Imagining a Postnational World: Hegemony and Space in Modern China 9789004327146, 9789004327153

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鐺 鐸鐓 鑔鑗 鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙 ‰ 鐗鐕鐖鐛 鐧 鑎鑑鑑鐓 鐦鑑鑑 鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘 鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓 鐲鑆鑞 鑓鑔鑙 鑇鑊 鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉 鑎鑓 鑆鑓鑞 鑋鑔鑗鑒 鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙 鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓 鑋鑗鑔鑒 鑙鑍鑊 鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑 鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙 鑋鑆鑎鑗 鑚鑘鑊鑘 鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉 鑚鑓鑉鑊 鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊 鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙 鑑鑆鑜

鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴 鐵鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑎鑓鑌 鐟 鑊鐧鑔鑔鑐 鐨鑔鑑鑑鑊鑈鑙鑎鑔鑓 鐍鐪鐧鐸鐨鐴鑍鑔鑘鑙鐎 鐒 鑕鑗鑎鑓鑙鑊鑉 鑔鑓 鐘鐔鐖鐚鐔鐗鐕鐗鐖 鐛鐟鐙鐘 鐵鐲 鑛鑎鑆 鐺鐳鐮鐻 鐴 鐨鐦鐱鐮 鐴鐷鐳鐮鐦鐒鐧鐪鐷鐰鐪鐱鐪鐾 鐦鐳鐟 鐖鐘鐛鐝鐖鐖鐛 鐠 鐲鑆鑙鑙鑊鑓鐑 鐲鑆鑗鑈 鐦鑓鑉鑗鑊鐓鐠 鐮鑒鑆鑌鑎鑓鑎鑓鑌 鑆 鐵鑔鑘鑙鑓鑆鑙鑎鑔鑓鑆鑑 鐼鑔鑗鑑鑉 鐟 鐭鑊鑌鑊鑒鑔鑓鑞 鑆鑓鑉 鐸鑕鑆鑈鑊 鑎鑓 鐲鑔鑉鑊鑗鑓 鐨鑍鑎鑓鑆 鐦鑈鑈鑔鑚鑓鑙鐟 鑘鐖鐗鐗鐛鐘鐜鐕

Imagining a Postnational World

Brill’s Series on Modern East Asia in a Global Historical Perspective Series Editors Billy K.L. So (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) Madeleine Zelin (Columbia University)

Editorial Board Prasenjit Duara (National University of Singapore) Wang Fan-sen (Academia Sinica) Rana Mitter (Oxford University) Joshua Fogel (York University Toronto) John Makeham (La Trobe University) Charles Armstrong (Columbia University) Tomobe Kenichi (Osaka University)

volume 5

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/meah

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Matten, Marc Andre. Title: Imagining a postnational world : hegemony and space in modern China /  by Marc Andre Matten. Description: Leiden : Brill, 2016. | Series: Brill’s series on modern East  Asia in a global historical perspective, ISSN 2212-1730 ; volume 5 |  Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifijiers: LCCN 2016030317 (print) | LCCN 2016035312 (ebook) | ISBN  9789004327146 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004327153 (ebook) | ISBN  9789004327153 (E-book) Subjects: LCSH: China—Foreign relations—East Asia. | East Asia—Foreign  relations—China. | China—Foreign relations—1976– | Hegemony—China. Classifijication: LCC DS518.15 .M38 2016 (print) | LCC DS518.15 (ebook) | DDC  327.5105—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016030317

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 2212-1730 isbn 978-90-04-32714-6 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-32715-3 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhofff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

For my parents

∵

Contents Preface & Acknowledgements ix List of Figures xi Introduction 1 1 Space, Territory, and National Sovereignty in Modern East Asia 13 2 Reconceptualizing World Order after the Tribute System 32 2.1 Doubting Political Order in Late Imperial China 45 2.2 Territory and Space after the Reconceptualization of World Order in Late Nineteenth Century 63 3 The Legal Principle of National Sovereignty in Modern East Asia 79 3.1 Globalizing International Law 79 3.2 National Sovereignty and the Problem of Territoriality vs. Spatiality 88 3.3 The Monroe Doctrine as a Global Spatial Principle 96 4 The Territoriality of National Sovereignty 112 4.1 Boundaries and the Emergence of Territorial Maps 119 4.2 Territorial Integrity and the Fear of Partition in China 154 5 Fighting the White Peril: Japan’s Turn to Spatiality 162 5.1 The White Peril: Placing the Outside Enemy 162 5.2 Japan’s Attitude toward its Asian Neighbors until 1894 173 5.3 Pan-Asian Thinking and the Rise of the Asian Monroe Doctrine 183 5.4 Japanese Pan-Asianism during World War I and Beyond 203 6 Pacifying the Hostis: China’s Return to Ecumenical Morality 225 6.1 The Scary Demon: Reconciling the Inside Enemy 232 6.2 Datong and the Idea of Universal Harmony in International Society 241 6.3 Going beyond the Nation-State: Tianxia as Alternative World Order in Twentieth-Century China 250 Excursus: The Renaissance of Tianxia in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought 258

viii

Contents

7 Lessons from the Past: Visions of World Order Today 277 7.1 Overcoming Hegemoniality 286 7.2 The Spatiality of Tianxia and the Dissolution of Ontological Enemies 293 Conclusion 299 Bibliography 307 Reference Works 307 Primary Sources 308 Secondary Sources 312 Index 357

Preface & Acknowledgements In the recent decades China has witnessed an impressive economic rise that has surprised (and sometimes shocked) the world. This rise once brought me to sinology as an undergraduate student at a time when doing Chinese studies was still an exception. Yet, the developments since then have convinced both media and academia that today nobody can do without China anymore (including me as a historian). Undoubtedly the achievements since the reform and opening policy in 1978—that only started with effforts in creating economic growth and now struggle to generate a cultural impact in world society as well—are by some observers easily equaled to the political and military rise of a formerly communist country that is believed (or even feared) to become a substantial danger to global stability and the existing distribution of resources and wealth. While there is also a number of voices emphasizing the greater integration of China into world society—making it a more responsible partner in global afffairs—the medial representation of its transformation only seldom corresponds to actual reality. This issue—a regularly discussed topic outside and inside academia (and also in my teaching on contemporary Chinese history)—was the original motivation to write this book. The task of it is however neither to show what future reality looks like, nor to predict whether or when China would possibly replace American hegemony. These are concerns that are in many cases influenced by the still-prevailing Orientalism. My intention is to go beyond the simple and ideological rhetoric involved here and to explain the rise of China diffferently. I hope to show how China’s effforts of repositioning itself in a rapidly globalizing world are influenced by the ambition to restore tenets of traditional political thought, a phenomenon that can only inadequately be interpreted as a return to the past where a sinocentric empire claimed to rule all-under-heaven. This book has profijited much from friends and colleagues I have met in the last years. While writing I have encountered many obstacles and arduous tasks that sometimes slowed me down yet never impeded me from continuing. My fijirst and foremost thank goes to Michael Lackner for giving me the “space” to write this monograph. Great progress in rewriting was made during a time away from both teaching and family at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Nanjing University. I deeply appreciate the hospitality of Sun Jiang, Chen Yunqian and Li Lifeng when being in Nanjing. I also thank William Callahan, Thomas Fröhlich, Sven Saaler, Axel Schneider and Torsten Weber for their hints and much appreciated help in things small and big, providing me with rare documents and hardly accessible sources.

x

Preface & Acknowledgements

I vividly remember thought-provoking discussions and exchanges with them that occurred at conferences in East and West. In fact, this book has profited much from previous presentations at conferences and workshops in Shanghai, Beijing, Honolulu, Toronto, Zürich, Göttingen, Nanjing, Erlangen, Taibei and Leiden where I was able to present parts and pieces of this book. I thank the audiences and commentators at these events. Helpful were also Iwo Amelung, Kai Vogelsang, Matthias Zachmann and Peter Zarrow. I have profijited from Clemens Kaufffmann’s comments in the area of political philosophy, and from Thomas Fröhlich’s thoughtful advice with regard to political Confucianism. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, Nicole Wayland for her meticulous and inspiring proof-reading, as well as Sema Yakar for fijinal corrections of the manuscript. My most profound gratitude goes to my parents who once challenged me with learning Chinese; to Hon Tze-ki who has always been a great critic; and last but not least to my students in Erlangen and elsewhere who never shied away from difffijicult questions inside and outside the classroom. I dedicate this book to them. Igelsdorf, Spring 2016

List of Figures 1 2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

The Eastern Hemisphere, as depicted in the Short Account of the Maritime Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe ♋ሠᘇ⮕), 1848 5 Ma Xingchi 俜ᱏ俣 (1873–1934), The Danger of Foreigners Using Railways to Invade China (Wairen yi tiedao qinlüe Zhongguo zhi weixiang ᄖੱએ㐅㆏ଚ⇛ਛ࿡ਯෂ⽎), 1908 7 The Situation in the Far East (Shijutu ᤨዬ࿩), 1899/1900 9 Complete Map of the Imperial Territory of the Great Qing (Da Qingguo jiangyu zongtu བྷ␵഻⮶ฏ㑭െ), late Qing 127 Map of Quzhou Prefecture in Zhejiang province, 1903 138 Map of Chinese National Humiliation (Zhonghua guochi ditu ਛ⪇࿡ᕯ࿾࿩), 1929 149 Map of China’s National Humiliation (Zhongguo guochi ditu ਛ࿡࿡ᕯ࿾࿩), 1927 151 “Völker Europas, wahrt Eure heiligsten Güter,” 1895 166 Confucius: “Volkeren van Azie, verdedigt uwe heilige goederen!”, 1900 168

The images in this book are without exception in the public domain in their country of origin (none of the images are younger than seventy years). According to copyright laws of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China all image works, and all works whose copyright holder is a juristic person, enter the public domain 50 years after they were fijirst published. US and German copyright law list 70 years accordingly. Every efffort has been made to contact possible copyright holders. However, if there is anybody who has not been contacted, please contact the publisher in the fijirst instance.

Introduction In 1905 the Japanese deputy consul in Changsha in Hunan province, Ihara Sanezumi Ӆ৏ⵏ▴, reported to his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Afffairs in Tōkyō his personal observation that the Hunanese people were very proud of their history. They had succeeded in developing a strong regional consciousness fostered by the pride of the glorious deeds of Zeng Guofan ᴮ഻㰙 (1811–1872), Hunan’s outstanding scholar, and the province’s great achievements in economy and politics in recent years.1 The modernization of Hunan had just taken offf in 1895, after China’s defeat in the war against Japan, when the provincial governor Chen Baozhen 䲣ሦ㇤ (1831–1900, a Hakka born in the province of Jiangxi) founded an offfijice for the exploitation of mineral resources, established a telegraph line between Hankou and Changsha, and founded an arsenal, a chemical factory as well as a company providing schools and examination halls with electric light.2 Chen’s intention was to strengthen Hunan against foreign pressure and imperialist exploitation. The Academy of Current Afffairs (Shiwu xuetang ᱲउᆨา), founded in August 1897 in Changsha, pursued a similar aim by educating new elites.3 The same year saw the publication of the Hunan Educational Journal (Xiangxuebao ⒈ ᆨ๡), which propagated a slow, yet thorough, reform program.4 The teaching personnel at the Academy, among them the journalist Liang Qichao ằஃ䎵 (1873–1929), the reformer Huang Zunxian 哳䚥២ (1848–1905) and the scholar Xiong Xiling ➺ᐼ喑 (1870–1937, the director of the Shiwu xuetang and later 1  For this report, see Shinkoku Konanshō gaiyō hōkoku ᷡ࿖ḓධ⋭᭎ⷐႎ๔, in Chōsa ryōjikan hōkoku sho 㐳ᴕ㗔੐㙚ႎ๔ᦠ, April 1905–June 1913, document number 6-1-6-62, Archive of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Afffairs (Gaimushō ᄖോ⋭). 2  The reason Chen, a scholar offfijicial from Jiangxi, engaged in a reform program in Hunan was because he had aided Zeng Guofan in the suppression of the Taiping and also became governor of Hunan in late 1895. 3  On the program of the Shiwu xuetang, see also the discussion by Liang Qichao, Hunan shiwu xuetang xueyue ḓධᤨോቑၴቑ⚂, in Liang Qichao quanji, 10 vols. (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), 107–109. On Liang’s activities in Hunan, see Satō Ichirō ૒⮮৻㇢, Ryō Keichō ni okeru Konan ᪞໪⿥ߦ߅ߌࠆḓධ, in Yamada Tatsuo ጊ↰ㄖ㓶, ed., Kindai Chūgoku jinbutsu kenkyū ㄭઍਛ࿖ੱ‛⎇ⓥ (Tōkyō: Keiō Tsūshin, 1989), 75–90. 4  The journal was published from April 1897 to August 1898. In issue 37, Zhang Zhidong published his influential article “Exhortation to Study (Quanxuepian ൥ቑ▻).” On the history of the Xiangxuebao and its successor, the Xiangbao ⒈๡, see Lin Nengshi ᨋ⢻჻, Qingji Hunan de xinzheng yundong ᷡቄḓධ⊛ᣂ᡽ㆇേ (Taipei: Jinghua yinshuguan, 1972), 64–76.

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2

Introduction

Premier of the Republic of China from 1913 to 1914), started their reform program after Germany had annexed Kiautschou (Jiaozhou ⤔Ꮊ) in Shandong province in the new race for concessions. The fear that China might soon be under the full control of the European powers caused Liang to call for radical measures. In a report on the reform movement in Hunan and Guangdong, he asked—in response to the German aggression—to declare Hunan’s independence (duli ⦘・) as a precondition for the survival of the country that had already sufffered severely from social Darwinism and imperialism: 㫻⮦ᱲ↓ᗧӪ‫ྚץ‬㟐ᐎѻᱲˈࡇ഻࠶ࢢѝ഻ѻ䄆བྷ䎧ˈ᭵⒆ইᘇ༛Ӫ Ӫ֌ӑਾѻെˈᙍ‫⒆؍‬ইѻ⦘・DŽ㘼⦘・ѻᬗˈ䶎ਟオ䀰ˈᗵަӪ≁ 㘂ᯬ᭯㺃ˈ㜭ᴹ㠚⋫ѻሖ䳋❦ᖼਟDŽ

When Germany annexed Kiautschou, the discussion arose that the powers divided China among itself. Thus, upright men from Hunan made plans for the time after the decay of China. Their aim was to assure the independence of Hunan. This was not just idle talk; it was necessary to train the people in the art of government and to make them familiar with the practice of autonomy.5 According to Ihara’s report, the great achievements in the Hunan reform program fostered not only a provincial pride but also—due to the century-long isolation of the province—a very distinct spirit that convinced the local people that Hunan belonged to the Hunanese.6 When publishing the influential pamphlet The New Hunan (Xin Hunan ᯠ⒆ই) in Tōkyō in 1902, the scholar and revolutionary Yang Shouren ὺᆸӱ (1872–1911)7 argued that the solution for China’s dismay was indeed to strengthen the provinces, not only with regard to 5  As argued by Liang in his report on the situation in Hunan and Guangdong (Hunan Guangdong qingxing ⒆ইᔓᶡᛵᖒ) in his summary of the Hundred Days’ Reform movement, Wuxu zhengbianji ᠺᠼ᭯䆺䁈 (1898). See Liang Qichao quanji, 246. 6  Shinkoku Konanshō gaiyō hōkoku ᷡ࿖ḓධ⋭᭎ⷐႎ๔, in Chōsa ryōjikan hōkoku sho 㐳ᴕ 㗔੐㙚ႎ๔ᦠ, April 1905–June 1913, document number 6-1-6-62, Archive of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Afffairs. For a good and well-funded overview of the patriotism of the Hunanese people, see Stephen R. Platt, Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 7  During the late 1890s, he had taught at the Shiwu xuetang together with Tang Caichang ୀ᡽Ᏹ (1867–1900) and Liang Qichao. In 1902 he went to Japan to study at the Kōbun Academy and later at Waseda University. His pamphlet is based on the piece The New Guangdong (Xin Guangdong ᣂᑝ᧲) published by Ou Jujia ᱏ᭗↲ (1858–1912) in Yokohama in the same year. For a biography of Yang, cf. Feng Ziyou, Geming yishi 䶙ભ䙨ਢ, vol. 2 (Taiwan Shangwuyin huiguan, 1939): 125–28.

Introduction

3

the necessary modernization but also as a means for protection against interventions of the autocratic central government in Beijing.8 He sensed that the inability of the Manchurian Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to participate in the fijight against foreign aggression made a new political order necessary. For doing so, it was considered imperative to enforce the autonomy of each province, because the Qing had seemingly failed to create an ethnically, culturally, and economically united state despite their control of the central government. In Yang’s eyes, China was less a united state than a polity whose eighteen provinces constituted eighteen independent states. He remarked that if the Hunanese wanted to renew China, Hunan had to be renewed fijirst, and all afffairs in Hunan should be settled by the Hunanese (ḓධ⠪㧘๋ḓධੱਯḓධ਽).9 This conclusion was propagated more forcefully in the year 1920 when the Hunan Self-Government Movement (Hunan zizhi yundong ⒆ই㠚⋫䙻अ) declared the Monroe Doctrine for Hunan. On September 5, Long Jiangong 喽 ެ‫( ޜ‬1889–1951) published in the newspaper L’Impartial (Dagongbao བྷ‫ޜ‬๡) an editorial titled “A Monroe Doctrine for Hunan” (Hunan Menluozhuyi ⒆ই 䮰㖵ѫ㗙). It reproduced for the province the principle of noninterference, which, since its reception in the late nineteenth century, proved to become the most influential principle in the Chinese fijight for national sovereignty. The following day, the young Mao Zedong ∋◔ᶡ (1893–1976) published an article titled “Absolute Support for the Hunanese Monroe Doctrine” ( Juedui zancheng Hunan Menluozhuyi ㎅ሽ䌺ᡀ⒆ই䮰㖵ѫ㗙).10 Here a principle originally applied in the fijield of international relations was reproduced for the inner Chinese context. Although the call for provincial independence was a temporary aberration in the process of nation building, policy proposals like that of Yang and Mao reflect one of the most inextricable problems Chinese scholars and politicians were facing at that time, namely, how to solve the conundrum of governmental power and territorial expansion. Since becoming part of a world that favored a division into nation-states, the Chinese Empire has faced 8 

9  10 

For the same purpose, the Cantonese students in Japan had founded in spring 1901 the Guangdong Independence Society (Guangdong duli xiehui ᔓᶡ⦘・঄ᴳ). The aim of this society was to declare independence from the Qing dynasty. Sun Yat-sen is supposed to have supported the aims of this society. See Feng, Geming yishi 䶙ભ䙨ਢ, vol. 1, 55. Yang Shouren ὺᆸӱ, “Xin Hunan ᣂḓධ,” Wan Qing geming wenxue ᲊ␵䶙ભ᮷ᆨ, ed. Zhang Yufa ᕥ⦹⌅, 67–68 (Taibei: Xinzhi zazhi she, 1971). These articles have been reproduced in History of the Self-government Movement in Hunan (Hunan zizhi yundongshi ⒆ই㠚⋫䙻अਢ , compiled by Wang Wuwei ⦻❑ ⛪ (Shanghai: Taidong tushuju, 1920). For a translation of later articles on Hunan selfgovernment, cf. Angus W. McDonald Jr., “Mao Tse-tung and the Hunan Self-government Movement, 1920: An Introduction and Five Translations,” The China Quarterly, no. 68 (1976): 751–77.

4

Introduction

this problem, and this has negated its former ecumenical ambitions. Similar to the creation of nations in Europe, China had in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to solve the problem of making territory (lingtu 㗔࿯) and people (renmin ੱ᳃) congruent, for only then could it properly enjoy national sovereignty (zhuquan ਥᰨ). With the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution in October 1911, the provinces of China declared their independence, putting the Monroe Doctrine into political reality. Their independence was viewed by some provinces as an act of restoration (restoring pre-Qing rule and thus liberating itself from the Manchurian autocracy) but by others as an explicit act of political independence that should only later be revoked. In fact, within seven weeks of the uprising in Wuchang, a large number of provinces declared either restoration or their outright independence, among them Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Guangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Shandong, Sichuan, Tibet, and Mongolia (only Gansu, Henan, and Zhili remained loyal to the Qing court). Although the majority of provinces were later integrated into the new republic founded on January 1, 1912 (thereby losing their independence from the central government), others were able to preserve their status (e.g., Outer Mongolia) or at least question their afffijiliation to China. This seems to contradict the long-cherished wish for territorial integrity. For the nationalist movement, Outer Mongolia became a lost territory, and this was caused by its strong independence movement that was largely a reaction to the Qing occupation and the imperial policies in the last decade of the dynasty aiming to assimilate the Mongols (among other ethnicities). This loss was not explicitly bewailed by later generations, contrary to other regions largely inhabited by non-Han Chinese, such as Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, which are currently considered an indisputable part of Chinese territory. This example shows how undetermined the relation among territory, people, and national sovereignty actually was at a time when the nation—defijined by this triad—emerged as the new political order. This indeterminacy resulted, as I argue, from being unfamiliar with the modern concept of territoriality that came to structure the global society according to European criteria. When Xu Jiyu ᗀ㒬⮜ (1795–1873), the scholar-offfijicial and geographer of the late Qing dynasty, compiled his Short Account of the Maritime Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe ♋ሠᘇ⮕) in 1848, he included a map of the Eastern Hemisphere that lacked a concept of national territory in the sense of bounded space. A comparison of Europe and China on the map shows China divided into provinces whereas Europe is divided into nation-states.

Introduction

Figure 1

5

The Eastern Hemisphere, as depicted in the Short Account of the Maritime Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe ♋ሠᘇ⮕), 1848.11

The indeterminacy changed to some extent after the arrival of national thinking and nationalism in the late imperial era. Researchers studying this transfer process have been busy explaining why this ideology came to China and what consequences it had on Chinese political history.12 In fact, the twentieth 11  12 

Yinghuan zhilüe, 1.1b–2, 1848. Public domain, according to https://commons.wikimedia .org/wiki/File:The_Map_of_Earth-zh-classical.png (last access April 30, 2016). Sabine Dabringhaus, Territorialer Nationalismus in China: Historisch-geographisches Denken 1900–1949 (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2006); Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); John Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Afffairs, no. 33 (1995): 75–104; Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Kauko Laitinen, Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Mandchu Propagandist (London: Curzon Press, 1990); Liu Qingfeng ࢹ䶂ጠ, ed., Minzuzhuyi yu

6

Introduction

century in Chinese history has rightfully been called “a century of nationalism.” National pride and national shame interchangeably enjoyed popularity among both intellectual circles and commoners, by being either optimistic or pessimistic of the fate of the Chinese nation (to quote the famous book by William Callahan).13 Late-nineteenth-century literati often issued the grievance that the weak nation might decay in the struggle for survival (wangguo ӑ഻) if it did not wake up.14 What was at the core of each nationalist movement in the twentieth century was not only the survival of the country (in a literal sense) but also its territorial integrity. The fear of China being carved up like a melon was a central element in the minds of late-Qing thinkers, as the caricature in Figure 2 shows. In it, the foreign powers of England, Japan, and Russia are engaging in the construction of railroad lines (designated by the melon sprouts), which would be used for getting a piece of Chinese territory. England, as the most powerful authority in China, holds the knife that will be used to carve up the sleeping old empire.15

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14 

15 

Zhongguo xiandaihua ≁᯿ѫ㗙㠷ѝ഻⨮ԓॆ (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hongkong, 1994); Sakamoto Hiroko ൲‫ݳ‬ȇȢᆀ, Chūgoku minzokushugi no shinwa: jinshu—shintai—jendā ѝഭ≁᯿ѫ㗙ȃ⾎䂡: ੱ⒳࡮り૕࡮ࠫࠚࡦ࠳࡯ (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2004); Gunter Schubert, Chinas Kampf um die Nation: Dimensionen nationalistischen Denkens in der VR China, Taiwan und Hongkong an der Jahrtausendwende (Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, 2002); James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” Australian Journal of Chinese Afffairs 27 (1992): 97–130; Martin C. Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China 1923–1928 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Young-tsu Wong, Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869–1936 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989); Zhao Suisheng, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). William Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For the history of the national humiliation movement see also Zheng Wang, Never forget national humiliation: historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). Rudolf Wagner has published a detailed paper on the sleeping lion metaphor, “China ‘Asleep’ and ‘Awakening’: A Study in Conceptualizing Asymmetry and Coping with It,” Transcultural Studies, no. 1 (2011): 4–139. Also published on http://dx.doi.org/10.11588/ ts.2011.1.7315. The use of cartoons and maps—that after 1915 would evolve into maps of national shame depicting territorial losses due to foreign aggression—was a powerful means to communicate the political message to the Chinese people, as I show throughout this book.

7

Introduction

Figure 2 Ma Xingchi 俜ᱏ俣 (1873–1934), The Danger of Foreigners Using Railways to Invade China (Wairen yi tiedao qinlüe Zhongguo zhi weixiang ᄖੱએ㐅㆏ଚ ⇛ਛ࿡ਯෂ⽎), 1908.16

The melon icon found its expression especially in graphic depictions that enjoyed a wide circulation among the populace, thereby turning national sovereignty—coupled with territorial integrity—into the highest political aim throughout the twentieth century, whether it be for the anti-Manchurian movement in the late Qing era, the Kuomintang (KMT) before 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Maoist period, or for today’s leadership in Beijing. From an intellectual historian’s point of view, this concern seems selfexplanatory, but it cannot explain the actual power this fear of partition has produced among political leaders as well as the majority of the people or why the fear is still to this day so prevailing, despite the insight that nationalism is nothing more than an ideological construct.17

16 

17 

Shenzhou Ribao ⾎ᐎᰕ๡, 14 April 1908. Library of the Harvard Yenching Institute. This illustration is taken from Wagner 2011. I thank Rudolf Wagner for pointing me out to his publication. Ma Xingchi—a man from the Hui community in Jining, Shandong Province—became famous for his cartoons and political cartoons in particular. He was the main cartoonist of The National Herald (Shenzhou ribao), and in 1910 became also the editor of The National Herald Illustrated (Shenzhou huabao ␹Ꮊ⇠ႎ). Current copyright holder for this image could not be found. This insight is not widely shared by scholars in the PRC. In general, nationalism in China is conceived as an essentialist ideology, and there is only a subtle critique of nationalism (despite the wide reception of Duara’s Rescuing History from the Nation, which has been available in Chinese translation since 2003). An exception is certainly Zhao Suisheng, but he is based in the United States.

8

Introduction

A closer view of the cartographic imagination of China dating to the last two decades of Qing dynasty (1644–1911) can help to clarify. In 1898 the Hong Kong paper Furen wenshe shekan 䕄ӱ᮷⽮⽮࠺, founded by the Cantonese Tse Tsan Tai (i.e., Xie Zuantai 䅍㓈⌠, 1872–1937),18 published a map under the title Map of the Current Situation (Shiju quantu ᱲተ‫ޘ‬െ). The paper again warned its readers that if the necessary measures were not taken, China would eventually—being “carved up like a melon” (⬌࠶)—cease to exist.19 This fear had been nurtured by the negative example of Poland, which had sufffered the fate of partition in the eighteenth century and had disappeared from the map fully in 1795, with its territory being divided among Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. This example was intended to incite the Chinese to stand together to rise against the foreign rule of the Manchus and resist further imperialist aggression.20 The later, colored version of Tse’s map, republished in 1899 or 18 

19 

20 

Xie was a member of the Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui 㠸ѝᴳ) and close associate of Sun Yat-sen. For a biography of Xie, see Feng, Geming yishi 䶙ભ䙨ਢ, vol. 2, 22–24, and Wagner, “China ‘Asleep’ and ‘Awakening,’ ” 90–92. The trope guafen is not a neologism invented by those who were worried about China’s national survival. It is an expression that was already in use during the Han dynasty, where it was used to bewail the division of imperial rule and the breakup of the unifijied empire. See here the exemplary biographies of Jia Yi 䋸䃬 (200–168 BC) of the Han dynasty and Duan Zhuo ⇥⚬ of the Jin period. For Jia, see Hanshu ṽᦠ, vol. 48, Liezhuan, no. 18, in Hanshu: 2221–65, esp. 2260, and for Duan see Jinshu ᱹᴨ, vol. 48, Liezhuan, no. 18, in Jinshu: 1336–79, esp. 1339. Also compelling is the discussion by Liu Zongyuan ḣᇇ‫ݳ‬ (773–819) in his famous text Fengjianlun ሱᔪ䇪, where it reads that the Zhou dynasty had possessed the all-under-heaven (tianxia) but lost it due to division of the land (ઘ ᴹཙлΤ㻲൏⭠㘼⬌࠶ѻ). Liu was—together with Li Baiyao ᵾⲮ㰕 (565–648) and Du You ᶌց (735–812)—convinced that the feudal system of the Zhou could no longer be restored and thus favored the junxian 䜑㑓 system of the Qin dynasty. His text Fengjianlun appeared as a reaction to the Anlushan Rebellion (755–763), when the future role of the fijiefdoms became a political problem. Even literary works discussed the danger of partition. In 1903 an author named Xuanyuan Zhengyi 䔂䕵↓㼄 published a novel titled Notes on the Prophecized Catastrophe of Partition (Guafen canhuo yuyan ji ⬌࠶ឈ⾽乀䀰䁈). This political novel appears to have been originally written by a female Japanese author named Nakae Tokusai ᷕ㰇 ㈔␸ (whose work is again a translation of an earlier Chinese book titled Prophecy of Catastrophe [Canhuo yuyan ᜘⾨亴䀰]) and translated by Xuanyuan Zhengyi, whose pseudonym translates as “the true descendant of the Yellow Emperor.” As there is no Japanese author with this name (or a novel with this or a similar name), it is highly probable that the Japanese authorship is insinuated for avoiding political persecution by the Qing authorities (the novel attributes China’s fate to the selfijishness and lacking patriotism among the Manchus). It is important to point out the author’s hint that a partition of China by the foreign powers is not only dangerous for China’s survival but also concerns Japan’s security. See Xuanyuan Zhengyi 䔂䕵↓㼄, Guafen canhuo yuyan ji ⬌࠶ឈ⾽乀

Introduction

Figure 3

21 

9

The Situation in the Far East (Shijutu ᤨዬ࿩), 1899/1900.21

䀰䁈 (Shanghai: Dushe, 1903). According to the fijindings of Nakamura Tadashi, the Guafen canhuo yuyan ji was mentioned in a list of dangerous publications (ড䳚ࠪ⡸⢙) compiled and closely monitored by Qing authorities. See Nakamura Tadashi ѝᶁ㗙, Shingai kakumeishi kenkyū 䗋ӕ䶙ભਢ⹄ウ (Tōkyō: Miraisha, 1979), 124. For a detailed graphic analysis of this map cf. Wagner 2011. There are no restrictions for this image according to US National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/5634178 (last access April 30, 2016).

10

Introduction

1900 under a slightly diffferent title, depicted the imminent partition22 more forcefully than the fijirst version drawn in 1898.23 Compared to the map by Xu Jiyu, this map shows that a territorially based national consciousness had gained fijirm ground within a few decades. In 1899 Liang Qichao wrote in his article “A Note of Warning on the Partition of China” (Guafen weiyan ⬌࠶ড䀰) that the fate of China depended not only on the behavior of Russia, England, and Germany (who all had a distinct interest in gaining access to China) but also on the behavior of the Chinese themselves (where responsibility and ethics of the national citizens were supposed to be territorialized). His critique addressed directly the inability of the Qing administration to deal with foreign pressure and pointed out that China as the sick man of the East needed a cure to be strengthened in the global struggle for survival.24 The necessary cure was the ideology of nationalism, which helped 22 

23 

24 

Feng, Geming yishi 䶙ભ䙨ਢ, vol. 2, 22–24. For a detailed analysis of this map and its function as a powerful metaphor in late Qing political discourse, cf. Wagner, “China ‘Asleep’ and ‘Awakening.’ ” The colored version of the map has been reproduced multiple times, such as in the form of a political postcard in 1899 or 1900. Another version appeared in 1903 in the newspaper Eshi jingwen ‫״‬һ䆖㚎 issued by Cai Yuanpei. Cf. here the article “The Present Situation (Xianshi ⨮ऒ),” Eshi jingwen, December 1903, reprinted in Zhonghua Minguo shiliao congbian, A12 (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui dangshi shiliao bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1983), 7–9. The fijirst version was most likely published in Japan, as Xie reported decades later in his Secret History of the Revolution. See Tse Tsan Tai, “The Chinese Republic: Secret History of the Revolution,” South China Morning Post, 1924, 9. Cf. also Wagner, “China ‘Asleep’ and ‘Awakening,’ ” 17–19. Liang explains this development with the wrong assessment of the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896. This treaty was signed on June 3, 1896, in Moscow by Foreign Minister Alexey Lobanov-Rostovsky and Finance Minister Serge Witte, and Viceroy Li Hongzhang on behalf of China. The two powers concluded a defensive alliance against Japan, pledging mutual support in case of a Japanese attack. Only at fijirst sight did this treaty seem to help China against Japanese aggression (by later leading to the return of the Liaodong Peninsula in the course of the Tripartite Intervention), but eventually came at a high price: the Russian empire was granted railway lines and mining concessions in China’s northeast, both guarded by their military forces. In other words, with one treaty whole Manchuria was lost. Diffferentiating between forms of physical and nonphysical partition (ᴹᖒѻ⬌࠶ˈ❑ᖒѻ⬌࠶), Liang argues here that the latter is more dangerous because the people are less aware of it, in contrast to a thorough partition achieved by a total defeat in war, for example. Liang describes the tendency of European nations to resort to fox strategies instead of simply applying brute force as a tiger would do (Ӻↀ ⍢਴഻ѻ᭯ㆆˈⲶ⤀㹼ҏˈ䶎㱾㹼ҏ). See Guafen weiyan ⬌࠶ড䀰, in Qingyibao, nos. 15, 16, 17, 23 (May–August 1899) (here taken from Yinbingshi wenji, 872–86). On China as a sick man see Yang Ruisong who has recently shown what role the metaphor of the

Introduction

11

intellectuals in the last two decades of the Qing Empire to imagine new ways of defijining Chineseness, which is to determine who belongs to China and who is excluded from the nation-to-be.25 Any nationalism that intends to function properly as a means to create and maintain a certain political order, however, cannot simply limit itself to the question, “Who is Chinese?” but also has to answer the question, “Where is China?” (i.e., its territorial extension). I show that discussions on the geographical whereabouts of China were largely absent in the years after the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 because more often than not the territorial expansion was taken for granted. In other words, the link between people (renmin) and territory (lingtu) remained astonishingly weak. Even though the slogan “China is the China of the Chinese” ruled the political thinking of many nationalist thinkers then (and now), a clear territorial consciousness was lacking. They were convinced that the nation-state was supposed to inherit the imperial borders, thus implying some kind of territorial continuity. In existing research, the origin of this kind of thinking is largely understudied. Instead of taking for granted the myth of a unifijied country with its territorial claims with regard to Taiwan, parts of the South China Sea, and other regions (as current nationalism in China does),26 I aim to fijind out how perceptions of territoriality and spatiality have influenced political (and especially national) thinking in twentieth-century China. First, I discuss the core values of the ethics of international relations to Japan and China, which included most prominently the principle of noninterference, or, more precisely, national sovereignty. In the nineteenth century, when the European powers intensifijied their imperialist and colonial engagement in East Asia, they produced a global ethic that was inflected by a civilizational geographic imaginary.27 This imaginary assured them that there was an unquestionable hierarchy of nations, allowing certain privileges and

25  26 

27 

“sick man of the East” played in political discourse (Bingfu, huanghuo yu shuishi: Xifang shiye de Zhongguo xingxiang yu jindai Zhongguo guozu lunshu xiangxiang ⯵ཛǃ哳⾽ 㠷ⶑ⥵:Ā㾯ᯩā㿆䟾Ⲵѝ഻ᖒ䊑㠷䘁ԓѝ഻഻᯿䄆䘠ᜣ‫[ ۿ‬Taibei: Zhengda chubanshe, 2010]). Marc Andre Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen: Nationale Identitätsstiftung im China des 20. Jahrhunderts (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz-Verlag, 2009). Likewise, Japanese nationalism takes for granted the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. This phenomenon is by no means limited to China but can rather be conceived as a general characteristic of any nationalist ideology, showing the predominant obsession for territorial integrity. Gerrit W. Gong, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ and the Entry of Non-European Countries into International Society: The Cases of China, Japan, and Siam.” PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1980.

12

Introduction

rights only to the European nations. China and Japan were thus obliged to fijight for the right of national sovereignty and noninterference and could not expect that these rights were simply granted. When engaging in the project of (political) modernization (a project that intended to catch up with the more advanced nations), both countries had to ask how to cope with that imaginary. The effforts to reproduce it soon proved to be futile because equal standing— a central condition for recognition of national sovereignty—was not conceded, even in the case of Japan, which became a modern nation surprisingly quick. Due to these negative experiences Chinese and Japanese thinkers experimented during the 1940s with alternative imaginaries that tried to transcend the Western nation-state, such as in the case of pan-Asianism and the renaissance of the all-under-heaven (tianxia) idea.28 To achieve such alternative world order, leaving behind realist theory was necessary, and this included a farewell to the aim of becoming a global power. Reality surely proved otherwise (considering the imperialist and colonialist attitudes of both countries then and now), but these issues were awkwardly absent in the formulation of alternative imaginaries. Next, I show how their proposals, which emerged after the reception of European international law, are not simply effforts to project diffferent modernities but should be seen as creative ways of combining modern conceptions of world order with traditional tenets. Their creativity notwithstanding, the morally inflicted visions of order—either pan-Asian, sinocentric, or Confucian—can hardly be seen as successful as they do not resolve the problem of hegemoniality. In the end, new conceptualizations of order—ambitious to make a contribution to the discipline of international relations theory— appear in many scholarly writings highly normative. Finally, to understand the effforts of reconceptualizing political order, in the concluding chapter, I leave the analytical level and delve into the recent discussions on developing international relations theory that intend to overcome European modernity.

28 

I need to point out here that the use of terms such as West and China is highly imprecise and by no means politically neutral. The orientalist critique often commits the same mistake as the orientalist himself when constructing realities by linguistic means that only seldom reflect reality.

Chapter 1

Space, Territory, and National Sovereignty in Modern East Asia ཛཙ㲅Ѿкˈൠ㲅Ѿлˈትཙൠѻѝ㘵ᴠѝ഻ˈትཙൠѻ‫ٿ‬㘵ᴠഋཧDŽഋཧ ཆҏˈѝ഻‫ޗ‬ҏDŽཙൠ⛪ѻѾ‫ޗ‬ཆˈᡰԕ䲀ҏDŽDŽDŽྲᯟ㘼ᐢ⸓DŽࡷѝ഻ˈ ѝ഻ҏˈഋཧˈഋཧҏDŽ —Shi Jie ⸣ӻ, On China (ca. 1035)1

… ѝ഻㘵੮ѝ഻Ӫѻѝ഻ˈ䶎ԆӪᡰᗇ㘼‫ޘ؍‬ҏDŽ‫ޘ؍‬ѝ഻㘵੮ѝ഻Ӫ㠚ᐡѻ 䋜ԫˈ䶎ԆӪᡰᗇ㘼ԓѻҏDŽ —Ziqiang 㠚ᕪ, On Independence (1900)2

∵ In the modern history of East Asia, no concept characterizes the numerous conflicts and wars that occurred in the process of decolonization and liberation better than national sovereignty, or national self-determination.3 As in Europe, sovereignty is considered an absolute political value that is conditional and vital for nation-states. In the international state system, a state without sovereignty was thought of as ceasing to exist (in the truest sense of the word). 1  Shi Jie ⸣ӻ Zhongguolun ѝ഻䄆, in Cu Laishi xiansheng wenji ᖲᗅ⸣‫⭏ݸ‬᮷䳶 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), part 10, 116–17. Shi Jie (1005–1045) was a leader of early Northern Song Confucianism and—in the tradition of Han Yu 七᜸ (768–824)—a declared opponent of both Buddhism and Daoism. In his Discussion of the Central Kingdom (Zhongguolun), he develops a categorical distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese. Being Chinese meant to share the Confucian ethics (the fijive human relationships, wulun ӄٛ), which were unknown in Buddhism and Daoism (both considered foreign religions by Shi). 2  Duli shuo ⦘・䃚, in Qingyibao, no. 58, September 24, 1900 (unknown author). 3  Here, national self-determination refers to the international level at which China had to protect herself against outside intervention. The term as it is used here does not entail intranational aspects where single ethnicities fought for their own interests by turning themselves against the Chinese state.

