericansY During the discussion about establishing a security zone in which the states of the American continent would respond collectively to any threat of attack against any one of them, Bramuglia argued that the principle of unanimity should be incorporated into every mutual defense agreement. This, of course, implied the possibility of a veto-a traditional Argentine demand. The proposal failed to win the support of the other participants, however, and Bramuglia let the matter drop, to avoid isolating the country in the inter-American system. The Argentine delegation accordingly resigned itself to the prospect of decisions being imposed by a two-thirds majority. Before leaving, Bramuglia explained his pragmatic response: "For unanimous decisions, you need unanimity. But our country is willing to respect majority decisions." 48 Another proposal presented by the Argentine foreign minister sought to differentiate between American aggressors, against whom peaceful

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means would be used, and non-American aggressors, who would be subject to collective sanctions. Once again the Argentine delegation failed to gain support for its initiative. In contrast to its custom at previous conferences, Argentina did not cling to its minority view, but adhered to the Rio resolutions laid out in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The State Department had a good opportunity to see that Peron's government was adopting a more flexible attitude toward the United States than were some of the leaders of the defeated Union Democratica. The Argentine delegation did manage to insert a provision requiring a meeting of the Organ of Consultation before any measures could take effect. Similarly, at Argentina's suggestion, the concept of "threats of aggression" was substituted for a clause that merely stipulated "certain objective facts." The conference also accepted the proposal that signatory states would not be required to supply armed forces against their will. Although throughout the process of drafting the military pact of Rio de Janeiro the Argentine delegation showed a willingness to cooperate with the United States and never relapsed into what had been considered its traditional obstructionist role at inter-American conferences, the two countries were no honeymoon couple. Mistrust and suspicion continued to characterize relations between Washington and Buenos Aires. U.S. diplomatic archives contain many documents reflecting the hostile distrust of the Peronist government that pervaded the corridors of the State Department. Moreover, although the Argentine Senate approved the Rio Treaty in 1948,49 the Chamber of Deputies did not follow suit until the end of June 1950, when the United States demanded final ratification of the treaty as a condition for a $125 million loan. 50 Bramuglia returned to Buenos Aires very well pleased. At the Moron airport he was awaited by the president, the ministers and secretaries of the executive power, national legislators, officers of the armed forces, and labor delegations, all welcoming him with extended applause and cheers. 51 At a press conference at the San Martin Palace, he expressed great satisfaction with the results the delegation had obtained: "Argentina proceeded modestly but with dignity, absolute independence, and a spirit of solidarity in defense of Argentine interests and the collective interests of America." 52 Not everyone was so happy. The nationalist militant Alejandro Olmos, for example, brought suit against Bramuglia in a federal court, where he argued that by signing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in Rio the minister had violated a number of penal code articles governing offenses against the security, peace, and dignity of the nation. The Rio treaty, according to Olmos, sought to diminish national

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independence and integrity, and because Bramuglia had "supported all the plans of the United States ... he was thus betraying the interests of the homeland." The Federal Criminal Chamber rejected the complaint. 53 To appease the nationalists, the foreign minister made a point of reiterating throughout his term of office what he considered to be the Argentine Republic's legitimate rights and title to the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, the South Georgia and South Sandwich islands, and land in the Argentine Atlantic sector (Argentine Antarctica). One principle that Bramuglia tried to emphasize at the Rio conference and later at the Ninth International Conference of American States, which met in Bogota between the end of March and beginning of May I948, was that it was not enough for nations to simply talk about the threat of communism; they also had to consider the role of economic and social disparities in inciting people to violence. For this reason he called on the inter-American forums time and again to discuss issues of social inequality. 54 At the conference in Bogota, however, with the Cold War becoming almost the only lens through which international events were viewed (at that time Berlin was suffering through the first Soviet blockade, and the power of the Communists in Italy was growing), the Americans were making efforts to ensure their hegemony in the region. Once again Bramuglia refrained from entering into any conflict with the United States, but expressed clearly and emphatically Argentina's concerns about the American plans. 55 Whereas George Marshall talked about creating an anticommunist bloc, his Argentine counterpart stressed the need to combat the communist threat in the sociopolitical and ideological spheres by improving the living conditions of the Latin American peoples and adopting the Peronist path of social justice. The Argentines showed reservations about the proposal to establish a continental organization that would have supranational powers and a constitution laying down political and military rules. 56 Ultimately the conference approved the charter of the new organization replacing the old Pan-American Union. However, it did accept the Argentine motion to change the name American Union to Organization of American States, as a way of protecting national sovereignty. 57 In the debates held in the Colombian capital, Argentina again urged the necessity of considering not only a hemispheric military cooperation, but also economic aid from the United States, offered through an interAmerican bank that would extend credit to the countries of the continent to promote development-thereby reducing the threat of social turmoil. "We must attack the causes, not the effects," Bramuglia kept insisting. The Bogotazo (rioting in Bogota) that erupted following the

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assassination of Colombia's popular liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, substantiated the Argentine assertions. 58 However, Bramuglia's initiative went nowhere, and the bank he envisioned was not created until 19 59· In the late 1940s the United States was focusing its attention on the reconstruction of Europe. The Argentine press provided daily coverage of the Bogota conference sessions, emphasizing that except for George Marshall, Bramuglia was the most prominent figure at the conference. 59 In particular, it praised his attitude when the popular agitation aroused by Gaitan's murder interrupted conference proceedings for a week. Although various other foreign ministers expressed fears and doubts, Bramuglia declared that the conference should go on: "We may have to sacrifice everything, including our own safety, but we cannot inflict on American regionalism the injury of abandoning it in the middle of this circumstantial political crisis." A typical article filled with praise was published in Clarin: When [Bramuglia] takes the floor, it is to say important things or to channel the debate, and he always does it with laudable moderation. On the subject of panAmericanism he is an innovator, and his refined, elegant style, achieved through brevity and clarity, has attracted attention for its uniqueness. In what we might call the reorganization of the Conference following the collapse caused by the popular revolt, Bramuglia was a man of counsel and considered judgment, giving him a pivotal role in the conversations. Bramuglia has now established himself as a continental figure. 60

Numerous telegrams and letters of congratulation arrived at both the foreign ministry and Bramuglia's home address. A wide variety of people and associations applauded him for insisting on Argentina's rights to the Malvinas and Antarctica and for emphasizing social rights and women's civil and political rights. They also praised his stand in opposing any expansion of the powers of the Pan-American Union in the case of a threat to continental security and his efforts to prevent the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States from becoming a "superstate.»G1 It is not surprising, then, that Bramuglia returned from Bogota to a hero's welcome in Buenos Aires. Police officers were deployed all along Rivadavia Street from the outskirts of the capital; music played and welcome signs were displayed in various streets of Moron, national emblems and flags decorated the neighborhoods around the airport, and crowds gathered along the route that the president, the foreign minister, and the official retinue would take. Waiting in the airport itself were Per6n-who embraced Bramuglia "for everything he had done at the Bogota conference" -the vice president, the government ministers, officials, diplomats, and officers of the armed forces. 62

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An interesting side note is that a few days before the Bogotazo, Bramuglia received a request for a meeting with a young Cuban, Fidel Castro, who was interested in talking to him about the Peronist government's policies and other Latin American topics. The Argentine foreign minister found the time for a long conversation with him, whom he described in his notes as: "Intelligent. Brilliant. (Communist?)."63 In October 19 51 the State Department made this analysis of the Peronist foreign policy: Historically, Argentina has been the most reluctant member of the interAmerican system. This has been a matter of serious concern to the U.S .... We have therefore welcomed the indications occurring during the past four years that Argentina is adopting a more active and cooperative inter-American attitude. At the major conferences at Rio de Janeiro in September 1947, at Bogota in April 1948 and at Washington in the Spring of 1951, Argentina was generally cooperative rather than obstructive. 64

This assessment can be considered as a validation of Bramuglia's policy-a policy that was not always sufficiently appreciated by his Argentine contemporaries. A similar document, prepared earlier in March 1950, judged that "since he became president, Peron has been rather more favorable to cooperation with the U.S. than many of his followers, and in some cases more favorable than the Radical party which constitutes his principal opposition." 65 In its policy toward its neighbors in the Southern Cone, Argentina tried to promote the formation of an economic bloc that would maintain the prices of raw materials in the face of the trade offensive waged by the industrialized countries; it hoped to buy from other Latin American countries some of the components it needed for its industrialization project, as well as diversify markets for Argentine exports. As part of this strategy, trade agreements were signed with various countries, and the establishment of customs unions was negotiated. 66 Argentina's policy of improving ties with its neighbors aroused suspicions in some cir~les in Washington, which feared that the country was aspiring to the leadership of a Latin American bloc that could put obstacles in the United States' path toward better cooperation in the hemisphere. Certain U.S. diplomats believed that a bloc of this kind could harm the economic interests and hegemonic position of the United States, indirectly serving Soviet interests in the region as well. 67 The Peronist policy also aroused some fears of supposed expansionist ambitions among certain sectors of the countries of the Southern Cone. 68 The Argentines tried to soothe the American fears, and the ministry of foreign affairs recommended caution to its diplomats: "[W]e need to strengthen ties with the Latin American countries, with Argentina playing the

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principal role in the relationship, but without suddenly intruding on American fields of action, to avoid provoking reactions." 69 Miranda, for his part, emphasized that better trade relations between the South American countries might help stabilize the economies of the region, thereby reducing the communist threat.7° In any case, the United States had tried to verify each of the supposed Argentine attempts at interference, but it had no real confirmation of such charges. The embassy in Buenos Aires reported back to Washington that "we feel that frequently too much importance has been attached" to Argentine ambitions in the Southern Cone. 71 Soon at least a few people in Washington realized that the accusations stemmed not only from a real fear of Argentina's political and economic aspirations, but also from some countries' efforts to impair U.S.-Argentine relations in order to safeguard their own share of the benefits Uncle Sam was distributing, especially in the field of weaponry. While the countries of Western Europe were enjoying the fruits of American generosity, the republics of Latin America found themselves forced to fight over the few crumbs thrown in their direction. Accordingly, at least some of them had an interest in reducing to a minimum the number of countries competing for the little there was.

THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCO: BRAMUGLIA IS RELUCTANT

A major initiative of Peronist foreign policy in the second half of the 1940s was the staunch, uncompromising aid that the Buenos Aires government extended to the regime of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. The Spanish dictatorship, established with the assistance of Hitler and Mussolini, was universally condemned after World War II by both West and East. In December 1946 the United Nations Organization (UN) passed a resolution urging member states to impose a diplomatic boycott on the Franco regime and to prevent it from joining the UN or any of the UN's dependent agencies. Peron's Argentina was then one of the few countries that refused to adopt these measures. 72 From the time he moved into the Casa Rosada in June 1946, Peron promoted a policy of political, diplomatic, and economic assistance to Spain.73 The political aid consisted mainly in Argentina's prodigious efforts to rehabilitate the Spanish dictatorship in the international community in general and Latin America in particular. Argentina's representatives came to Spain's defense in the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations, as well as at pan-American conferences and international conventions held in Argentina. In those forums they opposed every sug-

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gestion of sanctions against Nationalist Spain and called for its inclusion as an equal participant. Argentine diplomats and government officials lobbied on Spain's behalf in different countries of the American continent, urging them to improve their relations with Madrid, send an ambassador there, and vote in the UN to lift the diplomatic boycott the organization had imposed on Franco's regime. In a period when the representatives of Francoism were not welcome in most of the countries of the world and when Madrid did not receive many visitors from abroad, the dictatorship's representatives crossed the Atlantic Ocean to Buenos Aires, where they were warmly received (the most prominent of them, the Spanish foreign minister Alberto Martin Artajo, arrived in Argentina in October 1948). Similarly, a stream of Argentines found their way to the Iberian Peninsula-government officials, intellectuals, artists, military officers, clergy, and most notably Evita Peron herself in June 194 774 -their arrival trumpeted by the Spanish press. At the same time, the Peronist government was taking great pains at home to obstruct the activities of the Republican exiles and frustrated most attempts at anti-Francoist activity in Argentina. 75 The economic assistance provided to Spain consisted, first and foremost, in massive shipments of Argentine grain and meat sold on longterm credit to Spain, which, hungry as it was, lacked the hard currency to pay for the food staples it needed. The Civil War, besides exacting a terrible price in human lives, had dealt a heavy blow to Spain's economic development, putting it back several decades in some respects. World War II, which broke out only five months after the end of the Civil War, made economic recovery difficult. The Allied victory darkened not only the political, but also the economic horizon of the Franco regime. Many countries preferred to reduce their commercial and economic ties with Spain, and a number of weather-related calamities-notably, a series of bad droughts that were particularly disastrous for the wheat cropbrought many Spaniards to the brink of starvation. More than any other single factor, it was bread (or rather the insufficient quantities of it that could be obtained through the official rationing system or for exorbitant prices on the black market) that aroused dissatisfaction with the government. This was true throughout the 1940s. Argentina solved this acute problem by sending grain-laden ships to the ports of Spain. I believe that the political and economic aid that Spain received from Argentina in the second half of the 1940s was crucial in saving Franco's regime from collapse until the United States stepped in to help in the context of the Cold War. Under Peron's administration, Argentina provided important assistance to the Franco regime as it attempted to break through the embargo that circumscribed it, greatly strengthening its self-confidence in a period when many were predicting its demise, and

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demonstrating to both the local population and the international community that Spain did not walk alone. Moreover, the economic ties with Argentina enabled Franco to stand more firmly by his refusal to make any substantial change in the nature of his regime, the price he was asked to pay in exchange for Western aid and acceptance back into the family of nations. The Caudillo was thus able to get away with merely cosmetic alterations in his despotic regime, without having to take any real steps toward democracy. Argentine aid, which set no conditions for Spain's economic policy (and certainly none for the nature and shape of the regime), gave Franco the breathing space he needed to await the consummation of the changes expected to take place in a world transitioning from World War II to the escalation of the Cold War in the early 1950s. The first agreement with Francoist Spain was signed in 1946. Argentina undertook to sell Spain large quantities of grain and oil for five years and extended to it the credit it needed to effect these purchases, for a total of 350 million pesos. In return, the Spaniards agreed to supply Argentina with iron bars, sheet metal, lead, cork, and similar products. The treaty established, among other things, facilities to encourage Spanish immigration to the Rfo de la Plata, the possibility of organizing free-trade zones in Spanish ports for Argentine products, and provision for the construction of Argentine ships in Spanish shipyards. The Franco-Per6n Protocol, signed in April 1948, represented both the apex of relations between the two countries and a great symbolic challenge to U.S. policy. Upon hearing of the American decision to exclude Spain from the Marshall Plan, Argentina and Spain signed an additional protocol to the treaty of 1946, through which Madrid received even more generous benefits. 76 The relations with Spain constituted part of the Peronist government's effort to diversify its export and import markets, thereby boosting the industrialization process and ensuring the implementation of the FiveYear Plan. In the framework of this policy, a series of bilateral treaties were signed with European, Latin American, and Asian countries that defied the trend toward multilateralism imposed by the United States. However, the Peronist regime's aid to General Franco's government was motivated by other factors as well, ranging from cultural and ideological concerns to considerations of domestic policy and the balance of power between the Peronist leaders. This chapter will discuss only some of the aspects related to Argentina's foreign policy and its international status. 77 Despite the differences between the two regimes, at the end of World War II they both suffered from the same image, as well as from some of the same problems in the international sphere. Argentina was already familiar with the difficulties of contending with a hostile world that of-

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fered few sympathetic friends, and the diplomatic ban on Spain and the barriers to its membership in the UN were measures that had also been used against Argentina not long before. Moreover, both countries were excluded from the Marshall Plan, although in different ways. Spain was rejected as an aid recipient, whereas Argentina was denied access to the markets that were benefiting from the influx of U.S dollars. Several years later, Peron wrote that at the end of World War II, "we were treated the same as Spain and other extracontinental countries that had not participated in the last war. That is, we were put at the losers' table." 78 Thus, to a large extent international circumstances threw the two countries together. Beyond the warm feelings Spain had inspired by assisting Argentina in the recent past, supporting Spain allowed Peron to defend a much more important general principle. Throughout the 1940s, Argentina was itself subject to U.S. pressure and attempts to intervene in its internal affairs, especially during World War II and the Argentine electoral campaign of 1946. This intervention reached its peak with Ambassador Braden's activities and the publication of The Blue Book. Under the slogan "Braden or Peron," the Argentine leader adopted as his cause the defense of his country's national sovereignty against foreign intervention, a platform that helped him at the polls to some extent. U.S. pressure strengthened the Argentine leaders' conviction that they must energetically defend the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and reject any international boycott of the kind imposed on the Franco regime by the UN. Argentine opposition in international forums to any measures that could be construed as intervention in Spain's affairs or as attempts to impose a change of regime in Madrid from outside was considered by the Buenos Aires government as defense of Argentina's own interests, and sufficient reason to support Spain publicly. In fact, it was one of the main ideological justifications used by the regime for both domestic and foreign audiences. Peron also hoped it would help him to win wide support at home for his foreign policy and generate sympathy for Argentine diplomacy in Latin America, since almost all the states on the continent, having themselves suffered from foreign intervention, held this principle dear and considered it worth defending. A few weeks after Peron's government took office, Bramuglia told the Spanish ambassador, Count Bulnes, that the president was ready to take a fervent stand in the UN to defend the principle of opposing all attempts to intervene in any state's internal affairs. In this way, he would not only aid Spain against its detractors, but would also safeguard the principle that states must respect at all costs in their relations with Argentina.7 9

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In any case, the relationship with Spain was a convenient propaganda instrument for the Peronist government in its efforts to demonstrate that Argentina was pursuing a truly independent foreign policy that was not subject to foreign dictates. Against the background of the rapidly developing Cold War, the Spanish case offered the Buenos Aires government an ideal opportunity to demonstrate its independence, since supporting the boycott of the Franco regime was one of the few international issues on which Washington and Moscow seemed to agree. Argentina wanted to show that it did not depend on either of the two powers, that it would take its stand under neither the Red flag nor the Stars and Stripes, but would follow its own path. Bramuglia, however, was not enthusiastic about the close ties with Francoism. After all, he had expressed clear sympathy for the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War, and in World War II he had identified with the Allied cause. 80 Moreover, the connection with Franco's Spain was likely to undermine considerably his Herculean efforts to erase the fascist image that Peronism had acquired in the eyes of liberals and leftists in Europe and the United States. This could be noted, for example, in the criticisms of Argentina published in Britain after Evita's visit to Spain, when the possibility was raised that she would visit London. 81 At times, apparently, it was not clear to Bramuglia what a "Third Position" signified when both sides, East and West, were criticizing the Franco dictatorship. Argentine aid to Franco could not be considered as a middle path but rather left Argentina in an isolated position and could hinder its reintegration into the international community. While in exile, Peron mentioned to the historian Felix Luna his arguments with Bramuglia about Spain: I remember that Bramuglia, my foreign minister, held a different view ... Of course! He was a Republican, since he was a Socialist, and he said to me, "why should we expose ourselves, this is not a good idea"; and I said to him, "No, Minister, our government is a national government; and the forces that are today arrayed against Spain in the United Nations represent the whole anti-national line. So we will have to give in, if necessary, but in this position. And since I am the one responsible for this approach, I decide that it will be this way." 82

Bramuglia expressed his reservations about Peron's enthusiasm for the mother country on various occasions. The president had distinguished the Spanish delegation that came to his inauguration ceremonies with special marks of attention, and attended a great festive dinner held by the delegation on board the warship Galicia while it was anchored off Buenos Aires in early June 1946. Peron's statements of support for Spain on that occasion contradicted Bramuglia's assertions at a press conference that Argentina would accept the position on Franco's Spain taken

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by the other American states. 83 Already by July 1946 there were rumors about a resignation letter from Bramuglia, who Madrid officials believed was involved in the disputes over Spain in the Peronist leadership. 84 Before embarking for Spain, the new Argentine ambassador in Madrid, Pedro Radio, received instructions from the foreign minister to refrain from making any political or ideological statements, to avoid causing any unnecessary foreign-policy problems. 85 On various occasions Bramuglia asked the Franco government to pardon prisoners condemned to execution on humanitarian grounds. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that Spain's representatives in Buenos Aires always viewed him with a certain mistrust. 86 At the beginning of February 1947, the Argentine press published the news that Evita might visit Spain in April. The subject was apparently cause for dispute in the Peronist leadership, however, and soon, to the Franco government's disappointment, the First Lady's departure was delayed and her "exclusive visit" turned into "a tour of Europe," in which Spain was merely one stop on the route. One by one more stops were added: the Vatican, followed by a tour of Italy; a month later, France was added to the list. There were also rumors of a possible visit to Britain, but in the end nothing came of that. However, Portugal and Switzerland were added. On the eve of Evita's departure, the Spanish representative in Buenos Aires wrote, "It has been announced here that besides Spain she will visit the Holy Father, by special invitation of Pius XII, as well as Italy and other countries. This version has been published in order to dilute somewhat [the impression of] a trip made exclusively to Spain, something which no doubt alarmed officials in the foreign ministry here." 87 Bramuglia opposed Eva Peron's trip to Spain from the beginning. He told the U.S. and British ambassadors that he had been informed after the fact, that he had not been consulted before Evita accepted the Spanish invitation, and that if he had been consulted, he would have vigorously opposed the plan. Bramuglia's objection was twofold: Because he frowned on Evita's involvement in politics and in the administration of Argentine foreign policy, he disapproved of her trip, too; and he also disapproved of the Franco regime and feared that a trip to Spain would not help Argentina's international image. However, given the history of friction between Bramuglia and Evita (which dated back to October 1945), the foreign minister was afraid to provoke an outright confrontation with the First Lady. After a talk with Peron, it was agreed that he would direct Evita to refrain from political statements and to speak mainly of Peron's social projects, of her own interest in labor problems, and of the beauties of Spain-noncommittal remarks that would avoid associating the Argentine government too closely with Francoism. In

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any case, the trip was organized by Evita and her retinue, without the involvement of the Argentine foreign ministry. 88 In November 1947, Ambassador Enrique Corominas, number two in the Argentine delegation to the United Nations, told the foreign minister by telephone that it was "necessary that we defend the United Nations Charter and not the Spanish regime." 89 Bramuglia was bothered by the frequent declarations by the Argentine ambassador to the UN, Jose Arce, a fervent admirer of Francoism. Bramuglia himself received several invitations from the Spanish government to visit the Iberian Peninsula, 90 but turned them down.

BRAMUGLIA FAVORS THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE, ARGENTINA ABSTAINS IN THE UN

The subject of Argentina's relations with the new State of Israel is also very interesting, for at least three reasons: because it relates to Peronism's fascist, anti-Semitic image; because, given the U.S., Soviet, and Latin American support for the creation of a Jewish state, it was not clear how the Peronist Third Position would express itself; and because it illuminates the internal struggles involved in the formation of Peronist foreign policy. A number of factors influenced the Argentine government's Palestine policy in the years 1946-48, the main one being Argentina's relations with the United States and its desire to show a certain degree of independence in its foreign policy. This was a key objective, particularly because Palestine was not a central issue in Argentine foreign relations. An independent position on issues such as Palestine that did not necessarily entail confrontations with Washington seemed likely to increase the country's margin for maneuver and its bargaining power with the U.S. administration. Consequently, abstaining from the UN vote on the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state seemed logical. The Argentines also did not want to adopt a clear-cut position on a subject that was so important for the English. Another important reason for abstaining was Argentina's desire to preserve the Arab countries' support in the international arena, particularly the Moslem countries that were members of the UN at the time. Because Argentina is preeminently a country of immigrants, its foreign policy is necessarily influenced by the different minority communities living within its borders. The decision on Palestine had to take account of the Argentine Jewish community, which was the largest in Latin America, and of the local Arab community, composed primarily of

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Syrians and Lebanese who had arrived at the end of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Jewish community, most of whom voted for the opposition party coalition in the I946 elections, the Arab community was believed to have favored Peron's candidacy. Both Jews and Arabs formed lobbies to court the sympathy and support of policy makers and leaders of public opinion. Representatives of the Jewish Agency and the leaders of the Jewish political organization Delegacion de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations) tried to enlist Argentine support for the Zionist cause in the UN through Bramuglia. As the time for the UN vote approached, the activity of both lobbies increased noticeably. The Zionists focused their efforts on the foreign minister, whereas the Arabs hoped to gain the support of the Argentine ambassador to the UN, Jose Arce. Through the mediation of Diego Luis Molinari, the chairperson of the Argentine Senate foreign affairs committee (who had expressed solidarity with the Zionists as early as the end of the 1920s), Jewish leaders met with Bramuglia twice in October 1947. The foreign minister promised to draft directives for Argentina's representatives in the UN that would favor "a comprehensive solution to the Jewish problem." He stressed that Argentina would vote the same way as the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union-that is, in favor of the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. 91 In an effort to compel Argentina to adopt a pro-Zionist position, a telegram of thanks was sent to the foreign minister, and the Jewish Agency representative in Buenos Aires, Abraham Mibashan, publicized Bramuglia's statements during a rally held at the beginning of November to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the document that had legitimized the desire to create a national Jewish home in Palestine. 92 Throughout November, Molinari and Leonardo Benitez Piriz, a member of the Peronist Party and president of the Pro-Palestine Committee, continued to exert pressure on the foreign minister. However, as already noted, Bramuglia did not have free rein at the San Martin Palace. The upper ranks of the foreign ministry were locked in a struggle that influenced the formation of Argentine policy on Palestine and the Jewish question. The protagonists in the confrontations over the UN vote were the foreign minister himself, Bramuglia; the head of the Argentine delegation to the UN, Jose Arce; and the delegation's number-two man, Ambassador Enrique Corominas. Documents from Bramuglia's private archive reveal some of the ideological, personal, and intergenerational aspects of that struggle, and their impact on the Argentine position on the partition of Palestine-a position that in fact was decided only at the last minute. These documents show the influence of the internal strife within the Peronist bureaucratic state-despite Peron's charismatic, personalist

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leadership-and the inconsistency in political decision making. Although Peron blatantly intervened in other foreign-policy issues during the same period-such as relations with Spain-at this point in the Arab-Israeli conflict, when the situation in the Middle East was not yet very clear, the president preferred not to take any definite stand. Instead, he allowed his subordinates to deal with this diplomatic challenge. Jose Arce was a renowned surgeon who had also served as dean of the faculty of medicine and rector of the University of Buenos Aires. He was an experienced politician who had been a deputy in the national Chamber of Deputies for many years, and he belonged to one of the conservative groups in the heterogeneous coalition that united under Peron's leadership in 1945. 93 After winning the election, Peron appointed Arce ambassador to the UN. Arce, like his colleague and disciple Dr. Oscar lvanissevich, who was appointed ambassador to Washington, was supposed to give Peronism an image of decency in the international sphere. He held firm anticommunist views and showed great sympathy for Franco's regime in Spain-and as great an aversion to Jews and their ambition to establish a sovereign state. Equally significant for our purposes is the fact that Arce refused to accept the authority of the foreign ministry and the man who headed it, Bramuglia. "All ambassadors must report to the foreign minister except for the ambassador to the United Nations, who must report only to the president of the republic," Arce used to tell his friends, bragging of his direct connection to the president. 94 This attitude necessarily caused conflict between Arce and Bramuglia in many areas, one of them being the Argentine position on Israel and the Jews. To keep Arce more or less within bounds and to guarantee full, detailed reports of his sayings and doings at the UN headquarters in New York, Bramuglia appointed his own friend and confidant Enrique Corominas to the number-two position in Argentina's delegation to the UN. Corominas, a journalist of the same generation as Bramuglia, was associated with him in political life for at least twenty years, from the beginning of the 1940s until Bramuglia's death in 1962. Like Bramuglia, Corominas had started out as a left-wing militant, and he was equally sympathetic to the Zionist ambition to establish a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. From September to November 1947, Corominas sent long, detailed reports almost every day to Bramuglia in Buenos Aires. These reports-sent to Bramuglia's private residence in Juncal Street rather than to the foreign ministry in the San Martin Palace-are an invaluable primary source, laying bare the struggles between Arce and his deputy, Corominas, and the divergent views of Jews and Zionism held by different Peronist figures. 95 It was an alternative, unofficial channel

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of communication alongside the letters and telegrams that passed between the foreign ministry and the head of the UN delegation. Corominas complained that Arce went "his own way, as he usually does, evading the control of the Delegation and evading even more the principles emanating from the Foreign Ministry itsel£," 96 principles that, in Corominas's opinion, permitted support for the partition plan. As the moment for resolving the Palestine issue drew nearer, Corominas's criticisms of Arce grew sharper; he accused him of organizing a lobby among government leaders in Buenos Aires to promote his own views on Palestine and dropped hints that Arce was bypassing the foreign minister and applying directly to the presidency or "other channels," feeding them with "distorted" information. By "other channels" he meant none other than Eva Peron, Bramuglia's great rival. The impression produced by these letters is, among other things, one of intergenerational conflict. Corominas saw Arce as a representative of an older generation, unable to understand the nature of Peronism, or the changes that had occurred since World War II both internationally and in Argentina itself. As he saw it, Arce was clinging stubbornly to his outdated conservative views and consequently had trouble representing "the new Argentina" and the Third Position. 97 Corominas's complaints fell on fertile soil in Buenos Aires. Bramuglia, at least, was a willing listener. In a telephone conversation with Corominas, he said, "I am calling to ask you to contact Dr. Arce immediately and ascertain in my name whether he is willing to continue following instructions or not." Bramuglia explained that "we are disturbed here by the way things are being done at the United Nations ... This constitutes a defiance of international policy, which we direct from here, not Dr. Arce from there." Corominas, of course, agreed with the foreign minister's requests, and answered, "Allow me to say, on my own account, that I have tried, without success, to persuade him to change his political behavior, but the man pays no attention; he does just as he likes." 98 It should be noted that throughout his years at the UN, Arce epitomized a number of Argentine foreign policy's traditional tendencies, including a sort of isolationism and a propensity for turning historical and political problems into legal ones. 99 A dogmatic, uncompromising attitudefor example, in any matter concerning the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state-led Argentina to cast some surprising, or at least controversial, votes that did not give Peron's regime a progressive image. To Corominas's displeasure, Argentina did not join in censuring South Africa for racial discrimination against its Indian minority and opposed efforts to pressure it into granting independence to South West Africa (Namibia). Argentina also opposed any

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examination of the French colonialist policy in Morocco and did not join the critics of Dutch imperialism in the Far East. Its alliance with the Spanish dictator, Franco, certainly did nothing to efface the Peronist regime's profascist image. 100 On the Palestine question, too, Arce gave as much weight to legal grounds as political or moral ones in justifying his position. He emphasized to Bramuglia that the partition plan contravened the UN Charter with respect to the self-determination of nations. 101 Corominas argued in response that legal interpretations of the UN Charter were inadequate, because such interpretations "have no emotional life. Cold law does not exist any more. It is always defeated by emotional law, ... which is what wins the minds of nations . . . On the scale of popular emotions men are not valued for their greater wisdom or their higher level of legal knowledge, but for the goodness of their souls, ... for the tenderness of their actions." 102 He called upon the heads of Argentine diplomacy not to close their eyes to feelings and moral values. The representatives of Arab countries and the Arab High Committee were in constant, close communication with Arce, whereas Corominas became a contact for Jewish Agency representatives, whom he briefed on his conversations with colleagues from other countries of the continent and on the activities of Arab League representatives among the Latin American diplomats. During his visits to Buenos Aires, Corominas met with Mibashan, the representative of the Jewish Agency, who even held a formal reception in his honor under the auspices of the Pro-Palestine Committee, in recognition of his support for the Zionist cause. 103 The feud between Corominas and Arce also concerned the substance and significance of the "Third Position" policy. In this case, where the two major powers were in agreement that a Jewish state must be established, what did Argentina's abstention mean in the context of the escalating Cold War? In Corominas's view, the Third Position with respect to Palestine was in fact the position shared by the two major powers: Dr. Arce moved away from the Third Position and went precisely where he shouldn't have, or rather, where he was led by his racism, his anti-Semitism, his strong conservative and classist spirit, and, what's more, his disregard for the moral premises incorporated in the instructions of the Foreign Ministry... When the Arabs in Argentina hold public ceremonies to cheer the name of Ambassador Arce and Argentina's pro-Arab policy, it is because in UN debates Ambassador Arce has been in the Arab faction; and this was not precisely in accordance with our instructions. 104

