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English Pages [343] Year 2000
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WITH AM INTRODUCTION BY SAM TANENHAUS, AUTHOR OF "WHITTAKER CHAMBERS
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)Sr in concentration
them. They had given their entire
had died
of Russia so long
had been
sped toward the Finnish border
ment, thinking of the
Mos-
my
my
As the
compart-
comrades,
camps, almost
my
all
of
build a better world, and
not under the bullets of an enemy but
it.
left to
respect or admire?
What
hero or heroine
of our revolution has not been broken and destroyed?
I
could
think of but few. All those whose personal integrity was absolutely
above question had gone
down
as "traitors," "spies," or
comxv
W. G. Krivitsky
mon
War when
the Civil a
my mind
criminals. Pictures flashed through
same
these
and
"traitors"
—
pictures of
"spies" faced death
thousand times without flinching; of the arduous days that
and the superhuman demands
lowed, of industrialization
upon
all
the rations to keep us alive. all
before
Through
fol-
made
barely
had
—sweeping
And then the great purge who had labored hardest
destroying those
it,
which man should no longer exploit
state in
when we
of us, of collectivization and famine
it
the long years of struggle
all
sacrifice, that a
last vestige
of the old has been destroyed. But could
Bolshevik Revolution to destroy
learned to repeat
of the old society can
only be attained with moral as well as physical
world can not come into being until the
man.
his fellow
we had
to ourselves that a victory over injustices
to build a
new
of the habits
be necessary for a
it
Bolsheviks? Was
it
the Bol-
shevik Revolution that was destroying them, or had that revolution
itself
then, but
I
long since perished?
asked them
.
.
At the age of thirteen ment.
It
was
did not answer these questions
.
I
had entered the working-class move-
a half-mature, half-childish act.
melodies of
tive
I
my
I
heard the plain-
mingled with new songs of
suffering race
freedom. But in 19171 was a youngster of eighteen, and the Bolshe-vik Revolution
came
to
me
as
problems of poverty, inequality and vik Party with faith as a I
had
my
whole
soul.
weapon with which
I
an absolute solution of
injustice.
I
joined the Bolshe-
seized the Marxist
to assault the
and Leninist
wrongs against which
instinctively rebelled.
During
all
the years that
I
served the Soviet government
never expected anything more than the right to continue I
never received anything more.
been
me
all
stabilized,
I
enough
after the Soviet
and that twice landed
sixteen to eighteen hours a day,
to cover the
traveling abroad,
my work.
power had
was sent abroad on assignments that exposed
to the danger of death,
worked from
Long
I
most ordinary living expenses.
would
live in
me
in prison.
I
and never earned I
myself,
moderate comfort, but
I
when
did not
my apartment in Moscow heated properly or pay the price of milk for my two-year-old earn enough, even as late as 1935, to keep
xvi
In Stalin's Secret Service
son.
I
was nor
much absorbed
too
and
in a strategic position,
—
my work
in
to
I
had no
desire
—
become one of the new
I
was
privi-
leged bureaucrats with a material stake in defending the Soviet order.
I
defended
it
because
I
believed
it
was leading the way
new and better society. The very fact that my work was concerned with ing
much
of what was happening within
in the small inner ficer
I
world of power
its
politics.
the defense
me from
of the country against foreign enemies prevented
to a
think-
borders and especially
As an
Intelligence of-
saw the external enemies of the Soviet Union much more
closely than cist plots
its
internal conspirators.
that were being hatched
on
I
knew of separatist and
foreign
but
soil,
contact with the intrigues inside the Kremlin.
I
saw
I
was out of
Stalin rise to
undivided power while Lenin's closer comrades perished
hands of the
state
they had created. But like
many
Fas-
others,
at the I
reas-
sured myself with the thought that whatever might be the mistakes of the leadership, the Soviet
Union was
still
sound and was
the hope of mankind.
There were occasions when even occasions when,
if I
new
have chosen a
when
starvation,
and that
But always events
and
I
meant I
life
knew
might part
in the service of Stalin.
that Stalin's ruthless policies
for the
had caused
it,
state's help,
I
Germany and there destroy everything human spirit. Stalin was an enemy of Hitler in
remained in the service of Stalin.
In February, 1934, a similar
Marino Sanatorium
dilemma confronted me and
I
taking
my annual month's rest at
in the province
of Kursk, Central Russia.
made the same choice. I was then the
I
some other
was deliberately withholding the
saw Hitler take power and
me
in
the Russian people were dying by the millions of
Stalin
that
was badly shaken,
could have seen any hope elsewhere, course.
of the world would conspire to keep In 1933,
this faith
Marino was once the palace of Prince Buryatin, the conqueror of the Caucasus.
The
palace was in the resplendent style of Versailles,
surrounded by beautiful English parks and
torium had an excellent
staff
artificial lakes.
The sana-
of physicians, athletic instructors,
nurses and servants. Within walking distance of
its
enclosed xvi 1
W. G. Krivitsky
grounds was the
state
guests with food.
A
passing
on the
farm where peasants labored to provide
its
sentry at the gate kept the peasants from tres-
enclosure.
One morning soon
after
my arrival
I
walked with a compan-
The
ion to the village where these peasants lived.
beheld was appalling. Half-naked
little
spectacle
I
brats ran out of dilapi-
dated huts to beg us for a piece of bread. In the peasants' cooperative store was neither food nor fuel
— nothing
Everywhere the most abject poverty dismayed
my
depressed
was
bitterly cold,
ward the window.
—
I
saw the
the bezprizornii
—
of
an excellent supper.
after
but within, a roaring fireplace gave us
cozy warmth. By some chance
dren
and
eyes
in the brilliantly lighted dining hall
Marino, everyone was chatting gaily it
my
spirits.
That evening seated Outside,
to be had.
turned suddenly and looked to-
I
feverish eyes of
their little
cold panes. Soon others followed
hungry peasant
chil-
faces glued like pictures to the
my glance,
servant that the intruders be driven
off.
and gave orders
Almost every night
a
to a
few
of these children would succeed in eluding the sentry and sneak
up
to the palace in search
of something to
eat. I
sometimes slipped
out of the dining hall with bread for them, but
I
did this secretly
among us. Soviet officials against human suffering:
because the practice was frowned upon
have developed a stereotyped defense
"We wayside.
are
We
to socialism. Many must fall by the must be well fed and must recuperate from our la-
on the hard road
few weeks each
bors, enjoying, for a others, because
We
we
are the builders
tinue
on the hard
year,
comforts
still
denied to
are the builders of a Joyous Life in the future.
of socialism.
road.
We
must keep
Any unfortunates who
in shape to con-
cross
our path
will
be taken care of in due time. In the meanwhile, out of our way!
Don't pester us with your crumb, the goal
itself
may
it
runs.
And
peace of
mind
in that
So
it
is
suffering! If
we
XVlll
you
a
never be reached."
obvious that people protecting their
way
are
not going to be too squeamish
about the turns in the road, or inquire too really leading to the
stop to drop
Joyous Life or not.
critically
whether
it is
In Stalin's Secret Service
was an
It
from Marino. the
Moscow
room,
and
I
and
wandered into the
third-class
never be able to obliterate from
my mind
to spare,
shall
I
The
saw.
waiting
children, peasants
I
room was jammed
—about
full
was so
frightful that for a fleeting instant
flying over these tortured beings.
—on
thought
Many of them
their
saw bats
I
naked
lay almost
room. Others were manifestly dying of typhus
in the cold
Hunger, pain, desolation, or fering,
I
women, way The scene
of men,
hundred of them
six
herd of cattle from one prison camp to another.
like a
men
my way home
express. After eating a hearty breakfast in the lunch-
had time
I still
reached Kursk on
I
entered the railway station to await the arrival of
I
waiting room.
what
morning when
icy
were on every
just
While
face.
dumb I
half-dead submissive suf-
stood there, hard-faced militia-
of the ogpu undertook to rouse and herd them out
drove of
pushing and kicking the
cattle,
most too weak
to walk.
One
fever.
old man,
and those
stragglers I
saw
as
like a al-
turned away,
I
would never
rise
tachment,
knew, of the horde of millions of honest peasant
families
I
whom
longer means
from the
floor.
them
Stalin, calling
much more
This was but one mournful de-
"kulaks," a
name which no
than victim, had rooted up and trans-
ported and destroyed. I
also
ruary,
knew, however, that
1934
shelling the
had
—
at that
very
moment
Fascist field pieces in the streets
—
it
of Vienna were
model workers' apartment houses which the
built. Fascist
workers in their
was Feb-
socialists
machine guns were mowing down the Austrian last
desperate stand for socialism. Everywhere
Fascism was on the march. Everywhere the forces of reaction
were gaining ground. The Soviet Union of mankind. is,
of Stalin,
I
seemed the
sole
remained in the service of the Soviet Union
its
Two years
still
hope
—
that
master.
later
and Hitler pour
came the Spanish
their
men and
tragedy,
and
I
saw Mussolini
munitions to the aid of Franco,
Blum of France, a Socialist, was drawn in on game of "non-intervention" which doomed the
while Premier Leon the hypocritical
Spanish Republic.
and not enough
I
saw
—come
Stalin
—
belatedly to be sure,
and
timidly,
to the aid of the beleaguered republic.
I
xix
W. G. Krivitsky
still felt
that, as a choice
between
was fighting on the
evils, I
right
side.
But then came the turning point.
watched
I
Stalin,
while col-
lecting hard cash for his belated help, drive a knife into the
of the Loyalist government.
back
saw the purge assume insane pro-
I
Moscow, sweeping away the entire Bolshevik Party. I transported to Spain. And at the same time, from my van-
portions in
saw
it
tage point in the Intelligence Service,
of secret friendship to Hitler.
I
saw
I
Stalin extend the
saw him, while thus paying court
to the Nazi leader, execute the great generals of the
Tukhachevsky, and the other chiefs with I
had worked
hand
Red Army,
whom and under whom
of the Soviet Union and of
for years in the defense
socialism.
—
And then Stalin made his final demand upon me the demand he made upon all responsible officials who wished to escape the firing squads of the OGPU.
by delivering a close comrade into offer.
what
I I
its
must prove
I
clutches.
I
my
loyalty
declined the
I forced my eyes to remain open to my mind to know that, whether there
broke with Stalin.
had
seen.
I
forced
was any other hope in the world or not, tarian despot
who
differed
I
was serving
from Hitler only
phrases, the relic of his Marxist training
—
a totali-
in the Socialist
Socialist phrases to
which he hypocritically clung. I
the
broke with Stalin, and began to
fall
of 1937,
when he was
tell
the truth about him, in
successfully deceiving public opin-
ion and the statesmen of both Europe and America with his insincere denunciations of Hitler.
meaning people lions
to
remain
who had perished
Although advised by many well-
silent,
in Stalin's
compulsory famine; the millions
I
spoke out.
compulsory still
I
spoke for the mil-
collectivization
living at forced labor
concentration camps; the hundreds of thousands of
my
shot.
It
took the
final overt act
of
in
former
Bolshevik comrades in prison, the thousands and thousands
had been
and
and
who
Stalin's treachery, his
pact with Hitler, to convince a large public of the madness of hon-
oring him, of closing eyes to his monstrous crimes in the hope that he
xx
might carry a gun
in the armies
of democracy.
In Stalin's Secret Service
Now that Stalin
has
shown
his
hand,
who
time for others
it is
remained silent for shortsighted or strategic reasons, to speak out.
A
few have already done
so.
Luis
De
Araquistain, former ambas-
sador to France of the Loyalist government, has helped to dis-
abuse world opinion as to the character of Stalin's "help" to the
Spanish Republic. Largo Caballero, the former Spanish Premier, has also spoken.
There of them
are others
is
Romain
upon whom
Rolland.
rests
The
One
an obligation to speak.
help that this renowned author
gave to totalitarianism by covering the horrors of Stalin's dictatorship with the mantle of his great prestige,
many
years Rolland
incalculable. For
conducted a correspondence with
who was
Gorky, the noted Russian novelist. Gorky,
comradely with
is
Stalin,
and even exercised
at
a restraining
Maxim
one time
hand upon
him, no doubt played a part in bringing Rolland into the camp of the fellow travelers.
Gorky was
During the
last
months of his
life,
however,
him permission
a virtual prisoner. Stalin refused
to
go
abroad for his health. His mail was censored, and by special order the letters from Stalin's
head
Romain Rolland were
secretary,
and
intercepted by Stetsky, then
filed in Stalin's cabinet.
quieted at his friend's failure to answer his other friend, the assistant director of the
asking what was the matter. During the
wrote to an-
Moscow Art Theater, Moscow treason trial
last
the world was told that Gorky, supposedly
poisoned by Yagoda. At the time of this
letters,
Rolland, dis-
still
trial,
Stalin's friend,
was
in an interview with
the eminent writer Boris Souvarine, published in
La
Fleche,
ex-
I
Romain Rolland why his letters had not been delivered. I asked him to make a statement on the fact that his letters to Maxim Gorky were intercepted by Stalin. He remained silent. Will
plained to
he speak
now
that Stalin has openly joined hands with Hitler?
Eduard Benes, the former president of Czechoslovakia, has an account to
also
settle. When Tukhachevsky and the Red Army chiefs
were executed in June,
1
937, the shock to Europe was so great, the
disbelief in their guilt so stubborn, that Stalin
was forced
to seek a
channel to convince Western democratic governments that the
conqueror of Kolchak and Denikine was a Nazi
spy.
At
Stalin's
xxi
W. G. Krivitsky
direction the OGPU, in collaboration with the Intelligence Service
of the Red Army, prepared a dossier of the alleged evidence against the
Red generals
for transmission to the
Czech government. Eduard
Benes was then so certain that Stalin would fight for Czechoslovakia that he apparently took this evidence at Let Benes
now
recall
and re-examine,
face value.
in the light
events, the character of the evidence prepared
the
its
of present
by the experts of
OGPU and decide whether he is free to remain silent. Now that it has become painfully clear that the worst way of
fighting Hitler
is
to mitigate the crimes of Stalin,
were maneuvered into that
folly
years have taught us anything,
ought to speak.
it is
that the
all
those
who
If these last tragic
march of totalitarian
barbarism cannot be halted by strategic retreats to positions of half-truth
which I
and falsehood. While no one can
civilized
think that
all
Europe
by
New York,
xxi 1
its
man
those not destined for the
will agree that truth
called
will restore to
real
must be the
first
dictate the
method by
his dignity
and worth,
camp of Hitler and Stalin,
weapon, and murder must be
name.
October,
1939
W. G. Krivitsky
I
Stalin Appeases Hitler
DURING blood
the night of June 30, 1934,
purge broke out and while
Stalin called in the Kremlin.
it
when was
Hitler's first
still
going on,
an extraordinary session of the Politbureau
Even before the news of the Hitler purge reached
the wide world, Stalin had decided
upon
his next
move
in rela-
tion to the Nazi regime. I
was then
at
my
post in the Intelligence Department of the
General Staff of the Red
was impending
in
Army
in
Moscow.
Germany. All our confidential dispatches had
prepared us for an outbreak. As soon
we began
as Hitler
to receive constant bulletins
That night
I
We knew that a crisis launched
his purge,
from Germany.
was working feverishly with a
staff
of assistants,
Politbureau
War Commissar Voroshilov. nonmembers summoned to that meeting of the were my chief, General Berzin; Maxim Litvinov,
Commissar
for Foreign Affairs; Karl
summarizing our information
Among
the
for
Radek, then director of
W. G. Krivitsky
the information bureau of the Central
Committee of the Com-
munist Party; and A. C. Artusov, chief of the Foreign Division of the ogpu.
The emergency meeting of the Politbureau had been
probable consequences of the Hitler purge,
to consider the
and
its effects
called
upon
Soviet foreign policy. Confidential informa-
tion in our possession
showed
that
two extreme wings of Hitler's
opponents were involved. There was the group led by Captain
modThey were dreaming of a "second revolution.'' The other group was composed of officers of the German army, under the leadership of Generals Schleicher and Bredow This circle
Rohm,
consisting of Nazi radicals dissatisfied with Hitler's
erate policies.
had looked forward hands with the
to a restoration
Rohm wing
of the monarchy.
joined
purpose of unseating Hitler,
for the
Our
each side hoping to emerge triumphant in the end.
special
from Germany brought the news, however, that the gar-
bulletins
risons in the metropolitan centers
that the
It
main body of army
remained
officers
loyal to Hitler
was true
to the
and
government.
In Western Europe and America, Hitler's purge was widely interpreted as a weakening of the Nazi power. In Soviet circles, too, there
were those
who wished
collapse of Hitler's rule. Stalin
up the discussion
"The events
had no such
it
foreshadowed the
illusions.
He summed
at the Politbureau as follows:
in
the Nazi regime.
to believe
Germany do not
On
at all indicate the collapse
the contrary, they are
bound
of
to lead to the
consolidation of that regime, and to the strengthening of Hitler himself."
General Berzin came back from the Kremlin session with
this
dictum of Stalin. In
that
my
anxiety to learn the decision of the Politbureau
I
had
We had a strict rule no one, not even the Commissar of War himself, could take
stayed
up
all
night awaiting Berzin's return.
confidential state papers
would have
The from
to
home with him, and
come back
to the
course of Soviet policy toward Nazi
Stalin's
dictum.
The
I
knew
that Berzin
department.
Germany
Politbureau decided at
all
followed
costs to in-
In Stalin's Secret Service
duce Hitler to make a deal with the Soviet government.
Stalin
had
always believed in coming to terms early with a strong enemy.
The
night of June 30 convinced
new course
ture in his policy toward
Nazi regime during the
The
He
six years
of
recognized in Hitler a
idea prevailing
and
Hitler
Stalin
He
Germany.
only decided to redouble
appease Hitler. His whole policy toward the
his past efforts to
direction.
him of Hitler's strength. It was no It marked no revolutionary depar-
for Stalin, however.
up
its
tent suitor
was the
to the recent
Russian-German pact that
were mortal enemies, was pure myth.
was
There was enmity on
It
was a
and the vapors of
The true picture of their relations was who would not be discouraged by
suitor.
lain in that
real dictator.
distorted picture, created by clever camouflage
propaganda.
had
existence
Hitler's side.
that of a persisrebuffs. Stalin
On Stalin's there
fear.
If
one can speak of a pro-German in the Kremlin,
been that figure
all
along.
right after Lenin's death,
when
He
Nazis strengthened
him
favored cooperation with
and he did not
Hitler rose to power.
On
tions,
a
in his quest for closer
And
must come Stalin's
been a
Berlin.
in the Far East.
respect for the "mighty" totalitar-
he was guided throughout by the rule that one
to terms
with a superior power.
whole international policy during the
series
last six
years has
of maneuvers designed to place him in a favorable
position for a deal with Hitler.
Nations,
bonds with
menace
profound contempt for the "weakling" democratic na-
and an equally profound
ian states.
Germany
alter this basic attitude
the contrary, the triumph of the
In this he was spurred on by the Japanese
He had
Stalin has
when he proposed
When
he joined the League of
the system of collective security,
he sought the hand of France, Britain, intervened in Spain,
flirted
when
with Poland, courted Great
he was calculating every move with
an eye upon Berlin. His hope was to get into such a position that Hitler
A
would
find
it
high point in
advantageous to meet his advances. this Stalin policy
was reached
late in
1936
upon the conclusion of a secret German-Japanese agreement, negotiated behind the smoke screen of the anti-Comintern pact.
— W. G. Krivitsky
The terms of that session, in the
incited
him
secret agreement,
main through
my
which came into
Stalin's
and those of
efforts
my
posstaff,
to a desperate attempt to drive a bargain with Hitler.
Early in 1937 such a deal was actually pending between them.
Nobody knows
to
was anticipated
at that time.
what extent the recent
was two years before
It
his friendly attitude
Stalin
and occupation of the Sudeten world-shaking Nazi conquests. friendly overtures to Hitler.
Hitler
later,
The
began to disclose to the world
toward Germany.
pronouncement following
his first
It
treaty of August, 1939,
On March 10,
areas, giving his
made
of Austria
answer to these
The world was astounded by Stalin's
was dumbfounded when, three days
marched into Czechoslovakia.
record of Stalin's policy of appeasement toward Hitler
both the open and the secret record gressive Hitler's policies
—
reveal that the
more
ag-
became, the more Stalin pressed his court-
And the more strenuously Stalin wooed him,
ship.
1939, he
Hitler's annexation
the bolder were
Hitler's aggressions.
Long
man
before the rise of Hitler, or even of Stalin, Soviet-Ger-
cooperation had been dictated by the pressure of events.
Moscow-Berlin
tie
A
had been formed more than ten years be-
Both the Soviet Union and the German republic were then being treated as outcasts; both were in disfavor with the Allies; both opposed the fore Hitler in the Rapallo pact of 1922.
Versailles system.
mutual It is
was a
traditional business
bonds and
now common knowledge that during those ten years there arrangement between the Reichswehr the German and the Red Army. Soviet Russia permitted the German
—
secret
—
army
They had
interests.
republic to evade the Versailles prohibitions against training lery
and tank
officers,
artil-
and developing aviation and chemical war-
These things were done on Soviet
The Red Army, on German military knowledge. The two armies exchanged information. It is also common knowledge that trade between Soviet Russia and Germany flourished during that decade. The Germans invested capital and fare.
the other hand, got the benefit of expert
soil.
In Stalin's Secret Service
operated concessions in the Soviet Union.
The
Soviet govern-
ment imported machinery and engineering personnel from Germany.
Such was the situation when
menacing
Hitler's
figure arose.
Some seven or eight months before his ascent to power, in the early summer of 1932, I met in Danzig one of the high officers of the German general staff, a confirmed monarchist who came from Berlin expressly to meet me. He was an old-school military man and believed in the restoration of the German Empire in cooperation with Russia. I
asked this officer for his opinion on Germany's policy in the
event Hitler became the head of the government. Hitler's views, as outlined in his officer gave
me
his analysis
We
discussed
book, Mein Kampf.The
German
of coming developments, and con-
come and do his job. And then we, the army, will make short work of him." I asked the officer if he would be good enough to submit his cluded: "Let Hitler
views in writing for
do
so.
me
to forward to
His report created a
stir in
Moscow, and he agreed
Kremlin
view there was that military and economic
and Russia were disregard them.
Bolshevism
as a
The
circles. ties
prevailing
between Germany
so deep-rooted that Hitler could not possibly
Moscow understood
Hitler's
maneuver on the road
fulminations against
to power.
They had
their
function. But they could not change the basic interests of the countries,
which were bound
Stalin himself derives
German
officer.
to
Although
sure toward the east," he
to
make
two
for cooperation.
much comfort from fully alive to the
was habituated
the report of the
Nazi doctrine of "presto the tradition
of col-
Red Army and the Reichswehr, and had a wholesome respect for the German army and its leadership under General Von Seeckt. The report of the German staff officer dovetailed with his own views. Stalin looked upon the Nazi movement primarily as a reaction to the Versailles peace. It seemed to him that all Germany would do under Hitler was to throw off the shackles of Versailles. The Soviet government had been the first laboration between the
to
hammer
at
them. Indeed,
Moscow and
Berlin
had
originally
W. G. Krivitsky
been drawn together by their of the
common
opposition to the rapacity
allied victors.
For these reasons, Stalin to break the secret his best to
keep
it
made no
Berlin-Moscow
in force.
It
effort after the rise
On
tie.
of Hitler
the contrary, he tried
was Hitler who, during
his first three
Red and He only became
years, gradually dissolved the intimate link between the
the
German
armies. But this did not deter Stalin.
more assiduous in the pursuit of Hitler's friendship. On December 28, 1933, eleven months after Hitler became chancellor, Premier Molotov, speaking before the Congress of
Soviets, asserted Stalin's adherence to the
former German
policy:
"Our
relations
with
Germany have
place in our international relations
cause
on
The
its
.
.
always occupied a distinct .
The
Soviet
part for any change of policy toward
Union has no
Germany."
following day, before the same Congress, Foreign
Com-
missar Litvinov went even further than Molotov in pleading for
an understanding with outlined in ries.
He
Hitler. Litvinov described the
Mein Kampffov
the reconquest of all
spoke of the Nazi determination, "by
pave the way for expansion in the
east,
program
German
fire
territo-
and sword,
without stopping
to
at the
borders of the Soviet Union, and to enslave the peoples of this
Union."
"We and
And
he went on to
say:
Germany by
have been connected with
political relations for ten years.
try
which would have nothing
its
consequences.
economic
We were the only great coun-
do with the
We renounced the
this treaty reserved for us.
foreign trade.
to
close
rights
Versailles Treaty
and
and advantages which
Germany assumed
first
place in our
Both Germany and ourselves have derived extraor-
dinary advantages from the political and economic relation established
between
tee: 'Especially
many was
us. (President Kalinin,
Germany!')
able to speak
On
of the Executive
Commit-
the basis of these relations, Ger-
more boldly and confidently to her victors
of yesterday."
This hint, emphasized by President Kalinin's exclamation, was designed to remind Hitler of Soviet Russia's help in enabling
him
In Stalin's Secret Service
to challenge the Versailles victors. Litvinov then
made
the follow-
ing formal declaration:
we want to have the best relations. The Soviet Union and Germany will gain nothing by benefit from such relations. We, on our side, have no desire for "With Germany,
as
with other
states,
expansion, either in the west or the east or in any other direction.
We would like to
hear
Hitler did not say
Germany it.
But
say the
same thing
to us."
that did not deter Stalin.
It
encour-
aged him to a more strenuous courtship of the Nazi regime.
On
January 26, 1934, Stalin himself, addressing the Seven-
Communist
teenth
Party Congress, continued the drive for an
appeasement of Hitler. Hitler had then been year.
He had
rebuffed
all
of Moscow's
in
power
exactly
political advances,
one
although
he had entered into a trade deal on favorable credit terms with Soviet Russia. Stalin interpreted this as a sign of political
He
will.
referred to those
good
Nazi elements which favored a return to
"the policy of the ex-Kaiser of
Germany, who
at
one time occu-
pied the Ukraine, undertook a march against Leningrad, and trans-
formed the
Baltic countries into
There had been a change, he
an encampment for
German
said, in
this
policy,
march."
which he
attributed not to the theories of National Socialism, but to a desire to its
cist
avenge Versailles.
He denied that Soviet Russia had changed
policy toward Berlin because of "the establishment of a Fas-
regime in Germany," and stretched out his hand to Hitler with
these words:
"Of course we gime
in
are far
from enthusiastic about the
Germany. But Fascism
is
not the issue here,
Fascist reif
only for
the reason that Fascism, in Italy for example, did not prevent the
Soviet
Union from
establishing
good
relations with that coun-
try." Stalin's
outstretched
hand was ignored
in Berlin. Hitler
had
other ideas on the subject. But Stalin would not be discouraged.
He
only decided upon a change of method. Viewing the Nazi
agitation for an anti-Soviet bloc as a Hitler,
he resolved to respond to
it
maneuver on the part of
with a counter-maneuver.
Henceforth, the Soviet government would appear
as
an upholder
W. G. Krimtsky of the Versailles system, would join the League of Nations, would even associate with the anti-German bloc.
The
threat involved in
such a course, Stalin thought, would bring Hitler to his senses.
pave the way for
Stalin picked a brilliant journalist to
must be remembered that an
ersault. It
had been brought up the
in the belief that the Versailles Treaty
Soviet
band of pirates.
government
in the
There was onlv one
man
It
was no simple task
saw
I
1934
—
munist
to prepare Russian
this
subsequently
for his
tactics.
a great deal of
Radek
in those days
at the
headquarters of the Central
The Inner
Circle in
ing a build-up toward the articles
coming
were to appear
Communist and
—
in
in
the early spring of
Committee of the Com-
Moscow was
then buzzing with
series
Kremlin
of articles form-
policy.
both Pravda and
Soviet organs.
Izvestia, the
They would be
throughout the world and carefully studied in
all
reprinted
European chancel-
Radek's task was to whitewash the Versailles peace, to her-
leries.
ald a
up the
of January, 1937.
trial
about Radek's assignment to prepare a
leading
au-
Versailles.
and world opinion
Party.
The
was
and foreign con-
man who
plaved such a tragic role in the great
change of
its
Union who could do
sumption. That was Karl Radek, the
Radek
to dress
costume of a defender of the in the Soviet
publicitv stunt adequately both for domestic
Stalin picked
som-
entire Soviet generation
most pernicious instrument ever drawn up, and that
thors were a
talk
this
new
thizers
era of friendship
with
Paris, to
persuade Soviet sympa-
abroad that such a stand was harmonious with
commu-
nism, and at the same time to leave the door open for an agree-
ment with Germany. I
was
knew, because of my frequent
in daily consultation
with
calls at
Stalin.
Radek's
office, that
he
Sometimes he would dash
over to Stalin's office several times a day. Every phrase he wrote
was subject
to Stalin's personal supervision.
every sense a joint labor of
While
efforts
articles
were in
Stalin.
these articles were in preparation,
was keeping on with April, he
Radek and
The
Commissar Litvinov
toward an agreement with
Hitler. In
proposed to Germany a joint undertaking, to preserve
Secret Service
In Stalin's
and guarantee the independence and states. Berlin rejected
of the Baltic
inviolability
the proposal.
The Radek article was
hailed widely as foreshadowing a Soviet
turn toward France and the Little Entente, and away from Ger-
many. "German Fascism and Japanese imperialism," wrote Radek, of the world
"are in a struggle for a redivision
—
a struggle di-
rected against the Soviet Union, against France, Poland, Czecho-
Romania, and the
slovakia,
United States of America.
Baltic states; against
And
British imperialism
direct this struggle exclusively against the Soviet
At that
I
time
this
I
had quite
was familiar with
Radek would thing
loose a flood of talk:
Union."
He knew made some remark about
I
"Only
Germany. What
the realities are something
Germany
like to
it
was creating
in
circles.
let
ever break with
—
would
a conversation with Radek.
his assignment.
our "new policy" and spoke of the impression
uninformed
China and the
else.
fools can
imagine we
am writing here is one No one can give us what I
has given us. For us to break with
Germany
is
simply
impossible."
Radek continued me. very
to discourse along lines only too familiar to
He spoke of our relations much in the saddle even
big business in
Germany
with the
under
—was not
industrialists? Surely Hitler
German
trade with us. These
two
thumb of the
against the general
Russia. Surely Hitler
business circles,
forces
army, which was
of our relations with
Hitler under the
would not go
which favored cooperation with cross swords with
German
Hitler,
staff,
would not
who were doing a large
pillars
of German-Soviet
who thought
that Soviet Russia
were the
relations.
He denounced
as idiots those
should turn against
Communists and its
one thing. interests
Its leader,
members were It
because of the Nazi persecution of
Socialists. True, the
many was smashed. sands of
Germany
Communist
Thaelmann, was
Party of Ger-
in prison.
in concentration camps.
was something
else
when one
Thou-
But that was
considered the
vital
of Soviet Russia. Those interests demanded a continua-
tion of the policy of collaboration with the
German
Reich.
