In Search of Pre-Classical Antiquity: Rediscovering Ancient Peoples in Mediterranean Europe (19th and 20th c.) (National Cultivation of Culture, 13) 9004335412, 9789004335417

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In Search of Pre-Classical Antiquity

National Cultivation of Culture Edited by Joep Leerssen (University of Amsterdam) Editorial Board John Breuilly – Ina Ferris – Patrick J. Geary John Neubauer †– Tom Shippey – Anne-Marie Thiesse

Volume 13

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ncc

In Search of Pre-Classical Antiquity Rediscovering Ancient Peoples in Mediterranean Europe (19th and 20th c.)

Edited by

Antonino De Francesco

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Museo archeologico dell’antica Nola (Naples), Samnite Warrior, detail, from a tomb frieze, IV BC. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016044634

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1876-5645 isbn 978-90-04-33541-7 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-33542-4 (e-book) Copyright 2017 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents List of Figures vii Notes on Contributors viii Introduction 1 Antonino De Francesco 1 Italian Celticisms: A Second (Unpublished) Version of Giovanni Fabbroni’s Antichi Abitatori d’Italia (1803) 19 Katia Visconti 2 Local Pride, Ethnicity and Ancient History in Turin in the Risorgimento: The Representation of the Taurisci/Taurini in Carlo Promis’ Storia dell’Antica Torino (1869) 41 Filippo Carlà-Uhink 3 The Invention of Numantia and Emporion: Archaeology and the Regeneration of Spanish and Catalan Nationalisms after the Crisis of 1898 64 Francisco Gracia-Alonso 4 Illyrian Autochthonism and the Beginnings of South Slav Nationalisms in the West Balkans 96 Rok Stergar 5 Illyrians Across the Adriatic: A Cultural History of an Archaeological Culture 119 Maja Gori 6 Classical Antiquity and Modern Greek National Identity: Reliving the Ancient Maritime Heritage at the Sea of Salamis 146 Eleni Stefanou 7 Shifting Discourses of Heritage and Identity in Turkey: Anatolianist Ideologies and Beyond 166 Çiğdem Atakuman Bibliography 183 Index 204

List of Figures 1 2 3 4

24 August 1905. King Alfonso XIII visit Numancia guided by José Ramón Mélida 70 1909. The statue of Asclepius presented to children of a elementary school by Josep Puig i Cadafalch 90 1909. Emporion researcher Emili Gandia photographed in the walls sector of the Neapolis after the end of the first fieldworks 92 Notice of the visit of king Alfonso XIII at the archaeological site of Numancia, September 1903, in the Soria newspaper El Avisador Numantino 95

Notes on Contributors Ciğdem Atakuman is faculty member at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara. She is the author of Architectural Discourse and Social Transformation during the Early Neolithic of Southeast Anatolia (2014); Deciphering Later Neolithic Stamp Seal Imagery of Northern Mesopotamia (2013); Value of Heritage in Turkey: History and Politics of Turkey’s World Heritage Nominations (2010). Filippo Carlà-Uhink is lecturer in Ancient History and Classics at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. He is the author of Ancient Greek Culture and Myth in the Terra Mitica Theme Park in Classical Receptions Journal (2013); he is the co-author with Irene Berti of Ancient Magic and the Supernatural in the Modern Visual and Performing Acts (2015) and with Maja Gori of Gift Giving and the ‘Embedded’ Economy in the Ancient World (2014). Antonino De Francesco is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Milan, Italy. He is the author of The Antiquity of the Italian Nation: The Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796–1943 (OUP, 2013) and co-editor of Republics at War, 1776–1840: Revolutions, Conflicts, and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World (Palgrave, 2013). Maja Gori is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam. She is the author of Along the Rivers and through the Mountains. A Revised Chrono-cultural Framework for the South-Western Balkans during the Late 3rd and Early 2nd Millennium BCE (2014); she is the co-author with F. Carlà of Gift Giving and the ‘Embedded’ Economy in the Ancient World (2014) and with J. Walston of Building a New Land from Ancient Shards. Archeology and National Identity in the Balkans (2013). Francisco Gracia Alonso is professor of Ancient History and Archeology at the University of Barcelona, Spain. He is author of La Hecatombe de los Centauros. Las Cargas de la Caballería Francesa (2015); Archeologia i Politica. La Gestió de Martín Almagro Basch al Capdavant del Museu Arqueològic Provincial de Barcelona (1939–1962) 2012 and of La Arqueología durante el Primer Franquismo (1939–1956) (2009).

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Eleni Stefanou is an adjunct lecturer in the MSc course of Cultural Organisations Management, at the Hellenic Open University, Crete. She is the co-author with A. SimantirakiGrimshaw of From Archeology to Archaeologies: The ‘Other’ Past (2012), and author of The Materiality of Death: Human Relics and the ‘Resurrection’ of the Greek Maritime Past in Museum Spaces (2012). Rok Stergar is faculty member of the University of Ljubljana. He is the author of National Indifference in the Heyday of Nationalist Mobilization? Ljubljana Military Veterans and the Language of Command (2012), and L’impero asburgico come scuola della nazione. Illusione o realità? in Minoranze negli imperi. Popoli fra identità nazionale e ideologia imperiale, ed. B. Mazohl et al. (2011); Slovenci in vojska, 1867–1914: Slovenski odnos do vojaških vprašanj od uvedbe dualizma do začetka 1. svetovne vojne (2004). Katia Visconti is professor of Modern History at the University of Insubria. She is the author of L’ultimo Direttorio: La lotta politica nella Repubblica Cisalpina tra guerra rivoluzionaria e ascesa di Bonaparte, 1799–1800 (2011), of A Patriotic School: The Recruitment of the Italian Legion in France (1799–1800), in Republics at War, 1776–1840. Revolutions, Conflicts, and Geopolitics in Europe and in the Atlantic World, ed. P. Serna et al. (2013); and of La Storia americana di Carlo Botta: Una proposta costituzionale per l’Impero dei francesi?, in Tra Washington e Napoleone. Quattro saggi sulla Storia americana di Carlo Botta, ed. A. De Francesco (2014).

Introduction Antonino De Francesco Nationalism defies easy description, even though many attempts have been made to try to answer what nationalism is. Benedict Anderson described the phenomenon as a cultural artefact, underlining how, in historical terms, nations are a recent innovation and nationalisms are the ideology artificially forging the unity of a community.1 According to Gellner, nationalism aims at reinforcing the primacy of a peculiar culture within the borders of a national state, imposing it on a society informed by a lower cultural model.2 For Anthony D. Smith, nations have been created by a specific identity, grounded on «the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of [a] pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions».3 Historians also disagree on the origins of nationalisms. An opposition exists between those who argue that they emerged at the end of the 18th century, and those who see it as a more ancient phenomenon.4 This division reflects a previous split as it implies different evaluations of Kohn’s famous book The Idea of Nationalism, first published in 1944.5 As it is well known, Hans Kohn distinguished between two different concepts of nation: the Western, civic and liberal, and the Eastern, ethnic and illiberal. These two concepts were clearly located geographically and their natural boundary was the river Rhine. According to Kohn, west of the river, namely in France and Great Britain, a rational and universal concept of nation and patriotism, looking towards the political liberty and the rights of man, emerged from the 18th century. On the east of the Rhine, and especially in Germany, appeared another kind of nationalism, based on the concept of genealogical continuity and the transmission of cultural traditions. Written during World War II, Kohn’s book, often dismissed in the last decades as «a mixture of self-congratulation and wishful 1  B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso: London-New York, 1983). 2  E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell: Oxford, 1983). 3  A. D. Smith, The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hiearchy, Covenant and Republic (Blackwell: Oxford, 2008): 19. 4  See especially I. Atsuko & G. Uzelac (eds.), When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism (Routledge: London & New York, 2005). Their collection provide a useful critical assessment on the variety of positions with regard to the origin of nations. 5  T. Kuzio, “The Myth of the Civic State: a critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s framework for understanding nationalism”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25, n. 1 (2002): 20–39.

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thinking»,6 remains one of the landmarks of the study of nationalism and the geographical distinction introduced by his theory has never been questioned. Even though different interpretations concerning the nature of nationalism were proposed7 in the last decades, continental Europe is still seen as deeply interconnected with revolutionary France, when the invention of patriotism and the Napoleonic wars created, disseminated or simply reformulated nationalisms in Italy, Germany, Spain and across most of the old continent. This does not mean that 19th century European nationalisms should solely be seen as a result of the French Revolution, since they are also rooted in the counterrevolutionary movements, as well as in the Romantic revolt and the popular struggles against the Napoleonic rule in Europe. However, theorists of nationalism—such as perennialists, modernists and post-modernists (according to Anthony Smith’s classification)8—all agreee that the political earthquake of the end of the 18th century marks out a peculiar geographical distribution. The expanding, or—in more intriguing terms—the reformulating of nationalisms followed during the 19th century a precise perspective, moving from West to East, and from France to Germany. But this eastward spread of nationalism has led many historians to neglect another movement, Northern to Southern Europe, with the same models of nationalism expanding from France and Germany to the Iberian, Italian and Balkan peninsulas. This perspective entails, however, a fictitious differentiation, since Northern and Southern nationalisms both include an ethnic as well as a civic dimension and confirms how a rigid distinction between one aspect and the other is impossible.9 Neither of the two elements fully predominate in the corpus of any national identity, with specific social dynamics and political processes determining their constantly changing balance. Southern nationalisms should not consequently be treated differently than those in the North. However, their historical experience—namely the emergence, in the first decades of the 20th century, of authoritarian regimes proudly insisting on organic features—has always led to differentiation. Their cultural aspects are unjustly perceived as

6  B. Yack, “The Myth of Civic Nation”, Critical review, 10, n. 2 (1996): 196. 7  For a general overview of the debate concerning nationalism in the last decades, U. Őzkirimli, Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction (Palgrave: London, 2010). 8  A. D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism. A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (Routledge: London, 1983). 9  There is no space here to consider the numerous works devoted to deny Kohn’s dichotomy between a civic nationalism and an ethnic one. A general survey and a discussion of its origins and meaning is offered in A. Liebich, “Searching for the Perfect natio: the Itinerary of Hans Kohn, 1891–1971”, Nations and Nationalism, 12, n. 4 (2006): 579–596.

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following political movements or—perhaps even worse—as directly anticipating them. Both of these perspectives are, in any case, wrong-headed. Nationalisms formulated their political program on the basis of a cultural ideal and in so doing they plucked, in the storehouse of previous local traditions, the elements they required in order to realign and reconfigure them according to a renewed political sensibility. In other words, assuming the different nature of Mediterranean nationalisms by looking at their authoritarian denouement means the analysis considers more what they led to in the 20th century than what they were during the 19th century. According to this explanation, political movements are seen as stemming out of cultural movements, while they should rather be depicted as inaccurate translators of them. Nationalism was instead—as brilliantly asserted by Joep Leerssen—an “international” cultural movement, with its myths, symbols, ideas, features and notions rapidly propagating throughout Europe. Its cultural dynamics were “trans-national”, with notions being received from a different place, reformulated in other languages and shaped according to the new contexts into which they were plunged.10 Far from being distinguished from nationalism at large, cultural nationalism identifies the spatial and chronological contexts in which the specific features of a new sensibility were first defined, then redefined or simply imitated and then perhaps applied according to a specific political aim. Consequently, a renewed historical approach to the subject of nationalism should include, first of all, a review of the geographical spread of the cultural materials directly relating to it. Only after having tested their dissemination and transformation according to the specific geographical context in which they were appropriated and reconfigured, will it be possible to deal with the problems concerning how, when and why certain specific aspects of a cultural movement were retrieved in order to sustain a new political discourse. It is worth testing this methodological framework with respect to a welldefined aspect of nation-building: the myth of the autochthony of the ancient European people. Historians have paid close attention to the uses (and abuses) of the ancient world in modern times and the history of the rediscovery of antiquity has come a long way in recent decades.11 However, few scholars have, until now, been approaching this subject by dealing with the international 10  J. Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), and more in detail J. Leerssen, “Nationalism and the Cultivation of Culture”, Nations and Nationalism, 12, n. 4 (2006): 559–578. 11  A. D. Smith, The Antiquity of Nations (polity Press: Cambridge, 2004). For a useful overview, see also Umut Őzkirimli and Steven Grosby, “Nationalism Theory debate: The Antiquity of Nations?”, Nations and Nationalism, 13, n. 3 (2007): 523–537.

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connections of this particular rediscovery of the past. Too often, the tendency is to deal with national claims to antiquity through the special prism of a disciplinary perspective (how archaeology, linguistics, anthropology, history contributed to the interpretation of the origins of the nation), with historical experience analysed individually and within the boundaries of the nation state.12 Historians have rarely developed a European framework of comparison and, when doing so, refer, more or less convincingly, only to the French, the British and the German examples,13 They make few concessions to an interdisciplinary and international approach, only trying to unveil the contradictory discourses and practices of the nationalist movements with regard to their imagined past, but rarely dealing with the cultural exchanges across Europe that allowed the reconstruction of antiquity according to the ideological imagination of the agents involved. They have never dealt with a Mediterranean context, failing to re-read in wider terms how Southern Europe became an original cultural space, directly related to Northern Europe, but also developing its own particular trends. The topic of the antiquity of the nations should be however an excellent example, largely widespread throughout Europe as it was, from the Iberians of Portugal to the Sarmatians of Russia, from the Celts in Britain to the Pelasgians in the Balkans. These genealogies were not only meant to fill a historical vacuum, they are also embedded in the myth of the origins of the nations and necessarily relate to the concerns of contemporary communities regarding their specific identity. First of all, it is important to insist on the extent to which the diffusion of the myths about the antiquity permeated the modern national imagination. From the beginning of the 19th century, claims were made on the distant past, appropriating and reformulating earlier ideas and theories. This prompted many scholars to try to trace the lost history of national antiquity. It is illuminating to turn to the pages of these books: considering their inequalities, their scholarly and literary differences, all together they form the driving force in every European nation-building process. Consequently, this theme offers a compelling case study that delves in the ways in which, at the beginning of the 19th century, a topic was firstly reconfigured according to a new cultural sensibility, then spread widely throughout Europe and then developed by different political experiences within their 12  For discussions of ideology of antiquity in modern Europe, a useful exemple is G. Klaniczay, M. Werner (eds.), Multiple Antiquities—Multiple Modernities. Ancient Histories in Nineteenth-Century European Cultures (Campus Verlag: Frankfurt-New York, 2011). 13  See for example C. Manias, Race, Science, and the Nation. Reconstructing the Ancient Past in Britain, France and Germany (Routledge: London & New York, 2013).

Introduction

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specific appropriation of the national past. As is well known, the origins of the topic’s modern evolution lay in British imperialism14 and in Napoleonic France, when the Celtic world was integrated in an ideological framework which, inventing an ethnic pride and mingling this with institutional models, aimed to provide a cultural basis for French supremacy in Europe.15 Often present during the 18th century, when it performed the task of protesting against state invasiveness,16 the myth of pre-Roman Gaul returned suddenly to the limelight in the aftermath of the Terror for reasons that were both varied and in opposition to one another.17 On the one hand, it gathered in the Ancien Régime nostalgia of those who opposed administrative uniformity (whether of Rome, Louis XIV, or 1789), but, on the other, it also gave shape to the expectations of those who glimpsed, in that remote past, a revolutionary means of shattering the lines of continuity that had led from the victory of Caesar, through the conquest of Clovis, up to the triumph of absolutism. After Brumaire, the policy of ralliement put promptly into action by Bonaparte found no difficulty in redeploying cultural themes that had been created by his opposers. This explains why even Celtism, manipulated for another political banner, contributed to the birth of Empire.18 In 1805, the Académie celtique was established as an assembly of talents that set itself the wholly political objective of redefining the rediscovery of the Gallic past in terms of fully supporting, in a cultural context, a new national identity.19 With such appeals, Napoleon aimed to play two ambivalent roles: on the one hand, he was seeking to create a common ethnic identity within a French political society deeply divided by the earthquake of the revolutionary years; on the other, he aimed to push this newly unified and original France to establish its dominion over continental Europe. The symbolic example of the ancient Rome—firstly monarchical, then republican and finally imperial— was intriguing: it permitted to show how important was Bonaparte’s role in refunding France, the Empire being a kind of tertium genus, which merged the 14  M. Gibson, S. Trower et al., Mysticism, Myth and Celtic Identity (Routledge: London, 2013). 15   Ch. Dousset-Seiden, “La nation française et l’antiquité à l’époque napoléonienne”, Anabases 1 (2005): 59–74. 16  Ch. Grell, Le Dix-huitième siècle et l’Antiquité en France. 1680–1789 (Voltaire Foundation: Oxford, 1995, 2 vol.). 17  M. Raskolnikoff, Des anciens et des modernes (Publications de la Sorbonne: Paris, 1990): 95–127. 18  A.-M. Thiesse, La création des identités nationales. Europe: XVIIIe–XXe siècles (Seuil: Paris, 1999): 51–53. 19  N. Belmont (ed.), Aux sources de l’ethnologie française. L’académie celtique (CTHS: Paris, 1995).

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monarchical and republican traditions within original political institutions, whilst its civilizing dimension gave an ideological justification of the French military expansion. Consequently, during the Napoleonic years, Celtic and Roman identities were integrated in an ideological framework, which inventing an ethnic proud and mixing it to institutional models, aimed to give a cultural justification to the French dominion over Europe. It goes without saying in fact that these two identities were both devoted to represent and to legitimate the political present time. That is why this new approach to the antiquity was suddenly followed in continental Europe under the dominion of the French armies. The claim to dictate the cultural line to continental Europe favoured new forms of patriotism that opposed the French model on grounds that were very similar to one another. The rise of these nationalisms born out of contrast should not be considered too surprising, constituting as they did the poisoned fruit (for France) of the revolutionary plant seeded throughout a large portion of western Europe by the experiment of the “sister republics”.20 It is worth remembering that in the territories occupied by the French troops anti-Romanism, a phenomenon that already had well-established precedents,21 had been a strong influence as, with their proud references to the peoples of ancient Europe, the very names of the first republics themselves testify: Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Helvetic. The choice of such names— which continued through the years of Empire, with the appearance of the Kingdom of Etruria and the Illyrian Provinces—was part of a specific political programme, suggesting as it did that the French invasion brought with it not conquest but liberty. However, this reference to pre-Roman antiquity in the creation of the new republics also reflected a programme of nation-building since, following the French model, the far-distant past of the individual territories was brought into play to construct their new political identities.22 20  For a useful overview, see J. Oddens, M. Rutjes (eds.), The Political Culture of the Sister republics, 1794–1806 (Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam, 2015). 21  It is impossible to give a detailed account of Anti-Romanism in early modern European culture, which represented a “national” response to the claims of Roman superiority included in the triumphs of the Italian Renaissance. With respect to the English people antiquity, see G. Parry, Trophies of Time. English Antiquarians of the Seventeenth-Century (OUP: Oxford-New York, 2005): chap. 1. Among the numerous examples offered by continental Europe, the best known is the Batavian one: see R. Esser, The Politics of Memory. The Writing of Partition in the Seventeenth-Century Low Countries (Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2012): esp. ch. III. 22  See the example of the batavian Republic in W. Frijhoff, “L’évidence républicaine: les Bataves au passé, au présent et au futur”, Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, n. 296 (1994): 179–194.

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With the birth of Empire, such ideas seemed to be shattered. The message of the splendours of Celtomania was that the insistence on druidic primacy in ancient European civilisation was an allegory for that of France’s in the Europe of modern times. These were assumptions which neighbouring countries could hardly regard without a sense of great anxiety. Italy especially feared that initiatives of this kind were designed to assert that the states arising out of revolutionary expansionism would have to accept a future of subjugation that was not only political but also cultural. This in turn gave rise to the attempt to move away from Celtomania and make claims for an Italic primacy in opposition to that of the French. Vincenzo Cuoco, the most influential political writer in modern Italy, defended a national specificity in the face of French hegemony, and, in his Plato in Italy (Milan, 1804–1806), was careful to substitute the Celts for the Etruscans as the primogenial source of civilisation, asserting that the Greeks learned civilization from an Italic people, that he identified with the Etruscans, who did arrive in Greece well before the so-called Pelasgians. Few years later, in 1810, a Tuscan antiquarian, Giuseppe Micali, publishing in Florence his Italy before the Roman rule, focused on the antiquity of the Italic peoples to demonstrate that a high degree of civilization had already been achieved before the Romans, which were then sacrificed by the Empire’s work of assimilation. In this reconstruction of a pre-Roman past, Micali, despite insisting on an element of autochthony for the country’s peoples, was careful to keep them all distinct from one another and took care not to speak of their substantial uniformity. Micali’s thesis was therefore different from Cuoco’s: while the latter identified the Etruscans as the whole peninsula’s one ethnicity, the former, although recognizing their cultural primacy and agreeing on the ancient inhabitants’ autochthony, was also careful to differentiate the numerous Italic peoples, indicating that only the same cultural model bound them together. His autochtonism was however strong: in his opinion, not only were the Italic peoples different from one another, they were also far from similar to the Greeks, who in fact brought great changes to the anthropological profile of the southern regions of Italy. He also underlined how another people, the Gauls, overthrew the Etruscans in the northern regions and drove them away, thus distancing the Italic peoples from a common cultural process. At any rate, from a different point of view, Cuoco and Micali responded both to the French model: Cuoco from an ethnic point of view in order to assert the antiquity (and consequently the hope for the political indipendence) of the Italian nation, Micali from a cultural one, which permitted to savt, when the encounter between the various parts of Italy did not seem a particularly harmonious one and the Southern regions seemed too different from a political

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(and rapidly anthropological) point of view, the conviction of a federal Italic past was quickly opposed, if with unreliable results, by the work of national pedagogy initiated shortly after the birth of the Italian state . Roman history found new life in the following decades, following the example of Theodor Mommsen, and the decision to insist on the analogy between ancient Rome and modern Italy was a successful one, since provided a convincing response to the political crisis that, at the end of the nineteenth century, was endangering the national state. At any rate, the autochthony of the nation and the pre-Roman past would remain alive in other disciplines than history, such as archaeology and anthropology, fuelled by the political controversies of XIXth century Italy. The tensions, ambiguities, clashes and reconciliations that characterized these different subject are particularly obvious when one considers the success of archaeology, which showed, in the second half of the XIXth century, how the italian Bronze Age civilization was indigenous to Italy and owed nothing to importations from distant islands.23 In so doing, it opened the way to the Italian school of anthropology. At the end of the 19th century, focusing on the archaeological researches, Giuseppe Sergi could consequently underline the existence of western roots in Asia minor. It appears evident here that Sergi was attempting to reconstruct the origin of the European civilization along lines that brought out the particularity of the Mediterranean people with respect to the Indo-German theories. In the first decades of the 20th century, this rediscovery of an enduring Mediterranean civilization made it possible to think of Italy as a center of the civilizing process, thus supporting XIXth century Italy’s geopolitical claims in the Mediterranean.24 Consequently, the choice of Romanism as the clear genitor of Italian national identity, that also enjoyed an extraordinary success during the Fascist years,25 should not lead us to believe that the tradition of a pre-Roman civilization, founded on the specific contributions of peoples of Mediterranean origins, had been completely eradicated of Italian historiography.

23  A. Körner, Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy. From Unification to Fascism (London: Routledge, 2009): 142–159. 24  For a discussion of Sergi’s theories ant their impact on the origins of the Italian race, see L. Tedesco, For a healthy, peace-loving and hardworking race’: anthropologyand eugenics in the writings of Giuseppe Sergi, Modern Italy, 16, n. 1, (2011): 51–65; A. Volpone, “Giuseppe Sergi, champion of Darwinism?”, Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 89 (2011): 59–69. 25  On the appropriation of the Roman past in Fascist Italy, see J. Arthurs, Excavating Modernity. The Roman Past in Fascist Italy (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2012).

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There are a number of signs that, throughout the 1920s, the myth of a longlasting Italic antiquity, continued to garner wide consensus and influenced the regime’s international political action. Later, following the war in Ethiopia and the foundation of the Italian Empire, the same topic was used to foster the regime’s racial policy. Against any kind of biological racism who took their lead from Hitler’s Germany, a current of opinion soon formed stating that the Italian race coincided with the Italian nation for the autochtony of the Italian people had promoted the cultural model determining their historical originality. This perspective appears evident in the Italian Empire’s development policy in Africa, which rejected the mixing of races in the name of a civilising doctrine with regard to populations held to be inferior. It is only after World War II that the Republic would put an end to the myth of primordial national unity and establish the conditions for the subject, cleansed of all ideological superfluity, to return to the field of academic study alone.26 The Italian case is a good example of another attempt at nation-building, one which grew out of the same ideological and political coordinates as that of the French but which opposed the latter by rediscovering and redeploying and an ancient cultural tradition. In the mainstream of exchanges and influences animating cultural nationalism, the Italian approach to the topic of the antiquity is an interesting example. It does show how the paradigm was reformulated under the impact of French rule, how it grew out of the same ideological context as that of the French, how it opposed the latter on the basis of the recovery and redeployment of a preceding cultural tradition and how different political systems exploited it according to their own specific programs. From another point of view, however, the Italian example shows how, by circumscribing the analysis to a national context alone we know close to nothing of the direct influence of that specific model in the European context. In other words, we can convincingly argue that the Italian view of pre-Roman antiquity was initially permeated by French notions, but nothing is known about the consequent impact of these reformulated theories on other countries. The Italian cultural tradition represents, however, an important example in the Mediterranean context. It is well known how Venice, throughout the early modern age, was an extraordinary “Italian” cultural model in the Adriatic27 and 26  I have greatly developed such a perspective, addressing the significance of the pre-Roman antiquity in the Italian national political culture, in my The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. The Cultural origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796–1943 (OUP: Oxford-New York, 2013). 27  E. Dursteler, Language and Identity in the Early Modern Mediterranean, In J. Watkins, K. L. Reyerson (eds.), Mediterranean Identities in the Premodern Era. Entrepôts, Islands, Empires

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Aegean28 area and it should be emphasized how, still in the second half of the 19th century, the achievements of the Italian Risorgimento were a political example for the nationalist movements in the Austrian and Ottoman empires. The strength of the Italian model of nation—as the political culture of the Risorgimento had theorized it—was precisely that it appeared best suited to defy the dominance of the empires, since it guaranteed both independence and a free participation in the political process. Moreover, the same political profile of the Italian identity proved very important to give a secessionist perspective to nationalisms beginning to occur in Spain in the second half of the 19th century.29 All of this suggests that the explosion of theories concerning the autochthony of the Mediterranean people were more than a simple example of the succes of the Romantic cultural movements, related to the German or French examples. It could indeed be better interpreted through a comparative form of investigation—one opened up to include the spread of new political ideas in a wider geo-political area.30 With regard to this specific point, Mediterranean Europe seems a worthwhile example where the Iron Age, discovered by Northen Europe, was depicted as a golden age.31 However, the fact that different national movements came face to face with the apparently overwhelming strength of the Austrian and Ottoman empires sometimes, as in Greece and Italy, obtaining independence is a mediterranean peculiarity.32 In other words, from the mid-19th century onwards, Greece and Italy, influencing each other, initiated a political program that stressed the necessity

(Ashgate: London, 2014): 35–52. See also L. Wolff, Venice and the Slavs. The Discovery of Dalmatia in the Age of Enlightenment (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2002). 28  P. M. Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution. The Making of Modern Greece (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2013): 72–75. 29  C. P. Boyd, Historia patria. Politics, Historyand National identity in Spain, 1875–1995 (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1997): ch. III. 30  With respect to the ramifications of liberalism and nationalism in the Mediterranean basin, see now M. Isabella, K. Zanou (eds.), Mediterranean Diasporas. Politics and Ideas in the long 19th Century (Bloomsbury: London, 2015). 31  For a detatiled European overview of the topic, see P. Kohl – C. Fawcett (eds.), Nationalism, politics, and the practice of Archaeology (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995) and M. Diaz-Andreu, T. Champion (eds.), Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe (Westview Press: Boulder, 1996). 32  See, especially, M. Isabella, Liberalism and Empires in the Mediterranean: the View-Point of the Risorgimento, In S. Patriarca, L. Riall (eds.), The Risorgimento revisited. Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth Century Italy (Palgrave: London, 2012): 232–254.

Introduction

11

of a perfect equivalence between nation and state boundaries and until World War I their political programs were, with irredentist ambitions, both interconnected.33 Consequently, both became an example for the national movements confronted to countries divided religiously or ethnically. With respect to the Balkan peninsula, for example, the assertion of indigeneity with regard to the origins of the Slavic people had a long tradition. But the Napoleonic period, with the birth of a provisional new state, the Illyrian provinces, reshaped the theme according to a new cultural sensibility: the previous theories assumed a “national” perspective, because cultural renewal had transformed antiquarianism into a new political language.34 Somewhat curiously, the same schema explains the rediscovery of the proto-classic age by the other side of the Mediterranean world: in the latter half of the 19th century, liberal and unified Spain failed to find a political balance between the state and the autonomous traditions of various regions, such as Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country. As a result of this failure, independent programs began to be constructed, based on the example of the Italian and Greek national state. This led to a search in proto-historical times for a specific national antiquity supporting the rebuttal of traditional statements regarding the unity of the Spanish people. And in opposition to the first 19th century vulgate—with its insistence on the Celtiberians as the ancestors of the Spanish people— the new nationalisms, following a backward-tending procedure, invented new origins for their people, rediscovering at the same time Celts, Iberians and Tartassians.35 This latter point may be illustrated by considering the transformation of cultural nationalism as it appears and spreads amongst the people of the Ottoman Empire. Here too, between the 19th and 20th century, the elites close to the Young Turks established a novel account of the national past. Looking at the Greek model, its goal apparently attained, they overthrew the traditional view that Ottoman society had of itself and, following the definition invented by 33  See for ex. G. Pécout, “The International Armed Volunteers: Pilgrims of a Transnational Risorgimento”, Journal of Modern Italian studies, 14, n. 4 (2009): 413–426. 34  P. Štih, The Middle Ages between the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic. Select Papers on Slovene Historiography and Medieval History (Leiden-Brill: Boston, 2010): 41–45. 35  See for ex. R. Máiz, “Raza y mito celtico en los origenes del nacionalismo gallego: Manuel M. Murguía”, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 25 (1984): 137–180; J. Leal, “Las tesis lusitanistas. Arqueologia y antropologia en Portugal”, Complutum, 12 (2001): 297–309; A. Medeiros, “Rastros de Celtas y Lusitanos, creencias etnogenealógicas, consumos e identitades en Portugal y Galicia”, Politica y Sociedad 41, n. 3 (2004): 151–166; F. Gracia Alonso, “The development of archaeology in Catalonia in the early twentieth century”, Complutum, 24, n. 2 (2013): 131–144.

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European philologists, created a nation—the Turks: they located their origins in central Asia and proudly affirmed their antiquity, imagining the Sumerians and the Hittites as their direct ancestors.36 An attempt should hence be made to try to evaluate the importance in a Mediterranean context, from Spain to the Bosporus, of the long sweep of 19th century cultural nationalism on the one hand, and of the Greek-Italian political example of independence on the other. The objective would be to verify how, in such a widespread geographical context, the rediscovery of antiquity that took place in the Napoleonic years interwove with pre-existing cultural traditions to foster processes of nation-building that, due to this very type of political commingling, were all specific in nature yet at the same time comparable. Furthermore, and this is the most important point to investigate, approaching the use of antiquity in Mediterranean Europe’s nation-building processes in these terms should allow us to understand the subsequent formation of new political cultures and the shift toward the promotion by the states of racism and authoritarianism after World War I.37 Collectively, we decided to focus on meridional Europe, and considered that France, even if it has a Mediterranean seabord, was to be counted as a “northern” state. As I made it clear, we wanted to focus on forms of nationalism that have been scarcely studied and, when they were, it was almost only their relationship with the “Great nation” that was analyzed. Moreover, since we have seen that we were also keen on measuring the impact of the French Revolution on the other Mediterranean countries, it seemed strange to analyze France’s relationship with its ancient History. Finally, the ancient references made by all the meridional countries where deeply rooted in the mediterrenean world, while France’s claims to a gallic heritage was rooted in continental and northern Europe. Hence, we decided to develop all those questions by dividing the Mediterranean world in four zones that are coherent geographically and politically : the Iberian peninsula, the Italian peninsula, the southern Balkan, and the Ottoman Empire’s seat in Europe, namely Greece and Turkey. This should open the way to a more global analysis, which would not only take the Mediterranean world as a patchwork of loosely connected zones but that would try to combine all these national trajectories into a wider 36  M. Özdogan, Ideology and Archaeology in Turkey, In L. Meskell (ed.), Archaeology Under Fire. Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1998): 111–123 and more recently D. Gürpinar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 1860–1950 (Palgrave: London, 2013): ch. II. 37  An excellent example is offered by Y. Hamilakis, The Nation and Its Ruins. Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece (OUP: Oxford-New York, 2007).

Introduction

13

Mediterranean context. Thanks to the connections established by the different national experiences, a more profound investigation should be possible, clarifying not only how the individual countries of Southern Europe completely reconnected themselves to the cultural and political processes of Northern Europe, but what guidelines were entailed by the survivals, revivals, adaptations and racial shifts of antiquity throughout the Mediterranean world. In order to answer these questions, I felt the need to organise an international conference on this subject matter in Paris—where I spent the academic year 2014–2015 as a research fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies. The purpose of the conference was to widen the debate on the myth of the preRoman antiquity as a nationalizing tool in the Mediterranean basin bringing together scholars from different fields, with a background namely in philology, history and archaeology. This has encouraged a broad approach in developing the questions the conference concerned with. Consequently, the studies presented here depict ancient history and archeology as cultural constructs that give historians an opportunity to analyse the formation of nationalisms in countries as different as Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey and in the countries that were part of the former Yugoslavia, at a time where they rediscovered their «national» antiquities. Needless to say that each article has its own specificities since they all develop into different chronological and geographical frameworks. The studies provided by Katia Visconti and Filippo Carlà, both concerning northern Italy, focus mainly on 19th century. Visconti’s article analyses the unpublished new version provided by Giovanni Fabbroni, a historian and public servant in Tuscany both before and during Napoleonic rule, in his own work The Ancient Inhabitants of Italy (Florence, 1803). In his book, the author attempts to trace the Italian identity in the antiquity, Fabbroni’s objective being to show that the peninsula’s culture is the most ancient and, therefore, the most legitimate. His work follows a large number of 18th century publications that try to trace the Tuscans’ or, more broadly, the Italians’ ancestry, as Celtic, Pelasgian or even Egyptian. With respect to the 1803 edition—when Tuscany was formally an independent Kingdom of Etruria—the new version sees Fabbroni, writing as an officer of the French Empire, since Napoleon had then incorporated his fatherland. Therefore, in the latest version, made ready for printing but which was never published, Fabbroni tried to conjugate theories that established the antiquity of the Etruscan people, generally seen as the ancestors of northern Italians, while linking them to the Celts by stating that they had a common origin. Visconti hence shows how a non-French public official of the Empire manages to combine Napoleonic demands with a more local tradition that allowed him to defend the specificity of Tuscany. From this

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peculiar point of view, he could consequently exalt the ancient and glorious past of Tuscany and its chronological primacy in Europe, as well as its recent incorporation in the French Empire. With Filippo Carlà’s article, we move north from Tuscany to Piedmont, in the Kingdom of Sardinia, where the national movement for the unity of Italy came to be. The author focuses on Carlo Promis, the leading ancient historian in Turin around the mid-19th century. However, Carlo Promis’ work is a discordant voice on Italy’s unification. With his works on the ancient people that lived in Turin’s region during the antiquity, we are exposed to an alternative type of nationalism that, in the end, did not succeed. Indeed, Promis’ life and work were focused on the idea of seeing a strong and independent Kingdom of Sardinia. The unity did not have any sense to him, for cultural and historical reasons, mostly because he resented the inevitable primacy of Rome over his beloved Turin. This inspired his work on the ancient tribe of the Taurisci or Taurini. In his work, he tried to assess both the ancient glory of this people and the fact that in the 2nd century BC, already, it had been betrayed and used by Rome until its culture and language were crushed. This alternate analysis on the ancient peoples of Italy enlightens the contingency of the Italian national movement and illustrates the fact that unity was far from obvious for a part of the northern elites until the 1870’s and even 1880’s. On the other hand, Promis’ slow disappearance from the official historiography of new Kingdom of Italy, from the 1880’s onwards, also shows that these objections slowly disappeared amongst the elites and confirms how slowly the new national political culture started to rewrite its own official version of History. Francisco Gracia-Alonso’s article, devoted to the discoveries of the archaeological sites of Numantia and Emporion in Catalonia, also deals with conflicting nationalisms in a country trying to redefine, at the end of the 19th century, its national identity. Echoing contemporary debates about the independence of Catalonia, this article explores the aftermath of the Spanish-American war of 1898 which marked the definitive collapse of the Spanish colonial empire. The author uses the term «invention» referring to the archeological discoveries of two different cities, Numantia, a landmark of Iberian resistance to Rome, and Emporion, branded as the proof of an ancient Catalonian culture, in order to enlighten the main thesis of his article. Indeed, if «invention» is a specific archeological term it also refers to the way Spanish and Catalan elites used those archeological discoveries to advocate and promote contemporary nationalisms. The article shows how—in a time of utter political, economic and intellectual crisis—the Spanish unified state struggled to find its balance while autonomist or autonomist demands started to make their way in the public debate. The instrumental use of those archeological sites by Spanish

Introduction

15

officials and Catalan nationalists allows Gracia-Alonso to analyse the way two conflicting discourses tried to take the best out of each other. In both cases, the central question of identity, and of its antiquity, is fundamental and partly fails, illustrating how nationalism grounded in antiquity can sometimes miss its objective. In the Catalan case, the stark opposition from dictators Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco as well as the lack of interest of the Catalan people for the pseudo Greek origins of Catalonia, that Emporion was to prove, prompted the nationalists to ground their claim in the revival of Catalan medieval identity, opening yet another debate. The Illyrian case questions other aspects of nationalism. Both Rok Stergar and Maja Gori treat of a national idea, «illyrianism» that did not completely succeed. Moreover, they both take into account the role of the foreign powers’ constant meddling in the Balkans. Rok Stergar’s aim is to show the contingency of the national idea. He wants to deconstruct the common idea that nation building was a necessary, logical process. The ancient Illyria— considered as a geographical framework—gives him a great example since this article does not focus on Croatian, Serbian or Slovenian nationalisms but on another national idea that preceded them: «illyrianism». Initially it was a literary and intellectual movement that goes back as far as the 16th century. The idea was to establish that the people living in Illyria were autochthonous, thus opening claims in the wake of the French Revolution for national claims. Those were encouraged by some of the officials mandated by Napoleon after he created the Illyrian Provinces and they survived the emperor’s fall, even though the Illyrian kingdom created at the Congress of Vienna and directly ruled by the emperor of Austria was only a shrunken version of the provinces. However, confronted with the rise of Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian nationalism that appeared at the end of the 18th century, illyrianism did not manage to find an answer to the religious divisions and dwindled before disappearing as a movement grounded into the belief that the peoples forming the former Yugoslavia were indigenous. It did survive as a sort of cultural landmark until the 1970’s, but never managed to efficiently question the more recent nationalisms. In this article, Rok Stergar shows that nothing was played in advance in the Balkans and that nationalisms, which could appear today as inevitable, mainly because of the religious divisions, were actually preceded by another national ideal that included all the western «illyrians». However, he does recognize that, like the Catalans’ attempt to ground their national claim in antiquity, illyrianism never managed to make its way into the people, implying that this might explain its political disappearance. Maja Gori’s article analyses precisely the influence of western archaeology, mostly German, on the archaeological discourse in the Balkans and how this

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discourse helped in forging modern national identities in the countries that form the west Balkans as well as the western European vision of this region. Her aim is to show how archeology, inspired by the nationalist principles developed by German archaeologists, before, during and after the Third Reich, was instrumental in the different attempts to define national identity(ies) in this region. She demonstrates how each regime attempted to claim ownership of the ancient illyrians. Therefore, analysing these different, and sometimes contradictory, archaeological discourses and theories allows Gori to write a short history of modern nationalism in the Balkans and to show how the foreign, especially German, nationalist and racialist theory had an impact on them. Moreover, this does not cease in 1945, since the communist governments of Albania and Yugoslavia both attempted to use archaeology to strengthen their political and territorial claims. Eleni Stefanou analyses the annual commemoration of the battle of Salamis in Greece. She delves in the intricate maze that links modern and ancient Greece since the 19th century through the prism of the sea. The battle of Salamis is presented as the cornerstone of the complex relationship that modern Greece entertains with its past. Through the detailed analysis of the annual ceremony, Stefanou tries to show how Salamis can be regarded as an event that produces identity. Even though there are no remains, of the combat per se, she shows that the symbolic charge that has been bequeathed to this event accounts for a lot of contemporary issues of modern Greece which has defined itself progressively as the core of modern civilization as well as the ultimate rampart against barbarity and obscurantism. This allows her to link the secular and the religious commemoration of the battle as well as the local, national and touristic point of view on this commemoration. Her constructivist approach allows her to show how Salamis has become a fundamental event in modern Greek identity, something that has been perpetuated by national historiography. Historians such as Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos in the 19th century have established the deep connection between Greece and the sea while followers have coined the battle as the victory of culture and democracy against an all-destroying East. For her, by performing an annual commemoration, Greek secular and religious authorities state, so to say, the national identity annually while conferring a tremendous historical charge to the event. Likewise, connecting the local and national dimensions of this event allows to account for the different ideas of Greece that are bonded in this commemoration. Stefanou thus describes a successful official attempt to use pre-classical Antiquity to nourish modern nationalism.

Introduction

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Çigdem Atakuman’s article, analyses the different and contradictory values that were given to Turkish «heritage» over the 20th century. In this case, Atakuman focuses on Anatolia, systematically perceived, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as the cradle of Turkey. The article shows how, according to the internal and diplomatic political shifts, Anatolia has been invested with secular or religious values, and how the different layers of History that can still be exhibited through monuments and museums have been interpreted in order to justify the choices of the new Turkish state. Atakuman’s work ultimate goal is to deconstruct the western discourse on «heritage» as a kind of objective and universal set of monuments and objects, disconnected from any political agenda, that should be preserved at all costs. She esteems that it is the contrary, giving a few examples, such as early republican monuments, that were deemed uninteresting and, thus, destroyed exactly because they did not serve a political purpose or contradicted an official historical discourse. This article deeply roots the archaeological problematic in contemporary political issues to show how intertwined identity and historical speeches can be. After having combined a wide range of materials from different Mediterranean contexts, it should be noted that all the studies show how the principles and the representations that forged national ideals, and their relationship to ancient history, have circulated in Southern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. The authors of the articles concerning Spain, Italy and Illyria logically stress the importance of revolutionary and imperial France in the awakening or the reinforcing of their nationalisms. However, all the authors also emphasize the role of the neigbouring southern countries’ national awakenings as an influence and an impulse for each nation’s elite to delve into its own ancient past. Thus, those circulations of national ideals are both motivated by competing nationalisms in the context of decay of the multicultural central empires, as well as by a form of inspirational emulation between nations or want-to-be nations that have felt humiliated over the course of their centuriesold history. Taken together, then, the essays in this collection present us with a new point of view placing any suggestion concerning the birth of Southern European nationalisms in a radically new context. Naturally enough, there are differences among the most popular approaches here proposed. However, what is most likely to arouse the interest in this volume, in fact, are the interconnections and the interactions which favoured an ongoing dialogue among Mediterranean Europe. This confirms the scope of the volume and it is hoped that this book may represent a useful tool for other projects looking at reinterpreting the cultural origins of nationalism in Southern Europe. All the works reaffirm, in the end, that the time to consider Mediterranean nationalisms

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in different terms has come, analysing and inter-relating their cultural and political models according to a trans-national perspective. Before leaving the reader to the following pages, I would like to thank the Institute of Advanced Studies in Paris for its extraordinary support in enabling me to organize the international conference where all of these contributions were first presented. Many thanks to Joep Leerssen, who was so kind to attend the conference as general discussant and invited me to organize the papers into a volume. Milan, February 2016

CHAPTER 1

Italian Celticisms: A Second (Unpublished) Version of Giovanni Fabbroni’s Antichi Abitatori d’Italia (1803) Katia Visconti 1. It is well-known how, since the early centuries of the modern age, dynastic pride, together with municipal and patriotic interests, embroiled both Italian and foreign scholars in the study of the genealogies of Italian cities. A real dispute took shape, therefore, regarding Italic origins—one that brought into play assertions from various schools of interpretation. At the head of these came the biblical perspective, which saw the descendants of Noah, or even Noah himself, as the true founders of the Italic peoples and their cities.1 The debate continued to be a lively one during the eighteenth century when in the literary field, and indeed elsewhere, etruscheria or etruscomania were popular topics—discussions and theories, in other words, concerning the origin of the Italic-Etruscan-Pelasgian peoples. The reasons for this revitalised interest were not new, since it is common knowledge that pre-Roman history— the history, that is, of the first peoples of Europe—had often been deployed in

1  To note only a few examples, see G. Merula, De Gallorum Cisalpinarum antiquitate et originae (S. Gryphius: Lyon, 1538); G. Postel, De Etruriae regionis: quae prima in orbe Europaeo habitata est, originibus, institutis, religione & moribus, & imprimis de aurei saeculi doctrina et vita praestantissima quae in divinationis sacrae usu posita est, (Torrentino: Florence, 1551) [see now Y. Petry, Gende, Kabbalah and the Reformation. The Mystical Theology of Guillaume Postel (1510–1581) (Brill: Leiden Boston, 2004)]; V. Borghini, Discorsi storici di monsignore don Vincenzio Borghini. Al serenissimo Francesco Medici gran duca di Toscana, (Filippo and Iacopo Giunti: Florence, 1584–1595) [republished again in Florence in 1755]; P. Morigia, Historia delle antichità di Milano (Guerra: Venice 1592); P. Casella, De primis Italiae colonis. De Tuscorum origine et republica florentina. Elogia illustrium artificum. Epigrammata, et inscriptiones (Cardon: Lyon, 1606); Ph. Cluverio, Italia Antiqua, (Elzevir: Lyon, 1619–1624); E. Dickinson, Delphi Phoenicizantes, sive Tractatus, in quo Graecos, quicquid apud Delphos celebre erat (seu Pythonis & Apollinis historiam, seu Paenica certamina, & praemia . . .) è Josue historia. Cum necessariis indicibus. Appenditur ditriba de Noe in Italiam adventu, (Davis: Oxford, 1655); F. Bianchini, La Storia Universale, provata con monumenti e figurata con simboli degli antichi, (De Rossi Antonio: Rome 1697).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004335424_003

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order to enhance nostalgia for the Ancien Régime or, in contrast, to lament the increasing encroachment of political and administrative centralisation. Helping to fan the flames of the argument was the publication, in 1727, of De Etruria regali, edited by the Florentine Senator and pioneer of Etruscan archeology, Filippo Buonarroti. This work, which had remained unpublished for nearly a century, was composed by the Scottish scholar Thomas Dempster in 1640 on the commission of Cosimo II de’ Medici, its declared intent to bolster the dynastic legitimacy of the Medici family.2 Something of a hodgepodge, and certainly biased, the work was a homage to the civilisation, and even more so to the originality, of the Etruscan people. The 18th century edition was enriched, meanwhile, by the introductory preface of its editor, Buonarroti, who, as well as reiterating Etruscan primacy in terms of customs, laws, religion and artistic expression, strongly attacked those who claimed to have discovered traces of Hebrew in the Etruscan language. Buonarroti, instead, emphatically put forward the hypothesis that the origins of the Etruscans were Egyptian, given that there could be found on their monuments various references to religious rites and customs very similar to those of Egypt.3 This work was to open a new era of studies, creating a kind of schism within the intellectual world between those who continued to advocate a historical interpretation based on Biblical inspiration and those who found it expedient to dissociate themselves from this line of thinking in order to embrace alternative approaches. This led to the founding of a new school of thought that would be known as the Celtic school. In 1727, Scipione Maffei of Verona had already done a lot fuel the debate with his Ragionamento degli Itali primitivi, published as an appendix to the volume Istoria diplomatic.4 Here, Maffei praises the efforts of Senator Buonarroti and is in complete agreement with the idea of the centrality attributed to Etruscan civilization and its supremacy in religion, the arts and sciences. Nevertheless, he does take the opportunity to express one or two concerns, writing, 2  In relation to this, see P. Casini, L’antica sapienza italica. Cronistoria di un mito (il Mulino: Bologna, 1998): 203–206. 3  F. Buonarroti, Ad Monumenta etrusca operi Dempsteriano addita explicationes et coniecturae In T. Dempster, De Etruria Regali (J. C. Tartiniu: Florence, 1727): vol. II; see also, in relation to this, A. Vannucci, Storia dell’Italia antica (tipografia editrice Lombarda: Milan, 1873): 187 [1st ed., Milan 1853]. 4  S. Maffei, Istoria Diplomatica che serve d’introduzione all’arte critica in tal materia. Con raccolta de documenti non ancora divulgati, che rimangono in Papiro Egizio. Appresso per motivi nati dall’istessa Opera segue Ragionamento sopra gl’Itali primitivi in cui si scuopre l’origine degli Etrusci e de’ Latini (Alberto Turnerman: Mantua, 1727).

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Those who are familiar with Dempster’s undertaking will, I am certain, have not attempted to trace back the origin of the people of which he speaks, regarding it, perhaps, as something of a desperate enterprise.5 Maffei emphasised the need to make up for such deficiencies and, reiterating positions already held by the Biblical school, he identified the origin of the Etruscans in a people that, hailing from the ancient land of Canaan, had been driven out by the Moabites. It was a theory that allowed him to establish the primacy of the Etruscans—the real “first Italians”—in the context of pre-Roman Italy. Such specificity was also useful in terms of emphasising how closely related the Etruscan language was to Hebrew, and made it possible to vigorously contest those—such as the French geographer Samuel Bochart6—who stubbornly denied any affinity between the two tongues (even the Etruscan name, in Maffei’s view, was of Hebrew origin). Maffei’s ideas were successful in winning over converts, including the Neapolitan scholar Alessio Simmaco Mazzocchi, who returned to the subject several times. Mazzocchi took great care in demonstrating that the Etruscans had indeed come from the land of Canaan, explaining, through oriental languages and Hebrew, the names of the canals of the Po and many other names in Etrurian Campania and central Etruria.7 Maffei would come back to his ideas twelve years later, with an expanded edition of his Ragionamento, which he wanted to be a clear and decisive response both to the accusations of plagiarism and to the long-running dispute he had

5  S. Maffei, Ragionamento sopra gl’Itali primitivi, 204. 6  S. Bochart, Geographia sacra seu Phaleg et Canaan (Van de Water: Lyon 1707 [4th ed.]). Bochart believed that the Etruscans were an indigenous people, rejected the idea that they were descended from the Phoenicians and said that the Pelasgians were a population of Greek origin that had merged with the Etruscans in Italy, calling themselves Tyrrhenians. In this regard, see Stefano Bruni’s ideas in ‘Origini, etrusche, origini italiche e l’erudizione antiquaria settecentesca’, In Le origini degli Etrusci, Storia archeologia antropologia, edited by Vincenzo Bellelli, Collana Studia Archaeologica, (L’erma di Bretschneider: Rome, 2012): 295–337, in particular 299–301. 7  See A. S. Mazochius, Commentarii in Tabulas Heracleenses, (ex officina Benedicti Gessari: Naples, 1754–1755): 534 et seq. The etymological trajectory taken by Mazzocchi in order to prove his thesis drew greatly on his teaching experience: he taught classical languages at the Neapolitan seminary and Holy Scripture at the Royal University of Naples and at the archbishop’s high school. Here, again, it is worth looking at Stefano Bruni’s comments in ‘Origini, etrusche, origini italiche e l’erudizione antiquaria settecentesca’: 299–301.

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been involved in for years with the estruscologist Anton Francesco Gori.8 On that occasion, Maffei reiterated his belief of a Jewish origin of the ancestors of the Etruscans and rejected the theories of those who, in the meantime, had supported the “legends” of the fabulous Pelasgian race and who in fact identified the Etruscans with the Pelasgians. This mistake arose, in Maffei’s view, due to the Tyrrhenians being defined as “some Pelasgian troop come from Italy”.9 The arguments put forward by his adversary Antonio Francesco Gori were an entirely different matter. Gori based his ideas on the speculations developed by Samuel Bochart in his Geographia sacra: both the Etruscans and the Pelasgians, said Bochart, originated in the East—more specifically, the Greeks, Etruscans and Pelasgians were all descended from the Phoenicians, children of the Egyptians. The Pelasgians, like the Etruscans, had then moved from Phoenicia to Greece and from there directly to Italy.10 Meanwhile, as the controversy between Maffei and Gori went on, new paths were being explored by other figures, in particular the Jesuit Guido Ferrari. In his Dissertazioni sulle Antichità dell’Insubria (Dissertations on the Antiquities of Insubria) published in 1755, Ferrari claimed that the Orobii and the Umbrians, who had descended the valley of the Adige to populate the regions of the Po, Tuscany and the shores of the Mediterranean, derived their origins from the Celts.11 8  On the dispute between Maffei and Gori, see G. Cipriani, Scipione Maffei e il mondo etrusco, in Scipione Maffei nell’Europa del Settecento (atti del Convegno, Verona 23–25 settembre 1996), edited by G. P. Romagnani, (Cierre edizioni: Verona, 1998): 27–63; P. Casini, L’antica sapienza italica, 206–209 and also A. M. Faccini, “Una lettera inedita di Scipione Maffei ad Anton Francesco Gori. Ancora qualche precisazione sul loro rapporto”, Symbolae Antiquariae, 4 (2011): 101–104. 9  S. Maffei, “Degl’Itali primitivi”, Osservazioni letterarie per servire di continuazione al Giornale de’ Letterati d’Italia, IV (1739): 100–149. 10  A. F. Gori, Museum Etruscum exhibens insignia veterum Etruscorum Monumenta, aereis tabulis CC nunc primum edita et illustrata observationibus Antonii Francisci Gori, publici Historiarum Professoris, (Caietanus Albizinius: Florence 1737): vol. II. On the figure of Gori, see Dizionario Biografico Italiano, (Istituto Giovanni Treccani: Rome, 2002): vol. 58, now in http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/anton-francesco-gori_(Dizionario-Biografico)/; S. Bruni, “Anton Francesco Gori, Carlo Goldini e «la famiglia dell’antiquario». Una precisazione”, Symbolae Antiquariae, 1 (2008): 11–68; C. Cagianelli, “La scomparsa di Anton Francesco Gori tra cordoglio, tributi di stima e veleni”, Symbolae Antiquariae, 1 (2008): 71–119. 11  G. Ferrari, Dissertationes pertinentes ad Insubriae antiquitates, (Typis Marellianis: Milan 1765). For a biographical profile, see the essay in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, (Istituto Giovanni Treccani: Rome, 1996): vol. 46, now in http://www.treccani.it/ enciclopedia/guido-ferrari_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/.

