Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe 3030417603, 9783030417604

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Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe Anna McKeever

Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe

Anna McKeever

Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe

Anna McKeever School of Education and Social Sciences University of the West of Scotland Glasgow, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-41760-4    ISBN 978-3-030-41761-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Doomko/Alamy Stock Vector This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Dave

Acknowledgements

This book has benefited from the guidance and support of many people. It has its origins as a doctoral dissertation in political science in Ulster University, and I would like to thank my supervisors Cathy Gormley-­ Heenan and Markus Ketola for their invaluable academic advice and encouragement during the process. A special thanks to my external examiner Simon Usherwood for his insights into the British chapter. I would also like to thank Arthur Aughey for his efforts to liaise me with Conservative politicians. At Palgrave, I express my gratitude to my editors Ambra Finotello and Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun for being patient with me throughout this lengthy process and to anonymous reviewers for their perceptive comments. I am deeply grateful for the expertise and support provided by Lea Sgier. I also owe gratitude to Emily-St Denny and Emile Chabal for their insightful comments on the French case and to Charlotte Orgebin-Salmon from Regional Council of Ile-de-France for doing her best to liaise me with French politicians. The research for this book was supported by the Vice-Chancellor’s Scholarship and by the University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES) that funded my fieldwork in Switzerland, for which I am grateful. Thanks to the librarians from Ulster University, William, Jennie and David, whom I countlessly tortured with document delivery requests. I owe special gratitude to my interviewees who made this research possible. To name a few: Vince Cable, David Metcalf, Luzi Stamn, Thomas

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Aeschi, Ulrich Schluer, Hanz Fehr and many others who agreed to provide the insights into the black box of immigration policymaking. Last, but not least, I offer my gratitude to my family, to David McKeever, who is my best friend and my toughest critic, being a political scientist too. He has read many drafts of this book and the dissertation that came before it. This book is dedicated to him. I am grateful to Kononenko family for always supporting my career path and investing in my education and to McKeever family for their encouragement.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 Explaining Causes and Dynamics of Policy Change and Policy Deadlock 15 3 From Detoxification Strategy Back to ‘Nasty Party’: Explaining the Conservative’s Turn on Immigration Between 2005 and 2015  35 4 Immigration Policy and the SVP: Resisting the EU and Fighting Switzerland’s So-Called Islamisation 67 5 Immigration During Sarkozy’s Time in Office: Economic Orientation and Cultural Backlash 97 6 Explaining the Variation in Conservative Parties’ Responses to Immigration135 7 Conclusion153 Index165

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Abbreviations

ACSE BIS CAI CCT CVP EEA EU FASILD FDJP FDP FN IFOP INSEE MAC MP MWUK NHS OECD PBS SpAD SVP UDF UKIP UMP UUK

National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunities Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Contract of Reception and Integration Card of Competences and Talents Christian Democrat Party of Switzerland European Economic Area European Union Fond of Action and Support for Integration and Fight against Discrimination Federal Department of Justice and Police Liberal-Radical Party of Switzerland Front National French Institute of Public Opinion National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies Migration Advisory Committee Member of Parliament Migration Watch UK National Health Service Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Points-based system Special Advisor Swiss People’s Party Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland United Kingdom Independence Party Union for a Popular Movement Universities UK

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Net migration to the UK (2006–2016). (Source: Office of National Statistics (2016)) Fig. 3.2 EU-15 migration to the UK (2006–2016). (Source: Office of National Statistics (2016)) Fig. 3.3 EU migration to the UK (2000–2014). (Source: Office for National Statistics (2016)) Fig. 4.1 EU migration to Switzerland, 2002–2017. (Source: Office fédérale de la statistique (2018))

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Conservative Party’s rhetoric on immigration and immigration policy changes under the 2010–2015 Coalition government Table 4.1 SVP’s manifesto pledges, 2007–2015 Table 6.1 Causes of policy change in France, Switzerland and the UK Table 6.2 Contextual characteristics of the UK, Switzerland and France Table 6.3 Causal mechanisms of policy change and policy deadlock in the UK, Switzerland and France

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

What explains the introduction of restrictive immigration policies across a number of European states? Why do conservative parties choose to toughen their immigration policy stances? What explains the variation in the factors that affect conservative parties’ immigration policymaking logics? What mechanisms account for the dynamics of immigration policy change or policy deadlock? Using the cases of the UK, Switzerland and France, this book explains why governmental conservative parties in these countries changed their immigration policy stances and shaped immigration policy in a more restrictive direction between 2002 and 2015. It also sheds light on the mechanisms that explain both immigration policy change and integration policy deadlock. Immigration has become one of the crucial issues in Western Europe (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Grande et al. 2019), dominating agenda of political parties and voters  and remaining the biggest concern of the European voters (European Commission 2018). Britain’s exit (Brexit) from the European Union (EU), the acceptance of the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland, Marine Le Pen’s unprecedented success in the 2017 presidential elections are some of the examples that highlight the growing scepticism towards the EU and immigration in general and illustrate a growing demand for populist ideas. Conservative parties across Europe have not been immune to the rise of populism and Euroscepticism, which is largely centred around the issue of immigration. Right-wing governments or coalitions, which included mainstream conservative parties, © The Author(s) 2020 A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1_1

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have adopted restrictive immigration policies, creating a fertile ground for the growth of populism, which in the European context refers ‘to anti-­ immigration and xenophobia’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018: 2). In Europe, populism is generally characterised as right-wing (Betz 1994; Zaslove 2004), ethnic identity oriented (Mudde 2007) and exclusionist (Betz 2001). For right-wing populists, the enemy of the people is not just elites but also ‘others’, including immigrants, Muslims and regional minorities (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 6), which are not considered as part of ‘the people’ (Rooduijn et al. 2014: 564). Europe and the world are witnessing the rise  of radical right populism (Inglehart and Norris 2016), which signals the need to provide explanations about the origins and foundations of this change. Populism and the rise of radical right in Western Europe pose challenges for mainstream parties, which ultimately influence the positions of mainstream parties on issues like immigration, contributing to the right-­ turn in European politics (Mudde 2016: 9). It has been argued that as a result of the rise of radical right, mainstream parties and politicians have resorted to populist rhetoric: When explicitly prominent outsider gains prominence, parts of establishment will react by a combined strategy of exclusion and inclusion; while trying to exclude populist actor(s) from political power, they will include populist themes and rhetoric to try and fight off the challenge. (Mudde 2004: 563)

Not being part of the governments, radical right parties nevertheless have become significant players on political arena by politicising issues like immigration, economy and security (Mudde 2013; Van Spanje 2010; Abou-Chadi 2016). Growing public support for such parties has had an impact on the strategies that mainstream parties adopted to prevent the alienation of their electorate. Political discourse and the policies of established parties have been shifting further to the right, which demonstrates the ‘right turn’ in European politics (Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012). However, while evidence points to the fact that radical right parties have an influence on the positions of the conservative parties (Schain 2006; Mudde 2013; Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012), it is not the only explanation of why conservative parties adopt more restrictive immigration policy stances and other factors also need to be considered. Electoral threat from radical right parties does not solely explain the change in conservative

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­ arties’ immigration stances (Akkerman 2015; Alonso and Da Fonseca p 2012) as ‘radical right populist parties should be seen as catalysts rather than initiators, who are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the introduction of restrictive immigration policies’ (Mudde 2013: 1). So, what explains why conservative parties adopt restrictive immigration stances, leading to tougher immigration policies in Western Europe? As immigration continues to be an important issue on political agenda, so will the need to recognise the causes and mechanisms that account for the introduction of restrictive immigration policies. This book considers the impact of radical right on conservative parties’ policy stances but offers other explanations as to why conservative parties become more restrictive on immigration. It is timely as it helps to explain the general European shift to the right through one of the key lenses: immigration. While country-­specific nuances exist, there would appear to be pan-European concerns around immigration. Among the challenges that immigration poses are economic and identity concerns as well as Europeanisation, support for which is diminishing among some EU member states and their electorates, while nation-state sovereignty in immigration matters is seen as increasingly important. Cultural and social questions have arisen as a response to the widening of the European community, linking immigration with anxiety about social security and welfare (Delanty 2008). Immigration has adopted a negative connotation in European discourse and has been linked to new social security issues. Originally it was radical right parties like Front National (FN) in France, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and others that have been spearheading welfare chauvinism, arguing for limiting immigrants’ access to social welfare benefits. Today, the popularisation of ideas linking EU, immigration, welfare and security as sources of uncertainty is not any more a distinctive feature of radical right parties but has become a key issue on the agenda of conservative parties. In order to better understand the growth of right-wing populism across Europe, this book examines the role of conservative parties in mainstreaming it. The new millennium has brought a new set of challenges that has resulted in more restrictive immigration policies. The events of 9/11 in the USA, which brought a shift in perception of certain categories of migrants, had an impact on the perception of Muslims in the Western world and contributed to the rise of Islamophobia and backlash against multiculturalism (Castles and Miller 2009). Important changes have been happening on the European arena as well. The 2004 EU enlargement

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welcomed ten new countries, which substantially increased the population of the EU. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 contributed to the already existing tensions in certain European countries like the UK, especially with regard to labour migration. Global financial crisis, which unfolded in 2007–2008 and brought recession across the world, had a negative impact on labour markets and highlighted economic insecurities, which manifested in decreasing economic growth and rising unemployment (Hemerijck 2013). This book examines the period between 2002 and 2015, depending on the country case, based on the occurrence of critical junctures in each of the countries. In Switzerland, the analysis starts from 2003, when the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) became the largest party in National Council for the first time in Swiss history and since then has significantly contributed to the evolution of the Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. In the UK, David Cameron became the leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, pledging to transform it from a ‘nasty party’ and detoxify its image but shortly abandoned this endavour. Finally, since the appointment of Nicholas Sarkozy as minister of the Interior in France in 2002, and until the end of his presidency in 2012, French immigration policy experienced substantive changes and seen the introduction of tougher integration policies, targeting primarily female Muslim population, measures designed to restrict family, student and low-skilled migration. The period, which overall covers a decade, differs within country cases, but is more or less consistent across them. As different events happened at different times in three cases, in France, the timeframe examines the period from since Sarkozy became the minister of the Interior in 2002 until the end of his presidency in 2012; in the UK, the period studied starts with the election of David Cameron as the Conservative Party leader in 2005 and finishes with the end of the Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in 2015. In Switzerland, evolution of the SVP’s immigration stance is explored from 2003, when the party made its major electoral breakthrough, until 2014, when the Initiative Against Mass Migration was accepted by the population.

Focus on Conservative Parties Whilst there has been a lot said on the radical right and their role in politicising immigration, there has been less attention paid to the rightward moves of conservative parties, despite their much greater policy importance (Bale 2008). Scholars have given considerable attention to how

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radical right parties have influenced the immigration debate (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Carter 2005; Akkerman 2012, 2015; Mudde 2013; Van Spanje 2010; Van der Brug et al. 2005), but disregarded the role of conservative parties in immigration policy change. As Bale (2008: 317) highlights: It is about time, however, that we turned the telescope around and, trained it, too, on the parties that have a more direct impact on public policy at and beyond the level of the state. In this respect, parties of the centre-right […] have enjoyed nowhere near the scholarly attention of their more radical counterparts, are an obvious point of departure.

Conservative parties have been far more important in shaping immigration policies across Europe because of their decision-making powers, being either in government or in a coalition with other parties, having a direct effect on immigration policymaking (Schain 2006; Mudde 2013: 12). While existing studies have focused more on the demand side, addressing electoral support for conservative parties, supply-side explanations that examine the right-wing parties’ positions and the reasons behind their changing immigration stances remain limited. Despite the fact that immigration has become a concern for established parties on both sides of ideological spectrum (Bale et  al. 2010; Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012; Carvalho and Ruedin 2018), this book focuses only on conservative parties, as immigration constitutes a vital part of right-wing ideology and this issue has been primarily of interest and ownership of right-wing parties in power (Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012: 3–4). Politicisation of immigration poses more electoral threat to right-wing parties because it is one of the core issues as ‘their ideological raison d’etre is to defend national security and national communitarian values’ (Akkerman 2012: 516). This is not to say that left-wing parties do not suffer from voter defection when it comes to immigration, they also experience ‘pressure from their traditional working-class constituencies to be tougher on immigration and issues of law and order’ (Zaslove 2006: 10). While immigration still remains an important issue for the left, due to ‘a tension between representing the interests of the native working-class and wider concerns about social justice’ (Duncan and Van Hecke 2008: 434), for left-wing parties, immigration is not the priority issue and they are always seen less credible on immigration compared to

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the right-wing ­parties. Conservative parties are more likely to adopt restrictive immigration choices, which makes them paramount in explaining the introduction of restrictive immigration policies across a range of European countries. The book examines immigration policymaking logics of three conservative parties: the Conservative Party in the UK, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP—Union pour un movement Populaire) in France and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP—Schweizerische Volkspartei) in Switzerland. SVP stands out as it is often described as radical right wing (Skenderovic 2009) or populist radical right (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015; Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016) because of the nature of its rhetoric on immigration, which is profoundly nationalistic; therefore, it cannot be excluded from the analysis, as it has significantly redefined Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction, both on the level of discourse and on the level of legislation. The core questions analysed in this book are as follows. First, why have conservative parties changed their immigration policy stances, which resulted in the introduction of more restrictive policies in the UK, Switzerland and France between 2002 and 2015. Second, what mechanisms account for the dynamics of policy change in three country cases and for integration policy deadlock in France. Examining labour, student and family migration, including both EU and non-EU migration, the book offers explanations of why conservative parties altered their immigration stances in a restrictive way and identifies the mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy change  in three cases and integration policy deadlock in France. Illegal immigration is not being addressed in this book as the answer to why political parties adopt restrictive positions towards illegal immigration is in part self-explanatory, while the explanation of why conservative parties introduced more restrictive approach towards legal migration routes is more puzzling. This book also touches upon integration in France and Switzerland, which belong to assimilationist citizenship regime, making integration significant in understanding the logic of immigration policymaking overall. This book does not cover the timeframe of Brexit, but digs into its origins, which are linked to anti-immigration attitudes and growing Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party, which brought Brexit onto political agenda.

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Case Selection Undoubtedly, anti-immigration rhetoric and policies are becoming more pronounced in other countries, including Germany, Italy, Hungary and Poland, but this change is only relatively recent. Brexit in the UK, the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland and support for Marine Le Pen in 2017 French presidential election point to the increased anti-­ immigration attitudes both within the political establishment and general public. All these events are the outcomes of the growing concerns over immigration, which conservative parties in these countries identified as a crucial issue much earlier, and these events represent a culmination of the concerns that parties have had on immigration for a while. In order to answer the central question of this book—What explains the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies?—most different systems design (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Anckar 2008) was chosen as a case selection strategy. The goal is to discover relevant exogenous factors (Anckar 2008: 392) that explain position change of the conservative parties on immigration. In general, three countries do not vary on the outcome (Landman 2003: 29–34; Sartori 1991: 250) and exemplify the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies, which have undergone considerable tightening between 2002 and 2015. The cancellation of the post-study work visa for international students in the UK and France, the introduction of financial requirement for spouse visa in the UK, banning the construction of minarets in Switzerland and introducing automatic expelling for non-Swiss offenders are just some examples how immigration policies have changed. Three cases have a similar outcome but differ on a number of characteristics, which might be able to partly explain the differences in conservative parties’ approaches to immigration. The UK, Switzerland and France vary with regard to two important characteristics: country’s relationship with the EU and country’s citizenship regime. The question of country’s relationship with the EU in the context of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s role in it is not new. The UK’s membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) was first questioned under the Labour government, in non-binding 1975 referendum, where the population voted to be part of the EEC. However, Switzerland not being a part of the EU enjoys some benefits such as the free movement of people and access to EU’s single market for most of its industries. Finally, France has always been a Europhile country, by and

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large having a positive stance towards the EU, being one of its core founders, viewing Europe as a platform to exert its influence (Drake 2011). Second, three countries belong to different citizenship regimes, which create opportunities or constraints for political parties to exploit identity lens in the context of immigration. While Switzerland and France can be described as assimilationist regime type, the UK belongs to a multicultural regime. Here, it is important to emphasise that although all three countries are multicultural in nature and have diverse immigration inflows, they differ in terms of their integration approach, which is largely determined by the citizenship regime. Switzerland and France both relate to assimilationist model, though with some differences. While France is a part of civic-assimilationist model, combining a ‘civic conception of citizenship and assimilationist view of cultural obligations’ (Guigni and Passy 2004: 59), Switzerland belongs to the ethnic-assimilationist model, which requires ‘assimilation to the norms and values of the national community on the ethnocultural basis and tend to exclude those who are not entitled to sharing its norms, values and symbols’ (Guigni and Passy 2004: 58). The UK differs from two other cases as it belongs to the multicultural citizenship regime, where immigrants are allowed to ‘maintain their distinctive cultures and form ethnic communities, providing they conform to national laws’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 45), which does not place integration at the centre of immigration debate, at least not until latest terrorist attacks that happened in the UK. MDSD helps to explain what accounts for immigration policy change as it aims to find shared factors (Anckar 2008: 396) that lead to this change, which helps to generalise why countries adopt restrictive immigration policies. In this book, the application of MDSD relies on both deductive and inductive logics, where some of the factors that affect party policy change are part of previous theoretical explanations while some of the factors emerge during the data analysis. This aids in providing generalisations for other cases that share similar contextual attributes. By comparing these three cases, the book explains the variance of the approaches by drawing on the similarities and differences in the evolution of immigration policy stances of conservative parties and subsequently immigration policies in the UK, France and Switzerland and the mechanisms that explain policy change or policy deadlock.

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Plan of the Book The rest of the book is organised as follows. Chapter 2 synthesises the literature on factors contributing to party policy change and the literature on causal mechanisms that account for policy change or policy deadlock. This chapter starts with a discussion of scholarship on both internal and external factors that influence parties’ positions, focusing on external tradition, arguing that it provides a more complete explanation of the change. It then moves to discuss the scholarship on causal mechanisms, which are crucial in illuminating decision-making-processes. The chapter finishes with the discussion of comparative case study method, data collection and data analysis processes. Chapter 3, the first of three case studies, explores the change in Conservative Party’s immigration stance during David Cameron’s leadership (2005–2015) and explains why the party made a U-turn on immigration policy, abandoning its ‘detoxification strategy’, which  the party adopted upon Cameron’s election as a new party’s leader in 2005. In addition to testing existent theories of party policy change, the chapter identifies one new crucial factor that led to the change in Conservatives’ immigration policy—the Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which manifested itself in the Home Office’s control over agenda setting, evidence twisting and lack of communication with other governmental departments that were involved in immigration policymaking. Framing and departmental competition were  the mechanisms that accounted for the immigration policy change. Framing enabled the Conservatives to argue for more restrictive immigration policies while both in opposition and in Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Departmental competition accounted for the restrictive character of the UK immigration policy under the Coalition government. The chapter also provides an explanation of why some interest groups like Migration Watch UK (MWUK) were more successful in lobbying the UK Conservative Party than those of the educational sector such as the Universities UK (UUK) on the issue of student migration, which was a crucial and divisive issue for the Coalition government. Chapter 4 sheds light on the change in the SVP’s immigration stance from 2003, when the party  made an electoral breakthrough, becoming the largest party in the National Council. The chapter investigates the evolution of the SVP’s immigration stance and its attempts to change Swiss immigration policy using direct democracy. It demonstrates how

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framing permitted the SVP to criticise the government on immigration and acted as an instrument for popularising its stance. However, once the SVP lost its second seat in the Federal Council (government) and the control over the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP), its ability to shape immigration policy through governmental channels diminished. The consensual model of Swiss politics provided extra-parliamentary venues for the SVP to use direct democracy, a second mechanism that accounted for immigration policy change. The chapter points out that, despite not being a member of the EU, Switzerland has been facing adaptational pressures from Europeanisation, demonstrating how anxieties related to Europeanisation led to the acceptance of the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2014, which has endangered the cooperation between Switzerland and the EU. It also explains integration policy change, which relates to the prohibition of constructing minarets in Switzerland through a lens of cultural threat. Chapter 5 focuses on the evolution of the French immigration policy during Sarkozy’s time in office, since he was appointed as minister of the Interior in 2002 until the end of his presidency in 2012. The chapter points out to a number of exogenous factors that influenced Sarkozy’s immigration stance including perceived identity anxieties of the public, which largely manifested themselves in the fear of Islam, perceived economic anxieties about family immigration and pressure from the FN. The chapter also demonstrates that the crisis impeded the success of Sarkozy’s selective immigration approach, which aimed to attract highly skilled immigration. Framing enabled Sarkozy and his party to justify immigration policy change. Institutional layering and departmental competition accounted for integration policy deadlock. Institutional layering was designed to engineer policy change but led to departmental competition within new or combined structures, resulting in integration policy deadlock and triggering further institutional change. In Chap. 6, I link the findings from the three cases and analyse the variation in causes and mechanisms of policy change across the cases. The chapter points out that the factors that influence parties’ immigration policy stances are broadly similar in three countries, but the way that they are articulated by the parties is context dependent. This variation is explained by three contextual factors: the effects of the EU integration, party competition on the right and perceived identity concerns of the public towards immigration. Parties’ immigration policy stances are shaped by the parties’ attitudes towards the EU, the type of country’s citizenship regime and the

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strength of radical right competitor. The second part of the chapter delves into the comparison of causal mechanisms and explains the differences in policymaking logics through examination of the type of democracy a country belongs to. Chapter 7, conclusion, summarises the findings of the book and points out how they contribute to a number of broader discussions that relate to party policy change pointing to the factors that shape their immigration policy positions. The book also contributes to the theorisation of the dynamics of policy change and policy deadlock, highlighting the role of the institutions in it. The book concludes with offering some avenues for further research.

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Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2013). Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What? European Journal of Political Research, 52(1), 1–19. Mudde, C. (2016). The Populist Radical Right. London: Routledge. Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. Comparative Political Studies, 51(13), 1667–1693. Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley. Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. (2009). Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Related Techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Rooduijn, M., de Lange, S., & van der Brug, W. (2014). A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic Contagion by Populist Parties in Western Europe. Party Politics, 20(4), 563–575. Sartori, G. (1991). Comparing and miscomparing. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3, 243–257. Schain, M. (2006). The Extreme-Right and Immigration Policy-Making: Measuring Direct and Indirect Effects. West European Politics, 29(2), 270–289. Skenderovic, D. (2009). The Radical Right in Switzerland: Continuity and Change, 1945–2000. New York: Berghahn Books. Van Der Brug, W., Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (2005). Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed. Comparative Political Studies, 38(5), 537–573. Van Spanje, J. (2010). Contagious Parties: Anti-immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe. Party Politics, 16(5), 563–586. Zaslove, A. (2004). Closing the Door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy. Journal of Political Ideologies, 9(1), 99–118. Zaslove, A. (2006). The Politics of Immigration: A New Electoral Dilemma for the Right and the Left? The Review of European and Russian Affairs, 2(3), 10–36.

CHAPTER 2

Explaining Causes and Dynamics of Policy Change and Policy Deadlock

In this chapter, I present an overview of the theories of party policy change and the mechanisms that explain policy change or policy deadlock. I finish with sketching out the comparative case study framework, data collection and data analysis processes. I begin by focusing on theories that explain party policy change from internal perspective, which means that the cause of the change originates from within the party. I argue that these theories cannot fully explain the change and we need to consider factors external to the party that influence party’s policy stances to explain why parties adopt specific policy positions. Internal factors are not sufficient to explain why the change is happening, as parties do not take decisions in a vacuum and, in addition to internal factors, external factors drive their policymaking logics. As Fagerholm (2015: 501) highlights: ‘the social, political and economic environment challenges the everyday life of political parties and forces them to adapt to the change. This, in turn, emphasises the need for comparative research on how, when and why political parties change their standpoints’. Where the theories that focus on exogenous factors are vague, I operationalise them into specific variables. In the second part of the chapter I focus on the literature on causal mechanisms. Unpacking the black box of immigration policymaking also requires examining the mechanisms that explain policy change and policy deadlock because it is equally important to understand not only why the change is happening, but how, or what prevents it from happening. I conclude with the discussion of the comparative case study method, elaborate on data collection and data analysis process. © The Author(s) 2020 A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1_2

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Party Policy Change: Internal Explanations One of the central questions of this book is to explain why parties change their immigration policy stances, subsequently leading to the change in immigration policies. Political parties change their policies all the time and there  are different explanations as to why this is so (Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1153). Party policy change can be explained from two perspectives: internal and external. Internal tradition emphasises that parties change their policies as a result of the changes that happen within the party, which include a change of a party leader (Downs 1957; Harmel and Janda 1994), a change in a dominant faction in the party (Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003) and electoral defeat (Harmel and Janda 1994; Budge 1994). While some postulate that a change in party leader is an important factor for producing party policy change, especially for conservative parties (Harmel et al. 1995), others (Meyer 2013) came to the conclusion that it does not lead to the change in parties’ policy stances. The studies that examined the change in the dominant faction within the party point out that in isolation neither the change in a dominant faction nor the change in a party leader causes party policy change (Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003; Fagerholm 2015). Previous electoral performance can be important for a party, but it does not necessarily cause party policy change (Adams et al. 2004; Janda et al. 1995; Harmel et al. 1995). Some studies point out that parties alter their positions as a reaction to the substantial loss of their voter base, especially if it was a recent one (Somer-­ Topcu 2009). The explanation of party policy change caused simply by internal factors is not sufficient because parties do not take their decisions in a vacuum as parties are not immune to external pressures, which affect their decision-making (Partos and Bale 2015: 604). Party policy change is also driven by the events that are happening in broader political and institutional environments, either local or/and regional. Therefore, there is a need to address factors exogenous to parties to explain party policy change. This is not to imply that the internal tradition is flawed, but to suggest that the internal tradition cannot fully explain party policy change and that the examination of factors external to the party needs to be addressed.

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Party Policy Change: External Explanations Party Competition Party competition is one of the most studied factors that make parties change their positions (Norris 2005; Meguid 2007; Schain 2006). Parties change their policies as they tend to respond to the shift(s) of rival parties (Budge 1994). Threatened by a rise of the competitor, some parties choose an accommodative strategy to prevent voter defection and maximise their vote share (Downs 1957; Laver 2005). Evidence suggests that convergence of party policy positions is higher if parties belong to the same ideological family (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 835–837). Mainstream parties tend to adopt more restrictive positions as a result of presence of anti-immigrant parties (Sides and Citrin 2007: 477) to prevent the loss of electorate. Electoral rise of radical right changed ‘the structure of the political space’ (Rydgren 2003: 46), pressuring other parties to adopt accommodative strategies (Meguid 2007). In responding to the pressures from radical right, right-wing parties have been more receptive because of their ideological proximity to competitors (Abou-Chadi 2016; Akkerman 2012); however, left-wing parties are not immune to voter alienation either when it comes to immigration (Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012; Goodwin and Ford 2017). When immigration gains salience, other parties either hold onto their positions or co-opt the positions of the competitor (Bale et al. 2010). Issues like immigration have entered mainstream politics and can no longer be disregarded by other political parties. The rise of radical right parties’ electoral fortunes, which creates subsequent threats for conservative parties, puts pressure on other conservative parties, making them go hard-line on immigration. In case study chapters, I explore if conservative parties changed their immigration stances as a response to the rise of radical right, specifically if the Conservative Party in the UK and Sarkozy in France have factored the concerns about the growing electoral rise of UKIP and FN into their immigration policymaking logics. Party competition on the right is not considered as a factor that influences SVP’s positions on immigration because there has been no radical right competitor in Switzerland that would threaten the electoral fortunes of the SVP since 2003, when it became the largest and the most popular conservative party in the country.

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Public Opinion Parties also change their policies as a response to the shifts in public opinion (Lahav 2004; McDonald and Budge 2005). There is evidence that parties move away from their policy positions, when public opinion shifts away from the party (Adams et al. 2004). While niche parties do not usually respond to change in public opinion (Adams et al. 2006), mainstream parties do (Adams et  al. 2009). Ezrow et  al. (2011) demonstrate that mainstream parties respond more to shifts in the attitudes of their supporters rather than shifts in opinion of the general public. It is important to highlight that there is a two-way relationship between public opinion and policy, meaning that they both influence each other (Page and Shapiro 1983), and sometimes it is difficult to trace whether it is public opinion that had an impact on policy development or vice versa. This book examines whether conservative parties incorporate concerns about public opinion on immigration when altering their immigration policy stances, as parties do not always change their policies, despite public dissatisfaction with it (Page and Shapiro 1983). Economic and Cultural Anxieties The influence of public opinion on party positions is important, but it gives a general picture whether parties consider it when deciding to change their immigration stances. However, which particular concerns underlie voters’ opposition to immigration? There are two main sets of threats that explain public hostility towards immigration: economic and cultural (Malhotra et al. 2013). Public attitudes on immigration have been known to be linked to economic anxieties of the population, where opposition to immigration is driven by the labour market competition, which is reinforced when immigrants are coming in (Citrin et  al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Dustmann et al. 2005; Harwood 1986; Mayda 2006). As Malhotra et al. (2013) highlight, findings in support of the economic anxieties hypothesis diverge, with some studies showing empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis (Kessler 2001; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), while others find weak support (Burns and Gimpel 2000; McLaren and Johnson 2007) to confirm it. Another factor that drives voters’ opposition to immigration is cultural threat, with some individuals arguing that immigrants endanger the traditional way of life and pose threat to national identity, as they belong to different cultures (Brader

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et al. 2008; Luedtke 2005; McDaniel et al. 2011; McLaren 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007). Without exception, existing studies demonstrate strong evidence in support of the cultural threat hypothesis (Malhotra et  al. 2013). Case study chapters explore if conservative parties changed their policies as a response to economic anxieties (labour-market competition, unemployment concerns) or as a response to national identity concerns (cultural threat, anti-Islam sentiments). Global Economic Change While within country concerns are important, parties also react to the change that is happening in a wider environment. There is evidence that conservative parties alter their policy stances as a reaction to global economic change (Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010; Fagerholm 2015; Ward et al. 2011). Political parties take into consideration both domestic and international economic situation (Hibbs 1977; Garret 1998; Pierson 2001). Economic concerns and its impact on immigration debate are salient in a way that when a country faces economic hardship, political parties, especially conservative ones, can adopt more restrictive immigration policies as a way to protect economic resources for the native population by restricting access to welfare benefits, for example. In times of economic hardship, immigration can acquire a negative connotation, when immigrants are blamed for perceived economic problems and portrayed as benefit scroungers. In this book global economic change is operationalised through the lens of 2007–2008 global economic crisis, which falls within the studied timeframe.  Case study chapters examine if 2007–2008 global economic crisis has contributed to the toughening of conservative parties’ positions on immigration. The Effects of the EU Integration The changing pace of immigration and erosion of certain boundaries between states has had an impact on immigration discourse and policies across Western Europe. As Geddes (2003: 4) pinpoints: ‘Analysis of immigration policies should be placed in the context of general changes that affect countries from within—welfare state and labour market changes, and from outside—commitments to European integration’. Even though immigration policy remains a matter largely reserved to national governments, some of its aspects like the ‘four freedoms’, which

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include free movement of people, services, goods and capital, are defined by international agreements, established by supranational bodies. The freedom of movement is especially relevant to the case of immigration as it increases intra-EU mobility, which alters the levels of migration certain countries experience. This book operationalises the changes in political and socio-­economic environment through two EU enlargements—2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements and subsequent effects of the EU integration such as the freedom of movement. EU integration is seen to have an impact on countries’ immigration policies through two EU enlargements, 2004 and 2007, when a big chunk of Eastern Europe joined the EU, increasing its population by 75 million residents (Kvist 2004: 301). These enlargements brought anxieties about the jobs and welfare concerns (Kahanec et al. 2009). Widening of the EU and increased intra-EU migration did not only bring more opportunities for EU citizens to find work in other member states, but it also brought labour market and welfare concerns. There is an emerging crisis of solidarity with Europeanisation and this is centrally about anxieties about peoplehood. With the emergence of a European political community that has diminished national sovereignty at a time when global forces are also undermining nation states, both Europe and migration became linked as sources of instability for many people. Anxieties about Europe and migration are linked with fears of a clash of civilisations and anxieties about crime and social securities. (Delanty 2008: 677)

This book explores whether anxieties related to the EU integration were driving the change in conservative parties’ immigration stances, which eventually led to the immigration policy change in three country cases. Even countries that are not part of the EU tend to face pressures from it. For example, Switzerland’s participation in the free movement of people in an exchange to the EU’s single market has been a focal point in the SVP’s immigration discourse. This book does not treat factors in isolation and explains how their interaction led to the change in conservative parties’ immigration policy stances. The change does not simply consist of a variety of conditions that produce the change but constitutes the ‘intersection of appropriate preconditions—the right ingredients for change. In the absence of any of these essential ingredients, the phenomenon—or the change—does not

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emerge’ (Ragin 1987: 25). The causes of immigration policy change are not limited to the factors derived from the literature and described in this chapter. Other factors that contribute to immigration policy change might emerge through the analysis of interview data, which brings contribution to the existing theories on party policy change.