W. G. Krivitsky
As with
for the articles
was
facts? It
he was writing, what did they have to do a matter of big politics.
all
was a necessary
It
maneuver. Stalin had no idea of breaking with Germany. contrary, he
was seeking
All of this
to
draw Berlin
On
the
Moscow.
closer to
who were on the None of us dreamed, in the spring with Germany was possible. We all re-
was elementary to those of us
inside of the Kremlin
policy.
of 1934, that a rupture garded the Radek
articles as Stalinist strategy.
Litvinov went off on a tour of the European capitals, ostensibly in the interests of the so-called Eastern Locarno pact which
was to
insure,
by mutual agreement of
all
the governments con-
cerned, the existing boundaries of the nations in Eastern Europe.
He
Geneva. His
visited
visit filled
the world with rumors of a
coming Franco-Russian rapprochement, crowning the work begun by Radek's
articles.
At the same time,
to assert at the Politbureau:
"And
Stalin
continued doggedly
nevertheless,
we must
get to-
gether with the Germans."
On June
13, 1934, Litvinov
stopped in Berlin to confer with
Baron Konstantin von Neurath, then
Hitler's Foreign Minister.
Germany to join in his proposed Eastern EuroVon Neurath firmly declined the invitation, and bluntly pointed out that such an arrangement would perpetuate the Litvinov invited
pean
pact.
When
Moscow might strengthen its treaties with other nations by military alliances, Von Neurath replied that Germany was willing to risk such an encircle-
Versailles system.
Litvinov intimated that
ment.
The
following day, on June 14, Hitler
met Mussolini
in Venice
for luncheon. Stalin
Through
was not discouraged by
this latest rebuff
the Soviet trade envoys, he
persuade the leading
German
circles
had
all
from
Berlin.
along endeavored to
of his sincerity in seeking an
understanding with Hitler, allowing them to intimate that Mos-
cow would go
a long
way
At the same time,
10
in
making concessions
Stalin tried to
to
Germany.
induce Poland to define her
policy to the disadvantage of Germany.
Nobody knew at that time
which way Poland was going, and
a special session
of the
In Stalin's Secret Service
Politbureau was called to consider this problem. Litvinov and
Radek,
of the Commissariat of War,
as well as the representative
took the view that Poland could be influenced to join hands with
The only one who
Soviet Russia.
disagreed with this view was
Artusov, the chief of the Foreign Division of the ogpu.
He
con-
sidered the prospects of a Polish-Soviet accord illusory. Artusov, a bit rash in thus
opposing the majority of the Politbureau, was cut
short by Stalin himself: "You are misinforming the Politbureau."
This remark of Stalin traveled devil"
Artusov was regarded
quent events proved Artusov fold,
fast in
right.
He had joined the
and the Bolshevik Party
for a while.
in Czarist Russia as a
movement
revolutionary
in 1917.
The "dare-
man. Subse-
Poland joined the German
and that may have saved Artusov
who had taken up residence
the inner circle.
as already a finished
He was
before the
Of small
a Swiss
French teacher.
World War
stature, gray haired,
wearing a goatee, a lover of music, Artusov had married a Russian
woman and
and executed
The
Moscow. In 1937 he was
raised a family in
in the great purge.
fiasco
with Poland increased
need of appeasing
Hitler.
lin his readiness for
He
name but
conviction of the
an amicable arrangement. Hitler's blood purge
demonstrated for the
how
Stalin's
used every avenue to convey to Ber-
of June 30 immensely raised him in
he knew
arrested
first
Stalin's
time to the
men in
to wield power, that he
in deed. If Stalin
estimation. Hitler
was a
had
the Kremlin the that dictator,
had doubts before
not only in
as to Hitler's ability
to rule with an iron hand, to crush opposition, to assert his au-
thority even over potent political
were
now
master, a
dispelled.
man
From now
on, Stalin recognized in Hitler a
up
his challenge to the world. This,
able to back
more than anything
and military forces, those doubts
else,
was responsible
for Stalin's decision
on
the night of June 30 to secure at whatever cost an understanding
with the Nazi regime.
Two weeks gan
Izvestia,
later,
on July
attempted to
15,
raise before Berlin the
bugaboo of
He
ended, how-
Moscow's alignment with the ever,
with
this
Radek, writing in the Soviet or-
Versailles powers.
contrary note: 11
W. G. Krivitsky
"There
is
no reason why
Germany and
Fascist
should not get on together, inasmuch Fascist Italy are
good
Hitler's warning,
many was willing to a
move
The
ence.
much tion.
conveyed through Von Neurath, that Ger-
risk encirclement,
At
Army and
the
trade relations between the therefore looked
Moscow
maneuver
Not
was what sent
as a
his
still
in exist-
two countries were very
upon
Hitler's political course
for a favorable diplomatic posi-
he decided to respond to
to be outflanked,
maneuver of
Stalin off on
this time, the close relations
German army were
alive. Stalin
toward
Union and
as the Soviet
friends."
for counter-encirclement.
between the Red
Soviet Russia
it
by a wide
own.
Litvinov was sent back to Geneva. There in late November,
1934, he negotiated with Pierre Laval a preliminary joint agree-
ment envisaging
a mutual-assistance pact
open
Russia, purposively left col
was signed Four days
in
relations
powers to
Geneva on December
later,
Union never
Soviet
for other
between France and join.
This proto-
5.
Litvinov issued the following statement: "The ceases especially to desire the best all-around
with Germany. Such,
of France towards Germany.
I
am
The
confident,
is
also the attitude
Eastern European pact would
make
possible the creation
tions
between these three countries,
and further development of such as well as
rela-
between the other
signatories to the pact."
To
this
opened
maneuver Hitler did
to the Soviet
couraged.
The
at last
respond. Large credits were
government. Stalin was tremendously en-
financial interests of
Germany
were, in his judg-
ment, forcing Hitler's hand.
Anthony Eden, Pierre Laval and Eduard Benes were visiting Moscow, Stalin scored what he considered his greatest triumph. The Reichbank granted a long-term loan In the spring of 1935, while
of 200,000,000 gold marks to the Soviet government.
On the evening of August 2, other
members of his
Division of the OGPU.
on 12
his
famous
1935,
staff at the It
first flight
1
was with Artusov and the
Lubianka
offices
of the Foreign
was on the eve of Levanevsky's take-off across the
North Pole from Moscow
to
In Stalin's Secret Service
We
San Francisco. Levanevsky and
his
were
all
waiting for a car to take us to see
two companions
start for
were waiting and looking up papers in the relations with the
America. While
safes,
we
the subject of our
Nazi regime came up. Artusov produced a
highly confidential report just received from one of our leading agents in Berlin.
worrying
Stalin:
It
was prepared
in
answer to the question
What and how strong are the
forces in
Germany
favoring an accord with the Soviet Union?
After an exceptionally interesting review of the internal eco-
nomic and
political conditions in
Germany, of the elements of
possible discontent, of Berlin's relations with France
and other
powers, and of the dominant influences surrounding Hitler, our
correspondent arrived "All
are
at this conclusion:
of the Soviet attempts to appease and conciliate Hitler
doomed. The main
obstacle to an understanding with
cow is Hitler himself." The report made a profound impression upon logic
and
boss" took
ing
seemed unanswerable.
facts it.
Artusov remarked that
Germany remained unshaken. "Do you know what the boss
of
us. Its
We wondered how the Stalin's
"big
optimism concern-
said at the last
Politbureau?" Artusov observed with a
quoted
all
Mos-
meeting of the
wave of the hand. And he
Stalin:
"Well, now, us such loans?
how can Hitler make war on us when he has granted impossible. The business circles in Germany
It's
are too powerful,
and they
In September, 1935,
are in the saddle."
I left
for
Western Europe
to take
up
my
new post as Chief of the Military Intelligence there. Within a month I
flew back to
Moscow.
My hurried
return trip was caused by an
extraordinary development. I
discovered, in taking over our Intelligence network, that one
of our agents in
Germany had come upon
the
trail
of secret ne-
gotiations between the Japanese military attache in Berlin, Lieu-
tenant General Hiroshi Oshima, and Baron Joachim von Ribbentrop, then Hitler's unofficial minister for special foreign relations.
13
W. G. Krivitsky
I
decided that these negotiations were a matter of such para-
mount concern
to the Soviet
ceptional attention
no routine
affair. I
our disposal. For
on
government that they required
my part. To watch
their progress
needed for the task the boldest and best this
purpose
came back
headquarters.
I
sary authority
and means
to
I
returned to
Moscow
Holland armed with
to pursue to the bitter
all
ex-
would be
men
at
to consult
the neces-
end the quest
for
information on the Oshima-Ribbentrop conversations.
These conversations were carried on outside ordinary diplo-
The Japanese ambassador in Berlin and the German Foreign Office were not involved. Von Ribbentrop, Hitler's matic channels.
envoy extraordinary, was handling the matter privately with the Japanese general. By the end of 1935, the information in possession tiations
showed beyond
a
shadow of doubt
my
that the nego-
were progressing toward a definite objective.
We knew,
of course, that that objective was to checkmate the Soviet
Union.
We also knew that the Japanese
to
The Tokyo
militarists
been anx-
special anti-
had shown themselves willing
go to any lengths to obtain from Berlin
patents in
for years
and models of Germany's
ious to secure the plans aircraft guns.
army had
all
weapons of warfare. This was the
the latest technical
starting point for the
German-Japanese negotiations. Stalin kept in close
touch with developments. Apparently
Moscow decided to try to spike the negotiations by publicity. in January, 1936, reports
Early
began to appear in the Western Euro-
pean press that some kind of secret agreement had been concluded between
Germany and Japan.
On January
mier Molotov referred publicly to these reports. Berlin
10, Soviet Pre-
Two
and Tokyo denied that there was any substance
days
later,
in the ru-
mors.
The only
effect
of the publicity was to increase the secrecy of
the negotiations and to force the
German and
Japanese govern-
ments
to devise some mask for their real treaty. Throughout 1936, all the world capitals were
and private reports of the German-Japanese 14
astir
deal.
with public
Diplomatic
In Stalin's Secret Service
everywhere buzzed with exciting speculation.
Moscow
pressed hard for documentary proof of the agreement.
My men
circles
Germany were risking their lives, in the face of almost insuperable difficulties. They knew that no expense was too high, no hazin
ard too great. It
was known to us that the Nazi
and had
ing,
in
its
was intercept-
secret service
possession, copies of the
coded messages ex-
changed during the negotiations between General Oshima and Tokyo. Late in July, 1936,
tostatic
form by our men
ment and
The less
received
word
correspondence had
this confidential
provide us with
1
all
in Berlin.
of
The channel thus opened would from Oshima to his govern-
future messages
back.
of the following days, when
strain
material was
I
file
been secured in pho-
at last
had
I
knew
that this price-
our hands, but had to await
in
from Germany, was nearly unbearable.
and
that the complete
its
safe arrival
No chances could be taken
to wait patiently.
On August
8,
word came through
that the carrier of the cor-
German frontier and was due in Amsterdam. I was in Rotterdam when the message arrived. I got into my automobile, accompanied by an aide, and made a dash for Amsterdam. On the way we met our agent, who was speeding to respondence had crossed the
deliver the material to
"Here of film I
—
We've got
it is.
the form in
went
We stopped on the highway.
me.
it,"
straight to
we had
in
whom we
Moscow waiting I
and handed all
rolls
The Oshima correspondence was first-class
had scoured Moscow for the arrival
to find.
in
also
could not keep
I
of the documents by
get ready to fly to Paris at a
I
Japanese-language ex-
could not send coded messages from Holland.
men
me some
our mail.
our possession the Japanese code book.
had, awaiting us in Haarlem, a pert,
said,
Haarlem, where we had a secret photo-
graphic developing room. code, but
he
which we usually put
moment's
I
courier,
and
had one of our
notice, to send off a
long message to Moscow. I
saw, as
it
was being decoded, that
I
had before
me
the entire
sheaf of Oshima's correspondence with Tokyo, reporting step by 15
W. G. Krivitsky
step
all
tions
his negotiations
with Von Ribbentrop, and also the sugges-
him by
conveyed to
his
government. General Oshima
re-
ported that his negotiations were being conducted under the per-
who
sonal supervision of Hitler,
Ribbentrop and gave him
frequently conferred with
Von
instructions. His correspondence re-
vealed that the purpose of the negotiations was the conclusion of a secret pact to coordinate
kyo
in
Western Europe
the
all
moves made by Berlin and To-
No
as well as in the Pacific.
reference to
Communist International, and no suggestion of any move against communism, was contained in this correspondence coverthe
ing
more than
a year of negotiations.
Under the terms of the
many undertook
to regulate
Europe or
to China,
in the Pacific
Berlin also agreed to place
the disposal of Tokyo
its
and
Japan and Ger-
between themselves
Union and
lating to the Soviet either in
secret agreement,
and
matters
re-
no action
without consulting each other.
improvements
to
all
to take
in
weapons of war
at
exchange military missions with
Japan.
At with
five o'clock
my coded
one afternoon,
message.
I
returned
my
courier took off for Paris
home and took
a rest for sev-
From then on, all correspondence between General Oshima and Tokyo flowed regularly through our hands. It revealed finally that a secret pact had been drawn up and initialed by General Oshima and Von Ribbentrop. The pact was so worded as to extend the field of cooperation between Japan and Germany to
eral days.
include interests beyond
China and Soviet
There was but one problem secret agreement; Hitler as a device for
to settle:
Russia.
How to
camouflage the
decided to draft the anti-Comintern pact
misleading world opinion.
On November
25, in the presence of
all
the envoys of the
foreign powers in Berlin, with the exception of the Soviet Union,
the anti-Comintern pact was signed by the official representatives
of the governments of
document
Germany and
Japan.
The
pact
consisting of a couple of brief clauses.
is
a public
Behind
it lies
concealed a secret agreement, the existence of which has never
been acknowledged. 16
In Stalin's Secret Service
Stalin was, of course, in possession of
which
had uncovered.
I
government knew
all
He decided
about
it.
all
show
to
the proofs of this
Hitler that the Soviet
Foreign Commissar Litvinov was
assigned to spring the surprise
upon
On November
Berlin.
28
addressing an extraordinary session of the Congress of Soviets, Litvinov said:
Well-informed people refuse to believe that in order
draw up the two meager
to
which have been
articles
published of the German-Japanese agreement,
it
was
necessary to conduct negotiations for fifteen months; that these negotiations should have been entrusted to a
Japanese general and a
German super-diplomat, and that
they should have been conducted in extraordinary crecy and kept secret even from official
As
diplomacy
is
.
German and
Japanese
.
German-Japanese agreement which has
for the
been published, for
.
se-
I
would recommend
any meaning in
it,
since
it
to
really has
you not
to seek
no meaning.
It
only a cover for another agreement which was simul-
taneously discussed and initiated, probably also signed,
and which was not published and
is
not intended for
publication. I assert,
realizing the full
weight of
was to the working out of this the
word communism
is
my
words, that in
which
not even mentioned, that
fifteen
secret
document,
months of negotiations between the Japanese attache
it
military
and the German super-diplomat were devoted
.
.
.
This agreement with Japan will tend to extend any
war which breaks out on one continent if
not more than two, continents.
Needless to
As
umph.
to at least two,
for I
say,
my own
there
was consternation
share in this
was recommended
mendation was approved the time of the
all
affair,
for the
I
Moscow
hailed
it
as a tri-
Order of Lenin. The recom-
along the
Red Army purge.
in Berlin.
line,
but got
never received
lost sight
of at
it.
17
W. G. Krivitsky
An American sequel to to
the German-Japanese secret pact
my attention when I was already in
came
the United States. In Janu-
ary, 1939, Hitler appointed his personal aide, Capt. Fritz
Wiedemann, consul had been
Private Hitler's
one of the
commanding
is
tors.
The appointment of such
Ftihrer's
officer in
most intimate and trusted collabora-
and
on the
Wiedemann the World War
general at San Francisco. Fritz
a figure to a seemingly
Pacific suggests the significance
of the German-Japanese
secret agreement. Hitler included in his plans
of joint maneuvers with Japan in the
minor post
even the possibility
Pacific.
Oshima was elevated from military attache to Japanese ambassador to Germany in October, 1938, and presented his credentials to Hitler on November 22, last. Now, what was the effect of the Berlin-Tokyo pact upon the Lieutenant General
Kremlin's foreign policy?
How
did Stalin react to Hitler's en-
veloping operation against the Soviet Union? Stalin
of maneuvers he executed on the surface
series
open
continued his two simultaneous courses of action. The
He
record.
special treaty
is
a matter
of
strengthened his association with France by a
and pressed
for
an
alliance.
He
tual-assistance pact with Czechoslovakia.
entered into a
He
launched the
united-front campaign throughout the anti-Fascist world.
had Litvinov inaugurate the crusade
mu-
He
for collective security, de-
all the great and small powers in the defense of the Union from German-Japanese aggression. He intervened Spain in order to forge a closer link with Paris and London.
signed to align Soviet in
But Hitler,
all
these surface
moves were designed only
and bring success to
had but one aim:
his
a close accord
to impress
undercover maneuvers which with Germany.
No
sooner was
the German-Japanese pact signed than Stalin directed the Soviet trade
envoy
in Berlin, his personal emissary,
David Kandelaki,
to go outside the ordinary diplomatic channels
ever cost arrive at a deal with Hitler.
bureau held
ment with Germany." 18
at
whatPolit-
at this time, Stalin definitely
ants: "In the very near future
we
and
At a meeting of the
shall
informed
his lieuten-
consummate an
agree-
In Stalin's Secret Service
In December, 1936,
work
Germany. The
in
I
was
I
Moscow when he
in
accompanied by the
down our
months of 1937 were passed in exoutcome of Kandelaki's secret negotia-
pectancy of a favorable tions.
received orders to throttle
first
OGPU
arrived
from
representative in
Berlin, in April,
Germany. Kandelaki
brought with him the draft of an agreement with the Nazi government.
He was
lieved that he
At
this
received in private audiences by Stalin,
had
time
I
who
be-
achieved the goal of all his maneuvers.
at last
had occasion
for a long conference
with Yezhov,
then head of the ogpu. Yezhov had just reported to Stalin on certain operations of mine.
Yezhov had been a metal worker in
his youth, raised in the Stalin school.
great purge
had
with Stalin
at once,
word
for
a simple
mind.
This dreaded marshal of the
Any question
of policy he took up
and whatever the big boss
said,
he repeated
word, and then translated into action.
Yezhov and
I
discussed various reports in our possession as to
discontent in Germany, and possible opposition to Hitler from the old monarchist groups. Yezhov
day in
ject that very
had discussed the same subwith
Stalin.
His words were
phonographic record of the boss himself:
practically a
"What's
his conference
all this
drivel
about discontent with Hitler in the Ger-
man army?" he exclaimed. "What does it take to content an army? Ample rations? Hitler furnishes them. Good arms and equipment? and honor? Hitler provides
Hitler supplies them. Prestige
sense of power
and
army unrest
Germany
in
is all
"As for the capitalists,
wanted for
to put the workers
The
it.
A
talk
about
a Kaiser for?
They
victory? Hitler gives that, too.
nonsense.
what do they need back in the
factories. Hitler has
done
it
them. They wanted to get rid of the Communists. Hitler has
them
and concentration camps. They were fed up with
in jails
labor unions
and
strikes. Hitler
has put labor under state control
strikes.
Why
should the industrialists be discon-
Yezhov continued
in the
same
and outlawed tented?"
now
Who
the strongest
can doubt
it?
vein:
Germany
is
power
in the world. Hitler has
How
can anyone in his senses
strong.
made fail
She
her
is
so.
to reckon
19
— W. G. Krivitsky
with
For Soviet Russia there
it?
quoted
Stalin:
"We must come
is
but one course.
And
to terms with a superior
here he
power like
Nazi Germany." Hitler,
however, again rebuffed
Stalin's
advances.
By
the end
of 1937, with the collapse of the Stalin plans in Spain and the Japanese successes in China, the international isolation of the Soviet
Union became extreme.
Stalin then took,
position of neutrality between the
On November
on the
surface, a
two major groups of powers.
Com-
27, 1937, speaking in Leningrad, Foreign
missar Litvinov poked fun at
the democratic nations for their han-
dling of the Fascist nations. But Stalin's underlying purpose re-
mained the same. In March, 1938, Stalin staged his ten-day super-trial of the
Rykov-Bukharin-Krestinsky group of Bolsheviks, Lenin's closest associates
who had been
and who were among the
Soviet Revolution. These Bolshevik leaders
were shot by Stalin on March
3.
—
On March
fathers of the
hateful to Hitler
12, with
no
protest
from Russia, Hitler annexed Austria. Moscow's only reply was a proposal to
call a
parley of the democratic nations. Again,
when
Hitler annexed the Sudeten areas in September, 1938, Litvinov
proposed concerted aid to Prague, but made
it
conditional
upon
action by the League of Nations. Stalin himself remained silent
during the whole eventful year of 1938. But signs have not been
wanting since Munich of his continued wooing of Hitler.
On January
12, 1939, there
took place before the entire diplo-
matic corps in Berlin the cordial and demonstrative chat of Hitler
new Soviet ambassador. A week later an item appeared in the London News Chronicle reporting a coming rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. And this item was immediately and prominently reprinted, without comment and without refutation, in Stalin's mouthpiece, the Moscow Pravda. On January 25, W. N. Ewer, foreign editor of the London
with the
^
Daily Herald, leading British Labor paper, reported that the Nazi
government was "now almost convinced that in the event of a European war the Soviet Union would adopt a policy of neutrality and non-intervention" and that a German trade delegation 20
In Stalin's Secret Service
whose
"objects are political rather than commercial"
way
Moscow.
to
Early in February deal to to the
sell its oil
it
was disclosed that Moscow had made
only to Italy and
Rome-Berlin
axis.
For the
government had stopped the rations.
This
Germany
new
in case
Then, on
was
policy
time in
first
of
sale
would
Germany and its
a
nations friendly
history the Soviet
oil to private
foreign corpo-
provide supplies vital to Italy
and
of war with Great Britain and France.
Friday,
word
his first
was on the
March
spoke up.
10, 1939, Stalin at last
since the annexation of Austria
It
and the
Sudeten lands by Germany, and he displayed such remarkable
good humor toward Hitler
He
opinion.
that
it
came
as a
shock to world
excoriated the democracies for plotting to "poi-
son the atmosphere and provoke a conflict" between Germany
and Soviet Russia,
were "no
for which, he said, there
visible
grounds."
Three days slovakia.
after Stalin's speech, Hitler
Two days later,
Of course,
was the
this
result
of Chamberlain's policy of appease-
ment. The world did not then Stalin's policy
dismembered Czecho-
he extinguished Czechoslovakia altogether.
realize that
it
was
the Rome-Berlin against the London-Paris axis
not believe in the strength of the democratic
To entire
also the result
of
of appeasement. Secretly Stalin had been playing
was
all
along.
He
does
states.
had undertaken
to solve the
problem of Central and Southeastern Europe,
to bring the
Stalin
it
clear that Hitler
peoples and resources in those areas under his political and eco-
nomic domination, and
to extend there his military base for fu-
ture operations. Stalin has seen Hitler in recent years reach out
hold for a leap in almost every direction. chor in the
Pacific,
and put his hand
in
get a foot-
has dropped an an-
South America.
ing within striking distance of the British
And
He
and
Empire
in the
He is comNear
East.
he has, with the aid of Mussolini, driven a stake in colonial
Africa. Stalin
wants to avoid war
Hitler will assure
him
at
any
cost.
He
fears
war most.
If
peace, even at the price of important eco-
21
W. G. Krivitsky
nomic concessions, he rections
.
.
will give Hitler a free
hand
in
all
these di-
.
The above account of Stalin's hidden policies toward Hitler's Germany was written and published in the Saturday Evening Post several months before August 23, 1939, when the world was astounded by the signing of the Stalin-Hitler say that the pact was
no
pact.
surprise to the author.
It is
needless to
Both Molotov and
Von Ribbentrop assert that the Nazi-Soviet pact inaugurates a new epoch
in
German-Russian
relations,
which
will
have profound
consequences for the future history of Europe and the world.
That
22
is
absolutely true.
II
The End of the Communist International
THE
Communist
March
2,
1919.
International was born in
It
received
its
death blow in
Moscow on Moscow on
August 23, 1939, with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact by Premier Molotov and German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.
But
its
decay was apparent in
many
things that
happened
years
before.
On a May morning in
1934,
I
was with Volynski, the chief of
the counter-espionage section of the OGPU, in his office
on the
tenth floor of the Lubianka building in Moscow. Suddenly, from
we heard the sound of music and of singing men. Looking down we saw a parade going by. The marchers were three hundred members of the Austrian Socialist Army, the Schutzbiind, who had fought heroically on the barricades in Vienna
the street below,
against the Fascist this small battalion
Heimwehr. Soviet Russia had given refuge of Socialist
to
fighters.
23
W. G. Krivitsky
I
shall always
remember
of the Schutzbundler
that
May
morning: the happy
song, Brueder Zur Sonne,
Zur Freiheit,
the spontaneous fellowship of
moment
the Russian crowds as they joined the march. For a forgot where
I
was, but Volynski brought
"How many
spies
faces
they marched, singing their revolutionary
as
me down
do you suppose there
I
to earth.
among them,
are
Krivitsky?" he asked in the most natural tone of voice.
"Not one," "You're
I
replied angrily.
making a big mistake," he said. "In six or seven months
seventy percent of them will be sitting in the Lubianka prison."
Volynski was a good judge of the tioned.
Of
after their arrival. at
Stalin
machine func-
those three hundred Austrians not a single one re-
mains today on Soviet
territory.
Many of them were arrested soon
Others, although they
home, came flocking
ports
way the
knew what awaited them
to the Austrian
and returned home
embassy
for their pass-
to serve long prison sentences.
"Better behind bars in Austria," they said, "than at liberty in the Soviet Union."
The ment to
last
of these refugees were shipped by the Soviet govern-
the International Brigade in Spain during the Spanish Civil
War. Stalin was moving swiftly on the road to totalitarian despotism,
and the Comintern had long since outworn
its
original pur-
pose.
The Communist Bolshevik Party
*
International was founded by the Russian
twenty years ago in the belief that Europe was
on the eve of world revolution. Lenin,
its
moving
spirit,
was
convinced that the Socialist and labor parties of Western Europe by supporting the "imperialist war" waged by their gov-
ernments from 1914
*
A
few
functioned
to 1918,
had
socialists or converts to
as "delegates"
from
the representatives of the Left
forfeited the support of the
Bolshevism accidentally
their respective countries.
Wing
in
Moscow
But aside from
of the Scandinavian Socialist Parties,
the only genuine delegate from a foreign revolutionary organization, Eberlein,
representing the Spartacusbund in Germany,
Rosa Luxembourg
24
to vote against the formation
came with instructions from of a new international.
Secret Service
In Stalin's
working masses. He believed that the traditional labor
parties
and Trade Union Federations of Germany, France, Great and the United
ain,
with their
States
ernment and peaceful evolution
faith in representative gov-
to a
more equitable
were completely outmoded; that
der,
Brit-
it
social or-
was the task of the
vic-
torious Russian Bolsheviks to provide revolutionary leadership
workers of all nations.
to the
Communist United Communist order.
The
of Europe and ultimately a world
States
a
which guided Lenin was
vision
Lenin was certain that the Bolsheviks, despite their enthusi-
asm
in the first flush
of victory, could not build a Communist
society in Russia unless the
came
He saw
to their aid.
unless
working
his
classes
of advanced countries
bold experiment
doomed
backward agricultural Russia was joined by
the great industrial states.
He
to failure
at least
one of
put his biggest hopes in a speedy
revolution in Germany.
The
last
twenty years indicate that Lenin underestimated
the significance of existing labor organizations, trade-union as well as political,
and over-estimated the adaptability
ern Europe of Russian Bolshevism, with
mediate overthrow of
all
West-
battle cry
of the im-
governments, democratic
as well as
its
and the establishment of an International
autocratic,
to
Commu-
nist Dictatorship.
For two decades the Communist International
—
the
Comintern
founded, inspired and directed by the Russian Bolsheviks, sought to
implant their methods and their program beyond the bound-
aries
of the Soviet Union.
It
established
Communist parties
its
every-
where, patterned them closely after the highly centralized and disciplined Bolshevik
model and made them responsible and obedi-
ent to the general staff in It
sent
its
insurrections
and
in the
forts failed,
Moscow.
agents to every corner of the earth.
and military uprisings
Western Hemisphere. it
embarked
in 1935,
planned mass
Europe, in the Far East,
in
And
It
finally,
upon
its last
when
all
action, the Popular Front. In this final period, with the
ons of camouflage and compromise,
it
made
these ef-
course of political
its
new weap-
greatest drive,
25
W. G.
Krivits im-
penetrating into the organs of public opinion and even the gov-
ernmental institutions of the leading democratic nations.
was
I
in a position
from the very beginning Comintern.
serve closely the workings of the litical
and military part
teen years.
I
in
its
I
to ob-
took a direct po-
revolutionary actions abroad for eigh-
was one of the executive arms of
Stalin's
Spain, during which the Comintern sent
tion in
1937
until
its
interven-
forces into
battle for the last time.
My work with the Comintern began in Polish war. for the
I
1
920 during the Russo-
was then attached to the Soviet Military Intelligence
Western Front which had
its
headquarters in Smolensk. As
Red Armies of Tukhachevsky moved toward Warsaw
the
it
was
the function of our department to operate secretly behind the Polish lines, to create diversions, to sabotage the
shipment of
munitions, to shatter the morale of the Polish army by propaganda, and to furnish the general staff of the military
and
Red Army with
political information.
our work from that of we cooperated in every possible way with the recently formed Polish Communist Party, and we published a revolutionary newspaper Svit (Dawn) which we distributed among the soldiers of the Polish army.
As there was no
the
clear line separating
Comintern agents
in Poland,
On the day that Tukhachevsky stood before Dombal,
saw, "I
do not
the
the gates of War-
a peasant deputy, declared in the Polish parliament:
see in the
Red Army an enemy.
On the contrary,
Red Army as the friend of the Polish people." To us this was an event of great importance.
Dombal's speech
in Svit,
We
I
greet
printed
and distributed hundreds of thousands
of copies throughout Poland, especially
Dombal was immediately
arrested
saw Citadel, the dreaded Polish
among the
Polish soldiers.
and confined
in the
War-
political prison. After three years
the Soviet government finally obtained his release by exchanging
him
number of Polish aristocrats and priests held as hosHe then came to Moscow where he was acclaimed as one
for a
tages.
of the heroes of the Comintern. Lavish honors were heaped upon
him and he was 26
raised to a high position. For
more than
a decade,
In Stalin's Secret Service
Dombal was one of the most important non-Russian Communist International.
officials
of
the
In
1
936 he was
arrested
spy for seventeen years liament.
