In Defense of Polemics (Argumentation Library, 42) 3030852091, 9783030852092

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Argumentation Library

Ruth Amossy

In Defense of Polemics

Argumentation Library Volume 42

Series Editor Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Editorial Board Fernando Leal Carretero, University of Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico Maurice A Finocchiaro, Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada at Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, USA Bart Garssen, Faculty of Humanities, TAR, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands Sally Jackson, Communication, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA Wu Peng, School of Foreign Languages, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, China Sara Rubinelli, University of Luzern, Nottwil, Luzern, Switzerland Takeshi Suzuki, School of Information and Communication, Meiji University, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan Cristián Santibañez Yañez, Faculdad de Psicologia, University of Concepción, Concepción, Chile David Zarefsky, School of Communication, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA Sara Greco, IALS, Università della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland

Since 1986 Springer, formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers, publishes the international interdisciplinary journal Argumentation. This journal is a medium for distributing contributions to the study of argumentation from all schools of thought. From a journal that published guest-edited issues devoted to specific themes, Argumentation has developed into a regular journal providing a platform for discussing all theoretical aspects of argumentative discourse. Since 1999 the journal has an accompanying book series consisting of volumes containing substantial contributions to the study of argumentation. The Argumentation Library aims to be a high quality book series consisting of monographs and edited volumes. It publishes texts offering important theoretical insights in certain major characteristics of argumentative discourse in order to inform the international community of argumentation theorists of recent developments in the field. The insights concerned may pertain to the process of argumentation but also to aspects of argumentative texts resulting from this process. This means that books will be published not only on various types of argumentative procedures, but also on the features of enthymematic argumentation, argumentation structures, argumentation schemes and fallacies. Contributions to the series can be made by scholars from a broad variety of disciplines, ranging from law to history, from linguistics to theology, and from science to sociology. In particular, contributions are invited from argumentation theorists with a background in informal or formal logic, modern or classical rhetoric, and discourse analysis or speech communication. A prerequisite in all cases is that the contribution involved is original and provides the forum of argumentation theorists with an exemplary specimen of advanced scholarship. The Argumentation Library should enrich the study of argumentation with insights that enhance its quality and constitute a fruitful starting point for further research and application. All proposals will be carefully taken into consideration by the editors. They are to be submitted in fourfold. If the prospects for including a certain project in the series are realistic, the author(s) will be invited to send at least three representative chapters of their manuscript for review to the editors. In case the manuscript is then judged eligible for publication, the complete manuscript will be reviewed by outside expert referees. Only then a final decision can be taken concerning publication. This book series is indexed in SCOPUS. Authors interested in submitting a proposal or completed manuscript can contact either [email protected] or the Series Editor.

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Ruth Amossy

In Defense of Polemics

Ruth Amossy Tel-Aviv University Tel-Aviv, Israel Translated by Olga Kirschbaum

ISSN 1566-7650 ISSN 2215-1907 (electronic) Argumentation Library ISBN 978-3-030-85209-2 ISBN 978-3-030-85210-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8 Translation from the French language edition: Apologie de la polémique by Ruth Amossy, and Olga Kirschbaum, © Presses Universitaires de France 2014. Published by Presses universitaires de France. All Rights Reserved. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

This book is part of a broader research project on polemical discourse in the democratic sphere undertaken within the framework of the Israeli Sciences Foundation (ISF, project 734/08). A French version was published by the Presses Universitaires de France in 2014. It has since been translated into Italian, Spanish and Portuguese. Chapter 6 “Rationality and/or Passion Thomas Friedman and the Mexican Wall” has been written especially for this English version.

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Contents

1 Introduction: Why Polemics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I

1 6

Theoretical Considerations

2 Managing Disagreement in Democracies: Towards a Rhetoric of Dissensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Quest for Consensus and the Obsession of Agreement . . . . . . . 2.2 Contemporary Condemnations of Dissensus and Polemics . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Reevaluation of Dissensus in the Social Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Rhetorical Argumentation and the Question of Dissensus . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Towards a Rhetoric of Dissensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Public Controversy and Polemics: Some Attempts at Definitions . . . . 3.1 A Debate About a Question of Public Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Public Controversy as an Argumentative Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Tax Exile: The Public Controversy About Depardieu, Following Arnault and Clavier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 A Mode of Conflict Management: Dichotomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Polarization, or Social Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 The Relationship to the Other. The Disqualification of the Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 A Fierce Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 10 12 17 19 23 26 27 30 32 33 35 37 39 41 45 45

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Part II

Contents

How Do Polemics and Public Controversy Work? Looking at Debates on Women in the Public Sphere

4 Wearing the Burqa in France Polemical Discourse and Polemical Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Burqa Affair in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Enunciation and Journalistic Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Public Controversy as a Media Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Polarization in Journalistic Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 The Journalist as Polemicist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 The Televised Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Dialogue and Polylogue in Discussion Forums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 Public Controversy as Polylogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Controversies and Polemics in Public Space “The Exclusion of Women” in Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Public Controversy on the “Exclusion of Women” . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Formula as the Focus of Public Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Public Controversy in a Divided Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The Public Controversy Against the Ultraorthodox: Rallying in the Fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Public Controversy as Political Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Public Controversy in Ultra-Orthodox Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 The Dangers of Polarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49 51 54 55 56 58 60 63 66 69 71 73 74 75 76 79 84 85 91 93 95

Part III Reason, Passion, and Violence 6 Rationality and/or Passion Thomas Friedman and the Mexican Wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Controversy About Thomas Friedman’s Op-Ed on the Mexican Wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Condemning Emotional Responses in the Name of Reason . . . . . . . 6.3 The Role of Practical Reasoning in Public Controversy . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 The Place and Role of Emotions in Polemical Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99 102 104 105 112 120

7 Verbal Violence: Its Functions and Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 7.1 “Flames” in Online Conversations. Is Violence Intrinsic to Public Controversy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 7.2 What is Verbal Violence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Contents

7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6

The Verbal Violence of Discussions on the Net: Flames . . . . . . . . . . Violence and Argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public Controversy as a Personal Quarrel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Violence Directed Against a Third Party: Creating a Virtual Community of Protest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 Incitement to Violence: Polemical Violence and Coercive Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.8 Functional Violence. Regulation and Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Conclusion Coexistence in Dissensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Public Controversy in the Public Sphere Cannot be Measured with the Yardstick of Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 The Role of the Media in the Construction of Public Controversy and Polemics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Dissensus and Public Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Public Controversy and Alternative Rationalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 The Functions of Public Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.1 The Persuasive Function: Influencing and Winning the Round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.2 Weaving Together a Social Bond: The Functions of Connecting and Rallying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.3 Public Controversy as Protest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.4 Public Controversy as a Strategy of Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.5 By Way of Conclusion: In Defense of Polemics . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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127 129 131 135 136 140 143 143 145 145 148 149 152 154 154 155 156 157 159 159

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Chapter 1

Introduction: Why Polemics?

Being in the habit of consulting regularly the French media, I was quite impressed, a few years ago, by the frequency of the “polemics” or public controversies (in French, “polémiques”)1 they report on weekly. Here are the results of a random survey for the month of September 2012 (when I first collected the relevant items): On the 20th, Le Monde titles «L’étude qui relance la polémique sur les OMG» (“The study that relaunched the controversy about GMOs.”)2 On the 19th of September, the headline runs: «Charlie Hebdo crée la polémique en caricaturant Mahomet» (“Charlie Hebdo is creating the controversy by caricaturing Mohammed.”) And a day earlier: «Polémique: les classes prépa vont-elles devenir payantes?». (“Controversy: Preparatory Classes, will they become fee paying?”) On the 16th of September, it is «Enquête et polémique après la manifestation près de l’ambassade des États-Unis» (“Investigation and controversy after the protests near the American Embassy in reaction to the movie The innocence of Muslims).” Sometimes rather than reporting on a controversy, it is the newspapers that initiate it and become stakeholders in it. This is the case with the large aggressive title on the front page of the leftist daily Libération (10 September 2012) regarding Bernard Arnault, the wealthiest man in France, who had requested Belgian citizenship: “Get Lost You Rich Asshole,” that launched a controversy about tax evasion that was extensively disseminated and was itself the object of polemical responses. A survey of the 2019 French press shows that nothing has changed: “Roman Polanski: ce qu’il faut savoir sur la polémique qui embarrasse le cinéma français (Le Figaro, 13.11.2019) (“Roman Polanski: what you need to know about the controversy that is embarrassing the French film industry”), «Illuminations de Noël sur les Champs-Elysées: Polémique autour du partenariat

1

The use of “polemics” and “public controversy” in French and in English will be explained in Chap. 3. We use here controversy and public controversy in the sense of the French “polémique publique”. 2 All translations of media (newspaper, television, Internet) sources are ours as well as all translations of secondary source material unavailable in English. When there is published English translation of a secondary source, the translation is cited and referenced. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_1

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1 Introduction: Why Polemics?

avec Ferrero» (Capital, 25.11.2019). (“Christmas lights on the Champs-Elysées: The controversy about the partnership with Ferrero”). We can thus see that today the media constantly orchestrate and disseminate polemics on a multitude of subjects said to be of public interest, so that conflicts of opinion and their flare ups occupy an overriding place in the public sphere. However, despite the frequency of these mentions, public controversies in their polemical dimension plainly get bad press. They seem to attract trouble from censors on all sides. Is it any wonder then, if nobody defends them explicitly? In situations of sharp disagreement, people affirm loudly that they are not polemicizing (it is always the other side that has the bad taste to do so….). Everyone wants to avoid the censure that comes to stigmatize speech said to be partial, marred by passion, a violent discourse incapable of contributing to the smooth running of the rational debate that nourishes democracy. This situation gives pause for thought. If polemical public controversies do not provide any advantage, if they deserve nothing more than to be condemned and banned, why do they invade the public sphere in such a persistent way? If they are so disparaged, how is it that they occupy such a privileged place in the media that public opinion feeds off? There is a flagrant contradiction between the disdain that people show with regard to controversies and polemics and the place that they enjoy in the public sphere; between the indictment that they are charged with in theory and the lively interest that they don’t stop generating in practice. One can of course explain the phenomenon by the inability of both citizens and political figures to follow the rules of reasoned debate, or even by the unhealthy curiosity that the audience demonstrates for the spectacle of verbal violence. In the first case, critics deplore the deterioration of our morals and the negative influence of the new media, which supposedly create a dangerous degeneration of public debate and replace dialogue with the exchange of insults. These positions are common in academic as well as contemporary discourse. In both cases, the emphasis is placed on the fact that the public controversies seen on our screens resemble jousting matches that are watched because they entertain. We are in a society of spectacle: they attract because they are playful, because in them we can count the hits and designate the winner, not because they make us think. Likewise, the title of the newspaper that announces a new controversy offers a scoop that is supposed to attract the reader’s attention, which serious matters do not always hold (although the multiplicity of media polemics dulls their appeal by making them so common). No doubt none of this is wrong. These answers seem however to be easy solutions that rely on the current prevailing orthodoxy (the irresistible working of passion, the tendency of journalists to play to our base instincts, etc.) without investigating in depth the nature of the conflictual debates through which democracy sustains itself in a pluralistic society. The reflection that follows tries to answer the questions raised by public controversy in its polemical dimension by examining the way it works in democratic space, and the functions it fulfills in it. It places the idea of function at the forefront, for it is unlikely that such a recurring phenomenon does not fulfill any social functions, whatever their nature or their importance. It adds the notion of functioning (how it works),

1 Introduction: Why Polemics?

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for to understand the role that polemics can play, it is important to see examples on the ground, namely, in specific case studies, how they are constructed discursively and how they model communication. It retains the notion of public space, for it is there that stormy debates on controversial questions of general interest unfurl. It is limited to the democratic sphere, for it is there that differences of opinion can be freely expressed and can give way to open confrontations. The purpose of the study is not to probe a particular public controversy in order to better understand what it is debating. What matters here is not so much the social problem that it treats as the global phenomenon that it brings up. It goes without saying that such a study must be anchored in all of the theoretical questions probing the relationships that are forged between public sphere, deliberation, and democracy as they have been formulated and explored by tutelary figures (Habermas, Perelman, Mouffe …), as well as by various scholars in the social sciences. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that these studies, in other ways quite diverse, mention public controversies and polemical discourse only rarely and negatively. The reasons for this attitude will be analyzed later in this book. To return however to the question from a fresh perspective, we have preferred to give prominence to an empirical approach. Rather than giving over to a purely speculative exercise, we propose exploring a socio-discursive phenomenon in its materiality and in its complexity: not confining it to a Procrustean bed by modeling it on a prior theory, but reconceptualizing it thanks to an in-depth analysis of several contemporary examples. We have chosen to explore a few case studies rather than a single public controversy which would not suffice to raise this study to the desired level of generalization. In other words, it is in the practical examination of the polemical practices themselves that the questions related to the functions of polemical discourse in the public sphere—born from a sustained theoretical reflection—find here an answer. This course of action supposes that we suspend first of all our prior judgment in order to examine how things work on the ground when a particular debate turns into a polemical public controversy, or at least, resorts to polemical discourse at sensitive moments. A small team came together around such a project within the framework of the Israeli Sciences Foundation. It threw itself into a long-term endeavor: collecting and then analyzing materials related to controversies and polemics on subjects as diverse as bonuses and stock options in times of financial crisis, the extension of the age of retirement, the wearing of the burqa in public, the question of selective immigration, or in earlier times, the Naquet law, establishing the legality of divorce in France (1884). To these questions about French society I added in the course of the study controversies that shook Israeli society and that I was able to analyze with my students at the University of Tel Aviv. They allowed me to verify my hypotheses on a corpus taken from another culture, and to enlarge their scale while also measuring differences—an endeavor undertaken thanks to seminars I gave in Argentina and in Columbia, where the participants provided me with new materials. These encounters enriched my work, and it is principally from their results that this present book was born. To keep at least partly the multicultural dimension of this study, I added to the selected French case studies included in this book an Israeli controversy focusing

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on ultraorthodox Jews and dealing with the status of women, and for the English translation, a passionate controversy about Thomas Friedman’s ed-op in the NYT (April 2019) dealing with the Mexican wall advocated by President Trump. This analytical task is only possible if as an analyst, I take care not to turn myself into a polemicist: I have to avoid taking sides for one or other cause. This remark raises a much- discussed question: what should be the political and ethical involvement of the researcher? Such an involvement is even more difficult to avoid if as an analyst, I choose contemporary subjects that affect me personally. How can I stay aloof in a debate on the so-called “exclusion of women” from public spaces occurring in Israel in ultraorthodox communities, if I live as a secular woman in this very country? How can one not express her own point of view in a heated debate on the wearing of the burqa, when she supports secularism in France? Nothing forbids us, of course, from expressing our views on burning topics, even from using scientific analysis as a springboard for social criticism. Examples of this approach are not lacking, starting with the Anglo-Saxon Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Its representatives accomplish remarkable work that aspires to fulfill a real mission. To understand how public controversy functions in the public sphere and what role it plays, it nevertheless seems desirable to stay out of the fray. It is interesting to see that in order to deal with the question of neutrality (what she calls “engaged neutrality”), Nathalie Heinich refers to her work as a sociologist on the controversies around modern art. She says she forbid herself to take a side in order not to become herself an actor who is satisfied with “prop[ing] up” the arguments brought forward, because “neutrality is often the only resource for understanding each other’s logic.” (Heinich, 2002:124). The effort of not taking sides seems in any event to be the best option in order to observe polemical debates—their emergence, their regulation, their social roles—if we do not want to promote a cause (even were it to serve a good cause), but to account for the discursive phenomenon labelled public controversy and polemics and, through it, to understand better the functioning of the contemporary pluralist democracies in which we live today.3 The discourses were therefore, as much as possible, addressed without taking sides, through a detailed analysis attentive to the particular, but at the same time desirous of discovering recurring features in order to draw up a general profile of the phenomenon (what can be considered as being within the ambit of public controversy in its polemical dimension?), detecting its processes (how does it function on the discursive and argumentative level?) and unveiling its social functions (what roles, constructive or negative, do polemical debates play in the public sphere?). These observations are of course related to the entire framework of this analysis, centered on the nature of public debate and political deliberation, but also on the discursive management of conflicts and on verbal violence in the contemporary world. In the following study, after two theoretical considerations on the role of dissensus and the definition of polemics, each chapter enables us to answer a specific inquiry— how polemic discourse functions, how is a public controversy constructed, what role does rationality play in it, how can we understand the role and limits of violence 3

On the question of the ethical commitment of the researcher cf. Koren (ed.) (2013).

1 Introduction: Why Polemics?

5

in it. It is through the prism of these questions that specific cases are explored in their discursive materiality and in their argumentative configuration. They are not the object of an exhaustive study: they are enlisted to clarify particular aspects of polemics (Chaps. 3 and 5)—since these show the texture of polemical texts—both in the most important corpora that touch a multitude of texts, and in genres like TV debates or online forums. From the particularities of each one of these cases and from these frameworks emerge general characteristics that illuminate not only the nature, but also the functions of a global phenomenon. It is the phenomenon of verbal confrontation on social questions that rages on in the public sphere and that needs to be understood in the light not only of democratic deliberation, but also of pluralism and the conflictual nature of contemporary democracies. A few words on the orientation of this study at the risk of jumping ahead of the explication. An attentive exploration of the texts, undertaken in a well-defined methodological framework and a centered theoretical inquiry, has led the author to the conclusion that public controversy in its polemical dimension fulfils important social functions precisely because of what it is generally opposed for: a verbal management of the conflict carried out in the mode of dissensus. This affirmation may seem paradoxical to the extent that rhetoric attaches itself to the search for consensus, or at least to an agreement on the reasonable, which permits communal decisions. It seems however that in pluralistic democratic societies, agreement is far from always possible. Conflicts persist regardless of, or through public debate. No doubt democratic institutions come to regulate public life by offering the means of decision-making. Experience clearly shows, however, that these decisions—even when they lead to the enactment of a law—do not necessarily put an end to the dissension that is expressed in the public sphere. These reemerge in different forms, before giving way to other subjects of disagreement. Even when one-time agreements are established on specific points, they emerge like a transitory moment in the flux of the dissensions that oppose the adversaries. Indubitably it is conflict of opinion that predominates in contemporary democratic spaces respectful of diversity and of freedom of thought and expression. In this context, polemical controversies—which manage conflicts in the mode of the clash of contradictory opinions—do not allow so much for arriving at an agreement, as for ensuring a mode of coexistence in a community torn between diverging stances and interests. In their virulence and their very excess, they allow participants to share the same space without resorting to physical violence—and this down to cases of deep disagreement where the premises are too different to allow for an agreement on the reasonable. They thereby fulfil important functions which go from the possibility of public confrontation within tensions and intractable conflicts, to the creation of protest communities and public action. That is at least what, throughout, this work proposes to demonstrate.

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References Heinich, N. (2002). Pour une neutralité engagée. Questions De Communication, 2, 117–127. Koren, R. (Ed.) (2013). Analyse du discours et engagement du chercheur, Argumentation et analyse du discours, 11.

Part I

Theoretical Considerations

Chapter 2

Managing Disagreement in Democracies: Towards a Rhetoric of Dissensus

The challenge of democracy is to legitimate disagreement, not to put an end to polemics, disputes, controversies, and protests. (Ivie, 2005: 277)

To the extent that it appears like an often brutal clash of antagonistic opinions, polemics is indissolubly linked to disagreement. That is why it shares the discredit that weighs on multiple forms of dissensions (defined as disagreements that lead to discord). In our democratic societies, which are in the quest for consensus, pronounced and prolonged dissensions that bear witness to an incapacity of coming together to form a shared viewpoint are perceived as the source of all problems. They not only threaten to disturb social harmony; they also imperil the decision-making procedures necessary for the proper functioning of democracy. That is to say, the causes of the condemnation incurred by dissension are practical as much as ethical and social. The utopia of perfect relationships rests on an agreement without bumps, namely, on the possibility of coming to an agreement on ways of seeing, of judging, and of doing. Negativity is supposed to arise as soon as tensions, rifts, and violence erupt. To this shared doxa can be added the practical considerations that guide public life. How to decide which actions to undertake, how to manage a collectivity and to conduct policy, if we cannot reach a consensual standpoint? No doubt the divergence of opinions and adversarial debates appear to be necessary. But they are thought of as a stage, a juncture to overcome. Different discursive and institutional frameworks were put in place in order to achieve this result: deliberation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, lawsuits, or even the enactment of laws that settle disputes. Controversies as a clash of antagonistic positions figures as a poor relative, when not purely and simply crossed off the list. This obsession with consensus has not failed to raise some criticism; which we will return to. First of all, however, it is important to recall the whys and wherefores in order to truly comprehend how the horror of dissensus was able to delegitimize public controversy in its polemical form, despite the overriding place it occupies in the public sphere.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_2

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2.1 The Quest for Consensus and the Obsession of Agreement The focal point of this exploration is deliberation as the reasoned management of disagreement through verbal exchange. Deliberation, we know, is the centerpiece of an ancient discipline founded on the search for the most suitable means to persuade an audience: rhetoric. Indeed, argumentative rhetoric as part of the great Aristotelian tradition presents itself as the art of negotiating differences in order to come to an agreement. Aristotle situates the deliberative next to the judicial (the courtroom) and the epideictic (ceremonial). For him, deliberation, turned towards the future, enables the search for the path forward in public affairs by discussing the alternative options open to the citizens of the polis. It therefore supposes that different, if not contradictory, answers can be brought forward to a question that bears on the future of the city. A plurality of opinions, and of the proposed solutions, is thus respected. From this perspective, dissensus is the undisputed engine of democracy. However, rhetoric poses the necessity of finding, through verbal exchange, a common response that would permit disputes to be overcome and decisions reached, and collective action to be undertaken. It is precisely in this search for an agreement that deliberation, in the shape of political discourse and debate, arises. Political is understood here in the broad sense of the term: all that concerns public affairs and the welfare of the community. When she studies the means of persuasion, the rhetorician looks into the necessary conditions for obtaining an agreement. Deliberation must obey the requirements of reason: it is by definition the work of logos, that is to say of speech as discourse and reason. Those who deliberate on a controversial question put forward arguments that allow for the weighing of the pros and the cons of each point in order to reach a generally accepted answer. No doubt ethos—the orator’s self-presentation—and pathos—the capacity to stir emotions in the audience—have their part to play, and Aristotle grants them a key place. But all deliberation must essentially follow rational pathways if conflicts of opinion are to be resolved through the use of speech. It must be emphasized that rhetoric deals with the regulated use of speech. The art of persuasion which proposes to lead to an agreement (of all, of the majority, or of the wise, Aristotle specifies) takes place in frameworks that have their own norms and rituals. The debate assumes different forms depending on the institutional spaces where it takes place. Antiquity, by the way, provided practical instruction that trained orators capable of wielding their speech according to the rules of the art, and therefore mindful of the demands of the theatre where they had to speak. Such is the meaning of agon: a regulated confrontation subjected to a series of constraints and aiming at a common quest, if not for truth, at least for the most reasonable solution. The formal rules and the obedience to the edicts of reason made agonic debate a policed exchange where opinions were assessed vis a vis one another not by the arbitrariness of brute force, but by the arbitration of reason. In short, a regulation of public speech understood as an exercise of logos, of reasoned discourse, is enforced in order to reach an agreement, understood as the primary objective of all deliberation.

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From this rhetorical apparatus, is henceforth excluded what antiquity designated by the term of eristics. The latter is a search for victory at all costs, and uses any means that would enable achieving this victory, without any consideration for truth (this is in particular the interpretation that Plato gives to it).1 It is the art of verbal jousting that respects neither the formal constraints to which authentic rhetorical speech limits itself—it allows for derailments—nor the requirements of reason that demand all parties recognize valid arguments—it accepts power plays and the use of fallacious arguments. Eristics takes its name from the Greek goddess Eris, the daughter of the Night and the sister of Aries, the God of War whom she accompanies on the battlefield. Eris signifies quarrel, discord—its Latin name is Discordia, that is to say, a violent disagreement setting people against each other, and thus dividing them. Personification of the discord and division that are at the root of violence, the goddesses Eris (whom Zeus had driven out from Olympus, because she pit the divinities against one another; she threw the famous apple of discord during the wedding of Thetis and Peleus) often takes on a menacing aspect in mythology. Virgil described her with a bristly mane of snakes. Under her aegis, debate becomes a fight without scruples and rules, an art of dispute for its own sake. Henceforth, all shots are permitted. “Eristics,” Angenot (2008, p. 52) reminds us, “is “an art […] that doesn’t balk either at the worst expedients, or invectives, sarcasm, and slurs.2 ” Rhetoric forbids itself all the more from falling into eristics, “the unworthy art of dispute without wisdom” (ibid., p. 56) since it is often accused of serving the most skillful, of manipulating the audience, and of failing in the search for truth as well as in ethics. Rhetoric does not want to be a mere instrument of power. It aspires to be an art of running the city thanks to the sharing of controlled speech that responds to the ideal of logos as discourse and reason. This great tradition is taken up by contemporary thinkers who reinstated it by showing the nature and virtues of argumentation. Therefore, when Chaim Perelman, a follower of Aristotle, published already in 1958 with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation, he defined argumentation as “the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 4.) The aim of argumentation is thus to (re)orient ways of thinking and seeing through the use of discourse. The new rhetoric was not interested in reasoning that takes place in an autonomous way in the mind of a thinking subject; it intended to analyze verbal reasoning in a situation of communication and see how it can lead to agreement. It starts from the principle that discourse, studied as an exchange (there is communication and interaction between at least two participants), allows humans to co-construct collective answers to the problems that arise in a given social space. The terms of agreement as the goal of the quest, and of reason as the means of the quest, are once again essential. They speak to the concerns of the philosopher who sought to reinstate rationality at the heart of what he called in the broad sense “human affairs.” According to him, in the era of pluralism, humans can escape from the arbitrary and 1 2

For more a more detailed analysis of eristics according to Plato cf. Nehamas (1990). All quotations originally in French are translated by us.

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from violence only by searching for an agreement not based on the rational, but on the reasonable. In other words, they need to argue in order to reach a collective solution that seems acceptable and plausible to the majority. Putting society under the sign of reason is to subject its management, not to scientific demonstration aiming at establishing truth through rational means, but to an argumentation likely to establish a meeting of minds on the reasonable. Thus, agreement acquires a privileged place in Perelman’s work to the extent that it becomes the touchstone of rationality. It is in effect the agreement on what seems to be acceptable that grounds a position or opinion in reason. From this perspective, the quest for consensus includes philosophical as well as social stakes. This implies that dissent must be overcome at all costs, under penalty of falling short of the criteria of reason and of making the community sink into discord, division, even armed struggle. By re-infusing rationality into the heart of human behaviors, the agreement on the acceptable and on the plausible enables the keeping in check of surges of irrationality and violence, memories of which (we are in 1958) are particularly traumatizing.

2.2 Contemporary Condemnations of Dissensus and Polemics It is not surprising then to see that the new rhetoric endeavors to discredit the types of interactions that are not liable to lead to a meeting of hearts and minds. Indeed, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (who do not use the term polemics) condemn eristics. The one who gives in should not be beaten in an eristic contest but is supposed to yield to the self-evidence of truth. Dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate in which the partisans of opposed settled convictions defend their respective views, but rather a discussion in which the interlocutors search honestly and without bias for the best solution to a controversial problem. Certain contemporary writers who stress this heuristic viewpoint, as against the eristic one, hold that discussion is the instrument for reaching objectively valid conclusions. The assumption is that in discussion the interlocutors are concerned only with putting forward and testing all the arguments, for and against, bearing on the various matters in question. When successfully carried out, discussion should lead to an inevitable and unanimously accepted conclusion, if the arguments, which are presumed to weigh equally with everyone, have, as it were, been distributed in the pans of the balance. In a debate, on the other hand, each interlocutor advances only arguments favorable to his own thesis, and his sole concern for arguments unfavorable to him is for the purpose of refuting them or limiting their impact. The man with a settled position is thus one-sided, and because of his bias and the consequent restriction of his efforts to those pertinent arguments that are favorable to him, the others remain frozen, as it were, and only appear in the debate if his opponent puts them forward. And as the latter is presumed to adopt the same attitude, one sees how discussion came to be considered as a sincere quest for truth, whereas the protagonists of a debate are chiefly concerned with the triumph of their own viewpoint. (Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca, 1969 [1958]: 37–8)

This nomenclature, which strangely makes “debate” a synonym of “eristics,” should not mislead us. Its objective clearly consists in promoting an open dialogue in which partners engage in examining the pros and the cons in order to arrive, through

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the presentation and the discussion/refutation of rational arguments, at an agreement on an answer judged to be reasonable. To the extent that the notions of critical examination and openness of mind are essential to the success of the endeavor, what Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca designate as “debate” becomes radically disqualified through its assimilation to eristics, the rhetorical jousting whose only goal is victory through all possible means. Whereas discussion is based on a rational and honest approach which “should lead to an inevitable and unanimously accepted conclusion,” debate according to the new rhetoric rests on partial and biased involvement which does not seek to convince the other in a verbal interaction, but to bring him down. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca maintain this standpoint, essential to their argument, despite the fact that the distinction between discussion and debate is, by their own admission, hard to establish on the ground. One reads therefore in The New Rhetoric (ibid., p. 38): “In practice, there are many occasions in which this distinction between discussion and debate is hard to draw with any exactitude. In most cases, it is based on the intention which we, rightly or wrongly, ascribe to the participants in the dialogue, and this intention might vary in the course of the dialogue.” A clear dividing line can only be traced when we find ourselves in an institutional framework where the division of roles is clear and the intentions of the debaters transparent: in court, for example, or in the political sphere when the orator is identified with a party, or even performs a specific function like defending a candidate. What is more, Perelman & Olbrechs-Tyteca add, the heuristic dialogue, in which the interlocutor is an incarnation of the universal audience, and the eristic dialogue, which aims at overpowering the opponent, are both merely exceptional cases. In ordinary dialogues, the participants are merely trying to persuade their audience so as to bring about some immediate or future action; most of our arguments in daily life develop at this practical level”. (ibid., p. 39)

We see how much the distinction between debate (in this case eristics) and discussion (rational deliberation) remains blurred and difficult to establish in practice. The new rhetoric does not however renounce mentioning it and spelling it out. It is because the distinction between the collective search for the reasonable, which leads to an agreement, and the exercise of oratory battles confronting antagonistic positions, raises here philosophical and social stakes of the utmost importance. In the diverse theories of argumentation that have followed the new rhetoric, agreement remains a privileged position and presents itself as the ultimate goal towards which shared reason tends. This purpose can come out directly—when it is explicitly a question of the resolution of conflicts—or more indirectly. Thus, informal logic, the branch of philosophy that studies arguments and types of arguments, searches for the criteria of logical validity that should govern discourses in everyday language. It is committed to verifying whether they are subjected to the laws of reason by detecting fallacies, lines of argument that appear logically valid, but are not. The use of fallacies refers back to the blameworthy practice of eristics. Indeed, fallacious arguments are pointed out, classified, described, and denounced. Informal logic is from this perspective not content with relying on a critical evaluation. It also constructs the platform on which citizens will be able to agree about what should be accepted or

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rejected regarding the proposals that are made to them and the lines of arguments that are submitted to them. To train minds in such a way that they are broken into the critique of arguments and able to form valid arguments for themselves, is, for informal logic, to offer a contribution that goes beyond the walls of the academy to model an enlightened society. However, the question of eristics was in part reviewed by one of the most wellknown representatives of informal logic, Walton (1998). He shows that arguments cannot be judged correct or false in the absolute, but only within the frameworks in which they are used. These frameworks constitute for him abstract models of interaction endowed with a particular goal, called “dialogues.” He thereby distinguishes between the persuasive dialogue, the informational and the instructive dialogue; as well as the dialogue which pertains to inquiry, to deliberation, or to negotiation; and finally … the eristic dialogue. Walton sees in the latter a highly conflictual exchange where each seeks to deliver blows to the other by denigrating him, and even by hurting and humiliating him. He places it under the auspices of a quarrel that does not seek truth but expresses in broad daylight complaints and reproaches by personally attacking an interlocutor who stands as an adversary. For Walton eristic dialogue is thereby the privileged locus for fallacious arguments and manipulative tactics. We see that the pure and simple assimilation of eristics to altercations places this type of interaction on lower tier on the scale of dialogues. If it receives a place among them, it appears nonetheless like a purely emotional exercise that brings to the surface generally repressed feelings, and that sins in relation to dialectics to the extent that it jumps from one subject to another (Walton, 1992, p. 135). Furthermore, for Walton, eristics marks an unhappy evolution of other types of dialogues, prevailing when they fail to regulate a divergence by their own procedures. In this regard, the impossibility of reaching an agreement by regulated and reasoned speech is once again viewed as a failure with harmful consequences. Others, like the pragma-dialectic school of Amsterdam, focus more specifically on the resolution of conflicts. This approach departs therefore from all those that— not demanding from discussion a consensual goal—accept seeing in it the space for unresolved debates and persistent tensions. It is founded on the notion of a critical discussion in which “the parties involved attempt to resolve their difference of opinion by reaching an agreement about the acceptability or unacceptability of the standpoint at issue” (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 280). Argumentation as the effort of mutual persuasion undertaken by reasonable and free subjects is the heart of this approach. The latter requires moreover respecting a series of rules inspired by Grice’s principles of cooperation; any infraction of these rules constitutes a fallacy that upsets the rationality of the dialogue and creates an obstacle to the resolution of the dispute. Therefore, for example, rule 9: “A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense of the standpoint must result in the other party retracting its doubts about the standpoint” (ibid., p. 284). “The continuation of the difference of opinions in the polemics thus manifests the derailment of the argumentative procedure and a failure of the dialectic system” (Plantin, 2003, p. 379).

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Once again, we find ourselves faced with a theory that allies the good management of verbal exchange and of reason, with the goal of reaching an agreement. Even if van Eemeren and Garssen edited a collection of articles entitled Controversy and Confrontation where they allow full expression to the works of Marcelo Dascal on controversy (recognized by the authors as the specific manifestation of an argumentative discourse endowed with its own characteristics [van Eemeren & Garssen, 2008, p. 3]), their approach in this volume is consistent with their general viewpoint. In fact, they emphasize from the start that controversy is linked to confrontation and the efforts to put an end to it by the means of argumentation (ibid., p. 2). Its specificity resides in the fact that it is a persistent conflict where the difference of opinions seems often impossible to resolve. Discord is the sign of failure, and its pervasiveness is a problem in a vision where the quest for agreement predominates. In a certain way, the insistence on the effective means of conflict resolution can seem like a simple question of common sense and with this in mind, it is not surprising that not only contemporary rhetorical approaches—but also actual university curricula in the domain of social science entitled “Conflict Resolution”—are committed to it with special sympathy. If there is a debate, is it not to resolve a dispute, rather than to prolong or exacerbate it? If a verbal exchange takes place, we suppose that it is not for favoring disagreement, but for reaching a meeting of minds. It is of course important, in this context, to evoke the work of Jürgen Habermas whose concept of social communication maintains and strengthens the relationship between verbal exchange, reason, and agreement that is at the heart of rhetoric. Without reviewing here a theory that has been the object of many commentaries and indeed of many criticisms, I would like to recall, in line with these remarks, that Habermas constructs a notion of public sphere where cooperation through reasoned dialogue is supposed to bring about a negotiated solution for communal problems. (Habermas, 1992 [1962]). The notion of a public sphere thus rests on a model of rational discussion where citizens reach an agreement through a free verbal exchange. It designates a domain of social life in which public opinion is formed, open equally to all citizens, and where newspapers and magazines, radio and television—in short, the media—play a constitutive role. We will speak, Habermas adds, of the “political sphere in contrast, for instance, with the literary one, when public discussion deals with objects connected with the activity of the state” (Habermas, 1974 [1964], p. 50). The main point here is that the public sphere is a space of deliberation ruled by the rational quest for an agreement concerning the affairs of the city with the purpose of the public good. It thus constitutes a critical body that ensures mediation between society and the state in order to ensure the proper working of democracy. Furthermore, Habermas develops a conception of the current deterioration of the public sphere. For him, the space for reasoned discussion on subjects that involve the community has indeed undergone a radical transformation in the era of mass communication. Rather than active participants in the management of public affairs, citizens have become consumers of goods and of spectacle. What is more, public space “becomes a field for the competition of interests, competitions which assume the form of violent conflicts. Laws which obviously have come about under the

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‘pression of the street’ can scarcely be still understood as arising from the consensus of private individuals engaged in public discussion” (ibid., p. 54). The theory of communicative action that Habermas develops in the rest of his work conceptualizes an idea of communication where individuals construct together, through the free and reasoned use of speech, an inter-comprehension that establishes an agreement. The normal use of communication would not be, according to Habermas, strategic action, based on pure self-interest, but communicative action. Communicative action supposes that the speakers reach a mutual understanding thanks to a rational approach subjected to a series of validity claims. The latter include not only accuracy, but also moral rightness and personal sincerity. We are clearly in the realm of argumentation, from a viewpoint that takes up the ideal of rhetoric. Democracy rests on deliberation between equal citizens who can argue without restrictions; the notion of agreement born from exchange, and of rational argument as a solution to the problems posed by the management of public affairs, are at the center of the theory. Though the criticism addressed to Habermas has been great, Dascal and Knoll (2011, p. 7) emphasize that, generally speaking, it “does not deny the existence and need of deliberation in the public sphere. It rather focuses on more modest goals than reaching full agreement obtained by rational argumentation trying to overcome public dissent at large.”. All of these perspectives drive a vision of agreement that privileges reasoned debate as an ideal and as a practical means of democratic management—a vision which continues to influence a large part of the contemporary thinking on this debate.3 In short, in the conceptions of communication and debate inherited by classical rhetoric and developed in contemporary approaches of communication in public space, the rejection of disagreement remains central and tightly tied to an ideal of reason and social harmony. Any verbal fight that deals with a conflict without leading to an agreement is disqualified because it is considered to have broken down in failure. Consensus is privileged at the expense of dissensus, and if the latter is even taken into consideration, it is only to the extent that it is a starting point that must be overcome through the sharing of speech and reason—logos. Conflict calls for a resolution; public space requires that a rational debate lead to collective decisionmaking through the means of an agreement. Persuasive rhetoric, whose theories of argumentation and of contemporary communication have taken over, finds in these premises its justification.

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We will take as an example the work (published in 2011) of Constantin Salavastru, Argumentation et débats publics: “The goal of debate is not to initiate participants to a problem, but rather to solve, with their help, a conflict of opinion.” (2011: 57) Indeed he adds, “conflicts are, up to a point, a means of energizing the life of an individual and of society, but if they go beyond this point, they become destructive for the individual and society”. (Ibid., p. 48).

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2.3 The Reevaluation of Dissensus in the Social Sciences Certain currents of thought are however carrying out a reevaluation, if only partial, of dissensus. We will give a couple of prominent examples, borrowed from different fields (and more specifically sociology, philosophy, and political science), which will allow us to take up afresh the analysis conducted about polemics from a rhetorical perspective. These are only stepping stones, whose impact on a revision of the concepts of conflict at the basis of public debate are nevertheless essential. First, the functions of social conflict have been revisited since the 1950s, in particular by the pioneering work of Lewis A. Coser, himself inspired by Georg Simmel who published in 1912 his work Conflict. Simmel thought that contradiction and conflict are prior to unity and constantly influence it. Discord no doubt has negative effects on interpersonal relations, but it is functional in social groups where converging and diverging forces are always in interaction, creating a dynamic that is the source of life. According to Simmel, it is therefore the tension of the positive and the negative that constitutes a group as is: the combination of positive and negative is necessary because a wholly harmonious group would be deprived of structure and vitality. One ought not in fact confuse unity as consensus and concord between individuals (as opposed to discord and disharmony), with unity as the whole of the group that includes at the same time unitary and dualist relationships. In this whole, according to Simmel, conflict is a form of socialization, and not a pure force of rupture. Distinguishing conflict strictly speaking, which is always a case of interaction, from hostile attitudes as predispositions (a distinction that Simmel did not make), Coser extends this analysis to the positive functions of conflict. He notes inter alia that conflict is necessary in order to maintain a relationship to the extent that it allows the expression of dissent in situations of oppression. Furthermore, he distinguishes two categories of conflict: realistic ones, which seek to reach a specific goal by going after the appropriate target and can eventually reach their purpose by alternative means; and unrealistic ones, which express aggressive drives that need to be let out and can change their targets but not their means. This distinction allows us, among other things, not to confuse certain social conflicts—like those born from wage claims, for example,—with the simple need to relieve tension. Realistic conflicts are part of all social systems to the extent that social groups adhere to conflicting values, and to the extent that there is necessarily a struggle for the appropriation of limited resources and a struggle for power. In this respect, conflict is necessary for social change. Let us add that from a Marxist perspective, developed by certain strains of the sociology of conflict, conflict appears as indispensable to social evolution and to revolution. We are a long way in all of these cases from a condemnation of dissensus as a negative force. In the field of philosophy, an explicit and vehement plea for dissensus can be found in Nicolas Rescher’s important book, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993). Legitimating diversity, it claims that people’s ways of reasoning and evaluating depend on their changing experiential situations. In other words, the

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variety of beliefs, judgments and evaluations derives from the variety of people’s experiences, the variation of available data, the epistemic state of the art, etc. “In a human community of more than trivial size, dissensus rather than consensus is the normal condition” (1993, p. 77). Moreover, Rescher claims that dissensus is “at odds with a stifling orthodoxy” and generates creativity (ibid., p. 159). As a result, respect for the autonomy of others is needed in democratic spaces. Consensus as an idealized version of communication (such as Habermas’s or Rawl’s) is neither possible nor desirable. This explains why the obstinate search for general agreement is, in Rescher’s eyes, a big mistake. He suggests, on the practical level, to replace the notion of agreement with the notion of acquiescence (in disagreement). Acquiescence is. not a matter of approbation, but rather one of mutual restraint, which, even when disapproving and disagreeing, is willing (no doubt reluctantly) to ‘let things be’, because the alternative – actual conflict or warfare – will lead to a situation that is still worse’. (ibid., p. 164)

However, in the absence of agreement, how are decision and action possible? For Rescher, consensus is not a pre-requisite for cooperation, as people realize in many circumstances that “the cost to redirect their thinking in the paths of agreement is simply too high” (ibid., p. 179). What allows for cooperation is not consensus but a convergence of interests (ibid., p. 180), for which no significant degree of agreement is needed. In short, the pluralist (as opposed to the “consensualist”) replaces the attempt to avoid dissensus by an attempt to manage dissensus. Of particular interest from our perspective is also the reevaluating of dissensus developed in political science by Mouffe (2000a, 2000b) in her theory of deliberative democracy conceived as “agonistic pluralism.” According to her, we must distinguish between a one-time agreement that allows for making a decision in a democratic way and the omnipresence of dissensus and of conflict which in the democratic sphere divides groups with different visions of the world and diverging interests. Antagonism emerges when the difference is perceived as a conflict with a “they” who opposes the “us” and is defined as an “enemy.” As a consequence, and under certain conditions, collective identities can always be transformed into agonistic relationships with the result that “antagonism can never be eliminated and it constitutes an ever-present possibility in politics” (2000a, p. 13). One must therefore accept that “conflict and division are inherent in politics” and that a “reconciliation” can never be “definitely achieved as the full actualization of the unity of ‘the people’” (ibid., p. 16). Mouffe is not content with positing the preeminence of dissensus, she also denounces the tendency of celebrating consensus, and of putting forward a “moral” notion of deliberation where rational agreement could be established. Like Rescher, she attacks the rationalist approach (and in particular the theories of Habermas) that defines democratic deliberation as a debate between rational and equal individuals discussing freely in order to harmonize their views. She claims that in this framework, the democratic subject is perceived as a rational individual abstract from his social conditions of existence and cut off from the power relations and cultural frameworks in which he develops. This conception cannot account for the political in its antagonistic dimension. (Mouffe, 2000b, p. 11).

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But Mouffe goes further. She shows that agonistic pluralism does not threaten democracy but is on the contrary one of its preconditions of existence. Herein lies the democratic paradox that the political theorist’s book discusses. In fact, what enables democracy is indeed “recognition and legitimation of conflict” and “the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order” (ibid., p. 103). The utopian vision of society as an organic unity gives way to a vision of society with a plurality of values. Mouffe thus situates conflict and dissent at the heart of the democratic process, as its very engine. At the same time, she questions what allows for this process to function without falling in disorder and violence. It is, according to her, the capacity of the dynamism of democracy to turn the enemy into an adversary (Mouffe, 2000a, p. 102): Envisaged from the point of view of ‘agonistic pluralism’, the aim of democratic politics is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it should no longer be perceived as an enemy to be destroyed but as an ‘adversary’, that is, someone whose idea we combat but whose right to defend these ideas we do not put into question […] An adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have a common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of values, there is no rational resolution of the conflict, hence its antagonistic dimension. This does not mean, of course, that adversaries can never cease to disagree, but that does not prove that antagonism has been eradicated. To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion than a process of rational persuasion.

Violence is not avoided by the rational avenues of debate that must lead to a consensus, but by the substitution of the enemy who must be eliminated and destroyed with the adversary—against whose positions one must fight through the use of speech.

2.4 Rhetorical Argumentation and the Question of Dissensus Can these sociopolitical perspectives be retranslated in the terms of rhetorical argumentation in order to authorize a systematic reconsideration of polemics and to examine its constructive functions? This is precisely the path that some trends in argumentation theory and rhetorical studies have followed by exploring the limits of rational debate, the importance and social functions of disagreement, and the necessity to manage dissensus. Thus what the political theorist Pierre-André Taguieff suggests, in a homage to Perelman, ties the pervasiveness of conflict in the public sphere to the ideal that rhetoric must strive towards on that basis. While recognizing the importance of the new rhetoric, he ends his analysis with a denunciation of the supremacy of consensus. Perelman puts forward that agreement is the touchstone of the reasonable, namely of what is perceived as acceptable by a given community. This is why agreement constitutes the basis of any social life that calls for decisions taken collectively. Taguieff argues on the contrary that political discourse and public debate are

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founded on conflict and are nourished by it. He therefore calls for a post-perelmanian approach to go beyond what he defines as a naïve “contemporary dialogical angelism” ignoring that the basis of political interaction is conflict. (Taguieff, 1990, p. 273). This approach should take into consideration the inevitability of exchanges based on strong dissensions and the key role of antagonism in democracy—rather than rejecting them on the basis of ethical preoccupations or rationalist calls for agreement. Such an approach calls for a recognition of the limits of rational procedures in conflict resolution. Let’s start with the first cat set amongst the pigeons, already many years ago, by Robert Fogelin. His article, published in 1985 (and republished in 2005) in the journal Informal Logic, put forward that there were persistent disagreements that he called “deep disagreements,” that no rational reasoning was able to resolve. Criticizing purely deductive reasoning, Fogelin began by stating that normal argumentative communication implies a series of shared beliefs and a basic agreement on the procedures for the resolution of disputes. In the absence of these conditions, argumentation turns out to be impossible. “My thesis, or rather Wittgenstein’s thesis, is that deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of an argument for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing” (2005 [1985], p. 7–8). He does not speak about conflicts that are expressed with particular violence, or even about those that don’t reach a resolution—a failure that can eventually be attributed to the stubborn attitude of one of its participants rather than an overall defeat of rational procedures. Deep disagreement according to Fogelin, ensues from an incompatibility between the underlying principles of both parties. These principles are integrated in “a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking” (ibid., p. 9). Fogelin gives as an example the public controversy about abortion in North America. To the question of knowing which rational procedures can be mobilized to solve the deep disagreement between the “Pro Choice” (who defend the voluntary termination of a pregnancy) and the “Pro Life” (who condemn it vigorously), the author responds point blank that there aren’t any. And he cites Wittgenstein who writes that when two principles that do not accord cannot be reconciled, each one declares that the other is crazy or a heretic. It follows that the way forward regarding deep disagreements is to accept irrationality and to turn to alternative means of persuasion, about which the author—it must be said—does not go into detail. There exists then, based on the very admission of an adherent of informal logic for whom rationality is a basic principle and a reference, “disagreements, sometimes, on important issues, which by their nature, are not subject to rational resolutions” (ibid., p. 11). This idea, which has caused a lot of flurry and is still presented as a provocation and a challenge in the issue of Informal Logic consecrated to Fogelin in 2005, is satisfied with registering what it considers to be a reality that cannot be overlooked. The value judgment on the distressing character of the phenomenon raised is not suspended. The impossibility of arriving at an agreement is indeed regrettable—and if we must apparently accommodate ourselves to it, it is because there is no solution. In short, one must take into consideration, without finding any advantage in it, a field of debate where certain zones (for Fogelin, happily limited) remain impermeable to the conciliatory work of reason.

