Immigrant Integration in Europe: A Subjective Well-Being Perspective (Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making) 3030785041, 9783030785048

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Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making Series Editors: Richard J. Estes · M. Joseph Sirgy

Angela Paparusso

Immigrant Integration in Europe A Subjective Well-Being Perspective

Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making Series Editors Richard J. Estes, School of Social Policy & Practice, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA M. Joseph Sirgy , Department of Marketing, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Blacksburg, VA, USA

This series includes policy-focused books on the role of the public and private sectors in advancing quality of life and well-being. It creates a dialogue between wellbeing scholars and public policy makers. Well-being theory, research and practice are essentially interdisciplinary in nature and embrace contributions from all disciplines within the social sciences. With the exception of leading economists, the policy relevant contributions of social scientists are widely scattered and lack the coherence and integration needed to more effectively inform the actions of policy makers. Contributions in the series focus on one more of the following four aspects of wellbeing and public policy: • Discussions of the public policy and well-being focused on particular nations and worldwide regions • Discussions of the public policy and well-being in specialized sectors of policy making such as health, education, work, social welfare, housing, transportation, use of leisure time • Discussions of public policy and well-being associated with particular population groups such as women, children and youth, the aged, persons with disabilities and vulnerable populations • Special topics in well-being and public policy such as technology and well-being, terrorism and well-being, infrastructure and well-being. This series was initiated, in part, through funds provided by the Halloran Philanthropies of West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, USA. The commitment of the Halloran Philanthropies is to “inspire, innovate and accelerate sustainable social interventions that promote human well-being.” The series editors and Springer acknowledge Harry Halloran, Tony Carr and Audrey Selian for their contributions in helping to make the series a reality.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15692

Angela Paparusso

Immigrant Integration in Europe A Subjective Well-Being Perspective

Angela Paparusso National Research Council of Italy Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies (IRPPS-CNR) Rome, Italy

ISSN 2522-5367 ISSN 2522-5375 (electronic) Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making ISBN 978-3-030-78504-8 ISBN 978-3-030-78505-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my beloved husband, for his love, patience, and support.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Elena Ambrosetti (Sapienza University of Rome) who reviewed sections of this book, complemented the literature inventory with additional entries and offered support and guidance. Moreover, I would like to thank the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) for providing me with the datasets “Social Condition and Integration of Foreign Citizens” and “Integration of the Second Generation,” and the Migration Policy Group for the “Immigrant Citizens Survey.” Furthermore, I would like to thank all participants of the 2018 European Population Conference (EPC), the XIX ISA World Congress of Sociology, the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America (PAA), the IRPPS-CNR seminar “Are immigrants in Italy happy? An analysis of subjective well-being” and the 10th Alpine Population Conference, for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Series Editors, Richard J. Estes and M. Joseph Sirgy, for their constructive comments that greatly improved the manuscript. All errors are entirely mine.

vii

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Rationale and Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Immigration in Europe: A Short Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Refugee Crisis: A Litmus Test for the European Union . . . . . . . 1.4 Is the Global Governance of Migration a Solution to Future Migration Crises? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 5 10

2 Immigrant Integration Policies in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 What Does Integration Mean in Europe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The ‘Traditional National Models of Immigration and Integration’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Beyond the Tradition: Traits and Pitfalls of Civic Integration . . . . . . 2.4 The Unintended Consequences of the Civic Integration Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23 23

3 The European Union Framework on Immigrant Integration . . . . . . . 3.1 How the European Union Understands Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Construction of a “Soft Governance” on Immigrant Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027 . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Current State of Play and the Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Subjective Well-Being of Immigrants in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Defining Subjective Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Importance of Subjective Well-Being as a Measure of Individual and Societal Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Why Subjective Well-Being Matters When Studying Immigrant Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16 19

25 29 34 38 43 43 46 50 51 59 61 61 62 67

ix

x

Contents

4.4 Main Research Strands for the Study of Immigrants’ Subjective Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Previous Studies on Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Main Methodological Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Main Individual Factors Associated with the Self-reported Life Satisfaction of First-Generation Immigrants Residing in Seven European Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The Destination Moves the Needle: The Role of Country-Level Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Immigrants’ Subjective Well-Being in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Immigration in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 The Subjective Well-Being of First-Generation Immigrants in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Main Individual Factors Associated with First-Generation Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 How First-Generation Immigrants Perform Compared to Natives? A Difficult Approach for Subjective Well-Being in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Subjective Well-Being of Children with a Migrant Background in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 The Integration of Children with a Migrant Background in Europe: A Short Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Subjective Well-Being of Children with a Migrant Background in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Children with a Migrant Background in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Subjective Well-Being and Educational Attainment of Children with a Migrant Background and Their Native Peers in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Conclusions: Policy Implications of Immigrants’ Subjective Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction: Key Takeaways . . . . . . 8.2.1 Policy Recommendations: An Integrated System of Policy Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71 75 79 79 84

86 92 96 101 101 105 108

113 115 119 119 121 123

125 132 137 137 138 143 146 150 154

About the Author

Angela Paparusso demographer, is Researcher of the National Research Council of Italy at the Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies (IRPPSCNR). She holds a Ph.D. in Demography (2016) from the Doctoral School in Statistical Sciences of Sapienza University of Rome. She was also educated at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, the Autonomous University of Barcelona and CERI SciencesPo in Paris. Currently, she is part of the Rome Chapter of the UNESCO Chair in ‘Population, Migrations and Development’ and she is a member of the COST Action ‘ETHMIGSURVEYDATA—The International Ethnic and Immigrant Minorities’ Survey Data Network’, the Horizon 2020 project ‘FUME— Future Migration Scenarios for Europe’, and the PRIN project ‘Immigration, Integration, Settlement. ItalianStyle’. She is the author of several journal articles and book chapters on the topics of migration policies, immigrant integration, return migration intentions and subjective well-being among immigrants in Italy and Europe.

xi

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3

Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4

Fig. 6.5

Employment rates, foreign- and native-born population aged 15–64, 2019. Source Author’s elaboration on OECD data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unemployment rates, foreign- and native-born active population aged 15–64, 2019. Source Author’s elaboration on OECD data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Over-qualification rates, foreign- and native-born population aged 15–64, 2017. Source Author’s elaboration on OECD data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main individual factors associated with the self-reported life satisfaction of first-generation immigrants residing in seven European countries, around 2011–2012, N = 7,417. Source Author’s elaboration on the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS) . . . Main individual and country-level factors associated with the self-reported life satisfaction of first-generation immigrants residing in seven European countries, around 2011–2012, N = 7,417. Source Author’s elaboration on the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Foreign resident population in Italy, 1999–2020. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regular and irregular foreign population in Italy, 1999– 2020. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT and ISMU data . . . . Foreign resident population in Italy, by citizenship of origin, 2019. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage distribution of respondents according to their self-reported life satisfaction, Italy, around 2011–2012, N = 15,242. Source Ambrosetti and Paparusso (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondents’ mean values of self-reported life satisfaction according to their country of origin, Italy, around 2011– 2012, N = 15,242. Source Ambrosetti and Paparusso (2020) . . . .

52

52

53

88

94 102 102 103

109

109

xiii

xiv

Fig. 6.6

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3

Fig. 7.4

List of Figures

Main individual factors associated with self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants regularly residing in Italy, around 2011–2012, N = 15,242. Source Author’s elaboration on results presented in Ambrosetti and Paparusso (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Foreign children aged 0–17 regularly residing in Italy, 2002–2020. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data . . . . . . . . Pupils with non-Italian citizenship by school level, school years 2001/2002–2018/2019. Source Author’s elaboration on MIUR data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Associations between subjective well-being at school, subjective well-being in family, discrimination and citizenship, and average grade on Italian and Mathematics among children with a migrant background and natives in Italy, 2015, N = 68,127. Source Author’s elaboration on “Integration of the Second Generation” data, ISTAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Associations between subjective well-being at school, subjective well-being in family, discrimination and citizenship, and self-assessment of school outcomes among children with a migrant background and natives in Italy, 2015, N = 68,127. Source Author’s elaboration on “Integration of the Second Generation” data, ISTAT . . . . . . . . .

110 124

124

127

128

List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Table 5.3 Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Table 8.1

Factors shaping immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mean values of respondents’ self-reported life satisfaction according to their country of residence, around 2011– 2012, N = 7,417 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selected country-level variables associated with self-reported life satisfaction, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondents according to their country of citizenship, N = 36,827, Italy, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mean values of respondents’ self-reported life satisfaction according to their country of citizenship, N = 22,633, Italy, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Working-age population (20–64) in some European countries, 2020, 2035 and 2050 (data in thousands) . . . . . . . . . .

81

87 93 114

115 152

xv

List of Boxes

Box 1.1 Box 1.2 Box 2.1 Box 2.2 Box 3.1 Box 4.1 Box 5.1 Box 6.1 Box 7.1

Migration Systems and Transit Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Dublin System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Civic Integration in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Immigration Policies in Europe: Have They Become more Restrictive Over Years? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Best Practices of Welcoming and Integrating Refugees in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Health Status of Migrants and Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Return Migration and Return Migration Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . Immigration in Italy in the Aftermath of the 2008 Economic Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-rated Knowledge of Italian Language Among Children with a Migrant Background in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 12 32 37 45 69 82 104 130

xvii

List of Photos

Photo 1.1 Photo 1.2

Photo 1.3

Photo 2.1 Photo 2.2

Photo 2.3

Photo 2.4 Photo 2.5 Photo 3.1

Photo 3.2 Photo 3.3

Installation on the migration crisis and deaths at sea, Musée Mer Marine, Bordeaux. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . “Soleil Levant” installation, 2017. Chinese artist Ai Weiwei crams 3,500 refugee life jackets into Kunsthal Charlottenborg’s windows. Copenhagen. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Statue of Europe (or “Unity in Peace”), sculpture symbolising peace through European integration, located in the garden of Convent Van Maerlant, Brussels. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ellis Island Immigration Museum, New York City. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “Il y a un pacte vingt fois séculaire entre la grandeur de la France et la liberté du monde” (Charles de Gaulle—London, 1 March 1941). Photo taken at the Charles de Gaulle monument in Place Clemenceau, Paris. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Children waiting the start of an English class in a small village school close to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Immigrant women taking a language exam in Italy. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jan Sabach, I’mmigrant, picture taken in Mexico City. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Binario 95, social hub of reception and support for homeless and immigrant people, Termini Station, Rome. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Man working in a small village in Tanzania. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Berlaymont Building, European Commission headquarters in Brussels. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

11

15 24

27

31 34 36

45 49 56 xix

xx

Photo 3.4 Photo 4.1

Photo 4.2 Photo 4.3 Photo 6.1 Photo 7.1 Photo 8.1

List of Photos

Mural reading “The Future Is Europe’, European Council headquarters in Brussels. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . Installation symbolising the Annual High-level Political Forum (HLPF) on SDGs, held from 10 to 19 July 2017, Headquarters of the United Nations, New York City. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indonesian couple at the train station during the Covid-19 pandemic. Source Pixabay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sign of a cinema closed due to the Covid-19 lockdown in Stuttgart (Germany). Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “The Women are Persons”, Monument on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Ontario Canada. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . Children with a migrant background during a birthday party. Source Pixabay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Children in a small village school close to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Source Author’s photo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

64 66 67 113 129 154

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract This Chapter aims to illustrate the rationale and structure of the Book. Immigrant integration, understood in its complex and multidimensional character, is one of the key challenges of increasingly multicultural European societies. On the other hand, subjective well-being is recently capturing the research interest of migration scholars and researchers, as a measure of subjective integration. This Book aims to bring subjective well-being into the research strand of immigrant integration, using self-reported life satisfaction. This introductory Chapter begins by outlining the rationale and structure of the Book, as well as providing definitions of key concepts employed throughout the Book and positioning the present study in the broader field. Then, I proceed by providing a short historical overview of immigration in Europe, which is useful to understand the evolution of Europe as a continent of immigration and, therefore, of integration, in the last decades. The final paragraph focuses on the European response to the 2015 refugee crisis and provides insights into recent evolution in European migration governance. Keywords Immigrant integration · Subjective well-being · Europe · Immigrants · Refugees

1.1 Rationale and Structure of the Book Immigrant integration is a central issue in contemporary societies. It is at the core of both public debate and intimate reflection since it challenges both national identity and socio-economic cohesion. It pertains, at the same time, the private encounter with the ‘other’ and the communities’ best way of allocating resources and opportunities for all. For this reason, immigrant integration is at the top of European countries’ social policy agenda. The topic of integration become even more relevant if we think that, as elucidated by Crul et al. (2013), European cities are gradually becoming majority-minority cities, as New York, Sao Paolo, Toronto and Sydney already are (Alba, 2020; Alba & Reitz, 2019). In the next decades, everyone living in a large European city will belong to an ethnic minority group. Some cities, such as Amsterdam, Paris, Berlin © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Paparusso, Immigrant Integration in Europe, Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5_1

1

2

1 Introduction

and Brussels have already started this process. But are European cities prepared to this? Will they be able to better respond to this challenge? Do European citizens have open attitudes towards immigrants? To answer these questions it is necessary that European politicians, policy makers, scholars and researchers look beyond national boundaries. An international comparison can make integration policies and practices visible and therefore helpful to develop new perspectives on immigrant integration based on more diversity and equity. Integration should not be understood as a future goal, but as a present constitutive trait of modern societies. Although the inclusion of immigrants1 into the host society has been studied through different concepts, e.g., absorption, adaptation, assimilation, acculturation, inclusion, incorporation, and integration (Heckmann, 2007), the latter is widely used to explain the relationship between the newcomers to a residence country and the native or mainstream society in Europe. In particular, “the term integration refers to the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration” (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016: 11). In European countries, the integration of immigrants is a shared political goal, pursued through different instruments inspired by distinct philosophies of the relationship with the other. It is a mutual process of interaction and adaptation between immigrants and natives and between immigrant communities and host societies (Piché, 2004). For instance, Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016: 14) define integration as “the process of becoming an accepted part of society”. Although the host society seems to have a dominant role in the process of immigrant integration, immigrants, the host community, and countries of origin are all key actors in this complex process of mutual acceptance and adaptation (Piché, 2004). Immigrant integration is also understood as a multidimensional process (Ager & Strang, 2008). In particular, the international literature refers to four distinct dimensions: (1) a legal dimension, expressed in the acquisition of a legal residence, including the citizenship status of the new country of residence; (2) an economic dimension, meaning the integration of immigrants into the native labour market; (3) a socio-political dimension, leading to the recognition to immigrants of rights similar to those enjoyed by the natives; (4) a cultural dimension, concerning the knowledge of the language, culture, norms, and traditions of the host society (e.g., Penninx et al., 2004, 2006).

1

According to the United Nations Population Division, ‘international migrant’ is a person who changes his or her country of usual residence for a period that can go from three (short-term or temporary migration) to twelve months (long-term or permanent migration). With the term ‘immigrants’, I refer to people born abroad who are or intend to be settled in their new country of residence, irrespective of their citizenship status, that is whether or not they have acquired the nationality of their country of residence. Sometimes immigrants will be understood with the meaning of people with a migrant background (see, for instance, Chap. 7). According to Eurostat, a ‘person with a migrant background’ is a person who has migrated into their present country of residence; and/or previously had a different nationality from their present country of residence; and/or at least one of their parents previously entered their present country of residence as a migrant.

1.1 Rationale and Structure of the Book

3

These dimensions are not independent of each other; on the contrary, they are functional and interconnected, especially when moving from the conceptualisation dimension to the policy dimension. For instance, legal integration, in its different forms of status, generally favours socio-political integration, as it gives the entitlement to exercise those social and political rights that are typical of liberal democracies. Economic integration also fosters legal integration: as a prerequisite for an uninterrupted residence in the host country, stable employment can be a guarantee for obtaining a permanent residence permit and/or the naturalisation. Cultural integration can help to increase social and economic integration: it can improve the working conditions and promote legal integration, as it can be a necessary condition for obtaining a long-term residence permit and/or citizenship status. When empirically measuring integration, we can distinguish between objective and subjective indicators of integration (OECD/European Union, 2015). Among the objective indicators of integration, we find the level of educational attainment, household income, employment, housing, legal status, etc. Among the subjective indicators of integration, we have, for example, subjective well-being, happiness, self-reported life satisfaction, self-reported health status, psychological well-being, mental health, perceived financial well-being, and perceived discrimination. The objective indicators have been largely explored and employed in the literature on integration, leading researchers and scholars to study both the micro and the macro factors shaping immigrants’ socioeconomic, sociocultural and political integration, for instance using ad hoc indicators. Conversely the subjective indicators have remained little explored so far. In short, proponents of the ‘objective’ approach argue that objective indicators are the main thing to look out for when seeking to assess the actual state of play and guide social policy. However, objective indicators alone often do not provide sufficient information: especially when dealing with policy outcomes and when setting policy goals, subjective indicators become indispensable. Along this line of thought, integration studies have concluded that integration cannot only be understood by investigating its ‘objective’ forms. ‘Subjective integration’ should be studied, to take immigrants’ perceptions and opinions about their experience in the country of residence into account (Amit, 2010), thus fully understanding the range of factors that constitute their individual well-being. The study of the subjective well-being among immigrant populations is part of a broader research strand that criticises objective indicators, especially macroeconomic ones, as unique measures of our societies’ well-being. This critique has gradually led to the widespread use of other non-economic indicators of well-being: among them, we can find indicators of subjective well-being and quality of life. These are considered helpful in integrating the ability of objective indicators, especially the pecuniary ones, in capturing the complexity of individual and societal well-being (Grimes & Wesselbaum, 2021). Among the measures of subjective well-being, selfreported life satisfaction, which refers to how people evaluate their life as a whole, is particularly useful to estimate the quality of life within a country or a specific social group. For this reason, immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction can be a good proxy of immigrants’ conditions and can be used to evaluate the integration process within

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the country of residence from a subjective perspective: that is by asking the immigrants an evaluation of their experience in the new residence context, with the broader goal of improving reception conditions, through integration policies and practices (Diener et al., 1985). A better understanding of these elements has a crucial appeal as a candidate for policy interventions. Therefore, considering that (1) immigrant integration is one of the key challenges of increasingly multicultural European societies and (2) subjective well-being is increasingly capturing the research interest of migration scholars and experts, I believe that researchers and policymakers could take advantage of this Book to design and implement immigration and integration policies, not only taking the needs of the host societies into account but also the opinions, experiences, and expectations of the immigrants and their families. In fact, it is important to see whether integration policies match the hopes and needs of immigrants in Europe. Analysing the implications of the immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction can lead to the planning and the construction of new systems for attracting and incorporating immigrants, encouraging the peaceful cohabitation of different populations and boosting social cohesion and progress in our countries. Policies should be designed to consider national and local specificities. Likewise, immigrants can maximize their life satisfaction by adapting, before and after migration, their individual characteristics to the receiving country, or by choosing to migrate to the most appropriate reception context. This Book, which represents a synthesis of my past and current research on both immigrant integration and immigrants’ subjective well-being, is structured as follows. The remaining of this Chapter presents a short historical overview of immigration in Europe from 1945 to recent years. Chapter 2 is aimed at analysing integration policies in Europe, with a particular focus on the policy implications of the relatively recent convergence towards civic integration, which has contributed to the gradual decline of the so-called ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’. Chapter 3 presents the European Union (EU) framework on immigrant integration, describing the various programmatic responses to the integration of immigrants in the EU. Chapter 4 analyses the growing importance taken by subjective well-being in social sciences and illustrates the main research approaches migration and integration scholars have developed to study immigrants’ subjective well-being. Chapter 5 offers state-of-the-art research on self-reported life satisfaction as a subjective measure of immigrant integration, showing the most significant research findings and methodological challenges. To this end, Chap. 5 shows an empirical comparative analysis of self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants living in seven European countries, measuring the effect of both individual and country-level factors. Chapters 6 and 7 present Italy as a case study in the context of the ‘Southern European model of immigration’. In particular, Chap. 6 shows an empirical analysis of the main individual factors associated with self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants regularly residing in Italy. Chapter 7 explores the relationship between subjective well-being in different domains of life and the educational attainment of both children with a migrant background and native origin children residing in Italy. The Book concludes by presenting in Chap. 8 the

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main policy implications of studying immigrants’ subjective well-being and offering detailed policy recommendations and suggestions for future research. The topic of immigrants’ subjective well-being is particularly understudied in Italy, which has rapidly transformed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration over the last four decades and is now an important country of immigration in the European context and in the Mediterranean region (Bonifazi & Strozza, 2019). Immigrants have responded to the domestic demand for labour in the industry, care, and services sectors; in addition, they have contributed to slowing down population ageing and the decline in fertility (Colombo & Dalla Zuanna, 2019). The demographic importance of immigration will be even more relevant in the future. In this context, it is very important to collect information about the factors associated with immigrants’ subjective well-being. The subjective well-being of immigrants will contribute to determining whether they will choose to stay or to leave Italy. Their future migration intentions and behaviours will have consequences not only on their life but also on the future of the country. Policymakers will need to consider these elements, adapting the capacity of the country of attracting and retaining immigrants. Moreover, Italy represents a key country in the immigration policy field in Europe today. The public and political debate is particularly concentrated on sea arrivals and refugees. Despite the initial costs to integrate refugees into the educational system and the labour market of the host country, newcomers are expected to contribute to the receiving countries’ economies, through an increase in labour supply and demand, and to population decline, through younger age structures and higher fertility rates (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019). Shedding light on immigrants’ subjective well-being and the main associated factors means understanding how immigrants and their children feel in our society and having knowledge of the factors on which possibly intervene to improve their overall well-being. In terms of social policies, the knowledge of these factors can contribute to implementing more effective and sustainable policies that help to transform newcomers into integrated immigrants and active future citizens (Paparusso, 2019).

1.2 Immigration in Europe: A Short Historical Overview Europe has always been a continent of migration: as the origin of emigration flows and as a destination for people in search of a better life abroad. Many macrostructural events, such as national and international economic, political, and institutional changes and crises characterize migration in Europe (de Haas, 2011). While since the sixteenth century, Europe was the main point of departure of movements of colonization, work and settlement abroad, in the second half of the twentieth century, Europe became one of the major migration destinations of global movements (de Haas et al., 2020). To examine the evolution of immigration in Europe from 1945 onward, the following periodization can be adopted: 1945–1963; 1963–1973; 1973–1995, 1996–2010, 2011-present.

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The first period (1945–1963) is characterized by the economic and political reconstruction after the Second World War, the labour demand of Northern and Western European countries (namely, France, Germany, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria) and the supply from the Southern European countries (namely, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece). During this period, given that the demand for labour could not be satisfied domestically, Northern and Western European countries adopted policies to recruit foreign labour first from Southern European countries, later from Turkey and finally from North Africa. Such policies are better known as ‘guest worker programs’ (Gastarbeiter) and have some similarities with the 1942 Bracero Program between the U.S. and Mexico. They were based on a principle of rotation, according to which European countries sought to pull foreign workers into the labour market for a limited period of work and to send them back at the end of this temporary contractual period (Hansen, 2004). The most important examples of guest workers policies were those enacted by Switzerland in 1945, France in 1945–1946 and Germany in 1959–1960, which brought millions of migrants from Southern Europe, North Africa, Turkey, and Yugoslavia into their labour markets. The aim of these policies, or variants of these schemes, such as that adopted by the United Kingdom who mainly resorted to colonial migrants (Hansen, 2004), was to ask migrants to return to their country of origin when the economies of the hosting countries were recovered; nevertheless, many migrants ended up staying because of family reunification and integration processes (Castles, 2006). In the second period (1963–1973), migration from Southern European countries to the North started to decline, since the economic and democratic gap with Northern European countries was drastically reduced (Cagiano de Azevedo & Paparusso, 2018). On the contrary, there was a rise of population movements from the South and East Mediterranean towards the Northern shore. Migrants from Turkey and Maghreb were expected to replace labour migrants from Southern Europe only for a limited period, after which they were expected to return home, according to the same logic of the guest workers programs. The 1973 Yom Kippur war and the related international oil and economic crisis launched a new phase (1973–1995), during which Northern European countries were pushed to close their borders, by stopping recruiting workers from abroad. Guest workers programs ended: however, many guest workers permanently settled and brought their families with them. It was the beginning of the processes of family reunification, permanent settlement, and integration: these processes have been encouraged by the growth of second generation and by the demand of low-skilled jobs (Bonifazi, 2013). Conversely, Southern European countries became receiving countries of migration flows from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe. Migrants were largely employed in low-skilled occupations. However, among Southern European countries, Portugal has never ceased to be an emigration country, because of its economic development that is weaker compared to other European countries. More recently, we have witnessed a new emigration wave from Greece, Spain, and Italy, because these countries have been strongly affected

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by the economic downturn started in 2008. The new emigration abroad of Southern European citizens is certainly an element of novelty and, in some ways, a break with the situation prior to the economic crisis of 2008, a transformation that has risen many reflections on the loss of attractiveness and relative competitiveness of Southern European countries (Pugliese, 2018). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist states produced large flows of refugees from Eastern and Central Europe to Western and Southern Europe. Media and policymakers perceived these flows as a migration crisis of biblical proportions, which however did not occur with such dimensions. However, unlike today, European countries were quite willing to host asylum seekers who were considered easy to integrate since they were Europeans (Martin, 2016). For what concerns Southern European countries, they introduced instruments to regularize the status of those who were illegally present and employed in the underground economy, such as amnesties and quotas. The aim of such legislation was to cope with the arrival of many regular and irregular migrants from Eastern Europe, in the absence of an active immigration policy (Reyneri, 1998, 2001). The economic growth and the labour demand in low-skilled sectors started a new phase (1996–2010), in which Italy and Spain resulted as new countries of mass immigration from Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. This process was fostered by active regularization and family reunification programmes, which contributed to the definition of the ‘Southern European model of immigration’ (King et al., 2000). This model, which will be analysed more in depth in the next Chapter, is characterized, among other things, by the presence of irregular immigrants into the labour market, which is highly segmented (Reyneri, 2001). The international economic crisis, which broke out in 2008 and hit particularly Southern European countries, did not immediately affect the volume of people arriving and residing in those countries, especially because of the Arab Spring in 2011 (Bonifazi, 2017). However, a change in immigration policies occurred in Europe, as a response to the increase of unemployment rates, which further strengthened policy restrictiveness towards migration. Nevertheless, as with the oil crisis of 1973, the 2008 international economic crisis, which resulted from the U.S. subprime crisis of 2007, has not led to large return migration. Return migration has been higher among EU citizens compared to non-EU citizens, the former enjoying the possibility of maintaining residency rights once left or moving to other European countries with fewer restrictions (e.g., Finotelli et al., 2018). Yet, emigration from Southern European countries has resurged, because of the crisis that hit more severely these countries. Conversely, family and asylum migration in Europe have not been deterred by the economic crisis, proving that the motivations to migrate are deep-rooted at origin and are not necessarily affected by circumstances and economic conjunctures at destination (de Haas et al., 2019). In addition to that, the segmentation of dual labour markets and the process of population ageing, both characterizing European countries, did not stop the demand of immigrants working in the personal care and domestic sector at both public and private levels, as occurred especially in Southern

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European countries in the last years (de Haas et al., 2020; Poggiaro, 2013). Immigrant women have gradually replaced native women in this sector, allowing the former to resist to the economic crisis. With the Arab Spring, the revolutionary wave of anti-government protest and civil wars which began in North Africa and the Middle East at the end of 2010, Europe started to see quite massive arrivals of people from North Africa and sub-Saharan countries, which have not ended yet and which have caused the death of many migrants in the attempt of crossing the European borders. Between 2011 and 2014, European countries adopted a somewhat open attitude. Italy, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia served as transit countries, from where migrants could make their way north through the Balkans to Hungary and Austria and apply for asylum in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the latter adopting a quite welcoming policy (Brekke & Brochmann, 2015; Kuschminder, 2019). That period can be remembered, among other things, for Mare Nostrum, Triton Poseidon and Sophia operations, military and humanitarian operations coordinated by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex with the aim of rescuing migrants and of fighting against migrant smugglers in the Mediterranean Sea (Photo 1.1).

Photo 1.1 Installation on the migration crisis and deaths at sea, Musée Mer Marine, Bordeaux. Source Author’s photo

1.2 Immigration in Europe: A Short Historical Overview

Box 1.1 Migration Systems and Transit Countries In the last decades, the globalization of migration has resulted in the SouthSouth migration being progressively numerically more equivalent to the traditional South-North migration, thus leading to a sort of migratory emergency of the South (Wihtol de Wenden, 2010). At the origin of this process, there is the growing difficulty of entry for many international migrants, because of more restrictive migration policies globally (e.g., Faist, 2019; Withol de Wenden, 2013a). Consequently, a new phenomenon has occurred: the regionalization of migration (Wihtol de Wenden, 2010). Complex migration systems have been developed around a well-defined region: within that region migration flows are favoured by geographical, cultural, and linguistic proximity, by a common historical heritage, and by transnational networks of migrants (Ambrosetti & Strangio, 2016). Complex migration systems do not correspond to the geographical division of continents, but to a demand which encounters a supply of numerous regional migrants. Examples of migration systems are United States (with many migrants coming from Latin American countries), Arab Gulf States (from Southern Mediterranean countries, Middle East, and Asia), Russia (from countries of the former Soviet Union), the Mediterranean (from sub-Saharan African countries) and Europe (from EU or non-EU countries). According to Massey et al. (1994), an international migration system is made of a core receiving region—a country or a group of countries—and a set of specific sending countries, connected by large flows of immigrants. The countries involved in the system do not need to be geographically close; on the contrary, economic, and political links generally characterize these countries. Moreover, migration systems are not fixed over time: political, and economic situations behind such systems may change (Ambrosetti & Strangio, 2016). Transit countries can facilitate migration flows within a migration system. In particular, transit countries can be understood as both ‘waiting rooms’ for and ‘backdoors’ towards the main final destinations in a migration system. Due to the role they play, they can foster, or hinder migration flows also depending on the existence of migration policies or bilateral and multilateral agreements within the poles constituting the migration system (Collyer et al., 2012). In the European Union, the emergence of political concerns associated with the concept of ‘transit’ contributed to the development of new approaches to migration and asylum policy based on the externalization of borders and migration governance. Crucial to this new approach was the development of close cooperation with countries bordering the EU, which have been charged with the task of containing the irregular flows of migrants, especially during the migration crisis (Düvell, 2012).

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1.3 The Refugee Crisis: A Litmus Test for the European Union2 In 2015, an unprecedented number of migrants fleeing from war, persecution and destitution made their way to Europe crossing the Aegean Sea and via the Balkan route. This led to a humanitarian crisis that shook the very foundation of the European Union (Ferris & Donato, 2020). During 2015, EU countries received 1,322,825 asylum applications. In the same year, 1,015,078 irregular arrivals were counted, including migrants journeying by sea to Greece, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Malta, and Cyprus. Most of the asylum applications during 2015 were filled in Germany, as Germany allowed applications even if asylum seekers passed through safe countries before reaching its territory. This is despite the requirement of the Dublin Regulation—which is central to refugee law in the EU—to apply for asylum in the first safe country that has been reached (Martin, 2016). Already in June 2015, the European Commission included Turkey in the list of safe countries of origin, and in November, Turkey and the EU agreed on a joint action plan to manage the flow. The plan included the improvement of the condition of Syrian refugees in the country and the enhancement of the control of the border towards Europe, in exchange for visa liberalization for the Schengen area for Turkish citizens, 3 billion Euros, and the resumption of the EU accession negotiations (Council of the European Union, 2016). The cooperation was formalized in the EU-Turkey agreement, signed in March 2016. However, the UE-Turkey agreement has three main shortcomings: (1) it infringes the EU fundamental values, such as the respect of human solidarity and protection; (2) it violates the second paragraph of the Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, according to which “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”; (3) it implies that Turkey is a safe country (Cagiano de Azevedo & Paparusso, 2019). Difficulties in the implementation of the agreements were evident in the early days of the agreement (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017). In 2019, on a total population of 6 million, around 1 million Syrian refugees lived in Lebanon, while over 3.5 million in Turkey, thus demonstrating that “the real refugee crisis did not happen in Europe but in the Middle East” (de Haas et al., 2020: 138) and that notwithstanding the true cause of the refugee crisis was the Syrian war, the European Union’s main answer to that was intensifying external and internal border controls, instead of attempting to intervene on the root causes of the political changes occurring at the doors of Europe (Kang, 2021). The case of Turkey is only one among the various examples—such as Libya, Niger, Egypt, Mali, and Sudan—of the externalisation of the EU border (Saatçio˘glu, 2020). Even though externalisation has been a tool of EU migration policy since the 1990s, the crisis of 2015 has revamped this logic (Geddes et al., 2020). Externalisation, 2

I would like to thank Giulia Barletta (IRPPS-CNR) for providing some stimulating insights presented in this paragraph.

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however, rests on shaky foundations. Unequal and unstable relationships with third countries cannot be the base of a future-proof European migration and asylum policy that aims to respect the fundamental rights of people on the move. The refugee crisis showed the malfunction of collective action within the framework of the Dublin System, leading to a few Members’ asylum systems being overwhelmed, with dire consequences for asylum applicants’ conditions. In particular, the principle of the “first country of arrival” overburdened the asylum system of countries on the UE southern border. To tackle the issue, in 2015 the EU Council decision 2015/1601 was put into place. The decision entailed the relocation of 120,000 applicants from Italy and Greece to the other Member states, as well as more aid options for the two countries. Already in September 2015, following the increase in the redistribution quotas from 60,000 to 120,000, the Hungarian government built a fence of barbed wire to shut the border with Serbia and keep off asylum seekers. In February 2016, following Austria’s limitations of the asylum seekers flow, the Balkan countries closed their borders. Until 2019, only 34,700 people had been relocated inside the EU from Italy and Greece, less than a third of what was initially planned in the Council (Photo 1.2).

