Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries 9780773587656

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i m m i g r a n t i n t e g r at i o n i n f e d e r a l c o u n t r i e s

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t hemat i c i ssue s i n fe de r a l i sm As part of its increased focus on comparative work on sectoral issues in federal systems, this new series from the Forum of Federations complements and parallels the Global Dialogue series. More policy oriented than its sister series, each of the volumes has been planned around a template of questions that will provide information and analysis relevant to the needs of practitioners of federalism. Each volume is a comparative work edited by leading experts in the field and built around an author’s conference that allow for an exchange of ideas and provide direction with regard to the final publication. The volumes in the series to date deal with the financing and governance of capital cities in federal countries and immigrant integration in federal countries. 1   Finance and Governance

2 Immigrant Integration

of  Capital Cities in

in Federal Countries

Federal  Systems

Edited by Christian Joppke

Edited by Enid Slack

and F. Leslie Seidle

and Rupak Chattopadhyay

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Thematic Issues in Federalism Volume 2 

IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES edited by christian joppke and f. leslie seidle

Published for

by McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

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©

isbn 978-0-7735-8765-6 (EPDF) Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Immigrant integration in federal countries / edited by Christian Joppke and F. Leslie Seidle. Includes bibliographical references and index.

I. Joppke, Christian II. Seidle, F. Leslie

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Contents

1 Introduction

f. leslie seidle and christian joppke

2 Australia

lesleyanne hawthorne

3 Belgium

marco martiniello

4 Canada

keith banting

5 Germany 6 Spain

3

23

58

79

michael bommes and holger kolb

ric ard zapata-barrero

7 Switzerland gianni d’amato

113

135

162

8 United States of America gary p. freeman and stuart m. tendler 192 9 Concluding Observations christian joppke and f. leslie seidle 221 Contributors Index

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i m m i g r a n t i n t e g r at i o n i n f e d e r a l c o u n t r i e s

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1 Introduction F . L e s l i e S e i d l e a n d C hr i st i a n J o ppk e Immigrant integration has become one of the more prominent issues in contemporary political debates and public policy analysis. Its prominence reflects concern about a range of developments, including demographic change resulting from significant flows of immigrants and the diversification of source countries, increased illegal migration, the economic and social marginalization of some immigrant communities, a sense that some immigrants (and their descendants) are not fully adopting what some see as the core shared values of the receiving society, and the impact of religious extremism (including terrorist attacks in the United States (2001), Spain (2004), and the United Kingdom (2005)). Economic conditions following the 2008 financial crisis seem to have aggravated some of these concerns and increased their exploitation in political rhetoric.1 These and related developments have been analyzed in a wide range of academic research and have prompted numerous international organizations, foundations, and commissions to study the underlying factors. A number of their reports are of interest because they include recommendations for new or reformed public policies and programs.Moreover, they usually address the important question of what is meant by immigrant integration. Before reviewing some of this discussion, we present the rationale for the project that led to this exploration of the relation between federalism and immigrant integration policies in seven countries. This introduction concludes with an overview of the “country” chapters in this volume and the editors’ concluding observations.

Feder a lism and immig r a n t in t e g r at io n Immigrant integration presents particular challenges in federal countries. In light of the range of policy fields involved, at least some of the issues are subject to multi-level governance. In federations with one or

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F. Leslie Seidle and Christian Joppke Table 1.1 International Migrants in the Seven Countries, 2010 (estimate) Country Australia

Migrants as Proportion   of Country’s Population (%) 21.9

Belgium

9.1

Canada

21.3

Germany

13.1

Spain

14.1

Switzerland

23.2

United States

13.5

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009), Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008  Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008); http:// esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1 (accessed March 10, 2011). Note: The number of international migrants generally represents the number of persons born in a country other than that in which they live (United Nations Population Division glossary).

more national minorities, newcomers can alter the linguistic and political balance. It is thus somewhat surprising that comparative studies of immigration and integration policies have not frequently examined these issues from the perspective of federalism. One or more of the United States, Canada, and Australia – three of the oldest federations – are often included in comparative studies. However, this may be because they all have long histories as immigrant-receiving societies and fairly large foreign-born populations.2 Some of the Western European federations, particularly Germany, are also sometimes included in multi-country studies. Once again, though, federalism does not seem to be the key selection criterion. This volume is intended to contribute to filling this gap. At the outset, we selected seven federal countries that have had significant experience with immigration: Australia, Canada, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States (although Spain is not technically a federation, leading scholars classify it as a de facto federal system ).3 As table 1.1 shows, in all but one of the seven countries (Belgium) the proportion of international migrants is 13 percent or higher. Apart from such commonalities, these countries also show some interesting variations that allow meaningful comparisons. First, some of them (the United States, Canada, and Australia) were populated by immigrants over several centuries, while those in Western Europe have experienced significant inflows (not counting intra-European migration) for a much shorter period – essentially since World War II. Second, because of the presence of more than one language community, four of the countries are often described as “multination” (or

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Table 1.2 Official Languages in Belgium, Canada, Spain and Switzerland Country

Official Languages

Belgium

Dutch French German

1

Canada

English French

Spain

Spanish Co-official languages2 Catalan (Catalonia, Valencian Community, Balearic Islands) Basque (Basque Country, Navarre) Galician (Galicia)

Switzerland

German French Italian Romansh

1 In Quebec, French is the sole official language. In New Brunswick, English and French are official languages. 2 As determined by the statute of autonomy of each Comunidad Autónoma (autonomous community).

multinational) states: Belgium, Canada, Spain, and Switzerland (for further details see table 1.2).4 The models of federalism that apply vary. In the United States, Canada, and Australia, the constitution provides for a division of powers (legislative and administrative) between the federal and state/provincial governments; as a general rule, the government responsible for a given field both passes laws and administers the associated programs. This model has been labeled divided  federalism. In contrast, Germany has administrative  federalism: most legislative powers fall to the federal government, whereas most administrative powers have been assigned to the Länder.  In addition, the Länder governments participate actively in the federal law-making process through their ongoing representation in the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the national parliament.5 Switzerland has evolved from having a constitution with three lists of powers (federal, cantonal, and concurrent) to an approach (reflected in part in the 1999 constitution) closer to that of Germany.6 Belgium has a distinctive model of federalism based on regions and linguistic communities. Other differences among the seven countries,

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F. Leslie Seidle and Christian Joppke

including their federal histories and the degree of constitutional and fiscal decentralization, will be evident from the chapters that follow. All this means that, as Alan Fenna has noted with regard to another multi-federation study, “one has to make highly contextualized comparisons.”7 In one of the rare comparative reflections on federalism and immigration policy, legal scholar Peter Spiro examined three areas: immigration benefits, namely, who should be admitted and remain as residents and qualify for naturalization; immigrant rights, including access to social services and public education; and enforcement. Although his examples of policy change are drawn mostly from the United States, he found “a discernable trend towards greater subnational participation in each of the three categories of immigration decision-making.”8 One of the central questions underlying our project is the extent to which, consistent with Spiro’s observation (made a decade ago), there has been a trend towards greater constituent unit involvement along one or more of the dimensions discussed below. If such a trend is evident, has it been taking place in all, most, or only a few of the countries studied here? Is the trend more marked along some dimensions than along others? Two related sets of questions concern policy formation and governance. On policy, where the decentralization of certain aspects of immigrant integration to constituent units (states, provinces, Länder, etc.) has occurred, has this led to greater responsiveness to regional or local circumstances? To what degree have immigrant integration policies been linked to constituent units’ claims for greater autonomy and recognition of their linguistic and cultural specificity? As for governance, one issue is how federal states, particularly the more decentralized ones, are dealing with the possibility of policy variation among the constituent units. Is policy coherence a concern, particularly if it has led to inequities in rights and benefits? Or is such variation accepted as part of life in a federal state? Have processes been developed to encourage coordination among the various actors – particularly between constituent and federal governments? In order to help us respond to these questions, the authors were asked to focus on several dimensions of immigrant integration (described below), provide certain basic information (including the current law and recent statistics on admissions and naturalization), report major policy changes during the last decade or so and, in particular, assess trends towards greater responsibility or activity on the part of constituent units. The summaries presented in the “Overview” section below highlight their principal observations.

I m m i g rant integrat ion: co n c e p t a n d p r ac t ic e What is generally meant by immigrant integration? In the abundant literature on this topic the concept is not usually treated as a synonym for assimilation.9

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According to Rogers Brubaker, who drew on the development of the French state, assimilation is “a deliberate policy of making similar.”10 As Will Kymlicka has recounted, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand once had an assimilationist approach: “Immigrants were encouraged and expected to assimilate to the pre-existing society, with the hope that over time they would become indistinguishable from native-born citizens in their speech, dress, recreation, voting patterns, and way of life generally.”11 Since the 1960s, Kymlicka adds, two major changes occurred in those countries. First, they adopted raceneutral admission criteria for immigrant selection. Second, they shifted to “a more ‘multicultural’ conception of integration, one which expects that many immigrants will visibly and proudly express their ethnic identity, and which accepts an obligation on the part of public institutions … to accommodate these ethnic identities.”12 An acceptance that some aspects of immigrants’ “difference” may endure even after they become citizens of a new country is reflected in a number of public policy reports and statements of the past decade or so. In its 2005 report, the Global Commission on International Migration observed that the negative outcomes often experienced by first-generation migrants “arise from a variety of factors, including discrimination in the labour and housing markets, the inability of migrants to gain equitable access to education and health care, xenophobia and racism, as well as low education levels [and] limited language skills.” According to the commission, the immigrant integration process “should value social diversity, foster social cohesion and avert the marginalization of migrant communities.” There is nevertheless a need for balance: “Integration recognizes and accommodates differences, but require a sense of belonging amongst nationals and migrants alike.”13 Be that as it may, the countries of the European Union have taken steps toward a shared approach to immigrant integration. One of these was the European Council’s unanimous adoption in November 2004 of “Common Basic Principles [CBPs] for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union.”14 One analyst15 has divided the main principles into three categories: •

•

•

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Immigrant rights include equal treatment and non-discrimination, as well as the right to practise “diverse cultures and religions.” Another CBP reads as follows: “Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.” Immigrant  obligations include acquiring a basic knowledge of the “host society’s language, history and institutions” and not engaging in cultural or religious practices that “conflict with other inviolable European rights or national law.” A host society obligation involves enabling immigrants to acquire basic knowledge about the receiving society.16

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The first and third categories reflect one of the central assumptions of the CBPs, namely, that integration obligations do not fall only on the shoulders of immigrants. Indeed, the first CBP makes this explicit: “Integration is a dynamic, long-term and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. In a similar vein, a report from a 2008 G8 experts roundtable concluded that “making society more inclusive means transforming institutions and serious changes about how society operates.”17 This emphasis on mutual adaptation thus calls for proactive measures that go beyond passive tolerance and the acceptance of difference. As a statement agreed to by all twenty-five EU member states and thus not rich in specifics, it is perhaps not surprising that the CBPs have met with some criticism. Marco Martiniello identifies several weaknesses: the lack of an explicit definition of integration, the “linear and unidirectional” nature of the approach (“integration will take a more or less long time but it will take place eventually”), and a “paternalist vision” (reflected in the emphasis on values and responsibilities).18 Another analyst takes a more positive view: “The strength of the Common Basic Principles ... is in adding the endorsement of all Member States to a holistic integration strategy that focuses not only on migrants, but also on dismantling the barriers to integration that they face.”19 The CBPs have led to a number of modest initiatives, including the 2005 “Common Agenda for Integration,” a handbook on integration, and three annual reports.20 Another fairly widely accepted principle is the desirability of encouraging participation on the part of immigrants, which among other things entails citizenship acquisition. In 2005 a major study for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace underlined the importance of participation by all “lawfully settled” individuals within a polity: “Expanding opportunities for active participation in the economic, political and social life of a society enables individuals and groups with diverse interests, backgrounds and perspectives to contribute most fully to the material and cultural enrichment of all. Through engaging in these opportunities, members strengthen their concrete linkages to one another and deepen their most basic stakes in the general welfare of their communities.”21 On this view, participation is important not only for individual welfare and fulfilment but also for social cohesion. However, positions differ as to whether the emphasis should be on providing immigrants with the tools to map their own path to participation in the various domains or on requirements that are more directive or even obligatory. The latter approach, reflecting what a Dutch scholar has described as “increasing emphasis on native norms, values and behaviour,”22 has led to the introduction of integration courses and/or tests in a number of countries.23 Drawing on the key principles for immigrant integration presented in policy studies such as those discussed above, the following definition of

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integration was used for this project: “Immigrant integration is a process through which newcomers become capable of participating in the economic, social and civic/political life of the receiving country. Acquiring these capacities is not only the responsibility of newcomers: the receiving society and its governments must provide instruments and resources that will allow immigrants (and their families) to do so.” Defining immigrant integration as a process does not imply that the path is unidirectional and has a set endpoint – for example, naturalization. Some immigrants take up residence elsewhere but choose not to become citizens of their adopted country (in some cases because this would mean renouncing the citizenship of their country of origin). Such immigrants may nevertheless be relatively well integrated along other dimensions. Immigrants who do decide to naturalize may still continue along what is sometimes called their integration trajectory. For example, it may take a number of years for new citizens to move from precarious employment (perhaps not in their field) to more satisfying work with a reasonable level of job security. As for social integration, for some – for example, refugees and sponsored family members who arrive with limited knowledge of the language – this may require considerable time. Attaining a reasonable level of civic integration can take even longer. Consistent with the above definition, the authors of the chapters in this volume review key developments in their respective federal countries during the post-2000 decade and, in particular, current public policies and programs in three categories: selection/admission, economic and social integration, and civic and political integration.24 The following is a brief explanation of the scope and relevance of each category. Selection and Admission Although the rules that govern the acceptance of potential immigrants may seem to be outside the ambit of “integration,” some academics and policymakers consider them quite relevant to the integration process. Commenting on what he describes as the strong track record of Canada and Australia in the integration of immigrants, Kymlicka suggests this that “may be due in part to the fact that the immigration policies of these two countries focus heavily on selecting skilled immigrants, who arrive with greater levels of the human and social capital to integrate.”25 This does not mean that immigrants who arrive through other channels will face huge integration challenges. For example, employer-sponsored immigrants with the relevant language skills may fit into life in their new country without too much difficulty. However, countries that receive a large share of immigrants through family reunion and/or refugee policies – the case in a number of Western European countries – sometimes face considerable challenges.26

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Economic and Social Integration A wide range of public policies and programs are relevant to immigrants’ integration into the economy (notably the labour market) and society of their adopted country. In many cases, even before naturalization, they benefit from government services that are open to all residents – for example, job counselling and public education. An analysis of the role that these and other public services play in the economic and social integration of immigrants and their children would require a book in itself. For present purposes, we have focused on the following areas (although the degree of attention devoted to them varies from chapter to chapter in light of each country’s circumstances and policies): •

•

•

Language training. If new arrivals do not already speak the language (or one of the languages) of the receiving country, acquiring basic competence is virtually essential. For newcomers who have basic linguistic skills, additional language learning can facilitate more meaningful employment (e.g., in the field in which they were trained or worked previously) and the capacity to participate in social and civic life. In some countries the state provides language training, while in others the voluntary sector plays a significant role in service provision – for example, in Canada, where hundreds of nongovernmental organizations provide language training as part of what are referred to as settlement services.27 Recognition of credentials. In countries that select a significant share of their immigrants, newcomers often face barriers to the recognition of their academic/professional qualifications that affect their outcomes, e.g., employment rates, revenue, and so forth. Research shows that the governing bodies of certain professions are sometimes unwelcoming to immigrant professionals. This is being actively addressed in some of the countries covered by this project. Education. Although schools do not usually have an explicit mandate for immigrant integration, their structure (e.g., unified or tracked/streamed) can affect educational outcomes. In some countries, additional classes are provided to improve the language skills of immigrant children. The education system also plays an essential role in familiarizing immigrant children with the norms, culture, and so on, of the receiving society. Civic and Political Integration

Although the pattern varies considerably, most governments have policies and programs that are intended to help immigrants (and new citizens) acquire the motivation and skills to become actively involved within their new society. Their involvement may begin with civic activities such as participation in

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neighbourhood or advocacy organizations where they learn from and build networks with people primarily from their own background – what Irene Bloemraad describes as their initial political socialization.28 Some may expand their horizons by participating in the work of political parties, voting, and running for and possibly assuming elected office. For many, naturalization is an important part of this trajectory. Indeed, it is virtually always a pre-condition for voting in national elections and, outside a number of European countries, for voting in local elections.29 Here, as on the other dimensions, the opportunities the receiving society offers are a key factor. If doors appear closed, only the most highly motivated recent arrivals will choose to become civically involved. As with the previous category, civic/ political integration is quite a vast domain. In this project, we have focused on the following: •

•

•

Integration courses/services. A number of countries have introduced integration courses to familiarize immigrants with the way of life, values, and institutions of their new country. In some cases, these courses are obligatory, and there may be sanctions for non-participation. In others, participation is voluntary but expected. In some countries, settlement services have similar objectives. As Bloemraad has written, these services “increase immigrants’ ability to acquire citizenship and affect how interested they are in doing so.”30 Intercultural dialogue and exchange.31 Nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions, foundations, and other bodies often play an important role in encouraging interaction between immigrants and members of the receiving society. Structured exchanges through various activities help newcomers acquire social and civic skills and encourage mutual learning. While these activities largely occur within civil society, the organizations involved often receive funding under government programs. Naturalization. For decades, a number of European countries provided no pathway to citizenship for the guest workers they relied on so extensively during the postwar economic boom. Following the liberalization of naturalization laws in the 1980s and 1990s,32 with very few exceptions this is no longer the case. However, some countries (such as Switzerland) still have a lengthy residence requirement. In certain countries, such as Canada and the United States, children of immigrants born within the country’s territory become citizens at birth even if their parents have not yet been naturalized (jus soli). In a number of other countries, this is not the case (the children of immigrants may nevertheless be able to apply for naturalization once they are adults).33 Although naturalization is an important step, it needs to be seen in a broader context. According to the Transatlantic Council on Migration, “while it should be clearly accessible to immigrants and thus serve as an incentive for greater integration, citizenship should not

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F. Leslie Seidle and Christian Joppke

be thought of as the principal tool for immigrant integration or, for that matter, as the end point of the integration process.”34 It is worth underlining that the three categories of integration measures are interrelated. To take only one important example, language skills – whether acquired by immigrants through training courses or their children in schools – have an important impact on employment prospects and the capacity to be involved in mainstream civic activities.35 In addition, the different dimensions of the integration trajectory are a matter of degree, not absolutes. For example, immigrants may become better integrated into the labour market as they become more proficient in the receiving society’s language. Finally, non-integration along one or more of the three dimensions is a logical as well as a real possibility – one that can impair the life chances of immigrants, the economic efficiency of immigration, and the cohesion of the communities and countries where immigrants settle. 36 It should be clear from the preceding discussion that newcomer integration is a broad government responsibility that should not simply fall to the department or agency that applies the rules on immigrant selection/admission.37 In light of the multi-dimensional nature of immigrant integration, policy coherence and horizontal coordination within national governments are required. This means including departments and other government bodies that have a general, non-immigrant-specific “vocation” but whose work has important implications for immigrant integration – the field of education is a noteworthy example. Indeed, a shift along these lines seems to be taking place. For example, the 2008 G8 expert roundtable noted that “more G8 countries are moving towards a ‘whole of society’ approach in regard to managing integration and diversity.”38 In a similar vein, immigrant integration cannot be only the responsibility of national governments. A large proportion of immigrants settle in large cities, and local governments not only administer policies established at the national level but also have programs that reflect their particular circumstances. In the view of Rinus Penninx, national governments “should be involved in the framing of integration policies, providing general directions” to local authorities.39 Whatever the balance, local government integration activities can have impacts (or spillovers) beyond a given city. Immigrant integration policies and programs have thus become subject to multi-level governance; at the same time, as in many other policy fields, the participation of non-state actors has been increasing.40 The dynamics of multi-level governance are particularly evident in federal countries where – as is often the case – constituent units have constitutional responsibility for policy fields that directly or indirectly affect immigrant integration. In practice, both orders of government (federal and subnational) may administer programs. Settlement/integration services are an example of this:

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both the federal and constituent-unit governments may be active in sponsoring orientation sessions, language training, and integration courses (or the equivalent). In order to help us respond to the questions presented at the outset of this introduction, the authors were asked to focus on the dimensions of immigrant integration outlined above, provide certain basic information (including the current law and recent statistics on admissions and naturalization), report major policy changes during the last decade or so, and, in particular, assess trends towards greater responsibility or activity on the part of constituent units. The summaries presented in the next section highlight their principal observations.

Ov ervi e w In the opening chapter, Lesleyanne Hawthorne demonstrates that immigration has long been a key driver of Australia’s population and economic growth. Major investment has been made in integration processes. In 2006, 24 percent of the country’s population was foreign-born. Among immigration streams, skilled migration (through a points system) has dominated since the mid-1990s. A strong push to attract international students, many of whom could convert to permanent residence, led to controversy about the quality of courses being offered and a policy change that means that the numbers will drop somewhat. Since Australia is one of the few federations that has become more centralized (at least in fiscal terms) during recent decades, it is not surprising that almost all its major immigration and integration policies remain in the hands of the federal government. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s state governments (along with employers) have played a growing role in selecting candidates who agree to settle outside high-migration areas. By 2008–9, skilled immigrants selected by state governments accounted for 12 percent of the category total. As for settlement services, the largest share of programming is administered by the federal immigration department, and much of the delivery is carried out by nongovernmental organizations. State government involvement in this area varies; there is greater activity in states with larger immigrant populations. Hawthorne underlines that, even though the role of state governments in immigration and integration has been evolving fairly rapidly, any disagreements that arise are generally resolved. This was the case with the student migration controversy (the states were involved because of their responsibility for education) and with efforts to improve the recognition of foreign credentials (in which the Council of Australian Governments, an important intergovernmental institution, has played an important role). Next, Marco Martiniello, writing on Belgium, demonstrates how differing approaches to immigrant integration have become intertwined with distinct

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societal views in what he describes as a “federalism of disunion.” The three regional governments are responsible for socio-economic and territorial matters, and the three “communities” have jurisdiction over linguistic and cultural areas. However, European Union law has an impact, and the communes are also active in immigrant integration programs and services. The federal government retains responsibility for the admission of immigrants, but the regions issue work permits. The conditions of the permits vary – not a small matter when the migrants can seek work in other regions of the country. Flanders, as part of its nation-building efforts, is seeking powers over immigrant admission and residence permits. As for integration policies themselves, according to Martiniello the federal government shows very little leadership, and there is very little cooperation between the communities and the regions, not because of institutional deficiencies but because of the lack of shared will. Policy variation is considerable. For example, Flanders has a quite extensive integration course that is obligatory for newcomers, whereas Wallonia relies on regional integration centres whose approaches vary considerably. In Brussels, where up to 40 percent of the population is from a migration background, the French-speaking and Flemish parts of the regional government have different approaches: the former focuses on social cohesion, and the latter offers a non-compulsory integration course. Martiniello concludes that multi-level governance with regard to immigrant integration does not function very well. Nevetheless, as Belgium faces a somewhat uncertain future, immigration and integration issues will be part of the broader debate about the country’s structure. Turning to Canada, Keith Banting analyzes how, in three decades, the country moved from a centralized immigration and integration regime to a highly decentralized one. Provincial governments are now powerful actors in the selection, settlement, and integration of immigrants. Only naturalization remains an exclusive federal responsibility. In addition, the Canadian system is now highly asymmetric, with varied relationships between the federal government and different provinces.The initial catalyst for this shift was substate nationalism, as Quebec carved out a major role in the sector. Accommodating Quebec’s distinctiveness triggered a wider decentralization through a series of bilateral agreements between the federal government and individual provinces. Banting suggests that Canada offers lessons for traditional debates over the strengths and weaknesses of multilevel governance. Decentralization has certainly given the regions greater ability to tailor policies to local conditions, and greater autonomy for Quebec in this sector has contributed to the survival of Canada as a single state. Nevertheless, on other dimensions, he finds the scorecard is mixed. In Banting’s assessment, asymmetric decentralization has not made Canada a fairer place. Immigrants in similar circumstances are treated differently across the country, and while the new regime is contributing to a more even

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distribution of immigrants across the country, the federal government’s uneven treatment of the provinces is producing bitterness in some parts of the country. On political accountability, Canada has moved from a world in which one government was responsible to one in which everyone and no-one is in charge and accountable. Some critics also lament the loss of policy coherence and national vision. In the world of multi-level governance, Banting concludes, there are no straight lines to progress. Germany is covered by the late Michael Bommes and Holger Kolb. As they explain, despite the admission of millions of guest workers up to the mid-1970s, what was then West Germany did not consider itself a country of immigration. This explains in part why, for quite a time, immigrant integration was not addressed through specific federal policies. Rather, integration was to occur through general programs administered by the Länder, including education and social services. Local governments also played a major role through what the authors describe as “pragmatic outsourcing.” The selection and admission of immigrants remained entirely a federal government responsibility, as it still is. Following reunification, the first steps were taken towards what Bommes and Kolb label a process of political and legal normalization, included reforms of citizenship law (most notably in 2000) that reduced the pre-naturalization residence requirement to eight years and introduced a variant of jus soli for children of foreigners born in Germany. In 2005, as part of the federal government’s more active stance in this area, a national integration course was introduced and administered by an office of the federal government, not by the Länder. Otherwise, immigrant integration activities are largely carried out by the Länder and municipalities. A major reform of federalism in the post-2000 decade gave the Länder greater responsibility over education. Debates continue about whether the structure of the school system disadvantages children from a migration background. Finally, it should be highlighted that the Länder play a significant role in the naturalization process and that rates vary considerably among them (which may reflect in part the more restrictive approaches employed in certain Länder). Among the seven countries, Spain’s transition to a country of immigration has been the most recent. As Ricard Zapata-Barrero demonstrates, the foreign population grew five-fold between 2000 and 2009. The majority of immigrants are concentrated in the autonomous communities (ACs) of Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, and Madrid. The Spanish government has exclusive jurisdiction over admission and related matters. Its explicit involvement in integration policies is fairly recent. The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration for 2007–10 was a significant step in this regard. According to Zapata-Barrero, cooperative federalism was the driving force behind the strategic plan, which acknowledges the multidimensional nature of immigrant integration and the principle of subsidiarity. The ACs

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and local administrations have key responsibilities, but the Spanish government provides significant financial assistance through a special fund for the reception and integration of immigrants and their educational improvement. As in other public policy areas, some ACs have been more active than others in seeking greater responsibility over immigrant integration. Catalonia, in particular, has created links with its identity claims and efforts to obtain greater autonomy. Following adoption of its 2006 Statute of Autonomy, Catalonia became the first AC to obtain responsibility for authorizing initial work permits for foreigners. However, some other Catalan measures, including an attempt to make Catalan the sole language for immigrant reception purposes, have been contested in court. In this context, Zapata-Barrero concludes that the federalization of this field is taking place in the context of a multinational state and that a key question is how to reconcile the management of the general interest with the exercise of the ACs’ “self-government right” and their differing realities and interests. Switzerland is, on almost any measure, the most decentralized of the federations covered in this volume. However, as Gianni D’Amato demonstrates, the canton governments play only a secondary role in immigrant admission (they check if the person complies with the requirements to settle in Switzerland). Almost two-thirds of the population speaks German, but there are three other official languages (see table 1.1). Although the diversity of the population has affected integration policies and programs, which benefit from some funding from the federal government, Switzerland’s active use of direct democracy measures has had as much – if not more – influence. Tapping into what D’Amato describes as the country’s strong cultural inhibitions, the Swiss People’s party (SVP) has triggered referendums on a range of issues, from naturalization rules to minarets. This dynamic is unique among the seven countries. On naturalization, Switzerland also stands out: the federal, cantonal and commune governments all must consent – in one way or another – to most naturalization applications (for “facilitated” naturalizations of people married to a Swiss citizen the Confederation is solely responsible). Direct democracy plays a role here as well: a considerable number of communes allow citizens to vote (by secret ballot at an open meeting) on naturalization applications. D’Amato concludes that the involvement of many actors through multi-level governance has long prevented Switzerland from meeting the inclusive immigrant integration standards of most other European countries. The last of the “country chapters,” on the United States, is by Gary Freeman and Stuart Tendler. They recount that the federal government continues to dominate the regulation of immigration, including selection (state governments have acquired no formal role), residence qualifications and naturalization. The extent of illegal immigration, estimated at about 500,000 annually in recent years (compared to about 1.1 million admitted for permanent

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17

residence in 2009), sets the United States apart from the six other countries. As for integration policies, state governments play a major role in program development and implementation; funding increasingly comes from the federal government. Drawing on the experience of eighteen states, the authors demonstrate the considerable variation in immigrant-specific programs (such as English courses) and general programs that benefit substantial numbers of immigrants (e.g., social assistance). Many integration activities are based on public-private collaboration, and nonprofit organizations play a considerable role. The result is what Freeman and Tendler describe as a “dense web” of activities that constitute “what amounts to a slightly chaotic but substantial integration program.” A major current issue concerns the efforts by states and local governments to discourage illegal migration by passing measures to penalize illegal entrants, employers, and others who benefit from the services of undocumented workers. A well-known example is the 2010 Arizona law, parts of which were struck down in court (the case went to the US Supreme Court). “Attrition through enforcement,” though in some respects not clearly based on the states’ agreed constitutional jurisdiction, provides further examples of growing subnational government activity in the United States. Finally, Christian Joppke and Leslie Seidle present a series of concluding observations. They note that, in light of the variation among federations, it is not surprising that different relationships between federalism and immigrant integration were observed among, and within, the seven countries covered in this volume. In multination federations, pressure from linguistic communities seeking cultural protection has sometimes led to a transfer of powers to the relevant subnational units without being generalized throughout the country. On the dimension of immigrant integration outlined above, Joppke and Seidle’s key observations are that (1) selection and admission are the sole responsibility of the federal government in all of the countries except Canada and Australia (provincial government involvement in Canada is particularly significant); (2) on economic, social, and civic-political integration, the federal and constituent unit governments are as a general rule both involved; and (3) naturalization policy remains an exclusive federal responsibility in all seven countries except Switzerland (where the communes are the most important actors in the process). The co-editors also observe that there is considerable variation in the extent to which the federal government provides leadership on integration policies (for example, through legislation or a policy framework) and whether and how generously it funds programs administered by subnational governments. Joppke and Seidle close by observing that federalism is one among a number of factors that influence the shape of public policies that affect immigrant integration (including those that are not immigrant-specific) and, ultimately, the outcomes of newcomers and their descendants.

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Not es 1 For example, a 2010 survey carried out in Canada, the United States, and six European countries showed a drop in support since 2009 on the question of whether immigration enriches the country’s culture with new customs and ideas. German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic Trends: Immigration. Key Findings 2010,” 27. http://www.gmfus.org/trends/immigration/doc/ TTI2010_English_Key.pdf (accessed 5 March 2011). See also Transatlantic Council on Migration, Prioritizing Integration, ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010), 19. 2 See Myer Siemiatycki and Triadifilos Triadifilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” (Toronto: Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, May 2010), 1. 3 Thomas O. Hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (Peterborough: Broadview Press 2006), 19. 4 See, for example, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ed., Immigration and Self-government of  Minority Nations (Brussels: Peter Lang 2009); the volume includes chapters on Catalonia, Flanders, and Quebec. 5 This distinction is from Hueglin and Fenna, Comparative Federalism, 61–2. 6 Increasingly, the Swiss federal government adopts framework legislation that the cantons are in charge of implementing, assisted by fiscal transfers from the former. The Swiss sometimes call this “implementation federalism.” See Hueglin and Fenna, Comparative Federalism, 168–9. 7 Allan Fenna, “Benchmarking in Federal Systems,” Forum of Federations Occasional Paper no. 6 (2010), 11. 8 Peter Spiro, “Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends,” International Social  Science Journal (2001): 71. 9 In some of the literature, particularly by American authors, “incorporation” is used rather than “integration,” although the reason is not clear. Some scholars seem to treat the two terms as synonyms; see, for example, John H. Mollenkopf and Jennifer Hochschild, “Setting the Context,” in Hochschild and Mollenkopf, eds., Bringing  Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 3n1. 10 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1992), 8. See also Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration:  Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (Houndmills: Palgrave 1998). 11 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of  Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 71. 12 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, 72. 13 Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an Interconnected  World: New Directions for Action (United Nations 2004), 44, http://www.gcim.org/ attachements/gcim-complete-report-2005.pdf(accessed 24 February 2010). The

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14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

19

commission was launched in 2003 by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and a number of governments and was comprised of a commissioner from each of nineteen countries (including a number of former ministers). The report does not distinguish clearly between identity differences that can be expected to endure and discriminatory differences that public policy may seek to attenuate. In that sense, it mixes the antidiscrimination and multiculturalism agendas. On the two agendas, see Christian Joppke, “Minority rights for immigrants?” Israel Law  Review 43 (2010): 49–66. European Council, “Common Basic Principles of Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union” (2004), http://www.enaro.eu/dsip/download/eu-CommonBasic-Principles.pdf (accessed 24 February 2010). Sergio Carrera Nuñez, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Interaction between Integration,  Immigration and Nationality in the eu  (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2008), 52. The quotations in the points that follow are from the CBPs. This is often forgotten in the punitive approach taken to “civic integration” in some member states, most notably the Netherlands. Germany, Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Second G8 Experts Roundtable on Diversity and Integration, October 29–30, 2008” (Niesetal, Germany: Silber Druck oHG), 15. Marco Martiniello, “Towards a Coherent Approach to Immigrant Integration Policy(ies) in the European Union” (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 42/58/38295165.pdf (accessed 24 February 2010). Sarah Spencer, “The Challenge of Integration in Europe,” in Demetrios G. Papademetriou , eds., Europe and its Immigrants in the Twenty-first Century: A New Deal  or a Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf? (Washington: Migration Policy Institute 2006), 20. See also Rinus Penninx, “Elements for an EU Framework for Integration Policies for Immigrants,” in Rita Süssmuth and Werner Weidenfeld, eds., Managing  Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities towards Immigrants (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005). For a detailed account of these and related developments, see Carrera Nuñez, In  Search of the Perfect Citizen? chap. 3. Annual reports on migration and integration were issued in 2005, 2006, and 2007. It is not clear why the annual reports were not continued. For the latest edition of the handbook, see European Commission, Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners, 3d ed. (2009), http://ec. europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_12892_168517401.pdf (accessed 5 March 2011). T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for an Age of  Migration (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002), 5. In a similar vein, another study defines integration as “a process of providing immigrants with equal chances to access opportunities available to native-born”; see Mariya Aleksynska and Yann Algan, “Assimilation and Integration of Immigrants in Europe,” Institute for the Study of Labor (2010), 5,http://www.politiquessociales. net/IMG/pdf/r3_dp5185.pdf (accessed 5 March 2011) (emphasis added).

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22 Jan Rath, “Debating Multiculturalism: Europe’s Reaction in Context,” Harvard  International Review, 6 January 2011, http://hir.harvard.edu/debatingmulticulturalism (accessed 21 February 2011). 23 The integration course introduced in the Netherlands in 1998 served as an example to other countries; see Christian Joppke, “Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Europe,” in Keith Banting, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, eds., Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy 2007), 334–42. 24 For a multidimensional approach to immigrant integration, see Keith Banting, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, “Conclusion: Diversity, Belonging and Shared Citizenship,” in Banting, Courchene, and Seidle, eds., Belonging? Diversity,  Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada, 647–87. Gary Freeman has developed another categorization based on four sets of regulatory institutions that are most likely to affect immigrant integration: the state, market, welfare, and cultural sectors (“Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies,” International Migration  Review 38 [2004], 945–69). 25 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, 156. In this regard, a major policy-oriented report described “orderliness and strict selection criteria” as “the means through which immigrants become the economic (and social) assets they typically are”; see Transatlantic Council on Migration, Prioritizing Integration, 20. 26 On this point, see Christian Joppke, “European Immigrant Integration in Change,” Canadian Diversity 5 (2006), 148. 27 The significance of these policies is examined in depth and compared with the differing situation in the United States in Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen:  Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (Berkeley: University of California Press 2006). On settlement services in Canada, including the role provincial governments, see John Biles, “Integration Policies in EnglishSpeaking Canada,” in John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Frideres, eds., Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-first Century (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2008), 139–86; and F. Leslie Seidle, “The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement: Assessment and Options for Renewal” (Toronto: Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation 2010). 28 Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen, 6. 29 In the European Union, eighteen of the twenty-seven member states allow residents who are citizens of other non-EU countries to vote in local elections (provided they have met residence and other requirements). All citizens of EU member states have the right to vote in local elections in any other EU country. 30 Irene Bloemraad, “Citizenship in the United States and Canada,” Canadian  Diversity 6 (2008): 129–33. 31 For the Council of Europe, a strong advocate of the approach, intercultural dialogue “is understood as an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals [and] groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect.” See

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32 33

34

35

36

37

38 39

40

21

Council of Europe, “White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue” (2008), 10, http:// www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf (accessed 7 March 2011). See, among others, Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge: Polity Press 2010), chap. 2. There is considerably more variation in naturalization rules than can be explained here. An in-depth study from a historical perspective with up-to-date data on naturalization rates is Thomas Janoski, The Ironies of Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010). Delivering Citizenship, eds. Bertelsmann Stiftung, European Policy Centre and Migration Policy Institute (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008), 24 (emphasis added). The inter-related nature of integration measures is reflected in the Migrant Policy Integration Index (MIPEX), which uses 148 indicators in seven policy areas to arrive at a “multi-dimensional picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in society by assessing governments’ commitment to integration.” The results of the latest MIPEX review were released in early 2011; http://www.integrationindex.eu/ (accessed 10 March 2011). For an insightful discussion of immigrant political integration, including factors that can lead to “nonincorporation,” see Jennifer L. Hochschild and John H. Mollenkopf, “Modeling Immigrant Political Incorporation,” in Hochschild and Mollenkopf, eds., Bringing Outsiders In, 15–30. For example, according to a quite detailed study of government programs in Canada (excluding Quebec), at least fourteen departments and agencies of the federal government “have a direct connection to the integration of immigrants”; see Biles, “Integration Policies in English-Speaking Canada,” 141n4. “Second G8 Experts Roundtable on Diversity and Integration,” 8. Rinus Penninx, “Decentralising Integration Policies: Managing Migration in Cities, Regions and Localities” (2009), 10, http://www.policy-network.net/ publications/3450/Decentralising-integration-policies (accessed 9 March 2011). See also Tiziano Caponio and Maren Borkert, eds. The Local Dimension of Migration  Policy-making (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2010). Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, “Multi-level Governance: Conclusions and Implications,” in Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, eds., Multi-level Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), 197.

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2 Australia L E S L E Y A N N E HA WT HO R N E Australia is a global exemplar of nation-building through governmentplanned and administered skilled, family, and humanitarian migration programs. By 2011 it had the highest percentage of foreign-born residents (26 percent) of the seven countries covered in this volume; the comparable proportions in Canada and the United States in 2010 were 21 percent and 14 percent, respectively. Forty-four percent of Australians are currently immigrants or the children of immigrants.1 By 2009 Australia’s population stood at 21,875,000 people, following the largest growth in twenty years (a net annual gain of 443,100 people). Immigration was the primary cause, despite domestic fertility rates close to 2 percent. All eight states and territories experienced net population growth – the traditionally dominant states of New South Wales and Victoria leading, followed by the mineral-rich states of Western Australia and Queensland. The migration target for 2010–11 was set at 168,700 people, in addition to 13,000 humanitarian/refugee entrants, constituting 181,700 permanent arrivals. The federal government’s role has been critical since the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 (spanning migration policy, selection, admission, compliance, and naturalization functions, and settlement services in the past sixty years). The role of state/ territory governments has also dramatically grown – a process facilitated by generally amicable federal-subnational relations.

Th e Australian Co n st it u t io n a l Str uc t ure an d So c ie t y Australia was founded as a British colony in 1788, grafting successive migration waves onto a severely displaced Indigenous population that had been resident for many millennia. Federation occurred in 1901, following a decade of negotiations between six British Colonies (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, and South Australia).

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Lesleyanne Hawthorne

They were later joined by two territories: the Northern Territory (including Australia’s greatest concentration of Indigenous peoples) and the Australian Capital Territory, based around the capital city of Canberra. According to a recent analysis, Australia adopted an “integrative” model of federation in 1901 – the result of “an agreement among several mutually independent, self-governing British colonies rather than … the disintegration of one large nation-state”: [T]he Australian federal system was not devised as a response to ethnocultural diversity. Instead, it was a consequence of the sheer size of the continent and the outworking of an underlying belief in the virtues of local self-government and self-determination under a federal system of government. The federal system was principally seen as a political arrangement that would preserve the local self-governing powers of the constituent states while creating a federal government with sufficient powers to preside over the newly federated nation as a whole. The goals of federation were thus primarily political in this sense, and not specifically concerned to preserve a plurality of ethnocultural identities.2 Supported by the British colonial office, Australia’s 1901 federation pact conferred on the governing institutions of the Commonwealth of Australia “what were then thought to be sufficient powers and capacities to do directly and on a continental scale what could not be done efficiently by the colonies acting alone.”3 The states were to remain self-governing, with select functions delegated to the newly formed national government. Two directly elected chambers were created: the House of Representatives (the locus of government, with 150 seats filled through individual electorates), and the Senate (in which each state is represented by twelve senators and each territory by two). Federal and state executive powers “remained vested in the British Crown, but exercised by the Governor-General and the state Governors on the advice of responsible ministers – led by the prime minister and state premiers – who have the support of the majority of members of the lower houses of their respective parliaments.”4 Immigration policy and admission were assigned to the Commonwealth from the start. The Commonwealth government’s migration and humanitarian programs are administered by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). The federal government is deemed to be a “unifying migration and settlement force,” in a context where “local politics is typically concerned with matters such as the maintenance of local roads and services; state politics is usually concerned with matters such as education, hospitals and policing; and federal politics is largely concerned with matters such as economic management, taxation, social services, and international affairs.” Few debates on migration, multiculturalism, and Indigenous

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affairs have concerned federalism to date, despite frequent challenges to Commonwealth dominance in the more contested jurisdictions of health, education, and tax, aligned with calls for “reform of the distribution of powers and the financial arrangements of the federation.”5 Australia embarked on a mass postwar immigration program in 1946, following decades of sustained (predominantly British) intakes. The White Australia Policy, introduced through the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901, was maintained until 1973 as a bar to Asian and other “coloured” migration.6 Since 1945, seven million people have been selected as settlers, and 185,099 arrived in the peak year of 1969–70. Migration from the United Kingdom (UK) was first prioritized, along with the selection of former service personnel and resistance fighters from Europe. Initiating Australia’s sustained commitment to refugees, agreements were also reached with the International Refugee Office to settle a minimum of 12,000 displaced Europeans a year, resulting in 170,000 East European arrivals between 1947 and 1954.7 By the 1950s and 1960s the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia had emerged as important migration sources to Australia, triggered by domestic political and/or economic events. Major intakes of Hungarian (1956), Czech (1968), and Chilean (1973) refugees followed, and sustained flows from Vietnam occurred from 1975. Migration to Australia has reflected virtually every geopolitical event which has occurred since, in a context where a policy of multiculturalism was foreshadowed in 1973 and adopted from 1978, and immigration has become non-discriminatory and truly global.8 Before reviewing the scale and characteristics of recent intakes, it is important to briefly describe Australia’s political system in relation to migration (noting that bipartisan policy has been the norm). Since federation Australia has been dominated by three major parties – the Labor Party, the Liberal Party, and the Nationals, all of which are organized at both state and federal levels. The latter two are conservative, with a history of working in coalition (the Nationals represent rural interests). Minority parties have typically been less stable, with short life spans. The past decade for instance has coincided with the decimation of the centrist Australian Democrats, the ascendancy of the Greens, and the brief flaring of a far-right anti-immigration party (One Nation). Independent politicians are also elected, many serving sectional interests and holding seats for several terms. Their level of influence became exceptional following Australia’s knife-edge election in August 2010. The Greens and conservative independents held the balance of power, supporting the Gillard Labor government in uncertain coalition. This led to Australia’s first minority federal government in seven decades – the trade-off being enhanced regional (the independents) and environmental (the Greens) federal policy and funding initiatives. Within this context there is clear scope to tilt the migration debate in parliament, the most likely trigger being Australia’s response to asylum seekers.

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While a recent analysis notes that “there are no significant … distinct parties or political movements that are regionally defined,” they could sputter into life with a powerful impact. A notorious case was the establishment in 1997 of the One Nation anti-immigration party by Pauline Hanson (a disendorsed Queensland Liberal Party candidate elected as an independent senator in Australia’s 1996 federal election). Hanson’s platform was based on opposition to Asian immigration, multiculturalism, and Indigenous welfare, at a time of rising concern regarding the diversity of immigrant intakes. In her maiden speech to federal parliament she proclaimed: “For far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate by the major parties. I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians … They have their own culture and religion, form ghettoes and do not assimilate. Of course, I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country. A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united.”9 Hanson subsequently established the One Nation party and garnered strong regional support. The party won eleven seats in the 1998 Queensland state election, shocking conventional parties and mainstream Australia. This left Queensland with a hung parliament and the fate of the government in the hands of two independent members.10 Within months Hanson lost her Senate seat in the 1998 federal election, and One Nation self-destructed within five years, notably because its two leaders were jailed on charges of electoral fraud. Voter volatility on migration issues and the impact of regional differences, however, had been confirmed. The scale of Asian migration and/or asylum seeker flows has in fact influenced a range of federal elections in the past twenty years. The arrival of asylum seekers was conceded to be a major determinant of the return of the conservative Howard government in 1998 and 2001. In contrast, immigration is rarely a subnational election issue.11 Following One Nation’s establishment the Howard government moved further right – targeting the anti-migration vote, most notoriously through harsh treatment of “illegal” asylum seekers (direct arrivals from Asia by boat). Selected Australian offshore territories were “excised” from the nation state to deter these flows – an increasingly fraught issue after September 2001, when most asylum seekers were Muslims and there was fear that a “pipeline for terrorists” would emerge.12 Applicants were processed externally (for example in the Pacific island nation of Nauru) or in punitive detention centres established in remote desert sites.13 Temporary protection visas rather than permanent resident status were allocated to those found to be refugees – a limbo status proscribing or deferring access to family reunion. Direct boat arrivals all but stopped in the last six years of the Howard government. The

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Rudd Labor government restored more generous treatment from 2007 to 2010, coinciding with a renewed influx of boats (129 arrived in 2010 containing 6,224 people). While the Gillard government seeks to curtail such flows, in November 2010 a High Court judgment cast doubt on the validity of differential processing for offshore compared to onshore asylum-seekers. Comparable treatment will become the norm – an outcome certain to spur the activities of people-smugglers.14

Immigrat ion P at t e r n s: R ecent Migrat ion to A u st r a l ia The changing nature of migrant intakes thus represents a constant political pressure point in Australia. The federal government seeks two key outcomes from its migration and humanitarian programs, supported by state/ territory policy and settlement input: outcome 1 : Contributing to Australia’s society and its economic advancement through the lawful and orderly entry and stay of people. outcome 2: A society which values Australian citizenship and social cohesion, and enables migrants and refugees to participate equitably.15 Alongside this there can be vigorous contestation of multiculturalism in the policy domain, in a context where “the ethno-cultural diversity that it symbolises has become increasingly controversial and subject to scrutiny in response to the security and social challenges of the early twenty-first century.”16 By the time of the 2011 Census 25 percent of Australia’s population was overseas-born (compared to 23 percent in 2001).17 While the United Kingdom remained dominant in 2006 (24 percent), its proportional share was declining (down from 27 percent in 1996). The main ancestries in 2006 (beyond “Australian”) were English (32 percent), Irish (9 percent), and Scottish (8 percent); the next largest groups were Italian (4 percent), German (4 percent), Chinese (3 percent), Indigenous (2 percent), and Greek (2 percent). Most notably, two-thirds of overseas-born Australians aged 25–44 years had been born outside Europe, compared to just one in four aged 65 or older (see table 2.1).18 Sixty-four percent of the population was Christian (primarily Roman Catholic and Anglican), but other religions were growing rapidly – in particular Buddhism (at 2.1 percent), Islam (1.7 percent), Hinduism (0.7 percent), and Judaism (0.5 percent). Three key points about these population trends should be highlighted. First, Australia has developed a strong tradition of intermarriage compared to many other countries – a 1994 study demonstrated that 60 percent of Australians were “ethnically mixed and 20 percent [had] at least four ancestries.” This pattern has been maintained in the past fifteen years: young

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Table 2.1 Top 10 Overseas Birthplaces for Immigrants to Australia, by Age (2006 Census) Aged 0–14 Years

Aged 15–24 Years

Aged 25–44 Years

Aged 45–64 Years Aged 65+

1

New Zealand

China

UK

UK

UK

2

UK

New Zealand

New Zealand

New Zealand

Italy

3

South Africa

UK

Vietnam

Italy

Greece

4

India

India

China

Vietnam

Germany

5

US

Malaysia

India

China

Netherlands

6

Philippines

Hong Kong

Philippines

Germany

New Zealand

7

China

Philippines

South Africa

Greece

China

8

Korea

South Africa

Malaysia

Philippines

Poland

9

Singapore

Vietnam

Lebanon

Netherlands

Croatia

Indonesia

Hong Kong

India

India

10 Hong Kong

Source: Siew-Ean Khoo, “Generational Change in Ethnic Composition and Inter-Ethic Marriage: Implications for Australian Multiculturalism in the Twenty-first Century”, presentation at “A New Era in Australian Multiculturalism?” Melbourne, 19–20 November 2010 (based on 2006 Census data, Australian Bureau of Statistics).

Australians are increasingly inter-marrying migrants of non-European origin. Second, gender and religion profoundly influence demographic processes. For example, East Asian females are far more likely than males to inter-marry with the host population.19 Third, migrants are geographically dispersed, so that “by international standards … Australia has no strongly pronounced ethnocultural cleavages that are defined territorially.” At the same time, growing urban Asian and Islamic concentrations spur populist debate about developing “ghettoes.”20 By 2010 Australia’s population exceeded 21 million people, and English remained the dominant language. Residential concentrations were overwhelmingly along the coasts, with 83 percent of people located within 50 kilometers of the eastern, southern, and southwestern seaboards. In 2008–09, 171,318 permanent migrants and humanitarian applicants were admitted. An additional 101,280 temporary employer-sponsored migrants arrived to work for up to four years. In June 2010, 630,000 international students were also enrolled in Australian courses. By this stage, Australia had become the world’s second largest global destination following the United States, and export education had emerged as Australia’s third-largest industry. Like temporary workers, substantial numbers of students would shift categories in order to stay in Australia, converting from temporary to landed immigrant status through “two-step migration.”21 Permanent arrivals from New Zealand represented a further uncounted resource (the Trans-Tasman agreement permits free movement between the two countries). In 2008–09, 33,034 permanent New

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29

Zealand settlers arrived, at a time when 521,223 New Zealanders were semipermanently based in Australia (almost 10 percent of New Zealand’s total).22 Australia’s population expanded 2.1 percent in the year to June 2009 in consequence of these flows – far exceeding OECD norms and equivalent to the rates in certain Middle Eastern, African, and Asia-Pacific nations. Growth at this time was more than double that in Canada. This occurred in the context of record high departures from Australia in 2008–9. In all, Australia recorded 345,157 long-term or permanent departures that year, an 8 percent increase on 2006–7. Australians leaving were disproportionately young, skilled (53 percent), and employed (71 percent). Replacement inflows were thus deemed a national strategic priority.23

S election: Immigrat io n C at e g o r ie s Australia’s federal government prepares annual immigration and humanitarian program targets to support population growth and economic development. Based on state/territory and sector consultations, these targets are fine tuned in the light of socio-economic conditions, balancing short, medium, and long-term goals. The relative share of the skilled and family categories has shifted markedly in the past ten years: skilled migration has enjoyed exceptional growth24 (see table 2.2). In 2008–09, when Australia accepted a total of 184,825 migrants/refugees, the leading source countries were New Zealand (33,034), the United Kingdom (21,567), India (16,909), China (excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan) (14,935), the Philippines (5,619), Iraq (4,008), Sri Lanka (3,918), Malaysia (3,261), and Burma (Myanmar) (2,931).25 Birthplace varies markedly by stream. The top five source countries for the four main streams in 2008–09 were •  •  •  • 

Skilled: India (22 percent), United Kingdom (19 percent), China (10 percent), South Africa (6 percent), Malaysia (5 percent). Family: China (14 percent), United Kingdom (13 percent), India (9 percent), Philippines (6 percent), Vietnam (5 percent). Humanitarian off-shore (11,010 people): Iraq (26 percent), Burma (22 percent), Afghanistan (7 percent), Sudan (6 percent), and Bhutan (6 percent). Humanitarian  on-shore  (2,497 people): China, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe and Iraq (percentages not provided).26

Feder a l Gov ernment Selec t io n a n d A d missio n : Family and H uma nitar ia n C at e g o r ie s Australia’s selection of family- and humanitarian-stream migrants remains centralized and largely controlled by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship on behalf of the federal government. While family category

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Table 2.2 Permanent Immigration Intakes to Australia by Major Category Program  Numbers,   by Stream

                    1996–97 1998–99 2001–2 2006–7

    2007–8

Family

44,580

32,040

38,090

50,080

60,300

54,550

Skilled

27,550

35,000

53,520

97,920 108,500 115,000 108,100

113,850

1,730

890

1,480

200

220

300

300

300

11,900

11,356

12,349

13,017

13,000

13,500

13,750

TBA

Special Eligibility Humanitarian

49,870

          2010–11,  2008–9 2009–10 Plan 56,500

Source: Adapted from data in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, “Reform of Australia’s skilled Migration Program and Key Inflows: We’ve Checked Our Policy Settings – Now What?” May-June 2010, Canberra.

numbers have grown (from 45,291 in 2005–06 to 54,550 in 2010–11) the stream’s proportional share has decreased, from 56 percent of the migration program in 1990–91 (excluding refugees) to 32 percent for 2010–11. The category is dominated by spouse migration, followed by immigration of dependent children. The number of places allocated to ageing parents unable to contribute to their support has sharply contracted (currently 1,000 a year compared to 7,500 for “contributory parents”) – a matter of anguish to many sponsors. To be eligible to sponsor, families must have been resident in Australia for at least two years. A “balance of family” test is applied,27 which means that more children need to be living lawfully and permanently in Australia than in any single overseas country. An Assurance of Support is also required: a legal commitment to “provide financial support to the person applying to migrate” so that any welfare costs will be ”met by an Australian permanent resident or citizen, rather than the Australian community” (in the case of sponsored parents for periods of up to ten years) (see table 2.3).28 Humanitarian intakes are far more modest in size and have been stable at around 13,000 people a year (counted separately from the migration program). According to the Refugee Council of Australia, since federation 740,000 refugees have been admitted and provided with the most generous, prolonged, and integrated settlement services of any immigrant group. Community groups have played a critical voluntary role throughout this period in the provision of settlement services (for example, from the 1980s, through the Community Refugee Settlement Scheme). Many refugees have achieved success, reflecting Australia’s level of investment in English and labour market training, legal services, public-housing provision, employment access, and other services. Exceptional outcomes have been achieved

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Table 2.3 Migration Program Outcomes and Planning Levels by Sub-Category (2005–6 to 2010–11) Category Total Family Partner1 Child2 Preferential/Other Family3 Parent4 Total Skill Employer sponsored5 Skilled independent State/Territory sponsored6 Skilled Australian sponsored7 Distinguished talent Business skills 1 November onshore Skill as percent of total program8 Total Special Eligibility Total Program

2005–6  2006–7  2007–8  2008–9  2009–10  2010–11  Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome Planning9 45,291 36,374 2,547 1,869 4,501 97,336 15,226 49,858 8,024 19,062 99 5,060 7 68.1

60,254 44,755 3,544 2,468 9,487 107,868 40,987 37,315 18,889 3,688 199 6,789 1 64.0

54,550 42,000 3,300 750 8,500 113,850 44,150 35,200 23,000 3,500 200 7,800 0 67.5

175

501

300

142,933 148,200 158,630 171,318

168,623

168,700

306

50,079 49,870 56,366 40,435 39,931 42,098 3,008 3,062 3,238 2,136 2,378 2,530 4,500 4,499 8,500 97,922 108,540 114,777 16,585 23,762 38,026 54,179 55,891 44,594 6,928 7,530 14,055 14,167 14,579 10,504 227 211 201 5,836 6,565 7,397 0 2 0 66.1 68.4 67.0 199

220

Source: ‘Migration Program Statistics’, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, http:// www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/statistical-info/visa-grants/migrant.htm accessed 14 November 2010. Note: Numbers have been rounded and totals may not be the exact sum of components. Migration Program numbers do not include New Zealand citizens or holders of Secondary Movement Offshore Entry (Temporary), Secondary Movement Relocation (Temporary) and Temporary Protection Visas and are detailed at the top of the planning range. 1 Includes spouse, fiancé, and interdependent. Net outcome as places taken by provisional visa holders who do not subsequently obtain permanent visas are returned to the Migration Program in the year that the temporary visas expire. 2 Includes Child-adoption, Child Dependent and Orphan Minor. 3 Includes Aged Dependent, Carer, Orphan Unmarried and Remaining Relatives. 4 Includes Designated, Contributory and Non-contributory Parents. 5 Includes Employer Nomination Scheme, Labour Agreement, Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme. 6 Includes State/Territory Nominated Independent Scheme and Skilled Independent Regional. 7 Includes brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, non-dependent children, working age parents, grandchildren and first cousins who have been skill tested. 8 Net outcome as cancelled visas are returned to the Migration Program in that year. 9 Initial Planning Level.

by some – for example, the children of Vietnamese refugees, who have five times the typical representation in Australia’s elite medical schools, despite their parents’ low education levels.29 A recent survey of three recent refugee groups in Western Australia, however, exemplifies the challenges facing

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most – people at risk of unemployment or segmented labour market opportunity, including concentration in cleaning services, care of the aged, meat processing, taxi driving, security, and building.30 Labour market displacement, the lack of credential recognition, and poor English language and/or literacy consistently limit refugees’ socio-economic mobility in the early years, often trapping members of the first generation. By June 2010, 3,867 “irregular maritime arrivals” were also being held in Australian immigration detention centres while their cases were being assessed.31 By definition, lengthy incarceration can severely affect mental health as well as settlement outcomes.