©

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14

Chapter 1

Introduced to East Asia in the nineteenth century, this concept decisively influenced the international relations not only between countries in Asia and Europe (the latter often considered to be the predominant imperialist force) but also among the Asian nations themselves, such as Japan, China, and Korea, not to mention Taiwan and Russia. Each of these nation-states, once victim of imperialism and colonialism, learned quickly that national self-determination was a powerful remedy to protect one’s own national community against aggression from outside forces. This objective corresponds well with the then(and still currently) prevailing realism in international relations: world politics is driven by competitive self-interest, and the protection of national interests is equal to the protection of national security, with security being a zero-sum game.4 It is thus the utmost aim of each nation to safeguard fijirst and foremost its own interests and avoid compromises. The incessant wars and conflicts that occurred regionally in the nineteenth century and on a global scale for the fijirst time in 1914 pushed both philosophers and legal scholars to search anxiously for viable alternatives to realism, ranging from a contractualism based on international law to a morally inflicted idealism. In both cases, national self-determination, after having become a central element of international law discourse in the nineteenth century, structured the rules of the game in the world community. As shown by Antonio Cassese, it possesses a Janus-like nature.5 Its concept is both radical and progressive (by claiming to protect), as well as subversive and threatening (by questioning the hegemonic position of Europe). It is thus no wonder that the reception of European international law outside the Occident with the focus on the latter kind of self-determination—starting with the translation of Henry Wheaton’s influential work Elements of International Law (1836) into Chinese (1864) and Japanese (1865)—was, among others, extraordinarily successful.6 By using 4  Most forcefully argued in Paul Kennedy’s epic description of the rise and fall of great powers. 5  Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples—A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 6  The history of the translation of international law into Chinese has been amply researched by Rune Svarverud and Stefan Kroll. On the impressive number of translations of works on international law, cf. the list in Rune Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847–1911 (Leiden: Brill, 2007); and Stefan Kroll, Normgenese durch Re-Interpretation: China und das europäische Völkerrecht im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012). In the following, I am not going to reproduce their results but concentrate on how ideas on national sovereignty and national self-determination are reflected in translations and related writings. For the Marxist-Leninist discourse on nation, state, and sovereignty in post-1949 China, see Suzanne Peckham Ogden, “Chinese Concepts of the Nation, State and Sovereignty,” PhD thesis, Brown University, 1975.

Space, Territory, And National Sovereignty In Modern East Asia

15

“successful” in this context, I do not want to establish European modernity as the sole frame of reference or to reproduce the widespread assumption that Japan was more successful than China in abolishing unequal treaties and extraterritoriality.7 Reception cannot be measured here along the categories of success and failure but should take into account the fact that European conceptions of international law were combined with indigenous tenets, resulting in a legal pluralism that in the case of China had been inherited from legal traditions of the Ming and Qing eras. Pär Cassel argues here that to understand how extraterritoriality operated within the East Asian context, one needs to go beyond the modern concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty. The transformation of the legal order in East Asian international afffairs during that time is—although triggered by the Western impact—not simply equal to Westernization, despite the fact that the legal discourse readily used new concepts made available by translation.8 Teemu Ruskola has further shown in this context how a so-called legal orientalism has served Europe and especially the United States to construe a prejudicial image of China being lawless or lacking the necessary elements of modern civilization. This legal orientalism describes a process of othering that puts China outside the scope of the European discipline of law (an orientalism shared by Japanese intellectuals since the second half of the Meiji era, 1868–1912) that not only pertains to criminal and civil law (as in the case of extraterritoriality and today’s human rights discourse) but also to international law.9 In the case of the latter, the refusal of the colonial powers to accept the Middle Kingdom as an equal member of the family of nations was not the sole reason why Chinese conceptions of political order do not conform to the European role model that was at fijirst readily accepted. Observing the incessant conflicts, disputes, and wars occurring among nation-states that were caused by the defijiciency of the balance of power idea to preserve peace (either by forming alliances or allowing few greater powers to provide hegemonic stability), Chinese (and Japanese) literati and legal scholars began to question the European model in general by no later than 1915 and developed in the 7  I share here the critique of Mizoguchi. See Mizoguchi Yūzō Ⓧਓ䳴й, Chūgoku no shōgeki ѝഭȃ㺍᪳ (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2004), and Chūgoku shisōshi ѝഭᙍᜣ ਢ, together with Ikeda Tomohisa ⊐⭠⸕ѵ and Kojima Tsuyoshi ሿጦ⇵ (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2007). 8  Pär Cassel, Grounds of Judgment. Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 9  Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism: China, the United States, and Modern Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

16

Chapter 1

following years conceptions of political order that creatively combined traditional elements with diffferent imaginaries of space and territory. Instead of asking if there is no alternative to the view that international order is regulated by universal legal norms (after all, the narratives about what law actually is and what purpose it serves are globally circulating and determine the political behavior toward China and, to a lesser extent, Japan), the task is to provide a fuller picture of how it was possible for Chinese thinkers to imagine a diffferent structure and organization of international relations that was considered more than a simple addendum or replacement of European norms. For this reason, this study goes beyond the widespread assumption that international law with its normative set of rules is the sole way to organize international behavior, create peace, and prevent war. It has been well argued by many theoreticians in the fijields of law, philosophy, and politics that international law is a discipline of European origin (or even an Anglo-American discipline, according to the legal scholar Carl Schmitt [1888–1985]) that does not have the right to represent all cultures and civilizations. Furthermore, postcolonial critique holds that if international law is indeed a Eurocentric ideology it is surely difffijicult to sustain.10 I do not share the view that the integration of China into world society is conditioned by passive reception of European modernity.11 I instead observe a creative participation in formulating world order conceptualizations that disagree with the European norm as the sole way to organize peace and stability (similar to the works of Rune Svarverud and Stefan Kroll). The recent years have seen a kind of radical normative turn among Chinese scholars—thinking of harmonious foreign policy—dealing with either the history or the theory of international relations, which is commonly understood to be caused by the impact of postcolonial theory. Yet a closer look at the history of the twentieth century will show that alternative conceptions were present earlier, and these conceptions can only be understood properly when considering space and territory12 as a hitherto-neglected epistemological category in this context.13 History is created by an incessant interplay of both time and space, and while the temporal aspect has prevailed in histori-

10  11  12 

13 

As argued by Zhao Tingyang, Daniel Bell, Yan Xuetong, and Lydia Liu, for instance. See here the well-known works by Fairbank and Hsü. Space and territory are two concepts that are closely related to each other yet difffer signifijicantly. Sufffijice it to say here that while territory is limited and determined by fijixed boundaries, space is not. For a detailed discussion on how to defijine both concepts, cf. the chapter 2 of this volume. Since the spatial turn in the 1980s pursued by the discipline of geography space enjoys a new popularity in the fijield of social and cultural studies. Cf. here the numerous publications by Stuart Elden, for example.

Space, Territory, And National Sovereignty In Modern East Asia

17

cal research for a long time, it is—after the impressive career of poststructuralism and postmodernism—time to go beyond historical teleology as the only explaining factor. Being and time do not fully explain the phenomenon of human existence on this globe. To put it in the words of Fernand Braudel, the spatial dimension is the “enemy number one”:14 history of humankind has always been an endeavor to apprehend the category of space. Space was to be acquired and mastered, and this ambition was nurtured by the horror vacui of both premodern and modern societies. In the twentieth century, the father of European geopolitics, Friedrich Ratzel, succeeded in formulating a political geography that introduced Darwinism into the fijield of geography. By doing so, he achieved a new understanding of space as a political category,15 now rendering time according to space (“Wir lesen im Raum die Zeit”), as he does in his historical philosophy.16 Taking space now as an epistemological category, I argue that thinking in national categories is not solely established by linguistic signs (in form of symbols, metaphors, manifestos, or any other written form), in other words, being a problem of language (the creation and circulation of new concepts) and action (the usage of new concepts in political debates).17 In addition, it is the notion of space—in its broadest sense it also includes the sub-notion territory (henceforth, space/territory)—that creates and structures our perception of reality. At fijirst sight, such a conclusion may seem more than obvious: the protection of national territory and the acquisition of space have always been of major concern to both national and nationalist movements. The predominant conflicts in international relations were all, more or less, related to the control of territory/space.

14  15 

16 

17 

Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époche de Philippe II, vol. 1 (Paris: Colin, 1966), 326. In the words of Otto Schäfer, “Politische Geographie schaut vom Raume aus auf den Staat, aber Geopolitik schaut vom Staate aus auf den Raum.” Cf. Otto Schäfer, “Die Stellung der Geopolitik im Wissenschaftsganzen,” in Geographischer Anzeiger, no. 42 (1941): 44–48. Here taken from Geert Bakker, Duitse Geopolitiek 1919–1945: Een imperialistische ideologie (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp, 1967), 49. Ratzel, “Geschichte, Völkerkunde und historische Perspektive,” vol. 93, 28. Cf. also Karl Schlögel, Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik (München: Hanser, 2003), and Werner Köster, “Der ‘Raum’ als Kategorie der Resubstantialisierung: Analysen zur neuerlichen Konjunktur einer deutschen Semantik,” in TopoGraphien der Moderne: Medien der Repräsentation und Konstruktion von Räumen im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Robert Stockhammer (München: Fink Verlag, 2005), 25–72. Cf. Douglas Howland, Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in NineteenthCentury Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002).

18

Chapter 1

However, despite the virtual omnipresence of space and territory (Henri Lefebvre grasps space as the ultimate locus and medium of struggle, turning it into an important political issue that should be taken seriously),18 both should by no means be understood ontologically, for they are concepts that are constructed and function as ideological markers. Although one might argue that space and territory are conscious constructs of nationalist ideologies, the construction also works in reverse: the discourse on space/territory creates these ideologies, as in the form of geopolitics. Few studies have already dealt with the influence of historical geography on discourses of identity,19 but none thus far has tried to understand adequately the discourse of national sovereignty by considering space and spatiality—as well as territory and territoriality—as a major category of explanation and with a distinct focus on Asian geopolitics. As is well known, in the 1890s, geopolitics emerged in the European context as a response to the growing tensions between the imperialist powers. It constituted a rebuttal of the somewhat idealist belief that international relations can be organized by a normative set of rules. The reality of foreign politics in that period—when great powers more often than not disregarded international law in their pursuit for more wealth and power—proved otherwise, and the only exit strategy to guarantee one’s own survival was the acquisition and protection of space/territory (thereby turning space and territory into a biological concept). In this context, as claimed by Hans Weigert, geopolitics can be defijined as “the rationalization of the emotional effforts of nations to justify their claim for proper space.” If such a defijinition were deemed permissible, then it would mean that a single dogma of geopolitics applicable to all nations cannot exist.20 Insofar as it can be ascertained, geopolitics constitutes a counterdiscourse to the discipline of international law because it holds that nontelluric political ideas simply do not exist: the world is divided into a variety of nations, with each rooted in its own earth, thus a shared or universal understanding of how to organize international relations is absent. If this were the case, any efffort to organize a world society would seem futile. To some extent, the Chinese desperation to fijind a place in that society reflects

18  19 

20 

Henri Lefebvre, La production de l’espace (Paris: Anthropos, 1974), 174. Huang Donglan 哳ᶡ㱝, “Notions of Space in late Qing and Republican Geography Textbooks—National Territory, Imperial Space and National Shame (Shinmatsu minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkanhyōshō: ryōdo, kyōiki, kokuchi ᷡᧃ࡮᳃࿖ᦼ࿾ℂ ᢎ⑼ᦠߩⓨ㑆⴫⽎㧙㗔࿯࡮⇴ၞ࡮࿖ᕯ ,” Chūgoku kenkyu geppō 59, no. 3 (2005): 24–39, and Dabringhaus, Territorialer Nationalismus in China. Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 59.

Space, Territory, And National Sovereignty In Modern East Asia

19

this futility. While the danger of either being colonized or swallowed by imperialism the powers pushed China on a path of modernization via westernization (thereby causing also the reception of international law as some kind of protective and/or defensive mechanism in the beginning) the loss of territory as a result of the encroachment of the foreign nations is often considered to be a consequence of the failure to modernize sufffijiciently. The deeper insight into the true nature of international law (i.e., that it was barely some thin shield unable to fulfijill its promises) led—China as well as Japan—to recognize the new political signifijicance of space/territory in the fijirst half of the twentieth century. Both countries turned to spatial principles as a new solution: although international law helped to construct the imaginary of national territory in the fijirst place, it was replaced by a nonjudicial principle of foreign politics that in the long run proved to play a much more decisive role in the metamorphosis of space. I refer here to none other than the geopolitical principle known as the Monroe Doctrine, which, since its inception in 1823, has not only shaped American foreign policy but has also enjoyed a similar, albeit changing, popularity among Asian nations. It became popular in East Asia by the often-cited slogan “China is the China of the Chinese” or “Asia is the Asia of the Asians.” In contemporary international afffairs, this statement no longer makes sense, but for most of the twentieth century, it was a widespread tenet. To understand the political and historical signifijicance of this slogan, defijining both “China” and “Chinese” is imperative. This is done by focusing on the issue of (national) territory and its boundaries, as well as on the issue of defijining friend and foe, which served as a political strategy to defijine the self and the other. It is thus not surprising that the Monroe Doctrine played a central role in nationalist movements, and was even shared by Japan. Through this study, I aim to analyze the doctrine’s true historical signifijicance in the fijield of international relations by showing how it developed from its fijirst formulation mainly as a defensive ideology to its use as a justifijication for blatant imperialist moves during the 1930s and 1940s when Japan tried to implement an Asian Monroe Doctrine.21 Compared to China Japan namely had developed distinct imaginations of what role to play in Asia due to its diffferent experience of modernization. Pointing out that the true danger for peace and prosperity in Asia was caused by the white race, Japan proposed in the early twentieth century an Asian union based on an assumed homogeneity of Asian culture and ethnicity 21 

Earlier in the 1890s, the United States had used the Monroe Doctrine as justifijication for its own territorial/spatial expansion in the Middle and South American region and the Pacifijic Ocean area, such as in their intervention in Panama 1903 and their territorial acquisition of Hawai‘i and the Philippines during the 1890s.

20

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(dōbun dōshu ਼᮷਼ぞ). Its pan-Asianism aimed at creating a universal community that stood in direct contrast to the order of nation-states with its emphasis on the particularity of each nation. From the Japanese perspective, this was the true cause of rivalry and war: social Darwinism and imperialism in the name of their own national interests made perpetual peace impossible, as argued by the philosopher Nishida Kitarō 㾯⭠ᒮཊ䛾 (1870–1945) and the legal scholar Yasui Kaoru ᆹӅ䛱 (1907–1980) in the 1940s.22 My aim in this book is certainly not to provide a defijinition of what Asia is23 or simply to renarrate the discourse of pan-Asian ideology.24 Conversely, I want to try to answer the question of how the notion of Asia in a spatial sense has shaped international relations and conceptions of world order in that region. Discussed already in the 1900s by Japanese intellectuals and military politicians, pan-Asianism was to replace the European order of nation-states and create a greater space (Großraum) under Japanese leadership.25 A greater space was thought to be a realm under the control of a hegemonic power that accepted the responsible task of providing peace and security for itself and the nations that were part of 22 

23 

24 

25 

See the studies on Nishida: Christopher S. Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity (New York: Routledge, 2005), and Takeuchi Yoshimi ㄩ޵ྭ, ed., Ajiashugi ȪɀȪѫ㗙 (Tōkyō: Chikuma shobō, 1963); and on Yasui Kaoru: James J. Orr, “Yasui Kaoru: Citizen-scholar in War and Peace,” Japan Forum 12, no. 1 (2000): 1–14. Painstaking effforts have been made by Rebecca Karl, “Creating Asia: China in the World at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” American Historical Review 103, no. 4 (1998): 1096–1118; Sun Ge ᆛⅼ, Yazhou yiweizhe shenme: wenhuajian de Riben ӎ⍢᜿ણ㪇Ӱ 哭: ᮷ॆ䯃Ⲵᰕᵜ (Taipei: Juliu tushu gongsi, 2001), and Sun Ge ᆉⅼ, Zhuti misan de kongjian: Yazhou lunshu zhi liangnan ѫփᕕᮓⲴオ䰤: ӊ⍢䇪䘠ѻє䳮 (Nanchang: Jiangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002); Wang Ping ⦻ቿ, Jindai Riben de Yaxiyazhuyi 䘁ԓᰕᵜ Ⲵӊ㓶ӊѫѹ (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2004); and Uemura Kunihiko Ἵᶁ䛖ᖖ, Ajia wa Ajiateki ka ȪɀȪȄLJȪɀȪⲴLjǠ (Kyōto: Nakanishiya shuppan, 2006). Cf. here Sven Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: A Preliminary Approach.” Tōkyō, Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien, 2002 (DIJ Working Paper 02/4); Sven Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan: Kodera Kenkichi and His ‘Treatise on Greater Asianism,’ ” Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 6 (2007): 1261–94; Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman, Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, 2 vols. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefijield, 2011); Sven Saaler and Victor Koschmann, eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History (London: Routledge, 2007); Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931–1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). By doing so, Japan was interested in protecting its own national interests and gaining access to natural resources in China and Korea, and this was to be ideologically justifijied by referral to the common hostis (i.e., the imperialism of the white race).

Space, Territory, And National Sovereignty In Modern East Asia

21

the greater space, even though hegemoniality constituted a major problem in international relations of that region because Japan claimed to represent the collective will of the members of its own greater space vis-à-vis the interests of other greater spaces.26 The Asian Monroe Doctrine was thus not part of the discipline of international law (a law between equal nations) but of geopolitics. I argue that geopolitics is a method of analyzing international relations that emphasizes spatial relationships and the distribution of political power created by these relationships. It considers geography to be a highly influential factor in the growth and decline of (national) power, and power is the most permanent factor in international relations.27 At this point, I have to warn that this study does not intend to reproduce this discourse for the East Asian context. The ideological nature of geopolitical thinking has long been debunked; sufffijice it here to quote the English geographer Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), who once argued in a somewhat simple logic (common for him and other geopolitical thinkers) that “when our statesmen are in conversation with the defeated enemy, some airy cherub should whisper to them from time to time this saying: ‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the World.’ ”28 Werner Köster has shown that the geopolitical discourse has witnessed in the last decade a questionable resurgence with regard to the semantics of space.29 Contrary to this, I understand space as an epistemological category that while sharing the notion of spatial consciousness (i.e., spatiality) and the human ambition to acquire and control territory it is not simply reproducing the geodeterminist discourse of “living space” (Lebensraum), a “nation

26  27 

28  29 

An argument later reiterated by Carl Schmitt in his discussion on greater spaces. Such a vision has been developed most explicitly in the European tradition of geopolitics (Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford Mackinder, and Karl Ernst Haushofer). For the European context, the category of space (Raum) and geopolitics has been researched in detail; see here Köster, “Der ‘Raum’ als Kategorie der Resubstantialisierung: Analysen zur neuerlichen Konjunktur einer deutschen Semantik,” and Schlögel, Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (London: Constable and Company, 1919), 194. Exemplifijied by his polemique discussion of Rudolf Maresch and Niels Werber, Raum— Wissen—Macht (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), see here Werner Köster, “Der ‘Raum’ als Kategorie der Resubstantialisierung. Analysen zur neuerlichen Konjunktur einer deutschen Semantik.”

22

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without space” (Volk ohne Raum), or “Eastern space” (Ostraum).30 This discourse had, fijirst and foremost, serious consequences for the modern German historian who, according to the observation of the historian Richard J. Evans, has developed a “strange aversion . . . to maps,”31 one not shared by his French or British colleagues (let alone Chinese and Japanese scholars).32 There are two reasons for the German fear of maps. First, classic historism has understood history as the expression of human will during the course of time. Any limitation or determination of his action by either nature or environment was refused (space thus remained an anathema in historical sciences after historism). Second, the Nazi discourse has compromised any kind of geopolitics in postwar Germany.33 In the historical context of East Asia, however, the discourse of space has experienced a diffferent career. It is often argued in studies on Japanese imperialism34 that this discourse is influenced by the European discourse of space—the result of Japan imitating Western realist behavior in the pursuit of national strength. As a matter of fact, Japan proved to be more receptive toward European geopolitical thinking than China. Until the end of World War II, China witnessed translations of only some minor works on the thinking of Ratzel and Haushofer, Ratzel by a 1936 translation of Ellen C. Semple’s 30 

31  32  33 

34 

There is a genealogy of reflections on space that precedes the 1930s and 1940s, for example, in the works of Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) and Carl Ritter (1779–1859), both the founders of modern geography, the sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–1918), and Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) with his Arcades Project (Passagenwerk). However, it had hardly an impact on the nationalism and geopolitics in East Asia. Richard J. Evans, “Review of W.J. Mommsen: Propyläen-Geschichte Deutschlands, 7/1 and 7/2,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London 18, no. 2 (1996): 23. Signifijicant here is also the fact that both China and Japan were (and still are) using maps to claim territories in the South Chinese Sea. This was mainly caused by the writings and propaganda activities of geopolitical thinkers such as Karl Haushofer whose intellectual heritage has been avoided in political geography after 1945 due to the consequences caused by its application in foreign politics after the Machtergreifung in 1933. For the two reasons why space disappeared from German historical writing see Jürgen Osterhammel, “Die Wiederkehr des Raumes: Geopolitik, Geohistorie und historische Geographie,” Neue politische Literatur, no. 43 (1998), 374. See, for example, the documentary history on pan-Asianism in Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism. Other central works on Japanese imperialism include William G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); and Anneli Wallentowitz, Imperialismus in der japanischen Sprache am Übergang vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert: Begrifffsgeschichte im außereuropäischen Kontext (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2011).

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Influences of Geographic Environment: On the Basis of Ratzel’s System of Anthropo-Geography (1911)35 and Haushofer by a translation of his 1932 book Wehr-Geopolitik: geographische Grundlagen einer Wehrkunde,36 (published in Chongqing in 1945). In Japan, on the contrary, conceptions of geopolitics met great sympathies, and concepts such as Lebensraum enjoyed a sort of popularity among military people and politicians during the Pacifijic War. At the end of World War I, the now rather obscure French mystic Paul Richard (1874–1967) was widely read in Japan, India, and the United States. In the 1920s and 1930s then, Ratzel and Haushofer received considerable attention in Japan (Spang observes a true “Haushofer boom” in Japan) and later even Carl Schmitt (although he was more so a law scholar than a geopolitician).37 Haushofer, the editor of the influential Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (1925–1942), often included Japan in his discussions on international relations, which he saw as dominated by regional blocs. He also introduced the writings and activities of pan-Asianists such as Sun Yat-sen ቊㅺ઄ (1866–1925) and Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) to European readers. Their writings supported his theory that regional blocs would sooner or later replace the system of sovereign nation-states. Haushofer’s writings were very well received in Japan, which was partly due to his close contacts with many Japanese academics, diplomats, politicians, and members of the army and the navy.38 35 

36 

37 

38 

Ellen Churchill Semple ᠋᥉Ὼ, Influences of geographic environment: on the basis of Ratzel’s system of anthropo-geography. Translated as Dili huanjing zhi yingxiang ࿾ℂⅣ Ⴚਯᓇ㗀 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936). Karl Haushofer ⽕჻ᶈ⪇, Wehr-Geopolitik: geographische Grundlagen einer Wehrkunde. Translated as Guofang dilixue ࿡㒐࿾ℂቑ, by Zhou Guangda ๟శ㆐. (Chongqing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1945). Schmitt’s writings were available in Japanese translation as early as 1939. His spatial thinking was most prominently introduced to Japan by the legal scholar Yasui Kaoru ᆹӅ䛱 (1907–1980). During 1909 and 1910, Haushofer stayed eighteen months in East Asia, stationed in Japan as the fijirst Bavarian military offfijicer. He also traveled to Korea, China, and Manchuria during this period. After his return to Germany, where he again took up his former position as lecturer on war history at the Military Academy in Munich, he published extensively on geopolitics, including the region of Japan and the Pacifijic Ocean. Around 1940, most of his central works on geopolitics were available in Japanese translation. His Geopolitik des Pazifijischen Ozeans was even translated three times, the earliest issued by the admiralty as a semiofffijicial translation. There are three editions of this book, dating from 1924, 1927, and 1938. On Haushofer’s contacts to Japan, cf. Christian W. Spang, “Karl Haushofer Re-examined: Geopolitics as a Factor of Japanese-German Rapprochment in the Interwar Years?,” in Japanese-German Relations, 1895–1945: War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion, ed. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich (London: Routledge, 2006), 139–59.

24

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For this reason, Haushofer’s impact eventually strengthened Japanese ambitions of an Asian empire and resulted in an interest in geopolitics aiming at creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 1940s. One decade earlier, there were two major schools of Japanese geopolitics.39 One was represented by the Japanese Geopolitical Society (Chiseigaku kyōkai ࿾᡽ቇ දળ), and the other by the Pacifijic Society (Taiheiyō kyōkai ᄥᐔᵗදળ). Both sponsored translations of Haushofer’s writings,40 and both associations were located in Tōkyō and had close contacts to the elite—among them intellectuals, politicians, and high-ranking military offfijicers. A third school of geopolitical thought emerged at Kyōto Imperial University. Its leader, Komaki Saneshige ሿ⢗ሖ㑱 (1898–1990), propagated geopolitics of kōdō (ⲷ䚃), the imperial way. Although he appreciated Haushofer’s praise for the Japanese notion of national body (kokutai ഭփ), his school warned against the geopolitical thinking of Haushofer because he judged it to be hadō (㾷䚃), or the way of the hegemon. If Japan wanted to keep its role as the modernizer and liberator of East Asia, it had to legitimize its leadership otherwise and avoid the suspicion of hegemony. For this reason, the scholar and political scientist Rōyama Masamichi 㹏ኡ᭯䚃 (1895–1980) propagated the East Asia Cooperative Community (Tō-A kyōdōtai ᶡӌ‫਼ޡ‬փ) in 1938. The community was not based on a common culture or race but was one that rationalized relations between both countries in the name of development and progress (i.e., by pursuing mutual economic development). His proposal of an East Asian bloc—influenced by Haushofer—soon enjoyed wide prominence among Japanese politicians and the military because it was able to position itself in the tradition of the Asian Monroe Doctrine.41 Later enforced by the legal writings of Carl Schmitt the

39 

40 

41 

The following description follows Spang, “Karl Haushofer Re-examined”; Keiichi Takeuchi, “Japanese Geopolitics in the 1930s and 40s,” in Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought, ed. D. Atkinson and K. Dodds (London: Routledge, 2000); Keiichi Takeuchi, Modern Japanese Geography: An Intellectual History (Tōkyō: Kokon shoin, 2000). Asano Risaburō ⍵䟾࡙й䛾, Nichi–Doku–So tairiku burokkuron: sono chiseigakuteki kōsatsu ᰕ⤜Ʌབྷ䲨ɞɵɋȷ䄆˖Dzȃൠ᭯ᆖⲴ㘳ሏ (Tōkyō: Tōkaidō, 1941); Ezawa Jōji ⊏⋒䆢⡮, Hausuhōfā no taiheiyō chiseigaku ɗɁɣόɝȪόȃཚᒣ⌻ൠ᭯ᆖ (Tōkyō: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1941); Satō Shōichirō ր㰔㦈а䛾, Hausuhōfā no taiheiyō chiseigaku kaisetsu ɗȮɁɣόɝȩόȃཚᒣ⌻ൠ᭯ᆖ䀓䃚 (Tōkyō: Rokkō shuppanbu, 1944). Other pan-Asian thinkers influenced by Haushofer were Kanokogi Kazunobu 㣮ሶᧁຬ ା (1884–1949) and Hirano Yoshitarō ᐔ㊁⟵ᄥ㇢ (1897–1980). Cf. Saaler and Szpilman,

Space, Territory, And National Sovereignty In Modern East Asia

25

Monroe Doctrine emerged as a serious alternative principle of political order.42 In the decades after World War I, the doctrine offfered in the fijield of international politics a promising method of analysis by juxtaposing the proclaimed universality of international law (e.g., by Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations) and its rejection by politicians, militaries, and intellectuals who strove for the protection of their nation by creating nonnational spaces that do not endorse intervention from the outside. In order to avoid the allegation of hegemoniality Japanese pan-Asianists propagated an Asian Monroe Doctrine as a response to the Western imperialism and tried to develop a postnational order that was thought to be able to avoid the shortcomings of European modernity. Observing the diffferent careers of geopolitics in China and Japan and the consequences thereof that are still felt today my intention for this book is threefold. First, it is to offfer new insights into the study of the emergence of national thinking by concentrating on the genesis of territorial nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In current research, territory is all too often considered by geographers to be a relatively straightforward concept (i.e., something that can be easily grasped as a bounded space under the control of a certain group or state). Contrary to this interpretation, the classical study by Gottmann holds that although much ink and blood have been spilled over territorial disputes, there is no clear-cut defijinition of it: To politicians, territory means the population and the resources therein, and sometimes also the point of honor of irredentist claims. To the military, territory is topographic features conditioning tactical and strategic considerations as well as distance or space to be played with; occasionally it is also resources in terms of local supplies. To the jurist, territory is jurisdiction and delimitation; to the specialist in international law, it is both an attribute and the spatial extent of sovereignty. To the geographer, it is the portion of space enclosed by boundary lines, the location and internal characteristics of which are to be described and explained.43

42 

43 

Pan-Asianism, vol. 2, 149–54, 271–80. For the relation to the Asian Monroe Doctrine, see 175–78. This view is refuted by Lothar Gruchmann, Nationalsozialistische Großraumordnung: Die Konstruktion einer “deutschen Monroe-Doktrin” (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962). Jean Gottmann, The Signifijicance of Territory (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1973), preface.

26

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Since then, much research has been undertaken that tries to assess the political signifijicance of territory with regard to nation-states,44 global capitalism,45 geopolitics,46 and transnational phenomena.47 These works have provided deep insights into the political function of territory by taking a national, regional, or even global perspective. In the following discussion, I plan to assess the nature of territory and its epistemological signifijicance for the creation of—idealized or not—forms of world order as seen from the Chinese perspective. The creation and/or transformation of any order is, as I show in the upcoming chapters, a deeply political act involving more than the simple statement of modern political orders either being invented or imagined. Therefore, I focus, in contrast to the aforementioned works, on the relationship between territory and space (both being ideological concepts, with the latter in general related to the problem of hegemoniality) with the discourse of international law, while taking into 44 

45 

46 

47 

Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik (München: dtv wissenschaft, 1983); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationenbildung, Nationalstaat, Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann-Universitätsverlag, 1972); Karl W. Deutsch, On Nationalism, World Regions, and the Nature of the West (Berlin: IIVG, 1982); Avery Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice: A Political Theory of Territory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Lefebvre, La production de l’espace; Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Henri Lefebvre, State, Space, World: Selected Essays, ed. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2008); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Stuart Elden, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2009); Stuart Elden, “Land, Terrain, Territory,” Progress in Human Geography, no. 34 (2010): 799–817; Stuart Elden, “Reading Schmitt Geopolitically: Nomos, Territory and Großraum,” Radical Philosophy, no. 161 (2010): 18–26. Gearóid Ó Thuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, ed., The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge, 1999); Yves Lacoste et al., Geopolitik: zur Ideologiekritik politischer Raumkonzepte (Wien: Promedia, 2001); Osterhammel, “Die Wiederkehr des Raumes: Geopolitik, Geohistorie und historische Geographie”; Schlögel, Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit; Stefan Fröhlich, Amerikanische Geopolitik: Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Landsberg am Lech: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1998); Bakker, Duitse Geopolitiek 1919–1945. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2006); Liu Jie ഏவ, Mitani Hiroshi ਃ⼱ඳ and Yang Daqing ᬢᄢᘮ, Kokkyō wo koeru rekishi ninshiki— Nitchū taiwa no kokoromi ࿖Ⴚࠍ⿧߃ࠆᱧผ⹺⼂࡮ᣣਛኻ⹤ߩ⹜ߺ (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2006); Jürgen Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaates: Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2001).

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27

consideration that territorial law cannot be applied to spaces without reflection. Despite this, both territory and space are the underlying concepts of all political ideals that aim at creating and sustaining peace. However, while the relation of these ideals to the issue of peace (more so than the absence of war) has been well covered in the fijield of diplomatic history,48 the relation to space/ territory and spatiality/territoriality is still understudied. In other words, a history of spatiality/territoriality in East Asia still remains to be written, and this book is a fijirst step for doing so. Such a history cannot simply take into account the complexity of applying European concepts to the East Asian context (if space and territory are European concepts at all) but also has to reflect on the fact that China and Japan have each experienced a particular history of spatiality/territoriality in the past centuries. They have imagined space and territory diffferently, and this was only partially the result of their experiences with imperialism and colonialism. For instance, the introduction of boundaries meant for both countries the establishment of territorial boundaries aiming at protecting national interests within the domain of each nation-state. When the United States ended the Japanese era of isolation and when the European powers opened China for trade and later for colonization in the second half of the nineteenth century, their imperialism intended to overcome boundaries (boundaries were considered sole property of Western powers) and expand their territories, creating spatial extensions of their states that went beyond the primordial national boundaries and enjoyed priority over the territorial claims of premodern (or uncivilized, as it was held then) peoples. In the decades after World War I, Japanese imperialism trod down the same path, resulting fijinally in the 1940 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Tō-A kyōeiken བྷᶡӌ ‫ޡ‬Ḵി), which was considered an alternative to the Western projection of one’s own territory at the expenses of the victims of colonialism and imperialism. Building on its own imperial tradition, China pursued a quite similar 48 

Kawashima Shin ᐍጦⵏ, Chūgoku kindai gaikō no keisei ѝഭ䘁ԓཆӔȃᖒᡀ (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2004); Lin Xuezhong ᷇ᆖᘐ, Cong wanguo gongfa dao gongfa waijiao: Wan Qing guojifa de chuanru, quanshi yu yingyong Ӿзഭ‫ࡠ⌅ޜ‬ ‫⌅ޜ‬ཆӔ – ᲊ␵ഭ䱵⌅ⲴՐ‫ޕ‬ǃ䈐䟺оᓄ⭘ (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2009); Li Zhaoxiang ᵾ‫⾕ݶ‬, Jindai Zhongguo de waijiao zhuanxing yanjiu 䘁ԓѝഭ ⲴཆӔ䖜ර⹄ウ (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2008); Immanuel Hsü, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase 1858–1880 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism; Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, 1914–1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970); John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

28

Chapter 1

ideological strategy when proposing a revival of the ecumenical and nonexclusionary all-under-heaven (tianxia ཙл) system, yet this cannot simply be equated to Japanese imperialism of the 1940s, even though the renewed discussion of tianxia among philosophers and scholars in the fijield of international relations theories today49 is by some related to China’s recent economic and military rise. To fully understand this turn to the past (is it a restoration, a revival, or just an invented tradition?), in later chapters I discuss its impact on the discursive construction of world order, a construction that has to be explained historically. In fact, imaginaries of the past have in recent years experienced a normative turn that needs to be taken seriously if we are to comprehend whether both countries are pursuing hegemoniality in their own space. Second, this study intends to elaborate on the often implied yet seldom questioned rhetoric of pacifijism that has long ruled the Chinese perception of foreign relations (and was shared by Japan until 1945). It is a common assumption that China never started a war because it preferred the kingly way (wangdao ⦻ 䚃) over the way of the hegemon (badao 䵨䚃). Wang Yuan-kang and Alastair Johnston have shown for imperial China that actual behavior often followed the realist tradition in times of need and desperation.50 The intentional use of the pacifijist rhetoric is, however, not limited to the imperial age. I show in this book that in the twentieth century, actual behavior also followed the general trend that prevailed in international relations. While in times of national crisis the realist emphasis on strength and wealth ruled the nationalists’ thinking, it was paralleled by a deep conviction among intellectuals that China was able to contribute to world peace by reactivating tenets of traditional thought that emphasized harmony and cooperation over competition and conflict. The reason for nationalist rhetoric being largely realist in the time of crisis and distress was due to the fact that late imperial China—accompanied by the emergence 49 

50 

Cf. here the writings of Zhao Tingyang (Tianxia tixi: Shijie zhidu zhexue daolun ཙлփ ㌫˖ц⭼ࡦᓖଢᆖሬ䇪 [Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005]; Huai shijie yanjiu: zuowei diyi zhexue de zhengzhi zhexue ൿц⭼⹄ウˉ֌ѪㅜаଢᆖⲴ᭯⋫ଢᆖ [Beijing: Renmin daxue chubanshe]), Ren Xiao (“Traditional Chinese Theory and Practice of Foreign Relations: A Reassessment,” in China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu, ed. Yongnian Zheng [London: Routledge, 2010], 102–16); and William Callahan (Tianxia, Empire and the World: Soft Power and China’s Foreign Policy Discourse in the 21st Century, British Inter-University China Centre Working Paper Series, No. 1, 2007; and “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?” International Studies Review, no. 10, [2008]: 749–61). Cf. Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); and Wang Yuan-kang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

Space, Territory, And National Sovereignty In Modern East Asia

29

of territorial thinking and the discourse of boundaries (discussed in the following), the categories of belonging and non-belonging, or friend and foe— experienced a deep epistemological change, leading fijinally to the emergence of notions of enemies that were hitherto unknown. It goes without saying that these concepts—similar to the values mentioned above—are understood and used diffferently, depending on circumstances and time periods. Although the radicalization of politics occurred among both Japanese and Chinese scholars in their quest for national independence and self-determination, the later 1910s and 1920s brought a turn to pan-Asianism in Japan and two decades later the effforts of restoring the tianxia ideal in China, with both attempting to dissolve this notion of enmity. To understand the nature of conflicts sufffijiciently, the true political signifijicance of this notion needs to be assessed. Furthermore, it has to be asked what role the terms of friend and foe play in the politicalphilosophical transformation of East Asia, and what impact culture has on the nature of these two concepts. These two analytical steps allow for understanding of the process of establishing political orders on a regional and global level. By closely linking the transformations of the notions of friend and foe to the transformation of spatial thinking, it is possible to shed new light on the current discussion of if and to what extent international law serves as a means of creating such orders, may they be pacifijist or belligerent. Highlighting the Chinese obsession with national territory and sovereignty in the twentieth century, in this book, I show that a discussion of the assumptions and ideas underlying its international relations cannot do without a thorough consideration of spatial aspects. My focus is to illuminate the signifijicance of territory for the emergence of a territorially defijined political consciousness that found its most refijined expression in nationalism yet was simultaneously questioned by the emergence of spatial thinking, such as in the case of the Monroe Doctrine. In this book, I attempt to analyze the effforts of Chinese and Japanese intellectuals and scholars to produce an imaginary of their own, which, in those times, were understood as acts of resistance against European universalism. Whereas resistance is seen today as an integral part of postcolonial theory, the aversion of Chinese and Japanese thinkers to simply imitate Western notions was caused by their intellectual alienation when they experienced and pursued modernity. Their experiences with imperialism (although both were also behaving according to the rules of that ideology)51 soon made them realize that their self-understanding and the understanding of the West was not based on fijixed diffferences between 51 

While the case for Japan is obvious, China has long been considered a victim of imperialism. However, Kirk Larsen argues diffferently when pointing out that the Qing in the late nineteenth century tried to gain unequal privileges in Korea, for example, by installing

30

Chapter 1

static elements but that the meaning of being Chinese or Japanese was created by linguistic means that contradicted the very essence of Western universalism. Not surprisingly, their discourse on international order was loaded with moral issues, inciting intellectuals to grasp their respective nation as a moral space. To have access to this space meant that one could regain one’s sovereignty, although soon the intellectuals (and not only legal scholars) would recognize that their entanglement in an international society limited their ability to act. Thus, it came as no surprise that, given their early insight into the immoral nature of international relations, China and Japan developed hegemonies of their own when imagining political orders with Asian or Chinese characteristics. My aim with this book is certainly not to renarrate the diplomatic history of twentieth-century China or the history of its past conflicts. Instead of pursuing these old paths, the central point of this book is to delve into the signifijicance of territory and space for the self-understanding of China. In this work, I do not intend to produce an overview of the origin and nature of these territorial conflicts and debated boundaries between China and its neighbors or to discuss if these claims are justifijied (e.g., as would a history of Sino-Japanese relations). Rather, I aim to fijind out the historical signifijicance of discourses on territory and space and how to relate it to patterns of world order as imagined by either Chinese or Japanese intellectuals.52 Accordingly, I situate this book in the tradition of intellectual history, providing a history of international relations thinking that focuses on intellectuals’ discourses. It is less focused on the conceptual framework of international relations (as does international relations theory)53 and much less on reconstructing the history of international

52 

53 

Chinese concessions (Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850–1910 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008]). An instructive study on the geographical construction of British India has been written by Matthew H. Edney (Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843 [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997]). Representative studies are Nele Noesselt, Alternative Weltordnungsmodelle? IB-Diskurse in China (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2010); Zhang Xiaoming ᕐሿ᰾, Guoji guanxi Yingguo xuepai: lishi, lilun yu Zhongguoguan ഭ䱵‫ޣ‬㌫㤡ഭᆖ⍮: শਢǃ⨶䇪оѝഭ㿲 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2010); William Callahan, “China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: Discussion of ‘Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics,’” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 75–88; Song Xinning, “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 61–74; and Zhang Yongjin, “The ‘English School’ in China: A Travelogue of Ideas and their Difffusion,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 1 (2003); 87–114.