Photo 1.2 “Soleil Levant” installation, 2017. Chinese artist Ai Weiwei crams 3,500 refugee life jackets into Kunsthal Charlottenborg’s windows. Copenhagen. Source Author’s photo

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Box 1.2 The Dublin System The International Refugee Regime is based on the normative framework of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. With 149 States parties to both, they define the term ‘refugee’ and outline refugees’ rights and the legal obligations of States to protect them, including the principle of non-refoulment. The Refugee regime revolves around a single UN agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but there is a separate body for the Palestinian refugees, the United Nations Relief and Works Administration for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Even though the “right to seek and enjoy asylum” is a fundamental human right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, UDHR 1948, article 14), deciding whether asylum seekers are entitled to asylum and which rights can be enjoyed by refugees is a responsibility of the receiving countries. Developed countries, such as the US, Australia and European countries have played a key role in creating the regime and still formally appraise the international legal framework for refugees’ protection. In countries of the European Union, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) proved unsuited to channel the inflows of asylum seekers during the ‘refugee crisis’ and revealed many of its structural deficiencies (Beirens, 2018). As a consequence, in many Member States methods of deterrence have been expanded in the last few years, sometimes in contrast to the founding values of respect for human dignity and human rights and contradictory to the Members’ duties of sincere cooperation and commitment. The Dublin Convention is the cornerstone of the Dublin System and is central to refugee law in the European Union. It was first negotiated in 1990, in response to the implementation of the Schengen Agreement, which allowed asylum seekers to move around the area easier. The objectives of the Convention were: (1) to determine which Member State was responsible for an asylum seeker, (2) to eradicate the possibility of “asylum shopping”—i.e., applying for asylum in the country that the asylum seeker perceives as the most favourable—, and (3) to avert delayed access to protection for an asylum seeker, in case that non-EU Member claimed responsibility. In 2003, the Dublin Regulation (Dublin II) replaced the Convention. The Regulation aimed to ensure a rapid and efficient determination of the State responsible for asylum application, in order to grant a valid examination of all asylum claims and to avoid someone seeking asylum being present in the EU without any country taking responsibility for examining his or her request of asylum (“orbiting”) (Kang, 2021). To this end, EURODAC—database of fingerprints of asylum applicants—was created (Mitchell, 2017). In 2013, the Dublin Regulation was again revised, to clarify the criteria of responsibility for asylum seekers for the Member States. Dublin III came in effect in 2014, its most consequential novelty being the prohibition of the transfer of asylum seekers to states with “systemic flaws in the asylum

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procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights” (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013). The term ‘systemic flaws’ was first used in this sense in two cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights and by the European Court of Justice, regarding the compatibility of transfers to the first country of arrival in the EU with fundamental rights inscribed in the European Convention on Human Rights. The decision of the two cases determined an almost complete stop to transferring asylum seekers that had entered the EU through Greece back to the country (Mitchell, 2017). During the refugee emergency in Europe, Dublin III was subject of great controversy, as the “first country of arrival” principle overwhelmed the asylum system of countries on the southern border, such as Italy and Greece, leading to overcrowding and degrading reception conditions (Brekke and Brochman, 2015). At the same time, it also places restrictions on asylum seekers, who would rather continue their journey to other European countries, which might be more appealing because of structural conditions and the presence of social networks. On 4 May 2016, the Dublin IV proposal was presented by the European Commission. The purposed changes included (1) a new automated system to monitor the number of asylum applications and the number of people resettled; (2) a reference key to determine whether a state is undergoing disproportionate pressure; (3) a fairness mechanism. However, this proposal was formally withdrawn in September 2020. In office since December 2019, the President of the European Commission von der Leyen, in her first State of the Union speech has highlighted the deep division caused by the 2015 crisis and called for a “human and humane approach”. The President affirmed the necessity of rebuilding trust and solidarity in the EU, remarking that “migration is a European challenge and all of Europe must do its part” (von der Leyen, 2020). In the speech, von der Leyen also addressed the issues of hate and racism. During the crisis, the antagonisation of refugees, perceived not only as distinct “others” but also as threats, led to an inward turn and the building of metaphorical and physical walls throughout Europe. The rise of populist currents and the diffusion of anti-immigration and xenophobic discourses converged in an outbreak of antiEuropean sentiments and a lack of solidarity among the European Members States in the aftermath of 2015 (e.g., Postelnicescu, 2016). On 23 September 2020, the EC has proposed the New Pact on Asylum and Migration. The long gestation and the outcome of the New Pact revealed that serious tensions persisted on several issues, primarily concerning the Dublin System, while increasing the number of returns and enhancing external border control were shared priorities. Despite framing the Pact as a “fresh start” (European Commission, 2020a) and the emphasis put on the novelty factor in the press material released by the

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Commission, a closer analysis at the proposals reveals that much of the discursive framing is not reflected in the legislative proposals. Margaritis Schinas, vicePresident in the von der Leyen Commission, illustrated the New Pact as a house with three floors: (1) “The external dimension—centred around strengthened partnerships with countries of origin and transit; (2) robust management of our external borders, and (3) firm but fair internal rules, which ensure that solidarity is provided to Member States under pressure” (European Commission, 2020b). However, despite the strong emphasis on a rhetoric of “solidarity” and “responsibility”, the Pact is, in essence, a product of the needs and the infighting that have characterised European cooperation on migration and asylum so far. In this sense, the Pact does not provide principles and a coherent vision of how European migration and asylum policy could look like. On the contrary, it reveals a pragmatic trade-off between the diverging positions of the Member States, which seems to reinforce intergovernmentalism instead of making efforts towards enhancing communitarisation. This is especially true regarding the reform of the Dublin System, which remains virtually unchanged, and the proposed solidarity mechanism, that builds on previous asymmetries. The recent past has proven that much more focus is needed on the respect of fundamental rights and the protection of the right to asylum, both within the EU’s border and in the partner countries. This can be achieved only through comprehensive cooperation on migration policy with third countries, based on a fair exchange of interest and granting partners more legal migration opportunities. Inside the EU, the cooperation on migration and asylum needs to be built on the development of structural mechanisms that prevent future humanitarian emergencies. To this end, solidarity should be enforceable in a context of shared responsibility. This would be beneficial to the well-being of individuals and communities in migrants’ origin, transit, and receiving countries. It would represent a further advancement in the process of social acceptance and full integration of migrants and refugees in our societies and another piece that completes the puzzle of people’ subjective well-being in Europe (Photo 1.3). The short analysis of migration in Europe, characterized by the arrival of guestworkers, followed by their families, and the gradual surge in asylum seekers starting from 1980 to onwards, has demonstrated that labour migration has been reduced or stopped in almost all European countries starting from 1973. Family migration and humanitarian migration remain the two main entry channels to Europe. Especially the humanitarian channel is overused, sometimes improperly by economic migrants, with two important consequences: (1) humanitarian routes are becoming increasingly busy and controlled, therefore intensifying the risk of smuggling, and dying at border crossing; (2) since it is quite inflated, the institution of asylum risks to be delegitimized by the public opinion (Ambrosetti & Paparusso, 2018). Therefore, besides the reform of the Dublin Convention, it is urgent to re-introduce active labour migration policies. These policies should be designed to consider the specificities of the labour markets and societal and demographic needs of EU countries, for instance making systematic use of quotas, or to regularize irregular immigrants

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Photo 1.3 The Statue of Europe (or “Unity in Peace”), sculpture symbolising peace through European integration, located in the garden of Convent Van Maerlant, Brussels. Source Author’s photo

who are already present in countries of destination through ad hoc amnesties. Especially in Southern European countries, immigrants have responded to the demand for labour in the industry, care and services sectors and more broadly they have contributed to their economic productivity, even during the 2008 economic crisis (Venturini & Villosio, 2018). Moreover, immigrants have contributed to the slowing down of both the ageing of the population and the decline in fertility. The re-opening

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of legal migration channels would help receiving countries to cope with its domestic shortages, with the segmentation of the labour market and the structural process of population ageing. Furthermore, it would help to recognize the phenomenon of immigration as a structural and not a transitory one and, above all, to mitigate negative attitudes towards immigrants, which have generally been exacerbated by a political discourse and a policy action dominated by security and emergency issues (Panichella & Ambrosini, 2018). This would foster immigrants’ social acceptance in the host society and a mutual process of solidarity and integration. The European Union too would gain from such an option. The liberal values of democracy, freedom, and respect of human rights, on which the EU is founded, and which continuously attract newcomers, would be fully respected, with the vital consequence that the European citizens would show more optimism and consensus—which currently seem to waver under many points of view—towards the EU institutions. To re-establish such trust could potentially lay the foundation for an effective and sustainable answer to the European crisis of human mobility. Finally, integration, which is the main force driving long-term success in the lifetimes of immigrants, should be fundamental to ensure social cohesion in Europe and to prevent marginalization (Allen et al., 2018).

1.4 Is the Global Governance of Migration a Solution to Future Migration Crises? As underlined, the regulation of international migration has become a highly controversial and politically sensitive issue for many European countries (Hadj Abdou et al., 2021). This is especially true in the current period, marked by economic uncertainty and unprecedented movements of people globally—whether escaping from war and persecution, or towards fresh starts and economic opportunity—that in various countries all over Europe have shaped populist claims and social resentment against immigrants (Heinisch et al., 2018; Rustenbach, 2010). It is against this background that a global governance of migration is often advocated, as a solution to help immigrants’ receiving countries and intergovernmental organizations to fully understand that migration is not a temporary and exceptional phenomenon and that adopting muscular, short-term and emergency measures is highly onerous for them and, above all, contrary to both common sense and solidarity. The main goal of the global governance of migration—which can be defined as the ensemble of norms that regulate and help states and actors in responding to migration (Betts & Kainz, 2017)—is to combat the negative effects of policy restrictiveness on human mobility and to strengthen global stability. It means to give legitimacy to the right of people to immigrate, by recognizing human mobility as a global public good able to produce positive effects for all the actors involved in the migration process (Wihtol de Wenden, 2010). Despite many hesitations, lack of agreement and cooperation between international organizations, receiving countries, political parties, syndicates, immigrant and no-profit organizations, some important

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key points in the development of the global governance of migration can be traced (Wihtol de Wenden, 2013b). The genesis of the global migration governance can be traced back to the inter-War years. The main actions of that period were aimed at protecting Europe’s refugees and consisted in: the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), which signed a series of labour rights conventions which were increasingly applied to migration and in particular to displaced individuals in need of economic opportunities, especially in the first stages of its creation in 1919; the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) of 1949; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established in 1950 and responsible to supervise the Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951; the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) created in 1951 (later to become ICM in 1980 and IOM in 1989) to support actions on the movement of displaced populations (Betts & Kainz, 2017). The United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994, represented a fundamental starting point of the reflection on the global governance of migration in a broader sense: it suggested the importance of applying international norms to migration. The Global Migration Group (GMG), an inter-agency group, was founded in 2003, with the aim of promoting the application of all international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration. It has a symbolic link with the United Nations (UN), through the person of Peter Sutherland, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for International Migration. The High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) is, instead, at the origin of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), launched in 2006 at the General Assembly of the United Nations by the then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan. The main aim of the GFMD is to discuss of issues related to migration and development in a multilateral context and with a plurality of actors. Therefore, the GFMD has been organizing annual meetings, for example in Manila, Athens, Brussels, Geneva, and Puerto Vallarta, with distinctive elements of reflection and innovative policy-oriented goals. Successful experiences and best practices on migration policies and development have been shared by countries to give to human mobility the same importance and dignity of other international issues. Although the GFMD does not make part of the UN system, it is open to all UN member states that are interested in adopting a sustainable management of migration flows. The common feature of these initiatives is the multilateral partnership and the responsible involvement of many governmental and non-governmental institutions, such as IOM and ILO. However, although they produce important recommendations and advices and offer advanced visions on the migration policymaking (Geiger & Pécoud, 2014), they lack a political legitimacy able to influence countries’ prerogatives on migration. So far, there is no international treaty on migration or UN agency with a mandate for migration, except for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, which has a mandate for refugees and asylum seekers (Hampshire, 2016).

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Therefore, the existing global governance of migration is not able to produce a binding policy advocacy aimed at limiting countries’ ability to regulate migration and, therefore, at convincing them about the detrimental effect of policy restrictiveness and borders control, not only on migrants, but also on the building of cohesive and vibrant societies. Repressive security measures are counter-productive since they make more precarious the residence of migrants in receiving countries and fosters their irregularity. This produces sentiments of anxiety and fear towards migrants and gives raise to racism and xenophobia, thus increasing isolation and hindering the process of social acceptance and the successful incorporation of migrants into the host country. In addition, measures based on borders control ignore the fact that most irregular migrants are not people who have illegally crossed a border, but people who have regularly entered a country and have overstayed their visa. Therefore, security measures based on the enforcement of borders control are fated to fail in combatting illegal migration and controlling migrants’ irregularity (Paparusso, 2016). In September 2016, the UN General Assembly hosted a high-level summit on refugees and migrants. It was the first time the UN General Assembly decided to bring countries together, to strengthen the global governance on migration. The summit adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, with the commitment of: (1) protecting the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status; (2) supporting those countries rescuing, receiving and hosting large numbers of refugees and migrants; (3) enhancing the positive contributions made by migrants to economic and social development in their host countries; (4) implementing a comprehensive refugee response, setting out the responsibility of several actors; (5) strengthening the global governance of migration, by bringing the IOM into the UN system; (6) negotiating the adoption of a global compact in 2018, in order to achieve a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees. To this end, a wide consultation process has been planned with the most important public and private institutions involved, followed by intergovernmental negotiations that have produced the final draft of the “Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration”. The Global Compact, which is structured in 23 objectives and aims at inviting migrants’ sending and receiving countries to improve international cooperation and solidarity according to the principle of subsidiarity, have been adopted on 10–11 December in Marrakech, Morocco (Cagiano de Azevedo & Paparusso, 2019). Some time is needed to be able to evaluate if this ambitious declaration of intent will influence the global governance of migration and will be able to prevent new international migration crises. The Global Compact is a non-legally binding framework rooted in the 2030 Agenda. Moreover, some countries, such as the Visegrád countries, Austria, Israel, Italy, the USA, and Australia, have not signed or have signed against the document. Nevertheless, the Global Compact will probably succeed in filling one of the main gaps of the current global governance of migration: building an effective multilateral action on human mobility. The Global Compact has an important symbolic meaning: it gives legitimacy to the right of people to immigrate and recognizes human mobility as a global public good able to produce positive effects for all the actors involved.

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References Ager, A., & Strang, A. (2008). Understanding integration: A conceptual framework. Journal of Refugee Studies, 21(2), 166–191. Alba, R., & Reitz, J. G. (2019). The significance of mixed family backgrounds for mainstream integration in Canada. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47(4), 916–933. Alba, R. (2020). The great demographic illusion. Majority, minority, and the expanding American mainstream. Princeton University Press. Allen, W., Anderson, B., Van Hear, N., Sumption, M., Düvell, F., Hough, J., Rose, L., Humphris, R., & Walker, S. (2018). Who counts in crises? The new geopolitics of international migration and refugee governance. Geopolitics, 23(1), 217–243. Ambrosetti, E., & Strangio, D. (2016). Migration in the Mediterranean across disciplines. In E. Ambrosetti, D. Strangio & C. Wihtol de Wenden (Eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean. SocioEconomic Perspectives (pp. 3–14). Routledge. Amit, K. (2010). Determinants of life satisfaction among immigrants from Western countries and from the FSU in Israel. Social Indicators Research, 96(3), 515–534. Beirens, H. (2018). Cracked foundation, uncertain future: Structural weaknesses in the Common European Asylum System. Migration Policy Institute Europe. Betts, A., & Kainz, L. (2017). The history of global migration governance. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Working Papers series n. 122, 1–22. Bonifazi, C. (2013). L’Italia delle migrazioni [Italy of migrations]. Il Mulino. Bonifazi, C. (Ed.). (2017). Migrazioni e integrazioni nell’Italia di oggi [Migrations and integrations in Italy today]. CNR-IRPPS e-Publishing. Bonifazi, C., & Strozza, S. (2019). International migrations in the Southern countries of the European Union: Continuity and changes, before and after the crisis. In S. Capasso & E. Ferragina (Eds.), Mediterranean migration and the labour market: Policies for growth and social development in the Mediterranean area (pp. 198–223). Routledge. Bonifazi, C., & Paparusso, A. (2019). L’impatto delle politiche familiari sulla bassa fecondità europea [The impact of family policies on low European fertility]. La Rivista delle Politiche Sociali, 4, 31–49. Brekke, J. P., & Brochmann, G. (2015). Stuck in transit: Secondary migration of asylum seekers in Europe, national differences, and the Dublin regulation. Journal of Refugee Studies, 28(2), 145–162. Cagiano de Azevedo, R., & Paparusso, A. (2018). Generazioni di migranti, di leggi, di politiche. Il cammino di un dibattito [Generations of migrants, laws, policies. The path of a debate]. Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 85(2), 171–188. Cagiano de Azevedo, R., & Paparusso, A. (2019). Migration policies in times of crisis: A subsidiarity approach. Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 86(1), 97–108. Castles, S. (2006). Guestworkers in Europe: A resurrection? International Migration Review, 40(4), 741–766. Colombo, A. D., & Dalla Zuanna, G. (2019). Immigration Italian Style, 1977–2018. Population and Development Review, 45(3), 585–615. Collyer, M., Düvell, F., & de Haas, H. (2012). Critical approaches to transit migration. Population, Space and Place, 18(4), 407–414. Council of the European Union. (2016). EU-Turkey Statement, 9 October 2020, https://www.consil ium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/pdf. Crul, M., Schneider, J., & Lelie, F. (2013). Super-diversity. A new perspective on integration. VU University Press. de Haas, H. (2011). Mediterranean migration futures: Patterns, drivers and scenarios. Global Environmental Change, 21(1), S59–S69. de Haas, H., Czaika, M., Flahaux, M. L., Mahendra, E., Natter, K., Vezzoli, S., & Villares-Varela, M. (2019). International migration: Trends, determinants, and policy effects. Population and Development Review, 45(4), 885–922.

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de Haas, H., Castles, S., & Miller, M. (2020). The age of migration, sixth edition: International population movements in the modern world. The Guilford Press. Diener, E., Emmos, R., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49(1), 71–75. Düvell, F. (2012). Transit migration: A blurred and politicised concept. Population, Space and Place, 18(4), 415–427. European Commission. (2020a). A fresh start on migration: Building confidence and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity, 23 September 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commis sion/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1706. European Commission. (2020b). Speech by Vice-President Schinas on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 23 September 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPE ECH_20_1736. Faist, T. (2019). Contested externalisation: Responses to global inequalities. Comparative Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0158-y. Ferris, E. G., & Donato, K. M. (2019). Refugees, migration and global governance: Negotiating the Global Compacts. Routledge. Finotelli, C., La Barbera, M., & Echeverría, G. (2018). Beyond instrumental citizenship: The Spanish and Italian citizenship regimes in times of crisis. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(14), 2320–2339. Geddes, A., Hadj Abdou, L., & Brumat, L. (2020). Migration and mobility in the European Union (2nd edition). Red Global Press. Geiger, M., & Pécoud, A. (2014). International organisations and the politics of migration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(6), 865–887. Grimes, A., & Wesselbaum, D. (2021). The role of subjective wellbeing in cross-border migration. In K. Kourtit, B. Newbold, P. Nijkamp, & M. Partridge (Eds.), The Economic Geography of Cross-Border Migration (pp. 217–243). Springer. Hadj Abdou, L., Bale, T., & Geddes, A. P. (2021). Centre-right parties and immigration in an era of politicisation. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020. 1853901. Haferlach, L., & Kurban, D. (2017). Lessons learnt from the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement in guiding EU migration partnerships with origin and transit countries. Global Policy, 8, 85–93. Hampshire, J. (2016). Speaking with one voice? The European Union’s global approach to migration and mobility and the limits of international migration cooperation. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(4), 571–586. Hansen, R. (2004). Migration to Europe since 1945: Its history and its lessons. The Political Quarterly, 74(1), 25–38. Heckmann, F. (2007). Empirical research on migrant integration. Trends 1995–2004. Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft, 32(3–4), 505–532. Heinisch, R., Massetti, E., & Mazzoleni, O. (2018). Populism and ethno-territorial politics in European multi-level systems. Comparative European Politics, 16(6), 923–936. Kang, Y. D. (2021). Refugee crisis in Europe: Determinants of asylum seeking in European countries from 2008–2014. Journal of European Integration, 43(1), 33–48. King, R., Lazaridis, G., & Tsardanidis, C. (Eds.). (2000). Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Kuschminder, K. (2019). The multi-level governance of asylum in Italy: Understanding Eritreans’ secondary movements in search of relocation within Italy. Journal of Refugee Studies. https://doi. org/10.1093/jrs/fey074. Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Edward Taylor, J. E. (1994). An evaluation of international migration theory: The North American case. Population and Development Review, 20(4), 699–751. Martin, P. L. (2016). Viewpoint: Europe’s migration crisis: An American perspective. Migration Letters, 13(2), 307–319.

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Mitchell, J. (2017). The Dublin regulation and systemic flaws. San Diego International Law Journal, 18(2), 295–324. OECD/European Union. (2015). Indicators of immigrant integration 2015: Settling in. OECD Publishing. Panichella, N., & Ambrosini, M. (2018). Between fears, contacts and family dynamics: The antiimmigrant attitudes in Italy. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 19(2), 391–411. Paparusso, A. (2016). The European convergence towards civic integration. In E. Ambrosetti, D. Strangio & C. Wihtol de Wenden (Eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean. Socio-economic perspectives (pp. 149–168). Routledge. Paparusso, A. (2019). Immigrant citizenship status in Europe: The role of individual characteristics and national policies. Genus, 75(1), 1–23. Penninx, R., & Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2016). The concept of integration as an analytical tool and as a policy concept. In B. Garcés-Mascareñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), Integration processes and policies in Europe: Contexts, levels and actors (pp. 11–30). Springer. Penninx, R., Kraal, K., Martiniello, M., & Vertovec, S. (Eds.). (2004). Citizenship in European cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration policies. Ashgate. Penninx, R., Berger, M., & Karen, K. (Eds.). (2006). The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe. A state of the art. Amsterdam University Press. Piché, V. (2004). Immigration and intégration dans les pays développés: Un cadre conceptuel. In G. Caselli, J. Vallin, & G. Wunsh (Eds.), Demographie analyse et synthèse-population et société (Vol. VI, pp. 159–178). Ined. Poggiaro, A. (2013). How do immigrants fare during the downturn? Evidence from matching comparable natives. Demographic Research, 28(8), 229–258. Postelnicescu, C. (2016). Europe’s new identity: The refugee crisis and the rise of nationalism. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 12(2), 203–209. Pugliese, E. (2018). Quelli che se ne vanno. La nuova emigrazione italiana [Those who leave. The new Italian emigration]. Il Mulino. Reyneri, E. (1998). The role of the underground economy in irregular migration to Italy: Cause or effect? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(2), 313–331. Reyneri, E. (2001). Migrants’ involvement in irregular employment in the Mediterranean countries of the European Union. International Labor Organization. Rustenbach, E. (2010). Sources of negative attitudes toward immigrants in Europe: A multi-level analysis. International Migration Review, 44(1), 53–77. Saatçio˘glu, B. (2020). The European Union’s refugee crisis and rising functionalism in EU-Turkey relations. Turkish Studies, 21(2), 169–187. Venturini, A., & Villosio, C. (2018). Are migrants an asset in recession? Insights from Italy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(14), 2340–2357. von der Leyen, U. (2020). State of the Union 2020: Building the world we want to live in: a Union of vitality in a world of fragility. European Commission, 16 September 2020, https://ec.europa. eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_20_1655. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2010). La question migratoire au XXIe siècle. Migrants, réfugiés et relations internationales. Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2013a). Pour accompagner les migrations en Méditerranée. L’Harmattan. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2013b). Gouvernance mondiale, une graine d’espoir? Revue Projet, 2013/4( (335), 40–49.

Chapter 2

Immigrant Integration Policies in Europe

Abstract This Chapter aims to analyse immigrant integration policies in Europe. The ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’, which for decades have oriented the integration of immigrants in Europe, have been gradually blurred by the European convergence towards civic integration—that is policies asking immigrants to demonstrate their knowledge of the language, culture, and traditions of their new country of residence, to obtain a residence permit or the citizenship status. Language and cultural skills generally favour the socio-economic integration of immigrants into the host society. Nevertheless, the current characteristics of civic integration, based on criteria of selection and control of immigrants, risk undermining the social cohesion of European societies, since they intend to pursue differentiated integration pathways. This Chapter provides an introduction to the concept of integration in Europe and explores the different ‘traditional models of immigration and integration’ in the continent. In doing so, I seek to demonstrate in what ways the previously distinct models are converging towards civic integration and what implications this shift could bear for immigrants’ integration in the host society. Keywords Immigrant integration · Civic integration · Europe · Citizenship · Policies

2.1 What Does Integration Mean in Europe? While the American debate regarding the inclusion of immigrants in the host society, started at the beginning of the 1900s, focused on the assimilation of European immigrants living in the U.S., the more recent European debate refers to the concept of integration. In the American reflection, the term ‘assimilation’ implies an idea of a mainstream respect to which immigrants and their children can become similar. This can be the result of a process which, especially for the second-generation immigrants, can shape up-ward assimilation (Alba & Nee, 1997), downward assimilation (Gans, 1992) or segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou, 1993), depending on the levels of integration in the social milieus dominated by the majority population (Alba, 2020) (Photo 2.1). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Paparusso, Immigrant Integration in Europe, Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5_2

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Photo 2.1 Ellis Island Immigration Museum, New York City. Source Author’s photo

In the European context, instead, the term ‘integration’ suggests structural modes of incorporation, which mainly depends on immigrants’ educational attainment and access to the labour market (Crul et al., 2012). High educational and professional careers are, indeed, regarded as some of the indicators of immigrant integration into European societies (e.g., Ali & Fokkema, 2015). As recognized by a wide range of scholars, the integration of immigrants is shaped both by resources from within their own families and communities and by the educational, social, and economic opportunities that institutions provide (e.g., Hou & Bonikowska, 2017; Piché, 2004). In this regard, immigrant integration has been defined as the ensemble of the “processes that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants to obtain the valued ‘stuff’ of a society, as well as social acceptance, through participation in major institutions such as the educational and political system and the labour and housing markets” (Alba & Foner, 2016: 5). However, evidence shows that current opportunities and life chances, as well as social welfare benefits for immigrants, are significantly lower compared to those of natives (Guiraudon, 2014; Morris, 2001). In particular, studies have found that immigrants are exposed to the risk of experiencing ‘ethnic penalties’ (e.g., Koopmans, 2016; Zwysen & Demireva, 2020), which are forms of discrimination at work, unemployment, over-qualification, employment in the underground economy (Reyneri, 2001; Reyneri & Fullin, 2011), and lack of occupational mobility (Avola & Piccitto, 2020), which cannot be explained by differences in demographic or human capital characteristics (Falcke et al., 2020). Besides, immigrants suffer more negative consequences during economic downturns, as occurred with the 2008 economic crisis, which has negatively affected immigrants’ economic performance within the

2.1 What Does Integration Mean in Europe?

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host country’s labour market (e.g., Bonifazi & Marini, 2014; Fellini, 2018; Poggiaro, 2013). The same is occurring with the current Covid-19 pandemic crisis. According to the first empirical evidence, immigrants are the most affected by the socio-economic consequences of the crisis and in particular by the loss of a job or the reduction of the working hours (Shen & Bartram, 2020).

2.2 The ‘Traditional National Models of Immigration and Integration’ European countries designed and implemented their integration policies over the years individually on a national basis. In doing so, they followed different interpretations or philosophies of integration. Accordingly, the so-called ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’ have been developed. These models have been defined as “nationally distinct approaches to managing migration flows and their political consequences” (Freeman, 2006: 227), such as the integration of immigrants, through the construction of “abstract typologies of incorporation regimes” (Freeman, 2004: 946). The different models of integration can be paired with different conceptualizations of citizenship, leading to different criteria and principles for the attribution of citizenship rights to newcomers. By entailing membership and providing security, rights, and opportunities (Midtbøen et al., 2020), citizenship represents an integral part of the integration process of the immigrants. Three criteria for the attribution of citizenship exist: ius sanguinis or the right of blood, the most ancient and common one, ius soli or the right of land, which sets as a basic principle the birth on the national territory and ius domicili, the most liberal one, according to which a certain number of years of uninterrupted residence in a country is sufficient to become a citizen (Ambrosini, 2020). Four ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’ have been historically distinguished in Europe: the exclusionist or temporary model, the assimilationist model, the multiculturalist or pluralist model and the ‘new’ immigration countries model or Southern European model of immigration (Paparusso, 2019). These models must be conceived as ideal types based on the experiences of some European countries. They are not stable and constant policy approaches; on the contrary, they are dynamic and flexible systems of principles, shaped by different historical, structural and institutional settings, but also by dissimilar ideological and political understandings of national identities, which have undergone fundamental transformations over time (Duszczyk et al., 2020). The exclusionist model (Germany (pre-2000) and Austria) mainly considers migration as a short-term phenomenon and as a means of meeting short-term labour demand (such as the previously mentioned Gastarbeiter). Countries fitting this model are fairly averse to permanent settlement, family reunification, and immigrant naturalisation. While immigrants can be easily integrated into certain areas of society,

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such as the labour market, to acquire citizenship and to participate in politics is much more difficult (Ambrosini, 2020). Indeed, in this model, an ethnic understanding of nationhood is at the core of citizenship rights and consequently, these are granted according to the principle of ius sanguinis. If before 2000 Germany was considered an example of the exclusionist model, and therefore rooted its citizenship rights in the principle of ius sanguinis, after the German Nationality Act, the country shifted towards a more hybrid model. The German Nationality Act of 1999, entered into force in 2000, introduced citizenship at birth for those born in Germany if at least one parent has a permanent residence permit and has been residing in Germany for at least 8 years (8 years are also required for first-generation immigrants to naturalise). However, children must renounce to their parents’ nationality and make the decision between the age of 18 and 23 (Green, 2005). This is called ‘optional model’ and implies that if applicants declare an intention to keep German citizenship, they are obliged to prove the loss or renouncement of the foreign nationality; otherwise, if applicants do not declare anything on reaching the age of eighteen, they will lose their German nationality (Hailbronner & Farahat, 2015). However, the Immigration Act of 2004 introduced integration requirements, making the right to naturalisation dependent upon proof of sufficient knowledge of the German language. In addition, successful attendance at an integration course, consisting of a language course and a course on the German history and the political system, reduces the required time of lawful residence for naturalisation from eight to seven years. According to the assimilationist model (France and Belgium), immigrants are primarily expected to integrate into the host country as individuals and they are, therefore, asked to accept and sincerely adopt the culture and values of their new country of residence. Consequently, as it is a recognisable sign of equality with mainstream society (a reduction of differences), citizenship status is relatively easy to acquire. It is based on a civic and territorial understanding of nationhood and, therefore, on a mixture of ius sanguinis and ius soli. For instance, children born to foreign parents in France automatically become French when they reach 18 years old if they have resided in France for the last five years (Weil, 2005) (Photo 2.2). However, at the beginning of the 2000s, the limits of the assimilationist paradigm in integrating immigrants and their descendants were highlighted by several incidents, such as the rioting of young immigrants living in France, and this led to a shift towards anti-discrimination policies in France (Bertossi, 2007; Escafré-Dublet, 2014). The rationale behind anti-discrimination policies is to ease the burden on the immigrant to integrate into the host society, by making institutions, such as schools and the labour market, more responsible for immigrant integration, trying to guarantee them equity and emancipation within mainstream society. Moreover, from 2007 onwards immigrants have had to learn French and demonstrate their knowledge of French laws, signing the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’, to request a renewal of their permit of stay and the issuing of a permanent residency permit. However, these policies have not led to the adoption of broader multiculturalism, which still appears to be quite a long way from the French method of immigrant integration (Lépinard and Simon, 2009).

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Photo 2.2 “Il y a un pacte vingt fois séculaire entre la grandeur de la France et la liberté du monde” (Charles de Gaulle—London, 1 March 1941). Photo taken at the Charles de Gaulle monument in Place Clemenceau, Paris. Source Author’s photo

At the core of multiculturalism (Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden), there is the idea that ethnic minorities’ identity, culture, language, and religion should be preserved and enhanced. Hosting societies that adopt multiculturalist or pluralist models of immigrant integration generally show a strong willingness to include ethnic minorities into their community, respecting their language and their cultural

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and religious differences. Although immigrants do not always have the benefit of full social and political rights, ethnic communities are officially accepted, forms of ethnic entrepreneurship are encouraged, and quotas of social benefits and facilities are reserved to them. Nevertheless, the validity of such a model (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011; Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008) and the capacity of multiculturalism to grant immigrants equality and emancipation (Koopmans, 2010) has been questioned in the last years. In such a model, citizenship rights are based on a combination of both ius sanguinis and ius soli. For instance, the Dutch Citizenship Act of 1985 established that citizenship could be granted to immigrants after 5 years of legal residence, and children at the age of 18 if they had lived in the Netherlands continuously since they were born. However, in 1998, the Netherlands introduced the ‘Newcomer Integration Law’, which established that non-EU and non-Switzerland immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit and immigrants applying for citizenship have to follow 600 h of language, civic, and labour market courses and to pass a civic test. Language and civic knowledge are asked to family immigrants and to immigrants who planned to permanently reside in the Netherlands before leaving their country of origin, according to the so-called principle of ‘integration from abroad’ (Paparusso, 2016). The new immigration countries model or Southern European model of immigration (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) is characterized by a relatively recent immigration history, if compared to historical immigration countries, such as France, Germany and Britain: mainly emigration countries until the mid-1970s, the Southern European countries started to receive mass immigration in the 1990s (Freeman, 1995). Some common features, as far as the management of migration inflows is concerned, characterize the countries embedded in this model. In particular, one can observe a lack of selective immigration policies, a large underground economy attracting undocumented immigrants, a strong segmentation of the labour market, and the use of ex-post instruments to provide legal status to immigrants, such as regularizations, quota systems, and flow decrees (Arango & Finotelli, 2010; King et al., 2000; Peixoto et al., 2012). Therefore, the main common characteristics of this model are (a) the timing and the size of inflows, (b) the reasons for and the modes of entry, and (c) the distinctive manner of integration into the local labour market (Ambrosetti & Paparusso, 2018). The Southern European model of immigration does not have a well-established integration ideology and integration practices are still embryonic, although rather inclusive. The expression “implicit model of integration” has been used for Italy (Ambrosini, 2020), to denote the unintended and unsystematic way of integrating immigrants, which tends to privilege the economic inclusion with forms of overqualification and labour “ethnicization” (Ambrosini, 2013: 183), rather than the full political participation of immigrants.

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Countries fitting this model show some notable differences when the attribution of citizenship is considered. For instance, the Italian citizenship policy is mainly based on ius sanguinis: Italian-born foreign nationals under the age of 18 can apply for citizenship within one year of turning 18 (Law n. 91/1992). On the other hand, Portugal and Spain tend to combine elements of ius soli and ius sanguinis, through the introduction of rather lower residency requirements for immigrants to meet, so that their children acquire new citizenship status. For instance, children born in Portuguese territory to non-Portuguese parents may obtain citizenship rights if their parents have resided in Portugal for five years, or if they have completed primary school education in Portugal (Piçarra & Gil, 2012). In this regard, it is worth noting that a reform of the Italian citizenship law, aimed at granting citizenship to children born in Italy from foreign parents of which at least one holds the EU long-term residence permit (ius soli) and to children arrived in Italy within 12 years of age and attended at least 5 years of school in Italy (ius culturae), has been rejected in 2017 by the Senate of the Republic, thus interrupting the long advocacy process that has tried to guarantee citizenship rights to the children of immigrants in Italy. Nevertheless, some new elements have recently arisen as far as the definition of the Southern European model of immigration, such as the increasing importance of family reunification as an entry channel, the less frequent resort to regularizations and quotas to manage migration inflows, the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers (Italy and Greece), and the introduction of a language test amongst the requirements asked immigrants who apply for the residence permit and citizenship. The increasing number of asylum requests makes the Southern EU members countries of asylum too, as Germany and Sweden are. The stabilisation of the immigrant presence, the consequent increase of citizenship acquisitions, and the growth of the second generation mean that Southern European countries are no longer countries of recent immigration, but multi-ethnic societies, whose most significant issues concern the integration of immigrants and their families (Bonifazi & Strozza, 2019).