Federal Compared to Sub nat io n a l G ov e r n a n c e : Skilled- Migrant Se l e c t io n Australia’s most profound recent policy trend concerns skilled migration – the category in which subnational governments are now playing a transformational role. Migrants habitually settle in highly skewed sites, in particular capital cities associated with jobs, settlement services, networks, ethnic infrastructure, and urban amenities. In 2008–9 NSW attracted the largest national share (30 percent of total arrivals, compared to 42 percent a decade earlier), followed by Victoria (25 percent), and recent gains have recently been made by the mineral-rich states of Queensland and Western Australia.32 As illustrated in table 2.4, the remaining states/territories have attracted minute immigrant shares to date, regardless of their sustained aspirations for growth and important historic ethno-specific concentrations (for example, German wine makers in South Australia, and Pacific Islander and Italian cane-cutters in northern Queensland). This pattern is set to change, coordinated by DIAC and backed by strong federal and subnational government agreement. In the 1950s mass migration had been sold to the Australian public in terms of national self-interest (strategic population growth and the modernization of industry). By the 1990s the goal was economic restructuring in the post-technological age, skilled migration was to play a vital role, and “skills” were explicitly defined as an individual’s capacity to contribute to national income.33 Twenty years on, Australia’s commitment to skilled migration is transforming government selection. According to DIAC, by 2009 Australia’s managed-migration policy was driven by the “three p’s: population – the number of people in the economy; participation – the average number of hours these people work; and productivity –the average output produced by these people for each hour worked.” Immigration contributes to all three by • 

Increasing the working-age population by bringing into Australia more people aged 15 to 64 years,

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Table 2.4 State/Territories of Intended Residence, Settler Arrivals 1998–99 and 2008–9 State/Territory

1998–99% Immigrant Share

2008–9% Immigrant Share

New South Wales

41.8

29.8

Victoria

20.5

25.0

Queensland

19.0

20.9

Western Australia

12.7

15.5

South Australia

3.9

6.1

ACT

0.9

1.2

Tasmania

0.5

0.8

Northern Territory

0.6

0.7

Source: Adapted from table 1.1, Settler Arrivals 2008–9, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra (2010), 3.

• 

• 

Raising workforce participation by bringing in people who have a higher propensity to work and are concentrated in the prime working ages of 25 to 44 years, and Improving productivity by placing a strong emphasis on permanent and temporary skilled migration.34

In 2004–05, 77,800 skilled category migrants were selected by Australia, and a target of 113,850 was set for 2010–11. As early as 2006, 57 percent of Australia’s degree-qualified IT workforce consisted of firstgeneration migrants, along with 52 percent of engineers, 45 percent of doctors, and 44 percent of accountants; the majority had been admitted as “independent” migrants through points-based selection. Within this context, state governments have vigorously lobbied for a greater selection role, backed by the capacity to offer regional incentives. A 2005 submission from the Riverina fruit-growing district affirmed the importance of subnational governments and employers getting “more of a choice when it comes to recruiting skilled labour ... It is a basic requirement when recruiting staff that you look for people who will fit into your work culture.”35 The Western Australian government, at the height of the mining boom, stated, “it is critical that the Federal Government understands the magnitude and impacts of the skills shortage in Western Australia. Failing to address the skills shortage will threaten investment projects by driving up labour costs and extending project timelines and budgets … There is a need to take a range of initiatives to dramatically grow the intake of skilled migrants, target semi-skilled migrants and free up conditions for working holidaymakers.”36

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In 2005–06 Australia’s employer-sponsored and state/territory-sponsored skilled categories delivered 15,230 and 8,020 permanent migrants, respectively. By 2008–09 these numbers had risen to 38,030 and 14,060 (45 percent of the skilled intake compared to 24 percent). At the same time, temporary migration has grown considerably. This option is employer-driven, deregulated, and free of annual quotas, and it admits migrants for up to five years and ties visas to employment location. By the time of Australia’s 2005–06 skilled-migration review, five regional sponsorship schemes existed – two facilitating permanent entry and three facilitating temporary entry. And they were aligned with growing state selection.37 Permanent applicants could be sponsored at dramatically lower skill levels (70 points or less compared to the 120–point Australian norm).38 Additional points could be earned through regional study and/or family sponsorship, and there were liberal opportunities for transition to “twostep migration.” The states of South Australia and Tasmania rapidly embraced a greater “migration share.” For example, South Australia doubled its annual targets and established a skilled-migration office.39 Victoria’s pro-growth government defined Melbourne as a “regional” city to be eligible for select schemes, even though the city has a population of around four million.

C a se S t udy : Regiona l Sponsor sh ip of Me d ic a l Mig r a n t s In May 2008 Australia’s newly elected Labor government confirmed its commitment to skilled migration. Long-term labour market needs would be addressed through expanded domestic student training. Medium-term needs would be addressed through permanent skilled flows. Short-term demand would be satisfied by employer- and state/territory-sponsored temporary entrants, with all regionally sponsored applicants accorded priority DIAC processing. Australian states currently compete to attract and retain the best “regional migrants” – exemplified by their extraordinary reliance on international medical graduates (IMG’s) that has developed in the past fifteen years. By 2006, 45 percent of residents with medical qualifications were overseas-born; taking all permanent categories together, 7,596 doctors migrated between 2001 and 2006. Temporary flows are favoured, given the capacity to mandate location as a condition of entry, while addressing workforce shortages expeditiously (by 2010 just twenty-one days were required for visa approval for professionals).40 In recent years around three thousand immigrant doctors have arrived annually on this basis. Temporary sponsorship has the potential to shift migrant flows, dramatically increasing their regional and remote location presence (despite retention being a major issue). Within this context, state competition has become intense, including recruitment at global migration fairs supported by relocation packages up to $A100,000 or more.41 A comparable trend

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is under way for nursing. For example, from 2004–05 to 2008–09, 7,676 nurses came to Australia as permanent skilled migrants, with substantial additional numbers in family and humanitarian flows. These permanent arrivals were dwarfed, however, by the scale of temporary sponsored intakes – 14,950 from 2004–05 to 2008–09, in addition to substantial numbers of mental health nurses and midwives.42 It is important to note that regionally sponsored migrants have significantly lower early employment rates than most doctors and nurses, reflecting their lower points scores.43 Nevertheless, state/territory governments are being allocated major additional powers. In 2010 they were commissioned to develop skilled-migration plans to be coordinated by DIAC (with skill levels and “leakage” across state boundaries monitored). South Australia’s plan, for instance, included a list of 113 preferred occupations. Virtually every health profession was sought, the great majority requiring degreelevel qualifications. Engineering was the second priority field, followed by education, information technology, and accounting. In policy terms these skilled selection criteria exceeded those of the federal government. Three years of work experience was mandated for select occupations, and higherthan-usual English skills were required. Despite these criteria, employment could not be guaranteed. The South Australian government website states that “State Sponsored migrants must compete with all people in the labour market as part of the normal competitive selection process.”44

C a se S t u dy : Governa nce of “T wo- S t ep ” St u d e n t Mig r at io n State roles in immigrant selection are thus expanding. Governance can be problematic, however – an issue exemplified by Australia’s recent experimentation with student migration. From 1999, international students qualifying in Australia became immediately eligible to migrate. By 2006, 383,818 were enrolled across all education sectors (this figure rose to 630,000 in 2010). Students constituted half of Australia’s permanent skilled-migration program at this time, in a context where an extraordinary 66 percent of Indian and 38 percent of Chinese students would elect to stay.45 However, the 2006 skilled migration review found that they had inferior employment outcomes compared to offshore applicants. Despite nearly identical proportions being employed at six months (82–83 percent), former students were found to have “annual salaries of around $33,000 (compared to $52,500 for offshore arrivals); lower job satisfaction … and far less ‘often’ use of formal qualifications in current work (46% compared to 63%).”46 Such outcomes were the reverse of what the federal government had anticipated. The review identified a range of causal factors, including unrealistic assumptions about the speed and certainty of students’ English gains and

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the high level of cultural and linguistic “enclosure” experienced by many.47 The key problem, however, was that students were rapidly channelled into vocational training courses at a time of sustained economic growth when trade fields were being added to Australia’s Migration Occupations in Demand List (MODL) in unprecedented numbers (delivering twenty bonus points). By May 2009, the annual growth of international students in tertiary degrees had slowed to 1 percent, compared to 50 percent growth for vocational courses – the latter option being cheaper and easier and delivering comparable migration outcomes. India had overtaken China as the primary source of new enrolments, with 36,045 Indian students in the vocationaltraining sector, compared to just 1,827 six years earlier. Technical colleges responded rapidly to this trend, in particular some private sector providers were described in the skilled-migration review as “wily entrepreneurial players existing solely to funnel international students into skilled migration.”48 Serious abuses emerged. For example, when the MODL changed and electrical linesmen were dropped from the list, one private college that trained linesmen converted overnight to training “chefs,” with the same students, the same staff, and no kitchen.49 These perverse study-migration developments proved hard to curb, given that state governments controlled the booming and highly lucrative technical-training sector. By 2009, international students were generating $A14.2 billion per year – Australia’s third-largest export industry, and the first for Victoria.50 According to one senior state government informant: “We’re all operating in this self-interest circle and migration is fuelling it … You’ve got a large number of people whose task is to sell at any price. If an institution is unscrupulous and profit-driven enough it has the potential to do all kinds of things … Audit systems don’t pick up a lot and international students are unlikely to complain. The government recognizes there is light regulation appraisal, and has a chosen assumption that you’re dealing with scrupulous providers.”51 In the view of one critic, international education had become “the nexus between the free movement of labour in a globalised world and efforts by advanced countries to make education a highly lucrative commodity … [but] when it is so appallingly managed that humans are allowed to be treated as commodities in a marketplace that charges top dollar for low-grade education and training, it looks a lot like a government-sanctioned racket.”52 Addressing such issues was challenging from the perspective of migration governance, since few states were initially motivated to curb internationalstudent flows. Following the election of the Rudd Labor government (2007), a cycle of reviews was commissioned to remove perverse studymigration incentives.53 The effectiveness of the Migration Occupations in Demand List was assessed, along with the integrity of Australia’s exporteducation industry, students’ employment outcomes, and the merits of

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points-based selection. A profound skilled-migration policy transformation was launched, and from July 2011 the selection of employer and statesponsored applicants, elite former students, and older English-speaking migrants qualified by degrees or classic trades has been favoured. Support from the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), on which federal and state government are represented, has been critical to achieving these reforms. For example, in 2010 COAG developed the International Students Strategy for Australia to ensure “sustainable future quality international education.”54 In addition, in late February 2011 the federal government released draft legislation to establish the new Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, with a radical capacity to regulate university and non-university higher education standards nationwide, while overriding traditional state regulatory powers. The federal government’s policy aims are clear – to “deliver the best and brightest skilled migrants by emphasising high level qualifications, better English language levels and extensive skilled work experience.”55

Feder a lism and Its Impac t o n Immig r a n t I nt egrat ion: Cultur a l, P o l it ic a l , a n d C iv ic Int egr ation and So c io - e c o n o mic Int egr ation P r o g r a ms As demonstrated above, subnational governments involvement in skilledmigrant selection has been growing rapidly. This development builds on their long-standing expertise with migrants’ social and employment integration processes – a process comparable to Canada’s.56 For example, New South Wales established an Ethnic Affairs Council in 1975, followed by an Ethnic Affairs Commission shortly after. Its landmark Ethnic Affairs Policy Statement (EAPS) in 1983 was designed to achieve “systemic reform and change the attitudes of the bureaucracy towards the provision of services to better meet the needs of a diverse population.” Hailed as a world best practice and a “cornerstone” of effective public sector practice, EAPS first focused on welfare and equity, followed (from the 1990s) by the championing of cultural diversity “as an economic and social resource.”57 By 1993 ethnic affairs had become a stand-alone ministry in NSW (it has since been abolished). Two hundred government departments and agencies were required to report on multicultural initiatives. In 2000 this was extended to 160 local councils, after the establishment of the Community Relations Commission and Principles of Multiculturalism Act. Major hospitals and corporatized bodies are included, based on a constantly broadening definition of public authorities and strong accountability requirements. The state’s Charter of Principles for a Culturally Diverse Society defines a rightsbased framework:

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1 All individuals in NSW should have the greatest possible opportunity to contribute to, and participate in, all levels of public life. 2 All individuals and public institutions should respect and accommodate the culture, language and religion of others within an Australian legal institutional framework where English is the primary language. 3 All individuals should have the greatest possible opportunity to make use of and participate in relevant activities and programs provided and/or administered by NSW Government institutions. 4 All NSW public institutions should recognize the linguistic and cultural assets in the NSW population as a valuable resource and utilize and promote this resource to maximize the development of the state.58 Australia has made sustained investment in settlement services, which were developed in the postwar years to facilitate the socio-economic integration of non-British migrants. Delivery is supported by substantial fiscal power, in a context where the federal government collects 60 to 75 percent of total revenue (compared to 45 percent in Canada and Switzerland and 54 percent in the United States). Australia’s investment in managing migration and delivering settlement programs is huge, despite sporadic challenges to levels of spending. Integration services are largely managed by state governments, with significant financial assistance from the Commonwealth.59 In 2008–09 DIAC’s budget allocation included $A275, 925,000 in outlays for settlement, citizenship, and social cohesion programs, in addition to $A190,581,000 for program management and compliance.60 Additional investment flows through other federal and state/territory portfolios – for example, the federal Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations in relation to employment programs. DIAC has primary responsibility for settlement policy for the early years. NGOs have a major delivery role through competitive not-for-profit grants. Four major service-provision models exist Australia-wide: •  •  • 

• 

Mainstream. For example, social security benefits delivered to unemployed migrants through the federal employment and education ministry. Migrant-specific.  For example, the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP), delivered on arrival, followed by employment-related English training. Category-specific.  For example, catering to the needs of refugees, such as Melbourne- and Sydney-based services addressing the mental and physical needs of torture and trauma survivors. Ethno-specific.  Programs delivered through ethnic community grants, for example to support leadership and program development, such as the establishment of ethno-specific women’s refuges, crèche services, and so on.

A range of Australian services represent world best practice, despite inevitable limits – for example, the level of investment in English-language

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training and labour market bridging programs from the late 1970s.61 Informed by the visionary 1978 and 1981 Galbally reviews of multiculturalism, their aim is transitional support, stressing “the self-help nature of minority communities, in areas such as welfare, language maintenance, and religious identification,” with public institutions expected “only to support, not carry or implement, many of these initiatives.”62 A wide range of measures are involved, including, for example, Australia’s innovative multilingual Special Broadcasting Services, which are designed to address the linguistic, cultural, and ethno-specific needs of immigrant Australians at multiple stages of the life cycle. All states/territories are deeply engaged. In Victoria, for instance, programs have included multicultural policing, aged care, a highly specialized health interpreter service, strategies to facilitate foreign credential recognition (spurred by the state Overseas Qualifications Unit), and innovative field-specific labour market integration programs.

Englis h - Language T r a inin g fo r A d u lt Mig r a n t s The importance of host-country language ability within a knowledge economy can hardly be overstated. In Australia poor English ability is considered to represent “an awesome and devastating barrier” at every stage of the life cycle.63 NESB workers find it difficult to convert overseas credentials into work of an appropriate status, to locate this work in the fields for which they are qualified, and to secure adequate earnings rewards. Recessions render them particularly vulnerable. A key finding of Australia’s skilled-migration review in 2006 was that “graduates ... who did not speak English at least ‘very well’ were much more likely to be not employed; about half as likely as those with better English to be in a job commensurate with their skills; and about twice as likely to be employed in a relatively low skilled job.”64 Within this context, Australia’s federal government has refined skilledmigration selection criteria but has also made sustained investment in language training for all migrants. The Adult Migrant English Program commenced with “shipboard English” in the late 1940s. The service has since been vastly expanded and professionalized.65 As early as 1991 the AMEP was the largest government-funded adult English language-teaching program in the world. “Learner pathways” were designed at first point of contact to map migrants’ progression from the acquisition of basic English to ultimate employment and/or formal study goals.66 By 2009–10 the AMEP was providing tuition and associated services through eighteen contracts to more than 50,000 clients from 193 countries, studying in 250 locations (typically through subnational not-for-profit organizations). The program reaches around 60 percent of eligible migrants, including 90 percent of humanitarian entrants, 55 percent of family migrants, and 41 percent of the skilled-migration stream. Migrants lacking functional English are

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entitled to receive up to 510 hours of English tuition or “the number of hours it takes to reach functional English (whatever comes first)”; the average client receives 369 hours of teaching.67 State governments contribute complementary funding in the context of their ethnic-affairs policy frameworks. For example, by the early 1990s the NSW Migrant Employment and Qualifications Board was publishing a biennial directory of employmentbridging programs in that state, running to more than 140 pages.

Language T r a ining – C h il d Mig r a n t s Australia has also invested in child-migrant education services – a strategy fundamental to the impressive social mobility achieved by first- and second-generation migrants. The years from the 1970s to 1996 were associated with the recognition of the “distinctive needs of child migrants.” In 1969 and 1971 Australia’s Child Migrant Education Program was established and the Immigrant (Education) Act passed, defining shared federalstate responsibility in the context of Australia’s new multicultural policy.68 Two major options were developed – “on-arrival” early-intervention programs targeting acute needs, followed by “ongoing programs” addressing residual problems (for example, the impact of poor English on academic achievement). Bipartisan policy supported this development. Such services were delivered through federally funded state/territory education systems that exercised significant policy control. Australia’s commitment was spurred by community advocacy (for example, from the Federation of Ethnic Community Councils of Australia) and informed by governmentcommissioned reports (including the 1986 National Policy on Languages and the national literacy policy).69 The federal government currently funds the New Arrivals English as a Second Language Program (NAP) through the Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations. The program provides intensive English-language instruction to newly arrived immigrant children, who have an entitlement to six months compared to a year for refugees, delivered in purpose-designed language reception centres. Within Victoria, for instance, there are thirteen such centres or schools. “New arrivals outpost programs” cater to primary-aged children in small clusters, while specialist support materials are provided to isolated teachers. Religious and independent schools are deeply engaged, generating programs with a high degree of autonomy.70 In recent years, however, there have been criticisms of the adequacy of child migrant-education funding. In 2008 the New Arrivals Program assisted 13,931 children in all, compared to 14,536 in 2007,71 which was manifestly inadequate given the scale and diversity of recent flows. According to one critic the past decade has coincided with a “drift and loss of distinctiveness, broad-banding and mainstreaming, with many

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expert and specialist services vanishing.”72 In this context academic problems risk being attributed to “literacy, intelligence, personality or culture,” rather than students’ underlying English language deficits.73

Translation and Int e r p r e t in g Se rv ic e s To support immigrants’ integration and social engagement, sustained investment has also been made in the provision of free interpreting and translation services ($A19,861,000 by 2008–09). In 2009–10, 197,060 in-depth services were provided, both by phone (170,317) and on-site (26,743).74 Free interpreting services are available to private and public medical practitioners; non-profit, non-governmental, community-based organizations; pharmacies dispensing approved medications; trade unionists; politicians; and local government authorities. The Translating and Interpreting Service operates a national hotline twenty-four hours per day seven days per week, and 831,108 short services were provided in 2009–10. Free translation of settlement-related documents is available (federally funded on a competitive tender process).75 In addition, substantial sums are spent to advance community “partnerships” and “social harmony” each year – for example $A34 million in 2008–09 for 85 projects to promote social cohesion and 175 to support a diverse Australia (33 of these programs had a specific state/territory base).

Case S t udy: F ederal- State G ov e r n me n t R e fo r m of F oreign C r edent ia l R e c o g n it io n A number of integration strategies have proven challenging in relation to federal/state governance. A key example is the reform of foreign credential recognition in the context of growing skilled migration. In 1989 the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia proclaimed the right of “all Australians (to) enjoy ... equal life chances,” “fully… participate in society,” and “develop and make use of their potential for Australia’s economic and social development.” Simultaneously, the agenda affirmed the inferior overall labour market outcomes secured by NESB Australians.76 In the late 1980s just 50 per cent of NESB migrants’ qualifications were immediately recognized, compared to 90 per cent for ESB migrants. Within this context the Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies blasted persistent “highly fragmented” recognition procedures – as a result of endemic “rivalry between state and federal jurisidictions,” and the collective failure of state and federal authorities, professional associations, unions, and employer associations to secure better outcomes.77 Responding to growing community concern, a federally driven and funded Australian reform agenda was established from 1989, with the aim of

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establishing “the principles, procedures and institutional structures needed to establish an efficient, fair and consistent system for accreditation of overseas qualifications ... [based on proposals] flexible enough to cover all occupations and to respond to changing occupational and award structures.”78 Titled “competency-based assessment,” this approach represented an attempted democratization of skills recognition, in contrast to the elitism traditionally favoured by Australian professional bodies (with control typically exercised at state level). Vocational abilities were to be screened “in a way that is not dependent upon the nature and place of the skill development” and that recognized prior experience.79 Three types of assessment outcomes were specified: “full equivalence” to local qualifications, “partial equivalence” supplemented by prescribed local experience and/ or study, and “no equivalence but with a transcript of demonstrated skills that a prospective employer may use for acceptance.” To oversee this process, federal and state governments agreed to establish a specialist range of bodies reporting to mainstream labour force development boards. The National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition (NOOSR), created in 1989, would have prime responsibility for four major functions: to “promote national standards for skill recognition, encourage competency-based assessments, develop counseling and referral services, and promote improvements to occupational regulation,” backed by a stronger research focus and a broader dissemination of research findings. A national outreach process underpinned each step of this process – representatives of professional associations, registration bodies, unions, the higher-education and technical and further-education sectors, overseas qualifications boards, and employers continually invited to attend and participate in the dialogue accompanying new initiatives.80 Despite definite gains, including the definition of national competencies in nine key professions, control of licensing in regulated occupations remained in the hands of Australian regulatory bodies characterized by a high degree of professional protectionism.81 In 1996 the federal Labor government confirmed the achievement of minimal reforms, noting a continued “automatic devaluing of qualifications and skills acquired from non-English speaking background countries” relative to those of ESB origin and “sufficient evidence of negative cultural and racial stereotyping by employers to warrant an education campaign to be mounted by the Commonwealth Government on the benefits of employing people from a variety of cultures.”82 Reform in the majority of professions and para-professions remained mired in vested state interests, despite the development of a number of promising trends (most notably in nursing, engineering, and the trades).83 The Australian government’s primary strategy for addressing the problem of credential nonrecognition remained the funding of specialist labour market programs. In Western Australia, for example, the establishment of a bridging course for

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migrant nurses in the late 1980s converted an examination failure rate of 74 per cent (averaged across ten years) to a pass rate of 89 per cent.84 From 1999 the Howard government made a virtue of necessity – mandating pre-migration credential screening as a condition of eligibility for potential skilled migrants (though other categories remained unchanged). By 2008 DIAC was outsourcing assessment to twenty-seven approved regulatory and professional bodies (subject to government oversight), many operating at a subnational level. Separate bodies (Trades Recognition Australia and VETASSESS) provided assessment for 180 vocational-sector fields. Although high levels of immediate recognition prevailed in some professions (most notably engineering and the trades), lower recognition rates persisted in many fields, reflecting migrants’ differential training levels, the limits to Australia’s research base, and a clear reluctance of regulatory bodies to cede control. Attempts to expand recognition are still federally driven. In recent years, as we have seen, Australia has admitted up to twenty thousand foreign health professionals per year to work on a temporary- or permanentresident basis. Serious registration anomalies have evolved, with marked variations in the rigour of assessment requirements by state (for example) in relation to migrant doctors.85 To secure uniform registration and practice standards, in 2010 the Council of Australian Governments established the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) based on ten national boards (medicine, nursing and midwifery, dentistry, pharmacy, physiotherapy, optometry, podiatry, psychology, chiropractice, and osteopathy). This measure in principle involves strong state buy-in, with assessment and registration to be provided by once autonomous state boards on agreed national standards.86 COAG’s role has changed profoundly in the past decade – from “an occasional summit meeting of domestic political leadership to … being charged with the paramount leadership role in the federation, including detailed oversight of the implementation of federally agreed programs.”87 As for credential recognition its Reform Council recently found national health registration to have been largely achieved, despite the risk of it being “implemented in a way that retains or creates separate, jurisdictionspecific registration processes.” However, according to the shadow minister for health, the changeover has been “strife-riddled”; nurses and doctors have struggling to secure registration and many have been professionally displaced.88 Effective governance of qualifications recognition thus remains a challenging issue.

C a se S t udy: F ederal- Stat e R e sp o n se s to th e Cronulla Riots ( N e w So u t h W a l e s) As should be clear from the foregoing, sub-national governments exercise substantial civic and social-integration roles supported by highly evolved

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multicultural policy frameworks. Their scope is large – focused not merely on new immigrants but also on second-generation youth “grappling with issues of identity and participation [and] young people of all backgrounds … creating their own dynamic brand of Australian multiculturalism.”89 For example, in 2005 race riots between Lebanese and Australian youth erupted suddenly on a popular Sydney surfing beach (Cronulla), confronting “national and international audiences with reports of alcohol-fuelled violence against people of ‘Middle-Eastern appearance’ by demonstrators clad in Australian flags, and violent reprisal attacks that followed.”90 Statespecific integration initiatives were intensified, backed by the Council of Australian Governments’ National Action to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony  and Security.91 Multiple youth-focused programs have since developed, addressing leadership training, outreach to Muslim Australians (forty-two community projects facilitating interaction between Muslim and nonMuslim youth), inter-faith initiatives, school-based support, and ethnic community capacity-building. Comparable developments are underway in every state. For example, Victoria provides support for around seven hundred multicultural festivals per year, delivers a vast array of programs, and funds ethnic-organization infrastructure.92

Nat uralizat io n According to Aroney,93 Australian citizenship attempts to achieve unity through diversity, in a context where “on the one hand, the current citizenship oath calls upon new citizens to affirm certain basic liberal-democratic values intended to be common to all, while on the other hand, it is widely recognised that Australia is an ethnically and culturally diverse country and that government policies ought to respect this diversity and provide conditions in which it can flourish.” Australia’s commitment to naturalization is the bedrock of such initiatives. Migrants are encouraged to become citizens – a process that is important for civic rights (to vote, to stand for political office, and to apply for a range of public sector positions). Four million naturalizations have occurred in the past sixty years, including 119,791 in 2010 (a 92 percent success rate that year and a 12 percent annual growth). Decisions typically take ninety days. In marked contrast to Europe, sustained federal and state government efforts are under way to expand uptake while enhancing citizenship’s prestige. Requirements have nevertheless been tightened: four years residency are now required for eligibility (compared to three years previously). 94 A citizenship test was imposed in October 2007, replicating the United Kingdom view that “a coherent set of national values” would “help protect Australia in these uncertain times.”95 The aim has been to “encourage prospective citizens to obtain the knowledge they need to support successful integration into Australian society … to

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demonstrate in an objective way that they have the required knowledge of Australia, including the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship, and a basic knowledge and comprehension of English.”96 There was some controversy at the time the test was introduced, including objections to the importance of English and claims that the test was based on a “cultural normative model of citizenship … in which one group’s ownership of the national and political space is asserted through its ability to control the behaviour and outlook of a group not considered to be part of the national community.” The measure was nevertheless adopted with bipartisan support.97 The pass rate in 2009–10 was 98 percent for first and subsequent attempts. The federal government provided $A3.4 million in 2009–10 in grants to assist refugees and migrants with poor English or educational disadvantages to understand and prepare for the test (courses last up to thirteen weeks). This followed evidence the previous year that 99 percent of skilled-category applicants passed on first or subsequent attempts, compared to 94 percent of family migrants and just 79 percent of humanitarian entrants. 98 As demonstrated by table 2.5, 1,244,919 migrants have been naturalized in the past decade (out of a population of 21 million). Seven of the top ten groups approved have been Asian-born. By 2010 the United Kingdom ranked first (16 percent of approvals), followed by India (15 percent), China (9 percent), South Africa (4 percent) and the Philippines (4 percent).

Conclus io n The scale and diversity of Australia’s immigrant intakes is a defining national characteristic. Migration currently embraces every category of people – skilled and unskilled, family and refugee, legal and illegal, permanent and temporary. Short-term migration is rising markedly, while the accessibility of one immigrant-receiving country can transform the level of demand for another. By 2011 more than one-quarter of Australia’s population consisted of first-generation immigrants (26 percent of the population, followed by New Zealand, Canada, and the United States). Asia and the Middle East have contributed eight of the top ten recent source countries. Ethnic, racial, and religious profiles are thus changing markedly. Annual intakes have grown rapidly, matching the post-war peak of 185,000 in 1969–70. Asylum-seeker flows are also rising. In 2010 they included 129 boats with 6,224 people, at a time of growing concern that such arrivals could become a “pipeline for terrorists.” Within this volatile context immigration control is shared by Australia’s federal and subnational governments – a largely amicable process underpinned by bipartisan support. Since 1901 the Commonwealth has been responsible for policy and selection, including border protection, citizenship conferral, and settlement in the first post-arrival years. Multiculturalism

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Table 2.5 Australian Citizenship Approvals by Top 10 Source Countries, 2001 to 2010 Former   Nationality

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

United 12,474 16,411 14,854 17,201 20,127 22,143 25,948 27,369 18,510 22,832 Kingdom New Zealand China

11,007 17,334 13,994 13,052 9,363 6,890

6,416 7,126 7,072 7,798

7,636

7,379

7,317 11,251

6,806 3,744

Total 197,869

4,164

94,479

8,402 6,697 11,103

80,072

India

2,335

2,510 3,051 3,638 5,027

7,439 12,896

9,053 9,088 17,781

72,818

South Africa

2,992

3,922 3,998 4,908 5,085

5,036

5,490 4,128

47,255

6,489

5,207

Philippines 2,211

2,849 2,885 3,019 3,653

3,725

5,129

3,827 3,450

4,503

35,251

Sri Lanka

1,362 1,328 1,582 1,711

1,958

3,571

2,921 2,196

3,411

21,712

1,672

Iraq

1,862

2,182 1,502 1,271 2,115

2,173

1,924

4,216 2,148

1,538

20,931

Vietnam

1,953

2,090 1,676 2,215 2,056

2,114

2,603

2,185 1,519

2,000

20,411

1,057

1,504 1,619 1,846 1,798

2,000

2,794

2,717 1,771

2,211

19,317

Other country

Malaysia

27,617 29,709 27,131 31,245 34,362 41,809 56,272 48,235 33,730 45,041

634,804

Total

72,070 86,289 79,164 87,049 93,095 103,350 136,256 121,221 86,981 119,791 1,244,919

Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship data provided 25 Febtruary 2011.

provides the national policy framework, despite constant contestation. State/territory governments have focused on integration, led by ethnic affairs bureaucracies engaged in community outreach, capacity-building, and the implementation of rights-based policies supported by compliance requirements. Social cohesion has been a major priority – extending to “harmony” programs targeting second- as well as first-generation youth. Leveraging off their integration experience, in recent years states have sought and won significant selection roles. Following years of advocacy for greater autonomy and “immigrant share,” they can now admit skilled migrants with significantly fewer points, while directly engaging in global recruitment strategies.99 Growing numbers of temporary workers also arrive through uncapped employer and state-nominated schemes (intakes tripled from 34,000 in 2004–05 to 110,000 arrivals in 2007–08, encouraged by the possibility of “two-step migration”). In 2010 DIAC introduced priority processing for state-territory nominated applicants and commissioned subnational governments for the first time to develop state immigration plans. Coordinated by the Commonwealth, they are certain to enhance regional autonomy. While it is premature to assess the impact of these trends, it is important to note that state roles are evolving markedly at this time, endorsed

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by the federal government. When tensions erupt they are generally resolved – as this chapter has demonstrated through the recent examples of asylumseeker entry, student migration, and foreign credential recognition.

Not e s 1 In Australia “children of immigrants” is defined to denote immigrants with one or both parents born outside Australia. 2 Nicholas Aroney, “Australia,” in Luis Moreno and César Colino, eds., Diversity and  Unity in Federal Countries: A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 7 (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press 2010), 18–20. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., 28–9. 5 Ibid., 27. 6 Australia administered a “dictation test” as a tool of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act. Masquerading as an examination of literacy, the aim of the test was explicit racial exclusion. Applied at the discretion of federal immigration officers, it originally required the correct transcription of fifty words in any European language, later extended to “any prescribed” language. Within the period 1902 to 1946, rigorous application of the test ensured that only around 125,000 members of “the alien races” were admitted to Australia – the vast majority of these former residents, or others awarded Certificates of (Test) Exemption. According to the 1922 Commonwealth Year Book, “In pursuance of the ‘White Australia’ policy, the general practice is not to permit Asiatics or coloured immigrants to enter Australia for any purpose of settling permanently. Exclusion is effected, where necessary, by the application of a dictation test ... In other words, the test when applied is an absolute bar to admission.” Barry York, “Admitted: 1901–1946. Immigrants and Others Allowed into Australia between 1901 and 1946,” in Studies in Australian  Ethnic History, no. 2, Centre for Immigration and Multicultural Studies (Australia: Australian National University 1993), 4–6. 7 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, “Annual Report 2009–2010” (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010). Please note that Australia ratified the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1954. 8 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 4: More than 60 Years of PostWar Immigration 2009, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/04fifty.htm (accessed 27 October 2010). 9 Pauline Hanson, “Second Reading Speech: Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1996–97,” House of Representatives, Debates, 10 September 1996, viewed 16 September 2010 (Canberra: House of Representatives, Parliament of Australia), 3859. 10 Gerard Newman, Queensland Election 1998 Research Note 49 (Canberra: Statistics group, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1997–98), 1–2.

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11 In the election year of 1998 (October) the arrival of a growing range of boats of asylum seekers via Asia to Australia’s external territories polarized national debate concerning obligations to refugees, in a context where boat arrivals were stigmatized as “queue jumpers” (as had been the case in the late 1970s in relation to Vietnamese refugees). Populist and political debate raged on Australia’s obligations, with the Howard government winning a second electoral victory in part through taking a hard-line stance. In the next election year (November 2001) a boatload of 438 asylum seekers rescued by the Norwegian ship Tampa were refused access for processing by Australia, sparking a diplomatic row between Australia, Norway, and Indonesia. Peter Mares, Borderline: Australia’s Treatment of  Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press 2001). 12 Michael Grewcock, Border Crimes: Australia’s War on Illicit Migrants (Sydney: Federation Press 2010), 193–4. These areas included the Territory of Christmas Island in the Indian ocean, the Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands in the Timor Sea, the Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean – all excised by the Howard conservative government in September 2001 - and “any other external Territory and any island that forms part of a State or Territory prescribed in the regulations for the purposes of the definition of excised offshore place.” Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 81: Australia’s Excised  Offshore Places, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/81excised-offshore. htm (accessed 27 October 2010). For detailed analysis see also James Jupp, From  White Australia to Woomera (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 129–34; and J. Phillips and H. Spinks, Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976, Background Note (Canberra: Parliamentary Library 2010), 17–19. http://www.aph.gov.au/ library/pubs/BN/sp/BoatArrivals.pdf. 13 For a detailed analysis of federal policy trends, see Mares, Borderline. 14 Australian Broadcasting Commission, “Labor Responsible for High Court Ruling: Morrison,” Lateline, 11 November 2010. http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/ 2010/s3064194.htm. See also Paul Maley, “Who’s Afraid of Christmas Island Now?” The Australian, 8–9 January 2011, 11. From 1 March 2011, in consequence of a High Court ruling, failed asylum-seekers had unrestricted access to Australian courts to lodge appeals, ensuring there is virtually no legal distinction between applying for refugee status onshore or offshore. 15 Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report 2008–09 (Canberra: Department of Citizenship and Immigration 2009), 29. 16 Elsa Koleth, Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent  Debates in Australia and Overseas (Canberra: Parliamentary Library 2010), 1. 17 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, The People of Australia: Statistics from  the 2006 Census (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2008). 18 Siew-Ean Khoo, “Generational Change in Ethnic Composition and Inter-Ethic Marriage: Implications for Australian Multiculturalism in the 21st Century” (presentation at “A New Era in Australian Multiculturalism?” Research Symposium, Melbourne, Australia 19–20 November 2010).

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19 Charles Price, “Australia’s Population: Ethnic Origins,” People and Place 2, 4 (1994): 12–16; and Siew-Ean Khoo, “Generational Change in Ethnic Composition and Inter-Ethnic Marriage: Implications for Australian Multiculturalism in the 21st Century.” (Presentation at “A New Era in Australia Multiculturalism?” Research Symposium, Melbourne, 19–20 November 2010). 20 Aroney, “Australia,” 17. 21 Lesleyanne Hawthorne, “Demography, Migration and Demand for International Students,” in C. Findlay and W. Tierney, eds., The Globalization and Tertiary  Education in the Asia-Pacific: The Changing Nature of a Dynamic Market, 91–120 (Singapore: World Scientific Press 2010); and Lesleyanne Hawthorne, “How Valuable is ‘Two-Step Migration?’ Labour Market Outcomes for International Student Migrants to Australia,” Asia-Pacific Migration Journal 19, 1 (2010): 5–36. 22 Lesleyanne Hawthorne, Competitors and Collaborators – Skilled Migration to New  Zealand and Australia: Policy Trends and Outcomes 2004–2010 (Wellington: Department of Labour forthcoming). 23 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Population Flows: Immigration Aspects  2008–09 Edition (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010); Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Emigration, 2008–09 (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2009); Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Emigration, 2007–08 (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2008). 24 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 2001 Annual Report, http:// www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/2000–01/report17.htm (accessed 14 November 2010). 25 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 2: Key Facts in Immigration, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/02key.htm (accessed 27 October 2010). 26 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Population Flows: Immigration Aspects,  2008–09 Edition (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010), chaps. 2–4. 27 “Contributory” parents are fast-tracked (people willing to pay a substantially higher visa charge plus a larger Assurance of Support bond for a longer period). To be sponsored, parents must have at least half their children living lawfully and permanently in Australia, or more children living lawfully and permanently in Australia than in any single other country overseas (with all children of both parents counted in this test). 28 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 29: Overview of Family Stream  Migration; Fact Sheet 30: Family Stream Migration - Partners, Fact Sheet 31: Family Stream  Migration – Parent Category Visas; and Fact Sheet 34: Assurance of Support, http://www. immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets (accessed 27 October 2010). 29 Australian Medical Council, Country of Training Statistics: mcq Candidates (Canberra: Australian Medical Council 2009), unpublished examination registration data, supplied 24 March 2009.

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30 Val Colic-Pesker, “Employment Niches for Recent Refugees: Segmented Labour Market in Twenty-First Century Australia,” Journal of Refugee Studies 19, 2 (2006): 203–29. 31 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 60 – Australia’s Refugee and  Humanitarian Program; Fact Sheet 61: Seeking Asylum within Australia; and Fact Sheet  62: Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Australia, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/factsheets, (accessed 27 October 2010); and Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Report on Migration Program 2009–10, Program Year to 30 June 2010 (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2010): 3. 32 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Settler Arrivals 2008–09 (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010): 3; for a detailed analysis see Mark Cully, The Contribution of Migrants to Regional Australia (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2011). 33 Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policy (CAAIP), Immigration –  A Commitment to Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service 1988): 31. Please note that all quotations in this paragraph are derived from this source. 34 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Population Flows – Immigration Aspects  2008–09 Edition (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010): 95. 35 Riverina Regional Development Board (2005), Letter in submission to the 2005–6 review of the General Skilled Migration Program, Wagga Wagga, 1. 36 Minister for State Development: Energy (2005), “Skilled Shortage in Western Australia,” submission to the 2005–6 review of the General Skilled Migration Program, Department of State Development, Perth, 1–2. 37 It should be noted that Australia has a long history of subnational sponsorship of labour migrants, including state/territory governments and specific employers (e.g., Broken Hill Proprietary to coal-mining regions in the 1960s). These are not individually named given the range, complexity of purpose, and volatility of such schemes. 38 Australia’s standard entry criteria for skilled migrants at this time included the following:   •   English ability. Applicants were required to achieve “vocational” or higher level scores on the independently administered International English Language Testing System (IELTS), with the minimum standard raised to IELTS 6 in 2007.   •    Qualification level. The majority of points (60) were awarded to degree-level qualifications correlated to specific professional fields (from 2005, extended to trade qualifications in the context of Australia’s minerals boom).   •    Credential recognition. Primary applicants were obliged to apply for pre-migration screening by the relevant Australian national or state/territory licensing bodies – a strategy designed to avoid years of labour market displacement due to non-recognition.   •    Location of study. Former international students were immediately eligible to migrate and were awarded bonus points for possession of Australian credentials (requiring a minimum of two years study).

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  •    Employment demand. Up to twenty bonus points and priority processing for applicants qualified in high-demand fields, a measure associated to 2007 with enhanced employment and salary outcomes.   •    Age. Major points allocated for youth, with primary applicants aged forty-five or more years ineligible for skilled migration. •    Work experience and/or capital. Additional bonus points were awarded recent continuous Australian or international experience in a professional field, for a “genuine job offer” in an occupation in demand, for applicants with a spouse satisfying economic application criteria, for people bringing “a high level of capital with them to Australia” ($A100,000 or more), and for people sponsored by close Australia-based relatives. 39 The Skill Matching subclass allowed permanent settlement by state/territory governments in South Australia, Western Australia, and even Victoria (which sought strong population growth), along with virtually all regional areas when migrants were employer-nominated. The State/ Territory Nominated Independent subclass covered permanent entry to South Australia, Tasmania, and Victoria. The Skilled-Designated Areas Sponsored subclasses allowed temporary family sponsorship to anywhere in Australia with the exception of Sydney, Newcastle, and Wollongong in New South Wales, Perth, and Brisbane, requiring those sponsored to live in the same area as their sponsor for at least two years before to gaining landed immigrant status. The Skilled Independent Regional subclass allowed temporary labour migration to all of Australia, excluding nine urban sites, followed by transition (if employed) to permanent resident status. Finally, the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme subclass allowed temporary labour migration to all of Australia, excluding seven urban sites, followed by transition (if employed) to permanent resident status. See Bob Birrell, Lesleyanne Hawthorne, and Sue Richardson, Evaluation of the General Skilled Migration  Categories (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia 2006), 11. 40 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Reform of Australia’s Skilled Migration  Program and Key Inflows: We’ve Checked the Policy Settings: Now What? (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010). 41 Lesleyanne Hawthorne, Graeme Hawthorne, and Brendan Crotty, The Registration  and Training Status of Overseas Trained Doctors in Australia (Canberra: Department of Health and Ageing 2007). http://www.health.gov.au/internet/wcms/publishing. nsf/Content/D949ABAA95DCE77FCA2572AD007E1710. 42 For all detail on recent health workforce migration, see Hawthorne, Competitors  and Collaborators. 43 Birrell, Hawthorne and Richardson, Evaluation of the General Skilled Migration  Categories, 75. 44 Government of South Australia, “General Skilled Migration” (Adelaide: Department of Trade and Economic Development 2010), 1. 45 Bob Birrell and Virginia Rapson, “Immigration Rules and the Overseas Student Market in Australia,” Report prepared for IDP Australia (Clayton: Centre for Urban and Population Research 2005).

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46 Birrell, Hawthorne, and Richardson, Evaluation of the General Skilled Migration  Program, 97. 47 It should be acknowledged that Lesleyanne Hawthorne conducted the seventy-five Australia-wide interviews on which the definition of these and other operational issues were based. 48 Birrell, Hawthorne, and Richardson, Evaluation of the General Skilled Migration  Program, 101. 49 This example was one of many told to the author in the course of conducting interviews to define emerging policy issues as part of the 2006 skilled migration review. 50 Access Economics Pty Ltd, The Australian Education Sector and the Economic  Contribution of International Students (Melbourne: Australian Council for Private Education and Training 2009). 51 Birrell, Hawthorne, and Richardson, Evaluation of the General Skilled Migration  Program, 101. 52 Sushi Das, “Millions Trump Truth about Dodgy Schools,” The Age, 29 July 2009, 15. 53 It is important to affirm that Australia’s skilled migration outcomes at this time were exceptional in global terms. As demonstrated by DIAC, 81 percent of PAs were employed six months post-migration in 2000, compared to 60 percent in Canada (despite similar economic cycles). In 2006–07, 83 per cent of PAs in Australia were employed at six months, rising to 85 percent a year later, with salary levels and occupational mobility increasing markedly. These results were nearly identical to those achieved by New Zealand, in a context where 46 percent of PAs to New Zealand were derived from the major English-speaking countries (the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, Canada, and South Africa) and around 80 percent had New Zealand work. By contrast PAs in Australia were typically young, minimally experienced graduates, and eight of the top ten source countries were located in Asia. 54 Council of Australian Governments, “International Students Strategy for Australia” (Canberra: 2010). 55 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, “Introduction of a New Points Test” (2010). http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/general-skilled-migration/pdf/pointsfact. pdf, accessed 27 December 2010. 56 Myer Siemiatycki and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision” (Toronto: University of Toronto, MOWAT Centre of Policy Innovation, School of Public Policy and Governance, May 2010). 57 Anna Whelan, 25 Years of eaps : Review of eaps Operation in New South Wales (Sydney: NSW Government, Community Relations Commission 2009), 6, 14. 58 See NSW Government and Ethnic Affairs Commission, Charter of Principles for a  Culturally Diverse Society: Handbook for Chief Executives and Senior Managers (Sydney: NSW Government and Ethnic Affairs Commission, 1995). 59 George Anderson, Federalism: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 33, 35.

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60 Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report 2009–10 (Canberra: Department of Citizenship and Immigration 2010), 36–09. 61 As demonstrated by successive OECD reports, Australia’s level of investment in hostcountry language training and labour-migrant bridging programs was decades in advance of other OECD immigrant-receiving nations in terms of policy focus and dedicated funding. See, for example, Jobs for Immigrants Volume 1: Labour Market  Integration in Australia, Denmark, Germany and Sweden (OECD 2007). See also Lesleyanne Hawthorne, “Picking Winners: The Recent Transformation of Australia’s Skill Migration Policy,” International Migration Review 39, 2 (2005): 663–96. 62 Joseph Lo Bianco, “Multicultural Education in Australia: Evolution, Compromise and Contest” (presentation at International Alliance of Leading Education Institutions Conference, Singapore, September 2010), 8. 63 Office of Multicultural Affairs, Towards a National Agenda for a Multicultural  Australia: Sharing our Future (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1989), 39. 64 Birrell, Hawthorne, and Richardson, Evaluation of the General Skilled Migration  Categories, 87. http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/gsmreport/index.htm. 65 Frank Galbally et al., Report of the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services for  Migrants (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service 1978). 66 Department of Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, Adult Migrant  English Program: Australia (Canberra: Department of Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, 1991), 1–39. 67 Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report 2009–10 (Canberra: Department of Citizenship and Immigration 2010), 228. 68 Lo Bianco, “Multicultural Education in Australia: Evolution, Compromise and Contest,” 8. 69 Joseph Lo Bianco, “Renovating the Commitment: esl and Australia’s Faltering Response” (presentation at Conference for Faculty of Education, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, 26 May 2006). 70 Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010, http:// www.deewr.gov.au/Schooling/Programs/EnglishasaSecondLanguageNew Arrivals Program/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 3 November 2010); Alan Williams, Faculty of Education, University of Melbourne, e-mail message to author, 3 November 2010. 71 Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations, Annual Report  2008–09 (Canberra: Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations 2010), 46. 72 Lo Bianco, “Multicultural Education in Australia: Evolution, Compromise and Contest,” 8. 73 Joseph Lo Bianco, “Understanding Bilingualism and ESL” (Presentation at Seminar for Faculty of Education, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, 29 July 2009).

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74 The distinction between in-depth, face-to-face and telephone interpreter services is the length and complexity of the communication involved. For example, indepth, pre-booked services might involve an interpreter attending court for days, providing expert two-way translation throughout a trial for an NESB migrant and associated lawyers/juries. Alternatively the service might involve a pre-booked hospital communication where detailed medical explanations/responses were required. The telephone interpreter services are typically less specialized and not booked in advance, and they cater to short transactional needs. 75 Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report 2009–10 (Canberra: Department of Citizenship and Immigration 2010), 225. 76 Office of Multicultural Affairs, Towards a National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia:  A Discussion Paper (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1989), 8, 15. 77 Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policy, Immigration: A Commitment  to Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1988), 54. 78 National Population Council, Recognition of Overseas Qualifications and Skills (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1988), cover letter. 79 National Board for Employment Education and Training, Progress and Prospects in  Improved Skills Recognition, Commissioned Report No 10 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1991). 80 National Board of Employment Education and Training, Annual Report 1995–96  (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996), ix. 81 National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition, Forum of Professional Bodies: Record of  Proceedings - Major Issues (Canberra: National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition 1994), 3, 7–8. 82 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Community Affairs, A Fair Go  For All: Report on Migrant Access and Equity (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1996), 60, 84; see also Robyn Iredale and Reginald Appleyard, eds., International Migration: International Migration of the Highly Skilled 39, 5 (2001), Special Issue. 83 Lesleyanne Hawthorne, “Foreign Credential Recognition and Assessment: An Introduction,” in Foreign Credential Recognition: Canadian Issues (Ottawa: Association for Canadian Studies 2007). 84 Lesleyanne Hawthorne, “Qualifications Recognition Reform for Skilled Migrants in Australia: Applying Competency-Based Assessment to Overseas-Qualified Nurses,” International Migration Review 40, 6 (2002): 55–92. 85 L. Hawthorne, G. Hawthorne, and Crotty, The Registration and Training Status of  Overseas Trained Doctors in Australia. Analysis of 1978–2005 examination data for this major Australian study on international medical graduates demonstrated marked variations in the rigour of registration requirements by state, with some IMG’s working ten or more without securing full registration. 86 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, “About AHPRA” (Canberra: Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency 2011). http://www.ahpra.gov. au/About-AHPRA.aspx, accessed 11 February 2011.

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87 Michelle Grattan, “Staggering under the Load,” The Age, 2011. 88 For opposing views see COAG Reform Council, “National Partnership Agreement to Deliver a Seamless National Economy: Performance Report for 2009–10” (Canberra: COAG Reform Council 2011), 59; and Caroline Brettingham-Moore, “AHPRA Woes under Minister’s Scrutiny,” Medical Observer, http://www. medicalobserver.com.au/news/ahroa-woes-under-ministers-scrutiny?hash, accessed 14/02/2011, 2. 89 Anna Whelan, 25 Years of eaps : Review of eaps  Operation in New South Wales (Sydney: NSW Government, Community Relations Commission 2009), 13. 90 Elsa Koleth, “Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent Debates in Australia and Overseas” (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2010): 33. 91 See Commonwealth of Australia, “A National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security” (Canberra: Department of immigration and Citizenship), http://www.immi.gov.au/living-in-australia/a-diverse-australia/ national-action-plan/nap.htm, accessed 10 February 2011. The website states: (1) “The purpose of this National Action Plan (NAP) is to reinforce social cohesion, harmony and support the national security imperative in Australia by addressing extremism, the promotion of violence and intolerance, in response to the increased threat of global religious and political terrorism. It is an initiative of Australian governments to address issues of concern to the Australian community and to support Australian Muslims to participate effectively in the broader community. The NAP is part of the Australian governments’ national strategic framework to address terrorism, developed since the events of 11 September 2001. The framework is based on the principles of maximum preparedness, comprehensive prevention and effective response and recovery. Governments are committed to working in partnership to ensure the NAP is implemented in a co-ordinated and co-operative manner so that duplication does not occur, for example via exchange of information protocols. However, the approach adopted by individual jurisdictions will vary due to local demographic, social, cultural, religious and economic factors and these will be reflected in each jurisdiction’s implementation of the plan.” 92 Victorian Multicultural Commission, Enhancing Victoria’s Cultural, Religious and  Linguistic Diversity, Annual Report 2008–9 (Melbourne: Victorian Multicultural Commission 2009). 93 Aroney, “Australia,” 18–21. 94 For many years before the three-year rule, the residence requirement was two years. 95 Gary Hardgrave, MP, “Australian Citizenship: Then and Now,” Speech to the Sydney Institute, Media Release 7 July 2004 (Canberra: Ministry for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs), http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/search/display/ display.w3p:query=ld%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FJKBE6%22, viewed 2 June 2010. 96 Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report 2009–10, (Canberra: Department of Citizenship and Immigration 2010), 244–53.

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97 Gwenda Tavan, “Testing Times: The Problem of ‘History’ in the Howard Government’s Australian Citizenship Test,” http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/ immigration/mobile_devices/ch07.html, accessed 28 October 2010, 1–3. 98 See Michael Klapdor, Moira Coombs, and Catherine Bohm, “Australian Citizenship: A Chronology of Major Developments in Policy and Law” (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 11 September 2009). 99 Mark Cully, “The Effectiveness of Australia’s Points-Tested Skilled Entry System” and attachment, “Occupational Targeting in Selection of Skilled Migrants” (London: Speech at Migration Advisory Committee International Conference on Skilled Migration, 7 September 2009).

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3 Belgium M a rc o M a rt in i ello Belgium is both a multinational and a polyethnic state in Kymlicka’s terms.1 The literature on Belgian immigration policy is quite extensive, as is the research on the integration policies of the federated components of the state. But the link between the federalization process and immigration/ integration policy change has been largely understudied.2 The aim of this chapter is to start filling this gap. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first presents the main characteristics of the Belgian federal system, which is very atypical. Contrary to most of the other cases examined in this book, the Belgian federal structure emerged in response to centrifugal forces that claimed subnational autonomy or even independence. It is therefore a federalism of disunion. The second part presents some background data on recent immigration trends, as well as on populations originating from immigration in various parts of the country. The third part examines the emergence of different “philosophies” of integration and of public debates on immigration and integration in the federated entities. The fourth then looks at the links between the phases of the federalization process and immigrant integration policies by examining more concretely the policies in four key areas: admission; socio-economic integration; cultural, political, and civic integration; and, finally, access to nationality. The conclusion presents the major insights from the chapter and attempts to outline the possible scenarios for the future of Belgium and its immigration and integration policies in the context of the European Union (EU).

TH E MA IN CH ARACTER IS T IC S O F B E L G IA N F EDER A LISM AND ITS REC E N T E V O L U T IO N Théo Lefèvre, a former prime minister, used to say that “Belgium is a happy country composed of three oppressed minorities.”3 As a matter of fact, since its creation in 1830, Belgium has always been a divided country in

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which national unity has remained problematic. The opposition between the Flemings and the Walloons has been almost perennial. Despite these conflicts, there was a sort of implicit consensus between the major political forces in the country to keep the Belgian unitary state working. In this context, a set of institutional devices was constructed to control the centrifugal forces towards separation and to lead, when necessary, to what is usually called un pacte à la belge. When critical issues were at stake, conflicting groups usually never opposed each other beyond a point considered to be critical for the survival of the state. They engaged in extraordinary negotiations aimed at re-establishing harmony between the groups in a climate of moderation. There was thus a general willingness to mitigate conflicts that might have led to the dissolution of the state. In other words, Belgium was “sufficiently concerned with its potentiality for internal conflicts and with its intrinsic risk of self-demolition to establish and maintain permanent pacts between the various actors about social issues considered to be critical.”4 Claims for autonomy have always existed both in Flanders and in Wallonia. They led to the “linguistic laws” of 1962, which divided the country into two monolingual areas: a Flemish-speaking zone in the north and a French-speaking zone in the south. In the late 1960s, other threats to the unitary state linked to the Flemings-Walloons divide emerged, leading to significant amendments to the Constitution, passed in 1970, which started the process of federalization that led to Belgium’s formally becoming a federation as part of the 1993 revision of the Constitution.5 This “top-down” process of gradual acknowledgment of regional and communitarian autonomies took more than twenty years to be translated into further constitutional amendments. Belgian federalism is not at all based on the “bottom-up” integration of small entities into a larger federation. In that sense it is really atypical. Another interesting coincidence is that the federalization process started at more or less the same time as the Belgium government decided to officially stop the recruitment of migrant workers abroad in the early 1970s. At the time, there was a consensus on this policy that started the zero-immigration doctrine in Belgium, as in other European countries. Article 1 of the Constitution states that Belgium is a federal state composed of communities and regions. The federal state, the regions and the communities constitute the most important elements of the Belgian state and are on the same footing. The three regions (the Walloon Region, the Flemish Region, and the Brussels-Capital Region) are socio-economic entities. The three communities (the French-speaking community, the Flemish community, and the German-speaking community) are linguistic and cultural entities. In Flanders, contrary to the situation in the south of the country, the region and the community overlap perfectly. The distinction between the

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Flemish Region and the Flemish-speaking community is consequently rather theoretical. Belgium is also composed of 10 provinces (five French-speaking and five Flemish-speaking) and 589 communes (cities and towns). As for the chief competences of the main federated components of the Belgian state, the federal level is competent for matters concerning all the Belgian citizens independently of linguistic, cultural, or territorial considerations. The list of federal competences includes European Union policy and parts of external relations, defence, justice, finance, and home affairs, parts of social security and public health, and of parts scientific research. The regions are competent for what in Belgium are called “territorial matters.” The list of the latter includes land use, town planning, and “territorial installation”; environment, employment policy, and economic and industrial policy; parts of health, social action, and equality of opportunity policies; and parts of scientific research. As for the communities, they are responsible for matters related to persons, such as education; cultural matters, including broadcasting; linguistic policy, music, theater, and cinema; parts of health policy; parts of equal opportunities policies; and social action and assistance. In terms of immigration and integration, four levels of power share most competences: the EU level (for parts of immigration, asylum, and anti-discrimination policies); the federal, community, and regional levels; the provinces; and the communes. The EU supranational level and the federal level share a certain number of competences, and some others are shared between the federal level and the regional or community level. Since multilevel governance is not always organized very efficiently, recurrent conflicts of competences result from this very complex structure. Furthermore, nobody in Belgium considers that the federalization process is over. In Flanders, the process of nationbuilding is well under way, and further reform of the state is considered to be unavoidable. For the Flemish radical nationalists, the aim is to end the Belgian experience as soon as possible and to gain freedom for Flanders. Even though independence is also the ultimate goal of more moderate, or more patient, Flemish nationalists, they favour a multiple-step strategy and advocate a reform of the state to ensure greater clarity and efficiency for all the federated entities. On the francophone side, the refusal to engage in further reform of the state was dominant until 2010, after which it became accepted practice to give more competences to the federated entities and consequently to reduce the powers of the federal government, but not at all costs and through fair negotiations. However, a growing number of people doubt that the Flemish parties really want to reach a compromise. Ideas about alternatives to the Belgian state are being discussed openly. In Brussels, where there is a sense of being treated as hostages both by the Flemings and the Walloons, most citizens claim the right to have a say in the future of their region, which they believe should not be managed jointly by the two main linguistic groups.

