Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-Ways: Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman and Twentieth Century History of Turkey 9781617199295, 161719929X

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Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-Ways

i 14 f1

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

23

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-Ways

Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman and Twentieth Century History of Turkey

Robert Olson

The Isis Press, Istanbul

preSS 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 1996 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

ISBN 978-1-61719-929-5

Reprinted from the 1996 Istanbul edition.

Printed in the United States of America

Robert Olson (b. 1940) received his B. S. Degree from Bemidji Slate College in 1958 and his M. A. (1967) and Ph. D. (1973) from Indiana University. He is the author of The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743: A Study of Rebellion in the Capital and War in the Provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975); The Ba'th and Syria, 1947-1979: An Interpretative Historical Essay (Rome: The Middle East Institute: 1980); The Ba'th in Syria, 1947-1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party and State from the French Withdrawal to the Era of Hafiz al-Asad (Princeton, NJ : The Kingston Press, 1983); The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989); The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 1880-1891 (paperback of above). Dr. Olson is the editor of The Kurdish Nationalism Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1997); Islamic and Middle Eastern Societies (Brattleboro, VT; Amana Books, 1987); and co-editor of Iran: Essays on a Revolution in the Making (Lexington, KY: Mazda Press, 1981); Orientalism, Islam and Islamists (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984). Three of Professor Olson's books have been translated into Arabic and Turkish. He is the author of some 75 research articles and numerous essays on Middle Eastern topics. Dr. Olson teaches Middle East and Islamic History at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, Kentucky in the United States.

to Judith who shares my love and appreciation of the history, cultures, civilizations and peoples of the Middle East

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Notes on transliteration and spelling Preface Introduction

X XI XIII

Part I. Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman History 1.

2

3.

4.

5.

6.

"The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?" Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. XVII, Part 3 (1974), 329-44.

1

"Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. XX, Part II (1977), 185-207

13

"Jews in the Ottoman Empire and Their Role in Light of New Documents: Addenda and Revisions to Gibb and Bowen," Tarih Dergisi, no. 7-8 (1976-77), 119-44

33

"The Ottoman Empire in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century and the Fragmentalion of Tradition: Relations of the Nationalities (Millets, Guilds, Esnai) and the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire," Die Welt des Islams, vol. XVII, 1-4 (1977), 72-77

55

"Some Comments on Eighteenth Century Ottoman Historiography, in Islamic and Middle Eastern Societies: A Festschrift in Honor of Professor Wadie Jwaideh, edited by Robert Olson (Amana Press, 1987), 137-51

61

"The Ottoman-French Treaty of 1740: A Year to be Remembered? The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, vol. 15, no 2 (September 1991), 347-56

75

Vili

I M P E R I A L MEANDERINGS AND R E P U B L I C A N BY-WAYS

7.

"Conclusion," of The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743: A Study of Rebellion in the Capital and War in the Provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Indiana University Press, 1975), 185-202

83

Part II. Twentieth Century History of Turkey 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

"The Young Turks and the Jews: A Historiographical Revision,". Turcica, vol. XVII (1986), 219-35

101

"The Remains of Talat: A Dialectic Between Republic and Empire," Die Welt des 1slams, vol. XXVI (1986), 46-56

119

"Five Stages of Kurdish Nationalism: 1880-1980," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. XII, no. 2 (July 1991), 391409

127

"The Second Time Around: British Policy Towards the Kurds (1921-22), Die Welt des Islams, XXVII (1987), 91-102

147

"The Churchill-Cox Correspondence and the 'Battle' over Kurdistan: Its Consequences for British Policy Towards Turkey from 1921-1923," International Journal of Turkish Studies, vol. 5, nos. 1 & 2 [Winter, 1990-91), 121-36

6.

7.

8.

9.

157

"The International Consequences of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion," in Naqshbandis: Cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre mystique musulman, edited by March Gaborieau, Alexandre Popovic et Thierry Zarcone (Istanbul: Éditions Isis, 1990), 379406

175

"Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union toward the Turkoman Rebellion in Eastern Iran in 1924-1925 and the Kurdish Rebellion of Shaykh Said in Eastern Turkey in 1925: A Comparison," Central Asian Survey, vol. 9, no. 4 (1990), 7583

203

"Kurds and Turks: Two Documents Concerning Kurdish Autonomy in 1922 and 1923," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. XV, no. 2 ( 1991 ), 20-31

213

"Al-Fatah in Turkey: Its Influence on the 12 March Coup," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 1973), 197-205

225

TABLE 10.

11.

12.

13.

OF C O N T E N T S

IX

"The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East," Third World Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 3 (1992), 475-99

237

"The Kurdish Question and the Kurdish Problem: Some Geopolitic and Geostrategic Comparisons," in Peuples Méditerranéens, no. 68-69 Les Kurdes et Les États (JulyDecember, 1994), 215-41

267

"The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991 -1995: From the Gulf War to the Incursion Into Iraq," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. XIX, no. 1 (Fall, 1995), 1-30

293

"The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies Since the Gulf War: Middle East Policy, vol. IV, no. 3 (1996), 106-18

319

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND SPELLING

I have employed modern Turkish spelling insofar as possible in all of the articles in this colection since the bulk of the research on which they are based was in Ottoman and Turkish sources. In modern Turkish the letters 6 and ii are similar to the German letters. The letter i is pronounced like "sit" in English; the letters ( and } are pronounced like the ch in "church" and the sh in "should." The letter c is pronounced like j in "John." In modern Turkish, the Ottoman, Arabic and Farsi letters d and b are rendered as t and p at the end of words (thus, Mehmed, Ahmed and Receb in Ottoman Turkish become Mehmet, Ahmet, and Recep in modern Turkish). Turkish also has a letter g, which has the effect of lengthening the preceding vowel and sometimes obviates the need to pronounce the following consonants, as in aga (large landowner). In Ottoman and Arabic, the word is generally spelled agha with the sound of the letter ghain in Arabic. I have taken some liberties with the transliteration when certain names or places would be more familiar in a slightly different rendering. For example, 1 spell "sheikh" as I do rather than use the Turkish feyh or the Arabic shaykh because it is closer to the English "Sheikh." In other instances, I do not adhere to modern Turkish spelling if the meaning of a word, place, or name would be better understood or more in uniformity with the Arabic, Farsi or Kurdish if rendered differently or, as in the appendices, given as written in the documents. I have sometimes omitted the umlaut over certain le tters in order to make the words easily comprehensible to readers and speakers of Arabic, Farsi, Kurdish or Turkish. It is inevitable in articles that have been published over a 22 year span and in a variety of American, European and Turkish journals that different punctuation and footnote styles have been used. While most of the discrepancies have been corrected in this collection, it has not been possible to eliminate all of them: to do so would have entailed rewriting many of the references; again resulting in greater costs. All of the articles arc self-contained with regard to their references with the exception of article 7 in Part I. Since this article is the conclusion to The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743, the reader will have to refer to the main text for full citations.

PREFACE

I am delighted to present these twenty essays in the Isisiana Series. The seven articles in Part I deal with eighteenth century Ottoman topics. These essays are concerned particularly with the Tulip Period (Lale Devri), its consequences and the Ottoman-Iranian wars of the first half of the eighteenth century. Articles 1, 2 and 3 discuss aspects of the role of the Jews in the developments during this period, especially after the Patrona Halil rebellion in 1730. These three articles, along with article 1 in Part II which also deals with an aspect of Jewish-Young Turk relations, were attempts, at the time when I wrote them, to revise the then held views in the obtaining historiography. The other four articles, nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 are concerned primarily with the ideas of change, continuity, traditionalism, modernism, dependency, political economy, 'decline' and attempts to periodize these ideas and theories with regard to the first half of the eighteenth century. I present these essays here as they, 1 like to think, presaged many of the same topics that became so hotly debated from the 1970s to the 1990s. All of the articles in Part II, with two exceptions, deal with OttomanKurdish, Turkish-Kurdish and Kurdish history. In order that the articles appear in terms of content as closely as possible to the originals there is some redundancy. I thought it best not to cull all extraneous materials so that the reader and researcher would have full access to all notes and appendices. For example, I have included Everard Fawkener's 1740 despatch to the Duke of Newcastle, the British Foreign Secretary, in both articles 2 and 3. On a few occasions I have had to insert a word or two to clarify my views. For example, in article 3 in Part II, I have indicated that I do not think that Sheikh Ubaydallah was a nationalist. I disagree with Wadie Jwaideh on this point. Inevitably in articles, such as nos. 10-13, which deal with similar topics, there are redundancies that could not be eliminated without major rewriting entailing substantial expense. This would have defeated the purpose of presenting this collection of essays to a wider audience with the least possible cost. Robert Olson

INTRODUCTION

Imperial meanderings is an apt title for the articles included in Part I. It was while I was a peace corps volunteer in Turkey in the early 1960s teaching in Salihli in the Gediz river valley just across the Bozdag mountain range from the Meander, now named Menderes, river valley that I first fell in love with the civilizations, history, cultures and languages of the peoples of Turkey and the Middle East. When I had a few days off or a vacation I loved to meander through the Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Seljuk and Ottoman ruins as well as the still existing buildings. In a one day excursion from Salihli I could reach Ephesus, Aphrodisias, Miletus, Didyma, Hierapolis, Pamukkale, Manisa and Alajehir among many other places of interest. With a week's vacation I was able to reach Istanbul and see the mighty mosques of the Ottomans. Then, I was hooked for good. From that time onwards, my meanderings have never ceased. In order to encompass the broadest possible swath of my interests I decided to pursue a graduate program in Ottoman studies. I was interested especially in the eighteenth century and the role the Arab provinces of the empire played in the Ottoman-Iranian wars of the second quarter of that century. When I commenced my graduate work in 1965, Ottoman studies was still dominated by imperial, political and administrative studies with a strong Eurocentric and Balkan bias. For that reason I determined to study Ottoman relations with Iran and the impact of those relations on the political economy of the empire. My intention was to study the periphery in order to define more accurately the center. The essays comprising Part I deal with these efforts. Even though I commenced this research more than twenty-five years ago, I was delighted to learn upon reading Ariel Salzman's, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire," (Politics & Society, vol. 21, no. 4 (1993), 393-424) excellent and award winning article in which she critiques much of the scholarly literature regarding different interpretations of eighteenth century Ottoman political economy over the past half century, that she credits my work as attempting "to sort out the parties and issues-taxes, credit, promotion to offices and malikâne-'mvoUcd in these events," i.e. the period from 1703 to 1768.1 still think, however, even after 25 years, that historians of the eighteenth century have given short shrift to the impact the Safavid and Afsharid empires had on the

XIV

I M P E R I A L MEANDER INGS AND R E P U B L I C A N BY-WAYS

political economy of the Ottoman empire. This is particularly true with regard to t h e 'hottest' h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l c o n c e r n s and t r e n d s - c o n t i n u i t y , c h a n g e , dependency, traditionalism, modernism, dependency and the maelstrom swirling around the concept of decline' in the eighteenth century. I hope that the articles presented here have conlributed to clarifying and defining some of these issues. It seemed unlikely in the 1960s and 1970s that anything could pull me away from my eighteenth century meanderings and lead m e to the by-ways of twentieth century Turkey and the Middle East, especially the history of TurkishKurdish relations. Having served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Turkey in the early 1960s I was aware that Kurds existed in Turkey and in the Middle East. I traveled extensively in eastern and southeastern Turkey in 1965. But it was not until I commenced graduate studies at Indiana University in 1965 that my interest in the Kurds broadened. The main reason was that my mentor was Wadie Jwaideh who was the only person, at the time, to have written extensively on the Kurdish nationalist movement. After thirty-six years, his study, although unpublished, is still a valuable source for people interested in the Kurds. In addition, Jwaideh had enormous experience as an administrator in northern Iraq during the late 1940s. While I was during research on another topic at the Public Record Office in 1979-80,1 recognized immediately the value of a cache of documents relating to the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 that I came across in the Air Ministry files. It was the discovery of these documents that led to the publication of The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion: 1880-1925. This background and research proved invaluable when the Kurdish Question, i. e. the challenge of Kurdish nationalism, once again b e c a m e one of the most dominating issues of Middle Eastern politics in the wake of the Gulf war. The thirteen articles in Part II, with the exception of nos. 1 and 2, deal exclusively with aspects of twentieth century Ottoman-Kurdish, Turkish-Kurdish and Kurdish history and politics. Nos. 3 to 8 focus on the inter-war era and the emergence of Kurdish nationalism during that period. Nos. 9 - 1 3 are concerned with the increasing saliency of the Kurdish Question and the challenge of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey and the Middle East during the 1980s and 1990s. I realize, of course, there are c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n my

imperial

meanderings and my republican peregrinations. After all, Mosul is not far from Palu. My studies of eighteenth century Ottoman history are concerned with the geographical territories of central and eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran and the Caucasus, regions in which many determining events of Middle Eastern history have occurred not just in the eighteenth or twentieth centuries, but throughout the span of history.

INTRODUCTION

XV

None of this was intended. I sometimes think that it was my love of the seemingly peripheral, obscure and marginal and need to prove that denied history was not real history that led me on this journey. Anyway, most people know that by-ways are much more interesting than autobahns. One can learn, see, contemplate and sometimes stop on a by-way, but not a busy highway. Kurdish history and Turkish-Kurdish history were very much by-ways of Middle Eastern history thirty years ago: this is no longer so. I hope that the articles in this collection have contributed to taking Kurdish and Turkish-Kurdish history from the by-ways to the highways of Middle Eastern history. Robert Olson

THE ESNAF AND THE PATRONA HAUL REBELLION OF 1730: A REALIGNMENT IN OTTOMAN POLITICS?1

It is an established fact of Ottoman history that the Patrona Halil rebellion which occurred in Istanbul in 1730 had vast repercussions on the subsequent social, economic and political history of the Ottoman Empire. In order to put the role of the esnaf in the Patrona Halil rebellion into proper perspective, I first wish to cite several authorities' views which attest to the significance of the 1730 rebellion. The Patrona Halil rebellion temporarily and in some cases completely stopped the flow of ideas, literature, ambassadors and military consultants which had begun to take place between Europe, largely France, and the Porte during the reign of Ahmet III (1703-1730). The cultural flowering of this period has been characterized by calling it the Tulip Period' (Lale Devri) which also indicates the craze developed by segments of Ottoman society for tulips. But in the opinion of Professor Ziya Enver Karal the word tulip was the symbol of nothing less than a new mentality' which manifested in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire the first serious attempt to undertake the necessary measures to try to understand one a n o t h e r 3 . In the v i e w of Professor Karal this first period of secularization (garpliia$mak) which appeared so promisingly to introduce needed reorganization and reform into the Empire was put to an end with the outbreak of the 1730 rebellion. The Patrona rebellion brought into being a situation in which those who wished for reform were "opposed by the ulema, Janissaries and the people of Istanbul"-'. Professor Karal concludes that antagonism between the two groups resulted in a continual state of instability and in the rebellions subsequent to

The term esnaf as it is e m p l o y e d in this article follows the definition used by H. A. R. C i b b and Harold B o w e n Islamic Society and the West, part 1 ( O x f o r d , 1965), pp. 2 8 1 - 3 1 3 and Gabriel Bacr, "The Administrative E c o n o m i c and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds", International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES), vol. I, no. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 28-50. I will use the term esnaf as Bacr applies it t o his 'second' g r o u p of esnaf consisting of artisans and craftsmen, artisan-merchants and merchants proper as well as those esnaf or guilds engaged in transport and services. Cf, Baer, "Turkish Guilds", p. 31-32. 1 w o u l d like to e x p r e s s m y t h a n k s to P r o f e s s o r s W. J w a i d e h , B. Bayerle, B. Jelavich and C. Jelavich, and especially to C. Jelavich for all of the "kindnesses" he demonstrated for me. " E n v e r Ziya Karal, "Tanzimattan Evvel G a r p l i l a j m a Hareketleri ( 1 7 1 8 - 1 8 3 9 ) " in the volume Tanz.iniut 3

Ibid.,

/ (fstanbu/, 1940), p. 19.

p. 1».