Corominas believed that on an issue such as the future of Palestine, Argentina must take a stand one way or the other; it could not abstain. In his view, that stand ought to be in favor of the partition of Palestine

The Third Position and the establishment of a Jewish state. In a letter to Bramuglia, he asked the foreign minister to make a decision, emphasizing his certainty that Bramuglia sided with the Jewish position. The variety of arguments he cited included humanistic and Christian considerations as well as such pragmatic concerns as the importance of avoiding unnecessary conflict with Washington, whose position should be taken as a "compass" for Argentina. In an effort to exploit the regime's fear of presenting a negative image, Corominas warned that wounding the sensibilities of those who favored the creation of a Jewish home would be interpreted by the regime's opponents at home and abroad as evidence of racism and antiSemitism. He meant in particular the American Jews, who, like the Jews of Argentina, remained suspicious if not hostile toward Per6n. 105 Regardless of these arguments, Arce believed Argentina should vote for the Arab position. Corominas, for his part, hurried to explain to Bramuglia that Argentina could not vote against the partition plan, because this would make it a satellite of the Arab countries, while both the Jewish and the Arab representatives would interpret abstention as support for the Arab position. In any case, abstention would indicate a failure to grasp the historical significance of this resolution, undermining "the true feelings of the [Argentine] Nation, which wants to be a leading country in these political hours of the world." Moreover, he added, "In passing, I would like to remind you that our President and all those of us who follow his doctrine have always said we would fight for the great causes. I have believed that this [the desire to establish a national home for the Jewish people] was one of the great human causes, and that is why I have fought for it." Argentina did in fact abstain from the vote in the ad hoc committee, which took place on November 25. Most of the Latin American countries, twelve in number, voted in favor of the partition plan. Six of them, including Argentina, abstained, one voted against, and one was absent. Arce thought that Argentina should also abstain from the General Assembly vote. He telephoned the foreign ministry in Buenos Aires· and, in Bramuglia's absence, spoke to his deputy, Dr. Carlos Desmaras, laying before him the circumstances "in Dr. Arce's pro-Arab tone, not the impartial tone of the Argentine position." Dr. Desmaras instructed him to abstain in the General Assembly vote as well. Corominas asked Bramuglia for instructions to vote "yes." If Argentina wanted to give its vote both a regional and a pan-continental political significance, it had to support the partition plan. Most of the Latin American countries, he said, were displaying political maturity in their approach to the "Jewish problem." The renewal of the pan-American spirit signaled by the Rio de Janeiro conference a few months previously and the Bogota conference scheduled for early 1948 obliged Argentina

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to reinforce as much as possible the trend toward voting together, rather than splitting the vote on such an important issue. In the end, Argentina abstained from the November 29 General Assembly vote, and its abstention was interpreted in various ways by different observers. Some saw it as an expression of hostility toward Jews, dictated by the influence of fairly significant nationalist elements in the Peronist coalition and the status of the Argentine Catholic Church, which was an ally of the regime at that time. They concluded that a "regime with fascist characteristics" must be treated with suspicion. Others, in contrast, considered the fact that Argentina had not actually opposed the partition plan to represent an achievement on the part of Corominas and Bramuglia. Up to the last minute, some Zionist activists feared that Arce would succeed in persuading the leaders of Argentine diplomacy to vote against the resolution. This episode shows how heterogeneous the Peronist camp was. It included people with conflicting views on a whole series of domestic and international political issues, including the Jewish question and Zionism. Bramuglia usually represented the more moderate, pragmatic and less nationalistic current. Despite reservations, Argentina supported Israel's request for admission to the UN in December 1948 and again in May 1949. 106 The need to improve Peronism's international image and to strengthen ties with the United States had become a central consideration in Argentine foreign policy, and this was reflected in Argentina's friendly attitude toward the local Jewish community and its good relations with the state of Israel-once it became clear that the latter was there to stay. 107

THE BERLIN CRISIS: BRAMUGLIA'S RISE AND FALL

A series of international crises and tense situations in 1946-47 in Iran, Greece, Turkey, and other places led to an atmosphere of heightened confrontation between the major blocs. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of the Cominform were all expressions of the deep mutual suspicion and hostility that existed between the Soviet Union and its satellites, on one hand, and the United States and the countries of Western Europe, on the other. The Czech revolt in February 1948 and the expulsion of Eduard Benes, the last noncommunist leader in Eastern Europe, were additional proofs, were any needed, of the de facto partition of the European continent. The intensifying Cold War could have been a chance for Argentina, whose president, Juan Peron, had announced the adoption of the "Third

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Position," to demonstrate the independence of its foreign policy. A prudent but uncompromising stand between the blocs could have been a way to show that Buenos Aires did not adapt its diplomacy to the needs of either the United States or the Soviet Union, but served only its own national interests. However, this course of action turned out to be impossible in the United Nations Organization as long as Ambassador Jose Arce led the Argentine delegation. His categorical anti-Soviet stance eliminated any likelihood of his mediating between the rival powers in any situation or sphere. In contrast, Foreign Minister Juan Atilio Bramuglia's personality and views uniquely befitted him to play a significant role in the international arena, as the Berlin crisis of 1948 would prove. Indeed, Bramuglia served as mediator in this crisis from September to November 1948, while he was president of the UN Security Council. Within a short time, both Argentine and foreign observers became aware of the gap between the great international prestige he earned in his own right as a result of his diplomatic activity and the Peronist communication media's overwhelming silence on the subject of his deeds and popularity. At the center of this section lies the question as to how to reconcile the praise that the head of Argentine diplomacy received from both President Harry Truman and Marshal Josef Stalin with his dismissal from the Peron government mere months later.

ON THE THRESHOLD OF A THIRD WORLD WAR?

Among all the urgent questions concerning relations between the world powers at the end of World War II, the thorniest was how to treat Germany. And among the tough issues of the German future, none was more complicated than the question of Berlin, a city that, some 160 kilometers inside the territory occupied by the Russians, was divided between the four victorious powers: the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France. As Khrushchev would later put it, Berlin was a bone stuck in Moscow's throat. 108 From early 1947, the United States worked to incorporate into a single economic entity all the zones occupied by its own troops, the British troops, and the French troops, as a step toward creating a separate, economically strong Western German state. A year later these three occupying powers decided to introduce a new currency in the western zones to facilitate financial stability and economic recovery. In mid-June 1948 the monetary reform took place: The Reichsmark was replaced by the new Deutsche Mark (at a rate of 10:1), and controls were removed from prices and rationing for most products. The reform soon proved successful.

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The Russians were alarmed by the impact of Western prosperity on the impoverished inhabitants of eastern Germany. Condemning the currency reform as a violation of the Potsdam Accords, 109 they began to work toward pushing the Western powers out of their respective niches in Berlin. Thus, on June 24, 1948, in a move characterized by Frank Holey, commander of the U.S. forces in Berlin, as the most barbaric since the days of Genghis Khan/ 10 the Russians initiated a blockade of the neighborhoods controlled by the United States, Britain, and France, thereby giving rise to the first Berlin crisis. 111 This was a test of the West's determination. General Lucius Clay, commander of the U.S. occupation forces, wrote in those days that if Berlin fell into the hands of the Russians, all Germany would be next; and, after that, all of Europe would become part of the new Soviet empire. 112 The crisis was perceived as a threat to peace and European stability that could escalate into an armed confrontation, and, with the recent war still fresh in the memories of people on both sides of the Atlantic, fear was rampant. Many historians, too, believe that the risk of war was greater at that moment than at any other time since 1945. 113 The American and British response arrived in the form of an airlift of supplies for the 2,25o,ooo inhabitants of West Berlin, an unprecedented logistical operation that ran day and night without interruption for I I months. By the end of the crisis some 2oo,ooo flights had transported close to a million and a half tons of supplies, particularly coal, for the inhabitants of the blockaded cityY 4 At the same time, the Western powers put the subject on the UN Security Council agenda for debate on September 29. This issue was a challenge for the international organization, created as it was in order to guarantee world peace. The General Assembly was meeting in Paris at the time. Besides its permanent members (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China), the Security Council included Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Syria, and Ukraine as rotating members. The United States occupied the presidency at the time, but because it was directly involved in the crisis, it turned the office over to Argentina for all discussions concerning the German problem (the United States continued to exercise the presidency in sessions dealing with other topics). Accordingly, the Argentine minister of foreign relations presided over the Security Council through the decisive months of October and November, playing an important role in the center of world attention. The six Council members that were not directly involved in the conflict sought to resolve the crisis. Bramuglia, as their spokesman, suggested

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different plans for settling the issue. This was a rare opportunity for Argentina to act on the international stage and thereby· speed the process of its reintegration in the family of nations, finally overcoming the isolation imposed upon it by the suspicions aroused in both the West and the East by Peron's regime and Argentine neutrality in the world war.

ARCE-NO; BRAMUGLIA-YES

In November 1947, the UN General Assembly elected Argentina as a member of the Security Council for a term of two years. This election was a source of great satisfaction to the Argentine diplomatic corps; only two years earlier there had been some question, given Argentina's history of neutrality in the war, as to whether the country would be invited to attend the conference in San Francisco at which the United Nations Organization was founded. 115 The presidency of the Council should have been assumed by the Argentine ambassador to the UN, Dr. Jose Arce.11 6 Under the circumstances, however, because Argentina acceded to the office sooner than planned owing to the inability of the United States to preside in the Berlin crisis, Dr. Arce's forceful anti-Soviet remarks presented a problem. In his memoirs, the ambassador writes that initially Buenos Aires adopted an isolationist stance and rejected the idea of serving as president. On three occasions Bramuglia, already in Paris, received instructions to turn down the office. This reluctance on Peron's part stemmed from his deep-rooted suspicions of any international framework that might involve limitations on the sovereignty and freedom of action of the countries that were members in it. His decision at this juncture, however, was partly attributable to a chat he had with the Jewish Argentine Moshe Tov, a representative first of the Jewish Agency and, later, after the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, of the new nation's ministry of foreign affairs, where his job was to obtain the support of the Latin American nations. In a letter to Bramuglia in September, Peron explained why he preferred not to enter what might be a trap: I sent you the advice not to accept the presidency of the Security Council because the Jewish delegate Toff [Tov] who was here told us two weeks ago that a plot was afoot in the UN to discredit Argentina. This would be done by putting it in charge of deciding the three most disagreeable issues of the whole session: the Berlin affair, the Palestine affair, and the India affair. It was thought that if Argentina were left to its own devices, it would serve as president, dealing with the worst issues, and it would inevitably end up looking

The Third Position bad to the Russians, or to the Jews, or to the Arabs, and also to India or Hiradabak. Toff is, besides a Jew, an Argentine, and he declared that as such he hurried to alert us so that we would not enter the trap. I felt that "when in doubt, don't" was the best [policy], and I had the information sent to you. 117

Arce has described the pressure exerted on him by the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Phillip Jessup, to accept the presidency for Argentina. The Argentine diplomat asked his foreign minister for authority to address Peron a fourth time to try to persuade him to accept, even if it cost him his position. Arce claims he managed to convince Bramuglia, but that it was Bramuglia who spoke to the president. This time Peron agreed, although he made two conditions. First, Argentina would act as president only for the Berlin affair. Second, Bramuglia, not Arce, would take the office, 118 a condition Peron justified as follows: In my view the solution cannot be in Arce's hands under any circumstances. Since you are there, I'd like you to manage the matter personally, since ... I am certain that they won't deceive you, nor will they be clever enough to play any dirty tricks on you. The Berlin affair ... will be difficult and rough, and your management of it will be certain to preserve Argentina's prestige and position, that would not be the case with Arce, whose stormy and inconsistent performance might commit us further than is advisable. Arce's long service in the UN is bound to have given rise to friendships, prejudices, or obligations, besides his not very prudent ways, all of them risks the country cannot afford.

Arce gives a succinct but bitter account of this in his memoirs: "That same night [Bramuglia] called me and told me that the government accepted our request, on condition that ... 'Arce does not preside.' " 119 This decision was not motivated by Peron's desire to hold Arce back, but rather by his understanding that Arce as president would sabotage any possibility of an Argentine representative obtaining enough credit with the Eastern bloc to be able to engineer a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Arce's frequent confrontations with the Soviet representative, Andrei Vishinski-true verbal duels-led the Communist diplomats to view the "reactionary" delegate from Buenos Aires with mistrust and suspicion. 120 A person with a different image was needed, a moderate who could perform this delicate mission discreetly. No one was better suited to the job than Bramuglia, the most eminent and talented of the ministers in Peron's first administration; but Arce, deeply disgruntled by Peron's instructions, felt betrayed by the foreign minister as well as by the president. Bramuglia, for his part, was undoubtedly pleased by the prospect of paying Arce back for his repeated attempts in 1947 to

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bypass the foreign ministry and contact the Casa Rosada directly-for example, during the General Assembly debates that led to the partition of Palestine. In his speech in Paris on September 21, 1948, at the opening of the Third General Assembly of the United Nations, Bramuglia expressed himself moderately and peaceably, thus reinforcing the impression of his suitability as a mediator. His address, broadcast live by a number of Argentine radio stations and by the Latin American Service of the BBC in London, called for peace, solidarity, and harmonious coexistence among peoples. 121 His words matched the spirit of the Third Position and the pronouncements on economic cooperation and world peace that Peron had made a year earlier. However, the importance of his own role as president of the Security Council would stand out in early October, when this forum debated its first issue: the Berlin conflict.

A DAVID BETWEEN TWO GOLIATHS

On October 4, both parties presented their arguments before Bramuglia. By majority vote it was decided to include the Berlin issue on the Security Council agenda. The Soviet Union and Ukraine, which had expressed their objection to this, announced that they would not take part in sessions dealing with the issue. In fact, however, their representatives were present at all of them, although they did not exercise their right to speak. The Soviet delegate Andrei Vishinski maintained that there was no blockade of Berlin and that the measures taken by his country in that city were exclusively defensive in nature, a reaction to the monetary reform instituted in the parts of the city occupied by the Western powers. Consequently, the Soviet actions were in no way a threat to peace. The Russian diplomat added a legal argument: Citing Article 107 of the United Nations Charter, he claimed that the organization was not empowered to debate measures or policies adopted against enemy countries as a result of World War II and that the issue should instead be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers set up at the Potsdam Conference, which represented the four occupying powers. To this the U.S. ambassador, Phillip Jessup, responded that the blockade presented the Western powers with three options: yield to the use of force, respond with force to acts of force, or take the case to the Security Council. The three countries had chosen the third option. 122 A commission of neutral states headed by Bramuglia began to seek solutions, working on the issue through October and November. Parallel

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to the meetings that the Security Council devoted to Berlin, other efforts were pursued through unofficial diplomatic channels. The most important venue for these was the George V Hotel, where the Argentine delegation was staying. Other significant meetings were held at the Quai d'Orsay and various locations away from the public and the communication media. On different occasions Bramuglia publicly expounded his views on the need for a moral world order, based on the ideals mentioned in the United Nations Charter: peace, liberty, justice, tolerance, friendship, cooperation, mutual respect, equality, and the resolution of conflicts by nonviolent means. He recognized that the organization was limited in its ability to take action, especially in a period of rivalry and mutual distrust between the blocs. He understood, however, that there were grounds for hope and believed that every effort should be made to ensure that periods of peace were not merely interludes between international conflicts. Drawing on the diplomatic tradition of his country, he also believed that reforms were needed to make the UN truly universal and to permit the participation of all the countries of the world, without discriminating between the winners, the losers, and the neutral parties in the recently ended war. Bramuglia wanted to eliminate the organization's hierarchical structure, which allowed a few countries to decide the fate of the entire world. The veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council allowed them to torpedo decisions supported by the majority of countries. It should be recalled that Argentine representatives had expressed similar arguments concerning the League of Nations in the interwar period and that the lack of response to their concerns led then-President Hipolito Yrigoyen to instruct his delegates to withdraw from the League Assembly; in the following years Argentina remained an inactive member. 123 Peronist Argentina supported the same positions and reiterated them in the United Nations from 1946 on, through the intermediary of Jose Arce. Bramuglia saw the mediator's mission in the Berlin crisis as an opportunity to publicize Argentine views and demonstrate that agreements could be reached by peaceful means, through dialog, in addition to emphasizing that peripheral countries could play an important role in the international arena precisely because they were not directly involved in the conflict between the major powers. 124 At that time Peron and Bramuglia were in constant communication through letters, telegrams, and telephone calls. The foreign minister seemed to want to give the president the sense of being kept up to date, as well as convey the idea that his own activity was benefiting the regime as a whole. Peron, in turn, was trying to show his minister that he backed him unreservedly

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and supported him in his rivalry with the ambassador to the UN. In the second half of November Peron was already fully aware that the foreign minister's efforts were boosting Argentina's international image. In one letter to Paris, he wrote: "I believe as you do that the job done there is greater that the strength of the Republic, but I also believe that the honor the country derives from it is greater than what we could have hoped for when we went to the Conference." As a rule, whether in the Security Council or in answering journalists' questions, Bramuglia avoided referring in public to the origins of the Berlin crisis. Such statements might wound the sensibilities of one of the parties or be interpreted as an accusation against one of the powers, compromising his mission's chances of success. 125 The Argentine mediator used various techniques in his effort to first delay and subsequently neutralize the explosion of the Berlin crisis. If he thought that calling a Council meeting at a given moment would only aggravate the tension, or if he believed that a new recess would contribute to better understanding between the blocs, he would postpone a meeting; if he was convinced that the proposal presented by the group of neutral countries needed to be reformulated and redrafted in order to speed up negotiations, he took immediate steps to have this done. 126 In any case, he maintained constant contact with the representatives of the powers involved: Andrei Vishinski, Phillip Jessup, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Alexandre Parodi. He did not stop there, however; he also talked with eminent personalities in the international arena, including the U.S. secretary of state, George Marshall, whom he had already met at the Pan-American Conferences in Rio de Janeiro and Bogota; the French president, Vincent Auriol; and Pope Pius XII. The neutral countries met often, trying to hammer out compromise proposals that would be acceptable to the parties. 127 He did everything with boundless patience, wisdom, determination, responsibility, caution, and good manners-reflected in some of the terms the contemporary press used to describe his mission. Peron, for his part, referring to the difficulties Bramuglia faced, described him as "David between two Goliaths." Gradually Peron's initial reservations were replaced by enthusiasm over the international attention attracted by the mediating skills of the Argentine representative, to whom he wrote: I am following with pleasure and applause all your astute proceedings and dealings over there. We could not have done it better, and I am seeing the consequences here of the war of intrigues, lies, and slurs pursued by the Brazilians, the Chileans, the Uruguayans, etc., who suffer so much from our successes. In spite of all that, I am exceedingly happy, since if the dogs are barking at your heels, you know you're leading the pack.

The Third Position At the outset Bramuglia's chances of promoting an agreement between the powers appeared to be slim to nonexistent, and the Russians were demanding that the subject be stricken from the Security Council's agenda. Bragmuglia convened the plenary to ask two questions of the "big four." First, he requested details about the circumstances that had led automatically to limitations on communications, transport, and trade between Berlin and western Germany, and between western Germany and eastern Germany. Next he asked for a detailed explanation of the agreement reached in Moscow on August 30 that lifted the restrictions on Berlin, introduced the West German mark as the sole legal currency in the city, and convoked the representatives of the four major powers, asking why these provisions were not applied. 128 The United States, Britain, and France were willing to answer the questions, but the USSR was not. Vishinski interpreted their formulation in itself as an attempt to induce his country's delegation to participate in the debates on the Berlin affair, to which he had already expressed his opposition. Accordingly, the neutral countries presented a draft agreement to the Security Council on October 22, 1948, proposing an immediate termination of all the restrictions imposed by the parties on contact between Berlin and the different parts of Germany. At the same time the four military commanders in charge of the different sectors of the city were to meet to discuss the monetary unification of the city, based on the mark that was already circulating in the Soviet zone. In addition, the four foreign ministers would also meet to discuss Germany's future. 129 From Buenos Aires Peron congratulated Bramuglia on his proposal: "[Your] recommendation seems very good to me, very fair and appropriate. Even if it comes to nothing, we will look good. As you say, I too believe that the United Nations is not a forum for resolving anything, just for preparing a climate or atmosphere. Accordingly, I believe like you that it is fundamental to put Argentina in a good light there." Three days after this formula was presented-after the parties had had enough time to analyze it-the Security Council voted on it. Of the eleven members, only the Soviet Union and Ukraine opposed it, arguing that it did not respect the principle of simultaneity agreed upon in Moscow at the end of August for lifting the restrictions on trade and imposing a single currency in Berlin. The discussion, in fact, focused on timing: Should the blockade be lifted and only then the negotiations begin, or should a monetary agreement be reached first and then the restrictions be lifted? In effect, the Soviet position represented a veto of the proposed agreement, which was consequently taken off the agenda. In an interview published in Pravda on October 29, Stalin denounced the Western powers for the dead end they had entered and for pursuing

The Third Position an aggressive policy that reflected no interest in coming to terms with the Soviet Union.U 0 Despite this setback Bramuglia did not falter in his efforts; he was well aware that, given the background of mutual mistrust and hostility between the blocs, there was no magic formula that would instantly resolve the crisis. Optimistic by nature and convinced that it was precisely from optimism that solutions might be crafted, he did not fall into despair. Doing his best to avoid creating an unjustified atmosphere of acute crisis, he promised the journalists who flocked around him from all over the world that he would continue his efforts: "I am certain that none of the parties wants the worst to happen now. And it is my duty to try to get them to an agreement. Their differences have diminished somewhat, and they may yet achieve a meeting of the minds." 131 The president of the General Assembly, Australian foreign minister Herbert Evat, and the United Nations secretary-general, Trygve Lie, also tried to facilitate a solution. 132 However, although the Soviet Union was agreeable to a meeting between the four major powers, the three Western nations, especially Great Britain, preferred that the commission of neutral members of the Security Council continue their work. The delegates of those three countries met and officially rejected the General Assembly's proposal, accepting the call to try to resolve the problem within the framework of the Security Council. This, in effect, constituted a motion of confidence in Bramuglia's efforts. On November r8, Bramuglia again posed questions to the parties. The delegates of the neutral countries met to study the responses, and the negotiations resumed. The Argentine foreign minister drafted a new plan, approved on December r, which called for the formation of a committee of experts on financial matters. The committee would be composed of representatives appointed by the six neutral states in the Security Council and one additional state, to be designated by the UN secretary-general. 133 By design, the new initiative would not require an immediate meeting of the Security Council. Dr. Roberto Ares was appointed as the Argentine delegate. This was Bramuglia's last initiative; at the beginning of December he was finishing up his term as president of the Council, to be replaced by the Belgian Fernand Van Langenhov. The Argentine foreign minister left Paris for Italy and the United States, whence he would return home. For two months the committee of experts worked on a proposal to introduce a single legal currency in all the zones of Berlin, which was now administratively divided by Soviet initiative. At the beginning of December the USSR had conveyed its willingness to provide the committee with "all the information it needed" in a communique that was interpreted as support for Bramuglia's initiative and the beginning of

The Third Position a solution to what had up to then been the most acute crisis in the relations between the blocs. 134 The economic countermeasures adopted by the Western powers in Germany created an untenable situation for Moscow. In February 1949 the committee presented its report, and it was published a month later without prompting any debate in the Security Council plenary. At this point, the Russians must have recognized that the blockade had failed. Toward the end of April direct talks began between the parties, and in May the restrictions imposed on the city were lifted. By then the Soviets had realized they would have to learn to tolerate a Western enclave in the middle of the zone they had occupied during the war. The West's determination and the monopoly it still had on nuclear power finally led Stalin to back down. That same month, May 1949, saw the adoption of the constitution governing the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany-to which the Soviet Union responded by creating the Democratic Republic of Germany. The political and administrative division of the country would be an incontrovertible fact of life for the next four decades.

DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES

The efforts of the committee formed by the neutral states and headed by Bramuglia reflected a determination and perseverance that were not always recognized or appreciated. Throughout that period, the international press published reports expressing the doubts of Western "circles" or "sources" about the process in general and about the committee of experts, which journalists considered to be an attempt to save the prestige of the Argentine foreign minister before he ended his mandate as president of the Security Council, rather than a concrete means of promoting the chances of reaching an agreement. 135 Soviet suspicions concerning the Third Position did not make things any easier for Bramuglia. Moscow saw this policy as a mere smokescreen concealing irrevocable support for U.S. actions in the international arena. 136 Bramuglia was not daunted, however, and continued to make all possible efforts to avoid measures and declarations that might be interpreted as anti-Soviet. Even at the very beginning of the process, when he declared his support for including the Berlin issue in the agenda of the Security Council, he explained that this support did not constitute a criticism of the Kremlin's position, heeding Peron's dictum that "[a]ny definitive resolution of censure in the UN of any power in the Berlin case conspires against the very life of the UN and may serve to accelerate the outbreak of a war."

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When Bramuglia was asked, in an interview for U.S. News and World Report, whether the Soviets saw him as an impartial intermediary or a representative of the Western powers, he responded that he had never

had the impression that they saw him as the latter, but, if anything, as the former. 137 He did not hesitate to reject publicly and categorically any insinuation by the Russian ambassador implying a pro-Western bias on his part, drawing compliments even from Arce: "I was with him when he presided, and he conducted himself with remarkable adroitness, especially when responding to certain excessive language by Vychinski." 138 Bramuglia's task was further complicated by the internal frictions in the Argentine delegation, of which he complained to Peron. From the Casa Rosada, the foreign minister received encouragement, praise, and unconditional support for his position: Courage, friend, and keep in mind that whatever you do we support with the most absolute solidarity ... You are the Minister of Foreign Relations and there [you are] the President of the Republic, everything is in your hands ... The best and most tolerant man must know how to become the most intolerant and the most energetic when the good of the Nation is at stake, and there is no interest that cannot and should not be sacrificed in the name and for the good of the country.

During the foreign minister's extended absence, the minister of the navy, Fidel Anad6n, took provisional charge of the foreign ministry, although the person who actually took care of business there was the director of the department of foreign relations, Bramuglia's trusted friend Pascual La Rosa. La Rosa's role consisted not only in directing the current affairs of Argentine diplomacy, but also in keeping his superior and friend up to date on any political intrigues in the upper echelons of the regime that might threaten the minister's standing. Thus, at the beginning of September, shortly after Bramuglia's departure for the Old World, La Rosa wrote to tell the minister· the gist of his conversation with Ambassador Agosti about the planned trips of Domingo Orlando Maroglio and Miguel Miranda, members of the Consejo Econ6mico Nacional, to the United States and Europe, respectively: "He was explicit and frank with me, saying that both persons are being sent at the suggestion of your admirer [Evita] in order to interfere with your business, then he adds that 'it is necessary to work for your failure for the good of the country.' " 139 The rivalries within the Argentine delegation and the intrigues that were brewing behind Bramuglia's back during his absence from Buenos Aires were in stark contrast to the favorable treatment he received from international public opinion. In the first week of November the foreign

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minister left on a five-day visit to London by invitation of the British government. There he met with Prime Minister Clement Attlee and his foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, and was received with pomp and circumstance by King George VI at Buckingham Palace. 140 The honors showered on him by his hosts and his reception by the monarch at Buckingham Palace were more than an expression of appreciation for his efforts to resolve the Berlin crisis; they were a resounding slap in the face for Eva Peron, who one year earlier had not been allowed to visit the English capital. 141 At the end of Bramuglia's visit, the London Times wrote, "The only means of making relations between the two countries as good as they were in the old days before the war is by personal contact between the men directly responsible for policy, and nobody is likely to do better work in this cause than DR. BRAMUGLIA, whose untiring efforts to heal a more obstinate breach between the nations in Paris have won him such high praise." 142 Even the Washington Post, the newspaper of which the Argentine ambassador Jeronimo Remorino complained because "it attacks us systematically" and did everything possible "so that not even the name of the Argentine Republic should appear," deviated from these habits to publish Dr. Jessup's praise of Bramuglia's efforts. 143 The minutes of the Security Council sessions document the appreciation expressed by the representatives of Canada, Colombia, and Syria, as well as by the French representative, Alexandre Parodi, who thanked Bramuglia for his patience and his efforts, which, Parodi said, had shown both good will and intelligence. 144 The USSR did not praise Bramuglia's activity in public. Toward the end of October, Pravda published an interview with Stalin, in which, asked his opinion of the six Security Council members who were not involved in the conflict, he retorted with an accusation that the representatives of those countries supported an aggressive policy that was conducive to the outbreak of a new war. 145 In practice, however, the Russians spoke in positive terms of Bramuglia's role in ending th~ crisis. In 1953, the "Sun of the Nations" and his ambassador, Vishinski, were still taking an interest in the, by then, ex-foreign minister. 146 In his annual report for 1948-49, the UN secretary-general, Trygve Lie, maintained that although the negotiations in the Security Council had not directly resolved the crisis, they had helped reduce tension and the danger of a war, gaining time that was used to establish contacts by alternative channels. 147 Bramuglia received letters from different countries, some of them from private citizens, offering him support and encouragement; one of them even explained to him that the key to his diplomatic success lay in his astrological chart. 148

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BRAMUGLIA'S DISMISSAL

Shortly before Bramuglia completed his term as president of the Security Council, he was invited by the U.S. secretary of state, General Marshall, to visit Washington. The foreign minister sought and promptly received the approval of his president. Peron, mindful of the problematic relations between his country and the United States, as well as of the importance of those relations for the success of his development and modernization plans, glimpsed a great opportunity: With respect to your trip to the United States, it would be convenient from every standpoint, at least so you could get an impression of what is going on there and what that country's real situation is concerning our own country. Your conversations and personal contact with the big shots would be of extraordinary importance for current and future solutions. If you are not very tired and bored by playing the diplomat, if you believe like I do that it is desirable, then go ahead and do it.

Accordingly, Bramuglia accepted the invitation, and the State Department convinced the White House that President Truman should meet with the head of Argentine diplomacy. A meeting took place on December ro in a "very friendly atmosphere" and in the presence of the Argentine ambassador to Washington, Jeronimo Remorino. 149 This was the first time that an Argentine foreign minister had made an official visit to the United States, and he was received very warmly, with many marks of distinction. During his talks, he earned the esteem of the administration officials, and his role was recognized to the point that, when the Berlin crisis was finally resolved in May 1949, he and President Truman exchanged telegrams of thanks and appreciation. Bramuglia's success in the UN and during his visits to London and Washington conferred upon him an international prestige that no Argentine foreign minister had achieved since the days when Carlos Saavedra Lamas, operating in the framework of the League of Nations, helped negotiate an end to the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the mid-r93os. It was precisely that prestige, however, as Arce wrote in his memoirs, that hastened the eclipse of Bramuglia's political career.l5° Many contemporary foreign observers agreed with this assessment, including UN Secretary-General Lie. Bramuglia's image threatened to infringe on Peron's supremacy, while his international celebrity might eventually allow him to hold independent views rather than bend with every wind from the presidential palace-where "intermediaries" might not be necessary following the

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constitutional reform that would allow the reelection of the leader in 1951. In this respect, Peron was a victim of his own propaganda, which extolled his omnipotence and his supposed direct bond with the masses.