2.3 Beyond the Tradition: Traits and Pitfalls of Civic Integration The ongoing relevance of the ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’ has been recently questioned (Joppke, 2017). Immigration and integration policies are, indeed, increasingly convergent in practice. Increasing immigration has led receiving countries to propose analogous practices, especially at the local level, where problems and their solutions often appear to be similar across European countries (Penninx et al., 2006). Practices and processes of integration in European societies are more homogeneous than in the past and, therefore, progressively divergent from models and policies ‘on paper’. This is partly due to the impulse of European institutions, committed to promoting the realization of a common migration and integration regime (Wihtol de Wenden, 2016). Moreover, it is worth noting that the

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integration processes are influenced by multiple factors that go beyond integration policies in the strict sense (such as citizenship and anti-discrimination policies or language and training courses). Rather, these processes are influenced by policies that concern the labour market, the welfare system, and the civil society and its organizations, such as labour unions, cultural and no-profit organizations and ethnic and immigrant associations (Ambrosini, 2020). More specifically, the boundaries of the so-called ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’ have been blurred by the European convergence towards a de-ethnicized model that has found in civic integration a practical instrument of realization (Joppke, 2010). As stated by Geddes et al. (2020: 157) “civic integration is actually for many countries the first coherent national immigrant integration policy”. The contradictions, the exceptions, and the changes shown by the ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’ have been gradually resolved by the European turn to civic integration. However, although the civic integration has increased uniformity among European integration policies and programmes, this policy turn has contributed, for the first time in Europe, to making immigrant integration a tool of immigration control, as detailed in the next paragraph. With the expression of civic integration, we generally refer to those policies requiring immigrants to learn the language, the civic values, and the culture of the residence country. Civic integration policies often require immigrants, through the signature of an ‘integration agreement’ or an ‘integration contract’, to take language and civic courses immediately after their entry into the new country of residence, in order to ask for a permit of stay or to apply for citizenship status. Sometimes courses are organized in origin countries, to facilitate the so-called ‘integration from abroad’ or, more likely, to prevent or limit the entry of those immigrants who are considered particularly difficult to integrate, such as low-skilled immigrants and refugees (Paparusso, 2016) (Photo 2.3). A series of international terroristic events, starting from the 9/11 terroristic attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., have highlighted the lack of integration and the socio-economic marginalization of immigrants, especially those with Muslim origins or who are perceived as Muslims, who are more often victims of feelings of intolerance by majority members and practices of discrimination at different levels (Bursell, 2021; Dangubi´c et al., 2020). The need to recognise effective citizenship to various minorities living in increasingly multicultural societies has led policymakers to reassess their integration policies, emphasizing the necessity of improving immigrants’ socio-economic integration, through the knowledge of the language of the hosting society, the respect of the national identity, the promotion of the culture and values of the hosting society among immigrants. For this reason, it has been argued that European countries have converged towards civic integration (Joppke, 2004, 2007a, 2007b), which has favoured a certain degree of socio-cultural assimilation and contributed to the decline of multiculturalism as integration philosophy

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Photo 2.3 Children waiting the start of an English class in a small village school close to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Source Author’s photo

(Joppke, 2004; Joppke & Morawska, 2003). Multiculturalism as “category of practice” (Sciortino, 2003: 276), instead, remains at the core of the day-to-day social relationship between immigrant and hosting society, especially at the local level (Joppke, 2017). This demonstrated how the civic turn in Europe has blurred the boundaries of national models: reinforcing assimilation in some countries and incorporating multiculturalism in other countries. The success of immigrants in civic integration courses implies the issue or the renewal of the permit of stay and the granting of naturalization, while the failure means the denial or the non-renewal of permits of stay and naturalization (Joppke, 2007a). Accordingly, residence and citizenship are understood as a contractual relationship and granted to immigrants as a prize and not as a means for their integration (Wallace Goodman, 2010). Various EU directives, including the Long-Term Directive, the Family Reunification Directive, and the Researchers’ and Students’ Directive, mention mandatory civic integration requirements according to the view that if host countries have to create the conditions to enable the integration of newcomers, the latter are considered responsible of their own integration (Geddes et al., 2020). In a study based on a review of actual legal texts and academic literature (Paparusso, 2016), civic integration programmes have been identified in 14 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and Britain. There are many differences among these countries, in terms of timing, the coercive nature of language

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and integration courses and the degree of formalisation of the ‘integration contract’ (the French ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’integration’, for example, is one of the most articulated). However, the comparative analysis has highlighted common features and in particular: the use of mandatory ‘integration contracts’ for immigrants who ask for a permanent residence permit or apply for citizenship; the necessity to pass a final exam; the obligatory participation in language and civic courses for refugees and family immigrants; the almost total exemption of high-skilled and temporary immigrants from civic integration programmes; finally, the recourse to the ‘integration from abroad’ as a form of externalization of control of civic requirements (Paparusso, 2016). Therefore, regardless of their traditional integration philosophies, civic integration has become the dominant approach to conceding residence and citizenship rights in European countries. Nevertheless, taken for granted that host-country language ability is considered fundamental to enhance the socio-economic integration of immigrants, especially in the service sector, and the upward social mobility of their children—as recent studies have shown (e.g., Adserà & Pytliková, 2016), empirical evidence shows that policies based on civic requirements have a weak impact on socio-economic and political integration of immigrants (Wallace Goodman & Wright, 2015). On the contrary, civic integration policies appear to produce a ‘stratification’ of the immigrant population in hosting societies (Cuttitta, 2016). In particular, by building up different integration regimes, the civic integration tends to intensify the gap between low-skilled immigrants (such as refugees and family migrants, which are those who intend to permanently reside in European receiving countries) and high-skilled immigrants (mainly temporary immigrants or highly mobile people) (Paparusso, 2016). Civic integration policies exclude certain categories of immigrants, such as the poorest, the lowest educated and those whose native language is very different from that of the country of residence (Bassel et al., 2020). In other words, civic integration reinforces the boundaries between undesirable and desirable immigration and between immigrants who are difficult to be integrated and immigrants who are easy to be integrated, as well as the feelings of inclusion and exclusion, because of immigrants’ country of origin, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and educational background (Alarian & Neureiter, 2021; Jensen et al., 2021). Box 2.1 Civic Integration in Italy A turn towards the social and cultural dimension of integration has occurred also in Italy, showing not only an alignment to the European civic convergence, but also an agreement between the two Italian main political coalitions, the centre-right and the centre-left, whose traditional approaches to migration and immigrant integration were different. The knowledge of the Italian language and values has been considered crucial for the process of immigrants’ socioeconomic integration by both the government coalitions in the last years. The ‘Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione’ (transl.: ‘Charter of the values of citizenship and integration’), introduced by the Home Affairs Minister

2.3 Beyond the Tradition: Traits and Pitfalls of Civic Integration

Giuliano Amato during the II Prodi Government in 2006, the Security Package (Law 94/2009), approved by the IV Silvio Berlusconi Government in July 2009, the 2010 ‘Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza. Identità e incontro’ (transl.: ‘Plan for integration in secure environment. Identity and encounter’) and the ‘Patto per l’integrazione’ (transl.: ‘Integration agreement’), approved by the same government coalition in 2009, but entered into force in March 2012, claimed the importance of learning the Italian language and the Italian history and culture as prerequisite for a positive and active inclusion of newcomers into the Italian society. The ‘Integration Agreement’ defines integration as “a process designed to promote the coexistence of Italian citizens and foreign nationals legally residing in the country and based on mutual commitment to participate in the economic, social and cultural life, under the values enshrined in the Italian Constitution” (Italian Ministry of Interior). It asks newcomers to learn the Italian language (level A2); to learn the fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution and institutions; to learn the civic life, the functioning of the health sector, the education and social services sectors, the labour market and related fiscal obligations and, last but not least, to respect the rule according to which children have to attend school up to 16 years old. At the moment of the contract signing, immigrants receive 16 credits, but then have to score 30 credits within two years attending free courses on civic values. The non-attendance of these sessions implies the loss of 15 credits. If the number of credits acquired is more than 0 but less than 30 or the knowledge of the Italian language, the civic culture and the civil life cannot be sufficiently proved by the immigrant, the agreement can be extended for one more year. A number of credits equivalent to 0 or less than 0 means the denial or the non-renewal of the residence permit and the expulsion from the Italian territory. Finally, if the number of credits acquired is 40 or more than 40, additional cultural and formative activities are offered to immigrants. A number of non-profit organizations and institutions organize free languages courses for immigrants (Photo 2.4).

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Photo 2.4 Immigrant women taking a language exam in Italy. Source Author’s photo

2.4 The Unintended Consequences of the Civic Integration Paradigm The European convergence towards civic integration is, thus, underpinned by a philosophy based on migration control, security, and selection. Since the civic criteria are used as a new entry selection and integration evaluation tool, civic integration has contributed to “fuse immigrant integration with immigration control, which previously had been processed by separate policies” (Joppke, 2017: 1155). Several studies have shown the limited success of immigration control (e.g., Castles, 2004; Cornelius, 2005; Vogel, 2000). Policy measures aimed to control and select migration are generally ineffective since the factors determining, and nurturing migration processes are very complex and deep-rooted in both origin and destination areas (e.g., de Haas et al., 2019). Moreover, immigration policies based on control contributes to change the routes and channels through which people migrate, increasing illegal entries (Cornelius, 2001; de Haas, 2011). Finally, since they hinder circulation and mobility, restrictive immigration policies make the residence of immigrants more precarious and foster their irregularity (Massey et al., 2015; Wihtol de Wenden, 2017). Irregular migration and the political rhetoric on irregular migration produce feelings of anxiety and fear towards immigrants in hosting societies; this may undermine the social cohesion and discourage newcomers to adopt and internalize civic values.

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This vicious circle, on the one hand, provides evidence for the existence of a nexus between immigration and integration policies in Europe (Penninx, 2003), which means that immigration and integration are no longer separate fields, but that immigration and integration policies are interconnected and mutually influencing (Duszczyk et al., 2020). On the other hand, it also accounts for the fact that the nexus between immigration and integration policies has gradually shifted in the area of control and security, producing, however, unintended and ineffective consequences. For instance, it has been recently found (Helbling et al., 2020) that more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the likelihood to be admitted of more educated immigrants, but they do make it more likely for immigrants coming from European OECD countries to be admitted. At the same time, they make admission less likely for immigrants outside the OECD, who are ultimately the main target of integration policies based on language and civic requirements. Similar results have been recently found in other reception contexts, such as the U.S. and Australia (Tran et al. 2019). It has been shown that Asian immigrants in Australia, which has a skills-based immigration policy, are less selected than their counterparts in the United States, which, instead, has a family-based immigration policy. This confirms the existence of an ‘integration paradox’: skills-based immigration policy does not only result in less selected immigrants but also does not positively influence their integration into the host society (Geurts et al., 2021; Tran et al., 2019). Therefore, the nexus between immigration and integration appears stronger and inextricable. The shifting of this nexus in the area of control and security demonstrates how Europe is still reluctant to the immigration and the integration of newcomers and of their offspring. Europe is factually an immigration continent (Penninx et al., 2004). According to the most recent data provided by Eurostat (2018), foreigners residing in the EU-27 are 33.6 million and those born abroad are 50.5 million, representing respectively 7.5% and 11.3% of the EU population. At the EU level, the change in foreign presence is positive (+1.1 million), if compared to the previous year. Apart from the period 2010–2011, due to the economic recession and to some census adjustments, the trend of foreign presence in the EU has always maintained a positive trend. As far as the residence permits, in the European countries of consolidated immigration, where entries are more restricted, family and humanitarian migration are predominant; instead, labour migration prevails in the countries of most recent immigration, such as the Visegrád countries, except for Bulgaria, which also receives asylum seekers (Ortensi, 2019). Nevertheless, the lack of a proactive and managed immigration and integration policy, offset by a security approach, operating at the level of both policy making and political discourse, betrays the unwillingness to ensure long-term integration paths to first-, second- and third-generation immigrants (Hansen, 2004). As stated by Penninx (2006: 12), “integration policy measures are used to select those immigrants that are able and willing to integrate and deter those who are not. Making first admission dependent on tests in the country of origin, extension of residence permits on success in integration courses, and naturalisation on ever more elaborate requirements of integration are examples of measures that fit this inversion”. Moreover, the increasingly restrictive and defensive admission policies for migrants

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outside the EU (particularly for low-skilled migrants) appears strident considered the regime of ‘free mobility’ existing within the EU for citizens and residents of its Member States. This paradox is particularly unacceptable considering the contribution that immigrants have been effectively giving to European countries’ economy and demography, as will be highlighted in the last Chapter of the Book. However, the contribution given by civic integration to the process of gradual obsolescence of the ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’ in distinguishing integration policies and practices across Europe (Joppke, 2017) and, above all, in influencing the integration processes of the immigrants, should be complemented by the greater relevance assumed by other forms of citizenship (Ambrosini, 2020). Among them, we can find: (1) the larger tolerance towards dual citizenship, as the possibility for naturalized citizens to keep their native citizenship, which means a gradual evolution from exclusive sovereignty of states to increasing recognition of the legitimate instances and rights of individuals. (2) The multilevel

Photo 2.5 Jan Sabach, I’mmigrant, picture taken in Mexico City. Source Author’s photo

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citizenship, that is the participation of individuals to the local or regional decisionmaking process, for instance through the local vote (Cagiano de Azevedo et al., 2020; Ferris et al., 2020). (3) The nested citizenship, which does not deny national citizenship, but by giving rights exercisable outside their own country, adds supranational citizenship (one example is the EU citizenship). Finally, (4) the transnational or global citizenship, which implies a process of de-nationalization of citizenship, for instance by offering the possibility to vote from abroad for the political institutions of the home country (Ambrosini, 2020). These new forms of citizenship contributed to evolve the concept of membership and of its benefices and to create mixed identities: the country of origin can be a source of identity and the country of destination becomes a source of rights and vice versa. These identities are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary in shaping the integration process in ever more multicultural societies and deserve more recognition (Photo 2.5). Box 2.2 Immigration Policies in Europe: Have They Become more Restrictive Over Years? It is well-acknowledged that even within organisations with large policy powers, such as the European Union, immigration policies are still intimately connected to state sovereignty. Member states are still reluctant to limit their sovereignty and to accept a supranational management of their borders and immigration policies. In the effort of limiting migration inflows and long-term settlement, immigration policies at European level have become more restrictive over years, as the erection of border walls and fences along Europe, the strengthen of visa requirements and asylum procedures, the almost total closure of the labour migration channel and the introduction of civic requirements for acquiring residence and naturalization rights have made clear (Geddes et al., 2020; Joppke, 2017; Paparusso, 2016). Several reasons, such as the protection of the national culture and the loss of jobs, are behind this policy of closure. However, experience shows that borders are extremely porous, and that the adoption of restrictive immigration policies does not prevent people to move (Cornelius, 2001, 2005; de Haas et al., 2019). On the contrary, since it hinders legal entry and circulation, policy restrictiveness increases the risk of smuggling and dying at border crossing and migrants’ irregularity into the residence country (Massey et al., 2015). Moreover, when some migration routes are closed, migrants will choose another path, even more dangerous, to reach their destinations. However, immigration policies are not able to limit or channel migration because of (1) structural factors at both origin and destination, such as wars, political instability and poverty, the demand of low-skilled workers and the need of replacing the ageing working population with cheaper foreign work force and (2) political factors, such as the signature of international laws and human rights norms, such as the non-refoulement principle, and the pressure exerted by domestic political parties and public opinion, which, for multiple and

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diverse interests, tend to require and accept newcomers (Castles, 2004; Czaika & de Haas, 2013, 2014; Joppke, 1998). These factors have contributed to the socalled ‘liberalization’ of immigration policies (e.g., Abou-Chadi, 2016; Koopmans, 2012) over years, although states continue to fortify their borders and adopt several forms of policy controls. Because of this liberalization, immigration policies turn to be unintentionally permissive towards migrants, and migration “singularly intractable to policy intervention” (Skeldon, 2008: 14). The two above-described approaches to the analysis of immigration policies in Europe, also known as the ‘policy failure’ approach and the ‘securitization’ approach, contain important and useful keys to the interpretation of the topic (Geddes et al., 2020). Nevertheless, electing one or the other approach would be too simplistic and not entirely correct to obtain an objective picture of the immigration policies in Europe. Elements of both the approaches coexist, as the policy analysis presented in Chap. 1 and this chapter has contributed to depict.

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Tran, V. C., Guob, F., & Huangc, T. J. (2019). The integration paradox: Asian immigrants in Australia and the United States. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vogel, D. (2000). Migration control in Germany and the United States. International Migration Review, 34(2), 390–422. Wallace Goodman, S. (2010). Integration requirements for integration’s sake? Identifying, categorising and comparing civic integration policies. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(5), 753–772. Wallace Goodman, S., & Wright, M. (2015). Does mandatory integration matter? Effects of civic requirements on immigrant socio-economic and political outcomes. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(12), 1885–1908. Weil, P. (2005). Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la révolution. Gallimard. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2016). Atlas des migrations. Un équilibre mondial à inventer. Autrement. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2017). La question migratoire au XXI siècle. Migrants, réfugiés et relations internationales. Presses des SciencesPo. Zwysen, W., & Demireva, N. (2020). Ethnic and migrant penalties in job quality in the UK: The role of residential concentration and occupational clustering. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(1), 200–221.

Chapter 3

The European Union Framework on Immigrant Integration

Abstract This Chapter aims to disentangle the European Union (EU) framework on immigrant integration by analysing the EU integration governance, assessing the current state of play and providing guidance for some future steps towards a more inclusive society. First, I provide a definition of integration given by the EU, while highlighting the importance of actions at the local level, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Then, I lay down a timeline of the key events, plans, and agreements regarding integration policy in the EU. In doing so, I argue that a truly common integration policy in the European Union does not exist (yet), because immigrants’ integration is among the national competencies of Member States, although EU recommendations and good practices can harmonize integration practices across Europe. In the third section, I discuss the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027, by highlighting some of its key features and limitations. In the fourth section, I assess the current state of play by presenting recent data on the level of integration in Europe and introducing the Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020. I conclude by reflecting on how the Covid-19 pandemic has affected immigrants’ integration and inclusion, discussing how Next Generation EU could impact the integration of immigrants, and providing guidance for policymakers. Keywords Integration policies · European Union · Soft governance · Local level · Subsidiarity

3.1 How the European Union Understands Integration While the term and the meaning of integration can be understood differently among the European Union (EU) Member States, mainly depending on the timing when they experienced their first mass immigration and on the level of institutionalization of such a phenomenon (Freeman, 1995), the EU generally considers integration as a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States” (Council of Europe, Justice and Common Affairs, 2004). According to the Council of Europe, Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs (1997: 9), “integration is not a one-way-street leaving the burden on the shoulders of © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Paparusso, Immigrant Integration in Europe, Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5_3

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the migrants alone. It is a social process involving both sides, the migrants and their host society”. From this perspective, immigrants must demonstrate their willingness to be integrated into the host society and to respect its rules and values. On the other hand, the host societies must answer to immigrants’ needs and expectations and make efforts to grant and preserve their culture and origins. Since the integration process takes place primarily at the local level (Penninx et al., 2004), with cities and municipalities as the places where immigrants are received—find a home and a job, have children and access to health facilities— and natives encounter new cultures and identities, the EU argues that integration policies should be developed primarily at the local level. Indeed, according to the principle of subsidiarity (decisions made at the lowest possible level), the local level appears closer to immigrants in providing services they need and, at the same time, more appropriate in managing their interaction with natives. Local authorities effectively implement policies and forge the immigrant integration process in a number of ways. The importance of local action is highlighted in a report by the European Commission (2018), where examples of local integration practices in 10 cities are assessed. Some impactful actions include: • In Amsterdam, immigrants were granted early guidance and regarding employment and civic integration. This action was made possible by the coordination of stakeholders at different levels, from the Refugee Council to local civil society initiatives. • Athens created a programme called “Together” in child day-care facilities, whereby migrant and native-born parents could come together and bond. • In Barcelona, the municipality, neighbourhoods and immigrant associations created the “Network for Welcome and Support of Migrants”. By coordinating different actors, the network aims to complement the municipal programme in terms of language courses, legal and employment advice, and social support. • In Rome, the mediation and arbitration agency supports immigrants in their flat hunt, tackling discrimination barriers and providing counselling (Photo 3.1). The effectiveness of these actions and the concrete impact they have on the integration of immigrants is closely tied to the fact that practices at the local level can better answer the context-specific needs and provide tailor-made solutions. However, according to multilevel governance of integration, to create, maintain and support consistent and effective integration policies, strong coordination between all the actors involved in the integration process is necessary. This includes the EU institutions, the EU Member States, the national, regional, and local authorities, NGOs, migrant associations, ethnic organizations, think tanks and, finally, researchers and scholars.

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Photo 3.1 Binario 95, social hub of reception and support for homeless and immigrant people, Termini Station, Rome. Source Author’s photo

Box 3.1 Best Practices of Welcoming and Integrating Refugees in Italy The debate on the European migration crisis has overshadowed the best practices on integration developed in European cities, small municipalities, and rural areas. While traditional policies guarantee only essential services to meet the basic needs of immigrants, in some municipalities refugees and asylum seekers benefit from ad hoc programs to promote social and economic integration and the (re)acquisition of self-esteem. Language courses, internships, and temporary collaborations (such as maintenance jobs or social farming) offered to refugees have a positive impact on both the integration of immigrants and the local community. In Italy, for example, several localities situated in small villages, mountain and coastal areas affected by depopulation trends have been redeveloped thanks to the reception of refugees. The arrival of new arrivals has attracted new economic capitals and tourist flows. It happened in Coriano, a small town in the province of Rimini, and in Condofuri, Riace and Stignano in the province of Reggio Calabria, where the percentage of foreigners on the total population is significant (it represents 7%, 8.1%, 18.9% and 12.5%, respectively). The contribution of immigrants to the community is promising not only in the short term, as a consequence of the implementation of the first reception,

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but also in the long-term resulting from successful integration. Integration is a complex, two-way, bottom-up process that affects both immigrants and natives. The participation of immigrants in language courses and agricultural activities can help them to feel part of the community and it represents a first step in the long-term integration process. Successful policies implemented locally can help demonstrate the sustainability of the international protection system for EU Member States and strengthen the importance of the subsidiarity principle in European cooperation.

3.2 The Construction of a “Soft Governance” on Immigrant Integration Although often seen as a sort of ‘pendulum’ between actions aimed at protecting the EU from unwanted immigration and measures on the admission and the settlement of migrants in its Member States, there is general agreement on the existence of a common EU migration and asylum policy (e.g., Boswell & Geddes, 2011; Faist & Ette, 2007). With the increase of migration inflows, the EU migration and asylum policy has become progressively more restrictive: it appears to be marked by a ‘securitization’ approach (Bonjour, 2011; Geddes, 2003), both at the level of policy measures and at the level of public debate. Moreover, with the effort of policy harmonization, the ‘securitization’ approach has affected the EU Member States’ immigration measures as well. Strict border controls, stringent visa requirements, draconian asylum procedures and demanding administrative measures have made migration and residence in the EU more complicated. The Treaty of Amsterdam is considered a very important starting point of this policy since in 1999 it transferred asylum and immigration policies in a new Title IV of the Treaty dealing with free movement, migration and asylum. In particular, the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the European competences on external border controls; reception of asylum seekers; conditions of entry and residence for TCNs and fight against illegal migration. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 marked a further step towards a real communitarisation (Geddes, 2003) by transferring more powers to the EU institutions. Moreover, starting from Amsterdam, three five-years work plans have been organized, with the aim of monitoring and actualizing treaties’ provisions on migration and asylum (Boswell & Geddes, 2011). The Tampere Programme covered the period 1999–2004, with the agenda of enhancing cooperation with third countries, promoting fair treatment of TCNs regularly residing in the EU Member States, establishing a European Asylum System and controlling irregular migration. The Hague Programme (2005–09) intended to create a common asylum area and reinforce measures to contrast illegal migration, trafficking and smuggling. The

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Stockholm Programme (2010–14) tried to counterbalance the goal of promoting the socio-economic development of immigrants’ origin countries on the one hand, by incrementing the protection of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ on the other hand. Finally, the European Agenda on Migration 2015 consolidated previously established policies, such as those on border controls, fight against irregular migration and relationships with third countries. A similar consensus on the existence of a common EU immigrant integration policy does not exist. Immigrant integration is considered a strategic policy priority at European Union level. It became a topic for the EU institutions in the 1990s, because of the increasing immigrant population residing in European countries, also due to the consolidation of the Southern EU Member States, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, as countries of immigration (Bonifazi & Strozza, 2019). The annual inflow into the 15 EU Member States from both other Member States and third countries was equal to 1.87 million people for the period 1995–1999. In the same period, 1.26 million people emigrated either to another EU country or to a third country. Therefore, the positive net migration per year was around 610,000 (Baganha et al., 2006). The first developments of the EU’s immigrant integration agenda coincided with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty was concerned with the topics of discrimination and racism, which led in 2000 to the adoption of two Directives, the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive, both prohibiting discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origins in the areas, among others, of education, employment, vocational training, and social protection. However, was the Tampere Programme that, by establishing the EU’s priorities in the area of immigration and asylum for the period 1999– 2004, launched an EU cooperation on the integration of non-EU nationals, therefore including the integration issues in the EU competences. In particular, the equality of treatment between legally resident Third Country Nationals (TCNs) and EU citizens was then introduced. The 2003 Thessaloniki European Council and the consequent publication of the ‘Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment’ confirmed the EU interest in immigrant integration. The ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policies in the EU’ by the Council of Europe, Justice and Home Affairs Council Justice (JHA) (2004) set out the importance of developing goals and indicators to implement policies and to evaluate the national efforts and actions on integration (employment, education, equal and non-discriminatory access to public and private goods and services, cultural and religious diversity, participation in democratic processes and basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions). In 2005, the Commission of the European Communities announced, ‘A Common Agenda for Integration—Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union’. It referred to the aforementioned Common Basic Principles, which should be seen ‘as main elements of all national and EU integration policies’. In 2007, the ‘Handbook on Integration’ was produced by the European Commission to promote the exchange of good practices among policymakers and

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experts across Europe. In the 2010 Stockholm Programme, the European Council stressed the importance of the successful integration of legally residing third-country nationals, to maximise the benefits of immigration. The 2010 Zaragoza Ministerial Conference Member States established a set of core outcome indicators, which are now considered some of the most important sources of integration indicators at European level. It provided a framework for the development of common integration measures based on four main areas: occupation, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship. In particular, the evaluation and the comparison of the integration processes of immigrant populations have been carried out through the use of indicators based on four general dimensions: (a) the demographic and social characteristics and the territorial spread of the immigrant population; (b) the relations with the community of origin and with the welcoming community, in an attempt to assess the propensity to stabilize, and the interaction with the national population; (c) the effective integration and full realization in the school and work context, since school and work are fundamental axes for integration and social mobility; (d) living conditions and active participation in everyday life, the latter meaning a full and positive process of interaction with the welcoming environment. However, the 2011 ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals’ stressed that the EU’s role was limited to the establishment of common standards and benchmarking for integration measures, to the exchange of best practices and successful models of integration and the support of integration strategies in the EU Member States. In this regard, Article 79(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stated that the European Parliament and the Council, acting following the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States to promote the integration of third-country nationals legally residing in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. With this Article, the EU formally gave a mandate to Member States to conduct their integration policies. In this regard, it is important to stress that the 2011 ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals’ added the countries of origin as a third key actor in the process of immigrant integration, making an important shift in the conceptualization of integration at the EU level: from a two-way to a three-way process (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016). Finally, the 2016 Commission’s ‘Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals’ identified the successful integration of third-country nationals in the EU as a matter of common interest to all member-states. The EU declared to support countries in their integration efforts, highlighting the importance of both pre- and post-migration instruments of integration. Therefore, it can be argued that the immigrants’ integration is not subject to the harmonisation of national law at the EU level; the EU contributes almost exclusively to orientate, coordinate, and integrate Member States’ integration policies. In particular, the EU acts as a framework of standards and recommendations and as a forum of dialogue and information exchange (Bosswick & Heckmann, 2006), by producing incentives to the development of integration strategies among EU Member States, rather than as a policymaker. This approach was again confirmed in December 2017, when the European Commission and Social

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and Economic Partners organisations (ETUC, Business Europe, SMEUnited, CEEP, and Eurochambres) signed the European Partnership for Integration. The aim of the Partnership was to lay down key principles for the integration of refugees in the labour market and to bring together different stakeholders, such as employers, chambers of industry and commerce and migrants associations, to help immigrants integrate into the labour market. The commitment was renewed on 7 September 2020 through a joint statement (Photo 3.2). The existence of a European non-binding area able to influence immigrant integration has been defined as “soft governance” (Geddes et al., 2020). Soft governance is considered more acceptable by the EU Member States, given the strong political connotation of integration: as migration, it challenges the right of the state to control its external borders and to define the terms of belonging to its community. An important pillar of this soft governance is, however, the money, able to direct and to support both pre-entry and post-entry integration measures in the EU Member States. For this reason, it can be concluded that a common EU immigrant integration policy does not exist (yet). Nevertheless, it is incontrovertible that the EU good practices and dedicated funds (for instance, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund—AMIF) are able to influence the formulation and the implementation of integration policies at the national level and can help to produce a harmonization and a convergence of integration practices across Europe.

Photo 3.2 Man working in a small village in Tanzania. Source Author’s photo

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3.3 The Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027 On November 24, 2020, the European Commission (2020a) presented the new EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021–2027). The new Action Plan updates and renews the commitment expressed in 2016 and provides guidelines, concrete actions and funding to support national, regional, and local stakeholders’ integration initiatives. The main actions of the Plan include the promotion of inclusive education and training, improving employment opportunities and skills recognition, promoting access to health services and to adequate and affordable housing. In continuity with the soft law approach employed for the previous plan, the responsibility for integration policies lies primarily with the Member States. The consultations with relevant stakeholders carried out in the second half of 2020 provided the EU with a crucial evaluation and valuable insights on how the 2016 Plan panned out on the ground. On balance, spokespersons of civil society organisations, local and regional authorities and partners, intergovernmental organisations and the Expert Group created for the occasion evaluated the 2016 Action Plan positively, given its usefulness in improving coordination and involving different actors. However, some limitations stood out: 1.

2.

3.

4.

Immigrants were not involved enough: as stated above, the new Plan enhances the participation of immigrants by carrying out consultations with different actors, for example via the formation of an Expert Group on the views of immigrants. Other relevant stakeholders took part in public consultations and provided valuable insights on integration and increase participation, in view of creating more partnerships and closer cooperation with the interested parties. The 2016 Action Plan’s scope was too narrow: Integration and inclusion challenges characterise not only Third Country Nationals (TNCs), but also EU citizens with a migrant background. The recently presented Action Plan broadens the scope, previously limited to TNCs, to include all EU citizens of migrant background. The gender dimension was not sufficiently developed: Migrant women face specific challenges and additional obstacles to integration, and they tend to fare worse than migrant men in a wide range of integration and inclusion indicators. The 2021–2027 plan increases the focus on the gender aspect of integration and inclusion, promoting actions directly addressed at migrant women and girls. The funding was too difficult to access and manage: The 2021–2027 Plan recognized the importance of funding in the implementation of the proposed guidelines to build more inclusive societies and foster integration. However, while the resources required tend to increase, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021–2027 has allocated fewer resources to integration itself. The Commission, in turn, aims to use a wide array of funding instruments to support integration, but this requires careful allocation of resources and specific links with the use of EU funds.

3.3 The Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027

5.

6.

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The monitoring mechanisms were too weak and lacked valuable data: assessing the efficacy of the Plans is crucial for evaluation and to formulate more successful plans in the future. Integration and inclusion policies should be built upon reliable evidence concerning both the impact of previously established policies and the current level of integration in EU countries. A number of gaps in data and knowledge remain, despite the EU’s effort in this direction. This is especially true for what concerns cross-country comparisons and the evaluation of the impact of specific policies. Loose follow up by national authorities: the lack of evidence seriously undermines the opportunity of mutual learning, while an imperfect monitoring mechanism is bound to lead to insufficient coordination between the EU Member States. The current plan aims to build on stronger and closer collaboration with local and regional authorities while bringing increasing attention to durable, long-term actions.

3.4 The Current State of Play and the Way Forward Successful integration of immigrants is crucial to maximise the opportunities of migration and build more inclusive societies. Despite the ongoing efforts in this direction, there is still much to do in several European countries. Immigrants fare worse than nationals in many categories of indicators, spanning from employment to risk of poverty, including education and over-qualification, health and housing (OECD/European Union 2018; OECD 2020). Employment, unemployment and overqualification rates, the latter understood as the share of the highly educated who are employed in a low- or medium-skilled job, are only some of the indicators where immigrants perform worse compare to natives in OECD countries, as shown in Figs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. There are only very few exceptions regarding those countries whose immigrant population is more skilled compared to the native population or come from more developed countries. Of course, indicators of immigrant integration carry considerable variations across the EU Member States, depending on countries’ integration policies and overall approach to integration. A useful classification to grasp some of these differences is the Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 (MIPEX).1 MIPEX is a tool that evaluates and compares integration policies in 52 countries, including all EU Member States and non-Member countries in Europe. By developing policy indicators to capture immigrants’ opportunities to participate in society, MIPEX aims to engage policymakers and provide them with an evidence-based approach to improve integration governance and policy effectiveness. It measures eight areas of integration policies and identifies three key policy dimensions which help describe a country’s approach 1

https://www.mipex.eu/

Greece Spain Sweden Turkey France Italy Finland Belgium Denmark Portugal Austria Norway Switzerland Latvia Luxembourg Canada Estonia Netherlands Ireland Slovenia Poland Germany Lithuania Australia Mexico Iceland United Kingdom New Zealand Israel United States Czech Republic Hungary Iceland Czech Republic Israel Slovak Republic New Zealand Hungary Switzerland Portugal Poland United Kingdom Estonia Canada Australia United States Luxembourg Lithuania Ireland Germany Latvia Norway Austria Slovenia Netherlands Sweden Denmark Finland Spain Italy France Belgium Greece Mexico Turkey

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90.0

80.0

70.0

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0

Foreign-born

Foreign-born Nave-born

Fig. 3.1 Employment rates, foreign- and native-born population aged 15–64, 2019. Source Author’s elaboration on OECD data 35.0

30.0

25.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0

Native-born

Fig. 3.2 Unemployment rates, foreign- and native-born active population aged 15–64, 2019. Source Author’s elaboration on OECD data

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80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 Korea Greece Spain Italy Cyprus Ireland Chile Austria Estonia United States Israel Norway Iceland Australia Mexico United Kingdom Germany New Zealand France Sweden Poland Finland Turkey Belgium Denmark Latvia Portugal Malta Netherlands Lithuania Slovenia Hungary Slovak Republic Czech Republic Switzerland Croatia Luxembourg

0.0

Foreign-born

Native-born

Fig. 3.3 Over-qualification rates, foreign- and native-born population aged 15–64, 2017. Source Author’s elaboration on OECD data

to integration. The three dimensions are: basic rights, equal opportunities, and secure future. The first dimension investigates whether immigrants can enjoy comparable rights as nationals; the second dimension focuses on the support that immigrants receive to enjoy comparable opportunities, while the third dimension concerns the immigrants’ possibility of long-term settlement and their sense of security about the future in the country. Based on how countries fare in each dimension, they are sorted in four main groups, which represent different approaches to integration. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Comprehensive integration: immigrants have equal rights, opportunities and security. Equality on paper: immigrants are granted equal rights and security about their future, but not equal opportunities. Temporary integration: immigrants enjoy basic rights and equal opportunities, but not equal security, leading to issues with the long-term settlement. Immigration without Integration (Integration Denied): immigrants are denied basic rights and equal opportunities, even if they are able to settle long-term in the country.