—
on
a charge of having been a Polish
ever since his speech in the Polish par-
The OGPU decided that Dombal's greeting to the Red Army,
as well as his three-year prison term,
had been part of
ranged plot of the Polish Military Intelligence.
a prear-
Dombal was
ex-
ecuted.
During the Russo-Polish war the Polish Communist Party worked hand
in
hand with our department, and we prepared
that
Red Army. The Polish Communist Party obeyed all the commands of the advancing army
party for action in cooperation with the
of Tukhachevsky.
Members of the
Polish
Communist
Party aided us in organiz-
ing sabotage, in creating diversions, and in impeding the arrival of
munitions from France.
We
organized a strike in Danzig to pre-
vent the landing of French munitions for the Polish army. eled to Warsaw, Cracow,
Lemberg, German, and Czech
to Vienna, organizing strikes to stop
arms shipments.
a successful railroad strike in the
Czech
I
I
trav-
Silesia
and
organized
railroad junction of
Oderberg, persuading the Czech trainmen to walk out, rather than handle Skoda munitions for the Poland of Pilsudski. "Railroad workers!"
on your
line
I
wrote in a
leaflet.
"You
are transporting
guns to slaughter your Russian working-class broth-
ers.
At the same time,
a Polish Soviet
government, organized in
anticipation of the capture of Warsaw, was
Tukhachevsky' s
moving with
staff toward the Polish capital. Felix Dzerzhinsky,
veteran Polish revolutionist and head of the Russian earlier
head
name
this
for the
ogpu) had been appointed by
Cheka
(the
Moscow
to
government.
The Russo-Polish war was the one serious attempt made by Moscow to carry Bolshevism into Western Europe on the points of bayonets.
It failed,
despite
all
our
efforts, military
and
political,
Red Army, and although we had a Comintern working with our political agita-
despite the victories of the Polish section of the
27
W. G. Krivitsky
tors
and
men behind the Polish front. In the end the Red Army was forced to fall back. Pilsudski remained
intelligence
exhausted
master of Poland. Lenin's hope of joining hands through Poland,
Germany and helping them
with the revolutionary workers of
extend the revolution to the Rhine, was
The
lost.
idea of hastening Bolshevist Revolution through military
invasion had been entertained
earlier, in
1919, during the
exist-
ence of the short-lived Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet republics.
Detachments of Red Guards were then only about
from Hungarian
territory.
a
hundred miles
But the Bolsheviks were then too weak,
and were moreover fighting against the Whites
for their very ex-
istence.
By
the beginning of 1921,
when
the treaty of Riga was signed
between Russia and Poland, the Bolsheviks, and especially Lenin himself, realized that to bring successful revolutions to
Europe was
a serious
and long-time
task.
There was no such hope
of quick triumph on an international scale first
Western
as
had existed
at the
and second Congresses of the Comintern when Zinoviev,
President, proclaimed that within
Communist. Even
cow launched
after
one year
1921, however, and
all
its
Europe would be
as late as
a series of revolutionary adventures
1927, Mos-
and putsches.
In this series of irresponsible attempts, thousands of workers in
Germany,
in the Baltic
needlessly sacrificed.
on
a gamble, with
eral strikes
and
and Balkan countries, and in China, were
They were sent to slaughter by the Comintern
cooked-up schemes of military coups d'etat, gen-
rebellions,
none of which had any substantial chance
of success. Early in 1921 the situation in Russia was particularly threaten-
ing to the Soviet regime. Hunger, peasant uprisings, the revolt of the sailors in Kronstadt, and a general strike of the Petrograd
workers, brought the government to the brink of disaster. All the victories
of the Civil
War seemed
to have
been in vain,
as the
Bolsheviks groped blindly in the face of opposition from those
workers, peasants and sailors
who had been
their chief support.
The Comintern, caught in this desperate situation, decided that the only way of saving Bolshevism was through a revolution in 28
In Stalin's Secret Service
Germany. Zinoviev sent head of the Hungarian Bela
Kun
the Central
his trusted lieutenant, Bela
Kun, former
Soviet republic, to Berlin.
appears in Berlin in March, 1921, with an order to
Committee of
the
German Communist
Party from
Zinoviev and the executive committee of the Comintern: There
is
a revolutionary situation in Germany. The Communist Party must seizepower.
Committee of the German Communist Party is incredulous. The members can scarcely believe their ears. They know
The
Central
that they cannot
hope
to
overthrow the Berlin government. But
Bela Kun's orders are clear: an immediate uprising, the abolition
of the Weimar republic, and the establishment of a dictatorship in
Communist
Germany. The
Party obeys the instructions from
Moscow. As
subordinate of the Executive Committee of the ternational headed
Communist German
Central Committee of the
a loyal
Communist
In-
by Zinoviev and directed by Lenin, Trotsky,
Bukharin, Radek, and Stalin, the
German Communist
Party can-
not disobey.
On March districts
22, a general strike was declared in the industrial
of Mansfeld and Merseburg, central Germany.
On March
Communists seized the city administration buildings at Hamburg. In Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, and other cities of central Germany the Communists directed their attack upon court houses, city halls, public banks and police headquarters. The official German Communist newspaper, Die Rote Fahne, openly called 24, the
for a revolution.
In the Mansfeld copper mining district,
munist Robin Hood,
Max Hoelz,
the
Com-
who had a year before single-handedly waged
guerrilla warfare against the Berlin
government throughout the
Vogtland area of Saxony, arrived to announce that he was in charge of operations. About the same time a
series
of bombing outrages
took place throughout Germany, including attempts to blow up
monuments in Berlin. In this the government recognized Hoelz's expert hand. On March 24, the Communist workers in the huge nitrogen plant at Leuna, armed with rifles and hand grenades, barricaded
public buildings and
themselves within the factory.
29
W. G. Krivitsky
But the Communist
down
tions broke
responded to the
effort to co-ordinate these localized ac-
completely. Their loyal, trained party regulars call,
and were sent
battalion after battalion, his troops into battle.
to their death
by the
party,
more ruthlessly than Ludendorff had sent
The great mass of workers neither responded
for a general strike, nor joined in the scattered out-
to the call
By early April, the uprising had been put down everywhere. The leader of the German Communist Party, Dr. Paul Levi,
breaks.
who had opposed
the adventure as
madness from the very
was expelled from the party for putting the blame language where
He
it
ditions in
that
understood nothing of the con-
it
Western Europe, that
sands of workers
no uncertain
belonged.
Moscow
informed
in
it
had
upon an insane gamble. He referred Comintern
and "cheap
of thou-
sacrificed the lives
shevik leaders, and the emissaries of the drels"
to the Bolas
"scoun-
politicians."
uprising, the
Communist
Party of Germany had lost half of its members. As for
Max Hoelz,
Within
a short time after this
Communist
the
mite, he
and
fifty I
was
firebrand
tried
who
March
expected to seize power by dyna-
on charges of "murder,
other counts" and sentenced to
was interested
arson, highway- robbery life
in Hoelz's fate, because for
the workers of his native Vogtland he has figure.
When
I
was stationed
Hoelz was imprisoned, ers
imprisonment. all
his
wild no-
he was undoubtedly an honest and bold revolutionist. To
tions,
who had become
I
become
a legendary
several years later in Breslau,
established contact with
ate Hoelz. as
But
it
deeply attached to him. Through
was necessary for
authorization from the
Hamann,
him
reliable
men
ferred with the Central
such
sent
liber-
Communist Party. I communicated with for
me.
I
and he promised
to
then went to Berlin and con-
Committee of the
Some wanted Hoelz
party.
They debated
the
released through a legal maneuver,
him to the Reichstag. Others believed that his would be the very thing to galvanize the masses, who were
as electing
escape
I
jail-
to obtain assistance as well
the leader of the party in Breslau,
have several
issue.
me
where
one of his
Hoelz books, chocolates, and food. Together we plotted to
30
start,
In Stalin's Secret Service
Communist Party. I was granted perjail delivery Upon my return to Breslau,
then very apathetic to the mission to attempt the
however, the
first
thing Hoelz's
me was: "We
jailer told
have been
ordered to chain up his door."
The than
authorities
Hamann
member of the Hoelz was
working
had learned of our
—and
Reichstag
When
by
later released
to effect his escape
with him while in Breslau, in 1932, at the
Communists,
I
police stool pigeon.
means. Although
legal
had been
I
communication
and was
in constant
met him
for the first time in
Moscow
apartment of Kisch, the German Communist writer.
he learned
"Oh, you
through none other
plot,
himself, the leader of the Breslau
who
I
was, he laughed:
are the rich
American uncle who sent
me good books
and food." In
Moscow Hoelz was
Order of the Red Banner,
a hero for a time.
He was awarded
a factory in Leningrad
was named
him, and he was furnished with a good apartment
the
after
Hotel
at the
Metropole. But when the Communists capitulated to Hitler in 1933
without firing a shot, and policy of Stalin
He
was put off day
became
became
it
clear that this
and the Comintern, Hoelz asked after day,
and
spies
were
set
official
on
his trail.
He
He demanded immediate permission to leave. His Moscow now avoided him. The OGPU refused to return
furious.
friends in
his passport.
A little later an insignificant notice appeared in Pravda
announcing that Hoelz had been found drowned side
was the
for his passport.
Moscow. In the ogpu
I
was told that
in a stream out-
after the rise
of Hitler,
Hoelz had been seen coming out of the German Embassy
Moscow. The
fact
is
that
Hoelz was
glorious revolutionary past
killed
made him
by the ogpu because
in his
a potential leader of the
revolutionary opposition to the Comintern.
The defeat of the March uprising in Germany sobered Moscow considerably. Even Zinoviev toned down his proclamations and manifestoes. Europe was quite evidently not done with talism.
Nor was
Russia
itself
—
for after the suppression
peasant rebellions and the Kronstadt revolt, Lenin tant
economic concessions
to peasants
capi-
of the
made impor-
and business men. Russia 31
W. G. Krivitsky
settled
down
revolution
went decidedly into the background. The Comintern
was busy finding scapegoats for nist
and the world
to a period of internal reconstruction,
Central Committees
its
defeats, cleaning
in various countries
leaders in their places. Factional fights in the
out
Commu-
and appointing new
Communist
Parties
abroad kept the machinery of the Comintern busy drawing up resolutions, counter-resolutions
In January,
1
and expulsion
orders.
923 I was working in Moscow in the third section
of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army. us that the French were about to collect reparations.
was
I
was
living at this time in the
of the
also the chief residence
of visiting foreign Communists.
I
want
to explain that the
the headquarters of Western bies pass
Communist
.
officials .
reached
in order to
Hotel Lux, which
of the Comintern and
.
Hotel Lux was, and
Europe
leaders
Word
occupy the Ruhr
still is,
Moscow. Through
in
from every country,
union delegates, and individual workers
in fact, its
lob-
as well as trade
who have in some fashion
earned a trip to the proletarian Mecca.
Consequently,
it
is
important for the Soviet government to
keep a close watch upon the Hotel Lux, in order to discover exactly
what the comrades
in every
know their attitude toward
country are saying and doing, to
the Soviet government
warring factions within the Bolshevik Party. For
Hotel Lux residents.
the
is
honeycombed with OGPU
Among the
agents
OGPU informed about
workers, was Constantine
dor to the United I
had
purpose the
registered as guests
and
Lux and kept Communists and
lived at the Hotel
the doings of foreign
Oumansky,
at present Soviet
ambassa-
States.
met Oumansky
in Bessarabia,
who
and toward the
this
in
1922
lived in
for the first time.
Romania and Austria
Oumansky, born until
1922 when
he came to Moscow. Because of his knowledge of foreign languages, he received a position with Tass, the official Soviet
Agency. His wife was a typist in the Comintern
When Oumansky's turn came to serve in told me that he did not wish to "waste" two 32
News
office.
the
Red Army, he
years in
common
In Stalin's Secret Service
army
barracks. Soviet
then had not assumed the caste charac-
life
now
bears, and his remark shocked me. Most Communists upon service in the Red Army as a privilege. Not so still look Oumansky. He presented himself at the offices of the Intelligence Department with a recommendation from Foreign Commissar ter
it
Chicherin and from Doletsky, Chief of Tass, requesting that he be permitted to "serve" his two years in the for the
Army
as a translator
Fourth Department.
That very evening while
was
I
in the
company of Firin,
at that
time assistant to General Berzin, Chief of the Military Intelligence
Department,
saw Oumansky
replied that he
was going to
keep his Tass job, and serve
partment
in a
Moscow
kill
I
went over
his job
with Tass.
restaurant.
and asked him why he was dropping
to his table
He
I
two birds with one stone
his military
term in the Fourth De-
offices.
When
I
told this to Firin, he replied angrily:
"You may
rest
work
assured that he will not
Fourth
in the
Department." In those years soft berths were not easily arranged,
Oumansky
and
did not get the translator's job with the Red Army.
But he succeeded
in staying out of those
uncomfortable bar-
racks by serving as a diplomatic courier of the foreign office. This
was considered
a substitute for military service, because
all
diplo-
matic couriers are on the staff of the OGPU. Without giving up his Tass job,
Oumansky traveled
to Paris,
Rome, Vienna, Tokyo, and
Shanghai.
Oumansky served
the
OGPU
in the Tass
News Agency,
too, for
here were Soviet journalists and correspondents having a danger-
ously close contact with the outside world.
Oumansky was
able to
spy upon Tass reporters from every vantage point, from the Mos-
cow
office
and from abroad. And
tuned sharply to
Communists. in
bits
All of
at the
Hotel Lux he kept
his ear
of stray conversation exchanged by foreign
Oumansky' s
which he has worked, have
fallen before the bullets
superiors, in every
either
department
been removed and broken or
of the purge. These include his former
chief in the Tass, Doletsky, as well as nearly
all
his colleagues there;
33
W. G. Krivitsky
his
former chief in the foreign
Troyanovsky,
Vladimir friend.
office,
Maxim
Soviet ambassador to the United States,
first
Romm, Tass correspondent in Washington,
Troyanovsky and
Romm
were recalled to
Washington while Oumansky was working United
in the
Litvinov; Alexander
and
his personal
Moscow from
by side with them
side
States.
Oumansky
is
one of the few Communists who succeeded
in
crossing the barbed-wire frontier that separates the old Bolshevik
Party from the new.
During the purge there was only one passport
across this frontier.
You had
and
to present Stalin
the required quota of victims. Constantine
good
.
.
his
OGPU with
Oumansky made
.
When
news reached our department of the French occupa-
tion of the Ruhr, a group of five or six officers, including myself,
were ordered to leave hours
all
at
once for Germany. Within twenty-four
arrangements were made.
cussions of the French occupation
Moscow hoped would open
newed Comintern drive in Germany. Within a week I was in Berlin. My
Germany stood on
first
that the reper-
the
way
for a re-
impression was that
the eve of cataclysmic events. Inflation
carried the reichsmark to astronomical heights;
had
unemployment was
widespread; there were daily street fights between workers and police, as well as
between workers and nationalist fighting
bri-
The French occupation added fuel to the flames. For a moment it even looked as if exhausted and impoverished Germany might take up arms in a suicidal war against France. The Comintern leaders followed German events cautiously.
gades.
They had come that
off badly in 1921,
no blow was struck
Intelligence structions.
and they wanted
until internal chaos
to be certain
was complete. Our
Department, however, had given us very definite
We were
sent to
Germany
in-
to reconnoiter, to mobilize
elements of unrest in the Ruhr area, and to forge the weapons for
an uprising
We
at
when
moment
arrived.
once created three types of organizations in the Ger-
man Communist 34
the proper
Party: the Party Intelligence Service,
working
In Stalin's Secret Service
under the guidance of the Fourth Department of the Red Army; military formations as the nucleus of the future
and
Zersetzungsdienst, small units of
German Red Army;
men whose and the
shatter the morale of the Reichswehr
function was to
police.
At the head of the Party Intelligence Service we named Hans Kiepenberger, the son of a lessly,
Hamburg
weaving an elaborate spy net
police, the
in
hand with the
political party
and
His agents penetrated the monar-
hostile fighting organization.
tain officers
tire-
of the army and
in the ranks
governmental apparatus, and every
chist Stahlhelm, the
He worked
publisher.
Wehrwolf and
the Nazi units.
Zersetzungsdienst, they secretly
Working hand
sounded out
cer-
of the Reichswehr concerning the stand they would
take in the event of a
Communist
uprising.
Kiepenberger served the Comintern with great loyalty and courage. During the events of 1923, his day. In the
end he suffered the
life
was
in
danger every
fate that befell all loyal
Commu-
Elected to the Reichstag in 1927, he became a member of Committee on Military Affairs. Regarding himself as the Comintern's representative on that body, he supplied the Soviet
nists.
the
Military Intelligence with valuable information for
He
remained in Germany for some months
many
after Hitler
years.
came
to
power, continuing to do dangerous underground work for the
Communist
Party. In the fall
was arrested
as a
in
Nazi
of 1933 he fled to Russia. In 1936 he
spy.
The OGPU examiner pressed him for an admission that he was the service of the German Intelligence. Kiepenberger refused
to "confess."
"Ask Krivitsky whether
he pleaded. "He knows what "Didn't you
I
I
could become a Nazi agent,"
did in Germany."
know General Bredow, head of
Military Intelligence?" asked the
the Reichswehr
OGPU examiner.
"Of course I knew him," replied Kiepenberger. "I was a memCommunist fraction of the Reichstag and on the Mili-
ber of the
tary Affairs
Committee." (General Bredow had frequently appeared
before the Reichstag Committee.)
The OGPU had no
further "incriminating" evidence against
Kiepenberger. Nevertheless, after six months of "questioning,"
35
W. G. Krivitsky
the dauntless fighter "confessed" that he was in the service of the
Military Intelligence. "There
German
kept repeating. "Give
We
me
is
something that
me
put
will
head," he
to sleep."
German Communist foundation of the German Red Army
Soviet officers organized
formations, the
never to be, in a very systematic fashion, dividing
of one hundred men, Hundertschaft.
who had
nists
my
a nail in
them
Military that
was
into units
We prepared lists of Commuthem according
served in the war, cataloging
to
Out of this list we expected to create the officGerman Red Army. We also organized a technical
their military rank. ers
corps of the
staff
of experienced
machine-gunners,
specialists:
the nucleus of an aviation corps,
ers,
and
artillery offic-
a liaison personnel cho-
sen from trained wireless and telephone operators. organization of women and trained
them
We
up an
set
for hospital duty.
In the Ruhr, however, as a result of the French occupation,
we were
faced with an entirely different problem.
The Ruhr was
the scene of one of the strangest spectacles in history. Unable to
oppose French arms by
force, the
Mines and
passive resistance.
Germans were waging
factories shut
down, leaving only
skeleton staffs at their places to prevent the mines
and
to
war of
a
from flooding
keep factory equipment in working order. Railroads were
almost at a
standstill.
Unemployment was
universal.
The
Berlin
government, already faced with a fantastic inflation, supported virtually the entire population of the Ruhr.
Meanwhile the French began
ment which aimed
and form an independent Separatist
state.
it
opposed
it,
was native and very the Rhineland
in 1923. In
move-
Rhineland from Germany
Casual observers thought that the
movement was nothing but French propaganda.
however,
many
to encourage the Separatist
to detach the entire
serious,
and
if
the British
would have severed
itself
In fact,
had not
from Ger-
many Rhenish homes I saw busts of Napoleon,
the creator of the Confederation of the Rhine. Often
enough
I
heard the inhabitants complain that their rich country was exploited
by
Prussia.
The Communist every
36
means
Party opposed the Separatist
at its disposal.
The
movement by
slogan of the Comintern was
In Stalin's Secret Service
"War Against Stresemann and and
Stresemann!" rorist,
It
The slogan of the Nazis "War Against Poincare and
Poincare!"
their nationalist allies was:
was during these days that Schlageter,
was executed by the French military
a
Nazi
authorities. Schlageter's
death would have passed unnoticed outside the narrow
comrades had not Karl Radek, the Comintern's
his
pagandist, brought
it
ter-
home to the German people.
circle
of
cleverest pro-
"Join the
Com-
munists," cried Radek, "and you will liberate the Fatherland nationally
and
socially!"
For a time negotiations went on between Radek and a number
of Nazi and Nationalist leaders, notably Count Reventlow. basis for collaboration
was that German nationalism's
sole
The
chance
of success was in joining hands with Bolshevik Russia against imperialist France
summated.
It
and Great
was not
until
Britain.
But
1939 that
it
union was not con-
this
finally
took place under
conditions vastly different from those contemplated by
when Germany was
the underdog.
Meanwhile everything was prepared
The in
for a Separatist coup d'etat.
—Mathes,
leaders of the Separatist Party
marshaled their
forces.
September was
Moscow
A great
Dorten, Smith
demonstration in Dusseldorf
late
to be the signal for the proclamation of the
Rhenish republic.
The Nationalists were combating the Separatists by individual acts of terror. The Communist Party called a counterdemonstration "against the Separatist traitors."
When
met
I
at a cross section in the city,
Communists the
German
the two conflicting forces
saw, for the
first
time in
my life,
fighting side by side with Nationalist terrorists
police.
The
Separatists
and
were defeated, mainly because
of the interference of the pro-German British cabinet.
Even while we were supporting German Nationalists against the French in the Rhineland
and the Ruhr with every weapon
our disposal, we decided that in the event of a ing in Germany, conflict
we would not
with French military
mulated by our
Communist
at
upris-
allow ourselves to be drawn into
forces.
staff officers in the
Our
plan of strategy, as for-
Rhineland, called for the with-
drawal of our party military formations into central Germany, into
37
W. G. Krivitsky Communists were
Saxony, and Thuringia, where the strong at that time.
particularly
We trained our units with that in mind.
In preparing for the
munists created small
Communist revolution,
the
German Com-
"T"
terrorist groups, so-called
units, to de-
moralize the Reichswehr and the police by assassinations.
composed of
units were
zealots.
meeting of one of these groups on a September
recall a
I
courageous
fiercely
Communist
evening in the city of Essen, shortly before the ing.
I
recall
how
"Tonight we
commander announced
and
filed
their revolvers,
and
of the body of a murdered police
unknown. For weeks
effectively in various parts
When orderly
cause.
peace came these fanatics could find no place in the
life
Many
of the country.
of them took part in armed
holdups for revolutionary purposes
ally
these groups struck swiftly
of Germany, picking off police
and other enemies of the Communist
officers
acts
checked them for the
out one by one. The very next day the Essen
press reported the discovery officer, assassin
tersely:
act."
Calmly they took out time,
upris-
they came together, quietly, almost solemnly, to
receive their orders. Their
last
The "T"
of brigandage.
wound up
at first,
The few who found
and then simply
their
way
in
to Russia usu-
in Siberia in exile.
In the meantime, the
German Communist
Party was await-
ing instructions from the Comintern, which seemed incredibly
slow in coming. In September, Brandler, the leader of the party,
and
several
of his colleagues were
summoned
structions. Interminable discussions
to
Moscow
took place in the
Bureau, the supreme body of the Russian
for in-
Political
Communist
Party,
where the Bolshevik leaders were debating the proper hour to launch a German revolution. For of the
German Communist
many anxious
hours the leaders
Party cooled their heels in
while the Bolshevik brain trust was formulating
its
Moscow
final
plan of
action.
Moscow
decided to do the thing thoroughly this time.
cretly dispatched
Levine,
38
its
best people into
who had been one
Germany: Bukharin;
It se-
Max
of the leaders of the four weeks' Ba-
In Stalin's Secret Service
varian Soviet dictatorship; Piatakov; Hungarian and Bulgarian
Comintern
agents;
and Karl Radek himself.
Germany continued
We Red Army men in We held secret
training our military forces.
woods near Solingen in the Rhineland in which several thousand workers would take part. At last the word went around: "Zinoviev has set the date for night maneuvers in the
the uprising."
nal
Communist Party units throughout Germany awaited their fiinstructions. A telegram arrived from Zinoviev to the German
Central Committee fixing the exact hour. Comintern couriers has-
tened to the various party centers with the
command from Mos-
Guns were removed from their hiding places. With mounttension we awaited the zero hour. And then "A new telegram from 'Grisha,'" said the Communist leaders.
cow. ing
.
"The insurrection
is
.
.
postponed!"
Again the Comintern couriers sped through Germany with
new
orders
and
a
new
date for the revolution. This state of alarm
continued for several weeks. Almost every day a new telegram
would
new
arrive
from
agents from
'Grisha' (Zinoviev)
Moscow with new
—new
orders,
instructions
new
plans,
and new revolu-
tionary blueprints. At the beginning of October, orders
came
through for the Communists to join the governments of Saxony
and Thuringia
in coalition
with the Left
Socialists.
Moscow
thought that these governments would become effective
rally-
ing centers for the Communists, and that the police could be dis-
armed At
in
advance of the uprising.
last
the stage was
set.
A categorical telegram came through
from Zinoviev. Again the couriers of the Comintern sped ery party district in
Communist near.
with
Germany
to ev-
passing along the word. Again the
battalions mobilized for the attack.
The hour drew
There could be no turning back now, we thought, and awaited relief the
the last
end of those nerve-wracking weeks of
moment
the Central Committee of the
German
delay.
At
Party was
again hurriedly convened.
"A new telegram from
'Grisha'!
The
insurrection
is
postponed
again!"
39
W. G. Krivitsky
Again messengers were dispatched with urgent
man
The Hamburg Communists, with
late.
went
discipline,
into battle at the appointed hour.
of workers armed with
rifles
Ham-
true Ger-
Hundreds
attacked the police station. Others
occupied strategic points in the
Communist workers
minute
But the courier to
cancellation orders to the party centers.
burg arrived too
last
city.
of Germany were thrown
in other parts
into a state of panic.
"Why
are
we doing nothing while
the workers of
are fighting?" they asked the district leaders
Hamburg
of their party.
"Why
we come to their aid?" The party lieutenants had no answer to give them. Only those on top knew that the workers of Hamburg were perishing because of 'Grisha's' latest telegram. The Hamburg Communists held out for about three days. The great working-class masses of don't
and Saxony and Thuringia did not
the city remained indifferent,
The Reichswehr under General Von Seeckt entered Dresden and threw the CommunistLeft Socialist cabinet of Saxony out of office. The Thuringia cabinet suffered the same fate. The Communist revolution had come
to the aid
of the Communists.
fizzled out.
Those of us
cow were
in
Germany
all
knew
responsible for the fiasco.
that headquarters in
The
Mos-
entire strategy of the
proposed revolution had been worked out by the Bolshevik leaders
of the Comintern. This
The
made
it
necessary to find a scapegoat.
factional rivals of Brandler in the
German
Party were familiar
with the Comintern technique of covering up the mistakes of the high
command, and
they at once
"Brandler and the Central
swung
into action.
Committee
are responsible for our
new by Ruth Fischer, Thaelmann and Maslow failure to capture
power," shouted the
"Entirely correct," echoed tunist, a social
democrat.
"opposition" headed
Moscow. "Brandler
He must
is
go! All hail to the
an oppor-
new
revolu-
tionary leadership of
Ruth Fischer, Thaelmann and Maslow!" At the next World Congress of the Comintern this was
dressed
40
up
in ritualistic resolutions
and
decrees,
all
and with Moscow's
In Stalin's Secret Service
German Communist
blessings the
new
general
Brandler received an order to
German
come
to
Moscow, where he was
passport and given a Soviet office job.
matters, he was informed by Zinoviev, were
concern him. All of his
efforts to return to
no longer
to
Germany were unsuc-
cessful until his friends threatened to create
dal
its
staff.
deprived of his
German
Party was turned over to
an international scan-
by bringing the matter to the attention of the Berlin govern-
ment. Only then was he released from Soviet Russia and expelled
from the Communist
Party.
Souvarine, the eminent French writer and author of the most
comprehensive biography of
Ousted
Stalin,
had the same experience.
1924 from the leadership of the French Communist
in
Party by order of the Comintern, he was detained by the Soviet
government
until his friends in Paris threatened to appeal to the
French authorities.
Upon one branch
of the Soviet government the costly experi-
ment of 1 923 was not entirely wasted. That was ligence Service. efforts,
tion."
we
We
and the
When we
saw the collapse of the Comintern's
said: "Let's save
took the best
the Military Intel-
what we can of the German
men
revolu-
developed by our Party Intelligence
and incorporated them into the Soviet
Zersetzungsdienst,
Out of the ruins of the Communist revoluGermany for Soviet Russia a brilliant intelligence
Military Intelligence.
we
tion
built in
service, the
envy of every other nation.
Shaken by the defeat
in
Germany, Moscow began looking
for
By the late fall of 1924, Germany had The Communist International after nearly six
other fields of conquest.
become years
stabilized.
had not
a single victory
squandering of sites
money and
were on the Soviet
with which to justify
lives.
somewhere, was necessary
Thousands of Comintern para-
at
any
A
victory,
somehow,
cost.
Soviet Russia's western border was Estonia, a tiny nation,
then apparently in the throes of a tive
enormous
payrolls. Zinoviev's position within the
Bolshevik Party was beginning to wobble.
On
its
crisis.
Zinoviev and the execu-
committee of the Comintern decided
to
throw
all
Marxian 41
— W. G. Krivitsky
theory to the wind.
Summoning
the chief of the Intelligence
De-
partment of the Red Army, General Berzin, Zinoviev spoke to
him along
these lines: Estonia
not act there
no
strikes,
as
no
we
in a revolutionary crisis.
did in Germany.
agitation. All
command
under the
is
two or three days we
We will
we need
new methods
a few courageous groups
is
of a handful of Red will
use
We will
Army
officers,
and
in
be masters of Estonia.
man who obeyed orders. In a few days a reliable Red Army officers, mainly Baltic
General Berzin was a
group of about
sixty
Russians, was organized under Zhibur, one of the heroes of the
They were directed to enter Estonia through different routes, some through Finland and Latvia, others by slipping across the Soviet border. Awaiting them in Estonia were scattered special Communist units totaling about two hundred men. By late November all preparations were ready. On the morning of December 1, 1924, a "revolution" struck at specified focal points in Reval, the capital. The country remained completely calm. The workers proceeded to their factories as usual. Business moved at a normal pace, and in about four hours the civil
war.
"revolution" was completely crushed.
Communists were shot on nected with the ers
affair in
the spot.
About one hundred and
fifty
Hundreds of others, not con-
any way, were jailed. The Red Army offic-
returned quickly to Russia along pre-arranged routes. Zhibur
reappeared
at his
desk in the offices of the General
Estonian "revolution" was hushed up In Bulgaria, the
as
Comintern enjoyed
Staff,
and the
quickly as possible.
a period
of prosperity while
Stambouliski, the leader of the Peasant Party, was in power. Stambouliski was friendly to Moscow.
