In It To Win: Electing Madam President 9781628923278, 9781628923261, 9781501304798, 9781628923285

Citation preview

IN IT TO WIN

IN IT TO WIN Electing Madam President

LORI COX HAN

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Inc

N E W YOR K • LON DON • N E W DE L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Inc 1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2015 © Lori Cox Han, 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-6289-2327-8 PB: 978-1-6289-2326-1 ePub: 978-1-6289-2329-2 ePDF: 978-1-6289-2328-5 Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

For Tom, Taylor, and Davis

CONTENTS

List of tables  viii Acknowledgments  ix

1 Electing madam president  2 Women as candidates 

33

3 The invisible primary 

65

4 The nomination process  5 The general election 

1

97

125

6 A look ahead: 2016 and beyond  Selected bibliography  189 Index  198

165

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1  2000 Presidential Election

74

Table 3.2  2004 Presidential Election

76

Table 3.3  2008 Presidential Election

77

Table 3.4  2012 Presidential Election

79

Table 4.1  2012 Iowa Republican Caucuses—Final Results

102

Table 4.2  2008 Iowa Democratic Caucuses—Final Results

103

Table 4.3  2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary—Final Results

105

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My scholarly interest in the topic of gender equality, and more specifically electing a woman president, dates back to high school. In 1983, during my junior year at Big Valley High School in Bieber, California (a small, rural area of Northern California), I wrote my first-ever term paper on why the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) had failed. Despite having all the facts, and numbers, laid out in front of me, I just couldn’t understand why anyone would oppose such a simple amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Didn’t everyone think women should be treated equally in the eyes of the law? Granted, I didn’t have the most worldly of political views at the age of 17, but it became a defining moment for me in terms of the political process and the importance of voting. Then, the following summer, after graduating from high school and preparing to start my freshman year of college at UC Davis, the Democratic Party did an amazing thing—they nominated a woman for vice president. I was at first disappointed that Walter Mondale had not picked Dianne Feinstein, then-mayor of San Francisco, opting instead for Geraldine Ferraro. Growing up in Northern California (first the Bay Area and then the rural northeast corner of the state), I knew a lot more about Feinstein, as she stood out as one of so few women in political office at the time. Nonetheless, I followed news coverage of Ferraro’s campaign closely, and intently watched her debate with Vice President George Bush. Despite the landslide victory by Reagan/Bush in 1984, I still felt empowered as a woman’s name was on the ballot when I cast my first vote in a presidential election that fall. Thus began my interest in the study of women and American politics. During my sophomore year at UC Davis, and as an elective for my political

x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

science major, I enrolled in a women and politics course with Dr. Jennifer Ring. Throughout the quarter, we talked a lot about Ferraro’s candidacy, and what it meant for future women candidates. Also that spring, Ferraro spoke on campus, and I can still remember the excitement and optimism in the auditorium about how electing the first woman vice president, or even president, would happen sooner rather than later. My interest in Ferraro’s candidacy, and in electing the first woman president and/or vice president, then continued into graduate school. In 1993, I wrote my thesis to complete my MA in mass communication at California State University, Northridge, on newspaper coverage of Ferraro’s candidacy. I assumed at the time (incorrectly as it turned out) that the next woman vice presidential candidate was just around the proverbial corner and, as such, I would have some great comparable data about how the first and second women had fared in media coverage. Of course, that next woman candidate for vice president would not come until 2008—24 years later!—with Sarah Palin’s nomination. Also, since 1984, we have only seen four women run for president from the two major political parties, and only two—Hillary Clinton in 2008 and Michele Bachmann in 2012—had campaigns that lasted into the nomination period when voters actually had a say in the outcome. Over the years, and particularly as I teach my own women and politics course each year, I have often recalled the enthusiasm and sense of inevitability from 1984 about Ferraro’s campaign. While most political experts at the time acknowledged that a Mondale/Ferraro victory was a long shot, breaking a new political barrier by simply nominating a woman on a major party ticket was a big deal, and the historic significance was certainly not lost on this future political scientist (though that career ambition would not materialize for a few more years). And, thanks to my academic training, while I now have a much better and informed understanding of why the ERA failed, I am still just as committed to gender equality today as I was in high school. As I write this book, thirty years after Ferraro’s historic

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xi

nomination, I am on the one hand disappointed that more progress has not been made, yet still optimistic that I will see both a woman president and a woman vice president (and hopefully more than one in each office and from both parties) in my lifetime. And, not only has my interest in this topic not waned, neither has the interest among my students on the topic of electing a woman president. I hope this book will contribute, in some small way, to keeping that conversation going and to the inevitable progress of moving forward on finally electing madam president. As with all book projects, numerous people deserve acknowledgment and thanks. I would first like to thank my editor at Bloomsbury, Matthew Kopel, for his excitement about this book project right from the start. His encouragement along the way helped tremendously. My friend and colleague Victoria Farrar-Myers also deserves a special thanks, as she introduced me to Matthew at the Western Political Science Association annual meeting in Hollywood in 2013 (which was purely coincidental, but proves that good things happen when I hang out with Victoria at conferences). Jerry Johnson, Professor of Business Administration at Austin College, a friend and former colleague, also deserves credit for encouraging me to write this book several years ago (and continuing to do so ever since). I also want to acknowledge and thank Robert Konoske, a Chapman alumni and former student assistant in the Political Science Department, who helped out with some initial research during a busy semester for us both. Other friends and colleagues also deserve thanks for listening to me talk about the project, reading drafts of chapters, offering encouragement and support in various other ways, or just by making the world a better place: Caroline Heldman, Diane Heith, Drew Moshier, Chuck Hughes, Gordon Babst, John Compton, Erika Gonzalez, Sarah Fiske-Phillips, Paul M. Paolini, Brian Calfano, and Brian Frederick. I am also grateful for all of the helpful comments from reviewers at various stages of the writing process. My students at Chapman also deserve thanks for all the times they heard me

xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

talk about this book project in class, and that includes all my students and not just those enrolled in my women and politics class. I suspect that most students do not realize that our conversations in class can often inform my research as much as my research informs my teaching. I am blessed to have terrific students at Chapman University who are interested and engaged with the topics in American government about which I teach, and whose diverse partisan and ideological views make class discussions lively and enjoyable. Finally, thanks as always to my husband, Tom Han, my daughter, Taylor NyBlom, and my son, Davis Han, for their unconditional love, support, and patience as I finished this manuscript.

1 Electing madam president

In January 2014, Time placed on its cover perhaps one of the most frequently asked questions in politics in recent years: “Can anyone stop Hillary?” This is not the first time that speculation over whether or not Hillary Clinton would run for president, or become the first woman president, has reached a fever pitch in the news media. Talk of “Hillary as President” dates back to 1992 when during Bill Clinton’s first presidential campaign, he often told voters that they would get “two for the price of one” with Hillary as his co-president. She was labeled the early front-runner for the Democratic nomination in 2008, but Clinton would ultimately lose to Barack Obama. After Obama’s reelection in 2012, it seemed a foregone conclusion for some in the news media, and particularly Democratic and/or liberal-leaning pundits and strategists, that Clinton would be a lock for the Democratic nomination, and even the White House, in 2016. Determining why this is such a popular news story is not difficult, as it is part of the ongoing fascination with the broader question of electing America’s first woman president. In addition, Clinton provided the best case study for the news media to personalize the potential first woman president with a familiar, and for some controversial, political face. We have long known that news coverage tends to personalize, dramatize, interpret, and speculate on potential political outcomes.1 The horse race of politics—who’s up, who’s down, who’s winning, who’s losing, who’s in, who’s out—is the type

2

IN IT TO WIN

of coverage that attracts viewers and readers as participants in the political game. Electing the first woman president? The Clintons back in the White House? Obviously, this story is interesting to even the most casual political observer, no matter how one might view the Clintons. Journalists and political pundits are not the only ones focusing on electing the first woman president. Plenty of academics in the past decade or so, myself included, have written books and articles dedicated to analyzing the prospects of electing a woman president. I have written about how electing a woman president will not change the constitutional structure and powers of the office,2 how informal barriers on the campaign trail may harm a woman candidate’s chances,3 and why Clinton lost her bid for the Democratic nomination in 2008.4 The students in my political science classes always enjoy talking about and debating the prospects for electing a woman president, and those in my women and politics class write papers that analyze the pros and cons of potential presidential candidates among current women politicians. I have also given numerous talks in the community on this topic, simply because people are interested in and fascinated by the idea of electing a woman president, whether they think doing so is long overdue or because they believe too many hurdles still exist for it to happen anytime soon. Over the years, as I have continued to talk and write about electing a woman president, my training as a social scientist always leads me back to one simple question: What exactly do we know about this topic? This question is important since there seems to be a disconnect between current news media speculation about, for example, how easy it would be for Clinton to win the White House in 2016 versus what political scientists know about the role of gender in politics as well as what it takes to win a presidential election. While cable news may not be our best indicator of how people get their political news (due mostly to the overall small audience share compared to the total number of television viewers, as well as declining ratings),5 time

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

3

spent watching CNN, MSNBC, or Fox News since November 2012 would convince most viewers that Clinton would, at the very least, easily secure the Democratic nomination in 2016. For example, while many MSNBC hosts talked about Clinton’s election as inevitable, the attention to Clinton and such stories as her role in the Benghazi attacks in 2012 on Fox suggested that most Republicans and/or conservatives saw defeating Clinton in 2016 as a top priority, which brings me back to that same question—what exactly do we know, aside from the ongoing media speculation, about the possibility of electing a woman president anytime soon? Are the assumptions that have become conventional wisdom on this topic anything more than mere opinion or anecdotes? This book will answer those questions, as it offers a critical analysis of the current political environment and what that means for the chances of electing a woman president in 2016 and beyond. In doing so, I rely on political science research in two relevant subfields: women and politics, and presidential campaigns and elections. The former indicates that longstanding barriers to women’s electoral success—biases in party recruitment, fundraising, and media coverage, for example—are diminishing, yet do other barriers still remain? The latter explains the successes and failures of recent presidential campaign strategies in all three stages as well as the institutional factors of the process: the invisible primary/pre-nomination period, the nomination period, and the general election. By merging what we know from both literatures, a more accurate portrait can emerge (based on statistical data and empirical analysis) of the real chances (i.e., beyond media speculation, opinion, and anecdotes) for a woman presidential candidate to win. I rely on a case study approach throughout the book to examine the recent presidential campaigns of Clinton, Michele Bachmann, Carol Moseley Braun, Elizabeth Dole, as well as the vice presidential candidacies of Sarah Palin and Geraldine Ferraro, to better understand what barriers may still exist for woman presidential candidates. The theoretical

4

IN IT TO WIN

premise of the book rests on these two questions: Despite the fact that the office of the presidency continues to be viewed as a male prerogative, does a woman candidate need a unique strategy to run for president? Or, does a winning strategy already exist that can apply to a candidate regardless of gender?

Hillary and those who came before These days, every conversation about electing a woman president seems to begin and end with Hillary Clinton. While not the only woman to ever run for president, Clinton’s campaign is without a doubt the most famous. On January 20, 2007, Clinton ended years of speculation by officially announcing her presidential bid. In an online statement, she told viewers “Let’s start the conversation” about how to get the country back on track, while on her campaign webpage, she stated simply that “I’m in, and I’m in to win.” Clinton’s announcement came just four days after Obama had announced his presidential candidacy. Despite the excitement over a potential Obama bid for the White House, Clinton was still viewed as the solid front-runner for the Democratic nomination in early 2007. As a former first lady, a U.S. Senator from New York, and married to one of the most skilled politicians and fundraisers in modern American politics, it seemed that Clinton was uniquely situated to secure the Democratic nomination and become the first woman president despite her history as a polarizing political figure. At least, that’s what the news media had been reporting on a regular basis, often suggesting that the most likely 2008 general election contest, supported by public opinion polls, would be Clinton versus former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani.6 However, despite Clinton’s best laid plans, political fate had something else in store. She would be sworn in to a prestigious political position

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

5

two years later, not as the first woman president on January 20, 2009, but as the 67th U.S. Secretary of State (and the third woman to hold the position) on January 21, 2009. Obama’s decision to select Clinton as Secretary of State became one of the most talked-about topics during the presidential transition as political pundits focused on whether or not Obama was putting together his cabinet based on a “team of rivals” theory,7 or similarly, a theory based on the old adage, “keep your friends close and your enemies closer.” Despite an initial large field of candidates, the fight for the Democratic presidential nomination became a two-person race when Obama won the Iowa caucuses in January 2008, followed by Clinton’s victory in the New Hampshire primary a few days later. By March 2008, Obama had won enough delegates to all but ensure his nomination. Clinton, however, would not actually concede the race until a few days after the last nominating contest on June 3, 2008, finally ending the bitterly fought primary contest. Then, during the summer of 2008, media speculation turned to whether or not Obama would select Clinton as his running mate. Instead, Obama picked U.S. Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware to join him on the Democratic ticket (Biden was also a previous presidential contender in 2008, but had dropped out of the race after a poor showing in the first few primary contests). For the remainder of the summer and fall of 2008, Clinton pondered her political future as she campaigned on behalf of the Obama/Biden ticket, which also left the news media continuing to speculate about whether or not Americans had seen the last of Clinton as a presidential candidate. She seemed to end the speculation in an interview with Fox News in October 2008, when she stated that the chances were “probably close to zero” that she would ever run for president again8 despite the media narrative that she would again be the front-runner in 2012 if Obama lost and in 2016 if he won. Many observers noted that naming Clinton as Secretary of State was a shrewd political move by Obama; the resignation of her Senate seat would

6

IN IT TO WIN

remove a potential intraparty rival on contentious domestic battles on Capitol Hill (most notably on Clinton’s previous signature issue of health care, over which she and Obama sparred on the primary campaign trail) while capitalizing on her skill and goodwill with many foreign leaders to be the nation’s chief diplomat. Despite the fact that the position of secretary of state had once been a stepping stone to the presidency during the nineteenth century,9 the modern view of the office has become one that emphasizes diplomacy over politics, meaning that it is no longer seen as a good position from which to launch a presidential bid. While Clinton now held a position that placed her fourth in line for the presidency, thanks to the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, one had to believe that fact provided little comfort and mixed emotions to the new Secretary of State, the same woman who had put “18 million cracks” in the political glass ceiling in her quest to become the first woman president. However, political fortunes can change quickly, as can career trajectories, in Washington. Following Obama’s reelection in 2012 and Clinton’s decision not to continue as Secretary of State for a second term, Clinton once again became the immediate front-runner for the 2016 presidential race, thanks to media coverage all but awarding her the Democratic nomination as well as the title of “Madam President.” Yet, despite consensus among many political pundits, nothing in politics is a slam dunk, and early news media speculation about presidential races can often be wrong (case in point: 2008 was Obama vs. John McCain, not Clinton vs. Giuliani). Despite her loss in 2008, Clinton did make history on several counts. She became the first woman to win a presidential nominating contest (when she won the New Hampshire primary in January 2008) that also resulted in earning delegates to the national convention.10 In total, Clinton would win twenty-one primaries (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

7

South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia) and one caucus (Nevada),11 earn 1,896 delegates (out of 4,934 total, with 2,118 needed for the nomination) prior to the Democratic National Convention, and amass a total of 18,046,007 popular votes12 during the Democratic nomination process. Clinton also helped to recruit new voters to the process with the excitement over the possibility of electing a woman president, and her candidacy proved that working-class, white male voters in states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania would vote for a woman. Perhaps most importantly, after watching Clinton on the campaign trail for 18 months, many Americans grew accustomed to seeing a woman candidate as a serious contender for the White House. Since then, we have witnessed Sarah Palin’s vice presidential candidacy in 2008, as well as Michele Bachmann’s presidential bid in 2012. However, it is also important to remember the woman presidential candidates who came before Clinton in 2008. The first woman candidate for the presidency dates back to 1872, when Victoria Woodhull, a stockbroker, publisher, and protégé of Cornelius Vanderbilt, ran for president on the Equal Rights Party ticket. She was followed by Belva Lockwood, the first woman admitted to practice law before the U.S. Supreme Court and an active participant in the women’s suffrage movement, who ran for president on the same party ticket in 1884 and 1888. Since that time, women have continued the trend of seeking the presidency and vice presidency as third party candidates.13 As for major party candidates, U.S. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, a Maine Republican, ran for president in 1964. Smith made history by becoming the first woman to serve in both houses of Congress (elected to the House of Representatives in 1940 to replace her dying husband and to the Senate in 1948). She would drop out of the presidential race after placing fifth in the New Hampshire primary, but she was officially nominated for the presidency by Vermont U.S. Senator George Aiken at the Republican National Convention in July 1964. Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-NY), the first black woman to serve in Congress, ran for president in 1972. Chisholm used her candidacy to raise awareness of

8

IN IT TO WIN

issues such as education and other social programs within the Democratic presidential primary. Even though Chisholm’s name was placed on the ballot in twelve primary states, she never received more than 7 percent of the vote in any of the primary contests.14 Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) seriously considered a run for the presidency in 1988 after Democratic front-runner Gary Hart dropped out of the race in the spring of 1987. Her campaign, however, never made it out of the exploratory mode and had officially ended by September 1987. Elizabeth Dole, a former Cabinet Secretary in both the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, had a strong campaign organization in the early months leading up to the 2000 Republican primaries, yet she withdrew from the race in the fall of 1999 before she even officially announced she was running when her campaign lost momentum (specifically, a lack of money and positive news coverage). Unlike Schroeder and Dole, who both fared well enough in early public opinion polls to give their campaigns temporary credibility, former U.S. Senator Carol Moseley Braun’s (D-IL) campaign for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination was considered a long shot. Moseley Braun is the first and only African American woman ever elected to the U.S. Senate (in 1992), and was the first African American U.S. Senator for the Democratic Party (in 2004, Barack Obama became the second). While she would drop out of the race in January 2004, prior to the Iowa caucuses, Moseley Braun made it onto a total of twenty primary ballots, more than any other woman before her. She also performed well in several televised debates as the only woman in a field of mostly white men, and was credited with bringing a unique voice to the political discussion in the early days of the 2004 presidential race. She also had a major player within the women’s rights movement as her campaign manager—Patricia Ireland, prominent feminist author and former president of the National Organization for Women. Moseley Braun’s favorite line while out on the campaign trail told voters why they should take her candidacy seriously: “The final reason to vote for me is that I’m the clearest

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

9

alternative to George Bush. I don’t look like him. I don’t talk like him. I don’t think like him. And I certainly don’t act like him.”15

Electing a woman president: The conventional wisdom While many believe that electing the first woman president is not a question of if, but who and when, media speculation on the topic has yet to move it from an interesting talking point to political reality. However, the conventional wisdom in recent years has suggested that it is an uphill battle for a woman to win the White House. The presumed barriers to such an achievement include the inherent masculinity of the office of the presidency, prevalent negative stereotypes of women leaders, gender bias in news coverage of woman candidates, and a lack of potential women candidates due to so few women holding political positions. First, let’s consider how masculinity is associated with the presidency specifically and more generally with the notion of leadership. The executive branch is considered the most masculine of the three branches of government due to its hierarchical structure, the unity of command, and the ability of a president to act decisively when the need arises. The presidency has also been viewed as operating “on the great man model of leadership,” which automatically leaves women defined as the “other” in the executive branch.16 Strong leadership has historically been defined as an attempt to exert one’s will over a particular situation, a societal view that “has been conditioned by the interpretation of American history as written.” This, in turn, affects how the public will view other aspiring leaders, particularly women.17 It has also long been assumed that the notion of “presidential machismo,” which is the image desired by many Americans to have their president exhibit tough and aggressive behavior on the international stage, would be a disadvantage

10

IN IT TO WIN

for women presidential candidates. Even though the unilateral actions of a president to wage war or carry out other military actions may run “counter to aspects of democratic theory of governance,” public opinion polls routinely show that Americans admire this type of behavior by presidents, forming “the basis of a cult that often elevates presidents, primarily those regarded as strong and who waged successful wars, to the status of heroes.”18 How Americans view the notion of leadership also plays an important role in how we view presidential candidates. Aside from the constitutional requirements for the office of the presidency—being at least 35 years old, a 14-year U.S. resident, and a natural born citizen—no other formal criteria exists to run for president. However, we know that several informal qualifications exist that limit the pool of potential nominees, with factors such as religion, race, and gender making the pool of viable candidates for both president and vice president almost exclusively Protestant, white, and male.19 The health and age of the candidate, as well as family ties and personal relationships (particularly marital status and fidelity), are also important characteristics for candidates.20 So, too, are leadership qualities. While it may be a fluid and malleable term, “leadership” has routinely been defined on male, as opposed to female, terms. In American politics, business, and military circles, this view has been indoctrinated into the consciousness of most Americans through the traditional interpretation of our national history. This view of leadership, in turn, affects how the public will view other aspiring leaders, particularly women,21 and it has often left women with a “double standard and a double bind” as men are still more readily accepted as leaders than women.22 For example, women leaders can be viewed negatively if they exhibit leadership characteristics that are either too masculine (assertive equals abrasive or “bitchy”) or too feminine (too soft equals not tough enough to do the job).23 This double bind, long assumed to exist for women leaders, means that women are expected to be “warm, kind, and sensitive,” and if

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

11

they fail to meet this stereotypical standard, they “may be seen as difficult and unlikable.”24 This conceptualization of leadership on male terms is often pointed to as a barrier for women in politics. The policymaking process in the United States is based on the reallocation of resources within society, with winners exerting their power and influence over losers within the political arena. Since men are expected to be competitive, strong, tough, decisive, and in control, the male view of leadership better fits the American political model. Women, on the other hand, are expected to exhibit traits that are cooperative, supportive, understanding, and show a willingness to serve others. Other female characteristics of leadership include consensus decision-making, sharing power, resolving conflict, and promoting diversity, all of which can stem from gender socialization and stereotypes about the “proper” place for women in our society.25 Gender stereotypes can also play a role in how women candidates and their campaigns are covered in the news media. Potential women presidential and vice presidential candidates have not always been portrayed as authoritative or as strong leaders in the press. For example, Elizabeth Dole’s coverage in 1999 “was covered more as a novelty than a serious candidate,” what the White House Project referred to as the “hair, hemlines, and husbands” approach to coverage.26 Other studies in recent years have also showed this trend of gender bias, making gender a significant, and not always positive, label in news media coverage for women candidates.27 Public opinion in recent years suggests support for electing a woman president, at least in theory. However, in the two years following 9/11, support for electing a woman president in polling had declined, suggesting that women may face tougher public scrutiny during times of war.28 In addition, while public opinion polls consistently show support for a qualified female presidential candidate, there is evidence to suggest that responses to this polling question may suffer from what researchers call “social desirability effects”—that is, respondents may

12

IN IT TO WIN

be purposely giving false answers to avoid violating societal norms.29 Research has also shown that the gender, education, and political ideology of the respondents in polls about electing a woman president seem to be the most prominent factors that shape public opinion, followed by age, race, and party identification,30 and that the character, personality, and style of presidential candidates are crucial in how voters evaluate those seeking the White House. While party affiliation and policy preferences are still an important factor among voters, the decline of partisan loyalty and the desire for party nominees to appeal to moderate, middle-of-theroad voters during the general election campaign has placed more emphasis on the candidate as an individual. Political news reporting has become more cynical, sensationalized, hypercritical, and fragmented, which has led to an increased focus on the “cult of personality” during presidential campaigns.31 While “character” may be a broadly defined term, Americans look for, among other things, honesty, integrity, intelligence, strong communication skills, flexibility, compassion, open-mindedness, and a commitment to both the public good and a democratic process in their presidential candidates.32 For women candidates, it is even more important to develop an effective communication strategy to combat negative stereotypes in the news media by emphasizing her “perceived image and issue strengths—honesty and trustworthiness and dealing with social concerns—as well as [establishing] her credibility as a tough and decisive leader able to handle such issues as crime, foreign policy, and the economy.”33 Perhaps the most tangible problem when considering the prospects of electing a woman president is simply that so few women are in the “on-deck circle”—a short list of presidential candidates, put together in part by the news media through speculation as well as the behavior and travel patterns of notable politicians (e.g., who is traveling to Iowa and New Hampshire, or speaking at high-profile party events, in the months leading up to the first

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

13

nomination contests). This on-deck circle exists of roughly thirty to forty individuals in any given presidential election year and can include governors, prominent U.S. senators, a few members of the House of Representatives, and a handful of recent governors or vice presidents who have remained prominent in the news media.34 Given that four of the last six presidents were former governors, this type of political experience tends to elevate many candidates in the eyes of the news media. While serving as a state governor is certainly not the only path to the White House, the dearth of women who have executive experience—in either politics or business—leaves fewer women on the presidential short list. In addition, while the women currently serving in the U.S. Senate enjoy high profiles in American politics, the Senate is traditionally not the place to look for a presidential candidate. Barack Obama became the first president elected directly from the Senate since John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960, and only the third in U.S. history (the other being Warren Harding, elected in 1920). The lack of women leaders in Congress also tends to keep women off the presidential short list; despite the historic House speakership of Nancy Pelosi, she remains the only woman from either political party to ever hold a prominent leadership position in the House of Representatives or the Senate. The most glaring problem in electing a woman president may simply be that so few women hold the appropriate leadership positions within our government that allow them access to the on-deck circle. There are several reasons for this, including the traditional view that men should hold public leadership roles, while women should remain at home tending to domestic responsibilities and childrearing; a political system that is biased in favor of incumbents; a lack of role models for younger women who might aspire to political careers; women are less likely to be recruited to run for the presidency; and finally, due to the “double burden” of work and family responsibilities from which many professional women suffer, women are more likely to run for office much later in life than men.35 In

14

IN IT TO WIN

addition, recent research has shown that the candidate emergence phase of a campaign—moving from a potential to an actual candidate—represents one of the biggest hurdles for women to overcome, particularly in seeking the presidency. A gender gap seems to exist in political ambition, which is attributed to the fact that women are significantly less likely than men to receive encouragement (either from a current or former politician or from a financial supporter) to run for office or to deem themselves qualified to run for office.36 With so much attention focused on electing a woman president, it is important to remember that electing the first woman vice president would also break a significant political barrier. To date, fourteen vice presidents have gone on to become president, either through succession (following the death or resignation of the president) or by election in their own right. Since Geraldine Ferraro’s historic bid for the vice presidency as Democrat Walter Mondale’s running mate in 1984, only one other woman has been nominated for vice president—Alaska Governor Sarah Palin in 2008. When first announced as John McCain’s running mate in September 2008, Palin catapulted to instant political celebrity as the first Republican woman to run for vice president. Yet, for all of the excitement that her candidacy generated among the base of the Republican Party, she failed to garner the support of independent or crossover Democratic voters due to many of her social conservative views. In addition, despite the desire to elect a woman to the presidency or vice presidency, Democratic pro-choice women who had supported Clinton in the primaries did not support Palin’s candidacy. Palin’s lack of political experience (she had been governor for less than two years) and her lack of knowledge about major domestic and international issues caused many to question McCain’s decision to place her on the ticket. Palin also became a flash point for feminism during the presidential campaign, fueling discussions about working mothers, family responsibilities, and whether or not America had entered a postfeminism era (the general belief

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

15

that the problems of sexism and inequality have been resolved, making feminism and the women’s rights movement obsolete). Much attention was also focused on Palin’s appearance and whether or not she was too attractive to be taken seriously as a national candidate. Despite one’s views about Palin, her vice presidential candidacy did make history and expanded the diversity of women and their ideologies, perspectives, and personal histories on the national stage.

Electing a woman president: New perspectives Since the 2008 presidential campaign, interest in and speculation about electing the first woman president has only intensified. So, do we now know more about the real chances of electing the first woman president? Scholars and pundits have had a chance to make initial assessments about both Clinton and Palin and the significance of their respective campaigns. Since then, we have also seen another woman, Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-MN), run for president. Bachmann dropped out of the Republican primary race soon after a poor showing in the Iowa caucuses, finishing sixth with just under 5 percent of the vote. However, she performed well during the invisible primary in 2011, becoming the first woman to ever win the Iowa Straw Poll hosted by the Iowa Republican Party in August 2011 and giving her front-runner status for a few weeks in the press. A founder of the House Tea Party Caucus, Bachmann was popular among conservative voters and had a history of fundraising success, which contributed to some in the news media considering her to be a viable presidential candidate. In 2014, she chose not to seek reelection for another term in the House of Representatives. In addition to the real-life campaigns of women seeking the presidency or vice presidency since 2008, the “woman as president” theme has also continued to appear with regularity within pop culture. Both before

16

IN IT TO WIN

and after 2008, American movie and television viewers have seen many diverse portrayals of women as president and vice president. As Lilly Goren argues, “It is significant that Hollywood decided to elect minorities and women to the presidency some time before reality moved in that direction.”37 Such characters have come a long way since Polly Bergen’s portrayal of the first woman president in the 1964 film Kisses for My President, in which her character must resign the presidency when she discovers that she is pregnant (and by doing so, she will be able to spend more time with her family).38 More recently, movies such as Air Force One (1996) and The Contender (2000), and television shows such as ABC’s Commander in Chief (2005–2006), Fox’s 24 (2001–2010), SyFy’s Battlestar Galactica (2004–2009), HBO’s Veep (2012–present), ABC’s Scandal (2012–present), and NBC’s State of Affairs (2014–present) have allowed Americans to grow more accustomed, even if only in fictional portrayals, of women in positions of political power. The significance is that these characters function “as a propositional argument that women can serve as chief executives equal to men and that, to the extent that sexism endures in U.S. society, it is recognized as anachronistic, ridiculous, or corrupt.”39 The critically acclaimed Netflix series House of Cards (2013–present) also incorporated a story line during its second season in 2014 about a female member of the House of Representatives, a decorated Iraq War veteran, ascending to House Majority Whip when the show’s main character, Frank Underwood, resigns the post to become vice president. And in the fall of 2014, another series, Madam Secretary, premiered on CBS and depicts the professional and personal/family challenges faced by a woman secretary of state. As Marie Wilson, founder of The White House Project, has long argued, the portrayal of women in all types of political leadership positions, even if fictional, helps one to imagine that it is possible.40 In addition, the topic of electing “madam president” remains popular in the press and among political pundits. In her book about electing a woman

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

17

president, Notes from the Cracked Ceiling: What It Will Take for a Woman to Win, Washington Post reporter Anne Kornblut reminded readers that the speculation of Clinton’s potential 2016 run has been ongoing since 2008: “So the idea of her presidency lingers. But it is only an idea, just as the notion of a female president is still only that—a notion.”41 Kornblut assesses the many strengths and weaknesses of Clinton’s campaign from 2008, including the significant generational divide among Democratic women voters and how younger women favored Obama, while older women favored Clinton: Mothers and grandmothers who saw themselves in Clinton and formed the core of her support faced a confounding phenomenon: their daughters did not much care whether a woman won or lost. There was nothing, in their view, all that special about electing a woman—particularly this woman—president … [Clinton] was the wrong woman at the wrong time; she was a Clinton; she hadn’t gotten there on her own; a woman could be elected another year.42 Kornblut also discussed Clinton’s gender neutral strategy, which was more focused on inevitability and experience and less focused on gender, and wonders whether it was the right strategy for the wrong candidate, or the wrong strategy for the right candidate?43 And while Kornblut strongly hints throughout the book that gender bias in media coverage posed a significant hurdle for Clinton to overcome, no empirical evidence is offered. Yet, she does suggest that Clinton may not be a good case study for gender bias in a presidential election: “Was all of it because Clinton was a woman? Or because she was Hillary Clinton—such a target-rich opportunity after decades in the limelight and a style that grated even on some political sympathetic women?”44 More recently, feminist writer and interviewer Marianne Schnall’s book What Will It Take to Make a Woman President? provides reflections and opinions from various politicians, political activists, actors, writers, artists,

18

IN IT TO WIN

and what she labels “thought leaders” in an attempt to determine why the United States has not yet elected a woman president. While the collection of interviews provides purely anecdotal evidence to address the question, the comments from two political strategists provide compelling points to consider. In looking ahead to 2016, Democratic strategist Donna Brazile states, “So we’ve had moments before, but we’ve never had the right political ingredients to really stir up the electorate to make it happen, and we finally have them. One of the things that will matter to this is the marketing and the strategic placement of [the next female] candidate.” According to Brazile, Clinton’s failure in 2008 can be attributed in part to a failed strategy of marketing, not doing a constituent-based campaign, and failure to focus on caucuses as well as primaries, since “analytics [are now] driving so much of what we do in politics.”45 In addition, Ana Navarro, a Republican strategist, argues that the answer to the question posed is simple: Because we haven’t had the right candidate. And because it’s taken years, it’s taken decades, to get a deep enough stable of women elected officials to be able to have any of them turn into potential presidential candidates. I think we haven’t had a woman president because we have not had enough women elected officials, until recently, that can be groomed into becoming presidential candidates, that can grow into becoming presidential candidates. Navarro concludes that electing a woman president will be less about party affiliation and ideology and more about the individual: “It will be what that woman has done, shown, and proved throughout her life to get her to that point and earn the trust of the American people.”46 The most important contributions on this topic, however, have come from scholars whose academic expertise in the study of both women and politics and/or presidential campaigns and elections have expanded the

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

19

growing literature on electing a woman president, moving the conversation beyond conventional wisdom, opinion, and/or anecdotal conversations to provide more in-depth research that includes empirical data and analysis. For example, Justin Vaughn and Lilly Goren’s volume on the role of gender and popular culture offers a fresh perspective through case studies that incorporate both new and traditional forms of media to determine how Americans view the presidency. According to Vaughn and Goren, the importance of studying popular culture comes from “how these portrayals create a popular filter or prism through which the American electorate views and understands the leadership efforts of actual presidents in real time.”47 In addition, presidential power is seen as “singular, unilateral, male, and dominant.” As such, presidential candidates are “sold across the country to a variety of consumers with differing tastes and influences, and thus campaigns and candidates have adapted to sell the individual and, to a lesser degree, the policies advocated by the candidate, in a manner that plays extensively on cultural demands and norms.” This, in effect, can create a significant barrier to women candidates seeking the presidency.48 Similarly, Kristina Horn Sheeler and Karrin Vasby Anderson “assess diverse public discourses that constitute U.S. presidentiality in order to explicate the intransigent sexism that continues to constrain women in presidential politics.” They examine the backlash against female presidentiality, which they argue is a result of postfeminism rhetoric gaining traction in popular culture since the 1990s. While women have been running for president since the late nineteenth century, and even before they won the right to vote, women candidates have been stymied by a “uniquely American milieu” that seems to suggest that the very qualities we seek in a president (“hard work, equal opportunity, and limitless potential”) are undesirable in women, leaving women with “cultural, discursive, and rhetorical” electoral barriers.49 The main argument presented by Sheeler and Anderson is that the

20

IN IT TO WIN

“hegemonic masculinity of the U.S. presidency retains significant rhetorical force in the twenty-first century because it is so uniformly and thoroughly constituted by rhetorics of presidentiality. Antifeminist stereotypes are made more palatable by postfeminist narratives that herald women candidates’ equality even as they contain female presidentiality.” The normative view of the presidency as a masculine domain has kept the “cultural imagination” of American voters from perceiving the office as anything less. As a result, they argue that it is necessary to transform “the ideology of presidentiality in U.S. culture, for only when we can credibly and consistently imagine women as presidents will we be poised to elect them as such.”50 Many suggest that despite Clinton’s failure to secure the Democratic nomination in 2008, her campaign helped Americans begin to imagine, as Sheeler and Anderson argue, a woman as president. To better understand the campaign’s significance, Regina Lawrence and Melody Rose conducted an extensive study of media coverage of Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign. They conclude that Clinton’s campaign is “not a simple story of media bias or sexism” as it includes three interlocking factors: the role of gender in presidential politics, contemporary media norms and routines, and the individual candidate and her particular political context. Clinton had “unique assets and liabilities”; her campaign was unique—not just in the obvious fact that she was the most viable female presidential candidate in U.S. history, but in the fact that she was a particular female candidate with a particular political history who faced a particular political context … Clinton’s challenges were not just those faced by women politicians in general, but very specific to Clinton’s own personal and political history—challenges exacerbated by strategic and tactical missteps Clinton made throughout her campaign.51 On the question of gender bias in media coverage, Lawrence and Rose find that Clinton received a great deal of coverage, and much of it not positive,

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

21

but this is similar to patterns of coverage for previous male front-runners. In addition, the types of gender biases found in previous studies for other women candidates at all levels did not appear as prevalent in Hillary Clinton’s case … Clinton’s appearance and emotions were not mentioned significantly more than those of her two main competitors; while she was called by her first name significantly more often than her main competitors, she was also addressed more often by her formal title; while her qualifications for office were rarely discussed, they were discussed more often than those of her main competitors; and the fact that her husband and, to a lesser degree, her child were mentioned more often than the families of the leading male candidates is at least in part attributable to the fame of those family members and their campaign activities on Clinton’s behalf. They conclude that Clinton’s front-runner status proved to be a liability more so than gender, but that while “explicitly sexist bias” was not widespread in traditional news outlets, sexist coverage of Clinton was more common in online sources where it often went viral, and left the Clinton campaign little, if any, opportunity to control the content or narrative.52 Perhaps one of the most compelling and recent academic studies to be published is the work of Deborah Jordan Brooks. In her book He Runs, She Runs: Why Gender Stereotypes Do Not Harm Women Candidates, Brooks challenges the conventional wisdom that sexism and the “double bind” is what ultimately stops more women from being elected to public office. Brooks sets out to answer the following questions: Do women face double standards and/ or larger challenges than men when running for office? And, does gender bias in campaigns exist? Brooks argues there is a pervasive conventional wisdom in the public sphere about female candidates: they face tougher expectations about their qualifications and are penalized

22

IN IT TO WIN

for certain behaviors more than their male counterparts. … Despite the fact that most of those headlines and observations likely come out of perfectly good intentions—at the very least, they all reflect the fact that suspected gender dynamics in campaigns can now be discussed openly rather than kept in the shadows, where they used to reside—there are reasons to believe that the perpetuation of the conventional wisdom may actually help to create negative outcomes for women in politics. This may contribute to fewer women seeking public office, since they are constantly being told by the media that winning office is an uphill battle.53 Brooks provides empirical evidence to support the claim that women candidates do not face an extra burden due to the “double standards theory,” which posits that women are hampered by negative descriptive stereotypes that they will not be good leaders and that women face higher standards for qualifications and behavior. Also, Brooks finds, women candidates will not be punished if they don’t behave like “ladies.” Instead, she lays out a strong theoretical argument for the “Leaders-Not-Ladies Theory,” which means that “women politicians will be held to the standards of good leadership rather than to the standards of good femininity.” She finds three reasons for this: women candidates are judged on different grounds than ordinary women (multiple group stereotypes are often at play); information about candidates beyond group membership will tend to minimize the power of stereotypes (party affiliation, prior office, job history, education); and, the higher proportion of women in politics in recent decades may minimize the use of gender stereotypes by the public.54 Relying on online surveys/experiments about candidate perception with a national sample, Brooks’ empirical analysis shows the following: women candidates do not start out at a disadvantage compared to male candidates in terms of public perception; and, some women candidates benefit from stereotypes, but only when they are new to politics and still viewed as outsiders. Once they are considered insiders, they are judged similarly to men. However, this may also have more to do with

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

23

public mood about incumbency than gender.55 Brooks concludes that the conventional wisdom about a “double bind” is wrong, and that being a woman is not a political liability. She argues that potential women candidates do not face a tougher road to winning over the American public than their male counterparts, as many had long feared was the case. Women do not need to be “twice as good” as men to do well in politics. Women do not start on more tenuous ground, and they are not more likely to alienate the public with missteps along the way. … The public appears to be receptive to the idea of female political leadership, and that is very good news indeed.56 Finally, the continued work of Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox on the candidate emergence phase of campaigns shows that one of the biggest hurdles remaining for women’s advancement in politics comes from the fact that women are not as equally interested in running for office as men. This contributes to the dearth of qualified women in the candidate pool for the presidency and vice presidency. In an important update to their original 2001 study, Lawless and Fox find nearly a decade later that the “critical importance gender plays in the initial decision to run for office suggests that prospects for gender parity in our political institutions are bleak.” While political science research in other areas has recently found “no discernable, systematic biases against women candidates,” the fact that we know that women can win elections does not mean that they are willing to run in the first place. While scholars continue to study women’s underrepresentation in public office, Lawless and Fox continue to point out a key ingredient that tends to be missing in that literature, namely the decision to run for office: Nearly all of the research that addresses gender and U.S. politics, therefore, tends to begin with a justification for studying women and elections. Invariably, the normative underpinning to which scholars refer is women’s underrepresentation. Although this justification has become almost

24

IN IT TO WIN

cliché, it remains a potent reflection of reality; women’s presence in our political institutions bears directly on issues of substantive and symbolic representation.57 Lawless and Fox find three critical findings of dramatic evidence of gender’s role in the candidate emergence process: “Women are less likely than men to consider running for office; Women are less likely than men to run for office; Women are less likely than men to express interest in running for office in the future.” This, in turn, is linked to three crucial aspects of traditional gender socialization: “Traditional family role orientations, a masculinized ethos, and the gendered psyche overlap, interact, and simultaneously affect eligible candidates’ inclinations to pursue public office.”58 They conclude that not only does this gender gap in the candidate emergence phase hinder an increase in women’s representation, but so too does the lack of a coherent women’s movement (however, recent issues involving reproductive rights at both the national and state levels have provided political motivation among women’s rights activists). They offer the following advice to address the problem: “Entrepreneurial candidacies … define electoral competition in the United States. To compete effectively in this system, women must shed completely the vestiges of traditional gender socialization. They must build networks of support within political institutions that are operated by men and accustomed to working with male candidates.” This will ultimately contribute to moving past the “deeply embedded patterns of traditional gender socialization that pervade U.S. society and continue to make politics a much less likely path for women than for men.”59

Plan of the book: When, who, and how? The ultimate question remains: Does any of this research or continued talk among political pundits of electing a woman president offer any prediction

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

25

for 2016? Building on the Clinton and Palin campaigns in 2008, and the Bachmann campaign in 2012, are there any viable women contenders for the White House in 2016 and beyond? Public opinion polls continue to show support among voters for a woman to be elected president. According to a Rasmussen Poll in 2011, 73 percent of Americans said that a woman president is likely in the next ten years.60 Similarly, in 2013, EMILY’s List sponsored a poll (coinciding with their campaign to elect a woman to the White House) that showed 72 percent of voters thought a woman president was likely in 2016. The same survey found that 90 percent of voters in the battleground states would consider voting for a qualified woman candidate, and 86 percent believe that America is ready to elect a woman president.61 The EMILY’s List poll numbers, however, were not without criticism from those who pointed out that the “generic woman” questions in the poll were in reality about Hillary Clinton’s potential run in 2016. According to The Daily Beast’s Michelle Cottle, the numbers only make sense “in a political landscape featuring Hillary. It may be that nearly three-quarters of voters are ready (perhaps even eager) to elevate a generic woman to the Big Chair. But, absent Hillary, no way 72 percent of any group would consider such an outcome likely in [2016].”62 Yet, according to Frank Newport, editor in chief of Gallup: “From the American public’s perspective, Hillary Clinton’s greatest selling point going into the 2016 presidential election, should she decide to run, would be the historic fact that, if elected, she would be the first female president in the nation’s history.”63 Ironically, though, one woman who remains skeptical about electing a woman president is the only one to run for the office in 2012. In February 2014, Michele Bachmann said in an interview that she thinks many Americans “aren’t ready” for a female president, stating, “I don’t think there is a pent-up desire.”64 Despite Bachmann’s prediction, Clinton remains the presumptive Democratic front-runner according to media reports and early polling about 2016 if she decides to run. The “if ” is particularly important when

26

IN IT TO WIN

assessing the potential Democratic field for 2016, since few other potential candidates had yet to emerge by early 2015, perhaps not wanting such early media speculation about whether or not he or she could “beat Hillary.” Despite the inevitability of her securing the Democratic nomination by so many members of the press, a 2016 run by Clinton would, just as in 2008, have plenty of weaknesses. Among the potential vulnerabilities: ongoing Republican attacks about Benghazi; opinions of some who believe that John Kerry had more accomplishments as Secretary of State in his first year than Clinton did in four; connection to the Obama administration if his term should end with low approval ratings and/or problems from implementation of the Affordable Care Act and/or foreign policy decisions; questions being raised about the management of the Clinton Global Initiative as well as the activities of some advisers/friends/fundraisers who inhabit the “Clinton World” (both topics have been the subject of recent in-depth stories in the New York Times); skepticism over whether or not she could put together a more effective campaign team in 2016; her health (in question since she stepped down as Secretary of State) and age, which would be 69 if elected in 2016 (a deciding factor for her, according to political scientist Larry Sabato about “how much she wants, or is able, to keep going at a killer pace throughout her 70s”); and, of course, her husband (despite his recent surge in popularity, the near guarantee that all the baggage of Bill Clinton’s presidency would be relitigated ad nauseum in the press and by Clinton’s opponents).65 Should Clinton not run in 2016, or even if she does, other potential women candidates, either for president or vice president, and either Democrat or Republican, are worth noting. While no list is definitive, the names of several prominent women politicians continue to emerge, including Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-NH), Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL), Gov. Nicki Haley (R-SC), and Gov. Susana Martinez (R-NM), among others. When considering the presidential

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

27

contest in both 2016 and 2020, optimism is high that one or more women will be running for president and/or vice president. And while some obstacles may still exist for women candidates, particularly in the area of candidate emergence and women’s underrepresentation in positions of political power that place them in the presidential “on-deck circle,” recent scholarship has shown that gender may not play as large of a detrimental role as once assumed. Beyond Clinton, it seems that other prominent women are also waiting in the wings as potential candidates for the Oval Office. This provides a great starting point to consider the question of electing a woman president in much greater detail. In the following chapters, we will take a closer look at the current political environment, combined with what we know from current research, to determine how women candidates might fare in future presidential elections. In Chapter 2, we will review the extensive literature from women and politics scholars in recent years about the role gender plays in U.S. elections, not only for candidates, but voters as well. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, we will analyze the three phases of presidential elections, respectively—the invisible primary, the nomination process, and the general election—to determine what we know about the process and whether or not a woman candidate would benefit from a gendered strategy (i.e., whether being a woman seeking the presidency is an advantage or disadvantage given the numerous institutional factors present). Finally, in Chapter 6, we will return to the question that so many people are asking these days—when will we elect the first woman president? Having a better understanding of the role that gender can play in electoral politics, as well as the many intricate factors involved in putting together a successful presidential campaign, will provide a more informed answer that finally moves us beyond mere speculation and opinion. A broader perspective can also be gained that goes beyond speculation and, for some, obsession over Hillary Clinton, as she is not the only woman in politics with the potential to run and even win the presidency.