The average score of the EU-28 is 49/100. Among these, the ‘old’ EU-15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) tend to have a slightly more favourable approach to integration with a score of 58/100, while the EU-13

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(Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) score 41/100 on average. Five Members of the EU also appear in the Top Ten countries out of the MIPEX 52, being classified under the “comprehensive integration” approach and fully guaranteeing immigrants equal rights, opportunity, and security. These are Sweden (86/100), Finland (85/100), Portugal (81/100), Belgium (69/100), and Ireland (64/100). The majority of Western Europe adopts a “temporary integration” approach, while the majority of Eastern Europe is characterised by “equality on paper”. The differences in integration reflect not only the country-specific traditional approach and attitudes towards immigration and integration but also the history of immigration, as well as the state of democracy, the economic development and regional trends. In turn, the approach to integration influences the host society’s attitudes and behaviours towards immigration, as well as the immigrants’ experience of integration and sense of belonging (Cichocka, 2021). Therefore, the government approach, policies and discursive framing of integration impact the two-way social process of mutual accommodation, shaping either a ‘vicious circle’ of exclusion or ‘virtuous circle’ of integration that promotes interaction and trust. The Covid-19 pandemic has affected people regardless of their nationality or background. However, it is already evident that its consequences have and will hit the most vulnerable categories and marginalised groups the hardest. A recent OECD publication (2020a) has brought to light first evidence on the impact of the Covid19 pandemic on immigrants and their children, revealing that the current crisis is likely to have a disproportionate impact on this population. Immigrants are at a much higher risk of being infected with the virus than the native-born, due to a range of vulnerabilities regarding the incidence of poverty, overcrowding in housing and immigrants’ overrepresentation in jobs where it is difficult to implement social distancing. Also, the consequences of the pandemics on the labour market are likely to be particularly hard on immigrants, due to their overrepresentation in jobs that have been most affected by the pandemic or where physical distancing is difficult, such as the hospitality industry, care and agricultural sectors, and the fact that their position in the labour market is more vulnerable on average, due to their generally less stable employment conditions and lower seniority on the job (de Haas et al., 2010; Guadagno, 2020; Tagliacozzo et al., 2020). This has been exacerbated by the restrictions imposed on mobility, both within national borders and in the Schengen area, which deeply affected seasonal labourers (Koopmans, 2020; Zambrano et al., 2020). In other words, Covid-19 pandemic-induced stay-at-home measures have increased involuntary immobility, by reducing people’ capabilities to move and to demand for labour both within and outside their current country of residence, with dire consequences for those who lack options to work from home or who live or work in overcrowded and unhealthy conditions (O’Brien & Eger, 2020; Martin and Bergmann, 2021).

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In addition, the effect of distance learning measures implemented in schools all around Europe has been more unfavourable for immigrant children, because of language barriers, less availability of educational support at home and the persisting digital divide (Save the Children, 2020). The same can be said for integration courses and language learning for adults (Settersten, 2020). Distance learning is extremely difficult for low-educated immigrants or for those who are at early stages of language learning and it can have negative consequences for both language learning and socio-economic integration (OECD, 2020b). Despite the measures put in place in different countries to compensate for the loss of integration opportunities both in terms of language skills and social networking, the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to set back integration efforts and accomplishments achieved in the past few years. For this reason, it is especially important to promote a successful implementation of the new Action Plan, to leave no one behind and build a more inclusive society for all. Therefore, as the crisis is still unfolding and undermining integration opportunities for immigrants, it is key to address immigrants’ need specifically, by monitoring their situation in terms of employment, education, housing, and health, among other factors. In terms of health, it is now more necessary than ever to ensure that immigrants have stable access to healthcare and remove barriers that prevent testing and treatment for Covid-19. To avoid turning the pandemics in an integration crisis, it is also crucial to ensure that immigrants have access to the socio-economic measures of support put in place in response to the crisis. In addition, new and safe possibilities of interaction between immigrants and the native population must be provided to ensure social integration despite the current difficulties. The persisting differences in the approach to integration, the policies adopted and the integration outcomes across the EU suggest that the Member States can go a long way in the integration process by promoting mutual learning and stronger coordination of national integration policies (Geddes et al., 2020). However, for this to be possible, it is crucial to have reliable data on integration policies evaluation available, and an efficient monitoring mechanism in the new Action Plan. Furthermore, to promote a clearer commitment by the Member States, specific provisions to guide Member States’ actions and promote better coordination with local and regional authorities should be provided within the framework of the Action Plan. As stated above, the local level has a pivotal role in immigrants’ integration, as it is the primary stage where the integration process takes place. For this reason, it is fundamental to improve the coordination of integration policies across government levels, and, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, address the needs of immigrants by increasing the capacity of local actors to access and effectively use the financial resources available (Cagiano de Azevedo & Paparusso, 2019).

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Funding is crucial in this effort and should be made available with a clearer and streamlined procedure to facilitate the work of both non-governmental and governmental actors. In absence of a common EU immigrant integration policy, a serious commitment and sustained efforts by the Member States are essential to attaining the goals proposed in the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion. In addition, integration being a social process that involves both immigrants and the host society, it is fundamental that grassroots efforts are promoted, sustained, and are incorporated in more wide-ranging actions. It should be noted that for the realization of these objectives, we can also count on the massive economic and policy intervention that the EU is preparing, which represents an important opportunity not to be missed. The Next Generation EU package is certainly the most important of the tools introduced by the European Union to help repair the economic damage caused by the pandemic and invest in the next generations (European Commission, 2020b). This is a wide-ranging recovery plan of 750 billion euros which are added to the 1,100 already foreseen in the EU’s multi-year budget, bringing the overall intervention at EU level to approximately 1,850 billion for the years 2021–2027. On the long-term budget of the EU, including the Next Generation EU package, an agreement in principle was reached between the European Parliament and the German presidency of the Council on 10 November 2020 (European Commission, 2020c). Even though the package is not specifically addressed to tackling the effect of the Covid-19 crisis

Photo 3.3 Berlaymont Building, European Commission headquarters in Brussels. Source Author’s photo

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on immigrants, its successful implementation could, directly and indirectly, have an impact on immigrants, especially the youth and those active in the labour market. The objective of Next Generation EU is to integrate national efforts and facilitate the recovery of the European economy via three pillars: (1) direct instruments in support of the Member States; (2) measures to stimulate private investment and to support enterprises; (3) strengthening the EU’s strategic programs for the single market and the green and digital transition. Therefore, the European recipe for an economic restart is a sort of European Green Deal, combined with the strengthening of the single market in the digital age and fair and inclusive recovery for all. To take advantage of Next Generation EU funds, Member States are called upon to present projects that have an explicit reference to ecological transition and digitization, with the view that, according to the European Commission, reviving the economy does not mean returning to the situation preceding the crisis, but taking a leap forward (Photo 3.3). Member States were also urged to step up support for youth employment, making use of funding available under Next Generation EU and the EU budget, by launching a youth employment support package called Youth Employment Support: a bridge to jobs for the next generation, which aims to: (1) further strengthen the Youth Guarantee by increasing the participation of vulnerable young people aged 15–29; (2) adapt education and vocational training systems to the digital and green economy; (3) renew the impulse for apprenticeships, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and increase the involvement of the social partners concerned; (4) offer economic incentives for employment, starting up new businesses and developing networks for young entrepreneurs (European Commission, 2020d). We do not yet know what the effects of the instruments adopted by the EU will be on the current socio-economic crisis. Certainly, the adoption of the Next Generation EU can be considered a fundamental step towards the integration of national economic policies, in particular, because it establishes for the first time a European debt, albeit not definitive, managed directly at the supranational level by the European Commission. Youth Employment Support, on the other hand, is proof that supporting the employment and professional development of young people is an urgent issue—which the Coronavirus pandemic has brought to the attention of European institutions—for the socio-economic and demographic sustainability of the European Union and all its Member States (Photo 3.4).

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Photo 3.4 Mural reading “The Future Is Europe’, European Council headquarters in Brussels. Source Author’s photo

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Acknowledgements I warmly thank Giulia Barletta (IRPPS-CNR) for collaborating in the collection and selection of the documentation used to write this Chapter.

References Baganha, M. I., Doomernik, J., Fassmann, H., Gsir, S., Hofmann, M., Jandl, M., Kraler, A., Neske, M., & Reeger, U. (2006). International migration and its regulation. In R. Penninx, M. Berger, & K. Karen (Eds.), The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe. A state of the art (pp. 19–40). Amsterdam University Press. Bonifazi, C., & Strozza, S. (2019). International migrations in the Southern countries of the European Union: Continuity and changes, before and after the crisis. In S. Capasso & E. Ferragina (Eds.), Mediterranean migration and the labour market: Policies for growth and social development in the Mediterranean area (pp. 198–223). Routledge. Bonjour, S. (2011). The power and moral of policy makers: Reassessing the control gap debate. International Migration Review, 45, 89–122. Bosswick, W., & Heckmann, F. (2006). Integration of migrants: Contribution of local and regional authorities. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Boswell, C., & Geddes, A. (2011). Migration and Mobility in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Cagiano de Azevedo, R., & Paparusso, A. (2019). Migration policies in times of crisis: A subsidiarity approach. Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 86(1), 97–108. Cichocka, E. (2021). Safe, accepted and charmed by the city. Why do migrants feel better in Berlin than in Amsterdam? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X. 2021.1873113. Council of Europe, Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs. (1997). Measurement and indicators of integration. Council of Europe Publishing. Council of Europe, Justice and Home Affairs Council. (2004). The common basic principles for immigrant integration policies in the EU, 14615/04 (Presse 321). de Haas, H., Castles, S., & Miller, M. (2020). The age of migration, sixth edition: International population movements in the modern world. The Guilford Press. European Commission. (2018). Commission and OECD present report on the local integration of migrants. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/factsheet/oecd_local_integra tion_migrants_en.pdf. European Commission. (2020a). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027, COM(2020) 758 final, 24 November 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/pdf/action_plan_on_i ntegration_and_inclusion_2021-2027.pdf. European Commission. (2020b). Europe’s moment: Repair and prepare for the next generation, 27 May 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_940. European Commission. (2020c). EU’s next long-term budget & Next Generation EU: key facts and figures, 11 November 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/about_the_european_ commission/eu_budget/mff_factsheet_agreement_en_web_20.11.pdf. European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion. (2020d). Commission launches Youth Employment Support: a bridge to jobs for the next generation, 1 July 2020. https://ec.eur opa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=9719&langId=en. Faist, T., & Ette, A. (Eds.). (2007). The Europeanization of national policies and politics of immigration. Palgrave Macmillan. Freeman, G. P. (1995). Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states. International Migration Review, 29(4), 881–902.

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Garcés-Mascareñas, B., & Penninx, R. (2016). Introduction: Integration as a three-way process approach? In B. Garcés-Mascareñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), Integration processes and policies in Europe: Contexts, levels and actors (pp. 1–9). Springer. Geddes, A. (2003). The politics of migration and immigration in Europe. Sage. Geddes, A., Hadj Abdou, L., & Brumat, L. (2020). Migration and mobility in the European Union (2nd ed.). Red Global Press. Guadagno, L. (2020). Migrants and the COVID-19 pandemic: An initial analysis. Migration Research Series No. 60, International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/ system/files/pdf/mrs-60.pdf. Koopmans, R. (2020). A virus that knows no borders? Exposure to and restrictions of international travel and the global diffusion of COVID-19. No. SP VI 2020–103. WZB Discussion Paper. Martin, S., & Bergmann, J. (2020). (Im)mobility in the age of COVID-19. International Migration Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918320984104. OECD/European Union. (2018). Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307216-en. O’Brien, M. L., & Eger, M. A. (2020). Suppression, spikes, and stigma: How COVID-19 will shape international migration and hostilities toward it. International Migration Review. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0197918320968754. OECD. (2020a). What is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on immigrants and their children? http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/what-is-the-impact-of-thecovid-19-pandemic-on-immigrantsand-their-children-e7cbb7de/. OECD. (2020). Education at a Glance 2020. OECD Publishing. Penninx, R., Kraal, K., Martiniello, M., & Vertovec, S. (Eds.). (2004). Citizenship in European cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration policies. Ashgate. Save the Children. (2020). The impact of COVID-19 on children in Europe. A briefing by Save the Children. https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/17844/pdf/the_impact_of_ covid19_on_children_in_europe.pdf. Settersten, R. A., et al. (2020). Understanding the effects of Covid-19 through a life course lens. Advances in Life Course Research. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.alcr.2020.100360. Tagliacozzo, S., Pisacane, L., & Kilkey, M. (2020). The interplay between structural and systemic vulnerability during the COVID-19 pandemic: Migrant agricultural workers in informal settlements in Southern Italy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/136 9183X.2020.1857230. Zambrano, E., Bueermann, G., & Sullivan, D. (2020). Travel restrictions, points of entry, and mobility data: Impact in Covid-19 data models and needed solutions for proximity, location and mobility data. Migration Policy Practice, 10(2), 60–64.

Chapter 4

Subjective Well-Being of Immigrants in Europe

Abstract This Chapter analyses the growing importance taken by subjective wellbeing in the social sciences in the last fifteen years. It provides a definition of subjective well-being and of its main components, paying particular attention to the different concepts they represent. Moreover, it illustrates how subjective well-being is acquiring centrality in migration and integration studies. To this end, I outline some key studies, initiatives, and publications in the field of subjective well-being, which highlight the necessity of employing subjective indicators, along with objective ones, in order to assess policy success, select policy goals, and provide an encompassing picture of well-being. I argue that analysing subjective well-being is especially important when dealing with immigrants’ integration. In fact, subjective well-being can be used as a subjective measure of immigrant integration in the receiving country. However, researchers and practitioners alike must be aware of some differences that characterise investigating immigrants’ subjective well-being, compared to the general population’s. The Chapter ends by illustrating the main research approaches migration scholars have developed to study immigrants’ subjective well-being. Keywords Well-being indicators · Subjective well-being · Life satisfaction · Immigrants

4.1 Defining Subjective Well-Being The term well-being “refers to any state which is desirable from some point of view. […] First of all, the term can denote both individual states and states of social systems. Sometimes both elements are covered, sometimes only one.” (Veenhoven, 1984: 33). However, while for social systems one can only focus on objective well-being, for individual states both objective and subjective well-being can be studied. Subjective well-being (SWB) “refers to how people feel about their experiences and evaluate their lives and specific domains and activities in their lives. Experienced well-being is concerned with people’s emotional states; evaluative well-being refers to judgments of how satisfying one’s life is” (OECD, 2013: 2–3). In its subjective

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meaning, well-being conceptually converges towards ‘quality of life’. Quality of life is a multidimensional indicator, which is used in a wide range of fields and “refers to the extent to which an individual enjoys the important life possibilities, including improved standard of living and general welfare, as well as the feeling of being safe and satisfied with life” (Muhammed & Abubakar, 2019: 1). ‘Good life’, instead, is a broader concept that refers to a state of welfare or well-being in general, sometimes also perceived as happiness (Carlquist et al., 2017). Subjective well-being is generally operationalized according to three components: life satisfaction, happiness (or hedonic well-being) and eudemonic wellbeing. Happiness and life satisfaction are often used interchangeably, although they express different concepts. While happiness reflects people’s emotional evaluation and measures their current feelings or moods (both positive and negative), life satisfaction represents the (rational) cognitive dimension and measures how people evaluate their life as a whole (Diener et al., 1985). In this regard, as noted by Veenhoven (2007a: 8) “happiness is the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his/her own life-as-a-whole favourably”. Lastly, eudemonic well-being focuses on “judgments about the meaning and purpose of one’s life” (Steptoe et al., 2015: 641).

4.2 The Importance of Subjective Well-Being as a Measure of Individual and Societal Progress Although becoming prominent in the European policy agenda in the last decade, subjective well-being has been crucial in both social science and applied fields of policy for at least 50 years. More precisely, subjective well-being is inscribed in that broader field of research that criticises the gross domestic product (GDP) and other financial measures as unique and most effective indicators of progress and prosperity in increasingly complex societies (Bache, 2019; Corlet Walker et al., 2020; Kaminitz, 2020). This discussion has led to consider other fundamental dimensions of wellbeing. Environmental and social sustainability, social equity, civil justice, gender equality, good life and quality of life have been proposed as new and wide-ranging notions, with the aim of integrating the use of macroeconomic indicators in evaluating individual and societal progress and in orienting public policymaking. The recommendations of the Final Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz et al., 2009) strengthened the awareness that the parameters on which assessing the progress of a society cannot be exclusively economic in nature. This contributed to initiatives such as the European Commission’s Beyond GDP initiative (European Commission, 2009), the OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being (2013) and the development by

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Eurostat of quality-of-life indicators.1 More recently, “Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, a global development agenda with seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and associated targets for all countries and stakeholders, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2015,2 the World Happiness Reports of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the OECD’s “Better life” initiative (OECD, 2018), and the Italian reports on Equitable and Sustainable Well-being published by ISTAT, followed as valuable initiatives aimed at promoting the inclusion of quality of life and subjective well-being indicators among the measures of socio-economic development in more equitable and sustainable societies. Today the world is more focused on subjective well-being and happiness than in the past. Happiness and subjective well-being are considered as important as GDP and other monetary measures in determining how to achieve and measure countries’ social and economic development. In this vein, increasing attention at both policy and scientific level has been given to the subjective components of well-being and to their measurement, through the building of ad hoc indicators and surveys. Indeed, income and wealth, work and job quality, housing, health, knowledge and skills, environmental quality, safety, work-life balance, social connections and civil engagement, albeit fundamental in providing a comprehensive picture of individuals’ well-being (OECD, 2020) are not able to effectively understand if people are living well and how they really feel (Photo 4.1). As argued by Veenhoven (2007b: 16), “subjective indicators are indispensable in social policy, both for assessing policy success and for selecting policy goals. Objective indicators alone do not provide sufficient information, especially not on the subject of wellbeing”. Therefore, the emphasis on objective indicators (both specific and overall indicators) has been gradually overcome by the concept of subjectively experienced well-being (e.g., Pacheco et al., 2013). Subjective measures of well-being, capturing perceptions and evaluations expressed by people themselves, may be more effective than objective measures of outcomes because they consider different personal aspirations and expectations. Individuals with similar levels of well-being as assessed by objective measures may report different outcomes in terms of subjective well-being (Grimes & Wesselbaum, 2021). Therefore, subjective well-being could be an alternative and appropriate way to study individuals’ well-being (Hendriks & Bartram, 2019). In addition, measuring subjective well-being by means of a comprehensive indicator that incorporates a variety of life domains has many advantages, since it overcomes approaches that look at separate domains. First, overall measures do not exclude any domain a priori. Second, the use of self-assessment measures of well-being allows individuals to weight for 1

In this regard, it is worth noting that Eurostat implemented a dedicated EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) module starting from 2013 that contained 18 indicators on subjective well-being and that is expected to be repeated every six years. 2 Although the concept of well-being is transversal to many goals and targets, Goal 3 is explicitly dedicated to ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages.

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Photo 4.1 Installation symbolising the Annual High-level Political Forum (HLPF) on SDGs, held from 10 to 19 July 2017, Headquarters of the United Nations, New York City. Source Author’s photo

themselves the importance of different aspects of life. Third, overall measures of subjective well-being allow individuals to evaluate their own outcomes (Hendriks & Bartram, 2019). Indeed, it is well recognized that subjective well-being varies across individuals and it is influenced by time and space for the same individual. It is worth noting that subjective well-being also influences human longevity: happier people tend to live healthier and longer (Lozano & Solé-Auro, 2021). However, it is also true that lower socio-economic groups, mainly employed in manual and routine jobs, generally live shorter and arrive at retirement in unhealthier conditions. European countries should consider this issue since our populations are living longer but not necessarily in a healthier way and without forms of disabling morbidity. Therefore, it is important to prevent the factors that directly and indirectly influence an unhealthy ageing and retirement, because of their high socioeconomic costs. The factors include educational background, occupational position, socio-economic status, but also social relationships and networks, family life, experienced emotional well-being, happiness and satisfaction with life. In this regard, indicators like Years of Good Life (YoGL), Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and Well-Being-Adjusted Life-Years (WELLBYs) have been developed with the aim of including quality of life and well-being dimensions in the measurement of life expectancy with the aim of offering a more realistic and comprehensive

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understanding of individual health by considering both quantity and quality of life (Helliwell et al., 2021; Howren, 2013; Lutz et al., 2018). They are important tools for comparing the performance of different countries and implementing sustainable policies. An important source of data on subjective well-being in Europe is the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) (Eurofound, 2017). The EQLS is a monitoring tool that covers all EU Member States and some candidate countries and sets out to capture the quality of life in multiple dimensions. The survey started in 2003 and reiterated in 2007, 2011 and 2016. The 2016 survey contains 262 items encompassing socioeconomic background, resources, living conditions, unpaid work, social ties and use of services, including a uniquely large set of 26 indicators on subjective well-being. According to the EQLS findings, self-reported life satisfaction increased between 2011 and 2016 in some European Union (EU) countries, but especially in Estonia, Hungary and the United Kingdom, along with increased life satisfaction in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. On the contrary, in Greece, Italy and Spain, selfreported life satisfaction worsened during this period. The most important predictor of self-reported life satisfaction is self-perceived poor health, followed by unemployment, low relative income and low education. Self-reported health and mental health are consistently worse for lower-income groups than for others. Women have a slightly higher level of life satisfaction than men while being from another country has a small negative effect, which is especially pronounced for within-EU immigrants. Having children and being in a stable relationship are associated with greater happiness and life satisfaction. Finally, all countries score high on at least one subjective well-being measure within the EU, and with a few exceptions, all are near the bottom in at least one measure. In addition, many of these measures have continued to deteriorate between 2011 and 2016 after already worsening in the period following the 2008 crisis (Eurofound, 2017). Subjective well-being has been further worsened by the consequences of Covid19 pandemic, both directly and indirectly. Although overall happiness and life satisfaction have not significantly worsened compared to previous years, positive and negative emotions dramatically changed during the Covid-19 crisis. To this, we can add negative indirect effects on health, employment, social connection, trust in public institutions and socio-economic equality (Helliwell et al., 2021) (Photo 4.2). In particular, so far, much empirical research has been carried out at national and local level with the aim of disentangling the effects of the physical distancing—which has been enacted in most countries in order to flatten the curve of Covid-19 virus spreading—on individuals and families’ subjective well-being (see, for instance, Arpino et al., 2020 for France, Italy and Spain, and Cerbara et al., 2020, for Italy). Most studies focus on psychological well-being and mental health, highlighting a general deterioration of psychological well-being and in particular an increase of the experiencing of bad feelings, such as sadness, anxiety, fear and depression during the Covid-19 worldwide pandemic. In particular, the Covid-19 pandemic-induced lockdown and the consequent interruption or fragmentation of social and medical assistance has exacerbated pre-existing situations of uncertainty, loneliness, isolation, vulnerability and mental diseases with transversal consequences on objective

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Photo 4.2 Indonesian couple at the train station during the Covid-19 pandemic. Source Pixabay

and subjective outcomes of well-being (e.g., Akat and Karata¸s, 2020; Churchill, 2020; Guetto et al., 2020; Hamermesh, 2020; Luppi et al., 2020; Power et al., 2020) (Fig. 4.3). Similarly, European surveys, such as the European Social Survey (ESS), SHARE—Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe and Understanding Society—The UK Household Longitudinal Study have updated their questionnaires or have made ad hoc modules, to consider the effects of the recent Coronavirus crisis on objective and subjective indicators of well-being. In this regard, it is interesting to know that Shen and Bartram (2020) investigated the subjective consequences of the social inequalities exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, linking the Understanding Society Covid-19 longitudinal survey collected between April and May 2020, with the latest wave of the main-stage survey (Wave 9). They studied the psychological cost of economic lockdown for both UK-born and foreign-born working men. They found that employment disruption (measured with the work hour reduction) in the circumstances of the pandemic does not necessarily hurt subjective well-being (measured with mental well-being) of the native-born if their income is protected. For foreign-born men, however, work hour reduction or unemployment is accompanied by psychological costs, demonstrating that immigrants are a particularly vulnerable population that do not access financial compensation for work hours loss.

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Photo 4.3 Sign of a cinema closed due to the Covid-19 lockdown in Stuttgart (Germany). Source Author’s photo

4.3 Why Subjective Well-Being Matters When Studying Immigrant Integration Building from the studies of Sen on well-being, capabilities and human development (Sen, 1985a, 1985b, 1999), de Haas (2009) studied the interconnection between human mobility and well-being and argued that an increase in human mobility may result into the acquisition of new capabilities in turn affecting collective social, political and economic freedom. Recently, de Haas (2021) elaborated an aspirationscapabilities framework to understand migration as part of a broader process of social change and development and to build a more comprehensive and integrated migration theory. Migration is a function of aspirations and capabilities, within given sets of perceived geographical opportunity structures. Migration aspirations relate to people’s life aspirations, while capabilities depend on people’s positive and negative liberties. Furthermore, he distinguished between instrumental (functionalist/utilitarian) and intrinsic migration aspirations. According to an instrumental interpretation of migration aspirations, people move to improve their well-being in the new country of residence, by achieving for instance a higher income, higher socio-economic status, better education, better health care, better protection from

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persecution, higher life satisfaction, happiness, etc. According to an intrinsic interpretation of migration aspirations, migration, or the awareness of having the possibility to migrate, enhances people’s well-being. Migration, conceived as both the decision to move (voluntary mobility) and the choice to stay (voluntary immobility), is considered a “well-being-enhancing factor” in its own right (de Haas, 2021: 20). In other words, whether it is perceived as freedom of choice and autonomy or it is considered as means-to-an-end action, migration directly affects people’s well-being (Steckermeier, 2021). Also the role of immigrants for the well-being of societies is well recognized at international level. For instance, the already mentioned Agenda 2030 (“Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015, specifically recognizes the positive contribution of immigrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development of countries of origin, transit, and destination. In particular, immigrants were included into four SDG goals among other groups, concerning the access to rights and the elimination of trafficking and violence against women (Goals 5 and 16), the provision of safe environments for migrant workers (Goal 8), and data collection on migratory status (Goal 17). Finally, immigrants were also considered in Goal 10 ‘reduce inequality within and among countries’ and in particular in Goal 10.c ‘reduce the cost of remittances’ and Goal 10.7 ‘facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’ (Betts & Kainz, 2017). However, while the determinants of subjective well-being are broadly popular in social sciences and have been largely studied by economists, psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists (Diener et al., 2017), the importance to study immigrants’ subjective well-being is still not fully recognized in migration and integration studies (Hendriks & Bartram, 2019). For instance, Wright (2011) has pointed out that there are still few studies investigating “the specific needs that migrants themselves identify as important for ‘living well’ and how these are formed and transformed by the migration process” (Wright, 2011: 1471). In this regard, the authors of the World Migration Report stressed that “there is a need for further inquiry into the factors that contribute to subjective well-being” (IOM, 2013: 38). Indeed, an immigrant who scores high on objective criteria is not necessarily happier; for this reason, the relationship between objective and subjective well-being among immigrants is complex. The World Happiness Report 2018 follows this thread, dealing with measuring subjective well-being of the foreign-born and native-born population in every country of the world. In particular, it analyses what determines the happiness of immigrants living in and coming from different countries (Helliwell et al., 2018). However, Hendriks and Bartram (2019) advise researchers to be aware of four main differences between dealing with immigrants’ and the general population’s subjective well-being. Firstly, immigrants are at the same time a self-selected and a heterogeneous population and as such, they are different from the general one. Secondly, immigrants’ subjective well-being can be shaped by factors that are strictly connected to the migration conditions that do not concern the general population, such

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as acculturation, discrimination, and the available social and economic networks. Thirdly, immigrants’ subjective well-being can be directly related to the reason for migration or the channel of entry. Finally, the subjective well-being of immigrants can depend, to a certain extent, on their previous conditions in the country of origin. Given these considerations, the importance to study immigrants’ subjective wellbeing is twofold. First, it is generally assumed that migrants move because they expect to improve their well-being in the new country of residence (de Haas, 2021; Hendriks & Bartram, 2019). In other words, by migrating to another country, migrants are seeking a happier life for themselves and their family (Helliwell et al., 2018). Second, as already stressed, immigrant integration is a dynamic, multidimensional, and bidirectional process, which involves the receiving society and the newcomers at the same time (Penninx, 2003). The complexity and the multi-dimensionality of this process have led experts to study both the micro and the macro factors shaping immigrants’ socioeconomic, sociocultural and political integration (e.g., Koopmans, 2016; Maxwell, 2012; Wallace Goodman & Wright, 2015). Despite the remarkable contribution these works have made to integration studies, it has been concluded that integration cannot only be understood by investigating its ‘objective’ forms (e.g., educational attainment, household income, employment, housing, legal status, etc. (OECD, 2015)). ‘Subjective integration’ must be studied, to take immigrants’ perceptions and opinions about their experience in the country of residence into account (Amit, 2010). Box 4.1 The Health Status of Migrants and Refugees The World Health Organization (WHO)3 defines health as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. Good health may be considered one of the most important goals individuals aspire to during the life course. Moreover, a healthy life generally means a longer and happier life (e.g., Lozano and Solé-Auro, 2021). Accordingly, any life choice may be seen as directly or indirectly aimed at obtaining a better health status for oneself and one’s family. Migration is among these choices. Migration and health mutually influence each other: the individual’s health status can influence the aspiration and the decision to migrate as well as migration can determine one’s health status through the conditions associated with all the stages of the migration process, i.e., pre-migration, migration, settlement, and integration abroad (Castelli, 2018). Before migrating, a selection bias is generally observed: individuals who intend to migrate are usually young and in good physical and mental health. In the scientific literature this phenomenon is also known as the “healthy immigrant effect” (e.g., Gushulak, 2007). It “describes an empirically observed mortality advantage of migrants from certain countries of origin, relative to the majority population in the host countries, usually in the industrialized world. Occasionally, it relates to a relatively lower morbidity of immigrants as well” (Razum, 2008: 110). Indeed, according to the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory, the best way to maximize the chances of success of the family migration project is to select the best individual who would have

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the highest probability to reach the destination country and consequently to be positively integrated in the new reception contest, thus sending monetary remittances to the origin country and facilitating the reunification of the family members in the destination country (e.g., de Haas, 2005; Stark & Bloom, 1985). However, the good health of a migrant does not depend only on the living conditions before undertaking the migratory project, but also on other factors intervening during both the migration and integration processes (Borrell et al., 2015). As reported by Wickramage et al. (2018: 5), “being a migrant is not in itself a risk to health: it is the conditions associated with migration that may increase vulnerability to poor health. […] Migrants may reside in—or pass through—‘spaces of vulnerability’—key spaces associated with potentially negative health outcomes […]. Such spaces may contain a combination of social, economic and physical conditions that may increase the likelihood of exposure to violence and abuse and/or acquisition of communicable or noncommunicable disease”. Journeys can last many months and migrants can be obliged to pass through zones characterized by dangerous conditions, like deserts or long sea travels on little and unsafe boats, or war zones or countries characterised by open violence. All these criticalities increase the vulnerability of individuals and their exposure to worsening or endangering their health status. The lack of vaccinations and screening programs, poor health infrastructures, overcrowding living conditions and unsafe hygienic conditions in origin countries could also increase latent and non-communicable diseases. Mental and psychological illnesses, including anxiety, post-traumatic stress and depression could affect migrants and refugees and may be related to the socio-economic conditions in the country of origin and the experiences of war, violence and other traumatic events made before migrating or during the journey towards the destination country (Bogic et al., 2015; Fazel et al., 2005; Steel et al., 2009). In the phase after arrival in the destination country, immigrants are exposed to a completely different social, economic, political and cultural context that could negatively influence their health status. Some of the potential difficulties that an immigrant could face in the destination country are discrimination, unemployment, material deprivation and lack of knowledge of social and legal rights including the access to the health services, which can affect their mental and physical health (Lindert et al., 2009). Furthermore, interactions between newly arrived people and providers of care are often difficult due to language, cultural and religious barriers, factors that can have an impact on health (Jaschke & Kosyakova, 2021). The perceived lack of support and sense of empathy can affect their self-rated health and subjective well-being (Cela & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2019). Therefore, the migrant selection process, which singled out younger and healthier individuals for emigration (Loi & Hale, 2019) and which resulted in the “immigrant health paradox” (Jass & Massey, 2004) tend to decrease at the increase of the years after migration

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because of intervening socio-economic, political and cultural factors (Bacong & Menjívar, 2021). A similar but opposite process of selection may occur in the destination country: immigrants who have contracted a chronic disease or who are profoundly unsatisfied with their life in the destination country may decide to return to the country of origin (Giraudo et al., 2017). Within these considerations, there are no doubts that public health policies aimed at protecting immigrants during their arrival and integration in the host country have a duplex beneficial role, for both the immigrant and the host society. Public health policies can improve the physical and psychological health status of the immigrants and protect the receiving society from immediate health risks and future higher costs for cure and care. Access to health care is considered an essential element of the integration process, since acute as well as chronic diseases might develop over time. Immigrants change progressively their habits getting closer to host country lifestyle and ‘inheriting’ chronical and non-communicable diseases typical of the western countries (diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease) (Castelli, 2018). In this regard, it is important to note that Article 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights establishes that “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities”. Last but not least, health programmes targeted at immigrants with mental health disorders should be effectively implemented and integrated with labour market schemes. They will help not only immigrants to experience a better subjective well-being in the host country but also the host society to better integrate newcomers with broader positive long-term effects: people without severe forms of anxiety and depression and other psychological diseases are more efficient and productive workers and more responsible and proactive citizens (Frijters et al., 2010).

