In Statu Nascendi : Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations 2019/2 9783838273396

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IN STATU NASCENDI JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Vol. 2, No. 2 (2019)

   

 

About In Statu Nascendi

In Statu Nascendi (ISN) is a peer-reviewed journal that aspires to be a worldclass scholarly platform encompassing original academic research dedicated to the circle of Political Philosophy, Cultural Studies, Theory of International Relations, Foreign Policy, and the political decision-making process. The journal investigates specific issues through a socio-cultural, philosophical, and anthropological approach to raise a new type of civic awareness about the complexity of contemporary crisis, instability, and warfare situations, where the “stage-of-becoming” plays a vital role. ISN welcomes all types of partnership and collaboration for fostering a knowledge-based society, organizing events and framing new projects. If you are an academic institution, research institute, investigation team or group, a non-profitorganization, research center, or research funder and you are willing to become a long-term partner for ISN’s activities, please contact us at [email protected], and we will get back to you as soon as we can. Any views expressed in this publication are the views of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the editorial board of this journal. In Statu Nascendi is committed to freedom, liberty, and pluralism of opinions and endeavors to contribute to unconstrained public discourse and debate on relevant social, political and philosophical matters. More information about ISN, including information on the editorial board, membership information, and all our initiatives can be found on our website at

https://irinstatunascendi.wixsite.com/journal

   

 

ISN Editorial Board MARCIN GRABOWSKI, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

PIOTR PIETRZAK, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria (Editor in chief)

EVANGELOS KOUMPAROUDIS, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria

HRISTIYANA STOYANOVA, College of Europe, Natolin, Poland

STAVROS S. PANAGIOTOU, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria

ISN Advisory Board: TAMARA ALBERTINI, Hawaii University, USA ABIOLA BAMIJOKO-OKANGBAYE, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria ELIZA CAMPBELL, Georgetown University, USA SOPHIE GRACE CHAPPELL, the Open University, UK MOSCOS DIMITRIS, Panteion University, Greece ANDREAS GEORGALLIDES, University of Cyprus, Cyprus

NIEVES TURÉGANO MUÑOZ, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands ANAK AGUNG BANYU PERWITA, President University, Indonesia MOLLY PRENDERGAST, the University of Oslo, Norway ANDREA GIUSEPPE RAGNO, London School of Economics, UK VENERA RUSSO, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria IVAN SOLAKOV, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria

ZORAN KOJCIC, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria

IVAN SIMIĆ, Carleton University, Canada

MARYIA LAPPO, Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus

FRANCESCO TRUPIA, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria

SAMI MEHMETI, Southeast European University, North Macedonia

KRZYSZTOF ŻĘGOTA, University of Warmia and Mazury, Poland

Proofreading: MATTHEW GILL, M. Phil., Sofia U.

  Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. In Statu Nascendi—Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations Vol. 2, No. 2 (2019) Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag / ibidem Press Erscheinungsweise: halbjährlich / Frequency: biannual ISSN 2568-7638 ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-7339-6

© ibidem-Verlag / ibidem Press Stuttgart, Germany 2019 Alle Rechte vorbehalten Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who performs any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

 

In statu nascendi (Latin) In the process of creation, emerging, becoming

   

 

Table of Contents Editorial ......................................................................................................IX  PART I: POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ............. 1  Molly Prendergast Madonnas and whores or blood and gore? Roles for women in the so-called Islamic State .......................................................................... 3  Goran Ilik, Mladen Karadjoski, Nina Ilik The European Union Vs. The BRICS: The Conflict of Values and The Challenges of Liberal Democracy in The New International Context ............................................................................... 37  Piotr Pietrzak Zbigniew Brzezinski’s last Tweet and Donald J. Trump’s policies on North Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran .............................. 55  Deniz Ertin Contrariwise and inconsistent positions on Turkey’s EU membership—Do party politics matter in German foreign policy? .......... 77  Sami Mehmeti & Piotr Pietrzak Interview with Dr. Sami Mehmeti on the political situation in North Macedonia & Balkans in statu nascendi.................................. 109  PART II: PHILOSOPHY ........................................................................... 117  Andreas Georgallides The unclarity of the ontological frame of the Tractatus ................... 119  Gordon Freeman Charity Begins at Home: Resolving the Tensions of Liberalism(s), “White Privilege” and African Corruption via Rawls and Transnational Digital-Communitarianism ................. 127  VII 

  Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye Truth as the Currency of Democracy .................................................. 149  Piotr Pietrzak A Brief Comparative Study on Lukács, Kojève, and Verene’s Interpretations of Hegel’s Recollection in his Phenomenology of Spirit ........................................................................................................... 161  Joel Patomäki John Searle as a practice theoretician ................................................... 177  PART III: IN STATU NASCENDI’S REVIEWS & RESPONSES .....................185  Piotr Pietrzak In response to Stephen Kotkin’s “The Players Change, but the Game Remains”................................................................................ 187  Piotr Pietrzak In response to Francis Fukuyama’s “Against Identity Politics, The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy” ........................... 201  Call for Papers ......................................................................................... 211  Biographical Notes ................................................................................. 213  What We Stand for in Fourteen Different Languages ...................... 217  Coming up next on In Statu Nascendi ................................................ 221 

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Editorial Dear Readers, As you might know, the ancient Romans used to say “nihil fit sine causa” (nothing happens without a reason), which is important to us on a number of levels, starting with the fact that this phrase explains a great deal on our origin as a journal, as a non-profit organization, and as a growing network of academics from different universities, backgrounds, and countries who have decided to launch this initiative to fill in the growing gap in the literature of the subject. Surely, “nothing happens without a reason” may sound very simple and self-explanatory but in fact it is sophisticated in its simplicity, to the extent that it was selected as the main theme for this edition, for the combination of the papers in this volume would be quite unlikely in any traditional academic journal. In a way “nihil fit sine causa” also explains the fact that this year has been a very productive one for In Statu Nascendi, which would have not existed without its glorious year of 2017 when the idea was finally implemented, when we managed to persuade one of the leading publishers in the market to invest their time and energy promoting our idea. Indeed, without the support of Valerie Lange and Christian Schön from ibidem-Verlag and the unyielding support of their respective teams (especially such people like Florian Bölter, Stefanie Dosch, and Malisa Mahler), we would have not existed in the first place, and publishing as many as twenty-eight pieces a year would be still in our sweet dreams. Today it is a reality, and we endeavor to use this reality as a launching pad to unleash even more volumes with even more diverse collections of papers in the years to come. Without the support of Delyana Boyadzhieva-Pietrzak, Vaska Solakova, Ivan Solakov, and Francesco Trupia we would not exist as a nonprofit entity, and we would have struggled to organize the events that we have lined up for the next years. Subsequently, without Hristiyana Stoyanova, Koumparoudis Evangelos, Marcin Grabowski, Sami Mehmeti, Stavros Panayiotou, and our exceptional proofreader Matthew Gill we would have not be able to publish two full volumes this year, and be in the final stages of preparations for our First International Conference that will be held at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” on the 11 and 12th of October 2019. This interdisciplinary event, just like our journal, is dedicated to discussing various leading new developments in fields ranging from philosophy, politics, literature, IX 

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and art, to international relations theory, and is going to be held every four years. Naturally, some suggest that “we don’t stand a chance with the fierce competition that is currently in the market”, but we choose to disagree with this opinion, for by looking at the quality and numbers of recent submissions it seems that we are heading in the right direction. If our progress were to be evaluated on the basis of the number of expressions of interest from our readers, prospective contributors, as well as the organizations that want to collaborate with us, we could be compared to Usain Bolt of Jamaica accelerating to complete yet another 100 meter race in less than 9.6 seconds, for the number of such enquiries has skyrocketed from just over twenty in 2017, to forty-five in 2018, to a hundred and fifty-four paper submissions in 2019. But, as you may appreciate, we are not trying to break any world record, at least not in a sprint, for if we were using a sport metaphor, I think that more appropriate would be a metaphor of a marathon runner, in particular the example of Eliud Kipchoge of Kenya who completed the Vienna marathon in 2019 in 1:59:40.2, for we are in it for the long haul, ready to prepare our minds and bodies for a very long and at times not easy race forward, which clearly involves self-discipline, hard work, and perseverance. As much as we would be perfectly happy to switch from two volumes per year to four in 2020, we have chosen a path of consolidation for the next year, for we realize that the only way to increase our market potential is to get indexed in at least one of the leading indexing databases that assigns us with an impact factor and measures our citing behaviors, which should allow us to appeal to a wide audience and improve our reputation. By committing ourselves to continue to fulfill our strategic goal of inclusion in multiple databases, engines, and academic and scientific organizations, we should also be able to appeal to our future readers and those authors who naturally reach out to journals that are well-established, well-known, and recognized by their respective universities and institutes. Having said that, it is important to remember that these plans and these efforts will be verified by the most important person in our organization, namely by our respected reader who is our raison d’être, the reason of our existence. “In the process of creation” would have never materialized without our loyal readership in the first place, which is currently expanding very rapidly. We are fully aware of the fact that our readers seek a reliable, unbiased, and the authoritative source of high-quality information in social science, which is recognized by its interdisciplinary discourse, multidimensional approach, energy, passion, and a determination that we can learn from each —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

Editorial

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other, and we are ready to deliver on that. But we also want to supplement these efforts with our dedication to inclusiveness for if there is one thing that ISN is always happy to celebrate it is our diversity. We are a sizable community of academics that is growing increasingly conscious of our own strengths and weaknesses, our methods, our practices, our goals and aspirations, and finally we are increasingly more conscious of our roles in exploring our common process of creation, that thus far has helped us to gain the upper hand in our respective fields. That is why without any further ado I would like to welcome to you to this third edition of our journal, one which attempts to look at our sociopolitical reality from two leading perspectives: the philosophical and the political. This volume is a natural continuation of the previous two editions that includes a number of recurring themes related to the Middle East politics, European matters, Russian politics, American foreign policy, and continental philosophy, topics that have undoubtedly dominated our previous debates. Our Politics & International Relations section begins with the exceptionally fascinating piece on the role for women in the so-called Islamic State by Molly Prendergast, followed by a comparative study of two organizations, the European Union and the BRICS, by Goran Ilik, Mladen Karadjoski, and Nina Ilik. Consequently, I added to this section my piece that evaluates Donald Trump’s policy toward North Korea and Iran. This is followed by Deniz Ertin, who touches on a number of dilemmas in TurkishGerman relations that are discussed in the context of Turkey’s attitudes to EU membership. Finally, this section concludes with an interview with the rising star of the Balkans Dr. Sami Mehmeti, who explains the new geopolitical situation of the newly renamed North Macedonia in context of the Balkan and European politics. The philosophical part is opened up with “The unclarity of the ontological frame of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” by Andreas Georgallides, followed by a paper discussing the origins of charity, tensions within Liberalism(s), “White Privilege”, and African Corruption in the context of Rawlsian debate on Transnational Digital-Communitarianism, by Gordon Freeman. Consequently, Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye launches a philosophical debate on the notion of truth seen as the currency of democracy depicted through the prism of a number of important discussions related to African security and the threat of paramilitary organizations operating in Nigeria and Libya. Subsequently, this paper is followed by a comparative study discussing the differences and similarities in Lukács, Kojève, and Verene’s interpreta-

—In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

XII Piotr Pietrzak tions of Hegel’s recollection in his Phenomenology of Spirit. The section concludes with a paper on John Searle as a Practice Theoretician, by Joel Patomäki. In the final section titled In Statu Nascendi’s Commentaries & Debates the author of this editorial discusses Francis Fukuyama’s concept of identity through the prism of his previous work on the end of History and the Last Man and state-building that suggests that the way this American thinker has developed his most recent themes owes a lot to his early Hegelian influences. Finally, this issue concludes with a polemical response to Stephen Kotkin’s arguments published as “The Players Change, but the Game Remains”, which suggests that the US and China are likely to turn the current architecture of power into a bipolar one of two competing coalitions. As always, we are fully committed to keeping our readers updated about all of our initiatives, and publishing the next volume of this journal in the spring of 2020; we also want to encourage our prospective authors to take part in our great adventure and submit their proposals by the end of the spring of 2020. We are open to various forms of academic collaboration: we publish scholarly articles, book reviews, interviews, political commentary, comments, polemics, etc. So please don’t hesitate to email us with your proposals; I promise that we will get back to you within a reasonable amount of time. On behalf of our growing editorial board, I would like to thank you for purchasing this volume. We hope that you enjoy it. Yours sincerely,

Piotr Pietrzak Editor-in-chief In Statu Nascendi Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations [email protected]

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PART I: POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

 

 

 

Molly Prendergast

Madonnas and whores or blood and gore? Roles for women in the so-called Islamic State Abstract: From sweethearts to sex slaves, nurturing mothers to brutish police officers, roles for women in the so-called Islamic State are as diverse as their origins. Female functions within the organization vary, depending on religion, ideology, age, and nationality. While Daesh’s exhaustive propaganda machine legitimizes the assignment of women’s roles, they also remain consistent with exaggerated gender roles in warfare, recurrent in human history across time and space. This analysis strives to better understand the organization’s utilization of arguably their most powerful weapon. By analyzing Daesh propaganda through an intersection of qualitative content analysis overlaid with gender-war theory, this study explores the roles for women in Daesh, and tests whether female functions in Daesh fit the recurring gender roles posited by gender-war theorists. Keywords: ISIS, Daesh, Female, Gender, Women, Iraq, Syria, Introduction Theatrical violence and medieval shock tactics swirl around the media cyclone encircling Daesh1, the Jihadi2-Salafist3 militant group that skyrocketed to social media stardom. Between their Goebbels-esque ‘news’ branch pumping out propaganda, to the outpouring of reports, studies, and articles produced

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‘Daesh’ is the Arabic acronym for ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.’ Due to its similarity to the Arabic word ‘daes’, (‘one who crushed underfoot’), and ‘dahes,’ (‘one who sows discord’), the term is considered derogatory. I opt to use this name over IS, ISIS, or ISIL to avoid granting the group legitimacy by referring to it as a ‘state’. Relating to jihad, the fight against the enemies of Islam. Jihad can be offensive (purifying Islam of idolatrous practices) or defensive (defense against attacking apostate groups). Daesh claims jihad is an obligation upon all Muslims, including women, and lays out ways they can fulfill this obligation. Salafism is a strict, fundamentalist strain of Sunni Islam which strives for religious purity by removing shirk (idolatrous religious practices). Salafism broadens the definition of unbelievers (or kuffar) by narrowing the range of acceptable Islamic beliefs and practices. Practices specifically approved by Mohammad and the first three generations of believers following his death set the limits of acceptable Islam. Salafists consider themselves the only true Muslims.

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by global media outlets, Daesh is infamous worldwide. One consequence of its global notoriety is growth. Since their break with al-Qaeda in April 20134, Daesh’s technologically savvy online campaign and globally inclusive ambitions drew in enough recruits to establish first, an army, and then, a territory5. Perhaps the most revolutionary factor separating Daesh from other Islamic terror groups are its state-building ambitions. Evolving from a legacy of terrorist cells that plot in the shadows, Daesh has operated in the harsh, dusty daylight of its strongholds in Mosul6 and Raqqa7. And unlike its predecessors, Daesh relied on a new group of recruits to meet the challenges of building a proto state: women. While most studies reported on the growth of Daesh from the viewpoint of the mujahideen8, growing scholarship has shifted towards women. Foreign females flocked to the group in unprecedented numbers, leaving home to make hijrah9 and adopting the term muhajirat10 as a self-identifying badge of pride. An estimated 10% of foreign fighters traveling to Daesh-held territories from North America, Europe, and Australia are women—or around 55011. Less is known about foreign women from non-Western countries, though they are rumored to be in the “thousands.”12 Another area of

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In 2014, Daesh burst out of obscurity to front and center of the media ring after the group overtook strategic cities in Western Iraq. While Daesh became a global phenomenon in 2014, the organization’s roots stretch back to the founding of Al-Qaeda, their parent organization. Please note this analysis only considers Daesh-held territory in Iraq and Syria and excludes militant groups elsewhere who have pledged allegiance to the group (such as in Libya and Nigeria). Mosul is Iraq’s second-largest city with a pre-war population of almost 2 million. Daesh overran the city in June 2014. Raqqa is Syria’s sixth-largest city, with a pre-war population of around 220,000. Daesh took over the city in January 2014. Mujahideen—those engaged in jihad (singular: mujahid). Commonly refers to male jihadist soldiers or guerrilla fighters. Hijrah—understood as a migration of Muslims to escape religious persecution or seek religious freedom. Muhajirat—the literal translation from Arabic (singular: muhajirah) is “one who avoids or abandons bad things.” This later evolved to “migrant,” with the same linguistic roots as hijrah, implying a religious impetus behind migration. The term is specific to females. “Saudis most likely to join ISIS, 10% of group’s fighters are women,” MEMO: Middle Eastern Monitor, October 20, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:22]. Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli, “Intrepid Sisters Reveal How ISIS Depends on Role of Women,” News Deeply, May 26, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:25].

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interest examines local Iraqi and Syrian women residing in the so-called caliphate13. At the height of Daesh’s territorial expansion, some ten million people lived under its black flag14. Despite a population in the millions, Daesh has wielded an iron grip over communication to the outside world. Limited internet access, brutal punishments for speaking out, and bans on journalists and travel all shroud the mysterious “hermit kingdom15.” So air-tight is their control that most information from the caliphate is propaganda—their monopoly over free speech juxtaposed with an exhaustive public relations machine, generating a sophisticated online propaganda campaign. Although they rely on medieval war references and military battalions of centuries bygone, Daesh understands the conflict as a modern war of information. What we’re left with is a heavily photoshopped picture projected from their media branch. I rely on propaganda as my primary sources—understood here as their English magazine Dabiq, social media accounts of English-posting individuals in Daeshheld territories in Iraq and Syria, and official online Daesh publications— simply because it is all we have. II. Presentation of research questions My research strives to take an inclusive view of women16 within Daesh by considering local and foreign females17. I analyze Daesh propaganda to determine what the roles for women have been, and how these roles have benefited the group. Women streamed in from all over the world, with Daesh

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Caliphate understood as a political-religious state, home to a Muslim community and others under its jurisdiction. The caliphate is governed by a caliph. The first caliphate was founded in 632 CE after the death of the Prophet. The last caliphate crumbled with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the resurrection of a new caliphate (positioning himself as the caliph) in June 2014, though the majority of today’s Muslims do not recognize him and Daesh-held territories as such. “Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps,” BBC, July 20, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:23]. “ISIS Steps Up Information Control in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor,” Flash Notes 5 by The Sec-Dev Foundation, August 5, 2015, Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 2019, at 16:42].; “Human rights situation in Iraq in light of abuses committed by the socalled Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 13, 2015; “Iraq crisis: Islamic State accused of ethnic cleansing,” BBC News, September 2, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:44]; Johanna Green, Mays Al-Juboori, Mark Lattimer, Alessandro Manno, Alison Smith, and William Spencer, “No Way Home: Iraq’s minorities on the verge of disappearance,” The Ceasefire Project, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:45]; Nick Cumming-Bruce, “United Nations Investigators Accuse ISIS of Genocide Over Attacks on Yazidis,” New York Times, March 19, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:46]; Nina Shea, “The ISIS Genocide of Middle Eastern Christian Minorities and Its Jizya Propaganda Ploy,” Hudsen Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom, August 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:48]; Samer Muscati, “Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape—Yezidi Survivors in Need of Urgent Care,” Human Rights Watch, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 16:50].

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all females, including local female residents and non-Western muhajirat. To differentiate it from previous studies, this article argues for a different approach: women from all corners of the globe viewed jointly, not as separate issues of security risks or human rights violations, but as a central asset to Daesh. The primary questions posited by my paper are thus:  

What have been the roles for women within Daesh, as portrayed by the organization? How do these roles benefit the group?

To answer these questions, I scrutinized Daesh propaganda with qualitative content analysis through the lens of gender-war theory. III. Primary Source Materials My primary source materials consist of various forms of Daesh propaganda, released in English. One avenue is English-speaking social media accounts of individuals who either self-identify as living in the so-called caliphate, and/or are confirmed by secondary sources (news articles & academic reports). I identified six social media accounts on Tumblr and Twitter, and recorded posts from September 2015 through February 3, 2017. I only collected data relevant to my research questions and did not capture every post during the designated period. I identified the nationalities and genders behind account holders through secondary sources, or by the poster’s account. To protect the privacy of the account holders, I use code names based on nationality and gender (see table above). Social Media Accounts Similar to social media posts is the English journal “Days of Sahawaat” by Sudanese fighter Abu Saa’d Al-Sudani on his exploits west of Aleppo in 201420. The mentions of his female travel companions give a window into expected roles for foreign women. Another avenue consists of English ebooks and magazines published by Daesh. As of February 2016, there are thirteen issues of Dabiq, the monthly magazine for Daesh’s English-speaking audience. Furthermore, I analyzed two English e-books: the first, The Islamic State (2015), gives an overview of the background, goals, tactics, services, media outlets, and future of the organization21.

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Abu Saa’d Al-Sudani, “Days of Sahawaat (Episode One),” March 17, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:00]. The Islamic State, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:06].

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Molly Prendergast Code name

Platform

Place of origin

Gender

Number of posts

Word count

Type of posts recorded

UK-X

Tumblr, Twitter

UK

Female

18

3,479

Injustices against Muslims, call to hijrah, ideology

UK-Y

Tumblr

UK

Male

38

13,623

advice, pictures around the caliphate, Q&A

SWE-X1

Tumblr

Sweden

Female

7

4,850

Advice to muhajirat, life in the caliphate

SWE-X2

Tumblr

Sweden

Female

30

2,322

Idyllic caliphate, cubs of caliphate, community

MALX

Tumblr, Twitter

Malaysia

Female

51 tumblr, 30 Twitter

17,734

advice, Q&A on life in the caliphate

NE-Y

Tumblr

The Netherlands

Male

3

611

Q&A on ideology

Table 1: Social Media Accounts The second, Hijrah to the Islamic State (2015) provides travel advice, hijrah stories, and outlines the religious call to hijrah22. For a near-comprehensive picture of women’s roles (according to the organization), I examined two pamphlets. In late 2014, Daesh released A Sister’s Role in Jihad, an English booklet outlining women’s roles on and off the battlefield23. This piece is especially interesting when compared to Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto and Case Study by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade, a booklet on female role models and duties released in Arabic and intended for a Saudi audience; it was translated by Quilliam, a counter-terrorism organization, in January 201524. Together, these two publications offer a near-comprehensive picture of societal roles for foreign women within the caliphate; however, they leave

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Hijrah to the Islamic State, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:07]. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 18.11.2015]. Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto on Women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade, 2015, trans. Charlie Winter, The Quilliam Foundation Available at: [Accessed on 18.11.2015].

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out an important group—mushrikin (polytheists or heretics)25, apostates26, and kuffar (unbelievers or infidels)27. Within Daesh ideology, infidels can be taken as spoils of war28. In October/November 2014, Daesh released a pamphlet in Arabic (translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute) detailing 27 tips on sexual relations with captives29. IV. Methodology Qualitative content analysis: coding Qualitative content analysis is a form of textual analysis whose methodology authors Lawrence Frey, Carl Botan, Paul Friedman and Gary Kreps describe as “the method communication researchers use to describe and interpret characteristics of a recorded or visual message.”30 The goal of textual analysis is to determine the content, structure, and functions behind messages. Within textual analysis, qualitative content analysis interprets data through “the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns.”31 For Margrit Schreier, three qualities characterize qualitative content analysis: it reduces data, is systematic, and is flexible32.

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Mushrikin known as those who uphold shirk (idolatrous) religious practices. Also known as devil-worshippers or polytheists. Daesh mistakenly views the Yazidi as polytheists for their beliefs in angels, although their views are similar to angels in Christianity. Apostates—those who have known and turned their backs on Islam. Most often branded apostates by Daesh are Shia Muslims, whose traditions such as worshipping at the graves of imams and public self-flagellation have no mention in the Qur’an or the Prophet’s life. Shia Muslims believe Ali ibn Abi Talib (Ali) was the divinely-appointed successor to Mohammad and the first Imam, whereas Sunni (the majority of Muslims, including Daesh) consider him the fourth caliph. Daesh considers it their duty to kill Shia Muslims. Kuffar—translated as unbelievers. Often used interchangeably with mushrikin, though kuffar is a wider term, encompassing polytheists (the Yazidi), People of the Book (Christians and Jews), and apostates (Shia Muslims). “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” Dabiq no. 4 “The Failed Crusade”, August/September 2014, 14. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:08]. “Islamic State (ISIS) Releases Pamphlet on Female Slaves,” Middle Eastern Media Research Institute, December 3, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:09]. Lawrence Frey, Carl Botan, Paul Friedman, and Gary Kreps, Investigating Communication: An Introduction to Research Methods (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), p. 226−227. Yan Zhang and Barbara M. Wildemuth, “Qualitative Analysis of Content,” Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science, ed. by B. M. Wildemuth (Westport, Connecticut: Libraries Unlimited, 2009), p. 308. Margrit Schreier, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis, ed. by Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications, 2014), p. 170.

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Molly Prendergast

Qualitative content analysis cuts down on data by forcing the researcher to focus on specific themes. The method calls for a repetition of steps going over data repeatedly, making it fairly systematic. Codes, defined as “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language or visual data,”33 are developed, fine-tuned, and systematically applied. This coding is “at the heart of the method,” and determine patterns, which are then used to discover meaning34. Coding can be flexible, determined by data as well as by other concepts (theories, prior research, etc.)35. In contrast to its quantitative cousin, which systematically counts textual patterns, qualitative content analysis explores topics and underlying themes. Researchers identify patterns and reduce data volume by creating a coding system. Advantages and disadvantages of qualitative content analysis Qualitative content analysis is a systematic, thorough approach that applies the same analytical sequence of steps to data. At the same time, the method is flexible, allowing researchers to utilize inductive or deductive approaches, and to interpret data, thereby opening analytical possibilities36. However, this method is time-consuming. Steps are not clearly defined, confusing first-time users37. Finally, the lack of software widens the possibility of missed coding opportunities, dampening analytical richness. Applying qualitative content analysis In the early stages, I struggled to identify primary sources. While Daesh publications were easy to find, legitimate social media accounts proved difficult. I pored over news articles and academic reports to cross-examine accounts used in their publications. This way, I ensured that all six of the social media accounts analyzed are verified by a secondary source. To pull out digestible

                                                             33 34 35

36

37

Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), p. 3. Schreier, p. 170. Ji Young Cho and Eun-Hee Lee, “Reducing Confusion about Grounded Theory and Qualitative Content Analysis: Similarities and Differences,” The Quantitative Report 19 no. 32 (2014). p. 4. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:11]. Florian Kohlbacher, “The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 7, No. 1 (2006): 15. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 7:12]. Cho and Lee, p. 17.

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extracts, I searched for references to female, women, sister, mother, girl, muhajirah, slave, and Yazidi, weeding out irrelevant data. Once I collected my data, I analyzed the texts with the wartime gender roles, discussed by Joshua Goldstein, in mind38. For women, these roles are nurse, sweetheart, mother, peace activist and shamer39. With these roles, I had the early stages of my coding framework. V. Through the lens of gender-war theory What is gender? In her 1949 publication The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir famously declared that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman”. Beauvoir made a critical distinction between what later came to be known as “sex” and “gender”, distinguishing the former as biology and the latter as learned. By the 1970s and 1980s, the term ‘gender’ was mainstreamed by postmodernist and social constructionist scholars to signify societal norms40. This led to a growing understanding among feminists that gender is constructed by cultural practices and societal expectations, put more simply as “socially constructed”. Not all accept this explanation for gender identity—Nancy Chodrow faulted socialization as too simplistic41. Influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis, Chodrow theorized that gender develops from masculine and feminine personalities formed in infancy from parenting practices, especially as women are the primary caretakers42. However, this viewpoint cannot account for the genders of children in same-sex or single-parent households. Others see gender as an extension of sexuality. Catherine MacKinnon holds men and women as socially conditioned through pornography and other channels to find female submission pleasing; gender is therefore forged by the sexual objectification of women43. Yet gender existed before pornography became widely available. Pornography is also diverse, encompassing female dominance fantasies.

                                                             38 39

40

41 42 43

More on gender-war theory is discussed in the following chapter. Joshua Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System, and ViceVersa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). More on gender-war theory is discussed in Chapter 4. Sharon Rae Jenkins, “Introduction to the Special Issue: Defining Gender, Relationships, and Power,” Sex Roles: A Journal of Research 42, no. 7–8 (2001), p. 471, E-ISSN: 1573– 2762. Nancy Chodrow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 205. Ibid., p. 6–7. Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 113−114, 123.

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As more scholars added to the growing field of gender studies, others questioned whether we can study gender at all. For Nancy Tuana, we cannot disentangle sex from gender, as it relies on the assumption of a nature-nurture dichotomy that is simply impossible to achieve44. Others reject the underlying assumption of gender studies: that gender is uniform (known as gender realism). Elisabeth Spelman’s The Inessential Woman (1990) counters the assumption of a ‘common womanness’ based on differences in class, race, and other factors45. Aligning with Spelman, Judith Butler rejects gender realism based on “the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘women’ are constructed”46. My definition of gender Like Tuana and others, I reject my own ability (or that of any academic) to sever biology from society. As such, any reference to ‘gender’ is a catch-all for both sex and gender. Arguments against gender realism resonate in my own theoretical assumptions—that women within Daesh are assigned different roles on the basis of ethnicity, religion, and nationality. I endorse Butler, Spelman, and others who put forth the notion of a multifaceted gender, cut along socio-ethnic and religious cleavages. Gender-war theory In his book War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice-Versa, Joshua Goldstein navigates a “puzzling cross-cultural consistency”: the absence of female warriors throughout history47. While historians can point to a few examples, such as mandatory military service for Israeli women or the mythical Amazonian tribe, women are by and large missing from battle. Women’s absence is especially striking when Goldstein argues that individually, gender and warfare vary richly through time and space; yet together, they strike an eerie consistency. If women are missing from battle, where are they? Based on an exhaustive historical analysis, Goldstein presents women’s roles in war as mother, sweetheart, nurse, peace activist, shamer, and conquest. After exploring various hypotheses (in-

                                                             44

45 46 47

Nancy Tuana, “Refusing nature/nurture,” Women’s Studies International Forum 6 no.6 (1983): p. 625−626. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:14]. Elizabeth Spelman, The Inessential Woman (London: The Women’s Press, 1990), p. 159. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 13. Goldstein, p. 1.

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cluding biological), Goldstein concludes women’s absence is the product of social constructions of gender identity, hyper-inflated in wartime. Masculinity is built as aggression, strength, and toughness; to goad men into the fray, femininity is constructed in its mirror image: submission, weakness, and defenselessness. Permitting female warriors shatters these constructions, endangering male participation and the war effort at large. Women are called to serve in other ways, accounting for the near universality of female roles in wartime. My analysis applies Goldstein’s research on gendered war roles to explore whether his findings apply to women in Daesh. The many faces of women in Daesh Jihadi brides, mothers, homemakers, shamers, caretakers, soldiers, sex slaves and compliant citizens are but some of the pathways Daesh provides for women. To address my research question, I apply Goldstein’s research on gendered war roles, which argues that women in wartime assume the molds of sweetheart, mother, nurse, peace activist, shamer and feminized enemy. The following chapter addresses my research questions—what have been the roles for women in Daesh, as portrayed by the organization? How have these roles benefitted the group? VI. Roles for women in Daesh Sweetheart, mother, nurse, jihadi bride, sex slave, shamer. These six coding categories, determined through qualitative content analysis and guided by Goldstein’s gender-war theory, represent the roles allotted to women in the caliphate. The following subsections summarize the data for each code, as well as the layers of subcodes. 1. Sweetheart Women in war serve a vital function. According to Goldstein, their softness counteracts the horrors of war, providing men a much-needed escape to lick their wounds and brace themselves for the next battle48. At the same time, women reinforce the war machinery by cheering their loved ones off. The following category explores the caveats of the Sweetheart role, from the lives of single women to marriage, wifely duties, polygamy, and widowhood.

                                                             48

Goldstein, p. 310.

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a. Single Paradoxically, Daesh propaganda associates single life for women with a lack of freedom. Newcomers are required to spend their first night at the makkar49 for screening; chaperoned women are later collected, yet single women remain until marriage. Life in the makkar is farfrom glamorous: crowded and lacking privacy—these are common traits described by propagandists50. Women are not permitted outside without a mahram, which propaganda explains is for safety reasons51. However, the regulation also pressures women to marry quickly. As one muhajirah admits “coming as an unmarried woman without a Mahram is the hardest position ~ you would most likely be staying in the maqqar until you get married which could take weeks—I ask Allah to strengthen your heart because for any sister coming alone with no idea when she’ll be out it can be really frustrating”52.

There is no rose-tinted picture of life for single ladies here. One surmises there is an ulterior motive: to facilitate marriages with the mujahideen. b. Marriage On marriage, Daesh propaganda claims no unions are forced53. Women can pick from a cornucopia of nationalities at the time of her choosing54. Nonetheless, staying single does not seem to be an option. One account presents the marriage obligation in strong terms: I have stressed this before on twitter but I really need sisters to stop dreaming about coming to Shaam and not getting married. Wallahi life here is very difficult for the Muhajirat and we depend heavily on the brothers for a lot of support […]55.

Marriage for women, if not obligatory, is highly encouraged. Daesh sees the primary role for women as mothers raising the next generation of warriors— this contribution cannot be fulfilled without marriage. Ideally, women are married by sixteen or seventeen, while they are still young and active56. For muhajirat, finding a husband is easy, as even locals prefer foreign women57.

                                                             49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Makkar—translates as a safe-house for women, where newcomers are screened, and single women live. MAL-X, Tumblr post. Male guardian. UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; UK-X, Tumblr post, collected February 3, 2017. SWE-X-1, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; Hijrah to the Islamic State, p. 21. UK-Y, Tumblr post; SWE-X-1, Tumblr post. UK-X, Tumblr post. Women of the Islamic State, p. 24. UK-Y, Tumblr post.

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Many sources guide women on navigating a match. Both genders are encouraged to marry before hijrah—for men, to reduce the frustration of waiting for a bride; for women, to ease travel and transition58. When considering suitors, muhajirat are warned against online courting due to security and modesty concerns59. Instead, women are instructed to find spouses through married couples they know personally60. For single muhajirat seeking marriage, they can inform the sister-incharge at the makkar61, or a married female friend, who brokers a match with her husband62. Weddings are a modest affair: It was the simplest nikah63 I ever witnessed in my life. No glamorous dress, no crowds, no-nothing64. In keeping with rules on modesty, male and female guests are segregated. Married couples receive their own house65 and a $700 wedding present66. Married mujahideen receive more breaks, allowing them to spend time with brides67. Once married, women are expected to fulfill their wifely duties. c. Wifely duties Domestic chores A woman’s place is in the home, and wives spend most of their time performing domestic chores68. When their husbands return home, good wives cook their favorite foods and wash their clothes69. Wives are encouraged to carry out chores with a smile70. Sexual access & piety Muhajirat are instructed to bring lingerie, makeup, dresses, perfume, and jewelry for their husbands-to-be, and to be presentable in your appearance […] Let him enjoy you as you are halal for him, and he is halal for you71. Menin jihad require ‘female comforters’,and physical connection is important72.

                                                             58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

SWE-X-1, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post. MAL-X, Tumblr post; Hijrah to the Islamic State, p. 21. MAL-X, Tumblr post. Nikah—marriage contract. MAL-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; SWE-X-1, Tumblr post; UK-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post; The Islamic State 2015 Full Ebook, p. 61. UK-Y, Tumblr post; UK-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post; Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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At the same time, female piety is highly valued. Women are told to rely on their faith as a stalwart against the dangerous hurdles they face, a coping mechanism against trauma. Women are instructed to bring laptops with downloaded religious texts so they can pass their time in study73. Once in the caliphate, women attend all-female study circles, Koranic classes, and university74. Religious education is an obligation placed upon all Muslim women75. The emphasis on female piety hinges on the understanding that women are the holders of religion, and responsible for passing Islam down to their children76. The survival of Islam relies on the faith and religious practices of wives. This contradictory duality of sexual access and piety77 is not unique to Daesh, but commonly referred to as the madonna-whore complex. Modesty Among the most important virtues for Muslim women is modesty. To justify its rigid control over female dress and movement, Daesh frames modesty as a romantic anti-Western resistance. In the caliphate, women must avoid interactions with men outside their families (known as free mixing). Free mixing is banned to avoid fitnah, or temptation78. This taboo also applies online, where men and women are forbidden from interacting79. Any violation is grounds for divorce80. To avoid male-female interactions, women do not work, and universities are gender-segregated. They are instructed to stay in their homes, leaving only when necessary81. In the caliphate, wearing hijab is not an obligation, but a right. Women are free to practice this aspect of Shari’ah without harassment or discrimination. Daesh also plays into the symbolism of the veil. According to anthropologist Scott Atran, the veil symbolizes a shield against the corruption of

                                                             73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81

UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; UK-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; UK-X, Tumblr post; Dabiq no. 7, “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone,” January–February 2015, p. 51. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:15]; Women of the Islamic State, p. 34. Dabiq no. 11, p. 44. Koran 66: 6; referenced in Dabiq no. 11, p. 44. SWE-X-2, Tumblr post, collected January 13, 2016. UK-Y, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post. Dabiq no. 13, “The Rafida: From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” January–February 2016, 25−26. http://clarionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Issue-13-the-rafidah.pdf, Koran 33:33; referenced in MAL-X, Tumblr post.

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the material world82. Moreover, the veil stands as an emblem against Western colonialism and oppression. Quoting Frantz Franon, an important voice in post-colonialism theory, Daesh propaganda asserts, “this woman, who sees without being seen, frustrates the colonizer.” By adjuring Westernstandards of liberation, she asserts an identity, and even power, of her own, thus refusing to acknowledge the validity of, and inherent power in, her colonizer’s unveiling, subjugation and rape of her own culture.”83

The veil is the perfect accessory for Daesh’s narrative on the oppression of the Western powers against the Muslim world84. By wearing the veil, women become part of the resistance. Supportive As wives, women are taught to be pillars of emotional support for their fighting husbands. One mujahid explains why women are desperately needed in this role: The blood he sees, the body pieces he walks over on the battlefield, the friends he loses, the disturbed sleep he gets, all of this is sufficient to make anyone break. […] A woman by nature is someone who is loving and caring, and everyone needs this, especially a Mujahid85.

Female softness counterbalances the horrors of war. Goldstein argues male soldiers are taught to suppress their emotions, learn discipline, and endure war’s brutality. In turn, women must “pick up the emotional slack in relationships,”86 and compensate for the emotional stunting of their partners. Daesh propaganda guides women on nurturing battle-worn husbands. Let them rest, and avoid excessive complaints or demands, as some brothers end up wishing they could go for a martyrdom operation after marriage due to the stress some sisters cause them87. Women are instructed to offer a peaceful, comforting presence, speaking softly and kindly88. A woman’s role is to stay strong, allowing her husband to focus on his mission89.

                                                             82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Referenced by Simon Cottee, “What ISIS Women Want,” FP, May 17, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:00]. Quoted in MAL-X, Tumblr post. Much of Daesh’s English propaganda discusses Western oppression of the Muslim world in varying degrees of realism & hyperbole. UK-Y, Tumblr post. Goldstein, p. 269. UK-Y, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 10.

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Widow According to propaganda, mujahideen are usually martyred within the first two years—chances of entering widowhood are therefore high90. Daesh offers guidance on widowhood in the caliphate. Women are taught their husbands’ martyrdom is inevitable, and some present a flippant reaction to their deaths: When Abu Baraa became shahīd leaving behind one orphan child who was not even turned one year old yet—But—I was prepare for that news for long […] I wasn’t shaken with the news. …91

In the caliphate, widows are well-provided for92. To be the wife of a martyr is considered a great honor93, and wives are told they will join their husbands in Paradise. Once a husband is martyred, his family receives weekly food, wages, and a cash payout94. After a women finishes her Iddah95, she moves into a safe house with other widows96. According to some sources, widows are not forced to remarry97; another states they are highly encouraged to do so, as life in the caliphate without a husband is difficult98. Rules for widows are based on religious texts99. Iddah, the mourning period, lasts for four months and ten days. During this time, women wear black and abstain from make-up, jewelry, and perfume. While mourning, widows cannot attend weddings nor discuss marriage proposals100. At the same time, women are cautioned against excessive mourning101, alluding to the expectation of remarriage. The following section explores polygamy, the mechanism which allows widows to remarry. Polygamy Far from oppressing women, propaganda argues polygamy provides protection. In an article on the “wisdoms of polygamy,” Daesh puts forward the following arguments: first, women outnumber men, as men are more exposed to danger; second, widows, divorcees, and infertile women are protected in

                                                             90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

UK-Y, Tumblr post. MAL-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post. MAL-X, Tweet. MAL-X, Tumblr post; UK-Y, Tumblr post. Iddah—translates as mourning. UK-Y, Tumblr post. MAL-X, Tumblr post. UK-X, Tumblr post. Fiqh-us Sunnah v 004 Funerals and Dhikr, Fiqh 4.023; quoted in Dabiq no. 13, p. 24. Dabiq no. 13, p. 26. Ibid.

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marriage; third, men have others to fulfill their sexual needs when a wife is unable102. Women are advised to abandon jealousy and support their husbands in taking another wife, as it is an honorable act: Let every sister just put herself in the shoes of the wife of a shahīd and sacrifice some of the selfishness that is a part of our nature103! Wives of martyrs made a huge sacrifice, and must be looked after. Jealousy, while a natural reaction, is no excuse to ban polygamy. Women are told having co-wives gives them the opportunity to build a wonderful sisterhood104. Polygamy does not destroy marriages but bolsters their strength. 2. Mother Mothers raise soldiers. According to Goldstein, the perpetuation of the male warrior stems from grooming boys early, in the home. For women in Daesh, above all, the most important role is motherhood: The greatness of her position, the purpose of her existence is the Divine duty of motherhood105. In March 2016, the Quilliam Foundation estimated some 31,000 women in the caliphate were pregnant106. In this section, I first analyze the role of mothers as portrayed in propaganda; the second considers state participation in raising these ‘cubs of the caliphate’. a. Motherhood in Daesh For young muhajirat, motherhood begins as soon as they prepare to leave. Packing lists advise prenatal vitamins and stretchy t-shirts107. Upon arrival, even single women’s days revolve around looking after children in the makkar108. Motherhood is an obligation, and family planning requires the husband’s permission109. Once they have their own families, mothers become responsible for training their children according to Daesh’s guidance.

                                                             102

103 104 105 106

107 108 109

Dabiq no. 12, “Just Terror,” November−December 2015, 20. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:20]. Dabiq no. 12, p. 22. MAL-X, Twitter post. Women of the Islamic State, p. 18. Nadim Houry, “Children of the Caliphate: What to Do About Kids Born Under ISIS,” Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:20]. MAL-X, Tumblr post; SWE-X-1, Tumblr post. UK-X, Tumblr post. MAL-X, Tumblr post.

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Rearing lions and pious little princesses fulfills a woman’s jihad110. For women itching to be more active in jihad, Daesh assures them they will be better rewarded as mothers111. All children should be raised humbly, with true Muslim teachings. Girls should be brought up as pious, modest, and righteous; women must emulate these qualities to set a good example112. For boys and girls, Daesh gives extensive guidance on preparing them for war. Daesh advises mothers to start training children before age seven113. To spark their interest in jihad, mothers tell bedtime stories of Muslim martyrs, teach them to channel their anger towards Allah’s enemies, and encourage physical activity114. Daesh recommends target shooting using “safe toys”, playing military games, and devoting time to “jihad-friendly” activities115. Mothers should expose children to military books, CDs, and videos. Boys and girls have the right to basic military training from their parents116. If her husband is killed, women are expected to carry out this training alone, raising her sons to be mujahid, and daughters, wives of mujahid117. The ultimate duty comes when fighting arrives, and women send their sons into the fray: I saw sisters on a night enflamed by battle send their fifteen year old sons outside the home saying, “Allah is the greatest!”118 By fulfilling these obligations, women become “the mother of lion cubs.” b. Cubs of the caliphate Daesh propaganda repeatedly emphasizes the so-called caliphate as an ideal place to raise children. The caliphate is the safest place in the world119, where children play in parks and carnivals, free of racism, tribalism, or nationalism, where all are united under Islam120. The “cubs of the caliphate” are safe from drugs, alcohol, TV shows promoting adultery, immodest billboards, lessons on Christian holidays and sex education121. Instead, the state offers a detailed education plan for boys and girls.

                                                             110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121

NE-Y, Tumblr post; Dabiq no. 11, p. 41. UK-X-1, Tumblr post. MAL-X, Tumblr post. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 7. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 7−8. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 7–9. Ibid. “Days of Sahawaat,” p. 91; A Sister’s Role in Jihad, 13; Dabiq no. 11, p. 42−44. Dabiq no. 8, 36; Dabiq no. 11, p. 41. MAL-X, Tumblr post. The Islamic State 2015 Full Ebook, p. 44. UK-Y, Tumblr post; NE-Y, Tumblr post.

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In Daesh, schools are free and gender-segregated. Girls aged 7 to 9 attend classes on Islam and Shari’ah law, reading and writing Arabic, accounting, and natural sciences122. From 10 to 12 they study more Shari’ah, especially related to marriage and divorce, knitting, and cooking123. From 13 to 15, girls continue with Shari’ah, also studying Muslim history and child-rearing skills124. Like girls, boys also learn Arabic and Qur’an reading and memorization125. In addition to Islamic studies, boys attend training camps where they learn to use weapons, do martial arts, and engage in armed combat. Young boys are not allowed near the front lines but do spend time with soldiers at the safe houses126. In bearing and raising children, we find the ultimate utility of women for Daesh. Daesh does not attempt to hide their motive for attracting female candidates: by migrating to Sham you are not just benefitting yourself but you are also benefitting the Islamic State in its expansion and advancement. By raising your kids here, you are increasing its population and hence creating more Mujahideen127.

Women are the lifeblood of the caliphate, and provide a dual service: first, by producing future generations, and second, by indoctrinating children within their own homes. Without women, the caliphate would not survive, but fall back into the dusts of history as quickly as they rose. Mayyour sons be the bricks and mortar in the tower of majesty and minarets of the State of Islam128. 3. Nurse The tradition of female nurses in wartime stretches far back in the historical record. According to Goldstein, their utility is multi-pronged: along with sweethearts and mothers, nurses nurture male warriors129. Female nurses bear witness to male bravery, egging men on. Finally, from a practical standpoint, female nurses free up manpower, enabling men to fight130. In their use of female nurses, Daesh stands to reap these benefits.

                                                             122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

Women of the Islamic State, p. 22−24. Women of the Islamic State, p. 24. Ibid. The Islamic State 2015 Full Ebook, p. 44. UK-Y, Tumblr post; Dabiq no. 8, 20; The Islamic State 2015 Full Ebook, p. 44. UK-Y, Tumblr post. Women of the Islamic State, p. 41. Goldstein, p. 308–312 Goldstein, p. 308–312.

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Daesh propaganda makes repeated appeals to Muslims with medical backgrounds to serve in the caliphate, including women131. While Daesh emphasizes women should stay in their homes, working in medicine is a valid exception132. For women who have not completed their studies, Daesh invites them to attend medical colleges. Daesh provides packing lists of books and supplies for medical school hopefuls133. Medical schools are free and gender-segregated134; single women who attend do not live at the makkar, but in dormitories with other female students (an added incentive)135. Women work in the understaffed hospitals as doctors’ assistants, bringing patients food, straightening pillows, etc136. Providing medical support is an important component of a woman’s jihad137. At minimum, all women should know basic combat medicine and first aid, to be prepared138. Jihadi Bride

Today, an overwhelming 97% of militaries are male, despite advances in technology, military techniques, and societal change139. Aside from a few exceptions, this puzzling absence is consistent across time and space. Yet ‘jihadi girl power’ in Daesh propaganda, featuring veiled women posing with AK47s and suicide belts, portrays a pro-female warrior stance. At the same time, other sources assert that women are not permitted to fight. This section examines evidence for female warriors in Daesh, as well as posts claiming women cannot fight. a. Female warriors Despite the universal absence of female warriors, Daesh propaganda alludes to female soldiers in the caliphate. Unlike family planning, women do not need their husband’s permission to participate in jihad140. Women own guns (a common wedding present) and explosive belts141. Guard duty is an avenue

                                                             131

132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141

Dabiq no. 1, “The Return of the Khilafah,” June–July 2014, 11 https://clarionproject. org/docs/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf; Dabiq no. 9, p. 26; UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; SWE-X-1, Tumblr post. Women of the Islamic State, p. 22. UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; SWE-X-1, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post; SWE-X-1, Tumblr post; Dabiq no. 9, p. 26. SWE-X-1, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 4. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 15–16. Goldstein, p. 107. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 1–2. UK-Y, Tumblr post.

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of jihad open to women142. Attending weapons seminars and trainings organized by women is another way to pass the time143. When their husbands return home, women can practice target shooting144. Women are encouraged to receive military training for self-defense145. In an online journal, the author describes how one woman killed Daesh’s enemies: One of the sisters, before she got shahadah, was able to kill a few FSA men who charged at her and the other sisters when the brothers got shahadah. All of the killed brothers & sisters had their index fingers raised and we saw the FSA men trying to lower their index fingers to hide it from the people, but failed to do so146.