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This position is taken up and developed forcefully by Marc Angenot, in a framework that throws down an overall challenge to argumentative rhetoric as the art of persuasion. In an analysis begun by the study of cognitive breaks (2002) and which finds its crowning achievement in the 2008 work entitled significantly Dialogue de sourds (Dialogue of the Deaf ), Angenot posits (contrary to Fogelin) that arguments that do not end in an agreement are the rule, and not the exception. He takes as a proof all of the philosophical, public, political controversies that, despite their duration, never lead to a shared conclusion. The persistent absence of consensus is defined in relation to the art of persuasion: it is a failure, from which the researcher seeks to extricate the reasons. Angenot is not preoccupied with disagreement as such (which can follow from a simple divergence of interests) but with cases of deep disagreements, to use Fogelin’s term, those that present “breaks of argumentative logic” (Angenot, 2008, p. 15). One supposes then. a category of insurmountable disagreements due to the fact that the very rules of argumentation and the fundamental presumptions about what is “rational,” “obvious,” “demonstrable,” or “knowable” don’t or no longer constitute a common ground. In this last case study, as Saint Jerome writes, as emphasized in this book, the adversaries of ideas end up considering those on the other side to be “insane.” (ibid., p. 16)

To explore the ins and outs of the “dialogue of the deaf” leads Angenot to problematize the notion of a universal reason able to provide the basis of a common agreement. As a result, he sets up revisiting rhetoric by substituting the persuasion of old with the question of controversy and polemics. At the end of a fascinating journey, the author—who emphasized the constant failure of persuasion efforts and their uselessness—asks himself why humans persist in arguing. He puts forward the idea that they do it with the objectives of justification and positioning. Yet, justification is not only given in front of others in a course of action that allows the speaker to test her own reasons: it is also carried out in front of the specter of a rational judge, a universal audience, or “a spectral arbiter,” who guarantees the fact that the speaker “thinks in accordance with reason and justice.” (ibid., p. 443). This study opens a new field of research by positing the existence of a rationality that is relative to eras and cultures, and thus the source of insurmountable dissensions. It emphasizes that these disagreements are the rule rather than the exception. The notions of heterogeneous logics and cognitive breaks are particularly useful. Angenot, however, is interested in the reasons why we engage in polemics despite the acknowledged failure of all our attempts at persuasion: he does not look for the possible benefits of the expression of disagreements. He posits the value of “antilogical” thought, derived from Protagoras, and rehabilitated by contemporary works on the sophists that had been criticized by Aristotle and his long succession. Starting from the title of the work by Protagoras, The Antilogics, he thus notes: The issue for sophistry was to confront the antilogies or opposing reasons (antilegein = to contradict) by admitting that they can be irreconcilable and insurmountable without one of them being “true” or “false” […]. [This thesis] seems to say that political and social controversies are polarized in antilogical arguments, obscure to one another because they are illogical to one another, as I see things. (ibid., p. 43).

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But Angenot sees in Protagoras an “ethical preoccupation, hostile to eristic antagonism” (ibid., p. 44), since in a space polarized by contradictory opinions and denuded of absolute certainty, one should not boast of being absolutely correct in relation to others. The antilogical approach becomes therefore a mark of and a justification for skepticism—in whose field Pyrrho and Montaigne are cited. If the dialogue of the deaf is subtitled Treatise on antilogical rhetoric, it is because it is supportive of what he calls “a theory of dialogue negotiated within human reach.” (ibid., p. 44). This theory is “hostile to eristic antagonism” which supposes involvement in the defense of a position and in the fierce struggle against what the adversary puts forward. In this space governed by the philosophical principles of skepticism, controversy and polemics—where actors defending with virulence positions considered to be true confront each other—appear as a form of devalued reasoning and as a poor mode of verbal exchange. Other specialists of rhetoric also insist on the importance of polemics. Thus, Kendall Phillips proposes to go beyond the American rhetorical tradition by reexamining the public sphere (1996). Starting from a critique of Habermas, he examines the problems raised by a culture of consensus that ignores the crucial role of disagreement and subordinates it to an objective of conflict resolution. With this in mind, the participants in a so-called open discussion must bend to the rules at the risk of exclusion: the ideal of agreement tends to erase the constitutive differences of the communities by shifting the responsibility for their own exclusion on those who seem deviant. Moreover, notes Phillips, “partiality is a natural aspect of discourse” and its elimination leads to that of diversity as well (ibid., p. 240), limiting thereby our understanding and practice of resistance. And this, all the more that, in all intersubjectivity, the participants in the public debate are necessarily limited by the type of subjectivity provided and allowed by the symbolic system that is theirs; thus the person who suffers a wrongdoing finds himself prevented from expressing it since he cannot convey it in the dominant symbolic system that governs the discussion. Phillips concludes that what he calls social rhetoric in the United States (of which he gives numerous examples) leads to ignoring the growing diversity of discourses, reasons, rationalities, and arguments. We also ignore differences of knowledge and of power […] If dissension can be rescued from its oppositional and subservient role to consensus, then it might be possible to reconsider the issues of diversity, difference, and dissent, seriously. (ibid., p. 245)

It is in this regard that the author, in his own words, makes the case for a “rhetoric of controversy” and focuses in different works on public controversy and polemics— thus taking into account the fragmentation of contemporary society and the endless battles that take place there (Phillips, 1999). These reflections on the democratic culture of dissensus should by the same logic lead to seeing in polemical confrontation an inescapable and useful mode of managing conflicts. If in effect, conflict is inevitable in our pluralistic democracies, and if the crux of democracy is not consensus, but the management of dissensus, then controversy as verbal confrontation of contradictory opinions that does not lead to

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a utopian agreement must be reconsidered in depth. It is therefore a rhetoric of dissensus that must be developed, in which polemics must be high on the agenda.

2.5 Towards a Rhetoric of Dissensus Clearly, we can argue that the rudiments of this discipline can already be found in Schopenhauer’s The Art of Controversy (written in German in 1830–1831 and published in 1864), which defends a “controversial dialectic” defined as “the art of disputing and of disputing in such a way, as to hold one’s own, whether one is in the right or the wrong—per fas et nefas.” (2004).4 Starting with an observation on human nature—the vanity and dishonesty of men—, Schopenhauer notes that these divert them from the search for truth in favor of the victory of their own thesis. To this is added the fact that often, in disputes, interlocutors are not able to refute the arguments of others at the appropriate time even though it seems to them later that they were in fact right. Subsequently, “the weakness of our intellect and the perversity of our will lend each other mutual support” (ibid.) to attack the adversary’s argument, even when it seems valid. “A disputant fights not for truth, but for his proposition” (ibid.). Hence the necessity of reviewing all the procedures that form the basis of the art of being right in a treaty that brings to the fore the arguments said to be fallacious instead of denouncing them. The promotion of these “stratagems” arises from “eristic dialectic,” which Schopenhauer proposes to found contrary to Aristotle, who separated sophistry and eristics from dialectics. This eristic dialectic has as its goal teaching how to defend oneself (particularly against unfair attacks) and how to attack what the other says so as to be irrefutable. The author insists on the fact that it is not an art of defending false propositions, but of defending oneself well: one “must know what the dishonest tricks are, in order to meet them; nay, he must often make use of them himself, so as to beat the enemy with his own weapons” (ibid.). The position of the German philosopher undermines for Perelman and his disciples the possibility of basing the management of human affairs on rationality and of solving arguments by agreement. It is not therefore by accident that the author of the new rhetoric does not study polemics and does not use the term, whereas Schopenhauer, who bases himself on the inevitability of dissent and verbal battles, appears in contemporary studies of polemics and controversies as a founding father. We find on the one side faithfulness to a rhetoric anchored in the value of agreement, and on the other the exploration of a rhetoric of dissent where each person stands by his own positions. In Schopenhauer, the rhetoric of dissensus does not however put the accent on the social functions of verbal polemics, nor for that matter on its heuristic value. An important step in this direction was taken by Marcelo Dascal in his theory of controversies, where he underscores their character as a critical activity and their fecundity. In his view, they are not an act of resistance against reason motivated by the 4

I am using the version of the Project Gutenberg ebooks.

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stubbornness to ensure the triumph of one’s own position; they are a form of dialogical activity, which in the domain of the sciences, allows one to understand the meaning of a theory and to realize conceptual changes. Stated otherwise, the confrontation and the battle of antagonistic arguments has a heuristic value: they generate comprehension and even knowledge. With this in mind, Dascal (1998) suggests distinguishing between three kinds of “polemical exchanges”: “discussion”, in which the difference of opinion on a specific question derives from an error that can be corrected, allowing thereby for a solution to the conflict according to procedures approved of in the field in question; and “dispute”, which is anchored not in error, but in a preference, a sentiment, an attitude, without there being approved procedures for resolution. A dispute does not lead to an agreement: it can only dissolve or be dissolved. Finally, there is what Dascal calls “controversy,” which occupies an intermediary position: even if there are profound divergences and absences of recognized procedures for resolution, in a controversy the participants argue their position in order to tip the scales of reason in their favor. Thus, controversies do not lead to an uncontested solution nor to a dissolution, but to a resolution. This occurs when one recognizes that one of the positions outweighs the other, that an acceptable modification of the positions arises, or simply by mutual clarification of the difference in question. That is to say that discussion aims at establishing truth, disputes aims at victory, and controversies at persuasion. In this framework, Dascal explores public controversies, whose systematic cognitive dichotomization creates, according to him, an obstacle to the obtaining of an accord by reasonable avenues. In an article written with Knoll (2011), he enumerates the reasons that prevent disagreements from being the object of reasonable argumentation in the public sphere. The most important reasons are in the authors’ view their complexity, the fact that they bring into play divergent systems of values and visions of the world, and the interplay of contradictory interests. In this context, it is the dichotomization of positions and its effects on identity that blocks any search for a solution. One must therefore, according to the authors, find the means of putting public polemics back into the category of reasoned controversies by finding procedures of de-dichotomization. The authors emphasize that the paper is only a preliminary analysis which calls for exploring courses of action liable to reaching these ends. Ultimately, one sees that if Dascal underscores the heuristic virtue of scientific and philosophical controversies by anchoring them in argumentation and engages in his work in an analysis of their particular functioning, he only reflects upon polemics with the goal of finding the means of modifying the cognitive and verbal mechanism that blocks agreement. A rhetorical approach developed by the Danish scholar Christian Kock goes further in the acceptance and recognition of public controversy. He opens a path by suggesting that dissensus is an integral part of public life governed by practical arguments, that must be clearly distinguished from theoretical arguments. He flies in the face of the approaches (like those of informal logic or the pragma-dialectical school) that all posit that rational discussion is liable to resolve differences of opinion. When it is a matter of deciding the preferable course of action—and not a truth—the

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reasoning used is based on values that are by definition variable, mutually contradictory and which moreover can be classed differently. The reasons for and against the proposition can be simultaneously valid. It is the particular weight that they are given that tips the scales on one side or the other. That is to say that no party can prove in the strict sense of the term that it holds the right answer; the reasons here are not compelling. Under these conditions, in practical arguments based on action and not on truth, not only is a consensus not necessarily reached by the recourse to rational avenues, but also dissensus is not “an anomaly to be corrected.” (Kock, 2009, p. 106). According to Kock, the debate that does not lead to an agreement is no less useful for the members of the audience called to examine the pros and cons in order to make a free choice. Thus, dissensus appears as a positive factor, and the deliberative exercises from which it is indissociable as “constructive controversies”—which is, by the way, the title of the article cited. A point of view that the rhetorician reinforces with the works that, in other fields, currently champion a conception of democracy “based on a recognition of dissensus rather than consensus” (ibid., 107), in particular the above quoted works of Rescher and Mouffe in favor of pluralism. Kock thus puts forward a rhetoric defined as a discourse oriented by dissensus which is in his view, the very essence of classical rhetoric exemplified by Isocrates or Cicero, contrary to contemporary theories of argumentation that lose sight of the logic of practical argumentation. But if he puts the virtues of confrontation above the quest for consensus, he does not celebrate public controversies and polemical exchanges. That is precisely what I propose to do in the following pages, in line with my preceding works (particularly). My purpose is to give the rightful place to a rhetoric of dissensus, that is to say a management of conflicts of opinion in the mode of dissensus and not in the quest for an agreement. This endeavor will start from an examination of specific case studies. The examples, as already mentioned, will be selected from the domain of public controversies, and not from scientific or philosophical controversies which obey other rules. As stated in the introduction, the cases selected are not studied for their own sake, nor analyzed in an exhaustive manner. Each one of them allows for both the description of different aspects of public controversy as rhetoric of dissensus, and the response to fundamental questions: how do the modalities of polemical exchanges depart from standard models of dialogue? What happens to its rationality? What about its verbal violence and what of the ethical principles of discussion? And more generally: in a pluralistic space where divergences of opinion, often deep, are given a rightful place, where the presuppositions of each side often lead to incompatible forms of logic, where rational logic is substituted by alternative regimes of rationality, where deliberation most often fails to secure a consensus, what are the social functions of public controversies understood as polemical exchanges?

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References Angenot, M. (2002). Doxa and cognitive breaks. Poetics Today, 23(3), 513–537. Angenot, M. (2008). Le Dialogue de sourds. Traité de rhétorique antilogique. Mille et une Nuits. Coser, L. A. (1964) [1956]. The functions of social conflict. Free Press. Coser, L. A. (1970). Continuities in the study of social conflict. Free Press. ˇ Dascal, M. (1998). Types of polemics and types of polemical moves. In S. Cmejrková, J. Hoomannova, O Mulleirva, & J. Svetla, (Eds.), Dialogue analysis VI, 1, (pp. 15–33). Max Niemeyer. Dascal, M. (2008). Dichotomies and types of debates. In Van Eemeren, F., & Garssen, B. (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation (pp. 24–49). Benjamins. Dascal, M., & Knoll, A. (2011). Cognitive systemic dichotomization in public argumentation and controversies. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Argumentation: Cognition and community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) (pp. 1–35), May 18–21, 2011, Windsor, ON. CD ROM. Fogelin, R. (2005) [1985]. The logic of deep disagreements. Informal Logic, 25(1), 3–11. Habermas, J. (1974) [1964]. The public sphere: An encyclopedia article. New German Critiqu, 3, 49–55. Ivie, R. L. (2005). Democratic dissent and the trick of rhetorical critique. Cultural Studies—Critical Methodologies, 5, 276–293. Kock, C. (2009). Constructive controversy: Rhetoric as dissensus-oriented discourse. Cogency, 1(1), 89–111. Mouffe, C. (2000a). The democratic paradox. Verso. Mouffe, C. (2000b). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, Political Sciences Series 72. Nehamas, A. (1990). Eristic, antilogic, sophistic, dialectic: Plato’s demarcation of philosophy from sophistry. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 7, 3–17. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969) [1958]. The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. University of Notre Dame Press. Phillips, J. R. (1999). A rhetoric of controversy. Western Journal of Communication, 63(4), 488–510. Phillips, K. R. (1996). The spaces of public dissension: Reconsidering the public sphere. Communication Monographs, 63, 231–248. Plantin, C. (2003). Des polémistes aux polémiqueurs. In G. Declercq, M. Murat, & J. Dangel (Eds.), La Parole polémique (pp. 377–408). Champion. Salavastru, C. (2011). Argumentation et débats publics. Puf. Taguieff, P.-A. (1990). L’argumentation politique. Analyse du discours et nouvelle rhétorique. Hermès, 8–9, 261–278. Van Eemeren, F. H, & Garssen, B. (Eds.) (2008). Controversy and confrontation in argumentative discourse. In Controversy and confrontation. John Benjamins. Van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., & Hoekemans, F. S. (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. Walton, D. (1992). Types of dialogue, dialectical shifts and fallacies. In F. H. Van Eemeren, A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation illuminated (pp. 133–147). SICSAT. Walton, D. (1998). The new dialectic: Conversational contexts of arguments. University of Toronto Press.

Chapter 3

Public Controversy and Polemics: Some Attempts at Definitions

In public life as in daily life, verbal confrontations are numerous and names for designating them diverse. We speak about them in terms of debate, discussion, dispute, quarrel, controversy, or polemics to cite but the most common among them. What then is the specificity of public controversy and polemics in this group? When do we use these terms spontaneously—and when are we authorized to use them appropriately? The question of definition that arises at the outset does not simply aim to delimit the object of analysis on a purely formal level. It provides the impetus for reflection and directs the questioning by detecting the nodal points. In order to understand what public controversy and polemics are, we can basically draw from three types of sources: dictionaries, current discourse, and scholarly conceptualizations. In order to see how the terms are generally understood, we will first have a quick look at the dictionaries that aim at describing their common use. But first a few clarifications about the terms “polemics” and “public controversy” in French and in English are needed. The French original, Apologie de la polémique (2014), used the word “polémique,” which appears both in the media and in common usage. However, the use of the term differs in the anglophone world: in most of the cases where French would mention a “polémique,” English would rather speak of a “(public) controversy.” This divergence is made clear by the translations of the French titles provided at the beginning of the introduction, where we had to render “polémique” as “controversy” in order to comply with common usage: «L’étude qui relance la polémique sur les OMG» (“The study that relaunched the controversy about GMOs.”) «Charlie Hebdo crée la polémique en caricaturant Mahomet» (“Charlie Hebdo is creating the controversy by caricaturing Mohammed.”) «Enquête et polémique après la manifestation près de l’ambassade des Etats-Unis» (“Investigation and controversy after the protests near the American Embassy”). Let us, therefore, see what is implied by these denominations in the two languages and what they tell us about the socio-discursive phenomenon we intend to investigate. “Controversy” derives from the Latin controversia, a composite of controversus, from contra, against—meaning “turned in an opposite direction,”—and vertere, meaning to turn, or versus, hence, “to turn against.” In English, controversy refers to a debate, a discussion: a verbal exchange between two or more participants who sharply © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_3

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disagree on a given matter. It is defined in the Oxford dictionary as “a prolonged public disagreement or heated discussion,” and in the Merriam-Webster as “1. A discussion marked especially by the expression of opposing views: DISPUTE”, or as “2. QUARREL, STRIFE.” The Cambridge dictionary defines it as “a lot of disagreement or argument about something, usually because it affects or is important to many people” and the Collins defines it as “a lot of discussion and argument about something, often involving strong feelings of anger or disapproval.” The denomination “public controversy” is thus used to designate a verbal confrontation between two or more participants sharply disagreeing on a given matter. It is qualified as “heated,” said to develop about subjects that affect many people and to be accompanied by feelings of anger. As for “polemic” and “polemics,” they have slightly different meanings in English. The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines polemic as “1.a: an aggressive attack or refutation of the opinions or principles of another; b. the art or practice of disputation or controversy—usually used in plural,” and the Oxford Dictionary as “a strong verbal or written attack on someone or something” and in the plural “the practice of engaging in controversial debate or dispute.” The Cambridge dictionary gives a somewhat different definition: “a piece of writing or a speech in which a person strongly attacks or defends a particular opinion, person, idea, or set of beliefs.” And according to the Collins Dictionary: “1. a polemic is a very strong written or spoken attack on, or in defense of, a particular belief or opinion.” “2. Polemics is the skill of arguing very strongly for or against a belief or opinion. He enjoys polemics, persuasion, and controversy.” In the American heritage dictionary of the English Language, we read: “A controversial argument, especially one refuting or attacking a specific opinion or doctrine.” Thus, “polemic” means a discursive attack against an Other (it designates polemical discourse), whereas “polemics” is quite close to controversy (“the art of practicing controversy”) and can be considered as its synonym. This is why, in this translation, we often use controversy and polemics interchangeably. Nevertheless, we respect the linguistic custom that privileges “public controversy” where the use of “polemics,” which is the norm in French, would sound weird. We should not forget, however, that in spite of this semantic proximity, “controversy” is also understood, especially in the sciences, as an exchange of arguments for and against characterized by reasoned dialogue and the attempt at resolving a difference of opinion. “In traditional practice,” Cramer (2011, p. 14) notes about rhetoric, controversy is situated in a staged, spoken, decision-making dialogue explicitly structured by institutional norms, and depends on a coherent educational system that puts students through years of drilling and training, and that defines standard dialogue procedures, and models of arrangement for and roles for participants.

We will come back to this later. But it is important to emphasize from the outset that this fact leads us to clarify that controversy in the public sphere is always understood here as controversy in its polemical dimension. We have thus had recourse on many occasions to the expression “public controversy in its polemical dimension,” or linked

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the two terms and used them together, even if it might sound redundant: “public controversy and polemics.” After this short explanation necessitated by the transition from French to English, and by the need to respect the colloquial usages of these words in English, let us proceed to a deeper exploration of the matter. The term “polémique” is generally defined in all the French dictionaries as “débat vif ou agressif—“a lively or aggressive debate” (Kebrat-Orecchioni, 1980, p. 3). The aggressive dimension of a polemics is connected in English as in French to the etymology of the word. “Polemic[s]” derives from the Greek polemos, meaning war. The assimilation of debate to an armed conflict is certainly not innocuous. It points to the transformation of the verbal exchange into a verbal combat where the objective is to defeat the other through violence. Thus, the etymology of the term links together the refusal of reasoned dialogue in favor of a power struggle; the struggle between enemy camps; verbal violence; and the symbolic execution of the other. “The stakes of polemics (“la polémique”), as symbolic as it may be, notes Felman commenting on this etymology, “is the killing of the adversary.” (1979, p. 187) We are close to ancient eristic, and to the mythology where the goddess of quarrels and discord, Eris, accompanied her brother, the god of war, to the battlefields. The etymology thus permits us to grasp at a glance all the negativity expressed by the degradation of reasoned dialogue into fierce combat. Concerning the second level of description, the current use of the terms, some scholars have looked at the way the French press interprets “polémique.” Thus, Nadine Gelas has drawn a discursive definition from the different examples that she found—a definition constructed by the cross-checking of uses of the term in newspapers. “Polémique” appears there to describe a reaction to the taking of a stand on an issue where there is disagreement, in an emotional context and through exaggerated statements; it is often described as futile and sterile. It is not perceived as a form of argumentation, or rather it is described as pseudo-argumentation. Christian Plantin, who conducted a similar study relying on a set of 213 titles taken from the daily newspaper Le Monde, shows that for the journalist “a debate can legitimately be considered a public controversy [polémique] and explicitly designated as such when it manifests violent emotions such as anger and indignation.” (Plantin, 2003, p. 406) The term then gains a foothold, whatever the themes of the debate, its political scope or even the number of participants. Roselyn Koren, who studied the metalanguage of public controversies [“polémiques”] in about 60 articles from 1990 to 2003 drawn from dailies, weeklies, and monthlies that address public controversies as a subject, finds therein more complex definitions: “Its detractors criticize it mainly for resorting to forms of violence that are incompatible with the proper functioning of social life […] and for depriving the public of its freedom to think.” It is a “a degradation of the discussion.” (Koren, 2003, p. 71) in which the ends justify the means. One can see therefore what the users of the term, whether spontaneous (in their uses) or deliberate (in the metadiscourse) commonly invest it with. Generally, we observe that they disparage it by considering it to be a non-argumentative and coercive discourse of dissension, marked by verbal violence and emotion.

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This doxa has been the object of a reevaluation in the fields of language studies and rhetoric, which have, since the 1980s up until today, tried to better conceptualize the phenomenon.1 We will thus seize on colloquial terms such as polemics and public controversy, with their somewhat vague uses, in order to elaborate a clear concept that is susceptible of furnishing an analytical tool. In what follows, we will draw on the available sources without presenting them in a chronological or systematic manner. They will rather fuel a reflection on the nature of public controversy in its polemical dimension, and the definition that it should be given, by highlighting certain salient points and problematizing the different questions they arouse. In so doing, we will reconsider common definitions, but also certain scholarly definitions that expel public controversy from the field of argumentation and place it under the sole auspices of battle, emotion, and violence.

3.1 A Debate About a Question of Public Interest Public controversy must address a subject of public interest in order for it not to be a simple quarrel, a dispute between individuals. “Public controversy can obviously develop on the basis of an initially private matter, for example a matter between landlords and tenants, but it is necessary for the conflict to take a public turn calling into question major principles and the groups of defenders who are attached to them (identified with these principles)” (Plantin, 2003, p. 387). Nicole Gelas adds that when the debate seems at first to be futile, journalists make sure to point out what makes it worthy of public attention. I will give an example borrowed from a rather ludicrous episode which was widely discussed in the media in its time. In April 20, 2010, TF1 (French Television 1) called it: “the ‘politically incorrect’ photo that is creating a public controversy” (“La photo ‘politiquement incorrecte’ qui crée la polémique”.). It is a cliché taken during a competition held by the FNAC (a large media, book, and music retail chain) in Nice in the category “Politically incorrect,” showing a man wiping his bottom with the French flag.

1

I refer to ADARR’s annotated bibliography: http://humanities1.tau.ac.il/adarr/fr/2013-01-31-1045-33/le-discours-polemique. Several French-language collections have been dedicated to public controversy (“polémique”), among them Gelas and Kerbrat-Orecchioni (éds) (1980), Roellenbleck (éd.) (1985), Hayward and Garand (éds) (1998), Declerq et al. (eds) (2003), Grévisse et Dubied (éds) (2003), Albert and Nicolas (éds) (2010), Amossy and Burger (eds) (2011), Angenot et al. (eds.) (2012). Let us also mention the essential works of Angenot (1982, 2008), Maingueneau (1983) and Garand (1989).

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© F.L./DR

The news mention that the young photographer who just wanted to win a camera “regrets the controversy,” and deplores “such a big deal over nothing.” However the journalists who reported on the affair were careful to underline the serious nature of the offense, calling it a “lack of respect,” “an attack on the nation,” “contempt for the country.” The scatological episode seemed even more significant since it took place at a time when the debate about French national identity launched by the government of Nicolas Sarkozy was ongoing. The debate was initiated and piloted by Eric Besson, Minister of Immigration, of Integration, and of National Identity and Co-Development, who intended to reaffirm the values of national identity and pride in being French. Some politicians, echoed by numerous indignant citizens expressing themselves in online discussion forums, lambasted the current lack of respect towards national symbols. “It is good form today to spit on the French flag,” fulminates Lionel Luca, the Vice-President of the Departmental Council. We see that a seemingly sporadic incident, which could have been confined to an anecdote, set off a public controversy. The polemical debate deals first and foremost with the relationship between art and patriotism: should one criminalize a photo on the basis of nationalistic values? Contrary to all of those who call for sanctions, the public prosecutor in Nice, Éric de Montgolfier, considered that the photograph in question did not call for the opening of legal proceedings to the extent that is was “a work of authorship.” The dissensions on this matter were strong. The debate then extended into a public controversy about freedom of expression and its limits. In Rue 89 (a news magazine), for example, one can read: “And to all the patriots who will come to tell me that the freedom to insult the flag hardly deserves protection […] I will respond that there is no freedom to insult the flag, there is freedom, full stop.”2 Moving beyond the question of the autonomy of the arts and the rights of 2

http://www.rue89.com/2010/07/25/outrage-au-drapeau-notre-liberte-a-expire-vendredi-a-min uit-159846.

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man, the polemical debate likewise developed around the place of national symbols, and around the relationship of the citizen (both native and immigrant) to France (can the French citizen trample on the sacred symbols of his country with impunity?). The importance allotted to this question appears clearly in the legislation resulting from this scabrous photo. Following this incident, the Minister of Justice, Michelle Alliot-Marie, decided to put to a vote a decree that would authorize the sanctioning of the violation of the French flag in a public space with a fine of 1.500 euros. A law that itself did not fail to cause a vehement public controversy … This example underlines the extent to which public controversies, which deal with questions of public interest, are grounded in current events. How long will this incident stay (or should we rather say has this incident stayed) in people’s minds? Closely tied to what concerns the audience at a specific time, public controversy is ephemeral and often as quickly forgotten as it is pervasive at the time when it erupts. This is why an episode’s meaning and its stakes cease to be perceptible beyond its lifetime. It might also be incomprehensible beyond the cultural space in which it emerged. Do we still grasp the reach of the public controversies about the testimonies of WWI, which shook France in the early 1930s? We barely understand controversies that take place in other cultures when we don’t know their norms, their values, and their social problems. For instance, one cannot grasp the public controversy about the military service of the ultra-orthodox which rages in Israel without understanding the history and the society of the country, nor that which touches the ex-president of Colombia Álvaro Uribe if one ignores the problem of the role of paramilitary groups in the armed struggle against the FARQ. Some deduce from this that the study of public controversies can be reduced to that of fleeting texts that become immediately outdated. However, for a discourse analyst, as for a sociologist and historian, the study of such controversies turns out to be rich in teachings: it illuminates the society and the period in which the polemical discourse circulates in the public sphere.

3.2 Public Controversy as an Argumentative Modality Public controversies, or polemics, are thus debates about a current issue of public interest that comprise more or less important social stakes in a given culture. But do this kind of debates, generally qualified as bellicose, fall within deliberation and do they participate fully in rhetorical argumentation? Common opinion tends to answer in the negative. A closer examination shows, however, that one should fundamentally reconsider this hasty judgement. The first sign of a public controversy understood as a debate about current affairs is an opposition of discourses. The conflict of opinions that can be observed at the heart of a verbal confrontation is its sine qua non condition. It is the activity of bringing forward arguments in favor of one’s thesis and against the opposing thesis that construct polemical discourse. Angenot (1982, p. 34) emphasizes this point: polemics “suppose[s] an antagonistic counter-discourse […] which therefore aims

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at a double strategy: a demonstration of the thesis and a refutation-disqualification of an opposing thesis.” We are clearly in the field of argumentative rhetoric. We are said to engage in argumentation when a disagreement arises on a given question and two opposing responses are offered on a same question, obligating each one of the parties to justify the validity of his position. Meyer (2008, p. 52–3) sees the very nature of argumentation as lying within the contradictory debate about a question, explicitly asked, that divides individuals. This observation however raises a problem as far as controversy in its polemical dimension is concerned. It stresses not the dissimilarity, but indeed the similarity of public controversy and polemics, on the one hand, and of argumentation, on the other hand. Plantin (2003) clearly identifies this difficulty: insisting on the divergence and on the confrontation of points of view, he underlines that the features defining a public controversy in its polemical dimension are precisely those that characterize argumentation. Let’s reexamine from this perspective the link between them through a headline in the newspaper Le Monde from December 17 2012.

3.2.1 Tax Exile: The Public Controversy About Depardieu, Following Arnault and Clavier The title concerns the celebrated actor’s departure to Belgium before moving to Russia, set in parallel with that of the actor Christian Clavier, who settled in the UK, and of Bernard Arnault, the wealthiest man in France, who applied for Belgian nationality, after the tax reforms initiated by the leftwing government led by Francois Hollande. Beyond the personal attacks, a same question, allowing for two contradictory answers, arises about the wealthy Frenchmen under examination—is it legitimate for them to leave their country for another in order to pay lower taxes and, more generally (in the terms used in the article): “are the rich [in France] taxed too much or not enough?” Around these questions, and often based on particular cases that illustrate the issue, opposing stands respond to one another. The debate therefore raises a social question concerning fiscal policy and the duties of affluent citizens towards their homeland. To discuss the matter, the media systematically adopt the term “public controversy” (in French, “polémique”). The press speaks of “the current public controversy about the tax exiles launched after the announcement of Gérard Depardieu’s departure for Belgium, estimating that this public controversy about tax exiles continues to grow…” (December 23, 2012, BFM Business – France’s first business television channel) And, more precisely about the case of Depardieu, we read in France-Info (a news network): “Depardieu: the public controversy that divides artists.” (December 19, 2021), or on France bleu national (another news network): “the public controversy about Depardieu takes a political turn” (between left and right about fiscal policy in France). Examples abound. And it is clear that here, it is it the term “polémique” that is adopted unanimously by the journalists. At the same

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time, the polemical character of the debate does not stipulate in any way that it lies outside of the field of argumentation. Indeed, it is not enough to declare: “I am for Depardieu and I approve of his tax exile,” against: “I am against this actor and his decision,” for there to be a public controversy. The implicated parties justify their positions and present good reasons to refute those of the Opponent. Thus—to give but one succinct example—the French Prime Minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault, commented about Gérard Depardieu’s departure in these terms: “I find it pretty pathetic […] all of this in order not to pay taxes, in order not to pay enough.” The condemnation of what he interpreted as a tax evasion was justified by an explicitly designated value: the spirit of patriotism, which implies the solidarity between citizens (“[to] participle in the collective effort through [his] taxes): “paying one’s taxes is an act of solidarity, it is a patriotic act” (Le Figaro, December 17, 2012). In other words, and to reconstruct the syllogism on which the Minister’s argument rests: the good citizen fulfills his duties and thus participates in the collective effort; to exile oneself for tax purposes in order to pay less taxes does not respond to this principle; therefore, those who choose tax evasion are bad citizens. The personal attack against the movie star (who reacted in the strongest terms to these words) is founded on a process of reasoning. In response to this argument, Laurence Parisot, the head of the Medef (Movement of the Enterprises of France, the largest employer federation in France) pronounces a counter-discourse. Her first counter-argument reframes the debate by stipulating that the condemnations of Depardieu are no more than a search for a scapegoat. “Are we truly aware of the fact that today we spend our time, in the media, in our comments, designating scapegoats?” The term “scapegoat” signifies that exiled “high income personalities” are not really responsible for the ills from which France suffers; they are rather an object on which people heap all the blame in a ritual of purification and exclusion. Parisot thus presents the fiscal exiles as the victims of a wrongful maneuver that is not attributable to the Prime Minister alone and inverts the roles. An argument that we find in other declarations: “The verbal aggression that Depardieu was the subject of by the Prime Minister is scandalous. Ayrault chose a scapegoat,” thus claimed the national secretary of the UMP (Union pour un movement Populaire, the most important French right party until 2015) Philippe Chauvin. The second argument plays on the consequences (it is an ad consequentiam argument). According to the latter, this method is not only morally unacceptable, it must also be denounced due to its consequences since it is a source of division and does not allow for “restoring peace to the country and reducing antagonisms,” as the President Francois Hollande had promised. An argument by analogy is also advanced. According to Parisot, the definition of tax exiles as unworthy citizens (“At this time, we are saying: you, M. Gérard Depardieu, are unworthy of being French, you M. executive, are as well…”) “reeks of “civil war” and resembles 1789. The double analogy depicts the anger unleashed against the rich and privileged like a murderous rage that is tearing the country apart. We recall that in Libération (a left-wing newspaper) the famous actress Catherine Deneuve had responded to her colleague Philippe Torrenton, who had violently criticized Depardieu: “What would you have done in 1789, my body still trembles from it!”.

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These few cursive remarks come to underline that a polemical exchange well and truly participates in argumentation. From now on the question of knowing if public controversy belongs to argumentation is reversed: as pointed out earlier, we no longer ask ourselves if we should reject it from the domain of argumentation, but wonder to what extend it is distinct from ordinary deliberation. This question is clarified if one adopts a modular conception of argumentation which defines it as a continuum going from the co-construction of answers to the clash of antagonistic theses. Different global structures of verbal exchange, or argumentative modalities, can be found between these two poles. From this perspective, public controversy, or polemics, as a strongly agonistic exchange that crosses genres (pamphlets, parliamentary discourse, ed-ops, ….) as well as types of discourses (journalistic, political, …), is an argumentative modality situated on one of the poles of the continuum, if not at the extreme of its possible limits. We must, though, specify what it is that characterizes the polemical exchange structure as such. What are the features that give public controversies their particularity within the field of rhetorical argumentation? We will try to show in the following pages that they consist of an anchoring in the conflictual which is expressed through dichotomization, polarization, and disqualification of the other—and only secondarily, through verbal violence and pathos.

3.3 A Mode of Conflict Management: Dichotomization First of all, public controversy in its polemical dimension can be differentiated from a simple debate in that it arises from conflict. This takes us back to the military metaphor inscribed in the etymology of polemics. Conflict is defined on the lexicographical level as the “impact, clash, which occurs when opposing forces [...] enter into contact and try to drive each other out reciprocally” (ex. the Franco-German conflict). This clash manifests itself on the abstract level between opposing intellectual and moral forces (Trésor de la Langue française).) The same dictionary gives us the following as synonyms: “strong opposition,” “serious dispute.” One can thus define polemics as a clash of opposing opinions by highlighting the constitutive role that conflict plays in it. Garand (1998: 216) sees therein the defining feature par excellence of polemics. “The common denominator of polemical statements in all genres is not violence but conflict. Not all conflictual situations give rise to polemical speech […] but every public controversy is definitively the result of a conflict.” We cannot overemphasize the importance of this approach, which situates conflict at the heart of public controversy. It is necessary at the same time to mention that the formulation “the result of a conflict” is interesting. It suggests in fact that the conflictual is not only a part of public controversy in its polemical version: rather it is situated outside of public controversy and constitutes its source. Public controversy is thus a discursive manifestation in the form of a clash, of a brutal confrontation of contradictory opinions that circulate in the public sphere. As a form of verbal interaction, it appears as a specific mode of conflict management.

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If there is a clash of contradictory opinions, it is because the opposition of the discourses in a public controversy or polemics is submitted to a strong dichotomization where two antithetical options exclude one another. Whereas argumentative debate is supposed to lead participants toward a possible solution, dichotomization “radicalizes the debate, rendering it difficult—sometimes impossible—to resolve.” (Dascal, 2008, p. 27). According to Dascal, in current practice, we are faced not so much with logical dichotomies as with the construction of dichotomies at the service of argumentative goals. A logical dichotomy is “an operation whereby a concept, A, is divided into two others, B and C, which exclude each other, completely covering the domain of the original concept” (ibid., p. 28). However, this exclusionary relationship rarely presents itself in its purely logical form. If we take the example of: left/right, equality/inequality, justice/injustice, collectivism/individualism, pacifism/belligerence, tolerance/intolerance, we quickly notice that these oppositions are not absolute; they depend on socio-cultural frameworks, on basic beliefs, argumentative needs, historical circumstances, etc. (ibid., p. 30). It is therefore important, from a “contructivist and pragmatic” perspective, to see how dichotomies are constructed and deconstructed in a specific context. Dascal also introduces the notion of “dichotomization” as “radicalizing a polarity by emphasizing the incompatibility of the poles and the inexistence of intermediate alternatives, by stressing the obvious character of the dichotomy as well as the pole that ought to be preferred” (ibid., p. 34). “De-dichotomization” consists on the contrary in “showing that the opposition between the poles can be constructed as less logically binding than a contradiction, thus allowing for intermediate alternatives; actually developing or exemplifying such alternatives.” (ibid., p. 35). De-dichotomization thus provides an opening that could lead to compromises and solutions. Constructing the oppositions as dichotomies, pairs of ideas exclusive from one another without the possibility of compromise, blocks any possibility of a solution, and locks the parties in a face-off in which they hunker down in irreconcilable positions. The confrontation takes on the meaning given to it by Burger et al. (2011, p. 13): “the opposition between at least two points of view when the speakers who utter them do not orient themselves towards the possibility of an agreement.” This point of view overlaps with the one presented by Maingueneau (1983) in another context, according to which polemics requires a discursive space with two poles, that is to say a limited set of semantic categories distributed in pairs of oppositions. The discourse analyst tries to show that discourses in confrontation with one another exist in function of one another and are delimited mutually. Thus, the opposition cited by Dascal—left/right, equality/inequality, justice/injustice, collectivism/individualism, pacifist/belligerent, tolerant/intolerant—address for him “antagonistic isotopes that constitute a system,” each existing only as the opposite of the other. This is why in a discussion, each one of the parties re-appropriates the discourse of the other by integrating it through an inversion in her own system: “When we quote the discourse of the adversary, we do it in a way that makes it into the negative of our own discourse.” (Maingueneau, 1983, p. 136). According to Maingueneau, as a result, “inter-incomprehension is the very condition of public controversy.” (ibid).

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We can see that in this first work, Maingueneau proposes a semantics of polemics in which the notion of “inter-incomprehension” is insurmountable because it is “the translation of the structural limits of two discourses” that reciprocally define their own limits (ibid.) The dichotomization is part of the system, so much so that the adversaries (Jansenists and Jesuits in Maingueneau’s study, right and left in the example borrowed from Dascal) construct themselves by opposing each other. They cannot by definition hear each other and get along. From this perspective, the polemical mode fixes the interlocutors in symmetrical and unsurpassable positions. This semantic point of view with a structuralist inspiration denies a priori any possibility of agreement whereas the pragmatic perspective puts forward a notion of de-dichotomization liable to relativize the opposition in light of a common solution. The question of knowing whether public controversy constitutes a deadlock with no solution and therefore (to return to Angenot’s title) a “dialogue of the deaf,” remains open. We must examine it on the ground without, at this stage, seeing in it a defining feature of public controversy. Suffice it to say that the latter differentiates itself from ordinary argumentative exchanges in that it tends systematically towards a dichotomization that impedes the search for an agreement between the opposing parties. To sum up: public controversies or polemics, which address questions of public interest, are a mode of conflict management characterized by a tendency towards dichotomization which renders the quest for agreement problematic. At this stage, it is its relationship to the Other that should be examined closer—and this all the more that the said aggressive nature of this relationship is a charge often laid against polemics.

3.4 Polarization, or Social Division In public controversies, a distinction is needed between “actors” and “actants” (according to Greimas, an actorial structure that can be embodied by various individual actors, such as Helper/Opponent). The debate that pits two opposing positions against one another becomes concrete on the ground through actors, “concrete individuals who sustain these discourses.” (Plantin, 2003, p. 283) Thus, in the public controversy about the iconoclastic photo of the French flag, diverse political personalities, but also numerous ordinary people enter into the arena to take sides in favor of one or the other thesis. This is done on the level of enunciation. These concrete voices are caught in an orchestration that lays out two diametrically opposed sets. This division no longer pertains to the level of enunciation, it is part of the actantial structure that pits a Proponent and an Opponent facing a Third Party. We are not dealing here with individuals, but with roles: defender of the position put forward, opponent of this position, listener-spectator of the confrontation. Thus, there is a position which strongly opposes the contempt of the French flag in the photo awarded a prize by the Fnac, and another which tolerates and defends it. Each one designates a somewhat abstract actant.

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The actantial division between two adversaries caught in an antithetical relationship of a conflictual nature explains why public controversy in its polemical dimension launches a process of polarization which should be differentiated from dichotomization. Dichotomization exacerbates oppositions to the point of making them irreconcilable; it stems from an abstract operation. Polarization carries out a process of regrouping of the participants into opposing camps. It is not purely conceptual, it is social. Polarization does not only present a division between white/black, left/right, it places an “us” against a “they.” “As a rhetorical phenomenon,” write King and Anderson in a now classic article in the study of social movements (1971), polarization “may be defined as the process by which an extremely divided public is coalesced into two or more highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal solidarity in those beliefs which the persuader considers salient” (1971, p. 244). In short, the rhetoric of polarization consists of establishing enemy camps and is, for this reason, a social phenomenon rather than an abstract division into opposing and irreconcilable theses. It rallies a group constitutive of an identity, or presents things in such a way that those who already feel solidarity towards a given group mobilize in favor of the thesis that reinforces that group. We should underline that in public controversy, this polarization is created beyond, and in spite of, several differences. It is an effect of the distinction between actors and actants. Indeed, the actors who adopt the role of Proponent or Opponent can draw on different arguments; they do not necessarily participate in the same social group and can even speak out in the name of different ideologies. In particular circumstances, though, they can find themselves on the same side of the fence. In the public controversy over the burqa that we will examine later, the reasons that each person has for upholding the prohibition against wearing the full veil or opposing it are of different kinds. Some of those who are against a prohibitive enactment defend their right to follow the precepts of the Muslim religion, others fight for the predominance of individual liberty as the basis of democracy, or against intolerance and discrimination, if not islamophobia; some others oppose what they define as a stigmatization and repression of disadvantaged groups. Composed of members belonging to different social categories and to different political parties, the camp of the Opponents holds a large variety of voices that make themselves heard in their diversity. Despite this diversity, the engagement in polemical exchanges allows the participants to gather in the defense of tolerance. If polarization sometimes comes to uphold performed identities (it can be established according to a division of right/left, secular/religious, anti-discrimination/traditionalist imbued with prejudices …), it does not necessarily follow lines of preexisting division and can reconfigure groups around banners that call them to rally together. It is because it is based on an actantial structure where the most diverse participants come together in two opposing groups, that polarization is difficult to get past. In theory, if one only thinks of individual actors, we can imagine that they would be capable of changing their argumentative stance. We would therefore have a flexible model where differences could be settled. However, “in certain contexts of debate, the person exists only through his role” (Plantin, 2003, p. 386). In these cases, the assimilation of the stance that is being defended with the person of the debater points

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to a phenomenon of identity whose importance should not be underestimated. Often the thesis sustained during the public controversy is so intimately a part of the vision of the world, values belonging to a group, or social status, of the speaker that he can’t detach himself from it without losing his identity. How can a patriot concerned with respect for national symbols approve of contempt for the French flag or the national anthem without betraying what he is in his own eyes? Consequently, the distance between the actant (the role) and the actor (the individual who assumes it) seems, as much as the possibility of a “de-dichotomization,” to determine the capacity of the public controversy to overcome the deadlock.

3.5 The Relationship to the Other. The Disqualification of the Adversary Polarization does not only provoke a movement of grouping based on identification, it also works to “consolidate the identity of the group by presenting others pejoratively.” (Orkibi, 2008) It supposes the existence of a common enemy. The strategy of positive affirmation is joined by a “strategy of subversion” which “will undermine the ethos of competing groups, ideologies or institutions” (King & Anderson, 1971, p. 244). That is why polarization willingly uses maneuvers of vilification. It is a rhetorical strategy which discredits the adversary by defining him as biased, “ungenuine” and “malevolent” (Vanderford, 1989, p. 166). It is thus no surprise that the exacerbation of oppositions (dichotomization) is concretized on the ground by a division into antagonistic groups where each poses its social identity by opposing the other and by making it the symbol of error and of evil. Here we touch upon a fundamental defining feature of polemics. In the verbal jousting that takes place in front of a Third Party, polemics always distinguishes itself by its attempts to disqualify the Opponent. “Polemical discourse, writes KerbratOrecchioni (1980, p. 12), is a disqualifying discourse, that is to say it attacks a target […] and it puts at the service of this dominant pragmatic aim—to discredit the adversary, and the discourse that he is supposed to hold—the entire arsenal of rhetorical and argumentative techniques.” In the same vein, Oléron notes (1995, p. 21): “polemical argumentation aims at an adversary who has to be lowered, diminished, even ejected from the competition.” Thus, public controversies are not only a type of argumentation which manages conflicts by confronting, dichotomizing, and polarizing. They also attack an Opponent who has to be reduced, if not delegitimized. In this relationship with the Other, an entire gamut of antagonistic approaches is deployed. The most moderate method consists of attacking the discourse of the Other and taking aim at him only through it. The Opponent thus refutes the points of the adversary by showing that her argument is unworthy of trust and does not deserve to be adhered to. In this framework, the public controversy mentions the opposing discourse by undermining its foundations by any means possible: negation, directed reformulation, irony, the distortion of her words… Kerbrat-Orecchioni specifies that

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“To polemicize is to try to falsify (in the logical sense of the term, but often also […] in its common meaning) the words of the other.” (1980, p. 10). In order for this discriminatory reversal to be perceived by the public, the traces of conflictual dialogism must be detectable—either that visible signs show them at the heart of the counter-discourse (like reported speech or negative transformation), or that this antagonistic dialogism is present in allusions, or even that it is called upon to be recognized with the help of contextual knowledge. Polemics cannot be perceived as such without the discourse under attack being located and recognized in the text of the attacker. The disqualification of the thesis however generally goes hand in hand with that of the person, or of the group that she represents. Public controversies are fertile grounds for ad hominem arguments. The adversary is taken to task in order to deprive her of any possibility of exercising legitimately and effectively her influence. The disparagement heaped on people nullifies the force of their argument. The attacks can be more or less pronounced, and the relationship towards the Other can vary. One can disqualify an opposing thesis as well as its defenders, just by attacking them occasionally on the basis of their stance—for example, by denigrating someone because she favors legislation against contempt for the national flag. We can try to defeat an adversary in a profound conflict which surpasses the occasional opposition of antagonistic theses. It is then the very being of the Opponent in what constitutes her social identity that is attacked. We can also consider the Opponent as an intractable enemy and try to reduce her to silence, even to exclude her from the dialogue. Like the eristic of old, public controversy is then reduced to a pure power struggle. It “confronts us with this irrepressible force which pushes us to overcome [the adversary], to be assured of our power over him, to make him submit to us, and if necessary to erase him.” (Declerq, 2003, p. 18). In extreme cases, we find attempts at demonization, or presentations of the adversary in the form of absolute evil, which include appeals to fear as well as to hate (Amossy & Koren, 2010). The demonized Other can only be ostracized because it is unconceivable to enter into dialogue with Satan himself. Addressing directly the Other as well as dialoguing openly with him thus becomes difficult, and the attacks are generally made in discourses addressed to the Third Party. No doubt the reference to the devil is not generally as direct (and spectacular) as the one made by the former president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, speaking to the United Nations about Georges W. Bush. Yesterday, the devil came here. Right here. Right here. And it smells of sulfur still today, this table that I am now standing in front of. Yesterday, ladies and gentlemen, from this rostrum, the president of the United States, the gentleman to whom I refer as the devil, came here, talking as if he owned the world. Truly. As the owner of the world.” (20.9.2006)

Whether the metaphor is mobilized or not, demonization is a form of polarization taken to the extreme, which also plays the role of grouping (around Good and Evil) and of dividing (the battle of Good vs. Evil). If this type of exaggerated attack is often the object of moral condemnation—it dehumanizes and calls for the radical

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eviction of the scourge—in it we can also find social functions that scholarship on social movements has brought to light.