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Not surprisingly, immigration and the integration of migrants are discussed in the context of the difficult talks over the formation of a new Belgian state. Before turning to those discussions and to migration and integration policies in Belgium, it will be useful to provide some data on migration patterns and the origins of the immigrant population in the country.

MIGRATION TRENDS A N D T H E O R IG IN S OF T H E IMMIGRANT P O P U L A T IO N Belgium is in both a migration and a post-migration situation.6 On the one hand, the official termination of any new labour immigration, which was decided on by the Belgian government in 1974 in response to the growing unemployment rate in the wake of the first oil crisis, remains, in fact, only theoretical. In practice, various types of migration flows to Belgium (including labour migration and migration resulting from the freedom of circulation of European citizens, asylum seekers, family reunification, foreign students, and so on) have continued since then and have become increasingly diversified. Therefore, Belgium, like the other member states of the European Union, must deal with problems of migration even though there is no clear and proactive federal immigration policy. On the other hand, the migration waves of the past have led to the settlement of migrants and their descendants. For them, the migration cycle is over. Moreover, the presence of a significant number of citizens from the second, third, and even fourth generations is an important part of the post-migration situation. A first point to be made is that migration data and statistics have improved considerably over the past decade even though some gaps remain, for three main reasons. The first relates to the development of an observatory of migration within the Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, a federal agency. One of its missions is to provide accurate demographic and statistical data on migration to Belgium. The second reason relates to the creation of the Belgian Contact Point of the European Migration Network within the Aliens Office of the Ministry of the Interior. Finally, the Belgian Science Policy office launched studies on migration that also contributed to improving the quantitative and qualitative knowledge of migration and integration issues in the country. A second point concerns one of the deficiencies of official federal statistics in Belgium: the lack of ethnic data. The criterion of nationality continues to be the most widely used. It is therefore relatively easy to have data on Belgians and foreigners moving to or from Belgium or simply living in the country. But the subsequent generations tend to “disappear” from official federal statistics because many of them have accessed Belgian citizenship, and they are consequently not part of the statistics on the foreign population. On this point too, there are diverging attitudes towards the necessity of recording

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national origin and/or ethnicity in official statistics. In simplistic terms, the Walloon view is very hostile to that practice, while the Flemish approach is more open. Furthermore, access to the available data remains generally problematic. It can take a long time and much effort to get the specific data one is looking for. Migration being a very sensitive political issue, some data are not reported in a transparent manner – for example, on the Internet. How can we then characterize the migration patterns to Belgium in the past decade? First, as in other European countries and as already mentioned above, the official ban on recruiting new unqualified foreign workers that was passed in 1974 never produced a complete closure of the borders. Since then, immigration has simply changed, especially with regard to the types of immigration and the national origins of the migrants. Second, and contrary to what is often believed, contemporary immigration remains largely European. For example, in 2007 about 62 percent of the new immigrants came from EU member states, and France and the Netherlands were the top source countries.7 Poland and Romania have also become significant countries of emigration to Belgium. Third, even though Morocco and Turkey remain the most important countries of origin for new migrants to Belgium, through family reunification mainly, the evidence shows a huge diversification of origins with, for example, the emergence of waves from China and India.8 Fourth, whereas Wallonia was historically the main area of immigration, contemporary migration flows concern primarily Flanders, then Brussels, and finally Wallonia.9 Obviously, the main reason is that the economic situation of Flanders is better than that of Wallonia. A second reason is that many highly qualified EU citizens who work in Brussels choose to live in the green belt around Brussels, which is largely part of the Flemish Region. Fifth, there are striking differences in the regional profiles of immigration. For example, Polish and Romanian immigration is particularly high in the Brussels Region, whereas Chinese and Indian immigration is more significant in Flanders.10 However, the diversification of migration patterns concerns the three regions. Even the economically depressed parts of the Walloon Region attract new migrants mostly from various non-European countries. Sixth, as in other countries, the average age of new migrants is rather young. Most new migrants are between eighteen and forty years old.11 Seventh, the new migrants enjoy a much better level of formal education than previous migrants: more then 30 percent of them have a university education.12 Eighth, in Belgium, as in other countries of immigration, the thesis of the feminization of migration is partly supported by the available data, particularly for migration from some former Eastern European countries such as Ukraine and Russia and for migration from some Asian countries such as Thailand and the Philippines.13 Finally, the motives for immigration are highly complex. EU citizens come mainly for highly qualified work, but if we examine migrants who need a visa to get into Belgium,

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Table 3.1 Number of Work Permits delivered in the Regions (2000–06) Regions Year

Brussels

Wallonia

Flanders

2000

3,811

2,006

15,662

2001

3,956

2,092

16,313

2002

3,784

1,935

12,742

2003

11,765

6,308

17,450

2004

13,165

7,352

18,784

2005

12,044

7,416

20,337

2006

12,381

7,703

27,522

Source: Germe-Ulb, in Martiniello et al., Nouvelles  migrations, 89.

we see that the main motives for migration are respectively family reunion and family formation (more than 40 percent of the visas delivered in 2008), study (more than 23 percent of the visas delivered), and work (about 14 percent of the visas delivered).14 Table 3.1 shows the evolution of the work permits delivered in the three regions of the country between 2000 and 2006. The difference between Flanders and the other two regions is striking. In Flanders, the number of permits delivered almost doubled in this fairly brief period. Arrivals of asylum seekers remain relevant, but the number has not been growing at all over the past decade. Table 3.2 reports the evolution of asylum applications and the number of persons involved in these applications: one application can actually cover several persons from the same family. The table clearly shows that the peak of 2000 is quite exceptional. For the rest, the trend between 1999 and 2009 is certainly not towards a constant growth in the number of asylum seekers. Table 3.3 indicates that in 2008 the total foreign population in Belgium represented 9.1 percent of the country’s population. In Flanders, the percentage was 5.8, and it reached 28.1 in Brussels. These data concern the legal foreign population and do not take into account people with a migration background who have acquired Belgian citizenship. If we include the latter, the share of the population with a migration background would undoubtedly approach 40 percent in Brussels. The table also shows that Europeans are more numerous in Wallonia than in Flanders and that nonEuropeans are more numerous in Flanders than Wallonia. Over the years Brussels has become a highly diversified urban area in which the whole world is represented.

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Table 3.2 Asylum Applications in Belgium, 1999–2009 1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Number of 35,778 42,691 24,549 18,805 16,940 15,357 15,957 11,587 11,115 12,252 17,186 applications Number of persons concerned (estimate)

45,440 54,220 31,542 23,903 21,138 20,175 20,502 14,648 14,051 15,588 22,785

Source: FEDASIL, Annual Report, 2009, 31.

Table 3.3 Belgian Population and Foreign Population, by Region (2008) eu  citizens

Non-eu  Citizens

Total Foreign  Population 

Belgians

Total   Population

Percentage   of foreigners

Belgium

658,589

312,859

971,448

9,695,418

10,666,866

9,1

Flanders

225,242

129,128

354,370

5,807,230

6,161,600

5,8

Wallonia

251,692

70,343

322,035

3,134,740

3,456,775

9,3

Brussels-Cap,

181,655

113,388

295,043

753,448

1,048,491

28,1

Source: Registre National Calculus: DG SIE, data compiled by Nathalie Perrin and Marco Martiniello.

The regions of Belgium have different migration histories, and today they face somewhat different migration patterns. Have they developed different “philosophies of integration,” to use Adrian Favell’s expression? 15

PH ILOS OPH IES OF IMMIG R A N T INT EGR A T ION IN A DISU N IT IN G SO C IE T Y In an article published in 1995, I discussed two hypotheses. The first was that in each federal entity of Belgium, the terms of the internal debate on immigration and integration were to a certain extent determined by the dominant view of the ideal national society in each part of the country. The second hypothesis was that the politicization of immigration and racism had become an important dimension of the domestic conflict between Flemish-speaking and French-speaking Belgians. I was trying to explain that the relative predominance of a public discourse on kulturnation in Flemish political life had helped shape the terms of the debate that opposed multiculturalism and its defenders to monoculturalism and its partisans. In that context, other approaches to the phenomena of migration and immigrant groups were socially and politically offside and, therefore, bound to remain marginal. On the other hand, the

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relative political predominance of a public discourse on a staatnation  in Wallonia had contributed to impeding the emergence of any specific debate on those issues and to imposing the local version of assimilation. In 1991, the Commissariat Royal à la Politique des Immigrés (CRPI), which later became the Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, defined integration in the following terms: [a] form of “insertion.” The main criteria are: 1. assimilation where it is required; 2. acceptance of the fundamental social principles of the host society (principles that refer to the ideas of “modernity,” “emancipation,” and “pluralism”); 3. unequivocal respect for the cultural diversity in the sense of reciprocal enrichment in other fields. The host society must offer opportunities for this integration, by promoting the structural conditions for the participation of the migrants in the goals and activities of society.16 This definition, which later became official and has not yet been rejected, was broad and vague enough to accommodate a wide range of approaches and interpretations in the different regions of the country. According to Blommaert and Verschueren,17 two Flemish researchers whose work was largely contested in Flanders in the early 1990s and unknown in Wallonia, there was in Flanders “a collective psyche profoundly troubled by the very idea of diversity in society (linguistic or otherwise).”18 In other words, beyond the various approaches to the phenomena of immigration and ethnicity in Flanders, there was, according to these authors, a common belief, a common nucleus to all of them that defines ethnic and cultural diversity as a problem. Both in terms of intellectual debates and policy-making, two major sides logically emerged to analyze and solve the problem of ethnic and cultural diversity. On the one hand, defenders of the cultural  homogeneity of Flanders were struggling either for repatriation of immigrants or for their total assimilation to the Flemish society. On the other hand, the relatively “progressive” side was trying to discuss and to promote some sort of multicultural society based on a rhetoric of tolerance.19 Even though assimilationist tendencies were not at all absent from these multicultural approaches, they nevertheless constituted an attempt to control cultural diversity and make it compatible with the collective psyche of homogeneism. At the level of policies, the Dutch experience of ethnic-minorities policy was seen as a model that, if applied to Belgium, could reduce the risks of social and political disruptions implied by cultural diversity, while simultaneously respecting human rights. In Wallonia, things were somewhat different. Compared to Flanders, the region had a longer conscious history of immigration and assimilation. Since the end of the nineteenth century, poor Flemish workers had been recruited

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to work in the coal mines of rich Wallonia and later in the metal industry. Historians have shown how Flemish immigrants were forced to assimilate.20 Consequently, it is only half surprising to find many politicians of “Flemish descent” in the contemporary Walloon socialist movement. Since Wallonia seems also to have quite a vivid memory of working class struggle from the past, nowadays the Socialist Party (PS) is still largely dominant. These two features, namely a subjective history of assimilation and the salience of socialist rhetoric, help to explain the neglect of the cultural and ethnic dimensions of immigration. As the minister-president of the Walloon Region put it in 1993: “In Wallonia, there is no nationalism if the term supposes an aggression towards another ethnic of linguistic group. There are far more foreigners here than in Flanders, and this situation has never created any major problem: there is no discrimination, either towards those who come from Italy, Portugal and from more distant countries or, towards those who come from Flanders and are quite numerous in certain places.”21 In other words, racism and ethnic problems were seen in the official Walloon rhetoric as Flemish problems. This approach was undoubtedly to be understood in the framework of the Belgian domestic ethnic conflict between the Flemings and the Walloons. This also explains why the emphasis was put on social and economic issues, both in academic and political circles. In academic discussions, any approach in terms of ethnicity was almost automatically rejected because it was seen to be linked to racial theories of the nineteenth century. The mere use of the “ethnic” vocabulary was often condemned as politically dangerous and scientifically invalid.22 The debate thus turned almost exclusively around notions of social and economic exclusion. Politically, a specific link between immigrants and ethnic issues was denied, and logically, specific policies for immigrants were rejected. In fact, it was stated that if Wallonia succeeded in its struggle against economic marginalization and the general process of social exclusion, all the inhabitants of Wallonia would benefit. Therefore, integration policies tended to be included in broader social policies aimed at restoring some equilibrium in employment, housing, health, and so on, following, in a way, a French model. As to Brussels, it was as usual the crossroad between the two main groups and their visions. These two “philosophies “of integration developed in a social context characterized by the wide acceptance of the zero-immigration doctrine. Since the end of the 1990s and even more after the events of September 11, 2001, anti-multiculturalism has gained momentum in many parts of Europe and also in Belgium. At the same time, a new version of an old discourse started to emerge: interculturalism. Interculturalism was introduced by opponents of multiculturalism who saw it (unfairly) as encouraging a society in which different ethnic, religious, and cultural groups would co-exist without interactions between them. They claimed that interculturalism would

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promote interactions and dialogue between members of the ethnic, cultural, and religious groups composing a multicultural society. Furthermore, the concept of diversity was increasingly used in public debates. Finally, in Belgium, as elsewhere, a lot of attention was dedicated to security issues, the struggle against irregular migration, and the presence of Muslims in the cities. Until the financial crash of 2008, Flanders was more open to new labour migration on a temporary basis for economic reasons, since lots of jobs were not being filled in different sectors of the Flemish economy. Voices started to call for an autonomous immigration policy. The Walloon economy was and still is in a process of recovery and transition and faced with high levels of unemployment locally. Recruiting migrant workers abroad was and still is difficult to sell. As for its “philosophy” of integration, Flanders, like the Netherlands at the end of the 1980s, experienced an assimilationist turn, encouraging more cultural homogeneity than cultural deep diversity. Wallonia, like France, gradually opened up a little to cultural diversity. However, the expression “transitional interculturalism” characterizes the discourse on integration. At the end of the day, it is expected that migrants will conform to the majority culture and identity. The question therefore is, beyond the difference in labelling and discourse, are there still very different conceptions of what integration means in the two parts of the country? In Brussels, diversity, not only superficial but also deep diversity, is seen as a structural component of the region. Rare are those who defend any vision of a monocultural Brussels for tomorrow. Brussels remains the main gate of entry for new migrants, and its diversity is growing. It is therefore increasingly difficult to identify a majority to which newcomers should conform. The urban region has really become a multicultural, multiethnic, multiracial, and multifaith society in a much deeper way than the other regions of the country. All the demographic projections show that the process of diversification will continue. How to combine the structural diversity with enough unity is the question that is at the core of many debates in the city. In other words, the challenge is not so much to plan assimilation while allowing for superficial diversity, as in the other regions. It is more about building a new multicultural Brussels citizenship based on a shared local identification. How does all this lead to policy-making and evolution? The new developments in immigration and integration policies in an increasingly disuniting country will be described in the next section.

I NTEG RATION POLICIES IN A D ISU N IT E D FE D E R A T IO N The 2010 legislative elections took place on 13 June. In Flanders, the Nationalist and Independentist party (NVA) came first with about 30 percent of the vote. In Wallonia, the elections confirmed the historical leadership of the PS. Coalition building has always been a perilous exercise in a fragmented society

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like Belgium, so this time, everybody expected more complicated and longer negotiations between the winning parties’ leaders. But how to form a coalition when the key parties are so far apart? The nationalist NVA’s final aim is the total independence of Flanders. The PS understands the necessity of a deep reform of the federal state, but until very recently, its aim was to ensure the continuity of the Belgian state. On social and economic issues, the agenda of the NVA is considerably to the right of the spectrum, while the PS is clearly a left-wing political formation. By early 2011, there was still no agreement and therefore no new federal government. The issue of the end of Belgium is also part of the discussions. This contextual note is important, since the NVA and other Flemish parties claim complete Flemish autonomy with regard to immigration and integration policy. The mere idea of discussing and cooperating on these issues at the federal level has been increasingly challenged, not to say rejected by some parties like the NVA. Therefore, it is not quite clear whether Belgium in 2011 still has the framework of a federal system – even if it is atypical – or whether it has already entered a post-federal framework under the pressure of the main Flemish nationalist party. Are we trying to bring about a deep reform of the federal state? Are we trying to transform it into a Belgian confederation made up of several quasi-independent entities? Or are we, maybe without everyone knowing it, negotiating the dissolution of Belgium and creating several new states in the heart of the European Union? Nobody seems to know for sure. What is sure is that migration and integration are relevant issues in this troubled period of Belgian political history. The bottom line of the argument is that even though the competences in the area of immigration and integration are today shared by the different levels of power in many complex ways, there is a clear claim made in Flanders about gaining exclusive powers on these issues in a more or less distant future. In other words, if federalism means cooperation and dialogue between the federated entities, recent developments concerning immigration and integrated policies in the various parts of the country force us to question the solidity of the Belgian federal regime. Let us look successively at four key issues in the area, starting with admissions of immigrants.

A DMIS SION PO L IC IE S Unlike the situation in countries such as Canada and Australia, there is no coherent proactive labour-immigration policy in Belgium that would be encouraged by the federal government. There is no planning of desired immigration for the short, medium, or long terms. However, Belgium is far from being a fortress, and it is de facto a country of immigration, emigration, and transit. In theory, until now the admission of immigrants has been an exclusive federal competence. The Admission Law of 15 December 1980, which has

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been revised several times, defines five grounds for being admitted to and allowed to reside in Belgium: freedom of circulation for EU citizens, asylum, family reunion, studies, and work. For each category, there is a specific residence permit. Because the Admission Law was passed about six years after the ending of new unskilled labour migration in 1974, it might seem to contradict that decision in the sense that it allows explicitly for employment to provide a reason for coming to Belgium. But in practice, it simply reveals that the official halt was above all a symbolic measure aimed at convincing the population that migration was under control during a period of severe economic crisis. Belgian federal law is very much in line with EU immigration law. In that respect, double governance (EU-Belgium) is not very problematic from a technical point of view. Of course, the restrictions often imposed on foreigners coming to Belgium have been growing over the past two decades, as in the other member states of the EU. But this has so far not been central to the links between the evolution of the federalization process and immigration policy. The main problem is related to the lack of cooperation between the Belgian regions in delivering work permits. As a matter of fact, while the federal level authorizes admission and provides residence permits, work permits are provided by the regional levels. Moreover, the different regions actually have different policies and different administrative practices, and they absolutely do not work with each other. Because of their different economic structures and different labor force needs, they have different lists of “critical functions,” that is, different lists of sectors and functions in which there are job openings and needs. The problem is that most work permits delivered by a region are also valid in the other regions of the country. Therefore, the work permit policy of one region can affect the arrival of “unwanted” migrants in the other regions. Furthermore, while the administrative procedures are highly standardized and expeditious in Flanders (in many cases it takes only five days to obtain a work permit, especially for the most-wanted, highly skilled workers), in Brussels and even more in Wallonia, the same procedure often takes more than five or six weeks.23 Perhaps in a true federal system it would be more efficient to adopt the same definition of “critical functions,” if not the same list, which would depend on regional differences in the evolution of the labor market. It would also be logical to ensure more homogeneity in the administrative practices relating to the time taken by the procedure. However, there is not even a dialogue between the regions on these issues: each region goes its own way without paying attention to the other federated entities. Moreover, at least in Flanders, calls for the devolution of admissions policies and residence permits grows. This seems very logical in a region that tends to see itself more as a nation-state in the making then as a partner in a federation.

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The other issues included in the debate on integration follow the same logic. There is very little, if any, leadership by the federal government. In Flanders, a clear autonomist or even “sovereignist” claim is being made and translated into sub-national laws and policies. In Wallonia, there is a relatively unclear vision on those issues within the Walloon government. Finally, in Brussels there is a constant quest for more adequate solutions to the specific situation of the Brussels Region, which for some aspects of integration (education, for example) depends on Flemish and Walloon policies. Brussels is not completely free to develop its own integration policies. Flanders and the French Community can export their policies onto the territory of Brussels in important areas such as education, to mention just one. The capital city is in that sense at the crossroads of Flemish and francophone policies.

SOCI O-ECONOMIC AND C IVIC - C U L T U R A L IN T E G R A T IO N Except for political rights on access to nationality, all the other dimensions of immigrant integration policies were devolved to the communities and the regions in two steps, in 1980 and in 1994.24 As mentioned, the regions are responsible mainly for socio-economic issues, whereas the communities are responsible for cultural and education issues. This separation of competences is not relevant in the Flemish case, since the Flemish Region and Community overlap perfectly. It is highly relevant in the Walloon and Brussels cases, though. For example, immigrant children living in Brussels have in theory the choice between the Flemish integration policy and the French-community immigration policy in the area of education, while immigrant children living in Flanders or Wallonia are automatically taken care of by Flanders in the first case and by the Walloon Region in the latter. One striking feature is that there is very little cooperation between the communities and the regions in immigration integration, as in many other fields. Even the mere exchange of information and good practices in integration is highly problematic – this was one of the main findings of a recent inter-university research project.25 This is not because there would be institutional deficiencies that would make inter-regional cooperation impossible; it was rather a matter of a shared lack of political will. Flanders has a fairly clear vision of immigrant integration that fits with the nationbuilding process, and it does see the added value of collaboration with either Wallonia or Flanders. Wallonia does not have such a clear vision of immigration integration, and it does not see what it could gain fromcooperation with Flanders. As for Brussels, it is as usual caught between its two bigger neighbours and resists, through non-cooperation, what is  often seen as internal colonialism on the part of Flanders and Wallonia. This context is not favorable for positive results at the federal

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level on integration issues, which are and are seen as the chasse gardée (private hunting ground) of the federated entities. The federal government has, however, tried several times in the past ten years to stimulate a federal debate on integration in order to reconcile the various philosophies of integration represented in the country without offending the sensitivities of the federated entities. In 2004, it launched the Commission for Intercultural Dialogue.26 The aim was to redefine integration and citizenship policies in Belgium through wide-ranging consultations between experts and civil society. The final report, which was published in 2005, presented an interesting account of most of the central issues linked to cultural diversity, equality, and citizenship in the country. It also offered clear policy recommendations to the regions and communities, for example concerning respect for diversity, anti-discrimination mechanisms, the monitoring of the process of integration, and so on. However, almost none of the recommendations were endorsed, let alone implemented. In 2009 the federal government launched a new process to revive the conclusions of the previous commission. Under the responsibility of the francophone federal minister of equal opportunities and social integration, it launched the Interculturality Sessions.27 The regions and communities were not represented as such in the debates, and unsurprisingly, they did not show a great deal of interest in the work being done by a steering committee appointed by the minister and representing parts of the civil society. Furthermore, the federal government collapsed during the process, and it became even more unclear who would use the conclusions of the Interculturality Sessions. The report was finalized in November 2010, but there are virtually no expectations from any level of the state. The two examples demonstrate the difficulties encountered by the federal government in trying to be proactive and influential on issues of immigrant integration. The regions and the communities act independently, following their own logics, and as a result is there are differences not only in the philosophies of integration but also in the type of policies designed and implemented, not to mention in the budget allocated to integration programs. In Flanders, socio-economic and civic-cultural policies of immigrant integration consist mainly of the law on civic integration for newcomers and first-generation immigrants (“citizenization”)28 and the law on ethnocultural minorities designed for “following” generations of migrants, often called “allochtones”29 in Flanders. The first law actually provides the design of the integration courses. It covers both the socio-economic and the civiccultural dimensions of integration. The target groups are both newcomers and first-generation migrants who have been settled in Belgium for some time. The integration course, which is obligatory for newcomers and only encouraged for the established first generation, is divided into two steps. In the first, newcomers are expected to learn enough Dutch30 as soon as possible

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to be able to communicate in Flanders. The second component of the first step is a social-orientation class in which newcomers are taught the basics of the functioning of society and its norms and values. Finally, there is also a career orientation mechanism in this first step. Its aim is to encourage the newcomers to undertake studies, to find work, to engage in voluntary work, to participate in cultural activities, and to gain access to professional education if necessary. At the end of the first step of the integration course the successful newcomer receives a certificate that allows her or him to move to the second step. During this second step, the newcomer can get entrepreneurship training or advanced professional training. She or he can take advanced Dutch classes and register in higher education. At the end of the two steps, it is expected that the newcomer has become a good, active Flemish citizen and not so much a Belgian citizen. Various institutions strictly monitor the whole process and each participant enjoys individual tutorship. Taking part in the integration course is an obligation for several categories of newcomers residing on Flemish soil but not in the Brussels area. Those who do not participate receive an administrative sanction in the form of a fine of 100 to 150 euros. The second piece of legislation, the law on ethnocultural minorities, which passed in 1998, concerns the descendants of immigrants and not newcomers of the first generation. Therefore, it will not be presented here in detail. It is nevertheless relevant in that it underlines the changes of perspective revealed even by a superficial examination of the modifications brought to that legislation in April 2009. The terms of the initial law were very much inspired by the multicultural discourse of the Dutch ethnic-minority policies of the 1980s. The legislation defines “allochtones” as those persons legally residing in Belgium who fulfil two conditions: having at least one parent or one grandparent born in Belgium and being disadvantaged because of their ethnic origin or socio-economic situation. The “allochtones” all together form what the law calls “the ethnocultural minorities,” whose “emancipation” will allow them to integrate into Flemish society. The anti-multiculturalism turn of the end of the post-2000 decade is revealed by the changes of vocabulary introduced by the April 2009 modifications of the legislation: the name has changed, and it is now called the Flemish integration policy. The term “ethnocultural minorities” has disappeared, and the word “integration” survives to define the main objective of the revised law. In Wallonia, the integration of immigrants is organized by the law on the integration of foreigners and persons of foreign origin that passed in 1996 and was changed cosmetically in April 2009. The law defines general principles and missions for the newly established regional integration centres. It mentions “positive discrimination” without defining it, and no regional integration course is introduced. Migrants have absolutely no obligation to attend any program, and consequently, the idea of sanctions makes no

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sense in the Walloon context. The fact that this legislation does not provide a clear vision associated with policy tools at the regional level does not mean that no integration initiatives have been undertaken in Wallonia. Actually, a lot has been done in terms of language classes, labor market integration, and social orientation. But the law leaves a lot of autonomy to the regional integration centres, which therefore develop very different initiatives based on different visions of integration. For example, the Namur regional centre stresses very much the work on culture, while the Liège centre is more active in the socio-economic area. The new version of the law is merely cosmetic in the sense that it does not provide a common regional integration framework either. It replaces the expression “positive discrimination” with “positive action.” It also introduces the idea of an “intercultural society,” but the meaning of that expression is not explicitly developed. The degree of variability of the visions adopted and policies implemented by the regional integration centres reflects both the weakness of the Walloon government’s philosophy of integration and the historical importance of “subregionalism” in Wallonia. Local specificities are often used as arguments to resist the development of regional-scale policies in this field, as in others. In the Brussels region, the integration of immigrants is taken care of by the French-speaking part and by the Flemish part of the Brussels government. The French-speaking part passed legislation on social cohesion in 2006 that includes the integration of newcomers in different areas: social aid, housing, health, and, for immigrant children, learning of the French language. This legislation organizes the availability of services and is not at all an integration course like the one in Flanders. As for the Flemish part of the Brussels government, it organizes an immigrant integration course similar to the one presented in Flanders. One enormous difference is that there is no obligation for newcomers to Brussels to participate in that course and consequently no sanction for failure to do so. Furthermore, the councils of the nineteen communes that form the Brussels Region are also key actors in the field of immigrant and immigrant ethnic-community integration. In some of the communes in the centre of Brussels (Molenbeek, Schaerbeek, Saint-Josse, Brussels-City, etc.) the population of immigrant origin is quite large and sometimes even represents the majority of the total population. Its potential electoral power has led local politicians to design integration policies that do not necessarily exist in communes where the immigrant presence is much weaker.

POLI TI CAL INTEGRATION AND A C C E SS T O N A T IO N A L IT Y The current nationality law identifies three main ways of becoming Belgian: regular naturalization, jus soli, and marriage with a Belgian citizen. After three

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years of legal residence (two years for recognized refugees) a foreigner can apply for naturalization. The law allows for dual nationality. The law has established no requirement for the integration of the migrant during that relatively short period of residence. No language or civic-knowledge test is required. Naturalization applications have to be examined and accepted by the federal Parliament. More precisely, the naturalization applications are submitted to the Naturalization Service of the Chamber of the Representatives. The file is then transmitted to the Foreigners Office, the State Security Department, and the Court of First Instance for advice. In theory, these institutions are to provide their advice to the Service of Naturalization of the Chamber of Representatives within one month. Finally, the files reach the Naturalization Service of the Chamber of Representatives, which decides whether or not to grant Belgian citizenship to the applicant. Naturalization is seen as a favor granted by Belgium to the foreigner. Therefore, Parliament can and does reject applications every year. Indeed, between 48 percent and 65 percent of those applications were rejected every year since at least 1997.31 After seven years of residence, unless the person has a criminal record, naturalization becomes an entitlement. The above process does not apply; again, no language or civic-knowledge test is required. Jus soli applies to the third generation when the child is registered by a parent who has lived in Belgium for five of the ten years before the birth of the child. Finally, the acquisition of Belgian citizenship though the marriage of a Belgian citizen requires a minimum of six months of marriage and three years of legal residence. Table 3.4 shows the total number of foreigners who acquired Belgian citizenship between 1997 and 2007. For a small country like Belgium, the figures are quite significant: more than 430,000 foreigners acquired Belgian citizenship over the ten-year period. Furthermore, most of them were previously citizens of a non-EU state. This liberal naturalization law has been resisted, especially in Flanders. The main argument is that it conflicts with the obligatory integration course. In spring 2010, a new proposal was adopted by the government but could not be voted on by Parliament because of the collapse of the government. Its aims were to make access to Belgian nationality more restrictive by changing the residence requirement for applying for citizenship to five years. A second change was that the applicant would have to demonstrate knowledge of the language of the part of the country in which she or he had settled. A third change concerned the introduction of the condition of willingness to integrate that the applicant would be required to prove. Furthermore, since 2004, foreigners legally established in Belgium for at least five years have had the right to vote at the local level. The federal law granting that new right was not passed easily: there were lots of heated debates in the Parliament. Clearly, the approaches in the south and the north

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Table 3.4 Foreigners Who Acquired Belgian Nationality, 1997–2007, by Country of Origin Country   of Origin 

1997 1998

Total EU

3,367 2,987 2,353 6,297 6,605 5,173 5,019 4,864 4,622 5,081 4,956 51,324

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

Turkey

7,835 6,932 4,402 17,282 14,401 7,805 5,186 4,467 3,602 3,279 3,113 88,373

Algeria and Tunisia

1,187 1,298

821 1,930 2,010 1,444 1,205 1,232 1,036 1,079 1,121 14,363

Morocco 11,078 13,486 9,133 21,917 24,018 15,832 10,565 8,704 7,977 7,753 8,722 163,749 Congo (RDC)

1,059 1,753 1,890 2,933 2,830 2,564 1,651 2,406 1,917 1,751 2,020 22,774

Total 28,311 31,047 21,843 55,683 56,377 41,244 28,690 29,890 26,890 27,585 32,157 379,717 Non-EU Total

31,678 34,034 24,196 61,980 62,982 46,417 33,709 34,754 31,512 32,666 37,113 431,041

Source: Marco Martiniello and Andrea Rea, Institut National de Statistiques.

of the country were different; the reluctance to enfranchise foreigners was much stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia.

CONCLUS IO N What can we conclude from this overview of immigrant integration policies in the Belgian federation? Belgium is generally seen as a unique federal system because it consists of an attempt to counter centrifugal forces more then an attempt to assemble separate units into a new federal system. My argument goes beyond that statement. I have claimed that there is virtually no dialogue, let alone cooperation, on immigration and integration issues between the federated entities. I have also shown that the perspectives, the visions, and the “philosophies” of integration are very different in the North, in the South, and in Brussels, even though the differences have tended to diminish over time, especially between Flanders and Wallonia. Also the policies and programs – e.g., an obligatory integration course in Flanders but not in the two other regions – differ. This policy variation has become a political issue: Flemish authorities would like the other regions to have their own obligatory programs, but Wallonia and Brussels resist in the name of regional autonomy. The Belgian federal government is often considered to be either a constraint on the development of specific policies at the level of the federated entities or an irrelevant level of policy-making and governance. Especially in Flanders, federal “interference” is seen as highly problematic and unacceptable in the name of regional autonomy. It would also seem that the

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huge complexity of the institutional arrangements is an excuse but not a cause for the lack of cooperation and for efforts to keep the federal government from taking a more active role on integration issues. Even though Belgium is still legally a federation, it is moving away from a federal structure, mainly because Flanders is engaged in a concerted nation-building process that is forcing the other entities into at best a defensive but maybe a useless strategy. Is there a way to really reconstruct a federal Belgium in which autonomous federated entities would cooperate on, among other things, immigration and integration issues? At the end of the present analysis and having observed Belgian political life for the past twenty years, I would like to, but cannot be, optimistic.

Not es 1 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 11–26. 2 Marco Martiniello, “La question nationale belge à l’épreuve de l’immigration,” in Alain Dieckhoff, ed., Belgique. La force de la désunion (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, Espace international 1996), 85–104. 3 Maureen Covell, “Ethnic Conflict, Representation and the State in Belgium,” in Paul Brass, ed., Ethnic Groups and the State (London: Croom Helm 1985), 228-61. 4 Marco Martiniello, “Ethnic Leadership, Ethnic Communities’ Political Powerlessness and the State in Belgium,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16, 2 (1993): 251. 5 Els Witte and Jan Craeybeckx, La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours (Brussels: Labor 1990). 6 Martiniello, “Ethnic Leadership, Ethnic Communities’ Political Powerlessness and the State in Belgium,” 236–55. 7 CECLCR and GéDap, Migrations et Populations issues de l’immigration en Belgique,  Rapport statistique et démographique 2008, (Bruxelles: CECLCR 2008), 25. 8 Marco Martiniello et al., Nouvelles migrations et nouveaux migrants en Belgique (Gand : Academia Press 2010), 41–91. 9 Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme, Migration, Rapport  annuel 2009 (Brussels: 2010). 10 Marco Martiniello et al., Nouvelles migrations et nouveaux migrants en Belgique, 41–91. 11 CECLCR and GéDap, Migrations et Populations issues de l’immigration en Belgique, 50. 12 Marco Martiniello et al., “Nouvelles migrations et nouveaux migrants en Belgique,” 41–91. 13 CECLCR and GéDap, Migrations et Populations issues de l’immigration en Belgique, 54. 14 Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme, Migration, Rapport  annuel 2009. 15 Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in  France and Britain, 2d ed. (New York: Parlgrave 2001).

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16 Jan Vranken and Marco Martiniello, “Migrants, Guest Workers and Ethnic Minorities: Historical Patterns, Recent Trends and Social Implications of Migration in Belgium,” in Dietrich Thränhardt, ed., Europe: A New Immigration Continent (Münster: Lit Verlag 1992), 247. 17 Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, “The Rhetoric of Tolerance or, What Police Officers Are Taught about Migrants,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 14, 1 (1993): 49–63. 18 Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, “The Pragmatics of Minority Politics in Belgium,” Language in Society 20 (1991): 503. 19 Blommaert and Verschueren, “The Rhetoric of Tolerance or, What Police Officers Are Taught about Migrants,” 49–63. 20 Yves Quairiaux, “L’immigration flammande en Wallonie (1880–1914): Problèmes d’intégration. L’exemple de la région du centre,” paper presented at the conference “Second Generation Immigrants in Europe,” Florence, European University Insitute, April 1990. 21 Interview with Guy Spitaels published in La Wallonie, 28 January 1993 (author’s translation). 22 Andrea Rea, “La politique d’intégration des populations d’origine étrangère,” in Marco Martiniello and Marc Poncelet, eds., Migrations et minorités ethniques dans  l’espace européen, 143–66 (Brussels : De Boeck Université 1993). 23 Marco Martiniello et al., “Nouvelles migrations et nouveaux migrants en Belgique,” 85–115. 24 Marco Martiniello and Nathalie Perrin, “Immigration et diversité en Belgique,” in Jean Beaufays and Geoffroy Matagne, eds., La Belgique en mutation: Systèmes politiques et politiques publiques (1968-2008) (Brussels: Bruylant 2009), 217–51. 25 Marco Martiniello et al., “Nouvelles migrations et nouveaux migrants en Belgique,” 311–19. 26 Commission du Dialogue Interculturel, Rapport final et livre des auditions, Brussels, May 2005. 27 Assises de l’Interculturalité in French, Rondetafels van de Interculturaliteit in Dutch; see www.interculturaltite.be (accessed 5 October 2010). 28 The Flemish word “inburgering” is impossible to translate perfectly. It refers to the process by which a non-Flemish newcomer or primo-migrant will be turned into a Flemish citizen – the final aim of this legislation. 29 The word originally referred to animal or vegetal species that do not originate in the regions in which they are found. It is odd that it has come to be used in public policies to make a distinction between immigrant origin populations and nonimmigrant origin populations, first in the Netherlands and then in Flanders. 30 Flanders and the Netherlands share the same official and standardized Dutch language. However, in daily life a variety of local accents and dialects are spoken in the various areas of Flanders and the Netherlands. Generally, it is rather easy to identify where people are from on this basis. 31 There was a heated political debate in the Belgian press in November 2010 about the rejection figures.

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4 Canada K e i t h ba n t i n g Canadian federal institutions leave a deep imprint on the policy structures of the country.1 Government programs in sector after sector have been shaped by the institutional configuration of one of the most decentralized federations among contemporary democracies and by the intergovernmental diplomacy through which the multiple governments manage their interdependence. For much of the postwar era, immigration stood as an exception to this pattern. The federal government dominated the process from the selection of newcomers through their settlement, integration, and eventual naturalization as new citizens. In recent decades, however, the sector has been transformed by a rapid decentralization, with provincial authorities now exercising a substantial role in the selection and settlement of immigrants. This process has not been guided by a comprehensive blueprint of the new policy regime. Rather, the transformation has proceeded through a series of incremental adjustments, usually in the form of bilateral political deals between the federal government and individual provinces. These changes have been layered on top of each other, with limited reference to any comprehensive federal-provincial rationale or to their cumulative impact. The result is one of the most complex immigration systems in the world and a set of intergovernmental relations characterized by pervasive asymmetry rather than a common conception of federalism. This chapter traces the evolution of Canadian federalism across the full range of immigration and immigrant integration and provides a preliminary assessment of the consequences. The next section sets out the background, introducing the key features of the federal institutions in Canada and the basic nature of immigration and immigrant integration in the country. The third section traces the evolution of federal-provincial relations across the key phases of the immigration system in Canada, and the fourth section explores the impact of decentralization on the policy process, policy outcomes, and the nature of immigrant integration. The concluding section

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pulls the threads of the discussion together and reflects on the implications of the Canadian pattern for conceptions of multi-level governance in the twenty-first century.

th e ins t itut ional c o n t e x t  Federal Society/Federal Institutions More than in many countries, Canadian politics are territorial politics, rooted in linguistic and regional divisions. To borrow Livingstone’s language, Canada is not only a federal state but also a federal society.2 The division between English- and French-speaking communities has been an elemental feature of politics in what is now Canada since the surrender of the French to the British in 1760, and the formation of the federation in 1867 was seen by many French-Canadian leaders as a compact between two peoples. Although there are francophone minorities in several provinces, the primary linguistic divide is now between Quebec and the rest of Canada. The French-speaking people of Quebec have come to see themselves as constituting a distinct nation with its own history, culture, and identity. A nationalist ethos pervades the entire political spectrum within the province, and a strong separatist movement has on occasion threatened the survival of a single Canadian state. Wider conflicts among the regions of the country are also as old as the federation. Regional divisions take root in the geography of a country much larger than all of Europe. Although modern communications and transportation have diminished the salience of geography, they have not eliminated the political distance between the regions. This natural inheritance has been reinforced by economic and cultural development. Much of the history of the country can be written in terms of regionally uneven economic development and enduring tensions between the industrial heartland of central Canada and the resource-based economies of other regions. Social differences overlay economic ones, as different histories of settlement and immigration bestowed distinctive ethnic blends and cultures on the regions. Territorial politics have been reflected and amplified by federal institutions. Legislative authority is divided between the federal government, ten provincial governments, and three northern territories in complex ways, but both levels of government are engaged in most policy fields. The strength of regional interests and attitudes ensures that the Canadian federation is one of the most decentralized federations in the world.3 In addition, the distinctive features of Quebec have led to significant asymmetries in the relations between the central government and the provinces, with Quebec carving out larger domains of autonomy within the federation. As a result, multilevel governance in Canada is marked by high levels of interdependence and the weakness of hierarchical mechanisms of control.

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With the federal and provincial governments both engaged in many policy fields, much depends on the mechanisms through which they manage their interdependence. Canada was the first country to fuse federal institutions with the Westminster system of parliamentary government, which concentrates power in the hands of executives at both the federal and provincial levels. The prime minister and premiers, their cabinets, and senior officials dominate the policy process in their respective governments. It is these executives who manage federal-provincial relations through elaborate diplomacy and federal-provincial agreements that can rival international treaties in their complexity. There are few counterbalances to this executive dominance of intergovernmental relations. Unlike the German or the US system, there is little space for the mediation of territorial disputes through legislatures. Members of the parliamentary caucus of the governing party play a role, but MPs from a province do not speak for their provincial government. Indeed, they may be political opponents. Moreover, the governing party is often weak in certain regions, depriving those parts of the country of champions around the cabinet table and in the party caucus. Furthermore, the second chamber of Parliament, the Senate, remains an unelected body without the political legitimacy to serve as a forum for the resolution of regional or intergovernmental disputes. Nor does the party system integrate levels of government. Parties at the two levels are highly autonomous: federal and provincial parties bearing the same name are separate organizations, both in law and in political reality. Their leaders have separate career paths, their finances are unrelated, and their electoral bases are distinct. In several provinces completely different parties operate in the federal and provincial arenas. Consequently, there are few, if any, vertical party mechanisms through which intergovernmental disputes are managed. As a result, the primary vehicle for managing interdependence is intergovernmental negotiations, or what has been called intergovernmental diplomacy.4 Compared to some federations, these intergovernmental processes tend to be relatively informal and unstructured, with few formal venues, no firm decision rules, and no effective mechanisms for resolving disputes and roadblocks. Nonetheless, the process is central to policy development in the country. Such a process tends to be particularly responsive to the interests of the governments at the table and to social and economic issues that can be defined in regional terms. Such issues are readily championed by provincial governments. In contrast, more diffuse social interests have long complained of their relative exclusion. Municipalities play a limited role in the Canadian federation. Legally, municipalities are creatures of the provincial government, which has untrammelled authority over them. In the field of immigration, major metropolitan centres, such as Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal, are home to

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the largest concentrations of immigrants in Canada. Yet they do not have political or financial authority over the core services related to immigrant integration. Cities and local school boards do play important roles in the delivery of services that are critical to immigrant integration, and they are active in helping to coordinate agencies in the sector, supporting community organizations, developing avenues for immigrants and ethnic minorities to participate in community life, supporting anti-racism initiatives, and responding to local tensions.5 But they have a marginal role at best in shaping the major policy parameters of immigration policy in Canada, a reality that frustrates them immensely. Canada has thus developed a distinctive version of multi-level governance, one shaped by an amalgam of territorial politics, parliamentary government, and asymmetrical federal institutions. As we will see below, this model applies with increasing force in the case of immigration and immigrant integration. Immigration and Integration Canada is one of the most culturally diverse countries in the world.6 Among OECD countries, it is virtually unique in the co-existence of three dimensions of difference: the historic divide between English- and Frenchspeaking communities; the presence across the country of indigenous peoples, many of whom assert claims to self-governance; and significant immigrant communities. Canada is a classic settler society, with a long history of immigration; indeed, in historical perspective the most dramatic wave of immigration occurred in the years before World War I, when annual arrivals peaked at 5 percent of the population. But Canada still maintains one of the largest proportionate flows among OECD countries. Figure 4.1 tracks the trend in overall admissions from 1984 to 2009, capturing a sustained rise over the period. The annual flow of newcomers with permanent residency now represents 0.7 percent of the total population, and over time this flow has redefined Canadian society. First-generation immigrants – i.e., the foreign-born population – represented approximately 20 percent of the total population according to the 2006 Census. Moreover, in contrast to some host countries in which immigration comes predominantly from one part of the world, creating a relatively homogenous “other,” immigration to Canada has come from many different parts of the world, creating a “diverse diversity” of ethnicities, races, and religions. Canada has long seen immigration as an instrument of economic development and nation-building. Its immigration policy gives priority to economic migrants, who are expected to enter the labour force quickly, and immigrants are expected to sink roots in Canadian soil, become citizens, and join the evolving mainstream of Canadian life. Figure 4.1 also tracks the

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Canada 350 000 300 000

83

Refugees Family Economic

250 000 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0

84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Figure 4.1 Composition of immigrant inflow by category of immigrant resident, 1984–2009

evolving balance between economic, family, and refugee categories, demonstrating the growing dominance of the economic program. In addition, the country adds a large number of temporary residents. Figure 4.2 tracks the rise of the largest categories of temporary residents: foreign workers, foreign students, and refugee claimants. Since 2008, skilled temporary workers and international students have had a pathway to permanent resident status and eventual citizenship. For these groups, Canada has moved to a two-step immigration process. In a country sensitized to regional politics, the regional distribution of immigration has been critical. During the last half century, newcomers have concentrated in three provinces: Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec. As table 4.1 indicates, these three provinces received 90 percent of new permanent residents in 2000, with Ontario alone absorbing close to 60 percent. This hyper-concentration has been transforming the political geography of the federation, as other regions see their share of the total population and their relative economic and political weight in the country declining. As we shall see below, the result has been a pushback from other provinces, the effects of which can be seen in the change in the distribution of newcomers in 2008. Not surprisingly, the selection and integration of this large and diverse flow of newcomers is a constant preoccupation in Canada, a preoccupation that has become more intense in recent years as problems have emerged. Traditionally, immigrants to Canada moved quickly into the economic mainstream, but recent cohorts of newcomers have not enjoyed the same economic success, despite having higher levels of education and training. They are starting at lower income levels and are taking much longer to

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350 000

Refugee claimants

300 000

Foreign students Foreign workers

250 000 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 9 1 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Figure 4.2 Temporary residents entering Canada each year, principal categories, 1989–2009

Table 4.1 Distribution of New Permanent Residents, by region, 2000 and 2008 Region Atlantic provinces

2000%

2008%

1.3

2.7

Quebec

14.3

19.6

Ontario

58.7

42.4

Prairie provinces

9.1

18.8

British Columbia

16.5

16.4

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament (Ottawa 2010).

converge on the income of the native-born population.7 Questions are also being asked about social integration, especially in the case of the second generation – the children of immigrants born in Canada. Until recently, the integration of the second generation was considered a Canadian success story. Second-generation members of most racial minorities speak English or French with a flawless Canadian accent, match or surpass the educational achievements of their peers, and move effectively into the workforce. Success rates in schooling do vary across minorities, with Asian children doing particularly well but children with Afro-Caribbean and Latin American origins doing less well. Overall, however, an OECD survey of the educational attainment of the children of immigrants found little difference between the performance of immigrant and Canadian-born students.8 Nevertheless,

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recent studies have raised questions. Despite their impressive educational and economic successes, survey evidence suggests that the children of racialminority immigrants have a weaker sense of belonging in the country than their immigrant parents, raising difficult questions about discrimination and remaining barriers to social integration.9 Immigration and immigrant integration are constant issues in Canada. The new challenges in the integration process have triggered important shifts in the policy regime, and federalism is at the heart of the response.

FEDER A LISM AND T H E INT E G R A T IO N C O N T IN U U M The process of immigrant integration can be thought of as a continuum that begins with the selection and admission of immigrants and proceeds through their initial settlement and their eventual integration into the economic, social, and political mainstream of the country. At each phase of this continuum, complex institutional systems come into play. The key components interlock but do not mesh perfectly. As Freeman comments, “No state possesses a truly coherent incorporation regime … Rather one finds sub-system frameworks that are weakly, if at all, co-ordinated.”10 In the Canadian case, coordination issues inherent in any democratic state are compounded by federalism. The constitution provides only a partial definition of the division of powers over immigration and integration. Jurisdiction over immigration is concurrent. Section 95 of the Constitution Act 1867 bestows authority to make laws related to immigration on both the central government and the provinces, with the proviso of federal paramountcy: any provincial law related to immigration “shall have an effect in and for the Province as long as and as far as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada.” At the other end of the continuum, Section 91(25) grants exclusive authority over naturalization to the federal government. The constitution is silent, however, about the intervening phases of the continuum. Immigrant settlement and integration were not distinct concern of governments in the  mid-nineteenth century, when the constitution was drafted, and the terms “settlement” and “integration” do not appear in the list of powers parcelled out to the federal and provincial governments. The general division of authority over relevant programs prevails as a result, and the longerterm integration of immigrants depends heavily on provincial policies and programs, such as labour market regulation, education, and social services. These bare constitutional bones give only a partial view of intergovernmental relations in this sector. They have been supplemented with a complex array of political agreements that have been layered on top of each other through intergovernmental bargaining over the years. Although full meetings of federal-provincial-territorial ministers began again in 2002,

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after a hiatus of over a century, the critical bargaining tends to proceed on a bilateral basis between the central government and individual provinces. The result is considerable asymmetry, with Quebec having carved out a distinct role in the sector several decades ago and with significant variation creeping into the role of other provinces as well. In addition, intergovernmental relationships have been changing rapidly in this sector: significant decentralization in several phases of the process have occurred in the last few years. As a result, Canada has established the most decentralized immigration/integration regime of any federation in the OECD. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the intergovernmental balance in each phase of the integration continuum, and the following sections set out the details. Selection and Admission Before the establishment of the Canadian federation in 1867, each of the separate colonies in British North America had been preoccupied with immigration. The decision to grant concurrent powers to both levels of the new federation was therefore understandable, and an intergovernmental conference on immigration the year following Confederation produced Canada’s first federal-provincial agreement. However, provincial interest began to wane as early as an intergovernmental conference in 1874, and provincial inactivity persisted into the decades following the Second World War. As Hawkins observed of this era, “the management of immigration, in all its essential features, has been an exclusive federal concern.”11 Federal predominance came under challenge beginning in the 1960s. Not surprisingly, the push for decentralization started in Quebec, where immigration has always held a particular sensitivity. Within the province, Quebecers of French-Canadian ancestry represent a strong majority; within the larger Canadian and North American contexts, however, they are a minority and are concerned about the future of their language and culture. Historically, immigration was often seen as a threat to that culture, especially during the postwar era, when immigrants tended to assimilate to the English-speaking community in the province. In those years, analyses of public attitudes found that Quebecers of French-Canadian descent were more opposed to immigration and less comfortable with ethnic and cultural pluralism than other Canadians.12 Opposition to immigration began to ease later in the century, as the birth rate in Quebec declined and the francophone share of the population of the country as a whole began to shrink.13 Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the issues remained. The Quebec government responded to these sensitivities vigorously. Beginning in 1972, the province adopted a series of increasingly powerful language and education laws to steer immigrants into the francophone community.14 These policies were controversial when they were enacted,

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Table 4.2 Federalism and the Integration Continuum Stage 

Federal

Quebec

Other Provinces 

Selection and Admission

Traditionally dominant

Substantial

Growing rapidly

Settlement

Asymmetric responsibility

Exclusive responsibility

Asymmetric responsibility

Socio-economic integration

Secondary

Primary

Primary

Political integration (including naturalization)

Primary

Secondary

Secondary

with Quebec nationalists and immigrant communities mobilizing massively on opposing sides. But the primacy of French as the language of the public realm has become a central pillar of the provincial policy regime. In addition, the Quebec government sought to take greater control of immigration policy, establishing its own ministry of immigration in 1968 and pressing the federal government to cede a larger role to the province. The federal response was shaped by the intense constitutional battles that dominated Canadian politics in the last decades of the twentieth century. The federal government tried to forestall Quebec’s separation and the breakup of the country by recognizing and accommodating Quebec‘s distinctiveness within the federation. Starting in 1971, the federal government signed a succession of agreements with Quebec to accommodate the province’s aspirations. The 1978 Cullen-Couture Agreement gave Quebec effective control over the selection of economic immigrants. In 1987, a proposal for constitutional reform known as the Meech Lake Accord included a provision to entrench the terms of the Cullen-Couture Agreement and to transfer responsibility for all settlement services to the province. When the constitutional accord failed to be ratified, the federal government concluded a separate Canada-Quebec immigration agreement in 1991, implementing the Accord’s approach. The province utilized its expanded autonomy to establish its own approach to immigrant selection. It implemented its own version of the points system, which differs somewhat from the federal approach, especially in giving greater weight to French-language skills. In principle, authority over policies concerning other categories of immigrants – family class and refugees – remained in federal hands, but the selection of refugees selected overseas is carried out jointly by the federal government and Quebec.15 The federal government does remain responsible for the final admission of all

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immigrants and screens those selected by Quebec for security and health concerns. Nevertheless, the critical first step in the selection process had shifted to provincial hands.16 Quebec exceptionalism did not persist. As is often the case in Canada, an initiative that Quebec sought as recognition of its distinctiveness triggered a broader decentralization. In the early days, the federal government pressed for decentralization, since it was uncomfortable with asymmetry and did not want Quebec to be the only province with an immigration agreement. Initially, other provinces responded cautiously. In contrast to Quebec, the cultural imperative was less compelling; they tended to see immigration as a politically sensitive and potentially expensive program that they were content to leave to the federal government. As a result, initial immigration agreements were principally geared towards information sharing and consultation.17 By the late 1990s, however, provincial interest in more substantial agreements was growing. The concentration of immigrants in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec led other provinces to demand their “fair share.”18 Because of the mobility provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, immigrants cannot be compelled to settle in specific parts of the country.19 But a provincial role in selection and settlement still has steering effects. The Liberal government of the day wished to avoid replicating the Canada-Quebec approach, which would have eliminated the federal role in the selection of economic migrants, and it responded tentatively in 1995 by introducing the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). Under this program, provinces were authorized to identify a limited number of economic migrants to meet specific regional economic needs. As in the Quebec agreement, the federal government issues the final acceptance, but the intergovernmental agreements require it to process provincial nominees first. Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland were the first to take up the offer, establishing PNPs in 1999. By 2007, all other provinces (except Quebec) and two of the three northern territories had signed on. The initial intention was that the PNP would be small, and there were only 477 admissions in the first year. However, provincial enthusiasm for the program grew. In 2003, the federal government lifted the cap on the number of provincial nominations for Manitoba and, in the words of a senior Manitoba official, the program expanded “well beyond our wildest expectations.”20 In 2008, a Conservative federal government removed the cap on provincial nominations for the country as a whole. In part this was a reflection of the Conservatives’ more decentralist orientation to federalism. More importantly, expanding the PNP system allowed for the expeditious processing of economic immigrants selected by provinces rather than requiring them to join a rapidly growing backlog in the Federal Skilled Workers Program, which was generating long delays in obtaining visas.

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The number of provincial nominations soared. With a cap on the total level of admissions but no cap on the PNP program, PNP selections necessarily grew at the expense of the federal program. In 2009, the Auditor General worried that the PNP could quickly squeeze out the Federal Skilled Workers Program almost completely.21 In introducing its immigration plan for 2011, the federal government announced that, once again, “the admission range for federal economic immigration has been reduced to permit further growth in the Provincial Nominee Program.”22 But the minister also indicated that the PNP intake would be stabilized at the 2011 target. At that level, provincial selections, including under the Quebec economic class, would equal the number being admitted under the federal program. When provinces complained, the federal minister pushed back: “we can’t have 10 provinces arbitrarily settling their own goals, because ultimately there’s one pipeline for immigration … and that runs through the Government of Canada.”23 The targets for 2011 are set out in table 4.3. Within these targets, provinces develop their own selection criteria. Provincial governments are not bound by the federal points system or language provisions, and their programs have become highly diverse, with selection criteria varying substantially. Moreover, the federal promise to process PNP selections first contributes to much shorter wait times.24 Other changes are also enhancing the provincial role as gatekeepers for immigrants. Increasingly, international students who have completed degrees, diplomas, or certificates in the country can be fast-tracked for permanent residence. Special pathways have been created for them in many PNPs, the federal government’s new Canadian Experience Class, and a special allocation of positions for PhD students in the Federal Skilled Workers Program. As a result, provincial policies that influence Canada’s attractiveness to international students, such as the level of tuition fees they are expected to pay, have important implications for future immigrant flows. In summary, the process of selecting economic migrants has undergone a major decentralization. The federal government still controls important levers over immigration, including the overall levels of admissions and final admissions. It also maintains a significant steering capacity, and could effectively ask the provinces for more policy uniformity and reporting in the deployment of their respective PNPs. So far, it has not done so, and provinces remain significant, autonomous players in the selection process. Settlement and Socio-economic Integration The story is much the same in the realm of socio-economic integration. However, the relationships here need to be considered in two dimensions: settlement programs provided to newcomers in their first years in the country

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Keith Banting Table 4.3 Target Levels for Economic Immigration, 2011 Category 

Low (000s)

High (000s)

Federal economic class

74.0

80.4

Provincial economic class Quebec economic class Provincial nominees

34.6 42.0

35.9 45.0

150.6

161.3

Total economic class

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament   (Ottawa 2010), table 1. Note: Principal applicants plus spouses and dependents.

and programs relevant to longer-term integration. The intergovernmental relations in the two dimensions differ considerably. Settlement Canada has developed a comprehensive set of settlement programs, focused on the pre-naturalization phase. The federal government remains the largest funder of such programming, and it supports a variety of reception and adjustment services, language instruction at basic and enhanced levels, and programs that link newcomers with Canadian volunteers who act as hosts and informal counsellors. Outside of Quebec, Canada provides the majority of these services through third parties, including immigrant service provider organizations (SPOs), multicultural/ethnic organizations, educational institutions, or partners in the private sector.25 Settlement programs have traditionally been available only to permanent residents. Temporary workers, international students, refugee claimants awaiting disposition of their claim, and immigrants who have become citizens are ineligible. This limitation has become more problematic as the number of temporary residents has increased. These newcomers and their families are not eligible for federally funded language training or other supports, although some provinces have stepped in to provide services in certain cases. The intergovernmental trajectory in settlement programs parallels that in selection. Once again, Quebec led. As part of the 1991 Canada-Quebec immigration agreement, the federal government withdrew from all settlement services in the province and provided a financial transfer to the province to support its new responsibilities. In the aftermath of the failed effort at constitutional reform, the federal government was especially anxious for a deal, and the terms of the final financial settlement were extremely generous.26 In contrast to agreements with other provinces, the transfer is technically a “grant” rather than a “contribution,” which triggers no reporting or accountability obligations. The province is not even required to spend the money exclusively on settlement programs and does not do so, dispersing some of the funding

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to mainstream ministries. Moreover, the transfer to Quebec rises automatically with general federal spending levels and is guaranteed never to decline. Devolution to other provinces soon followed, although on more limited and less generous terms. The precipitating factors were fiscal crisis and budgetary restraint. The federal government was faced with severe fiscal pressures in the mid-1990s and sought to off-load responsibility for the delivery of settlement programming onto the provinces. Two provinces were open to the idea, but not on the financial terms initially on offer. The federal government had to up the ante, ironically by virtually the full amount it had hoped to save through devolution.27 In 1999, Manitoba and British Columbia assumed comprehensive responsibility for settlement services, although their deals with the federal government differed from the Quebec agreement in being contribution agreements that require reporting to the federal government. During the 2000s, the federal government began to have second thoughts about extending full devolution to other provinces and signed more limited deals with Alberta and Ontario, which did not want full devolution at that point. In its 2010 budget, Ontario announced that it wished to pursue full devolution, but the federal government rejected the idea. The federal minister told the press: “We weren’t prepared to rush into that kind of arrangement.”28 As a result, the field of settlement services came to reflect considerable asymmetry, with five types of intergovernmental relationships:29 •  •  • 

• 

• 

Comprehensive provincial control (Quebec). Devolved model (British Columbia and Manitoba): province is responsible for the delivery of services. Co-management model (Alberta): federal and provincial officials jointly select projects to be funded and decide which will be funded and delivered by each level of government. Tri-level model (Ontario): a joint federal-provincial steering committee, with a formal role for the City of Toronto, but the federal government retains final decision making over its programs and delivers them through its regional office in conjunction with local non-profit organizations. Consultation model (other provinces): consultation and information sharing with the federal government, which retains final decision making over its programs and delivers them through regional or local offices in conjunction with local non-profit organizations.