After killing their attackers, the woman died glamorously, finger raised in a defiant Daesh salute. Despite the allusions to female warriors, women are not yet joining men on the battlefield. Their jihadi glamor is superficial, girls playing dress-up to live out martyrdom fantasies. As one mujahid jokes, if she wants to wear a black headband and carry a gun, she can do that the whole day if she wants (hahaha! some sisters are very die hard Ma sha Allah)147. Women are told their participation in fighting is not yet needed, but to wait for summons. Nonetheless, they must be prepared148. This way, Daesh preserves strict gender roles, yet holds the key to an untapped fighting force. b. Women cannot fight While Daesh propaganda is full of glitzy jihadi glamor, sources maintain women are best suited to participate in other ways. As one muhajirah puts it, I will be straight up and blunt with you all, there is absolutely nothing for sisters to participate in […] These are all rumours you may have heard through some sources who themselves are not actually aware of the truth. And the women you may have seen online participating are all part of a propaganda […] Please sisters do not believe anything you hear or see online where apparently sisters are fighting149.

Images of gun-slinging women are seemingly propaganda. The muhajirah explains female fighters emasculate men, who cry when rejected for martyrdom operations150. Daesh asserts that jihad is an obligation upon women; however,

                                                             142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 5. UK-Y, Tumblr post. UK-X, Tumblr post; “Days of Sahawaat”, p. 3. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 10. “Days of Sahawaat,” p. 3. NE-Y, Tumblr post. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 4; Women of the Islamic State, p. 22. UK-X, Tumblr post. UK-X, Tumblr post.

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there are better ways to fulfill this duty. Most important for women is their role as mothers151. In the role of female warriors, Daesh presents two contradictory narratives. On one hand, propaganda is splattered with images of women wielding AK-47s and references to gun classes and suicide belts; on the other, posts assert that women do not fight, but her jihad is raising the next generation of mujahideen. By maintaining this juxtaposition, Daesh has the best of both worlds: rigid gender roles form the foundation of the organization, yet Daesh holds a final ace—an army reserve, waiting to be called up. c. All-Female morality police: the Hisbah One of the direct parallels we can draw to female fighters within Daesh is the Al-Khanssaa Brigade (also known as hisbah), an all-women morality police force152. With their strict laws against free-mixing, Daesh needed a way to enforce law within the home. The brigade punishes Muslim women who commit offenses, such as dressing immodestly, breastfeeding in public, or going out unchaperoned. An all-female brigade is a departure from the practices of other fundamentalist groups. For terrorism researcher Thomas Hegghammer, this signifies a larger trend of allowing women to participate more directly in jihadist activities. As Hegghammer explains, “there is a process of female emancipation taking place in the jihadi movement, albeit a very limited (and morbid) one”153. Many wonder whether this “female emancipation” will transfer to female warriors—putting weapons in women’s hands is a slippery slope towards deconstructing rigid gender roles; however, Daesh may need women fighters as they continue losing soldiers154. For now, women are by and large missing from battle—yet one wonders how long this female embargo will hold. 5. Feminization of enemies: sex slaves According to Daesh ideology, an al-sabi is a woman captured in war, and her captivity is made permissible by her unbelief (kuffar). Kuffar women include those of Jewish, Christian, and polytheistic faith (mushrikin), which Daesh

                                                             151 152 153

154

A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 7. Referenced in UK-Y, Tumblr post. Quoted in Kathy Gilsinan, “The ISIS Crackdown on Women, By Women: ISIS’s allfemale brigade and the slowly growing role of female jihadis,” The Atlantic, July 25, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:17]. The first report of female suicide bombers occurred in Libya in February 2016, though it is outside the geographic scope of this study.

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views the Yazidi155 as being of. Daesh’s genocidal persecution of Christian, Shia, and Yazidi communities156 echoes a common pattern of warfare in the ancient Middle East and Greece, where victorious armies slaughtered men and raped and enslaved women157. These actions feminized enemies as a form of symbolic domination. Rape is not driven by desire, but dominance158. Another function of wartime rape serves to erase the captive’s identity, as the captors assert their moral and spiritual identity as stronger. Daesh intends to destroy the Yazidi and Shia, because they view the former as guilty of polytheism, and the latter as apostates. Finally, rape (especially gang rape) leads to group cohesion, where soldiers are bound together by an unspeakable crime. Daesh incorporates rape into their ideology, transforming it into a religious duty. Escaped Yazidi women explain how Daesh men performed religious rites, praying before and after the assault and thus “bookending the rape with acts of religious devotion”159. By transforming rape into a religious obligation and developing rites to accompany the crime, Daesh espouses a “theology of rape”160. This theology forms one of the strands that weaves the men of the caliphate together. In this new age jihadi multiculturalism, Daesh requires a means of enhancing social cohesion. I write this while the letters drip of pride. Yes, O religions of kufr altogether, we have indeed raided and captured the kāfirah women, and drove them like sheep by the edge of the sword161.

                                                             155

156

157 158 159

160 161

An ethnically Kurdish religious community based in northern Iraq. Misunderstood for centuries, their religion encompasses strains of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism. In August 2014, the group was attacked on Mount Sinjar. Men, women, and children were killed indiscriminately, and survivors kidnapped. Around 9,900 individuals were killed or kidnapped in the assault. “Escape from hell,” Amnesty International; “Ethnic Cleansing on a Historic Scale,” Amnesty International; “Human rights situation in Iraq,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; “Iraq crisis: Islamic State accused of ethnic cleansing,” BBC News; Green, Al-Juboori, Lattimer, Manno, Smith, and Spencer, “No Way Home,”; CummingBruce, “United Nations Investigators Accuse ISIS of Genocide Over Attacks on Yazidis”; Shea, “The ISIS Genocide of Middle Eastern Christian Minorities”; Muscati, “Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape”. Goldstein, p. 357. Goldstein, p. 362. Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape,” New York Times, August 13, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theolo gy-of-rape.html. Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape.” Dabiq no. 9, p. 46.

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The above excerpt is taken from an article defending sexual slavery in the caliphate. Sexual slavery is not a matter of shame, but pride; a practice to celebrate, not hide. Sexual slavery is a sign of the victory of Muslims over Allah’s enemies162. A pamphlet on sex slaves leaked in 2014 provides a window into what is permissible within Daesh’s interpretations, and how they defend it. Among other rules, the pamphlet outlines that men cannot have intercourse with pregnant slaves, nor sell them. This ruling is consistent with accounts of escaped Yazidi women, who describe forced birth control163. By avoiding pregnancy, Daesh maintains its sex slave supply. Propagandists also report slaves freely accepting Islam, thus ensuring salvation164. Propaganda goes to great lengths to argue that sexual slavery is far from rape in the secular world: As for the slave-girl that was taken by the swords of men following the cheerful warrior […], then her enslavement is in opposition to human rights and copulation with her is rape?! What is wrong with you?165

The grim realities of sexual slavery are glossed over, painted instead as an affable arrangement with ‘the cheerful warrior’. 6. Shamer A vital role for women in war is to shame men into combat. To coax any human into war is difficult, as one must confront feelings of fear, guilt and empathy for the enemy. By constructing masculine identity as powerful and aggressive, feminine identities are made into mirror images—submissive and defenseless. Men are called upon to protect their women, and any deviation is labeled as cowardly. Shame thus becomes “the glue that holds the manmaking process together,” thus a form of “nagging men” into war166. As shamers, women are a vital cog in the war machinery. Women shaming men into war is observed across history, from ancient Greece, where men could not marry until proving themselves in battle, to World War I, when women handed out white feathers to men who stayed home167. Shaming also

                                                             162 163

164 165 166 167

Dabiq no. 9, p. 47. Rukmini Callimachi, “To Maintain Supply of Sex Slaves, ISIS Pushes Birth Control,” New York Times: March 12, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/world/mid dleeast/to-maintain-supply-of-sex-slaves-isis-pushes-birth-control.html. Dabiq no. 9, p. 48. Dabiq no. 9, p. 48−49. Goldstein, p. 253, 269. Goldstein, p. 272.

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explains women’s absence on the battlefield—if women were shown as capable of defending themselves, traditional constructions of manhood would crumble. One primary example of women shaming men into war in Daesh is through their choice of spouse. Women are instructed to marry a mujahid, as it is the noblest role. To combat reluctance on marrying a man destined for death, propaganda reassures women they will be reunited in Jannah168. Single women are given questions for their potential spouse to determine his keenness to die for Allah: So what questions should you ask a potential spouse before marrying him? 1. What his role is in the State 2. Why he is not currently on front lines. 3. How long has it been sincehe has not been on front lines. 4. What’s the longest duration he spent on ribat. 5. How long has he been in Sham169.

Women are warned against falling for men who are “always on twitter,” and to question why they are not on the front lines. Such lines of questioning teach men that serving as soldiers boosts their appeal. For married women, Daesh propaganda informs them they must push their husbands to join jihad. If their husbands refuse, women are obligated to divorce170. Fear of violence or losing one’s children is no excuse to stay, as their biggest fear should be Allah’s wrath171. Encouraging husbands and male family members to fight is a form of jihad for women, on and off the battlefield172. Off the battlefield, women can patiently and untiringly encourage the men of their families, reminding them of their duty to Allâh and other Muslims173. VII. Conclusion Summary Borne out of underground terrorist cells in remote desert hideouts, Daesh carved out a territorial stronghold through terror and blunt force. The group conducted a sophisticated propaganda campaign targeting women and attracted females to its bases in Iraq and Syria in droves. Media tended to label this female phenomenon as unprecedented—however, closer examination of

                                                             168 169 170 171 172 173

Referenced in UK-Y, Tumblr post; MAL-X, Tumblr post. UK-Y, Tumblr post. Dabiq no. 10, p. 44. Dabiq no. 10, p. 45. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 5, 10. A Sister’s Role in Jihad, p. 10.

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Molly Prendergast

Daesh propaganda reveals women’s roles in the caliphate resonate with traditional wartime roles for women, consistent with gender-war theory. In this analysis, I addressed the following questions: what have the roles for women in Daesh been? How have these roles benefitted the group? To explore these inquiries, I utilized qualitative content analysis to discern whether the universal roles for women in wartime outlined by Goldstein are reflected in Daesh propaganda. My analysis uncovered the following roles, consistent with Goldstein’s analysis: sweetheart, mother, nurse, jihadi bride, sex slave, and shamer. According to Daesh propaganda, foreign women voluntarily migrating to the so-called caliphate become sweethearts, mothers, jihadi brides, nurses, and shamers; local Syrian and Iraqi women, on the other hand, have higher chances of falling into sexual slavery. Despite pictures of gun-slinging women, the universal absence of female warriors also rings true for Daesh (though liberties awarded to the hisbah leave one wondering whether the future is female). Daesh understands the true value of women in war, coinciding with wartime roles for women throughout history. Study limitations and further research This analysis aims to provide an inclusive picture of women in Daesh and avoid yet another study on Western muhajirat—however, language constraints limited the potency of the study on non-Western women. While research groups provided English translations for some materials, this must be done on a larger scale. In addition to practical barriers, there should be more interest in foreign non-Western women joining Daesh. Female migrants from the Middle East and North Africa are said to number in the “thousands,” with a reported 700 women from Tunisia alone. These figures dwarf the estimated 550 Western females in Daesh, yet the discrepancy in size is not reflected in research. At the same time, governments’ reluctance to share data on citizens limits research avenues. Numbers of foreigners with the group are hard to come by—even more difficult is a gendered breakdown. For a more developed picture of women in Daesh, more collaboration is needed on international and domestic levels. Daesh’s message holds universal appeal, and efforts to counter them should be equally broad. With more research on propaganda narratives, government agencies can manufacture counter-propaganda. If we can understand the gravitation towards Daesh, we can reach out to those most at risk.

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References Primary Sources Magazines, pamphlets & e-books Abu Saa’d Al-Sudani. “Days of Sahawaat (Episode One).” March 17, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:10]. A Sister’s Role in Jihad. 2014. Accessed November 18, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:20]. Dabiq no. 1, “The Return of Khilafah.” June–July 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:21]. Dabiq no. 4, “The Failed Crusade.” August−September 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:22]. Dabiq no. 7, “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” January–February 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:25]. Dabiq no. 8, “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa.” February–March 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.19, at 12:30]. Dabiq no. 9, “They Plot and Allah Plots.” May–June 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 19, at 12:33]. Dabiq no. 10, “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men.” June–July 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:34]. Dabiq no. 11, “From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions.” August−September 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:55]. Dabiq no. 12, “Just Terror.” November–December 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:58].

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Dabiq no. 13, “The Rafida: From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal.” January–February 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:59]. Hijrah to the Islamic State. 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:00]. “Islamic State (ISIS) Releases Pamphlet on Female Slaves.” Middle Eastern Media Research Institute, December 4, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:00]. The Islamic State 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:10]. Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto on Women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade. 2015. Trans. Charlie Winter, The Quilliam Foundation. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:15]. Social media accounts UK-X. Tumblr posts. Collected February 3, 2017. UK-Y. Tumblr posts. Collected September 17, 2015–January 14, 2016. SWE-X-1. Tumblr posts. Collected October 28–November 3, 2015. SWE-X-2. Tumblr posts. Collected January 13, 2016. NE-Y. Tumblr posts. Collected December 26, 2015–January 13, 2016. MAL-X. Tumblr posts. Collected October 20, 2015–February 3, 2017. MAL-X. Twitter posts. Collected January 6–14, 2016. Secondary Sources Background Information “ISIS Steps Up Information Control in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.” Flash Notes 5 by The Sec-Dev Foundation, August 5, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:20]. “Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps.” BBC, July 20, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:22].

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Non-western Muhajirat “Chechen mother takes her two Dutch children to join Isis in Syria.” The Guardian, March 16, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:33]. “Forty-six Saudi women have joined ISIS since 2011, MOI says.” Al Arabiya English News, September 3, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:35]. Gilsinan, Kathy. “The ISIS Crackdown on Women, By Women: ISIS’s allfemale brigade and the slowly growing role of female jihadis.” The Atlantic: July 25, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:40]. Harel, Z. “Jordanian Journalists: Hundreds Of Thousands Of Young Jordanians Support ISIS—And The Authorities Aren’t Dealing With It.” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), May 3, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:55]. “Malaysian women offer their bodies to ISIS militants in ‘sexual jihad’; Najib slams Islamic radicals.” The Straits Times, August 27, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:55]. Oliphant, Roland. “‘Your son has become a martyr’: the Russian fighters from Dagestan rising up the ranks of Islamic State.” The Telegraph, July 30, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:55]. Pellegrini-Bettoli, Gaja. “Intrepid Sisters Reveal How ISIS Depends on Role of Women.” News Deeply, May 26, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:56]. “Saudis most likely to join ISIS, 10% of group’s fighters are women.” MEMO: Middle Eastern Monitor, October 20, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 13:57].

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Scherpen, Bastiaan. “Paris-Style Attack in Jakarta ‘Highly Unlikely,’ Expert Says.” Jakarta Globe: November 23, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:00]. Speckhard, Anne. “The Jihad in Jordan: Drivers of Radicalization into Violent Extremism in Jordan.” International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, March 25, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:01]. “38 percent of Moroccans Who Joined ISIS Are Women.” Morocco World News, July 8, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:04]. Western Muhajirat Bradford, Alexandra, Carolyn Hoyle, and Ross Frenett. “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.19, at 14:10]. Jaffer, Nabeelah. “The secret world of jihadi brides: ‘U dnt hav 2 pay 4 ANYTHING if u r wife of martyr.’” The Guardian, June 24, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 2019, at 14:10]. Kirschbaum, Erik and Sabine Siebold. “700 Germans are fighting for ISIS and the number of women joining keeps growing,” Reuters, June 24, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:20]. Massi, Alessandria. “Here’s How ISIS Recruits Westerners.” International Business Insider, September 10, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:21]. Patel, Sofia. “The Sultanate of Women: Exploring female roles in perpetuating and preventing violent extremism.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:22].

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Peresin, Anita. “Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no.4 (2015): 21–38. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:30]. Peresin, Anita and Alberto Cervone. “The Western Muhajirat of ISIS.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38 no. 7 (2015): 495–509. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:33]. Petrou, Michael. “What’s driving teen girls to jihad? Why are so many young women from Western countries running away from home to join a genocidal death cult?” Maclean’s, March 7, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:35]. Saltman, Erin Marie and Melanie Smith. “Til Martyrdom Do Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:40]. Shackle, Samira. “The London girls lost to Isis: what became of the ‘jihadi brides.’” New Statesman, October 6, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:44]. Walt, Vivienne. “Marriage and Martyrdom: How ISIS is Winning Women.” Time, November 18, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:47]. Ware, Jessica. “Australian woman leaves two children ‘to join ISIS in Syria’— telling babysitter she was going to pick up a new car.” Independent, May 29, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:55]. “Woman claims hundreds of Muslim women in Antwerp ‘pledged allegiance to ISIS.’” Women in the World Media, LLC, June 6, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:48]. Zheng, Catherine. “Women in ISIS: the Rise of Female Jihadists.” Harvard Political Review, March 18, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 2019, at 14:49].

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Local women Callimachi, Rukmini. “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape,” New York Times, August 13, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:50]. Callimachi, Rukmini. “To Maintain Supply of Sex Slaves, ISIS Pushes Birth Control.” New York Times, March 12, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 2019, at 14:51]. Cetorelli, Valeria, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, and Gilbert Burnham. “Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in 2014: A retrospective household survey.” PLOS Medicine 14, no. 5 (2017): 1–15. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:52]. Cumming-Bruce, Nick. “United Nations Investigators Accuse ISIS of Genocide Over Attacks on Yazidis.” New York Times, March 19, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:53]. “Escape from hell: Torture and sexual slavery in Islamic State captivity in Iraq.” AmnestyInternational, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 2019, at 14:54]. “Ethnic Cleansing on a Historic Scale: Islamic State’s Systematic Targeting of Minorities in Northern Iraq.” Amnesty International, 2014. Available at:

[Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:55]. Green, Johanna, Mays Al-Juboori, Mark Lattimer, Alessandro Manno, Alison Smith, and William Spencer. “No Way Home: Iraq’s minorities on the verge of disappearance.” The Ceasefire Project, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:57]. Gross, Terry. Interview with Rukmini Callimachi. Fresh Air podcast audio, August 11, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:58].

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“Human rights situation in Iraq in light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups.” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 13, 2015. “Iraq crisis: Islamic State accused of ethnic cleansing.” BBC News, September 2, 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:59]. Muscati, Samer. “Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape—Yezidi Survivors in Need of Urgent Care.” Human Rights Watch, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 15:02]. Shea, Nina. “The ISIS Genocide of Middle Eastern Christian Minorities and Its Jizya Propaganda Ploy.” Hudsen Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom, August 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 15:05]. Qualitative content analysis Botan, Carl, Lawrence Frey, Paul Friedman, and Gary Kreps. Investigating Communication: AnIntroduction to Research Methods. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999. Kohlbacher, Florian. “The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research.” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 7 no. 1 (2006). Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:40]. Lee, Eun-Hee and Ji Young Cho.“Reducing Confusion about Grounded Theory and Qualitative Content Analysis: Similarities and Differences.” The Quantitative Report 19 no. 32 (2014). Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 15:10]. Saldaña, Johnny. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009. Schreier, Margrit. “Qualitative Content Analysis.” The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis, ed. by Uwe Flick. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014. Wildemuth, Barbara M and Yan Zhang. “Qualitative Analysis of Content.” Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science, ed. by BM Wildemuth. Westport, Connecticut: Libraries Unlimited, 2009.

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Gender-war theory Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge, 1990. Chodrow, Nancy. The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978. Goldstein, Joshua. War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System, and ViceVersa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Jenkins, Sharon Rae. “Introduction to the Special Issue: Defining Gender, Relationships, and Power.” Sex Roles: A Journal of Research 42, no. 7−8 (2001): 467−493. E-ISSN: 1573−2762. Available at: [Accessed on 03. 10.2019, at 12:38]. MacKinnon, Catherine. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1989. Spelman, Elizabeth. The Inessential Woman. London: The Women’s Press, 1990. Tuana, Nancy. “Re-fusing nature/nurture.” Women’s Studies International Forum 6 No. 6 (1983): 621–632. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 15:20].

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Goran Ilik, Mladen Karadjoski, Nina Ilik

The European Union Vs. The BRICS: The Conflict of Values and The Challenges of Liberal Democracy in The New International Context Abstract: This paper investigates the challenges of liberal democracy in the new international context, provoked by the emergence of the new great powers (Russia and China), and especially the establishment of the BRICS grouping on the global stage. Subsequently the paper “clashes” both paradigms of the BRICS and the EU, to conclude their performances concerning the values of liberal democracy. The liberal axiological set of the EU as a postmodern entity is especially stressed, with typical soft power in international relations. The EU’s soft power stems from its axiological set, totally composed of liberal democratic values. The new international context is characterized by the establishment of liberal and illiberal actors. IR theorists treated the US and the EU as the main representatives of liberal democracy, whilst Russia was treated as a illiberal democracy or an autocracy, and China was treated as autocracy. This paper concludes the forthcoming challenges of liberal democracy in the new international context, as well as the place, role, and significance of the EU (with all its virtues and drawbacks), in its mission for safeguarding and advancing liberal democratic values. The new international context seems to become more complex and more heterogeneous, composed of various global actors, and less liberal compared to the present. One of the main challenges of the EU in the future will be its role as a pro-active defender of the values of liberal democracy. Keywords: European Union, BRICS, international relations, liberal democracy, values The European Union: A Postmodern Bastion of Liberal Values The EU highly affirms its axiological (value) foundations, creating the image of itself as a postmodern actor, which cooperates and communicates with other global actors rather than forcing its way. Several factors confirm the EU’s postmodern nature: “first, blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic politics; second, voluntary mutual intrusiveness and mutual verification; third, a complete repudiation of the use of force in settling 37

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disputes; and fourth, security built on transparency, mutual openness and inter-dependence” (Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas 2009, p. 4). The postmodern foreign policy means a break with modern concepts. In this sense, nationalism and national markets are: being increasingly replaced by cosmopolitanism and the globalized economy, national interest is complemented by humanitarian or environmental concerns, principles of noninterference and sovereignty are being undermined by the pooling of sovereignty, realpolitik is being complemented by ideational/normative considerations” (Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas 2009, 4).

Rokas Grajauskas and Laurynas Kasčiūnas (2009, p. 4) underlined that the EU “acts as an umbrella, placing the EU Member States under a postmodern framework. When EU countries want to act in a ‘modern’ way, they go on their own. In those areas where the EU is acting as a single actor, the EU’s action is postmodern”. In that context “postmodern international actors are not interested in acquiring territory or using force and rather choose to build their security relationships on cooperative grounds. They prefer to use nonmilitary foreign policy instruments and focus on soft power, as well as structural power” (Keukeleire and McNaughton 2008, p. 20). As a result, the affirmation of norms and values is becoming equally important as the affirmation of national interest (raison d’état). Foreign policy in the (Westphalian) modern age “was characterized by states as the main actors, by a clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics, by the protection of sovereignty and by the pursuit of national interest, power and raison d’état using mostly hard power, military means” (Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas 2009, p. 4). As opposed to the modern concept, EU interests could be defined as raison de valeur (or value interests), directly derived from its founding values— the values of liberal democracy. Hence, the EU is mainly defined as a normative power (Table 1), civilian power or just soft power. This is also highlighted in the new EU Global Strategy (2016, p. 4) with the following words: “The EU has always prided itself on its soft power—and it will keep doing so”. The soft power involves “leading by example” (Stuenkel 2016, p. 102). Considering soft power, Frank Vibert (2008, p. 5) stressed that “soft power comes from international relations theory and refers to accomplishing international aims through persuasion and co-option rather than through the use of armed force or other forms of coercion such as the use of economic sanctions”. This confirms EU soft power, which stems from its originality as a role model constituted on liberal democratic values and principles.

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The European Union vs. The BRICS Founding Principles Liberty Democracy Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms Rule of law

Tasks and Objectives Social progress Non-discrimination Sustainable development

39

Stable Institutions

Fundamental Rights

Guarantee of democracy Rule of law Human rights and fundamental freedoms Protection of minorities

Dignity Freedoms Equality Solidarity Citizenship Justice

Treaty Base—set out Treaty Base—set out Copenhagen Criteria —set out in the in Article 2 of the in Article 6 of the conclusions of the TEC and of the Treaty on European TEU, and Articles 6 June 1993 European Union Council and 13 of the TEC

Draft Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Table 1: Normative power Europe (Source: Manners 2002, p. 33) Ian Manners, the creator of the normative power concept, stated that the “EU represents neither a civilian power of an intergovernmental nature utilizing economic tools, nor a military power of a supranational nature using armed force, but a normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles” (Manners 2002, p. 29). This kind of international power has its basis, directly derived from the EU’s value system as a postmodern actor, “developed over the past fifty years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions” (Manners 2002, p. 33). The Founding Values The Lisbon Treaty stipulated a framework that requires both the EU and its member states to affirm and respect its founding values. Such values are not always named “values”, but sometimes are referred to by terms such as “objectives”, “tasks”, “principles”, “duties” and so on, which have an indisputable axiological essence. The Treaty on European Union specified the EU values in Article B, stating that the EU shall: “promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal borders, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. Likewise, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in Article I2 listed the following values: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minority groups. This treaty also confirmed the values of the previous Treaty establishing the European Community, such as: “promotion of scientific and technological development, opposition to social exclusion, the promotion of social justice and social protection, equality between men and women, solidarity, the promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion, and respect for cultural and linguistic differences”. Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty states that the EU’s actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired “its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law”. This article also confirms that the EU shall define and pursue its common policies and actions and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, to achieve the following objectives: (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (…) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance (The Treaty of Lisbon of 2007).

The EU Global Strategy 2016 (p. 13–15), once again confirms the significance of its founding values and its global interests, stating that: “Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy, and rules-based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action (…) These include respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”. Hence, the EU appears as a “defender” of the values of western civilization, while promoting its concept of the principled and constructive international system, based on rules and multilateralism. Despite the EU’s liberal and democratic reasoning, the new international context seems more complex and not so cooperative. The new international context means the beginning of the post-western world. In the text below, we will introduce the BRICS grouping and its value potential concerning the current liberal world order. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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The BRICS: An Overview The BRICS is a relatively young grouping of countries and fast-growing economies. At first, the foreign ministers of the initial four BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) “met in New York City in September 2006, beginning a series of high-level meetings” (First BRIC summit 2009). The BRIC diplomatic meetings focused on international challenges and “on joint efforts to fight the global economic crisis” (Lukin 2009). The leaders of the BRIC nations got together for the first time “on the sidelines of a G8 summit at Tokyo, Japan, on July 2008, and soon after that (…) Russian President Medvedev said during a visit to Rio de Janeiro that BRIC leaders would like to have a separate summit in Russia” (Lukin 2009). The Republic of South Africa (RSA) joined the group in December 2010 and BRIC finally became BRICS. As a curiosity, Jim O’Neill, a senior economist at Goldman Sachs, proposed the very acronym BRIC, using it “to denote the four major fastgrowing economies, the combined power of which might exceed that of the West sometime in the future—Brazil, Russia, India, China [and later South Africa]” (Lukin 2009). At the First Summit held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, the BRIC nations stated: “We are convinced that a reformed financial and economic architecture should be based, inter alia, on the following principles: 1) democratic and transparent decision-making and implementation process at the international financial organizations; 2) solid legal basis; 3) compatibility of activities of effective national regulatory institutions and international standard-setting bodies; and 4) strengthening of risk management and supervisory practices” (Joint Statement 2009). It can be concluded that the principle of democracy is affirmed only in terms of international financial organizations and their structuring and functioning, urging for greater involvement of the BRIC nations in them. The Second Summit held in Brasilia, Brazil, promoted the need “for corresponding transformations in global governance in all relevant areas” (Second BRIC Summit 2010). At this Summit, the BRIC nations underlined their support and will to create “multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States” (Second BRIC Summit 2010). This is an illustrative example of how the BRIC(S) political elites understand democracy. Democracy is understood as legitimacy for equal participation in world affairs, based on the sovereignty rights of all states. This stance complies with the Russian (semi-autocratic sovereign democracy concept) and Chinese (autocratic) understandings of international —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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relations. In this context, the term “multipolar” is used as the legitimacy basis of such reasoning, hoping that Russia and China will impose themselves on the international political scene as great powers, entitled to their share in international affairs. The Sanya Declaration, promulgated on the summit held in China, acknowledged that the BRICS “has played an important role in contributing to world peace, security and stability, boosting global economic growth, enhancing multilateralism and promoting greater democracy in international relations” (Sanya Declaration 2011). At the summit held in India on 29 March 2012, BRICS nations adopted the Delhi Declaration, emphasizing their vision for “global peace, economic and social progress and enlightened scientific temper” (Fourth BRICS Summit 2012), as well as the urgent need for greater involvement of the emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance, especially the UN. Shortly after, at the Durban Summit in South Africa, BRICS nations adopted the eThekwini Declaration, reaffirming their commitment to the “promotion of international law, multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations” (BRICS and Africa 2013), and stressing the BRICS contribution to the maintenance of “global peace, stability, development and cooperation” (BRICS and Africa 2013). And finally, the Fortaleza Declaration, adopted at the BRICS Summit held in Fortaleza, Brazil on 15–16 July 2014, reaffirmed their views and commitments to “international law and to multilateralism (…) global peace, economic stability, social inclusion, equality, sustainable development and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries” (Sixth BRICS Summit 2014). The BRICS nations emphasized that they are aligned with the UN system and values while seeking to enhance their role in it, particularly that of Brazil, India, and South Africa. The Fortaleza Declaration repeated BRICS’ “strong commitment to the UN as the fundamental multilateral organization entrusted with helping the international community maintain international peace and security, protect and foster human rights and promote sustainable development (…) [Reaffirming] the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, so that it can adequately respond to global challenges” (Sixth BRICS Summit 2014). This kind of activism reveals the BRICS intention to infiltrate as many of its members into the UN decision-making bodies, and also into other current international organizations and structures, to open more opportunities for shaping the international system in their style. In the years that followed, several other BRICS summits were held: —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

The European Union vs. The BRICS 



 

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Ufa Summit—was held in Ufa, Russia in 2015, with the theme “BRICS partnership—a driving force of global development”. The meeting was marked by the approval of the New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) constitutive agreements; Goa Summit—was held in Goa, India in 2016, with the title: “Building up inclusive and collective solutions”. The summit discussed global economic recovery, addressing issues such as fiscal and social responsibility, NDB institutionalization, investment attraction, counterterrorism, and economic growth; Xiamen Summit—was held in Xiamen, China in 2017 with the following theme: “BRICS: Stronger partnership for a brighter future”; Johannesburg Summit—was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2018, and its theme was “BRICS: collaboration for inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution”. The agreement regarding the establishment of the Regional Office for the Americas of the NDB was signed (BRICS Brazil 2019).

The Context of Disharmony Considering the internal situation, the value system of one part of the BRICS countries is in contradiction with the other part of the BRICS. There is an internal conflict of values, and lack of a common value system. Some of them accept the values of the liberal world order (democratic freedoms and human rights), while others anticipate more or less autocratic, illiberal values. Only Brazil, India, and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) can be considered as countries that highly accept the values of the current liberal world order. Russia and China are separate from other BRICS members. Both countries seek to improve their political, economic, and military performance, seeking to gain the power to impose their influence in the international context. Moreover, the creation of a BRICS common values system would appear to be a luxury for Russia and China, and an obstacle to their political, economic, and military power ambitions. Or as Barma, Ratner, and Weber put it, the emerging powers possibly want to establish a “parallel system with, as its own distinctive set of rules, institutions, and currencies of power, rejecting key tenets of liberal internationalism and particularly any notion of global civil society justifying political or military intervention” (Stuenkel 2016, p. 177). Oliver Stuenkel (2016, p. 22), in his book “Post-Western World”, emphasized that “this approach wrongly assumes non-Western initiatives to have a destabilizing effect. The BRICS countries are not frontally attacking —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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US-American hegemony, but they contest the West’s pretensions to permanent stewardship of the existing system largely because it no longer seems legitimate to emerging powers, particularly in the realm of economic governance”. The future seems not so pessimistic for liberal internationalism, considering that “both China and the United States are profoundly ambivalent about the international system” (Stuenkel 2016, p. 94). It is important to stress that both China and the US are more interested “to support and promote values around the world for reasons beyond raison d’état” (Stuenkel 2016, p. 94). It seems that the national interests (of global actors) are more appreciated than the health and future of liberal internationalism. China’s “geopolitical strategy to enhance its global position rests on its economic and financial assets. The penetration of markets, giant infrastructural and industrial projects like the One Belt One Road initiative, and the securing of energy supplies and resources for its advancing economy are Beijing’s main tools” (Schulze 2019). Concerning the position and role of Russia in the new international context, Wolfgang Ischinger emphasized: “Russia has little to offer besides energy and military strength; it is a ‘Scheinriese’ (a phantom giant) (Schulze 2019).The director of EU-Russia Centre in Brussels, Fraser Cameron, acknowledged: “two democracies, Brazil and India [and later the RSA], a democracy with authoritarian leanings [Russia] and an outright authoritarian state [China] cannot rally around the ‘shared values’ that such gatherings like to espouse” (Fraser 2011, p. 3) (Table 2). The grouping of India, Brazil, and South Africa is a “much more natural grouping” (Stem 2013), compared to Russia and China, as stressed by the former Ambassador of India in Brazil, Amitava Tripathi. BRICS is “a heterogeneous lot, consisting of energy exporters and importers, democracies and autocracies, aspiring hegemons and demographic disasters. This is not an easy group to keep together, and the evidence suggests that they don’t have much of a common policy agenda” (Losse BRICs 2015). Also, the BRICS “are too economically various and politically conflictual to form a cohesive and politically meaningful entity” (Cormier 2012, p. 28). Despite fast economic growth, “the main obstacles of future progress to the BRICS countries are remarkably the same, such as the lower position in the global value chain, weak financial market, unbalanced export structure, high reliance on external demand, etc.” (Fei 2017, p. 45). Three (Brazil, India, RSA) of five BRICS countries share the same values with those of the EU and US, which additionally make this group of countries more controversial in terms of common

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values. Despite the internal divergences and latent conflict of values, undeveloped financial system and axiological heterogeneity of this group, the main problem rests in the respect for political freedoms by some BRICS countries such as China and Russia. Democracies

Brazil

Autocracies Democracy with authoritarian leanings

Authoritarian state

Russia

PR China

India South Africa

Table 2: Our depiction, based on Fraser Cameron’s statement (Source: Director of the EU-Russia Centre in Brussels). The respect for political freedoms and their advancement represents the awareness of the significance of human rights and civil liberties and the rule of law and democracy as tenets of the civilized world. Having those values as founding principles, the EU differs from BRICS and other global actors with its new “mission civilistrice”, with a highly sharpened “sense of responsibility for the future of the world—and particularly the global environment” (Smith 2005, p. 66). According to the “Freedom House Report 2019”, Brazil, India, and South Africa have the status “Free”, while China and Russia have acquired the status “Not Free” (Freedom in the world 2019). As opposed to Russia and China, the Freedom House Report ranked the US and the EU member states with the highest freedom rates (Table 3.), except Hungary, where a certain regression is recorded in the area of freedom and liberty. Each country is assigned two ratings—one for political rights and one for civil liberties— based on its total scores for political rights and civil liberties questions. Each rating of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom, corresponds to a specific range of total scores, 1 to 2.5 representing “Free”, 3.0 to 5.0 representing “Partly Free” and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free” (Freedom in the world 2019). The political scientist Robert Gilpin emphasized that as a nation’s power increases, it “will be tempted to try to increase its control over its environment. To increase its security, it will try to expand its political, economic, and territorial control; it will try to change the international system following its particular set of interests” (Zakaria 2008, p. 114). The more BRICS become

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part of the “globalized world the more they want to keep their distance from western values. It is both a matter of identity and interest because they fear that the infringement of sovereignty might be used against them” (Laïdi 2012). The BRICS thus looks like a club that seeks to protect the political sovereignty of its members, aiming to gain more political and economic influence in international affairs. The current liberal order currently “overrides state sovereignty, to a certain degree, in the name of values such as democratic freedoms and human rights” (Zakaria 2008, p. 114). From Тable 2, it can be concluded that there has been some backsliding on political freedoms in the US in relation to 2018, accompanied with the intensification of Donald Trump’s approach—“America First”—as an attitude that vigorously affirms US exceptionalism in the international relations. “Make America Great Again” is Trump’s election slogan that in the long run promises to drastically change the US approach to the liberal world order to a more sovereigntist rather than internationalist direction. Concerning the EU, Hungary has already dropped into the category of “Partly Free” countries, firmly following the concept of illiberal democracy promulgated by its Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in his speech at Băile Tuşnad, Romania on 26 July 2014, pointing out: “The Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state” (Tóth 2014). Despite the rise of populism and autocracy in the EU in general, Italy and Poland still belong to the zone of free countries with some inclinations to autocracy. Hence, the US with Donald Trump, Hungary with Viktor Orbán, Italy with Matteo Salvini and his proponents, and the “Teflon populism” of Poland’s ruling party pose serious risks to deviate from their liberal character in a non-liberal, sovereignist, and autocratic direction. Concerning the BRICS grouping, besides Russia and China, Brazil with Jair Bolsonaro also manifests sovereignist, illiberal, and autocratic tendencies. Based on the various tendencies in international affairs and the rise of populism worldwide, while taking into account the internalization of the liberal democratic values (human rights and civil liberties, the rule of law and democracy etc.), Figure 1 is presents the picture of the current international context, with the accent on the EU, US, and BRICS. From this figure, it can be concluded that the current international system is starting to manifest the very dynamic attitudes of its constituents. Particularly interesting to note is that the new international context is a kind of “unconquered terrain”, a “maneuver field” freed from the rules of the present —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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liberal order, giving an opportunity to the US, China, and other emerging powers to reposition themselves and to redefine their roles in the process of shaping the new international context. That does not mean a total alteration of the current liberal order, but its reshaping by the power and the will of the most powerful global actors. Figure 1 shows the main global shifts and tendencies, and if the contours of the new international context are reminiscent of that, then it is definitely a creation of a world in which liberal values are of lesser importance. Based on that, the US administration, together with its populist counterpart in the EU, is moving towards the building of a new axis—the axis of non-liberal countries. Hence, the question is not to preserve the current world order, but its core liberal values—political freedoms and human rights. Тhat is the Rubicon that cannot be allowed to be crossed. Country USA Austria

Status Free Free

Freedom Rating 1.5 1.0

Belgium

Free

1.0

Bulgaria

Free

2.0

Cyprus

Free

1.0

Croatia

Free

1.5

Czech Republic

Free

1.0

Denmark

Free

1.0

Estonia

Free

1.0

Finland

Free

1.0

France

Free

1.5

Germany

Free

1.0

Greece

Free

1.5

Hungary

Partly Free

3.0

Ireland

Free

1.0

Italy

Free

1.0

Latvia

Free

2.0

Lithuania

Free

1.0

Luxembourg

Free

1.0

Malta

Free

1.5

Netherlands

Free

1.0

Poland

Free

2.0

Portugal

Free

1.0

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Goran Ilik & Mladen Karadjoski & Nina Ilik Romania

Free

2.0

Slovakia

Free

1.5

Slovenia

Free

1.0

Spain

Free

1.0

Sweden

Free

1.0

United Kingdom

Free

1.0

Table 3: Our depiction, based on Freedom in the world 2019 Report (Source: https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-worldfreedom-2019?order=field_fiw_combined_score&sort=asc). When one of the pillars of liberal internationalism succumbs (in this case the US), responsibility shifts to the other—the European Union, “armed” only with its values, principles and soft power. Obviously, we are witnessing an era of retreating freedom. How long it will last, time will tell. Counteracting this tendency remains the responsibility of the liberal and democratic forces that prefer rule-based global order rather than the politics of power, and values such as human rights, rule of law, and democracy highly positioned on the global agenda. Complicating this mix is an absence of long-term commitment to shared values among the BRICS nations. The concept of a world built on inter-dependence may be acceptable in the context of economic interaction, but there is a lack of consensus on the extent to which the BRICS wish to cooperate in the political sphere. There are differences in the political, economic and social paradigms that individual BRICS members are willing to follow. Concerning the BRICS grouping, its political integration is something that will have to wait a while, considering its evident political and value divergences. Or as is stated in the “Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order” (2013, p. 242): Simply speaking, in this grouping there is no common value system or value-sharing practices that would produce political cohesion or a unique common approach in due time. Considering that, Walter Ladwig emphasized: “[BRICS] economic characteristics are too different and political ambitions too much at odds to yield cooperation” (Cormier 2012, p. 27). At the same time, “merely organizing a never-ending string of meetings will not create sustainable cooperation […] only time will tell how much real cooperation these meetings can generate” (Stuenkel 2016, p. 165). However, the founding of a political organization based on common values, interests and political power “patterned after NATO or the EU, is impossible. China, India, and Russia are competitors for power in Asia, and Brazil and India have been hurt —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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by China’s undervalued currency. Thus BRIC[S] is not likely to become a serious political organization of like-minded states” (Bohler-Muller & Kornegay 2013, p. 242).

Figure 1: Our depiction of the new international context and the internalization of liberal democratic values. Conclusion The EU constitutive treaties contain a set of values (axiological foundations) which promotes and affirms cooperation instead of conflict and respect for international law instead of power politics. Unlike the other global actors, which promote the national interest or raison d’état, the EU also possesses raison de valeur, or value interest, which is directly derived from its axiological foundations, established in the constitutive treaties. The value foundations of the EU also represent a power source, i.e. its soft power. Many theorists noted that such axiological foundations of the EU foreign policy enable an opportunity for promoting good global governance and constitutionalization of international relations to reshape the current world order into a new, more just, more liberal and more cooperative international system. Those values make the EU foreign policy distinctive in comparison with other global actors, and thus, emphasizing its value engagement in the international relations.

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The BRICS has no authentic set of values, and therefore, this group experiences internal divergences in terms of internal values’ harmony (or disharmony) and their potential for value-sharing. BRICS is internally “stretched” between liberal and illiberal trends which disables all attempts to create a coherent political structure and a common values system. The type of democracy to which this group adheres refers only to the need for strengthening of its presence in the UN and other global financial institutions as a way to impose the political power of specific BRICS countries in the new international context. Precisely, it refers to Russia and China. Under the leadership of Russia and China, this group is heavily geared towards the strengthening of its influence in the UN, and strengthening the sovereign powers of its constitutive nations, making efforts to reform the international financial system, and building a new, parallel financial institution, aiming for these nations to grow into global political powers, despite the US and the EU. However, the BRICS grouping is an important phenomenon in terms of the future development of international relations, especially in terms of their decentralization and pluralization of global power, while preparing the world for the establishment of the new international context. The rise of BRICS means a serious shaking of the current system of international relations. Taking into account the EU’s global reasoning, the new international context seems to become more complex and confusing, and more heterogeneous, composed of various pro-active actors (EU, US, BRICS, Russia, China etc.), and also less liberal. One of the main challenges of the EU for the future will be the transformation of its power in a more hard power direction to consolidate itself as a pro-active defender of the liberal democratic values of the West (unlike the US with Trump), in the face of incoming autocracies such as Russia and China, and “apostate” liberal democracies such as the US, Hungary, Poland, (not yet) Italy and Brazil. As one may appreciate, the contest between liberty and power has been ongoing for millennia (The Human Freedom Index 2018, p. 14), and so it will be in the future. References BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration, and Industrialization: eThekwini Declaration. 2013. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10. 2019, at 15:10]. Laïdi Z. 2012. BRICS keep distance from western values. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 19:10]. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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BRICS Information Centre. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 22:10]. BRICS Brazil 2019. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 22:57]. Cormier B. 2012. “Why the Values of the BRICS Matter”. (Presentation Prepared in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MRes International Politics), University of Glasgow. Available at: [Accessed on 19.11.2019, at 13:28]. Drezner, Daniel W. 2009. Loose BRICs. Americans shouldn’t be alarmed by the BRIC summit. The body is just another toothless international grouping, not an attempt to exert hard power. June 17, 2009. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:17]. EU Global Strategy. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, EEAS. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10. 2019, at 22:58]. Fei W.W. 2017. Intra-Brics Financial Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges, İktisadiyat, 1(1), 39−50. Fraser C. 2011. The EU and the BRICs. Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Network: The Diplomatic System of the European Union. Freedom in the world 2015: Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist, Freedom House Report. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 22:59]. First BRIC Summit. Yekaterinburg. 2009. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019]. Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration. 2012. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:04]. Grajauskas R. And Kasčiūnas L. 2009. Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:05].