Accordingly, he began to get rid of most of the people who had accompanied him on his rise to power, a pattern of behavior that has been seen in numerous political systems and many leaders. It was during this time that figures such as Jose Figuerola, Domingo Mercante, and Juan Atilio Bramuglia himself were dropped from the presidential retinue. The one exception among the "old guard" was Angel Borlenghi, who continued to hold the interior ministry portfolio until the last months of Peron's government in 1955· Bramuglia's rivals began to disseminate unfounded rumors that the foreign minister was plotting against Peron, gradually convincing the president that he should assert his authority against such a dangerous adversary. The ex-union lawyer also fell prey to the guerrilla warfare waged against him by the First Lady. As already mentioned, the two had confronted each other in October 1945, when Bramuglia had refused or been slow to lodge an appeal of habeas corpus for Peron at Evita's request. Since that episode, the president's young wife had done everything she could to sabotage the foreign minister's career. Some people blamed her machinations for the failure of the plan to present Bramuglia as a candidate for governor of the important province of Buenos Aires in the 1946 elections, as well as for his being passed over for any executive position of importance in domestic affairs-notably the Secretariat of Labor or the interior ministry. In the first days after the electoral victory, the foreign ministry did not seem much of a prize; but Bramuglia quickly proved that appearances are deceiving. Another confrontation between Bramuglia and Evita took place in the first half of 1947, when Eva Peron's trip to Spain was being planned. Bramuglia opposed the trip, arguing that it was not a wise move when Argentina was investing so much effort in improving its international image and its relations with the United States. A visit to Franco could only injure the image of Peron's regime. Evita paid no attention to the foreign minister's suggestions, which angered him. On her way back from Europe, she stopped in Brazil to give a speech to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, then meeting in Rio de Janeiro; the glowing terms in which Secretary of State Marshall referred to the Argentine minister during his brief chat with Evita produced the opposite effect to what the American had expected. In the daily Democracia, which had been under Eva Peron's control since early 1947, the hostility toward Bramuglia was palpable. According

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to biographers Fraser and Navarro, Evita did not normally meddle directly in the affairs of the newspaper, which soon had a circulation of tens of thousands of copies, nor did she try to shape its editorial policy, once its Peronist alignment had been confirmed. However, one of her caprices was clearly reflected in the paper: the treatment of Juan Atilio Bramuglia. He was boycotted, his name never mentioned, even when he was mediating in the Berlin crisis, meeting with the U.S. president, or signing an agreement with Italy. If there was no alternative and his actions had to be mentioned, only his title appeared, without his name. Photographs that included Bramuglia either did not appear or were retouched; on several occasions the image of his body appeared, but not that of his face. 151 Under Evita's influence, other Peronist dailies also began to reduce their coverage of Bramuglia. The daily La Prensa, published in Spanish in New York, pointed out during Bramuglia's stay in the United States that the governmental press in Argentina was ignoring the foreign minister's historic visit to Washington, much as it had ignored his activities in Paris. 152 Peron himself, a week earlier, had given a speech in which he praised his country's contribution to world peace, although without mentioning the foreign minister by name (he did the same in the traditional speech with which he inaugurated the new congress session in May 1949). The governmentcontrolled radio stations took a similar approach. Bramuglia's meeting with the number-two man of the State Department (Marshall was hospitalized at the time for surgery) was reported only by independent newspapers, La Naci6n and La Prensa, and the Catholic publication El Pueblo. It was also published in the daily Clarin, which despite having adopted a line favorable to the regime, constantly highlighted the foreign minister's activity. Democracia, which, as mentioned, was controlled by Evita, and El Mundo, controlled by Miranda, avoided the subject, as did the evening papers. 153 In fact, researchers seeking to follow Bramuglia's activities as foreign minister should look first at the opposition (and foreign) papers of the time, especially La Naci6n and La Prensa, and not necessarily at those publications loyal to the regime. The American historian Robert Alexander characterized Bramuglia as "a prophet without honor in his own land," adding that although he was mentioned in publications in Europe and the rest of the American continent as a possible candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, the Buenos Aires press barely mentioned "the foreign minister." 154 From the creation in 1949 of the women's division of the Peronist Party, headed by Evita, the First Lady had a new official position in the Consejo Superior del Justicialismo (Superior Council of Justicialism).

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Her importance in the leadership that governed the destiny of the country increased, as well as her intervention in the composition of the cabinet headed by her husband. 155 Bramuglia was one more victim of this phenomenon-neither the first nor the last. Some time after his resignation, Bramuglia described that period, characterized by the growing influence of Eva Peron, as "the Argentine midnight." 156 The tense relations between the two were an open secret to many of those connected with the upper party echelons. In his memoirs, Benito Llambi, then Argentine ambassador to Switzerland, wrote, "Just as aresult of a report that I sent to Buenos Aires, emphasizing the happy effects that Bramuglia's action in the United Nations was having in the press, I found out about the complicated situation he was in. My great friend Jorge Torrent, political director in the ministry, "shelved" the report and warned me that if it got into Evita's hands, I might be in trouble." 157 While the foreign minister was still in the United States, on his way back from Europe, a Montevideo radio station reported on the criticisms leveled at Bramuglia by various ministers and the plans to replace him when he returned to Buenos Aires. The head of diplomacy, sensing betrayal at home, was questioned on the subject by journalists in New York, and tried to deny the rumors. The Casa de Gobierno sought to do the same: Despite the highly effective performance of our foreign minister in the UN, where he has played a role so distinguished that it in itself should discredit the malevolent report, the Government, which appreciates and values the Foreign Minister's achievements in the Security Council of the United Nations and in the countries that he visited, finds it necessary to deny categorically these lies, which can only be designed to obstruct the performance of our foreign minister and take away due credit from his work. 158

This notice ended with Peron's hope that he would be able to complete his term of office with the same people who were accompanying him and assisting him in his mission. At this point, however, it must already have been clear to Bramuglia that his job was in danger, despite the president's gesture of meeting him at the airport and embracing him warmly in front of the most important ministers. Sure enough, only a few months after returning to Buenos Aires, Bramuglia found himself forced to pay the price of his international success. He left the San Martin Palace to return to his own home and his professional activities as a legal expert and university professor. Bramuglia's resignation was first published on August 12/ 59 although the circumstances of his ouster remained somewhat clouded. The Dia de Ia Reconquista holiday and the weekend that followed facilitated the

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spread of rumors, many of which originated, once again, in Montevideo. Political circles in Buenos Aires were bubbling over with speculations as to the probable impact of Bramuglia's resignation on the upper echelons of the government. As New York Times correspondent Milton Bracker remarked, the foreign minister's resignation was like a stone thrown into a pool, creating ripples in previously still waters. According to the earliest reports, the resignation was submitted following a meeting between Peron, Bramuglia, and Ambassador Remorino, as a result of differences of opinion between the latter two men concerning the policy that should be followed with respect to the United States. For some time Remorino had been arguing that the foreign minister had led Argentina to a dead end in its relations with Washington, having failed in his attempts to attract the dollars so desperately needed by the Argentine economy. He also kept repeating to anyone who would listen that Bramuglia's presidential ambitions and his desire to present himself to the public as though he were the sole friend of the United States had sabotaged the embassy's work with the White House. However that may be, most of the news reports mentioned the possibility that Bramuglia had been ousted for "reasons of internal order, since the coldness of his relations with a domip.ant actor in Peronist politics is known." 160 Peron called Remorrno back to Buenos Aires from Washington, without Bramuglia's knowledge. The president supposedly tried to probe the differences between the two diplomats, both in the personal sphere and in matters relating to economic and trade ties with the United States. The tension between the two men was not new. For some time reports had been circulating that the foreign minister felt that Remorino was conspiring against him and, with Evita's support, trying to force him from his position. 161 Bramuglia obviously did not care much for the high profile that Remorino maintained in the U.S. media. In a secret telegram, for example, he instructed him, "Recommend you not make any more press statements without consulting foreign ministry. Also advisable that governments' decisions be published simultaneously by foreign ministries of both countries or the governmental organizations determined in advance by the same ... We think your management is a success and should not be put at risk by successive statements without previous authorization." 162 In the three-way meeting between Peron, Bramuglia, and Remorino, the ambassador accused the minister of carrying on "private negotiations" with the United States. Bramuglia reacted with visible irritation, accusing Remorino of scheming to obtain the post of foreign minister, and he apparently could not resist adding a personal insult, in which the ambassador's mother was mentioned. After this, he handed over a

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letter of resignation that he had ready in his pocket. 163 According to the U.S. weekly Time, this was the sixth time that Bramuglia had presented a letter of resignation. Only three days later the press reported Peron's acceptance of his resignation and Bramuglia's replacement by Hipolito Jesus Paz, a young man of only 32. The text of Bramuglia's letter was printed as well: Dear President and friend, Finding myself in a precarious state of health, and accordingly unable to maintain the intense pace of activity that the Secretariat of State demands of the position with which Your Excellency has duly honored me, I present my irrevocable resignation of the same. I thank you warmly for the trust, kindnesses, and attentions you have extended to me during the discharge of my functions, and, expressing my sincere wishes for your personal success and my inextinguishable solidarity with the ideals of the revolutionary movement, I take my leave from you, Mr. President, with a warm embrace. 164

The foreign press claimed that at least three other ministers were considering resigning out of sympathy and solidarity with Bramuglia: the minister of public health, Dr. Ramon Carrillo; the minister of economy, Roberto Antonio Ares; and the minister of finance, Dr. Alfredo Gomez Morales. It also highlighted the efforts of the vice president, Hortensia J. Quijano, who abandoned his traditional role of observer from the sidelines to try to prevent Bramuglia from resigning. 165 In this atmosphere of confusion, the interior minister, Angel Borlenghi, who like Bramuglia had militated in the Socialist Party before joining the Peronist movement, and who had once been considered a political friend of his, assured journalists that there was no government crisis and that, except for the foreign minister, all the ministers would remain in their respective positions. For his part, Bramuglia explained to the representatives of the press that the significance of his action should not be exaggerated and that he continued to support President Peron and his administration. 166 The resignation took on a more dramatic aspect when, as a result of the spirited exchange of words between Bramuglia and Remorino in front of Peron, the ambassador to Washington saw the offense as "a question of honor" and demanded either an apology or the opportunity to settle the matter with a duel. The seconds of both parties held a series of meetings at the Continental Hotel, at the end of which they issued a communique stating that the outgoing foreign minister "did not remember and could not exactly state the terms that in the long course of the same [three-way meeting] he might have pronounced, and that, in consequence, since those terms were lacking in offensive expression, he [Remorino] had no objection to dropping the matter." 167

The Third Position

There are many versions of the story of Bramuglia's ouster. In his direct, unsophisticated style, the railway leader Juan Rodrfguez explained it this way: Peron did not accept discussion or opposition. Even with Mercante he had friction, and Mercante was a very good friend of his. He also had problems with Castro, as well as with Juan Atilio Bramuglia, a man who promoted the country and increased its prestige in international conferences. He was an extraordinary figure, internationally known. All that upset him, or caused him some kind of psychic problem that I don't know, or mental, or I don't know what happened. But they opposed Per6n. 168

It is clear that many Peronists were rather perplexed by the foreign minister's resignation and were sorry to see him go. Bramuglia's successor, Hipolito Paz, recalls in his memoirs that on the day of his appointment he left the Casa de Gobierno and got into a taxi. I was sunk in thought. The driver's trembling voice pulled me back to the present: "Did you hear that Bramuglia resigned?" "So it seems," I answered evasively. "Let's pray that the next one is as good as he was!" the taxi driver entreated Providence anxiously. 169

Was it really Evita who wanted to get rid of Bramuglia, or was she, once again, merely an instrument in Peron's hands? Mercante's son tells of a visit he made with his father to the presidential villa in San Vicente, one Sunday toward the end of 1948. During a conversation between the Perons, Evita complained that Bramuglia was reluctant to follow the president's policy. "The latter, while beating the mayonnaise with his favorite oil, told her, 'Okay, skinny, don't be like that ... he's a good man, and don't forget that we need him ... The thing is, that he doesn't like you .. .' while he kept mixing his sauce." 170 The following day the First Lady gave the order to Apold and "from that moment the deepest silence prevailed in all the communication media concerning Bramuglia." The tendency to blame Evita may be related to the fact that many people perceive the trivial, but lose sight of the main issue. In this Rashomon-type story, involving so many testimonies that are sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory, another version should be mentioned as well. According to Raul Margueirat, by the end of 1948 Evita and Bramuglia had already made peace with each other. Upon his return from Europe, the foreign minister-angered at the boycott practiced against him by the Buenos Aires press, which was controlled by the former actress-did not want to continue in his position. Evita then called Margueirat, saying, "Look, Bramuglia is ready to resign, you have to fight for him not to do it." 171 Margueirat arranged a meeting

The Third Position

between the First Lady and the foreign minister, after which they both went their own ways without friction, "despite Subiza's intrigues and all the garbage in the government." Bramuglia's resignation, according to Margueirat, was caused by the machinations of this "terrible guy, that proper bastard, Remorino," who traveled from Washington to Buenos Aires, and "in combination with Admiral [Guillermo] Plater and [Oscar] Nicolini made Peron believe that Bramuglia had told Marshall that the future president of the Republic was going to be him, Bramuglia. That was the intrigue set up by that brazen jerk and he did it thinking that Peron was going to appoint him minister, because he was a swellhead." 172 In the meeting between the three-Peron, Bramuglia, and Remorinothe foreign minister "reacted and swore at Remorino in front of Peron, that was unacceptable to Peron." This time, too, said Margueirat, Evita tried to prevent Bramuglia's resignation, but it was already too late. Oscar Albrieu reinforced the hypothesis that some people in the Peronist leadership suspected that the Americans were trying to promote Bramuglia as a presidential candidate in the next elections (before the constitutional reform that opened the way to Peron's reelection), or that at least they encouraged him to express his reservations concerning the president. 173 This suspicion triggered a nationalistic response in some officials, who became involved in the campaign to oust Bramuglia on the pretext of defending national sovereignty. Off the record, foreign diplomats reacted with clear dismay. Peron had lost "the best collaborator he had," said some, and others bemoaned the ouster of Bramuglia, a politician of unimpeachable honesty. 174 An article published in the London weekly Economist reflected these feelings: The resignation of Senor Juan Bramuglia, Argentina's Foreign Minister, hasat least temporarily-removed the country's most widely respected statesman from the political scene. By all accounts the hard core of supporters round President and Senora Peron had been determined to get rid of him for some time. But the circumstances in which they have now done so have given foreign observers yet another argument for distrusting the personal and fractious nature of Argentina's present nationalistic mood. For three years Senor Bramuglia has represented a stable, common-sense attitude in a country subject to swift and hot-tempered change. Abroad, he will be remembered for his distinguished and dignified presidency of the United Nations Security Council last autumn. At home, his resignation represents to some extent a tit for tat over the part he played in ousting Senor Miranda from his aggressive and unfortunate control of Argentine economic affairs last January. 175

In the following days a flood of letters was delivered to the outgoing minister's residence at 1682 Juncal Street-letters that reflected the pain caused by his removal and the esteem in which he was held for his

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53

achievements and his personality. The signatories included Peronists (among them senators, official functionaries, and party activists) and anti-Peronists (such as General Eduardo Lonardi); foreign diplomats (such as the British ambassador in Buenos Aires, John Balfour) and other Argentine diplomats who were not afraid to support him; foreign journalists {such as Milton Bracker of the New York Times); university teachers; and inhabitants of Chascomus, the town of his birth. Several of the Peronist letter writers emphasized, "You are still the first civilian standard-bearer of the true revolution." 176 In an interview with the American historian Robert J. Alexander in July 1956, almost a year after Peron's overthrow, Bramuglia declared that during his stay in Paris he had known that the Peronist press was avoiding mention of his name and that this was one factor that led him to resign. From his perspective, his resignation was the culmination of a process of gradual alienation from the regime-a process that had begun with the elimination of the Labor Party and the intervention in the unions and had intensified with the restrictions on freedom of the press and expression and the intrigues in high places. He also maintained that he had resigned four times before his altercation with Ambassador Jeronimo Remorino finally convinced the president to accept his resignation. 177 Seen in perspective, in the Argentine history written by Peronists and anti-Peronists, leftists, centrists, or rightists, Bramuglia's administration was praised as "a model of mediation," exemplifying the Argentine ability to play an active and important role in the international arena, and demonstrating the possibility of maintaining an independent foreign policy. Apparently Hipolito ("Tuco") Paz won Bramuglia's job by mistake. In fact, Peron had been interested in appointing his father or his brother as foreign minister, 178 but the head of the Casa Militar {presidential guard) accidentally called Tuco instead. Paz himself says in his memoirs-in his usual dispassionate tone-that when I went in to the meeting, I saw Peron make a slight gesture of surprise. Afterwards I thought it was just my impression, and forgot it. Only years later did I discover the explanation. In an article that my friend the historian Enrique Pavon Pereyra wrote about [Peron] in exile and which appeared in one of his books, he asked [Peron] his opinion of some of his collaborators. My name came up. Then Peron answered: 'I met Dr. Paz by mistake, but I would have committed the greatest of mistakes had I not met him.' Perhaps on that occasion he had expected to meet another person with the same surname. Who? I don't know. 179

Before ending this chapter, I will stress one of my contentions concerning Bramuglia's eclipse. American diplomacy, through Ambassadors

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Messersmith and Bruce, tried throughout the years 1946-49 to weaken those they considered "extremists" in the Argentine government, notably Miranda, Castro, and Evita. At the same time, they worked to promote "moderates" such as Bramuglia. If this was indeed their intention, then the State Department failed once more in its policy on Argentina. Miranda-supposedly the great "obstacle" to the improvement of relations between Washington and Buenos Aires-was indeed removed in January 1949. On the other hand, a few months later Bramuglia too was forced to leave his ministerial post. In early January 1949, Bruce sent a report to Washington in which he evaluated the relations between the two countries and discussed Bramuglia and his political situation at length: Bramuglia added greatly to his own prestige and to that of Argentina by his statesman-like actions at the recent United Nations meeting in Paris. Obviously under orders from the Presidency, the local pro-Peron press carefully refrained from any mention of Bramuglia, to the point of appearing childish. No sooner had Bramuglia returned to Argentina from the United States than Evita demanded his head. Bramuglia's success at Paris and his visit to Washington was clearly too much for Evita to swallow without protest. It is reliably reported that Peron and others prevailed on her not to demand Bramuglia's resignation and she agreed to let it go for three or four months. Bramuglia runs the Foreign Office without her help and it is generally thought that he opposed her trip to Europe in 1947, and at least failed to help in plans for getting her invited to Washington. Bramuglia is head and shoulders above anyone else in the present administration and he is the only one who has anything like a reasonable outlook on foreign affairs. He has the respect of most Argentines and his departure from the Cabinet probably would place the administration in real danger of being overthrown. While the military elements are not known to be strong partisans of Bramuglia, they hate Miranda and Maroglio and look upon Bramuglia as the one honest and outstanding member of the Cabinet. Bramuglia is the only Cabinet member who can be said to enjoy widespread esteem. 180

U.S. diplomats did everything they could to oust Miranda, but very little to strengthen Bramuglia's position in the Argentine government. At the beginning of 1949, after Miranda's fall from favor, it was clear that the continuing lack of dollars would weaken the foreign minister, whom they had led to believe that the United States would back his politicalline once Miranda was out of the way. 181 In this period, Bramuglia's position and influence within the Peronist leadership depended on his capacity to convince the authorities in Washington to cease their economic pressure on Argentina. This did not happen, however, and Bramuglia had to step aside. According to MacDonald, the fear in the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires was that Bramuglia's inability to produce dollars had

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55

caused his fail-a fear that led Bruce to approach Peron to express his government's trust in the Argentine foreign minister and to ask him to retain him in the cabinet. It was already too late, however, and Peron refused to reconsider his decision. 182 Thus, Bramuglia was one of the victims of the United States' failed policy in Argentina in the second half of the 1940s, a policy that was characterized by numerous internal conflicts and constant ups and downs. Bruce himself had to acknowledge that "during recent years our policy towards Argentina has undergone so many changes-some of them in the form of a violent about-face-that it has been impossible for the wisest of our own people, much less for Argentines, to know just where we stood." 183

CHAPTER FOUR

The First "Peronism Without Peron" Bramuglia and the Union Popular

~

•

Considering that Juan Bramuglia presented his resignation several times during the years 1946-49, it would be fair to say that there was no one particular reason for his decision. The conflict with Remorino and even his differences with Evita were no more than the latest episodes in his struggle to prevent the populist reform movement that he had supported since 1943 from metamorphosing into an arbitrary, authoritarian government given to unproductive, nationalistic whims. As a reporter in the Argentine press put it some years later, "He resigned because of incompatibility with certain proceedings that began to govern all aspects of Argentine life." 1 Notable among the few well-informed works on Argentina published outside the country during Peron's presidency is Peron's Argentina, in which the author, George Blanksten, remarked that it was not easy to get rid of Bramuglia, whose ouster contributed to the growing unrest among the railroad workers. 2 When Mercante and Bramuglia-considered heroes by many in that sector since 1943-were ejected from the Peronist leadership (although Mercante continued to serve as governor of the province of Buenos Aires), the railway workers felt disillusioned and, in some cases, even betrayed by the government. Trying to eradicate the influence of both leaders in the unions, the regime replaced their partisans with people more loyal to Evita, Borlenghi, or other Peronist leaders. 3 This process fanned the flames of union discontent and significantly contributed to the atmosphere in which the major railroad strikes of 1950-51 developed. The wages of these workers, traditionally among the highest, began to decline after the sector was nationalized in 1948. To save on costs, the state, as the new employer, fired several thousand workers. In 1950 a series of strikes began, directed by dissident leaders. What began

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as a protest by laborers, wrote the Communist leader Rubens Iscaro-a historical icon in the syndical world-turned into a struggle by the entire union for social and economic rights, and for the democratization and

independence of the UF. 4 Thus, these strikes represented a great challenge to the regime, which reacted with an iron hand but ultimately yielded to the workers' wage demands. No further information is available to link the ouster of Bramuglia and Mercante with the alienation and strikes of the railroad workers, but some sources mention the Buenos Aires governor's supposed influence on these protests. The American historian Samuel Baily, echoing Blanksten's remarks, says: There is some evidence that others too were involved in the strike. Domingo Mercante, Juan Bramuglia, and Juan Castro all disliked Evita and her disciple [the new secretary-general of the Union Ferroviaria] Pablo Lopez and therefore may have supported or even joined with the opposition to embarrass both. Domingo Mercante, as governor of the province of Buenos Aires, where most of the activity took place, could have minimized the extent of the strike, but did nothing at all to stop it. Juan A. Bramuglia made more than his usual number of visits to Mercante during the period of the strikes. And Minister of Transportation Juan Castro dealt with the extra-legal Emergency Committee that obviously threatened Pablo Lopez's position of leadership and his control over the union. 5

Buenos Aires was seething with rumors following the foreign minister's resignation: that other cabinet members would follow his example, that Bramuglia would be appointed ambassador to Santiago de Chile in accordance with Peron's desire to keep him away from the Argentine capital, that the armed forces would turn against the regime, and much more. None of these scenarios actually occurred. However, one rumor that persisted-despite its failure to materialize-should be mentioned: Throughout 1950, political, journalistic, and diplomatic circles debated the possibility that Bramuglia would be Peron's main opponent in the presidential elections scheduled for 1951. 6 For example, in March 1950, Yaacov Tsur, the Israeli ambassador to Argentina, sent a report to his superiors in Jerusalem analyzing potential developments in the Peronist regime. One possibility mentioned was a political alliance between the Radical Party, socially conscious military sectors, and "progressive [elements] within the Peronist Party, gathered around the figure of Bramuglia" as an alternative to Peron? At that time, Mercante, who was seen as another justicialist opposing the Uder, was also weighing the possibility of running against Peron. Apparently Mercante, like Bramuglia, negotiated with the Radical leader Ricardo Balbfn, offering him the leading spot on a joint ticket with the

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provincial governor in the 1951 elections. This formula would have been supported by Bramuglia, who was hoping to return to the ministry of foreign affairs. However, Mercante's offer was rejected. In Balbfn's view, no one who had collaborated with Peron could be considered a legitimate political actor, and he preferred an all-Radical ticket. 8 It hardly needs to be said that an alliance between the Radicals and the dissident Peronists could have changed the course of Argentine political history. In any case, in 1951, when the professors at the law faculty of the University of Buenos Aires were pressured to sign a petition asking Peron to run for reelection, Bramuglia was the only one who refused, to the great dismay of the dean of his faculty. 9 Once Peron was reelected by an overwhelming majority, Bramuglia meticulously calculated his steps. He did not want to leave the Peronist movement, and he tried several times to mend fences with the president. Throughout 19 54 he kept trying to make an appointment with Peron, but his request was always refused with some polite excuse, whether a full agenda or a mild illness. 10 In the meantime, Bramuglia continued to send the president various books and to tell him about his own trips abroad.U A few days after the outbreak of the conflict between Peron and the Church, Bramuglia sent him a copy of The Divine Comedy as a birthday gift.U Nonetheless, the ex-foreign minister remained under a permanent cloud of suspicion. Now the regime feared a possible conspiracy involving the Catholic sectors and part of the armed forces, led by Bramuglia. Bramuglia himself was quick to deny this accusation, calling it "absurd and unjust" and "an infamous calumny." In a letter to Peron, Bramuglia asserted "categorically, on my word of honor," that he had no personal connection with bishops, priests, or any ecclesiastic or civil organization related to the Church: "I have many Catholic friends, and although I am not observant, I myself am a Catholic; but never under any circumstances have I talked or exchanged views about actions deleterious to our movement, and although many sectors of opinion have implicitly asked me to do this, I have always rejected them indignantly, decisively, and energetically, because our movement is part of my own soul." 13 This time the Lider did not delay his response. In his letter he feigned surprise that the ex-foreign minister had been told that he, Peron, had accused Bramuglia of being one of those mobilizing the Catholic sectors. After refuting this very explicitly, he wrote, "You can be certain that if anyone had said it in my presence, I would not have believed it. I know people, and I don't think I easily make mistakes in evaluating their conduct. You can relax and stop worrying about this." 14 More than once Bramuglia declared his loyalty, which he retained "although I have been repeatedly wronged for absolutely no reason by

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spongers and scoundrels, who abound in our movement as in all the movements in the world." To show how faithful he was, in a letter to Peron he declared his support for the controversial UES, the organization that had exposed the president to so much criticismY In this letter not only did he express his desire to contribute a thousand pesos a month from his income as a law professor, but he also enclosed a check for twelve thousand pesos, the total sum for the year 1955/ 6 and promised a similar donation in the following years. These gestures of solidarity did bring some material benefits for Bramuglia. In March 1955, for example, Peron allocated him a carY Apparently, however, it was not the model the ex-foreign minister had hoped for: "It's a small European car, whereas I am used to American cars. It seems okay and I suppose that I will get used to driving it." 18 In any case, as the conflict between Peron and the Church became increasingly acute, various nationalist and military figures consulted Bramuglia, telling him about their plans to overthrow the regime. In July 1956, Bramuglia told the American historian Robert Alexander that since his resignation seven years earlier he had been subjected to police surveillance and had participated in a plot against Peron, which was why he had been arrested in the aftermath of the September 16 military coup. Indeed, as soon as the secret services found out about the uprising that ended up removing Peron from the presidency, Bramuglia was tagged as a possible civilian ringleader. 19 Years later Oscar Albrieu, who had been interior minister at the time, explained, Bramuglia was a prisoner for half a day. That is, he was arrested at a meeting that he was attending with these nationalists who actually were in the plot ... But when they told me ... they had also arrested Frondizi ... , I told them to let him [Bramuglia] go. That is, it was not a civilian problem. It was a military problem. Of the forces that were loyal, everything these guys were doing had no point. It had no importance. Not the civilian commandos, or any of that. 20

THE LIBERATING REVOLUTION

A short time after Peron's overthrow in September 1955, the Justicialist Party was banned and its activity declared illegal. Nonetheless, the deposed general's mass following was still good political capital, an electoral resource that was a magnet for both union leaders and politicians. Different individuals who had at one time or another belonged to the Peronist camp nourished the hope of taking advantage of Peron's geographic exile from the Argentine political arena, imposed by the

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country's new military rulers, to launch independent political careers of their own. Such an ambition would have been impossible as long as the charismatic leader held the reins, but it seemed viable in the new

political situation. These circumstances, constituting a process that sociologists term "the dispersion of charisma," help explain the emergence of various neo-Peronist parties in the wake of the self-styled Liberating Revolution. 21 The first, most important, and most enduring of these parties was the Union Popular (UP, Popular Union), headed by Bramuglia himself. The UP claimed to be the heir of Peronism and fought to uphold the movement's original social messages independently of the charismatic leadership of the man so many admired and adored-and so many others rejected and vilified. This chapter and the next analyze the UP's characteristics and activity from its inception, as well as the reasons why, in the period up to Bramuglia's death in September 1962, it never managed to mount a successful challenge to the exiled Peron. My own research indicates several possible explanations for the UP's failure to construct a solid party base and to remodel the Peronist identity. To begin with, from exile (wherever that happened to be, up to his final refuge in Madrid in 1960) Peron directed a systematic campaign aimed at torpedoing Bramuglia's efforts to build an independent party. Peron was still an object of admiration and loyalty to many of his followers, who, impelled by a nascent idealization of "the lost golden age" (1946-55), continued to obey the exiled leader's instructions as to how they should vote in Argentina's various elections. Second, the UP was institutionally weak. As a party, it did not manage to construct a vital central bureaucratic apparatus, or any substantial network of branches or delegations in the interior of the country. 22 Consequently, its efforts to obtain adequate material resources were not fruitful. Third, the UP failed in its attempt to win popular support, particularly among the unions, which had always played a major role in the Peronist movement, overshadowing the actual party apparatus. The documentation I examined gives the impression that Bramuglia underestimated the Peronists' ability to maintain their hegemony in the unions under the rule of the military dictatorship of the Liberating Revolution. This miscalculation is even more notable if we take into account the fact that the English Labour Party, with its social-democratic ideals and its close ties with the unions, was, to a certain extent, Bramuglia's model. Other explanations for the UP's political failure derive from the chronic fragmentation and internal conflict that worked against the Peronist movement, particularly because Peron encouraged other elements in the

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movement and the unions, whose position might have been weakened in the event of Bramuglia's success. 23 Last but not least is the fact that the Argentine elites were clearly suspicious of any party that waved the banner of social reform. Moreover, part of the top brass of the armed forces adopted, in the climate of the Cold War-in which they considered themselves active participants on one of its fronts-an intransigent attitude that saw reformist populism as the pathway to revolutionary socialism. 24 Military officers showed hostility toward this neo-Peronist partisan experiment, in which they glimpsed a potential threat to the existing social and political order-even though Bramuglia's anticommunist views should have ruled out any theories of this sort. The successive governments of the Argentine Republic, especially those of the Liberating Revolution, were not able to create the legal and political conditions that would have permitted the development of neoPeronism as an institutionalized, democratic channel for the wishes of broad sectors of the population. The UP could have offered an outlet for those officers who opposed the legalization of the Peronist Party and the return of Peron but realized that they could not exclude from the political arena the very large numbers of people who supported Peronism. In my view, a dynamic UP presence in the second half of the 1950s could have helped strengthen and stabilize a democratic political system in Argentina. Bramuglia wanted to remodel the Peronist identity and convert the movement into an institutionalized party that respected the rules of democracy and the electoral process. Peron, as we know, was never interested in a strong, institutionalized party, not even when he was in power-whether because of ideological reasons and his own leadership style, or because he feared the party might become a base that potential rivals in the party organization could use to their advantage. Bramuglia himself, in an interview in July 1956 with historian Robert Alexander, maintained that a true Peronist party never existed. The so-called Peronist Party was a governmental-state apparatus set up by Peron, but it had no active life of its own, nor any support base at all. 25 Bramuglia proposed an alternative path for Peronism-one that has not received the attention it deserves from researchers. His political project reflected a trend within Peronism that favored the movement's integration into the political system. It is not surprising that most history writers have focused on the Peronist trend that was hostile to the system and that fought for political and cultural hegemony. The history of Peronism was written largely from the perspective of the winners within the movement, which in this case were Peron and the "hardliners"; this has to some extent obscured currents and tendencies that

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worked in other directions. Unavoidably, in their drive to demonize justicialism, anti-Peronist historians adopted the same focus, joining the Peronist disciples who sought to glorify the movement. Both groups disregarded, or at least underestimated, the value of the "soft," pragmatic line of Peronism. Many historians, as well as Argentine politicians, apparently preferred to discuss the more extreme alternatives and "heroic struggles." They betrayed a certain disdain for, or simply ignored, those individuals who tried to take a pragmatic approach; who saw politics as the art of the possible; who sought to improve, even if only minimally, the condition of millions of citizens on earth; and who were willing to postpone to the more distant future the prophecies of a new world. Marfa Fernanda Arias, in a pioneering study of the UP, posits five stages to describe the political life of this group from its creation up to Peronism's return to power in the 1970s. 26 This chapter analyzes the first stage, "rebellion," up to the national elections of February 1958.