Explaining the Dynamics of Policy Change and Policy Deadlock Causes of party position and policy change have been extensively covered in party politics literature, yet there has been less attention paid to identification of the mechanisms that explain policy change and policy deadlock (Bennett 2010; Falleti and Lynch 2008; Falleti and Lynch 2009). While the causes driving policy change have been documented, the processes that explain this change remain unclear (Afonso 2014: 568). Mechanisms are crucial in explaining how certain conditions produce a specific outcome (Mayntz 2004) and this book aims to identify the mechanisms that explain policy change or the absence thereof. There is no single agreed definition of a causal mechanism, but this book takes an approach in viewing a mechanism as a process: a causal pathway, which links causes with the outcomes (Gerring 2008: 178; Bengtsson and Hertting 2014: 4–5). It is important to note that while identifying and describing mechanisms, only specific parts of the causal process are described and the goal is to elucidate crucial details of the process by rejecting irrelevant details (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 53). Identifying causal mechanisms responsible for policy change is possible with the use of process tracing (Collier 2011; George and Bennett 2004; Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2015; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). It helps to open the black box of causality (Trampusch and Palier 2016) and figure out ‘who knew what, when, and what they did in response’ (Bennett 2010: 209), examining the change over time (Collier 1993). While some (Mahoney 2001: 580–581) postulate that mechanisms work the same in different contexts, following a deterministic approach to understanding mechanisms, others (Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1144) argue that context is crucial in explaining the change, following the probabilistic understanding of a mechanism, which means that mechanism does not always operate the same, but can work differently, depending on the context. The book views causal mechanisms as probabilistic, meaning that

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their operation cannot be predetermined and is ultimately context ­dependent (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Falleti and Lynch 2009). A probabilistic understanding of mechanisms helps to make stronger causal inferences than a deterministic one, by stressing the importance of appropriate contextualisation of mechanisms to avoid flawed causal inferences (Bengtsson and Hertting 2014; Falleti and Lynch 2009) and generalises causal mechanisms based on the context in which they operate. Below I discuss some of  the mechanisms that are pertinent to explaining party policy change. Framing Originally developed in the area of social movements, the concept of ‘frame’ originated from the work of Goffman (1974) and was later extrapolated to other areas, including  party politics and policymaking. Muller (1997) describes a frame as ‘a set of cognitive and moral maps that orient an actor within a policy sphere’. Frames are used to socially construct specific assumptions about certain groups or issues. As Bleich (2011: 60) points out: frames help actors identify problems and specify and prioritise their interests and goals; they point actors towards causal and normative judgements about effective and appropriate policies in ways that tend to propel policy down a particular path. […] frames give direction to policy making and help account for policy outcomes.

Framing represents the way political actors present their policy positions and how they articulate their views on certain issues. Framing is an argumentative mechanism that enables politicians to justify their views on specific policies as frames: function as modes of attribution and articulation. They attribute blame for perceived social problems by identifying individuals, social groups or structures that are believed to have caused the problem in question (diagnostic framing); they also suggest a general line of action (prognostic framing). (Rydgren 2005: 426)

However, political parties do not adopt frames randomly, they are careful in selecting which to choose because they are seeking to adopt the

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frame that resonates with a large number of voters in order to increase their vote share and prevent the alienation of their electorate. In Chaps. 3, 4 and 5, I explain how conservative parties framed immigration to create ground for the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies. Departmental Competition Departmental competition has been used to explain policymaking process. In a nutshell departmental competition occurs when, departments protect their own interests rather than contribute to the overall  development of a policy, creating a path-dependency  and holding their ground on specific policies (Cole and Fenwick 2003; Kavanaugh and Richards 2001; Hampshire and Bale 2015). Departments develop specific cultures of policymaking and, when working together, would oppose the change or the practices that would differ from their existing set of experiences (Kavanaugh and Richards 2001). Departments are often characterised by the ‘long held practices of protecting budgets and maintaining departmental “turf”—where a department seeks to maintain or extend the range of responsibilities—have only exacerbated the isolation of departments and in turn dissagregated governing’ (Consterdine 2018: 163). Departmentalism helps to explain not only why and how policy advances in a specific direction, but also how, at times, a policy comes to a dead end because policymakers and bureaucrats ‘see things differently from colleagues in other departments because their organizations have different objectives, ways of doing things, and because they have been socialized into thinking and acting in a different way’ (Page 2005: 143). Departmental tensions can be a result of the political relationships between actors (Suleiman 1978) where different departments want to reassure their centrality in policymaking process (Bezes 2009). The competition can also be structured by power relations within institution, where different departments have unequal policy influence because of the lack of financial resources or the lack of information to assert influence (Suleiman 1974). The competition can be aggravated by the autonomy that civil servants working in these departments acquire (Genieys 2005). Chapters 3 and 5 explain how departmental competition led to the domination of restrictive immigration policy choices in the UK and to integration policy deadlock in case of Sarkozy’s integration policy. Explaining UK immigration policy change under the Conservative-Liberal

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Democrat Coalition government, this book sheds light on why certain departments like the Home Office and the Department for Work and Pensions were able to have their policy choices to dominate. In the French case, departmental competition acted as a constraint to the development and implementation of policy, encouraging opposition between senior civil servants, ministers and their staff, who refused to cooperate, leading to policy deadlock. Institutional Layering While previously  institutional layering has been used to explain policy change (Thelen 2003; Streeck and Thelen 2005), in this book institutional layering is a mechanism that explains policy deadlock any progress on a given policy development. As institutions ‘both constrain and condition the behaviour of political actors’ (Consterdine 2015: 131), institutional change has a direct impact on a policy change or on the absence thereof. Therefore, the book examines how institutional layering, which aimed to change integration policy in France, led to departmental competition within layered institutions, creating integration policy deadlock. The essence of institutional layering is ‘the introduction of new rules on top of existing ones’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2009: 15), which affects the behaviour of the actors in that institution (Thelen 2003). While Mahoney and Thelen (2009: 17) posit that institutional layering can lead to substantial policy change, where old core is usually replaced by new core (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 31), this book argues that it is not necessarily the case and that new layers can be pushed out by the old core, leading to policy deadlock and further institutional change. In this book, institutional layering explains integration policy deadlock during Sarkozy’s time in the office, both as a minister of the Interior and as a president of the Republic.

Methods This book takes qualitative approach to opening the black box of immigration policymaking as it enables to explain not only why specific factors mattered but how they did so. Using case study method, the book sheds light on immigration decision-making by illuminating ‘why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result’ (Schramm 1971 cited in Yin 2003: 12). As the focus is on explaining the logic of conservative

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parties’ immigration position and policy changes from a structuralist perspective, emphasising the role of external factors in producing the change, the case study method is particularly suitable as it investigates the question in the context, explaining why certain decisions are made (Blatter and Haverland 2012; Hall 2003, 2008; Gerring 2007; Yin 2003). Context is operationalised through factors exogenous to a party and is crucial in explaining the variation in policymaking logics of conservative parties and the variation in the mechanisms that account for policy change. It is important to stress that the purpose of the book is to identify the factors that influenced conservative parties’ positions on immigration and not the degree to which one factor was more important than the other. Case study method also allows to unveil causal mechanisms that account for the dynamics of policy change or policy deadlock (George and Bennett 2004). Unlike statistical methods, case studies cannot determine the strength of a specific factor, but they are able to trace causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007: 44–45), which are directly relevant to answering the research questions this book raises. The aim of this book is not to produce three different explanations regarding conservative parties’ immigration stance and policy change, but to provide certain grounds for generalisation that can be tested in other cases of policy change. As process tracing is unable to yield crosscase inferences, which are important for generalisation of the findings, a comparative method is used to remedy this shortcoming and to overcome limitations associated with the generalisation of the findings produced by process tracing. As ‘single case constitutes neither the basis for valid generalisation nor the ground for disproving an established generalization’ (Lijphart 1971: 691), comparative method allows to point to the variation across the cases. Comparative method enables a systematic comparison of the factors across the cases (Collier 1993: 106). Explaining a variation is, in a nutshell, a point of comparison (Ragin 1987: 2) because by pointing out the explanation of why the variation occurs, we are able to provide causal inferences to other cases that share similar traits. While within-case inferences on why the immigration policy change occurred in the UK, Switzerland and France are important for scholars who study these countries, the aim of the book is to suggest grounds for generalisations that are important for scholars who study party policy change and immigration in general.

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Data In order to document immigration policy change, the book examines electoral manifestos of the three conservative parties and these countries’ respective immigration policies. The change in SVP’s position on immigration is evidenced by examining 2007, 2011 and 2015 federal elections manifestos, immigration initiatives launched by the SVP or by its party members, immigration laws and referendums. The evolution of the UK Conservative Party immigration stance is demonstrated with the reference to 2005, 2010 and 2015 general election manifestos and by examining immigration policies adopted under 2010–2015 Coalition government. Finally, French immigration policy change is explored through Sarkozy’s immigration laws, adopted during his time as the minister for the Interior, his 2007 and 2012 presidential programmes and integration laws that were adopted under his presidency between 2007 and 2012. The explanation of immigration policy change comes from semi-­ structured elite interviews that I conducted in the UK, Switzerland and France between 2015 and 2017. Semi-structured elite interviews allow to shed light on the logic of immigration policy change and are crucial in allowing to get first-hand accounts of certain processes and decisions (Tansey 2007: 767). They help to generate ‘unique data to investigate the complexities of policy and politics’ (Beamer 2002: 86). I conducted forty-­ five semi-structured elite interviews in the UK, Switzerland and France. The interviewees were chosen by targeted sampling. I identified the elites who belonged to the conservative parties and those who were part of the immigration policymaking process or those who exerted certain influence on political elites or on immigration decision-making. Across three cases, interviews were conducted with conservative politicians, civil servants, ministers, members of the Coalition government, special advisors and, where possible, pressure group representatives. Interviewees were contacted mostly by email, sometimes via the phone and in person during party events. While understanding that targeted sampling can cause a selection bias (King et al. 1994), it is the best strategy to explain the logic of the right-wing parties’ positions on immigration, as ‘certain categories of individuals may have a unique, different or important perspective on the phenomenon in question and their presence in the sample should be ensured’ (Robinson 2014: 32). Snowballing technique was employed at a later stage to increase the number of interviews. In Switzerland, the response rate was higher compared to the UK and, especially, compared to

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France, which was an obstacle for generalisation and had a potential to introduce ‘significant systemic error’ (Goldstein 2002: 669). This problem was, to a certain extent, offset by concentrating on the ‘degree to which non-respondents are likely to differ from those sampling units who are successfully contacted and interviewed’ (Goldstein 2002: 670). Thus, many non-respondents and refusals belonged to the same cohort of successfully targeted interviewees. All interviews were recorded and supplemented by the notes taken during the interview. Overall, the fieldwork in Switzerland and the UK has been successful in terms of getting the interviews, while in France the success was hindered by the low response rate. I briefly present some observations from conducting fieldwork in three countries, which might be useful for researchers working on similar topics in these three countries. Sketching out the peculiarities of political cultures in three cases can provide an insight into overcoming obstacles in getting access to elites and conducting interviews in different languages. In the UK, the low response rate was offset by the direct recruitment of the interviewees in person, during the Conservative Party conferences, and by networking. The UK Conservative Party conferences were a useful tool in getting access to politicians, with some of the interviews established during the conferences. Connections and knowing the right people also yielded positive results in the UK. In Switzerland, the problem with a low response rate was non-existent, as Swiss politicians were very forthcoming and a majority of them agreed for an interview straight away, which probably can be partly explained by direct democracy and openness of the Swiss political representatives to the public. Some interviews were also established through snowballing technique, which also proved successful. The language could be a definitive barrier to speaking to Swiss politicians from the French region, as most of them would not speak English or German, therefore fluency in French is advised. Swiss politicians from the German-speaking region would be more multilingual and would often be able to speak English or French. The success of getting interviews in France was hindered as, at the time of fieldwork, the Republicans (former UMP) were in the middle of primaries for the 2017 presidential election and were not particularly interested in giving interviews to academic researchers, or, at least, to the unknown foreign researchers. Targeted sampling successfully worked with French senior civil servants, while it failed with French politicians. Overall, getting interviews in France presented a bigger challenge than in the UK or Switzerland, even with researcher’s fluency in French.

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Interviews were analysed using thematic approach, which ‘allows categories to emerge from the data’ (Saldaña 2013: 1770) was used to analyse semi-structured elite interviews. Thematic approach searches for the themes in data, and these themes emerged  both deductively—from the theories of party policy change and theories of causal mechanisms  and inductively—from the raw data. During the initial level of coding, which was descriptive, I searched data for thematic explanation like party competition, or the role of economic factors in party policy change, which has been described by existing theoretical frameworks. Initially, bits of interview data, usually passages, were attributed a specific theme (Saldaña 2013; DeCuir-Gunby et al. 2011), which constituted first cycle codes that were ‘identifications of the topic’ (Tesch 1990). The codes were generated differently: some of the codes were developed from the theory (Boyatzis 1998: 33), while other codes were data-driven, meaning that they were not specified by the theory, but emerged from the raw data. These data-­ driven codes are crucial for enriching theories that explain particular phenomena (DeCuir-Gunby et  al. 2011: 138). Descriptive coding was an essential step for the second cycle analytical coding, which focused on the interpretation and analysis (Saldaña 2013; Wolcott 1994). Among different second-level coding techniques, I used pattern coding for the second cycle to search for causes and explanations (Saldaña 2013). This chapter highlights the importance of exogenous factors in explaining  policy  change. Structural explanations provide a better insight into immigration policy change, although agency-related explanations are not completely disregarded. In order to unpack the black box of immigration policymaking, it is equally important to explain the dynamics of the change, which can be achieved by tracing the mechanisms that account for the change or the mechanisms that lead to policy deadlock. The next chapter proceeds with the explanation of the UK Conservative Party’s immigration stance and why it has abandoned its detoxification strategy and introduced a number of restrictive immigration policies in the UK.

References Abou-Chadi, T. (2016). Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact. British Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 417–436. Adams, J., & Somer-Topcu, Z. (2009). Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties’ Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party

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CHAPTER 3

From Detoxification Strategy Back to ‘Nasty Party’: Explaining the Conservative’s Turn on Immigration Between 2005 and 2015

In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU. As the analysis of the vote demonstrates, immigration was the key driver of Brexit vote (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; Goodwin and Heath 2016) and Leave campaign’s slogan ‘Take back control’ was primarily about taking control over immigration (Gietel-Basten 2016: 673–674). Britain’s exit from the EU has been brought on the political agenda in 2013, when Cameron promised to hold a referendum, delivering the so-called Bloomberg speech (Clarke et al. 2017: 2). This demonstrated a stark contrast with the position of the Conservative Party that argued for softening its stance on certain issues including immigration as previously  its positions have  alienated voters (Clarke et al. 2017: 2). What has triggered this change? In order to understand this change, we need to examine the Conservative’s Party changing stance on immigration that preceded Brexit debate, where immigration has been a defining theme. The question that needs answered is what changed the Conservative Party’s mind on immigration? When David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, he came in on a platform of ‘detoxification’, pledging to change the image of the Conservatives as the ‘nasty’ party (Partos and Bale 2015: 2). Its political slogan for 2005 general election, ‘Are you thinking what we are thinking? It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’ (The Conservative Party 2005: 1, 17–18)  was not well received within the British public and the party lost 2005 general election. After being out of government for thirteen years, the Conservative Party was desperate to © The Author(s) 2020 A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1_3

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get back, and this was only possible with returning the liberal image to the party (Gruber and Bale 2014). With the election of David Cameron, the party aimed to attract broader electorate by downplaying immigration issue, but it appeared to be only temporary. The issue returned to the party’s agenda in 2007, when, during the Conservative Party conference, David Cameron gave a speech on ‘population pressure’, voicing concerns over immigration growth (BBC 2007). Further toughening of the immigration discourse and policies happened when the Conservatives returned to the office in 2010 and formed a Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Since 2010, the UK immigration policy underwent a major transformation towards tighter restrictions, representing the Conservative Party’s stance on the issue, despite the Liberal Democrats’ more liberal immigration approach. The cancellation of post-study work in 2012, the introduction of financial requirement for spouse visas, increased financial thresholds for labour migration and the introduction of National Health Service (NHS) surcharge for all non-EU and non-European Economic Area (EEA) migrants coming to the UK are just some of the examples of hostile environment of the Conservative Party on immigration. What explains this stark change in policy? Why did the Conservative Party change its tone on immigration? What were the mechanisms that enabled the Conservatives pursue restrictive immigration policies? This chapter sheds light on the drivers of the Conservatives’ shift on immigration and explores the dynamics that accounted for this change. It explains how the UK immigration policy has become numbers driven and restricted by addressing the role of the Conservative Party in immigration policymaking under the Coalition government, and also examines the change in Conservative’s stance on immigration preceding the Coalition. The chapter is organised into three sections. The first section gives a brief overview of the evolution of the UK immigration policy since the Second World War and illustrates the change in Conservative’s discourse on immigration while in the opposition (2005–2010) and while in the Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats (2010–2015). The second section sheds light on the causes behind the change in the Conservative Party’s immigration stance. The third section delves into the dynamics of the change, by elucidating the mechanisms that accounted for the domination of restrictive immigration policy choices under the Coalition government. The chapter concludes with the importance of structural explanations for influencing the party’s decision-making, while accounting for the significant role of the agency in pursuing restrictive policy choices.

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Historical Context British immigration policy has undergone a major transformation since the end of the Second World War. In the aftermath of the War, Britain relied on foreign labour to meet the demands of the economy. Majority of this labour force came from the Commonwealth, which was made easy as citizens of these countries were British subjects with unrestricted right to move and live in the UK (Hansen 2014: 201). However, this open immigration regime ended in 1962, when the British government introduced a work permit system for the Commonwealth citizens (Hansen 2014: 201). The economic crisis of the 1970s shifted the Conservative (Thatcher and Major) governments’ approach towards a more restrictive immigration policy and towards greater integration of immigrants residing in the UK (Ford et al. 2015: 1402). During Thatcher’s era, immigration was under tight control, which was evidenced by the number of work permits granted between 1973 and 1989, varying between 10,000 and 20,000 each year (Wright 2011: 49). However, the arrival of Labour government in 1997 has liberalised the UK immigration policy by introducing measures that would ‘facilitate the entry of migrant workers, which […] marked a decisive break with the previous model’ (Somerville 2007: 29). Most of immigration policy liberlisation happened between 2001 and 2005, during Blair’s second term (Consterdine and Hampshire 2014: 275, 278). Blair’s government encouraged economic immigration, both skilled and unskilled. Under Labour […] Britain’s economic immigration policy was transformed from a system underpinned by restriction to one of the most expansive in Europe: work permit criteria were relaxed, schemes such as the Working Holidaymakers programme and the Seasonal Agricultural Working Scheme (SAWS) were expanded, new highly skilled migrant worker schemes were launched and 2005 saw the introduction of a new points-based systems (PBS) modelled on the settler societies of Australia and Canada. (Consterdine 2015: 1434)

One of the major decisions taken by the Blair’s government was the decision not to impose transnational controls on the new EU member states during 2004 Eastern enlargement (Consterdine 2015). This decision was driven by the predictions that immigration from new EU member states would be very limited, varying from 5000 to 13,000 immigrants per year (Dustmann et al. 2005). However, as Consterdine (2015: 134)

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pinpoints, ‘the actual figure was over 20 times upper end of this estimate, with 293,000 A8 applicants between May 2004 and September 2005 alone’ arriving in the UK. The absence of transitional controls and large arrivals of Eastern Europeans increased public concern over immigration, resulting in the alienation of Labour voters in 2010 general election (Carey and Geddes 2010; Consterdine 2015). The opening of the British labour market to the residents of the new EU member states resulted in decreased electoral support for the Labour, with voters bringing the Conservative Party back to the office, albeit in the Coalition government.

Conservative Party’s Rhetoric in Opposition Following the victory of the Labour Party in 2005 general election, the Conservative Party realised that its hostile approach was not working. The party was unable to attract voters with openly hostile immigration approach, which was best characterised by the infamous phrase: ‘Are you thinking, what we’re thinking? It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’ (The Conservative Party 2005: 1, 17–18). In their 2005 manifesto, the Conservatives proposed to introduce a points-based system (PBS) for work migration and to set an annual cap for non-EU migration. The party went further than just imposing limits on immigration—it linked immigration to the anxieties about welfare. The manifesto underlined that: We will introduce health checks for immigrants in order to curb the spread of diseases such as TB and to protect access to our NHS. It is, after all, a national service, not a world health service. People coming to Britain from outside of the EU will be required to undergo a full medical test. And anyone settling permanently here from outside the EU will have to demonstrate that they have an acceptable standard of health and that they are unlikely to impose any significant costs or demands on Britain’s health system. (The Conservative Party 2005: 13)

Such approach did not render the party attractive to the voters. As the Conservative Party lost 2005 general election, it was clear that it needed to reposition itself on some of its core issues to broaden its electorate. Shortly after the election, the then leader of the party Michael Howard resigned and the election of the new leader was held. David Cameron was elected a new leader of the Conservative Party in December 2005. In an attempt to detoxify its image, the party had chosen to stay quiet on

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immigration, at least for a while. Conservative’s immigration stance changed in late 2007, when, at the Conservative Party conference, David Cameron delivered his speech on population pressure, stressing that immigration leads to population growth, creates various challenges, from economy to housing, and, therefore, needs to be restricted and controlled (BBC 2007). Bringing back immigration issue on the agenda was partly facilitated by the effects of 2004 EU enlargement and Labour’s decision not to impose transitional controls for new EU member states. The numbers of immigrants who were coming from Eastern member states were twenty times greater than estimated (Consterdine 2015). The closer the party got to the upcoming 2010 general election, the more it felt like its detoxification strategy was being abandoned. The Conservative Party’s rhetoric became more restrictive and included the introduction of a net migration target of ‘tens of thousands, not hundreds of thousands’ (The Conservative Party 2010: 21). Immigration approach became selective, limiting ‘access only to those who will bring the most value to the British economy (The Conservative Party 2010: 21). Recognising the failure of the Labour government to introduce transitional controls for Eastern European countries in 2004, the Conservatives insisted on the application of ‘transitional controls as a matter of course in the future for all new EU member states’ (The Conservative Party 2010: 21). In order to make the net migration target more achievable, the party proposed to introduce bonds that overseas students must pay when they start their degree, a bond that will be returned to a student upon the completion of degree and upon departure (The Conservative Party 2010: 21). The party also pledged to make post-study work procedure more complicated, not allowing students to switch from student to work visa from within the UK, but making them go to their countries to do so (The Conservative Party 2010: 21). All these measures were designed to reduce the numbers of people coming to the UK. The Conservative Party was able to resonate its concerns on immigration with the British public and returned to the government in 2010, forming a Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats.

Conservative Party’s Immigration Stance in the Coalition Government Immigration policy underwent a major transformation between 2010 and 2015, including student, family and work migration. After forming a Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, the Conservative Party

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introduced stricter rules for labour migration. In 2011, the Home Office announced the introduction of the quotas and income thresholds for highly skilled migrants from non-EU countries (The Migration Observatory 2015). A threshold of 20,700 people per year for Tier 2 general workers was established alongside the minimum pay thresholds for intra-company transfers, which were set at £24,000 for those immigrants coming to the UK for less than 12 months and £40,000 for those coming for more than one year (Metcalf 2013). Student migration was next. In April 2012, the then home secretary Theresa May announced the cancellation of the post-study work visa for students, which required students to have higher English language requirements, and curtailed students’ right to work in the UK for two years after graduating (Home Office 2011). The changes were announced in 2011 with the plan to take effect in 2012. Only those students who have a job offer from a sponsoring employer upon the completion of their degree will be able to stay, and only postgraduate students and government-­ sponsored students will be able to bring their family members to live with them in the UK (UK Government 2011). Family migration also underwent major tightening. In July 2012, the Home Office introduced a financial requirement for British citizens and residents, whose immediate family members wanted to join them in the UK for residency purposes (Home Office 2014). According to the new rules, an £18,600 threshold was put in place, meaning British citizens and non-EU residents, who want to bring their non-EU family member into the country, need to earn more than the above-mentioned income threshold per year. This selective immigration approach was introduced in order to reduce the numbers coming in and make the net migration target more achievable. The impossibility to control EU migration made non-EU migration the major target of the Conservative Party. At that time, immigration minister James Brokenshire commented: ‘We welcome those who wish to make a life in the UK with their family, work hard and make a contribution, but family life must not be established in the UK at the taxpayer’s expense and family migrants must be able to integrate’ (Home Office 2014). Non-EU migration became the major focus of the Conservatives as it was impossible to restrict migration from within the EU. However, the Conservative Party was able to address EU migration by linking it to social welfare concerns, arguing for welfare restrictions for EU migrants. In

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2014, the Department for Work and Pensions introduced new rules to limit migrant access to out-of-work benefits. From 1 of July 2014, jobseekers arriving in the UK will need to live in the country for three months in order to claim Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit. Migrant jobseekers already face a three-month wait before they can claim Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)’. Furthermore, ‘after 3 months migrants will also-have to take a stronger, more robust Habitual Residence Test if they want to claim income-based JSA; if they meet the conditions for entitlement, EEA jobseekers will only be able to get JSA, Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit for 6 months—after 6 months, only those who have a job offer or compelling evidence that they have a genuine chance of finding work will be able to continue claiming, and then only for a short period. (UK Government 2014a)

The Coalition government’s welfare approach became that of welfare nation-state (Nordensvard and Ketola 2014), redefining EU citizens’ access to benefits from universal to the one, based on the length of residency and employment status. The new rules put in place were designed to make the UK less attractive to potential migrants, which would reduce net migration levels. In addition to restricting out-of-work benefits for EU and EEA jobseekers, the government announced that starting from April 2014, EU jobseekers will no longer be able to claim Housing Benefit, apart from those EU nationals who are self-employed or in employment (UK Government 2014b). Finally, just in a month before the 2015 general election, on 6 April 2015, the Coalition government introduced the so-called NHS surcharge, which required that non-EEA nationals, coming to reside in the UK for more than six months, to pay a ‘health surcharge’ to get access to the NHS (UK Government 2015). The surcharge was also applicable to those non-EEA nationals already in the UK, who wished to apply to prolong their stay. It was to be paid for the total period of the stay and was set at £200 per year and £150 per year for students, with the whole amount paid upfront while making visa application (UK Government 2015). These key examples highlight that the detoxification strategy of the Conservative Party was abandoned closer to 2010 general election, with the manifesto listing a set of measures that would tackle different immigration subfields, including work, family and student migration. Shortly after returning to the office, the Conservative Party acted upon its promises

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and translated its discourse into restrictive immigration policies that gradually became intertwined with welfare issues. The department charged with immigration matters—the Home Office—was responsible for steering immigration policy in restrictive direction, despite consistent opposition from the Liberal Democrats. Conservative Party’s immigration discourse remained hostile before 2015 general election. Welfare anxieties linked to EU immigration were at the forefront of the party’s immigration discourse with the Conservatives pledging to control immigration from the EU by ‘reforming welfare rules’ (The Conservative Party 2015: 30). More interestingly, for the first time since David Cameron became a leader, the party openly stated the importance of putting ‘British people first’ (The Conservative Party 2015: 29). This nativist rhetoric, which is a defining feature of radical right parties and aims to prioritise native population (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990), was now part of the mainstream right Conservative Party’s discourse. The Conservatives also promised to further increase the financial income threshold for the British citizens, wanting to bring their non-EU family to the UK (The Conservative Party 2015: 30). Party’s family migration rhetoric was centred around the costs of family migrants to a taxpayer. EU immigration has continued to be reframed through social welfare lens, as the party’s proposals outlined that access to benefits, including tax credits, was to be based on length of residency (The Conservative Party 2015: 30). The party argued that EU immigrants could only claim benefits after four years of continuing residence in the UK and suggested child benefits to be cancelled for the children of EU migrants. Such rhetoric portrayed immigrants as benefit seekers, downplaying and denying their contribution to the society: ‘Instead of something-for-nothing, we will build a system based on the principle of something-for-something’ (The Conservative Party 2015: 30). Such framing of immigration issue made the Conservative Party similar to nativist parties, which tend to redefine access to welfare according to a nationalist and ethnic focus. Table  3.1 presents key positions of the Conservative Party on immigration since 2005, derived from their general election manifestos, and highlights major immigration policy changes of the Coalition government.

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Table 3.1  Conservative Party’s rhetoric on immigration and immigration policy changes under the 2010–2015 Coalition government 2005 Manifesto

2010 Manifesto

Coalition government

• 24 surveillance at • Set a cap for net border posts; migration: tens of thousands;

• Points-based system for work migration; • Annual cap for work migration (non-EU); • Popular consent for further demographic change; • Introduce TB tests to protect the NHS.

• Tighter regulations for non-EU/ non-EEA students and cancellation of post-study work visa in 2012, which allowed students to stay and work in the UK for two years after graduation; • Set an annual limit on the • Family migration was tightened: the numbers of non-EU financial requirement of £18,600 economic migrants; earning for the UK spouse; • Selective immigration: • The highly skilled migrant limit access to those who programme closed; can bring value to the British economy; • Transitional controls for • The annual limit for non-EU future EU members; migrants set at 20,700;

• Make foreign students • Increased financial thresholds for pay a bond that will be work migration; reimbursed once they finish their studies and return to their country; • Students cannot switch to • Welfare: EU jobseekers are no a different visa category longer able to claim Housing while in the UK, they Benefit since April 2014; a set of need to go back home measures restricting access to and reapply for a new out-of-work benefits, child benefit visa. and child tax credit by EU and EEA immigrants was introduced in July 2014; • NHS surcharge for non-EU migrants

What Explains the Conservative Party’s Change on Immigration? What explains the stark change in the Conservative Party’s attempt to detoxify its image as a ‘nasty party’? Change in party manifestos’ rhetoric and immigration policies under the Coalition government points to the creation of hostile immigration environment in the UK.