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Grajauskas R. 2011.Federal Europe: A Postmodern Force in International Relations? Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:08]. Hyde-Price A. 2004. The EU, Power and Coercion: From ‘Civilian’ to ‘Civilising’ Power, CIDEL Workshop, Oslo Human Freedom Index. 2018. Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:09]. Ischinger W. 2018. Welt in Gefahr; Deutschland und Europa in unsicheren Zeiten, Berlin: Econ. Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders. 2009. University of Toronto. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:10]. Keukeleire S. and McNaughton J. 2008. The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Kornegay, Francis A., Bohler-Muller, Narnia. 2013. “Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order: From Yekaterinburg 2009 to eThekwini 2013”. African Books Collective. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:11]. Lukin, Alexander. 2009. BRICS: Multi-format Cooperation. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:25]. Rieker P. 2007. Towards a Postmodern European Security Actor? The development of political and administrative capabilities. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Sanya Declaration, Sanya, Hainan, China, BRICS Information Centre, April 14, 2011, Content copyrighted by University of Toronto. All rights reserved. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:48]. Second BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement. Brasília, (April 15, 2010). Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:48]. Sixth BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration. 2014. Available at: [Accessed on 02. 10.2019, at 23:50]. Sjursen H. 2007. What Kind of Power? In Helen Sjursen (ed.) Civilian or Military Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective. Abingdon: Routledge. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Smith K.E. 2005. Still ‘civilian power EU?’, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Article, London School of Economics. Smith K.E. 2000. The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?, The International Spectator Volume XXXV, No. 2. Smith K. E. 2005. Beyond the civilian power EU debate, Dans Politique européenne 2005/3 (n° 17), pages 63 à 82. Stern E. 2013. Why the West is wary of the BRICS. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019]. Stuenkel O. 2016. Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:50]. Schulze P.W. 2019. The Crisis of the Old West: Views from Germany, The analytical media “Eurasian Studies”. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:56]. Tóth C. 2014. Viktor Orbán’s speech at Băile Tuşnad. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:57]. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:55]. The Treaty of Lisbon. Available at: [Accessed on 02.10.2019, at 23:59]. Van Damme, S. 2013. The European Union as a Post-modern Security Actor? Defence Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Available at: [Accessed on 19.11.2019, at 13:55]. Vibert F. 2008. Soft Power and international rule-making, Liberal Institute Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit, Berlin. Zakaria F. 2008. The Post-American World. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski’s last Tweet and Donald J. Trump’s policies on North Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran Abstract “Sophisticated US leadership is the sine qua non of a stable world order. However, we lack the former while the latter is getting worse”. ― Zbigniew Brzezinski, Twitter Post. May 4, 2017, 10:02 am. //twitter.com/zbig/status/860177803194630144

The paper offers a comparative account of the US government under Donald Trump, and his policy in two different spheres of US foreign policy: regarding Iran, which has nuclear ambitions, and North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons. It aspires to capture a change in the foreign policy attitudes towards these countries and explain the main rationale behind the US’s choices regarding these countries. Each of which will be traced separately on its own merits and provided with a suitable ground for a larger debate in the existing literature on the subject. Keywords: USA, North Korea, Iran, Donald Trump, Hassan Rohani, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Kim Jong-un, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Introduction According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “sophisticated US leadership is an essential condition and the necessary catalyst for a stable world order and effective international collaboration”, but any visible lack of it creates a massive vacuum that can destabilize the global structure of power in the most unpredictable way. Unfortunately, the positive years of Barack Obama’s presidency are long gone, and Trump, by implementing a number of rather eccentric, isolationist, and protectionist visions of the US’s role in the 21st century, simply shoots the US’s global position in the foot. That is why the words of the former security advisor to President Carter have proven to be so prophetic, for they could be interpreted either as a part of his intellectual output dedicated to his students or as a warning to future policymakers to make themselves aware of the seriousness of the increasingly complicated challenges to the global system. On this view of the global architecture of power, it seems 55

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that if US leadership is retracting, no other Western power can effectively fill Washington’s shoes, and the biggest beneficiaries of these surprising voluntary transfers of power will be autocratic regimes in China and Russia. (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 3−24, 194−209 & Brzezinski 2017) Indeed, in this respect, we can be certain that for such a devoted Democrat like “Zbig” it would be really painful to watch how Trump’s justified his decisions to withdraw from the landmark 2015 Iranian Nuclear Deal, to withdraw from Syria, and to move the US embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, not to mention about his overall hawkish attitudes to Iran, that, in turn, have undermined the stability of the entire Middle East. There is also a big likelihood that Brzezinski would be surprised and disappointed by the selection of desperate measures the Trump administration has used to please the most unpredictable man on the Korean peninsula, the so-called “rocket man”, in order to sign a memorandum on a denuclearization deal that has no chance of realization. We all know that even if Kim Jong-un has shown some intention to give up his nuclear toys, it would be a bluff, for the stability of his rule clearly depends on being able to extend his tight grip on power in his native country, by whatever means necessary. According to this logic, fulfilling the requirements of any nuclear disarmament act would undermine his internal position and some four–five decades of the consistent (and hardly affordable for such a little country) efforts of first his father and now him to attain a deterrent that cannot be ignored by any potential aggressors, both real and imaginary (Badawi 2018; Ibrahim 2017; Pietrzak 2018, p. 173–186). Naturally, Brzezinski did not have a chance to witness either the new Trumpian take on the US-Iranian nor the US-North Korean policy, for he passed away in early 2017, but his insightful comments, made on Twitter on May 4, 2017, surely convey a lot of meaning and may be more lasting and powerful than is commonly understood. Having said that it has to be admitted that his suggestion should not be solely seen as a prophetic counsel against one administration, but as a powerful warning against any Donald Trump-type politician who fails to understand the origin and the cause-effect relations between the US government and the countries in question, for it is rather clear that the recent unexpected eruption of tensions between the US and Iranian governments, the skillfully staged image of mutual respect and friendly handshakes between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, has its main origin in the Trump Administration initial choice to either pursue more hawkish policy in the former respect and more dovish policy in the latter example. As much as there could be certain differences in the way the situation in the Persian Gulf and the policy towards the Korean Peninsula are being shaped —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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it is just a new twist on the old game that starts with an intention to negotiate the improvement of the relations, and the lack of which with respect to Iran has surely produced tensions in the Persian Gulf and the entire greater Middle East and too much enthusiasm has led Donald Trump to hold a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings between him and Korean leaders in Singapore, Vietnam and now in one of the most heavily fortified demilitarized zones in the world (Badawi 2019; Ibish 2019). Surely, finding a guilty party to be blamed for the way both situations are unfolding is not enough; our main intention should be to determine the reasons why the situation in the Korean peninsula is slowly but steadily normalizing, whilst in the meantime we have been forced to the position of reluctant witness to a number of scary and unpredictable incidents across the Middle East and Persian Gulf (that can lead us to even more heated regional or even global conflicts). In order to do so we need to evaluate the way in which both policies are being shaped. This starts with rising following questions: Do these situations have their origin only in the larger and lesser instrumentality of the Trumpian Administration applied to both regions or should they rather be seen as a derivative of the given momentum, different inherent dynamics in both cases, or the inherent differences in regional and global structures of power (Ibish 2019 Laub 2015; Scott 2018)? In his “How America Should Handle Iran and North Korea”, Sungku Jang, an Asian fellow at The National Interest, suggests that: “Trump must surely be aware that North Korea’s human rights record is far worse than that of Iran but despite this fact he still favors doing business with Pyongyang rather than Tehran” (…). This author also explains that (…) “the Trumpian vocal rhetoric in respect of respecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the necessity of “preventing Iran from getting a bomb” is met with a slightly more liberal approach towards North Korea”. On top of that, as Jang claims, “unlike Iran, North Korea has not even allowed international inspectors into the country, so its real nuclear capability remains rather unclear (Pyongyang is believed to possess up to 60 nuclear warheads)”. (…) “Furthermore, unlike Iran, North Korea’s leader has not shown any intention of completely giving up its nuclear weapons arsenal”. (…) “But as much as North Korea shows a commitment to keep testing its Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and has already developed much more formidable conventional asymmetric capabilities including biological and chemical weapons, the Trump Administration still chose to pick on Tehran and frame the Iranian political and spiritual leadership as the biggest villain in the contemporary world for testing a few intercontinental ballistic missiles in recent months”. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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(…) Also “if we compare it with the North Korean political system, a typical example of a tyrannical dynastical state where there is one center of power who inherits his power from his father, and there is no political opposition, the Iranian ways of doing things seem more civilized, predictable, rational, and even more democratic, considering that after all the Iranian people can chose a president and a parliament” (…). Yet, the despite these facts the Trump Administration have shown a commitment to providing security guarantees to North Korea’s regime whilst the civilian Iranian leadership that is elected in a popular vote is threatened with “severe consequences the likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered,” if its officials chose to threaten America. That is why this author also concludes that it sometimes looks as if two different people were using Trump’s Twitter account (Jang 2018). On Trump Presidency During both of his terms in office, as well as during both of his presidential campaigns, Barack Obama was surely using this tool extensively, but it was his successor who has mastered the skill of utilizing Twitter to the best of his ability and might. That being said there was surely a possibility that because of all of the heated debates, aggression, and inappropriate comments that Donald Trump has posted on Twitter over the years, his account might have been blocked a long time ago; but being a celebrity, public figure, and an active politician who happens to be the president of the US might have saved his presence in this social media outlet after all. This being said, we need to give it to Trump that if anything, he was never struggling with social media, or shying away from capturing the eye of mainstream or cable outlets. As a matter of fact, this politician and successful entrepreneur has shown on countless occasions that he thrives in front of a camera and loves being in the spotlight. Similarly, when it comes to Twitter in particular, we can easily claim without any overestimation that Trump not only has simply turned it into yet another arm at his disposal, but has learned how to weaponize it and unleash it against any domestic or foreign enemy with a blink of an eye. It was just a matter of time before Trump’s obsession with Twitter would start to have a massive impact on the way US foreign policy is being shaped, for the dismissive and even more impatient US leader soon grew very weary of the time- and resources-consuming diplomatic efforts and started bypassing a traditional route with his own ad hoc Twitter-based campaigns that were rather dismissive of traditional diplomacy. That meant that regardless of their location, any respectful US ambassador or lower scale diplomat would have —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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to start their daily routine by checking the US president’s twitter account, for even if their instructions and recommendations were preapproved, their temperamental boss might have had a sudden change of heart (Manson 2019; Pietrzak 2016; Pietrzak 2018, p 173−186). What is even more important is the fact that the arrival of the Trump Administration not only had an impact on the means of communication used in the diplomatic day-to-day job, but it also had a more tangible impact on the way this policy is being shaped, and that was exactly the case with Trump’s policy towards Iran and North Korea, for this leader has also broken one unwritten tradition that most of his predecessors shared in respect of both counties: as much as they may have not been equally harsh, they have proven to be rather consistent, predictable, and dogmatic in criticizing both regimes for their endless human rights violations and countless trespasses of various non-proliferation rules and regulations. But Trump has proven quite reluctant to succumb to this tradition and started differentiating between the way both policies are approached for no apparent reason. He has ended up showing a massive resentment towards Iran and eagerly drifting into a conflict with this country that may have very dreadful unintended consequences but, in the meantime, presenting a completely different approach towards North Korea, completely ignoring Kim’s trespasses against regional and global stability. Naturally, before he even become president, Donald Trump as candidate promised to redefine the US foreign policy towards a more isolationist style that involves a far-reaching retraction from its global responsibilities, but he has ended up endorsing a double-standard type of policy. Iran, which is eager to find a modus vivendi with his administration and at first started acting rationally, is being punished by the uncooperative and even hostile behavior of the Trump administration. Meanwhile, however, North Korea, which emulates increasingly hawkish and assertive tendencies is rewarded by the Trump Administration with a series of bilateral meetings between their respective leaders. The question remains why there is such a massive difference in Trump’s foreign policy choices in respect of Iran and North Korea? In order to answer this question, let us look at it through the prism of US policies towards Iran and North Korea separately in order to open a more detailed discussion on these multidimensional matters in the following chapters. The US relations with Iran The bilateral relations between Iran and the US are at a historic low to the extent that both countries almost stumbled into a war in recent months. President Trump’s decision to abandon Iran’s Nuclear Deal and to announce a —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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fresh sanction regime against this Middle Eastern nation in particular until the new accord would be put in place could be seen as a massive setback, was ill-conceived and regrettable for many reasons, and has opened yet another Pandora’s box in the Middle East with a “sea of unintended consequences” for the entire world. This explanation is in line with Katrina Manson, Financial Times’ US Foreign Policy and Defence Correspondent, whose “Why does Trump treat Iran differently to North Korea”, published on June 15, 2018, suggests that Trump tore up a multi-party nuclear agreement that limited Tehran’s nuclear enrichment and took years to negotiate, claiming it was “disastrous” and one-sided (Manson 2019). From the perspective of hindsight we can confirm that the level of tensions in bilateral relations between both countries has been on the rise ever since Tehran was effectively asked that a precondition of any further diplomatic tasks would be pre-accepting even more further concessions that Iranian authorities had already refused to accept in the first place for at least the last ten years of nuclear negotiations with their international partners, including Trump’s predecessor Obama. In this respect, clearly, a suggestion that Trump has been on a collision course with Iran ever since he took office can surely be seen as a large understatement, for it started long before that. Indeed, this trend began long before the presidential election of 2016 that landed Trump in the office. During his presidential campaign Trump made it clear that if elected he would abandon the so-called Nuclear Deal and the moment, he sat in the oval office he started bringing this electoral promise to life. Not to mention the fact that just like the subsequent US administrations before him could never forgave Vladimir Putin that he is not as weak as Yeltsin, the Trump Administration also showed a large reluctance to forgive President Rouhani that he is not Reza Pahlavi and that he is not obediently projecting US interest in the region. As we may expect, abandoning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and further unexpected American pressures have unleashed real tensions with Iran that continue to grow free and wild, and resulted in increasing tensions in the Persian Gulf: tit-for-tat downing of US and Iranian drones, confiscation of British tankers by IRGC in the Persian Gulf, and many other actions that can be seen as malicious, but this country is definitely reluctant not to wage a suicidal war ” (Einhorn 2018; Fisher 2015; Manson 2019). In Trump’s defense, however, the recent conduct of the Iranian regime can be described as rather aggressive if not irrational for restarting the process of enriching uranium in July 2019, breaching previously agreed limits, and involving itself in a very malign terror campaign in the region; these should —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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be seen as evidence of a highly inadequate policy, for the government in Tehran was accused in recent months of being behind two sets of explosions that damaged six oil tankers in the region during the summer of 2019 and of instigating the Yemeni Houthis’ drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar oil facilities located in Al-Ahsa Governorate on 14th September 2019. So, on that note, we cannot say that Iran has truly used its unique chance to make its case and present itself as a much more rational, predictable, and respectful international player. Not to mention the fact that ever since Trump took office the government in Iran has conducted a half dozen missile tests since signing the deal on its nuclear weapons program in response to which the United States government first wants to bully Iran to the negotiating table, and when that does not work threatens Tehran with a military intervention. The side effect of overreacting is the fact that it really benefits only local hardliners in Iran who are given an incentive to unleash an even stronger campaign against the US and its interests in the region. President Trump is very particular to correlate the issue of nuclear proliferation with a total plan on the ballistic rocket tests in any future negotiations with Tehran. But this can be seen as another counterproductive and counterintuitive step for as Jean Yves Ndzana Ndzan explains, solving the Iranian ballistic equation requires taking into account the security variables of its regional rivals and an eventual political cost from the US as had been the case during the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. Furthermore, Ndzan, in his recent analysis, also makes it clear that the seeds of the Iranian ballistic missile program were sown during the IranIraq war from 1980 to 1988. As Tytto Erasto puts it, “the role of ballistic missiles in Iran’s national security was highlighted in the 1980s, when its cities were left defenseless against Scud missile and air attacks from Iraq under President Saddam Hussein, Iran’s acquisition and use of its own short-range missiles is regarded as a crucial turning point in the Iran-Iraq War. This means that we need to remember that the ballistic program has a historical role in the Iranian collective memory and particularly in its national defense and security policy”. On this basis we can explain Tehran’s categorical refusal to include the ballistics program in the agenda of the multilateral negotiations on the nuclear program between 2013 and 2015. “Today, more than a deterrent asset, the Iranian ballistic program is also the symbol of its sovereignty, as well as its regional influence, for this county has developed its ballistic missile program in response to an external threat” (Einhorn 2018; N Jean Yves 2017, p 1−2). Indeed, for the US it is difficult to understand for its government is preoccupied with pursuing its national interest in the Middle East, but for .

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Iran, it is the game for survival, “to be or not to be”. In this respect in a rare HARDtalk interview conducted by Zeinab Badawi for BBC, Iran Foreign Minister Javad Zarif claimed that such a singlehanded abandoning of the Nuclear Deal, implementing a new sanctions regime, and the reluctance of other partners to stand up to this American instrumental decision have created a number of setbacks for his country, and when asked whether Tehran will respect the new sanctions, he claimed that “we will continue to sell our oil, but we will not sell our dignity”. As Zarif explained Iran kept its end of the bargain but did not received promised benefits. Meanwhile Kim Jong-un breaks every single rule in the book and gets away with that, and not only that, will be rewarded for it (Badawi 2019; Einhorn 2018; Ibish 2019; Jang 2018; Melvin 2015; Pietrzak 2018, p. 173–186 ). The US’s relations with North Korea Indeed, the bilateral relations between North Korea and the US are at a historic high, for Donald Trump has recently become the first sitting US president to set foot in North Korea, meeting Kim Jong-un in the area dividing the two Koreas This meeting was arranged after Trump invited Kim on Twitter; they shook hands across the demarcation line between the Koreas before Mr. Trump briefly crossed into North Korea, a symbolic milestone. The reason why the situation in the Korean Peninsula has evolved in a completely different direction has its origins in the fact that the Trump Administration has also shown completely different attitudes towards the complexity of both North Korea-South Korea bilateral relations and the role of Kim Jong-un in the North in particular (Jang 2018). Furthermore, the lead-up to this complete change of tone has its origins in the fact that Trump was eager to complete a series of historic bilateral meetings with supreme leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un: the Singapore Summit at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018 (the first-ever meeting between leaders of North Korea and the United States). Subsequently, they met at the Hanoi Summit at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam on 27−28 February 2019. Even though White House officials announced just a day later that the summit was cut short and that no progress on denuclearization was reached, just a day later Trump has reached out to Kim in an impromptu tweet and arranged a meeting on 30 June 2019 between the two leaders. Thanks to this Twitter diplomacy174, both men had

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Twitter diplomacy, “Twiplomacy” or “hashtag diplomacy” is the term that refers to the use of social network and microblogging website, Twitter, by heads of state, leaders of

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yet another one-in-a-million opportunity to pose for handshakes at one of the most heavily fortified demilitarized zones in the world, which has divided Korea since 1953. Even though any prospects of this leader agreeing to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear deterrent do not look viable, Trump looked the man in the eye and stated that Kim looks like the man who wants to overcome all the unfortunate past and is very open to creating a new future for his country. The proponents of this development suggest that although North Korea has had zero intention of showing any commitment to complete or even partial denuclearization, Trump’s successful impromptu diplomatic efforts have resulted in reducing unnecessary tensions on the Korean peninsula, whilst the opponents of this development suggest that this relationship may have produced smiles and handshakes but not the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while the side effect of pursuing such a naïve policy is the US’s endorsement of Kim’s regime and an encouragement for North Korea to continue to develop its nuclear weapons program even more eagerly (Bennett & Wilkinson 2018). Surely, President Trump may have tried to persuade or compel Kim Jong-un to accept complete and rapid denuclearization; this administration may also try to persuade the North Korean leader to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear complex, but it is unlikely that such a policy will ever materialize for one simple reason: Ukraine’s example proves that North Korea should not be interested in changing the status quo for if a country with nuclear weapons gives them up, it may subject itself to unexpected dreadful circumstances in the future. For these reasons North Korea will never accept complete denuclearization, especially since up until very recently its leaders were petrified of US aggression. Kim realizes that the only reason why he has not been treated the same way as Iran is that his country possesses its nuclear program, so there is no way he would want to undermine his negotiating position (Jang 2018). But even if the U.S. tried to bully Iran to the negotiation table, there are no doves in the local architecture of power; there is no opposition here so the only party they can negotiate with is Kim Jong-un, and this hardliner has no appetite to reduce his nuclear and missile capabilities. Even if he had shown such interest, even if North Korea sent their nuclear warheads out of

                                                             international organizations to conduct diplomatic outreach and public diplomacy, for more on this phenomenon please see: Rob Worthington, The End of Twitter Diplomacy? Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 11:00].

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the country, it could restart its nuclear program again whenever it wants because it already holds the technology. Having said that, as much as Pyongyang currently enjoys formidable asymmetric capabilities including biological and chemical weapons, submarines, EMPs and nuclear weapons, naturally Kim may be interested in securing economic aid or other economic benefits to his country, so he may adopt, or show himself being ready to adopt such measures. But this would not come out of the purity of his heart but rather from an instrumental desire to stay in power, and if he sees economic benefits, he may be inclined to promise that North Korea will commit itself to such an endeavor. The question remains whether such a promise would be followed through on it (Einhorn 2018; Jang 2018; Pietrzak 2018, p. 173–186; Scott, 2018). International Relations Theory and its intake on the subject Given that both policies are so different and applied towards two very similar countries faced with rather similar regional and global challenges it is difficult to look at them through the prism of the sympathies and the antipathies of the current administration but we can also adopt a different approach that will allow us to properly look at Trump Administration policy towards Tehran. This necessitates focusing on the recent developments through the prism of both Pyongyang and Tehran’s strategic options, a discussion that should be supplemented by the selective theories of international relations, in particular, the offensive and the defensive realism presented by Kenneth Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer, and Marcin Grabowski. All three of these scholars have written extensively on similar topics and their input can shed some more light on this policy dilemma and bring a healthy dose of refreshing unconstrained truth to this equation. Surely, as long as such adherence prevents a nuclear disaster it does not prevent a conventional conflict in the region, and it does not put a halt to yet another hawkish behavior of one of the most hawkish players in the global architecture of power (Grabowski 2019; Mearsheimer 1993; Waltz 2012). This argument starts with his “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” Published by Foreign Affairs Magazine on June 15, 2012, Kenneth Waltz (1924– 2013) a founding father of defensive realism and one of the most prominent scholars in the field argued once that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the probability of international peace. According to this scholar, it has to do with the fact that the costs of nuclear war were too great for a pair of nuclear-capable antagonists to fight one another to the bitter end. So limited proliferation of nuclear weapons should be accepted as a —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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norm as it would help to build a lasting peace even between eternal antagonists. By extension, allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would have a stabilizing effect on the political backdrop of the Middle East and the entire structure of global power, as the leadership of Iran would have no choice but to start behaving in a more sensible way about its international obligations out of the fear of the retaliation of other capable players from the nuclear club. Nevertheless, when it comes to discussing North Korea and the idea of its hypothetical voluntary disarmament, we need to admit that from the strategic perspective such a policy makes very little sense (Waltz 2012). It has to do with Book 3 of Latin author Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus’s tract De Re Militari that suggests “si vis pacem, para bellum”, which translates to “if you want peace, prepare for war”, as the most effective means to ensure peace for a people is always to be armed and ready to defend oneself, as your enemy is less likely to attack you if they are afraid of you. Not only that Cicero, in his De Oratore, suggests that history is life’s teacher “Historia magistra vitae est” and there is a perfect example of that: We just need to bring to the fore John J. Mearsheimer’s “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent. The Logic of Proliferation” published by Foreign Affairs Magazine in its Summer 1993 issue. In this article he warned Ukraine’s political establishment against voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapons to Russia under any circumstances and argued that these weapons that Ukraine inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were the best guarantee of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. As we remember, when the USSR collapsed in 1991, independent Ukraine found itself with more nuclear weapons than Britain, France, and China combined. Yet, despite this good counsel the members of the newly formed Ukrainian political establishment surrendered under pressure and gave up those arms voluntarily in exchange for vaguely worded security assurances of its territorial integrity, codified in the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994 by the US, UK, and Russia. From the perspective of hindsight, we already know perfectly well that the Russian Federation that was a part of the international conference had no intention of keeping its end of the bargain (Mearsheimer 1993, Pietrzak 2018, p. 173–186). There is also a very strong argument made by Marcin Grabowski in his recent interview for In Statu Nascendi where he suggests that if he was to compare the situations in North Korea and Iran, he would say that

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Piotr Pietrzak “North Korea is located in the relatively peaceful region. Whereas Iran has Israel close to its border, the country that is unequivocally interested in putting a categorical halt to any further development in the Iranian nuclear program, there were actions against the scholars working on a nuclear program in Iran; there was a computer virus implanted to hamper the development of Iran’s nuclear program by destroying nuclear centrifuges. In the case of North Korea, this country has managed to acquire nuclear weapons and now is relatively safe. We should not expect the first strike on North Korea from external countries, because its response may include a nuclear” (…) one. “If we look at Iran, there is a much more difficult situation in this country. If Iran was a subject of foreign aggression, it has no tools to defend itself in a non-conventional way. For the moment, at the time of Barack Obama presidency, this country was safe, as the 44th President of the United States was relatively happy with the deal with Iran. As we know, Donald Trump has a different approach, and this is risky. If I were a part of the authorities of Iran, I would consider continuing the program” (Grabowski, Marcin. Interview by author. Video recording. Kraków, February 2, 2018175).

This academic from Jagiellonian University is right, in this respect, for one should not be surprised at all that there is a considerable fear in Tehran that if Iran decided to abandon its nuclear ambitions it could expose itself to a similar intervention to Bush’s intervention in neighboring Iraq in 2003. The US, especially under the Republican administrations, has gotten out of control in recent years; look at the examples of George W. Bush and Donald Trump alone. In this respect we need to focus on the symptoms of Tehran and Pyongyang’s policies that do not address the causes, we need to look at both of these issues through the broader cause-and-effect relationship. Indeed, a recent series of Tehran’s irresponsible behaviors can be explained through the prism of this country’s disappointment with the lost opportunity that presented itself with the Nuclear Deal of 2015. For many commentators (myself included) saw the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (known commonly as the Iran Nuclear Deal or Iran deal of 2015) as one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives since the series of agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union signed in 1979, known as SALT-II, that sought to curtail the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons by these cold-war competitors (Badawi 2019; Manson 2018; Pietrzak 2018, p. 173–186; Scott 2018).

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Please also see: “Interview with Marcin Grabowski, Ph.D., an Assistant Professor of the Jagiellonian University on the ever-changing political situation of the Asia Pacific Region in general, and the political backdrop of North Korea in particular”, In Statu Nascendi: Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations Vol. 1, No. 1 (2019), p. 1–35. Available at: https://cup.columbia.edu/book/in-statu-nascendi/97838382122960> [Accessed on: 24.09.2018, at 22:25].

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There is a direct causal link between the way the current crisis has unfolded and the fact that Tehran has started to perceive it as a win-win situation to all parties that they were now destitute from taking part in, working on the premise that despite the fact that Iran abandoned its nuclear ambition, it was presented with a real chance of lifting most of the international sanctions that prevented it from trading on the international markets. But this is just one side of the story; we need to look at this deal through the prism of the way American foreign policy is shaped in general. Throughout his first and second terms, former US President Barack Obama had pushed very vigorously in favor of this initiative, and his administration achieved a majority to pass this legislation in Congress, but the margins were not overwhelming. In fact, considering the political climate in the US and how serious the debate on the Iranian deal became around 2015, one could anticipate that the chances of survival of this deal would be rather slim if any Republican won the presidential race of 2016. Let us imagine that the Trump administration is successful in respect of North Korea, that Chairman Kim Jong-un signs something that resembles a, let us call it, North Korean Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (NKJCPOA). The question remains: what incentive would this country have to follow this deal through if the Republican administration of Donald Trump will be eventually replaced by his Democratic successor who may decide to send this deal to the dustbin of the history in a reciprocal manner? Or even if Trump’s successor decided to keep this deal, what incentive would Pyongyang have to adhere to the negotiated limits of nuclear enrichment in this hypothetical deal? It seems that when it comes to the limited scope between internal and external policy, Kenneth Waltz was wrong after all, as according to Francis Fukuyama, US foreign policy is definitely a function of domestic identity politics and the clearly anti-Iranian attitudes of the Trump Administration in the post-2020 US may easily be replaced with antiKorean fears if the domestic audiences needed another scapegoat (Fukuyama 2018, p. 90–115). Surely, his unorthodox diplomacy has created momentum on the Korean Peninsula that in turn has reduced tensions there. Surely, the ulterior motives in Kim’s behavior are more than clear, for his main motivation is definitely not to stop developing its nuclear weapons program but rather to find the way to rescue its weakened economy, which requires securing international guarantees, securing international markets for its raw materials and other produce that would allow the regime to maintain its leadership, improving the country’s infrastructure with the system of railways and roads to the outside world, not to be more open for the majority of its citizens but to find —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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the way to transport goods abroad. The apple does not fall far from the tree; just like his father did, each time he was running out of money to fuel his expensive tastes his fellow citizens faced a massive shortage. Yet the Trump Administration has already made an educated decision that Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are more important partners to the US than an attempt to normalize the US-Iranian relations, which is why despite the fact that it has been the Islamic Republic of Iran that over the course of the last decade has gone a very long way to rejoin the international community, which happened at the expense of severely slowing the development of its nuclear weapons program, in the end (unlike North Korea’s Kim Jong Un), the political leadership of this country has decided that it is in its country’s best interest to abandon the development of its first nuclear weapon, and embark on the path of compliance with the international community’s expectations to be given a realistic opportunity of reentering the international community. The Trump administration was willing to offer economic and security rewards only to the country that is believed to have up to 60 nuclear weapons, formidable asymmetric capabilities, and long-range ballistic missiles that could theoretically reach US soil and has no motivation to either take part in any real recognition games or commit to giving up his nuclear weapons, and take a hard course on Iran for the way it conducts its foreign policy. Had the Trump Administration’s reservations been valid and if the regime in Tehran was, in fact, violating international rules and regulations, abandoning the landmark 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal was definitely not the way forward as such an irresponsible move presents no hope to alter Tehran’s behavior. If anything, such drastic change could only encourage Tehran to try even harder to acquire its first nuclear bomb for the mere possession of such a bomb could deter any potential aggressors from intervening in its internal affairs (Pietrzak 2018). Discussion Donald Trump’s recent conduct in respect of North Korea shows that this politician can think outside the box, but his policy towards Iran and the withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, in particular, is rather disappointing. That is why, if he was alive, a scholar such as Zbigniew Brzezinski would criticize Trump for his stubbornness in respect of Iran, and naïveté in respect of North Korea. It has to do with the fact that Trump’s actions in respect of Iran, are likely to contribute to the further destabilization of the situation in the Middle East. On the other hand, Trump’s actions in respect of North —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Korea are neither likely to lead the Korean Peninsula closer to a complete denuclearization nor to the successful reunification. In respect of the latter, under current geopolitical setting, the only positive outcome for the US warming relations with North Korea would be if it was intended to work as a major diplomatic and reputational snub for China, for it surely does not look great when the US is interfering in its backyard. But I am afraid, the Trump Administration lacks any strategic imagination to come up with such a sophisticated policy in the first place. Simultaneously, Trump’s Iranian policy indicates that his team is unable to deal with complex geostrategic challenges that require adopting a certain sensitivity and open-mindedness to offer an olive branch to the government in Tehran, and indicates that the main geostrategic imperative in this respect is far different from finding the mutual ground of agreement with authorities in Iran. Surely, Teheran is also at fault in this respect, as its politics in the region have never been only peaceful, but Israel’s conduct in the regional affairs also lacks restraint in recent months and years, and this may present itself as a particular problem for the US decisionmaker in the future. In this respect, it is also important to acknowledge that Israel is believed to be one of US’s closest ally in the region, whilst Iran has been considered as this country’s archenemy, but by adding Israel to these deliberations, we can see that the Trump Administration is very selective about its foreign policy choices in the Middle East. Donald Trump has proven to be very sympathetic to the particular geopolitical situation Israel has been placed in, but his administration is not willing to show any even smaller desire to consider the peculiarity of Iran’s situation and the instability that comes from within its close neighborhood: Iraq in the West, and Afghanistan & Pakistan in the East. Yet, at the same time when Trump has shown a strong desire to burn all its bridges with Iran and was even open to the idea of going into a war with this country, simply because Iran has decided to modernize its defensive arsenal, his administration has turned a blind eye on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hawkish internal policy, that has started resembling the behavior of blind elephant in a China shop. Washington not only backed the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, and incorporation of the territories in the Jordan Valley (that were traditionally considered to be Palestinian) but has also encouraged moving of the Israeli capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Adopting harsh measures towards Iran would be perfectly justified if these same measures were applied towards North Korea, but (even at this stage) it can be observed that the US’s Middle Eastern and Far Eastern policies are inconsistent, and for this reason in no way can they be presented as —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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credible. On the one hand, Trump attempts to bully Iranian hardliners to stop their nuclear program but, in the meanwhile, his administration tries to woo the North Korean leader to abandon his already well-functioning nuclear program. Not only that, the US president has also chosen to reward North Korea, which has made a mockery out of international rules and regulations (and him in particular), with a series of bilateral meetings. Meanwhile, North Korea has illegally acquired nuclear weapons, and its regime has carried on a number of long-range ballistic missiles tests aimed explicitly at the US. Adopting those two policies indicate poor judgments by the American leader, for, in the dream world, if these policies were about to be effective, they should be very much interlinked. If President Trump is really interested in preventing the nuclear arms race in the Middle East, his eyes cannot be closed to the North Korean trespasses against the non-proliferation nuclear regime. Otherwise, things may quickly get out of control for, in the eyes of Tehran, Washington under the Donald Trump administration endorses a double standards game that is very dangerous. President Trump has proven to be one of the most vocal critics of the Iranian foreign policy but lacks consistency when it comes to the need to maintain the same very policy towards North Korea, which jeopardizes the stability of the entire region in a far more serious manner than Iran in the Middle East. Trump has to finally acknowledge that what happens in the Persian Gulf doesn’t stay in the Persian Gulf, for it has larger implications to the regional Middle Eastern architecture of power; in a similar manner to the consequences of the unstable situation in the Korean Peninsula may have a massive impact on the way the entire internal structure of power in Asia-Pacific region is being shaped. This finding is in line with the opinion of John Wolfsthal, former senior director of arms control and non-proliferation at the National Security Council during the Obama administration, who suggests that “Iran would be thrilled to sign up to the exact same deal that North Korea apparently accepted from Trump in Singapore, but it’s not being offered” any deal of a similar value. By extension, we can suggest that President Ruhani would accept with closed eyes the meeting with President Trump and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wouldn’t mind meeting the U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo or former US National Security Adviser John Bolton (as well as his replacement Robert O’Brien) to discuss the US coming back to the negotiating table, but there is little hope of such an event happening anytime soon, well, at least until the next president replaces Donald Trump (Borger 2019; Manson 2019).

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Donald Trump may not be a warmonger who, just like his predecessors, prefers to go into wars, but the problem may be as deep as that, for his administration undermines alliances, unilaterally withdraws from many multilateral deals of extreme importance. The very fact that Trump administration was willing to sacrifice Obama’s Iranian Gambit, which gave hope to the birth of the new US’s policy pivot to Iran, is a clear sign of the violation on Washington’s side, not the Teheran’s. The problem here is that even if Donald Trump’s actions were genuine, they have sent a wrong message, that we still live in a world where the most hawkish bully decides unilaterally what is right and what is wrong about certain treaties, or certain types of international conduct. Not only that the message is also that the international community is clearly not strong enough to withstand the shock of yet another hawkish American leader, for these reasons, if for both Ian’s and North Korea’s ultimate objectives are survival, their only viable strategic option is to continue their respective policies: for Iran the expansion of its conventional and nuclear capabilities and for North Korea the preservation of the nuclear status quo. In this sense, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s forecast can serve both as a powerful warning against Donald Trump’s way of doing things, in particular, and a prophetic counsel on the challenges ahead in general, for the Trump’s successors, may be prone to follow his type of predatory leadership. This is largely owed to the fact that the Trump presidency is very specific because, on the one hand, Trump seems to purposefully want to undermine the liberal global order, withdraw from the international organizations (that no longer seem to succumb to the necessity of the US national interest’s requirement, or favor the countries like the US in the first place), but on the other hand Trump still desires to maintain his administration’s delusions of grandeur. Also, in this respect, we can assume that the suggestion that “the sophisticated US leadership is the sine qua non of a stable world order” can be also seen as a massive overestimation, for one single nation, however powerful, cannot be responsible for maintaining global peace and stability. If anything, for the last three decades (and the last three years in particular) the world order was quite stable not because but despite various hawkish policies of the respective US presidents. Barack Obama with his Iranian Nuclear Deal attempted to change this pattern of behavior, but his successor has made a reckless decision to abandon this deal. This situation clearly shows that such serious international deals as the Iranian Nuclear Deal have real chances of success only if they are approved by an overwhelming majority after serious bipartisan negotiations between Democrats and Republicans. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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We need to remember that any transition of power from Democratic to Republican administrations involves a certain continuity in American foreign policy and a certain level of change, but 2016 was totally different. To many critics, the Trump’s rapprochement with Kim and his recent visit to North Korea is an attempt to look more presidential even at the expanse of legitimizing a regime with one of the worst human rights records on the planet. This is especially true considering that both Hassan Rouhani and Kim Jong-un seem to be better students of Hans Morgenthau’s concept of national interest than Trump himself; it is just they understand it in a more modern way. But if we were about to add to this equation the fact that the other important variable that suggests that neither the Government in Tehran nor the Government in Pyongyang will ever get any assurance that Trump won’t be replaced by someone like a Democratic version of George W. Bush with his hawkish, neoconservative type of behavior. That means that on the one hand if any of these courtiers “refuses to play the ball” it can face severe consequences now, but on the other hand “playing ball now” is not a strategically viable option either, for no one is able to predict how post-transition of power Washington is behaving in the future. If the American people continue to elect such irresponsible leaders as Trump, anything is possible. As much as this short study was designed to focus predominantly on the analysis of Trump’s policy towards Iran and North Korea, it can be also observed that the Trump Administration has also shown no interest in seeking a new modus vivendi with significant others such as Russia, China, the European Union, along with leading countries in this bloc, and the leaders of their respective regions: Brazil and Mexico in Latin America, Egypt and South Africa in Africa along with India, Pakistan, and Japan, for US relations with those countries are no longer based on mutual respect and understanding: it is either Trump’s way or highway. Biography Bennett, Brian & Wilkinson, Tracy. 2018. Trump agrees to meet with Kim Jong Un in what would be first meeting between a U.S. president and North Koreans (March 8, 2018 3:49 PM) Available at: [Accessed on 05.10.2019, at 22:37]. Brzezinski Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books. Brzezinski Zbigniew. Twitter Post. May 4, 2017, 10:02 AM. //twitter.com/ zbig/status/860177803194630144. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Einhorn, Robert. 2018. “Let’s get realistic on North Korea and Iran”. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:10]. Fisher, Max. 2015. “How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East”, (Nov. 19, 2016). Available at: [Accessed on 22.05.2017, at 22:37]. Fukuyama Francis “Against Identity Politics, The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy”, Foreign Affairs Magazine, September/October 2018 Issue, Volume 97, Number 5, p. 90–115. Available at: [Accessed on 06.01.2019, at 11:55]. Goldman-Eps, Miriam. 2016. “From ‘ripping up’ Iran deal to banning Muslims—what is Donald Trump’s plan for the Middle East?” (November 17, 2016 14:16 GMT) Available at: [Accessed on 22.05.2017, at 11:23]. Ibish, Hussein (Sep 17, 2019) “International Response Required to Deter Further Iranian Attacks on Global Energy Supplies. Strikes on Saudi oil facilities are an opportunity to marshal a global coalition to restore deterrence in the Gulf”. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:00]. Ibrahim Arwa. 2017. “The Middle East, and Donald Trump: What he thinks about Israel, Iran and Syria”, Available at: [Accessed on 25.05.2017, at 16:05]. Jang, Sungku, “How America Should Handle Iran and North Korea”. (29/08/2018) Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:08]. Manson, Katrina. 2018. “Why does Trump treat Iran differently to North Korea? Iran remains in US crosshairs despite the North Korean threat being far greater”. Thu, Jun 14, 2018, 10:05 Updated: Thu, Jun 14, 2018, 11:51. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:10].

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Melvin Don. 2015. “Six lesser-known facts about Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif”, Updated 1148 GMT (1948 HKT) (April 3, 2015). Available at: [Accessed on 24.05.2017, at 18:05]. Mearsheimer, John J., “The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent” Foreign Affairs Magazine Summer 1993. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2017, at 17:40]. Morgenthau, Hans J., Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton. 1948. Politics among nations. The struggle for power and peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1978. ‘Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. Morgenthau, Hans J., “The Restoration of American Politics” (Chicago. I L: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 237–239. M.S. “Everything you want to know about the Iranian Nuclear Deal”, Available at: [Accessed on 25.05.2017, at 14:05]. N Jean Yves, Ndzana. 2017. “Addressing Iran Ballistic Missile Program. Three Lessons from the Negotiation Over the Iranian Nuclear Program”, Journal of Defense Management, Yves, J Def Manag 2017, 7:2 Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 18:00]. Neascu, M. 2010. Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relation, Disenchantment, and Re-enchantment. Morello Carol, DeYoung Karen, “the Historic deal reached with Iran to limit nuclear program”. Available at: [Accessed on 24.05.2017, at 18:05]. Øyen, Else. (2004). “Living with imperfect comparisons”, p. 275−291, in: Patricia Kennett, A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy. Edward Elgar. ISBN 978-1-84064-886-7. Pietrzak, Piotr. 2014. “American Soft Power after George W. Bush’s Presidency, in: The United States and the World”. In From Imitation to Challenge. Edited by Andrzej Mania, Łukasz Wordliczek, Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press 2014. Available at: [Accessed on: 17.05.2017, at 14:17].

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Pietrzak, Piotr. 2016. “The U.S. Foreign Policy towards Syria under the Donald Trump Administration”. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 2019, at 17:45]. Pietrzak, Piotr. 2018. “Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Iranian Relations, and the Future of the Iranian Nuclear Deal”, In Statu Nascendi: Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018), p. 173–186. Available at: https://cup.columbia. edu/book/in-statu-nascendi/9783838212296> [Accessed on: 24.09.2018, at 22:25]. “President Obama’s remarks on the impact of U.S. leadership in Iran. The Iran Deal blocks the four pathways to a nuclear weapon”. Available at: [Accessed on 26.05.2017, at 22:05]. Przeworski, Adam; Teune, Henry. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. December 1970 American Political Science Association. Publisher: Wiley-Interscience. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 15:05]. Scott, Brendan “Iran, North Korea Forge Stronger Bond Under Trump’s Pressure. Washington must not use a one-size-fits-all approach”. August 8, 2018, 3:48 AM GMT+3 Updated on August 8, 2018, 1:49 PM GMT+3 Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:07]. Waltz, Kenneth, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb. Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability” (Published by Foreign Affairs Magazine on Jun 15, 2012). Available at: [Accessed on 03.09.2019, at 17:50]. Worthington, Rob “The End of Twitter Diplomacy?” Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 11:00]. Policies “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action implementation and verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”, Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 15 December 2015, Available at: [Accessed on 25. 05.2017, at 18:05]. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Statements “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Switzerland” (Bruxelles, 02/04/2015). Available at: [Accessed on 25.05.2017, at 22:05]. Commentaries Trump warns of Iranian nuclear threat on a visit to Israel, Available at: [Accessed on 26.05.2017, at 07:21]. Interviews Badawi, Zeinab, “Interview with Foreign Minister of Iran—Javad Zarif,” 17 Jul, HARDtalk, Available at: [Accessed on 25.05.2017, at 22:33]. “Interview with: Chuck Freilich”, Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center and Former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor. “Interview with Marcin Grabowski, Ph.D., an Assistant Professor of the Jagiellonian University on the ever-changing political situation of the Asia Pacific Region in general, and the political backdrop of North Korea in particular”, In Statu Nascendi: Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations Vol. 1, No. 1 (2019), p. 1–35. Available at: https://cup.columbia.edu/book/in-statu-nascendi/97838382122960/> [Accessed on: 24.09.2018, at 22:25]. Expert Roundup by Zachary Laub, “The Middle East After the Iran Nuclear Deal (Expert Roundup) The nuclear deal inked by Iran and major powers has implications not just for proliferation, but Middle Eastern security as well. Five experts weigh in on what the deal means for regional powers and conflicts”, (September 03, 2015). Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:05].

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Deniz Ertin

Contrariwise and inconsistent positions on Turkey’s EU membership—Do party politics matter in German foreign policy? Abstract: Despite Germany’s long tradition of continuity in foreign policy, its position on Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership has been always a bone of contention. We argue that changed positions of the German government and of political parties is key for the understanding of German-Turkish relations. The study encompasses the last six legislative periods since 1994 and analyses party positions of four different parties in government, positions of the chancellery, political statements of the German foreign ministry, and the coalition treaties. The study observed a continuity in party politics and a rapture in foreign policy after the CDU in 2005 started running the Chancellery. Both indicate the importance of the chancellery and party politics in German foreign policy. Beside many findings this study observed an ambivalent attitude of the FDP and a very late party-political positioning of the SPD on the EU membership of Turkey. Keywords: German-Turkish Relations, German Party Politics, German Foreign Policy, EU Accession of Turkey, party positions 1. Introduction The viewpoint that Turkey’s EU membership is highly dependent on Germany’s support has been shared for years by Turkey’s politicians and civil society as well (Ateş 2002, p. 44). Turkey’s road to Europe has included confusing traffic patterns from the various blocs governing Germany, however. When the Turkish government applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987, Germany’s took an opposing position. Accordingly, Richard von Weizsäcker, then president of West Germany, announced the application an “early step” and “hardly feasible” (Szymanski 2007, p. 28). Just seven years later, however, the conservative-liberal coalition government supported integration into the European Union Customs Union (EUCU) in 1994. Germany was seen as particularly instrumental to Turkish membership at this time; then foreign minister Klaus Kinkel from the Free

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Democratic Party (FDP) is said to have personally convinced the Greek leadership not to block the path to Turkish integration (Arıkan 2003, p. 182). These individual observations raise the question whether party politics play a role in German foreign policy in the case of Turkey’s accession to the EU. The aggravation of the refugee crisis in 2015 marked the beginning of a new period in Turkish-German relations. In the beginning, the relationship was characterized by intensified cooperation in security and migration affairs, with a series of high-level meetings within a very short period. The many intergovernmental dialogues across all ministries and the cooperation at EUTurkey summits indicated that both countries and the EU shared an agenda and were able to collaborate on the basis of mutual interests. Nevertheless, 2016 proved the vulnerability of German-Turkish relations: The “Böhmermann incident” in March 2016, the Armenian Resolution of the German Federal Parliament in May 2016, and a series of diplomatic inconsistencies after the failed coup attempt in July 2016 are just some of the many incidents that led to increased diplomatic tensions between the two countries in that year. The relationship between Germany and Turkey has continued to decline in 2017. The appearance of Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım in Oberhausen on February 18th, the conflict about the “spy affair” within the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) in Germany since January, and the police custody of German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel in mid-February, set the tone. The relationship doesn’t seem poised to improve. The challenges of 2016–17 have led Germany to switch from a focus on diplomatic cooperation to a pragmatic and strategic approach to Turkey. On the other side, Turkey has become more belligerent, with an increase of populist hostility against Germany and its politics. The aftermath of the Armenian resolution serves as a notable example, when the lives of German MEPs were threatened by German citizens of Turkish heritage (Gathmann, Meiritz, and Weiland 2016). After the financial crisis and the Brexit referendum, Germany has become the leading force for integration in Europe176. Its increasingly decisive position on the European Council will have important implications for the EU accession process of Turkey. It is therefore important to understand Germany’s conflicting historical and political positions on Turkish membership in the EU.

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Regarding the debate on Germany as a “reluctant hegemon”, Please see more in this respect at: Simon Bulmer & William E. Paterson, “Germany as the EU’s reluctant hegemon? Of economic strength and political constraints”. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:00], p. 1387– 1405.

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 79 This paper argues that changing positions of the German government affected by the different positions of the political parties is key to understanding German-Turkish relations. Thus, this essay aims to track and analyse the changes of the positions of the German political parties, and the different German governments, over the last six legislative periods (1994–2017). In doing so, we elaborate on the main constituents of the domestic political perspective that have influenced the attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership. We will start with a brief theoretical overview of the research framework. Thereafter, we then continue with an overview of the political system of Germany with regard to foreign policy to strengthen the theoretical argument. In the main part, we conduct an empirical analysis by using a textual analysis method. The data for the analysis is based on party manifestos, partly on the political party platform, the official statements of the chancellery and the chancellor, and the official statements of the foreign ministry and the ministers. In the final summary, we will compare our findings with the coalition treaties between governing parties. Taken together, this analysis will help to develop a comprehensive picture of the changing attitudes towards Turkey’s EU membership. 2. Framework—Do parties matter in German foreign policy? The foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are manifold and far from unidimensional. Before entering the specific question of German foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey, it is important to clarify our theoretical framework, and the important actors from this perspective. Theoretically we are opposed to the superiority of the classical theories in international relations, with realist (Carr 1939; Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 1948) and neo-realist (Waltz 1959) thinking. Both concepts were already falsified for the German foreign policy by a huge research project (Rittberger 2001). We rather see this study following the foreign policy analysis literature, assuming International Relations as human decision making of single individuals or groups (Hudson 2005, p. 21). Also, most current studies on German foreign policy argue from a neoliberal (Keohane 1984) and liberal intergovernmentalist perspective (Moravcsik 1993) instead. From this framework, foreign policy analysis necessitates the analysis of the preferences and the strategies of the constituents at the domestic level such as voters, political parties, the government, and interest groups (Woyke 2000, p. 50). This does not mean that other factors, such as foreign policy norms and public opinion could not be also decisive in shaping

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Germany’s foreign policy. But for these factors different requirements are needed. For example, public opinion needs an upcoming election and a salient political topic (Oppermann and Höse 2011, p. 61). In this study, we argue from an institutional and two-level game perspective. As Putnam puts it in a nutshell, “Each national political leader appears at both game boards”(Putnam 1988, p. 434), which means that the framework of foreign policy action, from an actor-centered view, lies often at the junction of international conditions and domestic preferences. Domestic preferences are mainly framed by the political parties and their actors in the institutional framework of the political system. Thus, we hypothesize that Germany’s position on Turkey’s EU membership relies on politically motivated party decisions. However, some researchers see no relevance or only a small effect of party politics on Germany’s foreign policy (Bartsch 1998:183). By contrast, a large number of experts of the German political system emphasize that it is impossible to analyse the foreign policy of Germany without considering party politics (Roth 1973, p. 29; Rudzio 2003, p. 117; Korte and Fröhlich 2009, p. 95). Accordingly, we argue like many others that political parties shape the foreign policy debate in Germany (Roth 1973, p. 27–29; Maull 2006, p. 436; Oppelland 2007, p. 269; Oppermann, Höse 2011, p. 67; Schmitt 2013, p. 144), and sometimes its outcome too, as we will show in the case of Turkey’s EU membership. The question of key actors in foreign policy rests upon the institutional structure of the German parliamentary democracy itself. Political parties have a dominant position in Germany’s political system. This is also the reason why the German political system is often called a “Party Democracy” (Parteiendemokratie) (Korte, Fröhlich 2009, p. 93). The German political system is also described as a parliamentary democracy with a strong party state (Parteienstaat) (Leibholz 1958, p. 93; Alemann 2003, p. 82). This shows the importance of the political parties in particular for the German political system, which are at the federal level compounded in the parliamentary groups (Fraktionen) of the German federal parliament (Bundestag) (Oppelland 2007, p. 269). Accordingly, members of the government can hardly govern other than with the values and beliefs of their own parliamentary group, which is very closely related to the political party. The groups, rather than the underlying parties, represent concrete policies in government, represent themselves in committees, and act as a voting unit. The fragility and significance of these alliances guarantee that members of parliament govern close to the values and beliefs stated by the group, which are loosely aligned with the values and beliefs of their own party. Political parties do not directly influence day-to—In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 81 day decision-making on foreign policy; what they do rather is guide and provide arguments for the governmental actors (Schwarz 1975, p. 177; Oppelland 2007, p. 269). As important politicians and actors in the government are generally party members, their behaviour is related to their party program, the party ideology, preferences of their party members and, in times of elections, also the attitudes of their loyal voters (Oppermann, Höse 2011, p. 67). Political parties base their policy orientation, ideology, and preferences mainly on the guidelines of their party manifesto (Gareis 2006, p. 35; Erler 2009, p. 29; Oppermann, Höse 2011, p. 55). This makes the party manifesto an important source for analysis. The political party system in Germany can be characterized as plural and very heterogeneous. Germany as a “multi-party-system” (Holtman 1999, p. 32) has five different party fractions, only four of which have been represented in the federal government till now177. The Christian Democratic parliamentary group (CDU/CSU) unites two parties: the CSU, which operates only in the province of Bavaria, and the CDU, which operates in all other provinces of the German Federal Republic. The second largest parliamentary group today, after the Christian Democrats, is that of the SPD. The Alliance ’90/The Greens and the FDP, as two small parliamentary groups, are usually junior partners in a coalition government, augmented by the important post of the foreign minister when they have been in government178. In the period of our analysis from 1994 to 2017, there were only three different constellations of coalitions in government (CDU/CSU–FDP; SPD–Greens; CDU/ CSU–SPD). The FRG has never had a government with a single parliamentary group; governance is therefore a matter of a coalition. Coalition negotiations are the dominant decision-making centre on foreign policy issues at the beginning of the legislative calendar (Korte, Fröhlich 2009:58).These negotiations, which lead to a coalition contract, are seen as a guideline for later decisions as well. A formal coalition contract is signed, giving clarity on the shared objectives of the members and allowing them to effectively work together. Tensions are rare and typically only arise close to federal or state elections. A comparison of the individual party manifestos and their coalition contracts

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This is the reason why we exclude the fifth political party “Die Linke” from the analysis, as they were never in government and had no influence on Germany’s foreign policy other than debating power. Germany’s political system has some informal rules. When the cabinet is formed, the smaller coalition party most of the time holds the foreign minister post, which is at the same time also that of the vice-chancellor. There have been only very rare exceptions.