TOWARD A NEW PERONIST IDENTITY

Peron's overthrow seemingly marked the end of a chapter in Argentine history, along with the end of Peron's political career. The ex-president found refuge in a Paraguayan gunboat anchored in the port of Buenos Aires, thus beginning an exile that would last for eighteen years and would include various stops in Latin America until he settled down permanently in Franco's Spain. General Eduardo Lonardi became the new tenant of the Casa Rosada. Adopting Urquiza's peacemaking slogan-"ni vencedores, ni vencidos" ("neither victors nor vanquished")-he hoped to form a renewed alliance among the nationalist groups, his colleagues in uniform, and the working class, as Peron had done in the 1940s. Peron's followers would have a place in this alliance, but the exiled general himself would not. Once the new regime had been instituted, Bramuglia established contact with General Lonardi, who was trying to gain the support of at least some of the Peronist camp. Although Lonardi criticized the government he had deposed, at the same time he left the CGT in Peronist hands and did not seem inclined to make any changes in Peron's social and labor legislation. He also allowed the Peronist Party to reorganize. 27 Lonardi had known Bramuglia for several years and held him in high regard. When Bramuglia resigned his position as minister of foreign relations, the general lamented, "For my part, I feel very particularly that the country has been deprived of the services of a minister who adds to his ex-

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qui site gentlemanliness a rigorous sense of the dignity of his position and an exceptional ability to bring honor to our Nation so distinctively." 28 Different people, including Bramuglia himself and Juan Carlos Goyeneche, Lonardi's press and cultural secretary, have testified that the new president intended to appoint him as minister of labor, a portfolio Bramuglia had desired back in 1946, when Peron made him foreign minister. The labor ministry played a central role in Lonardi's shortlived political project of national reconciliation. However, the resistance of those leaders of the Liberating Revolution most hostile to Peronism proved more powerful, and Lonardi had to give up this idea. 29 Raul Desmaras said in an interview that his father, Carlos, who had worked with Bramuglia first at the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, and then at the foreign ministry until 1949, was invited by Lonardi, together with the ex-minister, to Government House, where the provisional president explained to them his preferences and priorities for the position of minister of labor and welfare; he was considering Bramuglia, Cerruti Costa, and Desmaras. According to this version, it was Bramuglia who declined the post, because he had "other political aspirations." 30 The post was finally given to the nationalist lawyer Luis Cerruti Costa, legal advisor to the Union Obrera Metalurgica (Metal Workers' Union) and a labor-ministry official in Peron's government. His policy would be one of the main points of friction with the anti-Peronist sectors. Bramuglia obviously did have high ambitions; just as he had done with Peron a decade earlier, he first sounded out the possibility of forming an alliance with one of the more prominent figures of the Radical Party, a party that represented primarily the urban middle class. Juan Raul Pichetto, a civil magistrate and personal friend of Bramuglia, told the attache for labor and union affairs at the U.S. embassy about Bramuglia's efforts to promote his presidential prospects. According to Pichetto, Bramuglia's plan was to organize a political party of his own-since the Radical leader, Frondizi, had flatly rejected his offer of a joint ticket. 31 It should be emphasized that Bramuglia's attitude was not unusual and that, contrary to general belief, many Peronists were quite willing to cooperate with the new government. The president of the Peronist Party, Alejandro Leloir, sent a telegram to Lonardi that ended, "May God enlighten your peaceful guidance so that the motto 'neither victors nor vanquished' may come true." 32 The secretary-general of the CGT, Hugo Di Pietro, took a pragmatic approach and resigned a few days later. The textile workers' leader, Andres Framini, and the leader of the light and power workers, Luis Natalini, both acceptable to the government, were chosen to lead the trade union confederation. Even John William Cooke,

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future critic of Bramuglia, the UP, and the "soft line" in general, avoided an overly "tough" stance in those days. 33 Carlos Bramuglia explains that his father maintained a firm friendship with Lonardi, dating back to Bramuglia's days as the head of Argentine diplomacy, and that the elder Bramuglia was "very resentful" of Peronism, which had been closing every door to him since 1949. 34 In any case, he realized immediately that the new government would not oppose his plan to create a political framework that would be a "Peronism without Per6n." 35 Accordingly, during Lonardi's presidency, Bramuglia rejected Alejandro Leloir's offer to join the Consejo Superior (national council) of the Peronist Party. However, on November 13, a bare fifty-one days after assuming the presidency, Lonardi was deposed by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, who took a much more intransigent line, promising to "suppress every vestige of totalitarianism." Aramburu was manifestly hostile to the idea of reincorporating Peronism into political life in any way. It was a chaotic period for Argentina in general, and for the Peronist movement in particular. Tens of thousands of justicialist political and unionist activists were persecuted and arrested. The armed forces purged presumed sympathiers of the deposed regime from their ranks. The use of Peronist symbols, concepts, and slogans was prohibited. The party was outlawed, and the government intervened in the CGT. However, these efforts at forcible de-Peronization produced the opposite of the reaction hoped for-namely, a "re-Peronization." Without leadership from above, almost spontaneously, civilian resistance began: strikes, graffiti, and various kinds of sabotage. Realizing that he still had great influence in the country, Peron encouraged his followers to adopt tactics of urban terrorism in order to undermine the military regime. 36 Aramburu's government was also suspicious of Juan Bramuglia. Bramuglia's son Carlos tells how, shortly after Lonardi's ouster, the paternal home was raided and the police detained the ex-foreign minister. "I didn't know where he was, and finally I found him at the police station, playing cards with the police superintendent and officers, and eating barbecue." 37 The magazine Ahora accused the elder Bramuglia of "participation in an alleged anti-revolutionary act of conspiracy" 38 and published his Juncal Street address and his telephone number, an act that resulted in more than a few offensive calls to his home. Bramuglia denied the charge immediately, calling it a lie or at least an error based on false information: "It is true that I was detained for a few hours, and it is also true that I was ordered released without any interrogation and that the authorities declared that a regrettable mistake had been made." 39 In a letter to the editors of the local dailies, Bramuglia complained that

Bramuglia and the Union Popular "for long years I have been dogged by slander," and called for the creation in Argentina of a political culture that would reflect clear ideas on government and that would develop in an atmosphere of liberty and democracy. In the course of efforts to denigrate collaborators of the deposed regime, a story was leaked to the press that the investigating committee operating in the parliament building had found evidence that implicated the ex-governor of Buenos Aires province, Domingo A. Mercante, and his sons, as well as the former Buenos Aires interventor and ex-foreign minister Bramuglia, in fraudulent activities. According to this information, Bramuglia had, in the course of his duties as legal advisor to the UF, appropriated certain sums when paying out railroad union benefits, such as payment for workers' accidental death, total incapacitation, or partial incapacitation. He executed this fraudulent maneuver-again, according to the information published in, for example, the daily Democracia, which was now controlled by the Radicals-by having the widows or other beneficiaries sign a blank document and then writing, in his own hand, the amounts those beneficiaries would receive. In these cases he would have greater sums disbursed than were due to them, keeping the difference. 40 Bramuglia was also said to be implicated in various shady deals together with members of the now defunct executive board of the UF. 41 In reality, all this was an effort to recycle the accusations made and later retracted by Captain Raul Puyol, whom the June 1943 military government had appointed as interventor in the UF (see Chapter 2). Bramuglia now began firing off letters to the different Buenos Aires dailies and publishing paid notices that described these accusations as "a typical expression of moral baseness, and especially of falseness," and "a defamatory conspiracy." 42 A few weeks later, La Prensa, now returned to the control of the Gainza Paz family, informed its readers of new legal actions and accusations against Bramuglia, this time for supposedly having signed decrees as foreign minister that appointed eight neighbors from his home town of Chascomus to fictitious positions for which they received salaries. 43 However that may be, a month into the new government Aramburu showed signs of abandoning his original idea of preventing the establishment of a partisan framework led by Bramuglia. Thus, in December 1955, the UP was created, in the hopes of inheriting Peron's political legacy and capturing the votes of his followers in the upcoming elections. In the words of the daily El Mundo, Bramuglia wanted to "bury the body and appropriate the coffin." 44 The first name he had considered was Partido Radical-Laborista (Radical Labor Party), but the historic

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leader of the Labor Party, Cipriano Reyes, came forward with a group of supporters to claim the name of Laborists for themselves. The next name considered was Partido Popular (Popular Party), but since its initials were P.P. (like the prohibited Peronist Party), ultimately the choice fell on the name Union Popular. The small group of UP founders included various ex-Radicals (among others, Cesar Guillot and Bernardino Horne); many former officials and diplomats from the foreign ministry (such as Atilio Garda Mellid, Enrique Corominas, Carlos R. Desmaras, Pascual La Rosa, Pedro Radio, Zohar Ramon del Campo, Benito Llambf, and Eduardo Colombres Marmol); a few workers known for their political activism (Luis Girola, Telmo Luna, and Alcides Montiel 45 ); an ex-judge, Enrique Aftalion; a city official, Raul Salinas; and others. 46 Most of these people did not have much political influence or prestige, although this could also be seen as an advantage, since it guaranteed Bramuglia's position as indisputable leader of the new party. In statements to the press a few weeks later in Montevideo, Bramuglia explained that the new party was the initiative of a group of "friends."47 Indeed, the main characteristic of the group that founded the UP-and this may be typical of Argentine politics in general-was not necessarily a clear ideological common denominator as much as the fact that most of the founders were linked by long-established personal bonds of friendship and loyalty. The founding members had been associated with Bramuglia for many years, in some cases since the 1930s, and at least since the emergence of Peronism in the mid-1940s. According to Rodolfo Tecera del Franco, the secretary-general and one of the party's most prominent leaders throughout the 196os, the UP was created as a sort of shelter where Peronists could take refuge during the time that their party was outlawed. 48 In practice, the objectives went much further. Bramuglia was among the first to realize the futility of the Peronist resistance and the need to rise to the challenge of an institutionalized political system. In mid-December, after a forty-minute interview with Aramburu, he informed journalists, "The provisional president has given me every assurance that the new political party I will head will be able to act without impediment." 49 On this occasion, he asked the president to abolish the restrictive statute governing political parties, but could not get him to make any promises in the matter. It is not surprising that Peron, in exile in Panama from November 1955 to August 1956, and subsequently in Venezuela, should have been angry upon learning of the "traitorous" step that Bramuglia-without consulting him first-had taken in what Peron saw as an effort to supplant him. Under such circumstances, Peron had trouble accepting the

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military regime's connivance in the activities of neo-Peronist parties. The UP was particularly problematic for the exiled general, because it was led by none other than Juan Atilio Bramuglia, the same man who had been at his side in the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare and who had helped build the Peronist coalition that won the elections of February 1946-and the same man who, after a very successful performance as foreign minister in Peron's first government, had been deemed a political threat and accordingly expelled from the Peronist leadership in 1949. The UP had been in existence for only a few weeks when, in January 1956, Peron began to tell his followers to expose and repudiate "the traitors to our movement" -that is, those Peronist leaders who were trying to create new parties. 50 Ideologically, the newborn Union Popular adopted a progressive social program that reflected Bramuglia's Socialist Party origins and the Peronist base of the UP, together with conservative, anticommunist views-all seasoned with a dash of nationalist rhetoric. 51 This combination must have been attractive to wide sectors of the population, nonPeronist as well as Peronist. The party's political platform advocated accelerated industrialization, especially in industries based on local raw materials, together with a more equitable distribution of the national income and the formation of a fourth estate representing socioeconomic interests: a labor chamber including both employers and workers. It also included a vague promise to pursue agrarian reform, or at least to encourage a cooperativist movement in agriculture. An additional factor that may have increased the party's appeal was Bramuglia's personal prestige; on one hand, he was seen as someone who identified with Peronism, but, on the other hand, he had opposed the movement's demagogic tendencies, Peron's personality cult, and the increasing authoritarianism of the regime during the first half of the 1950s. To distance himself from Peronist demagogy, Bramuglia now emphasized that the changes in the unions had not begun in 1943, but many years earlier .52 The new party was therefore calling for implementation of social benefits, the Peronist labor legislation, and a unified syndicalism. At the same time, it championed harmony and peace, liberty and democracy, "redeeming the deeper meaning of these terms so that they cease to be tools of injustice by which to defraud the will of the people-tools that the exploitative oligarchies and the antipopular ideological minorities wield with such duplicity." 53 Thus, the UP waved the banner of justicialism but rejected Peron's hard line and sought ways of reintegrating Peronism in the political system, while trying to adjust to the limitations imposed on it by Aramburu. 54

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According to a columnist writing at the time, "[Bramuglia's] electoral platform is bound to please everyone: workers and bosses, industrialists and farmers, householders and the armed forces, and, especially, the middle class, for whom he is requesting a special protective statute." 55 Bramuglia had indeed once said, "Let's not forget that our country is 30% manual laborers; the rest, almost 6o%, is made up of the middle class, the suffering and forgotten middle class of our homeland." 56 The U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires followed Bramuglia's initiatives with great interest, considering him a key political figure at the time: Clearly, Bramuglia is an adversary to be feared by the established Argentine political parties. Linked with the earlier, "fresher" days of Peronismo and free from the stigma of association with its final collapse and exposure; aided by the prestige of his reputation as a diplomatic prodigy as the result of his capable handling of the Berlin Blockade problem while President of the UN General Assembly; comparatively young (53), energetic, and intelligent, and personally and professionally endowed to appeal to middle-class as well as lower-class supportBramuglia would seem to be the logical choice to attempt to lead what remains of the Peronista Party out of the political wilderness. 57

It is hardly surprising, then, that the creation of the UP aroused great interest in the Argentine political system and enjoyed extensive coverage in the media. Some members of the press approved of the new party and described Bramuglia's patience in waiting for Peron's downfall as a virtue "that he perhaps acquired as a fisherman on the shores of the Chascomus lake." El Mundo was the most positive, stressing the rupture in the relations between Bramuglia and Peron since the late 1940s: "Now, after that very long ostracism imposed by the members of his own party whom he had served with such dedication, he is returning to party activity. Welcome, because he is an intelligent man." 58 In marked contrast, La Epoca, which under the Liberating Revolution moved from Peronist to Socialist control, expressed its reservations about Bramuglia's political plans. After all, the Socialists, of all the traditional political parties, were the most relentless critics of anything reminiscent of Peronism. In a series of unsigned articles and mocking caricatures, the daily proclaimed its regret that "the ex-leader of the defeated regime" had not chosen to remain silent, "in the secret hope for the attendant oblivion." La Epoca warned readers not to be taken in by that "Saint John the Baptist back from the desert," who had in fact been one of Peron's associates, a full partner in the disgraceful past, who had lost his place in the Peronist leadership unwillingly, continuing up to the last moment to nourish the hope that he would return to Peron's government. 59 A week later, the daily returned to the attack: "But if he

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insists on continuing his political acrobatics with the help of a few displaced [comrades], official good sense and popular ridicule will set him straight. 'Look around and wake up,' Dr. Bramuglia." 60 La Epoca (as well as the Socialist weekly La Vanguardia) seemed to be conducting a veritable crusade against Bramuglia, who at the same time was having to deal with attacks from the Peronist hardliners. It was this daily paper that first disclosed the documents indicating, for example, that in March 1955 Bramuglia had received a car on Peron's instructions. Although the ex-foreign minister was disappointed that it was only a Fiat rather than a Mercury or a Cadillac, La Epoca jeered, he still sent a thank-you letter to the president and even donated a thousand pesos to the UES. 61 The newspaper's conclusion was categorical: "Saviors like Mr. Bramuglia are doomed. His record is his tombstone. The provisional government must block his ambitions in order to safeguard the moral and political health of the Nation." In contrast, Mayoria, a magazine characterized by a mix of ideas from the left and the right and which advocated the formation of a "national, popular movement," expressed its support, at least during the 1956-58 period, for the principal neo-Peronist party, Bramuglia's UP. 62 Given the magazine's enormous popularity and increased circulation following the publication of "Operaci6n Masacre," Rodolfo Walsh's feature on the bloody repression of June 1956, Mayoria's clear support for Bramuglia was highly significant and caused concern among the hardline Peronist militants.

THE PATH OF ABSTENTION

During the first half of 19 56, political polarization intensified, a situation likely to make Bramuglia's efforts to establish his party more difficult. This increased tension was apparent in March in a presidential decree that prohibited anyone who had held an elective or high appointive office on the national, provincial, or municipal level between 1946 and 1955 from running in the elections. Fearing that under these circumstances he would not be able to run for president of the nation, Bramuglia again tried to reach an understanding with Frondizi: Bramuglia would support him in the election campaign, and, if elected, Frondizi would give Bramuglia the job of minister of foreign relations. Frondizi, however, did not want to commit himself. 63 In June a group of pro-Peronist military officers led by Generals Juan Jose Valle and Raul Tanco attempted an uprising. The government

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discovered the plot at an early stage and had at least twenty-seven suspects shot without trial. 64 The hostility between the Peronist and antiPeronist camps flared up again. Although outlawing the Peronist Party proved relatively easy, Aramburu was unable to reduce the Peronists' influence in the unions. In this polarized atmosphere Bramuglia lauded democratic pluralism in statements to the magazine As{: "I will speak first of pacifying the country, because in every woman, every man, every family is the wish for peace, to be able to work and to shape the future of the country through a political culture that should be the responsibility of the political parties." 65 This statement contrasts sharply, in content and spirit, with the "Directivas generales para todos los peronistas" ("General Directives for All Peronists") that Peron would disseminate a few weeks later, and with the "Instrucciones generales para los dirigentes" ("General Instructions for Leaders") of July 1956. These two documents reflect a distinctly combative, intransigent attitude favoring a national insurrection, and lack any hint of self-criticism or stock taking, either on the personal level or in the name of the movement. 66 Peron described the representatives of the "soft line" pejoratively as "assenters," "defeatists," "peacemakers," and "traitors," whose views were "always inconclusive compromises" and who practiced "systematic fraud." 67 A major issue of the political struggle in the days of the Liberating Revolution and Frondizi's presidency was the position and social role of the Catholic Church. The debate centered on education in general and postsecondary education in particular. In this conflict, dubbed "laica o fibre" ("secular or free"), which hinged on the possibility of opening private universities alongside the national ones, Bramuglia stood up for free education. In the contemporary Argentine context, this meant approving the establishment of Catholic universities, because at the time only the Church had the economic resources and the institutional-educational infrastructure to set up new institutions of higher education. 68 Bramuglia's views on this issue did not stem from any deep religious conviction, 69 but were linked to his efforts to achieve national reconciliation. It was also his sophisticated, delicate way of emphasizing his disapproval of the last stages of Peron's regime, when it entered its destructive conflict with the Church. Accordingly, Bramuglia adopted the discourse of social Catholicism, a relic of the first years of Peronism, in order to acquire legitimacy in different social sectors, to stay on good terms with the Liberating Revolution, and to project a moderate image that would contrast with the extremism of Peronists like J. W. Cooke. The fact that he was surrounded by people with Catholic sensibilities, such as Atilio Garda Mellid and Francisco Anglada, also influenced him.

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The proscription of the Peronist Party created a void in which neoPeronist groups such as the UP could act. Between March and May of 1957, the UP obtained legal status as a political party in the federal capital, the province of Buenos Aires, and the interior of the country?0 The first time that the UP was called upon to test its strength at the polls was in the national elections for the constitutional convention (which was based on proportional representation) in July I957· The new party's decision to present candidates was an open challenge to Peron's leadership. After all, the task at hand was nothing less than choosing the body that would amend the national constitution of I949, which many saw as one of Peronism's most remarkable achievements. That Argentine Magna Carta included hitherto unheard-of social provisions that guaranteed workers' rights by making them constitutional rights. In addition, Bramuglia did not want to see the country return to the I853 constitution that had preceded the Peronist one, considering it to be excessively "individualist liberal," compared with the justicialist one, which was "organic liberal." 71 However, Bramuglia thought it was important to participate in these elections, because he realized that they would be the acid test of Peronism's survival as a movement. Because voting was obligatory and the Peronist Party had been outlawed, initially Peron opted for boycotting the event to express the party's repudiation of the military government and the elections. However, to avoid a greater anti-Peronist repression, he decided to order his followers to cast blank ballots. In the end, after considerable dithering and conflict in the party leadership, the UP did not participate in these elections. 72 Like Peron, the party advised its followers to cast blank ballots, to show that it did not recognize the legitimacy of a political system that denied Peronists the opportunity to participate in the electoral process?3 John William Cooke, whom Peron had appointed in November I956 as his representative and successor to the leadership of the Peronist movement in the event of his own decease, was, on May II, still telling his political boss that the UP and Bramuglia opposed the blank ballot tactic; 74 and, two weeks later, the UP was still negotiating with the authorities over radio spots for its electoral propaganda?5 However, at this point in the election preparations, the UP made its participation conditional on a change in the government's policy toward unions and political parties. At a meeting with President Aramburu and in its public statements, the national committee of the UP clarified its decision to participate in the political game at the same time that it was protesting against exclusions and disqualifications. In a statement issued on May 6, the UP explained its pragmatic attitude, saying, on one hand, "The past is just

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that: past ... From the past we retain the experiences, the wisdom, to persist in the successes and not repeat the mistakes"; on the other hand, it maintained that the government had not created the necessary conditions for a democratic electoral process. Tens of thousands of Argentines could not participate in the elections, thus "impoverishing electoral rolls that are meant to be a perfect expression of the electorate." The party complained that over three hundred thousand Argentines who had not been tried and who, consequently, had not been charged with any offense whatsoever, could not run for office or hold positions in the unions or state institutions; it also reminded public opinion that political prisoners were still in jail and that the state of siege had not been lifted. Consequently, explained the UP, if it was to be able to participate in the elections the government would first have to offer all Argentines legal equality and the freedom to lead their lives: "Let the Government lift the political and union disqualifications; grant a generous amnesty in the Armed Forces; release the political and union detainees who cannot be charged with any offense other than firmly maintaining their civic beliefs." 76 The government's refusal to consider these demands and the pressure exerted by different Peronist sectors did not leave the UP many options. When the election was less than a month away, the UP leaders accepted the inevitable. In a manifesto published in the city of Santa Fe during the first national convention of party representatives, they announced their decision not to take part in the national elections for the constitutional convention, and they called on members, affiliates, and sympathizers to cast blank votes: Against that national attitude held by some parties and by the government itself, which invokes minority arguments and the circumstantial power that offers the Argentine mind only two possible courses-electoral fraud by participating in the elections, or civic legality through an abstentionism that refuses to validate irregularities-the position of the Union Popular party cannot be other than what it has chosen: to guarantee, by rejecting the violation of moral and civic norms, the future possibility of a free, just, and civilized coexistence. 77

In a speech given on July 20, Bramuglia further explained that the UP "does not want to enter into the disputes of other parties, nor support with its votes the trends that are competing to impose old ideologies that, in our view, do not reflect national and international developments." Accordingly-and given that, in addition, the group felt itself unprotected by the law and without any legal recourse-"it has no other course but abstention, and therefore asks all its members to cast blank votes." To those who ridiculed the UP's position, saying that it had no votes anyway, Bramuglia answered that his party did indeed have many votes,

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but that "we want to apply them according to our understanding and reason in order to support whoever best interprets our ideas; and since the unlawful exclusion of thousands of citizens denies us the power of choice, that inherent condition of the right to vote, this has closed to us the route of a pure election without invalidating defects-defects created, we believe behind the back of public opinion." 78 Once the decision had been made, the UP national committee ordered its coordinating councils in the various provinces to disseminate the party position through street and wall propaganda-posters, fliers, loudspeakers, public events, and so on/9 Moreover, from that time on, Bramuglia stressed that the philosophy of the UP could be found in the 1949 constitution. Other neo-Peronist groups did choose to participate in the elections, and the Partido de los Trabajadores (Workers' Party) managed to put a representative in the constitutional convention. 80 This step backward for the UP was not simple obedience to orders from "the man in Caracas," although it was undoubtedly partly due to the fear of a direct confrontation with Peron, who in February 1957 had written a letter branding the neo-Peronist leaders as opportunists who thought more about their personal careers than about the future of the movement. 81 At the same time, however, the decision was the inevitable result of Aramburu's rigid policies and was perhaps also attributable to the fact that the UP's leaders did not believe the party was ready yet, in terms of organization, to take part in an electoral contest. The founding group, which included a dozen people, had not yet managed to set up a real party apparatus. Cooke described the UP's decision to take the blank-ballot route in a tone of hostility mixed with scorn: "Bramuglia, on the other hand, inherently incapable of heroics, advised casting blank votes, exposing himself to ridicule (in Berisso they shouted at him, in Mar del Plata they threw tomatoes, etc.). A Chilean journalist who saw him a few days ago told me that his defeat and desperation were evident." 82 Some researchers, such as McGuire, believe that the UP's abstention from these elections showed it to be "the most orthodox" of the neoPeronist parties and the most flexible in adapting to Peron's instructions. These arguments, however, reflect an erroneous impression of party politics in the years of the Liberating Revolution, based on research of a later era. 83 Bramuglia did not hesitate to criticize Peron's leadership, at least in the years 1955-58. His political proposals, his criticisms of "presidentialism," his attempt to create a political party that acted independently of the exiled general's instructions, and even his rhetorical style all constituted, to some degree, an open challenge to the overthrown leader and an effort to reshape the Peronist identity and the Argentine political system. In the long interview he granted to the American historian

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Robert Alexander, Bramuglia openly expressed these views and described his hopes, in r946, that Peron's regime would institute "a democratic and socially progressive government." For the first two years, that hope seemed reasonable, but then ominous signs appeared. Bramuglia complained that the real labor leaders had been removed and replaced by Eva Peron's favorite sycophants. He also did not hide his disillusionment with the gradual state and party takeover of the mass media. Peron himself, according to Bramuglia, did not believe in democracy. Like every military man, he believed in discipline and hierarchy. 84 Bramuglia reiterated these remarks in public speeches. 85

BETWEEN PERON AND FRONDIZI

The results of the constitutional convention elections, in which the Radicals ran on two rival tickets following a party schism a few months earlier, 86 showed that 24.3 percent of the voters had cast blank ballots and in fact constituted the main electoral force in the country (compared with 24.2 percent for the Union Civica Radical del Pueblo and 2r.2% for the Union Civica Radical Intransigente). 87 Such a result indicated that Peron still enjoyed considerable political power. However, it also indicated that most Argentines wanted to abide by the electoral process. 88 The participation rate was very high: For the first time in the country's history, more than 90 percent of the electorate had exercised their rights and complied with the obligation to vote; moreover, the number of canceled votes was insignificant. In some provinces certain neo-Peronist parties achieved fair success: such was the case of the Partido Laborista and its historical leader, Cipriano Reyes, in Jujuy and Salta, and the Partido de los Trabajadores (Workers' Party) in San Juan. Bramuglia and his followers decided that under the circumstances it would not be wise to continue their policy of boycotting the electoral process, and they resolved to strengthen their party bases at the national level. For this reason, they opted to hold the Union Popular's national convention in the city of Cordoba, which was not exactly a traditional Peronist stronghold. As was to be expected, Bramuglia delivered the main speech at this event. In it he criticized Aramburu's administration relentlessly, though not aggressively: "The government has, up to now, carried out a bloody, unremitting persecution through imprisonment, implicitly authorizing organized defamation, not to mention innumerable proceedings that set aside the general principles of law." In this speech Bramuglia presented his concept of government, which gave the state a primary role in guiding

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economic activity, but left a fairly wide margin of action to national and foreign capital for the development and modernization of the country. It was in this speech in Cordoba that he expressed concrete support for the Church, saying, "Since the Catholic religion is ours, there we must find the pure source of our development as a civilization." He also took various opportunities to declare his anticommunist views, justifying the military regime's persecution of Communist Party members, and warning that oppressing the Peronists would only succeed in driving some of them into the ranks of the extreme left. More than five hundred representatives from all over the country participated in the debates about the party constitution. The result was a document whose guiding principle was to set up quotas for all the party offices and the representative positions in its various institutions: onethird would go to workers, one-third to "politicians," and one-third to women. 89 The logic of this plan, based on the three mainstays of the outlawed Peronist Party, was debatable, but the main problem lay in its implementation. In Cordoba, as Cesar Teach has shown, and in other places, the party remained in the hands of "the politicians," usually middle-class professional men, particularly lawyers, with no workingclass or female representatives to speak of. This, as we will see later, proved to be one of the main failings of the UP. In putting together the UP's presidential ticket, the party leaders sought candidates who would be acceptable to the government and various segments of the middle class, but who would also be identified as Peronists loyal to the basic principles of justicialism and, as such, would enjoy the support of significant sectors of the working class. No less important, however, was the requirement that the candidates not be too objectionable to the exiled leader. At that stage the UP was ready to do without Peron's overt support, but it could not afford his express opposition. At this juncture, the convention in Cordoba thought it appropriate to adopt the recommendation of the founder of the party and nominate the presidential ticket of Alejandro Leloir-Juan A. Bramuglia. Leloir, appointed in August 1955 by Peron himself as the last president of the Peronist Party's central committee, had originally been a radical politician whom Bramuglia had recruited for the Peronist camp while working as federal interventor in the province of Buenos Aires in 1945. At a press conference, Bramuglia characterized Leloir as "a man whose faithfulness to our ideas and feelings, whose chivalry and past suffering, make him the right person to achieve it [the unification of the popular forces] in better conditions than anyone else, dispelling doubts and sowing mutual respect, for a harmonious coexistence within a shared ideology." 90 "Released by the military government from a long detention a few days