Strikingly, the three major immigrant-receiving provinces – Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec – all have a different relationship with the federal government. This pattern reflects the accumulation of bilateral political agreements rather than a multilateral approach to intergovernmental relations.

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Moreover, in contrast to some other policy areas, there was no commitment to offer the terms of later deals to provinces who settled earlier. Although the distinctive role of Quebec faithfully reflects the dualist nature of Canada, the wider asymmetry across the rest of the provinces defies any coherent policy rationale. Longer-Term Integration The process of long-term integration into the mainstream can take many years, and the process is influenced by general public services that were not designed specifically with immigrants in mind. As we have seen, a key problem in recent years has been the slowing economic incorporation of highly educated newcomers. In this context, credential recognition, supplementary training programs, and income support are important to newcomers. All of these fall primarily into provincial hands. For skilled immigrants trained in regulated professions, the recognition of their qualifications by occupational regulatory bodies is critical. These bodies are accountable to provincial governments, and their assessment, recognition, and licensing practices, including their use of standards and accountability frameworks, vary from province to province. The federal government has established a Foreign Credentials Referral Office, but, given the limits of its jurisdiction, it cannot actually conduct credential assessment. It provides advice to immigrants and prospective immigrants and develops tools for employers to assist them in assessing and recognizing the qualifications of foreign trained individuals. 30 The federal government also funds a variety of projects and activities in the area. But the real action lies at the provincial level. Training programs, which can be important to even skilled immigrants, also fall under provincial jurisdiction. The federal government provides financial support for provincial programs through federal-provincial Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs), a decentralizing initiative launched in the aftermath of the Quebec referendum in 1995. However, eligibility for LMDA-supported training is limited to individuals who are eligible for federal unemployment benefits and therefore excludes immigrants who are new market entrants. In 2007, the federal government announced a separate transfer to provinces to support labour market programs for people who are not eligible for training under the unemployment insurance program, but immigrants were not specified as a particular target group and no funds were specifically earmarked for them. If immigrants become unemployed and need income support, their primary source is provincial social assistance. In part, this reflects the limitations of the federal Employment Insurance program: at the national level, only about 40 percent of the unemployed actually receive unemployment benefits. This pattern is accentuated for immigrants by the regional nature of the program. Coverage rates are dramatically lower in areas where the percentage of immigrants is higher.31 In effect, the federal government has

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largely opted out of income stabilization in the half of the country where most immigrants live. When times get tough in these regions, immigrants must increasingly turn to provincial social assistance programs. Finally, for young immigrants and for the children of immigrants born in Canada – the second generation – the educational system is the primary instrument of integration. Education is the most sacred of provincial jurisdictions, and the federal government has no role at the primary and secondary levels. At the postsecondary level, the federal government is a partner in the student loan program, and it supports research. But it is provincial decisions that shape the overall scope and quality of the system. Education of the second generation is one success story that has not dimmed. As we saw earlier, Canada has a strong comparative advantage in educating immigrant and minority students. The cumulative trend is clear: the settlement and socio-economic integration stages of the continuum have also witnessed asymmetrical decentralization in recent years. Political Integration: Rights, Identity, and Naturalization In contrast with immigrant admission and socio-economic integration, the process of political integration is dominated by the federal government. The three key instruments of identity formation and political integration are multiculturalism policy, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and naturalization. The multiculturalism approach to immigrant integration was initially a federal initiative, introduced in a statement by the prime minister in 1971 and codified by a subsequent federal government in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988). The formal program of multicultural grants is relatively small, but the approach permeates a wider range of federal departments and agencies. Moreover, versions of the policy have been adopted by provincial and municipal governments, and by businesses and civil society organizations.32 The Canadian version of multiculturalism has sought to recognize and accommodate cultural differences and to encourage active participation in the Canadian mainstream. The core goals of federal multiculturalism as laid out in 1971 were recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity, removing barriers to participation, promoting interchange between groups, and promoting acquisition of the official languages. The Canadian approach has thus been integrationist: it has sought to shift the terms on which integration proceeds, but the ultimate goal has been integration into the wider society.33 Changes in the federal program over the years have reinforced the integrative intent. Starting in the late 1970s, participation and interethnic exchange increasingly received the lion’s share of funding under the federal program. Irene Bloemraad’s comparison of the political

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integration of immigrants in Canada and the United States illuminates the program’s impact. Multicultural funding has enabled immigrant groups to participate more quickly and more effectively in the mainstream Canadian political institutions by facilitating the self-organization of the community, by creating new cadres of community leaders who are familiar with Canadian institutions and practices, and by creating new mechanisms of consultation and participation.34 In addition to this organizational impact, multiculturalism has helped nurture a more inclusive sense of national identity, one more capable of accommodating the diverse diversity of contemporary Canada. The adoption of the policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism in the 1960s and 1970s represented a state-led redefinition of national identity, an effort to de-centre the historic conception of the country as a British society and to build an identity more reflective of Canada’s cultural complexity. The adoption of a new flag, one without British references, was a symbol of this wider transition.35 In addition to promoting a conception of Canada more open to newcomers, multicultural norms have sought to shape the identity of the historic population. As Harell observes, multiculturalism has helped to “normalize” diversity, especially for younger generations.36 Over the decades, Canadians have developed a multicultural conception of their identity, a definition of the country as a diverse community. In many countries, individuals with the strongest sense of national identity are most opposed to immigration. In Canada, those with the strongest sense of Canadian identity embrace immigration and immigrants more warmly than their less nationalist neighbours.37 A second instrument of political integration is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was entrenched in the constitution in 1982. Despite the embrace of diversity in political discourse, discrimination remains part of lived reality on the ground, and the Charter takes on particular importance. Section 2 of the Charter establishes a set of fundamental freedoms, including a guarantee of freedom of religion that has been important in protecting members of minority religions in a number of cases. In addition, Section 15 forbids “discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability.” The reach of Charter jurisprudence extends through elaborate human rights machinery, including federal and provincial human rights commissions. In addition, the Charter plays a role in political debates. It has contributed to a new rights-conscious culture, in which Canadians increasingly see themselves as a community of people holding the same rights and freedoms, irrespective of where they live, the language they speak or where they were born. In the immigration field, the Charter is an instrument for “Canadianizing” newcomers, inviting them to see the federal government as a source of their protection from discrimination and to identify with the pan-Canadian political community.38

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The Charter both reinforces and limits the multicultural approach to integration. Section 27 of the Charter states that it will be “interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” But the commitment to individual rights embedded in the Charter also stands as a counterweight to the multicultural strategy. The liberal democratic principles enshrined in the Charter represent a legal frame that circumscribes the range of cultural traditions deemed legitimate, ensuring that the accommodation of difference does not slide into a justification for discrimination or the denial of basic equalities, such as the equality of women. As Eliadas observes, “when multiculturalism is unhinged from equality, it tends to careen off in unpleasant and increasingly unacceptable directions.”39 Whenever a claim advanced in the name of multiculturalism is framed as being in conflict with individual or equality rights, the Charter values tend to trump, as was illustrated by the controversy in Ontario over a proposal for a Sharia tribunal to arbitrate family and inheritance issues.40 The final tool in the federal arsenal is naturalization. As we have seen, the federal government has exclusive authority over the granting of citizenship. It has chosen an accelerated approach, with immigrants becoming eligible for naturalization after three years in the country. They must take a citizenship test, which examines their understanding of Canadian democracy, history and geography. The citizenship test also determines whether applicants have a basic ability to communicate in either English or French. The pass rate on the test has traditional been very high, and the rate of naturalization of newcomers is among the highest in the world. According to a 2005 study, 84 percent of eligible immigrants were Canadian citizens in 2001; in contrast, the rate was 40 percent in the United States and lower still in many European states.41 The introduction of a new citizenship guide and a more demanding test in March 2010 led to a drop in the pass rate. The test was revised in October 2010 to ease the rules, although the rate remains somewhat lower than in the past.42 The federal approach to political integration has not gone uncontested. Each instrument of federal action – multiculturalism, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and naturalization – has proven controversial in Quebec. That provincial government has developed its own approach to diversity, known as interculturalism, which encourages newcomers to develop a sense of belonging to the Quebec political community.43 While federal language legislation and the Charter promote the choice of two official languages, English and French, the Quebec model defines French as the language of public life in the province. At important stages, the provincial language laws also came into conflict with the federal language regime, including the language provisions of the federal Charter of Rights. Immigrants to Quebec are thus swept up into two nation-building projects, two conceptions of the community they are encouraged to join. The

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Quebec government encourages minorities to join its national project of building a distinct society in Quebec. The federal government emphasizes attachment to the pan-Canadian community, and the granting of citizenship as a symbolic affirmation of its vision of Canada. The study guide which the federal government gives to immigrants preparing for the citizenship test, the formal ceremonies at which citizenship is formally awarded, and the oath of loyalty which newcomers take are all celebrations of Canada, replete with Canadian flags and symbols, prompting nationalist suggestions that the Quebec government give an official status to Quebec citizenship.44 In effect, “two identity-making processes that are in conflict with each other are operating simultaneously towards ends that are at odds with each other.”45 These dynamics have no parallel in other provinces. The imprint of federalism thus pervades the integration continuum. A powerful decentralizing process has transformed the admission and integration of immigrants to Canada. Only the final stage of the continuum, political integration, is dominated by the federal government. In three decades, Canada has moved from a highly centralized process to a decentralized asymmetrical world.

IMPACTS Does any of this matter? Are the patterns of immigration policy and integration programs different than they would be in a more centralized institutional setting? And do the differences in policies across the country lead to differences in the level of integration of immigrants? This section explores these questions, examining the implications of institutional change for responsiveness, equity, coherence, accountability, the balance between nation-building and province-building in the country, and immigrant integration. The questions cannot be answered definitively, but intergovernmental relations do seem to leave their imprint in a number of dimensions. Judgments have to be provisional, since the speed of program change is vastly outstripping our capacity for evaluation. But initial straws in the wind help frame the emerging debate. Responsiveness to Regional Diversity The promise of decentralization is greater policy responsiveness to local conditions and greater scope for experimentation. Is the promise realized in practice? In the case of selection, decentralization has clearly allowed some provinces to tailor policy to local conditions. Most obviously, the Canada-Quebec accord has allowed Quebec to introduce a distinctive version of the points system, which gives greater weight to applicants who speak French. The federal government, which is committed to treating French and English equally,

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would have greater difficulty doing this. Greater autonomy for Quebec in this sector has undoubtedly played a much larger role in Canadian statecraft, contributing to the survival of the country as a single state. The PNP initiative in Manitoba, which accounts for fully half of all provincial nominees, has also been widely seen as a success. It has allowed the province to change the occupational mix of new arrivals, shifting the balance from the knowledge workers favoured by the federal program towards semi-skilled trades, such as industrial butchers, truck drivers, and welders. The province has also been more successful in dispersing immigrants to smaller communities outside the Winnipeg metropolitan area. Most importantly, a recent study has found that the retention rate for PNP selectees was above 70 percent after five years; in comparison, the retention rate for federal economic immigrants who came to Manitoba in the same period dropped to 60 percent after one year and continued to decline thereafter.46 The Manitoba PNP helps explain the increase in the proportion of immigrants in the prairie provinces noted earlier in table 4.1. This pattern of success has not been universal. Other small provinces that traditionally receive few immigrants, such as those in Atlantic Canada, have not been as active or have managed their programs less effectively. At the extreme, important elements of the program in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island were suspended after damning reports by the provincial auditors general and public controversies about conflicts of interest, financial improprieties law suits and compensation paid to immigrants.47 The asymmetric decentralization of settlement programs has not been studied as thoroughly. The federal administration of settlement programs has often been criticized for its inability to adapt national policies to diverse localities, and the non-profit organizations delivering settlement services in Manitoba have reported an improvement when the provincial government assumed responsibility for services.48 However, there are no guarantees here. A parallel study of British Columbia in the early 2000s found that community organizations were systematically shut out of the policy process and that part of the initial federal financial transfer for settlement services was re-directed elsewhere in the provincial budget. The extent of engagement and consultation with local communities, service providers, and municipalities clearly depends less on the level of jurisdiction than on the ideological orientation of the government involved. In the words of the analyst who studied both provinces: “in multi-level governance there are no straight lines, and no one dimensional solutions.”49 Equity Does federalism help or hurt immigrants? According to some commentators, the diversity of selection systems inevitably reduces equity and fairness, since

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applicants with the same attributes are likely to receive different treatment depending on the door on which they knock.50 However, multiple doors also increase the range of opportunities for people wishing to come to Canada. Truck drivers as well as engineers now have a chance, if they know where to knock. The biggest problem is that the complexity of the system places a premium on sophisticated knowledge of the various pathways into the country, making applicants increasingly dependent on a thriving industry of immigration lawyers and consultants who advise them. While most of these experts are undoubtedly fully legitimate, others have exploited the vulnerability of sometimes desperate applicants. Their role has triggered governmental concern about the extent of fraud and misrepresentation in the process. Does asymmetric federalism benefit or hurt immigrants after they have arrived? To be sure, there are variations in the level and quality of reception settlement services across the country. Differences in the extent and level of language training services in particular are marked across the country, leading to calls for greater standardization of curriculum.51 Whether these variations are greater than differences in the quality of the provincial education and social services available to the general population is an important question on which we lack clear evidence. Certainly, local immigrant groups are not well placed politically to challenge the provision of inadequate services compared to those in other provinces, and much therefore depends on the attitudes of the provincial governments. But as long as provinces continue to compete for immigrants, variations in the supports they provide are unlikely to be dramatic. There is a larger point here. In some societies, federal institutions might leave minorities vulnerable to discrimination at the hands of local majorities. In Canada, however, support for immigration does not vary significantly across the regions, and decentralization is less likely to expose immigrants to pockets of deep hostility. Moreover, while history records many cases of racial discrimination at both levels of government, the Charter of Rights now provides stronger protection from majorities at both the national and the provincial levels. There is greater uneasiness about the cultural challenges posed by immigration in Quebec than in the rest of the country, and a recurring series of frictions have emerged there. But immigrants in the province do not report discrimination more often than elsewhere in the country. In a survey conducted in the early 2000s by Statistics Canada, racial-minority immigrants in Quebec were slightly less likely to report discrimination than their counterparts elsewhere, and second-generation racial minority respondents reported roughly the same level of discrimination as their counterparts in the rest of Canada.52 Equity can also be considered through a state-centred lens. Decentralization was driven in part by a concern for “fairness” for different regions, and the PNPs are contributing to a “fairer” distribution of immigrants across the country. But asymmetry also generates conflict. For example, there are frustrations over the allocation of PNP slots among provinces; it is remarkable, for

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example, that Manitoba, with less than 4 percent of the population of Canada receives half the total allocation. Inequalities in federal funding for settlement have also been a problem. The 1991 Canada-Quebec agreement provided that province with vastly more funding per immigrant than provinces carrying much larger burdens such as Ontario and British Columbia. Ontario agreed to establish a PNP, which Ottawa wanted, only if it received a “fairer” distribution of financial support, and sorting out that inequity required a significant additional injection of new federal funds.53 That injection largely eliminated the gap between Ontario and other English-speaking provinces, but the gap with Quebec remains large: the planned CIC allocation for 2012–13 in Quebec was $5,308 per immigrant compared to $2891 in Ontario and $2,612 in British Columbia.54 In addition, the federal refusal to offer Ontario the same devolved model as British Columbia and Manitoba has sparked anger. Overall, it seems hard to argue that asymmetry has served the cause of interregional equity.

POLICY C OHE R E N C E While there seem to be gains in terms of responsiveness, asymmetric decentralization has produced a very complicated immigration system. The lack of meta-rules or a common policy framework for economic immigration has generated diverse pathways to Canada. In the words of one commentator, “potential immigrants to Canada are confronted with the Quebec immigration program, nine provincial nominee programs, and two territorial programs, each with their own sub-component, selection criteria, fees, application processes, and timelines.”55 The auditor General of Canada is clearly uncomfortable with the emergence of “more than 50 different categories, each with its own selection approach and criteria.”56 Elements of policy incoherence are inevitable. Fragmentation creates openings for venue-shopping by prospective immigrants. Indeed, people refused permission by the federal department are sometimes advised they might be successful applying to a province instead.57 Such problems emerged in the early days of the Manitoba PNP. In 2002, the federal government stiffened its own entry requirements and, as a result, “Manitoba was flooded with applicants seeking a back door into the country.”58 Given immigrants’ right to inter-provincial mobility once in the country, some provinces serve as alternative routes into traditional immigrant-receiving provinces, eroding one of the apparent benefits of decentralization. While Manitoba has a relatively good record in holding its PNP arrivals, the retention rate in Atlantic Canada in particular is low.59 Perhaps the clearest case of policy incoherence concerns language competence. Language is one of the key determinants of successful economic integration, and the Federal Skilled Workers Program places increasing emphasis on the ability to speak one of Canada’s two official languages. Some

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provinces have paid much less attention to language, and adopting the federal criteria would dramatically reduce their programs. In January 2012, the federal minister announced that minimum language requirements should apply to all provincial nominees, but also noted that he cannot “force provinces to toe the line.”60 The variable geometry of the current system clearly leaves holes in the program coherence of the sector as a whole. Accountability It is hard to believe the new regime has increased accountability to legislatures and to citizens. Not all the problems in transparency and accountability can be attributed to federalism. The Canadian version of parliamentary government privileges cabinets over legislatures, and nowhere has this tradition been more marked than in the history of immigration policy. The recent dramatic remake of immigration and settlement has been accomplished almost exclusively through ministerial instructions and intergovernmental agreements, with virtually no new legislation at either level of government. The closed nature of policy-making is reinforced by a limited commitment to transparency, again at both levels. The lack of publicly available information on many of the most basic program elements is stunning in a country that likes to think of itself as a vibrant democracy.61 These barriers to effective accountability have been exacerbated by the complexity of intergovernmental relations in the sector. Analysts of intergovernmental relations in Canada have long argued that accountability is enhanced when each level of government is exclusively responsible for its own programs and that complex intergovernmental arrangements obscure responsibility and weaken the ability of citizens to hold governments to account. Recent evidence from the analysis of public attitudes and behaviour confirms these intuitions.62 In the postwar era, immigration was managed by one government and the public knew whom to reward or blame. Since then, immigration has fallen into the netherworld of asymmetric intergovernmentalism. Canadians can be forgiven for being confused. Who is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the immigration system? Who is in charge of fixing problems? At the moment, the answer to both questions is everyone and no-one. Nation-Building/Province-Building Much of the history of Canadian federalism in the last half century can be written in terms of ongoing struggles between nation-building and provincebuilding. Both levels of government have sought to strengthen their relationships with citizens and civil society, a dynamic best illustrated by social policy. For the central government, social policy has been seen as an

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instrument of territorial integration, part of the social glue holding together a vast country subject to powerful centrifugal tendencies. National social programs create a network of relations between citizens and the central government throughout the country, helping to define the boundaries of the national political community and enhancing the legitimacy of the federal state. However, provincial governments, especially the Quebec government, have also seen social policy as an instrument for building a distinctive community at the regional level, one reflecting the linguistic and cultural dynamics of québécois society. For both levels of government, therefore, social policy has been an instrument not only of social justice but also of statecraft, to be deployed in the competitive processes of nation-building.63 A similar dynamic is at work in the immigration field. Which level of government admits new immigrants and supports their settlement and integration is undoubtedly important to their long-term conception of the political community they are joining. Which level of government engages with civil society organizations to deliver settlement services matters to the overall pattern of linkages between state and society. As immigrant selection is decentralized, the federal government fades a little more from the lives of future citizens; as settlement programs are decentralized, hundreds of lines of contact between the central government and civil society are cut. For example, in 2008 the federal government had contribution agreements with more than three hundred local civil society organizations that deliver local settlement services.64 But such links are severed in provinces with full devolution agreements. Not only does the federal government receive less feedback about the experience of immigrants on the ground, it becomes more distant, less engaged in the economic and social realities of the country, less likely to be understood and trusted by local communities. There is, of course, a political dimension to this intergovernmental struggle. Both federal and provincial politicians seeking votes in immigrant communities are finely attuned to the advantages of settlement services. Such programs come replete with opportunities to visit events organized by local immigrant organizations and present cheques to support the integration services they provide. In recent years, the federal Conservative government has assiduously courted immigrant votes, especially in Ontario, and in the 2011 election the party made a significant breakthrough in constituencies with large immigrant populations in the province. The political leverage inherent in the settlement services for the largest concentration of immigrants in the country was undoubtedly a powerful motive in the federal rejection of Ontario’s request for devolution the year before. In a similar fashion, provincial politicians in regions with devolved programs are undoubtedly conscious of the political dimensions of such linkages with civil society.

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Levels of Integration Does any of this matter to the integration of immigrants to Canada? Are there significant regional variations in the economic, social, and political integration of newcomers? If so, can such regional differences be attributed to the federal nature of the policy regime? This final question is the most challenging. Untangling the influence of differences in provincial programs from all the other factors that influence integration is an analytically difficult task. Nevertheless, the question is important since, as we saw at the outset, Canada is having greater difficulty integrating its newcomers. Differences in integration levels across the English-speaking regions of the country are small, and there is no evidence as yet that decentralization has led to strikingly different levels of success. In the case of Manitoba, for example, PNP selectees had an initial economic advantage. Although they were much less likely to hold university degrees, their earnings were very similar to the earnings of the more highly educated immigrants admitted under the Federal Skilled Workers program in their year of arrival. But in the years after landing, immigrants with university degrees saw more rapid earnings growth, offsetting the initial PNP advantage. More generally across the country, Federal Skilled Workers have had higher earnings than those admitted under provincial nominee programs.65 The social and political integration of immigrants also proceeds in similar ways across the English-speaking regions. Bilodeau and his colleagues compare the attitudes of immigrants and the native-born on questions that normally produce sharp differences across the regions of the country, such as whether people trust the federal government or believe that their province is treated fairly in the federation.66 Their findings suggest that immigrants tend to embrace the views prevailing in the province where they settled. This lack of obvious differences should not be surprising. In part, the decentralizing trend is too recent to have left much of a mark on integration patterns. In addition, the most powerful factors that shape the inclusion of newcomers into Canadian life are undoubtedly to be found in the day-to-day lived experience of newcomers as they confront their new surroundings. Public programs are likely to leave a more modest impact. The big difference is between Quebec and the rest of Canada. While economic integration has weakened in all parts of the country, it has weakened more in Quebec.67 Part of the reason for the differences reflects the fact that the mix of immigrants into Quebec is weighted a bit more heavily to refugees than in other provinces. But analysts also point to the importance that Quebec immigration policy gives to the ability to speak French. The global pool of potential immigrants who speak French is smaller than the Englishspeaking pool, and immigrants to Quebec tend to have lower skill levels than in the rest of the country. In effect, “in choosing its immigrants, Quebec must compromise between immigrants’ linguistic skills and the other skills that

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they bring with them.”68 However, these differences seem inherent in the nature of Canadian dualism and the larger linguistic politics of Canada, rather than in the details of Quebec’s immigration policies. If immigrants heading for Quebec had been selected according to the federal language criteria, they might well have fared even less well in the Quebec labour market.69 Differences also appear in the social and political integration of immigrants in Quebec. In contrast to the rest of the country, immigrants to Quebec are less likely to embrace the identities and loyalties of the nativeborn population in the province, expressing greater support for the federal government than do their neighbours.70 Differences emerge in the second generation of visible minority groups as well. The sense of “belonging” in the second-generation drops more in Quebec than in the rest of the country.71 As in the case of economic integration, it seems difficult to attribute these patterns of inclusion to the minor differences in settlement programs that exist between Quebec and the rest of the country. Rather, they reflect the distinctive nature of identity politics in the province.

C ONC LUSIO N S In the space of two decades, Canada has moved from a centralized immigration regime to a decentralized, asymmetrical world. Some provincial governments are now powerful actors in the selection, settlement, and integration stages of the continuum. Only the final stage of the continuum, naturalization, is still the sole responsibility of the federal government. The result is one of the most complex immigration systems in the world and a set of intergovernmental relations characterized by asymmetry rather than a common conception of federalism. This transition has been driven by complicated forces. The initial catalyst was substate nationalism, as Quebec sought to carve out greater autonomy within the federation. But the wider asymmetry across other provinces reflects shifting political cross-currents at the federal and provincial levels. The federal government has been strikingly ambivalent: uncomfortable with the starkly visible asymmetry generated by accommodating Quebec’s distinctiveness; intent on encouraging a wider devolution to reduce that visibility; but unwilling to give other provinces the full powers transferred to Quebec; and sometimes resistant to greater devolution at all. The response of other provinces has also varied, both across time and across the country, contributing further to asymmetrical outcomes. The result has been the slow accretion of bilateral deals and a variegated intergovernmental geometry that, beyond the distinctive role of Quebec, lacks any coherent policy rationale. This complicated model offers lessons for traditional debates over the strengths and weaknesses of multi-level governance. As we have seen, the

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scorecard is decidedly mixed. Decentralization has offered the regions the ability to tailor policies to local conditions and priorities. In theory, it should also create greater potential for engaging local communities in policy development across such a vast landscape, but there are no guarantees that this will actually happen in practice. As we have seen, there are no straight lines to progress. Whether asymmetric decentralization has increased equity in the sector is more debatable. The variation between provinces in selection and settlement services means that immigrants in similar circumstances are treated differently, and differences in the level of language programming have been significant. But multiple entry points have also increased the opportunities for those wishing to come to the country, and the variation in settlement services may not be much greater than the variation in the core health and social services available to the general population. As long as provinces continue to compete for immigrants, differences in provincial support are unlikely to violate Canadian conceptions of equity. However, when equity is examined in inter-regional terms, the conclusions are less sanguine. Devolution has helped generate a “fairer” distribution of immigrants across the country, making some provincial governments happier. But asymmetrical political deal-making about money and authority has increased provincial anger elsewhere. The regional winners and losers have been reshuffled, but it is hard to say that Canada is a fairer place as a result. There has also been a price to be paid in terms of policy coherence, as we have seen. The fragmentation of authority generates calls for reform. A 2011 study by leading students of settlement programs called for a “supragovernance structure” which would incorporate federal and provincial governments, municipalities and representatives from the settlement sector, and would “be capable of setting strategic directions, endorsing best practices, promoting innovation, and initiating work to address common challenges.” 72 There is zero chance that federal and provincial governments would agree to such a dilution of their policy dominance. But such calls reveal the unease about the lack of integration and coordination in the Canadian system. The most negative impact lies elsewhere. One cannot pretend that asymmetric decentralization has enhanced political accountability. Canada has moved from a world in which one government was clearly responsible for immigration to one in which everyone and no-one is in charge and accountable. The system as a whole is opaque, and the lack of detailed information and transparency is striking. Allocating blame for policy failures that emerge in the sector is difficult even for experts, let alone for the average voter. Indeed, it is now difficult to envision a coherent national debate about the selection criteria for economic immigrants or settlement policy, since who is responsible varies so much across the country.

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The lack of public debate is striking. While immigration policy seizes centre stage in countries around the world, public debate in Canada largely ignores the sweeping transitions taking place. A few researchers and analysts comment from time to time, but wider engagement is rare. In part this reflects the Canadian public’s unusually supportive attitudes towards immigration.73 In part it reflects the low-visibility, stealth-like instruments used to change policy. Ministerial instructions and closed federal-provincial negotiations rather than legislative changes have been the order of the day at both federal and provincial levels. But the lack of debate undoubtedly also reflects the diffuse nature of power over immigration policy. Changes in the federal framework governing immigration may not have unduly harmed immigrants, but they have done nothing for the vibrancy of Canadian democracy.

Posts c r ip t In early 2012 (after this book had gone to press), the federal government announced a substantial number of changes to the immigration program, some of which relate to issues raised in this chapter. In a move that had been mooted since the evaluation of the pnp programs, the government announced that most pnp applicants for semi- and low-skilled professions will have to meet a federally established minimum language standard beginning in July 2012. Additionally, in a surprise move, the government gave notice of its intention to cancel the agreements with British Columbia and Manitoba, and to resume direct federal delivery of settlement services, beginning in 2013 in Manitoba and 2014 in British Columbia. Although the changes do not affect Quebec’s role in the system, they will reduce one important dimension of asymmetry in intergovernmental relations. The federal government explained its decision by saying that integration programs are “an essential part of nation-building” and that it was important “to avoid the development of a patchwork approach to the important work of settling new Canadians.”74 The political and electoral advantages of direct contact with minority communities were undoubtedly not lost on the Conservative government either. Unsurprisingly, the two provinces affected were not happy with the federal government’s unilateral decision, which was announced to the country in a media release.75 Canada may be pulling back in part from the pervasive asymmetry and policy incoherence explored in this chapter. But the pattern of secretive, elite-driven policy making in immigration continues.

NOT E S 1 I would like to thank Iain Reeve for excellent research assistance, and Naomi Alboim, Laura Chapman, André Juneau, Will Kymlicka, Phil Triadafilopoulos, Erin

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Tolley, and the co-editors, Christian Joppke and Leslie Seidle, for helpful comments on an earlier draft. William S. Livingstone, Federalism and Constitutional Change (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1956). Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3d ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2008). Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1972). Erin Tolley and Robert Young, eds., Immigrant Settlement Policy in Canadian  Municipalities (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2011); Kristin Good, Municipalities and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Immigration in Toronto and  Vancouver (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2009); Elizabeth McIssac, Nation  Building through Cities: A New Deal for Immigrant Settlement in Canada (Ottawa: The Caledon Institute of Social Policy 2003). James Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic  Growth 8 (2003): 195–222. Marc Frenette and René Morissette, “Will They Ever Converge? Earnings of Immigrant and Canadian-born Workers over the Last Two Decades,” International  Migration Review 9, 4 (2005): 363–81; Abdurrahan Aydemir and Arthur Sweetman, “First and Second Generation Immigrant Educational Attainment and Labour Market Outcomes: A Comparison of the United States and Canada,” Research in  Labour Economics 27 (2008): 215–70; Garnett Picot and Arthur Sweetman, “The Deteriorating Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible Causes: Update 2005,” Research Report No. 262 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada 2005). Miles Corak, “Immigration in the Long Run: The Education and Earnings Mobility of Second-Generation Canadians,” Choices, Institute for Research on Public Policy 14, 3 (2008); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Where Immigrant Students Succeed – A Comparative Review of Performance and  Engagement in pisa  2003 (Paris: OECD 2006). Jefffrey Reitz and Rupa Banerjee, “Racial Inequality, Social Cohesion and Policy Issues in Canada,” in Keith Banting, Thomas Courchene, and Leslie Seidle, eds., Belonging: Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy 2007); Stuart Soroka, Richard Johnston, and Keith Banting, “The Ties That Bind: Social Diversity and Cohesion in Canada,” in Banting, Courchene, and Seidle, eds., Belonging: Diversity, Recognition and Shared  Citizenship in Canada. Gary Freeman, “Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies,” International  Migration Review 38, 3 (2004): 945. Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, 2d ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1988). John Berry, Rudolf Kalin, and Donald Taylor, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes  in Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada 1976); Ronald Lambert and John Curtis, “The French and English Canadian Language Communities and

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Multicultural Attitudes,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 16 (1982): 30–46; Ronald Lambert and John Curtis, “Opposition to Multiculturalism among Québécois and English-Canadians,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 20 (1983): 193–206. Elisabeth Gidengil et al., “Language and Cultural Insecurity,” in Alain-G. Gagnon, ed., Québec: State and Society, 3d ed. (Peterborough: Broadview Press 2004). Marie McAndrew et al., “L’Aptitude au français des élèves montréalais d’origine immigrée,” Cahier Québécois de Démographie 29, 1 (2000): 89–117. An interesting example of asymmetry within asymmetry came in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake when Quebec effectively widened the definition of family members after the federal government refused to do so, enabling Quebec Haitians to sponsor a wider range of family members than Haitians based in other provinces; Ingrid Peritz, “Quebec Eases Immigration Rules for Haitians,” Globe and  Mail, 4 February 2010, A8. For a comparison of the points systems for economic immigrants used by the federal and Quebec governments see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker Program (Ottawa 2010), table 3–8. See also Cory Blad and Philippe Couton, “The Rise of an Intercultural Nation: Immigration, Diversity and Nationhood in Quebec,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, 4 (2009): 645–67; Joseph Garcea, “Bicommunalism and the Bifurcation of the Immigration System,” Canadian Journal of Ethnic Studies 30, 3 (1998): 149–72; and Chris Kostov, “Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971–1991) and Their Impact on Federalism,” American Journal of Canadian Studies 38, 1 (2008): 91–103. Robert Vineberg, “History of Federal-Provincial Relations in Immigration and Integration,” in John Biles, Meyer Burstein, James Frideres, Erin Tolley, and Robert Vineberg, eds., Integration and Inclusion of Newcomers and Minorities across  Canada,  (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2011). Manitoba had been demanding its “fair share” of immigrants since 1969. Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 180. Kostov, “Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971–1991) and Their Impact on Federalism,” 91. Gerald Clément, “The Manitoba Experience,” in Charles Beach, Alan Green, and Jeffrey Reitz, eds., Canadian Immigration Policy for the Twenty-first Century (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2003), 199. Auditor General of Canada, “Selecting Foreign Workers under the Immigration Program,” in Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, fall 2009, ch. 2, 12. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament (Ottawa 2010). Stephen Maher, “N.S. faces uphill battle on immigration,” Chronicle and Herald, 9 December 2010. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker  Program, 63.

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25 John Biles, “Integration Policies in English-Speaking Canada,” in John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Frideres, eds., Immigration and Integration in Canada in the  Twenty-first Century (Montreal: McGill-Queen`s University Press 2008), 141. 26 Leslie Seidle, The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement: Assessment and Options for  Renewal (Toronto: Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, University of Toronto, 2010), table 1. 27 Vineberg, “History of Federal-Provincial Relations in Immigration and Integration.” 28 Media Q., “After-Caucus Media Scrum with Minister Jason Kenny.” Transcript prepared for Citizenship and Immigration, 5 May 2010. 29 Seidle, The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement. For a slightly different categorization, see Caroline Andrew with Rachida Abdourhamane Hima, “Federal Policies on Immigrant Settlement,” in Erin Tolley and Robert Young, eds., Immigrant  Settlement Policy in Canadian Municipalities, 60. 30 Naomi Alboim and Elizabeth McIsaac, “Making the Connections: Ottawa’s Role in Immigrant Employment,” irpp 13, 3 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy 2007). 31 Michael Pal and Sujit Choudry, The Impact of Regionally Differentiated Entitlement to  Employment Insurance on Charter-Protected Canadians (Toronto: Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, University of Toronto, 2011). 32 Joseph Garcea, “Provincial Multiculturalism Politics in Canada, 1974–2004: A Policy Analysis,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 38, 3 (2006): 1–20. 33 Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press 1998); David Ley, “Multiculturalism: A Canadian Defence,” in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, eds., The  Multicultural Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices, 190–206 (London: Routledge 2010). 34 Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the  United States and Canada (Berkeley: University of California Press 2006). 35 C.P. Champion, The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian  Nationalism, 1964–1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2010); José Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945–71 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 2006); Varun Uberoi, “Do Policies of Multiculturalism Change National Identities?” Political Quarterly 79, 3 (2008): 404–17. 36 Allison Harell, “Minority-Majority Relations in Canada: The Rights Regime and the Adoption of Multicultural Values.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Ottawa, ON, 2009. 37 Richard Johnston, Keith Banting, Will Kymlicka, and Stuart Soroka, “National Identity and Support for the Welfare State,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, 2 (2010): 349–77. On the pattern in other countries, see Jack Citrin, Cara Wong, and Brian Duff, “The Meaning of American National Identity,” in Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussin, and David Wilder, eds., Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict,  and Conflict Reduction, 71–100 (New York: Oxford University Press 2001).

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38 Alain-G. Gagnon, “Immigration in a Multicultural Context: From Laissez-faire to an Institutional Framework in Quebec,” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ed., Immigration  and Self-Government of Minority Nations (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2009). 39 Pearl Eliadis, “Diversity and Equality: The Vital Connection,” in Banting, Courchene, and Seidle, eds., Belonging: Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship  in Canada, 551; see also Miriam Smith, “Diversity and Canadian Political Development,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 42, 4 (2009): 831–954. 40 Marion Boyd, “Religion-Based Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Challenge to Multiculturalism,” in Banting, Courchene, and Seidle, eds., Belonging: Diversity,  Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada. 41 Kelly Tran, Stan Kustec, and Tina Chui, “Becoming Canadian: Intent, Process and Outcome,” Canadian Social Trends 76, catalogue no. 11–008 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada 2005). 42 Dean Beeby, “Massive Failure Rates Follow New, Tougher Canadian Citizenship Tests,” The Star, 29 November 2010. 43 Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec: Debating  Multiculturalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2007); Micheline Labelle and François Rocher, “Debating Citizenship in Canada: The Collide of Two Nation-Building Projects,” in P. Boyer, ed., From Subjects to Citizens: A Hundred Years  of Citizenship in Australia and Canada (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 2004). 44 Gagnon, “Immigration in a Multicultural Context,” 45. 45 Labelle and Rocher, “Debating Citizenship in Canada,” 275; also Micheline Labelle and François Rocher, “Immigration, Integration and Citizenship Policies in Canada and Quebec: Tug of War between Competing Societal Projects,” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero, eds., Immigration and Self-Government of Minority Nations (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2009); Gagnon, “Immigration in a Multicultural Context,” in Gagnon and Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec: Debating  Multiculturalism,122. 46 Tom Carter, Manish Pandey, and James Townsend, The Manitoba Provincial Nominee  Program: Attraction, Integration and Retention of Immigrants. IRPP Study No. 10 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2010); for a more critical review of the Manitoba program, see Nathaniel Lewis, “A Decade Later: Assessing Successes and Challenges in Manitoba’s Provincial Immigrant Nominee Program,” Canadian Public Policy, 36, 2 (2010): 241–64. 47 On Nova Scotia, see Alexandra Dobrowolsky, “Nuancing Neoliberalism: Lessons Learned from a Failed Immigration Experiment,” International Migration and  Integration, forthcoming; on Prince Edward Island, see Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),“Inquiry into Immigrant Investor Program Needed: NDP,” 4 November 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/prince-edward-island/2009/11/ 04/pei-pnpo-inquiry-ndp-584.html. 48 Christopher Leo and Martine August, “The Multilevel Governance of Immigration and Settlement: Making Deep Federalism Work,” Canadian Journal of Political  Science 42, 2 (2009): 491–510.

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49 Christopher Leo and Jeremy Enns, “Multi-Level Governance and Ideological Rigidity: The Failure of Deep Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 42, 1 (2009): 95. 50 Naomi Alboim, Adjusting the Balance: Fixing Canada’s Economic Immigration Policies (Toronto: Maytree 2009). 51 Craig Alexander, Derek Burleton, and Francis Fong, Knocking Down Barriers Faced  by New Immigrants to Canada (Toronto: TD Economics, Toronto-Dominion Bank 2012), 14. 52 Keith Banting and Stuart Soroka, “Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration in Canada,” in Nations and Nationalism, , 18, 1 (2012), pp. 156–76. 53 Seidle, The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement, table 1. 54 Data supplied by the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs of the Government of Ontario. 55 Alboim, Adjusting the Balance, 34–5. 56 Auditor General of Canada,“Selecting Foreign Workers under the Immigration Program,” chap. 2, 25; see also Seidle, The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement, n19. 57 Tom Kent, Immigration: For Young Citizens (Ottawa: Caledon Institute for Social Policy 2010), 4. 58 Leo and August, “The Multilevel Governance of Immigration and Settlement,” 501–2. 59 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation Branch, Evaluation of the  Provincial Nominee Program (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011), table 4–6. Also Manish Pandey and James Townsend, “The Provincial Nominee Program,” Canadian Public Policy, 37 (4): 495–512; Ima Okonny-Myers, “The Interprovincial Mobility of Immigrants in Canada” (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration 2010); and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the  Foreign Skilled Workers Program, table 3–7. 60 Canada Press, “Kenny Wants Minimum Language Skills in Immigration Changes,” Globe and Mail, 26 January 2012. Downloaded from www.theglobeandmail.com 26 January 2012. 61 For a recent critique, see John Biles, Meyer Burstein, James Frideres, Erin Tolley, and Robert Vineberg, “Conclusions,” in John Biles et al. eds., Integration and  Inclusion of Newcomers and Minorities, 398–9. 62 Fred Cutler, “Government Responsibility and Accountability in Federations,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 34, 2 (2004): 19–38; Fred Cutler, “Whodunnit? Voters and Responsibility in Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Political  Science 41, 3 (2008): 627–54; Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, “Opinion Representation and Policy Feedback: Canada in Comparative Perspective,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 37, 3 (2004): 531–60. 63 Keith Banting, “Canada: Nation-Building in a Federal Welfare State,” in Herbert Obinger, Stephan Leibfried, and Frank G. Castle, eds., Federalism and the Welfare  State: New World and European Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005).

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64 Biles, “Integration Policies in English-Speaking Canada,” 166. 65 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the Provincial Nominee Program; Carter, Pandey, and Townsend, The Manitoba Provincial Nominee Program;  Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Workers  Program, figure 3–2, 29. 66 Antoine Bilodeau, Stephen White, and Neil Nevitte, “The Development of Dual Loyalties: Immigrants’ Integration to Canadian Regional Dynamics,” Canadian  Journal of Political Science 43, 3 (2010): 515–44. 67 Brahim Boudarbat and Maude Boulet, “Détérioration des salaires des nouveaux immigrants au Québec par rapport à l’Ontario et à la Columbe-Britannique,” Choix 13 ,7 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy 2007); MarieThérèse Chicha and Éric Charest, “L’intégration des immigrés sur le marché du travail à Montréal,” Choix, 14, 2 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy 2008); Serge Nadeau and Aylin Secklin, “The Immigrant Wage Gap in Canada: Quebec and the Rest of Canada,” Canadian Public Policy 36, 3 (2010): 265–85. 68 Nadeau and Secklin, “The Immigrant Wage Gap in Canada: Quebec and the Rest of Canada,” 279. 69 Ibid, figure 5. 70 Bilodeau, White, and Nevitte, “The Development of Dual Loyalties.” 71 Keith Banting and Stuart Soroka, “Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration in Canada.” 72 John Biles et al., “Conclusions,” 411. 73 Keith Banting, “Is There a Progressive`s Dilemma in Canada? Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, 4 (2010): 797–820. 74 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Government to Strengthen Responsibility for Integration of Newcomers: ‘Integration Services are About Nation Building’ says Kenney.” Media Release. www.cic.ca/english/department/media/releases/ 2012. Accessed 7 May 2012. 75 Immigration and Multiculturalism Manitoba, “How federal changes affect immigration and settlement in Manitoba.” Media release. www.gov.mb.ca/immigration/ federal_immgration_changes.html. Accessed 7 May 2012.

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5 Germany MI C H A E L B O M M E S A N D HO LG ER K O LB Although the comparative literature on migration and integration in Germany has been growing for many years,1 analyses of the influence of the institutional structure of nation-states and the impact of sub-national units on the course of migration and integration remain rather underdeveloped in the German social science literature.2 One reason might be the strong focus of huge parts of migration research on the national debates that first and foremost consider integration to be a consequence of migrants crossing national borders.3 Given the significance and concrete political scope of the action of sub-national units in a number of political areas relevant to the integration of immigrants, the impact of the structure of a polity on integration policies and outcomes is an important issue for migration research. Since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 migration and integration policy have gone through different political “market cycles.” In the initial decades, West German migration and integration mostly remained outside the political mainstream at the national and Länder (state) levels and were, in effect, ceded as fields of responsibility to the municipalities. After German reunification and the initiation of a long process of political and legal normalization, the former division of labour broke up and led to what can be described as “federal disorder.” Three quite recent and mutually independent political developments culminated in a kind of “federal equilibrium,” which to a certain extent disentangled the complicated federal interrelations and allocated new roles to the different actors. The analysis of the different phases of federal action in the realm of migration and integration policy requires, as a first step, a description and an analysis of the roots and structures of the federal system in Germany. In a second step, three different phases of the relation between federal action and the fields of migration and integration are introduced. The first phase, which ended with reunification and the finalization of “nation-building” in

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Germany, is analyzed as an era of pragmatic outsourcing of the problems arising from migration and integration to the municipalities. The second phase, which in effect ended with the passage of the 2005 immigration act, is described as a period of federal disorder and the reorientation of the roles of the different actors. Finally, major changes such as passage of the immigration act, the reform of federalism, and the reorganization of the welfare state constitute a new framework for federal relations in the political areas under analysis.

From Coo perat ive F edr ealis m to t h e Jo in t - D e c isio n Tra p? Str uc t ures of Ge r ma n Fe d e r a l ism One basic feature of German federal theory is the analytical differentiation between cooperative federalism (Verbundföderalismus) and interstate/competitive federalism (Trennföderalismus).4 This distinction presents ideal types of federal structures; the empirical reality displays many intermediate types and hybrids. Whereas interstate federalism rests on a sectional division of policy competencies in which each level has both executive and legislative powers for their policy areas, in cooperative federal countries all levels of government interact and cooperate in a prescribed and institutionalized manner. The clearer division between policy competencies in the model of interstate federalism does not rule out cooperation between the different levels, but the degree of entanglement between the different levels is much smaller. Both modes of federalism have their well-documented costs and benefits. Whereas a cooperative design of federal state structures promises a reduction of conflicts and the facilitation of coordination, supporters of interstate federalism claim increased efficiency of public policy and a greater responsiveness towards the preferences of the local population – if necessary even accepting greater inequality in the living conditions of the population.5 Against the background of the devastating consequences of World War II, the quick adoption of a more cooperative mode of federalism in Germany was inevitable. As Scharpf underlines, “except [for] Bavaria and Hamburg none of the new federal states disposed of a distinctive historical identity” and “the war-torn German people have had no appreciation for the cultivation of specific regional particularities and thus no tolerance for differences … which would hamper the mobility of families or companies. Even more, the burden caused by destruction and mass migration did not affect all federal states to the same degree, so that any emphasis on the overriding interests of a particular federal state would have had been condemned as refusal of national solidarity.”6 The adoption of a cooperative mode of federalism resulted in a division of labour that allocated the jurisdiction for law making to a large degree to the federal level and the administration and implementation of most laws

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to the Länder level. The Länder have a double role: they not only administer federal law but also implement their own statutes in certain defined policy areas.7 Very few areas of jurisdiction in the German system are federally administered – mainly defence, foreign service, and the border police (Art.  87). This model is also referred to as administrative federalism because the principal competencies of the sub-national units are of an administrative nature.8 This is reflected, for example, in the fact that a majority of civil servants are employed by Land governments. Municipalities are a third actor in the German federal system. From the perspective of constitutional law, municipalities and local governments are under the jurisdiction of the Länder.  Despite the constitutional principle of local self-government, the cities and counties are bound by instruction with regard to all delegated matters. This means that the municipalities recruit their own staff and organize the administration, but the Land government can give them instructions and intervene in decisions on particular cases. Nevertheless, the municipalities and local governments must be regarded as important political actors that make collectively binding decisions and have significant scope for political action. According to Swenden “there is no significant federal democracy without a second chamber.”9 The second chamber in the German federal system, the Bundesrat, occupies a very distinctive federal role.10 The members are not elected but are delegated by the Länder governments. The central role of the Bundesrat is approval of all national legislation that affects the Länder. A weighted majority of the Länder governments is required to pass such acts. Since the proportion of acts that need approval in the second chamber has increased to about 60 percent from the 10 percent originally intended,11 the Bundesrat is able to effectively block a considerable amount of national legislation.12 This situation can result in political gridlock when the members of the majority in the Bundesrat belong to political parties that are in the opposition in the lower house of the federal parliament, the Bundestag.13 Scharpf has coined the term “joint-decision trap” (Politikverflechtungsfalle)  to describe the German situation in which the government at the central level avoids innovative but challenging decisions because Länder governments will otherwise veto them.14 It is therefore not surprising that critics argue that “this system has proven to be not only crippling, but also problematic from a democratic point of view because everybody can be made responsible for everything and therefore nobody is responsible for anything.”15 The complicated and mutually entangled structure of German federalism results in multi-layered relations between the different levels of government. Following Thränhardt,16 we differentiate between three modes: (1) autonomous action on the part of one of the three levels of government; (2) the use of the scope of interpretation by sub-national units, which

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in Germany is a traditionally relevant mode because administration and implementation are the main task of the Länder  and municipalities; and (3) the involvement of the Länder at the national level (through the Bundesrat) when national legislation needs approval by the sub-national units. In the following analysis of migration and integration policy in Germany from the perspective of federalism, we not only differentiate between the three different modes of political action but also take into account the different ways in which governments can use their political powers.

The Lac k of Dec is ion- Ma k in g o n Mig r at io n and Int egr ation Policy : T h e Mu n ic ipa l it ie s as th e Ma in “Inte g r ato r s” In the mid-1950s Germany accepted various offers from Italy and other Mediterranean countries and began to actively recruit foreign “guest workers.”17 Although initially intended as a temporary labour recruitment program, these practices have led since the mid-1970s to processes of immigration and settlement that were fostered by the counterintuitive consequences of the recruitment ban in 1973, which lengthened the duration of stay, accelerated family reunification, and initiated a subsequent accumulation of social rights. This development led to differing political reactions that shared the common assumption that, officially, Germany is not a “country of immigration.” The only visible political initiative at the national political level during this period was a law to encourage immigrants to return to their countries of origin. However, apart from windfall gains for those immigrants who decided to return, the policy proved to be ineffective. The relative lack of explicit involvement of the national and Länder levels in migration and integration policy during this period was accompanied by the administration of locally context-bound integration activities by the municipalities. Bade and Bommes argue that the self-description of Germany as a country of non-immigration provided an effective and helpful political frame for the municipalities, welfare organizations, and local political administrations to pursue a pragmatic and problem-oriented approach to integration policy that was largely out of the public eye.18 During this period diverging policies of local and municipal integration were established in different areas:19 in the provision of accommodation and housing, in the establishment and enlargement of structures of social counselling services organized mainly by welfare organizations,20 in the appointment of political advisory boards for foreigners (Ausländerbeiräte) by offering specific support for migrant self-help organizations, by initiating the opening of nursery schools and the establishment of support programs for immigrant children, and by initiating integration programs for second-generation immigrants in cooperation with the local branches of the federal office of labour, among other policies.

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The institutional precondition for this approach was the inclusion of labour migrants in the general social security system of the German welfare state right from the beginning of their employment – a system that encompassed unemployment insurance, health protection, and family allowances and retirement, and that also included regulations governing industrial relations. It is worth noting that migrants were included as part of the general labour market policy of the German welfare state and not as part of an explicit integration policy – even though their inclusion proved to be the most relevant decision concerning the integration history of the labour migrants of the 1960 and 1970s and their families. In essence, during this period the political problem was kept concealed by means of an oscillation between public statements that Germany was not an immigration country and the avoidance of decision making. The focus was on the “consolidation of the employment of foreigners.” This created tremendous insecurity at the municipal level and left the municipalities in the dark concerning the problems that would result from migration and settlement.21 In spite of this approach, various scholars point to the relative success of German integration policy.22 Germany’s integration outcomes contrast with those of the Netherlands, which started to pursue an active, broadly discussed integration policy at the beginning of the 1980s. This first phase of the relationship between the different governments in the fields of migration and integration thus might be summarized as one of division of labour. Whereas the national and Länder governments remained largely silent and inactive, the municipalities – the level directly and immediately affected by the day-to-day consequences of migration – initiated highly divergent, pragmatic and locally context-bound approaches to cope with integration in the different realms of life. In a certain sense the dominant and only visible mode of federal action at that time was mode 1, because the municipalities had to use this period of political inertia of the national and the Länder levels for autonomous, pragmatic, and problemoriented initiatives. However, the silent “integration machine” was driven mainly by the general working principles of the German welfare state that included labour migrants as employees and provided them with social security, as it did for any other employee. The importance of this pattern can hardly be overestimated, and its impact was probably much greater than that of any integration program specifically designed for migrants.

THE E ND OF NATION- B UILDIN G A N D T H E E ME R G E N C E OF FEDERAL DIS ORDER: MIGR A T IO N A N D IN T E G R A T IO N POLIC Y AF T ER R E U N IFIC A T IO N Statistics indicate that the Federal Republic of Germany was a country of immigration right from the start: net migration between 1950 and 1993

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was 12.6 million people, which accounted for 80 percent of population growth during that period. The percentage of foreigners in the population grew from 1.2 percent in 1961 to 8.9 percent in 1996 and has since then remained stable. The micro census of 2005 indicated that 15 million out of 82 million inhabitants had a migration background, which means either that they were born abroad or that they were descendants of parents of whom at least one was not born in Germany. In Germany more fifteenyear-old youngsters come from families with a migration background than is the case in the United States, and one-third of children under six have a migration background. Since the mid-1990s immigration to Germany has stagnated or – in some years – even decreased (see figure 5.1). In 2009, for the first time since the end of the 1990s, Germany saw a negative net immigration balance. This has stirred an ongoing debate about the attractiveness of the country for highly skilled Germans and foreigners (SVR 2009).23 It is not without irony that in times of high net immigration political actors have to a large extent subscribed to the mantra that Germany is not a country of immigration, whereas in a period of increasing emigration and moderate immigration the political debate – at least from certain parts of the political spectrum – focuses on what some describe as too much immigration. The preceding overview obscures major changes in the composition of the immigrant population in Germany. As far as the countries of origin are concerned, the immigrant population has undergone a major process of diversification. From the late 1950s until the early 1980s few, but large, groups of immigrants – mainly from the former countries of labour recruitment and the countries of origin of ethnic Germans – played a dominant role. In 1970, immigrants from Italy, the former Yugoslavia, and Turkey accounted for almost 60 percent of the foreign population in Germany. In 2008 only Turkish citizens constituted a large immigrant group: almost 25 percent of all foreigners residing in Germany held a Turkish passport. The remaining 75 percent were composed of a large variety of small groups. This ongoing “diversification of diversity”24 is also true of recent flows of immigrants to Germany. The main source countries of recent immigrants to Germany belong to the European Union, which indicates that the scope for action on admission policy and migration control is severely limited. Data from the foreigners register allow for further differentiation according to the purpose of stay in Germany. In light of the recruitment ban, which has remained in force since 1973 despite a growing number of exemptions and restrictions on the formerly generous asylum system (which was adapted to European standards in a highly disputed reform at the beginning of the 1990s), the dominance of family migration and reunification, which are protected by the German Basic Law and the European Convention of Human Rights, is not surprising (see figure 5.2).