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can reveal much about power struggles within a parliamentary group and provides another layer to the analysis of foreign policy decisions. Thus, the party manifestos of the different parties in government and the coalition contract of the different governments are both important sources of analysis to answer the research question (RQ): Do party politics matter in German foreign policy when it comes to Turkey’s EU membership? To answer this question, we also have to look at institutional rules, to understand the political system of Germany and its foreign policy actors. Institutional rules for Germany’s foreign policy are determined by the German constitution (Grundgesetz). From an actor-centred perspective, there are many actors in the political system who may act in foreign policy issues, but only a few can be labelled as important ones.179 The German federal government (Bundesregierung) can be seen as the main actor in foreign policy making (Gareis 2006:36), as they define and execute the foreign policy strategy. Within the German federal government, the chancellery, the federal foreign office, and various ministries divide power over foreign policy decisions. As individual ministers possess authority over their portfolio according to the departmental principle (Ressortprinzip), it is important to highlight the parties and parliamentary group in control of each ministry. Thus, the government is far from being a homogenous actor, as the chancellery and the federal foreign office are interested in achieving their different party related preferences. It is thus appropriate to highlight the dividing lines between the ministries led by different political parties, as ministers possess authority over their portfolio, namely the departmental principle. Among the many political systems, an important characteristic of the German governmental system is the prominent and strong position of the chancellor. The chancellor has the authority to set guidelines in many policy fields and especially in foreign policy (Richtlinienkompetenz) (Lehner and Widmaier 2005, p. 152). One reason for the strong role of the chancellor in foreign policy is the bureaucratic and expert resources of the chancellery with its mirroring departments (Spiegelreferate) (Maull 2006, p. 434). Since the Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) administration, the chancellery is additionally equipped with the Department of EU Affairs. Still, one cannot claim “the hegemony of the chancellor” (Roth 1973, p. 29), as the chancellor is restricted

                                                             179

I do not include the president of Germany (Bundespräsident) in my analysis, as he only represents Germany’s foreign policy, but has neither competencies nor power on foreign policy decisions, (Maull 2006, p. 436). It is also disregard that the German Parliament (Bundestag), as the competences of the parliament members are restricted to control and participation right (Gareis 2006, p. 18).

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 83 as the representative of his/her own political party. This reduces his/her power on the one hand and strengthens it via the parliamentary group and the coalition partner on the other hand (Korte, Fröhlich 2009, p. 86). Furthermore, the power of the chancellor in setting foreign policy choices is also limited by the department principle and principle of collegiality (Oppermann, Höse 2011, p. 50). The second most important actor is the German minister of foreign affairs, who holds executive responsibility for foreign policy. His exceptional position is additionally due to his strong position in the federal government, with his role as the vice-chancellor and the strong position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compared to the other ministries. As head of this powerful bureaucracy, the foreign minister designs, manages, and executes the foreign policy (Schwarz 1975, p. 31). Related to our analysis, the foreign ministry has its own department for German-Turkish relations, which has the task of maintaining and intensifying the relations between the two countries and which enhances the minister’s expertise and diplomatic contacts (Bettzuege 2007, p. 231). To conclude, the two most important governmental actors in the making of Germany’s foreign policy are the chancellor and the foreign minister (Bierling 1999, p. 38). Both actors’ decisions are framed by a combination of their own political party manifestos and their coalition contracts. 3. Analysis of different institutional positions on Turkey’s EU membership For the analysis, we focus on written documents of the political parties and the statements of the chancellor and the foreign minister. We also consider statements published in leading newspapers and secondary literature as supporting elements for our analysis. We consider each of the six legislative periods (1994; 1998; 2002; 2005; 2009; 2013) in the timeframe. For each legislative period, we analyse the party manifestos from the election year, with a current political party platform if one is available.180 Next we analyse the positions of the chancellery for the period, and finally the position of the foreign ministers. While summarizing our key findings, we also compare them with the coalition treaties at the end.

                                                             180

All the quotations of the political party platform or party manifestos are translated by the author.

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3.1 Analysis of the official political party platform and party manifestos Legislative period: 1994–1998 Kohl V (CDU/CSU–FDP) Neither the CDU’s political party platform (principle program) from 1994 (CDU 1994) nor the party manifesto of the CDU/CSU (CDU/CSU 1994) includes any wording on Turkey’s EU membership. Even though the party manifesto of the coalition partner FDP contains a longer part on the future of EU enlargement, Turkey is not a topic at all (FDP 1994). Furthermore, the party manifestos in 1994 of the opposition parties (SPD and the Greens) also do not include any statement on the possible EU membership of Turkey (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1994; SPD 1994). We can state that in the first period from 1994 to 1998 Turkey’s EU membership was not on the political agenda of any party manifesto. Legislative period: 1998–2002 Schröder I (SPD–Alliance ’90/The Greens) As the SPD takes power in 1998, they still have not included a statement on EU membership for Turkey (SPD 1998). Their coalition partner however, Alliance ’90/The Greens, makes its position apparent: “We support that as many central and eastern European countries join the EU without any delay. Even if this is not possible at the same time, all candidate countries must be treated equally, including Turkey, if they fulfil the political and economic conditions.” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998, p. 139) Among the opposition parties, the CDU/CSU party manifesto still does not mention Turkey at all. The FDP manifesto is difficult to interpret. It is loosely formulated, indicating that it is against any exclusion of willing candidate countries of the EU enlargement. The party manifesto does not mention either including or excluding Turkey in the context of the enlargement (FDP 1998:98). In the context of previous FDP positions, we can categorize this as indicating reluctant support for Turkish membership. Legislative period: 2002–2005 Schröder II (SPD–Alliance ’90/The Greens) The SPD supports the Eastern enlargementin its party manifesto of 2002 without any specific wording on Turkey (SPD 2002). This is surprising because, under the last coalition in 1999, Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer launched the EU membership candidate status. The manifesto —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 85 of their coalition partner, Alliance ’90/The Greens, maintains their commitment to Turkish integration in the EU. They emphasise the preconditions more strongly in 2002 than they did in 1998, however, particularly the democratic criteria and human and minority rights (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002, p. 85). The FDP party manifesto continues to support Eastern enlargement, without mentioning Turkey in any word (FDP 2002). This can indicate ambivalence, if we interpret not mentioning this theme when it was generally on the agenda as a “reluctant opposition”. Interestingly, in the same period the CDU/CSU’s party manifesto includes for the first time a position on Turkey’s EU membership. The document considers Turkey as a “reliable ally” and calls for attention to Turkey’s “strategic role” under the changed security conditions after 9/11 (CDU/CSU 2002:69). The manifesto also mentions the European orientation of Turkey in economic, political, and institutional terms; nevertheless, the CDU/CSU formally opposes full EU membership for the country (CDU/CSU 2002:69). Legislative period: 2005–2009 Merkel I (CDU/CSU–SPD) The beginning of the “grand coalition” in 2005 marks a turning point in CDU/CSU policy. Before this time, the party formally opposed EU membership for Turkey (CDU/CSU 2005:36). In 2005 however, the CDU/CSU softens its position by outlining the concept of a “privileged partnership”181 in their party manifesto. The manifesto warns that the integration capacity of the EU could be overstretched by the inclusion of a large country such as Turkey. It proposes instead a privileged partnership, offering many of the same trade benefits without the access of full membership. In contrast, their coalition partner, the SPD, takes a strong pro-integration stance in their party manifesto. The coalition partner SPD formally supports EU accession not just for Bulgaria and Romania, but also for Turkey, and takes therefore a conflicting position to its coalition partner’s (SPD 2005:60–61). The argumentation of the SPD rests on the assumption that Europe will remain a region of peace and stability only if all contracts and commitments with accession countries are adhered to.

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Privileged partnership is a term for an alternative cooperation between the European Union and a non-EU country to advance common goals without using EU membership. First it was used to describe the relations to Turkey and later also to Russia, Israel, and many other countries. The term was introduced by the German historian Heinrich August Winkler (2002).

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The 2005 party manifesto for Alliance ’90/The Greens remains consistently in favour of Turkish EU membership (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005, p. 120). The document argues in depth on the subject, signalling a deep commitment on this question. The party manifesto considers the promise of full EU membership for candidate countries will strengthen the internal democratization process and initiate social change (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005, p. 120). At the same time the other opposition party, the FDP, becomes even more elusive in its position. In 1998, they hoped that every country could have the chance of full EU membership. In the party manifesto from 2002 they did not mention Turkey for the enlargement process. In 2005, however, they consider at most an “alternative partnership” for Turkey’s EU membership (FDP 2005:46–47). This alternative is considered an open-ended process, even if Turkey were to eventually fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The concept is reminiscent of the privileged partnership idea from the CDU/CSU, adding only the argument of an absorption capacity of the EU as a precondition for a full EU membership, leaving the door ajar without making any promises. Legislative period: 2009–2013 Merkel II (CDU/CSU–FDP) The CDU/CSU position does not change in the legislative period beginning in 2009. Their party manifesto restates the “privileged partnership” approach they had previously proposed (CDU/CSU 2009, p. 90). They also continue their argumentation on the EU’s limited capacity for integration of a large member like Turkey. Their thoughts are mirrored in the party manifesto of their coalition partner, the FDP, who uses the same arguments to defend the open-ended character of the negotiation talks (FDP 2009, p. 71). They argue that no precise date for accession should be given to candidate countries and that an open-ended accession process would lend more credibility to the enlargement policy of the EU. This critical view of Turkish accession, along with the idea of privileged partnership, were also supported by then-president Nicolas Sarkozy in France, along with his party the Union pour un movement populaire (UMP). With the leaders of two major EU members on board, this approach became more visible across the whole EU (Guérot 2007, p. 389). The SPD manifesto offers a contrast. The party very strongly supports full membership for Turkey as long as it fulfils the Copenhagen criteria (SPD 2009, p. 88). The Alliance ’90/The Greens also strengthens their position in 2009. Their manifesto considers full membership for Turkey as a stability and peace project for the region and a necessity for sustainable democracy in the country (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2009, p. 204). —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 87 Legislative period: 2013–2017 Merkel III (CDU/CSU–SPD) In the legislative period beginning in 2013, the differences between the CDU/CSU and the SPD on the question of Turkish EU membership become a fragile point in their second “grand coalition” (Zapf 2009, p. 65). The CDU/CSU manifesto argues for an intensification of relations between the EU and Turkey along similar lines to the “privileged partnership” from prior years. Renaming the concept a “strategic partnership” (CDU/CSU 2013, p. 73–74), the idea still denied full membership as a possibility. This reframing helped alleviate some of criticism from the Turkish government, and even from their own party members.182 The CDU’s negative position on Turkish EU membership is also visible in the later party manifesto from the election of the European Parliament in 2014. This document further stresses the concerns of the party that the EU would not be able to deal effectively with a Turkish EU membership due to its economic structure and size and population (Cebeci 2014). CDU/CSU 2013 2009 2005 2002 1998 1994

SPD

FDP

denial, strategic support ambivalent, open-ended partnership process denial, privileged support ambivalent, open-ended partnership process denial, privileged support ambivalent, alternative to partnership full membership denial not mentioned reluctant opposing/not mentioned (unclear) not mentioned not mentioned reluctant supportive/not mentioned (unclear) not mentioned not mentioned not mentioned

Alliance ’90/ The Greens support support support support support not mentioned

Table 1: Party positions derived from political party platform and party manifestos Despite their position as coalition partners, the SPD continues to support full EU membership for Turkey. Their party manifesto highlights political, economic, and cultural reasoning behind the position (SPD 2013, p. 110). This puts them more in line with the opposition parties. Alliance ’90/The Greens is also still in favour of membership, emphasizing in their party manifesto that the ultimate goal is “nothing less than full membership” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2013, p. 285). Additionally, the party emphasizes that the EU

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See: Vates ( 2013), on criticism from the CDU’s party base.

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accession process “must be fair, result-oriented and with a sense of proportion” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2013, p. 285). The manifesto is not unilateral in its support, however. Alliance ’90/The Greens also criticize the democratic deficits of Turkey, and its problems with freedom of the press, women’s rights, and the protection of minorities. The FDP’s position in their party manifesto of 2013 continued to be ambivalent. The party emphasizes the “profound partnership and common membership in the NATO” (FDP 2013, p. 81) and continues to insist on the open-ended character of the negotiations with Turkey (FDP 2013, p. 81). Later in the party manifesto they explicitly support liberalized immigration for Russia and Turkey (FDP 2013, p. 88). This issue, especially visa liberalization, has been a demand of Turkey for many years and has always been refused by Germany, even when the FDP held the foreign minister post183. This shows the ambivalent position of the FDP very clearly. We have summarized our findings and interpretations of the party manifestos and platforms in the table above (Tab.1). Overall, the Alliance ’90/The Greens have consistently supported Turkish membership in the EU since 1998. They were the first political party in the timeframe to take a supporting position on the question. The SPD only began to favour Turkish accession in their party manifesto of 2005. This is surprisingly late, considering that SPD Chancellor Schröder supported Turkey’s candidacy in 1999, when Germany held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The CDU/CSU, in contrast, have clearly opposed EU membership for Turkey since 2002, accepting only their concept of “privileged partnership” in their party manifestos in 2005 and 2009. They were the first party to offer an alternative to full EU membership, an idea that gained support even outside of Germany (Guérot 2007, p. 389). The FDP position is difficult to read. Their documents do not mention the question of Turkish accession for the longest time. One can read into the loosely worded manifesto of 1998 to find a reluctantly supportive attitude, but they opposed full membership in 2005 and 2009. Their denials were not categorical, though, supporting an openended process starting in 2009, and immigration liberalization in 2013. These are very fast changes compared to German foreign policy norms, and it is unclear what to make of them.

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The former foreign minister Guido Westerwelle proposed a visa-liberalization plan for Turkey, but was blocked by the strong opposing of the smaller coalition partner CSU, see: Spiegel Online ( 2012).

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 89 To conclude, all political party manifestos except the FDP’s are consistent. The only remarkable differences are their positions (support or opposition), the wording of a concept (privileged partnership or strategic partnership) and the point in time of the mentioning. 3.2 Chancellor and the chancellery In this part, we focus on the positions of the German chancellors towards Turkey’s EU membership between 1994 and 2016. Legislative period: 1994–1998 Kohl V (CDU/CSU) Helmut Kohl regarded Turkey mainly as a principal trading partner and a NATO ally that could effectively secure EU’s south-eastern external borders. Kohl’s position on the EU membership of Turkey was skeptical due to the Cyprus dispute and Turkey’s deficiency in relation to the principles of democracy (Weick 2001:28). Accordingly, Kohl was doubtful on Turkey’s EU membership and focused rather on the Central and Eastern European enlargement of the EU. In a conversation with British Prime Minister John Mayor in 1991, Kohl already said that it will be “out of question that Turkey will be integrated into the EEC and that one should not raise such hopes in Turkey”(Schwarz 2012, p. 714). In 1997, Kohl stated that “the European Union is a civilization project and within this civilization project, Turkey has no place”(Müftüler-Baç 2000, p. 21). The chancellor’s critical viewpoint was observed in the Luxemburg European Council on 13 December 1997, where he opposed changing Turkey’s status to a candidate country. Hence, Germany’s critical attitude worsened the relations between Turkey and Germany. For example, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz accused the EU of being a Christian Club under the leadership of Germany and alleged religious discrimination against Turkey (Taşpınar 2005, p. 23). To summarize, Helmut Kohl opposed Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. Legislative period: 1998–2005 Schröder I–Schröder II (SPD) The SPD’s position during the European Council meeting in Luxembourg was opposing too, mainly due to Turkey’s failure to meet democratic standards (Süddeutsche Zeitung 1997). However, in 1998, under the coalition of the SPD and the Alliance ’90/The Greens, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder gradually reviewed their attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership. In its

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first term, he focused rather on the deepening of the EU. Gradually, Schröder’s position became more enthusiastic. Rather than focusing on religious differences, Schöder prioritised the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. Schröder believed that the exclusion of Turkey from the EU would seriously harm relations and diminish the credibility of the EU (Schröder 1999; Büyükbay and Reiners 2016). Nonetheless, not all the prominent SPD politicians were in favour of Turkey’s accession. For example, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt raised objections because of Turkey’s cultural backgrounds and population (Bağci 2000). Nevertheless, Schröder’s continued his support and this was visible again in his second legislation in 2004, after he supported the decision taken by the European Council in 2004 to open negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Further evidence of his support can be observed by his declarations of support for the timely start of the negotiations in October 2005. Germany’s foreign policy was more security-oriented during the Kosovo conflict and prioritized the stability of EU’s south-eastern borders where Turkey could play an essential role (Büyükbay, Reiners 2016)184. But another important factor was that the SPD of Chancellor Schröder was supported in the elections by a majority of Germans with Turkish ethnic heritage. Those voters are mostly linked to the German labour unions and as such have strong affiliation to the SPD (Leggewie 2004, p. 202). This linkage of the Turkish immigrants, who were called “Gastarbeiter” in the beginning, to the SPD and German labour is due to their advocacy of labour rights and immigrant-friendly integration policy since the late 1960s. The voters with Turkish origin played a significant role for Schröder’s coalition, as also the Alliance ’90/The Greens were seen as a pro-immigrant political party from the 1980s onwards and supported Turkey’s EU membership (Aktürk 2010). At the European Council in Helsinki on 10th and 11th December 1999, Schröder could convince Greece not to block the EU’s decision to give Turkey official candidate status, which was a major step towards Turkey’s EU membership. Schröder’s positive turn on Turkey’s EU membership was also due to the strategy of the completion of the unity of Europe, shared by his colleague Günther Verheugen (SPD), who served as European Commissioner for Enlargement from 1999 to 2004. Moreover, Turkey’s constitutional amendments in 2001 were welcomed by Schröder (Büyükbay, Reiners 2016).

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See more on this topic in Büyükbay and Reiners (2016).

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 91 Legislative period: 2005–2009 Merkel I (CDU/CSU) Merkel regarded Turkey’s candidate status as a matter of continuity because agreements must be upheld by all the signatories according to international law. Nevertheless, she changed from the beginning the wording and behaviour vis-à-vis Turkey into a matter of fact (Marhold 2006, p. 4). Unlike France, Merkel did not block the negotiations between Turkey and the EU at any stage. Nevertheless, the clear support for Turkey’s EU accession was over under Merkel. The following statement by Merkel exemplifies this clearly: “I don’t believe that Turkey can become a member of the Union in a foreseeable future. Negotiating a privileged partnership is a way to keep close ties between Turkey and the EU” (İnal and Yeğenoğlu 2005). Merkel additionally brought the EU’s capacity to integrate new members into the debate. By arguing that the EU had to focus on deepening rather than widening, Merkel started to refrain from making concrete promises on the membership issue, especially on Turkey’s EU membership (Merkel 2006). Legislative period: 2009–2013 Merkel II (CDU/CSU) In 2010, Angela Merkel stated that the negotiations with Turkey are an openended process and prioritized the concept of “privileged partnership” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2010). Merkel often stressed her personal reservations about Turkey’s EU membership, but surprisingly offered in 2013 the start of a new chapter: “I believe that there is still a long negotiating ahead of us. Although I am skeptical, I have agreed to the continuation of the accession negotiations. We conduct these negotiations open-ended. Recently, they have become stuck, and I am in favor of opening a new chapter in these negotiations in order to make progress. I think, I will also discuss this with the Turkish Government during my visit.” (Bundesregierung 2013).

Turkey experienced riots starting in May 2013 with the Gezi protests, which became a countrywide resistance against the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP government, and their conservative-religious neoliberalist politics (Ataç and Dursun 2013, p. 443). Merkel’s softened position and support for opening new chapters in the EU-Turkey accession process in 2013 is under new circumstances after Gezi and democratic regression in Turkey and it cannot be explained with party political reasoning. Most probably, Merkel softened her position because of the demands of the business associations in Germany to intensify trade relations with Turkey.

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Legislative period: 2013–2017 Merkel III (CDU/CSU) Angela Merkel had proposed the concept of privileged partnership in line with her political party and their party manifesto in 2005. Since 2013, also in line with her political party and their party manifesto, she spoke and still speaks of a strategic partnership. Merkel also clearly has opposed Turkey’s EU membership since 2005 and follows this position in the years since 2013. Merkel tried to avoid strongly wording her opposition and became vague by saying that the accession process of Turkey to the EU will have “a very long way” and argued against any short-term perspective (tagesschau.de 2016). 2013 2009 2005 2002 1998 1994

Chancellor Angela Merkel Angela Merkel Angela Merkel Gerhard Schröder Gerhard Schröder Helmut Kohl

CDU/CSU Denial, Strategic Partnership Denial, Privileged Partnership Denial, Privileged Partnership

SPD

Support Support Denial

Table 2: Chancellor Position on Turkey’s EU Membership To summarise, Merkel’s reservations regarding Turkey’s EU membership continued in her third term. Later, after the refugee crisis reached Germany in 2015, Merkel started a closer cooperation with Turkey and made a significant concession on the EU accession process by accepting the visa liberalisation with Turkey in the European Council. In her Government declaration to the European Council before the German Bundestag, she explained her openness to the visa liberalisation and opening new negotiation sessions (Merkel 2016, p.15747). Against the strong criticism of opposition and civil society groups Merkel defended the EU-Turkey deal keenly (Metz 2016, p. 10). In the table 2, we summarize our findings of the positions of the chancellors. By concluding the different positions of the three different chancellors, we observe a party-political motivation of the position. It is worth mentioning that the SPD was in favor of Turkey’s membership for the first time in the party program of 2005 while Chancellor Schröder actively supported Turkey’s bid from 1999 on. This is surprising, and we might interpret that Schröder shaped the position of the SPD and their party manifesto and not vice versa. Beside the close ties to the political manifestos of the actors, we can observe a trend of strong chancellors shaping their own party politics and the German foreign policy on Turkey’s EU membership as well.

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 93 3.3 German Foreign Ministry In this part, we focus on the statements of the German foreign ministers on Turkey’s EU membership from 1994 on. Legislative period: 1994–1998 Klaus Kinkel (FDP) Klaus Kinkel, as the German foreign minister after 1994, was judged that compared to his precursor Hans-Dietrich Genscher, he was a weak foreign minister. While Hans-Dietrich Genscher earned experience under the chancellor Helmut Schmidt and continued his work under the chancellor Helmut Kohl, the situation for Klaus Kinkel was the opposite. With less experience working with an experienced and dominant chancellor as Kohl became later, Kinkel lost his impact on the foreign policy issues in favor of the chancellery (Gareis 2006, p. 38). The coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP was in favour of Turkey’s joining the Customs Union. Accordingly, German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel convinced Greece not to hinder the Customs Union Agreement which came into effect on 31 December 1995 (Arıkan 2003, p. 182). However, he was not supportive of Turkey’s EU membership. In his speeches, Kinkel used the concept of “Europeanness” and the membership question continuously. Differentiating between Europe and the EU, Kinkel stated in an interview: “… I have said clearly and distinctly that Turkey belongs to Europe, but that—in the foreseeable future—Turkey has no chance of becoming a member of the European Union” (Hülsse 2000, p. 7). Despite the fact that Kinkel denies Turkey’s EU membership, he saw Turkey as a part of Europe, as can be seen in this excerpt: “With the European Conference we want to set a sign that Turkey belongs to the European family” (Hülsse 2000, p. 8). His position seems rather ambivalent. His speeches and comments are very Turkey-friendly, but his official statements on Turkey’s EU membership are in strict opposition. Legislative period: 1998–2002 and 2002–2005 Joschka Fischer (Alliance ’90/The Greens) Joschka Fischer became the first foreign minister from the Alliance ’90/The Greens in German history. Fischer believed that after the September 11 attacks, Turkey’s geostrategic importance had increased. According to his opinion, the EU could have benefited from Turkey’s geostrategic value and focussed on international conflict management. Besides, Fischer was critical towards the idea of a “privileged partnership”, contending that the Union had made promises and should keep them (İnal, Yeğenoğlu 2005). —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Moreover, he argued that Turkey can be a democratic model for the Middle East. Fischer also maintained that Germany’s soft power based on a cultural diplomatic approach185 could be helpful in the modernisation of Turkey as an alternative model to the US’s hard power (Fischer 2004:3–4). Fischer was a strong supporter of EU enlargement and of Turkey’s EU membership. He stated that “Turkish membership could one day offer tremendous opportunities. The EU will benefit as it will have an opportunity to better integrate other cultures, it will gain in external stability and it will have a bridge to the countries of the Middle East. I am convinced that Turkey as a politically stable and modern democracy will be a valuable asset for the European Union. Thus, Turkey’s fulfilment of the reform goals should be met by the fulfilment of the EU’s pledges” (Fischer 2004:6). Legislative period: 2005–2009 Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) After the election in 2005, which led to the first grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and the SPD, the position towards Turkey’s EU membership changed. Frank-Walter Steinmeier from the smaller coalition partner SPD is known as an influential and very experienced politician, as he already ran the state secretary of the Chancellery under Gerhard Schröder. Although Steinmeier had in the beginning a good liaison with Chancellor Merkel, she become more influential in foreign policy later (Gareis 2006, p. 38). However, the SPD-led foreign ministry led Merkel to a more balanced approach towards Turkey’s EU membership, “bridging the original differences between the SPD and CDU policy positions” (Szymanski 2007, p. 31). Despite Merkel’s support for a privileged partnership, the grand coalition never blocked the accession process of Turkey-EU negotiations. This is definitely an achievement of Steinmeier’s strong supportive position on Turkey’s EU membership (European Stability Initiative 2006). This can also be found in the following excerpt: “[…] And this is why I say that Turkey must be given a chance to join the EU in the form of fair accession negotiations. Turkey has the potential to become an enlightened Islamic state at the south eastern tip of our continent. A Turkey, permanently committed to European values would be more than a geographical bridge to the Arab and Asian worlds. It would also be the most important intellectual mediator between a secular Europe and our deeply religious neighbouring regions. A Turkey rooted in Europe could help to combine European values and Islamic viewpoints in such a way as to guarantee the peaceful and secure coexistence of people in Europe and our neighbouring regions in the long term, based on the principle of tolerance. I strongly believe that Europe would be making a historical mistake if we were to squander this opportunity.” (Steinmeier 14.01.2007)

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See more on Fischer’s approach and his support in Büyükbay, Reiners (2016).

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 95 Legislative period: 2009–2013 Guido Westerwelle (FDP) The CDU, the CSU, and the FDP formed a center-right government after the federal elections of September 2009, with the head of the FDP, Guido Westerwelle, becoming the new minister for foreign affairs. Westerwelle continued the ambivalent position of the FDP on Turkey’s EU accession, which marked neither an open support nor a complete opposition. The position of Westerwelle on Turkey’s EU membership, however, was more positive than Merkel’s position, but not distinct enough. In line with the ambivalent party manifesto, Westerwelle continuously stressed that Turkey was not prepared for EU membership and the accession negotiations are an open-ended process (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2009). In 2010 Westerwelle already stated in a similar venue: “If a decision had to be reached today, Turkey would not be ready to accede, and neither would the European Union be ready to accept the country into its fold” (Auswärtiges Amt 2010). In 2013, before his term came to an end, Westerwelledramatically changed his position on Turkey’s EU membership. He repeatedly emphasized the notion of “absorption capacity” and highlighted the question of whether the EU is capable of integrating any new member state. This position is reflected in the following excerpt: “No one can say at this stage whether and when Turkey will be ready to join the EU, whether and when the EU will be ready to take in new members. […] In the coalition agreement we agreed to negotiate with Turkey fairly, consistently and above all with no predetermined outcome. That’s our common position.” (Mayntz 2013).

In May 2015, together with the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Westerwelle gave new impetus to the accession negotiations with Turkey. For the first time, Westerwelle was clearly pushing for Turkey’s EU membership (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2013). With this new position Westerwelle also initiated the “Strategic Dialogue” between Germany and Turkey in 2013, a long-term form of consultation which should bring intensive cooperation between the two countries (Auswärtiges Amt 2013). Legislative period: 2013–2017 Frank-Walter Steinmeier II (SPD) Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2013 became for a second time the federal foreign minister of the second grand coalition. In this legislative period, he developed bilateral cooperation in the context of global and regional crises. He is also the architect of the “new German foreign policy” which was extensively discussed at its first presentation at the Munich Security Conference in 2014 (Hellmann, Jacobi, and Urrestarazu 2015, p. 5). Even earlier, at the beginning of his term, he continued Westerwelle’s initiative of the “Strategic Dialogue” between Germany and Turkey. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Steinmeier continued his second term as foreign minister with a supportive position on Turkey’s EU membership, but also drew attention to the worsening of human rights and the rule of law in Turkey. Steinmeier spoke at the consultations of the “Strategic Dialogue” in favour of intensifying EU accession negotiations with Turkey (Auswärtiges Amt 2014). These consultations were already the preparation for the possibility of the opening of new EU accession chapters, namely 23 and 24 on human rights and justice (Metz 2. Mai 2016, p. 10). The relations between Turkey and Germany cooled down from 2016 onwards.

2013

Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier

2009

Guido Westerwelle

2005

Frank-Walter Steinmeier Joschka Fischer Joschka Fischer Klaus Kinkel

2002 1998 1994

SPD

FDP

Support (since the coup attempt a reluctant position) Ambivalent, openended process, support (2013) Support -

Ambivalent, denial

Alliance ’90/ The Greens -

-

Support Support -

Table 3: Positions of Foreign Ministers The many diplomatic inconsistencies led Steinmeier to break up the consistency of the consultation they had before with the Strategic Dialogue. Steinmeier’s first visit to Ankara after more than a year ended with a rupture by his Turkish colleague MevlütÇavuşoğlu, who presented him with a whole series of reproaches (Spiegel Online 2016). The authoritarian appearance in Turkey against its partners before and after the attempted military coup in July 2016 changed relations dramatically. Steinmeier, who always supported Turkey’s EU membership, faced a different Turkey in 2016. Especially after the failed military coup, neither the Turkish prime minister, nor the Turkish president, nor even the Turkish foreign minister have stopped their harsh tone against Germany. Frank-Walter Steinmeier became reluctant in his supporting attitude to Turkey’s EU membership since this dispute started. In the table above, we summarize our findings of the positions of the four different foreign ministers, which shows that the last two foreign ministers had contrariwise and inconsistent positions (Tab. 3).

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 97 4. Summary and discussion of the analysis Turkey’s EU accession process is a disputed topic in German public opinion and between the political parties as well. Parties such as Alliance ’90/The Greens and the SPD have a supportive attitude, whereas the CDU/CSU has an opposing one. The FDP never clearly pointed out in their party manifesto that they support Turkey’s EU membership, but they have argued since 2009 for an open-ended process, which might be interpreted in both directions. Westerwelle’s turn on Turkey’s EU membership at the end of his time in office was clearly against the FDP party manifesto of 2009 and the following one of 2013. Other than this single exception, we observe a harmonious condition between the position on Turkey’s EU membership of the party manifesto and position of the foreign affairs minister (see Tab. 4). The behaviour of the foreign affairs ministers had to be more reactive and was more restricted to their party manifesto compared to the chancellor’s behaviour before. Kohl and Schröder could act in a time with less foreign affairs restrictions and especially almost no restrictions from their party manifestos on EU-Turkey relations (see Tab. 4). Kinkel was the only foreign affairs ministers who had a similar privilege. We hypothesized in the beginning that political parties mainly influence the foreign policy debate and the actors in the German federal parliament and in other realms. Beyond the debate, however, the two main actors of foreign policy, the chancellor and foreign ministers, shape the public opinion and the bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey. With regard to their positions on Turkey’s EU membership, these two most important actors behave close to their party manifesto as we have elaborated above. The actors are thus mainly guided by the party ideology and its positions. But we cannot totally confirm the thesis as in some cases, as we have observed with Chancellors Schröder and Merkel, it is sometimes the other way around. In some instances, they also influenced their political party position. Gerhard Schröder was even setting the agenda on Turkey’s EU membership, and his position later became the position of the SPD in its party manifesto.

 

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98

Deniz Ertin

2013–2017 Merkel III (CDU/CSU–SPD) 2009–2013 Merkel II (CDU/CSU–FDP) 2005–2009 Merkel I (CDU/CSU–SPD) 2002–2005 Schröder II (SPD–Alliance ’90/ The Greens) 1998–2002 Schröder I (SPD–Alliance ’90/ The Greens) 1994–1998 Kohl V (CDU/CSU–FDP)

Governmental Party 1 (party manifesto) Denial

Position of Governmental the chancel- Party 2 (party lery manifesto) Denial Support

Denial

Denial

Ambivalent

Denial

Denial

Support

Foreign ministry position Support, reluctant Ambivalent, support Support

-

Support

Support

Support

-

Support

Support

Support

-

Denial

-

Denial

Table 4: Overview of all areas of analysis Dividing lines between the chancellors and foreign ministers are visible mainly due to the political party positions. The inconsistent positions on Turkey’s EU membership between CDU/CSU and SPD have not led to a visible struggle between both governmental parties and the coalition at all. But Berlin is not a unitary actor in this matter. Generally, the foreign ministers tend to be more supportive on promoting the EU accession of Turkey or at least on the bilateral relations vis-à-vis Turkey than the chancellors. Still, we argue this is due to their political party affiliation, not their institutional role. Party competition of the two largest political parties of opposing political ideologiesis very noticeable during the coalition government. In this case, the minor partner in the foreign ministery seeks a stronger profile (Paterson 2010). However, Chancellor Merkel plays a stronger role in international crises management due to the many recent crises which have had to be solved at the EU level. Since the refugee crisis the federal foreign office became relatively less important regarding Turkey’s EU membership, as the chancellery took the lead. At the same time Merkel became pragmatic regarding EU-Turkey relations and used the refugee deal for her own voter preferences in Germany (Hellmann 2016:11). The refugee crisis shows accurately that if there are bigger issues on the international level which involve domestic politics, the party positions recede more into the background. Today, Merkel seems to give more and more concessions to Turkey and their EU membership aspirations than her party manifesto and her previous position would allow.

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Germany political parties on the idea of Turkey’s EU membership 99 The refugee crisis was a catalyst for German-Turkish relations in the beginning, but the relations in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt have become frosty. External shocks somehow provided new momentum on German-Turkish relations and may undermine or even change the party position. The coalition agreements by the CDU/CSU and the SPD in 2005 and 2013 brought the differences between the policy positions of both parties into a line. The coalition contracts implied a compromise between the supportive attitude of the SPD and the skeptical view and opposition of the CDU/CSU. Differing from the SPD’s and CDU’s original positions, the coalition agreements emphasized that the aim of the accession negotiations is an EU membership. However, they also included the open-ended character of the negotiations and the argument of the absorption capacity of the EU (CDU, CSU, and SPD 2005). Thus, Germany had a positive position on Turkey’s EU membership despite the phase of 2009–2013, but in both grand coalitions, contrary attitudes still co-existed. If we compare this with the coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and FDP in 2009, we observe similar statements (CDU, CSU, and FDP 26.10.2009). The coalition agreement states Germany’s interest in fostering bilateral relations with Turkey and linking Turkey to the EU. The FDP succeeded in preventing the refusal of Turkey’s membership in the EU against the CDU/CSU (Niclauß 2015, p. 366). 5. Conclusion To conclude, we have observed continuity in party politics and rupture in foreign policy after the CDU started to run the chancellery in 2005. This inconsistency is surprising, as the pursuit of European integration has been a core part of German political doctrine since the 1950s (Müller-BrandeckBocquet 2006). Membership for Turkey is an outlier. For example, Germany very strongly supported Turkey’s EU membership during the coalition between SPD and the Alliance ’90/The Greens (Greens) from 1998–2002. However, since the CDU came to power in 2005, Germany has taken an opposing position on full membership for Turkey regardless of the specific governing constellation. The German position on Turkish membership in the EU is a notable exception to an otherwise consistent foreign policy record (Maull 2006, p. 421). Unusually for German foreign policy, the position has vacillated between strong support and strong opposition as different governmental constellations have come to power. These differences are mainly motivated by the two biggest political blocs, the Social Democratic Party of Germany

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100 Deniz Ertin (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) with their sister party, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) (Zapf 2009, p. 65). The study clearly indicates the importance of the chancellery and party politics in the making of the German foreign policy. We have observed additionally that the positions of the chancellors on Turkey’s EU membership were in practice more influential rather than the positions of the foreign ministers. Under the SPD government of chancellor Schröder, Germany was the main supporter of Turkey’s EU membership. However, following the CDU– SPD grand coalition under the leadership of Merkel, Germany changed its position considerably and the discourse of privileged partnership with Turkey became dominant. In 2013, the CDU under Merkel advocated a growing cooperation with Turkey on security and foreign policy issues but rejected Turkey’s EU membership. The chancellery brought its dominance to the issue even if the coalition agreements implied a rather balanced approach. This research project has empirically investigated if political parties in the German Bundestag influence Germany’s position on Turkey’s EU membership. As confirmed in this study, Germany’s position on Turkey’s EU membership, its attitudes, continuity and change can be understood via the party-political positions. Intra-party-political positions and priorities remain most of the time stable, except for the FDP which can be interpreted as an individual and solo intervention from foreign minister Westerwelle, as the later position of the FDP did not confirm the policy change in their party manifesto. The constant inter-party turbulences between CDU/CSU and SPD became mainly blurred in times of the two grand coalition governments. But this contrariwise position of two parties in a government may confuse other countries, the EU position, and especially Turkey. The work presented in this article could be extended in various ways. It would, be interesting to further investigate via interviews the relationship between the chancellor and the foreign minister in a coalition for a better understanding of what we have observed and stated above. Moreover, to learn more about the effect of party ideology, programmatic, and electoral incentives on the one hand and their framing strategies on the other, a comparison of other EU issues and especially of other EU member candidates is needed.

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108 Deniz Ertin Zapf, Uta. 2009. Außenpolitischer Burgfrieden. Kontinuität als Konsens. WeltTrends (67), p. 65–69. 2013. Zeit für den grünen Wandel – Teilhaben. Einmischen. Zukunft schaffen. Bundestagswahlprogramm 2013. Berlin.

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Sami Mehmeti & Piotr Pietrzak

Interview with Dr. Sami Mehmeti on the political situation in North Macedonia & Balkans in statu nascendi Can Changing the Country’s Name End a Two Decade-Long Name Dispute with Greece, and open the door to potential NATO and EU accession? Piotr Pietrzak (PP): Prof. Sami Mehmeti, thank you for accepting In Statu Nascendi’s invitation to talk about one of the most fascinating political developments in North Macedonia and in the Balkans. Also thank you for keeping me updated on the ever-changing political situation in the region; I appreciate your insight. As you have explained to me during our last meeting in November 2018 the situation in your country was extremely complicated back then, as there was massive disagreement between both domestic and external parties on how to resolve the tensions over the idea of changing the country’s name to North Macedonia. As far as I remember, we discussed the controversy related to one of the initial referendums on the name change that had failed, and there was no agreement on how to resolve this issue. As you explained to me, the whole idea of changing the name was meant to improve the tense relation between Greece and your country over rights to the name “Macedonia”. As far as I was also told, out of 120 MPs, there were about 72 ready to vote in favor of the idea of the name change, but it was still an insufficient number to put this process in motion. That meant that the so-called progressive proEuropean and pro-NATO bloc was still 8 votes short of securing the overall two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution, and change the country’s name. Naturally, today (just over half a year later) we have met under a completely different circumstances, as one of the biggest supporters of North Macedonia’s name change, Mr. Stevo Pendarovski, has just won the presidency, and the country is officially called North Macedonia. Could you please take me through this process? How did your legislature overcome this constitutional deadlock? (SM): The Prespa Agreement (officially known as: Final Agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Parties) was signed on 17 June 2018 between the foreign 109

110 Sami Mehmeti & Piotr Pietrzak ministers of Greece and North Macedonia. According to the agreement the country is renamed from the Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia. It recognizes the Macedonian language aong South Slavic languages and its people are called Macedonians or citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia. The agreement stipulates that people living in North Macedonia are not related to ancient Macedonians. The highway that connects Skopje and Thessaloniki, once named for Alexander the Great, was renamed as Friendship. On 25 June the Prespa Agreement was ratified by the Macedonian parliament; however, the president, who was openly against it, refuse to sign it. Two weeks later, the parliament again ratified the agreement and called for a non-binding referendum on changing the country’s name. In the referendum, which took place on 30 September 2018, 91% of the voters were in favor of changing the country’s name; however the turnout was only 37% and it did not meet the constitutional requirement of an absolute majority. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, the decision to initiate a change in the Constitution is made by the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia (Macedonian: Собрание на Република Северна Македонија) by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of representatives. In October it seemed that the governing coalition did not have the necessary majority in the parliament. However, the parliament adopted a law on amnesty which pardoned opposition MPs who were charged for the 27 April 2017 incident in parliament, and conditioned their vote in favor of the constitutional amendments. After more than two months of discussions, on 11 January 2019 the parliament, with the necessary majority (81 out of 120 MPs), finally approved the constitutional amendments to rename the country North Macedonia.

(PP): Prof. Mehmeti, as you have explained to me, the entire legislative process was quite complicated. An initial decision to launch a change in the constitution was made by the assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of representatives. The draft amendment to the constitution was confirmed by the assembly by a majority vote of the total number of representatives and then submitted to public debate. The decision to change the constitution was made by the assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of representatives. The change in the constitution has supposed to be declared by the assembly. But if we were about to look at this process not through the perspective of the lawyer’s eyes, but through the prism of the political commentator, who was in favor of the changes and who was against?

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Interview with Dr. Sami Mehmeti 111 (SM): The political spectrum in North Macedonia is divided between the leftist social democrats (SDSM) and the right-wing conservatives and nationalists (VMRO-DPMNE). It is customary when each of these parties win elections that they form a governing coalition with the Albanian political party that wins the majority of votes among the Albanian electorate. SDSM and the Albanian political parties supported the changing of country’s name whereas VMRO-DPMNE strongly opposed it. VMRO-DPMNE perceived it as a collapse of national identity and its core values. Some of its supporters labelled the constitutional amendments an act of treason. Aside from the identity issue, SDSM is perceived as progressive and membership in the EU and NATO are among the highest priorities on its agenda, even at the cost of sacrificing elements of national identity. VMRO-DPMNE brands itself as a conservative and nationalist movement which is not ready to surrender on identity issues to facilitate EU and NATO membership. Moreover, its leadership has traditionally had good relations with anti-NATO statesmen such as Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán.

(PP): As far as I remember you were very critical of both the actions of opposition leaders who attempted to use nationalist cards to derail the entire process to secure some interim political gains, and the controversy related to former PM Gruevski’s political blackmail and his threats that he would put an end to this process if his two-year prison sentence were not annulled. Prof. Mehmeti, you have explained that such an amnesty would set a very dangerous precedent as it could justify other shady deals of this kind. So could you tell us, how did the progressives resolve this deadlock? What actually happened? Did Gruevski get his sweet deal in exchange for his people’s support of the constitutional changes? What was the position of the VMRO in this respect and what did its leader, Mickovski, have to say about Gruevski’s backdoor attempt to regain his political life? (SM): After the wiretapping scandal was revealed in 2015 and the special public prosecutor’s office indicted the former prime minister and many other officials from VMRO-DPMNE for various criminal offences, the political landscape in North Macedonia changed considerably. Even though VMRODPMNE narrowly won the 2016 elections, the Albanian political parties chose to create a governing coalition with SDSM. When the new speaker of the parliament was elected 200 members and supporters of VMRO-DPMNE stormed the parliament building and attacked the MPs from SDSM, including its leader Zoran Zaev. During the next months tens of attackers were arrested and indicted, including some MPs from VMRO-DPMNE. The heavy defeat that VMRO-DPMNE suffered in the local elections threw the party into a

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112 Sami Mehmeti & Piotr Pietrzak state of disarray. The dire need for the necessary majority for adopting the constitutional amendments in parliament required the votes of the MPs controlled by Nikola Gruevski. He tried to obtain a pardon for himself but failed. In November 2018 he fled to Hungary, where he was granted political asylum. Meanwhile, a law on amnesty pardoned opposition MPs who were indicted for the 27 April 2017 incident. Eight MPs from VMRO-DPMNE voted against the party directives and later they were expelled from the party. Consequently, the governing coalition now still commands a comfortable majority.

(PP): Prof. Mehmeti, can I just ask you how this complicated internal process looks from the regional perspective? If we look at this process from the perspective of the evolution of the bilateral relations between Greece and North Macedonia, through the Prespa agreement on the naming dispute, signed on 17 June 2018, between Greece and North Macedonia, up to this day? Can we congratulate your country on reaching the first step that will bring you closer to the EU membership, or is it too early for that? (SM): I think the Prespa Agreement was the decisive step in bringing North Macedonia closer to EU membership. Before that, technically there was no chance to apply for membership in NATO and the EU because of the Greek veto. Now that this obstacle no longer exists, there are other conditions that should be fulfilled. Some progress has been made in implementing the “Recommendations of the Senior Experts’ Group on systemic Rule of Law issues relating to the communications interception revealed in Spring 2015” or the so-called Priebe report. The European Commission, in its latest report, recommended the launch of EU accession talks with North Macedonia as soon as possible, saying the country has “delivered on reforms. ” However, there remains a serious obstacle: not all member states are prepared to make the decision on opening negotiations in the coming days.

(PP): Prof. Mehmeti, surely, resolving such a long-standing name dispute in a peaceful way is beyond a shadow of doubt a positive outcome, but are there any serious political implications or costs of following such a strategy? How is the situation in the country at the moment? What is North Macedonia’s place in the new Balkans? (SM): My opinion is that North Macedonia is standing at an important crossroads which will define its future in the decades to come. The name issue was the main impediment for North Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO. Twenty years ago it was ahead of its neighbors in the integration processes and now it among the last to join NATO and start accession —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

Interview with Dr. Sami Mehmeti 113 negotiations with the EU. Too much has been lost in the last two decades. The current government in the last two years did much more than the previous one in ten years. There is a feeling that the country made significant concessions in changing its name and it is the the EU’s turn to reward it by beginning the negotiation process. There was a hope that the date would be set in June; however it will be delayed until autumn at the earliest. According to the President of the European Council Donald Tusk, the question is not “if” but “when” negotiations with N. Macedonia will start. The rise of rightwing parties in several European countries and reluctance to accept a new wave of enlargement is fueling a growing degree of uncertainty. If the date to open the accession negotiations is not set soon it may lead to an internal political crisis and a call for early elections. My opinion is that this would have a negative impact on progressives and it would provide the nationalists a much-needed boost to return to power. In that case much that was achieved in the last two years would be jeopardized.

(PP): Prof. Mehmeti, what is in your opinion the biggest challenge ahead of bilateral relations between Greece and North Macedonia? (SM): During the time when VMRO-DPMNE was in power (2006–2016) it embraced the process of “antiquization”, i.e. an identity policy that there is a direct link between modern Macedonian Slavs and Ancient Macedonians. Squares, roads, airports, and stadiums were named for Alexander the Great or Philip II. This enraged Greece and worsened the international position of the country. When Zoran Zaev came to power things changed radically. He was prepared to make sensible compromises. One of the main goals of the Prespa Agreement is to undo the effects of the process of “antiquization”. Squares, roads, airports, stadiums were renamed again. In April 2019,for the first time in history, a Greek prime minister made an official visit in Skopje. Prime Minister Tsipras traveled to Skopje with 10 Greek cabinet ministers and a large business delegation. Recently, in accordance with Article 10 of the Prespa Agreement, the Greek liaison office in Skopje was elevated to the level of embassy. For the time being, bilateral relations between Greece and North Macedonia are going through a golden era. They are at their best ever. However, there are some causes for serious concern. The leader of the opposition party in Greece that is leading the polls before national elections in July labelled the Prespa Agreement a “national defeat” and a “minefield”. In a recent interview, Kyriakos Mitsotakis said that “New Democracy will respect the Prespa Agreement but work to improve aspects or consequences

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114 Sami Mehmeti & Piotr Pietrzak of the agreement that are currently not in Greek interest”. In North Macedonia if VMRO-DPMNE returns to power one can expect that it will try to undermine the effects of the Prespa Agreement.

(PP): Prof. Mehmeti, how would you evaluate the government in Skopje’s relations with Tirana, Pristina, Belgrade, and Sofia? (SM):The relations with Serbia since Zoran Zaev became prime minister have not been that good. The current Serbian government was more sympathetic to Nikola Gruevski. One reason is that Vucic’s and Gruevski’s parties are members of European People’s Party. Another reason is the presence of an adviser at the Serbian embassy in Skopje in the 27 April incident in parliament. Moreover, the Sebian government was the last to publicly congratulate the signing of the Prespa agreement. The current North Macedonian government’s relations with Albania are good. The Albanian prime minister Edi Rama influenced Albanian political parties in North Macedonia not to make a coalition with Nikola Gruevski but choose Zoran Zaev instead. There is a feeling that the reluctance of some European countries to open accession talks with Albania may affect the position of North Macedonia as well. Kosovo is one of the most important trading partners of North Macedonia because North Macedonia continuously exports much more than it imports from its neighbor. It also profited from the tax that Kosovo last year imposed on Serbian imports. Kosovo recently completed a modern 65 km highway from its capital to the border with North Macedonia, but the work on a 13 km highway from the border to Skopje will take at least five years to be finished. In August 2017 the Bulgarian and North Macedonian governments signed a friendship treaty. The treaty recognizes both countries’ territorial integrity, stipulates the establishment of a commission that will try to resolve their differing views of history, and contains a pledge to protect the rights of the other country’s nationals living on each’s territory, but not to interfere in the other’s domestic affairs. Relations between Skopje and Sofia have been strained for years. Bulgaria officially recognizes Macedonia’s statehood, but has refused to recognise the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality or language.

(PP): Prof. Mehmeti, surely, you have participated in countless international conferences and you have published number of interesting papers. Could you please tell us more about your in statu nascendi, your process of creation and academic development?

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Interview with Dr. Sami Mehmeti 115 (SM): I completed my undergraduate studies in law in 2005 at South East European University, Tetovo, Macedonia, master studies in civil law in 2010 at the University of Pristina and PhD studies in legal history in 2015 at the University of Skopje. My PhD dissertation was on the impact of Roman law on the development of European science of private law. Since 2005 I have worked at the Faculty of Law of South East European University, first as teaching assistant and now as assistant professor. As a student I participated in the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition in 2003 in Washington D.C. In the spring semester of the academic year 2010/11 I was awarded a fellowship from the US Department of State and I was a visiting scholar at Brooklyn Law School in NYC. My papers cover issues relating to legal history, comparative law, law and religion, etc. I have presented in several international scientific conferences organized at universities in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, etc. Recently, I participated in the Second International Researcher Development Week at the University of Granada.

(PP): Who was a driving force behind the path you have chosen? Who was your mentor? (SM): The main driving force behind my intellectual development was my father. He is now a retired university professor of English grammar, but from a young age he influenced my career path when I had dilemmas whether to study political science, diplomacy, or law. Later in each cycle of my academic studies I had different mentors since my interest moved from international law to civil law and later to legal history. During my stay at Brooklyn Law School my academic advisor was Professor Maryellen Fullerton, who now is the interim dean of the school.