28

IN IT TO WIN

Notes 1

For example, see W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, 9th ed. (New York, NY: Pearson, 2012), 44–9.

2

Lori Cox Han, “Presidential Leadership: Governing from a Woman’s Perspective,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

3

Lori Cox Han, “Introduction: Is America Really Ready for a Woman President?” in Rethinking Madam President: Are We Ready for a Woman in the White House? eds. Lori Cox Han and Caroline Heldman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).

4

Lori Cox Han, “Still Waiting for Madam President: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 2008 Presidential Campaign,” Critical Issues of Our Time, The Centre for American Studies at The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Volume 2, Fall 2009.

5

According to the Pew Research Journalism Project, the cable news audience declined in 2013. The combined median prime-time viewership of the three major news channels—CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC—dropped 11 percent to about 3 million, the smallest it has been since 2007. Nielsen Media Research data show that the biggest decline came at MSNBC, which lost 24 percent of its prime-time audience (619,500 viewers). CNN declined 13 percent in prime time (543,000 viewers), while Fox was down 6 percent (1.75 million viewers). The daytime audience for cable news was more stable, holding flat at about 2 million viewers across the three news channels. See “State of the Media: Key Indicators in Media and News,” Pew Research Journalism Project, March 26, 2014, available at http://www.journalism .org/2014/03/26/state-of-the-news-media-2014-key-indicators-in-media-and-news/.

6

Polls can often shape subsequent news media narratives. For example, a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll released in December 2005 indicated Clinton and Giuliani were the early favorites to win their respective party’s nomination. See “Poll: Clinton vs. Giuliani in 2008,” December 16, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/ POLITICS/12/15/presidential.poll/index.html.

7

Many journalists made the comparison based on the 2005 book by Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005), about Lincoln’s decision to place previous political rivals in his cabinet.

8

“Hillary Clinton Gives Up On Another White House Run, ‘Probably,’ ” Los Angeles Times, October 14, 2008, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ washington/2008/10/hillary-clint-1.html.

9

Six former presidents have held the position of Secretary of State prior to their elections, including Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, and James Buchanan.

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

29

10 Democrat Shirley Chisholm won a nonbinding “beauty contest” primary in New Jersey in 1972 that awarded no delegates. 11 Michigan and Florida were “beauty contests” with no delegates awarded, and Texas included both a primary (which Clinton won) and a caucus (which Obama won). In addition, while Clinton’s popular vote victory in New Hampshire was seen as a major comeback after losing the Iowa caucuses, she and Obama earned an equal number of delegates in the state. Similarly, while Clinton won the popular vote in Nevada, Obama actually won more delegates (by one). 12 An estimate, according to RealClearPolitics.com, since Iowa, Nevada, Maine, and Washington did not release official vote totals. 13 For example, in the 2012 presidential election, Green Party candidate Jill Stein received 468,907 votes, and Peace and Freedom Party candidate Roseanne Barr received 67,326 votes. In 2008, former Democratic Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney received 161,603 votes in the presidential election as the Green Party candidate. 14 Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis, Madam President: Shattering the Last Glass Ceiling (New York, NY: Scribner, 2000), 28. 15 Alexandra Marks, “The Quest of Carol Moseley Braun,” The Christian Science Monitor, November 19, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1120/ p01s04-uspo.html. 16 Georgia Duerst-Lahti, “Reconceiving Theories of Power: Consequences of Masculinism in the Executive Branch,” in MaryAnne Borelli and Janet M. Martin, eds., The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 18. 17 Margaret M. Conway, Gertrude A. Steuernagel, and David W. Ahern, Women and Political Participation: Cultural Change in the Political Arena (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), 100. 18 Alexander DeConde, Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2000), 5. 19 Obviously, the election of Barack Obama in 2008 broke a significant barrier in terms of race, but what effect his election will have on electing future candidates of color to the White House remains to be seen. In terms of religion, John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, remains the only non-Protestant to hold the office of the presidency, and Joseph Lieberman remains the only Jewish candidate for president or vice president after his nomination as Al Gore’s running mate in 2000. 20 Stephen J. Wayne, The Road to the White House 2012 (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2012), 200–1. 21 Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern, Women and Political Participation, 112. 22 See Barbara Kellerman and Deborah L. Rhode, eds., Women & Leadership: The State of Play and Strategies for Change (New York, NY: Wiley, 2007), 7. See also Kathleen

30

IN IT TO WIN

Hall Jamieson, Beyond the Double Bind: Women and Leadership (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995). 23 Kellerman and Rhode, Women & Leadership, 7–8. 24 Linda L. Carli and Alice H. Eagly, “Overcoming Resistance to Women Leaders: The Importance of Leadership Style,” in Women & Leadership, eds. Barbara Kellerman and Deborah L. Rhode (New York, NY: Wiley, 2007), 128. 25 See Crystal L. Hoyt, “Women and Leadership,” in Peter G. Northouse, Leadership: Theory and Practice, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006), 265–92. 26 Marie C. Wilson, Closing the Leadership Gap: Why Women Can and Must Help Run the World (New York, NY: Penguin, 2004), 36. 27 Diane J. Heith, “The Lipstick Watch: Media Coverage, Gender, and Presidential Campaigns,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 123–4. 28 Jennifer L. Lawless, “Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 3 (September 2004): 479–90. 29 Matthew J. Streb, Barbara Burrell, Brian Frederick, and Michael A. Genovese, “Social Desirability Effects and Support for a Female American President,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 1 (2008): 76–89. This study found that roughly 26 percent of polling respondents were “angry or upset” about the prospect of electing a woman president, with this level of dissatisfaction constant across various demographic groups. 30 See Kate Kenski and Erika Falk, “Of What Is This Glass Ceiling Made? A Study of Attitudes About Women and the Oval Office,” Women & Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2004): pp. 57–80. 31 For a discussion on trends in news coverage of presidential campaigns, see Stephen J. Farnsworth and S. Robert Lichter, The Nightly News Nightmare: Media Coverage of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1988–2008, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Larry J. Sabato, Feeding Frenzy: Attack Journalism and American Politics (Baltimore, MD: Lanahan Publishers, 2000). 32 Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 32–7. 33 Dianne Bystrom, “On the Way to the White House: Communication Strategies for Women Candidates,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 104. 34 Cronin and Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 31. 35 Erika Falk and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Changing the Climate of Expectations,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 45–7.

ELECTING MADAM PRESIDENT

31

36 See Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, “Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2004): pp. 264–80. 37 Lilly J. Goren, “Fact or Fiction: The Reality of Race and Gender in Reaching the White House,” in Women and the White House: Gender, Popular Culture, and Presidential Politics, eds. Justin S. Vaughn and Lilly J. Goren (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 103. 38 Ironically, Bergen would also play the role of Kate Allen, mother of first woman president Mackenzie Allen, in the ABC series Commander in Chief. 39 Kristina Horn Sheeler and Karrin Vasby Anderson, Woman President: Confronting Postfeminist Political Culture (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2013), 86. 40 See Wilson, Closing the Leadership Gap. 41 Anne E. Kornblut, Notes from the Cracked Ceiling: What It Will Take for a Woman to Win (New York, NY: Broadway Paperbacks, 2011), xiii. 42 Kornblut, Notes from the Cracked Ceiling, 15–16. 43 Kornblut, Notes from the Cracked Ceiling, 35–41. 44 Kornblut, Notes from the Cracked Ceiling, 65. 45 Marianne Schnall, What Will It Take to Make a Woman President? (Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 2013), 46. 46 Schnall, What Will It Take to Make a Woman President?, 84–6. 47 Vaughn and Goren, eds, Women and the White House, 1. 48 Vaughn and Goren, eds, Women and the White House, 8. 49 Sheeler and Anderson, Woman President, 3. 50 Sheeler and Anderson, Woman President, 171–2. 51 Regina G. Lawrence and Melody Rose, Hillary Clinton’s Race for the White House: Gender Politics & the Media on the Campaign Trail (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 3–6. 52 Lawrence and Rose, Hillary Clinton’s Race for the White House, 172–4. 53 Deborah Jordan Brooks, He Runs, She Runs: Why Gender Stereotypes Do Not Harm Women Candidates (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 10–11. 54 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 20–33. 55 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 80–1. 56 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 164.

32

IN IT TO WIN

57 Jennifer L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox, It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don’t Run for Office, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2–5. 58 Lawless and Fox, It Still Takes a Candidate, 164–6. 59 Lawless and Fox, It Still Takes a Candidate, 169–75. 60 Rasmussen Reports, “73 percent Say Woman President Likely in Next 10 Years,” June 27, 2011, available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/ general_politics/june_2011/73_say_woman_president_likely_in_next_10_years. 61 Garance Franke-Ruta, “There’s No Such Thing as a Generic Woman Presidential Candidate,” The Atlantic, May 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ politics/archive/2013/05/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-generic-woman-presidential -candidate/275514/. 62 Michelle Cottle, “Is America Ready for a Female President—or Just President Hillary?” The Daily Beast, May 2, 2013, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/ articles/2013/05/02/is-america-ready-for-a-female-president-or-just-president -hillary.html. 63 Quoted in Dan Merica, “Desire to Break Glass Ceiling a Big Part of Aura Around Clinton,” CNN, March 21, 2014, available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/21/ politics/clinton-poll-woman-president/index.html. 64 Natalie Villacorta, “Michele Bachmann: U.S. Not Ready for Female President,” Politico, February 20, 2014, available at http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/ michele-bachmann-female-president-103731.html. 65 See, for example, Larry J. Sabato, “Hillary’s No Slam Dunk in 2016,” Politico Magazine, January 20, 2014, available at http://www.politico.com/magazine/ story/2014/01/hillary-clinton-2016-elections-102400.html#.UzeRG8JOX4Y; James A. Barnes, “Can Anyone Stop Hillary? Absolutely,” The Atlantic, January 2014, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/print/2014/01/can-anyone-stop -hillary-absolutely/283224/.

2 Women as candidates

The year 2020 will mark the 100th anniversary of passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave American women the right to vote. During the past century, the role of women as political participants has evolved dramatically as voters, as candidates, and as officeholders. Not only is the support of women voters now seen as essential in developing a winning campaign strategy, but women candidates and officeholders will never again be considered an anomaly in the political arena. Would the women who fought so hard and so long for suffrage in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Carrie Chapman Catt, to name just a few—be pleased or disappointed with the progress? Depending on one’s perspective, the results are mixed. For some, the glass is half full. For example, according to the Center for American Women and Politics, following the 2014 midterm elections, there are now more women serving in the U.S. Congress than ever before. Women hold 19.4 percent of the 535 seats, which includes 20 in the Senate and 84 in the House of Representatives. In addition, a total of 77 women (24.2 percent) hold statewide executive positions, 1,786 women (24.2 percent) serve as state legislators, and 13 women serve as mayors of the 100 largest U.S. cities. Women also outnumber men as voters; in the 2012 presidential election, for example, 71.4 million women voted while only 61.6 million men voted. Some called the

34

IN IT TO WIN

2012 election cycle the second “Year of the Woman.” The first, in 1992, saw a record number of women running for and winning political office at all levels due, in part, to the large number of open seats that came from retirements and redistricting.1 In 2012, during a campaign where policy issues relevant to women (including abortion, contraception, pay equity, and preventing violence against women) were front and center, voters in Wisconsin elected the first open lesbian to the Senate (Tammy Baldwin), voters in Hawaii elected the first Asian American woman to the Senate (Mazie Hirono), and New Hampshire became the first state with an all-female congressional delegation (in addition to having a woman governor, speaker of the state house, and chief justice of the state supreme court).2 This came not long after Nancy Pelosi’s tenure as Speaker of the House (2007–2011), and Hillary Clinton’s presidential and Sarah Palin’s vice presidential campaigns in 2008. For others, the glass is half empty. Despite the number of women holding political office, the overall percentages are still quite low, particularly when one considers the dearth of women who have served as state governors— only 36 women have served as governors in the history of the United States (and as of 2015, only five women currently serve in this position). While women have made tremendous progress in gaining access to positions of political power in recent years, the United States “has never had a woman president or vice president and is still not even near gender parity in the percentage of women holding elective legislative positions; it is likely to be many years, at best, before parity can even be on the horizon.”3 Also, if women make up slightly more than half of the population in the United States, which translates into more than half of eligible voters, then why are women still so underrepresented in elected political office? While public perceptions of women as active participants in the political process have broadened, many argue that various factors continue to restrict political opportunities for women, including sexual division of labor (women are still predominantly

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

35

responsible for child care and household chores); work structures and sex role expectations (lack of “flex-time” and other career advancement opportunities for women with family responsibilities); ambivalence about women exercising power; and perpetual issues such as how the media can portray women leaders in a negative light.4 Understanding the electoral process is a good place to start when considering why, despite gains made in some areas, the numbers of women holding political office are still relatively low. Are there barriers, either institutional or informal, that exist for women candidates? According to political scientists Susan Carroll and Richard Fox, American elections are “deeply gendered” in many ways. Not only do men constitute a large majority of the candidates running for president, Congress, and state governors, but those who work behind the scenes in campaigns— strategists, pollsters, fundraisers—are also mostly men. In the news media, most anchors and reporters covering presidential elections are men, the language used during campaigns is dominated by war and sports metaphors, and campaigns often rely on gender-specific strategies to attract votes (with the “women’s vote” receiving significant attention in recent years).5 In this chapter, we will look at current research on women as candidates to determine what, if any, barriers still exist, as well as the increasingly prominent role that gender has played in recent elections. Specifically, important topics to consider include public attitudes about women as leaders, the electoral process (including candidate recruitment, voting behavior, and fundraising, among other factors), and the mass media (including gender bias in media coverage and its effects). A clear understanding of the status of women as candidates across the political spectrum, and voter response to their candidacies, in recent years is necessary to understand how this knowledge can be applied to analyzing the chances of electing a woman president in the future.

36

IN IT TO WIN

The question of leadership For years, the topic of leadership—what it is and why it matters—has been discussed and written about by experts in numerous fields. Academics try to define this malleable and fluid term and determine how various factors, such as gender or communication skills, contribute to our understanding of what makes a good “leader.” Successful corporate executives and politicians often write how-to books about becoming a better leader, and political pundits opine about the leadership qualities (or lack thereof) of our presidents and other important politicians. There has also been no shortage of books written of late on women and leadership, with many so-called experts weighing in with their solutions to the problem of the shortage of women in positions of authority, whether in politics or the corporate world. One such book, Lean In by Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg, has generated much debate about how women should lead. According to Sandberg, more women leaders are needed. In order to fill this leadership gap, women simply need to “lean in,” meaning that women should be ambitious in their pursuits since increasing the number of women in positions of power is necessary to achieve true equality. Sandberg argues that women create internal barriers to leadership through self-doubt and worry too much about being liked, while external barriers include “blatant and subtle sexism, discrimination, and sexual harassment.” Stereotypes about women leaders can lead to women being marginalized, and so few women leaders can lead to inaccurate generalizations about women, particularly regarding leadership: “A truly equal world would be one where women ran half our countries and companies and men ran half our homes. I believe that this would be a better world. The laws of economics and many studies of diversity tell us that if we tapped the entire pool of human resources and talent, our collective performance would improve.”6

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

37

Debora Spar, president of Barnard College, takes a somewhat different approach. In her recent book Wonder Women, she argues that women of the postfeminism generation pursue perfection, which goes against the original goals of the feminist movement. With so many choices, women tend to place unreasonable expectations on themselves: In its original incarnation, feminism had nothing to do with perfection. In fact, the central aim of many of its most powerful proponents was to liberate women from the unreasonable, impossible standards that had long been thrust upon them. … As feminist ideals trickled and then flowed into mainstream culture, though, they became far more fanciful, more exuberant and trivial—something easier to sell to the millions of girls and women entranced by feminism’s appeal. This has created “highly unrealistic expectations” for women in trying to combine personal and professional obligations.7 The solution to this problem, according to Spar, is simple: remember biology, redefine choice, and involve men, since feminism “was supposed to be a joyous event. It was about expanding women’s choices, not constraining them. About making women’s lives richer and more fulfilling.”8 Other recent perspectives related to the topic of women’s life choices and their careers have suggested that “women can’t have it all,” as suggested by Anne-Marie Slaughter, an attorney and political scientist who has held numerous academic and government positions, including dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and a policy analyst for the U.S. State Department.9 Author Hanna Rosin has also declared “the end of men,” arguing that women have begun to surpass men in numerous statistical trends in the workforce and in college graduation rates.10 Several books and articles have also been devoted to the simple question, “What if women ran the world?”11 While only a small sample of the current debate about women as leaders, the arguments presented by Sandberg, Spar, and others highlight the

38

IN IT TO WIN

fact that there is no “one-size-fits-all” definition for how women should lead and/or make career choices. Marie Wilson, long known for her work with the White House Project and its goal of not only electing a woman president but in placing more women in all leadership positions, offers a qualified defense of Sandberg’s advice to “lean in,” but suggests that women need “to learn how to have these disagreements” in order to encourage debate and advance the women’s movement as more inclusive. Wilson states, I know there are some who will read my defense of Lean In and mutter that I’ve lost my mind. After all, these young women are being asked by Sandberg to do what so many of us did: Work harder, put out energy and make sacrifices, and still not get the rewards we should. I agree that the book is yet another call for overburdened women to work harder, while what we really need is institutional change. Most of us leaned in so far during my working life that it’s a wonder we can stand at all.12 Despite these high-profile debates about how women should lead or pursue their professional and personal lives, what do we really know about the topic of women as leaders? Following Nancy Pelosi’s historic ascent to Speaker of the House in 2007, Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign in 2008 and subsequent time as Secretary of State, and the rise of Sarah Palin in 2008 and Michele Bachmann in 2012 as political stars in conservative Republican circles, there has been much attention paid to the idea of women as political leaders and what changes, if any, would occur if women held more positions of power. As women continue to gain more prominence as candidates and officeholders, it becomes even more important to understand how leadership is defined from a woman’s perspective. Do women political leaders make a difference in their style and approach to governing and policymaking? Studies have shown that in some areas, particularly politics and business, women often bring “a more open, democratic, and ‘people-centered’ approach

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

39

to their leadership positions.” However, a more inclusive and participatory approach to leadership is not exclusive to women, and since women have yet to reach parity with men in leadership positions, not enough evidence yet exists to categorize leadership styles based on gender alone.13 Differences between male and female leadership styles are sometimes subtle and should not be overstated. It is also important to point out that a “generic woman” does not exist when attempting to determine such differences, since race, class, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation perhaps play even more important roles when determining the context of one’s actions or behaviors in the political arena.14 However, when considering women leaders from other countries, we often categorize leadership styles as either/or—some are viewed as more traditionally “male,” like German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and some more traditionally “female,” like Chilean President Michelle Bachelet and former Philippine President Corazon Aquino.15 Other studies have shown that men and women communicate differently. In general, men view communication as negotiations where they must maintain power, an “individual in a hierarchical social order in which he [is] either one-up or one-down,” while women view communication as an opportunity for confirmation, support, and consensus, “an individual in a network of connections.”16 Male politicians more often discuss goals, while women politicians more often reveal themselves through an intimate, conversational, and narrational style of speech. This difference can actually benefit women politicians, as they tend to have a greater comfort level in expressing as opposed to camouflaging themselves publicly, which can be quite useful in developing their public image.17 However, while men can easily adopt leadership strategies that are viewed as either male or female, and be praised for doing so, women can be viewed more negatively if they adopt a more traditionally male leadership style (being more competitive, tough, or decisive).18

40

IN IT TO WIN

When it comes to policymaking, many assume that women officeholders automatically support and prioritize what are often referred to as “women’s issues”—domestic policy issues including education, health care, welfare, and reproductive rights, among others. However, party affiliation (Democrat or Republican) and political ideology (liberal, moderate, or conservative) are still the most important predictor for bill sponsorship or the actual vote on a particular bill for women in Congress or state legislatures. A recent study on the role of gender and how it influences policymaking in state legislatures shows that party identity and institutional partisan structure “fundamentally shape how women represent women.” Party identity determines how women candidates stake out a position during the election and this continues when participating in the legislative policymaking process; majority party control of the chamber also shapes the alternatives to women’s issues offered by women legislators into a legislative agenda. Votes on this agenda are largely partisan or near unanimous; it is quite rare to see women legislators cross party lines to support the same women’s issues bill with their roll call votes in an otherwise partisan chamber vote. … Thus, for women legislators, representing women is an inherently partisan endeavor.19 However, women politicians can bring different priorities into the policymaking arena than their male colleagues, and some evidence suggests that women can also be more likely or willing to work across party lines to achieve policy goals. One example is the leadership style of female members of the U.S. Senate in recent years. Not only do the women of the Senate from both parties get together regularly to share a meal and talk about relevant issues, but they have made their collective voices heard on bipartisan issues affecting women, such as the Homemaker Individual Retirement Account (co-sponsored by Democrat Barbara Mikulski of Maryland and Republican Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas, which allows homemakers to invest as much

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

41

money in these tax-free retirement accounts as their working spouses) and a resolution in support of mammograms for women in their forties (co-sponsored by Mikulski and Republican Olympia Snowe of Maine).20 Yet, despite these and other examples of bipartisanship, the women in the Senate are still beholden to party loyalty on many other issues. As the Senate transformed from an “old boys club” into a more “individualist and a more partisan institution” by the late 1990s, the demands of state constituencies and increasing partisanship meant that all senators must often be team players when it comes to their party’s ideological goals. This was particularly evident during 2012, when the so-called “war on women” dominated policy discussions about such issues as reproductive rights. According to political scientist Michele Swers, “The women of the Senate played key roles in this quest for the hearts and minds of female voters,” while Republican Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire, for example, became a prominent Republican spokesperson to argue that issues involving contraception were about religious freedom and not a war on women.21 Swers argues that gender does have a strong influence on legislative behavior as it “affects the policy priorities of individual senators and the intensity of their commitment to issues. Beyond the preferences and perspectives of individuals, policy entrepreneurs recognize the association between gender and issue preferences. These entrepreneurs, ranging from fellow senators to interest group leaders, recruit women to their cause as they seek to build a support coalition for policy initiatives.”22 Gender is also politically symbolic over divisive public policy issues as “Democrats and to a lesser extent Republicans turn to their female members to deliver party messages designed to capture the women’s vote or defend the party against criticism that the party’s policies will hurt women.”23 This role differs for Republican women in the Senate since women’s issues are not a central part of the national Republican Party brand, but instead focuses its messages on lowering taxes, reducing regulation on business, and strengthening national

42

IN IT TO WIN

security. As a result, Republican women in the Senate “cannot leverage their connection to women’s interests and women voters into power and authority with the Republican caucus as easily as Democratic women can.” In addition, as the number of moderate Republican women continues to decrease, focusing on issues like reproductive rights “alienates the social conservative base of the Republican Party and puts these more moderate women in an uncomfortable position.” The smaller number of GOP women in both houses of Congress also means less leverage for women members when it comes to demanding a seat at the party leadership table.24 Less attention has been given to the study of women in executive leadership positions, due mostly to the fact that there are so few women who have held such positions in government or business. While it is no longer considered an anomaly for women to run for Congress or state legislative positions, women governors are still the exception rather than the rule. When it comes to executive political positions, “men are the ones who have historically made the decisions for the country” at both the national and state level.25 In addition, only one of the six largest electoral states (California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, and Pennsylvania) has ever elected a woman as governor. Democrat Ann Richards served one term as Texas governor, elected in 1990 but defeated by George W. Bush in her reelection campaign in 1994. (Richards is the second woman governor in Texas; Miriam Amanda “Ma” Ferguson, a Democrat, served as governor from 1925–1927 to 1933–1935, replacing her husband, who was impeached and removed from office). Democrat Wendy Davis ran for governor in 2014 but lost to Republican Greg Abbott. However, no woman has ever served as lieutenant governor or attorney general of Texas. California and New York offer similar records in electing women to statewide executive positions. California has seen three women gubernatorial candidates in the general election—Democrat Dianne Feinstein in 1990, Democrat Kathleen Brown in 1994, and Republican Meg Whitman in 2010—all of whom lost. No

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

43

woman has ever been elected lieutenant governor, though Democrat Mona Pasquil served as acting lieutenant governor for nearly six months in 2009– 2010 as an interim appointment. The current attorney general in California, Democrat Kamala Harris, is the only woman to ever hold that post and the highest ranking woman ever elected to a statewide position. In New York, no woman has ever been nominated on either the Democratic or Republican ticket to run for governor, and no woman has ever served as attorney general. Three women, however, have served as lieutenant governor; most recently, Republican Mary Donohue held the position from 1999 to 2006. The dearth of women holding statewide executive positions matters since the governor’s office of large states is one of the most likely stepping stones to the White House (four of the last six presidents were state governors), and serving as lieutenant governor and/or attorney general is often a stepping stone to being elected governor. State governors are also key players in the implementation of public policy at the state level, and serve as an important liaison in the creation of federal policy that effects state funding of programs (a crucial role as Congress has given more control and responsibility to states in the implementation of major federal programs). Governors perhaps hold more power and influence now than ever before, not only in overseeing their state budgets and bureaucracies but in policymaking within Washington. With so few women having served as state governors, research to determine leadership styles of women in this position has yet to provide definitive answers. However, recent trends have shown that most women running for governor have previous political experience at either the local or state level, and that women candidates are most successful when running in open seat elections (as opposed to an attempt to unseat an incumbent).26 In another study that considered the influence of gender on gubernatorial personality and how governors exert political power, women governors were more likely than male governors to express a more “feminine” approach to their public duties (empowering

44

IN IT TO WIN

others in the political process as opposed to wielding power over others), yet they were also just as likely to take a more “masculine, power over” approach when necessary to adapt to the traditionally male-dominated political environment.27 In addition, partisanship can also affect the policy priorities of women governors. While the data is limited in the low number of women who have served as state governors, a recent study suggests that women governors from both parties emphasize issues of economics and education, but women governors who are Democrats “systematically concentrated more on health policy areas while Republicans emphasized social welfare.”28 As discussed in Chapter 1, we do know that perceptions of women as political leaders have begun to change. As Deborah Jordan Brooks argues, the conventional wisdom about how women face a “double bind” (e.g., they are penalized by voters if they appear unfeminine or too “tough”) is wrong: Women benefit from toughness more than men with respect to their perceived effectiveness in the presidency and possibly to a modest degree with respect to favorability as well. And the empathy results indicate that although all candidates should be in touch with their empathetic, “feminine” side, that women do not have to be more attuned to it than men. … Indeed, the more general point to underscore is that to be judged as a leader and not as a lady is not necessarily a wholly positive experience; it simply means that women and men are not judged by different standards.29 Brooks goes on to point out that women politicians are judged more harshly as “politicians” as opposed to “women,” and that women are no longer tokens or anomalies in American politics, at least at the legislative level: “ … the genie of female leadership will not go back in the bottle. The fact that a candidate is a woman is not an oddity, problem, or all-defining characteristic that it may once have been.”30 She does not suggest, however, that women no longer face challenges on the campaign trail, but that gender alone is not the defining factor

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

45

in whether a candidate wins or loses, since “it is very hard for any candidate, man or woman, to win a race, especially a race for national or statewide office. The public has challenging expectations for any candidate.”31

The electoral process Do women candidates face barriers when running for office? Despite the gains made in recent decades, women candidates can still face barriers in achieving electoral success, including those imposed by the electoral process itself (incumbency and the creation of safe seats), and the fact that most women start their political careers later than most male candidates due, in part, to family demands. In addition, one of the most important barriers for women to overcome is simply making the decision to run for office; the perception for many potential women candidates that they do not have a strong chance of winning, even if untrue, is what contributes to the failure of women “to toss their hats in the ring” and hold more seats in Congress, state legislatures, and eventually the White House.32 Scholars point out why a compelling argument can be made as to why more women should become public officeholders and why their leadership at the national, state, and local levels can make an important difference in terms of public policies. For example, some point to how women politicians can offer an ideological advantage since, regardless of party affiliation, women are often in a better position to address certain societal needs relating to the overall welfare of citizens, or to protest other policies such as war. An increase in women’s representation can also help to legitimize the political system and provide societal benefits as well with increased competition for public office.33 There is growing evidence that suggests electing more women to public office can be contagious, meaning that “ … contagion is the influence of

46

IN IT TO WIN

women’s participation and political gains in one institution on others.” Increase in political participation can be a slow-building process in some countries, “but even small gains in the percentage of women can have significant effects down the road.”34 Important influences on women’s representation in other countries come from sources such as the level of development within the country, the level of political participation and the workforce, the type of electoral or selection system, the characteristics of the institution, and ideology/region. The adoption of quota laws, at either the party or national level, can also significantly increase women’s participation in parties, legislatures, and all political institutions.35 While adopting such quotas in the United States seems highly unlikely, it is important to point out that as of 2014, the United States ranks 84th among 189 countries when ranked in terms of the number of women in the national legislature.36 To better understand the political environment that women candidates face, let’s first consider the recruitment of women to run for political office. Do women receive adequate encouragement and support to run? The initial decision is perhaps the most difficult for women to make for their own careers in the short run, yet the most crucial in the longer term goal of placing more women in positions of political power. While women candidates have shown that they can raise money competitively compared to male candidates, and that women can win both congressional and statewide elections, there is still resistance for many potential women candidates to run. Research suggests that young women today often decide to shun political opportunities due to the high pressured, competitive lifestyle that comes with it. As a result, as the number of women in elected positions has leveled off in the past few years (compared to the yearly increases during the early 1990s of the percentage of women holding congressional and state positions), many women are thinking twice before committing to becoming a political candidate. As political scientist Ruth B. Mandel states,

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

47

There is a continuing conundrum here. Nothing will change the picture of leadership and perhaps the practices of leadership unless women themselves choose to pursue leadership. In the United States, far and away, this matter of women’s choices stands as the single greatest remaining challenge to achieving parity for women in leadership … [as] women must choose to walk the path.37 Party recruitment also plays an important role in electing more women. During the 1970s and 1980s, neither major party was overly committed to recruiting female candidates for Congress, and when the parties did recruit women, they were often doing little to facilitate their election during the campaign. Contacts between the parties and potential women candidates were less frequent, and women were often recruited to run as “sacrificial lambs” in a district where there was no hope of winning. This served as a barrier to more women running for and getting elected to legislative office.38 Women seeking office in state legislatures faced similar situations regarding candidate recruitment. The likelihood that a woman will run for a state legislative seat varies from state to state, yet party recruitment can and does play a significant role in electing women legislators in some states. The process often begins at the local level, as local party leaders can provide important information to party officials at the state level regarding which candidates may have the highest probability of winning an election. According to political scientist Kira Sanbonmatsu, “ … party leaders can play a major role in shaping the social composition of the legislature. … In states with an organized recruitment process, whether that process yields women candidates very much depends on party leaders’ perception of the quality and electability of women candidates and their personal knowledge of or access to names of potential women candidates.”39 In terms of being eligible to run for political office, most women candidates have the necessary qualifications for the job—most are well educated and

48

IN IT TO WIN

have professional or managerial careers. Most women candidates also have some party and organizational experience, yet, with most political offices still dominated by men, the one qualification that a large number of women still lack is prior office-holding experience.40 Prior political experience, particularly at the local level, can be a critical indicator of the number of women who will be seen as credible candidates for higher office. The “pipeline” or “bottleneck” that allows women to enter the political arena as candidates can explain one of the factors contributing to the lower number of women serving in elected office, since “experience in one elected office is seen as providing credentials for other offices.”41 Recent studies have attempted to better understand the factors that may keep women from running for elected office. Incumbency dominates much of the electoral process in Congress and state legislatures and serves as a structural barrier for all candidates, not just women. Yet there are still specific barriers to elected office that appear to be unique for potential women candidates. The primary reason for women’s underrepresentation at all levels of government stems from the simple fact that women choose to run less frequently than men, even though when they are similarly situated to male candidates (in terms of party and financial support) they are just as likely to win. The factors that seem to contribute to a woman’s choice not to run include the political gender role socialization, a lack of political confidence, family responsibilities, and a lack of visible women role models in politics.42 Also, as discussed in Chapter 1, a critical gender difference exists in the candidate emergence phase due to a substantial winnowing process that yields a smaller ratio of women than men candidates. Women may be less likely to receive encouragement from party officials at this crucial phase, yet women candidates who do choose to run tend to receive similar amounts of support from party leaders and other political activities. Women are also less likely to deem themselves qualified to run for political office, even when they have achieved great professional success. This suggests that “recruitment patterns—or lack thereof—appear to solidify women’s self-

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

49

perceptions.”43 In addition, women are often less interested in running for public office than men, and when women do run for office, they choose lower level offices.44 The dominance of incumbency on the electoral process can also explain a lot about who gets elected. The incumbency advantage, which includes a sizable fundraising advantage over challengers, can translate into high reelection rates. In Congress, since 1964, incumbent members in the House of Representatives have averaged a reelection rate of 96 percent, and incumbent members of the Senate have averaged a reelection rate of 82 percent. In certain years, those percentages are even higher. In 2004, for example, 98 percent of incumbents in the House of Representatives and 96 percent of incumbents in the Senate were reelected.45 The creation of socalled “safe seats” in recent years has also contributed to the high rates of incumbency. With the help of redistricting, which occurs at the state level, political parties who hold the majority in state legislatures have been able to create safe districts through partisan gerrymandering where the opposing party has little or no chance of defeating an incumbent. As a result, nearly one-fourth of all congressional seats in the most recent elections have seen incumbents running unopposed in the general election. This is particularly problematic for women candidates and helps to explain why women tend to do better in open seat elections where there is no incumbent on the ballot. The bottom line is that since so few women candidates are incumbents, and nonincumbents rarely win elections, the rate of women in political office has remained low.46 While we do know that women candidates can successfully compete on the campaign trail and win elections, incumbency often stands in the way of more opportunities for new faces, regardless of gender, to enter public office. One study of women candidates showed that women’s success rates were identical to men’s when comparing incumbent women and men, when comparing women and men running for open seats, and when comparing female challengers to male challengers. However, the lack of a level playing

50

IN IT TO WIN

field means that women challengers must “wait for men to retire, resign, or die, and then run for the open seat.”47 Other studies have shown that congressional districts with women representatives tend to be those that had open seat opportunities (no incumbent running), those with a history of female candidates and representatives, and those that are mostly outside of Southern states.48 Women candidates also tend to face more competition in the primary process for seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, even though women do not win primaries at lower rates than their male counterparts.49 All of this helps to explain the success of women candidates in 1992, known as “The Year of the Woman,” as the electoral environment offered numerous opportunities for political newcomers. Not only were American voters in a strong anti-incumbent mood following scandals involving the House post office and bank, but a large number of open seats were created from retirements and redistricting from the 1990 census. In addition, women’s interest groups were strongly motivated to nominate and elect women candidates following the U.S. Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas during the fall of 1991, which included testimony from law professor Anita Hill that Thomas had sexually harassed her while he served as her boss at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As a result, women candidates won a record number of seats in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate. In the House, 106 women ran for congressional seats on a major party ticket, and forty-seven won seats in the general election. In the Senate, eleven women ran and six were elected, which contributed to the largest ever one-time increase in candidates and winners. Gains were also made in state legislatures; prior to 1992, women made up 6 percent of Congress and 18 percent of state legislatures, with those numbers increasing to 10 percent in Congress and 20 percent at the state level following the 1992 election.50 Money also plays a prominent role in American political campaigns, and the costs associated with running for political office continues to escalate. In

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

51

2012, the average cost of a winning House campaign was $1,567,293, while the average cost of a losing House campaign was $496,637. In the Senate, the average winning campaign cost $11,474,077, while the average losing campaign cost $7,435,446.51 Since Congress first passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1971—followed by major amendments to the act in 1974, many Supreme Court rulings both increasing some and loosening other restrictions, and numerous political battles to reform campaign finance—women candidates have developed effective strategies to raise money to fund their campaigns. Initially, as women first began to run for political office in larger numbers during the 1970s and 1980s, they struggled to raise adequate campaign funds. Since women were underrepresented in both politics (political action committees (PACs) give proportionately more money to incumbents) and the corporate world (where many large single donations come from), they were often at a huge disadvantage in terms of fundraising. However, by the 1990s and continuing today, women candidates now raise and spend as much or more than their male counterparts.52 Recent campaign finance data has shown that women still lag behind men in contributions from large moneyed interests (such as business PACs), as they rely slightly more on contributions from both individuals and singleissue/ideological PACs. However, this also allows women candidates to find alternate pathways to financial viability while building a broader base of electoral support.53 Women’s PACs have made important financial contributions to women candidates in addition to providing training, consultation, and workers in support of the campaign. The timing of financial contributions also plays an important role as “early money” is crucial for building and maintaining momentum during the primary campaign. EMILY’s List for Democratic pro-choice women candidates, the WISH List for Republican pro-choice women candidates, and the Susan B. Anthony List for Republican pro-life women candidates have provided essential early money to women candidates in recent years. However, women’s PACs give early money disproportionately

52

IN IT TO WIN

to Democratic women candidates for Congress, while Republican women candidates “face a more daunting task of establishing early viability.”54 Nonetheless, women running for Congress in recent years have matched and, at times, outpaced their male counterparts. For example, U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) is considered one of the top fundraisers on Capitol Hill, and part of a growing class of women “powerhouse” fundraisers.55 Whether or not giving by women to women candidates has contributed to this trend is still somewhat unclear, but fundraising within the women’s community (particularly from national women’s PACs) has played a significant role in the level of success in this area of campaigning.56 The recent success among women candidates of both parties for congressional seats may provide an important harbinger for women presidential candidates in the future. Hillary Clinton raised a total of $223 million for her presidential campaign in 2008, which was second only to the $750 million raised by Barack Obama during his presidential campaign the same year (Obama’s totals include both the primaries and general election while Clinton’s totals reflect only the primaries). Despite losing the Democratic nomination to Obama, the Clinton campaign shattered any myth about women candidates not being able to raise significant amounts of money to fund a campaign.