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It was by no means a new theory and it had received some stimulus from beyond the Alps. The Celtic origin of the Umbrians had in fact already been submitted to the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in Paris, in 1745, by the historian and linguist Nicolas Fréret, a leading figure of the French Enlightenment.12 The work—published only in 1753, four years after his death—formed part of a much broader survey of the origins of the civilisations of classical antiquity.13 Fréret—partly inspired by his reading of Maffei’s work regarding the origins of the Etruscans14—had already begun to consider the subject years before. It was however, only in the 1740s that he had the opportunity to elaborate his ideas, after having been able to meet, at the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, the canon and archaeologist, Filippo Venuti, founder in 1738 of the Etruscan Academy of Cortona.15 The two scholars continued to meet and exchange opinions with each other for several months. The theme offered Fréret the opportunity to broaden the scope of discussion and to address the burning issue of the need to foster a new historical methodology that could find the space and strength to free itself from biblical tradition. In this regard, Fréret addressed the question of Etruscan origins in terms of a wider reconstruction of the history of the peopling of Europe and the Italian peninsula. Fréret’s concept of the populating process was not mechanical. Hence he did not believe that migrating waves of new peoples took over from older populations, forcing them to flee and leaving no trace behind them. While he of course accepted that the arrival of new and 12  Regarding the figure of Nicola Fréret and his ideas, see M. Renard, “Nicolas Fréret et la théorie de l’origine septentrionale des Étrusques”, Latomus, 3 (1939): 84–94; and the more recent C. Grell, C. Volpilhac-Auger (eds.), Nicolas Fréret, légende et vérité. Colloque des 18 et 19 octobre 1991, Clermont-Ferrand (Voltaire Foundation: Oxford, 1994). 13   Recherches sur l’origine et l’ancienne histoire des différents Peuples de l’Italie, in Histoire de l’Académie royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, avec les Mémoires de Littérature tirés des registres de cette Académie (Imprimerie Impériale: Paris, 1753): 72–114. 14  See G. Stenger, Fréret, Maffei et l’origine des anciens peuples de l’Italie (à propos d’une lettre inédite de Fréret), In C. Grell, C. Volpilhac-Auger (eds.), Nicolas Fréret, légende et vérité, (Voltaire Foundation: Oxford, 1994): 131–151. 15  Filippo Venuti was invited in 1739 by Pope Clement XII to become vicar general of the abbey of Clarac, near Bordeaux. Thanks to the backing of Montesquieu he became librarian of the Academy of Bordeaux and in 1743 was elected “correspondant honoraire” of the Académie royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, of which Fréret was secretary. This relationship with the canon made it possible for Fréret to join the Academia Etrusca of Cortona. See D. Briquel, “La questione delle origini etrusche nella Francia dell’Illuminismo” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome—Antiquité, 126–2 (2014): note 23 [on line since 12th December 2014, consulted 4th May 2015].

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successive groups of populations would have resulted in conquest and domination, he vigorously insisted on the concept of “mélange”—that, in other words, this arrival did not result in the complete disappearance of the previous population. In Fréret’s view, every people was the product of a fusion of different components—which he called “layers”—each of which added its own contribution to the formation of future populations. And, in this process of “stratification” of peoples that gave rise to the tableau of the Italian peninsula before the founding of Rome, Fréret, with a strong hint of national pride, attributed an important role to the “Celtic layer”. He thought, in fact, that the Celts had made their appearance in the peninsula before the Pelasgians—the first known people, he believed, who inhabited Greece and who founded several towns in Tuscany—and before the Etruscans. The latter, contrary to what was claimed in Greek and Roman sources, he imagined to be the direct descendants of the Raseni, who had come down from the Rhaetian Alps (from the Tyrol and Trentino regions) to populate the Po valley. This was not all, however. Fréret’s ideas were not themselves wholly original, based largely on views expressed by Simon Pelloutier, pastor of the French church in Berlin and librarian of the Academy of Prussia, in his work entitled Histoire des Celtes,16 published in The Hague in 1710. This was a true monument of national pride, and went through several reprintings before the end of the 18th century. Unsurprisingly, a large part of it was dedicated to Antichi Abitanti d’Italia. At the centre of his argument, Pelloutier placed the Scythians who, in the context of the migration of peoples from East to West, took the name of the Celts and went on to father the peoples of the whole of Europe and, in this specific case, all the populations that occupied the area between the Alps and the Apennines. With reference to the ancient inhabitants of the Italian peninsula, Pelloutier was careful to clarify how the Pelasgians—who he stated to be direct descendants of the Scythians (and therefore of the Celts)—had left their own homeland of Greece to settle in the peninsula’s southern region, which would later be given the name of Magna Grecia. Following on shortly thereafter from Fréret (and Pelloutier), the debate was joined by several “Italian” participants, such as Jacopo Durandi, a young Sabaudian official from Turin and author of the libretto of the opera Hannibal in Turin, which had strong political overtones.17 Very much influenced culturally 16  S. Pelloutier, Histoire des Celtes, et particulierement des Gaulois et des Germains, depuis le Tems fabuleux, jusqu’à la prise de Rome par les Gaulois, (chez Isaac Beauregard: The Hague, 1710). 17  Composed by Giovanni Paisiello, the opera, staged for the 1770–1771 carnival season, recounted the exploits of Taurinia, the ancient settlement that preceded the city of Turin,

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by the French Lumières movement, in 1769 Durandi published his work Saggio sulla Storia degli antichi popoli d’Italia (Essay on the History of the Ancient Peoples of Italy).18 The work was a restatement of Fréret’s research (combined with that author’s ideas derived from Pelloutier) but far narrower in scope. Durandi as well argued that the ancient Italic peoples—the Umbrians, Liburnians, Sicani, Ausoni, Osci, Ligurians and Etruscans—were all of Celtic descent. He differed, however, from the two French academics on the matter of the chronology of the Celts’ expansion westward. Durandi saw their arrival into Italy from the eastern continental region as passing through the Carnic Alps and from there, through the Maritime Alps, into Gaul, populating (in sequence) Provence, the Dauphiné, Savoy, the Iberian peninsula and, only much later, France.19 The evident intention was to emphasise the primacy of the Italic peoples with respect to every other European context, including France, also in terms of their Celtic heritage. In the same year, 1769, the Jesuit Stanislao Bardetti came out with the first of two substantial volumes dealing with Italy’s earliest inhabitants.20 The underlying theme of the work was the desire to link all the peoples of the peninsula to the Celts. In his reconstruction, Bardetti accepted the presence of seven “overseas” colonies that had arrived in Italy in an era preceding the fall of Troy. However, he also stated that these colonies—the most significant of which was identified as that of the Pelasgians—had met, and merged with, Italy’s first inhabitants. And the origin of these inhabitants, he emphasised, was not to be traced back to migration from abroad, as the ancients had established, but rather to the Circumpadana region around the Po, amongst the Ligurian, Umbrian and Taurisci tribes, all of whom were of Celtic-Germanic ancestry. 1769 also saw the publication of the first volume of Delle Rivoluzioni d’Italia (Of the Revolutions of Italy) by abbot Carlo Giovanni Denina who, being Napoleon’s personal librarian, became a member in 1807 of the Académie celtique in Paris. As is known, Denina’s work enjoyed immense popularity over the following decades, perhaps because of its strong conceptual framework. He raised wider questions about the unity of the peninsula, strongly emphasising which heroically resisted the assaults of the Carthaginian Hannibal. In regard to this, see A. Rizzuti, Annibale in Torino: una storia spettacolare, (De Sono: Turin, 2006). 18  J. Durandi, Saggio sulla Storia degli antichi popoli d’Italia, (Stamperia Giambattista Fontana: Turin, 1769). 19  Durandi, Saggio sulla Storia, p. 24. 20  S. Bardetti, De’ primi abitatori dell’Italia. Opera postuma. Parte prima, (Giovanni Montanari: Modena, 1769); S. Bardetti, Della lingua de’ primi abitatori dell’Italia. Opera postuma, (Società Tipografica: Modena, 1772).

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the specificity of the northern regions, which were so significantly different with respect to the rest of the peninsula precisely because of the presence of the Gauls.21 Yet another sturdy work was published around the same time, with the publication of Volterran prelate Mario Guarnacci’s Le Origini Italiche (The Italic Origins). Here, Guarnacci gave the Celtic theories a wide berth.22 The work was a kind of monument celebrating the etruscheria of the first half of the eighteenth century. The underlying theme was the ambition to finally solve the vexata quaestio of the priority of the Etruscan civilization over those of Greece and Rome.23 The result was an extravagant defence of the grandeur of the Etruscans, lords of civilization, ancestors not only of all the Italic peoples but even, indeed, of the Greeks themselves. Guarnacci envisaged the Etruscans as the direct descendants of the Pelasgians, the sons of Cetim, who arrived on the coasts of the peninsula in ancient times. From there, they travelled to Greece, taking with them their art, literature and customs, before finally returning to their “Italian homeland”. In short, Greek (and consequently Roman) civilisation was not, in Guarnacci’s view, the teacher of Etruscan civilization, but rather the student. From Maffei to Guarnacci, from Durandi to Bardetti: whatever the various arguments, it seemed to be a neatly braided circle—a circle that satisfied the requirements of constructing the professorial image of a pre-Roman Italy lavish with ancient wisdom. And it was into this context, in 1803, that Giovanni Fabbroni’s work, Antichi abitatori d’Italia (Ancient inhabitants of Italy) got published. 2. Physicist, chemist, politician, science populiser, and writer, this was how 19th century biographical profiles defined Giovanni Fabbroni. Born in Florence in 1752 to a family from Pistoia,24 Fabbroni was an intellectual who made his 21  C. Denina, Delle Rivoluzioni d’Italia, (Fratelli Reycends: Turin, 1769). 22  M. Guarnacci, Origini Italiche o siano memorie istorico-etrusche sopra l’antichissimo regno d’Italia, e sopra i di lei primi abitatori nei secoli più remoti (Leonardo Venturini: Lucca, 1767–1772, 3 vols). On the subject of Guarnacci’s cultural operation, see Casini, L’antica sapienza italica: 212–217. 23  «Whether Italy was the first to be populated and illuminated by the Science and Arts of the Greeks; or whether on the contrary the Greeks received from the Italic peoples their first Population and the first Seeds of their culture». Guarnacci, Origini Italiche, vol. I: 2. 24  For one amongst many examples, see the profile in E. De Tipaldo, Biografia degli Italiani illustri nelle scienze, lettere e arti del secolo XVIII e de’ contemporanei compilata da letterati italiani di ogni provincia, (Tipografia Alvisopoli: Venice, 1834): vol I. For a reconstruction of the biographical events of Fabbroni’s life, see the Dizionario Biografico degli

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career in public administration, first in the service of Leopold II and then of Napoleon. He was a talented interpretor of the political upheavals of the time and thus he managed to make a place for himself in Tuscan and French institutional life, allowing him to become a political figure. He was a promising young man with a strong vocation—at least in his adolescence—for the natural sciences. Although penniless, Fabbroni received an education under the patronage of an enlightened ruler, Pietro Leopoldo, the Grand Duke of Tuscany. In 1773, he was given a stable position at the Tuscan Court, and he had to organize the Museum of Physics and Natural History in Florence, run by the court physicist, Felice Fontana. Between 1775 and 1779, he made several trips to Paris and London on behalf of the Museum. A lengthy stay in the two capitals enabled him to establish strong links with the most eminent scientists and intellectuals of his day. On his return to Tuscany, he was appointed deputy director of the Museum and soon became a member of the Grand Duke’s intimate circle. This resulted in another visit to Paris in 1798–99 to take part, as representative of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, in the work of the Weights and Measures Commission for the preparation of the metric system. He continued with this assignment, at his express wish, even after the invasion of Tuscany by the French. In those years, his scientific offices ran alongside—and were then supplanted by—his direct involvement in public affairs. He became increasingly involved in reinforcing the image of the Grand Duchy as a reformist, a friend of revolutionary France and, above all, a pacifist. At the beginning of 1799, therefore, Fabbroni published, in French, a propaganda pamphlet, De la Toscane, in which France was presented as the best guarantee against anarchy and public disorder. His scientific and public activity earned Fabbroni a certain notoriety in the ranks of the Directory as well as creating close ties between himself and the intellectual world of French academe—in particular with influential figures of the Institut who, after Brumaire, would come to occupy prominent positions. Contacts such as these would allow Fabbroni to rebuild his career after falling out of favour. Italiani, (Istituto Giovanni Treccani: Rome, 1993): vol. 63 now in http://www.treccani.it/ enciclopedia/giovanni-fabbroni_(Dizionario-Biografico)/ and R. Pasta, Tra politica e pubblica amministrazione: la carriera di Giovanni Fabbroni in età napoleonica (1800–1814) In La Toscana nell’età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica, edited by I. Tognarini, (ESI: Naples, 1985): 89–129. See also the monograph by R. Pasta, Scienza politica e rivoluzione. L’opera di Giovanni Fabbroni (1752–1822) intellettuale e funzionario al servizio dei Lorena (Leo S. Olschki: Florence, 1989).

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For, after his experience at the Weights and Measures Commission, Fabbroni returned to Florence in August 1799 to find the political climate very changed. While the Grand Duchy had been occupied by French troops in March 1799, in May of the same year Austro-Russian forces had invaded Tuscany and thrown out the French. He therefore kept a low profile and cautiously bided his time. After the return of the French (October 1800), until the establishment of the Kingdom of Etruria (February to March 1801), Fabbroni held no official position, but maintained cooperative relations with the French military authorities. Only at the end of 1801 his participation in public life became once again an explicit reality, as between 1802 and 1803 he was called on to be part of the Kingdom’s Economic Deputation. He was awarded the title of honorary professor at the University of Pisa and then appointed head of the Mint, with a mandate to reform the institution, a position he held until his death. Intrigue at court, however, had a negative impact on Fabbroni’s career. With the abolition of the Economic Deputation and, above all, his removal from the position of Museum director, he was sidelined from involvement in administrative affairs. Only the contacts that he had cultivated during his years in Paris (and even more his knack for sensing which way the political wind was blowing, and knowing how to wait for the right moment) helped him once again turn things around. In 1807, Tuscany’s definitive annexation by the French empire, and then the return of the French to Florence, ushered in a new, and highly exploitable, era. The ensuing reorganisation of Tuscany was, in particular, an opportunity not to be missed. Fabbroni therefore made the most of all his acquaintanceships, both with old French friends and with Tuscans in useful positions in Paris, in order to preserve his prerogatives—especially those related to the Mint, which was also threatened with abolition. In 1809, an imperial decree guaranteed its survival and so Fabbroni’s position was safe. However, that was not all: in the summer of 1809, he was called to sit, as “Tuscan” representative, on the benches of the Legislative Council of France. Membership of this legislative body, as was clear to all its nominees, might provide a possible springboard to further advancement. And such, indeed, was the case: in January of 1810 Fabbroni was made a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor, an important first step on the climb towards the higher reaches of imperial public administration. Shortly thereafter, in July, an imperial decree appointed him Head of Roads and Bridges for the Italic départements. This position brought with it access to the State Council, broad jurisdictional powers over the work of prefects—crucial arteries of connection between the periphery of the Empire and its heart—and, alternating with periods of stay in Italy, residence in Paris. In 1812, Fabbroni was rewarded for his services with

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the title of baron and thanks to the explicit political support of the Secretary of State Maret and the Minister of War, Clarke,25 he was nominated Member of the Order of the Reunion. His appointment to the Legislative Council had come directly from Napoleon himself, and responded to a specific need: to carry out as speedily as possible the process of aggregation of the Tuscan départements to the Empire through the recruitment of suitably culturally-equipped personnel, both economically skilled and endowed with great ability (and even greater willingness) in terms of cooperation. Fabbroni’s career made him a perfect choice. Amongst the first to arrive in Paris and make himself available, he immediately set to work to help develop an effective amalgamation between the départements of Tuscany and the main body of the Empire. He re-established communication with his contacts at the Institut and with the learned circles of Paris, diligently striving, through an assiduous network of patronage, to fill key positions in the new French administrative system with skilled and trusted relatives, friends and acquaintances. Fabbroni, in other words (and, like him, many other “Italians”, including those with political pasts that revealed much more markedly ideological leanings towards democracy) proved to be the right man at the right time to pursue Napoleon’s strategy of integration. No abrupt breaking with time-honoured structures, but rather a gradual process of transition guided by apposite figures, who were able to manage the change while respecting customs and traditions and, even more importantly, safeguarding culture. And it is this specific context and time that should perhaps be taken as the proper background for interpreting Fabbroni’s revision of his work, Antichi abitatori d’Italia (The Ancient Inhabitants of Italy), the first edition of which came out in 1803. This new version, however, although made ready for printing, was never published.26 3. In January 1803, the Società degli amatori della Storia patria fiorentina (Society of Enthusiasts for the History of the Florentine Homeland) published a preview of the work that Giovanni Fabbroni would, in just a few months, 25  Fabbroni had had the opportunity to make the acquaintance of these two figures during his first stay in Paris as part of the Weights and Measures Commission. Later, during the years 1801–1805, when he returned to Florence as a private citizen, he was an accommodating host to visiting French dignitaries. See Pasta, Scienza politica e rivoluzione, pp. 563–580. 26  Fabbroni’s copy interleaved with his manuscript notes in the text laid in reproduction of original at the Kress library of Business and Economics, Harvard University.

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have printed by the publisher Ciardetti with the title Antichi abitatori d’Italia. The Society, itself established in that same year, spoke of the «praiseworthy task to compose a new, and illustrate in the light of the most severe Criticism and accurate Philosophy, our Homeland’s History». To this end, as the preface to the preview specified, the Society could not but, with all haste, offer a taste of the work under promotion. And amongst the many «Tuscan Scholars who had conjectured that Florence might boast of its origins in Etruscan times» it was seen fit to start with the work of society member Giovanni Fabbroni, which brought a new and interesting perspective to the theme: The particular examination of that which is due to our homeland has required him to broaden his viewpoint to an even wider extent. His interest is to trace the derivation of the first inhabitants of Italy, to investigate their customs and rites, the vestiges of their speech, their tastes and inclinations, their Arts and thus kindle new flames to illuminate the glory of Etruria, teacher of the Greeks themselves.27 This presentation clearly highlighted what Fabbroni stressed in his introduction. With his work, composed «in the course of a few days and in the even fewer moments left to me by my duties and my various and numerous responsibilities»28—thus in all probability between 1801 and 1802 when, having come to the end of his cautious wait-and-see period, he began once again to participate actively in public life—he intended to reconstruct the origin and culture of Italy’s ancient inhabitants by following parameters of investigation that differed from those of his predecessors. Inspired by the method with which France’s Nicolas Fréret had already experimented, and, above all, by Briton Charles Vallancey’s studies of the grammar of the Celtic language— mother, in his view, of all the ancient tongues29—his aim was to carry out 27   Memorie due lette nella Società degli Amatori della Storia Patria Fiorentina, il dì 9 gennaio 1803, (Leonardo Ciardetti: Florence, 1803): Preface of Derivazione e coltura degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia. Pensieri di Giovanni Fabbroni, pp. III–V. 28  G. Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia. Pensieri di Giovanni Fabbroni indirizzati sotto gli auspici di Miledi Margarita Giovanna Contessa di Mont-Cashell alla Società degli Amici Investigatori della Storia Patria (Leonardo Ciardetti: Florence, 1803): V. 29  Fabbroni referred to Charles Vallancey’s work, A Grammar of the Iberno-Celtic, or Irish Language, (G. Faulkner, T. Ewing and R. Moncrieffe: Dublin 1773), reprinted in 1782 with a substantial essay on the Celtic Language. The theme of the study of Etruscan, and, more generally, of Italic origins, also in terms of a linguistic perspective, had been quite a popular one in the English-speaking world since the 1730s. In 1738, just to give one example, John Swinton, chaplain of the English Factory in Livorno, who had lived for some time in

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a thorough enquiry into the language of the various peoples, and especially into their linguistic affinities. To his contemporaries, the main theme of Fabbroni’s work appeared quite clear. To give just one example, Milanese scholar and politician Luigi Bossi pointed out, in the columns of the Biblioteca italiana, that the author’s thesis emerged plainly from the very first pages: he not only believed that the peninsula had been inhabited since very ancient times, but strongly opposed the opinions of those who held that the Italians, and all their arts and sciences, were descended from the Greeks. Fabbroni, stressed Bossi, did not hesitate to go even further than this, forcefully endorsing the ideas of those who thougt that «peoples more ancient, and very different from the Greeks, lived in Italy before them, and that they had all found Aborigines, or the first Italians».30 Fabbroni’s work begins directly with the word used to name the peninsula by the first foreign colonies that arrived there. It was, in his view, “natural” that the first name given was Abargene—from the Celtic a-barg-in mhe: “land produced by fire”. A name deriving from the aspect the peninsula must once have had in ancient times, given the many volcanoes scattered over its territory. Equally obvious seemed the derivation of the word Aborigeni from Abargene, and the fact that indigenous natives already inhabited the peninsula. However, as he said it immediately, his book could not enter into the merits of the ancient Italic aboriginals without retracing the steps «regarding the

Florence, had printed the dissertation De lingua Etruriae regalis vernacula, (Oxford 1738) in which he tried to reconcile the Egyptian origin of the Etruscans with the Pelasgian theory. A few years later, the seventh volume of Universal History, printed between 1733 and 1744, devoted a great deal of space to the question of Etruscan origins. For a more detailed reconstruction of these points, see Bruni, Origini etrusche origini italiche, 310–311. Bruni himself makes reference to Giuseppe Ricuperati’s work, “Universal History: storia di un progetto europeo. Impostori, storici ed editori nella Ancien part”, Studi Settecenteschi, I (1991): 91–133 and to Guido Abbattista, “The Literary Mill: per una storia editoriale della “Universal History” (1736–1765)”, Studi Settecenteschi, I (1991): 7–90. 30  See L. Bossi, Della Istoria d’Italia antica e moderna, (Giegler: Milan, 1819): 97 where Bossi refers to his observations published «in a volume of the Biblioteca Italiana, which was then printed by the French in Turin». See also Annali Universali di Statistica, economia pubblica, storia, viaggi e commercio, 66 (1840): 173–190 where, following the much-discussed publication of Angelo Mazzoldi’s Delle Origini Italiche e della diffusione dell’incivilimento italiano all’Egitto, alla Fenicia, alla Grecia e a tutte le Nazioni Asiatiche poste nel Mediterraneo (Tipografia Guglielmini and Redaelli: Milan, 1840), Bossi’s reflections on Fabbroni’s 1803 work were published in Italian translation.

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source of our civilisation, the first incursions of foreigners into Italy, and the cradle of that famous people to which is given the name Etruria».31 In this regard, he launched into a lengthy and, in some ways, rather excessive lecture centred around two closely related peoples: the Celts and the Pelasgians. Fabbroni began with the assumption that India, China and Egypt formed the cradle of the first civilisation, since it was well-known that various peoples had flourished along the banks of their rivers and they, out of curiosity, need, ambition and the desire to spread their enlightenment more widely, began to travel «following the star that brings the day».32 Fabbroni, however, focused his attention on India, already divided—as Herodotus had reported—in terms of nations and languages. Having reached the peak of its splendour, four or five of its peoples had embarked on the journey west: the Ethiopians of the Indus valley had headed towards the Nile and the southern coasts of Africa, while the wanderings of the Scythians, Celts, Gauls and Pelasgians had taken them in all directions. The latter tribes, however, and Fabbroni took pains to emphasise this, were, in particular, responsible for the development of civilisation in Europe. He also underlined how these peoples were, originally, one people and that the difference between them was purely a matter of terminology, with the various names they had assumed depending on the regions that they had come to occupy. The Gauls, he said, left their homeland near the Ganges to pass through Tartary, Arabia, Palestine, Asia Minor and Macedonia until they reached «the Celtic Gaul where these peoples settled somewhat, to then flow back into the new Gaul of Italy».33 The solid evidence of these various phases lay in the similarity of the names given to identify places, rivers, mountains, cities and populations, still clearly detectable in all those regions affected by the migration of the Gauls: all the names bore within them a common root with the word Galli.34 The same procedure was useful to document the movements of people in the Altaic region, the Celts, whose name derived from Elti with the addition of the prepositional s’Elt or c’Elt. The Celts had crossed the entire continent to reach the extreme western shores of Europe. They had also occupied Tartary and skirted the Black Sea, moving north to arrive at the Polar Regions 31  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 6. 32  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 8. 33  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 11. 34  On the linguistic derivations of the Gauls, see Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 11–13.

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and south to the Illyrian coast and then the Mediterranean. At last, they came to the Iberian Peninsula, christening it with the name Iberica because it was enclosed between two seas.35 Fabbroni then moved on to investigate the origin of the Pelasgians, the subject of such frequent debate by his contemporaries and compatriots due to the fact they were so «intrinsically involved with our own Etruria».36 He pointed out that thanks to the investigations conducted by eminent British scholars on East India—the reference here being to the work of Michael Symes on the Kingdom of Ava, which, coming out in London in 1800, was then swiftly translated and printed in Paris by the publisher Buisson37—it was by then established that one of the peoples that emigrated from India to the west was called Pal or Pel. This was an ancient people, cultured and educated, but which no longer existed except in the language and writings that served as a sacred text in the Kingdom of Ava itself. It was a nation of great navigators, who had merged together with other peoples. The evidence of these contacts, said Fabbroni, was obvious in the etymology of the word Pelasgi: if the word Osc, which in the Celtic language meant traveller or migrant, was added to the word Pel, then the form Pelosc or Pelasc was obtained.38 The Pelasgians, like the Celts, had moved from the banks of the Indus River in a westerly direction, but, being a seafaring people, had taken different routes, first reaching the shores of Libya and then, after crossing the sea, landing in Italy. In other words, according to Fabbroni’s reconstruction of events, the Celts and Pelasgians, coming from common origins, had met up once again on the peninsula, probably at some halfway point in the region of the Apennines. This encounter gave rise to the Umbrians: a name that, not coincidentally, derived from the Celtic word, Ombri—“compatriots”. But another people too, went on Fabbroni, was descended from that meeting: the Osc—soon to be known as the Tosci or Toscani. Their numbers growing, the Osci founded a new colony beyond the Apennines, towards the western part of the peninsula, in which the town of Capua soon became the richest and most important settlement. The need to distinguish the original colony from 35  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 11–14. 36  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 14. 37  M. Symes, An Account of an embassy to the kingdom of Ava sent by the governor general of India in the year 1795, (G. and W. Nicol: London, 1800) trad. Fr. Relation de l’ambassade Anglaise envoyée en 1795 dans le royame d’Ava, en l’empire de Birmans, (Buisson: Paris, a. IX [1800]). 38  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 15.

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this new domain led to the former’s inhabitants being defined by the prefix of Aiter (Father in Celtic). And thus Fabbroni’s purpose was achieved: the original colony, whose ancestors could be traced back to both the Celts and the Pelasgians, came to be called Aiteroschi, a name which would then in turn evolve into Etruschi— the Etruscans.39 Fabbroni’s cultural operation did not stop there, however. The Etruscans, bore in their genes the characters of their Celtic and Pelasgian progenitors. So the populace led a double life: as peaceful and skilful cultivators, which earned them the distinctive name of Tiremh or Tirreni, (“farmers” in the Celtic language), their agricultural products combined with their navigational abilities (deriving, said Fabbroni, from their Pelasgian forefathers) offered them the great advantage of being able to trade with the different peoples that fringed the Mediterranean, allowing them to become a flourishing and powerful community.40 Nevertheless, the Etruscans also derived from the Pelasgians a certain “war-like” propensity that led them on continuous expeditions abroad with the aim of conquering and colonising new territories around the Mediterranean and even beyond the Pillars of Hercules. So they founded colonies in Corsica, in Sardinia, in the Ionian Sea, in Lydia, in Asia Minor, and in the Aegean sea, on the island of Lesbos.41 This was the keystone of Fabbroni’s argument: all those features, he believed, only served to prove the primacy of the Etruscans, even in relation to the Greeks, in terms of «every form of practice and knowledge».42 He also pointed out that the Pelasgians of Greece and of Thessaly spoke a language similar to that of the Pelasgians who still lived to the north of the famous Etruscan city of Cortona.43 Historical commonplace, therefore, had to be overturned. While it was true, as the ancients said, that the Pelasgian populace had passed from Greece to the Italic peninsula, this only took place after it had already established itself in Italy and after having contributed to the foundation of such a flourishing civilization as that of the Etruscans.

39  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 20–22. 40  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 40–42. 41  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 40–42. 42  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 49. 43  Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 46.

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The following pages focused on the primacy of the Etruscans in the arts, in literature, in wealth, in invention, in luxury and in magnificence.44 The Etruscans, in other words, were direct descendants of the Celts and the Pelasgians, and were second to no one, certainly not to the Greeks, who were their students even in the field of religion. For the Greek gods, too, were of foreign origin: while their names meant nothing in the Greek language, they found a plausible etymology only in the Celtic tongue, which arrived in Greece through the Etruscans.45 This was the demonstration, wrote Fabbroni, of the absolute anteriority of culture in Italy, and especially in Etruria (and thus his native Tuscany), which had fostered the arts long before the Greeks and dragged ancient Rome out of barbarism. And, more than all this, it was also clear evidence of the ingratitude of those Greek, and indeed Roman, “students”, whose youth had found religion, art, science, arms and populace there in Tuscany. Fabbroni’s thesis thus appears perfectly in harmony with the cultural climate of Tuscany. This aimed to praise, in the context of Italic antiquity, the primacy of the Etruscan civilization, and, even more—beyond the definitive institutional and political handover from the Grand Duchy of Lorraine to the Bourbonic Kingdom of Etruria—to claim, or rather, continue to claim, as in the past, its own cultural role in the Italian panorama. Fabbroni did not hesitate to make use of promptings from France, in particular from those intellectuals who, throughout the Directory period, had held firm to the value of Celtic antiquity. After the events of Brumaire, they had been called back thanks to the policy of ralliement implemented by the First Consul. Bonaparte was indeed a master at scooping up ideas (and men) from very different contexts and refashioning them in order to make them instrumental to his projects. One excellent demonstration of this was his official redeployment of Celtism through the birth, in 1804, of the Académie celtique—an assembly of scholars, many of them with political pasts that were markedly democratic in tendency. His intention was to illuminate the Celtic world in order to provide cultural support to the new political order, thus celebrating the glories of the past, present (and future) of France.46

44  Regarding Etruscan primacy and originality in relation to the Greeks, see Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 34–39; 44–46. 45  On the derivation of the Greek gods from Etruscan divinities, Fabbroni, Degli Antichi abitatori d’Italia, 40–42. 46  On the general climate that led to the establishment of the Académie Celtique and its political significance, see A. De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. The Cultural

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It was, perhaps, this very propensity in the direction of cultural rediscovery and rehabilitation that may have convinced Fabbroni (who had already given sign of his skill in the interpretation of change) to go back to his Antichi abitatori d’Italia. It is not known exactly when Fabbroni decided to take up his work once again and it is immediately worth pointing out that he brought no revisions to it in terms of argument. This, in fact, he promptly reinforced, through careful work of specification and addition, especially in the apparatus of notes. But it is the editions of the works cited in terms of integration or support in relation to those already listed in the 1803 edition that suggest that this revision dates back to the time when Fabbroni, removed from his post as director of the Museum of Florence through court intrigue, was re-establishing contact with the world of intellectual Paris and creating the preconditions for his future public career in imperial France. This period, as already mentioned, ended with his appointment to the Legislative Council and decisive transfer to the French capital. It certainly does not seem coincidental that the majority of the work involving the bibliographical apparatus refers back to the first editions of French translations of foreign texts—prevalently English—published between 1804 and 1809 and all still preserved today in the National Library in Paris. It has been said how, in its first edition, Fabbroni’s work had already obviously been influenced by the cultural influences emanating from France and which would later be consecrated by the Académie celtique. He too felt that the centrality continually assigned to the Greek-Roman world was a powerless idea; and he too attributed the dawn of primordial civilisation to the Celts. However—and here he stood alone—his vision linked the Celts together with the Pelasgians: two peoples that, originating in the same area, the banks of the Indus River, had contributed so greatly to the building of Western civilisation. Moreover, Fabbroni’s alignment on French cultural trends went even further. He also greatly admired—although he also partly reinterpreted them— ideas produced by members of the Institut National, especially the famous Orientalist Charles François Dupuis. Between 1799 and 1801, Dupuis had submitted two reports on the ancient Pelasgians in which he described their origins in ancient Egypt and Ethiopia and emphasised Greek civilisation’s indebtedness towards them.47

Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796–1803, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013): 29–35. 47  Ch.F. Dupuis, Mémoires sur le Pelasges, in Mémoires de l’Institut national de sciences et arts. Littérature et beaux arts, (Baudoin: Paris, fructidor an VII [September 1799]) : t. II, 44–116

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In his revisions, Fabbroni reiterated, and gave emphasis to, all of these aspects. To this end, he introduced two types of addition: linguistic, in order to prove the derivations of names, place names and words commonly used in the Celtic tongue; and explanatory, in order to further illustrate the Eastern origins of the Celts and Pelasgians, and therefore of the Etruscans. From frontispiece to endnotes, Fabbroni was determined to stress the validity of the method of linguistic investigation: the affinity of languages, he wrote, was the foremost indication in terms of judging the origin of nations. This affirmation came from English linguist Robert Sheringham, and was in turn taken verbatim from the work by Scottish author John Pinkerton, A Dissertation on the Origin and Progress of the Scythians or Goth, printed in 1787. Fabbroni says explicitly that he referred to this work in its French translation of 1804, revised and expanded by the author.48 Hence, his addition to the first edition notes of long, carefully compiled lists of linguistic similarities designed to prove that the origin of certain Etruscan, Latin and Greek terms—from the most common to the most precise—lay in the tongue of the eastern Celts.49 However, Fabbroni also made use of Pinkerton’s work in order to reject the arguments of the Biblical school and, in contrast, to reaffirm the validity of

and Ch. F. Dupuis, Second mémoire sur les Pelasges. De l’origine de ce peuple, (Baudoin: Paris, prairial an IX [May 1801]): t. III, 37–140. 48  J. Pinkerton, A Dissertation on the Origin and Progress of the Scythians or Goths. Being an Introduction to the ancient and modern History of Europe, (John Nicols: London, 1787); Recherches sur l’origine et le divers établissements des Scythes ou Goths, Servant d’Introduction à l’Histoire ancienne et moderne de l’Europe; accompagnées de plusieurs éclaircissemens sur la Géographie ancienne de cette partie du monde. Ouvrage traduit sur l’original Anglois avec des augmentations et des corrections faites par l’Auteur et une carte du monde connu des anciens, (De l’imprimerie de la République: Paris, an XII [1804]). 49  See, in this regard, the cogent work of integration involving the etymological derivations of the names of places, mountains, rivers, cities on pages 18, 25, 36, 37. The Additional Notes are perhaps even more relevant, where Fabbroni emphatically points out that «a criterion, one that is certainly not deceptive, to deduce the permanent home of foreign peoples in any region whatsoever, is to find repeated there the names already employed to distinguish the various existing places of their ancient homeland». This careful work of correlation and clarification follows on methodologically from Pinkerton’s ideas in part II of his book regarding the origin of the Germanic peoples (See J. Pinkerton, Recherches sur l’origine et le divers établissemens des Scythes ou Goth, II Partie, chap. II: Le Germanins étoinet Scythes. Première grande preuve, tirée de l’identité du lungage; chap. III: Le Germanins étoinet Scythes. Deuxième grande preuve, tirée du témoignage des anciens écrivains; chap. IV: Le Germanins étoinet Scythes. Troisième grande preuve, tirée de la similitude des moeurs, 168–247).

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the Celtic and Orientalist school.50 The examples given by his fellow Florentine Antonio Francesco Gori and the Neapolitan scholar Alessio Mazzocchi regarding the eastern origin of the Pelasgians (and Etruscans), already included in the first edition, were thus strengthened and integrated with notes taken from Pinkerton’s text and ancient and modern sources to which the Scottish antiquarian had also alluded. Herodotus and, above all, Dionysius of Halicarnassus51—to mention only two examples—were thus called into play to bolster the thesis on the origins of the Pelasgians. Modern authors referred to, on the other hand, who could provide evidence from an Orientalist perspective, included Louis Petit Radel’s discussions of Pinkerton’s ideas,52 the writings of Thomas Maurice in Indian Antiquities53—where Indian civilisation was compared to that of Persia, Egypt and Greece—and Michael Symes on the Kingdom of Ava.54 50  Fabbroni reinforced his arguments concerning the oriental origin of the Etruscans by referring extensively to the first part of Pinkerton’s work. This was dedicated to the reconstruction of the eastern origins, the identity and customs and the advances made by the Scythians, Goths and Pelasgians. Even more relevant in Fabbroni’s view were the pages relating to the movement of these peoples from their oriental territories to the Mediterranean coast. See in particular the references to Chapter IV of the French translation: Établissemens des Scythes ou Goths dans l’Occident, entre le Pont-Euxin et la Méditerranée, 68–141. 51  From Pinkerton, Fabbroni took references to Herodotus regarding the oriental provenance of the Pelasgians and their movement towards the coasts of Greece and the Mediterranean in general. See, for example, respectively, Fabbroni’s additions on pages 15–16 taken from Part I, Chapter IV of Pinkerton’s work, in particular pp. 86–89, 107. Fabbroni used Pinkerton’s observations regarding the work of Dionysius of Halicarnassus about Pelasgians movement towards the coasts of the peninsula. See, for example, his additions on pages 15, 46, 52, 59 and 79, drawn from Part I, Chapter IV of Pinkerton’s work, in particular pages 119–120. 52  L. Petit Radel, Observations critiques de M. Louis Petit-Radel sur un ouvrage intitulé «Recherches sur l’origine et les divers établissements des Scythes ou Goths» traduit sur l’original anglais de M. J. Pinkerton, s.d. [but 1804/5]. 53  Th. Maurice, Indian antiquities: or, dissertations, relative to the ancient geographical divisions, the pure system of primeval theology, the grand code of civil laws, the original form of government, and the various and profound literature, of Hindostan. Compared, throughout, with the religion, laws, government, and literature, of Persia, Egypt, and Greece, (printed for the author and sold by W. Richardson: London, 1794–1801). 54  M. Symes, An Account of an embassy to the kingdom of Ava sent by the governor general of India in the year 1795, (G. and W. Nicols: London, 1800), trad. Fr. Relation de l’ambassade Anglaise envoyée en 1795 dans le royame d’Ava, en l’empire de Birmans, (Buisson: Paris, a. IX [1800]).

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4. What considerations can be drawn, then, regarding Fabbroni’s particular cultural operation, and which interesting aspects can be highlighted? In the second edition of his Antichi abitatori d’Italia—prepared for publication, as the detailed index of manuscript materials reveal, but never given to the press—Fabbroni essentially reiterated arguments already put forward in the first edition. His insistence on the Celtic origin of the Etruscan language and on the eastern provenance of the Etruscan people’s ancestors represented an original way to fall into line with the etruscheria that, in Lorraine Tuscany, dominated the cultural field. His versions of the genealogies of Pelasgians and Etruscans also significantly contributed to the encouragement of dynastic pride, at a municipal, if not always patriotic, level. Moreover, his writing and revisions show themselves to be very much in harmony with the cultural climate north of the Alps and the pressure exerted by imperial France. Bonaparte—Napoleon now—was a past master at selecting ideas and theories from a variety of different contexts, reformulating them, and making them his own. He had reclaimed, and held firm to, the value of Celtic antiquity in order to legitimise, from a cultural perspective, his project to create and uphold a French hegemony in Europe—a recourse to a longpast indigenous tradition that, as has recently been pointed out, was intended to cancel any French debt to a history marked by other (Greek and Roman) primacies.55 Nevertheless, Fabbroni did not seem wholly committed to giving his unconditional support to a French cultural hegemony—unlike some of his fellow Italians, for example, such as the Celtist Carlo Denina.56 Thanks to the French empire and to his own astute personal opportunism, Fabbroni had managed to recycle himself and make the most of his skills as a long-standing Grand Ducal functionary. However, his writings and, perhaps even more, his revisions, while perfectly in line with the French way of thinking, also demonstrated a slightly chauvinistic—or perhaps nostalgic—tendency to exalt an ancient past in which Etruscan (and hence, Tuscan) primacy was a marked feature in the peninsula’s cultural landscape.

55  See once more De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 32–34. 56  Regarding the figure of Carlo Denina, see A. Marcone, “I libri Sull’Italia antica delle Rivoluzioni d’Italia di Denina”, Rivista Storica Italiana, 112 (2000): 1072–1093; G. Recuperati, “Ipotesi su Carlo Denina storico e comparatista”, Rivista Storica Italiana, 113 (2001): 107– 137; on his becoming a member of the Académie celtique, see Mémoires de l’Académie Celtique, 1 (1807): 3 and also Antonino De Francesco’s comments in The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 55–56.

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This vision of Fabbroni’s—which is diligently reemphasised in the revisions he brought to his work—may perhaps allow us to add a further element to our understanding of his character. It cannot be said say that his adherence to the Empire, the source of his great career opportunities, and to the Imperial cultural model, was not total. However, neither is it impossible understand the totality of the message that he intended to convey. Essentially, Fabbroni took the French political-cultural project and adapted it to his own particular “Tuscan” requirements. The reasons for this adherence, therefore, might also be sought in the occasions that the Empire could represent for a Tuscan, as an organic and functional part of that Empire. The Napoleonic political model—or rather the federal political system with which Bonaparte had justified the imperial solution, and of which Tuscany, and the Italian peninsula in general, were an integral part—in terms of Fabbroni’s logic, made it possible to carry on the Leopoldine tradition in which he had so earnestly believed. It was a model that brought with it an ideal of “good governance” that would help to ensure administrative efficiency—one that could guarantee the tutelage of order and civil progress, and to uphold, and even reinvigorate, the social, productive and cultural configuration of Tuscany (now one of the Empire’s départements).57 It is with this context in mind, then, that the Tuscan Fabbroni’s adherence to the French imperial order should be understood. His intellectual operation takes on particular significance in such a framework, broad enough to admit an indebtedness to Celtic progenitors (meaning France) but also to exalt an ancient past where Etruscan—and, therefore, Tuscan and, therefore, Italian— primacy was a vitally distinctive element. 57  In regard to this, see Pasta, Tra politica e pubblica amministrazione, 125–126.

CHAPTER 2

Local Pride, Ethnicity and Ancient History in Turin in the Risorgimento: The Representation of the Taurisci/Taurini in Carlo Promis’ Storia dell’Antica Torino (1869) Filippo Carlà-Uhink The Taurini, the pre-Roman population that occupied the area north of the Po and from which the Roman colony of Augusta Taurinorum, today Torino, took its name, were already a problematic issue for the ancient authors. The Latin sources are particularly confused when defining their relationship with the nearby populations of the Liguri (problematic as well) and of the Celts, such as the Insubri. An additional “difficulty”, for the Roman authors, was provided by the name itself, similar to the name of the Taurisci, which were located at the opposite end of the Alpine arch.1 Historians of the Antiquity have only realized recently that ethnicity should not be considered, from an essentialist perspective, as a natural “given”, but rather as a cultural construct and as a part of a complex set of segmented identities, meaning that etic and emic perspectives on ethnicity can be very different. For example, it is now clear that the Roman descriptions and definitions of ethnical belonging of the groups inhabiting Italy “before” them are a litmus of Roman perspectives, discourses and ideologies, and should not be taken as factual information, that could be applied automatically to the forms of selfrepresentation of the groups described. Until recently, scholars had another approach to this set of contradictory and problematic sources as they were looking for “the” objective and natural Taurin ethnicity and identity. They would systematically adopt and adapt those to their own specific convictions, ideologies, and needs, while postulating a continuity through the centuries between the pre-Roman population which resided in Piedmont and all the subsequent inhabitants of the area. In this chapter, I aim to show how Carlo Promis, the leading ancient historian in 1  On the Taurisci, see now M. Guštin, I Taurisci. Un popolo celtico tra l’Adriatico e la Pannonia, In F. M. Gambari (ed.), Taurini sul confine. Il Bric San Vito di Pecetto nell’Età del Ferro (Celid: Turin, 2008): 21–31, defining them South-Eastern Celts.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004335424_004

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Turin around the mid-19th century CE, dealt with the Taurini and their ethnicity, linking his treatment of the subject to his political ideas. It is not merely a case study—Promis a staunch opposer of a very specific cultural, scientific and political background, the Italian Risorgimento. His major work, Storia dell’antica Torino (1869), saluted by Theodor Mommsen as a work of very high quality,2 is a history of the city which led the movement of national unification and which had become, a few years before, in 1861, the first capital of the Kingdom of Italy, before it became Florence in 1864. A great number of scholars, when considering the historiography on this matter, have assumed that the political movement towards national unification imposed a teleological reading of the Roman conquest of Italy, which, starting from the contemporary rhetoric of the Nation States, recognized also in Classical Antiquity the existence of an Italian nation. If works of this sort did exist, it also has been recently shown that they mostly originated from Germany (the other nation to undergo a process of national unification during the 1860’s). They became widespread in Italy later, most notably during the nation-building process of the early 20th century. Additionally, it is impossible to assume that each and every intellectual in that period was in favor of Italian unification as it was carried out, the process being very different from the ideals of the 1840s for instance.3 A deeper analysis of Promis’ work will help clarify the varied “uses of the past” which characterized the Italian mid-19th century, as well as its participation in a broader European discourse, and its “reception” in the 20th century, when some particular political opinions had become “unconceivable”. In order to achieve that, I will first of all concentrate on the Taurini and on the very few ancient sources available, and which have been used by all scholars dealing with the subject. I will then present the Piedmontese historiography of the 19th century, the frame in which afterwards will be introduced Carlo Promis and his work. Eventually, I will analyze and explain his ideas about the ethnicity of the Taurini and their relationship to Rome.

2  S. Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “capitale degli studi seri”. Carteggio Thedor Mommsen—Carlo Promis (Celid: Turin, 2014): n. 9, 144. 3  A. De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. The Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796–1943 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013): 16–17.

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1

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The Taurini

The Taurini, as the nearby Liguri, are a particularly challenging pre-Roman population because of the relative scarcity of sources, literary as well as archaeological, available. It is certain that Taurini was a name used by the ancient group living in central Piedmont to describe themselves, considering that, following a common pattern in Roman name-giving, the colony founded here at the end of the 1st century BCE was called Augusta Taurinorum. But their extension, their relationship with all the neighboring populations, such as the Salassi, the Insubri, the Ligures or the Bagienni, are extremely difficult to grasp. In the complete lack of emic sources, in which the Taurini “speak about themselves”, even the etic view of the Taurini from the Roman side is absolutely not consistent. To say that ancient sources are scarce is to say the least. They tell us that the Taurini had one (and apparently only one) urban center, which was besieged by Hannibal in 218 BCE,4 and is today identified, but without any certainty, as the old Rocca di Po, under today’s city of Turin.5 In the 2nd century BCE, Cato defines the Salassi and the Lepontii, two nearby groups, as Taurisci—a name that, as already mentioned, defines a population living at the Eastern end of the Alps, too.6 Cato seems therefore to imply that Taurini, Salassi and Lepontii are all members of the same ethnicity, which is the same as the Eastern Taurisci’s. And since the Lepontii are unequivocally considered to be Celts, he seems to define all of them as Celts.7 In the same period, Polybius uses indifferently the names Taurisci and Taurini, locating them geographically near the Agones and the Salassi; while it is unclear whether the Salassi and the Taurini are related, the latter seem to be Ligurians.8 Later sources deny that the Taurini were Celts, too: Livy calls them “Semigalli”,9 and generally in the Augustan period they are rather considered to be Ligurians, as Strabo clearly calls the Taurini Ligurians.10 The problem in this context is that the Ligurians are also sometimes considered to be Celts and sometimes not. Pliny the Elder, 4  Polyb. 3.60; Liv. 21.39; App., Hann. 5, calling it Taurasia. 5  F. M. Gambari, Taurisci e Taurini in Piemonte: fonti storiche e archeologia in F. M. Gambari (ed.), Taurini sul confine. Il Bric San Vito di Pecetto nell’Età del Ferro (Celid: Turin, 2008): 39–41. 6  Cat., Orig. 2.7 Chassignet. 7  According to Gambari, Taurisci e Taurini, 34, Cato would use the name Taurisci to indicate all the Celtic speaking groups of the Alps, to distinguish them from the Raeti. 8  Polyb. 2.15.8; 34.10.18. 9  Liv. 21.38.5. 10  Strab. 4.6.6.

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investigating the language of the Taurini, denies that they either speak Ligurian or the language of the other cisalpine Celts, such as the Insubri,11 even if he calls Augusta Taurinorum a city of ancient Ligurian stock.12 It is therefore clear that the Roman definition of the ethnicity of the Taurini was shifting, as it can be expected of any discourse so deeply embedded in political, cultural and social structures. Such shifts took place in connection to the Roman definition of an “Italian community” of populations related by blood as well as by mores, which, starting with the Second Punic War, were presented always more as the “nearest relatives” of Rome, and the most familiar form of “Alterity”.13 Since the Ligurians were not always considered as part of this community, and the Celts were always perceived as an absolute Alterity, such changes in the definition of the ethnicities suggest a will of including or excluding specific groups, as the Taurini, in a “list of civilized populations”—or at least in a list of populations which could be civilized by Roman influence. In the Augustan age, the organization of the Augustan regions could have been the main reason for “uniting” the Taurini and the Ligurians.14 Nonetheless, later, Appian, who might have read older sources, defines once more the city of the Taurini as Celtic (Hann. 5). The desire to exclude the Celts from the “Italic community” is made explicit by Roman narratives about their arrival in Italy. Since they could not be accepted as autochthonous, they would have invaded it at the beginning of the 4th century BCE, coming from the other side of the Alps and chasing the previous inhabitants. This narrative has been accepted for a very long time by the historians, and is sometimes still found today in academic works. However, it is demonstrable that it is actually a Roman narrative invention covering much more complicated phenomena of influence, migration and acculturation.15 What has been noted is that the Taurini are absent from the “list” of the Celtic population that would have invaded Italy in this Roman narrative. While this is 11  Gambari, Taurisci e Taurini, 36. 12  Plin., NH 3.123. 13  On the Roman construction of this Italic identity, see F. Carlà-Uhink, The “Birth” of Italy: The Institutionalization of Italy as a Region in the Roman Republic (3rd–1st century BCE) forthcoming. 14  As admitted as a possibility by Gambari, Taurisci e Taurini, 36, even if he suggests other, less convincing, possibilities for this “absorption” of the Taurini into the Ligurians. 15  J. H. C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon. Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001): 75–79; S. Bourdin, Les peuples de l’Italie préromaine (Ècole française de Rome: Rome, 2012): 597–600; R. Häussler, Becoming Romans? Diverging Identities and Experiences in Ancient Northwest Italy (Left Coast Press:Walnut Creek, 2013): 81–87.

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probably connected, once again, to Roman discourses of inclusion and exclusion, it has often been used as proof by scholars that the Taurini had already “arrived” in the region where their presence was attested before the supposed big invasions of the 4th century.16 Studies on the ethnicity of the ancient Taurini, as all studies of ancient ethnicity, very often reveal a series of postulates which, once understood in their complete extent, reveal how weak is any kind of hypothesis in this field. Not only do we have only Greek and Roman, and therefore etic, descriptions of such groups, while emic descriptions, even when they are available (e.g. in the form of inscriptions) are scarce, very short and extremely hard to interpret. Less obvious, but still underlying most of the literature, is an essentialist conception of ethnicity, coupled with the idea that ethnicity is “brought” from somewhere (an idea against which Pallottino already fought when writing about the “origin of the Etruscans”). Scholars often also assume that ethnicity motivates political decisions. Therefore, an alliance or a war can be used to prove ethnic belonging, since members of “related ethnical groups” or perceived as such would never have waged war against each other. Finally, it is common to think that since we do not have more precise information there is a definable set of “common practices” which can define an ethnicity. It is not Kossinna’s material culture but it is the concept of “typical behavior” or “typical strategy” which allows to “recognize” ethnical groups. In the case of the Taurini, for instance, they might be considered ethnically connected to the Eastern Taurisci because they both are always allied with the Boi and because they always founded a city at the furthest point reached in their “invasions” (Turin, Tauranum near Belgrade and Aquileia).17 2

Piedmontese Historiography in the 19th Century

Therefore, even the most recent research is not exempt of essentialist readings of ancient ethnicities, and it always revolves around the same few sources, which were already available to those who tried to discuss the history of the Taurini in the 19th century, in a completely different political context. Indeed, in Italy, the development of the national movement in this century led to a discussion over the peninsula’s history from the perspective of what came to be conceived as the natural and cultural unity of the Italian nation, to justify, both during and afterwards this period, the political struggles for the realization of a 16  Gambari, Taurisci e Taurini, 37–38. 17  Gambari, Taurisci e Taurini, 37.

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unified country. Italy went substantially through the process of creation of its “imagined community”, to adopt Benedict Anderson’s terminology. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that Antiquity did not represent the only, and probably not even the main, point of discussion in this period—in a way similar to that played by the Visigothic kingdom in Spain and the Frankish one in France, it was the Lombard period which was the object of a wide debate all over the country.18 Rome was perceived more as the “big Empire”, and the “unification of Italy” realized by it was not seen as separate and distinguished from the further conquest of the rest of the Empire. The idea of an “Italian unification” under the aegis of Rome was bound to grow, and even to become a sort of historiographical paradigmatic model, also in Italian scholarship, but it originated in Germany. In the political context of the unification of the German States and of the foundation of the Second Reich (1871), it was Theodor Mommsen who presented the image of the peninsula’s unification which will slide back to Italian historiography mostly through Ettore Pais and shortly afterwards through Gaetano De Sanctis and dominate the early 20th century.19 The 19th century had been much more varied than scholarship has generally thought. In the 18th century, indeed, Italy had known a huge development of local historiographical traditions, which could appear inconsistent with the national movement. The historiography of that period represented Roman Italy as a federation of autonomous communities, every time underlining the contribution and the antiquity of single regions.20 These traditions were not sacrificed to the national ideal and hence did not disappear in the course of the 19th century. De Francesco has well shown how the model of Italian diversity survived the Risorgimento, and which role Micali, with his attention to this diversity, played in influencing the historiography of the 19th century.21 At the same time, such diversity was not only a past phenomenon, it was still very much present in methodological approaches and in historiographical research. Already in 1985 Romagnani has noted that we should not be misled 18  On the Lombard debate, in specific reference to Piedmont, G. P. Romagnani, Storiografia e politica culturale nel Piemonte di Carlo Alberto (Deputazione subalpina di storia patria: Turin, 1985): 235–272. 19  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 159–180. 20  N. Terrenato, The Romanization of Italy: Global Acculturation or Cultural Bricolage? in C. Forcey – J. Hawthorne – R. Witcher (eds.) TRAC 97, (OUP: Oxford, 1998): 20–21; G. Firpo, Roma, Etruschi e Italici nel ‘secolo senza Roma’, In G. Urso (ed.), Patria diversis gentibus una? Unità politica e identità etniche nell’Italia antica (Ets: Pisa, 2008): 267–304. 21  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 51–83.