The remnants of General
Wrangel's White Army, which the Bolsheviks had driven out of the Crimea, were
on Bulgarian
ment was anxious
to break
up
territory,
this force.
and the Soviet govern-
With
Stambouliski's con-
sent Russia sent a group of secret agents into Bulgaria for this
purpose. These agents used every
method of propaganda, including the publication of a newspaper, and every means of terror, including assassination. To a considerable extent they were suc-
cessful in
42
demoralizing
this potential anti-Soviet
army.
In Stalin's Secret Service
Despite these friendly relations between Stambouliski and
Moscow, when
in
1923 Tsankoff executed
a military revolt against
Com-
Stambouliski's government Moscow directed the Bulgarian
munist Party
to
remain neutral. The Communist leaders hoped
that as a result of the death struggle
between the army
and Stambouliski, they would gain
tionaries
full
power
for
reac-
them-
selves.
Stambouliski was overthrown and a military dictatorship.
gallows,
Two
Thousands of innocent people went
and the Comintern decided
years passed
A
for a
Communist putsch
to the
One
Communist
that the time
against the Tsankoff govern-
conspiracy was organized in
the Bulgarian officers.
Tsankoff established
and the Communist Party was driven underground.
had come ment.
slain.
Moscow by
the leaders of
Party with the assistance of
Red Army
of these Bulgarian leaders was George Dimitrov.
The Communists learned that on April 16, 1925, all the ranking members of the Bulgarian government would attend services in the Sveti Cathedral in Sofia. They decided to use the occasion for their uprising. By order of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Party, a
bomb was
exploded in the cathedral during the
reli-
About one hundred and fifty persons were killed. But Premier Tsankoff and the important members of his government survived. All the direct participants in the bombing were
gious services.
executed.
Dimitrov himself continued
Moscow. He became
its
to
work
representative in
for the
Comintern
Germany. Late
in
in 1932,
he was ordered back to Moscow, and people on the inside said that his career
was arrested
was
in
at
an end. Before he could obey the order he
connection with the historic Reichstag
fire.
His
bold and clever behavior before the Nazi court, where he suc-
ceeded in fixing the guilt on the Nazis themselves, made him the
Communist hero of the It is
day.
one of the inimitable
ironies
of Comintern history that
Dimitrov, one of those responsible for the Sofia bombing, later
became,
as
president of the Comintern, the official spokesman of
"democracy," "peace," and the popular front.
43
W. G. Krivitsky
Moscow had in
elaborate theoretical explanations for
its
failures
Hungary, Poland, Germany, Estonia and Bulgaria. These
volumes of
was
and
theses, resolutions,
it
The myth of the
sponsible.
reports. In
and
suggested that Bolshevism
of
fact
for the future,
failure,
The
more grandiose became
the
re-
of the Comintern leader-
ship was preserved with ecclesiastical stubbornness.
became the
however,
case,
Russian leaders were
its
infallibility
no
filled
clearer
the plans
and the more complicated the international
struc-
Comintern.
ture of the
Although the Communist International never accomplished its
primary aim, the establishment of a Communist dictatorship,
in a single country,
it
— —one of
became
especially after
stratagem of the popular front litical
the
turned to the
it
most important po-
agencies in the world.
The general framework of the Comintern is no secret. It is known that there are Communist Parties, legal or illegal, in every country of the world. The world knows that the headquar-
widely
ters are in
ratus,
Moscow. But
and
its
it
knows almost nothing of the
intimate connection with the
OGPU and
real
appa-
Soviet Mili-
tary Intelligence.
The
general staff of the
facing the Kremlin attire. It is
who
no spot
Comintern
is
located in a building
and heavily guarded by OGPU agents
for curious Muscovites to congregate. Persons
have business within the building, whatever their rank, are
subjected to the very closest scrutiny from the until they depart.
the
in civilian
commandant, If Earl
the
staffed
left
of the main entrance
is
they enter
the office of
by OGPU agents.
Browder, general secretary of the American
nist Party, desires
pass in the
To
moment
an audience with Dimitrov, he must obtain a
commandant's
office,
oughly examined. Before he
is
where
moment when
his papers will
be thor-
permitted to leave the Comintern
building his pass will again be examined.
hand, the exact
Commu-
It
must bear,
in Dimitrov's
their interview ended. If
any time
has elapsed since the end of the interview, an investigation
is
con-
ducted on the spot. Every minute spent in the Comintern building must be accounted for and recorded. Informal chats in the
44
In Stalin's Secret Service
and
corridors are severely discouraged
OGPU agent
reprimand a ranking
to
it
is
official
not unusual for an
of the Comintern for
violation of these rules. This system provides the
comprehensive
file
The heart of the Comintern
is
by
to use at the proper time.
known and never pubknown by its Russian initials
the
licized International Liaison Section, as the
little
O.M.S. Until the purge got underway, the O.M.S. was headed *
Piatnitsky, a veteran Bolshevik, trained
gime
a
regarding the associations of Russian and for-
Communists, which can be put
eign
OGPU with
in the practical business
during the Czarist
of distributing
illegal
re-
revolutionary
propaganda. Piatnitsky had been in charge of the transport of Lenin's paper, Iskra,
of the century.
from Switzerland
to Russia in the early part
When the Communist International was organized,
Lenin's choice for head of the all-important Foreign Liaison Section naturally
became, in
fell
effect,
upon
Piatnitsky.
As the chief of the O.M.S. he
the Finance Minister
and Director of Personnel
of the Comintern.
He
created a world-wide network of permanently stationed
agents responsible to him, to act as the liaison officers between
Moscow and
autonomous Communist
the nominally
Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the United agents of the Comintern, these
whip over the which they
leaders of the
are stationed. Neither the
majority of the leaders of the tity
O.M.S.
Communist
States.
Parties
As
of
resident
representatives hold the
Party in the country in
rank and
file,
nor even the
Communist Parties, know the idenwho is responsible to Moscow,
of the O.M.S. representative,
and who does not participate
directly in party discussions.
OGPU has gradually taken over many of the especially the hunting down and reporting to
In recent years the
O.M.S. functions,
Moscow of
cases
of heresy against
Stalin.
However,
in the
im-
mensely complicated work of subsidizing and coordinating the activities
of the
Communist
Parties, the
O.M.S.
is still
the chief
instrument.
Otdyel Mezhdunarodnoi Svyazi.
45
W. G. Krivitsky
is
The most delicate job entrusted to the O.M.S. resident agents the distribution of money to finance the Communist Parties,
their expensive
propaganda and
their false fronts
—
such, for in-
League for Peace and Democracy, the International
stance, as the
Labor Defense, the International Workers' Aid, the Friends of the Soviet Union, tions,
and
which became
a host of ostensibly non-partisan organiza-
especially important cogs
embarked upon the popular
many
For
when Moscow
front.
years, while revolutionary prospects there
promising, the Comintern poured the greater part of
Germany and
into
Central Europe. But
when
it
seemed
its
money
became more de-
an appendage of the Soviet government, and revolution-
cisively
ary objectives were sidetracked in favor of Stalinizing public
opinion and capturing key positions in the democratic governments, Moscow's budgets for France, Great Britain, and the
United States were enormously increased.
At no time has any single Communist Party in the world managed to cover more than a very small percentage of
Moscow's own estimate
is
that
it
its
expenses.
must bear on an average from
ninety to ninety-five percent of the expenditures of foreign
munist
Parties.
This
Com-
money is paid from the Soviet treasury through
the
O.M.S.
the
The O.M.S. resident agent is the judge, in the first instance, of wisdom of any new expenditure which a Communist Party
in
sums decided upon by
Stalin's Political
wishes to make. In the United States, for example,
if
Bureau.
the Political
Bureau of the American Communist Party contemplates the pubof a
lication
new
newspaper, the O.M.S. agent
considers the suggestion, cates
and
if it
with the O.M.S. headquarters in
important
cases,
it is
representative has
One
from Moscow
He
Bureau of the Rus-
minor matters, of course, the
discretion.
of the favorite methods of transmitting
structions
46
wide
consulted.
communiMoscow. From there, in
referred to the Political
sian Bolshevik Party for decision. In
O.M.S.
is
merits attention he
to a foreign
Communist Party is through immune from search. For this
money and
in-
country for the use of the
which
local
the diplomatic pouches,
are
reason the O.M.S. representa-
In Stalin's Secret Service
tive
is
bassy.
usually
employed
From Moscow he
the Soviet government,
nominal capacity
in a
receives, in
in the Soviet
packages bearing the
Em-
seal
of
of banknotes together with sealed
rolls
instructions for their distribution.
He
personally delivers the
roll
Communist leader, with whom he maintains direct Through carelessness, American, British, and French
of bills to the contact.
banknotes have several times been sent abroad for Comintern use bearing the In the
telltale
first
even more crudely.
Bureau
Political
confiscated
abroad.
stamp of the Soviet State Bank.
Comintern the financing was done
years of the I
recall a
time
to order the
when
the procedure was for the
Cheka (ogpu) to deliver sacks of to the Comintern for shipment
diamonds and gold
Still
other methods have since been developed. Conve-
nient blinds are the Soviet Trading Corporations, such as the Arcos
Amtorg in the United States, and connected private business firms. The constant displacement of leaders in the foreign Communist Parties presents its own special problem to the O.M.S. in its monetary operations. When Moscow supplanted the leadership of the German Communist Party, after the failure in
London and
the
of the 1923 uprising, Mirov-Abramov, the O.M.S. agent in Ger-
many,
as well as Piatnitsky in
Moscow, spent many anxious hours
wondering whom they could now trust with Comintern money.
It
them when Wilhelm Pieck was retained in the new Central Committee, for both Piatnitsky and Mirov-Abramov
was
a relief to
trusted this veteran labor leader.
Mirov-Abramov, representative in in the press
whom I knew for many years, was the O.M.S.
Germany from 1921
to 1930. Officially,
department of the Soviet Embassy
he worked
in Berlin. Actually
money and the transmission of Comintern instructions throughout Germany and the greater part of Central Europe. At the height of the Comintern's German he directed the distribution of
drive,
Mirov-Abramov employed
assistants
and
couriers.
as Piatnitsky's assistant.
the
more than twenty-five Later he was recalled to Moscow to work
When
a staff of
the old Bolshevik general staff of
Comintern was liquidated by
Stalin,
Mirov-Abramov together
with Piatnitsky were removed. Because of his exceptional under-
47
W. G. Krivitsky
Germany Mirov-Abramov was then transferred to the Soviet Military Intelligence where he served until 1937, when he was shot in the great purge. Absurdly enough, when Yagoda, ground contacts
in
the fallen chief of the OGPU, was tried the following year, he declared
on the witness stand
that he
had sent
sums of money
large
through Mirov-Abramov to Trotsky.
Managing tion
the finances of the
Comintern and
its
only a small part of the tasks of the O.M.S.
is
also as the
foreign secIt
functions
nervous system of the Comintern. Envoys dispatched
by Moscow
as political
commissars to the Communist Parties of
foreign countries establish
all
their contacts
which furnishes them with passports, addresses,
and generally
tween the
home
acts as the
offices in
through the O.M.S.,
them
directs
permanent
Moscow and
to "reliable"
liaison staff be-
these political agents
abroad.
A notable years ago
country
Comintern Commissar
for the
United States some
was the Hungarian Communist, Pogany, known
as
Lovestone and Gitlow, the leaders of the American Party, after they
jority
and
in this
John Pepper. His primary mission here was to remove had won
a vote of confidence
Communist
from the vast ma-
of the party members. Pogany- Pepper carried out his orders,
installed a
new high command
for the
American Communist
Pepper himself was arrested in Moscow in 1936 and shot. The passport division of the O.M.S. unlike the OGPU and Mili-
Party.
,
tary Intelligence, does not actually manufacture passports.
It
gets
genuine documents whenever possible and doctors them according to requirements. In obtaining passports natical zeal of
O.M.S.
draws upon the
man
Comintern agents
in the
in China,
American Communist
fa-
sympathizers. If the
representative in the United States requires
passports for his
Communist members and
it
two American
he communicates with
Party.
This
latter obtains
genuine United States passports from party members or sympathizers.
The O.M.S.
tutes others,
Moscow
and
skillfully
then removes the photographs, substi-
makes the other necessary changes.
has always been fond of American passports. In an-
other connection
48
staff
I
have described the part they played in the Span-
In Stalin's Secret Service
ish Civil
War.
OGPU agents
It is
not unusual for the O.M.S. representative or
to send batches of
where the central O.M.S. engaged
American passports
office has a staff
to
Moscow,
of about ten people
such documents according to the Comintern's
in fixing
needs.
1924 the Berlin police raided the O.M.S. headquarters
In
seized a batch of
and
German
passports, together with
there,
files list-
ing the names of their original owners, the true names of the
Comintern agents then using them, and the which they were passport
is
traveling.
much
China. but
I
I
He had
For such reasons of course a genuine
sent Earl
do not know why Browder was chosen
believe the
reminded a
names with
preferred.
Comintern and the OGPU
In 1927 the
fictitious
main reason was
in this connection
man working
his
for
I
passport.
had with
I
him named Lobonovsky, whose
competence was always the subject of anecdotes
in
capitals
Lobonovsky
in
one of the
am
Piatnitsky.
would often run
into
to
for the mission,
American
of a conversation
Browder
our
in-
circle.
I
of Eu-
rope as he scurried about on seemingly important missions. Later I
had occasion "Tell
me
him with Piatnitsky. Comrade Piatnitsky," I
to discuss
frankly,
keep that idiot on your
The
said,
"why do you
staff?"
veteran Bolshevik leader smiled tolerantly and replied:
"My dear young Walter, the question here is not Lobonovsky s capability. What is important is that he has a Canadian passport and
I
one
else will do."
need a Canadian for the missions on which
"Canadian!" a
I
I
send him.
No
exclaimed. "Lobonovsky isn't a Canadian. He's
Ukrainian born in Shepetovka." Piatnitsky bellowed.
"What do you mean, a
born
Canadian passport. That's good enough
it's
a
a Ukrainian
so easy to find a real Canadian?
Canadian born I
believe that
in Shepetovka! for
We've got
me. to
He has
Do you
make
think
the best of
in Shepetovka!"
when
sending Browder to
Comintern debated the question of China they were fully aware that he was not the
49
— W. G. Krivitsky
an expert on Chinese
from Kansas
affairs.
But Browder
a real
is
American
City, not Shepetovka.
Practically
all
matters regarding the manufacture and doctor-
ing of passports and other documents are entrusted to native Russians. Pre-war conditions in Czarist Russia gave tional training in this art.
The
them excep-
elaborate passport regulations
which
have become prevalent in most European countries since 1918
found the Bolsheviks well prepared. In the
who
offices
Army
and the Fourth Department of the Red
can forge consular signatures and government
indistinguishable
The Foreign importance.
It
from the genuine
all
still
the educational and propaganda
and about Moscow
scale. It
conducts
for carefully selected
munists from every country, teaching them warfare,
wholly
another function of great
Comintern on an international
training schools in
seals
article.
Liaison Section has
co-ordinates
functions of the
of the OGPU
there are experts
all
Com-
the angles of civil
from propaganda to the operation of machine guns.
These schools had
their
beginning during the
first
months of
when brief training courses were given German and Austrian war prisoners in the hope that these "cad-
the Bolshevik revolution to
res"
would use
knowledge on the barricades of Berlin and
their
Vienna. Later these courses became organized institutions.
most promising students would
receive military instruction
the immediate tutelage of the Intelligence
The
under
Department of the
General Staff of the Red Army. In 1926, a university was established in
Moscow
to instruct
Western European and American Communists in the technique of Bolshevism. This university, the so-called Lenin School,
is
subsi-
dized by the O.M.S., which also provides living quarters for the students. viet ish, life,
Its
dean
is
the wife of Yaroslavsky, Chief of the So-
"League of the Godless." The students, French and American Communists,
and have
in the Soviet
little
live
now
largely Brit-
an entirely secluded
contact with either Russians or foreigners
Union. Graduates of
this
Bolshevik academy are
expected to return to their native countries to work for the
Comintern 50
in labor unions,
government
offices
and other non-
In Stalin's Secret Service
Communist positions. Secrecy is maintained because their value to Moscow in the United States, France, and Great Britain is destroyed if it becomes known that they have studied methods of civil warfare under the Intelligence Officers of the Red Army. for very small groups of carefully
Another training course, sifted foreign
Communists,
Moscow
side
is
conducted
in
complete secrecy out-
suburb of Kuntsevo. Here European and
in the
American Communists are taught intelligence work, including wiretapping, the operation of secret radio stations, passport forgery, etc.
When
the
Comintern began
to turn
its
attention to China,
created a university of the east, the so-called sity,
with Karl Radek
Moscow was
at the head.
then in a frenzy of
optimism over the prospects of a Soviet revolution of generals and of high Chinese this special training school.
Kai-shek. the
The Kuomintang and
Among them
was the son of Chiang
the Chinese Nationalist Party, and
at
hand, and
in
Moscow felt
hand.
received a Russian political tutor, Borodin,
a Russian military advisor, General Galen-Bluecher, later
mander of the 1938. tered
When
central
into the
committee and
its
Chiang had received the
all
Kuomintang and many enacademy at Whampoa.
military
full
he made a sharp about face and on munists from
com-
Soviet Far Eastern District until his liquidation in
Communists flocked
its
Sons
were invited to attend
Comintern were then working hand was
in China.
officials
The Kuomintang,
that at last a big victory
it
Sun Yat Sen Univer-
benefit of
Moscow's support
May 20, 1 926 eliminated Com-
important positions.
Stalin,
however, avoided a
him later. known before
clean break with Chiang, hoping to outwit I
was
staying, at this time, at the hotel
lution as the Kniazi Dvor. Living
on the same
the revo-
floor with
me
was
General Feng, the Christian General. Despite the about-face in
May, the Comintern
leaders
were
still
confident of their approach-
ing victory in China. Feng was in Moscow, maneuvering to ar-
range an alliance against Chiang Kai-shek. Great importance was attached to his
visit
by the Soviet
leaders,
meetings and parties and boosted him
who
dragged him to
as a leader
of the Chinese 51
W. G. Krivitsky
masses. Feng played his part admirably, promising everywhere in
ringing speeches to fight for the victory of Leninism in China.
Almost every day
I
saw a new
delivered to the door of his suite, I
crate of
books and pamphlets
where OGPU
soldiers stood guard.
spoke to Feng several times, partly in English, partly in Russian.
He was
a typical
Chinese war
whom nothing in the world
lord, to
was more foreign than the Leninism with which he was being
bombarded. Like so many
He
others, he proved a disappointment.
returned to China without opening the crates of books, and
never gave another moment's thought to the "Leninist" promises
he had made in Moscow. In
December 1927,
after
Chiang had completed
his job
shooting and decapitating thousands of Communists hai, the
Comintern sent Heinz Neumann,
German Communist
Party, to lead
in
by
Shang-
a former leader of the
an uprising in Canton. The
uprising lasted two and a half days and cost nearly six thousand lives.
All the Chinese
Communist leaders
and Heinz Neumann
fled to
Communist
Canton were executed
Moscow.
Wholly independent of the individual
in
Parties,
vast
propaganda machinery of the
with their newspapers, magazines,
books, and pamphlets running into millions of dollars annually, the centralized propaganda apparatus of the is
in the charge of the
Comintern
is
itself. It
Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda, but
financed and actually directed by the Foreign Liaison Section.
most important publication
is
Its
the International Press Correspon-
dence, released in English, French, and
German.
It is
intended
Communist editors The Nazis have attempted to imitate this
primarily to benefit the hundreds of
in vari-
ous countries.
type of
propaganda with
their
tributed to pro-Fascist
World Service, published in Erfurt and
and anti-Semitic
dis-
editors throughout the
world.
Nothing occasions ties
more embarrassing
is
when
get their signals mixed,
same question.
to
Moscow than those Communist
the official newspapers of the
rare
Par-
and take contradictory stands on the
When the Berlin-Moscow pact was signed, ten days
before the outbreak of the present European War, the synchroni-
52
In Stalin's Secret Service
zation of the
Communist
official
organs was perfect.
The London
Daily Worker, the Paris LHumanite\ and the Daily Worker in the
United States simultaneously and in identical language hailed signal for general
war
The Comintern
as a great
this
contribution toward peace.
also publishes in every leading
country
in-
cluding the United States, a magazine called the Communist Interna-
which contains the decisions of the Comintern
tional, articles
as well as
by leading Russian and foreign Communists.
These key publications serve a double function. Not only do
Communist Parties recent years has become
they insure unity of opinion throughout the
of Europe and America, but what in
even more important, they constitute the mechanism whereby Stalin
is
guaranteed a well-organized echo to everything which he
decrees in for the
Moscow. During the
Kremlin
to be able to
pro-Communist
great purge
show
writers of Western
backed him to the
it
was very important
the Russian people that
Europe and the United
hilt in his liquidation
all
the
States
of the old Bolshevik he-
roes.
Foreigners
and 1938
German,
how vital it was for Stalin in
little realize
to be able to declare that the
Polish, Bulgarian,
American,
two
first
Not
936,
1
937,
British, French,
and Chinese Communists unanimously
supported the liquidation of the "Trotskyite,
and wreckers"
1
Fascist,
mad-dogs,
—among them even Zinoviev and Bukharin,
chiefs
the
of the Comintern.
a single
Communist
leader in the United States writing
during the period of the great purge, failed to furnish Stalin with these prescribed epithets directed against the former leaders of
the Bolshevik Party
and of the Comintern.
Even before the Comintern tactics, the
O.M.S. had
officially
began
started to subsidize a
form of propaganda. Moscow decided that adequate for
its
its
Popular Front
new and it
subtler
was no longer
purposes to reach only those groups
whom
it
Communist slogans. In the person of Willi Muenzenberg, once a leading German Communist and memcould attract by outright
ber of the Reichstag, field
it
found
a
means of branching out
into the
of what are called "front publications." Muenzenberg was
53
W. G. Krivitsky
publisher and entrepreneur.
He
turned out attractive illustrated newspapers and magazines,
all
set
up with O.M.S. funds,
as a big
apparently non-partisan but nevertheless "sympathetic" to the
He later went
Soviet Union.
motion picture business
into the
also
known
as Prometheus. The Muenzenberg managed and soon extended their operations into the Scandinavian countries. When Hitler came to power, Muenzenberg transferred them to Paris and Prague. When the great purge reached out for Muenzenberg it found him an elusive target. He declined an invitation to "visit" Moscow.
and founded
a concern
enterprises were cleverly
Dimitrov, the President of the Comintern, wrote reassuring
let-
Moscow needed him for important new assignMuenzenberg refused to bite. The OGPU then dispatched
ters insisting that
ments.
one of its agents, Byeletsky,
to convince
him
that he
had nothing
to fear.
"Who decides your fate?" argued And I know that Yezhov is on
OGPU?
Muenzenberg avoided the and
fall
trap,
Byeletsky.
your
"Dimitrov or the
side."
and during the
entire
summer
of 1937 remained in hiding, fearing a more violent type
He
of persuasion.
turned his establishments over to Smeral, a
Czech Communist. The German Communist Party expelled him
and indexed him
as
alive in Paris today.
an "enemy of the people." Muenzenberg
He
has never
come out openly
After the Seventh Congress of the
Muenzenberg
front publications
and the United
evening newspaper, Ce
Soir.
Comintern
became
States. In Paris, the
a
model
is
against Stalin. in
for
1935 the all
Europe
Comintern even founded an
But for the past three or four years
Comintern has spent more money for "nonpartisan" publications and front organizations in the United States than in any other
the
country. So long as
Moscow adhered
to the pretense
of collective
and anti-Hitlerism, the American public became a vericampaign ground for its propagandists. Instead of building
security table
revolutionary "cadres" to convince
New
among American workers,
Deal
officials,
the job was
now
respectable business executives,
trade-union leaders and journalists that Soviet Russia was in the forefront of the forces of "peace
54
and democracy."
In Stalin's Secret Service
At the height of this popular front campaign, when the
dicta-
Union was becoming more and more totalitarian and the purge was the dominant fact in Soviet life, the Comintern became more than ever, and indeed essentially, an OGPU torship within the Soviet
subsidiary.
The Comintern
has a "Control Commission" on the model
of that of the Russian Bolshevik Party, which over the political morals of Stalin
party grew
more
members. During the years that
its
climbed to sole power,
as the factional
acute, internal espionage
tion of this body.
supposed to watch
is
war
in the Bolshevik
became the
sole func-
The Control Commission threw all wavering Communist Party. The Comintern
Stalinists out of the Russian
Control Commission followed
example on an international
this
scale.
The Control Commission, however, other instrument, created to aid
of "Cadres Section." This
title
many years
Comintern. For
it
it, is
is
one of the milder
the
arm of the ogpu
friend of Dzerzhinsky, the
Soviet Secret Police,
and
many years
a
first
its
Communist
Party,
Chief of the
Comintern agent
United States and Latin America. Kraiewski planted every
in the
was headed by Kraiewski, a Polish
Communist, an old
for
in-
body bearing the innocent
a
now
is
of the Stalin regime. An-
quisitorial instruments at the disposal
in the
his agents in
and developed intra-party espionage
to
present level of supreme efficiency.
Every ten days the chief of
this
Cadres Section meets the
chief of a corresponding section of the
OGPU and turns over
him
The OGPU then
the material gathered by his agents.
data as
down
it
to
sees its
fit.
Today
this police office in the
Communists munist
uses this
Comintern
tracks
source every ripple of foreign opposition to Stalin.
follows with special vigilance
all
to
It
threads running from foreign
to potential oppositionists inside the Russian
Com-
Party.
One
of the most unsavory jobs assigned to
the luring to
Moscow
loyalty to Stalin.
ing with the
this
department
of foreign Communists suspected of
A Communist who believes himself in good
Comintern will
receive
word from
is
dis-
stand-
the executive
com55
W. G. Krivitsky
mittee that he
needed in Moscow. Flattered
is
at this recognition
Upon his Many such
of his importance, he hastens to the Comintern capital. he
arrival
turned over to the OGPU and disappears.
is
catches are credited to the Cadres Section,
work of
which through
spies frequently receives "information"
its
not only
net-
false,
but malicious, tending to show that the individual in question has not been toeing the Stalinist munists
who
line.
The number of foreign Com-
have been thus lured to their destruction will prob-
ably never be ascertained.
Moscow has also more refined methods of handling, foreign Communist leaders who are in disfavor. An important political figure who still enjoys a certain amount of prestige among his own followers has to be whittled down before he is ready for the discard. He must be compromised in the eyes of Communists in his own country. When that is done, he can be dealt with summarily.
The whittling down process follows a well designed pattern. The first step is to remove him from work in his own country. Ordered
to
Moscow, he must choose between obedience and im-
mediate expulsion. nist Party.
But
if
He
cannot refuse and remain in the
he has high standing, he cannot be turned right
off into a Soviet office boy.
Comintern, he
is
Summoned
to the offices of the
informed that he has been chosen for an impor-
tant mission in China, in the is
Near
East, or in Latin
America. This
the beginning of his decline. Detached from his
thrown into returns to
a
Commu-
own
remote sphere where he can accomplish
Moscow
to face a very
dour Comintern
for the six
dollars
months you were
—
that the
avail.
working
The
class
familiar
ings, falls
56
on deaf ears. Informed of all
they have not forgotten
light.
five
you
to
thousand
The Comintern
sent
argument
—and obvious
of Brazil has not yet reached a
cient level of political consciousness to
if
and the
you spent?"
Excuses are of no fact
in Brazil,
he
chief.
"Well, comrade," the chief says, "what results have
show
party,
little,
suffi-
embrace Communist teachthis, his
comrades
at
home,
him entirely, see him now in a new him to Brazil and he didn't deliver.
In Stalin's Secret Service
The
He is now given a job in one Bureaus. He becomes a wage employee
next step follows logically.
of the thousands of Soviet
of the Soviet government, and
From
this
moment,
he has any backbone,
at
is
his chief
an end.
ambition
is
of the Soviet Union and back to his country and to
to get out
sever
if
his political career
all ties
with Soviet Russia and the Comintern. In
this
he does
not often succeed.
One
of the most tragic cases of
this
kind was that of
my
friend Stanislaw Hubermann, brother of the world-renowned violinist. Hubermann, who was known in our circle as Stach Huber, entered the Polish revolutionary movement during the World War.
Together with Muenzenberg, he was one of the founders of the
Young Communist League. He worked valiantly in the underground Communist Party and soon became one of its leaders. He served many prison sentences in Poland and was often severely beaten by the police.
When tee
the
Comintern decided
of the Polish
Party,
to
change the central commit-
Huber was summoned
to
Moscow. He was
soon transferred to a newly created bureau connected with the railroads.
work.
He
Huber was completely out of
his
element in railroad
vainly exerted pressure to be sent back to
party in Poland.
work
He was pushed from one bureau to another,
in his
given
an opportunity to sample every aspect of Soviet bureaucracy, but
he was not allowed to go back to his Polish comrades.
He was
still
in
Moscow, working
as
an obscure secretary in a
when the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of Young Communist League was celebrated in the House of
Soviet office,
the
the Soviets.
On
viet regime,
parading in their splendor. Stirring speeches were de-
livered
the platform were the
new
dignitaries of the So-
emphasizing the great role of the Young Communist League
in Soviet Russia
and
in the world. In the
back of the
Huber, one of the founders of the Young
Wandering about long since
aimlessly,
hall
was Stach
Communist League. who had also
he met an old comrade
They were happy to run into each other and invited Huber to his apartment. They spent the
lost caste.
the old friend
better part of the night reminiscing
and exchanging anecdotes 57
W. G. Krivitsky Huber was summoned to appear before the Control Commission of the Comintern. "Were you at the home of Comrade N last Wednesday night?"
over a bottle. Several days
the
Stach
later,
Huber admitted the "charge." He was at once expelled from party, which made it impossible for him to get any job. He was
directed to vacate his apartment immediately,
He came
a roof over his head.
to live with
and was
me
left
without
my apartment.
in
I was almost certain during those days that Stach Huber would commit suicide. But Manuilsky, one of the leaders of the Comintern, came to his rescue. The Control Commission was persuaded to reverse its decision. Huber was readmitted into the
Party,
with the remark, "strong and
final
warning" recorded in
his
He was given a job at the railroad depot of Velikie Huber knew how precarious his position now was, and he
Party dossier. Luki.
labored assiduously in the hope that eventually the black
would be erased from
He worked
Huber was
his party record.
so well that in
1936 he was awarded an
air trip
Moscow for the November anniversary of Revolution. En route the plane crashed and Stach
from Velikie Luki the Bolshevik
mark
to
killed. Several
months
later
one of his
friends said to
me:
"How fortunate Stach was to die in an aeroplane crash!" And indeed he was fortunate. In the province of Velikie Luki the local
Communist official had rewarded him
for his
good work,
but in the OGPU office he was merely an old Bolshevik
been expelled from the Party and reinstated on parole. purge attained
its
height, the
OGPU was searching
who had
When
for Stach
the
Huber.