Media coverage Like money, media coverage of candidates plays a significant role in the electoral process. Not only are voters reliant on information provided by the news media about who is running and what is at stake during an election, but candidates must also spend a great deal of time developing effective media strategies. Much research in recent years has been devoted to how women candidates are portrayed in news media coverage, and whether or not a gender bias exists that stands in the way of more women being elected to

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

53

public office. Traditionally, women politicians have been viewed in the news media as an anomaly—a unique occurrence that deserves attention because it is outside the norm.57 Trivialization of women in the news media through portrayals on television and in movies also leads to “symbolic annihilation” of women in general, as well as the stereotyping that occurs in news coverage of women candidates and politicians.58 Early research also showed stereotypes to exist about both male and female political candidates. Women, who were considered more compassionate, were seen as more competent in the traditional “female” policy areas of health care, the environment, education, poverty, and civil rights. Men, who were considered more aggressive, showed stronger competencies in the traditionally “male” policy areas of military and defense matters, foreign policy, and economic and trade issues.59 Early research on news coverage of women candidates suggested that negative stereotyping of women candidates hurt their efforts to win an elected office. Political scientist Kim Fridkin Kahn found in the early 1990s that the news media pay more attention to style over substance when covering female candidates, and that news coverage that downplays issues and highlights personal traits develops less favorable images for female candidates.60 Other early studies found similar results in the negative stereotyping of women candidates. A study by the White House Project that included several gubernatorial candidates found that not only did women candidates receive more style coverage rather than that of substance, but that male reporters more often focused on the personal than did female reporters.61 In a similar study on women candidates in U.S. Senate races, the results showed that news media coverage on television “disadvantaged women candidates in the eyes of voters” by providing more favorable coverage of male candidates than of women candidates.62 However, while these studies and others show that media biases and negative stereotyping of women candidates still exist, “it does appear that coverage is becoming more equitable” in terms of quantity and substance.63 Often, a more subtle gender bias can exist in coverage, such as

54

IN IT TO WIN

inserting details about appearance in news stories about women candidates or describing women politicians “in ways and with words that emphasize women’s traditional roles” which “perpetuate stereotypes of women politicians as weak, indecisive, and emotional.”64 Women politicians can also be trivialized by the gender-specific words journalists would commonly use to describe them, such as “plucky,” “spunky,” or “feisty.”65 The results of these studies suggest that negative stereotyping of women candidates by the news media can be particularly problematic for women presidential or vice presidential candidates. During Geraldine Ferraro’s run for the vice presidency in 1984 (with Democratic nominee Walter Mondale) and Elizabeth Dole’s short-lived campaign for the Republican nomination in 1999–2000, gender was a significant label in the news coverage of both women candidates; “the most pernicious coverage for both campaigns was the ‘lipstick watch,’ ” with almost 30 percent of Ferraro’s coverage and more than 40 percent of Dole’s coverage containing references to clothing, makeup, hair, and other feminine categorizations.66 Other recent studies also suggested that while the news media are usually quick to herald the fact that American voters seem ready to elect a woman president, women running for elected office at all levels of government are still viewed as a political anomaly, that a disproportionate amount of coverage is devoted to clothing and hairstyles, and that the mass media in general still often rely on negative stereotyping of women.67 More recent studies point out that presidential elections are “gendered” spaces that focus on masculinity, toughness, and whether or not potential candidates have “presidential timber.” While the candidacies of Clinton in 2008 and Bachmann in 2012 began to shift the definition of masculinity on the campaign trail, more progress is needed to “regender” presidential campaigns to provide acceptance for styles of leadership that do not evoke hypermasculinity.68 News media emphasis on candidate sex, appearance, marital status, and masculine issues in news coverage “still haunts female

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

55

candidates,” particularly when considering the coverage of Clinton and Palin in the 2008 presidential race. New media (online and social media sites) included some of the most offensive/sexist coverage, as the “online universe of political commentary operates outside of traditional media editorial boundaries and is sometimes incisive but often offensive and unsubstantiated.”69 But, according to political scientist Dianne Bystrom, there is some good news for women candidates: “Despite continuing stereotypes held by voters and the media, women candidates can manage campaign communication tools in ways that improve their chances of success. Women candidates who present themselves successfully in their television ads and on their websites may be able to capitalize on these controlled messages to influence their media coverage for a synergistic communication effort.”70

Voting and the gender gap As stated earlier, women outnumber men when it comes to voter turnout, a trend that began in 1980. Recent presidential campaigns have also designed numerous strategies to attract the “women’s vote.” However, women do not constitute a “monolithic voting bloc,” as they represent a “diverse and heterogeneous group of voters, not the special interest group that the term the women’s vote implies. There are conservative and liberal women, anti-choice and pro-choice, women who oppose affirmative action and those who support it. The answer to the question ‘What do women want?’ depends on which women you ask.”71 The 2012 election showed once again that women are far from a monolithic voting bloc, with age/generational divide playing a key role; younger women lean more liberal/Democratic while older women lean more conservative/Republican. Other demographic factors that contribute to the various preferences among women voters include race/ethnicity, geographic region, marital status, socioeconomic

56

IN IT TO WIN

level, and religion.72 Women candidates also do not automatically attract or win the support of women voters. While women do tend to support women candidates by a slight advantage in most elections, partisanship among voters is still a better predictor of the outcome of a race as opposed to the sex of the voter when a woman candidate is on the ballot.73 While bias against women candidates is “largely a thing of the past,” a candidate’s sex is not irrelevant, as “hostility toward women has been replaced by a more complex set of considerations that involve people’s social and political reactions to candidate sex and gendered issues.”74 Similarly, a recent study found that gender stereotypes were not a key component of candidate evaluations or voter decisions, but that the political party of women candidates can instead play a more significant role in voter decisions.75 Yet, we do know that a “gender gap” now exists in the voting pattern of Americans, particularly during presidential elections. A trend that has been given much scholarly and media attention since 1980, the gender gap (given its name by former National Organization for Women President Eleanor Smeal in 1981) explains the differences between men and women in their party identification and voting choice. In general, election results suggest that women are more likely to identify with and vote for the Democratic Party and its candidates while men are more likely to support the Republican Party and its candidates. Between 1980 and 1992, the gap between how men and women voted for president had remained between a 4 to 8 percent difference, raising to 11 percent in the 1996 election and 10 percent in the 2000 presidential campaigns. Election results have shown that the gender gap is larger among white than nonwhite voters, and it is also larger among voters at higher socioeconomic levels, among voters with more formal education, among unmarried voters, and among voters without children.76 By the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, the gender gap had been reduced to only a seven-point difference, with 48 percent of women versus 55 percent of men voting to reelect George W. Bush, and 56 percent of women versus

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

57

49 percent of men voting to elect Barack Obama. By 2012, it was back to 10 percent, with 55 percent of women voting to reelect Obama versus 45 percent of men voting for Obama.77 Why does the gender gap matter? According to political scientist Susan J. Carroll, “The gender gap has increased the political influence wielded by women voters.”78 The marriage gap has also continued to play a major role in recent presidential elections. In 2012, 67 percent of unmarried women voted to reelect Obama, while only 31 percent voted for Mitt Romney. Among married women, 46 percent voted for Obama and 53 percent voted for Romney. These numbers are similar to the two previous elections. In 2008, 70 percent of unmarried women voters supported Obama, with only 31 percent supporting John McCain. Among married women, 50 percent voted for McCain while 47 percent voted for Obama. In 2004, 62 percent of unmarried women voted for John Kerry while 37 percent voted for George W. Bush, while 55 percent of married women voted for Bush with 44 percent for Kerry.79 However, political scientist Pippa Norris reminds us that many aspects of the gender gap phenomenon require further study to better understand the complexities involved with gender and its impact on voting behavior: “Gender realignment has now become an established part of American elections, taken for granted by commentators, journalists, and politicians. It provides a useful frame or ‘peg’ on which to hang different stories about the election. Nevertheless, we should not be seduced by the conventional wisdom as many assumptions surrounding this phenomenon remain underexplained.”80 One of the most important issues to point out about the gender gap is that it does not necessarily provide an advantage to one particular party (usually assumed to be the Democratic Party) or a particular candidate. It simply means that men and women vote differently.81 For example, for all of the excitement that her candidacy generated among conservative voters in 2008, Sarah Palin failed to garner the support of independent or crossover Democratic voters (which the McCain campaign counted on by selecting a

58

IN IT TO WIN

woman in an attempt to appeal to former Clinton supporters) due to many of her social conservative views. The gender gap can also vary across states, and can also vary depending on the key issues being discussed by the candidates (the gender gap can widen when the media and candidates focus heavily on gender issues).82

Conclusion Political attitudes toward women in politics have changed as more women have been elected to office, moving away from the outdated belief that women did not belong in public life. While scholars have documented numerous barriers that have traditionally existed for women candidates, some institutional and some informal, newer research by political scientists is beginning to show that gender stereotypes may not be as harmful as once thought. According to political scientist Kathleen Dolan, much work still needs to be done in the study of gender stereotypes for both women and men: Given the increasing number of women candidates who run for a wide range of offices, we should acknowledge that women’s uniqueness as candidates may be on the wane. And as public opinion data suggest that stereotypes of women and men may be easing, we should consider whether women candidates have successfully neutralized the impact of stereotypes through their decisions and actions.83 The bottom line is that as more women win campaigns and hold political office, the view of women as political leaders will more than likely continue to shift public attitudes about the efficacy of women in public life. The evergrowing literature by political scientists on women as candidates, particularly in the specific areas of leadership, various aspects of the electoral process, the mass media, and voting behavior suggest that while progress has been slower

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

59

than some would like, progress has nonetheless occurred in the success of women running for and winning political office.

Notes 1

Forty-seven women won seats in the House and six were elected to the Senate. A two-percent gain was also made in the number of women in state legislatures.

2

Sue Thomas, “Introduction,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1–2.

3 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 143. 4

Susan C. Bourque, “Political Leadership for Women: Redefining Power and Reassessing the Political,” in Women on Power: Leadership Redefined, eds. Sue J. M. Freeman, Susan C. Bourque, and Christine M. Shelton (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 86–9.

5

Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox, “Introduction: Gender and Electoral Politics in the Twenty-First Century,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1–8.

6

Sheryl Sandberg, Lean In (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 7–10.

7

Debora L. Spar, Wonder Women: Sex, Power, and the Quest for Perfection (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 231–3.

8 Spar, Wonder Women, 237–48. 9

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All,” The Atlantic, July/ August 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/ why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/.

10 Hanna Rosin, The End of Men: And the Rise of Women (New York, NY: Riverhead, 2012). 11 For example, see Sheila Ellison, If Women Ruled the World: How to Create the World We Want to Live In (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2004); Shelly Rachanow, If Women Ran the World, Sh*t Would Get Done: Celebrating All the Wonderful, Amazing, Stupendous, Inspiring, Butt-Kicking Things Women Do (Newburyport, MA: Conari Press, 2006); Shelly Rachanow, What Would You Do If You Ran the World? Everyday Ideas from Women Who Want to Make the World a Better Place (Newburyport, MA: Conari Press, 2009).

60

IN IT TO WIN

12 Marie Wilson, “Leaning in to New Ideas,” Huffington Post, August 3, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marie-c-wilson/sheryl-sandberg-lean -in_b_2838451.html. 13 Jean Stapleton, “Introduction,” in The American Woman 2001-2002: Getting to the Top, eds. Cynthia B. Costello and Anne J. Stone (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001), 33. 14 Deborah L. Rhode, “Introduction,” in The Difference “Difference” Makes: Women and Leadership, ed. Deborah L. Rhode, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 5. 15 Michael A. Genovese, “Women as National Leaders: What Do We Know?” in Women as National Leaders, ed. Michael A. Genovese (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press, 1993), 214–5. 16 Deborah Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (New York, NY: Ballantine, 1990), 24–5. 17 Jamieson, Beyond the Double Bind, 94–5. 18 Sue J. M. Freeman and Susan C. Bourque, “Leadership and Power: New Conceptions,” in Women on Power: Leadership Redefined, eds. Sue J. M. Freeman, Susan C. Bourque, and Christine M. Shelton (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 8–9. 19 Tracy L. Osborn, How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender, and Representation in the State Legislatures (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 19–20. 20 Catherine Whitney et al., Nine and Counting: The Women of the Senate (New York, NY: William Morrow, 2000), 125–7. 21 Michele L. Swers, Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 231–2. 22 Swers, Women in the Club, 231–2. 23 Swers, Women in the Club, 231–2. 24 Michele L. Swers, “Representing Women’s Interests in a Polarized Congress,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 178–9. 25 Valerie R. O’Regan and Stephen J. Stambough, “Female Governors and Gubernatorial Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 145. 26 Sara J. Wier, “Women Governors in the 21st Century: Re-Examining the Pathways to the Presidency,” in Women in Politics: Outsiders or Insiders? ed. Lois Duke Whitaker (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006), 226–37. 27 Jay Barth and Margaret R. Ferguson, “Gender and Gubernatorial Personality,” Women & Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2002): 63–82.

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

61

28 Richard Herrera and Karen Shafer, “Women in the Governor’s Mansion: How Party and Gender Affect Policy Agendas,” in Women and Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013), 113. 29 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 130–1. 30 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 169. 31 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 174. 32 Nancy E. McGlen, Karen O’Connor, Laura van Assendelft, and Wendy GuntherCanada, Women, Politics, and American Society, 4th ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 2002), 90–102. 33 R. Darcy, Susan Welch and Janet Clark, Women, Elections, and Representation (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 15–8. 34 Frank C. Thames and Margaret S. Williams, Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in Democracies Around the World (New York: NY University Press, 2013), 127–8. 35 Thames and Williams, Contagious Representation, 130–2. 36 “Women in National Parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, May 1, 2014, available at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. 37 Ruth B. Mandel “A Question About Women and the Leadership Option,” in The Difference “Difference” Makes: Women and Leadership, ed. Deborah L. Rhode (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 72. 38 Susan J. Carroll, Women as Candidates in American Politics, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 42–4. 39 Kira Sanbonmatsu, “Candidate Recruitment and Women’s Election to the State Legislatures,” report prepared for the Center for American Women and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, September 2003. 40 Carroll, Women as Candidates in American Politics, 91. 41 Georgia Duerst-Lahti, “The Bottleneck: Women Becoming Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 15. 42 Laurel Elder, “Why Women Don’t Run: Explaining Women’s Underrepresentation in America’s Political Institutions,” Women & Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2004): 27–56. 43 Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, “Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2004): 264–80. 44 See Richard L. Fox, “The Future of Women’s Political Leadership: Gender and the Decision to Run for Elective Office,” in Women & Leadership: The State of Play and

62

IN IT TO WIN

Strategies for Change, eds. Barbara Kellerman and Deborah L. Rhode (New York, NY: Wiley, 2007), 251–70. 45 “Reelection Rates Over the Years,” Center for Responsive Politics, available at http:// www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php. 46 Carroll, Women as Candidates in American Politics, 119. 47 Richard A. Seltzer, Jody Newman, and Melissa Voorhees Leighton, Sex as a Political Variable: Women as Candidates and Voters in U.S. Elections (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 7. 48 Heather L. Ondercin and Susan Welch, “Women Candidates for Congress,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 2nd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 60–80. 49 Jennifer L. Lawless and Kathryn Pearson, “The Primary Reason for Women’s Underrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 1 (January 2008): 67–82. 50 Sue Thomas, “Introduction,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 6–8. 51 “Election Stats,” Center for Responsive Politics, available at http://www.opensecrets .org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2012. 52 Barbara Burrell, “Campaign Finance: Women’s Experience in the Modern Era,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 2nd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 26–40. 53 Victoria Farrar-Myers and Brent D. Boyea, “Campaign Finance: A Barrier to Reaching the White House?” in Women and Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 224–6. 54 Peter L. Francia, “Early Fundraising by Nonincumbent Female Congressional Candidates: The Importance of Women’s PACs,” Women & Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (2001): 7–20. 55 Ailsa Chang, “From Humble Beginnings, A Powerhouse Fundraising Class Emerges,” NPR, May 6, 2014, available at http://www.npr.org/2014/05/06/310134589/from -humble-beginnings-a-powerhouse-fundraising-class-emerges. 56 Barbara C. Burrell, “Money and Women’s Candidacies for Public Office,” in Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 82. 57 Patricia Rice, “Women Out of the Myths and Into Focus,” in Women and the News, ed. Laurily Keir Epstein (New York, NY: Hastings House, 1978), 45–9. 58 See Gaye Tuchman, Hearth and Home: Images of Women in the News Media (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), 7–8; David L. Paletz, The Media in American Politics: Contents and Consequences, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 2002), 135–9.

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES

63

59 Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, “Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 37, No. 1 (February 1993): 119–147. 60 Kim Fridkin Kahn, The Political Consequences of Being a Woman (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 134–6. 61 Wilson, Closing the Leadership Gap, 37–8. 62 Martha E. Kropf and John A. Boiney, “The Electoral Glass Ceiling? Gender, Viability, and the News in U.S. Senate Campaigns,” Women & Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (2001): 79–101. 63 Dianne G. Bystrom, Mary Christine Banwart, Lynda Lee Kaid, and Terry A. Robertson, Gender and Candidate Communication: VideoStyle, WebStyle, NewsStyle (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 21. 64 Maria Braden, Women Politicians and the Media (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 1–4. 65 Braden, Women Politicians and the Media, 6–7. 66 Heith, “The Lipstick Watch: Media Coverage, Gender, and Presidential Campaigns,” 124–6. 67 For example, see Paletz, The Media in American Politics, 135–9; Kahn, The Political Consequences of Being a Woman, 134–6; Kropf and Boiney, “The Electoral Glass Ceiling?”; Bystrom et al., Gender and Candidate Communication, 21; and Caroline Heldman, Susan J. Carroll, and Stephanie Olson, “ ‘She Brought Only a Skirt:’ Print Media Coverage of Elizabeth Dole’s Bid for the Republican Nomination,” Political Communication, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2005): 315–35. 68 Georgia Duerst-Lahti, “Presidential Elections: Gendered Space and the Case of 2012,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 69 Dianne Bystrom, “Advertising, Websites, and Media Coverage: Gender and Communication along the Campaign Trail,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 262. 70 Bystrom, “Advertising, Websites, and Media Coverage,” 264. 71 Bystrom, “Advertising, Websites, and Media Coverage,” 266. 72 Susan A. MacManus, “Voter Participation and Turnout: The Political Generational Divide among Women Voters,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

64

IN IT TO WIN

73 Elizabeth Adell Cook, “Voter Reaction to Women Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 69–71. 74 Timothy R. Lynch and Kathleen Dolan, “Voter Attitudes, Behaviors, and Women Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 65. 75 Kathleen Dolan, “Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates: What Really Matters,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 1 (March 2014): 96–107. 76 Stephen J. Wayne, The Road to the White House 2008, (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2008), 100–1. 77 “The Gender Gap: Voting Choices in Presidential Elections,” Center for American Women and Politics, December 2012, available at http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/ fast_facts/voters/documents/GGPresVote.pdf. 78 Susan J. Carroll, “Voting Choices: How and Why the Gender Gap Matters,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 144. 79 See “Unmarried Women Play Critical Role in Historic Election,” Women’s Voices. Women Vote. Available at http://www.wvwv.org/research-items/unmarried -women-change-america; and “How Unmarried Women, Youth, and People of Color Defined This Election,” Women’s Voices. Women Vote. Available at http://www .voterparticipation.org/research/how-unmarried-women-youth-and-people-of-color -defined-this-election/. 80 Pippa Norris, “The Gender Gap: Old Challenges, New Approaches,” in Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions, ed. Susan J. Carroll (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 166. 81 Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton, Sex as a Political Variable, 4. 82 Cook, “Voter Reaction to Women Candidates,” 69–71. 83 Dolan, “Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates: What Really Matters,” 105.

3 The invisible primary

Presidential campaigns in the United States are seemingly never-ending. While we may know who won on election night (with the exception of the Bush versus Gore race in 2000, which needed a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court thirty-five days after election night), each new presidential campaign seems to overlap with the last. Media speculation is constant about who may or may not run in the next election, and such political chatter usually begins in the weeks leading up to the election that has yet to conclude. The high cost of a presidential campaign also requires that potential candidates start planning their fundraising efforts early; in 2012, a staggering $6.3 billion was spent by all candidates running, making it the most expensive presidential campaign on record.1 In addition, the intricacy with which voters are now microtargeted during both the primary and general election campaign, the emphasis on get-out-the-vote efforts, and putting together a top-notch team of campaign advisors, strategists, and pollsters make the entire process of running for president a massive undertaking. The bottom line is that the sooner you start running, even if you have yet to officially declare your candidacy, the better are your chances of succeeding. There are three distinct phases to each presidential campaign—the preprimary period, known as the invisible primary; the nomination period, which includes all primary and caucus contests as well as the nominating conventions; and the general election. In this chapter, we will consider the

66

IN IT TO WIN

invisible primary and how women candidates have fared during this crucial part of the campaign. First dubbed the “invisible primary” by journalist Arthur Hadley in 1976, the pre-nomination period is between the end of a presidential election and prior to the first primary of the next when presidential candidates are vetted and when one candidate can emerge as the front-runner to secure the nomination.2 Two things seem to matter more than anything else during the invisible primary—money and media— particularly as the invisible primary has grown increasingly longer in recent years with the frontloading of primaries (which means that more primary contests are held earlier in the calendar year). During the long pre-primary phase, candidates must raise large sums of money, hire campaign staffs, shape their partisan and ideological messages on numerous issues, gain visibility among party elites to obtain high-profile endorsements, and hope to be “taken seriously” by the news media.3 The issues of party recruitment and the candidate emergence phase are important when considering potential women presidential candidates, as evidence suggests that a gender gap exists in political ambition. Fundraising and the process of organizing a campaign during the invisible primary is also significant when determining the long-term viability for any presidential candidate. Campaign finance statistics suggest that, in general, women candidates no longer lag behind male candidates in fundraising. Each of the last four presidential campaigns provides an important case study about women candidates during the invisible primary—Elizabeth Dole in 1999, Carol Moseley Braun in 2003, Hillary Clinton in 2007, and Michele Bachmann in 2011. More recently, both the Clinton and Bachmann campaigns provide important insights about fundraising strategies and efforts to target potential donors based not only on gender but on key issues within both the Democratic and Republican party platforms. In addition, of particular interest with Clinton’s campaign is the “inevitability” of her success promoted so thoroughly by the news media leading up to the start of the 2008 primary season. How

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

67

media frame a candidate’s viability during the invisible primary provides an important link to fundraising and campaign strategy, and this chapter will answer the question as to why some candidates succeed and others fail during this stage while determining what lessons can be learned for future women presidential candidates.

Deciding to run By most accounts, presidential candidates do not decide to seek the White House on a whim. According to Michael Dukakis, the Democratic presidential nominee in 1988, “One doesn’t make the decision to run for the presidency lightly. In fact, it is probably the single most important decision anybody in public life in America will make.”4 Numerous factors must go into making the decision to run, not only about the actual campaign process but the personal and physical toll that running for president can take on both the candidate and his or her family. The act of campaigning can begin months, or now even years, before a candidate faces any voters in a state nominating contest. The constitutional requirements for the job of president are minimal—35 years of age, a natural born citizen, and U.S. residency of at least 14 years—but the unofficial requirements can include prior political experience, name recognition, party support, adequate financial resources, strong appeal to the party’s base during the primaries as well as strong appeal to independent voters during the general election, and strong leadership and communication skills. Self-confidence, obviously, is a must; a presidential candidate must not only believe that he or she can handle the campaign, often viewed as the “American political version of survival of the fittest,” but also believe that if elected, he or she can succeed as president and commander in chief.5 During the invisible primary prior to the 2000 presidential election, Elizabeth Dole met several of these unofficial requirements. In 1999, Dole was

68

IN IT TO WIN

a popular and well-respected public figure. Her husband, Bob Dole, had won the Republican presidential nomination in 1996; she had served as Secretary of Transportation during the Reagan administration (1983–1987), Secretary of Labor during the Bush administration (1989–1990), and head of the American Red Cross (1991–1999). Dole had often been talked about as a potential candidate for political office, due in part to her exemplary performance during her husband’s numerous national campaigns (former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole was Gerald Ford’s running mate in 1976, and he ran for the presidency in 1980 and 1988 prior to earning the Republican nomination in 1996). In particular, Dole received high marks for the speech she gave at the 1996 Republican National Convention, during which she emphasized her femininity and approachability while also displaying her knowledge of policy issues. Her casual yet informative style during the speech, which included the so-called “Liddy stroll” (where Dole would leave the podium to walk into the audience), provided a sharp contrast to the more aggressive, masculine approach seen by many male politicians at the time, including that of her husband.6 After Bob Dole lost the 1996 presidential election to Bill Clinton, many political pundits had commented that perhaps the wrong Dole had been on the Republican ticket.7 When Dole announced that she had formed a presidential exploratory committee with the Federal Election Commission, which kicked off her presidential campaign in March 1999 (though she would never officially declare herself a candidate), she emphasized her commitment to public service as well as the potential historic aspects of her campaign as a woman: “Now what would I as a woman offer our country? I’m no politician. And frankly, I think that’s a plus today. But I have spent a lifetime in public service.”8 The announcement came after weeks of media speculation that Dole would not only run for president, but would pose a serious challenge to front-runner George W. Bush due to her “national prominence and popularity among Republicans, her appeal to women,” and her public service experience which “could catapult [Dole] to the top tier of Republican contenders.”9

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

69

Four years later, former U.S. Senator Carol Moseley Braun made the decision to seek the Democratic nomination for president. While not as high profile as Dole, Moseley Braun did have the experience of running for—and winning—elected office. She began her career in public service as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, served nine years in the Illinois House of Representatives, and then four years as the Cook County Recorder of Deeds before being elected to the U.S. Senate in 1992. She was the first African American woman ever elected to the Senate, and her victory came during what was dubbed the “Year of the Woman” in American politics as numerous women ran for, and won, political office. Moseley Braun lost her reelection bid in 1998, but served as the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand from 1999 to 2001. In deciding to enter the large field of Democratic candidates by forming an exploratory committee in February 2003 (she would not officially declare her candidacy until September 2003), Moseley Braun believed that there should be a woman candidate to make sure that the Democratic Party did not take its large female constituency for granted.10 She also staked out a clear position in her opposition to the policies of the George W. Bush administration, stating that she was running “because I want to be a voice of hope for people who believe war is not the answer to our domestic security, and budget deficits are not a way to grow this economy.”11 As the only woman running for president that year, one of the biggest applause lines of her campaign became, “Take the men-only sign off the White House door.”12 When Hillary Clinton announced her presidential campaign in January 2007, she ended years of speculation surrounding the idea of the “other Clinton” seeking the White House. The 2008 presidential campaign became the longest on record; nearly all of the candidates for both the Democratic and Republican nominations had announced their candidacies by early 2007, which extended the not-so-invisible part (when candidates officially begin campaigning with full media coverage) of the invisible primary by several months. The 2008 presidential election was also the first since 1952 that

70

IN IT TO WIN

was an open nomination contest for both major political parties, with no incumbent president or vice president among the Democratic or Republican contenders. However, Clinton entered the Democratic field almost as if she was an incumbent; her status as a U.S. Senator from New York and, more importantly, the former First Lady, provided tremendous viability in the eyes of the news media (which had labeled her the presumptive front-runner since 2005). In addition, according to senior campaign advisor Howard Wolfson, the Clinton campaign “had a fair amount of confidence that she would be the nominee,” and that the goal during the invisible primary was “to project inevitability.”13 While it is impossible to know what truly motivates someone to run for president, beyond the factors mentioned earlier, Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist Carl Bernstein believed that “Hillary for President had come down to Restoration, another co-presidency in which all the considerable talents and experience of both Clintons and the hard lessons learned by each would be applied to reversing the catastrophes, ennui, and grievous misgovernance that had followed their inglorious exit from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.” Bernstein argued that talk of Clinton running for the presidency as early as 1992, during her husband’s first campaign, was nothing but “gossip and misinformation,” and that the idea of Hillary running for president never came to fruition until her husband’s impeachment in late 1998 and then her election to the Senate in 2000.14 There had also been much speculation in both the media and political circles about Clinton running as early as 2004. Many experts considered the Democratic field that year to be weak, and one that would not produce a candidate to beat the incumbent, George W. Bush. Despite the initial accusations of carpetbagging, Clinton had won a solid victory over her Republican opponent to win the New York Senate seat in 2000. Then, in 2003, her book tour to promote Living History, Clinton’s best-selling autobiography, “sparked the beginning of a flirtation with the idea of running for president in 2004 [and] … got the ball rolling inside Clinton’s head” due to the large

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

71

crowds and excitement generated among people eager to meet the former First Lady.15 In the end, however, Clinton decided to wait until 2008, after she had served out her first term in the Senate. Her decision not to run in 2004, along with her decisive victory in her reelection bid in 2006 (in which she won 67 percent of the popular vote), helped to create an air of inevitability for her 2008 campaign. Clinton had solidified her reputation as a winning politician outside of the success of her husband’s career, yet with the announcement of her presidential bid in 2007, she relied on the gravitas and experience that being part of the “Clintons” provided. According to Bernstein, The journey had always been about them, no matter how much he had been out in front in their first march to the White House. Now it was her turn, which was exactly how he had expressed it to her in private. … But she had earned them a second chance at the ultimate prize, at making right what had been squandered by his recklessness. … There was very little specific talk (or much to write home about) concerning what she had done in the Senate beyond the needs of New York, no talk of great legislation she had proposed or advocated, but rather the general suggestion that she had brought the Clintonian attitude and attributes of enlightenment, hard work, and humane principles to bear on her responsibilities. And she had visited eighty-three countries as a senator and first lady. … That was the message, and she was the candidate. A vote for her would be almost nostalgic  … 16 For Michele Bachmann, the decision to seek the Republican nomination in 2012 came after building a national reputation as a Tea Party firebrand opposed to “Obamacare,” same-sex marriage, legalized abortion, wasteful government spending, and other popular conservative causes. First elected to the House of Representatives from Minnesota in 2006, Bachmann made national headlines in a 2008 interview with Chris Matthews on MSNBC’s Hardball during which Bachmann suggested that several members of Congress were

72

IN IT TO WIN

“un-American” and should be investigated in McCarthy-like fashion. By 2010, she had bolstered her conservative credentials as a leading voice of the Tea Party movement, had helped to organize the Tea Party Caucus in the House, and her popularity with the base of the Republican Party had many talking about a potential presidential run in 2012. In announcing her candidacy in her hometown of Waterloo, Iowa, Bachmann stated, “I seek the presidency not for vanity, but because America is at a crucial moment.”17 While most political observers doubted that she could win the Republican nomination, she was nonetheless viewed as a formidable candidate due to the support of Christian Right/evangelical voters who make up a sizable amount of those who regularly turn out to participate in Republican primary contests. She was also viewed as a “pretty good communicator, good on television, good at making news,” and her position on key conservative issues had never wavered or shifted (something that can be a problem for longtime politicians who have changed positions on various policy issues).18 Many thought that Bachmann was especially well poised for the first contest, the Iowa caucuses, since “she could create a hunger for a new Christian Right champion in a state where the Christian Right still walks tall. Even if Bachmann doesn’t win a state outright, she could wreak havoc on the field.”19

Early money Once a candidate either files the paperwork with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to create an exploratory committee or officially announces their candidacy, they must begin fundraising in earnest. Raising money throughout the entire campaign is important, but early money is crucial, as perhaps nothing else signals as strongly to the political world that a candidate is indeed viable and competitive. Early money can buy name recognition and viability for those who need it, particularly those candidates without a national reputation at the start of the race. Raising large sums of money will

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

73

certainly get the attention of the news media, and can also discourage potential rivals from joining the race. Timing matters as well, as “candidates effectively need to have built up significant funds by no later than the end of the second calendar quarter in the year prior to the presidential election,” as a later start at significant fundraising can become an insurmountable obstacle in establishing viability.20 According to political scientist Stephen J. Wayne, “The press evaluates the candidates in part on the basis of how much money they can raise and how willing people are to contribute. Candidates who cannot raise much money are not usually taken seriously by the news media and by other potential contributors, even if they are well known, as was Elizabeth Dole in 2000.”21 In addition to media attention and name recognition, early money can also allow a candidate to hire a well-known and experienced campaign staff and develop a “deep field organization” in the early primary states.22 During this time period, candidates also must “undertake a certain amount of ideological preparation, attempting to shape a message”23 that will appeal to donors, party officials, and ultimately, voters. As Dole began her campaign in 1999, many believed that she would be a successful fundraiser; despite the fact that she had never run for public office before, raising money had been a large part of her job as head of the Red Cross, where she had raised $3.4 billion in her eight years at the helm. She also had access to the Rolodex of Republican contributors that had supported her husband in the previous presidential contest. Unfortunately, the fundraising aspect of her campaign got off to a bumpy start in the press, when her husband, Bob Dole, was quoted in the New York Times as saying that his wife was having trouble raising money, and that he was considering making a donation to rival candidate (albeit longtime friend and colleague) John McCain’s campaign. Dole responded to her husband’s comments with humor, telling reporters that “He’s been banished to the family woodshed.”24 Unfortunately for Dole, the 2000 presidential campaign saw the eventual Republican nominee, George W. Bush, break all previous fundraising records. He was also the first candidate

74

IN IT TO WIN

to reject primary matching funds, available to candidates once voting begins during the nomination process, because he did not need the extra funds (and would also not be burdened by the requisite spending limit that comes when candidates accept money from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF), first established by major campaign finance reform legislation in 1974). By the end of 1999, Dole had raised just over $5 million (see Table 3.1). While a significant amount of money, it paled in comparison to the war chest of $67.5 million that Bush had amassed. In a field of ten Republican candidates, Dole managed to rank sixth in total money raised. Fundraising efforts had highlighted the fact that she was a woman, and in the spring of 1999, Newsweek had reported that among her fundraising strategies, the Dole campaign bought subscriber lists from women’s magazines. The strategy was deemed successful in that 50 percent of her $5 million came from women contributors.25 Yet, the late start to Dole’s campaign (many believed she waited too long into 1999 to step down from the Red Cross and start campaigning), and the fact that many of the major Republican donors who had supported her husband four years prior did not show her campaign the same financial support, permanently hindered her fundraising efforts.26

Table 3.1  2000 Presidential Election Total Money Raised by Republican Candidates, Through December 31, 1999 George W. Bush

$67,567,934

Steve Forbes

$33,942,652*

John McCain

$15,544,828

Gary Bauer

$ 9,744,651

Dan Quayle

$ 5,631,291

Elizabeth Dole

$ 5,061,399 (Continued)

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

75

Total Money Raised by Republican Candidates, Through December 31, 1999 Alan Keyes

$ 4,432,756

Lamar Alexander

$ 3,085,631

Orrin Hatch

$ 2,281,029

Robert C. Smith

$ 1,614,198

Source: Federal Election Commission *The total for Forbes included a personal loan of $28,695,000 to his campaign.

Lackluster fundraising was one of the biggest hurdles facing Carol Moseley Braun’s 2004 presidential campaign. While she had successfully raised money for previous campaigns, including $6.5 million27 for her U.S. Senate race in 1992 (which she won) and $7.2 million28 during her reelection bid in 1998 (which she lost), not holding a current political office proved to be a huge liability. In 2003, when she started her presidential campaign, Moseley Braun had been out of the Senate for more than four years, which meant that she did not have immediate access to donors, particularly interest groups, in the same way that a sitting member of Congress enjoys. In addition, as Stephen J. Wayne points out, Moseley Braun was seen as a “pulpit candidate,” as opposed to a viable candidate among potential front-runners, meaning that she “lacked the stature to raise sufficient funds, even among women.”29 The crowded Democratic field saw the eventual nominee, John Kerry, raise more than $25 million during 2003, which was surpassed by Howard Dean (who would win only one primary contest in his home state of Vermont and after he had already withdrawn from the race) who had raised more than $40 million. Through the end of 2003, Moseley Braun had only raised just under $500,000, which ranked her ninth out of ten candidates seeking the 2004 Democratic nomination (see Table 3.2).