3.6 A Fierce Debate The expulsion of the Opponent from the dialogue in a symbolic execution seems more like a fantasy that motivates the debaters, or a goal intended to mobilize them, than a workable option. We have to understand that public controversy is caught between two poles. There is on the one hand, the violence that social polarization and the confrontation of dichotomous positions on a hot topic allows for (without however imposing it). There is on the other, the control that is dependent on socio-discursive institutional and cultural frameworks: it authorizes the conduct of the confrontation in the public sphere. It is from this perspective that the question of verbal violence and pathos should be examined. Before proceeding to this examination, however, two preliminary remarks are necessary. First, violence and control must be examined together: the relation between them is at the basis of polemical discourse Second, and contrary to what definitions taken from common usage would lead one to believe, violence and passion are not the basis of polemics, which is defined above all (as formulated earlier) by its anchoring in conflict, its tendency to dichotomization and polarization, and its attempt to disqualify the other. The dichotomized confrontation of antagonistic theses and the polarization that it leads to supposes subjects who are profoundly implicated in the debate. How can one participate in a heated debate which provokes a clash of antagonistic positions without becoming personally involved? Kerbrat-Orecchioni deduces therefrom that this type of discourse “shares with a few others the property of having strong enunciative marks.” (1980, p. 25). In other words, we can suppose that the speaker leaves numerous traces of subjectivity in her discourse and that she takes a strong stance by asserting, denying, using questioning and exclamation marks, etc. Here is an example taken from the response by Torreton to different on-screen personalities who attacked him after his virulent article against Depardieu in Libération (December 17, 2012) entitled “So, Gérard, are you sweating?”. As a citizen, I find it troubling, freedom of expression is a fundamental civil liberty, It is actually amazing to see that in France in 2013, there are people who contest this freedom of expression. We have more or less the right to express ourselves based on our social class, our profession? As for me, this is a France I feel like fighting tooth and nail. http://www.rmc.fr/editorial/343634/exil-de-depardieu-philippe-torreton-repond-aux-critiq ues/

The taking of a personal stand in a dichotomization (the defense vs. the repression of the right to freedom of expression) is clear-cut and provokes a polarization between two enemy camps necessitating a “tooth and nail fight.” These retorts, which attack all those who deny Torreton the right to criticize Depardieu publicly, offer a flagrant

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example of the subjectivity of the discourse both because the speaker speaks in the first person singular and plural, and because he uses emotional terms (“troubling,” “I feel like”) and axiological ones (it is actually amazing to consider”) which places the position of the person incriminated on the axis of evil.. What is even more important is that the rhetorical question gives the discourse a tone of indignation. The emotion is a result of the speaker’s implication in his discourse. The emotional involvement is overtaken by an endeavor to touch the hearts of the readers/spectators. Torrenton does not only express his indignation in the face of the ban he was put under from criticizing Depardieu as a tax exile. He also tries to arouse it in his audience by bringing out the scandalous character of this ban. In so doing, he addresses himself more to the heart than to the mind of his audience. The emotional character of polemics is one of the factors that has traditionally made it a target of criticism. It is reproached for managing the debate on the basis of emotions and not of reason, thus escaping from the realm of argumentation founded on logos. The question of the rationality of debate and, through it, that of deliberation in the public sphere, is incessantly raised in its most diverse aspects. There is nothing surprising in this— rational debate is often, as we have seen, considered to be the core of democracy. No doubt we should underline from the beginning that the predominance of emotion is not a necessary dimension of polemical discourse, even if it is common for reasons mentioned earlier (exacerbation caused by dichotomization, objective of disqualification linked to polarization into enemy groups, strong personal involvement in a topical and important issue). A strong implication in a public controversy can nevertheless be made without marked recourse to emotion, whether it relates to the emotions expressed by the speaker or to the feelings that the latter seeks to arouse in the audience. The comments by Brigitte Bardot on the AFP (French Press Agency) on Torrenton’s attacks thus invoke the argument of Depardieu’s celebrity as a considerable contribution to his homeland (the implication being: exile or not, one cannot accuse him of doing France wrong). The sober text of the press release has recourse to axiological rather than emotional discourse, even if the presence of injustice can appeal to righteous indignation. “I support Gérard Depardieu, the victim of extremely unjust persecution though he is a fan of bull fighting, this does not stop him from being an exceptional actor who represents France with unique popularity and celebrity.” The role of emotion in public controversy is therefore to be reconsidered, and its effects to be reexamined. What is more, it is important to go beyond the division of passion/reason, emotion/reflection. Nothing proves that a polemical discourse of an emotional type automatically eludes the rationality of the debate. The question deserves to be examined, and we will return to it at length (Chap. 5). Ultimately, it is important to revisit the question of verbal violence. Like emotion, the former is often treated in the doxa (the common view of the media, but also of mainstream “common sense”) as the defining feature par excellence of public controversy. It is from the aggressive tone, from the expressions of violence, and the use of all kinds of invective, that we often detect polemics, interpreted as a degradation of the verbal exchange. However—and we must again insist on this— not all verbal violence (an exchange of insults between individuals, for example)

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is a public controversy. The discursive means that create an impression of violence become a public controversy and polemics only when they are used in the framework of a confrontation of contradictory opinions. It is obviously often the case, and Torreton’s incriminating article on Depardieu illustrates this point eloquently. But Gérard, did you think we would approve? What did you expect? A medal? A César (the French Oscar) awarded by Bercy? Did you think that […] charitable associations would take down their frames of abbé Pierre (a French priest founder of an important association to help the poor), their Coluche [beloved comedian] to put your face mug under the glass. The Prime Minister judges your behavior to be pathetic, but you, how do you judge it? Heroic? Civic? Citizen-like? Altruistic? Tell us, we’d love to know…. http://www.liberation.fr/culture/2012/12/17/alors-gerard-t-as-les-boules_868296

If we must conclude that it is necessary to pay attention to the different forms of verbal violence and their uses, it does not follow from this that verbal violence is a sine qua non for public controversy in its polemical dimension. In this regard Nicole Gelas’s (1980a, 1980b) study of the motion by François Mitterand, then secretary of the Socialist Party (in 1978), entitled, “A Great Party for a Great Project” is very interesting. She shows that this text of analysis and propositions, well-structured and which does not appear to aim at a target, is a polemical text even though it is “neither violent, nor raging, but rather dominated by a certain nobility of tone.” (Gelas, 1980a, 1980b, p. 78) It is a true counter-discourse devaluing the positions of the adversary by systematically taking a stand against him. It thus creates an implicit confrontation through which Mitterand obliquely disqualifies those who do not adhere to what he defines as the only real socialism. The case where the target of attack is at no point made explicit while being present in the intertext, turns the orator’s words into a powerful counter-discourse that is well and good a public controversy (too polemical, some judged), without either verbal violence, or emotional overtones. No doubt this is an extreme case the representativeness of which should not be exaggerated. It nonetheless points to considering verbal violence as an optional rather than a defining trait of public controversy and polemics. Still, an analysis of public controversy cannot do without considering verbal violence, even if the latter’s linguistic definitions often remain vague and its functions insufficiently established. It is also important to address the frameworks in which verbal violence emerges, and the limit that they impose on it. In an issue on polemical journalism from 2003, Yanoshevsky (2003, p. 55) insisted on the fact that it is a heretical discourse because of its ruptures and its violence, and at the same time, it is “highly ritualized, with its own conventions, rules of conduct and exchange.” It is subjected to the regulation of different genres (the TV debate, the discussion forum, open letters and other types of dialogues, but also the pamphlet, the opinion piece, the address at a public meeting etc.). The possibilities and constraints of these genres shape and impose limits on polemical discourse. No doubt the electoral debate between two candidates for President is more regulated than the free exchange of web users in online discussion forums. But in all of these cases, license is never absolute and exchanges of blows are subject to written or tacit laws. This tension between a game with rules, a codified jousting, and the violence of the verbal attacks, is essential for the proper functioning of public controversies. It needs institutional locations

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where it can develop, and which give it, at least in part, its meaning according to their specific goals (helping to choose a President, allowing for a non-mediated citizen’s discussion, etc.) Let us make no mistake: public controversy is not to be confused with untamed words. It takes shape in a democratic space that authorizes and constrains it at the same time. In this framework, it is important to underline the tension that takes place between the expression of strong disagreement and the adherence to common norms and values making exchange possible. “The two combatants, notes Vlad (2008, p. 72), share the scene of interlocution where they construct together the object of the discourse and a relationship.” She quotes Kerbrat-Orecchioni according to whom to polemicize is still to share—values, presuppositions, rules of the game. Both parties must agree on what constitutes a subject of public interest, on the nature of the disagreement which divides them, on the necessity of debating it (which already supposes common values and hierarchies) and, finally, on rules of the game. Without this common basis, public controversy can neither arise nor unfold. Managing these tensions is obviously a delicate task and it can vary from one type of discourse to another, and from one public controversy to another. This raises the question of breach of contract, disorder, and outbursts, the nature and consequences of which should, once again, be studied on the ground. The question of the tensions between control and aggressivity, and that of verbal violence displayed for the Third Party, call for a final remark that touches on spectacularization. Today many insist upon the fact that polemical exchange becomes a spectacle offered to an audience. Broadcasted by the media and addressed to the public which it hopes to rally, it includes a monstrative and in certain respects theatrical aspect (Yanoshevky, 2003, p. 57). The speaker aims at persuading a Third Party by eliminating the Opponent, rather than dialoguing with him in an attempt to convince her. We can hardly imagine that Nicolas Sarkozy or François Hollande, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, would admit to being persuaded by the adversary in such a televised “duel”: the spectacle of oral jousting between two irreconcilable positions is of course offered to the public at large. From this perspective, the success of public controversies is often attributed to the desire for sensationalism by a press that needs to sell. Journalists are thus accused of making an issue of minor episodes and dramatizing divisions whose stakes are far from being crucial. The Dictionnaire du journalisme (Dictionary of Journalism) by Lebohec (2010) thus rails, in its entry on “Polémique,” about a “public dispute that a number of journalists love to relay and fuel, even create, because it is spectacular and because ‘it sells,’ at the risk of grossly oversimplifying the stakes and the problems.” To what extent, however, do the media create public controversy whole cloth in order to capture the attention of the readers, and do not back away from the risk of creating division or reinforcing rifts? Is the public controversy surrounding Depardieu a simple maneuver by journalists counting on the interest that the enfant terrible of French cinema arouses, or is it an initiative whose objective it to present to readers/spectators the terms of a serious conflict of opinions? One should not deduce from the structural role of the Third Party that all staging of public controversies can be reduced to a publicity stunt. The question (raised among others by Amossy and

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Burger in Polémiques médiatiques et journalistiques (Public Controversies in the Media and the Press) (2011) remains open, and we intend to come back to it.

3.7 Conclusion This rapid sketch, which is also a journey through existing scholarship, has repositioned polemical discourse in the field of argumentation, and through it, democratic deliberation. If we accept considering argumentation as a continuum in which the degree of explicit confrontation of diverging responses brought to bear on a same question vary in intensity, public controversy as polemics is clearly situated at the extremes of one pole. At the center we find argumentation as a regulated exchange of antagonist theses; at one of the poles, the discourse aiming at persuasion which does not directly attack the opposing position, which even does not present the position of the other and feigns to have no intention to influence; and at the other pole, the clash of antagonistic theses of which public controversy is a part. From this perspective, polemics is not a genre of discourse (it covers all the types and genres of discourse) but an argumentative modality among others. This reintegration of public controversy in its polemical dimension in the domain where we so often try to expel it from does not fail to raise a series of questions that the attempts at definitions undertaken in this chapter have enabled us, if only in part, to clarify. How do emotion and reason, arguments and personal attacks, violence and control come together in public controversies? To what extent do dichotomization and polarization enable polemical debates to achieve anything—are they really dialogues of the deaf? And if they don’t arrive at a settlement of the disputes, should we consider this to be a failure—thus implicitly confirming that agreement is the only purpose of democratic debates? Should we not rather ask ourselves if they might have other purposes and other social functions?

References Albert, L., & Nicolas, L. (Eds.) (2010). Polémique(s). Modalités et formes rhétoriques de la parole agonale de l’Antiquité à nos jours. De Boeck-Duculot. Amossy, R., & Koren, R. (2010). La “diabolisation” : un avatar du discours polémique au prisme des présidentielles de 2007. In D. Denis et al. (Eds.),Au corps du texte. Mélanges en l’honneur de Georges Molinié (pp. 219-236). Champion. Amossy, R., & Burger, M. (Eds) (2011). Semen 31 Polémiques médiatiques et journalistiques. Le discours polémique en question(s). Angenot, M. (1982). La Parole pamphlétaire. Typologie des discours modernes. Payot. Angenot, M. (2008). Le dialogue de sourds. Traite de rhetorique antilogique, Mille et Une nuits. Angenot, M., Marcel, C., Diane, D., & Dominique, G. (Eds.) (2012). Rhétorique des controverses savantes et des polémiques publiques. Discours social 43. Burger, M., J. Jacquin, & R. Micheli. (Eds.) (2011). La Parole politique en confrontation dans les médias. De Boeck.

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Cramer, P. (2011). Controversy as news discourse. Springer. Dascal, M. (2008). Dichotomies and Types of Debates. In F. Van Eemeren, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation (pp. 24–49). Benjamins. Declercq, G., Murat, M., & Dangel, J. (Eds.). (2003). La Parole Polémique. Champion. Declerq, G. (2003). Rhétorique et polémique. In G. Declerq, M. Murat, & J. Dangel (Eds.), La Parole polémique (pp. 17–21). Champion. Felman, S. (1979). Le discours polémique (Propositions préliminaires pour une théorie de la polémique. Cahiers de l’Association internationale des études françaises, 31, 179–192. «La polémique à l’École romantique». Garand, D. (1998). Propositions méthodologiques pour l’étude du Polémique. In A. Hayward & D. Garand (Eds.), États du polémique (pp. 211–268). Nota Bene. Garand, D. (1989). La Griffe du polémique. Le conflit entre les régionalistes et les exotiques. Hexagone. Gelas, N. (1980a). Étude de quelques emplois du mot “polémique.” In N. Gelas & C. KerbratOrecchioni (Eds.), Le Discours Polémique (pp. 41–50). Presses Universitaires de Lyon. Gelas, N. (1980b). L’hyper-polémique. In N. Gelas & C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (Eds.), Le Discours Polémique (pp. 75–82). Presses Universitaires de Lyon. Grévisse, B., & Dubied, A. (2003). La polémique journalistique. Recherches en communication, 20. Gelas, N., & Kerbrat-Orecchion, C. (Eds) (1980). Le Discours Polemique. Presses Universitaires de Lyon Hayward, A., & Garand, D. (Eds.) (1998). États du polémique. Nota Bene. Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. (1980). La polémique et ses définitions. In N. Gelas & C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (Eds.), Le Discours Polémique (pp. 3–40). Presses universitaires de Lyon. King, A. A., & Anderson, F. D. (1971). Nixon, Agnew, and the “silent majority”: A case study in the rhetoric of polarization. Western Speech, 35(4), 243–255. Koren, R. (2003). Stratégies et enjeux de la “dépolitisation” du langage. In B. Grevisse & A. Dubied (Eds.) La Polémique journalistique (Vol. 20, pp. 65–84). Recherches en communication. Lebohec, J. (2010). Dictionnaire du journalisme et des médias. Presses Universitaires de Rennes. Maingueneau, D. (1983). Sémantique de la polémique. L’Âge d’Homme. Meyer, M. (2008). Principia Rhetorica. Une théorie générale de l’argumentation. Fayard. Oléron, P. (1995). Sur l’argumentation polémique. Hermè, Argumentation et Rhétorique II, 16, 15–27. Orkibi, E. (2008). Ethos collectif et rhétorique de polarisation : le discours des étudiants en France pendant la guerre d’Algérie. Argumentation et analyse du discours 1. Plantin, C. (2003). Des polémistes aux polémiqueurs. In G. Declercq, M. Murat, & J. Dangel (Eds.), La Parole polémique (pp. 377–408). Champion. Roellenbleck, G. (Ed.). (1985). Le Discours polémique. Gunter Narr Verlag. Vanderford, M. L. (1989). Vilification and social movements: A case-study of pro-life and pro-choice rhetoric. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 75, 166–182. Vlad, D. (2008). La Polyphonie – de l’énoncé au discours, l’exemple du discours Polémique. Thèse de l’école doctorale sciences de l’homme et de la société, laboratoire ligérien de linguistique Orléans. Yanoshevsky, G. (2003). La polémique journalistique et l’impartialité du tiers. In B. Grevisse & A. Dubied (Eds.), Recherches en communication « La polémique journalistique » (Vol. 20, pp. 53–64).

Part II

How Do Polemics and Public Controversy Work? Looking at Debates on Women in the Public Sphere

Chapter 4

Wearing the Burqa in France Polemical Discourse and Polemical Exchanges

In the previous chapter, we have elaborated a working definition of polemics and public controversy as a specific discursive phenomenon. We will now proceed to a microanalysis attentive to the way this phenomenon is embedded in language. In order to do so, we will explore it on the ground.1 In other words, we will examine how it functions in specific cases. The first part of the analysis raised the question: what is public controversy in its polemical dimension? The second part poses the question of knowing how public controversy works, and sets out to identify its linguistic and rhetorical marks. Beyond the linguistic aspect, our objective is to see what these discursive manifestations reveal about the objectives and the social stakes of polemical debates. In order to answer these questions—while paying careful attention to nuances of the text—it is necessary to examine how the dichotomization, polarization, and discrediting heaped on the adversary, possibly accompanied by passion and violence, translate in terms of verbal behaviors and argumentative strategies. The latter are both singular—each polemics develops its own strategies—and collective—they are taken up again and modulated in numerous public debates. This analysis must however also take into consideration a formal distinction between polemical discourse and polemical exchange, neither of which should be confused with what we call polemics in the sense of a “public controversy.” Polemics consists of all of the antagonistic interventions on a given question at a given moment: for example, the public controversy about gun control or about sanctuary cities in the US, or on the change to the legal age of retirement in France. It is made up of all of the public or semi-public exchanges that deal with a social issue, and that are circulated during a given period of time. Polemical discourse and

1

This chapter like the one that follows it, explores specific examples of public controversy by mobilizing notions and tools borrowed from the linguistics of enunciation, Discourse Analysis, and theories of argumentation, which we will not however go over in detail in the following pages in order not to burden the presentation. A large number of references to our analytical approach can be found in Amossy 2021 [2000].

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_4

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polemical exchange are the verbal forms that the interventions constitutive of public controversy can take. Polemical discourse is “the discursive production of only one of the parties involved, but in which the discourse of the other is necessarily present.” (KerbratOrecchioni, 1980, p. 9). It is by definition dialogical, in the sense that it dialogues with the prior discourses it attacks: but it is not dialogal (it does not take the form of a formal dialogue) since there is no direct interaction with the adversary. Such is, for example, the case of a newspaper article that goes after a target without the latter retorting, a speech in a meeting that aims at an absent adversary, or a pamphlet that is circulated in the public arena. It is necessary to distinguish between polemical discourse and polemical exchange, which is a face to face or a deferred interaction. Polemical exchange implies that one or two adversaries engage in an oral or written discussion trying to prevail one over the other. The discourse here is fully dialogal. We can think of televised debates, of open letters, of exchanges in Internet discussion forums. As mentioned before, it is the totality of the discourses and the exchanges that circulate in the public sphere on a debated matter that constructs a public controversy (or “polemics”). These two forms—polemical discourse and polemical exchange—will be explored here in a specific framework of communication. We have chosen to focus on the media. They certainly don’t have exclusive rights over public controversies: the latter can also be heard in parliamentary discussions, in debates during professional meetings, in conversations between individuals, etc. But it is mostly in the media that they are spread, if not constructed, in the public sphere; it is through their channel that parliamentary speeches are brought to the attention of the general public; it is in this space that discussions have a chance of being read or heard among ordinary citizens. We will thus not only try to explore the way people engage in a media controversy, but also try to investigate the role of journalists and their responsibility in public debate. The case study selected for microanalysis is the public controversy on the bill aiming to prohibit the wearing of the burqa in public in France (June 2009–October 2010). The polemical discourse employed in this case is exemplified by an opinion piece published in June 2009 in the left-wing weekly Marianne. Polemical exchange is explored in two examples: a face to face interaction—a televised debate in which a politician, Jean-François Copé debates with a fully veiled woman, and an asynchonic exchange—one or two posts taken from the discussion forum that responds to Bénédicte Charles’s article in Marianne. They must of course be situated in the global framework of the public controversy about the burqa in France. However, the issue of the public controversy as such will only be examined in detail in the next chapter. The latter is based on another case study that also focuses on women in society in order to create a dyptich: it deals with the question of the so-called “exclusion of women” from public space in Israel.

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4.1 The Burqa Affair in France Let us first recall in a few words the burqa affair in France. The word burqa designates a full veil of afghan origin and is often used in French instead of “niqab.” It is a long black veil that completely hides the body and the face, leaving space only for the women’s eyes. French public opinion became concerned to see the burqa gain in popularity in certain neighborhoods and a sustained public controversy delved into the question of knowing whether it is appropriate to legislate on the subject. A bill that was bitterly debated in the public sphere ended up being passed in the French National Assembly on September 14, 2010, and was ratified by the Senate on October 11 of the same year (law 2012-1192). It forbids hiding one’s face in public, defined as “constituted by public thoroughfares as well as places open to the public or allotted to a public service,” stipulating that any person who fails to comply with this prohibition will be punished with a fine, and possibly even required to do a training course in civics. Moreover, according to article 225-4-10, the act of any person imposing the concealing of their face on one or several other persons by threat, violence, constraint, abuse of authority, or abuse of power, because of their sex. is punished with a year in prison and a fine of 30000 e. When the act is committed to the detriment of a minor the penalties are increased to two years of imprisonment and to 60 000 e of fines.

As early as June 18, 2009, the media seized on the affair launched at the initiative of André Gérin, a communist deputy. We will take as an example the following text, published in the left-wing weekly Marianne (and later the posts that followed it): Bénédicte Charles—Marianne | Thursday June 18, 2009.

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The AFP (French Press Association) dispatch fell on our desks yesterday, a little after 6:30 pm: “about sixty deputies, led by the communist party deputy for Vénissieux (Rhône) André Gérin, asked for the creation of a parliamentary commission of inquiry on the wearing in France of the burqa or the niqab, the full veil worn by certain Muslim women, at the risk of restarting a ‘war of the veil.’ Five years after the law on the wearing of the veil at school, the debate no longer concerns a scarf that hides the hair (and the neck, in certain cases) but a piece of clothing that covers the entirety of the body of women, from head to toe, leaving only the hands (with gloves) to show and the eyes (and even that, not always). How have we gotten here? “An epiphenomenon blown out of proportion” will say the never ending Amélie Poulains of the suburbs—well-meaning sociologists, blind community activists, etc. The communitarians will say “Islamophobia”—the UOIF has in fact already taken a stance and denounces “a new maneuver in order to encourage false analogies,” according to their general secretary Fouad Alaoui. Are they right? No. The problem exists. Indeed, when we speak of the burqa or the niqab, the images of Afghan or Iranian women come to mind for many French people. But those who live in the suburbs of Roubaix, of Vénissieux, of Val-de-Reuil, of Nanterre or elsewhere think about the women who are nicknamed the “Belphégor” in certain cities, those dark ghostlike and striking silhouettes the mere sight of whom makes the heart leap in our chests. Yes indeed: there are places in France where the spectacle of those women without a face, who always hurry to hide from the view of passers-by—except when they are accompanied by their husband—is part of daily life. There are neighborhoods where the wearing of the burqa or the niqab is becoming commonplace. This is what André Gérin and the 57 other members of parliament of all stripes (communists, socialists, UMP, new center, independents) are denouncing. “Today in the neighborhoods in our cities we are confronted with the wearing by certain Muslim women of the burqa, which completely veils and covers the body and the head in genuine walking prisons, or of the niqab that allows only the eyes to show,” writes the Mayor of Vénissieux in his proposal. Little by little, elected officials and community activists are following in his footsteps, as if they had waited for this chance to mention a problem that they have been aware of for a long time. Xavier Darcos, interviewed this morning on I-Télé, described the burqa as a form of “oppression.” Valérie Létard Secretary of State for National Unity, said she was in favor of a proposal that “has as an objective to better examine the question in order to better understand and act.” Fadela Amara considers that it is a “good initiative” and that “democracy and the Republic” must give themselves “the means to stop the proliferation of the burqa.” The national secretary of the Green Party Cécile Duflot, says she is “profoundly shocked” by the situation. The Rector of the Paris mosque Dalil Boubakeur “deplored” on Europe 1, that the wearing of the burqa is spreading in France, a clear sign for him of a “radicalization.” The debate is therefore not about knowing whether the burqa is spreading in France: 24 h after the AFP’s dispatch, nobody or almost nobody denies this anymore. The public controversy [polémique] is from now on about the necessity, or not, of prohibiting this degrading “piece of clothing.” Five years after the passing of the law on the wearing of the veil in school, this is where we are at: determining whether

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the wearing of the burqa Afghan style or of the niqab Iranian style pertains or not to basic individual liberty. After all, secularism is perhaps in the process of definitively losing the battle. I.

Polemical Discourse: The Actantial Structure and the System of Dichotomies

The word “polémique” is used only once, towards the end of the text. “Debate” spotlighted in the title, occurs in contrast three times. With fewer negative connotations than “polémique,” it seems to be more suitable for an initiative calling for deliberation at the heart of the highest governing bodies of the state. “Polémique” does however take over from “debate,” following a shift that the text does not care to justify. The result is that the article creates a perfect equivalence between the two notions: “The debate is therefore not about knowing if the burqa is spreading in France […] The polemics is from now on about the necessity, or not, of prohibiting this degrading ‘piece of clothing’.” What justifies the recourse to the word “polemics” (namely, public controversy)? What does it teach us about the ways in which the debate is managed? The confrontation of contradictory opinions between a Proponent and an Opponent lies at the heart of the article. The opposition of these antagonistic arguments is carried out on several levels. On the level of the facts: for the Proponent, the burqa is “becoming commonplace,” for the Opponent it remains an “epiphenomenon.” On the level of the evaluation of the facts: the Proponent considers that the wearing of the burqa became a problem in France, the Opponent considers that it is “blown out of proportion.” Finally, on the level of conclusions: the Proponent wants to launch legislative measures to prohibit the burqa, it is clear that the Opponent categorically rejects this measure. The journalistic text constructs in this way a dichotomization of positions which presents the disagreement as deep, and the resolution of the conflict of opinion as unlikely. Facts are the premises of argumentation; and without agreement on the premises, the undertaking is doomed to failure. Moreover, the debaters diverge radically in their assessment of the burqa: does it or does it not constitute a social problem in the French Republic? Some speak “as if they had waited for this chance to mention a problem which they were aware of for a long time,” whereas others see nothing in it but a baseless political “maneuver.” These dichotomized stances hinder any agreement about what measures to take: to legislate or not regarding the burqa. It should be noted that these oppositions are constructed by the journalist, who is writing one day after the deputy’s proposal before adverse voices had the time to make themselves fully heard. She presents the counter-arguments of the Opponent in a predictive fashion by using declarative verbs in the future tense: “will say the never-ending Amelie Poulains”, “will say the communitarians…” We can therefore ask ourselves if it is a text reporting on a “polemics” that is taking place elsewhere, or whether the text is launching, even participating in a polemics itself. What is the status of the author? Is she a polemicist among others, or is she just acting as a stage director?

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4.2 Enunciation and Journalistic Responsibility In the kind of writing characteristic of the press in general, and of opinion pieces in particular, the level of enunciation on which the actors of the confrontation express themselves is very important. Journalistic writing in public controversies often rests on embedded discourse. In the framing discourse, a journalist (in this case the signatory of the article, Bénédicte Charles) addresses the readers (here, those of the weekly Marianne, a left-wing magazine with a symbolic name, printing off about 300,000 copies, attached to the republican principles of secularism, of press freedom, and hostile to neoliberalism). She reports what the actors of the public controversy said, while pointing out the division of roles (thus, André Gérin, Xavier Darcos and others incarnate the Proponent versus the sociologists, Fouad Alaoui, and others represent the Opponent). In other words, the journalist stages a verbal confrontation aimed at her readers in the framing discourse; she constructs a dialogue. The embedded or entrenched discourse is the discourse in which the polemicists make themselves heard through the words of the journalist. In the terms of Ducrot (1980), we can say that it is a polyphonic structure where the writer makes the speech of different enunciators heard through her own words, in the way that a narrator in a story makes her characters speak. The speaker (the journalist) does not necessarily take responsibility for what the enunciators (the polemicists) say. Often, she is watchful on the contrary to distance herself from them. The extent to which she takes up the words of each of the two camps determines the role of the journalist in a public controversy. Her commitment depends on her degree of implication, which is in part dependent on the communication contract inherent to the genre. In an informational article, which aspires to “zero degree of implication,” it is a role of “intermediary,” “tied to the duty to represent events to the public through the press.” (Yanoshevsky, 2003, p. 60). The journalist thus functions as an author who collects and reports others’ standpoints as they recontextualize the speech of sources in order to report news events […] In narrating controversy as a pragmatic event, journalists construct dialogues among interlocutors whom they nominate and voice (Cramer, 2011, p. 72 & 75).

In genres like the opinion piece or the editorial, she can make herself into a spokesperson when she leans towards one of the adversaries and engages herself in favor of one of the two camps. In this case, the journalist is actively involved in the public controversy she is reporting on. She poses both as a journalist and as a polemicist, as a director and as an actor.

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4.3 Public Controversy as a Media Event The Marianne journalist must first construct the event while ensuring her own credibility. She does it by citing a dispatch from the AFP (French Press Agency) which is supposed to offer precise and impartial information, which in turn reports the words of the deputies within a citation in quotes and in italics. Through these marks of discursive heterogeneity, the author clearly distinguishes her words from those the AFP and from the deputies who question the full veil, by signaling that she adheres to her mission of information. The informative text does not however content itself with transmitting knowledge: it dramatizes the declaration by establishing it as an event of importance. Thus, Bénédicte Charles offers a comment in the form of a threat (referring to the polemics that raged on the wearing of a veil, the chador, in French public schools): “at the risk of restarting a ‘war of the veil.’” She not only deals with the initiative of the deputies, she also points out that a heated public controversy is about to start. The dramatic character of the event does not only derive from the cliché of war at the origin of the term “polemics.” It also arises from the selection of the term introducing the quotation: “The AFP French Press Agency dispatch fell yesterday, a little after 6:30 pm.” The metaphor “fell” is striking because it designates something that crashes down unexpectedly and spectacularly. The insistence on the hour, a trivial detail, likewise seems to designate the irruption of an event: to mention the exact moment means that something noteworthy has occurred. No doubt the press pursues one of its missions in this way: producing a “scoop.” At the same time, the article presents the demand called for by the deputies as the beginning of a public controversy, itself raised to the status of an important, even menacing, event. However, if “at the risk of,” signals a danger. The AFP’s and Bénédicte Charles’s assessment thereof is not clear: is it to denounce an act with negative consequences, or to point out a courageous initiative accomplished despite the risks? In any event, from the outset the article constructs the public controversy as a confrontation on a topical subject of public interest. This interest is implied by the reference to the chador affair which serves here as an intertext. The public controversy of the past that underlies the text becomes the model for the public controversy to come. In 2009, all of the readers still had in mind the polemical debate that exploded in 1989 following the suspension of three Muslim pupils who had refused to take off their scarf in a public high school in Creil, followed by a similar incident in 1990 in a suburb north of Paris, then in others between 1993 and 2003. The arguments developed during these years for or against permission to wear the veil in public (and thus by definition secular) schools were based on the confrontation between the value of secularism and the principle of individual freedom. In 2004, a law was voted on prohibiting ostentatious religious symbols in public schools first in the National Assembly and then in the Senate—leading to the law n. 2004–228 of March 15, 2004 (published in the Journal Officiel [the French Government Gazette]) March 17 2004). The new burqa affair is thus presented as all the more dramatic: it “restarts” a conflict that legislation has proven powerless to resolve. The resurgence of a same

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problem bears witness to its entrenchment in French society. It is therefore indeed an issue of public interest which touches real social problems. At the same time, we see how in the new burqa affair the article constructs public interest discursively. The very fact of presenting as a crucial step the passing of a bill on the wearing of the full veil, a practice adopted, according to the Service départemental d’information générale (SDIG), a government agency attached to the Ministry of the Interior, by only 367 women on French territory (some say 2000), is not an accident. And this especially since this emphasis contradicts the position of the Opponent about what he calls an “epiphenomenon” about which it seems superfluous to debate, even more so to legislate. In the ensuing discussions in the public sphere, many people argued that the problem is minor; it mainly serves to put aside the real social issues that the government would do better to deal with. Critics denounce the maneuvers of politicians who seize upon the burqa to distract attention from genuine problems, and to exempt themselves from giving them the necessary attention. The question of knowing if there is an occasion and matter to debate, is therefore itself contentious. The journalist does not discuss it. However, she provides her own answer in the very choice of bringing the problem to the reader’s attention in a dramatic fashion.

4.4 Polarization in Journalistic Writing Journalistic writing likewise shows the polarization, namely the division into two antagonistic groups, that public controversy creates in French society. This division is the result of the gathering of the parties around antithetical positions. In verbal public controversies, polarization is not a reality on the ground that the text simply reflects; rather it is constructed by the way the article organizes the players in two camps. This grouping can be seen in the dialogue that the journalist constructs when she reports the views of the two parties. We can see that the speaker reports fragmented and isolated declarations regrouped in antithetical positions that do not establish an actual dialogue. She cites or resumes the affirmations of the various parties in separate paragraphs that makes evident the chasm between the debaters. If the views reported are not structured in an actual interaction it is because in the text, none of the enunciators actually responds to the arguments of the other. There is on the one hand the enumeration of the comments that echo Gérin, presented one after the other; on the other, in an isolated paragraph, we find the opinions of the critics who reject the facts or prefer to reframe the problem in terms of Islamophobia. In this impossible dialogue, the picture emerges of two groups cut off from one another and frozen in an attitude of mutual hostility. The polarization in the text takes place on an ideological basis. The defenders of republican values are fighting all those who do not abide by them. The grouping is not based on social groups, classes, or milieus, not even political parties. Beyond traditional fault lines, a new division is being drawn that places on both sides of the

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barricade individuals of diverse origins, who nevertheless share the same vision of France and its future. Thus, in the category of the Proponent Gérin, the communist mayor who signed with deputies from all sides, rub shoulders with the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement, a center-right political party) Minister Xavier Darcos or the representative of the Green Party Cécile Duflot. The voices of moderate French Muslims—Fadela Amara and the rector of the Paris Mosque Dalil Boubakeur—echo those of the nonMuslims; the voices of women join those of men. The emphasis is clearly put (as with the document initiated by Gérin) on the rallying of diverse forces with varied political tendencies, beyond differences of religion and sex. The large number of family names cited in the article and the notoriety of the personalities selected, endow the criticism of the burqa with great strength. This gives the impression of a massive protest that expresses collective alarm, so much so that the great diversity of parties only accentuates a unity of purpose and action. Not so in the category of the Opponent designated by heterogenous groups, mentioned quickly with only one family name, Fouad Alaoui, the general secretary of the l’UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations of France). The coherence of the principles that unite the adversaries of the prohibition of the burqa is not emphasized: the sociologists, the community activists, the communitarians and the UIOF each present arguments of a different order. The term “epiphenemenon” insists on the totally minor character of the wearing of the veil and refuses to see in it an infraction against women’s dignity and against individual liberty; “blown out of proportion” accuses the Proponent of ill will; “Islamophobia” and “a new maneuver in order to encourage false analogies” transforms the problem of the burqa into a question of prejudice and discrimination. It designates all of the people who reframe the condemnation of the full veil as a problem of hostility towards Muslims, thereby blocking the discussion. Indeed, the denunciation of an attack against Islam replaces a scenario of free and equal debaters with that of victims faced with ill-intentioned persecutors. In short, the journalist does not organize the reported discourse of the participants who represent the Opponent so as to show what links and brings them together in a coherent argument. Contrary to the Proponent, the pole of the Opponent of the full veil thus appears as a disparate grouping founded on principles whose homogeneity is not clear. The polarization sketched by the article thus constructs in a partial way the ideologically based groupings of the public controversy about the full veil. We can see that the journalist takes an active part in the controversy through her personal remarks: she is an actress as much as she is a director. Indeed, it is in her own discourse that she discredits the Opponent. She not only undermines his views by reducing them to the minimum—a brief paragraph of 49 words, framed by two massive blocs expressing the opposing stance, she also does not even offer actual quotations but replaces them with fabricated statements which represent her prediction of counter-arguments to come. No doubt this maneuver can be explained, as we have already mentioned, by the fact that at that time the public controversy was still gestating. Nevertheless, the possibility of prediction flanked by the term “never ending” shows clearly that the adversaries are using worn-out arguments— which they already brandished in the quarrel about the chador and which they repeat

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tirelessly in the public sphere. The accuracy of the prediction is moreover confirmed by an actual citation along the same lines, with the help of the connecting word “in fact”: “the UOIF has in fact already taken a stance and denounces…”. As with its credibility, the authority of the discourse of the Opponent is undermined. The argument of authority which introduces the reference to respected personalities only works in favor of one of the parties. No individual or collective name of significance is cited regarding the sociologists or associations, and even more so “the communitarians” —a pejorative notion in itself that defies the principle of republican universalism. Beyond the reference to Fouad Aloui, one finds only the name of a fictitious heroine to whom the anonymous defenders of the burqa are assimilated. It is Amélie Poulain from the very successful film The Fabulous Destiny of Amélie Poulain, a naïve young woman who tries to transform and improve the lives of the people around her. In this way, scientists and activists are turned into gentle dreamers who imagine being able to change reality with the help of good intentions and pipe dreams. The axiological qualifications selected to describe these participants highlight this argumentative orientation. The sociologists are “well-meaning:” this ironic qualifier designates conformists who adopt a politically correct system instead of exercising their judgement. Likewise, antiracist associations are qualified as “blind.” It is their inability to consider the surrounding reality that is denounced.

4.5 The Journalist as Polemicist In the 527 words that the journalist granted herself, thereby taking the lion’s share of the article, she not only attacks and discredits her adversary, but also gives a clear-cut answer— “Are they right? No. The problem exists.” She also brings evidence—the mediated testimony of people living in the suburbs, and advances arguments. The arguments against the full veil are thus integrated into an orchestration of voices that construct an overall argument. First, Bénédicte Charles repeats in her own terms the quote from the AFP (French Press Agency) that the text began with. Her hyperbolic presentation describes a feminine body totally removed from sight with the help of ironic expressions such as the cliché “from head to toe,” and the phrase “only allowing her hands (gloved) and her eyes (and here again not always) to show.” The statement which displays the radicalness of this dissimulation of the feminine body is taken up again in a citation from the text of the deputies: “the burqa, veiling and fully enclosing the body and the head in virtual moving prisons or the niqab, which only allows for the eyes to show.” Added to this is the rumor from the suburbs that nicknames the women wearing burqas “Belphegor,” a ghost who in a mini-series haunted the Louvre Museum, with an explanation full of evaluative and affective marks added by the journalist: “those dark ghostlike and striking silhouettes whose mere sight makes the heart leap in our chests.” The condemnations puts forward analogical arguments: that of the denial of liberty which makes these women prisoners, that of death in life which reduces them to ghosts. Their rights as human beings are violated; they therefore are no longer autonomous subjects and do not fully participate in human

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society. Those arguments are taken up again by Xavier Darcos who described the burqa as a “form of oppression.” The analogical evocation links the emotional with the axiologial: the heart that pounds in the chest is suggestive of emotions of pity and of terror. And indeed, pathos is not absent from the text. In particular, the article brandishes the argument of fear. The mention in two instances of Afghanistan and Iran and the insistence on the fact that the customs of these Islamist countries are becoming common practice in France through the “radicalization of Islam” (mentioned by the very rector of the Paris mosque) bring to bear the menace of a transformation of the secular French Republic into an obscurantist country ruled by shariah law. The slow deterioration of the situation is emphasized by the passing, in only five years, from the chador to the burqa, an evolution that is the source of an emotional alarm call: “How could we have gotten here?”. Arguments by fear and threat strengthen the incitement to action—in this case, the creation of a commission and the promulgation of a law. The deputies’ proposal is reinforced at the end of the article by the words of Valérie Létard, Secretary of State for the Family and National Unity, who is said to be favorable to this undertaking, because it “has as an objective to better examine the question in order to better understand and act,” and Fadela Amara who, saluting this “good initiative,” declares that “democracy and the Republic” must give themselves “the means to stop the proliferation of the burqa.” The article does not however stop there: it is reframed by the alarm call and by the angry outcry of the journalist who rises up against the very possibility that customs borrowed from the most obscurantist countries could be debated in the French Republic in terms of individual freedom: “this is where we are at: determining whether the wearing of the burqa Afghan style or of the niqab Iranian style pertains or not to basic individual liberty. After all, secularism is perhaps in the process of definitively losing the battle.” The discussion ends with a reductio ad absurdum that destroys the discourse of the adversary, but also with a last call to fear: it evokes the danger incurred by secularism (“laicité”), one of the founding principles of the French Republic, defended by Marianne. Finally, the article polemicizes against the very possibility of a public controversy that should have no place in France. One does not debate what is obvious, said Aristotle. The current debate eloquently attests to the loss of shared beliefs and values which are at the basis of French society. We can thus see how this opinion piece produces a public controversy which it constitutes as a dramatic event and a subject of public interest. We can also see how it constructs an agonistic dialogue based on discourses that circulate in the public sphere and how, at the same time, the journalist participates in the debate. By selecting scattered statements, by ordering them around a clear axis of opposition which she dichotomizes, by regrouping the speakers whose words she reports around antagonistic poles of identity, Bénédicte Charles configures the confrontation for her readers. At the same time, she constructs, in the orchestration of the reported discourse, a dialogue in which she inscribes her own voice. Both director and actor, she mobilizes all the discursive and argumentative procedures that allow for taking a stance in the discussion, and for making arguments aimed at the audience—even if

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it means primarily to persuade those who think like you. Although Marianne counts on a readership faithful to the values of secularism, its members have nevertheless to be rallied to the new cause. Such is the privilege of discourse managed by a single speaker: the polemicist is the master of ceremonies. She orders and disposes; she imposes her interpretation in a space where the adversary does not have the leisure to express himself directly, without her mediation. II.

The Polemical Exchange: Dialogues and Polylogues

4.6 The Televised Debate The same cannot be said for the polemical exchange, where the debaters respond to each other mutually and have to react, sometimes on the spot, to the words of the other. This was the case for the televised debate that took place on January 9, 2011, with the participation of Roland Dumas and of the host Michel Cymes, that placed Jean-François Copé in front of Dalila, a young Muslim women wearing a full veil. Thierry Ardisson’s program on the channel Canal + , “Salut les Terriens “ (Hello Earthlings) was watched by 1.3 million viewers. It is clear that its sensasionalist side has something to do with this success. Seeing a woman enveloped in a burqa whose eyes are the only visible part of her face, confronting the President of the UMP group at the National Asssembly who ardently defends the promulgation of a law prohibiting the full veil, is certainly not common. Ardisson took care to first introduce the young woman, a twenty-two-year-old law student living with her French mother, but from an Algerian father who did not acknowledge her as his child. He let her recount her story—a way of individualizing her behind her veil. Jean-François Copé nonetheless leans on this face to face situation in order to emphasize the difficulty of communicating with an interlocutor whose face he does not see—an argument which is at the center of his condemnation of the burqa: Copé: My difficulty with you is that it is extremely difficult to argue if I may say so equal to equal with someone whose face we don’t see. Dalila: I understand Copé: I have a lot of difficulty Dalila: I understand Copé: speaking with you, I don’t see you Dalila: its normal, its normal Copé: But it’s very difficult Dalila: If you Copé: Because modern society organized society the society of respect it requires an encounter of faces. Dalila: No, not necessarily Copé: But of course you see the difficulty I have in speaking with you Dalila: If you see my face…. Copé: Lets stop lying to ourselves. That is the difficulty

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Dalila: Me, I see your face you can hide it you hide it you speak you have a voice Copé: That doesn’t happen because respect for a person also starts with his identity

Copé’s personal commentary on his face to face with Dalila comes to embody by an example de visu the argument that underlies his reasoning and that he just explained in so many words: the rule of the Republic is “living together;” “in order to be able to live together we need to know the identity of the other;” when one has “one’s face fully veiled,” “there is no more identity’- therefore the full veil is contrary to the rules of the Republic and to its ethics of living together. Copé transposes the abstract principle to the personal level by mentioning his own difficulty in communicating with the young woman in a burqa: “But of course you see the difficulty I have in speaking with you.” The words “difficulty” and “difficult” are hammered in his intervention. Even more than an illustration of rational syllogism, the situation on set is used like a visual argument playing on pathos. Indeed, the sight of a speaker whose eyes alone are visible, communicating with the rest of the world through a curtain of cloth that hides her body, her features and the expressions of her face, creates a shock for the French spectator. It destabilizes all of her expectations from a dialogue between two individuals come to exchange their points of view. In this face to face, the politician makes his voice heard in a firm and authoritarian manner, leaving few possibilities for his interlocutor to be heard. The incomplete replies of the young woman, interrupted and covered up by Copé, show that she has to fight to get her turn to speak. The notion of a discussion between equals put forward by the deputy thus takes on a different meaning. He views it as an automatic prerequisite for a citizen’s debate where the best reasons must prevail. The concrete situation points, on the contrary, to an inequality of positions and social status. It puts a mature man in front of a young woman, an experienced and recognized politician in front of a student, a parliamentarian who has the leisure of passing a law in front of a citizen called to submit to the law. Copé is not without an understanding of the situation. This is why he uses a hedge that implies that he does see the imbalance: “to discuss, if I may say, equal to equal.” He nonetheless maintains the notion of a discussion between equal citizens which is at the heart of his republican belief. By displaying the nature of the interaction, the TV show brings to light the power relation at play. This power relation underlies the relationship between the person who wants to prohibit the full veil and the one who wants to wear it. It sheds light on a frequent argument in the burqa debate: the fact that a rule is imposed on a marginalized population that would only be weakened by it (the debate in fact ends with Dalia’s plea explaining that if the burqa is prohibited in public space, she will no longer be able to leave her house, to help her handicapped mother and to pursue her university studies.) What the verbal dialogue reveals thus counterbalances the visual argument that the TV show provides in favor of Copé’s positions. In the spectacle of the debate, the arguments that the visual and the auditory indirectly construct oppose each other, thereby revealing to the public the two sides of the affair that divides the country.