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earlier, together with dozens of other ex-deputies of the Peronist Party/ 1 Leloir was pleased by his election as the UP presidential candidate (although because he had held a post under the Peronist regime he could not be a candidate under the terms of the decrees issued by the authorities of the Liberating Revolution): "My name will always be at the patriotic service of the united popular forces. Accordingly, I accept this lofty mission and am grateful for the expression of confidence that it represents." 92 The hardliners watched with concern as this Peronist alternative took shape, and sought by every possible means to portray it as "the enemy that is attacking us from our own ranks," the "classic scoundrel," "a monster parasitically fed by the Movement," "traitors and collaborators with the gorilas [anti-Peronists]." Rumors were spread that the authorities were financing the activities of the Union Popular. 93 Some, such as John William Cooke, had no doubts about what should be done with softliners: Without hesitation, he suggested eliminating them. However, with the generosity of a revolutionary, he explained, "Eliminating the 'soft line' does not mean eliminating all the individuals who serve it, that would be very difficult under circumstances like the present. We should actually use the 'effective potential of idiots' and even of turncoats. But on condition that first the Organization be sufficiently purged so that the idiots and the turncoats cannot assume, even partially, its management." 94 Shortly after the elections to the constitutional convention, Arturo Frondizi, leader of the Union Cfvica Radical lntransigente (UCRI, Intransigent Radical Civic Union), began to establish contacts to enlist Peronist support for his candidacy for president. He approached the neoPeronists; Peron's representatives in Argentina; and, finally, after going through various envoys, the exiled leader himself. Frondizi promised Peron to stop "the canoodling with leaders of 'Peronism without Peron' ... to stop his dealings with weak caudillos or leaders of Peronism." 95 Those in the government, including President Aramburu himself, who supported Ricardo Balbfn, leader of the Union Cfvica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP, People's Radical Civic Union), considered the possibility of lifting the ban on the Peronist Party in order to divide Frondizi's sympathizers. According to Robert Potash, a meeting of naval officers at the Puerto Belgrano base rejected this idea. 96 However, the government allowed various neo-Peronist parties, including the Union Popular, to register in the electoral courts and to present candidates. The navy protested vigorously; its minister, Admiral Teodoro Hartung, asked Aramburu to call an emergency meeting of the Junta Militar. Citing Hartung's diary,

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Potash writes that the Junta Militar met on January 24 and 29, 1958, to discuss the subject of the neo-Peronist parties, which to the navy were simply the Peronist Party under different names. Aramburu; General Victor Majo, the minister of the army; and Commodore Jorge Landaburu, the minister of aeronautics, did not share the navy's fear of a Peronist electoral victory under a neo-Peronist label. Accordingly, Aramburu respected the decision to allow neo-Peronist parties to participate in the elections, hoping in that way to divide the Peronist votes and enhance the UCRP's chances. 97 Nonetheless, when the news was published of the pact between Peron and Frondizi-namely, that the Peronist masses would support the UCRI in the presidential elections of February 1958 and, in exchange, Frondizi, once he was president, would work for the legalization of the outlawed party and adopt a social policy similar to Peron's-numerous Peronists found themselves in an awkward situation. 98 Their discomfort can be seen in the arguments they used to convince their party colleagues to vote for Frondizi. For example, in mid-February a group of Peronist leaders published a manifesto that said, among other things, "In short, we are obeying an order without voting 'in spirit' for anyone." 99 Under these circumstances, the neo-Peronist parties, taken unawares in the middle of organizing themselves, were in rather difficult straits. Vicente Leonidas Saadi, leader of the Populist Party, which was based mainly in the province of Catamarca, 100 did not hide his despair or his anger, telling the Cordoba Catholic daily Los Principios I reached an agreement with Peron that the Populist Party would go to the elections without appointing any candidate, but the electors would have to vote for Peron for president ... Peron has sent Leloir a letter in which he advises him to cast a blank vote. This letter is genuine, to judge from its sources. He has also talked to Frondizi's envoys, and promised them-a promise he has fulfilled-to advise [his followers] to vote for Frondizi. In light of this position of Peron's, which shows an obvious imbalance ... what can we do? I cannot recognize him any longer as head of the party. His duplicitous attitude has placed our party in a pretty bad position. 101

Although Saadi later retracted some of his remarks, the leaders of the UP clearly felt a similar frustration, and at least some of them, headed by Bramuglia, refused to accept the decision until the last moment. Their argument was that they could not obey instructions to vote for someone they considered "an enemy of the Peronist cause." 102 In a speech before the UP's national committee on January 16, 1958, Bramuglia stressed that the military coup of 1955 had not resulted

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"exclusively from the opposition, but also from our own breakdown." 103 Criticizing Peron and defending his own views, he warned of the danger of the "hard line": "The Argentine working class-and I have every right to say this because I gave it my whole life-should look very carefully at what it is doing, and should follow the positive ideological lines of nation-building; it cannot follow strange messages deceitfully deployed by men seeking to advance themselves at all costs." In case his point was not yet clear, Bramuglia explained to his listeners, They deceived the public, and, especially, the working masses. They tell them that the hard line is the most important thing, and what does the hard line imply? The hard line implies sitting quietly by and allowing our comrades to vote for the enemies of our cause. We may be few or many, but we will be faithful to the basic ideas of the movement ... We favor participating in elections, so let's take responsibility for it. Rejecting the accusations of treason, he challenged Peron, saying, "We never need orders to do our duty. To defend our flag we do not need to go get the opinion of the chief, we must defend it ourselves." Academic research has turned up various possible motives for Peron's pact with Frondizi, one of them being the ex-president's desire to give Peronism new legitimacy as an independent political actor on the: national stage. Without disputing these arguments, I think we can assume that one of the main reasons for this peculiar alliance was rooted in Peron's fear that the neo-Peronist parties in general and the UP in particular were going to do well in the elections, and that their success might end up eclipsing his own status and image. 104 His pact with Frondizi was accordingly designed to confirm his authority in the justicialist movement and to sweep from the political map those neo-Peronist parties that up until January 1958 had operated under the impression that their participation in the elections was sanctioned or at least tolerated by the ex-president. 105 At the same time, apparently, Peron realized that his instructions to cast blank votes were no longer a good idea, since they were increasingly likely to be ignored. Parallel to the instructions to vote for Frondizi, a propaganda campaign was launched against the neo-Peronist parties. To guarantee his electoral success, Bramuglia tried to form a common front with other neo-Peronist groups, such as the Partido de los Trabajadores, the Partido Blanco (White Party), the Partido Laborista Agrario (Agrarian Labor Party), and Vicente Saadi's Partido Populista (Populist Party). For some months Bramuglia had emphasized the need to forge a policy stressing the unification of kindred political forces that had emerged from the original movement of 1943 and that, despite personal or superficial

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differences, were in fact basically in agreement. 106 However, his hope of seeing this front become reality was shattered due to the pressure exerted by "verticalists" loyal to Peron. More than once Bramuglia complained despairingly of having to deal simultaneously with both the government's "black gorilismo" (reactionism) and the "white gorilismo" of the leading hardliners, who did nothing but criticize and sow discord among the Peronists, branding as traitors anyone who voiced different opinions and dared to question or dispute their extremist position. At the same time that the UP talked about peacemaking, they continued to incite to violence. Leloir's stand was ultimately changed by a letter the UP candidate received from Peron in early January, proposing that he support the blankvote tactic. There was also a stormy secret meeting between Frondizi and Leloir at Rogelio Frigerio's house, after which Leloir withdrew his candidacy with this Parthian shot: "Nothing would be so tragic for us as getting involved in an electoral adventure with unusual consequences ... We have reached the final conclusion that our attitude cannot be anything other than the most absolute intransigence, casting blank votes on February 23rd." 107 The leaders of the UP rejected this position in a manifesto affirming that Leloir's statements "have to call into question the firmness of his proposals and the seriousness of his commitments, [since they] now advocate abstention and casting blank ballots. We consider that position completely mistaken, since we are certain that whatever the attitude of the leaders, the masses intend to vote assiduously on February 23rd expressing their own, authentic political view." 108 In this manifesto they also contrasted Leloir's views with those of the labor unions, which had participated and triumphed in the union elections despite the most adverse conditions. According to Bramuglia and his followers, the workers' syndical movement "shows us the best way to defend our banners and confirms that we are right to participate. No one has tried to misrepresent the attitude taken by those union leaders; on the contrary, they have been pointed out as champions and self-denying defenders of common ideals." Forced to explain why the UP had not taken the same position at the constitutional convention, Bramuglia asserted that on that occasion they had been protesting the government's right to abrogate a constitution by decree, as well as the electoral fraud implicit in the voter disqualifications. In his speech at the closing ceremony of the UP national convention in the city of Cordoba, he said, "When I hear some colleagues say that they are 'hardliners,' I tell them categorically that they are making a grave mistake. We want to be a hammer, not an anvil. They prefer to

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be an anvil, which is hard but inert; we, a hammer, which is hard, but creative. That is why we are taking the active position." Leloir's desertion definitively doomed any possibility of a UP victory in the elections. In addition, because the resignation of its presidential candidate identified it more strongly with Peron in the eyes of the national authorities, the police began to harass the party and interfere in its meetings. In a press conference, Bramuglia complained that interventions in Salta and Cordoba had prevented him from speaking at party events, and protested the attempt to turn him into "the silent speaker." 109 Leloir was not alone; numerous activists in the federal capital and the interior of the country decided to withdraw from the elections. However, a fair number stood their ground, in spite of the exiled leader's instructions, and Bramuglia was now the UP's presidential candidate. There was at least one known attempt to take advantage of the general confusion by using an apocryphal letter, attributed to Peron, to convince people to vote for his ex-foreign minister. During the final event of the UP campaign in Cordoba, the following text was read: Some days ago I recommended supporting the only man in Argentina who will defend our three banners (I meant Dr. Bramuglia), and these instructions have been twisted to appear that I suggest voting for Frondizi ... I repeat my exact and categorical instructions: They directed and still do direct active participation in favor of authentically Peronist candidates. Never supporting the enemy: Peron is not for sale and does not betray his country. The industrialists of confusion have also tried to make me appear to be discrediting Dr. Bramuglia with a misunderstanding that we got over a long time ago. Another despicable lie to sow discord in the Peronist masses. Justicialism owes a great deal to Dr. Bramuglia. 110

It is interesting that a reference to the past differences between the president and the candidate was included to give the letter greater credibility. Even after Leloir's departure, Frondizi feared that the UP would undermine his electoral base. Carlos Bramuglia reports being contacted two days before the elections by the lawyer Raul Salinas, who was undersecretary of the Buenos Aires municipality and a founder of the UP. Salinas asked him to suggest to his father that the party give up its plan to participate in the elections; in exchange, Frondizi would guarantee the elder Bramuglia the foreign relations portfolio. Bramuglia, who had known Frondizi since the days when both had been students at La Plata, rejected the offer. He opposed Peron's directive, which would have made the national elections into an internal Radical election, and was especially irritated by the choice between casting a blank vote or abstaining, claiming that not participating in the elections "is the same as death." 111 Bramuglia resolutely carried on his party's campaign, emphasizing that

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the UP was the continuation of the Peronist path of the 1940s and of the social and unionist struggle begun by "the glorious Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare," and attacking Aramburu's government for its policy of political and social repression. Bramuglia portrayed Frondizi's platform as a simple variant of the government policy, although he also pointed to the support offered by the Communist Party as proof of Frondizi's supposed Marxist orientation. The internal pressures within the Peronist camp continued, however, and, two weeks before the elections, the so-called Intransigent Movement of the Union Popular published an open letter to Bramuglia asking him to withdraw his candidacy "out of respect for higher interests." The signatories expressed this hope: "Let Frondizi and his time be our slow, sure, strategic march towards the law." 112 On February 18, Bramuglia was still urging his followers to vote uniformly for the UP lists: "Onward, comrades of 1943 and 1945, with the clean banners of those days! The future awaits us, the past illuminates and spurs us. Let us conquer the present." 113 On the following day, the closing rally of the UP's electoral campaign was held in Plaza Constitucion in the federal capital. At the end of this event, Enrique Corominas, in the name of the party authorities, proclaimed Bramuglia's candidacy for president of the nation. Bramuglia mentioned Frondizi in his speech, warning of those "who only joined our movement not for ideals, but attracted by the laurels of success; it may be better that they are leaving, thus proving that they had no commitment to the ideology and banners of the movement, but were only attracted and fascinated by power." 114 It should be mentioned that while the rally was taking place, a firecracker went off with a considerable bang, causing momentary alarm among the participants, although no injury or damage resulted. A few days before the elections, UP members felt relatively optimistic, in particular because of the benefit they anticipated from the displeasure caused in some Peronist circles by Peron's order to vote for Frondizi. Bramuglia asserted that despite all the difficulties, we are going to the elections. We don't care about the results so much as letting the people know that we are on the move ... We do not take orders from anyone, because we are already big enough for self-determination by our own lights. Union Popular is not a party that came into being for an election: It wants to enter Argentine political history as a great force for progress and order. 115

Nonetheless, on the date of the election, they discovered that they could not disregard Peron's choice of Frondizi. Bramuglia, as head of the UP, Vicente Saadi of the Partido Populista, and the journalist (and editor of Palabra Argentina) Alejandro Olmos, who led the Partido Blanco,

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all proceeded to formally withdraw their candidate lists, although their supporters retained them in some districts. 116 This time, the election results showed that a very large proportion of Peronists had followed Peron's instructions. The UCRI, which won the support of Peronists, Communists, and nationalists, obtained about 45 percent of the votes, more than double the number it had obtained barely half a year earlier in the elections to the constitutional convention (4,090,840 votes in February 1958, compared with r,847,603 in July 1957). The UCRP, with Balbin at the helm, received scarcely 29 percent of the votes. Blank ballots, cast mostly by Peronists, slightly exceeded 9 percent of the total, and about ten neo-Peronist parties all together garnered less than 3 percent (some UP followers cast blank ballots). The UP extended its official presence to nine districts and received just a little more than 8o,ooo votes nationally (0.89 percent). Its performance in the important districts of the federal capital and Cordoba was especially wretched. In the province of Buenos Aires it garnered just over r percent and in Entre Rios and Salta 2 percent, winning a little more in San Juan. In Misiones and Tucuman, however, it was relatively successful, topping 5 percent of the total number of votes cast. 117 The UP's electoral failure surprised no one after the decision to withdraw the candidate lists, but it showed Bramuglia that it would not be possible to take advantage of the pool of Peronist followers as long as he had to compete with Peron, who was now beginning a new stage of exile in the Dominican Republic. For one thing, Peron's discovery that he still enjoyed wide support had rekindled his hopes of resuming the reins of government, so he put obstacles in the way of the party that threatened the fulfillment of those hopes, the Union Popular. At the same time, different trends of orthodox Peronism were sharpening their criticism of the neo-Peronist parties; for example, Teodoro Funes told the weekly Mayoria, "The people only want to be on the straight line: Peron's leadership . . . Some opponent of our movement once called us a 'flock of sheep.' To put it graphically, I'll accept that expression to say that the sheep that leaves the flock gets eaten by the lion.'' 118 Cordoba was a good example of the party's failure to obtain the support of the working class. The candidates for governor and deputy governor in that province were Cesar Cuestas Camero and Miguel Aspitia, respectively. The latter was an activist in the commercial employees' union, and his nomination reflected the UP's inability to obtain the support of stronger unions-such as the railroad workers, the metal workers, the transport employees, or the light and power union-which were averse to the policy of compromise and integration in the contemporary

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political system championed by Bramuglia's group, preferring to continue their hostile, unyielding resistance to the Aramburu government. Just a few days before the elections, the magazine Mayoria tried to sum up this stage in the political life of Bramugla and the Union Popular: Bramuglia did not get entangled in this subtle game of the liberators, and, deaf to the siren song of those who proposed to await the miraculous saving coup, chose to work patiently on the right weapon for the real battle that was coming. Union Popular, which had been born in order to keep the flags of 1945 waving, began a tenacious, silent task of organizing the length and breadth of the Republic. Village by village, city by city, province by province, its members went visiting old friends, to invite them to gather around the new formation, encouraged by the popular spirit of the great movement ... However, a new wave of rumors, mysterious "vetos," marches and countermarches without apparent explanation, contradictory orders and ambiguous attitudes burst into the inner life of the movement. No one was deceived as to where it came from and why, but without press, without resources, and moving in a sea of confusion, the enterprise had to go at walking pace when its progress should have been most rapid, spurred by time and the course of events ... as the culmination of all that process, Union Popular once again remains practically alone on the battlefront of election participation. 119

Bramuglia, as we will see in the final chapter, would now begin to make overtures toward Peron and his representatives in Argentina. Perhaps it is appropriate here to paraphrase a later remark by Tecera del Franco, who talked of a transition from "rebellion" to "controlled rebellion."

CHAPTER FIVE

The Controlled Rebellion Bramuglia~ Last Tango

~

•

Frondizi began his presidential mandate with wide support, although it was based on a fragile, heterogeneous coalition. That support had been sufficient to elect him with a comfortable majority, but now he had to implement a policy that would steer the country back to democracy, while fulfilling his numerous election promises. His political debts were very heavy, and his supporters at the polls did not extend unlimited credit. Peron wrote to Cooke after the elections, We must be very clear that our agreements with Frondizi do not put us in the government camp, but rather in a constructive opposition ... We are collaborating opponents until Frondizi fulfills [his promises to] the people and us ... We are allied with him against the gorilas ... but Frondizi must demonstrate that his actions have the same intention as ours [and], until now ... he has not shown it in a single case. 1

Thus, Peron's support was not unconditional, and both he and his sympathizers carefully scrutinized every one of Frondizi's actions. The armed forces constituted, a priori, a center of resistance to Frondizi, who was constantly dodging and shifting in his anxious attempts to placate those in uniform. However, giving in to the pressure of the military officers only emboldened them. Frondizi gradually turned into a president who governed by the grace of the General Staff, a puppet whose strings were pulled by the military. In the social and economic spheres, Frondizi soon found himself mired in contradictions, partly because of his propensity to decide and act independently, often without discussing the issue in the senate. Many decisions were taken in the small hours of the night. 2 The Radical leader who had waved the banner of democratization was proving to be no less of an authoritarian than were his predecessors.

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As one of his first measures to pacify the Peronists, Frondizi presented congress with a draft bill instituting a broad amnesty that would free political prisoners and end all the investigations and legal proceedings undertaken against civilians for political or ideological reasons. In the following months he did manage to promote steps towards union normalization and to abolish the decree prohibiting the use of Peronist symbols. Nonetheless, his declarations did not restore the Peronist Party to full, regular activity, nor did the amnesty law establish the groundwork that would permit Peron's return to Argentina, much to the disappointment of the ex-president's followers. 3 They were not alone in their disillusionment: Various factions of the governing coalition, particularly the Socialists and the nationalists, were dissatisfied with Frondizi's economic policy. Although one of Frondizi's first acts as president was to raise wages substantially, his failure to impose simultaneous controls on steadily rising prices caused a wave of inflation and a real drop in the wage level, engendering discontent among wage earners in general and the working class in particular. Another issue that aroused great irritation and strong criticism was the "oil battle," announced out of the blue on July 24, 1958, without any previous public discussion or congressional involvement. In a speech broadcast by radio that day to the entire population, the president announced that he had signed a series of contracts with different foreign companies, most of them based in the United States, for the purpose of increasing the extraction of hydrocarbons and the production of energy. 4 This policy flew in the face of both the position held by the Radicals since the days of Yrigoyen and the monopolistic concession to Yacimientos Petroliferas Fiscales, the national oil company, for the exploitation of oil resources. Frondizi himself had in the past referred to "patriotic energy" and the vital necessity of nationalizing oil. From the opposition benches he had quietly battled Peron's plan to sign a contract with the U.S. company Standard Oil, and his book Petr6leo y politica (Oil and Politics) discussed his rejection of all "imperialist economic activity," without making any distinction between "good" and "bad" foreign capital. 5 On November rr, 1958, the oil workers' union in the province of Mendoza declared a strike to show their opposition to the agreements signed with the U.S. companies. The strike triggered a series of protests that, in turn, led the government to declare a state of siege and to outlaw the Communist Party, the scapegoat for the strikes, disturbances, and violence. 6 This undemocratic measure was imposed on the entire country rather than on the "rebel" province alone. In addition, the decree was issued by the president rather than the congress. It was a surprising action for a democratically elected regime, particularly because it was

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initiated by a politician who, before his ascension to power, had objected to other states of emergency declared in the country. Before the thirty days of the original state of siege had expired, the government was already requesting an extension for an indeterminate length of timewhich in practice turned out to be almost the entire time that Frondizi remained in office. In his speech to the nation on December 29, the president unveiled a stabilization plan designed to ensure the success of the development and modernization processes and to rein in inflation. This plan also served as a basis for requesting loans from the International Monetary Fund and other public and private bodies in the United States. It was clear that the stabilization plan would cause a drop, albeit temporary, in wages, eliminate subsidies to public transport, and increase the prices of public services. The new policy-of which one of the architects was Alvaro Alsogaray, an orthodox conservative who was appointed minister of the economy in June I959 at the instigation of the military7-reduced the value of the peso and increased the cost of living. These economic measures brought furious reactions from the opposition and put an end to the agreements between Peron and Frondizi. Alsogaray's plan openly contradicted the Peronist social policy, and the followers of the exiled leader could not continue to support the government. Frondizi evidently had to abandon the populist policy that characterized the first months of his administration. His dependence on Peronist and Communist support aroused great resistance in right-wing circles, as well as in the UCRP, headed by Balbfn, who saw the president as a traitor to the Radical cause. Frondizi's early efforts to keep the Peronists happy encouraged them to make fresh demands. The country's monetary reserves were dwindling, while the complaints by industrialists and farmers about the government tax policies multiplied. All these factors spurred Frondizi to the economic shift that precipitated the end of his alliance with Peron. The new course demanded a great economic sacrifice from the less fortunate sectors of the population-a sacrifice that the Peronists could not accept. Between I958 and I959 real wages fell by about 20 percent, and although they recovered somewhat in the following two years, by I96I they were still about 5 percent below the level of I958. Moreover, the new economic plan involved a notable redistribution of income: The share of wage earners in the national income dropped from 48.7 percent in r958 to 42.I percent in I96I. Employment rates, too, were affected as a result of a brief but deep recession in I959· 8 At the same time, the frequent policy reversals and unexpected measures disconcerted and even infuriated the military-reactions that were compounded by the clivi-

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sions within the armed forces, especially concerning the position to be taken in regard to the Peronist movement.

BACK IN THE SAME OLD RUT?

During the first months of Frondizi's administration, the Union Popular tried to maintain a "vigilant cooperation with the government, agreeing completely with anything intended to bring peace to the Republic." 9 Bramuglia considered this cooperation important to defend constitutional order and to prevent a military revolt. He also refused to join those who condemned the government for its policy on hydrocarbons, instead speaking out as an advocate of extracting oil with the help of private capital, because "the oil must be extracted at all costs." 10 In addition, he supported free education, although he said that all diplomas should be "certified" by the state. Bramuglia's moderate views on these issues were a new source of irritation for Peron, who had been furious when his ex-foreign minister refused to mobilize for the pro-Frondizi electoral campaign in February. Now, from exile, Peron called on his followers to beware of the traps laid for them by "this Government of sell-outs and traitors in the service of oligarco-capitalist exploitation," a government that made no concessions to Peronist "hardliners," while seeking understandings with more pliable political and syndical leaders. He also warned that through infiltration, pressure, and bribery [the government] hopes to tone down the reaction of the masses, acting on those leaders who incline towards it. Even before the state of siege, at the request of Frigerio, Mercante, and Leloir, the party published a manifesto rejecting any protest that was not peaceful. Bramuglia, San Millan, Guardo, etc., according to the daily papers, subsequently ratified these ideas. This sort of infiltration work is being attempted even among union leaders.U

Just as he had done in the days of the Liberating Revolution, Peron again instructed his followers to "resist by all possible means in order to force the Government to meet its commitments." The pejorative tone he used to refer to the neo-Peronist leaders did not quite conceal his fear of their increasing power: "If the Guardos, Mercantes, Leloirs, Bramuglias, who for ten years have been proceeding from one failure to the next, are now becoming dangerous, it must be because we are losing all our own dangerousness. What can they represent in Peronism, which has never accepted caudillos?" Peron urged his followers to "provoke a disturbance without worrying about the consequences it may have for the

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government, and keep it up at all costs, to the point of either surrender or explosion." 12 Despite the inconsistencies in the Peronist approach, evident here in the gap between Bramuglia's "coexistence" and Peron's "resistance" and "insurrection," the new circumstances created in late 1958 by the collapse of the pact between Peron and Frondizi led Bramuglia to explore the possibility of bringing the deposed head of state and his delegates back to Argentina. This was the exact transition from "rebellion" to "controlled rebellion" described by Tecera del Franco. 13 Various elements within the movement considered that they should in fact take steps to attract the neo-Peronist parties, such as the Union Popular, Partido Popular, Partido Blanco, Partido de los Trabajadores, Partido Laborista Agrario (Salta), and Partido Bloquista (San Juan), instead of boycotting them. For example, in June 1958, Carlos Aloe, who in Peron's time had been administrative assistant secretary of the presidency and then governor of Buenos Aires province until the fall of the regime, wrote to the leader in exile, "I agree that there are men who have behaved unacceptably, so that their presence in the movement would be intolerable, but there are others and especially their groups whom we should try to attract, a task I do not think difficult; it only requires some tact and intelligence, and especially aiming higher, at the big picture." Aloe concluded his letter, which covered both sides of six pages, by asking Peron to put to good use the contributions "of all the capable men of the movement, without excluding anyone." 14 At the beginning of October 1958, Cooke informed Peron that Bramuglia, before leaving for the United States, had sent his son to talk to the leader of the left wing of the movement, with instructions to discuss the possibility of a merger and to organize a meeting between the exforeign minister and Peron. Peron, in the meantime, had left Venezuela after the overthrow of Perez Jimenez in January 1958 and headed for Santo Domingo (then called Ciudad Trujillo), where he would remain for two yearsY Indeed, in January 1959 the press reported Bramuglia's intention of traveling to the Dominican Republic to see Peron, a plan that ultimately came to nothing. 16 In an effort to create the right climate for a possible reconciliation, the leader of the UP told journalists that nothing he had done in his new party had ever deviated for a moment from the justicialist approach, a point he wanted to clarify given "the confusion created by different approaches implemented for the same purposes." 17 In the course of 1959, more than a million and a half workers went on strike, for a total of ten million workdays in the city of Buenos Aires. 18 These constant strong-arm tactics on the part of the unions, added to the street demonstrations and organized terrorism, helped create a

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propitious environment for the renewal of the UP's activities. At this stage Bramuglia tried to improve his ties with the unions. It should be noted that Frondizi's policy in union matters was ambivalent. At the same time that he was cracking down on the grassroots leaders, he was cutting deals with the national leaders and had a law of professional associations enacted that prohibited parallel unions. The result was that the unions consolidated into centralized organizations and the Peronist leaders displaced the anti-Peronists. 19 The leader of the UP understood that his party's limited success so far was rooted at least partly in its lack of a stronger union support base that could provide the material resources needed for a more diversified party activity. Another factor was the absence of cooperation with other neo-Peronist parties. Moreover, although for the 1959 provincial elections the Peronists again told their supporters to cast blank ballots, and obtained 25 percent of voter support, those Peronists who advocated positive participation in the electoral process prevailed, much to the concern of the exiled leader. 20 In any case, despite Bramuglia's efforts at reconciliation, during 1959 the gap between the respective conceptual universes, divergent styles, and rhetorical differences of Bramuglia and Peron could not be concealed. As Peron continued belligerent and irresponsible, the former lawyer kept insisting that the only way to go was the legal way. On the anniversary of the Revolution of June 4, 1943, he pointed out once again, "We do not want coups d'etat, nor to participate in conspiracies. The country knows, from painful experience, what results can be expected from revolutionary adventures." 21 Through his contacts with Generals Leon Bengoa and Elbio Anaya, 22 as well as from other sources, Bramuglia was fully aware of the conspiratorial plans of Peronist military officers, who included, for example, Generals Miguel A. Iniguez, Lugan, Polero, and Texier, and Colonels Yrigoyen, Firpo, and Gentiluomo. 23 However, the ex-foreign minister remained firm in his belief that the struggle should be political, civilian, legal, and democratic: "We repudiate every form of violence, especially any that translates into the death or injury of innocent beings." 24 Whereas Peron's rhetoric became increasingly extreme, Bramuglia's discourse during his last years is tinged with Catholic, national overtones. He never abandoned his commitment to social justice, although with increasing frequency he borrowed concepts from social Christianity, which rejected the exploitation of humans by humans and preached the dignity of humble lives. In the context of this dynamic, toward the end of 1959 the UP decided that in the next elections it would actually vote-that is, "with a

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positive vote along the lines of comprehension and national reconstruction." Bramuglia initiated talks with various other parties, including the Union Federal, the Partido Populista, the Partido Justicialista, and the Partido Conservador Popular (Popular Conservative Party), with the intention of establishing channels of cooperation. 25

ANOTHER BLANK VOTE: THE ELECTIONS OF MARCH

r960

AND THE

UNION POPULAR'S INTERNAL CRISIS

The year r96o was not a simple one for Frondizi, his government, or his party. Elections were held on March 27 to fill seats in the Chamber of Deputies, together with provincial and municipal elections in various parts of the country. In Buenos Aires there was talk that the Partido Justicialista might resume its activity and present candidates in the election, although without Peron at the head of the list. In that event, Bramuglia hoped to gain the exiled leader's support for his own bid for the party leadership. At this stage, the overthrown general continued to observe the neo-Peronists' overtures with suspicion, and, of course, so did Cooke, although his star had begun to fade; he was already drifting toward the fringes of the movement. 26 During these months the short shrift given to "softliners" could be seen in the treatment of Oscar Albrieu and Eleuterio Cardoso, secretarygeneral of the meatpackers' union, both of whom stressed the necessity of abandoning insurrectional tactics in favor of participation in elections. Albrieu was expelled from the Consejo Coordinador y Supervisor del Peronismo (CCS; Coordinating and Supervising Council of Peronism), and Cardoso was expelled from the Peronist movement and the "62 Organizations." 27 Peronist rhetoric called for total intransigence, a principle expressed in the slogan "Peron or death" chanted by many Peronists on various occasions. This ended Bramuglia's hopes. Coincidentally, a short time later the armed forces obliged the government to proscribe the activities of the Partido Justicialista again, a measure that was condemned by the executive board of the UP. 28 Under these circumstances, Peron again instructed his followers to cast blank votes. 29 Bramuglia, who at the time was making great efforts to regain the confidence of the ex-president, abandoned the public commitment he had made scarcely weeks earlier and again began to accept the orders of the political leader who had

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inspired the movement 30 -with the difference that this time his decision caused prominent members of the Union Popular to publicly question and challenge his leadership. By now they were fed up with the blankballot policy and Bramuglia's flip-flops on the issue; three years ago he had been preaching the vital necessity of effective participation and positive voting in the elections, only to yield, ultimately, to Peron's dictates. To maintain its position at the head of the party, the National Committee had to suspend five of its members, including Enrique Corominas, Alejandro Bartol, and lndalecio Bartol, designated as candidates in the city of Buenos Aires. 31 The expelled members were key party figures in the metropolitan district, including Bramuglia's old friend, Corominas; his sin had been to defy the party by proposing that real votes be cast in the next elections instead of the blank votes decreed by the National Committee. The party's national authorities decided to intervene in the metropolitan district, and Bramuglia appointed Commander Vicente Domenico as interventor. 32 In a radio broadcast, Bramuglia maintained that only a tiny dissident faction in the party was involved and that the conflict was due in part to government-sponsored infiltrations, 33 but in fact this episode represented an unprecedented internal challenge to his leadership, raising the question as to whether Bramuglia would succeed in blazing a path for his party that was truly independent of Peron. The dissidents tried to take their cause before the electoral judge and public opinion. At the UP's metropolitan convention on February 8, the members rejected the position taken by Bramuglia, who, they said, "like the leaders of justicialism, is betraying the party by endorsing blank ballots." He was accused of being "in connivance with the government," of being "a gangster of politics," and a "false apostle," of "only pretending to believe in Peronism, since it was he who insulted Eva Peron on a certain occasion," and so on. While the absent Bramuglia was showered with insults, Corominas, who was present, was greeted with enthusiastic applause and judged "the brilliant mind who managed to pull Bramuglia out of his political destitution." 34 The party decided to compete in the March elections with its own lists of candidates 35 and to expel from the federal capital district Bramuglia, the president of the National Committee; the party secretary-general, Tecera del Franco; the secretary of finance, Jose de Domenico; the national attorney, Pedro Bianchi; Valentin Lucco, a member of the National Committee; and various delegates to the convention. However, the Junta Electoral decided to disregard the candidates of the dissident faction of the UP. 36 This was undoubtedly the most serious crisis in the short history of this political group, and a personal challenge for Bramuglia. To add to the drama of the party crisis, the president of the Buenos Aires