2

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

1730 victories resided with the second group. Those Sultans w h o desired reform too ardently were deposed, their Grand Vizers killed, usually in a cruel manner. A rebellion served notice to a ' r e f o r m i n g ' Sultan and his m i n i s t e r s that m o r e imitation of Europe would not be tolerated. A n o t h e r view of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Patrona rebellion is that of Professor Niyazi Berkes who states that the French influenced secular t e n d of the T u l i p Period i n s o f a r as it originated in the rationalist spirit of the prerevolutionary France "gave a religious colouring to the anti-reform m o v e m e n t . T h e religious reaction held the reformationists responsible for the destruction of both din (religion) and devlet (state), not only because of their alien innovations which undermined the ancient tradition, but also because of their complicity with those infidels [French and Russian] who were now threatening Muslim rule f r o m two sides and from within. Thus a religiously oriented anti-western m o v e m e n t b e c a m e the second strand running a c r o s s the whole history of the T u r k i s h transformation, in contrast to the Westernist strand" 4 which had begun during the reign of Ahmet III. A c c o r d i n g to P r o f e s s o r §erif M a r d i n , in o n e of the most r e c e n t l y expressed views, the Patrona Halil rebellion is an important e x a m p l e of the c l e a v a g e in the c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y relations of Ottoman and m o d e r n T u r k i s h politics 5 . The 'center' in the Ottoman E m p i r e consisted of the Sultanate, the ulema or learned religious class and the elite members of the asakir or military class. Mardin stresses that several factors contributed to the strained relations between the center and the periphery a m o n g which were the incompatibility of urban dwellers with the n o m a d society of Anatolia, the e s t r a n g e m e n t of the ruling elite from the pre-Ottoman nobility during the early history of the empire and the religious orthodoxy (Sunni) of the center and the heterodoxy (Shi'i sects) of the provinces: an incompatibility which often ended in rebellion or war. The fact that many m e m b e r s of the center — the military elite — which at this point w e r e Janissaries and the Sultans' ministers, were converted Christians coupled with the organization of the n o n - M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s into millets w h i c h provided them with a great deal of a u t o n o m y further alienated the m a s s e s f r o m governmental p o w e r centered in Istanbul. T o be sure, as P r o f e s s o r M a r d i n relates, there were administrative and politically integrative institutions and elements which made the Ottoman governmental apparatus flexible e n o u g h to ameliorate from time lo time the accumulated tension a m o n g conflicting groups, but the Patrona rebellion introduced new disruptive urban elements on a scale hitherto unprecedented in the capital which culminated in the first anti-modern Turkish outbreak. Professor Mardin concludes,

4

N i y a z i Berkes, The Development

5

§ e r i f Mardin, S., "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", Duedatus,

of Secularism

102, no. I (Winter, 1973), pp. 169-190.

in Turkey

(Montreal, 1964), pp. 52. vol.

T H E E S N A F AND THE P A T R O N A H A L I L R E B E L L I O N

3

T h e r e had been m a n y rebellions in Istanbul before, but this [the Patrona Halil rebellion] w a s the first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: an effort to Westernize military and administrative organization propounded by a section of the official elite, accompanied by s o m e aping of W e s t e r n m a n n e r s , and used by another interest g r o u p [ulema] to mobilize the m a s s e s against Westernization, Turkish m o d e r n i s t s have concentrated exclusively upon the background of political intrigues by s t a t e s m e n w h i c h , indeed, w a s an aspect of this and similar revolts. H o w e v e r , for a c o m p l e t e picture we should also dwell on the cultural alienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery from the center. D u r i n g later p h a s e s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n , this a l i e n a t i o n w a s to b e compounded 6 . If we accept Professor Mardin's statement, the problem still remains of how to define and analyze the extent of the cultural alienation of the masses from their ruler, and, in particular, how the Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730 and the esnaf contributed to this alienation. During the course of the Patrona rebellion the rebels and s o m e of their supporters succeeded for a short period of time in achieving some of the highest offices in the Empire with the support of elements, especially the ulema, which had formerly supported the Sultan. T h e rebellion of 1730 in e f f e c t caused a realignment of those groups which supported or opposed the policy of increased contact with Europe advocated by the Sultan and his Grand Vizer. The m a j o r support of the Sultanate prior to 1730 had c o m e from the military elite and the ulema. After 1730 elements of the military elite, especially those opposed to the introduction of western military methods, and the ulema who were opposed to the subversion of Ottoman society by Europe began to collaborate with the antiSultan forces w h e n e v e r they felt it in their interest to do so. In e f f e c t , the post1730/1731 alignment was much more volatile than the pre-1730 one, because elements of the Janissaries and/or the ulema could alternate their support for the Sultan or for his opponents depending upon the circumstances and strength of t h e S u l t a n 7 . T h e fluidity of the new a l i g n m e n t is also d e m o n s t r a t e d by the actions of the esnaf or 'petite bourgeoisie' of artisans and merchants w h o in 1730 were one of the most vocal opponents of the Sultan and Grand Vizer. In the spring of 1731 the esnaf in the face of a threat to their businesses by the c o n t i n u i n g disorders in the city, threw their s u p p o r t s to the new Sultan, M a h m u d 1 (1730-1754), and the last supporters of Patrona Halil were executed or i m p r i s o n e d 8 . Even t h o u g h M a h m u d I promised to rescind the extraordinary

6

lbid„

p. 175.

^Robert W. Olson. The Siege of Mosul: War and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire. unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation (Indiana University, 1973), pp. 138-140.

1720-1743.

O

for this significant development see the dispatch of Lord Kinnoul, the British Resident in Istanbul, dated 4/15 April, 1731 in Stale Papers, (SP) Series 97, volume 26. Series 97 of the SP records correspondence between the British Residents of Istanbul with the Foreign Secretary and

4

I M P E R I A L M E A N D E R I N G S AND R E P U B L I C A N

BY-WAYS

campaign taxes imposed by his predecessor, the newly won allegiance of the esnaf, many of whom were non-Muslim, was to be a mainstay of his regime. The switch of allegiance of the esnaf to the Sultan was one of the most sudden and significant changes resulting from the rebellion of 1730-1731, and it requires some discussion of the role of the esnaf in the Patrona Halil rebellion itself. Since the political and social events surrounding the rebellion of 1730 have been stated in some detail in other works, I would like to confine my comments to the esnaf and their economic grievances which played a role in helping to precipitate the Patrona rebellion 9 . The treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700) turned Ottoman attention from southeastern Europe to their eastern provinces and Persia. This policy culminated in the reopening of the Persian front in 1723 which in turn was followed by increased taxes, rising food prices and a scarcity of food supplies, it also necessitated the reimposition of the so-called extraordinary 'campaign' taxes of imad-i seferriye, avariz-i divaniye and tekalif-i vrftye which fell most heavily on the esnaf' 0 . The reopening of the eastern front caused an influx of refugees to Istanbul which, added to the emigrants from Rumeli, added greatly to the problem of provisioning the city and of finding employment for the new residents. The preparation for war with E§ref Shah, the Afghan invader, in 1726 and the preparation for a second confrontation after the defeat of Ahmet Pa§a, the Ottoman Commander, at Andican placed even more oppressive obligations on the reaya of Rumeli and Anatolia". The abandonment of the land by the peasants aggravated the financial situation of the Porte by reducing the agricultural taxes and resulted in an economic crisis. To combat the crisis mukataalar (state lands) began to be sold as malikanes (lands usually held for life by an individual), a practice initiated after the Treaty of Karlowitz to raise revenue 12 . Miri mukataa which were usually granted for one, two, or three years, began to be granted for longer periods of time. Rich officials purchased the mukataalar as malikanes and administered them as their own property. The tax farming privilege fell into the hands of a few r i c h 1 3 . The supervisors (mutasarriflar) of the malikanes frequently sold the tax-gathering privileges to someone else, always for a higher price than he had paid. The last person to

Foreign Office in London. The SP are deposited in the Public Record Office in London. For details of this period see Miinir Aktepe, Patrona Uzunjarjili, Osmanli Purgstall, Hhtaire

Tarihi,

de l'empire

Isyant (1730)

(Istanbul,

1958); I. H.

part I (Ankara, 1956), pp. 204-218 and Joseph von HammerOttoman,

XIV, translated from the German by J. J. Heilert (Paris,

1839), pp. 2 1 9 - 2 4 9 . ^Aklepe, Patrona 10

p. 36

Ibid.,

p. II.

U

/bid.,

hyani,

pp. 11-21.

Ibid., p. 4 Cf. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic

Society,

1, pp. 235-275 for land tenure procedures

during the eighteenth century. " A k t e p e , Patrona exaggeration.

Isyum.

p. 4 states, "be$ on / e n g i n e iniinhasir", but this must be taken as an

THE E S N A F AND THE PATRONA HALIL REBELLION

5

purchase the tax-gathering rights to a malikane was rcduced to force the price of the malikane from the peasants 1 4 . In 1715 the Porte repossessed many lands sold as malikanes and resold them as miri (state) land to tax farmers (miiltezim) for a stated period of time, usually three years. In other words, the Porte sold land as a malikane or sold it to a miiltezim, who paid for his tax-gathering right in advance, depending on which method produced the most revenue. Even prior to 1723 Ibrahim Pa§a had taken measures to reduced expenditures. One thing which he did was to call the yoklama (roster of Sipahis) in 1715 to save paying the salaries of the Janissaries whose ulufe or quarterly paid wages were in arrears'"V He also reduced the salaries of numerous other sections of the army. The Grand Vizer's measures of increased taxation and of cutting back on the wages of the Janissaries as well as provincial militia such as the kala muhafizlar (fortress soldiers) helped to alienate these two important groups of Ottoman society. In 1726 and 1727 the levies of the extraordinary campaign taxes for the war with E§ref Shah were demanded from a decreased and poverty stricken reaya. The financial situation coupled with the tension in the city doubtlessly contributed to the conclusion of the treaty with E$ref Shah in the fall of 1727 after which the imadi seferriye was cancelled 16 . The temporary lilting of the campaign tax did no! benefit the reaya as the tax gatherers, despite orders to the contrary from the Porte, kept collecting it. Secondly no sooner had the treaty with E§ref Shah been concluded when Nadir Khan, the powerful new military leader of Persia, appeared as a major threat to the eastern provinces of the empire. These economic measures of the Grand Vizer not only alienated the Janissaries, provincial soldiery, and put increasing burdens on the reaya, but they also put great demands and restrictions on the esnaf. During the twelve-year Grand Vezirate of Ibrahim Pa§a the esnafs complaints had mounted. Their major grievances centered on what they considered to be the three major problems: (I) the continued debasement of the currency and the problems which accompanied it; (2) the changes resulting in the guild system of the esnaf because of the influx of immigrants from Anatolia and Rumeli and; (3) the tax (ordu akgesi) extracted from the esnaf in times of mobilization for war. The first problem increased in 1719 when Ahmet III issued a hatt-i hiimayun (imperial rescript), which ordered the selling of one silver dirhem that had previously sold for twenty-one ak^e, for twenty akge. The same dirhem was being sold on the market for twenty-two akfe. By such a measure the official

14

Ibid., p. 4.

' Hal it Sahilloglu, "SIVI$ Yili Buhranlari", iktisat Fakiillesi Mecmuasi (IFM), 27 (October, 1967-March, 1968), pp. 101-102. ""Aklcpe, Patrona Isyaiu, p. 11.

I M P E R I A L M E A N D E R I N G S AND R E P U B L I C A N B Y - W A Y S

6

price of the dirhem was less than the going street price. The government's idea was to raise the price of the ak^e. This policy, in turn, reduced the value of the silver that the people possessed and which they did not want to give up to the mint at a loss. T h e merchants also did not want to sell their g o o d s at the new valuation. The mint was soon unable to strike new coins for the lack of silver. T h e silver w h i c h w a s o n the market soon fell into the h a n d s of P e r s i a n merchants who took it to Persia where it was minted into the Abbasi, a silver c o i n : 1 7 Persian merchants apparently played a significant role in reducing the value of the akge and in contributing to the silver shortage. The merchants who brought food supplies into Istanbul would not accept ak?es which contributed to the shortage of f o o d in the city. Additional monetary woes c a m e in 1723 when the Istanbul m o n e y market was flooded with silver aktjes minted in Egypt and w h i c h w e r e less than the standard weight of the a k ^ e in Istanbul. T h i s precipitated the "problem of the counterfeit ak9e" (zuyuf akge meselesi), which further increased the tension a m o n g the merchants, g o v e r n m e n t officials and money changers (sarraflar). The weak ak^e remained a troublesome problem from 1716 up to the outbreak of the Patrona Halil rebellion in 1730 1 8 . The second complaint of the esnaf in the decade preceding the rebellion of 1730 was the stress placed on their guilds as a result of the unprecedented influx of people into Istanbul 1 9 . During the Grand Vezirate of Ibrahim Pa§a the guild system was put under great pressure. A m o n g the people (lowing into the capital were many artisans w h o wished to open their own shops or, al least, to work with a member of a guild. S o m e of ihe guilds were attracted to the new labor supply and the possibility of paying lower wages. The masters of the guilds were just as anxious to k e e p strict control on the n u m b e r of j o u r n e y m e n permitted to become masters. Ibrahim Pa§a also attempted to tax the previously untaxed products which were manufactured by the esnaf in Istanbul. After much complaint some of the newly imposed taxes were annulled, but a few remained in force until Ibrahim's death in 1730. O n e of the first requests of the esnaf to the new Sultan, M a h m u d I, in 1730 w a s to annul the taxes levied by Ibrahim Pajja. Attempts to tax the esnaf made them bitter enemies of the Porte. In face of the new competition f r o m the provincial artisans, the esnaf took measures to protect themselves and to keep non-guild m e m b e r s from producing goods. T h e e s n a f s measures were partially successful. T h e non-guild members, unable to work, provided a united and somewhat organized dissatisfied group capable of potential violence in the city. There was tension not only between guild and non-guild m e m b e r s but a m o n g the guilds t h e m s e l v e s . T h e main b o n e of contention was that one of the esnaf would begin to produce which, according to

17

Ibid.,

p. 19.

}i

lbid.,

p 21

' ^ B a e r , "Turkish Guilds," and Robert Mantrun, Istanbul (Paris, 1962), pp. 287-424.

duns la seconde

muilié du XVII"

siècle

THE E S N A F AND THE PATRONA HALIL R E B E L L I O N

7

guild regulations, was the exclusive right of another guild. In 1720 the earthenware pipe makers began to invade the market of the pots and pans and glass makers, contrary to all guild regulations. The same thing was happening a m o n g other groups of esnaf. T h e guilds which had previously held together under various difficulties began to break down in the years just prior to 1730. Other government measures increased the e s n a f s complaints. In 1726 Ibrahim Pa$a introduced a new middleman into the commercial life of the city in an attempt to increase government revenue. The men who filled the new office were called dellah and were the middle men between the producers (miistahsiller) and the retailers (perakendeciler). Previously all produce entering Istanbul customs were distributed by senior members or stewards of the guilds. Now, as a result of Ibrahim's new measure the dellals were able to act as a wholesaler. The dellah bought the produce at Istanbul customs and sold it to the retailers at the highest price they could exact, splitting their profits with the government. The third m a j o r complaint of the esnaf was that military personnel, especially the armorers (cebeciler) and Janissaries, were continually increasing their esnaf operations. During Ahmet Ill's reign the Janissaries had begun even to be cook-, of okra! The Janissaries and cebecis would force the growers of okra to sell their produce at prices lower than the market price. The growers as well as the esnaf were unable to offer any retaliation against the superior power of the Janissaries and cebecis. When Janissaries obtained the positions of dellal,

the

esnaf and the growers were unable to oppose to them. The third m a j o r grievance of the esnaf and the one most directly contributing to their unrest was the levying of the extraordinary campaign taxes with the commencement of the Persian wars in 1723. As mentioned above, the appearance of Nadir Khan in Azerbayjan in 1730 once again compelled Ibrahim Pa§a to impose the extraordinary campaign taxes. In 1730 Ibrahim Pa$a and Ahmet III had begun mobilizing their forces at Uskiidar in advent of an eastern campaign The days stretched into months and still the assembled troops did not depart for the Persian front. The esnaf who had paid their campaign taxes felt that they had been deceived and that the government was spending their tax money for something other than the war against Persia. Every day they remained at Uskiidar the e s n a f s wrath mounted against Ibrahim Pa§a. The bitterness of the esnaf was related directly to their involvement with the army's campaign. Whenever the Ottoman army left on a campaign the various esnaf and artisan groups attached a contingent of men from their respective guilds to the army to meet the army's needs for goods and repair during the course of the campaign. The esnaf members assigned to the army consisted of secondhand clothes dealers ( h a f f a f l a r ) to blacksmiths (demirciler) who would set up their tents and follow the campaign. All the expenses of the army esnaf {ordu esna/i) were paid by the esnaf guilds. For the privilege of selling goods to the army each guild had to pay a sum of

8

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN

BY-WAYS

money to the government. This tax was called the ordu akgesi or army ak^e and was paid by the guilds. The army akge was paid per hay me or tent that each guild attached to the army, but the tax differed according to trade. In 1730 the ordu akgesi assessed by the government rose to 360,000 ak^e on some haymes. On July 15, 1730 the Kadi (chief judge) of Istanbul sent fermans to the Aga of the Janissaries, the representatives of the esnaf (esnaf kethiidalar) and the masters (ustalar) of each trade to set up haymes in Istanbul. Twenty-seven different esnafs and eighty-four haymes were set up for which the esnaf paid a total of 3,168,800 ak^e 20 . The ordu akgesi assessed in 1730 was much higher than those of previous campaigns and the esnaf were only able to pay it with difficulty. Many esnaf were unable to pay the requested amount and went bankrupt. Those esnaf who did manage to pay were soon disillusioned. Every day the army hesitated at Uskiidar the lesser possibility of profit which they had hoped to make on the campaign. The rumors that much of the ordu akgesi had been embezzled (eklii bel) increased dissatisfaction. Consequently, in the summer of 1730 the esnaf found themselves in the position of having paid extraordinary campaign taxes plus ihe ordu akgesi with a diminishing possibility of recouping their expenditures. The Janissaries had closed their shops and joined the army. Many of them hoped to sell their goods to the army; others had purchased sufficient goods to last them throughout the campaign. It was rumored that the leader of the 1730 rebellion, Patrona Halil, once had been a secondhand goods dealer (eskici) who had invested his small amount of money in hopes of selling the old clothes to the army. Patrona Halil was just one of many disgruntled esnaf and small traders and when the army did not move, the esnaf and the people did. When the news that Nadir Shah had captured Tebriz reached Istanbul the pregnant tension gave birth to rebellion. On September, 1730, the largest and most influential rebellion of eighteenth century Ottoman history broke out and members and leaders of the esnaf were in the forefront of those spearheading the rebellion. The strength of the rebels was such that they were able to demand and obtain the execution of Ibrahim Pa§a who in the eyes of the ulema represented the French influences so hated by them. The deposition of Ahmet III on October 2, 1730, quickly followed the execution of the Grand Vizer and his two nephews, Kethiida Mehmed Pa§a and Mustafa Pa§a. The deposition of the Sultan demonstrated the extent of power that the rebels had obtained in comparison to previous rebellions which usually left the Sultan on the throne. Mahmud I's (1730-1754) accession to the throne was conditioned by his promise to the rebels