The end was not always so tragic. When Tomann, a leader of Communist Party, was appointed educational director of a seaman's home in Leningrad, he arranged to receive a telegram from Vienna informing him that his mother was dying. This time it was Moscow that was fooled. Upon reaching Vienna, Tomann announced his break with the Comintern. the Austrian
The coterie of foreign Communists at the
Hotel Lux,
parties,
58
as
residing in
Moscow chiefly
permanent representatives of their respective
have always constituted a glaring anomaly in Soviet
life.
In Stalin's Secrei
The Communist
Parties
Moscow. Men Thorez come only when summoned or congress. But each party has
from
are not paid
who
to
and
Pollitt
an important conference
Moscow
resident consuls in
the Bolshevik Bureau,
—
and
contempt by
especially
by
Stalin
—
or did shine until recently
as
Moscow.
During the famine
when
in 1932-33,
Browder,
like
sent them. Regarded with
himself, they nevertheless shine social lights in
its
their first rank
a regular diplomatic corps in that their salaries
by those
members of
the
rvice
do not of course send
leaders to reside in
too, differing
Si
bread and dried
that
accompanied
forcible collectivization
the average Soviet employee had to get along
fish, a
on
cooperative was created for the exclusive
use of these foreigners, where they could purchase, at moderate prices,
products that no
Lux became vite, if
asked
a
money could buy
symbol of social
who
lives in
injustice,
elsewhere.
The Hotel
and the average Musco-
comfort in Moscow, would invariably
reply:
"The diplomatic corps and
The handful of Russian mixed
casionally
to lick the plates
come
to
socially
of
the foreigners in the Hotel Lux."
writers, actors
actresses,
The
at the
oc-
Russians would
them and beg for such small conveniences
To the OGPU, the
who
with the Comintern people were forced
this foreign aristocracy.
needles, lipstick, fountain pens, or a
Lux
and
as razor blades,
pound of coffee.
international collection living at the Hotel
government's expense was, and
is
always, subject to
suspicion. This papier-mache world of the "proletarian revolution"
is
always buzzing with intrigue, and mutual recriminations,
Communist accusing the other of insufficient loyalty Stalin. The OGPU, through its planted "guests" in the hotel, bears
each foreign to all
these charges
luminous
and counter-charges and records them
in
its
vo-
files.
When
the great purge began there was a general
roundup and
Communists living in the Soviet Union. The Lux at last received important work. They became agents of the OGPU and denounced their own liquidation of foreign
Comintern consuls countrymen
living at the
in batches.
Being personally responsible for
all
for-
59
W. G. Krivitsky
eign
Communists then
own
positions
countrymen
in the Soviet
and often
their
own
Union, they could save
to the OGPU.
Ironically enough,
was during these years when the
it
Comintern became the creature of Stalin and the OGPU, viet Russia attained the tries.
The Popular
Horse speech
Seventh Congress of the
at the
that So-
peak of its prestige in the democratic coun-
famous Trojan
Front, heralded by Dimitrov's
national in 1935, ushered in a lar
their
necks only by delivering their
Communist
Inter-
new day. Abandoning the unpopu-
Bolshevik slogans, which after nearly two decades had failed to
take hold in a single foreign country, citadels
of capitalism
anti-Hitlerism.
as the
champion of
Even while the
us in every walk of
life,
Moscow now peace,
entered the
democracy and
was terrorizing
great purge
all
Stalin granted to his subjects "the
most
democratic constitution in the world," a constitution which,
though
it
exists
is
ment,
As
regarded by
many foreign
built
on the
Fascist sys-
liberals as, if not a great achieve-
at least a "significant aspiration."
a practical matter, the Popular Front
was important
in five
countries: the United States, Great Britain, France, Spain,
Czechoslovakia. In
all
Fascist
I
underground Communist
had good occasion
Parties
to observe, in
Intelligence in Western Europe,
a fight.
of Germany and
my post as
to their deaths.
amounted to nothing. Shot through
Communism
rupt in these countries, and
Germany
as a result
if a
The Italy,
Chief of Military
with Fascist stool pigeons, the only function they serve
men
and
and semi-Fascist countries the
Comintern abdicated without even the pretense of so-called as
al-
only on paper, and there openly guarantees the
permanent sovereignty of his new party tem,
of
has long since
is
to
send
become bank-
new revolutionary wave is to sweep
of Hitler's war,
it
most
certainly will not be
under the leadership of Moscow. In the stable and progressive democracies of Scandinavia, the
Popular Front's slogans
of
just as
had revolutionary slogans
earlier years.
In Great Britain, face
60
fell flat,
won
on the other hand, although Moscow's new
few converts among the laboring masses,
its
anti-Fascist
In Stalin's Secret Servh
slogans captured a substantial
number of
i
students, writers,
trade-union leaders. During the Spanish tragedy and the days,
many
and
Munich
scions of the British aristocracy enlisted both in the
Army of the Comintern in Spain) and Moscow show trials shocked many At the height of the Purge one of the mem-
International Brigade (the in
our Intelligence Service. The
new
of these
recruits.
bers of the Central
Committee of
the British
Communist
Party
said to a colleague of mine:
"Why
does Stalin shoot you people?
Union, but
serve the Soviet
I
am
I
know how
sure that if
loyally
you return
to
you
Mos-
cow, you too will be shot."
Such moods
The all its
arose,
but they subsided.
executions continued.
totalitarian horror.
But
The Spanish
picture unfolded in
Stalin kept his international follow-
ing as the great ally of the democracies against Hitler. In France the Front Populaire was so intimately tied up with the
Franco-Soviet alliance that ture.
it all
but captured the governmental struc-
True, there were those, like
military situation
from
Leon Blum, who
tried to
keep the
affecting internal politics, but to a large
Most of France, from General Gamelin
extent such efforts failed.
and conservative Deputy De
Kerillis to
trade-union leader Jouhaux,
were so obsessed with the idea that France's security was linked with Moscow, that the Front Populaire became the dominant
French
life.
On
the surface the
fact in
Comintern operated through
sugar-coated organizations. Newspapers like Ce
Soir,
book
publishing houses, theaters, motion picture companies
—
its
clubs, all
be-
came instruments of Stalin's "anti-Hitler" front. Behind the scenes the OGPU and Soviet Military Intelligence were working feverishly for a stranglehold
on the
The country was not
state institutions
entirely blind to the danger.
frequent interpellations on the floor of the in
of France.
which the charge was hurled
There were
Chamber of Deputies
that the Soviet
government was
too well informed regarding the secrets of French military aviation. is
Whatever
basis there
at least a fact that
may have been for these insinuations,
we of
number of ranking French
it
the Soviet Intelligence referred to a
officials as
"our people."
61
W. G. Krivitsky
Moscow's influence over Czechoslovakia was even more pronounced. Soviet Russia was looked upon by the most responsible ministers of the Prague its
government
as the vigilant
protector of
independence. Here an element of pan-slavism entered to make
the Kremlin's authority even greater.
enamoured of the notion of
The Czechs became
so
their great Slav brother protecting
them against Nazi Germany that they allowed themselves to be drawn
into
one of the most
story of how
The
Moscow
tragic intrigues in
modern
history.
used the Czech government for a pur-
pose of Stalin, has been told in
my introduction.
Communist Party as such never played and was always regarded by Moscow with su-
In the United States the
any serious
role,
preme contempt. For
all its
long years of activity up to 1935, the
American Communist Party had almost nothing nized labor did not respond to
its
slogans,
to show.
Orga-
and the mass of Ameri-
can people were barely aware of its existence. Even in those years, however, the party was important to us, because
connected than any other Intelligence Service.
of the Red Army,
Communist
it
was more
Party with our
closely
OGPU and
During the mechanization and motorization
we had members of the American Communist
Party as our agents in aircraft and automobile factories and in
munitions plants. In
Moscow
several years ago,
Intelligence in the far in
I
told the Chief of our Military
United States that
I
thought he was going too
mobilizing such a large percentage of American Party func-
tionaries for espionage.
"Why
not?
They
His reply was
receive
typical:
good Soviet money. They'll never
make a revolution, so they might as well earn their With the thousands of recruits enlisted under democracy, the
Communist
United States grew touched
territory.
much
By
pay."
the banner of
OGPU espionage ring in the and penetrated previously un-
Party
larger
carefully concealing their identity,
munists found their way into hundreds of key positions.
came cials
possible for
who would
Moscow
It
conduct of
be-
offi-
not knowingly approach a Comintern or OGPU
agent with a ten-foot pole.
62
to influence the
Com-
In Stalin's
More
Secret Service
challenging perhaps than this success in espionage and
pressure politics,
is
the Comintern's penetration into labor unions,
publishing houses, magazines, and newspapers
complished by simply erasing the Comintern's anti-Hitlerism in
a
label
maneuver
ac-
and stamping
place.
its
The members of world party and
—
its
the
Comintern have always regarded
Moscow
leadership as the
first
their
and para-
mount object of loyalty. Whether it was Kiepenberger as a member of the Military Affairs Committee of the German Reichstag, Gallacher in the British House of Commons, or Gabriel Peri, in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French
Chamber, the only the Comintern.
allegiance they recognized as binding
When
the
Comintern became
was to
a personal instru-
ment of Stalin they transferred their allegiance to him. The era of the Popular Front came to an end with a resounding crash on August 23, 1939. The curtain came down on the Popular Front farce at the moment when Soviet Premier Molotov affixed his signature
under that of Nazi Foreign Minister Von
Ribbentrop, in Stalin's beaming presence, to the Berlin-Moscow pact.
There
world was Berlin to the two
Stalin gave Hitler carte blanche, at war.
A
work out
and
in ten days the
Soviet military mission was dispatched to
the details of complete collaboration between
most autocratic, all-embracing tyrannies the world has ever
known.
To
Stalin the fusion
of these two dictatorships
is
the climax
of all he has striven toward for years. Hopelessly enmeshed in the contradictory results of his
own economic and
political blunders,
he can only hope to remain in power by working hand with
Stalin has always
hand
maintained a completely cynical attitude
ward the Communist International and aries.
in
Hitler.
As
far
back
1927 he
as
said,
its
to-
non-Russian function-
during a meeting of the Bolshe-
vik Political Bureau:
"Who are these Comintern people? They are nothing but hirelings
on our Soviet
payroll. In ninety years they will never
make
a
revolution anywhere."
63
— W. G. Krivitsky
Stalin's favorite
name
for the
Comintern
is
the "lavotchka"
or gyp joint. But he has been careful to preserve this gyp joint because it has served him well both for the purposes of internal
and
politics
in his international maneuvers.
Next
to the OGPU,
it
has been his most useful personal weapon.
Although
Stalin dealt a
deathblow to the Comintern
cluding his pact with Hitler, he will seek to preserve cratic countries exclusively
—
—
in con-
in the
demo-
skeleton party machines. These will
continue, to the extent of their dwindled power, to be the creatures of his totalitarian despotism.
The knows
64
big difference
that those
who
is
that since
August 23, 1939 the world
serve Stalin serve Hitler.
Ill
Stalin's
THE
Hand
in Spain
story of Soviet intervention in Spain
still
the major mystery of the Spanish Civil War.
knows
that there
was Soviet intervention
remains
The world
in Spain,
and
does know. It does not know why Stalin interhow he conducted his operations there, who were the undercover men in charge of his campaign, what he thought to get out of it, nor how the venture ended. that
is
vened
I
about
all it
in Spain,
happen
viet officials
to be the sole survivor
who had
a direct
tervention in Spain, and
am
abroad of the group of So-
hand
in organizing Soviet in-
the only one
now
free to
expose
this
dramatic chapter of current history. As Chief of the Soviet Military Intelligence in
Western Europe,
I
was on the inside of every
major step taken in the Spanish matter by the Kremlin. For years before that
I
had occupied
a post
which kept
me
many
in intimate
contact with Stalin's foreign policy, of which this Spanish venture
was an organic
part.
65
W. G. Krivitsky
Ever since the
rise
of Hitler in 1933,
He was
had been an anxious one. His
efforts to
come
Stalin's
foreign policy
driven by the fear of isolation.
now encouraged moments, when success here
with Hitler were
to terms
and now rebuffed. At hopeless seemed impossible, he would
try to revive the old Czarist pact
with France. But here too he had not the complete success he wanted. His attempts to join hands with Great Britain were even less successful.
Anthony Eden and Premier
In 1935,
their state visits to
Laval paid
Moscow. Foreign Commissar Litvinov went
to
Washington, secured American recognition, and then played a star role in
he got.
Geneva.
He got world-wide
London would make no
publicity, but publicity
was
commitment. The
definite
all
treaty
with France was a feeble reed to lean on. In this state of things, after the outbreak of the Franco rebel-
turned his eyes toward Spain.
lion, Stalin
He made haste slowly,
as
he always does. There was a period of watchful waiting, of furtive exploration. Stalin
wanted
to be sure first that there
quick and easy Franco victory.
—and him —
His idea was
who
served
influence.
this
Then he
was
intervened in Spain.
common
knowledge among us
to include Spain in the sphere of the Kremlin's
Such domination would secure
his ties
London, and thus strengthen, on the other hand,
—of —he would
ain
vital strategic
find
revolution.
But
ally to
bargaining
is
not true.
had long before that ceased
He would
Brit-
be a force to
The world believes that way connected with world
be coveted.
Spain were in some
this
his
importance to France and Great
what he was seeking.
be reckoned with, an Stalin's actions in
with Paris and
Once he was master of the Spanish govern-
position with Berlin.
ment
would be no
The problem of world
to be real to Stalin.
It
revolution
was
solely a
question of Russia's foreign policy.
Three countries participated directly in the Spanish Civil War: Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The participation
Germany and Italy was open. Both countries officially acknowledged the action of their expeditionary forces in Spain, of
exaggerating their military exploits rather than hiding them.
66
In Stalin's Secret Servk
But
Stalin, unlike Mussolini, played
it
i
safe in Spain. Far
from
down timidly, and indeed at the beginning concealed it altogether. The Soviet intervention might have been decisive at certain moments had boasting of his intervention, he played
Stalin taken the risks
on the Franco sure before
side that Mussolini took
But Stalin risked nothing.
side.
moving
on the Loyalist
it
that there was
enough gold
He
in the
Spain to more than cover the costs of his material
no chances of involving the Soviet Union launched of the
his intervention
made Bank of
even
aid.
He
took
in a great war.
He
under the slogan: "Stay out of range
artillery fire!"
This was and remained our guiding slogan throughout the Spanish intervention.
On July
19, 1936, the
day General Franco raised the banner
my headquarters in The Hague, Holland. I was my wife and child, as an Austrian antiquarian. This disguise accounted plausibly for my residence, for the funds with which I was supplied, and for my frequent journeys to other of revolt,
I
was
living there,
at
with
parts of Europe. I
had up
secret service
to then
been devoting nearly
network
in
Nazi Germany.
an understanding with Hitler were
still
all
my
energies to
my
Stalin's efforts to reach
unsuccessful,
and the
Kremlin was deeply concerned over the German-Japanese pact then being negotiated in Berlin. tiations closely, as
At the
first
I
I
was following the
secret nego-
have related in another chapter.
thunder of guns beyond the Pyrenees,
I
dispatched
an agent to Hendaye on the French-Spanish border, and another to Lisbon, to organize a secret information service in the Franco territory.
These were merely routine measures. structions
from Moscow
was no contact between
I
had received no
in-
in regard to Spain,
and
my
Madrid government.
As the responsible head of
agents and the its
at that time there
European Intelligence
Service,
I
was simply securing general information for relaying to the Kremlin.
67
W. G. Krivitsky
Our
agents in Berlin and
Rome, Hamburg and Genoa,
Bremen and Naples, duly reported to us the powerful aid that Franco was receiving from Italy and Germany. This information I dispatched to Moscow, where it was received in silence. I got no secret instructions regarding Spain. Publicly also
still
the Soviet government had nothing to say.
The Comintern, of none of us
course,
men
practical
made
took that
a great deal of noise, but
seriously.
This organization,
then already nicknamed the "gyp joint," had been relegated to a quiet suburb of
Moscow and from
international revolution,
being the intended torch of
had become
—sometimes
a
mere adjunct of
Stalin's
useful in indirect ways, other times a
foreign policy
considerable nuisance.
one great service had been to launch the international policy
Its
known
Popular Front. This meant that in every democratic
as the
country the obedient members of the
Communist
Party should
drop their opposition to the ruling powers and, in the name of "democracy," join forces with other political parties.
nique was to
The
tech-
with the aid of "fellow travelers" and dupes,
elect,
governments friendly to the Soviet Union. This had been of some help to the Kremlin in several countries. In France, indeed,
real
had elevated the moderate Socialist Leon Blum now in the Spanish crisis, with the Comintern shout-
the Front Populaire
But
to power.
ing for the Republic and issuing battle cries against Franco, Pre-
mier
Blum launched, with
the backing of
London, the policy
of nonintervention in Spain.
Comintern were still more number of its adherents there was almost infinitesionly 3,000 men in the Communist Party all told. Spanish
In Spain itself the shouts of the futile, for
mal
—
the
trade unions ist,
and
all
the strong revolutionary groupings, syndical-
anarchist, Party of Marxist Unity,
stinately
of existence,
still
relations
Notwithstanding
68
Socialist,
refused to recognize the Soviet
had no diplomatic ings
and
anti-Communist. The Spanish Republic,
this,
and collected funds
all
remained ob-
after five years
government and
with Moscow.
the
Comintern organized mass meet-
over the world for the Spanish Repub-
In Stalin's Secret Service
From
lie.
Union it dispatched as soldiers to Spain scores Communists who, outlawed in their own countries, had
the Soviet
of foreign
been living
as refugees in Russia. Stalin
was glad to get
of
rid
them.
To
Comintern,
a few veteran leaders of the
still
inwardly de-
voted to the ideal of world revolution, the fighting in Spain
brought new hope. These old revolutionists Spanish Civil their
War might once more
really
thought the
kindle the world. But
all
enthusiasm produced no munitions, no tanks, no planes,
none of the war supplies
for
which Madrid was pleading, and
with which the Fascist powers were supplying Franco. The function of the Comintern at this time was to
motion
The
to
drown
the louder noise
revelations of
made by
German and
real
make enough com-
the silence of Stalin.
Italian aid to Franco,
and the
desperate appeals of the Spanish revolutionary leaders for help,
seemed not
Kremlin
to penetrate the
walls.
The
Spain developed into a huge conflagration and
no move.
A
still
civil
war
Stalin
in
made
constant stream of devastating reports came in to
me
at
kia,
from Schneider
The Hague, and
them to Moscow. Although the Spanish government in Madrid was in possession of the $700,000,000 gold reserve of the Bank of Spain, its efforts to buy arms from Vickers in England, from Skoda in CzechoslovaI
steadily relayed
in France,
and from Germany's powerful mu-
nitions makers, were frustrated
word from
got no It
was
late in
by the noninterventionists.
August, and the Franco forces were firmly
organized and marching successfully on Madrid,
high
officials
when
three
of the Spanish Republic were finally received in
They came
Russia.
Still I
my government.
to
buy war
supplies,
and they offered
in
exchange huge sums of Spanish gold. Even now, however, they
were not conveyed to
And
Odessa.
Moscow
but kept incognito in a hotel in
to conceal the operation, Stalin issued,
on
Friday,
August 28, 1936, through the Commissar of Foreign Trade,
a
decree forbidding "the export, re-export or transit to Spain of all
kinds of arms, munitions, war materials, airplanes and war-
ships."
The
decree was published and broadcast to the world
69
W. G. Krivitsky
on the following Monday. The fellow travelers of the Comintern, and the public, roused by them, already privately dismayed at Stalin's failure to rush to the
now understood
that he
support of the Spanish Republic,
was joining Leon Blum's policy of non-
intervention. Stalin was in reality sneaking to the support of
the Spanish Republic.
While
its
high
officials
waited in Odessa,
and
Stalin called an extraordinary session of the Politbureau,
presented his plan for cautious intervention in the Spanish Civil
War
—
under cover of his proclamation of neutrality.
all this
was gone and that the new
Stalin argued that the old Spain
Spain could not stand alone.
must
It
and Germany, or the camp of
neither France nor Great Britain
which commands the entrance by
trolled
camp of Italy
join either the
opponents. Stalin said that
their
would
willingly allow Spain,
to the Mediterranean, to be con-
Rome and Berlin. A friendly Spain was vital to
and
Paris
London. Without public intervention, but by an adroit use of his position as the source of military supplies, Stalin believed
could
command
them the as a
offer
pos-
the respect of France
of a
real alliance,
and
and England, win from
either accept
it
or,
with that
bargaining point, arrive at his underlying steady aim and pur-
pose, a
compact with Germany.
That was was
it
Spain a regime controlled by him. That done he
sible to create in
also
Stalin's central
thought on Spanish intervention.
moved, however, by the need
foreign friends of the Soviet
for
some answer
Union who would be
He
to the
disaffected
by
the great purge and the shooting of his old Bolshevik colleagues.
The Western world does not
realize
was
how essential
Stalin's
hold on power, and
as dictator that
foreign
to him.
It is
not too
And his
tenuous it
was
at that
time
to his survival
he should be defended in these bloody acts by
Communists and eminent
Rolland.
how
much
failure to
fellow travelers, like
Romain
was
essential
to say that their support
defend the Spanish Republic, combined
with the shock of the great purge and the treason have cost him their support.
trials,
might
There was also that hoard of gold in Spain, $700,000,000, which the government was willing to spend for war materials. How
70
In Stalin's Secret Service
much of this
gold could be transported to Russia in payment for
munitions delivered in Spain, while the Soviet Union adhered to
its
officially
announced policy of strict nonintervention, was no
doubt an urgent question.
The
Politbureau of course adopted
He doubly
Stalin's policy.
cautioned his commissars that Soviet aid to Spain must be unofficial
and handled
covertly, in order to eliminate
involving his government in war. His
last
those at that Politbureau meeting as a ers
any
possibility
phrase, passed
command
to
all
of
down by
high
offic-
— Stay out of
of the service was: Podalshe ot artillereiskovo ognia!
range of the artillery
Two
fire!"
who came by
days later a special courier,
land, brought
me
instructions
plane to Hol-
from Moscow: "Extend your op-
erations immediately to cover Spanish Civil War. Mobilize
able agents
and
facilities for
prompt
creation of a system to pur-
chase and transport arms to Spain.
A
patched to Paris to aid you in
work.
there I
this
all avail-
being
dis-
will report to
you
special agent
He
is
and work under your supervision." was glad that
Spain.
Stalin
had
at last
The Kamenev-Zinoviev
trial
decided to
move
had created
earnestly in
a dreadful im-
pression in pro-Soviet circles, and the strict neutrality adopted by
Moscow
in the Spanish struggle
was giving
rise to
embarrassing
questions even in the friendliest quarters.
At
this
same time
Stalin instructed Yagoda, then chief of
up in Spain a branch of the Soviet secret podid the omnipotent Yagoda dream that five days afhonored him with this momentous commission he
the ogpu, to set lice. Little
ter Stalin
would be removed from in
his post,
and
a
few months
later
lodged
one of the Lubianka^cells over which he had presided so
came to an end before one of his own firing squads on March 14, 1938, after he had "confessed" to a plot to poison his successor, Yezhov, and also his old friend, Maxim long. His career
Gorky, the famous writer.
On September
14, obedient to Stalin's order,
emergency conference
at his
cow. Frinovskv, then
commander of
Yagoda
called
headquarters, the Lubianka, in
an
Mos-
the militarv forces of the
71
W. G. Krivitsky
OGPU,
came
later
to
commissar of the navy, was present. (His career
an abrupt end in 1939
when he
also
"disappeared.") Sloutski,
chief of the Foreign Division of the OGPU, and General Uritsky
Army
of the General Staff of the Red
From I
Sloutski,
were
also present.
whom I met frequently in Paris and elsewhere,
learned that at this conference a veteran officer of his depart-
ment was
detailed to establish the
OGPU
in Loyalist Spain.
He was
Nikolsky, alias Schwed, alias Lyova, alias Orlov.
This Lubianka conference also placed the Soviet secret police in charge
of Comintern operations in Spain.
dinate" the activities of the Spanish
It
decided to "coor-
Communist
Party with those
of the OGPU.
Another decision of
this
ment of volunteers
to Spain
by the OGPU. There
is
nist Party in the
sion from the
conference was to have the move-
from every country
in the central
world one member
OGPU and
it
secretly policed
Commu-
committee of every
who
holds a secret commis-
was through him that
this
would be
accomplished. In
many
United
countries, including the
States, enlistment
under the Spanish republic seemed a noble international crusade to rescue
democracy and
Young men from for these ideals.
all
to preserve socialism
over the world volunteered to fight in Spain
But the republican Spain that was fighting Franco
was by no means united in
up of many cialists.
factions
political beliefs or policies. It
—democrats,
mine the
and using Spain
relation of France
was made
anarchists, syndicalists,
Communists were a very small
seizing control
from destruction.
as a
and
so-
minority. Stalin's success in
weapon with which
to deter-
and England toward the Soviet gov-
ernment, depended upon his breaking the powerful anti-Communist opposition in the republican
to control the
camp.
movement of these
It
was therefore necessary
idealistic foreign volunteers, to
prevent
them from joining up with elements opposed
policies
and ambitions.
to Stalin's
The major question of organizing the arms shipments was solved by the Lubianka conference with a decision
72
to Spain to
push
In Stalin's Secret Service
the task simultaneously from Russia
and from abroad. The
for-
eign end was assigned to me.
The domestic phase of the undertaking was handled by Yagoda himself. it
presented even greater difficulties than mine, because
It
was absolutely necessary that no sign appear of any
ernment participation Yagoda sioned ers.
called in
him
Captain Oulansky of the OGPU and commis-
to organize a "private syndicate"
He had
of munitions deal-
"You
visits to
man
previously been entrusted by the
the delicate task of escorting
during their
gov-
in the traffic.
Captain Oulansky was an exceptionally skilled
service work.
official
in secret
ogpu with
Anthony Eden and Premier
Laval
the Soviet Union.
Odessa
will find three Spaniards in
ing their heels there for
some
who
have been cool-
time," Yagoda said to Captain
Oulansky. "They came to buy arms from us unofficially. Create a neutral private firm for
them
to deal with."
Since no one in Soviet Russia can buy so
from the government and the government
is
much
as a revolver
the sole manufac-
turer of arms, the idea of a private firm trading in munitions
would be
Soviet soil
was needed
to Soviet citizens preposterous.
for foreign
consumption. In plain terms,
tain Oulansky's job to organize glers,
and
by the
to
do
your
and operate
this so cleverly that
spies of foreign
"If you succeed," lapel for the
But the
no
a ring of
it
on
farce
was Cap-
arms smug-
trace could be discovered
governments.
Yagoda told him, "come back with
a hole in
Order of the Red Banner."
Captain Oulansky was instructed to trade for cash only and informed that the Spaniards would provide their own ships to transport the munitions as fast as they were delivered to the "private syndicate" from the arsenals of the
Red Army. He
armed with governmental orders placing under authorities in the city,
from the
local chief
left for
Odessa,
his control
all
the
of the secret police to
the president of the regional soviet.
General Uritsky represented the Intelligence Service of the
Red Army
at the
Lubianka conference.
It
was the function of his 73
W. G. Krjvitsky
department to handle the technical military side of the enterprise,
and kinds of equipment
to determine the quantities
vided from the
arsenals, to fix
military experts, pilots, artillery,
Spain. In military matters, these
to be pro-
number and personnel of the
the
and tank
officers to
men remained under
be sent to the orders
of the General Staff of the Red Army; otherwise, they were supervised by the secret police. Stalin's intervention in
action as active
if
were
I
war duty.
I
Spain was
at the front.
now launched. I went into
Indeed
my
assignment was to
recalled an important agent
from London,
another from Stockholm, a third from Switzerland, and arranged to
meet them
in Paris for a conference
with the special agent
me from Moscow. This agent, Zimin, was an exmunitions and a member of the military section of the
assigned to pert in
OGPU.
We all met in Paris in perfect secrecy on September 2 1 brought mit the in
explicit
Zimin
.
and emphatic instructions that we must not per-
slightest possibility
of the Soviet government's becoming
any way associated with our
traffic in
arms. All cargoes were to
be handled "privately" through business firms created for the purpose.
Our
first
problem, therefore, was to create a
new European
chain of ostensibly independent concerns, in addition to our existing "business" outposts, for the
porting war materials.
It
purpose of importing and ex-
was new to
us,
but
it is
an ancient profes-
sion in Europe.
Success depended
had such men societies allied
such
We
our disposal. Numbers of them were in the
with the various
Intelligence of the as
Communist
Party centers abroad,
Red Army looked upon war
Soviet defense system.
74
men.
Friends of the Soviet
of these societies
men
selecting the right
Union and the many "Leagues and Democracy." Both the OGPU and the Military
as the
for Peace
at
upon our
certain
members
reserves of civilian auxiliaries of the
We
were then able to choose
among
long tested in unofficial work for the Soviet Union.
A few
In Stalin's Secret Service
of course were profiteers or
but more of them were
careerists,
sincere idealists.
Many were discreet,
reliable,
having the right contacts and ca-
pable of playing a role without betraying themselves. plied the capital.
We
furnished the offices.
We
We
sup-
guaranteed the
The men were not hard to find. Within ten days we had a chain of brand-new import and
profits.
port firms established in Paris,
some other European
Zurich, Warsaw, Prague, Brussels, and ies.
In every firm an agent of the
OGPU was
furnished the funds and controlled mistake, he paid with his
While America
a silent partner.
urgently claimed
war
cit-
He
transactions. In case of a
all
life.
these firms were scouring the markets of
for available
ex-
London, Copenhagen, Amsterdam,
supplies, the
my attention.
Europe and
problem of transportation
Suitable
merchantmen were
obtained in Scandinavia for a sufficient price. to secure licenses for
such shipments to Spain.
on consigning them
to France,
The
to be
difficulty
was
We at first counted
and trans-shipping
to the Loyalist
Spanish ports. But the French Foreign Office refused to grant clearance papers.
There was but one other way
to secure consular papers
from
overseas governments, certifying that the arms were purchased for
import into their countries. From certain Latin American con-
sulates
I
was able to secure unlimited numbers of
we succeeded
Occasionally
in obtaining
certificates.
them from Eastern Eu-
ropean and Asiatic countries.
the
With such certificates we would obtain clearance papers and ships would proceed, not to South America or China, but to
the ports of Loyalist Spain.