76

IN IT TO WIN

Table 3.2  2004 Presidential Election Total Money Raised by Democratic Candidates, Through December 31, 2003 Howard Dean

$40,959,621

John Kerry

$25,057,443

Richard Gephardt

$16,488,049

John Edwards

$ 14,792692

Joseph Lieberman

$13,823,407

Wesley Clark

$13,699,256

Lyndon LaRouche

$ 6,389,182

Dennis Kucinich

$ 6,227,898

Carol Moseley Braun

$   492,069

Al Sharpton

$   408,342

Source: Federal Election Commission

When Hillary Clinton first announced her campaign in January 2007, she seemed to have all the advantages related to fundraising—a current member of Congress (she had just been reelected to the Senate in 2006), name recognition, viability, front-runner status in the news media, and like Dole, access to the Rolodex of top Democratic contributors who had supported her husband’s winning presidential campaigns in 1992 and 1996. The 2008 presidential campaign was projected to be the most expensive on record, with an open nomination for both major parties, and fundraising for all candidates got off to a furiously fast start in early 2007. The official start of Clinton’s campaign, which came just days after Barack Obama had announced his bid for the Democratic nomination, “highlighted the urgency for her of not falling behind in the competition for money, especially in New York, her home turf, where the battle has already reached a fever pitch.”30 Experts predicted that the “Clinton machine” would outpace all other candidates in terms of raising money. Bill Clinton, a prolific fundraiser during the 1990s who was still a big draw among

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

77

Democratic donors, was to play a large role in the fundraising strategy, which was similar to the strategy his reelection team used in 1995 and 1996—raise all of the available Democratic funds early to discourage any challengers in the primary. In addition, Clinton’s campaign had developed a network of large donors known as “Hillraisers,” donors who not only contributed the maximum legal contribution directly to the Clinton campaign (which was $2,300 during the 2007–2008 campaign cycle), but also bundled contributions of $100,000 or more from other donors (in effect serving as fundraisers on behalf of the Clinton campaign).31 An important benchmark for fundraising, and one of the ways that the news media assess a candidate’s viability during the invisible primary, comes from the required quarterly reports of financial activities (money raised and money spent) that must be filed by each candidate with the FEC. While Clinton would raise more money during 2007 than any other Democratic candidate, Obama had more success than Clinton during the first and second quarters of 2007—Obama had raised $25 million to Clinton’s $20 million for the first quarter of 2007, and $31 million to Clinton’s $21 million for the second quarter. Not until the third quarter of 2007 did Clinton finally raise more money than Obama ($22 million to $19 million), although that still left her trailing $75 million to $63 million overall going in to the last few crucial months before the Iowa caucuses.32 Ultimately, Clinton would win the early money race with just over $115 million raised compared to Obama’s total of $102 million during 2007 (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3  2008 Presidential Election Total Money Raised by Democratic Candidates, Through December 31, 2007 Hillary Clinton

$115,651,361

Barack Obama

$102,170,643

John Edwards

$ 43,878,439 (Continued)

78

IN IT TO WIN

Total Money Raised by Democratic Candidates, Through December 31, 2007 Bill Richardson

$23,035,552

Christopher Dodd

$16,500,510

Joseph Biden

$11,260,366

Dennis Kucinich

$ 3,889,524

Mike Gravel

$   483,060

Source: Federal Election Commission

During the spring of 2011, when Michele Bachmann was contemplating a run for the 2012 Republican nomination, political pundits were already assessing the pros and cons of a potential Bachmann candidacy. Among the advantages often mentioned was Bachmann’s success at fundraising, particularly her appeal among social conservative donors and interest groups. As a sitting member of Congress, Bachmann had raised a record-setting $13 million for her reelection campaign to the House of Representatives in 2010, which also demonstrated her national fundraising ability (particularly among Tea Party supporters). Much media speculation had been devoted to whether or not Sarah Palin would run for president in 2012, and Bachmann was often compared to Palin—both were favorites among the Christian Right and Tea Party supporters, and both were attractive women (a fact pointed out regularly in the news media) who drew large, supportive crowds for speeches during which each would harshly criticize the Obama administration.33 Yet, Bachmann was seen as the more experienced politician, particularly due to her fundraising abilities, which she displayed early on in her campaign. Bachmann officially declared her presidential candidacy on June 13, 2011, and subsequently raised $2.2 million within the first two weeks. While trailing the Republican front-runner and eventual nominee Mitt Romney, Bachmann was nonetheless able to raise more money in those two weeks than most of the other Republican candidates had raised in more than two months, relying mostly on her national small-donor

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

79

network “drawn to her uncompromising style, staunchly conservative politics and frequent cable-show clashes.” The average contribution during the early weeks of Bachmann’s campaign was about $48;34 she had no major donors and never held any fundraisers as all the money she raised came from small donations throughout her campaign.35 However, Bachmann’s fundraising efforts would ultimately be hurt by Texas Governor Rick Perry’s eventual candidacy (he did not officially enter the race until August 2011), since he, like Bachmann, enjoyed tremendous support among social conservative donors. Bachmann could also not sustain the momentum gained from winning the Iowa Straw Poll. At the end of 2011, she had raised more than $10 million, but she ranked sixth out of twelve Republican candidates, and fell well below Romney’s total of $56 million (see Table 3.4)

Table 3.4  2012 Presidential Election Total Money Raised by Republican Candidates, Through December 31, 2011 Mitt Romney

$56,073,108

Ron Paul

$25,901,305

Rick Perry

$19,775,136

Herman Cain

$16,529,032

Newt Gingrich

$12,648,565

Michele Bachmann

$10,100,742

Jon Huntsman

$ 5,882,409

Tim Pawlenty

$ 5,078,625

Rick Santorum

$ 2,178,703

Gary Johnson

$   578,125

Thad McCotter

$   547,389

Buddy Roemer

$   341,319

Source: Federal Election Commission

80

IN IT TO WIN

Early media coverage Having the news media consider a candidate viable during the invisible primary is driven in large part by early fundraising success, the hiring of wellknown (at least within political circles) campaign strategists and advisors, and results from early public opinion polling. Money, media, and polling contribute to what is called “momentum” during a presidential campaign. Momentum is particularly important during the early primaries and caucuses, as we will discuss in Chapter 4, but it also plays a role throughout the invisible primary during which a two-tiered campaign can emerge. Not all candidates are considered viable during the invisible primary, particularly when a crowded field of 8–12 or more contenders are jockeying for frontrunner status. Only a handful are placed in the top tier by news media coverage as viable; the others never break through to the top tier and as a result do not receive much attention from either the news media or donors. While a specific formula does not exist in determining this hierarchy, voters normally take their cues from news media coverage, so both the quality and quantity of attention by the news media can matter in the early months of a campaign. It is also during the invisible primary when the horse-race coverage of the campaign begins, when political reporters begin telling us, sometimes on a daily basis, who’s ahead and who’s behind in terms of fundraising and public opinion polls well before any votes are even cast.36 The media attention focused on this early aspect of the presidential campaign has, in recent years, made the invisible primary not-so-invisible, which has not only extended the length of the overall presidential campaign but also raises the bar for candidates by making an early campaign misstep or slow start nearly fatal.37 Despite the fact that Elizabeth Dole never officially declared her candidacy during the seven months of her presidential campaign between March and October 1999, Dole consistently ranked second in polls of Republican primary voters as a popular prospective candidate.38 The problem was,

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

81

however, that George W. Bush was so far ahead of the remaining Republican field that despite coming in second, Dole could never gain enough momentum to make up that much ground. For example, a Gallup poll in September 1999 showed Bush at 62 percent among Republican primary voters and Dole in second place at 10 percent. Gallup did report, however, that while Dole had not been able to “sustain a high level of public support for the GOP nomination, there are indications in the new Gallup survey that she is well positioned to emerge as a credible alternative to Bush for the nomination—or to be an attractive vice presidential choice.” In addition, the poll found that Dole had strong party crossover appeal with the potential to gain independent and Democratic voters if she were the Republican nominee, and even more so with women: Dole also provides the Republican Party with crossover appeal to a group her party has been anxious to attract in recent elections: women. With 59 percent of women saying they would be likely to support her if she were on the ballot, compared to 50 percent of men, she is the only Republican presidential candidate rated—including Bush—who has greater support among women than among men.39 Media coverage of Dole’s campaign often focused on style over substance, with particular attention to the novelty factor of her campaign as one of the only women to ever seek the presidency. Reporters would refer to Dole as scripted instead of prepared, labeling her a perfectionist, with much attention paid to her image, wardrobe, and hair. Media reports also criticized the choreography of Dole’s campaign, which was seen as “polished” while she was the candidate’s wife yet “scripted” when she was the candidate: Reporters don’t warm to Dole the way they did to her husband with his wry asides. She’s too programmed. Every anecdote, every story, every selfrevelation has been said before, and judged safe to repeat. It’s all there, indexed and cross-referenced. She is a walking Lexis-Nexis search. She

82

IN IT TO WIN

doesn’t engage in the kind of off-the-record banter that gives reporters the illusion they are glimpsing the person behind the sound bite.40 Ironically, reporters seemed to like and respect Dole, yet coverage of her campaign was often superficial or harshly critical. For example, in May 1999, Dole gave a speech in New Hampshire in which she stated her support for safety locks on guns, a ban on assault weapons, and the elimination of cop killer bullets, which was considered an “unusual statement for a Republican candidate in the middle of a primary.” Press reports stated that she had been booed during the speech, while only a few people in attendance had actually booed and many more had applauded. Yet, according to Ari Fleischer, Dole’s communication director, reporters told him afterward that Dole’s remarks were “brilliant” and had “established her as a serious, thoughtful candidate.”41 In the most comprehensive study of media coverage of Dole’s campaign, political scientists Caroline Heldman, Susan Carroll, and Stephanie Olson found that considerable gendered differences did occur when comparing Dole to the remaining Republican candidates, and that the differences likely hindered her candidacy. Dole did not receive an amount of media coverage consistent with her standing in public opinion polls, stories focused more on personality traits and appearance for Dole than for other candidates, horse-race coverage often referred to Bush as a front-runner and skilled fundraiser while referencing Dole as lacking fundraising skills and overall viability, the Dole campaign was often framed as a novelty, and “article after article recycled the same adjectives: scripted, rehearsed, robotic, controlled.” While Dole’s candidacy was “covered differently in the media in a variety of ways due to her gender,” and the “actual impact of this gendered coverage on her candidacy is not known,” she may have remained in the race longer if not for the perceived lack of viability regularly reported in the press.42 By the time Dole withdrew from the race in October 1999, her campaign was

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

83

“languishing” and the candidate was in “free fall” in the polls. Rumors had been circulating for weeks that she would drop out, and many on Dole’s campaign staff attributed the rumors to the McCain campaign (who would benefit from the race narrowing to just McCain and Bush heading into the primaries). McCain had risen in the polls in the fall of 1999, becoming a serious contender in the eyes of the press, while Dole’s candidacy faded.43 Carol Moseley Braun never made it to the top tier of Democratic candidates in 2004, and her campaign was regularly described in the news media with terms such as “long shot” and “underdog.” As is usually the case with second-tier candidates during the invisible primary, Moseley Braun staked out positions closer to the base, as opposed to the center, of her party; for example, she regularly spoke of her clear opposition to the war in Iraq, an issue that necessitated greater nuance among top-tier Democratic candidates U.S. Senators John Kerry and John Edwards in 2003 (both of whom had voted to authorize the war in 2002). Media speculation also focused on why Moseley Braun was running when she was not viewed as a viable candidate. While she would say she was running because of George W. Bush’s mismanagement of the country, the press would often cite Moseley Braun’s desire to repair her image after an FEC investigation over allegations of campaign finance irregularities during her 1992 Senate campaign (which contributed to her defeat for reelection in 1998): Braun faces considerable obstacles as she attempts to write a political sequel. Her fundraising is almost insignificant, and she has had staff turnover because of payment disputes. Analysts say she is still viewed by political Washington and Illinois Democrats as someone who undermined her extraordinary promise with bad judgment in handling family and campaign money, and in traveling to Nigeria when it was ruled by a murderous dictator. Her post-defeat appointment as ambassador to New Zealand and Samoa, they say, is seen as a bittersweet parting gift from

84

IN IT TO WIN

President Bill Clinton. Braun has ignored the criticism, except to note that a Federal Election Commission investigation of her campaign finances found only $311 unaccounted for, instead of the hundreds of thousands originally alleged, and that the Internal Revenue Service and the Justice Department declined to investigate or sanction her.44 In May 2003, the Democratic Party began what is now a staple of the invisible primary campaign—primary debates. Unlike the presidential debates held during every general election campaign (the first in 1960, then every year since 1976), the primary debates are often a rhetorical free-for-all among the candidates seeking their party’s nomination; they also serve as an opportunity for second-tier candidates to gain free media exposure. For Moseley Braun, despite being the only woman on the stage in a crowded field of Democratic challengers, coverage of her debate performances most often categorized her as a long-shot candidate who would not have broad appeal among the general election electorate: “[The Rev. Al] Sharpton, Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-Ohio) and former Illinois Senator Carol Moseley Braun, the lower-tier candidates, speak from the party’s most liberal wing.”45 Moseley Braun also ranked at 5 percent or below in public opinion polling regarding voter choice for the Democratic nomination throughout 2003; in January 2004, at the time she withdrew from the race, a Gallup poll showed her with 3 percent support, just above both Sharpton and Kucinich with 2 percent each.46 Assessment offered by the New York Times at the start of Moseley Braun’s campaign seemed to sum up media attention for the duration of her run for the White House: “And the measured assault on the last great glass ceiling by former Senator Carol Moseley Braun was received as a nostalgic touch of party inclusiveness more than as a cutting-edge possibility.”47 Unlike the Dole and Moseley Braun campaigns, Hillary Clinton did not lack media attention at the start of her campaign, nor did she suffer from press assessments that questioned her viability as a candidate. If anything,

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

85

political pundits had raised the bar quite high for Clinton in labeling her the front-runner for the 2008 Democratic nomination as early as 2005. In the weeks following the start of Clinton’s campaign in January 2007, she enjoyed a large lead over others seeking the Democratic nomination in public opinion polling, and press coverage of her campaign included more issue coverage, fewer physical descriptions, and more positive viability statements than for her closest rival, Barack Obama. This suggested that perhaps the press was “normalizing the reporting about women candidates or it may suggest that front-runner status may mitigate traditional associations with women.”48 With news coverage so often focused on stories of style versus substance from the presidential campaign trail, the candidate’s gender no longer seemed to be a discriminating factor. Examples from presidential campaign coverage in 2007 included stories on former U.S. Senator John Edwards’ $400 haircut, and a story in the New York Times on the candidates’ eating habits and exercise routines on the campaign trail (with particular attention given to New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson’s struggles with his weight).49 This fits the trend in recent years for “soft” versus “hard” news.50 An early study of news coverage of the 2007 invisible primary by the Project for Excellence in Journalism showed that Clinton had more coverage than any other candidate in either party, yet 38 percent of that coverage was negative, compared to just 27 percent positive (with the remaining coverage considered neutral).51 As discussed in Chapter 1, being the front-runner can also bring the disadvantage of more negative news coverage. In addition, press coverage in 2007 in the New York Times and Washington Post did not dwell on the fact that, if elected, Clinton would be the first woman president. Most coverage that did mention the “first factor” did so in a neutral tone (just stating facts) or positive tone in suggesting how gender might attract specific voting demographics.52 Polling throughout 2007 found consistent support for Clinton as the front-runner, with Obama and Edwards usually a close second or third

86

IN IT TO WIN

in support among Democratic voters. Yet, a closer look at various polls taken in 2007 did show vulnerabilities in her front-runner status; the announcement of Clinton’s campaign “fueled the already rampant political discussion about all the reasons why Clinton may not succeed in capturing her party’s nomination.” The reasons found in polling included her 2002 vote to authorize the war in Iraq, her connection to Bill Clinton’s presidency, an inability to connect with voters on a personal level, her perceived chances of winning in the general election, and many of her issue positions (often seen as too centrist for the liberal base of the Democratic Party).53 Yet, other polls throughout 2007 showed Clinton with higher ratings than Obama and Edwards on leadership, handling of most policy issues, experience, and the most electable Democrat.54 Polling, along with Clinton’s fundraising, seemed to track consistently with news coverage about her campaign during the invisible primary. While the role of the news media during the 2008 primary campaign will be discussed in the next chapter, Clinton did not seem to be at any disadvantage with news coverage during 2007. Clinton’s coverage not only labeled her the front-runner, but emphasized her political experience almost as if she was an incumbent. This was also a specific strategy of the Clinton campaign in 2007, which emphasized their candidate’s experience over the message of change coming from the Obama campaign. While women candidates have usually benefitted from the outsider/change label, Clinton seemed to turn that theory on its head: “Thus, in one of the great ironies of the 2008 campaign, the first woman to make a serious run for the White House came to be seen as the representative of the status quo.”55 While Moseley Braun had been a long-shot candidate for 2004, and Clinton was the one to beat for 2008, Michele Bachmann’s viability for 2012 fell somewhere in-between. Public opinion polls throughout 2011 showed a volatile race for the Republican nomination; while Mitt Romney remained a front-runner throughout 2011, polls also showed that the

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

87

conservative base of the Republican Party had their doubts about Romney and thus continued to shift support among other candidates. Bachmann’s campaign received a huge public relations boost when she won the Iowa Straw Poll in August 2011. For a brief period, she was considered a potential front-runner as the event gave her a surge in momentum. Bachmann was also the first of several Republican candidates seen as more conservative to Mitt Romney, and as such, took a turn in the news media and among Republican primary voters as a viable alternative to the frontrunner: “as soon as the support for one faded, another rose to contest and attack Romney.”56 This anyone-but-Romney theme was also aided by the large number of Republican debates held throughout; a total of twenty debates were aired on various television networks between May 2011 and February 2012. According to media scholar Jeffrey P. Jones, the Republican primary debates were akin to a reality television show, with various characters (Bachmann among them) taking a turn at derailing the front-runner (Romney) by attacking him from the right. While many of the Republican candidates were not viable to unseat an incumbent president in the general election, due to the simple fact that their conservative ideological views would not attract independent, middle-of-the-road, or crossover voters in swing states, the debates did allow each to take a turn in the media spotlight with interesting comments. One such comment from Bachmann, as an example of the appeal she had among her supporters for her unique brand of political analysis: “When you take [Herman Cain’s] 9-9-9 [tax] plan and turn it upside down, the devil is in the details.”57 Media coverage of Bachmann’s campaign had its highs and lows. In July, a story surfaced about how Bachmann suffered from migraine headaches, which prompted a slew of stories, lasting for two weeks, about her health and whether or not such a condition should disqualify her to serve as president. According to Bachmann’s campaign manager, Keith Nahigian, the issue was

88

IN IT TO WIN

not only overblown in the news media, but he believes Bachmann’s coverage showed a double standard for a woman candidate: It was kind of amazing. I mean, I was on the John McCain campaign in 2000, and we had to open up our medical records of John McCain and the post-POW camp kind of thing, and that was kind of interesting. But here we were. We were running against a guy [Herman Cain] with stagefour cancer, and they didn’t ask him a question about his health at all. It was overblown, considerably, and I was with her every day on the entire campaign. I never saw her have any issues at all. We literally had reporters jumping into us to ask questions about the migraine headache thing. It was absurd, and we also saw this in other ways. We saw stories about her nails and about the dresses she wore, and nobody ever wrote about Mitt Romney’s tie.58 Bachmann also made the cover of Newsweek on August 7, 2011, but the magazine ran an unflattering picture of her with the caption “The Queen of Rage.” According to Nahigian, the photographer told Bachmann at the cover shoot that he had been sent by his editors to intentionally take a bad picture of her.59 The picture used shows a wide-eyed Bachmann against a blue backdrop; Newsweek was criticized for its use of the photo, which many believed played into a stereotype of Bachmann being “crazy” and “extreme.”60 Despite these media incidents, the Bachmann campaign reached its highpoint during the summer months of 2011 in terms of both fundraising and public opinion polling. Numerous polls in July 2011 had Bachmann even with, or a few percentage points ahead or behind, Romney.61 Then in August, she won the Iowa Straw Poll, a nonbinding event that suggests support among Republican voters in the first voting contest of the primary season. The victory was particularly important for Bachmann “who sought to build on her early buzz and prove to a skeptical Washington establishment that she is not an unelectable candidate with narrow appeal.”62 But, that same day,

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

89

Texas Governor Rick Perry entered the presidential race, which seemed to represent the beginning of the end of Bachmann’s campaign. Perry’s entrance to the race eroded Bachmann’s support among Tea Party conservatives, as did Cain’s turn in September 2011 in the role of “anyone-but-Romney” in news coverage. A shake-up of Bachmann’s campaign staff also hurt her viability: “Since September her campaign manager and pollster have resigned and a number of Iowa campaign staff have returned to her congressional office staff. Reports suggest her campaign raised less than $5 million in the third quarter of the year, well below the levels raised by Romney and Perry. The bad news has dented the confidence of even her core supporters.”63 As a result, the lost momentum in the fall of 2011 left Bachmann’s campaign limping into the Iowa caucuses in January 2012.

Conclusion: Early momentum (or lack thereof) The four women seeking the presidency in the past four presidential campaigns met many (if not all) of the unofficial requirements that exist for presidential candidates. Each had unique reasons and motivations for choosing to run, and each candidate believed that she was qualified to run a successful campaign based on her political knowledge and skill. And, at the very least, each also believed that seeking her party’s nomination would bring an important perspective to the process. While the presidential campaigns of Dole and Moseley Braun did not survive the invisible primary, and thus did not continue on into the actual nominating contests, their presence on the campaign trail nonetheless in 1999 and 2003, respectively, helped to set the stage for the later campaigns of Clinton in 2008 and Bachmann in 2012. Dole may not have been the first woman to seek the presidency, but she is often seen as the first woman candidate with a real chance at winning. With no disrespect to any of the woman candidates who came before her,

90

IN IT TO WIN

most notably Shirley Chisholm in 1972, Dole’s candidacy (though brief and never officially declared since she relied solely on the announcement of her exploratory committee) was the first with viability. As is often the case with presidential contenders during the invisible primary, though, Dole could not capitalize on the name recognition and popularity she enjoyed, and she could not compete with the fundraising success of George W. Bush (nor could any of the other male candidates regarding the latter). Initially, Dole’s candidacy was taken seriously; she was considered to be one of two early front-runners, not that far behind Bush. Yet, for all of the early promise, the Dole campaign “never quite got off the ground.” Having never run for office before, the campaign suffered from numerous problems. Among them, inadequate staffing (high turnover rates and key positions, such as a national finance chairperson, remained vacant for long periods of time), as well as Dole’s wellpolished and meticulously choreographed style of public appearances, which did not match well with the spontaneity that often accompanies a presidential campaign. When she quit the race on October 20, 1999, many wondered if she “was simply running in the wrong party,” since the assumption that she would attract women and younger voters never materialized in the way that it did for Hillary Clinton’s Senate campaign in 2000.64 Since then, others have wondered if Dole’s style of campaigning was too feminine in seeking the presidency, and many also believed she would have been an excellent choice for Bush’s running mate in 2000. Regardless, Dole did rely on a feminine style of campaigning that was viewed as “more positive than it was negative” as it served to increase her overall popularity.65 The novelty of Dole’s candidacy, and her presence on the campaign trail, began to change the conversation about the viability of women presidential candidates. Moseley Braun never made it to the top tier of candidates in the crowded field of Democratic contenders in 2004, but not being seen as viable is common for most candidates seeking their party’s nomination, not just women candidates. Bachmann’s campaign had more viability than Moseley

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

91

Braun’s, yet her time in the top tier of candidates was short lived after her win in the Iowa Straw Poll. The momentum died out with competition from other candidates who appealed to Christian conservatives along with the inevitability of Romney capturing the Republican nomination. Bachmann is an interesting case, however, in that she was considered a top-tier candidate with viability for a few months during the invisible primary while at the same time still seen as a candidate with no real chance of winning the nomination. In the case of Clinton’s campaign, she remained the Democratic front-runner heading into the Iowa caucuses in 2008, and by all accounts, she “won” the invisible primary during 2007. But, she was not the first, and won’t be the last, presidential candidate to raise lots of money and to be labeled the front-runner heading into the primaries only to lose the nomination once voting begins. The question remains—is a gendered campaign strategy necessary, or helpful, during the invisible primary? We know that several factors contribute to the viability of a candidate during this stage of the campaign, with money, media attention, and name recognition among factors that develop the necessary momentum to take a presidential campaign to the next stage of primary contests. We also know that the novelty of seeing a woman run for president is not as strong as it once was. And being a woman can be beneficial at this stage of the campaign with early financial support from PACs and interest groups that support women candidates, and being seen as an outsider (as women remain the “other” within the White House until we actually elect a woman president or vice president) can also help with early media coverage. As political scientist Victoria Farrar-Myers reminds us, though, viability is about nuances and subtleties: A woman candidate seeking to blend the ingredient of her gender into her campaign must not push the issue too much so as to overwhelm her campaign … female presidential candidates need to undertake a careful

92

IN IT TO WIN

balancing act: one in which the goal is not to be seen as a “viable woman candidate” but instead a “viable candidate for president” that happens to be a woman.66 The bottom line is that few presidential candidates survive the invisible primary, and having all of the necessary ingredients come together to create a winning campaign strategy has less to do with gender than it does with the many institutional and intangible aspects of surviving this first stage of the presidential campaign process.

Notes 1

Russ Choma, “The 2012 Election: Our Price Tag (Finally) for the Whole Ball of Wax,” Center for Responsive Politics, March 13, 2013, available at http://www.opensecrets. org/news/2013/03/the-2012-election-our-price-tag-fin/

2

See Arthur T. Hadley, The Invisible Primary (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

3

Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 11th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 92–3.

4

Michael S. Dukakis, “The Experience of Running for President,” in The Making of the Presidential Candidates 2012, eds. William G. Mayer and Jonathan Bernstein (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2012), 93.

5

Lori Cox Han and Diane J. Heith, Presidents and the American Presidency (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 79.

6

See Kim Reiser, “Crafting a Feminine Presidency: Elizabeth Dole’s 1999 Presidential Campaign,” in Gender and Political Communication in America, ed. James L. Edwards (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 41–50.

7

Clift and Brazaitis, Madam President, 141.

8

Richard L. Berke, “Dole Presents Herself as Both Nonpolitician and an Insider,” New York Times, March 11, 1999, p. A28.

9

Richard L. Berke, “Eye on 2000, Elizabeth Dole Leaves Red Cross,” New York Times, January 5, 1999, p. A14.

10 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2008, 159.

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

93

11 David E. Rosenbaum, “2 War Foes Take Steps on Seeking Presidency,” New York Times, February 18, 2003, p. A17. 12 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2008, 159. 13 Howard Wolfson, Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008, The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 48. 14 Carl Bernstein, A Woman in Charge: The Life of Hillary Rodham Clinton (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 563–4. 15 John Heilemann and Mark Halperin, Game Change: Obama and the Clintons, McCain and Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2010), 15. 16 Bernstein, A Woman in Charge, 563–4. 17 Jeff Zeleny, “Bachmann Opens Campaign as Expectations Grow,” New York Times, June 28, 2011, p. A14. 18 Quote by Keith Nahigian, Bachmann’s campaign manager, in Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 25–6. 19 Ed Kilgore, “Springtime for Bachmann,” The New Republic, March 17, 2011, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/the-permanent-campaign/85365/michele -bachmann-2012-gop-presidential-nominee. 20 Farrar-Myers and Boyea, “Campaign Finance,” 223. 21 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2008, 143. 22 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2012, 138. 23 Nelson W. Polsby, Aaron Wildavsky, Steven E. Schier, and David A. Hopkins, Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 13th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 99. 24 Clift and Brazaitis, Madam President, 143–4. 25 Reiser, “Crafting a Feminine Presidency,” 55. 26 Clift and Brazaitis, Madam President, 145. 27 Federal Election Commission, “Congressional Candidate Table 2, Six-Year Financial Summary for 1992 Senate Campaigns through December 31,” available at http:// www.fec.gov/press/summaries/1992/tables/congressional/ConCand2_1992_24m .pdf#search=1992%20senate%20illinois%20december%2031%201992. 28 Federal Election Commission, “Financial Activity of 1997–98 Senate Campaigns,” available at http://www.fec.gov/1996/states/ilsen6.htm#search=1998%20senate%20 illinois%20december%2031%201998.

94

IN IT TO WIN

29 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2008, 159. 30 Patrick Healy and Jeff Zeleny, “Clinton Enters ’08 Field, Fueling Race for Money,” New York Times, January 21, 2007, p. A1. 31 The strategy of “bundling” was first developed by EMILY’s List in the early 1990s as a way to put together large, yet legal, donations to candidates. A bundler collects individual contributions from friends, colleagues, and other supporters of a particular candidate, then bundles the contributions to give the money directly to the campaign. The incentive for a bundler comes from the access it provides to the candidate (and potentially future officeholder) by bringing in large amounts of money, all legal under the guidelines set forth by the FEC. 32 Patrick Healy, “Clinton Steals Obama’s Fundraising Thunder,” New York Times, October 3, 2007, p. A1. 33 Jeff Zeleny, “A Tea Party Favorite Stirs Iowa, And No, Her Name Isn’t Palin,” New York Times, April 4, 2011, p. A1. 34 Jeff Zeleny and Nicholas Confessore, “Bachmann Off to Fast Start on Funds, But Plays Catch-Up,” New York Times, July 16, 2011, p. A12. 35 Nahigian, Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, 26. Many of the large donors who might have supported Bachmann’s campaign were waiting for Rick Perry to enter the race; his delay in entering the race “froze out” the potential for Bachmann to earn their support. 36 Christopher Hanson, “The Invisible Primary: Now Is the Time for All-Out Coverage,” Columbia Journalism Review, March/April, 2003. 37 For a discussion of media coverage during the invisible primary, see Lori Cox Han, “Off to the (Horse) Races: Media Coverage of the ‘Not-So-Invisible’ Invisible Primary of 2007,” in From Votes to Victory: Winning and Governing the White House in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Meena Bose (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2011). 38 Berke, “Eye on 2000, Elizabeth Dole Leaves Red Cross,” p. A14. 39 “George W. Bush—An Analysis,” September 17, 1999, The Gallup Poll 1999 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 78–80. 40 Clift and Brazaitis, Madam President, 149. 41 Ari Fleischer, Taking Heat: The President, the Press, and My Years in the White House (New York, NY: William Morrow, 2005), 101–2. 42 Caroline Heldman, Susan J. Carroll, and Stephanie Olson, “ ‘She Brought Only a Skirt:’ Print Media Coverage of Elizabeth Dole’s Bid for the Republican Nomination,” Political Communication, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2005): 315–35. 43 Clift and Brazaitis, Madam President, 157.

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY

95

44 Darryl Fears, “On a Mission in a Political Second Act; Bush’s Record Forced Her to Run, Braun Says,” Washington Post, July 13, 2003, p. A6. 45 Dan Balz, “Debate Bares Democrats’ Great Divide,” Washington Post, May 5, 2003, p. A1. 46 “Clark Comes on Strong in New Poll,” January 7, 2004, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2004 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2005), 5. 47 Francis X. Clines, “Editorial Observer; Wounded Democrats Check Out an EverGrowing, Ever-Hungry Crowd,” New York Times, February 24, 2003, p. A16. 48 Erika Falk, “Gender Bias and Maintenance: Press Coverage of Senator Hillary Clinton’s Announcement to Seek the White House,” in Gender and Political Communication in America, ed. James L. Edwards (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 227–8. 49 Jodi Kantor, “Where the Votes Are, So, Unfortunately, Are All Those Calories,” New York Times, November 23, 2007, p. A1. 50 Soft news is defined as news having no real connection to substantive policy issues, or as the opposite of “hard news” that includes coverage of breaking events or major issues impacting the daily routines of American citizens, and has steadily increased during the past two decades in response to competition within the media marketplace. See Thomas E. Patterson, “Doing Well and Doing Good: How Soft News and Critical Journalism Are Shrinking the News Audience and Weakening Democracy—And What News Outlets Can Do About It,” The Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics, and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2000. 51 Project for Excellence in Journalism and the Joan Shorenstein Center, Harvard University, “The Invisible Primary—Invisible No Longer: A First Look at Coverage of the 2008 Presidential Campaign,” October 29, 2007. 52 See Han, “Off to the (Horse) Races.” 53 Lydia Saad, “Hillary’s Liabilities: Electability or Likability?” The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2007 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2008), 32–3. 54 Lydia Saad, “Hillary’s Liabilities: Electability or Likability?” 45, 46, 71, 93, 238, and 476. 55 Kelly Dittmar and Susan J. Carroll, “Cracking the ‘Highest, Hardest Glass Ceiling’: Women as Presidential and Vice Presidential Contenders,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 63. 56 William J. Crotty, “The Obama Reelection Campaign,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 9.

96

IN IT TO WIN

57 Jeffrey P. Jones, “Presidential Campaigns as Cultural Events: The Convergence of Politics and Popular Culture in Election 2012,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 116–9. 58 Nahigian, Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, 81. 59 Nahigian, Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, 82. 60 “Newsweek’s Michele Bachmann Cover Raises Eyebrows,” Huffington Post, August 8, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/08/newsweeks-michele -bachman_n_920860.html. 61 For example, see Gabriella Schwarz, “Poll: Bachmann Surge Continues,” CNN, July 13, 2011, available at http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/13/poll -bachmann-surge-continues/; Mike Mullen, “Michele Bachmann Takes the Lead in National Poll,” Minneapolis City Pages/Blogs, July 19, 2011, available at http://blogs .citypages.com/blotter/2011/07/michele_bachman_leads_national_poll.php. 62 Brian Montopoli, “Michele Bachmann Wins Iowa Straw Poll,” CBS News, August 13, 2011, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michele-bachmann-wins-iowa -straw-poll/. 63 Jason McLure, “Michele Bachmann, Dropping in Polls, Vows to Fight On,” Reuters, October 9, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/us-usa -campaign-bachmann-idUSTRE79908720111010. 64 William G. Mayer, “The Presidential Nominations,” in The Election of 2000, ed. Gerald M. Pomper (New York, NY: Chatham, 2001), 28. 65 Reiser, “Crafting a Feminine Presidency,” 56. 66 Victoria Farrar-Myers, “Money and the Art and Science of Candidate Viability,” in Rethinking Madam President: Are We Ready for a Woman in the White House?, eds. Lori Cox Han and Caroline Heldman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 128.

4 The nomination process

Winning the Democratic or Republican party’s nomination for president is an amazing political feat. In some ways, it is even more impressive than winning the general election when you take into account the crowded field of candidates, the intense race for money and media coverage, and the fifty-plus contests (as nominating contests are held in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and other U.S. territories) spread out over several months and all with different rules set by the state party organizations. Where the general election is narrowed down to two candidates (or on the rare occasion three with an independent candidate), with only a handful of states on the Electoral College map even in play, and where everyone votes on the same day (with the exception of early voting), the primary contests can be an unpredictable free-for-all in an attempt to woo voters and secure delegates to the national conventions. As we have already discussed in previous chapters, nothing about the presidential election process in the United States is easy or inevitable; it is the ultimate “survival of the fittest” contest in American politics. Advantages and disadvantages abound for any and all candidates who enter the presidential primary race. While a generic “perfect candidate” does not exist, we do know that certain candidates and certain campaign strategies will have an advantage over others during certain campaigns, meaning that the political environment can dictate much of the circumstances in elevating one

98

IN IT TO WIN

particular candidate over others. With that in mind, in this chapter we will analyze the various phases of the primary process, as well as the emerging political landscape for future primary seasons. Topics include how media coverage, fundraising, and public opinion polling contribute to momentum during the early contests; how frontloading has shifted primary strategies in recent years; and how campaign organization, voter turnout, and an effective ground game is now more essential than ever. For example, media coverage during the primary process is most often focused on what scholars refer to as the “horse race,” which emphasizes the numbers game of who is winning versus who is losing, or who is ahead versus who is behind (regarding fundraising, public opinion polls, delegate count, etc.). In reality, a successful strategy to win a party’s nomination is much more detailed than is often portrayed in the news media. While “momentum” (including media coverage and standing in public opinion polls) is certainly important for a candidate, a successful campaign must also include an effective strategy for winning the “ground game” (including grassroots organizations at the state, district, and precinct levels that will succeed with both the recruitment of campaign volunteers and voter turnout). A case study of both the Clinton campaign in 2008 and the Bachmann campaign in 2012 (though the latter did not last beyond the Iowa caucuses) will provide some insight into the issue of whether or not gender played a significant role in either campaign. Numerous problems persisted within the organizational structure of the Clinton campaign in 2008, as well as a failure to execute a successful fifty-state strategy during the primary season. These issues are particularly salient as speculation persists about a Clinton run in 2016. In 2012, Bachmann’s campaign was initially dismissed by many political pundits as not viable, yet she did win the Iowa Straw Poll and enjoyed front-runner status in the news media for several weeks during late summer 2012. We will specifically consider the question of successful

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

99

campaign strategies and whether or not a woman candidate would need to develop a “gendered” primary strategy in order to secure her party’s nomination.

Momentum and the early contests Once voting begins in the early primary contests, nothing is more important to a presidential campaign than momentum. Several factors contribute to momentum, including name recognition, support from national and state party officials, media attention, standing in public opinion polls, and fundraising. While momentum during the invisible primary is also important (think money raised or media recognition earned), once voters get involved, the results are even more tangible. A candidate either does well enough in the first handful of contests to keep going, or they have a poor showing which will usually end his or her campaign. Named “Big Mo” by George Bush in 1980 after his defeat of Ronald Reagan in the Republican Iowa caucuses, momentum can be “fleeting and difficult to maintain.” Bush’s momentum turned out to be fleeting, as he lost nearly every remaining Republican contest to Reagan before eventually becoming his running mate.1 Various components of momentum work in tandem; for example, a win or second-place finish in Iowa or New Hampshire (always the first two presidential nominating contests) can generate positive media attention (such as, Candidate A is a winner with viability, while Candidate B placed fifth and has no long-term viability), which can then generate higher standing in public opinion polls and/or increased contributions to the campaign. Or, an uptick in public opinion poll standing or an increase in financial contributions to a campaign can get the media’s attention and generate positive coverage (as in, this candidate has a chance of winning

100

IN IT TO WIN

the nomination), which might get the attention of voters. But, unlike during the invisible primary, voters get the final say. So, understanding the importance of the early contests and how the primary calendar affects campaign strategy is crucial. The Iowa caucuses is always the first nomination contest, followed by the New Hampshire primary. Both contests occurred during the first week of January in 2008 and in 2012, even though they used to be held as late as April. This is due to a process called frontloading, where since 1996, many states had moved up their nominating contests earlier on the primary calendar. Larger states began doing this to have a greater say in the nomination process. For example, California traditionally held its presidential primary on the first Tuesday of June. But, during most presidential campaigns, the nominee for each major party had already been unofficially decided by capturing enough delegates to secure the party’s nomination in earlier contests. Proponents of frontloading are quick to point out the downside to allowing two small states like Iowa and New Hampshire to go first, and thus having a disproportionate say in winnowing down the presidential field for both parties as neither state is representative of national demographic trends. Yet, supporters of Iowa and New Hampshire keeping their status as the first nominating contests argue that the small size of each state allows for candidates to engage in what is called retail politics, meaning that presidential aspirants must campaign in a way that puts them in direct contact with voters in cities, towns, and counties throughout each state. This is also where each campaign succeeds or fails in the organizational and ground game aspects (discussed later). Regardless of the pros and cons, and while frontloading has made the entire campaign longer (which has implications for, among other things, the cost and increased attention to fundraising), the Iowa and New Hampshire contests won’t be pushed back on the calendar anytime

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

101

soon, so candidates must do well in one or both to keep their campaign going long enough to make it to the later, and larger, state contests. Michele Bachmann’s 2012 campaign is an excellent example of fleeting momentum during the invisible primary that could not be converted into voter support in the early contests. Bachmann’s campaign had counted on a strong showing in Iowa, which was not only her birthplace but a state with a large number of Republican caucus voters supportive of her Christian Right/Tea Party message. A first or second-place finish in Iowa would have provided tremendous momentum to her campaign going into the next several contests, as the media attention would have reversed her decline in fundraising and public opinion polls. According to Bachmann’s campaign strategists, they believed her conservative credentials would play well in both New Hampshire and South Carolina (the contests immediately following Iowa).2 The day before the Iowa caucuses, however, media outlets were questioning the “viability of her embattled campaign,” and had all but declared that it was over even before voting began: “For Mrs. Bachmann, it may be too late. Just over four months since her surprise victory in the Iowa Straw Poll, a contest that typically rewards the candidate with the strongest field organization, Mrs. Bachmann, a founder of the House Tea Party Caucus, has tumbled far from the top tier of candidates.”3 Unfortunately for Bachmann, the prediction was accurate, as she finished in sixth place with only five percent of the vote (see Table 4.1). As a result, Bachmann would announce the end of her campaign the next day, saying that she would “stand aside” yet without endorsing any of the other candidates. Bachmann’s exit from the race after Herman Cain, the only candidate of color to run in the 2012 presidential primaries, had already previously ended his campaign, the GOP field suddenly became “noticeably lacking any diversity. All of the candidates are men. All of the hopefuls are white. And four of the six are over the age of 60.”4

102

IN IT TO WIN

Table 4.1  2012 Iowa Republican Caucuses— Final Results5 Candidate

Total Votes

Percentage

Rick Santorum

29,839

24.56

Mitt Romney

29,805

24.53

Ron Paul

26,036

21.43

Newt Gingrich

16,163

13.30

Rick Perry

12,557

10.33

Michele Bachmann

6,046

4.98

Others

1,055

0.87

Hillary Clinton’s performances in the early 2008 contests, and the rise and fall of her momentum, tell a much different and more complicated story than Bachmann’s run in 2012. The front-runner going into the Iowa caucuses, Clinton’s loss to Obama (and former U.S. Senator John Edwards, who barely edged out Clinton for a second place finish) quickly changed the narrative as the possibility of electing the first black president suddenly became the bigger story than electing Clinton as the first woman president. Iowa had not been seen as a sure Clinton victory; not only had Edwards maintained a strong organizational presence there since his failed bid for the Democratic nomination in 2004, but the “Clinton machine” did not have strong ties to Iowa as the Democratic field in 1992, including Bill Clinton, had largely avoided campaigning there since Iowa U.S. Senator Tom Harkin was also a candidate that year.6 Often, the momentum at the start of a primary season comes from national statistics—public opinion polling and fundraising results— which do not always translate into success in a particular state. Nonetheless, Clinton’s third-place finish put a dent in the inevitability of her securing the nomination, while Obama’s victory, called by many a “political earthquake,” gave his campaign a big boost in momentum. According to David Brooks of

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

103

the New York Times, Clinton’s loss in Iowa was about much more than just the numerical loss of votes (see Table 4.2): This is a huge moment. It’s one of those times when a movement that seemed ethereal and idealistic became a reality and took on political substance. Iowa won’t settle the race, but the rest of the primary season is going to be colored by the glow of this result. Whatever their political affiliations, Americans are going to feel good about the Obama victory, which is a story of youth, possibility and unity through diversity—the primordial themes of the American experience. And Americans are not going to want to see this stopped. When an African-American man is leading a juggernaut to the White House, do you want to be the one to stand up and say No? 7

Table 4.2  2008 Iowa Democratic Caucuses— Final Results8 Candidate

Total Votes*

Percentage

Barack Obama

940

37.58

John Edwards

744

29.75

Hillary Clinton

737

29.47

Bill Richardson

53

2.12

Joe Biden

23

0.92

Chris Dodd

1

0.04

Others/Uncommitted

3

0.12

* Since the Iowa Democratic Party does not release raw vote totals, the vote totals are State Delegate Equivalents, which represent the estimated number of state convention delegates that the candidate would have, based on caucus results.