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Net Migration Target and Public Concerns Having been out of the government for thirteen years, the party desperately wanted to get re-elected. Immigration slowly started to return on Conservative Party’s agenda before 2010 general election, as, according to the polls, the public viewed the Conservative Party as more credible on immigration compared to Labour (Carey and Geddes 2010: 853). Public was dissatisfied with the Labour’s open immigration policy: the decision not to impose transitional controls on ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Park et al. 2013). Public concern around the effects of this decision created an opportunity for the Conservatives to act on the issue and to introduce a pledge of reducing immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ before 2010 general election. The idea of a numerical target was the invention of the right-wing interest group MWUK but the Conservative Party chose a specific number (Interview with the MWUK, 2015; Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015). As the numbers rose steadily, with the exception of a slight drop between 2012 and 2013 (see Fig. 3.1), the public started to grow hostile towards immigration, and the introduction of ‘tens of thousands’ requirement was designed to reassure the public that immigration was taken seriously by the Conservatives. The idea of achieving the net migration target underpinned the decision to introduce more selective approach to work migration, increasing the salary threshold for non-EU migrants, and the threshold for intra-­ company transfers, setting an annual cap of 20,700 on the number of highly skilled non-EU workers and closing down Tier-1 visa, which allowed highly skilled non-EU workers to come to the UK without a job offer (Metcalf 2013). The introduction of £18,600 financial threshold in the family migration domain, which was also tightened, was driven by voter alienation to UKIP. In July 2012, the Coalition government introduced a minimum income requirement of at least £18, 600, which would rise if they want to bring an additional family member (Home Office 2014). And, I suppose, you know, if you want to bring your family here, should earn sufficient income to look after them, so, otherwise, they go on benefits. And it would be strong feelings of the British people about things like that. (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2016)

As immigration was becoming a crucial issue, the Conservatives needed to stress the importance of addressing it and reducing it (Interview with a

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Fig. 3.1  Net migration to the UK (2006–2016). (Source: Office of National Statistics (2016))

former SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). Preceding 2010 general election, and throughout the Coalition government, the whole strategy of the Conservative Party was centred around pleasing the public on this issue (Interview with a former Special Advisor to a Conservative minister, 2015). The attachment to the immigration target aimed to prevent the alienation of the Conservatives’ electorate to UKIP, especially considering that net migration level had reached its highest level during the Coalition and the majority of the population was in favour of reducing it (Ford and Goodwin 2014). During the first two years, the Coalition government managed to reduce net migration from 256,000 to 177,000, but from 2013 onwards immigration numbers were on a steady rise reaching 332,000—its highest level in the UK history (Office for National Statistics 2016; see Fig. 3.1). The inability of the government to lower immigration levels was continuously exploited by the right-wing media, which kept immigration at the top of the agenda.

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Government is far too influenced by the Daily Mail, papers like that. I have seen the political advisers trying to please the Daily Mail and trying to get the right stories and responding to the public concern. And they have far more impact on the government that they should, at least on this government. (Interview with the senior Home Office civil servant, 2016)

The influence of right-wing pressure groups like the MWUK and right-­ wing media steered the development of UK immigration policy in a more restrictive direction as the party did not want to lose its credibility on immigration, as it happened with the Labour government, which has been repeatedly attacked by the MWUK because of the high immigration numbers (Hampshire and Bale 2015). No, Cameron was frightened if he got the wrong side of Migration Watch, Migration Watch would tell the big newspapers and then who would then attack him. (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016)

The idea of the net migration target was also designed to discourage alienation of the Conservative Party’s electorate to the UKIP. And that’s why we thought about the idea of limited net migration for each year, just to try to establish some level of control because it felt like immigration was uncontrolled and that had very bad social consequences. […] And the other thing, is to discourage the growth of parties on the extremes. (Interview with the former Conservative minister, 2015)

Since 2010, UKIP’s rise has alarmed both left- and right-wing British political parties. However, ideological proximity made the Conservative Party particularly vulnerable to the defection of their voters to the radical right UKIP. The growing concern about UKIP began to accumulate at the time when the Conservatives were in the Coalition government. Even though first past the post electoral system kept UKIP away from Westminster, their electoral support grew slowly, but steadily, between 2001 and 2010, doubling in almost all UK regions (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 87). If before 2010 the UKIP faced internal conflicts and electoral failures, since then and until the Brexit referendum, it has transformed into a significant contender for mainstream parties. Indeed, ‘having overcome a series of false starts and vicious civil wars, it was only in 2010 when the party began to emerge as a cohesive and serious political organization’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 97). The Conservative Party’s stance on

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immigration started to become more stringent, particularly while in government, which was related to the concerns about UKIP’s growth (Partos and Bale 2015: 4). And the net migration target was one way to go about fending off pressure from UKIP and reassuring the public. The Home Office acted as an ideological machine, framing immigration in a light that would enhance party’s credibility on the issue. Fiona Cunningham and Nick Timothy, who were Theresa May’s special advisors in the Home Office, consistently tried to show the party’s success on the issue, highlighting that ‘Immigration numbers are falling because our reforms on immigration are working’ (Interview with a former Home Office civil servant, 2015), despite the fact that numbers were hardly going down (see Fig.  3.1). The decrease in immigration numbers that they were describing did not correspond to real immigration figures. The Coalition government was able to decrease the numbers from 263,000 in June 2011 to 182,000 September 2013, but since then the net migration level was on a steady increase (Office for National Statistics 2016, see Fig. 3.1) primarily due to a lack of control over EU migration. The Home Office created an impression that their policies were working to address public concerns on immigration. As highlighted by one of the senior civil servants working with May, it was ‘more about impression rather than about doing things right’ (Interview with a Home Office civil servant, 2016). Knowing that they are unlikely to achieve reducing immigration to tens of thousands, the Home Office and the Conservative Party could only create a discourse on making progress on immigration. Virtually all immigration policies adopted under the Coalition government were attached to the immigration target to please the public (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). The Conservative Party determined to maintain the hardline on immigration as it did not want to repeat the mistake of the Liberal Democrats, who, by abandoning their pledge on opposing the tuition fee rise, as a result were completely wiped out by the Tories in South-West England (Merrill 2015). Having similar concerns about net migration target, the Conservative Party decided to stick to its pledge, which underpinned their more restrictive immigration stance between 2010 and 2015. I think the other factor was that Liberal Democrats, my party, lost a lot of popularity because they made the pledge about student tuition fees and abandoned it. And Cameron saw what happened and he realised that he has made a pledge about immigration numbers and he did not want to be seen

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to abandon a pledge that he made in the election. (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 2016)

Preoccupation with achieving the net migration target was a backbone of the UK immigration policymaking, and the Home Office played a crucial role in defending this electoral pledge despite the fact that its position did not always reflect the evidence (Interview with the senior Home Office civil servant; Interview with the UUK, 2016; Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). This not only resulted in ideological rather than evidence-based approach to immigration but also created a sense of frustration within the party, because a lot of Conservative MPs viewed the target as damaging for the British economy. Social Welfare Lens During the Coalition government, the Department for Work and Pensions introduced new rules on the distribution of welfare benefits for EU migrants. The rules limited EU migrants’ access to benefits by introducing a three-month residency requirement for Jobseeker’s Allowance, Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit (UK Government 2014a). The government also announced that from April 2014, all EU jobseekers will no longer be able to claim Housing Benefit (UK Government 2014b). The Coalition government redefined access to benefits from means-tested to residency-­ based, to lower the attractiveness of the UK for potential migrants. It also introduced an NHS surcharge for non-EU nationals coming to reside in the UK for long term just a month before 2015 general election (UK Government 2015). Having underestimated the pace of immigration from Eastern European countries, in 2007, the Labour government put in place seven-year transitional controls for Bulgaria and Romania to access the UK labour market, but it was too late to give them credibility on the issue. The Conservative Party used 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements to frame immigration issue around economic anxieties over jobs. The Conservative Party capitalised on these concerns by arguing for the introduction of more restrictive policies for the EU migrants, by redefining their access to welfare, which would limit the attractiveness of the UK labour market for potential migrants from the EU. The preoccupation of the Conservative Party led to linking immigration to social welfare concerns.

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They come here for work and they pay their taxes and contribute… However, if you have a small percentage that are not, but that small percentage itself is a large number, then it becomes an economic problem. It’s a drain on public finances. So, the numbers do matter and that’s the sort of truth when it comes to immigration policy. (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015)

This redefined access to welfare benefits for EU immigrants was a result of electoral pressure the party faced from the UKIP (Interview with a Conservative MP; 2015; Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2016). The Conservatives tried to prevent the defection of its electorate to UKIP by adopting an accommodative strategy (Meguid 2007), especially during the Coalition government, when UKIP’s popularity continued to grow. The Conservative Party did not just stop there, it went further with David Cameron promising to hold a referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU. And, in truth, once you declare the referendum, it kinda shoots UKIP’s fox because UKIP only exists to leave Europe. (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2016)

Linking immigration to welfare was particularly visible during the Brexit debate and was designed to reduce migration coming from the EU.  It was driven by the concerns of voter alienation, especially those working-class voters, who felt dissatisfied with the fact that immigrants’ access to welfare benefits was means-tested rather than contributory (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015; Interview with a Conservative MP, 2016). It is more a symbol rather than anything else. I think there is a very strong view, I mean the Home Office know that there is a very strong view, particularly amongst working class English people, British people generally that those, who haven’t been born here, those, who are not citizens of this country should not be getting benefits from taxes raised in this country. (Interview with former Home Office civil servant, 2015)

Despite the Department for Work and Pensions’ report (2012) that foreign-born people are less likely to claim benefits than British people, the Home Office and the Conservative Party continued to link immigration to welfare concerns, portraying immigrants as benefit-seekers. As the

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party was unable to control the EU migration, which made achieving the net migration target impossible, they decided to redefine welfare access to render the UK less attractive to potential migrants coming from the EU. Even though Liberal Democrats tried to act as a consistent brake on Conservative Party’s immigration proposals and policies, they supported the curtailment of welfare benefits for immigrants, as they were also cautious about voter alienation. People here get very angry when they read that some Polish people have been here, working here and then they get back to Poland and they get family allowance and it creates a lot of anger. So, and I think you have to deal with that kind of abuses, otherwise you lose the public. (Interview with the head of BIS, Vince Cable, 2016)

The intersection between welfare and immigration emerged partly as a response to the inability to manage EU migration, and more restrictive rules on accessing benefits for EU citizens aimed to discourage potential immigration to the UK (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015). Despite the lack of evidence on the subject of the so-called EU benefits-tourism, the Conservative Party ‘switched their attention to it because they knew they could do something about it’ (Interview with the head of BIS Vince Cable, 2016). As they were unable to stop the free movement of people, they choose to argue for welfare nation-state (Nordensvard and Ketola 2014), adopting an accommodative strategy on welfare (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2014) towards UKIP.  The Conservative Party argued for making access to welfare residence based (in terms of length) rather than means-tested. The Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which meant that the Home Office was putting ideology before the evidence, also had a profound impact on the issues of the so-­ called welfare tourism. Theresa May argued for the redefinition of access to welfare for EU migrants despite the evidence that EU migrants were less likely to access benefits than British citizens (Department for Work and Pensions 2012). This became a salient point in the Conservative Party’s immigration policy and took a central role in the Brexit debate that followed.

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The Origins of Brexit: Economic Anxieties About Labour Migration The initial abandoning of Conservative Party’s detoxification strategy in 2007 was connected to the effects of 2004 EU enlargement and Labour’s decision not to impose transitional controls on new EU member states. The underestimation of EU immigration by the Labour government and public dissatisfaction with it was taken by the Conservatives as an opportunity to pursue a restrictive discourse on EU migration as the party was unable to restrict intra-EU migration because of the free movement of people (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015). The absence of transnational agreements with Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 had an impact on Labour’s credibility on immigration (Mulvey 2011: 1486), which also increased public concerns on the issue (Evans and Chzhen 2013: 155). After 2005 the arrival of hundreds of thousands of A8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia— author) countries, particularly Poles, obviously. These three things came together, so immigration became an enormous crisis. (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015)

The effects of the EU integration, which manifested themselves in the EU enlargements and the arrivals of labour from new EU member states, underpinned the adoption of restrictive immigration discourse, which eventually led to declaring Brexit referendum in 2013. The party argued that the lack of control over EU migration resulted in large numbers of labour migrants coming to the UK, which created economic anxieties and unemployment concerns and posed a challenge in achieving a net migration target. Despite tightening non-EU immigration, overall net migration numbers did not go down because intra-EU migration could not be restricted. In addition to unlimited intra-EU migration, the Conservative Party viewed Eurozone crisis as a critical juncture that reinforced labour market anxieties, creating a sense of insecurity and called into question the ability of the British economy to satisfy the demand (Interview with a Conservative minister, 2015; Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015; Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). The Conservative Party argued for the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies as a result of

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Fig. 3.2  EU-15 migration to the UK (2006–2016). (Source: Office of National Statistics (2016))

the Eurozone crisis, which affected southern European states and resulted in an increased inflow of Italians, Spanish and Greeks, who came to the UK in search of employment (Interview with the Conservative MP, 2015; Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). While the numbers of migrants from original EU-15 did indeed rise in 2008 (see Fig. 3.2), the overall intra-EU migration fell sharply during the crisis, from about 127,000 to 63,000  in 2008 and to 58,000  in 2009 (Office for National Statistics 2016, see Fig. 3.3). According to the Conservative Party’s logic, the increasing number of workers coming from these countries and the inability to control intra-EU migration presented an obstacle for them to achieve tens of thousands migration target (Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015; Interview with a Conservative minister, 2015). As one former Conservative minister pointed out:

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Fig. 3.3  EU migration to the UK (2000–2014). (Source: Office for National Statistics (2016)) The biggest simple thing that could happen that would enable the British government to hit the immigration target would be a widespread recovery of the Eurozone and the capacity of the governments of those countries to create jobs for the young residents. (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015)

The Home Office also argued that high levels of immigration contributed to the displacement of British workers on the labour market, while there was little support for this argument (Manacorda et  al. 2011). As economic analysis demonstrates, EU workers have contributed more to the UK economy than they have taken out and it was the 2008 recession that contributed to the decrease in wages (Wadsworth et al. 2016). The Home Office exercised strict control over releasing the evidence that would not correspond to their immigration policy stances.

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I think there were ten—twelve studies. One of them showed that there was some displacement, in fact, particularly in periods of recession and low-paid workers. The others did not show the displacement, in fact. But what happened was propaganda war: the Home Office released the one study that suited their arguments. We got this summary of research and I pressed for it to be published. The home secretary refused to allow it to be published because it showed the wrong conclusions. Then they leaked to the newspapers the one study that showed what they wanted to show. (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 2016)

Despite the fact that the Home Office has been repeatedly insisting that intra-EU immigration, particularly low-skilled migration from Eastern Europe, had an effect on lowering the wages, there was little evidence to support this argument (Interview with the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) David Metcalf, 2015). Student Migration In 2012, the then home secretary Theresa May announced the closure of post-study work route that allowed international students to stay in the UK for two years upon the completion of their degrees (Home Office 2011). The Home Office argued that there was little benefit of students staying as they were working in low-skilled jobs rather than getting highly skilled work, thus, bringing little benefit to the UK economy. So, what underpinned this change? It was a combination of labour market concerns, fear of UKIP and the aim to achieve net migration target that was driving the changes on student migration. The Conservative Party tried to limit the numbers of those entering British labour market by closing the post-study work visa in 2011, arguing that graduates were taking low-­ skilled jobs (Interview with the UUK, 2016; Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015). As student numbers were included into the net migration figure, the Home Office, headed by Theresa May at that time, had major incentives to reduce student migration in order to achieve net migration target. The Home Office’s refusal to take international students out of the net migration target was driven by the concern about UKIP (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable 2016; Interview with a former SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). During the Coalition government, UKIP started to become a serious contender (Ford and Goodwin

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2014), and removing international students from the net migration target would have been detrimental to the Conservative Party as it promised to get immigration numbers down. The preoccupation of the Conservative Party with the net migration target was a response to constant criticism of the Tories by UKIP. [O]ne of the arguments you got back was ‘No, because this will encourage, because people who would otherwise vote Conservative would go to UKIP’. (Interview with a former SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015) I think they worried, the Tories, before the last election. They seem to be… In truth, in the general election they lost one, but they got the other, but they still have got eleven per cent vote. But I don’t think all the votes are taken away from Tories, but I think more votes were taken away from Tories than from Labour. So, certainly that is the part of the factor. (Interview with the senior Home Office civil servant, 2015)

The idea of achieving a net migration target underpinned the Home Office’s decision to close the post-study work visa, despite the suggestions from the MAC of making it more selective rather than completely shutting it down (Interview with chair of the MAC David Metcalf, 2015). Interestingly, UKIP themselves did not support the inclusion of students into the net migration target. But the exclusion of students from the net migration target would not allow to bring immigration down to tens of thousands, which would undermine Conservative’s pledge and possibly lead to the defection of some of its electorate to radical right UKIP. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), headed by liberal democrat Vince Cable, and the Ministry for Universities and Skills, headed by Conservative David Willetts, fought hard to get students out of the net migration target and lift the restrictions on post-study work visa. However, Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which meant control over immigration agenda setting and evidence, had a profound impact particularly on student migration, which is demonstrated by the battles between the Home Office and the BIS.  Control over agenda setting allowed the Home Office to keep students in the net migration target as Theresa May would not commission the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) to conduct any work on the issue, knowing that it would show that student migration was beneficial for the economy (Interview with the UUK, 2016; Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable,

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2016; Interview with the chair of the MAC, David Metcalf, 2015). Student migration represented the biggest migration route, accounting for approximately a half of overall net migration between 2010 and 2013, and remaining the biggest inflow compared to family or work migration between 2014 and 2015 (Office for National Statistics 2017; Sumption and Vargas-Silva 2019). Therefore, producing any kind of positive evidence on the issue would be detrimental for the Home Office because it would limit the chances of reducing migration to tens of thousands. The home secretary only asks the MAC the questions that she wants to. For example, there are other things that MAC has not been asked to do, but which could be really helpful for it to do. So, something like asking the MAC to conduct the analysis of the benefits of internationals students for the UK, taking in to account the costs as well, but also what is the overall benefit at a national level. But this is the question the home secretary is not going to ask because it doesn’t correspond to her objectives. (Interview with the UUK, 2016)

The Home Office and Theresa May only allowed the evidence in support of the Home Office’s immigration line to be made public, while the evidence that would contradict the Home Office’s position would not be commissioned or made public (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016; Interview with the UUK, 2016; Interview with a former special adviser to a Conservative minister, 2015). The lack of communication between the home secretary and other governmental actors was another feature of Home Office’s ideological dogmatism that underpinned the introduction of restrictive stance on student migration. The Home Office’s immigration policymaking approach was characterised as top down, highlighting the absence of effort of the home secretary Theresa May to have a collection discussion of immigration policy with the cabinet. This lack of discussion and collective approach to immigration created a sense of frustration within the Conservative Party. I still remember the day, when one of the ministers came into our office and said: ‘Theresa May just announced a new policy on immigration: reducing it to tens of thousands. And I asked ‘What does it mean for students?’. And none of us knew what it meant for students because the policy doesn’t seem

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to have ever been discussed collectively by the cabinet. And I think the whole problem stems partly from that. (Interview with a SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015)

Pro-immigration groups such as the UUK were unable to exert as much influence on the government, as their agenda on immigration did not correspond to the agenda of the Home Office. The attempts of the UUK to get international students out of the net migration target were ineffective because of the Home Office’s strong attachment to getting immigration down to tens of thousands. Despite the support of the BIS, the UUK was unable to lobby this, as the issue was too politically important for the Home Office (Interview with a SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). Taking students out of the net migration target would mean backing down on their electoral pledge, which the Conservative Party could not afford. However, the UUK was not completely unsuccessful in its effort to liberalise student migration. With the support from the BIS, the UUK managed to get some concessions from the Home Office by preventing the introduction of a cap on international students and the introduction of tougher language requirements for migrants (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016; Interview with the UUK, 2016; Portes 2015).

Dynamics of Policy Change Having explained the logic of immigration policy change, we need to delve into the dynamics of this change. How did it happen? Two mechanisms accounted for the change in the Conservative Party’s immigration approach: framing and departmental competition. While framing of immigration in a negative light was a prerequisite for the party to opt for more restrictive policy choices, departmental competition allowed more restrictive policy choices to dominate. This competition between governmental departments did not limit itself to two Coalition partners, but the differences in policy choices occurred between the departments led by the Conservatives. The Home Office and Theresa May were responsible for creating hostile immigration environment throughout the Coalition government and had a significant voice of framing immigration in a negative light.

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Framing Since 2007, immigration issue started to accrue a negative connotation in Conservative Party’s immigration discourse. The Conservatives used diagnostic framing (Snow and Benford 1988: 200–201) to establish that immigrants and growing levels of immigration were bad for British society because they were bringing more anxieties about social welfare and jobs. Prognostic framing, which suggested the general line of action that needed to be taken to deal with these issues (Snow and Benford 1988: 200–201), was present in party’s general election manifestos. Throughout the Conservatives’ time in the Coalition government, the party reframed sociocultural cleavage (immigration) through the lens of the economic one (welfare). Immigration was politicised by the Conservatives through the concepts of social policy like ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990), which meant restricting full welfare access to British citizens. Even though the Conservative Party has not campaigned for complete denial of benefit access for immigrants, it has repeatedly argued for restricting access to welfare entitlements based on the length of residency and contribution. The Conservative Party repeatedly described immigrants as ‘a drain on the British social welfare system’ to please the public (Interview with a Conservative MP, 2015; Interview with a Conservative minister, 2015). The Home Office was often driven more by politics rather than by evidence (Interview with the senior Home Office civil servant 2015; Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016). Nick Clegg admitted that the home secretary was framing immigration in ideological way, disregarding the evidence: She kept saying there was this terrible ‘abuse’ of freedom of movement, when simply describing EU citizens exercising their right to come and work in the UK.  They tried to insert statistics suggesting the number of UK citizens living and working in other EU countries was half a million lower than any other mainstream estimate. (Clegg cited in Asthana and Hattenstone 2016)

Special advisors to Theresa May acted as framers, who had considerable power and were responsible for framing immigration in a light that was showing the successes of the Home Office’s policies even though it was not always the case. Nick Timothy and Fiona Cunningham decided on the content of her immigration speeches and often had the last say in them.

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Because they were not interested in getting things right, they just wanted to do it the way they wanted. A lot of time, I think Theresa May knew directly what they were doing and they were thinking they were entitled to the decisions because they were working for her. They always wanted me to put the phrase ‘immigration numbers are falling because our reforms on immigration are working’. Political policies are about trying to persuade people that things are happening when they aren’t really happening. (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015)

However, their influence on Theresa May was only on the level of political discourse but did not affect any major policy decisions (Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2015). Framing was the only mechanism for the Conservative Party while it was in opposition because the party did not have any decision-making powers. But once the party got back to the office and formed a Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, then, in addition to framing, the competition among governmental departments shaped the UK immigration policy, allowing more restrictive policy choices to dominate. Departmental Competition The competition between governmental departments shaped the UK immigration policy under the Coalition government  and explained the domination of restrictive immigration policy choices. In a nutshell, it meant that different government departments had different views on how the UK immigration policy should look like. Departments ‘see things differently from colleagues in other departments because their organizations have different objectives, ways of doing things’ (Page 2005: 143). These differences in policy choices among departments are explained by the fact that ‘departments have, over time, developed an organizational culture and a set of practices that are resistant to change’ (Consterdine 2018: 162). In the Coalition government, the clashes were not only between the departments headed by Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats but also between the departments headed by Conservatives. The departments that had more resources were able to pursue their immigration agendas, which resulted in the introduction of restrictive immigration policies. Resources, it should be said, do not simply imply financial capital the departments had in their disposition, but rather the political authority, support and decision-­ making powers that they possessed.

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The competition between government departments took a shape of consistent security-economy debate and was reflected in the major tensions between the Home Office and the BIS. The BIS made numerous efforts to neutralise Home Office’s restrictive immigration policies, however, with limited success. It prevented the introduction of a cap for international students and the introduction of more advanced English language requirements (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS, Vince Cable, 2016; Interview with the UUK, 2016). Being a smaller coalition partner restrained immigration choices of the Liberal Democrats, as they had less leverage, but, at the same time, being part of the coalition, allowed the Liberal Democrats to act as a brake on some of the policies proposed by the Conservative Party and the Home Office. The lack of communication between the home secretary and other governmental departments led to numerous tensions and misunderstandings, particularly on student migration, not only between Coalition partners but also among the Conservative Party MPs (Interview with a SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2015). Prime minister’s patronage on immigration policy allowed the Home Office and the home secretary to pursue restrictive policy choices. The policy on including international students in the net migration target demonstrates how restrictive policy choices happen to dominate over more liberal ones. The tensions between economic-driven BIS and the Treasury, on the one hand, and the ideological Home Office, on the other hand, highlighted the diversity in policy preferences between the departments. Even though ‘outside the Home Office, the most influential department involved in economic immigration policy was the Treasury’ (Consterdine 2018: 169), in case of the UK immigration policy under the Coalition government, the Treasury had limited success in preventing the introduction of more restrictive policy choices. The Treasury ‘raises the questions about what it is in the taxpayer’s interest’ (Chapman 2002: 164), and this should give Treasury substantial say in economic immigration policymaking. However, Treasury’s ‘persuasion and influence’ (Chapman 2002: 160) did not help in getting students out of the net migration target as politics, but not economics, drove the immigration policy change of the Conservatives. The BIS, led by the Liberal Democrat Vince Cable, alongside the Ministry for the Universities and Skills, led by a Conservative minister David Willetts, fought to get international students out of the net target. Despite the support from the Treasury and the Chancellor George Osborne, the BIS and the Ministry for the Universities

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and Skills could secure their immigration views to dominate because of institutional constraints like being outvoted on the issue at the cabinet meetings (Interview with a SPaD to a Conservative minister, 2016). The ideas of the Home Office and the home secretary dominated as they had the prime minister’s patronage, which gave the home secretary the authority to pursue a hardline immigration policy and create hostile immigration environment. The Home Office has control over immigration, but actually David Cameron and Number 10, he is the prime minister, you know, he could sack Theresa May if he wanted to. Number 10 got really frustrated […] saying that “why are you lobbying Number 10 not to support the Home Office? It’s prime minister’s job to support the Home Secretary”. (Interview with a former Conservative minister, 2015)

Even though the option of the cabinet to outvote the Home Office and the home secretary existed, it was prime ministerial patronage that made the control mechanisms like full cabinet less likely to have been used. The prime minister and the home secretary acted as a unified front, and even if disagreements between them existed, they were not made public. Despite the opposition to some immigration policies not only from the Liberal Democrats but also from Conservative politicians like David Willetts and George Osborne, prime minister’s patronage allowed the home secretary to pursue her restrictive immigration approach. Finally, the malfunctioning of control mechanisms allowed the home secretary to pursue her line on immigration. Although consequential migration policy changes required a collective discussion within the government, the mechanisms that could have prevented the implementation of certain policies or ideas were not viable. And if the Home Office wants a really big migration change, it still has to get a collective sign off even though it has sole control over policy, there is still a mechanism, where it has to tell the other bits of government. […] I spoke to someone who used to be on the Home Affairs committee, the former minister and he said: “Theresa May would bring those ideas to Home Affairs committee and everybody there would say it’s a bad idea and she will just get back to the Home Office and do it anyway because there isn’t really a mechanism for checking”. (Interview with a SpAD to a Conservative minister, 2016)

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Immigration policies could have been even more restrictive if the Liberal Democrats did not act as a consistent brake on the policies the Home Office and the home secretary wanted to pursue. Liberal Democrats’ major gains on immigration were in the field of student migration. They prevented the introduction of quotas for international students and the introduction of higher English language requirement for international students, which the Home Office lobbied for (Interview with the secretary of state for BIS Vince Cable, 2016; Interview with the UUK, 2016; Interview with a senior Home Office civil servant, 2016). The Home Office compromised on certain issues because the Liberal Democrats could not be completely ignored by the Conservatives as they were in the Coalition government. The major institutional constraint for Liberal Democrats was their position in the Coalition government as a minor partner, making it likely for them to be outvoted in cabinet discussions. Certain compromises were made, but the Conservative Party changed the UK immigration policy in a  restrictive direction despite the opposition from the Liberal Democrats.

Conclusion Changes in immigration stance of the Conservative Party and subsequent UK immigration policy change are explained by taking into consideration the importance of public opinion, the rise of the UKIP, perceived economic anxieties of the public over immigration and the effects of the EU integration. These factors underpinned the introduction of tougher rules for work, family and student migration. Free movement of people and unlimited migration from the EU led the Conservative Party to adopt restrictive discourse on the EU migration and introduce a number of rules that restricted EU citizens’ access to some of the welfare benefits, which eventually resulted in declaring Brexit referendum. Throughout the Coalition government, immigration policy was driven more by political dynamics rather than by economic need. The Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which manifested itself in the control over agenda setting, evidence twisting and lack of communication among governmental departments, was instrumental in pursuing more restrictive immigration stance. It allowed the home secretary to steer immigration policy in the direction suitable for the Home Office, which signalled that its approach was not evidence based, but was driven by political considerations, underpinned by reducing the net migration target by all means. The chapter

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demonstrates that in addition to exogenous factors, agency  was also important in determining policy change. And not only the agency of political parties, but the agency of governmental departments like the Home Office was responsible for immigration policy. Home Office’s ideological dogmatism was essential in explaining why the Conservative Party adopted a restrictive immigration approach whilst in the Coalition government. The Home Office and the home secretary adopted ideological rather than evidence-based approach on immigration. The Conservative Party, the Home Office and the MWUK framed immigration in a restrictive light, blaming immigrants for labour market and welfare anxieties. The competition between governmental departments accounted for the domination of more restrictive policy choices. Numerous tensions unfolded between the Home Office and the BIS, especially on student and labour migration. Driven by reducing immigration to the tens of thousands, the Home Office was at odds not just with its junior Coalition partner but also with the departments headed by Conservative politicians, including The Treasury and the Ministry for the Universities and Skills. Home Office was successful in pursuing their hard line immigration approach as it had prime minister’s patronage, which allowed it to steer the policy in their direction. The Liberal Democrats as a coalition partner had certain leverage on decision-making, but it was much less than they expected to have had.

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CHAPTER 4

Immigration Policy and the SVP: Resisting the EU and Fighting Switzerland’s So-Called Islamisation

On 9 February 2014, the Swiss voted in favour of the Initiative Against Mass Migration. The initiative was launched by the national conservative populist SVP and aimed to restrict immigration from the EU, undermining the free movement of people and Switzerland’s relationship with the EU. In order to explain these changes in the Swiss immigration policy, one needs to examine how immigration came to be a major concern for the Swiss by exploring SVP’s role in raising salience of immigration in Switzerland. SVP, which played a key role in the success of the Initiative Against Mass Migration, has always been a proponent of limiting migration, maintaining a strong Eurosceptic stance since Switzerland’s accession to the EU entered Swiss political agenda in mid-1980s (McGann and Kitschelt 2005: 152). Immigration has become a core issue on the SVP’s agenda in 1990s, shifting party’s position towards a more radical direction, which yielded substantial electoral gains (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2007: 93–94). The party has been a central actor in the Swiss immigration debate in the last twenty years, especially since its major electoral breakthrough in 2003, when it gained the biggest number of seats (56) in the Swiss Parliament—National Council (Office Fédéral de la Statistique 2007). Electoral rise of the SVP gave the party ‘ability to take control of the national political agenda’ (Albertazzi 2008: 100), increasing the salience of immigration, which became a major topic of Swiss political debates (Skenderovic 2009).