(PP): Where have you been, where are you at the moment, and where are you heading in your academic development? What has led you to your academic choices? (SM):The academic environment in North Macedonia is very unpredictable and challenging. The number of universities in such a small country is too high. I think that we have more law schools here than in New York state. On the other hand, we have witnessed a 25% decreese in the number of students in elementary schools in the last 15 years. When you consider these factors it is not hard to conclude that the condition of higher education in North Macedonia does not look favorable. In these circumstances everybody fights for survival. In the institution where I am working we are trying to enhance the quality of teaching, research, and services offered to the community. Since —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

116 Sami Mehmeti & Piotr Pietrzak January I have been a member of the university’s central research committee, and I think during these months its members have done an admirable job in raising the standards of evaluating research output.

(PP): Thank you for your time Prof. Mehmeti, (SM): It has been a pleasure to me as well.

SAMI MEHMETI, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Legal History and Civil Law, 2016 at South East European University, Faculty of Law, Tetovo. He has completed his PhD in Legal History, University of Skopje, Macedonia, 2015, M.A. in Civil Law, University of Prishtina, Kosovo, 2010. Dr. Mehmeti also completed his B.A. in Law at South East European University, Tetovo, Macedonia in 2005.

E-mail: [email protected]

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PART II: PHILOSOPHY

 

 

Andreas Georgallides

The unclarity of the ontological frame of the Tractatus Abstract: This article examines and analyses the ontological frame of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus by giving a brief interpretation of its deliberate unclarity. Tractatus seems to introduce, from the beginning, an ontological frame with special characteristics, which is necessary for the development of a theory of language and for the clarification of the relations between language and the world. After all, the terms of this ontological frame (e.g. ‘state of affairs’, ‘the world’, ‘logical space’ and ‘reality’), which have the same unclear character, are not clarified because of the indeterminacy of the notion ‘object’ (‘Gegenstand’). From this follows, I argue, that Wittgenstein establishes the unclarity of the ontological frame in the Tractatus intentionally in order to lead the reader to a form of mysticism. Keywords: Wittgenstein, Tractatus, ontology, world, object The unclarity of the ontological frame of the Tractatus Taking into consideration that Wittgenstein attempts to formulate a theory of language in the Tractatus, it is natural, in a sense, to expect that he will formulate an ontological frame (the nature of reality) to which this language will correspond. This is because it is difficult to imagine a theory of language which does not refer to a world. In other words, it is difficult to think of sentences that do not refer to a world. As a matter of fact, the Tractatus begins with the following three remarks: The world is all that is the case (TLP 1)186. The world is the totality of facts, not of things (TLP 1.1). The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts (TLP 1.11).

From these remarks (TLP 1, 1.1 and 1.11), which begin with the German term ‘Die Welt’ (‘The world’), it is natural for the reader of the Tractatus to think that the work begins with the acceptance that there is a world which will be determined. Beyond that, the repetition of the notion of the ‘world’

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The majority of quotations from the Tractatus that are used in this article are taken from the translation by Pears and McGuinness (TLP). Whenever Ogden’s translation is used it will be clearly indicated (TLP*).

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120 Andreas Georgallides only points to a potential attempt to acknowledge its importance. The terms ‘case’, ‘facts’, and ‘things’ which are used in these specific remarks will not strike the reader who approaches the work for the first time as unfamiliar. Therefore, before the reader proceeds to the next remarks, they might think that the ‘world’ is something bigger than the ‘fact’ and the ‘thing’, and that the ‘fact’ is something bigger than the ‘thing’. Something that might make the reader curious is the phrase in the second remark ‘not of things’ (TLP 1.1), which might be perceived (by the reader) to be clarified through the following remarks. At this stage, it is almost impossible for the reader, having read only the first three remarks, to suspect that the specific remarks, like the ones that follow, are nonsense (something that the Tractatus will claim later) and that their understanding constitutes an impossibility. The character of these remarks as well as of the ones which follow is gradually revealed. Why is the ontological frame necessary in the Tractatus? In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein formulates the ‘picture theory of sentences’ which is based on the central idea that ‘A sentence [Satz]187 is a picture of reality. A sentence is a model of reality as we imagine it’ (TLP 4.01). By referring to ‘reality’, Wittgenstein essentially means the structure of the world. In other words, remark TLP 4.01 could have been formulated as follows: a sentence is a picture of the world. A sentence is a model of the world as we imagine it. Therefore, the possibility to create sentence-pictures of the world depends on at least one world. If the world did not exist, it would be impossible to have sentence-pictures that would refer to it (TLP 2.022). So, it would be impossible for the elements of a sentence-picture (names) to correspond to the elements of the world (objects). We cannot have a sentence-picture if we have not determined it. Therefore, for sentencepictures to exist it is necessary for at least a world to exist—a world with substance and the ‘objects make up the substance of the world’ (TLP 2.021)188. According to the Tractatus, the world must have substance so that

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I translate the German term ‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ instead of ‘proposition’, as Pears, McGuinness and Ogden do since the remarks of the Tractatus are remarks of a special kind without having sense (TLP 6.54), while the term ‘Satz’ means the sense of a sentence. Moreover, a ‘Satz’ has a fixed correlation with the world, while a ‘sentence’ does not necessarily have this and the remarks of the Tractatus belong to the second case. Wittgenstein supports that although it is impossible for someone to imagine objects without a logical space, it is possible to imagine a logical space being empty (TLP 2.013). According to Michael Morris, Wittgenstein can not mean an empty logical space without objects but a space without states of affairs (this does not mean that actual facts would not exist, but these—actual facts—would not be states of affairs) (Morris 2008, p. 38).

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the sense of all sentences are independent of the truth of any of them. The sense of an atomic sentence can never depend on the truth of another atomic sentence (TLP 2.0211 and 4.211). Wittgenstein states: ‘If the world had no substance, then whether a sentence had sense would depend on whether another sentence was true’ (TLP 2.0211).In other words, from the truth of an atomic sentence ‘p’, one cannot logically infer the truth or falsity of an atomic sentence ‘q’ (TLP 2.062 and TLP 5.134–5.135). At this point, it is important to mention that Wittgenstein’s ontological conceptionin the Tractatus arises from the thought about language itself and not from his observations about the world. This is compatible with the idea that in the Notebooks we do not encounter relevant ideas with the ontological section of the Tractatus (TLP 1-2.063), something which encourages us to think that the ontological part might have been written after Wittgenstein had realized the relation of language with the world (Georgallides, 2018, p. 5). Wittgenstein writes: ‘To give the essence of a sentence means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world’ (TLP 5.4711).

What is the ontological frame of the Tractatus? The main part of the Tractatus begins with the remark that ‘the world is all that is the case’ (TLP 1). The phrase ‘all that is the case’ needs to be clarified. A promising clarification is given in the remark right after that: ‘the world is the totality of facts, not of things’ (TLP 1.1)189. So, we can say that all that is the case (the world) is the totality of the facts (Tatsachen), not of objects (See TLP 2 and TLP 2.01). The crucial issue now moves from the phrase ‘all that is the case’ to the phrase ‘the totality of facts, not of things’. At this point, we have to examine two terms, ‘fact’ and ‘object’, which completely depend on the ‘theory of language’ of the Tractatus, and especially on the terms ‘sentence’ (‘Satz’) and ‘name’ (‘Name’) correspondingly. Characteristically, Wittgenstein states: ‘in a sentence a name is the representative of an object’ (TLP 3.22)190. According to Wittgenstein, the totality of the facts (Tatsachen) in logical space (which includes all possible facts) is the world (TLP 1.13). That is, the world includes all the possible combinations of objects since a state of affairs consists of objects (TLP 2.01 and 2.0272). The possibility of all combinations of objects in the world is nothing but the form of the world. Of course, the Tractatus might refer to possible facts butit also implies actual facts. For example, it is a possible fact that Wittgenstein was born in France. Of course, the

                                                            

189 190

Therefore, the Tractatus supports the idea that the existence of space is a necessity and that it does not support the idea that it would be possible for a space of possible states of affairs to exist without objects. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seems to use the terms ‘objects’ (‘Gegenstände’), ‘Sachen’ (‘things’) and ‘Dinge’ (‘things’) to refer to the same thing. See also TLP 4.01, 2.141 and 4.023.

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122 Andreas Georgallides actual fact is that Wittgenstein was born in Austria. Both possible and actual facts are part of logical space. A fact consists of states of affairs (Sachverhalt)191. Thus, facts that do not consist of a combination of other facts are called ‘Sachverhalte’ (‘states of affairs’), whereas facts which consist of two or more states of affairs (Sachverhalte) are called ‘Tatsachen’ (‘facts’). Here, we need to clarify that the combinations of objects (states of affairs) are limited and not finite, that is to say, they could change. So, Wittgenstein claims that ‘it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of objects’ (TLP 4.1272), and it is, therefore, also nonsensical to speak of the number of all of the states of affairs which constitute the world (TLP 1.1). Moreover, he states: ‘To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole―a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole―it is this that is mystical’ (TLP 6.45). As a result of this, it is nonsensical to speak of the form of the whole, which consists of all the forms of states of affairs. Thus, the sign ‘world’ cannot refer to the form of the whole but to the form of a limited whole. So, the notion of the ‘world’, as a finite whole, is a pseudo-notion. By taking into consideration the sentences TLP 2.04, 2.06, and 2.063, the terms ‘reality’ and ‘world’ seem to create some confusion. While the first two sentences (TLP 2.04 and 2.06) inform us that the limits of reality are beyond the limits of the world (reality includes both the positive facts—existing states of affairs and the negative facts—non-existing states of affairs, while the world includes only existing states of affairs), in sentence 2.063 an identification of these limits is stated: ‘The sum-total of reality is the world’. The word ‘sum-total’ (‘gesamt’) does not allow us to think of any case in which reality might be wider than the world (Georgallides, 2018, p. 21)192. The above confusion creates further difficulties for the task of clarifying the term ‘world’ and ‘reality’ apart from the difficulties that already exist concerning the term ‘object’ since we do not have and cannot have examples of this. In other words, we do not know and cannot find out what objects are193. For instance, it is important to mention that it is not clarified whether objects include universals, that is, properties and relations. In terms of language, the question whether he raises a distinction among the different kinds of expression corresponds to a distinction among the kinds of the entities of the

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Ogden uses the term ‘atomic fact’ (See TLP* 2 and 2.04). Pears’ and McGuinness’ translation is closer to the sense of the German term. I adopted this idea after a series of conversations with Michael Morris. In remark TLP 4.1272 the term ‘object’ functions as a pseudo-notion, as a linguistic device, which helps us talk about how names function.

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world194. As a result of this, the terms ‘name’ and ‘atomic sentence’ which correspond to the Tractarian ontological terms ‘object’ and ‘state of affairs’, are not clarified. I asked Wittgenstein whether, when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a ‘simple object’. His reply was that at that time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter! (Malcolm 2001, p. 70)

In 1949 Norman Malcolm posed the following issues to Wittgenstein: We can, therefore, assume, that had Wittgenstein replied to the question ‘what is an object?’, we could understand two basic terms of the Tractatus: ‘state of affairs’ and ‘world’. The world is the totality of facts (TLP 1.1) and a fact consists of states of affairs (TLP 2); therefore, the world consists of states of affairs. Since a state of affairs is a combination of objects (TLP 2.01) the world consists of states of affairs (but not of objects; see TLP 1.1)195 which are the combinations of objects. In addition to this, answering the question ‘what is an object?’, we could understand what could be perceived as a name which would replace an object in a sentence (TLP 3.22) since for the configuration of an atomic sentence, the required names correspond to objects (TLP 3.203).

Wittgenstein introduced the term ‘object’ for the first time on the first pages of his notes (Wittgenstein, 1992, p. 3; 3.09.1914) before he started writing the Tractatus and elaborated on his thoughts on this term mainly on the pages of the Notebooks 45–72. Among other things, he refers to his difficulty to give an example of an object (Wittgenstein, 1992, p. 68; 21.06.1915). According to the Tractatus, what we need to know in order to know an object is not its

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The realist view claims that objects include universals (See Ramsey, 1923; Stenius, 1960; Allaire, 1966; Hacker, 1975 as well as Hintikka and Hintikka, 1986) while the nominalist view claims that objects do not include universals (See Copi, 1966; Ishiguro, 1969; Carruthers, 1989; Anscombe, 1996; Ricketts, 1996 as well as Fogelin, 2004). Both views encourage us to think that if we perceive Tractarian objects as a reference point for the distinction between particulars and universals, it is impossible to reach a distinction. Wittgenstein seems to deliberately wish to keep a neutral position on the issue whether objects include universals. Wittgenstein, in remark TLP 1.1, by the phrase ‘not of things’, seems to believe that: (a) the totality of facts or states of affairs is not equal to the totality of objects and (b) the world is something more than the totality of objects. In terms of Wittgenstein’s theory of language, we can say that: (a) the totality of sentences (or atomic sentences) is not equal to the totality of names and (b) language is something more than the totality of names. If Wittgenstein was asserting that the world is the totality of objects, what remains to be clarified is the way in which objects are connected with each other. This would necessarily lead Wittgenstein to take a position on whether objects include relations and properties. However, Wittgenstein chooses to keep the specific issue open (Georgallides 2018, p. 9).

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124 Andreas Georgallides external but its internal properties (TLP 2.01231)196. If I know the internal properties of an object which are essential (the external properties are contingent), that is, its possibility to combine with other objects in a determined way (TLP 4.123), then I also know ‘all its possible occurrences in states of affairs’ (TLP 2.0123).Wittgenstein claims: ‘If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given’ (TLP 2.0124). By taking into consideration that the form of an object is the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs (TLP 2.0141), then remark 2.0124 can be transformed in the following way: if all forms of objects are given, then at the same time, all possible forms of states of affairs are given too. This means that if all forms of objects are given, at the same time the form of the world is also given. The crucial question here is whether something could be identified as a Tractarian object, without making a statement about its form. It seems that this cannot be done. We cannot identify something with an object without making a statement about its form. Thinking about the properties that are given about objects in the Tractatus we can understand that these things must not be identified with the empirical objects we refer to in everyday language197. It is about things that are simple (TLP 2.02), that are in a sense colourless (TLP 2.0232), unalterable (TLP 2.0271), which constitute the substance of the world (TLP 2.0201) and which stand for names without us being able to say that they either exist or not198. Thus, the objects of the Tractatus do not compose the substance of the natural world (as ancient philosophers like Leucippus and Democritus claimed when talking about physical atomism), but the substance to which all the possible logical worlds would refer. Wittgenstein states: ‘It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it’ (TLP 2.022). Wittgenstein seems that he left the question of what Tractarian objects are deliberately unclarified because he might have realised the difficulty of speaking of the nature of things. The Tractatus does not only project the idea

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197 198

Wittgenstein explains to Ogden that he prefers the verb ‘know’ for the German term ‘kennen’ which expresses a kind of limited knowledge (I know it without necessarily knowing anything about it) rather than the verb ‘I am acquainted with’ which expresses a kind of a broader knowledge (Wittgenstein 1973, p. 59). Frege and Russell have referred to such empirical objects (Waismann 1983, p. 41). Wittgenstein uses the term ‘bestehen’ (TLP 2.0121) and not the term ‘existieren’. Both terms ‘bestehen’ and ‘existieren’ are commonly translated into English as ‘exist’ but they have a different character. The term ‘bestehen’ states a relation—connexion of standing. Wittgenstein uses the term ‘existieren’ for other things (TLP 3.032, 3.24 and 3.323) but not for objects.

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that we are not in a position to predetermine the form of an object, and consequently the form of a state of affairs, and further the form of the world, but that we cannot even hypothesise anything about these notions. Essentially, Wittgenstein appears to think that the reader of the Tractatus should attempt to complete the ontological frame (which is not given) by himself. Specifically, in the Preface of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims: Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts.—So it is not a textbook.— Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it (Preface, TLP, p. 3). My sentences serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he hasused them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

Here, I would claim that Wittgenstein’s intriguing reference to ‘understanding’ does not equate to Wittgenstein’s demand that the reader of this work must understand every sentence of the Tractatus. In one of his letters to Ogden, May 5th, 1922, before the printing of the Tractatus, he writes: Rather than print the Ergänzungen to make the book fatter leave a dozen white sheets for the reader to swear into when he has purchased the book and cannot understand it (Wittgenstein 1973, p. 46). He must transcend these sentences, and then he will see the world aright. (TLP 6.54).

What Wittgenstein might mean when he refers to the ‘understanding’ is that the reader must understand him and become familiar with his spirit. This would help the reader to perceive the sentences of the work as nonsense. He states: The nonsense of sentences encourages the whole paradox. While Wittgenstein claims that all of his sentences function as ‘elucidations’ (‘Erläuterungen’), at the same time he claims that all of them (he does not say some of them) are ‘nonsense’ (‘Unsinn’) (TLP 6.54). Therefore, the question that arises is: how is it possible for nonsense to serve as an elucidation (Georgallides 2018, p. 122–124)? Thus, the paradox encourages the reader to think that the only way to ‘escape’ from the notion of nonsense is to transcend the sentences of the Tractatus, just like Wittgenstein did and to be led to a kind of mysticism which transcends the sense of things. According to the Tractatus, that which is surprising for the mystic is not how things are in the world but that this world exists (TLP 6.44).

The crucial idea encouraged by the Tractatus is that the existence of the world itself constitutes the reason so that the mystic experiences and reflects upon the nature of reality.

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126 Andreas Georgallides Bibliography Allaire, E. B. 1966. “The Tractatus: Nominalistic or Realistic?” In: I.M. Copi and R.W. Beard (eds.). Essays on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. New York: Macmillan, p. 325−341. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1996. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Carruthers, P. 1989. Tractarian Semantics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers. Copi, I.M. 1966. “Objects, Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus”, in I.M. Copi and R.W. Beard (eds.). Essays on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 167−186. Fogelin, R.J. 2004. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge Publishers. Georgallides, A. 2018. From Theory to Mysticism. The Unclarity of the Notion ‘Object’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars. Hacker, P.M.S. 1975. Insight and Illusion. London: Oxford University Press. Hintikka, M.B. and Hintikka, J. 1986. Investigating Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ishiguro, H. 1969. “Use and Reference of Names, in P. Winch” (ed.). Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 20−50. Malcolm, N. 2001. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Morris, M. 2008. Wittgenstein and the Tractatus. London: Routledge. Ramsey, F.P. 1923). “Critical Notice of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Mind”, Vol.32, p. 465−478. Ricketts, T. 1996. “Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”. In: H. Sluga and D. Stern (eds.). The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 59−99. Stenius, E. 1960. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Waismann, F. 1983. Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, Conversations recorded by F. Waismann, in B.F. McGuinness (ed.), translated by J. Schulte and B.F. McGuinness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. 1973. “Letters to C.K. Ogden”. In G. H. von Wright (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. 1992. Notebooks 1914−1916. In G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.), translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers. Wittgenstein, L. 2002. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by C.K. Ogden. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein, L. 2004. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D.F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

 

Gordon Freeman

Charity Begins at Home: Resolving the Tensions of Liberalism(s), “White Privilege” and African Corruption via Rawls and Transnational Digital-Communitarianism Abstract: This article seeks to examine the relationship between Classical and Modern Liberalism in the context of international aid, particularly from the EU to African nation-states. It argues that Classical Liberalism as espoused by Locke, and Kantian reason-based deontological ethical principles, have run their course in terms of contemporary applicability within the domain of intergovernmental aid to third world nations from political actors such as the EU. By making use of the latest statistical data on the amounts of aid transferred via intergovernmental mechanisms, this article makes the core argument that current practices of intergovernmental aid therefore constitute a morally reprehensible state of affairs. The practical limitations and intellectual contradictions of the latter paradigms vis-à-vis real-world scenarios, such as Zimbabwe, and which have created perpetual cycles of corruption and aid-dependency, are critically examined. Subsequently, they are contrasted with Communitarianism as an organizing social principle which, it is argued, offers the most pragmatic approach to the problems of wealth disparity and third world poverty in an era of mass digital connectivity. From this position, a wide variety of statistical data is employed to illustrate how the previous philosophical arguments are likewise borne out in socio-economic reality across many prominent African nations in terms of: rampant corruption; staggering levels of waste and ineptitude; being situated within morally retrograde and spiritually contradictory contexts, and which can only be characterized, in general terms, as ethically appalling, i.e. not only a waste of money, but a deliberate destruction of what it symbolizes in terms of good will. This, therefore, fully situates the core problem which this article seeks to offer a solution to. Given the statistically demonstrable, recurring failures of Lockean/Kantian organizing principles underlying aid donations from ‘Liberal’ first world governments to those in the third world, is it possible, in light of the patently useless and amoral nature of contemporary and historical developmental aid to Africa, to utilize a positive version of Liberalism which allows the ethical and efficacious transference of 127

128 Gordon Freeman wealth from individuals in comparatively wealthy societies to those who truly need it in impoverished and developing nations? It is argued that it is indeed possible: the work of Rawls vis-à-vis Political Liberalism, Justice as Fairness et al. is outlined— particularly ‘The Veil of Ignorance’ and the reasonable doctrines/principles which would constitute justice as a form of practical fairness—and then combined with previous arguments on Communitarianism to argue that whilst intergovernmental aid should be rapidly diminished and then ceased altogether as an ethical necessity, it is nonetheless possible via online crowdfunding charities such as Mary’s Meals and Watsi.org to reach a potentially viable solution which circumvents governmental level corruption. In order to situate this argument both within a wider, but also specifically EU context, the case of Bulgaria’s ascension and transformation within/through the EU is finally briefly considered to underscore the necessity of a situation-specific response which utilizes Political Philosophy in a practical, realistic manner thus eschewing the African fiscal calamities of well-meaning naïveté which have been the fruits of idealistic liberals for almost six decades. “No-one would remember the Good Samaritan if he’d only had good intentions; he had money as well.” ― Margaret Thatcher “They’re casting their problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbor. People have got the entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations, because there is no such thing as an entitlement unless someone has first met an obligation” ― Margaret Thatcher199

Keywords: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, Universalization, Foreign Aid, Corruption, Digital Communitarianism, Rawls, Intercultural Relations, Third World Poverty, European Union. Introduction In 1945, the European continent lay in ruins. It was fiscally, politically, physically, and socio-economically bankrupt, broken, and destroyed. The British Empire, the wealthiest and most expansive superpower in history, extended food rationing throughout the UK until 1954. After WWII, via the Marshall Plan, Europe received €25 billion a year (in real terms) for five years—a total of €125 billion, all of which was repaid in the subsequent six decades. During this period, Europe (including most bankrupted former Soviet satellites) was

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Keep Inspiring Me. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:20].

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Charity Begins at Home 129 transformed via the EU into the world’s largest pluralistic and participatory supranational democracy and the most powerful and economically successful, non-military (and least corrupt) geopolitical superpower in human history. In that same period, African nations have collectively received roughly €1 trillion—€20 billion per annum—in foreign aid. Africa has thus had what Europe had—in terms of fiscal assistance—a minimum of 12 times over200. Yet, Africa has not only grown comparatively worse according to many metrics—many African nations are now poorer—it is demonstrably the most corrupt, politically unstable, violent, and morally retrograde geopolitical zone on Earth201. This article will therefore seek to address three interconnected topics which (a) explain this shocking disparity (b) assert its continuation is a morally egregious and ethically reprehensible state of affairs and (c) exhort what can be philosophically reasoned as an appropriate response wherein the personal becomes political in the most direct sense. To that end, the first section will be a largely theoretical exploration of three major paradigms of socio-political engagement—Liberalism, Communitarianism and Universalism. I shall outline these paradigms and their comparative applicability to the aforementioned problematic disparities and argue that the current model of foreign aid to Africa must be: dramatically reduced in a staged manner over five to ten years and then stopped indefinitely; radically rethought; and thus overhauled. The second section will offer a connected means of achieving this by virtue of the interrelated theories of Rawls (A Theory of Justice, Justice as Fairness, Political Liberalism) which will be comparatively outlined and considered in terms of direct applicability via real-world case studies. Thus, the main methodology of this paper will be the combination of comparative theoretical analysis of political philosophy vis-à-vis its direct interpretation within real world contexts and subsequent verification via up-to-date statistical evidence involving the nation-states and case studies involved. Hence, it will be a combination of theoretical and quantitative analysis which therefore aims to convince the reader that the political philosophy of intercultural relations is not (and should not be) reserved for academic discussions in universities; rather, it is the essential component in confronting what has become a tacitly accepted 21st century social evil which must be dismantled.

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Snouts in the Trough. http://www.snouts-in-the-trough.com/archives/category/for eign-aid/> [Accessed on 27.08.2017, at 18:20]. See statistical data in sections 1 & 2.

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130 Gordon Freeman Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Universalism—An Outmoded Paradigmatic Trinity? “You know why people don’t like liberals? Because they lose. If liberals are so … smart, how come they lose so goddamn always?” ― Will McAvoy, The Newsroom

‘Liberalism’ does not have a unitary character: 21st century Liberals in the US are not British Liberal Democrats who in turn are not the proponents of a Rousseau-style ‘liberté’ wherein freedom/liberty are compounded within the collectivist logic of the ‘social compact’202. Therefore, in order to understand the contemporary global backlash203 against ‘liberalism’ we must examine what it actually is. Liberalism as a paradigmatic doctrine of political philosophy has its origins in John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Furthermore, it has two generalized ‘epochs’—Classical and New—the latter characterized principally by Rawls who shall be examined later—presently, we shall explore the former. Kant’s contribution to ‘Liberalism’ lies in his ethical formalism wherein he notes the dependency between rationality and justice in order to argue for a universal moral order on the basis of the unity of the agents’ values or on the basis of keeping to the same norms. Firstly, for Kant, rationality is the expression of that which is properly human, i.e. the agent who thinks and decides for himself must practically use reason in order to decide in a propitious manner which likewise mandates rational action. Secondly, the commands of rationality are called ‘imperatives’, the most fundamental ones being ‘categorical imperatives’, i.e. commands of rationality applying to me independently of my personal desires. Kant argues that all categorical imperatives are reducible to one which can be formulated thusly: (1) Act in a way that is consistent with every rational being acting in the same way (i.e. ‘universalizable’). (2) Treat every rational being as an end rather than as a means. Furthermore, (a) all morality is, essentially, the categorical imperative and (b) acting upon the categorical imperative (i.e. morally) realizes harmony with my true will, and thus in concomitant fashion my own free will. Freedom is not the liberty to do what one wants—it is the freedom to exercise one’s rationality in a universal moral manner. It is important to note that Kant was writing at a time where all paradigmatic frameworks from Newtonian physics to the

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E.g. ‘Je Suis Charlie’. We (collectively) are all (simultaneously) the singular case. E.g. Trump, Brexit, AfD, etc.

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Charity Begins at Home 131 French Revolution’s ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man’ and Catholic Absolutism were only intellectually legitimized by virtue of universalizability. Hence, ‘rationality’ is the vehicle by which individual agency becomes realized and thus, via rational reciprocity, the agent will extend this ‘liberty’ to all rational beings everywhere as a logical mandate and moral necessity. Therefore, interaction with other rational beings (i.e. with a capacity for rational decisionmaking) should proceed only on the basis of consent and rational argument, treating them as rational co-decision-makers alongside yourself, and never by coercion, manipulation, or deceit. Hence, reciprocal rationality creates reciprocal freedom in a mutually contracting progression of universalization: treating others as ends equates to acting in a universalizable way. Kant, in true Germanic fashion, via deducible rational logic insists that there are rules and that we all have a duty to adhere to them—this is the foundation of deontological (or duty-based) ethics. Unfortunately, Kant could not have foreseen the Nazi defence of ‘I was just following orders’—and herein lies a fundamental problem with his “Rational Liberalism”: humans are not (permanently) rational and as such—by virtue of circumstances or choice—find themselves in situations of extremity wherein ‘rationality’ breaks apart and other responses are not only ethically mandated, but are often the only ones possible204. Locke is generally considered the Father of (Classical) Liberalism, although his ideas are in many regards expansions upon earlier thinkers—e.g. Aristotle’s Politics—as well as reactions to others—e.g. Hobbes and Machiavelli. Like Kant, Locke’s thought is a mixture of intellectualism, place, circumstance, and personal history. Locke personally witnessed the execution of King Charles I as a schoolboy (he was literally meters away) and lived through one of the most tumultuous times in English history. His Liberalism is therefore primarily concerned with toleration and governmental legitimacy in terms of sovereign authority. Formerly, in his Letters Concerning Toleration (1689−1692), written in the wake of horrific European religious wars, Locke sought to expound three core arguments reasoning for religious tolerance:

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The famous example is lying to a Nazi to protect a Jew in hiding. However, I would argue that this problem manifests in many different ways, e.g. I once worked for a charity called ‘The Medical Foundation for Care of Victims of Torture’ which gave medical and psychotherapeutic treatment to refugees who had been tortured. One client was a young man who had been kidnapped as a child and forced to indiscriminately kill others as a child soldier in Africa (on pain of death for his family if he refused). Although he had also been tortured, he required psychotherapy not for this, but to understand that in such circumstances he could not be classified as a ‘murderer’ (he was continually torturing himself for years afterwards).

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132 Gordon Freeman (i) Earthly judges, the state and human beings generally, cannot dependably or comprehensively evaluate the truth-claims of competing religious standpoints e.g. the Great Schism and Reformation as ‘Events’ in and of themselves proved this. (ii) Even if possible, enforcing a single “true religion” would not have the desired effect, because belief cannot be compelled by violence e.g. Robespierre’s ‘Cult of the Supreme Being’ ending with him being shot in the face and then executed. (iii) Coercing religious uniformity would lead to more social disorder than allowing diversity e.g. the 30 Years War which, comparatively, was as destructive for Germany as WW2 and ended in a stalemate from which toleration emerged as the exhausted option. (Knowles 2001, p. 156−159) Locke’s religious Liberalism was amplified by his Political Theory (Two Treatises on Government, 1690) and Theory of Personhood (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1689) (ibid.). Locke, unlike Hobbes, argued that government had a limited function—the protection of life and tolerant civic space— and could be overthrown by the people if necessary. In contrast to Kant’s rationalistic expansion of moral universalism, Locke’s political philosophy espoused Liberty as the capacity to use one’s psychological properties as a means of labor-exchange which in turn granted physical property rights to individuals (ibid). It is thus founded on social contract theory, however, contrary to Hobbes, Locke asserted that human nature is defined by reason and tolerance; yet, like Hobbes, believed that human nature allowed people to be selfish, as evidenced by the introduction of currency (we forget that this means of exchange by symbolic proxy is a relatively recent invention). In the state of nature, all people are equal and independent, and thus everyone has a natural right to defend his “Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions”. This, in combination with his Religious Tolerance, resulted in a socio-political revolution extending across the globe205 for instance, the assurance of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” in the American Declaration of Independence. However, it is frequently forgotten that Locke also deployed his Political Philosophy as an extension of his Theory of Personhood to the effect of negating any sense of humanity or legitimacy to Native Americans (and as would later be the case, Aborigines and Indians) and thereby legitimize what

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William Uzgalis. “Locke” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available at: [Accessed September 27, 2017].

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Charity Begins at Home 133 was effectively the callous dispossession, extermination, and appalling segregation and genocide of these peoples whose lands and livelihoods were effectively stolen by extension of his (and Hobbes’) philosophy via the British Empire206. Although Locke’s ‘Liberalism’ espoused toleration, accountable civic government, a set of inalienable rights and the Right of Revolution to defend these, the truth (as with all versions of Liberalism) is more prosaic. To give a contemporary analogy: in the recent Brexit Referendum, every local district in Scotland voted to remain in the EU with a minimum of 60% majorities; the difference in England/Wales for/against was a mere 2%; it has been demonstrably shown that Scottish voting behavior has (for decades) had literally no impact whatsoever on the overall UK outcome and yet the deployment of Locke’s Liberalism is utilized daily in defence of this situation whilst being selectively denied (e.g. Theresa May’s refusal to ‘allow’ a Scottish Independence vote until at least 2023). When Brexit happened, I ceased to be “British”: I was suddenly able to psychologically and emotionally identify with every indigenous person around the globe whose sense of place and identity was deliberately and unapologetically destroyed by Locke-style Liberalism. And herein lies the core problem: (Classical) Liberalism, in practice and reality is only as inclusive, tolerant, and free as its (often self- or unfairlyappointed)207 custodians permit it to be. In virtually every former African colony, the same 300-year-old ‘Liberal’ laws against homosexuality remain on the statute books. LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) people across Africa (not to mention white farmers) are frequently described as being ‘worse than dogs’; compared with vermin; murdered or imprisoned and executed by populaces who are simultaneously the most: corrupt208 (i.e. thieves

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See “John Locke and the Native Americans: Early English Liberalism and its Colonial Reality” by Miura (2013) for a forensic exposition of the links between Locke’s philosophy and the subsequent destruction and genocide of native peoples. In the UK, one very specific, self-perpetuating group of people controls virtually all political power and public discourse. More than 75% of the nation’s politicians, lawyers, judges, senior military officers, journalists, media executives, etc. attended a fee-paying school and then graduated from Oxford or Cambridge University. The vast majority are descendants of the same people who caused untold misery around the planet via the ‘Liberal’ British Empire. As Chomsky has effectively said, ‘England was a paragon of virtue at home whilst behaving like Nazis in India’. See: https://chomsky.info/200311/> [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 18:30]. Transparency.org. Available at: [Accessed on 27.09.2017].

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134 Gordon Freeman and liars); amoral209 (child abuse, baby rape, female genital mutilation and murder are endemic); diseased210 (HIV/AIDS, Ebola, etc.) and persistently uneducated211 (88% of sub-Saharan adults are illiterate; 90% of the highest school non-attendance rates globally; and the top 50% of the lowest ranked Human Development Index nations) on Earth, and whose public discourse selectively mirrors that of Nazi Germany212 regarding LGBT persons. Yet, these are also the same people whom Western Liberals, deploying Locke/Kant style arguments of ‘humanity’, ‘universal’ rights (with seemingly non-universal obligations) and emotional guilt, argue that we must continually provide with mass fiscal support and yet whom should never be held to the same standards of Liberalist government accountability. In clinical psychology, this pattern of thinking is referred to as ‘double-binding’ whereby superimposed contradictory perceptions of reality by manipulative external agents place contradictory, untenable stresses upon developing children in turn leading to schizophrenic breakdown213. Classical Liberalism has likewise created a ‘schizophrenic’ reality vis-à-vis African aid. It’s time philosophers label it for what it is: insanity which must be stopped immediately as an ethical necessity. Communitarianism offers, to a limited extent, a way round the seeming impasse of Liberal double-binding. I shall here briefly summarise its main elements. Firstly, a communitarian perspective recognizes both individual human dignity and the social dimension of human existence and thus that the

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Royal College of Psychiatry. “Child Abuse and Neglect in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Available at: [Accessed on 27. 09.2017, at 17:00]. World Bank. “Global Burden of Disease”. Available at: [Accessed on 27.09.2017, at 17:00]. Sean Coughlin, “In School but Learning Nothing”, BBC News, October 3, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 27.09.2017, at 12:00]. There are endless examples of Africans of every variety advocating the prolonged imprisonment or mass execution of various different groups of people depending on relative perspective. E.g. “How Africa Was Seduced by Anti-gay Conservative Evangelicals”, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/how-uganda-was-se duced-by-anti-gay-conservative-evangelicals-9193593.html [Accessed September 27, 2017]. LGBT people are to Africa what Jews were to Nazi Germany. Or consider female genital utilation in comparison to medical experimentation at Auschwitz. See World Health Organisation, “Fact Sheet”. Available at: [Accessed on September 27, 2017]. Psychotherapy.com, “The Double Bind Theory”. Available at: [Accessed September 27, 2017].

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Charity Begins at Home 135 protection of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of civic governance whereby citizens learn mutual respect and personal and civic responsibilities, in conjunction with individual rights and corporate obligations. Bellah (1995214) has further outlined ‘four central values of communitarianism’: 1.

2.

3.

4.

“Democratic communitarianism is based on the value of the sacredness of the individual, which is common to most of the great religions and philosophies of the world. Anything that would oppress individuals or operate to stunt individual development would be contrary to the principles of democratic communitarianism. However, it does not think of individuals as existing in a vacuum or as existing in a world composed only of markets and states. Rather it believes that individuals are realized only in and through communities, and that strong, healthy, morally vigorous communities are the prerequisite for strong, healthy, morally vigorous individuals”. “Democratic communitarianism, therefore, affirms the central value of solidarity. Solidarity points to the fact that we become who we are through our relationships; that reciprocity, loyalty, and shared commitment to the good are defining features of a fully human life”. “Democratic communitarianism believes in what Boswell has called “complementary association.” By this he means a commitment to “varied social groupings: the family, the local community, the cultural or religious group, the economic enterprise, the trade union or profession, the nation-state.” Through this principle it is clear that community does not mean small-scale, all-inclusive, total groups. In our kind of society an individual will belong to many communities and ultimately the world itself can be seen as a community. Democratic communitarianism views such a multiplicity of belonging as a positive good, as potentially and in principle complementary”. “Finally, democratic communitarianism is committed to the idea of participation as both a right and a duty. Communities become positive goods only when they provide the opportunity and support to participate in them. A corollary of this principle is the principle of subsidiarity, derived from Catholic social teaching. This idea asserts that the groups closest to a problem should attend to it, receiving

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Robert N. Bellah, “Debate Central”. Available at: [Accessed on 27.09.2017, at 15:00].

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136 Gordon Freeman support from higher level groups only if necessary. A legitimate understanding of subsidiarity realizes the inevitability and necessity of the state. It has the responsibility of nurturing lower-level associations wherever they are weak, as they normally are among the poor and the marginalized”. In short, my view is that Communitarianism as thus described offers the benefits of Liberalism but as refracted through a pragmatic, realistic, and viable social reality as most of us have to live it. Whilst some radical individualists may reject certain aspects of this (e.g. Friedman, Nozick, Sartre, etc.), it is evident that such rejections will be both contextually related and thus individualized within temporal settings. Overall, Democratic Communitarianism offers the best framework for tackling the paradoxical obligation of individual moral response to corporate social problems both locally and further afield (i.e. in Africa). However, given the ‘glocalisation’ implosion of socio-economic space owing to technology215, I would suggest that subsidiarity no longer applies to geographic distance but rather affective ethical proximity, that which I care enough about to solve and which I am pragmatically able to assist with216. Thus ‘universalism’ as a doctrine based upon emotional idealism is negated: I do not believe (nor do I need to) that we are all ‘equal’ (relative to what, exactly?) or that everyone, every country etc. has an inalienable ‘right’ to the same treatment or level of assistance. I can legitimately refuse and reject communal giving to and participation within and towards certain spheres (i.e. Nigeria, Zimbabwe, etc.) whilst participating in a system which allows others to do the opposite. Enforced universalization, whether conceptual (Kant), legal (Locke) or through ‘social morality’ (White Liberal guilt) has demonstrably failed; however, a universalizable activity of reciprocal, accountable, and responsible giving is possible. I shall now outline how I believe this to be so via Rawls and selected case studies.

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This aspect of contemporary global digital culture has been discussed by various thinkers e.g. Castells, M. (2000) The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age—Economy, Society and Culture, Wiley: London. E.g. I work online as an English language teacher. Some of my students are some of the most powerful businesspeople on Earth, and some are poor students in Belarus. Whilst I give each the same level of service, I charge €7 per lesson to my Belarussian students and €18 per lesson to others. My only requirement is that they work hard as part of our pedagogical contract.

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Charity Begins at Home 137 Rawls—An Ounce of Prevention is Better Than a Pound of Cure “But don’t begin until you count the cost. For who would begin construction of a building without first calculating the cost to see if there is enough money to finish it? Otherwise, you might complete only the foundation before running out of money, and then everyone would laugh at you.” Luke 14:28 NLT

In 2015, the EU ceased 12 years of sanctions on Zimbabwe and offered €234 million to the Mugabe administration in order to assist with agricultural development, health, and institution building. The sanctions were lifted after the adoption of a new constitution (with minor relative changes) and the realization that ‘sanctions were not going to work’217. Corruption in Zimbabwe totals a minimum of €1 billion (or €1000 million) per annum, i.e. 427% more than EU aid being handed directly to its worst perpetrators218. In 2017, it was announced that a €1 billion grant (one quarter of the annual budget) had been sanctioned by the Zimbabwean government to fund the ‘Robert Gabriel Mugabe University’, to be built on land seized from white farmers and named after a despotic leader whose ascension to power has devolved Zimbabwe into a ‘failed state’219 wherein the current youth unemployment rate is 90%. Amongst the corrupt morass of Zimbabweans, 85% claim to be Christians with 62% regularly attending church services220. Without continuing to outline how the €811 million of annual ODA (Overseas Development Aid)221 funding is mostly squandered (and likewise in most other African countries which are similarly or even more corrupt), it should be patently obvious to the reader that (a) intergovernmental aid (via ODA et al.) is numerically incapable of providing any form of realistic or sustainable assistance to a populace

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David Smith, “EU resumes aid to Zimbabwe as relations with Robert Mugabe thaw” The Guardian, Feb 18, 2015. Available at: [Accessed on 27.09.2017, at: 16:45]. MacDonald Dzirutwe, “Zimbabwe losing $1 billion a year to corruption: report” Reuters, October 4, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 27.09.2017, at: 16:45]. Roxanne Juliane Kovacs, “What Makes a Failed State? Examining the Case of Zimbabwe”, E-International Relations, May 31, 2012. Available at: [Accessed on 27.09.2017, at: 14:10]. US Department of State, “Miscellaneous Documents”. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:00]. OECD, Net ODA, Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 12:22].

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138 Gordon Freeman which (b) habitually exists in a moral environment in direct contradiction of Christian teaching, i.e. not to lie (Exodus 20:16), not to steal (Exodus 20:15), not to take bribes (Exodus 23:8), not to tolerate corrupt(ing) political leadership (Ephesians 5:11), etc. Evidently, therefore, if an ethical (and potentially Christian) response is to be made to both Zimbabwean corruption and the dire need of many Zimbabweans (especially children) it will have to simultaneously take account of the (corrupt) aspects of public life whilst seeking to circumvent it, and simultaneously function on an applied ethical basis of vocally exorcising the normative discourses of ‘White Guilt Liberalism’ (e.g. governments must help the ‘poor’ (black) Zimbabweans) and selective Post-Colonial victimhood and reverse racism222. In the first instance, this would require an immediate cessation of all ODA et al. aid as an ethical countenance to corruption. Secondly, it would also require a new means of assistance to provide legitimate aid to those who legitimately require it. Latterly, I would argue that this is achievable through a selective appropriation of the work of John Rawls. Rawls (1921–2002), is one of the four223 seminal theorists of 20thcentury political philosophy (and thus intercultural relations). He is, effectively, a 20thcentury Locke: the publication of A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) were of equivalent importance and impact to Locke’s Treatises on Government (1689) and Letters on Toleration (1689). However, whilst we have seen the limitations and problems of Locke/Kant’s Liberalism(s), the effects of Rawls’ work are still being worked out. Here I shall begin by briefly outlining his ‘New’ Liberalism (noting its relative superiority to Classical Liberalism) before moving onto discuss his concepts of the ‘original position’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ via real-world case studies. Rawls’ main points in Political Liberalism can be summarized thusly (Freeman 2007, pp. 324–415): 

The core question of Liberalism is political legitimacy in the context of intractable philosophical, religious, and moral disagreement amongst citizens regarding the human good, which is both reasonable—a result of volitional enquiry—and inevitable. Liberalism, therefore, must defend and accept both and find a way to order the ‘liberal’ state to maintain both.

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Ebrahim Harvey, “The rise of a new black racism in South Africa”, Mail & Guardian, May 16, 2016. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 14:11]. The others being Leo Strauss (1899–1973) and Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) & Robert Nozick (1938–2002).

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Charity Begins at Home 139 

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Societies therefore must be predicated and built on reasonable ‘principles’ i.e. the legitimacy of a law is contingent upon its justification being impossible to reasonably reject. Rawls additionally refracts this through his prior arguments in Justice as Fairness in order to couple such principles with human flourishing as the free development of autonomous moral agency. Thus, the core of Political Liberalism is that retention of legitimacy requires the liberal state to commit itself to the ‘ideal of public reason’; i.e. citizens in their public capacity must engage one another only in terms of reasons whose status as reasons is mutually workable. Ergo, ‘political reasoning’ must unfold purely in terms of “public reasons”. Rawls believes that the duty of civility—the duty of citizens to offer one another reasons that are mutually understood as reasons—applies within what he called the “public political forum” which extends from the upper echelons of government to the deliberations of a citizen deciding how to vote. The ideal of public reason secures the dominance of the public political values—freedom, equality, and fairness—that serve as the foundation of the liberal state. Justification thereof would mandate deep (religious or moral) metaphysical commitments which could be reasonably rejected. Hence, since Rawls argues that public political values may only be justified privately by individual citizens, the public liberal civic polity and its concomitant values must be affirmed publicly i.e. via judicial opinions, leaders’ addresses, civic declarations, etc., whilst deep justifications will not. Justification transpires via ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ and the citizens who subscribe to them. A reasonable Catholic will justify liberal values one way, a reasonable Muslim another, and a reasonable secular citizen yet another way, thereby creating an ‘overlapping consensus’ of mutually acceptable commonality. ‘Unreasonable’ comprehensive doctrines are those incompatible with the duty of civility. i.e. contrary to freedom, equality and fairness and thus ‘New Liberalism’ becomes a systemic entity of interlocking commonalities wherein the bounds of the ‘social contract’ are no longer entirely fixed semi-permanently by abstracted parliaments, but rather are constituted by a shifting, re-integrating elision of common mutuality and acceptable difference(s). Rawls also clarifies the ‘principles of justice’ as follows: 1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

140 Gordon Freeman Having priority over … 2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (more important); and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (less important). Thus, whilst Rawls’ is normally characterized within the ‘Liberal’ paradigm, I would argue it is evident that much of his thought is coterminous with many of the core principles of Communitarianism. Indeed, I would argue that Rawls work is more appropriately characterized as a ‘Communitarian Liberalism’. Formerly, the communitarian aspects of Rawls’ thought are most clearly exemplified in concepts of the ‘original position’ (OP) and ‘veil of ignorance’ (VoI). Owing to spatial constraints, these can be briefly summarized as follows (Freeman, 2007, pp. 43–199): 

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The original position (OP) is a thought experiment designed to supersede the imagery of a Hobbesian (barbarous) state of nature. In the OP persons and groups select principles to determine the basic structure of the society they will live in from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, depriving participants of information about their idiosyncratic qualities, i.e. ethnicity, social status, gender, etc., and, crucially, their ‘Conception of the Good’ (conception of how to ‘lead a good life’) thereby forcing participants to select principles impartially and rationally. Thus, the traditional parameters of Social Contract Theory are redefined. The state of nature is replaced by the OP and the ‘contract’ is mediated via the VoI. The OP is a hypothetical position constructed to garner those principles of justice mandated by a society predicated on free and fair cooperation between citizens, respect for liberty, and a desire for reciprocity. Whereas Classical Social Contract Theory requires a legislative enforcer (i.e. physical force via police) to prevent domination owing to endowment, within the OP civic representatives are placed behind a “veil of ignorance”, and thus lack the information with which to threaten their fellows and thereby invalidate the social contract they are attempting to agree to.

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Charity Begins at Home 141 



Rawls OP extends only to ‘primary social goods’, basic rights and socio-economic advantages. He argues that the representatives in the OP would adopt the ‘maximin rule’ (making the choice that produces the highest payoff for the least advantaged position) as the principle of evaluation. Hence, ‘maximin’ in the original position represents a formulation of social equality. Likewise, in the OP, parties will select principles of justice that are to govern the basic structure of society. Rawls suggests: 1. Each citizen is guaranteed a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties, which is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all others; 2. Social and economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions: they must be a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference principle); b. attached to positions and offices open to all.

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Hence, the least well-off member is benefited since it is assumed that under the VoI and OP, people will be risk-averse, reticent of becoming the ‘poor’ members of society, thereby constructing the social contract to help and protect the least well-off members.

If Rawls’ conception of the OP/VoI were to be applied (it could be mandatorily taught in primary and high schools and universities), the concomitant effects would be staggering: since one may occupy any position in the imagined society once the veil is lifted, the device forces the parties to consider society from the perspective of all members, including the worst-off and best-off members. It is on this basis that the Scottish Charity ‘Mary’s Meals’ operates. Mary’s Meals (inspired by the Catholic faith of its founders and Mary, mother of Jesus) was founded in 2002 and began by feeding 200 Malawi children sufficiently to attend school, a breakfast and lunch. In 2017 it now feeds over 1 million children daily. The global average cost of feeding a child for a whole school year with Mary’s Meals is just €15.60! Furthermore, the benefits are multidirectional, boosting local economies, giving children sustainable educations, and creating new economic activity. Given its institutional transparency—every penny is scrupulously accounted for, with 98% going directly from donor to recipient—subsidiary fundraising operations have now spread to Australia, Austria, Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the UAE, and the US. Underlying —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

142 Gordon Freeman all of this, however, is a direct application of the OP and VoI (via advertising, campaigning, etc.) towards affluent ‘first world’ citizens relative to starving children in the ‘third world’. The OP and VoI instantiate the two Principles of Justice in actuality. Additionally, Mary’s Meals is but one example of many new charities operating via the direct application of Rawls: Watsi.org, for example, utilizes ‘first world’ crowdfunding in order to provide relatively inexpensive, yet utterly transformative, medical treatment to impoverished persons in the ‘third world’ where no such treatment exists. Again, every single penny is accounted for and the company operates transparently. This has not only saved, but transformed, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people across the globe. For example224 “Dibora’s story (July 9, 2017). Dibora is a 14-year-old girl from Ethiopia. She is one of 10 children, and her parents work as farmers to support their large family. Dibora was born with anorectal malformation, a birth defect in which the anus and the rectum do not develop “properly. As a result, Dibora cannot make stool and urine in a normal way. Furthermore, Dibora has had to drop out of school several times and is now many grade levels behind her peers. She has faced discrimination from other students and community members because of her medical condition, which has been very psychologically taxing. Our medical partner, African Mission Healthcare Foundation, is requesting $1,500 to fund corrective surgery for Dibora. The procedure is scheduled to take place on July 11 and, once completed, will hopefully allow Dibora to live more comfortably and confidently. Dibora’s father says “I lost all hope and the money I had after we returned home for the third time without a treatment. All these years, Dibora has been without treatment, facing so many social and psychological problems. I couldn’t bear to see her situation and I tried to find someone who can help us in my hometown and in other towns. I found this organization who told me about the service you are providing, and they brought me here.”