4.4 Main Research Strands for the Study of Immigrants’ Subjective Well-Being we are interested in studyingMigration scholars have developed three main research strands to study immigrants’ subjective well-being. In the first case, we are interested in studying differences between immigrants and natives. A possible research 3

Preamble to the Constitution of WHO as adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19 June - 22 July 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official Records of WHO, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948.

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question is: do immigrants become happy as natives in the host country? (Hendriks, 2015). Previous studies comparing immigrants with natives showed that, because of discrimination, migration does not necessarily imply an improvement in the subjective well-being of immigrants (Kirmano˘glu & Ba¸slevent, 2014). The influence of one’s heritage could also hinder progress towards the levels of subjective well-being of natives (Hendriks, 2015). Such studies have demonstrated that income plays only a minor role in increasing immigrants’ subjective well-being, while perceived discrimination and adaptation are particularly important in this context (Bartram, 2011). Other researchers found that over time, because of the process of assimilation, the level of subjective well-being of immigrants tends to adjust to the natives’ one, even if not completely (e.g., Safi, 2010). Conversely, Kóczán (2016) found that first-generation immigrants living in Germany are less satisfied than natives, but this difference is explained by factors related to economic integration, such as the employment conditions, rather than cultural factors, such as feelings of belonging. Indeed, after having controlled for having a secure job, working in the occupation they were trained and owning the house they live in, the perceived disadvantage position of immigrants disappears. Lastly, Tegegne and Glanville (2019) found that immigrants in Western Europe exhibit lower levels of subjective well-being than their native-born counterparts because of reduced social capital, measured by several indicators of informal social connections and generalized trust. The different findings reported by those studies are generally due to three main reasons. (1) The kind of country people migrate to. When they move to the happiest countries in the world ranking immigrants tend to be less happy than natives, while when they move to countries with lower levels of happiness in the world ranking, immigrants have a similar or higher level of happiness than natives. (2) Immigrants tend to move to countries where happiness is higher in the world ranking, therefore, their happiness tends to be lower than the one of natives (Hendriks et al., 2018). Assimilation generally occurs in the early years after migration, when an increase in the level of subjective well-being is recorded; however, over time, immigrants develop higher aspirations, since they stop making comparisons between their current living conditions and their country of origin’s circumstances, and they start thinking about the host country’s situation only (Hendriks & Bartram, 2019). (3) The subjective well-being of immigrants is dependent on their former lives in their countries of birth. Therefore, the relative dimension is also important when analysing immigrants’ subjective well-being. Reference groups in both the country of origin and the country of destination matter when evaluating the subjective well-being of immigrants (Kang et al., 2020; Stranges et al., 2020). In the second strand of immigrants’ subjective well-being research, the interest is in understanding whether migration improves the subjective well-being of people in respect to their situation in the country of origin (Bartram, 2013). In other words, the question is: do immigrants become happier? (Hendriks, 2015). Previous research comparing immigrants with stayers has shown contrasting results: in some cases, immigrants are happier with their life than stayers, in others the contrary is observed (Nikolova & Graham, 2015). These conflicting outcomes depend not only on the

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socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants and stayers and on specific immigration factors and admission requirements, but above all on the level of development and of subjective well-being of the countries from which immigrants arrive. Generally, immigrants come from countries with a lower level of development and happiness, thus resulting in higher subjective well-being than stayers. However, the approach of comparing immigrants with stayers is seldom adopted, because of the lack of sufficient and reliable data comparing immigrants in the country of destination and non-migrants in the country of origin (Hendriks, 2015). Amit and Riss (2014) add to this research approach by examining the relationship between subjective well-being and both pre- and post-immigration factors among North Americans who arrived in Israel. They found that the labour market performance of North American immigrants in Israel was lower than in their origin countries. However, immigrants perceived their standard of living in Israel to be the same as in their origin country, if not better, due to the low cost of services in Israel. They also found that the subjective well-being of North American immigrants in Israel was relatively high, and most immigrants did not intend to leave Israel. The subjective well-being of the immigrants in Israel was found to be related to their social networks in their origin country, to their religious immigration reason and to their job satisfaction in Israel. More recently, Tartakovsky et al. (2021) studied satisfaction with life (SWL) among first-generation Jewish immigrants from the Former Soviet Union to Israel and Jews staying in Russia, founding that immigrants, on average, reported higher satisfaction with life than stayers, thus indicating that in general the subjective well-being of immigrants was higher than that of stayers. Moreover, immigrants reported stronger identification with their country of residence. Nevertheless, immigrants reported a higher level of perceived discrimination than stayers, which indicates that immigrants from the Former Soviet Union feel less accepted by the majority society in Israel, and therefore less satisfied with their life, than do Jews staying in Russia. However, the two approaches to studying immigrants’ well-being described above are the most difficult to implement. This is due to the lack of surveys measuring subjective well-being both among natives in the country of destination and among non-migrants in the country of origin, and this is true also for other migration-related research topics (Impicciatore et al., 2020). It is important to note that the scarcity of longitudinal data limits the possibilities of understanding how immigrants’ subjective well-being changed after migrating and of measuring the effect of specific life course events on immigrants’ (changes of) subjective well-being. For instance, Stillman et al. (2015) estimated the impact of international migration from Tonga in the Pacific sea to New Zealand on immigrants’ subjective well-being, using several indicators to measure subjective wellbeing over different domains. They found complex effects of migration and in particular that immigrants’ mental health improved, while happiness declined after migration. Therefore, the literature mainly resorts to cross-national data to evaluate the subjective well-being of immigrants after migration and eventually to compare it to the subjective well-being of other groups (natives or stayers), the same point in time (Hendriks, 2015).

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Nevertheless, studies based on a cross-sectional survey conducted in the country of residence can be biased: unsatisfied immigrants are not accounted for because of the selection process, which excludes those who have already left the country to return to their country of origin or to re-migrate. Similarly, longitudinal studies can have some bias due to the fact the immigrants generally experience a decrease in their subjective well-being around three years before migration and a sharp increase in subjective well-being shortly after migration. In the light of the above considerations, a third perspective may be to explore all the outcomes of migration, both the positive and the negative ones. The research question is: how well immigrants feel most of the time? (Hendriks, 2015). As already argued, asking immigrants about an assessment of their subjective well-being in the new country of residence is the most appropriate way to consider their points of view and eventually to employ this assessment for policy making’s purposes. By using the Cantril ladder question, asking respondents to value their lives today on a 0 to 10 scale, with the worst possible life as a 0 and the best possible life as a 10, the authors of the World Happiness Report 2018 (Helliwell et al., 2018) concluded that in a typical country (1) the happiness of immigrants depends importantly on how accepting the locals are towards immigrants. In a more accepting country, immigrants are happier. (2) The happiness of immigrants depends not only on the happiness of locals but also on the level of happiness in the immigrants’ country of origin. Thus, if an immigrant goes from a less happy to a happier country, he/she ends up somewhat less happy than the locals. But the reverse is true if an immigrant goes from a more to a less happy country. (3) The happiness of immigrants does not improve much with their length of stay in the country of residence, since the gain in happiness is achieved in the first five years after migration. Finally, (4) when compared with stayers in the home country, immigrants (and their family members left behind) generally gain in happiness by migrating to a more developed country. Therefore, migration is a way to improve immigrants’ subjective well-being. Nevertheless, not all immigrants and families left behind gain happiness from migration; moreover, the happiness of immigrants in their new country of residence does not necessarily increase over time. Results can be more nuanced if we consider older immigrants living in the European Union (EU), as Gruber and Sand (2020) recently did, exploring whether migration pays off both in terms of income and subjective well-being for immigrants aged 50 plus who moved from one EU country to another EU country at some point in their life and are growing old abroad. Using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) between 2004 and 2017, the authors compared post-migration outcomes of immigrants with respondents with similar characteristics in the origin countries (stayers). The main countries of origin are Germany and Italy, while the main countries of destination are Belgium, Germany, France, Luxemburg, and Switzerland. They found that: (1) there is a clear advantage in absolute income for immigrants compared to stayers; (2) immigrants report higher subjective well-being than stayers; (3) older long-term immigrants compare themselves to the native reference group and not to stayers; (4) only having an equal or higher income compared to the native populations turns out to have a significant impact on immigrants’ subjective well-being. Therefore, it can be argued that overall, migration has

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consequences not only for the economic living conditions but also for the individual well-being in later life, although it must be acknowledged that the study did not control over the selection and the return migration of immigrants in the considered European countries.

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Chapter 5

Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Europe

Abstract This chapter offers state-of-the-art research on self-reported life satisfaction as a subjective measure of immigrant integration, showing the most significant research findings and methodological challenges. To this end, the Chapter presents an empirical comparative analysis of self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants living in seven European countries, measuring the effect of both individual and country-level factors. Data are drawn from the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), 2011–2012. The empirical results show that self-reported life satisfaction strongly depends on immigrants’ demographic characteristics and human capital factors, such as age, marital status, current economic situation and perceived financial well-being. ‘Immigration’ variables, namely legal status and country of residence also play a role in defining immigrants’ life satisfaction. As for countrylevel factors, proportion of non-EU foreign citizens, naturalisation rate, having the citizenship of the country of residence, unemployment rate and Human Development Index (HDI) are significant factors that influence immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in European countries, thus proving that not only individual characteristics but also receiving contexts matter for immigrants’ subjective well-being. Keywords Subjective well-being · Self-reported life satisfaction · Immigrants · Data · Regression analysis

5.1 Previous Studies on Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Europe Among the many available definitions, self-reported life satisfaction has been defined as “a global assessment of a person’s quality of life according to his chosen criteria” (Diener et al., 1985: 71). As it is commonly used to estimate the “apparent quality of life within a country or a specific social group” (Veenhoven, 1996: 3), immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction is a good proxy of immigrants’ conditions and can be used to evaluate the integration process within the country of residence by asking the immigrants about their experiences and expectations (Paparusso, 2019). In fact, as argued by Carlquist et al. (2017), self-reported life satisfaction generally refers © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Paparusso, Immigrant Integration in Europe, Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5_5

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to the individuals’ fulfilment of needs, desires or expectations, with respect to some selected standards or ideals. Understanding the spectrum of factors shaping immigrants’ assessment of their self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence is particularly important: it is a way to grasp and explain the mechanism at work in the process of immigrant integration from a subjective perspective, integrating traditional objective indicators of integration, such as educational attainment, household income, employment, housing, legal status, etc. For this reason, factors shaping immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction have been receiving increasing scientific and political attention, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of existing policies or to implement new ones (Paparusso, 2020). At this stage of the Book, it is important to clarify that, although happiness can be used as a synonym of self-reported life satisfaction, when the latter refers to life in total and not to some specific aspects of life, such as marriage, friends or work, the literature suggests some caution when using the concept of ‘happiness’ (Carlquist et al., 2017). Indeed, the concept of ‘happiness’ tends to have a different meaning in different languages, to be more volatile and directly dependent on emotions. On the contrary, one item life satisfaction tends to show strong consistency and less variability over time when repeatedly assessed for the same person (Lutz et al., 2018). In this regard, it is important to note that Veenhoven (2007b: 19) underlined that “the most subjective measures of subjective wellbeing are self-reports of satisfaction, and the most comprehensive measure of that kind is satisfaction with life-as-a-whole, shortly called ‘life-satisfaction’”. However, why does the term “happiness” seem to be more commonly used, compared to “life satisfaction”? First, happiness is a general term—often used interchangeably with terms like “well-being” or “quality of life”—which captures what most people think of, while life satisfaction is a more technical term to refer to how people evaluate their own life. Second, happiness covers both the overall evaluation of life and two other components: the evaluation of what people have and what people actually want (a cognitive component, socalled “contentment”, which is the degree to which an individual perceives his/her aspirations are met) and how happy people feel (so-called “affective component” or “hedonic level of affect”). However, the concept of life satisfaction refers more to the achievement of goals, needs, desires and expectations (Carlquist et al., 2017). This last specification makes life satisfaction particularly adequate to evaluate the immigrant integration process from a subjective perspective. Ascertaining people’s desires and needs is a prerequisite for any effective policy intervention. Especially in the immigrant integration field, policies can be improved by directly asking immigrants to evaluate their present conditions and their wishes and expectations for the future (Carlquist et al., 2017). For this reason, I decided to focus on self-reported life satisfaction as an indicator of immigrants’ subjective integration (Granderath et al., 2021; Tegegne & Glanville, 2019). Theory and empirical evidence suggest that a wide array of individual-level characteristics and country-level factors may affect immigrants’ assessment of life satisfaction in their country of residence (e.g., Amit, 2010; Bonini, 2008; Paloma et al., 2020). For a broader overview of these factors, see Table 5.1.

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Table 5.1 Factors shaping immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence Level

Field

Variables

Micro Socio-demographic Age, gender, marital status, country or area of origin, ethnic group, household structure, children left behind, geographical area of residence, religiosity, disability, mental well-being, physical and self-perceived health Human capital

Education, language proficiency, occupational status, annual income, income inequality, financial security, homeownership, housing conditions

Immigration

Years since migration, age at arrival, migration channel, legal status

Integration

Cultural similarity (e.g., use of the same language, common history, and similar traditions) and physical proximity of the home country to the host country, cultural assimilation, community engagement, political participation, existence of social networks, presence of close friends, loneliness, sense of belonging, gender attitudes and roles, perceived discrimination

Transnationalism

Frequency of return visits, contacts and remittances to the country of origin, return intentions, sense of attachment, ethnic identity, participation in immigrant associations and ethnic organisations

Macro Socio-economic

Human Development Index (HDI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), economic inequality (Gini coefficient), economic opportunities (labour market participation, employment and unemployment rates), public administration efficiency and transparency, social protection, structure of the labour market, qualification and skills recognition

Political

Immigration and citizenship policies, labour market policies, language and civic programs, anti-discrimination programs, personal and political freedom, equality and justice

Cultural

Symbolic ethnic boundaries, size of the ethnic community and diaspora, host society’s prevalent attitudes towards immigrants

Source Author’s elaboration

I have distinguished between micro-and macro-level factors. Among the microlevel factors, socio-demographic, human capital, immigration, integration and transnationalism variables can come into play before and after migration and affect immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence. The effect of the individual factors can be complemented by macro-level factors and in particular by socio-economic, political and cultural factors, which shape the structure of the host setting and may vary across immigrants’ receiving countries (Paparusso, 2019). The multidimensionality of the factors associated with immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction reveals the complexity and the multifaceted character of life satisfaction as a measure of immigrants’ subjective integration in the country of residence. To give only a few examples, Fugl-Meyer et al. (2002) found for Sweden that immigrants engaged in a stable relationship express significantly higher levels of satisfaction with life, compared to those without this status. In their analysis of Somali

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women in Melbourne, McMichael and Manderson (2004) concluded that weak social capital and social networks negatively affect women’s self-reported life satisfaction. Massey and Akresh (2006) revealed that more satisfied immigrants are more likely to wish to naturalise and permanently settle in the U.S. compared to less satisfied immigrants. Verkuyten (2008) showed for Turkish-Dutch immigrants that perceived discrimination was associated with lower life satisfaction. Amit (2010) found that levels of social integration, identification and migration reasons were key factors in explaining differences in life satisfaction of immigrants in Israel. Using a two-wave panel dataset (data collected during 2006 and 2007 as part of the Faith Matters (FM) Study, a nationwide study examining the connection between religion and social capital in America), Lim and Putnam (2010) demonstrated that religious service attendance has positive effects on life satisfaction. In particular and more importantly, they found that social networks forged in congregations and strong religious identities are the key variables that mediate the positive connection between religion and self-reported life satisfaction. In other words, it is neither faith nor communities per se that are important, but communities of faith. Therefore, for life satisfaction, praying together seems to be better than either bowling together or praying alone (Lim & Putnam, 2010). Knabe et al. (2013) showed that life satisfaction of immigrants in Germany decreased when right-wing extremism among natives increased. Angelini et al. (2015) found that in Germany again the positive effect of cultural assimilation on immigrants’ satisfaction with life is stronger for established and second-generation immigrants than for more recent immigrants. Schiele (2021) recently demonstrated that for each unit that the self-reported life satisfaction in Germany exceeded the life satisfaction in the country of origin, around 6% fewer immigrants intend to return to their country of origin. Finally, perceived freedom and more equalitarian family arrangements have been found to improve the self-reported life satisfaction of women, who find in migration the opportunity of gaining more autonomy in absence of their traditional family and social networks (Waseem et al., 2020). Box 5.1 Return Migration and Return Migration Intentions Studying return migration is helpful to have a complete picture of the entire migration process and to capture the policy implications that it may have for the origin and destination countries (Carling, 2004, 2014; Williams et al., 2018). Some scholars, such as Olesen (2002) and Ruhs (2006) believe that return migration should be considered a ‘brain gain’ for the migrants’ sending countries, because, along with monetary remittances, it contributes to the development of such countries. On the other side, receiving countries may consider migrants as a temporary labour force, developing immigration schemes more aligned to temporary stay rather than long term settlement (Baizan & GonzalezFerrer, 2016; Boese & Macdonald, 2016). In this regard, it is useful to note that many international agencies, such as the UN, the OIM, the World Bank and the European Commission, in accordance with national governments are

5.1 Previous Studies on Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Europe

promoting the creation of managed circular migration systems, able to effectively involve migrants’ origin and destination countries in a ‘win–win-win process’. Circular migration, understood as repeated movements between the home country and one or more countries of destination, is indeed able to produce mutual gains for migrants’ sending and receiving countries and for migrants themselves and their families. The potential benefits of circular migration are the followings: (1) circulation of human capital and production of remittances for development; (2) preservation of sectoral labour shortages, by ensuring that temporary migrants leave; (3) prevention and reduction of irregular migration; (4) recruitment of reliable and trained workers (Vertovec, 2007). Last but not least, circular migration is a policy strategy that could be better accepted by the public opinion in most receiving countries, especially in periods of economic crisis and political instability. However, to have an effective and positive impact on countries’ development and migrants’ wellbeing, circular migration should be carefully managed through the integration of national and regional development policies and migration policies in both origin and destination countries (Hugo, 2013). A vast corpus of international literature has disentangled the main factors associated with return migration, including return intentions, which are considered a good proxy of actual behaviours (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019). Many of these studies have based their analysis on the so-called “integrationtransnationalism nexus”; whereas others have focused their attention on some socio-economic factors in the country of residence or in the country of origin, such as year of arrival, age at migration, length of stay abroad, marital status, family members left behind, employment, home and business ownerships, remittances, skills, such as educational level and host language fluency, social networks, development of more equalitarian gender norms, subjective well-being, etc. (e.g., Anniste & Tammaru, 2014; Boccagni & Erdal, 2021; Carling & Pettersen, 2014; de Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Erdal, 2012; Kerpaci, 2019; Samari, 2021). All these studies agree that different processes influence return migration: integration is a factor that tends to strengthen the ties with the country of residence, whereas transnationalism reinforces those with the country of origin. The importance of the context cannot be overlooked when analysing the trade-off between social integration and transnationalism and the relationship with return migration. Contextual and institutional factors in both countries of residence and origin can shape migrants’ social integration and, therefore, affect migrants’ wish to return to the country of origin (Ruist, 2016; Yang, 1994). In other words, a favourable and inclusive social setting in the country of destination has a positive effect on migrants’ well-being in the country of residence and a negative effect on migrants’ decision to return to the home country (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; Della Puppa & King, 2019; Güngör & Tansel, 2014; Massey & Akresh, 2006; Model, 2016; Piotrowski & Tong, 2013; Schiele,

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2021). This consideration has become even more important in the past decade. The economic crisis in Europe has transformed how return is viewed and talked about by both migrants themselves and public institutions in origin and destination countries. While the return tended to be conceived as a long distant life project in relation to the conclusion of the working life, or as the successful outcome of the migratory adventure, for an increasing number of vulnerable migrants, return is seen as a safety net with respect to a precarious present condition. However, according to the “myth of return” (Anwar, 1979; Gmelch, 1980), return can be postponed for an indefinite period, and for many migrants “it remains just a projection into the future in an almost mythical form” (Boccagni, 2011: 471; Pelliccia, 2017). In some cases, return could never happen or be only a short-term experience, in the form of a holiday in the homeland (Pelliccia, 2018). It can also take the form of a “pendulum” experience, consisting in spending a part of the year in the country of origin, while maintaining official residence in the new country of settlement (de Haas & Fokkema, 2010). In this regard, it is very interesting to note that the role of return visits to the home country, also in the form of seasonal holidays, could have been affected by the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic on mobility. Broadly speaking, although immigrants can change their plans over time, having information on return migration intentions and the related factors can help to predict future migration scenarios with an impact on host countries’ reception and integration conditions. In other words, for policy making’s purposes, we can be interested in understanding if people intend to return, if they actually return to the country of origin and which are the main factors that make immigrants more likely to intend to eventually return to their home country.

5.2 Main Methodological Challenges From the methodological point of view, most of the studies on immigrants’ selfreported life satisfaction focus on one national context. To the best of my knowledge, comparative studies on the self-reported life satisfaction of immigrants living in European countries are still scant. This is an important scientific lacuna, mainly due to the lack of surveys measuring immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in European countries. The available studies on this topic are mostly based on the European Social Survey (ESS) that allows for comparisons between migrants and non-migrants and across immigrant generations (Arpino & de Valk, 2018). Relying on ESS data, Safi (2010), and Kirmano˘glu and Ba¸slevent (2014) showed that immigrants living in Europe report lower levels of life satisfaction than natives, and this gap persists even when the immigrant generation and the length of stay

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85

are considered. In particular, Safi (2010) demonstrated that perceived discrimination negatively affects immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in 13 European countries. The grade of self-reported life satisfaction decreases among ethnic groups facing more discrimination in their country of residence. Kirmano˘glu and Ba¸slevent (2014) found that the negative impact of discrimination perceptions depends on the type of discrimination as well as minority membership status. They also concluded that first- and second-generation immigrants differ in their levels of self-reported life satisfaction and according to whether they consider themselves as an ethnic minority member. Beier and Kroneberg (2013), using data from the 2002–2003 wave of the ESS, found that symbolic boundaries only influence the self-reported life satisfaction of first and second-generation immigrants with limited proficiency in the majority language. By comparing immigrants and natives in 34 European countries and by taking into account also immigrants’ generation too, Arpino and de Valk (2018) found that first generation immigrants’ life satisfaction is lower compared to natives’ one, while the gap is reduced for second generation immigrants and 2.5 generation immigrants. Using data from the first five waves of the ESS, Tegegne and Glanville (2019) suggested that immigrants in 15 European countries exhibit lower levels of subjective well-being (constructed as the average of the happiness and life satisfaction variables) than their native-born counterpart because of reduced social capital, measured by several indicators of informal social connections and generalized trust. For non-Western immigrants, the gap in well-being increases. Non-Western immigrants have higher levels of social capital that come from the religious involvement, which however is not sufficient to compensate for the gap with natives. By distinguishing between national citizens, EU citizens and third country nationals (TCNs), Heizmann and Böhnke (2019) proved that in terms of life satisfaction only TCNs profit from inclusive integration policies. While political multiculturalism does not play a role, EU immigrants appear more susceptible to the negative impact of natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes. Using data from the 2010–2016 period of the ESS, Hendriks and Burger (2019) showed that the development of less positive perceptions of the host country’s economic, political, and social conditions is associated with a decrease of first-generation immigrants’ subjective well-being in 17 developed European countries, although, compared to natives, their more positive societal perceptions are associated with a subjective well-being advantage. Finally, using data collected by the ESS from 2002 to 2018, Stranges et al. (2020) measured the relationship between immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction and their absolute and relative income, the latter compared with that of natives and other immigrants with similar characteristics in the country of residence. They found that absolute income has a stronger association with immigrants’ life satisfaction than the relative income. However, life satisfaction is more strongly associated with income relative to natives that income relative to other immigrants and this association is higher for second-generation immigrants, regardless of whether the income comparison is with natives or immigrants. This is especially true for more educated immigrants who are more interested in comparisons with reference groups. However, it is important to

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note that subjective measures of the own economic condition and the national socioeconomic institutional condition moderate the relationship between relative income and subjective well-being. Besides the lack of available data, another challenge that may arise when studying immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction is in the way to address it in the questionnaires. A commonly used instrument is the single-item measure of life satisfaction. The typical question is “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”. The item is rated on an 11-point scale (0 = no satisfaction at all to 10 = completely satisfied). However, not all surveys offer comprehensive indicators that incorporate a variety of life domains, therefore providing an item that rates satisfaction with life as a whole, as the literature recommends when measuring the concept of life satisfaction (Diener, 1984). Indeed, some concern has been expressed regarding assessing life satisfaction through separate life domains (multiple-item measures of life satisfaction), instead of using single-item life satisfaction as a synthesis of various domains. The study of Jovanovi´c and Lazi´c (2020) empirically tested the greater validity of single-item life satisfaction compared to multiple-item measures of life satisfaction. In particular, the study found a strong correlation between single-item life satisfaction and the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS), which consists of 5 items: “In most ways my life is close to my ideal”; “The conditions of my life are excellent”; “I am satisfied with my life”; “So far I have gotten the important things I want in life”; “If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing”. Items are rated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) (Diener et al., 1985).

5.3 The Main Individual Factors Associated with the Self-reported Life Satisfaction of First-Generation Immigrants Residing in Seven European Countries A study that tried to cope with the problem of rating life satisfaction as a whole is the one conducted by Paparusso (2019). This study aimed at testing the most important individual factors associated with self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants living in selected European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It used the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), conducted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, from October 2011 to January 2012. 7,468 immigrants were surveyed in seven European countries, with the aim of testing to what extent integration policies matched their hopes and needs. In particular, immigrants were asked for their assessment whether policies were relevant, whether support and services offered on paper were indeed implemented and used, and whether policies had an impact on their lives. Thus, the survey allows assessing whether immigration and integration policies had intended or unintended effects on the life of immigrants.

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87

The ICS survey was aimed at individuals with the following characteristics: those not born in the country of residence (although immigrated as minors); those who are or were non-EU citizens or stateless persons (born as a citizen of a country other than EU/EEA countries or Switzerland); those who have been living in the country for more than a year; those holding or renewing legal immigrant status and being 15 years of age or older. The survey deals with the following topics: employment; languages; civic and political participation; family reunion; long-term residence and citizenship. As far as the self-reported life satisfaction, respondents were asked the following question: could you please tell me on a scale of 0–10 how satisfied you are with each of the following items, when 0 means you are very dissatisfied and 10 means you are very satisfied? The items were the following: your life these days, your present level of education, your present job, your accommodation, your family life, your health and your social life. The item your present job has been excluded from the analysis because of the large number of missing data due to the unemployed not being supposed to answer. Therefore, the final sample is equal to 7,417 individuals. A synthetic indicator of self-reported life satisfaction as a whole has been calculated through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation, as the items relating to life satisfaction can be treated as cardinal rather than ordinal variables (Matysiak et al., 2016). Each respondent is assigned a life satisfaction score, used as the dependent variable in the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression analysis. The interpretation of the life satisfaction score is as follows: the higher the score, the higher the respondents’ level of self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence. First-generation immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in the seven European countries considered is on average quite high (7) and ranges between the lowest value of 6.2 of Italy and the highest values of 7.5 of Spain and of 7.5 of Germany (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Mean values of respondents’ self-reported life satisfaction according to their country of residence, around 2011–2012, N = 7,417

Country

Mean

N

Std. deviation

Belgium

7.2

1,021

2.041

France

7.0

984

2.155

Germany

7.5

1,202

1.865

Hungary

6.8

1,180

2.354

Italy

6.2

794

2.414

Portugal

6.6

1,244

2.434

Spain

7.5

992

1.934

Total

7.0

7,417

2.218

Source Author’s elaboration on the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS)

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1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

-1.5

-2.0

Fig. 5.1 Main individual factors associated with the self-reported life satisfaction of first-generation immigrants residing in seven European countries, around 2011–2012, N = 7,417. Source Author’s elaboration on the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS)

OLS regression results are presented in Fig. 5.1 (only statistically significant factors are reported and discussed here1 ). The coefficients of the dummy variables can be interpreted as the gap in self-reported life satisfaction between the corresponding groups and the reference groups while having been adjusted for all the controlling independent variables included in the models. The main results of the OLS regression can be summarized according to different categories of explanatory individual variables: demographic (age, age squared, gender, marital status, area of origin, and former colony), human capital (current economic situation, perceived financial well-being, and educational attainment) and ‘immigration’ variables (years since migration, immigrant generation, legal status, and country of residence) (see Paparusso, 2019, for details).2 As far as the socio-demographic factors, age has a negative effect on firstgeneration immigrants’ life satisfaction: the older immigrants are, the lower their 1

A stepwise ordinary least squared (OLS) regression was carried out to ascertain the contributions of the demographic, human capital and so-called ‘immigration’ variables, where demographic variables were introduced into the model first (Model 1), followed by the human capital variables (Model 2) and finally the ‘immigration’ variables (Model 3). Only the full model (Model 3) is presented here. It is important to highlight that the variable former colony, indicating whether the respondent’s country of origin is a former colony of his/her new country of residence (for instance, the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal) or not was not statistically significant in Model 3, while it was in the Model 1 and Model 2. 2 The adjusted R2 —understood as the portion of variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by the predictors of the model, adjusted for the number of predictors (independent variables)—is 0.22.

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level of satisfaction with life. However, additional analysis suggests that this effect is not linear, as age squared is positive. Thus, the negative effect of age is reduced as immigrants get older. Evidence for this result can be found in the literature, according to which younger and older immigrants report higher levels of self-reported life satisfaction (e.g., Bartram, 2013; D’Isanto et al., 2016). Regarding marital status, the results show that immigrants who are single, legally separated, divorced or with a dissolved civil union and widowed are less satisfied with life than those who are married or in a civil union. Marriage is positively related to life satisfaction. Indeed, marriage provides emotional, psychological, material and physical support, especially during the elderly stages of life (Chipperfield & Havens, 2001). Being married can be a predictor of more social capital (i.e., family networks), especially among immigrants. It can also point to long-term residence abroad and, therefore, a successful integration process within the country of residence (e.g., Piracha et al., 2013). Concerning the area of origin, immigrants coming from Latin American and Eastern European countries appear to be the most satisfied with life, while immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan African countries are the least satisfied. This result proves that socio-economic conditions at origin are an important predictor of subjective well-being and integration in the country of destination (Barbiano di Belgiojoso & Terzera, 2018; Cesareo & Blangiardo, 2009). As far as the human capital variables, immigrants who are retired, sick, disabled and unemployed are less satisfied with life than those who are employed (Kassenboehmer & Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Kim & Moen, 2002; Luhmann et al., 2014). Moreover, a worse financial situation decreases the immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. Perceived financial well-being, which can be interpreted as a proxy of income, is a subjective indicator of integration (OECD, 2015). This association is quite complex and not unidirectional, because of the psychological and relative factors that should be considered—“individuals enjoy being richer and being richer than others” (D’Ambrosio et al., 2020: 48). Nevertheless, by strengthening individuals’ economic capabilities, security and independence, income (especially if equally distributed) increases self-reported life satisfaction (Ng & Diener, 2019) and, therefore, improves immigrants’ socio-economic integration within the country of residence (Stranges et al., 2020; Tibesigwa et al., 2016). Education also has a positive impact on immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction: immigrants who are more educated show higher levels of life satisfaction compared to less educated immigrants. The interrelated role played by educational attainment, access to the labour market and economic well-being in the integration process is well acknowledged (e.g., Di Bartolomeo et al., 2015; Ewers et al., 2020). In this regard, it is interesting to highlight that in a recent study (Möwisch et al., 2021), the positive association between education and subjective well-being has been further disentangled. Using data from a nationally representative sample of the German Socioeconomic Panel Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS), it has been found that education was not related to positive affect (happiness, enthusiasm and satisfaction), but was positively associated with negative affect (anger, frustration, stress, worries, loneliness, etc.). In other words, higher educated people reported fewer negative emotions in everyday life

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than their lower educated counterparts, but not more positive emotions. Contrarily and unexpectedly, Granderath et al. (2021) recently discovered that beyond formal education, the continuing adult learning and education has no direct effect on life satisfaction of immigrants and natives in Germany, thus weaking the role of adult education among the measures considered important for immigrant integration, at least if a subjective perspective is adopted. Concerning the ‘immigration’ variables, the number of years since migration has a positive effect on the immigrants’ life satisfaction: the more years spent living in the residence country, the higher the level of satisfaction with life. Although the relationship between the immigrants’ length of stay in the host society and subjective well-being is not straightforward, with some studies reporting a positive relationship and others presenting opposite results (see Li & Yang, 2020, for an overview), the number of years since migration is a pivotal factor in the integration process. Integration is considered a long-term process and a higher number of years since migration indicates the maturity of this process in the country of residence (Piché, 2004). Since in this study self-reported life satisfaction is used as a measure of subjective integration, the direction of the relationship between years since migration and integration in the country of residence is confirmed to be positive. Moreover, the variable years since migration can reveal a process of selectivity that excludes temporary immigrants who only planned to spend a short period abroad, as well as unsatisfied immigrants who decided to return home (Cassarino, 2004). Immigrant generation positively affects life satisfaction, thus revealing that 1.5 generation immigrants are more satisfied with life than first generation immigrants. This result is consistent with the literature on integration studies, arguing that immigrants who arrived at younger ages are more integrated into the country of residence than immigrants who arrived at older ages (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993). In particular, as recently stressed by Lueck (2018), younger first-generation immigrants have a higher probability of socio-economic success, compared to older first-generation immigrants, given their higher possibilities to improve their language, occupational and income levels during their migration experience (e.g., Borjas, 1994; Chiswick & Miller, 2007). Regarding legal status, immigrants holding the citizenship of their country of residence appear to be the most satisfied with life. Citizenship is a legal status, which, by providing the same status and rights of native-born residents, contributes to establishing parity with natives, strengthening foreign-born citizens’ sense of identity and, therefore, fostering integration (Joppke, 2010). Furthermore, the citizenship status is linked with immigrants’ circular mobility, and therefore with the possibility of travelling to the origin country more easily without any fear of losing residency status or moving to other European countries to find better living conditions and economic opportunities (e.g., Massey et al., 2015). In addition, those who do not have access to formal citizenship, but enjoy stable and long-term residency conditions and rights, such as family and permanent immigrants, have a higher level of life satisfaction, compared to immigrants with work or study status. This recalls the ‘denizenship’ or ‘semi-citizenship’ status (Hammar, 1990), an intermediate status

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91

between citizen and long-term immigrant, which is associated with satisfying levels of integration in the country of residence. Conversely, humanitarian immigrants show the lowest level of life satisfaction: their stay in the country of residence is more precarious and uncomfortable compared to other categories of immigrants (Connor, 2010). Because of their weak migration networks and poor human capital, humanitarian immigrants generally face many difficulties in the integration process. Although they are not excluded from access to regular employment, they generally experience high levels of unemployment or over-qualification, as could be expected, mainly because of poor education, language and working skills, insecure living conditions, fragile social networks and other objective and perceived conditions of vulnerability in the country of residence (Busetta et al., 2019). Moreover, some pre-migration conditions characterized by war, violence or extreme poverty in the country of origin may a have a long-term impact on their subjective well-being in the country of residence (Bogic et al., 2015). Finally, because European societies often perceive them as a threat to national security, labour market, welfare participation and social cohesion, they often experience discrimination, racism and xenophobia (Cowling et al., 2019; Landmann et al., 2019; Steele & Abdelaaty, 2019). Finally, when the country of residence is considered, results show that immigrants residing in Portugal appear to be the most satisfied with life. The overall Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston et al., 2015) score can help to explain this result. Portugal has the highest score among the seven countries considered in the present study. Portugal’s MIPEX overall score, which was equal to 79/100 in 2011, suggests that immigrants living in countries that are considered more inclusive show a higher level of satisfaction with life, compared to those living in countries considered less inclusive. As anticipated in Chap. 3, the overall MIPEX score takes different integration areas into account, ranging from education to labour market participation to access to the nationality of the country of residence. Therefore, it can be concluded that an immigrant’s level of self-reported life satisfaction in relation to a country that has a high level of MIPEX can, to a substantial degree, mean the achievement of a complete and multifaceted level of integration in the country of residence. Moreover, the empirical analysis (multiple linear regression models have been run separately at country level, see Paparusso, 2019, for details) shows that while there are similarities among countries in terms of effects of age, marital status and perceived financial well-being on immigrants’ life satisfaction, other factors differ, thus highlighting the importance of country characteristics (e.g., different socio-economic and institutional contests) in shaping immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. For example, in Germany, immigrants in education are more satisfied compared to immigrants in paid work. Conversely, in other countries, the opposite is true, or the variable is not statistically significant. In Italy and Portugal, humanitarian immigrants are strongly less satisfied compared to work or study immigrants, while in Spain they are more satisfied. In Germany, humanitarian immigrants are slightly less satisfied compared to work or study immigrants, while other legal statuses are not statistically significant. Finally, in most countries, immigrants having children outside the country of residence are less satisfied, compared to immigrants who have not children outside

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the country of residence. This result shows that family unity is an important predictor of immigrants’ life satisfaction in the country of residence. In other words, the lack of family unity or the absence of family members in the new country of residence, and especially of children, negatively affect immigrants’ subjective integration (Gambaro et al., 2018). This can often lead them, for instance, to plan to re-emigrate or to return to the country of origin to re-join them (Barbiano di Belgiojoso & Terzera, 2018; Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019).