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The case of Swiss immigration policy stands out from other European countries due to a number of features. First, not being a member of the EU, Switzerland forms a relationship with the EU through a set of bilateral agreements, which not only gives Switzerland more freedom from the EU as if it was a member state but also imposes certain obligations such as the free movement of people. Second, the uniqueness of the Swiss political system of consensual democracy allows for the voices of smaller parties and groups to be represented while direct democracy makes the voices of the population heard, permitting smaller parties to have an influence on the policymaking process. As Afonso (2005: 656) pinpoints: ‘Every legal change proposed by the government is dependent upon the approval of all potential veto players who could launch a referendum, which makes the state only weakly autonomous vis-a-vis societal interests’. Third, Switzerland has one of the highest shares of foreigners relative to its population, which is approximately twenty-five per cent (Office Fédérale de la Statistique 2018), making immigration an issue that cannot be disregarded. Since the 1960s, the Swiss population has grown from over five to over eight million people, mostly through migration (Nguyen and Mariani 2014). Finally, the country’s strong economy with lower unemployment rate of 4.7 per cent compared to the European average (OECD 2019) is still largely dependent on foreign labour, yet immigration remains a concern for the Swiss voters, as highlighted by the acceptance of the Initiative Against Mass Migration. This chapter proceeds as follows. The first part explores Swiss-EU relations, highlighting the cornerstones in their development and sketches out the idiosyncratic features of the Swiss political system. Then the chapter proceeds with the examination of the SVP’s immigration stances and with the examination of the immigration policy change. Third section addresses the factors that led the SVP to campaign for more restrictive immigration policies. The final section sheds light on the mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy change in Switzerland.

Immigration to Switzerland and Switzerland’s Relationship with the EU In recent decades, Swiss immigration policy has undergone major transformations, pointing to the increased concerns over immigration (Manatschal 2015: 23). Labour migration started to grow in 1950s during postwar economic expansion, almost tripling in 1970s (Piguet 2013: 23).

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Immigration growth led to the increase in anti-immigration attitudes, which was demonstrated by the Schwarzenbach Initiative in 1970 that aimed to restrict immigration to Switzerland but was rejected by a narrow margin (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006: 1701). The arrival of 1970s oil crisis led to the economic downturn and the outflow of economic migrants from Switzerland, keeping the unemployment rate low throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Afonso 2005: 654). However, in the beginning of the 1990s, unemployment became a problem for Switzerland as unskilled guest workers faced challenges in finding employment (D’Amato 2014: 311). At that time, the SVP’s immigration rhetoric started to become increasingly hostile, which contributed to the party’s electoral rise, with the SVP doubling its support in the 2003 federal election and becoming a truly national party (Bühlmann et al. 2006: 3). This victory allowed the SVP to negotiate the ‘magic formula’, which refers to the ‘distribution of seats in the Federal Government to the four main parties (2 FDP, 2 CVP, 2 SP and 1 SVP)’ (Vatter 2016: 63) by taking a second seat in 2003 (Burgos et al. 2011). This was a major breakthrough for the party as previously SVP only had one seat in the federal government. Since becoming the national party in terms of electoral support, the SVP made a real progress in influencing Swiss immigration policymaking (Ruedin et al. 2015: 10). Examining Switzerland’s relationship with the EU is also important for understanding the SVP’s Euroscepticism and immigration stance more broadly. As the 2014 Initiative Against Mass Migration demonstrated, immigration debate in Switzerland continued to be dominated by the free movement of people until 2019, when immigration issue becoming less visible on the agenda of political parties. As the proposal for Switzerland to join the EEA in 1992 was rejected ‘by a thin majority (50.3 per cent) of the voters and a comfortable cantonal majority (eighteen of twenty-six) of cantons’ (Le Conseil Fédéral 2019), Switzerland and the EU continued the talks about mutual cooperation to avoid ‘economic discrimination and political isolation’ (Dupont and Sciarini 2007: 202). This resulted in a series of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU, concluded in the period from 1993 until 2004 (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Switzerland’s accession to the free movement of people was one of them. Bilateral Agreement I, signed in 1999, introduced the free movement of people with the EU and gave Switzerland access to the EU single market (Schwok and Najy 2016: 127), which was later supported by the large majority of the population, with sixty-eight per cent voting in favour of it (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2013: 5). This opened the Swiss labour market first to the members of the EU-15 and then to other

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­ embers that joined the EU during subsequent enlargements (Afonso m 2010: 64). Subsequent extensions of the Agreement to the new EU member states took place when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. Switzerland signed Protocol II in 2008 regarding the extension of the free movement to the citizens of these countries, which was supported by the population on the referendum (State Secretariat for Migration 2017). However, the acceptance of the Initiative Against Mass Migration showed that the attitude of the Swiss towards the free movement of people became increasingly hostile partly because of unprecedented pace of intra-EU migration. Despite supporting the extension of free movement of people to the EU new member states, Swiss never favoured joining the EU themselves (Schwok 2010: 9). Signing bilateral agreements was a compromise in the development of the relationship between Switzerland and the EU, which aimed to enhance economic cooperation between the two (Koch and Lavenex 2007: 161). While economic cooperation between Switzerland and the EU was developed through a set of bilateral agreements, the free movement of people resulted in an increased migration from the EU (Office Fédérale de la Statistique 2018). The SVP capitalised on the increasing immigration, eventually launching the collection of signatures for the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2011. The acceptance of this Initiative in 2014 has endangered Swiss-EU relations, as it aimed to restrict the free movement of people, which was incompatible with the Bilateral Agreement I because of the ‘guillotine clause’—the suspension of one agreement led to the automatic suspension of all them (Schwok and Najy 2016: 128). In December 2016, the Swiss Parliament voted to approve the amendment to the constitution (Secrétariat d’Etat aux Migrations 2017). The regulations on this amendment were adopted in December 2017 and envisaged that in certain sectors and certain areas with the high unemployment rates, employers were to advertise jobs in regional job centres first, where Swiss and jobseekers of any other nationality had first-hand and privileged access to the job adverts (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2019). The provisions did not impose any quotas on EU migration but aimed to prioritise Swiss and Swiss residents in the recruitment process. This concluded the implementation of the Initiative Against Mass Migration and the continuation of the free movement of people between Switzerland and the EU.

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Idiosyncrasies of the Swiss Political System To understand the evolution of the Swiss immigration policy, we need to examine the process of policymaking in Switzerland. Unlike other European countries, ‘policy-making in the Swiss parliament does not happen through stable coalitions where the same parties negotiate among themselves prior to any political debate. Parties form changing majorities on an issue by issue basis’ (Lutz 2012: 689). The nature of Swiss consensus democracy requires major parties to come to an agreement during the policymaking process. Policymaking happens not only through parliamentary means, but also through the direct democratic route. Direct democracy serves as a tool for people and parties to set the agenda by launching initiatives to change policies and make changes to constitution. Popular initiative ‘allows 100,000 citizens, by signing a formal proposition, to demand a constitutional amendment as well as to propose the alteration or removal of an existing provision’ (Kriesi and Wisler 1996: 20). The initiative helps to bring the issue onto the political agenda and forces political establishment to deal with the issue (Kriesi and Wisler 1996: 20). Despite being the biggest party, the SVP does not always have the support of other parties, especially on immigration, which makes finding a compromise among the parties difficult. The Swiss system of consensus democracy allows populist parties like the SVP to ‘claim that its preferences are ignored by other parties even if they participate in government, and regularly uses the tools of direct democracy (initiatives and referendums) to challenge government decisions’ (Afonso 2013: 25). In the absence of cross-party agreement, parties can push for their way using the instruments of direct democracy. As ‘every legal change in the domain of immigration or integration policy is subject to the approval of all significant political groups’ (Afonso 2005: 656), direct democracy remains a key tool for the SVP to advance its political preferences, especially on immigration. The SVP has made a few attempts to introduce more restrictive immigration policies and to oppose closer cooperation between Switzerland and the EU using direct democracy. As Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015: 121) highlight, ‘direct democracy played a major role in the SVP’s attempts to oppose the federal government on EU-related issues in recent decades’.

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SVP’s Immigration Stance and Immigration Policy Change in Switzerland Since the 1980s, SVP’s immigration rhetoric focused around protection of Switzerland from immigrants, in particular Muslims, criminals, and from international influence, primarily from the EU and its institutions (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 117). The SVP’s first major victory on the issue happened in 1992, when the EEA Treaty was rejected by the Swiss people in a nation-wide referendum, despite the majority of the parties persuading the people to accept it (Linder 2013: 191). The SVP ‘has supported the isolation of the country with respect to European integration, the defence of Switzerland’s key institutions (neutrality, direct democracy, and federalism) and the tightening of the country’s immigration and asylum policy’ (Varone et al. 2014: 108). Even though there has not been a major change in SVP’s immigration agenda between 2003 and 2015, some infamous examples of anti-immigration campaigning stand out, including a campaign ad, for the Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners, where white sheep kick a black sheep out of the Swiss flag. The other prominent example refers to the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, with a poster showing a woman in full veil behind the Swiss flag, covered by minarets. This kind of visual advertisement has proved to be successful in convincing the public to support the SVP’s initiatives. The electoral rise of the SVP has had a profound impact on the Swiss party system. Since 1991, and until 2015, SVP’s rise has been steady with the party more than doubling their representation rising from twenty-five seats in 1991 to sixty-five seats in the National Council (Office fédérale de la statistique n.d.). The SVP became a major player on the Swiss political arena, which allowed the SVP to have an impact on immigration policymaking through governmental channels. The 2003 election result altered the ‘magic formula’ of the Federal Council (Swiss government), allocating second seat for the SVP in the seven-member Swiss government, at the expense of the CVP. Christoph Blocher—SVP’s mastermind—was elected as a second SVP member of the Federal Council (Meuwly 2010: 133). Following his election to the Federal Council, Blocher became the head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP), which allowed the SVP to influence the direction of immigration policymaking and bring immigration to the forefront of the governmental agenda between 2004 and 2007. However, after Blocher failed to get reelected to the Federal Council in 2007, the party became confrontational (Bernhard 2016: 879)

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and has put a lot of effort in changing Swiss immigration policy using direct democratic tools.

Federal Election Manifestos (2007–2015) 2007 Federal Election Manifesto The 2007 federal election manifesto concentrated on tackling family migration, integration and opposition to the EU.  The SVP argued  that family migration was on rise and did not bring economic benefits. The SVP focused on the importance of immigrants’ integration and their respect of Swiss traditional values and laws. Although never mentioned explicitly with words, only with pictures, anti-Islam sentiment constituted a substantial part of SVP’s rhetoric on national identity, picturing two women in headscarves with the title under the picture ‘Are we the foreigners in our own country?’ (SVP 2007: 44). The major opposition to the EU was focused on the perceived loss of sovereignty as, the SVP viewed the EU as a super state, forcing political union on its members and imposing foreign policy, security and common currency (SVP 2007: 17). 2011 Federal Election Manifesto This SVP’s manifesto was distinct from previous ones as it featured the free movement for the first time. The SVP argued for a renegotiation of the free movement, stressing that people ‘were promised that the benefits would outweigh the disadvantages, and that quotas could be imposed as a safety valve if things got out of hand. We were also assured that freedom of movement would be limited to those who had jobs or were capable of supporting themselves’ (SVP 2011: 54). The dissatisfaction with the free movement of people was linked to social security concerns, with the party arguing that unemployed EU migrants are attracted by Switzerland’s social security provision (SVP 2011: 54). The party blamed immigration for salary dumping, particularly in the border regions (SVP 2011: 54–55). SVP linked immigration to the discourse of law and order, by reinstating its position on the implementation of the Initiative on Expelling Criminal Foreigners, which was accepted by the people in 2010 (SVP 2011: 56). National identity anxieties were highlighted on the party’s agenda, with the SVP insisting that the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets

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is to be fully respected, emphasising the supremacy of the ‘Swiss law and traditions’ (SVP 2011: 56). The SVP’s rhetoric on the EU remained the same with the party campaigning for the withdrawal of the EU accession application (SVP 2011: 37). Strong opposition to the EU came also from the necessity to co-exist with the EU law and EU institutions (SVP 2011: 37). 2015 Federal Election Manifesto The exact same phrase opens the 2015 electoral pledge on immigration as it was in 2011: ‘Excessive immigration is detrimental to Switzerland because it has an impact infrastructure, unemployment rates, wage pressure and welfare budget’ (SVP 2015: 31). The SVP criticised the government’s integration policies that use taxpayer’s money on immigrants’ integration, which should be the responsibility of the migrant, not the responsibility of the state (SVP 2015: 33). After the successful 9 February 2014 vote, the party stressed the importance of the implementation of the Initiative Against Mass Migration, that aimed to ensure the introduction of annual quotas on EU immigration and the implementation of the national preference for Swiss nationals during the employment process (SVP 2015: 33). Immigration was linked to welfare discourse through family migration, with the SVP claiming that immigrants have access to too many benefits. The question of integration continued to be dominated by anti-Islam sentiments. The SVP maintained its hardcore Eurosceptic position, demanding the suspension of the free movement of people, by introducing annual quotas. The manifesto stated that the agreement on the free movement of people should be renegotiated and that in case of failure to do so, the agreement should be suspended (SVP 2015: 34). The SVP threatened to launch a new initiative if the Swiss government and parliament refused to apply the new constitutional provision on immigration quotas (SVP 2015: 34). The party strongly opposed the necessity to adhere to the European legal framework, opposing the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on disputes between Switzerland and the EU (SVP 2015: 12–13). Immigration has continued to be linked to law and order and to the discourse on social security. Concerns over welfare were linked to family migration routes and to intra-EU migration. Table 4.1 summarizes SVP’s federal elections manifesto positions between 2007 and 2015.

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Table 4.1  SVP’s manifesto pledges, 2007–2015 2007 Manifesto

2011 Manifesto

2015 Manifesto

• Tackle family migration;

• Renegotiate the free movement of people;

• enhance integration;

• limit the free movement of people only to those immigrants that have a job offer; • withdraw EU accession application;

• Integration is a matter of individual, not of the state, reduce state expenditure on integration; • implement the Initiative Against Mass Migration by introducing national preference on the labour market; • withdraw EU accession application;

• withdraw EU accession application; • importance of national identity; • anti-Islamic sentiment.

• linking the free movement of people to social security anxieties; • law and order: reinstating the position on expelling criminal foreigners; • tougher integration requirements.

• suspension of the free movement of people; • ensure the supremacy of the Swiss law over the EU law.

Immigration Policy Change in Switzerland Despite gaining the biggest number of seats in the Swiss Parliament in 2003, which resulted in having more influence on parliamentary and governmental arenas, the SVP continued to present itself as an anti-­ governmental party. It launched popular initiatives, which allowed the party to pursue its restrictive immigration agenda and optional referendums, which acted as veto instruments for governmental decisions on immigration and EU matters. Often unable to persuade other parties and support the SVP’s position, the party influenced immigration policymaking through extra-parliamentary channels, resorting to direct democracy. There are a number of initiatives launched by the SVP that aimed to restrict immigration, oppose Islam and further EU integration, including the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, The Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners and the Initiative Against Mass Migration.

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Referendum on Schengen and Dublin Agreements In May 2005, Swiss were faced with a mandatory referendum, on rejecting or approving the Schengen and Dublin Agreements. Mandatory referendums are required to approve Switzerland’s participation in international treaties. The SVP viewed the acceptance of these agreements as a threat of further integration with the EU and prepared counterproposals (Milic 2006: 1277). The SVP was defeated as 56% of the people supported the extension of Agreements to the new EU member states (Chancellerie Fédérale 2017). Together with the Swiss Democrats, the SVP tried to deny the extension of free movement of people to citizens of Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004, but was unsuccessful as people voted to accept the extension (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 195). Modifications to the Aliens Law During the autumn parliamentary session, the SVP made some immigration gains, when the Swiss Parliament accepted the proposals of the FDJP, headed by Cristoph Blocher, to introduce more restrictive rules for family reunification and to tighten integration practices by requiring to possess sufficient knowledge of the local language as a confirmation of successful integration (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 196). Major amendments to the Aliens law included the introduction of more restrictive rules for non-EU immigrants, including conditions of admission to the country and integration process (Secrétariat de l’Etat aux Migrations 2007). The new law made the admission of non-EU workers to the Swiss labour market harder, prioritising Swiss or EU candidates (Secrétariat de l’Etat aux Migrations 2007). The law also introduced a requirement for non-EU workers to evidence sufficient financial means for staying in Switzerland (Pauchard 2006). The issuance of residence permit was to be based on the integration success, primarily the knowledge of the local language, and also envisaged a revocation of a permit in cases of long-term prison sentence and dependence on social assistance for prolonged periods of time (Pauchard 2006). In September 2006, the Swiss largely approved the modifications to the Aliens law, which was supported by sixty-eight per cent of the population (Secrétariat de l’Etat aux Migrations 2007).

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The Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets The Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets was not a party initiative but came from two prominent social conservative members of the SVP—Walter Wobbmann and Ulrich Schlüer—and was designed to prohibit the construction of minarets in Switzerland. This Initiative was primarily directed against Islam with the party arguing that it posed a threat to Switzerland (Mayer 2011: 11). Even though the Initiative was supported only by the SVP and by Christian Federal Democratic Union (UDF) party and rejected by all other parties, on 29 November 2009, Swiss voters accepted the Initiative by saying a firm ‘yes’ with a substantial majority of fifty-seven per cent in favour (Hirter and Vatter 2010). The Initiatives for Expelling Criminal Foreigners Another example of the SVP using direct democracy to advance their anti-­ immigration agenda was the Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners, which called for the automatic expulsion and return ban of non-Swiss offenders, who committed specific types of crimes, including social security fraud (Chancellerie fédérale 2019). It was accepted by fifty-three per cent of voters and the majority of the cantons on 28 November 2010 (Chancellerie fédérale 2010). The Federal Council and the Parliament rejected the Initiative, proposing a counter-project, which aimed to introduce a practice of stripping a foreigner, who had committed a serious crime, from entitlement to a residence permit. According to the counter-­ project, the right to reside in Switzerland was to be based on the seriousness of the crime, but not predetermined in the catalogue of crimes (Conseil Fédéral 2010). The SVP, who wanted deportation to be automatic, criticised the government’s counter-project as it contained the so-­ called hardship clause that enabled judges to intervene on a case by case basis and allow a person to stay in if there was a threat for person’s life if she or he were to be deported (Stephens 2016). The SVP was not satisfied with such decision and, in December 2012, it launched a new Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners (Implementation), which aimed to automatically deport foreigners, who committed certain crimes. It was rejected by both majority of people and a majority of cantons (Chancellerie Fédérale 2016).

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The Initiative Against Mass Migration One of the critical junctures in the Swiss immigration policy, which threatened the relationship between Switzerland and the EU, was ultimately the Initiative Against Mass Migration. The SVP launched the federal initiative in 2011, which included core issues like imposing the introduction of quotas on all types of immigrants coming to Switzerland including cross-­ border workers and asylum seekers. Despite the rejection of the inititative by the government and parliament, it was accepted by a tiny majority of the population on 9 February 2014, with 50.3 per cent voting in favour and accepted by a majority of the cantons (Chancelliere fédérale 2014). As Ackermann and Freitag (2015: 36) underline: ‘This voting outcome has triggered wide-ranging debates about both the policy on immigrants as well as the future of Switzerland within the European context’. In December 2016, the Swiss Parliament voted to implement the Initiative not by imposing quotas on EU immigration, but by giving Swiss and Swiss unemployed residents in certain regions and in certain professions with high unemployment rate an advanced access to job adverts, which were first to be released in regional job centres, and later on elsewhere (State Secretariat for Migration 2017). The SVP’s electoral rise resulted in the increased salience of immigration in Switzerland. As the SVP often disagreed with the other political parties on these issues, parliamentary ways of influencing immigration policymaking mostly have not proved to be effective. Despite being the most popular party in Switzerland since 2003, the SVP was not very successful in pursuing its restrictive immigration stance through parliamentary channels due to the lack of agreement with other political parties, even though their positions on immigration have also shifted to the right. This resulted in numerous initiatives and referendums launched by the party in order to help achieve its electoral pledges and defend its ideological positions. This tactic proved to be successful and resulted in important policy changes, including immigration and integration. The SVP’s immigration stance is largely centred around the resistance to the EU and to the so-called Islamisation of Switzerland.

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Resisting the Europeanisation of Swiss Immigration Policy Since 1991, the SVP has been opposing closer ties with the EU, which has been at the heart of its political programme. Continuously the SVP argued against the free movement of people and the extension of this principle to the new EU member states. The SVP’s Eurosceptic stance has not varied much between 2003 and 2015, but this has not always reflected the public opinion on the issue. The party had its first major success in 1992, when it campaigned for the rejection of the EEA Treaty, a decision supported by the Swiss voters. Since then the party was unable to prevent the Europeanisation of Swiss immigration policy with the SVP, the party being unsuccessful in blocking the extension of the free movement to the new EU member states. This changed on 9 February 2014, when the Swiss accepted the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which aimed to restrict migration from the EU, that was enabled by the free movement of people. Public hostility to immigration, which drastically increased as a result of the free movement of people (see Fig.  4.1), combined with the SVP’s Eurosceptic rhetoric, was a major driving force behind the Initiative (Ackermann and Freitag 2015: 37). Despite transitional agreements on the free movement of people with the new EU member states, the SVP continued to resist this enhanced integration between Switzerland and the EU, trying to block the extension of free movement of people to EU newest members. Switzerland’s participation in the free movement of people presented an opportunity for the party to reinforce and to combine its anti-immigration and anti-EU discourse. We started collecting the signatures because of the effects of the free movement of people because Bern has lied to us again. Suddenly we were forced to accept 40,000 people per year. (Interview with Geneva’s municipal councillor, Eric Bertinat, 2016) The effects of freedom of movement. We only saw the real effects later and then we saw a pressure on jobs and then when the public opinion began to shift, giving us solutions. (Interview with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016)

The free movement of people was a driving force behind the SVP’s anti-immigration and Eurosceptic discourse. The sharp increase in immigration before 2007 global financial crisis, which almost doubled since the

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Fig. 4.1  EU migration to Switzerland, 2002–2017. (Source: Office fédérale de la statistique (2018))

introduction of the free movement (see Fig.  4.1; Office fédérale de la statistique 2018), triggered the launch of the Initiative Against Mass Migration. With the adherence to the free movement of people, Switzerland abolished its strict quota system of work permits. Since the Agreement on free movement of people came into force in 2002, and until the arrival of the global financial crisis, immigration figures have doubled. While shortly after the introduction of the Agreement in 2002, immigration was at the level of around 54,000 people, in 2008, it was approximately 114,000 people (Office fédérale de la statistique 2018). The abolishment of quotas and the impossibility of controlling immigration from within the EU triggered the launch of the Initiative. You know, I think that’s the main reason is the growth of immigration. I think before the free movement we had a strong limitation for immigration and till this time immigration was more or less under control and with the

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introduction of free circulation of people, immigration was growing extremely. (Interview with a national councillor, Heinz Brand, 2016)

Labour Market Concerns From the SVP’s point of view, uncontrolled immigration from the EU to Switzerland presented labour market concerns: the ability of the economy to satisfy the demand. The SVP kept arguing that free movement of people brought imported unemployment, which was detrimental to the Swiss economy (Interview with a former vice-president of the SVP, Luzi Stamm, 2016). While in the past Switzerland was able to export unemployment by having ‘strict annual quotas’ on both regular workers and seasonal workers (Skenderovic 2007: 162), the introduction of the free movement of people ended that. The absence of limits on EU migration reinforced SVP’s opposition to the free movement of people as it brought economic anxieties about jobs (Interview with the vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016). According to the party’s logic, the impact of the free movement of people put pressure on the Swiss labour market by creating competition for Swiss jobs with the whole Europe (Interview with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016). This was an economic perspective, the fear of losing a job, the fear that foreigners will be privileged because when companies are hiring, they always want to import… it’s cheaper, this was the fear. Primarily it was an economic perspective. (Interview with a former national councillor, Hans Fehr, 2016)

These economic concerns were primarily centred around the competition on the labour market and linked to unemployment concerns. From the SVP’s perspective, free movement of people not only created labour market concerns for low-skilled immigration but also affected highly skilled immigration. Unemployment is the other concern. What is interesting, is that it creeps in some better paid jobs. In the beginning immigration was really low qualified, but now you have higher qualified immigration, which is no longer limited in the European Union. And they start to compete directly with average paid people, people with a salary of 60–70 thousand CHF a year. And this becomes a bit threatening. Before, it was only very low qualified labour, which nobody wanted to do and very high qualified personnel, which Switzerland did not have. But now it touches the mid-

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dle class and this affects more people, so I think the economic factor is also a big one. (Interview with the vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016)

Global financial crisis did not reinforce SVP’s rhetoric on immigration, as economic anxieties around immigration have already been a significant topic on the SVP’s agenda (Interview with a national councillor, Andreas Glarner, 2016; Interview with a national councillor, Alice Glauser, 2016; Interview with Geneva’s municipal councillor, Eric Bertinat, 2016; Interview with the secretary-general of Vaud cantonal branch, Kevin Grangier, 2016). Relatively speedy recovery of the Swiss economy from the global financial crisis (Interview with a social policy professor at the University of Lausanne, Giuliano Bonoli, 2016) resulted in the increased immigration to Switzerland from poorer Eurozone countries, which led to the feelings of insecurity on the labour market (Interview with the co-­ president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016). As it can be seen from Fig. 4.1, immigration fell down sharply after the financial crisis, but picked up in 2010 and continued to grow, reaching its highest ever level in 2014 before the Initiative Against Mass Migration was put for the vote. The SVP used economic concerns around the free movement of people as an opportunity to change Swiss immigration policy by launching the Initiative Against Mass Migration. However, by 2011 we could see that promises were not kept and that, in fact, it was ten times higher, but executive promised different numbers to the people before the vote on the European Union, so once we realised that immigration was not going down, but it was at extremely high level, we decided that it was time to act. We could not tolerate this situation. (Interview with the vice-president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016)

Unable to find support for orchestrating this change in parliament and government, the party used the instruments of direct democracy, aiming to present itself as a defender of the popular will. In Switzerland, direct democracy enables anybody to amend legislation through extra-­ parliamentary routes, by launching initiatives, for example. Direct democracy allows the party to understand public opinion on the issue, which has also been engineered by the SVP on immigration through highly effective and professional communication campaigning, funded by

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the SVP’s mastermind Blocher, including some of the infamous campaigns where black sheep is being kicked out from the Swiss flag. This 2007 campaign aimed to deport foreigners who committed violent crimes. In this was direct democracy also enabled the SVP to popularise its positions across the electorate. Direct democracy makes it more difficult as the politics that the government wants to come directly in opposition to the politics that people want. This is a big problem for us because normally there is an agreement between the popular will and the government. But in the last twenty years the government by and large wants to adhere to the European Union. Swiss do not want this. There is a divergence, and this makes it more difficult because the will of the government is curbed by the popular will. (Interview with the secretary-general of the Vaud cantonal branch, Kevin Grangier, 2016)

As a populist party, the SVP’s rhetoric was based on defending the ‘common man’ against the elites. During the campaign for the Initiative Against Mass Migration, the SVP have been claiming that border commuters have an impact on housing prices, which did not reflect the reality as border commuters do not reside in Switzerland. Yes, yes, and you see if you live in Geneva. You go there with your car, you see French plates everywhere. For the working man—what does he see? That his rent is increasing, his salary is decreasing, it takes a long time to go to work. (Interview with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016)

The SVP’s populist discourse was also focused on opposing further EU integration, highlighting the supreme character of European legal framework. Today there is a decision of the European Court of Human Rights and this decision is above the decision of the Swiss court. This is unacceptable. (Interview with a co-president of Valais cantonal branch, Cyrille Fauchère, 2016) It means Switzerland needs to accept the evolution of the European law and apply it in Switzerland, and if it does not, then it is the European tribunal that decides if this is fair to not apply the European law in Switzerland. Mr. Barroso finished the exceptional regime for Switzerland and now the rules

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of the European Union prevail. So, the debate became legal, not only political. (Interview with the secretary-general of the Vaud cantonal branch, with Kevin Grangier, 2016)

However, this populist  discourse was firmly rejected in 2018 by the majority of Swiss voters (sixty-six per cent), when SVP’s Initiative ‘Swiss law, not foreign judges’ (Self-determination Initiative) was put for the vote (FDJP 2018). It sought to ensure that when the results of the popular initiative are incompatible with the international agreements, Swiss constitution should take precedence (The Federal Council 2018). The SVP’s opposition to Europeanisation of the Swiss immigration policy also manifested itself through social welfare lens. The free movement of people allowed ‘EU workers (employed or self-employed) enjoy the right to social assistance benefits under the same conditions as nationals of that member state’ (Fernandes 2016: 11). The free movement of people enabled the SVP  to link immigration to anxieties about welfare. Welfare anxieties were particularly linked to family migration as the party argued that free movement of people permitted unrestricted family migration. This is very clearly the phenomenon of family reunification that we have to tackle because before the acceptance of the agreement of free movement of people in 2000, we had a permit of a seasonal worker in Switzerland. These were delivered primarily to the people from Eastern Europe, they came to Switzerland for nine-twelve months and the family reunification was not possible. It was possible for them to live in Switzerland, but nor for their families that lived in Romania, Poland. These were tough jobs and they were able to benefit from holidays that took couple of months. And this, this was abolished with the free movement of people and now it is possible because we accepted the agreement. Family reunion is a big chunk of the overall migration. In Switzerland, because of the family reunion we are forced to provide social assistance for the people that do not intend to integrate into the Swiss labour market. (Interview with a secretary-general of the Vaud cantonal branch, Kevin Grangier, 2016)

The SVP’s attempts to change immigration policy were a result of the ideological and populist nature of the party to represent itself as a defender of the people against the decisions taken by the elite. Direct democracy provided the party with an institutional opportunity not only to understand the attitudes of the public on immigration but also served as a tool

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to popularise the party’s positions and engineer public hostility on immigration. The Initiative Against Mass Migration was designed to tackle different kinds of anxieties, including labour market concerns, the loss of sovereignty to the EU and social welfare anxieties. Fighting Switzerland’s So-Called Islamisation Even though Switzerland is culturally and linguistically heterogeneous, assimilation of immigrants is mandatory as Switzerland belongs to ethnic-­ assimilationist citizenship regime, which requires assimilation to the norms of the host society on an ethno-cultural basis (Giugni and Passy 2004). Alongside economy, identity concern is also a crucial factor underpinning Swiss immigration policy change. immigration is not only about economics, it is also about identity, and fear and like factors that cannot that easily be said or described. (Interview with a personal secretary to the State secretary of the State Secretariat for Migration, Stefan Däpp, 2016)

Safeguarding Swiss identity has been at the core of the SVP’s agenda. The party has repeatedly argued that Swiss national identity and its existence have been threatened by the presence of foreigners, particularly Muslims. I think we make a distinction, particularly in the current context, where we have a big wave of migration from the Middle East, from countries that bring their own cultures with them, different values, Islam. (Interview with a co-president of the Valais cantonal branch, Cyrille Fauchère, 2016)

The fear of Islam and Islamisation of Switzerland triggered the launch of the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets in 2007. The Initiative did not come from the party but was launched by the SVP’s two prominent party members, Ulrich Schlüer and Walter Wobmann, and aimed to safeguard Swiss identity and culture, by prohibiting the ­construction of minarets on the Swiss territory (Interview with a former national councillor, Ulrich Schlüer, 2016; Interview with the vice president of the SVP, Thomas Aeschi, 2016). The aim of the Initiative was, however, broader than just to prohibit the construction of minarets; it was about resistance to Islam and the importance of assimilation to the Swiss way of life.