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by the success of the political struggle for national unity and, even more, by the complete domination of this field of study by Benedetto Croce’s History of the Italian Historiography in the XIX Century (1920), which oversimplified the historiographical scene in a division between “neoguelfi” and “neoghibellini” and obscured “the deep regional differences inherited from diverse cultural and political traditions”.22 The Piedmontese tradition itself has been quite neglected until now in favor of studies about historiography in Lombardy or in Southern Italy mainly because of this focus on the “neoguelf-neoghibellin” alternative. The intellectual tradition of the Reign of Sardinia, the political entity that managed in the end to complete the unification of the peninsula, so that the kings of the Savoy dynasty became the kings of Italy, is very hard to depict in such simplified dualistic terms. This depended not only on specific local traditions, deriving from the previous century, but also on the fact that Piedmont represented in those years the main point of contact with German scholarship in the entire peninsula,23 and the point of entrance in the Italian tradition of German theory and methodology. We will see how Promis played a pivotal role in this sense. A “Piedmontese historiography”, marked by a strong “piemontesism” was born in the age of King Carlo Alberto (1831–1848), the main political force behind the “First Independence War” of 1848–1849. In this time, the “Piedmontese historiography”, represented by a quite homogeneous group of authors,24 struggled between the strength of the local traditions and the “slow, but constant identification of a new, ‘national’ role for Piedmont”,25 discussing as central topic the Italianness of the Savoy dynasty, which was considered by some as belonging to the “French” nation and therefore unapt to 22  Romagnani, Storiografia e politica culturale, xvi. See also G. Ricuperati, Lo stato sabaudo e la storia da Emanuele Filiberto a Vittorio Amedeo II. Bilancio di studi e prospettive di ricerca, In Atti del convegno Studi sul Piemonte: Stato attuale, metodologie e indirizzi di ricerca (Centro Studi Piemontesi: Turin, 1980): 20–22; M. Fubini Leuzzi, Metodi e temi della ricerca storica promossa in Piemonte prima e dopo l’Unità, In I. Cotta – R. M. Tolu (eds.), Archivi e storia nell’Europa del XIX secolo. Alle radici dell’identità culturale europea (Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Cultuali: Rome 2006): 863–864. 23  Romagnani, Storiografia e politica culturale, xxii; L. Cracco Ruggini, “Eloquenza, antiquitates e storia antica in Piemonte, dal primo Ottocento alla vigilia della Seconda Guerra Mondiale”, Memorie della Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche dell’Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, s. 9, 13 (2001): 181–184; S. Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “la città dei grandi ingegni”, In S. Giorcelli Bersani (ed.), Carlo Promis e Theodor Mommsen: Cacciatori di Pietre fra Torino e Berlino (Hapax: Turin, 2015): 29–31. 24  Romagnani, Storiografia e politica culturale, xxiii. 25  Ricuperati, Lo stato sabaudo, 22.

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push forward the process of unification of the peninsula.26 As formulated by Ricuperati, this Piedmontese historiography was characterized by a very strong cult of the State, a very cautious moderatism, a cautious reformism, a great fear of popular movements, and a systematic use of the past as a way of guiding “top-down” political decisions.27 In this age, also the studies of ancient history were revolutionized, as demonstrated, for instance, by the opening, in 1848, of the first chair of Ancient History and Archaeology at the University of Turin.28 Carlo Alberto was and is considered in particular to represent the political and “active” side of an idea, “neoguelfism”, which was defeated, like him, in 1849. It had to give place to a completely different model, but which still is consi­ dered, according to Croce’s model, to have represented one of the two possible alternatives in historical writing at that time. The neoguelf project, as formulated by Vincenzo Gioberti, aimed at the creation of a federal State of Italy, from which every “foreign” influence would be excluded, and all local powers would stay in their place, inside a “light” frame that the Pope would have topped. This was a widespread political ideal in the years leading to the First Independence War, and at least in its general formulation it was shared by Carlo Alberto of Savoy and by Carlo Promis as well.29 Promis, architect,30 ancient historian, epigraphist, was born in Turin in 1808 from a “traditionalist” family, which was very respectful and obedient to the royal dynasty of the Savoy.31 After graduating in architecture in 1828 he moved to Rome for eight years, until 1836, where he developed both his professional activity and his interest for epigraphy and archaeology, publishing a book on the antiquities of Alba Fucens.32 In these years he works and is friend with Luigi Canina, through whom he enters in contact with the German “method”. Later, he shall 26  Romagnani, Storiografia e politica culturale, xxii–xxiii. On Carlo Alberto’s engagement with the funding of historical research, see also V. Fasoli, “Momenti di cultura nazionale e internazionale nell’opera dell’architetto torinese”, Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino, 89 (1991), 289. 27  Ricuperati, Lo stato sabaudo, 23–24. On historiography in this time in Piedmont, see also M. Fubini Leuzzi, “Gli studi storici in Piemonte dal 1766 al 1846: politica culturale e coscienza nazionale”, Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino, 20 (1983): 113–192. 28  Cracco Ruggini, “Eloquenza, antiquitates”, 161–193. On the studies in the period of Carlo Alberto, see also Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “capitale degli studi seri”, pp. 28–29. 29  V. Fasoli, L’insegnamento dell’architettura in Carlo Promis, In V. Fasoli – C. Vitulo (eds.), Carlo Promis. Professore di Architettura civile agli esordi della cultura politecnica (Celid: Turin, 1993): 29. 30  On Promis’ activity as an architect and a professor at the faculty of architecture, see Fasoli – Vitulo (eds.), Carlo Promis. Professore di Architettura. 31  M. A. Levi, Carlo Promis, BSBS 36 (1934): 403. 32  Promis 1836.

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push those contacts with Germany, and particularly with Berlin, further than Canina, giving into the traditional openness of Piedmont towards Prussia.33 His intellectual formation took therefore place in the first half of the 19th century and came to completion in that age of Carlo Alberto which was so central in the development of Piedmontese “Romantic” historiography.34 Back in Turin, he became professor of architecture, and additionally corresponding member of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut in 1836, Ispettore dei Monumenti di Antichità nei Regi Stati (a new position created for him) in 1837,35 Royal Archaeologist (another new title introduced only for him) in 1839, member of the Accademia delle Scienze di Torino in 1842. Once again, these new charges reveal the king’s interest in the study of the Piedmontese past,36 as well as the connection and the deep trust binding him to Carlo Promis. Promis became over the years the main correspondent of Theodor Mommsen regarding the Roman antiquities of the region, and a collaborator to the realization of the fifth volume of the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. Mommsen addressed him in a letter as the “maestro dell’epigrafia piemontese”.37 In the Royal Library in Turin and in the State Library in Berlin are preserved 64 letters, written between 1863 and 1872, which the two exchanged. Mommsen and Promis had a very friendly relationship, and Mommsen had a high esteem of Promis’ knowledge of Roman antiquity.38 Nonetheless, Promis absolutely did not share the historiographical model of “Italian unification” that Mommsen would produce and which would become so influential—nonetheless he represented in those years the point of contact between the German world and the Piedmontese school, as revealed also by the articles and commemorations organized in Berlin upon his death.39 Promis’ political affiliation was Carlo Alberto’s and his plans, even more than Gioberti’s and neoguelfism.40 In a series of letters to Matteo Ricci written during the war, Promis remains highly suspicious of the Pope, since he apparently believed that Carlo Alberto would want to unify the entire peninsula. 33  Fasoli, “Momenti di cultura nazionale e internazionale”, 276–277; Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “capitale degli studi seri”, 16–17. 34  Levi, Carlo Promis, 402. 35  Romagnani, Storiografia e politica culturale, 24. 36  Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “la città dei grandi ingegni”, 20–21. 37  Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “capitale degli studi seri”, n. 17, 154. 38  On the relationship between Promis and Mommsen, see Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “la città dei grandi ingegni”; Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “capitale degli studi seri”; F. Carlà-Uhink – S. Giorcelli Bersani, “Monsieur le Professeur . . .”: La correspondence entre Theodor Mommsen et Carlo, Domenico et Vincenzo Promis, forthcoming. 39  Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “la città dei grandi ingegni”, 14–15. 40  Fasoli, “Momenti di cultura nazionale e internazionale”, 277–278 states on the contrary that he was a convinced neoguelf.

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Promis states clearly that it is not the case. There is no unification project, and the only reasonable plan is the unification of Piedmont with Lombardy and the Veneto.41 Promis seems already in this moment to have remained on Carlo Alberto’s side by loyalty rather than by conviction. Indeed, his first and foremost passion was his city, for which he developed an extremely strong civic pride, leading him to defend its history and tradition also in relatively minor issues. It is enough to read his answer to Mommsen, who had highlighted the large amount of forgeries in Piedmontese epigraphy. Promis answers nervously that other areas, like Switzerland or Naples, had more, showing how his Piedmontese patriotism had been hurt by the German scholar.42 In another letter to Matteo Ricci, written on the 25th June 1848, he pessimistically reflects on the consequences of a victory in the war for Turin. The capital, he said, would be moved to Milan, and in any case Turin would be ruined. Because of its geographical location the city could not be the capital of a bigger country, nor could it be transformed into an industrial center, since no one would want 50000 communist workers in the city. The population would drop, and the city would disappear. As for himself, he would rather be executed than have to become a deputy of the Parliament.43 Even if, in 1849, Promis edited the anonymous Memorie ed osservazioni sulla Guerra dell’indipendenza d’Italia del 1848, which had been written by Carlo Alberto in person, and was a member of the commission which investigated on the mistakes of the campaign,44 it should be clear that the dream of an “Italian unity” and of a glorious unification of the nation was not a view he shared. Quite typically for Italy at that period, his first and foremost political loyalty went to his city, and to its ruling monarch and dynasty. This helps understand why he used to compare the destinies of Turin and Piedmont with those of the ancient Macedonians,45 building on a comparison between the kingdom of Macedonia and Piedmont that had existed since the late 18th century. Until now it had been intended in a positive way, as the transformation of a “peripheral and warlike” kingdom into the center of political and intellectual power.46 41  G. Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, architetto, storico ed archeologo piemontese (1808–1873) (Fratelli Bocca: Turin, 1877): 80–84. 42  Carlà-Uhink – Giorcelli Bersani, “Monsieur le Professeur . . .”, nn. 14–15. The former letter corresponds to Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “la città dei grandi ingegni”, n. 5, 139. See also the pp. 99–100. 43  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, 85–88. 44  C. Vitulo, Riflessioni sulla vita di Carlo Promis dai documenti della Biblioteca Reale di Torino, In Fasoli – Vitulo, Carlo Promis. Professore di Architettura, 58–59. 45  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, xxx–xxxi. 46  Cracco Ruggini, “Eloquenza, antiquitates e storia antica”, 191.

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Later Promis, revealing his negative opinion of the Unification, would clearly state that actually it had destroyed Rome too. Invited to visit the city again in 1873, he wrote to De Vit that he would not go, because «having enjoyed it for eight years (1828–1836) when Rome was really Rome, in all its very original efficacy, I would be sorry of seeing it now, dragging itself on the traces of Turin, Milan, and of Paris».47 The failure of 1848, which Promis attributed to the scarce interest of the other Italian peoples, particularly of the Lombards, made his doubts grow even more and it strengthened his detachment from any possible idea of a national program. In particular the abdication of Carlo Alberto marked a big change in the political landscape, with the death of the neoguelf project and the birth of a much more radical project of unification in a really national perspective,48 as it will be achieved in 1860–1861. Surely, not everybody agreed on this, but many of those who did not, as Promis, simply withdrew from active political life if not at town level. There is no trace of any joy expressed by Promis when in 1860–1861 the unity of Italy was achieved, much less when in 1864 the capital was transferred to Florence, thus reducing his beloved Turin to the rank of a regional center. 3

The Taurini according to Promis

It is therefore interesting, against this background, to see how he faced the problem of defining the ethnicity and the history of the Taurini in the first two chapters of his Storia dell’antica Torino. From this it will become once again very clear that the assumption that the entire Turin elite was happily on the side of unification and of Cavour would be terribly wrong. As already mentioned, the volume was published in 1869—even if Promis writes that this is the product of thirty years of work,49 it is important to realize that the final version was composed after the Second Independence War, the creation of the Kingdom of Italy and the displacement of the national capital to Florence—much of this is visible in the book, which far away from the possible earlier neoguelf enthusiasm of Promis sounds like a funerary song for Turin and Piedmont as they “historically” and “naturally” are, and like a very radical attack against (ancient) Rome and Roman imperialism, just before the French defeat of 1870

47  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, 315. See Levi, Carlo Promis, 405. 48  Romagnani, Storiografia e politica culturale, xxvi. 49  C. Promis, Storia della antica Torino, (Viglongo: Turin, 1869): iii.

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would open the way to the conquest of Rome by the kingdom of Italy and its becoming the national capital (1870). The end of the introduction is probably the point where Promis’ ideas become most explicit. While explaining that the history of Turin, as a city, is the history of Piedmont, because the city and its region are one and the same thing, Promis writes: In any time the history of Turin summarizes and represents the history of Piemont, including in a broader sense that of Savoy and of the County of Nizza. This will be shown in these pages for the ancient centuries, and this was valid for the modern ones too, in which the heroic age of our fatherland lasted until 1750 when, paying an infinite price of disasters and blood, Piedmont took the form of a State. It did that with its own armies, with the negotiations and with its quiet tenacity, while in the entire Italy some other peoples obtained a show of independency, laws, peace (but I don’t say honor) through the armies sent by France, Austria, Spain—others were placing the secret of their power in being forgotten.50 Many points here are relevant. First of all, the explicit mention of a “natural unity” of Piedmont around Turin including Nizza and Savoy, two territories which, nine years before, in March 1860, had been given by the royal government to France, through the “Trattato di Torino”. This fulfilled the agreement reached in 1858 in Plombières that was confirmed in the alliance treaty between France and Italy of January 1859; France would receive these two regions in exchange for Napoleon III’s support of the unification of Italy. Promis could therefore not approve the loss of territories “historically” belonging to his “real” fatherland, because of the creation of an alternative, “Italian” fatherland that did not please him. It is quite unclear, on the other hand, why Promis indicates that 1750 marks the end of the “heroic age” of Piedmont, since nothing particularly relevant happened that year. The date of the “transformation into a State” should have been 1712, when Vittorio Amedeo acquired the royal title, but I suspect that what Promis hints at are Carlo Emanuele III’s wars, and particularly the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1738), in which the king of Sardinia militarily occupied Lombardy and Milan and for the first time showed the ambition of expanding towards “Italy”, a direction confirmed with the acquisition of further territories in the East at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession (1748). 50  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, xviii–xix.

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This said, it is clear that Promis could not possibly recognize the Taurini as a Gallic population, and could not belong to the “Celtomaniac” tendency of the late 18th and 19th century, promptly embraced by parts of the Northern Italian scholarship, as e.g. Carlo Denina or later Cesare Cantù.51 The Gauls were on the one side the French, who, through Napoleon III, had wanted parts of “his” Piedmont and supported the unity. When Napoleon III visited Turin in 1859, Promis was actually invited to meet him and refused with disdain.52 Gauls were, at the same time, the Insubri, i.e. the ancestors of today’s Lombards, a Gallic city was Milan—and to the inhabitants of Lombardy Promis attributed both the responsibility of having drawn Piedmont in the unity adventure and of having abandoned Carlo Alberto in the worst possible moment and when the neoguelf project was still, in his opinion, an acceptable one. The first sentence of the book could thus not be more explicit: six centuries before our time, while Tarquinius Priscus reigned in Rome, the Gauls under Bellovesus came from the Alps and took away from the Etruscans the plain around the river Po, afterwards expanding up to the river Aesis on the Adriatic Sea. Before that time, the Gauls had been closed by the Alps, then an insuperable fortification, nor does history remember any earlier descent of the Gauls. Therefore, our ancestors, since they did not come down from the Gallic Alps, did not belong to that nation.53 According to Promis, indeed, the Taurini were already there before—before the Etruscans, coming from Tuscany, occupied the Po plain, which they could occupy only up to the Ticino, and surely before the Celts “for the first time” came from the Alps.54 This is a quite typical device of “earlier right” to the occupation of the territory. This population which occupied Piedmont was there from earlier periods, and was first of all an enemy of the Etruscans. The reason of this supposed hostility is not apparent; simply, according to Promis, the Etruscans did not occupy their territory. This, which could also be intended as a sign of friendship, is understood by our author rather as the sign that the Etruscans, who in his opinion never were in Piedmont,55 arrived later and were enemies 51  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 31–36; 94–95. 52  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, xxix. 53  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 1. 54  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 2. 55  Promis is in this case intentionally neglecting the Etruscan inscription from Busca, which was discovered in the 18th century and thus already known in his time (and is

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of the Taurini.56 This is probably to be identified as a reaction against the academic tradition that had exalted the role of the Etruscans in early Italy, as a «primogenial source of civilization».57 At the same time the Taurini might show some similarities, even though they are different from all other Italic peoples, with the only exception of the Veneti. Most Italic peoples come, according to Promis, from central Greece and had a Pelasgic origin. While the Pelasgic migrations are present in ancient sources, and most notably in Dionysius of Halicarnassus,58 the ethnical identity of the Pelasgi was broadly discussed, and they were recognized sometimes as Greek, but sometimes (as in the case of Cuoco) as Etruscans who had migrated eastwards to come back to Italy later.59 The Paeligni seem to Promis to have come from Illyricum, as, as stated at a later point, «different populations of central Italy»,60 but this does not lead the author to argue strongly for ethnical unity, and it could be analyzed as a continuation of his original adhesion to the neoguelf project. If, as underlined by De Francesco, many scholars of the Italian 19th century believed in «a cultural, rather than ethnic, uniformity of the Italian populations»,61 Promis was the contrary: he could accept an ethnical relatedness but clearly denied any cultural vicinity. While Micali and Cuoco, for instance, insisted on the “brotherhood” of the Italian peoples and on their “cultural unity” before the Roman conquests, Promis is different and made clear his opposition to any form of idea of unity. In Promis, Italy doesn’t exist at all if not as a geographic expression. Even if he first seems to have supported the Giobertian idea of a loose federation, he abandoned this idea after the defeat of 1849 when, according to his biographer

e.g. mentioned in L. Lanzi, Saggio di lingua etrusca e di altre antiche d’Italia per servire alla storia de’ popoli, delle lingue e delle belle arti, (Attilio Tofani: Florence, 1825): 562; G. Casalis, Dizionario geografico storico-statistico-commerciale degli Stati di S.M. il Re di Sardegna (G. Maspero librajo, Cassone Marzorati Vercellotti tipografi: Turin, 1834): vol. II, 758). The inscription is surely of local origin and reveals probably the “Etruscization” of an indigenous member of the local community: G. Sassatelli, Celti ed Etruschi nell’Etruria padana e nell’Italia settentrionale, In D. Vitali – S. Verger (eds.), Tra mondo celtico e mondo italico. La necropoli di Monte Bibele (Dpartimento di Archeologia: Bologna, 2008): 337–338. 56  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 2–3. 57  So De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 38, referring to Vincenzo Cuoco, who also dated to the Etruscan period the existence of an “Italian unity”. 58  Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom. 1.17–21. 59  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 38–39. 60  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 6; 17. 61  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 21.

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Lumbroso, he was seen crying and sighing.62 Lumbroso seems to have tampered a bit with the thoughts of his friend. The evaluation given in 1934 by Mario Attilio Levi is more balanced. He explicitly states that Promis, as Solaro della Margarita, was absolutely opposed to any project of unity, and that he had been enthusiastic in 1848 in a way which «did not show any real understanding of the Italian, and not purely Piedmontese, meaning of those events».63 In this sense, I think that it is impossible to read Promis’ work as “patriotic”, and as a continuous try to “connect” the local with the national history.64 His interest remained preeminently local, and Turin’s and Piedmont’s specificity are, particularly since the 1850s, what he focused on. Consequently, the case of the Salassi appears particularly relevant : Antonina Maria Cavallaro has shown that the Valle d’Aosta had developed a strong local, regional cultural identity around the Salassi since the 16th century, founded on the idea of an ethnical continuity since Antiquity. This was a claim for a local specificity, distinguishing the Valley from the rest of the world, and especially from the neighboring Granduchy of Savoy.65 It would take too long to discuss here the ethnogenetical theories of the Salassi. I shall solely focus briefly on Promis’ position in his book on Le antichità di Aosta, published in 1862. Meaningfully the book is dedicated, one year after the accomplishment of the national unity under Vittorio Emanuele, to the late Carlo Alberto, who had commissioned the work and had planned a systematic publication of the antiquities of all his kingdom.66 Promis considers the Salassi not to have been exterminated by the Romans and to form still the bulk of the modern population of the region. He adheres to local theories which opposed “national” propositions defending, amongst other things, the necessity of imposing Italian, instead than French, as the language of the region. Promis argued here too that there was a different physiognomy visible in the Valley revealing the presence of the Salassi,67 and that even here, as also in Piedmont, the Romans behaved terribly.68 Actually, according to Promis the Salassi were Taurisci – Taurini and therefore relatives of the rest

62  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, xvii. 63  Levi, Carlo Promis, 408. 64  E.g. Fasoli, “Momenti di cultura nazionale e internazionale”, 190; 1993, 29. 65  A. M. Cavallaro, “Salassi e Romani in Valle d’Aosta. Momenti di una storia condivisa delle origini”, Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino, 98 (2000): 11–22. 66  Promis, 1862, 10–11. 67  Promis, 1862, 22. 68  Promis 1862, 15–22. See Cavallaro, “Salassi e Romani in Valle d’Aosta”, 43–45.

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of the Piedmontese population.69 He expressed thus a clear desire to overcome the narrow local history of the Valley, but in a Piedmontese (as Carlo Alberto wanted), and definitely not in a national perspective. Compared to Gioberti himself, nonetheless, Promis was much less keen on underlining a “mixed” nature of the Italian (and Piedmontese) population, and the same applies also when Promis is compared to Cesare Balbo, the most important federalist and “theorist” of the role of Piedmont in the new state,70 even if the two shared the idea of an Italy composed by different populations which arrived at different times.71 Balbo and Promis did agree on many issues; Balbo was, as Promis, in a continuous and very productive exchange with the German school,72 and when Balbo in 1843 planned the never realized project of writing a big History of Italy with a group of different authors (the “società di amici”),73 Promis was one of them.74 The plan collapsed, as many other things, with the unsuccesful war of 1848–1849 and finally with Balbo’s death in 1853. What has been presented until now applies quite obviously also to Promis’ perception of the modern Italian peoples: he was hostile to the Italians “of Greek origin”, found the Tuscans, descendent of the Etruscans, to be absolutely dreadful in the military field,75 and so on. The decision with which Promis rejects any relatedness between the Taurini and the Ligurians must be read in the same light. It can be motivated by the general backwardness attributed to them in ancient sources,76 as well as with the poor political relations between Turin and the Republic of Genova since the second half of the 18th century and until the difficult integration of the latter in the kingdom of Sardinia after the Congress of Vienna. Promis seems therefore to contradict explicitly all the theories against a Greek origin or “civilization” of Italy, and in particular all “Etruscocentric” explanations, while at the same time strongly denying a relatedness of the Italic peoples among themselves and most of all with the Taurini—the point being 69  Promis 1862, 11–12. 70  Ricuperati, Lo stato sabaudo e la storia, 22. 71  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 80–82. 72  Fubini Leuzzi, “Gli studi storici in Piemonte”, 160–161; Fubini Leuzzi, Metodi e temi della ricerca storica, 875–876. On Balbo, in general, Fubini Leuzzi, “Gli studi storici in Piemonte”, 157–176. 73  Fubini Leuzzi, Metodi e temi della ricerca storica, 878–879. 74  Fubini Leuzzi, “Gli studi storici in Piemonte”, 189–190; Fasoli, “Momenti di cultura nazionale e internazionale”, 289. See also Fasoli, L’insegnamento dell’architettura in Carlo Promis, 29–30. 75  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, xxxii. 76  E.g. Cat., Orig. 2.2 Chassignet; Diod. Sic. 4.19.4; 5.39.1–6; Liv. 39.1.5–6. See also Carlà-Uhink, The “Birth” of Italy forthcoming.

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of course the supposed “teleological” role of Turin and of the Savoy dynasty in unifying Italy. If the historiography of the time of Carlo Alberto was insisting on demonstrating that the Savoy dynasty was Italian, and not French, Promis was now moving dozens of centuries back in time to say that the Taurini were the legitimate early occupiers of the region, unrelated to the other Italian populations. Promis does not say a word about the origin of the Etruscans, and autochthony does not seem to be a big worry for him—it does not indicate a “higher” status, if any people could be thought of having it. Even the Taurini are not autochthonous according to Promis, who recurs, as other people after him, to an artificial distinction between Gallic and Celtic to argue that they, of Celtic origin, belonged to a first, prehistoric invasion, anterior to any other movement, and completely different from the later Gallic invasions. According to the philological argument exposing the similarity of the Taurini and the Taurisci, Promis argues that “his ancestors” were actually of Illyrian origins. «In times so ancient that they precede any light of history [later more precisely indicated as “thirty centuries ago”,77 so around the 11th century BCE], a Celtic population, anterior to the Etruscans, by whom it was afterwards partially defeated» came from the territory of today’s Slovenia (ancient Noricum), moved along the river Po, without crossing the Alps, and occupied the entire Po plain. When later the Etruscans expanded, these Illyrians were defeated in the central area, but remained strong and independent (“always independent”) at its extremities—as the Taurini in Piedmont and as the Veneti on the Eastern side.78 Piedmontese and Venetians did still show, according to Promis, similar language features.79 And the fact that the local populations did not speak an Illyric language is easily ruled out by the fact that they were surrounded (one thinks almost besieged) by Gauls on all side, and that the adoption of Gallic traits in the language could be eased up by the common ancient Celtic origin.80 These Taurini could sometimes be allies of the Gauls—especially when they had to fight together against the dreaded Etruscans. This is the reason why the invasions of the 6th century left them quiet—because they did have an idea of an ancient common origin,81 which still did not mean that they shared the same ethnicity. Promis is very explicit in stating that the Taurini were, even in their physiognomy, very different from the Lombard Gauls. The former were blond, but small while the latter were huge. Physiognomy distinguishes them 77  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 6. 78  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 5. 79  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 19. 80  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 22. 81  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 2.

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from the dark Ligurians, too.82 Indeed, as some modern scholars still do,83 Promis argues that the later wars opposing the Gauls (Insubri) to the Taurini (actually the sources refer of only one, the one which was taking place when Hannibal arrived) must surely be a trace of ethnical hatred, since populations belonging to the same ethnicity would not fight each other. The Taurini enjoyed a region which created natural unity, as already mentioned “always independent”, but also offered a precise landscape, “identical” to the one of their “original” fatherland in the Illyricum. This suggested their permanence and their resistance, and generated also some onomastic similarities. For instance, two rivers were called “Dora”, as Duria is the Latin name of the Morava.84 To underline the natural unity of Piedmont, Promis cuts short on the different names of peoples attested by Latin sources to have inhabited this area: the Taurisci are the overarching ethnical name and the most powerful, six other tribes are only sub-groups of the Taurini, without their own ethnical identity: the Salassi, the Lepontii (who surely were Gauls!), the Segusini, the Agoni, the Ictimuli, which were later called the Bessi, and of course the Taurisci stricto sensu, of whom all the others are “clients”.85 The name of the population, according to Promis, was indeed Taurisci, the name Taurini being a Roman deformation which came into being only when they started siding with the Romans. The ultimate frontier of these people is the river Po, on the other side of which live the Liguri and the Gallic Bagienni. Following the mentioned passage of Appian, all these tribes and territories were ruled and dominated by one single city, and this is of course the modern city of Turin, the natural capital of such a region, but only of such a region, in a way which is perfectly consistent with the letter to Matteo Ricci quoted earlier. 4

rom the Taurisci to the Taurini, and from the Piedmontese to the F Italians. Or, How Bad Can the Romans (and Any Unification) Be

The Taurini were “natural enemies” of the Etruscans and of the Insubri, and therefore they were not enemies of the Romans. The same logic—my enemies’

82  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 19. 83  E. Culasso Gastaldi – G. Cresci Marrone, “I Taurini ai piedi delle Alpi”, Storia di Torino, 1: Dalla preistoria al comune medievale (Einaudi: Turin, 1997): 106. 84  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 4–5. 85  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 8–9.

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enemies are my friends—applied for the Veneti.86 As Promis clearly stated, when the Romans fought against any of these populations, as the Salassi, it was not by hostility, but simply to achieve a treacherous triumph.87 The Romans appear, indeed, to be the evil guys of Promis’ history. Once again, and still disagreeing with his friend Mommsen, he stated that unification was a terrible idea since it implied the disappearance of local cultures, and could only be achieved through disrespect and treachery. Levi realized in 1934 that Promis had a very hostile judgement of ancient Rome, and defined this a “Piedmontese rather than Italian” current of thought.88 But this is indeed not Piedmontese at all, and Promis simply belongs to the quite wide group of scholars who did not buy in the Risorgimento rhetoric of unity and already saw in the Roman conquest the death of the much more interesting local traditions. In a letter to Carlo Gattinara, composed in October 1860, Promis wrote: «indeed history, deeply seen, gives us Romulus as the leader of a conquering race, which reduces in humble condition the aboriginal farmers and keeps in a low state also the ones who every day came to get asylum. This wanted the ancient law»—going on stating how the humble classes were oppressed under Roman rule, and how this was caused by an excessive legalism of the Romans, Promis concluded, «all this was horrible, but strictly legal: you know that the Romans adored legality, so the letter of the law counted among them much more than its sense or its spirit».89 This was surely not a positive commentary, only partially resonating with Mommsen’s observations on the strong legalism which would have characterized the Romans.90 In the Storia dell’antica Torino Promis judges the Roman intervention in a consistent way: the Taurini, allies of the Romans because of their common hatred for the Insubri, let the Romans cross their territory freely already at the end of the 3rd century BCE (contradicting the statement that they had fought on the Gallic side at the battle of Talamon in 225 BCE). From this moment, they were Taurini and not Taurisci anymore.91 When Hannibal arrived, the Taurini were divided: the inhabitants of the city and the aristocracy on the Roman side, the farmers on Carthage’s (a clear sign, once again, of Promis’ quite elitist approach, extending a similar observation by Livy for central and 86  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 31. 87  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 14. 88  Levi, Carlo Promis, 409. 89  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, 212–214. 90  Th. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte. Band I: Bis zur Schlacht von Pydna (Weidmann: Leipzig, 1854): 166. 91  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 30–31.

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Southern Italian towns).92 The war against the Insubri had started because they were counting on the help of the other Taurisci. Upon Hannibal’s arrival they were counting on Roman help, but were defeated because the Romans were too slow. This was building on a famous topos and Promis wrote that «because of Roman slowness had been destroyed, shortly before, Saguntum; and now was destroyed Turin, since Scipio did nothing, either when the Carthaginians appeared on the Alps or when the Taurini, vanguard of Rome, oppressed by Gauls and Phoenicians, were going to a sure death».93 It gets worse: Hannibal could not keep the region, and gave it to his Gallic allies, and when at the end of the war the Romans got it back, they simply kept it, instead of reinstating their Taurini allies in their territory—«on such a treacherous occupation of the land at the source of the Po and of that at its mouth, intentionally the contemporary historians are silent». And again: «Don’t talk to me about Roman generosity! [. . .] Once they occupied the land of the Taurini, they confiscated it for themselves, making it ager publicus». And finally: «So little did the Romans write about ours, and so many tears, and so much blood they gave us».94 It is no wonder that Promis tried nonetheless to enhance at every point the importance of Turin in the Roman Empire, for instance interpreting any Roman cognomen Taurinus or similar as a sign of the origin of the person from the city of Turin95—the main idea that Piedmont had lost all in the Second Punic War was clear enough. The conclusion of this chapter is striking, even for a scholar who experienced the war of 1848–1849: «The Roman arts are the same as the Austrian ones; to enact them, they both remain quiet dissimulating at the beginning of the military campaign, and then they get both fruits of their intentional negligence».96 The reference to the experience of the First Independence War could not be clearer: the Austrians had let the “Italian” field collapse, with the loss of the papal support and of the troops from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, to then exploit the situation, as the Romans had let the Carthaginians defeat their allies to then take advantage of both. The Romans are like the Austrians, the cooperation of the Italian peoples is impossible, and it simply opens the way to foreign intrusion. Comparing the hated Romans with the

92  Liv. 23.14.7; 24.2.8. 93  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 39. 94  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 40–41. 95  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 12. 96  Promis, Storia della antica Torino, 42.

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Savoy dynasty, as some scholars did in Southern Italy,97 was of course impossible for Promis, who was loyal to the dynasty. “Anti-Roman winds” were quite common in the historiography of the 19th century, as a consequence of the strongly anti-Roman attitude of the 18th century, and can be found e.g. in Micali as in Cuoco (whose works were interestingly reprinted in 1852 in Turin),98 even if it had strongly diminished around the middle of the century, and was reduced in later works of the same Micali.99 Promis seemed to be aware of that. He was stating, as many scholars do, that he was only “looking for the truth”. Hence, unaware that he was dominated by his ideologies and convictions, he strongly criticized, in a letter to Mommsen dated October 1872, historians moved by individual and by national passions. The dangers of nationalism in politics as in research were the object also of an exchange of letters at the beginning of 1871—after the French-Prussian War, when Promis wrote to Mommsen: Je voudrais bien que cela fut un conte, mais le Ier Napoléon est tombé précisément pour avoir abusé de ses victoires et avoir insulté ses ennemis après les avoir écrasés. Vous avez dit superbement bien, que toute nation tient à honneur de déchirer avec l’épée les traités que l’humilient [underlined in the original]. La France est vaincue et courbée ; qu’on ne l’humilie pas dans son sentiment de dignité nationale, qu’on ne refasse pas les fautes de Napoléon.100 Mommsen’s answer was probably not what Promis would have wished for, and once again it becomes clear how distant the two friends and collaborators were on this matter, and how it would be impossible for them to share the same view on the Romans and on their conquest of Italy: Je comprends, qu’on désapprouve au dehors le traité de Versailles; mais pour le juger bien, vous devez réfléchir, que toute l’Allemagne, tant M. de Bismark que tout autre individu pas tout-à-fait dépourvu d’idées politiques, ne croit pas à la possibilité d’arriver avec la France à une paix bonne et sérieuse. Ce qu’on crie aux quatre vents à Paris, c’est bien notre conviction aussi, quoique nous ne crions pas si haut: la France ne se résignera jamais à supporter la défaite et ses conséquences inévitables et 97  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 118–119. 98  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 54–56. 99  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 77. 100  Carlà-Uhink – Giorcelli Bersani, “Monsieur le Professeur . . .”, n. 44.

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c’est malheureusement bien égal, si le traité est humiliant en soi même ou pas. C’est ce qu’il y a de plus triste dans cette triste guerre, qu’elle ne peut finir que par un armistice; et ce n’est pas notre faute, s’il est ainsi.101 As time went by, in any case, unity implied a stronger control on what was being written—and generally the new nation was fostering the development of a discourse which could finally overcome Micali and his plurality. As written by De Francesco, the «insistence on the study (and valorization) of local reality» was seen always more «as disguising a clear refusal of the recently established unitary state».102 In this context, Carlo Promis, who had died in 1873, could have been an uncomfortable figure. It was his friend and biographer, the Egyptologist and Papyrologist Giacomo Lumbroso, a pupil of Theodor Mommsen,103 who proceeded to solve this problem, by transforming Promis into a hero of Italian unity and independence. Already on page vii of his biographical reconstruction, Lumbroso claims that since 1840 Promis wrote that Italy had to be resurrected through the intervention of a Piedmontese prince who would free it; he calls Promis a «warm lover of the name and independence of Italy and of the mission of Piedmont».104 There is a particular point on which Promis’ real ideas and Lumbroso’s works on “correcting” them becomes clear. In April 1870 Carlo Promis wrote a letter to Theodor Mommsen. Among other things, he communicates the death of Amedeo Peyron, and bitterly comments on what happened to the Piedmontese: La place de ces hommes sérieux et honnêtes est prise par une jeunesse élevée à l’ecole des journaux bêtes et présomptueux; et qui dans sa naïve présomption ignore jusqu’à son ignorance. Nous avons pris tous les defauts et les vices des Italiens modernes et nous avons été punis par là où nous avions pêché. Plaignez-nous, car nous sommes bien à plaindre.105 Lumbroso, who published this letter, deleted these few lines which define the unity as a sin and so badly consider its consequences. What is interesting to underline, is that these conceptual frames, setting historiography into the new political context, were shifting at different times—in order to 101  See Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “capitale degli studi seri”, n. 15, 152; see also pp. 24–25. 102  De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation, 120. 103  On Lumbroso, see Giorcelli Bersani, Torino “capitale degli studi seri”, 38–41. 104  Lumbroso, Memorie e lettere di Carlo Promis, ix–x. 105  Carlà-Uhink – Giorcelli Bersani, “Monsieur le Professeur . . .”, n. 39.

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transform Promis into a real patriot, it was not necessary, in 1877, to delete his anti-Romanism. While at an earlier moment a love for Rome and for the unification of Italy under Roman rule was not considered a precondition for Italian patriotism, and it was only necessary to cut the most explicit statements against the unity to transform Promis into a supporter of the unified nation, two decades later things had changed, and anti-Romanism was automatically seen as a form of anti-Italianism. Levi, writing about Promis in 1934, exposed his attitude against the unification and wondered why Promis had been so successful as an epigraphist and as an antiquarian, but not as a historian. The answer lies in his anti-Romanism and regionalist attitudes that were not acceptable anymore. But this is another story. Referenced Sources Appian, Roman History, Volume I: Books 1–8.1, translated by H. White, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA 1912. Caton, Les origines. Fragments, texte établi, traduit et commenté par M. Chassignet, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1986. Diodorus Siculus, Library of Histories, Volume II: Books 2.35–4.58 and Volume III: Books 4.59–8, translated by C. H. Oldfather, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA 1935– 1939. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Volume I: Books 1–2, translated by E. Cary, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA 1937. Livy, History of Rome, Volume V: Books 21–22, translated by B. O. Foster, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA 1929. Livy, History of Rome, Volume VI: Books 23–25, translated by B. O. Foster, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA 1940. Pliny, Natural History, Volume II: Books 3–7, translated by H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA 1942. Polybius, The Histories, translated by W. R. Paton, revised by F. W. Walbank – C. Habicht, 6 vol., Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA – London 2010–2012. Strabo, Geography, Volume II: Books 3–5, translated by H. L. Jones, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA 1923.

CHAPTER 3

The Invention of Numantia* and Emporion**: Archaeology and the Regeneration of Spanish and Catalan Nationalisms after the Crisis of 1898 Francisco Gracia-Alonso 1

The Crisis of 1898: Society at a Crossroads The old Spain is dead. A society that lets itself be pushed to the wall, as ours has been pushed, without uttering a single cry; where the only voices have been those of politicians and coffeehouse patriots bravely defying the Yankee threat from their safe grandstands; which has looked on at the enormous crime of Cuba impassively without a tear in its eyes or a shake of its fists or a weight on its shoulders, on what grounds can it claim to be among the living in the civil registry of nations?1

Joaquín Costa’s analysis after Spain’s defeat in the Spanish-American War in 1898 clearly defined the extreme discontent of a section of the Spanish intelligentsia toward a political regime and system that had plunged Spain into a dreadful military, economic, political, social and, above all, ideological crisis. This was triggered by a century of instability: – The consequences of the Cuban War of Independence. – the emancipation of Spain’s colonies in the Americas. – The dynastic crises that triggered three civil or Carlist wars in the nineteenth century.

* Numantia (Numancia in Spanish) is the name of an ancient Celtiberian settlement, whose remains are located 7km north of the city of Soria. ** Formerly known by its Spanish name Ampurias, or Empúries in Catalan, Emporion was a town on the Mediterranean coast of the Catalan comarca of Alt Empordà in Catalonia, Spain. 1  El Liberal. Issue of October 18, 1898.

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– The failure of attempts to establish a liberal democracy that encouraged Isabel II’s fall, the General Juan Prim government, the reign of Amadeo I and the First Spanish Republic during the Liberal Sexennium. – The crisis of liberal and conservative politics arising from the dominance of local bosses known as caciques and an organized rotation in government that perverted the electoral system in which the results were rigged in advance. – The split in the army after the failure of the colonial wars in Cuba and the African expeditions that exacerbated the state’s indebtedness, since 65% of the budget was allocated to military spending and only 15% were invested in public services. – Spain’s decline in importance in the international arena. – The growing public debt that was to reach 10 billion pesetas by the end of the century combined with the inability of the Treasury to generate financial resources. – The inability to settle colonial problems and to respond to the insurgency in Cuba and the Philippines. – The disdain for Spain’s territorial and cultural diversity rendered clear by the preservation at any cost of Castile’s supremacy over other regions, and the vaunting of Castile as the very essence of Spain. – The crisis of a shrunken industrial structure focused on textile production and an iron and steel industry with low output, uncompetitive prices and very limited international markets. – Dependence on agricultural production, the prices of which were falling in the face of grain imports from the United States. – The lack of an intellectual response to social movements advocating a new political framework for the state. – The war against the United States. All these factors led to the greatest political, ideological and social crisis during the Bourbon Restoration since the military coup d’état led by General Martínez Campos in Sagunto on 29 December 1874, which had enabled Alfonso XII to take the throne. In Catalonia, the crisis of 1898 was exacerbated because of two major events: the loss of access to Caribbean markets for Catalan textile manufacturers, who had had a monopoly since the creation of protectionist tariffs in 1892, and the coming together of the political interests of the civil associations that were seeking to influence the government in Madrid. On the one hand, the Catalan nationalists wished to apply the ideas contained in the Bases de Manresa, but,

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on the other, the advocates of the economic and social measures championed the conservative Francisco Silvela, President of the Council of Ministers after the assassination of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo. One of the primary outcomes of the defeats of 1898 was ideological. In the collective consciousness of the Spanish intellectual classes, the idea persisted that Spain was still a major power on the European and world stage. They kept alive the fiction of the Spanish empire which has been forged in the 16th and 17th centuries, lost in the early 19th century, but maintained in some way through the trade ties that existed with the republics of Latin America. The military interventions in North Africa—an ideological parody of the expeditions of Carlos I in Tunisia and the campaigns of Felipe II against the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century—and the participation of Spain in the conflicts in Mexico, Cochinchina and Chile helped strengthen this fiction. They were used by Isabel II’s governments to keep up the patriotic constructs of “Imperial Spain” and “racial superiority”. As had occurred in Europe after the French Revolution, the emerging Spanish bourgeoisie of the second half of the 19th century used nationalism as a means to achieve political power, but historicist pretexts did not manage to cover up the country’s economic backwardness with its precarious industrialization. Exportations were almost nonexistent, except the ancient colonies of South America, while the economy was dependent on agricultural production. On the other hand, the gradual depopulation of the countryside was leading to a concentration of the population in cities that would define a new working class. To these economic factors one must add the disillusion of the intellectuals towards the political regime of the Alphonsine Restoration, which had risen out of a military coup and was deprived of regenerative ideas. This was leading Spain towards the fossilization of its social and productive structures and condemning it to the role of a small player in the international context. Such a regime could offer no response to the needs of the country. Before the definitive crisis, the “regenerationism” movement was beginning to stir debate and gather support in Spanish society with works such as Fernando Garrido’s La regeneración de España (1860) [in English, The Regeneration of Spain] and Lucas Mallada’s Los males de la patria (1890) [in English, The Ills of the Patria], but generally the society played no part in the debates about the necessary definition of a new concept of state. It was as if the 19th century had not happened. The common view was still that the superficial renewal of the ancient régime as the political form of the state should go on for many more years. This explains why the explosion on the battleship USS Maine in Havana harbour on 15th February 1898 did much more than detonate a war, it also dealt the first blow that led to the destruction of the Spanish 19th century, which would ultimately disappear in 1931.

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Numantia: The Dream of an Imperial and Eternal Spain

Since the Peninsular War against Napoleon’s armies in the early 19th century, the notion of Numantinismo, named after the ancient city of Numantia from Roman times, had been used as a touchstone to appeal to the Spanish national spirit. This spirit was depicted in a play by Antonio Sabiñón titled Numantia, Spanish Tragedy (1813), which intended to convey to the audience an idea of resistance against the invader, but also of belonging to a defined race with its own specific character. This followed on from works about the siege of ancient Numantia written by Miguel de Cervantes (1585), and Ignacio López de Ayala, whose Numantia (1775) was performed during the siege of Zaragoza by the French in 1808–1809 to boost the combatants’ morale. The contemptuous treatment of Spain at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, where it received no compensation in spite of its sustained resistance against Napoleon’s empire between 1808 and 1814, developed a tendency towards isolationism towards Europe, and in particular to European political currents. The Spanish had to call on heroic past deeds as reference points for social cohesion—as in the case of Sabiñón’s work, which were praised by Ramón de Mesonero Romanos and Mariano José de Larra: In politics as in tragedy, what is hardest is for the people to conquer its freedom. It is to be hoped that our freedom has a better end, just this once, than that of Numantia. It depends on us.2 In subsequent decades, the interpretation of ancient Numantia’s resistance as a crucible for ideas about unity and independence to portray the history of Spain proved useful to conservative and liberal governments alike. It was established through comprehensive works like the Historia General de España (General History of Spain) by the Jesuit priest Juan de Mariana, first published in 1592 and reissued successively until 1972, and the work of the same name by Modesto Lafuente, which were published in 13 volumes between 1850 and 1867. This portrayal gained increasing importance in the public’s imagination because of Romantic and historical paintings that characterized the 19th century. Among the themes of these paintings, suggested by the Royal Academy of History and the San Fernando Royal Academy of Fine Arts, the Numantine resistance was particularly popular, alongside episodes of the capture of Sagunto by Hannibal and the epic saga of Viriatus. Examples of the depiction of Numancia included three works by José de Madrazo entitled La capitulación 2  “Representación de Numancia. Tragedia en tres actos”. La Revista Española, núm. 236. Issue of June 9, 1834.

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de los romanos ante el jefe numantino Megara [in English, The Romans Surrendering to the Numantine Chief Megara]; La destrucción de Numancia [The Destruction of Numantia] and La muerte de Viriato (1807) [The Death of Viriatus], and those of Ramón Martí Alsina, El último día de Numancia (1858) [The Last Day of Numantia], and of Alejo Vera, El último día de Numancia (1881) [again, The Last Day of Numantia], all of which created the non-archaeological iconography of the legend. The patriotic revival of Numantia, which had already begun in the 17th and 18th centuries, developed in the wake of the territorial reorganization of Spain undertaken in 1833 by the Secretary of State and Office of Public Works, Francisco Javier de Burgos y del Olmo, in the government of Cea Bermúdez. The reorganization created the regional divisions that are still exist today, and the new administrative structures sought elements of identity to define the new provinces. The priest Gaspar Bono y Serrano, a resident of Soria, wrote in 1836: What Spaniard, however dimly he feels the fire of patriotism burning in his veins, however little it elevates his mind to remember our bygone glories, shall not be filled with a profound respect, an august veneration, to behold that venerable place? Arriving there, prostrating myself on the earth in an involuntary spasm of enthusiasm and kissing the darkened earth of that new Troy burnt to the ground was all the work of a moment. At the same time, Bono defined the need to preserve the memory of the city’s defenders: Thus amends are made, albeit belatedly, to those martyrs of national freedom. This tribute of gratitude and praise, which they so richly deserve, would have been fitting and proper at another time: but never did reason and justice demand it so imperatively as under the auspices of a wise and liberal government such as the one that fortunately rules over us.3 Numantinismo developed with support from the demands of the province of Soria—or Sorianismo, as this strand was called—which defined the city of Soria as the “heir to the glories of Numantia”. Indeed, two works by Gaspar Bono y Serrano entitled Last Day of Numantia and In the Ruins of Numantia

3  J. A. Gómez Barreda, Tras los orígenes de la Arqueología Soriana (Diputación provincial de Soria: Soria, 2014): 61–62.

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were used as a means to spread these ideas. By 1842, the ideological equating of the past with the present through Numantine history was well established. In Garray, the first monument was raised in remembrance of the Celtiberian Wars as the hill was being used as a place to pledge allegiance to the flag of the battalion of the National Militia of the province. This act would be repeated on 26 June 1886 when the second battalion of the Regiment of San Marcial, then stationed in the city, raised a new memorial to the Numantines. In 1853, Eduardo Saavedra carried out the first excavations, establishing the exact site of ancient Numantia. However, in spite of the pressure brought to bear by local scholars and politicians, more than half a century would pass before the work was continued. Soon after his ascent to the throne, Alfonso XIII paid his first visit to the archaeological site in September 1903 to reinforce his identification with the concepts of national unity, the greatness of the patria and resistance against foreign threats. Consequently, when the campaigns of General Valeriano Weyler in Cuba and General Camilo García de Polavieja in the Philippines were near to victory over the insurrectionist movements in 1897, the struggle of the Numantines against Rome was perfectly equated in the popular imagination with the aggression of the United States. It was necessary to translate such ideas to the population—at least to the educated people who had an influence on the political situation, since a large proportion of the Spanish people were still subject to powerful rural landowners, or caciques, and to their political ties. Press and school books were employed towards this end. In addition, the royal visit gave rise to the publication of the work Numantia! by Heliodoro Carpintero y Romero, whose objective was: «To propagate the image and meaning of such a heroic city among a group, that of school teachers, whose mission was, in turn, to educate the future citizens of the country». The source documents were not archaeological, but rather heroic traditions that had been built up since the 17th century on the basis of Classical texts. After the royal visit, the Senator Ramón Benito Aceña pushed for the construction of a new monument for the heroes of Numantia. The initiative was welcomed by the press as «a generous idea that is greatly fitting in these days of misfortune». Benito Aceña proposed the undertaking to the Minister of Public Education and Fine Arts, by drawing on arguments that blended elements of the patriotic character of the past with the present. Concerning the past, he argued: Without doubt, the most memorable event of ancient Spain is the siege and destruction of Numantia, whose hallowed ruins and whose now legendary heroism write one of the most glorious pages in the country’s history.

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Figure 1 24 August 1905. King Alfonso XIII visit Numancia guided by José Ramón Mélida.

Concerning the present, he went on to add: With its name carved in the hearts of all the people of Soria, and in the hearts of all Spaniards everywhere, it seems anomalous and inexplicable, nevertheless, that on that hill rising in the vicinity of Garray (. . .) there exists no monument, no pyramid, however simple it may be, such as in the Plaza del Dos de Mayo [in Madrid], in Bailén and in Girona These show present and future generations not only the gratitude and respect of a people towards those heroes of the national independence, but also that in those places there once rose the unvanquished city that merited from those same Romans the appellation of “terror of the empire.4 Alfonso XIII unveiled the monument on 24th August 1905, explaining his involvement in an occasion that addressed «the commemoration of a glorious event in the history of Spain, the heroic resistance and sublime sacrifice of the Numantines for the sake of independence». The ceremony took place a few days after Adolf Schulten and Konstantin Koenen began excavation of the site, a task hailed by the press as a patriotic undertaking.5 The work was led by a German researcher on behalf of the German Academy of Sciences. This however, antagonized local researchers and scholars who were alarmed that archaeological materials were being taken to Germany. They were also concerned that the interpretation of national history would be left to foreigners, their view being that the excavations of ancient Numantia were a «question of 4  Gómez Barreda, Tras los orígenes de la Arqueología Soriana, 135–136. 5  La Vanguardia. Issue of August 23, 1905, from a paper by El Imparcial.

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national honor». Strident nationalism and a repudiation of all things foreign came together in the creation of the Spanish Commission for the Excavation of Numantia through the Royal Order of 27 March 1906. The commission was made up of Eduardo Saavedra and Juan Catalina García, academics from the Royal Academy of History; José Ramón Mélida, from the San Fernando Royal Academy of Fine Arts; the members of the Soria Monuments Commission Teodoro Ramírez, Mariano Granados and Juan José García, and the architect Manuel Aníbal Álvarez representing the Ministry of Public Education. The digging began on 16th July, as Mélida attests in his press account of its identityoriented motives: Upon lifting away layer after layer of soil, which is like leafing through the veritable book of History, one gets a striking impression from touching these vestiges of the ruins of glorious Numantia and, after twenty-one centuries, picking out shards of vessels and other remains of ancient life, whose scenes appear to rise up and come to life before our eyes.6 It was decided that Schulten should work in the Roman encampments on the perimeter of the siege and not in Numantia itself. This set off a series of confrontations between the German researcher and the members of the Commission, particularly Santiago Gómez Santacruz, who joined in 1911. Between 1898 and 1908, at a time when the great powers of Europe were asserting their territorial expansion and pushing the colonial model to the limit, that had overseen the economic development of the continent through the 19th century, the heroic past of Numantia was used not only by traditionalists but also by reformists or “regenerationists”. The traditionalists sought to rearm the country ideologically, appealing to the evocation and sublimation of the past through comparisons with the present. They tried to show that the history of Spain was an unbroken line along which particular notions and social values were used to strengthen the unity of the patria and overcome crises of any sort, as Santiago Arambilet noted in 1904: In the final stages of Spanish decadence, when disaster struck at the frontline of the conquerors of the world and everywhere there resounded pained ayes and bitter complaints because of the loss of our extensive and rich colonial empire, the greatness and heroism of Numantia endures, serving as a constant spur to the defenders of national integrity, who do

6  J. R. Mélida, “Numancia”, Noticiero de Soria, n. 1930, Issue of August 4, 1906.

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not hesitate to shed their blood and lay down their lives on the sacrosanct altar of the patria, sacrificing their freedom and independence”.7 The key elements of this interpretative model were glory and pride in the past. However, supporters of regenerationism criticized these approaches, arguing for an analysis of the past that wouldn’t stem from a sterile perspective, but from a critical one. For them, it was necessary to interpret the history of Spain in terms of its diversity. The population should be treated not as subjects, but as fully-fledged citizens in need of education. This explains their distaste of the traditional way of telling history advocated by their opponents. Some of the leading intellectuals of the era, such as Antonio Machado and Joaquín Costa, defended that “regenerationist” position. To quote Machado: Our patriotism has changed course and channel (. . .) so that the remote possibilities of the future are not as far from us as the dead realities in our hands. We are fighting to free ourselves from the superstitious worship of the past.8 Costa, in turn, noted: Let us deflate those grand names Sagunto, Numantia, Otumba, Lepanto, with which we sully our youth in the schools, and let us hand them a sponge.9 The aim of the supporters of regenerationism was to move beyond an archaic vision of Spain, which would ultimately fail at consolidating the notions of patria, race and political unity as unifying elements within an idea of Spain. This vision would founder because it was unable to halt the rise of historic nationalist movements, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country. However, after the Civil War (1936–1939), the principles of Classical Numantinismo would be taken up by Francoism to defend identical elements as the basis of its own political ideology. In fact, Numantia and especially the “Numantine spirit” had 7  S. Arambilet, “Aceña y su monumento” Noticiero de Soria, Issue of August 24, 1905, from De la Torre: http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/arqueoweb/pdf/4-1/delatorre.pdf; and Gómez Barreda, Tras los orígenes de la Arqueología Soriana, 129–130. 8  A. Machado, “Nuestro patriotismo y la marcha de Cádiz”, 1908 In Antología Completa. II. Prosa (Ed. De la Torre: Madrid, 1999): 161–162. 9  J. Costa, Crisis política de España. Doble llave al sepulcro del Cid. (Biblioteca Costa: Madrid, 1914).