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The balance of power that the televised dialogue uncovers raises an important question: to what extent is it possible to polemicize in a situation of inequality where the authority of one can easily crush the other. It is often argued that public controversy is deployed in a framework where the hierarchies and the balance of power do not hinder the liberty of the participants. This is obviously not the case. Yet even if the inequality here is flagrant and is expressed in the tone adopted by the minister and the young woman, the televised debate still imposes its own generic rule. Its objective is precisely to authorize the discussion by asking both parties to confront each other publicly. It therefore gives a voice to those who are generally reduced to silence, and permits the subaltern not only to speak, but also to present her point of view and to resist. In this context, the young Muslim woman can publicly refute the arguments of her interlocutor, even if it is a politician of stature. She does it after a series of concessions that mark not only her position of weakness, but also her sensitivity to the feelings of the other. The “I understand” and “it’s normal” attest to her awareness of the difficulty Copé experiences—as do regularly French people around her in Dijon (whom she spoke about with Ardisson) —in interacting with a fully veiled woman. Her concessions are however followed by a denial: “No, not necessarily” opposed to the declarations against the full veil: “Because modern society organized society the society of respect it requires an encounter of faces.” Dalila contests the absolute truth of the principle formulated by her interlocutor, before putting forward the argument that comes to counter the central role conferred to the face in the republican “living together”. She emphasizes the function of the voice in social interaction and its capacity to individualize the participants: “I see you face you can hide it, you can talk you have a voice.” The voice, just as much as the face, is a bearer of identity. The argument is concretized because it is applied to Copé himself: his voice personalizes him and allows others to recognize him, it is one of the channels by which he expresses his uniqueness as an individual. The counter-argument is all the more powerful because it is uttered by a subaltern, a woman in a burqa, whose difficulty in establishing herself in the dialogue and whose concessions did not lead the audience to expect such a capacity of refutation. Behind the full veil appears the personality of a law student and of a thoughtful and courageous woman. More importantly, she counter-attacks without any aggressivity and without discrediting the adversary, by using a purely rational argument. The politician has on the contrary just discredited her by indirectly accusing her of harming the “society of respect;” he blames her for living outside of “modern society” and ignoring how it organizes human relationships. It should be noted that Copé sweeps aside the argument of his interlocutor (“that doesn’t happen”) without really answering it: he merely repeats the principle that he had stated previously without taking into consideration the objection about the identity that the voice confers— repeating: “That doesn’t happen because respect for a person also starts with his identity.” This deafness puts him in a vulnerable position within the perspective of the rules of critical discussion, where each arguer is committed to be relevant, and required to answer the arguments of the other.

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It is interesting to note that the public controversy is based on a misunderstanding about the very notion of identity. Indeed, Dalila explained in the first part of the TV show that she and her twin sister had found themselves in the Muslim religion (which was the religion of their Algerian father who had refused to acknowledge them as his children). In other words, the wearing of the full veil is for her constitutive of the identity she chose for herself and that she considers as her own. Copé does not take into consideration this dimension of identity—a dimension linked to a religious and/or communitarian chosen identity in which given individuals find themselves. He neither raises nor discusses the fact that in the eyes of the person who wears it, identity is granted by the veil (in a manner that has nothing to do with the way the veil characterizes her in the eyes of those who look at her.) The complex conception of the young woman is supplanted in favor of a more formal and legalistic notion of identity as something that is displayed in the traits of the face (which is the approach institutionalized by the identity card and official documents2 ). This difference in the interpretation of identity, of the respect which it is due and of the interactions it authorizes, is not conceptualized by either of the two debaters. It is part of the hidden premises of the debate. If it is covered by the explicit argumentation in the form of the affirmation of the thesis (the face as the basis of identity in social interactions) and of its refutation (the voice as the basis foundation of identity in social interactions), it nonetheless underlies the opposite points of view and partly accounts for their incompatibility.

4.7 Dialogue and Polylogue in Discussion Forums Let us now move to the differed polemical exchange, here exemplified by the discussion forum that followed Bénédicte Charles’s article in Marianne. The first post selected is a spontaneous intervention coming from an uneducated citizen. It allows us to investigate a popular form of polemics that finds its place today, through the Internet, in citizen discussions: For the freedom of expression and the right of women to dress as they so desire. Men in djellaba on the street no one says anything to them!!!! [sic] Pour la liberté d’expression et le droit aux femmes de se vêtir comme elles le désir. Les hommes en djelaba dans la rue ont leurs dit rien !!! (sic) 2

One should note without any surprise that the position of Copé prevailed in the legislative decision, as shown in the report by Jean-Paul Garraud to the National Assembly: It is commonly accepted, in our society, that one cannot permanently hide one’s face in public. The face is the carrier of identity and thus of the uniqueness of a person. It is through the face that a dialogue can be born. To hide the face is thus to exclude oneself from the social contract that renders life together possible […]. It is necessary to protect the foundation of living together and the immaterial or social public order, understood as the minimal basis for the reciprocal requirements and the guarantees essential to life in society. This public order guarantees the subtle balance that exists between our fundamental values which are liberty, equality, fraternity, and the dignity of the human person.

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This is indeed a polemical exchange to the extent that it constitutes a direct reaction, in the form of a refutation, to the condemnation of the burqa expressed by Bénédicte Charles. Carried by a statement redacted in a rudimentary style full of mistakes, it is composed of three juxtaposed elements: a call in the form of a slogan, a justification, and a hyperlink. What is striking in the post is first of all its recourse to vehemence, even verbal violence. Both are linked to the character of the act of speech that the utterance performs through its syntactic form: “For X.” The formula indicates a stand in a situation where one has to make a choice (for/against). The presupposition of the Internet user is thus that the Opponent (the journalist at Marianne hostile to the burqa) is against the freedom of expression. This formula presents itself as a call to mobilization. In this framework, the speaker does not care to give reasons: its objective is to defend a cause that has been attacked and to brandish a formula that sounds like a slogan. The readers—and the other Internet users—are challenged: they are called to rally around a banner. In brief, the statement is an assertive act of making a demand, an implicit act of protest. The fact that this utterance constitutes a verbal action is strongly underlined by the link that is given at the end of the post to a petition to be signed against this so-called islamophobic law. Words become a weapon susceptible of gathering all the readers in one same citizenship action, which radically opposes the action which Bénédicte Charles and the deputy are calling for (bringing about the legal prohibition of the burqa). The vehemence of the utterance should not veil the fact that it possesses a logical frame and appears as a refutation of the unconditional defense of secularism. It is first of all a great principle, which has been scorned and which all the readers must rally around, that is presented as a counter-argument to the prohibition of the full veil: freedom of expression. It is followed by the concretization of this principle—the liberty of individuals to dress as they wish. By linking with “and” the two utterances: “For the freedom of expression” and “the right of women to dress as they so desire,” the post presupposes that the two elements are intimately linked: the connective “and” creates an equivalence between the two segments. From this perspective, the burqa is presented as an innocuous piece of clothing that is selected through a personal choice. However, if we refer to what is said about the burqa as a marker of religious belonging, the post also defends (implicitly) the freedom to affirm one’s convictions and confessional identity in the public sphere (“on the street.”) Finally, the freedom of expression supposes the possibility of a choice according to one’s heart, which is reinforced by the selection of the term “desire” —in French, with a spelling mistake since the verb “[elles] désirent” is replaced by “désir,” the substantive, denotating a profound aspiration or a sexual drive. The inversion of the notion of “desire” here is flagrant: the post goes against what the Proponent says, namely that this costume is imposed on women and deprives them of their autonomy and of a free relation to their body. The counter-argument is silenced, and therefore does not need any formal refutation. The speech initiated by the defense of a great principle (freedom of speech) authorizes and covers up the absence of an explicit and systematic counterargument, by relying on a doxa familiar to the readers.

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The speaker inscribes his emotions in the discourse through the elliptical syntax of a punch, but also in the multiplication of the exclamation marks in the second utterance: “Men in djellaba on the street no one says anything to them!!!! [sic].” They not only represent an emotional explosion, they manifest a revolt and a concomitant feeling of moral indignation in the face of an injustice that the speaker wants the public join. The effect of pathos comes here to sustain this reasoning. It is allied to what Perelman names the rule of justice: that which is valid for X is also valid for Y, when both sides are equal. The stylistic violence indicates that what happens here is not a trivial violation of the rule of justice, but a shameful and revolting transgression. The assumption of the digital call is thus that man and woman are equal and that what is good for one is automatically good for the other. The refusal to let women wear a piece of clothing issued from their culture is interpreted as an infraction not only of the rule of justice, but also of women’s rights to liberty and equality. The Internet user projects the ethos of a defender of women’s rights. He claims to reinvest the position of the Proponent—by bluntly rejecting his pretention of expressing in an exclusive fashion the principles of the equality of the sexes and of the rights of women to dispose of themselves—with feminist and republican principles that the journalist at Marianne made a point of defending. We see in the polemical exchange how each party claims to defend the same values and engages in a struggle for the recognition of the public. The use of pseudonyms as a general rule in online posts plays here an important role, because we do not know if the Internet user is a man or woman. “Alier,” which has no meaning in French, is unisex. The post presents itself as a message of universal significance that does not differentiate between the two sexes, and even neutralizes the impact of gender. It remains deliberately on the level of principles that everyone must accept and recognize. The neutrality of the ethos of a citizen with principles who refuses to fit into established categories, is nevertheless troubled by the particularly low level of language of the Internet user, which places him/her at once in the category of the uncultured. Gross errors of grammar and spelling indeed designate a person without education, who does not master the correct use of the French language. The digital message makes a popular voice heard, one that does not care for formal arguments. It is thus interesting to see that the Internet user exploits a major characteristic of the genre, the possibility of links and hypertexts: he/she adds a link at the end of the post to a petition “against the new Islamophobic law.” No doubt the insertion of the link to the petition reinforces the value of the discourse as an act. On the other hand, the text of the petition contrasts violently with the post, because it offers an elaborate line of argument, thereby connecting the brief and terse post to tight reasoning anchored in clearly explained reasons. In so doing, he displaces the argument of Alier by presenting the bill as an attack against Muslims and a mark of Islamophobia—which the post does not do. Through the hyperlink, the Internet user switches from the defense of the liberties of women to the defense of the Muslims of France, from feminism to antiracism. But there is more: the petition, which starts with “We the citizens of the French Republic, teachers, elected officials, business leaders,

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members of civil society of all religions,” insists not only on the assembly of citizens, but also on the intervention of scholars and individuals who possess important intellectual baggage and social prestige. The Internet user, as we already mentioned, uses very simple language filled with mistakes. This ethos involuntarily but no doubt consciously projected by an uncouth man or woman without any education is thus offset by the figure of the signatory who wrote the petition given in the hypertext. As a result, the image of Alier can produce a dual effect. The ignorance of a man or woman who defends the great principles of liberty and equality can work against him/her: how could he/she be qualified to judge anything in a public controversy? But this image of a lack of education can also project another ethos, that of a simple person who makes us hear a cry from the heart and who speaks with others in the everyday language of the street—an almost childlike language: “men in djellaba no one says anything to them.” reminds us of the grumbling of children when they feel like they are the victims of an injustice; “Him, no one says anything to him.” No doubt this post stands outside of the recognized norms of regulated controversy and seems at first glance to be a cry from the heart that is not grounded in reason. It is nevertheless part of an interaction where a line of argument exists, even if not formulated in an explicit and systematic manner. It takes up in an uncouth and flawed manner the argument that we find in more elaborated discourses like that of Raphaël Logier in his article in the journal Actes Sud: I think instead that the Republic is putting itself in danger, struggling with fears, delusions, and prejudices which, in a sort of sustained media confusion, led it to question its own principles, and among them the freedom of every citizen to dress how he pleases. A citizen, by definition, is an individual whose capacity to express his will and be responsible for his acts we recognize. These women are citizens, and they consequently have the right to wear what they want on their face, their feet, and their legs. (2009, 3, p. 155) If we make the effort to recognize them, to speak with them (which is the minimum when one is a researcher), we can’t stay with the cliché of the woman dominated by her father or her husband, reduced to muteness, prisoner of her own family, because this is not the case with these young French women, it is rather well and truly a choice they have clearly made. (ibid., p. 156)

We see how much the polemical discourse varies from the post to the scholarly article, but also that certain uncouth forms of polemics whose logical frame remains below the surface, are not thereby devoid of rationality. We will come back to this in Chap. 6.

4.8 Public Controversy as Polylogue This post is part of a discussion forum where the argument of individual liberty is at the center of the debate. Thus “posted by Hassan Cehef 18/06/2009 18:48 EVERYONE IS FREE IN A DEMOCRACY TO DRESS HOW THEY WANT TO, AREN’T THEY ?” or “posted by Maryam 19/06/2009 at 22:20 Secularism is accepting the other the way they are, not the way we want them to be.”

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If a woman wants to wear a veil, she should her wear it!!!! It’s her business and only hers. It’s the same for the goths, nuns, and many more!!!” “Posted by All the hypocrites 18/06/2009 20 :52 This debate is totally hypocritical. Don’t get me wrong: the burqa gives me the creeps. But what scares me the most, it’s that my country speaks in its laws about the way I can or should dress. A little further and we will be imposing a uniform on everyone. Is that the direction you want to take??

The argument is also attacked by numerous opponents of the burqa. One can thus read this direct reply to Alier: 847.Posted by Bobbo 01/07/2009 00 :55 When I read this: Men in djellaba on the street no one says anything to them!!!! [sic] Guys in djellaba, we don’t give a shit, since their face is visible. The burqa, is first and foremost a legal problem: our legislation forbids masking our identity. Are you stupid or what?? Who gives a damn about morality in this story after all. If there are stupid bitches who let themselves be pushed around, that’s their problem, we gotta stop thinking for other people. Let people respect our legislation and not provoke us with the symbols of those who have declared war on our democracies, that’s all we ask. Let them wear their burqas, but with the face uncovered, and let them stop whining!!!

This reply written in an aggressive and vulgar style, rejects the argument of freedom of expression by opposing it with the principle of a law that forbids one from hiding one’s identity (the argument developed by Copé, which the Internet user does not however care to justify, and which is the foundation of the law of October 10, 2011 that deals with the prohibition, not of wearing the burqa, but of “hiding one’s face in public places.”) In a democracy, individual freedom ends where the law begins, and each person is beholden to respect it. The hierarchization of values that prioritizes republican principles is at the heart of this refutation.3 Moreover, the netsurfer rejects his adversary’s argument by denouncing the inaccurate character of the analogy on which he bases, in part, his argumentation: there is a difference between the burqa and the djellaba, which lies precisely in their relationship to identity since the latter does not hide the face. Eventually, the burqa as a concealer of identity and as an infraction against the law is also taken as the symbol of “those who have declared war on democracy”—an argument that places the defenders of the full veil on the side of the enemies of the Western world and discredits the adversary. We see that the principle of individual freedom, the rejection of authoritarianism that threatens democracy, the rule of justice and the tolerance of the practices of others, are repeated and consolidate each other mutually. In this way, numerous sets of arguments are articulated which certain blogs try to summarize (for the burqa: 3

We find this prioritization in the parliamentary report stipulating that “if some people wish, by a conscious decision, fruit of a freely chosen commitment, to continue to hide in a permanent manner their face in public, they will effectively stay in their homes, just as people who would wish to go around totally naked in public places cannot do so. The law will restrict to the margins their freedom of dress, in the name of living together”.

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freedom of dress, respect for religion, the will to respect one’s faith and to protect oneself, the Christians did the same; against the burqa: respect for women, secularism, security, integration into our culture, the burqa is not in the Qur’an, the promoters of moderate Islam believe that it should be taken off in the West, it is provoking racism. (http://www.polemistes.com/pour-ou-contre/l-interdictionde-la-burqa). These are all the arguments used to defend a same cause against the adversary, presented in a schematic and abstract form that can be concretized in multiple formulations. These lines of argument can take a number of forms, come from different sources, and are expressed on different platforms. Thus, in a televised address from March 24, 2010, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy develops an explicit and clear argumentation: For too long we have suffered the violations of secularism, of the equality of men and women, of discrimination. It is no longer bearable. The full veil is contrary to the dignity of women. The answer is the prohibition of the full veil. The government will introduce a bill to prohibit it in keeping with the general principles of our law.

Speeches on the burqa are also held in the National Assembly, where the Minister of Justice, Michèle Alliot-Marie, defends the idea of a bill (July 6, 2010). “Democracy, let’s say it clearly and let’s say it everywhere, is lived with the face uncovered,” she says, adding that we have “as a legacy liberty, democracy, the Republic.” A report is prepared and presented to the National Assembly on June 23, 2010, which studies the pros and cons of the law taking into consideration its legal aspects. On this topic, the French television presents live debates, like the one that opposed Alain Minc and Tariq Ramadan4 in “Face to Face” in addition to newspapers and weeklies that publish opinion pieces and open letters such as the much discussed one by Élisabeth Badinter in the magazine Nouvel Obs, or that of Fanny Truchelut who was fined for having asked women in a burqa to take them off in the common areas of her country lodge.5 Or of Philippe Bescond Garrec in response to “Marie-Georges Buffet, who defends women in burqas” (article 147 of Riposte laïque, May 31, 2010). We can add to these exchanges not only online forums that accompany the journalistic articles, but also discussion lists created especially for this occasion. On September 11, 2009 the Mrap66’s (chapter 66 of the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples) Weblog invited Internet users to an online debate on the wearing of the burqa and the public controversy around it.6 The “Legislation against the burqa” of January 10, 2010, which synthesized all of the arguments pro and con in order to open an informed debate,” is a discussion list launched by an ordinary citizen.7 The reframing of public controversy into a problem of Islamophobia (denounced by Bénédicte Charles) relaunches a debate that goes beyond the question of the full veil, which is itself just a visible sign of a deeper conflict. This is why the stigmatization of Islam is treated extensively. It is not only thousands of Muslims, but also anti-racist and feminist associations which denounce the exploitation of the principles of women’s rights to heap abuse on Islam. Thus, in “577 deputies and 367 4

http://www.last-video.com/alain-minc-vs-tariq-ramadan-debat-a-propos-dela-Burqa. http://www.laicite-republique.org/voile-lettre-ouverte-de-fanny.html. 6 http://mrap66.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/port-de-la-burka-le-mrap-66-vous-invite-au-debat/. 7 http://www.sur-la-toile.com/discussion-177178-1-Projet-de-loi-contre-laburqa-.html. 5

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burqas: where’s the problem?” the “Feminist Collective for Equality” stigmatizes a “freedom-destroying” law and calls for an end to “grotesque campaigns waged in the name of women but which only lead to penalizing them.” According to this manifesto, the feminist argument is put to the service “of a campaign of extremely violent stigmatization against Muslims.”8 As for SOS Racism (a movement of NGO’s that describe themselves as anti-racist), it expressed its indignation against a measure that falls into “a context of the stigmatization [of Muslims] for which political authorities are responsible in every respect.” The Mrap goes even further by linking this stigmatization to France’s colonial past. “The Racism, violence and civil and social inequality of the colonial period continue to this day—encouraged by the things unsaid and the refusal of remembrance– in the form of discriminations in all areas of life.”9 It should be noted that that these lines of argument are all founded on republican values that are placed in opposition to one another or prioritized differently: no one speaks in the name of fundamentalism, or of anti-democracy, or of the inequality of women in society, or even of communitarianism as taking precedence over the public interest. That is to say that there are no cognitive breaks here in the way that Angenot understood them –or at least, that opinions that do not respect the principles of the Republic have no place, and no legitimacy, in the public sphere. The dichotomization is no less strong, and the confrontation no less violent. Without reviewing all of the different arguments that face off against one another on the question of the burqa, it will suffice to underline that a public controversy in its polemical dimension is nourished by speeches and exchanges that circulate in the public sphere and whose resonance creates sets of arguments: groups of more or less articulated arguments that are divided into discourses and counter-discourses. There lies the logic of public controversy and its capacity to construct a public sphere beside, or instead of, rational deliberation that we will examine in the chapter focused on the so-called quarrel of “the exclusion of women.”

4.9 Conclusion The dichotomization of the objections, the polarization of the contending groups, and the discredit brought on the other are put in place in a series of language practices that mobilize a vast array of rhetorical procedures. As an argumentative modality, public controversy is in its polemical aspect first and foremost an art of refutation. It counters in a radical and uncompromising way opposing theses by taking up, reformulating, even distorting the more or less constant lines of argument that circulate in the public sphere. The reference to a topical interdiscourse and the modulation of this common speech constitutes a major characteristic of public controversies. 8

http://lmsi.net/577-deputes-et-367-burqas-ou-est. http://www.mrap.fr/contre-le-racisme-sous-toutes-ses-formes/linterdictionvengeresse-et-sterilede-la-burqa-fera-porter-a-la-societe-francaise-une-lourderesponsabilite.

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To carry out the endeavor of refutation, polemical discourse and polemical exchanges do not hesitate to use, in addition to counter-arguments, procedures of derision (irony, reductio ad absurdum,), of resorting to common sense (utilization of doxastic elements that mark the unreasonable character of the other), or ad hominem arguments (attacks on the thesis by attacking the person who defends it), to pathos (burst of indignation, anger…) Through rebuttal, polemics—public controversy— plays with confrontation in order to bring together two contradictory opinions, one of which is heavily devalued in favor of the other. That is why rhetorically, polemics is an art of antithesis and of hyperbole. It wields oppositions, exacerbates them, presents them through a magnifying glass by indulging in exaggeration. Discursively, recurring features can be found out within this framework: the marked inclusion of subjectivity, a heavily axiological vocabulary, a strategic selection of naming terms, the use of pejorative words, a biased handling of reported speech, and emphatic affirmations. This list is in no way exhaustive and mentions only the most flagrant aspects of the methods whereby dichotomization, polarization, and the discredit brought on the other are implemented in speech. Against this background, each polemical speech and interaction has the leisure to choose its own variants and to invent its strategies. Although each polemical intervention is unique, each nonetheless depends on a generic framework that shapes and constrains it. The newspaper article, the televised debate, the Internet discussion forums do not offer the same polemical forms, even if all three are part of contemporary media. The devise of the opinion piece presents an embedded structure that allows its smooth running: the reported speech of the participants is shaped by the journalist who constructs a contradictory dialogue. While the news story presents itself as a simple report by erasing the marks of the writer’s subjectivity, the opinion piece adds the voice of the journalist to the chorus of polemicists and does not hide its stand in the handling of the reported speech of all parties. But above all, the discursive modalities of public controversy vary depending on whether it is a discourse managed by the speaker alone—where the polemicist is the sole master on board, or whether it is an exchange between two or more debaters who must constantly readjust themselves according to the reactions of the other. In this great variety of forms, the functions of public controversy prove to be diversified. No doubt public controversy does not give up on persuading; but it is always a Third Party the polemicist attempts to have adhere to her opinions, and not the adversary. In most cases, the polemicist works indeed to persuade those who think like her—a mission which, contrary to what one might think, is not futile. In a dispute touching social questions, it is always necessary to strengthen the community of those who belong to the same camp, to prevent them from becoming complacent, and to stoke their hostility against the position to be fought against and the group that upholds it. Beyond these objectives of persuasion, polemical discourse and interaction fulfill other important functions. We have seen that they denounce; they protest; they call to action; and more generally, they maintain communication in the form of dissension between factions whose viewpoints are sometimes so far from each other that all contact seems impossible. It is mainly these functions that we will examine in the following chapters.

References

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References Cramer, P. (2011). Controversy as news discourse. Springer. Ducrot, O., et al. (1980). Les Mots du discours. Minuit. Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. (1980). La polémique et ses définitions. In N. Gelas & C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (Eds.), Le Discours Polémique (pp. 3–40). Presses universitaires de Lyon. Yanoshevsky, G. (2003). La polémique journalistique et l’impartialité du tiers. In B. Grevisse & A. Dubied (Eds.), Recherches en communication «La polémique journalistique» (Vol. 20, pp. 53–64).

Chapter 5

Controversies and Polemics in Public Space “The Exclusion of Women” in Israel

It is in the circulation of discourses that public controversy is constructed as a set of verbal confrontations on a social problem. Mono-managed discourses as well as verbal duels are drawn into the flow of statements that deal with a controversial subject. A politician’s speech broadcast by the media can solicit an antagonistic opinion piece, discussed in turn in many blogs or debated in a discussion forum, at the same time that it receives comments on several different television programs. With this profusion, the discourses are not necessarily structured as symmetrical exchanges whereby each intervention reacts to the preceding one. They circulate in parallel, often responding to each other only indirectly, or they cross each other incidentally. By revolving in the public sphere simultaneously, they all nevertheless contribute to constructing a public controversy on a subject of public interest. The main point here is to underline that public controversies are not constructed on the model of a classical dialogue. On the plane of the discourses that circulate in the public sphere (the plane of enunciation where the actors make themselves heard concretely), we find an incessant and somewhat anarchic dissemination of polemical speech. It requires the intervention of an a posteriori reconstruction in order to clearly divide the multiple and diverse discourses into antagonistic positions where the pros and cons confront each other. Only then can we reconstruct the actantial plane where a virtual dialogue can be put in place between two abstract entities—a Proponent and an Opponent. It is on this plane that two sets of arguments are outlined and solidified, even frozen. As we saw in the case of the burqa, recurring arguments more or less connected to each other thereby constitute an arsenal from which all of those who claim to defend the same cause draw upon. These argument blocks configure and sum up a structural opposition. The fact that the pattern of public controversy is not that of dialogue is not without its consequences. All the more so since we are accustomed to measuring all communicational success in terms of an ideal of dialogue, that is to say, to consider that the inability to come to an agreement with the other through a reasoned exchange constitutes a failure. What happens when the dialogue transforms itself into a myriad of polylogues and when the regulated interaction becomes an incessant and sometimes © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_5

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somewhat erratic circulation of discourses in the public sphere? In such a case, it seems fairly inappropriate to see the criteria for success in mutual persuasion and ethical discussion. To understand the communicational and social functions of public controversy, we have to start from polyphony—the multiplicity of voices that intervene on a controversial question—and the circulation of discourses –the intersection of discourses in the public arena.

5.1 The Public Controversy on the “Exclusion of Women” In order to explore this question, we will examine a heated public controversy in the media linked—as in the case of the burqa—to the question of the status of women in democratic societies. It is one of the episodes of the discussion on the so-called “exclusion of women” from the public arena that is still stirring people up in Israel today. Here are the main facts. In Israel, on Friday December 2010, a young woman by the name of Tanya Rozenblit got on the 451 bus from Ashdod to Jerusalem, used exclusively by the ultraorthodox, who are called haredim (the God-fearers) in Hebrew. Although this bus is part of the public transportation system, the custom there is to separate the two sexes, the women sit at the back so that the men cannot look at them. Tanya sat at the front of the bus and refused to change places when the passengers asked her to. A scandal followed which the media latched on to and which made a lot of noise in the whole country. The Israeli dailies and media brought the matter to a head in order to attack the ultraorthodox communities’ pretension to enforce their laws in public spaces while flouting the equality of the sexes. There was a public outcry and numerous polemical discourses made themselves heard against obligating women to sit separately at the back of buses, but also, more generally, against the exclusion of women from public spaces in Haredi circles and against the attempt of these same circles to impose their practices in the country. The ultraorthodox counterattacked, denouncing (among other things) a gross misunderstanding of their culture, a violation of the liberties of minorities, and a crusade launched against them in bad faith. This much discussed episode remained in the headlines because of the events that prolonged it, amplifying public feeling and relaunching the debate: a similar incident on 12/22/2011 with a female combat soldier in a well-known unit, Karakal, which aims to integrate the wearing of arms among men and women equally; the refusal of the ultraorthodox in uniform to listen to women sing in the army; insults aimed at a little 8 year-old girl, Naama Marguiles, whose clothing was judged not modest enough in the city of Beit Shemesh, where on 12/27/2011 a protest took place under the slogan: “we are not Teheran!” It is therefore in the general context of the month of December 2011 (12/16–30/2011) that we should examine the episode involving Tanya Rosenblit, who was transformed into a symbol of resistance against religious fanaticism.

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5.2 The Formula as the Focus of Public Controversy Several remarks are necessary at the outset. First, we must emphasize the centrality of the formula the “exclusion of women” in this public controversy. The moral panic and the aggressive attacks that the Tanya Rosenblit episode launched are indeed favored by the putting into circulation and the success of an expression that soon became a formula. Here we understand “formula” in the sense of “a set of formulations which, given their use at a given time and in a given public space, crystalize political and social stakes that these expressions contribute at the same time to constructing.” (Krieg-Planque, 2009, p. 7). Expressions taken in their frozen form like “ethnic cleansing” or “sustainable development” thus become a prerequisite for any discussion of the specific problem they refer to. In this instance, “the exclusion of women” in Hebrew refers to diverse attempts to remove women from the public arena or to assign them an inferior place in this same space. Taken pejoratively, the formula invaded the public discourse in order to designate an intolerable phenomenon against which a mobilization was required. A vague notion like all formulas, “the exclusion of women” has been invested with diverse meanings and interpreted according to the goals of the speakers, not without becoming the object of metalinguistic debates. In the case of the bus, the women are excluded from the front of the vehicle, which is reserved for the male travelers—that is to say, they are prevented from occupying a seat beside the men in a space pertaining to public transportation and are thus considered unequal to men. This exclusion is interpreted by the secular public as segregation. It is linked to the rejection of women from the public and political arena as a result of a religious ideology that commands keeping them in the familial and private sphere. Exclusion and segregation or discrimination often appear to be interchangeable. In Israel Hayom (12/19/2011) we read in the letters to the editor: “The exclusion of women: oppression and discrimination.1 ” Mayan Gerber, who leads on matters of human rights and gender equality at the Union of Israeli Students, underlines: “It is not exclusion, it is discrimination on the basis of sex and gender and the oppression of women.” The term “discrimination” is often used in official discourse. The chief rabbi of the army (Tzahal), in his letter to the soldiers (Israel Hayom 12/30/2011, p. 3), thus declares that discrimination against women is contrary to the values of Tzahal; in his view, “the Jewish religious tradition does not authorize under any circumstance discrimination or harm against women, whatever the circumstances or the basis.” And he concludes: we must prevent the spread of “extremist and false ideas which serve as a backdrop for the discrimination of women in Israeli society.” Segregating women and chasing them out of the public arena, is therefore contravening the principle of equality and thus individual rights. This definition of the exclusion of women, and its application to different cases, was challenged by the defenders of ultraorthodox morals. Sivan Rahav-Meir, a journalist for the channel 2 televised news program, warns: “confusion reigns: we call everything and anything the ‘exclusion of women.’” In the ultraorthodox discourse, the formula is always mentioned with quotation marks that relate it to a verbal 1

All of the quotations originally in Hebrew are translated by the author and the translator.

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source that should be kept at a distance, or revisited: “the object of the so-called ‘exclusion of women’ (Hamodia, 12/16/2011), “what the media calls the ‘exclusion of women.’ (Ibid.) Hamodia (12/19/2011) speaks of the campaign launched “under the code name ‘the exclusion of women.’” On 12/23/2011, we can read about “a venomous attack” launched against the ultraorthodox called haredim, “under the title, invented by whomever invented it, of ‘exclusion of women.’” And the author clarifies: our adversaries are using our ideas to serve their own interests by falsifying them and giving them the opposite meaning. In another article in the same newspaper, 12/25/2011, it is said that “the notion of ‘the exclusion of women’ did not suddenly appear from the pen of a talented journalist”: it is the result of a malicious program. Still in quotation marks, the exclusion of women is the object of ironic commentaries: “The entire state is engaged in a fateful campaign concerning the ‘exclusion of women.’” (Hamodia, 12/29/2011). The formula itself is thus the object of a public controversy that can be found at the heart of a global debate on women and the ultraorthodox, which it contributes to launching and to sustaining. For their part the haredim use the term the “separation of the sexes,” which has nothing to do with segregation. It is not in their eyes a matter of discrimination: it is a rejection of comingling prohibited by religious practice in order to respect the rules of modesty and decency. In other words, it does not express lack of respect towards women, on the contrary. Emilie Amaroussi thus protests in Israel Hayom (12/23/2011): “The ultraorthodox system has created a world apart for women, but it does not necessarily follow that it affects their value. There is a separation, it may not be to your taste, but it is not exclusion.” The orthodox underline that women are the object of genuine veneration in the Jewish religion. A pun on the formula, which operates a witty deconstruction, is used as a weapon in the verbal battle. The exclusion of women is called hadarat nashim in Hebrew, it was retranslated as haadarat nashim which means “the glorification of women.” The place assigned to women in the public sphere is a means of protecting their modesty which goes together with the elevated status granted to their sex in Judaism and the immense respect with which they are graced. This play on words emphasizes the rejection of the formula that sparked so much emotion and the reframing of the question from a totally different cultural perspective. At the same time, this “misunderstanding” about the formula exposes the incompatible premises on which the antagonistic rationales are based.

5.3 Public Controversy in a Divided Press The two remarks that follow concern the media. One may notice that the first public controversy under discussion emerged following a minor incident. It is related to a quarrel about public transportation whose importance can seem disproportionate to the extent of the heated debate that followed it. The thing may seem even more astounding since the so-called mehadrin bus lines (which strictly follow the religious law) frequented by the ultraorthodox have been commonplace for a long time, and

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were even the subject of a legal debate at the beginning of the year 2011. On January 6, 2011 the supreme court had in fact accepted that in the buses frequented by the ultraorthodox, their morals would be respected by a voluntary separation of the sexes, specifying however that this provision could not be the object of any constraint and that these bus lines did not constitute a legal exception to the rule of public transportation. A compromise seemed to have been put in place, which legalized a religious practice by imposing certain limits on it. It was supposed to put an end to any further discussion. Nevertheless, a controversy erupted, despite the fact that the affair seemed to be dealt with, and even though what happened on the 451 line was a matter of routine: nothing new under the Israeli sun. It is thus clear that it was the media and the way they portrayed the incident that attracted attention and sparked emotion. The general press, written and electronic, which we will explore here, does indeed give a voice to Tanya who tells the story of her altercation in the bus and her obstinate resistance to protest against a state of affairs judged to be intolerable and revolting. The young student’s narrative is dramatized by its placement—first page, photos, a headline such as “A courageous woman against dozens of ultraorthodox in a bus—‘They will not dictate where I sit.’” (Yediot Aharonot, 12/18/2011) The media propose a framing of the incident where the assignment of roles is clear—on the one hand, the young heroine who braves the enemy alone, on the other, the hordes of ultraorthodox men who aggress her and against whom she has to stand up. We are witnessing a battle between a woman who is fighting for her dignity and religious obscurantists who want to trample her underfoot. The media thus get a “scoop” by creating a general state of moral panic about a phenomenon that is in fact a well anchored tradition, tolerated by the courts of the land. In their view, the narrated incident is the paradigm of the control that the retrograde forces of fundamentalism want to implement in a democratic and progressive country. The spotlight turned, the same month, on other manifestations of this same hold, clarified the ultraorthodox aim. Finally, we can see that the raging debate on the exclusion of women following the incident on the so-called mehadrin bus took place in two presses that have no or little contact between each other: the media addressed to the general public, which launched the public controversy against their target, and the media reserved for the ultraorthodox, which in this case counter-attacked. The haredim can be distinguished from other religious, even orthodox Jews, by their will to maintain very strict practices and customs, including dress. They fiercely defend themselves against modernity by grouping into neighborhoods they seek to reserve for themselves and by maintaining a clear separation from other Jewish and non-Jewish populations. They thus constitute a minority voluntarily isolated from the general culture. Entrenched in their ways, they do not read the newspapers of the general Israeli press, whatever their tendencies, and do not watch television (we do not find televisions in their homes). Nevertheless, the spiritual leaders of various ultraorthodox streams very soon (as early at the last third of the nineteenth century) acquiesced to the necessity of providing an autonomous press, cut off from the rest of the Jewish press, whether religious or secular, for the communities that they wanted to protect. From a pragmatic perspective, and despite their reticence, they decided

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to fight against modernity with its own instruments. It therefore became essential to have an alternative press adapted to the needs of its audience and destined to keep it away from the non-ultraorthodox discourse, susceptible of confronting people with values judged to be dangerous. While there is an extensive ultraorthodox press, including weeklies and monthlies, we will focus here on two dailies that at the time occupied the top of the ladder in this community. The first is Hamodia, founded in 1950 by the ultraorthodox political party Agudath Israel (The Union of Israel, which later became Yahadut Hatorah— The Judaism of the Torah). The second influential daily that is under discussion here is Yated Ne’eman founded in 1985 following an internal split in this same movement. Like all of the others, these newspapers are under the authority of the rabbis and not of specialists in the media. They are edited by men, and when female journalists are featured their first names do not appear; no visual representation of women is authorized either. The information and the subjects addressed censor anything that could offend the public’s sensibility or change their values. They avoid spreading on anything relating to crime, drugs, sex, fashion, sports, etc. The propagation of a religious ideology that ought to be defended takes precedence over the duty to provide information: it as an openly partisan press. It does not hesitate to denounce with virulence all the opinions and the behaviors it condemns. At the same time, it attempts to correct the negative image that other media broadcast of the haredi community or of its individual members. Yated N e’eman mentioned this aim explicitly in 1997 when it wrote that by dint of denigrating him, journalists have blacked the name of the “true Jew.” They made him into a menacing and frightening figure, so much so that it is necessary to answer back and to give readers means to defend themselves (“Know what to say to a heretic:”) Elsewhere, the ultraorthodox newspapers go more than once after what the general press, secular and Zionist, reports, even if the latter does not directly reach the knowledge of the haredi readership which does not consult it. It is therefore through words of protest that the latter have access to what is being debated in the public sphere beyond their community. In this sense, the ultraorthodox press, which seeks to remain a protected island sheltered from the assaults of modernity, constitutes a counter-discourse. If ultraorthodox newspapers do not generally have electronic versions, we should nonetheless mention two sites, Be-hadrei-Haredim and Kikar Hashabat, which put articles that appeared in the ultraorthodox press online and which also feature discussion forums. The religious authorities, who succeeded in banning television, have apparently not been able to raise the same barriers against computers. The Internet is consulted by the ultraorthodox population, however with limited access, which keeps it sheltered from everything that is not authorized (among other things images of women). Given the current state of affairs, we can therefore start with two observations: the first is that the ultraorthodox public voluntarily ignores the general media. Its members confine themselves to their own press, possibly accompanied by Internet sites with limited access. In return, this sectoral press is obviously not read by the general Israeli population. The public opinion and the discourse of ultraorthodox populations, on the one hand, and of secular or moderate religious populations on

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the other, therefore draw from different sources. This state of affairs runs the risk of forming a real separation wall between the two reading publics. The second observation is that the barrier that separates the minority and majority media is not completely sealed. Mainstream newspapers such as the “intellectual” left-wing newspaper Haaretz, the free, government controlled right-wing newspaper Israel Hayom, and the most widely read newspaper Yediot Aharonot, do not avoid citing what is published in the ultraorthodox pages when the subject matter requires it, even if the latter do not constitute an important source for them. Israel Hayom has furthermore welcomed articles in defense of the ultraorthodox community written by its members beside diatribes against the exclusion of women. As a result, ultraorthodox voices have made themselves heard in the public arena. For their part, the newspapers that are intended for the ultraorthodox and are supposed to protect them from the secular world fulfill their vocation by relating information issued from this same world, in order to comment on, refute, and/or discredit the antagonistic discourse. As a counter-discourse, the ultra-orthodox press has to make other voices heard. Even if they are the object of virulent attacks, they are nonetheless brought to the attention of the readership. To this we can add the meeting points provided by the Internet with its sites, discussion forums, and its blogs. Here we find debates between Internet users that come from universes totally foreign to one another, thereby launching in the virtual world an agonic debate that cannot be fully deployed in the real world. In this particular media framework, how is the public controversy around the exclusion of women unleashed? And what purpose is served by a debate about an episode such as that of Tanya Rosenblit, which is blown out of proportion by the media in search of strong emotions, and which does not give way to a direct interaction between the opposing parties that would likely bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict? In order to answer these questions, we will examine the way that the public controversy was orchestrated in the two camps: we will try to grasp it in the circulation of discourses as it appears in each of the two spheres concerned (that of the secular and religious majority, and that of the ultraorthodox minority) before raising questions about their possible intersection.

5.4 The Public Controversy Against the Ultraorthodox: Rallying in the Fight Let us first address the general media who launched the public controversy. If the polemics was stormy, it is clearly because it calls into question a problem of identity linked to fundamental values. The real question is not whether Tanya Rosenblit should sit in the front or in the back of a bus frequented by the ultraorthodox; rather it is the place of religious law and of the law, in a country which, since its creation in 1948, did not adopt a constitution, did not establish separation of church and state, and which is subject to a political system of coalitions where the small ultraorthodox parties have

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always managed to impose their conditions (at the very time of the polemics, the party Yahadut Hatorah was a member of the right wing coalition in power under the leadership of Prime Minister Netanyahu). Can Israel, which defines itself as a “Jewish and democratic state,” maintain the democratic values it claims about itself and of which the equality of the sexes is an integral part? Or is it moving little by little towards a theocracy where religious law, which tramples on the rights of women, rules in all its rigor? Like in France where the wearing of the burqa constitutes a warning signal more than it designates the crux of the matter, the attribution to women of a particular place in public transportation attracts attention to the existence of a minority—the ultraorthodox—who do not respect common rules. Hence the question of whether one can allow forms of fundamentalism that threaten to contaminate the tolerant and pluralistic nature of a modern Western republic. But, also, of whether a Jewish state can prevent the respect due to the customs and traditions of ultraorthodox Jewish populations. These questions relate, as we shall see, to fundamental problems that touch both the place of women in Israeli democracy and the problematic integration of a minority that refuses to respect the principles and rules of law enacted for all. The public controversy in the media does not however intend to tackle these questions and probe their complexity. By exacerbating the formulations and by polarizing positions, it means to voice a denunciation. Revealing the seriousness of the facts, the general press reports on them in the mode of a scandal and with indignation. The voices it orchestrates rally around a same cause and participate in a common struggle: to defend a progressive and democratic way of life. They attack a wrongdoing (Garand, 1998) that endangers sacred values, in an attempt to prevail over the adversary rather than to convince him (a clearly impossible mission). The dichotomization is total, the polarization powerful; and indeed, the threat that the stance of the other is supposed to pose hardly leaves any room for indifference or neutrality. That is to say that the polemicists are not looking for a reasoned debate in which each participant is supposed to respect the other’s point of view: they aim at a target. The polemical discourse, which discredits and attacks the adversary thus permits constructing, against him, a collective identity around a common demand. The different articles that the press broadcasts are mono-managed polemical discourses where the voice of the journalist joins that of the actors he stages in order to attack the scandalous behaviors of the ultraorthodox. They operate by mobilizing different discursive and rhetorical procedures that all display the subjectivity of the speakers in the text and give it a clear argumentative range. Axiological terms abound and the conflicting stances are clearly presented both in the information articles and in the opinion pieces. Thus, in Haaretz, a so-called information article that reports on the incident begins with: “another example of discrimination against women: ultraorthodox insulted a woman sitting in the front of the bus….” (Revital Blumfeld, 12/18/2011). The ultraorthodox discourse can be summarized by “insults,” i.e. verbal violence, and is qualified as discriminatory: the particular case is presented as an example among others, denouncing a permanent state of affairs. The framing and the marks of subjectivity in the discourse express a clear condemnation of the representatives of the Opponent, whose speech and behaviors are openly disqualified even in the supposedly neutral discourse of information.

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The reverse of the opprobrium poured on the adversary is the glorification of the young woman around whom the representatives of the Proponent rally. To achieve that goal, the rhetorical example (or exemplum) is exploited in the sense of a historical precedent and an exemplary figure. Tanya Rosenblit, who is presented as the person who did not bow to the pressure exerted on her, is compared to Rosa Parks, the black heroine of the rights of Afro-Americans in the United States. “Despite all the differences’ we read in an editorial in Haaretz: It is difficult not to make the connection between Tanya Rosenblit, the brave traveler who got onto the bus going from Ashdod to Jerusalem and who refused to sit on the back seat, and the black women who fought for human rights, Rosa Louisa Parks. Parks got in December 1955 in a bus in the American city of Montgomery, and in spite of the racist policy of segregation in place, refused to give up her seat to a white man. (Haaretz, 12/19/2011)

The editorial reminds the reader that this gesture and the subsequent condemnation of Parks in court gave rise to a boycott of public transportation led by Martin Luther King that resulted in the abolition of the separation between Whites and Blacks in the buses and in a judgement stipulating that it was racial discrimination and therefore contrary to the American Constitution. The exemplum rapidly made its way in the interdiscourse. In Yediot Aharonot, a renowned journalist, Yaron London, took up the comparison by adding a detail that does not reflect favorably on Israel: in the Unites States, the episode testifies to a progress in the defense of human rights, in Israel it points to a regression. An article in a blog signed by Hadas Bashan also compares the two spontaneous reactions of resistance of the two women, noting however that in Israel it is not a matter of a struggle between the dominated and the dominating: Tanya is not an oppressed race, but a full member of a secular majority that an ultraorthodox minority tries to bend to its laws. We see that the variations on the analogy between Parks and Rosenblit do more than lionize the young Israeli. They point to two important elements: when it is interpreted as an act of segregation against human rights, the refusal to give up her seat is an act of resistance; when the differences at the heart of the analogy are underlined, the dissimilarity in relation to the American model serves to emphasize the seriousness of the Israeli situation. The exemplum appears therefore both as a historical precedent that was followed to good effect, and as a frame that allows for the deciphering of a sad reality. At the same time, it is the gesture of refusal itself that becomes exemplary and is given as a model to be followed. Tanya becomes, for better or worse, a symbol (she herself says she is not happy about it, because it depersonalizes her, but she accepts the role). “Even if she did not have the intention of becoming a symbol through her actions, there is no doubt that her determination symbolizes our shared need, in our concern about the future of Israel, to fight and not to give in,” declared the leader of the opposition Tzipi Livni. The courageous gesture of the young woman is presented as a behavior that must be repeated in order to be at the start of a true change in Israeli society (as in the case of Rosa Parks). The editorial of Haaretz considers that Tanya initiated a civilian struggle that “from now on is essential to conduct day by day and hour after hour on all the lines where the Egged bus company recognizes that the obligation of a separation between men and women has recently spread.”

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“We are all Rosa Parks, Join the struggle,” Alex du Carmel writes in a forum of Haaretz (12/11/11, 19: 36). Suggestions in this vein are made on social media—thus an Internet user urges people on Facebook to come in groups on 1/1/2012, in order that men and women should get on the bus together and sit beside one another on the so-called mehadrin lines. Moreover, Yoav Keren, in a 19/12/2011 article of Yediot, gives an additional dimension to Tanya’s exemplary behavior by projecting it on the political plane. He emphasizes that a young woman did indeed make a gesture of resistance that all of the statesmen and Israeli military chiefs never had the courage to do: “she said ‘no’ to the demands of the ultraorthodox.” He hopes that in the special commission that the Knesset named to deal with the exclusion of women, the ministers “will find in Tanya’s attitude some inspiration and will learn civic courage.” Another recurring rhetorical device consists of the recourse to metaphors of light and darkness—an antithesis that exacerbates the opposition between the two camps. The journalist Yaron London therefore paints a picture of desolation: “If light loses against ignorance, if we are condemned to live under the tutelage of the Jewish Muslim Brotherhood, lets separate.” (12/19/2011) Irit Rosenblum compares the exclusion of women to a witch hunt and writes (Israël Hayom, 12/25/2011): “Let’s remember that in the most fundamentalist regimes whose memory comes from the depths of history, it is women who are the first victims in a rotten society.” The metaphors of light and obscurity are translated in terms of civilization and fundamentalism, clearly linking them to the values of democracy, which must be defended. The denunciation of obscurantism and of a regression towards a medieval age constitutes an argument by fear. It is coupled with the argument of the slippery slope— if we let things go now, the phenomenon will develop and spread in different forms. Irit Rosenblum predicts that if legal measures are not taken immediately against the actions of the ultraorthodox, “we will sink into racist, oppressive, and obscurantist extremism.” The analogy with Iran and other fundamentalist Muslim countries is of course on the agenda—as the terrible future in which the rights of women and democracy risk being swallowed up. Lihi Lapid writes in Yediot on 12/27/2011: “Look at our neighbors, see what happened to them over there. There too it started on a small scale, first women were covered up with a veil, then they were locked up in their homes, and now there is nobody left to cry out. That can happen to us too.” “Khan ze Iran: Iran is Here”—a slogan from the Beit Shemesh demonstration against those ultraorthodox who try to make everybody submit to their law—carries out the analogy with a prime example of an oppressive and antidemocratic theocratic regime, to suggest that the Israeli reaction must be immediate and unbending. It should be noted that this analogy is interpreted as fallacious by some, such as the right-wing journalist Boaz Bismuth (Israel Hayom, 12/30/2011), who cries out: “Enough hysteria, this is not Iran.” He accuses the media of projecting through their exaggerations a false image of the country, when all of those who participate in the festive Thursday nights (most Israelis start their week-end on Thursday night and fill up the restaurants and bars) know perfectly well that it is a manufactured reality.