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The goal we wanted to achieve was that we have to put one, there was one principle that was important—the civil laws of Switzerland are above religious principles. (Interview with Jéromê Desmeules, 2016, co-president of Valais cantonal branch)

The launch of the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets is an example of how assimilationist views towards cultural integration are spearheaded by populist parties like the SVP. Assimilation of immigrants has been a distinctive feature of the ethnic-nationalist Swiss citizenship regime, which explains the logic of resistance to foreign cultures and to a certain extent the SVP’s success in appealing to the voters using Islamisation of Switzerland as a perceived identity threat. But the problem is that there are non-integrated foreigners and Swiss people wanted to explain themselves that they are not happy with nonintegrated foreigners. Because these people, in general it is not a problem to build a minaret, because who cares, but for many people this is a sign of non-­ integration. (Interview with a national councillor, Sebastian Frehner, 2016)

Despite Switzerland being ‘pluralist towards the cultures officially recognised within the context of federalism and the existing informal procedures for the integration of national minorities, it is much less pluralist towards the ethnic minorities of migrant origin’ (Giugni and Passy 2004: 58). It is less tolerant towards the migrants who do not share the same cultural practices as the Swiss, primarily immigrants from Middle East and former Yugoslavia, mainly from Albania and Kosovo, who are by and large Muslims. The fear of different cultures that bring different cultural and religious practices, which interfere with the public sphere and do not recognise the distinction between public and private, is one of the underlying causes of anti-Islam attitudes of the SVP. We have a different menu at school, the separation in swimming pools, the right to wear the veil and the removal of the crucifix, this we will not accept. (Interview with a co-president of Valais cantonal branch, Cyrille Fauchère, 2016)

The attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016 only strengthened anti-Islam sentiment linking it to security lens on the agenda of the SVP (Interview with a national councillor, Alice Glauser, 2016). The SVP’s identity discourse continues to be dominated by anti-Islam sentiment. In

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September 2017, the party deposited the new initiative ‘Yes to the prohibition of covering face in public’ (Oui à l’interdiction de dissimuler le visage). Following France, which banned covering face in public in 2010, the SVP continued framing integration through a security lens, aiming to change legislation. Terrorist attacks in France and Belgium presented an opportunity for the SVP to reinforce anti-Islam sentiment through security lens and linking Islam as a religion to terrorism. Even though the Initiative was rejected by the Federal Council in March 2019, it created further unease in the field of citizenship in Switzerland. If you see now the situation in Europe with these terrorist attacks. Nobody is prepared to come and not see whether it is a good willing person or not? Is this person armed or not? I think it is no longer acceptable in the situations we have now in Europe. (Interview with a former national councillor, Ulrich Schlüer, 2016)

Identity anxieties over Islamisation of Switzerland underpinned the logic of SVP’s position on integration and led to subsequent immigration policy change—The Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, which was accepted by the Swiss electorate in 2009. Swiss assimilationist citizenship regime characterised by the necessity of foreign cultures to assimilate in the Swiss society has been conducive to the popularisation of the SVP’s rhetoric on integration. The SVP’s anti-Islam discourse became increasingly connected to security lens after Paris and Belgium attacks, which led the launch of a new anti-Islam initiative against covering face in public places in March 2016, which was rejected by the Federal Council in March 2019.

Explaining the Dynamics of Swiss Immigration Policy Change What processes account for a change in a given policy? Having explored the causes that trigger the change, it is equally important to shed light on the mechanisms that account for this change. Two mechanisms permitted the SVP to pursue more restrictive immigration policies: framing and departmental competition. Framing was an argumentative mechanism that allowed the party to use not only anti-immigrant rhetoric, but, in particular, populist, anti-establishment rhetoric in order to provide a fundament for further political action. The SVP was able to criticise the

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government and use direct democracy to set the agenda on immigration. The party used direct democracy to drive immigration policy change in Switzerland from bottom-up direction, successfully launching numerous initiatives. The SVP’s critique of the government’s immigration stance led to the use of the mechanism of direct democracy by the SVP, which was a procedural mechanism that aimed at implementing the argumentation into policies and resulted in the adoption of more restrictive immigration policies between 2003 and 2015. Framing Framing has enabled the SVP to adopt more restrictive immigration stance, which focused on opposing immigration, enhancing integration with the EU and popularising anti-Islam sentiments. The financial investment of Christoph Blocher into spearheading the SVP’s anti-immigration rhetoric helped the party to engineer public opinion on immigration. At times, he used personal funds to finance some of the campaigns (Skenderovic 2009). The party has continuously repeated the need for limiting and controlling migration, both from the EU and from the third countries. The SVP linked intra-EU migration to Switzerland with unemployment and labour market concerns. The SVP’s hard-line Eurosceptic stance became more evident when Switzerland extended the principle of free movement of people to the new EU member states. The party has been responsible for spearheading anti-Islam sentiment, and linking it to the discourse on law and order and later on to security concerns. The SVP also linked immigration to social welfare concerns, attributing blame for welfare abuse to immigrants (Interview with a national councillor, Claudio Zanetti, 2016; Interview with a national councillor, Andreas Glarner, 2016; Interview with a national councillor, Heinz Brand, 2016). The SVP viewed immigrants as a drain on the Swiss welfare system, especially intra­EU immigrants, who exercised the right to welfare access under the free movement of people. Immigration was framed in this way to justify the need for restrictive immigration policies. Once the SVP got the second seat in the Federal Council and Christoph Blocher became the head of the FDJP in 2004, the party was able to exert more influence on the immigration policy through parliamentary and governmental routes. Thus, during 2005 parliamentary session, the party’s proposals to tighten rules for family reunification were supported by other

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parties (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015). However, when Blocher failed to get reelected to the Federal Council in 2007, subsequently losing control of the FDJP, the SVP’s influence on immigration policymaking through parliamentary and governmental routes diminished. Even though being in charge of the FDJP did not automatically result in the implementation of the SVP positions on immigration, because in the end, decision-­ making process in the government is collective, the FDJP as a department set the direction of immigration policymaking (Interview with a personal secretary to the state secretary of the State Secretariat for Migration, Stefan Däpp, 2016; Interview with the vice-president of the Federal Commission on Migration, Etienne Piguet, 2016). After the SVP lost the FDJP, which influenced SVP’s ability to steer immigration policy-making in their direction, the party resorted to the use of direct democracy, which that enabled the SVP to redefine Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive way. Direct Democracy The inability to find consensus with major political parties and the failure of the SVP member to get re-elected as a head of the FDJP, led the SVP to using direct democratic instruments to shape Swiss immigration policy. By resorting to direct democracy, the SVP used populist rhetoric of the absence of political will (la volonté politique) of the government to toughen immigration policies. Using this sort of anti-establishment rhetoric, which focused on the lack of the political will of the elites to defend the ‘interests of the people’ on immigration, allowed the SVP to shape Swiss immigration policy in a restrictive direction. The SVP has always had a distinct stance on immigration, and it rarely got support on it from other parties in the parliament. The impossibility of reaching consensus led the SVP, like any other party who is unable to influence policymaking process through parliamentary and governmental channels, to use direct democracy. It allows any dissatisfied political party to launch a popular initiative, which acts as an agenda-setting tool (Papadopoulos 1997). The peculiarity of the Swiss political system of consensual democracy allowed the SVP to pursue anti-establishment rhetoric despite being the most popular party in Switzerland since 2003 and to resort to the instruments of direct democracy. As, by and large, the SVP has been a lone wolf on immigration, it was the key mechanism for the party to redefine Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction.

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SVP’s anti-establishment populist rhetoric justified the use of direct democracy as it emphasises the role of the people in decision-making process and the importance of defending people’s will. This was highlighted in the case of the Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners (implementation) that was launched to correct the implementation of the initial Initiative that was accepted in 2010. If the government does not respect the decisions of the people, this is bad. For instance, the removal of foreign criminals, the government took some time, the parliament did not respect erectly the decisions of the people and that is why we made a second initiative on foreign criminals (the implementation). (Interview with a former national councillor, Hans Fehr, 2016)

Even though direct democratic route is a lengthy process that usually takes couple of years before an initiative can be presented a popular vote, it has been repeatedly used by the SVP. It brought the SVP some major victories including the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets and the Initiative Against Mass Migration. The SVP has been more successful in changing Swiss immigration policy through bottom-up approach compared to parliamentary route, as the party failed to make political alliances with other parties on immigration and the EU. If you look at France, when the president wants to decide something, if he has the majority then it is done. But we have direct democracy in Switzerland, many parties and everyone needs to be more or less satisfied. (Interview with a co-president of Valais cantonal branch, Jéromê Desmeules, 2016)

The SVP used direct democracy not only to advance its immigration agenda, but also as a veto tool to prevent further integration with the EU, especially in the area of the free movement of people by using optional referendums. On this battleground, the SVP has been less successful as the people supported the free movement of people and its subsequent extensions to the new EU member states. Eurosceptic positions of the SVP did not find much support on direct democratic arena as the party failed to prevent the extension of the free movement of people to new EU member states twice and failed to block the adoption of Schengen and Dublin Agreements in 2005.

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Conclusion This chapter explored the SVP’s immigration policymaking logic by identifying factors and mechanisms that accounted for Swiss immigration policy change between 2003 and 2015. The SVP’s immigration stance, which subsequently led to the evolution of Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction, was underpinned by the importance of public opinion, concerns about EU integration, perceived economic anxieties of the public, closely connected to the free movement of people, and identity concerns about the Islamisation of Switzerland and integration of Muslims. Even though the party has always had strong anti-immigration and Eurosceptic stance, it repeatedly used public opinion as a justification for defending the right of the people against the elite, which is a distinct feature of populist parties. Furthermore, the party managed to engineer negative public opinion on immigration and the EU over the years, campaigning for limiting migration, reinforcing anti-Islam sentiment and arguing for less integration with the EU, which has been highlighted by the success of several initiatives launched by the SVP. The SVP framed immigration in a negative light to justify the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies. When Blocher was the head of the FDJP, SVP had more leverage in influencing the direction of policymaking more than when it lost control of this department. However, his failure to get re-elected to the government in 2007 led to the loss of control over the direction of immigration policymaking. Hence, the party resorted to the use of direct democracy, which led to the evolution of Swiss immigration policy. The lack of consensus on immigration between the SVP and other political parties led to the immigration policy change through direct democratic route (bottom-up approach). The use of direct democracy enabled the SVP to redefine immigration policy in a more restrictive way. Being unable to influence immigration policymaking through parliamentary and governmental routes, the party has focused its efforts on launching popular initiatives to bring the issue on the agenda and optional referendums as veto tools to stop further integration with the EU, but was not successful. The next chapter proceeds with examining the French case of immigration policy.

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CHAPTER 5

Immigration During Sarkozy’s Time in Office: Economic Orientation and Cultural Backlash

The outcome of 2017 presidential election, which highlighted the unprecedented support for Marine Le Pen, illustrates how deeply right-wing populism had penetrated French society, challenging mainstream politics. Scoring almost thirty-four per cent of the national vote in the second round, Marine Le Pen’s result in 2017 general election highlights the demand for populist politics in France. Shortly after becoming the leader of the FN in 2011, FN has experienced the biggest support ever with Marine Le Pen attracting almost eighteen per cent of the votes in the first round of 2012 presidential election (Bastow 2017) and the FN scoring 13.6 per cent in 2012 legislative election, its best ever result (Ivaldi 2018: 172). To understand the rise of right-wing populism in France, which centres around immigration, one needs to examine the evolution of the French immigration policy under Sarkozy, which explains how his legacy on immigration and integration catalysed the acceptance of right-wing populist ideas. During Sarkozy’s time in office, immigration policies, as well as integration policies, became more restrictive. Sarkozy introduced selective immigration approach, which aimed to increase highly skilled immigration to France at the expense of unwanted family migration. However, unable to fulfil this promise, closer to the end of his presidency, Sarkozy abandoned his pledge on selective immigration approach and focused on reducing student migration. Keen to get the numbers of unwanted migration down, Sarkozy’s immigration minister Claude Guéant introduced a circular that limited non-EU graduates’ right to stay © The Author(s) 2020 A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1_5

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in France upon the completion of their degree. Sarkozy reinforced ­integration of migrants, making it a condition for obtaining a long-term residence permit. A number of restrictive measures towards family migration were introduced, including the Contract of Reception and Integration (CAI), which increased financial requirements for family reunification, and the necessity to demonstrate  knowledge of French language and Republican values (Carvalho 2016: 61). Integration discourse was framed through Muslim lens (Tiberj and Michon 2013: 586), which led to the adoption of the laws banning the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and the covering of the face in public, both of which aimed to target Muslim girls and women, though not explicitly. The popularisation of restrictive immigration discourse was partly a result of UMP’s populism under Sarkozy, who has been adopting an accommodative strategy towards the FN (Mondon 2013: 170). Especially it was evident in the run-up to 2012 presidential election, when Sarkozy tried to imitate FN’s position on laïcité, which  centres around separation of public and religious institutions from each other. The challenge from the radical right in France is not new and the normalisation of some of the FN’s ideas has been happening since FN’s then leader Jean-Marie Le Pen got through to the second round of 2002 presidential election.  French immigration policy has undoubtedly been influenced by the electoral breakthrough of FN’s leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002 presidential election and the FN’s subsequent electoral growth, since Marine Le Pen replaced her father as the leader of the party in 2011. In addition to common wisdom that FN had a significant indirect impact (Schain 2006) on the evolution of the French immigration policy, I also argue that the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies during Sarkozy’s time in office is also explained by examining other exogenous factors such as the importance of public opinion, economic concerns over immigration, identity anxieties about Islam and the effects of the EU integration. This chapter  also explains the dynamics of the policy change by examining how institutional layering and departmental competition accounted for integration policy deadlock during Sarkozy’s time as a minister of the Interior and as a president of the Republic.

Immigration in France In the latter half of the twentieth century, the French population has experienced transformation as a result of the colonial migration.

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After the Second World War, colonial migration to France was explained by the need for foreign labour to rebuild the country (Edmiston and Dumenil 2009: 228; Guiraudon 2005: 154). The economy was largely dependent on the foreign labour force during the trente glorieuses, the three-decade period of economic flourishing that followed the end of the Second World War (Hollifield 2014: 164). However, the changes in the global economy altered the direction of French immigration policy, and when the oil crisis hit Western Europe in the 1970s, France revisited its policy on foreign workers, halting foreign labour recruitment, with the exception of highly skilled and seasonal workers (Guiraudon 2005: 154). It was relatively easy to slow labour migration as a response to economic difficulties, but it was not so simple to halt family migration from former colonies, which was ‘humanitarian in nature and constitutionally protected’ (Hollifield 2014: 165). Restrictions on labour migration and the increased family reunification arrivals during the decolonisation process brought an integration challenge, as the majority of North African immigration to France was Muslim (Freedman 2004: 128). Integration started to become a ‘major preoccupation in French politics since the mid-1980s’ (Gastaut 2012: 333). In 1980s integration has gained salience in France following the long-term settlement of millions of immigrants, who arrived not only from its former colonies such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, but also from other countries of North Africa (Adida et al. 2014; Hollifield 2014). As a high percentage of North African immigration is Muslim, the integration debate is mostly focused on Islam and the co-habitation of Islam with the republican tradition, which is egalitarian and secular in nature (Hollifield 2014: 157). The principle of laïcité (secularism) has long  dominated  French society and political circles (Guiraudon 2005: 166). Secularism  poses numerous controversies for integration policy (Vaïsse 2004: 3), which is primarily focused on integration of Muslims.  During d’Estaing’s presidency, France experienced major tightening of immigration policies, which was largely a result of the economic crisis. Family migration, primarily from the former colonies, has constituted a large part of the immigration to France in 1970s despite d’Estaing government’s attempts to stop and prevent further family migration by deporting the majority of North Africans, especially Algerians (Weil 2005: 18). The government tried to forcefully deport Algerians, who had legally entered France and had been living there for years, but due to the big public outcry from civil society, churches, trade unions, left-wing parties and the Council of State, the policy was later abandoned (Weil 2005: 18). With the election of the

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left-wing Mitterand, France saw a U-turn on immigration policy, allowing all immigrants, who legally entered the country and who established their life there to stay (Weil 2005: 17), which subsequently led to the increase in family reunification from former French colonies in Maghreb. Since then the radical right FN has heavily influenced the immigration debate in France (Guiraudon 2005). Immigration became a prominent issue, and the policy has been substantially redefined since Sarkozy became the minister of the Interior in 2002 and until the end of his presidency in 2012. Increasing highly skilled labour migration, tightening family migration, introducing tougher integration requirements for new arrivals, banning the wear of religious symbols and banning face covering in public places characterised French immigration policy between 2002 and 2012.

Selective Immigration Approach The evolution of the French immigration policy between 2002 and 2012 can largely be understood to address the economic needs of the country, which has been a logical continuation of the immigration policies France has had since the end of the Second World War. When in the 1970s, during the oil crisis, the French economy became affected and unemployment was on the rise (Malinvaud 1986), France adopted the policy of exporting unemployment in economically insecure times by halting foreign labour migration. Similarly, the slowdown in French economic growth and the subsequent increase in unemployment during 2005 (INSEE 2019) led to the introduction of a selective approach to immigration, which aimed to prevent the inflow of low-skilled migration from third countries to France. Before 2007 presidential election, Sarkozy announced the politics of selective immigration (immigration choisie), which aimed to increase highly skilled labour migration and decrease family migration (Sarkozy 2006). The change in immigration approach from imposed (immigration subie: family migration, asylum seekers) to selective immigration (highly skilled labour migration) was dictated by high family migration levels, which were creating concerns within the French public (Interview with Sarkozy’s special adviser, 2016). In order to limit imposed migration, which referred to migration as a fundamental right that can be exercised through family route (Viprey 2010), the rules for family migration were  tightened. Sarkozy viewed selective immigration approach as an instrument to attract the electorate during the election campaign for 2007 presidential election (Interview

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with Sarkozy’s special adviser, 2016). His attempts to do this were reflected in this 2006 law (Loi relative à l’immigration et l’intégration), which was known as his ‘latest effort to open France for highly skilled migration’ (The Migration Policy Institute 2007: 6). It reinforced selective immigration approach by welcoming highly skilled third country migrants by introducing the card of ‘competences and talents’ (CCT) (la carte de séjour ‘competences et talents’), which was given for the period of three years, with a possibility of renewal (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2014). While highly skilled migrants were welcome, the politics towards low-skilled non-EU migrants and EU migrants from new member states continued to be based on the occupation list and temporary work permits (Carvalho and Geddes 2012: 283). This law was passed during Sarkozy’s second term as a minister of the Interior. Shortly after leaving the government in 2004 to become a leader of the UMP, he was asked by Chirac to return to head the Ministry of the Interior. According to the law, an immigrant, who wanted to bring his family to France, needed to have lived in the country for eighteen months instead of one year as it was before and had to justify that he or she had enough means to support the family without accessing social assistance (Legifrance 2006). The new law made more difficult for spouses of French nationals to receive permanent residence, increasing the number of marriage years required: from two to three (Chou and Baygert 2007: 5). Low-skilled migration was viewed as a burden to already existing high levels of unemployment in French suburbs, which were double the unemployment rates in non-deprived areas (Observatoire des inégalites 2014). This high level of unemployment, which was highlighted by 2005 riots in French suburbs, made Sarkozy adopt selective immigration approach, which would focus on attracting highly skilled migrants that would benefit the French economy (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). In 2005, the French economy does not behave well, we already have massive unemployment […] The economy does not function well and if we continue with the open immigration, we will not be able to give jobs to immigrants as much as we did in 1960s. In 1961–1964 many immigrants from Magreb countries came to France. But back then we had economic growth, job growth and housing. In 2005 we did not have growth, we do not have housing or jobs. And this was the reason why we needed to slow down immigration. (Interview with a senior civil servant  from Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 2016)

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The major concern for Sarkozy and the UMP was immigration from former colonies, primarily from Maghreb countries, residents of which mostly used family route to immigrate to France. Selective immigration approach was adopted to reduce the inflow of non-EU nationals to France. Shortly after becoming the president, in 2007, Sarkozy charged immigration minister Brice Hortefeux with the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development (Sarkozy 2007). The new ministry passed the law on immigration, integration and asylum (Loi relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile), that reinforced selective immigration approach by encouraging highly skilled migration, aiming to increase its share to fifty per cent, and to decrease low-skilled and family migration (Legifrance 2007). The law focused on family migration and integration of family members. According to the law, anybody, who would be applying for family reunification or for the long-term visa, needed to show knowledge of French and, if need be, the applicant could be asked to follow a short, maximum two-month course in the country of application and to present an appropriate level of French after the completion of the course (Legifrance 2007). In addition, the CAI for families was introduced, which required parents to look after their children’s’ integration and linked access to family benefits with the success of integration. The law introduced tougher financial requirements for family reunion, depending on the size of a family (Legifrance 2007). During the parliamentary debate regarding the law, one of the UMP MPs, Thierry Mariani, proposed a controversial DNA test on family reunion, but this was met with strong opposition from the left-wing parties and the Constitutional Council has ruled that this proposal would be unconstitutional, and it was later dropped (Carvalho 2019). Such attempts to increase highly skilled migration at the expense of family migration, the rules for which were becoming more restrictive, were a red thread during Sarkozy’s time in the office. Apart from family migration stemming primarily from former colonies, the UMP was also cautious about EU migration, especially from new EU member states. Following 2005 and 2007 Eastern enlargements, France imposed temporary transitional controls for labour migration from new EU member states (Drew and Sriskandarajah 2007). The party was concerned with the impact of uncontrolled migration from these countries to the French labour market, creating higher unemployment. This explains UMP’s decision to impose transitional controls for the new EU member states and why it tried to limit non-EU migration (Interview with a senior

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civil servant from Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control 2016). But for Sarkozy, the issue was not just about decreasing low-skilled non-EU migration, it was also about boosting highly skilled non-EU migration. Following his electoral promise for 2007 presidential election, Sarkozy introduced the card of competences and talents. However, in the period between 2007 and 2011, only 1143 such cards were delivered (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2014), and the policy of increasing highly skilled labour migration from seven to fifty per cent failed. This turned out to be a non-efficient scheme to deliver, as highly skilled migrants that were coming to France were recruited by the employers directly and they did not need this card to come and look for a job in France. As Sarkozy’s former adviser put it: It addressed the non-existent problem. It is because of this we have delivered too little on selective immigration, because it responds to the problem that does not exist. Those people who fall within the requirements of the card don’t need it as they are recruited by the companies directly. (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016)

The introduction of the card of competences and talents was a way to demonstrate Sarkozy’s commitment to bring the brightest and the best immigration to the country, but, in reality, it did not do much. Global financial crisis that unfolded in 2007 presented a constraint for Sarkozy to increase highly skilled migration to France. The 2007 global economic crisis reinforced Sarkozy’s discourse on unemployment and social security and prevented the implementation of Sarkozy’s selective immigration approach (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016; Interview with the senior civil servant from the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 2016). There was a substantial increase in employment in France. According to the Directorate General of the Treasury, in 2009, France has seen the worst slowdown in its economic growth since the Second World War, with a 2.6 per cent GDP drop with the crisis leading to the major job losses in the period 2008–2009 (Vincent 2011: 1). The 2007 global financial crisis undermined the success of Sarkozy’s selective immigration policy, as it had a negative impact on the economic situation in France, which saw an increase in unemployment. The inability to increase highly skilled migration forced Sarkozy to adopt even stricter immigration stance before the 2012 presidential

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e­ lection. In his presidential programme ‘La France forte’ (strong France), he suggested decreasing current immigration levels by half, tightening family migration to those who speak French and who accept republican values and demanding better control of external borders and, in the case of failure to do so, France would reinstate its own borders (Sarkozy 2012: 3). In order to attract the electorate, Sarkozy promised to cut overall immigration numbers by reducing immigration by half, adopting an Anglo-Saxon quota approach, which was a non-traditional approach for France (Sarkozy 2012). This subsequently led to the introduction of more restrictive policy towards non-EU graduates. Immigration numbers have seen the overall increase during Sarkozy’s presidency (Tribalat 2017), which forced him to redefine his immigration approach as he had concerns over the defection of his electorate to the radical right (Interview with Sarkozy’s former special adviser, 2016). His minister of the Interior Claude Guéant proposed to cut legal immigration by 20,000 per year and maintain 180,000 net migration level. This Anglo-Saxon quota approach, not typical to France, was introduced to demonstrate that Sarkozy was addressing perceived public anxieties on immigration. This was impossible to complete, but instrumental in attracting the electorate (Interview with Sarkozy’s former special adviser, 2016) and prevent it from alienating to the FN.

Student Migration Owing to the inability to decrease non-EU migration to France, Sarkozy, for the first time during his legacy, tried to target student migration to get the numbers down. His close ally and immigration minister Claude Guéant issued a circular, which prohibited foreign non-EU graduates staying in France and looking for a job upon the completion of their degree (Pellet 2015). These proposals did not correspond to Sarkozy’s previous stance on immigration, which sought to increase highly skilled labour migration to fifty per cent (Carvalho and Geddes 2012: 291). The circular aimed to decrease the numbers of non-EU migrants on the French labour market by making it more difficult for the non-EU graduates to obtain a residence permit upon completion of their studies. Targeting student migration was a result of trying to limit the overall immigration numbers and boost Sarkozy’s popularity, as the immigration numbers increased from 195,000 in 2009 to 230,000 in 2012 (INSEE 2017).

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When Claude Guéant became the minister of the Interior, and his former adviser told me what happened. So, when he became the minister of the Interior, he saw the immigration statistics since 2007 and he saw that it has increased. So, at the time we are in the midst of presidential campaign and the president is going to tell the people that he increased immigration. This is impossible. And at that particular time he had a brutal politics regarding immigration. (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016)

This circular was met with widespread criticism not only by the public and the socialist party, but by a lot of UMP MPs, as it endangered France’s soft power (rayonnement) in the education sphere. The unpopularity of this decision with the public forced Guéant to modify the circular, allowing graduates to remain in France. The modification came from the large opposition of civil society and political actors, including politicians from within the UMP, because it became detrimental to the French educational system and French influence in the world (Interview with a senior civil servant  from the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 2016). The government backtracked its position on the issue in January 2012, when it presented an additional document that allowed non-EU graduates with a master’s degree and above to stay in the country and look for a job (Floch 2012). Student migration became the target of UMP’s government as a means to limit the overall migration inflow into France, which manifested itself in the protectionist politics of the French economy from foreign labour. On the issue of student migration, public opinion played a crucial role in softening Sarkozy’s stance on student migration and made him reverse the policy. Overall, immigration was tied to the needs of the economy and the emphasis was made on increasing highly skilled immigration, which was crucial for economic development. Strict controls for non-EU immigration and imposed restrictions on citizens of the new EU member states aimed to reduce the unwanted inflow of unskilled labour. 2007–2008 global financial crisis reinforced the discourse on unemployment and insecurity on the job market and posed a constraint for Sarkozy’s attempts to increase the share of highly skilled immigrants, as France, at the time, experienced high levels of unemployment and low demand for foreign labour.