Five days later, Clinton would regain some of the lost momentum with a victory, albeit a close one, in the New Hampshire primary.9 Assuming that Obama would capitalize on the momentum from his victory in Iowa, Clinton’s

104

IN IT TO WIN

win in New Hampshire was labeled a “comeback” reminiscent of her husband’s second-place finish in the state in 1992 (when, amidst various scandals, his campaign had been declared all but over by many political pundits; his performance also earned him the nickname “the Comeback Kid”). And while no empirical evidence exists to support it, many in the news media reported that Clinton’s “tearing up” on the campaign trail the day before the primary allowed her to “ride a wave of female support to a surprise victory” over Obama. Exit polling did show that some undecided Democratic women claimed that it was a “galvanizing moment” in their decision to support Clinton when, on the campaign trail the day before, Clinton became emotional and appeared to choke up when speaking about her hopes for the nation, saying “this is very personal for me.”10 Much was made of this incident, with pundits analyzing the moment from every conceivable angle; also, given the gender stereotypes attached to a woman politician who showed such emotion (or crying, which Clinton did not), talk of whether or not a woman could handle the job of president was rampant online and in media coverage. Clinton’s campaign advisors worried that the incident would have a negative impact, and that it would be compared to “the Pat Schroeder moment” when, in September 1987, the Democratic congresswoman from Colorado cried when she announced she would not run for president.11 Clinton had also developed a reputation for not showing emotion in public, so conversely, many viewed the softer side of the candidate in a positive light. As Deborah Jordan Brooks found in her study of gender bias in campaigns, all candidates, regardless of gender, would be wise to control showing anger or crying on the campaign trail, even though crying does drive up voter perceptions of empathy and honesty. Her findings suggest that Clinton’s performance could have been helped with her show of emotion, but “there is simply no evidence that female candidates will face disproportionate penalties on Election Day if they cry or get angry. There is thus no empirical support for the double standards theory: while gender stereotypes about emotionality do exist for ordinary men and women, political

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

105

leaders seem relatively immune to them.” She argues that this stereotype about women politicians has either always been wrong, or is often faulty, or, “that it may have been true at one time, but not anymore.”12 Regardless, Clinton’s win in New Hampshire “set the stage for a protracted battle for delegates between Obama and Clinton that did not conclude until early June,” which made the Democratic nomination contest the longest contested race since 1972 (Table 4.3).13

Table 4.3  2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary— Final Results14 Candidate

Total votes

Percentage

Hillary Clinton

112,404

39.1

Barack Obama

104,815

36.5

John Edwards

48,699

16.9

Bill Richardson

13,269

4.6

Dennis Kucinich

3,891

1.4

Joe Biden

638

0.2

Mike Gravel

404

0.1

Chris Dodd

205

0.1

3,217

1.1

Others

The race for delegates Just like the general election is about winning the Electoral College vote as opposed to the popular vote nationwide, the nomination process for both major parties comes through winning a majority of delegates to the national party convention and not the most total votes earned. While each party, and each state, can differ in how it awards delegates after a primary or caucus (some

106

IN IT TO WIN

states do a winner-take-all system, while others allocate delegates based on proportional vote schemes), the candidate with a majority of the delegates at the convention will become the party’s nominee. So, while Clinton’s victory in New Hampshire went a long way in keeping her campaign competitive (as an Obama sweep of Iowa and New Hampshire would have certainly dealt a knockout punch), both the 2008 primary calendar and the Democratic Party’s use of “superdelegates” would prove to be insurmountable obstacles. The extensive frontloading of the primary and caucus contests for 2008, as more states than ever before moved up their election dates to compete with Iowa and New Hampshire in an attempt to have a louder voice in the nomination process, created what was nearly half a national primary on February 5, 2008, with Democratic contests in a total of 23 states/territories. Super Tuesday, which had emerged in the late 1980s as a way to group nomination contests in several Southern states, had been labeled “Tsunami Tuesday” in 2008 due not only to the number of contests for both Democrats and Republicans, but also to the inclusion of large states like California, New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Frontloading in 2008 became especially problematic for Democrats as both Michigan and Florida had defied the national party calendar and scheduled their contests prior to Super Tuesday. As a result, each state was initially stripped of its delegates to the national convention as punishment from the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Most candidates agreed not to campaign in either state, and most also removed their names from the ballots; Clinton, however, left her name on both ballots and after winning the “beauty contest” election in each state (with no serious campaigning or rivals on either ballot) would later try to claim she had won the delegates from both states.15 In addition, some of the larger states that Clinton would win later on in the spring of 2008, like Ohio, Texas,16 and Pennsylvania, came too late to alter the outcome as Obama had already built an insurmountable lead in delegates.

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

107

Part of the success of Obama’s campaign strategy came from focusing on all fifty states, while the failing of Clinton’s strategy came in her campaign’s “big state” game plan. This also applied to caucuses versus primaries. Part of the momentum that catapulted Obama to the Democratic nomination came from the momentum not only of winning smaller states, and the respective delegates, on Super Tuesday, but also in his eleven straight victories following Super Tuesday, including primaries and caucuses in Louisiana, Maine, Virginia, Maryland, Washington, Wisconsin, and Hawaii. Despite winning the big states of California and New York on Super Tuesday, Clinton would not win another contest until March 4 when she won Ohio and Texas, but Obama had already captured the momentum of the campaign and had taken away the mantle of “front-runner.” Harold Ickes, a top Clinton staffer, alerted the campaign of the delegate issue in late 2007 (that Obama’s strategy for winning delegates could pose a problem), but was virtually ignored until it was too late to develop an effective strategy to capture the delegates in smaller states, particularly those with caucuses.17 After Super Tuesday, Obama had earned a slight edge in the number of delegates, something the Clinton campaign had not counted on. The Democratic Party also uses “superdelegates” as part of its nomination process. Created in 1982, superdelegates were a response to the nomination reforms put into place in 1972 (and championed by that year’s nominee George McGovern) to turn over the selection process to the rank-and-file party members (the voters). Following Jimmy Carter’s failed bid at reelection in 1980, the Democratic Party decided to take back some of that power from the voters and return it to the party bosses. Superdelegates, then, became important names within the party, like those who held political office in Congress or high-profile state politicians (such as governors), and other notables within the party (like a former president or vice president). At the start of the 2008 primary season, Clinton had a commanding lead among

108

IN IT TO WIN

superdelegates who had pledged their support to her candidacy, but after Super Tuesday and the emergence of Obama as the front-runner, unpledged superdelegates slowly began to pledge their support to Obama, while others who had already pledged their support to Clinton switched to Obama once it seemed likely that he would win the nomination. Despite efforts by the Clinton campaign to convince undecided superdelegates that she was more electable than Obama, and claims that she had earned more votes than Obama (but only when including the contests in Michigan and Florida where Obama had not been on the ballot), a majority of superdelegates had pledged to Obama by the end of the 2008 primary season.18 Most nominations do not go on as long as the Democratic contest did in 2008. In 2012, for example, Mitt Romney had earned a majority of delegates by April 24, even though 14 state contests remained (including California and Texas, which had moved their nominating contests back to later in the primary season calendar). However, even with Clinton’s wins in big states that fell later in the primary calendar, by the end of March 2008, it was clear that Clinton had little chance of winning the Democratic nomination. The calendar, then, played a key role in Obama’s victory, which favored his campaign’s fifty-state strategy, along with his strategy for winning caucuses, and this left Clinton waiting out the calendar to get to the bigger prizes of larger states later in the primary season. Momentum could have shifted back to Clinton had states like Ohio, Texas, or Pennsylvania, which she won, been held on Super Tuesday, but the momentum had already been lost to Obama. Clinton was not the first candidate, nor will she be the last, frustrated by the scheduling of state contests. On the night of the last nominating contests on June 3, 2008, Obama finally declared victory. Clinton, however, would not concede for a few more days, even though Obama held a majority of delegates from the state contests as well as a majority of the superdelegates to secure, at least unofficially, the Democratic nomination. Clinton would not officially exit the race until the morning of June 7, at a rally for her supporters at the

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

109

National Building Museum in downtown Washington, DC. The speech, in which she finally endorsed Obama, is best remembered for her assessment of what her campaign, despite losing the nomination, had accomplished: “Although we weren’t able to shatter that hardest, highest glass ceiling this time, thanks to you, it’s got about eighteen million cracks in it. And the light is shining through like never before, filling us all with the hope and the sure knowledge that the path will be a little easier next time.”19

Money and the nomination process It takes a lot of money to run for president, and the costs associated with the campaign keep going up every four years. As we have already discussed, money is a key source of momentum for a candidate in the invisible primary and accumulating a large war chest is one of the most important campaign functions early on. But, once voters begin going to the polls during the primary season, the need to raise more money increases as the campaign moves forward, and spending decisions become an important part of the overall campaign strategy. As political scientist Stephen J. Wayne points out, “The magnitude of these expenditures poses serious problems for presidential candidates, who must raise considerable sums, closely watch their expenses, make important allocation decisions, and conform to the intricacies of finance laws during both the nomination and general election campaigns.”20 Raising and spending money, then, must be top priorities in developing an overall winning campaign strategy during the primaries. And in recent campaigns, most top-tier candidates no longer accept federal matching funds during the primaries due to the spending limit that is attached (a trend begun in 2000 by George W. Bush, who raised so much money in individual contributions that he did not need the matching funds).

110

IN IT TO WIN

One of the major reasons Hillary Clinton had enjoyed front-runner status leading up to the 2008 Democratic primary contests was the belief that she would break all fundraising records. Had it not been for Obama’s successful fundraising efforts, particularly from smaller donors through an immensely successful internet-based campaign,21 Clinton would have shattered the previous records. Still, Clinton raised the third-largest total of individual contributions in presidential campaign history at that time, with Obama in 2008 in first place, George W. Bush in 2004 in second, and beating out John Kerry in 2004 in fourth place and John McCain in 2008 in fifth place.22 However, fundraising and money issues persisted for Clinton through the end of the primary contests as her campaign struggled to keep pace with Obama in terms of money raised, in part due to Clinton’s reliance on large donors who maxed out early in hard money contributions (in 2008, the maximum an individual contributor could give to a candidate was $2,300).23 The belief among Clinton’s top advisors was that if Clinton won Iowa, fundraising would not be a problem as momentum would kick in; despite “burning cash at a prodigious rate” going into Iowa, “money would come gushing in to her campaign’s coffers” by winning the first contest.24 However, the investment in Iowa turned out to be a gamble; since no one in the Clinton campaign had anticipated that the contest would go past Super Tuesday, a long-term fundraising strategy had not been developed. Having spent $100 million through only the first contest in Iowa, in which she came in third, the Clinton campaign was broke at a time when it needed money most. As a result, Clinton was forced to loan herself $5 million to keep her campaign afloat through Super Tuesday. Obama’s fundraising totals in early 2008 also dealt a crippling blow to her campaign; in January, Obama outraised Clinton $32 million to $13.5 million, with even higher totals in February of $55 million for Obama and $35 million for Clinton. The lack of funds after Obama’s win in Iowa meant that the Clinton campaign could not effectively staff ground operations in states where it needed to compete with

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

111

Obama. In addition, when Clinton revealed after the Super Tuesday contests that she had lent herself $5 million, the story provided a counternarrative to the image she was trying to project going into the big primary states of Ohio, Texas, and Pennsylvania as being able to relate to average, working-class Americans. In addition, media coverage focused on the money both Clintons had earned since leaving the White House (both had received large advances for memoirs, and Bill Clinton earned sizable fees for speaking engagements; it also renewed questions over donors to the Clinton Presidential Library in Little Rock, Arkansas, whether or not the former president would reveal the list of donors, and whether or not those donors might present a conflict of interest for his wife if she were to become president). When Clinton conceded to Obama and announced the end of her candidacy in June 2008, she had raised nearly $230 million, had loaned her campaign a total of $11.4 million, and ended the campaign roughly $22.5 million in debt.25 Money issues during the campaign were also closely tied to another problem that the Clinton team experienced—the lack of an effective “ground game” that could compete with that of the Obama campaign. During the primary season, grassroots organizers and local volunteers can make a big difference in voter education, voter registration, and voter turnout. Sufficient campaign funds also help to pay staff members in various field offices across the country. For the Obama campaign, which was also having tremendous success in tapping into the youth vote (particularly on college campuses), the “ground game” helped to solidify the Obama fifty-state strategy—compete in every state and for every delegate. The Clinton campaign, on the other hand, had a large-state strategy that assumed that their candidate would wrap up the nomination by Super Tuesday with big wins in delegate-rich states like California, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. And with an empty campaign coffer in the weeks after the Iowa caucuses, the Clinton campaign had an impossible task in readjusting its strategy with limited resources.

112

IN IT TO WIN

Covering the horse race Just like raising money, gaining media attention during the primaries is a crucial element of a campaign’s momentum. Scholars of presidential campaigns have long considered the role of the press in a campaign to be that of a “kingmaker.”26 In a crowded field of candidates, when a party’s nomination is up for grabs with no incumbent president or vice president running, having name recognition and being a familiar face to reporters can be helpful, since “candidates cannot win if they are not known.”27 However, media coverage during the presidential primaries has long been considered problematic, due mostly to the horse-race aspect of the coverage. Instead of news reports about substantive policy issues that would provide crucial information for the voting public, most coverage instead gives the day-today tallies of who is ahead versus who is behind in the delegate count, public opinion polling, and raising money. In addition, coverage in the mainstream news media during the primaries does not provide enough information for voters, as coverage is not fairly allocated among candidates and the tone is often unfair and harshly critical for some candidates. As political scientists Stephen J. Farnsworth and S. Robert Lichter point out, “Citizens depend most heavily on the media during the presidential nomination process, a time when most candidates are not well-known, when the selection process often takes place quickly, and when voters cannot use partisanship as a cue to choose among competitors from the same political party.”28 The lesson from past campaigns regarding media coverage is rather straightforward—without front-runner status from the start (which comes from being in the top tier of candidates early on regarding fundraising and public opinion polls), a candidate is unlikely to win. The exception would be an outsider candidate who can energize his or her party’s base and who can “do better than expected in the early contests” as Obama did in 2008.29

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

113

Regarding Clinton’s coverage during the primaries in 2008, many charges were made at the time about media gender bias and sexism, including some high-profile examples of cable television commentators (including Chris Matthews, Tucker Carlson, Mike Barnicle, and Pat Buchanan in separate incidents on MSNBC) making questionable comments about Clinton and her candidacy regarding gender. Anecdotal evidence at the time suggested that such incidents seemed to follow similar trends in recent years for other female candidates.30 Another high-profile incident of sexism on the campaign trail came when Clinton, while on a campaign stop in New Hampshire just days before the first-in-the-nation primary, was greeted by male hecklers in the audience shouting “Iron my shirt!” Clinton responded, “Oh, the remnants of sexism are alive and well” as the men were removed from the event.31 Many people believed her response of labeling the actions as sexist, as opposed to ignoring it, helped her with voters and was the best strategy.32 However, a closer look at Clinton’s media coverage, and the overall context of the 2008 primary campaign, shows a more nuanced reality when considering gender bias. In addition, media coverage of the entire 2008 presidential campaign was unique due to the length of the campaign, the intense interest among Americans in the campaign, and the ever-expanding means of communicating campaign news to those interested (e.g., blogging and social networking sites played a prominent role in campaign coverage). As we discussed in Chapter 1, Regina Lawrence and Melody Rose found in their extensive study of media coverage of Clinton’s campaign that she received more negative coverage from being the front-runner than from being a woman candidate, and perhaps most importantly, “she was a particular female candidate with a particular political history who faced a particular political context.”33 Similarly, Melissa J. Miller, Jeffrey S. Peake, and Brittany Anne Boulton found that in newspaper coverage, Clinton

114

IN IT TO WIN

received more coverage than her male opponents, and that “neither her appearance nor her viability was noted disproportionately. Mentions of her qualifications and issue positions clearly indicate that the press treated her candidacy seriously.” However, the tone of her coverage was often “markedly personal.”34 Diane Bystrom argues that Clinton’s coverage, while not lacking in quantity, was different, and more negative than her male opponents due to its focus on campaign strategies, her association with Bill Clinton, and “attention to her physical appearance and personality, often in a sexist or sexualized way.” In addition, some of the most sexist comments came from new media sources, which then “spilled over into the mainstream media.”35 Others have suggested that Clinton’s media coverage was fraught with gender bias and sexism. For example, Erika Falk argues that Clinton’s coverage in 2008 continued the trend of media bias against women presidential candidates that dates back to Victoria Woodhull’s 1872 campaign, stating broadly, “That the press seemed biased against a woman running for president was not surprising.”36 It is of course difficult to compare Clinton’s coverage in 2008 to any woman who ran before her due not only to the uniqueness of Clinton as a candidate (particularly since she is to date the only viable woman candidate to make it past the first primary contests) but also to the vastly changing media environment. The conventional wisdom that media bias exists for women seeking the presidency often lacks empirical evidence about outcomes beyond prevailing stereotypes. While the influence of the mass media as an agent of socialization is not in dispute, nor is the fact that gender bias in a general sense as well as negative stereotypes abound about women throughout the mass media, no causal connection has yet been discovered as to whether or not media attention to things such as candidate appearance can be linked to voting preferences. In her recent study about gender bias in campaigns, Deborah Jordan Brooks explains the difference

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

115

between news stories with a “woman frame” and those with a “candidate frame,” and how that can also explain Clinton’s coverage: The angle that drives women-framed stories is the fact that the candidate is female. Because these reports are fundamentally about women, they often include descriptions of what the candidate is wearing, descriptions of emotions, and much information about personality and character. In other words, they include the kind of information that society regards as relevant to women … Clinton’s front-runner status may have forced reporters to approach the Clinton story using a candidate frame more so than a woman frame. This may have accounted for the reduction in coverage about her appearance, the increase in the total number of stories about her, and the fact that her policy positions were covered as often as her man competitor’s.37 In addition, it is important to remember that media coverage during the presidential primaries does not occur in a vacuum, as it often interacts with the media strategy and narrative developed by the campaign itself. For women candidates seeking the presidency, many argue a gendered strategy must emerge that considers the interplay of the gendered features of the office of the presidency, the norms and expectations of the candidate’s political party, and “gender-infused expectations and tensions, media coverage practices, and personal context.”38 Having a clear strategy of how to navigate these issues right from the start is also important; the post-campaign analysis of Clinton’s gender strategy has shown that rival factions among her advisors differed on whether to focus on the uniqueness of Clinton’s campaign as a woman seeking the presidency or to rely more on her experience (the latter seeking to downplay the historic aspects in favor of showing strength in a more traditionally masculine way). Different themes seemed to emerge at different stages during the primaries. As Lawrence and Rose argue, Clinton’s messaging

116

IN IT TO WIN

during her campaign clearly showed that she chose not to run primarily as a woman.39 This, along with other strategic missteps, contributed to problems the campaign experienced: So careful to check all the boxes a female candidate must check along her route to the White House, such as demonstrating fundraising prowess and assembling an experienced campaign team, Clinton appeared cavalier in some tactical choices that would prove decisive: her choice to run essentially a general election campaign during the primary season by speaking to the ideological center rather than the more liberal Democratic base; her campaign’s decision to work toward a Super Tuesday sweep of key primary contests rather than preparing for a longer, broader fight including organizing in caucus states; and her campaign’s reliance on old-style fundraising and communications against an opponent exploiting new technologies to their fullest.40 Determining whether news coverage of Clinton had a detrimental effect on her campaign is not a simple proposition. An interesting question arises over whether or not Clinton is really a good test case to make a solid determination about gender bias in campaign coverage, since some coverage may have included more “Clinton bias” than gender bias. Let’s not forget that since she first appeared on the national stage in 1992 during her husband’s first presidential campaign, Clinton has often had a turbulent relationship with the news media, and the numerous personal scandals during Bill Clinton’s presidency helped to create a difficult narrative for her campaign to rewrite in 2008. That is not to say that gender did not play a role in media coverage, but Clinton bias versus gender bias puts the question into a unique context and perspective. Other factors also came into play with Clinton’s primary campaign coverage, like the horse-race coverage of the primaries when the numbers did not show that Clinton had a chance of winning the

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

117

nomination, or news reports on her campaign being mismanaged or being in debt. These types of stories do not constitute gender bias, as they are standard (even if not all that informative to voters in a substantive way) in how the news media report on presidential campaigns. In addition, expecting the news media to act differently when covering politics, since soft news and/or what is considered infotainment coverage is now so prominent in all areas of political reporting, when covering a presidential campaign (the ultimate political game) is unrealistic. We do know, as political scientists Richard Fox and Zoe Oxley point out, that “media coverage of candidates matters.”41 They also argue that gone are the days when all women candidates receive decidedly worse media coverage than their male opponents. At the same time, we are not yet at the day when the media playing field is completely level across all elective offices. When running for the highest and, not coincidentally, most masculine office in the land, the media landscape is still unfair to women. To be sure, Hillary Clinton’s media coverage was much improved in some respects compared to prior women presidential candidates.42 Saying that women presidential candidates still experience a difficult time with negative news coverage does not take into account specific features of an individual campaign. Is there truly a causal effect here, or is this just conventional wisdom that might be incorrect? We also know that as the news media environment has evolved in the past decade or so with the continued expansion of technology and the increased number of online news outlets, more negative and sexist coverage of women politicians has occurred in these newer media outlets. What we may never know is to what extent negative coverage about Clinton was due to her gender, her early status as a frontrunner, her long association with her husband’s political career, or some combination of these factors.

118

IN IT TO WIN

Conclusion: Does gender matter? Several key points can be made about why Obama won the Democratic nomination in 2008, and why Mitt Romney won the Republican nomination in 2012. Conversely, there are several arguments to be made about why Clinton lost the Democratic nomination in 2008, as well as why Bachmann’s campaign in 2012 did not make it past the Iowa caucuses. While theories abound, one of the most common assumptions is that Americans are just not ready for a woman in the White House. Yet, looking at the recent state of the presidential nominating process from a political science standpoint provides a more substantive analysis by focusing on the nuts and bolts of what it takes to run, and win, a party’s nomination. There is no evidence to suggest that voters will not support a woman candidate. Clinton was considered a viable candidate, and the early front-runner, right from the start. Yet, she was also uniquely situated to run in a way that no other woman had been (or probably will ever be), and as a result, she brought a lot of political baggage to her campaign. Despite her name recognition and star power among the American electorate, and her presumed ability to raise large sums of campaign contributions, Clinton entered the presidential contest with high negatives among a large percentage of voters (what some considered “Clinton fatigue” after her husband’s scandal-plagued eight years in the White House). In addition, understanding the strategy and organization behind the Clinton campaign in areas such as fundraising, voter outreach, and navigating the primary calendar shows that Clinton’s chances of winning the nomination were never as strong as early media predictions suggested. Numerous other factors contributed to Clinton’s failure to capture the Democratic nomination; among them, the lack of a consistent message (she portrayed herself as the most experienced candidate while also claiming that as a woman, she would bring change to Washington), the lack of a fiftystate strategy (the Clinton campaign focused on the large states during the

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

119

primaries while the Obama campaign competed for every delegate in every state), and the inability to compete with Obama in terms of fundraising and the “ground game” (grassroots organizers and local volunteers who provide voter education, voter registration, and voter turnout).43 In addition, the Clinton campaign had been wracked with personality disputes and mismanagement that led to the “epic meltdown” of what was supposed to be a winning campaign: “ … the campaign was not prepared for a lengthy fight; it had an insufficient delegate operation; it squandered vast sums of money; and the candidate herself evinced a paralyzing schizophrenia—one day a shots-’n’-beers brawler, the next a Hallmark Channel mom. Through it all, her staff feuded and bickered, while her husband distracted.”44 Despite Clinton’s insistence that she had the executive and managerial competence to serve effectively as president, her campaign was poorly managed and the in-fighting often undermined the ability of the campaign to execute the strategies that had been developed. While Bachmann, on the other hand, was not viewed with the same level of viability as Clinton, she did enjoy a brief time in the spotlight as a top-tier candidate who could potentially derail Romney as the political front-runner. She did not have the broader electoral appeal among Republican voters that Clinton had among Democratic voters, yet Bachmann did appeal to a key demographic within her party as proved by her fundraising and her victory in the Iowa Straw Poll in the fall of 2011. In assessing Bachmann’s campaign, Fox and Oxley conclude that gender did not play a defining role: Bachmann’s candidacy was similar to the trajectory of many of the male Republican candidates who ran in 2012, as almost everyone in the field had a moment when he or she was near the top of the pack. In this regard, Bachmann’s candidacy could be seen as a mild normalization of women running for president, with her performance mirroring many of the men in the race and little attention being paid to the fact that she is a woman.45

120

IN IT TO WIN

The legacy of both campaigns is significant in that Clinton’s candidacy “opened the door a bit wider for other women. After 2008, the notion of a woman making a serious bid for the presidency no longer shocks or challenges the sensibilities of most voters.”46 Similarly, Bachmann’s campaign, while brief, “reminded the country both that women are not done running for the highest office and that obstacles remain for those who make the effort.”47 But, many of those obstacles are the same for any candidate running for president regardless of gender. Of all the candidates seeking their party’s nomination in 2008, only a handful were viable and in the top tier: Obama, Clinton, and Edwards for the Democratic Party, and McCain, Romney, and Mike Huckabee for the Republican Party (and the latter only after he won the Iowa caucuses). In 2012, Romney’s campaign for the Republican nomination was never really in doubt, yet the challenges Romney faced from candidates with stronger appeal to social conservative/Christian Right voters highlighted the ideological split within the Republican Party among more traditional (pro-business, fiscally conservative) Republicans, social conservatives, and Tea Party supporters (who can fall into either or both of the above groups). So, does a woman candidate seeking her party’s nomination need a gendered strategy to succeed? Perhaps in some areas of the campaign, but it is not an all-or-nothing proposition. For example, there are pros and cons for women candidates when it comes to fundraising; women candidates have shown, in general, an ability to succeed in fundraising among individual contributors (as Bachmann did), but some women candidates are also good at securing larger donations (as Clinton was). Regarding media coverage, while one can hope that reporters will eventually stop focusing on such things as clothing, hair styles, and other nonsubstantive issues as related to women candidates, most experts would argue that the news media need to do a better job overall in its coverage of presidential campaigns from start to finish (as in helping voters to be more informed about the substantive

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

121

policy issues that matter). While sexist and/or misogynistic comments about women candidates should never be tolerated, there is no evidence to suggest, for example, that sexist comments about a woman candidate on a cable news show will erode support for her among voters. For example, while much has been made of Chris Matthews’ sexist comments about Hillary Clinton during the 2008 primary campaign, during which he called Clinton “witchy,” “anti-male,” and “uppity,” among other comments,48 that did not stop 18 million-plus people from voting for her, nor is it the reason she lost the Democratic nomination. Regardless of a candidate’s gender, there is much about the presidential nomination process that is out of his or her control, and media coverage, despite strategic attempts to control one’s campaign narrative, is at the top of that list. So too is the primary calendar, the delegate allocation process in each party, and numerous other institutional/structural factors that determine the success or failure of a presidential campaign. Neither Clinton in 2008 nor Bachmann in 2012 failed to secure her party’s nomination for president simply due to gender. Strategically speaking, gender during this part of the process may matter at the margins of the campaign, but there is no significant evidence to suggest that it is the one and only determining factor.

Notes 1

Han and Heith, Presidents and the American Presidency, 83.

2

See Nahigian in Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, 25–6.

3

Susan Saulny, “Embattled But Confident, Bachmann Says She Is the ‘Complete Package,’ ” New York Times, January 2, 2012, p. A15.

4

Jena McGregor, “Michele Bachmann Drops Out of GOP Race After Iowa Caucuses,” Washington Post, January 4, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/michele-bachmann-drops-out-of-gop-race-after-iowa-caucuses/2012/01/04/ gIQAP6L9aP_story.html.

122

IN IT TO WIN

5

“Iowa Republican,” The Green Papers: 2012 Presidential Primaries, Caucuses, and Conventions, available at http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P12/IA-R.

6

While there is no evidence to suggest that it played a factor, Clinton’s campaign strategists regularly pointed out that Iowa had never elected a woman to Congress or a statewide office, suggesting that fact posed an extra burden on Clinton’s candidacy in the Iowa caucuses. In fact, Iowa had elected a woman, Jo Ann Zimmerman, as its lieutenant governor, serving from 1987 to 1991. See Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008, The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 114–6, 124. And in 2014, the state elected its first woman to the U.S. Senate, Republican Joni Ernst.

7

David Brooks, “The Two Earthquakes,” New York Times, January 4, 2008, p. A19.

8

“Election 2008: Iowa Caucus Results,” New York Times, available at http://politics .nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/results/states/IA.html.

9

While Clinton won the popular vote by 2.6 percent in New Hampshire, she and Obama each earned nine delegates from the contest to the Democratic National Convention.

10 Patrick Healy and Michael Cooper, “Clinton Is Victor, Defeating Obama; McCain Also Wins,” New York Times, January 9, 2008, p. A1. 11 Quote by Clinton senior campaign advisor Howard Wolfson in Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008, 135. 12 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 107–9. 13 Polsby, Wildavsky, Schier, and Hopkins, Presidential Elections, 110. 14 “Election 2008: New Hampshire Primary Results,” New York Times, available at http://politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/results/states/NH.html. 15 The issue of delegates in both Michigan and Florida would later be resolved by the DNC, prior to the Democratic convention, to allow delegates from both states to be seated at the convention. 16 Texas relied on what became popularly known as a “primacaucus,” in which delegates were awarded by both a primary vote and a caucus vote. While the news media declared Clinton the winner in Texas based on her win in the overall popular vote, Obama actually won more delegates from the state after the caucus portion of the state’s contest. 17 Joshua Green, “The Front-Runner’s Fall,” The Atlantic, September 2008. 18 Polsby, Wildavsky, Schier, and Hopkins, Presidential Elections, 126–7. 19 Quoted in Heilemann and Halperin, Game Change, 262. 20 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2012, 30.

THE NOMINATION PROCESS

123

21 While Obama raised large and consistent amounts of money from small donors throughout 2008, only 15 percent of the money raised in 2007 came from small donors. See Richard Wolffe, Renegade: The Making of a President (New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 2009), 74. 22 Farrar-Myers and Boyea, “Campaign Finance: A Barrier to Reaching the White House?”, 222. 23 Heilemann and Halperin, Game Change, 194. 24 Heilemann and Halperin, Game Change, 153. 25 Summary of Hillary Clinton’s 2008 Campaign Finances, Center for Responsive Politics, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/summary .php?cycle=2008&cid=N00000019 26 Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 8th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 196. 27 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2012, 138. 28 Stephen J. Farnsworth and S. Robert Lichter, “How Television Covers the Presidential Nomination Process,” in The Making of the Presidential Candidates 2012, eds. William G. Mayer and Jonathan Bernstein (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefied, 2012), 133–4. 29 Farnsworth and Lichter, “How Television Covers the Presidential Nomination Process,” 150. 30 See Katharine Q. Seelye and Julie Bosman, “Media Charged with Sexism in Clinton Coverage,” New York Times, June 13, 2008, p. A1. 31 Sarah Wheaton, “Iron My Shirt,” New York Times, January 7, 2008, available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/iron-my-shirt/comment-page-5/? _php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 32 Brooks, “The Two Earthquakes.” 33 Lawrence and Rose, Hillary Clinton’s Race for the White House, 6. 34 Melissa K. Miller, Jeffrey S. Peake, and Brittany Anne Boulton, “Testing the Saturday Night Live Hypothesis: Fairness and Bias in Newspaper Coverage of Hillary Clinton’s Presidential Campaign,” Politics & Gender, 6 (2010): 169–98. 35 Dianne Bystrom, “18 Million Cracks in the Glass Ceiling: The Rise and Fall of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Presidential Campaign,” in Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office, ed. Rainbow Murray (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 69–90. 36 Erika Falk, Women for President: Media Bias in Nine Campaigns, 2nd ed. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 1. 37 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 177.

124

IN IT TO WIN

38 Regina G. Lawrence and Melody Rose, “The Race for the Presidency: Hillary Rodham Clinton,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 68. 39 Lawrence and Rose, “Hillary Clinton’s Race for the White House,” 110. 40 Lawrence and Rose, “The Race for the Presidency,” 69. 41 Richard L. Fox and Zoe M. Oxley, “Why No Madame President? Gender and Presidential Politics in the United States,” in Women and Political Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing, eds. Michael A. Genovese and Janie S. Steckenrider (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 330. 42 Fox and Oxley, “Why No Madame President? Gender and Presidential Politics in the United States,” 330. 43 See Han, “Still Waiting for Madam President: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 2008 Presidential Campaign,”. 44 Joshua Green, “The Front-Runner’s Fall,” The Atlantic, September 2008. 45 Fox and Oxley, “Why No Madame President? Gender and Presidential Politics in the United States,” 311. 46 Fox and Oxley, “Why No Madame President? Gender and Presidential Politics in the United States,” 332. 47 Lawrence and Rose, “The Race for the Presidency,” 68. 48 For example, see “Chris Matthews Has a Sexist History with Hillary Clinton,” Jezebel, January 15, 2008, available at http://jezebel.com/345237/chris-matthews-has-a -sexist-history-with-hillary-clinton.

5 The general election

What exactly does it take to become President of the United States? Constitutionally speaking, the list of requirements is fairly short: a natural born citizen, 35 years old, and a resident within the United States for a minimum of fourteen years. Outside of that, there is a much longer list of requirements. We know that there are certain personal qualities that Americans tend to look for in their presidents, such as honesty, integrity, intelligence, political experience, communication skills, and of course, the potential for strong presidential leadership (though this is a difficult concept to accurately define). We also know that certain tactical resources are necessary to aid one’s campaign for the White House, including money (and the skills to raise it), media coverage (and the ability to use it to one’s advantage), skilled campaign advisors, motivated voters who will show up on election day, the time to actually run for office (as it is an extremely time-consuming endeavor), and even a bit of luck (as in, having the right skill set/personal story/political message to succeed in the political environment when one chooses to run). As we have discussed in earlier chapters, the decision to run for president is not one to be taken lightly, and from start to finish, a presidential campaign is a long, hard journey that often amounts to a political game of survival of the fittest. As political scientist Stephen J. Wayne points out, “The road to the White House is long, circuitous, and bumpy. It contains numerous hazards and potential dead ends.”1 No candidacy is

126

IN IT TO WIN

ever a lock, a sure thing, or inevitable. Even winning the most votes does not secure a victory (just ask Al Gore, who won the popular vote but lost the Electoral College vote, and thus the presidency, to George W. Bush in 2000). It takes the right candidate at the right time with the right campaign strategy and message to win. The bottom line is that winning the presidency is the sum of many complicated, nuanced, and sometimes, intangible, parts. While we have yet to witness a female major party presidential candidate, this may be the one phase of the campaign that gender matters the least when considering the Electoral College, campaign finance, shifting demographics, swing states, and the state of the two parties on the national level. For example, one of the most important points in understanding the relevance of the Electoral College map, not only in the most recent presidential election of 2012 but also in looking ahead to 2016 and beyond, comes from shifting demographics within key states (not only so-called “swing states” like Florida, Ohio, Colorado, or Nevada, for example, but also predicted changes that may be forthcoming to traditionally Republican strongholds such as Texas and Arizona). That is not to say that the historic significance of a women candidate would not matter (when in fact, it could provide a competitive edge in the right circumstances during the general election campaign), but the institutionalized procedures are a more significant factor. Just as no institutional and/or constitutional aspects of the presidency would change with a women president, a woman presidential candidate would also not change much about the constitutional, institutional, or the tactical “nuts and bolts” of a presidential election. This chapter will look at recent presidential contests to assess campaign strategies that worked and those that did not. In addition, this chapter will focus on whether or not a winning strategy would need to be altered at this phase of the campaign for a woman candidate, and will also provide a look ahead to the political landscape that is emerging for future presidential campaigns. Topics of importance when considering general election

THE GENERAL ELECTION

127

strategies include fundraising and public funding of presidential campaigns, the Electoral College, demographics and voter turnout, media coverage, campaign communications, presidential debate performances, and the selection of a running mate. An important question to ask about the general election campaign comes from the fact that much of the campaign process during this last phase of the contest has become institutionalized in recent decades. As such, beyond perhaps a campaign’s narrative/media strategy, does the gender of the candidate change anything about what it takes to develop a winning strategy in all of these areas, particularly the Electoral College, and to win the presidency? This chapter will also consider the vice presidential candidacies of Geraldine Ferraro in 1984 and Sarah Palin in 2008; Palin’s campaign especially provides an important case study of how gender can play a role in both news coverage and campaign strategy in a more contemporary political environment at the national level during a general election campaign.