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convention, Alejandro T. Bartol, issued a personal challenge to Bramuglia after the latter made remarks Bartol considered offensive, which were reported in the Buenos Aires daily La Raz6n. Bartol appointed seconds to fulfill the requirements of chivalry, but in the end, predictably, no pistol duel took place. 37 Bramuglia did not take up the gauntlet because, as he told the press, first the offended party "must demonstrate that he is a gentleman." 38 As the date of the elections drew near, Frondizi faced the prospect of presiding over a minority government. Accordingly, his administration played the anti-Peronist card for the first timeY That is, it revived the vocabulary of the Liberating Revolution, characterizing Peronism as anti-democratic. The daily Clarin, which was close to the Frondizi government, relayed the election results to its readers in these words: "Democracy triumphed. Positive votes overwhelmingly exceeded blank votes." 40 However, the majority of Argentines apparently considered the national government illegitimate, for defaulting on its promises and deceiving the public. In fact, the UCRP (Balbin's party) could be considered the winner in these elections. The UCRP managed to elect fifty-one deputies, who, added to those continuing in office, increased the party bloc to seventy-six. The UCRI obtained the election of forty-seven deputies, and the majority bloc dwindled to one hundred ten. As Mario Justo Lopez, Jr., a specialist in Argentine political history, has emphasized, the results for the entire country seemed to indicate that Argentina was returning to the electoral situation of I957· The UCRP received almost 24 percent of the vote and the UCRI a little more than 20 percent, while Peronist blank ballots were in the lead with 24.5 percent of the total. The rest of the votes were divided between Conservatives, Socialists, and neoPeronists (Laborites and other parties), which obtained r68,r38 votes total, that is, almost 2 percent. The number of blank votes also returned to its level in the elections to the constitutional assembly: 2,rrs,86r in 1957; 8o8,6sr in 1958; 2,228,or4 in r96o. 41 In other words, this was more than a show of public dissatisfaction with Frondizi's economic program; these results also represented a withdrawal of the support that Peronists and Communists had given him two years earlier. The problems of national politics were compounded by the issue of the Cold War in general and the Cuban Revolution in particular. The United States was seeking to enlist all the American states in support of its hostile policy on the new regime in the Caribbean. Those were also the days of the anticolonial struggles in Africa (Algeria, Congo, etc.) and Asia, and Argentine intellectuals were sympathetic to the national liberation movements and policies aimed at achieving political and economic independence. 42 The military showed their distrust of Frondizi,

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193

who often used the vocabulary of Marxist-Leninism, had been supported by the Communist Party in the elections of 1958, was on good terms with the Brazilian president Janio Quadros-whom some officers described as a communist-and, to top it all off, maintained an ambiguous position on the Cuban crisis. Until the death of its founder, the UP did not completely recover from the internal confrontation and party schism that took place before the elections. The faction led by Corominas formed a Junta Promotora Nacional (National Promotional Group), presided over by Fortunato Bruno, which angered the majority faction of Bramuglia loyalists. 43 The crisis gradually faded, however, partly owing to the National Committee's decision that the party would participate actively in elections (that is, it would not employ the blank-ballot tactic)-a promise made many times over the preceding three years, but which seemed more serious under the new political circumstances. Accordingly, the UP decided to activate all its committees in the nineteen districts of the republic where it had legal political status, so that it would be able to participate in future electoral contests. 44 In addition, it renewed its efforts to create agreements with kindred political forces, such as the neo-Peronist parties, the Union Federal, or the Popular Conservatives. At the same time, the party went back to emphasizing its political-ideological principlesY On various occasions, the party called for eliminating the state of siege, the political proscriptions, and the Plan de Conmocion lnterna del Estado (CONINTES), which since March 1960 had allowed the army to repress worker demonstrations; 46 for offering a wide, general amnesty without jurisdictional distinction; for reuniting the union movement in a single CGT; for replacing the government's economic team and adopting a "popular economy" for the purpose of redistributing the country's wealth more equitably; for defending the state enterprises; and for maintaining an independent international policyY An announcement by interior minister Alfredo R. Vitolo on December 28, 1960, inviting officially recognized political parties to meet with President Frondizi at the beginning of January to discuss the state of the nation, was received in Argentine political circles with reactions that ranged from absolute rejection, to skepticism, to reluctant acceptance. Many suspected the motives that had led the president to issue this invitation and doubted his willingness to accept the diverse points of view that the opposition parties would offer him. 48 The first audience was granted to the leader of the Partido Conservador Popular, Vicente Solano Lima. He was followed by Basilio Serrano, head of the Union Federal, and Julio R. Chamizo and Alfredo J. Vercelli of the Partido Civico Independiente. Bramuglia was the fourth to be received by Frondizi, and

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on that occasion he outlined the UP's position on the main issues of the February 5 elections. Upon leaving the Casa Rosada, Bramuglia gave journalists copies of a document he had given to the president in which he had detailed his views on questions of legality, economic development, social peace, and international policy. This text called for reforming the constitution by adjusting legal thinking to social necessities; lifting the state of siege; eliminating the CONINTES Plan; and halting the imprisonments and exiles. Bramuglia explained that the Law of State Security, used by Frondizi's government, had been imposed for the first time by Peron in 1948, "by the military group, against my views, [and] is totally and absolutely illegal owing to its unconstitutional nature." 49 He also clarified that the UP supported the existing electoral system and the Ley Saenza Pefia, characterized as illegal any exclusion of political parties, and called for the incorporation of Peronism in the national political scene. On the economic front, Bramuglia observed that the population had used up its reserves and that consumption levels had dwindled alarmingly. In addition, he maintained that it was the government's responsibility to create better economic conditions, to protect the national industry, to control export prices, to lift credit restrictions from industry and trade, and to redistribute the national wealth in order to revitalize the working-class sectors of society. As for the CGT, it should be consulted about amending the Law of Professional Associations so that it would enjoy the indispensable guarantee of its rights. 50 To the Peronists who criticized his decision to meet with Frondizi, Bramuglia responded, "We are defending our national, popular, and Christian doctrine. No one should yield in this struggle. We must join the national dialog and show that we are responsible men of ideas. We are the legal channel for the majority power and we are certain that many will understand that." 51 This was an open challenge by Bramuglia, although its result was to show more clearly than ever the continued charismatic power of a leader who was physically far away from his country and unable to distribute favors to his followers. Although it would not be accurate to talk of the UP falling back into its original rut, as the rest of the neo-Peronist parties had done, Bramuglia and his group did not show the same level of determination as the Movimiento Popular Neuquina (Neuquina People's Movement), founded in June 1961 by Elfas and Felipe Sapag, which charted an independent course throughout the period of Peron's ostracism. 52 Peron lived in constant fear of losing control of the movement, expressing this anxiety on many occasions-for example, in a letter to Augusto Vandor, where he warned against the "defection of some traitors [which] could be very detrimental to us." 53

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195

ALFREDO PALACIOS'S VICTORY AND THE BEGINNING OF PERONIST SOUL-SEARCHING

On February 5, 1961, elections were held in the city of Buenos Aires to replace a senator whose mandate was expiring and to fill a deputy's vacancy. These elections aroused great interest and influenced the political parties' preparations for the 1962 electoral campaign, when half the Chamber of Deputies and various provincial governments would be up for reelection. Peron tried to promote the candidacy of the integrationist leader Raul Damonte Taborda, head of the small Resistencia Popular Party, in the federal capital. 54 This move was rejected by Bramuglia, and the UP proposed Rodolfo Tecera del Franco as candidate for senator and Jose Sanchez, leader of the taxi drivers' union, as national deputy. 55 The dissident faction of the UP, led by Corominas, and the Labor Party both supported Arturo Jauretche for senator. 5 6 Meanwhile, the CCS and the 62 Organizations were calling for blank votes. This time the Peronists disobeyed the contradictory instructions from Peron and the CCS and, instead, voted for the veteran Socialist Alfredo L. Palacios, who became a national senator. 57 Palacios had been the first Socialist deputy of America, elected in 1904. Despite his advanced age (83) and his eccentric appearance (with his nineteenth-century whiskers, his cape, and his broad-brimmed hat), Palacios was a favorite with the citizens of Buenos Aires, especially the young people mobilized by his campaign in defense of the Revolution in Cuba. 58 Both the Communist Party's support and working-class dissatisfaction with Frondizi's austerity plan contributed to his victory. The deputy's seat was won by the UCRP candidate, Carlos Adrogue. In both votes Frondizi's UCRI came in third and the Peronists, who had decided to cast blank ballots again, came in fourth. 59 Palacios's electoral success was linked to his personal popularity, which-with the slogan "Not a drop of oil to foreign capital" and a certain sympathy for the Cuban revolutionarieson this occasion helped him to obtain the independent votes of the leftwing nationalists. Frondizi lost the support of most of the public in the federal capital, which forced him to devise a new electoral strategy for the following year. The Peronists, too, had to reconsider their strategy. In the election for the senate seat they showed they would not vote for just any candidate supported by Peron, which explains the disappointing results obtained by a mediocre figure like Raul Damonte Taborda. 60 Moreover, fourth place was not a place to which the Peronists were accustomed. Once the pact with Frondizi had ended, the Peronist strategists had to consider whether confrontation led by the unions and voting blank ballots

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in elections were adequate tactics. Peron did the math. In March r96o in the same city, Peronism had received 354,000 votes. In February of the following year it lost r3o,ooo votes. The Conductor had refused to support the neo-Peronists and stuck to the blank-ballot policy. On January 3r, r96r, the 62 Organizations published a paid announcement attacking the UCRI ("the sell-outs of today") and the rest of the parties ("traitors") and calling for blank votes. 61 Now, after the electoral debacle, a different strategy was needed. At this point, Peron could no longer keep ignoring the neo-Peronist parties. Because of his ostracism, these parties made no significant gains. The Labor Party, with Arturo Jauretche as its candidate, received only 23,000 votes, and the UP, with Rodolfo Tecera del Franco running for senator, obtained barely ro,ooo. In the provincial and municipal elections that took place later the same year, signs appeared that the Peronists were largely abandoning the blank-ballot policy and voting for other parties. For example, in Mendoza voters who had previously voted blank channeled their votes mostly toward the neo-Peronist party Tres Banderas, which was legally recognized there, whereas in Catamarca and Santa Fe the UCRI emerged as the apparent beneficiary of the decline in blank votes. On Sunday, June 5, the Peronist voters made another Socialist victory possible in Afiatuya, a town in the province of Santiago del Estero. The Argentine Socialist Party, which in the r96o elections had won r66 votes there, now obtained r,9r7, giving it the victory; at the same time, the number of blank votes dropped from 2,8ro in r96o to I49 in r96r. 62 The fact that so many Peronists were supporting Socialist candidates also caused Peron concern, even though such votes were encouraged by the CCS of the movement. 63 Under these circumstances, the Peronist leaders drew their own conclusions. Many of them naturally were alarmed by the erosive effect of the blank vote and by the apparent tendency in some provinces toward a practical "integrationism." Bramuglia, for his part, was concerned by the flight of Peronist votes toward the left. When he was asked about the electoral behavior of the Peronists in Afiatuya, he answered that it could be considered a consequence of proscription, and that the government was pushing many people to more serious extremes. 64 Meanwhile, the "free" education law, the oil policy, and the economic stabilization plan all challenged the Radicals' traditional ideology. As a result, in addition to its public-credibility problem, the UCRI itself was beginning to fall apart. To avoid another electoral defeat, the government considered changing the electoral system, substituting proportional representation for the mechanism established by the Saenz Pefia law. By this means it hoped to prevent Balbin's UCRP from winning more than half the elective offices. To that end, the ministry of the interior asked

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the different political parties to submit their opinions concerning this possible change. When the UP's turn came, Bramuglia and Tecera del Franco's views reflected their mistrust: Potential reform should not serve the authorities ... For a year now we have been publicly denouncing any Government plan to sponsor an electoral proportionality that "delays" the inevitable loss of [its] majority in the legislative chambers. The Government's political losses in the recent provincial elections led our Party to reiterate publicly the fear that the next recourse would be to reform the Electoral Law to avoid for a time the danger to the Governing Party's broad control in the National Congress. We would not like to see that the solution adopted curiously coincided with the official interests that we have been denouncing for some time. 65

Their conclusion was simple: "We must respect and obey the will of the voters, in whatever electoral form it is expressed ... If anyone wants to introduce in the Electoral Law of the Nation any variant, reform or addition that blocks the Argentine people's prospects of exercising its sovereignty, it will only serve to generate tremendous political chaos that may endanger the very life of the Nation." Accordingly, they recommended the comprehensive application of the Saenz Pefia law and suggested convening representatives of all the political parties to an "Open Council" to confront the issue publicly. However, the government soon abandoned the idea and left the electoral system intact. The elections of February and December 1961 showed that an election could be won with a mixture of non-Peronist and anti-Peronist votes. In the December election, results were favorable to the government in four provinces: It was victorious in Santa Fe, Catamarca, and San Luis, while the Partido Democrata won in Mendoza. However, these elections also marked a change in the Peronist strategy. This time around Peron had decided to support the neo-Peronist parties-a switch that confused many of his followers, who now did not know whether to keep casting blank votes, join the resistance, or support the parties that up until then had been labeled "traitors" by the orthodox who remained loyal to Peron. Nonetheless, Peronism's presence in the electoral game and the exiled leader's new strategy spurred the government to redesign its own strategy. From now on, it would build on the fear of Peron's return that prevailed in various circles. In other words, it presented the electorate with the false choice between the UCRI or the victory of Peronism.

FACE TO FACE AGAIN IN MADRID

Bramuglia, seeing that he would not be able to return to the center of the political stage without Peron, tried to do it with him. Peron, for his part,

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now realized that the blank-vote strategy could not continue, because it might weaken the movement, and so a new strategy would have to be adopted. The ex-foreign minister nourished the hope of getting back into the good graces of the Peronist leader, who since January 1960 had been settled in Francoist Spain and whose prospects of returning legally to his country still seemed remote, owing to the firm opposition of the military leadership. Peron remained suspicious of Bramuglia and his intentions, but he saw an opportunity to promote his own aims with the help of the party apparatus established by the lawyer from Chascomus. Since the "Resistance" (the violent opposition to the military regime) had clearly failed, the political alliance with Frondizi had not produced the desired results, and increasing numbers in the Peronist camp were questioning the founder's leadership, Peron decided to make some response to Bramuglia's overtures-among other reasons, because he was under pressure from union leaders. The latter had consolidated their power, especially in the industrial sectors of greater Buenos Aires. Unlike other Peronist groups they had abundant resources, and thought of extending their influence to the rest of the country by means of agreements with local neo-Peronist politicians who were trying to develop their political careers using the electoral capital of Peronism. Palacios's election and the success of the neo-Peronist parties Tres Banderas (established in Mendoza in January 1961 under the leadership of Alberto Seru Garda and Ernesto Corvalan Nanclares) and the Movimiento Popular Neuquina (founded in June that same year by the entrepreneurial Sapag brothers) also influenced the shift to active participation in elections. In early 1962, the trend toward participation threatened to prevail over Peron's instructions. Monitoring events from his exile, Peron realized he had to do something. Thus, complementary interests led Peron and Bramuglia, former friends who had become rivals, back to each other, even if it were only temporarily and conditionally. Despite Peron's suspicion of all neo-Peronist initiatives, he now instructed his delegates in Buenos Aires to establish ties with the neoPeronist parties, in order to form a joint front for the legislative and provincial elections of March 1962. This plan was reinforced by Bramuglia's trip to Madrid in May 196r. The purpose of the trip was a meeting between the two men, during which the UP leader apparently undertook to uphold Peron's instructions for the upcoming elections and expressed his intention of running for governor of the province of Buenos Aires, a position to which he had aspired since the elections of February 1946. The support Bramuglia enjoyed in both non-Peronist and Peronist circles and the fact that he had accumulated some experience during his work as interventor in that province in the mid-1940s seemed likely to

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increase his chances of winning the governorship. His impression, which he very soon realized was erroneous, was that Peron recognized the limitations of his own strength and understood that in broad segments of the population his voting instructions were not always accepted without question. Bramuglia arrived in Madrid on May 5 and met with Peron ten times before departing for Rome. These meetings took place one block away from the Plaza Republica Argentina, in the ex-president's apartment on Arce Street (named after the Argentine ambassador to the United Nations who had defended Francoist Spain in that international organization), where he lived with his new companion, Isabel Martinez. On one occasion they dined together in a luxurious restaurant. Although most studies of the neo-Peronists and their relations with the exiled Conductor during this period are based primarily on public statements and official publications, in this case we have the benefit of notes taken on the events and atmosphere of those first days of Bramuglia's visit to Madrid. These notes are the fascinating personal and unofficial jottings of Carlos Ballinas, press secretary of the UP National Committee, who accompanied Bramuglia throughout his journey, and they provide a different perspective on these meetings. 66 Bramuglia landed at Barajas airport, where he was awaited by Ricardo de Hoz, Peron's private secretary, who had come with the ex-president's own car to take Bramuglia to the Plaza Hotel. On Saturday morning, May 6, Ballinas found Bramuglia in a gloomy state of mind: I found him very pessimistic; I think he is frightened ... He was completely unimpressed by the fact that Peron sent his car and by his courtesy, courtesies that he shows no one. I take him for a walk in the Sabattini Gardens (the royal palace gardens) and there he lets loose a storm of insults against Peron and Jorge Antonio, whom he calls crooks and a gang of bandits. He says he has come at our insistence and that the General is an unscrupulous and amoral being ... I perfectly understand that Bramuglia is afraid of this meeting with Peron, and that during 12 years he accumulated tons of hatred. Undoubtedly he is afraid, and now I am beginning to feel afraid myself ... It seems to me that everything is over and that the meeting will be a failure.

That afternoon, the two men went to Peron's apartment, where Jorge Antonio was waiting as well, to Bramuglia's great regret. According to his notes, Ballinas tried to encourage Bramuglia, telling him to take the plunge. The ex-president received his visitor with open arms, and the two men embraced for a long moment. "The sincerity and emotion of this embrace were so evident that we all saw it, and he infected us all with a contagious joy." For half an hour Peron and Bramuglia cracked jokes on

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different subjects, and Ballinas could see the ex-foreign minister loosening up and recovering his self-possession. Bramuglia then launched into a lecture that lasted some forty minutes, as Ballinas tells it: We are all familiar with the attraction of his arguments, as well as the beauty of his voice. No one moved a muscle, and Don Atilio keeps expanding as he goes on. Peron enthusiastically endorses the opinions he is hearing, and only opens his mouth to say, "exactly ... exactly." Bramuglia violently criticizes everything that has happened in Argentina and shows that Peronism is the most profitable industry of our country ... Returning, not returning, participating in the elections, abstaining, are all being negotiated ... You [Peron] are no longer leading the political movement, and very soon you will cease to control the union movement! ... Bramuglia is a shining ray of light! ... He holds Peron himself responsible for everything and tells him that he does not put the right value on men. He asks him to give up his command and hand it over to the Argentines themselves, not contaminating himself with petty quarrels that damage his prestige ... he expresses the necessity of regaining the government so that we can write History and he won't be the Juan Manuel de Rosas of the next 50 years.

Ballinas quotes the main elements of Bramuglia's speech-Bramuglia's direct personal attack on Peron and many others in the leadership of the movement, and the general's enthusiastic response (or so it appeared?) as he assented (or seemed to?) to all the arguments of the person on whom he had once bestowed the foreign relations portfolio. In response to a question from Jorge Antonio, Bramuglia recalled that he had been briefly arrested on September r8 by Peron's government, to which the ex-president reacted with surprise: "Who was the son of a bitch who arrested you? How is it possible?" At the end of four hours they parted, agreeing to continue their conversation on Monday, May 8. On the date agreed upon, Bramuglia and Ballinas returned to Peron's apartment. This time the three men were alone, and, at least in the view of the UP press secretary, the balance of power between the two protagonists of the scene seemed to have shifted: I observe that Peron fears Bramuglia. He reveals his plans. We don't know if he is telling the truth. For my part, after having talked to him more than 30 times, and having listened to what he says to each visitor, I observe that he lies a lot ... He has an extraordinary talent, but so do we ... He declares that in accordance with Bramuglia's argument he will decree absolute autonomy for the members of the Consejo Superior. Bramuglia will draw up the document. He promises to proclaim himself the movement's figurehead, and let people in Argentina do what suits them, ... Peron fears Bramuglia, and this gives me great pleasure. I sincerely believe that Bramuglia could eventually be President of the Republi~.

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The next day, Bramuglia went to see Peron again, this time alone. Ballinas feared that Peron intended to deceive him. Apparently on this occasion they discussed who would be candidate for governor of Buenos Aires province in the next elections. Once again, the meeting could be considered particularly successful: "He [Bramuglia] comes back euphorically happy. He has achieved the most important objectives. Peron is enthusiastic about Don Atilio's joining the active struggle." 67 While Bramuglia was still in Europe, news of the meetings in Arce Street began to appear in the Buenos Aires press, including reports of the ex-foreign minister's attempt to interest the ex-president in the possibility of reincorporating Peronism as a legitimate part of the Argentine dialog with all differences apparently surmounted. The papers also reported that through these personal contacts the general wanted to signal that a stage in Peronist politics was over and that unity with the neo-Peronists should be achieved. 68 The media also noted Bramuglia's meetings with the Argentine ambassador in Madrid, General Hector D'Andrea; the Spanish ex-foreign minister, Alberto Martin Artajo; the minister in charge of syndicates, Jose Solfs; and other public figures who calculated that Bramuglia was likely to play an important role in the efforts to reconcile the government and the Peronist movement. 69 After his stop in Madrid, Bramuglia continued his trip, visiting Rome, London, New York, and Washington, D.C.7° In the Italian capital he was received by Cardinal Santiago Copello, with whom he apparently discussed the decree of excommunication imposed on Peron in June 19 55 as a result of his government's conflict with the Catholic Church. In the United States, Bramuglia warned officials of Fidel Castro's growing influence in Argentina and the probability that more and more Peronists would be pulled into Cuba's orbit. He explained that Peronism was the only effective barrier against the expansion of revolutionary ideas, although if it was to serve that purpose the movement had to be legalized and legitimized; otherwise, many Peronists would be tempted to choose the alternative of violence or to join those who supported the revolution in Cuba. 71 He reminded them that as a young student Fidel Castro had been involved in the 1948 Bogotazo. The two men had met briefly in the Columbian capital. After his return to Buenos Aires, Bramuglia called a press conference in his own home in Juncal Street, where he expressed his satisfaction over his meetings with Peron. In response to journalists' questions, he emphasized that the ex-head of state had no ambitions to occupy Rivadavia's seat again, that the various Peronist frameworks would be allowed to function autonomously in Argentina, and that all the Peronist and neo-Peronist

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organizations would be integrally unified, without exceptions or exclusions. He noted that "there would be a clean slate in Peronism, and ideally all over the country." 72 A few days later, the weekly Asi published an extensive feature on Bramuglia in which, in retrospect, it is clear that some of his responses in fact reflected wishful thinking: "General Peron is currently in favor of the positive vote?" "Peron agrees with it." "Did he tell you what he thought about the decline in blank votes?" "He did not attach any importance to it." "Does Peron consider returning to the country?" "He rules it out." "Does Peron acknowledge errors committed during his government?" "Yes, he does. Peronism has already crossed the waters of the Jordan; it has paid for its errors with persecution, exile, imprisonment, and even blood. Peron in fact acknowledges having committed many errors, and perhaps they were what triggered the crisis noticeable in the Peronist movement shortly before the September revolution." 73

THE LANDSLIDE VICTORY OF MARCH 1962

In June 1961, Alberto Iturbe of the Consejo Coordinador y Supervisor del Peronismo called a number of meetings with representatives of neoPeronist parties to discuss cooperation.74 An open letter published by Oscar Albrieu, Bramuglia, Ricardo Guardo, Alejandro Leloir, Domingo Mercante, Vicente Saadi, and Tecera del Franco supported this initiative. The participants in these meetings decided to form a justicialist front for the next elections, agreeing upon a formula that allowed each group to develop its own activities and orientation, but committed them all to support the candidates for public office that were selected by the CCS. 75 In addition, it was agreed that Bramuglia would be the candidate for the important post of governor of the Buenos Aires province, and that the candidate for vice governor would be a key union figure, Augusto Vandar or Andres Framini. Bramuglia knew well that lturbe was not enthusiastic about his campaign for governor and would have preferred that the UP hand over its party vehicle "unoccupied," so that the steering wheel would be in the hands of the CSS and the orthodox Peronists, while the neo-Peronists would be assigned seats in the back. 76 Consequently, to secure his status and safeguard his candidacy, Bramuglia hosted a meeting at his own home, inviting a group of political figures and union and religious leaders that included Mercante, Leloir, Framini, Di Pascuale, Sanchez Sorondo,

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Senorans, Carrillo (brother of the ex-minister), Delia Parodi (ex-president of the Peronist Women's Party), Monsignor Plaza, and General Iniguez, and enlisted them in his attempt to bring together all the Peronist and neo-Peronist configurations in a single front. Contrary to what Bramuglia wanted, they discussed a proposal by General Iniguez to consider the Peronist movement's response in the event that they were prevented from presenting a single list. 77 Arist6bulo F. Barrionuevo, a member of the CSS, told the first secretary of the U.S. embassy that a ticket headed by Dr. Bramuglia, with Vandor or Framini as candidate for deputy governor, would win. If it did, they could easily prevail in the national elections in 1964/8 The joint document published by the leaders of the different Peronist trends indicated that in some districts well-known neo-Peronist representatives might run as candidates of the Front/9 To judge from Ricardo Guardo's book, the neo-Peronists were apparently hoping that once legal authorization for the activities of the Partido Justicialista was obtained, all the different groups would merge behind it and they could go back to building the party "from the foundation up," democratically. 80 Now the U~ began to organize for the elections, especially in the federal capital and the important province of Buenos Aires, where the bulk of its members were concentrated. Its election propaganda contained a photograph with the caption, "Historic embrace: Per6n-Bramuglia, Madrid, May 196r." Below that caption appeared the following text: "Dr. Bramuglia is a 'coefficient' of the Argentine, Latin-American, and Western political moment-coauthor of the union of all the Peronist, popular, and national forces, [formed] to confront the governmental chaos with a positive, constructive vote." In early January 1962, it still appeared that Bramuglia would be leading the Peronist front in the province of Buenos Aires, and consequently criticism grew sharper from those media hostile to Peronism. 81 Notable among them was La Vanguardia, which since the mid-r940s had regularly attacked the politician who had deserted the ranks of the Socialist Party in order to join the Peronist camp. The Socialist organ jeered at the agreement between the Peronist and neo-Peronist factions, which permitted "the resurrection of certain old figures who were very far from having expurgated the title of traitor with which their political careers had culminated. Unquestionably the most notorious among them was Juan Atilio Bramuglia. Bramuglia's political career, despite all his fondest hopes, has not been forgotten. Neither his big betrayals nor his small sabotages have been forgotten." 82 This time, too, however, Bramuglia failed to accomplish his goal. The most important obstacle was that Peron did not trust him, even after their

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meetings in Madrid. It was difficult for Peron to forgive his ex-foreign minister for acting on his own in the second half of the 1950s, without consulting the Lider, and for expressing criticism of the Peronist government during the time of the Liberating Revolution. 83 Consequently, Peron was very slow to deliver his final verdict on Bramuglia's campaign for governor, causing incessant comings and goings in the ranks of the movement. 84 According to Joseph Page, Peron's biographer, during those months Peron was responding to contradictory pressures over the election strategy he should adopt "with vacillation, ambiguity and, in the end, weather-vane leadership." 85 Finally, Peron vetoed Bramuglia's candidacy. Another obstacle resulted from the internal tensions within Peronist syndicalism, which had resumed its preeminence in the organized labor movement and was demanding positions of power for its members in the new Peronist front, hoping thereby to broaden its political influence. The CONINTES plan's success in eliminating every "insurrectionist" aspect of Peronism, as well as the demobilization of the union struggle after the heights reached in 1959, increased the pragmatic option's attraction for the Peronist unions. The government also began to relax some of the more rigid elements of its stabilization plan and left the unions a greater margin in which to maneuver. As for the upcoming elections in the province of Buenos Aires, many union delegates were opposed to any candidate from the political wing of the movement, Bramuglia included, preferring, instead, a candidate of their own. 86 At the same time, Augusto Timoteo Vandor was becoming a powerful figure. Born in 1923 in the province of Entre Rfos, this leader completed his primary education before moving to the Once neighborhood in the city of Buenos Aires. In the 1940s he served in the navy, and in 1950 he began working as a machinist in the factory of the Dutch company Phillips. There he also began his union career, and by 1954 he was already secretary-general of the metalworkers' union, Union Obrera Metalurgica (UOM), in the capital. After the September 1955 coup, he was active in the resistance and helped organize a major strike at the Phillips plant in January 1956, an action that cost him several months in prison. In mid-19 57 he was elected national secretary-general of the UOM, and gradually began to build up power. 87 He supported the takeover of the Lisandro de la Torre meatpacking plant in 1959, and as a result he ended up back in jail. It should be noted that around the end of the 19 sos Vandor, nicknamed "El Lobo" ("the wolf"), was still a political ally of John W. Cooke, a representative of the left wing of the Peronist movement, and he met with Che Guevara in Cuba shortly after the Cuban Revolution. Nonetheless, Vandor slowly began to moderate his views and adapt them to changing realities.