•^Aktepe, Palrona Isyaiu, p. 36. Cf. M. Miinir Aktepc, "III. Ahmed Devrinde §ark Seferme lijtirak Edt'cek Ordu Esnafi Hakkinda Vesikalar," Tarth Der^isi (TD), VII. no. 10 (September, 1954), pp. 17-30

T H E E S N A F AND THE P A T R O N A H A U L R E B E L L I O N

9

that the extraordinary campaign taxes would be rescinded and that the palaces and kiosks constructed by Ibrahim Pa§a would be destroyed. The new Sultan w a s also given to understand that in his reign the ranking ulema w h o had been a m o n g the main instigators of the rebellion would exercise great power by virtue of the high government offices to which they were appointed. T h e execution of Patrona Halil and o n e his chief lieutenants, M a n a v M u s l u , 011 N o v e m b e r 25, 1730, temporarily lessened the rebels activities and enabled M a h m u d I to c o n s o l i d a t e his new regime. Patrona's e x e c u t i o n w a s significant in that it also served notice that the ulema, led by Ziilali Hasan E f e n d i , the new §eyhulislam, and two of his chief lieutenants now felt secure e n o u g h in their new and restored offices to cooperate with the Crimean Khan, Kaplan Giray and with Kabakulak Ibrahim Pa§a, the men chosen by M a h m u d I to suppress the rebellion 2 1 . However, M a h m u d I, his chief lieutenants and supporters were not granted their wish for quiet because four months after the execution of Patrona Halil r e b e l l i o n again

flared

and t h r e a t e n e d to reach the level of the p r e v i o u s

S e p t e m b e r 2 2 . The rebellion of March 25, 1731, was triggered by the execution of the Greek butcher, Kasab Yanak, who had been appointed at the zenith of Patrona's power, but had not filled, the position of H o s p o d a r ( g o v e r n o r ) of Moldavia 2 - 1 . Following the outbreak of March 25, 1731, several thousand people were put to death in efforts to suppress the rebellion 2 4 . At one point Sultan Mahmud I. relying upon the precedent of his predecessor had to display the sacred banner (Sancak-i $enf),

usually unfurled only against foreign enemies, to quell

the insurrection. The Sultan also enlisted the aid of Topal Osman Pa§a who had been instrumental in pursuing and executing those suspected of involvement in the M a r c h 25, 1731, rebellion. For his success in suppressing and executing those allegedly involved in the March rebellion, Topal Osman Pa§a was elevated to the Grand Vezirate, but his short tenure of six months continued to be filled with r e b e l l i o n 2 5 . On July 21, 1731, and September 2, 1731, there were again 2

' U z u n ^ a r j i h , Osmanh Tarihi, IV, part I, pp. 215-216; Hammer, Histoire, XIV, pp. 243-245. Ibid., pp. 247-248; Mary Lucille Shay, The Ottoman Empire from 1720-1734 as Revealed in the Dispatches of the Venetian Baili (Urbana, Illinois), p. 32 stales lhat the Venelian Baili dated ihe rebellion as starting on March 26; H a m m e r states March 24; Uzunte f"r the Ottomun Empire: 1966). pp. 44-115, has a good account of these efforts.

1717-1740

(London: John Murray,

THE OTTOMAN-FRENCH TREATY OF 1 7 4 0

79

French, or the War of the Polish Succession, but rather the Ottomans declared war on Russia in May 1736 in response to that empire's invasion of the Crimea. The resulting Austro-Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-39 was one from which Aksan concludes that "the Ottoman Empire was saved and even renewed by the French mediation," 1 8 of Villeneuve, de Tott, and others. The Treaty of Belgrade which ended the war and the French mediation certainly contributed to the Porte's granting the capitulations awarded by the Ottoman-French Treaty of 1740. Aksan's suggestion that in 1740 the Ottoman Empire entered a period of peace that was to last until 1768' 9 is somewhat eurocentric. The siege of Mosul in September and October 1743 engaged some quarter of a million men. Although the greatest numbers by far were on the side of the Iranians, the defense of Mosul was crucial to the Porte and it expended considerable efforts to keep Mosul from falling into the hands of the Iranians. 2 0 Another major battle was fought between the Ottomans and Nadir Shah at Erivan in June 1745 before the commencement of negotiations which led to the Treaty of 1746. In c onclusion then, the period of peace that the Ottomans embarked upon and enjoyed with Europe from 1740 to 1768 was brought about by several major trends, only two of which were determined by the European powers: 1) the lack of external pressure on the Porte from Europe after 1740, especially due to the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven Years War (1756-63), and 2) the precarious financial positions of both the Porte and the Europeans. There were other non-European considerations. For nearly seven years after the Treaty of Belgrade and six years after the Ottoman-French Treaty of 1740 the Ottomans had to raise revenues to meet the substantial costs of the war with Iran. Part of the Porte's policy of "peace with Europe" was to enable it to marshall the monies necessary to confront the Iranian challenge. It is probable that as early as 1730 the Porte realized that the Iranian challenge to its eastern provinces was more of a threat to the integrity and, more importantly, the legitimacy of the empire than were the European powers, excluding Russia. An alliance, collusion or even cooperation between Iran and Russia, or even an Iranian victory in Iraq, would have seriously weakened the Ottoman Empire during the period 1730-46. Perhaps the European powers as well as the Porte recognized this. The Ottoman-French Treaty of 1740 was signed in such a context. It was finalized in the month of May, the same month in which Nadir Shah reappeared in Iran. These events, in addition to the French participation in the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Belgrade, should be considered as influencing Ottoman policy in signing the 1740 treaty.

1 Q

Aksan, "Ottoman-French Relations," p. 11. I9

7 Al b i d „ p. I I . ~ v 'Olson, The Sie^e

of Mosul,

pp. 165-77.

80

IMPERIAL MPANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

There were still other non-European considerations which influenced Ottoman decision makers in the spring and early summer 1740. One month after the signing of the Ottoman-French Treaty and the reappearance of Nadir Shah in Iran, the revolt of 1740 broke out in Istanbul. 2 ' The revolt of 1740 occurred on Sunday 6 June 1740 (Rebiyiilevvel 1153). The circumstances of the revolt immediately called to mind those of 1730, the origins and consequences of which were still fresh in the minds of Ottoman authorities. The revolt of 1740 was prevented from mushrooming into full-fledged rebellion only by the decisive actions of Ni§anci §ehla Ahmed, Hasan Pa§a (Aga of the Janissaries), and another Janissary officer, Kulluk Corbasi Hasan, especially the bold actions of the latter. As many as three thousand rebels, many of them Albanians, as in 1730, were killed and dumped into the Bosphorus. 2 2 While the seriousness of the 1740 revolt did not reach the proportions of the 1730 Patrona Halil rebellion, the Porte did take the unprecedented precaution, in addition to other measures, of arming Christians and Jews. 23 In general there seems to have been an increase in Muslim and non-Mus!im tensions after 1718 which played a role in both the 1730 Patrona rebellion and in the 1740 revolt as well as in other disturbances. 2 4 While the immediate cause of the 1740 revolt was a shortage of provisions exacerbated by the severe winter of 1739, the socio-economic context of high prices and hardships for the people of Istanbul were factors which the AustroRusso-Ottoman War of 1736-39 and of the Ottoman-Iranian wars of 1730-36 aggravated. The biggest difference between the Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730 and the 1740 revolt in Istanbul was that the esnaf switched sides. In 1730 the esnaf were against the Porte and with the rebels; in 1740 they were with the Porte and against the rebels. The esnaf, especially the non-Muslim among them, were by 1740 supportive of the Porte's new policies of peace with the European powers and they anticipated benefits from this policy and reciprocity from the sultanate for their support of its policy. In this sense the Ottoman-French Treaty of 1740 is symbolic of this relationship and it bore fruit in the June 1740 revolt. The Porte realized that it needed the support of the esnaf, including, and perhaps especially, the non-Muslims among them in order to raise the necessary revenues to fight Nadir Shah, wars with whom were to rage for the next five years. Peace with Europe was to pay for war against the Iranians. It must be remembered that

2

' l have discussed the origins and c o n s e q u e n c e s of the rebellion in an earlier article, O l s o n , " J e w s , Janissaries, Esnaf " See also O l s o n , The Sie^e of Mosul, pp. 141-59, w h i c h d i s c u s s e s these events in a wider con:ext. 22

E v e r a r d F a w k e n e r , 17 June 1740, Stale

Papers

97, v. 31; and O l s o n , " J e w s , Janissaries,

E s n a f , " p. 204. Pages 2 0 3 - 6 of the a b o v e article has the entire text of F a w k e n e r ' s 17 J u n e despatch which discusses the revolt. 23

I b i d „ pp. 197-99.

24

A n e x a m p l e of which was the reimposition of the sumptuary laws in January 1742, which

caused great consternation

n the European embassies.

THE O T T O M A N - F R E N C H TREATY OF 1 7 4 0

81

the Iranians based the legitimacy of their war against the Ottomans on religious grounds. In this sense the Porte wished to extract f r o m its peace policy with Europe the utilization of Ottoman esnaf, including the Christians and Jews, to prosecute the upcoming wars against the Islamic based legitimacy claims of the Iranians. In 1740 also, the Porte was again about to be confronted with a "skip" or sivt§ year crisis. The s i v / j year crises were caused by the difference of eleven days between the lunar and solar calendars, both of which the O t t o m a n s employed. While much of the revenue collection and tax system were based on the solar (that is, agriculture year) many of the treasury expenditures were based on lunar year calculations. The difference of eleven days meant that every thirtythree years a lunar year had to be "skipped." The problem was that for every thirty-three lunar years, there would be only thirty-two budgets. Sahillioglu has observed that the sivif year crises greatly affected Ottoman domestic and foreign policies. 2 5 The major problem was that the ulufe or salaries of the Janissaries and other troops were paid every three months; the troops received four payments during the lunar year. A sivif year crisis was to occur in 1742, but already in 1740 the Porte was wrestling with the problem of how to pay the quarterly salaries of the Janissaries and other troops. 2 6 When the Patrona Halil rebellion broke out, the second quarter payments were due. While there is no evidence to indicate the degree to which unpaid ulufe contributed to the rebellion of 1740, the pending sivif year crisis must have been a factor. In November 1741 there were already mutinies of troops in Erzurum and rumblings of others demanding payment of their salaries which were not forthcoming from Istanbul b e c a u s e of the a n t i c i p a t e d sivtf crisis of 1742. 2 7 In 1740 the approaching crisis was undoubtedly already very much on the minds of Ottoman officials, especially the military commanders, as they mobilized their forces to meet once again the expected challenge of Nadir Shah. It is not without some irony that the very Ottoman reformists of the Tulip Period who sought closer relations with France had to accommodate themselves at the same time to "an attitude which came to be called anti-Islamic" based "on the modern rationalist spirit of pre-revolutionary France — the very

2 •'Halil Sahillioglu, "Sivi§ Yili Buhranlan," Iktisai Fukultesi Mecmuasi 27 (1986): 75-111. There is an English translation of this article entitled, "Sivij Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire," Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M. A. Cook (London: 1970), pp. 2.10-52. The Turkish article is fuller and has more graphs. I also discuss the stvif year crises and their effect on the period 1703-43 in The Siege of Mosul, pp. 145-51. ^Sahillioglu, "Sivij Y1I1 Buhranlan," p. 148 27 l b i d „ p. 149.

82

I M P E R I A L ME1ANDERINGS A N D R E P U B L I C A N B Y - W A Y S

spirit which the Turkish reformists were prepared to emulate." 2 8 The Tulip Period then, especially the decade of 1730-40, as Berkes has written, gave a religious coloring to the anti-reform movement. The religious reaction held the reformists responsible for the destruction of both din (religion) and devlet (state), not only because of their alien innovations which undermine the ancient tradition, but also because of their complicity with the infidels who were now threatening Muslim rule from two sides and from within. Thus, a religious oriented anti-Western Movement became the second strand running across the history of the Turkish transformation. 2 9 The year 1740, which clearly represents the emergence of a "peace policy" on the part of the Porte towards Europe, also represents a year during which the anti-European sentiments, especially among the Muslims of Istanbul, became stronger. The esnaf, especially the non-Muslim esnaf and traders of Istanbul who were the beneficiaries of the "peace policy," also became the target of those who did not benefit. The wars with Iran which commenced again in 1740 were to contribute to a clearer articulation of the differences between the reformists and the anti-reformists which affected, as Berkes noted, the subsequent history of the Turkish transformation. The year 1740 carries still more significance. Aksan suggests that 1740 may represent the definite emergence of a "pacific" tendency among the Porte's bureaucracy and its foreign policy decision makers. 10 Aksan sees evidence of this policy change in the Porte's refusal to be drawn into the Austrian War of Succession and its reluctance to he sucked into the Polish imbroglio. The year 1740 and the Ottoman-French Treaty of the same year then represent a context that symbolizes this pacific tendency and an earlier than hitherto suspected Ottoman recognition of the need for restructuring their foreign policy and their state. 31

2

® N i y a z i Berkes, The Development

of Secularism

in Turkey

(Montreal: McGill

University

Press, 1964), p. 52. 29

I b i d „ p. 52.

• ' " A k s a n , "Ottoman-French Relations," p 24. • " i t also brings up the question of the p e n o d i z a t i o n of the history of the Ottoman e m p i r e T h e interested r e a d e r should consult Robert W. O l s o n , " S o m e C o m m e n t s on Eighteenth C e n t u r y O t t o m a n H i s t o r i o g r a p h y , " n Islamic and Middle Eastern Societies: A Festschrift in Honor of Wadie Jwaideh, ed. Robert O l s o n ( B r a t t l e b o r o , Vt: A m a n a B o o k s , 1987), pp. 1 3 7 - 5 1 ; a n d Robert W. O l s o n , "The Patrona Halil Rebellion and the O t t o m a n - P e r s i a n W a r s and Eighteenth Century O t t o m a n Historiography," in Turkish Culture: Continuity and Change, ed. Sabri M . Akural ( B l o o m i n g t o n , IN: Indiana University Turkish Studies 6, 1987), pp. 65-82.

CONCLUSION THE AFTERMATH IN PERSIA

The failure of Nadir Shah to conquer Mosul ended his hope of extending his rule from the Indus to the Bosphorus. The repulsion of his forces at Mosul expelled the Persian threat to the Mosul-Aleppo and the Erzurum-DiyarbekirAleppo trade routes. Nadir, like Abbas, would not reach the Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire would not be severed; the eastern provinces would not be detached from Anatolia. The Porte was saved from the threat of three and a half centuries, and Persia was never again to be a danger to the sovereignty or economic integrity of the Ottoman Empire — a threat which the long sword of Nadir nearly realized. 1 But the Ottomans, like the Persians, were to be victims as well as the victors. In the Levantine cities of Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, and Beirut, the French, English, and Austrian merchants fought for and obtained capitulations — competition the Pone could not parallel. Although his dreams were shattered by defeat at Mosul, Nadir did not immediately abandon his goal of conquest. The Shah assuaged his injured ego by repairing to southern Iraq to visit the religious Shi'i shrines in Kerbela and Nejef. At Hilla, Nadir called a meeting of ulema whom he had summoned from Persia, Afghanistan, Balkh. and Bukhara. These ulema from the east were to confront the ulema from Iraq in an attempt to resolve the doctrinal differences over the Ja'fari school, which Nadir had not abandoned. 2 The Persians did, however, subsequently invade Iraq, but their activities were confined largely to the area of Baghdad and Basra. Karim Khan Zand (1750-1779), the Kurdish leader of the most powerful faction in Persia, conquered Basra in 1776 after a 13-month siege. The wars of the 1770 s were important as Jalilis, Mamluks, Karim Khan Zand, and the Porte as well as Britain jockeyed for power, but their clashes never approached the significance of the struggle of 1743. In the siege of Basra, Karim Khan employed thirty thousand men, compared to the nearly three hundred thousand Nadir had amassed for the siege of Mosul. For an account of Iraq after 1743, see Longrigg, Four Centuries, after p. 158; I A, "Bagdad," pp. 208-211; El2, "Bagdad," pp. 894908; Sabit, Bagdad'da Kolemen Hukumetinin Tefekkuiii ile Inktrazina dair Risule (Istanbul, 1292). It was this time that Nadir ordered the dome of Ali's shrine at Nejef be gilded, "in order," Laurence Lockhart stales, "no doubt to predispose the iocal divines in his favour," Nadir Shah, p 232. In 1745, when an English traveler, William Beawes, passed through Nejef the gilding of the dome was not yet completed. William Beawes, Narrative of a Journey from Aleppo to Basra m 1745, HaHuyt Society, no. 63 (London, 1928), p. 23.