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also been used by the Republic during the Civil War. As in the case of Zaragoza during the French invasion 130 years before, these ideas were employed to boost the morale of the defenders of Madrid during the conflict. However, they were also put into service during the Republican period by conservative writers like Azorín, who applauded the resistance of the Numantines comparing them to the defenders of Baler in the Philippines in 1898–1899 in order to argue on behalf of the heroism of the war against the United States: Numantia did not surrender and Baler did not surrender (. . .) Baler bears witness to us that the spirit of Numantia has not been extinguished. The war with the United States was a disaster; but it was also a magnificent demonstration of the heroic spirit of Spain (. . .) They knew they were going to be destroyed, annihilated, and they serenely went to the line of battle and opened fire.10 3

Archaeology and Nationalism in Catalonia

Neo-Hellenism was a hallmark of Europe’s intelligentsia in the 19th century. Only a year after the first Olympic Games of the modern era were held in 1896, the Cretan Revolt against Ottoman domination led to the establishment of political autonomy on the island, which was placed under the protection of King George I of Greece. The liberation of a territory oppressed since the second half of the 17th century had a strong impact on Catalonia. Intellectuals of the Catalan Renaissance, or Renaixença, who were attempting to give structure to a nationalist policy based on demands for political self-government in accordance with the Bases de Manresa, used the Cretan case to launch a public declaration of their intent. Antoni Rubió i Lluch, a scholar of the Catalan presence in Greece in the Middle Ages and secretary of the Unió Catalanista, proposed to draft a text to congratulate the King of Greece on his decision to grant autonomy to Crete. The text followed publication in the newspaper La Veu de Catalunya of a Catalan translation of the opening stanzas of the national anthem of modern Greece done by Rubió i Lluch himself. The declaration, entitled Message to H. M. George I, King of the Hellenes, was sent to the Greek Consul in Barcelona, Muzzopulo, in March 1897.11 The attempt to draw a parallel between the cases 10  Azorín, “Prólogo” In S. Martín Cerezo, El sitio de Baler. La historia de los últimos de Filipinas relatada por su más destacado protagonista (30-6-1898 a 2-6-1899) (Madrid, 1935). 11   La Renaixença, núm. 7239. Issue of March 9, 1897: 1379.

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of Crete and Catalonia in the face of oppression from the Ottoman and Spanish empires was crystal clear, and the political repercussions were swift: Enric Prat de la Riba, the man responsible for publishing the text, was subjected to prosecution. Among the items mentioned in the text, one was Catalan’s uniqueness: The Catalan people received its initiation to culture from the Hellenes; because of them, there existed Emporion, the first pole of attraction that the Catalan race has had, and one powerful enough to bend to its sway the farthest regions of our national territory. (. . .) If Catalonia had a vote in the concert of people, now more than ever it would stand by your side, for it has had to know, to our misfortune, what foreign domination is, so that it will abhor it forever and everywhere that it may be found, whether it comes from Turks or Christians. The ideas expressed above formed part of the political thinking of Enric Prat de la Riba, who stated in a speech to the Catalan Centre of Sabadell in April 1897: We Catalans have been the first to cheer the Greeks and admire their heroism (. . .) we want for everyone that which we desire for our own land; we want the great idea to triumph everywhere there are peoples who suffer: we wish for everyone who speaks the Greek language to live in freedom, as we would want a happy outcome for our own beloved aspiration that all those who think and speak the Catalan language may enjoy full autonomy (. . .) all those who constitute a single nationality have the sacred right, a right that is above the capricious will of the legislators and princes of the Earth, to live together under a single political sovereignty.12 The content of the message should the political and cultural context of Noucentisme, which sought to build an ideological structure out of cultural elements that could be used as a basis for political interest. This cultural structure was to be linked essentially with a Classical past that had to be reinvented, and also with the exaltation of the Middle Ages, which was seen in Catalonia as a period of political independence, economic development and social peace. These ideas underpinned the recovery and study of the Catalan Romanesque, which was expressed by Lluís Domènech i Montaner in his work In Search of a National Architecture (1877):13 12  E. Prat de la Riba, La nació i l’estat. Escrits de joventut (La Magrana/Diputació de Barcelona: Barcelona, 1983): 90–91. 13  LL. Domènech i Muntaner, “En busca d’una arquitectura nacional” La Renaixença, Issue of October, 31 (1877).

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Only societies without convictions, without fixed ideas, whose lives swing back and forth between thoughts of today and thoughts of yesterday, with no faith in tomorrow, only those societies do not write their history in enduring monuments. Two objectives needed to be achieved to build an identity-based reality that could be considered a decisive ideological and social force: the dissemination of ideas and their easy comprehension and adoption by the population. In the late 19th century, writings in periodicals such as La Renaixença argued that the link between the origin of the Catalan identity and Classical Greece as a belated expression of the ideals of the Romantic movement that had marked European support for Greek independence. The Mediterranean, as the axis for the transmission of culture, together with the colony of Emporion (Empúries in Catalan) as the port of entry for Classical culture, gave structure to this line of thought. During the early years of the 20th century, artists and intellectuals worked to add symbolic elements to the aforementioned demands. At the Salon d’Automne in Paris in 1905, Arístides Maillol presented his sculpture Woman Seated on the Ground, popularly known as The Mediterranean, a piece in which the artist, as his friend François Bassères noted, had sought to achieve “a young, pure, luminous and noble figure” to represent the Mediterranean spirit.14 The piece was joined by another, Leda, produced in 1900, in which the artist started to give shape to his idea of the female form inspired by the prototypes of Classical Greek sculpture. It is likely that Maillol sought to illustrate the connection between Greece and Catalonia and the political situation of Catalan nationalism by means of the sorrowful expression of the figure; years later, in 1939, he defined Catalonia as the legacy of the Classical world.15 Dramatists and poets also played their part. The poet Miquel Costa i Llobera recreated the period of Greek colonization in his work La deixa del geni grec (1901) [in English, The Legacy of the Greek Spirit], laying out the emergence of a new culture, the Catalan culture rising from the ruins of paganism. Eduardo Marquina wrote the text for the lyric opera Emporium (1906) set to music by Enric Morera. In the story, the slave Nethú exclaims: «My life flees from the present which you would deny, and sinks its great hope and fierce claws into the future». Just as in the plays of Àngel Guimerà, the statement must 14  B. Lorquin, “Maillol i la concepció de la beellesa en l’escultura moderna” In Maillol (Ed. Caixa de Catalunya: Barcelona, 2009): 36. 15  See R. Casanova, “La geografía catalana de Maillol. De les arts i els artistes a banda i banda dels Pirineus” In Maillol (Caixa de Catalunya: Barcelona, 2009): 77–78; from J. Claudel, Maillol. Sa vie. Son oeuvre. Ses idées (Grasset: Paris, 1937).

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be understood as an illustration of the political divide between Catalonia and Spain thinly disguised Greek culture’s message of liberty: «Greece has made you free, may the will to live once again take root in your heart»,16 a speech that can be linked to Catalonia’s demands for political autonomy and its attempts to assert its Classical origin. The political interpretation of the opera is also associated with the victory of the Solidaritat Catalana coalition in the elections of April 1907. Emporium was not the first work to deal with the oppression of indigenous communities or to present the theme through a modern-day lens. In 1875, Àngel Guimerà published his heroic poem Indíbil i Mandoni. The text defended the fight against oppression as a path towards the recovery of freedom, but it was also critical of a society that did not rise up in rebellion even when it saw its leaders executed—for example, when Mandoni’s mother shows her son’s head to the village: In tears, the mother shows it to the village/ what have you done, oh race of so many heroes? Look!/ at what price do you sell out to the executioners? Awake!/ Vengeance and freedom! And the village hushes! Guimerà was a member of the pro-autonomy movement La Jove Catalunya and he wrote his poem in the year of the Bourbon Restoration, when Alfonso XII’s ascent to the throne brought the Democratic Sexennium to an end. It was not a straightforward epic text, but voiced a political demand to which Guimerà would return years later. In December 1915, he completed a tragedy in three acts also entitled Indíbil and Mandoni, which opened in 1917. The play was an instant success both due to the excellence of the writing and of its identification with the “struggles of the patria”.17 The text begins with a clear reference to the historical and political tenets of Prat de la Riba in defence of the union between Greek and Iberian cultures. One of the characters, Ornech, teaches the sardana, Catalonia’s native dance, to the Ilergetes. He had learnt the dance, he says, in Emporion: On the sand of the beach, just as the sun was rising above the sea, some Massaliote sailors descended from a powerful trireme and joined hands

16  E. Marquina, Emporium. Drama líric en tres actes (Barcelona, 1906). 17  “Teatre català. L’estrena de Indíbil i Mandoni” La Veu de Catalunya issue of December 14 (1917): 5.

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to form a human garland that stole my heart: I heard it sung on their lips and learnt it for my land, friends.18 His speech stresses that the Ilergetes had surrendered to Rome without earning Rome’s respect for their freedom. For that reason, their only possible solution was to fight Roman oppression. Making an interesting nuance, the character Indíbil rejects any assimilation to Romanness, which is just another form of slavery. And it couldn’t be any different because the objective, as Mandoni puts it, is «a land united under the heavens and the sun, and only ours!». Guimerà achieves transcendence through the idea of an eternal Catalonia, indestructible through time despite defeats, indicating that the values of Catalan sentiment will never vanish: While there are yet children who have nursed at the breasts of the women of our race, above all else, in spite of the centuries, falling and raising ourselves even higher, we will be a people, and we will have our feet on our land.19 The aim was to invest his people with the hope of future freedom: Oh, Land of our ancestors, and of those who will one day be free, my soul remains with you as a legacy . . . A dawn will come in which the rising Sun will see you great, eternal, avenged of traitors, and victorious in freedom, honour and independence. He was attempting to convey a simple political message: the Catalans were deeply rooted in Iberian culture. Since Roman times they had been required to fight repeatedly against invaders and political oppressors, and yet, despite all these hardships, they had been able to preserve their identity as a population in the expectation of regaining their freedom. Analyzed in the context of 1917, the demands and claims of this work clearly reflect the political debate that led the Lliga Regionalista to push for a Statute of Autonomy and to present a proposal to be debated in the Spanish parliament a year later. At this time several independence movements were making their mark in Europe, and their aspirations were set forth in US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points on 8th January 1918. Consequently, it is understandable that Guimerà, with his 18  À. Guimerà, Indíbil y Mandoni. Tragèdia en tres actes (Imp. La Renaixensa: Barcelona, 1917), 9: I Act, I Scene. 19  Guimerà, Indíbil y Mandoni, 127: III Acta, VI Scene.

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links to the Lliga and his commitment to the political freedoms of Catalonia, should begin his work with a clear political message. These examples were not the only ones. Joan Maragall, with the help of Pere Bosch Gimpera, expressed his admiration for Greek culture in his versification of the Homeric Hymns (1911); Puig i Cadafalch expressed the importance of Greek colonisation in Catalonia in his classes at the institution Estudis Universitaris Catalans in 1906,20 and Joan Segalà defended the study of the Greek language at the University of Barcelona, where the first Hellenists received their training. 4

Enric Prat de la Riba and Archaeology as a Reference for Identity

Antonio Rubió i Lluch was named Greek Consul in Barcelona in 1903 and was also president of the Institute for Catalan Studies (IEC) from its founding in 1907. The IEC was entrusted with the task of supporting and strengthening the influence of Catalan culture as the national academies had done it in other countries. However, the real force behind the IEC was not Rubió but Enric Prat de la Riba, president of the provincial government of Barcelona (the Diputació Provincial), who selected the members to sit on the founding board. Prat de la Riba oversaw the early work of the institution and carried out plans for its enlargement in 1911. Prat de la Riba had been developing his ideas on the definition of a Catalan patria since the 1880s, articulating a series of proposals that would come to materialize in the Bases per a la Constitució Regional Catalana or, as it became known popularly, the Bases de Manresa, which is seen as the core document of Catalonia’s political demands during the period of the Renaixença. Prat reiterated his nationalist ideas in a multitude of forums. In November 1890, on the occasion of the opening session of the academic year 1890–1891 at the Barcelona school Centre Escolar Catalanista, of which he was president, he addressed his audience as follows: Gentlemen, I come to speak to you of the Catalan nation which, large or small, is our only nation; I would like to tell you of its current problems, and so that you may sense a better future, show you that it is enslaved and then make you see how to melt its chains.21 20  “Estudis Universitaris Catalans” La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of March 27, (1906): 4. 21  E. Prat de la Riba (1890): “Discurs del president del Centre Escolar Catalanista de Barcelona llegit en la sessió inaugural del curs de 1890 a 1891”. La Renaixença. Diari de Catalunya, Issue November 30, 1890.

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Prat went on to compare Catalonia to other nations of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. He pointed to Poland, whose territory had been divided and given away, and to Ireland, subjugated by the United Kingdom. He scorned the idea of the nation states abandoning the dynamic set in motion in Europe by the French Revolution and consolidated at the Congress of Vienna. These nation states, Prat argued, did not respect the people whose territories were included within their own. As a result, he focused on the defense of two principles, language and law, as the essential elements for political renewal and the struggle against centralism and autocracy. For Prat, the Spanish state had nearly reached the conclusion of its process to unify Spain ideologically and socially, but the debility of corrupt governments under the Bourbon Restoration had left room for the pursuit of a policy of popular instruction that was crystallized in the Compendi de la Doctrina Catalanista [in English, Compendium of Catalan Nationalist Doctrine], which Prat wrote with Pere Montañola22 and published in 1894. The work comprised a series of questions followed by maximalist responses and may be compared to the Spanish Catechism of 1808, which had set out key ideas for the instruction of a population then confronted by Napoleonic occupation. Prat’s compendium, which set forth the grievances of Catalan nationalism against Spain, expressed its main ideas around the definition of the idea of the patria: Question: What, then, is the patria? Answer: The community of people who speak the same language, who have a shared history and live united by a single spirit that is stamped with an original vision and typifies all the expressions of its life. The compendium distorted history to demonstrate that all the political, social and economic problems of Catalonia were the outcome of centuries of oppressive actions taken by Spanish centralism independently of the political regime that governed Spain, in order to define the essential demands of political Catalan nationalism: In Catalonia, the Catalans must govern and not, as today, the Castilians or politicians mimicking the Castilians, as if we were still children and did not know how (. . .) we must claim the indisputable right of Catalonia to constitute and organise itself according to its own needs and character, and to provide it with every sort of law that suits its way of being.

22  E. Prat de la Riba – P. Muntañola, Compendi de la Doctrina Catalanista (Sabadell 1894).

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Prat defined the assimilation of the concepts of patria and nation to lay the groundwork for the constitution of a new model of state, attacking the Spanish state by equating Spain with Castile, something that would become a cornerstone of Catalan nationalist thinking. However, there was a problem: the difficulty of mobilizing Catalan society for political autonomy. If nationalism was unable to become a popular mass movement, there was no chance it could achieve its demands. To make this possible, it was necessary to construct a powerful feeling of identity based on specific points of reference that would sharply distinguish the Catalan social ideological discourse from the Spanish state. Prat’s choice was to link his political demands with the recreation of Catalonia’s historical past. To build a reference of identity, in 1896 he began to focus on Greece and on the focal points of the dissemination of Greek culture. In order to establish the distinctiveness of the origins of Catalonia, he had to reflect on the essence of the history of Spain, which he linked conceptually to a core principle: the establishment of territorial unification was not to be only administrative, but also political and social. Thus, he argued, Spain was not a united country; and he attacked the commonly held view that attributed the country’s “unity” to the Visigoths:23 In the specific case to which we refer, what contributed to making this prejudice widespread was the interest of the writers of the central regions of Spain, who, in order to lend credence to and encourage the uniformity of the Castilian nationality to which they belonged, sought to present the variety of people and governments as a terrible and unfortunate consequence of the Muslim invasion. Prat underpinned his thought with the theses of Francesc Romaní i Puigdengolas in Antiquity of Spanish Regionalism (1890) and Gothic Domination in the Iberian Peninsula (1898), arguing that dominant political systems were transient to the cultural and social realities of people. The superstructures of government were short-lived, while the essence of communities remained immutable and reemerged each time the ruling political system faltered. In a lecture given in the Ateneu of Barcelona on 19th February 1897, Prat laid out the foundations of his ideas of Catalan nationality24 using three essential elements as his main themes: art, law and language: 23  E. Prat de la Riba (1896): “Un lugar común de la Histoira de España: la unidad de la España visigoda”, Revista Jurídica de Cataluña, II (1896): 840–844. 24  E. Prat de la Riba (1897): “Lo fet de la nacionalitat catalana”, La Renaixença. Diari de Catalunya. Issues of February 11, 12 and 13, 1897.

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The nationality that has been capable of producing an original art has given one of the most beautiful testimonies to life that a population can conceive (. . .) the people that has not been capable of constructing its own language is a failed population because language is the most perfect expression of the national spirit and the most powerful instrument of nation-building, and therefore of the preservation and life of the nationality. The study of Protohistory and of Classical texts helped Prat define the existence of an Iberian ethnos or nationality reaching from Murcia to the Rhône or the geography of the Catalan language and of the area of the Crown of Aragon in the Middle Ages. He used this theory to explain the political differences that existed in the territory, using as his guideposts the works of Hecataeus and Herodotus as well as the role played by Rome in the unification of the conquered lands (understanding unification as their cultural and social decimation). As a solution, Prat proposed that nationalities be incorporated into states inspired by their own political idea. Once he had defined the nation as an expression of the sentiments of a population, Prat concluded that it should be based on a spiritual principle that would craft people from their birth to their death. Such a national spirit was the result of the influence of diverse people unified by a language, viewed as the sole crucible of national thought. A political structure might prohibit the use of this language and bring to an end the customs and laws of a people, but it would never succeed in destroying the people’s spirit, which would be preserved in the expectation of a full resurgence later. Prat defined new historical roots of identity and rejected the medieval ones which were then used to frame the distinct political structure of Catalonia. He grounded this approach in the Iberian culture, which, as we have seen, he defined in terms of an Iberian ethnos or nationality. Though his approach could not rely on the backing of the archaeological record in 1897, it did enable him to strive for two outcomes: to distinguish the past of Catalonia from that of Castile-Spain before the first process of political and territorial unification following the Roman conquest, and to define the territorial area of Catalan culture inside a single geographical space. This was linked to the area of the Iberian ethnos based on the geographical boundaries marked out in the GrecoLatin sources. Prat thus began a series of writings in which he raised the Iberians—understood as pre-Catalans—to the category of a historical population equivalent to the Classical cultures of the Mediterranean because they had obtained part of their ideological and cultural foundations from Greek colonization.

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Prat made use of the fact that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, according to the accounts of Strabo and Livy, the Phocaean presence on the Peninsula was limited to the northeast. He also tied the ideological and economic progress of Catalonia over time to its Classical roots and to its position as the Peninsula’s port of entry for the technological and cultural advances from the Greek world during protohistory and, in the mid-1890s, from Europe. From this standpoint, he relegated the cultural evolution of Castile to a much later period and always conceived it as a result of the overlay of foreign political structures, from Rome to Al-Andalus—that is, by imposition, and not, as in the case of Catalonia, through a process of assimilation of ideas and cultural fusion in which the Greek settlers exerted no political dominion over the Iberian ethnos: When the Phoenician traveller whom Avienus copied followed the coasts of the Sea of Sardinia five hundred years before Christ, he found the Iberian ethnos, the Iberian nationality prevalent from Murcia to the Rhône, that is, from the Libyan-Phoenician peoples of eastern Andalusia to the Ligurians of Provence. Those people were our ancestors, that Iberion ethnos the first ring that History shows us of the chain of generations that have forged the Catalan soul.25 Prat also noted that the survival of Iberia-Catalonia was not possible because of the successive presence of troops from Carthage and Rome from the late third century BC onwards, which destroyed the Iberian ethnos by diluting its territories between Gaul and Hispania. However, at the time of the collapse of the Roman Empire the situation was reversed: When the political power of Rome fell apart, ancient buried people emerged into the light of History, each one speaking its own language, and the ancient Iberian ethnos being first among them made the accents of the Catalan language resound from Murcia to Provence, from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Aquitaine. Ligurians, Gauls, Tartessians, Greeks, Phoenicians, Carthaginians and Romans had not driven back our people by even a single inch of land. The frontiers of the Catalan language were the same as those that the most ancient of the explorer-historians drew for the Iberian ethnos (. . .) the transformation of Latin civilisation into Catalan civilisation is a fact that, in itself, demonstrates the existence of the Catalan national spirit.26 25  Prat de la Riba (1993), 55. 26  Prat de la Riba (1993), 56.

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The impact of Prat’s ideas served to reaffirm the notion of the differences between state and patria. While a state could be reorganized or created, a patria could not.27 He gave shape to his ideas in the work Compendi de la Història de Catalunya (1898) [in English, Compendium of the History of Catalonia], in which he argued that the protohistorical population of the northeastern Iberian Peninsula had formed part of a supposed Sardinian Empire, a territory known to the Egyptians as Sardanya. Later, in the fifth century BC it was called Iberia by the Greeks. This new social structure is the one that was impacted by Greek trade and colonization at a time when the Iberians were threatened by the Ligurians to the north and the Tartessians to the south: The Greeks of Marseille settled then on the Catalan coast, founding Emporion (450 BC) alongside ancient Indika, with which it ultimately merged to form a single city. Then the centre of trade and of the culture of our land, hitherto established on the Ebro and in Tarragona, moved to the Gulf of Roses; and by gradual advances, by means of new settlements and constant alliances, Emporion became the moral capital of all the people belonging to our race on either side of the Pyrenees. The political crisis that followed the defeat against the United States prompted Prat de la Riba to redefine the political system of the Spanish state through his articles in La Veu de Catalunya. In his pieces, Prat called for a greater degree of political and economic autonomy for Catalonia, but he distanced himself from advocating for complete rupture, summarizing his position in the statement: “If in Madrid they want Catalonia to be Spanish, they must find a way to make it comfortable within Spain”.28 Nevertheless, he soon understood that the governments of the Restoration strove for a unification of the peninsular territory that left only two options: being considered as Castilians or being considered as foreigners.29 After the creation of the Lliga Regionalista, Prat penned a warning in 1901 to the Catalan deputies in the Spanish parliament, warning them on the attempts to put an end to the plurality of nationalities within Spain and signaling that these national entities were impossible to destroy or change. In 1903, he expanded the historicist argument to contend that the Catalan cultural reality was not limited by the Ebro and the Pyrenees, but that it was a nation spanning from Valencia to the Rhône, stretching up the Ebro and beyond the Pyrenees all the way to the Atlantic and that the elements of its 27  Prat de la Riba (1897): “Comentaris al missatge al Rei dels Hel.lens” La Renaixença. Diari de Catalunya. Issue of March, 11, 1897. 28  Prat de la Riba (1899): “El que som” La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of July 25, 1899. 29  Prat de la Riba, “Catalunya i l’Estat” La Veu de Catalunya. Issue July 23, 1901.

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identity could be traced by means of the language.30 He would reaffirm these principles in a study on the Catalan parliament [Les Corts, in Catalan] in which he stressed that this institution, established by King Jaume I, defined the basis of Catalonia’s political constitution, a key body “in the public life of truly free peoples”31 and an expression of the political will and identity of the Catalan people and their desire to solidify a representative political system. The key text in Prat de la Riba’s thought, which influenced the construction Catalonian identity awareness and political demands, is La Nacionalitat Catalana (1905) [in English, The Catalan Nationality], a vital element of proautonomy federalism. The objective was to give shape to an ideological structure that withstood the backlash of the Spanish state articulated in the Law of Jurisdictions, which threatened to stifle the nationalist demands supported by broad sectors of Catalan society: Little by little, the study of its own way of being and its comparison with other human societies confers on Catalonia an awareness of its character, and it is this character that is the foundation of the right to all the elements of its national feeling and the right to its own State to direct them. The nationalist process continues. It has not yet achieved the State, the law and the language, we have not fully attained internal expansion, but Catalan nationalism has already initiated the second function of all nationalisms, the function of external influence, the imperialist function. Prat attacked the concept of state represented by Restoration Spain, saying that “the Spanish state is an army of occupation destined to live at the expense of a country: they all take whatever they can, however they can”. Prat’s ideas reflect an adaptation of the identity-based archaeology arising in Europe in the wake of the Congress of Vienna, when every nation-state was seeking to reaffirm its legitimacy and identity through the study of the past and the creation of deep connections in the population. All states, in the 19th century, saw their past as a projection of their future. Some, like Sweden and Denmark, created museum collections to present a distinct history of their territory since prehistory. Some added to their legitimation through national legends, such as Boudica in the United Kingdom; Arminius in Prussia and Second Reich Germany, and Vercingetorix in the France of Napoleon III. Antiquity was used to unite people to a past that was larger than their lives and bound them to their ancestors, 30  Prat de la Riba, “De lluny”. La Veu de Catalunya. Issue January 1, 1904. 31  Prat de la Riba, Corts Catalanes. Proposicions i respostes amb pròleg i comentaris d’Enric Prat de la Riba (Barcelona, 1906).

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stressing continuity through time as a tool to preserve the collective self. In addition, this gave a historical dimension to the elements used in the structuring of the nation, and the need to investigate the past increased the importance of archaeology as a means to give tangible demonstration of ideas linked to intangible, emotional definition. The connection of Iberian culture with Greece and the Classical world required a point of contact, a reference. For Prat de la Riba, the site of Emporion (Empúries in Catalan) could serve as this point of reference, a “place of memory” for a specific identity: Though it constituted no political unit, the city of Emporion, with the force of attraction common to great capitals, had become the centre of numerous territories. Well, the archaeology has located the traces of its influence almost always within the frontiers of the Iberian ethnos, and in the first treaty between Rome and Carthage, the southern limit of Rome and its allies, among which was Emporion, was fixed in the region of Murcia, the southern limit of the Catalan language.32 In other writings, Prat pushed further this idea based on the link between Catalonia and Classical Greece. In 1907, he argued that the adoption of science and knowledge by the inhabitants of the Catalan territory, forming the basis of their development, arose from contact with other people, and that this process was broken in the 15th century when Catalonia was subordinated by Spain and would not be revived until the growth of the movement of the Renaixença. He was determined in his use of archaeological references on the origins of Catalonia and the territories of the Catalan language, calling for a reunification of these lands into a Greater Catalonia: The Catalan race has hardly ever had a national name. At the beginning of history, when Phoenician vessels plied the Sea of Sardinia in their comings and goings from trading posts to the metropolis, the tribes settling in our territory had a common name. Later, when the long and tapering ships of the Phocaeans moored off our coasts, our ancestors also had a common name, a name that was perpetuated by the geographers and extended to the entire peninsula: Iberia. Since then, however, never has a single ethnic name designated all the people of our nationality.33

32  Prat de la Riba, La nacionalitat catalana. Compendi de la doctrina catalanista (La Magrana/ Diputació de Barcelona: Barcelona, 1993): 57. 33  Prat de la Riba, “Greater Catalonia”, La Senyera. Issue of Jannuary 12, 1907.

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Prat de la Riba began set his ideas into motion after his election as president of the provincial government of Barcelona (the Diputació) on April 23rd 1907, two days after the victory of Solidaritat Catalana in the Spanish parliamentary elections in which the coalition won 40 of the 44 seats in contention: la fuerza de la volunta de un pueblo.34 As part of his political plan, Prat strengthened cultural activity, creating the Institute for Catalan Studies (IEC) on 18th June of that year. At the IEC, the study of history and archaeological research were seen as crucial to the definition of the Catalan nationality. Together with the Council of Museums [in Catalan, the Junta de Museus] overseeing Barcelona’s museums and galleries, the IEC took a decision at its first meeting to undertake excavations of the ancient Greek settlement at Emporion. This was a project that Prat de la Riba presented as one of the cornerstones of the Diputació’s cultural activity on October 22nd 1908 in a speech given in the presence of Alfonso XIII during the king’s visit to Barcelona, citing the memory of the origins of Catalonia in his demands for political autonomy.35 Prat was aware that identity-based demands had served to unite diverse political forces and create a collective awareness among the citizenry of the grounds for political demands and of their historical tradition. Conscious of the importance of symbols as ways to illustrate his identity-focused discourse, Prat chose to give symbolic meaning to the ancient Palau de la Generalitat, the headquarters of the Diputació since 1908. His plan was to turn it into a symbol of civil architecture for the self-government longed for by the Catalan nationalists, and to do so he devised an iconographic discourse to symbolise the rebirth of Catalonia within the political and social space of the Catalan national entity.36 The painter Joaquim Torres i Garcia used the iconography of Ancient Greece to express the Catalan nationalist ethos in the composition La Catalunya eterna (1913) [in English, Eternal Catalonia], which featured the two basic elements of nationalist discourse: language and thought. This work refered to the goddess Hestia, protector of the sacred hearth fire, and recreated the Athena Giustiniani of the Vatican Museums as protector of the life of the patria. The scene abounds with references to Classical architecture37 in order to present a politically sovereign Catalonia, master of its fate. Texts by Ovid and Virgil served as inspiration for the second work in his series, entitled L’edat d’or de la humanitat (1915) [in English, The Golden Age of Humanity), which 34  Prat de la Riba, “Catalunya i avant” La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of April 23, 1907. 35  Prat de la Riba, 1907: “Discurs a la Diputació de Barcelona el primer d’octubre de 1909”. La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of October, 2, 1909. 36  J. Sureda, Torres García. La fascinació del clàssic (Caixa de Terrasa: Barcelona, 1993): 77–78. 37  Sureda, Torres García, 114–115.

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lauds the concepts of the land, agriculture and the family, adding in Christian elements to the iconographic discourse. However, after Primo de Rivera’s coup d’état in 1923 and the abolition of the Mancomunitat of Catalonia, the new president of the Diputació in Barcelona, the conservative Josep Maria Milà i Camps, had the works by Torres i Garcia covered over with allegorical depictions inspired by Spanish nationalist ideals. The start of the excavations at Emporion was the culmination of the interest in the history, art, and archaeology of Catalonia which had emerged in the last quarter of the 19th century in broad sectors of Catalan society. The aim was to recover the memory of the Catalan past, and one of the main forms of expressions that this project assumed was the creation of associations, as Josep Fiter i Inglès highlighted in 1876: Catalan nationalism in practice resulted in the rambler becoming a sort of advanced guard for the preachers of the patria, a kind of missionary who fell increasingly in love with Catalonia and wanted to communicate his love to other children of the land in whom it still lay dormant.38 In particular, Fiter i Inglès pointed to the ramblers’ association, the Centre Excursionista de Catalunya, which adopted the tenets of the regionalism of Valentí Almirall and of the nationalism of Prat de la Riba: Archaeology will carry us to a true programme of demands; it will remind us of times of prosperity and strength at all levels, times that, if we compare them to those of today, must confront us with the fact that we are looking on impassively at the collapse of a great building that threatens to take with it our house in the midst of its ruins. If we turn our eyes back towards the monuments of the past, each day we will discover new reasons not to be ashamed, but to feel honoured to be children of Catalonia.39 Archaeology and historical research were used to bring together social forces around specific ideas of political change and the inherent social evolution which it represented, taking care especially of the dissemination of the findings and what they represented. In the periodical La Renaixença, fourteen articles on the archaeology and ancient history of Catalonia were published 38  J. Gudiol, “L’excursionisme i l’arqueologia” Butlletí del Centre Excursionista de Catalunya 87 (1902): 91. 39  Gudiol, “L’excursionisme i l’arqueologia”, 94.

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between 1871 and 1898. Similarly, studies on archaeology and numismatics appeared in the Boletín de la Asociación Artístico-Arqueológica de Barcelona, and the Revista Histórica Latina and the Revista de Ciencias Históricas, both run by Salvador Sanpere i Miquel. At the same time, the first monographs were published about archaeological sites, such as those referring to the necropolises at Cabrera de Mar,40 Sant Feliu de Guíxols41 and Terrassa.42 Prat de la Riba offered strong personal support to the archaeological interventions at ancient Emporion in order to strengthen the ideological structure that he had created while studying Classical sources. This single-mindedness was acknowledged by Jaume Bofill in 1910: At the Council of Museums [Junta de Museus], none of the men who adored or were fanatical about Archaeology, not even one of our friends, with the exception of Puig i Cadafalch, wished to risk starting excavations because of doubts about their possible success and because of fear of being held accountable or inviting ridicule. [But] Prat de la Riba, an amateur among the professionals on the Council, did not hesitate even for a moment, and with gentle insistence, pushed on resolutely against the overt opposition of the majority (. . .) This confidence in the nationalist efficacy of history appears again in the archaeological historical character conferred on the Institute for Catalan Studies at its inception. To achieve this objective, however, Prat had to overcome the misgivings of historians like Joaquim Botet i Sisó, the author of the work Notícia histórica y arqueológica de la antigua ciudad de Emporion (1879) [in English, Historical and Archaeological Report of the Ancient City of Emporion] who rejected the Greek influence on the Catalan lands, but also the opposition of the Council of Museums, which voiced its reservations about the value of the excavations. Under the influence of the art historian Josep Pijoan, the Council advocated support for the continuation of studies of Romanesque art and the establishment of a major national museum; indeed, the Middle Ages and their artistic expressions were viewed by broad sectors of the intelligentsia as the foundational reference point of Catalonia’s history and, by extension, of its identity.

40  J. Rubio de la Serna, Notícia de una necrópolis anterromana descubierta en Cabrera de Mataró (Barcelona) en 1881 (Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello: Madrid 1888). 41  E. Gonzáles Hurtebise, Descubrimiento de una Antigua necrópolis en Sant Feliu de Guíxols (RBM: Madrid, 1905). 42  A. Soler i Palet, Tarrassa arqueológica (Serra y Rosell: Barcelona, 1906).

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Prat de la Riba received backing from Josep Puig i Cadafalch, in spite of the fact that Puig i Cadafalch took an opposing view in his work L’arquitectura romànica a Catalunya (1907–1909) [in English, Romanesque Architecture in Catalonia] and rejected the importance of Greek settlement in the formative process of the Catalan identity.43 For Puig i Cadafalch, the indigenous communities of the time had been culturally backward and the contacts between the Greeks and the indigenous people could not have formed the basis of a social and political structuring of the territory. He proposed to show this structuring process in Roman art, and in fact concurred with Pijoan that the Romanesque was the key to Catalonia’s distinctive artistic trajectory. Nevertheless, Puig i Cadafalch knew how to put political necessity ahead of his scientific considerations and joined Prat’s project to create a Greek identity in the origins of Catalonia.44 The Council of Museums agreed to purchase the land on which the site was located on 20th March 1908, and excavations began on 24 March. The work proceeded under the leadership of Puig i Cadafalch until the end of November. The La Veu de Catalunya, the Lliga Regionalista’s newspaper, defined the main objective of the excavations as the identification of the origins of the civilization of Catalonia in the period of Greek colonization, moving past the Middle Ages as a reference. Indeed, the first positive results occasioned an outpouring of joy that was dubbed “the celebration of the walls”45 because of the location of the gateway of the Roman city, which Puig i Cadafalch and Pijoan mistook for the gateway of the Greek city based on Livy’s account.46 With such a find only three months into the digging, the project’s sponsors believed they were now in possession of tangible evidence of the importance of the Greek settlement and might therefore be able to link the origins of Catalonia to the Classical world. Adolf Schulten paid a visit to the site in June 1908 accompanied by Puig i Cadafalch and Pijoan.47 Schulten then spoke to the governing board of the IEC, comparing the significance of the excavations at Emporion with Numantia. Thus, if those constructing a Spanish identity used the site at Garray as a key building block, those at work on the Catalan identity did the same in their study of the Greek settlement. 43  J. Puig i Cadafalch, L’arquitectura romànica a Catalunya I. Els precedents (IEC/Generalitat de Catalunya: Barcelona, 1983): 9–10. 44  F. “Cróniques de Madrid” La Veu de Catalunya. Issue May, 29, (1908): 1. 45  R. Casellas, “A propósit de la excavació d’Empúries. Del plaer de descobrir” La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of September 8, (1908): 1. 46   I EC Archiv. Actas de la Junta del IEC. Session of June 20, 1908. 47   I EC Archiv. Actas de la Junta del IEC. Session of September 27, 1909.

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1909. The statue of Asclepius presented to children of a elementary school by Josep Puig i Cadafalch.

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The nationalist impact sought through the excavations could not be kept only to the upper social classes. The results had to be disseminated at the grassroots level and this created a new phenomenon: identity-oriented mass tourism. In June 1909, the Centre Excursionista de Catalunya sent 160 people from the port of Barcelona to ancient Emporion aboard the steamship Balear. This was followed in 1910 by a new expedition of 600 people on the Tintoré, organised by the Ateneu Enciclopèdic Popular. The first archaeological documentary was filmed as well: entitled Excursió a les ruïnes d’Empúries [in English, Excursion to the Ruins of Emporion], the piece was shown in the cinemas of Barcelona in 1911. The importance and impact of the excavations increased still further after several sculptural fragments were found on 25th October 1909, including a male sculpture identified as Asclepius and a female head regarded as Venus. These findings were presented by Puig i Cadafalch to the IEC shortly afterwards,48 and attributed interchangeably as Neptune or Asclepius.49 On 5th November, further fragments were unearthed and immediately presented by the director of the fieldwork, Emili Gandia, to the members of the Council of Museums.50 Just as the intellectuals of the Noucentisme movement had hoped, the statue of Asclepius became an instant icon of the Greek influence in Catalonia51 and was regarded as tangible proof of Catalonia’s Classical roots. The pieces were rapidly adopted as symbols. Eugeni d’Ors, one of the most influential proponents of Noucentisme, described ancient Emporion as follows: As a reflection of an ancestral Catalonia, open to the Mediterranean and heir to the great cultures of the past, it was the link to Classical Greek culture, as a distinct element of [Catalonia’s] character and national identity. D’Ors also put the head of Venus52 on the cover of the journal Almanach dels Noucentistes, the publication in which he channeled his writings. In fact, he had already dedicated an ode to the figure entitled Petita oració [in English, Small Prayer],53 the text of which was theoretically poetic but laden with political intent: 48   I EC Archiv. Actas de la Junta del IEC. Session of November 8, 1909. 49  “Crònica del Institut d’Estudis Catalans. Octubre 1909”, La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of November, 4, (1909): 2. 50  “Sessió de la Junta de Museus”. La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of November, 8, (1909): 4. 51  “Darreres notícies”. La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of November 10, (1909): 32. 52  R. Casellas, “Troballes esculptòriques en les excavacions d’Empúries. L’estàtua femenina ¿Es una Diana?”, La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of September 15, (1901): 5. 53   La Veu de Catalunya. Issue of September 12, 1910.

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Figure 3

1909. Emporion researcher Emili Gandia photographed in the walls sector of the Neapolis after the end of the first fieldworks.

Small head of Venus that is likely to be a small head of Diana, found at Emporion and now housed in our Museums; she wishes, in memory and love of the ancient Greek Catalonia, to grant a Classical meaning to the modern bewildered Catalonia. There was obviously a double reference. Not only did d’Ors once again link the Classical past of the territory with the ideal defended by Catalan nationalist thinkers, but he was also making a clear allusion to the political situation of 1909. In this year the riots of the Tragic Week had called into question the foundations of a certain idea of Catalonia, conservative and bourgeois, that had seized power after the breakdown of the political unity achieved in 1906 with the candidacy of Solidaritat Catalana. D’Ors was not the only intellectual who used the findings at the excavations at Emporion as arguments and points of reference in his work. Josep Carner also did so in his poem Camperola Llatina [in English, Latin Peasant Woman], which appeared in the book Verger de les galanies (1911) [in English, Orchard of Kindness] and in the foreword to an edition of the work of the French poetess of Catalan roots Andrée Brugière de Gorgot, Dans les ruines d’Ampurias (1918) [in English, Among the Ruins of Emporion]. Carner argued that the excavations were the tangible sign of the Greek presence and influence in Catalonia:

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Emporion (. . .) is the Classical and Medieval past that appears upon the earth as a smile of promise, bearing witness to an ideal substance that is immaterial, inalienable, inextinguishable (. . .).54 The statue of Asclepius, removed to the Museum of Decorative Arts and Archaeology of Barcelona and presented to the public in the magazine Ilustració Catalana on 21st November 1909, became a symbol for Catalan political demands. On 19th February 1910, the Council of Museums of Barcelona agreed to commission three copies of the statue from the sculptor Alexandre Ghilloni i Molera. The destination of the copies reaffirmed the statue’s emblematic character. One was placed at the excavations’ site, while another was put in front of the main staircase leading to the headquarters of the IEC and the Library of Catalonia, located in the palace of the provincial government of Barcelona (the Diputació).55 Asclepius, the deity of healing, became the protector of Catalan culture and of the institutions representing it. Thus, in his inaugural address to open the Library of Catalonia on 28th May 1914 Rubió i Lluch could say: We must never let go of the golden thread of tradition so as not to sacrifice our national essence from which we receive life, but we must at the same time raise our eyes to the shining star of world civilisation. So as not to lose our place in the sun on this planet.56 The excavations at Emporion were a priority for the Council of Museums and the IEC. They continued under the leadership of Puig i Cadafalch until the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera recovered their association with the Catalan identity after the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931. Puig i Cadafalch also reaffirmed the relationship between Catalonia and Greece in the architectural blueprint for the Barcelona Universal Exposition of 1929, in which he linked Catalonia to the Ionian phase of Hellenic culture. He referred to Athens, its thought, and its philosophical and scientific outputs as the reference for a great number of nationalists. Barcelona would have to be Athens, and the mountain of Montjuïc, where the pavilions were located, its 54  J. Carner, “Pròleg” In A. Bruguière de Gorgot, Dans les ruines d’Ampurias (Seix Barral: Barcelona, 1918): 11. 55   I EC Archiv. Actas de la Junta de la SHA. Session of February 26, 1912. 56  A. Balcells – E. Pujol, Història de l’Institut d’estudis Catalans (IEC: Barcelona, 2002), I: 368.

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Acropolis. The triumphal esplanade that led to this Acropolis, which was symbolised in the National Palace, had a tetragrammaton made up by four Ionic columns that were twenty metres tall and originally topped by four winged statues representing victory. Symbolic of the four stripes or bars of the Catalan flag, the monument was torn down on the orders of the dictator Primo de Rivera who, after seizing power in 1923, abolished the leading political and cultural institutions of Catalonia. But it was not the dictatorship that brought the project to link Catalonia and its Greek origins to an end. Much earlier, particularly after the death of Prat de la Riba in 1917, the Catalan intelligentsia had already decided once again to connect the origins of the Catalan nation to its time of splendour in the Middle Ages. This discourse was endorsed definitively in the opening ceremony of the Museu d’Art de Catalunya on 24th March 1936, when the chairman of the Council of Museums, Pere Coromines, said: By opening this museum, Catalonia responds to those asking what it wanted to do with its national freedom. Here we have a totally new work, because only with the effort of the Catalans has it been created (. . .) the body of work on display is what our parents and grandparents produced out of their life, their suffering and their dreams (. . .) this is the mirror in which we must see ourselves reflected who now and in the future must convey to the world the message of the Catalan culture. This was a speech that Ventura Gassol, the Catalan minister of culture, supported wholeheartedly: We wish to make a statement of Catalan identity always and at all times, as our ancestors did in the Romanesque and Gothic periods, and as we repeat today to say to everyone what Catalonia believes, thinks and dreams.57 5

Conclusions

The disaster of 1898 impacted Spanish and Catalan nationalisms differently. For Spain, the defeats proved the impracticability of a continued colonial by the governments of the Restoration, which lacked legitimacy and resources. 57  F. Gracia Alonso – G. Munilla, Salvem l’art¡. La protección del patrimoni cultural català durant la Guerra Civil (La Magrana: Barcelona, 2011): 14–15.

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Figure 4 Notice of the visit of king Alfonso XIII at the archaeological site of Numancia, September 1903, in the Soria newspaper El Avisador Numantino.

Facing the disenchantment of a majority of the population, hard hit by the economic crisis, the government relied on patriotism as a formula for social cohesion around the figure of King Alfonso XIII. In order to restore the pride of the Spanish people, they resorted once again to the myth of ancient Numantia as an example of the supreme values of the patria. On this occasion, however, the ideological regeneration did not reach its goals. Beyond the local level—the so-called Sorianismo—the flickerings of Numantia had barely any influence over society, but it would nevertheless not be forgotten: over the course of the 20th century in Spain, various regimes of different stripes and persuasions would again turn to the exploits of Numantia as a support for their political thought. In the Catalan case, Prat de la Riba’s invention of a Greek past for Catalonia, which sought illustration through the interventions at Emporion, did not rise from the desolation of defeat, but as a force around which the political demands of Catalan nationalism could be unified. With the backing of intellectuals like Eugeni d’Ors and Josep Puig i Cadafalch, this notion, which was backed by no real archaeological evidence, quickly gained support in certain quarters and remained the justification for a distinct nationalism, at least until Prat de la Riba’s death in 1917. In time, the medieval period was accepted as the starting-point of the Catalan identity but the interest in archaeology was not abandoned. In fact, references to Catalonia’s Greek past, even if only as a mystification among groups of intellectuals, are still made today.

CHAPTER 4

Illyrian Autochthonism and the Beginnings of South Slav Nationalisms in the West Balkans1 Rok Stergar 1

Autochthony in Balkan Scientific and Public Discourse

For a lot of people, an answer to the questions “Who am I?” and/or “Who are we?” is intrinsically connected to an answer to the question “Where do I/we come from?” And it seems that many prefer an answer that gives them or the community they identify with an ancestry as old as possible; ancient origins are still perceived as a prestigious feature of a nation. Particularly in East and South East Europe such an understanding has been bolstered by the abuse of history made by politicians, some historians, and other scholars. There—as Julie Mostov has argued: national mythologies provide a renewed sense of identity for people, particularly for those who feel they were denied their particular religious or cultural identity by the old regime or other national groups. In the face of confusion, instability and abrupt change, a richly embroidered national identity provides a sense of historical continuity and deep historical roots. These tales have historical foundations, but often enjoy a number of embellishments and suffer from gaps where the histories of others are left out or distorted. Still, their historical grounding gives them credence and power, especially in the hands of historians, who use their training, knowledge and access to archives and rare documents to give them a certitude and legitimacy hard for any lay person to dispute.2

1  I would like to thank Marko Zajc, Jernej Kosi, Sašo Jerše, and the participants of the 2015 Conference “Beyond the Roman Antiquity: Rediscovering the Ancient People in the Mediterranean Europe (19th and 20th C.)” held at the Institut d’études avancées in Paris for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 2  J. Mostov, “The Use and Abuse of History in Eastern Europe: A Challenge for the 90s”, Constellations 4 (1998): 377.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004335424_006

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Certainly, the fascination with ancient origins is evident elsewhere, too.3 However, there are not many places where the obsession with continuity and indigeneity has reached such proportions as in South East Europe. In Greece, the claim that modern Greeks are direct descendants of ancient Hellenes is still almost a dogma. It is an important part of the self-representation of the state and of the media discourse; ever since Constantinos Paparrigopoulos and his History of the Greek Nation (1899) it dominates Greek historiography. A few rare attempts to challenge this uniformity have been resolutely and sometimes brutally rejected.4 The Romanian public and scholars—archaeologists, historians, linguists, and others—mostly see the modern Romanian nation as a continuation of the ancient “Daco-Roman” people; there are different variations of this theme, however continuity and autochthony are a common element.5 A belief in indigeneity also permeates the public and scholarly discourse in Albania; Albanians are seen as direct successors of Illyrians, who supposedly never completely assimilated under the Romans and withdrew to the mountains as the Roman rule began to crumble. Furthermore, the “Pelasgian theory”, a claim that Albanians are descendants of ancient Pelasgians, has recently resurfaced and gained a foothold in the popular discourse, especially in the Albanian diaspora.6 During the last decades, this obsession with autochthony (re)gained some traction amongst the South Slavs, too. Consequently, some circles are no longer in favour of the traditionalist perennial interpretations, which claim that modern South Slavic nations are an evolution of the Slavic tribes of the Völkerwanderung era, and their slightly more nuanced ethno-symbolist permutations. Some Slovenes, for example, arduously cling to the persuasively refuted “Venetic theory”, which claims that ancient Veneti, who inhabited North East Italy in the Pre-Roman era, were direct ancestors of Slovenes; therefore, Slovenes are supposed to be autochthonous. An even more absurd assertion gained some popularity in Serbia, where a number of pseudohistorians proposed that the Serbs are the oldest nation in the world and their language 3  H. Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present, trans. by William E. Yuill (Blackwell: Oxford, 1998): 95–96. See also: P. J. Geary, The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2002). 4  V. Karalis, “In Search of the Neo-Hellenic: Confronting the Ambiguities of Modernity in an Ancient Land”, Interactions: Studies in Communication & Culture 3, No. 2 (2012): 129–145. 5  L. Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness (Central European University Press: Budapest, 2001). 6  D. Dzino, “Constructing Illyrians: Prehistoric Inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula in Early Modern and Modern Perceptions”, Balkanistica 27 (April 2014): 15–16.

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“the mother of all other languages”.7 In both cases pseudoscientific fantasies have only gained a foothold in some nationalist circles and were resolutely opposed by scholars. In Bosnia, though, the claim that there is a direct continuity between ancient Illyrians and contemporary Bosnian Muslims managed to get some scholarly support after 1991; Bosnian authorities also financially supported the pseudo-archaeological excavations of the so-called Bosnian pyramid of Sun.8 The most scurrilous example, however, is of the use of pseudohistory in the official policy of the Macedonian state. During the last few years the ruling party of the Balkan nation has been pursuing systematic “antiquisation”, based on easily disproved “theories” on the origins of Macedonians.9 Consequently, autochthonism found its way in the official History of the Macedonian People and the capital, Skopje, is being transformed into a capital of kitschy architectural eclecticism.10

7  For a refutation of these pseudohistories and an analysis of the root causes of their popularity, see: P. Štih, Theories of Indigeneity and their Like among the Slovenes, In P. Štih, The Middle Ages between the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic: Select Papers on Slovene Historiography and Medieval History, East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 450–1450, 11 (Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2010): 38–55; L. Lisjak Gabrijelčič, “The Dissolution of the Slavic Identity of the Slovenes in the 1980s: The Case of the Venetic Theory,” MA thesis (Central European University, 2008), available at: http://www.etd.ceu .hu/2008/lisjak-gabrijelcic_luka.pdf; T. M. S. Priestly, “Vandals, Veneti, Windischer: The Pitfalls of Amateur Historical Linguistics”, Slovene Studies 19, n. 1/2 (1997): 3–41; Z. Skrbiš, “The Emotional Historiography of Venetologists: Slovene Diaspora, Memory and Nationalism,” Focaal: European Journal of Anthropology 39 (2002): 41–56; R. Radić, Srbi pre Adama i posle njega: Istorija jedne zloupotrebe: Slovo protiv “novoromantičara” [Serbs before Adam and after Him: A History of a Misuse: A Letter Against the “New Romantics”], 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2005). 8  M. Lomonosov, “Illyrianism in Bosnian Style: Balkan Antiquity in Contemporary National Mythology and Identity Construction among the Bosniaks”, The South Slav Journal 31, n. 3–4 (2012): 61–83. 9  A. Vangeli, “Nation-Building Ancient Macedonian Style: The Origins and the Effects of the So-Called Antiquization in Macedonia”, Nationalities Papers 39 (January 2011): 13–32; M. Lomonosov, “National Myths in Interdependence: The Narratives of the Ancient Past among Macedonians and Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia after 1991”, MA thesis (Central European University, 2012): 78–88 and passim. Available at http://www.etd.ceu .hu/2012/lomonosov_matvey.pdf. 10  Vangeli, “Nation-Building Ancient Macedonian Style”, 19, 20; “Stones of Contention: Macedonia writes a new story for its capital”, The Economist, January 5th, 2013. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21569009-macedonia-writes-newstory-its-capital-stones-contention.

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Origin Myths in a Modernist Framework

Actually, a belief in autochthony has a long history amongst the Balkan Slavs but had been largely superseded by the end of the 19th century. Its recently regained popularity is therefore extremely interesting, especially as it is contrary to the developments in the field of nationalism studies; it pretty much coincides with the establishment of modernism as the dominant paradigm. On the strength of its theoretical arguments and because they fit the historical data so well, modernism clearly has become the explanatory framework of choice in the last few decades. There is considerable agreement amongst scholars that nations are a product of nationalisms and are modern not only in a chronological sense of the word but also in substance; they are a modern phenomenon.11 Still, some scholars claim that modernism does not tell the whole story. While they agree with the modernity of nations, they are also convinced that modernism—as Anthony D. Smith has put it—«systematically overlooks the persistence of ethnic ties and cultural sentiments in many parts of the world, and their continuing significance for large numbers of people» and therefore only «tells half the story».12 The so-called ethno-symbolists claim that ethnic ties and communities are an important precondition for the creation of nations; they assert that most nations are in fact an evolution of an ethnic community. Nationalist activists could not simply invent a random nation, because they had been constrained by symbols, memories and myths of the people they were trying to mobilise.13

11   There is a large and ever-growing body of literature on nationalism and nationbuilding. The modernist “classics” are: B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised ed. (Verso: London/New York, 2006); E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge Unviersity Press: Cambridge, 1992); E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1983). Accessible overviews of different paradigms are: A. D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (Routledge: London/New York, 2001) and U. Özkırımli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2000). 12  A. D. Smith, “Nations and Their Pasts”, Nations and Nationalism 2 (November 1996): 358–365. 13  For a concise definition of the ethno-symbolist paradigm, see: A. D. Smith, Ethnosymbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (Routledge: London/New York, 2009). See further: A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Blackwell: Oxford/New York, 1986); J. A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1982).