Money in the general election As with all other phases of a presidential election, money in the general election campaign is a key ingredient for success. Candidates now rely on various sources of money to fund their presidential campaigns, including individual donors, political parties, PACs, and some also still rely on public funding. After Congress reformed the campaign finance system with passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, the funding for each subsequent general election campaign came from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF) until Barack Obama’s decision to forego public funding in 2008. The money in this fund comes from what is known as a tax checkoff, which allows tax payers to designate money for the PECF by checking a box on their federal income tax return instructing the Internal

128

IN IT TO WIN

Revenue Service to earmark $3 from federal taxes already owed to be placed in the fund.2 During the general election, which officially begins when each major party has concluded its nominating conventions (but which unofficially starts on Labor Day weekend), major party candidates then receive their public funding grant from the federal government. By accepting the funds, each candidate agrees to the same amount of money serving as their campaign’s spending limit. In 2004, George W. Bush and John Kerry each received just under $75 million to pay for their general election campaigns. In 2008, John McCain received $84.1 million in public funds to conduct his general election campaign (and under federal law, was allowed to raise an additional $46.4 million for legal and accounting expenses). Obama, however, decided not to accept the federal funds as he had raised the record-breaking total of $745.7 million in private funds for his primary nomination and general election campaign. Obama’s refusal to accept the general election funds from the federal government marked the first time in the history of presidential public financing that a major party nominee declined to accept the general election grant (and with it, the attached spending limit). As a result, by the end of the general election campaign, the Obama campaign was outspending the McCain campaign on television ads (a major expense during the general election) by a four-to-one margin.3 In 2012, both Obama and the Republican nominee, Mitt Romney, opted out of the available federal funding for the general election. The grant that year was approximately $91,241,400 for each major party nominee.4 Despite many efforts since the 1970s to curb the flow of money into presidential campaigns, the price tag for electing a president has kept going up. By the 1990s, a large part of presidential campaigns (with dollar amounts in the hundreds of millions) were being bankrolled by soft money contributions. These unlimited contributions were being raised by political parties and PACs for various expenditures (like voter education in the form of advertising, or get-out-the vote efforts), as opposed to hard money

THE GENERAL ELECTION

129

contributions made directly to candidates (and thus subject to federal contribution limits). In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which in effect banned soft money contributions. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in McConnell vs. FEC that the ban on soft money contributions was indeed constitutional. While many had hoped that banning soft money from presidential elections would bring down the overall costs, the ban served to create new and more innovative loopholes as campaign spending by presidential candidates hit all-time highs during the next three election cycles. In 2004, many big money donors who had been used to making large soft money contributions directly to the political parties instead began giving money to interest groups through tax-exempt organizations (called 527s because of the related IRS code that allows such groups to spend unlimited amounts of money as long as they do not “expressly advocate” for a particular candidate or coordinate their election activities with a particular campaign). Some of the most influential 527 groups in 2004, including MoveOn.Org (favoring the Democratic Party) and Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth (which attacked John Kerry on his Vietnam War record) spent millions of dollars on electioneering activities and especially on television ads.5 By 2008, MoveOn.Org had closed down its 527 operation in support of Barack Obama’s campaign, citing the hope that Obama’s fundraising efforts of relying on numerous small donors would help to change the tone of the campaign by decreasing the use of negative attack ads (even though MoveOn.Org had aired numerous such ads attacking both Bush in 2004 and McCain in 2008). Both Obama and McCain also made public pleas to their supporters in 2008 to send contributions to their campaigns directly and not to 527 groups.6 However, in 2010, the Supreme Court issued another ruling regarding the regulation of money that would change the campaign finance landscape of presidential campaigns yet again. In Citizens United vs. The Federal Election Commission, the Court overturned previous restrictions on electioneering

130

IN IT TO WIN

communications as well as the long-standing ban on corporations and labor unions contributing to PACs. Easing the restrictions on corporations and labor unions (big money interests) created the use of so-called Super PACs in 2012, which could accept unlimited contributions from wealthy donors. The money raised and spent by each Super PAC had no limit, as long as there was no coordination between the Super PAC and a particular campaign. A majority of the money was spent on negative attack ads, particularly during the Republican primary contests. By the general election, several factors contributed to the vast amounts of money being spent by the Obama and Romney campaigns. Technology has made it easier for larger numbers of small donors to give money to their preferred candidate, and to do so repeatedly via online or even cell phone donation options. In addition, the funding spent on behalf of candidates via Super PACs, along with the ability for each campaign to raise large sums of money, meant that neither Obama nor Romney would need the public financing as each easily raised more than the $91 million available from the federal government.7 Super PAC spending on behalf of Romney totaled more than $400 million, while the total for Obama was $163 million. However, a majority of that money spent was used on negative attack ads in opposition to one of the candidates.8 While the inclusion of Super PAC money is still new to the process, it is difficult to determine whether or not spending that much money translates into votes cast for a particular candidate. Early trends, however, suggest that Super PAC money played a bigger role in the Republican primaries (in helping Romney secure the nomination) than in the general election. The ability to target money spent in a particular state allowed the Romney campaign to saturate the airwaves at key moments in the primary contest to knock out his Republican rivals (what fellow candidate Newt Gingrich called “carpet bombing” in key primary states such as Florida).9 Also, large money Super PAC donors tend to have more ideologically extreme views than the general public, which can cause a presidential candidate to “juggle the demands of these two constituencies” during the campaign.10

THE GENERAL ELECTION

131

Navigating the Electoral College map The Electoral College, and not the national popular vote, determines the winner of each presidential election.11 The Electoral College is made up of the electors from all fifty states; in total, there are 538 electoral votes, and a candidate needs 270 to win the election. All but two states rely on a winnertake-all system of awarding electoral votes, which means that if a candidate wins the popular vote in a state, then he or she wins all of the electoral votes. Only Maine and Nebraska do not rely on the winner-take-all system. Instead, the candidate who wins each congressional district wins that electoral vote, while the candidate who wins the popular vote in the state wins the two votes represented by the state’s two seats in the U.S. Senate. After Election Day, the electors then vote in December at their state capital, and more than half the states have laws that require the electors to vote for the party nominee that they have been chosen to represent. Rarely, but not recently, do “faithless electors” cast their vote for someone other than the candidate on their slate. Serving as an Elector is considered a symbolic reward (often for party loyalty) more so than an opportunity to influence the election outcome. Yet, despite what many call the archaic presence of the Electoral College (put in place by the framers of the Constitution to guard against the popular will having a disproportionate say in selecting a president), it still influences election strategy and imposes strategic decision making on candidates based on the allocation of votes. The number of electoral votes has not increased since 1964; the total of 538 is based on the 435 seats in the House of Representatives, 100 seats in the Senate, and the three votes given to the District of Columbia by the Twenty-Third Amendment ratified that year. Getting to that magic number of 270, then, introduces various strategies and “electoral math” to presidential campaigns. For example, while the largest states obviously have the most electoral votes, some have not been in play

132

IN IT TO WIN

for a number of years. The three largest states in the nation have consistently voted for one party in recent decades—a Republican candidate has not won California since 1988 or New York since 1984, and a Democratic candidate has not won Texas since 1976. As a result, the opposing party’s candidate spends little time campaigning in a state where he or she has little chance of winning the electoral votes. However, candidates will still travel to these states and their large urban areas for fundraising activities during the campaign. But when it comes to targeting voters, campaigns focus most heavily on so-called swing states where presumably either major party candidate can win. Swing states receive more attention than other states during the campaign in the form of campaign stops by the candidate and his or her surrogates, as well as voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts. The news media also focus more heavily on these states since the outcome is unknown until election night. Correspondingly, voter participation in these states can also be higher than in noncompetitive states since so much attention is focused on voter mobilization efforts.12 While experts vary on their definition, the number of swing states in recent campaigns has been relatively small. In 2000, only twelve states were considered competitive by both campaigns. By 2008, sixteen states were considered battlegrounds; Obama won fifteen of them, and as a result, achieved a solid Electoral College victory over McCain (365 to 173). In 2012, most of those same states—Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin—were among the most-watched swing states. Obama won them all, as he had done in 2008, which gave him a 332–206 electoral vote victory over Romney. Two states Obama had won in 2008— Indiana and North Carolina—went back in the Republican column in 2012 (as did one electoral vote in the Nebraska district that includes Omaha), yet without one of the other swing states, the electoral math provided an insurmountable disadvantage for Romney. According to Romney’s political director Rich Beeson, “As far as the path, we always conceded that they had

THE GENERAL ELECTION

133

a wider path to 270 than we did.” The Romney campaign considered Ohio among the must-win states to win the Electoral College; without Ohio, the campaign called it “climbing the back side of Everest.”13 In effect, the Electoral College encourages presidential candidates to reject the idea of running in all fifty states, since it makes no sense to waste campaign resources in states with only a few electoral votes, or, large states where the candidate has no chance of winning. The existence of the Electoral College remains controversial as many flaws exist. First, a candidate can win the popular vote yet still lose the election by not securing the necessary 270 electoral votes. While Al Gore beat George W. Bush in the number of total votes cast by roughly 500,000 (Gore earned 48.4 percent of the vote to Bush’s 47.9 percent), Bush won the Electoral College 271–266 when he was declared the winner in Florida (thus earning that state’s twenty-five electoral votes) by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Bush vs. Gore (2000) decision. A popularvote winner had not lost the Electoral College, and thus the presidency, since 1876, when Democrat Samuel Tilden won 51 percent of the popular vote but Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, with only 47.9 percent of the popular vote, won the Electoral College. Advocates for eliminating the Electoral College argue that it is no longer necessary since voters now have the information they need to make an informed decision. In addition, opponents of the Electoral College argue that the system is dangerous with the possibility of electing a president who is not the choice of the people, which would cause a constitutional crisis (though the latter did not occur in 2000). Other arguments against the Electoral College include the fact that some states benefit unduly from the system; that different states use different methods for selecting electors, and there is no guarantee that electors will abide by the popular vote in all states; and because of the winner-take-all system in most states, some popular votes are nullified. The Electoral College does have its defenders, however, who argue that it recognizes the important role of the states as political units and guarantees that the president will be represented

134

IN IT TO WIN

by a geographically broad constituency. In addition, the Electoral College combines the elements of popular democracy with representative democracy; it can expand the sense that the president has the mandate to lead the country; it discourages the influence by extreme minor parties; it enables minority groups to wield power through significant blocs of electoral votes in a state; and it discourages voter fraud.14 To date, no significant progress has been made to either eliminate or amend the Electoral College, as this would require a constitutional amendment. However, several states are considering altering their selection of electors similar to the process used in Maine and Nebraska, thus eliminating the winner-take-all system. This could be a significant change if it occurred in a large state such as California, where using the district method could give approximately 2/5 of the state’s fifty-five electoral votes to the Republican candidate. While a Republican-backed statewide initiative in California to make the change failed to gain enough signatures to make the ballot in 2008,15 it remains a topic of political conversation in several states. Following the 2012 election, many experts conceded that the Electoral College map will continue to favor the Democratic candidate, due in part to shifting demographics (as we will discuss below). However, while the potential voting population in red states such as Texas and Arizona continues to diversify, which suggests an advantage for the Democratic Party, turning those potential voters into actual voters is more difficult to accomplish.16 In addition, altering the winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes in some larger states could mitigate the advantage for Democrats if progress is ever made in this area. Regardless, Democrats experienced continuity in both the 2008 and 2012 elections as Obama won important swing states in the Midwest, Southwest, as well as Florida. In addition, the Democratic candidate has won the popular vote in five of the last six presidential elections (with Bush’s reelection in 2004 the only Republican win), which experts agree is a promising sign for future Democratic success at the presidential level.17

THE GENERAL ELECTION

135

Voting behavior, voter turnout, and shifting demographics One of the most enduring questions for political scientists has always been—who votes, for whom do they vote, and why? While a definitive answer—that is, with 100 percent certainty—may never be possible, we do know that various factors play a role in voting decisions and that political scientists over the years have been able to develop numerous theories and models to predict voting behavior and voter turnout. Much of this work has been focused on presidential elections. Political socialization plays a large role in how voters perceive candidates, policy issues, and political parties. Influences such as family, peers, education, mass media, and various other demographics (such as socioeconomic status, gender, or religion) help us develop our political and ideological values and beliefs. This, in turn, can determine one’s connection to a political party or lack thereof, and even if one is motivated to vote in any given election. As a result, one of the main strategic considerations of a presidential campaign is not only how to appeal to a wide variety of voters, but how to get those same voters to show up on Election Day. Major studies by political scientists in the area of voting behavior have developed two basic models. One explains voting as a prospective behavior, meaning that voters consider the policy positions of the current candidates and their respective parties to make a choice in any particular election. The other suggests that voters behave retrospectively, meaning that voters look back at the job current officeholders have done regarding such things as the economy or national security to make their decision.18 For incumbent presidents, the retrospective model works well if, for example, the economy is strong or improving. Partisanship also plays an important role in voting behavior. Among the many factors that can play a role in determining voter choice, “identifying with a political party seems to be the most important.”19 Partisan

136

IN IT TO WIN

cues help voters decide which candidate they will support, or, whether they will even vote. Certain policy issues or personal characteristics of a candidate can play a greater role for voters in a presidential election if partisanship is weak. By the 1970s, as partisanship began to decline, a trend in split-ticket voting (e.g., voting for one party’s presidential candidate while voting for another party’s congressional candidate) began to emerge as voters relied less on party identification and more on the characteristics of individual candidates when making a decision. This trend of “candidate-centered” politics was a result of numerous factors, including social and economic changes, political upheaval from events such as the Vietnam War and Watergate, and voter’s reliance on mass media (television, and now the Internet) to get their political information (much of which used to be provided by the parties themselves).20 Reaching uncommitted, or less partisan, voters during a presidential campaign is of prime importance. Once a candidate has earned his or her party’s nomination, they are in effect the party’s standard bearer, so attention shifts during the general election to voter turnout as well as reaching independent voters in swing states. Partisanship, though, can matter when looking at voter turnout as well. While Democrats have enjoyed an advantage in recent years over Republicans among registered voters, Democrats also traditionally have lower voter turnout (often related to lower socioeconomic status) and are also more likely to defect from the party when they do vote.21 By 2012, technology began to play an increasingly important role in get-out-the-vote efforts through what some called “microtargeting” of swing voters by the Obama campaign. Data was collected on voters in swing states to determine the level of support each person might have for Obama and the likelihood of actually voting. Voter files were developed with the following information: name, address, age, party affiliation, and voter participation in previous elections. Then, census data showing ethnicity, income, and education was added, along with commercial data about consumer preferences, and data from the Obama campaign about

THE GENERAL ELECTION

137

past contributions, use of lawn signs, and/or responses to phone calls from the campaign. All this was done to develop a probability score about whether or not each voter was likely to support Obama. That data was used to determine future contacts with the voter, and even used to microtarget advertising based on what specific television show a voter might be watching or what webpages might be visited.22 According to some political scientists, partisanship was the deciding factor in the 2012 presidential election as severe polarization has continued among the American electorate.23 It is also instructive to look at the makeup of Obama’s winning coalition of voters, which included women, minorities, union members, young voters, as well as many voters who are unmarried, live in urban areas, are more secular in their religious views, and/or are members of the LGBT community. While a gender gap favoring Obama played a role in the outcome, a more severe gap occurred in the categories of race and ethnicity. Romney won among white voters by a 59–39 percent margin. Yet, Obama was still able to win the election because not only was the white vote concentrated in Southern states (where he was going to lose anyway), but his support among African American, Latino, and Asian American voters increased from 2008, as did the share of the electorate made up by these nonwhite voters (at 27 percent in 2012, an increase of four percent from 2008). Obama won among African American voters 93–6 percent, among Latino voters 71–27 percent, and among Asian American voters 72–26 percent. Most important among these trends is the increase in the Latino vote, which now makes up more than 10 percent of the national electorate. Not only did Obama increase his support of Latino voters in 2012, but the growing strength of the Latino vote in states such as Colorado, Florida, and Nevada helped to secure his Electoral College victory. According to political scientist Gerald Pomper, “demography is destiny,” so recent demographic trends suggest an advantage for the Democratic Party in future presidential elections.24

138

IN IT TO WIN

Campaign communications Thanks to ever-expanding technology, voters now have a growing number of choices in how they receive information about presidential candidates. Where voters used to rely on getting their information during the presidential campaign from traditional news sources such as television, newspapers, and weekly newsmagazines, today’s voters now also rely on new media sources from high-tech platforms to learn about candidates. The changes in media use during campaigns—by voters, the news media, and the candidates themselves—have been dramatic. The first candidate webpages emerged in 1996, and online fundraising success got its start with John McCain’s primary campaign in 2000 (he raised $1 million online after beating George W. Bush in the New Hampshire primary, which at the time was considered a huge sum of money).25 Since then, as available technologies for the Internet, along with cell phones and other mobile devices, has rapidly expanded, it is difficult to imagine a presidential campaign without the presence of Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, numerous political blogs and other sources of online news, stories about a candidate going viral, or memes. The candidate’s webpages are still an important strategic outlet for each campaign (particularly regarding fundraising and recruiting volunteers), yet they can seem rather pedestrian in comparison. However, despite the emphasis on new technology among presidential campaigns in the last few years (especially its use by the Obama campaign in both 2008 and 2012 in terms of both fundraising and communication), campaigns are still more conservative and less innovative in experimenting with new (and unproven) technologies in communicating with voters. Television ads are still produced, and brochures are still printed, proving that “the application of a new technology may be less important for its functionality than for its symbolism.”26 Yet, given the success of the Obama campaign’s use of social media, along with its image of being more in touch

THE GENERAL ELECTION

139

with younger Americans and their reliance on technology, it is difficult to imagine that future presidential campaigns will not follow a similar strategic course; “to be competitive candidates for the American presidency must have a technologically savvy social-media strategy.” Not only is a candidate webpage now seen as a staple, and a good way to communicate directly to voters in an unmediated fashion, a presence on social media sites like Facebook and Twitter are now expected. Technology has not only allowed campaigns to develop more direct means of getting their message out to voters, but the information provided by voters on candidate webpages or through cell phone apps also provide data mining opportunities to the campaign to microtarget messaging as well as fundraising opportunities. Yet, despite all the attention paid to new media technologies, “traditional media clearly remain important campaign tools for presidential candidates” given the amount of money spent in 2012 on television and radio advertising in swing states as well as interviews given by candidates in these mediums.27 Media coverage of the general election campaign, of course, plays a large role in setting the tone of the campaign as well as shaping the overall political environment. For loyal partisan voters, media coverage is unlikely to affect voter choice, although could influence the decision to participate. For independent voters, the content and quality of information from news sources can have a more prominent effect on decision-making. Media coverage also directly shapes campaign communication strategies. According to media scholar Doris Graber, “Twenty-first-century election campaigns are structured to garner the most favorable media exposure, reaching the largest number of prospective supporters, with the greatest degree of candidate control over the message. Candidates concentrate on photo opportunities, talk show appearances, or trips to interesting events and locations.”28 Media coverage trends of the 2012 general election campaign remained fairly consistent with that of the previous two campaigns in 2004 and 2008.

140

IN IT TO WIN

According to the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, in 2012, news consumption among Americans was rapidly changing, with reliance on traditional sources of news—television, radio, and newspapers— declining, while use of online sources was increasing.29 An October 2012 study by Pew Research found that in presidential campaigns, television remains the most cited source of all political information, with cable news during the general election getting the most attention from voters, followed by local news and then network news. However, the Internet was used almost as frequently for a source of campaign news as cable television: “The numbers portray a diverse landscape in which no platform dominates as the place for politics, and the vast majority of Americans say they regularly rely on multiple platforms to get political information. Just 6 percent said they turn regularly to just one platform.”30 Pew Research also documented the negativity of the 2012 general election campaign in the tone of news coverage. During the summer months of 2012 leading up to the national conventions, both Obama and Romney received more negative than positive coverage, as “the portrayal in the news media of the character and records of the two presidential contenders in 2012 has been as negative as any campaign in recent times, and neither candidate has enjoyed an advantage over the other.”31 Similar trends in negative coverage continued throughout the fall of 2012 for both candidates, with Obama receiving a slight reprieve from negative coverage in the final week before the election, “Much of that surge in positive coverage, the data suggest, was tied to Obama’s strategic position, including improving opinion polls and electoral math” and that coverage of Hurricane Sandy diverted some attention away from Romney.32 The preference for press coverage that focuses on the horse race of the campaign, as well as a narrative about the game of presidential politics (who is ahead, who is behind, who has raised the most money, whose campaign runs smoothly, etc.) begins in the invisible primary and

THE GENERAL ELECTION

141

carries through to Election Day. Much of the coverage during this time period focuses on day-to-day tracking polls at the national level (which is not particularly insightful given that we don’t elect our president by popular vote) or in swing states to determine the potential outcome of the Electoral College map. The trend of more soft news (personal stories about the candidate, horse-race coverage, internal fighting within a campaign, etc.) than hard news (news analysis of major policy issues and the candidate’s stance on such issues) has also continued. This is particularly evident on television with cable news, and also on network news and local news. Media scholars Stephen J. Farnsworth and S. Robert Lichter argue that the quality and quantity of television news coverage decline and its shortcomings relate to “a tendency to emphasize the campaign’s horse race coverage over matters of substance, a frequently controversial performance with respect to the core values of accuracy and fairness, a declining amount of attention paid to candidates (as opposed to that lavished on the journalists covering them), and declining volume of coverage of the election overall.”33 The pervasive coverage of polling during the general election comes not only from the emphasis on the horse race in news coverage but from the fact that so many polling organizations (including many in-house polling operations within news media companies) now exist. Gallup, Harris, Ipsos, Pew Research, Zogby, Roper, and Rasmussen are among the most notable polling organizations, while other notable polls include those from NBC News/Wall Street Journal, CBS/New York Times, CNN/Opinion Research, USA Today, and Quinnipiac University. Various political websites also provide aggregate polling results, such as RealClearPolitics (which started the trend in 2002), which combines the results of other polls about election outcomes to provide a larger sample. In 2008, baseball statistician Nate Silver developed his FiveThirtyEight.com website, which provided predictions about the 2008 presidential election that went beyond simply aggregating polling data. Silver relied on computer simulations in each

142

IN IT TO WIN

of the fifty states that included not only polling data (using a weighted formula based on the sample size, date, and credibility of the pollster), but also demographic data, previous election data, and economic data. His site, updated daily to reflect changes in his data analysis regarding statelevel predictions for the Electoral College and U.S. Senate races, attracted national attention.34 Silver’s predictions were exceptionally accurate; in 2008, he correctly predicted forty-nine out of fifty states in the presidential race (only missing Indiana, which Obama won by less than one percentage point) and all thirty-five Senate races. He enjoyed similar results in 2012, with correct predictions for all fifty states plus the District of Columbia and thirty-one of thirty-three Senate races (Democratic candidates won in the traditionally red states of Montana and North Dakota). However, in 2012, not all polling organizations were lauded for their accuracy. Gallup came under intense scrutiny for inaccurate polling in 2012, based on what some called the under-weighting of potential minority voters in swing states.35 When Gallup released its final poll of the 2012 election, it predicted that Romney would beat Obama 49–48 percent in the national popular vote, while Obama won the actual popular vote 51–47 percent.36 Candidates do a far better job providing distinguishing information, which of course makes sense, as it is their responsibility to articulate why they are the best choice. Moreover, the differences between the campaigns’ messages and the media’s messages are immense … candidates and campaigns do a far better job of responding to citizen desires for substance, fairness, and comprehensiveness than the television networks do. In other words, the mediated coverage of much campaign news has become so negative and so inaccurate that the unmediated speeches, advertisements, and Internet websites of the highly self-interested campaigns produce more-substantive, more-useful, and more-accurate forms of campaign discourse.37

THE GENERAL ELECTION

143

As a result, campaigns spend millions of dollars, and now have large portions of their campaign staffs, focusing on outreach via advertising, their websites, email, texting, a presence on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other online sites. Campaign messages are considered “essential in presenting the overall campaign narratives as well as positioning candidates on the issues.”38 Obama’s message in 2012 was much different than in 2008; in his first campaign, Obama ran as an outsider and agent of change, while in 2012, he ran as an incumbent in tough economic times. In response, the Romney campaign wanted to make the election a referendum on Obama and his record (particularly on economic issues), while Obama wanted voters to see Romney as an unacceptable alternative: “Obama’s narrative was about the economy, blaming Bush, and painting Romney as an out-of-touch plutocrat … Romney’s core message from the very beginning of his campaign involved jobs and the economy and his credentials as a businessman, governor, and Olympic organizer to address the problem. Obama could not fix the problem, but Romney could.”39 Despite the presence of newer media technologies, television ads, and more recently, Internet ads are the primary mechanism for candidates to reach voters without the filtering provided by the press. In a 30- or 60-second spot, candidates can provide biographical information, set the campaign’s issue agenda, cast blame and manage charges levied by an opponent or the media. Some of the most powerful and memorable advertising do what political scientist Darrell M. West terms priming and defusing. Candidates prime voters by setting up a focal point for the campaign, which might or might not have been on the minds of voters. When defusing, candidates use ads to respond to critiques by downplaying the charge or by reframing the charge.40 Some of the most effective and memorable campaign ads over the years were either positive in their message and imagery (e.g., Ronald Reagan’s “It’s morning again in America” ad from 1984) or did not even mention the name

144

IN IT TO WIN

of the opponent to get a message across to voters (e.g., Lyndon Johnson’s infamous “Daisy” ad from 1964). However, the 2012 general election campaign saw the most money ever spent on advertising (more than $1 billion was spent by the two candidates, parties, and outside groups) and ads were more negative than ever before (ads that stretched the truth or completely ignored it were pervasive). This trend actually presented a messaging problem for Romney, since more than 60 percent of the ads aired came from pro-Romney groups as opposed to the Romney campaign itself. Romney and his Super PACs outspent Obama in advertising, yet Obama had more message control. Approximately 90 percent of Romney ads, and pro-Romney group ads, included negative attacks. This took time away from Romney’s ability to construct a more positive narrative about himself, and shore up his support among the base of the Republican Party. Obama’s ad strategy was to go early; May to August allowed them to have lower advertising rates, create early impressions, and avoid the cluttered advertising environment in the final weeks of the campaign. The Obama campaign also spent more on advertising in key media markets in battleground states. Despite newer forms of media as campaign communication tools, “political advertising continues to be a vital tool for candidates. Advertising has always been about rallying partisans and recruiting the few undecided voters, and it has been a critical tool for moving the few voters who make up the margin in close elections.”41 One of the most important questions being considered in the aftermath of the 2012 election is whether or not the record-breaking amount of money spent on advertising by both candidates, and their respective Super PACs, was worth it. David Axelrod, senior Obama campaign advisor, has questioned the effectiveness of paid media during the modern presidential campaign: I have this feeling that media is very effective before the conventions, and it is decreasingly effective after the conventions. Look, people understand that what we do in some ways, maybe in every way, is propaganda. This is not objective truth. So they are more apt to believe what they see with their

THE GENERAL ELECTION

145

own eyes. They can see debates with their own eyes. They watch the news. They see wall-to-wall coverage. I think that, at the end of the day, moderates the impact of paid media.42 In the end, however, Obama had an “impressive victory … in a very negative political environment” despite high unemployment, a weak (yet slowly improving) economy, and “middling” job approval ratings. One of Obama’s strengths as a campaigner, both in 2008 and 2012, came from his strength as a communicator: “Obama dominated the race both as a messenger and on the message. He was seen by voters as being more in touch with them, while Romney was viewed as a less-empathetic wealthy candidate. Obama’s campaign strategy worked, and so the election was seen as more of a choice between candidates rather than as a referendum on his record.”43

Presidential debates Since 1976, there have been three presidential debates and one vice presidential debate held during the general election phase of the campaign. For candidates, the debates enable direct outreach in a live setting. Since there is no declared winner or loser, the goal for each candidate is to do well (as in, clearly articulate one’s policy positions and political views), to look presidential throughout, and avoid a major gaffe. For voters, the debates offer an opportunity to see how each candidate performs in this venue and under the intense pressure of a live event. The debates also represent the only time both candidates answer the same questions and also address each other directly. The debates are sponsored by the nonpartisan Presidential Debate Commission, which works with each campaign to negotiate such things as the style of the debate (single moderator, multiple questioners, and town hall) and the dates each will be held. Each debate is usually 90 minutes in length and is moderated by a well-known political journalist.

146

IN IT TO WIN

For candidates, the debates are potential minefields. Media coverage of the debates is intense, and in the waning weeks of the long campaign, many voters are watching. More than 67 million people watched the first presidential debate in 2012, which totaled 15 million more viewers than had watched the first debate in 2008.44 Media sources are also active after the debate in declaring a winner; cable and network news outlets generally conduct a “snap” poll after each debate to see how a sample of viewers rated the performance of each candidate (though these polls are inaccurate as they are not as large or as randomly generated as standard public opinion polls). Some networks will also use focus groups during the debate to see how viewers respond to each candidate. Each campaign will also have several staffers in the “spin room” following the debate to make the case to journalists that their candidate “won” the debate; staffers along with campaign surrogates also do the rounds of television news shows immediately following each debate to advocate for their candidate’s “winning” performance. Occasionally, a particular line in a debate can make headlines or, as in 2012, go viral. Mitt Romney had the most memorable lines from both the first and second debates; during the first, his comment that “I like Big Bird” when discussing federal funding for PBS earned much news coverage and even a tongue-in-cheek ad by the Obama campaign, mocking Romney’s comments and comparing Big Bird to Wall Street criminals such as Bernie Maddoff and Ken Lay: “Mitt Romney, taking on our enemies no matter where they nest.”45 During the second presidential debate, Romney made his now infamous “binders full of women” comment while discussing the number of women who served in his administration while governor of Massachusetts. While a bit of misstatement on Romney’s part (he was talking about how he had requested women’s groups to bring him resumes from qualified women for state-level appointments), it nonetheless took on a life of its own in cyberspace. Even before the conclusion of the debate, websites, pages on Facebook and Tumblr, Twitter feeds, and numerous memes went viral, mimicking Romney’s

THE GENERAL ELECTION

147

comments and providing a talking point for Democrats to attack Romney and the Republican Party on women’s issues.46 However, Obama did not make it through the debates unscathed, as incumbent presidents often face many challenges in this setting during their reelection campaigns. Most incumbents want to maintain their image as presidential and above politics, so attacking an opponent during a debate can be tricky. In addition, when an incumbent agrees to debate, it elevates his challenger as they stand on the same stage as equals. All of this played into the strategy and preparation for Obama’s debates with Romney in 2012. According to David Axelrod, the campaign knew that Romney was a skilled debater, especially since he had been campaigning all year and had participated in so many primary debates: Presidents, first of all, no one has been in their grill like that for four years, right? We had twenty-eight primary debates [in 2008]—most of them with then-Senator Clinton, who was quite a sparring partner. And then-Senator Obama was sort of in game shape. … So presidents aren’t used to this, and there is sort of a why do I have to do this attitude, even if it’s not articulated. I mean the president showed up for all the prep, read everything we asked him to read. But in a sense, it’s almost as if he showed up for a discussion, and they showed up for a debate, which is largely a performance. … Just the act of standing on that stage, it’s an elevating deal. Now the two guys are on an equal plane.47 Obama’s performance during the first debate was considered lackluster and less-than-stellar, as he was, according to his supporters, not aggressive enough in his responses to Romney’s attacks and avoided counterattacks on his Republican opponent. The consensus among most in the news media, as well as Obama’s supporters, was that he “fumbled” the debate, was not well prepared, and that he was too concerned with being a “nice guy” while on stage and seemed impatient with the entire process.48

148

IN IT TO WIN

As a result, following the first debate in 2012, polls tightened and Obama never regained the lead he had over Romney following the Democratic convention.49 And while Obama’s supporters (and many liberal commentators) began to panic somewhat over the president’s poor debate performance, and the Romney campaign enjoyed the slight bounce in the polls, the debates in 2012, or any of the previous debates dating back to the first televised debates between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 1960, had little if any effect on the election outcome. Of the many studies conducted by political scientists on the effect of presidential debates on voter choice, or whether or not a strong debate performance can clinch the election for a particular candidate, they are not the “game changers” that the news media (and even the campaigns) can make them out to be. According to political scientist John Sides, A common presumption about presidential debates is that one candidate can guarantee victory with a well-timed riposte or send their campaign into an irrevocable tailspin with an ill-timed stumble … [S]cholars who have looked most carefully at the data have found that, when it comes to shifting enough votes to decide the outcome of the election, presidential debates have rarely, if ever, mattered. The small or nonexistent movement in voters’ preferences is evident when comparing the polls before and after each debate or during the debate season as a whole. Political lore often glosses over or even ignores the polling data. Even those who do pay attention to polls often fail to separate real changes from random blips due to sampling error.50

Running mates Various considerations go into the selection of a running mate, yet the actual event of announcing the vice presidential candidate often ends

THE GENERAL ELECTION

149

up being “anticlimactic.” The main goal is to “balance the ticket” with the selection, whether in terms of political experience, geography, or ideological appeal within the party. Selecting one’s running mate requires an intense vetting process, often includes a committee of party heavy weights who participate in creating the short list, and speculation abounds in the news media leading up to the national convention. Yet, there is “little evidence that running mates normally add greatly to or detract severely from the popularity of presidential candidates with the voters.”51 While vice presidents have sparse constitutional duties (most notably, they serve as “President of the Senate,” which allows them to cast a vote only when there is a tie), it can nonetheless be an important stepping stone to the presidency as fourteen vice presidents have gone on to become president (either through succession due to death or resignation or by election in their own right). In recent presidential campaigns, women politicians have regularly made the short list of potential running mates, yet only two women to date—Geraldine Ferraro in 1984 and Sarah Palin in 2008—have been nominated for vice president by a major political party. Democratic nominee Walter Mondale made history in 1984 when he selected Representative Geraldine Ferraro of New York as his running mate. In her six-year tenure in the House of Representatives, Ferraro had gained a reputation for pursuing legislation beneficial to women’s causes, including working for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, sponsoring the Women’s Economic Equity Act ending pension discrimination against women, and seeking greater job training and opportunities for displaced homemakers. Mondale selected Ferraro (while also considering San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein) under pressure from women’s rights advocates and women’s organizations such as the National Organization for Women to place a woman on the ticket. In spite of her strong reputation as a legislator, Ferraro was considered a gamble by some political analysts, but a necessary one for Mondale to have any chance of upsetting incumbent

150

IN IT TO WIN

President Ronald Reagan that November. (Reagan would win in a landslide; the Mondale/Ferraro ticket lost every state except Mondale’s home state of Minnesota and the District of Columbia). Democrats believed that Ferraro could help Mondale close the growing gender gap, as numerous polls showed that fewer women than men supported Reagan and his policies. The first woman to be nominated on a major party ticket, Ferraro also served as a test case for the news media on how to handle a female candidate on the presidential campaign trail. While the race between Mondale and Reagan was never close during the fall of 1984, Ferraro’s presence on the ticket as the “first” woman vice presidential candidate made headlines throughout. However, stories about her family’s finances proved to be a distraction on the campaign trail.52 Ferraro’s husband, John Zaccaro, made news when he initially decided not to release his tax returns for fear it might compromise his business dealings. In her book about the campaign Ferraro: My Story, Ferraro recalled stating at a press conference, “He’s not the candidate, I am.” More than 250 reporters jammed the “disclosure” press conference when Zaccaro did release his tax returns only to learn that both Ferraro and her husband had overpaid, not underpaid, their federal income taxes.53 Similar press coverage would continue throughout the campaign, on issues ranging from Ferraro’s views on abortion as a Catholic (she was pro-choice) to how a “lady” candidate was supposed to act (e.g., should she and Mondale hug in public or merely shake hands?) to whether or not, due to her Italian heritage, her family had ties to organized crime (no evidence ever surfaced). Ferraro also recalled that conservative columnist George Will of the Washington Post wrote a scathing column about her family finances prior to the press conference at which the tax returns were disclosed. Ferraro challenged him on a national news show, saying he would have to apologize when the tax forms were revealed. Instead, Will sent her a dozen roses with a card that read, “Has anyone told you you are cute when you’re mad?”54

THE GENERAL ELECTION

151

Other stories related to the novelty of Ferraro’s campaign would include a “Convention Notebook” column in the Los Angeles Times that pondered the question: With so many Secret Service agents around, which candidate would go down the elevator first and be forced to wait in the garage for the other? The headline gave away the answer, “During Drafty Delay in a Garage, Protocol Rules It’s Ladies First.”55 Many stories also referenced Ferraro’s wardrobe; the New York Times’ story on Ferraro’s nomination described her appearance and clothing three separate times: “Mrs. Ferraro, dressed in a white suit, gave the thumbs-up sign in response to the convention” began the second paragraph of the story. Later, the story reported on Ferraro’s appearance at a fundraiser earlier in the day, “dressed in a bright turquoise dress,” and called Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill’s comments about Ferraro “avuncular.” The third reference to Ferraro’s appearance stated: “Clad in white and wearing a string of pearls about her neck, Mrs. Ferraro bounced in time to the beat of the song, ‘New York, New York,’ as, with a broad grin, she accepted waves of applause.” The news of Ferraro hugging several House colleagues whom she had not seen since Mondale had announced her candidacy was also included in the story.56 Another infamous press account occurred while Ferraro was campaigning in the South. During an August appearance in Mississippi, Jim Buck Ross, the state agriculture commissioner, quizzed Ferraro on whether or not she could bake blueberry muffins. When she responded, “I sure can. Can you?” she was informed that men in the South don’t cook. The exchange made headlines for several days in newspapers across the nation.57 After the loss in 1984, Ferraro would not return to politics until 1992. She sought the Democratic nomination in New York for the U.S. Senate that year, but lost. She ran again in 1998, and again lost in the Democratic primary. She would also work as a political analyst for CNN, and served as the ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Commission during the

152

IN IT TO WIN

Clinton administration. Ferraro made headlines during the 2008 presidential campaign; an early supporter of Hillary Clinton, Ferraro caused a stir when she commented on the success of Barack Obama’s campaign during the Democratic primaries: “If Obama was a white man, he would not be in this position. And if he was a woman (of any color) he would not be in this position. He happens to be very lucky to be who he is. And the country is caught up in the concept.”58 Ferraro was accused by many of making a racist comment, while she insisted that she was only speaking about historic candidacies. Nonetheless, within days of the story, she resigned her position on the Clinton campaign finance committee. On the nomination of Sarah Palin later that year as the second woman to run on a major party ticket for vice president, Ferraro stated her pleasure in no longer being the only woman to run for the office: “Every time a woman runs, women win.”59 Ferraro died of complications from blood cancer in 2011 at the age of 75; her political legacy remains intact as the woman “who strode onto a podium in 1984 to accept the Democratic nomination for vice president and to take her place in American history as the first woman nominated for national office by a major party” and for removing “the ‘men only’ sign from the White House door.”60 Perhaps no selection of a running mate received more media attention than John McCain’s choice of Alaska Governor Sarah Palin in 2008. The choice of Palin was an attempt by the McCain campaign to gain broader appeal both within the Republican Party and across the electorate. As a woman much younger than McCain, as a state executive, and as a social conservative, Palin initially galvanized the Republican convention and attracted voluminous media attention as something new and unexpected. Nicole Wallace, a senior advisor to the McCain campaign, recalls the selection of Palin as facing the strategic imperative of needing to win the support of some of Senator Hillary Clinton’s former supporters. We were very eager to win over women voters. We were also running in a party that was deeply unpopular and

THE GENERAL ELECTION

153

distrusted. It was a strategic imperative and, I think, personally important to John McCain to remind voters of his record of standing up against entrenched special interests and, probably more important, his own party. He sought a running mate who had done some of the same things that he had done, had stood up to special interests, had stood up to her own party, had taken a stand against corruption and was a doer and a player on the national energy scene.61 Palin was not a safe choice or an expected choice, resulting in a feedingfrenzied atmosphere as talk of the ticket dominated campaign coverage, just one day after Obama concluded his acceptance speech and closed the Democratic convention. Focus on Palin successfully cut short any postconvention Democratic bounce in opinion polls and provided an increase in interest in the Republican convention. In the immediate short term, the choice of Palin seemed inspired. Over the course of the campaign, however, she proved to be a lightning rod of both attention and controversy, often overshadowing McCain himself. Like Hillary Clinton, Palin’s relationship with the news media was somewhat unique due to her political persona, her life story, and her political ideology, yet much attention was paid to both her appearance and her family. The attention was often harsh and distracting, focusing on fashion spending sprees, her fitness for the office, her knowledge (or lack thereof) of national and international issues, and her family (including both her infant son with Down’s syndrome and her pregnant, unwed teenage daughter). Many considered Palin to be “a charismatic campaigner,” yet her lack of knowledge about national and international issues, on full display in high-profile interviews with Charles Gibson of ABC and Katie Couric of CBS “soon became a liability.” As a result, Americans began to view her as unqualified for office, particularly given McCain’s age (at 72, he was the oldest nonincumbent presidential nominee in American history) and his various health issues (including previous bouts with skin cancer); many questions

154

IN IT TO WIN

arose about presidential succession and whether or not Palin was qualified to be president.62 Palin’s political inexperience also undercut a key narrative of the McCain campaign that their candidate—a decorated Vietnam Vet who had served in Congress since 1983—had the experience to be president but Obama—a first term U.S. Senator—did not. Yet, despite McCain’s vast experience and foreign policy knowledge, and leading Obama in polling about who was better suited to be commander in chief, Obama’s message of “change” was driving the election. The Palin pick, then, was a calculated move by the McCain campaign to give up some of the experience advantage in polling to gain in the area of change.63 And while Palin did provide an initial bounce in the polls for the McCain campaign following her acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, she also provided a boost to the Obama campaign. According to Obama’s campaign manager David Plouffe, From the beginning, as much as she energized their base, and that lasted all the way through November 4, she provided us an enormous spark from the get-go. Why did we raise $150 million in September instead of $120 million? It was Sarah Palin. Why did our volunteer hours boost in September? It was Sarah Palin. It helped us both from an organizational and financial standpoint.64 On the campaign trail, Palin drew large crowds of fervent supporters. In her speeches, she did not talk much about women’s issues (which were disfavored by the Republican Party), as she claimed to be of a generation for whom gender discrimination was irrelevant. She also displayed traditional femininity: “Often clad in stiletto heels, silk skirts, and a trademark beehive hairdo, Palin embraced that most traditionally feminine justification for power—motherhood—as she showcased her large family, including her infant son, in her campaign appearances.”65 While Hillary Clinton had relied earlier in 2008 on a second wave feminism/gender equality narrative, Palin’s campaign narrative was more postfeminist: “While Clinton ran as a feminist

THE GENERAL ELECTION

155

candidate who donned pantsuits and could hold her own with the guys, Palin ran as a feminized candidate for whom feminism is passe, all the while cloaked in the trappings of conventional femininity.”66 Initial studies of Palin’s media coverage during the fall of 2008 show that she was covered differently than her Democratic counterpart, Joe Biden, as Palin received more press attention about her family and her appearance in television news and in the New York Times. In addition, Palin was more likely to be described as possessing “female” traits, such as emotionality or maternalism, or lacking “male” traits, such as competence or experience. Palin received more coverage on female issues than male issues, which is problematic since traditionally “male” issues (the economy, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) dominated the 2008 campaign.67 However, it is important to note that the McCain campaign selected Palin because of her uniqueness as a candidate, to compete against Obama’s narrative of change, and because she was viewed similarly to McCain as a “maverick.” In comparing Palin’s general election campaign to Clinton’s primary campaign in 2008, Regina Lawrence and Melody Rose conclude that both ran “as women,” but each did so differently by emphasizing “different aspects of gender—their own gender, the gender of voters, and gendered policy issues—in ways that make sense given their different party allegiances. Of course, some of these differences undoubtedly reflect the personalities and life stories of two very different women.”

68

The legacy of Palin’s campaign

may come from how she galvanized conservative women and began the “Mama Grizzlies” trend in emphasizing motherhood as a strength of character. According to political scientist Ronnee Schreiber, Republican women, on the basis of their gendered identities “encounter a special set of voter expectations that differ from Democratic women” since Democrats are relatively feminized while the GOP is more masculinized in its platform and image. In addition, social conservatives believe that women should prioritize their roles as mothers; Palin’s labeling herself a “hockey mom” played well

156

IN IT TO WIN

with the conservative base of the party as Republican voters tend to prefer women candidates who have children.69 It is also instructive to remember that running mates must adhere to the narrative set out by the candidate who chooses them, which also played a prominent role in Palin’s candidacy as “significant differences of gender-office congruency would seem to make the vice presidential post, with its ‘running mate’ expectations, somewhat easier for a more traditionally feminine woman to persuasively embody. After all, one does not run independently for the vice presidency but rather is called to service.”70

Conclusion From start to finish, a presidential campaign is a long, arduous process filled with campaign appearances, ads, debates, interviews, fundraisers, focus groups, public opinion polls, and perhaps above all else, strategies. While the general election may be the shortest of the three phases of a presidential campaign—ten weeks, give or take, following the national conventions until Election Day in November—the strategic choices made by each campaign are even more important as the race is narrowed to just two major party candidates. As we have discussed throughout this chapter, the most important strategic aspects of a general election campaign focus on money (how to raise it and how to spend it) and whether or not to accept public financing; the Electoral College (how to compete in the handful of swing states that will decide the election); voter turnout and demographics (how to appeal to key groups, like independents, women, or the growing Latino voting bloc, in swing states); campaign communications (how to craft, and control, a positive campaign narrative amidst the ever-changing and hypercompetitive media environment); debate performances (how to burnish a candidate’s image and, even more importantly, to do no harm to one’s campaign), and selecting a

THE GENERAL ELECTION

157

running mate (balancing the ticket in a way that might appeal to undecided voters). Given all of these factors as well as the current political environment, along with the strategic successes and failures from the past two presidential campaigns, how does gender fit into the strategic equation as we look ahead to 2016 and beyond? In nearly all of the important strategic aspects of a general election campaign, gender would not factor in that heavily. At the top of the ticket, if a woman candidate had earned her party’s nomination, she would be the standard bearer for that party and would presumably have the support of the party’s base. To get to the general election, one must not only succeed in the invisible primary, but survive the gauntlet of primary and caucus contests throughout the previous winter and spring months. In addition, the national convention unifies the party (in most cases) and launches the nominee into the general election campaign with as much excitement as possible. At the start of a general election campaign, with the sprint to the finish line, campaign advisors and strategists would not be wringing their hands over whether or not a woman could get elected, but would be focused solely on making sure they did everything in their power to get their candidate, male or female, to the White House. While we will never know if Hillary Clinton would have beat John McCain in 2008 had she become the Democratic nominee, it is safe to assume that simply being a woman would not have derailed her; she would have had access to similar money and resources that the Obama campaign enjoyed, and she would have also benefitted from a political environment that was a steep climb for the Republican ticket at that moment in political history. Obviously, many dynamics and narratives would have been different had Clinton been the nominee and not Obama, but the strategy of running against McCain, as well as the favorable demographics and Electoral College map for a Democrat in 2008, would not have changed much at all. It is hard to imagine Democratic voters not rallying behind a Clinton general election campaign, particularly with the historic significance

158

IN IT TO WIN

of electing the first woman president, and given the issue intensity in the election that year, voter turnout would have remained strong. To extend the “what if ” scenario a bit further, Clinton as the nominee would have probably meant that Palin would not have been selected as McCain’s running mate, and while a different running mate would have changed the narrative of the campaign, vice presidential candidates rarely make a difference in the election outcome. That is not to say, however, that a woman would not face any unique challenges on the general election campaign trail; we know, for example, that media coverage can differ for women candidates at the national level. However, with so little data available, and the most salient case studies being Clinton and Palin from 2008, there is no empirical data to suggest that simply being a woman cost Clinton the nomination, or that Palin’s candidacy cost McCain the presidency. The challenges that matter most during the general election campaign are there for any candidate, like voter turnout in key districts within swing states that can tip the Electoral College in a particular candidate’s favor. If anything, a general election campaign with the potential to make history by electing a woman president could very well provide the right kind of voter enthusiasm to push that candidate over the top. While we know that media coverage can still differ for women candidates versus male candidates in politics, stories about a woman candidate’s wardrobe or those that focus on “female” traits or issues is not enough to stop a major party nominee from getting elected; a woman candidate is a woman, after all, and a woman who was won her party’s nomination would obviously have broad voter appeal and be a skilled politician (as have been all of the male nominees, in many different ways, in the modern era of presidential politics). Many more women presidential and vice presidential candidates will need to run before a clearer picture can emerge about what difference, if any, gender will make on the presidential campaign trail. We learned little about

THE GENERAL ELECTION

159

this from Palin’s campaign and certainly nothing that can be generalized about a woman running at the national level. Palin became such a media sensation and a political celebrity that her candidacy almost took on a life of its own, often overshadowing the top of the ticket. As with Clinton in 2008, the Palin candidacy did highlight at times how badly some in the news media can behave toward women, yet some of the more general coverage was unique to Palin and not what every woman candidate would necessarily face. Palin’s inexperience in national politics, lack of knowledge about many important national and international issues, and many gaffes contributed to her negative coverage and narrative, as the uniqueness of her personal story and being a fresh face on the political scene also gained her legions of loyal followers and provided an initial bounce in polling for the McCain campaign. It is important to remember that, for better or worse and regardless of gender, a candidate brings their political experiences, family members, and life history into a campaign. While narrative and media coverage certainly matter, they are only two factors in a process that includes both institutional and constitutional requirements that make up the real “nuts and bolts” of a winning general election campaign.