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In any event, we can observe that the discourses that come from all sides in the general (secular) press echo each other and reinforce each other mutually in an orchestration that is not submitted to the rules of a reasoned dialogue with the adversary. By repeating the same theses, they create a united front between ethnic and political groups beyond the multiple disagreements opposing them on burning current issues. The front against the ultraorthodox permits the construction of a utopian unity on fundamental values, the values of democracy, whose hegemony must be assured. The consensual and non-negotiable character of the values in question is confirmed by the intervention of the highest state officials. Their participation officially situates the critics of the exclusion of women on the side of legality and democratic legitimacy. Thus on 21/18/2011, Haaretz runs the headline “Netanyahu: we must safeguard a public arena open to all.” Chief Rabbi Metzger: “it is not a country of the ultraorthodox.” In the body of the article, we read that the head of the Government said before a ministers’ meeting: “I think that we should not under any circumstances authorize marginal groups to undermine our common denominator, and we must guard that the public arena remains open and secure for all of the citizens of Israel.” The Government has furthermore appointed a special parliamentary commission charged with studying the question of the exclusion of women. The military authorities also take part in the debate. They did this among other things on the occasion of the air force ceremony in which five new women pilots are counted. The voices of simple citizens who express themselves in electronic exchanges echo the polemical discourses circulated by the press. Therein the voices in favor of the right of the ultraorthodox to impose their own rules in the buses that serve them are rejected with vehemence. They are often accompanied by personal attacks against the ultraorthodox community. Instances of verbal violence that the official press avoids reign there, as we see in the exchanges of 12/18/2012 in Haaretz: “ Let them sit at the back of the bus themselves, and let them be barred from singing and voting” (and from going to the gym;” (12:13) “They want to be even more pious than their ancestors…” (12:50), “Where is it written in the Bible?” (14:12); “Let’s finally boycott and let’s get buses on Saturdays” (6:52), “I love you and may patriots like you grow and multiply! Come let’s unite.” “This whole story is a question of politics and money. If we unite we will succeed. We will also have buses on Saturdays. For a better future for all of us who are sane in this state!” (14:25). “Haifa is an island of mental health in this country of crazies—secular and religious, Arabs and ultraorthodox coexist there, with public transport on shabbat (Saturday) (proof that if we want to it’s possible.” (7: 30 12/19/2011). The discussion forums lead to a rallying around an indignant attack that takes on a more violent turn than in the official discourse in the media. At the same time, it is interesting to see that they propose a union around subjects that are not directly part of the event discussed. It is not just a matter of letting women sit where they want in the bus; the important thing is to challenge the status quo, which maintains religious requirements in the country, and to fight against decrees like the one that forbids public transportation on Saturday. From this perspective, the public controversy on the Web engenders or brings back polemical debates that go beyond the original

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theme and are not part of the order of the day of politicians and the media. It proposes an alternative agenda by putting on the table problems that have remained without solution up until then.

5.5 Public Controversy as Political Positioning It should be noted that public controversy necessarily gives rise to positionings and that it thereby fulfills a particular function in the political arena. Thus, the leader of the opposition, Tzipi Livni put herself at the head of a candle-light procession organized for December 21, during Hanukah, under the slogan “We come to drive out the darkness.” She gave a very strong speech about civil liberties, representing the liberal political positions of the Kadima party. She also launched a campaign in which signs affixed on the buses proclaimed: “The women of Kadima are restoring Israel’s common sense.” Moreover, a quarrel broke out between Tzipi Livni and Limor Livnat, the Minister of Culture and Sport of Netanyahu’s party, the Likud. Livnat had been fiercely attacked by the leader of the opposition for having said that the separation between the sexes in buses in ultraorthodox neighborhoods should not be opposed by force in order not to collide with the customs of the residents. Livnat reacted by declaring (Israël Hayom, 12/26/2011): “To my great regret, there are members of parliament who have decided to pursue their politics against the government through this issue. Rather than acting together against a despicable phenomenon, the exclusion of women, they cynically exploit the popularity of the issue.” Livnat reminded the readers that the leader of the Government, Benyamin Netanyahu, had spoken up on several occasions, and very strongly, against the exclusion of women from public spaces. Charged with the inter-ministerial commission called to discuss the exclusion of women, Limor Livnat intends to be the spokesperson of all women for the rights of whom she is fighting, as well as the spokeperson of the government she represents in her ministerial functions. The need for a general consensus to lead an effective struggle is an argument which allows her to reinforce her position as well as the position of the party in power, and to sweep away the Opposition where another woman, Tzipi Livni, is trying to usurp her place. It is with this goal in mind that Limor Livnat does not hesitate to join the demonstration of protest initiated by her rival and tries to collect the benefit from it by proclaiming: “Hanukah is the festival of light, but a great darkness is falling over Israel. We will carry the torch of the light of liberalism, of a Jewish and democratic state of Israel where these values live together without opposing each other.” (Haaretz) The citizens are sensitized to the power struggles and mention them. Thus, for example, some of the Internet users in the Haaretz forum on the article dedicated to the subject do not fail to denounce a calculated strategy on the part of the Leader of the Opposition. Without going into the details of the power struggles, we will keep in mind that public controversy and polemics allow for positionings in the political arena that translates into rivalries, and that the question of the exclusion of women provides an opportunity for the Coalition Government and the Opposition to fight against each

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other. The Opposition does so in the name of the defense of the rights of women and of the struggle against obscurantism of which it aspires to appear as the champion; the Government does it in the name of the sacred union of all the democratic forces, a union that would allow it to keep its position of power and maintain its centrality on the political chess board. Within a unified point of view, and even though they are incarnating the same actant, the political actors try to make their own voice dominate and to gain the advantage. To sum up, we can say that in the general press, we find polemicists who dramatize and dichotomize the opposition between the values of the ultraorthodox and those of the rest of the Jewish and non-Jewish population through an entire arsenal of rhetorical devices such as metaphors or antitheses, and of arguments such as the exemplum or the scare tactic or the slippery slope. The highlighting of a striking formula—the “exclusion of women”—becomes the banner of the struggle against the constraints exercised by the ultraorthodox. To the extent that the defense of the fundamental values of democracy is very greatly shared, the public controversy allows for the rallying together of ideologically, politically, and religiously divergent voices to proclaim a unity often cruelly lacking. The protest against a vision perceived to be fundamentalist, is accompanied by political demands and eventually turns into activism (street demonstrations, protest actions….). From this perspective, public controversy as a polemical confrontation, with its virulence and its excesses, is not a form of negotiating differences; it is a verbal struggle. We are far from the ideal of dialogue in the quest for solution between two opposing parties.

5.6 Public Controversy in Ultra-Orthodox Media In the other camp, the ultraorthodox also deploy a discourse based on multiple monomanaged articles which combine to discredit an adversary that it does not really address. This mission is achieved in their press, the only one that the Haredim read: we will take as examples Hamodia and in Yated Ne’eman introduced above. All of the discourses that resonate and saturate the sphere of ultraorthodox opinion firmly steer the ways of thinking of its readership that, according to its leaders, is supposed to be guided as much as informed. The journal fulfills a pedagogical function by basing itself on the authority of the writer and of the speakers whose ideas he reports (among which we find many rabbis). First of all, the polemical attacks deal with the facts, namely with the narrative of the episode of the bus. The media are accused of broadcasting lies with total contempt for journalistic ethics: “because they are not looking for the truth. The truth, as we said, they know it, but their job is not to divulge it. Not at all. It is rather to incite hatred….” (Hamodia, 12/19/2011). Tanya Rosenblit’s behavior is depicted as a provocation, pure and simple. An eye witness said he politely asked the young woman to respect the customs adopted in place, in response to which she began to sing (the ultraorthodox are not allowed to hear women’s singing) and threatened to undress. The student is depicted as a provocateur who came with the firm intention of

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making a scene on the line where at all other times things run peacefully and without problems. The version of the story as one of lies and provocation aiming to discredit a peaceful population who in no way harms the public, is repeated in the forums of Hadrei Haredim. Numerous Internet users generously insult the young woman: “a brazen liar and provocateur,” “I was there. She is a liar, a wanton provocateur.” (12/18/2011, 23: 37) “That Tanya is not an innocent lamb, she is a little viper who did everything to make headlines […].” (12/18/2011, 20: 03). A call is then initiated by rabbis and the journalists to ask the population to continue to strictly enforce the separation of the sexes in the buses, but not to react to provocateurs who wait for every opportunity to drive the passengers crazy and show them in a negative light. The warning is repeated several times: “Particular attention must be paid not to be taken in by provocateurs who will surely show up in this period.” (Hamodia, 12/19/2011), “The public must ignore deliberate provocations and not provide to people full of hatred anything that will add to the flare up,” the rabbinical commission in charge of transportation declares. In the article entitled “Don’t get dragged into their provocations” (Hamodia, 12/25/2011) it is said that foolishness never places itself at the service of justice, and that one must take heed not to fall into the traps set for the naive. The provocateurs are indeed trying to push the buttons of the ultraorthodox to make the headlines in newspapers; it is thus doing them a favor to let oneself go in violent protests. Expressing orally one’s fury and indignation, making large gestures, is to deliver oneself to the cameras of the provocateurs who thereby attain their goal. Faced with an adversary dedicated to lying and malice, it is important not to argue—it should not be forgotten, the newspapers remind their readers, that any word that escapes the mouths of the ultraorthodox can be used against the community as a whole. The instructions given to the readers by this somewhat paternalistic press ask them not to react until the storm has passed and attention is turned elsewhere. It is therefore not a matter of engaging in dialogue, but of holding tight. Silent resistance is the watchword. Only the authorized voices of the press are entitled to answer the attacks and to delve into the public controversy. They mainly put forward the argument that in a space occupied by a religious minority that has its customs and mores, these must be respected. The Internet users follow in their footsteps. One of them suggests that courtesy consists in respecting one another and the customs of the place where a person finds himself. (Hadrei Haredim, 12/18/2011, 14: 14). Israel Cohen, in a newspaper article, insists on the fact that the issue concerns buses that go from one ultraorthodox neighborhood to another, frequented almost exclusively by the ultraorthodox; therefore it is not a matter of a public space open to all, but of a space reserved for ultraorthodox users, which it serves almost exclusively. These users have a right, like all citizens, to public services adapted to their needs, and the argument according to which the ultraorthodox simply have to abstain from taking the bus if the internal rules do not suit them, denies them this right—especially as most of them are poor and therefore make use of public transportation (Egged) massively. It should be noted that these remarks reinforce the idea of a sectoral national space, where diverse communities must be able to live without stepping on their respective territories, and in mutual respect of the particular law that prevails in a

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given community space. This position opposes the notion of an open public space where the laws that ensure the democratic character of the state reign unanimously. Henceforth, the disagreement is not only about the formula “the exclusion of women,” but also on the definition of public space in a democratic regime. Another argument concerns the “natural character” of the separation of the sexes, which according to the ultraorthodox should be recognized by any person with common sense. It is declined in recurring and often ironic analogies, like the one of public toilets. Thus, a post notes: “Should we also fight against the separation of the sexes in public bathrooms.” (Haaretz, Zeev, 12/18/2011, 9: 30). In Yated Ne’eman, a journalist, Israel Wertzel making fun of Hillary Clinton who publicly protested the exclusion of women in Israel, goes as far as writing that even the Nazis knew that the separation of the sexes was natural since they set the men and the women apart in the gas chambers. This comparison implies that those who do not understand the necessity of the separation of the sexes are worse than the Nazis … An analogy that did not fail to unleash indignation. On the whole, the defense of the ultraorthodox consists of projecting the image of a harmonious and peaceful community concentrated in its own neighborhoods and which, far from stifling women, allows them on the contrary to live a dignified life, surrounded by respect. The desire to follow the rules of modesty and decency is complete and voluntary. The newspapers fulfill here one of their self-proclaimed objectives: to correct the falsified representations that (according to its authors) are circulated of a community closed in on itself and unfairly depicted as negative and threatening. The voices of ultraorthodox women also make themselves heard on this subject, though in a very parsimonious way, since they do not have as a primary task expressing themselves publicly. Nonetheless, they turned to the Minister of Transportation in a public letter saying: Your “concern” strengthens the extremists and harms us… We have an elevated status and live in an atmosphere of affection, and all that emerges from the media undertaking of these last weeks distorts the image of the true existence that we live…. We can no longer remain silent faced with this campaign of defamation against the ultraorthodox sector, which is the result of ignorance and misunderstanding (Israël Hayom, 12/21/2011).

Through this type of text, the ultraorthodox community seeks to project to the outside, as well as to the inside, a positive collective ethos that refutes the defamatory accusations launched against it. It also does it by inversing roles; presenting themselves not as oppressors, wishing to impose their laws on everyone, but as misunderstood and persecuted victims. Far from being a threat to civil society, they are themselves under threat. “When we see,” we read in Hamodia (12/23/2011), “that everyone turns away from the actual threats that weigh on the country in order to focus on this illusory threat out of sheer hatred for the haredim, we feel strongly the extent to which we are becoming the target of a genuine threat…” The rhetoric of the haredim resorts to retorsion, namely taking the adversary’s arguments in order to inverse them and to turn them against him. Thus, it is not women who are oppressed by the ultraorthodox but the ultraorthodox themselves who are bullied by secular people: their traditional way of life, founded on the respect for divine law, the precepts of

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the Torah, and modesty, is being attacked. The humiliation suffered by the women obliged to stay at the back of the bus becomes the humiliation that secular people inflict upon the ultraorthodox community: the signs posted on the public vehicles are intended to “humiliate” “the haredi woman who puts modesty at the top of her values in all conscience and of her own accord.” (Hamodia, 12/25/2011). The opposition between enlightenment and obscurantism is taken up again in another register and inverted: it is the Torah’s light casts aside the darkness of secular life. (Hamodia, 23.12.2011). Moreover, the version of the story given by secular people is derided: it is a matter of “repulsive paternalism (only an enlightened secular woman would know what is suitable for an obscurantist haredi woman),” wrote Emilie Amroussi in Israel Hayom. (12/23/2011). Finally, and symptomatically, the formula “religious coercion” which is generally used in Israel to refer to the forced imposition of religious laws to the whole of the population is turned on its head to become “secular coercion.” The new formula circulates and establishes itself, at least in part, in the public sphere. Boaz Bismuth (Israël Hayom, 12/30/2011) uses the two expressions in the same breath: “live and let live, it is the only means to live in this country. Without religious coercion but also without secular coercion.” A column by Israel Cohen in Mako, the Internet version of the mainstream Maariv, brandished in turn the expression “secular coercion.” “Stop secular coercion,” writes in the discussion forum of Haaretz Itai, “a religious person who takes things to heart.” (12/15/2011) I have the right to sit where I want,” writes an Internet user who signs off as “Jewess,” and “I want to sit according to the rules of modesty!!!!!” [Hadrei Haredim, 12/19/2011, 8: 50] “It is time to tell them: enough. Stop with the secular coercion.” (Hamodia, 12/27/2011). Consequently, it is the argument of religious freedom and the liberty of minorities that is emphasized: “The ultraorthodox are also a minority that should be taken into consideration.” (Haaretz, 12/14/2011, 19: 26, p. 5) However some try to impose on the ultraorthodox population a lifestyle that is opposite to their vision of the world. (Hamodia, 12/19/2011). And, more strongly, Hamodia writes: Shamelessly they fight by using secular coercion, against our right to maintain the prescriptions of Jewish religious law, which is totally antidemocratic and reminds us of obscurantist regimes who trampled the rights of their citizens under foot under well-known virtuous pretexts …This is a radicalization and a coercion exercised by an extremist secular minority with a lot of money from foreign countries and with the support of hostile media working together to exclude and to violate the honor of ultraorthodox women and to discriminate against ultraorthodox society as a whole. (12/18/2020)

The “coercion exercised by an extremist secular minority constitutes a grave danger to democracy” which should worry all citizens in the country. (Hamodia, 12/18/2011) Moreover the ultraorthodox journalists emphasize the fact that the separation of the sexes is legal, since it was approved by the Israeli courts on the condition of not being imposed by force—“this order is the result of women who demand to protect their honor in public transportation, of their own initiative without constraints.” (Yated Ne’eman, 12/30/2011). Therefore, it is the Opponents of the socalled exclusion who are not on the side of the law and do not respect the decisions of the courts regulating life in a democracy. Clearly, and according to a tested recipe,

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democratic values are turned against secular people who claim to defend them. It is they who are discredited for their intolerance, their disdain for mores that do not correspond to their own, their refusal to grant rights to minorities, and their disdain for the law. On the whole, the media hype about the exclusion of women is interpreted by the Opponent as an attempt to attack the entire ultraorthodox community. This opinion is reverberated as far as the secular press: in Emilie Amaroussi’s column we read: “Those who speak of the ‘exclusion of women’ want to say we can’t stand the ultraorthodox…[…] It is not a matter of the exclusion of women, but of the exclusion of the ultraorthodox (Israël Hayom, 12/23/2011).” One will have noticed the expression “the exclusion of the ultraorthodox,” which takes up and inverts the formula “the exclusion of women.” This phrase is found in several instances penned by journalists. It is in their view a genuine attempt at delegitimization: what the foreign media do to Israel is of the same order as what “the Israeli media do to the ultraorthodox community.” The foundations that are said to subsidize the leftist political parties in order to bring the government down are also accused of striving to delegitimize the ultraorthodox in order to make believe that they are a threat on the existence of the State of Israel (Hamodia, 12/23/2011). The use of the term “delegitimization” refers in Hebrew to the formula “the delegitimization of Israel,” attributed to hostile forces that want to erase the State of Israel from the map. It establishes a pregnant analogy between the ultraorthodox and Israel, on the one hand, and the powers that try to eradicate the state of Israel and those who go after the haredim, on the other. As in the case of the State of Israel, the enemy tries to deprive the ultraorthodox of their right to be what they are in an attempt to destroy them. Hamodia goes further and compares what actually happens in Israel to well-known manifestations of antisemitism. “The very serious incitement of hatred against the ultraorthodox is similar to the declarations of the great anti-Semites of the Diaspora.” (Hamodia, 12/29/2011) “Some of the articles and of the information broadcast in the Israeli media yesterday would surely have generated the reaction of ‘incitement to anti-Semitism’ if they have been written against the Jews in foreign countries.” (Hamodia, 12/19/2011). It is hardly surprising then that the term most often used by the ultraorthodox media is that of the incitement to hatred, or of the attempt to turn a populace against individuals or groups. The term is matched with carefully chosen axiological words: “The incitement to savage and unbridled hatred against the ultraorthodox population continues.” (Yated N e’eman, 12/26/2011) “The days of media incitement to hatred are frightful days,” we read in Hamodia (12/19/2011) “There is an attempt at reinforcing the hatred and hostility towards the ultraorthodox Jew.” (Hamodia, 12/23/2011) The main culprit targeted is the press, “the national instigator” (which is the title of a Hamodia article from December 19), whose profession is to play people off against each other and who, in its laziness and futility, thinks only of finding sensational information that makes headlines. Different reasons are given for the persecution of the ultraorthodox. Some are of a moral nature—the panic triggered by the growing rallying of citizens to their community, the jealousy caused by their harmonious way of life. Others emphasize the theme of conspiracy: the present events did not arise spontaneously, they were

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carefully programmed by hostile groups. “The war against the ‘exclusion of women’ did not arise by itself one night […] It is a process that was carefully planned.” (Hamodia, 12/25/2011) It is therefore not by chance that Tanya got into this bus, nor that the media made such a fuss about the incident: there are hidden enemies at the source of this campaign, grants are given from foreign countries to sustain the movement and to harm the ultraorthodox. “This is a time when fringe elements funded by foundations from the extreme left create incitement to hatred and provocation and try to harm the holy enterprise of the blessed mehadrin lines.” (Hamodia, 12/18/2011) It is reported that “interested parties” stir up hostility towards the latter with “hypocritical and well-orchestrated propaganda.” Yated Ne’eman, 12/26/2011) In short, so-called leftist groups are targeted with these denunciations of conspiracies. We enter here into reasons of a political nature that are asserted to explain an unjustified attitude towards the ultraorthodox. The question of power games becomes an argument in the hands of the Opponent. Certain voices present the entire affair as an opposition maneuver against the current government. Thus, Uri Makley, a deputy in the ultraorthodox party “Torah Judaism” that participates in the ruling coalition, declared: The interest shown in the exclusion of women is political and is destined to harm the Government… When the right is in power with the ultraorthodox there are always affairs of this kind. It is one more battle among numerous others that the opposition is leading in order to strike the Prime Minister through the intermediary of the ultraorthodox. (Israël Hayom, 12/27/2011)

This position can be found in Hamodia (12/19/2011): “It is not impossible that [this orchestration] derives from the political goal of the responsible parties, who work with the greatest energy to bring down the current government.” He cites the high-profile parliamentarian Gafni: “the leader of the Government is falling into the trap set by the media.” (Yated Ne’eman, 12/25/2011). The proof is its intervention in the Knesset on the exclusion of women—because if the facts had been true, notes an open letter from the parliamentarians of the party Yahadut HaTorah (Torah Judaism) to the head of state, would it have been necessary to react with such gusto to a completely isolated case when hundreds of thousands of passengers have been taking these mehadrin buses for twenty years? The suspicious motives of a politician who ensures his popularity at the expense of his allies in the governmental coalition are sometimes denounced with less sensitivity: Prime Minister Netanyahu is accused of sacrificing his allies to the benefit of his electoral popularity. Those who wish to seize the chance to promote their party or to create a window of opportunity are accused of political opportunism. Regarding Kadima, directed at the time by Tzipi Livni, who fought hard against the exclusion of women, a journalist notes that here the old adage is put into practice: “Hit the ultraorthodox and save your party.” (Hamodia, 12/25/2011). Shots are fired at Yair Lapid who relentlessly attacked the ultraorthodox sector on his television program—the journalist seeks to enter into politics in the footsteps of his father Tommy Lapid, known for his militantly secular positions. (Hamodia, 12/26/2011). On the whole we can see that the ultraorthodox counterattack with an orchestration of voices that ally with one another to inverse the script of aggressors and victims,

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and to construct a collective ethos which contradicts in every way the representation developed by the media. The image of an oppressed minority, of a Jewish community persecuted and prevented from practicing its religion, of a group who survives and wins the round through passive and obstinate resistance, reminds us of the diaspora Jew. It simply transposes it to Israel. The polemical response in the press works to reinforce the unity in the ranks of the ultraorthodox by strengthening them in their values, their customs and tradition, and their rights. The discredit heaped on the adversaries—all those who do not participate in the ultraorthodox world and criticize it—contribute to increasing an already existing polarization in a community where separatism is required, and to give it a militant and aggressive turn.

5.7 The Dangers of Polarization At this stage, a few words are necessary about the extreme disqualification and polarization that characterizes the polemics about the exclusion of women in Israel. Here the Other is the representative of absolute evil and therefore should be eradicated—as the metaphor of cancer indicates: “Israel needs an aggressive chemotherapy against the cancer called the exclusion of women.” (Israël Hayom, 12/18/2011, Miki Jessin, director of the association “Free Israel.”) Consequently, the behavior of the ultraorthodox becomes an Evil to be fought, and the gap between the two populations is widened, increasing a polarization in which divisions based on identity are aggravated. Ultimately, the dividing in opposing camps leads to a break. Yaron London speaks explicitly of a separation of populations: “if we are condemned to live under the supervision of the Jewish Muslim Brotherhood lets separate.” (12/19/2020) Ilan Osfeld writes in Israel Hayom on 12/25/2011: “And don’t threaten us with a ‘fratricidal war’: those who behave this way are not my brothers.” The ultraorthodox, as for them, have locked themselves into an extremist separatism which cuts them off totally from the rest of the population of which they claim to be the innocent victims. The gap is unbridgeable. In view of this danger, attempts to attenuate this increasingly exacerbated division have been made. Extreme polarization is replaced by another division that seems less socially dangerous: an enlightened and moderate majority is presented as facing a handful of fanatics who are in no way representative of the ultraorthodox community. If Hamodia and Yated Ne’eman are satisfied with asking everyone to respect the rules of courtesy, which is a biblical virtue, without denouncing the excesses of their own people, other voices nevertheless attribute the offending acts to a tiny minority of fanatics from which the ultraorthodox community wants to disengage itself. By condemning the excesses and the violence of a widely disapproved small minority, this line of defense breaks the community’s isolation, which had hitherto been both desired (the ultraorthodox hold themselves apart voluntarily) and imposed (they claim they are stigmatized). It presents the ultraorthodox community as being an integral part of the people. The real division is between the entirety of the country— including the ultraorthodox—and a dangerous group of extremists against whom

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all must rise up together. That is the line that the deputy Moshe Gafni adopts by asking journalists why they point to him and what he has to do with small marginal yeshivas (centers of Torah and Talmud study) which engage in violence. He mentions that he was himself physically attacked in Mea Shearim (the neighborhood of the ultraorthodox extremists who do not recognize the state of Israel) and adds: “These people, enemies of the state, did they not attack the parliamentary deputy Uri Macley when he came with me […]?,” emphasizing that in his view, the fanatics should be held to account according to the law. These answers are reported on in an article published by Yated Ne’eman under the title of: “What do they want?” with a photo of Gafni. From this perspective, the adversary is blamed for confusing an entire sector of the population with a handful of fanatics. By conflating the extremists with the entire community, he unjustly wrongs the latter: As it often happens with us, the legitimate criticism of marginal brutes who circulate within ultraorthodox society slides into an unjustified and generalized critique of an entire sector of the population. Without more precautions, all of its members have been labelled fundamentalists, primitive, and violent, without a distinction of sects, communities or sex. (Dr. Aviad Ha-cohen, Israël Hayom, 12/28/2011)

We find in Hamodia on 12/29/2011 the same reasoning, which speaks of the thugs who wish to set the law and cause material and psychological damage. Binyamin Hinkis, a writer, also puts forward that we can’t condemn an entire sector of the population because of a small activist minority. We remain within the tone of the polemical attack, but this time to bridge the divide that has widened between the two camps. In the mainstream press as well, there is an attempt to stop a fratricidal war by somewhat modifying the data. It puts forward that the problem is not the entire ultraorthodox population, but the fundamentalists who also terrorize the ultraorthodox themselves. In his speech to the Knesset, the Prime Minister declared that we should not let fringe groups destroy our common ground. Gideon Sa’ar, the Minister of Education, insisted on the fact that the “sicarii”2 (the extremist groups) do not represent the entire ultraorthodox population. The incidents in the small town of Beit Shemesh, where children were exposed to the insults and spitting of the ultraorthodox who live near their school, allowed for the strengthening of this tendency. The secular press let critical voices be heard from religious circles; the qualifier of “extremist” was brandished repeatedly. An observant woman on whom an ultraorthodox man spat wrote thus: “The extremists do not act in the name of the Torah […] What they do is a desecration, and they give to Judaism an image that it never had before.” (Alissa Kolman Yediot Aharonot, 27/12/2011) Still others establish a distinction between the fanatics who allow themselves to occupy the top of the ladder, and the ultraorthodox who suffer from this activist minority but keep quiet because they are afraid. Thus, Yair Lapid, a famous journalist who later moved on to politics and in 2013 became Minister of the Economy, spoke in Yediot Aharonot (12/19/2011) of all 2

A term used to designate a Jewish sect of fanatics who used violence in the period of the struggles against the Romans (cited in Flavius Josephus The Jewish War).

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of the ultraorthodox who understand that those who cross the line cause harm to their community and stigmatize it in the eyes of the whole population. Sane ultraorthodox people, that is to say reasonable ones (“and they are much more numerous than you imagine”), must consequently, according to Lapid, turn against the extremists in their own camp. It is thus in terms of opposition between the moderates on all sides, who are endowed with reason, and the fanatics devoted to the extremes, that the polarization is reformulated in its softened form. Tanya Rosenblit declares this herself: “In my opinion, the best way to treat the problem consists in making the voices of the moderates and rational people heard loud and clear both in the secular camp and in the haredi one. We must all unite against this phenomenon …” (Yediot Aharonot, 12/27/2011). Thus, as soon as the public controversy exacerbates a polarization that holds the threat of an explosion and of an irreparable tear in the social fabric, efforts are made to modify its terms. By bringing together into the same camp all of the moderates capable of agreeing on the reasonable, the management of public controversy attempts to bypass the risk of a total breakdown in national unity and of a subsequent surge in violence. Because, as B. Netanyahu insisted during the Tanya Rosenblit incident, “Israeli society is a complex mosaic of Jews and Arabs, of secular and religion and ultraorthodox, and up until now we have found a mode of peaceful coexistence thanks to a mutual respect of all of the parties of the society […] We must look for that which unites us and allows us to build bridges, and not for what divides and separates us…” It is from this perspective that in Yediot Aharonot (12/27/2011), the ultraorthodox journalist Shoshan Chen published an open letter to her secular sister: I feel that we are running towards a whirlwind which creates a violent atmosphere stopping people from expressing themselves and sterilizing conversations, encouraging censorship. You wage war against me, see me as a threat weighing on your way of life and do not try to understand me and to respect me. So, my sister, let’s restore our common sense and the sharing of words…

This attempt destined to start a dialogue between the parties remains exceptional. It nevertheless marks the awareness of the dangers that an uncontrolled exacerbation of the public controversy poses by showing how it can awaken the desire to reestablish an exchange. It is all the more remarkable that in this instance, the purpose is to establish not an interrupted interaction, but a dialogue, almost non-existent, between secular and ultraorthodox women. It is a reversal of polemical violence, which obviously remains utopian.

5.8 Conclusion The public controversy on the exclusion of women in Israel is deployed in the public sphere through two sets of mono-managed discourses—that of the secular and that of the ultraorthodox. In each case, the speakers primarily address themselves and work to persuade those who think like them. By doing this, each community promotes an identity-based turning inward around the defense of its own values. The actors,

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grouped together in two antagonist parties, proceed in a similar way despite their total disagreement. The same elements are reframed differently, thus receiving opposite meanings, founded on incompatible premises. Thus, some see a necessary and salutary separation of the sexes where others see a discriminatory exclusion of women from the public sphere. Beyond this fundamental lack of understanding, which marks what Angenot (2008) calls a cognitive break, and Fogelin (2005 [1985]) names a deep disagreement, a genuine symmetry is drawn. It is not only that of “interincomprehension” in which Maingueneau (1983) saw the key to public controversy. It is also a similarity of the attitudes in the dual distribution of the roles and the management of the conflict. The reason for this symmetry is mainly that each of the antagonistic parties feels threatened by the other; each one sees in the other a dangerous aggressor (the violence committed against women and secular law in the face of the violence done to the ultraorthodox and minorities). Each one gets involved passionately in a struggle on which the survival of his identity depends—that of a democratic entity participating in a progressive Western culture, or that of a Jewish entity subject to divine law. One group speaks of religious coercion, the others answer with the reverse notion of secular coercion. In short, each party fights verbally against the other in order to maintain its right to live according to its own views in the same State. Polemics thus both feeds off of a similarity, albeit reversed, and, in turn, nourishes it. In both camps, the discourses published in the media overlap, repeat themselves, accumulate, and end up by offering recurring arguments which stabilize into antagonistic sets. An agonic structure is thus drawn, where the reasoning of the Proponent and the Opponent clash. This does not mean that a dialogue takes place: the latter only emerges when the analyst makes the effort to reconstruct it by gathering scattered statements that circulate in the public sphere. When we look at the data, we can see that it is not an exchange of words, a face to face or differed interaction allowing for a rational confrontation of views. The dialogue—if there is any—remains virtual, and as a result, it does not engage the speakers (who are not genuine interlocutors) in a common quest of the reasonable. This is a typical device of the mass media. It is very far from the deliberation where two parties try, in a regulated exchange, to find a solution to a social problem. No doubt the use of polemical discourse, which aims to discredit the adversary and to construct, against him, a collective identity around a common demand, exempts the two parties from engaging in a genuine dialogue. And this, all the more so since in this specific case, we are dealing with groups isolated from one another who do not share the same media. This is indeed an extreme instance in which two presses develop in parallel for two different readerships. This creates a divided public sphere where the points of contact between the two camps are minimal. By filling the entirety of the public sphere, the public controversy, nevertheless, deploys diametrically opposed arguments and positions that allow each party to make its voice heard in an attempt to influence collective decisions and the future of the collective. But there is more: we can see that beyond the discourses addressed to an already persuaded audience, encounters—albeit agonic—are sketched out. Beyond the intrinsic dialogism of all confrontations, we find discursive spaces where the voice of the Other makes itself

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heard freely—the newspaper Israël Hayom which welcomes ultraorthodox texts and is read by a great portion of the population; the secular and ultraorthodox Internet sites where discourses cross each other, albeit in the sense of crossing swords. The two parties then have the possibility of making the other hear their point of view, of presenting arguments beyond their own camp that are then passed on, and of countering the arguments of their adversaries. They don’t agree, they don’t speak directly to one another, but to a certain extent, they are communicating. Moreover, in light of the storm caused, both sides take care to warn against excesses and violence and to remind everyone of the necessity of not putting national unity in danger. Verbal polemics thus turn enemies who must be eradicated into adversaries—namely, in the terms of Chantal Mouffe, “a legitimate enemy” with whom we can fight verbally in the name of common principles about whose meaning the interpretation sometimes diverges radically. The discursive expression of the conflict creates social ties even within a situation of polarization. Even if the two camps do not agree on the notion of public space, on the respect for women’s rights, on the place of religion within the State, or on the meaning that the principle of individual liberty takes on in a democracy, they are dealing with the same referents and agree on the fact that they have to be discussed. This is because they share, for better or for worse, the same national space. Paradoxically, it is thus public controversy as an agonic exchange that permits the very coexistence that in its excesses it seems to threaten. Beyond or rather through its functions of protest, incitement to action and rallying based on a shared identity, public controversy fulfills an important function: it authorizes coexistence in dissensus.

References Angenot, M. (2008). Le Dialogue de sourds. Traité de rhétorique antilogique. Mille et une Nuits. Fogelin R. (2005) [1985]. The logic of deep disagreements. Informal Logic, 25(1), 3–11 Garand, D. (1998). Propositions méthodologiques pour l’étude du Polémique. In A. Hayward & D. Garand (Eds.), États du polémique (pp. 211–268). Nota Bene. Krieg-Planque, A. (2009). La Notion de « formule » en analyse du discours. Cadre théorique et méthodologique. Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté. Maingueneau, D. (1983). Sémantique de la polémique. L’Âge d’Homme.

Part III

Reason, Passion, and Violence

Chapter 6

Rationality and/or Passion Thomas Friedman and the Mexican Wall

Does public controversy in its polemical dimension lie under the banner of passion? That is what public opinion would lead us to think. It places polemics under the auspices of passion on two accounts: as pathos in the strict rhetorical sense, that is to say as an attempt to elicit emotions from the audience; but also, as a feeling expressed with vehemence by a speaker deeply implicated in his discourse. In common parlance and in newspapers, the presence of strong emotion generally suffices for commentators to speak of public controversy. Kerbrat-Orecchioni notes regarding lexicographical definitions: “In contrast, it is a characteristic (the last) that all of the received definitions unanimously mention, and that is worth acknowledging as absolutely relevant: polemics takes places in a context of violence and passion” (1980, p. 7); it is part of a “discourse of passion.” (ibid., p. 16). But is passion really a necessary characteristic of public controversy and polemics? Indignation and anger, which abound in the examples of public controversies already cited, appear in numerous other forms of verbal exchanges. Their sole presence in no way suffices to prove the polemical character of the offending discourse: they must accompany a clash of contradictory opinions. From this perspective, Micheli writes that if the discursive construction of emotion is “a characteristic trait of polemical discourse,” it is not however “definitional and cannot, alone, serve to distinguish polemics from other neighboring genres. “(Micheli, 2010b: 360). In other words, the inclusion of feelings in polemical discourse is common but not constitutive. We can therefore consider that the verbal confrontation of contradictory opinions on a controversial question is often, but not necessarily, accompanied by a strong emotional charge. The issue of passion is important to the extent that it calls into question the rationality of public controversy and its capacity to contribute to deliberation, that is to say to construct a public space where decisions can be made on the basis of an open debate. If we stick with the prevailing view, feelings paralyze reflection and do not allow for calmly weighing the pros and cons of the various arguments in a debate. The opinion of the philosopher on public controversies (Foucault, 1994) and the opinion expressed in the press (Koren, 2003) coincide on this point. Strongly © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_6

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implicated in her discourse, the speaker risks getting caught up in the impetuousness of her emotions and deviating from the straight line of reasoning. If she is motivated by passion, it is moreover very likely that she is biased. “A distinctive property of the logic of feelings,” notes Parret (1986: 141), “is that the conclusion is always determined in advance, at least virtually.” This is the approach that Michel Meyer (2000) likewise defends in Philosophy and the Passions when he says that whenever passion is involved, the arguments become a simple pretext to validate beliefs that are already there and that are beyond questioning. We are far from the ability to weigh the pros and cons that should characterize deliberation. Even at the level of the capacity for persuasion, the emotion of a speaker risks having negative effects. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), the orator who is carried away by his passion can scarcely adapt to his audience. Overtaken by his feelings, he does not concern himself enough with the shared premises on which he must base his endeavor of persuasion. The same is true if we place ourselves from the point of view of the receiver. Because it tries to arouse emotions in the audience by wielding pathos, the polemical discourse is accused of interfering with the public’s judgement: it calls on spontaneous identification more than on mature reflection. It is therefore both effective—it brings in the public—and morally reprehensible—it is manipulative. We find here again the discussion about pathos that traverses the entire history of rhetoric and theories of argumentation. We know that Cicero spoke about this matter in terms of “troubling souls” rather than “enlightening spirits.” He thus established a clear division between the heart and reason. The emphasis put on feelings to the detriment of reflection hardly bothers rhetoricians who, wishing to persuade the audience, concerns themselves mainly with results. Polemical discourse seems much more reprehensible to all those who wish to practice an ethical discourse respectful of the liberty of judgement of others. It is also criticized by those who look for logical validity, which the intrusion of pathos risks affecting by encouraging fallacious reasoning (ad misericordiam, ad baculum,…). To the extent that it is supposed to resort massively to the affect, polemics sins with regard to reason as well as with regard to ethics. However, the traditional dissociation between reason and passion can be misleading. We know that numerous works today argue for a narrow entanglement of rationality and feelings (Amossy, 2010; Charaudeau, 2000; Micheli, 2010a; Parret, 1986; Plantin, 1997, 1998, 2011; Walton, 1992, to cite but a few). Raymond Boudon’s study, which aims to show that moral sentiments in general, and the sentiment of justice in particular, are based on reasons, proves to be particularly interesting within the framework of a reflection on public controversies. Opposing Pareto’s point of view, which makes reasons emanate from purely affective forces, “the logic of moral sentiments” advances that “at the basis of all feeling of justice, especially when it is intensely felt, we can always, in principle at least, identify a system of solid reasons.” (Boudon, 1994, p. 30). It is indeed a matter of feelings “to the extent that [moral sentiments] are easily associated with affective reactions, eventually violent ones.” (ibid., p. 32). Yet, they rely on reason, and it is the solidity of these reasons that gives the

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feeling of injustice “its trans-subjective character and make justice possible.” (ibid., p. 47). We see here “the role of judgement in the formation of passions” (Micheli, 2010a, p. 49). The excellent studies by Nussbaum (1996, 2001), show that emotions are deployed on the basis of an activity of reason which is both analytic and evaluative. Let’s take for example indignation, a passion that is by definition polemical to the extent that it is directed against a target. Thus, the indignation we feel against bosses who benefit from very high bonuses although their companies made enormous losses is, according to Nussbaum, based on (1) a categorization of the situation, which is a cognitive process (2) an allocation of responsibility: “indignation is an emotion which requires that one describes a negative state of affairs not as the result of chance, but well and good as the effect of an action to which one can impute the responsibility of an agent.” (Micheli, 2010b: 136). In Distant Suffering, Morality, Media and Politics, Luc Boltanski had already underlined that “The transformation of pity into indignation presupposes precisely a redirection of attention away from the depressing consideration of the unfortunate and his sufferings and in search of a persecutor on whom to focus”, (2009 [1999], p. 58); (3) an evaluation of the consequences and (4) a judgement on the validity of the reward. The two last points clearly reveal cognitive procedures. If it is the case that the financial situation of the company is good and that it had been well managed, then the judgment of the merit of the bonuses could change and the feelings of indignation could blow over. There are, in this regard, reasons for emotions. These reasons can take the form of explicit justifications: they can be argued. But more often they are underlying, when the feeling seems to burst forth spontaneously in the discourse without taking the trouble of relying on any formal reasoning. A final word about emotions, more specifically those susceptible to being mobilized in polemical discourse. We have already dealt with indignation. It is the sentiment that one experiences, according to Aristotle, in the face of unmerited prosperity because “that which is underserved is unjust.”1 However, we can add to it other emotions like anger, contempt, hatred, all studied in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which are classified in the category of emotions directed against a target. Anger is, according to Aristotle, turned against someone who is guilty of a “conspicuous slight directed without justification against what concerns oneself or the people you are concerned about.” The Cambridge Dictionary defines anger as “the strong emotion that you feel when you think that someone has behaved in an unfair, cruel, or unacceptable way.” Hatred refers to an extreme dislike accompanied by ill will. Contempt is the feeling that a person is worthless. All these emotions share the feature that they target an adversary and are an incentive to attack him. In this sense, they are “negative” emotions, as opposed to “positive” ones. The latter such as love, patriotism, compassion, etc. provide strong motivation for the speaking subject engaged in the defense of a cause. In the analysis that follows, we will investigate how emotions, more particularly negative emotions, play a role in public controversy and polemics in a way that 1

http://www.bocc.ubi.pt/pag/Aristotle-rhetoric.pdf.

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is closely related to practical reasoning. We will also probe to what extent they exacerbate the polarization that divides participants into two irreconcilable camps.

6.1 The Controversy About Thomas Friedman’s Op-Ed on the Mexican Wall Here again, we chose to explore these questions through the analysis of a case study. We will try both to examine the importance of pathos in a specific polemical exchange and to outline some more general principles concerning verbal emotions in heated public controversies. The case study is borrowed from the US media: it is the public controversy that took place on the Net surrounding an ed-op by the well-known journalist Thomas Friedman. It is entitled “Trump Is Wasting Our Immigration Crisis,” and was published on April 23, 2019 in the New York Time.2 In his article, Friedman declares that a visit to the Mexican border had convinced him that there is a severe immigration crisis calling for the building of a wall. According to Friedman, a growing number of immigrants is “now flocking to open borders,” especially from South America, but also “from as far away as Haiti and Africa.” Such a stance from a liberal columnist writing in the leftist NYT, who had always fiercely opposed Donald Trump, the champion of the Mexican wall, and had insisted all along that he was pro-immigration, came as a total surprise. Friedman concludes however that this high wall should have “a big gate—but a smart gate,” and he adds: But for this wall to have a big gate, it has to be a smart and compassionate one, one that says, “Besides legitimate asylum seekers, we’ll accept immigrants at a rate at which they can be properly absorbed into our society and work force, and we’ll favor visa seekers with energies and talents that enrich and advance our society.” That’s the opposite of the unstrategic, far-too random, chaotic immigration “system” we have now.

In his op-ed, Friedman denounces at length the “crazy” system allowing “millions of people” to cross into our country illegally or overstay their visas. Or cross over and claim asylum and then melt into society while awaiting their hearings. Or bring in their family members through family reunification programs. And that’s no matter their possible impact on communities and social welfare resources or their ability to assimilate and contribute to society.

So, according to the NYT columnist, the wall should be built, but should also be coupled with a series of measures aimed at improving the whole process of immigrant admission. His paper thus endeavors both to reframe the problem, and to rise above apparently unbridgeable divisions. It emphasizes that “there has to be a compromise” between Trump’s supporters who think that a wall suffices to solve the problem and 2

The electronic version mentions that “A version of this article appears in print on April 24, 2019, Section A, Page 23 of the New York edition with the headline: Trump Is Wasting Our Border Crisis”.

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the Democrats who must understand that “we simply cannot take everyone who shows up at our border.” On April 24, 2019, Friedman vehemently defended the same point of view in an interview with Wolf Blitzer in Situation room on CNN. From our perspective, the interesting point is that Friedman intervenes in an ongoing public controversy about the Mexican wall with the clearly stated objective of de-dichotomizing it and finding a solution that would end American society’s polarization on this issue. It is well-known that President Donald Trump planned to reinforce the struggle against illegal immigration by extending the existing barrier between Mexico and the United States and made it a central theme of his 2016 presidential campaign. Everybody also remembers that “Build the wall” turned into a slogan that Trump’s supporters enthusiastically sang at his meetings. The refusal of the Mexican state to pay for the wall (a demand expressed in Trump’s campaign discourses), and the elected President’s incapacity to obtain the budget necessary for the costly construction of the wall, considerably delayed the project. It also kindled the hostilities between liberals and conservatives. In this heated atmosphere, Friedman, a strong opponent of Trump, tried to rise above the fray, namely, above the polemical exchanges on the Mexican wall, and to discuss its efficacy and its consequences. His well-organized piece relies on arguments that justify his choices and confirms his desire to solve the problem and pacify the American people, rather than to pursue a verbal war on the planned barrier against illegal immigration. This article received 748 comments on the NYT’s site, and 1022 comments on FoxNews’s3 site on April 24, 2019. We will mainly focus on the online political discussion forums in two media affiliated with rival political parties promoting sharply conflicting views in general, and on the Mexican wall in particular. We will also have a look at the 671 comments on Mediaite,4 a digital news site—part of the Abrams Media Network—that covers, in its own words, political news “across the political spectrum.” This focus on the digital debates will shed light on the way ordinary citizens (rather than professional journalists) engage in a debate about what is defined by an Internet user as a “complex, emotionally arousing and tortuous issue.” The selected case study will help us answer the following questions: in discussions on a “hot” subject liable to rely on affective reactions, does pathos defeat logos—or can emotion be entwined with reason? To what extent do the theoretical views on emotion and reason expressed by the speakers engaged in a controversy determine their own practice? If the adversarial exchanges do convey strong emotions, to what extent are the latter a major determinant of the incapacity to reach agreement? Last but not least: at what specific points do these emotions surface and to what extent can they reveal hotspots in the online debate?

3

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/long-time-new-york-times-liberal-columnist-argues-for-tru mps-border-wall-the-solution-is-a-high-wall. 4 https://www.mediaite.com/tv/watch-ny-times-columnist-thomas-friedman-comes-out-in-favorof-a-high-wall-with-big-smart-gate-at-border. Consulted 11/17/2019.

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6.2 Condemning Emotional Responses in the Name of Reason It is noteworthy that the posts value reason over emotion, blaming the latter for blurring issues and impeding valid conclusions. The importance of reason is expressed, for example, by the use of terms such as “reasonable,” “rational,” as well as other synonyms. They mostly appear in the NYT: 26 occurrences of “reasonable” (1 in Fox and none in Mediaite), 18 occurrences of “rational” (1 in Fox and none in Mediaite), 12 occurrences of “sensible” (2 in Fox, none in Mediaite), 18 occurrences of “common sense” (3 in Fox, 1 in Mediaite). There are also 31 occurrences of “compromise in NYT (1 in Fox, 11 in Mediaite). Moreover, condemnation of pathos and support for a rational approach weighing the pros and cons of a problem is expressed in so many words by a number of the participants. Here is what RSH writes in the NYT (April 24): Finally, someone reports […] details that I can understand, not get emotionally-all-’riled-upabout-it. […] Thank you, Thomas. Excellent approach, only a few commenters are worthy of reading sadly--emotion overtaking them rather quickly.

The Internet user addresses both the way the columnist presents the case, and the way his readers react to it, complimenting Friedman and criticizing most of the unworthy addressees. Also in NYT, Sam (NJApril 24), after summarizing the questions Friedman raises, writes: Saying we want “a high wall with a big gate”’ doesn’t answer ANY of these questions!! The immigration ‘crisis’ like other seemingly unsolvable issues facing this country, is never addressed because the debate is centered on rhetoric and emotional appeals, not facts and policy.

Paradoxically, the criticism on the prevalence of emotion is quite emotional itself, as the double exclamation point clearly shows. The same can be said about the following post on Fox, where the Internet user blames the adversary for relying on emotion: “StanBrookLeader 24 Apr “They [the Dems] have brains. If only they’d use them. They think with their hearts. They function on emotions, which is why all they have, nowadays, to offer anyone is sanctimony.” And on Mediaite: 7 months ago (2019, April 14): “For the crazy leftists, it is more important that the president doesn’t get a win than it is to protect the country. Their brains only function on emotion, not logic and reason.” Reason is supposed to be on the side of the arguer who blames his adversaries for relying on feelings, an attitude supposed to generate only phony moral superiority and political irresponsibility. Once again, the speaker, while praising reason and denigrating the emotional attitude of the other, paradoxically displays a passionate vehemence (we will come back to this point). Together with an emphasis on reason, the online political discussion deals with Friedman’s attempt at promoting a solution that would put an end to the polemical exchanges polarizing Americans. The Internet users blame the adoption of extreme views for leading to dichotomization, namely, to a confrontation of irreconcilable solutions: “Joel G, Upstate NYApril 23 I can’t believe I’m reading this in the NYT.

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Someone talking about reasonable immigration policy, rather than the extremes?” “Scott IllyriaApril 24Mr. Friedman’s take on this feels like a breath of fresh air. I may or may not agree with all his conclusions but at least he’s not following the increasingly rigid dogmas of both the left and right, where either a wall is the ONLY answer or any suggestion that any type of border control is needed is instantly condemned as racism.” A balanced approach drawing on reason is opposed to “extreme” stances and described as sanity compared to madness. Affective reactions, defined as impulses blocking the capacity to think and to find viable solutions, are condemned. Many Internet users admire the columnist’s worthy efforts to avoid a prevalent attitude verging on madness: DipThoughts San Francisco, CAApril 24 Finally some sanity in the madness going on for years. From separating children to abolish ICE, it has been nothing but madness; herd mentality of thinking one way or the opposite. Thank you Mr. Friedman for your thoughtful analysis and your ideas for solving the crisis.