From a personal perspective, I can testify that participating in this process of giving feels good: I give 50% of my monthly tithings (= €50) to these, and similar charities, as an expressionof my Christian faith in a way which I can ethically reconcile as a philosopher (and someone who had to teach English for three hours to earn it). Each year, I refuse birthday presents from friends: instead, I do a sponsored five-kilometer swim the proceeds of which are then donated. Thus, on average, in a year I can donate roughly €750, which equates to 48 children being properly fed and attending school for a year; or the entire or substantial funding of transformative medical treatment; or the building of a well providing a village with clean, safe water and sanitation. If the governments of the ‘first world’ were to progressively cease ODA over a short period (5–10 years) and their citizens were to then channel this reclaimed tax

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Watsi, Diabora’s Story: Success! Dibora from Ethiopia raised $1,500 to fund corrective surgery. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:00].

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Charity Begins at Home 143 (and their supplementary incomes) in a similar fashion, the vast majority of global inequalities would irreversibly disappear within a few years at most. However, to my mind, Rawls’ approach shares a common flaw with both Kant and Locke: it is too ‘nice’ and ‘clever’ for its own good. Rawls’ discussion of justice as fairness assiduously avoids one of the core tenets of Conservatism (and Libertarianism): people are, to greater or lesser extents, for varying periods of time, capable of exceptionally stupid, vicious, and destructive behaviour relative to which fine ‘Liberal’ intellectual abstraction, with all its noble intentions, is effectively spat at. Consider, for instance: the election of Trump (sadistic insular patriotism); Northern Ireland (blind, circular bigotry); Marine Le Pen (self-righteous racism); and Africa (corrupt politicians). Furthermore, Conservatives intuitively understand (and rightly, in my view) that to ignore these aspects of the human condition is not only naïve, but extremely dangerous: as Freud argued via the ‘Reality Principle’225, the suppression of aggression, hate, and legitimate conflict via a regression into fantasy (e.g. ‘Make Poverty History’, ‘Save the Planet’ etc.) only leads these forces to return with renewed (and often highly lethal) ferocity via the Death Drive. Rawls’ Liberalism and intellectual brilliance are compounded by his relative isolation within academia: most of the people he wishes to help are neither capable of understanding or even care about 90% of what he has to say. Furthermore, given the voluminous statistical evidence available, it is also patently obvious that liberal attempts to fund ‘institution building’ within African nation-states with hopes of fostering tolerant, liberal, and transparent governments and societies (thus tacitly defined as morally and culturally superior in their terms) are therefore doomed to the same failures they have encountered for decades. Hence, a drastic and rapid progressive cessation of ODA to Africa—as warranted punishment for corruption and normative cultural standards—and the concomitant, non-intentional (and thus non-culpable) massive loss of life and anarchy which would ensue in the short term, is in my view the ‘shock treatment’ needed by both African nations—to teach them fundamental moral values226—and naive and/or selfish ‘first world’ citizens—to prompt them to demand accountability whilst donating equal or

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Khan Academy, “Freud—Death drive, reality principle, and pleasure principle”. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10. 2019, at 19:00]. This method was frequently used by God in the Old Testament in order to punish His people for similar behaviour and bring them back into line with righteous (i.e. non-corrupt) socio-economic practices. E.g. 1 Kings 17–18 where the Prophet Elijah induces a

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144 Gordon Freeman greater sums via transparently effective charitable means in order to counter the short-term horrors they would witness and yet progressively prevent and heal in the long term. Rawls emerged in the US in the late 20th Century because it was only through such a society he could be conceived and thus himself go on to conceive philosophical ideas. Africa, to be blunt, could never produce, and therefore can never (internally) by itself institute his philosophy. It has to be done from the outside in a targeted manner (like Mary’s Meals and Watsi). “Therefore, consider carefully how you listen. Whoever has will be given more; whoever does not have, even what they think they have will be taken from them.” Luke 8:18 New International Version (NIV) “Wisdom shouts in the streets … How long will you who are simple love your simple ways? … You … rejected the correction I offered. So, I will laugh when you are in trouble! I will mock you when disaster overtakes you; when calamity overtakes you like a storm, when disaster engulfs you like a cyclone, and anguish and distress overwhelm you. Proverbs 1:20–29 New Living Translation (NLT)

Conclusion—The Life You Can Save… And the One’s We Shouldn’t Bother Wasting Money On In this article I have combined a comparative theoretical analysis of several major paradigms of political philosophy—Liberalism, Kantian reason-based Deontological Ethics, Communitarianism, and Neo-Liberalism via Rawls— with quantitative, evidence-based amplification of the conclusions reached thereby, namely, that the current model of intergovernmental development aid, particularly to Africa via the EU et al., is not only failing, but in itself constitutes a contradictory moral morass of corruption, deceit, and ineptitude which can only be characterised as a pernicious, self-perpetuating form of social evil. This method utilised standard interpretations of several foundational political philosophies whilst critiquing them from a rigorous consequentialist perspective as supported by voluminous quantitative data; by examining how the consequences of the real-world application of these doctrines has played out, it exposed several key philosophical problems contained therein. Subsequently, I have therefore argued that these must be rectified by a radical reexamination and reapplication of these doctrines via an appropriation of ‘Digital Communitarianism’. In terms of further study, I would suggest the inclusion of Nozick contra Rawls—‘Digital Communitarianism’ is

                                                             three-and-a-half-year drought, thereby starving large portions of the Israelite populace to death.

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Charity Begins at Home 145 essentially a pragmatic combination of what are normally considered opposing philosophies—in order to deepen and strengthen the overall philosophical argument, whilst combining this with a detailed array of statistical data from various sources traversing longer time scales, particularly those related to the efficacy of humanitarian initiatives like Mary’s Meals and Watsi. Overall, what broad conclusions can be stated? Nation-state intergovernmental level aid from affluent ‘first world’ nations to those in ‘third world’ Africa is, essentially, the moral equivalent of the Italian government creating and enforcing a punitive tax upon its lawabiding citizens in order to purchase food, clothing, shelter, and schooling for the Mafia and their children whilst simultaneously ceasing criminal prosecutions of Mafiosi. Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and the like are not only failed states227, they are criminal enterprises which espouse ‘Christian’ nationhood whilst being evidently anti-Christian according to the Bible228. In terms of socioeconomic dynamics, most sub-Saharan (black) political, civic, and industrial leaders (not to mention ‘Christian’ preachers) are the 21st century equivalent of (black) tribal chiefs who recruited (black) locals to hunt and capture members of other tribes in order to sell them for profit and luxuries to (white) slavers and thereby effectively murder multitudes by proxy229. A dead infant thrown from a slave ship in the 16th– 19thcenturies is essentially no different than one who dies needlessly of malnutrition or disease today, with the exception that the corrupt overlords are now mostly of the same nationality and racial grouping. Bulgaria by contrast, the most corrupt and poorest nation in the EU by GDP230, is legally required by the EU to demonstrate ongoing, progressively effective measures against corruption whilst simultaneously aligning its internal political practices with

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Fragile States Index, “The Fragile State Index 2017”. Available at: [Accessed September 27, 2017]. See Biblical references in contradistinction to the reality of life in these countries. Understanding Slavery Initiative, Capture and Enslavement Case Study, http://www.un derstandingslavery.com/index.php-option=com_content&view=article&id=368&Item id=227.html/> [Accessed September 27, 2017]. Reconnecting Europe, Bulgaria and Romania’s 10th EU Anniversary: What’s Changed?, Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 19:10]. However, in my view GDP levels ignore many other sources of non-material wealth which Bulgaria is rich in.

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146 Gordon Freeman those at an EU-wide level231. This has transformed the country beyond recognition in an ongoing quiet revolution. Whilst certainly not perfect232, Bulgaria, a mere seven years after accession to the EU, has produced Kristalina Georgiva, EU Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources (2014–16), EU Commissioner of the Year and European of The Year (2010), and current CEO of the World Bank! In twenty years, I predict Bulgaria will recover from Communism. Evidently, there is an untenable contradiction: no one worthy of the title ‘philosopher’ can, ethically, remain silent with regards to the ‘African Problem’ and thereby be complicit in mass criminal activity perpetrated by morally retrograde nations owing to guilt over slavery, colonialism, continuing racism, and fear of reprisal from Liberal Fascists. What works for a ‘second world’ country relative to the EU evidently does not for the ‘third world’ relative to the ‘first world’. In this article I have objectively outlined (a) the interlocking frameworks of Liberalism(s), Communitarianism and Universalism (b) the appalling nature of African corruption and (c) shown how they can no longer be mutually relied upon to deliver effective social assistance to those who genuinely need and would benefit from it. I have argued, therefore, that a rapid cessation of the current government foreign aid programs is the most logical and ethical response to a situation of such drastic severity that something equally severely drastic should be done. Whilst acknowledging that this may lead to an explosive short-term increase in mortality across Africa, I have also argued that it should be zealously replaced by a system of digitized, accountable, transparent, and (therefore) morally legitimate transference of wealth based on connecting the donor with the recipient through ‘Communitarian Liberalist’ intervention like Mary’s Meals and Watsi.org. What is clear, however, is that without some radical change in the near future the ‘African Problem’ will continue to metastasize like an undiagnosed bone cancer which will eventually kill the patient owing

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YouTube, България Дългата революция, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cvs9m EmVtnk/> [Accessed on September 27, 2017]. Bulgaria is 75th out of 176 in the Corruption Perception Index. (Lower is better). Russia, the country which systematically politically and socio-economically raped Bulgaria for decades via the USSR and left it bankrupt and destroyed, ranks 131st. However, Bulgaria is viscerally honest about its problems and is actively transforming its society at every level in order to remove them and dismantle the underlying structures which transmit corruption intergenerationally.

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Charity Begins at Home 147 to the obvious ecological233, demographic234, and economic235 unsustainability of such a situation. As a Christian, I pray for the former; as a psychoanalytic philosopher, I expect the latter. As to whether I myself shall laugh at such an outcome remains to be seen. Bibliography Arneson, R. “Equality of Opportunity”. Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:00]. Bellah, R.N. “What Communitarianism Is.” Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:00]. Christman, J. (2002) Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge: London. Freeman, S. “Original Position”. Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:00]. Freeman, S. (2007) Rawls: Routledge Philosophers, Routledge: London. Knowles, D. (2001) Political Philosophy, Routledge: London. MacIntyre, A. (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationality? University of Notre Dame Press: Indiana. Miller, D. (1991) Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism, Oxford University Press: Oxford. Rawls, J. (1991) A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press: Oxford. Rawls, J. (2001) Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. Rauscher, F. “Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy.” Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:10].

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Rodeny Muhumuza, “Africa’s water crisis said to be worsened by climate change, human influence”, Portland Press & Herald, March 22, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on September 27, 2017]. Dan Negrea, “The Africa Development Imperative: A coming population tsunami could threaten world peace”, Washington Times, August 8, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on September 27, 2017]. The Economist, Hopeless Africa, http://www.economist.com/node/333429/> [Accessed on September 27, 2017].

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148 Gordon Freeman Richardson, H.S. “Rawls, John”. Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:15]. Stein, S.M. & Harper, T. L. (2005) “Rawls’s ‘Justice as Fairness’: A Moral Basis for Contemporary Planning Theory” Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:30]. Sussex University. “An Introduction to Kant’s Political Philosophy, via Rousseau” Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:20]. Wenar, L. “Rawls”. Accessed September 27, 2017. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:30].

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Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye

Truth as the Currency of Democracy Abstract: Global events at the present moment are deemed to be unprecedented by thinkers of our generation. The rise of politicians peddling extreme ideology observed in Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Poland, the migration crisis facing European nations, and increased activities of global militias have raised fundamental moral questions about our identity and our place in history. I aim in this paper to propound that the issues facing the region today are self-made chaos created by leaders that we put in power, and only the people can change the dynamic of the situation. The paper also aims to accentuate the importance of truth in our democratic process. I adduce a historical occurrence to find a commonality with today’s events. This paper shall infer that the good angels of history, the people with their positive actions, are in the position to determine the right outcome. Keywords: Migration, identity, politics, cultural studies, international relations, Post-truth. Introduction This paper has been divided into five parts. The first one provides a brief analysis deliberating on the main causes of the social challenges facing western nations today, that thinkers seemed to view as an unprecedented time in our history. The second part will cover the socio-political dimensions of this situation. The following part will bring to the fore the notion of the “broken system” that partly explains certain dimensions of the current status quo. The fourth part puts forward a new horizon that aims at explaining the current situation with number or relevant historical examples, patterns and developments. This will subsequently lead us to the concluding paragraph that outlines the main findings in this paper. This being said, it has to be emphasized that the assimilation of a certain event can require time, and with time we gain a comprehensive understanding of a particular event, while reflection on historical occurrences expands our horizon. In postmodernity, the measurement of information disappearing from our consciousness at lightning speed can be flummoxing. Before we process an event, we are bombarded with the next. As we are hoping for an interval to close the lacuna the show begins; this is the digital age and the post-truth world shows where the displacement

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150 Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye of truth to the spectrum of alternative reality can be difficult for the ordinary mind to grasp. The heroes have become the villains, and the propagators of alternative reality have become leaders. In their inept proclamation, they create problems simultaneously providing solutions for their self-created problem hailed by their fellow spectators as the savior of humanity. In order to explain this situation further, I suggest to look at it through the prism of a topsy-turvy world in which everything is inverted and the adept spectators have found themselves in the state of quietude (Verene 1985). In this context, the state of quietude implies the state of not speaking truth to power. One might ask whether their silence is temporal, strategic, or if they are part of the playlet. The answer might not be clear-cut considering the events we are experiencing; the soliloquy is overheard; they may be awake. The alternative truth tellers have relegated the adept to the periphery of existence. Who are sleeping and not ready to wake up from their state of quietude? The good angels of history are distracted from fighting the real battle when society finds itself in an alternate reality world. The grotesqueness of the play initiated by the new occupiers of power never reaches a terra firma. When the players of the grotesque show are called out on their inconsistency and lies, they double down on their contradictions. The repertoire of their acts can be eerie. Politics and Post-truth The stars of the show perform for the public in the public arena, and their audiences clap in amusement. The good angels recognize this grotesquerie hoping that the actors would reach the state of anagnorisis. The show director must have indicated that this state is not part of the script; good angels are left to figure it out. Good angels wait for peripeteia; it eludes them. The good angels even heed the call of casting, desiring that they could become the voice of reason; some of them never get the callback, not that the audition was bad but rather the producer executives don’t have room for such character. Apart from those that were ejected, the ones that got the callback became mimes. The legitimate voices hoping that a cool head prevails are designated a bit part to play until they quit the show entirely and for those who remain they become tainted. Some regroup to strategize and to develop a new master plan; as they manage to tease out a solution to change the direction of the show, others figure out that they are powerless to create the resolution they wish to see. The battle for the soul of humanity has just begun, and this is fought across the planet; local conflicts have flared up to become a global conflict like the one ongoing in Syria and a global showdown of egomaniacs —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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fighting over how big their nuclear buttons are, like Kim Jong-un (Gambino 2018). Welcome to the show where the currency of democracy is eroding, and the good angels of history are undecided whether to pick up the pieces and rearrange it or watch as the show unfolds. Decency has become elusive; pejorative comments by politicians have been normalised in our political discourse. The essence of the soul has been shifted, and “the show must go on”, say the producers of the grotesquerie. One might ask what the price of the currency of democracy is. I propound in this paper that truth is the currency of democracy and this truth is the cornerstone of our democracy and when the truth is gone, our democracy becomes fractured; if care is not taken, we all find ourselves in a dystopian society. As the cornerstones of our democracy are getting tested, the repercussions of the decisions made by our elected officials are right in our front door. A fraction of the society cannot fathom the causes of the challenges faced by the locals. For example, the Syrian refugee crisis, increased activities of militias in North Africa and across the globe, and the enslavement of Nigerians in Libya are emblematic of those decisions. Some of these self-inflicted wounds affecting the population can be corrected by the good angels of history, the purveyor of these truths, the people. Naturally the scale, the background and the origin of uncertainty in different places is different, but it is a predominant feeling across the world. It does not matter whether you live in Damascus, Tripoli, Brussels, Washington, Abuja, Budapest, Vienna, Rome, Warsaw or Berlin, it is spreading everywhere like a cloud and the humanity can no longer manage it properly. This shift in our politics prompted the Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria to ask Bono about this new environment we are currently witnessing across Europe, that is, the rise of populism and nativism. The announcer has spoken, and the center stage is set; on the one hand, we have those who support the show, the policies and on the other hand those who are appalled about what is going on. This is evident when Bono says “The word patriotism has been stolen from us by nationalists and extremists who demand uniformity. However, real patriots seek unity above homogeneity. Reaffirming that is, to me, the real European project” ( Zakaria 2018). The main characters of the show, in grandiose and unwarranted use of their newly gained power, have divorced themselves from reality. The performers are called to the stage, light, camera and action, and the beat is on. Unsurprisingly for the adept observers, the actors revert to the same old play

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152 Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye that the good angels have seen before rewinding ad hominem attacks, pivoting the conversation to deflect from the substance of the topic. What is to be acted upon gets farther away from realization and what is usually frowned upon becomes the order of the day. Melodrama unfolds when facts are expected from the main characters. The actors have successfully appealed to the worst emotion of their ardent audiences. Some of the spectators have allowed propagandists, demagogues, and false preachers to exploit them for their selfish ends. As we get to this stage, the emotions take over facts. Facts reduced to the typical description associated with nothing. The birth of the post-truth world Post-truth entails what we know as bullshitting and gaslighting, the former in which the veracity and validity of one’s statement are non-existent. The latter is associated with narcissistic and aggressive personalities ready to show their gangsterism to maintain a position of influence over others. Gaslighters aim to destroy the capability of the audiences to make a sound judgement. The bullshitter, as Frankfurt puts it, through excessive indulgence in bullshitting, which involves making assertions without paying attention to anything except what it suits one to say, causes a person’s regular habit of attending to the way things are may to become attenuated or lost (Frankfurt 2005). What is characteristic of a gaslighter is their disregard for the truth. It is this disregard for truth that Anthony Clifford Grayling attempts to make explicit when he says: “These guys have realized you don’t need facts, you just lie” (Coughlan 2017). An analogous point can be made about the main character of the current show who deflects and controls the narrative while their supporters are busy breaking down the values of democracy and when questioned, they shield themselves in obscurantism. The Broken System The fractures start when truth carries no weight. It is not like we are surprised that politicians lie per se but when caught spewing untruth they usually admit they misspoke or resign because of embarrassment whereas now they intensify their lies. The enslavement of Africans is representative of these fractures. One might assume that I am talking about pre-emancipation. Abraham Lincoln issued his emancipation proclamation in 1863, which was officially passed by Congress on Jan. 31, 1865, and ratified in 1865, bringing an end to immoral actions of the past. The good angels were at work to elicit this change, the echo was never again, and civil war was even fought for the great cause. We all have turned over a new leaf hoping that such an inimical act —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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would not happen again236. As the saying has it, history repeats itself and sometimes even rhymes itself. In another case this century, there is enslavement of Nigerians intercepted on the sea attempting to cross to Europe. Most people were shocked in 2017 when it was brought to our attention that such an evil act was taking place in Libya. Most of the economic migrants often end up in detention centres in North Africa where specific areas are hotbeds for militias vying for control (BBC Reporter 2018). It is in this detention centre that correctional officers abused, starved, raped, and traded them as slaves. This evil act had been ongoing before it was known to the public. This abuse has become endemic within the Libyan’s detention system. For the traffickers and corrections officers who extorted money from the migrants it is business, and for the migrants, it is hell on earth. The urgency of this situation is discernible in the numbers of deaths this year alone; according to the UN refugee agency UNHCR, they registered over 1500 people unaccounted for. The assumption is that they are either dead or gone missing (Crisp 2018). Libya, once a moderate, stable country, has become a breeding ground for different militia groups and violent groups. Before the decision was taken by western nations to overthrow Qaddafi, he was on a rapprochement course with western nations. Just as in Iraq, hard power can win you the ground, but soft power wins you the heart. As western countries planned the removal of Qaddafi, as usual, humans are humans who often forget their history, always in a state of quietude; the desire to have a post-intervention plan that involves the tribal governing culture of Libya was not considered, and omniscient plans were put in action. The instability in Iraq was not a cautionary tale; NATO hard power rains on Libya without a sound post-intervention plan, resulting in a power vacuum. After the demise of Qaddafi, the conventional democratic system never manifested. Libya has become a danger zone. The power vacuum created by the West engenders lawlessness that birthed new school militias who cultivated behavior of chaos. Euronews reports that rival factions mostly between the United Nations-backed government and house of representatives supported by rebel general Khalifa Haftar are still vying for control of Libya (Tidley 2018). Thoroughly, we notice in this chaos the young Nigerians attempting to cross to Europe are doing so because their government has failed them. It is

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13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Primary Documents in American History. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 19:20].

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154 Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye imperative not to conflate the reason behind the journey to Europe with the crisis of Boko Haram tormenting the people in the northern part of Nigeria. Boko Haram is an ideological group; they started locally and are now affiliated with other global militia networks. The Western decisions made in Syria and Iraq are exacerbating the terror in northern Nigeria; usually when Boko Haram attacks they typically retreat but they have now switched tactics in similitude with tactics employed by ISIL, Islamic states of Iraq and Levant, by holding lands. To understand this similarity, unwrapping their ideology is essential to grasping their quest to pledge alliance with other global networks. Boko Haram dogma propagates a movement that forbids activity which resembles the Western way of life. According to their doctrine, democratic participation and liberal education are banned. They believe the government governing Nigeria consists of non-believers and see it as their duty to bring the government down, replacing it with sharia law, neglecting the interdenominational set-up of Nigeria. In 2009, Boko Haram became heavily active in creating havoc across northern Nigeria and it was put on the US terror list in 2013. Akin to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant strategy, they declare a caliphate on the land they control, and the armed forces are engaging them militarily to recapture those lands. The Nigerian security forces initially killed the founding father of the group and in haste declared the end of the insurgency. This declaration appeared to be short-lived in the face of the group regrouping under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau, who directed further attacks in the region. With the chaos in Syria and Iraq, Shekau moves its organization closer to ISIL, declaring allegiance. Prior to that, Boko Haram was affiliated with Al-Qaeda global networks. The wrong decisions made in Syria and Iraq have fueled the insurgency in Nigeria and strengthened the global militia alliances. Though their dogma is to resist everything modern, evidence accumulated that they use modern types of equipment as seen in their kidnapping of Chibok schoolgirls and to date, some of those girls are still missing. The majority of youths who are the future of the nation are similarly in the state of quietude subordinated by the affluence whose source of prosperity is unknown. The titillation of Nigerian’s youth is discernible by their consumerism, measures developed to distract from the challenges facing the nation, even though the majority of the middle class are alienated and precluded from equal sharing of resources. According to a report by The World Poverty Clock, an estimated 87 million people are now living in extreme poverty, ap-

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proximately half of the country’s total population (Adebayo 2018). Accountability becomes complicated when the government that is expected to be fully accountable to its citizens sets up a delicate decorum of what to account for, hence the numerous irregularities observed. Indeed, it is the responsibility of a nation to provide security to its citizens, yet the Nigerian government eschews this responsibility; as the level of uncertainty increases, the youths’ world outlook becomes dire, and the ramifications of the decision taken by the fractured government are directly linked with the dangerous journey to Europe. Consequently, it becomes a situation where arrival to the shore is never sure and unfortunately some pay with their lives, a very bad optic for humanity. Again, the images shock us, and we think this is the climax of the chaos; now the good angels of history must provide us with relief to decrease the tension associated with such images. Images prompted the European Union to liaise with Libyan coast guards to lessen the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea. The instability in the region has not made the endeavor a smooth ride. Fleshing out the Libya crisis, Qaddafi came to power by coup d’état predicated on Islamic socialism; he later shifted from this ideology to embrace pan-Africanism and reestablished contact with the west. The flaws of his government cannot be overlooked, for example, the silencing of dissenting voices and the alleged involvement in the Lockerbie bombing which left the country isolated. Nevertheless, Libya was a moderately stable country during the reopening of diplomatic ties with the West. The Arab Spring protest that swept through Egypt and Tunisia and the intervention of NATO created a vacuum where the country was de facto split on tribal lines. As the West was planning the response, they went in with the assumption that the opposition has the general support of the people just like in Iraq. This line of thought backfired, resulting in the rise of militia activities, and some of the militia exploited the chaos to create carnage in the area. Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a splinter cell of an Algerian militia, has seen their influence grow beyond Algeria. It is an example of a militia that took advantage of the instability in the region. Menacingly, they have stretched their alliances, penetrating Mali to continue their torment. Besides, it is also observed that there is a light movement of partisans related to the one apparent in Pakistan towards Mali to join the group. This group has openly called for other networks with similar ideology across the continent to continue their fight, and unsurprisingly Boko Haram was included, making them an affiliate. The flaws that accompany the event in Libya did not deter the actors in Syria. It would be expected that a different approach would be —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

156 Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye employed to prevent the failings in Syria. Individuum est ineffabile, the ineffability of the individual is in action in this civil war, a not-thought-out strategy was implemented, and the execution of the plan has turned out to be a failure. The opposition was once again supported in Syria; the expectation is that they would unite against Assad. This assumption did not play out as expected; Assad with the Russians’ support was able to hold onto power. The internal fighting within the opposition happens to be a hefty price to pay for Syrians and Europeans, and through this chaos, ISIL was conceived; they skillfully exploited the confusion on the ground. Was this a misjudgment or flimflam orchestrated by our elected officials? Regardless, the implication of this failed policy is visible on our streets. As always expected, the good angels have to clean it up again. The crisis that transpired after this misjudgment in Syria was unexpected, a mass exodus of refugees towards Europe. Refugees are assisted and offered support but this time around their arrival is not welcomed by all; the miscalculation in Syria and Libya brings new waves of extreme right populist leaders in Europe promoting a weaponized identity politics. Such issues have considerable implication for society because it engenders sharp division between the host nations and refugees. A division that slows the integration of refugees into society benefits no participants. I mean it would be expected by our elected officials in Europe during this crisis to at least respect the laws put in place to protect refugees but what we see is their disregard for rules and truth. We observe them carrying out anti-democratic policies. For a neutral observer, on the face of it, it would be unreal that our policymakers expected to be the guardian of our laws are the ones breaking the laws that they voted to pass and implement. The recent verdict by the UK court of appeal exemplifies this disregard for the rules of law. The court has ruled that the government broke the law by refusing to allow unaccompanied minor refugees to enter the country (Bulman 2018). Once again in Europe, we started seeing the resemblance of the ideology purported by WWII populist leaders. Unpacking this event, we recognize that fascism rose in Europe because democracy was weak. The rise of autocracies in Europe which propagated nefarious activities had no regard for truth. It is “us” against “them” identity politics. Didn’t we see a similar pattern in 1939? The Similitude of Events The resemblance was real when we saw on our street in 2017 people with tiki torches screaming “blood and soil”; most of us could not comprehend what is behind the hate we saw on our roads (Heim 2017). Was Charlottesville in —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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2017 the gangsterism of humans at its worst, 1939 again? In 1945, we echoed a new arrangement of power. The ineffective League of Nations was replaced with the United Nations. We all know the repercussions of weaponizing identity politics. The adept good angels as they always do were also at the centre stage to counter hate in Charlottesville, an event that cost the lives of one protester and law enforcement officers. Generally speaking, it would be expected that this should not be a political spectrum debate but rather one of right versus wrong for anyone with a little sense of decency. The events that transpired after that day display humans as a Being who repetitively forget their history. It is indisputable what we take to be easy to judge might be difficult for others to comprehend. An illustration is when power hijacks truth, democracy weakens, resulting in erosion of societal values. The adept may be well versed in distinguishing between reality and alternative reality, but if false preachers gain power, their truth becomes the truth of humankind. For this reason, the adept cannot stay in the state of quietude but must speak truth to power as the court of appeal in the UK demonstrated that our government needs to be held accountable at all times. A reliable system with awakened citizens is likely to prevent abuse of power. It could have been a different case in the UK, had alternative truth tellers controlled the courts. Consequently, the good angels of history, the awakened citizen should always use their voice and attempt to change the narrative of history. Sometimes discord is necessary to elicit the change we aspire. The underpinning factor behind the action in 2017 and the effect of 1939 was that people allowed false prophets to tap into the worst aspect of their emotion. People have become vulnerable to gaslighting and to false trails. Identity politics were weaponized and employed to demonize the Others among us. Crimes committed by a few of refugees were taken to be indicative that all refugees are dangerous for their host nation. For the audiences of this new play, facts do not matter. They have been emotionalized and gaslighted; the existence of objectively verifiable fact becomes obscured from their audiences. This time philosophers would wish that philosophy is brought back to the centre stage because philosophy is apposite to clear up the cloud and bring rationale to the conversation. Although ISIL is militarily defeated in Syria and Iraq, their ideologies remain deeply rooted in the region. The inconsistent position taken by Western countries has yielded mixed results in this conflict. The Syria war is still ongoing while ISIL remnants are still active in the region. The commonality of these events is that they are self-made chaos that produced self-inflicted wounds. The politicians in power in Europe must take responsibility for the —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

158 Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye growing populist movements that we see around Europe right now. The weaponized form of identity politics is being used to score political points and a sign of it ebbing is not in sight. The intricate complexity surrounding the rise of a weaponized form of identity politics is opaque to the general public. Historically, the leaders of those previous weaponized identity politics were consigned to the dustbin of human history. The perpetrators of this weaponized identity politics awash with their supporters are oscillating between extremes. As the false prophets traffic to the extreme spectrum of our political discourse, the good angels of history must stay awake. The intellectuals, thinkers, artists, organizations, unions, and society at large must not lie in the state of quietude. The desire to make this place worth living for all should be the oxygen driving the movement. As Cornel West puts it, we have a gangster in us all; the control of that gangsterism separated us from those others living their gangsterism (West 2018). We would be complicit if we then turned a blind eye to hostile acts. Using our platform for the great cause is ethical. We should not do this because of the praise; we do it because it is a reasonable thing to do. It is called Nazi Germany (Germany between 1933 to 1945) for a reason; we are associated with our period and time. As humans live the life of forgetting their history, it is the responsibility of historians, thinkers, and philosophers to remind us about the good angels of history; they might have the gangsterism in them, but they kept that aspect of their emotion in check. Conclusion As the show continues, the contours of this post-truth are interwoven with time and period. However, through the analysis of the current climate in Europe, I discern a commonality between the occurrences of history (Europe in the 1930s) and the current environment (rise of populism in Europe). This uncomfortable commonality shows that truth as a democratic value is central to our peaceful coexistence. Further monitoring will be required to see the turn of events considering the volatile nature of events. Unequivocally, the rise of totalitarian regimes begins with the destruction of our democratic values; truth as the currency of democracy is at a crossroads. Thinkers could be privy to historical dimensions of things. If the benefits of our existence are at stake, letting the cat out of the bag is the right thing to do. As shown in this paper, the decisions made in Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and Abuja have an impact on how we live our life as visibly displayed with the migration crisis, increased activities of global militia networks, and the instability in Libya that engendered the enslavement of Nigerians. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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We must hold our leadership accountable. The emergence of the socalled protagonist of weaponized identity politics should always be reminded of their place in history. We can hope that history puts them in the space of notoriety, as it usually does. My concern about our democratic values is also one about a zombie culture that is losing our ability to question things. The results of weaponized identity politics are known throughout history; Charlottesville is a sharp reminder that the good angels can’t stay in the state of quietude. As we recognized the right to dissent anchored within our democratic system and that the proponents of weaponized identity politics used our common medium to express their politics, we must respond with appropriate politics that guarantee the protection of the marginalized, minorities, and Others within our society. To be awakened is to understand the laws passed by our elected officials and through the recollection of our history, we will remember the ideals of who we are. It is this understanding and principles that allow us to call our government out when they break the law. A wellversed society is likely to prevent injustice. Let’s be hopeful that the good angels of history, awakened citizens, will emerge to fix things by using the power of their votes. This is the battle for the soul of humanity; all the chips are on the table. References Adebayo, Bukola. 2018. “Nigeria Overtakes India In Extreme Poverty Ranking”. CNN. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:00]. BBC. 2018. “Used As A Slave In A Libyan Detention Centre”. BBC News. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:00]. Bulman, May. 2018. “Government’s Treatment Of Child Refugees Under Dubs Scheme Broke Law, Court Of Appeal Rules”. The Independent. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:43]. Congress Library 2018. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:42]. Coughlan, Sean. 2017. “What Does Post-Truth Mean For A Philosopher?” BBC News. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:33].

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160 Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye Crisp, James. 2018. “One In 18 Migrants Die Crossing The Mediterranean As Death Rate Soars Amid Divisions Over EU Rescue Policy”. The Telegraph. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:46]. Frankfurt, Harry G. 2005. On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gambino, Lauren. 2018. “Donald Trump Boasts That His Nuclear Button Is Bigger Than Kim Jong-Un’s”. The Guardian. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:42]. Heim, Joe. 2018. Washington Post. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:34]. Tidey, Alice. 2018. “Rival Factions Battle For Control Of Libya’s Tripoli, Euronews Answers”. Euronews. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 16:40]. Verene, Donald Phillip. 1985. Hegel’s Recollection: A Study Of Images In The Phenomenology Of Spirit (SUNY Series In Hegelian Studies). State University of New York Press. Zakaria, Fareed. 2018. Washington Post. Available at: [Accessed on 04.10.2019, at 17:00].

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Piotr Pietrzak

A Brief Comparative Study on Lukács, Kojève, and Verene’s Interpretations of Hegel’s Recollection in his

Phenomenology of Spirit Abstract: Studying Hegelian philosophy is not an easy task, for Hegel presents some of the most sophisticated, complex, and demanding ideas in the literature of the subject. One of them is that of recollection, which is especially challenging to the young adepts of philosophy who very often struggle to try to find an easily approachable explanation. For these reasons I have decided to gather the work of three very influential commentators of Hegelian work, György Lukács, Alexandre Kojève, and Donald Phillip Verene to provide a user-friendly manual on how to decode this concept in a more approachable manner than Hegel did in his Phenomenology of Spirit so we can compare their insights into this seemingly peculiar concept. Introduction Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is still considered to be one of the most prominent Continental philosophers of all times, his work still exerts a significant impact on today’s philosophy, and his countless followers still after almost two centuries show a massive propensity and determination to gain a better understanding of his work. As a matter of fact, this recent revival of interest in Hegelian studies is observed despite the inherent complexity of the so-called Hegelian project. Normally, we need more than just one individual act of going through the selected works of this philosopher to fully comprehend his system; it is more like a continuous commitment to searching and fully acknowledging all of the requirements or certain hidden between-thelines intrinsic aspects of the system, one step at the time, to get a better recollection of what we have studied so far, where we are at the moment, and what we will study in the future. But too often, especially the young adepts of philosophy find the whole endeavors too sophisticated and too challenging and, in the end, they settle for what is beyond the surface. For decoding the true message out of the Hegelian philosophy may seem like reading three books at the same time and simultaneously playing multi-layered chess against multiple opponents, whilst of course continually climbing and descending 161

162 Piotr Pietrzak stairs in a random manner on a double-decker bus travelling on a very busy multi-lane roundabout, that on the top of that does not seem to have any exit. The only way forward to free oneself from such a trap, seems to be circulating until we reach yet another paralleled reality, which according to Hegelian standards would present itself as available to us only after careful recollection of all of the previous stages that we have already traveled through. But I agree that comparing the Hegelian project to a bumpy bus journey may not sound particularly credible, or inspiring—we definitely need to use a different metaphor in this case—it is more like an intellectual rollercoaster type of experience, heavily supplemented by some of the most sophisticated, complex, and demanding ideas in the literature of the subject, that still can appeal to our imagination in a very sophisticated way. Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit, in particular, is like a drug, for once you try it, you will never ever stop; you will keep coming back and beg for more (Arato & Breines 1974; Bernstein 1984; Burbidge 2007; Goldstein 2006; Kojève 1834; Osborne 2000; Williamson 1984; Verene 1985; Verene 2007). Surely one can approach Hegel by studying his work directly, but when it comes to the notion of recollection, in particular, it is recommended to approach it through the prism of leading commentaries available on the market of ideas, and this study offers you something more than anything that has been tried before, for it discusses Hegel’s view on recollection from the perspective of some of the most talented and influential commentators of Hegelian philosophy of all times—the work of György Lukács, Alexandre Kojève, and Donald Phillip Verene, all in one place at the same time, to discuss the most important features of the Hegelian system. These philosophers presented us with a considerable portfolio of various multidimensional, sophisticated, bold, and interdisciplinary methods and ideas that have significantly impacted our understanding of the position of the individual within society, different power struggles going on in the contemporary world that is intrinsic to our human soul (Kojève 1834; Lukács 1975; Verene 1985; Verene 2007). Discussing Selective Interpretations in Hegel’s recollection György Lukács (1885–1971) György Lukács is very often accused of endorsing a very specific shade of historical determinism combined with various inclinations on materialist readings of Hegel, but this scholaris more multi-dimensional than is commonly understood. Despite popular opinions, we cannot pigeonhole this —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Hungarian philosopher as a court Marxist, for he was also a very successful Hegelian thinker who is still considered to be one of the most successful commenters on Hegelian philosophy in the 20th century and whose work still challenges many conventional readings of Hegelian philosophy. This is especially true in respect of Hegelian notion of recollection, for Lukács’ The young Hegel brings to the fore the debate on the time when Hegel was still gathering his early ideas and shaping his methods in the pre-Jena period that at the later stage lead him to the formation of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Prior to this publication, these very early stages in Hegel’s philosophical development were very much overlooked. By focusing on Hegel’s humble beginnings in Tübingen, Bern, and Frankfurt between 1793 and 1806, Lukács presents us with a different recollection of the journey that Hegel made on his road to discovery from the perspective of various evolutionary processes that led him to shape his philosophy into a holistic and distinguishable unit (Lukács 1975). In this respect, I already have had the privilege of publishing my previous remarks on György Lukács’ reading of Hegel in September 2018’s edition of In Statu Nascendi where I argued that taken together, they had a tremendous impact on his future development and the formation of his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) that in turn led to changing the course of contemporary philosophy, but I did not mention that by focusing on the Hegelian early experience in such a sophisticated manner and by assigning to these deliberations a historical context, Lukács adds to these deliberations not only a brand new horizon but also suggests in essence such a recollection of each and every stage of Hegelian development (early, mature, late). What is even more important in this respect is not the fact that Lukács takes us to Hegel’s youth to search for the way in which he developed the most important of his ideas, but the very fact that he shows so much interest in recollecting the process of formation of Hegel’s thought, from the historical perspective (Arato & Breiners 1979; Corredor 1997; Lukács 1975). By pointing out this notion of recollection, he makes a very original contribution to the Hegelian system and initiates far deeper research into the Hegelian notion of recollection than ever before. This attempt may directly contrast with Hegelian idealism, as it endorses certain mental stages and consciousness that are infused with material interactions, but in no wayis this a point-blank instrumental attempt; on the contrary Lukács’ attempt is rather genuine, recognizing the clear boundaries between interpretations of one’s work and presenting his own philosophical project. Most importantly, his

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164 Piotr Pietrzak historical voyage to the time of Hegel’s youth does not undermine the integrity of the entire Hegelian system, for he is clear that there is an element of speculation in his attempt to time-travel to Hegel’s youth (Feenberg 1981; Gluck 1985; Lukács 1975). Alexandre Kojève (1902–1968) Alexandre Kojève’s influence is of a different kind from that of Lukács’ who seemed to represent the revitalization of an old tradition of attempting to find the truth about Hegelian system, whereas Kojève tends to be more idiosyncratic, even peculiar, and very selective about the individual parts of the entire Hegelian system. In his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (First Edition 1934, English translation 1969), Kojève claims that the recollection happens in the mind of the Slave not the Master, for the Master does not need to recollect any previous stages. But before we comprehend that we need to acknowledge a very multidimensional type of analysis of consciousness and self-consciousness. In this respect, consciousness is presented as evolving to become a real self-consciousness of the absolute idea in Hegel, and that happens through negation as Kojève sees man as a fundamentally negative creature that negates existence through labor. He, the philosopher, is inclined to follow in the same suit when he is driven by the desire to become the wise man. That is why Kojève is so particular to insist that the Hegelian system should be seen through the prism of motionless analysis of the very dynamic and multidimensional system that is extremely deep and sophisticated (Kojève 1969, p. 10−35). Meanwhile, however, this philosopher is also very particular to emphasize that the Hegelian method is not dialectical but contemplative, which is very surprising at first, but that is why we find it so very motionless and comprising negation that works in a positive manner. According to Kojève, Hegel found himself in possession of the fundamental idea of up-to-date philosophy, not only because his system comprises the negation of the negation, but also because it does not need to use the dialectic that is commonly understood, because the philosopher can synthesize the dialectical achievements of all of his predecessors. That is why he can just recollect the necessary information to present his upgraded system of philosophy that he sees as a system. Focusing on the internal psychoanalytical analysis of Slave and Master Dialectics allows Kojève to come to understand that Hegel’s System should be presented as circular and return to itself. As we can see this Russian-French philosopher wants to see the progression and recollection in the Hegelian system entirely through the prism of the master-slave parable. Not only that, —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Kojève used a master-slave parable as an interpretive tool for an entire Phenomenology of Spirit ( Kojève 1969, p. 10−44). The notion of recollection is interlinked to the existence of the parable of the master and the slave (as representatives of ruling and ruled elites) which shows their internal dialectic, and suggests it, to be used as an interpretive tool for most parts of Hegelian phenomenology of Spirit. As medieval as that may sound, Kojève’s reading of Hegel offers a particular way out; a redemption for it comes from the understanding that there will be a time of selfrealization of the final actuality through the continuous dialectic of history until the Greek telos τέλος understood as an end or purpose; “history will be completed at the moment when the synthesis of the master and the slave will be realized”. But there is “a catch” as all those concepts used in Kojève’s analysis of Hegelian philosophy visibly imply quite a strong inclination of the need of recollection of the experiences from the perspective of hindsight. Kojève in this respect points out that you and I are within our own individual self-consciousness, through the internal dialectic that is taking place between the master and the slave. That is taking place in ourselves, internally in our self-consciousness. Consciousness evolves and becomes a true self-consciousness of the absolute idea in Hegel. That is where the birth of the desire of the beginning takes place when we begin to see ourselves as I, desire disquiets the self and draws it into action, and this desire rather negates the impact on ourselves and draws it to action. There is a negation of the form of the given with three steps: there is the destruction of the form, transformation of the given object, and then re-assimilation of the object into self. The Master became master because he risked his life, whilst the Slave became the Slave because he hesitated to take part in this fight for recognition because he preferred the comfort and predictability of his existence, even if it meant enslavement. In order to understand this relation, we also need to recognize the importance of the concept of desire in Hegelian philosophy. The self-consciousness makes its appearance in the decision of Man to fight to the death for the sake of recognition only because of the existence of the desire (Kojève 1969, p. 20−66). Subsequently, Kojève explains that Man starts to become genuinely selfconscious only to the extent that he actively engages in a fight where he risks his life for something that does not really exist. That is solely for glory or for the sake of vanity. The section on self-consciousness opens with this fight because Kojève wants to show that Man becomes self-conscious of his humanity only by negating himself as an animal in his willingness to risk his life; therefore, he is inclined to negate his biological fear of death for the sake of —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

166 Piotr Pietrzak being esteemed by another human being. Subsequently, this philosopher adds to his analysis of the Master-Slave relations the element of work that is central in the Marxist theory that implies that if the Slave is still not willing to risk his life in the fight for recognition, we can become the Master by merely working. Subsequently, this philosopher brings to fore the analysis of the notion of consciousness and self-consciousness within not only the community where they have found themselves, but also within a very particular psychology and the deliberations on the place of the individual being in the history that is deemed to end (because human history is eschatological, because it is considered to achieve finitude, one’s satisfaction of desires). There is a negating action of the desire and the negation of the form, then there is a transformation of the object and the given, and then the returning assimilation of the given into itself. That is what happens when the action is instigated because the self feels interrogated to provide action rather than just passive experience (Kojève 1969, p. 66−165). To Kojève, Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit accounts for a circular enterprise, in which being is conscious or semi-conscious of what is happening. Subsequently, going beyond understanding and “revealing being in its new totality” means that one has to travel through the different stages, on the circle that leads the being back to square one at its point of departure, and that is when the being would undergo a new process of reckoning, recollecting and analyzing what has happened in the previous stages. In this respect Kojève is clear that during the entire process the being would experience certain forgetfulness, so he would not have all the recollection of what has happened in the past. That is the place where Kojève introduces us to the concept of reflection, revealing, dialectical overcoming, rereading of the structure, transcending of self with respect to self as given, attributing meaning, and deliberations on the way the myth is being revealed ( Kojève 1969, p. 172−182). In a way, there is a desire in Being to understand, to move beyond. In this respect we need to emphasize that Kojève claims that the desire at the elementary level is a desire for preservation that is predominantly concerned about preserving oneself; transformation of reality is a transformation for ourselves that is ego-based for preservation; we are making the world our world through our internal precepts at the level of the psyche. The concept is not cogito. That is when we arrive at the debate on the most distinguishing feature of Hegelian philosophy suggesting that for Hegel, Cartesian “cogito ergo sum” does not sufficiently prove the existence of being, as it is definitely not sufficient enough; there is something missing here, directly because it does not put too much emphasis on “the I” in the “I think therefore I am”; —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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it is not underlining the importance of the object in question. In this respect it is not only object or subject that is important but object in relation to the subject, when the object is a philosopher. Kojève insists in this case that he is particularly interested in the I that is the philosopher, the I that is Hegel who knows that he is contemporary to the most significant statesman alive, Napoleon—directly because whilst he writes his phenomenology of spirit he hears the cannons from the battle of Jena; therefore, he knows that the notion of abolition of time, and the end of history is happening in front of his eyes. Surely, from the first look, especially of those less familiar and less experienced adepts of Hegelian philosophy, this may sound like a rather convincing interpretation of Hegelian philosophy, but a careful observer will notice countless assertions in Kojève that have nothing to do with the Hegelian system; as a matter of fact, they can be seen as unwanted additions that are distorted or infantilize the overall integrity of the Hegelian system. Some of them are quite harmless, such as his wild-west-type descriptions aimed at creating the conditions that describe the way Hegel thinks or the attempts to trick the reader into imagining that they hear together with Hegel the sound of the cannons at the battle of Jena, exploding and shaking the desk where this German philosopher sat and wrote his opus magnum. But there are also far more serious attempts aimed at ignoring an inherent complexity of Hegelian work and sweetening them up with various oversimplifications (Kojève 1969, p. 100−166). To start with, similarly to Lukács, Kojève shows a propensity to emphasize the very materialistic nature of the Hegelian system. But he is trying very hard not to go to the extreme in this case. As much as Kojève is very much in tune with the system itself, and sees no problem with supplementing his analysis with Marxist philosophy, such as elements such as the development of the bourgeoisie and proletarian consciousness, he also is inclined to use various central themes of Martin Heidegger’s Dasein and his throwings in the world. Not to mention the fact that Kojève is also under the spell of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, his sophisticated multi-vectored analysis, and finally his emphasis on desire and the fulfillment of desire. What is very problematic in this case is not the fact that he intertwines the Hegelian philosophy with other debates but the fact that he is mixing the philosophy that he is supposed to comment on without clearly distinguishing whether this is a premeditated attempt to supplement Hegelian system, to show its ineffectiveness in respect of other existing theories, or just in order to create some sort of matrix collage merging an introduction to Hegel, selected works of Marx, Heidegger, and Freud. At times, Kojèvian claims about the Hegelian system is so widely at —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

168 Piotr Pietrzak odds with reality that you may struggle to distinguish whether you are reading someone who wants to interpret Hegel or a scholar who just craves to present his own shade of philosophy, but the paradox of the situation is that despite the fact that Kojève is clearly caught presenting his own ideas as a part of the Hegelian system, he gets away with that thanks to the sophisticated manner of his writing, which may be dogmatic and instrumental but cannot be ignored. As much as Kojève’s interpretation largely departs from the core of the Hegelian system, his schism does not look a priori irreconcilable. It is just when we try to reapply and recollect Kojève and impute to encoding Hegelian philosophy from the perspective of a posteriori when we have gained a different horizon that we come to terms with all of the limitations of his method (Kojève 1969, p. 172−182). Naturally, a similar pattern is noted in Lukács, as this Hungarian philosopher is definitely guilty of treating the Hegelian system in a rather instrumental manner, but Lukács’ misdemeanor against the integrity of Hegelian system is of a totally different manner, for he seemed more genuine than any of the Kevin premeditated calculated attempts aiming at presenting his own findings as a part of the Hegelian system. An attack was unleashed in the most obvious way. In other words, Lukács may be a co-conspirator but it was Kojève who stabbed the Caesar, and unlike Brutus, he got away with that despite the arbitrariness in his actions that disregard the importance of Hegelian recollection. But again, the question that needs to be asked in this respect is if Kojève does Hegel any injustice by supplementing his philosophy with his ill-conceived Heideggerian and Marxist adventurism. He surely engages with Hegel on the level of ideas without sliding into any radical oversimplifications. Not only that, there are moments when Kojève shows humility and respect to Hegel, especially when he suggests us that there is no other way, that studying Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a prerequisite to being able to call oneself a Wise Man or a Philosopher or to discover absolute truth. What also works in his favor is the fact that Kojève shows awareness of the necessity of applying a broad contemplative approach to the analysis of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and realizes also that it is indeed a humbling endeavor. He suggests that it may take a lifetime of investigation to truly comprehend the broad scope of the Hegelian system and his ontology. Donald Phillip Verene (born 1937) Donald Phillip Verene advances an entirely new reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, for he is convinced that the profound meaning of this work depends as much on Hegel’s use of metaphor and image as it does on Hegel’s —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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dialectical and discursive descriptions of various stages of consciousness. The focus is on Hegel’s concept of recollection (Ensnaring), for consciousness confronts itself with the aim of achieving absolute knowing. In his Hegel’s absolute. An Introduction to Reading the Phenomenology of Spirit, Verne suggests that Hegel’s text makes unusual demands on the reader. This is especially true of Phenomenology of the Spirit because this author indicates that this text is commonly regarded as one of the most challenging texts in the history of philosophy (Verene 1985, p. 1−13). As he explains, Hegel’s intentions here cannot be presented as a summary of the results of the investigations. A full path has to be traveled by the reader, each moment has to linger, each moment is necessary, endured. Verene suggests that the spirit (Being) has to indulge or permit a certain amount of patience—to pass through all of those stages over the long passage of time and to take upon itself enormous labor of world history. In this respect, Verene explains that it is not sufficient for the reader to study the text from an external point of view; one must make its science for oneself. In order to understand Hegel, the reader really needs to strive not merely to pass from one shape of the spirit to the next but to aim to know each one, to think through each one, in the manner of the (Begriff) the process as a whole. This requires the reader to acquire the mentality of a speculative philosopher. That relates to being able to be open to the idea that the most significant stumbling block to comprehending Hegel’s work and studying his science is a propensity to argumentation, refuting and destroying. There is a further problem of the passivity of the subject due to the fact that in speculative thinking the subject is actively engaged in altering itself in reaction to the object (Verene 1985, p. 1−26). In this case, Verene suggests that philosophical work is never in principle a single act; it is more of an ability to portray this self-altering process of knowing, trying the reader’s ability to the limit, and this is particularly relevant to the reading of a philosophical text that portrays this self-altering process of knowing. In this case, it is also being argued that Hegel says we learn by experience that we meant something other than what we meant to suggest and this correction of our meaning compels our knowing to go back to the propositions to give them a proper thought, to see if we can understand them in a different manner. In this sense, the author of this text shares with us three suggestions: the first drives from principles of rhetoric and from principles of speech, the second from Hegel’s conception of language, and the third from the general nature of philosophical texts (Verene 1985, p. 27−38).