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At the beginning of the r96os El Lobo, like Bramuglia, was working to create a Peronist party independent of Peron. His task was not easy. The 62 Organizations encompassed different tendencies: the "hardliners" of the Peronist resistance, who wanted to create a revolutionary climate and were attracted by Marxist discourse; the "integrationists," who had moved closer to Frondizi, but who in r962 were already losing their influence as a result of the president's flip-flops; and, finally, the strongest group, the Vandoristas, who held nationalist, anticommunist views and enjoyed the sympathy of many military officers. The Vandorists were now willing to share their powerful organization with the UP in exchange for key positions on the candidate lists in the federal capital and the provinces of Buenos Aires and Cordoba. "The prospect of a good outcome for the Union Popular," writes McGuire, "put Peron in a difficult position." 88 Electoral success for the UP and Vandor could well have initiated the process of transforming Peron into nothing more than a symbolic figure. Vandor and a delegation comprising leaders of the 62 Organizations, including Amado Olmos (of the health workers' union), Jose Alonso (textiles), and Roberto Garcia (leather), traveled to Madrid to talk Peron into supporting participation in the elections and approving the UP ticket. According to the memoirs of the Vandorist Juan Jose Taccone, of the light and power union, the delegation insisted that the Lider put his approbation of the neoPeronist ticket in writing, for fear he would continue his maneuvering and change his mind. 89 Vandor and his followers had the impression, which soon proved to be mistaken, that Peron really had been convinced by the arguments presented to him, and that the electoral ticket for the province of Buenos Aires was going to be Bramuglia and El Lobo. 9°Consequently, they were surprised when, returning to Argentina, they came across a newspaper article stating that only one man had been vetoed in Madrid: Atilio Bramuglia. Their surprise was even greater when Peron decided to offer the ticket to Andres Framini, one of the hardliners and Vandor's main rival in the early r96os. The ex-president had once again demonstrated his mastery of the political manipulations required to maintain his own place of honor. Framini, born in Berisso forty-eight years earlier, was already prominent in the textile workers' union, Asociacion Obrera Textil, at the beginning of the I940s, and was elected its secretary-general in I953. 91 Between I955 and r96o he racked up two and a half years in prison for his union activities. Peron used him to prevent Vandor, Bramuglia, or any other neo-Peronist leader from getting too strong, as Framini himself acknowledged a few years later. 92 Framini made his own pilgrimage to Peron's home in the Madrid neighborhood of Puerta de Hierro

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in mid-January 1962. "Look, my friend," said Peron to Framini, "up to now you played the horse; now we'll make the others play the horse, and you'll be the rider." 93 Peron then offered him the candidacy for the governor's office. Peron explained to Alberto Iturbe how important it was to have a working-class candidate who had come out of the unions, particularly in the area around the federal capital, the "industrial belt" of greater Buenos Aires. He also emphasized the need to run a ticket that, being unobjectionable to everyone, would bring together the greatest number of votes, on top of those that Peronism itself is guaranteed to win. None of the candidates unites these characteristics to the extent that Framini does. Consequently, nothing seems so natural as for the ticket to be headed by this comrade, with one of the many candidates mentioned as his running mate. Overcoming friend Framini's scruples, I have convinced him to run for Governor ... and he has undertaken to do what I say in this matter. 94

A few days later, he proposed himself as candidate for deputy governor. The slogan "Framini y Peron, un solo corazon" (Framini and Peron, a single heart), was shouted by the Peronists and appeared on posters. The first rumors about Peron's intention of running for deputy governor took almost everyone by surprise, including Alberto lturbe and most of the Peronist leaders. It was Vicente Saadi who came out with the news in the Argentine press. In his meeting with Peron in Madrid, the now orthodox Saadi warned him: "General, they will abandon you if you yourself do not lead them to victory." 95 A few years later, Framini recounted ·that the previous night, at the opening of the campaign in the province of Buenos Aires, Mariano Tedesco had called him: He told me that the ticket was already known. I asked him what it was and where it had come from. He just answered: it's Framini-Per6n. I told him he was crazy, or pulling my leg. He insisted. I didn't see the reason for a decision like this. Besides, I was sure they weren't going to let him run. I was even more surprised when I found out that Peron was also going to appear on the lists for federal capital deputies. What kind of trick was this? Really, I didn't understand it. 96

Bramuglia could not believe the news. Once again, Peron had dealt him a low blow. One day before the Framini campaign was launched, he was still telling a reporter that he was not certain that the rumors of Peron's intentions were true. 97 Certainly it must have been extremely humiliating for the leader of the UP to have to speak at the opening of the campaign, which took place in Adolfo Alsina Plaza in the city of Avellaneda. 98 Apart from his personal feelings, however, the atmosphere was charged with excitement. At times the participants felt as if the glorious days of the past had returned: posters, songs, drums, and the party

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march with the most prominent leaders of the movement in the 1940s and 1950s-all gave the impression of a Peronist renaissance. Peron's veto of Bramuglia's candidacy for governor of Buenos Aires caused great disillusionment among the UP leaders, who felt humiliated, cheated, and deceived. Some of them, friends of Bramuglia for many years, who had been at his side in the hard years when they were still shaping the party and trying to assert its independence, who with him had been subjected to insults and threats, now realized once and for all that whether Bramuglia chose a path independent of Peron or opted to remain a loyal follower, his way to the top would remain blocked, a dead end with no way out. Accordingly, some of them resolved to get rid of him before their association with him ended up irreversibly tainting their own tmages. One example was Carlos Ballinas, who just a few months earlier, while witnessing the meeting between Bramuglia and Peron, had left a written record of his euphoria and his vision of a future in which the ex-foreign minister was virtually certain of winning the provincial governorship in the 1962 elections, and could aspire to the presidency of the republic in 1964 or 1965. Now, in contrast, Ballinas wrote the ousted candidate a long letter in a bitter, rather contemptuous tone, which we can imagine constituted a particularly painful link in the long chain of slights and humiliations that Bramuglia had to bear. Using the excuse of the intervention in the UP in the San Juan district, Ballinas announced his irrevocable resignation as a member of the party's National Committee, saying, Justicialism supports many liberal outposts in its bosom, and these cysts are what impede the definitive organization of the National Movement. During 1961 we have had the historic honor of remaining at the side of General Juan D. Peron, and once more we must recognize the precision of his thinking: "Bramuglia weaves ... and weaves ... but in the end he gets entangled in his own web." This time, too, he has become entangled, and you could not say with any certainty whether he serves [Pope] John XXIII, Karl Marx, Frondizi, Aramburu, or Per6n. 99

During the same period, the president of the metropolitan committee of the UP, Commander Vicente Domenico, also resigned. Because everyone knew that the military would not tolerate Peron running for deputy governor, Peron's gesture was very probably intended to provoke the proscription of all the UP candidates. 100 In fact, in his letter to the members of the CCS, Peron asked, "What sort of elections are they going to hold if the 'government,' pressured by the armed forces, is the one who chooses the candidates for the opposition tickets?" His conclusion was very clear: "To participate in elections under such circumstances

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is tantamount to legalizing the ongoing fraud, and also to giving legality to the 'government's' arbitrary decision to veto Peronist candidates ... It is indisputable that the 'government,' with this attitude, will not let us win a single election." 101 In this document Peron returned to the rhetoric of violence: "Disqualified from implementing decisions and prevented from exercising our rights as citizens, we have no alternative but to declare ourselves in open revolt and devote ourselves to preparing for national insurrection, which is the only path that imprudence and arbitrariness leave open to us." If it was indeed his intention to get the UP candidates disqualified, this "typical dirty trick" by the Conductor failed: The military vetoed only his own candidacy and permitted the rest of the candidates nominated by the UP to continue campaigning. On January 29, 1962, the interior minister, Alfredo Vftolo, met with the military secretaries of the three forces: General Rosendo Fraga of the army, Rear Admiral Gaston Clemente of the navy, and Brigadier Jorge Sylveyra of the air force. At this meeting the participants signed a secret document dealing with the challenge to Peron's candidacy for deputy governor of Buenos Aires. The military officers expressed their determination to prevent the restoration of the shameful regime overthrown by the Liberating Revolution, and the return of Juan Domingo Peron and those responsible with him for wrongs inflicted on the Nation, liberty, and humanity: criminals who cannot hold elective office, or any other office without impairment to the national dignity. In that sense, messieurs the Military Secretaries indicated that they are steadfastly determined to prevent by all possible means the return of the deposed fugitive to power or to politicallife. 102

However, they explained that this "did not mean that those who were partisans of the ex-dictator could not organize legally and be part of the national coexistence with peaceful, democratic objectives. It is Peron and his regime who are disqualified." Peron's order to abstain from these new elections aroused intense opposition from all the candidates and Vandor's supporters in the movement, who refused to continue obeying the deposed leader. Unprecedented turmoil broke out in the Peronist ranks, with neo-Peronists and Vandorists working behind the scenes to orchestrate insubordination against the founder of justicialism. Although removed from the competition for governor of the largest and most important province in the country, Bramuglia refused to give up his position within the movement, and he also played a major role in this challenge to Peron's leadership. A new delegation of the 62 Organizations left for Madrid to meet with the tenant of Arce Street, returning with new instructions barely eleven days after Peron had written the letter calling for abstention. This time Peron was

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forced to give the order to participate, which made some observers think that the Conductor was losing his ability to direct the course of events in his movement. A long, sincere letter to him from lturbe describes the palace coup that had taken place in the Peronist leadership. The importance of this document justifies its lengthy citation here: As I must inform you with all accuracy, although it pains me to say it, I must acknowledge that the Movement is now beyond the control of the Consejo as a body and of myself, of course, as secretary-general. Since the return of the "62" delegation the Movement has been directed by the union leaders, who in coming to the Consejo to debate some problem come simply to uphold what they have already decided. The justicialist political leadership has been almost completely supplanted, and, even more distressing, they keep up the appearance of political participation by having the neo-Peronist politicians appear as the leadership figures. For example, the union groups hold political talks with other parties and bring them already primed to the Consejo, so that the Movement is turning into a classist party in the way it is led, since the political sector is a numerical minority in the Consejo. But what's more, in the zeal to compete in the elections, so much preeminence is being given to neo-Peronism that the union faction now arranges problems directly with the neos, especially Bramuglia, to the point that I had to refuse to attend the announcement of the candidates of the Capital in Once, inasmuch as it appeared in all the papers that the candidates would be announced by Bramuglia, who would give the closing speech. 103

Bramuglia seemed to be a phoenix of sorts, suffering blow after blow from Peron over the years, yet each time rising again from the ashes, spreading his wings, and taking flight-until the next blow. A few days after everyone had given up his political career as a lost cause, he seemed to be back on center stage. The last paragraphs of Iturbe's ten-page letter show that, on the eve of the March 1962 elections, the ex-foreign minister was still a key figure in the Peronist movement: To sum up, I repeat, my General, that the Consejo has lost the political leadership of the movement, which at the current time has been assumed by the union sector, and by Tecera del Franco, Lucco, and Jornet in the Federal Capital, and generally speaking, especially [in] Buenos Aires Province, in consultation with Bramuglia, whose advice, one can't help noticing, is most sought after precisely by the sector that was most opposed to his running for governor of the Province. Confessing to you my failure in this respect, I must logically offer you my resignation, since I cannot take responsibility for what I cannot control.

After the Peronists were obliged to drop Peron as a candidate, on the legal grounds that he had not been registered in 1957, the internal struggle began over who would take his place. The solution was barely reached in the last twenty-four hours before the deadline, with a compromise proposed by the Vandor-Bramuglia axis. The nomination for

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deputy governor fell to Francisco Marcos Anglada, while union leaders were the overwhelming majority on all the lists. Anglada (1916-94), born in Necochea in the province of Buenos Aires, was the son of a railroad employee. He began his political activity in the Radical Party while he was a law student at the University of La Plata, with Ricardo Balbfn. He met the Union Ferroviaria's influential legal adviser when he accompanied his father, a union leader, to a meeting. At that time the young Anglada was legal adviser to the provincial Asociaci6n de Empleados, Jubilados y Pensionistas Ferroviarios. Shortly afterward he became part of the coterie of young Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare employees that formed around Bramuglia. Together with Salvador Cetra and Alejandro Leloir, Anglada came to Peronism through the Junta Renovadora of the UCR. When Bramuglia took up the job of interventor in the province of Buenos Aires, Anglada worked with him at the municipality of La Plata. In 1952 he became rector of the University of La Plata. Two months before the Liberating Revolution he was appointed minister of education in the national cabinet. When Peron's regime was overthrown, he spent three months in prison and then moved to Spain for a few years. 104 Bramuglia had in fact wanted him as his running mate back when he still nourished hopes of running for governor himself. The agreement reached with Peron provided that for every six candidates nominated by the 62 Organizations, six others would be selected as follows: two by the ex-president, one from the women's division, one from the UP, one from the neo-Peronist Labor Party, and another from the "orthodox" Partido Justicialista, founded in 1959 and immediately outlawed on the grounds that it was in fact "a continuation of Peronism." The same system, with slight variations, was used for the lists presented in the federal capital. The first five places on the UP list of candidates for the national congress were allocated to unionists, headed by Paulino Niembro, leader of the metalworkers' union in the capital and a close associate of Vandor. The successful campaign in the most important province was carried out by the UP and financed by the unions. Frondizi and his minister of the interior, Alfredo Vitolo, worked arduously for several months to convince the senior officers of the armed forces to permit candidates from the Peronist parties to run in the legislative and provincial elections. Vitolo assured the military officers that the groups in question would not win enough seats in congress, or in the provincial congresses, to do any harm, and letting them participate would serve to destroy the myth of Peron's power. Some of this complacency was probably inspired by the UCRI's December 1961 victory over the Peronist candidates in the elections in Santa Fe. 105 After the fact,

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Frondizi claimed to have foreseen his party's failure in the elections, although that is difficult to believe. 106 Frondizi's strategy failed. The anti-Peronist vote remained divided, and the UCRI was by now unacceptable to most Argentines. The elections of March 18, 1962, demonstrated the power of neo-Peronism, which under various names (Union Popular, Partido Laborista, Partido Blanco, Partido Tres Banderas, Movimiento Popular, etc.) obtained almost 32 percent of the votes, with a total of 2,53o,ooo, versus 2,454,000 for the UCRI and 1,886,ooo for the UCRP. 107 The Peronists would now have forty-five of the ninety-six seats up for election in the congress, and nine of the fourteen governors elected. Arias and Garda Heras correctly remark that "compared with its behavior in 1960, the Peronist electorate proved more disciplined in voting for its own candidates"; 108 in the federal capital the UCRI obtained 233,204 votes, the UP 200,575, and the UCRP 181,823. In the province of Buenos Aires, Framini was victorious with 1,171,757 votes, largely thanks to the campaign stratagems that the UP was able to orchestrate there with the aid and funding of the unions, particularly the UOM. 109 The UCRI, which had invested the trifling sum of 150 million pesos, the equivalent of about half a million dollars, came in second with 731,877 votes, while the UCRP attracted 627,094 voters. 110 Once again Bramuglia, who had put the UP at the service of the Frente Justicialista and whose party had provided many candidates for legislative offices, played an important role in the triumph of Peronism without being able to enjoy the fruits of it himself. Bramuglia had again become a bridge that allowed Peron to move forward toward his goals. In a posthumous tribute to Bramuglia organized in early September 1965 in the deliberative council of General San Martin in the province of Buenos Aires, the speaker, Mr. Cuccarese, described, in rather idealized terms, the role that had fallen to the founder of the UP in the 1962 campaign. He said that although many Peronists had called for him to fill the highest office in the province of Buenos Aires, Bramuglia "loyally respect[ed] the decision of the Lider, and in a rarely matched gesture of generosity he [went] around one by one to the villages of Buenos Aires to contribute to the resounding triumph of 18 March 1962." 111 To some extent, the alliance of verticalists, syndicalists, and neoPeronists had achieved the electoral legitimation of Peronism. However, this victory at the polls did not pave the way for the legalization of the Partido Justicialista; it simply marked the beginning of the end for Frondizi. If the president believed that a strong neo-Peronist presence would help his cause, as it had in the provincial elections at the end of the previous year, he discovered, much to his regret, that his calculations

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had been wrong. Now he feared the reaction of the armed forces, having assured them that a Framini victory in the province of Buenos Aires was impossible. His fears were justified: The military leaders refused to accept the results of the democratic process and proceeded to annul the elections. Interventors were installed in most of the provinces where Peronism had triumphed, including Buenos Aires, Tucuman, Santiago del Estero, Chaco, and Rio Negro. The president turned to General Aramburu again, asking him to pacify his former subordinates and help Frondizi weather the crisis, but without success. Not even Frondizi's promise that he would support Aramburu as a candidate for president succeeded in motivating the ex-commander of the Liberating Revolution; 112 although Aramburu had lent his assistance more than once in the past to keep Frondizi in the government, on this occasion he could not be moved. The political comings and goings and the pressures and counterpressures continued for several days. Among other stratagems, Frondizi tried to form a coalition cabinet with the UCRP, but Ricardo Balbfn, too, refused his support. No one was willing to offer the president any political credit at all; for the moment the internal bickering in the armed forces seemed to have disappeared. Andres Framini figuratively described the internal contradictions of the government's actions: "Frondizi put one foot on each horse. One foot on the pueblo and one foot on the antipueblo. When the horses moved apart, he fell." 113 Frondizi was deposed by a military coup on March 29, r962, and was sent under arrest to the Island of Martin Garcia.U 4 His views on Cuba and on the Peronist question had been the last straw for the military. Although Argentina severed relations with the Havana regime in February, this measure was seen as too little and too late for the president and his political survival. 115 The military, despite its range of ideological orientations, had collectively lost its confidence in the government and its winding road. Even Frondizi's handling of the Peronist electoral victory was seen as too little and too late. Frondizi's moderate policy on Cuba also aroused the displeasure of the United States, which did not make much of an effort to prevent his overthrow. For the Kennedy administration, halting the advance of Castro and communism on the continent was more important than maintaining democracy in Argentina or promoting the activities of the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy himself was intolerant of Argentina's constant refusal to share his own vision of the dangers of the Cold War and to accept the dictates of the United States. 116 His government not only failed to defend a democratically elected president and friend of the United States at a decisive historical crossroads, but it actually en-

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couraged Argentine military circles to oppose Frondizi on account of his policy on the Cuban question. Arthur Schlesinger, President Kennedy's adviser, was notable for his opposition to giving the Argentine armed forces the "green light" for taking power. In a memorandum dated March 20, he expressed his alarm at the State Department's support for Ambassador McClintock's rejection of Frondizi's request that the U.S. diplomatic legation use its influence with the armed forces to prevent a coup. Schlesinger suggested to McClintock to at least communicate the following to the generals, "Our view is that in all normal cases the maintenance of constitutional processes is more important than anything else. If Argentina, the best educated and most advanced country in Latin America, should respond to every irritation by a military coup, it will set back the cause of constitutionalism not only in Argentina but across the continent." 117 Schlesinger was virtually alone in his protest, however. Most of Washington's representatives preferred to say nothing, an attitude that was interpreted as consent. A couple of weeks later, Dean Rusk, at that time assistant secretary of state, explained briefly at a meeting with members of Congress that what had led to the coup against Frondizi was the direct result of his attitude toward Castro. 118 While the military heads were debating the political future, the defense minister, Rodolfo Martinez, and the minister of the Supreme Court, Julio Oyhanarte, swore in as president the person who was supposed to succeed Frondizi under the law of presidential succession: the president of the senate, Jose Marfa Guido (Frondizi's vice president had resigned in 1959 and was never replaced). This solution, which preserved the appearance of legality, was supported by many Radicals from both factions, as well as by Aramburu. In any case, it was very clear who the heads of state really were. The dissolution of congress and intervention in the provinces showed that the reins of power were in the hands of the military. 119 The hostility between Peronists and anti-Peronists kept escalating in the following months, partly because of the armed confrontations between the "Azules" ("Blues") and the "Colorados" ("Reds"), opposing factions within the armed forces. Andres Framini, who had been democratically elected governor of the province of Buenos Aires before the army intervened there, warned of uprisings and bloodshed if Peronist voters had no electoral outlet. Meanwhile, Raul Matera, who had taken a moderate position up until the election results were canceled, announced that there would no longer be a moderate line and a hard line in the movement; all were united in the struggle for elections, and the alternative

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was bloodshedP 0 On May I, the date that the elected Peronist governors should have taken office, the movement organized a symbolic takeover of Government House. Now it was Framini who led the attack against the government, adopting a rather belligerent tone that displeased Bramuglia and that merely helped confirm the conservatives in their belief that Peronism would open the gates to a socialist revolution. Framini made several highly publicized visits to Madrid, there receiving Peron's approval of his "turn to the left." In July I962 Framini and Olmos called a plenary meeting of the 62 Organizations in Huerta Grande, in the province of Cordoba. The meeting adopted a radical program of social change, including worker control of production, the nationalization of basic industries, and an agrarian reform that would affect the landowning oligarchy. 121 Once more, Peron's support for the left wing of his movement was intended, first, to counteract the strength of potentially more autonomous sectors, such as the neo-Peronist parties or the Vandorist movement, whose growing influence threatened to turn the exiled leader into a mere figurehead. As Framini told it years later, "I had an order from Peron to assume a position and I couldn't say so. The blame or the applause had to fall on Framini. The general had to be kept above everything." 122 Around the end of August, the electoral judge in the federal capital announced a ruling that annulled the legal recognition of the UP as a party, based on the provisions of Decree 7I62, which amended the Statute of Political Parties. The judge's ruling was based on the fact that in the elections of February I96I for the seats of a senator and a national deputy in the federal capital, the UP had received only some Io,ooo votes, less than 3 percent of the total. In the elections of March IS, I962, in the same city, the UP won almost 32o,ooo votes, coming in second place after the UCRI; but since those elections were later annulled because of the Peronist victories in various provinces, they could not be considered as "the last valid elections" under the terms of the amended Statute. Accordingly, the UP lost its legal status and capacity to act. 123 A few days after this court decision, Bramuglia was admitted to a Buenos Aires clinic for a surgical procedure "of no particular importance," according to his friends. He was operated on for a stomach ulcer that had been giving him trouble for some time. In the process the surgeon discovered a tumor and removed it. The doctors considered the operation a success, and the patient was not thought to be in any immediate danger. Four hours later, however, Bramuglia suffered heart failure, dying instantly early in the morning of Tuesday, September 4· He was 59 years old. 124

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The following day, his remains were interred in the Chacarita cemetery in Buenos Aires. A large crowd-close to a thousand peoplewas already gathered at the cemetery when the hearse, preceded by five flower-bedecked cars, arrived. The ceremony was attended by exministers of the Peronist government, ex-legislators, ex-diplomats, labor leaders, and political figures, including Franklin Lucero, Ramon Cereijo, Delia Parodi, Generals Anaya and Bengoa, Alejandro Leloir, Domingo Mercante, Antonio Cafiero, Andres Framini, Rodolfo Tecera del Franco, and Francisco Marcos Anglada. Notable among the floral tributes was one flaunting the name of its sender: "Juan Peron." The thirteen speeches delivered on this occasion will not be quoted here, although some of them will be mentioned briefly. The first speaker was Eduardo Stafforini, one of the architects of the social policies of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare back in the mid-1940s, who highlighted Bramuglia's work in the field of labor legislation. Marcelo Benmaor spoke on behalf of the UP, recalling words spoken by the departed politician: "Let us not seek the road of violence, he always told us: 'We must seek dialog because might does not make right.'" Raul Bustos Fierro, in the name of the Labor Party, reminisced about Bramuglia's international career, particularly his term as president of the UN General Assembly, saying, "no one has given the country as much prestige in international politics as Bramuglia." The Peronist militant Jesus Porto added, "He was a bad politician because he was truthful. He was a bad politician because he never changed his ideals. We all die a little day by day in this country as we see Argentina dismantled. We can also say that Argentina has killed Bramuglia. Because he suffered for Argentina." Valentin Lucca said that Bramuglia had died "when the darkest night falls on the history of the country. A short time ago his party died in the machine of a political statute, and now he dies. Perhaps when the hour of victory is closer than ever." Speaking for the CGT, Manuel Evaristo Reyno said, "Of humble origins, the son of laborers, he knew sacrifice and made his way by his own efforts." The last speaker was Framini, on behalf of the 62 Organizations. He said of the decedent that he had been "an example of fervor in the inevitable triumph of the humble. He was and is a Peronist. This is his greatest title.''1 25 Now that Bramuglia-and the political challenge he represented-was dead, it appeared that all the Peronists were united in eulogizing him. Thus the curtain fell on one more act of the political drama starring the Union Popular. The party's new leaders, who included Tecera del Franco and Carlos Bramuglia, son of the late founder, lacked the prestige and the experience of the ex-foreign minister. As a result, it was

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now easier for Peron to use the party and its apparatus to promote his own interests; the personal hostility he had felt towards his ex-minister did not carry over to his relations with Bramuglia's successors. 126

A FEW FINAL REFLECTIONS

Should Juan Atilio Bramuglia's political career be summed up as a failure? The response seems clear and incisive, as presented in the introduction to this book. And yet the concept of failure is a bit elusive. General George Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State, said once that if Bramuglia had been born in the United States of America, he would have become president. Bramuglia never occupied Rivadavia's seat, and if this is the criterion, then there is not the slightest doubt that his is the story of a failure. Some see in the photographs of the period a certain physical similarity between him and Peron, although Bramuglia obviously did not have the same charisma or leadership capacity. However, he helped shape the justicialist doctrine and the Peronist movement, the most important political force of twentieth-century Argentina, and he also played an important role in the turbulent period after the fall of the regime; so perhaps it is not fair to speak of Bramuglia's failure. Certainly he was personally defeated after reaching the summit of his career in the foreign ministry, and then again when he tried to achieve a political renaissance; but Bramuglia triumphed in many respects, and he left his mark on various institutional aspects of Peronism, from its ideology to the reinforcement of the tendency to institutionalize the party at the expense of the plebiscitarian leader and the unions. It would appear that Bramuglia indeed believed in the ideas that he upheld in most of his political speeches, and from that perspective he had his triumphs. In a country like Argentina, which has oscillated between ideological inconsistency and the narrowest dogmatism, the trajectory of political leaders like Bramuglia needs to be redeemed. In any case, the political career of this union lawyer who metamorphosed into foreign minister and political leader offers us another perspective, until now practically unknown, for understanding different characteristics of the Peronist movement and Argentine politics of the period 1943-62. What is more, it can help round out our understanding of the Peronist phenomenon as a whole, complementing, on one hand, the studies centered on the figures of Peron and Evita, and, on the other, more recent works (such as those of Daniel James) that focus on "ordinary" Peronists. Bramuglia's biography thus falls somewhere between Peron's biography and the stories of lives such as Dofia Marfa's, revealing

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the functions and influence of the intermediaries between the leader and the masses. The force of Juan Domingo Peron's personalist leadership extended beyond his own life and pervaded the history of the political movement that he led for almost thirty years. Not only did his exclusivist leadership eclipse the individuals who were his companions, but it also swallowed them up in later years, consigning them to historiographic oblivion. Between Peron, Evita, and the Peronist masses was an enormous void, partially covered over by a series of intermediary leaders judged by how "loyal" or "disloyal" they were to the Conductor and his wife. This book seeks to fill that void in another way: by shedding light on the second line of the original Peronism in general and on the figure of Juan Atilio Bramuglia in particular, and emphasizing, among other things, the contradictory alternatives inherent in this populist movement. As for the experience of the UP under Bramuglia's leadership, as described in the last two chapters, it can scarcely be considered a successeven less so if its goal really was to "bury the body [of Peron] and appropriate the coffin." 127 The party wanted to assume Peron's mantle and present an institutionalized, organized, and democratic version of Peronism, waving the banner of social reforms and working-class integration into the political process. Bramuglia also tried to defuse the Peronism/antiPeronism conflict, taking advantage of the fact that he was respected by both the Peronists and their opponents (particularly in the Radical Party, where he had friends in the leadership-notably Frondizi and Balbfnand among second- and third-line activists, especially in the UCRI), in both Argentina and abroad. To a certain extent, Bramuglia's effort, like that of Vandor a few years later, represented a solution to what the political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell called "the impossible game," the situation where the military could live neither with nor without the electoral restrictions imposed on Peronism since 1955. 128 From 1955 on, various neo-Peronist politicians shared the same views on Peron, whose caudillismo they believed they had to sweep away once and for all, in order to make way for an organic, impersonal leadership. Juan Atilio Bramuglia, Peron's close colleague from the first, was the man who most determinedly confronted the task of constructing a party that was Peronist from the doctrinal standpoint, but did not include Per6n-or, rather, in which Peron was no longer the omnipotent head. Bramuglia apparently thought the same thing that Vandorism would sum up in the mid-196os in the memorable slogan, "to save Peron you must be against Peron." Peronism has always been very strong on collective identity, but weakly organized as a political party. Bramuglia's aim was precisely to

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make the national movement into a party. As James McGuire has pointed out, the leaders and members of a national movement wish to establish hegemonic control over the system of government, whereas the leaders of

a party want their organizations to obtain victories over and over again, in free, clean elections, competing with other parties. A national movement, which supposedly embodies the highest interests of the nation, explores many different routes to power besides the legal, electoral ways, whereas a political party can only test itself in elections. 129 Bramuglia clearly preferred the second option, and this outlook gave rise to very harsh criticism in the orthodox ranks of the movement, where many labeled him as a traitor to the cause and its principles. It must be borne in mind that the morality and values that arose out of the experience of the resistance against Aramburu and Frondizi were a crucial ideological legacy for many Peronists. As Daniel James has shown, the hard line turned into an attitude, a "structure of feeling," more than an articulated political or ideological stand.B° For these people, Bramuglia's discourse was anathema. Ultimately, both the hard line and the soft line of the movement adopted their own selective interpretations of the Peronist experience to justify their views, and considered their rivals as disloyal to the doctrine. The Catholic overtones of Bramuglia's rhetoric in later years and the fact that the party platform offered broader prospects for private economic activity conferred upon the UP and Bramuglia an image of conservative Peronism that undermined its popularity within the movement, but did give the party an advantage in some sectors of the country and abroad, where at times the UP was the only palatable Peronist force. This caused Peron great concern. The UP's victory in the Buenos Aires provincial election highlighted its alliance with the union leaders who would soon constitute the Vandorist movement, another challenge to Peron's leadership that would end badly. However, if Bramuglia was expecting Peron's overthrow to initiate the routinization of his charismatic authority or a dispersion of charisma, the facts proved otherwise. The failure of this "early neo-Peronism" had various causes, of which two are particularly important. First, Peron's charismatic leadership did not permit the UP to lead an independent existence. The exiled general did not give up on the longed-for return, and did everything in his not inconsiderable means to create obstacles for the party and to block any alternative to himself. In fact, he became the arbitrator of Argentine politics after 1955, an arena in which the main political force remained proscribed. The challenges presented by Vandor in 1966 and Antonio Cafiero in 1988 also failed, because of Peron's opposition in the first case and the opposition of one of his charismatic

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successors, Carlos Saul Menem, in the second. In each, the situation was compounded by the rejection of union leaders who needed Peron's and later Menem's help to win political battles in their unions and the CGT. 131 The second reason is connected with the intransigent attitudes of the main political and social sectors toward a party (the UP) that waved the banner of social reforms, as well as the rigid views of military officers who, living in the climate of the Cold War, saw reformist populism as a preamble to revolutionary socialism and therefore also preferred to eliminate the neo-Peronist political experiment, which they considered as a threat to public order and the existing economy. The legislation adopted after Peron's overthrow was draconian and did not permit any unrestricted neo-Peronist activity. From the Liberating Revolution on, successive governments tried to build a democracy that would exclude the majorities of the right from full political participation. Consequently, although neo-Peronism per se failed, the national governments failed too, because they adopted the language of exclusion. On one hand, they offered no recognition or legal status to the neo-Peronists, thus providing no support for any moderate tendency within the justicialist camp and enhancing the myth of Peron. On the other hand, they did not have the capacity to attract more than a few of the deposed leader's numerous followers to the non-Peronist parties. Consequently, the threat the Peronist hard line presented to the political establishment only grew in the following years and ended up costing Argentine society an exorbitant price.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

r. Anthony M. Friedson, ed., New Directions in Biography (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981); Stephen B. Oates, ed., Biography as High Adventure (Amherst: University of Massachussetts, 1986); Moshe Zimmermann, "Biography as a Historical Monograph," Tel Aviver ]ahrbuch fiir Deutsche Geschichte 20 (1991): 449-457; Anita Shapira, "The Mysteries of Biography" [Hebrew], Alpaim 8 (1993): 225-239. 2. B. Tuchman, "Biography as a Prism of History," in Biography as High Adventure, ed. Oates, 94· 3· Ruth Sautu, ed., El metoda biogrcifico (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1999), 21. For a fascinating life history and its application to the study of Peronism by a historian devoted to oral history, see Daniel James, Doiia Maria's Story: Life History, Memory, and Political Identity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2ooo); Mirta Lobato, "Mujeres en Ia f:ibrica: El caso de las obreras en el frigorifico Armour 1915-1969,'' Anuario IEHS 5 (1990). 4· GeorgeS. Messersmith Papers [hereafter GSM Papers], University of Delaware Library, Newark, Delaware (March 12 and 31, 1947); C. A. MacDonald, "The U.S., Britain and Argentina in the Years Immediately after the Second World War," in The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946, ed. Guido Di Tella and D. C. Platt (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 186; Moshe Tov, El murmullo de Israel-historial diplomcitico (Jerusalem: Semana Publicaciones, 1983), 98. 5· The biographical information on Bramuglia is based in part on my interviews with his children, Carlos Atilio (Buenos Aires, June 1989, and Madrid, July 2002) and Miriam Esther (Lita) (Buenos Aires, August 2003), and his nieces, Cristina Bramuglia (Buenos Aires, April 1996) and Maria Graciela Bramuglia (Buenos Aires, April 1996), as well as a letter Bramuglia sent to the editor of the nationalist daily La Fronda in October 1941, in which he objected to having been described as a communist and presented his social and political