We made slovakia,
large purchases
from
several firms in France,
Holland. Such
is
bought arms
Nazi Germany.
in
from the Skoda works from others
in
in
Poland and
the nature of the munitions trade that I
Czecho-
we even
sent an agent representing a
Dutch
Hamburg, where we had ascertained that quantiof somewhat obsolete rifles and machine guns were for sale.
firm of ours to ties
75
W. G. Krivitsky
The
director of the
the price, the
bank
German
firm was interested in nothing but
references
and the
legal papers
of consign-
ment.
we bought was first class. Arms grow obsolete very rapidly these days. But we made it our object to furnish Caballero's government with rifles that would shoot, and furnish them without delay. The situation in Madrid was becoming grave. By the middle of October, shiploads of arms began to reach republican Spain. The Soviet aid came in two streams. My organization used foreign vessels exclusively, most of them of ScandiNot
navian
all
the material
registry.
Captain Oulansky's "private syndicate" in Odessa
began by using Spanish boats but found their number limited.
Moscow, held by
become
Stalin's insistence
involved in a war,
on absolute secrecy
lest
would not permit the use of ships
he
sail-
ing under Soviet papers. Stalin was especially obdurate after sub-
marines and trawlers in the Mediterranean began to attack and seize freighters
bound
for the Spanish coast.
Captain Oulansky, however, was resourceful. Mueller, chief of the
ogpu Passport
He
Section, to supply
called
on
him with
counterfeit foreign clearance papers. Mueller's department, with
had developed
the inexhaustible resources of the government, the art of forgery to
Some months
unexampled
later in
his receiving the decoration
"Why,
that's
perfection.
Moscow I was of the Red
an altogether
new
Star.
field
shipping papers!" he cried. "You think
it
teasing Mueller about
of operation
was easy?
—
forging
We worked day
and night!"
With these false papers, Soviet boats loaded with munitions would sail from Odessa under new names, flying foreign colors, and they would
German and
Italian
counter-espionage agents were keeping a sharp lookout.
When
clear the
Bosporus, where
they had entered Loyalist ports and delivered their cargo, their
names would be changed back to Russian ones and they would return to Odessa under their own colors.
Madrid was desperately the
76
call in
calling for airplanes.
orders to me. Franco was advancing
Moscow echoed
on the
capital; his
In Stalin's Secret Service
and German
Italian
flying squadrons
and mechanics were
aviators
can planes were few and
were masters of the
air.
Our
arriving in Madrid, but the republi-
inferior.
I
had
to find
somewhere
in
Eu-
rope a supply of bombing and pursuit planes that could be bought
No
quickly.
private firm, naturally, can furnish at a
moment's no-
any considerable number of war planes. Only a government
tice
can do
that.
With
the rapid advances in aviation, however,
able to suppose that a friendly sale
of a part of
its air
force.
Europe.
made
sign,
For but
decided to approach such a government in Eastern
I
bank
combat planes of obsolescent de-
purpose an exceptional agent was obviously required,
man. He was
right
aristocratic family,
able
fifty
in France.
this
had the
I
to the
equipment, thus being enabled to modernize
its
owned about
It
was reason-
it
government might consent
a blue blood, the son of an old
with the best of connections and unimpeach-
references.
Both he and
his wife
were staunch friends
of the Soviet Union, and ardent supporters of the Loyalist cause in Spain.
He had
already
done
a
few
services for us.
I
knew
that
I
could count on him. I
him.
him
asked
The
to
come
and outlined the
to Holland,
next day he flew to the Eastern European capital. That
night he put through a long distance in turned called
me
at
call to
from him.
When
my agent in Paris, who
The Hague and arranged
the following morning, at a certain place
carefully
situation to
this call
came through
for
and time,
me
to await,
a direct call
my aristocrat gave me,
in
coded language, the report of a deplorable experience.
He had
secured an introduction to the Minister of War. Pre-
senting to the minister his card, bearing the
name of one of the
banks in the world, he had gone directly to the heart of his
largest
mission. "I
have come here to buy a quantity of war planes from your
government. sent to at
sell
I
would
them.
like to
We are
know
in the
if
your Excellency would con-
market
for at least fifty machines,
your Excellency's price."
77
W. G. Krivitsky
The Minister of War looked again
request
at the visitor's card.
you
my office
to leave
at
his desk.
He grew
He examined
he turned upon
Then
troduction.
from
rose
my
He
pale.
the letter of in-
agent and said quietly:
"I
once."
My agent got up to leave. But he could not accept failure without making one more
effort.
"Pardon me, your Excellency," he word. This mission.
come
is all
It is
in the open.
There
is
me to add one nothing questionable in my said.
"Permit
a matter of helping the Spanish
my
here as a representative of groups in
lieve that
we should
country
protect the Spanish republic in the
I
have
who
be-
name of
We believe that your country has a stake in keeping the
humanity.
powers out of the Mediterranean
Fascist
government.
—
in preventing Italy
from
dominating it." "I
reply.
am the Minister of War; I am "Good
"It
not a merchant," was the cold
day, sir."
looks hopeless
—
quite hopeless,"
my
agent
mourned
over
the phone.
"Give
you
it
up
as a
bad job and
clear out,"
I
told him. "I will
meet
at the airport."
"Not
yet,"
Three days
he
said. "I
later
I
am
not ready to give up yet."
received a report that he was returning by
The Hague. When he emerged from the cabin, I saw that his head was bound in a bandage. He looked exhausted. I took him quickly to my waiting car. plane to
As soon
as
we were
inside,
he told
me
that he
had bought the
fifty planes.
"The day
after
I
called you," he said, "the card of a
representing the largest
bank
in the
gentleman
country was brought to
me in
my hotel room. I invited him to come up. He made no reference to my call on the War Minister but merely said he understood that I
wanted
to
buy war
suggested that
we
planes. If
I
was prepared to do business, he
discuss the matter at his office."
My agent had bought the fifty government planes for $20,000 each, subject to inspection.
78
When
the question of the consignee
In Stalin's Secret Service
came
The
up, he offered a choice of a Latin
American country or China.
dealer preferred China. "I
assured
him on behalf of the Chinese government
that the
papers would be in perfect order."
"But
how did you get this?"
I
inquired, indicating the bandage
around his forehead.
"Oh,
just a jolly
good bump when
I
climbed into that bloody
plane," he laughed.
Arrangements had appraise the planes.
I
made immediately
to be
went
a French aircraft expert, with
two
the Eastern European capital port.
I
and employed
to Paris
and
to inspect for this
and returned with
purpose
They
engineers as aides.
flew to
a favorable re-
ordered the planes dismantled and crated with
all
possible
speed.
Throughout the world the merciless
there was a cry of anguished fury at
bombing of almost
defenseless Madrid.
My organi-
zation performed miracles to hasten the transport of the fifty
Norwegian boat
pursuit planes and bombers. In mid-October a
was loaded with them.
At that point
I
received strict instructions
to permit the boat to deliver
its
from Moscow not
cargo in Barcelona.
Under no
circumstances were those planes to pass through Catalonia, which
had
its
own government,
very
much
like that
of a sovereign
state.
This Catalonian government was dominated by revolutionists of anti-Stalinist persuasion.
They were not
trusted
by Moscow,
though they were then desperately holding one of the most sectors of the Loyalist front against fierce attacks
al-
vital
from Franco's
army. I
was ordered
to send the planes to Alicante.
blockaded by Franco's Alicante, but
tempted board.
to
had
head
vessels.
to turn
The master of
back to save
for Barcelona, but
My shipload
the ship
and
made
for
He
at-
cargo.
was prevented by
my agent on
of aircraft plied back and forth in the Medi-
terranean. Franco kept Barcelona. In the
his ship
But that port was
it
from Alicante.
meantime
Loyalist Spain
Stalin kept
it
from
was fighting desper-
79
W. G. Krivitsky
ately
and was woefully short of planes. At
last
my agent on
board
directed the ship to proceed to Marseilles.
This fantastic development was part of lent battle to gain
which went on behind the open theater of war.
was
make
pawn
Spain a
tion was in Catalonia. Stalin
The spearhead of that
was determined
and manpower only those groups
in Spain
accept without reservation his leadership. the Catalonians lay hands
which were ready
increase their prestige
days, while with
On
Soviet
Union only do
one hand
Stalin
October
16, Stalin
was keeping
wired to Diaz: "The
duty when they give
the
Communist toilers
to the revolutionary masses of Spain."
"The Spanish
common
cause of
for Soviet adherents
The Norwegian ade and discharged
war
of the
the aid within
of Spaniards.
advanced and progressive man-
all
kind." This message was, of course, intended for the
and
his first
all
their
struggle," Stalin continued, "is not a private affair It is
and thus
from Barcelona, with the other he addressed
Party.
power
to
resolved not to
public message to Jose Diaz, leader of the Spanish
their
arms
weight in the republican ranks.
During these military aid
opposi-
to support with
He was
all
on our planes, with which they might
win a military victory that would their political
If Stalin
power game, he must subdue
in his
opposition in the Spanish republic.
let
si-
complete control of the Loyalist government, a
battle
to
but
Stalin's fierce
Comintern
throughout the world.
ship finally slipped through Franco's blockits
planes at Alicante. At the
supplies, including tanks
and
artillery,
same time, other
arrived
from the Soviet
Union. All Loyalist Spain saw that tangible aid was actually coming from Russia. calists
had only
The
republicans, Socialists, anarchists
theories
and
ideals to offer.
and syndi-
The Communists were
producing guns and planes to use against Franco. Soviet prestige soared.
On
The
jubilant
Communists made
October 28, Caballero,
as
lamation to the Spanish republic. said: "At this
armaments 80
—
moment we have we have tanks and
the most of it.
Minister of War, issued a procIt
was a
at last in
call to victory,
and
it
our hands formidable
powerful aviation."
In Stalin's Secret Service
who had opened wide the doors to Stalin's messengers, did not know the nature of the force that was coming to the rescue of the Spanish republic. He did not realize that this aid would cause his own fall. The movement of war supplies to Spain went hand in hand Caballero,
with a world-wide movement of manpower to Madrid. Volunteers
from the
British Isles, the
America and South rope, even
United
States,
Canada, Latin
Africa, Scandinavia, the Balkans
from Nazi Germany and
Italy,
and
all
Eu-
from Australia and the
Philippines, were eager to fight for the Loyalist cause.
The famous
International Brigade was being formed.
Now, to
if Stalin
was
support with arms,
to control the Spain that it
he was beginning
was imperative to organize and
and
far-flung tide of crusaders,
to
weld
it
direct this
into a Stalinist force.
Caballero's popular-front government was a precarious coalition of antagonistic political parties.
group of Communists,
The
small, hard, disciplined
now commanded by
the OGPU, sup-
ported Caballero's government but did not control
more important
for
Moscow
to seize control
it.
It
was the
of the International
Brigade.
The nucleus of this Brigade was the 500 to 600 foreign refugee Communists sent from Russia. Not a single Russian was among them. Later, when the brigade swelled to nearly 15,000 fighters, no Russian was permitted
to join
was deliberately erected between
Red Army
its
ranks.
this force
An
impenetrable wall
and the
units of the
detailed for service in Spain.
In every foreign country, including the United States, the recruiting agencies of the International Brigade were the local
munist
Parties
Socialists
and
their auxiliaries.
and other
radicals
Some independent groups of
attempted to organize columns. But
the overwhelming majority of recruits were enlisted by
Commu-
nists
and drawn from the spreading networks of "fellow
ers,"
who
cised over
When
are often entirely
Com-
travel-
unaware of the remote control
exer-
them by communists. a volunteer offered
enlistment bureau. Here he
himself he was directed to a secret
filled
out a questionnaire and was told 81
W. G. Krivitsky
to await notification.
Behind the scenes the OGPU investigated
political record; if
seemed acceptable, he was
it
called
his
back and
who was rarely a Russian and somemember of the Communist Party, but and absolutely devoted to his Communist and
questioned by an ogpu agent, times not even officially a
was always
OGPU in the
reliable
chiefs. After this political investigation,
Anglo-Saxon countries
—appeared
which
—
especially
to be quite casual
and
informal, the recruit was directed for physical examination to an
equally reliable physician with solid
sympathy for the Communist
cause. Passing this examination satisfactorily,
transportation
and instructed
he was supplied with
to report at a given address in
Eu-
rope.
we improvised a number of secret control points where each applicant would be thoroughly reinvestigated by In Europe
devoted and trustworthy foreign Communists, or secretaries and agents of Communist-controlled organizations like the S.R.I. (Secours
Rouge
International), the Friends of Republican Spain,
or officials of such Spanish administrations as were entirely in the
hands of the Communists. As Luis ist
Ambassador
De Araquistain,
to France, conclusively shows,
former Loyal-
90 percent of
all
War Department were at a later stage firmly occupied by Stalin's henchmen. The OGPu's control of those volunteers who were found worthy to sacrifice important posts in the Spanish
their lives in
what they believed
to be the cause of the repub-
was continued
in Spain, where informers were planted weed out suspected spies, to eliminate men whose political opinions were not strictly orthodox, and to supervise their reading matter and conversation. Practically all the political commissars with the International Brigade, and later even with the greater part of the Republican Army, were stalwart Communists. lic,
among them
to
All the volunteers' passports in Spain,
man was From
and very
rarely
was
were taken up when they arrived
a passport returned.
discharged, he was told that his passport
the United States alone about 2,000 volunteers
and genuine American passports 82
Even when
had been
are highly prized at
a
lost.
came over, OGPU head-
In Stalin's
Moscow. Nearly every diplomatic pouch from Spain
quarters in
that arrived at the
members of
Lubianka contained
I
was
this mail in the offices
One
a batch
in
Moscow
in the spring
of 1937,
I
of the Foreign Division of the OGPU.
day a batch of about a hundred passports arrived; half of
them were American. They had belonged was
of passports from
the International Brigade.
Several times while
saw
Secret Servic]
to
The
a great haul, a cause for celebration.
some weeks of inquiry
dead, after
dead
soldiers.
That
passports of the
into the family histories of their
original owners, are easily adapted to their
new
bearers, the
OGPU
agents.
While
—
Brigade
this International
was taking shape
Red Army were
the
army of the Comintern of the
in the foreground, purely Russian units
quietly arriving
hind the Spanish
front.
and taking up
their posts be-
This Soviet military personnel in Spain
never reached more than 2,000 men, and only pilots and tank of-
saw
ficers
active duty.
Most of
the Russians were technicians
general staff men, military instructors, engineers, specialists in set-
up war
ting
industries, experts in chemical warfare, aviation
chanics, radio operators
men
and gunnery
experts.
were segregated from the Spanish
sible,
watched by the OGPU, both secret
civilians as
housed apart and never permitted
with Spanish political groups or
and
to prevent
any
to
These Red
much
to associate in
figures.
They were
me-
Army
as pos-
any way
ceaselessly
keep their presence in Spain a
political heresy
from corrupting the
Red Army. This special expeditionary force was under the direct control of Gen. Ian Berzin, one of the two leading Soviet figures assigned
by Stalin to captain Arthur Stashevsky, in Barcelona.
his intervention in Spain.
officially the Soviet trade
They were
the real mystery
The
other was
envoy stationed
men
of
Moscow
be-
hind the scenes of the Spanish theater of war, and while they gathered
all
the controls of the Spanish republican government
into their hands, their missions remained completely
General Berzin had served for fifteen years Military Intelligence of the
Red Army.
unknown.
as chief
A native of Latvia,
of the he had
83
W. G. Krivitsky
led, at the
band
age of sixteen, a guerrilla
in the revolutionary
He was wounded,
struggle against the Czar.
captured, and sen-
tenced to death in 1906. Because of his youth, however, the Czar's
government commuted
He
his sentence to penal servitude in Siberia.
escaped and was leading the
tionist
Army
when
of an underground revolu-
Red
under Trotsky, and rose to a powerful position in the high
command. Large framed, crafty,
life
the Czar was overthrown. Berzin joined the
already gray-haired, given to few words,
Berzin was selected by Stalin to organize and direct the
Loyalist army. Stalin's chief political
shevsky.
He was
commissar
in Spain
was Arthur
Sta-
of Polish extraction. Short and stocky, he looked
like a business
man, and nominally, he was the Soviet trade envoy
in Barcelona.
But Stashevsky,
He
too,
had served
resigned from the military service to take
organizing the Russian fur industry at a time
in the
Red Army.
up the
task of re-
when
important
this
industry was prostrate. His success was brilliant; he revived the
Russian fur trade in trip to the
United
the world's markets,
all
States. Stalin
now
making
assigned
him
incidentally a
the job of ma-
nipulating the political and financial reins of Loyalist Spain.
While Berzin and Stashevsky were operating backstage, the International Brigade was holding the spotlight of the spectacular Loyalist campaign. front, the real
To
foreign
mystery
war correspondents on the Spanish
man seemed
to be
Emil Kleber, leader of
the International Brigade. Millions of readers will as the
most dramatized
remember Kleber
figure of the heroic defense of
Madrid.
Kleber was presented to the world, in interviews and sketches, as
the strong
man
of the hour, fated to play a
momentous
role in
the history of Spain and the world. His physical appearance lent color to the legends. his face
one
He was
big in stature, the features of
were heavy, and his shock of gray hair belied
years.
his forty-
Kleber was introduced to the world as a soldier of
fortune, a naturalized Canadian, a native of Austria,
who,
as
an
Austrian war prisoner in Russia had joined the White Guards in their fight against the Bolsheviks, only to finally to
84
communism.
become converted
In Stalin's Secret Service
This picture was compounded at the OGPU headquarters in Moscow, which supplied Kleber with his false Canadian passport. Kleber played his part under OGPU dictation. His interviews were outlined for him by the agents of the Kremlin. I
had known Kleber and
many years. His
real
then in Austria and
his wife
and children and brother
name was Stem. He was
now
in
for
of Bukovina,
a native
Romania. During the World War, he
served as an officer, was taken prisoner by the Czar's troops, and
camp
sent to a
at
Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. After the Soviet revolution
he joined the Bolshevik Party and the Red Army, and fought throughout the Russian
civil
war on the Soviet
side.
Then he
at-
tended the Frunze Military Academy, from which he was graduated in 1924. For a while
we worked
Department of the General
Staff.
together in the Intelligence
In 1927, Kleber was assigned to
the military section of the Comintern, in
its
military schools.
He went
and acted
China
to
as
an instructor
Comintern on
for the
confidential missions.
Kleber had never been to Canada and never associated with the
White Guards. This of his being a
fact
as leader
bit
of fiction was used to cover up the
staff officer
of the Red Army.
made
It
of the International Brigade more plausible. In
despite the dramatic part assigned to him, he in the Soviet
machine. In November, 1936,
his role reality,
was without power
this
Russian general
was named supreme commander of the Spanish government in the northern sector
On
one of the
first
No
ters.
hotel
which served
I
took off from
A waiting car whisked me
and the members of
and worked our military
to a
in Barcelona as Soviet headquar-
outside guests were permitted to stay there. Here
Stashevsky, our trade envoy, lived
November
days of
Marseilles by plane for Barcelona.
downtown
forces
of the Madrid front.
his staff.
I
met
Here
intelligence staff in Catalonia, un-
der the supervision of General Akulov. I
had come
to Barcelona to
under the orders of tions
put
my agents in Franco's territory
staff officers in
which General Berzin was
charge of the military opera-
secretly directing.
I
thought that
85
W. G. Krivitsky
the information
more
I
was receiving from the
Madrid and Barcelona than
useful in
rebel zones in
would be
Moscow.
General Akulov had organized our secret intelligence service
enemy's camp most
in the
Our
efficiently.
radio operatives there
were working without interruption, and daily transmitted vital formation by means of portable radio Naturally,
my first questions were
The reply was, in Our only comfort is
in-
sets.
about the prospect of mili-
"Things are in a
frightful
tary victory.
effect:
mess here.
that they are in a worse mess over
there."
General Berzin was working indefatigably to shape an army out of undisciplined and uncoordinated armed detachments.
was pressing Caballero
He
for conscription.
Berzin had assembled a group of Russian staff officers, and
was making them the backbone of the Loyalist command.
He
took a leading part in organizing the defense of Madrid during the desperate weeks of
November and December.
Yet so thor-
oughly was Berzin masked that even his presence in Spain, alone his identity, was
known
to only half a
let
dozen of the highest
Loyalists.
Berzin insisted on the appointment of a commander-in-chief.
This authority the republican government, supported by jealous
and
parties
factions,
suitable candidate in litical
was reluctant
to establish. Berzin
ambitions. Within a few weeks
obtained the appointment for Miaja,
mand
until the
found
a
Gen. Jose Miaja, a good soldier without po-
end of the
—
in
who
November, 1936 retained supreme
—he com-
Civil War.
Meanwhile, Arthur Stashevsky was exerting
all
his efforts to
gather into Soviet hands the control of the finances of the republic.
He
liked Spain
and the Spaniards.
He was
entranced with his
assignment, feeling that he was living over again his experiences in the Russian Revolution of twenty years before.
He discovered in Juan Negrin,
Finance Minister in the Madrid
cabinet, a willing collaborator in his financial schemes.
found
it
world market. The Spanish republic had deposited
86
Madrid
almost impossible to buy arms openly anywhere in the a considerable
In Stalin's Secret Service
quantity of the Spanish gold reserve in Paris banks, hoping to
import war materials from France. But an insuperable
difficulty
developed: the French banks refused to release the gold because
Franco threatened to victory.
claims against
Such claims would
the gold was in ish
file
its
them
in the event
of his
disturb the distant Kremlin, once
little
possession. Stashevsky offered to take the Span-
gold to Soviet Russia, and to supply Madrid with arms and
munitions in exchange. Through Negrin, he made the deal with Caballero's government.
Somehow made
a
rumor of this
deal traveled abroad. Charges were
had mortgaged part of
in the foreign press that Caballero
the national gold reserve for Soviet aid.
On December
transport of the gold was being arranged,
3,
while
Moscow
officially
—
it
denied that such a deal had been consummated
just as
has
consistently denied the existence of Soviet intervention in Spain. In our inner circle, Stashevsky was then jestingly called "the richest
man
in the
world" because of his control of the
Spanish treasury. In
my conversations with
ber, Stalin's
Stashevsky
Stashevsky in Barcelona in
Novem-
next moves in Spain were already cropping out.
made no
secret to
me
of the
fact that
Juan Negrin
would be the next head of the Madrid government. At
that time,
Caballero was universally regarded as the favorite of the Kremlin,
but Stashevsky had already picked Negrin
as his successor.
Caballero was a genuine radical, a revolutionary over,
idealist.
More-
he did not favor the work of the OGPU, which, under Orlov,
was beginning
to develop in Spain as in Russia a
sweeping purge
of all those dissidents, independents and anti-Stalinists,
whom the
party lumps together under the label of " Trotsky is ts." Dr. Juan Negrin,
on the other hand, had
bureaucratic politician. fairs
a professor, he
with the outlook of a businessman.
show
to Paris
the makings of a
was a
He was
man
of
af-
just the type to
make a good facade and London and Geneva. He would impress the
suit Stalin's needs.
to
Though
all
Like General Miaja, he would
outside world with the "sanity"
republican cause; he
would
and "propriety" of the Spanish
frighten
nobody by revolutionary
re-
87
W. G. Krivitsky
He had
marks.
and moreover
a Russian wife,
as a practical
man,
Doctor Negrin welcomed the purging of the "uncontrollables" and "troublemakers" in his country by any hand, even the foreign
hand of Stalin Doctor Negrin, of course, saw the only salvation of his counwith the Soviet Union.
try in close cooperation
obvious that active support could
was ready to go along with
come only from
It
had become
He
that source.
Stalin in everything, sacrificing
all
other
considerations to secure this aid.
These things were discussed while
months before the
sador,
OGPU
in Barcelona, six
of the Caballero government.
fall
long to effect the change. aid of an
was
I
It
was accomplished
plot in Barcelona.
Here the
took that with the
official Soviet
ambas-
Marcel Rosenberg, was making speeches and keeping in
the public eye, but the Kremlin never considered Silently
and
effectively,
Stashevsky did the
ordered from
modeled on parture.
Moscow
him important.
work of Stalin.
Sloutski, chief of the Foreign Division of the
tory,
It
at the last
OGPU, had been
to inspect the secret police
that of Russia.
He
arrived a day or
The OGPU was then blossoming out
all
two
which was
after
my
over Loyalist
de-
terri-
but concentrating on Catalonia, where the independent groups
were strongest and where
also the real Trotskyists
had
their party
headquarters.
"They have good material over he returned to Paris some weeks
We
there," Sloutski told
later,
cannot allow Spain to become a
"but they lack experience.
camping ground
for
all
the anti-Soviet elements that have been flocking there from
all
over the world. After front.
all, it is
free
our Spain now, part of the Soviet
We must make it solid for us. Who
there are
among
Trotskyists, even
those volunteers?
though they
And
knows how many
them
as for the anarchists
1
and
we have
to root
out."
The OGPU had done ber,
spies
are anti-Fascist soldiers, they are
our enemies. They are counter-revolutionists, and
a brilliant bit of work. Already in
Decem-
936, the terror was sweeping Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia.
The ogpu had 88
me, when
its
own
special prisons. Its units carried out assassi-
In Stalin's Secret
nations and kidnappings. ing raids.
It
It filled
kvk
Si
i
hidden dungeons and made
fly-
functioned, of course, independently of the Loyalist
government. The Ministry of Justice had no authority over the OGPU, which was an empire within an empire.
which even some of the highest
fore
It
was a power be-
officers in the Caballero
government trembled. The Soviet Union seemed
on
Loyalist Spain, as if
On
December
it
were already a Soviet possession.
Largo Caballero issued his proclamation
16,
of defiance to Franco: "Madrid will not begin, because
Next day
now we
in
to have a grip
fall!
Now
the war will
have the necessary war materials."
Moscow,
Stalin's official
mouthpiece, the newspa-
per Pravda, openly proclaimed that the purge in Catalonia, already
begun,
"will
conducted
The
be conducted with the same energy with which
in the Soviet
heroic and desperate defense of
Madrid was reaching
had been wrecking the
troops were almost in the suburbs. But the Loyalists
and
pilots, tanks
was
Union."
climax. Franco's air squadrons
ers
it
and
artillery.
Our
its
capital, his
now had bomb-
military aid
came
just in
time to save Madrid. General Berzin and his staff silently guided the fighting that General Miaja publicly
commanded, and
Kleber,
the
Comintern
rial
help received from the Soviet Union, so promoted the growth
The of the
general, dramatized before the world.
splendid feats of the International Brigade, and the mate-
Communist
bership was
Party of Spain that by January, 1937,
prestige.
At the same time intervention in the in
stage of Stalin's
The business of Stalin izing Spain now The OGPU was in charge. The Comintern
to the rear.
was announced that
first
war.
civil
was removed from the
Malaga
marked the end of the
it
grim earnest.
was relegated
to
mem-
more than 200,000. The saving of Madrid enormously
enhanced Soviet
began
its
On
February
command
this
1937, General Kleber
4,
of the International Brigade.
Comintern general was
to organize the Loyalist defense.
to
He was
It
be transferred never heard of
again.
Some weeks
later,
while in Moscow,
I
learned that Kleber's
disappearance was connected with the purge in the Red Army,
89
W. G. Krivitsky
and the numerous
arrests
rades were being executed I
of staff officers.
Many of his
as conspirators
by
ran into Kleber's brother,
who had been
April. Several days later he, too,
The vanishing of useful to Stalin,
and that
now had The those
Comintern
he knew too much.
in the great
who were no
longer
Stalin decided that
job in Spain. Berzin and Stashevsky
its
on the government.
a firm grip
comment from
vanishing of General Kleber evoked no
who had sung
his praises all over the world.
His manufac-
tured glory died with him. General Lukacz was perhaps
vored by the gods.
in
was arrested by the ogpu.
the general of the
Comintern had done
com-
squads.
from abroad
recalled
purge simply meant that he was one of those
the
close
Stalin's firing
He was
Hungarian Communist
a
more
fa-
writer, his
name Mata Zalka, and he perished on the Spanish front. The successful defense of Madrid with Soviet arms gave the OGPU new opportunities to extend its powers. Thousands were arrested, including many foreign volunteers who had come to fight real
Franco.
Any criticism
of methods, any unflattering opinion of the
any association with
Stalin dictatorship in Russia,
men
of hereti-
The OGPU employed
cal political beliefs,
became
methods
Moscow of extorting confessions and
mary I
alist
familiar in
treason.
all
the
of sum-
executions.
do not know the number of anti-Stalinists executed Spain.
I
could describe scores of individual
confine myself to one probable victim
but
cases,
who may still
be
Loy-
in
shall
I
alive.
The
few facts which I shall relate may help his family to save him. A young Englishman, a radio engineer named Friend, had a brother in Leningrad, anti-Fascist,
married to a Russian
girl.
He was
and Soviet Russia was the land of
an enthusiastic his
dreams.
He
succeeded, after long efforts, in gaining admission to the Soviet
Union, and took up
When
his residence there.
Soviet intervention began, he was dispatched to Spain
as a radio technician.
cow headquarters of the OGPU
to the effect that Friend
ing "Trotskyist sympathies."
knew
tion in
90
Early in 1937, a report arrived at the
I
the boy, and there
Mos-
was showis
no ques-
my mind that he was wholeheartedly devoted to the Loyal-
In Stalin's Secret Service
ist
cause and to the Soviet Union. True, he had associated with
and other
Socialists
radicals,
Englishman unaware of the
which was only natural
invisible
for a
young
Chinese Wall segregating the
Soviet personnel from the Spaniards.
Later
1
asked one of the ogpu
him, and was answered that Friend
On
evasively.
had been brought home
was told of the
trick
Moscow about
further inquiry
I
learned
Odessa.
as a prisoner to
by which he had been taken. The ogpu
Spain had lured him onto a Soviet
needed
officials in
vessel,
I
in
pretending that he was
to repair the ship's radio transmitter. Friend
had no
suspi-
him. Once on board, he was seized.
cion that the
ogpu was
On April
he was put in the dungeons of the ogpu in Moscow.
To
12,
this day, his
after
brother in Leningrad and his family in England do
know what happened
not
whether he was executed
to
him. Nor have
as a "spy" or lives
I
been able to learn
now
in a
remote con-
centration camp.
There were countless such disappearances. Some
men
were
kidnapped and taken to Soviet Russia. Others were assassinated
One
Spain.
of the most celebrated cases
is
that of
in
Andres Nin,
the leader of the revolutionary party of Marxist Unity (poum).
Nin had once been ers
a Trotskyism
and years before one of the
of the Comintern. With a group of
lead-
Nin van-
his associates,
ished from the prison where they had been confined by the ogpu.