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1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0 -500,000

91 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2

19

-1,000,000 Immigration of Foreigners

Emigration of Foreigners

Balance

Figure 5.1 Immigration to and emigration from Germany (foreign nationals, including from EU countries) Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office)

Study 16% Other 25% Toleration 8%

Family 26%

Education 5% Work 16% Humanitarian Reasons 4%

Figure 5.2 Immigration from outside the European Union, according to purpose of stay, 2009 Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office of Migration and Refugees)

Given the relatively low level of immigration to Germany, the political debate seems only loosely linked to empirical reality. More interesting for the purpose of this chapter than lamenting about the denial of statistical reality (such as in Bade)25 is the analysis of the roots of this contrariness. A very convincing analysis is presented by Joppke,26 who argues that critics of this dichotomy have overlooked the normative dimension of this denial

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and its grounding in the national self-definition of Germany. In his view, the “no-immigration formula is over-determined by history and culture.”27 The roots of this can be found in the former ethno-cultural mode of German nationhood. Even if the ethno-cultural concept of citizenship to be found in the basic law of 1949 goes back to 1913, its adoption was a consequence of World War Two. One of the side effects of the liberation of Germany from the Nazi regime was the division of Germany, the displacement of the former eastern borders of Germany to the west and the emergence and existence of huge German diasporas. The corollary of this development was the perception of the Federal Republic of Germany as an incomplete nation-state.28 The former preamble to the Basic Law underlines the provisional self-understanding of Germany by stating, “The entire German people remains asked to complete the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination.” A quick and direct acceptance that Germany is generally a country of immigration would have led to the risk of being obliged to redefine the national identity of Germany and to weaken the historical obligation to its dispersed co-ethnics in the East.29 One of the most influential voices in the field of migration law, Kay Hailbronner, gets to the heart of this by stating that “conceiving of the Federal Republic as an immigration country with multiple national minorities would contradict the Basic Law’s conception of a provisional state geared toward the recovery of national unity.”30 The collapse of the socialist system, the subsequent unification and the finalization of nation-building in the “incomplete nation-state” of Germany31 fundamentally changed the political and legal framework of migration and integration policy and thus the relations between the orders of government. At the same time that Germany witnessed an increased influx of ethnic Germans, asylum seekers, and war refugees, the completed nation-state Germany started to ease its attitude towards the no-immigration formula, to adapt to the migration and integration policies of its European neighbours, and to pursue a more coordinated migration and integration policy. The Federal Republic of Germany could thus begin a process of political and legal normalization.32 The major steps in this process were the aliens act, the so-called asylum compromise (which actually should have been referred to as a “migration compromise,” since all major immigrant groups – guest workers, ethnic Germans, asylum seekers – were affected),33 and the new citizenship law. However, these changes did not come into effect without major conflicts between the different levels of government, conflicts that mainly centred on the numerically most important immigrant groups at that time, the ethnic Germans and the asylum seekers. Once migration became possible after the fall of the Iron Curtain, large numbers of ethnic Germans took advantage of the option to come to Germany. Until the beginning of the 1990s the main financial responsibility for immigration lay with the Federal Office

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of Labour, part of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In the light of the increasing number of immigrating ethnic Germans, the federal government shifted the responsibility for this group to the municipal level and thereby realized enormous costs savings. In a number of municipalities and counties that became core areas of immigration for ethnic Germans there was a sudden increase in the demands on municipal budgets.34 Some of the regions most affected launched a political campaign to return the political and financial responsibility to the federal level. In sum, the sudden influx of ethnic Germans challenged the historically established division of labour between the national and the municipal levels and led to calls for a fundamental reorganization of the responsibilities assigned to the different governments in the field of migration and integration policy. A similar kind of battle took place over the increased immigration of asylum seekers and civil war refugees at the beginning of the 1990s. Because the federal and Länder levels proved unable or unwilling to agree on a common legal basis for the reception of civil war refugees, most of the refugees who fled from war and persecution in the former Yugoslavia and who were provided refuge by the families of the former “guest workers” fell under the responsibility of the municipalities; the latter, in turn, began to urge the refugees to apply for asylum, because doing so would transfer the costs for this group to the Länder level. Both cases reflected “federal disorder” in migration and integration policy, which was subsequently reduced by the introduction of a more coordinated migration and integration policy whose political and legal milestones were the reform of the aliens act in 1991, the migration compromise of 1992 (including the reform of the asylum system) and the new citizenship act of 2000. This process led to the incorporation of migration and integration policy into the traditional and historically established division of labour between the national and the sub-national units.

Nat uralizat io n As described above, German federalism leads to a specific division of labour in that the Länder are mandated to implement the laws that have been passed by the national level (referred to above as mode 2 of the relations between different federal levels). Naturalization provides a further example of how the Länder administer federal laws in politically distinctive ways. In his famous analysis of citizenship and nationhood in Germany and France, which appeared in the early 1990s,35 Rogers Brubaker correctly described the citizenship models of Germany and France from that period as fundamentally different. The differences, he argued, reflected different understandings of belonging and thus antagonistic ideas about the nation. For a long time, Germany actually was the paradigm of an ethnocultural

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maverick that insisted on discretionary naturalization procedures, which meant that applications for naturalization depended to a large degree on the decisions of naturalization officers. Moreover, it also opposed the introduction of jus soli rules that would automatically grant German citizenship to the children of former guest workers. As a consequence, a significant number of persons born in Germany as descendants of former guest workers grew up without a German passport and with only limited chances to become German citizens. The citizenship act of 2000 is widely perceived as the breakthrough that led to the transformation of an outmoded naturalization policy into a modern and more inviting one by introducing significant jus  soli elements. However, the first steps towards the adoption of regulations comparable to those of Germany’s European neighbours were made in 1991, when legal entitlements to citizenship first replaced discretionary rules. Thus, the 2000 citizenship act must be seen as the finalization of a process of politicallegal normalization in Germany, rather than as its beginning.36 Today, Germany has a conditional jus soli system that is more or less standard in the Western world. It stipulates that children born in Germany are automatically German citizens; however, they must decide at age twenty-three whether they want to remain Germans or take up the citizenship of their parents (EU citizens may hold dual citizenship). In addition, after a period of eight years of legal residence in Germany,37 foreigners have a right to naturalize if they meet certain basic requirements: they have to be able to secure a living for themselves and dependent family members without recourse to welfare benefits and have a clean criminal record; they must have sufficient German language skills and pass a citizenship test; and they must indicate their commitment to the free democratic constitutional order of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.38 In addition to naturalization based on legal entitlement (as described above), Germany allows for discretionary naturalization in cases justified by the public interest. Although the same citizenship test (which dates from 2008) applies across the entire country and administrative instructions have been issued in order to equalize the differences among the sixteen Länder, the latter still have several tools either to support naturalization or to reduce the rates.39 For example, they can influence the organization of the aliens departments in order to accelerate or decelerate the naturalization processes. They can also interpret the rules on language proficiency generously or restrictively, and they have the power to decide whether an applicant qualifies for the shortened naturalization period of six years.40 In addition, they can use their scope for action to decide whether a person qualifies for naturalization based on the public interest. As table 5.1 demonstrates, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg traditionally trail the other Länder on naturalization rates. Until recently Baden-Württemberg

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Table 5.1 Naturalization Rates in the West German Länder 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Baden-W.

0.82

1.1

1.0

1.36 1.97 2.26 2.17 1.76 1.51 1.25 1.17 1.12 1.02 0.89

Bavaria

0.6

0.72 0.81 0.96 1.35 1.82 1.71 1.46 1.24 1.13 1.03 1.14 1.11 0.85

Berlin

1.81

1.6

Bremen

0.88

0.91 0.96 1.57 2.3

1.44 1.57 2.19 1.55 1.42 1.51 1.48 1.43 1.52 1.73 1.62 1.42 2.64 2.32 2.34 1.97 2.35 2.44 2.32 2.00 1.86

Hamburg

1.39

1.89 1.34 2.02 2.13 3.3

Hesse

1.07

1.37 1.45 1.71 2.3

3.77 3.03 2.67 1.98 1.75 1.86 1.59 1.12

Lower Sax.

1.11

1.2

NRW

1.08

1.29 1.23 1.74 2.32 3.29 3.05 2.52 2.26 2.06 1.82 1.92 1.71 1.37

2.83 2.68 2.47 2.46 2.16 1.98 1.95 2.05 1.96

1.31 1.66 1.97 2.93 2.76 2.39 2.16 2.05 2.04 2.16 1.75 1.45

RLP

0.83

1.06 0.95 1.21 1.64 2.43 2.50 2.39 2.21 2.11 1.76 2.22 2.14 1.63

Saarland

0.62

0.66 0.65 1.12 1.13 2.1

Schlesw.-H

1.04

1.09 1.1

1.39 1.43 1.63 1.39 1.38 1.77 1.47 1.46

1.63 2.46 3.72 3.34 3.34 2.82 3.08 2.73 2.85 2.63 2.11

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office). Note: Naturalization rates indicate the ratio of the absolute number of naturalizations in a given year to the number of legally resident foreign nationals at the beginning of the year.

used an interview guide in order to assess whether the applicant’s “declaration of loyalty” to the constitution, which since 2000 has been mandatory under the naturalization procedure, corresponds to his or her actual beliefs or “inner disposition.” This interview guide was intended to be used only for applicants from member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),41 but after mounting concern that this implied unacceptable discrimination against Muslims,42 the state government of Baden-Württemberg clarified that all applicants who in the eyes of the local aliens departments raise doubts about their loyalty to the constitution may become subject to the interview guide. An initial evaluation of its application revealed that more than 50 percent of the interviewees were of Turkish origin and that 13.5 percent of the interviews were conducted with persons from non-OIC countries. The existence of such an interview guide can of course have a major impact on an individual’s propensity to seek naturalization. It remains unclear, however, to what extent this explains the low naturalization rates in BadenWürttemberg. The new Land government finally abolished the test.

New Roles For Immigr a nt In t e g r at io n A c to r s This section is not intended to review the various fields and situations where administrative action by the Länder can lead to different procedures and

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outcomes. Instead, we discuss three recent political and legal developments that might fundamentally change the roles of the three levels of government and intergovernmental relations. The first of these developments was a major reform of German federalism itself. Federalism Reform In recent decades, Germany came to witness broad dissatisfaction with how effectively political and economic challenges were being met, the impression of excessive and increasing complexity of the political system, and a lack of accountability and transparency. The growing sense that the federal system was contributing more than its share to the growing disillusionment with the political system43 led both major political parties to agree to establish (in 2003) a commission of the Bundestag and Bundesrat on “the modernization of the federal system.”44 The first attempt failed, but the creation of a “grand coalition” after the snap elections in 2005 led to a revived interest in a major reform of German federalism. The changes agreed passed both chambers in the summer of 2006 and went into effect on 1 September of that year. The main thrust of the reform can be summarized as a deal between both federal levels: the Länder accepted a reduction in the number of laws requiring Bundesrat consent (mode 3), and as compensation for this significant loss of power, they received additional responsibilities in a number of fields (mode 1). The latter included exclusive legislative power for fields such as salaries for their civil servants, prisons, shop closing, right of assembly, and media law, and the right to legislate their own regulations even if they deviate from the federal regulations in the areas of environmental and education law. This is a complete novelty in the German federal system. The reform of federalism thus resulted in a significant change in intergovernmental relations and in the three regulatory modes described above. In particular, it significantly strengthened mode 1 at the cost of mode 3. This has a potential impact on the scope of action of the different governments in the field of immigrant integration. Education Policy The impact of the reform of federalism is particularly striking in the field of education policy, which is generally regarded as the key area for political intervention in integration processes and which is an exclusive responsibility of the Länder. Apart from the question of what kind of school system renders the biggest returns for immigrant children, it is obvious that the “education policy leverage” of the Länder provides a powerful tool for integration policy. Germany’s education policy is characterized by a north-south divide.

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Whereas the northern Länder have been continually trying to remodel their school systems with the objective of shaping integrated systems that promise not only a greater permeability between the different tiers but also higher rates of high-school graduates, the southern Länder have been reluctant to reform and have traditionally relied more on their classic differentiated systems, because these transformations in their eyes would have severe negative consequences not only for high-performing pupils but for the quality and ambitions of teaching in general. The dispute between supporters of integrated school systems and the adherents of the differentiated system seems to be a never-ending story. It found a new venue in the question of what system produces the biggest return for immigrant children. The superiority of any system in this regard is far from being clear, and the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and other data did not show consistently that a system of type A generally helps immigrant children to catch up more quickly in the education system than a system of type B.45 It is no exaggeration to say that in Germany there are basically sixteen different school systems, even though the Länder try to agree on common guidelines through institutionalized Länder-Länder  coordination bodies in many policy fields, particularly in cultural affairs, through the Kultusministerkonferenz (cultural ministers’ conference). The fact that education policy is one of the few fields that allow politicians at the Länder level to shape a distinctive political profile has caused a number of Länder governments to initiate processes of educational reform. For example, in 2010 the government of Hamburg tried to establish primary schools lasting six years instead of four, but a binding referendum overruled the reform. In 2011 the newly elected federal government of North Rhine-Westphalia, the biggest Land, launched a plan to transform at least 30 percent of all secondary schools into community schools by 2015. The potential effects of this reform are doubtful. Rather, the repeated successful performance of Länder such as Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg in various international comparative studies such as PISA points to the fact that their political conservatism has an important and beneficial side effect that contrasts with the situation in Länder with ongoing educational reforms. The conservative Länder provide stable and reliable conditions for teachers, parents, and pupils.46 This seems to be an unintended asset because stability generates a higher degree of security for the various organizations involved and thus indirectly contributes to a stable and well-functioning school system. Although education policy by no means exclusively targets aspects of immigrant integration, there is no doubt that this responsibility makes the Länder the most influential actors in the field of integration policy. The further consolidation of mode 1 by the reform of federalism and the inclusion of the field of education policy in this broader set of mode 1 policies significantly strengthens the role of the Länder in the integration process.

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Education policy, as Henkes convincingly points out, is not the only area where the Länder can actively influence immigrant integration.47 Against the background of an increasing ethnic and religious diversity and the establishment of Islam as the third most important religion in Germany, the question of how to reconcile religious privileges with the religiously neutral educational institutions is another increasingly important area allocated to the Länder. In this regard, the question of whether Muslim teachers are allowed to wear headscarves while teaching is a highly controversial issue that is not being dealt with in a consistent and uniform way by the different Länder (see table 5.2). This is thus another area where the political scope of action of the Länder can be used to respond to local conditions.  National Integration Courses and Related Developments Whereas the Länder  must be regarded as clear winners in the reform of federalism – at least as far as integration policy is concerned – the national level did not remain politically inactive. In fact, quite to the contrary, an impressive and unexpected political initiative found its most visible and symbolically influential expression in a new national integration plan, the creation of a state ministry for integration and the initiation of the German Islam conference. In material terms more relevant than these mainly symbolic initiatives, however, was the implementation of a new system of mandatory language and orientation courses introduced with the immigration law of 2005. Deviating from the usual division of labour between the federal and the sub-national levels, the federal level has full responsibility for the integration courses. There were two main reasons for this. First, one of the political priorities of the centre-left, “red-green” government elected in 2005 was a sweeping reform and a new immigration law. However, the conservative parties dominated the Länder, making the involvement of the Länder and a compromise difficult. Second, even more important was the unwillingness of the Länder to contribute to the funding of the program. Consequently, the authority for the courses was assigned to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge), which is part of the Federal Ministry of Interior. Along with its regional sub-offices, the Federal Office manages the entire program of integration courses and develops the curriculum and evaluates the course system. Generally, newcomers have the right to participate in integration courses. Newcomers who do not show sufficient proficiency in German, furthermore, can be obliged to attend a course that consists of six  hundred (sometimes nine hundred) hours of language training and a forty-five hour integration course. Between the beginning of 2005 and 31 July 2009, 727,893 entitlements for participation were issued, and about

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Table 5.2 Länder and the Regulation of Teachers’ Headscarves in Schools Allowed

Prohibited

Baden-W.

X

Bavaria

X

Berlin

X

Bremen

X

Hamburg

X

Hesse

X

Lower Saxony

X

Northrhine-Westphalia Rhinleland-Palatinate

X X

Saarland

X

Schleswig-Holstein

X

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

X

Brandenburg

X

Saxony-Anhalt

X

Saxony

X

Thuringia

X

Source: Christian Henkes, “Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern,” in Politik in den Bundesländern im Vergleich, ed. Frieder Wolf and Achim Hildebrandt (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 130.

one-quarter of those with entitlements were obliged to participate. Thus, autonomous action was not limited to the Länder; for a variety of reasons the national level single-handedly decided to conceptualize and implement the integration courses and thus made use of mode 1. The question about the number of persons who failed to participate despite being obliged to is a highly controversial political one. Data from the Federal Office indicate that more than 75 percent of those who were obliged to participate at least started the course; still unclear is the number of dropouts. Although sanctions such as a moderate reduction of social aid or non-renewal of temporary residence permits may be imposed by the respective authorities on those who refuse to participate, the impact of these sanctions should not in general be overestimated, since there are numerous exemptions. Nevertheless, the integration and orientation courses point to a new and important role for the national level of government. Although the importance of the courses should not be exaggerated given the stagnating or even decreasing numbers of immigrants to Germany and the numerous exemptions from their being obliged to participate, the courses

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nevertheless must be seen as an important and rather recent power that falls under the direct responsibility of the federal level. The Role of the Municipalities Finally, municipalities are increasingly seen as important actors or moderators in the field of immigrant integration. Almost every keynote address at conferences on integration (probably not only) in Germany includes the statement that “social integration takes place on the ground, at the local level.” However, this statement is not very insightful, since everything that happens, in effect happens at some local level. The important role of municipalities has already been referred to above; particularly certain big cities legitimately can claim a leading role as political actors in the field of integration policy. Already before the reform of the welfare state and the immigration act of 2005, which structurally expanded the political scope of action for the municipalities, certain cities displayed a great deal of activity in the field of integration. One example is provided by the city of Frankfurt, which quite early on set up an office for multicultural affairs in order to create a structurally responsible political contact point for all matters that are somewhat related to the local consequences of migration and integration. Moreover, the side effects of the new immigration law and the highly controversial reforms of the welfare state (known in Germany as the Hartz reforms, after the chairman of the commission that developed the reforms) have led to changes in the role of the municipalities in the field of integration, including a lessening of tensions with the national level.48 The definition of social integration as it is phrased in the immigration law of 2005 displays a striking similarity to the new relation between welfare recipients and the welfare state. “Actively supporting and demanding” (Fördern und Fordern) became the new master framework not only for the reform of the welfare state but also for the redefinition of integration policy. A corollary of this development is a fundamental devaluation of citizenship as “social gatekeeper.” The replacement of the previous unemployment aid by the so-called unemployment benefit 2 and the inclusion of all former social-aid recipients in this new welfare scheme created for all welfare recipients the same relationship to the state: the formula Fördern und Fordern describes the limitation of the right to refuse employment provisions. A right to support will be granted only if the stipulation to accept work is met. The interplay of the introduction of the integration courses in the context of the immigration act and the essential change in the principles of the German welfare state, whose foundations lay in the institutionalization of cooperation between the federal office of labour and the municipalities, thus makes the latter important integration actors. Examples for the new influence of the municipalities are (1) that they can exert a major influence

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129

on the appointment and selection of the local providers of the integration courses and on the question of what kind of migrants locally should belong to the target group of the courses and (2) that they have new, expanded responsibility for a specific and locally context-bound design of labourmarket placement services. This is not a migrant-specific scope of action, but it does imply greater local government responsibility for migrant groups with poor chances of successful labour market integration. Like the actors at the national and the Länder levels, the local-level actors have thus found or created the niche that allocates a certain scope of political action to them. The opportunities that have been mentioned to become active specifically in the field of a local labour market policy are not directly another type of mode 1 independent action: the actions of the municipalities remain dependent on the relevant national guidelines. However, the scope of action and implementation has been increased considerably.

Con clus ion: New Roles fo r A l l G ov e r n me n t s The political scope of specific actors in the integration policy has been undergoing significant changes for quite a while. In general, the scope for autonomous action by the three orders of government (mode 1, above) has increased, although each order has been affected in different ways. The national actor just recently “discovered” integration policy as a politically promising and valuable policy field and reacted by launching mainly symbolic but materially less relevant political initiatives such as the national integration plan, the German Islam conference, and the relocation of the office of the commissioner for integration from the Ministry of Family and Youth to the Chancellery.49 The new role of the national level as an integration actor is thus rather weak;50 the only powerful leverage at the national level consists of the new integration courses. The clear winners in the political developments of recent years are the Länder and the municipalities. The reform of federalism in Germany strengthened the already strong role of the Länder in the field of education policy. This was significant because, with shrinking immigration rates, the so-called second and third generations, who did not migrate themselves but have “inherited” their migration background from their parents, constitute the “master key” for successful integration. The Länder are, more than ever, the venue for steering integration processes. However, voices from all political sides have been criticizing the shift of these responsibilities to the Länder and are lobbying for a stronger role for the national level. The same critical assessment might apply to the decision to allow or ban headscarves (and other religious symbols) for teachers in public schools. Independently of the question of whether states should tolerate religious symbols in the public sphere and in public organizations or should guarantee a religiously

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neutral state – which is a normative question and thus beyond the scope of this chapter – the current “rag rug” of regulations in the different Länder hardly seems to provide a feasible approach for dealing with the challenges of religious diversity. Finally, the municipalities complete the list of “winners” in the field of integration policy. The impulse towards an increasing municipalization of labour market and social policy initiated by the reform of the welfare state and the reconfiguration of integration policies (“actively supporting and demanding”) significantly strengthened the municipalities’ scope for action. In the changing history of the relationship between federalism and immigrant integration policy in Germany their strong role remains one of the few constants.

NOT ES

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Personal note of Holger Kolb: This chapter began as a joint project with Michael Bommes, my academic teacher and close friend, who conceptualized large parts of the text. After a long fight against his illness, Michael passed away in December 2010. The fact that I could not rely on Michael’s sharp mind at the final stages of the work means that any remaining errors are purely mine. Michael Bommes, “Migration and Migration Research in Germany,” in Ellie Vasta and Vasoodeven Vuddamalay, eds., International Migration and the Social Sciences.  Confronting National Experiences in Australia, France and Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2006), 143–221. Christian Henkes, “Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern,” in Frieder Wolf and Achim Hildebrandt, eds., Politik in den Bundesländern im Vergleich (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008), 114. Dietrich Thränhardt, “Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern,” in Dietrich Thränhardt and Lale Akgün, eds., Integrationspolitik in föderalistischen Systemen,  (Münster: LIT 2001), 27–8. Akhtar Majeed, “Introduction: Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries” in Akhtar Majeed, Ronald Lampman Watts, and Douglas Mitchell Brown, eds., Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries  (Kingston: McGill-Queen´s University Press 2006), 3–7. Udo Margedant, “Die Föderalismusdiskussion in Deutschland,” Aus Politik und  Zeitgeschichte 29–30 (2003): 8; and Ronald Lampman Watts, “Comparative Conclusions,” in Majeed, Watts, and Brown, eds., Distribution of Powers and  Responsibilities in Federal Countries, 343. Fritz W. Scharpf, “Föderale Politikverflechtung: Was muß man ertragen? Was kann man ändern?” in Konrath Morath, ed., Reform des Föderalismus (Bad Homburg: Stiftung Marktwirtschaft und Politik 1999), 26, translated by Holger Kolb. Hans-Peter Schneider, “Federal Republic of Germany,” in Majeed, Watts, and Brown, eds., Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, 124.

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8 George Anderson, Federalism: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 22. 9 Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Second Chambers. Regional Representation in  Parliamentary Federations: The Australian Senate and the German Bundesrat Compared  (Frankfurt am Main: Lang 2004), 25 10 Anderson, Federalism, 46. 11 Jörn Ipsen, “Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Ländern nach der Föderalismusnovelle,” Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 39 (2006): 2802. 12 Arthur Gunlicks, The Länder and German Federalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2005), 1285. 13 The Bundesrat also has the possibility to object to the remaining 40 percent, but this is a suspensive veto that a majority of the Bundestag can override. 14 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Die ‘Politikverflechtungsfalle’: Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im Vergleich,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 4 (1985): 323–56. 15 Jutta Kramer, “The Federal Republic of Germany,” in Raoul Blindenbacher and Abigail Ostien, eds., Dialogues on Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in  Federal Countries, 21. 16 Thränhardt, “Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern,” 31. 17 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter,  Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge (München: Beck 2001). 18 Klaus J. Bade and Michael Bommes, “Politische Kultur im “Nicht-Einwanderungsland: Appellative Verweigerung und pragmatische Integration,” in Klaus. J. Bade and Rainer Münz, eds., Migrationsreport 2000: Fakten – Analysen  – Perspektiven (Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus 2000), 136–80. 19 Bommes, “Migration and Migration Research in Germany.” 20 Jürgen Puskeppeleit and Dietrich Thränhardt, Vom betreuten Ausländer zum gleichberechtigten Bürger (Freiburg: Lambertus 1990). 21 Herbert, “Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland.” 22 See, among others, Bade and Bommes, “Politische Kultur im ‘NichtEinwanderungsland”; Anita Böcker and Dietrich Thränhardt, “Was hilft gegen Diskriminierung in Beschäftigung und Beruf: Ergebnisse eines niederländischdeutschen Vergleichs,” in Anne Walter, Margarete Menz, and Sabina De Carlo, eds., Grenzen der Gesellschaft: Migration und sozialstruktureller Wandel in der  Zuwanderungsregion Europa, (Göttingen: VR Unipress 2006), 163–77; and Ruud Koopmans, “Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multi-culturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective,” Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (2010): 1–26. 23 The current immigration debate was mainly triggered by a controversial book of a former SPD secretary of finances in Berlin and member of the board of the Central Bank. The book, titled Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abolishes itself) is a rather crude accusation that migrants overpopulate Germany, cost too much money, produce too many children, water down the average intelligence of people

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24 25

26 27 28

29 30 31

32

33 34 5 36 37

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in Germany, and do not like to integrate. See Thilo Sarrazin, Deutschland schafft sich  ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen (München: DVA 2010). Steve Vertovec, “Super-diversity and Its Implications,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30 (2007): 1024–54. Klaus J. Bade, “Versäumte Integrationschancen und nachholende Integrationspolitik,” in Klaus. J. Bade and Hans-Georg Hiesserich, eds., Nachholende  Integrationspolitik und Gestaltungsperspektiven der Integrationspraxis, 21–96 (V&R Unipress: Göttingen 2007). Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany and  Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999). Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State, 62. This incompleteness was reflected in various institutional realms. For example Germany did not have a constitution, but a basic law that underlines that it was supposed to be in force only until Germany became reunited and thus complete. A second example is the former German capital, Bonn, which – among various other reasons – could be understood as another signal to indicate the provisional character of the Federal Republic. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State, 65. Kay Hailbronner, “Ausländerrecht und Verfassung,” Neue Juristische Wochenschrift  1983: 2113. In 1990 the German state-building process ended, since after reunification, for the first time the identity of territory and population was realized: Germany neither claims any external territory nor does it claim that any population living outside the territory of the state belongs to the German nation. Michael Bommes, “Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Die Normalisierung der Migrationserfahrung,“ in Klaus J. Bade, ed., Einwanderungskontinent Europa: Migration und  Integration am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, 49–60 (Osnabrück: Rasch 2001). Klaus J. Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl. (München: C.H. Beck 1994), 122. Michael Bommes, “Kommunen: Moderatoren im Prozess der sozialen Integration?” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 46–7 (2010): 36–41. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1992). Bommes, “Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Die Normalisierung der Migrationserfahrung.” This period can be reduced to seven years if the candidate has successfully completed an integration course and to six years if the candidate has participated in special integration measures. Candidates for citizenship are given 60 minutes to answer 33 test questions that are selected from a pool of 310 multiple-choice questions. A minimum of 17 correct answers is needed to pass the test. The test can be repeated as often as necessary; all questions and answers are public and can thus be prepared in advance. The first years of implementation have shown passing rates above 98 percent. For a concise analysis of the content of the test see Ines Michalowski, “Required to

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39

40 41

42

43 44

45

46 47 48 49

50

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Assimilate? The Context of Citizenship Tests in Five Countries,” Citizenship Studies 15 (2011): 749–68. Henkes, “Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern,” and Dietrich Thränhardt, Einbürgerung: Rahmenbedingungen, Motive und Perspektiven des Erwerbs der deutschen  Staatsangehörigkeit (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung 2008). Henkes, “Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern.” The Organization of the Islamic Conference is an international organization with fifty-six member states that seeks to be the collective voice of the Muslim world. Turkey was one of the founding members. These concerns were further backed by the legal opinion of the director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben, Gutachten zur Vereinbarkeit des Gesprächsleitfaden für die  Einbürgerungsbehörden des Landes Baden-Württemberg mit Völkerrecht (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law 2006). Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, “Reformbedürftigkeit des deutschen Föderalismus,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2005): 13–14. The commission had thirty-two voting members, sixteen each from the Bundestag  and the Bundesrat. Nonvoting members included two Land parliament presidents, four party group leaders from Land parliaments, three representatives of local government associations, and twelve professors who are experts on federalism. Hartmut Esser, “Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre (P)Fründe,” in Paul Hill, Frank Kalter, Johannes Kopp, Clemens Kroneberg, and Rainer Schnell, eds., Hartmut  Essers Erklärende Soziologie Kontroversen und Perspektiven, 349–83 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus 2009). Michael Bommes, “Die Unwahrscheinlichkeit der Erziehung und die “Integration von Migrantenkindern,“ IMIS-Beiträge 38 (2010): 101–13. Henkes, “Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern.” Bommes, “Kommunen: Moderatoren im Prozess der sozialen Integration?“ A survey conducted by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration accordingly found out that both initiatives generally are barely known and that persons with a migration background are even less informed and interested than native Germans. See “Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration,” Einwanderungsgesellschaft 2010 (Berlin 2010). This assessment applies only for the field of integration; the national level remains the only decisive player for admission policies and border control.

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6 Spain R i c a r d Z a pata -B a r r er o Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Spain compared with other European countries. Spain’s first immigration law dates from 1985, just ten years after the beginning of the democratic transition process (it was a condition of Spain’s entry into the European Union in 1986). Moreover, because immigration was never part of the democratic-transition agenda, it was not considered a jurisdictional power that needed to be defined in policy and administrative terms. Immigration has emerged as an administrative and technical issue in the 1990s and as a political and social issue in the 2000s.1 During this period, Spain has been addressing immigration by induction, using instruments in its administrative and policy structure and developing legal and regulatory measures that reflect its increasingly decentralized political and administrative structure. This chapter focuses on the impact of this process of change on immigrant integration issues.2 I interpret the changes as part of a federalization process, whereby jurisdiction over immigration is being introduced into administration and public policy, altering the current territorial distribution of responsibilities. In this regard, the horizontal (intersectoral) and multi-level (intergovernmental) nature of immigration policy is an important factor.3 Spain is also a laboratory for analyzing the dynamics of a federalization process in which immigrant integration is a new responsibility that needs to be defined in administrative terms.4 The management dynamic followed in Spain is as follows. The central (Spanish) government manages admission and naturalization, and the autonomous communities (ACs) and local governments have a large share of the responsibility for managing integration processes, since most integration policies (reception, housing, education, work) are either the exclusive responsibility of the ACs or shared between the central government and the ACs. Spain is a “multinational state,”5 which means that two criteria play a role in the federalization process with regard to immigrant integration policies:

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efficiency (based mainly on the subsidiarity principle),6 and national identity (integration policies raise identity concerns for some substate entities).7 Although efficiency and identity (mainly linguistic) concerns push in the direction of decentralization, both provide the basis for different discourses with regard to integration policies. This confirms the linguistic hypothesis of Erk and Koning, who conclude that decentralization is likely to be more pronounced in heterogeneous linguistic settings than in homogeneous ones.8 In general, the Spanish government has a common integration program for all ACs and seeks to coordinate integration policies through a set of common criteria that are guided by principles of efficiency and cooperative federalism.9 However, Catalonia10 is following its own path (“via catalana”) through legal and political means, optimizing its instruments of selfgovernment and in the process producing an asymmetrical pattern in Spain. This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I outline the main dimensions of the constitutional structure and evolution of Spain, along with immigration patterns. In the second and central section, I analyze how this structure affects the definition of immigrant integration policies. I examine the policy instruments at different levels of government that encourage integration and the current relations between the Spanish government and the. I then address four main categories of integration measures: admission policies; socio-economic integration (language training, the education system, work permits); cultural, political, and civic integration (integration programs, political involvement, intercultural exchange); and naturalization. I then discuss how Catalonia has introduced some of its own instruments, which are contributing to a cooperative federalization of integration policies in Spain. In conclusion, I contend that there is a need to take further steps in the federalization process, including addressing governance in this policy field. This latter step will require more innovation, since the structures for collaboration remain to be built.

Th e S pa nish “Feder a l ” St r u c t u r e a nd Immigr ation P at t e r n s The Spanish “Federal” Structure Spain can be categorized as a multilingual, multi-unit, recently federalized country with one dominant language (Castilian) and several territorially delimited national groups called “historical nationalities.” The latter are basically differentiated by language, as in Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia, whose territorial units are considered bilingual (with their own national language and the dominant Castilian one). Currently there are seventeen ACs, but their powers are different. This asymmetrical pattern

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has been the result of responses to the ACs’ varying circumstances rather than the outcome of constitutional design.11 Spain’s democratic transition led to the establishment of a “state of autonomous communities” (Estado de las Autonomias). Although Spain is not constitutionally recognized as a federation, constitutional practice supports the accommodation of a range of collective identities, addressing historical grievances and a long-standing inclination toward subnational self-rule.12 Spain’s multinational character plays the role of an independent variable in explaining the institutional change in the federalization process that has led to deep political and administrative decentralization. However, in contrast to the situation in some federations, the Spanish second chamber, the Senate, does not really work as a body representing the ACs’ interests.13 There are two central tensions in the functioning of the Spanish state. The first is a vertical one between the ACs and the central government. The ACs consistently seek more powers and resources (mainly economic) from the Spanish government, and the latter tries to maintain its role in coordinating state-wide policy-making and cooperative intergovernmental relations. The second tension is horizontal, among the ACs. Here there are practically no structured relations.14 There are, moreover, differences in the status of the “historical” and the “non-historical” ACs and in their capacity to assert and benefit from their differences. Spain’s linguistic diversity is the driving force for many political claims put forward by different nationalities. These language differences are often politicized (including by nationalist parties represented in the Spanish parliament) in order to seek a greater degree of autonomy in policy areas such as education or social services.15 As for the constitutional recognition of diversity, the definition of Spain’s quasi-federal arrangements was left ambiguous. This situation allows several groups to interpret their membership differently and avoids, at the same time, the “swallowing up” of a particular definition of diversity favoured by majoritarian groups.16 Spain’s federalization process is proceeding by pragmatism and induction;17 that is, it is not the result of an initial constitutional agreement, with powers already territorially delimited among different levels of government.18 Two forces are at play: centrifugal pressure from the central state, which tries to establish a common framework for integration, and centripetal pressure coming mainly from Catalonia. This AC is trying to gain powers for managing integration, since it sees clearly that integration policies are not only a social issue but also involve a dimension of national identity.19 I will elaborate on both these processes in the following section. Immigration affects the integrity of the identity of various constituent units, which also have language and cultural markers.20 The premise is that these units may feel threatened by newcomers that have different languages, religions, and cultures, and more precisely if they share the

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official language of the central government (Castilian). Immigration can thus be seen as an additional factor of tension between the historical ACs and the Spanish state.21 However, the policy governance of immigration22 was for the first time explicitly decentralized in the 2009 foreigners law:23 integration policies are being administratively and politically decentralized. In addition, in some fields, such as those of work permits and reception, Catalonia is seeking to apply its claim to self-rule and pressuring the central administration to assume additional responsibilities. In this case, bilateralism is playing a pivotal role. Immigration Patterns In the second half of the 1980s Spain was transformed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration. Before this period, many Spanish citizens migrated to northern European and Latin American countries. After Spain’s accession to the European Community in 1986, its economy began to flourish, guest worker programs in several northern European countries ended, and immigrants started to settle in Spain. The economic and historical connections with North Africa and South America have been responsible for the larger immigration flows, but Europeans also represent a large group of Spain’s foreign residents. After the 1990s, the imbalance in the labour market was further aggravated as a result of two factors. First, economic growth from 1995 to 2001 led to an increased demand for labour of almost 670,000 new jobs a year.24 Second, with the entry into the job market of the cohorts born after 1976, the availability of new native workers declined after 1992 by approximately two million people.25 Between 1996 and 2000, 19.1 percent of the new jobs created in Spain went to immigrants. Immigration has become a political issue only since 2000, when political parties started to include the issue in their electoral campaigns and immigration became institutionalized after several legislative changes.26 The year 2000 also saw the first debates on the social integration of immigrants, after riots against Moroccan immigrant workers took place in El Ejido, a market-gardening town in southeastern Spain.27 Other incidents (such as immigrant strikes to obtain civil, cultural, social, and economic rights), racism, and prejudice triggered public and political debate on the social integration of immigrants. The unprecedented rise in immigration after 2000 was related to the imbalance just mentioned between labour supply and labour demand. On the one hand, between 2001 and 2005, the growth of the Spanish economy led to an increase of 690,000 new jobs a year. On the other hand, the capacity to respond to this demand was reduced because of the drop in unemployment figures (7.1 percent in 2005), an increase in

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the female participation rate (which rose to 58.1 percent in 2005), and the demographic shock resulting from the decline in the birth rate after 1976.28 Figure 6.1 illustrates the growth of Spain’s foreign population from 1996 to 2009. In 2000 there were almost 900,000 foreign residents (2.18 percent of the total population). There were 1.3 million (3.10 percent) in 2002, 1.9 million (4.48 percent) in 2004, 3 million (6.7 percent) in 2006, 3.9 million (8.6 percent) in 2007, and 4.8 million in 2009 (10.2 percent). In March 2010 there were 4,842,499 foreign residents in Spain, representing more than 10 percent of the Spanish population. Most foreign residents have come from other EU countries (39 percent), Latin America (30 percent), and Africa (20 percent). The most numerous nationalities are Moroccans, Romanians, Ecuadorians, Colombians, British, Italians, Chinese, Bulgarians, Peruvians, and Portuguese (see figure 6.2). Within the immigrant population, the proportion of men (53.3 percent) in 2010 was slightly higher than that of women (46.7 percent). Most foreign residents were between 16 and 64 years old (82.3 percent in 2010), which means that most of them were of working age (their average age in 2010 was 33.6 years). As shown in figure 6.3, the majority of non-EU foreign residents (55.1 percent in 2010) had temporary residence permits. Of the 1,418,347 temporary residence permits, 14 percent were in the first year, 33 percent between the second and third years, and 46 percent between the fourth and fifth years (see figure 6.3). Lower proportions of Latin Americans (31.9 percent) and non-EU European migrants (41.5 percent) have permanent residence permits, while higher shares of African (59.6 percent) and North American migrants (58.6 percent) have such permits. The majority of non-EU migrant workers are concentrated in services (58.1 percent), but they also have significant presence in construction (24.6 percent), industry (11.1 percent), and agriculture (6.2 percent). Broken down by gender, the figures show that 42.3 percent of male foreign workers had jobs in construction, while 89.7 percent of female foreign workers were in the service sector (more than half in domestic employment and somewhat less than half in commerce). Turning to the territorial distribution of immigrants, figure 6.4 shows that the majority of immigrants are concentrated in Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, and Madrid. As table 6.1 illustrates, in nine of the seventeen ACs, immigrants represent 10 percent or more of the population.

I m m igr a nt Int egr ation Po l ic ie s a n d P r o g r a ms In this section, I analyze the policy instruments of different levels of governments that encourage integration and the current structure of relations between the Spanish state and the ACs. I then turn to the four broad categories of integration measures: admission policies; socio-economic integration

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6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 0

96

97

19

19

98

19

99

19

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

Figure 6.1 Foreign population in Spain, 1996–2009

Other countries 22,8

Morocco: 16,01

Dominican Republic: 1,8

France: 1,82

Rumania: 15,95

Argentina: 2 Germany: 2,32 Bolivia: 2,52

Ecuador: 9,03

Portual: 2,66

Colombia: 5,89

Peru: 2,97

Great Britain: 4,61

Bulgaria: 3,12 China: 3,18

Figure 6.2

Italy: 3,32

Foreign residents by nationality, 2010 (percentages)

Source: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, 2010

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Temporary, 1st year: 7,7 Permanent residence: 45,3

Temporary, 4d–3rd year: 18,4

Temporary, 4th–5th year: 25,5

Temporary, exceptional circumstances: 3,1

Figure 6.3 Percentages of non-EU foreign residents, according to type of residence permit, 2010 Source: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, 2010

Cataluña Madrid Com. Valenciana Andalucia Canarias Murcia Castilla – La Baleares Castilla y León Aragón Pais Vasco Galicia Navarra La Rioja Extremadura Asturias Cantabria Melilla Ceuta No costa 0

Figure 6.4

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200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000 1,200,000

Size of foreign population by autonomous community, 2009

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Table 6.1 Relative Foreign Population by Autonomous Community, 2009 >10% La Rioja Navarra Aragón Baleares Murcia Canarias Com. Valenciana Madrid Cataluña

between 5 and 10% 14.36 10.17 12.66 18.31 14.39 11.32 11.97 13.66 14.14

Ceuta Melilla Cantabria Castilla y León Castilla – la Mancha Andalucía

5.58 9.73 6.11 6.87 9.76 7.15

less than 5 % Asturias Extremadura Galicia País Vasco

3.76 3.79 3.24 4.90

programs (basically, language training, the education system, and work permits); cultural, political, and civic integration measures (integration programs, political involvement, intercultural exchange); and naturalization. Policy Instruments for Immigrant Integration of Different Levels of Government The  peci : A Framework for Cooperation? The Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration (PECI, or Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración, 2007– 2010) is the main policy instrument for immigrant integration. It is intended as a general policy framework for immigrant integration for all the ACs, while respecting the powers of other governments and serving as a reference point. It should be noted that the Strategic Plan does not take account of the multinational character of Spain (it has not even been translated into Spain’s different languages). It provides for some administrative decentralization but without giving various governments new identity-based powers beyond those they already have. The driving force behind the PECI is clearly cooperative federalism. Its decentralized administrative characteristics provides specific guidance for equal treatment for all sub-units. This is confirmed by the rules for distributing funds, which apply the same criteria to all the ACs without considering that some of them may need additional resources to manage the effects of immigration in light of their own priorities. The Strategic Plan is intended to be a framework for cooperation, bringing together initiatives, creating partnerships, and giving coherence to immigrant integration actions at different levels of government (and even framing civil society actions). Cooperation is to be based on the open method of coordination inspired by the EU. Among the several dimensions of this method, three can be highlighted. The first is subsidiarity: it is recognised that the ACs and local administrations are to be responsible for giving

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concrete content to their powers and can find in the Strategic Plan guidelines and resources to help them do so. Second is territorial  monitoring, which entails regular monitoring of plans and actions being carried out in the different territories. The third dimension of cooperation is the integrated  approach. The Strategic Plan acknowledges the multidimensional sense of integration, resulting in the need to implement policies and actions in areas as diverse as reception,29 education, employment, housing, health, social services, equal treatment, gender, participation, and awareness (sensibilización). The PECI also states that vertical cooperation will be promoted through annual action plans. These plans contain a description of the measures to be funded jointly by both authorities and those that will be performed through city councils. The financial instrument supporting these activities is primarily the Fund to Support the Reception and Integration of Immigrants (Fondo de Apoyo a la Acogida e Integracion de inmigrantes), which was established following the Spanish government’s budget of 2005. The fund was set at 120 million Euros for 2005, and for 2006 it was increased by 52 percent to 182.4 million Euros, of which 50 percent went to Reinforcement Education and 40 percent to municipalities. As shown in table 6.2, in 2010 there was a drastic reduction of 30 percent of the fund because of the economic crisis, and this provoked a good deal of protest from AC governments.30 This cooperative framework was to be implemented through financial means, rather than through political and policy avenues. However, the fund has made possible the definition of a framework for cooperation between the Spanish government and the ACs. The general evaluation has been politically and administratively very positive, since it has allowed for the consolidation of integration policies at all territorial and sector levels and has  reinforced the opportunities for cooperation between ACs and local administrations. Integration Programs of the Autonomous Communities The ACs and local administrations play a major role in the integration of immigrants. Ideally, the integration programs must be PECI-based (or at least PECI-inspired), but in practice almost all ACs develop their programs independently.31 Following their own criteria, ACs and local administrations manage many of the basic public services related to the reception and settlement of immigrants, including education, health, housing, employment, and social services. The ACs’ programs generally recognize the two-way nature of the integration process. Measures are therefore directed at both the immigrant population and the host society, and awareness campaigns (campañas de sensibilizacón)  such as promoting interculturalism and combating discrimination, racism, and xenophobia are regarded as important.32

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Ricard Zapata-Barrero Table 6.2 Budget for the Fund for Reception and Integration of Immigrants and Their Educational Improvement (millions of Euros) 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

120

182.4

188

192.5

196.9

141

Source: Boletín Oficial del Estado, 30 June 2009, no. 157; Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2 April 2009, no. 80; Boletín Oficial del Estado, 25 April 2006, no. 98.

The ACs’ programs also contribute to the recognition of social rights for immigrants, based on a shared set of principles, even if sometimes they are defined differently. These common principles are identified in the Strategic Plan as follows.33 • • • • • •

Equality: equal rights, duties, and opportunities for citizens and immigrants. Comprehensiveness: the integrated treatment of all aspects and fields that can affect the integration of immigrants. Horizontality: the incorporation of issues related to integration within all relevant public policies. Standardization (normalización): immigrant access to the general services that the welfare state provides to citizens. Interculturalism: defined in different ways but usually involving the consideration of immigrant-related cultural diversity policies. A citizenship approach: most integration programs (and even most municipal ones) have introduced the concept of citizenship. The first was the Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005–8) (Plan de Ciutadania i  Immigració ),34 which is similar to those of the Council and the European Commission and focuses on plural and civic citizenship.35

Most of the relations between the Spanish government and the ACs in the integration field are covered by agreements and partnerships with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs for the implementation of the Support Fund for Reception and Integration. Taken together, these plans reflect at least three premises: they form a common ground; they lead to the incorporation of immigration issues into the general policies of each AC; and, especially in those territorial areas that have the largest presence of immigrants, they strengthen both administrative practices of social intervention and the activities of management and participation agencies (such as the Forum for the Integration of Immigrants – see below) in the design and implementation of the integration policies. It is also important to highlight the role of local administrations (cities) in immigrant integration. The role of the Spanish councils in the reception and integration of immigrants has been of fundamental importance since

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the 1980s. In some municipalities these actions are reflected in integration plans that have incorporated immigration into the political agenda. They have also generated practical knowledge in this field and contributed to good governance in the management of immigrant integration, along with civil society, social partners, NGOs, residents’ associations, and immigrant associations.36 Relations  between  the  Spanish  Government  and  the  ac s. Most of the decisions about the management of the immigration system (as opposed to immigrant integration) are made by the Spanish government, except in two cases. First, the ACs participate in the joint determination of the number of workers required annually, along with the major unions and business organizations. Second, local governments have a certain level of autonomy in deciding the criteria for census registration. This means that, to a certain degree, those who are in Spain illegally may be counted in the census. The new immigration legislation adopted by the Spanish Parliament in December 2009 provides the basis for significant new roles for the ACs in a number of areas, including granting initial work permits, offering training courses that immigrants must take if they wish to renew their permits, and developing arrangements to certify immigrants’ level of integration. The law also includes a section on the distribution of government responsibilities for immigration. Thus, for the first time Spanish law addresses how to govern immigration in a decentralized state. One of the questions it leaves open is the definition of a new model of administrative organization, given the assumption that some ACs will assume certain powers with regard to work permits and integration.37 It also lays the groundwork for strengthening the mechanisms of intergovernmental collaboration (discussed further below). Within the Spanish central government, the Ministry of Labour and Immigration seeks to coordinate its activities with two ministries in particular: the Ministry of the Interior, which develops and implements security and border policies, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, which is increasingly taking an active role in the development and implementation of policies directed at countries of origin and migrants themselves. If we consider the logic of the political practices of each ministry, we can say that their interrelationship symbolizes Spanish immigration policy, which seeks to interpret the global approach to migration policies in a way that ensures a link between security, human rights, and the labour market. This close cooperation is manifested in the efforts of the three ministries to improve the management of migration through areas such as joint development, cooperation with third countries, and the signing of bilateral cooperation agreements. The ACs have been involved in three main institutional bodies. In all cases, other organizations, such as trade unions, employees, and NGOs and

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immigrant associations, have also been represented.38 In general, these bodies exchange information and debate key issues affecting everyone and do not determine policy design or directions. •

•

•

The Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants  (Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes) provides consultation, information, and advice to government on the integration of immigrants. It involves the three levels of government, social organizations, associations of immigrants and refugees, expert observers, and special guests. The Sectoral Conference on Immigration (Conferencia Sectorial sobre Inmigración) was created in March 2007, and its main objectives include strengthening intergovernmental cooperation. Composed of representatives from the Spanish and AC governments, with some observers from local government, the conference aims at achieving maximum consistency in the implementation of public policies pursued by the central government and the ACs. Academics agree that this body did not in practice achieve its aims, because of inefficient organization and infrequent meetings.39 In a new law of December 2009 (see below) the conference was redefined. The Higher Council for Immigration Policy (Consejo Superior de Política de Inmigración) was created in 2001 to ensure coordination of the actions of public authorities with responsibility for the integration of immigrants and the development of a comprehensive policy in this area. It was composed of representatives of national ministerial departments with responsibility for immigration, the ACs, and local governments. As a result of the December 2009 law, this body was abolished and most of its functions assigned to the Sectoral Conference on Immigration. Measures for Immigrant Integration

Admission  Policies The government of Spain has exclusive jurisdiction over admission; this is regulated by fundamental law and executed by the Ministry of the Interior. In particular, the Spanish government has exclusive responsibility for the policies governing entry to and exit from Spanish territory (asylum and visas) and the general legal regime that applies to foreigners and immigration, return and repatriation, the signing of readmission agreements, the issuing of passports and other identity documents, and naturalization This could be described as a central-government hegemony model,40 both because the Spanish government has the final say over these specific policies and because it is the only actor in the decisionmaking and implementation process. However, as we will see below, a new trend is emerging that will allow the ACs some powers in granting initial work permits.

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Spain does not have a points system or procedures based on any kind of tests (e.g., tests to measure language skills, cultural knowledge, and/or civic commitment). In the case of Catalonia, the new Statute of Autonomy (art. 138.3) specifies that the Generalitat (Catalan government) participates in Spanish government decisions concerning immigration that are especially important for Catalonia and, in particular, for determining the annual labour entry quota (contingente)41of foreign workers by means of the mechanisms established by a bilateral commission.42 The ACs play no role in developing visa policies. The government has since 1993 established annual labour entry quotas as a control policy to manage the national employment situation. These quotas define the need for temporary and permanent foreign workers by sector, autonomous community, and nationality. They have resulted in yet another type of institutional discrimination, since some countries of origin are favoured over others.43 Other admissions are related to family reunification and asylum. Table 6.3 provides data on admissions for 2008. Socio-economic Integration As I have already said, one of the key principles for understanding how integration competencies are distributed and executed is subsidiarity, which suggests that regional governments would do better in designing and implementing these kinds of programs. Thus, language training policies are determined at the AC level. Besides what is included in the Spanish strategic plan (funds and distributions between the AC), in the case of Catalonia language training is granted in two ways according to the Catalan program for Citizenship and Immigration (2005–8). Concerning adults, the Catalan government developed the Linguistic Reception Plans, which are coordinated by the Consorci per la Normalització Lingüística (Generalitat of Catalonia). This program establishes Catalan courses (basic and elementary) as well as additional voluntary language training. Different levels of government (Generalitat, city halls, regional delegations) as well as NGOs and associations working with immigrants are involved. In this regard, a lack of coordination among the CPNL and other organizations has been reported.44 The December 2009 law maintains this policy, making Catalan compulsory for integration. As for the education system, the Education Ministry and Integration Secretary of the Spanish government develop national standards for education and integration. The ACs have the power to expand on these standards and to regulate and manage other elements of the education system in their own territory. One of the main elements of the new education reform45 has been programming intended to guarantee an adequate distribution among the schools of students with educational-support needs, a category that includes substantial numbers of immigrants. Most of the ACs have developed their own reception plans for immigrant students, which give special attention to language.

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Table 6.3 Visas Granted in 2008   Number Percentage

Total

Family Reunification

Residence

Work

Study

288,151

103,422

4,255

130,928

49,546

100

35.9

1.5

45.4

17.2

Source: Anuario estadístico Secretaría de Inmigración y Emigración, 2009.

In Catalonia, Catalan language immersion is one of the main policies of the Generalitat. It has designed the so-called Aula d’Acollida (reception class) in which those not speaking Catalan have to attend courses for a number of hours each day until they learn Catalan. It also provides some other courses for those having a lower level of knowledge in a particular subject. There is currently an experimental project called EBE (Espai de Benvinguda Educativa, the educational welcome space), which provides for a family reception area prior to schooling. The EBE is focused on newly arrived students from eight to sixteen, who receive four hours a day of Catalan lessons, as well as information on the educational system and Catalan society. The average duration of this learning is estimated to be two weeks to a month. This project has nevertheless led to certain criticisms. Some NGOs, teachers, and school workers have claimed that it leads to segregation. At the same time, the director of the biggest public school in Vic (the first city where EBE was implemented), as well as teachers in Aula d’Acollida, consider that two weeks is not enough, adding that students arrive at regular school much more relaxed since they are already familiar with the school environment. As for access to employment and work permits, the Spanish government’s responsibilities over labour are shared with the ACs, and the ACs execute the legal framework developed by the central state. Furthermore, the Spanish government maintains a list of job positions that are difficult to fill and oversees the hiring of foreign workers for those positions. As for immigrant integration into the labour market, each AC develops its own policies. In the case of Catalonia, programs led by the Labour Department focus on, among other objectives, promoting the integration of immigrant workers in the field of labour relations; coordinating the reception, hiring, and accommodation of seasonal workers; and providing information about the labour market and employees’ rights. Cultural,  Political  and  Civic  Integration Unlike other European countries, and in spite the quite rapid move to a country of immigration, Spain has not developed integration contracts or other compulsory measures such as integration courses.46 This is the case at both the national and the AC levels. For instance, one of the distinguishing features of Catalonia’s 2009 reception

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bill (see below) is its non-compulsory character. Some cities have developed non-compulsory integration courses to help familiarize immigrants with basic issues following arrival. For instance, the city of Mataró (Catalonia) has developed a so-called “reception circuit,” a voluntary program that includes basic information about city services and a language course. The city of Barcelona has an extensive network for receiving newcomers. The absence of compulsory integration courses or tests reflects in part the absence of a test for candidates for Spanish citizenship. Here, Spain is radically distancing itself from the general European tendency. This might be explained by the fact that Spain citizenship has a progressive connotation and a proactive sense. Moreover, as a relatively new country of immigration, Spain has perhaps not tired of the effects of immigration on society, or perhaps it is aware of these measures elsewhere in Europe but wants to disassociate itself from this conservative logic. There may be a third factor: the possibility that the introduction of integration tests would highlight the plurality of identities in Spain. Although the debate on immigration is hardly ever contextualized in terms of identity, the language of identity is intrinsic to the political debate in certain ACs. As for political involvement, since immigrants to Spain have the right of association, there is an extensive network of immigrant organizations. There are also consultative bodies at different territorial levels. Here I will cover two main dimensions of political involvement: voting rights and political mobilization. The Spanish debate on immigrants’ voting rights has had two dimensions.47 The first is territorial. A Spanish citizen has the right to vote at four different levels: the European, the national, the AC, and the local. One debate revolves around the question of at which level non-EU immigrants should be allowed to vote. The second focuses on the legal criteria for granting voting rights to immigrants. The Spanish Constitution does not grant immigrants the right to vote or to stand for election. The sole exceptions are cases where this right is established by treaty or where the law attends to the so-called principle of reciprocity.48 This exclusion does not affect residents who are EU member-state nationals, who have been entitled to vote in municipal and European Parliament elections since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. For their part, immigrant associations often act as social movements. They are a tool for social and political pressure, and a means of channelling immigrants’ demands into the broader political process. Immigrant associations are also involved in the implementation of policies. They thus constitute an altruistic social movement providing welfare. In this context, local integration policies that promote the development and consolidation of associations among immigrants contribute to their inclusion in the city’s active demos.49 However, this raises a dilemma. Policies that promote the

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formation and consolidation of associations by and among immigrants tend to facilitate the creation of a separate network that in some cases can become segregated from the associations of the population as a whole. In contrast, the aim of more general policies is to encourage immigrants to become active in existing citizens’ associations. Although interculturalism is one of the key principles of the PECI, what it means in practice is still unclear. Basically it seems to mean promoting interaction among immigrants and citizens, and among immigrants themselves. Most of the ACs have developed intercultural programs. However, there is no comprehensive policy on interculturalism at the AC level. Within the Spanish government, the Ministry for Labour and Migration, through its Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and Their Educational Reinforcement, has financed several projects related to interculturalism. However, neither the plan nor the fund provides specific directives related to intercultural exchange. At the local level several intercultural policies and plans have been developed by city councils, notably in Madrid and Barcelona. The intercultural approach of Barcelona city is comprehensive: it applies to all integration fields, not only education. This approach promotes positive interaction, contact, dialogue, and mutual knowledge as key elements for better addressing the complex challenges posed by diversity. This approach reflects various initiatives of the EU and the Council of Europe.50 As with admission, naturalization is an exclusive jurisdiction of the Spanish government and is administered by the Ministry of Justice. As a general rule, citizenship can be obtained after residence of at least ten years in Spain. This period is reduced to five years for those with refugee status and two years for applicants from Latin American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal, and the Sephardim. Citizenship can also be obtained through other means, such as marriage to a Spanish citizen, Spanish descent, or birth in a Spanish territory. While most foreign residents still have temporary status, there has been a gradual increase in the number who have become Spanish citizens. Between 2001 and 2008, 364,592 foreign residents acquired Spanish citizenship. In 2001, 16,743 foreigners were granted citizenship, but by 2008 this number had risen to 84,170. In 2008, 81 percent of naturalizations were from Latin America and 13 percent from Africa, principally Morocco (see figure 6.5). This no doubt reflects the fact that immigrants from Latin America may apply for naturalization after two years, whereas those from Morocco and other African countries must wait ten years (see table 6.4). The Catalan Statute of Autonomy and Immigrant Integration Issues Before concluding, it will be instructive to discuss in more detail Catalonia’s recent efforts to acquire greater responsibilities for certain policies that

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Table 6.4 Naturalizations in 2008

Number Percentage

Total

Two Years Residence

Ten Years Residence

Other*

84,170

58,813

6,636

18,531

100

69.9

7.9

22.0

Source: Anuario estadístico Secretaría de Inmigración y Emigración. *Includes marriage, Spanish descent, birth in Spain, other.