Interestingly, 183 among the NYT Internet users recommended this post. The latter is also reinforced by this ironic comment: “Andrew RossNY Denver COApril 24 So you’re saying nuanced debate and a holistic approach is better than jingoistic sloganeering? Do tell.[…].” Without going into a detailed analysis of these reactions, let us emphasize the points that are most relevant to our study. (1) The debaters, and above all the Internet users of the NYT, praise reason; (2) they condemn emotional approaches in the management of public affairs; and (3) some of them see the necessity for putting an end to a controversy privileging extreme positions described as madness, and hopelessly dividing the American people. However, as we have seen in part of the posts, the reactions that praise reason and ask for a sensible, common sense attitude towards a loaded issue, display (at least partly) the very emotions they condemn. Let us now examine to what extent the exchange of posts is built on arguments or rather feeds on emotions.

6.3 The Role of Practical Reasoning in Public Controversy First, we can see in the Friedman controversy that rational arguments can play an important part in agonistic discussions. As mentioned earlier, polemical exchanges display dichotomized stances leading to polarization and to the discrediting of the Other—but they are not all necessarily built on emotion or on appeals to emotions. A substantial part of the debate relies on reasoning rather than on affective reactions. Reading the NYT posts, one cannot but be struck by a strange fact: contrary to expectations, the liberal Internet users are rarely shocked by the author’s defense of a big wall along the Mexican border. We might have expected protests such as the following: “srwdmBostonApril 24 Excellent analysis, Mr. Friedman, except for all the ‘wall’ rhetoric. When you know how loaded that term is, why do you keep

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hammering it?” Or: “AlanCaliforniaApril 24 […] A great wall is a poor way to modify human behavior, whether it is built across China, Israel/Palestine, or Berlin. But Friedman took a trip to ‘the border’ and, surprise, now he thinks it’s susceptible to his favorite solution: a compromise– this time with Trump and the extreme nationalists.” However, it turns out that these protests are the exception. Most of the posts do not vituperate against the leftist columnist who expresses such an unexpected and “unorthodox” opinion. If they mention their surprise, it is to draw the attention to the importance of what Friedman is saying rather than to attack him: Devendra. Boston, MAApril 24. I never dreamed that Thomas Friedman, a devout Liberal, would ever say that we need the Wall. OR, that we have a crisis at our borders. When some one like him says we have a crisis that if not tackled properly now and this onslaught of economic migrants not stopped, we would lose our nation. Then it is time to panic.

Thus, contrary to the Fox Internet users, who mock the NYT columnist’s change of mind (as we will see later), the overall reaction of NYT liberals is rarely outrage at his apparent flip-flopping and so-called support for Trump’s policy. How can we explain that there are so few emotional attacks in the NYT on Friedman’s new stance (the Republicans, of course, cannot but rejoice at this change of mind)? The scarcity of polemical posts attacking the columnist is related to the fact that in the liberal daily, opposition to the article mostly derives from practical and not ideological or ethical reasons. The topic under discussion is not whether the wall is “immoral,” as Nancy Pelosi would have it when she declared on January 3, 2019, that “a wall is an immorality. It is not who we are as a nation.” It is not the outcry of the conscience against an act endowed with symbolic meaning—this post referring to the Berlin wall is quite exceptional: “S.M. Aker TexasApril 24 “I still do not agree that a wall is needed. Whenever it’s mentioned I think about the Berlin wall and the barriers between Eastern Europe and the West. Mexico is NOT an adversary and a wall treats it as one.” From the same point of view, there are no attacks against the columnist concerning an unethical lack of feeling towards suffering populations. The readers accept at face value Friedman’s notion of a “compassionate” and “humane” wall—the metonymy he uses being a “compassionate gate,” a qualification referring very loosely to the willingness to let in, under certain conditions and in reasonable proportions, immigrants in addition to asylum seekers, and implying that this decision is at least partly dictated by sympathy for the suffering of the people desperately trying to flee their misery. It is interesting in this respect to notice that references to pity and related feelings are rare: we find 11 occurrences of “compassionate” in the NYT (9 in Fox, mostly quotations of Friedman, 1 in Mediaite), 2 occurrences of “pity” (one negative) in the NYT, none in Fox and Mediaite, 17 occurrences of “humane” in the NYT (1 in Fox, none in Mediaite), 7 occurrences of “misery” in the NYT (none in Fox and Mediaite). Of course, these numbers do not allow for a better understanding of how emotions are mobilized, but they clearly show that the “positive” emotion of compassion plays no role in the Republican discourse and does not have a crucial function in the NYT’s online forum, where it rarely appears as an incentive to refute or attack Friedman’s

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approval of the wall. An indignant protest such as the following one, that one might have expected to be the norm, is quite exceptional: Patricia Allan Hamburg, NYApril 24 This situation has reached at the heart of our moral responsibility to others. What happened to the children? Why have we not seen the authorities wiping noses and changing diapers? Are we so afraid that those children will grow up to be like us? hard hearted? dismissive? selfish, self seeking? Why? There are no answers, Mr. Friedman, except in the hearts of the people. We can open the doors at the same time as we keep the frame in place. We can train judges, police personnel, clergy, all to take a closer look with eyes inside their chests.

The limited space devoted to ethical principles and emotional protests derives from the fact that the topic of the debate is not whether the flow of illegal immigration from Mexico should or should not be stopped. The Internet users seem to take it for granted that preventing the possibility of a massive illegal crossing of the border is urgently needed. They agree on what is the desired state of affairs (even if there are many differences in their overall views on immigration policy). Here are a few statements testifying to this: “EverywhereApril 2 NYT Although we have long accepted Immigrants, everyone knows we cannot accept all immigrants;” “Ray C Fort Myers, FLApril 24. No sensible person is advocating for open borders;” “Maryfran WisconsinApril 24Democrats are not in favor of open borders. Democrats don’t say that only fascists enforce borders;” “MCNJApril 24 Except for a small, sometimes vocal, minority, the clear majority of Democrats, liberals, and progressives believe in a secure border—that can include barriers, walls, but actually mainly fences from a practical standpoint, where it makes sense. They don’t believe in open borders or unlimited immigration—legal or illegal;” “durhamApril 24 Excellent article, really gets to the heart of the matter. I’m a liberal leaning independent, and I agree every country has a right to border control.” The idea of ensuring secure borders and of controlling the flow of illegal immigrants is thus largely consensual and a post claiming that “This is one world, and one humankind. All borders should be eliminated, leading to free migration anywhere. World government is the only possible way to end war” (Times Pick) is the object of ironic attacks, such as “Gimme A. Break HoustonApril 24 Are these the initial lyrics for ‘Imagine’ by John Lennon ? Very touching, but when some take their fantasies for politics in the real world, the result is disaster.” To sum up, most of the refutations of Friedman’s paper are not aPresident Trump. The emotional aspect, bout the goal to be reached, but about the appropriate means to achieve it. In this context, we find in the reactions many pieces of practical reasoning— namely, the kind of argumentation leading to a decision about what should be done in a given situation. Audi reminds us that “the typical conclusion of a practical reasoning is the forming of a practical judgement,” whether the action recommended is performed or not. Simply put, it consists of the following scheme: S wants a given state of affairs X (major premise); doing Y would contribute to bring about X (minor premise); thus S should do Y (conclusion) (Audi, 1982: 31). The columnist’s Opponents do not share his belief that Y (a high wall) would contribute to achieve

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X—to solve the problem of massive illegal immigration. It is this point that is debated, as each side needs to provide good reasons to justify the validity of his/her views on the actual steps that could lead to the wished-for result. Along with many recognitions of the article’s rightfulness (they are surprisingly numerous), we find in the NYT refutations of Friedman’s thesis based on the principle that if S wants X, doing Y would not bring about X, so S should abstain from doing X. Here are a few examples: CP , MinnesotaApril 24 If you could “miracle” a wall into existence tomorrow, it only means people get on boats and come ashore where there will be no wall - so long as circumstances in Central America remain as bad as they are, people will migrate, wall or no wall. Shimr, Spring Valley, NYApril 24 […] Furthermore, as in Israel, walls lead to tunnels being built, and with the cartels anxious to continue their illegal entry, they will be built in profusion. Itsy , Anywhere, USAApril 24 I’m still anti wall, though. Very expensive and I’m skeptical it does work in the big picture. Mr. Friedman talks about how specific homes and neighborhoods were transformed once a wall was built, but didn’t that just push the problem someplace else? When people are desperate, don’t underestimate their ability to climb, dig, break, or walk around a wall--or find alternative means like trucks and boats […].

The justifications for the uselessness of building the Mexican wall are: people who are desperate because of the violence and misery overtaking their home country will always find ways to cross the border. There are many ways to circumvent the obstacle: building tunnels, entering the territory by boat where possible, “climb, dig, break, or walk around;” there will always be a means to sneak in. Moreover, “cartels anxious to continue their illegal entry” for drug trafficking will find ways do so even if there is a high physical barrier. This internal controversy characteristic of the NYT, focusing on the minor premise rather than on the major one (on the objective to be achieved), can also be found elsewhere. Thus, in Mediaite, we can read the following polemical exchange (April 24, 2019): “Canada is the enemy”.DJT • 7 months ago Show me a high wall..I’ll show you an extension ladder Allan Nichols“Canada is the enemy”.DJT • 7 months ago • edited By your own absurd logic you need to remove the doors to your house and any locks. After all you show me a door and I will show you many ways to smash it down. Show me a lock and I will show you a cordless power drill and a dozen other ways to thwart it. So, why bother attempting to secure your house with doors and locks when they ultimately cant stop all criminals from coming in anyway????

The first arguer refutes Friedman’s allegations on the same grounds that the previous NYT posts quoted (any wall can be climbed); his Opponent supporting the wall solution refutes his stance with an argument by analogy: A—doors and locks— is to B—a private house- what C—the Mexican wall—is to D—the national territory. This analogy (recurrent in the talkbacks) provides here a reductio ad absurdum reasoning: if it is true that any protection wall is ineffective and thus superfluous, then

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the doors and locks on our private houses are also ineffective and should be removed. This conclusion goes against everyday practice and common sense, confronting the arguer with his/her own contradictions. Another feature of the analogy might go unnoticed: the immigrants trying to enter the US are tacitly presented as equivalent to criminals trying to break into a house for purposes of mischief. Under the guise of self-evidence, the analogy thus tacitly defines the border wall as protection against criminals (an argument that is explicitly stated elsewhere in Republican posts). The point here is however that this post, whether flawed or not, uses practical reasoning and is not just an emotional outburst. Other posts arguing that the building of a wall is not the right solution to prevent or drastically reduce illegal immigration not only provide criticism: they also suggest alternative means. In all the sites consulted, many participants discuss Friedman’s solutions and bring in their own ideas about the best way to control the borders. One of the alternative solutions to prevent people from crossing would be using advanced technological means: Shimr, Spring Valley, NYApril 24 We may well agree with Dr. Friedman that the immigration problem needs repair but disagree with his emphasis on a tall wall to stem the tide of immigrants. […] Technology--drones, cameras, fast cars to respond to intruders, barbed wire, delay barriers-- can slow the march into America sufficiently to quell a crisis of the unseen flowing in. Paul McGlasson, Athens, GAApril 24, We need a wall so that Americans will feel safe? We need a wall, in essence, as a political stop to immigration reform? I do not buy it, despite the other fine suggestions made here. We need modern, technologically sound, theoretically based, scientifically tested, enforcement techniques on our borders. That may include some new advanced barriers here and there, but certainly not a wall, and certainly only as one part of a larger enforcement solution.

The same solution is suggested along with a supplementary argument against the wall, this time an ecological one: “coolstar Las VegasApril 24 […] A real wall along the entire border would be an ecological disaster that the land and rivers will NEVER recover from in a human lifetime. What is needed along MOST of the border (out in the wild, wild) is a smart wall, using drones, sensors, etc. etc. As has been said, we have the technology (and it’s inexpensive compared to a horrible physical wall. Friedman should know this!).” Another alternative solution accompanying the criticism of the wall is focusing on the prevention from hiring illegals: Dan GallagherApril 24 1. You can’t build a wall across the entire 2,000 mile border. 2. Where there are border walls today they are tunneled under and circumvented. 3. The “crisis” is created by people turning themselves in for asylum. Walls don’t prevent that. 4. Drugs come through legal channels (hidden) not illegal crossings. 5. Illegal entries, overwhelmingly, come here for work. And they get hired. Prevent that and your crisis dries up overnight (our emphasis).

Additionally, here are examples of comments posted in FOX to the same effect: “macan2017Leader, 24 Apr, the Wall is not the point. It should be about employers checking for valid ID documents and using ID check. Trump has no credibility

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on this because he hires illegals. Immigrants with no legal documents should be deported. We don’t need a wall. Illegal immigrants enter our Country all sorts of ways.” While insisting in turn on the incapacity of walls to stop illegal immigration, the last Internet user challenges the view that physical barriers are the main point and suggests reframing the issue. According to him, the reason for the flow of illegal immigrants is that they are hired by unscrupulous employers. Here again, all the participants share the major premise, but do not share the same belief about the right means to achieve it. However, instead of simply rejecting the Proponent’s proposition, the two arguers replace the idea of the wall (supposed to make it impossible for illegal immigrants to get into the US) with the idea of preventing the hiring of illegals (making it impossible for the undocumented immigrants to get work in the US). For the Fox speaker, the latter is coupled with the deportation of all undocumented workers caught on US territory. This is an extreme stance that is far from shared by all, but the notion that the most effective solution—or at least one effective solution— would be to use fines and other drastic measures to prevent employers from hiring illegals is quite frequent, especially in the liberal NYT: Hadel Cartran (NYT), Ann ArborApril 24, Amazing! In an article on immigration and with over 50% of illegal immigrants those who overstay visas, there is no mention of penalties/fines for employers hiring those here illegally via border crossings or overstayed visas. Employer fines could be progressive, increasing for each successive violation and being high enough to have a deterrent effect.

Thus, we find lots of posts refuting the ed-op reasoning by substituting one kind of causality with another: the main cause of illegal immigration is not the lack of barriers but the incentive provided by the high probability of being hired in the US and of making a living there. There is thus a shift of the blame to all the profiteers, namely, the Americans who unscrupulously benefit from cheap labor, and whose fraudulent behavior should not go unpunished. For some NYT Internet users, the US President himself is among those who hire undocumented aliens in his companies: “Kkseattle SeattleApril 24 @GRH Trump himself has been illegally hiring workers with obviously fake green cards for decades. Why? To make money.” The fact that the argument is repeated over and over again in the NYT demonstrates that the participants in the online political discussion forum look for rational arguments and try to develop a common line of reasoning: “EverywhereApril 24 The main motivation for most asylum seeking migrants is work. If employers were forced to properly verify their workers’ status, it would vastly reduce the total number of immigrants;” Forest Hills NYApril 23 @Mark: “ And a bigger reason is that the masters of the US economy need willing hands and backs to do a lot of hard, dirty work at low wages. Every western-style economy needs more and more workers. It’s cheaper for employers to use those who can be exploited but denied education–and who can be deported as needed.” Times Pick (Georgia April 24) asks for “crackdown on employers of illegal residents and sellers of fake documents. They will stop coming if they can’t get jobs and employers large and small will stop hiring them if they face jail time” (he got 168 recommendations). A net surfer gives the same argument in Mediate in the more abrupt form of violent injunctions: “logansfun • 7 months ago.

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Treat people who hire illegals like johns. Publish their names on websites and local papers to shame them. Social position is very important for some people and their wives won’t like being humiliated.” And also: “logansfunLola • 7 months ago. Shoot anyone who hires one. It will be over in a week.” As mentioned before, this refutation by a substitution of causality is also used on the Fox site, the opponent of the NYT: “24 Apr Farbish “The problem is that there is a labor shortage and employers need to hire illegals for cheap labor to make high profits;” “NoNonsenseTooLeader24 Apr A sensible solution to illegal immigration is to eliminate any and all public assistance to illegals, and to slap stiff punitive fines on any employer who hires them and to property owners who rent to them.” The nuances are there—employers need to hire”, public assistance should be eliminated—but the bulk of the argument is the same. Another substitution of causality attributes the reason for illegal immigration to the desperate situation in the countries of origin and concludes that massive investment in these countries is the only real solution to the problem. Posts like John’s (San Jose, CAApril 24) deplore that we do not address the “root causes” understood as the awful conditions in which the South American populations live in their own country. “IntheFray Sarasota, Fl.April 24 The root causes of people fleeing their countries has to be addressed. If they feel safe at home and can find gainful employment there, they will not make the trek up to the States.” Another Internet user writes. No one just wakes up on a Tuesday and thinks ‘maybe I’ll risk my life to leave my homeland and try to get into a country that doesn’t want me.’ Illegal immigration is driven by horrible conditions in countries in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Overpopulation […], corruption […] crime (fueled by the illegal drug cartels) have left many countries dysfunctional. Until these problems are reduced in these ‘source countries’, we will have immigration problems.

Hence the idea of spending resources on development in Central America rather than on border enforcement: “Eddie Silver SpringApril 24 If […] Let’s not spend billions on an ugly, self-defeating, wall and let’s pass comprehensive immigration reform and assist Central American countries to uplift their people. It’s common sense.” The practical advice is sometimes linked to ethical considerations: an Internet user who introduces himself as a progressive democrat close to Sanders writes: “To end the mass migrations and stabilize the world, we must improve conditions abroad. Would we want to have a fenced in utopia in the midst of a hellishly overpopulated world of misery.” Other arguers emphasize the fatal role of the US in the South American situation—even if they do not consider, like Chaudri the peacenik, that America has to “expiate” for the wrong-doings that brought about the “break-down” of South American countries. Deborah Fink Ames, IowaApril 24 thinks that “We need to acknowledge U.S. complicity in creating the poverty and lawlessness in Mexico and Central America.” In this regard, the participants agree with Friedman’s condemnation when he writes “that President Trump recently decided—insanely—to cut humanitarian aid” to countries like Guatemala and Honduras; “Shimr Spring Valley, NY April 25. To cut aid to the source countries is definitely the wrong approach. Better to help the governments involved to control the gangs and to increase real jobs and industry.”

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6.4 The Place and Role of Emotions in Polemical Debate We have seen that the solution of building a wall is debated from a practical vantage point rather than from an ideological or ethical one, so that practical reasoning prevails. Moreover, the participants condemn emotional approaches in the name of reason. Is that to say that the debate is unemotional? Even a quick look at the quotations that deploy arguments clearly shows that this is not the case. In “We need a wall so that Americans will feel safe? We need a wall, in essence, as a political stop to immigration reform? I do not buy it,” the question marks accompanying the repetition of “we need a wall” reveal the irritation and the impatience of the speaker. The same can be said for the already quoted post: “srwdmBostonApril 24 Excellent analysis, Mr. Friedman, except for all the ‘wall’ rhetoric. When you know how loaded that term is, why do you keep hammering it?” (with the strong negative connotation of the term “hammering,” reinforcing the anger underlying the reproach). In short, an affective dimension pervades the exchanges even in the framework of practical reasoning. But where and when does it appear? What are the topics that are dealt with emotionally? A thorough analysis of the corpus leads to an interesting discovery that we will formulate at the outset, and justify in the following pages: the clashes and attacks involving strong emotions derive less from the divergent solutions under scrutiny in the debate, than from the political divide between Trump’s firm supporters and his fierce opponents, as well as between liberals and conservatives. Just a word concerning these two lines of division: they cannot be conflated, since not all Democrats put all the blame on Trump, and not all Republicans support Trump—as some participants point out, like in Fox: “lynzee19Leader24 Apr Not all liberals are against the president. Not all Republicans like the president. Not all Democrats dislike the president. We need to stop grouping people together. All individuals can think for themselves. I am a conservative republican and have issues with this president.” Concerning the divide between two political sides, it is true that there are posts calling for rising above political divisions and struggles in order to solve an acute problem through common sense solutions. Nevertheless, most of the verbal traces of emotion are related to the division between liberals and conservatives, pro-and anti-Trump. Let’s start with the most conspicuous topic that arouses strong emotions, even more than Friedman and his “compassionate wall” solution: the US President Donald Trump. He is mentioned in no less than 421 NYT posts. These attacks follow the accusations of the columnist himself who, after giving some advice on the adequate measures to be adopted, deplores: Unfortunately, all those actions would require a president ready and able to forge a national immigration compromise. Instead, we’re stuck with a man who just exploits the border crisis and uses his “wall” to divide the nation and energize his base.

The very choice of the title “Trump Is Wasting Our Immigration Crisis” (whether it was selected by Friedman himself or by the newspaper) clearly demonstrates the

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desire to accuse the US president above all: it puts the spotlight on him by starting with his name, stressing his agency (he is the subject of an active verb, to waste) and declaring that he is damaging an issue concerning all the readers (our immigration crisis). In the footsteps of Friedman, many posts of the NYT deploy a very hostile discourse against the president, who turns out to be the main target of the polemical attacks and emotional outbursts. The Internet users send emotionally loaded messages revealing why Trump is the main obstacle to a reasonable compromise ensuring border security. Here is an example of this heated polemical approach in the NYT: NYT, MC, NJApril 24 [Democrats] believe in comprehensive solutions that actually work. What Democrats oppose is Trump’s magical wall to satisfy a notion born from Trump rallies (with a punch line that Mexico will pay for it) that is a vanity project that satisfies Trump’s desire and strategy to take a real issue and offer a ridiculous “solution” that’s really just a way to demagogue, hate/fear monger the issue. What Democrats oppose is taking a legitimate humanitarian crisis at the border (not a fake National Emergency) and using cruelty and incompetence as responses, which is the Trump/Miller approach, which has both deliberately and unintentionally made the crisis worse.

The arguer accuses the other party of unworthy appeals to emotions such as hatred and fear that pave the way to demagogy. He also imputes to the adversary a lack of human feelings (they use “cruelty” when dealing with a “humanitarian crisis”). Moreover, he recalls the fact that the “Build the wall” slogan had been mobilized and chanted in electoral pro-Trump rallies, which associates the wall so closely with Trump propaganda that the two cannot be disentangled—any wall, be it Friedman’s compassionate one, automatically refers to “Trump’s magical wall.” As one of the NYT Internet users puts it: “Trump has poisoned the well for building a wall.” In short, the Democrat auto-mandated spokesman who is on the side of a reasonable solution blames President Trump and his followers for conducting a policy calling for unworthy emotions and failing to deal with an important crisis. In doing so, the speaker himself expresses his indignation. The affective component of the discourse can be seen in the use of anaphora (“What democrats oppose” mentioned two times at the beginning of the sentence) which emphasizes the strength of the rejection, and the use of evaluative expressions such as “vanity project,” “ridiculous,” “demagogue,” “incompetence,” etc. displaying the speaker’s contempt. The indignation aroused by the way Trump and his team make policy based on demagogy, and transform “a legitimate humanitarian crisis at the border” into a “fake National Emergency,” explains why a discussion related to Trump cannot free itself from emotional biases. That hostility to the president is an obstacle that cannot be overcome in the search for a common solution is clearly expressed in all the posts claiming that nothing can be done so long as Trump stays in power. Here is how one of the Internet users formulates it: LT, ChicagoApril 23, NYT: But then the whole point of the Trump Presidency is indulging the fear and hatred of the 63 million Americans who cheered an openly racist, nativist, hate-filled man all the way

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into the White House. There is no hope of any immigration reform until Trump is gone and enough of his base decide that voting for politicians who support putting children in cages and destroying families is a sin not a solution.

Ethical and political considerations are put forward to express anger mixed with indignation towards a man accused of racism and hatred—the words used to qualify his mischief constitute a violent diatribe against a leader supposed to be totally devoid of compassion—he is “putting children into cages,” “destroying families.” It makes it clear that the main obstacle to the conflict’s resolution is the very person of the adversary, who incarnates all the offences and misconduct that must be eliminated from the political sphere: “There is no hope of any immigration reform until Trump is gone.” This declaration is echoed by other participants, such as Save who vents his anger at the leader of the US, presenting him as the very incarnation of evil: “Save NYCApril 24 Tom, what we really need is a new POTUS [President of the United States] who can engage the citizenry and embrace a bipartisan consensus. It can be done, just not with an evil vindictive leader”. The most recurrent arguments are (the examples are picked among many others and only serve as illustrations): (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Trump does not really care about the illegal immigration problem, he himself hires illegals—it is just an electoral stratagem. Example 1: Tucson AZApril 24 @Richard Winchester He does not want a solution to the immigration crisis because it’s the fuel that runs his re-election campaign. Trump is a conniving liar who just wants to win; he has never been interested in actually governing and doing positive things for America. Trumps exploits the situation to flatter his base and consolidate his own power and influence. Example 1: Glenn. ctApril 24Trump is not seeking a solution—he is seeking political points at the expense of people. Is that not a high crime? Example 2: rocky Vermont vermontApril 24 The last thing Trump wants to do is fix the so-called immigration crisis. It gins up his racist and xenophobic base. It attaches stupid people as far away as Maine to Don the Con” (13 recommend). The wall issue is part of Trump’s politics of fear and incentive to hatred. JP New JerseyApril 24 I can’t stomach the prospect of taking any action that would (or could be) taken as an endorsement of President Trump’s inhumane characterization of immigrants or his fear-mongering. Trump is using the wall issue to reinforce and better propagate his xenophobic and racist stances Example 1: Anna Ogden NYApril 24 NYApril 24 Trump wants to turn the figurative “Wall of Racism” along the border into a literal one Example 2: Jeremy. IndianaApril 24 The wall is NO part of the solution. It is a nothing but monument to racism and paranoia Example 3: Donegal South WestApril 24 The wall is the “symbol of their bone-deep hatred of brown-skinned people. Fix the immigration problems in this country, and Trump voters will have to openly admit their racism and

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(5)

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bigotry. They will no longer have brown-skinned targets to go after. And this is what they really want […] . Their braying about “illegals” is a fig leaf for their racism. It is a “politically correct” way to vent their bigotry. Example 4: Jerryg MassachusettsApril 24 Trump was never interested in whether it’s the right approach or not. The wall is a symbol for an attitude toward immigrants expressed succinctly in Trump’s rallies as “Kill them all.” The wall is the next best thing. We can add to it the milder argument, used by NYT but also Fox Internet users, that Trump greatly contributed to creating the crisis because of his declarations about the border. Example 1: Fox. ChernburnLeader If Trump wasn’t the president, there wouldn’t be the crisis there is. He hurried people’s decision to come here by threatening to close the border and by talking away the funding to help those countries. Example 2: MediaiteObservantProfessor It’s a crisis of Trump’s own making. Ask the Central American immigrants: they say the possibility of a wall is partly responsible for them coming to the border at this time.

As we can see, the indignation of the participants is expressed not only towards the border policies but also, and mostly, towards the ideology underlying Trump’s discourse on the wall in particular, and on immigration in general—an ideology of ethnic hatred, and of discrimination of “brown people” verging—according to some participants—on fascism: “Jefflz. San FranciscoApril 24: Politicians across the board are using anti-immigrant fear and hatred to gain unprecedented power for hard-core right wing white nationalists.” Thus, Trump’s wall becomes the sign and the symbol of a general worldview going against all the democratic values that NYT readers, and other Americans writing on the Fox site or on Mediaite, believe in. It represents symbolically a “hate wall,” a racist wall: “Ilya Shlyakhter Cambridge, MAApril 24 Thanks to Trump’s rhetoric, the wall is a symbol not just of rule of law, but of white supremacy.” It is also a wall of ignorance imposed on the country: “David Michael Eugene, ORApril24 The Trump wall extends to our entire country. He has created walls of ignorance around him that have laid waste in every department during his term of a would-be president.” In short, the wall becomes the symbol of all the negative aspects of the politics promoted by the US President. As Trump himself becomes the incarnation of an approach deemed contrary to what really makes America great, it is no wonder that these parts of the posts express virulent criticism of his very person: “NYCApril 24 Trump is not a thoughtful person. He is a made-for-to demagogue. To assign him any more credibility is ludicrous;” “Eugene, ORApril 24 The Great American Wall is just an exercise in futility for a very sick man. Trump is not fit to be president”. “srwdm BostonApril 24 One thing is CERTAIN: There is no confidence or trust in an incessant pathological liar and known bigot and racist called Trump. Any comprehensive addressing of our southern border will have to await his departure.” Hence: “Bob Allen Long IslandApril 24Make US great again—DumpTrump.” The violence of the ad hominem attacks testifies to the incommensurable hatred of the Internet users for Trump and explains why his very

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presence as the leader of the US blocks any possibility of dialogue on the border issue: Chris CharlotteApril 23 There can be no compromise because Trump has made democrats so nuts that common sense ideas of fences, walls and saying no to any immigrants has become anathema to them. To concede that Trump was right about anything regarding the border and immigration is a line that can’t cross. They would rather see the border swamped and immigrants camping out in our town squares than work with Trump.

This argument is used both by the anti-Trump participants, who explicitly state that they are reluctant to adopt anything Trump promotes because of the ideology it springs from, and their opponents who see in it an argument ad hitlerum. The former consider that “The blatant xenophobia and racism of Donald Trump has turned it into a political hand grenade” (Steve Acho, AustinApril 24). The latter argue: “FOX. KramiItinhardLeader 24 Apr All liberals know we need the wall, they’re just stomping their feet because Trump wants a wall. Kinda childish.” We can also find it in the NYT: “sam finn CaliforniaApril 24 @ Trump could promote mothers’ milk for infants, and half the anti-Trumpers would promptly denounce mothers’ milk.” It is mostly the charge of aligning with Trump despite his outspoken hostility to the President that turns Friedman into a target of polemical attacks. From the columnist’s vantage point, the sharp criticism of Trump was supposed to make it clear that the op-ed does not adopt Trump’s views, and that it does not suggest at any point that the President might have been right. The idea that Friedman is recognizing, even if unwillingly, the truth of the President’s argument has nonetheless been pointed out by some NYT net surfers, and bandied about with much satisfaction, and a lot of sarcasm, by Friedman’s conservative adversaries. The article in Fox dealing with the matter is entitled “Long-time New-York Times liberal columnist argues for Trump’s border wall” (by Liam Quinn). The article in Mediaite opens with: “President Donald Trump ‘s southern border wall has an unlikely new proponent” (Joe DePaoloApr 24th, 2019, 8:53 pm). The Fox readers mock the NYT columnist, emphasizing that he adopts the very project of the political figure he so fiercely denigrates. Friedman’s supposed departure from Trump’s political line is either ignored or refuted. Some of the participants provide an explanation: for MandailaOruKuttu in Mediaite, Friedman’s attack on Trump is interpreted as a mere attempt to stay politically correct in the eyes of his liberal readers: His article is a vindication of Trump’s plans, but he has to suddenly remember he is from NYT and a democrat leaning [sic] paper, so he introduces disjointed paragraphs in the middle like ’Trump wasted a crisis, just riling up his base,’ he does not have any plans for other immigration reforms’ etc. You take out those loaded democrat shilling, basically Tom Friedman is no different from what Trump Bannon Coulter and the rest of America is saying. Build a secure physical wall along with high tech border openings and state of the art monitoring.

Other posts dealing with the difference between the liberal columnist and the president are more sarcastic: “Fox. cleverlyengaged25Apr This columnist doesn’t agree with Trump on the reasons for building a wall. He just agrees that a wall needs to be built.” In the NYT, we can also find critiques of Friedman’s pretense

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that he is not adopting Trump’s discourse: “usApril24 This column is an amazing reincarnation of a short story ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote’ by Jorge Luis Borges. We should make exactly what Trump proposes but it will have a totally different meaning.” Thus, the blame is incurred less for what the author is saying than for the fact that his op-ed apparently endorses Trump’s policies. Most of the Fox posts are much more vehement and display the conservatives’ contempt for Friedman and his thinking abilities, often through irony: “Freethinker7Leader 25 Apr So he is basically saying Trump and conservatives have been exactly correct all along. Brilliant.” Others Internet users point out glaring contradictions in Friedman’s discourse: Fox— “CreptixLeader 25 Apr Friedman: ‘Trump is disturbed!’” Also Friedman: ‘We need a high wall at the border’” “DopeAndMangeLeader 25 Apr Creptix He feels that Trump is both disturbed and also correct at the same time.” The NYT Internet users also point with indignant surprise to Friedman’s approval of the wall advocated by Trump: “Monroeville PAApril 24 This morning fox touted this article as validation of Trump and his immigration policies. Hell has truly frozen over.” Others protest: “Alan. CaliforniaApril24But this is no time to compromise with Trump or to accept any part of his xenophobia. Friedman should know that strict borders-based nationalism is not a worthy goal […].” Besides the ironic comments on the fact that Friedman eventually came to grasp the truth of his worst enemy’s proposal, numerous comments on Fox attack Friedman not only as the already well-known columnist and author (among others, many posts recall that he supported the Iraq war), but also and mainly as a representative of what the liberal NYT stands for. This can be seen in the qualifications used to name him: “a liberal” or a “Libbie,” “a leftist,” more seldom a Democrat: through Friedman and the NYT, the adversaries (mostly in Fox, but not only) attack the Democrats and what they stand for. This is why (despite some efforts to overcome the political dissensions and look for a common solution), the divide is far from being eliminated: on the contrary, it structures a great deal of the online political debate. Many polemical exchanges read as attacks on the other party, especially when they are exacerbated by the duel between pro- and anti-Trump Internet users. In this context, the polemical discourse goes beyond the discussion about the Mexican wall, and includes antagonistic views on immigration, reciprocal denunciations of so-called electoral calculations and so on. In other words, the attempt to rationally discuss antagonistic stances is replaced by a verbal fight that extends beyond the question of the Mexican wall to various, and numerous, points of dissension. Each party thus diverts from the theme of the debate and advances its own theses on different issues, while expressing hostility, anger, and contempt toward the other party. This is encouraged by the genre of the online political discussion forum, “where arguers are free to generate as many standpoints (‘ideas’) relevant to the issue as they can,” thus creating a “network of interrelated issues […] organizing into discussion threads.” (Lewi´nski, 2010, p. 38). Among other ideas, the Republicans circulate on Fox the notion that Democrats are people cut off from reality and are thus unable to find adequate solutions to practical problems. They are living in a dream from which they should wake up, a view that is often formulated through ironical remarks: “DisplayNameHereLeader25 Apr

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Did I just read that right? A libbie turned? Does this mean he woke?” “Fernandinasun275Leader 24 Apr. Liberals are slow to realize reality. But even a blind squirrel finds a corn every once in awhile.” Many posts deal with the fact that a Democrat at last went to the border in order to see the situation with his own eyes, while the others never cared to do so: “BillyBobbed718Leader 24 AprThis is why3 no democrats in congress tour the border. They would have to face reality if they did.” Sometimes, Friedman’s approval provides an opportunity to attack liberals as a whole: “mmil55Leader 24 AprWhat he did is in contrast to the many liberal politicians that refuse to admit that there is an emergency. He actually visited the border and saw first-hand. His eyes were opened. The politicians even refuse to visit the scene because they know that they are wrong.” Liberals are not only described as blind, they are also accused of lacking logic and common sense: “psprLeader 25 Apr Even on the liberal side some common sense seeps through on rare occasions;” “LostSoul2112Leader24 AprCher, Friedman, I find it reassuring that some Democrats can still be reached with logic.” Moreover, they are accused of hypocrisy: “Ghosthunter2018Leader 24 Apr Democrats who oppose a border wall have a wall surrounding their property as well as armed security.” For all this, and many more flaws, the Republicans predict the defeat of the Democrats at the next elections: “Trump is going to destroy the democrats in 2020, and it’s mostly because democrats have shot themselves in each foot over and over. And they don’t learn from their mistakes! The only thing they are going to have to run on in 2020 is a lot of sanctimony.” Accusing them of bad faith, some even summon them to apologize: “WRP385Leader 24 Apr GreggBadmitten596 Too late for that argument. Democrats have labelled Republicans as racists based primarily on the wall. Democrats can’t now simply say they agree with a Republican position that they have, up to now, been condemning. Dems must admit publicly they used it for political reasons and now acknowledge it was a major error. That is what Adults do.” Thus the “libbies” or “libs”, “dems” are the target of polemical attacks for the theses they defend or their unrealistic approach to reality, as well as for their contradictions or lack of common sense. Most of the posts express contempt rather than indignation—the latter supposes that the target of indignant emotion enjoys a status he does not deserve, which is not the case: the liberal approach is presented as a failure— made even more conspicuous by Friedman’s change of mind—and as a path leading to electoral disaster. The predominant scorn is vehiculated through ironic and often sarcastic remarks, as we have seen in a number of the citations. Trump supporters and more generally, the Republicans on the Fox site, do not address their opponents, who are not judged worthy of participating in a dialogue. They are designated by a “they,” a third person described by the linguist Benveniste as a non-person (namely, a party that does not participate in the dialogue where “I” is exchanging with “you”). The same happens in the NYT, although there are posts that mention the common interest of both parties or the necessity for both of them to make compromises. However, most of the mentions of Republicans express anger and/or indignation. Here is an instance of this attitude by Mathias (NORCALApril 24): […].

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No movement until the Republicans wake up and remove the petty tyrant! I voted to block this thug in office so why should I follow his agenda? The Russia divide and conquered agenda? I also know that this immigration is zero threat to me and my family! These people just want a chance to live and are no threat to me! This has been going on for decades and I don’t believe for a second this is the right time to do something with all this racial rhetoric and my way or the highway from republicans. You lost all bipartisan good faith! You threw it away republicans! Enjoy the mess you caused by your leaderships actions crossing the border! You made the mess! Stop playing John Wayne and simply watch him on TV where it belongs!

The emotional attitude of the speaker surfaces in the numerous exclamation marks and the choice of hyperbolic and disparaging qualifications such as “petty tyrant,” “thug,” “mess,” etc. The Opponent is addressed, but in an aggressive manner that does not open the door to any dialogue: the arguer just points a finger at him, in an act of accusation calling for no answer: “You made the mess!”. The condemnation of racism (“racist rhetoric”) directed against Trump reflects on the entire Republican population that elected him. These traces of anger towards a group that “has behaved in an unfair, cruel or unacceptable way” are accompanied by scorn: just as the conservatives accuse the “libbies” of being cut off from reality, the liberal denounces the fact that Republicans are confusing Western movies with the real world. Thus the general conclusion that “Nothing good will happen with Republicans in control” (rantall MassachusettsApril 24). As a rule, the conservatives incur the same reproaches as their leader: exploiting the crisis for electoral purposes, arousing the issue of the Mexican wall to flatter the feelings of hatred and the racism of their supporters so they can stay in power (“If the crisis goes away, they will too. It’s always about P-O-W-E-R.” BobMeredith, NYApril 24), “demonizing desperate and vulnerable people” (JordanApril24) to exploit feelings of fear, pretending to deal with illegal immigration while unwilling to solve it because they enjoy cheap labor: “Allen82OxfordApril 24 He [Trump] does not want to fix it and neither do the Republicans. They need the ‘invasion’ issue for the 2020 election. It brings in two voting blocks who want to oppose “the other”: Bigots/Nationalists and The Religious.” The indignation that pervades the posts denouncing the Republicans’ exploitation of the immigration issue for their own purposes can be felt in the intensity of the attacks, even when they refrain from using direct verbal violence. This indignation also transpires in the accusation of having turned down all the Democrats’ propositions for solving the problem: “Jim DennisHouston, TexasApril 24. The Democrats offered 25 billion for border security in exchange for a path to citizenship for DACA children. Republicans, and Trump, turned it down. That sure seems pretty shortsighted, inflexible, cruel and stupid right now, doesn’t it?” A more detailed but no less passionate account is provided by another Internet user: MC NJApril 23 May 2006: Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, Senate passed 62-36, bipartisan support. The Republican House refused to take it up. June 2013: Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, Senate passed 68-32, bipartisan support, every Democratic Senator supported it, 14 Republican Senators supported it. The Republican House refused to take it up, to compromise and find a real solution

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for our broken immigration system. Since then Republicans voted for an openly racist, white nationalist supporting President, that 90% of Republicans still support no matter how outrageous/dangerous/criminal his behavior. A President who only wants to demagogue and hate/fear monger the immigration issue and refuses all good faith attempts by Democrats to deal with the real issues. […]

As we have seen, the NYT and FOX posts rarely engage the Internet users in face to face confrontations. This is obviously due to the fact that they participate in different platforms and do not care to mingle, even if there are some conservatives commenting on the NYT site and some liberals on Fox. The talkbacks where we can find most verbal confrontations are in Mediaite, where there are obviously people from both sides. They are more personal, and often turn to verbal violence and insults—an aspect of polemical exchanges we will explore in the next chapter. In sum, it appears that both practical reasoning and emotions together create the polemical exchanges on the Net. The Internet users who blame pathos recur to it themselves in their indictments. Antagonistic stances based on more or less developed arguments are pervaded with emotion, as many axiological and affective marks show. At the same time, the emotions expressed in the posts are closely linked to the rational causes that justify them: contempt for Friedman, anger against Republicans or Democrats, indignation against Trump, etc. are all anchored in “good” reasons that can be understood if not always shared by the readers. More interestingly, the spots where the strongest “negative” emotions emerge reveal the core of the dissension. It is not so much Friedman’s recommendation of a wall reminiscent of Trump’s slogan as it is a general and unbridgeable conflict of values between liberals and conservatives, linked to the person of President Trump. The emotional aspect, expressing hostility, hatred, anger, contempt and indignation, is mostly concentrated on the very controversial President of the US. It is also rooted in the conflicts of values that oppose the conservative and liberal parties, since for the members of each party some of these values are constitutive of their identity. Thus, online political discussion loaded with these ethical and emotional components only deepens the gap, despite many good faith declarations of the necessity to avoid extremes and reach a compromise. We can see how feelings grounded in conflicting values and worldviews felt to be under attack, and the depth of emotions around the figure of President Trump as a source of deep disagreement, cause a strong emotional involvement that generates violent clashes and blocks any possibility of a solution to the conflict.

References Amossy, R. (2010). L’Argumentation dans le discours. Colin. Boudon, R. (1994). La logique des sentiments moraux. L’année Sociologique, 44, 19–51. Charaudeau, P. (2000). Une problématisation discursive de l’émotion. À propos des effets de pathémisation à la télévision. In C. Plantin, et al. (Eds.), Les Émotions dans les interactions. Arci/Presses universitaires de Lyon.

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Foucault, M. (1994). Polémique, politique et problématisation. In Dits et Écrits (Vol. 4, pp. 591– 598). Gallimard. Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. (1980). La polémique et ses définitions. In N. Gelas & C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (Eds.), Le Discours Polémique (pp. 3–40). Presses universitaires de Lyon. Koren, R. (2003). Stratégies et enjeux de la “dépolitisation” du langage. In B. Grevisse & A. Dubied (Eds.), La Polémique journalistique (Vol. 20, pp. 65–84). Recherches en communication. Lewi´nski, M. (2010). Internet political discussion forums as an argumentative activity type. Sicsat/Rozenberg Publishers. Meyer, M. (2000). Philosophy and the passions: Towards a philosophy of human nature (Robert F. Barsky, Trans.). Pennsylvania State University Press. Micheli, R. (2010a). L’Émotion argumentée. L’abolition de la peine de mort dans le débat parlementaire français. Le Cerf. Micheli, R. (2010b). Qu’est-ce qu’une polémique affective ? Réflexion sur les liens entre la polémique et la construction discursive de l’émotion. In A. Luce & N. Loïc (Eds.), Polémique(s) Modalités et formes rhétoriques de la parole agonale de l’Antiquité à nos jours. De Boeck-Duculot. Nussbaum, M. C. (1996). Aristotle on emotions and rational persuasion. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (pp. 303–323). University of California Press. Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). Upheavels of thought: The intelligence of emotion. Cambridge University Press. Parret, H. (1986). Les passions. Mardaga. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969) [1958]. The New Rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. University of Notre Dame Press Plantin, C. (1997). L’argumentation dans l’émotion. Pratiques, 96, 81–100. Plantin, C. (1998). Les raisons des émotions. In M. Bondi (Ed.), Forms of Argumentative Discourse/Per un’analisi linguistica dell’argomentare. CLUEB. Plantin, C. (2011). Les Bonnes Raisons des émotions. Principes et méthode pour l’étude du discours émotionné. Peter Lang. Walton, D. (1992). The place of emotion in argument. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Chapter 7

Verbal Violence: Its Functions and Limits

7.1 “Flames” in Online Conversations. Is Violence Intrinsic to Public Controversy? A discourse of passion, polemics is also accused of being a discourse of violence. It is by this latter characteristic, more so than by emotion, that the speaker often believes he can identify it. An increase in tension in the interaction (Fracchiola et al., 2013, p. 11) or a virulence of tone in the argument, suffices for a discourse to be perceived as polemical. However, public controversy or polemics, as we have seen, is an argumentative modality and not just an aggressive discourse. It is a confrontation, a strong opposition of discourses on a controversial issue. Its basis, as Garand rightly underlines, is the conflictual and not violence. A mere exchange of insults between neighbors is certainly violent, but it is not a public controversy. If violence does not make polemics, we can say inversely (and contrary to conventional wisdom) that polemics does not necessarily require verbal violence. We have already mentioned the example of Mitterand’s text (Chap. 3), where the target is not named and the attacks remain implicit. Beyond this extreme case, we can find numerous discourses where the dichotomization and the polarization, even the discrediting of the adversary, do not occur through verbal violence. Thus, in the French debate about the excessive remunerations of corporate executives at the very moment when they are laying off workers, polemical comments appear on the “slogans” that are circulating in the public sphere: When I read that Sanofi is preparing a PLAN TO SAVE JOBS by cutting 575 jobs, I ask myself am I dreaming… or am I on another planet, in another civilization… it is like the VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES… Do you understand the employers’ new language coming from the Medef (Movement of the Enterprises of France)? I don’t…. (Lola Saturday March 21 [2009], 9:30)

To this comment Jean Karim (Saturday March 21, 10:00) adds: “Not at all, you are not on another planet but well and good in France. The compulsory use of certain expressions aims to mold public opinion and make it accept the unacceptable […] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_7

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All of this is called manipulation and it is not new. We can see that the press relays fairly complacently this deceptive argument.” The criticism of the so-called manipulative formulas aims at targets: the companies that issue them, the Medef (Movement of the Enterprises of France), the media. It provokes a clash of antagonistic theses (companies dupe the public by laying off people for their own benefit vs. companies lay people off to ensure their performance, or to escape bankruptcy); and it polarizes people into two groups (the exploiters/the exploited, corporate executives/workers). The unreasonable character of the position of the adversary is underlined by the metaphor of another planet or another civilization—a world where a logic without any relationship to our own reigns. The demystification of the “corporate” terminology which comes to support unreasonable policies (it is said to disguise the “unacceptable”) is nonetheless done through a discourse exempt from verbal violence that relies on identifiable arguments. We see therefore that for public controversy in its polemical form, verbal violence is neither a sufficient nor even a necessary condition. Even when it accompanies polemical discourse, as it often does, violence appears like a secondary rather than a defining characteristic. This is because verbal violence is not an argumentative modality, but rather a discursive register (Amossy, 2008). It does not refer to the way argumentation functions but to a tone and style used in an agonic exchange. As a discursive register, verbal violence can accompany public controversy, but it does not structure it. Like pathos, it gives public controversy more strength by manifesting and exacerbating the dichotomization, polarization, and discredit that define it. I would like to argue here that the verbal violence that often but not necessarily accompanies public controversies, does not turn them into wild and uncontrolled speech. On the contrary, it is functional and regulated. In the framework of the more or less permissive legislation that rules different types of interactions, verbal violence helps public controversy to fulfill different functions (such as protest, for example, or the incitement to action). This does not go, however, without raising the question of the possible excesses and external limits that should be assigned to it.

7.2 What is Verbal Violence? To test this hypothesis, we must first of all ask what constructs, in the discourse, the aggressive tonality that characterizes public controversy and polemics. We must recognize along with Maingueneau (2008, p. 113) that “verbal’violence’ is […] an intuitive notion that is very difficult to translate in linguistic terms.” We can nevertheless try to identify the parameters that allow for identifying the verbal violence on which the confrontation of arguments feeds. Overall, we can speak of verbal violence when: (1)

A strong pressure or coercion is exercised in order to prevent the other party from expressing himself and freely presenting his point of view. They are expressed linguistically by methods such as (a non-exhaustive list):

7.2 What is Verbal Violence?

a.

b.

c.