Their bodies were found only bers of Parliament
had come
after a
commission of British
mem-
to Spain to investigate their disap-
pearance. Another outstanding case
is
that of young Smillie, son
of the famous British Labor leader, Robert Smillie, murdered in
an OGPU prison in Spain.
Still
another
is
that of Mark Rein, son of
the emigre Russian Socialist leader, Raphael Abramovitch
(see
Chap-
ter IV).
The work of anti-Fascist ranks lero
and
the
ogpu on Spanish
of the republic.
his associates that they
It
soil
created a
rift
in the
began to dawn upon Cabal-
had not known what they were
doing when they joined hands with the Communist Party in the united front. Premier Caballero had no stomach for the Soviet terror,
which was decimating
his
own
party and striking
down
his
91
W. G. Krivitsky
The autonomous government of Catalonia which
political allies.
was resisting the Caballero.
From
An
OGPU purge, tooth and
internal crisis
was ripening
I
watched the
blessings of
in Spain.
Moscow, where the
the inside in
were being decided,
had the
nail,
internal affairs of Spain
crisis
develop and reach
its
climax.
In March, 1937,
Berzin to the
read a confidential report from General
I
Commissar of War,
Voroshilov.
Yezhov, Yagoda's successor as chief of the dated").
Such
It
OGPU
was
also read
by
(also since "liqui-
reports were, of course, intended for Stalin himself,
although addressed to the immediate superior of the writer. After giving an optimistic estimate of the military situation,
and commending Generalissimo Miaja, Berzin reported
ment and
protests against the
OGPU
in high Spanish circles.
OGPU agents were compromising the
stated that our
thority in Spain by their unwarranted interference in
government
quarters.
be recalled from Spain "Berzin after
I
is
He
Soviet au-
and espionage
He concluded with a demand that Orlov
at once.
absolutely right," was Sloutski's
had read the
resent-
comment
to
me,
report. Sloutski, chief of the Foreign Division
of the OGPU, went on to say that our
men
were behaving in Spain
as if
they were in a colony, treating even Spanish leaders as colo-
nists
handle natives.
When I asked him if anything would be done
about Orlov, Sloutski said
it
was up to Yezhov.
Yezhov, grand marshal of the great purge then under way,
himself looked upon Spain Berzin's associates in the all
as a
Russian province. Moreover,
Red Army were
over the Soviet Union, and Berzin's
any.
With
own
already being seized life
was no
safer
than
many of his comrades in the nets of the OGPU, any him would be viewed with suspicion at the Kremlin.
so
report from
Moscow to report to Stalin on the Spanish situation. Though a rockribbed Stalinist,
In April, Stashevsky arrived in personally a rigidly
orthodox party man, Stashevsky
of the OGPU in the Loyalist areas was an
also felt that the
error.
conduct
Like General Berzin
he opposed the high-handed colonial methods used by Russians
on Spanish 92
soil.
In Stalin's Secret Service
Stashevsky had no use for dissenters or "Trotskyists" in Russia,
and approved the ogpu method of dealing with them, but he
thought that the OGPU should respect the regular Spanish parties.
political
Cautiously he intimated that Stalin might perhaps change
the Spanish policy of the ogpu.
with him, and Stashevsky
left
The
"Big Boss" pretended to agree
the Kremlin quite elated.
Later he had a conference with Marshal Tukhachevsky, in the
course of which he called attention to the disgraceful behavior of the Soviet officials in Spain. This conference caused quite a lot of talk in the inner circle, partly because
shaken position. ing those
The Marshal was
who behaved
of Tukhachevsky's already
fully alive to the
in Spain as
though
it
need of curb-
were a conquered
country, but he was already without the authority to discipline
them. Stashevsky and fall
I
had
of Caballero and the
groomed
He was awaiting the early of Negrin, the man whom he had
several talks. rise
for the premiership.
"Big fights are ahead of us in Spain" he remarked more than once.
This was plain to those of us Stalin
had consolidated
who understood
his successes in the plan to
dependency of the Kremlin, and was already forward.
Berzin
The Comintern was
now
Stalin's policy.
make Spain
for another
of Spain to Moscow.
army
in his hands.
had proceeded
in accordance with Stalin's
instructions: "Stay out of the range of the artillery fire!" risks
seemed within
Bank
The ogpu machine was going full steam ahead.
enterprise
avoided the
push
fading out of the picture altogether.
held the reins of the Spanish
Stashevsky had transferred most of the gold reserve from the
The whole
a
of an international war, and yet
We
had
Stalin's goal
grasp.
The one big obstacle in the way was Catalonia. The Catalonians were
anti-Stalinist,
and they were one of the main props of the
Caballero government.
To
seize full control, Stalin
had still
to bring
Catalonia under his rule and oust Caballero.
This was emphasized to ers
me
in a report
of the Russian anarchist group in
by one of the lead-
Paris,
who was
a secret
93
W. G. Krivitsky
agent of the OGPU.
He had been
despatched to Barcelona, where
prominent anarchist he enjoyed the confidence of the
as a
anarcho-syndicalists in the local government. His mission was
an agent provocateur,
to act as acts that
would
behind the
reports,
it
at the
in tiny rolls
Like
all
our secret
of photographic film.
Moscow headquarters
American photographic apparatus
for
Each page of the report was an enlarged
The
as if to suppress a revolt
at least thirty pages.
was conveyed
department
finest
army
front.
His report covered
cial
to incite the Catalonians to rash
justify calling in the
is
A spe-
equipped with the
handling these
films.
print.
agent gave a detailed report of his conferences with the
various party leaders
whose confidence he shared, and of the
measures he had taken to inspire them to acts which would give the
OGPU an excuse
for destroying
would soon be an outbreak
them.
He was
sure that there
in Barcelona.
came from Jose Diaz, the leader of the Spanish Communist Party, and was addressed to Dimitrov, the Another report
I
read
president of the Comintern. Dimitrov sent
it
immediately to the
headquarters of the OGPU, since he had long since learned
who
his
master was. Diaz berated Caballero as a dreamer and a phrase
monger who would never become
He
praised Negrin.
doing among
He
a trusted ally of the Stalinists.
described the
Socialists
work
the
Communists were
and anarcho-syndicalists
to sap their
strength from within.
These reports made
it
clear that the
OGPU was
plotting to crush
the "uncontrollable" elements in Barcelona and seize control for Stalin.
On May
2, Sloutski
telephoned
me
at the
Hotel Savoy, and
me to call on an important Spanish Communist named He was the chief of the secret service of the Loyalist government, which now had its capital at Valencia. He had been sent to Russia to attend the May Day celebration. Because of preasked
Garcia.
occupation with the purge, a telegram announcing his
been neglected.
94
No
one had met him, and he was
all
arrival
had
alone at the
In Stalin's Secret Service
New Moscow best
me
to repair the oversight as
could.
I I
Hotel. Sloutski asked
went with
vigorous
man
a
comrade
in his early thirties.
Orlov, chief of the
vacation for "I
to visit Garcia,
him
OGPU
and found
a neat
and
He told me that his good friend,
in Spain,
had kindly arranged
this little
in the Soviet capital.
was happy to come" he
said,
"but no one greeted me, and
could not get a pass to enter the Red Square on able to see of the parade were glimpses of
my window here." We extended apologies
to
it
I
May Day. All I was
across the river
from
Comrade Garcia and took him
to
He remarked that the Soviet workers in the much worse off than the Spanish workers, even during civil war. He had observed that supplies were scarce, and asked me why the Soviet government was not successful in dinner
at the Savoy.
streets were obviously
raising the standard
of living of the masses.
When I saw Sloutski I asked him:
"What's the idea of bringing
that Spaniard over here?"
"Orlov wants him out of the way," Sloutski
said.
"We
have to
keep him amused here until the end of May."
Having read the
reports,
I
did not need to ask what Orlov
expected to do in May.
The news from Barcelona burst sensationally upon the world. The headlines screamed: Anarchist Revolt in Barcelona! The correspondents reported an anti-Stalinist conspiracy in the capital of Catalonia, a fight for the Telephone Exchange, street riots, barricades, executions.
To
this day, the
Barcelona
the history of our times as a fratricidal cists
May Days
appear in
war among the
anti-Fas-
while Franco was attacking them. According to the
official
statements, the Catalonian revolutionists treacherously attempted to seize resist
power
at a
moment when
every energy was needed to
Fascism. Another version of the Barcelona tragedy, given to
the press and echoed throughout the world,
is
that
it
was a
some uncontrollable elements who managed extreme wing of the anarchist movement, in order
rebel-
lion "by
to get into
the
to
provoke
disturbances in favor of the enemies of the republic."
95
W. G. Krivitsky
The ers
fact
were
was
is
that in Catalonia the great majority of the
fiercely anti-Stalinist. Stalin
inevitable, but
knew
that a
work-
showdown
he also knew that the opposition forces were
badly divided and could be crushed by swift bold action.
and provoked
The
OGPU and Socialists against one another. After five days of bloodshed, in which five hundred persons were killed and more than a thousand wounded, Catalonia was made the issue on which the Caballero government must stand or fall. The Spanish Communists, led by Diaz, demanded the suppression of all antiStalinist parties and trade unions in Catalonia; the placing of newspapers, radio stations and meeting halls under OGPU control, and the immediate and complete extinction of all antiStalinist movements throughout Loyalist territory. Largo Caballero would not yield to these demands, and he was forced to resign on May 15. Dr. Juan Negrin became the premier of the new government, as Stashevsky had long ago decided. His government was hailed as the Government of Victory. Negrin remained premier until the collapse of the Loyalist defense in March 1939. Garcia, on hearing the news from Barcelona, came running to fanned the flames
me
of high excitement.
in a state
syndicalists, anarchists
He had
been to the Spanish
He wanted to return to Spain at once. He could not understand why he could not get away. But Sloutski would not let
Embassy.
him
go;
Orlov
in Barcelona did
not want Garcia around. True, he
was an important Communist, but he might make trouble. In Barcelona the ogpu was taking prisoners en masse. Sloutski offered Garcia a trip to the Caucasus
the Soviet government
wanted
to go
home.
wanted him
Of course
and the Crimea,
insisting that
to see everything.
But Garcia
he did not go.
In the Spanish Embassy, Garcia
made
the acquaintance of
who also wanted to go home. These four had been provided with two spacious rooms at the Hotel Metropole. They had been escorted to every museum m Moscow, to every sight in and around the capital. They had been to the four other Spaniards
Crimea, to the Caucasus, to Leningrad, even to the Dnieprostroy
96
In Stalin's Secret Service
Dam. For viet
five
months they had been seeing
the sights in the So-
Union. Daily they went to the Spanish Embassy for news from
home. Daily they ing with them,
tried to get their passports back.
suspected that they
I
From
knew they were
Their government could not help them; Stalin ruled
talk-
prisoners.
their govern-
ment. asked Sloutski
I
who
"Those four?" he Spain.
They came
months counting
they were.
said.
"They
are cashiers
from the Bank of
over with the gold shipment. it,
They spent
day and night, and then checking the
Now they want to go home!" When I asked Sloutski how it would end, "They'll be lucky to get out of here
he
when
three
figures.
said:
the
war ends. For
the present they will have to remain in our hands."
A
few days before Sloutski told
iers
of the Bank of Spain,
list
of high ogpu
I
officials
me
had noticed
who had
the story of the cashin the
Moscow
press a
received the Order of the
Red Banner. Among them were several familiar names. It occurred to me to ask Sloutski what distinguished service had brought them this coveted decoration. He said that the hon-
men had been the leaders trusted officers who had been
ored
work
as
of a special squad of about thirty sent to Odessa in
December
longshoremen.
An enormous Spain. Stalin
quantity of gold had arrived at that time from
would
entrust only the highest officials of his secret
police with the job of unloading the treasure, fearing that it
might get out.
task.
The
word of
He made Yezhov personally pick the men
for the
operation had been surrounded with such extraordinary
secrecy that this was the
One
to
first I
of my associates,
tion, described to
me
the pier was cleared
myself had heard of
who had gone on
the scene in Odessa.
this
The
it.
unusual expedientire vicinity of
and surrounded by cordons of special
troops.
Across this cleared and empty space from dock to railroad track,
ogpu officials carried the boxes of gold on their backs. For days and days they carried this burden of gold, loading it on
the highest
97
W. G. Krivitsky
freight cars,
which were then taken
Moscow under armed
to
con-
voys.
He
attempted to give
me
an estimate of the amount of gold
they had unloaded in Odessa.
Red Square. He pointed
We
were walking across the huge
open
to the several
acres
surrounding
us,
we piled up in the Odessa and said: "If all yards were laid side by side here in the Red Square, they would cover it from end to end." That was his way of picturing the size the boxes of gold that
of the haul.
The
treasure secured
by
Stalin
from Spain
hundreds of millions of dollars, and
may
certainly ran into
have reached half a
bil-
lion.
Shortly after the Caballero government
day
the Special Section. left
when the telephone They wanted to know
in Sloutski's office
fell, I
rang. if
It
was
sitting
was a
call
one
from
Miss Stashevsky had
the Soviet Union.
who was
Sloutski,
troubled.
When
On
a friend of Stashevsky
and
his family,
was
another telephone he called the Passport Division.
down
he put
the receiver he sighed with
Stashevsky had crossed the frontier.
He
relief.
Miss
gave this information to
the Special Section.
We both knew that the call had then returned in Paris,
to his post in Barcelona.
working in the Soviet Pavilion
had made arrangements
for their
mother and work with her
month
meant no good
at the exposition.
Stashevsky
daughter of nineteen to join her
there.
from the Soviet
The
Pavilion.
thing, she returned to the Soviet
He
His wife, Regina, was
girl
reached
Paris,
June, she was instructed to take back to
later, in
certain exhibits
to Stashevsky.
but a
Moscow
Without suspecting any-
Union.
In the meantime, her father had been recalled from Spain. In July,
1937,
I
was back
Stashevsky to find out
day she told
me
in Paris.
when
that he
98
Madame there. One
kept telephoning
her husband would arrive
and General Berzin had come through,
but had stopped only between great haste.
I
trains,
proceeding to
Moscow
in
She could not disguise her anxiety. In June, Stalin had
In Staj
wiped out nearly the
entire high
Marshal Tukhachevsky I
Madame
saw
Secret Servu
en's
at the
command
i
of the Red Army, with
head.
Stashevsky repeatedly. She heard nothing
from her daughter or her husband. She began their
apartment
a friend
in
would be
Moscow, knowing
to telephone to
that if they were not there,
living in the apartment. For several days
and
nights she kept the long-distance operators ringing her number.
The
"No
report was always the same:
answer."
She could not understand what was happening, and kept on trying. Finally the
connection was made.
Stashevsky had not arrived. that he girl,
was
in
No
one
Moscow. Nor was
A housemaid answered. apartment even knew
in the
there any information as to the
who had been lured as a hostage a month earlier. Two weeks passed without news. Early in August, Madame
Stashevsky received a brief note from her husband, asking her to
wind up everything and return telephone
calls,
went back
to the Soviet
that the letter
to
came from
Union
—
to
General Berzin also vanished.
commanders of Stashevsky, he
missars
the
Moscow. She knew,
all
after
her
prison. She packed
and
she had
The
left in
the world.
execution of the leading
Red Army portended
ill
for Berzin. Like
had been intimately associated with the purged com-
and generals since the beginning of the Soviet revolution,
nearly twenty years before. Against that fact his achievements in
Spain and his
To
this
leaders
strict
and obedient
loyalty
would count
for nothing.
day he belongs to that great number of vanished Soviet
whose
fate
can only be surmised and
may
never become
known.
At
this time, in the
summer of 1937,
just
when
Stalin ap-
peared to have achieved his goal in faraway Spain, Japan struck at
China.
The menace
to the Soviet
Union
in the Far East
became
bombarded Shanghai advanced on Nanking. The government of Chiang Kai-shek made peace with Moscow and solicited Soviet aid. Simultaneously, the Fascist powers became more and more
alarming. Japanese forces took Peiping [Peking],
aggressive in the West. Italy
and Germany intervened openly on 99
W. G. Krivitsky
Franco's side.
The
military situation of the Spanish republic grew
increasingly difficult. If Stalin were to capitalize
ment
in Spain, he
would have
to give her
help needed to defeat Franco and his
he was loath to the artillery
China and
The
risk a
fire!"
on
now the
allies.
his achieve-
full
measure of
But more than
ever,
major war. His slogan "Stay out of range of
became more
insistent after Japan's invasion
of
threat to the Siberian frontier.
role
close. Stalin
of Stalin in Spain was drawing to an ignominious
had intervened there
in the
hope that he might, with
the stepping-stone of a Spanish dependency, build a road from
Moscow to London and
Paris,
maneuver was unsuccessful. his
and so ultimately
He
to
Germany. His
lacked real audacity.
He
played
game boldly against the independence of the Spanish people,
but feebly against Franco.
He
succeeded in murderous intrigue,
but failed in waging war.
Leon Blum and Anthony Eden resigned. Paris and London adopted a more friendly attitude toward Franco. Gradually, during 1938, Stalin withdrew his hand from Spain. All he got out of the adventure was a pile of Spanish gold.
100
IV
When
Stalin
Counterfeited Dollars
THE
first
Five-Year Plan extended from 1928 to 1932.
Those were the
years of our heavy purchases of foreign
machinery and materials trialize Russia.
One
for the gigantic drive to indus-
of the major consequences of that drive was
an acute shortage of foreign exchange in Moscow. In the course of those
same
years the globe
was
circled
by a
of spurious $ 1 00 Federal Reserve banknotes of the United
trail
States.
They
first
trickled
and
later
flowed into the United States
Treasury from Shanghai and San Francisco, from Houston and
New
York, from Montreal and Havana, from Warsaw, Geneva,
Bucharest, Berlin, Vienna, Sofia, and Belgrade. It
was
Stalin
who thus put into circulation throughout the world
about ten million dollars in bogus American currency.
The
fact
is
interesting, not only intrinsically,
reveals the primitiveness
of
this
Georgian's
mind
but because
—
it
his ignorance
101
W. G. Krivitsky
of modern world conditions, and the readiness with which in a he turns to the expedients of
crisis
rose to
prominence
propriations"
—
common
in the Bolshevik party as
that
is,
crime. Stalin
first
an organizer of "ex-
bank robberies designed
to replenish the
party treasury. Boris Souvarine, in his recent Life of Stalin, describes such an expropriation at Tiflis, organized
although not participated
were exploded in the
in,
It is
Stalin, in
street, fifty
and 341,000 roubles— that funds.
by
directed,
which eight bombs
people injured, three
$170,000— added
is
and
not surprising that in another
killed,
to the Party's
crisis in
which he
felt
the need of ready cash, Stalin should conceive the all-too-simple
idea of taking
The
it
out of the United States Treasury.
need, however, was extreme.
The fund of
foreign ex-
change in the Soviet Treasury was woefully inadequate for the first-line industrial
departments.
The foreign
and the Soviet Military Intelligence were condition at a time
The
when
quest for "valuta"
they, too,
—gold
or
its
divisions of the
in a critical budgetary
were expanding their equivalents
occupation of the Soviet government.
A
OGPU
—was
a
services.
main
special Valuta
pre-
Bureau
was organized by the OGPU, and every conceivable method, from trickery to terror,
employed
to
pump
treasures out of the population.
It
foreign currency
reached
its
climax in the so-
called Dollar Inquisition, the systematic extortion
citizens of relief remittances sent to
America.
Many
by the OGPU All this
became known
To
this day, the
relatives in
ransom money arrived from abroad. to a fairly
more primitive grab
still
them by
from Soviet
of the victims were imprisoned and tortured
until
his
and other
for easy
wide public, but
money
a pretty
Stalin kept
deep
secret.
source of those forged $ 1 00 notes remains an
unsolved mystery even for American and European secret
ser-
vices.
Suspicions were indeed entertained, and even voiced, that
there
was a counterfeiting ring
in Soviet Russia.
But no one
in
authority dared to suggest that the Soviet government was the criminal.
The
facts are that Stalin
counterfeiting ring, that
102
its
himself established and directed this
presses
were in
Moscow in
the deepest
In Stalin's Secret Service
of the OGPU, and that the distributors of the bogus cur-
recesses
rency were Soviet agents.
The United
notes were printed
imported from the
special stock
and were of such superb workmanship, that bank
States,
tellers in
on
America accepted them
as authentic for years after their
appearance. So sure were the counterfeiters that their prod-
first
would defy
uct
detection, that they offered the bogus notes in
quantity for exchange to leading American financial institutions. Stalin's agents
world
—
worked
in alliance
with the criminal under-
with a gang of American racketeers
in Berlin, for instance,
operating in Eastern Europe, and in Chicago with sters.
These
facts
have been established by police probes. But the
agents themselves, so far as
from purely
known gang-
is
known, took no
political motives.
They wanted
profits,
and acted
to help the Soviet
Union. In the Federal Penitentiary of Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, there is
now
a prisoner
serving a fifteen-year sentence for victimizing
Chicago banks to the extent of $25,500
The
prisoner
is
Dr. Valentine Gregory Burtan, a
cian, identified as a
punishment
in counterfeit
$100
notes.
New York physi-
prominent Communist. Dr. Burtan took
stoically,
giving no hint of the higher-ups in
whose devoted agent he was. Therefore,
his trial in 1934,
his
Moscow although
preceded by an intensive investigation on the part of the United States Secret Service, failed to solve the
mystery of the bogus
notes.
In Berlin, several years before Dr. Burtan's arrest, the private
banking firm of Sass ner,
by the Soviet government
ing bogus
of
& Martini was bought up, in a devious man-
bills in
bulk.
The
for the express
purpose of exchang-
collapse of the venture
and the
flight
promoter caused an international sensation, and again
its
a
police probe brought out connections with the underworld. But the agent involved, a
ous undertaking in a Soviet Union.
was
as
good
man well known to me, entered this hazardmood of consecration to the service of the
Although he was not captured by the
as
police, his life
ruined in the cause.
103
W. G. Krivitsky
My own
first
came on January
intimation of Stalin's counterfeiting operations 23, 1930, while
I
was on
a train
Rome. Getting off at a way station to buy a paper,
from Vienna I
to
noticed, in the
Berliner Tageblatt, a sensational headline displayed over a story run-
ning across the top of the entire page, which read:
TERFEITS
The
"WHO COUN-
THE DOLLARS?"
story began as follows:
The news of
$100
the circulation of counterfeit
banknotes formed the topic of conversation today in
banking
circles
and on the stock exchange. So
far nei-
ther the counterfeiters nor their plant has been discov-
But recent investigations have established that
ered.
Franz Fischer, of the
Neue
Winterfeldstrasse 3,
undertook to pass the counterfeit notes
in Berlin,
who had
returned from Russia in March, 1929.
The name of Franz Fischer leaped the devil!"
the account, in that paper and others
firmed
my worst
fears. It
at
me from the page. "What
must be our
said to myself. "This
I
I
affair."
The
rest
bought along the way, con-
appeared that a group of American pro-
moters, dealing in Canadian mining shares, had acquired in the
of 1929 the private banking house of Sass
founded
in 1846.
of
&
fall
Martini, a firm
The promoters soon stepped out and turned
ownership over to a certain Herr Simons, and he in turn sold
the
it
to
none other than Paul Roth, formerly Communist member of the Berlin Municipal Council.
ployee of the Soviet
I
knew Roth
Embassy
in
Franz Fischer was described I
had known Fischer
1923 when munist
I
to be a confidential
Germany.
as the
since 1920,
chief customer of the bank.
and had worked with him
helped organize a military staff for the
Party.
I
knew
that he
had been
for years in the service
the Soviet Military Intelligence, and that he
that since 1927, Alfred
in the
United
104
States.
in
German Com-
worked under the
pervision of "Alfred," one of our leading officers abroad.
knew
em-
I
of
su-
also
had been spending most of his time
In Stalin's
There was
knew and
a personal
Secret Service
me and
bond, too, between
respected his mother, a veteran revolutionist
Fischer.
and an out-
Communist movement in Germany. It was World War days, that the Spartacus Bund, led
standing figure of the in her
home
in the
*
by Karl Liebknecht, was cradled. Franz had grown up sphere of social revolt. Although
of
late,
was sure that he was
I
I
had
I
a
still
lost
in
an atmo-
him
contact with
thoroughgoing
idealist.
Counterfeiting for lucrative reasons would be impossible to him.
His
role in the Sass
under
& Martini adventure must have been played
political orders. In brief,
Moscow was
involved,
Moreover,
The
pattern.
I
I
had no doubt
that, if Fischer
was
involved.
recognized in the press reports a familiar Soviet
acquisition of the old banking firm by an elusive
group of "Canadian American" promoters, of it to a Mr. Simons,
ately disposed
for interests represented
who
by Paul Roth
—
who
in turn
immedi-
turned out to be acting
all
this
was
just the
kind
of window dressing our secret services were in the habit of hang-
The
ing out.
old Berlin bank had obviously been purchased in
order to inspire confidence in the bogus currency to be handled. I
learned from the Tage I? la tt that
Fischer
had exchanged
$ 19,000 in $
1
00
bills.
at the Sass
Sass
on December
&
10, 1929, Franz
Martini Bank the
sum of
& Martini had them deposited with
the Deutsche Bank, which shipped a quantity to the National City
Bank of New size type,
interest
York.
A
York. As the notes were of an old-fashioned, large-
then no longer issued in America, they aroused some
upon
their arrival at the Federal Reserve
Bank
in
New
microscopic investigation by experts discovered them to
be counterfeits of a pattern already familiar to the Treasury.
On
December 23, New York cabled Berlin that the notes were spuriThe cable warned the German banks and authorities that the
ous.
counterfeit
The
bills
were the best imitation ever discovered.
Berlin police, under
Commissioner von Liebermann,
promptly swooped down on Sass
Not
to be confused with
Ruth
& Martini, and soon exposed
its
Fischer.
105
W. G. Krivitsky
artificial character. All its
transactions in bogus
Fischer's connections
with
secret to the authorities that 1
927
in the
The fair.
Moscow were known.
It
was no
he had been employed during 1925-
automobile section of the Soviet Trade Mission in
He had
Berlin.
however, led
bills,
and Fischer had vanished.
to Franz Fischer,
one time made a hobby of automobile
at
racing.
police concluded that he served only as a "fence" in the af-
A high German
official declared:
"The gang must have
a big printing shop somewhere, with a
large staff of experts, or they could never produce such perfect
They have turned out
results in quantity.
so
much
that they
must
have relations with a big paper mill, probably through bribery of employees. Their profits must be enormous."
The theory of the
Berlin police, according to the papers, was
that the counterfeiting ring
Balkans.
their eyes to
bought
was operating
wondered how long
I
Moscow.
feared grave consequences to
all
of
us. I
of papers and studied every item on the counter-
sorts
all
feiting case.
I
either in Poland or the
would be before they turned
it
My
primary
intelligence network.
The
interest
was
in protecting
some of our
fact that
our military
agents were en-
tangled in this crazy enterprise appalled me. Besides that,
was disturbed
I
for Franz Fischer.
military intelligence operations in the United States,
I read about the police raid on Sass main aspect of the crime seemed to be
The United back to
this
the
more
States its
I
had no confi-
judgment.
at all in his
As the
his
important post of chief of our
superior, "Alfred" occupied the
dence
Although
government,
I
it
its
Martini, to
me
sheer stupidity.
thought, would surely trace
source in Moscow.
fantastic
&
And
appeared that in
more I pondered, modern age of inter-
the
this
national exchange a great state should engage in such shenani-
gans
I
felt
a stop to
that
I
ought to do or say something calculated to put
it.
Fortunately,
I
fidential emissary,
was to meet
in
Stalin's personal
and con-
General "Ter" Tairov, then abroad on a tour of
inspection of our secret services.
106
Rome
A
native of the Caucasus, like
In Stalin's Secret Service
Tairov was later the Soviet Envoy in Outer Mongolia
Stalin,
*
which
is
to say that he
Tairov
came
first
was
appeared on
Stalin's viceroy there.
my horizon in
1928
in Paris,
where he
ostensibly as the representative of the Soviet Oil Syndicate.
In reality his mission was to look into things Stalin. It
was
meeting with Tairov that
in this
with the highly personal character of
As an
officer
my superiors, mittee. Tairov
as a
went
member of the
and sundry
for
got acquainted
Stalin's dictatorship.
of Military Intelligence,
and
all
I first
I
had been trained obey the
party, to
at things in a novel way.
to serve
central
com-
Although working
in a
department remote from mine, he would suggest in an offhand
manner that he was "If
where
me
else, just let
me any help I might require.
in a position to offer
you need anything,
aid
from the Embassy or from any-
know, and
I'll
drop a
line to the Boss."
conversation was punctuated with such personal references. this straight
to take the
from
man
Stalin," or "Stalin told
for a braggart
me
that."
I
"I
His got
was inclined
and inquired of my chief in Mos-
cow, General Berzin, whether he was reliable. Berzin sent
word
that Tairov's claims to intimacy with Stalin were not inventions.
He had been one
of the group that served under Stalin during the
Civil War. Later, in
Department
to
1
932, he had been planted by Stalin in the War
open the mail of War Commissar Voroshilov and
other generals. I
now met Tairov
Rome, and
at the Tivoli in
I
jumped
right
into the question of the counterfeit dollars.
"That
much will viet
is
some messy
afraid of
its
affair
over in Berlin,"
I
said.
"I'm very
developing into an international scandal that
wreck our intelligence organization and compromise the Sogovernment." "Nitchevo!" said Tairov, with a shrug of the shoulders, dis-
missing the whole thing with that inimitable Russian word which
means,
literally,
In a recent listed as
under
"Nothing!"
New
—
or "Aw,
it
York Times dispatch
doesn't matter!"
his
name was among
officers
arrest.
107
W. G. Krivitsky
"Don't be surprised
if
you
"This won't blow over.
said.
all
pay with your heads
Whoever
for
started this will get
all
it," I
of us
into hot water."
"Don't you worry about is
on
in
You
it.
would go
Tairov reassured me. "The Boss
don't think the boys in the Fourth
in for this
Department
kind of thing without the word from
was taken aback
I
it,"
for a minute. It
would never have ventured authorization of Stalin.
I
is
Stalin!"
true that General Berzin
into such an enterprise without the
returned to the argument, however.
"Aside from political considerations," financially preposterous. Just stop
and
I
said, "the enterprise
How much
consider.
is
false
Then estimate the money into
currency can one exchange in the world markets? the cost of the plant, and the expense of getting
Exchange
circulation. credit.
Cash
in
doesn't go
modern times
far.
is
largely a matter of bank
Whoever conceived
the idea
is,
my
in
opinion, a barbarian." "Well, that's just
why we bought a bank in
Berlin," Tairov said.