Chile 1% Uruguay 1%

Other national groups 13% Ecuador 31%

Venezuela 2% Cuba 3% Dominican Republic 4% Argentina 6% Peru 10%

Colombia 19% Morocco 10%

Figure 6.5 Grants of Spanish citizenship in 2008, by country of origin (10 largest nationalities)

have an important impact on immigrant integration. In terms of Catalonia’s relations with the Spanish state, we are now in what I call a more operational phase.51 This period is interesting from a federal point of view because it highlights some of the difficulties entailed in going beyond central government hegemony to a more cooperative and asymmetrical form of federalism. Certain ACs, including Catalonia, are taking significant steps in the direction of self-government. In the immigration field, Catalonia is taking the lead in pressing the Spanish government for additional responsibilities. Indeed, the Catalan government’s immigration program, launched in 1993, preceded the Spanish government’s initial immigration integration plan, which was issued in 1994.52

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A central element of the Catalan government’s actions was the Statute of Autonomy53 approved in 2006, which included a section (138) on immigration responsibilities. The right-wing, centralist Popular Party launched a court action challenging the constitutionally of that section. In 2010 the Spanish Constitutional Court declared section 138 “subject to interpretation” – that is, not explicitly constitutional or unconstitutional.54 The decision means that section 138 is not removed from the statutory text. Rather, it will be subject to interpretation as specific cases arise. Thus, measures taken by the Catalan government on initial reception, elements of health care, and the promotion of immigrant integration could be constitutional, since they fall within the scope of powers attributed to Catalonia. The provisions concerning the power to issue initial work permits and resolve appeals about them would follow the same line of interpretation. Finally, the provision stating that the Catalan government has the right to participate in central government decisions on immigration that are especially important to Catalonia was considered constitutional because the court concluded that the Statute of Autonomy does not grant new powers to Catalonia. Following from the Statute of Autonomy, the Catalan Generalitat and the Spanish government reached an agreement in January 2008 through which Catalonia became the first AC to attain responsibility to authorize initial work permits for foreigners.55 Further, in June 2009 the Catalan Parliament approved an immigrant reception bill, a text without precedent in Spain that is intended as a toolkit to promote newcomers’ social mobility. When interpreting the bill, the first thing to note is that it is a legislative text and not a public policy document. The law’s basic objective is to provide immigrants with the capabilities to be autonomous within Catalan society. The law thus recognizes the need for immigrants to have a minimum linguistic ability and to acquire knowledge of the government, history, politics, economy, and culture of Catalonia, including its diversity. In August 2010 the Spanish ombudsman sent an appeal to the Constitutional Court claiming that Catalan cannot be the only language for reception purposes, as was stipulated in the reception bill, since this infringes the right of immigrants to learn Spanish and is counter to Catalonia’s officially bilingual status.56 Catalonia is thus using its Statute of Autonomy and its powers over education, reception, labour, and the regulation of the Catalan language. With regard to the latter, we ought to recognize that people speak the language of their workplace. The motivation of people of immigrant origin to speak Catalan will depend on two factors: their intention to settle permanently in Catalonia and the necessity of using Catalan for work and for professional and upward social mobility. Catalonia is clearly entering a new phase in which its government is defining its philosophy of identity, basically linking immigration policy and linguistic

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policy. It thus confirms Rainer Bauböck’s argument that immigration inverts the relationship between language and self-government. That is, although in principle self-government is the necessary condition for maintaining and protecting language, with the arrival of immigrants, the relationship is inverted: language is the condition for maintaining self-government.57

C onc lusio n As this chapter has demonstrated, there are two main tensions in the current federalization of Spain’s immigrant integration policies. First, in a number of general policy fields that affect immigrant integration, such as housing, education, and social services, the attribution of government authority follows the distribution of powers in the Spanish constitution, with the ACs taking on important responsibilities. At the same time, the roles of the central and the subnational governments are being determined in three other areas that are specific to immigrants: admission, reception, and naturalization. In this case, the Spanish government is maintaining its hegemony over admission and naturalization, while tending to leave reception policies and programs to the ACs. The second main tension relates to the development of a common framework for collaboration. As Miret suggests,58 coordination criteria need to be based on the premise that what one government does can affect other governments and territories.59 This can be clearly seen in the context of immigrants’ mobility (research shows that immigrants move more often than citizens).60 The issue of internal freedom of movement was raised during the public debate following approval of the immigration law in December 2009. One of the Popular Party’s arguments was that the law would have unintended consequences, possibly leading to a “dis-coordinating” structure (see press releases from 1 September 2009 to January 2010). This is probably the first sign of a debate that could become much more intense – particularly if an asymmetrical model of immigrant integration emerges. In the case of Spain, key issues are generated by the broad question of how to reconcile the country’s unity (and the management of the general interest) with the exercise of the ACs’ self-government right and their differing realities and interests. Some more specific questions also arise. In a given federal state, do we find a single immigration policy or immigration policies? If different approaches to immigration are accepted, how do we ensure consistency between federal and subnational policies? If we seek to combine a plural approach to immigration and a certain level of consistency between the subnational and central governments, is there a single way to do so, or can we think of different systems that would achieve the same result? Looking at Spiro’s three models of immigrant federalism, namely centralist, cooperative, and devolutionary federalism,61 we see that Spain is certainly

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still in the process of defining its model. Cooperative federalism seems to be reflected in the current government’s Strategic Plan. However, Spiro does not envisage the possibility of asymmetrical federalism, where each AC can have a measure of autonomy to manage the impact of immigration in economic, cultural, social, and even demographic terms, and the degree of autonomy will vary among the ACs. Are we heading towards asymmetrical or cooperative federalism in immigration and integration policy, or towards a combination of both? It is becoming clear that in spite of the cooperative and coordinated approach of the Spanish government, AC actions in this field cannot be homogeneous.62 There are several reasons for this, including historical and identity realities, whether or not an AC has its own language, how its education system works, its labour market needs, and whether immigrants are territorially concentrated or not.63 Finally, the Spanish case demonstrates that at least two steps in the federalization process need to be distinguished analytically. The first concerns the definition of the jurisdiction over immigration policy and of administrative terms (i.e., the logic of who does what). This process is already taking place and is leading to a considerable degree of decentralization with regard to immigrant integration policies and programs. This approach can be expected to continue in the years ahead. The second step, an eventual transfer of certain government responsibilities, remains to be reached. If a transfer of jurisdiction for certain matters to ACs with strong national identity claims were to take place, the challenge would be to preserve a cooperative and coordinated approach for the country as a whole. The dynamics are already beginning to change as a result of Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy and its judicial interpretation. The diversity of legal frameworks that may emerge will need to strike a balance between, on the one hand, unity and autonomy and, on the other, efficiency and identity criteria. Looking to the longer term, it is fair to say that Spain is at the beginning of a long march.

Not es 1 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “The ‘Discovery’ of Immigration: The Politicization of Immigration in the Case of El Ejido,” Journal of International Migration and  Integration 4, 4. 2 These issues are understood as means to allow “newcomers to become capable of participating in the economic, social and political life” of Spain, and as a two-way process. “Acquiring these capacities is not only the responsibility of newcomers; the receiving society and its governments must provide the instruments and resources that will allow immigrants (and their families) to do so” (from this volume, 9).

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3 Even though Spain is not constitutionally a federation, it is commonly included in cross-comparative studies. See Jan Erk and Edward Koning, “New Structuralism and Institutional Change: Federalism between Centralization and Decentralization,” Comparative Political Studies 43, 3 (2010): 353–78. 4 For the question of “who does what,” see George Anderson, Federalism: An  Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 21. 5 Robert Agranoff, “Federal Evolution in Spain,” International Political Science Review 17, 4 (1996); Robert Agranoff, “Asymmetrical and Symmetrical Federalism in Spain” in Bertus de Villiers, ed., Evaluating Federal Systems (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff Publishers 1994); Miquel Caminal, El federalismo pluralista: Del federalismo nacional  al federalismo plurinacional (Barcelona: Paidós 2002); Eric Fossas, “Asymmetry and Plurinationality in Spain.” Working Paper 167, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona (1999); Ferran Requejo “Political Liberalism in Multinational States: The Legitimacy of Plural and Asymmetrical Federalism,” in Alain Gagnon and James Tully, eds., Multinational Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001); Ferran Requejo, Federalisme plurinacional i estat de les autonomies  (Barcelona: Proa 2003). 6 On this issue see Peter H. Schuck, “Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously,” The  Forum, 7, 3 (2009): 1–14. In this context, the subsidiarity principle suggests that unless there is a specific rationale to the contrary, the governments that are closer to the people (in this case, the ACs) should be responsible for the policies and programs. 7 This national identity criterion is linguistically based, since to say that Spain is multinational is basically the same as saying that it is multi-linguistic. In this sense the hypothesis of Erk and Koning is confirmed in immigration matters: federal institutions in countries with linguistically homogeneous bases have become more central, while the institutional structure in federations with linguistically heterogeneous bases has moved in the decentralizing direction. See Erk and Koning, “New Structuralism and Institutional Change.” 8 Ibid. 9 Related to the federalism-immigration nexus, and following P.J. Spiro’s seminal work, we define cooperative immigrant federalism as a model where “central government retains primary control and supervision over immigration decision making but enlists sub-national authorities as junior partners and allows them some discretion to assert or account for particular sub-national needs.” Peter J. Spiro “Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends,” International Social Science  Journal 53, 167 (2001): 67–73. 10 We must recognize that Catalonia provides the reference point not only in time: Catalonia’s first immigration plan dates from 1993, and it was the first in Spain, even predating that of the Central government. It also provides a reference point because of its innovative approach, having also introduced into the central government the citizenship approach to integration policies, which basically means considering that integration is a process of acquiring full citizenship, and also because

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11

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13

14

15 16

17

18 19 20 21 22 23

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it considers the two-way dimension, or mutual-adaptation dimension, of the process. Robert Agranof and Juan Antonio Ramos Gallarín, “Toward Federal Democracy in Spain: An Examination of Intergovernmental Relations,” Publius 27, 4 (1997): 1–38. César Colino and Luis Moreno, “Diversity and Unity in Spain’s estado de las  Autonomías,” in Rupak Chattopadhyay and Abigail Ostien Karos, eds., Dialogues on  Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries. A Global Dialogue on Federalism, Booklet Series vol. 7 (Canada: Forum of Federations and IACFS 2009), 41. There has been a President’s Conference (conferencia de Presidentes) since 2004, but one with very limited power and one that has had a very negative evaluation in its short life. There have been four Conferences since 2004 (October 2004, September 2005, January 2007, and December 2009), and only in the third conference, in 2007, did an agreement arise for the creation of a Sectoral Conference on Immigration, which also received very negative evaluation both because of its functioning and its limited powers. I discuss this institution below. Xavier Arbós Marín, “Relaciones intergubernamentales: Estado de la cuestión, cuestión de Estado.” In Maria José García Morales, José Antonio Montilla, and Xavier Arbós Marín, Las relaciones intergubernamentales en el Estado Autonómico (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales 2006). Colino and Moreno, “Diversity and Unity in Spain’s Estado de las Autonomías,” 42. Colino and Moreno, “Comparative Reflections on Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries,” in Chattopadhyay and Karos, eds., Dialogues on Diversity and Unity in  Federal Countries, 7–8. This pragmatism argument is also made in J José Luis Monereo Pérez, “La distribución de competencias en el Estado social autonómico en materia de políticas de empleo e inmigración,” Tribuna social no. 198 (2007): 33. Luis Moreno, “La federalización de la España plural,” Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i  Federals 8 (April 2010): 120. Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ed., Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels: Peter Lang 2009). See this argument in Colino and Moreno, “Comparative Reflections on Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries,” 4. See Zapata-Barrero, ed., Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations. For this term, see Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ed., Políticas y gobernabilidad de la Inmigración  en España (Barcelona: Ariel 2009) Ley Orgánica 2/2009, de 11 de diciembre, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social (Reform of the Constitutional Law 4/2000). J. Oliver Alonso, “Inmigración y mercado de trabajo en 2006: Razones de la acentuación del choque inmigratorio,” in Eliseo Aja and Joaquin Arango, eds., La inmigración en España en 2006: Anuario de inmigración y políticas de inmigración. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra 2007, 46.

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25 Alonso, “Inmigración y mercado de trabajo en 2006: Razones de la acentuación del choque inmigratorio,” 35. 26 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “Spain,” in Jan Niessen and Yogmi Schibel, eds., eu  and US  Approaches to the Management of Immigration: Comparative Perspectives (Brussels: Migration Policy Group 2003); Lorenzo Cachón-Rodríguez, “Los inmigrantes en el mercado de trabajo en España (1996–2004),” in Eliseo Aja and Joaquin Arango, eds., Veinte años de inmigración en España: Perspectivas jurídica y sociológica [1985– 2004] (Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB 2006). 27 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “The ‘Discovery’ of Immigration.” 28 Alonso, “Inmigración y mercado de trabajo en 2006: Razones de la acentuación del choque inmigratorio,” 32. 29 In addition to the other competencies related to immigrant integration, the reception policy is perhaps the only new one that needs to be defined in legal and political terms, since it is a competency that is very specific to integration. The others are standard policies already existing in our modern welfare state systems. See, among others, José María Alonso Seco, “Protección social e inmigración (y II): Comunidades Autónomas e Inmigración,” Foro de Seguridad Social 3 (2001): 16–24. 30 See press release April 2010. 31 Several works analyze the AC programs; see, among others, Antonio Izquierdo, “La inmigración hacia dentro: Argumentos sobre la necesidad de la coordinación de las políticas de inmigración en un Estado multinivel,” Política y Sociedad 45, 1(2008): 11–39; Lorenzo Cachón-Rodríguez, “La integración de y con los inmigrantes en España: Debates teóricos, políticas y diversidad territorial,” Política y Sociedad 45, 1 (2008): 205–35. 32 Ricard Zapata-Barrero “Dynamics of diversity in Spain: Old questions, New challenges,”  in Steven Vertovec and Susan Wessendorf, eds., The Multiculturalism Backlash:  European Discourses, Policies and Practices (London: Routledge 2010). 33 PECI, 158. 34 Zapata-Barrero, ed., Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations. 35 The European Commission proposed the concept of “civic citizenship” in its Communication of November 2000 and defined it as a set of rights and basic duties that immigrants acquire gradually over a period of several years, so that they receive the same treatment as citizens of their host state, although they have not been naturalized. 36 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ed., Políticas y gobernabilidad de la Inmigración en España  (Barcelona: Ariel 2009). 37 See David Moya, “La reforma de la Ley de Extranjería, DT 20/2009” (Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano 2009). 38 See the website of the ministry: http://www.mtin.es/. 39 See Eduard Roig, “Relaciones intergubernamentales en materia de inmigración: desarrollo de un modelo en construcción,” in Eliseo Aja, ed., Las Comunidades  Autónomas y la inmigración (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch 2006): 98–114; Izquierdo, “La inmigración hacia dentro.”

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40 Peter J. Spiro, “Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends,” International  Social Science Journal 53, 167 (2001). 41 The term refers to a system of labor quotas intended to channel immigration flows towards sectors of the Spanish economy with a shortage of labour force. 42 This is also the case for the new Statute of Andalucia Autonomous Community. For a comparison of the impact of the different Statutes of Autonomy on state immigration norms see, among others, Eduardo Rojo and Ferran Camas “La reforma de los estatutos de autonomía y su impacto en la normativa estatal de inmigración,” Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración 80 (2008): 97–117. 43 Since 2002 the government has restricted the quota to foreign workers from countries that have signed bilateral agreements with Spain: Morocco, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. These bilateral agreements not only function as mechanisms of control of immigration but they also enable the repatriation of illegal immigrants and channel labour into sectors where there is a shortage. 44 Alfons Fomariz, Xavier Aranda, Miquel Casanovas, and Pep Vidal, De l’acollida a la  ciutadania: La formació de la població adulta inmigrada (Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill 2010). 45 This new Education Law (LO 2/2006, of 3 May) introduced new norms for admissions policy, changed the curricula with regard to religious education, introduced the subject “education for citizenship,” and established “attention to diversity” as a basic principle of the educational system. On this issue, see Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “Education as a Mirror of Spanish Society: Challenges and Policies towards Multiple Diversity,” Omnes: The Journal of Multicultural Society 2 (2010): 65–100. 46 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ed., Citizenship Policies in the Age of Diversity (Barcelona: Cidob Foundation 2009). 47 Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Jonathan Zaragoza, “La gestión del derecho de voto de los inmigrantes en España,” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ed., Políticas y gobernabilidad  de la inmigración en España (Barcelona: Ariel 2009). 48 The principle of reciprocity conditions the voting rights of immigrants in Spain in the following way: immigrants whose country of origin grants voting rights to Spanish emigrants living in its territory receive equivalent political rights in Spain (Norway is an example and also, in principle, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela). However, this leads to the differential granting of political rights to immigrants and therefore undermines the objective of common integration. 49 Laura Morales, Amparo Gonzalez, and Laia Jorba, “Políticas de incorporación y la gestión del asociacionismo de la población de origen inmigrante a nivel local,” in Zapata-Barrero, ed., Políticas y gobernabilidad de la Inmigración en España. 50 See the website http://www.interculturalitat.cat/ and also Ricard Zapata-Barrero “Dynamics of Diversity in Spain: Old Questions, New Challenges,” in Steven Vertovec and Susan Wessendorf, eds., The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses,  Policies and Practices (London: Routledge 2010): 181–200. 51 Zapata-Barrero, ed., Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations, 127.

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52 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, El turno de los inmigrantes: Esferas de justicia y políticas de acomodación (Madrid: Imserso Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 2002). 53 The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (Estatut de Catalunya) sets out the basic Catalonian institutional regulations. It defines the rights and obligations of the citizens of Catalonia, the political institutions of the Catalan nationality and their competences, and relations with the Spanish State and the financing of the Government of Catalonia. www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/index.htm. 54 Sentencia 31/2010 de 28 de Junio de 2010. Recurso de Inconstitucionalidad 8045–2006; 263–8. http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/resolucionesrecientes/ Documents/SENTENCIA_RI_8045-2006.pdf. 55 For more details, see http://www.iceta.org/dt100108.pdf [Sept. 2008]. 56 See press release August 2010. 57 “They want to preserve the regional language boundary in order to maintain their claims to self-government within a federation. If a national linguistic minority were to become a minority in its own province through intermarriage, the immigration of other groups, or the emigration of its own members, this demographic shift would undermine its power to claim regional autonomy and special representation at the federal level.” Rainer Bauböck, “Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights, and Self-government,” in Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds., Citizenship Today (Washington: Carnegie 2001), 333. 58 Angel Miret, “La gestión de la división de comptenecias en materia de inmigración,” in Zapata-Barrero, ed., Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración en España. 59 See also Izquierdo, “La inmigración hacia dentro.” This coordination problem and challenge is also mentioned in the clarifying work of Alonso Seco, “Protección social e inmigración (y II)”: “We are in the expected dialectic between the various entities that make up our constitutional state, which, in my opinion, have only one solution, to establish mechanisms for coordination and cooperation, but without assuming that either the State or the Autonomous Communities have to abandon the responsibilities that they have and must uphold by the original or acquired powers” (translated from the Spanish by the author: “Estamos ante la esperada dialectica entre los distintos entes que conforman nuestro Estado constitucional, que, a mi juicio, sólo tiene una única solución, la de establecer mecanismos de coordinación y cooperación, pero sin que ni Estado ni comunidades autónomas dejen de asumir las responsabilidades propias por las competencias originarias o adquiridas que tienen y han de ejercer”). 60 Carmen Lamela, “Migración interna de los extranjeros,” in Antonio Izquierdo, ed., Demografía de los extranjeros: Incidencia en el crecimiento de la población (Bilbao: Fundación BBVA 2006); Joaquin Recaño, “La movilidad geográfica de la población extranjera en España: Un fenómeno emergente,” Cuadernos de Geografía 72 (2002) 61 Spiro, “Federalism and immigration: Models and Trends.” 62 Alonso Seco, “Protección social e inmigración (y II),” 19. 63 This is also the important issue highlighted by JL Monereo. Expressed globally, but applied to the case of Spain (2007, 16), “the problem lies in establishing the

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distribution of competences and their limits (the line of demarcation of responsibilities) to combine the fact of diversity (of country or region) with the demands of unity and homogeneity” (translated from the Spanish by the author: “el problema reside en establecer la distribución de competencias y sus límites (la línea de demarcación competencial) para conjugar el hecho diferencial (país o región) con las exigencias de unidad y homogeneidad”).

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7 Switzerland G i a n n i D ’Amato In contrast to what is observed in a good deal of the literature in this field, the multicultural composition of Switzerland has had only a limited impact on immigrant integration policies and outcomes. Instead, as this chapter seeks to demonstrate, the institutional structures inherent in the political history of Switzerland, such as consociationalism, direct democracy, the autonomy of the municipalities and, obviously, the federal structure, have had the most influence on integration policies. After briefly reviewing the background, the second section of this chapter describes, by way of an historical overview and demographic data, the process of integration and its impact on the founding myths during the twentieth century. The third section highlights the importance of various stakeholders and the evolution of particular migration policies at the cantonal level. The fourth section analyses external factors and opportunity structures that may have affected policy development. It shows that federalism, municipal autonomy, and a consensus-oriented political culture have affected admission and integration policies as much as external influences (e.g., foreign governments, the European Union). The influence of these factors on Switzerland’s immigration and integration policies are explored further in the conclusion.

Bac k grou n d Switzerland is renowned for its neutrality and peaceful attitudes, its ethnic and linguistic diversity, and a decentralized form of government through which most laws are made at the canton level (the federal structure is reviewed in greater detail below). Yet there is good reason for immigrant control and integration policies to figure large. This federal country has been challenged since its birth – in the aftermath of the successful liberal Constitution of 1848 – by centrifugal forces at the religious, regional, political, social, and ideological levels. Certain foreign scholars, puzzled by

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Switzerland’s apparent enduring stability (and overlooking a history of conflicts from the civil war of 1847 until the social unrest of the 1930s), identify its source in the clever management of a multicultural country through its federal institutions. Some see Switzerland as a “paradigmatic case of political integration,” the result of a government structure that supports both strong municipal autonomy and a comparatively well-informed constituency when it comes to voting.1 For others, the source of the country’s stability lies in the successful creation of a strong national identity that helped overcome the social distrust that arose during rapid industrialization. This identity was based on the country’s small size and the idea that Switzerland was under permanent threat from powerful neighbouring countries, i.e. a fear that foreign influences could destabilize the country from within.  Switzerland nevertheless had one of the highest immigration rates in Europe during the twentieth century. In 2009, 25.8 per cent of the 7.8 million people comprising the total population were foreign born, and 23 percent, or nearly 1.8 million, were foreign nationals. The proportion of foreign nationals is twice as high as in the United States (12.5 per cent in 2009) and considerably higher than in Canada (19.8 per cent in 2006), two countries widely considered as prototypes of countries of immigration. In contrast to its internal pluralistic character, however, officially and according to a popular view Switzerland never considered itself as a country of immigration. This is reflected in the absence of an immigrant policy at the federal level and the lack of facilitated access to Swiss citizenship for the second generation, or jus soli regulations.2 This policy of “prevention” influenced the country’s decision not to admit Jewish refugees after 1933 and also affected the implementation of a guest worker rotation model after the Second World War.3 Another inconsistency concerns the handling of admission and integration issues at the political level. After the World War II, Switzerland was a popular destination for guest workers from Italy and, later, from other countries. A labour-force-demanding economy wanted them and was supported by the Swiss government in preparing bilateral agreements. Nevertheless, in complete absence of the social hardships encountered in its neighbouring countries (high unemployment rates among migrants, ethnic and social segregation, social unrest, etc.), the immigration issue has been a contentious topic since the 1960s. This discrepancy can be explained through a careful analysis of how admission and integration policies evolved in Switzerland.

Immigr ation P at t e r n s Switzerland’s reputation as an ideal place for exiles dates back to the sixteenth century, when the Huguenots of France were welcomed as religious refugees and found their place among the cultural, political, and

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entrepreneurial elite of what is today Switzerland. But the modern transformation of Switzerland into a country of immigration contre  coeur took place during its accelerated industrial take-off in the second half of the nineteenth century.4 In contrast to its rural image, the Swiss Confederation was a European forerunner in various areas of modern mechanical and chemical industries and has had an enormous need to invest in knowledge and infrastructures to meet the demands of these industries. While many rural inhabitants were leaving Switzerland to make their living in the New World, a significant number of German intellectuals fleeing from the failed liberal revolutions of 1848–49 found their place at the local universities. Italian craftsmen and workers were also recruited at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century, mainly in the construction business and the railroad sector. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the size of the foreign population in Swiss cities increased: at the turn of the century, 41 percent of the population in Geneva, 28 percent in Basel, and 29 percent in Zurich were born outside Switzerland. Nationwide, Germans outnumbered the Italians and the French.5 Moreover, the proportion of foreign nationals in the total population increased from 3 percent in 1850 to 14.7 percent on the eve of World War I, mostly from neighbouring countries. During the two world wars, however, the foreign population decreased significantly. By 1941, Switzerland’s foreign population had dropped to 5.2 percent.6 In the liberal period preceding the World War I, immigration was largely the responsibility of the cantons, whose laws had to conform to bilateral agreements signed between Switzerland and other European states. Through the agreements, Switzerland remained open to immigrants in order to ensure that Swiss citizens could also easily emigrate to find work. However, after the first campaign against the presence of foreign nationals in Switzerland during World War I, a new article was introduced into the Constitution in 1925. It gave the federal government the power to address immigration issues at the national level, thus providing the legal basis for the existence of the federal aliens police and the Law on Residence and Settlement of Foreigners, which came into force in 1931.7 This law gave the police discretion in the implementation of immigration policy, although at the time the stated aim was maintaining national identity, rather than regulating migration. Essentially, the authorities had to factor into their decisions the country’s moral and economic interests, as well as the Grad der Überfremdung, or the “degree of over-foreignization.” Nationwide political consensus on cultural “purity” prevented the drafting of any consistent immigrant policy until very recently. In principle, foreigners without work were not allowed to settle permanently and had to leave the country.

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Postwa r La b our Mig r at io n Shortly after World War II, the economic demands of neighbouring countries engaged in economic recovery stimulated rapid growth in the Swiss economy. In the context of the postwar economic boom, Switzerland signed an agreement with the Italian government in 1948 for the recruitment of Italian guest workers. The workers were mainly employed in the construction sector but also in textile and machine factories. An increasing flow of foreign workers immigrated to Switzerland: from 285,000 in 1950 (6.1 percent of the total population) to 585,000 (10.8 percent) in 1960 and to 1,080,000 (17.2 percent) in 1970. Predominantly Italian during the 1950s, the composition of immigrants diversified in the 1960s. A similar agreement was signed with Spain in 1961. By 1970, although more than 50 percent of immigrants were still Italian, about 20 percent came from Germany, France, and Austria, while 10 percent came from Spain and 4 percent from Yugoslavia, Portugal, and Turkey.8 Initially, those immigrants with temporary seasonal permits were entitled to stay for one year, although their contracts could be prolonged, which frequently happened. To ensure the workers did not settle permanently and could be sent home, the period of residence required for obtaining a permanent residence permit was increased from five to ten years, and restrictive conditions on family reunion were adopted. This policy was called the “rotation model” because it meant that new workers could be brought in as others returned home. As the Swiss economy boomed throughout the 1960s, the guest worker system became less tightly controlled. Switzerland faced increasing pressure from Italy to introduce more generous family reunification regulations. As a result, the number of Italian workers willing to come to Switzerland decreased, while other destinations, such as Germany, became more attractive. In addition, internal economic development in Italy started a wave of internal migration, particularly to destinations in northern Italy. Following the 1973 oil crisis, demand for many workers decreased, and many workers were forced to leave the country because they lacked adequate unemployment insurance. This allowed Switzerland to “export” its unemployment by not renewing residence permits of guest workers.9 The percentage of the foreign population fell from 17.2 percent in 1970 to 14.8 percent in 1980. But as the economy recovered, new guest workers arrived not only from Italy, but also from Spain, Portugal, and Turkey. Their share of the population increased from 14.8 percent (945,000 persons) in 1980 to 18.1 percent (1,245,000 persons) in 1990 and 22.4 percent in 2000 (nearly 1.5 million people).10 Because of the long economic boom and a more lenient application of the rotation model to attract needed workers, many guest workers were able to meet permanent residence requirements.

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By the time the worldwide recession of the early 1990s reached Switzerland, the unskilled and aging guest workers suffered high rates of unemployment and found it very difficult to find new jobs. This situation led to an unprecedented level of structural unemployment and poverty, one that Switzerland had not experienced previously. The larger cities, which according to the subsidiary logic of the Swiss federal system, are responsible for welfare, urged the federal government to support extended integration programs for immigrant workers.11 A new admission policy was needed to combine the evolving needs of a new economy with those of migration control.

A sylum Pol icy After World War II, the Swiss government recognized that its authorities had been responsible for denying admission to many Jewish refugees. The government stressed its willingness to uphold the country’s humanitarian tradition and in 1955 signed the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. During the two decades that followed, the country adopted a liberal policy, offering asylum to refugees from communist countries in Eastern Europe. In 1956, 14,000 Hungarians were allowed to settle permanently after their country’s uprising against Soviet troops, and in 1968, 12,000 Czechoslovakian nationals arrived in Switzerland.12 In the mid-1970s, the arrival of a few hundred Chilean dissidents who had fled Pinochet’s regime ignited controversy about their eligibility for asylum. Between 1979 and 1982, Switzerland offered protection to approximately 8,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian “boat people,”13 who were accepted on the basis of yearly quotas. Their subsequent integration process was more difficult than that of any previous refugee group.14 All these events prompted the creation of a federal asylum policy in 1981, which codified the country’s relatively generous practices. It defined the rules of the refugee status determination procedure and gave the Confederation policy-making power in this field, while clearly giving the cantons the responsibility for implementing these policies. In domains such as welfare, education, and repatriation, the powers of the cantons in making refugee-related decisions are significant. As a result, there were major differences in outcomes among the cantons. After 1981, two trends emerged. First, the number of applications, which had been steady at about a thousand a year during the 1970s, increased exponentially. Second, most of the refugees – except for a large number from Poland in 1982 – came from other parts of the world: Turkey, Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Unlike the anti-communist dissidents, they were not always professional or university-educated. In addition, a weak economy made it difficult for these non-European refugees to find work. By

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the mid-1980s, asylum had become a sensitive subject. In public debates, refugees were called “asylum seekers” who did not deserve refugee status. Subsequent revisions to the 1981 law created stricter procedures. The government gradually started accepting fewer asylum requests, even from people fleeing civil wars and violence. As a rough indicator of this trend, the proportion of applications accepted averaged 86 percent between 1975 and 1979. This dropped to an average of 47 percent between 1980 and 1984, and then to an average of 6 percent between 1985 and 1990.15

The impact of th e Cons t it u t io n a l St r u c t u r e on Immigrant Integ r at io n P o l ic ie s Switzerland is a confederation of twenty-six cantons that have a large degree of autonomy with regard to education policy, police, and taxation. Reflecting this principle, the Swiss Parliament consists of two chambers: the National Council and the Council of States. New laws must be passed by both chambers, but can be overturned in a popular referendum (which can be triggered by fifty thousand signatures). The mechanisms of decision making in Switzerland are complex. The Swiss population does not directly elect the members of the government (i.e., the Federal Council), as it does at the cantonal level: at the federal level the election of the government is the prerogative of the Parliament. The seven members of the Federal Council are elected for four years. Parliament cannot give and withdraw a vote of confidence to the Federal Council, which gives the government a certain amount of autonomy with regard to the Parliament. However, the autonomy of the government is restricted by the two instruments of Swiss direct democracy: the referendum and the popular initiative. The popular initiative gives citizens the right to seek a decision on an amendment they want integrated into the Constitution. For such an initiative to be organized, the signatures of one hundred thousand voters must be collected within eighteen months. Federal laws are subject to an optional referendum: in this case, a popular ballot is cast if fifty thousand citizens request such an action. The signatures must be collected within a hundred days of a decree’s publication. The referendum is similar to a veto. For such a plebiscite to pass, a majority of those voting is required. At the cantonal and municipal levels, voters can also launch popular initiatives; cantonal laws are subject to the optional referendum. As a federal state, Switzerland is confronted with the challenges of multilevel governance. Certain centralizing mechanisms, which in Germany and the United States are enforced by the Supreme Court, are less successful in Switzerland. Centralizing legal approaches are counteracted by Parliament and the people. As Wolf Linder has stated, an important limitation on the central-government institutions in Switzerland is provided by the limited

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possibilities for coercive implementation of federal policies.16 In this sense, federal political authorities are often compelled to induce cooperation with the cantons by offering financial subsidies. This federal structure may have an advantage, since knowledge of local interests can lead to quicker, more appropriate decisions, ensuring greater recognition of particular interests (e.g., minorities). While the federation has the legislative power in most areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides to a large extent with the cantons. For the federation, this has the advantage of reducing its workload; for the cantons the advantage lies in controlling their own program priorities and being able to adapt federal policies to local contexts. However, this often difficult implementation of overarching federal policies may lead to neglect of the broader context and induce adverse effects that vary throughout the country. Adrian Vatter explains that the inadequate level of cooperation between the federation and the cantons lies with the less than precise delineation of tasks between the two levels of the system.17 Consequently, new tasks, for example integration policies, are passed back and forth between the cantons and the federation. Whereas active cantons fulfill the obligations coming from the central government, others complain and call for (financial) help. This makes it necessary to provide the federation with further responsibilities for support and sanctions. The result is usually an increasing standardization of the implementation process, stricter criteria for federal subsidies, and stronger policy integration between the federation and the cantons. Other factors that lie at the root of the implementation problem in different political fields are inadequate horizontal coordination; overly complex procedures; large disparities among the cantonal administrations in financial, legal, and human resources; the limited financial capacity of the federation; and insufficient regard by the federation for the specific regional context. These aspects of the Swiss federal state also affect integration policies. In this case, the central actors are the cantons and the municipalities. In particular, cantons have room for manoeuvre when in comes to the promotion and implementation of integration provisions as recommended by federal institutions. In many cantons the Cantonal Offices for Migration are the actors who decide how the law is to be interpreted and implemented and develop measures intended to help migrants to integrate in areas such as education, health, and security. Studies analysing the implementation of integration policies by the cantons are still in their infancy, but they are beginning to become available.18

Federal is m a nd it s Impact o n Mig r at io n P o l ic ie s Since immigration and integration policies in Switzerland are intrinsically bound by the Swiss institutional structure, this section will first present the

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main actors in policy-making and then discuss the recent changes in admission, asylum, integration, and naturalization policies. Actors in Policy-making Until 2005, two federal offices within the Federal Department of Justice and Police dealt with foreign nationals living in Switzerland: the Federal Office for Refugees (FOR) and the Federal Office for Immigration, Integration and Emigration (IMES). The first office was introduced in 1991 in reaction to the influx of asylum seekers since the 1980s. The second was founded in 2000, although its beginnings date back to the implementation of the 1931 Law on Residence and Settlement of Foreigners, when the main task of the administration was to prevent the “over-foreignization” of Switzerland and to enforce assimilation policies for foreigners. These two offices were merged into the Federal Office for Migration (FOM) in 2005. One branch in the new FOM continues to be responsible for the implementation of Swiss asylum policy. Another picks up where IMES left off, implementing the admission policy, which includes the enforcement of laws regarding residence in Switzerland (immigration and residence section) and assessing labour market needs (labour market section).19 The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which is part of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs  (DEA), is the government agency responsible for questions about economics and labour. SECO has influenced Swiss labour migration policy since 1945 by determining the qualitative and quantitative needs of the market. At the federal level, there were three important permanent commissions, namely the Federal Commission for Foreigners (FCF), the Federal Commission for Refugees (CFR) – both advisory bodies reporting to the government and to the Federal Office for Migration – and the Federal Commission against Racism (FCR). The Federal Commission against Racism is part of the Federal Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Within the DHA, there is the Service de lutte contre le racisme, an interlocutor that coordinates the activities of various actors participating in the fight against racism. Among other activities, it administers a fund for anti-racism projects. In 2008, the FCF and the CFR were merged into one commission, the Federal Commission on Migration (FCM). All these commissions form an important interest group involved in the consultations concerning new laws. In particular, in the area of migration policy, the political processes and policy-making are dominated by preparliamentary negotiations and direct democracy, while Parliament plays a secondary role.20 Significantly, the two levels of policy-making and political process are also characterized by different political styles.21 While in pre-parliamentary negotiations, compromise is the final objective of the

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consultation process, in which expert commissions can play a decisive role, the arena of direct democracy is mainly determined by confrontational attitudes and divisive outcomes. At the federal level, Switzerland’s most important political parties are the “centrist block,” composed of the Liberal-Democratic Party (FDP) and the Christian Democrats (CVP); the nationalist-conservative Swiss People’s Party (SVP); and the left-wing parties, namely the Social Democrats (SPS) and the Green Party (GP). With the exception of the GP, all parties are members of the government. The SVP is an important stakeholder in the debates on migration and asylum policy. Formerly the centrist party of artisans and peasants, it changed into a radical modern populist party once the charismatic lawyer and entrepreneur Christoph Blocher took over its Zurich branch in the late 1970s. The SVP supported a popular initiative aiming to reduce the number of residents illegally residing in Switzerland and was in charge of an initiative taken against “asylum abuse.” In Zurich, the party launched an initiative demanding that all requests for naturalization be subject to popular referendum, and in 2009 they successfully fought to constitutionally ban the construction of minarets. Trade unions and employer’s representatives traditionally always play a role in the formulation of Swiss immigration policy. They exert their influence both formally, through the consultation procedure that is as a central part of Swiss law-making, and informally, by helping to determine the number of foreigners allowed into Switzerland. Owing to the state’s federal structure, the cantons are also very influential actors in the formulation of government policies. The cantons’ sphere of authority over policies affecting foreigners includes the aliens’ police and is focused on determining the needs of the labour market. Furthermore, the cantons are responsible for the implementation of integration measures. Since the Confederation does not have a federal police force, the cantons are responsible for maintaining public order and enforcing decisions involving repatriation. Thus, it is through their competence and experience in implementing measures concerning asylum seekers that the cantons contribute significantly to the formulation of Swiss policy in this area. The Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Justice and Police (CCMJP) has become increasingly vocal in its position on questions of interior security (e.g., concerning crimes committed by foreigners) and asylum. Cooperation with the municipalities is important, since the municipalities are responsible for the accommodation of asylum seekers and refugees and must pay for costs associated with the social welfare of legal immigrants. They believe that their concerns are not sufficiently taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of asylum and immigration policies. Larger cities, notably Zurich, have recently launched initiatives on the asylum issue, inciting major debate. Smaller municipalities have also

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been in the headlines: one municipality refused to accommodate the requested number of asylum seekers; others have banned asylum seekers from accessing public areas such as schools, playgrounds, and soccer fields. NGOs also play a role in implementing Swiss asylum policy. They offer social counselling and legal advice to asylum seekers. The Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe (SFH),  the Swiss Refugee Council, an umbrella organization of Swiss asylum organizations, seeks to influence political decisionmaking by publishing position papers on various asylum-related questions. The Forum pour l’integration des migrantes et des migrants (FIMM Suisse) was created in 2001 and is composed of 330 representatives. FIMM is the umbrella organization of all foreigners’ associations in Switzerland. It organizes public debates on issues concerning foreigners in Switzerland (e.g., Schengen agreements), collaborates with the federal authorities (FOM, FCM), and participates in the consultation procedures. Recent Changes in Admission Policies The following paragraphs describe how the different interest groups consult with the federal administration during the policy-making process in Parliament and, not least of all, through direct democracy processes. There have been two major changes in the last few years regarding regular immigration. First, June 2002 saw the entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the EU member states. Second came an admission policy applicable to third-country nationals that would prove more restrictive than the policy Switzerland had pursued thus far, resulting in admitting “only urgently required qualified workers” from outside the EU/EFTA area. The positive migration balance changed sharply after the 2002 enactment of the bilateral agreements. In the 2000 the balance was 24,898, including 88,000 immigrants. In 2009, the balance tripled to 79,000 (the immigration of 138,000 persons and the emigration of 57,000 persons (see figure 7.1). At present, work permits are only issued to executives, specialists, and other highly qualified workers from outside the EU/EFTA area if no Swiss or EU/efta national meets the requirements. When issuing residence permits, the authorities further consider candidates’ professional qualifications, their ability to adapt to professional requirements, language skills, and age. If a person meets the criteria established in these areas, he or she should in theory be able to achieve sustainable integration into the Swiss labour market and the social environment.22 In 2006 a new Aliens Law was passed despite a referendum that was intended to prevent the introduction of a two-class admission system between EU and non-EU immigrants. At the time, the reform was supported only by the CVP and the FDP, while the SVP did not want to introduce any

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200,000

150,000

100,000 50,000

0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

-50,000

-100,000 Immigration

Figure 7.1

Emigration

Balance

Immigration and emigration of foreigners to and from Switzerland

Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office – petra, espop.

improvement for third-country nationals, denying them the opportunity for family reunification. The political left – notably the SPS, the GP, and the unions – criticized the discriminatory partitioning of foreigners into two categories, which vividly evoked old initiatives that had been rejected by the population. The new Aliens Law was ratified by the National Council with support from the CVP and the FDP. The SPS also approved this bill, primarily to avoid hindering further negotiations and to prevent a more restrictive interpretation from emerging. The GP and the SVP refused to support the law for opposite reasons: the former out of human rights concerns, the latter because the bill was not strict enough to fight abuses. In December 2003, the new Federal Council thus elected a council member to be responsible for migration issues, minister of justice Christoph Blocher (SVP), who would present a more restrictive version of the bill in the Swiss Council of States. In quantitative terms, the new bill – like the old law – paved the way for authorities to pursue a more permissive or a more restrictive admission policy, as necessary. The decisive factors for determining Switzerland’s quotas of persons to be admitted from outside the EU/EFTA are the current economic situation and the need for labour in certain segments of the market. The authorities will continue to be able to adopt a quota for third-country nationals.

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The policy’s basic principle is that admission must serve the interest of the entire economy, not particular interests. A such, professional qualifications and the ability to integrate should play decisive roles. Moreover, admission must take Switzerland’s social and demographic needs into account. In contrast to previous regulations, a limited opening of the market to self-employed people is foreseen in the new law if the activity is likely to stimulate competition. Increased competition should promote the economic efficiency and, in the long run, guarantee the international competitiveness of Swiss companies. When labour market needs were reassessed in the 1990s, postwar migration policy was identified as one of the main reasons for reduced investments and a decline of Swiss competitiveness in various new industrial areas.23 On the one hand, the new Aliens Law constitutes a greater barrier for nationals of non-EU/EFTA states wishing to enter Switzerland. On the other hand, the situation for foreigners who lawfully and permanently reside in Switzerland is improved by better opportunities to change occupations or jobs or cantons. The subsequent immigration of families of short-term residents and students is also to be permitted, provided that residential and financial requirements are satisfied (see table 7.1). These measures are thought to facilitate integration, simplify procedures for employers and authorities, and ensure uniform application of the law. In the aforementioned areas, the law aims to harmonize the rules applicable to third-country nationals with those applicable to EU/EFTA nationals.24 Recent Changes in Asylum Policies As it did elsewhere in Western Europe, asylum migration gained increasing importance during the 1980s. Although asylum recognition rates decreased in the 1990s, many asylum seekers were able to remain in Switzerland under subsidiary protection or for humanitarian reasons.25 While their rights were restricted during a period of time set by the canton – their access to the labour market and welfare were limited and family reunification was forbidden – most of those granted protection were later able to settle permanently. In the 1990s, war in the former Yugoslavia prompted a massive influx of asylum seekers from Bosnia and Kosovo, many of whom had family ties in Switzerland from earlier labour migration. Between 1990 and 2002, Switzerland received 146,587 asylum applications from the war-torn Balkans. According to the Swiss Federal Office for Migration, some 10,000 persons were granted asylum, and 62,000 received temporary or subsidiary protection over the course of several years.26 The Swiss public became concerned about the increasing number of asylum applications, largely because the economy was in recession and unemployment was on the rise. Thus, the federal government adopted

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Table 7.1 Immigration and Emigration of Foreigners to and from Switzerland, by Type of Residence Permit, 2009 (in thousands) Type of Residence Permit Temporary residence permit (B and Ci permits)

Immigration 1

Emigration

Balance

103.9

38.5

65.4

Permanent residence permit (C permit)1

2.4

11.2

-8.8

Short-term residence permit (≥ 12 months) (L permit)

0.0

4.8

-4.7

International civil servants, diplomats

7.1

4.8

2.3

Short-term residence permit (< 12 months) (L permit)

88.2

71.7

16.4

Asylum-related permit (N permit)

14.5

10.3

4.1

0.7

0.4

0.3

Temporarily admitted foreigners (F permit) Source: Swiss Federal Statistic Office – PETRA, ESPOP. 1 Immigration including transfers from asylum process.

administrative and legal measures to speed up the processing of applications and the implementation of decisions. And after numerous partial revisions, a completely revised Asylum Law came into force in 1999. It introduced new grounds for non-admission to the regular asylum procedure. This meant that applicants who stayed in the country illegally prior to their request or who did not submit travel or identity documents would generally be refused asylum. On the other hand – and as a concession to humanitarian arguments – the law now allowed temporary collective protection of war refugees, giving Kosovars and Bosnians temporary admission. Despite the steady decrease in asylum requests – in 2003 the number of requests fell nearly 20 percent from the previous year (21,759 in absolute numbers) – the SVP continued to battle asylum inflows (see table 7.2). Their initiative against asylum abuses did not pass the ballot in 2002 (it failed with the narrowest result in Swiss history: 49.9 percent). Seeing themselves as a moral winner, the SVP demanded a new asylum initiative in June 2003. This initiative by SVP chairman Blocher, also still an MP at the time, provoked the other parties. They condemned the SVP move as a form of blackmail, not to mention pure electioneering. The other parties responded with a revision of the Asylum Law, expressing the desire to transfer competences for asylum matters completely to the federal level. Another idea was to exclude uncooperative and liable asylum seekers at the beginning of the asylum procedure, as well as to exclude those who had stayed in the country illegally. They were to be punished with a prison sentence or expulsion.27 The Political Institutions Committee of the National Council decided to take both revisions to the vote simultaneously. Meanwhile, the SVP had plans to bring forward a revision of the Asylum Law.28 The government interpreted realistically the population’s sceptical attitude towards asylum policy, yet the decreasing number of asylum requests no

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Table 7.2 Asylum Applications and Approvals in Switzerland, 2000–10 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

2006

2007 2008 2009

2010

Total asylum 19,750 21,854 26,987 21,759 15,061 10,795 11,173 10,844 16,606 16,005 15,567 applications Granted asylum Application declined DAWES

2,080

1,610 1,529

1,467

1,827

1,537 2,261 2,622

3,449

13,572 14,306 15,493 10,898 7,735

6,536

3,800

4,483 5,750 6,541

640

49

174

173

2,227 1,720

54

42

52

30

111

99

103

16

Source: Federal Office for Migration – Asylum statistics ZEMIS. 1 DAWES: decision to dismiss an application without entering into the substance of the case.

longer supported this interpretation. Support from the people was to be regained by means of a new asylum law. In future, asylum seekers whose requests could not be accommodated would be treated as illegal foreigners without any rights to claim social welfare benefits. They would be transferred to the less attractive, though constitutionally protected, system of emergency aid, which is submitted to continuous administrative controls. Through this change, the government anticipated additional annual savings of approximately 77 million CHF, as well as an increase in the number of repatriations and a lessening of Switzerland’s attraction as a destination country. However, only a few years before the cantons and cities had refused to support a similar measure, fearing the impact it would have on their housing costs (cantons and municipalities are responsible for emergency aid).29 But with the SVP’s electoral success, the mood in Parliament shifted, leading to a more restrictive policy. Blocher, at that time elected by Parliament as a federal councillor, was dissatisfied with approved changes of the National Council and introduced modification requests concerning consultation of the Council of States. The cantons welcomed these coercive measures as much as the centreright FDP and CVP, while welfare organizations and the left voiced fundamental concerns about this revision. Blocher’s argumentation passed the Council of States and the second reading in the National Council with a large majority. The newspaper Neue  Zürcher  Zeitung noted with astonishment how unanimously all centre-right parties stood behind Blocher and expressed surprise over the fact that no further suggestions were introduced in the formulation of a future migration policy. This seemed to prove “how much the mood had changed after Christoph Blocher had taken over the department of justice. Today bills are passed with large majorities whereas a few years ago they would have caused doubt and refusal in the political centre-right. The left, the charitable organizations and the churches have not reacted to these changes and, furthermore, practically

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oppose all changes in the whole country instead of focusing on some really problematic reinforcement of the law.” 30 Together with the Aliens Law, the Asylum Law was submitted to a popular referendum and passed the ballot with a three-to-one vote in September 2006, subsequently coming into operation in 2008. Recent Changes in Integration Policies When the Swiss government abandoned its rotation policy in the early 1960s, it recognized that the alternative could only be a policy of integration. The belief, both then and now, however, is that in the course of time integration will occur naturally through participation in the labour market and in schools, as well as in associations, labour unions, clubs, churches, and neighbourhoods, and through other informal networks. But immigrants are expected to dissociate themselves from their former community: “After several years of residence, [they] should ... no longer be reliant on the community of their fellow countrymen, but start to live as Swiss.”31 Since the 1970s, the Confederation’s main integration policy has been aiming to improve the legal status of immigrants, reunite families more quickly, and grant immigrants a more secure status. In order to facilitate the integration of foreigners and to respond to the public’s concerns about foreigners, the government established the Federal Commission for Foreigners (FCF) in 1970, which was to “study the social problems of foreign workforces … and to address in particular questions regarding social care, the adaptation to our working and living conditions, assimilation and naturalization.”32 After the migratory confusion of the 1980s – the sudden increase of asylum seekers, a first asylum law, the substitution of the Italian guest workers with workers from Yugoslavia and Portugal – the concept of integration won acceptance in the 1990s. The metaphor of assimilation did not seem to be adequate anymore, but multiculturalism could not gain ground. The concept of integration took shape, in particular, in the context of the political discussions of the 1990s on the revaluation of urban areas. Cities tried to position themselves in an international competition over geographic locations and were meanwhile confronted with social difficulties that were identified as strictly related to migration. The debate on integration had been connected since the second half of the 1990s with urbanism and urban development; it led to the formulation of official integration guidelines in cities such as Berne, Zurich, and Basle. Integration was the new buzz word, a fresh and powerful idea ready to shape the Swiss policies on immigrants. Exempt from the constrictions of ordinary social policies but also from the debts towards “old-fashioned” humanitarian beliefs, integration became an unexpected creative element for the design of future migration policies.

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At the beginning of the 1990s a government report stated that in the future “to a larger extent than before, measures should be taken to encourage integration at all levels of the polity.”33 The promotion of integration was included in the legislative planning of 1995–99 as a new target, and in 1996, the FCF submitted a report34 delineating the outlines of an integration policy: “certain groups of people, such as Muslims, Turks and nationals from the former Yugoslavia must be prevented from being pushed into the role of problematic foreigners, thereby being even more discriminated against and isolated.”35 Therefore, after the strong lobbying of the cities during the economic crisis of the 1990s, the Swiss alien policy adapted to the new reality, considering the integration of foreigners as a prerequisite for achieving a politically and socially sustainable immigration policy. There was no clear and binding definition of the term: integration was open to a liberal and a conservative interpretation with respect to future policies. Liberals understood integration as a means to encourage participation in mainstream society. Migrants were supposed to be willing to integrate, but some of them needed particular help or promotion (Fördern). This open interpretation of integration was contrasted with a conservative reading that emphasized the need for mandatory and coercive measures in order to fight abuses of the right of hospitality accorded by the Swiss administration. This closed interpretation demands that immigrants comply with specific sorts of behaviour (Fordern). Seen first as a liberal achievement included in the guidelines of the City of Basel,36 the “new policy” of Fördern and Fordern (promote and demand, intended as the “carrot and stick”) was meant to prevent populist challengers from charging local governments with being too soft on migrants, but it was also intended to rely on the abilities of newly arrived migrants. On the basis of the declaration of Human Rights and the Swiss Constitution, migrants should be regarded not as members of groups but as individuals able to realize their own potential . The approaches of this new policy were described as future-oriented, meritocratic, emancipatory, and taking individual responsibilities seriously, based on the same rights and duties. Thus, “integration” stands for the participation of foreigners in economic, social, and cultural life. The Integration Article in the old Alien Law, passed in 1999, paved the way for a more proactive federal integration policy; it also strengthened the FCF’s role. Since 2001, the government has spent between 10 and 12 million Swiss francs (€ 6 million to € 7 million) per year to support integration projects, including language and integration courses and training for integration leaders. Cantons and larger municipalities also have their own integration and intercultural cooperation committees and offices, which offer language and integration courses. In many communes, foreigners participate in school boards and, in some cases, the municipal government. With the support of consulates and the local education department,

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larger communes offer courses in immigrant children’s native languages and cultures. While churches proved to be among the major institutions promoting the coexistence of the Swiss and the foreign population, other non-governmental organizations have become interested in the process as well. In keeping with this new spirit, for the first time the Swiss government recognized Switzerland to be a country of immigration that should provide help to integrate immigrants. Whereas at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new decade emphasis was put on Fördern, on positive encouragement of integration, a prudent reading of official papers would have indicated that a coercive reading was always present. Indeed, Fördern und Fordern acquired a nearly magical connotation that allowed each side to read integration as they wished: “It is not the host society that is responsible for the integration of the migrants, but this is largely their own responsibility. Only someone who is ready to do so can count on the appropriate opportunities and expect help in improving one’s personal situation. The promotion of integration remains always [providing] help to self-help.”37 As a final point, the new immigration law, a legislative project finalized by Christoph Blocher that passed a popular ballot with a large majority of 68 percent in 2006 (and came into effect in 2008), stipulates that immigrants must fulfill certain criteria that should facilitate their integration. Permanent residents and their families are required to integrate on both the professional and social levels as soon as possible. Those who fail to be financially autonomous can be deported. But these considerations are related only to poorly qualified third-country nationals. This restrictive component corresponds in its content to the criterion of “qualitatively high-standard immigration.” Levels of education and professional qualifications are interpreted to improve the integration of foreigners and guarantee their vocational reintegration in the case of unemployment. Restrictions aim at avoiding the errors that were committed in the past, i.e., the granting of temporary work permits to poorly qualified seasonal workers. Furthermore, it explicitly foresees that it is the immigrant’s duty to make every effort necessary to facilitate his or her integration. The new integration paradigm, as enforced by the latest Aliens Law, has two components: on the one hand, integration is linked to the restriction of immigration, and on the other hand, it relies on the understanding that EU/EFTA citizens can be fully integrated, whereas it supposes that thirdcountry nationals have “deficits” if they are not highly qualified personnel. These assumed deficits are located either in the culture, the religion, or the language of those migrants or in their alleged failure to accept their duties towards Swiss society, in particular in their supposed lack of respect for local laws, customs, and constitutional rights. The new approach, originally intended to discipline immigrants, is also reflected by the dissolution of the Federal Commission for Foreigners (FCF)

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and its integration into the Federal Department of Police and Justice. The general tendency to dissociate public integration institutions away from Departments of Social Affairs and to the Police Department can also be observed in different cantons and may underline the assumption that integration has undergone a political ideologization and securitization, as was the case before with the assimilation paradigm. With its orientation to individual achievements, integration has acquired a coercive character, and in most instances, any alternative understanding of the term has lost significance. For example, it has not been considered that integration could be linked to the dismantling of obstacles, such as discrimination in the labour and housing markets, the failure to recognize foreign diplomas, the codification of residence rights, and barriers to real participation. Dismantling these obstacles would be not nearly as cost-intensive as “integration programs,” but it would correspond better to the concept of a liberal society that relies on incentives.38 The fact that the new Ausländergesetz is putting third-country nationals under general suspicion is not only morally wrong, but it relies on an ahistorical reading of its own immigration history when compared to the successful integration of former migrant groups. And it may be counterproductive if the message of distrust reaches second- and third-generation youths. What still remains impressive is the semantic shift of integration as a concept that included emancipation to a term that now comprises coercion and repression. Recent Changes in Naturalization Policies Persons who have resided in Switzerland for at least twelve years – the years spent between the completion of the tenth and the twentieth years are counted as double for this purpose – may apply for naturalization. The Federal Office for Migration examines whether applicants are integrated into “the Swiss way of life,” are familiar with Swiss customs and traditions, comply with Swiss laws, and do not endanger Switzerland’s internal or external security. This examination is based on cantonal and communal reports. If the requirements provided by the federal law are satisfied, applicants receive a naturalization permit from the Federal Office for Migration.39 Naturalization proceeds in three stages. The federal naturalization permit is the Confederation’s green light for the acquisition of Swiss nationality. The cantons and the communities may have their own, additional residence requirements that applicants must satisfy once federal preconditions are met. Once the federal naturalization permit is obtained, only those applicants naturalized by both their commune and canton acquire Swiss citizenship. As a general rule, there is no legal right to being naturalized by a community and a canton. The cantons’ criteria and processes vary greatly. For example, in Nidwalden applicants must have spent the entire twelve-year

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period in the canton. In Geneva, two years of residence are sufficient, and candidates who have moved from other cantons fulfill the preconditions. The requirements at the communal level can also vary greatly. In three referendums passed over the last twenty years (1983, 1994, 2004), Swiss voters and the majority of the cantons rejected laws that would have made it easier for the children of immigrants to become naturalized. The law that was submitted to a referendum in 2004 (see below) would have allowed the Swiss-born grandchild of a foreign resident to gain Swiss citizenship automatically at birth. The main reason for this new provision was that automatic naturalization would have eliminated the community’s role in decision making, which many Swiss considered an important step in the political process. Over the last fifty years, naturalization rates have stayed lower than federal authorities have desired, possibly because many immigrants decided to return to their home countries after working for a time in Switzerland. In 1992, dual citizenship was permitted. Between 1991 and 2008, the number of naturalizations increased from 8,757 to 44,365 (see table 7.3). Nationals from the former Yugoslavia, mostly from Kosovo and Bosnia, were the quickest to naturalize, having little interest in returning to the unstable political situation in their home country. Moreover, having Swiss citizenship would mean they could never be forced to return. Yet citizenship is not always necessary for voting in local elections. In several French-speaking cantons, foreigners who have lived in the canton for a number of years have the right to vote at the municipal level; in a few cantons they may even vote in cantonal elections. In the latter case, foreign nationals can influence politics at the federal level, since their votes in cantonal elections can influence the composition of the Council of States (Ständerat).40 The 2004 introduction of this legal innovation led to hotly debated controversy on the significance of citizenship. As already mentioned, in 2002 the Swiss Parliament debated the revision of the citizenship law for a third time. In the detailed consultation process, there were violent criticisms of suggestions presented by the Federal Council and the CVP to shorten the minimum residence requirements. When it came to regulations to facilitate the naturalization of the second generation, the SVP demanded stricter legislation. The party was of the opinion that only those born in the country should profit from easier access to citizenship, as opposed to young people who had only spent over half their school life in Switzerland. The National Council rejected this proposal. When the discussion shifted to whether citizenship should automatically be granted to the third generation (which would have introduced the principle of jus  soli), the debate became strongly polarized. Against the acrimonious resistance of the SVP, the National Council approved the right to appeal to a court for those whose request was rejected in municipalities

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Table 7.3 Foreigners Who Acquired Swiss Nationality, 1999–2009, by origin 1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004 2005

2006 2007

2008

2009

Total

20,363 28,700 27,583 36,515 35,424 35,685 38,437 46,711 43,889 44,365 43,440

Europe

15,626 21,975 20,969 28,102 27,558 27,728 30,109 36,087 33,771 34,879 33,795

E U -27

9,331 12,394 10,577 12,567 10,861

9,810 10,015 12,571 12,644 13,848 15,774

Turkey

2,260

3,127

3,116

4,128

4,216

3,565

3,467

2,866

2,593

2,365 Serbia and Montenegro

3,285

3,686

5,803

6,332

7,854

9,503 11,762 10,441 10,272

8,879

409

999

1,128

1,865

2,268

2,371

2,790

3,016

2,855

2,408

Other continents

4,721

6,709

6,601

8,397

7,854

7,945

8,319 10,613 10,103

9,472

9,621

Africa

1,339

1,824

1,900

2,163

1,954

1,848

2,064

2,619

2,883

2,599

2,627

America

1,247

1,875

1,844

2,166

2,116

1,959

1,814

2,266

2,372

2,046

2,229

Asia

2,121

2,981

2,830

4,033

3,717

4,065

4,382

5,666

4,787

4,771

4,710

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3,457

3,149

3,044

Source: Swiss Federal Statistic Office – PETRA.

without reason. At the end of the consultations, the SVP announced their wish to have a referendum against this revision.41 Shortly after this debate, a discussion about granting easier access to citizenship was influenced by a Federal Tribunal42 decision in Lausanne. The judges deemed the concession of citizenship for reasons of origin or religion unconstitutional because it violated the principal of non-discrimination and thereby ordered municipalities to adopt a procedure that did not violate the Constitution. In their written justification, the judges declared that no immigrant had an automatic right to be naturalized but that in certain municipalities voting on applicants was an administrative function, since the status of inhabitants was being decided upon. This type of function would require authorities and the population, both, to respect the prohibition of discrimination.43 Both chambers of Parliament passed the bill with practically no alterations. In the final round, only the SVP voted unanimously against the new regulations, disapproving of easier access for the second generation, jus soli for the third generation, and the right to judicial appeal for rejected candidates. The latter point was also supported by a large minority of the FDP. On 26 September 2004, the referendum took place. The advocates of the change, the CVP, the SPS, and the liberal FDP, sponsored little advertising, underestimating its importance to the SVP campaign. The winds changed shortly before voting day. Support from employers’ associations and unions was not powerful enough. Blocher should have supported the bill, since it

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came from his ministry, but he sabotaged it during the campaign by providing only limited technical information about the new provisions. With a – for Switzerland – rather high turnout (54 percent), the majority of the people and the cantons rejected the reform of the citizenship law. The introduction of facilitated naturalization was rejected by 57 percent of voters, and automatic naturalization of the third generation at birth was opposed by 51.6 percent. It is interesting to compare the result with that of the referendum in 1994: with the exception of Basel-City, all other Swiss-German cantons that had approved a more liberal application of the naturalization law ten years earlier switched camps.44 There are two explanations for this: the parties that supported the bill in Parliament did not defend facilitated access to citizenship during the campaign. Spellbound by promising polls, they were surprised by how easily and successfully the SVP, in the last few weeks before the referendum, were able to mobilize fears about granting valued citizenship to what opponents described as non-deserving young immigrants. They characterized an automatic acquisition of nationality as a devaluation of Swiss citizenship and objected to the weakening of local popular sovereignty that it implied.45 Finally, this time the reformed law was not backed by the department responsible and its staff, which formerly had supported such a change.