84

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

Nadir S h a h had requested A h m e t P a j a , vali

of B a g h d a d , to permit

Abdullah ibn H u s a y n a s - S u w a y d i , the Sunni (Orthodox M u s l i m ) mufti

of

Baghdad, to be the impartial judge of the debate. T h e conferences were held in D e c e m b e r 1743 and, as expected, reached the results which Nadir desired. The Ja'fari school which Nadir promulgated in 1735 was affirmed as the religious school to which all Persians should adhere. 3 While the religiaus conferences were in progress, Nadir was negotiating for a peace treaty wilh Ahmet Pa§a, the only person with w h o m he would negotiate. T h e full text of this treaty has not been preserved, but there is no indication that Nadir abandoned his religious demands. Kerkiik and Irbil were to be controlled by the Ottomans, but if other territorial concessions were to be made, they have not been preserved. At this point Nadir's intentions are not clear. Lockhart has suggested that the Shah's chief aim was to amuse the Porte in order to gain time to suppress rebellions which were mushrooming all over Persia. It was Nadir's intention to suppress these rebellions and then again to c o n f r o n t the O t t o m a n s . 4 William Aspinwell wrote that a formal treaty was received in Istanbul and that Ahmet Pa§a warned the Porte of the necessity to conclude it or perhaps suffer the loss of Baghdad. Aspinwell stated that in one of the articles Nadir withdrew his former demands for a pillar in the Ka'aba, but that he still insisted on having a Persian Emir-iil-haj. Nadir also demanded 14,000 pieces of gold (one million pounds sterling) for war reparations and the delivering of the pretender, Safi Mirza. 5 If we accept Aspinwell's account, the d e m a n d s of Nadir wert: centered much more on economic rather than religious proposals. The policy of Nadir in 1732 and 1736 still held in 1743. While Nadir continued his adherence to the Ja'fari school and continued to demand its acceptance, the abandonment of this demand for a pillar in the Ka'aba would in effect negate the former as a threat to Ottoman religious supremacy. The Ja'fari school was now more of a need for Nadir than a threat to the Porte. If we accept Aspinwell's version, the siege of Mosul represents a turning point with regard to Nadir's religious demands. These demands appear to have provided the casus belli for a decade of contention and armed conflict between the two empires. There is no other evidence, however, to indicate that Nadir completely abandoned his

• ' A b d u l l a h ibn H u s a y n as S u w a y d i has left an a c c o u n t of these highly interesting d i s c u s s i o n s w h i c h were published in Cairo in 1326 and in Istanbul in 1327. There are several copies of these editions in Siileymaniye Kiitiiphanesi in Istanbul. I consulted Suwaydi's Huccac Kat'iya fi'l furk al-lslamiye (Istanbul, 1327), which consists of 152 p a g e s . Note: In this instance I have used the transliteration system e m p l o y e d by Siileymaniye Kiitiiphanesi to facilitate its location by other interested scholars. P r o f e s s o r A. E. S c h m i d t has c o m m e n t e d on the a b o v e work in " I t Istorii S u n n i t s k o - S h i i t s k i k h O t m o s h n i i , " Festschrift

for

V. V. Barlold

( T a s h k a n d , 1929), pp. 6 9 - 1 0 7

^Lockhart, Nadir Shah, p. 234. 5

L o c k h a r t , Nadir Shah, p. 234; Lockhart writes, "The have been preserved, but there seeins to be no doubt r e l i g i o u s d e m a n d s . " W i l l i a m A s p i n w e l l , SP 97, 32, recedes f r o m one of his f o r m e r pretensions c o n c e r n i n g

full text of this treaty does not a p p e a r to that it s h o w e d no a b a t e m e n t o f Nadir's 10 February 1744, states, " T h e S a u g h Mecca..."

CONCLUSION

85

religious demands at this time. T h e affirmation of Nadir's religious policy by the ulema in 1743 would seem to indicate that he still pursued the s a m e policy. Nevertheless, it is possible that Nadir might have made it known to the Porte that he was willing to abandon the idea of a pillar in the Ka'aba if appropriate e c o n o m i c concessions were made by the Porte. However, he still refused to abandon his demands for the recognition of the Ja'fari school by the Ottomans — a demand which was now necessary for maintaining himself in power. T h e Porte welcomed Nadir's abandonment of the demand for a pillar in the Ka'aba, for this constituted a tacit recognition on his part of the religious supremacy of the Porte. This development convinced the Porte that Nadir no longer posed a threat to the very basis of their undisputed supremacy in the Sunni Muslim world. Defeated at Mosul and beset by rebellion at home, Nadir desperatedly needed a face-saving device — perhaps a victory — to strengthen his position both at home and abroad. Nadir's overtures to the Porte came to nought, and the Shah sought a decision on the battlefield. The Ottomans and Persians met in battle at Kars in July 1744, but Nadir failed to take the city after an eighty-day siege. The successful resistance of the Ottoman forces presented a striking contrast to the poor siege tactics employed by Nadir's army. Nadir's position was further aggravated by the Porte's support and encouragement of the Laz, w h o continued to attack the rear of his army. 6 In July 1744, while Nadir was besieging Kars, one Yusuf Pa§a had left the Porte for Dagistan with his pockets stuffed with a reported large amount of money. 7 Regrouping his forces over the winter, Nadir moved on Erivan in June 1745. At Erivan Nadir met the former Grand Vezir, Yegen Mehmet Pa§a, now serasker of Azerbayjan, with a force of one hundred thousand — forty thousand of whom were Janissaries. 8 After protracted trench warfare, Nadir struck suddenly — taking advantage of a mutiny a m o n g the Janissaries in the Turkish c a m p . The attack resulted in the death of Yegen Mehmet Pa§a and in a sweeping victory over the Ottoman forces. The news of the death of the serasker, which spread rapidly, shattered morale so completely that the entire Ottoman force was routed. The army, now in a state of complete disarray, headed for Kars. 9 Nadir reaped the fruits of victory, but despite his opportunity to pursue the fleeing remnants of Yegen Mehmet Papa's forces, he did not do so. Instead, the Shah released all Ottoman prisoners and sent them to Kars. Nadir's seemingly clement behavior was merely a prelude to fresh peace

6

Aspinwell

SP 97, 32, 2 7 D e c e m b e r 1743.

^ A s p i n w e l l , SP 97, 32, 14 January 1744, reported lhal the Porte continued to e n c o u r a g e the Laz with money and with promises of high offices. o

°Hammer, Hi.doire, vol 15, p. 96; Uzunfarjili, Osmunh Tarthi. vol. 4, p. 305.

^ I r o n i c a l l y , the battle took place on the s a m e plain, B o g a v e r d , where N a d i r had d e f e a t e d Abdullah Kopriilii ten years earlier.

86

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

proposals. For the First time there was no insistence on the recognition of the Ja'fari school or a demand for a pillar in the Ka'aba. The siege of Mosul prevented Nadir from penetrating north or east in the fall of 1743. At the same time, it provided the Porte with desperately needed time to mobilize their forces and to step up their support for the Dagistanis, who incidentally received additional help from Muhammad, the son of Suray, the chief of the Gazi Kumuks. The Dagistani resistance was greatly strengthened by the presence of the pretender, Sam Mirza. 1 0 The support which the Dagistanis gave Sam Mirza and the vigor which characterized their resistance was in large measure due to the brui al exactions of Nadir's tax collectors in the spring and early summer of 1743. Most of these taxes had been used to finance the campaign against M o s u l . " Nadir never dipped into the wealth he had carried back from India; it remained buried in the treasury houses at Kelat. The battle of Mosul and the failure of Nadir to capture the trade routes radiating from that city induced the Shah to concentrate his energies on the development of the Caspian Sea outlet. The activities of Captain John Elton, who had begun working for Nadir in July 1742, were greatly intensified on the Caspian Sea after Nadir's failure to take Mosul in 1743. Nadir was in greater straits than ever before The Mediterranean was closed to him. Basra and the Persian Gulf routes were infested with as many rival groups as there were Arab tribes surrounding the Gulf. 1 2 The defeat at Mosul made the development of the Caspian Sea trade owlet and the growth of the Russian Company more imperative than ever. 1 1 Moreover, Nadir's failure at Mosul obviated the need for the expansion of the Caspian Sea route which, among other things, had been one of the sources for supplying Nadir's huge army with English cloth.' 4 One might also add that the defeat at Mosul signified the end of the massive confrontations involving over a quarter of a million soldiers on each side. Nadir was not again to mobilize such numbers. The greatly increased activities of the English owned and operated Russian Company, following Nadir's failure at Mosul, was to generate a suspicious and hostile attitude among the Russian merchants which was to contribute to the exacerbation of tempers in both London and St. Petersburg. In 1751, four years after Nadir's death, all British traders were withdrawn from the Caspian Sea region and John Elton was murdered. Russia, rather than either Persia or Britain, was to dominate the Caspian. 1 5 A few months after his defeat at Mosul, Nadir also raised the siege of Basra. From

10

S e e Chapter V; Lockhart, Nadir Shah. p. 2.11.

U

lbid„

p. 239.

'^The main source for the Eilton mission is Hanway, vols. 1 and 2.

13

Hanway, vols. 1 and 2. '^Hanway, vol. 1, pp. 35-4^. 15

H a n w a y , vols. 1 and 2; Lockhart, Nadir Shah, pp. 286-90.

CONCLUSION

87

Mosul to Basra, Iraq w a s again open to trade, but most of the revenues and customs were not to go to the Shah. Nadir's bid to control the Persian Gulf, like his bid to control the Caspian, had ended in failure. His failure to penetrate the walls of M o s u l had p e r f o r c e temporarily laid open the gates of Basra, a development which was eventually to lead to his abandonment of the Caspian region.

T H E L E G A C Y O F 1743 IN M O S U L A N D IRAQ Jean Otter, the French agent, stated that in the Middle East the consensus was that the: "war of 1743" was caused by the intrigues between Ahmet Pa§a and Nadir Shah. T h e Porte's jealousy of the power of Ahmet Pa§a and the failure of the Sultan's inner treasury to receive any revenues from the Baghdad vilayet further incensed the Porte. T h e Pa§a foiled every attempt on the part of the Porte to remove him, whether it was the sending o f f e r m a n s and forces "to help him" or the tinkering with the internal workings of Baghdad politics, such as in the case of Osman Pa§a, the Janissary Aga of Baghdad, in 1741. In Otter's opinion the removal of Ahmet Pa§a from Basra in 1741 and his replacement by Husayn Ja!ili of Mosul precipitated the war. Ahmet Pa§a endeavored by collusion or sheer manipulation to present the Muntefik uprisings as a major rebellion in order to regain Basra. Otter, Jonas Hanway, and Umari were convinced that Ahmet had sent a "man of confidence" to entreat Nadir to abandon his war in Dagistan and to attack the Porte. If Ahmet Pa§a would not directly aid the Shah, he certainly would not hinder him, if he, the Shah, attempted to conquer Kerkiik, Diyarhckir, and the Jalili stronghold of M o s u l . 1 6 The stories which circulated concerning the Shah's high regard for Ahmet Pa$a tended to confirm the rumors of collusion between the two m e n . 1 7 The exchange of envoys between the Persian monarch and the governor of Baghdad was followed by the announcement thai the former would soon attack the Ottoman dominions. 1 8 While Otter was convinced of the collusion, Jonas Hanway's account appears to agree m o r e closely with the facts. According to Hanway, "the circumstances of the Basha rendered it necessary that the G.S. should be kept in fear of the Persians as a decisive blow on either side might oblige him to yield up his g o v e r n m e n t . . . . " 1 9 As a matter of fact this usually well-informed authority believed that, rumors notwithstanding, the Pa§a had been very careful not to appear guilty of treachery. Whatever evidence there may have been to the contrary, it was certainly too vague and inconclusive. 2 0 Ahmet Pa$a, however, did use his leverage to build up

16

Olter, Six Voyages, p. 361.

17

/i>/rf. ] hbid„ p. 365.

' ^ H a n w a y , vol. 4, p. 235.

2oLorigrigg,

Four Centuries,

p. 161.

88

IMPERIAL MBANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

his power into a dynasty — a dynasty which became officially recognized by the Porte in 1749 when Siileyman, Ahmet Pa$a's kahya and son-in-law, became vali of Baghdad, Basra, and Mardin. The long cherished hope of the Mamluks blossomed in the years 1741-1743. During these years the differences between the administrators of northern and southern Iraq became more clearly discernible. The governorship of Mosul became almost the exclusive preserve of the Jalili family. The Jalilis, and especially Husayn Pa§a, became the Porte's chosen instrument to break-up Ahmet Pa§a's hegemony, which stretched from Mardin to Basra. The Porte gave Mardin and Basra to Husayn Jalili and even went so far as to appoint him kaymakam of Baghdad in 1735 (1148) during the one brief interlude in Ahmet Paja's reign over Baghdad. Jean Otter believed that the ouster of Ahmet Pa§a from Basra in 1741 and the appointment of Husayn Jalili as vali was the main incident which triggered the war of 1743. Ahmet Pa§a, resentful and outraged, was determined to exact revenge. Soon after this, the Muntefik attacked Seyf Bey, Haj Husayn's mutesellim, subjecting him to prolonged harassment. Ahmet Pa§a, who did not come to the mutesellim s aid, prevented Husayn Pa$a from providing badly needed help to his chief lieutenant in Basra. By 1743 Seyf Bey had returned to Mosul and Ahmet Pa$a, was again ruler of Basra. In the first full-fleged battle between Jalilis and Mamluks, the latter was victorious. The hostility of the Jalilis toward Ahmed Pa§a is clearly indicated by the appellative, "Nizam-ul-Mulk," which their spokesman, Seyf Bey, applied to Ahmet Pa§a — the very mention of which was redolent of treachery. This odious nickname was to hound Ahmet Pa$a; it originated with the Jalilis. The apogee of

2

' T h e establishment of the M a m l u k dynasty in B a g h d a d is usually dated as 1704 by Western h i s t o r i a n s . L o n g r i g g , Four Centuries, p. 122, and Robert M a n t r a n , "Baghdad à l ' é p o q u e o t t o m a n e . Arabica, special volume, 1962, p. 312, indicates three periods of B a g h d a d history: (1) direct g o v e r n m e n t by the O t t o m a n s ( 1 5 3 4 - 1 7 0 4 ) , (2) g o v e r n m e n t by the M a m e l u k s ( 1 7 0 4 1830), a n d (3) the r e c o v e r y of p o w e r by the O t t o m a n s ( 1 8 3 1 - 1 9 1 7 ) . B o t h M a n t r a n a n d L o n g r i g g used the date 1704 since it m a r k s the b e g i n n i n g of H a s a n Pa$a's reign a n d his e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a palace school on the order of that in Istanbul. T h e students and g r a d u a t e s of the M a m l u k school were used t o strengthen his administration and a r m y . Both M a n t r a n a n d L o n g r i g g rely upon a d e s c r i p t i o n of H a s a n Papa's p a l a c e s c h o o l given in Sabit. Bagdad'da Kôlemen Hiikumetinin TefekkitlU ile fnkirazma dâir Risàie (Istanbul, 1292), pp. 5-9. M a n t r a n and L o n g r i g g indicate that the similarity of the palace schools in Istanbul and Baghdad mark the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of i n d e p e n d e n t rule by H a s a n P a j a . O t t o m a n a n d T u r k i s h h i s t o r i a n s set the b e g i n n i n g of Mamluk rule in 1749, when Siileyman Aga, A h m e t Paça's kahya, b e c a m e the first M a m l u k to be appointed vali of B a g h d a d . Sabit, the O t t o m a n historian of the M a m l u k d y n a s t y , d a t e s the origin of t h e dynasty in 1749 as d o e s C a v i d B a y s u n , i A, 2, "Bagdad," p. 208. T h e c h o i c e of both dates, 1704 and 1749, obscures the real factors leading to the i n d e p e n d e n c e of B a g h d a d : these factors occurred under Ahmet Pa$a's rule. A h m e t Pa$a after his defeat at Andican in 1727 was heavily reinforced by Istanbul. A f t e r he d e f e a t e d T a h m a s p at Kurican in 1731, he not only possessed all the war material and c a n n o n s he had received between 1727 and 1732, but h e recovered the o n e s he had lost at A n d i c a n in 1727. W h i l e collecting substantial r e v e n u e d u r i n g the sieges of B a g h d a d in 1733 and 1743, A h m e t lost few men and no artillery. H e sallied out of Baghdad only after victory w a s assured in 1733. In 1743 he did not c o m e to the aid of H u s a y n Jalili. In 1733 and in 1743 A h m e t Pa$a used the threat of war with Persia to build up his c o f f e r s . He received over 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 kuruf b e t w e e n 1724 and the outbreak of hostilities in 1743 A g a i n in 1743, he did not leave Baghdad, k e e p i n g all of his w e a p o n s intact. It was not in 1704 or 1749, but during Ahmet Pa$a's rule that the foundation of the M a m l u k dynasty was laid.