5.4 The Destination Moves the Needle: The Role of Country-Level Factors The results of the variable country of residence and those of the multiple linear regressions run separately at country level suggest that further analysis is needed to better explain country differences. For that purpose, I included in the empirical analysis some country-level factors and performed a cluster-robust analysis and in particular a multiple linear regression with cluster-robust standard errors. A cluster-robust analysis is used when data are grouped into clusters, with model errors uncorrelated across clusters but correlated within-cluster (Cameron & Miller, 2015). When individual-level cross-sectional data are clustered into geographical areas, such as country, to control for within-cluster error correlation is important to obtain accurate standard errors and, thus, precise estimates. I identified five country-level variables consistent with the macro-level factors associated with immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction that have been discussed above (Sect. 5.1). First, the proportion of foreign citizens, a continuous variable measuring the number of non-EU foreign citizens as a percentage of the total resident population (Eurostat online database). Second, the naturalisation rate, the ratio between the yearly number of naturalisations of non-EU foreign citizens and the number of nonEU foreign citizens in a country (Eurostat online database). Third, the unemployment rate, a continuous variable measuring the number of non-EU unemployed foreign citizens (aged 20–64), as a percentage of the total foreign labour force (Eurostat online database). Fourth, the MIPEX overall score.3 Finally, the Human Development Index (HDI).4 The natural log of GDP per capita (Eurostat online database) and the Happiness score5 were also initially considered, but successively they were dropped out of 3

I draw on the longitudinal MIPEX dataset, which was released in 2015 and which captures integration policies for each year from 2007 to 2014, by selecting only 2011, https://www.mipex.eu/ download-pdf. 4 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data. 5 The Happiness Score is taken by the World Happiness Report. The underlying source is the Gallup World Poll, a set of nationally representative surveys undertaken in more than 160 countries in over

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93

Table 5.3 Selected country-level variables associated with self-reported life satisfaction, 2011 Country

Proportion (%) Naturalisation of non-EU rate (%) of foreign citizens non-EU foreign citizens

Unemployment MIPEX overall Human rate, 20–64, of score development non-EU foreign index (HDI) citizens

Belgium

3.7

5.5

27.8

67

France

3.8

4.1

23.9

53

0.876

Germany 4.8

2.4

14.1

60

0.925

Hungary

1.4

5.3

11.0

45

0.823

Italy

4.9

1.8

11.7

57

0.875

Portugal

2.8

6.6

23.7

79

0.827

Spain

7.0

3.5

33.4

62

0.870

0.904

Source Author’s elaboration on various sources of data

the analysis. There was, indeed, a high degree of multicollinearity between GDP per capita, HDI and Happiness score. This is not surprising given that high income provides the means for longer life expectancy, education, and purchasing power, which are the primary components of the HDI and that living in a country with higher HDI may impact happiness (Bonini, 2008). Table 5.3 shows detailed values for the selected variables. The considered country-level measures reflect the individual-level data and, therefore, refer to people not born in the country of residence, who are or were non-EU citizens and who are holding or renewing a legal immigrant status in the new country of residence. Moreover, all country-level variables refer to the year in which the ICS survey has been carried out and therefore to 2011. Of the countries represented here, Spain and Portugal have the highest proportion of non-EU foreign citizens (7%) and naturalisation rate (6.6%), respectively. This is because of Portuguese and Spanish legislations allowing some nationalities coming from former colonies to easily acquire citizenship without losing citizenship of their country of birth. Moreover, the use of the same language and the sharing of common history and traditions, due to past colonial ties, may have an influence on these indicators. On the contrary, as a result of their stricter citizenship rules, Italy and Germany have the lowest naturalization rates of non-EU foreign citizens (1.8% and 2.4%, respectively), while Hungary has the lowest share of non-EU foreign citizens residing in the country. Spain has the highest unemployment rate (33.4%), while Italy, together with Hungary, has the lowest rates of unemployment of nonEU foreign citizens aged 20–64 years (11.7% and 11%, respectively). These results can be explained with the effects of the 2008 economic crisis. Southern European 140 languages. The main life evaluation question asked in the poll is: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” (so-called “Cantril Ladder”), https://ourworldindata.org/happiness-and-life-satisfaction.

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5 Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Europe

3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0

Fig. 5.2 Main individual and country-level factors associated with the self-reported life satisfaction of first-generation immigrants residing in seven European countries, around 2011–2012, N = 7,417. Source Author’s elaboration on the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS)

countries are generally characterized by the combination of a relatively low unemployment risk with extremely limited chances of accessing highly skilled jobs (Fullin & Reyneri, 2010). However, during the economic recession, the labour-market participation of both natives and immigrants have worsened, with immigrants hit harder than natives by the crisis (Sacchetto & Vianello, 2016). Nevertheless, in Italy, unemployment was not as dramatic as in Spain. Skilled jobs were significantly affected by unemployment, while the demand for unskilled labour continued to grow even during the crisis, due to households’ domestic and care needs mainly satisfied by immigrants (Fellini, 2018). As far as MIPEX, as already noted, Portugal has the highest overall score (79), while Hungary and France have the lowest scores (45 and 53, respectively). When the HDI is considered, the primacy belongs to Germany (0.925), followed by Belgium (0.904). On the contrary, Hungary has the lowest score for both MIPEX and HDI (0.823), thus revealing lower levels of immigrant integration and socio-economic development. While the effect of the individual-level variables remains unchanged compared to the previous analysis (except for Sub-Saharan Africa that becomes significant and negative), the country-level variables show interesting results, adding relevant contribution to the role played by macro factors in explaining immigrants’ selfreported life satisfaction in Europe (see Fig. 5.2).6

6

The adjusted R2 of the model is 0.22.

5.4 The Destination Moves the Needle: The Role

95

The proportion of non-EU foreign citizens is positively associated with selfreported life satisfaction. The proportion of non-EU foreign citizens reflects the general context, including the level of ethnic diversity of a country (Li et al., 2021), and tell us something about the immigration and integration policies of a country (Bauböck & Helbling, 2011). The naturalisation rate, which can depend on both the naturalisation policy of a country and on foreign citizen demand (Howard, 2009), has also a positive effect on first-generation immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. In particular, the higher the naturalisation rate, the higher their likelihood of having citizenship status in the new country of residence. Having the citizenship of the country of residence generally positively influences immigrants’ employment and occupational status, political integration, sense of belonging to the country of residence and therefore immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction (Huddleston & Vink, 2015; Peters et al., 2015). In other words, the ‘citizen premium’, which depends also on the citizenship policy of a country (Vink et al., 2013; Hoxhaj et al., 2019), has multifaceted effects on immigrants’ lives in the country of residence. Both the proportion of non-EU foreign citizens and the naturalization rate reflect the openness and the inclination of the host society to welcome newcomers and potential new citizens (Bauböck & Helbling, 2011; Dronkers & Vink, 2012; Huddleston, 2020). The unemployment rate, which reveals the availability of jobs on the labour market, is negatively associated with immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. Indeed, unemployment deters immigrants’ economic integration in the country of residence and, therefore, their subjective well-being (Clark, 2003; Clark et al., 2010; Ewers et al., 2020). As already acknowledged, the MIPEX overall score constitutes the most comprehensive cross-national indicator to measure integration policies. The MIPEX overall score captures the political, social and cultural rights of immigrants, which have been shown to affect their integration outcomes. The latest MIPEX analyses found a strong positive correlation between the national approach to integration, as measured by the MIPEX overall score, and the immigrants’ levels of happiness, measured by the World Happiness Report 2018 (Solano & Huddleston, 2020). Nevertheless, given the already mentioned conceptual and operational differences between happiness and self-reported life satisfaction, however, when testing the relationship between the latter and the MIPEX overall score, it is found to be positive, but not statistically significant. Finally, the Human Development Index is positively associated with immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction: first-generation immigrants who live in higher developed countries experiment higher self-reported life satisfaction, thus demonstrating that immigrants generally gain in happiness by migrating to a more developed country (Helliwell et al., 2018). These results reinforce the importance not only of considering the concurrent role played by country-level factors in shaping immigrants’ subjective well-being in the country of destination, but also of overcoming the dominant approach exclusively based on macro-economic indicators in understanding the individuals’ well-being in contemporary European societies. The latter coincides with the scope of this

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Book: studying immigrant integration from a subjective perspective, with the aim of integrating existing scientific knowledge resulting from objective research analyses.

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Chapter 6

Immigrants’ Subjective Well-Being in Italy

Abstract The topic of immigrants’ subjective well-being is particularly understudied in Italy, an important country of immigration in the European context and the Mediterranean region. This Chapter is aimed at measuring the main individual factors associated with self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants regularly residing in Italy, using data from the survey on “Social Condition and Integration of Foreign Citizens” collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2011–2012. Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, I provide a brief historical excursus of the evolution of immigration in Italy and, in the next paragraph, I present some key findings on the subjective well-being of immigrants in the country. The multivariate analysis is based on ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and includes various kinds of individual factors: demographic, human capital, immigration, transnationalism and sense of belonging variables. The analysis concludes that demographic and human capital variables have a strong positive impact on selfreported life satisfaction. Country of origin, immigration variables, transnationalism, and gender attitudes also have an impact on life satisfaction. Finally, this Chapter discusses the challenging issue of comparing the self-reported life satisfaction of immigrants with that of natives in Italy. Keywords Self-reported life satisfaction · Immigration · Italy · Survey · ISTAT

6.1 Immigration in Italy Italy is an important country of immigration belonging to the ‘Southern European model of immigration’, having rapidly transformed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration over the last five decades (Bonifazi, 2007, 2013). Indeed, the foreign resident population in Italy had risen from 1,116,394 in 1999 to 2,419,483 individuals by 2006 and to 5,306,548 people by 2020 (ISTAT, 2020) (see Fig. 6.1), currently representing about 8.8 per cent of the total population. This figure rises to around 6 million (nearly 10 per cent of the total population) on taking into consideration regular and irregular foreign population (ISMU, 2020) (see Fig. 6.2). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Paparusso, Immigrant Integration in Europe, Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5_6

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5,500,000 5,000,000 4,500,000 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0

Fig. 6.1 Foreign resident population in Italy, 1999–2020. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data 6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

0

Regular foreign populaon

Irregular foreign populaon

Fig. 6.2 Regular and irregular foreign population in Italy, 1999–2020. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT and ISMU data

In the Seventies and in the Eighties, migrants mainly came from North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt), the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Philippines, China and Sri Lanka). Since the Nineties, because of the fall of the Berlin wall and

6.1 Immigration in Italy 25.0

103

23.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

8.4

8.0 5.7

5.0

4.6

3.2

3.0

2.7

2.5

2.4

2.3

2.2

2.1

2.1

1.8

0.0

Fig. 6.3 Foreign resident population in Italy, by citizenship of origin, 2019. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data

the collapse of the Soviet Union and, afterwards, of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement, Italy receives a strong inflow of migrants from Eastern European countries (Albania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine) and to a lesser extent, from East Asian countries (China and the Philippines). At the same time, North Africa (Morocco) is still an important area of origin for immigrants living in Italy. Today, the most part of immigrants come from Romania, Albania, Morocco, China and Ukraine; together they form 49.7% of the total immigrant population (see Fig. 6.3). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the main factors attracting international migrants were the Italian economic growth and, therefore, a demand for labour in family-care services, in the northern-central factories, and in the southern agriculture sector (Impicciatore et al., 2020), thus representing a structural element of the productive (businesses) and social (households) systems in Italy (Impicciatore & Panichella, 2019). In recent years, the increase in foreign presence has been linked to family reunification and asylum, also because of the 2008 economic crisis that has gradually contributed to a reduction of labour migration (Bonifazi & Strozza, 2019). Different geographical origins, migration histories, and integration patterns, therefore, coexist in the immigrant population residing in Italy today (Bonifazi, 2017). The increase and the changed characteristics of the foreign presence residing in Italy have led to a growing number of studies on such a population. Researchers have focused their attention on several issues, such as immigrants’ settling, immigrants’ integration and the rise of the second generation, the demographic and economic behaviour of immigrants, immigration and integration policies, the recent surge of

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refugees and undocumented immigrants, attitudes towards immigrants, etc. (e.g., Ambrosetti & Paparusso, 2018; Ambrosini, 2018; Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019a; Busetta et al., 2019; Mussino & Strozza, 2012; Ortensi, 2015; Paparusso et al., 2017). Box 6.1 Immigration in Italy in the Aftermath of the 2008 Economic Crisis The economic crisis of 2008 represented for Italy the conclusion of a period of extraordinary growth of immigration, which began in the early Nineties with the fall of the Berlin Wall (Bonifazi, 2017). However, although at a much lower rate than in previous years, the foreign population regularly residing in Italy continued to grow even in the period of the economic crisis. A dynamic that demonstrates how much immigration has now entered the constitutive processes of Italian society. An important aspect to highlight is the new entries from non-EU countries: in 2019 they were 177 thousand, a reduction compared to previous years, especially those before the 2012 crisis. Of these entries in 2019, 56.9% concerned family reunification, 15.6% were for asylum and humanitarian reasons, 11.5% for study, 9.6% for elective residence, religion, and health, and just 6.4% for work. Considering the period 2006–2019, the activity rates of the foreign population are higher than those of the Italian population, for both males and females. However, there was a reduction in the activity rates of foreign males because of the crisis, with an improvement in recent years which, however, did not make it possible to recover all the loss: in fact, the values went from 94.4% in 2006 to 86.4% in 2014 and 89.3% in 2019. For Italian males, on the other hand, the crisis led to a much more contained decline in activity rates and a recovery that led them to higher values than in 2006. Female activity rates record a convergence between Italian women (60.3% in 2019) and foreign women (61.9%), which, however, is weighed down by the growth in family reunification which also affects communities with more traditional gender roles. Employment rates are also substantially similar, although the years following the 2008 economic crisis saw a much more marked deterioration in the situation of foreigners. This trend is more evident for males, whose employment rates continue to exceed those of Italians. For example, the employment rate of foreign males goes from 90% in 2006 to 72.9% in 2014 and to 79.2% in 2019, while that of Italians goes from 74.7% in 2006 to 69.3% in 2014 and 72.6% in 2019. Therefore, during the economic crisis, the Italian labour market, whose secondary segment is characterized by poor qualification, low remuneration and more precarious conditions, saw a loss of foreign work which, at least in part, was recovered in the following years (Fellini, 2018; Venturini & Villosio, 2018). Generally, foreigners are characterized by greater work flexibility, including over-qualification, which in times of economic recession can help

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reduce the risk of unemployment, although this affects their labour mobility and socio-economic integration (Avola & Piccitto, 2020). The employment rate of foreign women has remained fairly stable over time and until 2017 is higher than the employment rate of Italian women; in recent years, in fact, their employment has deteriorated, going from 52.6% in 2017 to 51.4% in 2019, compared to that of Italian women, who instead went from 52.5 to 54.1%. Foreign women have suffered less from the economic crisis than foreign men, because they work in different sectors: mainly in social and domestic services, the former, in construction and manufacturing, the latter, as we will see better later. Demographic aging and greater female participation in the labour market, often difficult to reconcile with domestic work, make the work of foreign women necessary and, in some ways, impervious to the economic crisis (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019b). On the contrary, the construction and manufacturing sectors have been strongly affected by the economic recession, leading to a more marked decline in male employment among foreign citizens (Poggiaro, 2013). Finally, as regards unemployment, foreigners have much higher values than Italians, confirming that the foreign workforce has been hit more significantly by the economic crisis than the national workforce. In 2019, the unemployment rate of foreign males was 11.3%, against 8.7% of Italian males, while that of foreign women was 16.9%, compared to 10.2% of Italian women (see Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2021, for further details).

6.2 The Subjective Well-Being of First-Generation Immigrants in Italy Only a few studies have addressed the topic of subjective well-being among immigrants living in Italy (Barbiano di Belgiojoso & Ortensi, 2019; Barbiano di Belgiojoso et al., 2020; Boccagni, 2016; Carella et al., 2020; Cela & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2019; D’Isanto et al., 2016; Loi & Hale, 2019). As already stressed, understanding the factors associated with immigrants’ subjective well-being in the country of destination appears particularly useful for societies interested in achieving full integration of immigrants (Bimonte et al., 2020; Herrero et al., 2011). It has many implications for the immigrants’ long-term commitment to life in the host country and contributes to preventing social conflicts in the immigrants’ host countries. Especially in Italy—a key country in the field of immigration policy in Europe today—immigration represents a stable component of society. Knowledge of the factors associated with immigrants’ subjective well-being is particularly relevant to implement more effective long-term immigration and integration policies. By helping immigrants to realize their search for better life opportunities in the new country of residence, policies may help to favour their condition of parity with natives, one of the main aims of the

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integration process (Joppke, 2010; Vink, 2013). In other words, improving immigrants’ subjective well-being may help immigrants to feel that they have equality with the rest of the population in the host society. Similarly, policies improving access to education, participation in the labour market and granting of social welfare and political rights may facilitate the integration process and increase the sense of belonging to the country of destination and, therefore, make immigrants and their families more satisfied with their life. The specificities of the ‘Southern European model of immigration’ have been largely described in Chap. 2. They can be summarised as a lack of selective immigration policies, a large underground economy attracting undocumented immigrants, a social welfare typically focused on families and a strong segmentation of the labour market, which both attract low-skilled and low-paid foreign labour supply, and, finally, the use of ex-post instruments of regularization, such as amnesties (the most recent one, addressed to agricultural, care and domestic workers, has been issued during the sanitary emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. More than 200,000 requests of regularization have been presented by non-EU immigrant workers), and flow decrees for the entry of newcomers. These characteristics could be found to be significant for immigrants’ subjective well-being in Italy and may help explain the results of the empirical analysis shown in the next paragraph. Boccagni (2016) studied how the subjective well-being of thirty middle-aged immigrant women from Eastern Europe employed as care workers in Northern Italy is perceived, conceptualized, and experienced. His qualitative analysis shows that immigrant women working in the care sector in Italy have conflicting subjective well-being: their search for better life opportunities is often sacrificed to foster the well-being of others: the families where they work, and the families left behind in the country of origin. However, this ambivalence about their subjective well-being is sometimes a source of personal motivation, self-assertion, better future life, and working aspirations. D’Isanto et al. (2016) explored the main factors associated with the subjective well-being of legal and illegal immigrants living in South of Italy (Naples) and found that (1) migration is more beneficial in terms of subjective well-being for illegal immigrants than for legal ones; (2) income is positively associated with the subjective well-being of illegal immigrants; (3) poor health is negatively associated with the well-being of illegal immigrants; (4) family size is positively associated with the subjective well-being of legal immigrants; finally, (5) while Europeans and Asians report the highest levels of subjective well-being, compared to Americans and Africans, Europeans are happier amongst illegal immigrants and Asians are happier amongst legal immigrants. In a recent study on job satisfaction of immigrants’ women in Italy working in the domestic and care sector, Barbiano di Belgiojoso and Ortensi (2019) found that although the segmentation of the Italian labour market strongly limits mobility, those women can be satisfied with their job as long as they have guaranteed basic decent working conditions. Other factors affecting their job satisfaction are economic drivers (in particular, income to maintain the family left behind in the country of origin), the agency of domestic workers (the awareness of being useful to families and of

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107

having acquired specific skills and experiences in the domestic and care sector), and the emotive dimension of domestic and care work (both face-to-face relationships with the care recipients and sense of rewarding help to relieve the sense of isolation and segregation caused by this type of work). In another recent study on immigrants’ subjective well-being in Italy, Loi and Hale (2019), focussing on immigrants’ self-rated health compared to natives, found that immigrants report better health than natives particularly at the beginning of their stay in Italy. When the length of stay in Italy increases, they found support for a convergence on the self-reported health of immigrants and natives, and finally, they found that immigrants with the worst economic conditions (material deprivation) report worst health compared to those immigrants who are better off. Another study that is worth mentioning is the one of Cela and Barbiano di Belgiojoso (2019): they also studied self-rated health; however, their study concerns older immigrants aged 50 and over. The findings of this study show that self-rated health is related to multiple factors. First, both the journey to Italy and the permanence in Italy are fundamental for self-rated health of older immigrants. Second, economic conditions and labour market outcomes are also quite important for self-rated health. Third, transnational social ties are important, and they have a positive association with self-rated health. Fourth, life satisfaction has a positive impact on self-rated health while loneliness has a negative impact. Finally, the country of origin matters too: immigrants from Western countries report better health, compared to immigrants coming from ‘high migration pressure countries’. A more recent study is the one of Carella et al. (2020). The study analysed the relationship between living in transnational families and (1) self-reported life satisfaction, (2) feelings of loneliness and (3) sense of belonging among married immigrants residing in Italy. In particular, married immigrants with a partner living abroad are more likely to show lower levels of life satisfaction than those involved in couples where both are living together in Italy. Second, immigrants experiencing transnational families (both partnership and parenthood) are more likely to report higher levels of loneliness than those living with their families in the host country. Third, the transnational character of families does not seem to have any influence on the sense of belonging of married immigrants. Finally, Barbiano di Belgiojoso et al. (2020) studied subjective well-being among ageing immigrants in Italy, focussing on the effects of the migration experience on self-reported life satisfaction. They found that life satisfaction is associated with many personal, material, and social factors in the country of residence (among them, health conditions, living environment, citizenship status and religiosity), thus confirming the multidimensional character of life satisfaction.

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6.3 The Main Individual Factors Associated with First-Generation Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction in Italy One of the first studies that evaluates the main individual factors associated with self-reported life-satisfaction among first-generation immigrants regularly residing in Italy is the one of Ambrosetti and Paparusso (2020). In particular, the study explores the relationship between life satisfaction and immigrants’ socio-demographic, human capital, immigration, transnationalism and sense of belonging variables. The study is based on the national survey on the “Social Condition and Integration of Foreign Citizens in Italy” (SCIF), carried out by ISTAT in 2011–2012. The survey collected information on a total sample of 25,326 individuals, including first- and secondgeneration immigrants with regular legal status in Italy. However, the study limited the analysis to foreign-born individuals with citizenship of a foreign country aged 18 years and over. In other words, the study considered as immigrants those who are foreign from the point of view of both country of birth and citizenship. Many of the questions contemplated in the analysis were not appropriate for foreigners born in Italy; moreover, foreigners who naturalized were very few and would have made any kind of inclusion in the empirical analysis inconsistent. The final sub-sample consists of 15,242 individuals. The survey deals with the following topics: employment; languages; civic and political participation; family reunion; long-term residence and citizenship; health; education, discrimination; social networks; and ties with the country of origin. Self-reported life satisfaction is measured with an 11-point Likert scale from 0 to 10. The question was: “Could you please tell me how much you are satisfied with your life on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates not satisfied at all and 10 completely satisfied?”. Self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants aged 18 and over is quite high: the 6.1% of them have a life satisfaction equal to 5, and the 10.8% declare a life satisfaction of 6; the 23.4% feel to be satisfied with their life for a score of 7, the 32.4% have a life satisfaction equal to 8, the 11.5% report a 9-level perceived satisfaction and the 13.3% have a self-reported life satisfaction of 10. The remaining 2.7% of immigrants have a life satisfaction lower than 5 (Fig. 6.4). Figure 6.5 shows how life satisfaction changes according to respondents’ country of origin. The authors of the study selected the 10 main countries of origin represented in the sample on the basis of their numerosity, the remaining countries being identified as “other”. Immigrants from the Philippines (8.0), India and Moldova (7.8) show the highest mean values of life satisfaction (the mean total value is 7.6). Such results may be explained by the differences in cultural factors (like language and level of development) that characterize the country of origin and the host country. Immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction could also be related to migration projects and models, which are different according to the immigrants’ country of origin. To evaluate the main individual factors associated with self-reported life satisfaction (our dependent variable), an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression has been run. When the response variable has ordered categorical values, an ordered logistic

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109

35.0

32.4

30.0 23.4

25.0 20.0 15.0

13.3 11.5

10.8 10.0 6.1 5.0 .5

.1

.4

.6

1.1

0

1

2

3

4

0.0 5

6

7

8

9

10

Fig. 6.4 Percentage distribution of respondents according to their self-reported life satisfaction, Italy, around 2011–2012, N = 15,242. Source Ambrosetti and Paparusso (2020) 10.0 9.5 9.0 8.5 8.0 7.5

8.0 7.6

7.6

7.4

7.3

7.8

7.8 7.6

7.6

7.7

7.2

7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0

Fig. 6.5 Respondents’ mean values of self-reported life satisfaction according to their country of origin, Italy, around 2011–2012, N = 15,242. Source Ambrosetti and Paparusso (2020)

regression is generally recommended (Brant, 1990). The proportional odds assumption is one of the main assumptions underlying the ordered logistic regression. This means that the relationship between each couple of outcome categories should be the same. However, the data did not confirm the assumption of proportional odds;

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0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.20 -0.30 -0.40 -0.50 -0.60 -0.70 -0.80

Fig. 6.6 Main individual factors associated with self-reported life satisfaction among firstgeneration immigrants regularly residing in Italy, around 2011–2012, N = 15,242. Source Author’s elaboration on results presented in Ambrosetti and Paparusso (2020)

therefore, the authors opted to use the OLS regression model since it has been demonstrated that “assuming cardinality or ordinality of the answers to general satisfaction questions is relatively unimportant to results” (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004: 655). The main results of the OLS regression can be summarized according to different categories of explanatory individual variables: socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, age squared, marital status, country of origin, geographical area of residence (NUTS1) and having children), human capital factors (educational attainment and occupational condition), immigration (period of arrival in Italy, legal status and having been regularized through an amnesty), transnationalism and sense of belonging variables (frequency of return visits, loneliness, presence of close friends in Italy, discrimination, future migration intentions, feeling proud of being a foreigner and gender attitudes). Results are presented in Fig. 6.6 (only statistically significant factors are reported here; see Ambrosetti & Paparusso, 2020, for details).1 As far as the demographic variables, age has a negative effect on the immigrants’ life satisfaction: the higher the age, the lower the level of satisfaction with life. However, additional analysis suggests that this effect is not linear, as age squared is positive but tiny (it has been dropped out from the graph because it was not 1

The adjusted R2, which is the portion of the variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by the predictors of the model, adjusted for the number of predictors (independent variables), is 0.13.

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111

visible). As already found (see Chap. 5), the effect of age on life satisfaction can be approximated by a U-shaped curve: the elderly generally reports higher selfreported life satisfaction than adults. In particular, life satisfaction typically declines around middle age, reaching its minimum value, and then increases again in older age (Baumann et al., 2020). However, it is important to underlie that Bartram (2020), using data taken from Waves 1 through 6 of the World Values Survey, has recently found that if we run separate models for older and younger individuals, post middle age increase in life satisfaction becomes negligible. Analyses by country reinforces this result: some countries show a decrease in self-reported life satisfaction of people aged 45 years and over, while other countries show a slightly bigger increase in life satisfaction compared to people under 45. This result reduces the centrality attributed to the existence of a significant increase in life satisfaction after middle age, therefore that supports the conclusion of a distinct U-shaped pattern, and requires future research at least as far as populations with immigrant background. Males are less satisfied with life than females. For men, migration may be associated with a loss of status and public recognition, which can only be regained by returning to their home country, with a consequent decline in their perceived subjective well-being abroad. By contrast, for women migration can mean gaining independence from their country of origin and cultural norms, i.e., acquiring more freedom and autonomy, factors that increase the satisfaction with life in the new country of residence (e.g., Samari, 2021; Strockmeijer et al., 2019). As for the country of origin, all other things being equal, none of the immigrants is as satisfied as the reference group from Romania, except for the immigrants from the Philippines. This result can be explained by the distinctive cultural factors characterizing these countries. The immigrants’ life satisfaction could also be related to migration projects, models, and trajectories, which differ according to the immigrants’ country of origin (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019a). The immigrants residing in the Northern regions of Italy show higher levels of satisfaction with life than the others, because of the strong socio-economic gap between the northern and southern regions of Italy. Development discrepancies and inequalities may be reflected in the provision of different social services and economic opportunities, and different attitudes towards immigrants, the latter often being seen as competitors in the labour market by the natives (Panichella & Ambrosini, 2018). This directly affects immigrants’ self-reported satisfaction with life. With regard to the human capital variables, as expected immigrants with primary or lower educational attainment exhibit lower levels of life satisfaction than those with higher levels of education. Moreover, the immigrants who are dependent workers show higher levels of satisfaction than the others, while those who are unemployed or inactive experience lower satisfaction with life. The higher life satisfaction of immigrants who are more educated and dependent workers finds support in the already stressed interrelated role played by education and occupational condition in shaping self-reported life satisfaction (see Chap. 5). As for the immigration variables and, in particular, the period of arrival in Italy, the immigrants who arrived between 2006 and 2008 show lower levels of satisfaction

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with life than those who entered Italy before 2003. The restrictiveness of immigration policies adopted after 2002, when the Bossi-Fini Law (Law n. 198/2002) was enacted, had an impact on immigrants’ subjective well-being: earlier on, immigrants enjoyed more open-armed immigration and integration laws and more rights than subsequently (Paparusso et al., 2017). In addition, the economic instability experienced in Italy as of 2008 has proved detrimental for the immigrants who arrived thereafter (Bonifazi & Marini, 2014). The legal status also matters for self-reported life satisfaction. It is a key result if we consider the multifaceted implications that legal status has for immigrants’ integration trajectories and outcomes in European countries (Agadjanian et al., 2021). Indeed, data analysis shows that, compared to EU citizens who have immigrated to Italy, non-EU immigrants who hold a residence permit are more satisfied with life. This result is apparently counterintuitive since one would expect EU legal status—which ensures important mobility and social rights in Europe for immigrants (Juverdeanu, 2019)—to improve subjective well-being. However, some studies have highlighted that EU citizen status does not necessarily imply an improvement in the immigrants’ life satisfaction: for instance, immigrants from EU countries may experience negative attitudes on the part of the majority population more frequently than immigrants from other countries (e.g., Heizmann & Böhnke, 2019). This interesting result shows that the status of EU citizen does not play a central role in the interpretation of migration outcomes (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019a). In particular, the immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence cannot be accounted for solely by considering this status. In the context of the ‘Southern European model of immigration’, having benefitted from an amnesty is positively associated with life satisfaction, meaning an improvement in immigrants’ status mobility, moving on, in fact, from an irregular to a regular status (Paparusso et al., 2017). It seems that in a context where a precarious legal status is seen as normal for most non-EU immigrants, being regularized is a good predictor of life satisfaction. In this regard, it is worth noting that although perceived discrimination is negatively associated with life satisfaction (Kirmano˘glu & Ba¸slevent, 2014; Tartakovsky et al., 2021), in Italy only a few immigrants report having ever been discriminated against (4.1% of the respondents). This result reflects a feature of the ‘Southern European model of immigration’, predominant in Italy, where the ‘implicit model of integration’ (Ambrosini, 2001), although unplanned and unsystematic, generally helps to prevent episodes of discrimination and racism. Therefore, despite some shortcomings, the ‘Southern European model of immigration’ does not hamper immigrants’ satisfaction with their life in Italy. Transnationalism and sense of belonging variables show interesting results: the immigrants who frequently visit their home country show higher levels of satisfaction with life than those who do not. Similarly, the immigrants who intend to remain in Italy are more satisfied with life than those who aim to return to the home country (Massey & Akresh, 2006). Moreover, the immigrants who have a strong sense of belonging to their country of origin feel more satisfied than those who have a weaker feeling of belonging or no feeling of belonging at all. This indicates that immigrants need to have a level of subjective well-being that allows them to have transnational

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Photo 6.1 “The Women are Persons”, Monument on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Ontario Canada. Source Author’s photo

links and to continue the process of integration in the host country (de Haas et al., 2015; Fokkema, 2011). However, endogeneity needs to be considered, that is the fact that it is also the immigrants who are not satisfied that intend to leave the country and vice versa. Finally, the importance of social networks for self-reported life satisfaction is confirmed (Arpino & de Valk, 2018; Li & Yang, 2020). In particular, feeling lonely decreases life satisfaction, while having a close friend in Italy increases it (Amati et al., 2018; Carella et al., 2020). Positive gender attitudes are also important for subjective well-being: immigrants with more gender-egalitarian opinions are more satisfied with life than the immigrants with less egalitarian views (Beek & Fleischmann, 2019; Sweeting et al., 2014; Waseem et al., 2020) (Photo 6.1).