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170 Piotr Pietrzak Subsequently, Verene explains that in his perspective each section of the Hegelian work should be read three times with more prominent emphasis on rhetoric, language, and philosophical texts in their general nature. By following this rule, we should be able to grasp the meaning of the section as a whole and acknowledge the transitions from the point within Hegel’s thought, and finally, we are likely to understand particular phrases or modes of expression used to make its central ideas comprehensible and memorable. Those principles correspond with three classical principles of composition in rhetoric as found in the Roman textbook in the rhetoric of Quintilian: inventio—the discovery of materials, disposito—the arrangements, and elucution—the formulation in language. Furthermore, Verene explains that philosophical texts work in a similar manner to songs, for their meaning is revealed in repetition, and he suggests that any work is composed in a similar manner whether or not its author is aware of that; therefore, no work can be complete that does not have these three elements (Verene 1985, p. 1−59). In his Hegel’s Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Verene explains that Hegel’s main aspiration is to overcome the dichotomies of Kant’s critical philosophy (its denial that we can know of the absolute or thing in itself). In the Phenomenology, Hegel projects Hölderlin’s and Schelling’s conception of absolute knowledge regarding immediate intuition or feeling; such a conception, he argues, dissolves the rich differentiation and determination of empirical content into a “night in which all cows are black” (94). In contradistinction to this romantic conception, Hegel develops his distinctive understanding of absolute knowledge as the product of a dialectical process of mediation and self-differentiation. Finally, he has elaborated a very sophisticated system of philosophy that comprises various interconnected elements, which indicates that this philosopher had been using his imagination extensively. Verene subsequently suggests that Hegel in this instance takes imagination to a new level, and this is visible especially in an extraordinary command of metaphor and irony used by him. To Verene, Hegel’s concept of recollection of the spirit (Erinnerung) is of pivotal importance, for it inadvertently connects three Hegelian circles: Art, Religion and Philosophy. This spirit relates to the notion of almighty: the absolute God, as the concept of God. As much as the notion of God can be considered as an embodiment of spirit, for it is transcendental and for this reason, it knows everything, humans are prone to self-deception and misunderstanding, because their road towards absolute knowledge may go astray. In the end, we have only our self-consciousness within our means that can help us to go from one stage —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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to another and recollect our memories. Naturally, partial recollection is possible within the entire development of the circle, but full recollection is available only when the spirit has already gone through all of the stages and when it reconsiders what has happened at any previous stage. Verene explains that Hegel presents us with the notion of the traditional dialectics in which spiritual substance is self-contained; it is present to itself that which takes into account recollected unity, timeless unity of the absolute that is seen as spirit. In this sense, the truth is considered to be a system, and the substance is considered to be a spirit (Verene 1985, p. 59−115). Subsequently, traditional dialectic undergoes a new debate in which reflection will be reflected in itself, a spiritual element in itself; everything is within the spirit, the substance is for the other, an element would be reflective, and the acting substance becomes aware for itself. The substance will become for itself while the subject will be self-conscious. In such a Subject and substance composition, we come across two leading “forces”: either substance dominating or subject dominating. By going through all the circles, we are rescuing ourselves from inauthenticity, for when we go through all the stages the Spirit reaches logic; after logic, we conclude the perfect idea that will consequently release itself, become nature. Subsequently, the spirit comes back to itself and is reacquainted with absolute knowledge. We need to investigate individual development and the way the spirit goes. Second, and equally important, we need to look into the notion of imagination, rethinking, and imagination in Hegel, as images are linked with creativity and the idea of recollection (memory and memory of self-recollection). Robert C. Solomon (in this respect) defines absolute knowledge as “knowledge that is unbiased, undistorted, unqualified, all-encompassing, free from counter-examples and internal inconsistencies (Burbidge, 2007, p. 70−80); but we need to remember that Hegel puts a unique accent on the notion of speculation, which he explains (Latin: speco) means see, watch, vision, symbols intend and aim at. That is why one can assert that we engage in aiming. Subsequently, there are two levels of thinking perception and speculation; they can be perceived immediately when they are immediate or through mediation—when it is aimed to see beyond the obvious, through what is believed to be pre-conceived. If we intend to go beyond, we can reach the level of consciousness. In a vague form, the consciousness that goes beyond absolute knowing is present and can guide us. In this respect, Hegel brings to fore the notion of Concept— (Begriff) that is involved in absolute knowing. In order to reach the concept, we are using representation (Bild), a conceptual thing, thinking in images also

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172 Piotr Pietrzak known as (Vorstellung) pictorial thinking. Consciousness emerges in development of humanity as each stage is overcome through sublation (Aufhebung)— individual transition and particular transition. It is speculation that allows us to use metaphors and symbols within these images, to understand them correctly, to recollect the information about them as the notion of recollection (Erinnerung) is linked very closely with these images. These images are never static and cannot be seen in a positivistic way (Verene 1985, p. 1−38). That is why we need Recollection (Erinnerung) to investigate them, and to check their internal and external relations. That is precisely how we recollect; the first step is to set off on this journey, and then we involve ourselves in a number of activities, passages, and a sub-recollection that will help us to make one step from one level of consciousness to another; sub-recollections are helping speculation on each level as we get tiny recollections of absolute knowledge. Whilst our primary objective is to reconcile all of them, the recollection per se appears at the very end of this process. After this reconciliation of expertise of the objects we reach the realm of concepts, and this is logic; it is pure thinking, the end goal of phenomenology. Logic, pure thought, is synonymous with the purpose of phenomenology. Very often a proper recollection is not possible, or it may take extra time and effort, and we are prone to various contradictions (we may, for instance, end up in the topsy-turvy world). Recollection (Erinnerung) is the true individuality of stages. In this respect, Verene invites us to rethink the concept of conceptual recollection and spirit—the transformation from itself for itself. That is why we need to consider the wholeness of the spirit—recollection—a circle and in order to do that we need the imagination. The illusions are being stored when the spirit realizes the impossibility of absolute knowledge and stops and recollects in circles of the whole and outside time (Verene 1985, p. 39−58). Naturally, besides a thorough explanation of the notion of recollection, Verene brings to the fore a number of findings of pivotal importance about Hegelian philosophy. It really helps that his interpretation is analytical and very strong on metaphors and irony and pays very close attention to Hegel’s methods; that is the main reason why it allows him to show us such an indescribable and previously undisclosed variety of Hegelian way of argumentation, his style and the specifics of the language he had used. There are also other strengths of his method: as this American scholar is very particular to synthesize the ideas, focus his attention on the matters related to the symbolic form, metaphor, poetry, and rhetoric, language, and emphasize things that seem less important from the perspective of other authors in Hegelian tradition. This shows specificity, inter-connecting aspect of the Hegelian project —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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and the multidimensional dimension of his ontology and metaphysics (Verene 1985, p. 27−38). Furthermore, this academic makes sure to highlight the necessity of shifting towards more poetic-mythical dialectics and at times a speculative approach in our endeavor to decode Hegelian philosophy. Meanwhile, it has to be emphasized that if he appears he is in doubt about any aspect of Hegelian philosophy, he always errs on the side of caution, and unlike Kojève and Lukács, he refrains from making any unsubstantiated assumptions, and refrains from using Marx, Heidegger, or Freud to strengthen the power of his argumentation, for he is perfectly aware that such exercises may cause unnecessary miscomprehensions and avoidable confusion. Conclusion In this short paper, the Hegelian notion of recollection has been approached from the perspective of a carefully selected group of philosophers who happen to commit a lot of attention and time to interpreting selected parts of his work. Despite the fact that they all belong to the mainstream of Hegelian interpretations they present totally different interpretations. Rightly or wrongly Lukács has shown a commitment to Marxism as an analytical perspective intended to expose the contradictions of an expansionary inhumanly exploitative Capitalism, but to me, he was first and foremost a Hegelian thinker, and then he was a Marxist. Even if I am wrong in this respect, Lukács’ Marxist twist on Hegel was much more benign and more sublimated than Kojève’s attempt, for he was definitely far more resolute in his criticism of Soviet imperialism than Kojève ever endeavored to be. Meanwhile, Verene’s interpretation is as pure as it gets, for he offers a great deal of sound methodological scholarship, avoids speculative exercises, and resists making any unsubstantiated claims. Whilst Kojève and Lukács seem to be more advantageous and riskier in their interpretations, Verene refrains from going beyond what he is certain about. Verene is almost rigorously Kantian, patient, curious, and contemplative in his Hegelian explorations, and his approach demonstrates that he is more interested in finding the truth about the Hegelian system. By doing so, Verene presents the most academic style of the three interpreters of the Hegelian work. But it is those Marxist elements in Lukács and Heideggerian combined with Freudian inclinations in Kojève, their unsolicited adventurism, that allows us to relate the Hegelian project to various broader debates in contemporary philosophy such as existentialism and post-structuralism. Surely it is Verene who is the most determined to scrutinize the notion of recollection in Hegel in the most —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

174 Piotr Pietrzak systemic manner but both Kojève and Lukács put special emphasis on this self-perpetuating Hegelian circle that is constantly reiterating, recollecting the information from the past stages. All of the above-mentioned scholars give particular importance to the concept of recollection despite the fact that their methods, their styles, and most importantly, their intentions, are completely different in respect of decoding the Hegelian code. Having said that, it is suggested that instead of entering into the heat of the pointless debate as to which of these three interpretations of the Hegelian concept of recollection is the best, one should take part in a game that requires the use of our imagination for just a moment. Let us imagine for a moment that we have Kojève, Lukács, and Verene gathered together deliberating on each and every aspect of the Hegelian system whilst playing multilayered chess against each other on the double-decker bus that is circulating around the never-ending perpetual roundabout without any exits trying to establish what Hegel actually had in mind when he was discussing various stages of his recollection, from various perspectives. Now let us take chess and the doubledecker bus out of equation and we end up with three scholars that individually offer us rather incomplete interpretations of the Hegelian work, but taken together they seem to constitute a great team capable of highlighting different seemingly unimportant aspects of the Hegelian philosophy that has had an immense impact on the way our glocalised society has been constructed Major limitations of this project The way this paper has been constructed has exposed it to a number of limitations. The author of this paper is fully aware that selection of only three commentators of Hegel’s work is rather incomplete and by no means can represent a diversified collection of the approaches available on the market of ideas, but he sees this attempt as a good point of theoretical departure for his future research. In order to improve this rather imperfect comparative study, I hope to supplement it in the near future with Hans Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida’s takes on the Hegelian concept of recollection as well as a couple of selective approaches from the Frankfurt School. I will also attempt to reread Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as well as his other works, with particular emphasis on the commentaries made by Lukács, Kojève, and Verene. At times I may have embraced a certain uninspiring style that may appeal only to academics who are deeply fascinated by the Hegelian philosophy, but it was only in order to reach a different horizon that, in turn, should allow me to launch a broader debate on the Hegelian

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concept of recollection (Erinnerung) and connect it with the broader deliberations on Hegelian methods, his ontology, his language, and the broader debates within contemporary philosophy. To be continued. References Arato, Andrew & Breines, Paul. 1979. The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism. New York: Seabury. Bernstein, J. M. 1984. The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukács, Marxism, and the Dialectics of Form. Brighton: Harvester. Burbidge, John. 2007. Absolute Knowing, in Hegel’s Systematic Contingency, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Corredor, Eva L., ed. Lukács After Communism: Interviews with Contemporary Intellectuals. Post–Contemporary Interventions. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. Feenberg, Andrew. 1981. Lukács, Marx, and the Sources of Critical Theory. Oxford: Martin Robertson, Gluck, Mary. 1985. Georg Lukács and His Generation, 1900–1918. Cambridge, Massachuset: Harvard University Press. Goldstein, J. D. 2006. Hegel’s Idea of the Good Life: From Virtue to Freedom, Early Writings, and Mature Political Philosophy. Springer. Kojève, Alexandre. 1934. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, 1969; Lukács, György. 1975. The young Hegel: studies in the relations between dialectics and economics, London: Merlin Press, translated by Rodney Livingstone. Osborne, Peter. 2000. Philosophy in Cultural Theory, London, and New York: Routledge. Shafai, Fariborz. 1996. The Ontology of Georg Lukács: Studies in Materialist Dialectics. Avebury Series in Philosophy. Aldershot: Avebury. Thompson, Michael J. 2011. Georg Lukács Reconsidered: Critical Essays in Politics, Philosophy and Aesthetics. London: Continuum. Williamson, Raymond K. 1984. Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion. State University of New York Press. Verene, Donald Phillip. 1985. Hegel’s Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit. SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Verene, Donald Phillip 2007. Hegel’s Absolute. An Introduction to Reading the Phenomenology of Spirit, State University of New York Press.

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Joel Patomäki

John Searle as a practice theoretician Abstract I will research John Searle as a practice theoretician. It is a Wittgensteinian idea flourished by Theodore Schatzki. In his Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory that also functions as the book’s name. The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory is connected to the registrations of Ferraris, which will be discussed after this introductory chapter of my PhD project. This idea of practice is connected to process reading of social ontology in general by Emmanuel Renault (2016). I will therefore connect Searle’s understanding of causation in social ontology as a process and as a practice. I will look into the ideas of some of the leading critical posthumanist oriented thinkers from this process perspective that explains Searle both as practice and process theoretician. Keywords: practice, process ontology, posthumanism, realism, poststructuralism Introduction Searle is an American contemporary philosopher who has travelled from speech acts (1969) to philosophy of mind (1983, 1988) and to the opposition of postmodernism from these frameworks, consisting of different concepts, in which causation is explained by collective intentionality. Searle also differentiates intentional network and subconscious capacities in a way that allows for posthuman understanding of some parts of his theory. Searle explains causation in a social ontology with three terms: collective intentionality, background and performative or speech act. These three terms are separately discussed in Searle’s social ontology (1996, 2008, 2010) I will discuss a little Searle’s philosophy of mind—namely the idea that realism is relevant in contemporary thought. I will also examine contemporary Marxist economist and social ontologist Tony Lawson, in relation to Searle’s philosophy of mind. I would like to replace Searle’s three concepts with more Marxist-oriented ideas of posthuman practices. I will state that these three terms explaining causation in Searle’s social ontology are also included in the Wittgensteinian notion of practice. Theodore Schatzki has theorized this notion of practice (1996, 2004), and this connection between Searle and practice is the basis of the argument in this paper. The other argument accomplishes to these notions is process ontology, that 177

178 Joel Patomäki refers the same notion, that all is one and there is no need to distinguish nature and society. Here, nature is brute physical facts and society transcendental, meaning giving process, which is explained in Searle’s theory for example by status function. Critical posthumanism means a way to see nature and society as interconnected, and therefore makes no differentiation. In this article nature and society have been seen as interconnected unified whole, and this is explained in terms of Searle’s theory. That is the practice approach. I will concentrate on the practice, but the work also contains a posthuman understanding of nature and society, as interconnected in many ways implicitly, since subconscious processes are in most ways natural coming as they do from primitive capacities to make sense of the world. Intentional networks are also somehow social, but because intentional networks are based on the unconscious, even in Searle’s theory, nature is always connected to the so-called social in ways, that as far as they go always social, are natural, also in almost every way. Status function is the concept at the very center of Searle’s theory. It was changed from the basic known everywhere form (Searle 1996) of X is Y in context of C to more complex form of declaration in Searle’s—(2010)— book on social ontology. Status function, in which ever form is basically the idea that some brute fact is given some institutional or intentional meaning. Then the meaning is attached to the brute fact in some particular context C. In Searle’s theory and also Deleuzian process ontology must be looked into in order to see practice as process and to ground specific reading of Searle’s social ontology. Then the speech act or declaration (2010) is in many ways coming not from collective intentionality but from material background. Emmanuel Renault has made a distinction between two types of social ontology. “The first of these two ontological interrogations deals with the types of entities that compose or constitute the social world. The second approach deals with the type of being that is proper to social reality” (Renault 2016, p. 23). This is also the Deleuzian perspective on social ontology, which is process-oriented. Gilles Deleuze, a contemporary philosopher undertakes interpre-tations of historical philosophers and has written about social ontology with Felix Quattari. The language of Deleuze’s social ontology is particularly emphasizes a fluid network of currents, to give some hint about Deleuzian process perspective on social ontology. In this paper I also discuss Alan Bourassa, who writes about marriage as a social event “It is not difficult to think of other examples of events, paradoxical events, that hover over their own fields, that —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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distribute heterogeneous series” (Bourassa 2009, p. 89). At the center of my ontology are the basic categories of the social world. Ordinary language philosophy is important for this project because the problem of action and structure is so central to the history of sociology. This is important because in the sphere of social ontology. The heterogeneous series mentioned in Bourassa’s quote highlight the analytical process perspectives to practices. There is an analytical category where different heterogeneous series can be differentiated and analyzed in addition to seeing the social event as practice or, in Searlean terms, collective intentionality holds with tacit knowledge of background the performative of practice together. I will argue that by using Ferraris as an explanation of some concepts in Searle’s theory, especially the concept of collective intentionality, it is possible to use these two concepts in different spheres of social ontology. Therefore, analytically and traditionally structured social ontology in the former sense, could be made critical by using process approaches in certain sectors. Practice is the central category connecting Searle’s concepts explaining causation in social ontology. There are elements of practice in all three of these concepts. In order to look into the principles that shed light on the frames according to how the performances are organized as the background structure, in order to form the collective intentionality in the Searlean terms. There is the complex institutional structure beneath which it is hard (or impossible) to explicate all the underlying rules and institutions. In common speech act theory, the rules that make some speech act possible, are always clear. This is anyway an illusion that does not take into account the idea that the background is beneath the collective intentionality (Dreyfus 1991). Dreyfus understands this that way. Then the rules are clear, but the whole practices around the speech act are not clear in the same way. There is always the background of tacit knowledge beneath collective intentionality. This is the most Wittgensteinian notion of Searle’s conception of causation. Searle discusses Wittgenstein when discussing causation. This is one of the things that makes practice an important notion in this work. Some words cause different kinds of effects. The performatives are therefore understood as a variation of the practice that seems to follow specific rules as an individual speech act, which have been catalogued by Searle himself. These performatives are performed to cause certain effects and have the secondary function of upholding the practice that allows the effects to take place. These secondary effects are not always controlled by such straightforward rules, as I have noted, in understanding the background as a part of —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

180 Joel Patomäki the secondary function. In other words, the background is a part of the thing that the secondary functions create. The calling the name of the boat in general in it is then the practice in general that is, a part of the practice bundle that gives meaning to the naming of a boat as a useful function. 1.1. Ferraris critique Ferraris (2013, p. 154) has criticized Searle’s view of collective intentionality by asking that if collective intentionality is the glue of social ontology, what is then the function of documents? Theodore Schatzki writes that the idea of an expressive body (that is at the center of the performative culture theory) can be seen as the Wittgensteinian vision of the social practices that create the social reality by expressing meanings through bodily practices. On the other hand, Schatzki claims that the Wittgensteinian idea strongly resembles Judith Butler’s performance theory of a gender identity, because like Wittgenstein, Butler rejects the notion that a person (gender or sex) a substance, or metaphysical substrate, whose identity lies in the continuing possession of specific “inner” properties” (Schatzki 1996, p. 46). According to Butler, the performative gender is a process that is not rooted in brute physical facts. In Butler’s notion, it is somehow unclear if she is overemphasizing the difference between nature and reality in the sense, that is, not giving material reality is clear enough role in her theory, in a posthumanist sense. The word stylized, in the reference paragraph from Schatzki, refers in my view to the concept. So, all these claims about the Construction of Social Reality seem to return to the network of these elements of the social reality. It is small changes that relate to the background practice in things like graffiti, when there often is not very explicit collective intentionality, but the variation of practices like avoiding the cops, and writing your name in varied styles. I will try to develop Searle’s theory to accept some parts and interpretations of the current poststructuralist philosophy that has developed in different branches and also originates from many different ideas including the pragmatist and ordinary language philosophies. Practice is a Wittgensteinianrelated idea. Practice is the term that binds the three of the terms together in Searle’s theory: collective intentionality and performatives or speech acts coming from it, and background that grounds collective intentionality and is also directly connected to the performative in purely Wittgensteinian theory. Thus, this is a brief introduction of Searle, and this article guides the reader to understand poststructuralist neomaterialist ideas can be connected to Searle. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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Neo-materialism develops ideas of the immanent material world, not having a separate social transcendental dimension meaning that everything is relational between material entities. I will develop this idea more in the next chapters on the background completing this article. This leads us to branches of posthuman and poststructuralist investigations in the contemporary era. There might be a possibility to use those new elements namely ordinary language philosophy and American pragmatism to link Searle’s theory to the current form of posthuman theorizing in a bit more of an analytical sense. The theory of Ferraris works as a bridge between Searle’s social ontology and poststructural related neomaterial thought. In political thought, Wittgenstein is seen as near to poststructuralism and pragmatism in the ideas of Chantal Mouffe and Ludwig Nagel (2001). Therefore, there is a clear link in poststructuralist reading of collective intentionality, and therefore also other two terms defining causation in Searle’s social ontology are present in the poststructuralist alternative social ontology of Ferraris. Therefore, also a Wittgensteinian practice approach to social is present, if Wittgenstein is seen as theoretically near to poststructuralism. 1.2. Practice on Searle The explanation of how Searle is linked to the discussions and ideas about practice, is at the center of this article. This article posits Searle in a way that gives space to new interpretations of him, namely, that he might be a process theoretician in a basic sense, insofar as he, for example, talks about the processes. Searle’s theory is based on many of the elements on which the idea of practice is based: namely, collective intentionality and the background that makes performatives function. Searle refers to the social as a process sometimes. He then seems to understand, that there are different order words or such that have complex flows that create the background, which is kind of the absolute presupposition, in one way or another, at least in the posthuman era. It has also been argued that the notion of structure is a collective entity that is created by the performatives that are allowed by the structure. This goes like that, in the rough sense. Seeing Searle as the practice theoretician helps to see parts of his theory, namely collective intentionality, background, and the performative in Austinian sense that explain the causation in his theory in too simplistic sense as a process. Emmanuel Renault (2016) has argued that critical theoretical thinking would be best described by process ontology. Searle as the social ontology theoretician who tries to see the social world as a process, could be connected to a form of practice theory by rereading his

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182 Joel Patomäki theory’s parts that explain causation in social ontology as practice. This could help to connect Searle to the critical canon. Collective intentionality could be perceived as a phenomenon, that has no existence in real sense, or that would be in a hard position between the liberal individualistic social ontological, or that position has been questioned in many ways. I don’t want to express any claims about that as itself, but I want to point out, that in different ideas it is important to have different conceptions of science or sciences. The social world is not a hidden entity that is only “naturally” modified by neoliberal social scientist, who model it with some non-existent (read too general) assumptions like maximizing that profit in a rational way. That last claim about neoliberal social ontology does not need theorization about the phenomenon itself, but rather about the ingredients of individuals. For example, many animals have collective intentionality, including the way how they perceive the world, and they learn from others. By the performative framework I mean the basic idea of cause and effect between somebody uttering a sentence and the effects it causes. This process is at work for example, in the declaration of naming a boat etc. It basically works in the following way: I say something that you recognize as the declaration of war (on a large or small scale). It is important partly because the popular practice approach draws from the same kind of explanation that does not emphasize action nor structure. I will next go through my basic arguments that explain the basic elements of practice and collective intentionality, as parts of the same structure. So collective intentionality is a more precise form of creating a collective, and background is always beneath it. Then the practice is all of it including the performatives tied to both. Another question, however, is: what is the status of causality, in itself as (outside) a part of this process? This question can be answered by using Roy Bhaskar’s (1979) idea of causal effects as potentials that work on the tendency principle, which means that tendency can be actualized as an actual force, etc.: however, it exists even in a potential form. This is critical to realist social ontology and its idea of causality. It is important to mention here sketching out a different concept of causality, which also uses the notion of practice. This notion is way of defining causality other than Searle’s formula of three related terms. The most fundamental one, according to my understanding of these three terms, is background. This is because there is important problematic for understanding the relation of different objects in object-oriented ontology. In a sense, this is the core of the argument in this paper. —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

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The same is often true in human institutions. This idea is true, for example, of a word. There is the potential for a declaration even if no one ever uses it. The important point here is that the understanding of the nature of conventions, (un)consciousness, etc., is crucial for understanding a causality according to the performatives. Andrew Collier (1994) writes about critical realist understanding of the unconsciousness. The idea of the unconscious as mentioned earlier, is a common notion in the discussion about the performatives. It is very present for example in the famous Derrida-Searle debate because Derrida claims that partly unconscious recontextualization of signs makes speech acts unstable. This is however only small point that partly explains causation in social ontology, since it is often also seen that the speech act is the term by which things happen in Searle’s social ontology. According to Searle background capacities are different from the network of intentional capacities applying them (Searle 1992, p. 190). Therefore in practice thinking, it is necessary to differentiate between two layers intentional network level and subconscious level. The concept itself needs more precise formulation in many ways. The interpretation according to which Searle’s concept of the collective intentionality is problematic, could be interpreted to suit many different approaches to Searle’s system of collective intentionality. I will research John Searle’s idea of social causation as a collective intentionality and (according to my understanding) even more important notion of the background. Deleuze’s social ontology is well described in Reidar Due’s introductory book Deleuze (Due 2007). Objects as tendencies are connected to each other with unstable flows. Deleuze is used to create the view of Foucault that is complementary with so-called posthuman thinking. Searle only said something about Deleuze indirectly through his fierce critique of so called “postmodernisms” that came to America often through formalized Derridean methodological introductions to literature studies. Bibliography Austin, John L. 1979 “Performative Utterances”, p. 220−240 J.Urmson & G. Warnock (toim.) Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Austin, John L. 1975. How to do Things With Words. 2nd edition, J.Urmson & M.Sbisà (eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press. Bourassa Alan. 2009. Deleuze and American Literature Affect and Virtuality in Faulkner Wharton Ellison and McCarthy Palgrave Macmillan New York

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184 Joel Patomäki Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. Lontoo & New York: Routledge. Canfield, John V. 1981. Wittgenstein Language and World. United States of America University of Massachusetts Press. Deleuze, Gilles. 1988. Foucault Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Ferraris, Maurizio. 2013. Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces. Trans. R.Davies. New York: Fordham University Press. Ferraris, Maurizio (2015) Introduction to New Realism. Italiasta käänt. S. De Sanctis. Lontoo: Bloomsbury Academic. Harman Graham. 2009. Prince of Networks Bruno Latour and Metaphysics. re.press Melbourne Australia. Latour Bruno. 1987. Science in Action Harvard University Press Cambridge Massachusetts. Meijers Anthonie W. M. 2003. “Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized”, p.167−184 teoksessa Koepsell S Moss (eds.) John Searle’s Ideas about the Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisims and Reconstructions. Oxford: Blackwell. Nagl, Ludvig & Mouffe Chantal (eds.) 2001. The Legacy of Wittgenstein: Pragmatism or Deconstruction. Peter Lang. Schatzki Theodore. 1996. Social Practises: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schatzki Theodore. 2002. The Site of the Social: a philosophical account of the constitution of social life and change. Pennysylvania State University. Searle, John R. 1996. The Construction of Social Reality. Lontoo: Penguin. Searle, John R. 2005. “What is Institution?”, Journal of Instititutional Economics, 1(1), p. 1−22. Searle, John R. 2010. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Searle John R. 2002. Consciouness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein Ludwig. 2001. Filosofisia Tutkimuksia, Bookwell Oy, Juva.

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PART III: IN STATU NASCENDI’S REVIEWS & RESPONSES

 

 

Piotr Pietrzak In response to Stephen Kotkin’s “The Players Change, but the Game Remains” Foreign Affairs Magazine, July/August 2018 Issue, Volume 94, Number 4, p. 10–15. It is definitely not a coincidence that the “Realist World—The Players Change, but the Game Remains” written by Stephen Kotkin was chosen as an opening paper of the Foreign Affairs Magazine’s July/August 2018 edition, for this volume comprises a collection of papers describing the global reality at hand through the prism of the leading approaches in the literature of the subject. This undoubtedly follows an unwritten pattern that has it that the most respected textbooks of the theory of international relations begin with a brief outline of the realist tradition. After all, despite its pitfalls, realism is the oldest tradition in the literature of the subject, and rumor has it that when it is properly applied, it can be still very useful in explaining the social reality in the most approachable manner. Coincidentally, some of the most successful realist thinkers known for identifying some of the most complicated patterns in the global architecture of power happen to be historians, for unlike most of us, they can look at the causes and the effects of any given contemporary event through the prism of a very rich arsenal of handy historical examples that give them a head start in any further deliberations on the subject area. For these reasons we can suspect that the selection of Kotkin’s paper in this distinctive collection is definitely un-

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derstandable, for his reputation as a successful historian proceeds him. As much as more history-conscious readers will surely enjoy a number of elaborated and very relevant analogies, it has to be admitted, that on this occasion Kotkin’s strong historical background will not help him to appeal to more politically orientated readers, for his analysis is largely outdated, dysfunctional, and based on wishful thinking, and for these reasons cannot do realism any good (Kotkin 2019, p. 10−11). Naturally, the full extent of the damage is not noticeable at first, for at first sight the paper addresses several important issues, surprises us with very poetic metaphors, and sets off with a very alluring suggestion claiming that “geopolitics didn’t have to return; for it never went away (…). The arc of history bends toward delusion, and it continues explaining that every hegemon thinks it is the last; all ages believe they will endure forever”. Unfortunately, the application of such picturesque language is not intended to help to decode the complexity of the global architecture of power in the most approachable manner, but to implant the basis for Kotkin’s strongest insinuation suggesting that the geopolitical picture today has not changed too much from the 1970s or even the 1920s. According to this author, similar to 50 or 100 years ago, we are reluctant eyewitness to similar

188 Piotr Pietrzak tendencies in the global architecture of power, the diminished but enduring Russian power that trembles Eurasia, Germany situated at the core of a strong but feckless Europe, and a distracted US giant, powerful enough to lead but wavering about doing so. Kotkin also adds to this list Brazil and South Africa, which have also managed to dominate their respective regions in a way they had in the past. Naturally, as Kotkin explains, there are surely differences as the Indian, Ottoman, and Persian power centers are definitely not as dominant as in the past. Subsequently, the more shrewd and careful observer will notice the displacement of Japan by China as the central player in the Asian balance of power (Kotkin 2019, p. 11−12). Yet, as much as one could be inclined to agree with the majority of these insightful observations, Kotkin makes a rather unpersuasive case that the contemporary global order is deemed to evolve into yet another semi-bipolar momentum in which the leading position of the US is still largely taken for granted, despite the clear voices of discontent, whilst the place that used to be reserved for the Soviet Union (up to the last days of its existence in the second half of the 20th century) has steadily but surely been taken by the People’s Republic of China. Kotkin clarifies that from his perspective China’s ascendance to superpower status did not happen overnight, and should be seen through the prism of the broader genesis that dates back to two centuries ago when this country’s reemergence as a global power was delayed first by the European powers in 19thcentury, and then in the first half of the 20th century by Japan. If Kotkin’s opinion is anything to go by, we can expect that in the not so

distant future we are likely to witness even more apparent acceleration of this competition of the two mighty gladiators, for the Middle Kingdom is inevitably deemed to challenge various aspects of Washington’s position in its pursuit for the dominium mundi. In this respect, however, it is worth pointing out that by implying that China is taking the Soviet Union’s place as the evil empire and the enemy of the Western world, Kotkin wants us to believe that the competition between China and the United States should be seen as a new twist on an old story, but the way he frames his argument does not inspire a great deal of confidence for as much as China economically can be presented as the strongest US competitor in overall terms, the GDP per capita in this country is way below the OECD’s average. Militarily, China may have made massive progress since 1949 but its strength cannot be compared to the US or even Russia as a matter of fact. Culturally this country is very strong but when it comes to innovative technology, Chinese policymakers are reliant on foreign research and development. Surely, there is no Chinese Dream that could attract millions of people to follow in Beijing’s footsteps in the way the American dream has attracted millions of people around the world and appealed to their hearts and minds. Just to paraphrase Samuel Paul Huntington’s claim about Japan, China is a civilization without many followers. Still, we need to agree with Kotkin that should the current trend continue, China may earn its place as the US’s peer or even successor in its dominant position in a few decades (Kotkin 2019, p. 10−15).

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Reviews and Responses It is an unquestionable fact that the international architecture of power has undergone a major transformation in the last 50 years, and clearly, China’s rapid ascendance to the position of one of few leading global powers cannot be denied, but Kotkin undermines the integrity of this argument by implying that this process is so well underway. There is nothing wrong with picturing China as an emerging superpower, even if such an account could be seen as rather premature, if not generous, but it is not happening in such a rapid manner as Kotkin wants us to believe. Suggesting that “the coming century will not be largely determined by how China and the United States manage their power resources and their relationship”, is rather far-fetched, especially to any respectable realist thinker. Kotkin undermines the validity of his argument by suggesting that “as the free-trading United Kingdom allowed its rival, imperial Germany, to grow strong, so the free-trading United States has done the same with China”. Despite its obvious limitations, I need to admit that the first part of this argument on the bilateral relations between the UK and Germany is well known in the literature of the subject, and it has been widely accepted by scholars since long before I was born, but extending this type of argumentation to much more recent events is not only politically inappropriate but also has no valid relevance in the facts. Again, the issue is much deeper than we think, for the realists used to be known for such disrespectful and unsubstantiated comparisons, but the 21st century realist who undergoes a more civilized form of education would never allow himself to be disrespectful

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and wrong on the top of that. Framing similar arguments on China’s place in the global architecture of power would be a domain of some megalomaniac neoconservative politician who still believes in self-serving fairytales combined with some untamed illusions of grandeur (Kotkin 2019, p. 10−15). Naturally, for the sake of exploring all options on this argument, we could assume for a split second that there is a chance that Kotkin’s hypothesis is valid. Where does it leave us? If indeed Britain and US had overslept the right moment to respond with a mighty action that would restore the global and regional balances of power at the time when their immediate action could be designed to balance the growth of the countries that were destined to become their immediate rivals, Kotkin surely should have specified exactly which moment he had exactly in mind. Instead, this scholar does not even attempt to suggest how he would even imagine the US government facilitating such a difficult mission of putting restraint on China’s growth in such a sophisticated manner after 1945, when it slowly but surely started realizing that from then on containing the Soviet Union would be its number one priority. Not only that, but it was also not in the US’s interest to show Beijing its place for the US government simply could not afford to create more enemies when it was suspected that the Soviets might be in the lead, especially in space exploration after 1957. This finding is even more valid when it comes to the late 1970s that is supported by ample evidence in the literature of subject, including Paul Kennedy’s everlasting Rise and Fall of the Great

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190 Piotr Pietrzak Powers that makes it painfully clear that throughout the entire cold war the US national interest required playing China and Soviet Union against each other, and that was true to such an extent that the US government was even ready to sacrifice its geostrategic imperatives in Southeast Asia, which inadvertently implied losing the Vietnam War, only to persuade Beijing to drift away from the Soviet sphere of influence. As Paul Kennedy suggests, thanks to Henry Kissinger’s brilliant idea of recognizing the PRC as a legitimate international player and downgrading the international recognition of Taiwan as an independent nation, Nixon’s administration used China in the most instrumental manner, and burst Beijing’s self-confidence in order to put a dent in the internal coherence and integrity of the Communist bloc, for Communism was not supposed to survive heated internal competition between the two communist giants for primacy in the entire bloc (Kennedy 1989 & 2017). In Kotkin’s defense, however, it has to be admitted that using China to throw up roadblocks in the Soviet Union’s way may have produced far more serious geopolitical consequences than is commonly understood, for they may have been much more enduring than the side effects of the support of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and then leaving them forgotten the moment the Soviets actually lost their “Afghan crusade”, which largely contributed to events like 9/11. The same can be said of the US Department of State’s decision to sell chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein in the late 1970s and of backing Chilean President Pinochet in his brutal

fight against local Communists. But in all fairness, we need to admit that all of these decisions have a common denominator, namely the fact that the way the global status quo was being shaped at that particular moment had required the respectable decision-maker to suggest embracing such morally questionable decisions. Having said that we need to remember that if there is one distinctive feature of the realist scholar’s character it is the fact that he is not too sanctimonious, for they are fully aware that they cannot defend a claim that their methods being moral would make them superior to the others. They are rather open about their flaws and limitations, but they are inclined to follow one simple rule, that the end very often will justify the means. That is the main reason why at first, we may find Kotkin’s suggestion to present the future world of politics as a place of a confrontation between two mighty powers as not only appealing but also inevitable. He also wants us to believe that the players change, but the game remains, but these observations are rather flawed for not only the players change, but also the game evolves for they are so heavily invested in their respective dominium mundi pursuit, that given a chance they would use any selfserving means to attain or maintain their ultimate objective of global power recognition. This is especially visible when the aspiring power meets an already recognized one that has no intention to extend its recognition to its ultimate rival for out of two already well established global powers, the US and the Russian Federation, the latter is definitely very determined not to allow that to happen with-

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Reviews and Responses out a fight, and the very man who authored countless books on Soviet history, including some of the most popular international bestsellers, should notice something so painfully obvious. As much as we need to give it to Kotkin that he is right to suggest that Russia is not quite there yet to capitalize on its extended influence, for it needs more consistency in pursuing its global goals and objectives, we need to acknowledge that Kotkin happens to be very selective about the way he frames his arguments on Russia. Surely, Putin’s efforts to restore Russia’s former glory may seem very clumsy, obsolete, and even at times, let’s face it, quite illegal, especially when we look at his current actions in Ukraine from the perspective of international law, but pigeonholing the current status of Russia as merely “well organized Putin’s corrupted kleptocracy” may appear to more sensitive readers as a childish error that could be avoided by such a respectable historian, for no respectable realist would allow himself to sound so biased and petty-minded. Whilst dismissing Russia’s contribution to the global architecture of power in such a derogatory manner does less to strengthen the overall integrity of Kotkin’s hypothesis and more to show his “sympathies and antipathies”, it is my hope that in principle we could agree with Kotkin that the main responsibility of the realist thinker is to present the world of politics just the way it is, and not the way he wishes it to look in the future. As much as the author of this paper could rise to the challenge by overcoming his biases, there are more fundamental problems in his argument, for I am not sure whether this pundit

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would show any enthusiasm to acknowledge that whether Russia is governed by Putin or someone else, it is unlikely to give up its pretenses to superpower status; and the Western powers may have a hard nut to crack trying to civilize Moscow’s behavior. Even if currently their claim to the superpower status may be seen as unattainable, Russia will not voluntarily surrender this claim. In order to understand the inherently complex Russian soul one needs to be well acquainted with Dostoyevsky’s, Tolstoy’s, and Pushkin’s works that clearly state that both historical and contemporary Russian rulers would be inclined to inevitably share this desire to be in the center of global affairs at any cost, and if the project of restoration of the country’s former glory and pride would potentially drain the Kremlin’s coffers, so be it; the Tsar of Muscovy is happy to keep up with the Joneses at any cost. Indeed, the price tag was definitely not the cheapest these days, for the list of recent Russia’s misfortunes is rather hefty, starting with an alleged nuclear reactor explosion that caused a radiation spike in Arkhangelsk region in August 2019, the deadly nuclear-powered submarine incident in the Barents Sea that left fourteen sailors dead in July 2019, the failure to repair the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier since 2018, the slow pace of progress in Russia’s covert operations in Eastern Ukraine, not to mention putting the program of modernization of Russian Army and Navy on hold; these are surely the clear signs of rather enduring troubles that Russia has encountered on its road to restore its superpower status, but assuming Russia’s weakness and caricaturing this county in

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192 Piotr Pietrzak such a point-blank derogatory manner should be seen as a mistake for we must remember that Putin also happens to be a careful student of San Tzu, who is known to proclaim this simple rule: “when you are strong, project weakness, when you are weak project strength”. Not to mention the fact that for centuries Russia has been one of the most active, capable, and successful players in the global architecture of power, and this country’s influence and strength will not disappear simply because Kotkin did not look at the map of the world when he was writing this paper. Surely, Putin may not be as westward thinking as was initially expected of him, as he abuses democracy and simply is not as obedient as Yeltsin, but it has to be admitted that Russia is currently governed by a man who is the most recognized as the most dangerous global villain, who simply out-Machiavellis Machiavelli, for Vladimir Putin is the strongest Russian leader in generations and has to rebuild Russia’s international prestige as one of the most unpredictable international actors. Surely, this may be a source of great fear to the people in Poland, the Baltic states, and Ukraine, as most of his actions are met with international outrage, but Putin also happens to be the first Russian leader since Joseph Stalin who has singlehandedly redrawn hundreds of kilometers of Europe’s borders, in Ukraine and Georgia, and has proven to be the source of destabilization for large swathes of land in the Middle East, North Africa, and even in Venezuela, not to mention various post-Soviet countries from the so-called near abroad. So instead of redirecting our attention

toward less heated and more frozen tensions between mainland China and Taiwan, and instead of twisting his daydreams into the global architecture of power that is drifting towards a bilateral division of the world divided into some magical pro-US and the pro-China camps, Kotkin should at least mention Russia’s engagemenst in Syria, Libya, and Venezuela, or at least its covert operations in Ukraine should be noted for the record. But in his defense, it must be admitted that this scholar is not alone in underestimating Russia; for the last three decades a large proportion of American scholars have fallen into similar conceptual difficulties. Instead of dismissing Russia’s claim to a leading role in the international structure of power so casually and instead of belittling Putin’s position in such a disrespectful manner, the author of this paper would benefit from rethinking the whole concept of bipolarity altogether, for it is only possible in hypothetical academic discourse that takes Russia, along with other aspiring global powers such as India, Brazil, France, UK, and even Germany completely out of the equation. (Pietrzak 2019, p. 34−95). Naturally, a certain degree of delusions of grandeur had to be allowed, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, largely due to quite favorable circumstances the respective US governments have enjoyed in the realm of the international affairs since 1991, so scholars such as Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history and Zbigniew Brzezinski called this country the last and only remaining superpower, but similar claims made in 2018 or 2019 sound like rather unrealistic descriptions of the global reality at hand. The biggest

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Reviews and Responses paradox of the situation is the fact that US leaders can no longer be so confident about the attainability of their plans for global domination and the US’s leading place in the global architecture of power. It is not because of some lack of the US’s hard power’s capabilities, but because of the crisis of its leadership, the crisis in US soft power capabilities, and most importantly the self-dethroning direction the Trump Administration has voluntarily chosen to pursue ever since the end of 2016. Indeed, the current US leader has chosen an unprecedented path of voluntary renunciation of superpower status accompanied by a reckless self-imposed deconstruction of the demo-liberal world order that has benefited the US the most for the last 75 years (Brzezinski 1997, p. 3−23 & 194−208). The sad truth is that the status of US’s reputation as a global power is at stake, but it is still not so much because of the challenge for the structure of power and emergence of the new powers, but because of the challenges from within. Domestic desire to give up its superpower status is stronger than ever; by embracing a combination of protectionist policies, isolationist attitudes, irrational behaviors, and misconstrued mercantilist policies that put the liberal rulesbased system established after 1945 under unprecedented strain, Trump is playing with fire and Kotkin simply fails to acknowledge that; he simply takes the leading position of the US for granted, and that happens despite the fact that the international community at large may not be so inclined to keep recognizing the US as a superior superpower state. But Kotkin’s narrative in this respect is contaminated by a naïve and unrealistic

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world view of continued and unshaken American supremacy, despite the fact Donald Trump causes massive reputational damage to the US’s position around the world. Some of the chapters of his article read as if he was blissfully unaware of the real damage the Trump administration has inflicted on the US’s global reputation and fails to acknowledge the full extent of the detrimental impact on the way the US global leadership is perceived internationally. I understand the rationale of not doing just that, for the whole Trump argument contradicts the integrity of his earlier deliberations suggesting that the global architecture of power has been arranged in a semi-bipolar way as a confrontation between the US and the PRC, but focusing on only this dimension of the entire rather multipolar architecture of power is rather implausible when we take into account the fact that Trump is in charge of one of these centers of powers and it is clear that the US’s superpower status will soon be questioned, for it is a just logical consequence of the fact that “the emperor is naked”, for Donald Trump is more interested in entering the path of greatest isolation rather than having the US play the role of global policeman. Surely, by arranging his analysis in a structural manner, Kotkin avoids the necessity of dealing with individual case examples of the individual global leaders, but instead of pretending to be a structural realist, the author of this paper would really benefit from acknowledging the full extent of the damage one individual has been able to inflict on the structure itself. Surely, in his defense, he points out the recent turn towards populism and

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194 Piotr Pietrzak nationalism in Washington, but he fails to mention who has inspired that type of behavior. The name Donald Trump is not even mentioned in this analysis, even though his administration shakes the very foundation of this structure in a negative way. I am afraid Kotkin has failed to do a proper damage control assessment to be able to notice that. This scholar has just assumed that Donald Trump has happened to be a very divisive political figure who will have a limited effect on the US global standing and some negative internal consequences. The problem is that because of Trump, the US may have problems recovering from in the decades to come long after the end of his term or terms in office. What we are currently having the displeasure of observing is not a very uniquely transformative moment in American political history; the Trumpian way of pursuing his goals and objectives in the realm of domestic and global affairs will have direct but unintended consequences for the US global position, for by undermining the current demo-liberal system this leader shoots not only his own foot, but also each and every foot of his successors, for it seems that after his presidency the US leader will no longer be considered the leader of the free world. Yet, as much as Boris Johnson in Britain can afford playing with fire, for British superpower status is forever gone, the stakes for Donald Trump are much higher. Yet, instead of at least trying to appear presidential, the US commander-in-chief behaves like an elephant in the china shop and makes disrespectful statements about other NATO members, his country’s closest and natural allies. Not just his reckless language

but his parochial geopolitical worldview accelerates this process. In a miscalculated endeavor to provide more employment for American workers and greater profits for American businesses, the president does everything he possibly can to blame others for his own country’s misfortunes. He embraces politics of division, and populist, nationalist, and segregationist policies. Ever since he has moved into the White House the US’s global position has rapidly been deteriorating because the US’s global leadership is undergoing a massive crisis of confidence, for Trump’s foreign policy lacks any long-term geostrategic thinking necessary to play its major competitors against each other because the current resident of the White House is more preoccupied with internal policy. He does poke the dragon and the bear at the same time, insults the US’s traditional allies for fun and meanwhile uses Twitter diplomacy to hang out with the leader of North Korea without no apparent reason. The problem here is much deeper, and Kotkin is right to suggest that despite his single-dimensional worldview combined with an obsolete last century-type understanding of the notion of national interest that Trump appears to believe in, the problem here is not with one man only; it is also the problem of the people who elected him. It is true that “The tribunes of the popular insurgencies may traffic in fakery, but the sentiments of their voters are real and reflect major problems that the supposed experts ignored or dismissed”. The very fact that they have made such a reckless decision suggests that a substantial proportion of US society is tired of the idea of being the global policeman, since there is no