CONCLUSION

89

the conflict between Baghdad and Mosul was reached in 1743. T h e deep seated causes of the future struggle between the two antagonists came into being when the Mosulis succeeded, with no help from Baghdad, in staunchly withstanding and eventually defeating Nadir Shah. The struggle for power which began in 1743 continued unabated for nearly a century. The struggle which followed A h m e t Pa§a's death in 1747 resulted in the rise of Siileyman Pa§a to supreme power in the Pa$alik of Baghdad. H e was to become the founder and the first governor of the Mamluk dynasty in 1749. In the two years following the death of A h m e t P a j a , the Jalilis again tried to outflank the rulers of Baghdad by establishing a power base in Basra. In 1748 H a j Husayn Pa$a was appointed vali of Basra but again, as in 1741, his rule was short. The foundation of the new dynasty had been so firmly laid out that even Ahmet Papa's death failed to upset the balance of power between Baghdad and Mosul. The years 1741-1743 brought other tensions to the surface in Iraq. T h e e x a m p l e of Kurt O s m a n ' s siege of Mosul on Ahmet Papa's orders foretold additional strife between the Jalilis and the Kurds in the coming years. Kurt Osman's short siege of Mosul contributed to keeping Husayn Pa§a locked up in Mosul and inhibited him from aiding Seyf Bey in Basra. The Jalilis were not quick to forget what they considered so perfidious an act on the part of the Kurds. A strong Jalili dynasty in Mosul meant a reduction of Kurdish power, which was growing with the aid and support of Nadir Shah. The recommencement of the Persian wars in 1723 and the appearance of Nadir increased the rebellion, robbery, and plunder of the Kurdish tribes. The ready refuge of nearby Persia gave them incentive and increased their restiveness. In 1743 Nadir received an oath of loyalty from Selim Pa§a, leader of the Baban Kurds. 2 2 Selim's adherence to Persia was to create a complex web of rivalries not only between Persia and the Porte, Nadir Shah and Ahmet Pa§a, but also among various groups of Kurdish tribes on the one hand and the Baban dynasty on the other. In 1743-1744 the Karacholan district of §ehrizor became a Persian province. Ahmet Pa§a, the survivor of so many battles against the Persians as well as his Ottoman suzerains, was to s u c c u m b in the course of a punitive expedition against the Babans. 2 3 While tensions continued to mount between Mosul and Baghdad after 1743, these tensions did not prove to be insurmountable when cooperation between Mosul and Baghdad was to their mutual benefit. In 1750, during his seventh governorship of Mosul, Haj Husayn Pa§a joined the M a m l u k

vali,

Siileyman Pa§a, in battle against the Kurds. In 1753 Amin Pa§a, son of Haj Husayn Pa§a, joined Siileyman in a large campaign against the Yezidis of Sinjar

Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 159. For the rise of the Babans to power, also see pages 13133, 158-60, and 178-80. 23 H a v i , Duhat-uI-vUzera. fol. 120-21.

90

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

whose frequent plundering forays against the caravan routes jeopardized one of the main sources of revenue of both governors. 24 It was quite evident from this that neither Mosul nor Baghdad would tolerate these depredations which threatened to interfere with their economic lifelines to the west. However, it is interesting to note that although the common threat to the interests of the two parties had resulted in united action, it failed to resolve the deep-seated differences and suspicions which continued to embitter their relations. In 1743 Mosul had contented that Ahmet Pa$a was the Nizam-ul-Mulk, but in 1775 when Karim Khan Zand marched into Iraq with the largest force since the days of Nadir Shah, it was Mosul and not Baghdad which this time supported the Persians. The Jalilis who now governed both Mosul and §ehrizor supported Karim Khan against Omer Aga, the Mamluk governor of Baghdad. 25 The establishment of the Mamluk dynasty in Baghdad in 1749 upon the foundations provided by Ahmet Pa$a was to determine both the nature of the Mamluk regime in Baghdad and its relationship to Mosul. Throughout the period from 1743-1830, except for the brief span of two years, 1747-1749, when Siileyman Aga was vali of Adana, the vali of Baghdad served only Mamluk dynastic interests. The situation in Mosul was quite different. The fame and glory of the victory in 1743 succeeded in propelling Haj Husayn Pa§a in the direction of imperial service. Amin Pa$a, Haj Husayn's son, served in the RussoTurkish war of 1768-1774 where he fought valiantly before being captured and imprisoned for five years. Following his release by the Russians, Amin Pa§a received some of the highest honors of the empire and had an audience with Sultan Abdiilhamid I (1774-1779). 2 6 Amin Jalili was received with honor, and his father's exploits of 1743 were well remembered at the Porte. 27 The hold of the Jalilis on the governorship of Mosul was not consecutive like that of their Mamluk neighbors in Baghdad. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that in times of crisis it invariably required a Jalili to bring calm to the troubled city. 28 When the Jalilis themselves were divided, bloodshed was the result. 2 9 The Porte did not interfere in Jalili affairs in Mosul. It was evident in Istanbul, as in Mosul, that the victory of 1743 was due not to the "victorious armies of Islam," but rather to the cohesion given to the amalgam of local

24

L o n g r i g g , Four centuries,

p. 176; Sa'igh, Ta'rikh,

p. 291.

25

1 A, 2, "Baghdad," p. 208.

26

M e h m e t Siireyya, Sidll-i

3 3 6 ; Sa'igh, Ta'rikh, 27

S a ' i g h , Ta'rikh,

Osmuni,

pp. 209-11; U z u n i a r § i h , Osmanh

Tarihi,

vol. 4, pt. 2, p.

p. 29C

p. 292

l O

There is no full-length study of the political factions in Mosul during this period. For studies of cities similar to Mosul see Herbert B o d m a n , Political Factions in Aleppo (1760-1826) (Chapel Hill, 1963); and A b d u l - K a r i m Rafeq, The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783 (Beirut, 1966). 29

' U m a r i , Manlial,

p. 156. Longrigg, Four Centuries,

p. 177.

CONCLUSION

91

forces-Christians, Jews, Muslims — by the Jalili family under the leadership of Haj Husayn Pa§a. The fame of 1743 made the Jalili family known throughout the empire, and the family served imperial interests as well as family interests in Mosul. The Mamluks, on the other hand, focused both their attention and their energies upon themselves, concentrating on keeping the reins of power in their own hands in opposition to the imperial government. Another legacy of the 1740's in Iraq was the growth of a spirit of rebelliousness among Arab tribal elements, a spirit which was to become increasingly widespread and which was to assume the dangerous form of large tribal confederations. The Shammar, Anaza, and the Muntefik formed a loose confederation under the leadership of the Sadun — a development which bode ill for the future. The title of the Sadun ruler, "Sultan-ul-Arab," was to give rise in years to come to well-founded fears in Istanbul. The exhaustion and disarray of both the Ottoman and the Persian Empires was responsible for the formation of these large Arab tribal combinations. The tendency of the Arab tribes to coalesce and form large units was to play a decisive role in the mosaic of power whose form and pattern was to become increasingly clear in the 1740's. The exploits of the Sadun did not go unnoticed. By the 1770's, "They [the Muntefik] maintained their own customs-houses on the rivers, to levy tolls on the boats passing from Basra to Hilla and Baghdad; and after the Persian occupation of Basra (1776-9)... they dominated the Port."-' 0

THE LEGACY OF 1743 IN ISTANBUL AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE The defeat of Nadir Shah at Mosul in 1743 was celebrated with great festivities in Istanbul. Mahmut I, in his hatt-i ferif to Haj Husayn Pa§a, had claimed the victory for the "victorious Islamic armies of the Ottoman Empire." 31 As the war raged in Mosul, William Aspinwell remarked from his post in Istanbul that the fall of Mosul would have augured ill for the Porte — both from within and without. After the news of the successful defense of Mosul reached Istanbul, the British Resident succinctly summed up the importance of the victory at Mosul for the Porte by stating that the Porte had recovered from a very dangerous dilemma for they had "given everything for gone." 32 In September 1743 many provinces of the Ottoman Empire and especially the capital were on the verge of revolution. The occurrence of another Patrona rebellion would have inevitably brought about massive changes in the structure

Albert Hourani, "The C h a n g i n g Face of the Fertile Crescent in the 18th C e n i u r y , " Islamica 7 - 9 (1957-58): 98. - 1 , T h e complete Hutl-t ¡erif h given in the Muxul 32

A s p i n w e l l , SP 97. 32, 20 N o v e m b e r 1743.

Salnamesi.

Studia

pp. 2 8 4 - 8 9 ; M D , 150, p. 168.

92

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN

BY-WAYS

of the Ottoman government, perhaps greater than those of 1730. The empty treasuries, the progressively worsening sivif crisis, the food shortages, the general discontent, the conflict among the esnaf, the Janissaries, and the Porte, 3 3 as well as the hostility of Russia and Austria could have combined to produce rebellion and massive dislocations. Popular discontent with the Persian war had reached the point of explosion in the capital. The fall of Tebriz in 1730 had triggered the revolution of 1730 and had demonstrated how intimate and sensitive the relationship between war on the frontier and rebellion in Istanbul had become. The legacy of the treaty of 1724 and the creation of a split among the ulema as a result of the treaty, as well as the westernizing reforms of the Tulip Period introduced a fissure between the Porte and the people, led by the ulema, which was to reappear in Republican Turkey. The differences between the Porte and its opponents, both in Istanbul and on the periphery of the empire, were deepened and accelerated by the events of 1743. 34 The political and propaganda onslaught of E§ref Shah had resulted in a fetva in which the $eyhiilislam admitted the Caliphate was not universal. Even though E§ref was not recognized as Sultan within Persia, his claims struck a blow at the underpinnings of the Ottoman Caliphate; some of the ulema thought his claims were just. The division among the ulema was one of the main reasons which permitted the spread of Patrona Halil's rebellion. 3 5 Nadir's religious proposals had caused c onsternation among the ulema in the 1730's and again in 1741-1742 when the Shah resubmitted proposals. It was during this period (1742) that Ragib Pa§a, the Reisiilkiittab and chief negotiator of the treaty of 1736, 3 6 had to remind the hesitant ulema that there were only four schools (mezhebler) of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam, not five. Ragib Pa§a further remarked that wherever the Padijah's writ ruled, both the interpretation and the implementation of the law would be given in accordance with the HaneiT school. Ragib Pa§a further stated that even if the Porte were to recognize the Ja'fari school, the Hanefi school would still be the only school to prevail in the lands under Ottoman jurisdiction. 3 7 The Reisiilkiittab stated that Ottoman official opinion in regard to the Ja'fari school was that "this affirmation [of the Ja'fari

•I-, - Part of the Porte's e a g e r n e s s to face Nadir in 1744 was to rid Istanbul of the Janissaries. T h e unrest of the Janissaries w a s exacerbated by the continuing effects of the i i v i f crisis of 1742 The nonpayment of the ulufe resulted in the defeat and flight of the O t t o m a n s at Erivan in 1745. 34

l r e f e r to the split in O t t o m a n society and a m o n g the ulema between the c o n s e r v a t i v e s and

reformists which e m e r g e d during the Tulip Period. T h i s trend is traced by E n v e r Z i y a Karal,

Tanzimal I Devdupment (if Secularism (Montreal,

"Tanzimattan evvel G a r p h l a j m a Hareketleri" in

(Istanbul, 1940), pp. 14-30, and in

Niyazi Berkes, The 35 S e e Chapter V.

1964), pp. 23-63.

£

N o r m a n I t z k o w i t z , "Kaghib Pasha: T h e M a k i n g of an O t t o m a n G r a n d V e z i r " (Ph. D. dissertation, P r i n c e t o n , 14"i8). 37 • U z u n f a r j i l i , Osmanlt Tanhi, vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 307-8, "Caferi mezhebi dahi tasdik olunsa yine Osmanli iilkelerinde H a n e f i mezhebi cari olur."

CONCLUSION

93

school is a thing w h i c h is said but not m e a n t . " 3 8 T h e f u t u r e G r a n d V e z i r continued that it w a s for the ostensible reason of "rejecting recognition of the Ja'fari school that Anatolia has been laid to ruins, 100,000 M u s l i m s have been killed and the treasuries emptied. Real e n e m i e s to the Porte such as Russia and Austria have appeared. N o w again [summer of 1742] w e are about to open a campaign against Persia for the mere reason of a quarrel over creeds. T h e

feriyat

has expressed such a situation in a few words, "The general interest shall not suffer before special interests."-' 9 R a g i b Papa's remarks were obviously directed to s o m e of the p o w e r f u l officials and ulema w h o were willing to see the ruin of Anatolia and its people b e f o r e even considering c o m p r o m i s e or negotiating a c c e p t a n c e of the Ja'fari school — an acceptance which would not have changed the jurisprudence in the territories under Ottoman rule. The law cases would be tried, interpreted, verdicts would be given, and assessments made in accordance with the H a n e f i school. Ragib Papa's remarks succinctly s u m m e d up and destroyed the reasons for the d e c a d e of war which had ostensibly been f o u g h t over the q u e s t i o n of the acceptance of the Ja'fari school — a question which some of the official Ottoman p o l i c y m a k e r s regarded as a myth. S o m e of the most powerful and influential policymakers, however, refused to accept Ragib Papa's astute conclusion. Be$ir Aga. the most powerful of this select group, the Kizlar Agasi w h o had m a d e and u n m a d e so m a n y G r a n d Vezirs, proved as unwilling to change his religious policy as he was to c h a n g e G r a n d Vezirs. Upon hearing of R a g i b Papa's comments. Be§ir Aga called him to his quarters and admonished,"Don't you talk about theological points anymore, for as long as I a m living, 1 will not consider adding a fifth school to the other f o u r . " 4 0 The statements of Ragib Pa§a in the s u m m e r of 1742 were indicative of the hesitancy and the indecisiveness a m o n g the ulema and the willingness of some officials of the stature of Ragib Pa§a to settle the conflict with Nadir. But Be^ir A g a had his way, and the victory at Mosul assured that the religious demands of Nadir would not be accepted at the Porte. Within little m o r e than a decade (after 1743), Ragib Pa§a b e c a m e Grand Vezir (17.')7-1763), and from 1759 onward the Ottomans dropped the title EmirUl-irtuminin

( c o m m a n d e r of the believers) from their titulary. T h e reopening of

hostilities in 1742 and the e v e n t s s u r r o u n d i n g the siege of M o s u l

TO - Uzuniar§ili, Osmunh

-in -

,

Ibid.,

Tarihi,

were

vol. 4, pt. 2, p, 308, "Bu tasdik lafzi murad bir seydir."

" K u r a bir siiz ile b o y l e zarurette §cr'in miisaadesi vardir: zarar-i a m d a n zarar-i-has

evladir." R a g i b Pa§a was o b v i o u s l y referring to the willingness of the elite of the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t to s a c r i f i c e the lands and p e o p l e of Anatolia b e f o r e giving u p the p r i n c i p l e a d v o c a t i n g only four schools, an admission which they felt would weaken their status. Ragib Pa$a, as mentioned in the text, had already demonstrated that acceptance of the Ja'fari school would only be a nominal loss of sovereignly for the elite of the empire because law cases and, consequently, the fees would be tried and assessed according to the HanefT school. 40

.Siileyman § e m d a n i z a d c , Muri-uHevarih (Bayezit Umumi Kutiiphanesi T. Y. 5144, [Istanbull 1159, "Bir d a h a bu kelami a g i z m a a l m a m a d e m k i ben hayattayim dort m e z h e b e b e j i n c i ilave etlirmen."

94

I M P E R I A L M E A N D E R I N G S AND R E P U B L I C A N B Y - W A Y S

instrumental in hastening the trend begun in 1725, which resulted in a d e c r e a s e of the omnipotence of the Caliphate in 1759. T h e events of 1743 were important catalysts in this trend. 4 1 W h i l e the O t t o m a n s had been victorious at M o s u l , the P o r t e w a s p a i n f u l l y aware of how little the victory was d u e to t h e imperial forces. T h e victory at Mosul w a s the realization that the c l a i m s on w h i c h the Porte had based its universality — d e f e n s e of the trade routes and protection of pilgrims — was not true in Iraq, let alone Persia. The battle of Mosul demonstrated certain clear trends in the eighteenthcentury Ottoman government and administration. In considering the causes of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, it is now possible, it seems, to trace the seeds of d e c l i n e to the e m p i r e ' s origin. It is o f t e n stated that practices s u c h as the w i t h d r a w i n g of the Sultan's sons ( ¡ e h z a d e s ) f r o m the g o v e r n o r s h i p s of the provinces and preventing them from gaining leadership experience was one of the c a u s e s of the e m p i r e ' s decline. S o m e historians, h o w e v e r , look u p o n this practice as strengthening the empire, for it prevented the Sultan's sons f r o m gathering disgruntled sipahis

and starting a rebellion. 4 2 In 1559 all the Sultan's

sons, except the heir to the throne, were withdrawn f r o m the provinces, a fact usually considered a cause of decay, but considered by the Porte as a necessary s t e p to preserve o r d e r and to strengthen the g o v e r n m e n t a l structure. T h i s increased order w a s subsequently undermined by the Janissaries w h o m the Porte had sent — for the first time — into the provinces to quell the rebellion of Bayezit. S o m e historians consider the c a u s e s and c o n s e q u e n c e s of Bayezit's rebellion as an e x a m p l e of actions on the part of the Porte which led to its decline; others feel that the measures of the Porte strengthened it and prevented a loss of central authority. What the rebellion of Bayezit exemplifies is that forces which in the long run contributed to the decline of the empire, in the short run strengthened it. This rebellion furnishes only one example demonstrating that the actions of the Porte must be considered as weakening or strengthening factors only in relation to the lime and to the circumstances of the empire. T h e first half of the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y o f f e r s a n o t h e r e x a m p l e of contrasting strengths and weaknesses. Derebeys

and ayan-i vilayet always existed

in the Ottoman E m p i r e . 4 3 T h e Kurds always were derebeys

in the real sense of

the word and, indeed, had been granted virtual independence by Selim I for their support against Shah Ismail. 4 4 The Celali rebellions had paved the way for an

41

H . A. R. Gibb, "Lulfi Pa^a on the Ottoman Caliphate," Orlens

42

A n e x a m p l e is the rebellion of J e h z a d e Bayezit in 1559. After the rebellion of 1559 only the

15 (1962): 287-96.

heir to the throne, not a ¡ehzade,

w a s permitted to be a villi.