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However, these assertions were persuasively refuted with theoretical as well as factual arguments. With his typical wit, Ernest Gellner has remarked that for nations the pre-existing ethnic community «is rather like the navel. Some nations have it and some don’t and in any case it’s inessential».14 Furthermore, Umut Özkırımli has shown that nationalists were really not very constrained by ethnic symbols, myths and memories for there had always been a large repertoire they could select from—and so they did.15 Additionally, Siniša Malešević has shown that the ethno-symbolist theorising—and Smith’s in particular—is epistemologically weak as it is—among other things—deterministic, fatalistic and finalistic. Malešević demonstrated that Smith’s «rigid historicist connection between an ethnie and a nation . . . prevents any hypothetical possibility of different directions or reversibility of that process» and is thus contrary to historical evidence.16 In fact, in the last decade or two some historians of East Central and South East Europe have shown exactly that. They have established that the supposed evolution of ethnic communities into nations is highly questionable, because the existence of quasi-national ethnic communities turned out to be an illusion or—to be more precise—an imposition of the present on the past. In an illuminating essay, Jeremy King has shown that ethnicity had never been a relevant category of identification for many East Central Europeans and that there were, in any case, many more ethnicities than there are nations today. He therefore concluded that the claims of Smith and others lack «empirical underpinnings».17 Indeed, even the almost paradigmatic and seldom disputed cases of Balkan nations that had supposedly evolved from ethnic communities have been persuasively deconstructed. Bratislav Pantelić, for example, has shown that the modern Serb nation is not an evolution of the older Serb ethnic community; in fact, such a community never existed. Contrary to the claims of ethno-symbolists, the foundational myths of Serbs «did not invoke any deep-seated memories or emotions but had to be gradually impressed on the 14  E. Gellner, “Do Nations Have Navels?”, Nations and Nationalism 2 (November 1996): 366–370. 15  U. Özkırımli, “The Nation as an Artichoke? A Critique of Ethnosymbolist Interpretations of Nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism 9 (2003): 339–355. On the nationalist dealings with the past, see also the standard volume: E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge/New York, 1983). 16  S. Malešević, “ ‘Divine Ethnies’ and ‘Sacred Nations’: Anthony D. Smith and the NeoDurkhemian Theory of Nationalism”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 10 (2004): 561–593. 17  J. King, The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond, In M. Bucur and N. M. Wingfield, (eds.), Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present (West Lafayette: IN, 2001), 112–152.

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population, in school and church, until [they] finally ‘resonated’».18 Similarly, Antonis Liakos challenged the dominant interpretations of Greek history and demonstrated that the Greek nation is also a modern invention and not a transhistorical phenomenon. «As a nation . . . Greece was the result of a large shift in cultural identifications since the eighteenth century and it was consolidated during the nineteenth century», he wrote in his important article “Historical Time and National Space in Modern Greece”.19 Finally, Shlomo Sand’s The Invention of the Jewish People, a powerful challenge to the most often invoked case of a nation evolving from a supposed ethnic community with a long history, needs to be mentioned in this context, even if its primary focus is not the Balkans. The author persuasively argues that the Jewish ethnic community does not have a long history; on the contrary, it is a retrospective invention of Jewish nationalists, another imposition of the present on the past.20 To reiterate: there is overwhelming evidence that nations are not an evolution of premodern communities but new inventions. They start off as ideas and only subsequently develop—or not—into real social phenomena and there is no pre-emptive reason why any hypothetical nation cannot be imagined and then established as a viable category of identification. That does not mean that all the ideas will establish themselves, but it does mean that none of them has a head-start or is destined to fail. Their success is historically contingent, it is dependent on many factors; pre-existing ethnic identities and communities might be one of them but they are not a necessary precondition for the establishment of a nation. As Paschalis M. Kitromilides has pointed out, modernists by and large do not assume that nationalism and modern nations emerged “in a historical vacuum”; in the pre-national period the population certainly spoke different vernaculars, had diverse habits, and “forms of ethnic consciousness”. However, “ethnic origins” hardly decisively shaped

18  B. Pantelić, “Memories of a Time Forgotten: The Myth of the Perennial Nation”, Nations and Nationalism 17 (April 2011): 443–464. 19  A. Liakos, Historical Time and National Space in Modern Greece, In H. Tadayuki and H. Fukuda (eds.), Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present, Slavic Euroasian Studies, 15 (Slavic Research Center: Sapporo, 2007): 205–227. See also: Idem, The Construction of National Time: The Making of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination, In J. Revel and G. Levi, (eds.), Political Uses of the Past: The Recent Mediterrannean Experience (F. Cass: London, 2002): 27–42. For the Ottoman Balkans in general, see: P. M. Kitromilides, “ ‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans”, European History Quarterly 19 (1989): 14–94. 20  S. Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People, trans. Yael Lotan (Verso: London, New York, 2009).

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nationalisms; on the contrary, they have been subsequently transformed, recreated, or even destroyed by the nationalists.21 These opening remarks are important in order to prevent a misunderstanding. Namely, as I will be looking at older literary traditions and their importance in the earliest phases of nation building, I will not be searching for elusive ethnic origins of nations but merely trying to explore the intellectual prehistory of nationalism. I will be following Joep Leerssen’s pertinent advice and will be looking at older «source traditions and ramifications of the nationalist ideology, without confusing the source traditions with the thing itself».22 The exploration of literary traditions is important if we want to better understand the intellectual climate, in which the first nationalist programmes took shape. For even if we reject the ethno-symbolist teleology on good grounds, it would be wrong to assume that older traditions did not play a role in the earliest phases of nation building. On the contrary, the first nationalist did not operate in an empty space. Scholarly and literary traditions were often the intellectual framework for their conceptualisations of nations; they also provided the material nationalists could select from and rework it into an invented tradition of a new nation. The article will then, firstly, describe the development of the Illyrian ideologeme, a literary phenomenon, and, secondly, analyse its role in the earliest phases of South Slav nationalisms in the Western Balkans. It will try to show how it helped shape some of the earlier nationalist ideas; in order to do that, it will focus on its presence and resonance amongst the educated, given their crucial importance at that stage. Finally, it will try to provide a tentative explanation as to why it subsequently lost its importance and why no Illyrian nation emerged. 3

Illyrian National Thought

Sometime in 1487 Georgius Sisgoreus Sibenicensis (or Juraj Šižgorić) finished his De situ Illyriae et civitate Sibenici, a manuscript of some twenty pages. Under the influence of 14th and 15th centuries’ writers from Italy, who linked their 21  P. M. Kitromilides, Paradigm Nation: The Study of Nationalism and the ‘Canonization’ of Greece, In R. Beaton and D. Ricks (eds.), The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, & the Uses of the Past (1797–1896) (Ashgate: Farnham, 2009): 28–29. See also: Özkırımli, “The Nation as an Artichoke”, 342. 22  J. Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam, 2006): 15.

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communal patriotism with a sense of belonging to Italy, he also situated his Dalmatian hometown, Šibenik-Sebenico, into a wider framework. He stressed that it is a part of the ancient province of Dalmatia which is a part of Illyria, a region he delimited with Macedonia, the Black Sea, Hungary, and Friuli. He further claimed that Illyria is inhabited by some thirty Illyrian nations, descendants of Illyrius, one of the three sons of Polyphemus and Galatea; all of them are a part of the ancient and glorious natio Illyriorum. The manuscript was not only a eulogy to Sisgoreus’s hometown but probably also a polemic against contemporary claims by some Venetian authors that La Serenissima has a duty to rule over Dalmatia. Furthermore, it was also an attempt to boost morale at a time, when Ottomans were pushing against the borders of Venetian Dalmatia.23 De situ Illyriae et civitate Sibenici, has only been published at the end of the 19th century, however the manuscript had most probably served as the basis for the speech of a Dominican monk from the Adriatic island of HvarLesina, Vincentius Priboevius (or Vinko Pribojević), published in Venice in 1532.24 De origine successibusque Slavorum certainly echoed a lot of ideas from .

23  Z. Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma [lllyrism before Illyrism] (Zagreb, 2008): 115–118, 123– 125. Blažević’s book is a standard book-length treatment of the Illyrian ideologeme; she has also published a number of articles on the topic, some in English. See: Z. Blažević, “Rethinking Balkanism: Interpretative Challenge of the Early Modern Illyrism”, Etudes Balkaniques, n. 1 (2007): 87–106; Z. Blažević, Indetermi-Nation: Narrative Identity and Symbolic Politics in Early Modern Illyrism, In B. Trencsényi and M. Zászkaliczky (eds.), Whose Love of Which Country? Composite States, National Histories and Patriotic Discourses in Early Modern East Central Europe, Studies in the History of Political Thought, 3 (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 2010): 203–224. See also: F. Zwitter, Les origines de lʼillyrisme politique et la création des Provinces illyriennes (Darantiere: Dijon, 1933) (reprinted in F. Zwitter, Les Provinces Illyrienns: Cinq études, ed. Alain Jejcic (Paris, 2010): 45–112); R. Lauer, Genese und Funktion des Illyrischen Ideologems in den südslawischen Literaturen (16. bis Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts), In K.-D. Grothusen (ed.), Ethnogenese und Staatsbildung in Südosteuropa (Göttingen, 1974), 116–143; B. Kuntić-Makvić, O povijesti uporabe ilirskog nazivlja [On the History of the Usage of the Illyrian Terminology], In Spomenica Ljube Bobana: 1933– 1994 (Zagreb, 1996): 133–143; Dzino, “Constructing Illyrians,” 1–39. A modern edition of Sisgoreus with a Croatian translation is: J. Šižgorić Šibenčanin, O smještaju Ilirije i o gradu Šibeniku: De situ Illyriae et civitate Sibenici, ed. and trans. Veljko Gortan, 2nd ed. (Šibenik, 1981). 24  D. Madunić, Strategies of Distinction in the Work of Vinko Pribojević, In B. Trencsényi and M. Zászkaliczky (eds.), Whose Love of Which Country? Composite States, National Histories and Patriotic Discourses in Early Modern East Central Europe, Studies in the History of Political Thought, 3 (Leiden/Boston, 2010): 181. A modern edition of Priboevius with a Croatian translation is: V. Pribojević, O podrijetlu i slavi Slavena [On the Origins and Glory of the Slavs], trans. Veljko Gortan and Pavao Knezović (Zagreb, 1997).

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Sisgoreus’s manuscript but also introduced some new ones. Most importantly, Priboevius equated Illyrians with Slavs, something Sisgoreus vehemently denied. Because of that, his Illyria was even larger than Sisgoreus’s. Based on a series of spurious assumptions about the linguistic identity of ancient tribes it extended not only over East and South East Europe but also over the Near East and parts of North Africa. Furthermore, Priboevius also claimed that the three brothers Lech, Čech, and Rus from the 13th century Chronicum Poloniae, mythical forefathers of Czechs, Poles, and Russians, originated from Dalmatia, thus making it the original homeland of all the Slavs.25 Priboevius’s book was the first book-length identification of ancient Illyrians with Slavs and Dalmatia as their original homeland and as such it was the beginning of a long tradition, the founding moment of the so-called Illyrian ideologeme. This equation was an echo of the contemporary “barbarian turn”, a new habit of humanist historians, who began searching for the origo gentis in the barbarian tribes after the publication of Tacitus’s Germania. More specifically, Priboevius was probably influenced by the contemporary Sarmatism as he had previously lived in Poland for three years.26 Priboevius’s ideas were already shared by a few other Dalmatian intellectuals when De origine successibusque Slavorum was published; in latter decades and centuries the notion that Slavs originate from South East Europe (or— more specifically—Dalmatia), that they are descendants of ancient Illyrians, and that they all (or sometimes just South Slavs) speak a single language became a veritable locus communis shared not only by local writers but also by authors from all over Europe. Besides ancient origin, common language, and enormous extent, literary Illyrians were defined by their martial prowess, their saints, especially Saint Jerome (Hieronymus), and Illyrian rulers and heroes, Alexander the Great amongst them.27 In short, we can surely apply Joep Leerssen’s term national thought to this phenomenon. Leerssen makes a useful distinction between nationalism and 25  Madunić, “Strategies of Distinction”, 181–182; Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 119–127. 26  Madunić, “Strategies of Distinction”, 181–182; Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 126–134. On the reception of Germania and the “barbarian turn”, see: S. Martínez Bermejo, Translating Tacitus: The Reception of Tacitus’s Works in the Vernacular Languages of Europe, 16th–17th Centuries, CLIOHRES.net Doctoral Dissertations, 15 (Pisa, 2010); Ch. B. Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book: Tacitus’s Germania from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich (W. W. Norton & Co: New York/London, 2011); P. J. Geary, “Europe of Nations or the Nation of Europe Origin Myths Past and Present”, Revista Lusófona de Estudos Culturais=Lusophone Journal of Cultural Studies 1, n. 1 (2013): 44, 45. On some even older beliefs in the indigeneity of Balkan Slavs, see: Štih, “Theories of Indigeneity”, 39–40. 27  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 88–113.

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national thought and defines the latter as a «way of seeing human society primarily as consisting of discrete, different nations, each with an obvious right to exist and to command loyalty, each characterized and set apart unambiguously by its own separate identity and culture».28 National thought is wider than nationalism, a political doctrine, and is at the same time mostly observable in culture; it is essentially a literary phenomenon. In fact, this is exactly the case with the Illyrian national thought. Outside of literature, the Illyrian nation was nowhere to be found, however from the 16th century on, the idea of an Illyrian nation with its distinct characteristics was very much alive in the texts of contemporary historians, linguists, and other authors. It had been a discursive construct relevant to a small groups of intellectuals and mostly irrelevant and even unknown to the vast majority of putative Illyrians. Before the onset of nationalism, a doctrine that had still not been invented at the time, other identification categories were relevant outside of texts: religion, family, locality and—for the most part only for the nobility and the small educated elite—a province, a kingdom, or the Empire. However, for the early modern men of letters the Illyrian nation had been very relevant in all its variations and transformations. For example, as Protestant Reformation had reached Inner Austria and Croatia in the second half of the 16th century, the notion about the extent of the Slavic language in the Balkans, thought to be in use even in the Ottoman court, gave rise to the idea that it could be a perfect vehicle for the expansion of the “true faith”. Slav-speaking as well as some German-speaking protestants, amongst them none other than Philipp Melanchton, seriously entertained the idea that the Protestant Reformation could quickly spread as far as Constantinople if books—above all the Bible—in a South Slav—Illyrian—standard could be distributed amongst the local population.29 Such ideas had been highly unrealistic to begin with; with the onset of Counter-Reformation, when Catholic Habsburgs enforced the cuius-regio-eius-religio principle in their lands, any possibility of a Protestant action in South East Europe has been wiped out. However, the Post-Tridentine Catholic church had similar ideas. It also supported the efforts to standardise the Illyrian language that could be used in its proselytising endeavours amongst Balkan Orthodox Christians. One of the centres of these efforts was the Collegium Illyricum in the Italian town of Loreto, an institution (re)established in 1627 by pope Urban VIII, who stressed

28  Leerssen, National Thought, 15. 29  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 140–142.

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that the college’s mission is to help «the nation of Illyrian language that lives in large parts of Europe and the majority of Asia».30 The clergy from the East coast of the Adriatic had been very involved in this efforts, establishing networks of sympathisers on the other side of the Ottoman border and publishing a number of books about the glorious history of Illyrians, among them Mavro Orbini’s Il regno degli Slavi (1601), a crownjewel of the Illyrian national thought.31 Moreover, the 17th and 18th century Catholic Illyrian endeavours were not limited to Dalmatia; for example, one of the authors, Krastyo Peykich, came from the land now called Bulgaria and has been active in Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, and Croatia. His efforts were not limited to bringing the Orthodox and Muslims into the fold of the Catholic Church as he also entertained ideas about a war against the Ottomans that would bring the South Slavs under the rule of the Catholic Emperor.32 The anti-Ottoman angle had been present in Illyrian publications ever since Sisgoreus and Priboevius but in 16th and 17th centuries it was becoming even more explicit. Authors frequently appealed to various contemporary rulers to re-establish their particular imagined Illyria. Ioannes Tomcus Marnavitius (Ivan Tomko Mrnavić), for example, proposed a number of different plans; in 1627 he penned a plan to wrangle the territories of the former Eastern Roman Empire from the Ottomans and divide them between the Pope and the rulers of the Catholic League, three years later the Emperor Ferdinand II of Habsburg was supposed to be his “restorer of Illyria”.33 30  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 152–155; M. S. Iovine, The ‘Illyrian Language’ and the Language Question among Southern Slavs in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, In R. Picchio and H. Goldblatt (eds.), Aspects of the Slavic Language Question, vol. 1: Church Slavonic—South Slavic—West Slavic (Slavica Publishers: New Haven, CT, 1984): 101–156. 31  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 176–192; Z. Zlatar, “Kraljevstvo Slavena u međunarodnom političkom, ekonomskom i kulturnom kontekstu (o. 1550.-1610.) [The Kingdom of the Slavs in Its International Political, Economic and Cultural Context (c. 1550–1610)]”, Radovi— Zavod za hrvatsku povijest 43 (2011): 15–36. A modern Croatian translation of Orbini is: M. Orbini, Kraljevstvo Slavena [The Kingdom of the Slavs], trans. Snježana Husić (Zagreb, 1999). 32  I. Manova, “Historico-Philosophical Studies on Krastyo Peykich of Chiprovtsi (1666– 1730): An Overview of the Literature and Some Critical Remarks”, Philosophia: E-Journal of Philosophy and Culture, n. 4 (2012). Available at: http://philosophy-e.com/historicophilosophical-studies-on-krastyo-peykich-of-chiprovtsi-1666-1730-an-overview-of-theliterature-and-some-critical-remarks/. 33  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 226–38; Z. Blažević, How to Revive Illyricum? Political Institution of the ‘Illyrian Emperors’ in Early Modern Illyrism, In U. Heinen (ed.), Welche Antike? Rezeptionen des Altertums im Barock. Wolfenbütteler Arbeiten zur Barockforschung, 47 (Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 2011): 431–444.

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A move of focus from religion to politics was even more apparent in the writings of Georg or Juraj Rattkay, a philandering canon from Croatia; in 1660’s the Croatian banus had tasked him with providing a historical foundation for the equality of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia with the Kingdom of Hungary. Namely, this was the time, when the Estates of Croatia-Slavonia were trying to strengthen the position of their Kingdom within the Realm of St. Stephen. Rattkay provided the arguments in his Memoria regum et banorum Regnorum Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Sclavoniae, published in 1652 with the financial support of the banus, Nicholas Zrinyi. Rattkay’s writings had clearly been influenced by the Illyrian national thought as he incorporated a lot of ideas from earlier authors, most notably Orbini, in his book. However, he shifted the centre of his Illyria to the North, making Krapina, a provincial Croatian town, the hometown of Čech and Lech and the banus of Croatia the heir to the putative ancient and medieval Illyrian rulers. Clearly, the transposed topoi of Illyrian national thought were supposed to shore up the political aspirations of the Croatian estates.34 Some decades later, after the Long War of 1683–99 had ended with a massive shift of the Ottoman border to the South East, the fate of the newly acquired territories was being decided. It was a time when Luigi Fernando Marsigli, tasked by the Emperor Leopold I with the finalisation of the new border, had been «besieged by addle-pated fantasists and dreamers who kept offering him biblical genealogical charts about the ancestry of the Illyrian nation and by self-styled leaders aspiring to rule never-existent countries and dioceses, who waved fake documents or muddled historical arguments in his face».35 Fortunately, Marsigli found an able associate in Paul Ritter, a noble from Croatia and a prolific author. They set about reorganising the newly acquired territories in the spirit of early modern patriotism. Ritter provided arguments from history as he used the Illyrian ideologeme to buttress the claims of the Kingdom of Croatia to these territories and the claims of the Habsburgs on Dalmatia, a Venetian possession. He applied the usual arsenal of claims to argue that these lands should be incorporated in the Kingdom of Croatia but it is an innovation, appearing in some of his books which is particularly interesting. Namely, at the 34  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 275–86; S. Bene, Koncepcja ‘potrójnej Ilirii’: Trzy królestwa pewnego kanonika: Chorwacka historia Györgya Ráttkaya [A Concept of ‘Triple Illyria’: Three Kingdoms of One Canon], In J. Axer and L. Szörényi (eds.), Latinitas Hungarica: Łacina w kulturze węgierskiej (Dig: Warsaw, 2013): 341–366. 35  S. Bene, Questions of the New Balcan Settlement after 1699: L.F. Marsili and the Local Traditions, In R. Gherardi (ed.), La politica, la scienza, le armi: Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e la costruzione della frontiera dell’impero e dell’Europa (Clueb: Bologna, 2010): 201.

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same time as he was reproducing topoi from the standard repertory of Illyrian national thought, he claimed that the Illyrians/Slavs should actually be called Croats. Obviously, his terminological acrobatics served the purpose of further strengthening the territorial claims of the Kingdom of Croatia—Ritter was arguing that Emperor Leopold should claim these territories and some more as rex totius Croatiae.36 Ritter’s “croatisation” of the ideologeme demonstrates its malleability; its topoi could be reconfigured and repurposed. I am, however, not inclined to agree with those historians who see Croatian proto-nationalism in Ritter’s writings. On the contrary, his work is in essence only a variation on the Illyrian ideologeme, despite the name change that made him a favourite of the Croatian nationalists in the second half of the 19th century; Ritter’s writings were a pragmatic adaptation of the Illyrian national thought to the contemporary political circumstance. This is further confirmed by his collaboration with another contemporary political project that sought to acquire its legitimacy by invoking invented Illyrian history. Namely, in the beginning of the 18th century, Ritter adapted the topics of Illyrian national thought for the purposes of the Orthodox hierarchy in South Hungary. The hierarchy was looking for historical arguments that would support the privileges of the newly arrived Orthodox population. Ritter, who had fallen out of favour in Croatia, dutifully obliged in his Serbiae illustratae libri octo, which was an amalgam of Orthodox traditions and elements of Illyrian ideologeme.37 This use of the Illyrian topoi further proves their malleability but—more importantly—also their reach and relevance. It is no coincidence that Ritter and other “addle-pated fantasists and dreamers” based their claims on them; obviously they all saw Illyria as a powerful argument for the political reorganisation they desired. This was the case with Ritter’s born-again Croatia (Croatia 36  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 295–318; Bene, “Questions of the New Balcan Settlement”, 199–216. See also: Z. Blažević, Vitezovićeva Hrvatska između stvarnosti i utopije [Vitezović’s Croatia between Reality and Utopia] (Barbat: Zagreb, 2002); Z. Blažević, “Performing National Identity: The Case of Ritter Vitezovic (1652–1713)”, National Identities 5 (2003): 251–267; Z. Blažević, “Intertekstualni odnosi između Orbinijeva Kraljestva Slavena i latinskih historiografskih djela Pavla Ritterja Vitezovića [Intertextual Relations between Orbini’s The Kingdom of Slavs and Latin Historiographical Works of Paul Ritter Vitezović]”, Radovi—Zavod za hrvatsku povijest 43 (2011): 97–112; Z. Pleše, “Bolonjski grof i hrvatski barun: Odnosi Luigija Ferdinanda Marsiglija i Pavla Rittera Vitezovića u utvrđivanju hrvatskih granica [A Bolognese Count and a Croatian Baron: The Relations of L. F. Marsigli and P. R. Vitezović during the Process of Determining the Borders of Croatia]”, Croatica Christiana Periodica 46 (2000): 49–76. 37  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 298–299.

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rediviva) and his Serbia, and this was also the case with the simultaneous endeavours of the self-styled “Illyrian despot” Đorđe Branković. He also hoped to bolster his ambition to become the ruler of the revived Illyrian Kingdom by invoking a number of the Illyrian topoi in his many writings.38 From the last decades of the 15th century to the first decade of the 18th, we can follow the development of Illyrian national thought, a literary phenomenon, which has produced a highly relevant category of identification but only for a small group of educated priests and nobles. Those saw themselves—at least in certain contexts—as members of a community of Slav-speakers, descendants of ancient Illyrians. Some of them attempted to bring Illyria back to life, or—better said—hoped that one of the contemporary rulers might revive it but they were entirely unsuccessful in their endeavours. 4

The Beginnings of Illyrian Nationalism

However, during the 18th century things began to change. Firstly, Illyrian national thought gained some popularity in wider strata of population. Because it has been thematised in the local Slavic vernaculars—for example in a widely read and often reprinted Ugodni razgovor naroda slovinskog (A Pleasant Conversation of the Slavic People, 1756)—and because more people were literate, the idea that speakers of South Slav vernaculars represent a single autochthonous community “trickled down”; it became popular among some country priests, well-off peasants and such.39 At the same time, the spread of ideas of enlightenment introduced new political concepts and eventually also the idea of a political community of all the people in a certain area. The modern nation became a desired goal for the followers of the philosophes, especially after the French Revolution. Although many, who spoke of popular sovereignty, were actually only paying lip-service to a fashionable doctrine, some were taking it rather seriously. Soon enough, they began to formulate nationalist programmes and Illyrian was one of them. 38  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 319–336; Z. Blažević, “Srpski ilirizam prije ilirizma: nacionalno-identifikacijski modeli u historiografskim djelima grofa Đorđa Brankovića (1645–1711) [Serbian Illyrism before Illyrism: National and Ideological Models in the Historiographic Works of Count Đorđe Branković (1645–1711.)]”, Književna istorija 44 (2012): 23–39. 39  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 40–41; J. Hösler, Von Krain zu Slowenien: Die Anfänge der nationalen Differenzierungsprozesse in Krain und der Untersteiermark von der Aufklärung bis zur Revolution 1768 bis 1848, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, 126 (Oldenbourg: Munich, 2006): 161.

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In 1790s, the leader of the so-called Jacobin conspiracy in Hungary, Ignaz Martinovics, was drawing up plans for a revolution that would turn the Realm of St. Stephen into a federal republic comprising Hungary proper, Slovakia, Transylvania, and Illyria. A few years later, Tommaso Bassegli (Toma Basiljević), a supporter of the French Revolution from Dubrovnik-Ragusa put together a proposal for the establishment of an Illyrian republic; according to his plan it would have comprised Dalmatia with Dubrovnik, Croatia and Slavonia, Serbia, and Bosnia and would have functioned as one of the Sister Republics of France. Some years later, when republics grew out of fashion, an Orthodox enlightened aristocrat from South Hungary, Sava Tekelija, sent Napoleon a plan for the establishment of a Kingdom of Illyria, stretching from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. Despite the monarchical form of government, the plan is interesting because Tekelija claimed that Illyrian nationalism would bind together the population that speaks the same language but is divided by faith.40 These programmes are significant because they demonstrate a link between national thought and the conceptualisations of modern nations. It is actually hardly surprising that Illyrian nationalism emerged at the time, because Illyrian national thought had been so prevalent amongst the educated. On the contrary, it would have been surprising if the belief in the existence of the Illyrian nation would not have resulted in the emergence of an Illyrian nationalism at the time when nationalism had been an intellectual fashion. We can retrospectively argue that modern nations are an invention, and I have done so in the introductory part of this article, but nationalists were for the most part convinced that they are only transforming—awakening!—a pre-existing community. Therefore, their inventions were informed and shaped by the categories of identification they were already familiar with. Nevertheless, one should not forget that in the same area alternative imaginings of nations were circulating at the time. In the last decades of the 18th century, members of provincial Estates in the Habsburg monarchy were using the modern understanding of the nation in their polemics against Josephinist centralism; nations they were talking about were delimited by provincial borders and not language.41 The same goes for the Dalmatian nation, natione 40  B. Trencsényi and M. Kopeček (eds.), Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945): Texts and Commentaries, vol. 1: Late Enlightenment— Emergence of the Modern ‘National Idea’ (Budapest, 2006): 313–318; D. T. Bataković, “A Balkan-Style French Revolution? The 1804 Serbian Uprising in European Perspective”, Balcanica 36 (2005): 119–120. 41  P. M. Judson, The Habsburg Empire: A New History (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass./London, 2016): 87–89.

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Dalmata, some patriots from Venetian Dalmatia began writing about during the last period of Venetian rule on the Eastern shores of the Adriatic. This idea started developing into Dalmatian nationalism after 1805, during the period of French rule.42 These alternatives refute the ethno-symbolist teleology and clearly show the indeterminacy and open-endedness of nation-building. They demonstrate the validity of Joep Leerssen’s assertion that the present-day situation is historically contingent, because: «Alternatives . . . were thinkable, and were circulating. . . . The history of nationalism is far more complex than merely a pre-history of the contemporary states».43 5

The Unrealised Illyrian Nation-State

However, in 1809 it seemed that the proponents of Illyrian nationalism have gained the upper hand. Namely, after the Austrian Empire was forced to cede a large tract of territory to France in the Treaty of Schönbrunn, Napoleon merged it with Dalmatia and former Venetian Istria the French held since 1805 and created a new dependency of the French Empire, the Illyrian Provinces. Even if it is clear that the Emperor of the French did not want to create an Illyrian nation-state—he used the name of the Roman Province for the lands that essentially had a strategic importance for him—some natives saw it otherwise. To them the name alone suggested that the French had established a Slav state as the usual translations of Provinces illyriennes in the local vernaculars indicate. They were “Slav Lands” or “Slav States” because the interpreters translated the name according to the traditional equation of Slavs and Illyrians.44 The clearest expression of such an understanding was a poem by a Carniolan priest and schoolmaster, Valentin Vodnik, published in 1811. “Ilirija oživljena” (Illyria Reborn) talks about ancient and glorious Illyria, whose 42  J. Vrandečić, Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret u XIX. stoljeću [The Dalmatian Autonomist Movement in the 19th Century] (Dom i svijet: Zagreb, 2002); K. Clewing, Staatlichkeit und nationale Identitätsbildung: Dalmatien in Vormärz und Revolution (Oldenbourg: Munich, 2001). 43  Leerssen, National Thought, 18. 44  Zwitter, “Les origines de lʼillyrisme politique”, 92. For a concise overview of the Illyrian Provinces, see: J. Šumrada, Les principaux traits de la politique napoléonienne dans les Provinces illyriennes, In J. Šumrada (ed.), Napoleon na Jadranu: Napoléon dans lʼAdriatique (Koper/Zadar, 2006): 43–58, 308–311 and R. A. Stauber, The Illyrian Provinces, In M. Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimera (eds.), The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850 (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2012): 241–253.

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warriors had been «the fear/of the Spartan prince» and ruled the waves «when the Romans/were still learning how to build ships». Yet, the Romans eventually defeated the Illyrians, who were then ruled by foreign rulers until «Napoleon says:/ Illyria ascend!/She arises and sighs,/Who calls me alert?» In short, the poem evokes most of the topoi of Illyrian national thought and claims that the Illyrian Provinces are a rebirth of the ancient Illyria and as such a nationstate of Illyrians/South Slavs.45 For Vodnik the poem has also been an interesting U-turn for he had previously rejected the identification of Slavs with Illyrians, and therefore their autochthony, and endorsed a novel view of a fellow Carniolan, Anton Linhart, who claimed that the Slavs only settled in the Balkans in the Early Middle Ages. Of course, it would be important to know what Vodnik’s reasons for the change of heart were. Did he use the topoi of Illyrian national thought as a “rhetorical instrument” even though he was aware that they had become unconvincing, as has already been suggested in a recent study or—as I am inclined to believe—was he convinced of the opposite: that the Illyrian national thought still held a lot of nation-building potential?46 A number of well-informed French bureaucrats and diplomats had certainly been of the opinion that the potential was there. Even before the establishment of the Provinces, Giambattista Stratico, a Dalmatian working for the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, had suggested that the French should expand their Balkan possessions and revive Illyria; this would have been a powerful rampart of the West because of the martial prowess of the Balkan Slavs, who «feel the Illyrism or the spirit of national unity that binds them».47 After the Provinces had been established, the French administration really did try to build an Illyrian nation and consequently turn the Provinces into an Illyrian nation-state. In that vein, a French Colonel informed the inhabitants of Boka Kotorska-Boche di Cattaro in 1810: «You are now a part of a large nation, confederated with a great and powerful empire, you have become Illyrians again».48 The French also supported the standardisation of a single South Slav literary language, Illyrian, that would unite the population speaking different vernaculars.49 To claim 45   The English translation is available at: http://spinnet.eu/wiki-anthology/index.php/ Illyria_Reborn. See also: Hösler, Von Krain zu Slowenien, 127–132; J. Kos, “Valentin Vodnik kot nacionalnopolitični pesnik slovenskega razsvetljenstva [Valentin Vodnik as a National Political Poet of the Slovene Enlightenment]”, Slavistična revija 36 (1988): 13–26. 46  Gabrijelčič, “The Dissolution of the Slavic Identity”, 21–22. 47  Zwitter, “Les origines de lʼillyrisme politique”, 75, 104–112. 48  Zwitter, “Les origines de lʼillyrisme politique”, 93. 49  Zwitter, “Les origines de lʼillyrisme politique”, 92 and passim.

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that the Provinces functioned as a nationalizing state would be an exaggeration but some French bureaucrats had certainly hoped they would. However, Illyrian provinces had but a short life; in the summer of 1813 Austrians attacked from the North and East and the British fleet from the South. When the French troops in Dubrovnik-Ragusa had surrendered at the end of January 1814, the last remnant of French rule was gone. Austrians occupied the Provinces and the Vienna Congress definitely assigned them to the Austrian Empire. Despite the efforts of some influential natives and a number of Austrian bureaucrats and politicians, foreign minister Klemens von Metternich amongst them, the Emperor Francis, an heir to the Josephinist centralizing tradition and a man who did not comprehend the importance of nationalism, decided against keeping the former Provinces a whole. In 1816, Francis established an Illyrian Kingdom but it was smaller, had no common institutions, and—most importantly and against Metternich’s recommendation—was not conceptualized as a South Slav nation-state at all.50 The development of the Illyrian nation thus lost its institutional support and the playing field had been levelled for the alternatives—Slovene, Serb, and Croatian nationalism—that had also began circulating at the time. Thus, the Emperor’s decision had much more far-reaching consequences then most of the contemporaries could conceive. 6

The Last Hurrah—the Illyrian Movement

Nevertheless, despite Francis’s refusal to engage in a bit of social engineering— Metternich supported the Illyrian project because he was afraid that other alternatives might turn out to be less attached to the Habsburg state—Illyrian nationalism still had some future as it had a lot of currency amongst intellectuals. In the 20s, Mojsije Baltić, a student at the University of Graz, gathered a number of supporters of a South Slav state in an “Illyrian club”; furthermore in 50  J. Polec, Kraljestvo Ilirija: Prispevek k zgodovini razvoja javnega prava v slovenskih deželah [The Kingdom of Illyria: A Contribution to the History of the Development of Public Law in Slovene Lands] (Ljubljana, 1925); L. Vidmar, “ ‘Et in politicis propheta’: politični komentarji v korespondenci med Žigo Zoisom in Jernejem Kopitarjem [‘Et in politicis propheta’: Political Comments in the Correspondence between Sigismund Zois and Bartholomäus Kopitar]”, Slavistična revija 54 (2006): 753–75; A. G. Haas, Metternich, Reorganization and Nationality 1813–1818: A Story of Foresight and Frustration in the Rebuilding of the Austrian Empire, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, 28 (Franz Steiner Verlag: Wiesbaden, 1963); E. Radvany, Metternichʼs Projects for Reform in Austria (Nijhoff: The Hague, 1971).

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the first decades of the 19th century, a number of Orthodox notables were likewise suggesting the South Slavs should unite under the Illyrian name.51 Most importantly, the idea that the South Slavs all belong to a single—Illyrian— language group and consequently to a single nation had been endorsed by the influential Pan-Slav author, pastor Ján Kollár. He divided all the Slavs in four nations: Russian, Illyrian, Polish, and Czech-Slovak.52 His authority was instrumental in shaping the strongest South Slav national movement of that period. Centred in Provincial Croatia, the Illyrian movement attempted to create a common literary language and a common culture for all the South Slavs. In politics, it mostly restricted itself to Croatia and Slavonia, although occasionally a more ambitious plan did surface.53 In 1832, count Janko Drašković published his Disertacija (Dissertation) where he proposed the establishment of a Greater Illyria comprising Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Carinthia, Carniola, the Austrian Littoral, and South Styria. As an echo of the writings of Paul Ritter, his Illyria was an amalgam of the Kingdom of Croatia and Illyria; it would be based on the Croatian statehood but also on the fact that the population belongs to a single—Illyrian—nation.54 Despite a greater emphasis on the tradition of Croatian statehood, Illyrian national thought played a very important role in the Illyrian movement. Actually, attempts to reach a wider audience often went hand in hand with an accentuation of the Illyrian angle. For example, Ljudevit Gaj, one of the most important men of the movement, prepared a new version of his popular song “Još Horvatska ni propala” (Croatia Has Not Yet Fallen) in 1835, replacing most mentions of Croatia and Croatians with Illyria and Illyrians.55 Gaj, who 51  N. Stančić, Gajeva “Još Horvatska ni propala” iz 1832–33.: Ideologija Ljudevita Gaja u pripremnom razdoblju hrvatskog narodnog preporoda [Gaj’s “Još Horvatska ni propala” from 1832–33: The Ideology of Ljudevit Gaj in the Preliminary Period of the Croat National Revival] (Zagreb, 1989): 119–120. 52  M. L. Greenberg, The Illyrian Movement: A Croatian Vision of South Slavic Unity, In J. A. Fishman and O. García (eds.), Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity: The SuccessFailure Continuum in Language Identity Efforts, vol. 2 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011): 364–380; A. Maxwell, “Herder, Kollár, and the Origins of Slavic Ethnography”, Traditiones 40, n. 2 (2011): 79–95. 53  Besides Greenberg, see also: J. Šidak (ed.) Hrvatski narodni preporod—ilirski pokret [The Croatian Nationa Revival—Illyrian Movement], 2nd ed. (Zagreb, 1990); E. Murray Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement (New York/Boulder/London, 1975); A. P. Maissen, “Wie ein Blitz schlägt es aus meinem Mund.” Der Illyrismus: Die Hauptschriften der kroatischen Nationalbewegung 1830–1844 (Bern, 1998). 54  Stančić, Gajeva, 142–143. 55  Stančić, Gajeva, 26–27.

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had been conversant with the loci communi of the Illyrian national thought and firmly believed in the autochthony of the South Slavs, and his associates, realized that Croatian traditions were mostly irrelevant outside of Provincial Croatia whereas Illyrian national thought had some traction amongst the educated speakers of South Slav vernaculars.56 In fact, the movement gained some adherents in the Military Border, Dalmatia, South Styria, Carniola, and South Carinthia but could not really establish itself outside Provincial Croatia. Religious difference between the Catholics and the Orthodox, provincial identities, and emerging alternative nationalisms—but sometimes also less than perfect relationships between some protagonists—proved to be an obstacle the Illyrian movement could not overcome. Finally, the policies of the Habsburg state proved particularly detrimental. The border between the Hungarian and the Austrian part of the monarchy, a veritable “Chinese wall”—to quote from a 1836 letter—, complicated or even prevented the circulation of newspapers, one of the crucial means for the establishment of an imagined community.57 Also, the Illyrian movement could introduce the new Illyrian standard language—based on the Štokavian—in official use and in schools in Croatia and Slavonia, since it had a majority in the Provincial Diet of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia. However, this was entirely impossible elsewhere. In local historiographies, the interpretation that Illyrian nationalism was doomed from the start, because Slovene, Croat, and Serb nationalism were supposedly based on ethnic communities, still prevails. However, recent research has demonstrated that such communities did not exist and that Slovene, Croat, and Serb nationalism arose from fairly new ideas about the existence of those three nations, ideas that were certainly much younger than the Illyrian national thought as they only started to appear at the end of the 18th and in the beginning of the 19th centuries. Their success, however, was a consequence of historical contingencies and certainly not a foregone conclusion.58 56  Stančić, Gajeva, 109–116; Kuntić-Makvić, O povijesti uporabe ilirskog nazivlja, 137. 57  Greenberg, The Illyrian Movement, 370–374; M. Zajc, Kje se slovensko neha in hrvaško začne: Slovensko-hrvaška meja v 19. in začetku 20. stoletja [Where the Slovene Ends and the Croatian Begins: The Slovene-Croatian Border in the 19th and in the Beginning of the 20th Century] (Modrijan: Ljubljana, 2006): 52–67; F. Petrè, Poizkus ilirizma pri Slovencih (1835–1849) [An Attempt at the Illyrian Movement among the Slovenes (1835– 1849)] (Slovenska matica: Ljubljana, 1939); M. Birk, “Panslawistische und illyrische Kulturideologie in der Laibacher Literaturpublizistik des Vormärz”, Zagreber germanistische Beiträge 10 (2001): 137–151. The 1836 letter is quoted in Zajc, 57. 58  Pantelić, “Memories of a Time Forgotten”; J. Kosi, “Je bil proces formiranja slovenskega naroda v 19. stoletju res zgolj končni nasledek tisočletne slovenske kontinuitete? [Was the

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The policies of the Habsburg state—let us remind ourselves of the decision of Emperor Francis in 1816 once again—had been just such a contingency. 7

Illyrism after the Establishment of South Slav Nationalisms

Despite the relative failure of the Illyrian movement, Yugoslavism, as the movement started to call itself in the 50s, had not disappeared from the scene. However, in politics it had been mostly relegated to the background as a longterm goal of the more established Slovene, Serb, and Croat national movements; it came to the fore only occasionally. Plans and speculations about the establishment of a South Slav state—within or outside the Habsburg Monarchy—were often debated; sometimes the Illyrian name was revived for this purpose. Speculations that the Habsburg Kingdom of Illyria might have been brought back to life—it was abolished in 1849—, enlarged, and transformed into a South Slav nation-state were periodically circulating. In fact, as late as January 1918 one of the leading Slovene politicians proposed the establishment of Illyria comprising the South Slav provinces of Cisleithania to Emperor Karl.59 Amongst the people, the Illyrian name also had some relevance; in some cases, it was still used as a self-designation. For example, when Mojsije Baltić wrote a policy paper in the beginning of the 50s, he still used the term Illyrians for the South Slavs, and in the 70s a Croat nationalist politician was complaining to a friend that on occasion Slav-speakers in Istria still call themselves Illyrians.60 Some outsiders also did not cease to call the South Slavs Illyrians; 19th-Century Process of the Formation of the Slovene Nation Truly a Mere Continuation of the Millenary Slovene Continuity?]”, Zgodovinski časopis 64 (2010): 154–175; G. Makarovič, Ko še nismo bili Slovenci in Slovenke: Novoveške etnične identitete pred slovensko narodno zavestjo [When We Were Not Slovenes Yet: Early Modern Ethnic Identities before Slovene National Conciousness], Razprave in eseji, 60 (Ljubljana, 2008); J. V. A. Fine, Jr. When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans: A Study of Identity in Pre-nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early-Modern Periods (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2006). 59  W. Lukan, Iz črnožolte kletke narodov v zlato svobodo? Habsburška monarhija in Slovenci v prvi svetovni vojni [From the Black-Yellow Cage of Nations towards Golden Liberty? The Habsburg Monarchy and the Slovenes during World War I], Zbirka Zgodovinskega časopisa, 47 (Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije: Ljubljana, 2014): 95–97. 60  D. Pavličević, “Elaborat Mojsija Baltića o kućnim zadrugama u Hrvatskoj [A Report of Mojsije Baltić on House Communities in Croatia]”, Arhivski vjesnik 33 (1990): 16; Hrvatski državni arhiv [National Archives of Croatia], Papers of Vjekoslav Spinčić (HR HDA 819), box 63, a letter of Matko Laginja to Vjekoslav Spinčić, July 23, 1870.

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when the famous archaeologist Arthur Evans wrote about his travels in the Balkans, he frequently used the terms Illyrians and Illyrian to describe the local population.61 So, Illyrian national thought and Illyrian nationalism had not been entirely wiped out by the expansion of Slovene, Croat, and Serb nationalism. However, the idea that South Slavs were autochthonous in the Balkans, that they were its first inhabitants, heirs to ancient Illyrians, has been increasingly pushed to the margins by the emergence of modern positivist historiography. When the Neoillyrian movement—a group of Slovene intellectuals, advocating a rapid cultural and linguistic unification of South Slavs—appeared after the turn of the century, their name was meant to evoke the Illyrian movement and not the half-forgotten myth.62 Nevertheless, the belief in the indigeneity of South Slavs and their equation with the ancient Illyrians lingered on in the writings of a few impassioned amateurs—along with a number of other pseudohistorical stories of origin.63 Even in the 60s and 70s, autochthony still could serve a purpose as it gave South Slav nationalists an illusion of antiquity and thus a way to assert primacy. Especially in the contested border regions along the East coast of the Adriatic it was used as a rhetorical weapon against the claims of Italian nationalists. For example, Slovene paper from Triest with an indicative title Ilirski primorjan (The Illyrian from the Littoral) claimed in 1866 that the city belongs to the Slovenes, because their ancestors, the Illyrians, had settled there long before the Romans. This was no isolated occurrence; far from it, for a while indigeneity was the chief argument of local Slovene nationalists.64 8

Conclusion

To summarise, Illyrian national thought had been a literary phenomenon that started developing in the last decades of the 15th century and rather rapidly spread amongst South Slav intellectuals in the Western Balkans. From the

61  Dzino, “Constructing Illyrians”, 12. 62  On Neoillyrism, see: Zajc, Kje se slovensko neha in hrvaško začne, 251–278. 63  L. Gabrijelčič, “The Dissolution of the Slavic Identity”, 22–26; Štih, Theories of Indigeneity, 41–44; M. Bratovž, “Avtohtonistične teorije na Slovenskem pred drugo svetovno vojno [Autochthonist Theories in Slovenia before World War II]”, BA thesis (University of Ljubljana, 2014). 64  M. Verginella, Border Genealogies: Slovenian Claims to Trieste, In D. Artico and B. Mantelli (eds.), From Versailles to Munich (Dolnośląskie Wydawnictwo Edukacyjne:Wrocław, 2010): 91–94.

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beginning it also had a political dimension but all the efforts to make it politically relevant had failed. However, as nationalism appeared, Illyrian national thought provided a framework within which a single nation of South Slavs was conceptualised. It also provided a vast supply of topoi that could be reworked into an invented tradition as indeed they were. Last but not least, the literary tradition provided the nationalists with an illusion of autochthony and thus historical precedence. However, as much as the belief in indigeneity had been important for the morale of the first South Slav nationalists—and it most certainly was—and as much as their programmes were informed by the Illyrian national thought, in the end the spread of the Illyrian ideologeme could not secure the establishment of the Illyrian nationalism. Not unconvincingly, Zrinka Blažević has argued that there are all the elements of Anthony D. Smith’s ethnie in the Illyrian national thought.65 Nevertheless, the Illyrian nation never established itself beyond small groups of intellectuals, nobles, priests, and burghers; there had been no nationalisation of the masses. Today, The Illyrian nation is nowhere to be found, whereas other South Slav national categories of identification are able to mobilise large parts of the population in the Western Balkans; Serb, Croat, and Slovene nation are all well and truly established. In marked contrast to the ethno-symbolist assumptions, traditions, myths and symbols proved far less important in the process of nation building than—say—the policies of the Habsburg state. 65  Blažević, Ilirizam prije ilirizma, 89–90.

CHAPTER 5

Illyrians Across the Adriatic: A Cultural History of an Archaeological Culture Maja Gori 1

Introduction

This paper focuses on the construction of Illyrians as Iron Age archaeological culture and on the role it played within the Albanian and Yugoslav identity building processes. It explores the evolution and changes of the Illyrian concept and discourse through time, when and how they were used and how they were influenced by different trends in archaeological interpretation and historical events. By discussing the most relevant theoretical approaches to archaeology that shaped the discipline in Albania and Yugoslavia during the 19th and 20th century, this paper shows how different trends in archaeological interpretation were deeply influenced by changing geopolitical scenarios. The idea of an archaeological culture as a definable entity in space and time has survived the onslaughts of several generations of theoretically inclined archaeologists. Cultures have been deconstructed, reformulated, renamed and simply ignored but have been refusing to be consigned to the dustbin of archaeological research, as Roberts and Vander Linden have recently recalled.1 Whether they are employed as a background to regional or local investigations or they provide the central focus for research, archaeological cultures show no signs of going away. For decades, archaeologists have classified spatial clusters of artefacts into discrete “cultures”, which are conventionally treated as bound entities. As material culture was increasingly seen as an expression of group identity, archaeological cultures themselves have often been equated with past social, or even ethnic, entities. The need for reconceptualising boundaries and identity is a recurrent theme in archaeology since the late 1960s. Researchers became suspect of simple correlations between artefact distributions and group identity and sought new approaches to the interpretation of variability. 1  B. Roberts – M. Vander Linden, Investigating Archaeological Cultures: Material Culture, Variability and Transmission In B. Roberts – M. Vander Linden (eds.) Investigating archaeological cultures: material culture, variability, and transmission (Springer: New YorkHeidelberg, 2011): 1–21.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004335424_007

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These debates and ensuing theoretical shifts have although had very limited impact on research in the Balkans.2 At the same time, the complex and troubled history and changing political scenarios that characterized the late 19th and 20th century continue to cast a shadow on archaeological research in this region, (re)constructions of prehistoric groups often follow the political borders established at the beginning of the 20th century or tend to reflect current political aspirations. The projection of historically contingent concepts of culture and identity into the distant past is therefore not simply a methodological shortcoming, producing agenda-driven interpretations of the archaeological record but also has caused political consequences for the present. Different types of appropriation of the past in the form of archaeological discourse based on the concept of archaeological culture reflect power struggles centred on nation and identity building. 2

The Time of Heroes Between Scientific and Popular Narratives

One of the rare overviews of Iron Age archaeology, based on the Illyrian culture concept is the book The Illyrians. Written by J. Wilkes,3 it is an attempt to present an overall synthesis of the Iron Age in the western Balkans including not only Albania, but also the whole region known in as Illyria in the past. This book belongs to a series of publications by Blackwell called The Peoples of Europe. The editorial project focuses on «the European tribes and peoples from their origins in prehistory to the present day».4 Despite being part of a project patterned after ethnogenic concepts, Wilkes deals with the Illyrians abandoning this perspective in favour of a more inclusive and nationalism-free approach. In his work the Illyrians are dealt with as different groups, which inhabited western Balkans during Iron Age and Classical period. Illyria is then mainly used as a geographic concept, describing the roughly defined western Balkan region as seen from a Roman perspective as for the Greco-Roman historiography from the 4th century BCE, rather than a ethnic one. Aside from judging its scientific value, which is not the purpose of this paper, it is important to note that Wilkes’ book doesn’t meet the favours of the general public. Indeed, Amazon customer reviews accused his work of «suffering from Greek and Serbian propaganda” or being “influenced by anti-Albanians who have tried to erase Albania from 2  M. Gori – M. Ivanova (eds.), Balkan Dialogues. Negotiating Identity Between Prehistory and the Present (Routledge: London, 2017). 3  J. Wilkes, The Illyrians (Blackwell: Oxford, 1992). 4  http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-398180.html last accessed on 26-11-2015.

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the map for thousands of years».5 Wilkes’ work and its impact on both academia and the non specialist public, is diagnostic for assessing how scientific and popular archaeologies are intertwined and, therefore, how they need to be dealt with as the two faces of the same coin. Iron Age is one of the historical period more frequently adopted in the process of modern European states national identity construction.6 Celts and Iberians in Spain, Gauls in France and Celts in Ireland represent some of the better-known examples of Iron Age importance in the archaeological discourse at the national identity narratives basis. Iron Age is typically depicted and evoked as the golden age of the nation, a time when a heroic and primigenial society, characterized by exceptional cultural, technological and social achievements, laid the foundations for a present-day ethnic groups. Iron Age popularity is related to the fact that the first chiefdoms in Europe that put emphasis on the martial prowess were established during this period, when warrior graves and mounted warfare became a widespread phenomenon.7 The representation of Iron Age as “time of heroes” originates from the Illuminist cultural milieu and reaches its peak of popularity during the Romantic era, when representation of pre-Roman warriors and freedom fighters became icons for irredentist claims, struggles against the invaders and national identity.8 The romanticization of the pre-Roman epoch that characterized 19th-century Europe has developed into present-day historical national narratives, which often combine scientific archaeology with elements of popular culture. An interesting example of Iron 5  http://www.amazon.com/The-Illyrians-John-Wilkes/dp/0631198075/ref=cm_cr_ pr_product_ top last accessed on 26–11–2015. 6  See among others J. Collis, Celts and politics In P. Graves-Brown – S. Jones – C. Gamble (eds.), Cultural Identity and Archaeology. The Construction of European Communities (Routledge: London, 1996): 167–177; M. Diaz-Andreu, Archaeology and nationalism in Spain In M. DiazAndreu – T. Champion (eds.), Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe (University College London Press: London, 1995): 39–56; B. Fleury-Ilett, The identity of France: Archetypes in Iron Age studies In Graves-Brown – Jones – Gamble (eds.), Cultural Identity and Archaeology, 196–208; S. Jones – P. Graves-Brown, Introduction. Archaeology and cultural identity in Europe In Graves-Brown – Jones – Gamble (eds.), Cultural Identity and Archaeology, 14–17; M. ŠešelKos, “Ethnic manipulation with ancient Veneti and Illyrians” Le identità difficili. Archeologia, Potere, Propaganda nei Balcani. Portolano Adriatico III 3(2007): 11; G. R. Zapatero, Celts and Iberians. Ideological manipulations in Spanish archaeology In Graves-Brown – Jones – Gamble (eds.), Cultural Identity and Archaeology, 179–195. 7  C. Renfrew, Prehistory and the identity of Europe, or, don’t let’s be beastly to the Hungarians In Graves-Brown – Jones – Gamble (eds.), Cultural Identity and Archaeology, 131. 8  For Celts see e.g. G. Carruthers – A. Rawes (eds.), English Romanticism and the Celtic world (University Press: Cambridge, 2003).