6.4 How First-Generation Immigrants Perform Compared to Natives? A Difficult Approach for Subjective Well-Being in Italy As already argued, one of the best approaches to study immigrants’ subjective wellbeing is by comparing their situation with that of natives (Hendriks, 2015). This is also the most difficult approach, because of the scarcity of suitable data. However, this

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approach is important to verify if immigrants are happy as natives in the host country and to understand the main factors that eventually allow or hinder the achievement of a condition of parity with natives, with respect to subjective well-being. Moreover, since for immigrants the achievement of this condition could also mean the realisation of the integration process in the host society, this kind of comparison is particularly interesting and useful for effectively implementing or improving inclusive immigration and integration policies. In Italy, a comparison between immigrants and natives is not easy because of the lack of a survey covering the topic of subjective well-being among both populations. For immigrants, the best available option is the cross-sectional survey “Social Condition and Integration of Foreign Citizens”, employed in the empirical analyses shown in the previous paragraph. The cross-sectional “Multipurpose Survey on Households: Aspects of Daily Life” is a large annual sample survey that covers the resident population in private households. The survey provides information on the citizens’ habits and the problems they face in everyday life: the degree of satisfaction of their conditions, their economic situation, the area in which they live, the functioning of all public utility services, all topics useful to study the quality of life of Italian citizens. However, the different design of the two mentioned surveys—with reference to subjective well-being—does not allow to perform a proper comparative analysis on self-reported life satisfaction among immigrants and natives. Other surveys, such as the European Social Survey (ESS) or the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) do not provide a sub-sample enabling to perform consistent comparative analyses for Italy. The “European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC) survey, started in 2004 with the European Union Regulation n. 1177/2003, provides a module containing a list of target secondary variables relating to well-being in 2013. The survey addresses 37,209 respondents aged 16 and over. A more recent similar module has been issued in 2018. However, considering the 2013 module would allow me to have a temporal uniformity throughout the analyses presented in this Book. Most respondents have Italian citizenship (92.1%), 2.7% have the citizenship of a country of the European Union, while 5.2% have the citizenship of another country (see Table 6.1). Table 6.1 Respondents according to their country of citizenship, N = 36,8272 , Italy, 2013

Country of citizenship

Number

Italy

33,916

European Union’s country

994

Other

1,917

Total

36,827

Source Author’s elaboration on EU-SILC data 2

The variable country of citizenship contains missing values.

% 92.1 2.7 5.2 100.0

6.4 How First-Generation Immigrants Perform Compared to Natives? … Table 6.2 Mean values of respondents’ self-reported life satisfaction according to their country of citizenship, N = 22,633, Italy, 2013

Country of citizenship

Mean

115 Number

Italy

6.4

20,905

European Union’s country

6.3

591

Other country

6.2

1,137

Total

6.4

22,633

Source Author’s elaboration on EU-SILC data

When self-reported life satisfaction is considered, the sample is reduced to 22,636 individuals. Self-reported life satisfaction (referred to as “overall life satisfaction” in the questionnaire) is measured with an 11-point Likert scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Italian citizens are on average 6.4 satisfied, immigrants having the citizenship of a European Union’s country are 6.3 satisfied and, finally, immigrants with the citizenship of another country have a life satisfaction equal to 6.2. Therefore, Italian citizens are only slightly more satisfied than foreigners residing in Italy (see Table 6.2). However, given the structure of the sub-samples (in particular, immigrants are few), I concluded that a comparison between immigrants and natives, for instance, evaluating the main individual factors associated with their self-reported life satisfaction, is not possible with this survey. Unfortunately, the “Income and Living Conditions of Families with Migrants” carried out in 2009 by ISTAT and following for both contents and methodology the EU-SILC has not been repeated yet. Repeating this survey would represent an important achievement for performing a consistent comparative analysis for immigrants and natives in Italy.

References Agadjanian, V., Oh, B., & Menjívar, C. (2021). (Il)legality and psychosocial well-being: Central Asian migrant women in Russia. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1369183X.2021.1872373. Amati, V., Meggiolaro, S., Rivellini, G., & Zaccarin, S. (2018). Social relations and life satisfaction: The role of friends. Genus, 74(1), 1–18. Ambrosetti, E., & Paparusso, A. (2018). Migrants or refugees? The evolving governance of migration flows in Italy during the “refugee crisis”. Revue Europeenne des Migrations Internationales, 34(1), 151–171. Ambrosetti, E., & Paparusso, A. (2020). What are the main factors associated with immigrants’ subjective well-being in Italy? Evidence from self-reported life satisfaction. International Migration. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12780. Ambrosini, M. (2001). La fatica di integrarsi. Immigrati e lavoro in Italia [Struggling for being integrated. Immigrants and work in Italy]. Il Mulino. Ambrosini, M. (2018). Irregular immigration in Southern Europe: Actors, dynamics and governance. Palgrave. Arpino, B., & de Valk, H. (2018). Comparing life satisfaction of immigrants and natives across Europe: The role of social contacts. Social Indicators Research, 137, 1163–1184.

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Avola, M., & Piccitto, G. (2020). Ethnic penalty and occupational mobility in the Italian labour market. Ethnicities, 20(6), 1093–1116. Barbiano di Belgiojoso, E., Cela, E., & Rimoldi, S. M. L. (2020). The effect of migration experiences on wellbeing among ageing migrants in Italy. Social Indicators Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11205-020-02335-6. Barbiano di Belgiojoso, E., & Ortensi, L. E. (2019). Satisfied after all? Working trajectories and job satisfaction of foreign-born female domestic and care workers in Italy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(13), 2527–2550. Bartram, D. (2020). Age and life satisfaction: Getting control variables under control. Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038520926871. Baumann, D., Ruch, W., Margelisch, K., Gander, F., & Wagner, L. (2020). Character strengths and life satisfaction in later life: An analysis of different living conditions. Applied Research in Quality of Life, 15(2), 329–347. Beek, M., & Fleischmann, F. (2019). Religion and integration: Does immigrant generation matter? The case of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1620417. Bimonte, S., Bosco, L., & Stabile, A. (2020). Integration and subjective well-being among off-site university students. Social Indicators Research, 147(3), 947–969. Boccagni, P. (2016). Searching for well-being in care work migration: Constructions, practices and displacements among immigrant women in Italy. Social Politics, 23(2), 284–306. Bonifazi, C. (2007). L’immigrazione straniera in Italia [Foreign immigration in Italy]. Il Mulino. Bonifazi, C. (2013). L’Italia delle migrazioni [Italy of migrations]. Il Mulino. Bonifazi, C. (Ed.). (2017). Migrazioni e integrazioni nell’Italia di oggi [Migrations and integrations in Italy today]. CNR-IRPPS e-Publishing. Bonifazi, C., & Marini, C. (2014). The impact of the economic crisis on foreigners in the Italian labour market. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(3), 493–511. Bonifazi, C., & Paparusso, A. (2019a). Remain or return home: The migration intentions of firstgeneration migrants in Italy. Population, Space and Place, 25(2), e2174. Bonifazi, C., & Paparusso, A. (2019b). L’impatto delle politiche familiari sulla bassa fecondità europea [The impact of family policies on low European fertility]. La Rivista delle Politiche Sociali, 4, 31–49. Bonifazi, C., & Paparusso, A. (2021). Gli immigrati nell’economia italiana: tra necessità e opportunità [Immigrants in the Italian economy: between necessity and opportunity]. Laboratorio Futuro, Istituto Toniolo. https://www.laboratoriofuturo.it/ricerche/gli-immigrati-nelleconomiaitaliana-tra-necessita-e-opportunita/. Bonifazi, C., & Strozza, S. (2019). International migrations in the Southern countries of the European Union: Continuity and changes, before and after the crisis. In S. Capasso & E. Ferragina (Eds.), Mediterranean migration and the labour market: Policies for growth and social development in the Mediterranean area (pp. 198–223). Routledge. Brant, R. (1990). Assessing proportionality in the proportional odds model for ordinal logistic regression. Biometrics, 46(4), 1171–1178. Busetta, A., Mendola, D., Wilson, B., & Cetorelli, V. (2019). Measuring vulnerability of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47(3), 596–615. Carella, M., García-Pereiro, T., & Pace, R. (2020). Subjective well-being, transnational families and social integration of married immigrants in Italy. Social Indicators Research. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s11205-020-02402-y. Cela, E., & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, E. (2019). Ageing in a foreign country: Determinants of selfrated health among older migrants in Italy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. https://doi. org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1627863. D’Isanto, F., Fouskas, P., & Verde, M. (2016). Determinants of well-being among legal and illegal immigrants: Evidence from South Italy. Social Indicators Research, 126(3), 1109–1141.

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Chapter 7

Subjective Well-Being of Children with a Migrant Background in Italy

Abstract Although research on objective dimensions of the integration of children with a migrant background, with a particular focus on educational attainment, has been receiving increasing attention, indicators of subjective well-being remain still little explored in Italy. This chapter aims to fill this gap by exploring the relationship between subjective well-being in different domains of life and two indicators of educational attainment, the average grade on Italian and Mathematics and selfassessment of school outcomes, among children with a migrant background residing in Italy. Results show that subjective well-being at school and subjective well-being in the family are positively associated with both indicators of educational attainment among students enrolled in both lower and upper secondary schools in Italy. Conversely, and importantly, subjective well-being in the social domain (discrimination) has a negative impact on the self-assessment of school outcomes. Education being one of the key areas of immigrants’ integration, the results of this analysis have crucial policy implications, even more so now that the Covid-19 pandemic has deeply affected both children education and well-being and the integration of children with a migrant background. Keywords Children with a migrant background · Educational attainment · School · ISTAT · Italy

7.1 The Integration of Children with a Migrant Background in Europe: A Short Overview As recognized by the international literature, the life chances and future integration of children with a migrant background are shaped by both personal resources and by the educational and socio-economic opportunities that institutions provide (e.g., Borjas, 1994; Chiswick & Miller, 2007; Chiswick et al., 2002). However, scientific evidence shows that opportunities and life chances for children with a migrant background are significantly lower compared to those of peers born to non-immigrant parents (Heath & Cheung, 2007; Heath et al., 2008; OECD, 2018; Van Niekerk, 2007; Zuccotti et al., 2017). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Paparusso, Immigrant Integration in Europe, Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5_7

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There is a great deal of literature on the integration patterns of children with a migrant background in European countries starting from the 2000s, following the debate developed on the same topic in the U.S. (Foner, 2000; Portes, 1996; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). The pioneering research in Europe (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003) proposed two theoretical approaches for the analysis of integration patterns of children with a migrant background among European countries: the citizenship approach (Brubaker, 1992; Castles & Miller, 2003; Joppke, 1999) and the institutional approach (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Crul et al., 2012). The first explains differences in integration paths relying on the assumption that the ‘traditional national models of immigration and integration’ have a substantial effect on the socio-economic position of immigrants and their children. Conversely, the institutional approach regarding national changes in institutional arrangements, argues that there is no precise effect of such models on the socio-economic integration of children with a migrant background, in terms of both their educational and labour market outcomes (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003). This approach focuses on the societal context, for instance by highlighting the role of ethnic enclaves, which are functional and protective for first-generation immigrants, although being potentially detrimental to the children with a migrant background by limiting their social mobility (Gonzalez, 2003; Osypuk et al., 2010). The research carried out so far in Europe has found that children with a migrant background are generally disadvantaged in education in most European receiving countries and this remains true even after controlling for their socio-economic status (e.g., Hou & Bonikowska, 2017; Miyamoto et al., 2020; Mussino & Strozza, 2012; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Portes et al., 2009). Education is not the only aspect in which the children with a migrant background perform worse. They are disadvantaged also in terms of cognitive development, socio-emotional development, physical health, self-esteem, sense of efficacy and mastery, and satisfaction with life (Bankston III & Zhou, 2002; Guerra et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019). Nevertheless, knowledge about the gap between children with a migrant background and children with no migrant background in such spheres and related determinants is much more limited. Understanding how these spheres can influence education is essential to create educational opportunities for all children independently of their background and, therefore, to build more equal and cohesive societies. Research on education among both children with a migrant background and children with no migrant background in Europe suffers from two main limitations. First, there is a limited range of educationally relevant indicators of child development. The literature is often focused on objective indicators, such as long-term educational careers. It is, therefore, difficult to know whether the educational disadvantage of children with a migrant background is associated with lower cognitive development, more significant socio-emotional problems, and lower perceived satisfaction in different domains of life, such as the school environment, the friendship and kin relations. Second, several factors at both origin and destination, including the reason of migration, the timing of family migration, perceived discrimination, poor living

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conditions and economic well-being, legal status and the acquisition of citizenship should be considered to formulate successful policies addressing migration-related disadvantages. As in a ‘win–win-win process’, the ability of receiving societies to successfully integrate children with a migrant background, therefore, to increase their future academic and economic success and contextually to maintain social cohesion, goes through the improvement of the spectrum of factors that increase their subjective well-being (OECD, 2018).

7.2 The Subjective Well-Being of Children with a Migrant Background in Europe The most recent international research has shown that there are significant differences between adults and children’ subjective well-being (e.g., Bimonte et al., 2020; Losada-Puente et al., 2020). Children’s subjective well-being is subject to more changes compared to adults’ subjective well-being. Indeed, while the subjective wellbeing of adults is more dependent on objective life conditions (Sirgy et al., 2019), numerous changes in the homeostatic system, influenced by subjective and relational variables, including the relationship with their parents and peers, make children’ evaluation of their subjective well-being less stable during the early stages of their life (Losada-Puente et al., 2020). However, empirical research has shown that children with a migrant background are more disadvantaged in terms of subjective well-being, compared to children with no migrant background, with important consequences in terms of socio-cultural integration, school achievement and, therefore, self-esteem (e.g., Bankston III & Zhou, 2002; Cha, 2003; Guerra et al., 2019; Katja et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2019). The opposite is also true: sociocultural integration can foster the subjective well-being of children with a migrant background. In this regard, it is worth noting that Berry and Hou (2017) after having identified four groups of immigrants among second generation and 1.5-generation—integrated (strong sense of Canadian belonging and ethnic belonging), assimilated (strong Canadian belonging and weak ethnic belonging), separated (strong ethnic belonging and weak Canadian belonging), and marginalized (weak Canadian and ethnic belonging)—found that individuals in the integration group had a significantly higher level of life satisfaction than the other three groups. The assimilation and separation groups had similar levels of life satisfaction to each other, and both groups had higher levels of life satisfaction than the marginalization group. These patterns remained when group differences in exposure to the larger Canadian society, socioeconomic status, and demographic characteristics were adjusted for. More recently, using the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU), Lee (2019) examined how identity is related to the subjective well-being of high school immigrant and native students in England,

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Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. She showed that marginalized students who identify with neither their heritage group nor the majority group reported significantly lower happiness. Integrated students also reported significantly higher subjective well-being than assimilated immigrant students did. Therefore, integrated students have more successful and happier outcomes, possibly through greater adaptability or cognitive flexibility to navigate easily through multiple worlds, or through the benefits, capital, and resources available through selective acculturation (Lee, 2019). The main individual factors associated with various measures of subjective wellbeing of children with a migrant background are: gender, age, immigrant generation, parents’ ethnicity, language attainment, educational attainment, parents’ socioeconomic status, household income, friends and ethnic identity, participation in associations, religiosity, acculturation, discrimination, loneliness, etc. (e.g., Bankston III & Zhou, 2002; Berry & Hou, 2017; Dryden-Peterson, 2018; Lee, 2019; Neto, 1995, 2001; Schwartz, 2013). However, although measures, such as happiness, life satisfaction, psychological well-being and self-esteem are used for adults as well as for children, the subjective well-being of children is often measured considering the school environment as the main place of socialization, with a key role in preparing the inclusion path into society (e.g., Balatsky & Diener, 1993; Konu et al., 2002). Especially in the case of the children with a migrant background, the subjective wellbeing at school is used as a measure of perceived integration and of the possibility of gaining parity with natives (OECD, 2018). Neto (1995) in his study on Portuguese secondary school students residing in Paris (born in France but with both parents being Portuguese) found that significant effects on satisfaction with life (measured with the Satisfaction With Life Scale—SWLS) were related to religion, participation in an association, number of Portuguese friends and ethnic identity. Satisfaction with life showed significant negative correlations with perceived difficulties of adaptation, marginalization, social anxiety, and loneliness, and positive correlations with integration and locus of control. The strongest predictor variables of satisfaction with life were, however, loneliness and perceived state of health. The same author (2001) in a work on adolescents with migrant background enrolled in high school in Lisbon area showed that mastery was the most important factor related to life satisfaction (again measured with SWLS). Gender, self-esteem, and living in an ethnically homogeneous neighbourhood were also found to be important predictors of satisfaction with life. Bankston III and Zhou (2002) explored the relationship between the academic achievement of white, Asian, black, and Latino adolescents in the United States and self-esteem, finding that the children with a migrant background showed significantly lower levels of reported self-esteem and psychological well-being. Asians showed the lowest levels of reported self-esteem of the major racial-ethnic groups, but also the highest grade-point averages. Black adolescents, on the other hand, showed the highest levels of reported self-esteem but showed relatively low grade-point averages. Both the school performance and the apparently lower self-esteem were consistent with observations that immigrant parents tend to put more pressure on their children than do other parents.

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Schwartz et al. (2013) studied the association between acculturation (comprising of heritage and American cultural practices, values such as individualism and collectivism and identifications) and well-being (operationalized in terms of subjective, psychological, and eudaimonic components) among first-generation and secondgeneration immigrant college students, from 6 ethnic groups and from 30 colleges and universities in the United States. Individualism was positively related to subjective, psychological, and eudaimonic well-being. American and heritage identifications were both modestly related to psychological and eudaimonic well-being. These results hold true across gender, immigrant generation, and ethnicity. Finally, Dryden-Peterson (2018) focused on how the family-school relationship influence the academic, socio-economic, and social and emotional well-being of a sample of black African immigrant children attending elementary schools in the United States and reported that good relationship between school and parents foster children’s subjective well-being.

7.3 Children with a Migrant Background in Italy In a country of relatively recent immigration, such as Italy, the literature on children with a migrant background has emerged only recently compared to the European context. To investigate the integration patterns of children with a migrant background in Italy, the ITAGEN2 nation-wide survey was carried out among students living in Italy with at least one foreign parent and attending middle school during the 2005–2006 school year. First Wave includes a sample of 6,368 foreigners and 10,537 natives, while two years after, in 2008, a follow-up was implemented to have information about scholastic attainment and achievement among a subsample of the original one (Barban & Dalla Zuanna, 2010). Research based on the ITAGEN2 survey showed that children with a migrant background have lower educational attainment, lower education aspirations, being more concentrated than natives in vocational education. However, the situation changes for children who arrived at a very young age in Italy or were born in Italy: for them, the differences with native Italians are lower and to some extent disappear (Barban & White, 2011; Gabrielli et al., 2013; Minello & Barban, 2012). The number of foreign children aged 0–17 regularly residing in Italy has increased over the years, due to family migration and new births. As shown in Fig. 7.1, the number of foreign minors regularly residing in Italy has risen from 288,950 in 2002 to 1,077,544 by 2020 (ISTAT, 2020). However, a slight decrease, followed by a stabilization of the trend can be observed after 2014, as a result of the process of integration and adaptation of the immigrant population to the country. According to the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) data, the number of minors with non-Italian citizenship in Italian schools has also strongly increased in the period 2001/2002–2018/2019, passing from 196,414 children in 2001/2002 to 673,800 children in 2009/2010 and to 857,729 children in 2018/2019 (see Fig. 7.2). The number of pupils with non-Italian citizenship has

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1,200,000

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Fig. 7.1 Foreign children aged 0–17 regularly residing in Italy, 2002–2020. Source Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data 1,000,000 900,000 800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000

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Fig. 7.2 Pupils with non-Italian citizenship by school level, school years 2001/2002–2018/2019. Source Author’s elaboration on MIUR data

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increased by 16 thousand units (+1.9%) in the last school year and its incidence on the total student population has risen from 9.7% in 2017/2018 to 10% by 2018/2019. However, the trend data show a stabilization of the presence of foreign students in Italian schools in the last years. Most of the foreign pupils is enrolled in primary school (313,204), followed by upper secondary school (199,020), lower secondary school (180,296), and kindergarten (165,209). Despite research on objective dimensions of the integration of children with a migrant background, with a particular focus on educational attainment, has been receiving increasing attention (e.g., Ambrosini & Molina, 2004; Azzolini & Barone, 2013; Bonifazi et al., 2019; Contini, 2006; Di Bartolomeo, 2011; Strozza, 2008, 2015; Triventi, 2020), indicators of subjective well-being remain still little explored in Italy. In particular, to the best of my knowledge, the relationship between subjective wellbeing and educational attainment of children with a migrant background in Italy has been very little investigated so far, and it is mainly focused on typologies of distress (Colombo & Santagati, 2010), the relationship with peers and teachers (Colombo et al., 2014) and self-assessed integration in Italy estimated through the assertion of feeling more Italian than foreigner (Cocchi & Giovinazzi, 2019).

7.4 Subjective Well-Being and Educational Attainment of Children with a Migrant Background and Their Native Peers in Italy Therefore, in this paragraph, I intend to fill this gap by analysing how subjective well-being in different domains of life influence the educational attainment of both children with a migrant background and native children residing in Italy, controlling for several other relevant socio-demographic factors. Data were drawn from the Survey on the “Integration of the Second Generation” carried out by ISTAT in 2015. The survey includes a national representative sample of 68,127 students interviewed in both lower and upper secondary schools. Around 47% of them are children with a migrant background without Italian citizenship. The largest share (72%) was born abroad, while the remaining part was born in Italy. The survey deals with the following topics: family history; school life; education; use of language; housing; leisure time; discrimination; social networks and future aspirations. My research aim is to explore the relationship between different domains of subjective well-being and school outcomes, comparing children with a migrant background and native children, in order to understand the existence of possibly significant differences in either school performance and/or in the factors influencing it. To this end, ordinary least squared (OLS) regression models (four models by school grade) have been performed, separately.

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As for school outcomes (dependent variable): (1) average grade on Italian and Mathematics (from 0 to 10) and (2) self-assessment of school outcomes (from 1 very bad to 5 very good) have been considered. Concerning subjective well-being (main independent variable), three domains of subjective well-being have been defined through Principal Component Analysis (PCA): school domain (subjective well-being at school); family domain (subjective well-being in the family) and social domain (discrimination). In particular, the school domain refers to the relationship with the schoolmates (from 1 not at all to 5 completely, the items are: In my class I feel good; At school I have friends; I don’t get along with my school mates; Usually my school mates talk to me willingly; When I can’t understand something during the lessons, my classmates help me), the studying (from 1 not at all to 5 completely, the items are: I like to study and work in groups; I like to study and do homework; I think they give us too much homework; I happen to study at my home or that of my classmates; Sometimes I feel insecure to speak in Italian) and the teachers (from 1 not at all to 5 completely, the items are: Teachers treat all pupils in the same way; If I don’t understand something during the lessons, I ask the teacher; I trust my teachers; The teachers make me feel appreciated; Teachers put enthusiasm into their work). The family domain refers to the relationship with the family (from 1 not at all to 5 completely, the items are: My family is happy with my school outcome; My family believes that studying is the key to finding a good job; In family I often talk about what happens at school; My family does not consider school important to succeed in life; My family asks me about my school outcome). Finally, the social domain refers to episodes of verbal and physical discrimination received by other boys or girls in the last 12 months (from 1 every day to 5 never, the items are: Offended with nicknames, swear words, insults; Hit with shoving, banging, kicking, punching; Offended as a girl/boy; Made fun of/marginalized for your opinions; Threatened; Compelled/blackmailed to do things you didn’t want to do; Targeted by shooting at you, telling stories about you around; Made fun of your physical appearance/way of speaking; Excluded, marginalized without talking to you again; Excluded from parties or other occasions of meeting or group of friends; Targeting you with bad jokes; Targeted by damaging your property; Forced to deliver your money, mobile phone or other). Citizenship (Italian and foreign) has been included as an explanatory variable. Finally, I controlled for: gender, age, household composition, self-perceived financial well-being, parents’ country of origin, parents’ education, parents’ occupation, and residence in a big city/small town. School performances are different among native children and children with a migrant background: the median grade of natives is higher than children with a migrant background in both Italian and Mathematics. When asked to assess their school outcomes, the share of good ratings is almost 10 percentage points higher among natives than children with a migrant background. At the same time, it is interesting to highlight that there are no significant differences between natives and children with a migrant background in subjective well-being at school. However, when comparing natives and children with a migrant background in terms of

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perceived discrimination, differences emerge: the latter report about being a victim of discrimination more frequently. As shown in Figs. 7.3 and 7.4, subjective well-being at school and subjective well-being in the family are positively associated with both indicators of educational attainment among students enrolled in both lower and upper secondary schools in Italy. Conversely, and importantly, subjective well-being in the social domain, therefore, having experienced episodes of discrimination has a negative impact on the selfassessment of school outcomes in both lower and upper secondary schools. Finally, Lower secondary school

0.2 0.1 0 SWB at school

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Fig. 7.3 Associations between subjective well-being at school, subjective well-being in family, discrimination and citizenship, and average grade on Italian and Mathematics among children with a migrant background and natives in Italy, 2015, N = 68,127. Source Author’s elaboration on “Integration of the Second Generation” data, ISTAT

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Fig. 7.4 Associations between subjective well-being at school, subjective well-being in family, discrimination and citizenship, and self-assessment of school outcomes among children with a migrant background and natives in Italy, 2015, N = 68,127. Source Author’s elaboration on “Integration of the Second Generation” data, ISTAT

having foreign citizenship is negatively associated with both indicators of educational attainment in both lower and upper secondary schools in Italy, thus meaning that children with a migrant background have poorer performance compared to native peers. Even if they are not reported here, results show that a better socio-economic status of the family (having at least one parent who is employed and who reports a higher education), better self-perceived financial well-being, living in a household with a reduced number of components and residing in a big city are positively associated with both indicators of educational attainment.

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These results help to shed light on a rather understudied topic in Italy and to highlight that subjective well-being, declined in its different domains, affect children’ educational attainment, as also found by previous studies (e.g., Berry et al., 2017; Guerra et al., 2019; Hashemi et al., 2019; Liang et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2019). This has important policy implications. Especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, during which the school has been one of the most penalized sectors in Italy, with a long period of closure and consequent forms of distance learning or home-schooling, understanding the importance not only of objective factors but also of subjective indicators in determining the educational attainment of both children with a migrant background and natives is of crucial importance. This will help to have a complete and realistic picture of the short- and long-term effects of political measures such as those based on social and physical distancing, on school, a key place for the socialization, education, and cognitive development of children and adolescents. In particular, the Covid-19 pandemic-induced lockdown has sharpened the effect of socio-economic disparities on the learning or academic achievement of children and adolescents in Italy, such as in other countries (Engzell et al., 2020; Settersten et al., 2020). These considerations become even more important, considering that children with a migrant background generally perform poorly compared to native peers (OECD, 2020).

Photo 7.1 Children with a migrant background during a birthday party. Source Pixabay

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The full integration of the children with a migrant background is a strategic issue for building societies with reduced social conflict and that consider the diversity and cultural specificities of others. Inclusive and successful education represents an important stage of life and a prerequisite for full integration into the Italian labour market and society. These aspects must be closely monitored to remove obstacles and promote equal opportunities for all. A strategic choice is not to leave the children with a migrant background behind and to continue to adapt the Italian education system to the new educational needs, even during unexpected periods of crisis. This will ensure high levels of education and will offer Italy an excellent human capital to compete on the international scene and to alleviate the skills and labour shortage due to population ageing and fertility decline (Comolli, 2017; Vignoli et al., 2020) (Photo 7.1). Box 7.1 Self-rated Knowledge of Italian Language Among Children with a Migrant Background in Italy Among the social consequences of the growth of the immigrant population in receiving societies, the phenomenon of multilingualism is one of the most interesting and with the most important policy implications. In Italy, the impact of the language attainment on the processes of school inclusion among children with a migrant background has been largely investigated. On the contrary, the self-perceived degree of knowledge of the Italian language among the children with a migrant background has been little studied so far. Using the Survey on the “Integration of the Second Generation” carried out by ISTAT in 2015, it is possible to fill this gap by evaluating the self-rated knowledge of Italian language among students with a migrant background enrolled in lower and upper secondary schools in Italy and to understand the main related factors (see Bonifazi et al., 2019, for details). More than one fifth (22%) of children with a migrant background declared a low level of knowledge of the Italian language. On the other hand, students who, based on their perceptions, think they have a medium and high level of knowledge of Italian are more or less equivalent: 40 and 37%, respectively. Students progressing in the Italian school system declare better linguistic competences, also because those who fail to acquire the skills necessary to study leave the school system, thus helping to increase the proportion of those with a good knowledge of Italian. In detail, the students who declare a low level of knowledge of Italian language are 30% in the first year of middle school, they drop to 23% at the beginning of high school and are reduced to 10% among those attending the last year. Those who believe they know Italian well, on the other hand, go from 26 to 37% between the first year of lower and upper secondary school, to reach 44% of those enrolled in the last year of the secondary cycle. Gender also seems to play an important role in the knowledge of Italian. For both levels of education, girls most frequently declare high levels of proficiency

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in the Italian language. Almost half of the female students in upper secondary school have an excellent knowledge of Italian, while for males the proportion is about 40%. Those born abroad have a lower knowledge of the language than those born in Italy, even if the differences are stronger in the first grade of the secondary school and are thinner in the second grade. However, even for those born in Italy, the percentage of foreigners with a low knowledge of the language is not negligible (23% in lower secondary school and 14% in upper secondary school). Important differences emerge even if it stands out among the top ten citizenships of students. For example, among the Chinese there is the highest share of girls and boys with the lowest level of knowledge of Italian in both first grade secondary (63%) and second grade (54%) of the secondary school. Conversely, Romanians and Albanians show the share of girls and boys with a higher level of knowledge of Italian. In general, there is a progressive improvement in the knowledge of Italian in the transition from lower secondary school to upper secondary school for all nationalities considered. The higher the training cycle in which the foreign student enters Italy for the first time, the worse their knowledge of the language of the country is. In fact, students who enter the Italian school system after primary school are severely disadvantaged. Among them, those enrolled in lower secondary school in 2015 believe that in over 60% of cases they have an inadequate knowledge of the language. However, even among those who have entered the Italian school system since kindergarten, the difficulties among those attending lower secondary school are not negligible: in fact, in 21% of cases they believe they have a low level of knowledge of the Italian language. But this proportion is reduced by 10 percentage points among those attending upper secondary school (10%). Students who began their studies in Italy in primary school, on the other hand, occupy an intermediate position with a worse knowledge of Italian than those who started school in kindergarten but better than those who started studying in Italy in secondary school. It is interesting to note that the quantity and composition of friends’ networks significantly affect the level of knowledge of the language. In both levels of education, those who do not attend classmates or friends, neither compatriots nor of any other nationality, are those who most often believe that they have a low knowledge of the Italian language (45% of lower secondary school students and 29% of those of the second degree). This is followed by students who attend only classmates of the same nationality. Similar results are obtained when considering the nationality of the friends (outside the classmates) attended. Those who have the lowest level of proficiency in the language are the isolated ones, followed by those who mostly hang out with friends of the same nationality.

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank Elena Ambrosetti (Sapienza University of Rome), Giulia Bettin (Università Politecnica delle Marche) and Eralba Cela (University of Milan) for the empirical analyses presented in this Chapter.

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Chapter 8

Conclusions: Policy Implications of Immigrants’ Subjective Well-Being

Abstract This final Chapter summarizes the Book providing key takeaways. It reflects on the importance of increasing the conceptual clarity of indicators of subjective well-being to improve targeted policy interventions. In particular, it reiterates the importance of using a rational evaluation of one’s overall life according to personal criteria for the purpose of assessing immigrants’ integration in the host society. Analysing the factors associated with immigrants’ life satisfaction in the country of destination is a pivotal tool for societies that seek to achieve full integration of immigrants. The chapter also summarizes the main micro- and macro-level factors associated with first-generation immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence and offers some policy considerations. In this historical moment, with the Covid-19 pandemic deeply affecting all spheres of public life, an improved understanding of the factors associated with immigrants’ life satisfaction is crucial to tackle the consequences of the crisis on immigrants’ integration. The chapter concludes by elucidating the main limitations of the Book, proposing methodological suggestions for future research, and highlighting the policy implications of studying immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction for increasingly ageing European countries. Keywords Life satisfaction · Policymaking · Longitudinal data · Methodology · Population ageing

8.1 Introduction The topic of subjective well-being is becoming increasingly popular among scholars and researchers from different fields, as also the number of publications on the subject demonstrates. For instance, the World Database of Happiness (WDoH, 2020), which is the archive of research findings on happiness and life satisfaction, at the time of writing, has collected 15,054 publications, from which 17,651 distributional findings (how happy people are) and 20,585 correlational findings (what goes together with happiness) have been extracted. The growing interest in happiness and quality of life also reflects in the establishment of various specialized scientific journals. However, some efforts are still needed to avoid conceptual confusion and to increase © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Paparusso, Immigrant Integration in Europe, Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78505-5_8

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the comparability of research findings on the different components of subjective well-being. As already noted, recent years have witnessed the development and implementation of many indicators of well-being and quality of life. Objective and subjective indicators have been developed, in order to overcome the limitations of GDP per capita and other macroeconomic measures in evaluating the well-being of individuals, societies, and nations. Among them, subjective indicators are used to complement objectives measures of well-being. Moreover, they allow comparisons across countries and social groups. However, the need for devising better-suited measures has produced a conceptual multiplicity that still characterises well-being research (Carlquist et al., 2017). As far as subjective well-being, concepts like happiness, life satisfaction, eudemonic well-being and good life are often used interchangeably, although they refer to different concepts (see Chap. 4). Disentangling these concepts is not easy; nevertheless, it is fundamental not only for advancing research but, above all, for improving policy making processes (Corlet Walker et al., 2020; Kaminitz, 2020). In effect, the lack of consensus on the use of words in the field hinders to select the data that pertains to the specific components of subjective well-being, to accumulate knowledge, to coordinate and to offer comparable results, and, finally, to properly apply findings (for instance, the conditions and the consequences of happiness or life satisfaction) in different contexts of analysis. In other words, the conceptual multiplicity obstructs the potential to serve policy purposes. Contributing to enhancing subjective well-being research has been one of the aims of this Book, together with focussing on immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction as a measure of subjective integration. Life satisfaction is a rational evaluation of one’s overall life according to personal criteria. It contains a cognitive assessment of current needs and perceptions and future wishes and expectations. Identifying and evaluating people’s desires and needs is a prerequisite for any effective policy intervention. To ask citizens to evaluate their present conditions and their desires and expectations for the future is an instrument to improve policies. Using subjective well-being indicators, such as self-reported life satisfaction, is a relatively recent but very promising approach in integration studies. Indeed, if the best way to design and implement successful policies is to understand what the beneficiaries think of and expect from them, to ask immigrants to evaluate their life experience in the country of residence means to improve immigration and integration policies.