R e j i m i n i n B o z u l u j u , " AÜDTGFD

vol. 3, no. 4 (1945): 4 1 9 - 3 1 ; Turan §erafettin,

Ofilu $eli7.ade Bayezid 43 44

Vuk'asi

See M u s t a f a A k d a g ,

"Timar

Kanuni'nin

(Ankara, 1961).

/ / t , 2, "Ayan," pp. 40-42.

T h e origins of the derebeys is covered in M u s t a f a Akdag, CeUtH Isyanlarr, §erif M a r d i n , "Historical D e t e r m i n a n t s of Social S t r a t i f i c a t i o n : Social C l a s s and C l a s s C o n s c i o u s n e s s in

CONCLUSION

95

increase in the number of ayans. The tendency toward derebeylik was greatly accelerated during the first half of the eighteenth century. T h e long wars in Europe (1685-1699) and the wars with Russia and Venice (1711-1718) had resulted in the proliferation of the ayans and the power which they began to exercise over local government. 4 5 In Anatolia and Iraq the growth of derebeys and ayans was greater than in Rumeli because the provinces lay farther from Istanbul and in much more difficult terrain. In the eighteenth century most taxes, including the avanz, were collected by ayans. This practice increased the power of the ayans, many of whom became tax collectors themselves. The ayans and derebeys mercilessly taxed the people and reduced the poverty-stricken peasantry to an even worse condition. The ayans and derebeys remitted some of the revenue to Istanbul — revenue and taxes which the Porte, near financial collapse, could not have collected through its own administrative apparatus. In turn, the derebeys and ayans for all their repression did offer a modicum of protection for the peasants, not readily forthcoming from the Porte. The situation from 1730-1760 resembled that from 1555-1559. While the growth of ayans and derebeys may in one sense be regarded as a cause of decay in that it represents a weakening of the central authority, in another sense the growth of these new provincial power centers may be regarded as the reinvigoration of the empire based upon a new reorganization and distribution of power. It is quite likely that but for this development, administration in the provinces and on the periphery of the empire would have been much more chaotic than it was. The siege of Mosul represents the height of power and effectiveness of the ayans who now had assumed the functions of the sipahi, as well as that of the ayans and derebeys. The Jalilis were ayans and members of the e¡ref of Mosul; they acted as the tax collectors for the vilayet. The justness with which they collectcd taxes influenced to a large extent the response which they received from the people of the Mosul area. The liberality they showed in times of crisis, especially in 1743. by giving much of their wealth for the defense of Mosul was a decisive factor in the unity the people of Mosul exhibited against Nadir Shah. The clash of the two empires in 1743, at one of the most momentous periods in their respective histories, had found one of the empires' main military forces absent from the battlefield. The vilayet of Mosul, ruled by ayans, had helped bring together divergent religious and ethnic groups. Moreover, it succeeded in generating among them an esprit de corps and a determination seldom encountered in recent Middle Eastern history. In 1743 we have an

T u r k e y , " Siyasal Bilgiler Faküllesi Delist 22, no. 4 ( D e c e m b e r 1967): 111-42; Idris K ü ? ü k ö m e r Düienin Yabanalafmasi (Batila;ma), (Istanbul, 1969), pp. 30-56: Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye Iklisat Tarihi, vol. 2, (Istanbul, 1970), pp. 335-47. 45 A v d o S u i e s k a , " B e d e u t u n g und E n t w i c k l u n g des B e g r i f f e s A'yän in O s m a n i s c h e n Reich, Südost-Forschungen 25 ( 1 9 6 6 ) : 3 - 2 6 ; D e e n a R Sadat, "Rumeli A y a n l a r i : The E i g h t e e n t h Century." The Journal of Modern History 44, no. 3 (September 1972), 340-63.

96

I M P E R I A L M E A N D E R I N G S AND R E P U B L I C A N B Y - W A Y S

e x a m p l e of a decentralized, a y a n - c o n t r o l l e d vilayet that withstood the largest army assembled by Nadir Shah against the Porte. Only the people and ayans of Mosul had saved the imperial g o v e r n m e n t from i m p e n d i n g disaster in the greatest demonstration of the effectiveness of an Aryan-controlled government. However, this unity which provided the sinews of effective government could be obtained only in m o m e n t s of crisis. Mosul and other provinces rallied to the central government only when there was external danger greater than the Porte. For the Porte to obtain the full support of the a y a n - c o n t r o l l e d vilayets, the danger had to come from without as in the case of the war with a foreign power such as Persia, Austria, or Russia. In 1743 the outside danger of Nadir Shah was clear to the people of Mosul. The fact that the Porte was unable to send them any help made it imperative that they present a united front to Nadir. T h e situation was such in 1743 that all the components of the decentralized ayanderebey system meshed and merged to produce an astounding victory. The forces of a city had defeated the army of a great rival empire. In 1743 the periphery of the empire demonstrated that it had more strength than the center. The battle of 1743 was also a turning point in the economic war that had raged between the Porte and Persia for two and a half centuries. 4 6 As Professor lnalcik has shown, the rapid expansion of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the absorption of the trade routes radiating from Persia. The Ottoman-Safavid wars of 1512-1514, the Iraq campaigns of Siileyman, and the long period of wars from 1578-1639 were all precipitated by economic considerations. The stranglehold which the Porte held over Persian trade was maintained by the failure of Safavids to find an alternative route which bypassed Ottoman lands. After the Treaty of Passarowitz, the Persians were eager to expand their growing trade with the Habsburg Empire. T h e Ottomans w h o turned this trade on and off at will had turned it off from 1715-1720. Just as trade was beginning to flow between Persia and the Austrian Empire the war of 1723 began. From 1723 onward the trade of Persia flowing to the west had been seriously impaired and substantially decreased the silk trade. Moreover, the price revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries hurt Persia even more than the Ottomans. In 1704, 1728, and 1732 the Persian currency was debased and devalued — a development which brought about a severe shortage of currency in Persia. T h e resulting flow of Ottoman currency to Persia, where it fetched higher prices, increased the severe s h o r t a g e in the Istanbul market as w e l l . 4 7 In 1717, 1718, and 1719 the postponement of the ulufe payments caused by the sivi$ year crisis contributed to the eagerness of the Porte to attack the ailing Safavid Empire. The opening of the war in 1723 resulted in restrictions on Persian trade passing through Ottoman dominions. In 1740 John Elton reported that the Persians were still determined to circumvent the Turks and to deprive the Porte of the profit that

4()

47

S e e C h a p t e r I and Niyaii Berkes, Tiirkiye

Aktepe, Palrima, p. 21

(ktisat Turihi, pp. 111-203.

CONCLUSION

97

they reaped from the Persian trade. 4 8 According to Muhammad Kazvin, 4 9 it was the levying of taxes on Persian pilgrims and the caravan trade that caused Nadir Shah to terminate his campaign in Dagistan and to attack the Porte. 5 0 In 1743, in order to stop Ottoman harassment of Persian pilgrims and merchants, Nadir decided to strike a decisive blow against the Ottomans. His objective this time, unlike in 1732 and 1735, was not Baghdad as many people had expected, but Mosul and the northern trade routes. Aleppo's fears were stilled only by the fortunate turn of events at Mosul. After the defeat at Mosul, the economic and political fabric of Persia was subjected to the most severe strains and stresses. It should be pointed out here that the victors were not more fortunate than the vanquished. The situation in the Ottoman Empire continued to be as bad after the siege of Mosul as it had been before it. The political and economic instability which had begun in 1730 remained unchanged. In 1731 the esnaf, weary of rebellion, sided with the Sultan in subduing the rebellious factions. By 1740 the Sultan enlisted the aid of the esnaf, most of whom were non-Muslims, to crush the unrest of 1740 — a situation which Sir Everard Fawkener suggested could very possibly have led to a massacre of Christians and Jews. 5 1 The situation in 1743 appeared to be more threatening than in 1730. The victory at Mosul in 1743 prevented a potential major confrontation between various elements of the esnaf, Janissaries, and ulema. 5 2 A revolution in Istanbul in 1743 might have changed the alignment of forces, favoring westernization and industrialization, which had been generated during the Tulip Period. This, however, did not happen. The reformers who favored the new movement for westernization and industrialization appeared to have been held in check by the conservatives who opposed it. This group consisted of the esnaf in general (including the Janissaries who had become esnaf), the military (including some Janissaries), and the ulema, as well as the people of Istanbul. The divisions of 1730 had assumed harder and more clear-cut lines by the year 1743. The wars with Persia from 1723-1746 led to domestic and foreign borrowing to replenish a nearly empty treasury. The Sultan began to sell state (miri) lands as malikdnes

at a frenzied pace. In 1740 the age of capitulations

began in earnest — a direct outgrowth of the expenses of the Persian wars. The capitulations with France extended the traditional and extraterritorial privileges to

4

®Hanway, vol. 1, p. 40.

49

F o r bibliographical references, see Lockhart, Nadir Shah, pp. 296-99.

50

S e e Chapter VI.

51

See Chapter VI.

o Ji

Enver Ziy.i Kara), "Tanziroaltan evvel Garplilajma Hareketleri" in Tanzimal I (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 13-30; Idris Kui;uk6mer, Duzenin Yabanalcifmasi, pp. 53-58; Niyazi Berkes, The

Secularization of Turkey, pp. 23-63.

98

IMPERIAL MHANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

an increasing number of nations. 5 3 The tide was never to be turned back. The capitulatory regime assured the ascendancy of the non-Muslims — Greek, Armenian, and Jewish merchants and bankers. The victory of 1743 at Mosul was the outcome of a concentration of events that culminated in the unsuccessful and humiliating siege which was tantamount to a defeat for the Persians. Thus after several months of hard fighting before the walls of Mosul, the Persians were forced to sue for peace and to relinquish the futile struggle. The Persian withdrawal marked the end of the forward policy of Nadir Shah. Ironically, the decisive confrontation between the Ottoman and the Persian Empires which was to have taken place at Mosul resulted in the defeat of one of the two protagonists without the participation of the other. This bizarre element in the drama of the siege of Mosul had, of course, a deeper significance. It indicated the exhaustion and senescence of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were not absent by choice. The Perso-Ottoman wars of 1723-1736 and of 1743 paved the way for the penetration and eventual exploitation of Iraq and Persia by European powers. These two countries, as well as India, were to become inevitably enmeshed in the toils of the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). The British and the French had been Fighting each other for economic supremacy in India and the Persian Gulf for several decades, 5 4 but the year 1744 represents a line of demarcation in several respects. For the first time, India was the scene of formal hostilities between France and England. What is more, the spread of hostilities from Europe to India indicated the intensification of colonial rivalry between the two countries, and marked the beginning of British intervention in the internal affairs of India. 5 5 The rivalry in India was no longer confined to commercial matters; it had now assumed the character of a determined drive for territorial and political control. Nadir Shah's invasion of India in 1739 precipitated the collapse of the Moghul Empire which had been undergoing rapid decline during the first part of the eighteenth century. 56 The shaken empire never recovered from Nadir's attack; it soon dissolved into civil war and chaos. In September 1744 news arrived in India that Britain and France were at war in Europe. The British and French trading companies were thus suddenly forced to make a momentous decision. They were either to participate in the war and engage in hostilities

ti E n v e r Z i y a Karal, " T a n ; i m a t t a n Evvel Garplila$ma Hareketleri," Tanzimal pp.

I (Istanbul, 1940).

13-30.

54 S . P. Sen, The French in India 1763-1X16 ( C a l c u t t a , 1958), c o v e r s the rivalry b e t w e e n England and France b e f o r e 1763; Sir Arnold T . Wilson, The Persian Gulf {Oxford, I92S), pp. 110-91. 55

G l y n d w r Williams. The Expansion 105.

of Europe

in the Eighteenth

Century

(London, 1966), p.

56 V i n c e n t A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, ed. Percival Spear ( O x f o r d , 1958), in which B o o k 3 covers British activities in eighteenth-century India.

CONCLUSION

99

against each other or to continue to pursue their commercial activities in peace. Contrary to precedent and despite proposals of neutrality by the French, the East India Company decided on war. 5 7 T h e declaration of war by the British in 1744 resulted in continuous w a r f a r e between the two countries until the French surrender at Plassey in 1757. 5 8 Even before the French surrender at Plassey, the British had undertaken to establish sound and secure communications between India and Eingland. While the sea would remain the main passage, a faster means of transportation was necessary for the post and special correspondence. The only expeditious route was via Basra-Aleppo, either across the desert or through Mosul. The French had also realized the importance of Basra for this purpose, as well as for the purpose of trade, and had appointed a resident in Basra in 1739. Consequently, Basra was to become the hub for dispatches moving between India and Europe. The Basra-Aleppo route which had seen no European travelers for half a century (1697-1745) was again to be put into use. William Beawes, an East India Company agent, traveled this course on his way to India in 1745, 5 9 and soon a succession of others followed. In 1749 a regular postal service from India to London traveled the same path. 6 0 The Tigris and the Euphrates were becoming necessary for British control of India. The O t t o m a n s and M a m l u k s were no more able to resist British penetration than had the Moghul Empire. Nadir's conquest of India ensured the success of British expansion in that country. While the Shah was not victorious in Iraq, his activities there produced the same results they had produced in India. The power enclaves which emerged in Iraq after 1743 and in the chaos which fallowed in the wake of the demise of Nadir Shah and Ahmet Pa§a in 1747 could not prevail against continuous pressure. T h e pattern and thrust of British penetration into Iraq was to become very clear as early as the reign of the first Mamluk ruler, Siilcyman Pa§a (1749-1762). 6 1 Developments in northwest Persia and the Caspian provinces were fraught with dire consequences for both the Ottomans and the Persians. The Treaty of Genj in 1735 had returned Derbent and Baku to Persia; however, the long involvement of Nadir in India had allowed the Russians to maintain a strong presence in Dagistan — a presence which had grown stronger in 1741 and 1742 - ^ G l y n d w r Williams, The Expansion 58

of Europe

in the Eighteenth

Century,

p. 109.

/ W . , p. 123.

" ^ W i l l i a m Beawes, Narrative 6 3 ( L o n d o n , 1928), p. 23.

of u Journey from

Aleppo

to Basra in 1745, Hakluyl Society, no.

60 A m i r A b d u l A m i n , British Interest in the Persian Gulf (Leiden, 1967), p. 22; H. Furber, "The Overland Route to India in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," Journal of Indian History 29 (1951): 105-35. 61 Amir A b d u l A m i n , British Interest in the Persian Gulf (Leiden, 1967), p. 54. "The British received every e n c o u r a g e m e n t and protection from S u l e i m a n Pasha. W h e n e v e r the c o m p a n y ' s Resident al f l a s r a was oppressed by the local authorities in the port he would rely on the Pasha's support."

100

I M P E R I A L M E A N D E R I N G S AND R E P U B L I C A N B Y - W A Y S

when the people of Dagistan entreated the Tsar and the Porte for protection. Persia's hold on the Caspian was further reduced by the antagonism of Russian merchants to the Elton mission and to the English Russian Company. In 1746 the Empress withdrew the transit privileges which had been accorded the British merchants by the commercial treaty of 1734 and requested that British merchants liquidate their affairs in Persia. By 1751 no British merchants were left in northern Persia. T h e collapse of British commercial enterprise in this region, coupled with the death of Elton w h o was murdered in 1751, ensured Russian hegemony in the Caspian Sea region. The dream of Peter the Great in 1721 was realized in 1751. De facto spheres of influence were now clearly discernible in the area. Russia was paramount in northern Persia and Britain in southern Persia and Iraq.

THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE JEWS: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVISION

While doing research in the Public Records Office in London in autumn 1979 I came across a dossier listed as FO 195/2479, number 480. The dossier discusses the return to Istanbul of the body of Talat Pa§a, a leader of the Committee of Union and Progress (lttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti) and the Young Turks during 1908-1918 1 . One comment which was made in dossier number 480 struck my attention. It was made by D. L. Busk who was acting first secretary of the British Eimbassy in Ankara. Busk stated, «Ahmet Emin Yalman, grandson of Salonician Jews (and who knows how much 'Union and Progress' was under the influence of 'deunmes') wrote, a few days ago in the 'Vatan': 'The honours rendered to Talat Pacha are the first manifestation of Turkish gratefulness to this great patriot and an amend for the oblivion into which the great man had fallen'". In this article I do not wish to cover the entire historiography of the Young Turk movement for that has been adequately done in the works which I mention below. I do think, however, that many of the major books and articles during the last twenty-five years do not pay adequate attention to some Zionist sources on the Young Turk movement and, in particular, to Vladimir Jabotinsky's works and to Joseph B, Schectman's biography of Jabotinsky 2 . The association among the donmes, Freemasons and Young Turks may have been closer than the works of Bernard Lewis, Feroz Ahmad, Ernest Ramsaur Jr., and Elie Kedourie indicate even though all of the above scholars have different views regarding the significance of the relationship between Jews, Freemasons and Young Turks. The works on this subject by Elie Kedourie, Bernard Lewis and Ernest Ramsaur seem to imply that those authors and writers who see a strong connection or, indeed, any connection at all, between Young Turks, donmes and

' l presented the results of this research at the Atatiirk Devrimleri II. Uluslararasi Simpozyumu at Istanbul University, 11-15 M a y 1981, t h e results of w h i c h are to be p u b l i s h e d in a v o l u m e edited by Yilmaz Altug. Because of the narrow focus of that article and the subject matter 1 was not able to include all of the material and research that I had obtained on the topic of Talat Pa$a and the return of his remains to Turkey on 25 February 1943. Rebel and Statesman: Y o s e l e f f , Inc., 1956).

The

Vladimir

Jabotinsky

Story,

vol. I and II ( N e w Y o r k : T h o m a s

102

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN

BY-WAYS

F r e e m a s o n s d o so almost e x c l u s i v e l y o n the basis of anti-semitism3. W h i l e the e x i s t e n c e o f a n t i - s e m i t i s m c a n n o t b e r u l e d o u t a n d , i n d e e d , it m u s t b e s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d , I t h i n k t o o that s o m e p r e v i o u s l y u n u s e d r e l e v a n t Z i o n i s t

works

s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d a n d that i s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s article. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g that the idea the C U P w a s "under the i n f l u e n c e o f the d o n m e s " still p r e v a i l e d a m o n g B r i t i s h E m b a s s y o f f i c i a l s in 1 9 4 3 , a s it a p p a r e n t l y h a d in 1 9 0 8 .

O n e o f t h e b e s t a n a l y s i s o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e C U P a n d t h e J e w s i s that o f F e r o z A h m a d w h o s t a t e s " t h o s e w h o s a w t h e J e w i s h c o n n e c t i o n in the C U P — t h o u g h it w a s n e v e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l — w e r e n o t t o t a l l y w r o n g , h o w e v e r . T h e y w e r e m i s t a k e n in t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n , in s e e i n g the C U P a s a front f o r J e w i s h a i m s and aspirations as t h o u g h the T u r k s w e r e m e r e d u p e s o f s u c h ambition. O t t o m a n J e w s d i d p l a y a n i m p o r t a n t part in t h e U n i o n i s t m o v e m e n t b e f o r e a n d after 1908, but never as the f o r c e c a p a b l e o f m a n i p u l a t i n g the m o v e m e n t for their o w n ends. Historical c i r c u m s t a n c e s united the destinies o f J e w s and Turks a n d a s a r e s u l t t h e t w o e l e m e n t s e n d e d u p c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h e C U P . In f a c t , s u c h w a s t h e u n i t y o f i n t e r e s t s that t h e J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y ' s s u p p o r t f o r t h e

•'For a discussion of ihe CUP and the donmes see the following works: Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University, 1961), pp. 207-8 and note 4; Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, Jr, The Younn Turks: Prelude to Ihe Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, 1957), especially pages 100-39, Elie Kedourie, "Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews", Middle East Studies, vol. 7, no I [January 1971), pp 89-104, One of the latest articles concerning the Young Turks is Kemal H Karpat. "The Memoires of N. Batzuria: The Young Turks and Nationalism," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (July 1975), pp 27699. Karpat includes a bibliography which contains works in Turkish and Russian not utilized in Feroz Ahmad, The Younx Turks (Oxford University, 1969), the best work in English on the Young Turks. It is interesting that Karpat states "We know that the Freemason lodges and the Jews of Salonica played important roles in shaping the ideology and policies of the Union and Progress Society, at least during its formative years in the Balkans." (Karpat, p. 280) and in a footnote he says to see on this issue the article of Elie Kedourie's mentioned above. But if I understand Kedourie's article correctly, he was debunking the views of those, especially G. H. Fitzmaurice, the chief dragoman of British Ambassador Sir Gerard Lowther, who assigned a predominant role in the creation of Union and Progress to the Jews. Views, which in the opinion of Kedourie, were based on Fitzmaurice's anti-semitism. In fact, in Kedourie's mind, Fitzmaurice exaggerated the role of the Jews and their influence in the Union and Progress movement, in spite of which his views still found their way into other British policy making circles But his opinions may have impressed others so much "that such fictions helped to persuade the British government to fall for and to take up Zionism: Clio is indeed an ironic muse." See Kedourie, pp 194-5. It seems in regard to this specific paragraph that Kedourie's "fictions" are Karpat's "reliable sources." I think (he statements of both Kedourie and Karpat indicate clearly different interpretations of the role of the Jews in the Young Turk movement, even during its formative years in the Balkans. The relationship and status of donmes in Ottoman and Turkish history still continues to attract attention. In this regard see Irvine Cemil Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak's review of Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1977), in MEHIP Reports, no. 84 (January 1980), pp, 14-5 in which they make comments on Ahmet Emin Yalman, member of a prominent donme family This donme-Young Turk relationship is also mentioned in llhan Tekeli and Selim llkin, "Kurtulu; Savajinda Talat Paja ile Mustafa Kemal'in Mektuplajmalan", Belleten, vol. XL1V, no I''4 (April 1980), p. 320.

103

THE Y O U N G T U R K S A N D THE J E W S

committee was virtually unconditional." 4 In a more recent article A h m a d states f u r t h e r "the Turkish and Jewish h a r m o n y of interest was such that many European writers described the Y o u n g Turk movement as a Jewish, Masonic conspiracy in which the Unionists were the dupes in the hands of the Jews and the Donme or the crypto-Jews. For the same reason the Zionist movement failed to find an enthusiastic response amongst Ottoman Jews who remained totally loyal to Istanbul." 5 T w o Turkish scholars, llhan Tekeli and Selim tlkin, have also recently added to the topic by indicating that during the latest quarter of the nineteenth century the Macedonian National Movement was desirous of attaching itself to other countries. In addition to other nationalist groups, the Macedonian Nationalists also had to contend with the Jews who had no equivalent nationalist movement of their own and w h o had little influence outside of Salonika. As a result, as the bourgeoisie in the newly emerging independent Balkan countries were gaining in strength, the Jewish bourgeoisie were losing power. In this new social revolutionary situation some Jews wanted to support workers' movements but the Jewish upper classes would not support them. Given the situation the Jews thought the best choice was for Macedonia to stay under Ottoman control. During this, period of time [the early 1900s] the Ottoman government was not in control of Macedonia. Even if the situation were to change, sooner or later, it was thought, the Balkan nationalist movements would achieve success. For these reasons say Tekeli and llkin, the Jews elected to support the contemporary movements advocating Ottoman control 6 . The above assessment, however, does not mean that the Zionists did not seek to take advantage of the Young Turk movement in planning, "ambitious plans ... for a systematic political enlightenment campaign in Constantinople, and for the Zionization of Turkish Jewry which so far remained almost completely untouched by Jewish national and Zionist tendencies. The Cultural Committee of the Russian Zionist organization took the initiative for creating in Turkey a network of press organs and c o n d u c t i n g widespread Zionist propaganda," according to Joseph B. Schectman 7 . Schectman goes on to state

Feroz A h m a d , "Unionist Relations with the Greek, A r m e n i a n and Jewish C o m m u n i t i e s of the O t t o m a n Empire, 1908-1914," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, edited by B e n j a m i n Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: H o l m e s & Meier 1982), p. 42.5. 5

F e r o z A h m a d , "Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: T h e Social and E c o n o m i c Policy of the

Young

Turks.

1908-1918,"

s u b s e q u e n t l y TSET,

in

Tiirkiye'nin

Sosyal

ve

Ektmomik

Turihi

(1071-1920),

edited b y O s m a n Okyar and Halil Inalcik (Ankara: 1980), p. 332. For this

statement A h m a d cites Kedourie's article and A b r a h a m GalantC. Turcs et Juifs (Istanbul: 1932) and the s a m e author's Tiirkler

ve Vahudiler(

1947) without page citations,

''llhan Tekeli and Selim llkin, "lttihat ve Terakki Hareketinin O l u j u m u n d a Selanik'in Toplumsa! Yapisimn Belirleyiciligi," in TSET,

pp. 371-2.

^Schectman, p. 150; w h i l e I q u o t e selected p a s s a g e s , all of chapter e i g h t of S c h e c t m a n s biography which deals with Jabotinsky's assignment to Turkey should be consulted. T h e q u o t e s are from chapter eight unless otherwise cited.

104

I M P E R I A L MEANDERINGS AND R E P U B L I C A N BY-WAYS

that "for this p u r p o s e it [the cultural committee of the Russian Zionist Organization] raised considerable f u n d s and put them at the disposal of the Zionist Inner Actions Committee with headquarters in Cologne; this body was headed by Herzl's successor, David Wolffsohn." Also in June, 1909 there was a meeting in Constantinople of Jabotinsky, David Wolffsohn and Nahum Sokolov — the latter two representing the Zionist headquarters in Cologne — with M. M. Ussishkin and I. A. Rosov of the Russian Zionist Cultural Committee and, "as a result of their deliberations, a Zionist controlled press network was established" to a d v a n c e positions sympathetic to the Zionists. The daily newspaper, Courrier d'Orient, whose name was later changed to Jeune Turc, was established. It was under the nominal editorship of Celal Nuri Bey, the son of a Turkish CUP minister, but in reality edited by Lucien Sciutto. A weekly in French, L'Aurore, also edited by Lucien Sciutto, a leader of the Sephardic Jewish community, was similarly established. In addition there was a weekly in Ladino, El Judeo Ha-Yehudi, edited by David El Kanon, and a weekly in Hebrew, Ha-Mevasser. In this fashion, according to Schectman, all of the main languages of the Ottoman Jews — Ottoman, French, Ladino and Hebrew would all be covered 8 . It is interesting to note that Vladimir Jabotinsky was appointed to be in charge of this entire press network. A press committee to oversee the Zionist controlled press network consisted of Jabotinsky, Dr. Victor Jacobsen, who at that time was responsible for all Zionist activities in Turkey, and Sami Hochberg, a Zionist from St. Petersburg, who had lived for a long time in the Middle East. It was stipulated that any change in the composition of the committee could only take place with the consent of the powerful Zionist Inner Actions Committee headed by David Wolffsohn, Professor Otto Warburg and Jakobus Kann of the World Zionist Organization, of the representatives of the Russian Zionist Organization, and of the press c o m m i t t e e itself. Under Jabotinsky's guidance, the Jeune Turc became one of Constantinople's leading and most influential dailies. The French organ, L'Aurore, Jabotinsky himself reported, "soon earned an authoritative position in all circles of the Jewish intelligentsia in Constantinople and Salonica. It is being read by everybody even by adversaries and indifferents...." The circulation of the Judeo-Spanish and Zionist El Judeo began to equal that of the oldest Sephardic periodical, El Tiempo. In the later part of 1909 and early 1910 Jabotinsky participated actively in the politics of the Zionists in Istanbul and Salonika. According to Schectman, it was during this time that Jabotinsky "conquered" two influential Jewish members of the Turkish Parliament — Nessim Russo and Missim Matzliach (Mazliyah) Effendi and that this was

®!hid.,

p, 155. S c h e c t m a n m i s s p e l l s H a - y e h u d i .

THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE JEWS

105

considered a major Zionist achievement. Both men were friends of the Young Turk movement and previous to their contact with Jabotinsky they had been completely indifferent to the Jewish national ideal. Schectman, quoting from Shalom Schwarz's biography of Jabotinsky, states that at the conference of Zionist leaders in Constantinople in December, 1909 Russo stated, "in his own and Matzliach's name that they fully agree with the Zionist program as expounded to them by Jabotinsky and were ready to work for his ideas." 9 When Victor Jacobsen visited Constantinople in autumn 1908 his contacts were, "Emmanuel Karasu (an important member of CUP from Salonika), Hayim Nahum (the Haham Ba§i, or Chief Rabbi of the Empire), Nisim Mazliah (a deputy in Parliament from Smyrna, and Nisim Ruso (Secretary to the Minister of Interior))." 10 Nissim Matzliach (Mazliyah) remained close to Talat up to the time of the latter's assassination. Matzliach was also engaged in supplying and in obtaining money for Talat Pa§a and the Young Turk operations in Berlin. This is stated by Talat Pa§a in his letter to Mustafa Kemal as published by Tekeli and llkin 1 i n addition,. Matzliach or Mazliyah was a contact for the Young Turks in Berlin with the European socialists. He attended the International Socialist Conference in 1917 held in Stockholm as one of three Turkish representatives "hoping to forestall condemnation by the International Socialist Bureau, whose Armenian section was already strongly lobbying for dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the war should end...." 1 2 Schectman also records that Emmanuel Carasso (Karasu), a prominent member of the Ottoman parliament, stated in an interview published in the Salonika paper, L'Epoca, that, after a discussion he had with Jabotinsky and Jacobson, he was, "in complete agreement with them in regard to Zionism." 1 3 There is other evidence, however, that Karasu's professed allegiance to Zionism was questionable as he later supported "even the harshest anti-Zionist m e a s u r e s . " 1 4 In a letter Jabotinsky wrote to the Zionist Press Committee in Constantinople on 4 May 1910 he stated that, "during the last few months the attitude of the Constantinople Jews toward national consciousness and Zionism has changed strikingly. The fear that Zionism might be high treason is gradually

^Ibid., p. 158. Schwarz's biography is entitled, Jabotinsky — Fighter of the Nation (Jerusalem, 1942). 10 Neville J Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism before World War / (University of California, 1976), p. 60.

' 'Tekeli and llkin, Kurtuluf Savaftnda...,

i2

p. 320.

' ^ G e o r g e Harris, The Origins of Communism Institution, 1967), p. 31.

in Turkey (Stanford University: The Hoover

17Schectman, p. 158.

I4

D. M. Dubnow, Die Neueste Geschichte 540-1.

des Judischen

Volkes (Berlin, 1920-23), vol. Ill, pp.

106

I M P E R I A L M E A N D E R I N G S AND R E P U B L I C A N B Y - W A Y S

disappearing. Considerable strata of the youth (whose majority was educated in the Alliance schools) feel inspired by our [Zionist] ideals." 1 5 Paul D u m o n t has stated that one of the developments which may have contributed to the spread of Zionist ideas in Alliance schools is that the instruction in Turkish was very weak 1 6 . It should be noted that while Jabotinsky was satisfied with his Zionist activities among the Jewish community he was unsuccessful in influencing the policy of the CUP government, even Schectman acknowledges this. Also the "Kann controversy" which was caused by the publication of Erez Israel, Das Jüdische Land, a book authored by Jakobus A. Kann, one of the three members of the World Zionist Organization and published in Köln and Leipzig in 1909 undoubtedly contributed to the reluctance of the CUP government to be identified with any Zionist program. "Zionist representatives in Constantinople — not to s p e a k of O t t o m a n J e w s — thought that Kann's act was a m a j o r political b l u n d e r . " 1 7 Mandel stales, and Herzl's diaries confirm, that Herzl met Dr. Abdullah Cevdet Bey, w h o had accepted a post as physician to the Ottoman Embasy at Vienna in 1903 1 8 . In 1903 Herzl also talked with A h m e d Riza and other Turks and conferred in Paris with Dr. Max Nordau, one of Herzl's closest collaborators. In spring 1909, soon after the 13 February coup during which the CUP ousted Kamil Pa§a as Grand Vezir, Jacobsen and his contacts spoke with A h m e d Riza w h o had assumed the o f f i c e of Presidency of the C h a m b e r of Deputies of the Ottoman Parliament. T h e result of these conversations was that t h e C U P d e c l a r e d that it w o u l d o p p o s e J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n i n t o P a l e s t i n e , but

not e l s e w h e r e into the Empire. Despite this decision, however, the new mutassarrif of Jerusalem, Subhi Bey, w h o had met with the Zionist officials, Victor Jacobsen and Isaac Fernandez in December, 1908, before leaving for his post in Palestine, decided in March, 1909, "apparently on his own authority, first, to allow land sales to Ottoman Jews to continue, and second, to dispense

l5

S c h e c t m a n , p. 158.