Notes 1 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2012, 2. 2

Participation in the tax checkoff program has declined each year, from a high of 28.7 percent for 1980 returns to 6 percent for returns filed with the IRS in 2013. See Presidential Fund Income Tax Check-Off Status, 1992–2013, Federal Election Commission, available at http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/pres_cf/ PresidentialFundStatus_September2012.pdf.

3

Jim Rutenberg, “Nearing Record, Obama’s Ad Effort Swamps McCain,” New York Times, October 17, 2008, p. A1.

4

“Presidential Election Campaign Fund,” Federal Election Commission, available at http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml.

160

IN IT TO WIN

5

See Thomas E. Mann, “Reform Agenda,” in The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook, eds. Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, and Trevor Potter (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).

6

Jonathan Weisman and Michael D. Shear, “Obama, McCain Aim to Curb ‘527s,’ ” Washington Post, May 14, 2008, p. A6.

7

Andrew Dowdle, Randall E. Adkins, Karen Sebold, and Patrick A. Stewart, “Financing the 2012 Presidential Election in a Post-Citizens United World,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 163, 168.

8

Dowdle, Adkins, Sebold, and Stewart, “Financing the 2012 Presidential Election in a Post-Citizens United World,” 169.

9

“Gingrich: Romney ‘Carpet Bombing’ Rival with Ads,” Associated Press, January 29, 2012, available at http://news.yahoo.com/gingrich-romney-carpet-bombing-rival -ads-144744488.html.

10 Dowdle, Adkins, Sebold, and Stewart, “Financing the 2012 Presidential Election in a Post-Citizens United World,” 171. 11 For a discussion on the origins of the Electoral College, as well as current campaign strategies associated with it, see Chapters 2 and 3 in Lori Cox Han and Diane J. Heith, Presidents and the American Presidency (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013). 12 See Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York, NY: Macmillan Press, 1993). 13 Quote by Romney campaign political director Rich Beeson in Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, 226. 14 See Cronin and Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency. For a full discussion on the Electoral College, see also George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College is Bad for America, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); Gary Bugh, ed., Electoral College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010). 15 Dan Morain, “Electoral Vote Measure Fails to Make June Ballot,” Los Angeles Times, December 7, 2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-electoral7dec07 -story.html. 16 Micah Cohen, “Can Democrats Turn Texas and Arizona Blue by 2016?” New York Times, March 1, 2013, available at http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes .com/2013/03/01/can-democrats-turn-texas-and-arizona-blue-by-2016/. 17 Gerald M. Pomper, “The Presidential Election: Voting for Parties and Principles,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 41. 18 The classic works on voting behavior include, among others, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York,

THE GENERAL ELECTION

161

NY: Wiley, 1960); V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 19 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2012, 82. 20 See Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952–1996, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Martin P. Wattenberg, The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential Elections of the 1980s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 21 Charles L. Prysby, “Explaining the Presidential Vote,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 117. 22 Richard Wolffe, The Message: The Reselling of President Obama (New York, NY: Twelve/Hachette Book Group, 2013), 134–9. 23 Pomper, “The Presidential Election: Voting for Parties and Principles,” 41. 24 Pomper, “The Presidential Election: Voting for Parties and Principles,” 45–8. 25 Michael D. Shear and Juliet Eilperin, “McCain Stakes His Campaign on New Hampshire,” Washington Post, November 18, 2007, available at http://www .washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/17/AR2007111701625.html. 26 Stephen E. Frantzich, “ ‘Are We Halfway There Yet?’ New Technology and the 2012 Election,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 90. 27 John Allen Hendricks, “The New-Media Campaign of 2012,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 148–9. 28 Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 200. 29 “The State of the News Media 2012,” Pew Research Center for People and the Press, March 19, 2012, available at http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/overview-4/. 30 “Internet Gains Most as Campaign News Source But Cable TV Still Leads,” Pew Research Center for People and the Press, October 25, 2012, available at http://www .journalism.org/2012/10/25/social-media-doubles-remains-limited/. 31 “The Master Character Narratives in Campaign 2012,” Pew Research Center for People and the Press, August 23, 2012, available at http://www.journalism .org/2012/08/23/2012-campaign-character-narratives/. 32 “The Final Days of the Media Campaign 2012,” Pew Research Center for People and the Press, November 19, 2012, available at http://www.journalism.org/2012/11/19/ final-days-media-campaign-2012/. 33 Farnsworth and Lichter, The Nightly News Nightmare, 3. 34 Polsby, Wildavsky, Schier, and Hopkins, Presidential Elections, 203.

162

IN IT TO WIN

35 Mark Blumenthal, “Race Matters: Why Gallup Poll Finds Less Support for President Obama,” Huffington Post, June 17, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost .com/2012/06/17/gallup-poll-race-barack-obama_n_1589937.html. 36 “Romney 49%, Obama 48% in Gallup’s Final Election Survey,” Gallup, November 5, 2012, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/158519/romney-obama-gallup-final -election-survey.aspx. 37 Farnsworth and Lichter, The Nightly News Nightmare, 5. 38 Henry C. Kenski and Kate M. Kenski, “Explaining the Vote in the Election of 2012: Obama’s Reelection,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 173. 39 Kenski and Kenski, “Explaining the Vote in the Election of 2012: Obama’s Reelection,” 173–4. 40 See Darrell M. West, Air Wars: Television Advertising and Social Media in Election Campaigns 1952–2012, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013). 41 John C. Tedesco and Scott W. Dunn, “Political Advertising in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 91–2. 42 Quote by David Axelrod in Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, 195. 43 Kenski and Kenski, “Explaining the Vote in the Election of 2012: Obama’s Reelection,” 186. 44 Lisa de Moraes, “About 67 Million People Watch First Presidential Debate, Washington Post, October 4, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/tv-column/post/fox-news-channel-scores-most-viewers-for-debate-according -to-early-stats/2012/10/04/9538a3b4-0e4c-11e2-bd1a-b868e65d57eb_blog.html. 45 “Big Bird,” Obama 2012 campaign ad, The Living Room Candidate, available at http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/2012. 46 “Binders full of women” even has its own Wikipedia page: http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Binders_full_of_women. 47 Axelrod, Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012, 210–2. 48 Jessica Yellen, “Analysis: Five Reasons the President Fumbled the Debate,” CNN, October 5, 2012, available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/04/politics/debate -fumble/index.html. 49 “Presidential Race Dead Even; Romney Maintains Turnout Edge,” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, October 29, 2012, available at http://www .people-press.org/2012/10/29/presidential-race-dead-even-romney-maintains -turnout-edge/.

THE GENERAL ELECTION

163

50 John Sides, “Do Presidential Debates Really Matter?” Washington Monthly, September/October 2012, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ magazine/septemberoctober_2012/ten_miles_square/do_presidential_debates _really039413.php. 51 See Polsby, Wildovsky, Schier, and Hopkins, Presidential Elections, 138–42. 52 Polsby, Wildovsky, Schier, and Hopkins, Presidential Elections, 141. 53 Geraldine Ferraro with Linda Bird Francke, Ferraro: My Story (New York, NY: Bantam, 1985), 174–80. 54 Ferraro with Francke, Ferraro: My Story, 179–80. 55 “Convention Notebook: During Drafty Delay in a Garage, Protocol Rules It’s Ladies First,” Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1984, p. A7. 56 Jane Perlez, “ ‘Gerry, Gerry,’ the Convention Chants,” New York Times, July 20, 1984, p. A1. 57 Bernard Weinraub, “Mississippi Farm Topic: Does She Bake Muffins?” New York Times, August 2, 1984, p. 16. 58 Jim Farber, “Geraldine Ferraro Lets Her Emotions Do the Talking,” Daily Breeze, March 7, 2008. 59 Julia Baird, “From Seneca Falls to … Sarah Palin?” Newsweek, September 13, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/158893/page/1. 60 Douglas Martin, “Geraldine A. Ferraro, 1935-2011: She Ended the Men’s Club of National Politics,” New York Times, March 26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes .com/2011/03/27/us/politics/27geraldine-ferraro.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 61 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, ed., Electing the President 2008: The Insider’s View (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 13–14. 62 Polsby, Wildavsky, Schier, and Hopkins, Presidential Elections, 141–2. 63 Quote by McCain’s campaign manager Rick Davis in Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008, 169. 64 Quote by Obama’s campaign manager David Plouffe in Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008, 167. 65 Lawrence and Rose, “The Race for the Presidency,” 76. 66 Regina G. Lawrence and Melody Rose, “The Real ’08 Fight: Clinton vs. Palin,” in Women & Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 29. 67 See Gina Serignese Woodall, Kim L. Fridkin, and Jill Carle, “ ‘Sarah Palin: Beauty is Beastly?’ An Exploratory Content Analysis of Media Coverage,” in Cracking the

164

IN IT TO WIN

Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office, ed. Rainbow Murray (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010); Kim L. Fridkin, Jill Carle, and Gina Serignese Woodall, “The Vice Presidency as the New Glass Ceiling: Media Coverage of Sarah Palin,” in Women & Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013). 68 Lawrence and Rose, “The Race for the Presidency,” 76. 69 Ronnee Schreiber, “Conservative Women Run for Office,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 112–4. 70 Lawrence and Rose, “The Race for the Presidency,” 76.

6 A look ahead: 2016 and beyond Every four years, in the weeks and months that follow each presidential campaign, journalists, pundits, and other so-called political experts offer their thoughts, opinions, and analysis about why a particular candidate or party lost their bid for the White House. Answers can range from bad messaging, not enough money, low voter turnout in swing states, unpopularity of the party’s brand, a poor debate performance, unfair media coverage, or just being the wrong candidate at the wrong political moment. While some combination of these and other factors may be partially true, there is no simple answer to the question: Why did this presidential candidate win and why did this presidential candidate lose? As we have discussed throughout this book, multiple factors play a role in a candidate’s success or failure; the final analysis of any campaign comes down to lots of data plus nuanced and sometimes intangible variables. In 2012, there were many reasons why Barack Obama won and many reasons why Mitt Romney lost, and many of those factors overlapped. It is not as simple as saying “Obama was the incumbent,” since we know that many aspects of the Obama presidency—like mediocre approval ratings and a high unemployment rate—worked against his reelection more than it helped. Similarly, saying that Romney lost because of his comments during a private fundraiser about how 47 percent of Americans are dependent on government and would therefore never vote for him, or because pro-Romney Super PACs spent too much money on negative advertising are

166

IN IT TO WIN

only two factors out of many that contributed to the overall dynamic of the campaign. The bottom line is that when it comes to presidential campaigns, there is no simple or easy answer for who wins, who loses, and why; in the final analysis, it’s complicated. The same is true when asking the question, why haven’t we yet elected a woman president in the United States? Saying that a woman candidate— whether Hillary Clinton in 2008, Michele Bachmann in 2012, or any other woman who has run—lost their White House bid simply because she was a woman is a superficial answer that lacks empirical evidence or even a thoughtful analysis. The main goal of this book has been to determine what we know about presidential campaigns and elections, combined with what we know about women as candidates, to determine if significant barriers exist for electing a woman president. Political scientists have developed wellresearched and substantive theories, designed predictive models based on cutting-edge methodologies, and explained voting trends in recent decades that make us much more informed about the political process overall. Yet, as much as we know about voting behavior, we will never have a definitive answer that applies to every voter in America as to what motivates them in voting for a particular candidate, aligning with a particular party, or, in simply not voting at all. Women in politics still face some barriers, but many have been broken down in the past two decades as more women have entered the political arena, won political offices, and held politically powerful positions. We also know that some advantages exist for women candidates in certain situations, such as fundraising among certain ideological groups, or enjoying the “outsider” label in certain campaigns (since American voters seem to dislike, and distrust, incumbent politicians). Perhaps the most important potential barrier for a woman winning the White House, or becoming vice president, is simply the fact that fewer women are choosing to run for political office. That translates into fewer women in the political pipeline, and, most importantly, fewer qualified women in the on-deck circle to occupy the top spots on each party’s national ticket every four years.

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

167

In this concluding chapter, we look at the current political environment and what that might mean for the viability of a woman presidential and/or vice presidential candidate in 2016 and beyond. In addition, we will assess the short list of women presidential and vice presidential candidates for both Democrats and Republicans in the coming years. As some political scientists who study presidential elections have pointed out, there are many reasons to be optimistic about the prospects of electing a woman president or vice president in the near future, suggesting that Clinton’s “near-miss campaign” in 2008 may mean “that many Americans no longer reject the prospect of a female chief executive.”1 In addition, Stephen J. Wayne points out that “The gender barrier fell for vice presidential nominations in 1984 when the Democrats chose Geraldine Ferraro and in 2008 when the Republicans selected Sarah Palin. Hillary Rodham Clinton’s nearly successful quest for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008 suggests that gender may no longer be a barrier to presidential nominations.”2 Building on the past two presidential elections and then looking forward, what might the political future hold?

Possible contenders Some of the most common questions that arise when discussing the possibility of electing a woman president focus not only on who and when, but also whether or not the first woman president will be a Democrat or Republican. In addition, many ask, will we elect a woman vice president first? And, does age and political experience matter more for a woman, meaning, is there a narrower window of opportunity to be the right age for a woman candidate (beyond child bearing/raising years yet not “too old”) and a higher bar for political accomplishments? Would a woman candidate with Barack Obama’s 2008 resume be seen as not experienced enough to be president, or too old to be president if she were the same age as John McCain

168

IN IT TO WIN

(who was 72) in 2008? The only real answer to any of these questions will come from voters who will decide when more women seek the presidency. For now, the good news is that in addition to Hillary Clinton, several other women politicians in both parties are potential presidential and/or vice presidential candidates. Let’s begin with Clinton, who has been considered the Democratic frontrunner for 2016 since Obama’s reelection in 2012. If she decides to seek the presidency a second time, there are many pros and cons to a Clinton candidacy, and despite media speculation that she would win, we know that there are no guarantees in presidential politics. Clinton’s status as the Democratic front-runner by early 2015 came from her name recognition, political star power, and fundraising ability. Regarding the latter, a big political name such as Clinton can, in effect, freeze out the field (as in, big money contributors) while considering a run. While major donors are waiting to see if someone like Clinton enters a race, other potential candidates cannot secure their backing. The Ready for Hillary Super PAC has also been fundraising and laying the groundwork for a potential Clinton White House bid since January 2013. The group, which has capped contributions at $25,000 despite being able to raise unlimited funds, raised more than $4 million in 2013 as part of what it calls its “grassroots” effort to get Clinton to run.3 In addition, Clinton’s time as Secretary of State allowed her not only to step back from politics somewhat (which increased her popularity) but garnered her international experience that is seen by many voters as an important quality in presidential candidates. In the summer of 2014, Clinton embarked on a national book tour/media blitz to promote her new book, Hard Choices, which many believed was a test case for a possible presidential run in 2016 as “every aspect of the upcoming book launch is being evaluated as possible strategy in a yet-undeclared presidential campaign.”4

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

169

The book tour, which saturated the news media for several weeks with constant news about Clinton and speculation about a potential presidential campaign, also brought with it some negative press from a few verbal missteps on Clinton’s behalf. Her comments about the Clinton’s debt (due to legal bills) at the end of her husband’s presidential term in 2001 (according to Clinton, they were “dead broke” when they left the White House) suggested to many political watchers that the Clintons were out of touch with average Americans. Two weeks later, she said in an interview that she “regretted” the “inartful” way she made the comment.5 Questions have also been raised about her age (she will turn 69 just thirteen days before the election on November 8, 2016, which would make her the second oldest president ever elected behind Ronald Reagan, who was just weeks shy of his seventieth birthday in 1980) and her health (stemming from a concussion she received in December 2012 when she fainted from dehydration while battling a stomach virus). It is important to note, however, that the age and health of a presidential candidate has been a legitimate topic of conversation throughout the modern era of presidential politics, and this was not an example of gender bias in news coverage.6 Clinton’s popularity has also declined since she left the Obama administration,7 which is not all that surprising given that she has since been reengaging in politics as opposed to the diplomatic and mostly above politics role that the position of Secretary of State has taken on in recent decades. While Clinton began to distance herself from some of the Obama administration’s foreign policy decisions, and thus some of Obama’s unpopularity among voters, doing so since leaving the Obama administration also risked losing support among the Obama faithful within the Democratic Party (and those who did not vote for her in 2008).8 Despite the consensus among some in the press that Clinton would run, and would win, not every journalist is on the same page about

170

IN IT TO WIN

Clinton’s candidacy. For example, according to Andrew Sullivan, writer and political commentator, Clinton has a “vacuity” problem: If you ask of Clinton what she’s fighting for, what she believes in, if you want to get her to disagree with you on something, good luck. Any actual politics right now would tarnish the inevitability of a resumeled coronation. … She remains scarred by the 1990s, understandably so. But the country has moved on in a way she seems to find hard to comprehend.9 Sullivan’s views, and those of others not on the media “Hillary for President” bandwagon, point to what has been perhaps Clinton’s biggest weakness as a presidential candidate in 2016, which is one of the same weaknesses that hurt her campaign in 2008: She has tremendous political baggage and she remains a divisive political figure, which can be a tremendous hurdle to overcome while running for president. Beyond Clinton, other women politicians are also considered rising stars of their respective parties with much potential to compete for higher political office in the coming years. Possible women contenders from the Democratic Party are only now being talked about as Obama nears the end of his two-term presidency. (No candidate emerged to challenge Obama in the Democratic primaries in 2012; the last significant challenge to an incumbent president from within his own party came in 1980, with U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts beating President Jimmy Carter in several primaries before Carter eventually won the nomination). Some of the most notable Democratic women deserving of a presidential/vice presidential short list include:

Maria Cantwell—U.S. Senator from Washington, elected in 2000,

l

reelected in 2006 and 2012, and former business executive. Has chaired the Senate committees on Small Business and Indian Affairs.

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND



l

171

Kirsten Gillibrand—U.S. Senator from New York, appointed in 2009, won special election in 2010, reelected to a full term in 2012. Has served on the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations committees, as well as the Environment and Public Works and Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry committees.



l

Kamala Harris—California Attorney General, elected in 2010, reelected in 2014, and former district attorney of San Francisco. She is the first woman, first African American, and first Asian American to serve as attorney general in California. Has policy experience in the areas of gun control, housing, education, the environment, and violent/hate/financial crimes.



l

Maggie Hassan—Governor of New Hampshire, elected in 2012, reelected in 2014, and former majority leader of the New Hampshire Senate. Has public policy experience among a wide array of issues, including bill sponsorship, in the areas of economic development, energy, health care, and education.



l

Amy Klobuchar—U.S. Senator from Minnesota, elected in 2006, reelected in 2012, and former county attorney for Hannepin County (MN). Has served on the following committees: Judiciary; Commerce, Science, and Transportation; Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; and Rules and Administration.



l

Elizabeth Warren—U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, elected in 2012, former Harvard Law School professor and special advisor to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Serves on the Senate committees of Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; and Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.



l

Debbie Wasserman Schultz—U.S. Representative from Florida’s 23rd District, elected in 2004, and current chair of the Democratic National

172

IN IT TO WIN

Committee. Former member of the Florida House of Representatives and Senate. Serves on the House Appropriations committee and is one of the chief deputy whips for the Democratic Party. Among the most notable Republican women who could be potential presidential or vice presidential candidates include:

l

Kelly Ayotte—U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, elected in 2010, former New Hampshire Attorney General. Has served on the Senate Armed Services committee, as well as the Budget, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Commerce, Science, and Transportation committees.



l

Marcia Blackburn—U.S. Representative from Tennessee’s 7th District, elected in 2002, former minority whip in the Tennessee State Senate. Serves as the vice chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and also serves on the House Budget Committee.



l

Mary Fallin—Governor of Oklahoma, elected in 2010, reelected in 2014, former member of the U.S. House of Representatives, lieutenant governor of Oklahoma, and member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives. She is the former chair of the National Governors Association, and is the first woman to serve as governor of Oklahoma.



l

Deb Fisher—U.S. Senator from Nebraska, elected in 2012, former member of the Nebraska Legislature. Has served on the following committees: Armed Services; Commerce, Science, and Transportation; Environment and Public Works; Indian Affairs; and Small Business and Entrepreneurship.



l

Nicki Haley—Governor of South Carolina, elected in 2010, reelected in 2014, former member of the South Carolina House of Representatives. She is the first woman to serve as governor of South Carolina, and is known for her fiscal conservatism and commitment to lower taxes and smaller government.

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND



l

173

Susana Martinez—Governor of New Mexico, elected in 2010, reelected in 2014, former district attorney for the 3rd Judicial District of Dona Ana County in New Mexico. She is the first woman to serve as governor of New Mexico and the first Latina governor elected in the United States. She is known for fiscal conservative policies, including tax cuts, and a commitment to education reforms.



Cathy McMorris Rodgers—U.S. Representative from Washington’s 5th

l

District, elected in 2004, former member of the Washington House of Representatives. Currently serving as the chair of the House Republican Conference, and serves on the House Energy and Commerce Committee.

l

Lisa Murkowski—U.S. Senator from Alaska, appointed in 2002, reelected in 2004 and 2010, former member of the Alaska House of Representatives. Serves as the chair of the Senate committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and has also served on the Appropriations; the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; and the Indian Affairs committees.

Electing madam president: Is a gendered strategy necessary? In assessing the current political environment, and how that will play a role in determining the field of presidential contenders in the next election cycle, several factors must be considered. The state of the two major parties, campaign finance, and the news media as an industry are just a few parts of the equation. In addition, with no incumbent president seeking reelection, both parties will have competitive primary seasons. This may provide opportunities for women candidates to emerge either during the invisible primary and the nomination process or during the selection of running mates. And when they do, will they need a gendered strategy in order to compete and win?

174

IN IT TO WIN

Political parties: When considering the state of the two parties, there is no sign that the hyperpartisanship and ideological polarization between Democrats and Republicans will ease anytime in the near future. This has caused ideological homogenization within both parties, meaning that those in office representing each party have moved more to the left and right, respectively, leaving little room for political compromise or bipartisanship in Washington. This trend has been even more pronounced among Republicans, whose ideological shift to the right was on full display among the Republican presidential candidates in 2012, which presented a challenge to some, especially Mitt Romney, given “ … the fact that the Republican Party was ideologically homogenized as the conservative party in American politics and was becoming much more so as the 2012 race began.”10 The 2012 election was one of the most partisan presidential elections in recent history. Obama won by winning the votes of a Democratic majority; in 2012, 38 percent of voters identified themselves as a Democrat while 32 percent identified themselves as a Republican. Nearly all partisan voters, at 92 percent, voted along their partisan affiliation when choosing a president. Independents were nearly split between Obama and Romney. Party identification is still the most important predictor of voting behavior, as it is a “meaningful attachment that affects how people think and act in the political sphere. Americans support policies that are advocated for by their partisan leaders, vote along their partisan affiliation, and evaluate government through a partisan prism.”11 However, this continuing trend presents a potential danger for Republicans in future presidential elections, as we know that Republican candidates are doing worse among demographic groups that make up a growing share of the electorate. Demographic trends show a Republican Party that is becoming increasingly older, whiter, and more centered in parts of the country such as Southern states. At the same time, the overall demographic trend in the United States shows a population that is becoming more diverse, with particular growth among Latino voters as a crucial voting bloc for successful

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

175

candidates. While history shows that parties tend to moderate their message after an overwhelming electoral defeat, as Democrats began to do after Ronald Reagan’s landslide reelection in 1984, such a move risks alienating the party’s base. Some political scientists have argued that the center of the ideological spectrum in American politics—meaning the independent voters that have always been thought to determine the outcome of presidential elections—is shrinking due to the continued partisan polarization. The base of the Republican Party is perhaps more conservative than it has ever been, and the base of either party constitutes its more active and supportive members (in terms of not only voting, but financial support as well). While Republican congressional candidates maintain an advantage from partisan gerrymandering of House seats, which may allow Republicans to maintain control in the House for many years, the situation at the national level and in large states with diverse populations is a different story: “Whether these trends are because of bad messaging or a bad message, if they continue the party may soon be unable to compete at the national level. … Future Republican nominees would need to win [among white voters] by overwhelming margins to even come close to a popular vote majority, and in 20 years even that might not be enough.”12 This poses an additional challenge for women politicians within the Republican Party due to conflicting conservative values about the proper role of women in the public sphere, presenting an “additional test for Republican women candidates as they decide whether or not their candidacies are viable and also how to frame their messages as they campaign.” As we saw with Sarah Palin’s campaign in 2008 and Michele Bachmann’s campaign in 2012, emphasizing traditional female qualities like motherhood can help gain support from social conservatives, “but also might cast them as being too feminized for leadership duties by some male Republican voters.”13 While women in the Democratic Party are more likely to gain support and receive encouragement to run for office from both party officials and interest

176

IN IT TO WIN

groups, developing the appropriate message based on gendered expectations for leadership remains a challenge for women candidates in both parties. As political scientist Ronnee Schreiber argues, the extent to which motherhood should matter for women is not new but does reveal the challenges that all women, regardless of partisan affiliation, face as they seek political influence as elected officials. Feminist and conservative women activists have long invoked their identities as mothers in politics, in part because it gave, and continues to give, women legitimacy to act in the public sphere. Whether or not this holds true for women running for office is less clear.14 This is related to the question of whether or not a woman presidential candidate needs a gendered strategy, but perhaps suggests that such a strategy is unique to each woman candidate, her leadership and campaign style, and current circumstances within the political environment. We can assume that strong leadership qualities, especially as they are tied to the president’s role as commander in chief, will remain an important evaluative mechanism for voters as foreign policy issues continue to dominate the political agenda. Whether or not this is a disadvantage for a woman candidate is not so clear, as much of the policy positioning on key international issues would be dictated more by partisanship than any other factor. The specific circumstances of a particular election also play a role. For example, in July 2008, John McCain was an overwhelming favorite in national polling when asked whether he or Barack Obama was better suited to serve as commander in chief (not surprising given McCain’s experience and much-longer resume in dealing with foreign policy). Yet, according to McCain pollster Bill McInturff, it was not enough to close the enthusiasm gap for Obama: In July, our candidate was up by twenty-five to twenty-eight points on commander-in-chief and up by thirty points on experience, but we were

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

177

losing the election by eight or nine points. If people value the commanderin-chief and experience and you have those attributes by twenty-five to thirty points and you are losing by eight, you’ve got some demonstration that those attributes are not driving the ballot.15 While only one small data point, it does demonstrate how the situation on the ground at any given moment in a campaign can dictate the outcome, and how an issue such as who is best suited to be commander in chief, long thought to be a hindrance for women candidates, may not always be a defining factor. Obviously, a woman presidential candidate will need to show foreign policy knowledge and expertise, just as any presidential candidate needs to do. But, there may also be times when other domestic issues outweigh the commander in chief question for voters. Newer research by women and politics scholars is beginning to show some rethinking of the conventional wisdom about the “double binds” that women candidates face. The current political environment, as well as a candidate’s personal and political history, must also be considered to determine if, or how much of, a gendered strategy may be necessary in strategic decisions such as campaign messaging. Yet, as Regina Lawrence and Melody Rose correctly argue, as [Hillary] Clinton’s case suggests, gender stereotypes are not by themselves an adequate explanation for the United States’ failure so far to elect a female president. … Any female candidate who enters presidential politics will be presented with tactical choices that either stabilize or topple her balance between competing gravitational pulls: demonstrating proper “femininity” along with the required “toughness” for the Oval Office.16 Money: Adequately financing a campaign, from start to finish, is also among the tactical choices that a woman presidential candidate must address. As Victoria Farrar-Myers and Brent D. Boyea remind us, while the pathway to the White House, the governor’s mansion, or any elective office must be paved in gold … gender does not have to be a barrier to

178

IN IT TO WIN

achieving financial viability. Female candidates for governor, the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and even the presidency, have proven to be successful fund-raisers and to have done it as well as, if not better than, men.17 However, women candidates, and particularly Republican women, have traditionally not done as well with moneyed interests (namely, business PACs), which can be seen as a structural barrier for electing a woman president since the political “gatekeepers” (not only those who recruit candidates but fund them as well) are more likely to seek men than women to run for office. Yet, campaign finance data in recent years has shown that women candidates tend to draw a higher percentage of their PAC funds from single-issue/ideological PACs. Also, the Citizens United ruling in 2010 now allows corporations and labor unions to spend freely on electioneering through Super PACs as long as the activities are not coordinated with a campaign. While labor union PACs tend to favor women congressional candidates but at smaller overall contributions than corporate PACs, one might also conclude that corporate Super PACs and labor Super PACs would also disproportionately favor male candidates, resulting “in another structural barrier to the advancement of women through the political pipeline.”18 As a result, women candidates must find more than one pathway to financial viability, and relying on Obama’s model of fundraising from 2008 might be particularly useful given that he complimented the need for big money contributors with small donors who generated a broad base of electoral support. Not only did we see a similar strategy in Michele Bachmann’s fundraising during 2011, but also to some extent in Sarah Palin’s fundraising prior to 2012 as she contemplated a presidential run. This is good news for women candidates due to a greater dependence on individual and single-issue/ideological PAC contributions as they tend to be more grass roots in nature, thus building that broader base of support among voters. As Farrar-Myers and Boyea conclude,

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

179

Although small donors constitute only one ingredient of achieving financial viability, they offer a route to the White House whose potential, before Obama, was not fully appreciated. … In a way, the campaign financing experience of women may be putting the old adage of “what does not kill you makes you stronger” into action. By being forced to overcome structural barriers and to find alternative ways to achieve financial viability, women who succeed initially in building individual donor support may be better situated to find success on their pathway to higher office and eventually the White House.19 Media: The conventional wisdom about media coverage of women candidates has always been that gender bias exists, and that it is keeping a woman from winning the White House. Yet, while many studies have documented incidences in news stories that focus on a woman candidate’s appearance, or stories that provide more coverage about the personal lives and/or novelty of a woman candidate, and even studies that have shown news coverage focusing more on domestic issues as related to women candidates than on foreign policy and/or economic issues, no empirical evidence exists to prove that such coverage changes the minds of enough voters to alter the outcome of the election. As Deborah Jordan Brooks concludes, while coverage that focuses on appearance and family members may have “face validity” for women candidates, “a causal link between that kind of coverage and its effect on women candidates vis-à-vis the public has not been established.”20 News coverage of a campaign is just one of many factors that create the political environment in which a candidate seeks political office; media coverage alone does not stop a woman from getting elected, unless she has a campaign plagued with scandals, which would seriously harm any candidate’s chances of getting elected, regardless of gender. The broader issue about media coverage that deserves attention is related to political socialization. Young women in America need positive role models,

180

IN IT TO WIN

particularly in encouraging them to seek political careers, and mass media that degrade and hypersexualize women is harmful in this regard, as well as many others. It is also important to consider the state of the news media as an industry and what drives “news” as we currently know it. The news is a profit-driven industry, news is fragmented, and numerous media scholars in recent decades have documented the ill-effects from this on a well-functioning deliberative democracy.21 If voters are not as informed as they should be, or are choosing not to participate in the political process (and thus avoiding their civic duty as an American citizen), we know that the news media play a significant role as the overwhelmingly sole source of political information. There is a distinct difference between “news” and “journalism;” the former is a product to be consumed, and the latter, in its ideal form, provides substantive information that informs citizens about their governing and political processes. Political scientist Tom Patterson argues that we desperately need a “knowledgebased journalism” because Americans are “mired in misinformation.” While changes in communication have played a role in creating the situation, Americans have also been “ill-served by the intermediaries—the journalists, politicians, talk show hosts, pundits, and bloggers—that claim to be their trusted guides.”22 The competiveness of the media industry, as well as ever-expanding technology, has also dramatically changed the political environment for politicians and voters alike. Despite early predictions by some that the Internet and mobile technologies would usher in an era of highly informed and connected citizens, such a revolution has yet to occur. As media scholar Robert McChesney argues, “Now that capitalism is in the midst of a global crisis with no apparent end and the state of democratic governance, in the United States at least, is appalling, it seems high time to take a more critical look at the relationship of the Internet to capitalism and both of them to democracy.”23

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

181

Why is understanding the state of the news media important when thinking about electing a woman president? In the context of assessing the extent of gender bias in news media coverage of women candidates, it should not be that surprising to see some attention paid to what a woman candidate is wearing, how she styles her hair, or other superficial information in a news environment that is saturated with soft news, celebrity-driven infotainment, and stories that emphasize personality and drama over substance. It is unrealistic to expect that the competitive, bottom-line nature of selling news as a product that has been so prevalent in the news media industry for the past two-plus decades would cover politics differently than the rest of what constitutes news. While we should have higher expectations for news coverage, particularly of our political process, the reality is that substance does not always sell. Particularly on cable news, and more recently with online news sources, the more outrageous the comments, or the louder someone yells, the larger the audience.24 In one section of the 2012 documentary Miss Representation, viewers can witness some of the worst sexist and misogynistic comments by media pundits about powerful women politicians like Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, Nancy Pelosi, and Madeleine Albright. Glenn Beck is shown fawning over Palin’s good looks, Tucker Carlson tells viewers that he automatically crosses his legs when he sees Clinton on television (presumably fearing castration), Pat Buchanan compares Clinton to an ex-wife in probate court, Alex Castellanos and Jay Thomas accuse Pelosi of having plastic surgery and make denigrating comments about her appearance, and Rush Limbaugh declares “ding, dong, the witch is dead” when Republicans win the House in 2010, ending Pelosi’s tenure as Speaker.25 Many more examples beyond these few exist, and unfortunately, such bad behavior on cable news and in online sources, where the bar of what is considered acceptable content is much lower, will continue. However, it is also important to point out that not only do both liberal and conservative

182

IN IT TO WIN

commentators engage in this behavior about women politicians in both parties, but both male and female commentators have been guilty as well. While plenty of conservative commentators were guilty of sexist and inappropriate comments about Clinton in 2008, liberal commentators were just as guilty of chastising Palin for a lack of intelligence, calling her names such as “Caribou Barbie,” and mocking her for being attractive, among many other topics. While it may be hard to imagine the “perfect woman candidate” who might be immune to this type of bad behavior in the media, it is just as difficult to imagine a change in the media environment that would put an end to this content altogether. The point is that as bad as this behavior is and how we can assume it has a harmful effect when considering the broader issue of political socialization, we should not overinflate its importance as it relates to voting behavior or more specifically, in electing a woman president. In addition, recent research has suggested that “publicly identifying and criticizing sexist attacks” eliminates the effectiveness and makes it seem less credible.26 And, coverage of Clinton and Palin in 2008, or Bachmann in 2012, may not be a predictor for future women presidential candidates as changes in technology and the media environment continue to occur. In recent years, those changes have often been so dramatic that it is difficult to compare what happened in 2008 to just eight years prior in 2000, and as a result, past coverage is not an accurate harbinger of what will occur in future presidential campaigns.

Electing madam president: Who and when? We conclude where we began, by asking the question, why has America not yet elected a woman president? And, is there a particular gendered strategy necessary for a women candidate to win a presidential election? In some areas, being a woman running for president may require a unique strategy

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

183

in fundraising, messaging, and creating a narrative that presents a strong leader capable of handling the job of president. Yet, these strategic areas are not permanent structural barriers that stop a woman from winning the White House. Every candidate, male or female, has strengths and weaknesses on the campaign trail; the perfect candidate, male or female, does not and never will exist. Instead, the right candidate at the right time seems to emerge, and that candidate has a campaign strategy that takes advantage of the particular political environment at that moment in political time. As I often tell my students, it may not be based on a political science theory or model, but sometimes the political stars are just in alignment for a particular candidate, like Ronald Reagan in 1980 or Barack Obama in 2008, in a way they might not have been for that same candidate in a different election in a different year. The one thing that we do know, however, is that in order to elect the first (and second, and third … ) woman as president and vice president is the need to continue to increase the number of women running for political office, and seeking higher political office (in the U.S. Senate, as governors, and in holding leadership positions within Congress and state legislatures). Doing so will place more women into the political pipeline for presidential and vice presidential consideration. We should also remember that when comparing the United States to other countries that have elected women as national leaders, our system of electing presidents in this country—the length and expense of the campaign, and the Electoral College, among other factors—is unique in many ways. One of the main reasons that women have succeeded more often in becoming prime ministers in other countries is that there is a “reduced emphasis on individual candidates with a parliamentary system, with more emphasis being placed on the party ticket.” As a result, the prime minister ends up being the leader of the party which wins the most seats in a legislative election. Since voters choose “party representatives within their constituency rather than directly electing the leader, it is usually the case that the majority of votes cast for the

184

IN IT TO WIN

victorious party were directed at male parliamentary candidates, and based on the party’s performance as a whole” which “reduces the impact of gender stereotyping in parliamentary systems.”27 That is not to say that a woman cannot win the presidency in the United States, but serves to put into context the fact that so many other countries, with different governing systems, have already selected a woman as their national leader. Other countries, beyond those who have parliamentary systems, have also adopted reforms and even quotas in an effort to elect more women to political office. But, as Pippa Norris and Mona Lena Krook point out, while achieving gender equality in politics should be a top priority, progress toward this goal in the United States has been “slow and erratic,” due in part to the fact that the use of constitutional amendments, electoral reforms, and candidate gender quotas all seem too radical for the United States to even debate seriously on the policy agenda, let alone pass and implement. Many factors inhibit the sort of structural reforms taken by other countries, including the individualistic American culture, the “tyranny of structurelessness” of the U.S. primary selection process, the weakness and decentralization of party recruitment, the strength of incumbency due to partisan gerrymandering, campaigns awash with money, and extreme constitutional rigidity.28 When considering the 2016 campaign, so much attention has been focused on a possible Clinton candidacy that many other potential women candidates have not yet been considered. Yet, as it stands, as the clear front-runner for the Democratic field if Clinton runs in 2016, her candidacy “poses the real possibility that a woman will win a major party nomination for the first time.”29 The historic nature of such a campaign would “undoubtedly focus heavily on gender issues and female voters,” yet whether women voters would give Clinton a victory is unknown as many other factors would also come into play. But, according to political scientist Richard Fox, “a Hillary Clinton candidacy would certainly provide the opportunity to galvanize the women’s

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

185

vote and push the gender gap to new heights in 2016.”30 If Clinton does not run, another woman candidate from either party, or perhaps more than one, might decide to run. In addition, 2016 may also be an opportune time for either party to select another woman as a running mate, particularly on the Republican ticket if Clinton won the Democratic nomination. The bottom line is that many possibilities exist for women seeking, and winning, higher political office in the near future, and nominating a woman for president and/ or vice president may have strategic advantages for both parties. In the end, regardless of when the political glass ceiling (or what some are now calling the “glass elevator” as empirical studies continue to refute a bias against female candidates31) is broken at the national level, both political parties must recognize that all women politicians, whether legislators or governors, bring an important perspective to government and policymaking. What political scientist Kim Fridkin Kahn pointed out more than two decades ago is still true today, that by limiting the number of women in elective office, we limit the attention of the government to predominantly male concerns and ignore the concerns of women and women legislators. A governing body that neglects a range of issues not only ignores the concerns of a large segment of the electorate but also may be less effective than a government addressing a wider spectrum of policy concerns.32 There has long been an assumption that a viable woman presidential candidate (i.e., a candidate who could legitimately compete in primaries and caucuses and have a real chance at her party’s nomination) would help to further break down barriers for woman candidates at all levels of government. This remains true, and even though Clinton and Palin in 2008 and Bachmann in 2012 did not succeed, all of their efforts, as well as the women presidential and vice presidential candidates before them, serve as an important milestone for women in American politics by achieving so many

186

IN IT TO WIN

“firsts” on the presidential campaign trail. Specifically, Clinton’s candidacy in 2008 showed an unprecedented level of support among American voters to cast a ballot for the first woman president. In the long run, that is perhaps the most important legacy of Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign as it leaves a solid achievement for future women presidential candidates on which to build. In the final analysis, when we ask the question, “When will America elect its first woman president?”, the answer may simply be that we have yet to see the right woman candidate, with the right experience, and the right campaign strategy, running at the right moment in political time, to give America its first “madam president.”