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Reviews and Responses enthusiasm to commit as much energy, resources, and manpower on the global level amongst the people, so one should not expect that the rest of the word will continue to recognize the US’s right to shape global affairs in the same unilateral manner as it has for the last 50–100 years. For these reasons, one can only hope that the US public will come to its senses and consider their choices on November 3rd, 2020. If the American public decides to reelect Trump for a second term, it will inevitably happen at the expense of the US’s global standing, for his first term in office has inflicted on American imperium and the American dream a massive blow. Another four years of the cancerous presidency of Donald Trump would be celebrated by Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping with Dom Perignon. Indeed, the current leadership in Beijing and Moscow may be accused of harboring many revisionist intentions, but the same can be said about Japan, India, Brazil, France, Britain, and even Germany. Not only that, we also have to acknowledge the other players too, such as India, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, Turkey, Spain, the European Union, ASEAN, Mercosur, and the African Union, which still exercise considerable influence in the realm of international relations and want their pieces of this global cake. So, the strong realist argument, in this case, would be that the US’s global influence is faced not only with one big China and a slightly smaller in size but comparable in ambitions Russia, but by number of “small Chinas” and “small Russias” perfectly capable of challenging particular aspects of the US’s global leadership. There are a number of little and sizable tectonic shifts that have

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happened in the global architecture of power since 1991, and it is expected that in the 21st century there may be a massive earthquake that will redefine the nature of our global architecture of power. Yet again, I don’t think that the nature of these transformative or at times revolutionary changes may fit Kotkin’s description of changing the status quo in these respective areas, especially in respect of Australia, for Kotkin suggests that the PRC may soon attempt more assertive steps to lure Australia into some twenty-first century version of Finlandization, for Beijing’s influence and interference in this country have been growing steadily over the last generation, both as natural consequences of economic interdependence. I am not sure, but I don’t think that Kotkin really understands what the term Finlandization means, and if he does, I cannot possibly imagine what kind of luring, wooing, and puffing China would have to emulate to attract Canberra to follow Beijing’s lead or simply outsource its foreign policy prerogatives to this country. Possibly the only case scenario that I could see happening is if Queen Elizabeth II passes away and the crown is inherited by her son Charles. This is even more unlikely considering how the situation has unfolded in Hong Kong since the 31st of March 2019, for the cause of the protests known as the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement will deter the Australians from embracing any form of Chinese dominance. Another major downside I saw of this article was the fact that after all of that struggle to look at the global architecture of power from the perspective of historical context to identify some easily

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196 Piotr Pietrzak distinguishable patterns, Kotkin concludes his final paragraph by suggesting that the only lesson that we can learn from our careful observations of history is the fact that the future is very unpredictable, and this is definitely not a conclusion that anyone was expecting from this otherwise very fascinating and lengthy deliberation on global affairs because it simply contradicts his assertions and arguments that he was so eagerly building up during the course of this paper. If that was really the case, every realist thinker would have asked, if we cannot predict future behavior of international players, and on top of that our explanations of the present and past are not so plausible, what is the use of embracing such a sophisticated theory to discuss world politics in the first place? Are we not meant to explain the current state of affairs and to suggest what may be happening soon? The answer to that question may vary depending on whether we ask the theoretician or the practitioner—for instance Kenneth Waltz and Zbigniew Brzezinski (as well as others) may belong to different corners of the realist debate but they happen to inadvertently embrace very similar methods that embrace similar logic that is applied in the Kondratiev waves that have revolutionized explanations on various dimensions of the social reality simply because they provided such explanations with an acceptable horizon of tenability of certain forecasts, out of existing data, and most of the possible exceptions in the range from forty to fifty years, out of existing data. Naturally, without going into the details of the rationale behind arranging

the developed cycles consisting of alternating intervals in a way of high spectral growth in power projection initiatives and intervals of retrospective regress in similar tendencies, we can definitely claim that even some of the most respected game theorists such as John Forbes Nash and Robert Axelrod, for instance, came up with a number of ideas that can be used in order to forecast in which directions certain global patterns drift, and how it affects the entire global architecture of power at large, so we can dismiss Kotkin’s conclusion as implausible on the basis of the fact that it is very dogmatic. I may not have a magic ball forecasting the future, but I am certain that still we are able to forecast some outcomes, though surely, we will struggle to predict all of them. Surely, from this scholar of such a caliber, one would expect more than just mechanically repeating some of the worst realist mistakes of seriously overestimating the geostrategic importance of just a few international actors, such as the US and China, and seriously underestimating the role of the others. This happens to be indicative of Kotkin’s background; I saw it few times when I read his biography of Stalin, Kotkin likes to follow certain patterns, and in this paper he clearly follows the realist pattern of explanations (Amstrup 1978; Ashley 1984). Undoubtedly, just like Nicollò Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the author of this paper captures a number of essential qualities of realism and visibly fully embraces a narrative that situates the weaker states at the disadvantage only because of the relative power disparity with their tangibly

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Reviews and Responses more powerful immediate rival. In the 21st century, however, no state or international organization is deemed to assume the roles of passive spectators of the show who are just permitted to observe what is going on; on the contrary, this century began with a non-state and very weak actor serving a powerful blow to the reputation of the United States as the only remaining superpower. In his explanation of the 9/11 attacks, Joseph Nye suggested that the New Rome was attacked by the New Barbarians (Nye 2014, p. 180–220), but this is just one example in which the mighty player fails to protect itself from the development of all of the unfavorable circumstances created by seemingly weaker states. If the global order was truly unipolar the US would have dealt with the emergencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Mali with grace, and promptly, and that was not the case at all. The stronger player does not assume the role of some ancient demiurge in the global architecture of power who would be willing to go all in to affect the outcomes and set the global strategy table in the way they would want it. Surely, we cannot accuse Kotkin of not knowing realism itself, for the most plausible explanation to the question as to why most of his assertions bring him to the wrong conclusions could be that Kotkin is not fully familiar with the recent developments in theory and for these reasons his research leads him astray, but the facts definitely do not support such accusations. On the contrary, not only for him do the strongest nations in the architecture of power enjoy the right to determine the fate of their peoples without interference by

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other states or external actors, but just like the majority of realist thinkers, Kotkin also very clearly doubts the idea of costly altruism in the realm of international relations. He sees the decisionmakers as rational actors inclined to make rational decisions, whilst decisionmaking leads to the pursuit of the national interest, and he believes that the global architecture of power should be seen as a place of constant confrontation in which a zero-sum game is the only possibility, so either you are with or against us; in this sense Kotkin expresses himself very clearly and this naturally makes his argument loud and clear, but as much as he may be power orientated, state-centric, statist, and very cynical in his explanations, simply because he focuses his research on power transfers and traditional military and economic power indicators, this definitely does not make him very unique. If I was about to place his argument in the wider realist debate, I would not call him an inventor, but a follower who furthermore fails to acknowledge that there are some obvious differences between different shades of realism (Mearsheimer & Litwak & Ikenberry 2002; Toft 2003). Surely, Kotkin sympathizes with Mearsheimer’s claim that states are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, for they pursue power because of the anarchic system in which they operate. Without expanding their power militarily, geographically, and economically, they would undermine their security, but offensive realism does not have a monopoly on the use of common sense. What matters is the way of executing this idea. Indeed, the problem related to the fact that Kotkin is guilty of embracing

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198 Piotr Pietrzak more defective offensive-realist fantasies such as a hypothesis that states seek to maximize their power and influence through the means of domination and hegemony, and that the anarchic nature of the international system is largely responsible for aggressive state behavior in international politics, is that fortunately this scholar seems to be very much attached to the structural defensive branch of the same tree in most of his analysis. There are more similarities between Stephen Kotkin and Kenneth Waltz than any other realist thinkers (Waltz 2000a, Waltz 2000b). As a matter of fact, it seems that Kotkin sees eye to eye with the cofounder of the structural realist school of thought on a number of fundamental matters, and that starts with the emphasis on the structure of power in the global environment that Waltz sees as of parallel importance to understanding the complexity of international relations. Like Waltz, Kotkin remains very pessimistic about the global environment, assuming that the state of war is much more easily explainable than conditions for peace as far as realist theory is concerned, because the state of bellum omnium contra omnes has been considered here as a natural condition for explaining global environment; it is, therefore, according to this type of eplaination it is actually peace not war that has tendency to break out (Waltz, 2000, p. 5−41). In this respect, Waltz is certain that since states have always competed for wealth and security and the competition has often led to conflict, contemporary states cannot be sure that today’s friend will not end up tomorrow’s enemy absent an external authority. Meanwhile, Kotkin

embraces the above-mentioned argument full-heartedly for he seems to be very particular to remind us that the first duty of any state is to defend itself and engage in power balancing strategies seems to be the best possible strategy for survival at one’s disposal (Grieco 1988, p. 485−507; Waltz 2000a, p. 5−41). If I was allowed to make a speculative argument, I would suggest that the reason Kotkin is so eager to argue in favor of the necessity of the evolution of the global architecture of power in a semi-bilateral way is that Waltz’s suggestion that has it that the realist narration could be changed only if the whole system of international politics was altered. Naturally, the question remains whether a little amendment within the system we witness on a daily basis or more significant one (like for example the collapse of the Berlin Wall) should motivate us to alter our entire perception of the global system of international politics so drastically. I don’t think that I have a solution to this dilemma at this moment and I am not sure what Kotkin’s suggestion is either in this case. What I have also noticed during the analysis of this paper is the fact that just like classical realists, Kotkin also ignores the fact that the international institutions can produce certain outcomes either directly through affecting the prospects for international cooperation, or indirectly through various measures aimed at shaping and forcing given actions on the states’ bureaucracies. To Kotkin, the national states will always occupy the central stage of world politics, and the same international environment will inevitably penalize them if they fail to protect their interests. Period.

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Reviews and Responses That, in turn, will again translate into another argument in favor of the assertion that the national states will account for unitary, rational agents, predominantly interested in pursuing their national interests at the expense of other power seekers and their immediate rivals. Like any other respectable classical realist, the author of this paper is also of the opinion that given a chance, the strongest national states would almost always disobey rules and regulations that don’t particularly suit their imminent or long-term interest, yet Kotkin cannot be seen as a truly classical scholar for he completely ignores classical Machiavellian attention to an individual’s leadership skills and Morgentauian obsession with human nature. There are some anomalies even within such a distinctive tradition as realism. But Kotkin fails to acknowledge that realism surely has its limits, and cannot explain every single social phenomenon, which is why, in turn, he also forgets about the fact that the contemporary global architecture of power of the globalization age is no longer a static system; on the contrary, it is inherently interconnected, multilateral, elusive, and unpredictable, so applying the same standards and methods of description may seem rather counterproductive. My problem with Kotkin’s paper is not even related to the fact that it demonstrates that his shade of realism lacks freshness, theoretical coherence, or distinctiveness, and accounts for a rather disappointing personal plan for the global domination of the world rather than a scholarly debate. No, we cannot accuse Kotkin of these limitations because they are rather distinctive features of a realism; my problem with Kotkin is that he claims to

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be a realist and in fact he is a neoconservative, for he completely lacks the sensitivity to acknowledge the most apparent basic facts that he tries to hide under the rug. If he was interested in crafting a realist account of the global situation at hand, he would have acknowledged that global architecture is more multipolar and more anarchic than is commonly understood, and this starts with the way the behavior of international actors is being shaped. Instead, he is just like a dogmatic historian who feeds us with several very surely enjoyable historical anecdotes that attempt to explain some hidden historical patterns, but in fact they backfire on him because they pigeonhole the whole realist argument into a rather unsuccessful attempt of retro realism. No wonder that his forecasts on the way the global architecture of power is shifting are wrong if he is contradicting his own claims and uses obsolete methods and repetitive arguments. Unfortunately, Kotkin’s analysis leaves us very much perplexed in this particular instance, for his paper reads more like a double whammy: on the one hand he serves us with an obsolete, outdated, wishful-thinking type of description that can be seen only as a caricature of realism, and on the other hand he shows very little enthusiasm to utilize the realist tradition’s full explanatory potential, or to acknowledge this approach’s strengths and limitations to produce a straightforward and easily approachable account of the global situation at hand. Kotkin presents neither a comprehensive nor a genuine evaluation of the current status quo, for this analysis has less to do with any form of realism and more to do with obsolete wishful

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200 Piotr Pietrzak thinking replicating the same very obsolete visions of obsolete cold war Sovietologists who try to recreate an old drama and frame this debate into yet another type of superpower competition that divides the entire world into two seemingly unequal and improbable power blocs only to protect the more sensitive members of the American broader public from the hardship of the inconvenient truth that the fat years are largely over, and that we are in this together. Fortunately, unless something goes terribly wrong with the entire global architecture of power, there is no chance that Kotkin’s vision of reality ever will materialize, for this scholar fails to understand that being a realist is much more than just following the official line without question, applying some of the most dysfunctional self-contradictory paradigms and irreconcilable contradictions, entering into the most obvious conceptual traps and pitfalls, and sticking to some of the most obsolete methods, old tools, and a lack of independent thinking. This is not the essence of realism, for this theory’s main aesthetic component goes missing under such conditions. Realism can be seen as a profound explanatory tool capable of exposing various dynamics and hidden mechanisms of the fascinating world of politics only when it is interested in unleashing the truth, even inconvenient truth, about the global situation at hand. That is why Stephen Kotkin could benefit from revisiting the work of Niccolò Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Henry Kissinger more often, for their analysis is very instrumental but at least it is painfully honest; these authors do not allow any window-dressing.

References Amstrup, Niels. 1978. “The ‘Early’ Morgenthau. A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism”. First Published Jul 1, 1978. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 14:30]. Ashley, Richard K. 1984. The poverty of neorealism. Published by The MIT Press. Volume 38, Issue 2. Spring 1984, p. 225–286. Available at: [Accessed on 07.10. 2019, at 14:00]. & DOI: https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300026 709/> [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 14:30]. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009. Brzezinski Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books 1997. Fukuyama Francis “Against Identity Politics, The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy”, Foreign Affairs Magazine, September/ October 2018 Issue, Volume 97, Number 5, p. 90–115. Available at: [Accessed on 06. 01.2019, at 11:55]. Grieco, Joseph. (1988). “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism”. Available at: [Accessed on 03.10.2019, at 17:00]. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009.

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Reviews and Responses Herz, J., Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago, IL; University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 200–5 Kennedy, Paul M. 2017. The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 To 2000. London: William Collins Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After hegemony. Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Kotkin, Stephen “The Realist World. The Players Change, but the Game Remains”. Available at: [Accessed on 01.06.2019, at 11:00]. Mearsheimer, J. J., Litwak, R., & Ikenberry, G. J. 2002. The tragedy of great power politics. West Lafayette, IN, C-SPAN Archives. Nye Joseph. 2004. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization. From Realism to Globalization, 1st Edition

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Pietrzak, Piotr. 2018. “The Syrian Conflict (2011–ongoing): How a Perfectly Winnable Uprising Has Ended Up as a Ferocious Proxy War of Global Importance”. In: In Statu Nascendi: Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations Vol. 1, No. 1 (2019), p. 34–95. Available at: https://cup.co lumbia.edu/book/in-statu-nascen di/97838382122960> [Accessed on: 24.09.2018, at 22:25]. Toft, Peter. 2003. John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics & power. Kbh, Institut for Statskundskab, Københavns Universitet. Waltz, Kenneth. 2000a. “Structural Realism After The Cold War” International Security 25(1):5-41. Available at: [Accessed on 19th November 2019, at 16:33]. Waltz, Kenneth. 2010b. Theory Of International Politics. Long Grove, Ill, Waveland Press.

Piotr Pietrzak In response to Francis Fukuyama’s “Against Identity Politics, The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy” Foreign Affairs Magazine, September/October 2018 Issue, Volume 97, Number 5, p. 90–115. If I were to compare Francis “Frank” Fukuyama to any country I would have to choose Scotland, for this scholar can be looked at from two perspectives. To some he will always just be the celebrity scholar who once upon a time declared the “end of history”, which could be compared with the type of tourists who

go up north (beyond the wall) and search for the Loch Ness Monster, and then fail to find it and go back to whatever their destinations were and complain that this mystical creature does not and has never existed in the first place and that they will never ever believe in fairy tales again. Surely the world is full of such tourists,

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202 Piotr Pietrzak and I personally met some of them during my trips from Inverness to Fort Augustus in 2005 and 2009. But there are also those explorers who are willing to indulge in lone backpacking walks in the Highlands, Claim Ben Nevis, travel to Aberdeen with a Megabus, take a train trip from Oban to Glasgow, visit Edinburgh to take part in the Summer Festival, or just disappear on the Isle of Sky and many eat haggis, listen to bagpipers, try all of those countless types of good old whiskey, and surely this type of slightly more open-minded tourist knows that Scotland may surprise you. Francis Fukuyama should be seen as exactly this type of exciting first choice for anyone who searches for something other than the traditional in the literature of the subject, for his work, however underestimated, is extremely multidimensional and comprehensive. If I was allowed yet another handy comparison I would suggest that it is like a rollercoaster ride, for as an underdog he started very slow, but the moment he declared the end of history, this scholar almost instantly became one of the most recognizable IR scholars in the world, a celebrity in his own right. Without even properly realizing the scope of his influence and fame he was faced with the need to defend his findings (at a very early age) against the attacks of some of the most sophisticated and well-established academics such as Samuel Paul Huntington, who by this time had entered the market of ideas a few decades before, and very often in the popular opinion his Clash of Civilisations could be seen as a response to the End of the World argument. In this early period his arguments got so terribly

twisted, over-simplified, and misunderstood that he was pigeonholed as “the man who prophesized the end of history”, nothing more, nothing less. This has allowed the people who either never read The End of History and the Last Man (1992), or were unable to comprehend the whole sophisticated argument in this publication that in essence suggested that the worldwide spread of liberal democracies and free market capitalism of the West and its lifestyle may signal the end point of humanity’s socio-cultural evolution and become the final form of human government, whilst globalization was about to be seen as a driving force by which liberalism would spread across the globe. The rule of law and institutions would supplant power politics and tribal divisions. In this setting democracy was destined to win out over all other forms of government, especially communism, because the natural desire for peace and well-being set nations on a path to progress from which it was impossible to divert. Unfortunately, those who either did not get this message or did not care to acquaint themselves with this argument were provided with more excuses to attack Fukuyama with various campaigns of disinformation and accusations against him (Fukuyama 1992). This early argument by Fukuyama can be explained through the prism of Hegelian philosophy for Fukuyama bases a number of his claims on his comprehension of Hegel’s idea that there will come a time of self-realization of final actuality through the continuous dialectic of history and then, of course, that finality actually was the product of the neo-liberal world order of the 1990s. In this sense, Hegel sees the possibility of

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Reviews and Responses the historical process and the reconciliation towards unity. For Hegel, human history is the history of thought as it attempts to understand itself and its relation to the world. And just like Kojève can be blamed for the serious introduction of Hegel into 20th century French philosophy, Fukuyama is responsible for introducing the Hegelian system into 20th century English-language social science and political theory. Surely, this was rather a rebellious attempt that was made through the back door debate on the end of the history, but in fact Fukuyama is definitely guilty of using Hegel to prove the case of the triumph of liberal capitalism over communism, and he did that in a quite instrumental manner without explaining that time and identity are quite important in this equation (Kojève 1934; Lukács 1975; Verene 1985; Verene 2007). In this respect it is worth emphasising that its is rather a gloomy insistence on the spiritual meaninglessness likely to befall late capitalist societies in which atheist consumers have nothing serious to live for which rules out such breezy optimism. After the fall of communism, free-market liberal democracy had won out and would become the world’s final form of human government. In order to understand this we need to get to know Hegel better. This can be achieved either directly through extensive reading, or through the prism of people who interpret his work in a more approachable manner, such as Kojève, Luckas, and Verene. It really depends on us. In his The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama took the initiative of debating with Hegel through the Kojève’s interpretation of the nature of time. The

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mature Fukuyama significantly departs from Hegel but the late Fukuyama reconciles with Hegel to look at some of the most important features of his project through the prism of identity that shows certain Hegelian inclinations. As we most certainly know from Kojève, Luckas, and most importantly from Verene, one of the most important of Hegel’s intellectual encounters was exactly his attempt to attain a much more satisfactory recollection of his identity. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, in particular attempts to explore his views of identity in a very specific manner. Like previous philosophers such as Kant and Descartes, Hegel forms his own definition of what identity consists of. He deduces that the first knowledge we obtain is immediate and therefore the attempt to describe its identity is also immediate. He defines “sense-certainty” as the genuine feeling that comes from sensory experience. From this, Hegel also deduces that “consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as a pure ‘I’” which means that the ability of self-consciousness is the purest form of knowing oneself. In this respect it is worth emphasizing that Hegel is very motivated to find the way to attain a reconciliation towards unity through the historical process, as for Hegel human history is the history of thought as it attempts to understand itself and its relation to the world. This endeavor surely would require time, and time in Hegel is not linear but rather more circular. I remember reading The End of History and the Last Man (1992) some twenty years ago for the first time, and I need to admit that despite the fact that it made a considerable impression on me, I surely

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204 Piotr Pietrzak have failed to acknowledge the importance of all its debates in this publication to the full extent. However, more recently I have started finally acknowledging what back then constituted a background noise, and now the debates that I could not fully relate to have become more and more familiar (Fukuyama 1992). I suppose that if he had to write this publication again he would try to make his ideas sound less overly complicated, for being misunderstood on a number of occasions has exposed this political theorist and philosopher to a number of unsubstantiated accusations, which must have been a truly humbling experience for him. On the other hand, it definitely gave Fukuyama enough strength and equipped him with the selfdiscipline to come back stronger than ever before with his State Building. Governance and World Order in the 21st century, published in 2004. Indeed this publication is much more mature and thanks to that much more approachable to readers who have never had any exposure to continental philosophy, for this distinctive political scientist, political economist, philosopher, and author has always been against the idea of such US military interventions as George W. Bush’s actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and this publication clearly proves that one cannot build a country or implement demoliberal rule in the country that is not ready for it; he has proven that it has to be more evolutionary process. This brings me to the latest developments in Fukuyama’s intellectual development and his recent publication “Against Identity Politics. The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy”,

published by Foreign Affairs Magazine in its September/October 2018 edition, which makes a very convincing argument suggesting that free-market liberal democracy may have won out against communism and should in theory become the world’s “final form of human government.” But in fact, liberal democracy seems to be in crisis across the West, for we are heading towards a period of profound uncertainty because of the new backlash of right-wing nationalism on both sides of the Atlantic, which is in full swing. The main reason behind this development is that despite the fact that the number of electoral democracies has increased from 35 to more than 110 during the last half century and despite all positive technological improvements and the fact that over the same period of time the proportion of the global population living in extreme poverty plummeted from 42% to 18%, liberalism, democracy, and globalization are not delivering at home and they have not turned out as popular as may have been thought some 30 years ago. The growing internal tensions may not be so easy to reconcile for there are a number of multidimentional factors related to the institutional settings, a weakening of democratic norms under a president who seems willing to question the legitimacy of anything that may stand in his way, and managing difficult relations between public and private sectors, which can be combined with grievances over immigration and multiculturalism and created room for “demagogic populism”. This crisis is consuming liberalism’s identity or identies, leaving them unable or unwilling to respond to pressing challenges around the world. Another remarkable

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Reviews and Responses finding encapsulated in this paper is the suggestion that it explains why people will never stop thinking about themselves in identity terms. For as this professor of political science and a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, and a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center for Global Development explains, people’s identities are neither fixed nor necessarily given by birth, which is why identity can be used either to divide or to unify. Fukuyama claims that all of those negative developments have been kept under the rug of euphemisms or political correctness for far too long, and this in turn has resulted in complete, tectonic shifts in the local as well as regional architecture of power and has had an impact on the way the local traditional political spectrum is being arranged. The left now focuses less on creating broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of marginalized groups, whilst the right has redefined its core mission as the protection of traditional national identity which is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity, or religion. Fukuyama recognizes that the cynical, calculated, populist move to get votes by exploiting fear and the inevitability of changes, and he does it in a very careful and sophisticated manner by suggesting that although in authoritarian countries such appeals are old hat, nowadays such tendencies can be observed all over the world, for political leaders have mobilized followers around the idea that their dignity has been affronted and must be restored. Fukuyama also fears for democracy’s future and makes a strong case

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against tribalism and clannishness being coeval with human social life. Yet the recent worldwide outbreak of fundamentalisms, nationalisms, and separatisms suggests that something portentously new is afoot, a kind of global backlash against the perceived failures of liberal societies. One familiar example, in both America and Europe, is panic in the face of a real or threatened influx of culturally diverse immigrants. That the president of the United States finds political advantage in stoking such anxieties is another sign of our identity-troubled times. Globalization has brought rapid economic and social change and made those societies far more diverse, creating demands for recognition on the parts of groups that were once invisible to mainstream society. Fukuyama also claims that democratic societies are fracturing into segments based on ever-narrower identities, threatening the possibility of deliberation and collective action by society as a whole. This brings him to the conclusion that there is a need to work their way back to a more universal understanding of human dignity (Fukuyama 2018, p. 92−93). In respect of the debate on human dignity he explains that the connection between capitalism, democracy, and liberalism upon which he based his previous arguments reaches certain limits, for this phenomenon escapes the attention of the contemporary economists, who are wrong to assume that human beings can only be motivated by a desire for material resources or goods. As Fukuyama explains, every single group craves dignity, and the best way to touch upon this subject is to bring to the fore classical philosophy and its debate on the third

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206 Piotr Pietrzak part of the soul. For instance, Plato’s tripartite theory of soul is that it is composed of Nous (intellect, reason), which is or should be the controlling part which subjugates the appetites with the help of thumos, Thumos (passion), the emotional element in virtue of which we feel anger, fear, etc., and Epithumia (appetite, affection), to which are ascribed bodily desires. But in this respect, it is worth emphasizing that this theory of psyche proposed in his treatise the Republic, was not only deliberated on by Plato. A careful study of ancient texts will allow us to realize that three types of souls were also the subject of very active deliberations by Aristotle and some of his contemporaries, who claimed that there were indeed also three parts of the soul: the nutritive soul, the sensible soul, and the rational soul. In this respect Aristotle claimed that the nutritive soul is what urges any creature to protect itself whenever possible, but also to produce offspring in any form because its own life is finite. The sensible soul, or the soul of perception, was meant to be designed to help us to perceive the world around us. Finally, the rational soul belongs to the human alone, and this is the soul by virtue of which we possess the capacity for rational thought. This philosopher also divides this last type of the soul into two subcategories. The first is the passive intellect. It is the part of our mind that collects information and stores it for later use that allows us to act upon the information gathered by that part of the soul and consequently the active intellect is the part that allows us to engage in the actual process of thinking. It allows us to take our sensory input, combine it with our memories and skills, and apply it to

our betterment. Aristotle was of the opinion that an active intellect was responsible for our ability to consider abstract concepts that we have never perceived. Fukuyama suggests that this debate has to be revisited by contemporary scholars so we can explore all of the different dimensions of the craving for dignity. As in Homer’s works, Thumos (also commonly spelled Thymos) (Greek: θυμός) was used to denote emotions, desire, or an internal urge; it is a Greek word expressing the concept of “spiritedness” (as in spirited stallion or spirited debate). The word indicates a physical association with breath or blood. The word is also used to express the human desire for recognition. Fukuyama suggests that it is also a form of a spirit that can be separated to two forms, Megalothymia, which refers to the need to be recognized as superior to others, and Isothymia, which is the need to be recognized as merely equal to others. As this political theorist suggests, the main problem with megalothymia is that for every person recognized as superior far more people are seen as inferior and receive no public recognition of their human worth. Fukuyama explains that normally a very powerful feeling of resentment arises when one is disrespected. That is why to counterbalance this form the ancient Greeks also invented Isothymia, which makes people want to be seen as just as good as everyone else, and the rise of modern democracy is the story of isotymia’s triumph over megalothymia. Through these two forms we can explain various important tectonic shifts in which society is operating with better clarity and ease, such as in social democracy, which combines the two crucial

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Reviews and Responses agendas of accepted liberal democracy and the welfare state to cover more people with more social protections (Fukuyama 2018, p. 93−94). In this respect, I refer the careful reader to the article itself, for it deliberates on various redistributive programs that create various perverse incentives that discourage work, savings, and entrepreneurship, which in turn shrink the overall economic pie. The debate on Charles Taylor’s powerful moral idea, thymos, is followed by deliberations on multiple identities shaped by social interactions, creed-based national identities, and multiculturalism acting as an obstacle to assimilation. As Fukuyama explains the nature of modern identity is to be changeable, for lived experiences create broader and more integrative identities, but this notion of change is very often misused, or used instrumentally in a way to seduce people who feel betrayed and disrespected by existing power structures. This brings Fukuyama to the suggestion that as much as well-assimilated immigrants bring a healthy diversity to any society, and as much as the US in particular has benefited from diversity, Americans cannot build their national identity solely on diversity (Fukuyama 2018, p. 105−108). In this respect this scholar suggests that as much as our present world is moving toward the opposing dystopias of hyper-centralization and endless fragmentation, with various authoritarian regimes building a massive dictatorship in which the government collects highly specific personal data on daily transactions of every citizen, whilst social media and the internet have facilitated the emergence of self-contained comments walled off not

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by physical barriers buy shared identities, the positive thing about dystopian fiction is that it almost never comes true (Fukuyama 2018, p. 113). On this note, I want to emphasize that there is a reason why his work is so eloquent, approachable, and descriptive, for Francis Fukuyama has been at the forefront of some of the most important debates in political theory and political philosophy for the last four decades. Furthermore, to me this scholar should be seen as a perfect example of a true man of the Renaissance; he presents a healthy dose of philosophical, social, and political references that allow us to look at a number of multidimensional matters with a very approachable clarity despite the fact that he is preoccupied with constant development. Surely, his work is truly addictive also because it gives a fascinating detailed account, but in order to fully understand him we need to see him as an in statu nascendi type of scholar who is constantly transforming and is dedicated to rediscovering his own process of creation and as far as I can see that in his instance requires constant interactions with other academics, policymakers, and students. Undoubtedly, some of his ideas have been maturing encapsulated in four walls of academic halls some have cherished thanks to the debates he has engaged in, and thanks to his openness this scholar has managed to refine some of his early thoughts. There are very few academics and political commentators who attract a similarly international acclaim as Francis Fukuyama. In order to understand his phenomenon, we need to look at it through the prism of Francis Fukuyama’s in statu nascendi. The world has

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208 Piotr Pietrzak changed practically completely since 1991, and Fukuyama was one of the most adaptative academics who had to deal with this change; he has been steering our ship in the sea of uncertainty. His expertise and his observations are timeless. Fukuyama is one of the greatest living political theorists who from time to time happens to be very controversial, but we simply cannot look at him from a single-dimensional perspective; he can be seen as a true hybrid between a philosopher and a political theorist; he has to be looked at from his own process of creation from an early stage as an underdog who at the time when everyone was stunned and watched with open months the tectonic shifts in the entire socio-political structure and geopolitical architecture of power after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, came up with the perfect suggestion of using Hegel’s idea of the end of the world to describe it with one simple phrase, on through the period of other successful publications and academic work up to his recent publications on identity both in Foreign Affairs Magazine in 2018 and as an independent publication that represents a massive qualitative change in his development. As much as his early work read with all the spice and excitement of an early Tom Clancy novel, his late academic work comes across as something between Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, for it encapsulated in a clear form the boundaries of a thinker who has reached the potential of an accomplished but still extremely exciting and accomplished storyteller who still manages to give you this rare moment of excitement and thrill about rediscovering a totally different dimension of social reality, and who may

describe certain developments in a rather pessimistic manner but in a way that completely escapes any melancholy, repetitiveness, or boredom. Fukuyama is never boring; he engages all of your five senses and on the top of that provides us with a coolheaded, fair, and comprehensible account of the global reality at hand. For these reasons, I have no hesitation whatsoever in recommending this fine, well-researched, balanced paper to any reader interested in politics, international relation, philosophy, or sociology, for it was difficult to put it down; it was really an addictive page turner. As an editor of In Statu Nascendi I can only hope that one day we will be lucky enough to publish the paper or an article with this distinctive academic.

References Bloom, A. 1989. Responses to Fukuyama. [online] Wesjones.com. Available at: http://www.wesjones.com /eoh_response.htm [Accessed 3 Jan. 2015]. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The end of history and the last man. New York: Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 2003. “The End of History?—Francis Fukuyama”. [online] Wesjones.com. Available at: htt p://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm/> [Accessed on 07.10.2019, at 11:00]. Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2004. ISBN 08014-4292-3.

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Reviews and Responses Fukuyama Francis “Against Identity Politics, The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy”, Foreign Affairs Magazine, September/October 2018 Issue, Volume 97, Number 5, p. 90−115. Available at: [Accessed on 06.01. 2019, at 11:55]. Kojève, Alexandre. 1934. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, 1969. Lukács, György.1975. The young Hegel: studies in the relations between dialectics and economics, London: Merlin Press, translated by Rodney Livingstone.

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Stanley, Timothy & Lee Alexander, “It’s Still Not the End of History. Twenty-five years after Francis Fukuyama’s landmark essay, liberal democracy is increasingly beset. Its defenders need to go back to the basics”. Available at [Accessed on 06.10.2019, at 11:55]. Verene, Donald Phillip. 1985. Hegel’s Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit. SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Verene, Donald Phillip 2007. Hegel’s Absolute. An Introduction to Reading the Phenomenology of Spirit, State University of New York Press.

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Biographical Notes ABIOLA BAMIJOKO-OKUNGBAYE holds a PhD degree in Philosophy from Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridiski”, where he has researched the ethical dimensions of medicine and mental health. He also holds a Master’s degree in mental health from the University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom and he is a certified member of the world council for psychotherapy based in Vienna, Austria. His specialization includes bioethics, mental health, integrative mental health approaches for refugees and staffs, psychosocial and medical concerns of forced migration as a result of a war, major disasters, and political and climate changes. Abiola is an author of Rethinking Theories of Mind. Toward Phenomenology and Neuroscience (2018). E-mail: [email protected]

CAN BÜYÜKBAY was an Assistant Professor at the Turkish-German University in İstanbul. He holds a PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Zurich, where he also worked as a lecturer at the Department of Political Science and History. WEBSITE: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Can_Bueyuekbay E-mail: [email protected]

DENIZ ERTIN is a doctoral student at the Jean Monnet Chair of Prof. Dr. med. Wessels, CETEUS—Center for Turkey and European Union Studies, Institute for Political Science and European Studies at the University of Cologne. He studied in Copenhagen and Cologne and worked as a student assistant and lecturer at the University of Cologne. WEBSITE: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Deniz_Ertin E-mail: [email protected]

GORDON FREEMAN is a PhD Candidate at the St. Kliment Ohridiski Sofia University (Bulgaria) where he is preparing a thesis on Political Philosophy and Psychoanalysis applied to the EU. He holds a BA Hons International Media from Goldsmiths, University of London and an MSc Philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. He is also completing (currently deferred) a BA Hons Humanities at The Open University (UK). E-mail: [email protected]

 

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214 Biographic Notes

MLADEN KARADJOSKI graduated in Interdisciplinary Studies for Public Administration from the University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola, (North Macedonia) as the best student of its first generation. He earned an MA in public administration at the Faculty of administration and MIS. He acquired a PhD degree in 2011 in the area of public administration. He is an Associate Professor at the University of St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola. In his academic career he has participated at numerous scientific conferences, seminars, forums, workshops, etc. E-mail: [email protected]

GORAN ILIK, PhD is an Associate Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law at St. Kliment Ohridski University in Bitola (North Macedonia). His academic background includes a BA in Law (International Law and International Relations), an MA in Political Sciences (European Union Studies) and a PhD in Political Sciences with the specific interest in European Union foreign, security, and defense policy. His publication list contains papers, chapters and monographs emphasizing the role of the European Union in international relations, the institutional architecture of its foreign policy, its axiological performances, and its international political power. Also, many of his papers treat the EU’s role in the new international context in relation to the contemporary challenges of the liberal world order. He is author of the books “Europe at the crossroads: The Treaty of Lisbon as a basis of European Union international identity” and “EUtopia: the international political power of the EU in the process of ideeologization of the post-American world”. He is co-founder of the Institute for Research and European Studies, Bitola, and Editor-in-Chief of the international academic journal “Journal of Liberty and International Affairs” (www.e-jlia.com). ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3501-1386 E-mail: [email protected]

NINA ILIK obtained her bachelor’s degree at the University of Skopje (North Macedonia) from the Department of German language and literature. During her primary studies she also took classes in Italian language and literature. Since her graduation in 2010, she has actively worked as a translator and interpreter in various fields. In 2015, she obtained a master’s degree in German language and literature. Her scientific and research work concerns comparative linguistics in general, European affairs, and international relations. Currently, she works as a Professor of German language and literature at Josip Broz Tito High School in Bitola and Researcher at the Institute of Research and European Studies in Bitola. E-mail: [email protected] —In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

Biographic Notes

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SAMI MEHMETI, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Legal History and Civil Law, 2016 at South East European University, Faculty of Law, Tetovo. He has completed his PhD in Legal History, University of Skopje, Macedonia, 2015, M.A. in Civil Law, University of Prishtina, Kosovo, 2010. Dr. Mehmeti also completed his B.A. in Law at South East European University, Tetovo, Macedonia in 2005. WEBSITE: https://irinstatunascendi.wixsite.com/journal/sami-mehmeti E-mail: [email protected]

JOEL PATOMÄKI is a PhD Candidate at University of Jyväskylä, Finland. His research in general incorporates poststructuralism, social ontology, and collective intentionality. Currently, he is preoccupied with the combination of pragmatics and posthuman thought that he developed during his second master’s degree at Lille University where he got acquainted with both analytical and continental traditions of contemporary philosophy. E-mail: [email protected]

PIOTR PIETRZAK specializes in the politics of the Middle East and the Islamic world, focuses his attention on the theory of international relations; geopolitics, conflict resolution strategies, and international law; and primarily matters related to superpower competition during and after the Cold War. Piotr is editor-in-chief of In Statu Nascendi—Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations and a Ph.D. Candidate at the Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridiski” (Bulgaria). He holds a Master’s Degree in International Politics & International Relations from the University of Manchester (United Kingdom), and Master Degree in Politics from the University of Warmia and Mazury (Poland). Piotr was also awarded an Erasmus Scholarship from the University of Cyprus in 2007. ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0464-1991 E-mail: [email protected]

MOLLY PRENDERGAST holds a B.A. in history with a minor in Spanish from California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, and an M.A. from the University of Oslo in Peace and Conflict Studies. She worked for the Norwegian Refugee Council, a humanitarian organization helping people forced to flee around the world. Recently, Molly switched over to environmental work based on the realization that climate change and related disasters displace three to ten times more people than conflict or war. Website: https://www.ran.org/staff/molly-prendergast/ E-mail: [email protected]

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216 Biographic Notes

Proofreading: MATTHEW GILL holds an M.A. in Philosophy from Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridiski” and a B.A. in Comparative Literature from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. E-mail: [email protected]

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What We Stand for in Fourteen Different Languages Arabic In Statu Nascendi ‫ﺗﻜ ﻮﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻟ ﻰ ﺗﻄﻤ ﺢ ﺍﻷﻗ ﺮﺍﻥ ﻻﺳ ﺘﻌﺮﺍﺽ ﺟﺪﻳ ﺪﺓ ﻣﺠﻠ ﺔ ﻳﻮﺟ ﺪ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺻ ﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﻛﺎﺩﻳﻤﻴ ﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺤ ﻮﺙ ﺗﺸ ﻤﻞ ﺍﻟﻌ ﺎﻟﻤﻲ ﺍﻟﻄ ﺮﺍﺯ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﻴ ﺔ ﻣﻨﺼ ﺔ‬ ‫ﻔﺔ ﻟ ﺪﺍﺋﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺼﺼ ﺔ‬ ‫ﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴ‬ ‫ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳ‬، ‫ﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳ ﺎﺕ‬ ‫ ﺍﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴ‬، ‫ﻧﻈﺮﻳ ﺔ‬ ‫ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ ﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗ ﺎﺕ‬، ‫ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺟﻴ ﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳ ﺔ‬، ‫ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳ ﻲ ﺍﻟﻘ ﺮﺍﺭ ﺻ ﻨﻊ ﻭﻋﻤﻠﻴ ﺔ‬. ‫ﻔﻲ ﺛﻘ ﺎﻓﻲ ﺍﺟﺘﻤ ﺎﻋﻲ ﻧﻬ ﺞ ﺧ ﻼﻝ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺤﺪﺩﺓ ﻗﻀ ﺎﻳﺎ ﻓ ﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺠﻠ ﺔ ﻭﺗﺤﻘ ﻖ‬ ‫ﻭﻓﻠﺴ‬ ‫ﺜﺮﻭﺑﻮﻟﻮﺟﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺎﺕ ﺗﻌﻘﻴ ﺪ ﺣﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻤ ﺪﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﻮﻋ ﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺪﻳ ﺪ ﻧ ﻮﻉ ﻟ ﺮﻓﻊ ﻭﺃﻧ‬ ‫ ﻭﺍﻟﺤ ﺮﺏ ﺍﻻﺳ ﺘﻘﺮﺍﺭ ﻭﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺻ ﺮﺓ‬، ‫ﺣﻴﻮﻳﺎ ً ﺩﻭﺭﺍ ً ”ﺍﻻﻧﻄ ﻼﻕ ﻣﺮﺣﻠ ﺔ“ ﺗﻠﻌ ﺐ ﺣﻴ ﺚ‬. Bulgarian In Statu Nascendi (Ин Стату Насенди)–е нов академичен журнал, който се стреми да бъде научна платформа от световна класа, включваща оригинални академични изследвания, посветени на политическата философия, културните изследвания, теорията на международните отношения, външната политика и политическия процес на вземане на решения. Журналът изследва конкретни проблеми чрез социално-културен, философски и антропологичен подход за издигане на нов тип гражданска осведоменост относно сложността на съвременните кризи, нестабилност и военни ситуации, където “състоянието на зараждане” (in statu nascendi) играе жизненоважна роля. Belarusian In Statu Nascendi–гэта новы часопіс, які рэцэнзуюць эксперты. Мэта часопіса—стаць навуковай пляцоўкай сусветнага ўзроўню. In Statu Nascendi публікуе акадэмічныя даследаванні, прысвечаныя палітычнай філасофіі, культурным пытанням, тэорыі міжнародных адносінаў, замежнай палітыцы і палітычнаму працэсу прыняцця рашэнняў. Задача публікуемых даследаванняў—спрыяць фарміраванню новага тыпу грамадзянскай свядомасці ва ўмовах сучаснага крызісу, нестабільнасці і ваенных сітуацый.

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218 Piotr Pietrzak (ed.) Dutch In Statu Nascendi is een nieuw wetenschappelijk getoetst tijdschrift dat ernaar streeft een academisch platform van wereldklasse te zijn en te vormen. Het omvat origineel academisch onderzoek met een focus naar politieke filosofie, culturele studies, theorie van internationale betrekkingen, buitenlands beleid en het politieke besluitvormingsproces. Het tijdschrift onderzoekt specifieke kwesties door middel van een sociaal-culturele, filosofische en antropologische benadering om een nieuw type van burgerbewustzijn op te wekken. Aangaande de complexiteit van de hedendaagse crisis, instabiliteit en oorlogssituaties, waarbij het ‘stadium van wording’ een vitale rol speelt. French In Statu Nascendi est un nouveau journal des revues par les pairs qui aspire à devenir une plate-forme scolaire globale. Il englobe des recherches académiques dédiées aux: Philosophie politique, études culturels, théories des relations internationales, politiques étrangères et les procédés des décisions politiques. Le journal étudie des questions particulières, par une approche socioculturelle, philosophique et anthropologique, afin d’accroître un nouveau type de sensibilisation civique concernant la crise contemporaine; sa complexité, instabilité et situations de guerre, dont la phase de lancement joue un rôle vital. German In Statu Nascendi ist eine neue, wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift, die Beiträge der politischen Philosophie, Kulturwissenschaften, Theorie internationaler Beziehungen, Außenpolitik und politischer Entscheidungsprozesse veröffentlicht. Die Artikel werden im Peer-Review-Verfahren geprüft und untersuchen konkrete Themen mithilfe einer soziokulturellen, philosophischen und anthropologischen Herangehensweise. Ziel ist es, zu einem neuen Bürgerbewusstsein über die Komplexität von gegenwärtigen Krisen, Instabilität und Kriegssituationen, bei denen die Phase der Entstehung eine wesentliche Rolle spielt, beizutragen. Greek Το επιστημονικό περιοδικό In Statu Nascendi δημοσιεύει μετά από κρίση πρωτότυπες μελέτες πάνω σε θέματα Πολιτικής Φιλοσοφίας, Κοινωνικών και Πολιτισμικών Σπουδών, Θεωρίες Διεθνών Σχέσεων, Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής, Πολιτικής Διπλωματίας και Ανθρωπολογίας. Το περιοδικό πραγματεύεται κυρίως εξειδικευμένα άρθρα που προσεγγίζουν πτυχές της κοινωνικο—In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

What We Stand for in Fourteen Different Languages

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πολιτισμικής, φιλοσοφικής και ανθρωπολογικής επιστήμης και έρευνας με σκοπό την διαμόρφωση ορθής πολιτικής και κοινωνικής συνείδησης σχετικά με την πολυπλοκότητα της σύγχρονης ‘κρίσης’, την αστάθεια και τις εμπόλεμες καταστάσεις που αναδύονται στην σύγχρονη πραγματικότητα, όπου το πλαίσιο του κοινωνικο-πολιτικού γίγνεσθαι χρίζει ιδιαίτερης αναφοράς. Italian In Statu Nascendi–è una nuova rivista accademica che aspira a essere una internazionale piattaforma di ricerca dedicata allo studio di tematiche legate alla Filosofia Politica, gli Affari Internazionali, gli Studi Culturali e le diverse Teorie delle Relazioni Internazionali. La rivista analizza tali specificità tematiche attraverso un approccio socio-culturale, filosofico e antropologico per costruir una nuova consapevolezza civile sulle tante complessità della società odierna, della sua instabilità e conflittualità, all’interno della quale nuovi “processi-in-divenire” interagiscono tra loro in modo rilevante Polish In Statu Nascendi jest nowym recenzowanym czasopismem akademickim, które aspiruje do światowej klasy platformy naukowej obejmującej oryginalne badania naukowe poświęcone kręgowi zagadnień zwiazanych z filozofią polityczną, kulturoznawstwem, teorią stosunków międzynarodowych, polityką zagraniczną i złożonością współczesnego procesu decyzyjnego. To czasopismo analizuje konkretne zagadnienia za pomocą podejścia społeczno kulturowego, filozoficznego i antropologicznego, w celu podniesienia poziom świadomości obywatelskiej na temat złożoności współczesnych sytuacji kryzysowych, niestabilnosci miedzynarodowej, i wojen w których kluczową rolę odgrywa „etap stawania się”. Russian In Statu Nascendi–это новый журнал, рецензируемый экспертами, цель которого–стать научной платформой мирового уровня. In Statu Nascendi публикует академические исследования, посвященные политической философии, культурным вопросам, теории международных отношений, зарубежной политике и политическому процессу принятия решений. Задача публикуемых исследований– способствовать формированию нового типа гражданской осознанности в условиях современного кризиса, нестабильности и военных ситуаций.

—In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

220 Piotr Pietrzak (ed.) Spanish In Statu Nascendi es una nueva revista con revisión paritaria que aspira a convertirse en una plataforma de investigación académica mundial dedicada al campo de la Filosofía Política, Estudios Culturales, teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales, Política Exterior, y procesos de toma de decisión política. Esta revista analiza asuntos de relevancia internacional a través de un enfoque socio-cultural, filosófico y antropológico. Nuestro objetivo es crear un nuevo tipo de conciencia cívica que tenga en cuenta la complejidad de las crisis coetáneas y la problemática de la inestabilidad y la guerra en las que el ‘stageof-becoming’ juega un rol crucial. Turkish In Statu Nascendi–Siyaset Felsefesi, Kültürel Çalışmalar, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Dış Politika ve siyasi Karar verme sürecine adanmış özgün akademik araştırmaları kapsayan dünya çapında bir akademik platform olmayı amaçlayan yeni bir hakemli dergidir. Dergi, “kriz aşamasının” hayati bir rol oynadığı çağdaş kriz, istikrarsızlık ve savaş durumlarının karmaşıklığı hakkında yeni bir sivil farkındalık yaratmak için sosyo-kültürel, felsefi ve antropolojik bir yaklaşımla belirli konuları araştırıyor. Ukrainian In Statu Nascendi–це новий рецензований науковий журнал метою якого стати науковою платформою на світовому рівні. Опубліковані академічні вивчення присвячені політичній філософії, культурології, міжнародним відносинам та зарубіжній політиці, і також політичному процесу прийняття питань. Вивчатимуться дослідження соціальнокультурними, філософськими та антропологічними підходами та направлені на створення нового виду громадської свідомості в умовах сучасного кризисну в світі, нестабільності та військових ситуацій.

—In Statu Nascendi 2:2 (2019)—

 

Coming up next on In Statu Nascendi In Statu Nascendi is a peer-reviewed journal that aspires to be a world-class scholarly platform encompassing original academic research dedicated to the circle of Political Philosophy, Cultural Studies, International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy, and the political decision-making process. The journal investigates specific issues through a socio-cultural, philosophical, and anthropological approach to raise a new type of civic awareness about the complexity of contemporary crisis, instability, and warfare situations, where the “stage-of-becoming” plays a vital role. Issue 2020: 1 comprises, amongst others, the following interviews & articles:

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Interview with Dr. Zoran Kojcic The Phenomenology of Women. On Female Discourse in Julia Kristeva and Simone de Beauvoir. Paul Tillich’s critical and political theology and his critique of modernity Cross-language Relation. The Implications of Relativity in Translation and vice versa. Dueling with Disinformation: Disinformation and Information and Communication Technologies in the Middle East

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