" ' F o r the d e v e l o p m e n t of the A l l i a n c e Israélite U n i v e r s e l l e see Paul D u m o n t , " J e w i s h C o m m u n i t i e s of T u r k e y d u r i n g the last d e c a d e s of the nineteenth century in the light of the A r c h i v e s of the Alliance Israélite Universelle," in Braude and Lewis, pp. 2 0 9 - 3 0 . As noted in the text D u m o n t stales that one of the d e v e l o p m e n t s which may have c o n t r i b u t e d to the spread of Zionist ideas in Alliance schools is that the instruction in Turkish was very weak. T h e l a n g u a g e of instruction was F r e n c h . H o w e v e r , the instruction in Turkish did increase after the a d v e n t of the C U P to power. In another article, "Sources inédites pour l'histoire du m o u v e m e n t ouvrier et d e s c o u r a n t s socialistes dans l'Empire o t t o m a n au début du X X e siècle," TS KT, pp. 3 8 3 - 9 6 , D u m o n t indicates just how important the k n o w l e d g e of French was for the spread of socialism. And, I might add, Z i o n i s m ? ' ^ M a n d e l , pp. 93-4. In general Mandel supports many of Schectman s contentions. ' ^ T h e o d o r e Herzl, The C miplete five volumes (New

Diaries

York and L o n d o n ,

reference f r o m Mandel

of Theodore

Herzl, ed., R. Patai and trans, b y H. Z o h n ,

1960), vol. 4, pp. 1417-8 ( 1 6 . 2 . 1 9 0 3 ) . I got t h i s

THE YOUNG T U R K S AND THE J E W S

107

with the need for foreign Jews purchasing land to undertake not to settle Jews on it." 1 9 One of Mandel's conclusions is that the Young Turks were as opposed to the Zionists as Abdiilhamid's regime and that leading Young Turk politicians made this clear to Zionist representatives in the months after the revolution of 1908 and that official opposition hardened further in 1909 when the CUP, the dominant wing a m o n g the Y o u n g T u r k s , began e n f o r c i n g its policy of Ottomanization. This opposition was relaxed for only a few months in 1913 and 1914, "when the Government angled for the financial support it believed to be at the c o m m a n d of Jews in E u r o p e . " 2 0 Mandel fails to mention, however, that despite this o f f i c i a l "hardening," Jewish colonization continued apace in Palestine during the CUP period. Throughout the relationship between the Zionist Jews and the CUP was the constant question of the need for money. After the first Balkan war when the CUP's financial state was particularly acute, the Zionist representative in Constantinople, Victor Jacobsen, in September 1912 met with Kamil Pa§a, the President of the Council of State and with Gabriel Noradungian, the Minister of Foreign affairs. As a result of the meetings. Jacobsen recorded that he had gained the impression, "that both men believed in the Zionists' power" in Europe. Sami Hochberg, now the editor of the Jeune Turc, was the intermediary between the European Zionists and the C U P Government, in an attempt by the C U P Government to get the Zionists to raise capital for it in Europe. Lucien Sciutto, the editor of the pro-Zionist L'Aurore, did not scruple to mention in an article on 17 March 1913 that, "World Jewry," among other things, ... "by its financiers t o o , . . . is a great force of a different kind to be reckoned with.. ,." 2 ' Even Rashid Rida, one of the intellectual founders of Arab nationalism, saw no objection to using Jewish capital for development purposes in Syria. Mandel considers, however. Rida's contention that the Jews controlled the finances of Europe and that the idea that the Jews dominated the CUP as forms of Arab anti-semitism. 2 2 It was in fact the Zionist desire to purchase land in Palestine and the CUP's need for capital from the Jews and the Zionists of Europe, and the belief of the leaders of the CUP that the Jews possessed and could deliver it, whether founded in fact or fiction, which served as the basis and fostered much of the CUP- Young Turk and Zionist contact from 1908-1921. This was, as we have seen above, a concern which apparently continued up to the time of Talat Pa§a's assassination. This concern for capital also was the main reason for the so-called

,9

M a n d e l , p. 62.

2 (

W ,

p. 225.

21

Ibid., pp. 142 and 146.

22

Ibid., pp. 228-9.

108

I M P E R I A L MHANDERINGS AND R E P U B L I C A N B Y - W A Y S

"Muslim-Jewish Alliance" proposed by Talat Pa§a in February, 1913, Talat's proposal, probably for this very reason, produced little in the way of an actual alliance. 2 3 An additional footnote regarding the young Turks and the Jews is the sojourn in the Ottoman Empire of Alexander Helphand, the Russian socialist and w o u l d - b e Bolshevik, which nearly coincided with Jabotinsky's stay in the Ottoman Empire. Israel Lazarevich Helphand, he later adopted the name Alexander and also the pseudonym 'Parvus', was born 27 August 1869 in Berezino, White Russia. 2 4 Escaping from Siberia where he had been incarcerated for his participation in the 1905 revolution in Russia, Helphand went on to b e c o m e one of the most important marxist and socialist thinkers, and perhaps, paradoxically, at least to his friends, one of the richest men in Germany. 2 5 Even before his departure for Istanbul in the autumn of 1910 Helphand had played an important role in German socialist circles. It seems that it was a dispute among Helphand, the German socialists, and the novelist and playwriter, Maxim Gorki, over who had rights to the novelist's royalties which played a role in Helphand's leaving for Istanbul where he remained for more than four years. From 1914 up to 1919 Helphand, writing under the name of 'Parvus', played an important role in European marxist, socialist and communist circles. He seems to have been instrumental in arranging with the Germans the passage and necessary money so procure it, of Lenin's travel through Germany to Russia in April of 1917 — an event which had significant historical c o n s e q u e n c e s . 2 6 Helphand's apparent desire to join the Bolsheviks was, however, rejected by Lenin — a rejection which proved fateful for his subsequent socialist career. Helphand died on 12 December 1924. The period of Helphand's life which is of interest to the topic at hand is the interlude f r o m N o v e m b e r 1910 to February 1915 which he spent in the Ottoman Empire, much of it in Istanbul. 2 7 Helphand's stay in the O t t o m a n

23

Ibid.,

pp. 165-85.

24

A t least this is the date established by his biographers. Z. A B. Zeman and W. B. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution: The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus) 1867-1924 (Oxford University Press, 1965) 25 Ibid., pp. 192-205 and :i81. Ibid., pp. 206-234. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey ( M o n t r e a l : McGill University Press, 1964) is also of this opinion even though Berkes's book was published in 1964 and Helphand's biography in 1965. It is unfortunate that Berkes did not have access to Zeman and Scharlau's biography. 97 Zeman and Scharlau, pp 125-44.

THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE JEWS

109

Empire played a great role in the success of his later career for it was there that he became wealthy by trading in commodities, especially cereal grains. His business became lucrative during the Balkan wars when he seems to have gained concessions to supply the Ottoman army. Helphand also seems to have acted as a business agent for European business men which may have included the Krupp concern and Sir Basil Zaharoff. He also established a successful publishing house in Istanbul. Helphand's business activities and his "importation of railway equipment as well as spare parts for the milling industry" may have aided in inducing the Ottoman Empire "to her early entry into the war." 28 Helphand's objectives in these activities seems to have been to direct the Ottoman Empire as early as possible against the Russians: "His house in Constantinople became the meeting place of both the nationalist and socialist conspirators against the Tsarist regime" 29 which included Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians as well as Turks. Besides accumulating a fortune in Istanbul Helphand continued to write on socialist causes in various Ottoman newspapers, such as Yusuf Akkra's Turk Yurdu, Bilgi Mecmuasi, Tanin, Jeune Ture and Tasvir-i EJkár. His major work in Turkish, Tiirkiyenin Can Daman, published under his pseudonym, was published in 1 9 1 4 3 0 . Helphand's preference in his book for a bourgeois democratic regime and hence for economic liberalism for the Ottoman Empire were eventually rejected by the Young Turks for a policy of étatism, but not before his ideas had played a significant role regarding the economic options available to the Ottoman Empire. As 1 mentioned above, the immediate reasons for Jabotinsky's sojourn in the Ottoman Empire was the Young Turk revolution. Jabotinsky first went to Turkey in early winter (November?) of 1908 where he remained for several weeks and from where he made a trip to Palestine. Upon his return from Turkey

2H

lbid., p. 132.

2
A

W

Berkes, p. 336. The latter work was translated into modern Turkish by Muammer Sencer as, Tiirkiye'nin Mali Tutsakhgi (Istanbul 1977). 1 have not read this book. 1 got the reference from llhan Tekeli and Selim llkin, "Ittihat ve Terakki Hareketinin Oluçumunda Selanik'in Toplumsal Yapisimn Belirleyiciligi," TSET, pp. 351-82. One of the things Helphand suggested in his book in Turkish was the necessity of mechanization of Macedonian agriculture. According to Helphand, America had played an important role, apparently because of the great amount of land planted in cereal grains and because of its mechanized agriculture, and its railway system, in the decline of international cereal grains' prices. In order to compete with America, Helphand recommended that a railroad network be built and that agricultural technology be obtained. Helphand helped to set up several experimental farms. The Yearbook of Salonika for 1909 states that new plows and agricultural equipment were, indeed, introduced and that the number of harvesting machines were increasing two or three times every year. See Tekeli and llkin, p. 363. On the journalistic activities of Helphand in Turkey, see also Paul Dumont, "Un économiste

social-démocrate au service de la Jeune Turquie," in Mémorial Ômer Lûtfi Barktin (Paris: Librarie d'Amérique et d'Orient A. Maisonneuve, 1980), pp. 75-86.

110

IMPERIAL MiîANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

Jabotinsky wrote several articles on "New Turkey and Our Perspectives" 31 in early 1909.

[Zionist]

Jabotinsky returned to Istanbul in June 1909 at which time he was appointed head of a "Zionist-controlled press network" 3 2 consisting of four newspapers. One of which, interestingly enough was the Jeune Turc, a newspaper to which Helphand also contributed articles 33 and of which from June 1909 onward Jabotinsky became the chief editorial writer. According to his biographer, "under his guidance, the Jeune Turc became one of Constantinople's leading and most influential dailies." 34 Jabotinsky left Istanbul around June 1910 as a result of his opposition to the views of Jakobus H. Kann, a member of the Inner Actions Committee of the World Zionist Organization who had written a book in German in 1909 entitled Erez Israel. It was translated into French in 1910. In his book Kann suggested that the boundaries oiEretz Israel be Lebanon in the north, Damascus-Aqaba railway to the east, Egypt in the south, and the Mediterranean to the west. The Jewish government was to possess sovereignty in matters of taxation an army and police of its own. Kann's views were not those currently being followed by the Zionist propaganda organization, led by Jabotinsky, in the Ottoman Empire. When Jabotinsky disagreed with Kann's views and with David Wolffson, head of the Inner Actions Committee, he was forced to resign his position. 35 By the dates which can be established, it appears that Jabotinsky and Helphand, the two Jewish journalists, writers, intellectuals and ideologues, never met. Jabotinsky left Istanbul in June 1910 and Helphand arrived in November 1910. While there is little information regarding Helphand's views on Zionism, it seems likely that he familiarized himself with the socialist and Young Turk organizations which included a great number of Jews as well as with various Jewish organization, both media and otherwise. As Paul Dumont has recently demonstrated, in many instances there was considerable overlap among the socialist, Young Turk and Jewish organizations, especially in Macedonia and in Salonika in particular 3 6 . In this regard it seems probable, especially if Schectman's relation of Jabotinsky's role in the Ottoman Empire is accurate, and

3

' S c h e c t m a n , p. 152. Jabotinsky devoted only one p a g e of his Aulobingruphy

to his j o u r n e y

t o Istanbul and Palestine i2

lbid.

33 3

Jeune Turc was its later n i m e . In June 1909 it was called Courrier

d'Orient.

^ S c h e c h ( m a n , p. 156.

3 < 36

W . , p. 166.

P a u l D u m o n t , "Sources I n é d i t e s . . . " pp. 3 8 7 - 9 0 . Also see D u m o n t ' s " U n e o r g a n i s a t i o n socialiste o t t o m a n e : la Fédération O u v r i è r e de Salonique ( 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 1 2 ) , " Éludes Balkaniques (Sofia, 1975), no. I, pp. 76-88. In this article P r o f e s s o r D u m o n t discusses the role of H e l p h a n d in w e a v i n g the socialist network in the B a l k a n s , especially in Salonika and in M a c e d o n i a , up until 1912 when they were supressed by the Young Turks.

THE YOUNG T U R K S AND THE J E W S

111

if Helpharid's influence on the socialist and c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t s in the Ottoman Empire and in Europe was as substantial as it seems to have been, then the historiography dealing with this aspect of the Young Turk period, especially up to 1912-1913, underestimates the role of the Jews. A further need to update and to revise the historiography of this period is demonstrated in the recent work of three scholars. The first is the work of Neville Mandel whose book has already been mentioned and the others are Isaiah Friedman, Germany,

Turkey

Siyonizm

Sorunu

ve Filistin

and Zionism,

1897-1918

and M i m Kemal Oke,

( 1 8 8 0 - 1 9 1 4 ) 3 7 . Mandel's book w a s published

before Friedman's and h e did not have Friedman's research available to him. Friedman, whose book was published in 1977, did not have Mandel's book available, although he did have access to two of Mandel's articles- 18 . In his book one of Mandel's conclusions is that "the Zionists did not seek a state extending from Palestine to Iraq. They did not possess vast financial resources any more than the Jews controlled the finances of Europe. They did not dominate the CUP, nor were they in league with it (even though the idea was mooted in 1913 and 1914). And neither the Russians nor the G e r m a n s were using them [the Zionists] as a device to extend their respective i n t e r e s t s . T h e conclusion that the Germans were not using the Zionists "as a device to extend their respective interests" is conclusively challenged and rebutted by Friedman. Friedman's entire book is devoted to the reasons [although these reasons changed from time to timel for Germany's support of the Jews in Palestine and for the Zionist movement. Friedman concludes, writing about the events up to 1912, although "with the Ottoman archives still largely unexplored these conclusions cannot be fully substantiated, but on the basis of the evidence adduced above it is safe to say that much of Turkey's earlier opposition to Jewish colonization had evaporated. Moreover, it seems that the Germans, and the Turks independently of them discovered in Zionism certain advantages for their respective interest." 4 0 In fact it is with some irony that Friedman states that it was the desire of some Zionist groups to support Hebrew rather than German in Zionist schools in Palestine which led in the winter of 1913-1914 to temporarily strained relations between the Zionists and Germany. Secondly, it was the Zionist disregard of the Ottoman governor's, Muhdi Bey, announced policy that Jews should become Ottoman citizens which prevented even closer relations between the Young Turks and the Jews. Mim Kemal Oke also disagrees with Mandel by stating that

F r i e d m a n ' s b o o k w a s p u b l i s h e d by O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s in 1977 and O k e ' s w a s p u b l i s h e d by U f d a l Nc$riyat in Istanbul in 1 9 8 2 . - ^ F r i e d m a n , p. 4 4 5 . F r i e d m a n states, in a n o b v i o u s t y p o g r a p h i c a l error, M a n d e l ' s , " A t t e m p t s at an A r a b - Z i o n i s t E n t e n t e , 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 1 4 , " Middle it s h o u l d b e 1 9 6 5 . • " M a n d e l , p. 2 2 9 40

F r i e d m a n , p. 167.

Eastern

Studies

as b e i n g p u b l i s h e d in April

1946;

112

IMPERIAL MEANDERINGS AND REPUBLICAN BY-WAYS

Russia as well as Germany thought they would benefit by supporting Zionism 4 1 in that it would reduce the numbers and leadership, much of it thought to be Jewish, of the socialist parties and revolutionary organizations. Support of Zionism also would reduce the nationalist opposition to their governments and at the same time "anti-semitism would be sapped of its impetus." 4 2 Thirdly, both Russia and Germany would derive benefits from supporting and protecting the Jews and the Zionists in the Ottoman Empire. Another question addressed by Mandel and Oke is that of the relationship among Jews, Freemasons and the Young Turks 4 3 Mandel states that he agrees with Bernard Lewis that no dominate role was played by neither Jews or Freemasons with the CUP. 44 Oke agrees with Mandel and Lewis. He states that in his research on this subject he found no evidence before 1908 that the Young Turks or Zionists cooperated or that the Zionists aided the Young Turks in toppling Abdulhamid II. He states that of the Young Turks only Abdullah Cevdet had met Herzl and that was in 1902. The Zionists did, however, make recommendations to advance their interests in Istanbul. 45 Recent works by Paul Dumont have added to our knowledge concerning the relationship between the Jews, Freemasons and the Young Turks. Dumont's research indicates that the relationship among these groups may have been closer than has hitherto been acknowledged in the historiography of this topic. 4 6 Regarding the Masonic lodges in Salonika, Dumont's research is limited to two French obedient lodges: Veritas and L'Avenirde I'Orient. He emphasizes that the data to which he had access and which is available is not conclusive with regard to the role of French Masonry in the political life of the dying empire. He

4

' / / AbdUlhamld. 153-155.

4

Siwnistler

ve Filistin

Meselesi

(Istanbul: Kervan Kitapçilik,

1981), pp.

" l t is n o t e w o r t h y to mention that Ô k e is q u o t i n g here advice given t o Kaiser W i l h e l m and

Russian Prime Minister P h d v e by Herzl himself, p. 153; Ôke also s u m m a r i z e d the c o n c l u s i o n s of his book in two articles: "Zionists and the O t t o m a n Foreign Ministry D u r i n g the Reign of A b d u l h a m i d II ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 0 9 ) , " Arab

Studies

Quarterly,

vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1980), pp. 364-373. I

q u o t e d f r o m page 373 of this article, but the r e a d e r should also consult Ô k e ' s , "The O t t o m a n E m p i r e , Zionism, and the Question of Palestine (1880-1908)," International East

Studies,

Journal

of

Middle

vol. 14, no. 3 (1982), pp. 329-341. It should be noted t h e s e t w o articles are

virtually the same. F r i e d m a n , pages 62-74 should also be consulted. 43

S e e n. 3.

44

M a n d e l , p. 83.

4