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Age iconic warrior representation is the catalogue cover of the exposition on the Greek Dark Ages held in Karlsruhe in 2008–2009.9 The cover recalls fantasy books illustrations and shows a helm and a Greek warrior throwing a spear, surrounded by classic ruins. It is interesting to note that even if the Fantasy genre is predominantly linked to a medievalist form,10 Iron Age enjoys a fairly prominent position as well.11 Iron Age remains very fashionable still today and drives the interest of a large public of non-specialists. For example, in the archaeological open air Museums inaugurated in Europe between 1900 and 2010 (most of them established after the 1980s) the Iron Age, with 96 out of 393 depictions, is the most represented time period12 followed by Early Middle Ages with 78 depictions.13 As for other European countries, Iron Age knew great popularity in Albania, especially in historical narratives connected to 20th-century national identity building. The idea of Illyrians as distinct people originating modern Albanians permeated the 20th-century archaeological discourse and was constructed in opposition to Slav neighbours. On the contrary, in Yugoslavia14 the Illyrian concept was used for identity building purposes mainly in the 19th, while in the 20th century other archaeological narratives emerged and were perceived as more relevant in the ethnic based process of identity construction. As effectively pointed out by S. Jones,15 speculations on the origins of ethnic distinctiveness are a forced passage for each discourse based on archaeological narrative that wants to foster or create the self-perception of a group as ethnically distinct from others. 9  C. Hattler – K. Horst – A. Seiffert, Zeit der Helden. Die “dunklen Jahrhunderte” Griechenlands 1200–700 v. Chr. (Primus: Darmstadt, 2008). 10  J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings is the most renowned western Fantasy book in medievalist form, but see also the yet to be finished novel A Song of Ice and Fire by G. R. R. Martin and its TV adaptation A Game of Thrones. 11  E.g. the popular computer game Civilisation. 12  Note that many Open Air Museum depict different periods at the same time. 13  R. Paardekooper, The Value of an Archaeological Open-air Museum is in Its Use: Understanding Archaeological Open Air Museums and their Visitors (Sidestone Press: Leiden, 2012): 96–103, in particular figure 4.16 and 4.17. 14  For simplicity Yugoslavia here is referred to as the territories belonging to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1944), the Yugoslav federation (1945–1992) and to the independent republics established after the Yugoslav wars (1992-present). The territories rougly corresponding to former Yugoslavia and previously included in the Austrian Empire (1801– 1867), and in the Austria-Hungary (1867–1918) are taken in consideration as well. 15  S. Jones, The Archaeology of Ethnicity. Constructing the Identity on Past and Present (Routledge: London, 1997).

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The Rebirth of the Illyrians

Following the classical period, the name Illyria emerged again from history’s mist in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night. The comedy, which is believed to be written around 1601, was set in an anonymous city in Illyria, an exotic place populated by pirates at the borders of Europe.16 In 1809 the name Illyrian Provinces was given to the territories along the north-east coast of the Adriatic Sea, which had been conquered in the War of the Fifth Coalition by Napoleon and lost again five years later. This choice is directly connected to the profound political and cultural transformations occurred in France at the end of the 18th century. Indeed, after 1789, Greco-Roman Antiquity lost in popularity and was put to one side. At the same time Celtic past was discovered, and Roman Gauls and the image of Vercingetorix in chains became a bright symbol of those power abuses committed by the Ancienne Régime. As De Francesco reminded us, the passage to the new century saw the explosion of the Celtomania, which was celebrating Druidic liberty as foreshadow of the political and cultural originality of the new French nation.17 In the Eastern Question geopolitical frame, the name Illyrian for the relabeling of the Dalmatian coast was deliberately chosen as it evoked the pre-Roman era, a time when aboriginal Illyrian tribes were living in the western Balkans free and independent from the Imperial yoke. The Kingdom of Illyria was officially established on August 3rd 1816 as a crown state of the Austrian Empire and as the successor state of the Napoleonic Illyrian Provinces following their re-conquest by Austria. The territory of the kingdom included the western and central part of present-day Slovenia, i.e. Carniola with the capital Ljubljana and the Slovenian Littoral, Austrian Carinthia and Slovenian Carinthia, as well as some territories in north-western Croatia and north-eastern Italy. In 1822, the part of territory between the right bank of the Sava and the city of Rijeka was annexed again to the Habsburg Kingdom of Croatia. The first irredentist movements of north-western Balkans started to grow in this geopolitical scenario. The Illyrian movement was a pan-South-Slav cultural and political campaign initiated by a group of young Croatian intellectuals in 16  Wilkes, The Illyrians, 4. The term is attested also earlier, see E. Ivetic, Jugoslavia sognata. Lo jugoslavismo delle origini (Franco Angeli, Milan, 2012): 98. 17  A. De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. The Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796–1803 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013): 29–32. Celtomania, adequately directed and manoeuvred, served later also as support to Bonaparte’s policy. See pp. 33-ff. Celtomania was a widespread phenomenon; see for example England in Carruthers – Rawes (eds.), English Romanticism.

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the years 1835–1849. The political views of the New Illyrians mirrored the power relation between dominant Austro-Hungarian political establishment and the construction of South Slavic identity in the framework of Romanticism.18 One of the central objectives of the New Illyrians was the establishment of a standard language as a counter-weight to Hungarian and the promotion of Croatian written literature and official culture. Ljudevit Gaj was instrumental in providing the foundation for the flourishing of the Croatian literature, being largely responsible for establishing the Croatian orthography and grammar. Indeed, the Illyrian Movement aimed at creating a Croatian national establishment in Austria-Hungary through linguistic and ethnic unity among South Slavs. The city of Zagreb had become an important centre of political, economic, and cultural activity, and did therefore establish itself as the centre of the movement. Choosing Illyrian as their name represented a symbolic gesture dense of political significance. By referring to the pre-Roman antiquity, movement members and leadership attempted to bring the “real” history of the Croatian to the forefront. In 1850, a small group of New Illyrians and Serbian representatives signed the Vienna Agreement, which proclaimed the southern Štokavian dialect to be the standard common language of Serbs and Croats, with Serbian Cyrillic and Croatian Latin alphabet as equal letters. The agreement was the basis of standardizing the Serbo-Croatian language.19 In the same years, Johann Georg von Hahn published at Jena his famous work Albanesische Studien,20 the first sustaining the idea that modern Albanians were descended from ancient Illyrians. Von Hahn was an Austrian diplomat, philologist and specialist in Albanian history, language and culture. In 1847, he was named Austrian consul in Ioannina and from 1869 was the consul-general in Athens. Von Hahn is considered the founder of Albanian studies. During his stay in the Balkans he assembled source materials on Albanian language and culture, learned the Albanian language and demonstrated its membership in the Indo-European languages family. A relevant part of von Hahn’s work was devoted to the analysis of ancient classic sources and ancient languages, which were compared to modern Albanian. In his work he defines the Albanians as autochthones in contraposition to the Slavs, which migrated to the Balkan Peninsula in the 6th century CE. Albanesische 18  D. Dzino, “Deconstructing “Illyrians”: Zeitgeist, Chamging Perceptions and the Identity of Peoples from Ancient Illyricum” Croatian Studies Review 5 (2008): 44. 19  H. Fofić, Die Genese der kroatischen Standardsprache im 19. Jahrhundert—Ljudevit Gaj und die Illyrer (Bd. 16. Bochumer slavistische Beiträge. Hagen: Rottmann, 1990). 20  J. G. von Hahn, Albanesische Studien, (F. Mauko: Jena, 1854). Available at https://archive .org/details/ahy9953.0001.001.umich.eduvon Hahn 1854.

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Studien is primarily a brilliant travel account, in which archaeological notes were presented together with a huge amount of anthropological data and linguistic analysis. Von Hahn’s hypothesis of a relation between ancient Illyrians and modern Albanians immediately prospered among Albanian intellectuals, laying the foundation of the Illyrian archaeological and historical discourse, which has dominated Albanian identity building process until present days. Although less popular than Hellenism,21 Illyrism22 represents a comparable phenomenon reflecting the penetration of 19th century centre-European themes and ideologies among Balkan intellectuals and their recasting in new forms of discourse used in identity and nation building processes.23 At the end of the 19th century and until the end of the Second World War, foreign diplomats, officials and scholars conducted most of archaeological field researches in south-western Balkans. The young Sir Arthur Evans was among the first archaeologists travelling in the Balkan Peninsula. In 1875, before devoting himself to Cretan archaeology, Evans started his trip in search of ancient traces of the Balkan past. His primarily ambition was to discover forgotten civilisations, but his search for Illyrians became soon bound up with the cause of Slav freedom. In his account the description of south Slav peasants’ sufferance under the Austro-Hungarian rule plays an important role. As special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, he reported in unflattering terms the imposition of Austrian rules after the Berlin congress, arguing that the Emperor’s regime was not better than that of the Ottomans. In 1881 he published a sympathetic account of the activities of Slav dissidents and, after a brief permanence in prison, he was deported from Austria.24 Evans’ book Antiquarian Researches in Illyricum was published in 1883–5. It is an eloquent and enthusiastic account of Illyrian prehistoric and classical remains. The achievements of the Illyrians in the remote past were deployed in order to emphasize how dark and regressive the era of Turkish rule had been. In his book there is an interesting ethnographic account portraying local population: From Gorazda the road after crossing the Drina and traversing the glen of Čajnica, ascends the steeps of Mount Kovać, still covered with a primæval 21  On this topic see, for example, Y. Hamilakis, Lives in Ruins: Antiquities and National Imagination in Modern Greece In S. Kane, (ed.), The Politics of Archaeology and Identity in a Global Context (Archaeological Institute of America: Boston, 2003): 51–78. 22  On Illyrism see E. Ivetić, Jugoslavia sognata: lo jugoslavismo delle origini (Franco Angeli: Milano, 2012): 97–107. 23  For the passage from Illyrism to Jugoslavism refer to Ivetić, Jugoslavia sognata, 97–115. 24  Wilkes, The Illyrians, 6–7.

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forest growth of gigantic firs and beeches. On this range I came upon one of the most striking ethnological phenomena anywhere to be found in the Balkan lands. The peasant women, whose attire through this and the adjoining Serbian province is as exclusively Slavonic as their language, have here preserved a distinctively Illyrian element in their dress. They wear, in fact, over and above the Slavonic apron, an Albanian fustanella; and, though their language is pure Serb, their longer and more finely-cut faces and the expression of their eyes, as much as their characteristic skirts, proclaim their kinship with the aboriginal people of Illyricum.25 It is most likely that Evans came across one of the Vlach groups spread across the Balkans. What is relevant to be highlighted here is that the “aboriginal people of Illyricum” in Evans’ mind were definitely closer to the Albanians than to the Slavs. At the end of the 19th century it was not clear if the Illyrians were connected more to the Slavs or to the Albanians, and the term Illyrian was ubiquitously used to define both. This ambivalence can be clearly seen in the relative invoice of the Century Dictionary, which reflects 19th century uses of the word in the English-speaking countries: Illyrian (i-lir’i-an) a. and n. I a. 1. Pertaining to Illyria or Illyricum, an ancient region east of the Adriatic, comprising in its widest extent modern Albania, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, Dalmatia, etc., conquered by the Romans and made a province, and later a prefecture.—2. Pertaining to modern Illyria, a titular kingdom of Austria-Hungary, comprising present Carinthia, Carniola, and the Maritime Territory.—3. Pertaining to the modern Serbo-Croatian race or language.—Illyrian Provinces, a government formed by Napoleon in 1809, comprising various territories taken from Austria, lying north and east of the Adriatic. It was under French control, was abolished in 1814–15, and in 1816 was made a nominal kingdom of the Austrian empire. See def. 2 II. N. 1. A native of ancient Illyricum. The Illyrians were perhaps allied to the Thracians, and are now represented by the Albanians.—2. An

25  A. J. Evans, Ancient Illyria. An Archaeological Exploration, Reproduction from Antiquarian Research in Illyricum, In Archaeologia vol. 48 parts I & II, 1885 and vol. 49 part III & IV, 1886 (London, 2006): 126.

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inhabitant of the modern titular kingdom of Illyria.—3. A member of the Serbo-Croatian race, now living in the territory of ancient Illyricum.”26 The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia was one of the largest and most famous encyclopaedic dictionaries of the English language and has been used as an information source for the makers of many later dictionaries, including editors of the Oxford English Dictionary, who cited it over 2,000 times in the first edition. It is evident that the term Illyrian at the end of the 19th century presented some ambiguities. On one side it designed “modern Serbo-Croatian race or language” and a member of the “Serbo-Croatian race”,27 while on the other it indicated “a native of ancient Illyricum, [. . .] now represented by the Albanians”. This equivocality will persist during the 20th century. Controversies based on the use and appropriation of the Illyrian concept by different present-day nations will indeed characterize the entire 20th-century identity building process in Western Balkans, mirroring geopolitical tensions between Albania and Yugoslavia. 4

The Birth of Archaeology in the Western Balkans

With the Austrian and, later, the Austro-Hungarian domination, archaeological discipline was established in the north-western Balkans and the first archaeological investigations started. Archaeology developed within a multi-national institutional framework and, even after the dissolution of the Empire, the Hasburg legacy and, afterward, the Austrian influence, remained very strong in archaeological studies. In the Caput Adriae Region, Venetian antiquarian tradition and, later, Italian archaeology were also prominent, and both were contributing to the discipline’s development. At the beginning of the 19th century the provincial Museums, whose activities covered the territory of present-day Slovenia, were established: Graz (1811), Ljubljana (1821), Klagenfurt (1844) and, later, Trieste (the Town Museum of natural History in 1846 and the Town Museum of Antiquities 1875). In particular, the museum of Graz dealt mainly with pre-Roman archaeology and hosted 26   The Century Dictionary vol. IV 1895: 2991. Consulted online last time on the 15th November 2014 http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/splash3.html. 27  The continuity of use of the term Illyrian to describe Slavs is, however, attested since 15th century. See Ivetić, Jugoslavia sognata, 98–99 for the presence of different types of Illyrism.

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the work of Carlo Marchesetti, who worked extensively on the prehistoric hill forts of the Regione Giulia, the Julian March.28 The Central Commission in Wien was responsible for the coordination of the regional Museums. On the Croatian territory, archaeological museums in Split (1818–21), Zadar (1830) and Zagreb (1846) were established. In 1870 the first number of the Journal of the Zagreb Archaeological Museum was published.29 With the treaty of Berlin (1878), Bosnia and Herzegovina came under Austro-Hungarian control. Ten years later, in 1888, the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, having originally been conceived as earlier as 1850. During the same years the first excavations started, and scientific journals focusing on archaeology and antiquity were created. The most renowned is Glasnik.30 The first Museum in Belgrade opened in 1844 in the context of the uprising for the independence from Ottoman Empire. Some years later, in 1884 the first scientific journal of antiquities Starinar31 was founded. The birth of archaeology in western Balkans and its close connection with political circumstances and emancipation movements is easier to understand when framed within this discipline development at a European level. In the late 19th century, cultural evolutionism was simultaneously challenged across Europe by growing nationalism and declining faith in the benefits of technological progress. These two developments were closely entangled, since a reduced commitment to evolutionism made ethnicity appear to be the most important factor in human history.32 In central and northern Europe, archaeology started to be increasingly intertwined with nationalism. In Germany, for example, by promoting a sense of ethnic identity, archaeology played a significant role in the unification of the country in 1871 and, afterwards, by expressing the pride 28  P. Novaković, Archaeology in the New Countries of Southeastern Europe: A Historical Perspective In L. Lozny, Comparative Archaeologies: A Sociological View of the Science of the Past, (Springer: New York, Heidelberg London, 2011): 353–356. For a portrait of Marchesetti and his importance for Italian Prehistoric archaeology see R. Peroni, Marchesetti archeo­ logo nel quadro degli studi italiani ed europei di preistoria fra 1870 e 1920 In G. Bandelli – E. Montagnari Kokelj (eds.), Carlo Marchesetti e i Castellieri 1903–2003 (Editreg SRL: Trieste, 2005): 25–30. 29   Journal series: 1. Viestnik Narodnoga zemaljskoga muzeja u Zagrebu (1870–1876.); 2. Viestnik Hrvatskoga arkeologičkoga družtva (1879–1892.); 3. Vjesnik Hrvatskoga arheološkoga društva, nova serija (1895–1941/1942.); 4. Vjesnik Arheološkog muzeja u Zagrebu (1958–). 30  The journal Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja was founded in Sarajevo in 1889. 31  Старинар. Српског археолошког друштва 1884–1 Година I. - Број I. У Београду Краљевско-српска државна штампарија 1884. Editor: Михаило Валтровић. 32  B. Trigger, A history of archaeological though (University Press: Cambridge, 1989): 148.

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of Germans in their accomplishment as people. The same process occurred in most European countries. Along with Germany, France and Denmark are two of the most quoted examples for the use of archaeological discourse in the 19th-century national identity building process. By encouraging a sense of ethnic identity among groups living under Austrian, Prussian and Russian dominations, Eastern European archaeologies played a role in the dissolution of these empires and the eventual emergence of a series of nation states. Between the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, national unity was encouraged by arguing that, within each nation, everyone, regardless of social class, was united by a common biological heritage, which constituted the strongest of all human bonds.33 In Croatia, and to a lesser extent also in Slovenia, antiquity’s revival and the establishment of archaeology as scientific discipline34 were closely intertwined with political emancipation of the Croat and Slovenian nations.35 Between the 19th and the 20th century, excavations of cemeteries and settlements and the display of archaeological objects made visible to the people the physical remains of their ancestors and thus their everlasting connection to the land. It is important to recall that the main characteristic that differentiates the use of history from archaeology in national narratives is that archaeology is able to translate the idealised image of the ethnic past into tactile realities, according to modern standards of knowledge. The physicality of archaeology, the fact that one can see, touch, feel and experience archaeological heritage gives an added sense of authenticity to the nationalist narratives. The materiality of archaeological remains, thus, representing the tangible aspect of historical narratives,36 transforms the search for these “facts on the ground” into a patriotic duty.37

33  Trigger, A history of archaeological though, 149. 34  B. Slapšak – P. Novaković, Is there national archaeology without nationalism?: archaeological tradition in Slovenia In M. Díaz-Andreu – T. Champion, (eds.), Nationalism and archaeology in Europe (UCL Press: London, 1996): 256–293 and Novaković in: P. Biehl, A. Gramsch, A. Marcziniak (eds.) ARCHAOLOGIEN EUROPAS / ARCHAEOLOGIES OF EUROPE, Geschichte, Methoden und Theorien / History, Methods and Theories Munster (Waxmann: New York/ Munchen Berlin, 2002). 35  Novaković, Archaeology in the New Countries of Southeastern Europe, 375. 36  For the relation of land to people see e.g. the case of Israel in M. Gori, “The stones of contention. The role of archaeological heritage in Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, Archaeologies. The Journal of the World Archaeological Congress 9 (2013): 213–229. 37  On territorial self-fashioning see the paradigmatic case of Israel in N. Abu El Haj, Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-fashioning in Israeli Society (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2001).

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Archaeology in Western Balkans in the 20th Century

In the late 19th century, German archaeology has been characterized by a revolt against the classical heritage of Western Europe, with a revival of the Middle Age and prehistoric archaeology.38 Nevertheless, German tradition in classical archaeology continued to occupy a prominent position in Europe. This is, for obvious reasons, particularly evident in Italy and even more in Greece. Indeed, the German Archaeological Institute (DAI) at Athens, along with other foreign research institutions, shaped and directed archaeological research in Greece giving also substantial contribution to the construction of the archaeological discourse Greek identity building process is based upon.39 The DAI was founded in 1872 as the second foreign archaeological institute in Athens following the French School at Athens, which was established in 1846. In the first part of the 20th century, the most popular approach to prehistoric archaeology was the so-called “Kossinna-Childe paradigm”, better known by the name of culture-historical archaeology. G. Kossinna introduced the method of matching an archaeological culture with an ethnos, thus allowing archaeology to participate in the solution of ethnogenic problems. While Kossinna is probably the most ill famed European archaeologist, being indissolubly linked to Nazi ideology, V. G. Childe’s work exemplifies the European Marxist approach to archaeology and represents still today a milestone in the development of archaeological thought. Childe was an Australian archaeologist working in England for the most of his academic life. His strong Marxist background and communist ideas lead him to be actively involved in politics. In his book The Dawn of European Civilization,40 Childe adopted Kossinna’s basic concept of archaeological culture and his identification of such cultures as the remains of prehistoric peoples, while rejecting all of the racist connotations that Kossinna had attributed to them.41 In the introduction of The Danube in Prehistory, Childe wrote: 38  Trigger, A history of archaeological though, 148–149. 39  For the influence of Germany on Greek national identity construction see, for example, M. Gori, Fabricating Identity from Ancient Shards. Memory Construction and Cultural Appropriation in the New Macedonian Question In Fabricating History: Representations, Manipulation, Evidence. The Hungarian Historical Review 3(2) 2014: 285–311, and M. Gori, Il nodo gordiano macedone. Archeologia, identità etnica e appartenenza politica In J. Bassi – G. Canè, (eds.), Sulle spalle degli antichi. Eredità classica e costruzione delle identità nazionali nel Novecento (Unicopli: Mantova, 2014): 43–44 and the quoted bibliography. 40  V. Childe, The Dawn of European Civilization (Kegan Paul: London, 1925). 41  Trigger, A history of archaeological though, 170.

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we find certain types of remains—pots, implements, ornaments, burial rites, house forms—constantly recurring together. Such a complex of regularly associated traits we shall term a ‘cultural group’ or just a ‘culture’. We assume that such a complex is the material expression of what today would be called a people.42 In this way, each culture was identified in terms of constituent artefacts and its diffusion on the basis of their recurrence over a geographic area. The difference between Childe, one of the fathers of European prehistoric archaeology, and Kossinna, the one who provided scientific legitimacy to Nazi expansion in Europe, needs to be sought mainly in the political ideas that oriented their research rather than in actual differences in their theoretical approaches. The development of both national and nationalist archaeology in Germany is particularly interesting for its strong influence on the discipline’s development in the western Balkans. Prior to 1945, Germany was economically, politically and culturally the strongest power in Central Europe and, consequently, it exercised great influence in cultural and scientific development of a number of disciplines, archaeology included. Even during the Cold War, West German archaeology maintained strong ties with Eastern European and Balkan countries, keeping its scientific leadership in the field of archaeology until today. German School is a colloquialism, which comprehends a group of different approaches to archaeology typical of German-speaking countries. The expression “German School” labels an archaeological approach marked by a strong emphasis on empirical and positivist aspects of the archaeological research of material culture, a detailed comparative typological and chronological studies of its formal aspects, and the use of cross-cultural comparisons aimed at developing culture historical interpretations and reconstruct “histories of cultures”. The focus of this approach was on two major units of observation: the artefact itself and the culture as a particular assemblage of artefacts in time and space, for which it was implied a particular socio-cultural, frequently ethnic or ethnic-like, grouping of peoples. Priority was given to those aspects of the archaeological past, which were perceived as instrumental for explaining national history and ethnogenesis or ethnic history of a territory. P. Novaković has demonstrated that the German School was extremely influent in Yugoslav archaeology.43 His research analyses the background of 42  V. Childe, The Danube in Prehistory, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1929) v–vi. 43  B. Slapšak – P. Novaković, Is there national archaeology; B. Slapšak, Entangled Histories in South-East Europe: Memory and Archaeology In G. Klaniczay – M. Werner – O. Gecser (eds.) Multiple Antiquities – Multiple Modernities, (Campus: Frankfurt, 2011): 419; P. Novaković,

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the most influent personalities in the field of archaeology, covering more than 90% of all archaeologists or professionals in archaeology working in western Balkans in the period 1870–1945. He demonstrates that the striking majority of scholars active in former Yugoslavia graduated or received their PhDs before the Second World War in Austrian or German universities. Despite the tension between Western and Eastern blocks that characterized the Cold War era, Western Germany maintained a prominent role in Yugoslav prehistoric archaeology. Indeed, German continued to be the most used foreign language in scientific archaeology and the academic ties between the two countries remained strong. For example, the eminent scholar Vladimir Milojčič (1918–1978), a former student of M. Vasić at the University of Belgrade in late 1930s and 1940s, developed his academic career in Germany at the University of Heidelberg becoming the director of the Institute of Ur- und Frühgeschichte. Archaeological research in Albania started later than in the neighbouring countries and was influenced by different political and cultural circumstances. Due to very weak public and consequently academic infrastructures, a true national disciplinary framework for archaeology was introduced in Albania only in the early 1950s, with a strong boost from Enver Hoxha’s Communist Party. Prior to this period there was almost no archaeological practice in Albania apart from foreign missions. The most important were the Austrian expeditions of Carl Patsch in 1904, of Camillo Prashinker and Arnold Schober in 1916–1918 followed by French excavations at Apollonia in 1924–1938,44 the Italian expeditions at Butrint from 1928 to 1943, under G. M. Ugolini’s45 supervision and the exploration in Paleolithic sites by Luigi Cardini in 1930–39.46 The Italian archaeological mission lead by Ugolini in the eastern Mediterranean represents a good example of archaeological imperialism. The Italians added to imperialism the nationalist component by heavily using the myth of Aeneas and his association with Butrint in the context of Mussolini’s Mediterranean geopolitics.47 Indeed the archaeological mission served as forerunner for the political annexation of Albania, which was militarily occupied by Italy in 1939. The „German School“ and its influence on the national archaeologies of the Western Balkans In Branka Migotti et al. (eds.) Scripta in honorem Bojan Djurić (Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana 2012): 51–72. 44  Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 10. 45  O. J. Gilkes (ed.), The theatre at Butrint. Luigi Maria Ugolini’s excavations at Butrint 1928– 1932 (Albania antica IV) (The British School at Athens: London, 2003). 46  K. Francis, Explorations in Albania. The Notebook of Luigi Cardini, Prehistorian with the Italian Archaeological Mission (The British School at Athens: London, 2005). 47  Gilkes (ed.), The theatre at Butrint; M. Galaty – C. Watkinson (eds.), Archaeology under Dictatorships (Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publ.: New York, 2004).

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During the fascist Ventennio, the Italian mission at Apollonia was generously financed by Mussolini regime to substantiate, with archaeological proofs, the claimed connections between Italy and Albania.48 The Italians were interested in pandering to Albanian nationalist tendencies, “the fanatical and puerile national pride [. . .] to know and illustrate their ancestors the Illyrians”,49 and to use them in opposition to the French archaeological and political presence in Albania. By 1926–27 the Italian government was developing ideals of an extended territorial hegemony, and further, Rome’s own Trojan past was increasingly being promoted in Italy as a symbol of identity and as corroboration for fascist policy. Ugolini’s earliest archaeological explorations were not at Butrint but at nearby Phoenicê. Ugolini’s early interest in Phoenicê might have been chosen in order to win favor with current Albanian nationalist sentiments regarding an Illyrian past. Through the study of the ancient sources, Ugolini was attempting to find archaeological relationships in Butrint to prove the authenticity of the Trojan history. The story was enthusiastically picked up by the regime in Rome and Mussolini personally requested Ugolini to write a popular book detailing the results from Butrint.50 If the mythological origins of Butrint and its common ancestry with Rome was used to promote and popularise the site, quite another methodological thinking under-pinned Ugolini’s archaeological approach. Despite clearly being enmeshed in the ideological thinking of the time, Ugolini was able to apply different methodologies to different contexts: as a publicist he used the ancient sources as a means to discover an epic past, but in the field, and as an academic, he applied a rigorous investigative methodology derived by his background as prehistorian. With the end of the Second World War, European geopolitical assets changed and consequently the spheres influencing western Balkan archaeology. During the Cold War, archaeology in the Eastern Block was strongly subject to the influence of the Marxist and Soviet approaches to the discipline, which set the scientific standards for most of the Warsaw pact member countries or the ones gravitating around it.51 The mission of Soviet archaeology was to promote a materialist understanding of human history aligned with the guiding philosophy of the Communist Party. After 1940 in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party itself supported the creation of a Marxist approach to 48  E. Cella – M. Gori – A. Pintucci, “Archaeology in the Adriatic. From the Dawn to the Sunset of Communist Ideologies”, Ex Novo 1 (2016). 49  T. R. Paribeni, Director of the Missione Italiana in Levante in 1924, from Gilkes 2005, 1. 50  L. M. Ugolini, Butrinto: il mito d’Enea; gli scavi (Istituto Grafico Tiberino: Rome, 1937). 51  L. Klejn, Soviet archaeology: schools, trends, and history (Oxford Univ. Press: Oxford, 2012): 135–142, 151.

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archaeology. Archaeologists were to use their data to illustrate the laws and regularities of historical process and by doing so, demonstrate the accuracy and utility of Marxist concepts. Archaeologists were initially encouraged to explain changes in the archaeological records not in terms of migration and diffusion but as the result of internal social development. In the ‘70s Soviet archaeology had just broken from obligatory autochthonism and begun reconstructing peoples movements embracing migrationism, into Europe from the steppes, in clear opposition to the direction elaborated by Kossinna.52 6

Archaeology in the Cold War Era

The interpretative framework for archaeology in use within western Balkans during the Cold War resulted from a mixture of early 20th century culturehistory and Marxist-Soviet approaches blended with local archaeological backgrounds. In Yugoslavia the socialist regime supported and promoted archaeology as an important instrument for emancipation of the Yugoslav nations and for the promotion of achievements of the new society. In both Yugoslav and Albanian national archaeologies emancipation was seen as a task more important than insisting on class-struggle types of interpretations of archaeological record. For this reason the European Marxist approach was generally preferred to the Soviet Marxist one. However, Soviet theoretical framework was adopted in its earliest form for its concept of autochthonism, which was extensively used as basis of the Illyrian archaeological discourse, particularly in Albania. In Yugoslavia the influence and impact of Marxist ideology is well visible through the terminology, which was used in describing social relations in Illyrian societies. “Primitive communities”, “tribal aristocracy”, “emerging class division” are expressions that can be often found in Yugoslav archaeological literature.53 In this cultural and political framework Illyrians were seen as macro-ethnic group made up of heterogeneous and culturally loose linked tribes that inhabited Roman Illyricum. The parallel between Illyrian tribes and the socialist federal Yugoslavia, made of different but akin nations bound by a joint political structure and pervaded by brotherhood-and-unity ideology, was at the fingerprints of the socialist regime in its nation building process.54 However, the idea of a general Illyrian identity in

52  Trigger, A history of archaeological though, 230–231. 53  Dzino, “Deconstructing “Illyrians”, 44. 54  Dzino, “Deconstructing “Illyrians”, 45.

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Yugoslavia started to vanish quite rapidly when different pre-Roman “archaeological cultures” such Dalmatian, Iapodean, Pannonian, Histrian, etc. started to be conceived and singled out on the basis of Iron Age material culture patterns. Regional and political issues, such as the Serbian-Albanian conflict over Kosovo, were thus projected into the past through the debate over autochthonism and ethnic identity. Elements of Iron Age material culture were presented as alleged proofs for nationalist and separatist claims. The deconstruction of the Illyrian discourse coincided with the dissolving of Yugoslav geo-political frame and started in with the adoption of the 1974 decentralized Constitution. Yugoslavian identity disintegrated favouring the rising nationalism in the 1980’s. Following the Yugoslav war of the 1990s, the pan-Yugoslav Illyrian discourse was completely abandoned, but not the use of local Iron Age “archaeological cultures” in the identity building discourses of the new post-conflict political entities. In former Yugoslavia the Illyrian discourse was adopted by Kosovo to foster the connection with Albania, where the Illyrians had a long-lasting fortune in the archaeological discourse. After seizing power in 1944, the Albanian Communist government soon banned all foreign expeditions and started to develop its own national disciplinary framework literally from scratch. The first Albanian archaeological institution, the Archaeological-Ethnographic Museum, was established in 1948 under the aegis of the Institute of Sciences, and an independent archaeological institute gradually developed at the Academy of Sciences, first as the Center for Archaeological Research (1976), later renamed as the Archaeological Institute (1992). The existence of a link between modern Albanians and Illyrians entered steadily the national identity discourse during the Second World War. Under the rule of Enver Hoxha, founder of the Party of Labor of Albania in 1941 and chief of state from the end of the Second World War until his death in 1985, Albania’s path had been one of increasing isolation and institutionalized xenophobia. The country had established and renounced alliances with Tito’s Yugoslavia, Khrushchev’s Soviet Union, and Mao’s China until, by the late 1970s, deciding to go “solo” and isolate itself as other few countries have been able to do during the 20th Century. In some cases, those alliances produced joint archaeological enterprises, as the Albanian-Soviet cooperation in Apollonia, in 1958–60.55 The periodical Iliria was established in 1971 to publish archaeological research focusing mainly on material culture, while monuments and structural remains, were published in the journal Monumentet. For the Iron Age, much energy was spent in demonstrating the autochthony and distinctiveness of the Illyrian people, from whom modern Albanians 55  N. Ceka, The Illyrians to the Albanians (Migjeni: Tirana, 2005): 16.

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were believed to descend. The Albanian theory of Illyrian origins is centred on the idea of an unbroken and direct descent of modern Albanians from the Illyrians, who were spread in Albania and Kosovo, but also in Epirus, western Macedonia and southern Montenegro, a geographical area roughly covering the the Greater Albania—an irredentist concept of land based on claims of present-day or historical presence of Albanian populations in those areas.56 To “find the Illyrians” several excavations targeting prehistoric sites were financed, like at Maliq in the Korce Basin,57 and at several Bronze and Iron Age tumuli58 to supplement evidence for Illyrian ethnogenesis and autochthony. Albanian political and cultural isolation favoured the crystallization of early 20th century culture-history themes popular in central European archaeology. These were combined with Marxist-Soviet approaches and re-casted in a form of archaeological interpretation suitable for the regime propaganda. The border between science and propaganda was extremely evanescent in Albania during Hoxha’s regime. Together with the scientific archaeological production, several books were also published with the clear intent of illustrating Albanian ethnogenesis to a larger public of non-Albanians. A good example of regime book published in English by the prestigious publishing house Routledge for an international audience in 1981 is The history of Albania: from its origins to the present day. In the 2nd chapter From the Illyrians to the Albanians, Slav tribes barbaric invasions in the Balkans are described. Towards the end of the book, the Greater Albania concept finds its place: since in New Epirus, Ancient Epirus, Prevalitania and Dardania the Illyrian population must have been preponderant and compact if one considers that the descendants of the Illyrians, the present Albanians, came from these provinces.59 However, this book is not only interesting for the Greater Albania concept and the evident anti-Slav tones. Worthy of note is also the early 20th German century culture-historical interpretative framework that, although rejected in the rest of Europe, survived in Albanian archaeology thanks to the scientific isolation imposed by Hoxha. The following is a quote from the first chapter of the book:

56  M. Gori, Who are the Illyrians? The Use and Abuse of Archaeology in the Construction of National and Trans-National Identities in the Southwestern Balkans In C. N. Popa – R.Ó Ríagáin (eds.), Archaeology and the (De) Construction of National and Supra-National Polities, Archaeological Review from Cambridge 27.2 (2012): 71–84. 57  F. Prendi, “La civilisation préhistorique de Maliq”, Studia Albanica 1 (1966): 255–280. 58  Z. Andrea, Kultura ilire e tumave në pellgun e Korçës (Tirana, 1985). 59  S. Pollo – A. Puto, The History of Albania from its Origins to Present Day (Routledge: London, 1981): 28. See also Gori, Who are the Illyrians?, 78.

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According to the German archaeologist Gustav Kossina, whose theories are the most well-known and the most accepted, the Illyrians were an ethnic group founded in Lusatia (Lausiz), an area in western Poland. Eventually, carrying with them the Lusatian civilization from “the field of urns”, they made for the south.60 The paragraph goes on challenging Kossinna’s interpretation by adopting an Albanian nationalistic perspective and taking as counterproof for autochthonism new Iron Age tumuli excavations in the country. Interestingly enough quoting an archaeologist indissolubly associated with Nazi propaganda, as an authoritative source in a book supporting a communist regime, didn’t represent a contradiction nor a source of embarrassment. Most of the Eastern Bloc states embarked on their dramatic political, social, and economic transformations in 1989, and it was to be only a matter of time before Albania followed suit. Ramiz Alia, who succeeded to Hoxha in 1985, was forced to bow to public pressure in the winter of 1990–1991, and in short order the country started to go through the long path towards democracy and the implementation of a market economy. Despite the relatively rapid opening to foreign archaeology, the Illyrian concept in archaeological discourses that was at the basis of national identity building process was not rejected despite being indissolubly associated to the Communist era.61 As we saw earlier, in the first part of the 20th century Western archaeology was dominated by diffusionist theories which explained cultural change mainly in terms of diffusion of culture and technology from a more developed area to a less developed one, which is from the East to the West according to Childe and from Central Europe to the East according to Kossinna. From the 1960s this interpretative framework was firmly challenged by New Archaeology, a form of archaeological theory elaborated in the US and then adopted in Europe putting emphasis on the explanation of cultural changes in terms of autochthonous developments. Proponents of New Archaeology (known also as Processual Archaeology) claimed that with the rigorous use of the scientific method it was possible to get past the limits of the archaeological record and learn something about how the people who used the artefacts actually lived. Ironically, the Processual idea of autochthonous development was close to the earlier Marxist-Soviet paradigm which was dominating research in the Eastern Block before the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Marxist-Soviet archaeology and New Archaeology present striking similarities, both based on an evolutionary 60  Pollo – Puto, The History of Albania, 2–3. 61  Novaković, “Use of the past”, 47–64.

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view of cultural change which sought to understand the regularities exhibited by that process explaining them in terms of local development.62 The period of maximum diffusion of the Processual approach coincided with the opening of Albanian archaeology to the West and its influences in archaeological interpretation. This coincidence somehow favoured the autochthonist approach endurance and in some cases even the sclerotization of the concept of ethnic continuity between Illyrians and Albanians from the Bronze Age to present. 7

Who Owns the Illyrians?

In Hoxha’s Albania the Illyrian argument was clearly used in an anti-Slav perspective, as it is evident from the conferences organized on the theme Illyrians-Albanians in both Albania and Yugoslavia. The milestone of the scientific dispute on the Illyrian-Albanian ethnogenesis is the first Colloque des Ètudes Illyriennes, organized in 1972 by the Academy of Science of the Popular Republic of Albania.63 The conference was replicated in 1985.64 These two editions of the Colloque des Ètudes Illyriennes were directed to give scientific legitimacy through archaeology and linguistics to the ethnogenic and autochthonist theories that consider Albanians as the only authentic direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians. It is noteworthy that the second conference was opened to international guests coming from Greece, France, Germany and Italy. Among those who presented a paper, three out of six, Klaus Kilian, Imma Kilian and Bernard Hänsel, were prehistorians from German universities, confirming the tight connections of Germany with Balkan archaeology.65 What can be considered as a proper “response conference” was organized in 1986 by the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts few years before the start of the Yugoslav wars. Milutin Garašanin,66 one of the most renowned Yugoslav archaeologists, made clear in the proceedings concluding remarks the will of the Serbian Academy of Science to counteract with actual scientific 62  Trigger, A history of archaeological thought 326–327. 63  M. Korkuti, (ed.), La ville illyrienne. édition spéciale en français. l’occasion du Premier Colloque des études Illyriennes; 15–21 septembre 1972. Iliria 2. 64  S. Islami – M. Korkuti – D. Komata – F. Prendi – N. Ceka – S. Anamali (eds.), IIe`me Colloque des Ètudes Illyriennes. Tirane, 20–24 . XI (1985). Iliria 15 (2). 65  Klaus Kilian, Imma Kilian from Heidelberg and Bernard Hänsel from Berlin. 66  M. Garašanin, Considerations Finales In M. Garašanin (ed.), Iliri i Albanci/Les Illyriens et les Albanais. Serie de Conferences tenues du 21 mai au 4 juin 1986. Academie Serbe des Sciences et des Arts. Colloques scientifiques XXXIX (1988): 369–375.

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arguments the Albanian propaganda, on the basis of the Illyrian discourse in Kosovo and in the other Yugoslav regions inhabited by a consistent Albanian community.67 After Yugoslavia’s dissolution and during the armed conflict for the control over Kosovo (1996–1999), Serbia through its Academy of Sciences resorted again to archaeology to reaffirm its dominion on the region. The exhibition Arheološko blago Kosova i Metohije: od neolita do ranog srednjeg veka (Archaeological treasures of Kosovo and Metohija. From prehistory to the Middle Ages)68 was organized by the Serbian Academy of Science in 1998. Dardanians and Illyrians occupied a central place in the catalogue chapters devoted to the Iron Age. Dardanians are identified as independent people of Daco-Mysian origin, whose Bronze Age substratum can be identified in the Brnjica-Strazava culture. The Brnjica culture is an archaeological group in present-day Serbia dating from 1400 BCE, which is identified as the non-Illyrian component in the Dardanian ethnogenesis. Most of the archaeological objects taken for the exposition to Belgrade never returned to Priština. Before the declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008, the cooperation of local archaeologists with foreign missions was already very tight, primarily with Albania. The most relevant project carried out by a joint Kosovo-Albanian team is the redaction of the Harta Arkeologjike e Kosovës (The Archaeological Map of Kosovo), a common project of the Academy of Arts and Science of Kosovo and the Academy of Science of Albania.69 Noteworthy this publication adopts exclusively Albanian toponyms and excludes the Slav ones. 8

Between Popular and Scientific Archaeologies

Outside the Albanian academic world the questio Ilirica and the debate on autochthonism and ethnic identity remained popular even after Hoxha’s regime disintegration. This can be well observed in the myriad of documents and publications produced in the last decades targeting the public at large and spread via the Internet. New Media70 have multifaceted and often 67  Gori, Who are the Illyrians? 68  N. Tasić (ed.), Arheološko blago Kosova i Metohije: od neolita do ranog srednjeg veka (Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti: Beograd, 1998). 69  L. Perrzhita, Harta arkeologjike e Kosovës/1. 2006. Prishtinë: Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Aerteve Kosovës [u.a.]. 70  Although there are several ways that new media may be described, here it is referred to as the form of communicating in the digital world over the Internet, and in particular to on-demand access to content anytime, anywhere, on any digital device, as well as

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contradictory roles in contemporary society and culture and represent an effective tool for the promotion of archaeological national narratives. New media technologies are generating profound changes in our political, cultural and social experience. Working in search of the ‘roots’ was once a prerogative of modern secular intellectuals71 which nowadays can be extended to a larger number of people thanks to the massive information supply potentially available through the Internet. The dominant communication technologies of the 20th century have been the printed press, radio and television. They have made knowledge available, transmitting information from a central source to many people insomuch that they were then defined ‘technologies of freedom’. Just as the old media, online and internet communications can be defined a ‘technology of freedom’ as well, although Morriset stresses the fact that just as these earlier ‘technologies of freedom’ carried with them dangers to freedom, so does and will the Internet.72 Illyrian discourse in the national identity building process is still perceived as absolutely relevant and problematic, as shown by the increasing relevance of the archaeological discourse in Kosovo national identity building. Sali Berisha’s government (2005–2013) also emphasised how present Albanians should be considered direct descent from the ancient Illyrians and it can be interpreted as the revisited and modernized perpetuation of the cultural policy insisting on the Illyrian discourse enacted by Enver Hoxa. The role of the Albanian Diaspora is also extremely interesting in the analysis of Illyrian importance for the definition of Albanian identity overseas. The book L’Etrusco Lingua Viva written in both Italian and English by N. V. Falaschi73 has had a strong impact on the Albanian Diaspora in Italy and represents the main reference for several websites that want to reconstruct the “lost truth” behind Albanian people and their forefathers. N. V. Falaschi was the daughter of Ismail Qemali, a principal figure in the formation of an independent government of Albania in 1912 and the wife of an Italian diplomat. In Falaschi’s book the Etruscan language is translated using modern Albanian. The Pelasgians, the forefathers of the Illyrians, brought the civilization to Italy and originated the Etruscans. Therefore, despite their inglorious present, the other Europeans shall treat interactive user feedback, creative participation and community formation around the media content. 71  A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1986). 72  L. Morrisett, Technologies of Freedom? In H. Jenkins – D. Thorburn (eds.), Democracy and New Media (The MIT Press: Cambridge, 2005): 26. 73  N. V. Falaschi, L’Etrusco Lingua Viva. Ulteriori interpretazioni epigrafiche e commenti storico-linguistici in italiano e in inglese (Bardi: Rome, 1989).

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the Albanians with more respect because of their glorious past as first and most ancient civilized people of Europe.74 The book was strongly inspired by von Hahn’s Albanesische Studien, which constitutes the main reference for Falaschi’s speculations. The Albanians. An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present by Edwin E. Jacques,75 often quoted as a reliable source in Wikipedia, is another book which fosters the Illyrian discourse for identity building purposes among people of the Albanian Diaspora, especially in the United States. Reverend Edwin Everett Jacques, who died in 1996 when almost 90, was an American writer and Christian minister who spent several years of his life teaching English in Korçë, in south Albania. Enthusiastic Amazon costumer reviews provide interesting insights into the current Illyrian discourse in Albanian ethnogenesis, showing how this topic is very popular among expatriates. So read some of the comments: Being myself an Albanian, it has surpassed all my expectations. It is truly true in its content, revealing much of the truth about Albania, that even Albanians themselves do not know. [. . .] I think it made me prouder being an Albanian than ever before. I strongly advise all Albanians and friends of Albania to add this rare item to their collection.” “[. . .] Reading the book, one can crystally see that the Pelasgian language is the same as the present-day Albanian language. Moreover, it tells what brush paintings had been put on Pelasgian (Albanian) culture and language.” “The book has it all. It should [be] a Koran or Bible for every Albanian and I would urge everyone one to own a copy or at least read it”.76 Despite the enthusiastic reception that Jacques’ book receives outside the academic world, Tim Cole’s review tells us much of its scientific value: As Forrest Gump manages to appear at every major moment in modern American history, so Jacques’ ‘Albanians’ crop up everywhere. Not only are Alexander the Great, Diocletian, Constantine the Great, Homer, Aristotle, Hippocrates, Pope Clement XI and Jerome claimed as 74  Gori, Who are the Illyrians?, 80. 75  E. E. Jacques, The Albanians. An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Mc Farland: Jefferson-North Carolina, 1995). 76  http://www.amazon.com/The-Albanians-History-Prehistoric-Present/product-reiews/ 0786442387/ref=cm_cr_dp_see_all_btm?ie=UTF8&showViewpoints=1&sortBy=bySubmission Date descending Last accessed on 14 January 2015.

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‘Albanians’ (pp. xii–xiii), but Jacques also claims as ‘conceivable’ that the Magi who saw the ‘star in the East’ were ‘Albanian’ [. . .] and even hints at a ‘possible connection’ between ‘Albanians’ and Stonehenge.77 The limit between scientific and popular archaeology are sometimes ambiguous and it is difficult to draw a clear-cut line dividing the two. However, the use of Illyrians to foster national identity building can be seen, for example, in the volume written by Neritan Ceka, The Illyrians to the Albanians.78 The title leaves no doubts on the ideological guideline of the work. Neritan Ceka is the son of Hasan Ceka, one of the fathers of Albanian archaeology. Hasan Ceka had served as a government representative on the excavations of Luigi Maria Ugolini at Butrint and Leon Rey at Apollonia. Together with Dhimosten Budina, who studied archaeology in Moscow, he was a principal figure in inviting Vladimir Demitriovitch Blavatski to participate in various AlbanianSoviet archaeological projects. Like his father, Neritan Ceka is an archaeologist, who has studied in Tirana and Berlin and worked at several archaeological institutions in Albania. He has also worked as corresponding member for the German Archaeological Institute (DAI). Ceka is, however, mostly a politician. Indeed he served as leader of the Democratic Alliance Party and as the Ministry of the Interior in the Fatos Nano Government in 1998. At present Ceka officiates as the Ambassador of the Albanian Republic in Italy.79 In Kosovo, the Illyrian discourse is exploited by both groups of interest and political parties. The right-wing and populist party Vetëvendosje! lead by Albin Kurti, uses the Illyrian discourse to foster its political agenda. One of the main points of Vetëvendosje!’s political program is the unification of Kosovo and Albania, and possibly of all the regions where the Albanian ethnic minority is present. 9

Concluding Remarks

When viewed through a diachronic and cross-regional perspective, the Illyrian concept results clearly ubiquitous. It was created in a peculiar cultural and political milieu and has undergone a number of transformation processes 77  T. Cole, review of the book The Albanians. An ethnic history from prehistoric times to the present: (Edwin E. Jacques, McFarland and Company, Jefferson, 1995, 730 pp.) In Political Geography 16. 7 (1997): 627. 78  Ceka, The Illyrians to the Albanians (Tirana: Migjeni) 2005. 79  http://www.ambasadat.gov.al/italy/it/ambasciatore-profneritan-ceka.

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connected to changes in domestic and international western Balkan geo­ political scenarios. As such it needs to be analysed adopting a postmodernist approach, seeing thus archaeology as cultural production rather than as the pursuit of truth.80 Geschichtskultur represents the specific and particular way in which a society relates to its past. When we study historical culture, we investigate the social production of historical experience and its objective manifestation in a community’s life. Archaeology can be defined as history’s material outcome, and as such it represents a central aspect of a people’s reception and representation of the past. E. Hobsbawm argues that the contrast between the constant change and innovation of the modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts of social life as unchanging and invariant, has led many unprecedented political institutions, ideological movements and groups to invent their historic continuity. New symbols and devices derived from archaeological heritage came into existence as part of national movements and states that claim a direct connection to the past. Archaeology, like history, is thus used to legitimise action and cement group cohesion.81 B. Anderson defines the nation as an imagined community82 and underlines that if nation-states are conceded to be “historical”, the nation to which they give political expression is always believed to originate from an immemorial past and to glide into a limitless future. He argues that the nationalist imagining is characterized by its concern with death and immortality which draw it close to the religious imagining. This way the concepts of unchanging and invariant become steady components of the invented traditions that constitute nation narratives, and act as responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old ones.83 For Anderson Museums, together with maps and census, the institutions of power are the ones shaping the way in which the colonial state imagines the legitimacy of its ancestry.84 From the middle 1990s the amount of books and papers devoted to the relation between archaeology and politics, written by archaeologists, has

80  Trigger 1984; I. Hodder (ed.), Archaeological theory in Europe. The last three decades (Routledge: London and New York, 1991); K. S. Brown – Y. Hamilakis Y. (eds.), The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories (Lexington Books: Lanham, 2003). 81  E. Hobsbawm – T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983): 7, 12. 82  B. Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, (Verso: London-New York, 2006): 6–7. 83  B. Anderson, Imagined communities, 11. 84  B. Anderson, Imagined communities, 163–185.

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steadily increased.85 This research interest follows the general trend of the literature concerning nationalism, which also experienced a strong expansion in the same period. However, with the exception of Greece, the study of the relation between archaeology, Geschichtskultur and politics in the western Balkans has received scarce attention by archaeologists, leaving this research area alarmingly underrepresented. One of the causes may be sought in the complexity of Balkan archaeology and recent history combined with the difficulty in accessing literature written in Albanian or South Slav languages. However, it is also most likely that this void can be connected to the orientalization86 of the Balkans and of Balkan archaeology. Contrary to what happens for the Balkans, Greek archaeology was (and still is!) abundantly used in Western decorative and visual arts, literature, theatre, music, and architecture, not to mention its importance in the current discourse on European cultural and political roots. On the contrary the Balkans had become synonym for backward, tribal, primitive and barbarian, and the interethnic conflict that characterized Yugoslav wars and the country’s dissolution reinforced the stereotypes present in the European imaginary. The term Balkanization, for example, which is used to describe the division of a multinational state into smaller ethnically homogeneous entities and refers to ethnic conflict within multi-ethnic states, reflects very well the general perception of the Balkans. It was coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and is today invoked to explain the disintegration of some multiethnic states and their devolution into dictatorship, ethnic cleansing, and civil war.87 In her groundbreaking work Imagining the Balkans, Maria Todorova showed how the Balkans have been always described as the “other” Europe in terms of uncivilized versus civilized word.88 Identity issues based on archaeological discourse in the 85  P. L. Kohl – C. Fawcett (eds.), Nationalism, politics and the practice of archaeology (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995); Graves-Brown – Jones – Gamble (eds.), Cultural Identity and archaeology; Atkinson et al. 1996; M. Diaz-Andreu – T. Champion, (eds.), Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe (University College London Press: London, 1996); Galaty – Watkinson (eds.), Archaeology under Dictatorships; Y. Hamilakis, The Nation and its Ruins. Antiquity, archaeology, and national imagination in Greece (Oxford Uni. Press: Oxford, 2007); R. Boytner – L. Swartz Dodd – B. Parker (eds.), Controlling the Past, Owing the Future. The political uses of Archaeology in the Middle East (The University of Arizona Press: Tucson, 2010). 86  For the concept of Orientalism refer to E. Said, Orientalism (Pantheon Books: New York, 1978). 87  http://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkanization last accessed on 1 December 2015. 88  M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (University Press: Oxford, 2006).

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Western Balkans are perceived as extreme distortions of archaeological discipline rooted in local development of archaeological practice. The role played by western archaeology and its deep influence in the Balkans discipline’s development needs, however, to be acknowledged and critically assessed. Indeed, western archaeology has not only influenced the establishment of archaeology as scientific discipline, but also the creation and use of archaeological discourses at the basis of past and present national identity building process. Insisting that all aspects of archaeological practice need to be understood within their historical contexts and accepting that they are imbued with power and politics, one can move towards new ways of engagement with Balkan archaeology and its relation to the present.89

89  Gori, Fabricating Identity from Ancient Shards. Archaeology, Cultural Memory and Politics in Former Yugoslavia (in preparation).