8.2 Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction: Key Takeaways Understanding the factors associated with immigrants’ life satisfaction in the country of destination appears particularly useful for societies interested in achieving full integration of immigrants. It has many implications for the immigrants’ long-term

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commitment to life in the host country and contributes to alleviating social inequalities and preventing social conflicts in the host societies. Better knowledge of the factors associated with immigrants’ subjective well-being is particularly relevant to implementing more effective long-term immigration and integration policies. Against this backdrop, this Book intended to shed light on the importance taken by subjective well-being in migration and integration studies. In particular, it offered state-of-the-art research on self-reported life satisfaction as a subjective measure of immigrant integration, showing the most significant research findings and methodological challenges. To this end, it presented a comparative analysis of self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants living in seven European countries, measuring the impact of both individual and country-level factors. Moreover, it studied the main individual factors associated with self-reported life satisfaction among first-generation immigrants regularly residing in Italy, an important country of immigration in Europe. Finally, it explored the relationship between subjective wellbeing in different domains of life and two indicators of educational attainment, the average grade on Italian and Mathematics, and self-assessment of school outcomes, among children with a migrant background and natives in Italy. The empirical analyses show interesting results that, on the one hand, confirm previous findings, thus demonstrating the soundness of subjective well-being research and, on the other hand, provide a new contribution to the study of immigrant integration from a subjective perspective. As far as the comparative analysis on self-reported life satisfaction measured on first-generation immigrants residing in seven European countries, results show that young and adult immigrants are on average quite satisfied with their life. More precisely, they report a self-reported life satisfaction which is equal to 7. Immigrants living in Italy (6.2) are the least satisfied, followed by immigrants residing in Hungary (6.8), whereas immigrants living in Spain (7.5) and Germany (7.5) are the most satisfied with their life. However, not only individual but also contextual factors are behind these findings, as the analysis of the macro-level factors has confirmed and as will be resumed later. Starting from the micro-level factors associated with immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction, and in particular, from the socio-demographic factors, immigrants who are younger and older (in other words, who are in either end of the age distribution), who are married, who come from Latin America and Eastern Europe report higher levels of life satisfaction. Employed, more educated and well-off immigrants are also more satisfied with their life, compared to immigrants without these human capital characteristics. Higher levels of self-reported life satisfaction in the country of residence are associated with structural modes of integration into the host society, which mainly depends on immigrants’ educational attainment, access to the labour market, and income, all relevant factors for immigrants to be considered integrated into European societies (Crul et al., 2012). Moreover, immigrants who have spent more years living in the country of residence and who arrived at younger ages report higher levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Length of stay abroad and the socialization process in the country of residence are indeed among the most important objective indicators of immigrant integration (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou,

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1993). Finally, citizenship status is associated with the highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. The explanation of the positive association between citizenship status and self-reported life satisfaction is quite intuitive considering that, according to a linear interpretation of the integration process, the achievement of citizenship rights is viewed as the final step of the integration process. In particular, according to this interpretation, citizenship rights should only be granted to immigrants who can demonstrate they have fully integrated and therefore they fulfil high integration requirements (Paparusso, 2019). Even those who disagree with a view of citizenship status as a reward for successful integration, believe that by conceding immigrants the same status and rights as natives, citizenship status formally reduces the gap between the new and the original citizens by creating parity between them, one of the main goals of the integration process (Vink, 2013). Because of the positive effects the ‘citizenship premium’ has on many aspects of immigrants’ life in the country of residence, including human capital development, improvement of employment and occupational status and participation to the political system, “access to citizenship is seen as one of the focal points of public policy aimed at promoting migrant integration” (Hoxhaj et al., 2019: 2). Therefore, it can be said there is a general consensus on citizenship status as an objective indicator of integration (e.g., Portes & Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994). In this regard, the subjective perspective adopted in this Book adds further confirmative evidence to integration studies based on objective criteria. After all, as recently stated by Kaminitz (2020: 12), “a doing well society shows high performance in both subjective and objective aspects”. How can these results be relevant for policymakers? Policymakers should look at the factors that are positively associated with immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction, confirming their efforts in strengthening them for assuring the success of the integration process. However, they should consider also the less satisfied immigrants, trying to understand the reasons for their dissatisfaction and to enact specific policy measures. For instance, humanitarian immigrants show the lowest levels of life satisfaction in the country of residence (e.g., Gambaro et al., 2018). Problems including anxiety, depression and feelings of lack of mastery and self-efficacy are common among refugees and asylum seekers (Tip et al., 2020), because of both their past traumatic experiences of war and violence made in the country of origin and current difficulties in finding accommodation or accessing employment, education or healthcare, and in establishing solid social support networks in the country of residence (Gladwell, 2020). Humanitarian immigrants initially may represent a cost for host societies. For this reason, they are perceived by European countries as undesired and unwelcomed immigrants. However, in the long-term, refugees can contribute to the receiving countries’ economies, through an increase in labour supply and demand, to overall public welfare and infrastructures and, last but not least, to population decline and depopulation (Hansen, 2021). Understanding this may represent an incentive to admit and incorporate refugees in the host society (besides honouring countries’ human rights commitments and obligations), for instance starting to involve them in host language courses, vocational training and jobs of public and social utility, thus improving their subjective well-being and gradually making them feel an accepted and active part of the host society (Penninx, 2003).

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The same occurs with lonely (who are divorced or widowed, or with no children or children left behind in the country of origin or with no close friends) or unemployed immigrants, who report lower levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Nevertheless, in this case, the same policy interventions of natives can be addressed to immigrants: employment, education, health and social assistance policies. This is relevant for policymakers and for the general sustainability of policies. As elucidated by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016: 21), there exist immigrant integration policies that designate specific groups of immigrants as target groups, policies that focus on all immigrants, policies targeting all individuals regardless of their origin, and policies targeting natives only. Not all the factors that are associated with lower life satisfaction need specific or target policy interventions. The factors determining happiness or life satisfaction are often common among immigrants and natives, therefore there is no need for extraordinary interventions for immigrants and their families. The relationship between self-reported life satisfaction and age, marital status, educational attainment, employment, income, and family unit characterizes all individuals regardless of their origin. This reduces the costs of implementing targeted policies for increasing immigrants’ happiness in the country of residence. The above-mentioned variables are demographic and human capital characteristics for which both the individuals and the countries are responsible. Conversely, attracting new migrants, favouring a long-lasting residence in the country of residence, and granting permanent residency or citizenship rights reflect the willingness of the host society to welcome newcomers, to achieve full integration of immigrants and to increase the overall societal well-being. In this regard, it is noteworthy that higher proportions of non-EU foreign citizens and naturalisation rates are macro-level factors that have been found to be relevant for first-generation immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction living in European countries. As far as other contextual factors, as expected, the unemployment rate has been found to be negatively associated with immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction, since it hinders immigrants’ participation to the labour market and, therefore, decreases their possibilities of independence, planning for the future, contacts with other members of the host society and self-esteem (Ager & Strang, 2008). Conversely, higher levels of Human Development Index (HDI) are positively associated with immigrants’ selfreported life satisfaction. Broadly speaking, first-generation immigrants who live in higher developed contexts generally experiment higher self-reported life satisfaction. The benefits of a higher income per capita, a longer life and more years of education may increase immigrants’ happiness, especially if they migrated at younger ages and come from a lesser developed country (Helliwell et al., 2018). Additional factors emerged as relevant for the self-reported life satisfaction of first-generation immigrants living in Italy, an important country of immigration in the Southern European context. In particular, having arrived in Italy between 2006 and 2008 is negatively associated with self-reported life satisfaction. The restrictiveness of immigration policies adopted after 2002, when the Bossi-Fini Law (Law n. 198/2002) was enacted, and the economic instability experienced in Italy as from 2008 have proved detrimental for the subjective well-being of the immigrants who arrived thereafter. Moreover, the status of EU citizen does not play a role in

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interpreting self-reported life satisfaction: non-EU immigrants who hold a residence permit are more satisfied with life compared to EU citizens who have immigrated to Italy. In this regard, some studies have highlighted that immigrants from EU countries may experience negative attitudes on the part of the majority population more frequently than immigrants from non-EU countries (e.g., Heizmann & Böhnke, 2019). Also, having benefitted from an amnesty is positively associated with self-reported life satisfaction. This result reflects a distinctive feature of the ‘Southern European model of immigration’: the use of ex-post instruments to provide legal status to immigrants who are already present in the country, because of the lack of explicit selective immigration policies to attract newcomers (Peixoto et al., 2012). Frequent return visits to the home country, a stronger sense of belonging to the country of origin, on the one hand, and the intention to remain and having a close friend in Italy, on the other hand, are also positively associated with self-reported life satisfaction. On the contrary, feeling lonely, having been discriminated against because of ethnicity, and having no gender-egalitarian opinions are negatively associated with self-reported life satisfaction. These results provide evidence for the fact that sense of attachment to the country of origin and presence of social networks in the country of residence are not mutually exclusive processes: quite the opposite, they can easily coexist, contributing to increasing immigrants’ subjective integration in the country of residence. In particular, visits to the country of origin and all forms of transnational communication, which have been intensified through the advancement of technologies and affordability of travels’ costs, can be seen as part of the mobile and transnational life of immigrants: they allow them at the same time to stay connected with the country of origin and to be well inserted in the receiving society, thus living a double identity. In other words, they should be interpreted as a part of the entire migration cycle (Carling & Erdal, 2014; Jain, 2013). Therefore, integration and transnationalism are compatible experiences in the life of immigrants. The willingness of nurturing personal contacts and exchanging monetary and non-monetary goods with the country of origin does not hinder the process of investing in the new country of residence and vice versa. For this reason, transnational practices should be facilitated by policymakers in both countries of origin and countries of destination since they positively affect immigrants’ subjective well-being. Finally, the analysis of the relationship between subjective well-being in different domains of life and two indicators of educational attainment, the average grade on Italian and Mathematics and self-assessment of school outcomes, among native children and children with a migrant background residing in Italy showed that subjective well-being at school and subjective well-being in the family are positively associated with both indicators of educational attainment. Conversely, subjective wellbeing in the social domain, therefore, having experienced episodes of discrimination has a negative impact on the self-assessment of school outcomes in both lower and upper secondary schools. Finally, having foreign citizenship is negatively associated with both indicators of educational attainment in both lower and upper secondary

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143

schools in Italy, thus confirming that children with a migrant background have poorer performance compared to their native peers. Research on both objective and subjective integration outcomes of children with a migrant background agrees that three is an interrelated relationship among the school environment, the family, the teachers, and the peers. All these actors play a concurrent role in shaping the objective and subjective well-being of children. In particular, they can help to improve children’s educational resilience, that is “achieving academic/educational competence despite being in challenging or disadvantaged circumstances” (Yeung & Li, 2021: 675). Children with a migrant background, who are more likely to have lower school performances, can take advantage from the protecting role exercised by the school and the family in succeeding educationally. Education and integration policymakers should contextually and inextricably consider children’s educational attainment and subjective well-being outcomes as key factors in forging their future active role into society. Reducing gaps at school, by intervening also on other factors which very often characterise immigrant households, such as low socio-economic status and lack of family unity (see, for instance, transnational families), means providing the same opportunities to all also in other major institutions of our society: the labour and housing markets and the political system. This has many advantages for societies, not only in terms of higher equality among individuals and groups, and therefore of reduced social conflict, but also in terms of higher participation in major national institutions, the one really contributing to increasing general competitiveness and progress. To conclude, the subjective well-being of immigrants is shaped by both individual and host-country characteristics. In particular, immigrants’ life satisfaction can be directly or indirectly influenced by the institutional context (Heizmann & Böhnke, 2019; Kogan et al., 2018). Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that, except for the study on secondary school students in Italy, the empirical findings presented in this Book refer to 2011–2012; therefore, some changes may have occurred in the meanwhile, especially after the 2015 refugee crisis and the Coronavirus pandemic. However, I believe that both the micro- and macro-level factors that emerged from my empirical analysis are amongst the plethora of factors that should be considered by national and local policymakers to improve the subjective well-being of immigrants living in European societies.

8.2.1 Policy Recommendations: An Integrated System of Policy Actions The above-mentioned characteristics of immigrants’ participation to the host country’s labour market and educational system, and the lack of support in family and social networks in the country of residence, typically enjoyed by natives, which, in turn, affect their subjective well-being, reinforce the belief that welfare policies should necessarily include the immigrants and their families as well.

144

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As recently portrayed by Vintila and Lafleur (2020), contributory welfare benefits1 are provided to residents regardless of citizenship in many European countries. In other words, entitlement to most contributory benefits derives from employment or qualifying periods of contribution to the social security system of the European country of residence and not on nationality. However, eligibility criteria, such as qualifying periods of contribution, waiting periods, type of documents supporting the application, or the general application procedure can be more complicated for foreigner workers than nationals. Moreover, unemployment rates of foreigners are generally higher compared to nationals and obtaining a valid work permit is not always easy. Additionally, in many European countries non-contributory benefits are allowed to foreigners with a long-term or permanent residence permit or with a minimum number of years of uninterrupted residence in the country of residence. Finally, reliance on social assistance can negatively affect the renewal of foreigners’ residence permits, their applications for family reunification, or even their citizenship applications, as the latter generally depend on proving one’s stable income and self-sufficiency. Therefore, it can be argued that welfare policies ‘on paper’ are rather inclusive in granting equal access of non-national residents to welfare benefits, while policies ‘in practice’ reveal that significant differences still exist in the regulations conditioning immigrants’ access to welfare benefits (Vintila & Lafleur, 2020). Working to reduce these differences, which currently make our societies highly stratified and unequal, should drive the European agenda on immigrant integration in the next future. Within this framework, an integrated system of policy actions is highly recommended for improving integration and subjective well-being among immigrants and their children in Europe. 1.

1

Increasing labour market participation and reducing unemployment and overqualification rates are necessary for improving immigrants’ socio-economic integration and subjective well-being, since they reduce employment penalties and ethnic discrimination. In addition to that, it is important to stress that European countries are increasingly multi-ethnic societies. Immigrants represent a constitutive component of their economy and population. Improving their labour market conditions, especially in those sectors which are refused by natives, will help to overcome host country’s labour market shortages in the short-term. The demand for labour in immigration countries is generally divided into segments that offer skilled and well-paid jobs and segments for unskilled jobs. The lower pay makes the secondary sector unattractive for native workers, so these jobs remain available for immigrants who are more motivated to work in these low-level jobs because the expected income is higher than that of their areas of origin (e.g., Piore, 1979). This contributes to increase over-qualification among immigrants. However, in the long-term,

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the entitlement to a contributory benefit is based on contributions from insured persons and/or their employer. Conversely, the entitlement to a non-contributory benefit is not based on the previous payment of contributions but on other criteria, which may vary among countries.

8.2 Immigrants’ Self-reported Life Satisfaction: Key Takeaways

2.

3.

4.

5.

145

the working-age immigrant population will become more and more essential in both low-skilled and high-skilled occupations, considering the process of population ageing that characterizes European countries and that inevitably leads to a reduction of the active population. Income support and access to public housing are the policy areas in which the demand for social services by immigrant families is currently expressed with greater emphasis. These are also the areas of social services in which there will most likely be a greater increase in demand from immigrant families in the future, considering the economic recession that hits immigrants more than natives, and in which it will be important to possibly increase the supply of resources to better cope with any form of discrimination and social exclusion. Enhancing school inclusion and academic performance of children with a migrant background means contributing to improve their objective and subjective well-being. It helps to reduce present and future socio-economic gaps between immigrants and natives into society. It also contributes to progressively make European countries more attractive for high-skilled immigration with important consequences on host countries’ economic growth and sociocultural advancement. Skilled immigrants contribute to increase economic competitiveness and to boost socio-economic progress. Empirical studies have found that skilled immigrants have a positive effect on innovation, but the effect is stronger in industries with low levels of over-qualification and greater ethnic diversity (Fassio et al., 2019). Moreover, the mobility of skilled workers is increasingly recognized as an important factor for growth, innovation, and employment. The need for companies to be able to access this supply of skilled labour in a flexible manner according to the labour market demand, has led many multinational companies and professional associations to take a more active role in the international regulation of the global labour market in the direction of a complete liberalization of the mobility of the highly skilled workforce (Lavenex, 2007). Granting permanent residency and citizenship rights to immigrants is necessary for investing in their long-term stability in the country of residence. The so-called ‘denizen status’ improves immigrants’ integration and well-being in several ways. It increases immigrants’ parity (of status and rights) with natives, strengths their sense of attachment to the country of residence and feeling of being politically represented, makes easier for immigrants to cope with welfare benefits’ criteria, which, in turn, has positive effects on their everyday life, future mobility plans and family projects (Paparusso et al., 2017). Strengthening social capital among immigrants through family reunification or diaspora networks is pivotal for immigrants’ subjective integration, especially for those having transnational families, family members left behind in the country of origin or disrupted families in the country of residence. Bonding and bridging social capital have positive consequences in terms of integration and social mobility: it can reduce immigrants’ loneliness, isolation, and depression, by providing forms of collaboration, loyalty, and solidarity and by sharing

146

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

8 Conclusions: Policy Implications of Immigrants’ Subjective …

information, ideas, and values both within the immigrant group itself and with the whole society. Supporting transnational practices is beneficial to immigrants’ subjective well-being. Having a transnational lifestyle can certainly help immigrants to maintain kinship and friendship relations in the country of origin, strengthen the sense of ethno-national belonging, facilitate capital investments, and provide monetary remittances, therefore contributing to develop projects in the home country (Jeffrey & Murison, 2011). However, it has been demonstrated that living a ‘double existence’ in both the country of origin and the country of destination does not hinder the process of integration; conversely, it improves immigrants’ life satisfaction in the country of residence (Ambrosetti & Paparusso, 2020). Boosting gender equality and increasing female participation in the labour market are also extremely important for integration and overall well-being. It has been demonstrated that the full participation of women in the labour market has positive effects in terms of economic growth and subjective well-being of the society as a whole (OECD, 2018a). More information initiatives on the policy measures in place to support immigrant integration are also highly recommended. To this end, it is important to integrate existing hubs and counselling points (and to create new ones) for providing health assistance, legal and employment advice, education and language information, and social support. Differentiated policy measures at local level, according to the subsidiarity principle, are needed to respond more effectively to the needs of immigrant families and more generally to deal with specific local problems. Strong coordination among stakeholders at various levels is therefore desirable. Moreover, identifying the best practices by mapping, classifying, and analysing the characteristics of the integration policies is also recommended for sharing standards and approaches among European countries and cities. Systems of policy evaluation should be correctly implemented. We should look also at the integration of our host societies and not only at the integration of immigrants and their descendants. This will help to reduce the so-called ‘methodological nationalism’ (Faist, 2012), that is host country’s national superiority in judging immigrants’ integration according to own fixed criteria. Integrating objective analyses with subjective results on immigrant integration is the way forward to realize more effective and inclusive policies.

8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research There are some limitations of the Book which must be recognised. First, the empirical analyses presented in this Book are based on cross-sectional surveys conducted in the country of residence: this implies dealing with immigrants who are still in that country. Unsatisfied or not well-integrated immigrants are not accounted for

8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

147

because of the selection process, which excludes those who have already left the country to return to their country of origin or re-migrate. In this regard, there is a need for surveys conducted in the country of origin, to understand the factors that influence immigrants’ decision to leave and in particular, the role played by subjective well-being. Moreover, with cross-sectional surveys conducted in the country of residence, the situation at the date of observation alone is analysed, therefore, the effect of specific life course events on subjective well-being can be only evaluated retrospectively. Although much progress has been done, longitudinal data are still scant or not entirely suitable for the examination of changes of subjective well-being among immigrants. As already noted, immigrants can experience a decrease in their subjective well-being around three years before migration and an increase in their subjective well-being shortly after migration. Nevertheless, for those who report higher happiness or life satisfaction after migration, it is important to determine whether it is a permanent effect or not. Therefore, longitudinal data will naturally be the most important data resource on subjective well-being, to ascertain the effect of specific life course events on immigrants’ changes of subjective well-being. Life satisfaction and happiness are highly variable over lifetime and panel data are essential to investigate such changes. Moreover, the use of longitudinal data could shed light on the causality between factors: indeed, reverse causality between the variables studied in the empirical analyses presented in this Book cannot be proved. To make an example, it is not possible to establish the direction of the relationship between having close friends in the country of residence and higher self-reported life satisfaction, and therefore, to understand whether the presence of close friends increase immigrants’ life satisfaction or, conversely, immigrants who are more satisfied with their life make friends more easily, compared to those who are less satisfied. Therefore, the separation of causes and effects in life satisfaction requires panel data. Second, as already argued, when studying subjective well-being, we may want to study differences between immigrants and natives, or we may be interested in understanding whether migration improves the subjective well-being of people as compared with their experience in the country of origin. However, with the sole exception of the study on subjective well-being and education among children with a migrant background and their native peers in Italy, it was not possible to adopt either of these two approaches, because of the lack of surveys measuring subjective well-being both among natives in the country of destination and among non-migrants in the country of origin. It is also important to compare first- and second-generation immigrants in the country of residence. The integration outcomes of first- and secondgeneration immigrants living in Europe are different (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Heath et al., 2008). The second-generation immigrants experiment a double process of socialisation: with the immigrant community and with the society of settlement, mainly through their participation in mainstream institutions, particularly the education system. If such a process of socialisation takes place under favourable conditions, second-generation immigrants will report better levels of objective and subjective integration during their life, compared to first-generation immigrants (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016). These differences deserve particular attention from researchers and policymakers alike (OECD, 2018b).

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Third, as far as the comparative study on self-reported life satisfaction of firstgeneration immigrants residing in Europe, the ICS dataset was limited to only seven European countries. For instance, Nordic countries, whose immigrants usually show high levels of life satisfaction (e.g., Helliwell et al., 2020), because of the availability of better economic and welfare conditions, are excluded. When studying the immigrant integration process and in particular immigrants’ subjective well-being, one of the best ways to explain diversities (or similarities) in outcomes is through comparative studies. We may compare different immigrant groups in the same institutional context of a nation or a city or we may be interested in comparing the integration of the same immigrant groups in different national or local contexts. Both the categories of comparisons are important to disentangle the different paths of integration and the type of factors that are behind the outcomes of integration. Understanding whether the characteristics of the immigrant groups or the contextual conditions are the main explanatory factors of the subjective well-being of immigrants is fundamental in terms of policymaking. Improving country or city comparisons, clustering individuals and families, is particularly welcome for analyses on the importance of macro-level factors and, therefore, for understanding the importance of institutions and policies in shaping immigrants’ subjective well-being in the country of residence. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that not only surveys but also administrative data and national registries, which are a valuable data source due to their wide size for many research questions, should gradually open to questions regarding components of subjective well-being, which are generally not solicited in such data. This will favour deeper acceptability of the topic of subjective well-being among the measures of individual and societal well-being and, above all, better comparability of results across countries. Fourth, it is worth to highlight that the analyses presented in this Book do not include irregular immigrants. It is well acknowledged that irregular immigrants face more integration problems compared with immigrants holding a regular status (e.g., Paparusso et al., 2017; Singh Garha & Paparusso, 2018). The former generally experience high levels of unemployment, uncomfortable living conditions, and weak social networks. These conditions negatively influence their subjective well-being: for instance, we expect that irregular immigrants experience lower levels of selfreported life satisfaction, compared to regular migrants, and that their levels of life satisfaction depend on both micro- and macro-level factors that are distinctive of their legal condition in the country of residence. In this regard, qualitative data, possibly longitudinal as well, are necessary to make visible the experience of hard-to-reach and vulnerable populations, such as irregular immigrants. Moreover, qualitative data are best suited for uncovering the breadth and diversity of individual situations. Subjective well-being and its determinants are nuanced and varied and sometimes they are not well assessed by fixed-choice survey questions, therefore, qualitative data may help to complete the picture of the mechanisms behind the subjective well-being of both regular and irregular immigrants. Last but not least, future research should incorporate the relationship between immigration and the subjective well-being of natives. While there is extensive literature investigating the impact of immigration on objective measures of well-being,

8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

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such as labour market outcomes, research examining the relationship between immigration and subjective indicators of well-being among natives is still scant (e.g., Akay et al., 2014; Betz & Simpson, 2013; Howley et al., 2019). For instance, the study of Howley et al. (2019) show remarkable results and in particular that in England both foreign-born individuals and migrant share have larger negative effects on the subjective well-being of UK native-born citizens who are older (60+), unemployed and in relatively lower educational and income groups. Moreover, in times of economic stress, the negative subjective well-being impact of immigration seems to be more evident. On the contrary, the subjective well-being of residents born outside the UK appears to be improved by immigration. Similarly and importantly, Tatarko et al. (2021) studied the relationship between immigrant integration policies and the subjective well-being of the host population (non-immigrants). In particular, they examined the relationship between the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) for 22 countries in Europe and subjective well-being, using by the European Social Survey (ESS) data. They found a positive relationship between the MIPEX and non-immigrants’ subjective well-being. Moreover, considering the different components of the MIPEX separately (namely, family reunion, access to nationality, anti-discrimination policies, labour market mobility, access to education, political participation, permanent residence, and attention to immigrants’ health needs), they found most of them being positively related to the subjective well-being of non-immigrants. Moreover, no negative relationship was ascertained between any of the eight MIPEX components and subjective wellbeing, thus concluding that inclusive immigrant integration policies are beneficial not only of the immigrant populations living in the host country but also of the non-immigrants, therefore of the society as a whole. Therefore, the relationship between immigration and the subjective well-being of natives may be an innovative approach to be further developed in the future: it may complement the study of immigrants’ subjective well-being in the residence country as a measure of subjective integration. Indeed, by analysing the effect of immigration on the natives’ subjective well-being, this kind of approach completes the picture of the analysis of social cohesion in increasingly multi-ethnic societies, especially in periods marked by various kinds of crises and distrusts in public institutions, which may increase hostility and xenophobia towards immigrants (Mingo & Faggiano, 2020). The progress of receiving societies consists not only in the ability to successfully integrate newcomers, that is in effectively managing their settlement and interaction with natives, but also in governing the social change that follows, therefore in assuring that the host society does not perceive immigrants as a treat to the labour market, the social identity and the sense of belonging. That will prevent natives from experiencing sentiments of fear and resentment towards immigrants, which, in turn, can produce a worsening of the subjective well-being of both the populations. To avoid this, it is not sufficient only to look at the quality of the relationship between the immigrants and the natives, but it is necessary to also consider the institutional arrangements and policy resources that the host country provides, as well as at the arguments that dominate the public discourse and the political debate, which, by lessening or exacerbating differences and particularisms, may influence the interaction between

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immigrants and natives. The combination of these elements will prevent the risk of social conflict in the host society and will contribute to improving the well-being of both natives and immigrants, thus achieving successful pathways to integration (Akay et al., 2014).

8.4 Concluding Thoughts Integration is often assumed as a linear and unidirectional path along which the immigrants are expected to change almost completely while the host society is supposed to remain the same (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016). This is not true: integration is a dynamic and bidirectional process, where the host society does not remain unaffected by this change. Moreover, integration is not a compulsory path or a straightline process: it is a complex and multifaceted process with unexpected and original results. For instance, it may progress at different paces in its constituting dimensions: immigrants can succeed in achieving one dimension, while they can have difficulties in another domain of integration. Considering all immigrants as a single homogeneous unit is also incorrect. Some individuals of an immigrant community can be successfully integrated into specific spheres of the host societies, while others can stay behind. Even within the same community of origin, immigrants integrate at a different pace. Only if we understand the holistic nature of the immigrant integration process, we will pay the same attention to both immigrants and natives—understood as individuals, groups, and institutions—as complementary actors of the immigrant integration process (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016). The study of immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction has further demonstrated the composite and multidimensional character of the immigrant integration process and the complementary of the objective and subjective perspective in analysing and interpreting its outcomes. Therefore, an integrated assessment of both the objective and subjective dimensions of immigrants’ integration represents a means to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon and to improve the policy actions addressing its constituting domains and its beneficiaries. As far as subjective well-being, a self-assessment of life is asked to immigrants themselves, to see whether their migration and integration experiences match their original expectations when they decided to migrate, as well as their future intentions to remain in the new country of residence. Therefore, the immigrants’ evaluation of their life allows policymakers to consider the opinions of those who benefit from the policies and to remove obstacles to integration. Indeed, we can only design effective policies, if we consider the experiences, needs, wishes and expectations of those directly affected by them. The evaluation of immigrants’ experience in the country of residence, that is the assessment of their subjective integration, acquires particular relevance because of the process of population ageing that European countries are facing today. A decrease in the total population and in particular in the working-age population (people aged

8.4 Concluding Thoughts

151

20–64 years) in the next years will make the contribution of immigrants to European societies even more important, according to the United Nations projections (2019). Between 2020 and 2035, the working-age population in Europe is projected to decrease by 37.2 million with migration (WM) and by 47.1 without migration (ZM) (this is a zero-migration scenario, a purely hypothetical unrealistic case of Europe being entirely closed to migration, which however assumes the same ranges of fertility and mortality of the scenario with migration). What is more, between 2020 and 2050, the working-age population is forecasted to diminish by 74.3 million with migration and by 95.2 without migration, as shown in Table 8.1. Among the European countries considered, Germany and Italy are expected to witness the most significant reductions. Between 2020 and 2035, 6.7 million individuals with migration and 10.8 million individuals without migration would be lost in Germany, while Italy would be deprived of 4.2 million individuals with migration and 5.5 million individuals without migration. Between 2020 and 2050, the decrease is estimated to be of 8.6 million individuals with migration and 15.5 million individuals without migration in Germany and of 9.3 million persons with migration and 11.7 million persons without migration in Italy. The decreases in Spain and the two Visegrád countries considered, namely Poland and Hungary, are predicted to be more limited but still significant. Without migration, there would also be a decrease in the working-age populations of Sweden and France. However, with migration, a slight increase in the working-age population is predicted only in Sweden. These differences mainly depend on the fertility rates of the countries considered: where the fertility rates are slightly higher, but still under the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, such as in France and Sweden, more limited immigration allows to keep the size of the working-age population more stable, compared to countries with the lowest fertility rates, such as Germany, Italy and Spain (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019b). Moreover, the number of women already born is different among the considered countries. It is well acknowledged that immigration alone cannot invert long-term demographic processes: the annual number of immigrants necessary to compensate for low fertility is unrealistic and unsustainable under many points of view (Bagavos, 2019; United Nations, 2000). Therefore, policies aimed at increasing fertility, for instance, helping couples to conciliate family and labour market responsibilities are also necessary (Wesolowski et al., 2020). However, the demographic importance of immigration has already been relevant in the past and will be even more so in the future (Gesano & Strozza, 2011). Especially in Italy, immigrants have responded to the domestic demand for labour in the industry, agricultural, care, and services sectors; besides, they have contributed to respond to population ageing and fertility decline (Gesano & Strozza, 2019). In a perspective of management of international migration and of its consequences for receiving countries, understanding the factors that are positively associated with immigrants’ life satisfaction and other components of subjective well-being will affect their future intentions of permanently settling in the receiving country and, therefore, of economically and demographically contributing to the host society (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2019a). Moreover, with a view to grasping the consequences

49,632

35,645

28,444

23,260

5,835

446,765

France

Germany

Italy

Spain

Poland

Hungary

Europe

409,523

5,291

20,810

25,520

31,404

42,965

5,511

ZM

399,634

5,217

20,936

25,013

30,102

38,833

34,804

2035

35,557

5,884

WM

372,410

4,510

17,197

20,482

26,312

41,095

5,355

ZM

351,568

4,353

17,457

19,450

23,941

34,124

33,033

2050

34,523

6,153

WM

−10,799 −5,542 −3,430 −2,325 −618 −47,131

−6,667 −4,240 −2,924 −2,451 −543 −37,242

−74,355

−1,325

−6,063

−7,962

−9,333

−8,537

−1,793

428

−214 −1,512

158

WM

−95,197

−1,482

−5,803

−8,994

−11,704

−15,508

−3,283

−370

ZM

Total increase (2020–2050)

ZM

−759

WM

Total increase (2020–2035)

Source United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, the 2019 Revision

5,725

36,316

Sweden

2020

Country

Population 20–64

Table 8.1 Working-age population (20–64) in some European countries, 2020, 2035 and 2050 (data in thousands)

152 8 Conclusions: Policy Implications of Immigrants’ Subjective …

8.4 Concluding Thoughts

153

that the recent Coronavirus crisis may have for migratory projects, studying immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction could prove particularly helpful in orienting the set of policy interventions that influence the factors affecting not only the immigrants’ future intentions and behaviours, but also the future economic and demographic dynamics of the host society (Demeny, 2016). Immigrants contribute in a crucial way to our societies. Designing effective policies that can improve their overall life satisfaction means promoting their integration and making European societies more inclusive, cohesive and competitive. Future scenarios can be different if things do not change or if a country does not implement the appropriate policies. Understanding the importance of such a decision has implications for the overall well-being and progress of our societies. Today they are called to face a new challenge: the Covid-19 pandemic and its socio-economic consequences. Under the health point of view, immigrants are at a much higher risk of being infected with the Coronavirus than natives (Rebhun, 2021). This is partly due to the fact that immigrants are over-represented in work sectors that not only have been hardly hit by the pandemic, but that also lead them to continuous contacts with other people: food services, domestic work and caregiving. Immigrants are concentrated in essential occupations that cannot be undertaken from home. Moreover, they often work in precarious jobs without adequate protection and in dangerous conditions (Guadagno, 2020). Immigrants are also more likely to live in higher density buildings and neighbourhoods, which makes the respect of social distancing more difficult. The closure of schools is also likely to have a more painful impact on immigrants and their children. If already under normal conditions there is a gap between children with a migrant background and natives, distance learning has undoubtedly widened the gap (Save the Children, 2020). Home schooling clearly penalizes pupils who do not have a computer, a fast Internet connection, a quiet place to study, a family network able of assisting them with their homework: all elements in which, on average, the children with a migrant background are disadvantaged, compared to native children. Adult education has also been affected by the pandemic. Finally, the current economic crisis may increase sentiments of hostility and fear towards immigrants, who are seen by natives as a threat to the labour market participation, to the welfare system, as well as to the spread of the virus (O’Brien & Eger, 2020) (Photo 8.1). Considering these aspects is of crucial importance for both researchers and policymakers committed not only with immigrant integration but with broader welfare policies. It has to do primarily with our social cohesion, subsequently with our collective growth and competitiveness, ultimately with our innate search for happiness.

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Photo 8.1 Children in a small village school close to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Source Author’s photo

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