Space, Territory, And National Sovereignty In Modern East Asia

31

relations per se. Therefore, this book departs methodologically from intellectual history approaches insofar as it assesses how China tries to develop its own conceptualizations of world order by integrating philosophical ideals into imaginations of global order that are seen as alternate and better forms of order than those offfered by the West. Both imperial and postimperial China have always emphasized that the creation of order has, since ancient times, been a highly metapolitical act that confronted political and social reality with a future ideal order. Accordingly, the recourse on Confucian political theory is seen among Chinese scholars to be a valuable contribution to global discussions of international relations. This book ends with a discussion of the rather hopeless character of these normative effforts to foster an international morality, showing that recent proposals of world order are of nothing more than epistemological value precisely because of the problem of hegemoniality.

Chapter 2

Reconceptualizing World Order after the Tribute System The history of Chinese foreign relations has long argued that before the arrival of European imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century introduced the idea of national sovereignty the regional order in East Asia has been hierarchical and ecumenical. The sociopolitical function of the tianxia, or all-under-heaven, was to provide an exclusive order (immortalia et semper manentia, to put it into the words of Augustinus)1 by creating sense and positioning the human into an either unknown or rapidly changing cosmos. In both cases, order offfers orientation.2 Tianxia allowed—and longed for—the integration of the areas beyond the civilized world. Thus, in principle, China is seen during the imperial age as an empire without borders, or, to put it into Chinese political language, tianxia, i.e. the “all-under-heaven.”3 It is conceived as a suprapolitical entity that is signifijicantly bigger than the single state and claims a universality that is only rarely questioned. At the same time, though being a distinct Han-Chinese vision of how the world is structured it was readily taken over by non-Han ethnicities that conquered the empire, such as the Jurchen, Mongolians and last

1  De vera religione, here taken from Eric Voegelin, Ordnung und Geschichte, vol. 1 (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2002), 221. 2  From a plain Eurocentric perspective, the notion of a Chinese ecumene is actually misleading: in a literal sense, there can be only one ecumene, and not a plurality thereof. However, if understood in a cosmological sense, a variety of ecumenes can coexist, each providing sense and order to a given historical community. Hence, cosmological cultures are characterized by the notion of tolerance (i.e., the exchangeability of symbolizations). There is neither orthodoxy (i.e., orthopraxy) nor heresy. The cosmological myth was part of each ancient civilization, ranging from ancient Greece over Mesopotamia to ancient China. Only, the arrival of Jewish monotheism and Greek philosophy caused the conceptions of world order to experience profound changes (Voegelin, Ordnung und Geschichte, vol. 9, 139–140). 3  For various terminological discussions on the term tianxia, cf. Yuri Pines, “Changing Views of tianxia in Pre-imperial Discourse,” Oriens Extremus, no. 43 (2002): 101–16; Peter WeberSchäfer, Oikumene und Imperium: Studien zur Ziviltheologie des chinesischen Kaiserreiches (München: Paul List Verlag, 1968); Mizoguchi, Chūgoku shisōshi ѝഭᙍᜣਢ; and the RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism.

©

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Reconceptualizing World Order After The Tribute System

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but not least the Manchu.4 A short conceptual history of tianxia will show how the idea of a borderless polity was able to survive despite these conquests and military conflicts, and will clarify what consequences the (assumed) longevity of tianxia had for the spatial-territorial imagination of China. I argue here that the ecumenical claim of Confucianism entailed an obvious efffort to integrate those areas beyond the civilized world that were inhabited by outer barbarians (waiyi ཆཧ), i.e. those who were still without the blessings of Chinese civilization. Those in the east were called Dongyi ᶡཧ, those in the west Xirong 㾯ᠾ, those in the south Nanman ই㹫, and those in the north Beidi े⣴, all being within the range of Chinese influence. Those people outside this range (huawai zhi di ॆཆѻൠ) lived in areas so far away from the civilizational center that its culture was unable to transform (hua ॆ) them into civilized (or human) beings. The inability to do so was considered to be merely temporary, and not absolute. Thus in principle, no social, ethnic or cultural group was to be excluded, but rather integrated into the cosmological order by the very fact that the political rulers of areas beyond the direct control of the emperor derived their power from the center (as in the case of the tributary states, for instance). The idea of tianxia being a suprapolitical entity is already mentioned in the oldest scriptures, such as the Zuozhuan, the earliest Chinese work of history (covering the period from 722 bc to 468 ad). Since then, it has often been used in political reasoning, as exemplifijied in the Analects (Lunyu ⺰⺆) of Confucius, or Kongzi ሹሶ (551–479 bc), where it reads in chapter 16/2: ᆄᆀᴠཙлᴹ䚃ࡷ⿞′ᖱՀ㠚ཙᆀࠪཙл❑䚃ࡷ⿞′ᖱՀ㠚䄨‫ࠪן‬㠚 䄨‫ࠪן‬㫻ॱцᐼнཡ⸓㠚བྷཛࠪӄцᐼнཡ⸓䲚㠓ว഻ભйцᐼнཡ ⸓ཙлᴹ䚃ࡷ᭯н൘བྷཛཙлᴹ䚃ࡷᓦӪн䆠DŽ

Confucius said: When good government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music and punitive military expeditions proceed from the son of

4  See Herbert Franke and Rolf Trauzettel, Das Chinesische Kaiserreich (Frankfurt: Fischer Bücherei, 1968), 207–10. The crisis of the Song dynasty in the early twelfth century did not destroy the ideal of tianxia, because the invading Jurchen forces did not question the worldview itself, and because the Song were very well able to adapt to the changing situation. For more on this issue, see Rolf Trauzettel, “Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese Nationalism,” in Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China, ed. John Winthrop Haeger (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975), 199–214; Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen; and Christopher P. Atwood, “ ‘ Worshiping Grace’: The Language of Loyalty in Qing Mongolia,” Late Imperial China 21, no. 2 (2000): 86–139.

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Chapter 2

Heaven. When bad government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music and punitive military expeditions proceed from the princes. When these things proceed from the princes, as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in ten generations. When they proceed from the Great offfijicers of the princes, as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in fijive generations. When the subsidiary ministers of the Great offfijicers hold in their grasp the orders of the state, as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in three generations. When right principles prevail in the kingdom, government will not be in the hands of the Great offfijicers. When right principles prevail in the kingdom, there will be no discussions among the common people.5 In the Analects, the limits of tianxia are defijined by the area under the rule of the Son of Heaven, which then was the Zhou realm. While Confucius praised the great statesman Guan Zhong ㇑Ԣ (?–645 bc) for bringing unity and order to the tianxia, he was well aware of the fact that Guan had only stabilized parts of the Zhou realm. But this did not matter: the limits of the civilized world were the limits of the universe.6 In the fijifth century bc, the cultural notion of tianxia gained signifijicance in the political domain, which was achieved by the writings of the philosopher Mozi (between 479–381 bc), for whom tianxia is a more important unit than the single state (guo ࿡): he politicizes the former concept by using distinct expressions such as “to properly rule all under heaven” (zhi tianxia ⋫ཙл) or “to be a king of all under heaven” (wang tianxia ⦻ཙл).7 Later texts follow this ideal, most famously the writings of Mencius ᆏᆀ, who puts the cultural aspect of tianxia in the foreground. We can thus conclude with Yuri Pines that—despite his warning that tianxia (unlike many other terms) is a term devoid of terminological precision (i.e., its precise meaning has never been scrutinized by pre-imperial statesmen and thinkers)—its applications in various contexts all share the underlying conviction that tianxia is juxtaposed to the rivaling political order of the single state, guojia.8 This has

5  James Legge, The Chinese Classics: With a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1969), vol. 1, 310. 6  Cf. here the chapter Xianwen ២୿ in the Lunyu, in: Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 1, 275–294. 7  Yuri Pines argues further that the quest for unifijication of China caused the politicization of the term tianxia. See Yuri Pines, “ ‘The One that pervades All’ in Ancient Chinese Political Thought: Origins of the Great Unity Paradigm,” T’oung Pao, vol. 86, no. 4–5 (2000): 280–324. 8  Yuri Pines, “Changing Views of tianxia in Pre-imperial Discourse.”

Reconceptualizing World Order After The Tribute System

35

been influential for the discourse on the Confucian worldview, above all in the political thinking of Mencius where tianxia is defijined as follows: ᆏᆀᴠ˖йԓѻᗇཙлҏԕӱˈަཡཙлҏԕнӱDŽ഻ѻᡰԕᔒ㠸ᆈӑ㘵Ӗ ❦DŽཙᆀнӱˈн‫؍‬ഋ⎧˗䄨‫ן‬нӱˈн‫⽮؍‬で˗যབྷཛнӱˈн‫؍‬ᇇᔏ˗ ༛ᓦӪнӱˈн‫؍‬ഋ億DŽᜑ↫ӑ㘼′нӱˈᱟ⥦ᜑ䞹㘼ᕧ䞂DŽ

Mencius said, “It was by benevolence that the three dynasties gained the throne, and by not being benevolent that they lost it. It is by the same means that the decaying and flourishing, the preservation and perishing, of States are determined. If the sovereign be not benevolent, he cannot preserve the throne from passing from him. If the Head of a State be not benevolent, he cannot preserve his rule. If a high noble or great offfijicer be not benevolent, he cannot preserve his ancestral temple. If a scholar or common man be not benevolent, he cannot preserve his four limbs. Now they hate death and ruin, and yet delight in being not benevolent;—this like hating to be drunk, and yet being strong to drink wine.”9 The close link between morality and legitimacy is also apparent in another, often quoted, context: ᆄᆀᴠ˖ӱнਟ⛪⵮ҏDŽཛ഻ੋྭӱˈཙл❑ᮥDŽ

Confucius said, “As against so benevolent a sovereign, they could not be deemed a multitude.” Thus, if the prince of a State love benevolence, he will have no opponents in all the kingdom.10 It is obvious here that the question whether one belongs to the tianxia is decided by the norm sharing the Confucian values, with benevolence ren being the most central one. Central here is the notion that a well-ordered tianxia does not know enemies (or opponents), therefore—in accordance with the widespread pacifijist bias—it is a harmonious world order without conflict and war. The loyalty of Confucius and his disciples during the Warring States period (Zhanguo ᡠ഻, 475–221 bc) was not confijined to a single state, but the greater realm, i.e. the world. Accordingly, Confucius’ diffferentiation between state (guo ഻, or also bang 䛖) and the larger unit tianxia makes

9  10 

Mencius 4A3; translation in Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 1, 293–294. Mencius 4A7; translation in Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 1, 296–298.

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Chapter 2

perfectly sense.11 In the following centuries, the ideal notion of all under Heaven as political objective of each ruler was the generally accepted worldview, even by the Qin dynasty that created a sense of otherness in the late Zhanguo era when its aggressiveness turned the rising power of the rivaling states into the enemy of the tianxia. Yet the resulting questioning of the universality of all under heaven was only temporary. With the foundation of the Qin dynasty and the simultaneous imperial unifijication of China in 221 BC, the earlier construction of diffference was revoked and the universality of tianxia restored. This ecumenical universality was—if we take a closer look at the philosophical writings from later centuries—highly influential in the later imaginations of world order, despite the radical changes that later dynasties were facing. While the Tang and other earlier dynasties had already experienced periods of war and rivalry with neighboring people (mostly considered barbarian), the 10th century observed a fundamental change. Now, tribal rulers actually had the intention of becoming the emperor of China. Starting with the Khitan state, its founder Apaoki bestowed the title heavenly emperor (tian huangdi ཙ ⲷᑍ) on himself in 907 after he became emperor in 900. He further introduced the habit of using an era name (nianhao ᒤ㲏) in 916 and tried to emulate the Chinese empire, by e.g. taking over the Chinese court ceremonial (including state and court rituals). The state administration incorporated both nomadic elements and Chinese bureaucracy and maintained this dualistic character in various areas. This was also the case for the later Jurchen and Mongolian dynasties. The fijirst time that the universality of Confucianism was principally questioned occurred in early 12th century when the Song dynasty experienced a fijirst crisis of the tianxia worldview. In 1115, the eunuch Tong Guan ┬⽾ (1054–1126) at the Chinese court formed—in reaction to the passivity of Emperor Huizong ᗭᇇ (1082–1135, reign 1101–1125)—an alliance with the Jurchen (Nüzhen ྣ ⵎ), a Tungusic people inhabiting the region of Manchuria. At that time, the Jurchen had established their Jin dynasty (1115–1234). The alliance was directed against another nomadic people, the Khitan (Qidan ཱྀѩ), who were residing in the region of Mongolia and Western Manchuria. When war broke out in 1122/23, the Jurchen defeated the Khitan, ended their Liao dynasty and took over the power in North China. The Song—who had expected diffferently—did not have a share in this victory. On the contrary, the Jurchens moved southwards, invaded the Huai region and conquered the Song capital Kaifeng, where

11 

The juxtaposition, which appears for the fijirst time in the chapter 16/2 of the Lunyu, frequently appears in texts of the Zhanguo-Period (453–221 bc).

Reconceptualizing World Order After The Tribute System

37

they captivated the emperor Huizong and his later successor, his son Qinzong Ⅽᇇ (1100–1161).12

The crisis did not last for long because the invading forces did not question the ecumenical order. This was even the case when the Song signed a treaty with the aggressive Western Xia (Xixia 㾯༿), a state existing from 1038 to 1227 in the northwestern Chinese provinces of Ningxia, Gansu, eastern Qinghai, and parts of Mongolia. The treaty secured a coexistence of both states, forcing the Song to pay yearly contributions to the Western Xia (as it has been with the Khitan), but also included a clause saying that the Song emperor adopted the ruler of the rivaling country as his son. In so far, we can argue from an anthropological perspective that while classical Confucianism propagates an ethic of the extended family—with the clan being the reference point for loyalty— the universal character of tianxia caused an extension of kinship ethics to a larger frame of reference. With the analogy between the role of the ruler and that of the father, kinship relations were indefijinitely expanded and defamiliarized. Accordingly, Confucian moral values gained a universal validity, and the empire was able to maintain its Sinocentrism.13 These discursive moves allowed later—especially during the Qing dynasty— for a more ideological defijinition of China and its borders, by again making moral values the core criteria. This is reflected in the frequent references to the writings by Mencius by both Han-Chinese and the alien dynasty of the Manchu. In the seventeenth century the late Ming intellectual Gu Yanwu 亗⚾ ↖ (1613–1682) defijined with reference to Mencius political order along the lines of guo and tianxia accordingly: ᴹӑ഻ˈᴹӑཙлDŽ ӑ഻㠷ӑཙлྊ䗘˛ᴠ᱃ဃ᭩㲏ˈ䄲ѻӑ഻ˈӱ㗙‫ݵ‬ຎ 㘼㠣Ҿ⦷⦨伏ӪˈӪሷ⴨伏ˈ䄲ѻӑཙлDŽ

12 

13 

Trauzettel points out, however, that Neo-Confucian thinkers such as Chen Liang and the Yongjia-scholars had renounced universalism in the wake of the Northern aggression. He argues that their concern was no longer the universal tianxia, but the single state (guo)— the barbarians could no longer be considered potential members of the oikumene. See Rolf Trauzettel, “Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese Nationalism.” Rolf Trauzettel, “Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese Nationalism.” For the reaction of Song dynasty toward the Mongolian invasion see Charles A. Peterson, “First Sung Reactions to the Mongol Invasion of the North, 1211–17,” in Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China, ed. John Winthrop Haeger (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1975), 215–254; and for research on the national hero Yue Fei in the Song’s fijight against the invasion Matten, “The Worship of General Yue Fei (1103–1142) and His Problematic Creation as a National Hero in Twentieth-Century China,” Frontiers of History in China 6, no. 1 (2011): 74–94.

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There is destruction of kuo and destruction of t’ien-hsia. Between destruction of kuo and destruction of t’ien-hsia what distinction should be made? ‘Change the surname, alter the style’ (i-hsing kai-hao ᱃ဃ᭩㲏)— this is a description of the destruction of kuo. The widespread dominion of benevolence and righteousness ( jen ӱ and i 㗙) decayed into the rule of beast-eat-man, men, leaders eating each other—this is a description of the destruction of t’ien-hsia.14 Culture and morality—defijined as learnable values—belong to the tianxia as the primordial order in cosmos. The guo, in the parlance of Levenson the “regime of power,” is opposed to the “regime of value” (tianxia), where the son of heaven rules indirectly via his moral exemplarity.15 The Manchu shared this view when emphasizing that morality determines if a ruler is legitimate (zhengtong ↓㎡), or not. The argument of morality was reiterated in the 1720s when the Qing saw a number of literary inquisition cases. One of the famous ones had been instigated by a Hunanese school teacher called Zeng Jing ᦦ㕕 (1679–1736) who questioned the legitimacy of the Qing ruler Yongzheng 䳽↓ (1678–1736). Zeng not only stressed the apparent ethnic diffferences between Manchus and Chinese (equaling the Manchus to beasts), but also claimed that Yongzheng was a tyrant who in no way conformed to the moral requirements of a ruler: he had not only killed his father in his ambition to succeed the throne, but also his brothers. Above all, he was a drinker and a playboy. To avoid being called a troublemaker who simply acted in a personal-selfijish interest, Zeng even pointed to the natural disasters and crop failures had proven in the recent years that proved that heaven was not indiffferent towards these issues. Contrary to earlier cases of lèse-majesté that in some cases had ended in executions,16 Yongzheng pursued the policy of educating the HanChinese school teacher. Referring to the famous passage in the Mencius that the most heroic rulers of ancient China were of barbarian ancestry, he tried to prove that he had properly obtained the mandate of heaven, no matter what his ethnic origin was. In the Record of How Great Righteousness awakens the

14 

15  16 

Rizhilu jishi vol. I, 13.41, compiled by Gu Yanwu. Translation taken from Joseph R. Levenson, “T’ien-hsia and Kuo”, and the “Transvaluation of Values”, The Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 4 (1952): 449. Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 99. See here Qingdai wenziyu dang ␵ԓ᮷ᆇ⥴⃄, ed. by Yuan Beiping gugong bowuyuan wenxianguan ේർᐔ᡿ችඳ‛㒮ᢥ₰㙚 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1986).

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Misguided (Dayi juemilu ᄢ⟵ⷵㅅ) that described the process of reeducation, Yongzheng writes: ᆏᆀᴠ˖㡌⭏ᯬ䄨俞ˈ䚧ᯬ䋐༿ˈংᯬ匤ọˈᶡཧѻӪҏDŽ᮷⦻⭏ᯬዀઘˈ ংᯬ⮒䜒ˈ㾯ཧѻӪҏDŽ

Mencius said, Shun was born in Chu-fang, removed to Fu-hsia, and died in Ming-t’iao;—a man near the wild tribes on the east. King Wan was born in Chao by mount Ch’i, and died in Pi-ying;—a man near the wild tribes on the west.17 While the translation by James Legge reads “a man near the wild tribes on the east”, it is—as I have shown elsewhere18—more precise to render the quote “a man of the wild tribes in the east”, if one considers that Yongzheng had a rather ideological understanding of what it meant to be Chinese. In his discussion of this Mencian quotation, the Qing emperor pointed namely out that ൘䘶䋺ㅹѻ᜿ᗂ䄲ᵜᵍԕ┯⍢ѻੋ‫ޕ‬⡢ѝ഻ѻѫྴ⭏↔⮶ᖬ⭼ѻ⿱䙲᭵⡢䁅 䅇䁶䅿ѻ䃚㙣н⸕ᵜᵍѻ⛪┯⍢⥦ѝ഻ѻᴹ㉽䋛㡌⛪ᶡཧѻӪ᮷⦻⛪㾯ཧѻ Ӫᴮօᨽᯬ㚆ᗧѾDŽ

The insurgent rebels claim that we are the ruler of Manchuria and only later penetrated into the (Chinese) central region to become their ruler. Their prejudices with regard to the separation of the two countries have led to many hateful fabrications. What the rebels did not understand is the fact that what is Manchuria for the Manchus is the same what the birthplace ( jiguan) for the peoples of the Central Area is. Shun is one of the Eastern Yi, and King Wen is one of the Western Yi. Does this fact diminish their virtues?19 While Zeng depicts the relationship between Han and Manchus as one between man and beast, the emperor simply sees it as a relationship between ruler and subject, and thus in accordance with Confucian tradition. In other words, despite cultural diffferences—which were for him of low signifijicance— the Qing rule was legitimate: the mandate of heaven had been transferred to them because they had restored order and security after the end of the corrupt 17  18  19 

Mencius 4B1, translation from Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 1, 316. Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen. Dayi juemilu ᄢ⟵ⷵㅅ, 1/2b–3a.

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Ming Dynasty. Rulership was not a matter ius sanguis (xuetong 㹰㎡), but one of devotion to Confucian values.20 The Qing clearly embodied these values, of which the fijive social relationships were the most important ones: ཛӪѻᡰԕ⡢Ӫ㘼⮠Ҿ⿭⦨㘵ԕᴹ↔ٛᑨѻ⨶ҏ᭵ӄٛ䄲ѻӪٛᱟ䰅аࡷн ਟ䄲ѻӪ⸓DŽੋ㠓ትӄٛѻ俆ཙлᴹ❑ੋѻӪ㘼ቊਟ䄲ѻӪѾDŽӪ㘼ᠧ❑ੋ ѻᗳˈ㘼ቊн䄲ѻ⿭⦨ѾDŽⴑӪٛࡷ䄲Ӫ⓵ཙ⨶ࡷ䄲⿭⦨䶎ਟഐ㨟ཧ㘼॰ࡕ Ӫ⿭ҏфཙભѻԕ⡢ੋ㘼ѳᠧ䘶ཙѻ᜿✹ᴹн䚝ཙѻ䂵㘵⇋Ѿ

What distinguishes man from animals are the principles of the fijive relationships. These fijive relationships are the human relationships. When one of them is neglected, one is no longer human. The most important is the relationship between ruler and subject. How can people call themselves human if they do not have a ruler? Those who do not desire a ruler, are they not animals? Those who exhaust human relationships are humans. Those who destroy the heavenly principles are animals. One can (therefore) does not distinguish humans and animals with the help of the categories hua and yi. Those who have a ruler who enjoys the mandate of heaven, but who turn against heaven, are irrevocably erased by heaven.21 It is obvious for Yongzheng that Confucian values are not tied to ethnic or territorial boundaries. They claim validity in all regions of the empire and can also be represented by the Manchus. This has two major consequences. By making the Manchus subjects of heaven, China becomes larger than the territory of the Ming (by doing so it was possible to legitimize the later conquests of Xinjiang and Tibet). Second, by rendering the Confucian values universal, they are not tied to ethnic boundaries either.22 Consequently, there was also no contradiction when Yongzheng called himself a “foreigner” (waiguoren ཆ഻Ӫ) who ruled China: Shun and Wen became sages because they were able

20  21  22 

Yongzheng considered himself as the father of all Chinese, and stressed the value of fijilial virtue (xiao ᆍ). See the introduction in the Dayi juemilu written by him. Dayi juemilu ᄢ⟵ⷵㅅ, 1/10–11. Yongzheng points out that ethnic or geographic origin of the Manchu is irrelevant, the Book of Documents (Shujing ᦠ⛫) states that “Great Heaven has no personal attachments, it helps only the virtuous.” ⲷཙ❑㿚ᗧᱟ䕄ᜏ. Cf. Dayi juemilu: 1/1, and for the Shujing the chapter Yushu–Yijimo 㲎ᴨ–⳺で䅘. See also Atwood, “ ‘Worshiping Grace’: The Language of Loyalty in Qing Mongolia.”

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to transform and cultivate themselves.23 There is thus no need to distinguish between people from in- and outside central China, after all, the world is one family and that all things are of the same origin. In the end, the Manchu Qing succeeded in establishing a concept of imperial sovereignty that worked universally and beyond ethnic diffferences.24 This universal rule was however characterized by a distinct hierarchy. Representing an ideal order, the Sinocentrism of imperial China obliged the ruler to ensure in relations with the periphery that all realms not under the direct rule of the Chinese emperor presented tributes to the Son of Heaven, thereby maintaining order and preventing destruction from outside barbarism.25 The tribute system, often idealized by rulers, provided from its start both an administrative means to control vassals and a way to grant exclusive trading rights to those vassal states that actually paid tribute.26 By doing so, the hierarchy was upheld. Hence, the system meant more than the moral value of tribute and the material value of trade. It served the purpose of domestic political legitimation as well as security at the frontier. It is, 23 

24 

25 

26 

Dayi juemilu 1/2b–3a; 42b–43a, see also Hirano Satoshi ᒣ䟾㚑. Shin teikoku to Chibetto mondai: taminzoku tōgō no seiritsu to gakai ␵ᑍഭǽɉɡɋɐ୿乼: ཊ≁᯿㎡ਸȃᡀ ・ǽ⬖䀓 (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppansha, 2004): 38–40. The same conclusion is valid for Yongzheng’s successor emperor Qianlong (reign 1736– 1796) who understood himself as the “supreme lord” or “king of kings”, rather than using the simple title of emperor. Evelyn Rawski therefore stresses that Sinicization—the assumption that all non-Han peoples that are part of the empire are assimilated by the Han Chinese culture—is a Han-nationalist interpretation of the past that stems from the 20th century. See here Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Signifijicance of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 4 (1996): 829–50. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, identifijies three important zones. On the origins of the tribute system, cf. the discussion in James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 12. On the characteristics of the tribute system, see John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yü Teng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” in Ch’ing Administration: Three Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 163–73, as well as Hamashita Takeshi, China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives, ed. together with Linda Grove and Mark Selden (New York: Routledge, 2008). Fairbank and Teng viewed the tribute system as “the medium for Chinese international relations and diplomacy” and “a scheme of things entire . . . the mechanism by which barbarous non-Chinese regions were given their place in the all-embracing Chinese political, and therefore ethical, scheme of things” (Fairbank and Teng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” 137, 139).

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however, not wise to take this model as an unchanging historical given. The system has been understood as “a Western invention for descriptive purposes”27 and has been criticized for various reasons. In political reality, the Confucian scholar certainly did not conceive of a tribute system in institutional terms, and in his eyes the prevailing opposition in this system was not China and nonChina but rather civilization and barbarism. In other words, premodern China tended to an exclusion of dealing with other polities in the region, which is clear proof of its sinocentric bias because this model is built on the assumption of supposed Chinese superiority that had to be respected and acknowledged by the tributary states, thus in the end resulting in nonegalitarian relations.28 Certainly, I do not take the hierarchy presented here at face value; it existed merely on a normative level. Recent research has further shown that this hierarchy was evidentially much flatter than Chinese court rhetoric would suggest.29 Yet, scholarship on the tribute system has been largely historical to date.30 Zhang Feng has pointed out that there is virtually no international relations 27  28 

29 

30 

Mark Mancall, “The Ch’ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay,” in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, 63. This bias is also the reason that Fairbank encountered critique in the decades after the publication of his work. For a general overview on the criticism of Fairbank and Sinocentrism, cf. the introduction in Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar. Rana Mitter, “An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective,” in Order and Justice in International Relations, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 207–35. For instance, the tribute system only meant that the Chinese emperor enjoyed nominal control, with the suzerain being rather autonomous. This explains the readiness of the Qing court to conclude the Treaty of Nerchinsk, for instance (cf. here the chapter 2 of this volume), but does not question the hierarchy itself. Finally, one should also be aware that the tribute system itself was not a monolithic entity. Peter Perdue pointed out that the system was constantly under change, collapsing, being reconfijigured and rebuilt. While it enjoyed an impressive continuity with regard to Korea, the system was more flexible in its relations to the people residing in the northwest (Peter Perdue, “A Frontier View of Chineseness,” in The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspective, ed. Giovanni Arrighi et al. [London: Routledge, 2003], 51–77). Joseph Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368–1844,” in The Chinese World Order, 206–24; Morris Rossabi, ed., China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); John E. Wills Jr., Pepper, Guns, and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and China, 1662–1681 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1974); John E. Wills Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’anghsi, 1666–1687 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984); James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy,

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scholarship that systematically analyzes the system for possible theory developments. For him, the tribute system model is characterized by fundamental problems, such as the underlying assumption of Sinocentrism, coupled with the idea of it being static and unable to cope with tributary states that grew powerful and thus posed a danger to the existing order. In fact, a distinction should be allowed between the periods of a strong and weak (or unifijied and divided) empire.31 Wang Gungwu emphasized in this context that the rhetoric of superiority—based on strength and meaninglessness during times of weakness and disorder—was “clearly myth, a sustaining and comforting myth, but equally clearly at other times . . . reality, a reality that nurtured cultural pride but also called for moral restraint.”32 In other words, the assumption of Sinocentrism is certainly helpful for analysis of periods of Chinese strength but not necessarily for periods of weakness and division.33

31 

32  33 

Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Peter Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Nicola Di Cosmo, “Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier: Tribute, Trade, or Gift-Exchange?” in Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt (London: Curzon Press, 2003), 351–72. Zhang Feng, “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 4 (2009): 545–74. Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in The Chinese World Order, 34–62. This also explains why China was ill-prepared to deal adequately with the Western impact in the nineteenth century, resulting in the demise of the long-cherished hierarchy. This interpretation is criticized by postcolonial historians, for it is the expression of a world order that unreflectedly assumes a stagnant and involuted China that had to be awakened by the so-called progressive West. For more on this aspect, see Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, and the critique thereof by Joseph W. Esherick, “Cherishing Sources from Afar,” Modern China 24, no. 2 (1998): 135–61. Hevia argues that the Fairbank model was a functional one and thus entailed the weaknesses of all functional models. In a later reply to a harsh critique by Esherick of his 1995 book on the Qing guest ritual, Hevia points out that his “goal was to construct a symmetrical account, one that would not privilege either the Qing or British record of events and would, in the process, help to break up simplistic dichotomies, such as tradition/modernity, China/the West, or Chinese isolationism/Western cosmopolitanism” (James L. Hevia, “Postpolemical Historiography: A Response to Joseph W. Esherick,” Modern China 24, no. 3 [July 1998]: 321–322). Esherick, on the contrary, argues that Hevia has placed greater value on political correctness than on providing an accurate representation of the past. In fact, Hevia’s criticism is not new if we take into consideration the work of earlier scholars such as John Wills (Embassies and Illusions). He has discussed the considerable Qing flexibility in applying the tribute

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These limitations notwithstanding, I consider the tribute system to be a functioning heuristic model that—admittedly taking the Chinese perspective—serves well as a starting point for explaining the transformation of the sinocentric world order, an order that political philosophers tried to safe despite the arrival of European nation-state in nineteenth century. While territorial threats by non-Han Chinese ethnic groups in the premodern era did not translate into a rejection of Confucian universalism, the situation looked diffferently in the late nineteenth century when the nation was defijined by race and ethnicity. With these exclusionary concepts China could no longer claim to be a polity without borders, and the fijirst profound crisis of the world order occurred—as identifijied in the literature—with the breakdown of the tribute system. It started in the mid-nineteenth century when the European nations were not willing to submit themselves to the Chinese civilization (and behave according to the Chinese hierarchy), as they were based upon alternative principles, among which nationalism and social Darwinism played a central role. As argued by Luo Zhitian, Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, as well as Chen Tingxiang and Zhou Ding, tianxia was transformed to be the world, but this world was now characterized by a particularistic state order in which no single state could claim moral superiority (albeit long for hegemony).34 This transformation is closely linked to the introduction of international law in the second half of the nineteenth century, which produced profound changes in the conceptions of territory, space, and territoriality.

34 

system but concludes by noting the court’s insistence on maintaining ceremonial supremacy and its consequent inability to adjust rationally to the demands of a new commercial age. Luo Zhitian, “From ‘tianxia’ (All under Heaven) to ‘the World’: Changes in Late Qing Intellectuals’ Conceptions of Human Society,” Social Sciences in China 29, no. 2 (2008), 93–105; Jin Guantao 䠁㿰☔ and Liu Qingfeng ࢹ䶂ጠ, Guannianshi yanjiu: Zhongguo xiandai zhongyao zhengzhi shuyu de xingcheng 㿰ᘥਢ⹄ウѝ഻⨮ԓ䟽㾱᭯⋫㺃䃎 Ⲵᖒᡀ (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008), here 221–245; Chen Tingxiang 䱸ᔧ ⒈ and Zhou Ding ઘ唾, Tianxia, shijie, guojia: jindai Zhongguo dui wai guannian yanbian shilun ཙл, ц⭼, ഭᇦ: 䘁ԓѝഭሩཆ㿲ᘥ╄ਈਢ䇪 (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian chubanshe, 2008).

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2.1

45

Doubting Political Order in Late Imperial China ਚᴹཙлˈі❑഻ᇦDŽ㘼ᡰ䄲ཙл㘵ˈॱ‫ⴱޛ‬㠣↓བྷѝˈᡰᴹᯱ഻ˈⲶ൘㾱 㦂䄨ᴽѻࡇˈԕަ❑⭡・ࡕˈ᭵❑഻ᇦਟ䀰DŽ —Yan Fu, Lectures on Politics, 190635

∵ In the wake of the arrival of European imperialism in East Asia, Chinese thinkers in the late Qing period faced a severe identity crisis. Whereas Yan Fu ೤ᗙ (1854–1921) lamented that his compatriots only knew tianxia ཙл, as opposed to the order of the state or nation-state (guojia ഻ᇦ), and were thus unable to conform to the new world order as exemplifijied by the Europeans (see the opening epigraph), his coeval Sun Yat-sen noticed that despite the long history of Chinese civilization, the Chinese were a people without a nation. In his eyes, the function of nationalism is to provide the people with political power and enable them to take the fate of their nation into their own hands. This judgment was most prominently propagated by the metaphor “heap of loose sand” (yipian sansha ৻⡷ᮓ⋉) in Sun’s writings. It was evoked for the fijirst time on April 10, 1912, when he addressed military and political representatives of Hubei Province at a meeting where he elaborated on the true meaning of freedom (Ziyou zhi zhendi 㠚⭡ѻⵏ䄖).36 Fearing the failure or breakdown of the new republican order immediately after the success of the Xinhai Revolution (1911), Sun commenced with a wide array of nation-building projects, starting with the implementation of national symbols such as a national flag and national anthem that were later institutionalized in the nationwide school system.37 The nation or nation-state was to replace the traditional tianxia, which was part and parcel of the political modernization process, as Liang Qichao put 35 

36 

37 

Yan Fu ೤ᗙ, Zhengzhi jiangyi, di yi hui ᭯⋫䅋㗙ˈㅜаഎ, in Yan Fu ji, no. 5, 1245; here taken from Yan Fu ѕ༽, Lun shibian zhi ji: Yan Fu ji 䇪цਈѻӏ——ѕ༽䳶 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994), 184. Zai Hubei junzhengjie daibiao huanyinghui de yanshuo ࿷ḓർァ᡽⇇ઍ⴫ᱚㄫᦩ⊛ Ṷ䃚, in Guofu quanji, vol. 2, 220–22. The metaphor of the loose sand can be found in many of Sun’s writings, it fijigured also prominently in his “Three principles of the People.” Cf. also his second speech of the people’s rights in early 1924, in Guofu quanji, vol. 1, 81. Onodera Shirō ሿ䟾ሪਢ䛾, Kokki, kokka, kokkei: Nashionarizumu to shinboru no Chūgoku kindaishi ഭᰇ࡮ഭⅼ࡮ഭឦ ɒȿɯɒɲɂɨǽȿɻɤɳȃѝഭ䘁ԓਢ (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2011).

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it in his writings on nationalism. He emphasized the obvious lack of national and political cohesion, most prominently discussed in his New Historiography (Xin shixue ᯠਢᆨ), dating from 1902. It was imperative for Liang to call for a moral revolution that would transform the passive subject into a responsible citizen able and eager to engage in politics.38 Instead of dispersed atomistic individuals who only knew tianxia in an abstract sense, Liang felt that national citizens with a fijirm interest in the matters of the nation would emerge. This transition from tianxia to nation-state was a long and arduous process during the last decades of the Qing dynasty whose beginning year can be narrowed down to 1895. By employing a quantitative statistical method, Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng—making use of their database that covers texts dating from 1860 to 1915 (totaling seventy million Chinese characters)—implemented a frequency count and meaning analysis of terms that shed light on the disintegration of the tianxia concept.39 By highlighting the shifting frequency of the terms tianxia, state (guojia ഻ᇦ), nation (minzu ≁᯿), ten thousand countries (wanguo 㩜഻), and world (shijie ц⭼), they concluded that until the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Chinese literati were deeply embedded in their traditional world order characterized by the China-centered wanguo guan 㩜഻㿰, which was a variation of the earlier tianxia guan ཙл 㿰. The 1864 translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (Wanguo gongfa ⪦࿡౏ᴺ) changed this world view by introducing wanguo as an alternative term to political texts, thereby changing the exclusive position of tianxia as a synonym for the world. The world was now conceived as existing of multiple politeias, yet without diminishing the orthodox standing of the Confucian tianxia concept. Jin and Liu argue that this was no longer the case in 1895, when tianxia lost its persuasive power. Defeated by Japan, the former disciple, China could no longer claim moral or civilizational superiority; thus, the tianxia fijinally disintegrated. Once being without borders and claiming universality, the new political order of the nation-state now had to recognize alternative polities. According to Joseph Levenson, this recognition caused the “intellectual alienation” that was both cause and content of later Chinese nationalism.40 The acceptance of nationalism implied the rejection of the reverence for morality and civilization as required by Confucian ortho38  39  40 

Ironically, by emphasizing morality in this context, Liang did not difffer much from the Confucian conception of society. For a list of the considered texts, cf. Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Guannianshi yanjiu: Zhongguo xiandai zhongyao zhengzhi shuyu de xingcheng, 463–77. Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, vol. 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), 95. For a similar interpretation, cf. Chen Tingxiang and Zhou Ding,

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doxy and orthopraxy, and the alienation caused a profound dissolution of this orthodoxy and orthopraxy. As a consequence, Confucianism was viewed as lagging behind the modern European civilization and was—as Levenson put it in his Confucian China and Its Modern Fate—banished into the museum. At this point, we need to emphasize that the notion of tianxia was at all times by no means a political reality but part of the mental world order of which literati were profoundly convinced. Their ideal notion of universal Confucian values ruling the world, beyond the factual borders of the empire, was a claim one felt obliged to defend. In the case of lower social strata, however, the direct link between the ruler—the Son of Heaven—and the subject was less predominant than for the educated literati-gentry.41 For this reason, the transformation of tianxia to guojia should be understood in a heuristic sense, allowing to determine what changed the mental mind-set of Chinese literati when their political thinking met modernity.42 In historical reality, this dichotomy is difffijicult to identify because the change from the traditional to the modern order did not occur instantly (nor did it entail a concrete break with the past). With regard to China’s foreign relations, the transformation related primarily to the conception of world order in which the empire longed to be fully accepted as a member of the family of nations. Although often understood as the absence of chaos in international community, world order needs to be defijined diffferently in this context, as argued by Robert Cox: I use the term “world order” in preference to “inter-state system” as it is relevant to all historical periods (and not only those in which states have been the component entities) and in preference to “world system” as it is more indicative of a structure having only a certain duration in time and avoiding the equilibrium connotations of “system”. “World” designates the relevant totality, geographically limited by the range of probable interactions (some past “worlds” being limited to the Mediterranean, to Europe, to China, etc.). “Order” is used in the sense of the way things usually happen (not the absence of turbulence); thus disorder is included in

41 

42 

Tianxia, shijie, guojia: jindai Zhongguo dui wai guannian yanbian shilun, as well as the chapter on tianxia in Jin and Liu, Guannianshi yanjiu. For local societies (far away from direct rule of the imperial court), there were alternative patterns of identifijication, most prominent among them the clan with its genealogy defijined by ancestor worship. Cf. Chow Kai-wing, The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics and Lineage Discourse (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). See here Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, xi.