CHAPTER 6

Classical Antiquity and Modern Greek National Identity: Reliving the Ancient Maritime Heritage at the Sea of Salamis1 Eleni Stefanou 1

Introduction Today we celebrate almost 2500 years from the Naval Battle of Salamis with such a great significance for Greece and humanity because it established the prerequisites for the survival of civilisation and Hellenism. The Naval Battle of Salamis is not important just as a significant naval event but also because it demonstrated that the entire Greek future is utterly connected to the sea. Its messages are still dominant and show that the future of Greeks is connected to free societies, democracy, and freedom.2

Every year on the last weekend of September the island of Salamina commemorates the Naval Battle of Salamis, an historical event of great importance for the classical Greek antiquity that took place in 480 BC, when the fleet of the Athenian Coalition successfully confronted the Persian fleet. As seen in school textbooks, maritime museums, and official historiographical texts, the Naval Battle of Salamis is largely depicted as the most important naval event of the Greek national maritime past. In the website of the Piraeus Prefecture, the Naval Battle of Salamis is referred to as a «luminous example of superb thought, maritime ability, and mainly Greek bravery. The glorious result in favor of the Greeks allowed the Greek nation to acquire consciousness of its superiority, and also it has taught and it still teaches people that faith in the ideals of freedom and democracy should be above all».3 1  All quotes and ethnographic information are cited in the author’s unpublished Phd Thesis: E. Stefanou, Aspects of identity and nationhood: commemorating, representing and replicating the Greek maritime past. Thesis (PhD). Southampton University, UK, 2008. 2  Speech by the Mayor of Ambelakia Mr. Agapiou, September 2005 (author’s translation). 3  Η Ναυμαχία της Σαλαμίνας αποτελεί φωτεινό παράδειγμα της μεγαλοφυούς σκέψης, της ναυτικής δεινότητας, κυρίως όμως της γενναιότητας και ομοψυχίας των Ελλήνων. Η λαμπερή της έκβαση υπέρ των Ελλήνων αφενός επέτρεψε στο ελληνικό έθνος να αποκτήσει συνείδηση του μεγαλειώδους

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Salamineia, as the commemorative ceremony of the naval event is named, takes place on the top of the so-called “Magoula” hill, which is a designated archaeological site because of the findings relating to the tombs of those who fought at sea and to the remains of the submerged ancient harbor from which the triremes set sail.4 In reality, the Magoula hill is actually a landfill, surrounded by rusty sunken shipwrecks, such an ironic contradiction to the glorified rhetoric proclaimed by the performative event. The opening ceremony of Salamineia is symbolically held outside of the island, at the Monument of the Unknown Soldier in front of the Greek Parliament in Athens. It includes a short commemorative event and wreath laying, attended by Greek politicians, the Military Forces, the Hellenic Navy, delegates of many different states from Europe and beyond, whose national flags were carried by traditionally dressed local women in front of replicas of ancient weaponry and shields, the Navy’s Musical Band, local folk dance groups and, local theatrical groups. Back on the island, the celebrations reach their peak with the Christian orthodox memorial service «for those who heroically fought for our faith σθένους του, αφετέρου δίδαξε και διδάσκει στους λαούς ότι «νυν υπέρ πάντων» είναι η πίστη στα ιδανικά, της ελευθερίας και της δημοκρατίας (www.nomarhiapeiraia.gr/Templates/deltia_ tipou/2005/09/27b.htm; last accessed 04/03/2008). 4  Although it is an archaeological site which belongs to the state according to the Greek Law 3028 for the Protection of Antiquities, a peculiar status of ownership exists. Salamina is an island full of dockyards, which also surround the Magoula hill, as property of a Greek shipping company Arkadia A. E. On 14/11/1964 the place was declared archaeological site but in 1971 the Ministry of Culture under the Colonels Dictatorship sold the area to Arkadia A. E. which needed it to construct shipyards, provided that they would not cause any damage to the tombs and the surroundings of the hill. In 1975 the company applied for a permit to carry out work, which was turned down. Still, part of the hill’s eastern area was arbitrarily bulldozed destroying several tombs during the construction of an outdoor storage area for charcoal and iron-plates. Hence, after 1975 the bones from the tombs were collected by archaeologists of the Greek archaeological service. In 1985 the archaeological service started a procedure for the expropriation of the area which has remained “frozen” due to financial disagreements.In 1989 it was suggested to expropriate just 5.531 square meters, whereas in 1991 the archaeological service further suggested the compulsory expropriation of the entire area (around 20.000 square meters more) belonging to the shipping company. However, when the compulsory expropriation was actually attempted under the leadership of Th. Mikroutsikos, the Greek Minister of Culture (16/05/1994–21/01/1996), the owners of Arkadia A. E. demanded compensation of one billion drachmas (£2,026,041.454). This amount of money was never given to them and since then the procedure for the archaeological exploitation of the site has been “frozen” (newspapers Kyriakatiki Avriani 25/11/2005, Rizospastis 29/01/1998, Eleftherotypia 04/02/1993, Pontiki 27/05/1993).

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and homeland», the public commemorative ceremony, the re-enactment of ancient-like rituals, the Navy’s band playing the national anthem, a series of speeches given by local politicians and government, military, naval and church representatives, two parades, one by the Military and another by the schoolchildren of the area, two acts of wreath laying (one on site at the monument dedicated to the fighters at sea and the other in the water in memory of the dead), and a minute’s silence as a tribute to those who fell in the naval battle. This main body of remembrance acts is enhanced with various other festive events, that are enriched as the years go by, such as a demonstration of fireworks, video projections, folk dances, a red carpet placed on top of wooden pallets that leads to the sea-shore where the laying of wreaths takes place, etc. In a reverential atmosphere, classical antiquity is the main point of reference throughout the ceremony, connected to ancestral ties and the land’s sacredness [«It is our duty to pay tribute to the historical event and the ancestral honour in this sacred site»], to the significance of past historical achievements for modern times [«the event has to be promoted on a national and global level, equal to the value of the site and our history; the commemorative ceremony has to surpass its local boundaries and acquire national and global character»], to the naval battle’s strategic role for the cohesion of the modern Greek national identity [«the Naval Battle of Salamis is a glowing event and should be safeguarded in honour of the historical event and in order for us to keep standing as a people, as a race, as a social cell»]. Cultural, ancestral and ideological affiliation between the classical past and the present appears to be relevant not just for the modern Greek nation but also for the entire Europe and for humanity as a whole. That is because the Naval Battle of Salamis is portrayed as the most critical moment of classical antiquity, one that secured the survival of European culture and the values of democracy. In this highly performative event, the sea acquires a dual role, both actual and symbolic, by being the geographical space where the fate of Europe was determined and also the emblematic Greek locus from where the European ideals have derived. Aim of this article is to throw light on the uses of the Greek maritime past in the shaping and underpinning of modern Greek national identity, through the study of the commemorative ceremony of the Naval Battle of Salamis. The main questions, as they stem from the act of commemoration, revolve around the historical and socio-political reasons why the maritime past holds a significant role for the modern Greek national ideology; its points of reference and the means of its public performance and representation; and the ideological processes through which maritimity contributes today in the formation of a collective Greek identity.

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In order to better understand the dynamics of the performative event and the agents involved in the commemorative ceremony, it is essential to consider the following parameters: 1. Organisers: Who are the actual instigators of the ceremony, (a) if they are state representatives or private agents, (b) their professional backgrounds, (c) their relationship with the island, (d) their involvement in state or governmental positions, and (e) their aims for organising the commemorative event. 2. Discourses: How are the ceremony’s ideological scripts articulated, what are their implications regarding nationhood and classical antiquity. 3. Media: What kind of audiovisual media are employed in order to make the event appear authentic and appeal to the public? What is the combination of these media, how do they succeed in soliciting the senses and visualising the national narrative. 4. Structure: Like every successful performative event, the ceremony adopts a certain narrative form: (a) specific structure, an introductory beginning with a general description of the event, a central part where the significance of the historical event is given and the narration reaches its peak, a celebratory and reverential end, (b) highly defined plot and order, with clear articulation of arguments. 5. Character: The character of the commemorative ceremony might appear homogeneous as far as its nationalistic undertones are concerned but it cannot be characterised as a monolithic, since it fulfils multiple roles, by being a didactic event with educational purposes, a leisure activity for tourists, a festive celebration and, a symbolic capital for the locals, a part of national and universal history, an economic capital and cultural commodity for tourists and for the heritage industry. 6. Audiences: The dynamics of the audience are also important, judging by the rough estimate of the number of people attending the performative event, the attendees’ provenance, (locals, Greek tourists or foreign tourists, their arrangement in space, especially. if they are seated or standing, in order to determine the degree of attendance and the level of the formality of the event, along with its didactic or festive style. 7. Spatial location: The spatial location of the event determines the relationship with the landscape and, consequently, illustrates perceptions of memory and identity, notions of local and national continuity in space and time, and the degree of authenticity of the historical event, which is supposed to unfold in its original setting. On the whole, two basically different standpoints can be discerned in the commemorative ceremony: the first is inherent in the ceremony’s discourses and

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concerns the representation of national revival that considers the nation a pre-existing entity, resurrected in modernity and claiming an active historical role; the second has to do with the interpretation of the processes of national formation through the institutions of the political community. These two approaches to the nation, differ in their readings of the direction of time:5 in the representation, which is the key element of any performative event and, hence, of the commemorative ceremony under study, the direction is from the past to the present; in the interpretation, whereupon this chapter’s analysis is based, the direction is from the present to the past. For that reason, a constructivist paradigm is adopted here in order to challenge the framework within which the representation of the classical naval past is articulated, performed and commemorated in relation to the (re)production of identity discourses. 2

lassical Antiquity, the Naval Battle of Salamis and National C Historiography

From the 19th century onwards, the Naval Battle of Salamis has been a fundamental part of the modern Greek national discourse, when classical antiquity became the core ideological axis for the shaping of the Greek national narrative, as well as the main locus for the modern Greek identity to trace its place of origin. The splendour of classical Greece is vital in the process of national formation, a process which, however, cannot be rendered an innocent or a simple one. On the contrary, it is a complex procedure with multiple layers of approach and analysis, situated within the context of postcolonial studies, along with the broader readings of the institutionalisation of European archaeology on the eve of the newly founded nation-states and hand to hand with the development of national historiography.6 Most scholarly works which attempt a critical reading of the relationship between classical antiquity and modern Greek national imagination pinpoint some parameters, such as the Renaissance ideals within which classical Greece

5  A. Liakos, Historical Time and National Space in Modern Greece In H. Tadayuki – H. Fukuda (eds.), “Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present” Sapporo Slavic Euroasian Studies, 15 (2001): 27. 6  M. Diaz-Andreu, “Guest editor’s introduction: nationalism and archaeology”, Nations and Nationalism 7, 4 (2001): 432–434; Y. Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins: antiquity, archaeology, and national imagination in Greece (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007).

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was considered the cradle of modern Europe,7 the identification of the Western Europeans with the ancient Greeks on the basis of an idiosyncratic spiritual kinship, attributing to antiquity timeless and universal values; the sanctity, harmony, beauty, and magnificence;8 the subsequent 18th and 19th century ideological colonisation of ancient Greece,9 and a series of other entangled issues, such as the creation of a heterotopic locus10 in modernity based on iconographic and topographic metaphors of classical antiquity; the neglect of pre-modern ethnic structures sustained under the Ottoman Empire; the disregard of the local populations as oriental and barbarian, and, lastly, the exclusion of the Christian Orthodox tradition which, as the strongest bond with Byzantium, thought to be a foreign element the classical antiquity and the western European ideas. These «overlapping and conflicting dynamics» that are involved in the shaping of perceptions about the Greek archaeological past, along with the «multitude of social actors involved inside and outside Greece»,11 although mainly focused on terrestrial antiquities, can lead to the understanding of the ideological framework within which the modern discourses regarding Greek maritime heritage operate. As part of the 19th century nation-building processes, narratives about the sea and the naval battle of Salamis were shaped as part of the linear and unifying 7  See K. Th. Dimaras, Ellinikos diafotismos (Hellenic Enlightenment) (Athens, 1964); R. Jenkyns, The Victorians and ancient Greece (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1980): 5; R. R. Bolgar, The Greek legacy In M. I. Finley (ed.), The Legacy of Greece (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1981): 466; Th. E. Kalpaxis, Arhaiologia kai politiki I: Samiaka arhaiologika 1850–1914 (Archaeology and politics I: archaeologies of Samos 1850–1914), (Crete University Press: Rethymno:, 1990): 17; A. Kokkou, I merimna gia tis arhaiotites stin Ellada kai ta prota mouseia (The concern for antiquities in Greece and the first museums) (Hermes: Athens 1977): 5–17; D. Lowenthal, The heritage crusade and the spoils of history (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998): 728–730. 8  A. Leontis, Topographies of Hellenism: mapping the homeland (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1995). 9  Y. Hamilakis, The colonial, the national and the local: legacies of the ‘Minoan’ past In Y. Hamilakis – N. Momigliano (eds.), Archaeology and European modernity: producing and consuming the ‘Minoans’ (Botega D’Erasmo: Padova 2006): 95. 10  See A. Thacker, Moving through modernity: space and geography in modernism (Manchester University Press: Manchester and New York, 2003). As Thacker (2003: 27) puts it “heterotopia incorporates diverse places, moving between and across them, and in so doing it reveals the processes that link together different kinds of topoi”, further adding that, according to Foucault in The Order of Things (Routledge: London and New York, 1989, xviii), heterotopia is about “placing incongruous things together” [. . .], also referring to “the site upon which strange objects are grouped together”. 11  Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins, 83.

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national history that unravels from prehistoric times until the creation of the modern Greek nation-state in 1830. As Leontis notes,12 the portrayal of the sea in the national narrative changes «depending on the times and the beholder». Yet, what most of the accounts appear to have in common is the exaltation of the Greekness of the Aegean, the supposition that «the sea is in the blood of Greeks», and the declaration that «the sea is the nation’s soul». Such a priori statements about the role of the sea in national identity rely on metaphysical assumptions, which treat the sea as an inherent value of a timeless Greek identity, or on geographically deterministic approaches, which substantiate the nation based on its geographical location. The position the maritime past holds in the Greek national narrative is lucidly illustrated in numerous historical sources and in a variety of Greek websites with maritime or naval content. While it is beyond the aim of this chapter to produce a detailed analysis of historiographic texts regarding maritimity, still, it will attempt to position the prevailing perceptions on Greek maritimity in the historical framework they were initially established on. Amongst the most dominant references about the Naval Battle of Salamis are the writings of the national historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos in the volumes of the History of the Greek Nation (1860–1876). Paparrigopoulos, is considered the founder of modern Greek national historiography13 and the most important conveyor of the theory of Greek historical continuity from antiquity until the creation of the modern Greek state.14 In his work he promotes the notion of the temporal and cultural unification of Hellenism, the primordial beliefs about the origins of the Greek nation, as well as the establishment of the use of the first person in historical narration. In his hermeneutic approach towards Greek history, he also discusses naval aspects of the past which are identified with military achievements at sea. They extend from prehistory and mythical traditions to the first half of the 19th century. The Naval Battle of Salamis holds a prominent position in this narration,15 being considered 12  A. Leontis, Greek modernists’ discovery of the Aegean In J. F. Cherry – D. Margomenou – L. E. Talalay (eds.), Prehistorians round the pond: reflections on Aegean prehistory as a discipline (Kelsey Museum of Archaeology: Ann Arbor, 2004): 133. 13  K. Th. Dimaras, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos: istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous (Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos: History of the Greek Nation), (Estia: Athens, 1970 [1999]). 14  A. Kitroef, Synexeia kai allagi sti sygxroni elliniki istoriografia (Continuity and change into contemporary Greek historiography) In Th. Veremis (ed), Ethniki taftotita kai ethnikismos sti neoteri Ellada (National identity and nationalism in modern Greece) (Morfotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezis (MIET): Athens, 1997): 272. 15  K. Paparrigopoulos, Epitomos istoria tou Ellinikou ethnous: perilamvanousa ta didaktikotera porismata tis pentatomou istorias tou (Pergaminai: Athens, 1899 [1955]): 111–113.

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as the «widely known naval battle that defined the destiny of the Aegean and maybe of the modern world»16 and «the greatest and most glorious triumph of the Greek nation during antiquity, which still attracts the admiration of all peoples on earth and remains a symbol of the struggles for liberation of all humanity».17 The narration is event-based, comprised of descriptive details about the strategy, references to the participants, the number of ships and so on. The use of dramatic language is intense: «it was a ruthless struggle but the Greeks with the winner’s high spirit rush into battle, they sink or capture the Persian ships, many of which they jump on and mercilessly decapitate the opponents».18 Empathic and epic language is used for the description of the fighters: «patriotic excitement and belligerent rage had possessed the Greek fighters for liberation»; «[the Greeks] had to liberate their homeland from the barbarians, to save their children and their wives, the shrines of their fathers’ Gods, and their ancestors’ heritage with an ultimate struggle».19 For Paparrigopoulos, the sea becomes the symbolic vessel though which the Greeks would win over the Persians, as the only means that would determine the war’s positive outcome because of the skilfulness of the ancient Greek sailors. Navalism is regarded in his text as a means for survival, seen from a cultural, racial, and geographical point of view. The fighters of classical antiquity are the great and heroic ancestors whose braveries at sea should be an example worth imitating by the coming generations. In the same vein, some hundreds years later, the History of the Greek Nation (1970–1978)20 was published as a synthetic and collective work of 14 volumes which is officially considered the most essential and representative book of Greek history overall covering the period from prehistory until 1941. Although this collectively authored work does not diverge from the traditional narrative of Greek continuity, it is indicative of the «democratisation» of historiography trends since it is largely comprised of writings by a broad range of Greek historians each one specialised in political, military, naval, economic history and so on. Its 14 volumes cover the history of Greece from prehistory until the end of the 20th century. The style of writing resembles that of Paparrigopoulos, not so much in the dramatised language but in the descriptive style of narration, the event-based

16  Paparrigopoulos, Epitomos istoria, 113 (author’s translation). 17  Paparrigopoulos, Epitomos istoria, 113 (author’s translation). 18  Paparrigopoulos, Epitomos istoria, 113 (author’s translation). 19  Paparrigopoulos, Epitomos istoria, 112 (author’s translation). 20  The last volume from 1941 until the end of the 20th century was published in 2000 by the publishing house Ekdotiki Athinon under the auspices of the Academy of Athens.

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history writing, the division of Hellenism in chronological/cultural periods, and most importantly the primordial perceptions of the nation. References about the Naval Battle of Salamis are found in Volume Γ1–Γ2 which discusses Classical Hellenism. In a perennial line of thought, the naval battle is characterised as one of the «great national wars».21 Primarily, the narration unfolds around the plan of Themistocles «to render Athens the biggest naval power of Greece»22 by investing in the development of both a merchant and a naval fleet. The development of the merchant marine and the navy would secure the future of Athens by safeguarding the city’s autonomy and economic progress. The sea of Salamis is primarily portrayed as a means of defence and of safeguarding freedom and independence, so that cultural exchange, trade and further socioeconomic development can be achieved. It appears that in the two official historiography texts, the History of the Greek Nation (1860–1876) by the national historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, and the collective volumes entitled the History of the Greek Nation (1970–1978), the sea is regarded primarily as the basis of Greek power and control. In a glorifying rhetoric, Greek navalism and classical antiquity are utterly connected, envisioning perceptions of a timeless Greek identity bound with the sea due to the Naval Battle of Salamis. 3

Performing the Nation

The narrative that unfolds in the annual commemorative ceremony of the Naval Battle of Salamis does not deviate much from the narratives of the aforementioned historiographic discourses. In an attempt to sketch the general atmosphere, the celebrations are organized so that they emanate feelings of awe and pride to the audience: «The convergence of the time brought together the glorious past of Greece with the modern promising future, by watching young children with raised flags parading where approximately 2500 years ago the way for the glorious victory of Democracy and Culture was prepared». The performative event requires recipients in order to transmit its messages and activate a set of non-lived memories regarding the national triumph. Their attendance is not just a passive presence and, although they are not able to intervene, their senses are all alert. The intense atmosphere, created by the 21  H. Pelekidis, The reasons and the significance of the Persian Wars In History of the Greek Nation, volume B (Ekdotiki Athinon: Athens, 1971): 280. 22  H. Pelekidis, After the battle In History of the Greek Nation, volume B (Ekdotiki Athinon: Athens, 1971): 313.

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organisers, aims to stimulate the attendants’ thoughts, beliefs and empathic feelings towards the event, which is highly defined by a set of individual and collective habitual actions, speech-acts and bodily practices. It is due to this stimulation of senses that the distinction between “acting” and “being” is vague.23 The audience is thus the event’s “compulsory witness”;24 it legitimizes the act of commemoration, which exists in and for the eyes of the witnesses and it would not have the same validity if it were not for its attendants. In this context, the commemorative ceremony has a dual significance: as a staged act, a performance, it needs certain organizers, actors, audience, a clear structure and roles adopted only for that occurrence; as a performative practice, it is a habitual action with discourses of local identity and national ideology being embedded and embodied in everyday life.25 The notion of the habitual lays not so much in the frequency of the performance’s reiteration; rather, it is determined by the demonstration of the beliefs about national origins of both organizers and participants. The re-enactment is thus rendered a performative act due to the embeddedness of the life-stances it entails. Yet, it is also a normative practice because the meanings it disseminates appear constant and focused on the performance of a single, monolithic and primordial narrative. Performativity and performance are two key issues when it comes to the articulation of rituals. The clearly religious significance of “ritual” is here shifted to characterise “ritual” heritage practices that (a) require public participation and are crucially dependent on it, (b) are self-projected as the representative authorities of fundamental ideas on identity and origins, (c) aim at the celebration of common myths, histories, triumphs, and tragedies, and (d) result in the standardisation of beliefs on national identity and national past. The public confronts canonised views of local and national identity discourses. People’s thoughts are guided in order to accord with the presented maritime past. They are not independently evaluating their participation, but they perform as “believers”. Even when the audiences are not Greek nor do they have any knowledge on Greek history, the official perceptions are so strong that they do not allow much space for other viewings. Without doubt, each person receives differently what they see, but in the end what prevails is a rigid representation of Greek maritimity through the performative event. This endeavour is aided by the notion of the convergence of time and space, namely of national time and national space, that is prevalent in the 23  C. Weber, “Performative states”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27, 1 (1998): 82. 24  A. Parker – E. Kosofsky-Sedgwick (eds.), Performativity and performance (Routledge: New York, 1995): 10–11. 25  Weber, “Performative states”, 81.

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performative event. Through the merging of present and past, of material and intangible heritage, national imagination is successfully reproduced in an active process where nationalism, albeit a modern ideology, depends on antiquity for its own legitimization.26 In the commemoration of the Naval Battle of Salamis, antiquity is not just a set of past values but it represents a set of tangible elements, which provides the national narrative with adequate support in its search for the so-passionately sought sense of national authenticity, continuity, cultural uniqueness and identity. Antiquity, especially when experienced as a performance, enables the national narrative to be communicated through a visual language,27 since it endows with direct images perceptions of how the nations imagine themselves. Materiality, real or constructed, is thus a vital component of any performative event, vividly transferring aspects of the past in the present in a direct dialectic relationship that embodies notions of temporality and territoriality, defining national time and national space in national discourses. In the commemoration of the Naval Battle of Salamis, national time is presented as a ceaseless notion, in which the nation always existed as an active entity. Likewise, national space is perceived as the material and physical foundation of the nation and a prerequisite for the restitution of the national past.28 In this context, the Magoula hill becomes the locus where all past values are being performed. It is conceived, dreamed and imagined outside the limits of the actual socio-political space where it belongs. It ceases being a landfill, a neglected archaeological site, and instead it delineates the terrain of the historic homeland,29 outlining national geography. “Time” and “space” are thus notions inherently linked to the commemorative ceremony, which however pursues to surpass the national boundaries and acquire global significance. In the commemorative ceremony’s narratives, the global value of the Naval Battle of Salamis and the island’s symbolic sanctity are clearly pinpointed:

26  P. Kohl – C. Fawcett, Archaeology in the service of the sate: teoretical considerations In P. Kohl – C. Fawcett (eds.), Nationalism, politics, and the practice of Archaeology (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995): 9. 27  Y. Hamilakis, “Through the looking glass: nationalism, archaeology, and the politics of identity”, Antiquity 70 (1996): 976; Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins. 28  Leontis, Topographies of Hellenism, 84–85. 29  A. D. Smith, “Authenticity, antiquity, and archaeology”, Nations and Nationalism 7, 4 (2001): 443.

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Salamineia should be celebrated not only in our country but worldwide, since the universal values of Freedom and Democracy were secured after the epic victory of the Greeks in the Holy land of Salamis. Tremendous significance is attributed to the Greek victory, because it is thought to have led to the development of the Greek, European and Universal culture after having confronted the oriental and barbarian Persians: This is the day that changed the route of history, the day when light dominated over darkness and democracy dominated over obscurantism. It is the day of the first naval battle in history, the day of the Greek victory in honor of their ancestors. Although the Greeks had limited ship forces, they indeed had unique courage. This courage facilitated the naval supremacy of the Athenians and the stronger consolidation of democracy. The Greek triumph became a legend; a moral lesson for peoples; a starting point of the Greek and world nautical history. Therefore, we are indebted to eternally honour those who sacrificed themselves selflessly, who used their body as a shield to repel the intruder and defend our sacred lands (author’s translation). These moralizing perceptions reveal the network of polarized connotations and dichotomies around which the Salamineia commemorative ceremony is structured and identities are being performed, on a national level (bravery, patriotism, heroism, glory etc), on a cultural level (obscurantism and barbarism versus the classical and humanitarian), on a political level (freedom and democracy versus dynasty and despotism), and on a religious level (faith, Christian orthodox practices). 4

Performing the Secular and the Sacred

Elements of syncretism, in religious and political contexts, dominate this performative act. The Christian orthodox memorial service imposes on the long dead commemorative practices of a religion unknown and opposed to their culture. Christian orthodox elements, like psalms and symbols, icons and the cross, are employed to bless the memory of the dead of a pagan polytheist system. The result is the establishment of an undistorted image of Greekness through the centuries and a homogenized and unified view of the past, despite the complete ideological distinction between classical antiquity, Byzantine and contemporary Orthodoxy.

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Apart from aligning itself with antiquity, Orthodoxy also appears congruent with democracy and westernization, as opposed to the perceived despotic culture of Oriental barbarism: «. . . a collision of obscurantism and light, despotism and democracy took place». “Otherness” is overemphasized throughout the ceremony, since the values of Christianity, Greekness and Europeanism are constantly contrasted with the Oriental “other”, an alleged cultural enemy that keeps changing context, while roaming through the historical realities, since in 480 BC it stood for the Persians, in 1821 AD during the War of Independence it stood for the Ottomans, and today the “other” is the Turkish nation. Despite this adaptation being dependent on the historical context, both notions of the Orient and Greekness appear to bear a rigid significance, unchanged over the centuries. Primordial ideas are, thus, accentuated, unveiling ideologies of origin, along with local, national and transnational agendas. The continuous conflict of the two opposing entities, the war of a handful of Greeks against the large Barbarian enemy, symbolizes the struggle of darkness over light, of democracy over obscurantism. The notion of otherness is juxtaposed to ties of kinship developed with the dead of classical antiquity. Their remembrance as direct ancestors and close relatives offers some sort of familiarization with the classical past, which leads to its appropriation and adjustment to fit the modern national practices. The religious notion of national sacrifice is prevalent, exalting ancestral sacrifice that saved the nation and secured its freedom and prosperity. Religious metaphors of ancestral commemoration allow the remembrance of the heroic ancestors as sanctified personalities, a process which resembles the Saints’ veneration through their icons.30 Ancestral sacrifice viewed from the lens of the Orthodox Church results in the preservation of Greekness, a national entity treated as a respectful and timeless notion on a spiritual and secular dimension: spiritually due to the significance of Hellenism which manages to survive despite all impediments, and secularly because of the actual freedom and national sovereignty gained through ancestral bravery and religious struggles. In this process, the most prevailing concept is the integration of the secular with the sacred: the religious worship outside sacred spaces, the direct involvement of the Church in the remembrance of the classical past, and the constant amalgamation of historical, religious, and archaeological elements.31 The sacralisation of the classical past is, thus, achieved, as the sacred appears to take diverse forms. By distancing itself from the strictly religious domains, 30  D. E. Sutton, Memories cast in stone: the relevance of the past in everyday life (Berg: Oxford, 1998): 126. 31  See E. Stefanou, Aspects of identity and nationhood: commemorating, representing and replicating the Greek maritime past. Thesis (PhD). Southampton University, UK, 2008.

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it influences broader politicized fields such as the practice of archaeology and the historical representation. The sacralised past is automatically transformed into a “politicized religion”, which aids the fusion of multiple sociopolitical realities (namely classical Greek, Christian Orthodox, modern Greek) and unifies them under a single narrative reproduced in the performative event. This amalgamation strengthens the nation’s line of continuity, reminds of its timeless components and proves the pivotal role of the Greek naval power. The classical naval past is promoted as the ultimate agent of Greekness and as an embedded value in Greek society, an approach which facilitates its connection to Orthodoxy, the other fundamental axis of the modern Greek national identity and an ordinary part of everyday life. The sacralisation of the past and the secularization of religion demonstrate the naturalization of faith and veneration practices outside religious spaces and within cultural domains. This secularized religion appears to have a lot in common with national ideology, as they both entail their own language, ritual practices, performances and adornment of symbols.32 The integration of the secular with the sacred and the lack of a straightforward distinction between secularization and religiousness is strongly evident in Greek maritime heritage representations and performances,33 expressed through the presence of relics in museums, their religious worship outside sacred spaces, the direct involvement of church representatives in the commemoration of the maritime past, the employment of religious practices and orthodox memorial rituals in the remembrance of the long dead and their lament as immediate ancestors, and the constant amalgamation of historical, religious, and archaeological elements. All of these materialize the sacralisation of maritime heritage in practice and not just on a symbolic sphere, especially because Orthodox religion is thought to have resulted in segregating Greece from the Orient and the Aegean islands from the culture of the eastern mainland, shaping the modern Greek national identity. 5

Negotiating Locality and Nationhood

The complex framework within which classical antiquity and national identity are placed during the commemorative ceremony, provide Salamis with a 32  Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins. 33  See E. Stefanou, Aspects of identity and nationhood and E. Stefanou, The materiality of death: human relics and the ‘resurrection’ of the Greek maritime past in museum spaces In E. Beneki – J. P. Delgado – A. Filippoupoliti (eds.), “Memory in the Maritime Museum: objects, narratives, identities”, International Journal of Heritage Studies, 18 (2012): 1–15.

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diachronic significance as a historical locus of the past and as a point of reference for the modern national narrative. It verifies itself as an important landmark in European culture and in the establishment of universal moral values, having secured the development of democracy, morality and liberal thought, forming the basis of western civilization. Its importance aspires to surpass its local boundaries, not only because the commemorative ceremony transcends the boundaries of the island but also because it «provided the foundations for the survival of civilisation». Seeking to acquire transnational significance, it communicates perceptions about Europe’s moral debt and obligation to Greece and reproduces 19th century narratives on Philhellenism. Notions of ancestral debt are evident. They are communicated in a ritualized manner, with epic narration and exaltation of past braveries on a cherished landscape, which suggests that the status of a place aiming to become a national landscape is gained through historical and cultural processes.34 It is in this context that locality is produced as a national and a transnational subject through ritual practices inscribed on local actors.35 Their successful materialisation demands the public participation, in order to emanate an embodied experience of locality to the participants and to incorporate locality in national contexts. That is why the annual ritual performed on Salamina is not just a mechanical reproduction and reiteration of meaning. In fact, it inherently entails an active, intentional and productive character, as well as a highly specific way of localizing space and time.36 In this light, ritual practices in commemoration of the classical past are forms of social practices that are deliberate, intentional, and actively productive discourses of identity. Their realisation is not just a habitual repetition but a constantly redefined practice, which is rich in symbolisms and it designates locality spatially, temporally and culturally, in relation to the Greek national identity. Locality acquires, thus, a dual significance: it is perceived as the articulation of territorial space, by denoting a certain geographical region, and as an actual place, by denoting a certain historical and political achievement.37 Salamina stops being a mere geographical territory or a value-free neutral landscape; instead, it becomes a locality understood as an active agent, that is

34  S. Sörlin, “The articulation of territory: landscape and the constitution of regional and national identity”, Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift 53 (1999): 104. 35  A. Appadurai, The production of locality In R. Fardon (ed.), Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge (Routledge: London and New York, 1995): 204–205. 36  Appadurai, The production of locality, 206. 37  See Appadurai, The production of locality and N. J. Entrikin, “Place and region 3”, Progress in Human Geography, 21, 2 (1997): 263–268.

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capable of engaging with “the production, reproduction, and representation” of meanings.38 These processes bring to the fore the concept of “heterotopia”, referring to the imaginary construction of the nation and its visualisation through material culture, which in our case occurs in relation to the archaeological past and classical antiquity. This results in the iconographic and topographic production of the national imagination,39 where “classical antiquity can be seen as the essential emblem, image and material landmark that defines the topos of the nation” and secures the desired national continuity, which is the vital concept for the naturalization of the nation. The quest of local identity to be inscribed in the national narrative is more thoroughly understood through the performative act in memory of the Naval Battle of Salamis that accentuates the interplay between “locality” and “nationhood”. Whether this interplay concerns the representation of history or heritage, it is a basic element for the temporal and geographical incorporation of all territorial areas in a nation-state and consequently in the national narrative. The two tension-laden entities, locality and nation, coexist in many ways on the basis of symbiosis, opposition, ambivalent incorporation40 or assimilation: they can contradict each other by serving distinct interests; they can be integrated into a single collectivity through socio-political processes of assimilation and subordination; locality can replicate the national centre; and the periphery may attempt to “prove” its fine qualities that render it suitable to be part of the nation.41 These are evident in the commemorative ceremony of the Naval Battle of Salamis, which however takes a slightly different approach, emphasizing the universal significance of the naval battle, a fact which increases the national duty to honour it accordingly. Although the event’s local and national significance is considered highly important, it is also regarded as a given human value, embedded in people’s consciousness worldwide. Hence, during the commemorative ceremony it seems appropriate to accentuate its supra­ national significance, as an important landmark in European civilization and in the establishment of universal moral values. Salamina transcends its local 38  See Appadurai, The production of locality and M. Herzfeld, “Localism and the logic of nationalistic folklore: Cretan Reflections”, Society for Comparative Study of Society and History 45 (2003): 281–310. 39  Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins, 16; Leontis, Topographies of Hellenism, 40–66. 40  After Hamilakis, The colonial, the national and the local. 41  See Appadurai, The production of locality; M. Herzfeld, “Localism and the logic of nationalistic folklore: Cretan Reflections”, Society for Comparative Study of Society and History 45 (2003): 281–310; Hamilakis, The colonial, the national and the local.

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and national boundaries by having prevented the Persian expansion and, consequently, the domination and suppression of European lands by an oriental power, thus securing the development of democracy and forming the basis of western culture. The notion of transcendence is prevalent, since the Naval Battle of Salamis is re-contextualised due to a remarkable combination of past and present sociopolitical elements and the conflation of various aspects of modern Greek identity, the national flag and Christian Orthodox rituals being just a couple among others. These symbols imposition on ancient Greek subjects reveals syncretic action42 and a series of anachronisms in order to claim continuity with ancient Greece but without contradicting the current articulation of modern Greek national identity. These complex references to past and present adopt a linear sequence and a unified view of Greek society in the narratives of the commemorative ceremony. In them, the locality of Salamis is successfully incorporated in national and transnational discourses as a dynamic unit of the Greek nation as a result of its naval achievements. Such practices reproduced in commemorative ceremonies and performative acts create a very precise image of Greekness, reflected in the locality of Salamis. The island becomes a landmark; it is stripped of its other histories and it is identified solely with the naval battle. Salamis comes to signify a single event and a rich repository of moral values. These values are not passed on just to the modern Greeks but they are deemed universal. They are the origins of European civilization, which is considered the ultimate expression of culture. In an attempt to “defend” the characteristics of Greek cultural identity against anything that currently reminds of the Orient (be it the Persians, the Ottomans, or the contemporary Turks), the East is considered as a culturally underdeveloped entity. Another aspect of the interplay between the local and the national is related to the feelings of debt and gratitude towards the ancient ancestors, which however cannot be proudly expressed as long as the shame and inability to protect the tombs and the archaeological site persist. The safeguarding of the Salamis tombs is not just a request for antiquities protection. It is seen as a collective plead for the protection of the “local” cemetery, which acquires the significance that a modern cemetery has. It is perceived as the cemetery of “our” ancestors which should not be vandalised or abandoned anymore. Particular emphasis on pronouns such as “we”, “us”, “our”, signifies the collective character of remembrance.43 They give out the sense of a community, created during 42  C. Stewart – R. Shaw (eds.), Syncretism/Anti-syncretism: the politics of religious synthesis (Routledge: London, 1994): 4. 43  P. Connerton, How societies remember (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1989): 58.

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the actual commemorative ceremony, which shares common memories and hence a common past. This past is thought of as a benefactor not just of the strict locality but of the entire nation and Europe. In this vein, safeguarding the ancient tombs and the archaeological site signifies the maintenance of an eternal symbol and the sustaining of the vital characteristics of locality.44 Thus, the failure to preserve the event’s material expressions, while claiming the origins of both western culture and moral values, is perceived as unacceptable for such a civilised nation. It appears that in the case of Salamineia, the local reprimands the national (the nation-state) for not taking care of the material ancestral past. Although the narratives of the commemorative ceremony do not contradict the national rhetoric, the tension between the local and the national is obvious. On the basis of policies, it concerns the protection and management of the national material past of Salamina and reflects the different priorities of local and state agents regarding the representation maritime heritage. Yet, on the basis of ideologies, the ceremony’s narratives are in line with the national discourse. Despite claims of the site’s destruction by the archaeological service’s negligence, and regardless of the obvious clash between local and state protection policies, Salamineia even enhances the notion of nationhood: the national is not only enriched but it is elevated into a matter of an international and supra-national significance. When it comes to the public representation of locality through maritime heritage, it appears to be longing for national recognition. Salamis is self-defined on the basis of its relationship to the nation, and not as a separate entity, judging by its perceived ideological contribution to the national past. It becomes obvious that although locality may have numerous expressions as a single place, those which publicly represent it are usually selected through careful processes that engage with the public and invite the public to engage, celebrate, perform and revere the local past. This is achieved with the deployment of performative elements in order for the commemorative ceremony to transmit feelings of empathy towards a collective past, using “the metaphor of performance by staging and broadcasting the nation”, as noted by Edensor.45 Thus, “live” or “authentic” manifestations of heritage are amongst the basic for the success of the commemorative ceremony of the Naval Battle of Salamis, also perceived as a nostalgic representation of the past due to its “personal touch”46 and its ability to generate feelings of empathy, even without evoking lived memories. 44  See Appadurai, The production of locality, 206. 45  T. Edensor, National identity, popular culture and everyday life (Berg: Oxford, 2002): 69. 46  See R. D. Hicks, “What is a maritime museum?”, Museum Management and Curatorship 19, 2 (2001): 159–174.

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Conclusions

Primordial perceptions about Greek identity render the sea of Salamis the battlefield where Greek history was defined. There a constant clash is hosted between conflicting powers, Greeks against Barbarians, West versus East, democracy opposed to obscurantism, Christianity against Islam. Naturalising and deterministic interpretations of the maritime past are promoted in the domain of public history, where the sea of Salamis is projected as a national locus despite its current neglect. The land of the Magoula hill, reinforces Greek national imagination by materialising and visualising the intangibility of the sea, Greece’s natural frontier and its demarcated border from east, south and west. Thus, the sea appears as the real and symbolic boundary of defence of cultural, political and military interests from classical antiquity until nowadays. Since water precludes the possibility of any physical memorial, the commemorative ceremony of the Naval Battle of Salamis comes to visualise the historical occurrences that took place in these waters by producing a mnemonic locus47 which visibly reproduces national imagination through a series of performative acts. The lack of material remains from the naval battle does not undermine its credibility, since the notion authenticity of the represented naval events is communicated differently, not defined by ‘substance’ (what the objects are) but by ‘appearance’ (how do the objects look and of what do they remind of).48 The representations of non-original material do not really question what is authentic or how the authentic should appear but rather express aspects of a national, triumphal and glorified maritime past through the practices of performance and commemoration. In them, the strong presence of Orthodoxy attributes history the qualities of a pilgrimage that is materialised through the religious worship of the dead in secular spaces, the direct participation of the clergy in representations of the maritime past and the commemoration of ancestors lost at sea: all elements that identify religious and maritime discourses, embedding them within national consciousness. The commemorative ceremony inherently expresses the aforementioned narratives which are entrenched in the Greek national imagination, mirroring the Greek socio-political reality: the innate and authoritative presence of Orthodoxy in contemporary Greece is a defining element of everyday life within and outside religious spaces. Religious 47  Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins, 397. 48  C. Holtorf, Introduction to the session ‘Invented Civilisations’ in the European Association of Archaeologists 13th Annual Meeting, 18th–23rd September 2007, Zadar, Croatia.

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veneration practiced in non-religious contexts, such as in naval commemorative ceremonies, defines the notion of Greekness within these cultural spaces and indirectly appoints the terms under which national identity is culturally formed, performed, represented and celebrated through the sacralisation of the maritime past. As an embodied experience49 of the past, the ceremony’s performative elements result in the construction of maritime identity through public participation. It could be argued that mass audience participation weakens the singularised character50 of the represented historical events, which in turn become commodities for mass consumption. Yet, such modes of representation do not diminish the symbolic value of maritimity, nor do they dilute its authenticity, exactly because they are the only material expressions of this maritime past and are promoted as such. Hence, the contradictory notions of singularization and commoditization, of the sacred and the secular, of the symbolic and the material are blurred within maritime heritage representations and performative acts. In this context, Salamis possesses the potential to dynamically produce identity discourses and stereotypes about the classical naval past, having contributed to national defence and presenting virtues that the abstract national community otherwise lacks. Salamis essentially becomes the nation’s home, brilliantly demonstrating how to produce accounts regarding the past without deviating from the national rhetoric. Through the commemoration of the Naval Battle of Salamis, the link between Greece and the sea, as a concept and as a natural border, is re-established, emphasising the deterministic supposition that “the sea is in the blood of Greeks” and the metaphysical declaration that “the sea is the nation’s soul”,51 an inherent value of a timeless Greek identity and the carrier of universal ideals. Yet, no matter how powerful this claim, one cannot help but ponder over (a) the reasons behind the need of certain social groups to pursue selfidentification governed by this particular rhetoric; (b) how timely and necessary these discourses are in the current socioeconomic and political period for Greece and the EU; and (c) what are the political purposes conveyed, amidst one of the worst refugee crisis of our times, with the Aegean Sea being now a mass watery grave were lives, identities and human rights are at stake.

49  Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins, 395. 50  Hamilakis, The nation and its ruins, 401. 51  See Stefanou, The materiality of death.

CHAPTER 7

Shifting Discourses of Heritage and Identity in Turkey: Anatolianist Ideologies and Beyond Çiğdem Atakuman 1

The Concept of Heritage

“Heritage” is often associated with a physical ‘object’, a piece of property, a building or a place that can be ‘owned’ and ‘passed on’. According to UNESCO’s definition,1 heritage is “our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations”. Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘heritage’ as2 a “property that is or may be inherited; an inheritance; valued things such as historic buildings that have been passed down from previous generations, and relating to things of historic or cultural value that are worthy of preservation”. This object oriented framing of heritage has arguably stemmed from a desire to connect past and present within a continuous trajectory imposed upon a bounded landscape of common destiny which has been in operation since the Enlightenment Era. This formulation was also very much in tune with developing ideas of historical progress and continuity as well as romantic notions of attachment to places that have, to a certain extent, paved the way for our modern understanding of heritage in the world order of nation-states.3 In the world of nationalism, a legitimate rule and rights of self determination of a nation-state can be achieved by reference to ‘the people’ of a country which is demarcated in time and space. By providing the factual basis for the mythic images of a nation’s past, material remains of the past assume a central role within this configuration. Emerging “heritage” discourse thus enhances group’s self-confidence, makes its success appear natural, predestined and inevitable, inspire collective action while disguising important 1  U NESCO World Heritage Center Online (accessed December 4. 2015). http://whc.unesco.org/ en/about/. 2  Oxford Dictionary Online (accessed in November 2015). http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/english/heritage . 3  G. Ashworth – B. Graham – J. Tunbridge, Pluralising Pasts: Heritage, Identity and Place in Multicultural Societies (Pluto: London, 2007).

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political agendas.4 Therefore, heritage is a powerful political tool, ‘a technology of governance . . . a point of validation or legitimization for the present in which actions and policies are justified by continuing references to representations and narratives of the past that are encapsulated through manifestations of tangible and intangible’.5 Heritage discourses provide powerful mediums to convey messages not only for framing the exclusiveness of national unity, but also the inclusiveness of the nation-state in the international arena. The material remains of the past assume central importance in nationalist narratives due to such double potency, i.e. claims to nationhood are not simply internal claims for constituting a distinctive political community; they are also keys for locating national histories within the universal history of civilizations. Thus, national discourse surrounding heritage is one of the ways of competitively demonstrating a nation’s worthiness of civilization in the ranks of the modern world order, so that certain rights within a world-system of states can be claimed. It is within this context that the artifacts of the past are elevated to the heritage status and become an inseparable part in building a shared identity of the nation-state and its connection to the modern world order. Nation-states list evidential expressions of their collective memory as they fit their national identity discourse; such “evidence” are often located in carefully selected, iconic artifacts scattered throughout the landscape of the nation-state. In other words, “heritage” is not merely a material thing; the material remains of the past have no intrinsic value outside the narratives surrounding them.6 Instead, heritage is a world of meaning created during selective memories of the past that perpetuate certain forms of understanding and engaging with the present. Based on their political and social histories, each nation-state has a different type of engagement with material remains of the past. This study briefly examines the emergence of the concept of Anatolia in Turkish heritage discourse and its shifting meaning throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. It is argued that, the current conceptualization and practice of heritage is paradoxical; despite its claim to a shared identity around universal ideals, the modern discourse and practice surrounding heritage continuously create new sites of conflict by way of perpetuating “otherness” at many scales.

4  B. G. Trigger, A History of Archaeological Thought (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1989): 15. 5  L. J. Smith, Uses of Heritage (Routledge: London, 2006): 2. 6  D. Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998).

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Ottomans and Heritage

Whereas the Ottoman state built museums and began to practice archaeology during the second part of the 19th century, archaeology was not a self induced search for common roots in the past. Instead, Ottoman archaeology developed as a response to European interests in the lands of the Orient. For example, the very practice of excavations and collections was initially not focused upon the Turkic and Islamic character of the Ottomans, as one would have expected. Alternatively, the approach to museum displays by the first Ottoman director of the Imperial Museum, Osman Hamdi, did not speak about the historical progress of the nation, even though he was well versed in the European methods of evolutionary display. Instead the core exhibit at the Imperial Museum, which was originally established in 1869, focused upon pre-Islamic , in particular the Classical, remains.7 In this context, non mixing the Classical “archaeological heritage” with “Islamic heritage” was probably due to a pressing concern for the protection of an ‘internal cultural core’; while it was commonly believed that accepting ‘Oriental values’ would deny the type of civilization the empire sought, allowing Islamic ethics and norms to degenerate during the process of modernization was equally unacceptable.8 For the Ottomans, modernization was a matter of importing technology, commonly believed to be the fundamental source of European superiority. Whereas ideas such as critical reasoning, individual autonomy, individual rights and the individual’s relationship to the state were intrinsic to modernization in Europe, in the pragmatic lens of Ottoman modernizers, these ideas remained of marginal significance.9 In reality, the Imperial Museum may have been expected to demonstrate the Ottomans’ knowledge of the “modern”, “European” and “civilized” ways of doing things; while it thwarted the ideas of historical unity and progress,10 that were intrinsic to the museum practice in Europe. On the one hand, the Ottomans practiced archaeology as a medium to display their modernity; on the other hand, they used it as a medium to resist11 the European centered 7  W. M. Shaw, “Islamic Arts in the Ottoman Imperial Museum, 1889–1923”, Ars Orientalis 30 (2000): 55–68; W. M. Shaw, Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology, and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire (University of California Press: Berkeley, 2003). 8  A. Kadıoğlu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the construction of official identity”, Middle Eastern Studies 32, 2 (1996): 177–193. 9  T. Atabaki – E. Zürcher, Men of Order (I.B. Tauris: London, 2004). 10  Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 78. 11  Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 225.

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understanding of history. The practice of Ottoman archaeology spoke both of belonging to and conflict with Europe, not just in the language of heritage and history, but of conquest and territory. Arguably in this context, Ottoman archaeology was institutionalized to highlight the territorial possession of the cultural properties sought after by Europeans in an attempt to restore the Ottoman Empire’s weakened political power. This political and ideological context within which ancient artefacts gained value in the Ottoman Empire was reflected in the first antiquities edict of 1869 and through the subsequent laws of 1874, 1884 and 1906.12 In fact, the basic postulates of the 1884 law, which banned for the first time the transport of antiquities outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire, were carried over into the 1906 law and this law remained in effect until 1973, shaping generations of archaeological thoughts and heritage practice in the Turkish Republic. In fact, the values and ethics of science, the museum and the university have ever since shaped upon this foundation of pragmatic and authoritarian nation building, whether it is run by religious or secular bureaucrats.13 3

Turkey and Heritage

In retrospect, the birth of heritage discourse and practice in Turkey was an outcome of the conditions that controlled the demise of the Ottoman Empire whose dynastic control over its territories was completely weakened at the beginning of the 20th century. During this time, irredentist ideas like PanTurkism, Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism were already in circulation amongst the state elite who aimed to salvage the collapsing empire. The Turkish Hearths movement was eventually established in 1912 and became the ideological center of Young Turk style irredentist movements.14 However, it soon became clear that these irredentist efforts to save the empire were futile. Pan-Ottomanist ideas were abandoned following the disastrous Tripoli and Balkan Wars and the Albanian revolts of 1912–1913. Armistice that followed the 1917 October Revolution crushed hopes for Pan-Turkic unification. Pan-Islamic dreams were buried under the Arab Revolts of 1916–1918.

12  Ç. Atakuman, “Value of heritage in Turkey: History and politics of Turkey’s world heritage nominations”,  Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology, 23, 1 (2010): 107–131. 13  Atakuman, “Value of heritage in Turkey”. 14  F. Üstel, “Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Anadolu Metaforu” [“The Metaphor of Anatolia in Turkish Nationalism”], Tarih ve Toplum 109(1993): 51–55.

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As perhaps the only viable remaining alternative to irredentist ideas, the theme of Anatolia15 emerged as a common symbol that could tie the historical destiny of the Turks to the remaining territory of the Empire. One of the first mentions of Anatolia as “the land of nation’s common destiny” appeared in a hand written monthly journal called Anadolu which was published for a short period of time between 1918 and 191916 by a group of intellectuals composed of Mehmet Halil Bayrı, Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu. The journal included a range of not systematized ideas that aimed to present Anatolia as a unifying cultural source of national history and destiny through folk tales, legends, poems and historical stories. The supporters of this first wave of Anatolianism played with the ideas of an ethnically defined and geographically bounded Turkic identity that had its roots deep in the Anatolian soil.17 However, the first wave of Anatolianism was strongly tied to Islamic identity, since Turkishness meant little to the Empire’s populations who were still organized and ruled by religion. In this context, the most convenient rhetorical focus for the Islamic and Turkish history of Anatolia was identified as the year 1071, the date the already islamized Oguz Turks began migrating into Anatolia after defeating the Byzantines in Malazgirt (Eastern Anatolia). Some argued that a whole new chapter in the history of Anatolia and the Turks started then, as it was argued that this was the point when Turks developed a very different culture from their Central Asian forbearers by moulding Anatolia’s ancient cultural accumulation into a new cultural identity and a new cultural destiny. Interestingly, the proponents of this first wave of the Anatolianist movement strongly supported Mustafa Kemal who successfully exploited Islamic signifiers, such as the glorification of martyrdom, during the war of Independence. However, following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the first signs 15  The name Anatolia refers to “sunrise” in Greek, possibly referring to the Ionian colonies in the east of mainland Greece. During the Byzantine rule, the central areas of present day Turkey were also included in this definition. Interestingly, the earliest Turkic migrants preferred to call the peninsula ‘Land of Rûm (Rome)’ to identify an entity separated from that of the ‘Christian State of Rome’. The name “Turkey” was introduced by Europeans to refer to Muslim Anatolia ruled by hordes of ‘barbaric’ Turkic races. Ironically, until the end of 19th century, the Ottomans carefully distinguished themselves from what they perceived to be the Turks; mainly the Turcoman tribes living in rural Anatolia. 16  F. Üstel, “Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Anadolu Metaforu”. 17  F. Tachau, “The Search for National Identity among the Turks”, Die Welt Des Islams 8, 3 (1963): 165–176; Atabay, Mithat, İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Akımları [Nationalist Movements in Turkey during the Second World War] (Kaynak Yayınları: İstanbul, 2005), 141–223.

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of a change in the state’s leanings toward a more secular ideology were already felt when “Turkey” was chosen as the name of the new nation-state, because the term “Anatolia” resonated too much with the first wave of Anatolianism and its association with Islam. Ultimately, the first wave of Anatolianisms fell out of favour at this time as the state ideology took a stronger turn in the 1930’s towards a secular direction. During the early years of Turkish Republic, Atatürk paid particular attention to the academic development of archaeology and supported studies that unearthed the depth and diversity of Anatolian heritage. In this way, Anatolia was “scientifically” tied to an ethnically bound and secular understanding of national identity, within which archaeology became essential in formulating a national image. The state induced Turkish History Thesis of these years re-formulated Anatolia both as the true homeland of the Turks and as their link to the West. To gain quick passage to the Westernized world, the Turkish History Thesis claimed that the Turks were people engaged in building a civilization that was equivalent to that of Europeans, and that Anatolia had been their homeland from prehistoric times. Finding the proof of the existence of Turks in Anatolia since prehistoric times became instrumental in affirming the territorial rights of the Turkish state against other ethnic groups who were argued to have collaborated with the Western powers against the goals of the Turkish War of Independence. Within this context, high status was conferred to state supported archaeologists as prestigious representatives of “the positivistic science of history”;18 while many prestigious scholars of the time, such as Fuad Köprülü and Zeki Velidi Togan, were expelled, humiliated or excommunicated from elite circles due to their irreconcilable differences with the official ideology. The Thesis’s emphasis on prehistory was useful in demonstrating that Turkish history developed independently of Islam, which was perceived by the Turkish state leaders as one of the factors most detrimental to their aim of modernization. More than anything else, however, the primary endeavor of the Turkish History Thesis was to prove the Turkish nation to be the equal of European nations or, more specifically, to lay claim to the primordial roots of European civilization by uncovering the genealogical connection thought to be redesigning the racial and linguistic origins of Turks and Europeans. In this context, the Hittites were represented as one of the earliest Turkish presences 18  Ç. Atakuman, “Cradle or crucible: Anatolia and archaeology in the early years of the Turkish Republic: 1923–38”,  Journal of Social Archaeology 8 (2008): 214–235; B. Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu 1929–1937 [Power and History: Formation of the Turkish History Thesis 1929–1937] (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul 2006).

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in Anatolia. Although the assertion of Hittites as proto-Turks was later abandoned due to the discovery of their linguistic origins in Indo-European languages, the presence of a powerful state within the territories of the Turkish Republic came to be perceived as a symbol of national pride. In addition, the fact that the Hittites, one of the earliest known Indo-European-speaking populations, were to be found within the Anatolian territories was thought to increase the chances of Turkey being seen as a civilized European state. Following Ataturk’s death in 1938 and the Second World War, social and economic changes accelerated and Turkey entered a new phase of politics that was characterized primarily by the search for a closer union with Europe and the United States against the growing threat of communism flourishing among Turkey’s neighbors. After joining NATO in 1952, the Turkish military grew stronger through the US aid. As Turkey began to function as a cold-war security shield for the West, nurturing Islam and ethnic nationalisms against the influential rhetoric of communism became a popular political strategy against the perceived threat of communism. The secular ideals gradually weakened as a large portion of the Turkish public were brought together under a new Islamic economic expansion model. This model reintegrated religion in the center of social life which continued to be built upon the original structures of the authoritarian state. Within this new political environment, popular signifiers of religious and traditional life styles began to be exploited again. New alliances were sought both nationally and internationally, and state support for the 1930’s Turkish History Thesis was withdrawn. During this time, a number of movements that cultivated ideas of ethnic nationalism and Islam among youths were nurtured.19 Established in 1951, the religious education schools called Imam-Hatip Liseleri became the hearth of Islamism. At the same time the Ülkücü (idealist) youth movement became a seedbed for ultra-nationalists. Both movements were effective in creating and developing a new generation of cultural elites that provided an ideological armature for a new synthesis that brought ethnic and religious doctrines together within the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”.20 At the same time, the secular intellectuals began to work on seemingly more humanistic ways of re-rooting the secular ideals of the Early Republican regime. One of the most influential

19  Ş. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1962): 184. 20  G. Çetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: some preliminary notes on the roots of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” in modern Turkish Political Thought”, The Muslim World 89, 3–4 (1999): 350–376.