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Integration, FN’s Impact and Perceived Identity Anxieties About Islam In France, the politics of immigration is not only focused on the management of the inflows but also centred around the issue of integration (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). Identity concerns remain a contentious issue because of the country’s colonial past, which led residents from former colonies settling in France, often with their families (Schain 2012). After the decolonisation of French empire and the 1970s oil crisis, France experienced large inflows of family migration primarily of Muslim background (Hollifield 2014), which created tensions in secular France. Integration policy in France has been closely associated with colonialism: ‘current “problems”, particularly associated with laïcité and national integration, are a replay of echo of the colonial past’ (Chabal 2017: 71). Despite being a multicultural country, France rejects multiculturalism and expects immigrants to integrate in French society by adhering to the values of the Republic. Understanding of the French integration debate is largely based on the assimilationist type of citizenship regime, which does not recognise cultural differences and prioritises migrants’ acceptance of the French societal values. Emphasising equality, universal and secularism, French integration model prioritises assimilation of immigrants (Marthaler 2008) to the French republican values of liberté, égalité, fraternité, which lies at the heart of French citizenship (van Houdt et al. 2011: 417). Assimilationist character of the  French citizenship regime stresses the importance of accepting  French values: ‘France combines short residence requirement and the allowance of dual nationality with fairly strong linguistic and cultural integration requirements and a strong jus soli for the second generation’ (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010: 779). Secular setup of France, which is underpinned by adherence to the Republican values, helps to explain integration policy changes. One of the underlying principles of French republicanism is the concept of laïcité (Drake 2011: 66), which means that the state does not favour any confession or any particular conception of the good life, while guaranteeing the free expression of every confession, with certain limits (Haarscher 2011). It embraces ‘the removal of the religious factor in public life’ (Drake 2011: 66) and comes as a particular challenge for Islam because Islam does not recognise the separation of church and state. In this way, the conflation of private and public sphere of religious expression has entered French immigration debate. As Islam is

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the second religion in France in terms of adherents, the integration of Muslims into a French society poses a challenge as French republican tradition does not officially recognise the exposure of cultural and religious differences (Marthaler 2008). Furthermore, ‘the perception that migrants, particularly Muslim migrants, are no longer assimilable has been a predominant issue in the immigration debate since the mid-1980s’ (Marthaler 2008). While French republicanism requires strong separation between private and public spheres, especially when it comes to religion, Islam fails to accept that separation, which creates tensions in the French society. Republicanism points out how the issue of Islam in France has become central in the French political debate, which led to the substantial changes in integration legislation, with republicanism becoming ‘the dominant discourse in all discussions of laïcité’ (Chabal 2015: 69). Therefore, the changes in integration policy, debate around Islam and integration of Muslims are explained through the lens of republicanism. The incompatibility between republican values and Islam led to the numerous debates on integration of Muslims into French society, including contentious debates on headscarves and full veils. In France, the debate around integration has been influenced by the colonial past and has been calibrated by the issue of Islam and the danger that it poses to the French national identity, a concept that does not have one established definition, especially considering France’s diverse immigration background. Changes in French integration policy during Sarkozy’s time in office were driven by the perceived concern of the French about the disappearance of national identity, about the invasion of foreign cultures, which was represented through the lens of Islam: The French society is afraid. It is afraid to be invaded, it is afraid to recognise itself (de se reconnaître), it is afraid to lose its identity and all these fears crystallise through the question of Islam nowadays. (Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016)

The anti-Islam sentiment is also fuelled by the  pressure from the FN. The electoral success of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 2002 presidential election signalled the importance of addressing public anxieties about integration and Islam. As it will be demonstrated below, perceived identity concerns underpinned the logic of integration policy change during Sarkozy’s time in office, as he was trying to demonstrate that he and his

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party had the ownership of the issue (Interview with a senior civil servant from the  Inter-ministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 2016). However, by trying to appeal to FN’s voters, Sarkozy only deepened the existing divisions between minorities and receiving society (Tiberj and Michon 2013: 586). The first major example of Sarkozy’s attempt to attract Le Pen’s electorate through integration lens was a controversial headscarf affair, which led to the creation of infamous law on banning the religious symbols in French public schools in 2004. It started with the expulsion of two female students who were wearing headscarves in public school in the Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis in 2003 (Van Eeckhout 2007). Responding to integration anxieties of the public about the incompatibility of Islam with the republican values, primarily, laïcité, French president Jacques Chirac ‘succumbed to public pressure to set up a commission to investigate the wearing of religious symbols at schools’ (Chabal 2015: 66). He established the Stasi Commission, which examined the application of the principle of laïcité and issued a recommendation to ban wearing of headscarf in public schools (Le Monde 2003). This recommendation was voted in March 2004, when both chambers of the French parliament voted in favour of the legislation banning religious symbols in French state schools (Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics) (Legifrance 2004). Despite being a contentious issue, this law was supported by more than three quarters of the public (IFOP 2015: 9). Both chambers of the French parliament voted in favour of the legislation banning religious symbols in French public schools (Legifrance 2004). This legislation targeted primarily the issue of headscarves, worn by Muslim girls, even though the word ‘headscarf’ was not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the law. The French were largely in favour of the law, as they were concerned that the arrival of new immigrants from different cultures would threaten French national identity (Martigny 2009: 27). The headscarf affair that sparked a heated debate in 2003–2004, reminded political elites of the importance of integration. Even though Muslims represent only 7.5 per cent of the total French population, compared to sixty-three per cent of Christians (Pew Research Center 2015), the presence of Islam in France and the integration of Muslims remain contentious issues as Muslim immigration in a strongly secular France poses certain challenges. French society is multicultural in nature, but it rejects multiculturalism per se, strongly arguing

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for the assimilation of immigrants (Marthaler 2008). With a large proportion of French immigrant population and those of immigrant origin, particularly from Muslim  countries and Islam being the second religion in France in terms of adherents (Hollifield 2014), the issues of integration and Islam remain at the core of the French immigration debate. The situation with integration of immigrants and French of immigrant origin came to the forefront of the agenda in 2005, provoking riots in Parisian suburbs, which were a public backlash against the electrocution of two teenagers of immigrant origin who were followed by the French police (Mucchielli and Goaziou 2007). It signalled the marginalisation of the French citizens of immigrant origins by the French authorities and triggered integration to become a primary preoccupation for Sarkozy before the 2007 presidential election. Riots in Parisian suburbs and the FN’s rhetoric on integration and law and order led to the change in Sarkozy’s integration paradigm from that of anti-discrimination to the equality of chances (Van Eeckhout 2007). As one UMP MP remarked, the evolution of the French integration policy has been effectively focused on the French citizens of immigrant origin, on those living in French suburbs (banlieues), and on those who are French, but who do not feel accepted by the French society, either economically or culturally: Of course, the problem is not 200,000 immigrants that arrive every year, rather the problem is 5–6 million of people in France, whose grandparents were immigrants, but they are now French, but they have a problem with national identity. […] The problem is not the foreigners, it is the French that are not assimilated. (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016)

The danger of Sarkozy’s electorate defecting to the radical right FN and the constant politicisation of immigration, national identity and integration by the FN led to the reinforcement of Sarkozy’s discourse. National identity and integration became one of the major topics of Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign with Sarkozy stressing the importance of integration into French society by learning French before coming to France, respecting republican values of laïcité and equality between men and women (Sarkozy 2007: 14). Sarkozy also promised to create the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development to tackle the crisis of national identity (Sarkozy 2007: 14). Associating immigration with the crisis of national identity and portraying immigration as a danger were comparable with the rhetoric of the radical right FN (Carvalho

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and Geddes 2012: 283) and aimed to attract part of the FN’s electorate (Carvalho 2019). This accommodative strategy proved to be successful in attracting some of the FN’s electorate (Mayer 2007). Immigration was a crucial issue for the voters with forty per cent of them indicating that immigration was very important in influencing their vote (Brouard and Tiberj 2007: 2). Soon after the presidential election, Sarkozy fulfilled his electoral promise and created the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development with the intention to reduce immigration, improve integration and promote national identity (Duelund 2016: 213). The rhetoric around the creation of this Ministry was a sign of ‘soft nationalism’ (Noiriel 2007) and aimed at targeting FN voters during the presidential campaign by stressing the importance of national identity and integration (Marlière 2013: 33). Following the establishment of the Ministry, launching the debate on the national identity in 2009 was another example of Sarkozy’s accommodative strategy towards FN. The debate on national identity arose under the pressure from the FN. There would not have been the debate if we did not have such strong FN. The defence of national identity is the electoral question of the FN. And Nicholas Sarkozy knew that and used that. (Interview with former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016)

The FN has been capitalising on national identity concerns and Sakrozy with the UMP could not afford losing the credibility on the issue. This prompted the launch of the debate on national identity in 2009; however, contrary to the aim, the debate on national identity, launched by the immigration minister Éric Besson (Besson 2009), did not find much support within the French public and was viewed negatively by the majority of the population (Libération 2010). Associating immigration with the crisis of national identity and portraying immigration as a danger were comparable with the rhetoric of the radical right FN (Carvalho and Geddes 2012: 283) and aimed to attract the FN’s electorate (Carvalho  2019). However, this debate proved to be detrimental to Sarkozy’s attempts to recuperate FN’s voters, and endangered the alienation of his own electorate. Thinking about political gain, Sarkozy did not account for the difficulty in defining national identity, especially in such a country as France, which has a long colonial history.

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This was a political sign for the FN’s electorate to reassure them that he wanted to take care of national identity but the big mistake is that nobody knows what is national identity and nobody can give specific definition of what it is. (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016)

With the pressure not only from the left-wing camp, but also from within his own party, this debate was abandoned in February 2010 when, after three months of discussions on Islam and xenophobia, Sarkozy was forced to halt the debate because of the public disapproval (Lemarié 2012). Public attitudes on the creation of the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development and public dissatisfaction with 2009 national identity debate led to the U-turn on immigration policy, halting the national identity debate and dissolving of the Ministry in November 2010 with immigration affairs returning under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Interior. The halt of the debate on French national identity, which was disapproved by the public and which subsequently led to the dissolution of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development in autumn 2010, demonstrated that public opinion was essential in driving immigration policy change under Sarkozy (Wihtol de Wenden 2012: 326), at times, in a more liberal direction. After the dissolution of the Ministry, integration still remained a priority issue for Sarkozy alongside the reduction of overall migration numbers (Carvalho 2019). National identity, integration, Islam and republican values were at the forefront of the agenda, especially during Sarkozy’s presidency. In 2010 the French Parliament passed legislation on the prohibition of covering faces in public, more commonly known as a ‘burqa ban’—2010 law prohibiting the covering of faces in public places (Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public) (Legifrance 2010). Six years after the prohibition of the wearing of headscarves in French public schools, the question of Muslim integration and secularisation returned to the forefront of the political debates. The debate originated from the request of the French Communist Party MP in 2009 to create a commission on the practice of the wearing of niqab and burqa on the national territory—‘Commission on the practice of the wearing of niqab and burqa on the national territory’ (Commision d’enquête sur la pratique du port du niqab et de la burqa sur la territoire national) (Roger 2010). However, French president Nicholas Sarkozy has endorsed the proposition and expressed his view on the ban of the full veil in France, saying that ‘Burqa

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is not welcome on the territory of the republic, […] it is not a religious problem, but a problem of liberty and dignity of a woman’ (The Guardian 2009). This led to the adoption of the law in October 2010, which prohibited the coverage of the face in public places (Gabizon 2010). Even though the text of the law did not explicitly mention the word ‘burqa’ or ‘veil’, and did not refer to any religious belonging, it was implicitly directed against Islam and Muslim women wearing full veil. It was estimated that around 2000 women wear the full veil in France and represent a tiny minority of the four million Muslim population in the country (Camus 2013). The law envisaged 150 euros fine for women for wearing a full veil, and one-year prison sentence and 30,000 euros fine for men who would force female members of their family to wear a full veil (Legifrance 2010). This law was later upheld by the International Court of Human Rights, which indicated that French authorities have the legal right to preserve the idea of ‘living together’ (Jamet and Ceilles 2014). Despite controversy, it received substantial public support with eighty-two per cent approving of the ban (Pew Research Center 2010). By reinforcing this kind of discourse and laws, Sarkozy politicised the issue of Islam emphasising strong attachment of the French to laïcite (Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016).

Cultural, but Not Socio-Economic Integration While Sarkozy focused on cultural integration, he failed to address the socio-economic one: unfavourable socio-economic status of immigrants and French of immigrant origin. The socio-economic status of immigrant and immigrant origin French population remains largely disadvantaged with higher unemployment rates and unfavourable fiscal positions of immigrant households (OECD 2017: 23). Socio-economic integration has not undergone major changes because of the absence of political will, as Sarkozy feared that increasing economic investment into integration would not find widespread public support and would go against what he campaigned for: not bring more family migrants who need to integrate, but limit family migration because of economic and cultural concerns. If we refer to the politics of integration of immigration, there are talks that we should do something positive for the immigrants, but politically there is no courage to do it. There is no wish to really do it. (Interview with

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­ arie-­José Bernardot, former head of the Office for territorial, social and M cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, 2016)

The politicisation of the immigration debate by the FN has forced Sarkozy to redefine their immigration stances and policies on cultural integration, but not on socio-economic one (Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016). By addressing integration issue from only one perspective—cultural, which has been widely exploited by FN—Sarkozy attempted to neutralise the competitor, which, like Sarkozy, did not care about improving economic position of immigrants. There is an influence in a sense that FN neutralises two principal parties of the government. It neutralises or, in other words, simplifies the debate. So, all the stakes are at addressing the debate and leaving the FN aside. (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016)

Indeed, Sarkozy did address the debate, but it was the debate about cultural integration, not socio-economic one. While there was sufficient discourse about the intention to improve integration, there was a lack of political will to finance the integration policy and to improve socio-­ economic situation of the immigrants and the French of immigrant origin. Governmental policy towards integration of Muslims had more of an assimilative character, which led to the prohibition of ostentatious symbols in French public schools following the ‘headscarf affair’. In order to boost his popularity and prevent the alienation of his electorate to FN, Sarkozy chose to target cultural integration, by reinforcing the Republican values of laïcité, and has not focused on addressing economic integration, which aims to incorporate people into French society by erasing discrimination of immigrants and the French of immigrant origin, creating opportunities for achieving better educational results, decreasing unemployment and increasing wages. Socio-economic deprivation in the French suburbs came to the forefront of the French political agenda in 2005, when violence erupted in Parisian suburbs. These riots led to the evolution of integration policy and triggered an important change in Sarkozy’s integration approach, shifting it from an anti-discrimination to an equal opportunities paradigm. The adoption of the law for equality of opportunities (Loi pour l’égalité des chances) represented a legal basis for this change. The creation of ACSE aimed to improve social cohesion and finance the development

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of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. However, this change in approach erased an important legal instrument of punishment of those who were discriminating and the change in Sarkozy’s integration discourse after 2005 riots aimed to draw away attention from discrimination to equal opportunities: Nicholas Sarkozy closes the only public institution in charge of discrimination—FASILD (Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discrminations) and proposes to create the institution that will focus on the notion of equal opportunities […] which is not attached to legal framework, meaning that in case of discrimination you cannot sentence anyone. (Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frederic Callens, 2016)

The lack of political will to properly finance the integration budget was an obstacle to developing integration (Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016). While it was more pleasant to show the electorate that on cultural integration Sakozy toughened the rules, it is more politically risky to address economic integration (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). Sarkozy’s approach focused on cultural integration but neglected socio-economic integration in socially deprived areas with high immigrant concentration. Despite the promise and the introduction of equality opportunities approach, the improvement with economic integration is not felt by the residents in those areas (Chrisafis 2015). On the contrary, the gap between unemployment rates in sensitive urban zones (zones urbaines sensibles) and other zones widened (Observatoire des inégalites 2014). Sarkozy’s goal to improve socio-­ economic integration was only present on the level of discourse but lacked the political will to improve the actual situation in the French suburbs.

Effects of the EU Integration Intra-EU migration has never been a concern for France; on the contrary, in the post-war period, French political authorities had preferences for European migration, instead of migration from former colonies, because it was easier to assimilate Europeans than North Africans (Schain 2012). Despite the absence or substantial concerns with intra-EU migration, the EU, nonetheless, played a salient role in Sarkozy’s security discourse on

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immigration, which stressed the necessity to retain control over the French border with another EU member state—Italy. Sarkozy and the UMP were primarily concerned with illegal migration coming from other EU member states, especially Italy, and the protection of the maritime border with European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). In his 2007 presidential election programme, Sarkozy considered that cooperation between the countries in immigration domain was necessary and expressed support for strengthening of the European borders (Sarkozy 2007: 10). The absence of border controls with neighbouring countries and Schengen free travel within the EU created anxieties about third-country illegal migration stemming to France (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). So, they came primarily from the Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria to get to the UK or other countries in Europe. There is also irregular migration from French colonies, from the black Africa, Maghreb… People, who pass specifically through Italy and arrive to France. (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016)

The choice for stricter immigration policies was also a result of the effects of the EU integration such as the free movement of people. Following Arab Spring and the arrival of refugees from Tunisia and Libya, Italy accepted them, which allowed them to move freely within the EU (Cottey 2013: 255). The lack of control over external EU border led to tensions with Italy. In spring 2011, France temporarily reinstated the border checks with Italy and turned away some of the migrants (Cottey 2013: 255), which was a violation of Schengen Agreement. Sarkozy and the UMP had concerns about the ineffective controls of the EU border and the malfunctioning of the Schengen area, which resulted in the suspension of the French border with Italy for a short period of time with the issue escalating to the EU level. The UMP emphasised the need to protect EU’s external border from the illegal migration inflow from the Middle East and the need to transform Schengen to prevent the inflow of illegal immigration to France (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). The EU enlargements and EU integration, which manifested itself in the absence of borders within the EU, have had an impact on the Sarkozy’s immigration stance and not only affected his discourse on illegal immigration but also

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involved the suspension of border with another EU state, even though for a short period of time. Effects of the EU integration such as free movement of people posed a challenge for Sarkozy and the UMP with regard to the loss of sovereignty, which manifested itself through the necessity of cohesion between the French law and the EU law. These concerns related to the impossibility of the French government to reduce unwanted family migration stemming from the EU because of the European legal framework (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016; Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). This resulted in the UMP making a populist argument about the superiority of the supranational EU, referring primarily to Schengen Agreement: Nowadays the policies are communitarised, visa policies, border control… So, there are subjects where Europe exercises more competence than member states. (Interview with a senior civil servant from Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 2016)

Sarkozy’s immigration paradigm underwent major transformation in response to the interaction of a variety of factors. The importance of public opinion on immigration and integration, combined with the increasing pressure from the radical right FN and with perceived identity anxieties of the public, which focused on Islam, was instrumental in the redefinition of immigration policies under Sarkozy. The effects of the EU integration, such as enlargements and the free movement of people within the EU, led to evolution of the French immigration policy in a more restrictive direction, imposing transitional controls on labour migration and temporarily shutting the land border with Italy. Unstable economic situation, combined with 2007–2008 global financial crisis, resulted in the introduction of restrictive measures on student migration, which were abandoned at the later stage due to the public disapproval. Sarkozy’s failure to increase the share of highly skilled migration is also explained by the global financial crisis, which aggravated the economic situation in France.

Explaining Immigration Policy Change and Integration Policy Deadlock During the ten years that Sarkozy and his party were in the office, his discourse on immigration underwent substantial transformation. A particularly stark contrast in Sarkozy’s immigration stance could be seen before

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the 2007 presidential elections and towards the end of Sarkozy’s presidency. His rhetoric had shifted from the limitation of family migration and increase of highly skilled migration to the limitation of overall immigration numbers. Framing is the way political actors present their policy positions and portray immigration through the lens of external factors to justify their policy choices. Frames “function as modes of attribution and articulation. They attribute blame for perceived social problems to individuals, social groups or structures that are believed to have caused the problem in question (diagnostic framing) and also suggest a general line of action (prognostic framing)” (Rydgren 2005: 426). Political actors do not adopt frames randomly; they are careful in selecting which to choose because they are seeking to adopt the frame that will resonate with a large number of voters in order to attract new voters and prevent the old electorate from alienating. Framing acted as a discursive mechanism responsible for justifying Sarkozy’s position on immigration.  By identifying family migration as a major social problem, Sarkozy  argued that immigrants were a burden on the social welfare system and family migration needed to be reduced. To reduce the pressure from family migration, he proposed to increase financial requirements and introduce mandatory integration for family members in the form of the CAI. Discourse on highly skilled labour migration has changed as well. While before 2007 presidential election Sarkozy framed highly skilled labour migration as beneficial and needed for economic growth, such discourse disappeared before 2012 presidential election as Sarkozy feared defection of his electorate to Marine Le Pen. Towards the end of his presidency, Sarkozy substantially changed his framing on immigration, by arguing not only for the restriction on family migration, but also by highlighting the necessity to reduce the buyers of legal migration. Before 2012 presidential election, he framed immigration through a numeric lens, proposing to cut immigration in half, from 200,000 to 100,000 a year (Sarkozy 2012), aiming to recuperate Le Pen’s electorate. In order to reduce overall immigration numbers, student migration was the new target of the conservative immigration minister Claude Guéant, who framed student migration in a negative light, arguing that studying at French universities had become a way of getting into the country for reasons other than education. The discourse on limiting student migration was also framed around economic anxieties that it posed for the French labour market. Framing of integration policy was centred through the lens of Islam with Sarkozy arguing that it was a threat to the values of equality and

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s­ ecularism—the cornerstones of the French republicanism. The emphasis on cultural integration was at the heart of Sarkozy’s discourse with strong opposition to headscarves in French public schools and full veils in public places. Sarkozy blamed Muslim communities for the failure to integrate, which allowed him to reinforce concerns about the erosion of the French national identity. To address these issues, Sarkozy proposed to launch the national identity debate and supported the ban of covering the face in public places, which targeted Muslim women wearing burqas. Integration was a cornerstone of Sarkozy’s political agenda during his time in the office, both as a minister of the Interior and as a president of France. When Sarkozy was appointed the minister of the Interior in Chirac’s government in 2002, he argued for positive discrimination of immigrants and French of immigrant origin. Following 2005 riots in French suburbs, Sarkozy’s integration policy paradigm changed from anti-­ discrimination to equal opportunities approach. The adoption of equal opportunities paradigm resulted in the creation of the new institution in charge of equal opportunities—ACSE (Agence Nationale pour la Cohesion Sociale et l’Egalité des Chances), which was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Urban Policy (Ministère de la Ville), leading to the first integration policy deadlock. The essence of this deadlock was that integration policy became dominated by the urban policy, which eventually resulted in the re-separation of these policies and transfer of integration policy to the Ministry of the Interior. A second integration policy deadlock occurred when the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, designed to improve integration and created shortly after Sarkozy’s election as a president, was abolished three years later. What mechanisms account for this policy deadlock? From Anti-discrimination to Equal Opportunities Paradigm Shortly after his appointment as Minister of the Interior in Chirac’s government in 2002, Sarkozy promised to improve integration by taking a positive discrimination approach towards foreigners and French of immigrant origin (issus de l’immigration). As minister of the Interior, Sarkozy stressed the importance of making integration more efficient by focusing on the integration of those people, who were discriminated in the communities, which by and large are populated with immigrants and the French of immigrant origin (Simon 2009). This positive discrimination approach was bold and distinguished Sarkozy from president Chirac’s

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position, putting him at odds with the French republican tradition, where individuals are defined without considering their gender, social and ethnic background and place of residence (Drake 2011; Marthaler 2008; Simon 2007). Sarkozy’s integration approach was centred around cultural integration, supporting the ban of religious symbols in state schools (Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics), but neglected socio-economic integration in socially deprived areas with high immigrant concentration. It had not focused on addressing economic integration, which meant incorporating people into French society by erasing discrimination against immigrants and the French of immigrant origin, creating opportunities for achieving better educational results, decreasing unemployment and increasing wages. As a number of interviewees pointed out, addressing integration only from cultural perspective, which has been notably advocated by FN, was Sarkozy’s attempt to neutralise the competitor, which, similarly to Sarkozy, did not focus on improving the economic position of immigrants and providing better chances for them (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016; Interview with the UMP MP, 2016). It was more acceptable to show the electorate that on cultural integration, Sarkozy toughened the rules; it was more politically risky to address economic integration (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser 2016). An absence of political will explains the lack of socio-­ economic integration, as Sarkozy feared that increasing economic investment into integration would not find widespread public support (Interview with Marie-José Bernardot, former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, 2016). As 2005 riots highlighted socio-economic deprivation in Parisian suburbs and in French suburbs more generally, Sarkozy was forced to address socio-economic integration. The riots erupted in Parisian suburbs, showing a public backlash against the electrocution of two teenagers of immigrant origin who were followed by the French police (Mucchielli and Goaziou 2007). They signalled the marginalisation of French citizens of immigrant origin by the French authorities, and not the positive discrimination that Sarkozy promised in 2002 (Marthaler 2008). The riots led to the evolution of integration policy by triggering an important change in Sarkozy’s integration approach, shifting it from an anti-discrimination to an equal opportunities paradigm. Sarkozy decided to replace the institution responsible for discrimination against immigrants

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and French issus de l’immigration FASILD (Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations) with ACSE. The anti-discrimination paradigm had been implemented by the FASILD, a governmental agency that had been in charge of integration of immigrants or those of immigrant origin, living primarily in disadvantaged areas (quartiers prioritaires) as well as the fight against their discrimination (Senat n.d.). Name change also reflected change in mission. While FASILD targeted discrimination of the immigrants and French of immigrant origin, ACSE was no longer working with the immigrant population and instead focused on reducing territorial inequalities (Escafré-Dublet 2014: 5). Policy of equality of opportunity applied to all French citizens irrespective of their origin, but, by and large, ACSE’s policies ‘while not targeted—disproportionally affected people of immigrant descent’ (Escafré-Dublet 2014: 5). However, ACSE’s role did not envisage the notion of fighting against discrimination, thus hindering socio-economic integration of immigrants and French of immigrant origin (Lepinard and Simon 2008; Noël 2008). This was not in line with the positive discrimination approach promised by Sarkozy, because the new institution—ACSE—was designed to promote equal opportunities to those living in socially deprived areas (quartiers prioritaires), but not fight against discrimination of these people, as was previously done by FASILD.  This represented the change from the promise of positive integration of immigrants and French of immigrant origin to the adoption of the new paradigm, which promoted equal opportunities for every French citizen, not just immigrants or those issus de l’immigration. This change in integration approach erased an important legal instrument of punishment of those who were discriminating and not helping to ensure the equality of opportunities: Nicolas Sarkozy closes the only public institution in charge of discrimination—FASILD and proposes to create the ACSE that will focus on the notion of equal opportunities […] which is not attached to legal framework, meaning that in case of discrimination you cannot sentence anyone. (Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frédéric Callens, 2016)

Replacing FASILD, ACSE as a new social actor reunited urban policy (la politique de la ville) and integration policy and was placed under the

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authority of the Ministry of Urban Policy (Le Ministère de la Ville). Integration policy deadlock occurred because ACSE was layered to the existing institution—the Ministry of Urban Policy—which led to the domination of urban policy over integration, eventually resulting in the re-separation of these policies and transfer of integration into a different institution—Ministry of the Interior. While Streeck and Thelen (2005: 31) argue that institutional layering destabilises existing institutions, resulting in the defeat of the old layer, the case of urban policy domination within ACSE under the Ministry of Urban Policy demonstrates that the opposite can be true. It shows how a new institutional layer (integration policy) does not necessarily defeat the old one (urban policy), leading to integration policy deadlock. The competition within ACSE between integration and urban policy led to unequal redistribution of financial resources, which were disproportionately allocated in favour of urban policy. As a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot explained: It took time to reform the administration and harmonisation of urban policy with the policy of integration, which originally belonged to two different ministries—Ministry of Urban Policy and Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, which resulted in the domination of urban policy and received the majority of the ACSE’s budget. (Interview with a former head of the Office for territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior, Marie-José Bernardot, 2016)

Institutional layering led to the intra-departmental competition within ACSE, where none of the actors were ready to compromise, resulting in the failure of integration policy. A former regional director of FASILD and ACSE, Frédéric Callens underlined: Departmental competition within the newly formed institution—ACSE resulted in the re-separation of these policies. The wish of every administration to have their own budget and independent decision-making powers, which made cooperation impossible, precipitated the failure of integration policy. (Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE Frédéric Callens, 2016)

This competition arises as a result of the political relationships between actors (Suleiman 1978). Different subdivisions within ACSE

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were driven by different goals, which made cooperation between them problematic. Furthermore, such competition is structured by power relations that exist within a single organisation, where different autonomous subdivisions might have unequal influence (Suleiman 1974: 149). In the case of ACSE, weak subdivisions like integration policy were ‘unable to obtain necessary information for asserting the influence […] and without the necessary means cannot overcome the hostilities’ of other subdivisions (Suleiman 1974: 150). As a result of the inability of integration policy actors to exert influence on the Ministry of Urban Policy terms of decision-making and allocation of resources, integration policy was placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, and later under the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. Institutional layering, which attached ACSE to the Ministry of Urban Policy, caused departmental tensions between integration and urban policy, leading to the domination of the latter and integration policy deadlock. Creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development When Sarkozy announced he would run for the presidency, integration and national identity became one of the major topics of Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign with the promise of the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, which would be responsible for tackling the so-called crisis of national identity and improving integration (Ivaldi 2008). Sarkozy pledged that all immigration matters, including integration, would be incorporated under the umbrella of one ministry: Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development (Sarkozy 2007: 14). By associating immigration with the crisis of national identity, Sarkozy aimed to attract part of the FN’s electorate (Carvalho 2019; Mayer 2007). Shortly after becoming the president, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development was created, whose role was to ‘improve the social integration of immigrants, and to promote national identity’ (Duelund 2016: 213). However, linking immigration to national identity provoked strong criticisms among liberals (Ocak 2016) because it ‘legitimised perceptions of immigration representing a threat to national identity. The rhetoric around the creation of this ministry was a sign of ‘soft nationalism’ (Noiriel 2007) and aimed at targeting FN voters during the presiden-

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tial campaign by stressing the importance of national identity and integration (Marlière 2013: 33). One of the major events, associated with new Ministry, was the debate on national identity, which was launched on Sarkozy’s demand by ­immigration minister Eric Besson in October 2009 (Le Monde 2009). With the pressure not only from the left-wing camp, but also from within his own party, this debate was quickly abandoned in February 2010 when, after three months of discussions on Islam and xenophobia, Sarkozy was forced to halt the debate because the public viewed it as unconstructive (Lemarié 2012). Public dissatisfaction with the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development and with the national identity debate led to the halt of the debate with Sarkozy publicly recognising that it ‘had led to tensions and misunderstandings’ (Duelund 2016: 213). Aiming to boost his electoral base, Sarkozy did not realise that national identity was not something specific or easy to define, especially in a country like France, which has a long colonial history. As one of the UMP MP’s pointed out: Sarkozy’s strategy to start the debate was a political sign for the FN’s electorate, made to reassure them that national identity would be taken care of, but the big mistake was that nobody knew what national identity is, it was something that was difficult to describe. (Interview with the UMP MP, 2016)

While the halt of the national identity debate is explained by public disapproval, what accounted for the dissolution of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development? It was abolished in November 2010, with immigration affairs being placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior (Wihtol de Wenden 2012: 326). The dissolution of the Ministry, which aimed to improve integration and tackle national identity crisis, represented another integration policy deadlock. Shortly after Sarkozy was elected as president, he created the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development in 2007, reuniting the Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Work under its umbrella. In case of the new Ministry, which united the responsibilities of three different ministries that had their own stabilised rules and conventions, such layering did not result in policy change, but led to opposition of the ministers and their administrations to work together. As Sarkozy’s

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former adviser highlighted, there was strong resistance by each of the ministers and their administrations to any compromise on integration, including sharing a common budget and decision-making powers (Interview with Sarkozy’s former adviser, 2016). Institutional layering led to ­departmental competition, which referred to the competition among staff from three different ministries: the Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Work. Departmental competition implies that policy change is affected by the policymaking logics of different departments within one institution with the departments known to protect their interests rather than contribute to the overall policy as they have developed specific cultures of policymaking within their own departments or ministries. The conflicts among ministers and their administration are a result of the politicisation of the French civil servants that have their own political loyalties (Suleiman 1978). Considerable autonomy that civil servants acquire (Genieys 2005: 416), which is enshrined in the educational practices of the French Grandes Ecoles that they attend (Birnbaum 1982; Bourdieu 1996), explains their resistance to cooperation. Interministerial tensions, which included the resistance to share decision-­making powers and path-dependency of policymaking practices that three ministries and their administrations had, were highlighted by civil servants working inside the Ministry (Interview with a senior civil servant, 2016) and by the senior civil servant from the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control: So, we have made it badly, we have put all together. The administrations that have reunited in this new ministry, did not really work together. In addition, there are physical constraints as well. When the people want to work together, physical constraints do not matter. Physically people are in different ministries, but legally they are under authority of one Ministry of Immigration. And, we have not put different services in the Ministry that we should have put because there was a lot of disagreement between the ministries. The new Ministry was created, but the people did not want to work together and in three years the Ministry has been dissolved. (Interview with a senior civil servant from the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control, 2016)

The conflicts among different ministries reunited under one institution stem from the fact that each ministry aimed to ‘reaffirm its centrality in the

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governance process’ (Bezes 2009, 2016). In the context of new Ministry, the conflict related ‘to the chains of hierarchical authority that govern relations between multiple levels of organization (distribution of tasks, circulation of information and modes of control’ (Bezes 2007: 21). Institutional layering, which fused immigration and integration matters under the authority of three ministries into one, led to departmental tensions within the new institution, which accounted for integration policy deadlock. As a result, the Ministry was eventually dissolved in 2010. Furthermore, departmental tensions also arose between ACSE, who was a social actor, and three ministries that were merged into the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. Following the separation of urban and integration policies, which were originally attached to the Ministry of the Urban Policy, ACSE was first placed under the umbrella of the Ministry of Integration and later transferred to the authority of the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development. This organisational layering of ACSE as a social actor to the new Ministry resulted in new departmental tensions, now between the staff from ACSE, who were responsible for integration matters, and ministerial staff. As former regional director of FASILD and ACSE Frédéric Callens explained, the inclusion of integration policy under the new Ministry led to the exclusion of social actors like the ACSE from strategic planning and governance, which was dominated by the ministerial staff (Interview with a former regional director of FASILD and ACSE Frédéric Callens, 2016). The tensions arose between the Ministry staff and the ACSE staff, as the latter were not given freedom to act and their decision-making powers were limited. This organisational layering can equally cause policy deadlocks. Those who come from ACSE, they find themselves in the new organism that tells them to do things differently, to do different things and to use different methods, other objectives and other actors. (Interview with the former head of the Office or territorial, social and cultural integration in the Ministry of the Interior Marie-José Bernardot, 2016)

Sarkozy’s attempt to incorporate integration matters under the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development led to the exclusion of social actors from the decision-making and implementation process, which was dominated by ministerial actors. These departmental conflicts, in addition to departmental competition between

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Ministry of Integration and Social Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Work, led to the integration policy deadlock and to the eventual dissolution of the Ministry in late 2010.