Notes 1

Polsby, Wildovsky, Schier, and Hopkins, Presidential Elections, 159.

2 Wayne, The Road to the White House 2012, 200. 3

Matea Gold, “Ready for Hillary Raised More than $4 Million in 2013,” Washington Post, January 7, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post -politics/wp/2014/01/07/ready-for-hillary-raised-more-than-4-million-in-2013/.

4

Martha T. Moore, “Hillary Clinton’s Book Tour May Preview Future Campaign, USA Today, May 28, 2014, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ politics/2014/05/28/hillary-clinton-book-launch-campaign/9660549/.

5

Sean Sullivan, “Hillary Clinton on ‘Dead Broke’ Comment: I Regret It,” Washington Post, July 29, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/ wp/2014/07/29/hillary-clinton-on-dead-broke-comment-i-regret-it/.

6

Landon Hall, “Hail to the Hearty: Presidential Candidates Have Long Faced Health Questions,” Orange County Register, June 3, 2014, available at http://www.ocregister .com/articles/clinton-616761-age-rove.html?page=2.

7

Jonathan Topaz, “Poll: Hillary Clinton’s Favorability Slips,” Politico, June 11, 2014, available at http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/poll-hillary-clinton -favorability-107706.html.

8

Janet Hook, “Hillary Clinton Faults Administration for Rise of Islamic Militants,” Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2014, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/08/10/ hillary-clinton-faults-administration-for-rise-of-islamic-militants/.

A LOOK AHEAD: 2016 AND BEYOND

9

187

Andrew Sullivan, “The Worrying Vacuity of Hillary Clinton,” The Dish, July 24, 2014, available at http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/07/24/self-aggrandizement-isnt -diplomacy/.

10 Arthur C. Paulson, “Presidential Nominations in a Polarized Party System: The Republican Primaries of 2012,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2013), 30. 11 Amnon Cavari, “The Interplay of Macropartisanship and Macrohandling, and the 2012 Electoral Success of the Democratic Party,” in The 2012 Presidential Election: Forecasts, Outcomes, and Consequences, eds. Amnon Cavari, Richard J. Powell, and Kenneth R. Mayer (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 83. 12 Kenneth R. Mayer, “Lessons of Defeat: Republican Party Responses to the 2012 Presidential Election,” in The 2012 Presidential Election: Forecasts, Outcomes, and Consequences, eds. Amnon Cavari, Richard J. Powell, and Kenneth R. Mayer (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 104. 13 Schreiber, “Conservative Women Run for Office,” 115. 14 Schreiber, “Conservative Women Run for Office,” 123. 15 Quote by Bill McInturff, Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008, 168. 16 Lawrence and Rose, “The Race for the Presidency,” 70. 17 Farrar-Myers and Boyea, “Campaign Finance: A Barrier to Reaching the White House?” 224. 18 Farrar-Myers and Boyea, “Campaign Finance: A Barrier to Reaching the White House?” 226. 19 Farrar-Myers and Boyea, “Campaign Finance: A Barrier to Reaching the White House?” 226–7. 20 Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 150. 21 For example, see Bennett, News; Robert McChesney, The Death and Life of American Journalism (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2010); Joseph E. Uscinski, The People’s News: Media, Politics, and the Demands of Capitalism (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2014). 22 Thomas E. Patterson, Informing the News: The Need for Knowledge-Based Journalism (New York, NY: Vintage Press, 2013), 5. 23 Robert McChesney, Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning the Internet Against Democracy (New York, NY: The New Press, 2013), xiii. 24 In the 2012 documentary Miss Representation, Rachel Maddow of MSNBC talks about how an elevated and more agitated voice in delivering the news can often garner more viewers.

188

IN IT TO WIN

25 “Miss Representation,” Virgil Films and Entertainment, 2012. 26 See Brooks, He Runs, She Runs, 154. 27 Rainbow Murray, “Introduction: Gender Stereotypes and Media Coverage of Women Candidates” in Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office, ed. Rainbow Murray (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 20–1. 28 Pippa Norris and Mona Lena Krook, “Women in Elective Office Worldwide: Barriers and Opportunities,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 304–5. 29 Richard L. Fox, “The Gender Gap and the Election of 2012,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 156. 30 Fox, “The Gender Gap and the Election of 2012,” 156. 31 “Women in American Politics: The Glass Elevator in American Politics,” The Economist, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21015137/print. 32 Kahn, The Political Consequences of Being a Woman, 138.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barth, Jay and Margaret R. Ferguson. “Gender and Gubernatorial Personality.” Women & Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2002): 63–82. Bennett, W. Lance. News: The Politics of Illusion, 9th ed. New York, NY: Pearson, 2012. Bernstein, Carl. A Woman in Charge: The Life of Hillary Rodham Clinton. New York, NY: Vintage, 2008. Bourque, Susan C. “Political Leadership for Women: Redefining Power and Reassessing the Political,” in Women on Power: Leadership Redefined, eds. Sue J. M. Freeman, Susan C. Bourque, and Christine M. Shelton. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001. Braden, Maria. Women Politicians and the Media. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996. Brooks, Deborah Jordan. He Runs, She Runs: Why Gender Stereotypes Do Not Harm Women Candidates. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Bugh, Gary, ed. Electoral College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010. Burrell, Barbara C. “Money and Women’s Candidacies for Public Office,” in Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions, ed. Sue Carroll. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ———. “Campaign Finance: Women’s Experience in the Modern Era,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 2nd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005. Bystrom, Dianne. “On the Way to the White House: Communication Strategies for Women Candidates,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. ———. “18 Million Cracks in the Glass Ceiling: The Rise and Fall of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Presidential Campaign,” in Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office, ed. Rainbow Murray. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010. ———. “Advertising, Websites, and Media Coverage: Gender and Communication along the Campaign Trail,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Bystrom, Dianne G., Mary Christine Banwart, Lynda Lee Kaid, and Terry A. Robertson. Gender and Candidate Communication: VideoStyle, WebStyle, NewsStyle. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008. The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.

190

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2012. The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes. The American Voter. New York, NY: Wiley, 1960. Carli, Linda L. and Alice H. Eagly. “Overcoming Resistance to Women Leaders: The Importance of Leadership Style,” in Women & Leadership: The State of Play and Strategies for Change, eds. Barbara Kellerman and Deborah L. Rhode. New York, NY: Wiley, 2007. Carroll, Susan J. Women as Candidates in American Politics, 2nd ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994. ———. “Voting Choices: How and Why the Gender Gap Matters,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Carroll, Susan J. and Richard L. Fox. “Introduction: Gender and Electoral Politics in the Twenty First Century,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Cavari, Amnon. “The Interplay of Macropartisanship and Macrohandling, and the 2012 Electoral Success of the Democratic Party,” in The 2012 Presidential Election: Forecasts, Outcomes, and Consequences, eds. Amnon Cavari, Richard J. Powell, and Kenneth R. Mayer. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Clift, Eleanor and Tom Brazaitis. Madam President: Shattering the Last Glass Ceiling. New York, NY: Scribner, 2000. Conway, Margaret M., Gertrude A. Steuernagel, and David W. Ahern. Women and Political Participation: Cultural Change in the Political Arena. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997. Cook, Elizabeth Adell. “Voter Reaction to Women Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998. Cronin, Thomas E. and Michael A. Genovese. The Paradoxes of the American Presidency. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998. Crotty, William J. “The Obama Reelection Campaign,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013. Darcy, R., Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. Women, Elections, and Representation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994. DeConde, Alexander. Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2000. Dittmar, Kelly and Susan J. Carroll. “Cracking the ‘Highest, Hardest Glass Ceiling’: Women as Presidential and Vice Presidential Contenders,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Dolan, Kathleen. “Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates: What Really Matters.” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 1 (March 2014): 96–107.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

191

Dowdle, Andrew, Randall E. Adkins, Karen Sebold, and Patrick A. Stewart. “Financing the 2012 Presidential Election in a Post-Citizens United World,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013. Duerst-Lahti, Georgia. “Reconceiving Theories of Power: Consequences of Masculinism in the Executive Branch,” in The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch, eds. MaryAnne Borelli and Janet M. Martin. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. ———. “The Bottleneck: Women Becoming Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998. ———. “Presidential Elections: Gendered Space and the Case of 2012,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Dukakis, Michael S. “The Experience of Running for President,” in The Making of the Presidential Candidates 2012, eds. William G. Mayer and Jonathan Bernstein. Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2012. Edwards, George C. III. Why the Electoral College is Bad for America, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011. Elder, Laurel. “Why Women Don’t Run: Explaining Women’s Underrepresentation in America’s Political Institutions.” Women & Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2004): 27–56. Ellison, Sheila. If Women Ruled the World: How to Create the World We Want to Live In. Novato, CA: New World Library, 2004. Falk, Erika. “Gender Bias and Maintenance: Press Coverage of Senator Hillary Clinton’s Announcement to Seek the White House,” in Gender and Political Communication in America, ed. James L. Edwards. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. ———. Women for President: Media Bias in Nine Campaigns, 2nd ed. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010. Falk, Erika and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. “Changing the Climate of Expectations,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. ———. “How Television Covers the Presidential Nomination Process,” in The Making of the Presidential Candidates 2012, eds. William G. Mayer and Jonathan Bernstein. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Farrar-Myers, Victoria. “Money and the Art and Science of Candidate Viability,” in Rethinking Madam President: Are We Ready for a Woman in the White House?, eds. Lori Cox Han and Caroline Heldman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007. Farrar-Myers, Victoria and Brent D. Boyea. “Campaign Finance: A Barrier to Reaching the White House?” in Women and Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013. Ferraro, Geraldine, with Linda Bird Francke. Ferraro: My Story. New York, NY: Bantam, 1985. Fiorina, Morris P. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981. Fleischer, Ari. Taking Heat: The President, the Press, and My Years in the White House. New York, NY: William Morrow, 2005.

192

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fox, Richard L. “The Future of Women’s Political Leadership: Gender and the Decision to Run for Elective Office,” in Women & Leadership: The State of Play and Strategies for Change, eds. Barbara Kellerman and Deborah L. Rhode. New York, NY: Wiley, 2007. ———. “The Gender Gap and the Election of 2012,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013. Fox, Richard L. and Jennifer L. Lawless. “Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2004): 264–80. Fox, Richard L. and Zoe M. Oxley. “Why No Madame President? Gender and Presidential Politics in the United States,” in Women and Political Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing, eds. Michael A. Genovese and Janie S. Steckenrider. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. Francia, Peter L. “Early Fundraising by Nonincumbent Female Congressional Candidates: The Importance of Women’s PACs.” Women & Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (2001): 7–20. Frantzich, Stephen E. “ ‘Are We Halfway There Yet?’ New Technology and the 2012 Election,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013. Freeman, Sue J. M. and Susan C. Bourque. “Leadership and Power: New Conceptions,” in Women on Power: Leadership Redefined, eds. Sue J. M. Freeman, Susan C. Bourque, and Christine M. Shelton. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001. Fridkin, Kim L., Jill Carle, and Gina Serignese Woodall. “The Vice Presidency as the New Glass Ceiling: Media Coverage of Sarah Palin,” in Women & Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013. Genovese, Michael A. “Women as National Leaders: What Do We Know?” in Women as National Leaders, ed. Michael A. Genovese. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press, 1993. Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005. Goren, Lilly. “Fact or Fiction: The Reality of Race and Gender in Reaching the White House,” in Women and the White House: Gender, Popular Culture, and Presidential Politics, eds. Justin S. Vaughn and Lilly J. Goren. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Graber, Doris A. Mass Media and American Politics, 8th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010. Hadley, Arthur T. The Invisible Primary. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976. Han, Lori Cox. “Presidential Leadership: Governing from a Woman’s Perspective,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. ———. “Introduction: Is America Really Ready for a Woman President?” in Rethinking Madam President: Are We Ready for a Woman in the White House? eds. Lori Cox Han and Caroline Heldman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007. ———. “Off to the (Horse) Races: Media Coverage of the ‘Not-So-Invisible’ Invisible Primary of 2007,” in From Votes to Victory: Winning and Governing the White House in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Meena Bose. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2011.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

193

———. “Still Waiting for Madam President: Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 2008 Presidential Campaign.” Critical Issues of Our Time, The Centre for American Studies at The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Vol. 2, Fall 2009. Han, Lori Cox and Diane J. Heith. Presidents and the American Presidency. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013. Heilemann, John and Mark Halperin. Game Change: Obama and the Clintons, McCain and Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime. New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2010. Heith, Diane J. “The Lipstick Watch: Media Coverage, Gender, and Presidential Campaigns,” in Anticipating Madam President, eds. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Heldman, Caroline, Susan J. Carroll, and Stephanie Olson. “ ‘She Brought Only a Skirt:’ Print Media Coverage of Elizabeth Dole’s Bid for the Republican Nomination.” Political Communication, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2005): 315–35. Hendricks, John Allen. “The New-Media Campaign of 2012,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Herrera, Richard and Karen Shafer. “Women in the Governor’s Mansion: How Party and Gender Affect Policy Agendas,” in Women and Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013. Hoyt, Crystal L. “Women and Leadership,” in Leadership: Theory and Practice, 4th ed., ed. Peter G. Northouse. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006. Huddy, Leonie and Nayda Terkildsen. “Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 1 (February 1993): 119–47. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, ed. Beyond the Double Bind: Women and Leadership. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. ———. Electing the President 2008: The Insider’s View. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. Jones, Jeffrey P. “Presidential Campaigns as Cultural Events: The Convergence of Politics and Popular Culture in Election 2012,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Kahn, Kim Fridkin. The Political Consequences of Being a Woman: How Stereotypes Influence the Conduct and Consequences of Political Campaigns. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996. Kellerman, Barbara and Deborah L. Rhode, eds. Women & Leadership: The State of Play and Strategies for Change. New York, NY: Wiley, 2007. Kenski, Kate and Erika Falk. “Of What Is This Glass Ceiling Made? A Study of Attitudes About Women and the Oval Office.” Women & Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2004): pp. 57–80. Kenski, Henry C. and Kate M. Kenski. “Explaining the Vote in the Election of 2012: Obama’s Reelection,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Key, V.O. Jr. The Responsible Electorate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966. Kornblut, Anne E. Notes from the Cracked Ceiling: What It Will Take for a Woman to Win. New York, NY: Broadway Paperbacks, 2011.

194

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kropf, Martha E. and John A. Boiney. “The Electoral Glass Ceiling? Gender, Viability, and the News in U.S. Senate Campaigns.” Women & Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (2001): 79–101. Lawless, Jennifer L. “Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era.” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 3 (September 2004): 479–90. Lawless, Jennifer L. and Kathryn Pearson. “The Primary Reason for Women’s Underrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 1 (January 2008): 67–82. Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard L. Fox. It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don’t Run for Office, rev. ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Lawrence, Regina G. and Melody Rose. Hillary Clinton’s Race for the White House: Gender Politics & the Media on the Campaign Trail. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. ———. “The Real ’08 Fight: Clinton vs. Palin,” in Women & Executive Office: Pathways and Performance, ed. Melody Rose. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013. ———. “The Race for the Presidency: Hillary Rodham Clinton,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Lynch, Timothy R. and Kathleen Dolan. “Voter Attitudes, Behaviors, and Women Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. MacManus, Susan A. “Voter Participation and Turnout: The Political Generational Divide among Women Voters,” in Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, 3rd ed., eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Mandel, Ruth B. “A Question About Women and the Leadership Option,” in The Difference “Difference” Makes: Women and Leadership, ed. Deborah L. Rhode. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. Mann, Thomas E. “Reform Agenda,” in The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook, eds. Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, and Trevor Potter. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. Mayer, William G. “The Presidential Nominations,” in The Election of 2000, ed. Gerald M. Pomper. New York, NY: Chatham, 2001. Mayer, Kenneth R. “Lessons of Defeat: Republican Party Responses to the 2012 Presidential Election,” in The 2012 Presidential Election: Forecasts, Outcomes, and Consequences, eds. Amnon Cavari, Richard J. Powell, and Kenneth R. Mayer. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. McChesney, Robert. The Death and Life of American Journalism. New York, NY: Nation Books, 2010. ———. Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning the Internet Against Democracy. New York, NY: The New Press, 2013. McGlen, Nancy E., Karen O’Connor, Laura van Assendelft, and Wendy Gunther-Canada. Women, Politics, and American Society, 4th ed. New York, NY: Longman, 2002.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

195

Miller, Melissa K., Jeffrey S. Peake, and Brittany Anne Boulton. “Testing the Saturday Night Live Hypothesis: Fairness and Bias in Newspaper Coverage of Hillary Clinton’s Presidential Campaign.” Politics & Gender, 6 (2010): 169–98. Murray, Rainbow. “Introduction: Gender Stereotypes and Media Coverage of Women Candidates” in Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office, ed. Rainbow Murray. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010. Norris, Pippa. “The Gender Gap: Old Challenges, New Approaches,” in Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions, ed. Susan J. Carroll. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. Norris, Pippa and Mona Lena Krook. “Women in Elective Office Worldwide: Barriers and Opportunities,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Ondercin, Heather L. and Susan Welch. “Women Candidates for Congress,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 2nd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005. O’Regan, Valerie R. and Stephen J. Stambough. “Female Governors and Gubernatorial Candidates,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Osborn, Tracy L. How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender, and Representation in the State Legislatures. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. Paletz, David L. The Media in American Politics: Contents and Consequences, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Longman, 2002. Patterson, Thomas E. “Doing Well and Doing Good: How Soft News and Critical Journalism Are Shrinking the News Audience and Weakening Democracy—And What News Outlets Can Do About It.” The Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics, and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2000. ———. Informing the News: The Need for Knowledge-Based Journalism. New York, NY: Vintage Press, 2013. Paulson, Arthur C. “Presidential Nominations in a Polarized Party System: The Republican Primaries of 2012,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2013. Polsby, Nelson W. and Aaron Wildavsky. Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 11th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Polsby, Nelson W., Aaron Wildavsky, Steven E. Schier, and David A. Hopkins. Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 13th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Pomper, Gerald M. “The Presidential Election: Voting for Parties and Principles,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013. Popkin, Samuel L. The Reasoning Voter. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Prysby, Charles L. “Explaining the Presidential Vote,” in Winning the Presidency 2012, ed. William J. Crotty. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013. Rachanow, Shelly. If Women Ran the World, Sh*t Would Get Done: Celebrating All the Wonderful, Amazing, Stupendous, Inspiring, Butt-Kicking Things Women Do. Newburyport, MA: Conari Press, 2006.

196

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. What Would You Do If You Ran the World? Everyday Ideas from Women Who Want to Make the World a Better Place. Newburyport, MA: Conari Press, 2009. Reiser, Kim. “Crafting a Feminine Presidency: Elizabeth Dole’s 1999 Presidential Campaign,” in Gender and Political Communication in America, ed. James L. Edwards. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. Rhode, Deborah L. “Introduction,” in The Difference “Difference” Makes: Women and Leadership, ed. Deborah L. Rhode. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. Rice, Patricia. “Women Out of the Myths and into Focus,” in Women and the News, ed. Laurily Keir Epstein. New York, NY: Hastings House, 1978. Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York, NY: Macmillan Press, 1993. Rosin, Hanna. The End of Men: And the Rise of Women. New York, NY: Riverhead, 2012. Sabato, Larry J. Feeding Frenzy: Attack Journalism and American Politics. Baltimore, MD: Lanahan Publishers, 2000. Sanbonmatsu, Kira. “Candidate Recruitment and Women’s Election to the State Legislatures.” Report prepared for the Center for American Women and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, September 2003. Sandberg, Sheryl. Lean In. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. Schnall, Marianne. What Will It Take to Make a Woman President? Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 2013. Schreiber, Ronnee. “Conservative Women Run for Office,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Seltzer, Richard A., Jody Newman, and Melissa Voorhees Leighton. Sex as a Political Variable: Women as Candidates and Voters in U.S. Elections. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. Sheeler, Kristina Horn and Karrin Vasby Anderson. Woman President: Confronting Postfeminist Political Culture. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2013. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All.” The Atlantic. July/August 2012. Spar, Debora L. Wonder Women: Sex, Power, and the Quest for Perfection. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013. Stapleton, Jean. “Introduction,” in The American Woman 2001-2002: Getting to the Top, eds. Cynthia B. Costello and Anne J. Stone. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001. Stephen, Farnsworth J. and S. Robert Lichter. The Nightly News Nightmare: Media Coverage of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1988–2008, 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Streb, Matthew J., Barbara Burrell, Brian Frederick, and Michael A. Genovese. “Social Desirability Effects and Support for a Female American President.” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 1 (2008): 76–89. Swers, Michele L. Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

197

———. “Representing Women’s Interests in a Polarized Congress,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Tannen, Deborah. You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation. New York, NY: Ballantine, 1990. Tedesco, John C. and Scott W. Dunn. “Political Advertising in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election,” in The 2012 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Thames, Frank C. and Margaret S. Williams. Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in Democracies Around the World. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2013). Thomas, Sue. “Introduction,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998. ———. “Introduction,” in Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 3rd ed., eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Tuchman, Gaye. Hearth and Home: Images of Women in the News Media. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978. Uscinski, Joseph E. The People’s News: Media, Politics, and the Demands of Capitalism. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2014. Wattenberg, Martin P. The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential Elections of the 1980s. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. ———. The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952–1996, 5th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. Wayne, Stephen J. The Road to the White House 2008, 8th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2008. ———. The Road to the White House 2012, 9th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2012. West, Darrell M. Air Wars: Television Advertising and Social Media in Election Campaigns 1952–2012, 6th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013. Whitney, Catherine, et al. Nine and Counting: The Women of the Senate. New York, NY: William Morrow, 2000. Wier, Sara J. “Women Governors in the 21st Century: Re-Examining the Pathways to the Presidency,” in Women in Politics: Outsiders or Insiders? ed. Lois Duke Whitaker. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006. Wilson, Marie C. Closing the Leadership Gap: Why Women Can and Must Help Run the World. New York, NY: Penguin, 2004. Wolffe, Richard. Renegade: The Making of a President. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 2009. ———. The Message: The Reselling of President Obama. New York, NY: Twelve/Hachette Book Group, 2013. Woodall, Gina Serignese, Kim L. Fridkin, and Jill Carle. “ ‘Sarah Palin: Beauty Is Beastly?’ An Exploratory Content Analysis of Media Coverage,” in Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office, ed. Rainbow Murray. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010.

INDEX

Abbott, Greg 42 ABC 153 Adams, John Quincy 28n. 9 Affordable Care Act 26 Afghanistan War 155 Aggregate polling 141 Aiken, George 7 Air Force One (1996) 16 Albright, Madeleine 181 Alexander, Lamar 75 American Red Cross 68, 73, 74 Anderson, Karrin Vasby 19 Anthony, Susan B. 33 Aquino, Corazon 39 Axelrod, David 144–5, 147 Ayotte, Kelly 26, 41, 172 Bachelet, Michelle 39 Bachmann, Michele x, 3, 7, 15, 25, 38, 54, 66, 71–2, 78–9, 86–9, 90–1, 94n. 35, 98, 101–2, 118–21, 166, 175, 178, 182, 185 Baldwin, Tammy 34 Barnicle, Mike 113 Barr, Roseanne 29n. 13 Battlestar Galactica (SyFy) 16 Bauer, Gary 74 Beck, Glenn 181 Beeson, Rich 132 Benghazi terror attacks (2012) 3, 26 Bergen, Polly 16, 31n. 38 Bernstein, Carl 70–1 Biden, Joseph 5, 78, 103, 105, 155 Big Bird 146 “Binders full of women” 146, 162n. 46 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002) 129 Blackburn, Marcia 172

Boulton, Brittany Anne 113 Boyea, Brent D. 177, 178 Braun, Carol Moseley 3, 8–9, 66, 69, 75–6, 83–4, 86, 89, 90–1 Brazile, Donna 18 Brooks, David 102–3 Brooks, Deborah Jordan 21–3, 44, 104, 114, 179 and “leaders-not-ladies theory” 22 Brown, Kathleen 42 Buchanan, James 28n. 9 Buchanan, Pat 113, 181 Bundling 77, 94n. 31 Bush, George H.W. ix, 8, 68, 99 Bush, George W. 42, 56, 65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 81, 83, 90, 109, 110, 126, 128, 129, 133, 134, 138, 143 Bush v. Gore (2000) 133 Bystrom, Dianne 55, 114 Cable news 2, 140, 141 Cain, Herman 79, 87, 88, 89, 101 campaign finance 50–2, 66–7, 109–11, 126, 127–30, 156 and federal matching funds 109 and public funding 127, 156 campaign narrative 21, 121, 127, 143–4, 154–6, 157–8, 159, 183 and Hillary Clinton 102, 111, 115–16 candidate-centered politics 136 candidate emergence phase 14, 23–4, 48 candidate webpages 138, 139 Cantwell, Maria 170 Carlson, Tucker 113, 181 Carroll, Susan J. 35, 57, 82 Carter, Jimmy 107, 170 Castellanos, Alex 181

INDEX

Catt, Carrie Chapman 33 CBS 153 CBS/New York Times Poll 141 Center for American Women and Politics 33 Chisholm, Shirley 7–8, 29n. 10, 90 Christian Right 72, 78, 101, 120 Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 129, 178 Clark, Wesley 76 “Clinton bias” 116 Clinton, Bill 1, 26, 68, 70, 76–7, 84, 86, 102, 104, 111, 114, 116–19, 152, 169 “Clinton fatigue” 118 Clinton Global Initiative 26 Clinton, Hillary x, 1, 27, 90, 181 and 2008 presidential campaign 1, 2, 3, 4–7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 34, 38, 52, 54, 55, 58, 66, 69–71, 76–8, 84–6, 89, 91, 98, 102–11, 118–20, 121, 122n. 16, 147, 152–5, 157–9, 166, 167, 177, 182, 185–6 and campaign narrative 102, 111, 115–16 and front-runner status for 2008 21, 118 and front-runner status for 2016 168 and inevitability of winning 66, 70, 71, 102, 170 and media coverage of 2008 campaign 20–1, 113–17 and potential 2016 presidential campaign 1–2, 17, 25, 168–70, 184–5 as Secretary of State 5–6, 168, 169 and tearing up on campaign trail in 2008 104 Clinton Presidential Library 111 CNN 3, 28n. 5, 151 CNN/Opinion Research Poll 141 Commander in Chief (ABC) 16, 31n. 38 Communication, women and 39 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 171 Contender, The (2000) 16

199

Cottle, Michelle 25 Couric, Katie 153 Daily Beast, The 25 “Daisy ad” (1964) 144 Davis, Wendy 42 Dean, Howard 75 debates, primary 84, 87 debates, general election 145–8, 156 and Kennedy/Nixon debate in 1960 148 and snap polls 146 and spin room 146 deliberative democracy 180 Democratic National Committee 106, 122n. 15, 171 Democratic National Convention in 2008 6, 7, 106, 122n. 15 in 2012 140 demographic trends 126, 135, 137, 156, 174 Dodd, Christopher 78, 103, 105 Dolan, Kathleen 58 Dole, Bob 68, 73 Dole, Elizabeth 3, 8, 11, 54, 66–9, 73–6, 80–4, 89 Donohue, Mary 43 double bind theory 10–11, 21, 23, 44, 177 double burden theory 13 double standards theory 22, 104 Dukakis, Michael 67 Edwards, John 76, 77, 83, 85, 102, 103, 105, 120 Electoral College 97, 105, 126, 127, 131–4, 137, 141, 142, 156, 157, 158, 183 and faithless electors 131 electoral process 45–52 EMILY’s List 25, 51, 94n. 31 Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) ix, x, 149 Equal Rights Party 7 Ernst, Joni 122n. 6 Facebook 36, 138, 139, 143, 146 Falk, Erika 114 Fallin, Mary 172

200

INDEX

Farnsworth, Stephen J. 112, 141 Farrar-Myers, Victoria 91, 177, 178 Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) 51 Federal Election Campaign Act (1974) 51, 127 Federal Election Commission (FEC) 68, 72, 77, 83, 84 Feinstein, Diane ix, 42, 149 feminism 14, 37, 154 Ferguson, Miriam Amanda “Ma” 42 Ferraro, Geraldine ix–xi, 3, 14, 54, 127, 149–52, 167 Fisher, Deb 172 FiveThirtyEight.com 141 527s 129 Fleischer, Ari 82 focus groups 146 Forbes, Steve 74 Ford, Gerald 68 Fox News 3, 5, 28n. 5 Fox, Richard 23–4, 35, 117, 119, 184 frontloading 66, 98, 100, 106 Gallup Poll 25, 81, 141, 142 gender bias 114, 179 in news coverage 17, 113, 114, 116, 181 gender gap 55–8, 137, 150, 185 gender socialization 24, 48 gender stereotypes 22, 53, 56, 104, 177 in news media 11–12, 114 gendered campaign strategy 91, 115, 120–1, 173–82 and campaign finance 177–9 and news media coverage 179–82 and political parties 174–7 gendered elections 35 general election 27, 125–7, 156–9 and campaign communications 138–45, 156 and campaign finance 127–30 and demographics 135, 137 and Electoral College 131–4 and presidential debates 145–8 and selecting running mates 148–56

and voter turnout 135, 136–7 and voting behavior 135–6 Gephardt, Richard 76 get-out-the-vote efforts 65, 128, 132, 136 Gibson, Charles 153 Gillibrand, Kirsten 26, 52, 171 Gingrich, Newt 79, 102, 130 Giuliani, Rudy 4, 6 Goodwin, Doris Kearns 28n. 7 Gore, Al 29n. 19, 65, 126, 133 Goren, Lilly 16, 19 Graber, Doris 139 Gravel, Mike 78, 105 Green Party 29n. 13 ground game 98, 100, 110, 111, 119 Hadley, Arthur 66 Haley, Nicki 26, 172 Hallmark Channel 119 Hardball (MSNBC) 71 Harding, Warren 13 hard money contributions 110, 128 hard news 85, 95n. 50, 141 Harkin, Tom 102 Harris, Kamala 43, 171 Harris Poll 141 Hart, Gary 8 Hassan, Maggie 171 Hatch, Orrin 75 Hayes, Rutherford B. 133 Heldman, Caroline 82 Hill, Anita 50 “Hillraisers” 77 Hirono, Mazie 34 “hockey mom” 155 Homemaker Individual Retirement Account 40 horse-race coverage of campaigns 1–2, 80, 82, 98, 112, 116, 140–1 House of Cards (Netflix) 16 Huckabee, Mike 120 Huntsman, Jon 79 Hurricane Sandy 140 Hutchison, Kay Bailey 40

INDEX

Ickes, Harold 107 incumbency 13, 45, 48–50, 184 Internal Revenue Service 84, 127 internet ads 143 invisible primary 27, 65–7, 89–92, 109, 173 in 1999 67–8, 73–5, 80–3 in 2003 69, 75–6, 83–4 in 2007 69–71, 76–8, 84–6 in 2011 15, 71–2, 78–9, 86–9 and deciding to run 67–72 and early media coverage 80–9 and early money 72–9 Iowa caucuses 99–103 in 1980 99 in 1992 102 in 2004 8 in 2008 5, 91, 102, 103, 106, 110, 111, 120, 122n. 6 in 2012 15, 72, 89, 98, 118 Iowa Straw Poll 79, 87, 88, 91, 98, 101, 119 Ipsos Poll 141 Iraq War 83, 86, 155 Ireland, Patricia 8 Jefferson, Thomas 28n. 9 Johnson, Gary 79 Johnson, Lyndon 144 Jones, Jeffrey P. 87 Kahn, Kim Fridkin 185 Kennedy, Edward 170 Kennedy, John F. 13, 29n. 19, 148 Kerry, John 26, 57, 75, 83, 110, 128, 129 Keyes, Alan 75 Kisses for My President (1964) 16 Klobuchar, Amy 26, 171 Kornblut, Anne 17 Krook, Mona Lena 184 Kucinich, Dennis 76, 78, 105 LaRouche, Lyndon 76 Latino voters 137, 156, 174 Lawless, Jennifer 23–4 Lawrence, Regina 20, 113, 115–16, 155, 177

201

Lay, Ken 146 leadership 36–45 differences between women and men 38–9 stereotypes about women and 36 women and 36, 38–9, 54–5 Lichter, S. Robert 112, 141 “Liddy stroll” 68 Lieberman, Joseph 29n. 19, 76 Limbaugh, Rush 181 local news 140, 141 Lockwood, Belva 7 Los Angeles Times 151 Madam Secretary (CBS) 16 Maddoff, Bernie Maddow, Rachel 187n. 24 Madison, James 28n. 9 “Mama Grizzlies” 155 Mandel, Ruth B. 46–7 marriage gap 57 Martinez, Susana 26, 173 Matthews, Chris 71, 113, 121 McCain, John 6, 14, 57, 73, 74, 83, 88, 110, 120, 128–9, 132, 138, 152–5, 157–9, 167, 176 McChesney, Robert 180 McConnell v. FEC (2003) 129 McCotter, Thad 79 McGovern, George 107 McInturff, Bill 176 McKinney, Cynthia 29n. 13 Merkel, Angela 39 microtargeting of voters 136–7, 139 Mikulski, Barbara 40, 41 Miller, Melissa J. 113 Miss Representation (2012) 181 momentum 8, 80, 87, 91, 98–102, 107, 108, 110, 112 Mondale, Walter ix, 14, 54, 149, 150 Monroe, James 28n. 9 MoveOn.org 129 MSNBC 3, 28n. 5, 71, 113, 187n. 24 Murkowski, Lisa 26, 173

202

INDEX

Nahigian, Keith 87–8 National Organization for Women (NOW) 8, 56, 149 Navarro, Ana 18 NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll 141 network news 140, 141 New Hampshire primary 99–100, 103–5 in 1964 7 in 2000 138 in 2008 5, 6, 103, 106, 122n. 9 new media 55, 114, 138–9 Newport, Frank 25 news media and campaign coverage 52–5, 139–42 and fragmentation 180 and gender bias 52–4 and negative tone of campaign coverage 140 and portrayals of women 35 Newsweek 74, 88 New York Times 26, 73, 84, 85, 103, 151, 155 Nineteenth Amendment 33 Nixon, Richard 148 nomination process 27, 97–9, 118–21, 173 and campaign finance 109–11 and delegates 105–9 and early contests 100–5 and fifty-state strategy 98, 108, 111, 118 and horse-race coverage 112–17 and momentum 99–100 Norris, Pippa 57, 184 Obama, Barack 1, 4, 5, 8, 13, 26, 29n. 19, 57, 78, 169, 170, 178 and 2008 presidential campaign 17, 52, 76–7, 85–6, 102–11, 112, 118–20, 122n. 16, 123n. 21, 127–9, 132, 134, 138, 142, 152–4, 157, 165, 167, 176, 183 and 2012 reelection campaign 6, 130, 132, 134, 136–8, 140, 142–5, 146–8, 168, 174

“Obamacare” 71 Olson, Stephanie 82 “on-deck circle” 12–13, 27, 166 O’Neill, Tip 151 online news sources 140 open-seat elections 43, 49–50 Oxley, Zoe 117, 119 Palin, Sarah x, 3, 7, 14, 15, 25, 34, 38, 55, 57, 78, 127, 149, 152–7, 159, 167, 175, 178, 181, 182, 185 partisan cues 135–6 partisan gerrymandering 49, 175, 184 partisan polarization 137 party identification 174 Pasquil, Mona 43 Patterson, Tom 180 Paul, Ron 79, 102 Pawlenty, Tim 79 PBS 146 Peace and Freedom Party 29n. 13 Peake, Jeffery S. 113 Pelosi, Nancy 13, 34, 38, 181 Perry, Rick 79, 89, 94n. 35, 102 Pew Research Center for People and the Press 140 Pew Research Poll 141 Plouffe, David 154 policymaking and role of gender 40, 41 political action committees (PACs) 51–2, 127, 128, 130, 178 political advertising 128, 129, 130, 138, 139, 143–4 and attack ads 129, 130 and cost in 2012, 144 and defusing 143 and priming 143 political experience 47–8 political parties, state of 126 political socialization 114, 135, 179–80, 182 Pomper, Gerald 137 postfeminism 14–15, 19–20, 37, 154

INDEX

Presidential Debate Commission 145 Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF) 74, 127 presidential leadership 9–11, 125 presidential masculinity 9 Presidential Succession Act of 1947 6 “presidential timber” 54 primacaucus (Texas) 122n. 16 Project for Excellence in Journalism 85 prospective voting 135 public opinion polls and aggregating 141 and news coverage during general election 141–2 and snap polls following debates 146 and support for electing a woman president 11–12, 25 Quayle, Dan 74 Quinnipiac University 141 quota laws 46, 184 Rasmussen Poll 25, 141 Ready for Hillary Super PAC 168 Reagan, Ronald 8, 68, 99, 143, 150, 169, 175, 183 and 1984 campaign ads 143 RealClearPolitics 141 recruitment of women candidates 46–7, 48–9 and “political pipeline” 48, 166, 178, 183 reproductive rights 41, 42, 71 Republican National Convention in 1964 7 in 1996 68 in 2008 154 in 2012 140 retail politics 100 retrospective voting 135 Richards, Ann 42 Richardson, Bill 78, 85, 103, 105 Rodgers, Cathy McMorris 173 Roemer, Buddy 79

Romney, Mitt 57, 78, 79, 86–9, 91, 102, 108, 118–20, 128, 130, 132, 137, 140, 142–5, 146–8, 165, 174 Roper Poll 141 Rose, Melody 20, 113, 115–16, 155, 177 Rosin, Hanna 37 Ross, Jim Buck 151 Sabato, Larry 26 safe seats 45, 49 same-sex marriage 71 Sanbonmatsu, Kira 47 Sandberg, Sheryl 36, 38 Santorum, Rick 79, 102 Scandal (ABC) 16 Schnall, Marianne 17 Schreiber, Ronnee 155, 176 Schroeder, Patricia 8, 104 Schultz, Debbie Wasserman 26, 171 secretary of state, as stepping stone to presidency 6 sexism 113, 114, 121 sexual division of labor 34–5 Sharpton, Al 76 Sheeler, Kristina Horn 19 Sides, John 148 Silver, Nate 141–2 Slaughter, Anne-Marie 37 Smeal, Eleanor 56 Smith, Margaret Chase 7 Smith, Robert C. 75 Snowe, Olympia 41 social media 55, 138–9 soft money contributions 128–9 soft news 85, 95n. 50, 117, 141, 181 Spar, Debora 37 split-ticket voting 136 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady 33 State of Affairs (NBC) 16 Stein, Jill 29n. 13 Sullivan, Andrew 170 superdelegates 106, 107 Super PACs 130, 144, 165, 178 Super Tuesday 106, 107, 110, 111, 116

203

204

INDEX

Susan B. Anthony List 51 Swers, Michele 41 Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth 129 swing states 126, 132, 136, 139, 156, 158

vice presidents and succession to presidency 14 voter turnout 55, 98, 135, 136–7, 156, 157 voting behavior 55–8, 135–6, 174

tax checkoff 127, 159n. 2 Tea Party 71, 72, 78, 89, 101, 120 Tea Party Caucus, House of Representatives 15, 72, 101 “team of rivals” theory 5 Thatcher, Margaret 39 Thomas, Clarence 50 Thomas, Jay 181 Tilden, Samuel 133 Time 1 “traditional media” 139, 140 “Tsunami Tuesday” (2008) 106 Tumblr 146 24 (Fox) 16 Twenty-Third Amendment 131 Twitter 138, 139, 143, 146 two-tiered campaign 68, 80, 83, 84, 90–1, 101, 109, 112, 119–20

Wallace, Nicole 152 “war on women” 41 Warren, Elizabeth 26, 171 Washington Post 17, 85, 150 Wayne, Stephen J. 73, 75, 109, 125, 167 West, Darrell M. 143 White House Project 16, 38 Whitman, Meg 42 Will, George 150 Wilson, Marie 16, 38 WISH List 51 Wolfson, Howard 70 “woman as president” theme in popular culture 15–16 woman as executive leaders 42–3 woman governors 42–4 woman politicians as role models 13, 48, 179 woman as voters 33–4, 35, 55–8 Women’s Economic Equity Act 149 women’s interest groups 50 “women’s issues” 40 women’s representation in other countries 45–6 Woodhull, Victoria 7, 114

United Nations Human Rights Commission 151 USA Today 141 Van Buren, Martin 28n. 9 Vanderbilt, Cornelius 7 Vaughn, Justin 19 Veep (HBO) 16 viability of presidential candidates 76, 77, 80, 82–6, 90–1, 99–101, 118–20, 185 vice presidential running mates, selection of 148–56, 157, 173

“Year of the Woman” (1992) 34, 50, 69 YouTube 138, 143 Zaccaro, John 150 Zimmerman, Jo Ann 122n. 6 Zogby Poll 141