An aly sis of th e Policy - Ma k in g P r o c e ss In order to understand the Swiss policy-making process, three distinct features of the national polity must be taken into consideration: the federal structure of the state; the financial and political autonomy of municipalities; and a tool of intervention secured by the consociational negotiations of interest groups and the participation of the people through direct democracy. Federalism Federalism plays an important role in many domains. They include, among others, the field of education, which is presented here as a paradigmatic case (religious matters or the quest for political rights would also have served this purpose). Switzerland’s educational system is organized by the cantons, which require immigrants to adopt the dominant cantonal language and culture. During the 1970s, cantonal education systems found it difficult to accommodate the differing social and cultural situations and thus could not guarantee equal educational opportunities.46 Many discrepancies in the quality of the curricula from school to school continue to persist, even if the federal education authorities regularly publish recommendations for the better integration of immigrant children.47 Some cantons, more than others, support immigrant children and promote their integration at school by

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investing more resources in local schools and introducing institution-wide changes such as team-teaching and intercultural programs that favour the introduction of children with a migrant background. Not all cantons implement these recommendations, and in fact, several tend toward discriminatory practices. Contrasting cantonal responses roughly correspond to linguistic as well as political cleavages. In German-speaking cantons one can generally observe a tendency to set up institutions specifically for immigrant children, with the exception of those urban cantons possessing the necessary tools to support their school bodies without enforcing segregation,48 whereas in French- and Italian-speaking areas, the response has been to integrate all children into mainstream institutions. In this analysis, the cantonal level merits special attention, since Switzerland’s highly federalized institutional system is characterized by vertical segmentation and horizontal fragmentation that allow both institutions and cantonal parties a high degree of organizational and political autonomy. As witnessed with voting, cantons can use their autonomy to experiment with various approaches in migrant-related political fields and to try to influence decision making at the federal level. The Council of States makes it necessary for federal authorities to secure the loyalty of the cantons and to make sure that strong cantonal political entrepreneurs do not withdraw from the consensus. If the perception held by the cantons internally changes, the federal level must thus adapt. But only until recently, when the general mood became anti-immigrant, the example of the autonomous educational system had made it clear that the cantons have enough space to manoeuvre and need not share a common approach to all fields related to migrants. Municipal Autonomy Strong trade and political fragmentation explain why Switzerland has a relatively robust urban network. Moreover, municipal autonomy is a key factor when it comes to questions of citizenship and, paradoxically, of nationhood. As noted above, there are three stages in the naturalization process: citizenship within the municipality, then in the canton, and finally in the Swiss federal state. There is great variety in naturalization practices at the local level, particularly between the German- and French-speaking cantons. While the Frenchspeaking municipalities tend to have more formalized procedures, many German-speaking cantons and municipalities endorse the romantic principle of local adherence and political participation. The question of who is allowed to acquire citizenship can easily be turned into a question of preferential treatment and prejudice. Newspaper stories have reported that in several small German-speaking towns, applicants recognized as being of Eastern European and Asian origin were prevented from naturalizing.49

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This means that even though the country was founded on the idea of a political contract, naturalization is to a large extent based on local ethnicity. Furthermore, since a 2003 decision by the Federal Tribunal that declared public votes on naturalization by a show of hands or a referendum in certain municipalities unconstitutional, a new debate has emerged on the role of judicial authority. It is largely a debate between those who favour the rule of law and those who interpret access to citizenship as a political and sovereign act of the citizenry. This judgment was quite exceptional and reflects a tension between the Federal Tribunal and conservative parts of Parliament, and between the rule of law and people’s rights within the processes of direct democracy. In 2008 the Swiss people confirmed the judgment of the Federal Tribunal in a popular vote (in response to an initiative launched by the SVP). Since then, votes on naturalization have had to be consistent with the constitutional rights of the applicants. In order to allow for a decision to be appealed, a legal justification for why a candidate was refused must be provided. Consociationalism and Direct Democracy Consociationalism and direct democracy are important for understanding Switzerland’s political process in general and integration policies in particular. As Mahnig and Wimmer50 have stated in their lucid article, these two characteristics of the Swiss political system are responsible for the country’s intense politicization of migration issues and the exclusion of migrants from political participation. Consociationalism includes the proportional representation of different minorities (e.g., linguistic, political, and religious minorities) in federal institutions and reaching compromise between political forces that goes beyond the search for simple majorities.51 All members of the government, as well as the higher administration, are chosen in rough proportionality according to their party affiliation (based on what is often referred to as the “magic formula”), and their linguistic and regional origins are also considered. This principle of proportionality is followed by wide consensus but on a voluntary basis. Swiss politics is characterized by a permanent process of compromise-building between these groups. Another important way of influencing the political decision-making process is the consultation procedure, the phase in legislative preparation when draft bills by the Confederation are evaluated by the cantons, parties, associations, and sometimes also by other interested circles throughout Switzerland, in order to ascertain the likelihood of their acceptance and implementation. Persons not invited to take part in the consultation procedure can also state their views on a proposal. All views and possible objections are evaluated with a view to the veto power of those who reject a reform by means of a referendum. The Federal Council then passes the

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main points of its proposal on to Parliament and debates the draft bill in light of the outcomes of this consultation. Direct democracy gives social groups some opportunities to participate directly in the political process through the aforementioned popular initiative and referendum. These are in place at the federal as well as at the local levels. According to some observers, it was the instruments of direct democracy that allowed the consociational system to emerge, because all laws voted in Parliament can be submitted to a referendum and therefore need the support of large alliances within the political elite.52 These two main characteristics of the political system provoke major politicization of the migrant issue and the exclusion of immigrants from political participation. Because of the long negotiating and decision-making process in a consociational democracy, this system involves extended periods of indecision with regard to immigration issues. Since the interests in the political field of migration are too divergent, it is difficult for the parties to come to an agreement easily. Furthermore, the instruments of direct democracy have forced the political elite to negotiate the concept of “over-foreignization” with populist challengers. Immigration policies that had permitted the various actors to agree to accommodate the economic needs of the country became one of the most contested and controversial issues since the 1960s, when radical right-wing populist parties started to gain public support by claiming that Switzerland was becoming “over-foreignised” by ever-increasing immigrants. Using the tools of direct democracy, these xenophobic movements succeeded in vetoing liberal government reforms and put their parties under pressure by launching eleven popular initiatives and several referendums to curb the presence of foreigners. Although until the minaret initiative of 2009 none of these initiatives had passed, they had already since the 1970s consistently influenced the migration policy agenda and possibly also public opinion on immigration issues by urging the Swiss government to adopt more restrictive admission policies.53 The opportunities direct democracy offers for intervention within the political system make it quite likely that the SVP will reinforce its oppositional role in the future by exploiting migration policy as a major issue, since controversial questions can never be confined to Parliament alone. Other European countries may be able to adopt policies behind closed doors to extend political and social rights to migrants, but this is nearly impossible in Switzerland.54 However, a right-wing strategy, no matter how determined its proponents, may not always find popular support. An important point of reference is the SVP’s defeat in the 1 June 2008 vote. This vote on “democratic naturalizations” focused the SVP’s intention to, through popular initiative, abolish the rule of law in acquiring Swiss citizenship, thus reinforcing the power of the municipalities to make even more arbitrary decisions. The ultimate failure here proved that even a strong,

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resolute party cannot always gain the support necessary for a popular initiative to pass into law, especially if their arguments threaten the sense of fair and equal access to rights.

Conclus io n For a long time, from World War II until the late 1990s, labour market demands influenced Switzerland’s admission policy without integration being taken into account. Admission policies were focused on a labour rotation model that fuelled the economy, but there were no integration provisions for migrants who came to stay; after all, immigrants were not regarded as a potential part of the population. This utilitarian policy seemed to fit with the proclaimed need for the country to be free of foreign cultural influences. Since the 1970s, migrants’ length of stay in Switzerland and their own changing attitudes and expectations, along with the evolving needs of the economy and the education system, have made shifts towards more inclusive migration policy inevitable. But the alliance between the government and the regional economic and supranational human rights interests who lobbied to include the foreign workforce through legislative reforms was continuously forced to deal with a xenophobic movement. While politically isolated, this movement could use structures provided by the federal and consociational system to influence government decision making through referendums and the implicit threat to call a referendum. This policy was generally consistent with Switzerland’s minimal welfare state, which, until the 1970s, excluded immigrants from access to social services and benefits. A paradigm shift occurred in the 1980s, influenced by the oil crisis in the 1970s, when it became clear that migrants who chose not to return to their country of origin would stay in Switzerland. The introduction of unemployment insurance and the inauguration of a larger welfare system also protected labour migrants and introduced them to social citizenship. At the same time, asylum emerged as a metaphor for unwanted migration. The government reacted to the new challenge with a two-tiered approach. First came new severity on the asylum issue and the enforcement of a policy that deterred illegitimate immigration. Following that was the introduction of legislative reforms that favoured integration for desired labour migration. This debate seemed to end with the Aliens and Asylum Law that was passed with popular approval in 2006 and came into force in 2008. Swiss institutional structures, notably federalism, municipal autonomy, consociationalism, and direct democracy, constitute a framework in which many actors and stakeholders attempt to influence the decision-making process. This form of multi-level governance has long prevented Switzerland from matching its policy to inclusive European standards of social rights. In

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recent years it has nevertheless allowed its guiding principles to converge with those of its important European partners – for example, through the signing of bilateral agreements). Points of convergence between Switzerland and the EU on immigration and migration policies will no doubt increase in the future. However, the spectre of “over-foreignization” will probably prevent Switzerland from adopting the kind of liberal citizenship policy shared by most of its European partners. Switzerland’s cultural inhibitions are too strong to allow highly valued citizenship to be extended to allegedly undeserving immigrants. But who is to say whether, in the evolution of political processes, late runners will not one day become European forerunners, especially in a field as volatile as migration and citizenship?

Not e s 1 Karl W. Deutsch, Die Schweiz als ein paradigmatischer Fall politischer Integration (Bern: Haupt, 1976); Dominique Schnapper, “Citoyenneté et reconnaissance des hommes et des cultures,” in Jacques Hainard and Roland Kaehr, eds., Dire les autres: Réflexions et  pratiques ethnologiques. Textes offerts à Pierre Centlivres, 139–48 (Lausanne: Payot 1997). 2 Hans Mahnig and Andreas Wimmer, “Integration without Immigrant Policy: The Case of Switzerland,” in Friedrich Heckmann and Dominique Schnapper, eds., The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of  Convergence, 135–64 (Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius 2003). 3 According to the rotation scheme, migrants entered the country for a period of one to two years and were then supposed to return home to be replaced by other guest workers. 4 Madelyn Holmes, Forgotten Migrants: Foreign Workers in Switzerland before World War I  (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1988); Gaetano Romano, “Zeit der Krise – Krise der Zeit: Identität, Überfremdung und verschlüsselte Zeitstrukturen,” in Andreas Ernst and Erich Wigger, eds., Die neue Schweiz? Eine  Gesellschaft zwischen Integration und Polarisierung (1910–1930), 41–77 (Zürich: Chronos 1996). 5 Denise Efionayi-Mäder et al., Switzerland Faces Common European Challenges (New York: Migration Information Source/MPI) 2005. 6 Gérard Arlettaz, “Démographie et identité nationale (1850–1914): La Suisse et  ‘La question des étrangers,’” Etudes et sources 11 (1985): 83–174. 7 Angela Garrido, “Les années vingt et la première initiative xénophobe en Suisse,” in Hans-Ulrich Jost, ed., Racisme et xénophobies: Colloque à l‘Université de Lausanne,  37–45 (Lausanne: Université de Lausanne 1990). 8 Hans Mahnig and Etienne Piguet, “La politique suisse d’immigration de 1948 à 1998: Évolution et effets,” in Hans-Rudolf Wicker, Rosita Fibbi, and Werner Haug, eds., Les migrations et la Suisse: Résultats du Programme national de recherche “Migrations  et relations interculturelles,” 63–103 (Zurich: Seismo 2003).

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9 Peter J. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of  Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1987). 10 Mahnig and Piguet, “La politique Suisse,” 70. 11 Gianni D’Amato and Brigitta Gerber, Herausforderung Integration: Städtische  Migrationspolitik in der Schweiz und in Europa (Zürich: Seismo 2005). 12 Denise Efionayi-Mäder, “Asylpolitik der Schweiz, 1950–2000,” Asyl 18 (2003): 3–9. 13 The term “boat people” refers to the mass of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in the late 1970s seeking to escape the newly installed communist regimes. 14 Lorena Parini and Matteo Gianni, “La tension entre précarité et intégration: Politique à l’égard des migrants en Suisse,” in Françoise Lorcerie, ed., Politiques  publiques et droit (Paris: Ed. LGDJ 1997/98). 15 Efionayi-Mäder, Switzerland. 16 Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies (Houndmills: Macmillan Press 1998), 22. 17 Adrian Vatter, “Federalism,” in Ulrich Klöti et al., eds., Handbook of Swiss Politics,  71–100 (Zurich: NZZ Publshing 2004). 18 Nicole Wichmann and Gianni D’Amato, Migration und Integration in Basel-Stadt: Ein  Pionierkanton unter der Lupe (Neuchâtel: SFM 2010). 19 For this section see Efionayi, “Asylpolitik.” 20 Hans Mahnig, Das migrationspolitische Feld der Schweiz: Eine politikwissenschaftliche  Analyse der Vernehmlassung zum Arbenzbericht (Neuchâtel: Forum suisse pour l’étude des migrations 1996). 21 Leonhard Neidhart, Plebiszit und pluralitäre Demokratie: Eine Analyse der Funktion des  schweizerischen Gesetzesreferendums (Bern: Francke 1970). 22 Efionayi, “Asylpolitik.” 23 Niklaus Blattner and George Sheldon, “Foreign Labour, Growth and Productivity: The Case of Switzerland,” in Ian Gordon and Anthony Philip Thirlwall, eds., European Factor Mobility: Trends and Consequences. Proceedings of the Conference of the  Confederation of European Economic Associations, 148–65 (Houndmills: MacMillan 1989); George Sheldon, The Effect of Foreign Labor on Relative Wages and Growth in  Switzerland (Basel: Labor Market and Industrial Organization Research Unit (FAI) 1998). 24 Efionayi, “Asylpolitik.” 25 The most pertinent definition of subsidiary protection refers to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and states that applicants that cannot fulfill the requirements for becoming a refugee may not be sent back to their country of origin if protection is not assured. 26 Bülent Kaya, “Switzerland,” in Jan Niessen, Yongmi Schibel, and Cressida Thompson, eds., Current Immigration Debates in Europe: A Publication of the European  Migration Dialogue, 383–98 (Brussels: Migration Policy Group 2005). 27 See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 June 2003; 15 September 2003. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) is a Zurich-based quality newspaper. 28 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 January 2003.

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29 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13 February 2003; 14 February 2003; 5 April 2003. 30 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28 September 2005; translated by the author. 31 Quoted in Josef Martin Niederberger, Ausgrenzen, Assimilieren, Integrieren:  Die Entwicklung einer schweizerischen Integrationspolitik (Zürich: Seismo 2004). 32 Swiss Federal Council, Protocols of 18 November 1970, quoted in Niederberger, Ausgrenzen, Assimilieren, Integrieren, 81. 33 Swiss Federal Council, Protocols of 18 November 1970, quoted in Niederberger, Ausgrenzen, Assimilieren, Integrieren, 81. 34 René Riedo, Umrisse zu einem Integrationskonzept (Bern: Eidgenössische Ausländerkommission 1996). 35 Quoted in Niederberger, Ausgrenzen, Assimilieren, Integrieren, 148. 36 Rebekka Ehret, Leitbild und Handlungskonzept des Regierungsrates zur Integrationspolitik des Kantons Basel-Stadt (Basel: Polizei- und Militärdepartement des Kantons Basel-Stadt 1999). 37 Bundesamt für Migration, Probleme der Integration von Ausländerinnen und  Ausländern in der Schweiz: Bestandesaufnahme der Fakten, Ursachen, Risikogruppen,  Massnahmen und des integrationspolitischen Handlungsbedarfs (Bundesamt für Migration 2006). 38 Hans-Rudolf Wicker, “Die neue schweizerische Integrationspolitik,” in Esteban Pineiro, Isabelle Bopp, and Georg Kreis, eds., Fördern und Fordern im Fokus:  Leerstellen des schweizerischen Integrationsdiskurses, 23–47 (Zurich: Seismo 2009). 39 Philippe Wanner and Gianni D’Amato, Naturalisation en Suisse: Le rôle des changements législatifs sur la demande de naturalisation (Zürich: Avenir suisse 2003). 40 Didier Ruedin, Wie würden Personen ohne den roten Pass wählen: Wahlverhalten von  Ausländerinnen und Ausländern (Neuchâtel: SFM Discussion Paper 24, 2010). 41 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 September 2002. 42 The highest federal court in Switzerland. 43 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 July 2003; 25 July 2003. 44 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 September 2004. 45 Bülent Kaya, “Switzerland.” 46 Sibilla Schuh, “Luciano und die Höhle der Elefanten: Selektionsdruck im Spannungsfeld zwischen zwei Welten,” in Armin Gretler et al., eds., Fremde Heimat:  Soziokulturelle und sprachliche Probleme von Fremdarbeiterkindern, 223–39 (Cousset: Delval 1987). 47 Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren, Grundsätze  zur Schulung der Gastarbeiterkinder, vom 2. November 1972 (Bern: Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren 1972); Grundsätze zur Schulung  der Gastarbeiterkinder: Ergänzung vom 14. Mai 1976 (Bern: Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren 1976); Ausländerkinder in unseren Schulen:  Nach wie vor ein Problem? (Genf: Sekretariat EDK 1982); Empfehlungen zur Schulung der fremdsprachigen Kinder, vom 24. Oktober 1985 (Bern: Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren 1985); Empfehlungen  zur Schulung der fremdsprachigen Kinder, vom 24./25. Oktober 1991 (Bern:

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48

49

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Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren 1991); Interkulturelle Pädagogik in der Schweiz: Sonderfall oder Schulalltag? Zusammenstellung  der Tagungsbeiträge: edk -Convegno, Emmetten 1992 (Bern: EDK, Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren 1993); Empfehlungen und  Beschlüsse (Bern: Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren (EDK) 1995); Erklärung zur Förderung des zweisprachigen Unterrichts in der Schweiz,  vom 2. März 1995 (Bern: Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren 1995); Aktionsplan “pisa  2000” – Folgemassnahmen (Bern: Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren 2003). Markus Truniger, Schulung der fremdprachigen Kinder und interkulturelle Pädagogik:  Überprüfung der Umsetzung der Empfehlungen (Schuljahre 1999/2000 und 2000/01):  Bericht zuhanden des Bildungsrats (Zürich: Bildungsdirektion 2002). Bernhard Ehrenzeller and Paul-Lukas Good, Rechtsgutachten zu Handen des  Gemeinderates von Emmen betreffend das Einbürgerungsverfahren in der Gemeinde Emmen  (St Gallen: [n.p.] 2003); Ruedi Leuthold and Christian Aeberhard, “Der Fall Emmen,” Das Magazin (2002): 18–31. Mahnig and Wimmer, “Integration without Immigrant Policy.” Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies  (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998) Neidhart, “Plebiszite.” Niederberger, Ausgrenzen, Assimilieren, Integrieren. Virginie Guiraudon, Les politiques d‘immigration en Europe: Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas  (Paris: L‘Harmattan 2000).

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8 United States of America Gary P . F r e e m a n a n d S t ua rt M. T en d ler The generally accepted constitutional interpretation of US federalism is that regulating who may enter the country, the conditions governing residency, and the path to citizenship are the exclusive prerogative of the federal government. Integrating immigrants into society, in contrast, is largely a state and local matter if it is not to be left to the private and nonprofit sectors. There are exceptions to these expectations. While the implementation of integration programs has been decentralized, program finances have increasingly come from Washington. The federal government dominates the regulation of immigration, but drawing on their police and regulatory powers, states and localities both act independently and partner with Washington to manage immigration. Even when integration is apparently the responsibility of state and local governments, they are constrained by constitutional and statutory guidelines governing civil rights and race relations. And everywhere, integration is a public-private collaboration, with business and nonprofits providing financial, technical, and administrative support; the public sector usually in an agenda-setting, coordinating, and implementing role; and nonprofits often the main actors delivering services. Although the United States has a much lengthier experience with the settlement of immigrants than most of the countries included in this volume, the ownership and characteristics of its integration policies are typically less explicit and organizationally coherent than those of the other countries. The federal structure affects almost every aspect of US immigration, but demonstrating how the settlement experience might be different if the US were a unitary state or if integration policy were the exclusive domain of the federal authorities or of the states is difficult owing to the patchwork quality, ceaseless alteration, and rich variety of policies across the fifty states. In this chapter, we generally examine a subset of eighteen states chosen for the size of their immigrant populations, regional diversity, and importance in national electoral politics. They are Arizona, California,

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Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Our review of US integration and settlement policy reveals the following about the federalism-integration nexus. Measured across income, employment, welfare receipt, and naturalization rates, significant variation exists across the states in the success of the foreign-born population. Along those same policy dimensions, naturalized immigrants have integrated much more successfully than foreign-born non-citizens. Indeed, on some measures and in some states naturalized immigrants are better integrated socioeconomically than the native-born. Nonetheless, we cannot readily discern a systematic explanation for these findings that is rooted in distinctive state or local policies. In the conclusion, we speculate about whether US settlement policy is more or less generous under the purview of the national, state, or local governments and about what might account for state variation in immigrant integration. We also speculate about whether there are any observable consequences of a growing role in immigrant integration of the central government, and we note the winners, losers, and incentives created by federalism and comment generally on the politics swirling around immigration at the state and federal levels.

Bac k gro u n d Evolution of the Federal Structure A European settler society, the United States was born through the unification of thirteen highly diverse British colonies. Marked regional cleavages were reinforced by distinct political economies. The northeastern states were originally bastions of manufacturing and industry and their corollary urban working class; the southern states built on aristocratic commercial agriculture and its corollary poor class of tenant farmers and, until the mid-to-late nineteenth century, an African-American slave workforce. As the United States expanded westward, conflict broke out among those who supported an activist central government promoting industrial development, protection from international economic competition, and the subjugation of southern interests to northern economic needs, on the one hand, and those who favored a decentralized, passive central government, repression of the domestic workforce, and the maintenance of strong political and economic ties with international trading partners, not least Great Britain. National politics in the United States has frequently featured competition to sustain political coalitions spread across regionally diverse political and economic preferences. Out of this context, two concepts of federalism emerged: the national and the compact theory.1 The former, championed by supporters of a

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strong, centralized federal government, argues that the people themselves are the source of authority in the political system and, through their consent, it established the federal system of government and delegated limited authority to the central government were established. In contrast, the latter theory, championed by supporters of a weak central government, argues that a compact among sovereign states, not the act of a sovereign people, established the central government and delegated limited authority to it. From the perspective of the compact theory, sovereign states, not the general public, determine what the federal government may or may not do. Importantly, debates over American federalism have traditionally turned less on philosophical concerns about the balance of power between levels of government and more on concerns over the policies for which those powers are used. Conceptions of the proper allocation of authority in the federal system have chiefly been employed to support purposes that proponents want the system to serve, with the interests that line up on the side of the federal government or the states changing according to the issue of the day.2 Whichever theory of the founding one embraces, American federalism yields a matrix of governments with powers distributed across no fixed rank order and with both national and state governments necessarily involved in nearly all policy domains.3 Both levels of government wind up with an irrevocable share of decision making and responsibility for implementation processes; in the United States, these overlapping authorities are extended, de facto, to localities. The system is made operationally effective through intergovernmental and public-private partnerships, and nationally established programs are meaningful only once they have been made functional at the local level. Never a strict zero-sum game, it is possible for all levels of government to increase their powers simultaneously. Because of substantial intergovernmental cooperation, as the general role of government expands, all levels of government see their responsibilities increase. Still, it must be said that the major trend in federalism’s evolution in the United States is the gradual erosion of state and local authority to the benefit of the federal government. In many cases, states and localities have been reduced to interest groups lobbying Washington for preferential outcomes.4 However, because states and localities retain fundamental regulatory and police powers over private and economic matters, the territorial division of power possesses significant influence over daily life. Before 1819 there was little significant federal legislation relating to immigration.5 The federal posture was initially one of general nonintervention, effectively leaving responsibility with individual states. Before that, the colonies enforced immigration regulations – the earliest records of deportation show settlers in Plymouth, Massachusetts, in 1639 requiring the removal of foreign paupers;6 in 1740 in Delaware, it was lawful for any two justices of the peace to compel a master of a vessel or anyone else who

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imported certain people (lunatics, the maimed, impotents, vagrants) to return aliens to the place from which they came. The possibility of the federal government deporting aliens first arose in the period immediately after 1793 as a political reaction to chaotic international relations, especially with France. The 1798 Alien Act, defended as a war measure and destined to expire after two years, empowered the president, through executive order, to deport aliens deemed inimical to the country’s welfare. When the act expired and war-time emotions faded, deportation for political reasons declined, rising again only following World War I. After 1800, with an increase in the number of paupers who entered the country, attention focused on aliens as an economic burden. The centralization of federal immigration control began in 1864, though it was not given institutional form until 1895, when the Bureau of Immigration was established within the Department of the Treasury. Until 1860 federal legislation was mostly directed at improving the conditions of steerage passengers on their way to the United States, with legislation being an indirect means of helping immigrants enter the country on passenger ships. In 1864, a Commissioner of Immigration was established, appointed by the president for a four-year term and under the purview of the Department of State. An immigration office under the direction of a Superintendent of Immigration was then established in New York City and given responsibility for overseeing the transport of immigrants to their final destination. The states’ ability to regulate immigration was limited by an 1876 Supreme Court decision, Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, which ruled that states were prohibited from levying a tax on incoming aliens. On 19 April 1890, the federal government relieved New York authorities of responsibility for immigration at the port of New York, and the 1891 Immigration Act ended the dual statefederal administration of immigration law, establishing federal control over immigration by creating an Office of the Superintendent of Immigration within the Treasury (upgraded to the Bureau of Immigration in 1895), which became responsible for all immigration matters except the Chinese Exclusion Act. All duties previously given to state commissions, boards, or officers were transferred to US inspection officials. A century later, conflict, and uncertainty over the proper allocation of immigration policy between Washington, the states, and localities abound. On the one hand, three doctrinal traditions form the contours within which immigration policy is made at the federal and state levels.7 These traditions include judicial deference to immigration law and policy-making by the political branches of government, equal protection law that extends to citizens and non-citizens alike, and federal pre-emption of state and local law. On the other hand, state and local legislation has grown rapidly, case law is largely underdeveloped, and key constitutional questions remain unaddressed.8 It is also not incontrovertibly clear that immigration

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policy is inherently an exclusively federal responsibility.9 The main exception to the fog of ambiguity around the law is the 1976 Supreme Court case De Canas v. Bica, which addressed a California law prohibiting employers from knowingly employing an illegal alien in certain circumstances. The court ruled that state and local laws implicating immigrants do not necessarily amount to an instance of immigration regulation. Three tests were laid out to determine whether federal law pre-empts state and local law relating to immigration: (1) Does the statute directly regulate who can be admitted and the conditions under which aliens are allowed to remain; (2) does clear congressional intent to exclude state authority from the area of regulation exist; and (3) does the state statute obstruct the accomplishment or execution of congressional purposes and objectives or make compliance with federal and state law impossible? An affirmative answer to any of these questions nullifies the state or local law in favour of the principle of federal pre-emption. The judicial system has long been the key arbiter of statutory and constitutional immigration disputes. A few landmark cases include Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins (1886), which ruled that Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees were not exclusive to citizens; Mathews v. Diaz (1976), which affirmed congressional authority to condition alien benefit eligibility (opening the door to 1996 welfare reforms); and Plyler  v.  Doe (1982), which ruled that states cannot deny public education to the children of undocumented immigrants. The recent explosion of state and local policies and programs regulating illegal immigrants nationwide has dramatically highlighted the need for firm guidance on the subject from the Supreme Court. Arizona’s controversial 2010 statute imposing a range of restraints on illegal migrants gave legislative form to a strategy of attrition through enforcement, decreasing illegal immigration by making it difficult for aliens to live and work in the state. This move not only seized the nation’s attention but appeared to successfully decrease and deter settlement in Arizona while spawning copycat legislative movements in many states. The Obama administration challenged the constitutionality of the law, throwing down the gauntlet and provoking a potentially definitive showdown between the central government and the states not seen since the civil rights conflict of the 1950s and 1960s. The parameters of the debate can be identified by investigating the key elements of the Justice Department’s (DOJ) suit,10 as well as the reasoning used in the partial injunction imposed on Arizona’s S.B. 1070 by a US District Court in July 2010.11 In its suit, DOJ argued that the Arizona statute is preempted by federal law and therefore violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. DOJ also contended that although states may exercise their police powers in a way that incidentally or indirectly affects aliens, states may not establish their own immigration policies or enforce state laws

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in a way that interferes with federal immigration laws. In sum, DOJ submitted that Arizona’s law disrupts federal enforcement priorities and resources, conflicts with and therefore will undermine federal objectives, and infringes on federal diplomatic relations with Mexico. Regarding the preliminary injunction, one should first note those parts of the law that were allowed to stand. These include making it a crime to stop a motor vehicle to pick up day labourers, toughening the crimes of knowingly or intentionally employing unauthorized aliens, and establishing new requirements for checking employment eligibility. The section making it a state crime for a person to be in violation of criminal human smuggling laws was also allowed to go into effect. Stating that they are likely unconstitutional because of federal preemption, the court disallowed the following parts of the law: the requirement that public safety officers determine the immigration status of people they stop if they reasonably suspect unlawful presence; the requirement of verification before release of the immigration status of all persons arrested; criminalizing the failure to apply for or carry alien registration papers; making it a crime for an unauthorized alien to seek or perform work; and authorization of the warrantless arrest of a person given probable cause that an individual has committed an offense making that person deportable. The case will make its way through the appeals process and is likely to be decided by the Supreme Court.

A dmis sion and Immig r at io n P at t e r n s Although states and local governments have become more aggressive in their attempts to regulate immigration, the federal government retains full control over the selection and admission of immigrants into the United States, with no participation from the subnational governments, and there have been no significant changes to the rules in the past decade. The major statutory guidelines regulating immigrant admission were most recently set by the 1990 Immigration Act. Subsequent legislation has either focused on grounds for excluding and deporting immigrants or has tinkered with temporary, non-immigrant admissions. The major category of permanent admissions in the United States is the family class, which distributes 480,000 visas each year, although spouses and unmarried children of US citizens enter outside this annual ceiling. Family sponsorship visas are available to the immediate family of lawful permanent residents and to the extended family of citizens (parents and adult children). Employment-based visas go to skilled workers and their families. Diversity visas were created in 1990 and are distributed by lottery to immigrants from certain under-represented countries. The final major category is reserved for refugees and asylees. Legal admissions dropped from more than one million in the beginning of the 2000s to below

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three-quarters of a million by 2003, but then rose steadily throughout the remainder of the 2000s. In fiscal year 2009, nearly 1.13 million immigrants were admitted for permanent residency.12 Nearly half (47 percent) of immigrant admissions were comprised of immediate relatives of US citizens who did not require a sponsor. An additional 19 percent were admitted under family-sponsored visas. Refugees and asylees comprised about 16 percent of admissions, 13 percent of visas were employment-based, and 4 percent entered on diversity visas. A major development over the last decade is that the bulk of immigrant admissions are increasingly adjustments of status, meaning that most immigrants being “admitted” are already present in the country on a temporary, non-immigrant visa or have been in irregular status and were adjusted to legal status. In fiscal year 2009, 59 percent of admissions were adjustments of status compared to 41 percent new arrivals, whereas ten years earlier new arrivals outnumbered adjustments of status. The change in the proportion of new arrivals is the result of the relentless influx of undocumented immigrants and legal but temporary migrants, both of whom obtain legal permanent status in large numbers. Since the 1965 amendments to the Immigration Act eliminated the national origins mechanism, which favoured immigration from western and northern Europe, immigration to the United States has been dominated by nationals from countries in Latin America and Asia; Mexico is the single most important country for both legal and illegal entries. In fiscal year 2009, Mexico claimed 164,920 permanent residence visas, China 64,238, the Philippines 60,029, and India 57,304; immigrants from these four countries comprise nearly 31 percent of annual admissions. Immigration law and source-country demand are consequently out of sync. Current law allocates visas equally across nations, and therefore both workers and family members from these four countries routinely need to wait for years before a visa becomes available even if a petition to immigrate has been approved. More than any of the other countries discussed in this volume, the United States is vulnerable to large annual illegal migration, both from entries without inspection across its external borders and from people overstaying legal entry visas. The two-thousand-mile land border with Mexico, lax enforcement of labour and workplace regulations, and the absence of effective means of tracking the exit of migrants with expired entry visas facilitate illegal entry. In recent years illegal entries have mounted to 500,000 annually, leading to an estimated 10.8 million undocumented residents.13 This population poses severe integration challenges, but we are unable to speak specifically to the outcome of these efforts, because it is impossible to gather authoritative data on the illegal population. In the analysis that follows,

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we assume that the data we present include a significant but unknowable share of the undocumented population. The most nuanced mechanism for selecting immigrants concerns the 140,000 annually available employment-based visas, of which there are five classes. Employment-based visas are divided between those requiring employer sponsorship and those that do not. Priority workers, who enter on EB-1 visas, do not require employer sponsorship. Because of their extraordinary ability, which they must demonstrate in the application, they may self-petition for a visa with no need to demonstrate an available job. Other employment-based visas, apart from certain waivers such as those for wealthy investors, must have a job offer and sponsorship from an employer and the US Department of Labor must certify the application. First, second, and third priority workers (EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3) received roughly equal numbers of visas in fiscal year 2009.

Ec onomic a nd S ocia l In t e g r at io n The federal government’s interest in integration is focused heavily on training, education, coordination, and public outreach. The broad approach is to provide state and local governments with financial assistance and to coordinate an overarching framework of integration focused on language acquisition, civic acculturation, and naturalization, but to otherwise leave local communities to their own devices. During the last decade, the federal government took nonintrusive but unprecedented measures to involve itself in immigrant integration. Most notably, the Office of Citizenship, created in 2003 within the US Department of Homeland Security, became the federal government’s first unit dedicated to immigrant integration. The office conducts public education and outreach on citizenship rights, responsibilities, and requirements. A web portal, welcometousa.gov, providing information for arriving immigrants, was created, the New Americans Project was launched as an initiative to encourage community volunteerism, and the Civics and Citizenship Toolkit, which contains educational materials, was created and distributed to almost six thousand libraries and organizations serving immigrants across the country. In 2006, President George W. Bush established by Executive Order the Task Force on New Americans and charged it with developing a coordinated national framework to assimilate legal immigrants into the United States. The task force report, issued in 2008, represents the most up-to-date and authoritative statement of the federal government’s thinking on immigrant integration. The report recommended drawing liberally on state and local governments, community and faith-based organizations, businesses, adult educators, public libraries, and civic and philanthropic organizations as partners in the integration effort.14 With respect to the federal government’s

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specific role, the task force called for the promotion of a common civic identity, development and dissemination of educational resources, provision of technical resources and training, coordination of best practices across sectors, and provision of overall leadership for a national Americanization movement. The task force was guided by two principles expressed as slogans: “Diversity with Unity” and “Citizenship is an Identity.” Because American identity is not based on ethnic or cultural characteristics, civic identity can coexist with religious and cultural diversity. American civic identity, defined politically, requires embracing the principles of American democracy, identifying with American history, and communicating in English. “Citizenship Is an Identity” requires naturalizing and embracing American citizenship as constituting the definition of the self. The task force confined itself to political assimilation, stating that cultural and religious traditions are beyond the scope of government. The task force concluded that although the federal government maintains jurisdiction over immigration, community groups are the primary agents of integration. The task force focused on aligning policies and programs to complement and bolster community group actions. But state and local governments are critical players, and they have become more active. One state strategy has been to create a commission or office representing immigrant groups that provides policy recommendations and acts as liaison between government and immigrant communities; cities have also created offices to facilitate immigrant integration. A second strategy is to establish programs, some supported by federal monies, to help immigrants acquire English proficiency and other skills needed to be active community members. For example, federal agencies such as the US Department of Labor and the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, often in collaboration with cities, local nonprofit organizations, and community colleges, have supported state and local efforts that establish referral and information-dissemination systems to help immigrants attain language and occupational training, job placement, interpretation and translation services, literacy training, resettlement assistance, and legal and other assistance in anticipation of naturalization, or that simply offer guidance for accessing general public services. Public schools and public libraries have also participated in these efforts. The task force highlighted cooperation between the US Department of Education (DOE), the states, local governments, and private institutions in promoting adult education through the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) as a model to be emulated. Through AEFLA, the DOE allocates funds to the states through formula grants, giving states flexibility to prioritize spending. States must spend a minimum 25 percent match of federal funds, but they are free to spend more. As of 2007, this program funded at least 3,100 adult education programs nationwide, and more than

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half the 2.4 million adults enrolled in 2006–7 in AEFLA programs accessed ESL education. In 2007, California’s $80 million AEFLA grant was the largest in the country, and the state added $500 million in state funds. The federal government has also worked with professional organizations to improve language and civic instruction. USCIS has collaborated with the group Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) to help train adult education instructors on teaching civics and citizenship to adult English language learners as they prepare to naturalize; in turn, USCIS has exploited TESOL knowledge to improve USCIS outreach. When the federal government is not active, community and faith-based organizations and forprofit enterprises, as well as states, have been known to offer ESL and civic education services, but no serious data exist on the availability of such nonfederally funded services. The task force noted that some businesses provide workplace English classes and integration programs, including language, literacy, life skills, and citizenship instruction, as part of their broader workforce development programs. The task force was enthusiastic about the prospect of private sector involvement driven by business self-interest in successful immigrant integration. Similar enthusiasm was articulated regarding the role of philanthropies and foundations, as well as civic organizations and service clubs. This emphasis on outsourcing public policy to private agencies is consistent with developments in many arenas of government activity. Income Level Naturalized citizens compare favourably to the native-born in terms of annual earnings, but there is no consistent pattern across states (see table 8.1). Sometimes the naturalized earn more than the native born and sometimes not. Natives out-earn the naturalized foreign-born in Arizona, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and Texas, but not in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Moreover, in those states where the naturalized out-earn natives, they tend to do so by a much larger margin than in those states where natives out-earn naturalized citizens. Nationwide, mean annual household earnings in 2006–8 were $72,100; for the native population, $72,512; the foreign-born, $69,673; the naturalized foreignborn, $81,885; and the noncitizen foreign-born, $58,181. Unemployment Table 8.2 shows that unemployment for native-born Latinos is consistently higher than for other natives or the foreign-born, except in Michigan. Foreign-born (fb) Latinos usually have relatively high rates of unemployment

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Table 8.1 Mean Annual Income, $US State 

Mean Earnings, Total

Native

Foreign Born

Naturalized

Noncitizen

Arizona

68,641

71,405

55,473

68,832

47,775

California

83,958

89,217

73,320

87,152

59,059

Colorado

73,626

75,598

57,212

73,735

47,523

Florida

67,439

68,835

62,493

70,671

53,823

Georgia

68,923

69,338

65,428

78,797

56,483

Illinois

77,028

78,201

71,133

82,576

59,609

Indiana

62,713

62,827

60,411

75,141

50,953

Massachusetts

89,349

91,184

80,172

86,811

72,652

Michigan

66,496

65,832

75,628

85,458

65,293

Nevada

71,857

74,249

63,496

73,711

54,980

New Jersey

96,063

98,285

89,074

98,816

76,725

New Mexico

57,303

58,835

45,934

60,059

38,824

New York

83,748

86,940

74,642

80,694

66,076

North Carolina

62,511

62,909

57,895

74,748

49,816

Ohio

64,305

63,886

73,958

84,279

63,182

Oklahoma

57,698

58,125

51,133

67,441

40,993

Pennsylvania

69,726

69,411

74,550

83,014

65,014

Texas

68,424

71,829

54,505

69,810

45,549

Nationwide

72,100

72,512

69,673

81,885

58,181

Source: American Community Survey, 2006–8.

as well.15 Overall, native and foreign-born unemployment rates are about even (data are presented as a percentage of the population). There is, however, state-to-state variation. Native unemployment slightly exceeds foreignborn unemployment in Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Access to Benefits One of the most concrete impacts of federalism on immigrant integration in the United States involves immigrant access to welfare benefits. More favourable reception conditions increase the probability of naturalization,16 and high welfare benefit levels should accelerate and deepen

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Table 8.2 Unemployment Rates (percentages, 2000–8 average)

State 

Native  Unemployment

Hispanic or Latino Native  Unemployment

fb  Hispanic  fb  Unemployment

or Latino  Unemployment

Arizona

4.87

7.49

5.14

5.57

California

5.85

7.98

5.89

6.67

Colorado

4.55

7.03

4.89

5.67

Florida

4.35

5.95

5.16

5.28

Georgia

4.78

6.26

4.75

5.03

Illinois

5.75

7.85

5.36

6.12

Indiana

4.95

6.85

4.37

4.76

Massachusetts

4.67

10.89

5.03

7.35

Michigan

6.49

9.06

6.29

9.95

Nevada

4.95

6.95

4.48

5.04

New Jersey

4.86

7.38

4.69

5.33

New Mexico

5.06

6.47

4.39

4.65

New York

5.27

8.86

5.17

5.95

North Carolina

5.38

6.75

5.38

5.75

Ohio

5.57

7.85

4.65

6.15 4.75

Oklahoma

4.35

7.02

3.99

Pennsylvania

5.

9.67

4.78

6.27

Texas

5.39

6.45

4.85

4.95

Nationwide

5.13

7.45

5.17

5.85

Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

socio-economic incorporation, with the potential to eventually decrease welfare use over time and across generations.17 Federal benefits eligibility legislation, including the 2006 Deficit Reduction Act, which required all Medicaid applicants to prove citizenship or legal immigrant status, has also been a motivating factor in state and local legislation providing for various immigrant identification and verification requirements.18 The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) curtailed states’ ability to grant immigrants access to certain welfare benefits but also devolved significant authority to state governments to voluntarily continue providing immigrants with access to certain welfare benefits. With the Congressional Budget Office predicting that 44 percent of the legislation’s $54 billion in welfare savings would come from cutting immigrant access to benefits, states were given new authority to deny benefits to noncitizens, and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

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Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) gave states authority to hold immigrants’ visa sponsors liable for any benefits paid to their beneficiaries.19 The main welfare programs affected were federal means-tested public benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Food Stamp Program (renamed in 2008 the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP), Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Medicaid is a joint federal-state program providing health benefits for lowincome children, parents, pregnant women, the elderly, and the disabled, and it is through state acceptance of Medicaid money that states become obligated to provide emergency medical services to all people, regardless of immigration status. In 2007, there were 44 million Medicaid beneficiaries. Until 1996, legal noncitizens generally enjoyed the same benefit eligibility as citizens. The 1996 reforms did not affect unauthorized immigrants – they were and remain ineligible for most benefits. Legal immigrants, however, saw new restrictions placed on their eligibility. Three major classifications were codified into law: naturalized citizens and noncitizens; qualified aliens and unqualified aliens; and pre-enactment immigrants and post-enactment immigrants. The immigrants most affected are post-enactment qualified aliens – immigrants who are legally in the country and who usually have received long-term permanent residence (LPR) status (the most advanced status short of naturalization: LPRs can live and work in the country indefinitely) but who entered following the enactment of the 1996 reforms. Most pointedly, post-enactment qualified aliens became subject to a five-year bar, following entry, on their eligibility for TANF, SSI, Medicaid, and SCHIP. In 2006, there were about 4 million post-enactment LPRs in the country, about 40 percent of the LPR population.20 As part of the reform, states were given the freedom to make two decisions. First, they were allowed to restrict the eligibility of pre-enactment qualified immigrants. That is, while the law required restricting federal money for immigrants who entered after 1996, states were given the choice to restrict eligibility for qualified immigrants who had entered previously. Only two states exercised this option. Alabama restricted pre-enactment eligibility for TANF, and Wyoming did the same for Medicaid.21 Second, states were given the option to fund post-enactment qualified immigrants with their own state funds, which would, in effect, nullify the impact of the legislation on individual beneficiaries. Some states, including California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, exercised this option and extended TANF, Medicaid, Food Stamps, and SCHIP to post-enactment qualified aliens who otherwise would have lost access to these benefits.22 Following fierce lobbying by state governments,23 many of the most severe measures restricting immigrant access to federal means-tested welfare benefits have been rolled back, though by no means all. The starkest distinction that has

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been drawn is that between children and adults. In most cases, pre-1996 eligibility has been restored for immigrant children, but not adult immigrants. Despite program changes, recent analyses suggest that restricting immigrant access to welfare benefits did not dramatically decrease program caseloads. Government Accountability Office analysis of TANF, for example, for which the most restrictive measures were put in place, concluded that had 2005 eligibility rules been in place in 1995, 1.6 percent fewer families would have been eligible for cash benefits that year.24 And indeed, perhaps contrary to strict, short-term cost-benefit expectations of state decision making, the more immigrants that states take in, the less stringent they become in providing access to welfare benefits.25 Food Stamp Receipts Nationwide, in 2009 the US Department of Agriculture provided food stamp assistance to 31.8 million people. If we take the percentage of the population receiving food stamps as an indicator of poverty (table 8.3), immigrants are not significantly more prone to poverty than are natives, and certainly not the naturalized foreign-born. Overall, however, the foreign-born have higher poverty rates than the native born, but with much state-to-state variation. In many cases the naturalized foreign-born are better off than the native born – this is the case in California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oklahoma. Noncitizens are better off than natives in Georgia and Ohio. It should also be noted that receiving food stamps can be seen in part as a measure of integration, as well as an indicator of poverty. Receiving food stamps means that, although poor, immigrants live within the welfare state’s institutions, as opposed to outside society. Foreign Credentials and State Codes The federal government operated the Foreign Credential Evaluation Service from the end of World War I through 1973, when it was discontinued.26 Foreign credential evaluation is now performed by colleges, universities, and independent private services. There are three major actors: institutions of higher education, employers, and state boards of professional licensing. Some of these operate their own evaluations, but more common is outsourcing to specialized credential evaluation agencies. Created in 1987, the National Association of Credential Evaluation Services is meant to establish industry standards. Professional regulations vary by profession and by state. For non-regulated professions, authority regarding credentials usually lies with employers. For regulated professions, such as nursing or social work, the authority to

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Table 8.3 Food Stamp Recipients, (as percentage of population) Receive Food  Stamps Total

Native

 Foreign Born

 Naturalized fb

Noncitizen

Arizona

7.3

6.5

11.5

8.7

13.4

California

4.6

4

5.9

3.2

9.1

Colorado

5

4.9

6.1

4.8

6.9

Florida

6.8

5.8

10.5

10.2

10.9

Georgia

8.4

8.7

5.2

5.1

5.3

Illinois

8.2

8.3

7.4

6.3

8.7

Indiana

8.6

8.7

7.5

5.6

8.8

Massachusetts

6.9

6.5

9.1

9

9.3

State 

Michigan

10.8

10.8

9.7

8.4

11.3

Nevada

4.3

4.3

4.4

3.5

5.2

New Jersey

4.2

4

5

4.8

5.3

New Mexico

9

8.4

13.5

9

New York

9.9

8.8

13.1

12.7

13.7

North Carolina

9.2

9.2

8.3

6.5

9.3

Ohio

16

9.5

9.6

7.6

7.4

7.8

10.5

10.6

8.8

8.7

8.9

Pennsylvania

8

8

8.7

8.6

8.9

Texas

9.4

8.7

12.8

9.7

14.8

Nationwide

8.1

8

8.7

7.3

10.3

Oklahoma

Source: American Community Survey, 2006–8.

recognize credentials usually rests with state boards. A 2003 study found that in the years 1977–2001, citizenship requirements in state occupation codes plummeted.27 Still, many barriers do exist in state codes, especially for the highest levels of state public administration. Some examples from three states, chosen randomly for their place in the alphabet, follow.28 In Arkansas, noncitizens lack rights with regard to owning and holding agricultural land, and they may not be members of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, may not be licensed to carry a concealed handgun, may not hold an admissions representative license from the State Board of Private Career Education for Vocation and Technical Education, may not make campaign contributions, are prohibited from certain mining professions, may not hold an employment counsellor’s license, may not hold a license to operate an employment agency, may not be police officers in the Department of Arkansas State Police, and may not sit on a number of

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boards responsible for licensing those who work in particular professions. In Alabama, at least 75 percent of the directors of a bank must be citizens. Only citizens may be licensed to operate a billiard room, and only citizens may serve on the Alabama Athletes Agents Commission, the State Board of Public Accountancy, and a number of other professional/occupational boards. In Arizona, only citizens may serve on the state’s Employment Advisory Council, the state’s Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, the Board of Psychologist Examiners, and the Private Investigator and Security Guard Hearing Board. The restrictiveness or laxity of state occupation codes as they affect immigrants, and especially as they affect legal immigrants, has been mostly absent from public debate. However, these regulatory frameworks are prime targets for immigration restrictionists, and depending on the progression of federal immigration law and how harshly the federal courts restrict state and local government immigration initiatives, they could become increasingly prevalent in state and local political debates. And, no doubt, immigrant advocates will lobby for more permissive regulatory frameworks. Educational Attainment Educational attainment of the foreign-born tends to lag behind native attainment, but that generalization holds only when naturalized and noncitizen foreign-born are combined.29 Immigrant educational attainment is much more impressive for naturalized immigrants, although in some states, such as Colorado and Massachusetts, the gap between native and naturalized attainment is high and favours natives; in other states, such as Georgia, the gap is also high, though it favours naturalized immigrants. Naturalized foreign-born often outperform other groups, including native born, in educational attainment. Nationwide, in 2006–08 the naturalized foreign-born had a higher percentage of college graduates than the native born (19.4 percent compared to 17.3 percent); the rates are about even in California and Florida, but the native born have a slight edge in Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Texas (see table 8.4). In-State College Tuition Public universities in the United States typically offer state residents discounted tuition. In 1996, IIRIRA sought to limit states’ ability to offer instate rates to unauthorized aliens but left the statutory language relatively vague. In response, states wishing to continue providing in-state tuition to unauthorized aliens who have grown up in the United States have crafted legislation permitting them to do so, and eleven states have done so (Texas, California, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,

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Table 8.4 Educational Achievement (as percentage of population) State  Arizona

ba  Degree Total ba  Native ba  Foreign Born

16.1

17.5

10.1

ba , Naturalized fb

ba , Noncitizen

14.7

7.7

California

18.8

20.5

15.9

20.7

11.4

Colorado

22.5

23.7

13.8

19.6

10.6

Florida

16.7

17

16

17.4

14.5

Georgia

17.6

17.5

17.6

22.8

14.6

Illinois

18.5

18.9

16.5

19.9

13.3

Indiana

14.2

14.2

14.7

17.3

12.9

Massachusetts

21.7

22.8

16.7

17.4

16

Michigan

15.3

15

18.5

18.1

19

Nevada

14.2

14.7

12.8

17.4

9.6

New Jersey

21.3

21.4

21.1

23.1

18.8

New Mexico

14.3

15.3

7.2

10.3

5.5

New York

18.1

18.5

17

19

14.5

North Carolina

17.1

17.3

14.3

20.7

11.3

Ohio

15.1

14.9

19.6

19.5

19.8

Oklahoma

15.1

15.2

12.4

16.3

10.1

Pennsylvania

16.1

15.9

18.4

19

17.7

Texas

16.9

18.4

11.5

16.6

Nationwide

17.3

17.6

16

19.4

8.7 13

Source: American Community Survey, 2006–8.

Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).30 The legality of in-state tuition for noncitizens is in the hands of the judiciary, where suits contesting its legality are pending, as well as with Congress, which has for years considered legislation that would offer amnesty to unauthorized aliens brought to the country illegally when they were children. Congress and the judiciary set different trajectories, with congressional efforts stalling and initial judicial rulings favoring immigrants. The effects of eligibility for in-state tuition on the probability of attending college are not known, although one recent analysis suggests there is limited to no impact.31 Permitting illegal immigrants to receive access to in-state tuition in some states has provided an outlet for anti-immigration forces in other states. Oklahoma barred undocumented immigrants from receiving in-state tuition (although, as was their right in the statute, the state regents for higher education reversed the policy). Arizona and Colorado deny in-state benefits

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to undocumented immigrants. North Carolina first barred undocumented immigrants from attending public universities but then relaxed this policy to only deny tuition assistance, whereas in South Carolina undocumented immigrants are barred from attending outright. In Georgia, this most restrictive bar applies only to the state’s five leading public institutions.32 Language Acquisition and the Education System Some language instruction is funded through the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Vocational and Adult Education, which administers formula grants to states for educational services to immigrants and other English Language Learner (ELL) populations. Recipients of these grants, such as community colleges and nonprofit organizations, are charged with incorporating instruction on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and civic participation in return for receiving funding. However, the primary mechanism for funding English language instruction in the public education system is governed by Title III of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),33 the federal education reform legislation enacted during the first term of President George W. Bush. Under NCLB, grants are provided to states for English-language instruction. They are distributed based on the number of ELLs in a state, and the states with the largest ELL populations get the most money. State educational agencies (SEAs) submit a plan for using the money to the US Secretary of Education, and the Department of Education then distributes the money to SEAs and to local education agencies (LEAs), such as school districts. Although the money is meant to go where the most ELLs reside, SEAs are permitted to reserve up to 15 percent of their grant for high-growth areas – areas where there may not be large absolute numbers of ELLs but where there has been a disproportionate increase. No allotment to an SEA is less than $500,000. SEAs must spend at least 95 percent of the money on sub-grants of at least $10,000 to eligible entities, which include LEAs, education-related community groups and nonprofit organizations, parents, teachers, school administrators, and researchers. LEAs and individual schools are meant to be held accountable for providing a language instruction educational program that increases the English proficiency and academic achievement of ELLs. ELL programs come in numerous forms, and the decision as to which, if any, to implement, is left to the discretion of state and local authorities. The profusion of different programs is either testimony of the inventiveness of program developers or a sign of serious confusion and intense competition for federal dollars. The programs include Content-based English as a Second Language, Dual Language Program, Maintenance Bilingual Education, Newcomer Program (designed specifically for newly arrived immigrants),

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Sheltered English Instruction, Structured English Immersion, and Transitional Bilingual Education (also called early-exit bilingual education). ELL programs are governed by the 1981 Supreme Court case of Castañeda  v. Pickard, which established a three-part test to determine the adequacy of an ELL program: the program must be based on an educational theory recognized as sound by experts or considered as a legitimate experimental strategy; programs and practices must be reasonably calculated to implement the theory effectively; and school districts must evaluate programs and make adjustments as needed. Castañeda v. Pickard established legal minima; more precise standards have been tied to different funding mechanisms. The following are 2008–09 data highlighting variation in state policies toward ELL students.34 In total, thirty-three states have adopted teacher standards for ELL instruction; three states require that prospective teachers demonstrate competence in ELL instruction (Arizona, Florida, and New York); eleven states offer incentives to earn an English as a Second Language (ESL) license and/or endorsement (Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, New York, Washington, and West Virginia); and seven states have banned or restricted native-language instruction (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire [with exceptions], and Wisconsin)(table 8.5) Of the eighteen states on which we concentrate, fifteen have adopted teacher standards for ELL instruction (Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas); Nevada, Ohio, and Oklahoma have not. Three states (Arizona, Florida, and New York) require that prospective teachers demonstrate competence in ELL instruction. The same three states are the only ones in our sample to offer incentives to earn an ESL license and/or endorsement (Arizona, Florida, and New York); and three of the states in our sample have prohibited bilingual education through popular ballot initiatives (Arizona, California, and Massachusetts) (table 8.6). English language instruction controversies are closely intertwined with arguments between proponents of English-only laws and advocates for more accommodative linguistic policies. Both have origins in the 1974 Supreme Court case of Lau v Nichols. In that case, Chinese-speaking students in a San Francisco public school challenged the school district’s policy of offering instruction only in English. The Supreme Court ruled that a failure to provide information and services in languages other than English could be discrimination on the basis of national origin, which is prohibited by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: discrimination based on national origin is prohibited under any program or activity receiving federal assistance. Because states and localities have grown dependent on federal financial support, they have therefore become limited in their ability to resist becoming multilingual service providers.