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re-reading of the Turkish History Thesis was re-produced in this context, by the Blue Anatolianists of the 1940’s and 1950’s.21 Paradoxically, the adoption of humanism by Blue Anatolianist movement was once again pragmatic, seeking to promote westernization by introducing the Turkish public to translations of Greek and Latin classics, as well as to later classics of European literature. Emphasis was placed upon classical Greek culture as it had been widely claimed since the beginning of the Republic that the roots of Greek civilization lay in Anatolia, the Turkish homeland. Familiar notions were reasserted that Anatolia was the source of civilization, that Turks were the true carriers of all Anatolian civilizations, and that they were in true possession of the origins of Western civilization. In the narratives of the Blue Anatolianists, there were frequent references to those who impeded the natural process of becoming “us” at both a national and international level. “We” were, in fact, so tolerant and humanistic by nature that we accepted churches by converting them into mosques and have been supporting excavations on the Greek and Roman Periods while Greeks have consistently been setting Ottoman antiquities on fire and destroyed them. It was the “others” among “us”, namely the religious and conservative minds, who denied “our” unique contribution to the European culture.22 For example, in the words of one of the fundamental figures of Blue Anatolianism, Cevat Şakir Kabaağaçlı (known as the fisherman of Halicarnassus), “Anatolia is the land that gave Hellenic consciousness to Greece. Otherwise, it would be impossible for Greece to produce this awareness”.23 Or, in the words of another fundamental figure of Blue Anatolianism, Eyüboğlu,24 The true roots of Turks are in Turkey. One should not misinterpret the History and Language Theses of Atatürk. They developed out of his efforts to accept all the (cultural) heritage of this land. When (he) claimed that ‘Greeks are Turks’, he actually meant that ‘we were the owners of this land before Greeks; in fact, Greek (culture) had split off from Anatolia. 21  Barış Karacasu, Mavi Kemalizm: Türk Hümanizmi ve Anadoluculuk [Blue Kemalism: Turkish Humanism and Anatolianism] In, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce 2: Kemalizm [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Kemalism] (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004); E. Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931–1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine [From Turkish History Thesis to Turkish Islamic Synthesis in the History Curriculum Books 1931–1993] (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları: İstanbul, 1998). 22  Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931–1993). 23  B. Halikarnas, Düşün Yazıları (Bilgi Yayınevi: Ankara 1985): 43. 24  S. Eyüboğlu, Bizim Anadolu [Our Anatolia], (İstanbul, 1956) cited from Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931–1993), 265.

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This stand has found strong sympathy within the Turkish public and archaeological community and a belief was constructed that Turks are the only community to have perfectly evaluated and understood the unique Anatolian cultural development. However, at a closer look, the effort to reduce the whole of European civilization to Anatolia and the Turks was based on the same premises as the Turkish History Thesis; to create an honorable image for a Turkish nation, terribly injured by the attitudes of Western nations. While these conflicting ideas of Anatolia’s ethnic identity were circulating, the Turkish Republic’s first effort as a democracy came to a halt with the 1960 coup d’état. This coup was organized by the secularist elite in reaction to growing Islamic sentiments within the ruling Democratic Party. However, military intervention to re-impose the secular ideals onto the government was short lived since it failed to re-establish the authority of Early Republican ideals. As ethno-religious doctrines continued to gain popularity and strength, the ideologues of a flourishing Turkish-Islamic Synthesis came together under the umbrella of a new institution called Aydınlar Ocağı (the Intellectuals Hearth). This organization was established in support of the 1971 coup d’état which aimed to realign Turkey more firmly within the ethno-religious doctrines.25 The Intellectuals Hearth wanted to achieve political unity within the Turkish right wing by providing an intellectual and moral foundation for a renewed authoritarian political system that brought together both ethnic nationalists and Islamists. They argued that damage had been inflicted by secular westernization ideals, which denied the “real” foundations of the national culture. According to the ideologues of the Hearth, the secular-humanist ideology did more damage to nationalist sentiment than any other influence, because it attempted to attach Turkish history and culture to that of ancient Greece and Rome.26 To counter this danger, Islam was clearly defined as one of the three main elements of Turkish nationalism. The other two elements were the Turkish language and Westernization. Within this trio of elements, the West was mainly understood through a pragmatic lens as the source of technological development, while the Turkish language and Islam constituted the permanent essence of the new synthesis.27 The manifesto of the Intellectuals Hearth was definitively institutionalized by the Turkish State after the 1980 coup d’état. 25  E. Akın – Ö. Karasapan, “The Turkish Islamic Synthesis”, Middle East Report 153, 1 (1987): 18. 26  Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931–1993), 58–59. 27  M.Ergin-A. Bolak-S. Yalçın Yeni Bir Yüzyıla Girerken Türk-İslam Sentezi Görüşünde Meselelerimiz: Milliyetçiler IV. Büyük İlmi Kurultayı vol.1 [Our Views on Turkish-Islamic Synthesis While Entering a new Century: The Fourth Great Scientific Convention of

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This coup was the natural culmination of the NATO policies in the Middle East that sought to encourage various forms of Islam in the region against a Soviet threat which, it was feared, might sever American control over the oil flow. Arguably, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis provided a perfect ideological foundation for renewed authoritarian structures and social control which was intended to create a «protracted period of social and economic dislocation» in Turkey, in synchrony with the global capitalistic visions.28 The shift in the secular-ethnicist identity politics of the Kemalist Turkish Republic towards religious-ethnicist grounds has had major repercussions on the state heritage discourse and national education while the imprint left on Turkish culture and intellectual life can still be seen today. Mosque building activities and the number of schools training personnel for religious service (Imam Hatip Liseleri) has increased, while Quran courses, religious foundations and tariqats have become more widespread than ever before in the history of the Republic. Major school curricula and text books have been revised with a strong conservative bias while religion courses have been made compulsory in primary and secondary education (Şimşek 2004). The Turkish Language Association (TDK), the Turkish Historical Association (TTK) and The State Radio and Television Authority (TRT) have been restructured under the control of ideologues of the Intellectuals Hearth; most importantly, the universities have lost their autonomy through the establishment of the “Higher Education Council” YÖK, a direct arm of the state in control of all academic activities. While the modern ideals of democracy were to a large extend failed in Turkey by 1980, following the first elections, Turkey ratified the World Heritage Convention in 1983 and in 1984 it submitted its first nominations: the Divriği Mosque in Sivas and the Old City of Istanbul. Both choices carried subtle messages of the state supported ideological orientation. The Divriği Mosque, a beautifully ornate Seljuk architectural structure with an attached hospital, provided a fresh look at Islamic architecture that went beyond the stereotypical classics of Islamic architecture and provided evidence for the unique Turkish version of Islam, whose difference had inspired the creation of innately beautiful structures in Anatolia.29 Istanbul, on the other hand, was a living monument to conquest and tolerance. Both the Old City of Istanbul and the Divriği Mosque were inscribed in the World Heritage List in 1985. Nationalists] Aydınlar Ocağı (Taşangil Matbaacılık: İstanbul, 1988); B. Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2010). 28  Akın – Karasapan, “The Turkish Islamic Synthesis”. 29  D. Kuban, Divriği Mucizesi [The Divriği Miracle] (Yapı Kredi Yayınları: İstanbul, 1999).

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With the construction of ‘new worlds’ in the 1990s, Turkey appeared to be marginalized, since its role as a shield against the now collapsed Communist Bloc ceased to exist. The European Community rejected Turkey’s membership application in December 1989, presenting as an excuse the task of absorbing the former communist-bloc states. This stimulated the ideologues of the Synthesis to refurbish Turkey’s image in the international arena. The concept of Anatolia appeared once again in a book called “Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey”.30 This book was prepared at the personal initiative of Turgut Özal, the first prime minister of Turkey after the 1980 coup d’état. Özal highlighted the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a universally humanistic one that could only have flourished in Anatolia.31 His aim was, no doubt, to separate Turkey from other Islamic states in the region in order to show Europe the worthiness of Turkey as a secular Islamic country with ideals better suited to Europe than to neighbouring Islamic states. The arguments in this new version of old concepts continued to purport that the Turks have accepted and embraced all the cultures of Anatolia; in fact, «to embrace Turkey, Europe’s view of her own history and perception of the world will need to be as secular and universal as ours is».32 Within this context, new metaphors were created within the heritage discourse to glorify the Turkish style of Islam as different from and superior to other forms. Metaphors such as ‘cradle of civilizations’, ‘mosaic of cultures’ and ‘bridge between East and West’ begun to circulate as new concepts of Anatolia. It was argued that the ‘bridge’ metaphor perfectly served the longstanding ideals of the Turkish modernization project by constituting a condition ‘in between’, believed to strike the right balance between modernity and tradition.33 In other terms, this equilibrium was to be found in the right mixture of Western materialism and Eastern spirituality that resisted cultural degeneration.34 In line with a discourse that remains popular nowadays among both secular and ethno-religious groups, this metaphor helped constructing an original and superior identity capable of independently analyzing and synthesizing Western and Eastern paradigms. The Turks, once again, appeared to be the only community capable of evaluating accurately and understanding not only their own cultural heritage, but that of Europe as well. 30  T. Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey (K. Rüstem ve Brother: Cyprus, 1991). 31  Özal, Turkey in Europe, 345–356. 32  Özal, Turkey in Europe, 356. 33  G. B. Yazıcıoğlu, Archaeological politics of Anatolia: imaginative identity of an imaginative geography In L. Popova – C. Hartley – A. Smith (eds), Social Orders and Social Landscapes (Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Cambridge, 2007): 218–252. 34  Kadıoğlu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism”.

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The overwhelmingly destructive effects of the First Gulf War on the Turkish economy ushered a new era of distrust of the West during the 1990s. Specifically, the creation of an American supported Kurdish enclave on the Turkish border in northern Iraq in 1991 transformed the Turkish state’s historically rooted ethnic conflict with Kurds into a long-term military conflict with the Kurdish nationalist movement. Ethnicist and Islamicist sentiments further grew with the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada in 1987 and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims between 1992–95. The circulation of Armenian Massacre bills in the French and American legislatures further empowered these ethnicist and Islamicist nationalisms. Thus, Islam became the new peril replacing Communism while Turkey’s difficulties with Europe were boiled down to a war of religions. Following the general elections in November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), essentially an islamicist party with a liberal economic vision, took full control of Turkish politics. AKP’s initial enthusiasm for the start of EU accession negotiations was viewed by some as a signal of hope. But, this hope was largely abandoned within a few years as the party’s intrusive policies toward education, justice system and media have also engendered a sense of hopelessness for many in Turkish society. Coupled with the global economic crisis, and the implications of the so called “Arab spring or fall”, along with the simmering Kurdish movement; the current government has chosen to lean toward the use of the 1982 constitution still largely in effect, to strengthen its authority in an attempt to exploit opportunities to become a regional leader. This has resulted in a strong reliance on extra-ordinary security measures on a routine basis which are being used to silence opposition particularly in media, academia and youth. In this context, archaeological heritage has been deemed a dangerous topic by state officials, who disregard it as a low-priority issue while maintaining careful control over its management. This is also due to the fact that the heritage practice and archaeology in Turkey have been shaped by the mission and status given personally by Atatürk himself. Because of this background that could be detrimental to the religious cultural policies and capitalist expansion practices of the state, importance of heritage in building up any national consciousness has been demoted since the 1980 coup d’état, The state has limited the functions of Turkey’s archaeological heritage to matters related to international diplomacy and touristic displays within the identity politics of Islamization, authoritarian nation building and the liberal economic policies of expansion and construction. Accordingly, Turkey’s heritage continues to be, as it was under the Ottomans, a matter of prestige building, international diplomacy and the tourist economy, deliberately removed from the construction of

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both national and universal identities and from the recognition of diversity. On the one hand, the remains of the past are instrumental to gain a quick passage to the Eurocentric conceptions of civilization and modernity; on the other, the very prestige gained through this passage is being used to justify state policies at home, fuelled by identity politics of Islamicization as well as the liberal economic policies of expansion and construction. The land piece that we call Anatolia is laden with remains that can be used for various different constructions of ethnic and religious identity, many of which can be in conflict with the state’s ethno-religious postulates. The Hagia Sophia, the sixth-century Byzantine church located in the old quarter next to the Sultan’s palace at Topkapı, is one of the most contested sites. Converted into a mosque following the Ottoman capture of Istanbul in 1453, it was transformed into a museum during the first years of the Republic by a Kemalist regime that wanted to forget the Islamic past. In this context, complementary to the Synthesis, Istanbul symbolizes the conquest of the Christian Byzantines. In fact, this perception aims to shape Istanbul’s urban landscape in the form of mosque construction projects designated for central locations such as Taksim Square, arguably the most cosmopolitan part of the city. Despite having been blocked a number of times since the 1950s, plans for a Taksim Square Mosque continue to be served up with every rise in Islamicist sentiment in Turkey. Today, both Taksim Square and Hagia Sophia are regular sites of protests both by secularists and ethno-islamicists. Similarly, Ankara, the iconic capital of the Turkish secular nation state and civic culture, also became a target of the islamicist conquest of the secular urban topographies.35 Monumental mosques have been erected in the center of the city as the Early Republican monuments were cropped, trimmed and cut through as new urban projects were given priority. Within this limbo, heritage discourse and practice is struggling between conflicting identity politics, economic expansion policies and academic goals. Some academics continue to argue that the Early Republican approach to archaeology and heritage should be adopted as state policy. In order to sketch a new vision for the state policy, the supporters of the recent (neo-) Anatolianist trend have argued that the Early Republican state paid particular attention to the academic development of archaeology and supported the studies that unearthed the depth and diversity of Anatolian heritage. The level of objectivism and democracy was arguably displayed in the support given to 35  S. Şimşek, “New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980”, Turkish Studies 5, 2 (2004): 111–139; G. Ersan, “Secularism, Islamism, Emblemata: The Visual Discourse of Progress in Turkey”, Design Issues 23, 2 (2007): 66–82.

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the studies of Greek and Roman periods, despite the historical conflicts and political problems between Greece and Turkey.36 Within this view, the real intent of Atatürk has been reinterpreted as the construction of a citizenship based Turkish identity that cherished the multi-cultural heritage of Anatolia;37 however, they would argue, Atatürk’s ultimate aim was eventually distorted through the ethnic and religious policies adopted by the state after his death in 1938.38 The ever burdening policies and bureaucratic requirements for receiving excavation permits and carrying out fieldwork have since increased, distancing the Turkish archaeologists from the theoretical developments. Ultimately, it is thought that the bureaucratic conservatism has constricted the discipline within the limits of positivistic data recovery and descriptive culture-history, despite the Turkish archaeologists’ strong background in scientific method. Within this view, the Turkish archaeologists are framed as defenders of the secular and scientific ideals against the increasingly conservative state. With all due respect, supporters of the neo-Anatolianist visions do not dispute the fact that, in the 1930’s, archaeology became an instrument for state politics. However, the belief that the discipline has been protected from the political zeitgeist of the 20th century due to Atatürk’s initial insistence on positivism, demonstrates an interesting self evaluation of archaeology and archaeologists in Turkey. While I would agree with a number of points raised in their perspectives, I also believe that the resurgent Anatolianist narrative illustrates a peculiar relationship constructed between the state and archaeology. During the Early Republican Period, archaeological campaigns may have glorified the historical depth of cultural variety. However, the actual diverse populations living in Turkey at the time were forced to set aside their multiple ethnic and religious identities and were pressured to become unified under the umbrella 36  M. Özdoğan, Arkeolojinin Politikası ve Politik bir Araç olarak Arkeoloji [Politics of Archaeology and Archaeology as a Political Device] (Arkeoloji ve Sanat Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006). 37  M. Özdoğan, Türk Arkeolojisinin Sorunları ve Koruma Politikaları [Problems of Turkish Archaeology and Protection Policies] (Arkeoloji ve Sanat Yayınları: İstanbul, 2001); M. Özdoğan, Ideology and Archaeology in Turkey In L. Meskell (ed.), Archaeology under fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, (Routledge: London and New York, 2001): 111–123; 2006; Özdoğan, [Politics of Archaeology and Archaeology; G. Pulhan, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Geçmişini Arıyor: Cumhuriyet’in Arkeoloji Seferberliği [Turkish republic Searhing for its Past: The Republic’s Archaeology Campaign] In Oğuz Erdur – Güneş Duru (eds.), Arkeoloji: Niye? Nasıl? Ne İçin? [Archaeology: Why? How? What For?] (Ege Yayınları: İstanbul, 2003): 139–148. 38  Özdoğan, Arkeolojinin Politikası ve Politik bir Araç olarak Arkeoloji [Politics of Archaeology and Archaeology as a Political Device].

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of the state’s particular understanding of religion and ethnicity. It was within this context that the discipline of archaeology as “the positivistic science of history” gained particular prestige in the eyes of the state elite. Moreover, the most important reason for a Turkish focus on the classical periods was not exactly due to a democratic approach to the diversity of Anatolian heritage, but due to an intense desire to be a part of European narratives of civilization.39 The Ottoman and the Turkish State hoped to gain a position in the civilized world by demonstrating the state’s “possession” of antiquities and its involvement in practices that were obviously European. Arguably, the recent glorification of the Atatürk’s heritage policy by archaeologists and heritage specialists is based on a desire to be closer to the state elite as was the case during the early years of the Turkish republic. However, it is too easily forgotten that archaeology was put on a pedestal, only when it produced evidence that was in synchrony with state ideology during that time. Since then, Turkish archaeology and heritage practice has suffered deeply from the structural ties it established with the state throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. The banishment of ideologically non-compliant academics became a peculiar tradition of the Turkish State policy over Turkish universities. Within this context, the narrative of Anatolianist archaeology as a positivistic and objective endeavor above politics may have protected the surviving academics from further interventions of the state. But, the resulting deep academic attachment to state has also nurtured an academic culture of hypocrisy that has produced a few influential individuals who strategically exploit state institutions to their own ends to the detriment of their colleagues. This stand has hindered the development of the heritage related disciplines, such as archaeology, as a medium for academic discussion and reconciliation within Turkish society.40 4

Conclusion

Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, a number of Anatolianisms, both religious and secular, have emerged and informed the development of 39  W. M. Shaw, Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology, and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire (University of California Press: Berkeley, 2003). 40  S. Aydın, Batılılaşma Karşısında Arkeoloji ve Klasik Çağ Araştırmaları [Archaeology and Classics Research in Reaction to Westernization] In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce 3: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Modernization and Westernization] (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004): 403–427.

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official discourses and practices of identity. By utilizing the universal language of heritage and history, these discourses have perpetuated strong sentiments of territory, conquest and superiority of “Anatolian” cultural achievement. At the same time, they perpetuated ethnic and religious divisions within the nation-state society. Essentially, the very structure of heritage language seems to have supported emergence of new sites of conflict rather than sites of peace at many scales. At the national scale, selected sites are ratified to the status of heritage, whereas other significant sites become a subject of routine destruction for political or economic agendas. At the international scale, the “world heritage” discourse continues to emphasise heritage as a collection of material things that should be protected for their attestation to ethnic pride, celebration of elite aesthetic values and contribution to tourist economy, while certain monuments become a subject of violent attacks exactly due to their association with these values, embedded in colonialist agendas. I believe that there is an urgent need to expose where the concepts of “civilization” and “heritage” stand in relation to the political economy of heritage in our society and the World today.

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Index Abbattista, Guido 31n Abu El Haj, Nadia 129n Adige, river 22 Adriatic Sea 10, 53, 103, 106, 110, 111, 117, 123, 126 Aegean Sea 10, 34, 152, 153, 159, 165 Aeneas 132 Aesis, river 53 Africa 9, 32, 65 Agapiou, Evangelos 146n Akın, Erkan 174n, 175n Al-Andalus 82 Alba Fucens 48 Albania 16, 97, 119, 120, 122, 126, 127, 132–142 Albania, Popular Republic of 138 Albanian Republic 142 Alexander the Great, (Alexander III of Macedon) 104, 141 Alfonso XII, King of Spain 65, 76 Alfonso XIII, King of Spain 69, 70, 70f, 86, 95, 95f Alia, Ramiz 137 Almirall i Llozer, Valentí 87 Alpine arch, see Alps Alps 23, 24, 39, 41, 43, 43n, 44, 53, 57, 60 Álvarez Amoroso, Manuel Aníbal 71 Amadeo I, King of Spain 65 Anamali, S. 138n Anatolia 17, 167, 170n, 170–176, 178, 179 Anderson, Benedict 1, 1n, 46, 99n, 143, 143n Andrea, Zhaneta 136n Ankara 178 Aosta Valley 55 Apennines 24, 33 Apollonia 132, 133, 135, 142 Appadurai, A. 160n, 161n, 163n Appian (Appian of Alexandria) 44, 58 Aquileia 45 Aquitaine, Sea of 82 Arabia 32 Arambilet, Santiago 71, 72n Aristotle 141 Arminius 84 Armstrong, John A. 99n

Arthurs, Joshua 8n Artico, Davide 117n Asclepius 90f, 91, 93 Ashworth, Gregory 166n Asia Minor, see Anatolia Atabaki, Touraj 168n Atabay, Mithat 170n Atakuman, Çiğdem 17, 169n, 171n Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 171–173, 177, 179, 180 Athens 93, 124, 130, 147, 154 Atlantic Ocean 83 Atsuko, Ichijo 1n Austria 52, 123, 125, 126 Austria-Hungary 122n, 124, 126 Austrian Carinthia 123 Austrian Empire 10, 111, 113, 122n, 123, 126, 129 Ava, Kingdom of 33, 38 Avienus 82 Axer, Jerzy 107n Aydın, Suavi 180n Azorín, see Martínez Ruíz, José Bailén 70 Balbo, Cesare 56, 56n Baler 73 Balkan Nation, see Balkans Balkan Peninsula, see Balkans Balkans 2, 4, 11, 15, 16, 98, 100, 101, 105, 112, 117, 120, 124–126, 131, 136, 144, 145 Baltić, Mojsije 113, 116 Bandelli, Gino 128n Barcelona 73, 78, 80, 86, 87, 91, 93 Bardetti, Stanislao 25, 25n, 26 Basiljević, Toma see Bassegli, Tommaso Basque Country 11, 72 Bassegli, Tommaso 110 Bassères, François 75 Bassi, Jacopo 130n Bataković, Dušan T. 110n Batavian Republic 6, 6n Bayrı, Mehmet Halil 170 Beaton, Roderick 102n Belgrade 45, 128, 132, 139 Bellelli, Vincenzo 21n

Index Bellovesus 53 Belmont, Nicole 5n Bene, Sándor 107n, 108n Beneki, E. 159n Benito Aceña, Ramón 69 Berisha, Sali 140 Berlin 24, 49, 138, 142 Bianchini, Francesco 19n Biehl, Peter F. 129n Birk, Matjaž 115n Bismark, Otto von 61 Black Sea 32, 103, 110 Blavatski, Vladimir Demitriovitch 142 Blažević, Zrinka 103n–109n, 118, 118n Bochart, Samuel 21, 21n, 22 Bofill i Mates, Jaume 88 Boia, Lucian 97n Bolak, Aydın 174n Bolgar, R.R. 151n Bonaparte, Napoleon see Napoleon Bonaparte Bono y Serrano, Gaspar 68 Bordeaux 23n Borghini, Vincenzo 19n Bosch Gimpera, Pere 78 Bosnia 98, 110, 114, 126, 128 Bosporus 12 Bossi, Luigi 31, 31n Botet i Sisó, Joaquim 88 Boudica, Queen of the Iceni 84 Bourdin, Stéphane 44n Boyd, Carolyn P. 10n Branković, Đorđe 109, 109n Bratovž, Matic 117n Briquel, Dominique 23n Britain 4 Broers, Michael 111 Brown, K. S. 121n, 143n, 144n Broz, Josip Tito 135 Brugière de Gorgot, Andrée 92 Bruni, Stefano 21n, 22n, 31n Bucur, Maria 100n Budina, Dhimosten 142 Buisson, François 33 Bulgaria 106 Buonarroti, Filippo 20, 20n Burgos y del Olmo, Francisco Javier 68 Butrint 132, 133, 142

205 Canaan, land of 21 Cabrera de Mar 88 Caesar, Gaius Julius 5 Cagianelli, C. 22n Čajnica, see Čajniče Čajniče 125 Canè, Gianluca 130n Canina, Luigi 48, 49 Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio 66 Cantù, Cesare 53 Capua 33 Cardini, Luigi 132 Carinthia 114, 126 Carlà-Uhink, Filippo 13, 14, 44n, 49n, 50n, 56n, 61n, 62n Carlo Alberto, King of Sardinia 55–57 Carlo Emanuele III, King of Sardinia 52 Carlos I, King of Spain 66 Carner i Puigoriol, Josep 92, 93n Carnic Alps 25 Carniola 114, 115, 123, 126 Carpintero y Romero, Heliodoro 69 Caribbean 65 Carruthers, Gerard 121n, 123n Carthage 59, 82, 85 Casalis, Goffredo 54n Casella, Pierleone (Pietro Leone) 19n Casellas R. 89n, 91n Casini, Paolo 20n, 22n, 26n Castile 65, 80–82 Catalina García y López, Juan 71 Catalonia 11, 14, 15, 64n, 72–89, 91–95 Cato the Elder 43, 43n Cavallaro, Antonina Maria 55, 55n Cavour, Camillo Benso di 51 Cea Bermúdez, Francisco 68 Čech 104, 107 Ceka, Hasan 142 Ceka, Neritan 135n, 138n, 142, 142n Cella, Elisa 133n Central Etruria 21 Central Europe 128, 131, 137 Central Italy 54 Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de 67 Çetinsaya, Gökhan 172n Champion, Timothy 10n, 121n, 129n, 144n Cherry, John F. 152n

206 Childe, Vere Gordon 130, 130n, 131, 131n, 137 Chile 66 China 32, 135 Ciardetti, Leonardo 30 Cipriani, Giovanni 22n Cisalpine Republic 6 Cisleithania 116 Clarke, Henri Jacques Guillaume 29 Clement XI, Pope 141 Clement XII, Pope 23n Clewing, Konrad 111n Clovis, King of France 5 Clüver, Philippe 19n Cluverio, Philippe see Clüver, Philippe Cochinchina 66 Cole, Tim 141, 142n Collis, John 121n Connerton, Paul 162n Copeaux, Etienne 173n, 174n Coromines i Montanya, Pere 94 Corsica 34 Cosimo II, Grand Duke of Tuscany 20 Costa i Llobera, Miquel 75 Costa Martínez, Joaquín 64, 72, 72n Costantine the Great, Roman Emperor 141 Constantinople 105 Cotta, Irene 47n Cracco Ruggini, Lellia 47n, 48n, 50n Cresci Marrone, Giovannella 58n Crete 73, 74 Croatia 105–108, 110, 114, 115, 126, 129 Croatia, Kingdom of 108, 114, 123 Croatia and Slavonia, Kingdom of 107, 115 Croce, Benedetto 47, 48 Cuba 64, 65, 69 Culasso Gastaldi, Enrica 58n Cuoco, Vincenzo 7, 54, 54n, 61 D’Ors i Rovira, Eugeni 91, 92, 95 Dalmatia 103, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, 114, 115, 123, 126 Dardania 136 Dauphiné 25 De Francesco, Antonino 35n, 39n, 42n, 46, 46n, 53n, 54, 54n, 56n, 61n, 62, 62n, 123, 123n De Sanctis, Gaetano 46 De Tipaldo, Emilio 26n De Vit, Vincenzo 51

Index Delgado, J. P. 159n Dempster, Thomas 20, 20n, 21 Denina, Carlo Giovanni 25, 26n, 39, 39n, 53 Denmark 84, 129 Diana (goddess) 92 Diaz-Andreu, Margarita 10n, 121n, 129n, 144n, 150n Dickinson, Edmund 19n Dimaras, K. Th., 151n 152n Diocletian, Roman Emperor 141 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 38, 38n, 54 Domènech i Montaner, Lluís 74, 74n Dora, river 58 Dousset-Seiden, Christine 5n Drašković, Janko 114 Drina, river 125 Dubrovnik 110, 113 Dupuis, Charles François 36, 36n, 37n Durandi, Jacopo 24–26, 25n Duria, ancient name of the river Morava 58 Durstele, Eric 9n Dzino, Danijel 97n, 103n, 117n, 124n, 134n East Central Europa 98n East Europa 96, 98n, 100, 131 East India 33 Eastern Anatolia 170 Ebro, river 83 Edensor, Tim 163, 163n Egypt 20, 32, 36, 38 Emporion (Empúries) 14, 15, 64n, 74–76, 83, 85–89, 91, 92f, 93, 95 England 123n, 130 Entrikin, Nicholas J. 160n Epirus 136 Ergin, Muharrem 174n Ersan, Gökhan 178n Ersanlı, Büşra 171n Esino, river see Aesis, river Esser, Raingard 6n Ethiopia 9, 36 Etruria 30, 32, 33, 35 Etruria, Kingdom of 6, 13, 28, 35 Etrurian Campania 21 Europe 2–7, 6n, 9, 10, 14, 19, 23–25, 32, 39, 66, 67, 71, 73, 77, 79, 82, 84, 104, 106, 120–123, 128–131, 134, 136, 137, 141, 144, 147, 148, 151, 160, 163, 168, 169, 172, 176, 177

Index Evans, Sir Arthur 117, 125, 126, 126n Eyüboğlu, Sabahattin 173, 173n Fabbroni, Giovanni 13, 26–37, 26n, 29n–35n, 37n, 38n, 39, 40 Faccini, Anna Maria 22n Fasoli, Vilma 48n–50n, 55n, 56n Fawcett, Clare 10n, 144n, 156n Felipe II, King of Spain 66 Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor 106 Ferrari, Guido 22, 22n Filippoupoliti, Anastasia 159n Fındıkoğlu, Ziyaeddin Fahri 170 Fine, Jr., John V. A., 116n Finley, M. I. 151n First Spanish Republic 65 Fishman, Joshua A. 114n Fiter i Inglès, Josep 87 Fleury-Ilett, Beatrice 121n Florence 7, 26–28, 29n, 30, 31n, 36, 42, 51 Fofić, Heike 124n Fontana, Felice 27 Forcey, Colin 46n France 1, 2, 5–7, 12, 17, 25, 27, 30, 35, 36, 39, 40, 46, 52, 61, 84, 110, 111, 121, 123, 129, 138 Francis II (I), Holy Roman Emperor (later, Emperor of Austria) 113, 116 Francis, Karen 132n Franco, Francisco 15 French Empire 13, 14, 28, 39, 111 Fréret, Nicolas 23–25, 23n, 30 Frijhoff, Willem 6n Friuli 103 Fubini Leuzzi, M. 47n, 48n, 56n Fukuda, Hiroshi 101n, 150n Gaj, Ljudevit (Ludwig) 114, 114n, 124, 124n Galatea 103 Galaty, Michael L., 132n 144n Galicia 11 Gambari, Filippo Maria 41n, 43n–45n Gamble, Clive 121n, 144n Gandia i Ortega, Emili 91, 92f Ganges, river 32 Garašanin, Milutin 138, 138n García de Polavieja y del Castillo, Camilo 69 García, Juan José 71 García, Ofelia 114n Garray 69, 70, 89

207 Garrido Tortosa, Fernando 66 Gassol i Rovira, Bonaventura, Ventura 94 Gattinara, Carlo 59 Gaul 5, 25, 32, 53, 82, 121, 123 Geary, Patrick J. 97n 104n Gellner, Ernest 1, 1n, 99n, 100, 100n Genova, Republic of 56 George I, King of Greece 73 German States 46 Germany 1, 2, 9, 42, 46, 49, 70, 84, 128, 129, 130n, 131, 132, 138 Gherardi, Raffaella 107n Ghilloni i Molera, Alexandre 93 Gibson, Marion 5n Gilkes, Oliver J. 132n, 133n Gioberti, Vincenzo 48, 49, 54, 56 Giorcelli Bersani, Silvia 42n, 47n–50n, 61n, 62n Girona 70 Goldblatt, Harvey 106n Goldini, Carlo 22 Gómez Barreda, Juan Antonio 68n, 70n, 72n Gómez Santacruz, Santiago 71 González Hurtebise, Eduardo 88n Gori, Anton Francesco 22, 22n, 38 Gori, Maja 15, 16, 120n, 129n, 130n, 133n, 136n, 139n, 141n, 145n Gortan, Veljko 103n Gracia-Alonso, Francisco 11, 14, 15, 94 Graham, Brian 166n Gramsch, Alexander 129n Granados Campos, Mariano 71 Graves-Brown, Paul 121n, 144n Graz 127 Great Britain 1 Greece 7, 10, 12, 13, 16, 22, 24, 26, 34, 35, 38, 38n, 54, 73, 75, 76, 80, 85, 86, 93, 97, 101, 130, 138, 144, 146, 150, 151, 153, 154, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 170n, 173, 174, 179 Greek Catalonia 92 Greenberg, Marc L. 114n, 115n Grell, Chantal 5n, 23n Grosby, Steven 3n Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev 103n Guarnacci, Mario 26, 26n Gudiol i Cunill, Josep 87n Guimerà i Jorge, Àngel 75–77 Guimera, Agustin 76, 77, 77n, 111n Gulf of Roses 83

208 Gürpınar, Doğan 12n Guštin, Mitja 41n Haas, Arthur G. 113n Habsburg monarchy 110, 116, 116n Hahn, Johann Georg von 124, 124n, 125, 141 Halicarnassus 173 Halikarnas, Balıkçısı 173n Hamilakis, Yannis 12n, 125n, 143n, 144n, 150n, 151n, 156n, 159n, 161n, 164n, 165n Hannibal 24, 25n, 43, 58–60, 67 Hänsel, Bernard 138, 138n Hartley, Charles W. 176n Hattler, Claus 122n Häussler, Ralph 44n Havana 66 Hawthorne, John 46n Heidelberg 138n Heinen, Ulrich 106n Helvetic Republic 6 Herodotus 32, 38, 38n, 81 Herzegovina 128 Herzfeld, Michael 161n Hicks, Peter 111n Hicks, Robert D. 163n Hippocrates 141 Hispania, Roman province 82 Hitler, Adolf 9 Hobsbawm, Eric. J. 99n, 100n, 143, 143n Hodder, Ian 143n Holtorf, Cornelius 164n Homer 141 Horst, Katarina 122n Hösler, Joachim 109n, 112n Hoxha, Enver 132, 135–139 Hungary 103, 106, 110 Hungary, Kingdom of 107 Husić, Snježana 106n Hvar, island of 103 Iberia 82, 83, 85 Iberian peninsula 2, 12, 25, 33, 83 Illyria 15, 17, 103, 104–108, 110–112, 114, 116, 120, 123, 126 Illyria, Kingdom of 15, 109, 110, 113, 116, 127 Illyrian Provinces 6, 11, 15, 111–113, 123, 126 Illyricum, ancient region 54, 58, 126, 127, 134 India 32, 33

Index Indus, river 33, 36 Indus valley 32 Inner Austria 105 Ioannina 124 Ionian Sea 34 Iovine, Micaela S. 106n Ireland 79, 121 Isabel II, Queen of Spain 65, 66 Isabella, Maurizio 10n Islami, S. 138n Italian Peninsula, see Italy Italy 2, 7, 8, 8n, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 21–26, 21n, 26n, 28–35, 40, 41, 42, 44–48, 50–52, 54, 56, 57, 62, 63, 102, 103, 130, 132, 133, 138, 140, 142 Italy, Kingdom of 14, 42, 51, 52, 112 Ivanova, Maria 120n Ivetic, Egidio 123n, 125n, 127n Jacques, Edwin Everett 141, 141n, 142, 142n Jaume I, King of Aragón 84 Jejcic, Alain 103n Jena 124 Jenkins, Henry 140n Jenkyns, Richard 151n Jerše, Sašo 96n Jones, Siah 121n, 122, 122n, 144 Judson, Pieter M. 110n Julian March (Venezia Giulia) 128 Kabaağaçlı, Cevat Şakir 173 Kadioğlu, Ayşe 168n, 176n Kalpaxis, Thanassis E. 151n Kane, Susan 125n Karacasu, Barış 173n Karalis, Vrasidas 97n Karasapan, Ömer 174n, 175n Karl I, Holy Roman Emperor 116 Khrushchev Nikita 135 Kilian, Imma 138, 138n Kilian, Klaus 138, 138n King, Jeremy 100, 100n Kitroef, A. 152n Kitromilides, Paschalis M. 10n, 101, 101n, 102n Klagenfurt 127 Klaniczay, Gabor 4n, 131n Klejn, Leo S. 133n Knezović, Pavao 103n

209

Index Koenen, Konstantin 70 Kohl, Philip L. 10n, 144n, 156n Kohn, Hans 1, 1n, 2n Kokkou, A. 151n Kollár, Ján 114, 114n Komata, D. 138n Kopeček, Michal 110n Kopitar, Bartholomäus (Jernej) 113n Köprülü, Fuad 171 Korce (Korçë) 136, 141 Körner, Axel 8n Korkuti, Muzafer 138n Kos, Janko 112n Kosi, Jernej 96, 115n Kosofsky-Sedgwick, Eve 155n Kosovo 135, 136, 139, 140, 142 Kossinna, Gustaf 45, 130, 131, 134, 137 Krapina 107 Krebs, Christopher B. 104n Kuban, Doğan 175n Kuntić-Makvić, Bruna 103n, 115n Kurti, Albin 142 Kuzio, Taras 1n Lafuente y Zamalloa, Modesto 67 Laginja, Matko 116n Lanzi, Luigi 54n Larra y Sánchez de Castro, Mariano José 67 Latin America, republics of 66 Lauer, Reinhard 103n Leal, João 11n Leerssen, Joep 3, 3n, 18, 102, 102n, 104, 105n, 111, 111n Leontis, A. 151n, 152, 152n, 156n, 161n Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor 107, 108 Leopold II, Holy Roman Emperor 27 Lepanto 72 Lesbos, Island of 34 Lesina, island of, see Hvar, island of Levi, Giovanni 101n Levi, Mario Attilio 48n, 49n, 51n, 55, 55n, 59, 59n, 63 Liakos, Antonis 101, 101n, 150n Libya 33 Liebich, André 2n Ligurian, Republic 6 Linhart, Anton 112 Lisjak Gabrijelčič, Luka 98n

Livorno 30n Livy 43, 59, 63, 82, 89 Ljubljana 123n, 127 Lombardy 47, 50, 52, 53 Lomonosov, Matvey 98n London 27, 33 López de Ayala y Lobato, Ignacio 67 Loreto 105 Lorraine, Grand Duchy of 35 Lorraine Tuscany 39 Lotan, Yael 101n Louis XIV, King of France 5 Lowenthal, David 151n, 167n Lozny, Ludomir R. 128n Lukan, Walter 116n Lumbroso, Giacomo 50n, 51n, 53n, 55, 55n, 56n, 59n, 62, 62n Lusatia (Lausiz) 137 Lydia 34 Macedonia 32, 98, 98n, 103 Macedonia, Kingdom of 50 Macedonian state, see Macedonia Machado Ruiz, Antonio 72, 72n Madrazo y Agudo, José de 67 Madrid 65, 70, 73, 83 Madunić, Domagoj 103n–104n Maffei, Scipione 20–23, 20–23n, 26 Magna Grecia 24 Magoula 147, 147n, 156, 164 Maillol, Arístides 75 Maissen, Anna Pia 114n Maíz, Ramón 11n Makarovič, Gorazd 116n Malazgirt 170 Malešević, Siniša 100, 100n Maliq 136 Mallada y Pueyo, Lucas 66 Manias, Chirs 4n Manova, Iva 106n Mantelli, Brunello 117n Mao Tse-Tung 135 Maragall i Gorina, Joan 78 Marchesetti, Carlo 128, 128n Marcone, Arnaldo 39n Marcziniak, Arkadiusz 129n Mardin, Şeri 172n Maret, Hugues-Bernard 29

210 Margomenou, Despoina 152n Mariana, Juan de 67 Maritime Alps 25 Marnavitius, Ioannes Tomcus 106 Marquina Angulo, Eduardo 75, 76n Marseille 83 Marsigli, Luigi Fernando 107, 108n Marsili, Luigi Fernando see Marsigli, Luigi Fernando Martí i Alsina, Ramón 68 Martin, G. R. R. 122n Martínez Bermejo, Saúl 104n Martínez Ruíz, José (Azorín) 73, 73n Martínez-Campos Antón, Arsenio 65 Martinovics, Ignaz 110 Maurice, Thomas 38, 38n Maxwell, Alexander 114n Mazzocchi, Alessio Simmaco 21, 21n, 38 Mazzoldi, Angelo 31n Medeiros, Antonio 11n Medici family 20 Mediterranean Europe 10, 12, 17 Mediterranean Sea 4, 8, 10–13, 17, 19, 22, 33, 34, 38n, 64n, 75, 81, 82, 91, 132 Melanchton, Philipp 105 Mélida y Alinari, José Ramón 70f, 71, 71n Meridional Europe, see Southern Europe Merula, Gaud 19n Meskell, Lynn 12n, 179n Mesonero Romanos, Ramón de 67 Metternich, Klemens von 113 Mexico 66 Micali, Giuseppe 7, 46, 54, 61, 62 Middle East 175 Migotti, Branka 132n Mikroutsikos, Thanos 147n Milà i Camps, Josep Maria 87 Milan 7, 18, 50–53 Milojčič, Vladimir 132 Momigliano, Nicoletta 151n Mommsen, Theodor 8, 42, 46, 49, 49n, 50, 59, 59n, 61, 62 Montagnari Kokelj, Emanuela 128n Montañola i Carné, Pere 79 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat  23n Montjuïc, mountain of 93 Morava, river 58 Morera i Viura, Enric 75

Index Morigia, Paolo 19n Morrisett, Lloyd 140n Moscow 142 Mostov, Julie 96, 96n Mrnavić, Ivan Tomko see Marnavitius, Ioannes Tomcus Murcia 81, 82, 85 Murray Despalatović, Elinor 114n Mussolini, Benito 132, 133 Nano, Fatos 142 Naples 50 Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French 5, 13, 15, 25, 27, 29, 35, 39, 40, 61, 67, 110–112, 123, 123n 126 Napoleon III, Emperor of the French 52, 53, 84 Neptune (god) 91 Nile, river 32 Nizza 52 Noah (Patriarch) 19 Noricum 57 North Africa 66, 104 North East Italy 97, 123 North Western Balkans 127 North Western Croatia 123 Northern Europe 10, 12, 13, 128 Northern Iraq 177 Northern Italy 13 Novaković, Predrag 128n, 129n, 131, 131n, 137n Numantia 14, 64, 64n, 67, 68–73, 89, 95 Oddens, Joris 6n Orbini, Mavro 106, 106n, 107, 108n Osman Hamdi 168 Ottoman Balkans 101n Ottoman Empire 10–12, 17, 66, 73, 74, 128, 144, 151, 168, 169, 180 Ottoman State see Ottoman Empire Otumba 72 Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso) 86 Özal, Turgut 176, 176n Ozdogan (Özdoğan), Mehmet 12n, 179n Özkırımli, Umut 2n, 3n, 99n, 100, 100n, 102n Paardekooper, Roeland 122n Pais, Ettore 46 Paisiello, Giovanni 24n

211

Index Palestine 32 Pallottino, Massimo 45 Pantelić, Bratislav 100, 101n, 115n Paparrigopoulos, Constantinos, see Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos 16, 97, 152–154, 152n, 153n Paris 13, 18, 23, 25, 27–29, 29n, 33, 36, 51, 61, 75, 96n Parker, Andrew 155n Parker, Bradley J. 144n Parry, Graham 6n Pasta, Renato 27n, 29n, 40n Patriarca, Silvana 10n Patsch, Carl 132 Pavličević, Dragutin 116n Pécout, Gilles 11n Pelekidis, H. 154n Pelloutier, Simon 24, 24n, 25 Peroni, Renato 128n Persia 38 Petit Radel, Louis 38, 38n Petrè, Fran 115n Petry, Yvonne 19n Peykich, Krastyo 106, 106n Peyron, Amedeo 62 Philippines 65, 69, 73 Phoenicê (Phoenice) 133 Phoenicia 22 Picchio, Riccardo 106n Piedmont 14, 41, 43, 46n, 47, 48n, 49–53, 55–58, 60, 62 Pietro Leopoldo, Grand Duke of Tuscany 27 Pijoan i Soteras, Josep 88, 89 Pinkerton, John 37, 37n, 38, 38n Pistoia 26 Pleše, Zlatko 108 Pliny the Elder 43, 63 Po, river 21, 25, 41, 53, 57, 58, 60 Po valley 22, 24 Poland 79, 104 Polec, Janko 113n Pollo, Stefanaq 136n 137n Polybius 43, 63 Polyphemus (Cyclops) 103 Popova, Laura M. 176n Portugal 4 Postel, Guillaume 19n Prashinker, Camillo 132

Prat de la Riba i Sarrà, Enric 74, 74n, 76, 78–89, 78n–80n, 82n–86n, 94, 95 Prendi, F. 136n, 138n Prevalitania (Praevalitana) 136 Priboevius, Vincentius 103, 103n, 104, 106 Pribojević, Vinko see Priboevius, Vincentius Priestly, Tom M. S. 98n Prim, Juan 65 Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja, Miguel 15, 93, 94 Priština 139 Promis, Carlo 14, 41, 42, 47–63, 48n, 49n, 51n–60n Provence 25, 82 Prussia 84 Puig i Cadafalch, Josep 78, 88, 89, 89n, 90f, 91, 93, 95 Puto, Arben 136n, 137n Pyrenees 83 Qemali, Ismail 140 Radić, Radivoj 98n Radvany, Egon 113n Ragusa, see Dubrovnik Ramírez Rojas, Teodoro 71 Ranger, Terence 100n, 143n Raskolnikoff, Mouza 5n Rattkay, Georg (Juraj) 107 Rawes, Alan 121n, 123n Renfrew, Colin 121n Renard, Marcel 23n Revel, Jacques 101n Rey, Leon 142 Reyerson, Kathryn L. 9n Rhine, river 1 Riall, Lucy 10n Ricci, Matteo 49, 50, 58 Ricks, David 102n Ricuperati, Giuseppe 31n, 47n, 48, 48n, 56n Rijeka 123 Ritter Vitezović, Pavao see Ritter, Paul Ritter, Paul 107, 108, 108n, 114 Rivera, Primo de 15, 87, 93, 94 Rizzuti, Alberto 25n Rhaetian Alps 24 Rhône, river 81–83 Roberts, Benjamin 119, 119n Romagnani, Gian Paolo 22n, 46, 46n–49n, 51n

212 Roman Empire 60, 82, 106 Romaní i Puigdengolas, Francesc 80 Rome 5, 8, 14, 24, 26, 35, 42, 44, 46, 48, 51–53, 59, 60, 63, 69, 77, 81, 82, 85, 133, 170n, 174 Romulus, King of Rome 59 Rubio de la Serna i de Falces, Joan 88n Rubió i Lluch, Antoni 73, 78, 93 Ruiz Zapatero, Gonzalo 121n Russia 4 Rutjes, Mart 6n Saavedra y Moragas, Eduardo 69, 71 Sabiñón Yáñez, Antonio 67 Saguntum, see Sagunto Sagunto 60, 65, 67, 72 Said, Edward 144n Saint Jerome (Hieronymus) 104, 141 Sand, Shlomo 101, 101n Sanpere i Miquel, Salvador 88 Sant Feliu de Guíxols 88 Sardanya 83 Sardinia 34 Sardinia, Kingdom of 14, 47, 56 Sardinia, Reign of, see Sardinia, Kingdom of Sardinia, Sea of 82, 85 Sardinian Empire, see Sardanya Sassatelli, Giuseppe 54n Sava, river 123 Savoy 25, 52 Savoy, dynasty 47, 48, 57, 61 Savoy, Grand Duchy of 55 Schober, Arnold 132 Schulten, Adolf 70, 71, 89 Schulze, Hagen 97n Scipio Africanus 60 Sebenico, see Šibenik Second Reich 46, 84 Segalà i Estalella, Joan 78 Seiffert, Aletta 122n Serbia 97, 109, 110, 126, 139 Serenissima, (Republic of Venice) 103 Sergi, Giuseppe 8, 8n Šešel-Kos, M. 121n Shakespeare, William 123 Shaw, Rosalind 162n Shaw, Wendy M. K. 168n, 180

Index Sheringham, Robert 37 Šibenik 103 Šidak, Jaroslav 114 Silvela y de La Vielleuze, Francisco 66 Şimşek, Sefa 178n Sisgoreus Sibenicensis, Georgius 102–104, 103n, 106 Sivas 175 Šižgorić, Juraj see Sisgoreus Sibenicensis, Georgius Skopje 98 Skrbiš, Zlatko 98n Slapsak, Bozidar 129n, 131n Slavonia 107, 110, 114, 115 Slovakia 110 Slovenia 57, 117n, 123, 127, 129 Slovenian Carinthia 123 Smith, Adam T. 176n Smith, Anthony D. 1, 1n–3n, 2, 99, 99n, 100, 100n, 118, 140n, 156n Smith, Laurajane 167n Solaro della Margarita, Clemente 55 Soler i Palet, Josep A. 88n Soria 64n, 68, 70, 71, 95f Sörlin, S. 160n South Albania 141 South America, colonies of 66 South Carinthia 115 South East Europe 13, 96, 97, 104, 105 South Hungary 108, 110 South Slavic nations 97 South Slav provinces 116 South Western Balkans 125 Southern Balkans 12 Southern Europe 4, 12, 17 Southern Italy 47, 61 Southern Montenegro 136 Soviet Union 133, 135 Spinčić, Vjekoslav 116n Split 128 St. Stephen, Realm of 107, 110 Stančić, Nikša 114n, 115n Stauber, Reinhard A. 111n Stefanou, Eleni 16, 146n, 158n, 159n, 165n Stenger, Gerhardt 23n Stergar, Rok 15 Stewart, Charles 162n

213

Index Štih, Peter 11n, 98n, 104n, 117n Strabo 43, 82 Stratico, Giambattista 112 Šumrada, Janez 111n Sutton, David E. 158n Swartz Dodd, Lynn 144n Sweden 84 Swinton, John 30n Switzerland 50 Symes, Michael 33, 33n, 38, 38n Szörényi, László 107n Tachau, Frank 170n Tacitus, Publius Cornelius 104 Tadayuki, Hayashi 101n, 150n Talalay, Lauren E. 152n Tarquinius Priscus, King of Rome 53 Tarragona 83 Tartary 32 Tasić, Nikola 139n Tauranum 45 Taurinia 24n Tedesco, Luca 8n Tekelija, Sava 110 Terrassa 88 Terrenato, Nicola 46n Thacker, Andrew 151n The Hague 24 Thessaly 34 Thiesse, Anne-Marie 5n Third Reich 16 Thorburn, David 140n Ticino 53 Tirana 142 Titus Livius, see Livy Todorova, Maria 144, 144n Togan, Zeki Velidi 171 Tognarini, Ivan 27n Tolkien, J. R. R. 122n Tolu, Rosalia Manno 47n Torres i García, Joaquim 86, 87 Transylvania 106, 110 Trencsényi, Balázs 103n, 110n Trentino 24 Triest, see Trieste Trieste 127

Trigger, Bruce G. 128n–130n, 134n, 138n, 143n, 167n Trower, Shelley 5n Troy 25, 68 Tunbridge, John E. 166n Tunisia 66 Turin 14, 24, 24n, 31n, 42, 43, 45, 48–53, 55–58, 60, 61 Turkey 12, 13, 17, 169, 170n, 171–179 Turkish Republic 167, 169–172, 174, 175, 180 Tuscany 13, 14, 22, 24, 27–29, 35, 39, 40, 53 Tuscany, Grand Duchy of 27 Two Sicilies, Kingdom of the 60 Tyrol 24 Ugolini, Luigi Maria 132, 133, 133n, 142 Ülken, Hilmi Ziya 170 United Kingdom 79, 84 United States 65, 69, 73, 83, 137, 141, 172 Urban VIII, Pope 105 Urso, Gianpaolo 46n US see United States Üstel Füsun 169n, 170n Uzelac, Gordana 1n Valencia 83 Vallancey, Charles 30, 30n Valle d’Aosta, see Aosta Valley Vander Linden, Marc 119, 119n Venetian Dalmatia 103, 111 Vangeli, Anastasi 98n Vannucci, Atto 20n Vasić, Miloje 132 Venice 9, 103 Venuti, Filippo 23, 23n Venus (goddess) 91, 92 Vera y Estaca, Alejo 68 Vercingetorix, King of the Arveni 84, 123 Veremis, Thanos 152n Verger, Stéphane 54n Verginella, Marta 117n Verona 20 Vidmar, Luka 113n Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro) 86 Viriatus 67 Visconti, Katia 13

214 Vitali, Daniele 54n Vittorio Amedeo III, King of Sardinia 52 Vittorio Emanuele II, King of Italy 55 Vitulo, Clara 48n, 50n Vlora Falaschi, Nermin 140, 140n, 141 Vodnik, Valentin 111, 112, 112n Volpilhac-Auger, Catherine 23n Volpone, Alessandro 8n Vrandečić, Josip 111n Wallachia 106 Watkins, John 9n Watkinson, Charles 132n, 144n Weber, Cynthia 155n Werner, Michael 4n, 131n Western Balkans 16, 102, 117, 118, 120, 123, 124, 127, 128, 131–134, 143–145 Western Europe 130 Western Germany 132 Western Macedonia 136 Western Poland 137 Weyler y Nicolau, Valeriano 69 Wien 128 Wilkes, John 120, 120n, 121, 121n, 123n, 125n, 132n Williams, J. H. C. 44n

Index Wilson, Woodrow 77 Wingfield, Nancy M. 100n Witcher, Robert 46n Wolff, Larry 10n Yack, Bernard 2n Yalçın, Süleyman 174n Yazıcıoğlu, G. Bike 176n Yinanç, Mükrimin Halil 170 Yugoslav Federation 122n Yugoslavia 13, 15, 16, 119, 122, 122n, 127, 132, 134, 135, 138, 139 Yugoslavia, Kingdom of 122n Yuill, William E. 97 Zadar 128 Zagreb 124, 128 Zanou, Konstantina 10n Zajc, Marko 96n, 115n, 117n Zászkaliczky, Márton 103n Zemun, see Tauranum Zlatar, Zdenko 106n Zois, Sigismund (Žiga) 113n Zrinyi, Nicholas 107 Zürcher Erik J. 168n Zwitter, Fran 103n, 111n, 112n