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the concept of order. An inter-state system is one historical form of world order. The term is used in the plural to indicate that particular patterns of power relationships which have endured in time can be contrasted in terms of their principal characteristics as distinctive world orders.43 This resembles Hedley Bull’s defijinition of order in his magisterial work The Anarchical Society (1977), as Cox notes in a later publication: Hedley Bull defijined “order” to mean “that the constituents of order are related to one another according to some pattern, that their relationship is not purely haphazard but contains some discernible principle” (Bull, 1977). This suggests a dimension ranging from something just short of “purely haphazard” to a condition of stasis. Even the notion of haphazard can be contested, as scientists now perceive order within chaos (Gleick, 1987). Some kind of order may be perceived in anarchy. Order is thus not to be perceived as a limited range of social situations, e.g., those which are free from turbulence or conflict. Order is whatever pattern or regularity of interaction is to be found in any social situation.44 These defijinitions represent order as a morally and politically neutral concept that serves the primary purpose of either describing or analyzing political entities that are characterized by social and political interaction, whether this be trade, war, or intellectual exchange. Order is everywhere, and it is the task of either the historian or the social scientist to distinguish diffferent forms of order rather than distinguishing chaos from order. Contrary to this observation, the intellectual alienation in late imperial China caused feelings of disorder. Instead of understanding the nation or nation-state as an alternative form of order, it was rather dreaded by conservative thinkers, and the refusal of the Qing to implement reforms necessary for the participation in the sweeping modernization program as exemplifijied by Japan not only strengthened the opposition to the court but also caused an identity crisis among those who wondered what kind of place China should take in the new global order. 43  44 

Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 151–152, fn. 4. Robert W. Cox, “Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 136–37. For Gleick, cf. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin Books, 1987).

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Previously, the strict hierarchical understanding of the world order prohibited the emergence of international relations in its modern sense, as this necessitates the acknowledgment of a plurality of nation-states. The thinking of intellectuals in modern China witnessed, as Joseph Levenson once put it, “the contraction of China from a world to a nation in the world.”45 As a matter of fact, the intellectual Yang Du argued in his highly influential text On the Doctrine of Gold and Iron ( Jintiezhuyi shuo 䠁䩥ѫ㗙䃚)—based on Liang Qichao’s view that the Chinese people saw their state as tianxia and not as one state among many—that in the long course of Chinese history, China never had a word for international: before the challenge of the West, “China was the world and the world was China.”46 Accordingly, the notion of the nation or nation-state as the principal political order itself was absent in imperial China,47 also impeding the acceptance of equality of states (i.e., the basic principle of modern diplomacy) and the introduction of law and judicial principles as a major factor for the development of rules and norms in international relations. Intellectuals of the late Qing era felt that this “defijiciency” should be remedied by accepting and adhering to the notion of the equality of nations. Only then could the revision of unequal treaties, protection of national territory, and independence of the state in a world where national strength was not equally distributed be achieved.48 Yet such a world would be devoid of morality, and this caused

45 

46  47 

48 

Joseph R. Levenson, “The Genesis of Confucian China and Its Modern Fate,” in The Historian’s Workshop: Original Essays by Sixteen Historians, ed. L.P. Curtis (New York: Knopf, 1970), 288. Yang Du, Jintiezhuyi shuo 䠁䩥ѫ㗙䃚, in Yang Du ji, 214. As shown elsewhere, late imperial China knew a great variety of terms denoting the nation (minzu ᳃ᣖ, guojia ࿡ኅ, guomin ࿡᳃, guozu ࿡ᣖ), leading historians to the conclusion that the concept of “nation” is virtually impossible to defijine in the Chinese context (Marc Andre Matten, “China is the China of the Chinese”: The Concept of Nation and Its Impact on Political Thinking in Modern China,” Oriens Extremus, no. 51 [2003]: 63–106; Shen Sung-chiao ⊸ᶮ‫܁‬, Jindai Zhongguo minzuzhuyi de fazhan: jianlun minzuzhuyi de liangge wenti 䘁ԓѝ഻≁᯿ѫ㗙ⲴⲬኅ˖ެ䄆≁᯿ѫ㗙Ⲵ‫୿ػޙ‬乼, in Zhengzhi yu shehui zhexue pinglun, no. 3 [2002]: 49–119). Even the writings of one of the most ardent nationalist thinkers in late Qing China, Liang Qichao—who had a profound knowledge on the history of European nationalism—had only an imprecise understanding of what it meant to think in national terms. In the end, the huge variety of diffferent defijinitions of nation and nationalism creates what Akzin once called a “terminological jungle” difffijicult to traverse. See Benjamin Akzin, State and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1964), 7–10. For the jungle in China, see Matten, “China is the China of the Chinese.” For the revision of unequal treaties in Japan and China, cf. Louis G. Perez, Japan Comes of Age: Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties (London: Associated

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some to warn against a too-straightforward rejection of Confucian ideals, as the conservative backlash in the 1920s showed.49 Likewise, when Fairbank’s The Chinese World Order came out in 1968 (a book that became the most seminal work on the history of Chinese foreign relations in the twentieth century), there were voices cautioning against an oversimplifijication or overgeneralization of the whole model that put the nation-state as a rationalized form of political order, as opposed to the moralized tianxia.50 According to Rolf Trauzettel, this dichotomy is based on the diffference of the European nomos and the Chinese li (⿞), or ritual. The former is a human statutory law in a modern form (i.e., as written law, nomos gegrammenos), resulting in a distinct separation of the two spheres of religion or moral and law. The latter was unaware of such a separation and resided in the deep conviction that the longing for harmony between the ruler and the ruled (among others) was of primary importance. This dichotomy is due to the fact that while the concept of law is based on the ideal of individual autonomy, a similar concept could not emerge in China due to the heteronomy of the individual.51 The Chinese conceptions of morality defijine the order of the state (zhiguo ⋫഻) as an order in the cosmic as well as in the social sense. In this context, the individual is morally obliged to subordinate him- or herself to the prescribed

49  50  51 

University Presses, 1999); Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism; and Thomas F. Millard, The End of Exterritoriality in China (Shanghai: The ABC Press, 1931). See here Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Change—Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). For an enlightening discussion of the culturalism-nationalism paradigm, cf. Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism.” Rolf Trauzettel, “Individuum und Heteronomie: Historische Aspekte des Verhältnisses von Individuum und Gesellschaft in China,” Saeculum 28, no. 3 (1977): 340–64 (English translation: “Historical Aspects of the Individual-Society Relationship in China,” in Society, Culture, and Patterns of Behaviour [East Asian Civilizations: New Attempts at Understanding Traditions 3/4], ed. C.-A. Seyschab, A. Sievers, and S. Szynkiewicz [Unkel/ Rhein: Horlemann, 1990], 25–70), and Rolf Trauzettel, “On the Problem of the Universal Applicability of Confucianism,” in Confucianism and the Modernization of China, ed. Rolf Trauzettel and Silke Krieger (Mainz: V. Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1991), 42–50. At fijirst sight, this dichotomy seems to put ritual and ceremony at the one end, and reason and rationality at the other, implying that modern societies replace ritual by ratio on their path to modernity. However, Emile Durkheim has shown how rituals help to create society in the fijirst place. See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 424–27. For the political signifijicance of rituals in early Republican China, cf. Peter Zarrow, “Political Ritual in the Early Republic of China,” in Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia, ed. Chow Kai-Wing, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 149–88.

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order and to be educated to develop a functioning morality.52 The primary role of rites in the creation of order and the subjection of rights to the systems of rites caused an identity of right and morality, which was an absolute order of cosmos and the ecumene. Accordingly, this identity did not allow a dualism of divine and secular right, or physis and nomos.53 The lack thereof was also the reason why the philosophical code in China did not have its roots in the diffferentiation between good and evil, reality and illusion, or the immanent and the transcendent. Instead, China was based on moralized notions of order and disorder. Various philosophical writings in both the Daoist and the Confucian tradition were recipes for creating order (zhi ⋫) in a society that dreaded disorder and chaos (luan Ҳ). In modern Chinese, zhi has become part of the neologism politics (zhengzhi ᭯⋫), and the creation of order was a fundamental necessity for allowing any political system to emerge. The Great Learning (Daxue བྷᆨ), one of the most seminal texts of the Confucian canon that is frequently employed for legitimizing rule in both imperial and postimperial China, considers zhi to be the starting point for making the tianxia tranquil and happy.54 The ensuing process is characterized by the famous catena of kingdom (tianxia ཙл),55 state (guo ഻), family ( jia ᇦ), person (shen 䓛), heart (xin ᗳ), thought (yi ᜿), knowledge (zhi ⸕), and investigation of things (gewu Ṭ⢙). In its original stance, this process promotes a universal commitment to these moral values. The ambition of this text to be a foundation for world peace (tianxia ping ཙлᒣ) is justifijied by this moral universalism that transcends religious, political, and ethnic particularities.56 It is therefore also highly normative.

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54  55  56 

As a semiotic category right (quanli ᰨ೑)—opposed to the notion of duty (yiwu 㗙उ)—emerged only in the late nineteenth century. Cf. here Rune Svarverud, “The Notions of ‘Power’ and ‘Rights’ in Chinese Political Discourse,” in New Terms for New Ideas, ed. Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, 125–46 (Leiden: Brill, 2001). Only when rights, morals, and conventions break apart—as it happened in fijifth-centuryBC Greece—can a sense of individual subjectivity emerge (Trauzettel, “Individuum und Heteronomie,” 350). See here Daxue 2; translation in Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 1, 357–59. Tianxia, translated by Legge as kingdom (which is larger than a state), refers here to the known world, or all-under-heaven. The choice to be part of this moralist community is fijinally an acknowledgment of this universal truth formulated in the Daxue and other Confucian scripts. This view is still upheld in a recent publication on tianxia, where the author Wu Jiaxiang describes tianxia as a collective that is considered heterogeneous and multifaceted in terms of languages, ethnicities, religions, and cultures. See Wu Jiaxiang ੤ぬ⾕, Gong tianxia: duo zhongxin

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It is interesting that the catena in the Great Learning is characterized by a concentric hierarchy where the moral values emanate from the inside to the outside or from the individual to the collective (in an ideal society). This concentric hierarchy is reproduced in the political structure of the ecumenical empire. To create order is a concrete act of regulating social behavior, and this is compulsory for the individual, for whom a vision of order is always a cosmic one or a metapolitical (and not metaphysical) one. This being said, achieving order in the cosmos includes the human order, and to create order, then, is less a question of power politics, as stated by Machiavelli, and more a question of how to establish and maintain order in a given system. The neo-Confucianism school of the Song dynasty (960–1290) rationalized the understanding of the world and conceived the world as being intelligible and the way (dao) to be something accessible for human beings, granted that they followed their moral perfection as exemplifijied in the Daxue, for instance. By doing so, producing a balance at the heart of the individual, family, kingdom, and cosmos was possible. It is obvious here that the cosmological (and less the political) and the ethical are closely related to each other, but, even more, politics is not a matter of resignation to fate (“Die Politik ist das Schicksal,” as Goethe put it once in reference to Napoleon)57 but, rather, a realistic project based on the deep conviction that this was the perfect order that one undeniably could establish and maintain perpetually. Coupled with this orthodox belief, proposals of alternative order conceptions traditionally faced an uphill struggle, being unable to do signifijicant harm to the self-assured confijidence of Chinese civilization. This sinocentric world order was both self-referential and devoid of political choice: one could not be anything other than a Confucian.58 The political was always an efffort to create and maintain a known social order of the past, and as such, the nature and function of the order were unquestioned. So far, this order can be understood to be more cosmological than political. If creating a metapolitical order is indeed the result of a social process it begs the

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zhili yu shuang zhuti faquan ‫ޜ‬ཙл—ཊѝᗳ⋫⨶оৼѫփ⌅ᵳ (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012). Ernst Vollrath, Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theorie des Politischen (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1987), 289–90. Only exceptionally could one choose to be a Daoist or Buddhist, but this choice was not exclusive; it was rather—more often than not—a temporary choice of hermitage as a form of protest against an incompetent or illegitimate ruler.

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question if and how it can claim to be universal, and possibly even provide a reasonable order for international society?59 As seen with the Qing’s imagination of China as an empire without borders based on a Confucian universalism,60 the integration of both Chinese and non-Chinese into the same collective did not cause any problems.61 After all, despite all the fijights within China over how to achieve order, the order itself was unquestioned. Agency in installing this order was therefore not an issue. As a result, the reason was surely not an issue of scope (with the political order being directed inward and thus limited in various senses, as opposed to the unlimited cosmological order) but, rather, an intrinsic element of belief doctrine: Sinocentrism was regarded—from its self-understanding—as principally inclusive, i.e. it was associating without dissociating. This observation has two consequences for the imagination of order. First, the lack of dissociation explains why the tianxia seemed to do without enmity (dissociation was thus never seen in an absolute way). Second, it seems to imply further that the political was principally absent in imperial China, yet this is only true with regard to the conceptualization of world order. In general, Christian Meier defijines the political with regard to ancient Greece by emphasizing that the area of relation and conflict (Beziehungs- und Spannungsfeld) is the one where political units make decisions that result in the creation of a social order.62 By choosing a defijinition that focuses on the political instead of politics, it is possible to understand political thinking (if politics is not simply understood as an operational term referring to the actions of the state) as a synthesis of action (Handeln) and counteraction (Gegenhandeln).63 This synthesis implies, however, that there is a choice and that the process of taking sides among diffferent social and political actors entails the participation of the concerned citizen, as 59  60  61 

62  63 

A question I deal with in detail in the fijinal chapter where I discuss the possible contribution of social constructivism to the politics of international relations. See Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen, and “The Worship of General Yue Fei (1103– 1142) and His Problematic Creation as a National Hero in Twentieth-Century China.” The parallels with ancient Greece in this discussion on the political are obvious here. Similar to ancient China, Greece distinguished between the Hellenes and the barbarians in hierarchical terms yet still allowed a general recognition of the barbarian by the Hellene (combined, of course, with a distinct sense of superiority). Cf. the analysis in Reinhart Koselleck, “The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetrical Counterconcepts,” in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 155–91. Christian Meier, Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 16–17. Vollrath, Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theorie des Politischen.

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observed by Meier. Applying the same defijinition to the Chinese case, where the claim of cosmology made it impossible to imagine alternatives, is difffijicult. In this sense, the political was absent, and there was not a fijight for the right order, or as Otto Suhr (1894–1957) put it once, “Politik ist Kampf um die rechte Ordnung.”64 His classical defijinition concentrates on the true function of politics and due to its shortness allows for a variety of arrangements, whether left or right, progressive or conservative, where there is, in principle, the possibility of choice, of a true or false kind of order. This is a very modern understanding of the political because it rests on choices made possible by negotiations of diffferent political actors that either act or counteract, thus resulting in either dissociation or association. Before that era, political systems based on cosmological thinking or religious universalism were not dissociative (nor were they associative) but characterized by a unity of politics, ethics, and practical philosophy. This unity existed in the traditions of political thinking from Aristotle to Christian Wolfff (1679–1754) and was part of the Confucian order that successfully resisted the manifold attacks by heretic movements in various centuries. These movements, however, did not question the unity (although sometimes were directed against the political order per se), and thus, the tianxia cosmology remained a central tenet of the political. After all, “heresy was less a matter of ideology per se than of practice,”65 and accordingly, Confucianism could not simply become suspect of ideology (ideologieverdächtig). In the European context, the unity became obsolete in the wake of the Enlightenment movement when nation-states emerged as new actors that followed egoistic aims of each strengthening its own power and expanding its territory. This is caused by the intrinsic particularism of the nation-state order. It is often argued that this order cannot do without the defijinitions of friend and foe, as proposed by the legal scholar Carl Schmitt. Thinkers who hold this particularism responsible for rivalry, conflict, and war often base their proposal for a postnational global order on a very simplistic reading of Schmitt’s writings by overestimating the dichotomy of friend and foe.66 In fact, Schmitt’s vision is not a political issue per se but aims at determining the political collec-

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Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, Einführung in die politische Wissenschaft (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965), 14. Richard Smith, “Ritual in Ch’ing Culture,” in Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China, ed. Liu Kwang-ching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 304. For heresy and heresiography in general, cf. John B. Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: NeoConfucian, Islamic, Jewish and Early Christian Patterns (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). As does, for instance, the philosopher Zhao Tingyang.

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tive (i.e., it poses the question of who belongs to the collective and who does not). Although this dichotomy of good and evil on the moral fijield, beautiful and ugly on the aesthetic fijield, and benefijicial and harmful on the economic fijield is central to his political thinking, his call for an alternative order is less radical in the sense that, despite his later anti-Semitic statements, he does not aim for a political order that is denying the opposite its existence.67 The process of othering is an aim in itself, not one for further aims such as annihilating dissociation. In other words, the thinking of Schmitt in this context is less signifijicant than one would assume.68 In the Chinese case, the breakup of the unity of politics, ethics, and practical philosophy occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Quite parallel to the European development roughly two centuries earlier, how to create an order that is able to deal with political questions was no longer of interest, but whom to provide with the necessary legitimation and also power to make decisions with political impact was. Here, both dissociation and association emerge, and the choice for either is a central characteristic for any political movement of that time. The arrival of the political coincides with a new radicalness in the modern age that resonates with the increase in conflicts and territorial expansions in the nationalist/imperialist age and results into the emergence of a particularistic world order. This was due to the dissolution of Confucian morality that made alternative orders imaginable or realistic, coupled with the obligatory choice of options (i.e., the decision to prefer one to another). In fact, as soon as the tianxia lost its persuasive power, politics were now no longer an afffair of the state but concerned those who were politically interested and interested in participating in politics. Only in this context could action and counteraction meet and create the political, which, in turn, led to

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Raphael Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden: Eine deutsche Rechtslehre (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005). For this reason, Schmitt is also—in his writings before 1933 and even more pronounced in his 1963 The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political (Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begrifff des Politischen)—pursuing the control of the enemy by establishing rules of war (“gehegter Krieg”), and not his annihilation. He defends this understanding of the political by his concept of nomos; cf. Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte, in Staat, Großraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 269–371; Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1950); Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos; and Elden, “Reading Schmitt Geopolitically.” Even though Zhao Tingyang (Meigeren de zhengzhi ⇿њӪⲴ᭯⋫ [Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010]) argues diffferently and considers Schmitt’s concept of the political to be central for diffferentiating Chinese and Western civilization.

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a fundamental reinterpretation of the Confucian tradition in the fijirst decades of the twentieth century. In the following, I show—contrary to the assumed dissolution of Confucianism—that certain associative elements of the tianxia thought remained politically efffective. This was caused by two major factors, namely, the failure of the right concept to gain ground in creating and maintaining the new world order and the unquestioned civilizational pride that praised the tianxia of the past as superior form of political order. The insight at the wake of World War I that the once-cherished superior civilization of Europe was unable to guarantee peace and stability caused the highly moralist text of the Confucian tradition—the Great Learning—to maintain its popularity. In fact, the idea of moral refijinement as a means to generate order—as normative as that may be—continued to have an impact on political thinkers. For instance, Liang Qichao recognized during the war that the European model of organizing international relations with the help of norms and regulations put down in international law had utterly failed. Pitting a materialist West against a spiritual East (i.e., China), he—as did conservative thinkers of his era—regained his pride of a superior Chinese civilization that could provide a valuable role model for a world without war and conflict. In his Record of My Impressions on A Tour of Europe (Ouyou xinyinglu ↀ⑨ᗳᖡ䤴),69 he criticized the cultural and moral bankruptcy of the West because of its obsession with science and materialism. In order to overcome the crisis, it was imperative to reintegrate humanistic values in life by a reconsideration of Chinese tradition. Accordingly, his discussion of the League of Nations (Guoji lianmeng ഻䳋㚟ⴏ) incorporated elements taken from the Great Learning. A future world order, Liang argues, should go beyond the nation-state as the highest form of political order (i.e., the ideal of a global collective [quan renlei da tuanti ‫ޘ‬Ӫ于བྷൈ億]). This ideal has its origin in the Chinese tradition that humankind, not the nation-state, is the most signifijicant kind of collective. By comparing the situation of postwar Europe to the Warring States period (475–221 BC), Liang arrives at showing that China had once also experienced a state of rivalry, chaos, and war, yet it managed to escape when unifying the empire in the second century bc. In this context, the ideal of the transforma69 

In 1919 Liang went to Europe as a member of China’s unofffijicial delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The book is a collection of several articles that narrate his observations in Europe. The articles were fijirst published in the newspaper The China Times (Shishi xinbao ᱲһᯠ๡) and as a supplement to the Morning Post (Chenbao Ი๡). The fijirst part of the collection Ouyou xinyinglu bears the title Europe before and after the World War (Dazhan qianhou zhi Ouzhou བྷᡠࡽᖼѻↀ⍢).

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tive power of self-cultivation played a central role, as argued in the catena of the Great Learning.70 Compared to Europe that has been divided into single states, China—having a similar size—has enjoyed (territorial) unity, and this was fijirst and foremost due to the Mencian thought of “all-under-heaven is one family” (tianxia yijia ཙлаᇦ).71 A few years later, the former president of the republic and leading politician of the Kuomintang ഻≁唘, Sun Yat-sen, referred to the Great Learning again when lecturing on the nature and task of nationalism in China. Sharing with Liang the necessity to establish a fijirm national consciousness among his compatriots, he discussed in the fijinal lecture on nationalism in his Three Principles of the People (Sanminzhuyi й≁ѫ㗙, 1924) the restoration of China as a nation. He was convinced of China’s superiority in both ability and morality to create an international order devoid of conflict, war, and aggression. China will succeed in doing so by reviving its traditional Confucian values, among them loyalty (zhong ᔘ), fijiliality (xiao ቁ humanity (ren ੳ), charity (ai ᗲ), trustworthiness (xin ା) and justice (yi ⟵), he argues. These values do not describe historical reality but serve as points of moral orientation and are thus of vital importance; still there was one value even more precious: ѝ഻ᴤᴹаぞᾥྭⲴ䚃ᗧˈᱟᝋ઼ᒣDŽ⨮൘ц⭼кⲴ഻ᇦ઼≁᯿ˈ→ᴹѝ഻ ᱟ䅋઼ᒣ˗ཆ഻䜭ᱟ䅋ᡠ⡝ˈѫᕥᑍ഻ѫ㗙৫⓵ӪⲴ഻ᇦDŽ䘁ᒤഐ⛪㏃䙾䁡 ཊབྷᡠˈ⇈⇪ཚབྷˈ᡽ѫᕥ‫ݽ‬৫ᡠ⡝ˈ䮻Ҷྭᒮ⅑઼ᒣᴳ䆠ˈ‫ۿ‬ᗎࡽⲴ⎧⢉ ᴳ䆠ˈↀᡠѻᖼⲴ㨟䌭⡮ᴳ䆠ǃ䠁䛓⬖ᴳ䆠ǃ㨟ⴋ乃ᴳ䆠ˈᴰ䘁Ⲵ⍋ẁᴳ 䆠DŽնᱟ䙉Ӌᴳ䆠ˈ਴഻Ӫ‫਼ޡ‬৫䅋઼ᒣˈᱟഐ⛪ᙅᡠ⡝ˈࠪᯬࣹᕧ㘼❦ Ⲵˈнᱟࠪᯬа㡜഻≁ⲴཙᙗDŽѝ഻Ӫᒮॳᒤ䞧ᝋ઼ᒣˈ䜭ᱟࠪᯬཙᙗDŽ䄆 ࡠ‫ػ‬Ӫ‫ׯ‬䟽䅉䇃ˈ䄆ࡠ᭯⋫‫ׯ‬䃚Njнఌ⇪Ӫ㘵㜭аѻnjˈ઼ཆ഻Ӫ‫ׯ‬ᴹབྷབྷ Ⲵн਼DŽᡰԕѝ഻ᗎࡽⲴᘐᆍӱᝋؑ㗙ぞぞⲴ㠺䚃ᗧˈപ❦ᱟ倅Ѿཆ഻Ӫˈ

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Contrary to the later critique of the inhuman Confucianism, Liang shares the NeoConfucian idea of self-cultivation and the family as fundamental for any political order. This is also discussed in his serial essay “The New Citizen” (Xinminshuo, 1902), which took its title from the Daxue that begins with the passage: “What the Great Learning teaches, is to illustrate illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence” (བྷᆨѻ䚃ˈ൘᰾᰾ᗧˈ൘㿚≁ˈ൘→ᯬ㠣ழ Legge, The Chinese Classics, 356). Legge translates the term qinmin—loving the people—as “renovating the people” (xinmin), due to the alternate reading of the character qin. Though community or civil associations are not mentioned in the catena, the Great Learning heavily influenced Liang’s essay. Liang’s praise for Mencius’s political thought goes back to 1899, when he published a short piece on the essentials of Mencian thought. Cf. Liang Qichao, Du Mengzi jieshuo 䆰ᆏᆀ ⭼䃚, in Qingyibao, July 18 and 28, 1899, here taken from Yinbingshi wenji, vol. 1, 13–15.

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Chapter 2 䃚ࡠ઼ᒣⲴ䚃ᗧˈᴤᱟ倅Ѿཆ഻ӪDŽ䙉ぞ⢩ࡕⲴྭ䚃ᗧˈ‫ׯ‬ᱟᡁ‫≁ف‬᯿Ⲵ㋮ ⾎DŽᡁ‫ف‬ԕᖼሽᯬ䙉ぞ㋮⾎нնᱟ㾱‫؍‬ᆈˈіф㾱Ⲭᨊ‫ݹ‬བྷˈ❦ᖼᡁ‫≁ف‬᯿ Ⲵൠս᡽ਟԕᚒᗙDŽ

China possesses still another very good virtue, namely, the love of peace. Among the states and nations of the world at the present day, China is the only one who speaks of peace, whereas all the other nations speak of war and advocate the extermination of other foreign states by means of imperialism. (It is only) in the last years that, after many big wars and extensive slaughters, they have proposed to avoid wars and have held several peace conferences, such as the Hague Conference, the Versailles Conference after the European War, the Geneva Conference, the Washington Conference, and, lately, the Lausanne Conference. But if the diffferent countries spoke in common of peace at those conferences, it was because they feared war, and out of a (feeling) of necessity, not out of a natural (love for peace) on the part of the citizens (of any of these nations), whereas the intense love for peace which the Chinese have manifested for thousands of years is but an offfspring of their natural character. As to the individuals, we pay much regard to humility and deference. As to the government we say: “He who delights not in slaughter can unify all men.” It is quite diffferent with foreigners. Therefore there is no doubt that China was formerly superior to foreigners in the virtues of loyalty, fijilial piety, humanity, charity, faithfulness, and justice; she is still far superior to the foreigners in the virtue of peace. These characteristic virtues represent the (very) spirit of our nation. Henceforth, we must not only preserve this spirit of our nation, but we must cause it to shine with greater splendor. Then we shall be able to recapture the standing of our nation.72 The love for peace and the conviction that China had ever been a pacifijist country is located in the (neo-)Confucian tradition that stressed the values acquired by moral perfection of the individual (xiuyang ‫؞‬伺) as conditional for a peaceful order. The ideals of the past were, however, not lost but needed to be recovered if China wanted to contribute to a peaceful world order: ᡁ‫ف‬㠺ᴹⲴ䚃ᗧ៹䂢ᚒᗙԕཆˈ䚴ᴹപᴹⲴᲪ㜭ҏ៹䂢ᚒᗙ䎧ֶDŽᡁ‫ف‬㠚㻛 ┯␵ᖱᴽҶԕᖼˈഋ㩜㩜Ӫⶑ㿪ˈнնᱟ䚃ᗧⶑҶ㿪ˈ䙓⸕䆈ҏⶑҶ㿪DŽᡁ 72 

Sun Zhongshan quanji, vol. 9, 246–47. Translation taken from Pasquale d’Elia, The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-Sen (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1974), 193–94.

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‫ف‬Ӻཙ㾱ᚒᗙ≁᯿㋮⾎ˈнնᱟ㾱ொ䟂പᴹⲴ䚃ᗧˈቡᱟപᴹⲴ⸕䆈ҏ៹䂢 ொ䟂ԆDŽѝ഻ᴹӰ哬പᴹⲴ⸕䆈઒˛ቡӪ⭏ሽᯬ഻ᇦⲴ㿰ᘥˈѝ഻ਔᱲᴹᖸ ྭⲴ᭯⋫ଢᆨDŽᡁ‫ف‬ԕ⛪ↀ㖾Ⲵ഻ᇦ䘁ֶᖸ䙢↕ˈնᱟ䃚ࡠԆ‫Ⲵف‬ᯠ᮷ॆˈ 䚴нྲᡁ‫ف‬᭯⋫ଢᆨⲴᆼ‫ޘ‬DŽѝ഻ᴹа⇥ᴰᴹ㌫㎡Ⲵ᭯⋫ଢᆨˈ൘ཆ഻Ⲵབྷ ᭯⋫ᇦ䚴⋂ᴹ㾻ࡠˈ䚴⋂ᴹ䃚ࡠ䛓⁓␵ᾊⲴˈቡᱟljབྷᆨNJѝᡰ䃚ⲴNjṬ ⢙ǃ㠤⸕ǃ䃐᜿ǃ↓ᗳǃ‫؞‬䓛ǃ啺ᇦǃ⋫഻ǃᒣཙлnj䛓а⇥Ⲵ䂡DŽᢺа‫ػ‬ Ӫᗎ‫Ⲭޗ‬ᨊࡠཆˈ⭡а‫ػ‬ӪⲴ‫ޗ‬䜘‫ڊ‬䎧ˈ᧘ࡠᒣཙл→DŽ‫ۿ‬䙉⁓㋮ᗞ䮻ኅⲴ ⨶䄆ˈ❑䄆ཆ഻Ӱ哬᭯⋫ଢᆨᇦ䜭⋂ᴹ㾻ࡠˈ䜭⋂ᴹ䃚ࠪˈ䙉ቡᱟᡁ‫ف‬᭯⋫ ଢᆨⲴ⸕䆈ѝ⦘ᴹⲴሦ䋍ˈᱟ៹䂢㾱‫؍‬ᆈⲴDŽ

Besides reviving our ancient Chinese morality, we must also revive our wisdom and ability. Since we were conquered by the Manchus, our 400,000,000 people have been sleeping. Not only did morality slumber, knowledge also remained sleeping. If today we want to revive our national spirit, we must revive not only the morality which is proper to us, but we must revive also our own knowledge. What is the knowledge proper to China? Regarding the question of the relations between human life and the State, China had in ancient times an excellent political philosophy. We imagine that the nations of Europe and America have made wonderful progress in recent times, but their new culture is not as perfect as our political philosophy. China has a well systematized political philosophy which we do not fijind among foreign politicians—(at least not) with the same degree of clearness. It is found in the Great Learning (བྷᆨ): “Investigate into things, attain the utmost knowledge, make the thoughts sincere, rectify the heart, cultivate the person, regulate the family, govern the country rightly, pacify the world.”73 This doctrine makes a man develop from within outward, and it expands from the inner life of an individual to the pacifijication of the whole world. Such a theory, so detailed, minute, and progressive, was neither discovered nor spoken of by any foreign political philosopher. It is a peculiar intellectual treasure pertaining to our political philosophy, which we must preserve.74 Sun expresses a great pride in the Confucian tradition of political thought. Although his lectures on nationalism clearly espouse his wish to transform China into a functioning and globally accepted nation-state, this does not prevent him from reintroducing elements from this tradition that both Liang 73  74 

Cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 1, 222–23. Sun Zhongshan quanji, vol. 9, 247. Translation taken from d’Elia, The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-Sen, 194–95.

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Qichao and he once had deemed incompatible with nationalism. It is intriguing to observe that Sun rejects the sinocentric empire based on universal moral values and simultaneously calls for an order that cannot do without these universal and—under the impression of the disastrous consequences of World War I—superior Confucian values. To solve this conundrum Sun diffferentiates in his Triple Demism between an imperial (i.e., dynastic) state based on military force and political power exerted by the central state, and the modern, advanced national consciousness that prefers cultural values embodied by the Han, which were the ethnic majority in a state that aimed at creating a unity by means of acculturation. In his eyes, it would be mistaken to simply replace the idea of the nation-state with the tianxia ideology (tianxiazhuyi ᄤਅਥ⟵). Rather, it seems wise to establish a new universalism called shijiezhuyi ਎⇇ ਥ⟵ that according to Sun is based on the (Han-)Chinese nationalism. In his universalism, the nation does not disappear, but is integrated into a new world order conception conceived by a new reading of the Great Learning.75 Sun’s interpretation of this Confucian classic is shared by his political successor, Chiang Kai-shek 㭓ӻ⸣ (1887–1975), who in 1930 wrote in his essay On Politics and Learning (Weizheng yu qiuxue ⛪᭯㠷≲ᆨ) that ❢ℂᤚฎ੹ਛᄖ⊛ᦠ⛔⛔⋴ㆊ⊛㧘⸵ᄙ⊛⑼ቑ㧘❢ℂㇺ⎇ⓥㆊ㧘౔ਛᦨ㊀ ⷐ㧘ᦨ㜞ᷓ⊛㧘ଢᤚᄢቑ਄⊛ᐞฏ⹤㧦‫‛ޟ‬ᩰ⠰อ⍮⥋㧘⍮⥋⠰อᗧ⺈㧘ᗧ ⺈⠰อᔃᱜ㧘ᔃᱜ⠰อりୃ㧘りୃ⠰อኅ㥱㧘ኅ㥱⠰อ࿡ᴦ㧘࿡ᴦ⠰อᄤਅ ᐔ‫ޠޕ‬ㅡᐞฏ⹤ᓬૼᧂ᦭ੱ⊔᣿ㆊ㧘ㅡ⿷⻹᣿ਛ࿡⊛᡽ᴦືቑ㧘ᦨᷓ㆙㧘ᦨ ඳᄢ‫ޕ‬ή⺰㇊৻୘⷏ᵗ᡽ᴦኅ㧘⛔⛔⻠ਇ಴ㅡᐞฏ⹤ૼ‫ޕ‬

Dr. Sun has studied the most important books, both traditional and modern, of Chinese and West. He has also done much scientifijic research. But, of all he has studied and researched, the most important and profound is this passage from The Great Learning: “When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectifijied; when the mind is rectifijied, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world.” The idea of this passage is found nowhere else 75 

I thank Thomas Fröhlich for pointing me out to Sun’s re-reading of the Daxue. See here Thomas Fröhlich, “Der Machtstaat in Sun Yat-sens Drei Volksprinzipien: Nationalismus und Expertokratie in der chinesischen Republik,” in Staatsverständnis in Ostasien, ed. Lee Eun-Jeung and Thomas Fröhlich (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), 89–113.

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in the world, which proves that Chinese political philosophy has great depth. Western political thinkers have never expounded this idea.76 The Great Learning not only became a central element in the New Life Movement Campaign (Xin shenghuo yundong ᯠ⭏⍫䙻अ) in 193477 but was also supported by the conservative KMT politician Chen Lifu 䲣・ཛ (1900– 2001). In 1944 in his book Philosophy of Life (Sheng zhi yuanli ⭏ѻ৏⨶), he elaborated on the paramount signifijicance of this Confucian text for the moral improvement of the people, the unifijication of the family, and the pacifijication of the all-under-heaven.78 What happens here is that conservative thinkers propagate values of Chinese (i.e., Confucian) origin for the glorious aim of creating world peace by turning the Great Learning catena into reality. It can thus be concluded that the Confucian heritage exerted a strong influence long after the breakdown of the empire in 1911. Because of its intrinsic optimism, political thinkers of the twentieth century were still convinced that it was actually possible to realize the tianxia.79 Although the traditional heritage was originally thought to be counterproductive to the project of political 76 

77 

78  79 

Xian zongtong Jiang gong quanji, vol. 1, 611, translation taken from Stanislaus Kuang Lo, “Chiang Kai-shek’s Interpretation of the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean,” in Proceedings of Conference on Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China, vol. 1 (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1987), 99. Here Lo takes the translation of the Daxue quote from the translation done by Wing-tsit Chan in the 1963 edition of the Sources of Chinese Tradition. The 1999 edition has the quote on pages 330–33. See Chiang’s speech “The Way of the Daxue” (Daxue zhi dao བྷᆨѻ䚃) of September 11 and 15, 1934, published in Chiang Kai-shek 㭓ӻ⸣, Daxue zhi dao བྷᆨѻ䚃, in Jiang zongtong yanlun huibian 㭓㑭㎡䀰䄆ᖉ㐘, vol. 12 (Taibei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1956), 1–24. Chen Lifu 䲣・ཛ, Sheng zhi yuanli ⭏ѻ৏⨶ (Chongqing: Zhengzhong shuju, 1944); Chen Lifu, Philosophy of Life (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948). The optimism was widely shared in the twentieth century as has been put forward by Thomas Fröhlich who points out that Tang Junyi seemed to be one of the few thinkers who questioned the applicability of the Daxue to modern states. In an article published in 1951, Tang pointed out that thinkers of the past had always failed to explain adequately the underlying concepts of tianxia and guojia in order to make the Daxue feasible. After all, its catena had been applied only to feudal society. Cf. Tang Junyi ୀੋ⇵, Jiating, guojia, tianxia zhi guannian zaijianli xulun ᇦᓝǃ഻ᇦǃཙлѻ㿰ᘥ޽ᔪ・ᒿ䄆, in Renwen xuekan, no. 1 (1951). For Fröhlich’s interpretation of Tang Junyi cf. Fröhlich, Thomas, “Regulating, Governing, and Pacifying the Modern World: Optimism Regarding Civilizational Progress in Chinese Interpretations of the Great Learning in the 20th Century,” in Lecture et Usages de la Grande Étude, eds. Anne Cheng and Damien MorierGenoud (Paris: Collège de France, Institut des hautes études chinoises, 2015), 397–414.

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modernization, if one shares Levenson’s observation of “intellectual alienation,” it was now put into a national framework yet without being limited to it. It is, however, not possible to simply conjecture here an efffort of nationalizing the past: Confucian morality clashes with European conceptions of how social and political relations are construed and this had far-reaching consequences that are present still today. The problem at this point was the fundamental question of whether Chinese thinkers developed a counterdiscourse to European modernity that either negates the latter’s universality or if it simply tried to avoid this issue by promoting a return to the idealized past. Instead of engaging in such a discussion that, in the past, has proved more futile than helpful, the more interesting issue should be how to imagine a possible reconciliation of order conceptions that sometimes contradict each other in the late imperial era to such an extent that one model is abandoned in favor of the other alternative. For instance, James Hevia introduced to idea of Qing guest ritual80 for the sole sake of explaining the nature of Chinese imperial behavior without implying a lack of the category of right that might explain why China insisted on maintaining its tributary relations until it signed the Kanghwa treaty in 1876. In fact, China had concluded international treaties already earlier, most notably the Treaty of Nanking after the First Opium War that had ended the old Canton system. It created a new framework for foreign relations where negotiations between China and foreign nations were not conducted in form of the Qing guest ritual anymore but on the basis of judicial norms, denoting clearly rights and duties of the contracting parties. By negating this transformation, Hevia tries to sustain a cultural dichotomy in which the ritual li is conflated with a Western historical understanding of ritual81 and where by the very existence of this dichotomy an incompatibility of the two perceptions of world order is claimed. This poses the problem for how to imagine a world order when removing China from it. It is therefore important to point out that ritual—especially in the form of the tribute system—had a distinct political-moral function aiming at construing a political order compatible with the Sinocentrism of the Chinese. The tribute system followed the logic of ritual, but this did not make Qing bureaucrats irrational in their intercourse with foreign powers, as I show in the following with the example of the Nerchinsk treaty negotiations with Russia in the early eighteenth century. I argue that though ritual is not opposed to rationality it never80  81 

James L. Hevia, “A Multitude of Lords: Qing Court Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793,” Late Imperial China 10, no. 2 (1989): 72–105; Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar. Cf. here the discussion in Angela Zito, “Ritualizing Li: Implications for Studying Power and Gender,” Positions 1, no. 2 (1993): 321–48.

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theless posed a major problem when the Chinese court encountered European imperialism with its request for organizing relations with the help of treaties based on the notion of nomos. The problem of the imperial court was to reconcile the universal applicability of ritual with a world that preferred rationality over ritual and divided itself into national territories, each of which claimed sovereignty in acting. The question was to what spatial extent it was permissible to expand Confucian morality, or to put it in other words if and how the Great Learning could be applied to the realm beyond the Chinese domain that in the last decade of nineteenth century came to be limited by the modern notion of territoriality.