"And what did you get out of it? You bought the bank with good money. if
it
And how much currency could the bank have floated even
had survived? Don't our people
of a world profits,
we
and
live in?
also
in
Moscow understand the kind
Didn't they estimate the costs and possible
weigh the hazards,
And what
in advance?
are they
going to do now? Here we've built up an intelligence network, great cost
and danger, and
this infantile
Tairov admitted that he did not Sass
& Martini affair, but he
still
scheme
is
going to wreck
know what
tried to
to
at
it!"
do about the
defend the counterfeiting
plan on grounds of the acute shortage of valuta in connection
with the Five- Year Plan. I
pointed out the
to the inefficiency
money sent a
to us
difficulties
we secret service agents had, owing
of our financial bureaucrats in exchanging
from Moscow. At times the courier would bring
whole bundle of $500 banknotes,
at other times, ten
dollars in one-dollar bills. Occasionally, these notes
the stamp of the Soviet State Bank.
changing 108
this
real
The
risk
thousand
would
carry
of exposure in ex-
genuine currency was bad enough.
And
now, Mos-
In Stalin's Secret Service
cow proposed good
to furnish us with counterfeit
death sentence to
as a
money!
was
It
our work. Tairov was shaken by
all
as
my
arguments, and gave ground. "Perhaps you're right," he conceded, "as
Europe
far as
is
con-
cerned. But you must understand, this business was organized
primarily with an eye on China.
of these
dollars,
and we need them
This stumped me, for China, and we dropped
took place
and more
Over
at Ostia, the
The
there."
knew nothing about
I
conditions in
the matter until our next meeting, which
new
seaport near
successfully, tried to
the whole business.
there we're floating millions
Rome. There
convince him that
I
again,
we should end
& Martini case was then beginning
Sass
to re-echo from every corner of the globe.
The
Bankers' Association of Berlin had issued a public warn-
ing against spurious United States banknotes of tion bearing an oval portrait of several its
minute discrepancies
$100 denomina-
Benjamin Franklin.
in the counterfeit
It
described
money to
facilitate
detection.
The
Berlin police
its
that "these ($100) bills are so
no foreign bank has ever detected them," and
cleverly forged that
broadcast
announced
belief that "Millions of dollars of this false
are in circulation in
On January 23,
money
America and Europe." a bulletin
from Geneva announced: "Ameri-
can Treasury Officials have warned the Federal Police Depart-
ment
Berne that $100
at
These notes
The
notes are circulating in Switzerland.
are very clever forgeries."
next day
forged $100
false
bills
word came from
Berlin:
"About $40,000
have been discovered to date.
A
in
reward for
the capture of Fischer has been offered by the police."
On January
26, the Associated Press carried a dispatch from
Havana, Cuba: Police revealed the existence of an international counterfeiting ring in last
Havana, said to have circulated
week between $75,000 and $100,000
States Federal Reserve
$100
bills
of the
in
in the
bogus United
New York bank. 109
W. G. Krivitsky
A survey of the American banks here showed all held number of
a
these
bills.
The Havana branch of
the
National City Bank has fourteen, and has refused to accept approximately $16,000 more. All banks have installed special tellers to scrutinize large
currency. place,
is
The Casino
denomination
National, an expensive gambling
said to have received
many
of the fraudulent
notes.
On
January 29, the well-known
Alphonse Sack (who some years in the
famous Reichstag
room,
his readiness to
later
German
attorney, Dr.
appeared for the defense
Fire Trial) declared in a Berlin court-
prove that the forged $100 notes had
been made in the Soviet State Printing Establishment cow. Dr. Sack alleged, according to the
New
Mos-
at
York Times of
January 30, that "during the recent trouble with China, $2,500,000
in counterfeit
source, was circulated in
On
February
6,
pound and dollar notes from China by Soviet agents."
news came from Warsaw of the
Communist leader found in days later from the same States
$100
same
the
arrest
possession of American currency.
city:
notes were found,
of a
Ten
"Large quantities of forged United
upon
analysis, in a
bank
in
Lwow
(Lemberg)," and these notes were found to be similar to those discovered in the
German
banks.
At about the same time the Berlin police made public
a report
of the discovery in Antwerp, Belgium, of a counterfeiting ring,
flooding Europe with fictitious American $100 and $500 banknotes, and of the arrest of three men, a Romanian, a garian,
and
The
Hun-
a Czech.
Federal Reserve
Bank of
New
York issued a circular on
February 22, 1930, calling attention to a number of minute crepancies in the fake
spacing between the
1
bills,
among them
and the
first
numerals on the face of the note was genuine.
110
dis-
the fact that the black
of the slightly
1
00
in the corner
wider than in the
In Stalin's Secret Service
On March 3,
large quantities
of this counterfeit currency were
encountered in Mexico City. Here, too, the workmanship was pro-
nounced very
skillful.
On March
seven smugglers of the
7,
were seized
false bills
at
Teschen, on the Polish-Czech frontier.
While had been
these echoes were resounding through the world, Tairov
communication with Moscow, and he
in
orders to assign
me
to liquidate the affair.
returned to Vienna, where
I
Military Intelligence in Austria.
who had
had
in the
meantime
met Alexandrovsky, then head of our
of nerves over the whole thing. Alfred,
I
finally received
I
found Alexandrovsky
He
in a state
was particularly incensed
now
shipped Fischer to Vienna, and
at
expected
Alexandrovsky to provide the fugitive with a hide-out and the necessary papers for clandestine passage from Austria to the So-
Union. Circulars carrying the picture and description of Franz
viet
Fischer were by this time posted throughout Western Europe. "I told
Tairov
when he was
here that
I
didn't
want
anything to do with the case," Alexandrovsky complained that imbecile Alfred
"It's
Let
who
is
He
that
it,"
saw Fischer
in
Vienna
bitterly.
replied Alexandrovsky,
he had no choice but to obey
to Odessa,
and thence
just before his departure.
instructions.
him
supplied Fischer with passports, enabling
way of Romania and Turkey
have
responsible for the whole mess.
him clean it up." "What did Tairov say?" I asked. "He told me the Boss was behind
which meant, of course,
to
to
to
go by
Moscow.
About
I
six feet
tall,
slender but strongly built, always smartly dressed, Fischer was
well
known
tache,
for his dashing appearance.
and dressed
carelessly.
He now wore a false mus-
Besides that, he was effectively dis-
—
mood a sorry figure indeed. am a finished man," he said to me. He knew that once he got to Soviet Russia, he would never be allowed to leave. He also knew that Stalin could not afford to let
guised by his disheartened "I
him
survive if he remained abroad.
fate.
After
all,
he had done the job in
orders of the Soviet
I
was deeply moved by
his line
his
of duty, acting under
Government. Ill
W. G. Krivitsky
met Alfred
I
March
in
opened our conversation "You blockhead!"
and Western Europe
He
I
Cafe Kuenstler, in Vienna, and
at the
no
in
said.
flattering terms.
"You have
defend himself.
tried to
said.
like ordinary counterfeit currency.
same paper they use that
United
in the
"This
stuff.
The only
States.
in
I
It
got the
difference
is
our conversation Alfred referred to
"Nick," an American, apparently of Latvian origin,
main
money
aide in circulating the false
He was him
money.
real
is
the real
It's
printed on our presses instead of in Washington."
it's
More than once his
States
and learned absolutely nothing."
for years,
"But you don't understand," he isn't
United
lived in the
of their success and
full
realize the gravity
Martini venture,
had put
the problem. Point by point position into
The
States.
collapse of the Sass
a different
analyzed for
I
United
in the
took some time to make
it
of the situation.
explained,
I
who had been
which he had maneuvered
us.
&
complexion on
him
the dangerous
He sat there like a man
hearing a death sentence, and finally asked imploringly:
"What can I
told
him
do?"
I
that
instructed to lay
Moscow.
I
the
all
off,
had
bills
to be called in,
and
and that he himself would have
was not sure that Alfred would obey
meet us
therefore arranged for Tairov to
my
together,
to
his agents
go back to
and
orders,
I
and confirm
my full authority in the matter. It
was from Alfred that
I
learned
counterfeiting scheme. Although
under It
at
any
rate,
who
the details of the
was carried out
in
Moscow
he claimed to have originated the
Stalin's supervision,
was he,
it
some of
idea.
secured in the United States a shipment
of the special paper used in printing money. Alfred, circle in
whose
head. Alfred was tures.
I
name was
last
tall,
blue-eyed, lanky, of strong but
had known him and
was statuesque, was known everybody in
112
Tilden, belonged to the Latvian
our department, of which General Ian Berzin was the
Moscow
his wife as a
Maria
homely
for several years.
fea-
Maria
crack shot, and was considered by
the brains of the family.
In Stalin's Secret Servn
come
In the spring of 1928, Alfred had
i
tried
and
hard to keep Alfred from taking Lydia with him.
clever
officer
woman, then
and
later
had joined our
in her thirties,
one
to Paris to detach
of our best agents, Lydia Stahl, and transfer her to America.
A
had
I
striking
once the wife of a Czarist
married to Baron Stahl, a Baltic nobleman, Lydia secret service while a refugee in Finland in 1921.
She was one of the best we had. Alfred States.
won
his point,
and took Lydia with him
She remained about three
espionage case broke in Paris rested there, tried,
and given
years,
at the
to the
United
but when the Gordon Switz
end of 1932, Lydia was
ar-
a five-year prison sentence. Alfred's
wife Maria, then stationed in Finland as our military intelligence agent,
was
also caught,
and
is
now serving
a ten-year sentence as a
Soviet spy in a Finnish prison.
Despite
all
his ineptness, Alfred
himself never got into trouble
with the police. However, the collapse of the counterfeiting enterprise
was a setback
to his career.
well-known Communists,
like
The
fact that
he had employed
Franz Fischer and Paul Roth, was
one of the gravest aspects of his
failure, as it
was bound
to
com-
promise the Communist parties of Western Europe. It
took
me
several
weeks to liquidate the
affair
and have the
outstanding counterfeit currency shipped back to Moscow. In May,
1930, Alfred, too, went back home, and Fischer had by that time
By mid-June the storm seemed to have blown over, although $100 notes continued to appear now and then in the Balkans. About June 20, 1 returned to Moscow to arrived safely in Soviet Russia.
report to General Berzin.
Tairov was also in Moscow, and was present at our conference. General Berzin expressed in an for
embrace
jumping into the breach caused by the
me
his gratitude to
collapse of the Sass
Martini Bank. In the course of our conversation,
I
offered
&
some
frank criticisms of the whole enterprise.
"Counterfeiting I
said. "It
is
no business
puts us on a par with
for a powerful state to
go into,"
some small underground
sect
without resources."
113
— W. G. Krivitsky
Berzin explained again that the plan had been worked out with a
view to China, where large-scale operations were possible, and
admitted that
it
was not suitable
for the West.
I
argued that
it
was
ridiculous anywhere.
"Didn't Napoleon print British banknotes?" Berzin countered. I
recognized in that the voice of Stalin himself.
"The comparison won't stand up," ditions are wholly different.
I
said.
A few million
"Modern
fiscal
con-
dollars'
worth of cur-
—
dam-
rency can accomplish nothing substantial today
except to
age the prestige of the state that prints them." I
went away feeling that the counterfeiting venture had been killed
for good,
and
that the banknotes
on hand would be
New York and
mistaken, as subsequent events in
destroyed.
I
was
Chicago proved.
Alfred was later transferred to Minsk, near the Polish border,
where he was put
in charge of
White Russian Military
the motorized forces of the
all
assumed
District. Franz Fischer
a
new
name as soon as he arrived in the Soviet Union. Although a veteran Communist in Germany, he was not admitted into the Russian Communist Party a severe handicap. He was assigned
—
OGPU Construction
after a while to the
him
off as a foreman to
much
Some of us
for a time, but
In the late
me
Vienna
to
I
Division,
which shipped
Northeastern Siberia
sent Franz parcels of
warm
clothing,
he never acknowledged our communications. of 1931, General Berzin suddenly dispatched
fall
to act
Here, once more, prise.
in
North Pole and Alaska than the nearest Rus-
nearer the
sian railroad.
Kolyma,
I
once more
came on the
as a trail
troubleshooter in a mess.
of the counterfeiting enter-
was introduced to an impressive American couple, then
stopping
at the
Hotel Regina, with
whom
I
passed
many sociable
hours in Vienna. They were Nick Dozenberg and his attractive
young
wife. This
in the
United
was the same Nick
States. Originally
the founders of the
who had worked with Alfred
from Boston, he had been one of
Communist
Party in the United States. In
1927, after the arrival of Alfred, Dozenberg "went underground," i.e.,
he became inactive in the public
began to operate
114
secretly as
Communist movement and
one of our agents.
In Stalin's
Tall, heavily built,
Secret Service
with a massive head, and well dressed, Nick
Dozenberg looked the part of a very successful American business-
He was operating for us now in Romania, where he maintained the American-Romanian Export Film Company. He had come on to
man.
us in
Vienna
to try to secure funds for a trip to
America
to purchase
an expensive filming machine. But the valuta situation
now more
was
critical
than
Moscow
in
So acute was the shortage of
ever.
foreign currency that even our pivotal
men
were handicapped by
budgetary limitations. Moreover, Dozenberg was accustomed to a
much higher standard of living than we Soviet citizens. Two years had then passed since the Sass & Martini venture. The counterfeit banknotes had ceased appearing. The press had forgotten them. Franz Fischer was pictures in
European railway
ering dust.
I
had good reason
stations
from a
foolish
Early in
and
I
and
seashore,
offices
both the American and
thought, had
of those
come out unscathed
fantastic venture.
to the
United
States.
left for Berlin,
to be
on the lookout
and
Toward the beginning of
new warning was suddenly sounded from Geneva
European banks
his
were gath-
their quest for the source
1 932 Nick Dozenberg and his wife
from there went on April, a
and post
to think that
European police had dropped bogus banknotes. Moscow,
on the Arctic
for the
same old $100
to
all
notes.
On April 29, the Berlin Boersenzeitung reported that counterfeit $ 1 00 bills
had appeared once more
in
uted no special importance to "fence" of Alfred's until
Vienna and Budapest.
thinking that some former
this,
had retained
a
attrib-
I
few of the
he thought he could exchange them
bills,
safely. I
and waited
did not then
connect Dozenberg's return to the United States with the reappearance of the counterfeit -money. ever, that
news burst
like a
1933, and
its
lin.
how-
little later, 1
932 pro-
to Stalin's counterfeiting venture.
bombshell
in
New York and
reverberations were heard in
to be at the time,
The
learned a
Dozenberg's stay in the United States during
duced an American sequel
pened
I
Chicago
in January,
Moscow, where
and caused some uneasiness
The
in the
I
hap-
Krem-
following events took place in the United States in conse-
quence of Dozenberg's expedition. 115
W. G. Krivitsky
On Tuesday port, the
from
afternoon, January 3, 1933, at the
United States Secret Service
a plane
Air-
he alighted
from Montreal, a certain "Count" von Buelow. Upon
man was
investigation, this
identified as
a police record in Chicago.
had
Newark
arrested, just as
who
one Hans Dechow,
He was
charged with being an
agent of a counterfeiting ring in Canada and Mexico.
On January 4,
the Federal agents
New York
York, reported by the
made another
Times
arrest in
as follows:
Agents of United States Secret Service arrested night Dr. Valentine Gregory Burtan,
of 133 East 58th
Street,
on
New
last
young physician
a charge of counterfeiting.
His arrest came within 24 hours after that of "Count"
von Buelow. The
arrest
followed disclosure from Chi-
cago that agents of the ring had passed $25,500 in a
Loop Bank of
that
police, returned
Burtan
Dr. Burtan, according to the
from Montreal yesterday by
a heart specialist
is
Hospital.
He
The United face to face
city.
is
34
train. Dr.
connected with the Midtown
years old
and
a Russian
by
States authorities, in arresting the
birth.
two men, came
with what they found to be one of the most baffling cases
in the history
of counterfeiting.
Dechow made
the Federal agents, and the case against
a full confession to
him was suspended from
the
docket in view of his testimony for the government. Dechow's confession was that he had been meddling in the munitions business, particularly in the
chemical warfare equipment, and had met
Dr. Burtan in
New York in the summer of 1 932. Dechow had connec-
tions with the
Chicago underworld. In November, 1932, Dr. Burtan
told to
him
that he
him by
had $ 1 00,000
a patient, a
in $
1
00
bills
member of Arnold
which had been given
Rothstein's gang,
and
that
New York. Dechow unChicago. He went there with a
he did not wish to have them exchanged in
dertook to
effect the
exchange in
sample of the money and offered the business to some Chicago
The Chicago case,
had the fake
nounced them 116
racketeers, eight bills
pals.
of whom were involved in the
examined by various bank
tellers
authentic. Dr. Burtan then arrived
who
on the
pro-
scene,
In Stalin's Secret Service
and an agreement was consummated under the terms of which thirty percent
of the receipts was to go to the underworld group
passing the money.
The sum of $100,000 was turned
over to the
gangsters for exchange.
This was ing the tional
just before Christmas,
got off to a good
bills
Bank
and Trust
the Harris Trust
warded
start.
Company,
and the business of exchang-
The Continental
and Savings Bank, exchanged the
several parcels
NaCompany,
Illinois
the Northern Trust
bills
and
for-
of them to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago. That was on December 23, 1932. Again the arrival of several packages
Mr. Thomas called in to
J.
of $100 notes of an old issue aroused suspicion.
Callaghan, of the United States Secret Service, was
examine the banknotes.
them
and
identified
and
at various other points since
All the
mas
a
He declared them counterfeit,
those found in Berlin in 1930,
as similar to
1928.
Chicago banks were warned, and
man was
just before Christ-
arrested at the First National
Bank of Chicago
while trying to change one hundred $ 1 00 notes for ten $ 1 000 notes.
This
arrest led the police to the
underworld syndicate, whose
mem-
had been swindled. They money was genuine. They relinquished the $40,000 of bogus money still in their possession, offered to cooper-
bers were outraged to discover that they
had been sure
that the
ate to the limit
report in the
Dechow
with the Federal authorities, and according to a
New York tried to
had been taken
in
Times, "promised to take Burtan for a ride."
convince his underworld friends that he too
by the
New
York physician.
He
New York to clear up the misunderstanding with Dr. fident that he could
redeem himself with
his
Chicago
returned to Burtan, concronies.
But
when Dechow told him of the developments in Chicago. He advised Dechow to get away to Europe at once. But Dechow did not like that at all. He insisted that the Chicago crowd wanted good money for the bogus curDr. Burtan changed his attitude
rency.
At
a corner
leaving Dr. Burtan,
of 90th Street and Central Park West,
Dechow was
that if he did not leave for a ride.
The
accosted
Europe
by a man who
at once,
after
told
him
he would be taken for
stranger was about five feet eight inches
tall,
and
in his
117
W. G. Krivitsky
After this experience,
late thirties.
Dechow compromised, and
agreed to meet Dr. Burtan in Canada.
On January Mount Royal
1
,
Dechow
arrived in Montreal, registered at the
Hotel, and there
met Dr. Burtan. To Dechow
a most unsatisfactory conference. Indeed, he
menaced from losses
three sides.
made good. The
The Chicago
now found
racketeers
on the
Federal agents were
was
himself
wanted
trail
involved in the case. And, in addition, the stranger
it
their
of all those
who had
ac-
him in New York now appeared in Montreal, and warned Dechow to take passage for Europe at once. Dechow did not know that the mysterious stranger deployed against him by Dr. Burtan was an agent of the Russian OGPU. But he knew that something was the matter. He promised to take the next boat for Europe. costed
Instead, he decided to eral authorities,
was
arrested.
He
throw himself upon the mercy of the Fed-
and took the next plane
for
Newark, where he
then led the United States agents to Dr. Burtan's
office.
The
investigation
which followed established
that Dr. Burtan
had been prominently identified with the Communist February 24, 1933,
New York
Party.
account of the matter appeared in the
this
Times:
FLOOD OF FAKE
BILLS
IS
TRACED TO RUSSIA
The origin of $100,000 in counterfeit $100 notes, many of which were successfully passed last month in Chicago, has been traced by Federal agents to Soviet Russia,
it
was disclosed yesterday
at the Federal Build-
ing.
The notes, which have turned up
as far
away as China,
have been pronounced by experts of the Treasury De-
partment to be the most genuine-appearing counterfeits
ever uncovered.
They
are said to
have been made
six years ago.
The government,
it
was disclosed,
report that Dr. V. Gregory Burtan,
118
On
is
investigating the
New
York physi-
km
In Stalin's Se
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eat
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a
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W. G. Krivitsky
.^Usi.*^
&& Dr. Yohl Mid that the first ties he celled on tri-rltaky at Urn Bagua, Bollard, lr 1936 for itiodi/ visit ha erne Hac* Broasee
there, later in 1937 when KrlTitaky e*U*d upon hie (ToU) is Ptrie, Tranea he ataic ea» Brussac. although fohl did not knee? Braesse'e connection with Irivitaky he smid Brueise see an expert locked th end had ir.^mnt^d * avail elMtrio light nitd la that prof«aelon« lohl elaijui further to h*r» aeen Bruesse on the street* of Bee forte shortly before January 7, 1941 and appears to >eve» acapeeted thet Bruesae ems oo the trail of KriTiteky ghg had defected. A copy of &t *•* Tork BMrco 19, 19-OL Urn report of Special in tha ease entitled •B*n* Brcnsae ot el, Bepiona^e - R,« ie for your information,
^«iSBBetW
.
tOC
(65-3315^-9)
bl
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282
x-
In Stalin's
Secret Service
&P furnished tba following aancriptlona of
fc)C fcT>&
aod lor* BxuMiwi Ban*
SSBSB
»
AH
•bout
Baignt
6' or awar
(tn 1947)
largo, with broad ahmTlrtem P»la, locked ill and had aug*r dlabataa light brown or dark blond aanally wora flaaaaa
Ca«pl»zioo
Bair
Cbame t«ilstiM t lora Bna««a»
abont 28 &n 1947) aawOl, pattta MPB uujiah bob bad beautiful faoa and were
aga Build Charactarlatioai
elothee praferring low healtd aboai
and bloaeae* The photographs of teas and Jan Bmaaae, first eonaiae of Bans BruoBoa 4 ara being forwarded for exhibition Ton will bt adriaad of any pertinent
_ Agant^| your
It i» ragpa» tad that yon afford the aneloaad report of Spade! /relative to Sana Bruaaaa so dJaoawdaetloa entelde ^-j
eceuey^^^^^^
-3
::
y-S.
283
q
W. G. Krivitsky
I'MTTJ) STATES GOT
S^RET
"iNMEVT
Memorandum DIRECTOR, KBI (100-11146)
i\m.
FROM
* SUBJECT
NEW YORK (100-59589)
7/13/65
date:
At!*
rrcr*' '.tic^t ccaniB©
^'
WALTER Q. KRIVITSKY aka IS-R
OTHSLfflSE^
Aa the Bureau la aware, Oeneral WALTER Q. KRIVITSKY, former Western European Head of Soviet Military Intelligence was found shot to death on ^10/41 in his room In Bellevue Hctil in Washington, D.C. That death was listed aa a suicide, although strong suspicion has continued to exlat that in fact, the Soviets did away with KRIVITSKY.
On 11/26/59, POVL BANQ-JENSEN, a Danish diplomat for 20 years and a Senior Political Officer at the UN, was found dead of a bullet wound in the right ten^le in Alley pond park at Little Neck, Queens, NY, and a 25 automatic NYCPD listed the death as a suicide. was clutched in his hand.
r^r
*"»
*»
"**
t;" f*.
The Internal Security Sub- Committee of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United states Senate, 87th Congress, First Session, conducted hearings on that case and issued a report on 9/1 V^ 1 concerning their findings. In it they referred to the death of WALTER KRIVITSKY as well aa those of LAWRENCE DUGOAN, a former Chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department, WALTER MARVIN SMITH, an attorney in the Office of the United States Solicitor Oeneral, as well as LOUIS ADAMIC and others. The sub- committee raises the question of suicide and murder aa well as the problem of simulated or induced suicide and refers to the above mentioned cases in that connection and points out that It is common knowledge among those who have worked in the Soviet apparatus, that the Soviets have highly developed techniques for simulatedsuicide. PETR S. DERIABIN, a former member of the Soviet Terror Apparatus who defected in 195^ stated "it is general knowledge among those who have worked in the ranks of the MVD that the MVD, when it undertakes the liquidation of a political
Bureau New York .
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WDD:gr
j*..*«j]*W
(3) Daje of Occliu
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284
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iht Payroll
Sarinp Plan
In Stalin's
^ NY
Secret Service
S^r;E7
100-59589
opponent, has certain techniques for simulating suicide and other techniques for inducing suicide* A convincing suicide may talce a year or two to prepare During this period, the subject' 8 life Is examined minutely in order to determine the methods most suitable to his personality and circumstances. Meanwhile, stories may be circulated to the press, if possible, and at the very least among his neighbors, that the subject This prepares the ground for plausible is despondent. suicide story when the deed occurs. The report then states "simulating or inducing suicide are very real phenomena. M .
i
"Local police chiefs will be well advised to call in the FBI in any case of apparent suicide where there is some reason, even the slightest reason for believing that the Kremlin stood to benefit from the death of the deceased
"N
^
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%
s
285
r
W. G. Krivitsky
s
sWwr
U Drlso
f
s
comments on IriviUky's book entitled
"In Stalin's secret Serotoe" are contained i« our report of June 23, 1ZS4, entitled "Alexander Qrloxt, soith client, Internal Security - R, * a copy of which was furnished to your Agency on September 10, lStSd. There in ho additional pertinent information or references oomcermtng Xrioitsky's
acttoittes whtch hap* not previously bee* furnished to
***
iith reference to contacting Chambers, this Bureau kao in recent monthe refrained from making ony aontacte with Chanter* mhtch mere not absolutely oecoooary Lr. i. Besse in view of his serious heart condition* Silkies of eestmtnstsr, Maryland, who is Chambers' phyeictau, has advised this Bureau that en October BO, 19S5, Chambero suffered another severe heart attack and would be confined to bed for an extended ported of time, Lr* tilkins recommended against any contacts which might excite Chambers and even prior to this time Mrs, Chambers hod requested that contacts fcftlt her husband be held to an absolute minimum and oaly in connection with »oat important and urgent mature* &\sk\
- * f
286
Sibil tjk%l
s
j Jf
In Stalin's Secret Service
#
shbiT
All data regarding lrioiteey*e movement* during immediately preceding Me death and the identitiee ef oarioue oereone amnocta\e& fn oaf arty nr another with him \oere furniehed to__ ~\y memorandum regarding Margarita KTWT9mr¥W§l9W Tebert and ltteT~lolf Dobert, with eleven tmweetigative reporte tm the eaee entitled Mane Brueeee and other*, Sepiomage - £• (65-33254the period
initial theory regarding Krioiteky'e death van tnat trivitehjf committed euicide ef hie o»» accord due to hie oca feelinge induced by economic difficulty and "hope 1* at home lt/4*" ^^^ Thie ie eet out on page IS of the repert of Special Agent Wg/gtl dated Horch £4, 1*42, at lev lore City, in the Mane Brueoee caee mentioned above.
According to references in House locument Mo. 711, diet Concree*, Leoond Session, Toretgn Relatione of the United : tctee 1*33-1939, the Soviet Union," the eentemce ef death oca carried out on General Tu*ha4heeeki and others, including one Futna, former Soutet Military Attache la Berlin, on June 12, 1*37, after they had been found guilty ef treason by a military collegium in a epecial judicial eeesion of the Supreme Court of the OSSfi. (65-37939-254, encl m, pages 379-383)
hi SZtotlT
287
W. G. Krivitsky
8*foxT
3
V>\
, m
cruel* in J>laim Tmlk* /or October, 194*, "1 alto recalled to trlattoky the starting tten which had cropped out during hie fir** all-tig** nee-ting with thtttaker Chanbertj involving m major em the general eta// e/ the 8*s m Army, m graduate e/ West Point* It appeared that tkio e//lcor, who wee given to axceeeiva drinking, had been maneuvered into becoming m patd op* 0/ tho Soviet military intelligence. Bit pramature death one rtgardod ae a blew by the chief* a/ the Soviet underworld* I tried to /tnd out /rem Irivituky %/ the Iremltn had, te hie knowlodg*, any ether agent* in our national de/emee d*part~ mentt+ n Thit quoted paragraph mae merely the introduction to the quotation /rem mPloin fmlk" en pago one of this memorandum. Levin* at that ttmo did iot attribute to trtviteky any ttcteneatt regarding Putna or a decooeod American major. la.
vi*
lev in* otcttd:
Any mddtttoncl data coming to your attention regarding thee* nntttr* would b* o/ interett.
\
>
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288
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In Stalin's Se
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Isaac Don**i,evinej free-lance writer, indicated in press to have told British Embaszy, lashington, D. C, in 1939 that tu>o Soviet agente had penetrated British Foreign .Service, Indicated one had been executed in Touxr of London and the other had all the characteristics of Donald Maclean, Any representations by Levine to Bri tish un known to B ureau. fel \>1
H
RECORDED
100-1146 cc - Board ian Belmont Branigan " Payne Whitson L*;blb f
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(6)
/
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289
J
)
W. G. Krivitsky
s
:k. Memorandum for
L»
F.
Boardman
DETAILS: Newspaper* 6-7-56 carried stories that Isaac Don Levine, free-lance writer, testified at hearing of Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that in 1939 he, Levine, had told the British Embassy in Washington, 2). Cm, that tico Soviet spies had infiltr: ted its Diplomatic Corps. Levine ^testified he got the information from the late Walter Krivitsky, Levine also testified that one of these wis later identified as a men named King who held a key spot in the coda room of the British Consular Office* According to Levine, the British executed King in October, 1939, in zhe Tower of London* (** Levine said Krivitsky had described the second man as a member of a Scottish family and a young intellectual con.r.unist with
artistic interests which Levine stated
all characteristics of Donald Maclean.
we/^i jr
A British spokesman was quoted as saying that King had been convicted on evidence relayed from, the United States
Tou inquired,
290
"Is this true,
"(a,
In Stalin's Secret Service
- * The f olloring telegram was received today sent to the sane oa-fy as those furnished to you yesterday and sent by the sane sender? "Hill yof check Waldran, Hotel Villard, on today's Journal story that revolver found was, 30 calibre vh\le Dobert says Krioitsky bought *32, Also Waldr.an yest erday telephoned Washingtonian in on the kr.ox (confidentially Dies Committee Inves+igotor) lectin? hin think he wes talking to Louis Wcldnon, said emphatically that it was a suicide, fou might press Waldnan on that. Also you might build up a new lead on the statenent fron faldman that whether suicide or murder what he wants is a Federal incuiry into the activities of the OOPU here."