(2)

(3)

1

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In spoken encounters—the interruption and overlapping of speech in face to face exchanges. The polemicist does not respect people taking turns and does not let the other present his point of view. The assertiveness that Angenot characterizes as “the emphatic version of assertion” (1982, p. 238): the affirmation is presented in a peremptory fashion, and appears all the more as a coup de force that needs no justification. The polemicist hit the other with a truth that seeks to occupy the entire terrain by preventing him from advancing and justifying his own arguments. Rhetorical questions: the polemicist presents to his audience questions that contain their answer and hardly leave him any room to put forward his own. Halsall enumerates, among what he calls “figures of speech of vehemence,” one specific type of rhetorical question, the epiplexis, or precontrario. It “serves to blame the enunciator by asking him loaded questions” and aims at “revealing what in the eyes of the enunciator constitutes his faults.” (Halsall, 2003, p. 269)

The point of view presented is totally discredited or ridiculed, that is to say, is the subject of an attack destined to make the other lose face and to put him out of the game. Linguistically, the counter-discourse only presents the opposing side in highly disparaging ways by mobilizing all the means of reported discourse. The arguments of the Other are taken up and reformulated in such a way as to deprive them of their coherence, or decontextualized and diverted from their original meaning: they are the object of a reductio ad absurdum, or of a highly ironic or parodical treatment that invalidates them by making them ridiculous. The polemicist attacks the very person of the Opponent. Here we are dealing with the so-called ad hominem argument, which goes after the person of the adversary rather than his thesis. This argument includes several variants that Douglas Walton (who published numerous works on the issue including his first book in 19851 ) summarizes in the following ways: (1) a direct attack against the person of the Proponent that goes after his character and his personality instead of refuting the arguments he puts forward. The logic of ad hominem is therefore that an argument proposed by a person deficient in morality or in intelligence must be considered as equally deficient; (2) “circumstantial,” which supposes an inconsistency between the argument of the Proponent and a circumstantial feature of the person like his behavior or a contradiction in his statements—hence disqualification for incoherence; (3) the biased argument: The Proponent is accused of having a personal interest, a hidden agenda, and therefore of not producing objective and honest reasoning; (4) the tu quoque (you too) consists in returning against the other the accusations made against you (to the one who accuses you of denigrating your

The bibliography about ad hominem arguments is vast. The annotated bibliography of ADARR website is a good resource on this topic: http://www.tau.ac.il/~adarr/index.files/bibliographies/adh ominem.html.

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(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

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adversaries, you respond: you too!). In all cases, it appears that the refutation of the arguments of the adversary is short-circuited by a direct or indirect attack against his person. Violence emerges from the fact of discrediting the other in order to stop him from exposing his positions and, most of all, in the case of a direct attack, of denigrating him in an aggressive manner. The point of view, the entity or the person who incarnates it are assimilated to absolute Evil, delivering him to public hatred. Polemical discourse creates in this case an extreme polarization which turns into Manicheism, leading to the demonization of the other.2 The features attributed to the adversary make him into an incarnation of absolute Evil and as such, he is the subject of a loathing which expels him from the circle of legitimate participants. This scenario obviously only tolerates an exchange addressed by the Proponent to Third Parties, in front of whom the harm of the Opponent is revealed in all of its darkness. Violence is often linked to pathos: the polemicist expresses violent sentiments which are registered by lexical, syntactic, and prosodic markers. The aggressivity here comes from the fact that the speaker seems agitated by the strong feelings aroused by the Opponent and directed against him. This emotion is translated on the lexical plane or in exclamations, in phatic repetitions, or in the rhythm. The polemicist uses insults against his adversary. As a speech act, the insult combines the assertive (it attributes to the other qualities that disqualify him), the expressive (it shows hostility towards him) and the directive (it seeks a reaction from him or from a Third Party) (Chevalier & Chanay 2009, p. 46). The insult relates to arguments against the person: it manifests a strong disagreement with regard to the discourse or the behavior of the other (Vincent & Barbeau, 2012). Added to this is the fact that the speaker positions himself as the one who has the right to disqualify the Other, whom he puts down, and often does this in front of an audience: “if the insulted party is not convinced he is a poor shmuck, certain members of the public will be, multiplying the possibility of the propagation of the insult, often up to its naturalization in the public sphere.” (ibid.) For Goffman, the insult is an aggressive act which threatens the face of the receiver (but can be turned against the one who produces the act). (Goffman, 1967) The polemicist incites violence against others. The accusation launched against those who support the opposite thesis and represent the point of view accused of all of the evils is filled with encouragements to use force against them—by arms, the putting to death or other violent means other than verbal ones. Therefore, it is a form of violence on the ground encouraged by the polemicist, sometimes in the symbolic mode (a verbal expression which does not have an immediate impact), sometimes on the practical plane (an incentive to act concretely).

For a more in-depth discussion of demonization cf. Amossy and Koren (2010).

7.2 What is Verbal Violence?

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This is a broad definition of verbal violence that includes both interruptions or aggressive emotionality, and the elements associated in a clearer fashion with violence such as the insult or incitement to murder. These parameters are diversely exploited in polemical exchanges. Rather than further exploring forms of verbal violence, we intend to examine their relationship to argumentation and to rethink their function in the regulated framework of public controversy. The issue here is to understand to what extent a discourse that is excessive and violates the norms of civility (there is a transgression of the rules of politeness and an attack on the honor of the other) and the deontology of rational discussion (the rules of critical discussion aiming for a resolution of disagreements), can usefully participate in a public debate.

7.3 The Verbal Violence of Discussions on the Net: Flames This exploration will focus on a discussion forum of the French leftist newspaper Libération that deals with the stock options and the bonuses distributed in times of crisis.3 We can thereby get a closer look at how public controversies that use verbal violence appear on the Internet. It is a subject that has made a lot of ink flow in these last years. Indeed, the Net is accused by some of giving free reign to unbridled and dangerous violence, whereas others salute in it an instrument of civilian participation and of democratization. Regarding verbal violence on the Internet, the pseudonyms allowing participants to intervene in virtual space under a false identity are generally at issue. According to some, the clash that takes place between the masks allows for a confrontation of points of view detached from relationships of place, constraints of politeness, and maneuvers called for by the protection of private interests. Nevertheless, many insist on the dangers of de-responsabilization: under the cover of the pseudonym, the Internet users can wield verbal violence and threaten the face of the other without any sanction. Let us emphasize that such a device is the polar opposite not only of ordinary conversation, but also of traditional polemical exchanges. It is enough to consider the open letter, the televised debate, even the face to face political discussion in a bar on in a private home. As it is practiced in contemporary democracies, the political attack is undertaken by a social actor who comes forward with an uncovered face and implicates his person in order to promote a cause or to combat an abuse. It is in this sense that the polemicist assumes his responsibility fully: he engages his civic person in a fight where he can pay a high price—not only legal proceedings, but also attacks on his reputation, breaks in social relations, or damage caused to his private interests. None of all of this happens in the discussion forums. Indeed, the criticism and the attacks there express a strong personal involvement, but it is within a role play that leads to depersonalization and, thus to a lack of accountability at the 3

The studies about political discourse on the Internet are particularly numerous today, and it is impossible to mention all of the works on which my views are based. However, I will cite Marcoccia (2003) and Cardon (2010).

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legal as well as social and ethical levels (the person of the Internet user cannot be penalized). Consequently, the polemical exchange no longer opposes social actors, but “avatars,” beings endowed with a fictious identity in cyberspace. In the carnivalization of political speech authorized by the game of masks, the Internet user gives himself every right, so much so that the worst excesses are to be feared. It is in this context that the question of the verbal violence of public controversies in computermediated communication (CMC) arises. Let’s explore one of its most conspicuous forms: flames and flaming. Let’s start with a brief presentation of some studies in the social sciences on Internet flames. This metaphorical designation has been used in everyday language to designate hostile and aggressive interactions in online discussion, and it has been the subject of scholarly articles which questioned its exact definition, its exclusive occurrence in CMC, its sociopsychological sources, and its functions in virtual interactions. Flaming has generally been perceived as deregulated verbal behavior freed from all inhibition that tends to emerge in exchanges in virtual face to face encounters, and which include abuse, insults, and profane language. The idea that flames occur exclusively in online communication has however been disproved by experimental research (Lea et al., 1992, p. 108–9) showing that the phenomenon is not specific to electronic exchanges: it can be found in other spaces (O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2012, p. 71). These findings are accompanied by attempts at more systematic definitions. If flaming represents a manifestation of hostility (Kayani, 1998, p. 1137–8), it is no less closely linked to conflict: it consists of hostile reactions “leading to an escalation of the conflict.” (Rice & Steinfeld in Thompsen, 2003, p. 3). Moreover, this conflict is not the pure fruit of exchange on the Internet: it relates to a political, cultural, and religious context so much so that the flames appear as the expression of conflicts outside the Net (Kayani, 1998, p. 1137) that find a place to develop in virtual space. Certain studies therefore permit differentiating between the gratuitous verbal violence often attributed to flaming, from the violence expressed in a conflictual exchange dealing with social issues. The social sciences also investigate the transgression of norms that is at the heart of the definition of verbal violence. From a sociopsychological perspective, it has been defined as an intentional violation of interactional norms, thus as a harmful behavior. This judgement is however reconsidered by scholars such as Lea et al. (1992, p. 109), for whom flaming is, on the contrary, a normative behavior in a social context modeled by the rules of the medium. It arises in social groups that include among their shared norms behavior freed from inhibitions (Ibid., p. 107). From this perspective, flames are part of interactional routines—albeit unconventional and irreverent ones. This explains why, although the explosions of verbal violence are manifest infractions of the code of politeness, participants accept or tolerate them. Even if they denounce them, they do not abandon the game. As an integral part of the digital conversation, flaming seems to be part of the (proper) functioning of the exchange. In sum, flames are verbal behaviors which violate the rules of civility and as a result seem to threaten the smooth running of the interaction, even though they are

7.3 The Verbal Violence of Discussions on the Net: Flames

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in fact a part of a permissible routine in virtual communities (along the lines of the exchanges that sociolinguists have studied in specific milieus like communities of young people in poor suburbs). Far from being simple explosions of individual moods, they are on the contrary linked to psychosocial conflicts which they express on the Internet. Down to their brutality, they participate in a ritual which models the agonic relations at the basis of public controversies and polemics. It is nevertheless necessary to add that they do not escape formal regulation (designated by the term “netiquette”) often practiced in discussion forums by moderators who eliminate posts that are too vulgar, defamatory, or racist. In Libération we find in these cases a side bar with the comment: “This contribution, which goes against the charter of Libération, has been sent to the graveyard for comments.”

7.4 Violence and Argumentation It is important to emphasize that in journalistic discussion forums, the violence of flames does not ipso facto expel argumentation.4 Thus “god” launches a personal attack against “liberal” destined to make him lose face and to discredit him: “you should be ashamed of choosing liberal as your pseudonym when everyone agrees that it is liberalism that dragged the world into this crisis !!! There are always extremists to defend the indefensible. With a bit of luck, it is the end of capitalism. We will do everything in our power for it! (Saturday, March 21, 10:45)” If the post damns the other about his choice of pseudonym with a passion and aggressivity marked by multiple exclamation marks (feature 5), it nonetheless puts forward its reasons in an argument in the form of an enthymeme: to get on the side of what causes social evils is shameful/liberal by his choice of pseudonym gets on the side of a recognized source of social evils/therefore liberal adopts a shameful behavior. And further: extremism is guilty, because it leads to defending indefensible causes/liberal defends the cause of liberalism judged by all to be indefensible (the consensus on the origin of the crisis constituting proof)/therefore he is a reprehensible extremist. Here, the argumentation holds an ad hominem attack that damns the Opponent. (feature 3). The same liberal attacked for his pseudonym and his opinions retorts to the journalist who, in “Bad Actions for the Bosses” (Libération 7.29. 2009) attacks the CEOs for whom lay-offs are not shameful in themselves, through a post that initiates a long and heated debate on the question of the lay-off plans: According to Libé, eliminating jobs is a shameful indicator for a boss. They prefer that we safeguard jobs at all costs: we sell less cars: let’s continue to make them to save jobs. We sell less financial products: let’s continue to keep employment in the banks. We sell less newspapers: let’s continue to keep journalists who don’t provide satisfaction to their customers!

4

For an interesting analysis of argumentation in the framework of discussion and dissent online, see Chaput (2008) and Lewi´nski (2010).

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What will companies do to keep their employees occupied? We will make them move a big pile of sands. When they have moved it they will put it back in its original place. It’s useless but at least jobs will be spared (Saturday March 21, 8:53).

This post employs verbal violence not through the use of insulting or rude language, but through the recourse to a total disqualification of the adversary turned into derision (feature 2). The target here is both the signatory of the article, and all of those who, following him, stigmatize the very idea of lay-offs. The Internet user employs a reductio ad absurdum which ridicules the objective of preserving jobs no matter what (“keeping jobs at all costs”). His/her own thesis (when there aren’t enough orders the company must lay workers off) emerges from this reductio ad absurdum of the opposing stance—which implicitly confers on the polemicist a position of common sense (s/he represents the reasonable versus the unreasonable—the absurd). Those who do not think like liberal are thus put out of the game by their incoherent reasoning—with a dig in “lets continue to keep journalists who don’t provide satisfaction to their customers! “ That verbal violence does not exclude argumentation is manifested down to the use of insults (feature 6), which Vincent and Barbeau (2012, paragraph 12) have shown constitute a specific argumentative form of the ad hominem: Doing (X) is disqualifiable B does (X) Therefore B is (called a ydisqualification ). “The rot of French Management! It is not surprising that the budget of France is what it is! And to say that the Government and the Medef (the Movement of the Enterprises of France) support this type of vandals.” (Boris, Wednesday March 25 [2009], 19: 11) This post is found in “Chevreux, maxi-bonus, 75 lay-offs.” The journalist reveals that in the brokerage affiliate of Green Bank of Chevreux a restructuring plan aiming to save 32 million euros involves cutting 75 jobs despite the fact that it gives 51 million Euros in bonuses to its management and more specifically to its top executives. The insult thrown at the management (rot, vandals) clearly comes to stigmatize reprehensible behavior that grossly contravenes the rule of justice. Granting oneself big financial advantages by harming others is dishonest and damaging/the executives grant themselves bonuses and lay-off employees/therefore they are dishonest and deserve to be treated as “trash” and “vandals.” The same goes when the insult is thrown at the head of an interlocutor rather than being directed against an adversary to whom one is not addressing directly. It is this coexistence of argumentation and of violence that stops numerical flames from lapsing into pure aggressivity and enables them to remain within the framework of public controversy as an argumentative modality characterized by the clash of antagonistic opinions. Flames are not an unbridled verbal behavior that allows for dropping of all inhibitions, but a mode of conflict management in which the devise of the discussion forum grants a non-negligible place to verbal violence.

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7.5 Public Controversy as a Personal Quarrel When we look at flames in discussion forums, we notice that the public controversies between Internet users often take the shape of personal quarrels. These are explosive even though they are conflicts between individuals hidden under a pseudonym that remain by definition within the limits of a virtual encounter. The matter seems, to say the least, paradoxical. Actually, this aspect of personal quarrel is due to the conversationalization and the subsequent subjectivation that characterize online exchanges. “Conversationalization” is used here with the meaning given to it by Fairclough (1992): the extension of the genre of conversation to other discursive situations. Here, the conversation migrates from the “private sphere to the public domain” (Gadet, 2005, p. 240); as a result, the civic confrontation now takes on the appearance of an online conversation. Although written and asynchronous, the debate thus takes up the appearance of an every-day exchange between individuals, often (although not necessarily) marked by a linguistic phenomenon of oralization which nourishes the violence of the remarks. We can add to this the subjectivation of the debate: the personal expression of opinions, of reactions and individual feelings is the rule. The notion of subjectivation is understood here in the broad sense: the inclusion of subjectivity in the discourse; linguistic commitment—the speaker taking responsibility for a point of view of which he is the source, or refusing to commit himself to a point of view that he disassociates from. (Dendale & Coltier, 2005); and, more generally, the taking of a stance by a speaker who expresses his opinion. “Opinion,” which is not discursively noticeable, unless it is accompanied by a metadiscourse—“That is my personal opinion,” “In my opinion,”—is defined as the evaluative position of an individual on a state of affairs. It offers the representation of an exterior situation founded on an interior understanding of this same situation (Schiffrin, 1990, p. 244–5). The discussion forum thus allows, both the invasion of journalistic space by a subjectivity that is concretely marked in the discourse and in form of the interaction; and the expression of personal opinions in argued debates dealing with global issues. This subjectivation in the framework of the conversationalization characterizing online discussions, contributes to making debates imbued with violence look like a quarrel between individuals. The conversationalisation of public controversies on the Net can take place in “duels” where two Internet users polemicize in a sustained manner in a space that is accessible to all (the others are therefore nothing but bystanders, passive receivers): decentered or star-shaped public controversies in which several violent reactions are addressed to a same internaut; complex developments where debate alternates with polemics and bifurcates from time to time because of “new threads” that intersect it. In all of these frameworks, the violence that emerges in the agonic exchanges give them their aspect of a personal dispute even though it is a digital conversation between two masked interlocutors who do not have any direct relationship with each other. Let’s look here at the first case study. We find in Libération, following an article signed by Nicolas Cori, “A massive golden parachute at Valeo (French automotive

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supplier)” (24.03.2009), an exchange which brings Minuk and Zythum into conflict. The latter, in his profile, says he is “on the left but a republican and democrat above all” and someone who cannot bear “stupidity and injustice” (Minuk on the other hand, does not signal anything in his profile). Minuk argues by trying to corner in their own contradictions those who think that there are differences in income that cannot be justified; he asks why these disparities should be more justifiable when they are between French citizens and citizens from less privileged countries. The polemical exchange continues with Zythum who intervenes with a passion marked though the excessive use of question marks: “And Morin…. How many Cambodians could he feed??? Have you done the math???? (Tuesday March 24, 14:21)” A genuinely argued discussion thus takes place, in a virulent tone, between two Internet users, in which Minuk asks his Opponent to go all the way with his logic: if we should not accept a great disparity in the living standards between humans, this is also valid between France and poor countries. The argument rests here on the rule of justice which requires an equal treatment of beings who are essentially alike (Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca, 1969 [1958]). If, refusing universal sharing, the leftist does not accept this rule and the logic that ensues, he contravenes his own principles of equality. He then falls under the reproach of one of the variants of the ad hominem argument since he contradicts himself (it is the circumstantial ad hominem). It should be noted that Minuk also bases his reasoning on the argument of the “slippery slope” (often considered a fallacy) which is a type of argument by the consequence (a first step will lead to an inevitable chain of events whose final result will be bad). Thus, if we accept the necessity of sharing the wealth in France on the basis of principles of justice and equality, we will also have to accept it between France and Cambodia, then with the entire world. This argument is tacitly opposed to the position of the adversary (in this case, the necessity of the equitable sharing of wealth in France) by showing the consequences of this logic when it is pursued to its final conclusion, because in this “game,” the French will be the losers. Zythum, in turn, admits that we are always the “super-rich” of someone, but accuses his adversary of advancing this argument to dilute the problem and not tackle the question of the scandalous inequalities in France. He brands him with bad faith. He follows up by trying thereafter to corner his adversary in a contradiction: “I can see that when the matter under discussion is the salaries of the top executives, one has always looked upwards.” If we admit that by adopting a global measure the inequalities should not be reduced at the bottom, why accept doing it at the top by taking the United States as a model to justify raises of salaries for the executives? Here again, the rule of justice is applied in an approach modeled on that of the Opponent, and the ad hominem argument guides the attack against the arguer who is accused of contradicting himself. In this polemical exchange nourished by formal arguments, the adversaries don’t deny themselves the right to use verbal violence. They both have recourse, as we have just seen, to the circumstantial ad hominem that catches the other in the trap of his own reasoning by showing that he contradicts himself and shows evidence of incoherence. The ad hominem in the form of a personal attack, by definition more violent, also arises:

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What I notice…. […] Obviously, we are always the “rich guy” for someone else in the absolute, if we go to the other end of the earth…. But if it is your way of placating those who here in France don’t have anywhere to live and barely have anything to eat, excuse me, but I find that so arrogant…. Its pathetic! The clients of the restos du Coeur (a food bank) will appreciate your noble spirit….(my emphasis)

Aggressive assaults personalize the attack by directly calling on the interlocutor: “But here in case you haven’t realized, we are talking about salaries that are 100, 200, 500 times higher than minimum wage!!!! (my emphasis) The remarks of the interlocutor are presented as exposing the deficiency in his reasoning and, as a consequence, of his abilities: “Minuk: Pathetic! A pitiful remark ….” Minuk, first more measured, ends up adopting the same tone: “What I am simply saying, is that it is easy, naïve, and as a matter of fact infantile, to demand as a solution “sharing, sharing, sharing,” hopping along, especially if in this sharing … only those better off than oneself are included! It is pathetic!” Infantilism against arrogance—it is, among other things, this exchange of insults that turns this online conversation into a personal quarrel. Moreover, the exchanges look like a quarrel in which each one accuses the other of bad faith in how they report the statements of the adversary, Minuk: “Don’t make me say what I didn’t say—or didn’t write poorly;” “stop looking for dirt; you’ve understood very well what I meant …;” “This sentence you haven’t heard it from me, so stop attributing it to me, by putting people into little boxes according to the way that YOU imagine them. Okay?!” Zythum declares in turn: “Don’t you see that you are caricaturing everything I say…” The protests of the Internet user come to refute the image that his reported discourse projects of him. “I have never suggested that the situation of the restos du Coeur regulars should be left as is, nor that it was necessary that the people in question should be satisfied with it […] One would have to be seriously dumb!” We see the identity stakes linked to the accusations of distorting the other’s words when feigning to report his discourse. They explain in part the violence of the exchange. The oralization of the debate visible in the colloquialisms (“Okay?!” “One would have to be seriously dumb!,” etc.) reinforce the virulence of the attack against the Opponent. Once more, verbal violence is displayed in the argumentative framework of a debate on a social issue, however the debate about the question of social justice in terms of equitable repartition of resources takes on, in this instance, the appearance of a dispute between two individuals who attack and hurt each other personally. An examination of the diverse occurrences of public controversies, including the numerous cases where the debate between several speakers (and not only between two Internet users) turns to the violent confrontation of antagonistic theses, confirms that the entanglement of the argued discourse and the virulent personal quarrel is a constant in the corpus of discussion forums. The participants become invested in a discussion both private (it is between individuals) and public (it is given to all to read and deals with societal problems). The online conversation therefore takes over from the café and salon discussions. I so doing, it introduces a violence that the former did not tolerate.

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Even if the conversationalization explains the aspect of a personal quarrel, we can wonder why the latter arises in a framework where the participants, masked under their pseudonyms, don’t know each other and have no a priori reason to transform the debate on a public issue into a dispute between individuals. On second thought, however, the logic of this phenomenon reveals itself clearly. On the Net the adversary is perceived uniquely in relation to the opinion he represents and defends. He does not possess the multiple dimensions—institutional, professional, friendly etc.—that interfere with ordinary human relationships and complicate them. The man and the position defended conflate and become one and the same, to the exclusion of all other factors. From this perspective, the actor is an empty form which naturally blends into the actant, so much so that the thesis and the person to be discredited are one. The Internet user, reduced to a simple pseudonym, thus becomes a target that is both disembodied and personalized—an opinion against which violence can express itself all the more since it is being exercised in a space where status and titles are erased.5 In this particular framework marked by violence, online conversation permits Internet users to meet virtually representatives of the antagonistic position that they might not have had the opportunity to face in everyday life, and they certainly would not have been able to attack as openly in a face to face encounter, especially with a person they know and in a social situation bound by hierarchies and rules of politeness. We can deduce from this, as do some, that discussion forums authorize unfortunate excesses by lifting all inhibitions, and that they have a pure function of release. But we can also consider that they offer a necessary arena for polemical confrontations where the clash of antagonistic opinions takes place in all its force,6 and where the holders of contradictory positions can rant liberally against the adversary while measuring themselves against him and fighting for their opinions. The persistence of Internet users in crossing swords in online discussions shows the need experienced by ordinary people not only to give free reign to a violence too often held inside, but also to initiate a dialogue with their adversaries, albeit in an exchange that resembles a quarrel more than a dialogue in search of an agreement.

5

This remark adds to the results of certain studies on the fact that the lack of complexity based on the difference facets of the personality of the participants in the debate leads to a lack of flexibility and difficulty in reaching an agreement (Flichy, 2008, p. 163). 6 Flichy thus reports the results of an inquiry led by Jennifer Stromer-Galley among Internet users. “[…] Many interviewees value diversity. They express the pleasure there is in meeting online people that are different from them by their social or geographic origin, but also people who think differently. […] The studies of Wyat and Katz on political conversations […] show that these take place most often in the home and at work and take place for the most part (80–85%) with people with whom there aren’t any frequent disagreements.” (Flichy, 2008, p. 175).

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7.6 Violence Directed Against a Third Party: Creating a Virtual Community of Protest The aspect of a personal quarrel does not however exhaust the question of violence on the Net. It is also necessary to inquire about the functions of the discussions that usually present themselves as polylogues between an open number of participants who join in the pluralistic debate opened by the newspaper article, or in the “thread” proposed by one of the participants. In this framework, flames on the Net come from several Internet users and are directed either towards an addressee on whom the attack is concentrated, or against a Third Party or a group. As in the case of emotion, from which it is inseparable, this practice of acerbic and aggressive criticism exacerbates the protest. Most of all, it contributes to consolidating a virtual community by unifying the internauts in an attack against a common enemy. The discredited Opponent is completely removed from the dialogue: polarization taken to the extreme has the result that no negotiation with what he proposes and represents is possible. We can say that in these cases, the online discussion forums construct a community of protest. In “Bad Actions for the Bosses,” we find a series of attacks against executives, rich in marks of emotionality and insults, which echo each other by reinforcing each other mutually: Yaguar: “Dough! (Satuday March 21, 8:47); els2 Incorrigibles. Decidedly, they will never understand (Saturday March 21, 8:37); pomalo; not … incorrigibles but rotten! justice because when we speak of scum it is of that scum that we should be speaking.” (Saturday March 21, 8: 46). In this same forum (following the article “Bad Actions for the Bosses”), a community of protest emerges around the same topic: the mismanagement of the situation by President Sarkozy whose words are not followed by actions. Thus, ramon 78 (Saturday March 21, 9:20) reports Sarkozy’s statement: “Determined measures must be put in place to fight the crisis,” and concludes: “From speech to speech …. NOTHING CONCRETE hot air,” adding that the president maybe “a slacker” behind his behavior of “nervous, agitated, and angry person.” Damiendenacy adds: “If Nico [Nicolas Sarkozy] imagines that the simple fact of denouncing the practices of stock options will be sufficient to curb the mounting anger of the employees and of those who have a job and of those who are losing it, the guy is wrong. We are asking for just one thing: dough, that’s all. Otherwise, it’s gonna blow, that’s for sure!” (Saturday March 21, 9: 04). Tita 84 (Saturday March 21, 8: 54): “When will they use Kärcher7 for the bank executives? Pitiful, one more show of the vibrio8 quicker at silencing The National Assembly or the media than at changing the arrogant behavior 7

During the 2005 riots in the suburbs in France, Nicolas Sarkozy, at the time Interior Minister, announced that he was going to “clean out the city with a Kärcher” (nettoyer la cité au Kärcher), a brand of high pressure water cleaners, in order to eradicate urban violence and the black market. The expression has widely circulated and remained engraved in the memory of French citizens. 8 The vibrio is a mobile micro-organism—the nickname was attributed to Nicolas Sarkozy in part because of his short stature, but mainly because the figurative meaning of a vibrio is: a very active person, which is the case of Sarkozy who is perceived as an agitated man.

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of these banker buddies […].” Palombe (Saturdya March 21, 14:00): “A windmill besides getting excited will he make them give back their bonuses and other stock options obtained in a way that is not far from banditry but these men are untouchable because they are sarko’s grey eminences.9 ” To which Crinquebille adds that contrary to Barack Obama, “The Government will content itself with making wind to divert everyone’s attention.” The president is targeted by an insulting description which depicts him as an agitated, nervous, and choleric man who does not act. This demeaning image circulates in the social discourse and finds itself in other forums: “SARKO it would be a bit of Louis de Funès (a French slapstick comedian), but more excited, and much less funny.” (clairandre, Wednesday March 25 [2009], 14: 20). He is also the ally of the bosses with “arrogant and depraved behavior” comparable to “banditry” (“his banker buddies,” his secret advisers …) whose activities reflect on him. He is therefore insulted to the extent that he is himself accused of depravity and cronyism. The Internet users gather on the Net around their reprimands whose verbal violence is not only an outlet. They express a common rage and a collective refusal to remain silent about the behaviors they consider to be intolerable. In this collective explosion which is sometimes followed by threats (“Otherwise it’s gonna blow, that’s for sure!”), the President is taken to task despite his firm declarations and his decision to take steps to restrict the salaries of company executives in times of crisis. The numerous Internet users who attack and insult Sarkozy gather and form a community of protesters decrying their lack of confidence in the good will of the President as a representative of the right and of liberal politics, as an ally and friend of the very wealthy, and as an untrustworthy individual, a buffoon who contents himself with grand gestures. The violence expressed against a Third Party through ad hominem arguments, the insults and the attempt to discredit him completely have the effect of gathering and unifying speakers who do not know each other but who recognize each other. In the framework of public controversy where violence remains caught in argumentation, this proximity allies the outbreak of collective aggressivity with reasoned adhesion to common theses. By decrying their rage in the virulent terms that the game of masks characteristic of the discussion forum authorizes, the Internet users reinforce themselves mutually and construct a virtual community of opinion and protest.

7.7 Incitement to Violence: Polemical Violence and Coercive Rhetoric Collective protest is in itself an act of resistance. In addition to expressing his frustration and to adding his voice to other voices, the protester tries to oppose a power said to victimize him; he aspires to contribute to social change. In collective protests such as those dealing with stock options or with the status of women, public controversy 9

An éminence grise or grey eminence is a powerful adviser who operates “behind the scenes”.

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takes on an anti-establishment form that can turn it into mobilization. It is sometimes concretized on the ground when it brings crowds onto the streets or leads to acts of public resistance. Speech is then the lever in an action that contributes to a social struggle. This aspect is found in the posts that call on Internet users to react and to act: “I vote for general mayhem, unlimited strikes, obstruction, stopping everything as long as this clique has not been removed from the pot of honey and from power once and for all […] SICK AND TIRED!” In the same vein, Josephine writes: “But when, finally, are the good people going to tear everything down in the face of this cynicism, this contempt, this violence from the bosses and other executives. With these bonuses, and other money sugar-coating by these guys, we are reaching the filthiest levels! Class struggle, does that mean anything to you? So what are we waiting for to torch the place?” (Wednesday March 25, 11: 01). The call to action is here to an explicit incitement to violence (feature 7). The flames of violence often advocate, symbolically or not, Revolution, and are nourished by the ancestral imaginary of 1789 and 1793. Thus Davidax writes “Otherwise it’s Revolution,” in the forum of the article “The Bosses are stuffing their faces:” “In the eighteenth century, when this type of situation presented itself (manifest injustice between Nobles, the Bourgeoisie and the people), there was a Revolution…” (Wednesday April 1, at 01:11). This remark does not include discursive marks of violence, but it brandishes a threat, leaving readers, and especially leaving interested parties to induce the fatal consequences of a pursuit of social injustice. We can see how this same call to Revolution takes on different modes in the same discussion forums relating to the remuneration of bosses in times of crisis. Another variation can be found in Marc’s post: Grab your arms, citizens!10 Visibly a new “nobility” has come to replace the one whose head we cut off in 1789. To the same words the same remedies, let’s make minced meat with these overprivileged jerks who have nothing but contempt for the national interest, and who think it is normal to stuff your face when the “little people” sink further into trouble – provoked by these same people. […] SICK OF IT! Wednesday March 25, at 13: 27

And from Claude: “To the lamp post11 ! [String them up!]:” “They produce no wealth and they stuff their faces so its time to restart 1789! It’s not just up to employees to bear the weight of the crisis, capital must also contribute” (Wednesday April 1 at 08: 19). It is followed by a pure cry from the heart from Zorglub: “You are right! Let’s set up the Guillotine on the Place de la Concorde! Enough….” (Wednesday April 1 at 8:31) On his end Robert exclaimed: “The abolition of privileges and bring back the widow [slang for the guillotine]. That’s the only solution. (Wednesday March 25, 10

This is a direct quotation from the French national hymn, the Marseillaise: “Aux armes, citoyens!”. A symbol of popular justice in the French Revolution, lamp posts served in 1789 as means of execution.

11

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8: 45). We note that Pedro backs off from the idea of the guillotine, and recommends a less bloody form of violence: “The widow NO but forced labor or if need be Salvation’s Island.12 When the function of incitement to action becomes incitement to violence, questions about the limits of public controversies inevitably arise. From the perspective of rhetoric defined as an art of the negotiation of differences and of the resolution of disputes, any violent discourse which stokes conflict and leads to outpourings of violence is reprehensible. It knocks down the barriers that the sharing of logos tries to erect against destruction, civil war, armed violence and, more generally, the disruption of order and the overthrow of the frameworks which establish social order. We can, however, as did Simon in 1972, recall that maintaining order is not necessarily desirable and that the conflict leading to change should not always be suppressed to the benefit of consensus. Basing himself in part on Coser (Chap. 1), the rhetorician of social movements insists on the value of conflict. According to him, “where alternative systems are manifestly preferable, conflict may be the only means of bringing them into being. Hence, to work at inciting or exacerbating conflict may be just as ethical as working at preventing, managing or resolving it.” (Simons, 1972, p. 239) This is all the more so the case when exulted violence appears to be the only possible response to another violence—“this violence of the bosses and other executives” that imposes on the dominated a law where the power struggle is concealed under an appearance of legitimacy. (That is symbolic violence according to Bourdieu). In the cases, then, when public controversy goes beyond simple differences of opinion in order to deal with social conflicts that put into question a power structure and a system of norms, it can legitimately—according to Simons and the rhetoric of social movements—arm itself concretely with violence on the ground. Persuasion is no more the contrary of coercion in a dissociation between argumentative reason and brute force. On the contrary, the violence of certain public acts must be understood as a means of communication that comes to take over the ordinary ways of persuasive speech. The persuasion power of coercive strategies can be superior to approaches that traditionally build on a collaboration and an argumentative co-construction that too often have failed. We are then in the domain of “coercive rhetoric.” Its polemical violence is but one element beside other verbal forms such as the discourse of street protests, but also beside acts such as strikes, sit-ins, etc. The passage from a rhetoric of persuasion to a rhetoric of coercion appears in this light as the obligatory trajectory for any action that wants to be effective. This coercive rhetoric was exercised in the framework of a day of action including strikes and protests organized by union organizations on March 1, 2009 (following the strikes and protests of January 29, 2009 against the crisis and the reform of Darcos (the Minister of National Education), a mobilization which assembled from union sources 2.5 million people throughout France, and (in the words of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]) “directly challenges the government and the French employers.”

12

Salvation’s Island is a remote set of Islands off of French Guiana where the French operated a penal colony.

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The objective was to make the government as well as the employers’ representatives and the employers themselves, understand a series of demands: To defend public and private jobs, to fight against poverty and economic and social deregulation, to require salary policies which maintain the purchasing power of salaried employees, of the homeless and retirees and reduce inequalities, to defend the collective framework and the solidarity of social protections and quality public services (Call on March 19 2009 from the Union organizations FSU, CFDT, CFTC, CFE-CGC, CGT, FO, Solidaires, UNSA).

It was obviously not a day of mobilization exclusively aimed at the abusive remunerations of the management distributed during times of workers lay-offs, and of the government’s neglect in fixing it. This protest took place as part of a general demonstration. Indeed, signs and banners were brandished there on this topic. Here is a slogan built on an untranslatable rhyme: “Augmentez nos salaires, pas les actionnaires” (“Raise our salaries, not those of the shareholders.”) At Saint Étienne: “Another world is possible, let’s get out of the casino economy.” A CGT banner: “Capitalism is sick, let it die,” “Social justice, general strike—(“Justice sociale, Grève générale”.) And: “The crisis it’s them it’s not up to us to pay for it,” or: “The crisis, it’s not the workers’ fault.” A sign taking up a quotation saying that in France, no one notices strikes, bore an inscription in huge letters: “Hey there??? You see the strike, ‘You poor shmuck13 ’? Insulting representations of Sarkozy accompanied the protests, such as Sarkozy’s head on a pike.

We have slid here from verbal polemics to concrete actions which express a social protest and collective claims. When we speak of the conflictual, it is indeed necessary to distinguish the conflict of opinions from social conflict. Coser (1970), one of the founders of the sociology of conflicts in the 1950s, saw in social conflicts a struggle involving values and demands about statutes, positions of power, and resources, where the goal of the antagonistic parties was to neutralize, diminish, even eliminate the adversary. A specialist on social movements, Simons (1972, p. 231) clearly 13

“Pauvre con!”, “poor schmuck” echoes an insult launched by Sarkozy at an ordinary citizen who refused to shake his hand in March 2009. It was vastly circulated.

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marks the difference between the latter and public controversies by underlining that a true conflict cannot be reduced to a controversy: he points to the mistake of rhetoricians who have seen in social conflicts simple divergences of belief and of attitudes, whereas conflicting interests and power struggles in a dynamic of action (beyond discourse) and of coercion (beyond persuasion) should be taken into consideration. From this perspective, and it seems necessary to insist on this specific point, public controversy does not fall within the category of coercive rhetoric as the management of a social conflict. It remains the management of verbal exchanges in conflicts of opinion. It does not constitute a struggle on the ground where communication turns into forms of symbolic action, but a modality of public discussion on the position that should be taken on a social issue. At the same time, the polemical debate (including “flames” in Internet forums) clearly deals with subjects that are connected to social conflicts, like the one which arose with the financial crisis of 2008–2009. The polemical debate confronts positions and leads to clashes of contradictory stances by generating protest groupings, and even by inciting to action. It is in this framework that the incitement to violence mentioned above emerges: exchanges on stock options and scandalous bonuses certainly include calls to use physical violence, beyond outburst of indignation, and insults. Public controversy does not however have as a vocation achieving what it advocates. It remains within the limits of verbal communication and does not venture out on the ground. Even when it calls to action, it keeps itself within the framework of an exchange whose horizon is deliberation—the attempt to arrive at decisions and at action by means of a verbal confrontation. We can thus see that public controversy can sustain union and citizen mobilizations, but it does not take part in them. Moreover, protests and strikes do not put an end to public discussion, and do not replace them: they accompany them, and continue to take place even when protest takes on more concrete forms (it sometimes even debates the forms it should take, like the merits of street protests). We will have noted moreover that the large trade union mobilization of March 19, 2009 predates the discussion forums studied above: it precedes them and does not put an end to them.

7.8 Functional Violence. Regulation and Limits The incitement to violence and to physical confrontation requires us to revisit the functions and the limits of violence in public controversy. We can say, even when dealing with the extreme example of the much denigrated flames, that the violence of public controversies is functional. By this expression, I mean that verbal violence is not wild and gratuitous. It fulfills certain functions in a verbal exchange that frames and regulates it. These modes of expression depend on the global logic that underpins a given genre, and on the limits it assigns to aggressivity in conflictual interactions. Once it is functional (once it fulfills functions in a system of exchange), violence is also constrained. It is deployed differently in parliamentary debates, televised debate, open letters, discussion forums on

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the Internet, professional assemblies, political discussions between friends, etc. The criteria of legitimization change in each of these frameworks—what is authorized or tolerated in one is not tolerated in another. The infractions are sometimes sanctioned by censure (calls to order in Parliament, the interventions of the journalist on the television, the censure of the moderator in electronic forums), sometimes denounced in a system of autoregulation that makes violence inefficient and redundant when it transgresses the limits of an often tacit law. It is therefore only within the limits of a social and institutional game that polemical violence can be freely expressed, even unleashed. It is not a matter here of renewing the well-known division between the agonic or regulated struggle and the eristic or anarchical and deregulated confrontation. The question is not, in fact so much to know whether we are dealing with the controlled struggle that allows for the agon, or with the freedom of eristic where all hits are allowed on the condition that they hit the target. What is essential is to recognize that different frameworks of communication authorize different modes of confrontation, and that violence, even when it erupts, is submitted to rituals of interaction. The insult that appears to be reprehensible because it transgresses the rules of politeness and makes the other lose face, is authorized in certain frameworks such as the discussion forum. It is however forbidden in a televised debate where its aggressiveness seems intolerable and damaging for the confrontation. This aggressivity can therefore only take on less brutal forms, in which ad hominem arguments, among others, play an important role. There is a ritual of verbal violence with which the public is familiar. The leeway given to insults in forums, the nature and the forms of expression of these insults, can vary according not only to the newspapers in which they appear (it is then a question of internal regulation), but also to the codes and the thresholds of tolerance of the different individuals composing the audience. When a participant in the polemical exchange does not respect its rules or outrageously crosses the limits, he undermines his own self-image. An ethos of a sore loser or of a person who does not master appropriate social codes discredits the arguer who tries to disqualify the adversary. Needless to say, this autoregulation is far from being perfect… But can verbal violence, especially in the form of incitement, even symbolical, to physical violence, sometimes make participants leave their own circle and propel then to murder or to the chaos of armed struggle? We can wonder whether what happened following certain street demonstrations does not apply to polemics. In 1995, in multiple demonstrations that took place in Israel following the Oslo Accords and the suicide attacks that lead to numerous deaths, the far right turned against the Head of State, Yitzchak Rabin, and chanted personal attacks against him such as “Rabin traitor” and “Rabin murderer,” or “With fire and sword we’ll drive Rabin out.” These instances of verbal violence did not fail to raise concerns in left-wing circles and a journalist even wrote that the expression “Rabin traitor” could lead one of the listeners on the right to want to settle his score with the said traitor. The same with the demonization and Nazification of Rabin presented as an incarnation of Evil that is leading Israel to its demise. These concerns were realized far beyond the predictions with the assassination of Rabin by a right-wing extremist, Ygal Amir, as the Prime Minister was leaving a demonstration for peace. Here is an example of

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violence which, even if it is not direct incitement to murder, no less risks making verbal aggression spill over into physical aggression. We are on the tenuous border which separates speech from action—on the line that divides the more or less institutionalized space of social discourses where verbal violence is regulated from the extra-discursive space where an unbridled use of brute force can be made. By becoming physical violence in the world of extra-discursive action, verbal violence loses its argumentative status and its benefits. It deviates from the law of democracy that regulates discourse to prevent physical battles –aggression against the other, murder, and wars. It is no longer a question of functional violence—we have left the rhetorical empire, the domain of argumentation where violence is both a passionate outpouring and a regulated game, a hit that hurts as well as a familiar ritual. But it cannot serve as the gateway to an action that places violence in bodies, at the heart of lived experience. The true ethical illegitimacy, which is the supreme betrayal of the logos, is the transformation of functional violence, which is of the order of discourse, into real violence. Not, as Douglas Walton worried, the degeneration of dialogue into a quarrel, but the degradation of public controversy into a fist-fight or an armed conflict. No doubt it is because of possible deadly consequences that the law tries to suppress excesses of verbal violence, while also guarding not to infringe on freedom of speech. Thus, in France, any insult of defamation is punishable by applying the law of the press from July 29, 1881.14 It is an “outrage” when a government official is attacked, an offense to the head of State when it is the President of the Republic (as in the case of Hervé Éon who had written “Get lost, you poor shmuck” under the eyes of Nicolas Sarkozy in a demonstration in August 2008 [taken from Rue89, a left-wing French website]). In other words, outbursts of verbal violence are liable to legal action—even if they do not always seem to apply to numerous contemporary infractions that are as a result generally left unpunished. The necessity of legislating, and of applying existing legislation, in matters of verbal violence is obviously problematic if we recognize that violence is functional and that its degree of permissiveness depends on the rules of the genre in which it is expressed. Furthermore, how can we distinguish between the symbolic level on which verbal violence expresses itself and the possibilities of deadly effects on the ground? Orkibi (2012) thus analyses insults against Sarkozy that we find on “antisarko” sites, some of which say: “Sarko, one punch and you’re out,” others show an image of a hanged man which features the president, or the photo of a target. These calls to blows and to murder remain however purely symbolic, and nobody has ever imagined that they could be followed up with deeds.

14

On the relationship between argumentation and verbal violence from a legal perspective see Lagorgette (2012).

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7.9 Conclusion We see, at the end of this analysis, that verbal violence, which constitutes one of the discursive registers of public controversy, does not cast it out of the field of argumentation. Like passion, verbal violence is part of this argumentative modality and is characterized by the clash of antagonistic opinions; it contributes to exacerbating dichotomization, polarization and even more so the discredit heaped on the other, but does not replace the elements constitutive of public controversy nor does it cover them up. Verbal violence fulfills certain functions within polemical exchanges depending on the frameworks in which it is used. Thus, in the example of the discussion forums we analyzed, it favors protest, the formation of virtual communities, incitement to action and the encounter between individuals with radically opposing opinions. But it also favors, as we have seen, the incitement to violence. The question of the limits to be assigned to verbal violence remains open and continues to challenge not only ethical judgement, but also the legitimacy of censorship and the measures that the legal system should take. From the perspective adopted here, we should remember that public controversy has as its purpose to manage, in the regulated space of verbal exchanges, the conflictual, understood as the foundation of democratic life. Therein lie the limits of the legitimacy that we can permit the register of verbal violence that often accompanies polemics. Being excessive and in violation of the rules of the genre can transform verbal violence into a weapon that turns against the aggressor. But it stays within the logic of the system and is subject to its tacit legislation. As soon as it leaves the system, its nature changes. Any stepping out from the verbal and institutional framework in which it is deployed risks tilting polemics into real aggression, thus radically transgressing the foundational principle of the rhetorical activity in which it is participating. Verbal violence in its different forms has the right to strike others down symbolically. But it cannot serve as the gateway to actions that exert violence against individuals and groups.

References Amossy, R. (2008) Modalités argumentatives et registres discursifs: le cas du polémique. In L. Gaudin-Bordes & G. Salvan (Eds.), Les Registres. Enjeux stylistiques et pragmatiques (pp. 93– 108). Academia Bruylant. Amossy, R., & Koren, R. (2010). La “diabolisation”: un avatar du discours polémique au prisme des présidentielles de 2007. In D. Denis, et al. (Eds.), Au corps du texte. Mélanges en l’honneur de Georges Molinié (pp. 219–236). Champion. Angenot, M. (1982). La Parole pamphlétaire. Payot: Typologie des discours modernes. Cardon, D. (2010). La Démocratie Internet. Le Seuil. Chaput, M. (2008). Analyser la discussion politique en ligne. De l’idéal délibératif à la reconstruction des pratiques argumentatives. Réseaux 4/150, 83–106.

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Chevalier, Y., & de Chanay, H. C. (2009). Savoir être insulteur, ou les marqueurs verbaux et non verbaux de l’insulte: quelques exemples de “pédé.” In D. Lagorgette(Ed.), Les Insultes en français: de la recherche fondamentale à ses applications (pp. 45–74). Université de Savoie. Coser, L. A. (1970). Continuities in the study of social conflict. Free Press. Dendale, P., & Coltier, D. (2005). La notion de prise en charge ou de responsabilité dans la théorie scandinave de la polyphonie linguistique. In J. Bres, P. P. Haillet, S. Mellet, H. Nølke, & L. Rosier (Eds.), Dialogisme et polyphonie Approches linguistiques (pp. 125–140). De Boeck/Duculot. Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. Polity Press. Flichy, P. (2008). Internet et le débat démocratique. Réseaux, 4(150), 159–185. Fracchiolla, B., Moïse, C., Christina, S. R., & Auger, N. (2013). Violences verbales. Analyses, enjeux, perspectives. Pur. Gadet, F. (2005). Mélange des genres dans un JT “innovant.” In M. Broth, M. Forsgren, C. Norén, & F. Sullet-Nylander (Eds.), Le Français parlé dans les médias (pp. 221–241). Université de Stockholm. Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. Pantheon Books. Halsall, A. W. (2003). Figures de la véhémence chez Shakespeare et Hugo. In G. Declercq, M. Murat, & J. Dangel (Eds.), La Parole polémique (pp. 263–282). Champion. Kayani, J. M. (1998). Contexts of uninhibited online behavior: Flaming in social newsgroup on usenet. Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 49(12), 1135–1141. Lagorgette, D. (2012). Insulte, injure et diffamation : de la linguistique au Code pénal ? Argumentation et analyse du discours, 8. Lea, M., O’Shea, T., Fung, P., & Spears, P. (1992). Flaming’ in computer-mediated communication. A recursive review. In M. Lea (Ed.), Contexts of computer-mediated communication (pp. 89–112). Hervester Whatsheaf. Lewi´nski, M. (2010). Internet political discussion forums as an argumentative activity type. Sicsat/Rozenberg Publishers. Maingueneau, D. (2008). Les trois dimensions du polémique. In L. Gaudin-Bordes & G. Salvan (Eds.), Les Registres. Enjeux stylistiques et pragmatiques (pp. 109–120). Academia Bruylant. Marcoccia, M. (2003). Parler politique dans un forum de discussion. Langage Et Société, 104, 9–55. Orkibi, E. (2012) «L’insulte comme argument et outil de cadrage dans le mouvement “anti-Sarko”». Argumentation et analyse du discours, 8. O’Sullivan, P., & Flanagin J.A.B. (2012). An Interactional Reconceptualization of “Flaming” and Other Problematic Messages. http://my.ilstu.edu/~posull/flaming.htm. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969) [1958]. The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. University of Notre Dame Press Schiffrin, D. (1990). The management of a co-operative self during argument: The role of opinions and stories. In A. D. Grimshaw (Ed.) Conflict talk (pp. 241–259). Simons, H. W. (1972). Persuasion in social conflicts: A critique of prevailing conceptions and a framework for future research. Speech Mongraphs, 39(4), 227–247. Thompsen, P.A. (2003). A social influence model of flaming in computer-mediated communication. A paper presented to the Western States Communication Association, 1–9. Vincent, D., & G. Bernard Barbeau. (2012). Insulte, disqualification, persuasion et tropes communicationnels: à qui l’insulte profite-t-elle? Argumentation et analyse du discours, 8.