2.2

Territory and Space after the Reconceptualization of World Order in Late Nineteenth Century

As argued above, the tianxia concept—coupled with the Daxue catena— provided the Chinese empire with the imaginary of the world as a realm without boundaries.82 Being closely related to the issue of spatiality (and not territoriality, as I show in this chapter) it also explains why threats and attacks (even military ones) by non-Han Chinese ethnic groups did not translate into a rejection of Confucian universalism. The classical example here are the peace negotiations after the Russian–Manchu border conflicts (1652–1689) that only at fijirst sight seem to contradict the tribute system model. When China concluded the ensuing Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, it did for the fijirst time recognize a territorial boundary defijined by judicial means.83 Its territorial terms 82 

83 

Following the same logic, the Qing territorial/spatial expansion in the eighteenth century—which included Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang)—was not just deemed an expansion by military or economic means (like the European imperialism one century later) but from the Chinese perspective a spread of civilization into areas inhabited by barbarians, which, again, justifijied Qing rule over Han and non-Han regions. On the issue of sinicization in this context, cf. the discussion by Ho Ping-ti, “The Signifijicance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 26, no. 2 (1967): 189–95; and Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Signifijicance of the Qing Period in Chinese History.” The agreement was signed in Nerchinsk on August 27, 1689. The signatories were Songgotu, on behalf of the Kangxi emperor, and Fedor Golovin, on behalf of the Russian tsars Peter I and Ivan V. While the authoritative version was in Latin (with translations into Russian and Manchu), these versions difffered considerably. There was no offfijicial Chinese text for another two centuries; the border markers were inscribed in Chinese along with Manchu, Russian, and Latin. For the territorial implications of this treaty and on the

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remained in force for 160 years. The treaty was, however, a compromise caused by the geostrategic situation: two empires had come into conflict with each other in the course of their expansion, and China did not confront another nation-state, a situation that might have necessitated an integration into the global order. In fact, the later Treaty of Kiakhta of 1727 integrated the Russian Empire into their tribute system by establishing a peace zone (and not a border) for more than a century. The Kiakhta system enjoyed a long period of stability, with border trade being considered a gracious act by the Qing.84 For this reason, it—though being an exceptional and singular case of application of the European diplomatic principles—had no immediate consequences for China’s perception of international relations.85 The situation changed when the Qing was forced to sign the Treaty of Peking in 1860. This treaty stipulated that Russia could open consulates in Urga and Kashgar (with full diplomatic equality and extraterritorial jurisdiction over Russian subjects), and the Qing was to have the same privileges in Russia. By then, the Qing had lost valuable territories to Russia because it had been restricted by the outmoded policy of confijining Han-Chinese settlement within China proper, thereby leaving the frontier regions to be res nullius86 instead of fijirmly enclosing them into the

84 

85 

86 

diffference of the three versions, cf. V.S. Frank, “The Territorial Terms of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689,” The Pacifijic Historical Review (August 1947): 265–70; and for the negotiations, see Joseph Sebes and Thomas Pereira, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689): The Diary of Thomas Pereira, Bibliotheca Instituti Historici S.I., vol. 18 (Rome: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1962). For the original texts of the treaties, see Michael Weiers, ed., Die Verträge zwischen Russland und China, 1689–1881 (Bonn: Wehling, 1979). For the economic aspects of both treaties, cf. Jürgen Osterhammel, China und die Weltgesellschaft: Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit (München: C.H. Beck, 1989), 100–105. For the Qing’s view on the Kiakhta system, see Fu Lo-shu, ed., A Documentary Chronicle of the Sino-Western-Relations (1644–1820), vol. 1 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 322. Diplomacy was conducted on two diffferent levels, with Chinese principles of diplomacy on the Chinese side, which did not correspond to the European understanding and use of diplomacy. See Sabine Dabringhaus, “Grenzzone im Gleichgewicht: China und Rußland im 18. Jahrhundert,” in Frieden und Krieg in der Frühen Neuzeit: Die europäische Staatenordnung und die außereuropäische Welt, ed. Ronald G. Asch (München: Fink, 2001), 577–97. In addition, John Wills has shown in his contribution to the volume The Chinese World Order that although relations with the European powers were already incompatible with the tribute model in the Canton system of trade in the eighteenth century, this did not question the world order itself. In the same way, aboriginal Taiwan was considered to be an autonomous region beyond administrative and judicial control of the Qing and could thus be civilized by any power

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65

empire. The notion of boundary gained a new meaning here when this treaty determined the boundary as following the mountain range, great rivers, and the present lines of permanent borders stones as installed by the Chinese.87 The need to defijine exact boundaries that separated Chinese and nonChinese became preeminent in the decades after the First Opium War. This is reflected in the writings of literati and scholars who were engaged in introducing Western knowledge to their compatriots. The publication of books dealing with foreign countries, most prominently the Illustrated Treatise on the Sea Kingdoms (Haiguo tuzhi ⎧഻െᘇ), published by the scholar Wei Yuan 兿Ⓚ (1794–1856) just four months after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, and the ten-volume A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe ♋ሠ ᘇ⮕, 1848) by Xu Jiyu ᗀ㒬⮜ described these diffferences in detail and made the Chinese realize that the world was not solely theirs anymore. By becoming just one part of the world, they felt the urge to defijine China in terms of people and territory. The intensive research on Chinese nationalism and national identity has covered these aspects at length,88 but the accompanying changes

87  88 

able to do so. In 1874 the Japanese empire decided take on the task, after having been advised by the American former consul in Amoy, Charles LeGendre. In other words, the Japanese occupation of Taiwanese territory beyond the Qing border was seen as nothing more than the occupation of a territory that is res nullius. In later negotiations with the Qing Zongli yamen from September 14 to October 23, 1874, this point was made abundantly clear by the Japanese High Commissioner Ōkubo Toshimichi. Cf. the discussion in Chang Lung-chih, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and Japanese Sovereignty Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874–1906, PhD thesis, Harvard University, 2003, 24–70. Cf. Diplomatic Relations with Russia (Bangjiao—Eluosi 䛖Ӕа‫״‬㖵ᯟ), in Draft History of the Qing (Qingshigao ␵ਢは), vol. 153, 4487. Chow Kai-Wing, “Narrating Nation, Race and National Culture: Imagining the Hanzu Identity in Modern China,” in Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia, 47–84; Prasenjit Duara, “De-constructing the Chinese Nation,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Afffairs, no. 30 (1993): 1–26; Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State,” Joan Judge, “Talent, Virtue, and the Nation: Chinese Nationalisms and Female Subjectivities in the Early Twentieth Century,” The American Historical Review 106, no. 3 (2001): 765–803; Karl, Staging the World; Laitinen, Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty; Liu, Minzuzhuyi yu Zhongguo xiandaihua ≁᯿ѫ㗙㠷ѝ഻⨮ԓॆ; Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen; Sakamoto, Chūgoku minzokushugi no shinwa; Schubert, Chinas Kampf um die Nation; Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism”; Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Wang Ke ⦻ḟ, 20 seiki Chūgoku no kokka kensetsu to minzoku 20 ц㌰ѝ ഭȃഭᇦᔪ䁝ǽNj≁᯿nj (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2006); Wong, Search for Modern Nationalism; Yoshizawa Seiichirō ਹ◔䃐а䛾, Aikokushugi no sōsei ᝋഭѫ㗙 ȃࢥᡀ (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2003); Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction.

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in the perception and the defijinition of territory following the disintegration of the tianxia worldview have largely remained understudied.89 The major reason therefore is the fact that nationalist writings of the late Qing and the Republican period, in general, took the territorial extension of their country for granted and insisted on the continuity of territorial integrity, instead of reasoning as in the case of ethnicity. This holds true not only for China. Avery Kolers argues that territory is actually a “blind spot” in the fijield of political philosophy; even a conceptual history of territory is missing if one takes into consideration that the works of Reinhart Koselleck do not explicitly deal with the question of territory (except when relating it to the issue of nation and nationalism). In 1993 John Ruggie further warned that it is difffijicult to achieve a sufffijicient understanding of how territory shapes politics. Referring to Anthony Giddens, he points out that the most generic attribute of any system of rule can be defijined “as comprising legitimate dominion over a spatial extension.”90 Using “spatial extension” here allows a broader perspective by limiting forms of political order not only to the territorial nation-state. Ruggie argues that systems of rule need not to be territorial at all. Social collectives can take and have taken diffferent forms of spatial representation than territoriality. Primitive forms of collectives in the ancient past chose spatial extensions on the basis of kinship that could—at least on a theoretical level—be expanded endlessly. Furthermore, systems of rule need not be territorially fijixed. In nomadic societies, as shown by Owen Lattimore, a single pasture did not defijine the extension of the tribe’s members, but rather, “[t]hey laid claim to defijinite pastures and to the control of routes of migration between these pastures.” In other words, “the right to move prevailed over the right to camp. Ownership meant, in efffect, the title to a cycle of migration.”91 And fijinally, systems of rule—even if they were territorial and if territoriality was relatively fijixed—did not mean to be exclusive (i.e., boundaries were rather 89 

90 

91 

With the exception of Tang Xiaobing (Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao [Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996]), of course. However, his work is highly problematic, as his assessment that Liang’s historical thinking—if approached from the notion of spatiality—culminates in a global imaginary of diffference is stretched too far. In the end, Liang becomes a postmodern thinker, what is hardly tenable. John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 148. The work quoted here is Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 45. Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928–1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 535; 66.

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fluid and could be adjusted to the true political or military situation). Prior to the thirteenth century in China, there were no explicit closed or hard boundaries between territories under diffferent rule, only frontiers or zones of nonexclusion, similar to the situation in Europe: “Briefly put, the spatial extension of the medieval system of rule [in Europe] was structured by a nonexclusive form of territoriality, in which authority was both personalized and parcelized within and across territorial formations and for which inclusive bases of legitimation prevailed.”92 While continental powers were eager to expand these neighboring zones and to put them under direct rule, maritime powers were in pursuit of territory that was res nullius. Yet, this situation changed at the end of the imperial age. Diplomats and those engaged in international relations were eager to create a more peaceful order by limiting rule to distinct territories. As for Europe, this occurred in the seventeenth century and coincided with the creation of international public law, when the tradition of nonexclusive territorial government of medieval Europe was no longer bearable.93 When the European nation-states expanded to the Americas and the Far East, this caused changes in the political orders there as well, and accordingly, the issue of territory and territoriality became a political issue. When the Chinese state produced the nation in the fijirst decades of the twentieth century, it defijined the nation as a “territorial-political unit” whose nationalism aspired self-government.94 The statist nationalism was thus preoccupied with installing national symbols into the minds of its citizens,95 and this included a territorial consciousness. Trying to add to their state the idea of a national community intellectuals of this era did not doubt that the young republic should—similar to each dynasty in the past that had inherited the functioning state—inherit the territorial expansion from its predecessor. Thus, when government authority changed to the republican system (1912–1927), the nationalist period (1928–1949), and the current rule of the Communist Party, institutional discontinuity was coupled with territorial continuity, and for the republic in 1912, inheriting not only the territory under the current control of the Qing but also the territory lost because of unequal treaties and the

92  93  94  95 

Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond,” 150. Joseph R. Strayer and Dana C. Munro, The Middle Ages (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1959), 115. See Anthony David Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 176. Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State”; Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction; Onodera, Kokki, kokka, kokkei; Henrietta Harrison, China—Inventing the Nation (London: Arnold, 2001).

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scramble for concessions was more than natural.96 It is thus safe to say that territory (inhabited by a certain people) became the most signifijicant element of nationalism. In other words, to understand the genesis of the Chinese nation-state, we need to grasp the nature of the triad of people, territory, and sovereignty that has been put forward by the discipline of international law as the primary defijinition of nation-state. In this context, territory is the least well defijined. Conventional defijinitions “emphasize boundedness, identity, integrity, sovereignty and spatial coherence,” but these concepts were destroyed a long time ago, as poststructuralism holds.97 Stuart Elden warns us further that the political conceptualization of territory—despite the influential works of Jean Gottmann, Thongchai Winichakul, and Avery Kolers98—is still weak, because it often conflates terrain, territory, and territoriality. Therefore substantial defijinitions have to be provided before continuing the analysis. To fully understand the function of these notions in political discourse, one needs to ask what the specifijic nature of territory is, which—as we have seen in the preceding chapter—is considered the most signifijicant political value of any nationalist movement (especially if we think of calls for the protection of national territory, or the warning against meddling in the internal afffairs of another state). Based on preliminary results presented by Stuart Elden99 I argue that territory cannot—and should not—be understood through territoriality. Rather, 96 

97 

98 

99 

For the notion of territorial continuity in twentieth-century China, cf. Dabringhaus, Territorialer Nationalismus in China, and Murata Yūjirō ᶁ⭠䳴Ҽ䛾, “Sun Yat-sen and the Discussion of the Republic of Five Ethnicities in the time of the Xinhai Revolution (Sun Zhongshan yu xinhai geming shiqi de “wuzu gonghe” lun ᆉѝኡо䗋ӕ䶙ભᰦᵏ ⲴNjӄ᯿‫઼ޡ‬nj䇪]),” Fuyin baokan ziliao—Zhongguo jindaishi, no. 1 (2005): 84–91. For its relation to the creation of a national identity, cf. Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen. Joe Painter, “Territory-Network,” paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting, Chicago, 2006, 3, http://dro.dur .ac.uk/8537/1/8537.pdf (last access April 15, 2016). For a discussion on cartography and poststructuralism and the relation between power, knowledge, and the mapping process, cf. Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion Books, 1997). With reference to J.B. Harley, Black questions that cartography should be treated as science due to its misleading claims for objectivity and rather emphasizes the open political character of mapping processes. Cf. Jean Gottmann, The Signifijicance of Territory (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1973); Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994); Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice: A Political Theory of Territory. Stuart Elden, “Land, Terrain, Territory,” Progress in Human Geography, No. 34 (2010): 799–817.

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it is imperative to pinpoint the relation of the state to the emergence of the category of space. In other words, what understanding of space was necessary for the idea of territory?100 Viewing territory as bounded space (or as Giddens’s bounded power container)101 was undoubtedly a breakthrough in political geography, but questions remain: what this space is, and how boundaries are established and maintained. It is also certainly true that when one thinks of boundaries, we already have an idea of a homogeneous territory (even if this does not exist in political reality).102 In other words, boundaries become imaginable through a notion of space rather than vice versa. In fact, boundaries are politically intended, created, and installed by political actors to exert control of land. Taking territory as “bounded space” is possible only if “boundaries” and “space” are taken as terms worthy of investigation in their own right, substantiated by a rigid conceptual and historical analysis. To do so, I diffferentiate in the following between places, territory, and space.103 All three concepts are created by means of language (signs) and fijind their most distinct expression in the form of maps, albeit all with a diffferent set of political functions and intentions. To start with the territorial concept most closely related to the life of the (in premodern societies) politically often disinterested or unconcerned individual, place (difang ൠᯩ) refers to the geographical locality that creates a sense of origin and native homeland. In a traditional society, this locality was, in most cases, synonymous with the village in which one was born.104 Household registers ( jiguan ㉽䋛) and catastre registered the 100  I consider space here to be a serious epistemological category that shapes political thinking. Space should not, however, be conflated with the Schmittian notion of Raum; it is used here as a reference to spatiality. Accordingly, I share the assessment of Werner Köster (“Der ‘Raum’ als Kategorie der Resubstantialisierung”), who warns that any uncritical attitude toward space pushes the historian close to the pre-1945 German discourse on Raum. Thus, space and Raum are not used interchangeably in this work. 101  Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Volume 2: The Nation-state and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 102  Paul Alliès, L’invention du territoire (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1980). 103  The distinction between place and space, with space as global, universal, and objective, and place as local, particular, and subjective, has been discussed in detail by various authors. Sufffijice it to say that some see place in dialectic opposition to space; others plainly consider these two concepts to be the result of daily practice of space. For an overview on this discussion, cf. Andrew Merrifijield, “Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation,” in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, N.S. 8, no. 4 (1993): 516–31. 104  This observation corresponds with the analysis of Hans Günter Zekl, who points out that traditional societies have rather concepts of close regions (Nahweltkonzeptionen) in the sense of the Greek city-state (polis). But these were places rather than spaces, and the latter were unable to be imagined by those who had not experienced the unlimited horizon

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population and their land possession. The according local gazetteers (difangzhi ൠᯩᘇ) were compiled as compendiums of detailed information on a given region (prefecture, county, province), often including a section of maps. These maps were a valuable aid in government because they provide state offfijicials with information on the people, land, mountains, and streams where everything could be seen at once.105 The existence and intensive use of these data by state authorities, however, did not mean that the localities possessed political signifijicance for its members or inhabitants. One’s ethnic, cultural, or religious origin was closely related to a certain locality, but this could have been any other, too, insofar as the locality is not defijined in the sense of modern ethnogeography that describes the distinct geographical beliefs of various cultures. According to Avery Kolers, ethnogeography defijines culturally specifijic conceptions of land, in other words, ontologies of land and the human relationship to it (what land is, what is valuable about it, how humans interact with it).106 Although people in the rural communities were, to some extent, quite sure about these questions, they rarely related their perceptions to the institutions of the central state that encompassed a multitude of localities. Being limited to the local face-to-face community or the clan (an equally limited community based on kinship), their political consciousness was far from modern. It would emerge only later when they realized that the fate of their local community was directly related to the fate of the superior authority (i.e., when the three issues of people, sovereignty, and territory were set into context with one another). This view follows the most prevailing interpretation of nationalism (i.e., the modernist paradigm that explains nations and nationalism as spe-

of possibilities as it emerged in the early modern age, beginning with the discovery of the new world or with the Mongolian expansion to the European periphery. Greek philosophers such as Aristotle understood space as place (topos), in other words, as a place that is a given one where people and things are residing. Accordingly, boundaries or town walls (as in the case of the polis) were irrelevant (Hans Günter Zekl, Topos [Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1990]). 105  Cordell Yee, “Chinese Maps in Political Culture,” in The History of Cartography, vol. 2, book 2, Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies, ed. J.B. Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 91. For the contents of local gazetteers, cf. also Chinese History: A Manual, compiled by Endymion Wilkinson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 154–61. 106  The fact that these ontologies are culturally specifijic shows that they are not ontologies in the strict sense of the word; rather, they are subjective ontologies. See here Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice: A Political Theory of Territory.

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cifijic products of modernity) by naming industrialism,107 the rise of capitalism108 and print-capitalism,109 or the modern state110 as the central cause or by grasping nations and nationalism as more or less conscious constructions and/or inventions.111 The consciousness of belonging to a collective larger than one’s own social group emerged only in the modern period, and it found its most distinct expression in national thinking that aimed at installing or supporting a state authority for the sake of the survival of the own collective. In the wake of this fundamental transformation, the localization of the group could no longer be limited to the own place or terrain. With the growing migration of Han Chinese in the latter half of the nineteenth century (most notably into Manchuria but also the interprovincial migration in the developing and industrializing regions at the coast, such as the provinces of Jiangxi and Zhejiang), it was possible to develop a supralocal consciousness, one that was no longer restricted to the local community.112 The notion of supralocal consciousness refers to the emergence of a consciousness that the political fate of the locality was related to events beyond their place of daily routine. With the rise of a transregional media landscape in the 1870s and 1880s and a modern education system in the late 1890s, this development resulted into the creation of a population that became interested in the fate of their nation. The political attachment was now no longer restricted to the local place but was expanded to the national territory (lingtu 么൏). Territory is here defijined as the realm ruled by the particularistic ideology of nationalism. Being thrown into a global order of particularism, each nation was obliged to defijine its own proper or national territory by clearly delineating boundaries and borderlines. In the words of Jean Gottmann, territory is the result of the partitioning of the world that, in the European context, had its origin in ancient Greece, where 107  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 108  Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: New Left Books, 1977). 109  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 110  Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Michael Mann, “A Political Theory of Nationalism and Its Excesses,” in Notions of Nationalism, ed. Sukumar Periwal (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), 44–64; John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982). 111  Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 112  See here Emily Honig, Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

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for the fijirst time a distinct, yet universal, longing for the partition of space was expressed to set oneself apart from others. Quoting Aristotle on the formation of the Greek city-state, the polis, he argues: “When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufffijicing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.”113 Territory is thus understood “as a portion of space defijined by a system of laws and a unity of government” (i.e., being under jurisdiction of a certain people).114 In other words, territory is “a portion of geographical space that coincides with the spatial extent of a government’s jurisdiction.”115 By doing so, it provides both security and opportunity for those within its bounds.116 This is not to imply that the ancient Greeks already had a notion of nation or nationalism. Gottmann’s argument simply points out that the partitioning of space is the origin of any political thinking.117 In modern times, however, this thinking experienced a fundamental change that was caused by the emergence of national thinking. Recent studies have shown that territory is best understood as a discursive construct, or as a product of technologies, ideologies, and both local and national practices that are constantly changing.118 The most profound impact to changes in conceptions of territory was the formation and extension of the international system, which is a system of sovereign nation-states defijined by territorial exclusivity.119 To conclude here, I follow the traditional understanding of territory as a bounded space that is under control of a group of people that ideally form a nation-state. In the past, countries such as Britain and France had oversea territories, and most states of the United States were categorized as territories before becoming an integral part of the American state. In both cases, the term 113  Aristotle, Politics, 1.2.1252b, here quoted from Gottmann, The Signifijicance of Territory, 1. 114  Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (University of California Press, 1989). 115  Jean Gottmann, “The Evolution of the Concept of Territory,” Social Sciences Information 14, no. 3 (1975): 29. 116  This also corresponds to the contemporary use and understanding of territory. The word “territory” was formed by adding to “terra” (land, earth) the sufffijix “torium” (belonging to, surrounding). Territory is thus, in its modern sense, understood as “the land or country belonging to or under the dominion of a ruler or state” (Oxford English Dictionary). 117  As are the effforts of associating and dissociating (Christian Meier). 118  Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. 119  Gottmann, The Signifijicance of Territory; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System,” World Politics, no. 39 (1986): 27–52; Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond.”

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space is more appropriate than territory because it can encompass regions that do not enjoy statehood. Thus, territory in the following always means state territory, with the understanding of territoriality as a prerequisite for statehood. To quote Stuart Elden, “Territory is a political and legal term concerning the relation between sovereignty, land, and people.”120 Within the European tradition of political thought, political sovereignty is tied to land (i.e., territory that is fijirmly controlled): “The territorium is the sum of the lands within the boundaries of a community civitatis; which some say is so named because the magistrate of a place has the right of terrifying terrendi, that is, exercising jurisdiction, within its boundaries.”121 In other words, the premodern period was characterized by the notion of spatial extensions that were structured by nonexclusive forms of territoriality. The extent of territoriality difffered signifijicantly (depending on the military and/or economic power). Contrary to this, notions of fijixed boundary lines between major territorial formations (i.e., states) emerged in Europe only in the fourteenth century, and since then, territory has acquired political signifijicance. Prior to that time, spatial limitations of rule were defijined as frontiers, or zones of transition, that were not fijixed but could be adjusted perennially. Boundaries, as legally defijined distinctions, existed only in the context of property rights (i.e., in private legal relations). With the emergence of the modern state, fluid frontiers (that are temporary by nature) were replaced with permanent (national) boundaries, resulting in principles such as territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.122 This reduced the possibility of variations of territory. This is also true with regard to colonial frontiers. Many of the lines pinpointed on colonial maps that were originally defijining spheres of interest now became permanent boundaries of the states that were able to get rid of occupation and achieve independence (often coupled with a territorial continuity inherited from the colonial power). The nationalist movement in late imperial China shared these aims

120  Elden, Terror and Territory, xxvi. 121  Pomponius, Manual, in the digest of Justinian. For this quotation and the relation of terror to territory, cf. Elden, Terror and Territory, esp. xxviii–xxx. 122  Accordingly, the spatial perception of imperial China difffers decisively from the European model established with the Westphalian Peace in 1648. If we consider the great analysis of Owen Lattimore, even the Great Wall is not a boundary in the modern sense: “The concept of a man-made Great Wall . . . was more a product of the kind of state created within China than of the kind of pressure against China from the steppe. Naturally enough, it is the military aspect of the Great Wall that has commanded most attention, and this has distorted its historical signifijicance.” Cf. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 434.

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when longing for protection of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, although its defijinitions of national territory were far from clearly determined. For instance, the rather enigmatic textual critic and anti-Manchu revolutionary Zhang Taiyan ㄐཚ⚾ (1869–1936) considered in his writings of the 1900s race to be the most prominent feature in defijining China’s geographical extension. Relying on ancestry and ancestral worship as a proper way to defijine China, he emphasized the commitment to Confucianism. This defijinition, coupled with the ideology of social Darwinism and racism, created an unusual image of China, which he described in his influential essay Explanations of the Chinese Republic (Zhonghua minguo jie ਛ⪇᳃࿡⸃) of 1907 as a realm that, after the overthrow of the Manchus, should include the territory of Korea and Vietnam but could do without the regions that had been annexed by the Manchu, namely, Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang (unless they wanted to become part of China). The eccentric Zhang was certainly an exception with his defijinition of China, yet his arguments show how underdetermined territoriality actually was, especially when considering that the national territory was, at that time, generally equated to that of imperial times, without qualifying it much further. Observing this continuity, one might wonder if China does not continue to be an empire beyond 1912. As shown earlier in the discussion of the Daxue, this is certainly not the case with regard to the form of the political order as aspired to by Sun Yat-sen, for example. He wanted to transform China into a functioning and globally accepted nation-state (yet one with an imperial identity as shown elsewhere123). The question remains what this factual continuity of territorial size does to the conceptualization of territory/space in the decades after 1912. For Sun’s successor, Chiang Kai-shek, this question was nonexistent. In 1943 he formulated his aims in the book China’s Destiny by arguing that the unifijied Chinese nation-state is defijined by its natural boundaries, i.e. those of the Qing dynasty. China was to include Manchuria, Tibet, and Xinjiang, with the exception of Outer Mongolia, where he acknowledged the Soviet protectorate, thereby basically granting Mongolia its independence. Chiang reproduced the geodeterminist ideas of earlier historical geographers who perceived Chinese territory as a cultural territory and its extension as a historical given.124 The conscious effforts to gain control of peripheral spaces (Tibet and Xinjiang) throughout the twentieth century notwithstanding, this did not necessarily mean that they were able to develop an imperialist thinking similar to that 123  Cf. Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen. 124  On the creation of a Chinese geobody in this context during the 1930s and 1940s, cf. Dabringhaus, Territorialer Nationalismus in China.

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of Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States in that period, even if one considered China to be or soon to become an empire (either in the traditional sense or in the way Hardt and Negri envisioned it). Since the rise of China as a military and economic power, commencing in 1978, geopolitical ambitions that seem to be part of the effforts to regain the former position as a world empire and thereby imitating the ambitions of the imperialist nations of the past are visible. China appears here either as opportunity for economic growth or as danger to stability.125 However, an empire in itself does not necessarily orient itself to the latter. In general, the concept of empire presents itself not as a historical regime resulting from conquest but as an order that exists beyond history and enjoys a status that allows it to defijine and to establish the existing order for eternity. There is, however, a fundamental diffference between existing and future empires. In the tradition of late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century German political thought, the Reich is a concept of a future political order, one that has not been achieved but that needs to be to guarantee peace and stability. It is supposed to be meaningful and to provide orientation in a world characterized by fundamental political changes, especially in the decades after World War I.126 Although the latter point is also true for the East Asian context, the concept of Reich itself can hardly be applied to China. Grounded in the fijirm belief that the ideal political order of tianxia had once existed in Zhou dynasty and that the dao—the most fundamental principle in political thought—is known to humankind, the Chinese shared a sense of mission (Sendungsbewußtsein)127 for restoring the halcyon days of the past. In other words, with regard to the lack of any historical teleology before the writings of Kang Youwei ᓧᴹ⛪ (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao ᪞໪⿥ (1873–1929), one can observe here a eutopia rather than a utopia. The influx of modernization theory then transformed this traditional, imperial empire into the conception of a modern empire, one that accepted the teleology and fijirm belief in progress, especially in the wake of the May Fourth Movement, when socialist and communist ideas had fostered and propelled the idea of a utopian society. However, what is a characteristic for each of these imperial formations (in various degrees) is their missionary zeal caused by a belief in moral, civilizational, cultural, or racial superiority. 125  Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011). 126  Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, chap. 10. 127  Similar to the manifest destiny of the United States.

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By claiming that the own values and conceptions of political order are both distinct and superior, each empire tries to create a true universalism that is already realized in parts of one’s own empire and now only has to be spread further to those regions that do not enjoy these blessings, which is currently also done by means of soft power, as I show in the concluding chapter. The expansion of universalism is however not only a philosophical matter. To understand the function of empires properly, we need to go beyond the defijinition by Hardt and Negri. This is precisely because it does not explain the attitude of empires toward territoriality and spatiality. There is a fundamental diffference between traditional imperial empires and modern Empires (in the following written with a capitalized letter). The former ones have a clear conception of the area under their rule, but their territory—as opposed to that of the nation-state—is not exclusive. Boundaries are subject to the actual political or military power of the ruler. Modern Empires are obsessed with the acquisition and/or control of territory that is beyond their limited territory. They have an idealized notion of being able to conquer, control, and form space. In their case, an Empire is “formed not on the basis of force itself but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being the service of right and peace.”128 It commands space, not simply a limited territory. In the European context, this is because of the secularization that introduced rationalized forms of rule. The modern Empire is the result of the history of industrialization and the political use of technology. This was possible only after the effforts of modernization since the fijifteenth century, and only then did Europe developed economically and technologically so far that it was ready to reach out and to conquer the globe. In the ensuing Columbian epoch, the central European powers such as Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, later then England, France, and Germany engaged in obtaining colonies which they put under their rule for primarily economic motives yet without making them part of their (national) territory. There existed a clear hierarchy among the diffferent parts of the empire. In contrast to imperial empires, the modern Empires did not necessarily pursue the aim of creating a cultural, religious, or political homogeneous polity.129 Although bringing civilization to less-developed regions of the world by installing a modern school system and by introducing rule by law and modern institutions, this was rather an attempt to provide moral legitimization of colonization. The second diffference between imperial 128  Hardt and Negri, Empire, 15. 129  As imperial China would have done when pursuing sinicization of non-civilized regions in the periphery (even if only passively).

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empires and modern Empires is their attitude toward spatiality. The latter ones long for a conscious and fundamental control of space, which is, part and parcel, of geopolitical thinking. Here, space is subjected to politics. When Japan tried to imitate this path of modernization in the decades before 1945, it had the ambition of becoming an Empire similar to the European and American great powers and thus pursued the acquisition of space that stretched far into the Pacifijic region and on the continent, which was considered a guarantee of national survival, even if the Japanese interpreted their aspirations as a form of resistance against the West, positioning themselves as an imperial empire that did not share the oppressive and aggressive attitude of imperialist nations.130 The Chinese, for their part, instead remained silent on their imperial discourse in the post-1912 era, because they insisted on the protection of national boundaries as precondition for becoming an accepted member in the family of nation-states. In the coming chapters, I show that the fijixation on territory made it impossible to develop a spatial consciousness similar to those countries that had the ambition to become a modern Empire. In addition, the deep conviction of tianxia being the most superior form of political order made it difffijicult for Chinese thinkers to develop notions of hegemony, as those would have contradicted the long-cherished ideal of pacifijism. In other words, the diffferentiation between imperial empire and modern Empire proposed here helps to explain the lack of geopolitical discourse in China when compared with the case of Japan. By summarizing these theoretical reflections I propose the following, threelayered analytical scheme that reflects the historical transformation of territoriality and spatiality: 1.

The notion of place is defijined by an explicit unconsciousness of space that is characteristic of premodern societies. Due to the lack of spatial consciousness there is no ontology of territory (i.e., ethnogeography). Ethnography is defijined here according to Avery Kolers as specifijic conceptions of land (i.e., ontologies of land and the human relationship to it).131 This, however, is not to imply that there was no territorial expansion; premodern societies also experienced the horror vacui.

130  In the words of Hardt and Negri (Empire) and Dirlik (Arif Dirlik, The Postcolonial Aura: Third-World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997]), this is an anti-Western, but not an antimodern, modernity. 131  Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice: A Political Theory of Territory.

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2.

Modern statehood developed the notion of territory in the process of political modernization. Territory is defijined in the words of Ruggie as “a particular form of territoriality—disjoint, fijixed, and mutually exclusive— as the basis for organizing political life.”132 The protection of one’s own territory from outside aggression was the central task of the government. Space is a concept characteristic for modern states that consciously and intentionally engage in acquiring territory beyond the national boundaries. Whereas territory is ideally limited and fijixed, space is not. In the process of modernization—accompanied by globalization—space is here subjected to colonization, exploitation, and development. The conscious acquisition and use of space are considered indispensable means to survive.

3.

Seen from this perspective, it is obvious that Hegel’s view of the nation-state as the last stage of political evolution is too shortsighted. In the following chapters, I show that while geopolitical thinking and imperialist ambitions are results of national modernization (most apparent in cases of exaggerated nationalism), supranational orders are even more so. The beginning emergence of both Japan and the United States as regional great powers in the Far East in the last years of the nineteenth century made it clear that they intended to replace the nation-state system, thereby limiting the function of international law as a viable means for preserving peace and creating a supranational order based not on the notion of right but on might. Later effforts of creating orders shared by both East and West, either by establishing a global communist system, a morally defijined realm such as the great community (datong) as envisioned by Kang Youwei, or the pan-Asianism movement weakened the function and acceptance of international law so severely that even the idealism of Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) in the wake of World War I was unable to provide solutions to the problems of international society. This cannot simply be explained by the ambitions of hegemonic actors but needs to be seen in the context of territorial and spatial ontologies, as I show in the remainder of this book.

132  Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond,” 168.

Chapter 3

The Legal Principle of National Sovereignty in Modern East Asia ѫ℺⭡㤡᮷㺘⽪ֶࠪⲴ᜿ᙍᾥ⡢⾎㚆ˈ੮Ӫ❑䚙⮦ѻᆇਟ㜭ᾲᤜަਜ਼㗙ˈਚ ᗇ䆟⡢Njѫ℺njҼᆇᖼˈ࣐ԕ㠣儈❑кⲴᖒᇩ䂎DŽ

The meaning of sovereignty in English has an utmost divine character. We Chinese lack suitable words which are able to generalize its meaning. After translating sovereignty zhuquan, we add the descriptive words of zhigao wushang—the highest.1 —Li Shengwu, 1933

∵ 3.1

Globalizing International Law

When encountering China in its course of global expansion, modern European merchants and diplomats met a diffferent imaginary of world order that they viewed in the second half of the nineteenth century as an expression of cultural arrogance. The reason for their inability or reluctance to conform to the hierarchical character of the sinocentric order characterized by the need of ritual and factual submission was due to a diffferent historical development that seemed to privilege Europe in a geographic imaginary defijined by diffferent degrees of civilization.2 Two centuries before the arrival of British and French canon boats in the Chinese sea, the European states had witnessed in their space the emergence of a new form of organizing international relations, which was international law. The bloody and disastrous Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) made many intellectuals rethink of how to organize foreign relations, especially regarding the prevention of future wars. The war had rearranged the 1  Li Shengwu ᵾ㚆ӄ, On International Public Law (Guoji gongfa lun ഻䳋‫⌅ޜ‬䄆 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1933), 53. 2  Gong, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ and the Entry of Non-European Countries into International Society.”

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European power structure, dividing the continent into sovereign states that were—due to a shared civilization—in principle on an equal standing. This new order inevitably had to clash with the sinocentric order, as shown by the fate of the Macartney Embassy to the court of Emperor Qianlong in 1793.3 In the Enlightenment’s wake, European and American political theorists had started reworking the theory of jus gentium of the Middle Ages into a discipline of positive law that more suited the drastically changed political order after the Vatican lost its authority and the continent was divided into a number of independent states. The relations between these states were subjected to an international law that was based on single states defijined by fijixed territorial boundaries. In the following centuries, the concept of balance of power became the major regulating principle. It was deeply entrenched in the Hobbesian world order, for it was never able to provide and preserve eternal peace. Its primary function was merely to preserve the system of states, and this required from time to time the exercise of war. Thus, the balance of power was unable to remove the source of war. For this reason, in 1625 the Dutch theologian, humanist, and jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) wrote his De jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Three Books on the Law of War and Peace), in which he founded the discipline of modern international law.4 He argued that nations, as well as persons, ought to be governed by universal principles of morality and divine justice, and relations between polities were to be based on the law of peoples, the jus gentium. The jus gentium was to be established by a formal consent of the community of nations (pacta sunt servanda). Grotius held that war and conflict could only be ended if they were restrained based on a broad moral consensus. By defijining the jus gentium as “that body of law concerned with the mutual relations among states or rulers of states,”5 he hoped that rational human beings might be able to agree to legal limits on war’s destruction and thereby establishing a system of principles of natural law considered binding for all people and nations. Accordingly, the jus gentium claimed to be a set of rules binding on the human race. When the Spanish age ended with 3  Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar. 4  For Grotius, cf. Hamilton Vreeland, Hugo Grotius: The Father of the Modern Science of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1917). 5  J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory,” Review of International Studies 15 (1989): 21; Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libris tres in quibus ius naturae & gentium, item iuris publici praecipua explicantur (Paris: Nicolaum Buon, 1625); Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 3 vols., ed. and with an introduction by Richard Tuck, from the edition by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005). Grotius’s book constitutes a theory of just war, with self-defense, reparation of injury, and punishment being permissible causes of war.

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the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the peace treaty marked the beginning of a new world order characterized by the concept of a sovereign state governed by a sovereign. The rules and principles stipulated in this peace treaty regulated the behavior of European states, and do so in principle until today. These rules included, among others, the observation of treaties and negotiations by peaceful means. War without a just cause was deemed illegal, and mediation or arbitration was introduced as a measure to uphold peace.6 The central principle in the European understanding of international order was the balance of power, which is, in fact, a political balance of power, because the “politics of foreign policy is always power politics.”7 In the following centuries, the balance of power witnessed a fundamental change due to the global colonial expansion of the European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Constant negotiations between the powers caused the need for diplomatic representatives, consular jurisdiction, and exterritoriality. When conflicts with the powers grew to become a substantial danger in the 1840s, Chinese literati and government offfijicials developed an interest in the discipline of international law, which, at that point, had profound epistemological implications for their intellectual tradition. Rune Svarverud has described in detail how theories and defijinitions of international law were introduced to China as an immediate efffect of the Opium Wars.8 Among the most important theoretical and structural principles of international law to be translated and received were national sovereignty and the concept of nonintervention, both of which were related to the issue of territoriality/spatiality. However, if China was also to be given the privilege of enjoying international law, it had to be admitted to the family of nations, and this constituted a problem for the European states. The reason therefore was rather simple: because sovereignty was considered to play an important “international social function,”9 regulating the behavior of nations and states meant limiting the political and economic opportunities of the colonial powers. It was therefore more than understandable that the introduction of international law—starting in 1864 with the translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International

6  Cf. Stephan Verosta, “History of the Law of Nations: 1648–1815,” in Encyclopedia of International Law (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1984), 160–61; Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 16–17. 7  Verosta, “History of the Law of Nations: 1648–1815,” 162, here quoted from Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China, 37. 8  Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China. 9  Gottmann, The Signifijicance of Territory, 7.

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Law (1836)10 by the American missionary William Alexander Parsons Martin (1827–1916)—was welcomed by the Chinese,11 yet was seen critically by foreign representatives in China. For instance, Samuel Wells Williams (1812–1884), chargé d’afffaires at the American embassy, was concerned that Martin’s work could afffect Western extraterritorial privileges because both China and Japan would readily make use of international law to protect their own nations.12 His colleague at the French legation, Count Michel Alexandr Klecskowsky, even showed a great deal of contempt for Martin, pointing out to the American minister to China, Anson Burlingame (1820–1870), “Who is this man who is going to give the Chinese an insight into our European international law? Kill him— choke him offf; he will make us endless trouble.”13 It was general conviction in the nineteenth century that the “standard of civilisation” determined if one

10 

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Wheaton’s work—one of the most influential textbooks on international law in the nineteenth century—appeared in eight editions and was translated into a variety of languages. For its impact in America and Europe, cf. Peter Macalister-Smith and Joachim Schwietzke, “Bibliography of the Textbooks and Comprehensive Treatises on Positive International Law of the 19th century,” Journal of the History of International Law 3 (2001): 30. Martin later recorded the moment when he was introduced to the members of the Zongli yamen by Anson Burlingame (1820–1870), the American minister to China: “The Chinese ministers expressed much pleasure when I laid on the table my unfijinished version of Wheaton, though they knew little of its nature or contents” (W.A.P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathay: Or, China, South and North [New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1897, reprint 1900], 233–34).What perhaps left the biggest impression on Chinese ministers was the very obvious advantage of using this book of international law in foreign relations: its preface describes that Switzerland and Belgium—though being small countries—are properly able to safeguard their national interests and protect their national sovereignty against greater powers with the help of international law. The grand secretary of the Zongli yamen, Wenxiang ᢥ␽ (1818–1876), pointed out after having been introduced to the contents of the Elements that “this will be our guide when we send ministers to foreign countries,” as Martin reports in his autobiographical text. See Martin, A Cycle of Cathay (1897), 233. As has been shown by Pär Cassel, the situation was more complicated than it seems. In fact, China had extraterritorial rights in Japan (the largest community in Japan that was granted these rights was the Chinese one) and was thus also enjoying certain privileges with regard to the jurisdiction over her nationals that were only abolished in 1895 with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Kirk Larsen (Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850–1910) shows that China also acquired concessions and unequal privileges in Korea. This is reported by Martin himself, see Martin, A Cycle of Cathay (1897), 234. Here quoted from Hsü, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations, 138.