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Table 8.5 State Variation in Language Acquisition Policies States with Teacher  Standards for ell  Instruction

States Requiring  Teacher Competence  in ell  Instruction

States with  Incentives to Earn  esl   License

States with Restricted  Native-Language   Instruction

33

3

11

7

Table 8.6 Subset of State Variation in Language Acquisition Policies States without Teacher Standards for ell  Instruction Nevada Ohio Oklahoma

States Requiring Teacher   Competence  in ell Instruction

States with  Incentives to Earn  esl  License

States with Ban   on Bilingual  Education

Arizona Florida New York

Arizona Florida New York

Arizona California Massachusetts

At the federal level, Title VI was given real teeth by Executive Order 13166, signed by Bill Clinton in 2000 and directing federal agencies to take reasonable steps to ensure meaningful access to their programs and activities by Limited English Proficient (LEP) persons. Title VI requirements provide a stark contrast to state-level English-only movements. By 2010, thirty states had passed initiatives, statutes, or constitutional amendments making English their state’s official language. Such action does not violate Title VI requirements, because these measures are either symbolic or simply mandate that government business be conducted in English. However, a main idea behind these measures is that people should not have the right to demand government services in any language other than English. This does conflict directly with federal guidelines and US Department of Justice regulations specifically, which prohibit states that have passed official English laws from sidestepping Title VI requirements. It remains an open question whether the courts will ultimately rule on Title VI, which has two parts relevant to the discussion. Section 601 creates a private right of action for individuals to enforce the law if they are subjected to an intentional act of discrimination. Section 602 directs the federal executive to promulgate regulations giving effect to section 601. The legal question that the courts have yet to answer is whether section 602 confers authority on the executive to promulgate disparate impact regulations, meaning regulations that ban all forms of discrimination whether that discrimination is intentional or an unfortunate by-product of an otherwise permissible law. Current practice assumes that such authority exists, but it remains undecided.

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The courts came close to ruling on the legal standing of disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI with the 2001 Supreme Court case Alexander v. Sandoval. The case involved a challenge to an Alabama law requiring that driver’s license exams be given exclusively in English, which the plaintiff argued violated Title VI. The court threw the case out because Title VI offers no private right of action in cases of disparate impact discrimination. Still, in the wake of the case and with the signing of Executive Order 13166, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a guidance directing state agencies to offer multilingual driver’s license exams when appropriate, and Alabama reinstated multilingual exams. English Proficiency Table 8.7 shows that although the naturalized foreign-born have acquired English proficiency at rates significantly above the noncitizen foreign-born, a high proportion of even the naturalized foreign-born are not proficient in English, and overall about half the foreign-born population lacks English proficiency. Naturalized citizens have been in the country on average longer than noncitizens, and it is therefore expected that they are more proficient English speakers. However, because elementary English proficiency is a condition of naturalization and because so much of the U.S. integration regime targets language acquisition, it might reasonably be expected that the number of naturalized citizens who speak English less than very well would be lower. There are significant differences in foreign-born English proficiency across the states. As table 8.7 indicates, nine states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas) have a higher proportion of foreign-born who speak English less than very well compared to the national average. The state with the highest proportion of foreign-born unable to speak English very well is Texas (62.2 percent) and the state with the lowest proportion is Ohio (35.8 percent).

Nat uralizat io n Among the most significant requirements to obtain US citizenship by naturalization are the following: must be at least eighteen years old at the time of filing; have been lawfully admitted to the United States; have resided as a permanent resident in the United States for at least five years, or three years if the person meets all eligibility requirements to file as a spouse of a US citizen; have demonstrated continuous permanent residence; have demonstrated physical presence; have lived for three months in the USCIS district or state where the person filed; demonstrate good moral character; show an attachment to the US Constitution; be able to read, write, speak,

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Table 8.7 English Proficiency (as percentage of population) English Less than  Very Well Total

Native

fb

Arizona

12.1

3.1

59.2

37

68.9

California

19.9

4

58.8

46

68.9

Colorado

7.5

1.9

54.8

32.4

65.2

Florida

11.7

2.4

49.1

37.1

59.3

Georgia

5.7

1

49.7

30.4

59.2

Illinois

9.8

1.9

55.5

42.7

65.8

Indiana

3

0.9

49.5

31.5

59.5

Massachusetts

8.6

2.2

44.6

37.5

51.3

Michigan

3.4

0.9

41.1

31.1

50.3

State

Naturalized

Noncitizen

Nevada

13

2.2

55

37.5

65.5

New Jersey

11.7

2.5

46.3

35.6

57.1

New Mexico

10.2

4.6

58.6

40.2

66.6

New York

13.2

3.2

46.8

37.8

56.5

North Carolina

4.7

0.9

52.7

27.8

62.6

Ohio

2.2

0.8

35.8

27.8

43.6

Oklahoma

3.6

0.8

54.3

35.1

63.6

Pennsylvania

3.5

1.4

40.1

32.7

47.4

14.5

4.7

62.2

44.2

70.4

8.6

1.9

52.3

38.9

62.2

Texas Nationwide

Source: American Community Survey, 2006–8.

and understand basic English; demonstrate a knowledge of US civics (history and government); and take the oath of allegiance to the United States. The test immigrants must take to naturalize is meant to assess language proficiency and civic knowledge, and reforms to the test implemented in 2008 were intended to bolster the civics portion of the exam. Formally, dual citizenship is not permitted – immigrants must renounce any foreign allegiance when naturalizing; however, in practice, this condition is rarely enforced. Three sets of bodies, policies, and practices affect immigrant naturalization patterns: bureaucracies that deal directly with naturalization, government programs directed at the settlement of newcomers, and governmentsponsored diversity policies.35 Government policies facilitate immigrant incorporation by providing material resources, increasing immigrant access to decision makers, and shaping immigrant understanding of citizenship’s symbolic place within the polity.36 However, historically, the federal

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government has done very little to promote naturalization.37 This pattern was broken in the 1990s with the introduction of a federal naturalization program called Citizenship USA.38 Between August 1995 and September 1996 the federal government attempted to accelerate the naturalization process, contracted certain services outside the public sector, and increased interaction with community groups. Although this resulted in record naturalization numbers in 1996, it became a source of serious controversy and political backlash, particularly against the Democratic Party, which was seen as acting strictly for electoral benefit, the evidence for which was the large numbers of criminals legally barred from naturalizing who nonetheless gained citizenship in the rush to swell the ledger.39 Beginning with the 2006 Task Force on New Americans, however, naturalization has been receiving a new federal push, and the USCIS Office of Citizenship offered two competitive funding opportunities in FY 2010 for organizations servicing lawful permanent residents preparing to naturalize. The grants are part of the Citizenship and Integration Grant Program, and the money is provided through the FY 2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which allocated $11 million to USCIS for immigrant integration initiatives, with about $7 million to be used for citizenship education. Approximately forty-five grants of up to $100,000 were available for locally based citizenship service providers through the Citizenship and Integration Direct Services Grant Program. Activities that count as direct citizenship preparation services to LPRs and that are therefore eligible for grant funding include citizenship or civics-focused ESL instruction; citizenship instruction; resources such as textbooks, language software and computers; and assistance with naturalization applications, including legal services. Eligible organizations include public school systems, universities and community colleges, civic, community, and faith-based groups, adult education programs, public libraries, and volunteer and literacy organizations. A second group of grant awards, with approximately five grants of up to $500,000 were available to members or affiliates of national, regional, or statewide organizations offering citizenship services in underserved communities through the Citizenship and Integration National Capacity Building Grant Program. In 2006–8, naturalization rates ranged, on average, from 52 percent in New York to 28 percent in North Carolina. Nationwide, 42.5 percent of the foreign-born population was naturalized, on average, from 2006 to 2008. The midwestern and northeastern states have the highest rates, while states along the southwest border and new immigrant destinations such as North Carolina have the lowest rates (see table 8.8).40

CONCLUS IO N The impact of federalism on immigrant incorporation is undeniably large. The American constitution divides power between one national government

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Table 8.8 Foreign-Born Population and Naturalization Rates State 

Population Foreign-Born (%)

Foreign-Born Population Naturalized (%)

Arizona

14.9

30.1

California

27.1

43.8

Colorado

10.1

31.5

Florida

18.7

46.0

Georgia

9.2

33.0

Illinois

13.7

44.3

Indiana

4.1

35.7

14.2

48.1

Massachusetts Michigan

5.9

47.9

Nevada

19.0

37.2

New Jersey

19.8

49.8

New Mexico

9.7

30.3

21.7

51.9

North Carolina

6.9

28.2

Ohio

3.7

48.7

Oklahoma

5.0

32.4

New York

Pennsylvania

5.3

49.7

Texas

15.9

31.0

Nationwide

12.5

42.5

Source: American Community Survey, 2006–8.

and at present fifty states and thousands of local governments that are more than mere creatures of the states. If authority over immigration policy is mostly in the hands of the federal government, there is nonetheless a major role in the development and implementation of integration policies at the subnational level. The broad contours of policy are designed in Washington, but the decisions about whether to take them up and with what vigour is out of Washington’s direct control. The national government in the guise of the executive and the legislature employs the carrot of funding and in the guise of the courts the stick of judicial rulings. At the level of the national government we have demonstrated that the appetite for an activist, centrally directed, and uniform integration policy is modest. Washington has been slow to take up responsibility for the settling of the millions of immigrants who arrive in the United States; but increasingly it is taking responsibility, particularly through finance but also on more substantive matters. States and localities have been drawn into a dense

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web of federal, state, local, and voluntary activities that constitute what amounts to a slightly chaotic but substantial integration program. If the significance of federalism is evident in the decentralized, collaborative, and uneven character of integration policies, programs, and consequences, it is difficult to generalize as to what systematic consequences for the integration of immigrants this federal structure has. One effect of the American federal system as it operates in the immigration arena is to promote policies that are customized to the particular needs of states and localities. This appears to foster experimentation and in theory is more efficient than a national policy imposed uniformly across the nation. On the question of whether US settlement policy is more or less generous depending on which level of government leads policy, we can offer a partial answer. There is no question that if left to their own devices, certain states and localities would adopt unapologetic legislation demanding integration policies that would require immigrants to fully assimilate to the native society. However, it is equally evident that federal officials believe both that the national government should not play an activist role in integrating immigrants and that there is no alternative to helping underwrite its mass migration policies. Harsh legislation is more likely to emanate from the state and local level than it is from the central government, but so too are more multicultural and accommodative policies. What is most clear is that without federal financing, states and localities would be crushed by the fiscal burdens imposed by immigrant settlement. It seems reasonable to conclude that all levels of government have a shared interest in seeing immigrants naturalize. For the federal government, naturalization reinforces the country’s self-image as a nation of immigrants; for state and local governments, naturalization eases the financial overhead. For states, the structural requirements for accessing federal funds induce them to promote immigrant integration. Regarding cross-state and cross-indicator variation in the extent and effectiveness of integration, our conclusions are hardly robust. Clearly, significant cross-state variation exists, but why it does is an open question. Looking just at naturalization, it appears that two usual suspects are involved – proximity to the southwestern border and length of residency. North Carolina, for example, a new immigrant destination, should have a relatively low naturalization rate, and it has the lowest in our sample. Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas are not new immigrant destinations, but they border Mexico, and border states typically have lower naturalization rates than are seen in immigrant states such as Illinois, New Jersey, and New York. The patterns our empirical investigation uncovered are highly suggestive. They indicate that the next step ought to be multi-variate analysis that can sort out the multiple factors driving these patterns. One striking trend in the data is the success of naturalized immigrants relative to the foreign-born population as a whole, to the native population,

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and to noncitizen aliens. In the big picture, naturalized immigrants are markedly successful across socio-economic indicators, and the pattern is mostly independent of the state in which they reside. Whether the federal government’s concentrating its resources on naturalization is responsible for this is not something we are equipped to answer here. It does suggest, however, that the most successful immigrants are those targeted by federal integration policies and that the importance of this federal assistance trumps the significance of variations in state and local policies. More definitively, the spread of immigrants beyond the handful of traditional settlement states is wreaking havoc with the political and policy status quo to which Washington has grown accustomed. While the judicial system tends to be the final voice on immigration conflict in the United States, it is by no means the only voice, and local and state political maneuverings often care little what the judiciary ultimately says. The uptick in state legislatures entertaining legislation that would curtail birthright citizenship in their states, which on its face looks as if it would not pass muster on the most conservative of Supreme Court benches, is the most recent example. But even if the attempt to regulate citizenship is unconstitutional, it does not mean that symbolic politics are irrelevant. If the federal Congress senses enough revolt in their home districts they could be emboldened to change citizenship law through statute, something that could well gain judicial approval. To this point in contemporary America, immigration politics and policy have played out in the context of relatively concentrated immigrant populations. But as the context changes, politics and policy may also change. This is especially true because the federal structure interacts with immigration policies to create fiscal winners and losers, with high-immigrant states carrying the burden and low-immigrant states maneuvering to maintain their edge.41 Moreover, as more states become impacted by immigrant settlement, coordinated state action could experience an increased rate of return. Finally, the challenges of immigrant integration are affecting federalism proper and increasing the reach of the central government. Debates over education policy are a good example. Local control over education policy has historically been a cornerstone of American federalism, but the No Child Left Behind Act represents a real abrogation of that principle. Interestingly, debates over education led to a partisan flip-flop on the issue. Because the Democratic Party, the party of the central government since the civil rights era, represents teacher unions, it was the Democrats who led the charge against No Child Left Behind and couched their arguments in part through a defense of federalism. In contrast, market-friendly Republicans eager to introduce business-world accountability into the local education system had little trouble shedding their commitment to states rights. America’s overall struggle to produce a skilled workforce was certainly the overriding

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concern, but the failure of Latino immigrants to keep pace in the educational system also stood front and centre. As we noted toward the outset, federalism in the United States is a political weapon employed to advance or defend various policy agendas. As settlement becomes more dispersed and policy complexities multiply, federalism remains in the thick of American immigration politics.

NOT ES 1 Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1993). 2 Beer, To Make a Nation , 379; Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of  Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 1981). 3 Daniel J. Elazar, Continuity and Change in American Federalism (Philadelphia, PA: Center for the Study of Federalism 1968). 4 Robert L. Bach, “Settlement Policies in the United States,” in Gary P. Freeman and James Jupp, eds., Nation of Immigrants: Australia, the United States, and International  Migration , 145–64 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press 1992); John Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press 2009). 5 Sharon Masanz, “History of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” A Report, Prepared at the Request of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, for the Use of the Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Committee Print, 70–108. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1980). 6 Jane Perry Clark, Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europe (New York: Columbia University Press 1931), 35. 7 Michael J. Wishnie, “Welfare Reform after a Decade: Integration, Exclusion, and Immigration Federalism,” in Michael Fix, ed., Immigrants and Welfare: The Impact of  Welfare Reform on America’s Newcomers (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute 2009), 69–89. 8 Wishnie, “Welfare Reform after a Decade,” 75. 9 Peter H. Schuck, “Immigrants’ Incorporation in the United States after 9/11: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back,” in Jennifer L. Hochschild and John H. Mollenkopf, eds., Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant  Political Incorporation, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2009), 167–8.  10 The United States of America v The State of Arizona, http://www.justice.gov/opa/ documents/az-complaint.pdf (accessed 16 August 2010). 11 In The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, http://www.azd. uscourts.gov/azd/courtinfo.nsf/983700DFEE44B56B0725776E005D6CCB/$fi le/10-1413-87.pdf?openelement (accessed 16 August 2010).

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12 http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/LPR09.shtm, Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2009 (accessed 29 October 2010). 13 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration (Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker), Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population  Residing in the United States: January 2010, Population Estimates, February 2011, Office of Immigration Statistics (http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011). 14 US Department of Homeland Security, Task Force on New Americans, Building  an Americanization Movement for the Twenty-first Century: A Report to the President of the  United States from the Task Force on New Americans (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 2008). 15 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, table 13, “Labor Force Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population 16 Years and Over.” 16 Jennifer Van Hook, Susan K. Brown, and Frank D. Bean, “For Love or Money? Welfare Reform and Immigrant Naturalization,” Social Forces 85, 4 (2006): 643–66. 17 Jennifer Van Hook and Frank D. Bean, “Immigrant Welfare Receipt: Implications for Immigrant Settlement and Integration,” in Michael Fix, ed., Immigrants and  Welfare: The Impact of Welfare Reform on America’s Newcomers, 93–122 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute 2009). 18 Cristina M. Rodriguez, “The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,” Michigan Law Review 106, 4 (2008): 567–642. 19 Michael E. Fix, Randy Capps, and Neeraj Kaushal, “Immigrants and Welfare: Overview,” in Michael Fix, ed., Immigrants and Welfare: The Impact of Welfare Reform  on America’s Newcomers, 1–36 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute 2009). 20 Fix, Capps, and Kaushal, “Immigrants and Welfare: Overview.” 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Council of State Governments, “Statement of Intergovernmental Policy: Immigration (Statement of Policy for Immigration, CSG National Committee and Task Force Meeting, The Greenbrier, West Virginia),” 10 May 2006; National Governors Association, “HHS-01. ‘Immigration and Refugee Policy,’ Policy Position, Health and Human Services Committee, Special Committee on Homeland Security and Public Safety,” 2009. 24 US Government Accountability Office, “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Few Eligible Families Have Received Cash Assistance Since the 1990s, and the Recession’s Impact on Caseloads Varies by State,” February 2010, GAO-10-164: 13. 25 Deboarh Roempke Graefe, Gordon F. De Jong, Matthew Hall, Samuel Sturgeon, and Julie Van Eerden, “Immigrants’ TANF Eligibility, 1996–2003: What Explains the New Across-State Inequalities?” International Migration Review 42, 1 (2008): 89–133. 26 Nejdan Yildiz, “Skilled Immigrants and the Recognition of Foreign Credentials in the United States” (World Education News and Reviews, December 2009), http:// www.wes.org/ewenr/PF/09dec/pffeature.htm (accessed August 16, 2010).

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27 Luis F.B. Plascencia, Gary P. Freeman and Mark Setzler, “The Decline of Barriers to Immigrant Economic and Political Rights in the American States: 1977–2001,” International Migration Review 37, 1 (2003): 5–23. 28 Data were gathered using the LexisNexis State Statutes, Codes, and Regulations online database 29 Data in this, preceding, and following subsections taken from the US Census Bureau, “2006–2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates,” Table S0501. Selected Characteristics of the Native and Foreign-Born Populations. 30 Ann Morse and Kerry Birnbach, “In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students” (Washington, DC: National Conference of State Legislatures, 28 January 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13100 (accessed 16 August 2010). 31 Aimee Chin and Chinhui Juhn, “Does Reducing College Costs Improve Educational Outcomes for Undocumented Immigrants? Evidence from State Laws Permitting Undocumented Immigrants to Pay In-State Tuition at State Colleges and Universities” (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 15932, April 2010), http://www.nber.org/ papers/w15932 (accessed 16 August 2010). 32 Texas House of Representatives, House Research Organization, 15 December 2010. Interim News, Number 81–6, “In-State Tuition for Undocumented Immigrants Debated.” 33 English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement Act, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/pg40.html (accessed 16 August 2010). 34 US Department of Education Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, State Education Reforms, table 3.6, “State Policies regarding Teaching of English Language Learner (ELL) Students, by State: 2008–9.” 35 Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the  United States and Canada (Berkeley: University of California Press 2006), 106. 36 Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen. 37 Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Making Americans, Remaking America:  Immigration and Immigrant Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1998). 38 DeSipio and de la Garza, Making Americans; Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen. 39 Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen; DeSipio and de la Garza, Making Americans. 40 US Census Bureau, “2006–2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates,” tables B05001 and C05001, Citizenship Status in the United States. 41 Ivan Light, “Federal/State Cost Sharing of Immigrant Welfare,” California Journal  of Public Policy 2, 1 (2010): 1–22.

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9 Concluding Observations Ch r i s t i a n J o p p k e a nd F. Lesli e Sei d le A state-of-the-art volume on the impacts of federalism on the welfare state concluded that these impacts were “multiple, time-dependent, and contingent,” and that “federalism” does not affect welfare states uniformly across time and space.”1 The preceding chapters suggest that the same can be said about the relationship between federalism and immigrant integration. Indeed, federations vary so much in their origins, rationales, and ways of operating that it would be misguided to expect a uniform impact on immigrant integration policies. The oldest federations began as a bottom-up “coming together” of colonies of settlement. Others, more recently established, are top-down arrangements for “holding together.”2 A number of these are multi-nation states that have bestowed asymmetric privileges on constituent units that want more than the others as a price for staying together. The purpose of some federations is to be “demos constraining,” to check the power of the democratic majority, as with the United States. Others, in contrast, are to be “demos enabling,” as with Switzerland and postwar Germany. Finally, some federations juxtapose two full-blown government structures that each have legislative and administrative powers, while in certain other cases the federal government legislates and the sub-federal governments largely implement federal laws. Of course, there is a common core to all federal states. In William Riker’s classic definition, federalism combines two governments that “rule over the same territory and people and each has the authority to make some decisions independently of the other.”3 Or, in the language of democracy, since most of today’s federal states are democratic, the “essence of federalism” is “two constitutionally established orders of government with some genuine autonomy from each other, and the governments at each level are primarily accountable to their respective electorates.”4 Finally, the constitutions of federal states provide certain guarantees of the autonomy of the constituent units (states, provinces, etc.). In contrast,

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in most countries the powers of municipal governments are merely delegated and are thus revocable by the central state (or the government of the constituent unit). That said, even within a single federation there may be multiple, even contradictory, impacts of federalism on immigrant integration policies. In the United States, for example, anti-immigrant campaigns have emerged in a number of states, most notably Arizona, where the state government passed drastic legislation aimed at curbing illegal immigration by criminalizing certain activities. At the same time, states with large immigrant populations, such as New York, California, and Texas, have not implemented the welfare restrictions for legal immigrants that became possible under federal law in the mid-1990s and (unlike some other states) have continued to charge the children of illegal immigrants only in-state university tuition fees. Gary Freeman and Stuart Tendler thus conclude: “Harsh legislation is more likely to emanate from the state and local level than it is from the central government, but so too are more multicultural and accommodative policies.” As the chapters in this volume clearly demonstrate, immigration is a particularly sensitive issue in multination federations of the “staying together” type, in which the constituent units correspond to historical communities seeking greater autonomy or even independence. The classic example is Quebec, whose strivings for “asymmetrical” arrangements have led to perhaps the most decentralized immigration system in the world today. As Keith Banting explains, this has affected not only integration policies but also the selection function normally guarded jealously by the federal state. In this context, immigrant integration poses some knotty problems for minority nations within multinational states. While across liberal states collective identities tend to get thinner, minority nations see their particular “here but not there” at risk not only from the weight of the majority nation but also from new immigrants who settle within their territory. But the natural instinct of most immigrants is to adopt the majority language and majority orientations because of the mobility prospects these offer. To counter that tendency, minority nations such as Quebec and Catalonia have passed measures that oblige immigrants and/or their children to adopt especially the minority language. Some of these measures, such as Quebec’s Law 101, clearly have illiberal features. Asymmetric federalism in multi-nation states is where the action is when one is looking at immigrant integration from the vantage point of federalism. In the homogenous, symmetric federations the issues with respect to immigrant integration are less fundamental. In large measure, they focus on redistributing – in some cases avoiding – financial costs and social burdens and on providing opportunities for ameliorative or exclusionary policies and programs.

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The following sections of this conclusion seek to identify more detailed similarities and variations in federalism-integration linkages across the policy dimensions that formed the grid for our country studies. We close with a discussion of the implications of policy variation for the rights and integration trajectories of newcomers and for governance within federal countries.

Selec t ion a nd A d missio n The rules for the admission of migrants are closely linked to issues of national sovereignty, notably the control of borders and movement across them. Security issues are increasingly part of this dynamic. It is thus not surprising that in the seven countries covered in this volume the general rule is that the selection and admission of immigrants is the sole responsibility of the federal government. There are nevertheless two exceptions – Canada and Australia. In Canada, as Keith Banting recounts in his chapter, the initial catalyst for provincial government involvement in immigrant selection was substate nationalism. Starting in the 1960s, Quebec’s political leaders sought greater powers for their province, with its largely French-speaking population, on a range of matters. The Quebec government argued that it was best suited to select newcomers who could be expected to integrate into Quebec society. Initial moves in the 1970s led to a 1991 agreement with the government of Canada that allows the Quebec government to select all economic immigrants who intend to settle in the province. Pressures from some other provinces seeking a greater share of immigrants led to the establishment of the Provincial Nominee program (PNP) in the late 1990s. All the other provinces and two of the three territories now have agreements that allow them to recruit a wider range of migrants, including those with lower skill levels, than is possible under the Federal Skilled Worker Program (the main avenue for economic immigrants selected by the federal government). By 2009, provincially selected (Quebec and PNP) immigrants accounted for 44 percent of the total permanent economic principal applicants admitted, whereas 38  percent were chosen through the Federal Skilled Worker Program (through a points system). Although public opinion seems to favour federal selection,5 this sharing of responsibility can be expected to endure. In monolingual Australia, no single state government has been as active as Quebec. State/territory government selection takes place through a number of programs, but the shift has not been as dramatic as in Canada. As Lesleyanne Hawthorne reports, in 2008–9, only 12 percent of those in the skilled migrant category were selected by state/territory governments. This was nevertheless almost double the number admitted through this channel in 2005– 6. In 2010, the federal immigration department introduced priority processing for state/territory nominees and requested that, for the first

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time, the subnational governments develop immigration plans. For Hawthorne, these moves are certain to enhance “regional autonomy” in this field. Although American state governments do not have a formal role in immigrant selection, as noted above some of them have adopted measures intended to stem illegal immigration (particularly from Mexico) – a highly volatile issue that has hampered several attempts to reform the country’s immigration law. According to Freeman and Tendler, the states behind such moves claim their law enforcement responsibilities give them the authority to stop and potentially detain suspected illegal migrants. An initial court decision supported key elements of the federal case against Arizona’s 2010 law, and this was confirmed in April 2011 by a court of appeals.6 The case could well end up before the Supreme Court, possibly leading to what Freeman and Tendler describe as a showdown between the federal government and the states not seen since the civil rights conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s.

Policies and Programs fo r E c o n o mic , Social, a nd Civ ic- Politi c a l In t e g r at io n The chapters in this volume address three broad dimensions of immigrant integration: economic, social, and civic-political. As explained in the introduction, these are not set points on immigrants’ integration trajectories. Rather, they are aspects of a process that can continue for a considerable number of years. On all these dimensions, federal and constituent units are as a rule both involved, and the latter are generally the most active. However, as could be expected, policies and programs differ considerably among the seven countries and in certain cases among the constituent units. As we shall see below, there is also a good deal of variation in the degree to which the federal government funds subnational governments’ activities and whether there are intergovernmental agreements or similar measures that provide a policy and/or governance framework. The economic integration of immigrants has been intensely researched and debated in all the countries represented in this volume. We decided to focus on one important aspect – the challenges immigrants face finding work in their fields of education/training because of difficulties with the recognition of the credentials (degrees, diplomas, etc.) they acquired in their home countries. Although this issue is of concern mainly in countries that select large shares of their immigrants, research confirms that the negative impact on newcomers’ outcomes has been significant. In Australia, Hawthorne recounts that foreign credential recognition has been the source of significant tension between the federal and state governments. Despite sustained federal reform efforts, control of licensure has been characterized by professional protectionism and vested state government interests. In 1999, the Australian government introduced pre-migration

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credential screening for potential skilled immigrants. High levels of immediate recognition were observed in some professions, and research points to a positive impact on immigrant outcomes. In 2010 the Council of Australian Governments established the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency. Assessment and registration is to be provided by once autonomous state boards according to agreed national standards. Despite federal leadership and state government buy-in, Hawthorne concludes that effective governance of qualifications recognition remains an unfinished issue. In Canada, although provincial governments have jurisdiction over licensing, professional bodies have jealously guarded what amounts to delegated regulatory authority. Some provincial governments have addressed the problem, but with varying degrees of commitment. Ontario has probably gone the furthest by creating the Office of the Fairness Commissioner whose mandate is to assess the registration practices of fourteen non-health professions. The federal government has established a Foreign Credentials Referral Office to provide advice to immigrants and prospective immigrants and to develop tools to assist employers in assessing foreign qualifications. However, as Banting points out, given the limits of its jurisdiction, the office cannot actually conduct credential assessment. In 2009, the federal, provincial, and territorial Forum of Labour Market Ministers agreed to address barriers in fourteen professions, in part by developing standards for the timely treatment of applications for credential recognition. It remains to be seen whether the agreement will lead to the lowering of barriers, which remain considerable. In the United States, the federal government operated the Foreign Credential Evaluation Service from the end of the First World War to 1973, when it was disbanded. As Freeman and Tendler explain, the major actors in credential evaluation are now higher-education institutions, employers, and state professional licensing boards. Some of these operate their own evaluations, but it is more common to outsource this function to specialized credential evaluation agencies. The diffusion of responsibility and lack of federal government policy involvement do not seem to be major public issues. Turning to social and civic-political integration, all seven countries have policies and programs aimed at enhancing the opportunities of immigrants to participate actively in the receiving society. In light of the importance of these dimensions – including for economic integration – the rest of this section highlights the main policies and governance arrangements in each of the countries. In Australia, the Commonwealth government invests considerable resources in immigrant integration programming: in 2008–9, the immigration department’s budget for settlement, citizenship, and social cohesion programs was $A276 million. Delivery is largely managed by state governments, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) playing a significant

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role. One of the most important federally funded programs is the Adult Migrant English Program, which provides for language training upon arrival, followed by employment-related English courses. An additional federal program delivered through the education and employment department provides intensive English language instruction to newly arrived immigrant children. Hawthorne notes that state governments contribute complementary funding – for example, as part of the ethnic affairs policy frameworks that exist in some states. Although immigration levels and illegal migration by boat are controversial issues in Australia, the approach to integration services is not contested; nor is it a source of tension between the state and Commonwealth governments. The Belgian federal government has no overall immigrant integration policy. Rather, the regions and (linguistic) communities have a range of policies and programs, as do some local governments (notably Brussels, where the ethnocultural composition of the communes varies considerably). Flanders has taken the most “directive” approach through its integration course, which is obligatory for newcomers and encouraged for the established first generation. As Marco Martiniello explains, the initial phase of the course is comprised of Dutch-language training, social orientation (covering the norms and values of Flemish society), and career counselling. The second phase, for those who succeed in the first, includes professional training and advanced Dutch classes. Wallonia has no integration course, but regional integration centres provide language training and labour market integration and social orientation services. Martiniello is critical of the variation in services in Wallonia, which are due in part to the autonomy of the regional centres. In Brussels, the French-speaking part of the government focuses on providing services (including language training) for newcomers and their children, and the Flemish part has an integration course that is similar to the one in Flanders but is not obligatory. Martiniello notes that there is virtually no dialogue, much less cooperation, on integration policies among Belgium’s federated entities. Canada’s extensive settlement services focus on immigrant reception and orientation, language training, and employment assistance and on linking immigrants with citizens to help newcomers learn about Canadian society and build networks. Federal government funding is considerable – almost C$1.1 million in 2010-11. As part of what Banting labels asymmetric decentralization, the administration of settlement services was devolved to Quebec, British Columbia, and Manitoba through bilateral agreements. In the remaining provinces, the services continued to be administered by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Even within this group, governance and other arrangements vary. What Banting describes as the uneven treatment of provinces is producing “bitterness” in some parts of the country. The level of the CIC’s transfers to/spending in particular provinces has

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been one source of discord. Unlike in most other policy fields in Canada, settlement programming and funding have largely been addressed bilaterally (province – federal government) rather than through multilateral agreements. However, in 2010 federal, provincial, and territorial ministers agreed to pursue the development of a pan-Canadian framework for settlement outcomes – a move that could lead to enhanced multilateral engagement on integration issues. In Germany, as Michael Bommes and Holger Kolb recount, public policy did not traditionally target immigrants and their families. Rather, from the late 1950s labour migrants were included in the general social security system. Municipalities also became important actors and remain so. As Germany moved to acknowledge that it is a country of immigration, the federal government took steps to address immigrant integration more explicitly. Following adoption of the 2005 immigration law, a two-part integration course was launched. Because the Länder declined to fund the courses, management authority was assigned to a federal office. Participants receive at least six hundred hours of language training and take an additional thirtyhour course about democratic values and the legal system, culture, and the history of Germany (participation has been obligatory for about one-quarter of those entitled to participate). While it is too early to judge the overall impact of the integration courses, Bommes and Kolb conclude that they represent a new and important role for the German federal government. As explained in the introduction, Spain became a country of immigration later than the others. Similarly, the Spanish national government began only relatively recently to play a policy role in immigrant integration. One major step, the Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI) for 2007-10, is both horizontal and intergovernmental. As Ricard Zapata-Barrero explains, it reflects a commitment to cooperative federalism and the principle of subsidiarity. The autonomous communities (ACs) and local government administrations thus have a large share of program responsibilities. To assist them, the Spanish government provides significant financial assistance. The fund for the reception and integration of immigrants and their educational improvement reached €197 million in 2009 but was reduced to €141 million for 2010. At the time of writing, a successor to the PECI was being negotiated. Catalonia has been particularly active in the immigrant integration area. In 2009 it adopted a reception bill – the first such legislation at the AC level. Compulsory integration courses do not exist in Spain, and political pressure to go down that route has so far not been significant. Since 2001, the Swiss government has allocated between 10 and 15 million (Swiss) francs a year to support integration projects, including language and integration courses. The cantons benefit from some of this funding and also allocate some of their own resources to such projects. According to Gianni D’Amato, the 2006 Aliens Law reflects an assumption that non-EU

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migrants (unless they are highly qualified) have “deficits” that may include a purported lack of respect for Swiss laws, customs, and constitutional rights. Some cantons call for additional financial assistance from the federal government. However, the political climate (notably the considerable influence of the Swiss People’s party) is not conducive to increased federal spending. Additional difficulties flow from inadequate coordination among the cantons and overly complex procedures. All in all, D’Amato’s assessment is that the dynamics of multilevel governance have hampered the development and coordination of immigrant integration programs in Switzerland. Finally, in the United States the federal government has no specific legislation or policy on immigrant integration. Certain integration objectives are nevertheless reflected – though more implicitly than explicitly – in a host of federal funding programs.7 Language learning is an important focus. One notable initiative was the 2001 No  Child  Left  Behind  Act, under which the federal education department provides grants to state governments that are intended in part to assist immigrants and other Englishlanguage learners. The program’s 2010 budget was $750 million. Freeman and Tendler’s assessment is that without federal funding states and local governments would be crushed by the burdens imposed by immigrant settlement. They conclude that the challenges of immigrant integration are increasing the reach of the national government. As for naturalization, this remains an exclusive federal government responsibility in all of the seven countries but one – Switzerland. In that country, all three orders of government – the federal authorities, the cantons, and the communes (municipalities) – have formal responsibilities in the naturalization process. However, the Swiss federal government is not the key actor in the naturalization process (except for “facilitated” naturalizations for those who marry Swiss citizens). Rather, approval is decided by the commune, following a process that may include interviews by local officials and/or tests to determine candidates’ familiarity with the Swiss political system, Swiss history, and so on. In some communes, “town hall” meetings are held at which those present vote on citizenship applications.8 The preceding summaries, necessarily rather brief, illustrate the variety of policies and programs the seven countries have developed to further immigrant social and civic-political integration. In almost all cases, the federal government funds constituent governments through transfers or grants for integration services, particularly language training. Some of this funding may be shared with local governments or education authorities, and nongovernmental organizations are often closely involved as delivery agents. As for the governance of these arrangements, the pattern ranges from the intergovernmental, multisectoral approach underlying Spain’s PECI to the absence of even informal processes for coordination, which is the case in the United States and Belgium. Here, too, federalism is associated with diversity of practice.

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Dec ent r a lizat ion, Po l icy V a r iat io n , and Gov ern a n c e It should be clear from the observations above that decentralization is an important aspect of this dynamic policy field in all the countries covered in this volume. There is nevertheless variation on two questions: (1) the extent to which responsibilities are carried out by subnational units, and (2) whether a trend towards greater decentralization has been or is in play. Taking into account all dimensions of immigrant integration, the greatest degree of decentralization is evident in Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland. In Belgium, neither selection nor naturalization is performed by the regional or community governments. However, in contrast to virtually all the other countries, Belgium has no federal framework for integration services. Even highly decentralized Switzerland has legislation on immigrant integration and provides funding (if somewhat modest) for subnational programming. Moreover, Belgium has no processes for even a basic level of coordination among governments. All three of these federations are multination states, thus providing further confirmation of the observation by Jan Erk and Edward Koning that the direction for institutional change in federal systems with territorially based linguistic heterogeneity is decentralizing.9 As for trends towards greater decentralization, Canada probably provides the clearest example. The involvement of all provincial governments in selection grew considerably in the last decade, and settlement services were formally devolved to three provinces in the 1990s. In Australia, the number of immigrants selected by state governments doubled in the 2005–10 period; it is not clear whether such growth will continue. In Spain, the ACs have become more involved in immigrant integration programming in recent years through the PECI and in other ways. Some of them are being more assertive than others – for example, Catalonia with its 2006 Statue of Autonomy and its 2009 reception legislation (in both cases, the constitutionality of certain aspects has been contested by the Spanish government). In all three of these countries, intergovernmental agreements (though not constitutional change) have been part of the processes leading to enhanced subnational responsibilities. In other federations with high degrees of decentralization, this is not primarily the result of a recent trend in this policy field. In Switzerland, the involvement of the cantons and communes in the naturalization process began in the nineteenth century. As for Belgium, the regional governments’ dominant role in integration programming flows in large measure from the broader federalization process through which, since the 1970s, the regional and community governments acquired extensive jurisdiction in fields that are relevant to immigrant integration (education, certain social services, etc.). The regional governments have used their authority to develop programming that

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responds to local contexts and political pressures – for example, the integration course required of all newcomers settling in Flanders. Policy variation is present to a greater or lesser degree in all the federal countries we studied. This is not really surprising: after all, one of the assumptions of federalism is that subnational units should be able to use the powers allocated to them under the constitution (or formally specified in other ways) to develop policies and programs that reflect regional and local circumstances. Innovation and experimentation with particular subnational units may, it is claimed, lead to benefits beyond their respective borders.10 Within the differing policy spaces, governments are influenced by a range of factors, including the presence of linguistic communities (sometimes considered national minorities), the proportion of immigrants (and their descendants), economic and labour market conditions, and so on. In the multination states, the exploitation of policy spaces to develop distinctive approaches to immigrant integration can be linked to the existence of differing forms of pluralism.11 Language is a key factor here. As Jan Erk has put it, linguistic divisions can “demarcate the borders between separate demoi, i.e., communities which function as the default base for democratic politics.”12 In Quebec, Flanders, and Catalonia language, the definition of community, and efforts to obtain greater autonomy have affected the shape of basic rules that apply to immigrants and their descendants. The education system is a prime example. In the three subnational units, the children of immigrants must pursue primary and secondary education in French, Catalan, and Flemish, respectively. For Eve Hepburn, Quebec and Catalonia have sought, through such policies, “to create a new generation of minority language speakers to struggle for recognition of their distinctiveness.”13 Similar rules apply in the education sector in Switzerland, although the French- and German-speaking cantons are not pursing the kind of nation-building projects evident in Quebec, Flanders, and Catalonia. Integration courses can also be seen in this optic. For example, Martiniello observes that, once newcomers have completed the Flemish integration courses, it is expected that they will have become good, active Flemish citizens and not so much Belgian citizens. It is fair to ask whether there are limits to the degree of variation that is reasonable in this policy field. On naturalization, in most countries all candidates for naturalization must, as a general rule, fulfill the same requirements. Yet in Switzerland the rules respecting the number of years a candidate has been resident in the canton where he/she is applying for naturalization and the process leading to a decision vary greatly (and are not always transparent).14 In Canada, intergovernmental agreements have led to considerable variation among the provinces in the criteria for choosing immigrants, as well as a certain level of asymmetry in settlement services. In the United States, variation among the states on such basic matters as access to English language training is considerable.

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While it is not our task to take a stand on these (and other) examples of policy variation, it is interesting that this has become a public issue in only some of the countries. In Belgium, Martiniello notes that Flemish political leaders call for the other regions to have their own obligatory integration programs, but Wallonia and Brussels resist in the name of regional autonomy. In contrast, Banting observes there has been a striking absence of public debate in Canada about the growing asymmetry in policy and programs. The concerns he raises are valid: in Canada, as elsewhere, there are important implications for migrants’ rights, equity, and program effectiveness. The question of policy variation with regard to immigrant integration clearly merits deeper consideration – not only in federal countries but also in unitary states with decentralized governance structures.

Outlo o k In the end, the reader of a volume on federalism and immigrant integration wants answers to two questions. First, is federalism good or bad for immigrants? Second, does federalism increase policy effectiveness with respect to the integration of increasingly diverse immigrant societies? Both questions do not necessarily coincide, since what is good or bad for immigrants is not necessarily in the interest of the larger society. With respect to the first question, our study does not provide a conclusive answer, because federal structures help amplify both restrictive and inclusive possibilities and trends. As noted above, American federalism has been conducive both to Arizona’s anti-illegal-immigrant crusade and to liberal welfare policies towards legal immigrants in New York and California (and other states) that run counter to the national trend. To the degree that federalism increases the powers of the demos, it cannot in principle be good for immigrants, because majority publics are almost everywhere hostile to immigration. The interests of immigrants may this be best served behind the doors of “enlightened” state administrators.15 Even in countries such as the United States, where federalism may have been intended to be demos-constraining, in reality it must be demos-enabling, because the pathways to power are necessarily shorter and more direct than in unitary states. Because immigration is often regionally clustered, local or regional grievances can be more easily transported onto the political agenda of subfederal than of central governments.16 At the same time, as the proverbial logo “all integration is local” suggests and scholars’ interest in shifting the unit of analysis from “nation state” to “city” alludes to, the local level, whose impact is amplified in federal states, may also be a positive site of integration: there is a pragmatic need to resolve pressing problems of inadequate housing, infrastructure, work, and educational opportunities there. Moreover, the local level provides opportunities for the two-way processes of integration that we discussed in the introduction to

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be implemented in practical and potentially fruitful ways. The regional and local, which by definition have more weight in federal than in non-federal states, may thus cut either way, toward greater inclusiveness or more restrictiveness. It all depends on context, as our country chapters illustrate. Second, with respect to policy effectiveness, there is probably no intrinsic reason to prefer federal to non-federal solutions. Broadly, there are two arguments in favour of federalism. One is that it is required by scale of population and territory, and the other that multination states may need it to stay together. Both considerations are unrelated to immigration. Immigration is a second- or third-order consideration in all federations, which move along historical tracks that are differently determined. In addition, what is often more important for integration outcomes (though admittedly not the main focus of this book) than particular policies are the more general, immigrantunspecific institutions, such as labour markets and educational systems. In a remarkable review of integration outcomes of the second generation in several European and US cities17 the authors gave the highest rating to Sweden and – surprisingly – France, both unitary states with diametrically opposed approaches to immigrant integration. Key factors were that in both countries (1) the comprehensive public school system does not separate at an early age the gifted from the not so well-endowed and (2) public childcare and education systems remove children from their parents early in their lives and for extended hours, thus compensating for some of the potentially deleterious impacts of immigrant parents and homes on children. A second set of nonimmigrant-specific institutional factors comprises labour market and welfare state structures. If immigrants are more likely to be in work than on welfare in North America and Australia than in continental Europe, this has everything to do with the highly regulated labour markets and generous welfare states in European countries, not whether the latter are federal or not. All in all, federalism does play a role in the broad, ongoing story of immigrant integration, but it is a relatively limited one. That said, a good deal can be learned from studying this dynamic, particularly in federal countries where linguistic and cultural diversities have long influenced the structure of government, the protection of rights, and the definition of community.

Not es 1 Herbert Obinger, Stephan Leibfried, and Francis G. Castles, eds., Federalism and the  Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005), 2. 2 This and the following distinction are from Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative  Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), 320–1, 333–5. 3 William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown 1964), 5.

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4 George Anderson, Federalism: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 4. 5 In a 2010 survey, 58 percent of respondents said the Canadian federal government was “best suited to address the matter of selecting immigrants,” and 18 percent indicated provincial governments were best suited to do so; see Richard L. Cole and John Kincaid, “Best Practices in Intergovernmental Cooperation in Managing Diversity,” presentation to conference on Governance, Identity and Attachment in Canada and Other Federal States,” Ottawa, 6 April 2011; http://www.acs-aec.ca/en/events/other-events/governance-attachmentidentities-in-federal-states-comparing-canada-the-united-states-germany-spain-/ (accessed 15 April 2011). 6 This was the second Arizona law in this area. The first, passed in 2007, provided sanctions for employers who hire illegal immigrants. In May 2011, the US Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision, upheld the 2007 law, indicating it could not disallow action by states on immigration enforcement, even though federal law generally pre-empts state measures in this area; see Julia Preston, “Justices’ Arizona Ruling on Illegal Immigration May Embolden States,” New  York Times, 27 May 2011. A study found that since the 2007 law came into effect there was a statistically significant reduction in the proportion of the Arizona population that are foreign-born and in particular, that are Hispanic noncitizens; see Sarah Bohn, Magnus Lofstrom, and Steven Raphael, “Did the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act Reduce the State’s Unauthorized Immigrant Population?” (Institute for the Study of Labor, April 2011); http://ftp.iza.org/ dp5682.pdf (accessed 10 June 2011). 7 The US Citizenship and Immigration Services (part of the Department of Homeland Security) has a program that provides grants intended to help permanent residents prepare for naturalization and increase the capacity of organizations that promote immigrant integration through citizenship services. However, the program is very modest: its budget in fiscal year 2010 was $7 million. 8 Following a 2003 judicial decision, those whose applications for naturalization are not approved at such a meeting must be informed of the reasons for the decision. 9 Jan Erk and Edward Koning, “New Structuralism and Institutional Change: Federalism between Centralization and Decentralization,” Comparative Political  Studies 43, 3 (2010): 378. 10 See the discussion in Claire Huntington, “The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,” Vanderbilt Law Review 61, 3 (2008): 827–37. 11 On this point, see Daniel Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 32. 12 Jan Erk, Explaining Federalism: State, Society and Congruence in Austria, Belgium,  Canada, Germany and Switzerland (London: Routledge 2008), 7. 13 Eve Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the Region’: Party Conceptions of Regional Citizenship and Immigrant Integration,” European Journal of Political Research 50 (2011): 521.

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14 For example, in Nidwalden a candidate for naturalization has to have lived in the canton at least six of his/her years of residence in Switzerland; in Geneva, the candidate needs to have lived in the canton for only two years. In his comprehensive study of citizenship in eighteen industrialized countries, Thomas Janoski found that the naturalization rate in Switzerland in 2000-5 was the third lowest (Japan was second-last and Italy last). Among the countries covered in this volume, with the exception of Spain (which was not part of Janoski’s study), Switzerland placed last during the same period; see Thomas Janoski, The Ironies of Citizenship: Naturalization and Integration in Industrialized  Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 226. On the lack of transparency in the processes for reviewing applications, see Marc Helbling, “Switzerland: Contentious Citizenship Attribution in a Federal State” (n.d); http://www.ucd.ie/norface/papers/maa_helbling.pdf (accessed 13 June 2011). 15 See Virginie Guiraudon, “Citizenship Rights for Non-citizens,” in Christian Joppke, ed., Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the  United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998). 16 For the connection between regionally clustered immigration and political dynamics, see the instructive work by Jeannette Money, Fences or Neighbors: The  Political Geography of Immigration Control (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1999). 17 Maurice Crul and John Mollenkopf, “Challenges and Chances for Second Generation Youth in World Cities in Europe and the United States,” in Crul and Mollenkopf, eds., The Changing Face of World Cities: The Second Generation in  Europe and the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, under consideration).

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Contributors

KEITH BANTING holds the Queen’s Research Chair in Public Policy at Queen’s University in Canada. He has a long-standing interest in federalism, dating from his Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (1987). His current research focuses on immigration and multiculturalism. He is co-editor of Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary  Democracies (2006) and of Belonging?  Diversity,  Recognition  and  Shared  Citizenship in Canada (2007). Michael BOMMES was professor for sociology and interdisciplinary migration research at the University of Osnabrück. He was dean of the Social Science Faculty and director of the Institute of Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS). Among his last publications are Foggy  Social  Structures: Irregular Migration, European Labour Markets and the Welfare State, edited with Giuseppe Sciortino  (Amsterdam  University Press 2011) and Netzwerke  in  der  funktional  differenzierten  Gesellschaft, edited with Veronika Tacke (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2010).  GIANNI D’AMATO is professor at the University of Neuchâtel and director of the Swiss Forum of Migration and Population Studies (SFM). His research interests are focused on citizenship, transnationalism, populism, and the history of migration. His recent publications include “Switzerland: A Multicultural Country without Multicultural Policies?” in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, eds., The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices (Routledge 2010). GARY FREEMAN is chair of the Government Department at the University of Texas at Austin. Most recently he has published articles on diversity and support for the welfare state, the conflict between liberal democracy and

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mass immigration, and the role of interest groups in the making of immigration policy. LESLEYANNE HAWTHORNE is professor and associate dean international at the University of Melbourne. She has twenty-five years experience researching high-skilled migration, foreign-credential recognition, labour market integration, and international student flows. Most recently this has included commissioned research for the Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian governments, UNESCO, the Migration Policy Institute and the research arm of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. CHRISTIAN JOPPKE holds a chair in sociology at the University of Bern, Switzerland.  Previously he taught at the University of Southern California, the European University Institute, the University of British Columbia, the International University Bremen, and the American University of Paris. He has also held research fellowships at Georgetown University and the Russell Sage Foundation, New York. His recent books are Citizenship and Immigration (Polity 2010), Veil:  Mirror  of  Identity (Polity 2009), and Selecting  by  Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State (Harvard University Press 2005). Holger KOLB is senior researcher at the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, an independent scientific monitoring, evaluating, and advisory council. His main research interests are economic and demographic aspects of migration, migration policies in comparative perspective, and highly skilled migration. He has recently published “Emigration, Immigration and the Quality of Membership: On the Political Economy of Highly Skilled Immigration Politics,” in Georg Menz and Alexander Caviedes, eds., Labor Migration in Europe (Palgrave MacMillan 2010). MARCO MARTINIELLO is research director at the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FRS-FNRS). He teaches sociology at the University of Liège and is the director of the Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM) in the same university. He is a member of the executive board of the European Research Network IMISCOE and president of the Research Committee n°31 Sociology of Migration (ISA). His most recent book is La démocratie multiculturelle (Presses de Science Po 2011). F. LESLIE SEIDLE is senior program advisor with the Forum of Federations, director of the Diversity, Immigration and Integration program at the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), and a public policy consultant. He has previously held senior positions in the government of Canada. He has authored numerous articles on immigration, electoral and constitutional reform, and other issues and has edited/co-edited twelve books,

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including Belonging?  Diversity,  Recognition  and  Shared  Citizenship  in  Canada (IRPP 2007). STUART TENDLER is a research associate in the Department of Government and Public Policy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the coauthor of book chapters on immigration and interest group politics, and immigration and the global financial crisis. RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO is associate professor of political theory at the Department of Social and Political Science, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona. He is Coordinator of the GRITIM (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration) and the Master Program on immigration management at UPF. His main lines of research deal with contemporary issues of liberal democracy in contexts of diversity, especially the relationship between democracy, citizenship, and immigration.

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Index

admission of immigrants: relation to immigrant integration, 8; role of subnational governments, 223–4. See also  individual countries Arizona: restrictive legislation (sb 1070), 196–7, 222 assimilation: defined, 7; not the same as integration, 7 Australia: admission of immigrants, 29–37, 46; decentralization, 34–5, 46; economic integration, 41–3; federal system, 23–5; immigration patterns, 25–9; naturalization, 44–6; social integration, 38–41; two-step migration, 35–6 Belgium: admission of immigrants, 62–4, 68–9; civic/political integration, 73–5; decentralization, 75–6; economic integration, 71–3; federal system, 58–60; immigration patterns, 61–2; lack of cooperation between regions and communities, 70, 75–6; naturalization, 73–5; social integration, 71–3; work permits, 69. See also  Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia Blocher, Christoph, 170, 175. See also  Switzerland: Swiss People’s Party Brubaker, Rogers, 7, 121

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Brussels, approaches to immigrant integration, 67, 73. See also Belgium Canada: admission of immigrants, 86–9; asymmetry, 98, 103–4; civic/ political integration, 93–5, 103; decentralization, 87–9, 96–9, 100–1, 104; economic integration, 92–3; federal system, 80–2, 85; immigration patterns, 83–4, 89; intergovernmental agreements, 87–9, 105; levels of integration, 102–3; naturalization, 95–6; Provincial Nominee program, 88–9, 97; social integration, 90–2, 103. See also Quebec Catalonia: acquisition of Catalan language, 148; reception bill (2009), 149, 152; Statute of Autonomy, 150–2, 154. See also Spain civic integration of immigrants, 9; defined, 10–11; overview of findings, 225–8. See also individual countries citizenship. See naturalization Common Basic Principles (European Union), 7–8 decentralization: relation to linguistic heterogeneity, 229; trends in the

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various countries, 229–30. See also  Belgium, Canada, Spain, Switzerland economic integration of immigrants: defined, 10; recognition of foreign credentials, 10, 224–5. See also individual countries education system: significance for immigrant integration, 10, 124–6, 232 Erk, Jan, 229, 230 federalism: models, 5–6, 221–2, 231; relation to immigrant integration policies, 222, 231–2. See also individual countries Fenna, Alan, 6 Flanders: approach to immigrant integration, 65–7; integration courses, 71–2. See also Belgium Germany: admission of immigrants, 118–19; decentralization, 129–30; education system, 124–6; federal system, 114–17, 124, 129–30; headscarves in schools (regulation of), 126–7; immigration patterns, 118–19; integration courses, 126–8; municipalities as important actors, 116–17, 128; naturalization, 121–3 immigrant integration, definition, 9; no set end-point, 8; not the equivalent of assimilation, 7; not unidirectional, 8; and participation, 8; significance of general policies and institutions, 232; trajectories, 8; two-way process, 8, 231. See also Common Basic Principles immigration patterns: periods of significant inflows, 4; proportion of international migrants in seven countries, 4. See also individual countries

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integration of immigrants. See immigrant integration Kymlica, Will, 7, 103n33, 108n37 language training: relation to immigrant integration, 10 multilevel governance: coordination among governments, 12; intergovernmental agreements, 229. See also  Canada, Spain, Switzerland multination (multinational) federations, 5; and asymmetry, 222; significance of language differences, 230. naturalization: significance for immigrant integration, 11; overview of findings, 228. See also individual countries national minorities, 4–5; impact on immigrant integration policies, 230 No Child Left Behind Act (United States), 209, 217 policy coherence. See policy variation policy variation, 6; implications, 230–1; in Canada, 99–100; in Belgium, 231 political integration of immigrants: defined, 11. See also individual countries Quebec: catalyst for decentralization, 103; differences in integration (compared to rest of Canada), 102–3; role in selection of immigrants, 87–8, 222; settlement services, 90–1 recognition of foreign credentials. See economic integration of immigrants Riker, William, 221

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Index selection of immigrants. See admission of immigrants social integration of immigrants, 9; defined, 10; overview of findings, 225–8. See also individual countries source countries (for immigration). See immigration patterns Spain: admission of immigrants, 138, 141, 146–7; civic/political integration, 149–50; constitutional structure, 136–8, 147–8; decentralization, 153; immigration patterns, 138–42; intergovernmental cooperation/ coordination, 142–3, 145–6, 154; as a multinational state, 135–6; naturalization, 150–1; social integration, 147–8, 150. See also Catalonia Spiro, Peter, 6, 153 Switzerland: admission of immigrants, 166–7, 171–2; asylum policies, 173–5; decentralization, 229; direct democracy, 184–6; economic integration, 177–8; federal system, 162–3, 167–8, 182; immigration patterns,

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241 163–6, 172; intergovernmental coordination (lack of), 168; multilevel governance, 167, 186; municipalities (role of), 183–4; naturalization, 179–82; social integration, 177–8; Swiss People’s Party, 170, 180–1

United States of America: admission of immigrants, 196–9; attrition through enforcement, 196; civic/ political integration, 214; economic integration, 199–207; English language acquisition, 209–12; Englishonly laws, 210; federal government funding (significance of), 216; federal system, 193–6; immigration patterns, 198; naturalization, 212–14; social integration, 199–212; variation among states, 216. See also  Arizona Wallonia: approach to immigrant integration, 65–6, 72–3; regional integration centres, 73. See also Belgium

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