Conclusion Immigration policy in France between 2002 and 2012 underwent a considerable transformation, which included tightening of family migration, redefining integration policy by prohibiting the wearing of headscarves in public schools and full veils in public, creating tougher conditions for student migration and abandoning the pledge on increasing highly skilled immigration. The change started with the appointment of Sarkozy as the minister of the Interior in 2002, and the adoption of accommodative strategy towards the FN on immigration, which remained salient during his presidency. The importance of pleasing the public was instrumental in redefining immigration and integration paradigms and underpinned toughening of Sarkozy’s immigration discourse and policies. However, at times, public opinion also led to a liberalisation of Sarkozy’s policies, including relaxing the rules for student migration and the halt of the national identity debate. Identity concerns contributed to the change in Sarkozy’s rhetoric and led to the major changes in integration policies, which resulted in the prohibition of religious symbols in public schools and the ban of wearing full veils in public places. Sarkozy’s policies highlighted the attempts to address cultural integration, while ignoring socio-­ economic ones. The effects of the EU integration, particularly free movement of people within the EU, played a salient role in the Sarkozy’s security discourse on migration by emphasising the importance of the protection of the EU external border from third-country illegal immigration. Economic anxieties on immigration underpinned Sarkozy’s selective immigration approach, which aimed to increase highly skilled migration and reduce unwanted family migration, and its impact on the French welfare state. Global financial crisis, which aggravated economic situation in France, impeded the successful implementation of the selective immigration approach. This crisis presented a constraint for Sarkozy to succeed in his selective immigration by expanding highly skilled labour migration because it led to slower economic growth, which resulted in increased unemployment.

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While being the minister of the Interior and the president of the Republic Sarkozy promised to improve integration but failed to do so, where attempt to change integration policy resulted in the policy deadlock. This deadlock is explained by examining institutional change that Sarkozy engineered. Institutional layering triggered departmental competition within newly created or merged structures, resulting in policy deadlock and further institutional change. Institutional layering and departmental competition can be useful not only in shedding light on why there has not been any progress on a given policy but can also be used to understand the changing nature of the institutions that are responsible for it. While exogenous factors shaped Sarkozy’s immigration and integration policy choices, which highlight the importance of the structure in explaining immigration position change, the importance of agency is crucial when it comes to explaining policy deadlock, highlighting the role of actors responsible for integration policymaking and the resistance for their cooperation.

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Mucchielli, L., & Goaziou, V. (2007). Quand les banlieus brûlent… Retour sur les émeuts de novembre 2005. Retrieved from https://www.travail-social.com/telecharger/conference_banlieues.pdf. Noël, O. (2008). Politique de diversité ou politique de diversion? Du paradigm public de lute contre les discriminations à sa déqualification juridique. Revue Asylon(s) 4, Institutionnalisation de la xénophobie en France, http://www. reseau-terra.eu/article764.html. Noiriel, G. (2007). A Quoi Sert “l’identite Nationale”. Marseille: Agone. Observatoire des inégalites. (2014). Le chômage dans les zones urbaines sensibles, Observatoire des inégalites. Retrieved from https://www.inegalites.fr/ Le-chomage-dans-les-zones-urbaines-sensibles. Ocak, Ö. (2016). Immigration and French National Identity Under Neoliberalism: Sarkozy’s Selective Immigration Politics as a Performance of Sovereignty. Patterns of Prejudice, 50(1), 82–95. OECD. (2017). Unemployment rate (indicator). Available at: https://data.oecd. org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm. Pellet, S. (2015). Former sans embaucher ? La Circulaire Guéant et ses conséquences. Regards croisés sur l’économie, 16(1), 260–264. Pew Research Center. (2010). Widespread Support for Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/08/ widespread-support-for-banning-full-islamic-veil-in-western-europe/. Pew Research Center. (2015). Religious Composition by Country, 2010–2050. Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2010/percent/all/. Roger, P. (2010). Nicolas Sarkozy a tranché en faveur d’une interdiction générale de la burqa. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/04/22/nicolas-sarkozy-a-tranche-en-faveur-d-une-interdictiongenerale-de-la-burqa_1341109_3224.html. Rydgren, J. (2005). Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family. European Journal of Political Research, 44(3), 413–437. Sarkozy, N. (2006). Conférence de presse sur l’immigration. Retrieved from http:// www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-ministre-de-l-interieur/Archivesde-Nicolas-Sarkozy-2005-2007/Interventions/11.12.2006-Conferencede-presse-sur-l-immigration. Sarkozy, N. (2007). Lettre de mission de M.  Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, adressée à M.  Brice Hortefeux, ministre de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du codeveloppement, sur les priorités en matière de politique d’immigration, le 9 juillet 2007. Retrieved from http:// discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/077002185.html. Sarkozy, N. (2012). Propositions de Nicholas Sarkozy pour une France forte. Retrieved from http://www.agitclub.ru/election/euro/frfoto2012/programme_2012.pdf.

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Schain, M. (2006). The Extreme-Right and Immigration Policy-Making: Measuring Direct and Indirect Effects. West European Politics, 29(2), 270–289. Schain, M. (2012). The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States. A Comparative Study. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Senat. (n.d.). Annexe 2. Le fond d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations. Senat. Retrieved from https://www.senat.fr/ rap/a04-033/a04-0338.html. Simon, P. (2007). Comment la lutte contre les discriminations est passé à droite. Mouvements, 52(4), 153–163. Simon, P. (2009). La stratégie de la discrimination positive: Sarkozy et le débat français sur l’égalité. Modern and Contemporary France, 17(4), 435–450. Streeck, W., & Thelen, K. (2005). Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Suleiman, E. (1974). Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Suleiman, E. (1978). Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. The Guardian. (2009). Nicolas Sarkozy Says Islamic Veils Are Not Welcome in France. The Migration Policy Institute. (2007). Immigration and the 2007 French presidential elections. Available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/France_ Elections050307.pdf. Tiberj, V., & Michon, L. (2013). Two-Tier Pluralism in ‘Colour-blind’ France. West European Politics, 36(3), 580–596. Tribalat, M. (2017). Immigration: ‘De 2007 à 2016, le nombre d’admis au séjour a augmenté de près d’un tiers’. Retrieved from http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/ societe/2017/04/17/31003-20170417ARTFIG00099-michel-tribalat-non-les-chiffres-de-l-immigration-ne-sont-pas-stables.php. Vaïsse, J. (2004). Veiled Meaning: The French Law Banning Religious Symbols in Public Schools. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/ vaisse20040229.pdf. Van Eeckhout, L. (2007). Rétrocontroverse: 1989, la République laïque face au foulard islamique. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2007/08/02/retrocontroverse-1989-la-republique-laique-face-au-foulard-islamique_941317_3232.html. Van Houdt, F., Suvarierol, S., & Schinkel, W. (2011). Neoliberal Communitarian Citizenship: Current Trends Towards ‘Earned Citizenship’ in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. International Sociology, 26(3), 408–432. Vincent, J. (2011). Impact of the Crisis on Unemployment and Wages in France. Retrieved from https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/file/325838.

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Viprey, M. (2010). Immigration choisie, immigration subie: du discours à la réalité. La Revue de l’IRES, 64, 149–169. Weil, P. (2005). La République et sa Diversité: Immigration, Intégration, Discriminations. Paris: Seuil. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2012). Les questions de citoyenetté, de diversité et de nation en référence au récent débat sur l’identité nationale en France. In M. Labelle, J. Couture, & F. Remiggi (Eds.), La communauté politique en question: Regards croisés sur l’immigration, la citoyenneté, la diversité et le pouvoir (1st ed.). Quebéc: Presses de l’Université de Quebec.

CHAPTER 6

Explaining the Variation in Conservative Parties’ Responses to Immigration

As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, between 2002 and 2015, conservative parties in Western Europe have toughened their immigration stances, which subsequently led to the redefinition of immigration policies, introducing more restrictive rules for family, student and labour migration. While France and Switzerland have witnessed major restrictions in integration policies in the wake of a perceived threat to national identities, which were primarily focused on the integration of Muslims in those societies, identity anxieties did not underpin the logic of immigration policy change of the British Conservatives. The importance of immigration as a policy priority for these parties not only resulted in major changes for each country’s national politics but also has had a profound impact on the international context producing some important critical junctures. In the UK, the Conservative Party promised to hold public referendum on exiting the EU partly as a response to public concerns on immigration and as a response to growing Euroscepticism within the party itself. In Switzerland, SVP’s immigration anxieties led to the acceptance of the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which nearly brought back an old quota system for immigration and threatened the relationship between Switzerland and the EU, undermining the free movement of people. The causes of immigration policy change are broadly similar in the UK, Switzerland and France; however, the way these narratives were articulated by the SVP, the Conservative Party and the UMP differed and remained largely context dependent. On the surface, this means that the © The Author(s) 2020 A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1_6

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rhetoric of these parties has become increasingly hostile to immigrants, with a sort of shared attitude towards restricting immigration. Yet in practice, the perspectives on dealing with immigration concerns in the three cases remain distinct. This chapter explains what accounts for this variation in causes behind conservative parties’ changing immigration policymaking logics and mechanisms that accounted for policy change or policy deadlock.

Similarities and Differences in Causes of Policy Change Across Three Cases Table 6.1 points to the differences and similarities across the cases in terms of factors that underpinned immigration policy change in three countries. Which explanations are consistent across the cases and how can differences in underlying causes be explained? Public Opinion The importance of public opinion underpinned the logic of immigration policy change in three cases. Sarkozy and the UMP, the Conservative Party and the SVP factored public opinion into the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies in order to prevent the alienation of their electorates. In the UK, the introduction of the net migration target was the backbone of the Conservative’s immigration policymaking during the Coalition government. The Home Office and the Conservative Party argued for restrictive immigration approach to reassure the public about their commitment to the net migration target. For the SVP, public opinion was important, but it was not always driving the immigration policy change, as the SVP’s strong anti-immigrant and anti-EU stance did not always correspond to the attitudes of the public, which often supported the free movement of people and its subsequent extensions to new member states. In France, public opinion underpinned the logic of Sarkozy’s integration Table 6.1  Causes of policy change in France, Switzerland and the UK

UK Switzerland France

Public opinion

Party competition

EU integration

Economic concerns

Identity concerns

Present Present Present

Present Absent Present

Present Present Absent

Present Present Present

Absent Present Present

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policy change, introducing the ban of religious symbols in state schools and ban on face covering in public places. However, it also contributed to a certain liberalisation of immigration discourse and policies. It led to the halt of 2009 national identity debate and lifted some restrictions placed on non-EU graduates, resulting in the amendment of Guéant’s circular, which made it more difficult for the non-EU graduates to obtain residence permit upon the completion of their degrees. As public viewed national identity debate negatively and there was a big outcry regarding Guéant’s circular, these policies were subsequently reversed. Party Competition As parties tend to respond to the electoral pressures from their competitors, the electoral growth of the FN in France and the UKIP in the UK contributed to the adoption of restrictive immigration discourse and policies by Sarkozy and by the Conservative Party. However, the support for radical right parties was different in two countries. France has already experienced a support for radical right Jean Marie Le Pen in the 2002 presidential election, while in the UK, the UKIP only started to emerge as a credible competitor after 2010 (Ford and Goodwin 2014). The intensification of anti-immigrant rhetoric and the adoption of hostile immigration policies demonstrated that Sarkozy in France and the Conservative party in the UK were concerned about defection of their electorates to radical right. In France, integration policy experienced major transformation after the 2002 presidential election, when Sarkozy was appointed as the Minister of the Interior. In the UK, a more restrictive character of the Conservative Party rhetoric appeared before 2010 general election and was translated into a number of restrictive immigration policies under the Coalition government. In Switzerland, party competition on the right was irrelevant as the SVP did not have a credible radical right competitor, which would alienate party’s voters. Effects of the EU Integration Parties are known to change their policies as a response to the wider socio-­ economic changes in a political environment (Fagerholm 2015). With reference to immigration, these changes are operationalised through the effects of the EU integration, which included EU enlargements and free movement of people. Comparison of the three cases demonstrates that the

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effects of the EU integration played different roles in the UK, Switzerland and France, and resulted in immigration policy change in Switzerland and in the UK, but not in France. In the UK, the effects of EU integration led to concerns about the lack of control over EU migration, which substantially increased as a result of the 2004 EU enlargement, when the Labour Party did not introduce transnational agreements with the new EU member states. This resulted in the introduction of restrictive discourse and policies by the Conservative Party, which capitalised on these anxieties and used it as a chance to get back to government. Similarly, in Switzerland, enhanced Europeanisation of the Swiss immigration policy, which manifested itself through the extension of free movement of people to new EU members, has been consistently used by the SVP to engineer anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes. This eventually led to the launch of the Initiative Against Mass Migration in 2011, which aimed to restrict immigration from within the EU.  Growing Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party eventually led David Cameron to declare Brexit referendum in 2013. This book shows that conservative parties do react to crucial socio-economic changes such as EU enlargements and also points that these changes lead to critical junctures in country’s immigration policies, like Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland. In France, the effects of EU integration did not underpin the change in immigration policies in France, as Sarkozy and his party did not view EU immigration as a major concern in France. While certain anxieties about the free movement of persons existed and reinforced Sarkozy’s security discourse, they were focused on the EU’s external border and tied to illegal third-country migration stemming to France from other EU member states. These concerns only had an impact on Sarkozy’s immigration rhetoric but did not translate into more restrictive immigration policies, with the exception of the temporary suspension of the free movement of people between Italy and France in spring 2011, which was shortly restored. Perceived Economic Anxieties Perceived economic anxieties of the public  led to immigration policy change in all three countries. In the UK, the Conservative Party, aiming to control intra-EU migration from poorer EU countries, redefined EU immigrants’ access to some of the welfare benefits from universal to

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r­esidence based. Similarly, in Switzerland, economic concerns linked to unrestricted EU migration underpinned SVP’s logic on immigration policy change. These anxieties were primarily brought by the free movement of people as non-EU immigration was strictly controlled. The SVP argued that the lack of control over EU migration created labour market anxieties, which were linked to unemployment concerns. If in the past Switzerland had a strict quota system for bringing in labour migrants, the free movement of people erased it and the SVP viewed intra-EU migration as a threat to both working- and middle-class families. In France, on the other hand, economic anxieties were related to family reunification, which primarily originates from non-EU countries and remains the largest immigration inflow. Sarkozy’s support for stricter controls for non-EU labour migration was underpinned by the fears that the French economy would struggle if an open immigration approach was adopted and that increased migration would import unemployment. Perceived Identity Anxieties Perceived identity anxieties of the public led to the introduction of restrictive immigration policies in Switzerland and in France, but not in the UK. This is not to say that identity was not an important issue for the Conservative Party, but that its impact on the introduction of restrictive immigration policies remained negligible and the party chose to build its immigration stance change primarily through the economic lens rather than through identitarian one. In France, identity angle was crucial for Sarkozy, as his integration stance was driven by the perceived fear of Islam as a threat to French national identity, pushing for enhanced assimilation of Muslims into the French society. Anxieties about Islam were at the origin of the introduction of two major integration laws. The first law introduced the prohibition of wearing religious symbols in French state schools and the second prohibited covering of the face in public places. Similarly, SVP argued for the introduction of tougher integration requirements, as it was concerned about Switzerland’s so-called Islamisation. Using the instruments of direct democracy, the party launched the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets in 2009, which was supported by the majority of the Swiss population.

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Table 6.2  Contextual characteristics of the UK, Switzerland and France

UK Switzerland France

Citizenship regime

Party’s attitude to the EU

Radical right competitor

Multicultural Assimilationist Assimilationist

Eurosceptic Eurosceptic Europhile

Present Absent Present

The Differences in Immigration Policymaking Logics Overall, immigration policies in three countries changed in a more restrictive direction, however, with some differences. Table 6.2 illustrates that the UK, Switzerland and France vary in relation to three factors: citizenship regime, party’s attitude to the EU and radical right competitor. These contextual factors are crucial in explaining what accounts for the variation in conservative parties’ immigration stances and subsequent immigration policy changes in three countries. The choices of conservative parties on immigration do not only depend on the external factors per se, but on the way these causal factors are articulated into different narratives based on the context in which they take place. Citizenship Regime While identity anxieties underpinned the logic of immigration policy change in Switzerland and in France, in the UK they were not of a paramount concern of the Conservative Party during Cameron’s leadership. Despite both France and the UK being former colonial empires and having a substantial population of foreign origin, cultural backlash occurred in France, but not in the UK. The UMP and the SVP were similar in their approach to integration, being driven primarily by anti-Muslim attitudes. While in Switzerland the SVP propagated open anti-Islam rhetoric, in France, Sarkozy did not explicitly mention Muslims as a threat, but implicitly it was clear that his assimilationist integration stance was directed primarily against female Muslims based on the laws that were enacted during his time in the office. The type of citizenship regime provided opportunities for conservative parties in Switzerland and in France to frame their integration stance around identity anxieties, but made articulation of identity discourse in the UK more difficult. Both Switzerland and France represent assimilationist type of citizenship regime, which requires the immigrants give up their differences and assimilate to the host country.

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As the UK belongs to multicultural regime, which recognises the differences of ethnic minorities, it was more difficult for the Conservative Party to factor identity anxieties into their discourse without alienating the voters. Identity concerns underpinned the restrictive character of integration policies in France and Switzerland. Sarkozy’s assimilationist integration discourse and policies are explained through the fear of Islam, which does not recognize the separation between private and public spheres. France’s strong attachment to the principle of laïcité (secularism) and equality is at the core of the republican tradition (Marthaler 2008; Drake 2011), which makes integration of foreigners and integration of the French of immigrant origin equally important as the management of immigration inflows. The assimilationist character of French citizenship regime, secularism and the republican tradition of equality provided Sarkozy with the opportunity to argue for enhanced assimilation and to adopt two laws that prohibited the wearing of religious symbols in state schools and covering the face in public places. Undoubtedly, other factors such as the growth of radical right also had an impact on Sarkozy’s integration stance, but assimilationist character of citizenship regime and French republican tradition facilitated the introduction of stricter integration policies in France. In Switzerland, identity anxieties formed the basis of the SVP’s attempts to redefine integration policies as preserving Swiss identity was SVP’s core issue and because ethnic-assimilationist regime presented an opportunity for the party to voice these concerns and to argue for enhanced integration. In the UK, which belongs to multicultural regime that recognises diversity and does not require immigrants to assimilate and to give up their culture, multiculturalism constrained  the Conservative Party in framing its discourse through an identity lens. The Conservative Party was cautious about using explicitly identity-focused immigration  rhetoric. Despite having a substantial part of the population from the former colonies, in the UK, the party chose to frame immigration anxieties primarily through an economic lens because UK’s multicultural citizenship regime provided fewer opportunities for the party to do so without alienation of some of its voters. Strength of Radical Right Competitor While the UK Conservative Party and the UMP in France were concerned about defection of their electorate to radical right  parties, adopting an accommodative strategy (Meguid 2007) towards radical right, in

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Switzerland, this did not happen as the SVP did not have any radical right competitor. Radical right parties’ electoral performance explains why the UK Conservative Party and Sarkozy have altered their immigration stances, leading to more restrictive immigration policies. Mere presence of niche party competitor does not necessarily lead to the adoption of accommodative strategy by mainstream party. Mainstream party strategy depends on the threat of the niche party and its electoral success (Meguid 2007: 96). Established competitor FN and growing electoral contender UKIP had an influence on conservative parties’ immigration agenda, which resulted in the introduction of more restrictive policies in France and the UK, moving their respective  conservative parties closer to the so-called pathological normalcy: the radicalisation of mainstream values (Mudde 2010). In France, the electoral threat from the FN has become profound in 2002 when Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round of the presidential election. This in part led to the tightening of immigration policy under the two terms of Sarkozy as a minister of the Interior between 2002 and 2007. Both 2007 and 2012 presidential campaigns were centred around immigration as one of the key issues on Sarkozy’s agenda. The adoption of an accommodative strategy towards the FN allowed Sarkozy to recuperate some of the FN’s electorate in 2007 presidential election (Mayer 2007). In the UK, however, the radical right UKIP has not always been a credible competitor for the mainstream Conservative Party. The Conservative Party’s rhetoric started to become more restrictive before 2010 general election and once the party got into the Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats as UKIP grew into a credible electoral contender (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Anxieties about the defection of the Conservative’s electorate to UKIP forced the Conservative Party to keep its ‘tens of thousands’ immigration target in the 2015 general election manifesto. This strategy was not successful as UKIP managed to take almost a third of the Conservatives electorate in 2015 general election (Murdoch et al. 2017). Despite the fact that both the UK and France have a majoritarian system in parliamentary elections, which keeps niche parties like FN and UKIP at bay, the threat that the radical right presents for the right-wing parties is voter defection. As much as the right-wing parties do not want to alienate their electorate to radical right, they also seek to attract radical right’s voters to boost their chances of winning office in competition with other mainstream parties. Considering that first past the post electoral systems keeps extremists like the UKIP away from

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­ arliamentary representation, the alienation of Conservative voters to the p UKIP would decrease Conservative Party’s electoral chances in competition with the Labour Party, which the Conservatives could not afford. The strength of radical right competitor explains why, in France and the UK, the right-­wing parties adopted tougher immigration policies. Party’s Attitude to the EU Party’s attitude towards the EU sheds light on why anxieties about the EU were articulated by the SVP in Switzerland and by the Conservative Party in the UK but were not exploited by Sarkozy in France. The similarity between Switzerland and the UK in incorporating EU anxieties into the logic of immigration policy change is explained by Eurosceptic attitudes of the SVP and of the Conservative Party even though the two parties differed in their level of Euroscepticism preceding the Brexit debate. While the Conservative Party could have been characterised as soft Eurosceptic party (Lynch and Whitaker 2013), the SVP could  be portrayed as a hard core Eurosceptic. Euroscepticism of both parties accounted for the incorporation of the concerns on EU migration and the inability to control it. The attitude of the party (Eurosceptic/Europhile) towards the EU determined the direction of conservative parties’ immigration policies in three countries. The effects of the EU integration underpinned the conservative parties’ logic of immigration policy change, subsequently leading to the evolution of British and Swiss immigration policy, while in France the effects of the EU integration  were not a cause behind the redefinition of the French immigration policy. Historically, the SVP and the UK Conservative Party both have been Eurosceptic parties, but varied in terms of the degree of their Euroscepticism. The SVP has been a hard-Eurosceptic party, opposing the EU in principle, and the Conservative Party represented a soft version of Euroscepticism, opposing further European integration (Lynch and Whitaker 2013). Anti-European sentiment started to become more visible and divisive within the Conservative Party in 1990s (Taggart 1998: 365), and, as demonstrated by recent political events, started to become more mainstream once the Brexit referendum was announced (Brack and Startin 2015; Startin 2015). Euroscepticism has entered mainstream right-­ wing politics in Europe and is not anymore a defining feature of populist radical right parties, but is now shared by mainstream conservative parties, whose positions are becoming more EU wary (Conti and Memoli 2012).

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The EU enlargements and the extension of the free movement of people to the new EU member states are important features of European integration, which in case of the SVP and the Conservative Party influenced parties’ immigration stances and led to subsequent critical junctures—Brexit and the Initiative Against Mass Migration. Both the SVP and the Conservative Party viewed intra-EU migration through the economic lens, arguing that it not only increases the numbers that these two countries can absorb but also poses threats to their respective labour markets, by increasing the competition and suppressing the wages. In Switzerland and the UK, the conservative parties linked EU anxieties to the economic concerns around intra-EU migration, especially during the times of Eurozone crisis (Usherwood and Startin 2012: 2). The SVP and the Conservative Party were determined to reduce the overall migration numbers, which was difficult because of the free movement of people. This preoccupation led to major policy change in both cases: in Switzerland, economic concerns about EU migration led to the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which aimed to restrict the free movement of people from the EU, and, in the UK, these concerns resulted in Brexit. This demonstrates that Eurosceptical attitudes are not any more the defining features of the fringe parties (Taggart 1998) and Euroscepticism has infiltrated mainstream political space with established parties voicing their anxieties on the issue. Sarkozy and the UMP did not view anxieties about EU integration as a cause underpinning immigration policy change as the party’s position was not characterised by strong Eurosceptic attitudes. Sarkozy regarded the EU as a platform for reinstating France’s image on the European and world scene (Drake 2011). This is not to say that the party has not been immune to Eurosceptic attitudes, but they were not related to intra-EU migration (Usherwood and Startin 2012). UMP’s major anxieties about the EU were focused on the strength of the EU’s external border, which enabled illegal migration from third countries to the EU, and then through the free movement of people to France. The absence of major economic anxieties around the EU migration explains why critical junctures like Brexit or the Initiative Against Mass Migration did not occur in France. The purpose of this book goes beyond providing three separate explanations of immigration policy change but aims to offer certain grounds for generalisation of the factors that influenced the conservative parties’ positions. Even though process-tracing allows to make only within-case inferences about causes and mechanisms of policy change and does not enable

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one to generalise the findings to the population of cases (Bennett and Checkel 2015), this can be overcome to a degree through comparison. Generalisation to other cases or cross-case inference becomes possible through comparison of the findings of the cases (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 69). It can be argued that the importance of public opinion and economic anxieties on immigration are likely to affect the strategies of political parties, by making conservative parties adopt restrictive immigration stances and policies. In Switzerland, France and the UK, the development of immigration policies has been largely dependent on the country’s economic situation and tied to the needs of the economy. Economic anxieties were primarily linked to the effects of EU integration like the free movement of people, which did not pose any restrictions on EU migration and to low-skilled migration  originating from the EU.  In less advantageous economic times, like during the global financial crisis, all three parties argued that increased migration from poorer Eurozone countries was detrimental to the labour markets because it contributed to the unemployment levels. Therefore, conservative parties are likely to change their immigration stances based on the economic pressure that immigration can pose, particularly low-skilled, which is especially evident a insecure economic times. This is not to say that global economic changes like the 2007 financial crisis will necessarily contribute to change, as Swiss case demonstrates that SVP’s rhetoric has been profoundly anti-immigration even before the global financial crisis occurred. Conservative parties’ responses on immigration varied in relation to perceived identity concerns, party competition on the right and the effects of the EU integration. First, identity anxieties underpinned the logic of immigration policy change in Switzerland and in France, but not in the UK. The findings give grounds to suggest that in countries with assimilationist type of citizenship regime, conservative parties would factor identity concerns into their logic of immigration policy change as assimilationist regime provides an opportunity for the conservative parties to articulate this kind of discourse without alienating core voter base. Second, party competition on the right led to the toughening of immigration stances and policies in the UK and in France, whereas it did not occur in Switzerland. Conservative parties adopt accommodative strategies towards their radical right competitors when the strength of this competitor is high and there is a threat of voter defection even when electoral system allows to keep extermist parties at bay. Finally, effects of the EU integration had

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an impact on the development of immigration policies in Switzerland and in the UK, while in France they were not driving immigration policy change. Eurosceptic parties (both hard and soft) would articulate concerns over the effects of the EU integration in their immigration rhetoric and policies.

Mechanisms of Immigration Policy Change and Policy Deadlock As Table 6.3 points out the mechanisms that accounted for policy change and policy deadlock vary across three cases. While framing as an argumentative mechanism occurred in three cases, other mechanisms varied across these. This section starts with a brief description of each of the mechanisms that accounted for immigration policy change and integration policy deadlock in three cases and proceeds with explaining the variation in these mechanisms across three cases. Framing Framing was used by the conservative parties to justify the introduction of more restrictive immigration stances. Through diagnostic framing (Rydgren 2003; Snow and Benford 1988: 200–201), the parties attributed blame for social problems to immigrants, while prognostic framing (Rydgren 2003; Snow and Benford 1988: 200–201) represented the adoption of a more restrictive immigration stance. In the UK, the Conservative Party linked immigration to anxieties about welfare to demonstrate to the voters the importance of both immigration and economy themes. In France, framing was used to justify the change in Sarkozy’s immigration approach, which first aimed to increase highly skilled migration and then  focused on reducing all migration inflows. Furthermore, Table 6.3  Causal mechanisms of policy change and policy deadlock in the UK, Switzerland and France

UK Switzerland France

Framing

Institutional layering

Departmental competition

Direct democracy

Present Present Present

Absent Absent Present

Present Absent Present

Absent Present Absent

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framing immigration through the lens of Islam was central to Sarkozy’s integration policy change. The SVP framed  immigration in a negative light not only to popularise its immigration stance but also to engineer negative public opinion on immigration. Institutional Layering While being the minister of the Interior and the president of the Republic, Sarkozy promised to improve integration but failed to do so; his attempt to change integration policy resulted in the policy deadlock. When Sarkozy was appointed the minister of the Interior in Chirac’s government in 2002, he argued for positive discrimination of immigrants and French of immigrant origin. Following 2005 riots in French suburbs, Sarkozy’s integration policy paradigm changed from anti-discrimination to equal opportunities approach. The adoption of equal opportunities paradigm resulted in the creation of the new institution in charge of equal opportunities— ACSE (Agence Nationale pour la Cohesion Sociale et l’Egalité des Chances)— which was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Urban Policy (Ministère de la Ville), leading to the first integration policy deadlock. The essence of this deadlock was that integration policy became dominated by the urban policy, which eventually resulted in the re-separation of these policies and transfer of integration policy to the Ministry of the Interior. A second integration policy deadlock occurred when the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, which was designed to improve integration and created shortly after Sarkozy’s election as a president, was abolished three years later. This deadlock is explained by examining institutional change that Sarkozy engineered. Institutional layering triggered departmental competition within newly created or merged structures, resulting in policy deadlock and further institutional change. Institutional layering and departmental competition can be useful not only in shedding light on why there has not been any progress on a given policy but can also be used to understand the changing nature of the institutions that are responsible for it. Departmental Competition This mechanism accounted for immigration policy change and manifested itself in the competition between various governmental departments or different divisions within one ministry. Departmental competition acted as a constraint to the implementation of political promises, demonstrating

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opposition among actors in new or fused institutions or within different institutions that were supposed to work together, preventing the successful delivery of immigration and integration policy outputs. In the UK, departmental competition manifested itself in the constant security-­ economy debate primarily between the Home Office and the BIS.  The ideas of those departments that had greater availability of resources, including decision-making powers and political patronage, prevailed over the ideas of other departments. The Home Office was able to pursue its restrictive immigration stance as it had greater support from the prime minister, while other departments, like BIS and the Ministry for the Universities and Skills, did not, and, as a result, were not able to pursue their immigration approaches as much as was required. In France, departmental competition explains Sarkozy’s integration policy deadlock and highlights how institutional change leads to the departmental tensions within new institutions. These tensions do not only originate from different weight that departments have within an institution but are a result of the considerable autonomy that civil servants and ministers acquire during their careers. Direct Democracy Direct democracy enabled the SVP to shape Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive way. The inability to control the FDJP, after Blocher failed to get re-elected to the Federal Council in 2007, reduced SVP’s ability to define a direction of immigration policymaking through governmental routes. The lack of consensus between the SVP and other parties forced the SVP to use the instruments of direct democracy such as popular initiatives to set the agenda setting on immigration and optional referendums to prevent closer cooperation between Switzerland and the EU. Even though it is a lengthy process, which takes at least a couple of years, direct democracy was often the only way for the SVP to pursue its restrictive immigration stance as other parties would not often agree with the SVP’s immigration stance. This resulted in a number of successes for the SVP, including the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, the Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners and the Initiative Against Mass Migration.