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country was able to enjoy international law.14 Accordingly, it appeared instead as a “law of Christian nations” or the “public law of Europe,” and China was left out of the scope of international law.15 For instance, William Edward Hall (1835–1894) considered that it is scarcely necessary to point out that as international law is a product of the special civilisation of modern Europe, and forms a highly artifijicial system of which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognized by countries diffferently civilized, such states can only be presumed to be subject to it as inheritors of that civilisation. They have lived, and are living, under law, and a positive act of withdrawal would be required to free them from its restraints. But states outside European civilisation must formally enter into the circle of law-governed countries.16 The exclusion or inclusion of non-European states in the family of nations, here, is a matter of their standard of civilization measured according to European standards, and “statehood alone does not include membership of the Family of Nations,” as noted by Hall’s colleague Oppenheim.17 Although in the fijirst 14 

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Most famous is the description by Lorimer. See James Lorimer, The Institutes of Law of Nations, a Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1980). For a thoughtful introduction of the concept of the standard of civilization in the discourse of international law, see also the well-written (yet Eurocentric, therefore problematic) study by Gong, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ and the Entry of Non-European Countries into International Society.” A standard of “civilisation” had emerged as an explicit legal principle and an integral part of the doctrines of international law by 1905 at the latest. See Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (Milton: Professional Books, Ltd., 1976). Likewise, Europeans were outside the scope of Chinese law: the principle of extraterritoriality allowed them to be judged by their own laws and avoid the “cruelty” of Chinese law. In other words, foreigners in China dismissed law to be of territorial nature. On the problem of extraterritoriality, see Turan Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Pär Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan; and Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism: China, the United States, and Modern Law. William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), 42–43. Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I. Peace/Vol. II. War and Neutrality (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905), 108. Oppenheim (1858–1919) was a German jurist, regarded in general as one of the founding fathers of the modern discipline of international law. Likewise, Thomas Holland (1835–1926) argued that the applicability of

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edition of Elements of International Law Henry Wheaton still negated the possibility of a universal law of nations,18 in later editions he was more positive on this issue, conceding the chance of non-European nations to enjoy international law. The fourth edition dating from 1904 then contains a section titled “The International Status of Non-Christian Nations.” The inclusion of these nations was made possible partly by the successful modernization of Japan, which not only had achieved tremendous progress since the 1870s by reforming government institutions, legal systems, and general international practices to a degree that it was considered being on par with Western civilization, but it was now also accepted as a full member of international society because of the fullfledged implementation of European international law. In the case of China, the acceptance as an equal member of the international community was still denied for many decades, as Gerrit Gong has argued.19 In the end, the universal application of international law remained questionable, very much like John Quincy Adams had put it in 1841 with regard to the First Opium War: “[w]e have a separate and diffferent Law of Nations for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indian tribes of our own Continent; another Law of Nations between us, and the woolly headed natives of Africa; another with the Barbary Powers and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire; a Law of Nations with the Inhabitants of the Isles of the Sea . . . and lastly a Law of Nations with the flowery Land, the celestial Empire, the Mantchoo-Tartar Dynasty of Despotism.”20 Stefan Kroll

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international law was a “question rather of Civilisation than Creed.” See Thomas Erskine Holland, Lectures on International Law (London: Sweet and Kaxwell, 1933), 38. Wheaton negates openly in early editions of the Elements that there is a uniform law of nations. This view is also included in the Chinese translation and was thus known early on by the Chinese. See Henry Wheaton ᜐ亯, Wanguo gongfa 㩜഻‫⌅ޜ‬, trans. W.A.P. Martin б业㢟 (Shanghai, 1864, here: reprint of Man’gukkongpŏp 㩜഻‫⌅ޜ‬, in Han‘guk kŭndae pŏpche saryo ch’ongsŏ 七഻䘁ԓ⌅ࡦਢᯉ਒ᴨ, no. 1, Sŏul: Asea Munhwasa, 1981), I, I, § 10, 16–17. The process of adaptation to international norms, starting in 1842 with the unequal treaty of Nanjing, found its end only with the abrogation of exterritoriality in January 1943 during the preparations of the Cairo Conference (Gong, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ and the Entry of Non-European Countries into International Society”). At this conference, Roosevelt and Churchill gave up their special rights and privileges in China when meeting with Chiang Kai-shek. China joined the antifascist war and became a member of the United Nations after the war, as well as a permanent member of the Security Council, which fijinally fulfijilled her wish to become accepted as a civilized member of international society. John Quincy Adams, “Lecture on the War with China, Delivered before the Massachusetts Historical Society, December 1841,” Chinese Repository 11, no. 5 (May 1842): 274–88. For this view, see also Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China, 54–58.

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has shown in his study on the re-interpretation of international law by Chinese scholars that, basing his observation on numerous European publications on international law in the nineteenth century, works favorable to the integration of China into the family of nations—such as the fourth edition of Wheaton’s Elements—played only a minor role in the process of globalizing international law. It were rather those works that denied the integration of China into the realm of international law that proved influential (as I show on the following pages).21 Taking the outsider perspective in his book on modern law, Teemu Ruskola points out that the exclusion of China from the discipline of modern law (which was not limited to international law) is a clear sign of orientalism that is influencing political attitudes and behavior until today, resulting in the construction of a world order that is highly hierarchical and uneven, and depicting the Orient as lawless and despotic.22 Indeed, expressions of contempt like that of Count Klecskowsky were very common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Postcolonial theory and the discussions on hegemoniality since Antonio Gramsci have shown at length how this construction of the other happens and what consequences this can have. Instead of reproducing these fijindings with regard to China’s perception and adaptation to international law,23 in the following I instead try to answer the question, “Who defijines law for what kind of purposes?” Given that the discussion on international law has never been a pure national concern, a thorough discussion on this matter cannot do without taking into consideration local variations in modernization process because rules simply do not exist beyond social context but are also an integral part of it. From the outsider perspective, law in China was, in general, a nonterritorial law because the majority of foreign nations present in China claimed extraterritoriality by arguing that Chinese penal law was far too cruel to be applied to members of the so-called civilized nations.24 Ruskola points out that it is difffijicult (and even impossible, as I would argue) to solve the conundrum if international law is universal or particular. For this reason, I rather attempt to explain how rules and regulations—termed law or not— are supposed to function so that one is able to decipher Chinese conceptions of world order (whose diffference is self-evident when compared to occidental 21  22  23  24 

Cf. Kroll, Normgenese durch Re-Interpretation, 9–18. As does Karl A. Wittfogel in his 1957 book Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). As does Lydia Liu, for instance. Law was thus rather a bodily law than a territorial one. See here the discussion in Ruskola, Legal Orientalism.

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conceptions), without judging similarities or diffferences normatively, as an Orientalist would do. In fact, in the early phase of reception of European international law, the exclusion of China was, in the eyes of Chinese diplomats, legal scholars, and the literati, no obstacle, and even the principle of extraterritoriality was less problematic than it was a century later. They were at that time simply convinced that the discipline could also be applied to their country. After all, even small and weak countries were able to protect themselves with the help of international law against great powers, so why should then not China, Zhang Sigui ᕥᯟṲ (1816–1888)25 asked in his preface to the translated Elements of International Law. The offfijicial imperial sanction for the publication of this work was granted after the text itself had proved useful for Chinese afffairs: in 1864 Prussia had captured three Danish ships outside Tianjin as prize of war because of the Prussian-Danish War in Europe. Prince Gong ᕶⷫ₺ (1833–1898, the sixth son of emperor Daoguang) considered this act to be unlawful because Prussia had no right to capture Danish ships within Chinese maritime jurisdiction. By referring to the concept of territorial neutrality in Wheaton’s Elements, he was able to resolve the case successfully, and the question of whether international law could be applied to China was resolved.26 Zhang was not a lonely voice in accepting the contribution of international law to the modernization of China. Likewise, his coeval Zheng Guanying ㈕ ⷹᙥ (1842–1922), an influential early reformist—himself familiar with the Elements of International Law—described the considerable value of international law for the defense against the West in his 1880 Words of Change (Yiyan ᱃䀰).27 Expounding his ideas on reform, Zheng argues for an equal treatment of China, such as in terms of trade, where foreign products often enjoyed 25  26 

27 

Zhang Sigui was a Chinese foreign afffairs expert and later an associate envoy to Japan. On this incident, cf. the analysis in Kroll, Normgenese durch Re-Interpretation, 118–22. This historic case also contradicts the negative assessment of Lydia Liu (which is motivated by postcolonial concerns) that the linguistic and conceptual transfer of national sovereignty from Europe to China was a one-sided “act of aggression.” Zheng had never passed the civil service examination. Unlike most late-Qing reformists, he was a member of the merchant class. He began to work in Shanghai at the age of seventeen and learned English through evening classes offfered by the Anglo-Chinese School, as well as with the missionary John Fryer (1839–1928). Later, Zheng worked from 1860 on in the offfijice of the British fijirm Dent and Company and was in charge of freighting and warehouses. When Dent went bankrupt, he served as an interpreter and later became the comprador to the China Navigation Company. Given this biographical background, it is understandable why Zheng often criticizes the unequal taxation of foreign products imported to China and Chinese export products in his writings. For more biographic

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being tax-free whereas Chinese products were not. In a related article titled “On Taxation (Shuize 䦭ೣ),” Zheng complains that such a practice was unjust and violated Chinese sovereignty.28 It disadvantaged trade opportunities of his country, as he pointed out in his second major publication, the Warnings to a Prosperous Age (Shengshi weiyan ⴋцড䀰, 1895).29 Furthermore, it openly contradicted the main principle of international law, which holds that all of its stipulations are equally valid for each country. This fact had already been acknowledged by Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States when they concluded treaties with China in 1858. It is a shame that this lofty principle now did not conform to their actual behavior, Zheng thus concludes his chapter On International Law (Lun gongfa 䄆‫)⌅ޜ‬.30 In the second half of the 1890s, the literati realized that if international law was not granted to China, it would share the same fate as Poland, India, the Philippines, and Transvaal, which were countries already carved up like a melon and pushed to the brink of extinction. Although Liang Qichao complained in 1904 that the poor protection of Chinese sovereignty in past and present was a result of the lack of people trained in international law (especially among the Chinese ruling elite), he also offfered fijirst critical views toward the factual role of international law as a means of protection. In his article “The international law position of China in the Russo-Japanese War and Some Related Questions”31 Liang lamented that so far China had been the recipient of action instead of being active itself, and even knowledge of international law was of assistance in only a few cases. Often brute force, and not judicial norms, dictated foreign afffairs. For example, he argues that China—by declaring itself neutral in the ongoing conflict between Japan and Russia and simultaneously excluding Manchuria from this agreement on neutrality—undermined its sovereign rights in Manchuria.32 In international law, such a position is selfcontradictory. In my view it could be explained either by what could be called territorial amnesia, or by a lack of understanding of basic concepts of international law. It is compelling to observe that Liang was still complaining after

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31  32 

details, cf. Yen-P’ing Hao, “Cheng Kuan-ying: The Comprador as Reformer,” The Journal of Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (1969): 15–22. Zheng Guanying ji 䝝㿰៹䳶, 2 vols. (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), 69. Ibid., 436–39. Ibid., 388. The Warnings to a Prosperous Age had a great influence (especially on the later 1898 reform movement) as it had been presented to Emperor Guangxu, who ordered the Zongli yamen to reprint and distribute it to offfijicials. Ri E zhanyi guanyu guojifa shang Zhongguo zhi diwei ji gezhong wenti ᰕ‫״‬ᡠᖩ䰌ᯬ഻ 䳋⌅кѝ഻ѻൠս৺਴ぞ୿乼, in Xinmin congbao, no. 50 (March 1904). Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China, 209–10.

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half a century during which the European tradition of international law had been introduced to China via translations. In fact, he rather suspected that the foreign powers were implementing international law for their own imperialist interests. In other words, if China wanted to safeguard its territory and related interests while barring foreign aggression and interventions, a more profound knowledge of international law and a better understanding of its legal concepts would be of vital importance—despite the fact that the reception of American and European theories on international law had been so successful that national sovereignty became a widely discussed issue in a multitude of encyclopedias, newspapers, and journals.33 It was after the concession of the Kiautschou Bay to the German Empire in 1897 and the signing of the Boxer Protocol between the Eight-Nation Alliance and China in 1901 that zhuquan became, slowly but surely, a common household word that guided the reasoning and acting of politicians, reformers, and intellectuals. Starting in May 1901, the Citizen Journal (Guominbao ࿡᳃ႎ, published in Tōkyō) carried an article titled “On the Origin of the State” (Yuanguo ৏഻), which argued that a partial loss of territory, a change of dynasty, or an overthrow of government does not necessarily lead to the death of the country (wangguoӑ഻): only a loss of sovereignty does (ୟཡަѫ℺ࡷ഻ӑ). In the case of China, the author even had the presumption to claim that “the sovereignty of China is in the hand of foreigners” (ѝ഻ѻѫ℺ˈཆӪѻѫ℺ҏ).34 These discussions show that there was already in the last years of the Qing Empire a considerable insight into the weaknesses of international law, which were only partly the result of insufffijicient knowledge or training in international law practices. One of the most intriguing and detailed analyses can be found in The People’s Journal (Minbao ᳃ႎ), where the radical nationalist Hu Hanmin relates sovereignty to the issue of territory and space and offfers one of the fijirst detailed critical discussions on the discipline of international law.

3.2

National Sovereignty and the Problem of Territoriality vs. Spatiality

In his lengthy article Antiforeign Sentiments and International Law (Paiwai yu guojifa ᧂཆ㠷഻䳋⌅) Hu Hanmin 㜑╒≁ (1879–1936)—a supporter of Sun Yat-sen in the decade before the Xinhai Revolution—defended the current antiforeign sentiments among Chinese nationalists as a justifijied reaction

33  34 

Cf. Kroll, Normgenese durch Re-Interpretation, 106–18. Xinhai geming qian shinian shilun xuanji, vol. 1a, 63–65.

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toward the aggression of the European imperialist powers.35 The foreign claims for extraterritoriality, the forced leasing of coastal land and harbors, the signing of unequal treaties and the Open Door Policy36 should be rejected harshly, Hu writes. China should claim its legitimate rights as stipulated by international law, whether the Europeans liked it or not. The rights Hu is referring to are territorial sovereignty (lingtu zhuquan 么൏ѫ℺), equal rights of states (guojia pingdengquan ഻ᇦᒣㅹ℺), the right of independence for states (guojia duliquan ഻ᇦ⦘・℺), and the rights of self-defense of states (guojia ziweiquan ഻ᇦ㠚㺋℺).37 Among these rights, Hu considers territorial sovereignty to be the most important. Taking it as the foundation of international law (because it is linked to the actual possession of territory), he concluded that while unpossessed territory was once still available and could be added to the territory of an existing state, such an expansion is today not possible anymore: since the nineteenth century, no state has the right to expand its territory at the cost of another unless one admits exchange (jiaohuan Ӕᨋ), cession (gerang ࢢ䇃), or conquest (zhengfu ᖱᴽ). However, this was only possible for the great

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Published between 1906 and 1907 in Minbao, nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13. Declared in 1899 by the United States, this policy was highly influential in securing American economic interests in China. For this policy, see Charles Vevier, “The Open Door: An Idea in Action, 1906–1913,” The Pacifijic Historical Review 24, no. 1 (1955): 49–62; Noel Pugach, “Making the Open Door Work: Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913–1919,” The Pacifijic Historical Review 38, no. 2 (1969): 157–75; Delber L. McKee, Chinese Exclusion versus the Open-Door-Policy, 1900–1906: Clashes over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977). These are the same rights the Japanese law scholar Takahashi Sakue 儈⁻֌㺋 (1867– 1920) lists in his voluminous work International Law in Peace Time (Heiji kokusai kōhō ᒣ ᱲഭ䳋‫⌅ޜ‬, 1007 pages), published in 1903 in Tōkyō. Many arguments Hu makes stem from this book, such as his discussion on Westlake. This proves that he had access to this book while in Japan. Takahashi’s work is mostly based on William Edward Hall’s (1836– 1894) International Law (1880, translated 1899 by Tachi Sakutarō ・֌ཚ䛾, 1874–1943), Thomas Joseph Lawrence’s A Handbook of Public International Law (1898), Westlake’s A Treatise on Private International Law (1890, translated 1901 by Fukai Eigo ␡Ӆ㤡ӄ, 1871–1945), and Friedrich Fromhold Martens (1845–1909, also known as Fedor Fedorovich Martens), whose book Völkerrecht: Das internationale Recht der civilisierten Nationen (Russian version 1881/82, German version 1883/86, and French version 1887/88) was translated by Nakamura Shingo ਛ᧛ㅴඦ (1870–1939) in 1900 as International Law (Kokusaihō ࿖㓙ᴺ). The influence of Nakamura Shingo on Chinese perceptions of international law was substantial: he taught international law at Hōsei University in Tōkyō, a position in which he educated many Chinese students from 1904–08 during the high tide of the foreign studies movement.

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powers, as argued by the international law scholar John Westlake (1828–1913),38 whom Hu quotes here. For Westlake, international law—being a law among civilized states—cannot be applied to barbarian peoples. Thus, the conquest of territory in the new world was considered legitimate: the European colonial powers only took possession of what had no master. It is interesting that foreign concessions (zujie 』⭼) and spheres of influence (shili fanwei ऒ࣋ㇴ ഽ)—which Hu mentions as the two most signifijicant forms of foreign intrusion into China—were not territorial but spatial changes. By expanding control over regions beyond their national territories, the foreign nations were not only invading Chinese territory but also creating a spatiality that allowed them to intervene in the afffairs of other states and to exercise hegemony, either politically or economically. For Hu, the sphere is a spatial principle because the sphere is not fijirmly integrated into the homeland of the occupying power. The spatial transformation of East Asia not only raised concerns in China but was also recognized as a danger to stability and peace by the United States and Great Britain. Reacting to the Russian expansion to the East, both countries opposed the principle of sphere of influence because it—to a larger extent than the concession—aimed at dividing Chinese territory and eventually leading to break up of the Qing Empire. Joining both countries in their warnings against Russian expansion was Japan that also perceived a danger for its own interests on the continent. On February 3, 1901, Uchida Ryōhei ౝ↰ ⦟ᐔ (1874–1937) founded the Amur River Society (Kokuryūkai 唂喽Պ). Being

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John Westlake was a British legal scholar who argued that international law was the very foundation of civilization. His Treatise on Private International Law (1858) was a pioneering work, as well as his later work International Law (part I, Peace [1904]; part II, War [1907]). Anghie points out that international lawyers in the nineteenth century such as Westlake (and also Wheaton) were convinced that the imposition of Western international law over the non-Western states was essential to bring them up to the high ideal of civilization (Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 54). In this respect, Westlake has made clear in the introductory chapter of one of Takahashi Sakue’s works that Japan was the successful example. By accepting the European international law, it had changed to a modern and civilized state: “Japan presents a rare and interesting example of the passage of a state from the oriental to the European class. By virtue of treaties already concluded with the leading Christian states of Europe and America she will shortly be freed from the institution of consular jurisdiction, and in her recent war with China she displayed both the disposition and in the main the ability to observe western rules concerning war and neutrality” (Takahashi Sakue, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War [with a preface by T.E. Holland and an introduction by J. Westlake] [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899], xvi).

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discontented with the results of the Tripartite Intervention that—as a diplomatic intervention by Russia, Germany, and France on 23 April 1895 over the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki—robbed Japan of its acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula, Uchida developed strong anti-Russian feelings, and on the day of its founding, his Kokuryūkai declared that “in view of the situation in East Asia and the mission of imperial Japan, and to check the expansion of the Western powers in the East, and to promote development and prosperity of East Asia, it is the urgent duty of Japan to fijight Russia and expel it from the East and then to lay the foundation for a grand continental enterprise taking Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia as one region.”39 It was the clear conviction of the society that eternal peace in East Asia could only be achieved if the continental empire was defeated. In April, the society printed a map of Manchuria, and in May the Rokoku tōhō keiei bumen zenzu 䵢ഭᶡᯩ㍼௦䜘 䶒‫ޘ‬ണ, a map showing the Russian expansion to the East.40 Some months later, Uchida published On Decaying Russia (Roshia bōkokuron 䵢㾯ӌӑഭ䄆), whose distribution was stopped by the government: only a revised edition with the less-offfensive title On Russia (Roshia ron 䵢㾯ӌ䄆) was allowed to appear. All these works argued for a necessary war against the Russian tsar.41 The Japanese government, on the contrary, remained cautious on this issue. However, when Russia failed to withdraw its troops from Manchuria on April 8, 1903 (as agreed on in the Boxer Protocol) and presented to the Qing a list of seven demands aimed at solidifying Russian control of Manchuria,42 39 

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Kokuryūkurabu, ed., Kokushi Uchida Ryōhei den ഭ༛޵⭠㢟ᒣՍ (Tōkyō: Hara shobō, 1967), 245; Kuzuu Yoshihisa ⪾↢⢻ਭ, Tō-A senkaku shishi kiden ᶡӌ‫ݸ‬㿊ᘇ༛䁈Ս. 3 vols. (Tōkyō: Ōzorasha, 1997), vol. 1, 520. Translation quoted in Okamoto Shumpei, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 61. This map is accessible at the Kyoto University Collection Modern Educational Wallcharts 1857–1941 (Kindai kyōiku kakezu); cf. here the digitalized version at http://edb.kulib.kyotou.ac.jp/exhibit/kakezu/page/0306.html. It is assumed that the publication of this map was supported by Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō ሿᶁሯཚ䛾 (1855–1911) and Yamaza Enjirō ኡᓗ޶⅑䛾 (1866–1914). Yamaza was involved in the forging of the AngloJapanese Alliance and in the diplomacy concerning the war against Russia. He later also attended the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Cf. Kuzuu Yoshihisa ⪾↢⢻ਭ, Tō-A senkaku shishi kiden ᶡӌ‫ݸ‬㿊ᘇ༛䁈Ս, vol. 1, 153–62; vol. 3, 468–70. The strong anti-Russian attitude of Uchida was, however, more complex: he simultaneously opened a Russian language school and established a Japan-Russia Society, both in wise precaution for postwar relations with Russia. See Kokuryūkurabu, ed., Kokushi Uchida Ryōhei den, 246–60. These demands did not difffer much from those Count Witte presented on January 17, 1901, to Yang Ru ὺ݂ (?–1902), the Chinese minister to Russia, Austria, and Holland, when

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Japan’s offfijicial position changed. On the same day, the nationalist National Alliance Association (Kokumin dōmeikai ഭ≁਼ⴏՊ)—founded in 1900 by Konoe Atsumaro ㄭⴤ◊㤚 (1863–1904, the German-educated president of the House of Peers) and Tōyama Mitsuru 九ኡ⒰ (1855–1944, the founder of the influential Pan-Asian society Genyōsha ₵ᵗ␠ in 1881) for the sake of unifying public opinion in Japan concerning the Far East question—had its revival. The Kokumin dōmeikai argued that the solution contained two necessary elements, namely, maintaining the integrity of China (Shina hozen ᭟䛓‫ )ޘ؍‬and upholding Korea (Chōsen yōgo ᵍ凞᫱䆧). Its primary objective was to urge the government to send troops to Korea to check Russian ambitions in Manchuria. On the day of its revival, the organization was renamed the Comrades’ Society for a Strong Foreign Policy (Taigaikō dōshikai ሮཆ⺜਼ᘇՊ), and its objective was to obtain Manchuria as a space necessary for national survival.43 In a speech given at the inaugural meeting, Tomizu Kanjin ᚭ᳓ኡੱ (1861–1935) argued that given the sharp rise in the population of Japan it would be important that Manchuria remained open for Japanese immigration and provided the resources necessary for sustaining Japan. As an inevitable consequence, Russia had to be removed from the region. At the meeting, the following resolution was passed: “Apart from the question whether or not Russia’s evacuation procedure constitutes any indication of the withdrawal of its troops from Manchuria, we believe that in actuality it as yet evinces no intention to abandon its military occupation. We therefore hope that the government of Japan and England will at once urge the Chinese government to take steps to recover its administrative rights in Manchuria and to open that region to other foreign powers, so as to secure permanent tranquility in East Asia.”44

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trying to make a separate deal with China. The demands included an indemnity for railway damages caused by the Boxer Rebellion; Russian control over Manchurian administration, exclusion of foreign concessions from Manchuria, Mongolia, and the northern provinces, as well as exclusion of Chinese railway concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia; replacement of England with Russia for the collection of customs in Manchuria; and so forth. Yang Ru refuted such demands, as they would have turned Manchuria into a Russian protectorate. The only diffference from the demands now presented to China was that Russia no longer claimed Xinjiang to be part of its sphere of interest, and some requirements for Mongolia were relaxed. Cf. Sarah Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia and their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 217–21. Cf. North China Herald, April 23, 1903, 776; Okamoto Shumpei, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War, 62–63. Japan Weekly Mail, April 18, 1903, 414; translation here taken from Okamoto Shumpei, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War, 63.

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The argument for an open door in China is particularly obvious: only a Japanese engagement in northeast China could ensure a solid bulwark against the Russian expansionism. Japan and Russia were rivaling for access and control of the Manchurian space that should belong to either of the two great powers, yet not to China.45 The Japanese warnings against the Russian advance were from the beginning a shared concern among Chinese who were studying in Japan at that time. Incited by the current situation in the northeast China, the third issue of the Hubei Student World (Hubei xueshengjie ḓർቑ↢⇇) published an article titled “On the Prospects of China and the Responsibility of its People” (Lun Zhongguo zhi qiantu ji guomin yingjin zhi zeren 䄆ѝ഻ѻࡽ䙄৺഻≁៹ⴑѻ 䋜ԫ; April 1903) that from its very start declared that China belongs to the Chinese and that no foreigner is allowed to interfere (ѝ഻㘵ˈѝ഻Ӫѻѝ ഻ˈ䶎ཆӪᡰᗇ㘼ᒢ⎹ҏ). It commented sarcastically the justifijication of the Boxer Rebellion by the international force as a means to secure the territorial integrity of China and to keep the Open Door Policy: did the Europeans really act for the well-being of China? Actually not, they are rather interested in expanding their sphere of influence. Acquiring railways, mining rights, shipping rights, and engaging in business and missionary work was surely only possible if the territorial integrity was guaranteed, but at the cost of the Chinese people being annihilated. For these reasons, the Open Door Policy should be rejected, the article states. In 1903 Die Xuesheng ஻㹰⭏ discussed the “Opening of China” (Zhongguo kaifanglun ѝ഻䮻᭮䄆) as a global strategy of the colonial powers that aimed at expanding their sphere of interest and influence. It is despicable that the tame lion China (xunshi 俤⥵) did not resist but preferred to welcome the foreigners, providing even more opportunities for exploitation and oppression. Die explains this with the lack of national and racial thinking among government offfijicials. He further points out that an economic sphere of interest quickly turns into a sphere of influence when the protection of foreigners living in and around the concession areas necessitated political interventions from outside.46

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For similar reasons, Konoe Atsumaro, the founder of the pan-Asian political movement called the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tō-A dōbunkai ᶡӌ਼᮷Պ) in 1898, established in August 1903 the Anti-Russia Society (Tairo dōshikai ሮ䵢਼ᘇՊ). This society pushed for a hard-line foreign policy toward the Russian Empire, which was conceived as a threat to the independence of China, Korea, and Japan. Zhongguo kaifanglun, 4, in Zhejiangchao no. 6 (1903). This critical view on the sphere of influence is shared by Paul Samuel Reinsch, World Politics at the End of the 19th Century: As Influenced by the Oriental Question (New York: Macmillan, 1900; reprint Elibron Classics), 60.

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In his contribution to the People’s Journal, Hu Hanmin picks up this argument and emphasizes that both concepts have—so far applied to no other countries than China—a very special function. Many treaties, he observes, mention that the establishment of a concession “does not infringe upon Chinese sovereignty” (』ُൠѻ␵഻ѫ℺❑ᡰ࿘) and does not “obstruct the rights of the Chinese empire” (ѝ㨟ᑍ℺нᗇᨽ⽉). Apparently this is nothing short of a deception of both the Qing court and the Chinese people because, in fact, supreme rights (gaoquan 儈℺) and rights of jurisdiction (guanxiaquan ㇑䕴℺) are in the hands of the foreign powers within the concessions; even if the defijinition of a concession is relatively tricky because this area, de nomine, still belonged to China but at the same time to the space of the imperial power concerned.47 Because China cannot execute its rights within the concessions, its sovereignty was nonexistent in these areas (or at best limited). The question remains whether the concessions were still Chinese territory or not. Separating property or sovereignty, on one hand, from possession, on the other, is difffijicult. It would be wise—to avoid the problems arising from such inexact use of terms and concepts—to regard “concession” as a mere diplomatic device for veiling the fact that territory has been lost: China lost its sovereignty over the concessions it gave to the European powers.48 To sum up, in his contribution to the Minbao, Hu Hanmin shows a thorough understanding of international law, leading him to the conclusion that it should be applied to China, because—as Lawrence stated in his Principles of International Law—international law “applies to civilized states only, though it is not confijined to Christian states.”49 After all, all states were of equal status. 47 

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Hu Hanmin, Paiwai yu guojifa ᧂཆ㠷഻䳋⌅, Minbao, no. 6 (July 1906): 51–52. Hu quotes here Lawrence’s work The Principles of International Law (London: Macmillan & Co., 1985), 667–69. Rune Svarverud reports that Lawrence’s book was available in Chinese translation only in 1910. The translator Dan Tao ն☔ (1881–1970) was, however, already translating the work while studying in Japan from 1903 on. Dan was enrolled at the English law department at Chūō-University in Tōkyō and attended lectures of the influential Nakamura Shingo (Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China). Liang Qichao shared this interpretation by pointing out in his article “A Note of Warning on the Partition of China (Guafen weiyan)” that “concession” is a new term invented for the destruction of China. See Guafen weiyan ⬌࠶ড䀰, in Qingyibao (May–August 1899): 15, 16, 17, 23; here taken from Yinbingshi wenji, 882. Hu quotes Lawrence here (Minbao, no. 7, 6–7), who argued that international law is currently applied even to Turkey and Japan, which have made formal profession of regulating their conduct by international law (Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 4–5).

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With reference to Lawrence again, Hu shows that in the past, six powers controlled Europe, putting smaller and less-powerful countries under their control. The same observation goes for America, where the United States controlled Central and South America with help of its Monroe Doctrine. Yet, even if there might not be true equality in the fijield of international law50 this principle embodied the ultimate hope for the Chinese: if every state was supposed to be equal, then the incessant aggression of imperialist forces could be stopped. Hu admits in his following discussion that the equal rights of states are based on natural law (Naturrecht) and cannot be relinquished.51 However, this view is— according to Hu—refuted by the Japanese legal scholar Akiyama Masanosuke ⿻ኡ䳵ѻӻ (1866–1937),52 who adds that the real power of a state cannot be neglected. In so far, judicial concepts such as sovereignty are of no protective aid against aggression or pressure from outside. A quite similar observation can be found in an article titled “Comment on the Terms Supreme Rights and Rights of Jurisdiction as Found in Treaties with Germany, Russia, England and France, with a Lament on the Treaty of Zhoushan.”53 Its anonymous author, Fufeng 㣉ጟ, critically assesses diffferent terms in the works of European and Japanese law scholars when discussing the problems of applying international law in the Chinese foreign students’ journal Tide of Zhejiang (Zhejiangchao ᵽᳯầ, 1903). After having provided an overview on various unequal treaties concluded between the powers and the Qing administration, the author points out that the understanding of basic

50 

51  52 

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Hu ascribes this view to a certain Martens ⪚⡮б. It is not clear to whom Hu is referring. It may be Charles de (Karl von) Martens (1790–1861), whose work Le Guide Diplomatique: Précis Des Droits Et Des Fonctions Des Agents Diplomatiques Et Consulaires; Suivi D’un Traité Des Actes Et Offfijices Divers Qui Sont Du Ressort de la Diplomatie, Accompagné de Pièce Et Documents Proposés Comme Exemples (1851) was translated into Chinese in 1876 (under the supervision of W.A.P. Martin); or Friedrich Fromhold Martens (1845–1909), a diplomat and jurist in the service of the Russian empire who had written Völkerrecht: Das internationale Recht der civilisierten Nationen. Hu Hanmin, Paiwai yu guojifa, in Minbao no. 7, 25. In 1906 Akiyama was a legal advisor to the Imperial Japanese Navy in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, when the Navy set up a “research council for provisions of capture at sea” at the Higher Naval College. Xu De E Ying Fa tiaoyue suozai gaoquan ji guanxiaquan zhi pinglun yinji Zhoushan tiaoyue zhi gankai ᭽ᗧ‫״‬㤡⌅ọ㌴ᡰ䔹Ǎ儈℺ǎ৺Ǎ㇑䕴℺ǎѻ䂅䄆ഐ৺Ǎ㡏ኡọ ㌴ǎѻᝏម, in Zhejiangchao, nos. 2 and 7 (1903). The treaty of Zhoushan was concluded between England and the Qing empire on April 4, 1846, leading to the cession of the Zhoushan Islands to England. In this article, both the Chinese and the English versions of the treaty are provided.

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terms and concepts in the fijield of international law was still very low, resulting in the confusion that concepts such as supreme rights, special rights, and jurisdiction could be applied to China simultaneously and were not restricting Chinese sovereignty.54 However, limited sovereignty is, in fact, no true sovereignty. Fufeng adds that the use of these concepts—as shown by the Japanese law scholar Matsubara Kazuo ᶮ৏а䳴 (1877–?)—is nothing but a “crooked strategy” ( jiaohua zhi zhenglüe ⤑⥮ѻ᭯⮕) aimed at deceiving the Chinese with concepts of nonjudicial origin ( fei falü de wenzi 䶎⌅ᖻⲴ᮷ᆇ).55 In the end, though the translations of works on international law promised to provide a set of universal rules that could protect China, political reality proved otherwise. The country was still outside the scope of international law, which led to a search for alternative principles able to regulate international behavior. Hence, the nationalist movement—which also included scholars of international law—not only applied reason and logic in its attempt for national sovereignty and equal treatment but also searched for alternative modes of protection. Hu’s insight that the world was not divided into states defijined by territorial sovereignty and equal rights helped to popularize a spatial principle not restricted by civilizational considerations, which was the Monroe Doctrine. With the rise of the United States as a new colonial power in East Asia, the doctrine—itself being a nonjudicial principle and based on space as a defijining criterion—became an important element of Chinese nationalism because it was better able to catch the emotional mood among those who worried about China’s future and more adequately reflected the geopolitical situation.

3.3

The Monroe Doctrine as a Global Spatial Principle

On December 2, 1823, US president James Monroe (1758–1831) argued in his seventh State of the Union Address to the Congress that the United States was unwilling to accept further effforts by European governments to obtain colonies in the New World or to interfere with afffairs in North or South America. If the Europeans did not restrain themselves to their own hemisphere, it would 54  55 

Xu De E Ying Fa tiaoyue suozai gaoquan ji guanxiaquan, 5, in Zhejiangchao, no. 2 (1903). Matsubara was a Japanese legal scholar who published his fijirst works on international law in 1904, such as the book On the Principles of Current International Law (Saikin kokusai kōhō genron ᴰ䘁ഭ䳋‫⌅ޜ‬৏䄆). Before 1904, he was mainly known as an expert in criminal law. Hu Hanmin argues similarly when talking about half-sovereign countries (banzhuquan guo ॺѫ℺഻). See here Hu Hanmin, Paiwai yu guojifa, in Minbao, no. 7, 27–28.

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be viewed as an act of aggression that required US intervention. On this day the Monroe Doctrine was born, a doctrine that later proved to be one of the longeststanding tenets of US foreign policy.56 Monroe claimed that his country would not interfere in European internal afffairs, and—quid pro quo—expected the same behavior from the states in the old world. His doctrine—not just a means for the fijight for freedom and independence—became a popular principle in East Asian foreign politics some decades later. Originally conceived as a means to provide fijinancial and economic stability—in the sense of the hegemonic stability theory, which limits the provision of public goods not to limited national territories but explicitly prefers an extension of stability and peace beyond one’s own boundaries (much in the sense of Hardt’s and Negri’s modern Empire)—the Monroe Doctrine also possessed a spatial dimension.57 This dimension became obvious in 1905 when the Roosevelt Corollary turned the initially defensive doctrine into an aggressive policy.58 In other words, the Monroe Doctrine was transformed into a principle that should serve as an ideological justifijication for US hegemony and function as a right of unilateral intervention without being bound by international law. At the same time establishing hegemony in the Western Hemisphere is also considered by many scholars to be the beginning of worldwide US imperialism. Noam Chomsky confijirms that the Monroe Doctrine, as an ideology, is a direct and distinct expression of social Darwinist, if not racist, thinking. When Wilsonian 56 

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In the decades to come, later presidents, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and John F. Kennedy, referred to the doctrine in their foreign policies. A detailed overview of the doctrine can be found in Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1823–1826 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927); Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1826–1867 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933); Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1867–1907 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937); Dexter Perkins, Hands Offf: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1941); and Frederick Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism 1843–1849 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968). Cf. Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Deepak Lal, “Globalization, Imperialism, and Regulation,” Cambridge Review of International Afffairs 14, no. 1 (2001): 107–21. For a newer discussion on the concept in hegemonic stability theory, cf. the impressive work by Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Accordingly, Serge Ricard goes one step further than the common interpretation of the corollary, arguing that Roosevelt’s announcement was not just a corollary but an entirely new principle of foreign policy: the United States was now the policeman responsible for the Western hemisphere, denying any European power the opportunity to interfere in any part of what he defijines “the American zone of influence.” Cf. Serge Ricard, “The Roosevelt Corollary,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 17–26.

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idealism surfaced in World War I, the exercise of US power in the world was still limited, but Woodrow Wilson considered Filipinos “children who must obey as those who are in tutelage”—they are nothing but naughty children who do not know better, Chomsky writes.59 Their political thinking assumed a civilizational hierarchy in which the advanced nations were morally obliged to intervene and support (a similar line of thinking became characteristic of the Japanese pan-Asianism discourse some years later). Chinese translations of American texts on the Monroe Doctrine commented that the US intention to establish hegemony in the Pacifijician region ran against the ideals of national sovereignty and self-determination. In August 1910 the Journal of National Current (Guofengbao ࿡㘑ႎ) published the translation of an article that Theodore Roosevelt had written after his return from his tour to Africa and Europe in summer 1910 for the Outlook magazine.60 In this article, the president defended his policy: if a country were not able to sustain order and protect foreign investment, it would be the moral duty of the developed countries to intervene and foster progress in the countries concerned. This was the United States’ and European powers’ mission civilisatrice. The translator of this speech, Tang Mingrui ⒟਽⶯ (1878–1916), added in his epilogue that such a justifijication was merely an excuse: the U.S. engagement in the Philippines for instance clearly robbed the country of its sovereignty, how could one still claim that the Philippines belonged to the Filipinos?61 Facing pressure from both the East (America) and the West (Europe), the public opinion in China quickly gained the insight that the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine was not to contribute to world peace but to divide the global world into two hemispheres, the Western and Eastern one. However, the two spheres were not restricted to their respective continents but were gradually extended to spaces beyond. To understand sufffijiciently the origins and the signifijicance of this profound alteration of the Monroe Doctrine, it is necessary to have a look at the theories

59  60 

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Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 63–65. Theodore Roosevelt, “The Management of Small States Which Are Unable to Manage Themselves,” Outlook, July 2, 1910; reproduced in Theodore Roosevelt, American Problems (New York: The Outlook Company, 1910), 3–8. Cf. Mingshui ᰾≤, “On the New Partition (Xin guafenlun ᯠ⬌࠶䄆),” in Guofengbao 1, no. 19 (1910): 43–47. Tang, publishing under the pseudonym Mingshui ᰾≤, was a contributor to the journal Guofengbao and became the director of the Bank of China after the foundation of the Republic.