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creed: Juan Atilio Bramuglia Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University (hereafter JAB Papers), Bramuglia to Delfin Medina, October 5, I94I, caja I, expediente I (hereafter III). 6. Another possibility, of course, is that my interviewees did not think that these aspects of his life would be interesting to historians and so chose to focus on his public life. 7· On prosopography, see Lawrence Stone, "Prosopography," Daedalus (Winter, I97I): 46-79; T. F. Carney, "Prosopographie Payoffs and Pitfalls," Phoenix 27 (I993): Is6-I79; Karl Ferdinand Werner, ''L'apport de Ia prosopographie a l'histoire sociale des elites," in Family Trees and the Roots of Politics, ed. K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, I997). 8. Monica Esti Rein, Politics and Education in Argentina I946-I962, trans. Martha Grenzeback (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, I998). 9· Mariano Ben Plotkin, Manana es San Peron (Buenos Aires: Ariel, I993), Part IV. IO. Robert Gittings, The Nature of Biography (Seattle: University of Washington Press, I978), 77· II. See, for example, the significant collection of articles compiled by Darfo Macor and Cesar Teach, La invencion del peronismo en el interior del pais (Santa Fe: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 2003). I2. The only two figures to which historians have paid any attention at alland even that partial and limited-are Borlenghi and Mercante. See Domingo Alfredo Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron (Buenos Aires: De Ia Flor, I995); Enrique Pavon Pereyra, Borlenghi: Hombre de estado (Buenos Aires: Desmemoria, I999). I3. See, for example, Marfa F. Arias and Raul Garcia Heras, "Carisma disperso y rebelion: Los partidos neoperonistas," in Peron del exilio al poder, ed. Samuel Amaral and Mariano Plotkin (Buenos Aires: Cantaro, I993), 95-I25; James W. McGuire, Peronism Without Peron: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, I997). I4· Raanan Rein, The Franco-Peron Alliance: Relations Between Spain & Argentina I946-r955, trans. Martha Grenzeback (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, I993). An Argentine edition was published under the title Entre el abismo y la salvacion: El pacta Franco-Peron, trans. Bar Kojba Malaj (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Lumiere, 2003). CHAPTER ONE

r. Torcuato Luca de Tena eta!., Yo, Juan Domingo Peron (Barcelona: Planeta, I976), 88. 2. Alberto Ciria, Peron y el justicialismo (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, I97I);Juan Corradi, "Between Corporatism and Insurgency: The Sources of Ambivalence in Peronist Ideology," in Terms of Conflict: Ideology in Latin American Politics, ed. Morris Blachman and Ronald Hellman (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, I977); Ricardo del Barco, El regimen peronista I946-r955 (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, I983); Mariano Plotkin,

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"La ideologfa de Peron: Rupturas y continuidades," in Peron del exilio al poder, ed. S. Amaral and M. Plotkin (Buenos Aires: Cintaro, I993). 3· G. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I953), 279· 4· Carlos S. Fayt et al., La naturaleza del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Viracocha, I967). A detailed comparison can be found in Paul H. Lewis, "Was Peron a Fascist? An Inquiry into the Nature of Fascism," journal of Politics 42, no. I (I98o): 242-256. See also Alberto Spektorowski, The Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). For a systematic discussion of the characteristics of fascism, see Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, I9I4-I945 (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, I995). 5· Seymour M. Lipset, The Political Man (London: Heinemann, I965), I70-I73· 6. There is wide debate concerning Peronism's social base. This is not the place to delve into it, but some of the more prominent contributions to this discussion are: Manuel Mora y Araujo and Ignacio Llorente, camps., El voto peronista (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, I98o); P. H. Smith, "The Social Base of Peronism," Hispanic American Historical Review 52, no. I (I952): 55-73; E. Spencer Wellhofer, "Peronism in Argentina: The Social Base of the First Regime, I946-I955,'' The Journal of Developing Areas II, no. 3 (I977): 335-356; Walter Little, "The Popular Origins of Peronism," in Argentina in the Twentieth Century, ed. D. Rock (London: Duckworth, I975), I62-I78. 7· Jose Luis de Imaz, Los que mandan (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1977), I9. According to Peter Snow, 32 percent of the Peronist members of congress in I946 had union backgrounds. See P. Snow, Political Forces in Argentina (New York: Praeger I979), 32. 8. For a Latin American attack against Peronist Argentina's plans for expansion and infiltration, see Alejandro Magnet, Nuestros vecinos justicialistas (Santiago de Chile: Del Pacifico, I954), ch. 7; Juan Oddone, Vecinos en discordia (Montevideo: Universidad de Ia Republica, 2003). 9· Monica Quijada, "El proyecto peronista de creacion de un Zollverein sudamericano, I946-I955,'' Ciclos 6 (I994): 145-I72; Juan Peron, Tercera Posicion y unidad latinoamericana (Buenos Aires: Biblos, I98 5). IO. According to some more recent literature, the policies of rapprochement toward neighboring countries undertaken by Peron between I953 and I955 can be seen as a first attempt to create a common market in the Southern Cone along the lines of today's Mercosur. II. On this subject, see, for example, Kevin Passmore, ed., Women, Gender, and Fascism in Europe (New Brunswick, N.J.: Manchester University Press, 2003) and Barbara Spackman, Fascist Virilities: Rhetoric, Ideology, and Social Fantasy in Italy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I996). I2. Opinions differ as to Evita's real power and whether it was independent of or even rivaled that of Peron, or whether she was simply a tool in Peron's hands. See, among others, Marysa Navarro, Evita (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, I98I); Alicia Dujovne Ortiz, Eva Peron: La biograf£a (Buenos Aires: Aguilar,

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1995); and Julie M. Taylor, Eva Peron: The Myth of a Woman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). IJ. Gino Germani, Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transicion (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1968), 319. 14· M. E. Rein, Politics and Education in Argentina; Raanan Rein, Peronismo, populismo y politica: Argentina 1943-1955 (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrana, 1998), ch. 3; M. Plotkin, Manana es San Peron, ch. 5-6; Jorge Bernetti and Adriana Puiggros, Peronismo: cultura politica y educacion (Buenos Aires: Galerna, 1993). I 5. On the Manichean discourse that divides society into antagonistic factions, the people against the oligarchy, see Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977). r6. On Peron's regime and the judicial power, see Ezequiel Abasolo, "La dimension politica de la Corte Suprema durante el regimen peronista," EIAL 13, no. 2 (2003): 65-87. 17. For a recent contribution to the study of the opposition to Peronism, see the articles of Marcela Garda Sebastiani, "The Other Side of Peronist Argentina: Radicals and Socialists in the Political Opposition to Peron (1946-1955)," Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (2003): 3n-339; idem, "Peronismo y oposicion polftica en el Parlamento argentino. La dimension del conflicto con la Union Cfvica Radical (1946-1951)," Revista de Indias 221 (2oor): 27-66. 18. Pablo Sirven, Peron y los medias de comunicacion (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1984). 19. Ricardo Sidicaro, La politica mirada desde arriba: Las ideas del diario La Nacion I909-1989 (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1993). 20. Quoted in Lars Schoultz, The Populist Challenge: Argentine Electoral Behavior in the Postwar Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 4· 21. G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, eds., Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics (New York: Macmillan, 1969), r. 22. Zeev Sternhell, Fascist Thought and Its Variations [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1988), 14· 23. Extensive research has been done on Latin American populism. The most notable works include: Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978); Francisco C. Weffort, 0 populismo na politica brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1978); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), ch. 4; Michael L. Conniff, ed., Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982). Prominent among the more recent works are Alan Knight, "Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico," Journal of Latin American Studies 30 (1998): 225-248; Maria Moira Mackinnon and Mario Alberto Petrone, comps., Populismo y neopopulismo en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1998); Michael L. Conniff, ed., Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999); Carlos de Ia Torre,

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Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). 24. On the parallels between Yrigoyen and Peron in this respect, see David Tamarin, "Yrigoyen and Peron: The Limits of Argentine Populism," in Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, ed. Michael L. Conniff, 3I-45· 25. Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Obstacles to Change in Latin America, ed. Claudio Veliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 47· 26. Carlos Waisman argues that Peronism was essentially a counterrevolutionary movement. See his Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Parties and their Structural Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). 27. Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, r946-r976 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Part r. 28. Jose Alvarez Junco, "El populismo como problema," in El populismo en Espana y America, ed. Alvarez Junco and Gonzalez Leandri (Madrid: Catriel, 1994), 27. 29. Dan Keith Simonton, Genius, Creativity, and Leadership: Historiometric Inquiries (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, r984), r2r. 30. Max Weber, Economy and Society, trans. Ephraim Fischoff eta!. (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968), 241. For a more recent contribution to the debate over the "creation of charisma," see Ronald Glassman, "Legitimacy and Manufactured Charisma," Social Research 42 (Winter, 1975); Clifford Geertz, "Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbols of Power," in Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology (New York, Basic Books, 1983), 121-q6. 31. We will not broach the question here as to whether Argentina's circumstances at the beginning of the 1940s can be considered as a social crisis and institutional breakdown. 32. Carlos Vilas, "Estudio preliminario: El populismo o Ia democratizacion fundamental de America Latina," in La democratizaci6n fundamental: El populismo en America Latina (Mexico City: Consejo Nacional para Ia Cultura y las Artes, 1995), rr-18. 33· Weber, Economy and Society, 242. 34· Douglas Madsen and Peter G. Snow, The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Times of Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I991), 5· 35· Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), 98-104, especially p. 98. 36. Madsen and Snow should be given credit for questioning this attitude; see The Charismatic Bond, 8. For a discussion of these ideas, see Jose Enrique Miguens, "The Presidential Elections of 1973 and the End of an Ideology," in Juan Peron and the Reshaping of Argentina, ed. Frederick C. Turner and ]. E. Miguens (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 147-150.

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37· Germani, Polftica y sociedad en una epoca de transicion; Samuel L. Baily, Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967). 38. Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sabre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 1971). More recent works include: David Tamarin, The Argentine Labor Movement, I930-I945= A Study in the Origins of Peronism (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); Joel Horowitz, Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Peron, I930I945 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1990); Juan Carlos Torre, La vieja guardia sindical y Peron: Sabre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1990); Roberto P. Korzeniewicz, "Labor Unrest in Argentina, 1930-1943," Latin American Research Review 28, no. I (1993): 7-40. 39· Madsen and Snow, The Charismatic Bond, 25. See also E. Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," World Politics I I (1958): 1-19. 40. Madsen and Snow, The Charismatic Bond, 25. 41. See, for example, A. E. Van Niekerk, Populism and Political Development in Latin America (Rotterdam: Universitaire Pers Rotterdam, 1974). 42. Guido Di Tella, Peron-Peron, I973-r976 (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1983), I08. 43· Robert Dix was unable to detect changes in the development of Peronism, which he saw as an authoritarian populist movement from its beginnings up to the 1970s. In his view, Peronism, like Ibaiiism in Chile and the Rojas movement in Colombia, was a typical example of authoritarian populism, whereas Accion Democratica (AD) in Venezuela, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria (APRA) in Peru, and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in Bolivia are examples of democratic populism. SeeR. H. Dix, "Populism: Authoritarian and Democratic," Latin American Research Review 20, no. 2 (1985): 29-52. 44· Peron himself never denied this eclecticism: "In the first place, we are not sectarian ... We obey facts ... If there is something in communism we can take, we take it, names don't frighten us. If fascism, anarchism, or communism has something good, we take it." Quoted in Cristian Buchrucker, Nacionalismo y peronismo: La Argentina en la crisis ideologica mundial (r927-I955) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1987), 325. It should be recalled that the Peronist doctrine was developed at a relatively late stage, after Peron was already president, and even then it was never really put into any kind of systematic order. One of the first efforts to systematize the doctrine can be found in Raul A. Mende, El justicialismo-doctrina y realidad peronista (Buenos Aires: Doctrinarias, 1950). 45· Fayt, La naturaleza del peronismo, 106. 46. The following paragraphs are based partly on an interview I held with his widow, Clara Borlenghi (Buenos Aires, Sept. 9, 1997), in her office at the union of commercial employees-a union that her husband had led since 1931-as well as on Enrique Pavon Pereyra, Borlenghi: Hombre de estado (Buenos Aires: Desmemoria, 1999); Luis Alberto Debayle, "Apuntes para !a biograffa de un ministro que dur6 nueve aiios," Esto es, July 19, I955·

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47· Peron to Borlenghi, Nov. 15, 1957 (copy of letter in author's possession). 48. Horowitz, Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Peron, 81-84. 49· Ibid., So; author's interview with Dardo Cuneo (Buenos Aires, April 26, 1996), who was a member of the Socialist Party in those years. "We leaders of that period were always bothered by the carpet that Borlenghi had in his office; with our [class] struggle mentality, we did not approve of it" (interview with R. Gincochio, Proyecto de Historia Oral, Instituto Di Tella, Buenos Aires). According to Perez Leiros, "Borlenghi was an effeminate-looking guy, always well-dressed, always well-turned-out, a man who did not run the risk of getting arrested for the way he looked" (interview, Proyecto de Historia Oral, Instituto Di Tella). so. Jose M. Gofii Moreno, La hora decisiva (Buenos Aires: Pefia Lillo, 1967), 76. The participants in this meeting included Jose Marfa Argafia, who, like Borlenghi, moved from socialism to Peronism. 51. Felix Luna, El45: Cronica de un aiio decisivo, 1st ed. (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1971), 85 ff. 52. Rodolfo Puiggros, El peronismo, 126, cited in Horowitz, Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Peron, 199. 53· Torre, La vieja guardia sindical y Peron, 50-89; Hugo L. Sylvester, Historia viva de Ia legislaci6n del trabajo (Buenos Aires: Asociaci6n Obrera Minera Argentina, 1968), ch. 17. 54· Quoted in Pavon Pereyra, Borlenghi, 23. A slightly different version appears in Torre, La vieja guardia sindical, IIO. 55· Jeremy Adelman, "Reflections on Argentine Labour and the Rise of Peron," Bulletin of Latin American Research II, no. 3 (1992): 243-259. 56. El Obrero Ferroviario, Sept. r. 1945. 57· Adelman, "Reflection on Argentine Labour," p. 251. 58. Luis Gay, El Partido Laborista en Ia Argentina (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1999), 19. 59· Pavon Pereyra, Borlenghi, 90. This accusation was made at the beginning of April 1947, in Congress, by the rebel labor leader, Cipriano Reyes, a declared enemy of Borlenghi. According to Reyes, in the uncertain days leading up to October 17, Borlenghi had supported the opposition's proposal to hand power over to the Supreme Court. See Horowitz, Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Peron, I930-I945, 201; Torre, La vieja guardia sindical y Peron, 221-222, n. 26. 6o. Luna, El45, 85 ff. 6r. On some of the positions Borlenghi took while acting as minister of the interior, see the following: Angel G. Borlenghi, La reforma constitucional (Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1948); idem, Evolucion del movimiento obrero (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1950); idem, La opinion de Peron sabre los empleados de comercio; las directivas de Borlenghi orientan al gremio (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1954). 62. Interview with R. Margueirat, Proyecto de Historia Oral, Instituto Di Tella, Buenos Aires, 12. 63. Interview with 0. Albrieu, Proyecto de Historia Oral, Instituto Di Tella, Buenos Aires, 33·

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64. Interview with R. Margueirat, 16. 65. Pavon Pereyra, Borlenghi, 4S-49. 66. Gay, El Partido Laborista, 197. 67. Joseph A. Page, Peron: A Biography (New York: Random House, 1983), ch. 2o; Serafino Romualdi, Presidents and Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967), ch. 4; Torre, La vieja guardia sindical, 23S-250. 6S. Robert A. Potash, El ejercito y Ia politica en Ia Argentina, vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 19S5), 193. 69. Quoted in Hugo Gambini, Historia del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1999), I: 279. 70. Author's interview with Jose Luis de Imaz (Buenos Aires, September 1, 1997). 71. Quoted in Pavon Pereyra, Borlenghi, 159. 72. Quoted in Gambini, Historia del peronismo, II: 55· 73· Marcela Garda Sebastiani, "El Partido Socialista en Ia Argentina peronista: Oposicion y crisis de representacion polftica (1946-1951)," EIAL 13, no. 2 (2002): 31-63. 74· La Vanguardia had been published as a partisan periodical since 1905, except for interruptions under the military governments of Uriburu, Ramirez, and Farrell. Since its reappearance in January 1945, the socialist weekly had been managed by Americo Ghioldi and enjoyed a large circulation that extended beyond the membership of the Socialist Party. According to the party, in early 194S, four months before it was shut down, it had a press run of 2oo,ooo copies and of 30o,ooo on the eve of its closure. Ibid., n. 55· Despite being shut down, the paper continued to appear clandestinely, in limited numbers. 75· The opposing views are reflected in Julio Gonzalez, La oportunidad del Partido Socialista. Reflexiones sabre su accion futura (Buenos Aires: n.p., 19 so); Americo Ghioldi, Los trabajadores, el senor Peron y el Partido Socialista. Peron 2es socialista o retrogrado? (Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia, 1950). 76. Dardo Cuneo, Renuncia a! Comite Ejecutivo (circulacion exclusiva entre afiliados del Partido Socialista) (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1952), 14· 77· Quoted in Garda Sebastiani, "El Partido Socialista en Ia Argentina peronista," p. 46. 7S. M.D. Bejar, "La entrevista Dickmann-Peron," Todo es Historia 143 (April 1979): S3-93· 79· Dickmann was by no means the first leader expelled from the Socialist Party for maintaining contacts with the Peronist regime, although he was probably the highest-ranking one. Others included Alfredo Lopez, Carlos Marfa Bravo, and Jose Oriente Cavalieri. So. Marcela Garda Sebastiani, "The Other Side of Peronist Argentina,"]ournat of Latin American Studies 35 (2003), especially pp. 336-337. Sr. Raanan Rein, Argentina, Israel, and the Jews (Bethesda, Md.: University Press of Maryland, 2003), ch. 2. S2. On this subject, see Ruben Jesus de Hoyos, "The Role of the Catholic Church in the Revolution against President Juan Peron" (Ph.D. diss., New York

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University, 1970); Lila M. Caimari, Peron y Ia Iglesia Catolica: Religion, estado y sociedad en la Argentina (1943-55) (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1994), Part IV; Noreen Frances Stack, "Avoiding the Greater Evil: The Response of the Argentine Catholic Church to Juan Peron, 1943-55" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1976), ch. 6; Michael A. Burdick, For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995), ch. 2. 83. Author's interviews with Alfredo Gomez Morales (Buenos Aires, 20 June 1989) and Miguel Unamuno (1 Sept. 1997); Potash, El ejercito y la politica, 2, 243 ff.; Raul Bustos Fierro, Desde Peron hasta Ongania (Buenos Aires: Octubre, 1969), 186. 84. Page, Peron, ch. 34· 85. On Olivieri's attitude to Borlenghi, see Anfbal 0. Olivieri, Dos veces rebelde (Buenos Aires: Sigla, 1958), 98-100. 86. Concerning accusations of this sort, see E. F. Sanchez Zinny, El culto de Ia infamia (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1958), vol. 1; Pedro Santos Martinez, La Nueva Argentina 1946-1955 (Buenos Aires: La Bastilla, 1988), vol. 2: 252-253; Rein, Argentina, Israel, and the Jews, ch. 5. 87. Another close associate of Borlenghi's since his early days in the commercial employees' union was David Diskin, a Jewish socialist from Bahia Blanca. Diskin was, among other things, a member of the executive board of the CGT (1946-55) and a national deputy (1952-55). See his El compaiiero Borlenghi: Su trayectoria, su integridad, su temple (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1979). Diskin passed away in 2001 at the age of 86; see La Nueva Provincia (Bahia Blanca), March 9, 2oor. 88. On the Organizacion Israelita Argentina, see Rein, Argentina, Israel, and the jews, ch. 2; Leonardo Senkman, "El peronismo vista desde Ia legacion israeli en Buenos Aires: sus relaciones con Ia OIA, 1949-1954," in]udaica Latinaamericana (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1993), vol. II: II5-136; Jeffrey Marder, "The Organizacion Israelita Argentina: Between Peron and the Jews," Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 20, nos. 39-40 (1995): 125-152; Lawrence D. Bell, "The Jews and Peron: Communal Politics and National Identity in Peronist Argentina, 1946-1955" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2002). 89. Maria Seoane, El burgues maldito (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1998), 62. 90. The new minister of the interior and justice was Oscar Albrieu, a Peronist deputy for La Rioja, who was reputedly both competent and moderate. His mission was to carry out Peron's pacification program, which meant negotiating with the Church and the opposition parties. 91. According to rumors cited in a U.S. document, Borlenghi took 6 million pesos with him when he left Argentina and intended to invest some of it in Venezuela in 1956. Borlenghi denied these rumors. See Fisher to State Department, 73s.oolr2-2756, in National Archives, Documents of the Department of State, Record Group 59, College Park, Md. (hereafter NA). During his years of exile in Cuba, Borlenghi lived off the money he received as owner of El Faro, a hotel and eatery in Havana.

Notes to Chapter 1 92. Romualdi, Presidents and Peons, 151. In Libra negro de la segunda tirania (Buenos Aires: Editorial Investigacion, 1958), Borlenghi was described as a "jailor and executioner" who "disposed of the ministry's 'reserved funds' at a whim" (p. II?)· 93· Ricardo Rojo, My Friend Che (New York: Dial Press, 1968), 104, 139. 94· Raanan Rein, The Franco- Peron Alliance: Relations between Spain and Argentina, I946-r955 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 139; Clarin, March II, 1996; Cronica, March 18, 1984. In 1940, Borlenghi organized an event to show support for the Spanish Republic that was attended by Indalecio Prieto, the Spanish Socialist leader. 95· Peron to Borlenghi, Nov. 15, 1957, in Juan D. Peron, Correspondencia (Buenos Aires: Portugalia, 1983), vol. r: 48. 96. Clarin, March 12, 1996. 97· Domingo Alfredo Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron (Buenos Aires: De !a Flor, 1995); Graciela Mateo, "El gobierno de Domingo Mercante: Expresion singular del peronismo clasico," EIAL 15, no. 2 (2004); Monica Blanco, "Peronismo, mercantismo y politica agraria en !a Provincia de Buenos Aires (1946-1955)," at www.mundoagrario.unlp.edu.ar/nro2/Blanco.html. 98. Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron, 38; author's interview with D.A. Mercante (Jr.) (Buenos Aires, 13 Aug. 2003). 99· Robert A. Potash, Peron y el GOU. Los documentos de una logia secreta (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1984). 100. Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron, 48. ror. Page, Peron, II8. 102. Ibid., II9. 103. Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron, 69-71. Within the Labor Secretariat, which at the time was still controlled by anti-Peronists, Mercante's nephew, Hugo Mercante, continued to promote union membership. 104. However, Mercante, who was suffering pain from a stomach ulcer, was unable to accompany Peron to the Casa Rosada that night. After a medical examination, he remained under observation at the hospital and could not be with the Lfder during the critical moments (Page, Peron, 132). Mercante's son has a somewhat different version: "Mercante was not present on the balcony, but a few paces further back. He had fainted, attended by a doctor of the presidency." (Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron, 74). In any case, a few days later Mercante and Juan Duarte were the two witnesses to the civil marriage ceremony between Peron and Eva in their Posadas Street apartment. 105. On October 17, 1946, the first anniversary of the "October Revolution," the government inaugurated the Medal of Loyalty and bestowed the first one on Mercante. ro6. Luna, E/45, 442, 425. 107. Blanco, "Peronismo, mercantismo y politica agraria." ro8. Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron, Sr. 109. Elena Susana Pont, Partido Laborista: estado y sindicatos (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1984); Luis Gay, El Partido Laborista en la Argentina; as well as the author's interviews with Cipriano Reyes (Quilmes, Sept. 15, 1989; La Plata, May 3, 1996).

Notes to Chapter 1 no. On the Labor Party and its demands concerning Mercante's candidacy, see Reyes, La farsa del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana/Planeta, 1987); Gay, El Partido Laborista. According to Mercante's son, Peron remained "more curious than displeased" about this maneuvering by Mercante and Cipriano Reyes (Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron, 82). III. During the second half of 1946, Evita often traveled to La Plata to consult with Mercante, who had recently left the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare; because she was just beginning similar work, she wanted a deeper grasp of the relations between political power and the organized workers' movement. II2. Oscar H. Aelo, "Elites pollticas en Ia provincia de Buenos Aires: Peronistas y radicales en las elecciones de 1948," EIAL 13, no. 2 (2002): 89-114. II3. Despite the initial, almost revolutionary, rhetoric, anyone who was hoping that Peron would embark on agrarian reform was quickly disillusioned. Author's interview with Antonio Manuel Molinari (Buenos Aires, Aug. 23 and Sept. 2, 1989); Mario Lattuada, La politica agraria peronista (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1986). II4. Blanco, "Peronismo, mercantismo y polltica agraria." rr5. Information on Mercante's mangagement can be found in the following publications: Domingo A. Mercante, Finanzas publicas de Ia provincia de Buenos Aires, 1947 (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1947); idem, Discurso inaugural del Consejo Superior de Ia Politica Economica del Coronel D.A. Mercante (La Plata: n.p., 1947); idem, Economia y accion social en Buenos Aires (La Plata: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1948); idem, Mensaje del Gobernador de Ia provincia de Buenos Aires a Ia Honorable Legislatura (La Plata: n.p., 1950); idem, Mercante: Ejemplo de gobernante peronista (La Plata: n.p., 1950); Fernando Klappenbach, ed., Reseiia historica del Partido Justicialista de Ia Plata, I945-1955 (La Plata: Partido Justicialista de La Plata, 2oor), 75-76. n6. On FORJA, see Miguel Angel Scenna, FOR]A. Una aventura argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1972); Arturo Jauretche, FOR]A y Ia decada infame (Buenos Aires: Coyoacan, 1976). II?. Norberto Galasso, Jauretche y su epoca (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 1985); Noeml Girbal-Blacha, Historia del Banco de Ia Provincia de Buenos Aires. Gestion del doctor Arturo ]auretche (I946-I950) (Buenos Aires: Banco de Ia Provincia, 1993). 118. Aelo, "Elites pollticas en Ia provincia de Buenos Aires." 119. Page, Peron, 203. 120. Mercante, Mercante: El corazon de Peron, 122; Bernardo Rabinovitz, Sucedio en Ia Argentina: Lo que no se dijo, I943-1956 (Buenos Aires: Gure, 1956), IIO. 121. Quoted in D. Mercante, Mercante, el corazon de Peron, 129-130. Just before departing on her European tour in mid-1947, Evita wrote a letter to the president in which, among other things, she advised him to keep the faithful Mercante at his side at all times. See Esteban Peicovich, El ultimo Peron (Madrid: Cambio 16, 1975), n8. 122. Ibid., 144. 123. Cesar Arrondo, Balbin entre rejas. La prision de Ricardo Balbin en 1950 (La Plata: Universidad de La Plata, 2002).

232

Notes to Chapter 1

124. See, for example, Navarro, Evita, ch. r2; Dujovne Ortiz, Eva Peron: La biograf£a, ch. 8. 125. According to one source, when Quijano, who was gravely ill, was appointed as vice-presidential candidate, ro Peronist senators and 17 deputies from Buenos Aires, followers of Mercante, gave up their seats "because they lacked peace in which to carry out their duties." (Rabinovitz, Sucedio en fa Argentina, 138). r26. Carlos Aloe, Gobierno, proceso, conducta (Buenos Aires: Sudestada, 1969); author's interview with D. A. Mercante (junior). 127. Author's interview with D. A. Mercante (junior). 128. Democracia, Nov. 17, I955· 129. Author's interview with D. A. Mercante (junior). 130. Miguel Angel Scenna, "Hombres de la politica argentina," Todo es Historia ror (Oct. 1975): 87-88. 131. On the hostility shown by most prominent industrialists toward Peron in the years 1943-45, see Dardo Cuneo, Comportamiento y crisis de !a clase empresaria (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1967). 132. Cristina Lucchini, Apoyo industrial en los or{genes del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1990); Marcelo Rougier, La pol£tica crediticia del Banco Industrial durante el primer peronismo (I944I955) (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2oor). The loans offered by this bank increased steeply in the following decade. In 1945 it had allocated 4,268 loans for a total of 276.8 billion pesos; by 1955 these figures had grown to 67,407 and 2,869.2 billion, respectively. 133. See Eldon Kenworthy, "Did the 'New Industrialists' Play a Significant Role in the Formation of Peron's Coalition, 1943-46?" in New Perspectives on Modern Argentina, ed. Alberto Ciria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 15-28; Lucchini, Apoyo industrial. 134. Peron's relations with Argentine industrialists are a controversial subject. Besides the works already mentioned, the following make important contributions in this area: Jorge Schvarzer, Empresarios del pasado: La Union Industrial Argentina (Buenos Aires: Imago Mundi, 1991); Judith Teichman, "Interest Conflict and Entrepreneurial Support for Peron," Latin American Research Review r6, no. r (1981): 144-155; Scott Mainwaring, "The State and the Industrial Bourgeoisie in Peron's Argentina, 1945-1955," Studies in Comparative International Development 21, no. 3 (1986): 3-31; Graciela Swiderski, "La UIA ~Sustitucion de importaciones o mercado externo?" in Argentina en !a paz de dos guerras, I9I4-I945, ed. Waldo Ansaldi et al. (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1993). I35· On the contemporary image of "the dangerous working class," see Waisman, Reversal of Development in Argentina, especially ch. 7· 136. Juan Peron, Peron Expounds His Doctrine, tr. Argentine Association of English Culture (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1948), 20. I37· Kenworthy, "Did the 'New Industrialists' Play a Significant Role in the Formation of Peron's Coalition, 1943-46?"; Joel Horowitz, "Industrialists and the Rise of Peron, 1943-1946: Some Implications for the Conceptualization of Populism," The Americas XLVII, no. 2 (Oct. 1990): 199-217.

Notes to Chapter 1

2 33

138. Murmis and Portantiero, Estudio sabre los origenes del peronismo; Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America"; Lucchini, Apoyo industrial 139. James P. Brennan, "Industrialists and Bolicheros: Business and the Peronist Populist Alliance, 1943-1976," in Peronism and Argentina, ed.]. P. Brennan (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1998), 79-123. 140. Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 155. I4I. On Peronist economic policies, see, among others, Pablo Gerchunoff, "Peronist Economic Policies, 1946-1955,'' in The Political Economy of Argentina, I946-I955, ed. Guido Di Tella and Roger Dornbusch (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1989); Jose C. Villarruel, "El estado, las clases sociales y !a polftica de ingresos en los gobiernos peronistas, 1946-1955,'' in Economia e historia. Contribuciones ala historia econ6mica argentina, ed. Mario Rapoport (Buenos Aires: Tesis, 1998). 142. Susana Novick, IAPI: Auge y decadencia (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1986). !43· Quoted in Page, Peron, 170. I44· The left joined its voice to that of reactionary nationalism and Radicalism, as if the Union Democr