Chapter 8

Conclusion Coexistence in Dissensus

The functions of public controversies. Exploring specific public controversies as they appear concretely on the ground turns out to be rich with lessons. Beyond theories that tend to conceptualize a social phenomenon from an abstract point of view, the discursive and argumentative analyses show the complexity of public debates. To look into the materiality of language, the circulation of statements, the construction of arguments in context, allows for a better understanding of the multiple public controversies that invade our universe and for identifying their underlying logic. At the same time, this approach makes possible the radical renewing of our conception of public controversy in its polemical dimension. To the question of whether, as a debate marked by the exacerbation of disputes, public controversy and polemics are likely to participate in the construction of a public sphere and of democratic deliberation, this empirical study allows us to answer in the affirmative. And this despite numerous prejudices that continue to circulate on this subject.

8.1 Public Controversy in the Public Sphere Cannot be Measured with the Yardstick of Dialogue Placing head to head groups of arguments caught in a logical opposition might create the illusion of a dialogue between two parties. However, we have to remember that these more of less organized sets of arguments pro and con are a posteriori (re)constructions; they are not to be confused with a live discussion between interlocutors standing on opposite sides. The artificial face to face of the arguments is situated on the abstract structural plane; the oral or written interaction is situated on the plane of enunciation, that is to say, of speech and of actual verbal exchange. The public controversy on the Mexican wall or on the exclusion of women, studied in its full extent, clearly demonstrates this phenomenon. The Israeli public controversy © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8_8

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does so all the better that it hardly includes direct exchanges between the parties— each one has its press, its discursive space, its rationality, its values, so much so that direct interactions between adversaries are almost non-existent. In this regard, it is only by reconstructing the arguments of the two camps and by making oppositions and divisions explicit, that the analyst gives the impression of a dialogue though one did not actually take place on the ground. Thus, our inquiry flies in the face of the idea that polemics results in failure because it does not fulfill the mission of persuasion assigned to dialogue. It can hardly be defined as a “dialogue of the deaf” to the extent that its format is not a dialogue; as a corollary, its objective is not consensus. Public controversies and polemics emerge and develop in the circulation of discourses and it is in this form that they constitute a mode of conflict management. Consequently, their success cannot be measured by the yardstick of rational persuasion. In other words, their communicational success is unlike the achievement that comes to crown the dialogue between two speakers engaged in a verbal exchange where each undertakes to convince the other by the means of logos. But the fact that a negotiated solution is not reached is not a sign of failure. Public controversy and polemics function according to other communicational modalities, and their socio-discursive functions are situated elsewhere. Let us first summarize a few important points concerning the relation of public controversy and polemics to dialogue. • Public controversy and polemics are by definition dialogical The examination of case studies indeed clearly shows that if public controversy is profoundly dialogical, it is not necessarily dialogal. It is dialogical in the sense that Bahktin/Volosinov gives to this term (1986 [1929]): every enunciation is part of a chain, it repeats and eventually antagonizes the discourses that have preceded it, it anticipates reactions. Thus, each utterance in the debate on the burqa, the exclusion of women, or the Mexican wall takes up prior discourses and answers them directly or indirectly in order to better disqualify them. Polemical discourse is a counter discourse focused on refutation and discredit where the words of the other appear only in the effort made to counter them. In this sense, it exploits reported discourse in its most diverse forms: citation, paraphrase, indirect discourse, ironic antiphrasis, allusion, negation, etc. But if public controversy is intrinsically dialogic, it is not necessarily dialogal. By that I mean that it is not subject to the structure of dialogue in which two partners respond to each other symmetrically face to face or in a differed exchange. • Public controversy and polemics include polemical discourse as well as polemical exchanges One of the verbal modalities of public controversy is “polemical discourse” that is mono-managed in the sense that the speaker has mastery over it without the intervention of the other. She constructs an opposition of points of view which she exacerbates: she discredits and attacks the adversary by widening identity-based divisions. The direct addressee is not the Opponent, but the public (the Third Party), invited to

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rally to the good cause. It goes without saying that in a controversy, each party circulates a large number of polemical discourses which modulate in their own way the dichotomization, the polarization, and the discredit of the other by which the agonic confrontation is sustained. These discourses intersect each other in the public sphere without necessarily constituting a formal dialogue: they only present themselves episodically in pairs. Let us not however get the wrong idea: this does not mean that verbal duels in which two adversaries confront each other in front of an actual or virtual audience do not exist in polemics and public controversies. Such an affirmation would obviously be counterfactual. There are face to face exchanges, defined as agonic interactions between two or more participants. They present a verbal confrontation where the representative(s) of each camp directly repl(ies/y) to the arguments and attacks of the other. We find this type of verbal fight in all of the controversies that unfold in the public sphere. We saw an interesting example in the debate which opposed Jean-François Copé with the young woman covered in the full veil. These exchanges are regulated—but their rules are variable to the extent that they depend on the types of discourse that they fall under. They bring into play questions of status and of a face-threatening act, but also of verbal violence, which are linked to the logic of the interaction in general, and to a specific type of interaction in particular. The dichotomization and polarization can be seen in the exchange of rejoinders [clumsy formulation], where each reply is a direct reaction to what the other just put forward. Along with the discredit thrown on the interlocutor in a situation of direct contact (even if it is virtual), the face to face exchange presents exercises of refutation according to a ritual that is at times concerned with protocol, at times does not hesitate to attack the other’s face. As a general rule, these verbal duels confront and exacerbate contradictory opinions without looking to get the adversary to join one’s cause. Once again, it is the adhesion of the public that the arguer is looking for. These agonic interactions are no doubt dialogues but, like monomanaged discourses, they are but one component at the heart of a set. To put it plainly, public controversy is constructed from a multiplicity of polemical discourses and polemical exchanges; it includes within it discourses managed by one speaker, dialogues and polylogues, debates and electronic quarrels—but it is not itself structured as a dialogue. Its own format, as stated before, is that of the circulation of discourses. It emerges and is consolidated through the dissemination, in the public sphere, of a proliferation of discourses and polemical interactions. These antagonistic voices intersect and overlap often without prior orchestration; they are far from the exchanges and the symmetrical rejoinders that a true dialogue requires. We are not dealing with two subjects who are looking for a solution together through a reasoned exchange, but with a plurality of discourses, which in their own way, on their own platform, and in their own particular context, deal with a controversial question. Public controversy as polemics is constructed in those verbal constellations taken from the incessant movement of the media flow, beyond (or below) the rules of the dialogue which confront two thinking subjects.

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That is what the investigation into the mass of documents gathered from print media and in Internet sites highlights. No doubt it is not easy to show this proliferation and this fragmentation to the extent that the analysis necessarily imposes an order and conveys coherence. The analyst identifies the recurrences, the variations, the oppositions, in order to arrange them in an organized whole. He thus takes up texts in movement (the outpouring and the fluidity of the polemical discourses and interactions as they appear in the media), in order to extract a unified structure built on conflictual sets of arguments. If this structure endows the polemical debate with meaning, it ineluctably distorts its mode of occurrence and functioning in the public sphere.

8.2 The Role of the Media in the Construction of Public Controversy and Polemics This dissemination of dialogue and of direct exchange in public discussion is made possible, if not inevitable, by the preeminence of the media. Social problems are discussed on newspapers pages, television screens, computers or cell phones, or radio waves, in a dynamic and sometimes chaotic interlacing of discourses. To the extent that contradictory opinions are expressed and spread in the above-mentioned way, the circulation of discourses, of which the media are both the holder and the motor, replaces the ideal model of civic dialogue. The media play, as a result, a key role in the construction of public controversies—a role that it is not sufficient simply to theorize or to bemoan. One must examine it, in practice, without prejudice. We have been able to see how a journalistic article launched the polemics by trumpeting it loudly, thus attracting the attention of readers about a dispute supposedly concerning them directly (or of which the author intends to show the readers that it touches them closely). The media transform the conflict into an event that offers them a “scoop”—the article in Marianne on the burqa offers a probing example of this discursive construction of the event. No doubt the hope is thereby to attract readers. But the important point is that the spotlighting of a minor episode—like Depardieu’s tax exile, or the episode of the young Israeli women whose right to sit at the front of the bus was contested by the ultra-orthodox—puts into play a social conflict. Engaged in current topics, the journalist reports elements that are intentionally dramatized, by becoming more or less personally invested in her discourse: she can feign to stay out of it, but she can also proclaim loud and clear her own point of view in opinion articles, editorials, etc. What is essential however is to see clearly that the journalist does not content herself with reporting what is said and structured elsewhere. She constructs the public controversy, in the sense that she constructs a virtual dialogue between the parties who take a stand in an abundant multitude of spoken and written words. She selects, orders, and produces a virtual exchange between the representatives of the pros and cons—those who had direct exchanges between themselves, and those who

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did not have them. She reverberates the words of the actors she selects, by putting them into two opposing camps—those of the Proponent and of the Opponent. She thereby allows the reader to locate herself in the mass of discourses that circulate in the public sphere, structuring it, and making it meaningful for her. It is impossible in this regard to overestimate the role of the journalist. She launches the public controversy by publicizing it; she gives it the status of an event and constructs with the help of the different forms of reported discourses a virtual dialogue between the holders of the positions in conflict, highlighting the arguments that structure the debate and contributing to orienting the latter by indirect and direct interventions.

8.3 Dissensus and Public Space In this particular context, what then becomes of the objective of persuasion, which is at the basis of the endeavor of rhetoric in general and deliberative rhetoric in particular? By circulating discourses for and against, by offering the spectacle of interactions where antagonistic opinions clash, public controversy in its polemical dimension clearly does not have as a goal to resolve conflicts. It does not offer a dialogue in which differences are negotiated with a view to an agreement on what is reasonable. On the contrary, it multiplies the antagonistic discourses that dichotomize the oppositions by underlying their irreducible character. It prolongs them by polarizing the adversaries into identity-based groups tensed up in mutual hostility. The discourses that circulate in the most diverse media, from the printed press to the Internet, show this clearly: public controversy is nourished by dichotomization, by polarization, and by the disrepute thrown on the other, in a movement that the presence of passion or of verbal violence can only exacerbate. Consequently, debate, which is supposed to generate compromises and median solutions, appears like an attempt to impose one’s own values to the detriment of alternative positions. Situated outside of the framework of dialogue and of its logic, public controversies that are constructed and reverberate in the media are not directed towards the resolution of conflicts. If public controversy and polemics are the place where the dissensions that pit against each other groups divided by their opinions, their beliefs, and their values find their expression, is that to say that they are incapable of constructing a public sphere? We recall that for Habermas, this notion rests on the model of rational discussion where citizens reach an agreement through the free exchange of speech. In this regard, all of the reproaches traditionally made against polemical discourses seem to come together to deny them the right to construct a public sphere worthy of the name. They denounce their insistence on the conflict in which each party seeks to ensure the triumph of its cause alone; they condemn their tendency to turn into a spectacle offered to passive consumers by media greedy for “scoops.” Considered from the perspective of cooperative dialogue with a persuasive aim, polemics is no doubt a failure. But, as emphasized before, it is precisely the persistence of judging it with the yardstick of “classical” dialogue, a category within which it does not fall,

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that skews perspectives here. Its particular functioning is subject to other rules and responds to other needs. Indeed, in a pluralistic democracy, differences and tensions must have a place to find their expression, despite the utopia of a pacifying consensus. Citizens in such a democracy are divided by projects that are often irreconcilable: a space of individual freedom where the full veil is allowed/a space of equality between the sexes where it is forbidden; a state where a single democratic law rules/a state where divine laws are respected and taken into account; a society that sees to the just allocation of wealth/a society dominated by the laws of the neo-liberal economy, etc. At the same time, individuals and groups in a democracy share a national space where they must coexist not only in their differences, but also with their disputes. In the complexity of power games and interests, of unequal statuses and identity-based tensions, of ideological and religious differences, it is illusory to think that all disagreements can be solved by serene and well-intentioned discussion. If the ultra-orthodox do not reach a common solution with the secular, if the defenders of the neo-liberal system do not find an answer that satisfies the holders of an economic vision of an egalitarian nature, it is not because the modalities of their debate led them to failure, or because rational persuasion failed where it should have achieved its purpose. It is because pluralistic society is by definition governed by the conflict and the confrontation between antagonistic positions, as political scientists such as Taguieff and Mouffe, or philosophers like Rescher, insist on (cf. Chap. 1). It is precisely there that public controversy intervenes. It must be emphasized that public controversy fulfills its role both in the case of disagreements within a shared vision of the world as well in the case of deep disagreements. It is not because the two parties share values that they can’t be ripped apart by the choices to make on a social issue. Thus, in the case of the burqa affair, the participants all base themselves on republican principles (we don’t find Islamist interventions rejecting these principles, even if one can suppose that they exist on French territory.) The same is true in the case of the construction of the wall intended to curb illegal immigration from Mexico. The debaters generally agree that illegal immigration cannot be unlimited and that a means must be found to regulate it, all the while diverging on the magnitude of the scandal and most of all on the solutions that need to be brought to the crisis. If polemics hardly leads to solutions even where there is no deep disagreement or “argumentative break” in Angenot’s terms (2008)—as it should do according to the tenants of persuasive rhetoric or of informal logic—it is not because it does not follow the rules of argumentation. It is because it presides over the management of a conflict that looks to give a voice to differences. It is because it is deployed in a pluralistic democracy where each person has the right not only to maintain but also to make their stance in its ideological and identitybased components prevail. With this in mind, the persuasion of the adversary and the attempt to make her share a common answer is no longer on the horizon of the verbal confrontation. We are in the rhetoric of dissensus where the persistence of the dispute is not a sign of failure, but a characteristic of the functioning of democracy. This is also valid for the extreme cases of confrontations between irreconcilable positions, of which the debate on the exclusion of women is an eloquent illustration.

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No doubt one can deplore the existence of cognitive and argumentative breaks, which prevent communities living on the same land to get along. Rather, however, than deploring the so-called dialogue of the deaf, we must recognize the complexity of opinions and social divisions in democratic regimes. Conflict is at the same time both inevitable and constructive, to the extent that it permits all of the voices to make themselves heard without rejecting them in dissidence. In the case of exacerbated conflict, like in less radical disagreements, polemics, by establishing the possibility of agonic debate, even of eristics, offers a means of coexistence which ensures a living together. Even when carried out in parallel media by groups that do not share the same system of rationality and hardly have contact with each another, it allows the parties to make their contradictory demands heard; it thus prevents the division from turning into physical violence or a disruption of the national body. This objective is crucial in a society that is concerned with preserving a diversity of values, of customs, of religion, of morals, and of culture. In order for the much-promoted notion of diversity not to become a vain word, it is necessary to be able to manage a situation where a divide, often deep, grows between populations who fight for their difference. If polemicists are in disagreement about the very vision of what the state where they live should be, at the very least they share a fundamental premise: that of the right of each person, of minorities as much as majorities, of religious as much as secular, of Republicans as much as Democrats to make their voices heard and to fight verbally for their point of view in case of a divergence. This is the key to the transformation of an enemy into an adversary of which Chantal Mouffe aptly speaks, a process which replaces the threat of a civil war with the verbal struggle that nourishes democracy. In this regard, we can see that public controversy sometimes allows for the slight moderating of power relations by giving a voice to those who, in a certain consensual hegemony, barely have the right to speak. This is the case of the ultra-orthodox minority in Israel (about whom we must not however forget that they enjoy political representation in parliament if not in government). This is the case of women covered in the full veil, if they accept, as did the woman who gave the rebuttal to Copé or like certain Internet users, to speak up in a public manner. If public controversy does not allow for a large scale challenge like that of coercive rhetoric, which is translated into symbolic acts (demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, etc.), it nevertheless permits giving a voice to subalterns, and providing them with a framework where they can express themselves in defiance of the consensus of those who dominate. The same is true, though to different degrees, with discussion forums, which permit all citizen voices to participate in the confrontation of points of view according to their capacities, even if in a faulty and poorly argued style. If the Internet is well and good this instrument of democratization as some celebrate it to be, it is in part because it authorizes the clash of contradictory opinions even in the form of the flames that it is criticized for. Being the place where dissensions are freely spoken, where hostilities that do not turn into armed conflict are nourished, where the other is an adversary to whom one grants the right to freely express her opinion and to fight for it, despite the fact that one vilifies and tries to defeat her, public controversy is thus essentially a mode of coexistence in dissensus. It is as such that it proves to be essential within a pluralistic democracy governed by conflict. The alternatives—forced consensus, the repression

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of free speech, the rejection in dissidence of those who are in disagreement with the authorized opinion, oppression of minority groups—are well known, and we will not dwell on it. In this regard, public controversy as much as reasoned debate authorizes the construction of a public sphere—on the condition of revising the definition put forward by Habermas as well as the classical ideal of deliberation through dialogue. We will do it following Eric Dacheux who synthetically redefines the public sphere, “a key concept of democracy” (2008, p. 9), as a “place of political legitimization:” “it is the public sphere where citizens have access to information, where they can debate and forge an opinion, and where they chose the people who will exercise political power”— (ibid., p. 19) by becoming actors themselves. It is “the foundation of the political community”- “a symbolic space that allows individuals belonging to diverse […] communities to connect with one another (ibid.); and it is, finally, a “‘stage’ where the political appears” and where “public problems become visible and perceptible.” (ibid., p. 20) And he adds that this “potential sphere, open to all the actors […] is the place where antagonistic visions of the general interest are formulated. The latter is therefore not the exclusive prerogative of power.” (ibid) This is why the public sphere can be constructed by public controversy and polemics as much as by “the communicative action” of Habermas; by the discussion that manages the dissensus as by that which is exclusively guided by consensus.

8.4 Public Controversy and Alternative Rationalities Rationality is not excluded from the process of public controversy and polemics, far from it; but it is not limited as the new rhetoric would have it to the agreement on the reasonable, or as Habermas puts forward to communicational rationality. Above and beyond their differences, Perelman and Habermas are inspired by the classical notion of logos as argumentation’s power to lead to an agreement that goes beyond individual subjectivity and gives a foundation to collective action. Listening to the lesson of public controversy and polemics, on the contrary, calls for admitting that the ways of reasoning can be divergent and its conclusions irreconcilable; and that the definitions of the unreasonable and of the inadmissible are sometimes, in a same society, the least shared thing in the world. (Amossy, 2012) The rationality at work in polemical discourse does not rest on a universalistic conception of reason. It supposes that a point of view must base its validity on an argument that anchors it in reasons and develops its internal logic. These reasons and this logic must certainly receive the backing of a set of people who can certify their validity, beyond the conviction of the speaking subject. But it does not have to be a universal audience, unless it is a universal audience in the sense given by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca when they wrote that “each individual, each culture, thus has his own conception of the universal audience. The study of these variations would be very instructive, as we would learn from it what men, at different times in history, have regarded as real, true, and objectively valid (1969, p. 33). In other words, the reasonable is relative

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and variable because it is socio-historically and culturally determined. If we accept the notion that during a same era, and on a same territory, it is possible to find divergent modes of thought shaped by socio-economic, ideological and political, cultural and religious differences, we must recognize that an argument that receives the adherence of a group while being rejected or even judged aberrant by another group, can perfectly well be founded on reason(s). By the visibility given to antithetical series of antagonistic arguments, public controversy in its polemical dimension makes manifest the existence of alternative rationalities in a same society. It shows that logic and truth are not the prerogative of a single camp. We should however emphasize that we find on the one hand, arguments that lead to opposite conclusions by basing themselves on the same type of reasoning; and on the other, arguments where obviously the debaters do not share the same way of thinking. Thus, for example, the answer to the question of knowing whether the wearing of the burqa must or not be authorized rests in part on a similar approach, though its hierarchy of values is inverted. Among the great principles of the Republic, some prioritize individual liberty, others prioritize secularism. From this difference arise antagonistic arguments and refutations, which are dichotomized by the tendency to present as unreasonable and shocking any infraction of the principles being defended (How can we allow the full veil in a secular country? Or: How can we legislate on the attire of individuals?) Despite the incompatible character of the stances and the polarization that follows, the participants follow the same logic. This is not the case in the example of the exclusion of women from the public sphere in Israel. Not only are the premises incompatible—rights of women/protection of modesty, national space subject to the same law/community spaces erecting their own rules, etc.: the reasoning of the ultra-orthodox is based on the Holy Scriptures and the word of the rabbis, therefore on the argument of authority, which imposes a strict separation of the sexes (which also reverberates in the modes of exchange between the ultra-orthodox press and its readers). This reasoning does not in any way correspond to that of the majority of the population, for whom arguments based on religious authority are not the rule. Beyond parallel reasonings, alternative rationalities are thus implemented in polemics. Consequently, there isn’t a single and unique rational way to deal with the question that would lead to a shared solution. Groups who do not share the same way of reasoning therefore have the right to make their voices heard in the public sphere. This is what the excellent article by Kendall Phillips on “the spaces of public dissension” that I have already cited strongly underlines. He posits that the rationality whose norms present themselves as indisputable is in fact the dominant rationality of public consensus which excludes the communities that refuse to abandon their unique forms of reasoning (Phillips, 1996, p. 242). In addition, according to him, if we want to allow for diversity and resistance, we have to “accept that different rationalities compete and conflict” (ibid., p.243). We are here in the domain of democratic and antagonistic pluralism of which public controversy and polemics are one of the foundations.

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We can add to these conclusions a renewed vision of the relations between passion and reason such as has emerged from the case studies and such as it has been conceptualized in Chap. 6. Because even when passion intervenes in public controversy (which is often, but not necessarily the case), it is always anchored in reasons. These reasons are sometimes formulated explicitly—they present themselves in an all the more visible and elaborate manner, when the public controversy instigates and calls for recognizing the validity of a course of action. Let us not forget that public controversy is not only a refutation and rejection of the positions of the Other, it is also an attempt to promote an alternative thesis. But the main point of what these texts teach us lies elsewhere. Even when the reasons remain implicit, they are present in the marks of affectivity to be found in the discourse. First of all, they are at the heart of moral sentiments, of which indignation, so common in polemics, offers a good paradigm. As said before, indignation is indissociable from a judgment about what is just and unjust, and this pathos is closely linked to logos. Second, because in public controversy the reasons for the underlying emotion can be tacit in the text, but at the same time inscribed in the inter-discourse. It is because the participant in the polemical confrontation bases herself on preexisting arguments that circulate in the public sphere and are familiar to everyone, that she can omit the reasoning that justifies her feeling of indignation or her anger. Thus, the reasons inscribed in the discourse that circulate and echo indefinitely in the public sphere allow for a passionate discourse where arguments are the submerged part of the iceberg.

8.5 The Functions of Public Controversy If public controversy in its polemical dimension ensures coexistence in dissensus, the examination of particular cases shows that we can’t only stick to this global function. It can also, depending on the circumstances, fulfil other social functions.

8.5.1 The Persuasive Function: Influencing and Winning the Round The first and most obvious function is no doubt that which is most often alleged, and which remains within the limits of persuasive rhetoric. Public controversy is deployed for an audience that must make societal choices. It is in relation to this audience, and not the adversary, that a mission of persuasion is undertaken: the polemicist does not aim at the Opponent as a representative of the antagonistic thesis, but clearly at a Third Party. There is clearly an attempt to rally the greatest number of people possible to the thesis put forward by the polemicist. In democracies, the number of adherents to a given position matters because the citizens go to the polls, and because the pressure of public opinion can weigh on government decisions. As a

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result, public controversy takes over from debate: it is an instrument of combat where each person tries to defend his ways of understanding and ordering a society for which antagonistic and sometimes incompatible models are proposed. Therefore, we should not be surprised that public controversy often rages under circumstances where making a decision is crucial, especially if it is coming up or if it is linked to a proposed bill. The latter instance is fairly common. In the case of the burqa, for example, the public controversy precedes the proposed bill; in that of the stockoptions, it calls for government intervention that finally takes the form of a decree, when it does not demand a law limiting the earnings of CEOs (which would not see the light of day); in the case of the exclusion of women, it requires the enforcement of a court decision that the adversary is said to violate. Public controversy can also, of course, deal with citizen issues that do not call for collective measures: is it tolerable that a very wealthy Frenchman like Depardieu leave France for tax reasons? Here too, however, the discussion implies the questioning or the defense of a government decision—in this instance, the tax policy of the new socialist government presided over by François Hollande. Of course, the promulgation of a legislative measure does not ensure in any way the end of a public controversy, which invariably continues when the legislation does not resolve the conflict of opinion. The executive order promulgated by the Sarkozy government, judged to be insufficient, is itself the subject of new public controversies. The law on the burqa, difficult to apply, leads to surprise twists—and most of all, does not solve the conflict which pits the defenders of secularism against those Muslims in the Republic who give priority to the law of the Quran. The polemics around the young Israeli woman who refused to sit at the back of the bus is just one episode in a long conflict that pits, under diverse circumstances the ultra-orthodox against the rest of the population. In addition, the public controversy that calls for legal intervention or a government action does not necessarily stop when it comes into effect. Confrontations are often drawn out long after official decisions are announced on the controversial question. And indeed, the polemics rages as long as the conflict of opinion persists. In other words, it continues as long as it is necessary to manage a social problem by ensuring what I have called a coexistence in dissensus.

8.5.2 Weaving Together a Social Bond: The Functions of Connecting and Rallying Beyond this persuasive function, the case studies examined have shown that public controversy and polemics fulfill other important socio-discursive functions. One of them, centered on confrontation, consists of exposing antagonistic groups to the reasonings of their adversaries, thus allowing for more or less virtual encounters in the public sphere. No doubt the parties can cross swords in televised programs, even in face to face discussion in professional or private meetings. But usually, the holders of conflicting positions rarely meet, or are prevented from openly discussing the issues

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due to rules governing sociability. By exposing each party to the arguments of the other, polemics, which makes itself heard in the circulation of discourses, prevents an unbridgeable gap from widening between populations who are completely ignorant of the arguments of the other. As it takes places thanks to new technologies, the confrontation furthermore allows unlikely encounters in the real world, as a result giving ordinary citizens not only the opportunity to hear individuals whose positions are diametrically opposed to theirs, but also to engage in lively discussions with them. In this sense, public controversy and polemics, although they do not result in agreement, weave a social bond. It also does this, conversely and complimentarily, by allowing the parties to meet individuals who share their point of view, so that by participating in a public controversy on the same side, they come to form a community. This aspect was demonstrated with particular acuity in the discussion forums (Chaps. 6 and 7), where virtual communities are created. It marks the capacity of public controversies to form a consensus inside an antagonistic framework. The public controversy that creates divisions and favors identity-based withdrawals is also the one that arouses rallying. They often occur against the other—nothing brings people together more than a struggle against a common enemy. When focused on one cause, public controversy often contributes to creating an illusion of unity around a common principle. Individuals and groups separated by many differences, who are far from agreeing on everything, rally around a common banner. The diversity of the participants in the public controversy engaged in this mission of aggression against an adversary identified as the source of all evils explains the diversity of the voices that make themselves heard on the same side of the fence. Thus, the defense of the wearing of the burqa gathers Muslims in favor of a custom said to be Islamic, human rights organizations, citizens focused on the republican principle of liberty, feminists who do not want their cause to be confused with that of the Opponents of the full veil, politicians and sociologists who are sensitive to the problems in poor suburbs and to the proper integration of underprivileged populations. The fierce polemics against the so-called exclusion of women brings together secular and religious, not to speak of the political parties divided between themselves who create an artificial moment of national unity on this issue. These parties nevertheless keep their agenda, and a conflicting system of values expressed in diverging discourses. It is only in the unity of the actantial division (Proponent/Opponent) that a perfect similitude of views seems to reign. In the reality of the exchange, on the plane of enunciation where the actor-speakers act, the differences, even the divergences remain.

8.5.3 Public Controversy as Protest An important vector of accusation and denunciation, public controversy in its polemical dimension favors individual and social protest. It permits pointing out a wrong and rising up powerfully against its instigators, allies, or defenders. It fights to stop

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something that we consider to be unbearable, intolerable—something we think we can change by crying out. Protest presupposes by definition a refusal and a desire for change; participating in a struggle for power, it claims to be an act of resistance. Polemics calls on those who hold power in order to summon them to meet demands anchored in ethical values and social principles. Once it has become a form of protest, public controversy and polemics appear as a means of collective action among others. If it exacerbates the conflict of opinions, it is in order to contribute to bringing about a change, to leading to a modification of the status quo. That is clearly what polemical discourses against the stock options for CEOs show, where the criticism is accompanied by a strong sense of indignation, a posture of resistance, and incitement to action. We must no doubt insist, in this context, on the fact that public controversy and polemics remain by definition within the framework of verbal communication. They are not an action in itself, and the rhetoric of dissensus is different in this regard from coercive rhetoric as a form of symbolic action used in protests, strikes, and the occupation of premises, etc. They do not manage social conflicts, but conflicts of opinion related to social conflicts. This explains why they accompany or continue after social movements that make people take to the streets and that sometimes have recourse to physical violence. The violence of polemics itself, however, does not translate into physical violence and remains at the same time verbal, and functional: it is deployed according to the rules authorized by the discursive frameworks it participates in, and fulfills the functions already mentioned of struggle, of protest, and of rallying. What about the issue of the incitement to violence, which at any moment (but when and to what extent?) risks making the public controversy spill over from the space of communication to that of direct action (like the call to murder for example)? The risks of spilling over problematize the latitude to be granted to polemical discourses and interactions that abuse verbal violence without measure and that advocate the use of physical violence. In both cases, the possibility of coexistence in dissensus is threatened, so much so that public controversy risks in its excesses to fail in its mission and to turn against itself. No doubt it raises a practical question about the permissiveness of public controversy and polemics that each society has a duty to regulate: the balance to be found seems far from being assured. This is a caveat that one must not forget to mention in any praise of public controversy.

8.5.4 Public Controversy as a Strategy of Positioning Finally, let us not forget that polemics constitutes a game whose rules are known to the participants and to the public. In this framework, it performs a “staging of incomprehension by its discursive exacerbation.” (Albert & Nicolas, 2010, p. 36) The exercise includes benefits, among which is visibility given to each stance in its irreducible difference, and ruthless unveiling of the deficiency of the other. One should not however deduce therefrom that this dramatization ipso facto transforms

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public controversy into a game where the participants feign a radicalization leading to the impossibility of an agreement, as Albert and Nicolas would have it: The nay sayers, in order to respect the system of expectations attached to the game, to the pact of public controversy, endeavor thus conventionally to accentuate their dissensions – which remain very real, there is no doubting it -, and engage in making “as if” nothing could ever be common to them, “as if” everything opposed them, “as if” their disagreement was decidedly unbreakable […]. (ibid., p. 36)

The public controversies studied here show on the contrary that dichotomization and polarization are the result of the distance that actually separates the parties and of the strongly antagonistic way that they perceive the opinions discussed and the identities called into question. To what extent can one speak of a “process of reciprocal exclusion […] in ‘as if” (Albert & Nicolas, 2010, p.37), which empties public controversy of its substance? It seems that it is principally in the domain of political positioning that this principle finds a way to materialize. In this sense, and paradoxically, it is the political game which depoliticizes the debate by putting the substance of the conflicts of opinion often engaged over social conflicts in the background, in order to essentially fulfill a mission of promoting people and political parties. We have thus seen that at the time of the public controversy on the exclusion of women that arose from the episode of the bus, the head of the opposition Tsipi Livni placed herself at the head of a protest and pronounced very harsh polemical remarks against the ultra-orthodox which her party even modified in order to make slogans to be posted on buses. Her adversaries denounced this as a way of saying and doing tied to party warfare. Limor Livnat, the Minister of Education belonging to the ruling party, tried to prevent the politician from occupying the slot of head of the defense of women’s rights and of the enlightened world by making declarations at the same protest. In other cases, politicians can seize on a strong opposition, or on one that is inflated for the circumstance, in order to promote their image at the expense of the adversary. The televised confrontation on the burqa was not foreign to the construction of the ethos of Copé (UMP—Union for a Popular Movement), and this all the more that Roland Dumas (PS/Socialist Party) took part in the debate by embracing the opposite of the minister’s views. In extreme cases, positionings in the political sphere can be the ultimate, even the sole, objective of public controversies—Maria Brilliant showed this in her article on the use of the formula “chosen immigration” during its emergence in France: the polemics, which was just beginning at the time, “presents [itself] more like a game on the political chess board: it translates strategies of positioning more than ideological clashes.” (Brilliant, 2011, p. 127) The fact that in the political field, public controversy has to be understood in terms of ethos construction and of power, thereby becoming a ritual of positioning, attracts attention to the fact that generally speaking public controversy always puts into play the promotion strategies of the polemicist’s person. But this aspect of highlighting one’s mastery and superiority should not hide the other, essentially social functions of public controversy.

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8.5.5 By Way of Conclusion: In Defense of Polemics At the end of the day, this book is clearly an apologia for polemics. Not that one should harbor illusions about its powers or its morality or praise it unconditionally. The essential point is that it furnishes a modality of exchange, admittedly limited and imperfect, but that fulfils constructive functions precisely because of its limits and faults. If we want to preserve the pluralism and diversity of a divided society where the conflict of opinion is the rule, public controversy and polemics provide a means to fight for a cause, to protest against what is perceived as intolerable and to carry out identity-based groupings, all the while provoking more or less direct exchanges with the adversary, and managing disagreements, be they deep or not, without allowing them to degenerate into a dislocation of the social body and fratricidal violence. It is in this sense that polemics constructs a social space as much as classical deliberation, which aims to ensure consensus. This does not mean, of course, that the deliberative ideal should not remain on the horizon of contemporary democracies. It remains indispensable as a model aiming to change the social body through verbal means in a space where discussion is the rule. But the reality of pluralistic democracy, which feeds on differences and conflict, calls for a rhetoric capable of complementing the rhetoric of consensus in the very numerous cases where an agreement on the reasonable turns out to be impossible. That is what justifies in my view, the formula with which I would like to conclude, of “coexistence in dissensus.”

References Albert, L., & Nicolas, L. (Eds.) (2010). Polémique(s). Modalités et formes rhétoriques de la parole agonale de l’Antiquité à nos jours. De Boeck-Duculot. Amossy, R. (2012). Les enjeux du “déraisonnable”. Rhétorique de la persuasion et rhétorique du dissensus. In B. Frydman & M. Meyer (Eds.), Perelman (1912–2012): de la nouvelle rhétorique à la logique juridique. Puf. Angenot, M. (2008). Le Dialogue de sourds. Traité de rhétorique antilogique. Mille et une Nuits. Brilliant, M. (2011). L’émergence de la polémique autour de la formule “immigration choisie” dans la presse française (janvier-juillet 2005). In R. Amossy & M. Burger (Eds.), Polémiques médiatiques et journalistiques, Semen 31, 113–128. Dacheux, É. (2008). L’espace public: un concept clé de la démocratie. In É. Dacheux (Ed.) L’Espace public (pp. 7–30). CNRS, coll. «Les Essentiels d’Hermès». Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969) [1958]. The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. University of Notre Dame Press Phillips, K. R. (1996). The spaces of public dissension: Reconsidering the public sphere. Communication Monographs, 63, 231–248.

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Index

A Acquiescence, 18 Actant, 37–39, 85, 134 Actantial, 37, 38, 53, 73, 156 Act of speech, 64 Actor, 4, 22, 33, 34, 37–39, 42, 54, 59, 73, 80, 85, 93, 127, 128, 134, 149, 152, 156 Ad hitlerum argument, 116 Ad hominem argument, 40, 70, 115, 125, 129, 130, 132, 136, 141 Adversary, 5, 14, 19, 21–23, 29, 36–40, 43, 44, 49, 50, 54, 57–60, 62, 67, 68, 70, 76, 80, 81, 83, 85–87, 91, 92, 94, 95, 101, 104, 106, 113, 114, 116, 117, 123–126, 130, 132–134, 139, 141, 146, 147, 149–151, 154–156, 158, 159 Aggressivity (aggressive), 44, 62, 126, 129, 130, 136, 140, 141 Agon, 10, 141 Agonistic, 18, 19, 35, 59, 105 Agreement, 5, 9–16, 18–25, 36, 37, 45, 53, 73, 103, 134, 149, 152, 156, 158, 159 Analogy, 34, 52, 57, 67, 81, 82, 87, 89, 108, 109 Anger, 28, 29, 70, 99, 101, 112, 114, 117– 120, 135, 154 Antilogics (antilogical), 21, 22 Antithesis, 70, 82 Argument -argument by the consequences (ad consequentiam), 34, 132 Argumentation, 11–16, 19–21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32–35, 39, 42, 45, 49, 53, 63, 67, 68, 100, 107, 124, 127, 129, 130, 136, 142, 143, 150, 152

Argumentative modality, 32, 35, 45, 69, 123, 124, 130, 143 Asynchronous, 131 Attack, 18, 23, 28, 31, 33, 34, 39–43, 45, 50, 57, 58, 62, 65, 70, 74–76, 79, 80, 83, 85, 86, 89, 92, 101, 106, 107, 112, 113, 115–120, 123, 125–127, 129, 132–136, 141, 146, 147 Axiological, 42, 58, 70, 80, 89, 120

C Circulation of discourses, 73, 74, 79, 146– 148, 156 Coercion, 88, 94, 124, 138, 140 Coercive rhetoric, 136, 138, 140, 151, 157 Coexistence, 5, 93, 95, 130, 151 Coexistence in dissensus, 95, 151, 154, 155, 157, 159 Cognitive break, 21, 69, 94 Commitment, 4, 54, 67, 131 Common sense, 15, 42, 70, 84, 87, 93, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 116, 118, 130 Communicative action, 16, 152 Compassion, 101, 106, 114 Condemnation (condemn), 9, 12, 17, 20, 34, 40, 57, 58, 60, 64, 78, 80, 81, 104, 105, 111, 112, 119, 149 Conflict -conflict management, 35, 37, 130, 146 -conflict resolution, 15, 20, 22 Confrontation, 3, 5, 10, 15, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 35–37, 41, 43, 45, 53–55, 59, 69, 70, 73, 85, 94, 99, 104, 120, 123, 124, 127, 131, 133, 134, 140, 141, 147, 150, 151, 154–156, 158

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Amossy, In Defense of Polemics, Argumentation Library 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85210-8

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164 Consensus, 5, 9, 10, 12, 16–19, 21, 22, 25, 84, 114, 129, 138, 146, 150–153, 156, 159 Contradiction, 2, 17, 36, 109, 117, 118, 125, 132 Conversationalization, 131, 134 Counter-discourse, 32, 34, 40, 43, 69, 78, 79, 125, 146 D Debate, 2–5, 9–20, 22, 25, 27–38, 41–43, 45, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59–63, 66–68, 70, 74–77, 79, 80, 83, 99, 103–105, 107, 112, 117, 123, 127, 129, 131, 133–135, 140, 141, 145–152, 155, 158 Deep disagreement, 5, 20, 21, 94, 120, 150 Deliberation (deliberative), 3–5, 9, 10, 13– 16, 18, 19, 25, 32, 35, 42, 45, 53, 69, 94, 99, 100, 140, 145, 149, 152, 159 Democracy (democratic), 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18–20, 22, 25, 38, 42, 44, 45, 52, 59, 67–69, 74, 77, 80, 82–85, 87–89, 94, 95, 115, 119, 142, 143, 150–153, 159 Demonization, 40, 126, 141 Denunciation (denounce), 18, 19, 52, 55–58, 68, 70, 78, 80, 82, 84, 90, 102, 116, 117, 119, 128, 149, 156 Dialogal, 50, 146 Dialogical (dialogism), 20, 24, 40, 50, 94, 146 Dialogue, 2, 12–15, 22, 25, 28, 29, 40, 41, 43, 50, 54, 56, 59–63, 70, 73, 83, 85, 86, 93, 94, 116, 118, 119, 134, 135, 142, 145–149, 152 Dialogue of the deaf, 21, 22, 37, 45, 146, 151 Dichotomization, 24, 35–39, 41, 42, 45, 49, 53, 69, 70, 80, 104, 123, 124, 143, 147, 149, 158 Difference of opinion, 3, 14, 15, 24, 28, 138 Disagreement, 2, 5, 9–11, 15, 16, 18–22, 24, 28, 29, 33, 44, 53, 83, 87, 94, 126, 127, 134, 150–152, 158, 159 Discourse -indirect discourse, 146 -mono-managed discourse, 73, 93 -reported discourse, 57, 59, 125, 133, 146, 149 Discredit (discrediting), 9, 12, 39, 49, 57, 58, 62, 67, 69, 70, 79, 80, 85, 86, 91, 94, 105, 123, 124, 126, 129, 136, 141, 143, 146, 147

Index Discursive register, 124, 143 Discussion forum, 31, 43, 50, 63, 66, 70, 73, 78, 79, 83, 88, 103, 110, 117, 127, 129–131, 133–137, 140, 141, 143, 151, 156 Dispute, 9–11, 14, 15, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 35, 44, 45, 70, 131, 133, 134, 138, 145, 148, 150 Dissensus, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 16–19, 22–25, 149, 150, 152, 157 Dissidence, 151, 152 E Ed-op, 4, 35, 102, 110 Emotion, 10, 30, 42, 45, 59, 65, 76, 77, 79, 99–106, 112, 113, 118, 120, 123, 126, 135, 154 Enemy, 18, 19, 23, 29, 38–42, 67, 77, 89, 90, 92, 95, 108, 117, 135, 151, 156 Enthymem, 129 Enunciation, 37, 49, 54, 73, 145, 146, 156 Eristics (eristic), 11–14, 22, 23, 29, 40, 141, 151 Ethos, 10, 39, 65, 66, 87, 91, 141, 158 Exclamation mark, 41, 65, 119, 129 Exemplum, 81, 85 F Fallacy (fallacious), 11, 13, 14, 23, 82, 100, 132 Flames (flaming), 123, 127–131, 135, 137, 140, 151 Formula, 64, 75, 76, 85, 87–89, 124, 158, 159 G Genre, 5, 35, 43, 45, 54, 65, 99, 117, 131, 140, 142, 143 I Indignation, 29, 42, 65, 69, 70, 80, 86, 87, 99, 101, 113–115, 118–120, 140, 154, 157 Informal logic, 13, 14, 20, 24, 150 Insult, 2, 31, 42, 74, 80, 86, 92, 120, 123, 126–128, 130, 133, 135, 136, 139– 142 Interdiscourse, 69, 81 Inter-incomprehension, 37, 94 Internet, 1, 50, 63–68, 70, 78, 79, 82, 84, 86, 88, 95, 103–107, 110, 111, 113, 115,

Index 117, 119, 120, 127–137, 140, 141, 148, 149, 151 Intertext, 43, 55 Irony, 39, 70, 117

J Justification, 16, 21, 22, 64, 101, 108, 125

L Logos, 10, 11, 16, 42, 103, 138, 142, 146, 152, 154

M Media, 1, 2, 15, 27, 30, 33, 34, 42, 44, 45, 50, 51, 55, 66, 70, 73, 74, 76–80, 82– 85, 87–91, 94, 101–103, 124, 135, 147–149, 151

N Negotiation, 9, 14, 135, 138

O Opponent, 12, 13, 34, 37–41, 44, 53, 54, 56– 58, 64, 67, 73, 80, 88–90, 94, 103, 107, 108, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 125, 126, 129, 132, 133, 135, 146, 149, 154, 156 Oralization, 131, 133

P Passion, 2, 41, 42, 49, 99–101, 123, 129, 132, 143, 149, 154 Pathos, 10, 35, 41, 59, 61, 65, 70, 99, 100, 102–104, 120, 124, 126, 154 Persuasion, 10, 14, 19–21, 24, 28, 45, 70, 74, 100, 138, 140, 146, 149, 150, 154 Pluralistic (Pluralism), 2, 5, 11, 17–19, 22, 25, 80, 135, 150, 151, 153, 159 Polarization, 35, 37–42, 45, 49, 56, 57, 69, 70, 80, 91, 93, 95, 102, 103, 105, 123, 124, 126, 135, 143, 147, 149, 153, 158 Polemical discourse, 3, 28, 32, 39, 41–43, 45, 49, 50, 53, 66, 70, 74, 80, 83, 94, 99–101, 117, 124, 126, 146–149, 152, 157 Polemical exchange, 24, 25, 35, 38, 44, 49, 50, 60, 63–65, 70, 102–105, 108, 117,

165 120, 127, 128, 132, 141, 143, 146, 147 Polemicist, 4, 53, 54, 58, 60, 70, 80, 85, 125–127, 130, 151, 154, 158 Polemics, 1–5, 9, 12, 14, 17, 19, 21–24, 27– 30, 32, 33, 35–37, 39–43, 45, 49, 50, 53, 55, 63, 66, 70, 73, 79, 80, 84, 91, 94, 95, 99–101, 123, 124, 129, 131, 139, 141, 143, 145–159 Politeness, 127, 128, 134, 141 Polylogue, 60, 63, 66, 73, 135, 147 Post, 20, 50, 51, 63–66, 87, 104–113, 115– 120, 129, 130, 137 Practical reasoning, 102, 105, 107, 109, 112, 120 Pragma-dialectics, 14 Principles of cooperation, 14 Proponent, 37, 38, 53, 54, 57, 64, 65, 73, 81, 94, 110, 116, 125, 126, 149, 156 Protest -community of protest, 135 Pseudonym, 65, 127, 129, 131, 134 Public controversy, 1–5, 9, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27–45, 49–57, 59, 62, 63, 66, 68– 70, 73–77, 79, 80, 83–86, 93–95, 99– 103, 105, 123, 124, 127–131, 133, 136, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145–159 Public sphere, 2–5, 9, 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 28, 32, 35, 41, 42, 50, 51, 56, 58, 59, 64, 69, 73, 74, 76, 78, 88, 93, 94, 123, 126, 145, 147–149, 152–155 Q Quarrel, 11, 14, 27–30, 57, 69, 76, 84, 131, 133–135, 142, 147 Question marks, 112, 132 R Rational, 2, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18–21, 24, 25, 42, 61, 62, 69, 93, 94, 104, 105, 110, 120, 127, 146, 149, 150, 153 Rationality -alternative rationalities, 152, 153 Reasonable, 5, 10, 12–14, 19, 24, 93, 94, 104–106, 113, 130, 149, 152, 159 Reductio ad absurdum, 59, 70, 108, 125, 130 Refutation (refuting), 12, 13, 28, 33, 62–64, 67, 69, 70, 107, 108, 110, 111, 125, 126, 146, 147, 153, 154 Responsibility, 22, 50, 54, 101, 104, 107, 127, 131 Rhetorical question, 42, 125

166

Index

Rhythm, 126 Rule of justice, 65, 67, 130, 132

Threat to the face, 51, 55 Tu quoque, 125

S Scare tactics, 85 Slippery slope, 82, 85, 132 Social movement, 38, 41, 138, 139, 157 Subjectivation, 131 Subjectivity, 22, 41, 42, 70, 80, 131, 152

V Value(s), 17, 19–21, 23–25, 31, 32, 34, 39, 44, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 65, 67, 69, 75, 76, 78–80, 82–85, 88, 89, 91, 93, 104, 106, 115, 120, 134, 138, 139, 146, 149–151, 153, 156, 157 Violence -incitement to violence, 136–138, 140, 143, 157 -symbolic violence, 138 Virtual community, 129, 135, 136, 143, 156

T Third Party, 37, 39, 40, 44, 70, 126, 135, 136, 146, 154