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of the United States Navy flag offfijicer and geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), the principal founder of modern geopolitical thought.62 Mahan’s most influential book outside the fijield of naval history was his 1900 published The Problem of Asia and its Efffect upon International Policies (a book President Theodore Roosevelt was very fond of).63 His geopolitical views originated in the Frontier Thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932). The latter had argued in 1893 that the spirit and success of the United States are directly tied to the country’s westward expansion. The American identity was forged at the juncture between the civilization of settlement and the savagery of wilderness. This produced a unique type of citizenry characterized by individuality as well as the power to tame the wild. For Mahan, pushing the frontier over the Pacifijic—with Hawai‘i and the Philippines (“the widest sweep, in space, of our national extension”) as new stepping-stones for US expansion—was the next logical step after the frontier was declared closed in 1890.64 Mahan, Roosevelt and Homer Lea (one of the famous yellow perilists of the fijirst decade of the twentieth century) all shared the romantic conviction of the nation as a living organism which was born, grows to maturity and fijinally dies. To survive, it was in their eyes imperative that the state was able to continue its growth and expansion, even if it meant to cross the Pacifijic and further.65 For Mahan, 62 

63 

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Further, his ideas on the signifijicant role of sea power led to the naval build-ups around the world in the years before World War I (most decisively, Japan and Germany). For a general introduction of the military and strategic thinking of Mahan, cf. Michael Hanke, Das Werk Alfred T. Mahan’s: Darstellung und Analyse (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1974). Cf. the introduction in Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia: Its Efffect upon International Politics (with a New Introduction by Francis P. Sempa) (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1900; reprint 2003), 19–20. As president of the Naval War College from 1886 to 1889 and again from 1892 to 1893, he met and befriended in 1887 Theodore Roosevelt, who was at that time a visiting lecturer at the college. For the relationship between both, cf. the informative book by Richard W. Turk, The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), which also includes their correspondence from 1890 to 1914. Mahan, The Problem of Asia, 59–60. Mahan considered the Hawai’ian Islands to be essential to U.S. security in the North Pacifijic. If the United States did not manage to obtain control of the islands, the resulting power vacuum would be fijilled by China, which would be a great danger to the United States. Cf. Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Hawai’i and Our Future Sea Power,” in The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Port Washington: BiblioBazaar, 1897, reprint 2007), 31–32. Brooks Adams, America’s Economic Supremacy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1900); Mahan, “Hawai’i and Our Future Sea Power,” 1–2; Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (New York: Harper & Bros., 1909), 8–12. Cf. here also the discussion in Richard Austin Thompson, The Yellow Peril 1890–1924 (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 27.

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American imperialism was a natural outgrowth of the Monroe Doctrine.66 In the current global situation, however, the doctrine required a fundamental adjustment to cope with the dangers emanating from Asia. Mahan considered the growing Russian influence in the Far East to be a danger to American security and thus argued for an Anglo-American-Japanese understanding that would be able to limit Russia’s ambitions. In the end, the problem of Asia is a world problem, especially due to the rapid ways of communication in the civil as well as military sector. To counterbalance the Russian thrive for expansion to the East or the South, Mahan argues, it is necessary to get a good hold over the maritime trade. This would foster—in combination with an alliance with other countries operating as checks upon Russian predominance—a balance of power. Mahan was convinced that an alliance based on solidarity of interests between Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States—all four being a sea power (among them three being Teutonic people, and Japan being the only Asiatic people welcoming European culture), as opposed to the Russian land power, a Slavic people—would provide this balance.67 The Eurasian balance of power is a major element of Mahanian geopolitics. Nations and empires grow and expand, and therefore inevitably come into conflict with one another. It is thus futile, Mahan believed, that perpetual peace in international relations is possible, unless a balance is formed where groups or alliances will prevent other powers from becoming too strong or predominant. He appealed to the United States to become more active in this respect, because since their entry into world politics they can no longer sit on the fence and just watch: what happens in one region of the world necessarily afffects the United States, and they had vital economic and security interests beyond their shores. Mahan even goes one step further when 66 

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Mahan, The Problem of Asia, 29. American historians, on the contrary, have interpreted Mahan’s thinking as a kind of mercantilist imperialism; see William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 48, 294; Foster R. Dulles, The Imperial Years (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1956), 42. I consider, however, the arguments presented here to be more explicatory than the simple referral to rather traditional interpretations of imperialism. For Mahan, the alliance of the four states would be based on naval predominance that is shielded from land attack, with the exception of Germany’s colony in the province Shandong. Japan is protected by its insular position, Hong Kong by its remoteness from possible land powers, and the Philippines is a secure naval base for the United States. It would, however, still be necessary to gain control over the Yangtze River as an access for sea power into the interior of China, which is navigable for battle ships. Further, for security reasons, Mahan proposes to move the Chinese capital from Beijing to the Yangtze River. See Mahan, The Problem of Asia, 86–87.

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he urged his country to imitate the foreign policy behavior of Great Britain. American imperialism, he claimed, would bring civilization to the backward peoples and at the same time ensure peace in the radically changing world of his times.68 The spatial expansion far beyond the western coastline of the United States by gaining access to the Pacifijic region is thus essentially important to Mahan. He sees the acquisition and control of space in an age of global rivalry as indispensable. During the fijirst half of the twentieth century, Mahan came to influence geopolitical and geostrategic thinkers, among them most prominently Halford J. Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, and Karl Haushofer. Decades later, the German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt argued that space—in the sense of sphere of influence—is no longer restricted by state borders but emanates into regions beyond national borders. In one of his major writings on state and international relations, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte (April 1939), Schmitt states that sovereign statehood is disappearing because of two factors. First, states dissolve and new subjects in international law emerge. Second, war had lost its conventional character and was not regionally limited anymore but was ubiquitous. The origin of this development is for him the Monroe Doctrine, which replaced states by so-called Großräume (larger spaces). Because the doctrine entailed a forbiddance of interference of foreign powers (Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte), it was not limited anymore to the state: the United Stated has accordingly changed to a Großraum in the Western Hemisphere. Replacing the state by the large space has substantial consequences for international law, which was originally based upon the idea that single sovereign states are subjects of law.69 In his 1939 piece Großraum gegen Universalismus, Schmitt points out that the original, true Monroe Doctrine as proclaimed 1823 consists of three elements, namely, independence of the American states, noncolonization of the American Raum, and nonintervention of foreign powers into the American hemisphere (and vice versa). However, the doctrine can remain unchanged in its core only if the notion of a concretely defijined Großraum is maintained. This is imperative for Schmitt, because if the concrete space disappears, the relations 68 

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That is, in the fullest sense of the hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger). It is thus no wonder that Mahan not only supported the annexations of Cuba, Hawai’i, and the Philippines, but also the building of the Panama Canal and the Open Door Policy in China, which he considered prerequisites for power and prosperity of the United States. Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos, 269–371. See also Gruchmann, Nationalsozialistische Großraumordnung.

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among collective groups are ruled by a universal world principle. Schmitt abhors such a vision as it leads to unlimited interventions where everyone intervenes everywhere. In this case, the prevention of unlimited intervention by so-called raumfremde Mächte is impossible. For him, this development results from the economic-imperialist policies of Theodore Roosevelt, who transformed the defensive Monroe Doctrine into an aggressive one that now served the so-called liberal-capitalist dollar diplomacy and turned America into a true Großraum. Mahan defijined quite similarly in his work The Problem of Asia, the American Großraum by interrelating US interests in the Pacifijic with those in the Atlantic Ocean, arguing that the control of the Caribbean Sea and the Panama canal is essential for asserting the US interests in Hawai‘i, the Philippines, and, fijinally, China. For Mahan, the key to supremacy was the disposability of a strong navy: only a strong navy was able to protect a powerful merchant fleet and to exercise a maritime power that could, in case of conflict, enforce trade blockades and, if necessary, wipe out naval squadrons of the enemy. In this respect, Mahan difffered respectively from Schmitt who put his focus on the continent. In his short booklet Land und Meer, Schmitt pointed out that the dichotomy of land and sea is integrated in a metaphysical scheme of friend and foe (i.e., it possessed a theological foundation).70 Land and sea are existentially diffferent. England being a sea power is not a geographical given but a conscious decision of England to do so. England and the United States as sea powers have chosen free trade and trafffijic, propagating an economic and political liberalism, an unconditional belief in progress and in a universalism of international law.71 In the end, freedom at sea is diametrically opposed to the state sovereignty, as preferred by continental powers. As suggested by Christopher Connery, Land und Meer can be interpreted as a response to Mahan, mainly inspired by Hegelian philosophy.72 If this interpretation is correct, it positions a telluric Schmitt against an oceanic Mahan. In 1950 in The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum 70 

71 

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Cf. here his discussion in the 1941 essay Staatliche Souveränität und freies Meer—Über den Gegensatz von Land und See im Völkerrecht der Neuzeit. This view has been refuted by Jan Assmann, Politische Theologie zwischen Ägypten und Israel (München: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 1992/2006). I discuss the signifijicance of possible theological foundations of political thinking in chapter 6 of this book. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte; Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1942/2001). Christopher L. Connery, “Ideologies of Land and Sea: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Carl Schmitt, and the Shaping of Global Myth Elements,” Boundary 2 28, no. 2 (2001): 190.

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Europaeum), Schmitt wrote that “all pre-global systems were essentially landbased, even if they included sea dominions and thalassocracies.”73 His vision of political order was, at its core, telluric, linked to the principle of land appropriation and the sacred defijinition of boundaries. The boundless and unruly waves of the sea were beyond any specifijic spatial order controlled by the state: even the rule of an emperor could not stretch further than the shores of his realm. The sea was a space devoid of rules and free of any kind of state authority. It was neither state territory nor colonial space nor a space that could be occupied. On the contrary, the land is divided in state territories by clear lines and borders that orient themselves to mountains, rivers, and forests. This particularity caused land and sea to generate distinct legal systems, principles, and concepts after the sixteenth century. The antagonism of land and sea constituted not only the jus publicum Europaeum but also created the equilibrium of land and sea, which, again, defijined the nomos of the earth. The equilibrium of powers was achieved by England, which became the prime naval power (Seemacht) and with this the bearer of the maritime part of the Eurocentric global order. In other words, its supremacy on sea safeguarded the equilibrium of land and sea, which included the spatial order of international law (spatialer Ordnungsgedanke des Völkerrechts). Furthermore, the equilibrium of land and sea caused the equilibrium of the continental powers (e.g., the Netherlands, France, and Spain, the naval powers of earlier centuries). However, this equilibrium was not accompanied by an according equilibrium at sea: a possible balance of sea powers would have divided the sea (the boundless and uncontrollable being) and consequentially destroyed the equilibrium of land and sea. It was imperative for the nomos of the earth that only England enjoyed maritime supremacy. If there should be any radical change arising from the sea, a fundamental change of the global world order would set in. In other words, the American expansion into the Pacifijic region by applying the Monroe Doctrine—in combination with Mahan’s proposal for an Anglo-American–Japanese alliance counterbalancing the Russians in North China—would then fijinally cause the collapse of the jus publicum Europaeum.74

73  74 

Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 19. This is due to the fact that the separation between the continental land (festes Land) and the free sea (freies Meer) is, according to Schmitt, the decisive principle of this jus. The later historical development in East Asia showed that this geopolitical change had a signifijicant impact on the organization of international relations in Asia. As a reaction to the destruction of the land-sea equilibrium, Japan would quite similarly pursue the acquisition and control of space beyond its national borders. The more and more perceptible enforcement of political, military, and economic interests on the Asian

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Mahan had already pointed out to this danger in February 1902. In an article titled “Retrospect and Prospect,” he noted with concern the commentary by the Russian ambassador to China that only Britain and Russia had signifijicant and legitimate interests in China. Mahan refutes this position, writing that the United States—as a commercial nation with possessions in the Pacifijic— indeed had a substantial share.75 In his view, China was the space where future rivalries were going to take place: it was the most important country not yet colonized. Because of the geopolitical situation on the Asian continent, even the alliance of the United States, Japan, Germany, and Great Britain would not be strong enough to resist Russian pressure upon the Qing empire. Thus, the alliance also had to delay China’s efffective political organization. China should, Mahan writes, “undergo a period of political division” . . . “that would be benefijicial . . . for the general political equilibrium of the world.”76 As dictated by geography, the “contest for pre-eminence in Asia, and specifijically in China,” would be a struggle between the Russian land power and the four sea powers.77 The best solution to the Asian problem would be “found in a condition of political equilibrium between the external powers, whereby the equality of opposing forces, resting each on stable foundations, should prevent the undue preponderance of any one state, or of any one force resulting from a combination of states, and which at the same time should promote . . . the material and spiritual development of the populations afffected.”78 Mahan’s vision of an according China policy can be summarized as follows: “(1) Prevention of preponderant political control by any one external state, or group of states; and (2) Insistence upon the open door, in a broader sense . . .; that is, the door should be open not only for commerce, but also for the entrance of European thought and its teacher in its various branches, when they seek admission voluntarily, and not as agents of a foreign government.”79 In his opinion, the United States should have a stake in China, especially with regard to the economic and political opportunities still not divided among

75  76  77  78  79 

continent resulted during the Shōwa era in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Tō-A kyōeiken བྷᶡӌ‫ޡ‬Ḵി), which refuted the universal character of the jus publicum Europaeum by claiming a Monroe Doctrine for Asia. Alfred Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations Naval and Political (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1902), 31–33. Mahan, The Problem of Asia, 88, 106. Ibid., 136. Ibid., 105. Ibid., 138.

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the colonial powers. By becoming an “Asiatic power,”80 it was more than natural for the United States to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. Since the 1890s, the danger of such a foreign policy was well perceived in China and Japan. In 1896 the Oriental Association (Tōhō kyōkai ᶡ䛖঄Պ), an Asianist society founded in 1890 by the Japanese Ozawa Katsurō ሿ⋒䉱 䛾 (1858–1901), published a translation of Mahan’s work The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; Kaijō kenryoku shiron ⎧к⁙࣋ਢ䄆), which appeared in partial translation into Chinese only after 1910 in the journal The Navy (Haijun ⎧䓽).81 In 1900 the Chinese-language newspaper East Asian Times (Yadong shibao ӎᶡᱲ๡), published by the Japanese Itsubi-Society (ᰕᵜ҉ᵚՊ) in Shanghai, presented an introduction to Mahan’s thinking in the article “On the Elements of Sea Power” (Haishang quanli yaosu lun ⎧к℺ ࣋㾱㍐䄆).82 Liang Qichao introduced Mahan’s notion of naval power for the fijirst time in his piece “A Note of Warning on the Partition of China (Guafen weiyan ⬌࠶ড䀰).”83 Later, the translation of a Japanese article provided by Liang appeared under the title On Naval Power in the Pacifijic and the Prospects of China (Lun Taipingyang haiquan ji Zhongguo qiantu 䄆ཚᒣ⌻⎧℺৺ѝ഻ ࡽ䙄) in 1903.84 In both Japanese and Chinese publications, the United States was described as a rising power in the Pacifijic region that joined the European nations in the imperialist struggle for colonies far from its homeland. The perception of the United States as an actual danger in the Asian space influenced the emergence of nationalism in both countries. What was, however, already susceptible in 1900 was the insight that the once-defensive Monroe Doctrine had changed to an ideological means of imperialism. The Chinese quickly realized its dark side, while the Japanese developed their own views on political equilibrium in the region. 80 

81 

82 

83  84 

Charles Denby (U.S. Minister to China from 1885 to 1898) in his reminiscences, cf. Charles Denby, China and Her People: Being the Observations, Reminiscences, and Conclusions of an American Diplomat. 2 vols. (Boston: L.C. Page & Co., 1906), vol. 2, 237–38. On the introduction of Mahan’s naval strategy to Japan and its later influence on the Imperial Japanese Navy, cf. Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006). The Itsubi-Society (The 1895 Society) was founded by Japanese entrepreneurs in Shanghai. Its aim—in the line of Arao Sei ⨹የᷡ (1858–1896)—was to promote Japanese diplomatic and commercial interests in China. The paper Yadong shibao was founded in June 1898, and with its sixth issue, Tang Caichang ୀ᡽Ᏹ (1867–1900) became editor-in-chief. When he was executed in 1900, after a failed uprising of the Protect the Emperor Society (Baohuanghui ଻⊞ᦩ) in the Yangzi Valley, the paper ceased to exist. Cf. Guafen weiyan ⬌࠶ড䀰, in Qingyibao 15 (May–August 1899): 16, 17, 23; here taken from Yinbingshi wenji, 883–84. Xinmin congbao, no. 26.

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The Monroe Doctrine in China The fijirst time the Monroe Doctrine was mentioned in China is in a short entry in the journal The China Discussion (Qingyibao ᷡ⼏ႎ) on December 12, 1900, a journal published by Liang Qichao in Yokohama. It defijines the doctrine with the paraphrase that later proved popular in Asia “America is the America of the Americans (ᆏ冟ѫ㗙㘵օ˛ⴋ㹼Ҿॱҍц㌰кॺᵏѻӎ㖾࡙࣐㘵ҏDŽ ⮕䆟ަ᜿ࡷӎ㖾࡙࣐㘵ӎ㖾࡙࣐Ӫѻӎ㖾࡙࣐ҏ).”85 In his view, this doctrine created an enormous expansion of American territory (described by the author as a surprise). Taking into consideration that—while Democrats praised the Monroe Doctrine and Republicans supported imperialism—the Republicans held currently the majority in Congress and had appointed the president, it was, according to Liang, more than obvious how the American foreign policy will look like in the years to come. In other words, the originally positively judged role of the doctrine in the process of nation building and liberation was feared to turn into an imperialist policy that threatened East Asia. Two years later, the Diplomatic Review (Waijiaobao ཆӔ๡) provided an overview of the Monroe Doctrine as presented in the book A Century of American Diplomacy (1900) by the American John Watson Foster.86 The overview, translated from the Japanese Revue diplomatique (Nihon gaikō jihō ᰕᵜ ཆӔᱲ๡), reiterates the origins of this doctrine and defijines it as a right of selfdefense.87 In the eyes of the Chinese, the once-peace-loving United States have changed into an aggressive power: it annexed Cuba, Hawai‘i, defeated Spain and conquered the Philippines in the search for new markets and the wish of enforcing American interests in China.88 The annexation of Hawai‘i is seen by Liang Qichao in an article in the Qingyibao (right before he left Japan for the United States in late 1899) as only one step in a continuing expansion of the United States to the west: after turning the kingdom into a coal depot for the American navy, the Philippines and then China would surely follow.89 As 85  86 

87  88 

89 

“Monroeism (Mengluzhuyi ቃ㞉ਥ⟵),” in Qingyibao, no. 67 (December 12, 1900). John Watson Foster (1836–1917), thirty-second United States Secretary of State, a military man, journalist, and diplomat. The full title of the book reads A Century of American Diplomacy: A Brief Review of the Foreign Relations of the United States 1776 to 1876. “On the Monroe Doctrine (Lun Menglu zhengce 䄆ᆏ⾯᭯ㆆ),” in Waijiaobao, no. 31. “On the Development of Imperialism and the Prospects of the World in the 20th Century (Lun diguozhuyi zhi fada ji ershi shiji zhi qiantu 䄆ᑍ഻ѫ㗙ѻⲬ䚄৺Ҽॱц㌰ц⭼ѻ ࡽ䙄),” in Xinhai geming qianshinian jian shilun xuanji 1a, 55. So predicted in an article on the consequences of the on-going international conflicts, see “About the Efffects of Conflicts between America and the Philippines and between England and Transvaal on China (Lun Mei-Fei Ying-Du zhi zhanshi guanxi yu Zhongguo 䄆㖾㨢㤡ᶌѻᡠһ䰌‫ײ‬㠷ѝ഻),” in Qingyibao, no. 32 (December 13, 1899). On the

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predicted, the Treaty of Paris—which ended the war—stipulated that Spain surrendered the Philippines to the United States.90 Although US President William McKinley (1843–1901) originally only intended to have a naval base at Manila, in the end he decided to occupy all of the Philippines (a move that then led to the Philippine-American War, 1899–1913). The Spanish defeat, however, put an end to the Spanish empire in America and marked the beginning of the United States’ rise as a colonial power. The fijirst detailed discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in the Chinese context can be found in the journal Tide of Zhejiang (Zhejiangchao ᵽᳯầ), which was published by Chinese students in Japan in 1903. Under the heading of “Explanations of New Terms” (Xin mingci shiyi ᯠ਽䂎䟻㗙), the magazine presents a rough defijinition of the Monroe Doctrine. Its anonymous author writes that the United States was successful in applying this doctrine to its territorial ambitions in the late nineteenth century when driving away the Spanish and seizing Hawai‘i. Arguing for safeguarding self-determination of the local people, the United States occupied these areas for itself. However, this kind of behavior is only natural: driving away the Europeans necessarily leads to an expansion of one’s own territory. Thus, Monroe Doctrine is nothing more than a synonym for imperialism, the author concludes.91 Another contribution to the Zhejiangchao, titled “Monroeism” (Mengluzhuyi ᆏ冟ѫ㗙), describes how the doctrine emerged in America and Europe while mentioning the Asian context only marginally. The author—using the pseudonym Monroe-fancier (Aimengluzhe ᝋᆏ冟㘵)—admired that Monroe was able to take a fijirm stand vis-à-vis the Europeans and to establish the rule of nonintervention, thereby strengthening the right of self-determination of the nations. In the second part of the article, the author reasoned that the doctrine is a conservative doctrine, because it aims at preserving the current status and preventing radical changes

90 

91 

Chinese reaction to the American expansion into the Pacifijican space, see Karl, Staging the World. Further, it was agreed that Spain give up all rights to Cuba (according to the Teller Amendment and Platt Amendment) and surrender Puerto Rico as well as Guam to the United States. See Xin mingci shiyi, 6, in Zhejiangchao, no. 6 (1903). In the translation of a Japanese newspaper article, the Monroe Doctrine, as propagated by the Japanese, was assessed in a more positive way, declaring that the call for Asia to the Asians is part and parcel of the Japanese pan-Asianism (ᰕᵜᬤᕥཚᒣ⌻ѻऒ࣋᭦ᗙӎ㍠ӎѻѫ℺ࡷӎ⍢㩜 ⾿哳ぞ㩜⾿⌡⌡ૹҼॱц㌰ѻཚᒣ⌻ަ哳ぞ㟘㝩ѻᱲԓѾᚒᚒૹҼॱц㌰ѻ ཚᒣ⌻ަӎ⍢⦘・ѻส⼾Ѿ). Cf. “Japanese Newspaper: Rivalry in the Pacifijic (Riben xinwen: Taipingyang zhi jingzheng ᰕᵜᯠ㚎˖ཚᒣ⌻ѻㄦ⡝),” in Youxue yibian, no. 1 (November 14, 1902).

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in terms of territoriality.92 The author expounds that although considered an important part of international law, the doctrine is not a rational concept, but an emotional one. In its proper sense, it aimed at preserving one’s life, and this can be expanded to the homeland, the state, race, or even the continent.93 The obligation to protect one’s own nation94 is, however, not only an expression of pitifulness but also a true sympathy toward the own community. The emotional character of the doctrine is also reflected in the more often than not abbreviated slogan “America to the Americans” (㖾⍢㘵㖾⍢Ӫѻ㖾⍢)95 in the contribution to the Zhejiangchao, a slogan that enjoyed a global popularity at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century and was well reported by Chinese journalists at that time. The Transvaal president Paul Kruger propagated “Africa for the Africans,”96 Japanese pan-Asianists claimed “Asia for the Asians,”97 and the Filipino general and independence leader Emiliano Aguinaldo claimed “the Philippines for the Filipinos.”98 This slogan was—with referral to the Monroe Doctrine—able to perfectly catch the emotional mood resulting from the incessant aggression of the imperialist

92  93  94 

95  96  97 

98 

Mengluzhuyi ᆏ冟ѫ㗙, in Zhejiangchao, no. 4 (1903), 12. Mengluzhuyi ᆏ冟ѫ㗙, in Zhejiangchao, no. 4 (1903), 13. An article in the journal Yunnan complained that while human relations are guided by moral values, relations between states were not. This is, however, necessary if one wants to attain peace, yet reality showed that even peace-loving religions such as Christianity and Buddhism cannot achieve this. See “Morality between Countries (Guojia jian zhi daode ഻ᇦ䯃ѻ䚃ᗧ),” Yunnan, no. 2 (November 1906): 42–44. Mengluzhuyi ᆏ冟ѫ㗙, in Zhejiangchao, no. 3 (1903), 4. “A Brief Biography of President Kruger of the South African Republic (Nanfei gongheguo da tongling Gulujia jianzhuan),” in Jingzhong ribao, July 18, 1904. In 1898 Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904) proclaimed in a conservation with Kang Youwei that “the Orient is the Orient of the Orient” (tōyō wa tōyō no tōyō nari ᧲ᵗߪ᧲ᵗߩ᧲ ᵗߥࠅ). Cf. Marius Jansen, “Konoe Atsumaro,” in The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 107–23; and Urs Matthias Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: Chinese Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity, 1985–1904 (London: Routledge, 2009): 85n142. For these quotations, see also the discussion in Xu Xiaoqing, 1903 nian qianhou xinshi zhishi fenzi de zhuquan yishi yu minzu guojia rentong 1903 ᒤࡽਾᯠᔿ⸕䇶࠶ᆀⲴѫᵳ᜿ 䇶о≁᯿ഭᇦ䇔਼, in Xinhai geming yu 20 shiji de Zhongguo 䗋ӕ䶙ભо20ц㓚Ⲵѝ ഭ, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2002).

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forces.99 Simultaneously, it fostered the belief in geodeterminism, relating territory to the people.100 Interestingly, the article on Monroeism in the Zhejiangchao spends most of the discussion on the situation in the Americas and only rarely touches on China. Yet, the author is convinced that this doctrine, in general, can also be applied to China: ᆏ冟ѫ㗙㘵⍱䌚Ⲵ㘼䶎ᇊ䌚㘵ҏDŽDŽDŽ䄲❑ᇊ㗙ᇊ㗙പ൘䄲ᴹᇊ㗙ᇊ㗙പօ ൘DŽ᭵䰌Ҿ㖾⍢ᡰࠖѻൠս㠷ᡰ↧ѻᱲԓ㘼↔ѫ㗙⛪ѻ兲ণ䰌Ҿ䶎㖾⍢ᡰࠖ ѻൠս㠷ᡰ↧ѻᱲԓ㘼↔ѫ㗙Ӗ䳘൘䋛⌘㘼ᵚ䌎ᡆ⍙ᆏ冟ѫ㗙ѳ⾎࿉нਟ⥌ ᓖҏྲᱟDŽ

The Monroe Doctrine has a fluid not a stable meaning. . . . If one says it has no defijinition, then the defijinition appears; if one says it has a defijinition, then the defijinition is impossible to fijind. Its principles embody the spirit of the physical location of the American continent on which it concentrates. However, its principles also leak into those areas on which the Doctrine has designs but which have not yet experienced it, and are not of the American continent and thus do not pertain to the historicity of the Doctrine’s era. The Monroe Doctrine is just that sort of subtle thing that cannot be predicted.101 In other words, in the same way that the Americans repulsed the Europeans from their continent can the Chinese repulse the Europeans from their homeland. This is not only desirable but also necessary: Asia was the only continent that had not yet fully been colonized by the imperialist powers. For this 99 

Because the Chinese nationalism in the fijirst decade of the twentieth century was mainly a Han-Chinese nationalism directed against the foreign rulers, the Manchu, the piece Four Guest Articles on Politics (Si kezheng lun ഋᇒ᭯䄆) in the seventh issue of the Zhejiangchao argues that China belongs to the Han race. This defijinition of China is, of course, diffferent from a nationalism that claims “China for the Chinese” (ഋᇒѻ䀰⭢ ᴠѝ഻㘵ѝ഻Ӫѻѝ഻ҏᆠ⛪ѝ഻Ӫ╒Ӫぞҏ╒Ӫѻ⛪ѝ഻ѫӪ㗱ҏ), see Si kezheng lun, 2, in Zhejiangchao, no. 7 (1903). 100  See here, for instance, the contribution to the Qingyibao as early as 1900, where the anonymous author argues in his piece “On Independence” that China belongs to the Chinese and that it is the duty of every Chinese to protect the territory (ѝ഻㘵੮ѝ഻Ӫѻѝ ഻䶎ԆӪᡰᗇ㘼‫ޘ؍‬ҏ‫ޘ؍‬ѝ഻㘵੮ѝ഻Ӫ㠚ᐡѻ䋜ԫ䶎ԆӪᡰᗇ㘼ԓѻҏ). See “On Independence (Duli shuo ⦘・䃚),” in Qingyibao, no. 58 (September 24, 1900). 101  Ai Mengluzhe ᝋᆏ冟㘵, “Mengluzhuyi ᆏ冟ѫ㗙,” in Zhejiangchao no. 3 (1903): 111–17; no. 4 (1903), 85–92, here 85. Translation taken from Karl, Staging the World, 64.

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reason, the author states, it is also awkward that the Monroe Doctrine does not enjoy an according popularity in China. He observes a paradigmatic change of the Monroe Doctrine. Once directed against European interventionism and limited to the American continent, it had been turned into a doctrine that is deterritorialized: its spatiality had reached global dimensions and had become an abstract notion that not only claimed to be universally applicable, as argued by Roosevelt and offfijicially noted in his corollary, but had also divided the world into distinct greater spaces.102 However, the problem was that the discussion during the years after the annexation of the Philippines revolved around the question of how to make a spatial principle part of international law that had, at its core, the rights and duties of single, territorially defijined nation-states? Whereas Japan—having become a major power in East Asia and been accepted as a full member of international society after its victory against Russia in 1904–1905—quickly adopted the Monroe Doctrine as part of its foreign policy, declaring that it would take responsibility for its so-called liberation from European imperialism, China tried to employ the spatial doctrine for the protection of territoriality, even if the validity and actual strength of the doctrine were doubted. For instance, in 1902, the Diplomatic Review (Waijiaobao ཆӔ๡) presented the translation of an article originally published in the periodical The Atlantic Monthly that the pressure of European colonial powers would currently be too strong for a success of the Monroe Doctrine. Because Europe was now again interested in areas such as Brazil and Argentina, it would not act in accordance with the doctrine forever. Eventually, a war between both hemispheres would take place no later than fijifty years from then,103 and this also concerned Asia because the powers would not exclude that continent from their

102  In the same year, the magazine Xinmin congbao praised the impressive power of Roosevelt. His Monroe Doctrine is lauded for upholding world peace by protecting territories from external intervention. Cf. “Biography of a Current Person: The American President Roosevelt (Renwu shiping—Meiguo datongling Luosifu Ӫ⢙ᱲ䂅—㖾഻བྷ㎡ 么㖵ᯟ⾿ ,” in Xinmin congbao, no. 33 (1903). 103  Waijiaobao, no. 1, “America Will Not Forever Be Able to Keep up the Monroe Doctrine and Bar the European Powers (Lun Meiguo buneng yongshou Menglu yixun yi ju Ouzhou geguo ⺰⟤࿡ਇ⢻᳗቞ቃ⑊ㆮ⸠એᜎᱏᵮฦ࿡).” The original article titled “Europe and America” (written by Sydney Brooks) appeared in the American periodical The Atlantic Monthly (here mistaken for a British publication) 88, no. 529 (November 1901): 577–88. For details on nature and publication of Waijiaobao, cf. Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China, 257–59.

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ambitions.104 If their race for colonies in the Pacifijic region continued, the questions were: where to situate China in the Eastern Hemisphere and how to ensure its national sovereignty with a spatial principle, when the urgent matter was to protect its territorial integrity in the fijirst place? To understand this paradox, I analyze the emergence of territorial thinking in China in the next chapter.

104  Waijiaobao, no. 18, “On the Pacifijic Ocean in the twentieth Century (Lun ershi shiji taipingyang 䄆Ҽॱц㌰ཚᒣ⌻).”

Chapter 4

The Territoriality of National Sovereignty The arrival and acceptance of nationalist thinking and the sovereign nationstate in China had profound consequences for defijining the own national collective. No longer situated in a civilizational universalism that did not know any borders the empire now had to adapt to the European world order. This order negated universality and rather presented a political order characterized by the notion of particularity: it was based on nation-states that coexist, enjoy equality, and were protected by international law. The discussion of Liang Qichao’s and Hu Hanmin’s critique of that law has shown that the hope for protection and defense of their country could not simply be based on theoretical norms that even admitted spheres of influence and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Their line of reasoning was very close the fijindings of Fukuzawa Yukichi ⾿⋒䄝ਹ (1835–1901) who in his 1878 work Popular Theory of the State’s Rights (Tsūzoku kokkenron 䙊؇ഭ⁙䄆) had already declared that international law was merely a means for the European powers in their fijight for territory, resources and influence all over the globe.1 With international law not functioning properly, the alternative was to create and to defijine a territorial imaginary of the nation and to deduce from this defijinition the right and also the duty to protect it. As shown in detail by the works of Dabringhaus and Huang Donglan, the call for protecting the national territory does not, at fijirst sight, difffer much from protecting the territory of imperial China: territorial continuity was and still is an unquestioned fact. In actual political discourse, however, I show that there is a signifijicant conceptual ambiguity in how rule is related to the concepts of place, space, and territoriality. I argue here that transforming civil theology (the universal) into political philosophy (the particular) was fundamental for modernity in China. This change is also visible with regard to spatiality: because the tianxia world order did not know distinct boundaries, it could claim to be universal. With the arrival of the nation-state concept, the space called China had to be redefijined by discriminating it from other nation-states.2 This was possible by 1  In the 1880s Fukuzawa lost his critical stance toward international law and—according to his notion of civilizational progress—rather preferred the reception of international law and its conscious application for the interests of the Japanese nation. 2  Thus also the emergence of various discourses on national identity in late Qing China. Cf. Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen; Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, China’s Quest

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introducing the idea of nonnegotiable boundaries based on ontological diffferences into political discourse. However, this was not a smooth transition and caused multiple problems in East Asia, including the fate of Korea when the Japanese spatial ambitions on the Korean Peninsula collided with the Sinocentrism of the neighboring empire in the fijirst decade of the twentieth century. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when Japan began its expansion to the continent, it—based on the success in modernization—questioned the predominant position of the Chinese Empire and its claim of suzerainty on the Korean Peninsula. In 1876 Japan forced Korea to open its country to trade by securing the Treaty of Kanghwa, which allowed its merchants and diplomats to move freely and enjoy the status of exterritoriality on the peninsula. For protecting its national citizens, Japan stationed troops there that later went to war with China (1894–1895) and Russia (1904–1905). In both wars, Japan claimed to be protecting Korea and liberating it from Chinese and Russian hegemony.3 It is interesting to note that its anguish for control of Korea was the result of the emulation of international law, as shown by Alexis Dudden. Japan legitimated its expansion to the continent by pointing out that according to international law, colonization was still regarded as a legal act in the early twentieth century (in the same way slavery was once legal), insofar as the Japanese expansion was no diffferent from the expansion of the European imperialist nations, which had—in the name of civilization—expanded their territories and engaged in transforming barbarian (or less-developed) nations into modernized ones. In

for National Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Lung-Kee Sun, The Chinese National Character (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Zheng Shiqu 䝝ᑛ⑐, Wanqing guocui pai: wenhua sixiang yanjiu ᲊ␵഻㋩⍮: ᮷ॆᙍᜣ⹄ウ (Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 1997), et al. 3  In addition, Japan perceived Korea as a danger to its national interests. Japanese military strategists often referred to Korea as a dagger threatening to stab the Japanese heartland (due to its geographic form) if a third nation would obtain control over Korea (cf. Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period, 16). The same metaphor was used by Klemens Wilhelm Jacob Meckel (1842–1905), a general in the Prussian army and military advisor to the Meiji government. Meckel is credited for having introduced Clausewitz’s military theories and the Prussian concept of war games (Kriegsspiel) to the Japanese. The dagger metaphor is still popular among right-wing historians in Japan today, such as in the case of Nishio Kanji, the founding president of the Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru-kai ᯠǬǙ↤ਢᮉ、ᴨȧǹǤȠՊ). See Nishio Kanji 㾯ቮᒩ Ҽ, ed., Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho ᯠǬǙ↤ਢᮉ、ᴨ (Tōkyō: Fusōsha, 2001), 216; and Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society (München: Iudicium, 2005), 55.

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addition, Meiji-era Japan shared the European view that the world was divided into civilized countries that had the right to be sovereign and into those that simply did not possess these qualities.4 When the Korean king refused to acknowledge the new Meiji regime and its emperor in the early 1870s because (according to the principles of the sinocentric world order) he was only loyal to the emperor in Beijing, Japan felt forced to intervene and replaced the Korean government with the members from the pro-Japanese faction. The legitimacy of this new government was in return rejected by China, and the stage was set for conflict. It was the declared aim of Japan to free Korea from Chinese control, and to make it part of its own sphere of influence. China, on the contrary, wanted to keep the kingdom as a tributary fijief.5 The impossibility to do so delivered a heavy blow to the Chinese world order, causing the tianxia to collapse. The Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki after the defeat of the Qing in 1894 codifijied the Japanese expansion on the continent and stipulated that China recognized defijinitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea. In consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China being in contradiction to such independence and autonomy were to cease wholly. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 then, which grew out of the rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea, Japan fijinally managed to secure its exclusive dominance in Korea. Its victory changed the balance of power in East Asia so fundamentally that this war is today also conceived of as World War Zero.6

4  Only in the former case did a country have the right to intervene in or conquer another country of lower civilizational standing. For such arguments in the writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi see Encouragement of Learning (Gakumon no susume ᆖ୿ɖɁɁɩ, 1872–1876) and An Outline of a Theory of Civilization (Bunmeiron no gairyaku ᮷᰾䄆ѻᾲ⮕, 1875). Cf. also the critical view of Mizoguchi Yūzō Ⓧਓ䳴й (“A Search for the Perspective on the Studies of East Asia,” Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 1, no. 1 [2001]: 7–15) toward this phenomenon and the issue of Japanese responsibility for its aggression toward Korea and China. 5  For further sources on this conflict and the resulting First Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895, cf. Sarah Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Immanuel Hsü, “Late Ch’ing Foreign Relations, 1866– 1905,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part 2, ed. John King Fairbank and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 70–141; Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850–1910; and Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945. 6  John W. Steinberg, ed. The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero. Leiden: Brill, 2005.

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In terms of spatiality, both wars pushed Japan to intensify its expansion of hegemony on the peninsula, and the spatial ambitions of Tōkyō led to the virtual extermination of Korea from the political map. During the summer of 1907, the world declared the Hermit kingdom illegal when the emperor Kojong sent three representatives to the Second International Conference on Peace at The Hague and demanded the registration of his protest against Japan’s protectorate agreement. The three envois presented a letter to the conference in which their ruler specifijied the invalidity of Japanese claims on Korea and demanded an international condemnation of the invading country. However, among the participating nations, none reacted to the Koreans (except Russia which had just lost the war in 1905 and was eager to support any protest against Japan). According to the standards of international law, it was namely legally not possible for Korea to participate in the Conference. In 1905 the Portsmouth treaty had secured the peace between Japan and Russia, granting Japan the privilege to protect its interests in Korea. On November 17, 1905, Japan and Korea signed the Second Japan–Korea Agreement (Eulsa Treaty), which, in efffect, made Korea a protectorate of Japan and deprived the country of its diplomatic sovereignty,7 insofar as Korea had lost the right to be represented in the international community. This excluded it from participating in the conference at The Hague. For the United States, the status of Korea was not negotiable because it had accepted Japanese claims and promised not to interfere with Japan in matters concerning Korea, as agreed on in the Taft–Katsura Agreement (July 29, 1905). In the end, Korea lost its sovereignty, lost the territory under its control, and, fijinally, disappeared from the political map. This example shows how high the protection of national sovereignty and national boundaries was valued by those countries that feared to be inferior in the social Darwinist struggle and consequently be annihilated, both physically and geographically, as it had been the case with Poland, India, Turkey, and Egypt before. The example of Korea shows further that sovereignty was a central concern for securing a country’s survival, and survival meant to ensure the territorial representation of the nation on a map. This issue proved to be

7  The treaty was signed by fijive Korean ministers who were later called the Five Eulsa Traitors. Due to the fact that some offfijicials, among them the emperor Kojong and his prime minister Han Gyu-seol, did not sign the treaty, the de jure legality of the treaty was questioned. For the powers present at the conference in The Hague, this was, however, not an issue, and when the full annexation of Korea by Japan followed in 1910, no objections were made on their side. For more details on this treaty and the Japanese expansion on the Korean peninsula, cf. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945, 85–101; and Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005).