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Variation in Causal Mechanisms Across Three Cases Differences in the dynamics of policymaking in the UK, Switzerland and France are explained by looking at the different types of political regimes that countries belong to: parliamentary in the UK, consensus democracy in Switzerland (Lijphart 2012) and semi-presidentialism in France (Duverger 1980). In France, which is an archetype of semi-presidentialism (Elgie 2009), major decisions are made by the strong president, who has the support of his party in the Assemblée Nationale if there is no co-­habitation regime. Likewise, in the UK, which represents the Westminster model of democracy, executive power is usually concentrated within one party (Lijphart 2012). The logic of the executive branch’s power, which determines policy direction, in France and the UK is similar, and decision-­making powers are concentrated either in the hands of a party (UK) or in one powerful president (France). Even though the Conservative Party was in the Coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives remained a major player, retaining the majority of ministries and stronger decision-making powers. As the Home Office in the UK had the prime minister’s patronage on immigration, it was therefore able to pursue its hostile immigration approach, while in France, powerful president was able to engineer institutional change that resulted in the departmental competition. While in the UK departmental competition accounted for immigration policy change, in France departmental competition explained integration policy deadlock. Swiss political system, which is based on the consensus between political players, where power is dispersed to different actors (Lijphart 2012: 33), presented an opportunity for the SVP to use direct democracy. The inability of the SVP to reach a consensus with other political parties led to the major changes in Swiss immigration policy with the party, using direct democracy to pursue its restrictive immigration stance. Different models of democracy explain why departmental competition occurred in France and in the UK, while it did not occur in Switzerland, where the SVP resorted to the instruments of direct democracy. Comparative findings of the mechanisms in three cases give grounds to suggest that departmental competition is likely to occur in those ­democracies that are not bound by consensus politics. Both parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies fall within that range. In Swiss model of consensual democracy, where political decisions are the outcomes of a consensus between different political actors, departmental competition cannot explain the dynamics of immigration policymaking logic.

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Conclusion Causes that underpin the change in conservative parties’ immigration policy positions are mainly similar in the UK, Switzerland and France, but the way conservative parties articulated some of these factors is context dependent. Strength of radical right competitor, citizenship regime and party’s attitude towards the EU explain why some factors underpinned the logic of immigration policy change of conservative parties  in some countries, while not in others. These causal factors can be tested in other cases of immigration policy change and in other policy domains, as some of the factors are not only applicable to immigration but can be extrapolated to other policy issues as well. Some contextual factors like effects of the EU integration do not only explain the logic of policy change but also shed light on the occurrence of critical junctures on domestic arenas. Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland demonstrate that factors exogenous to the country not only produce changes in that country’s domestic environment but have implications for the wider political context, changing the country’s relationship with supranational institutions like the EU. With regards to the dynamics of policy change, framing was a discursive mechanism that laid ground for conservative parties’ immigration position changes, while direct democracy accounted for the introduction of restrictive policies in Switzerland. Departmental competition and institutional layering can act as mechanisms that lead to both policy change and policy deadlock: while in the UK departmental competition explained the dominance of restrictive immigration policy choices, in France, in combination with the institutional layering it accounted for integration policy deadlock. The variation in policy dynamics is explained by a democracy type (parliamentary, consensus and semi-presidential). While some exogenous factors might only be tested in particular policy areas, causal mechanisms can be tested in all policy areas as their operation is static across the cases, but the outcomes they produce are context dependent.

References Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Bennett, A., & Checkel, J. (2015). Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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Brack, N., & Startin, N. (2015). Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the Margins to the Mainstream. International Political Science Review, 36(3), 239–249. Conti, N., & Memoli, V. (2012). The Multi-Faceted Nature of Party-Based Euroscepticism. Acta Politica, 47(2), 91–112. Drake, H. (2011). Contemporary France. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Duverger, M. (1980). A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government. European Journal of Political Research, 8(2), 165–187. Elgie, R. (2009). Duverger, Semi-presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype. West European Politics, 32(2), 248–267. Fagerholm, A. (2015). Why Do Political Parties Change Their Policy Positions? A Review. Political Studies Review, 14, 501–511. Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for Radical Right in Britain. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Geddes, A. (2003). The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: SAGE Publications. Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lynch, P., & Whitaker, R. (2013). Where There Is Discord, Can They Bring Harmony? Managing Intra-Party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15(3), 317–339. Marthaler, S. (2008). Nicolas Sarkozy and the Politics of French Immigration Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(3), 382–397. Mayer, N. (2007). Comment Nicolas Sarkozy a rétréci l’électorat Le Pen. Revue française de science politique, 57(3), 429–445. Meguid, B. (2007). Party Competition Between Unequals. Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2010). The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy. West European Politics, 33(6), 1167–1186. Murdoch, J., Ehrenberg-Shannon, B., Wisniewska, A., & Rai, A. (2017). Election 2017: How the UK Voted in 7 Charts. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/ content/dac3a3b2-4ad7-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b. Rydgren, J. (2003). Meso-Level Reasons for Racism and Xenophobia: Some Converging and Diverging Effects of Radical Right Populism in France and Sweden. European Journal of Social Theory, 6(1), 45–68. Snow, D., & Benford, R. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. In B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, & S. Tarrow (Eds.), From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures (pp.  197–217). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Startin, N. (2015). Have We Reached a Tipping Point? The Mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the UK. International Political Science Review, 36(3), 311–323.

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Taggart, P. (1998). A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), 363–388. Usherwood, S., & Startin, N. (2012). Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 1–16.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Immigration has become one of the crucial issues on the agenda of most political parties, dominating political debates in many countries (Grande et al. 2019). The salience of immigration grew (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019) not least because of its politicisation by mainstream parties (Bale 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Meyer and Rosenberger 2015; Van der Brug et al. 2005), triggering such critical junctures as Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Migration in Switzerland. Despite conventional wisdom that mainstream parties  adopt more restrictive immigration policies as a response to the rise of the radical right (Abou-­ Chadi 2016; Akkerman 2012a, b; Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012), they cannot solely explain their increasingly nationalistic and populist rhetoric of mainstream parties. A central aim of this book was to identify the factors that explain why conservative parties change their immigration policy stances, leading to immigration policy change and identify the mechanisms that account for this policy change or for policy deadlock. The findings of this book suggest that exogenous factors are crucial in explaining immigration policy change and that the explanation of this change is broadly similar in three cases, but the way these narratives are articulated by conservative parties in three cases is context dependent. The book demonstrates that the importance of public opinion and perceived economic concerns on immigration were driving immigration policy change of three conservative parties. Other factors, including the effects of © The Author(s) 2020 A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1_7

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the EU integration, party competition on the right and perceived identity anxieties differed across three cases. This variation in causes that underpin conservative parties’ immigration logics is explained by examining party’s attitude towards the EU, the  strength of radical right competitor and country’s citizenship regime. With regard to the  dynamics of policy change, parties used framing to justify the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies in all three cases. In the UK, departmental competition accounted for the domination of more restrictive immigration policy choices under the Coalition government. In France, institutional layering and departmental competition accounted for integration policy deadlock. Finally, in Switzerland, direct democracy enabled the SVP to redefine Swiss  to immigration policy in a restrictive direction.

Party Competition on the Right Party competition on the right and the presence of strong radical right competitor make conservative parties adopt more restrictive policy choices on immigration. Increasing electoral support for the FN in France and for UKIP in the UK influenced Sarkozy’s and the Conservative Party’s immigration policy stances in a more restrictive direction. In an attempt to neutralise the FN, Sarkozy adopted an accommodative strategy to prevent the defection of his electorate. Similarly, in the UK, the Conservatives considerably tightened their immigration stance once in the Coalition government, after UKIP started to emerge as a credible competitor since 2010 (Ford and Goodwin 2014). In Switzerland, the SVP did not face any competition from the radical right Ticino League (Lega dei Ticinesi), which often supported the SVP’s position on immigration. The party competed for the votes with other right-wing parties such as CVP and FDP but they cannot be described as radical right parties.

Public Opinion Conservative parties pursue restrictive immigration policy stances trying to please the public on the issue, which became one of the crucial ones on national agendas. The importance of public opinion for the Conservative Party in the UK is demonstrated by the party abandoning its detoxification strategy closer to 2010 general election. Following the increase in negative attitudes of the public in response to the Eastern enlargements, the Conservative Party introduced the idea of reducing

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immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ to reassure the public on its credibility on immigration. This net migration target became a backbone of the Conservative’s immigration policy during the Coalition government and remained in place despite the inability of the government to achieve it. In Switzerland, the importance of public opinion shaped SVP’s immigration stance. However, it is important to note that the SVP also played an important role in engineering negative public opinion on immigration over the years, which was influenced by SVP’s propaganda campaigns, including infamous ads featuring white sheep kicking out black sheep from the Swiss flag and Muslim women covered in burqas  on a minaret background. The SVP managed to capitalise on the public opinion, which was demonstrated by the public accepting the Initiative Against Mass Migration and the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets. In France, integration policies during Sarkozy’s time in office became more restrictive, indirectly targeting female Muslim population in France. The introduction of the restrictions on wearing religious symbols in public schools and the prohibition of full-­face covering was underpinned by the perceived identity anxieties of the public. However, under Sarkozy’s presidency, public opinion also accounted for the liberalisation of policy on student migration. After the initial restrictions, introduced by Guéant circular, public outcry on the issue resulted in Sarkozy reversing his policy of toughening the conditions of obtaining residence permit by nonEU graduates.

Economic Anxieties on Immigration Perceived economic anxieties led to the introduction of more restrictive immigration policies in all three countries. The parties, though, referred to different types of migration to emphasise economic salience of immigration. While in the UK and in Switzerland intra-EU work migration was at the heart of these anxieties, in France economic salience of immigration was primarily linked to non-EU family migration. The Conservatives’ changing stance on immigration in the UK was a response to the labour market anxieties, brought by unrestricted intra-EU migration. As a result  the  Conservative Party redefined EU migrants’ access to benefits from universal to residence based. Similarly, in Switzerland, unlimited intra-EU migration, which became possible with the free movement of people, had an impact on SVP’s immigration stance and resulted in a major critical juncture—the Initiative Against Mass Migration, which

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aimed to limit uncontrolled migration from the EU. In France, economic salience of immigration was primarily linked to non-EU family migration, which remained the largest immigration inflow in the country.

Identity Concerns and Fear of Islam Perceived identity anxieties of the public on immigration, which manifested themselves in the fear of Islam, underpinned the logic of integration policy change in Switzerland and France and led to the introduction of the legislation that targeted female Muslim population in the expression of their religion. In the UK, the Conservative Party did not factor perceived identity anxieties into their logic of immigration policy change and focused on framing immigration through an economic lens. Perceived identity anxieties underpinned Sarkozy’s attempt to tighten cultural integration, while failing to target the socio-economic integration of migrants. Identity anxieties over the so-called Islamisation of Switzerland were successfully translated by the SVP into the Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, which was supported by the Swiss during the popular vote.

Resisting Europeanisation The effects of the EU integration shaped conservative parties’ stances on immigration in the UK and in Switzerland, leading to Brexit and the Initiative Against Mass Migration, while in France they only led to the change in Sarkozy’s discourse. The effects of the EU integration, which  were operationalised in this book through the EU enlargements and the free movement of people, were a central theme of the SVP’s immigration discourse. The SVP’s Eurosceptic attitudes were driven by the lack of control over the free movement of people, which, combined with economic concerns over EU migration, resulted in a major policy change— the Initiative Against Mass Migration. In the UK, the effects of the EU integration were centred around the lack of control over EU migration, the impossibility to reduce it, which eventually led to Brexit, making immigration one of the defining themes in Brexit debate. In France, they did not lead to a policy change but affected Sarkozy’s immigration discourse, which focused on the malfunctioning of controls of the EU’s external border. This created anxieties about third-country migration coming to France through other EU member states like Italy. Even though France took a temporary measure and suspended the free movement of

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people with Italy in an attempt to prevent Tunisian migrants entering France (Cottey 2013), this did not lead to a major policy change, with France reinstating proper functioning of Schengen zone shortly after.

Explaining the Differences Understanding cross-national similarities and differences in the  factors that led conservative parties to change their immigration policy stances can be explained by examining the context in which these changes were happening. While the importance of public opinion and economic salience of immigration explained this shift in all three cases, the parties’ stances differed with regard to the effects of the EU integration, party competition and perceived identity concerns. How can this variation be explained? First, factoring identity anxieties into immigration policy change can depend on the citizenship regime of a given country. Perceived identity concerns underpinned the logic of immigration policy change in Switzerland and in France that both belong to assimilationist type of citizenship regime, which makes integration a crucial topic on the policy agenda in these countries. The UK belongs to multicultural type of citizenship regime, which recognises cultural differences and does not require assimilation to the host society, therefore making it harder for conservative parties to incorporate this kind of discourse without alienating their core voter base. Type of citizenship regime constrains the use of assimilationist rhetoric by mainstream parties in multicultural societies. Second, the effects of the EU integration are likely to affect policy stances of Eurosceptic parties compared to the policy stance of Europhile parties. Both the SVP in Switzerland and the Conservative Party in the UK incorporated anxieties about the effects of the EU integration into their immigration discourse and policies. Concerns brought by the effects of the EU integration did not lead to the change in Sarkozy’s rhetoric and policies as the UMP viewed Europe and the EU as a platform to reinforce French soft power (Drake 2011). Finally, the strength of radical right competitor explains why French and British conservative parties adopted restrictive immigration policy stances. During the period covered, in France and in the UK, the radical right FN and the UKIP have grown electorally, which had an impact on the radicalisation of conservative parties’ positions on immigration. Despite the fact that majoritarian systems in France and in the UK keep extremist parties like UKIP and FN at bay, the UMP and the Conservative Party could not afford the alienation of the voters to the

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radical right as they would lose their votes in competition with other mainstream parties. In Switzerland, party competition on the right was irrelevant as the SVP did not have a credible radical right-wing competitor. The party competed for the votes with the mainstream right parties, including CVP and FDP, but radical right Ticino League did not present a threat for the SVP. Apart from exogenous factors shaping conservative parties’ immigration stances, the findings of the book identified one specific agency-related factor—Home Office’s ideological dogmastism—that contributed to the redefinition of the UK immigration policy. This  ideological dogmatism manifested itself in the Home Office’s control over agenda setting, evidence twisting and lack of communication with other governmental departments that were involved in immigration policymaking. Control over agenda setting included keeping the proposals of interest groups that had different to the Home Office view on immigration  off the table. Specifically, it made it difficult for the interests groups like the UUK to have any influence on liberalisation of student migration as the Home Office was driven by migration target of ‘tens of thousands’. Home Office’s ideological dogmatism also led to the introduction of restrictive rules on labour migration and contributed to the introduction of some welfare restrictions for EU citizens. Confrontations between the BIS and the Home Office on these issues demonstrate the resistance of the Home Office to use evidence-based approach, refusing to accept evidence on the benefits of student migration and evidence on welfare contribution of EU migrants. The lack of communication between the Home Office and other governmental departments on the unified immigration strategy and the lack of interest of the then home secretary Theresa May in collective discussion on immigration resulted in the introduction of restrictive immigration policies in the UK. This book also provides an explanation of the dynamics of immigration policy change, mapping the mechanisms that accounted for it and explains policy deadlocks.  All three political parties used framing to justify their changing immigration stances. Departmental competition explained  the domination of more restrictive immigration policy choices under the Coalition government as  the Home Office had greater availability of resources, including prime ministerial patronage. In France, institutional layering and departmental competition accounted for integration policy deadlock, resulting in further institutional change but no policy change. In Switzerland, the use of direct democracy by the SVP allowed the party

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to redefine Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. So, what accounts for the variation in the mechanisms that explain the dynamics of policy change and the mechanisms that account for policy deadlock? This variation is explained by examining the type of democracy that these countries belong to. Parliamentary and presidential democracies, where policy decisions do not need to be approved by all major political actors, but by those who have the majority, allow for mechanisms such as departmental competition to occur. This mechanism did not occur in Switzerland as the country belongs to the consensus model of democracy, which requires a general compromise between major political actors  on issues like immigration. In the absence of such compromise, actors wanting policy change can resort to direct democratic instruments. Departmental competition can be extrapolated to other cases of policy change and is not limited to immigration domain, but the outcomes that it produces will depend on the context in which this change is happening. As the book demonstrates, departmental competition can lead to two different outputs: policy change that characterises UK immigration policy under the Coalition government and policy deadlock that relates to integration policy in France.

The Broader Picture The findings on this book aim to make a contribution to a number of broader discussions that relate to party policy change, to the theorisation of the dynamics of policy change and to the literature on Euroscepticism. As it has been previously theorised, broader political and socio-economic changes make parties alter their policy positions as they need to adjust to the change (Fagerholm, 2015). While this suggestion stands, these changes have not been conceptualised in the literature  on party policy change. In the context of immigration policy, this book proposed to operationalise this major political change as the effects of the EU integration, which incorporates EU enlargements and the free movement of people. The findings suggest that in the UK and in Switzerland, EU enlargements and subsequent extension of the free movement of people to the new EU member states have brought primarily economic anxieties, which partially led to the occurrence of major critical junctures like Brexit in the UK and the Initiative Against Mass Migration in Switzerland. Second, while tracing the exogenous factors that led to party policy change, this book identified one agency-related factor that was crucial in explaining the evolution

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of the British immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which manifested itself in the control over agenda setting and evidence, led to the domination of more restrictive policy choices as the Home Office and the home secretary had the prime minister’s patronage on the issue. This finding highlights that theories that explain party position change from agency-related explanations (Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel and Tan 2003) should consider a new dimension of the political patronage of powerful party actors that make some policy choices prevail over the other ones. With regard to the dynamics of policy change, which focuses on tracing the mechanisms leading to it, this book points out that institutional layering, which triggers institutional change does not necessarily cause policy change, but instead can lead to policy deadlock, causing further institutional change, rather than policy change. Furthermore, departmental tensions sometimes occur as a result of layering, and new layered actors do not always have the capacity to push old ones out, resulting in further institutional change and eventually in a policy deadlock. Finally, this book adds to existing research on Euroscepticism (Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Kuhn 2011; Meijers 2017; Usherwood 2013; Usherwood and Startin 2012) by exploring the impact of the supranational entities like the EU on the development of the national immigration policies. In the UK and in Switzerland, the effects of the EU integration, which included EU enlargements and the free movement of people, led to major critical junctures like Brexit and the Initiative Against Mass Migration. This book demonstrates how conservative parties are changing the dynamics of the relationship between the EU and the nation-states. It highlights that not only supranational EU can pose adaptational pressures on the development of national immigration policies, but also that domestic changes within the states can structure the relationship with the EU as evidenced by the Brexit and the Initiative Against Mass Migration. Future research on immigration and mainstream  political parties can focus on the role of the agency of political parties and civil servants, who, at times, can become too politicised in the process of policy change. While there has been some research done on the role of the agency in immigration policy change (Partos and Bale 2015; Gruber and Bale 2014), it explored only a limited range of agency factors. Future studies can focus on the role of agency in immigration decision-making in other cases of immigration policy change, exploring how intra-party dynamics lead certain policy choices to prevail over the other ones. Finally, as immigration

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and the rise of populism have affected both left- and right-wing parties’ electoral fortunes, new avenues can be explored by examining immigration policymaking logics of the mainstream left parties, which remain understudied (Van Spanje 2010; Alonso and Da Fonseca 2012). Future studies can focus on the challenges that immigration and populism pose for left-wing parties and explore if these challenges differ from the ones that right-wing parties face. This book explained why conservative parties in the UK, Switzerland and France changed their immigration policy stances in a more restrictive direction and identified the mechanisms that enabled this change to happen or led to policy deadlock. The book demonstrates that the causes of immigration policy change in three cases are broadly the same, as parties had similar concerns about immigration, but the way that these anxieties were articulated depends on the context. Framing accounted for immigration policy change in all three cases, while departmental competition led to immigration policy change in the UK, but accounted for integration policy deadlock in France, alongside institutional layering. Direct democracy enabled the SVP to redefine Swiss immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. The findings highlight the importance of the context, which enables and constrains political parties to articulate these causes differently in the process of immigration decision- and policy making. Despite the variation in parties’ immigration stances, the book sought to demonstrate that some of the factors that led to policy change can be articulated across cases and that some of the mechanisms are shared regardless of the context in which they operate.

References Abou-Chadi, T. (2016). Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact. British Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 417–436. Akkerman, T. (2012a). Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immigration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010). West European Politics, 35(3), 511–529. Akkerman, T. (2012b). Immigration Policy and Electoral Competition in Western Europe: A Fine-Grained Analysis of Party Positions Over the Past Two Decades. Party Politics, 21(1), 54–67. Alonso, S., & Da Fonseca, S. (2012). Immigration, Left and Right. Party Politics, 18(6), 865–884.

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Bale, T. (2008). Turning Round the Telescope. Centre-Right Parties and Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe1. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(3), 315–330. Boomgaarden, H., Schuck, A., Elenbaas, M., & de Vreese, C. (2011). Mapping EU Attitudes: Conceptual and Empirical Dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU Support. European Union Politics, 12(2), 241–266. Cottey, A. (2013). Security in 21st Century Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Drake, H. (2011). Contemporary France. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Fagerholm, A. (2015). Why do Political Parties Change Their Policy Positions? A Review. Political Studies Review, 14, 501–511. Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for Radical Right in Britain Abingdon. Oxon: Routledge. Grande, E., Schwarzbözl, T., and Fattke, M. (2019). Politicising Immigration in Western Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(10), 1444–1463. Green-Pedersen, C., & Krogstrup, J. (2008). Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and Sweden. European Journal of Political Research, 47(5), 610–634. Green-Pedersen, C., & Otjes, S. (2019). A Hot Topic? Immigration on the Agenda in Western Europe. Party Politics, 25(3), 424–434. Gruber, O., & Bale, T. (2014). And It’s Good Night Vienna. How (Not) to Deal with the Populist Radical Right: The Conservatives, UKIP and Some Lessons from the Heartland. British Politics, 9(3), 237–254. Harmel, R., & Janda, K. (1994). An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6(3), 259–287. Harmel, R., & Tan, A. C. (2003). Party Actors and Party Change: Does Factional Dominance Matter? European Journal of Political Research, 42(3), 409–424. Harmel, R., Tan, A. C., Janda, K. and Smith, J. M. (1995, 31 August–3 September). Substance vs Packaging: An Empirical Analysis of Parties’ Issue Profiles. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago: IL Kuhn, T. (2011). Europa Ante Portas: Border Residence, Transnational Interaction and Euroscepticism in Germany and France. European Union Politics, 13(1), 94–117. Meijers, M. (2017). Contagious Euroscepticism. The Impact of Eurosceptic Support on Mainstream Party Positions on European Integration. Party Politics, 23(4), 413–423. Meyer, S., & Rosenberger, S. (2015). Just a Shadow? The Role of Radical Right Parties in the Politicization of Immigration, 1995–2009. Politics and Governance, 3(2), 1–17. Partos, R., & Bale, T. (2015). Immigration and Asylum Policy Under Cameron’s Conservatives. British Politics, 10(2), 169–184.

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Usherwood, S. (2013). The Shifting Focus of Opposition to the European Union’. UACES Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(2), 279–296. Usherwood, S., & Startin, N. (2012). Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 1–16. Van Der Brug, W., Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (2005). Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed. Comparative Political Studies, 38(5), 537–573. Van Spanje, J. (2010). Contagious Parties: Anti-immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe. Party Politics, 16(5), 563–586.

Index

A Accommodative strategy, 17, 110, 126, 141, 142, 145, 154 Anti-discrimination, 109, 113, 118, 147 Anti-immigration, 2, 6, 7, 17, 77, 79, 91, 136–138 Assimilationist citizenship regime, 6, 8, 87, 106, 140, 145, 157 B Benefits, 42, 54, 74, 102 Bilateral agreements, 70 Brexit, 1, 6, 7, 35, 46, 49, 50, 62, 138, 143, 144, 150, 153, 156, 159, 160 C Cameron, David, 4, 35, 38, 42, 46, 47, 49, 61, 138, 140 Causal mechanisms, 9, 11, 146, 149 Citizenship regime, 154

Coalition government, 4, 9, 36, 38, 39, 41–43, 45–49, 54, 59, 62, 137, 149, 155 Comparative case study, 15 Consensus democracy, 68, 71, 89, 149 Consensus model, 159 Conservative parties, 1–9, 16, 17, 36, 38–44, 46–52, 55, 56, 58–60, 62, 63, 135–150, 153, 154, 156–158, 161 Contextual factors, 10, 150 D Departmental competition, 9, 10, 57, 59–62, 87, 121, 125, 127, 147–150, 154, 158, 159, 161 Direct democracy, 9, 68, 71, 72, 75, 77, 82, 84, 88–91, 148–150, 158, 161 Dynamics, 62, 87–90 of policy change, 6, 57–62, 159, 160 of policy deadlock, 11

© The Author(s) 2020 A. McKeever, Immigration Policy and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41761-1

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E Economic anxieties, 10, 51, 117, 126, 138–139, 144, 145, 155 Economic concerns, 3 Equal opportunities, 113, 114, 118, 120, 147 Ethnic-assimilationist citizenship regime, 8, 85, 141 EU enlargements, 39, 51, 115, 156, 160 EU family migration, 155 EU integration, 10, 51, 62, 75, 83, 114–116, 126, 137–138, 143–146, 150, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160 EU migration, 40, 47, 48, 50, 51, 62, 70, 81, 101, 102, 139, 143, 144, 156 Europe, 1, 3, 8 European integration, 72 Europeanisation, 3, 10, 79–87, 138 European Union (EU), 1, 3, 6, 10, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 53, 62, 67–91, 102, 105, 115, 116, 126, 135, 138, 143, 144, 154, 156, 159, 160 Eurosceptic/euroscepticism, 6, 74, 79, 88, 91, 135, 138, 143, 144, 146, 156, 157, 159, 160 Exogenous factors, 7, 15, 63, 127, 150, 158, 159 External factors, 15 F Family migration, 6, 40, 42, 44, 74, 84, 98–100, 102, 104, 116, 117, 126 Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP), 10, 72, 76, 84, 88, 91, 148 Financial requirement, 7, 36, 40 Framing, 9, 57–59, 87, 88, 117, 146, 154, 161

France, 3 Free movement of people, 7, 68–70, 73, 79, 81, 84, 88, 90, 91, 115, 116, 126, 135, 136, 138, 144, 145, 155–157 French immigration policy, 10, 97, 99, 100, 116, 143 Front National (FN), 3, 10, 97, 100, 107, 109, 110, 113, 119, 126, 142, 154, 157 G Global financial crisis, 79, 82, 103, 105, 116, 126, 145 H Highly skilled migration, 10, 81, 101–103, 105, 116, 117, 126 Home Office, 9, 40, 42, 47–50, 53–58, 60–62, 136, 148, 149, 158, 160 Home Office ideological dogmastism, 9, 62, 158, 160 I Identity, 3 anxieties, 10, 87, 106–112, 116, 135, 139, 140, 145, 155, 156 concerns, 10, 85, 157 Ideological spectrum, 5 Immigration/immigrants, 2, 3, 5–8, 10, 17, 35–39, 43, 44, 46–50, 53, 55–63, 67–69, 71–74, 76, 78–80, 84, 85, 88–91, 97–127, 135–150, 153–156, 158–161 policies, 1, 3, 6, 8–10, 16, 37, 39, 42, 44, 50, 53, 60–63, 84, 88, 100, 103, 111, 142, 143, 150, 154, 159, 161

 INDEX 

Immigration policy change, 5, 6, 8–10, 60, 87, 88, 111, 116–126, 135, 136, 138, 139, 143–150, 153, 156–158, 160, 161 Immigration policy making, 5, 9, 36, 60, 72, 75, 78, 89, 91, 136, 148, 149, 161 Initiative Against Mass Migration, 1, 4, 7, 10, 67–70, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 83, 85, 90, 135, 138, 144, 148, 150, 153, 155, 156, 159, 160 Initiative Against the Construction of Minarets, 72, 73, 75, 77, 85–87, 90, 139, 148, 155, 156 Initiative for Expelling Criminal Foreigners, 72, 73, 75, 77, 90, 148 Institutional change, 10, 127, 147–149 Institutional layering, 10, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 147, 158, 161 Integration, 1, 4, 6, 8, 37, 74, 78, 86–88, 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 102, 106–119, 121–123, 125–127, 140, 141, 147, 148, 155, 156 Integration policy, 71, 106, 107, 109, 113, 118, 121, 122, 126, 127, 137, 147 Integration policy deadlock, 10, 116–126, 147–150, 154, 161 Interest groups, 9 Internal factors, 15, 16 Intra-EU migration, 51, 52, 54, 70, 74, 88, 114, 138, 139, 144 Islamophobia, 3 L Labour, 6, 7, 37–40, 44, 46, 48, 51, 55 migration, 4, 36, 63, 68, 99, 135

167

Labour market, 4, 38, 48, 53, 54, 63, 69, 81–85, 88, 102, 104, 117, 139 Labour Party, 138, 143 Laïcité, 98, 106–108, 113, 141 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 107, 137, 142 Le Pen, Marine, 7, 97, 117 Liberal Democrats, 4, 9, 36, 39, 42, 47, 50, 59–63, 142, 149 Low-skilled migration, 54, 81, 101, 145 M Mainstream parties, 2, 17, 142, 153 Mechanisms, 1, 3, 6, 10, 15, 36, 57, 59, 61, 87–89, 91, 117, 118, 144, 146–150, 159–161 Migrants/migration, 9, 40, 41, 48, 104–105 Migration Watch UK (MWUK), 9, 44, 46, 63 Minarets, 7, 10, 85 Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, 109–111, 118, 122, 123, 125, 147 Multicultural citizenship regime, 8, 141 Muslims, 3, 4, 72, 85, 86, 91, 98, 99, 106–108, 111–113, 118, 135, 139, 140, 155, 156 N National Health Service (NHS), 36, 38, 41, 48 National identity, 85, 107–111, 118, 122, 123, 126, 137, 139 Net migration target, 39, 44, 47, 50, 51, 54, 55, 57, 60, 62, 136, 155 Non-EU migrants/migration, 6, 38, 40, 44, 51, 101–105, 139

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INDEX

P Party competition on the right, 10, 17, 137, 145, 154, 157 Party policy change, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 159 Policy change, 8, 10, 15, 123, 124, 144, 146, 150, 157, 159, 160 Policy deadlock, 1, 6, 8, 15, 127, 147, 150, 158–161 Policy making, 1, 68, 71, 89, 91, 124, 149 Political parties, 1, 6, 15–17, 63, 78, 91, 145, 153, 160, 161 Populism, 98, 161 Populist, 1, 2, 83, 84, 89, 91, 97, 116 Public opinion, 62, 79, 91, 105, 111, 116, 136–137, 145, 147, 154–155, 157 R Radical right, 3, 5, 6, 11, 17, 98, 100, 104, 109, 110, 137, 141–143, 145, 150, 153, 154, 157 Radical right FN, 116 Radical right parties, 2, 42 Right-wing parties, 5, 6, 17, 142, 143, 161 Right-wing populism, 3, 97 S Sarkozy, Nicholas, 4, 10, 98, 100–105, 108–120, 123, 125–127, 136–142, 144, 147, 154–157 Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), 4, 6, 9, 135, 136

Selective immigration approach, 10, 97, 100–104, 126 Student migration, 6, 40, 54, 56, 57, 60, 63, 97, 104–105, 117, 126, 135, 155 Swiss immigration policy, 6, 67, 69, 71, 73, 78, 84, 85, 87–91, 138, 143, 149, 159, 161 Swiss People’s Party (SVP), 67–91, 137–144, 147–149, 154–158, 161 U UK immigration policy, 9, 36, 46, 59, 60, 62, 158 UK immigration policy-making, 48 Union for a Popular Movement/Union pour un movement Populaire (UMP), 6, 98, 102, 105, 115, 135, 136, 140, 141, 144, 157 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 3, 45, 46, 49, 54, 55, 62, 137, 142, 143, 154, 157 Universities UK (UUK), 9, 48, 55, 57, 158 V Voters, 1, 38, 44, 49, 50, 77, 79, 108, 110, 141, 142, 145 W Welfare, 3, 38, 41, 42, 48–50, 58, 62, 63, 74, 84, 88, 117, 126, 138 Western Europe, 1, 3, 135