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highly signifijicant for China, which had to cope with territorial losses since the First Opium War, but had already recognized during the eighteenth century that adequate cartographic representations of the empire was a blind spot in its self-perception, as I argue in this chapter. In the early nationalist movements in China, the issue of territorial representations of the single nation-state on geographical and especially political maps was undoubtedly a heatedly debated issue. In general, maps reflect the distribution of political power, may it be by deleting one country from a map (as shown above) or by creating maps with disputed boundaries.8 They are, more often than not, misleading in their representation of political, cultural, or ethnic realities because their production is the result of a construction of knowledge spaces subjected to the distribution of political power in a given collective. Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen have shown that maps are culturally determined social constructs. According to them, the division of the global world into continents and nation-states is utterly Eurocentric because actual divisions follow the dichotomy of modern-traditional or civilized-barbarian, as exemplifijied by the fact that most European maps have Europe in the center, with the Greenwich Prime Meridian organizing both space and time. In the case of China, maps also tend to arrange countries and civilizations around China as the global center, with Europe and Africa on the left rim, and the Americas on the right rim. Virtually every map reflects the tendency to see the own community as the natural center of a world order, and China is no exception.9 Furthermore, the taxonomy of division is highly static because of its inherent geographical determinism, thereby creating a world order composed of essentialized imaginaries of single nation-states. Lewis and Wigen argue that the categories of nation-state, civilization and continent are metageographical categories highly inadequate in the process of grasping global geography.10 Accordingly, maps of European origin tend to follow a

8

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For the latter case, studies on this issue are uncountable; for examples, see Marc Andre Matten ⦻俜‫ݻ‬, Quanqiuhua zhong de fengbihua: minzu rentong dui Zhong Ri Han benguo lishi renshi de yingxiang ‫ॆ⨳ޘ‬ѝⲴሱ䮹ॆˉˉ≁᯿䂽਼ሽѝᰕ七ᵜ഻↧ਢ䂽 䆈Ⲵᖡ丯, in Ershiyi shiji, no. 94 (2006): 80–88; and Callahan, China. For this argument, see the introduction in James R. Akerman, ed., The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Korea was also no exception as shown by a world map dating from the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. See Leo Bagrow and R.A. Skelton, Meister der Kartographie (Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1963), 299. Martin W. Lewis and Kären Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 41–43.

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trend of metageographical determinism that is reproduced in non-European mapping effforts.11 This was no easy process. When modern European style maps were introduced to China, the empire had to cope with the problem of how reconciling these with their own traditional cartographical representations that followed an own hierarchy by depicting the empire as a political oikoumene that only knew center and periphery. These maps were characterized by a lack of pronounced boundaries.12 In late Qing era, such a self-perception provided little guidance in a changing world order, and the fijirst time that the empire recognized a judicial limitation of its claims to power was the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). It was a compromise caused by the geostrategic situation: both the Qing and the Russian empires had come into conflict with each other in the course of their expansion. Yet, military or political inferiority experienced by the Qing court here was compensated for by claiming a cultural superiority, with the mechanism of the Sino-Russian relations being interpreted in cultural terms: whereas the Russians viewed their trade caravans to China as purely economic enterprises, the Chinese noted the visits in their offfijicial documents as tribute missions, without feeling obliged to handle them in this way,13 insofar as the boundaries drawn on the geographical map had a diffferent quality than the boundaries China shared in the East with the maritime powers. The territorial arrangements in Central Asia did not translate into a rejection of Confucian universalism.14 The boundaries laid down in the various treaties were fijirst of 11 

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As in the case of Afrocentrism, see Lewis and Wigen, The Myth of Continents, 104–23. Instructive for the case of reproduction of Eurocentrism in Asia is also Uemura Kunihiko, Ajia wa Ajiateki ka. To give an example for the inconsistency of boundaries (and loyalties) in premodern times, the Ryūkyū Kingdom was once an independent kingdom occupying the Ryūkyū Islands. In 1372 it became a tributary state of the Ming dynasty, and in 1609 it was invaded by Shimazu Tadatsune, the Lord of the Satsuma domain (one of the most powerful feudal domains in Tokugawa Japan). Shimazu invaded the kingdom and established suzerainty over the islands. After the peaceful surrender, the kings of Ryūkyū paid tribute to the Japanese shogun as well as the Chinese emperor. Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984), 79. This shows that during the Kiakhta negotiations the Sinocentrism of the Qing could still be reconciled with the European notions of sovereignty, creating a peace zone for more than one century (Sebes and Pereira, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk [1689]). In the end, the Qing had integrated the Russian empire into their tribute system. Accordingly, the institution responsible for negotiations with Russia was not the Ministry of Rites (Libu ⿞䜘, as it was the case for European delegations) but the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions (Lifanyuan ⨶㰙䲒).

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all identity boundaries, and as shown earlier, identity was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries negotiable and not an ontological given.15 With the disintegration of traditional sociopolitical and cultural-moral order starting in 1840 and the questioning of the absolute faith in the universality of Chinese kingship16 this pragmatic handling changed. The arrival of the nation-state as the new form of political order caused boundaries to change from soft ones to hard ones,17 and especially territorial boundaries were no longer crossable or negotiable. In the following I question various assumptions on the quality and signifijicance of boundaries in imperial and national China mapping. Ascribing the consciousness of boundaries to the project of nation building18 is certainly true for the emergence of the modern science of geography (as argued by Liang Qichao), but this is only part of the story when one takes into consideration that already the early Qing dynasty had a distinct interest in defijining and mapping boundaries. The handling of border lines during and after the treaty negotiations of Nerchinsk are an obvious proof, but if the Qing empire was an empire in the proper sense of the word (which it was), its attitude toward boundaries should be—as I expect—a diffferent one than that of Republican China.

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In 1911 the scholar Zou Daijun 䝂ԓ䡎 (1854–1908) published a book that discussed in detail the problem of defijining and protecting boundaries with the Russian empire by pointing out the urgent need to properly defijine boundaries in order to prevent territorial losses (as it had happened in the past since the reign of Kangxi). The major way to do so is to rely on geographical maps that clearly depict the extant of the Chinese empire (䰌Ѿൠ䕯ѻ䔹㉽䶎െн᰾) (Zou Daijun 䝂ԓ䡎, Zhong-E jieji ѝ‫⭼״‬䁈 [Shenyang: Unknown publisher, 1911], 4). This book includes a detailed list of border agreements with Russia, denoting the territories that have been lost to the neighboring power (11–18). This account is—difffering from the negotiations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—concerned with the fate of China in a world of rivaling nation-states. On the role of Zou Daijun as an influential scholar in the modernization of Chinese cartography, see Iwo Amelung, “New Maps for the Modernizing State: Western Cartographic Knowledge and Its Application in 19th and 20th Century China,” in Graphics and Text in the Production of Knowledge in China: The Warp and the Weft, ed. Francesca Bray, Vera DorofeevaLichtmann, and Georges Métailié (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 685–726. Benjamin Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present,” in The Chinese World Order, 276–91; Lin Yü-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979). Duara, “De-constructing the Chinese Nation.” Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation; Huang Donglan, Shinmatsu minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkanhyōshō.

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Boundaries and the Emergence of Territorial Maps That many maps treat of politics is readily apparent; this was true from the outset of cartography. There was a close connection in the ancient world between map-making and imperial conquest and rule, between what purported to be world maps and pretensions to world power. An emphasis on political power remains true of much modern cartography: maps are used both to assert territorial claims and to settle them, especially frontier disputes; and political preferences at elections are often presented in terms of maps. —Jeremy Black19

∵ It has often been argued in the fijield of historical geography that premodern China lacked the scientifijic precision to produce exact maps and collect data on the terrain it commanded.20 However, Charles Maier has pointed out that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries observed a global obsession (in both Europe and Asia) to form “more cohesively organized territorial states” by fortifying frontiers and redefijining sovereignty along their lines. Both centuries were thus an “epoch of enclosure.”21 Alongside with this process, the compilation of maps was—because of the advances in physics, astronomy, navigation, printing, and precision toolmaking achieved since the Renaissance—understood as a mathematical or quantitative tradition, characterized by attention to aspects of scale, factual representation, and practical function (e.g., civil and military administration). It served as fundamental tool in surveying the country and its regions in European state-building and the emergence of overseas empires in the Americas and Asia, and maps allowed their readers to visualize remote places and landscape.22 Despite some qualitative diffferences when 19  20 

21  22 

Black, Maps and Politics, 9. For an overview on the role of cartography in Chinese history in general, see Richard J. Smith, Chinese Maps (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). The following chapter draws heavily from publications of James Millward and Mark Elliott. Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 817. For example, Edney, Mapping an Empire, has shown in his study of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India that the colonizers were interested in systematically produced surveys of the realm because such scientifijic maps seemed to provide them with the necessary legitimacy to rule the newly acquired territories. In the case of Thailand,

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comparing cartographic techniques with older ones, issues such as the uniformity of scale were considered important for achieving a high degree of fijidelity to geographic reality (a circumstance believed to make a diffference between traditional and modern maps). However, mapping was not only a surveying act for laying the foundation for modern governance but was also pursued for the sake of demonstrating power, educational purposes, and aesthetic appreciation. It would thus be problematic to understand cartography solely as a rational, mathematical discipline, as the European critique of Chinese mapping in the nineteenth century had once implied.23 Current trends in the history of cartography have relativized the progress of mapmaking toward greater “rationality” or “accuracy” according to scientifijic standards and now defijine the act of mapmaking as a more cultural and ideological project that reflects notions of space, political power and the relationship between humans and environment.24 Generally, a map is a medium between spatial reality and human beings that helps with the perception of space without the need of directly experiencing it. The cartographer depicts a given or perceived reality, which is then deciphered by the reader. In this sense, a map is nothing less than a sign in the

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Thongchai Winichakul has shown how representatives of British, French, and Siamese states competed to map land and legitimize power. As a result thereof, maps created the nation. See Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994). For instance, Cordell Yee has shown that the idea of scale was, in principle, already understood in the Han dynasty, and the technique of grid mapping was available in the Ming. For this somewhat revisionist approach to the history of Chinese cartography, cf. Yee’s contributed chapters in J.B. Harley and David Woodward, ed., The History of Cartography, Volume 2, Book 2: Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Yee argues that quantitative interpretation of traditional Chinese cartography is inadequate for understanding the function and signifijicance of maps in Chinese culture. Consequently, it is incorrect to assume that traditional Chinese cartography had to or did experience Westernization before the nineteenth century. The surveying techniques and mapping principles did not signifijicantly influence the Chinese tradition, and Yee’s objection is a corrective to Needham’s sinophilism (James Millward “Coming Onto the Map: “Western Regions” Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang,” Late Imperial China, 20, no. 2 (1999): 61–98). However, as shown by Endymion Wilkinson, the introduction of trigonometric surveys between 1708 and 1718 by the Jesuits exerted great influence on mapmaking in the following centuries. See Chinese History: A Manual, compiled by Endymion Wilkinson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 148, 154–61. These are reflections beyond the concern of creating maps of a high degree in accuracy toward physical realities. For these trends in general, cf. Black, Maps and Politics.

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process of cartographic communication. It is the medium between the cartographer and the reader, who normally never meet. The transmission of information from objects to signs and from signs to the reader involves a complex interpretative process, which in most cases is facilitated by the rather simple design of maps: diffferent colors depict diffferent countries; generalizations simplify the map by means of reduction, selection, distortion, approximation, or exaggeration; and distinct lines defijine boundaries between given national territories.25 A map creates then identity by presenting a spatial order structured along lines of inside and outside, or territorial/spatial representation, and at the same time aims at symbolically appropriating space/territory in the state-building process: visualizing and measuring places and landscapes are key to claim territorial sovereignty. Indeed, influenced by the notions of space and knowledge as formulated by Michel Foucault Brian Harley situates cartographic endeavors and their results in the following way: Maps are never value-free images; except in the narrowest Euclidean sense they are not in themselves true or false. Both in the selectivity of their content and in their signs and styles of representation maps are a way of conceiving, articulating, and structuring the human world which is biased towards, promoted by, and exert influence upon particular sets of social relations. By accepting such premises it becomes easier to see how appropriate they are to manipulation by the powerful in society.26 It is obvious how poststructuralist theory has fostered the view that there is an inherent connection between mapping and exercise of power via the mechanism of representation, making it a universal characteristic for all kind of cartographic productions. Without doubt, maps portray power and are instruments of power, describing limits and extensions of political rule.27 Often it is argued that this characteristic not only is true for the modern discipline of cartography

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On the creation of space by a map, cf. A. Kolacny, “Cartographic Information: A Fundamental Concept and Term in Modern Geography,” Cartographic Journal 6, no. 1 (1969): 47–49; and Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 52–55. Brian Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” in The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design, and Use of Past Environments, ed. Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 278. Brian Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” Cartographica 26, no. 2 (1989): 1–20. See here also Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, ed., Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007).

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but can also be observed in the case of traditional maps that are similarly not just plain aids to visualize geographical situations: they also play a much more fundamental role, for they depict and project world visions.28 James Millward has shown in his work on cartographic nomenclature in Qing dynasty that this phenomenon was by no means limited to the European context. In the case of China, both the Ming and the Qing dynasties compiled imperial maps. The Ming emperor Chengzu ᡀ⾆ (r. 1403–1424) ordered scholars to gather maps and documents from all prefecture of the empire and to include them into one work. The project was completed in 1461, when the Gazetteer of the Unifijied Great Ming (Da Ming yitong zhi བྷ᰾а㎡ᘇ) was published. Its preface states that it was the intention to provide a comprehensive map of the empire and contiguous lands. In the Qing era, the Gazetteer of the Great Qing Unifijication (Da Qing yitong zhi བྷ␵а㎡ᘇ; ca. 1746) and the Collected Statutes of the Great Qing (Da Qing huidian བྷ␵ᴳި) pursued similar aims, as did the Map of a Full View of the Imperial Realm (Huangyu quanlan tu ⲷ䕯‫ޘ‬㿭െ, completed in 1717) (see the following discussion). Their mapmaking was of an iconic character, intending to integrate newly acquired (or conquered) territories into the empire. By collecting and producing geographical knowledge on these territories the Qing court openly and directly asserted that the area under their control was larger than that of the Ming.29 Thus, mapping was a means to strengthen administration. The linkage between administrative matters and territory is also obvious in the classical term bantu ⡸െ, which not only signifijies the imperial space but also the administrative act of “entering on population registers and map.” Accordingly, when the Qing declared that the newly occupied Xinjiang in the Northwest was to ru bantu ‫ޕ‬⡸െ, they were pointing at Xinjiang “becoming part of our empire” in the closest sense of the word.30 In the case of Manchuria, Mark Elliott has shown that the geographic region in Northeast China was incorporated into the Qing empire from an early date on (i.e., by transforming this region from undiffferentiated frontier 28 

29  30 

In his interview with the geographers of the journal Hérodote, Foucault declared that spatial categories are not primarily geographical but instead shot through with power: “Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s fijirst of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power” (Michel Foucault, “Questions on Geography,” trans. C. Gordon, in Space, Knowledge, and Power, 176). For these maps, see the partial reprints in Tuwen tianxia: Ming Qing yudixue yaoji മ᮷ ཙлü᰾␵㠶ൠᆖ㾱㉽ (Beijing: Gugong bowuyuan, 2011). James A. Millward, “Coming onto the Map: ‘Western Regions’ Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang,” Late Imperial China 20, no. 2 (1999): 61–98.

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to an integrated part of China). Yet, the terre natale of the Manchus was not simply integrated into the empire as other regions, but the emperors were consciously emphasizing the distinctiveness of the Manchu people with regard to the ethnic majority of the Han. Even when Jesuit missionaries introduced new cartographic knowledge to the court during the early 1700s, this view did not change because their project of mapping the Manchu homeland resulted in an investment of this area with a separate identity, creating three new provinces, Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, which were spatially merged to become Manchuria. Although commonly called Manchuria, Elliott points out that the word Manju never possessed a geographical sense in the Manchurian language, nor was Manzhou viewed as an orthodox place name in Chinese. In essence, Manzhou functions more as an ethnonym than as a toponym.31 With imperial rule independent of ethnicity and territory, the cartographic enterprises of the Qing, being equally ideological, reflected the strategic intentions of the court not only to defijine the extent of Qing imperial space but also to maintain the diffference between proper China and the northeast provinces.32 In the end, the Annals of the Great Qing Unifijication and the Collected Statutes of the Great Qing clearly depict the borderline between Manchuria and China.33 The frontier line accentuates the distinctiveness of both territories, however, without construing political diffferences in claiming that both territories were incommensurable (contrary to a boundary). While the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk created a common border between the Qing and Romanov empires 31 

32 

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Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (2000): 603–46. Manchuria is a troublesome toponym still today and often avoided in use, mainly due to the later Japanese effforts to integrate Manchuria into their empire in the form of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in the 1930s and 1940s. The diffferentiation between the territories of China and Manchu is here no contradiction but reflects the ideological character of rule under the Qing dynasty. Thus also the numerous ethnographic works compiled during the Qing, with the Gazetteer of the Great Qing Unifijication (Da Qing yitong zhi བྷ␵а㎡ᘇ) (ca. 1746) and the Qing Imperial Tribute Illustrations (Huang Qing zhigong tu ⲷ␵㚧䋒െ) (ca. 1769) being the most famous ones. For ethnographic writing of the Qing, cf. Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); and Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). In the late Qing then, the Jesuits’ influence results in maps that—after experiencing the European imperialism—included bold lines delineating Chinese territory as opposed to neighboring countries in both the west and north. For an example, cf. an atlas dating from 1871, the Huang Qing dili tu ⲷ␵ൠ⨶െ (1871), based on the imperial maps of Kangxi and Qianlong. Cf. further Millward, “Coming onto the Map.”

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by defijining a physical delimitation, this act of drawing a boundary both cartographically and physically (by the erection of boundary stones) did not mean that imperial China possessed a precise consciousness of homogenous and perennial territoriality.34 In 1717, the Map of a Full View of the Imperial Realm (Huangyu quanlan tu ⲷ䕯‫ޘ‬㿭െ)—one of the fijirst maps based on topographical explorations whose production integrated Jesuit knowledge35— depicts the Qing’s borders with Russia, Vietnam, Laos, Nepal, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, but these boundaries are not designated by clear lines but by dotted lines, which is also the case for the provincial borders within the empire.36 Accordingly, the boundaries remain overtly underdetermined and non-exclusive.37 This map was thus still closely integrated in the traditional worldview.38 It allowed a fluid way of cartographical representation of geographical reality in which belonging and non-belonging depended on the degree of civilization in the regions concerned. The fluidity of mapping made it possible to defijine belonging to the empire as something independent of ethnic, cultural, or religious diffferences.39 As a consequence, it is also

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This might also explain the territorial amnesia with regard to Manchuria in 1904, when that region was excluded from China’s neutrality in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 (as discussed above). This map is famous for having been carried to Paris for reproduction on copperplates. See Henri Bernard, “Les Etapes de la Cartographie Scientifijique pour la Chine et les Pays Voisin depuis le XVIe siècle jusqu’à la fijin du XVIIIe siècle,” Monumenta Serica, no. 3 (1938): 428– 76; and Cordell Yee, “Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization,” in The History of Cartography, vol. 2, book 2, Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies, ed. J.B. Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 170–202. For the map, see Akerman, The Imperial Map, 101, 103. Herfried Münkler, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft: vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuchverlag, 2007), 150. In the words of Ludden, “Territorial maps in the mind give social space cultural form because elites map spatial power with symbols that contain human attachments spatially. Authors of territorialism have long described their own sublime domain as the enclosure of civility, outside of which fearsome people and demons lurk in the dreaded forest, wild steppe, fijierce desert, mysterious mountains, and endless untamed darkness of the sea.” See David Ludden, “Presidential Address: Maps in the Mind and the Mobility of Asia,” Journal of Asian Studies, 62, no. 4 (2003): 1061. Cf. the discussion in Zou Zhenhuan 䛩ᥟ⧟, Wan Qing xifang dilixue zai Zhongguo: yi 1815 zhi 1911 nian xifang dilixue yizhu de chuanbo yu yingxiang wei zhongxin ᲊ␵㾯ᯩ ൠ⨶ᆖ൘ѝഭüԕ 1815 㠣 1911 ᒤ㾯ᯩൠ⨶ᆖ䈁㪇ⲴՐ᫝оᖡ૽Ѫѝᗳ (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2000), 51–53. This was the case in the political thinking of Qianlong in the late eighteenth century. For this aspect, see the discussion in Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen. This view

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no surprise that on some maps, place names north of the Great Wall are in Manchu and those south of the Great Wall, in Chinese.40 By doing so, the Qing was able to declare that despite linguistic diffferences, all areas were part of the empire. The Annals contain—from Qing perspective—an irrefutable imperial logic that intends to prove their legitimacy of rule by its very character of being a geographical encyclopedia.41 Preserving the Manchu identity (e.g., by imposing a legal ban on Han settlement in the northeastern provinces) the Qing fostered a Manchurian regionality, and this was also the case on the Map of a Full View of the Imperial Realm that perpetuated the tradition of cosmological cartography by basing it on general information instead of on exact geographic surveying, despite having been heavily influenced by Jesuit knowledge.42 For a long time, the style and quality of maps remained on the same level, and the breakthrough in mathematical cartography observed by Needham was only a partial one.43 A closer look at maps printed in local gazetteers ( fangzhi ᯩᘇ) shows that these maps were not interested in representing “cartographic truth” by corresponding in scale and geometry to geographical reality. There was no true geographical interest in maps, but rather effforts to obtain maps that can serve political, if not

40 

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also explains the character of boundaries in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century SinoRussian relations, where treaties and arrangements were not based on essentialized diffferences but rather handled pragmatically: a phenomenon that Eric Voegelin has called—with regard to the transition from the Greek to the Roman empire—a pragmatic ecumene. See Voegelin, Ordnung und Geschichte, 8: 173. Walter Fuchs, Der Jesuiten-Atlas der Kanghsi-zeit: Seine Entstehungsgeschichte nebst Namensindices für die Karten der Mandjurei, Mongolei, Ostturkestan, und Tibet (Peking: Fu-jen Universität, 1943), 81. The preface of the 1842 edition of the Annals states that the Qing had inherited the mandate of heaven and had been the legitimate ruler for two hundred years now (ᡁབྷ␵ѻਇཙ ભᴹཙл໎ᔿᔃ㘼བྷа㎡㘵ᯬӺҼⲮᒤ⍚ᜏ). Cf. Da Qing yitong zhi (1842), preface. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China: Mathematics and the Sciences of the Heavens and the Earth, vol. 3, together with Wang Ling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). Needham emphasized that the new cartographic techniques enabled China to be “ahead of all other countries of the world in map-making” (583–86), arguing that there was a general breakthrough in mathematical cartography from the Song dynasty into the seventeenth century. See also Lu Liangzhi ঒㢟ᘇ, Zhongguo dituxue shi ѝഭൠ മᆖਢ (Beijing: Cehui chubanshe, 1984). Zou Zhenhuan, Wan Qing xifang dilixue zai Zhongguo. The European tradition of cartography became influential only in the late nineteenth century. On the application of Western knowledge in the process of mapmaking in modern China, cf. Amelung, “New Maps for the Modernizing State.” Amelung is here very critical of the actual contribution of the Jesuits.

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ideological, aims.44 This observation holds true even for contemporary China, where maps, as I show, are instead perceived as a means for creating a moral space, which was especially the case with national maps that defijined which regions belonged to the Chinese nation and which did not, insofar as national mapmaking was much more than the well-known effforts of the late Qing and early Republican periods that, fijirst and foremost, cared about surveying and representing Chinese localities according to the principles of geographical fijidelity. Therefore, in the following pages, I focus on the ideological function of maps. As argued in the introduction, the history of humankind has always been an endeavor to apprehend the category of space/territory. Space/territory was to be acquired and mastered, and the ambition to do so was nurtured by the horror vacui. Although the concern with space/territory is a universal and perennial trait of each civilization, its political signifijicance has evolved considerably since the early nineteenth century. In the modern age, each nation defijines itself by articulating national sovereignty and self-determination to protect its own particularity in a world characterized by national divisions. In China, the discussion of one’s own territory—coinciding with the emergence of nationalist ideology—resulted in manifold publications of national maps in the last two decades of the imperial age. These maps of national territory (lingtu 么൏) were not a creation ex nihilo but an adaptation of imperial maps. The latter ones denoted the dominium of the Chinese emperor, named jiangyu ⮶ฏ. According to the historical semantics of this term, yu is the imperial realm marked by the boundaries jiang. The realm stretched as far as the cultural and moral authority of the emperor reached (i.e., it included the territories of the tribute and vassal states).45 44 

45 

Both Ray Huang and Guo Tingyi have shown in this context that the move backward in both understanding and application of geographical knowledge was not simply restricted to the discipline of geography itself but was rather a profound expression of the eighteenth-century effforts to strengthen the isolationism. Ray Huang explains this by the limits of Qing pragmatism; cf. Ray Huang, China: A Macro History (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). For the assessment of Guo, cf. Guo Tingyi 䜝ᔧԕ, Zhongguo jindaihua de yanwu: jianlun zaoqi Zhong Ying guanxi de xingzhi ѝഭ䘁ԓॆⲴᔦ䈟üެ䇪ᰙ ᵏѝ㤡‫ޣ‬㌫Ⲵᙗ䍘, in Zhongguo xiandaihua licheng de tansuo ѝഭ⧠ԓॆশ〻Ⲵ᧒ ㍒, ed. Luo Rongqu 㖇㦓⑐ and Niu Dayong ⢋བྷࣷ (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1992). Zou Zhenhuan shares this view, pointing out that the level of Qing geography—as exemplifijied in The Annals of the Great Qing Unifijication—fell back behind the knowledge already introduced in the Ming dynasty. See Zou Zhenhuan, Wan Qing xifang dilixue zai Zhongguo, 51–53. The Chinese claim to these geographical areas was made explicit in the manifold “illustrations of tribute-bearing peoples” (zhigongtu 㚧ᐕെ), such as the Illustrated Account of

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Figure 4

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Complete Map of the Imperial Territory of the Great Qing (Da Qingguo jiangyu zongtu བྷ␵഻⮶ฏ㑭െ), late Qing.46

Similarly, the frontier region (bianjiang 䚺⮶) was to be integrated into the empire. The area defijined by the frontier line is not a static one (otherwise, it would be a border) but a fluid and constantly shifting one, depending here on the actual extension of imperial authority.47 As it has been throughout prenineteenth-century Chinese history, borders were not based on ethnogeography, and given that the imperial space was subjected to the values of Chinese

46 

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the Tribute-bearing Kirghiz People ( Jiaxiasi chaogong tuzhuan ᡋ唐ᯟᵍ䋒െۣ, dating from 844), the Illustrated Record of an Embassy to Korea in the Xuanhe Period (Xuanhe fengshi Gaoli tujing ᇓ઼ཹ֯儈哇െ㏃, 1124), the Illustrated Gazetteer of Foreign Lands (Yiyu tuzhi ⮠ฏെᘇ, c. 1430), and the most famous one, the Qing Imperial Tribute Illustrations (Huang Qing zhigong tu ⲷ␵㚧䋒െ) (ca. 1769). It is a common characteristic of these works to perpetuate the traditional Sinocentrism. This map was originally published in a geography textbook for upper elementary schools, the Zuixin gaodeng xiaoxue dili jiaokeshu ᴰᯠ儈ㅹሿᆨൠ⨶ᮉ、ᴨ, published by Shanghai Huiwen xueshe к⎧ᴳ᮷ᆨ⽮ in the late Qing period. It was revised by Cai Yuanpei who around the year 1906 had been working as an editor for the Huiwen xueshe in Shanghai. Current copyright holder for this image could not be found. Opposed to the frontier region is the term zhongyuan ѝ৏, which is China proper, or the civilized area/place. Bianjiang is understood here in a similar sense as the American frontier in the nineteenth century.

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civilization, it is impossible to account for boundaries negotiated by equal parties (the famous exception being here the Treaty of Nerchinsk). Figure 4 shows the jiangyu of the Qing empire, which includes detailed information of the empire (mountains, cities, rivers) but leaves the non-Chinese areas blank. It thereby perpetuates, willingly or not, the distinction of barbarism and civilization.48 In the late nineteenth century, the imperial territory ( jiangyu) was then transformed into the lingtu. When China became a republic in 1912, it was the declared aim to safeguard the imperial territory and simply transform it into a national territory without any concessions. The principle of uti possidetis was thought to provide the judicial legitimation to maintain the territorial continuity of Qing China. However, later developments showed that it was futile to simply do so. When the European, Japanese, and Americans arrived in China and enforced the signing of the unequal treaties limiting Chinese territory, a diffferent set of maps emerged. These maps argued in national terms, using lines and diffferent colors when depicting diffferent countries and aiming at describing boundaries and territories as a way of defijining particular territories considered inviolable.49 Border regions were no longer understood as jiangyu but were semantically delineated by neologisms such as bianjie 䚺⭼ or bianjing 䚺ຳ, with bian 䚺 meaning “edge” or “rim,” and jie ⭼ or jing ຳ meaning “boundary.” The delineation of political frontiers creates the imaginary of an apparently impermeable sovereign territorial state, and in this sense, maps were important mediators in the dissemination of the European ideas about sovereign political territory.50 In addition, frontiers and boundaries were imprinted with iconic signifijicance and related with feelings of security, belonging, enclosure,

48  49 

50 

This view is taken from Callahan, China. Considering that territoriality is evident already in the vertebrate animal kingdom, its omnipresence in the human—and especially in the political—world is not astonishing. Cf. Richard Muir, Modern Political Geography (London: Macmillan Press, 1975), 15–16. Mid-sixteenth-century world maps of European provenience portray a political world that seems to do without bounded political spaces. Yet, this does not mean that there was no sense of political territoriality. European monarchs had always struggled for protection or expansion of territorial power, and treaties often discussed frontiers in fairly precise terms. The frequent absence of frontier lines on sixteenth-century maps shows simply that Renaissance Europe had a diffferent conception of sovereignty, one that should change only with the introduction of international law in the century after the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). This also explains why maps with distinct boundaries appeared in China so late.

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and exclusion.51 On national maps, they served as normative instruments of power in struggle over territorial authority, often characterized by organized violence. By choosing distinct ways of designing maps and using conventional symbols, the designers reflected the political circumstances in which the work was created or “whether a map is produced under the banner of cartographic science . . . or whether it is an overt propaganda exercise, it cannot escape involvement in the processes by which power is deployed.”52 Boundaries, once established as a spatial principle on a map, change into a “living energy” (lebendige Energie)53 that separate two collectives from each other. Richard Muir describes them as follows: Located at the interface between adjacent state territories, international boundaries have a special signifijicance in determining the limits of sovereign authority and defijining the spatial form of the contained political regions. Frontiers and boundaries have usually been studied in terms of their geographical relationships to the human and physical landscapes through which they pass, . . . Boundaries have been loosely described as being linear; in fact they occur where the vertical interfaces between state sovereignties intersect the surface of the earth . . . As vertical interfaces, boundaries have no horizontal extent.54 In the modern age, we observe internal and external boundaries of national states so often that they appear as natural. Their ubiquitous presence on national and global maps gives the impression that national boundaries are more often than not natural boundaries. This impression has been installed in our minds to a larger extent since the nineteenth century, when new cartographic technologies for surveying the earth, the production of statistics in various respects and their dissemination via mass education and mass printing made viewing standardized maps a common experience. Recent scholarship has shown that the construction of groups (nation, ethnos) heavily relies on particular notions of territory in their genesis. A shared homeland is often considered part of the repertoire of elements that creates a sense of ethnicity, with 51  52  53 

54 

See here the discussion by Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1969; reprint 1998). Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” 279. As Simmel argues in his text “Soziologie des Raumes,” in Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, ed. Gustav Schmoller, 27, no. 1 (1903): 27–71. Muir, Modern Political Geography, 119.

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cartographic mapping being an important part of constructing a convincing sense of belonging together or a collective consciousness.55 Based on the concept of ethnogeography, we understand in the following territory as national territory, in other words, a territory defijined by clear boundaries that simultaneously limit and protect realms of power (Machträume). These boundaries are reflected in the realm of international law, which functions as a measure to protect national territories (rather than spaces), but it is a prerequisite for a sense of territoriality inherent in the notion of sovereignty itself, as put by the French sociologist Henri Lefebvre: Sovereignty implies ‘space’ [more precisely territoriality, M.A.M.], and what is more it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed—a space established and constituted by violence . . . Every state is born of violence, and state power endures only by virtue of violence directed towards a space . . . At the same time, too, violence enthroned a specifijic rationality, that of accumulation, that of the bureaucracy and the army—a unitary, logistical, operational and quantifying rationality which would make economic growth possible and draw strength from that growth for its own expansion to a point where it would take possession of the entire planet. A founding violence, and continuous creation by violence (by fijire and blood, in Bismarck’s phrase)—such are the hallmarks of the state.56 Arguing that state power is closely linked to the exertion of power, Lefebvre reflects on the inevitability of war and conflict. In the modern age, greed creates territorial nations that strive for strengthening and preserving national interests (thereby expanding to the outside), and even the lofty principle ruling international relations—the principle of territorial sovereignty—did not prove to be a solution, as showed Hu Hanmin’s discussion of international law. His disappointment notwithstanding, Hu still believed in the principles of national sovereignty and national self-determination, arguing that the state’s right of independence is defijined by three decisive elements, namely, people (renmin), territory (tudi), and sovereignty (zhuquan). Such a defijinition corresponds well with the notion of political geography that people, politics and territory form a union (albeit one that exists in a dynamic equilibrium). Robert Sack considers the notion of territoriality to be central here: 55  56 

See Anderson, Imagined Communities; and Anthony David Smith, “Ethnic Election and Cultural Identity,” Ethnic Studies 10, nos. 1–3 (1993): 9–25. Lefebvre, La production de l’espace, 322–33; Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 280.

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“territoriality is the attempt by an individual or group to afffect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over geographic area . . . It is not an instinct or drive, but a rather complex strategy . . . and the device through which people construct and maintain spatial organizations.”57 Territoriality it thus a man-made construct, one that follows political or ideological guidelines. By describing a territory through references to historical, cultural, or geographic arguments, the formulation of a geobody forms the most solid foundation of nationhood as a whole, insofar as the insistence on the concept of zhuquan in late Qing China and beyond is symptomatic. Fighting for such a right was the aim of every nationalist, and commanding proper maps was imperative. These insights caused among Chinese literati a turn to political geography and resulted in the creation of geohistorical pride. In February 1902, in his journal Renewing the People (Xinmin congbao ᯠ≁ ਒๡), Liang Qichao discussed the Japanese interest in geography, which was heavily influenced by the geographical determinism of the British historian Henry Thomas Buckle.58 In the introduction to his article “On the Relationship between Geography and Civilization” (Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi ൠ⨶㠷 ᮷᰾ѻ䰌‫)ײ‬,59 Liang presented the law of causality in nature. According to John Locke, the level of development of a given civilization depended on the relation between geography and history. For example, one might ask why people in the tropical area of the world were less developed. It is the heat that restrained development of brain and body (this argument is taken from Buckle). Liang combined here geographical determinism with social Darwinism and established a view on civilization that seemed to put China on the lower ranks. However, shortly afterward he painted a diffferent picture. Based on his reading of the works of Shiga Shigetaka ᘇ䋰䟽ᰲ (1863–1927), the pioneering cultural geographer in Japan then, Liang depicts Asia as the fanciest, most precious, and most beautiful continent. His reading of Shiga’s text The Currents of Inquiring Asian Geography (Ajia chiri kōkyū no hōshin ӌ㍠ӌൠ⨶㘳ウѻᯩ䠍)60 results in a great pride, telling his readers that all great civilizations were founded here, all major religions originated here, and 57  58  59  60 

Robert D. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 19–20, 216. Tang Xiaobing, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity, 40. Xinmin congbao, no. 1, 2. Originally part of a lecture given by Shiga at the Tōkyō senmon gakkō ᶡӜሲ䮰ᆖṑ (the predecessor of Waseda University), published in 1901 under the title Geography (Chirigaku ൠ⨶ᆖ)

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geographically, Asia was home to the greatest natural wonders: highest mountains, deepest oceans, longest rivers, greatest plains, and so on. Furthermore, Western literature, art, and philosophy stemmed from Asia.61 Following this, Shiga Liang reproduced in the Xinmin congbao a graphic representation that charted the continent accordingly. The drawing presented China in terms of geography, denoting mountain ranges, rivers and oceans, and aiming at situating the country in the global context. By noting that the center of Asia is an elevated plain, it is evident that rivers flow either north or east. Through this understanding, the topography is easy to understand, and if one adds knowledge regarding the diffferences in climate, one can also reckon diffferences in fauna and flora, which again has an impact on the living styles in diffferent regions, the accompanying text to this map explains.62 In the end, geography serves as an investigative tool to chart the political and cultural development of Chinese history and is less an issue of surveying. The examination of history in terms of the natural and human landscape promised to offfer new insights. Considering Liang’s emphasis on national pride in his writings on geography, it is apparent that it has a cultural-political function (or even an ideological one). Geography is thus not understood as a plainly scientifijic discipline; in Liang’s case it did not even meet up the standards of Western empiricist scientism and failed to “create a perfect geographic panopticon” as it had been the case with the geographic surveying effforts in British India.63 This is also the case with maps that promised to provide “cartographic truth” when the events in the decade of the First Opium War (1839–1842) made new

61 

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Liang Qichao, “On the General Features of Asian Geography (Yazhou dili dashilun ӎ⍢ൠ⨶བྷऒ䄆),” in Xinmin congbao, no. 4 (1902); cf. also Ishikawa Yoshihiro, “Liang Qichao, the Field of Geography in Meiji Japan, and Geographical Determinism,” in The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao’s Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to China, ed. Joshua Fogel (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2004), 156–76. This pride in Asia found a further expression in the article “On the General Features of Chinese Geography (Zhongguo dili dashilun ѝ഻ൠ⨶བྷऒ䄆),” where Liang elaborated on the greatness of China based on its geography (length of rivers, size of territory, etc.), language, race, literature, customs, and teachings and its homogeneous culture. See Xinmin congbao, no. 6, 8, 9 (1902). This map was reproduced by Tu Ji ነᇴ (1856–1921) in his 1905 Chinese Geography Textbook (Zhongguo dili jiaokeshu ѝ഻ൠ⨶ᮉ、ᴨ). For the Japanese original see Shiga, Chirigaku, 110. Edney, Mapping an Empire. Taking into account the critique of metageography as described by Lewis and Wigen, one might wonder if there can be an objective and purely scientifijic geography at all. For the following analysis, this point can be neglected insofar as I am interested in the political function of geography, and not in an objectively correct geographical description of China.

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maps depicting the world outside China an urgent necessity. The classical example often quoted in this context is the scholar Wei Yuan 兿Ⓚ (1794–1856), who, four months after the Treaty of Nanking, had published his most famous work, the Illustrated Treatise on the Sea Kingdoms (Haiguo tuzhi ⎧഻െᘇ).64 The Treatise sums up Wei Yuan’s perception of the changing power relations in Asia, caused by the Western commercial expansion to the East and the continuing weakness of the Qing.65 It further investigates geographical and historical information on the European maritime expansion, reflecting on the possible implications for its tributary sphere in Southeast Asia. The intention of the work was to provide offfijicials with practical knowledge of how to conduct maritime relations. Although Wei was primarily focusing on the area in South and Southeast Asia (Nanyang ই⌻), he did not forget to warn his compatriots that knowledge of the globe was imperative because the England had acquired colonies and territorial possessions all over the world. Accordingly, the main part of the Treatise deals with world geography, providing maps of the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, followed by individual maps of the major continents (Africa, Europe, and the Americas) and complemented by maps of countries Wei considered to have special signifijicance for Sino-Western relations, such as Japan, Vietnam, England, and Russia, among others. On a cartographical level, these maps difffer in style and quality, some are in Chinese style, and others are clearly based on Western maps. From its structure, however, the book placed the West in the category of the traditional barbarian ocean region. It was further mainly occupied with showing the Western intrusion into East Asia, and less with situating China into the global order. Wei’s understanding of global geography can thus be explained with the fact that his most important sources used in the Haiguo tuzhi were actually mainly Chinese ones. Without belittling the role of Western works on geography collected by him and Lin Zexu, his perception of geography was rather restricted to the maritime world in Southeast Asia, what Leonard has termed the rediscovery of Sino-Nanyang traditions. 64 

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The treatise was partially based on materials collected by Lin Zexu ᷇ࡷᗀ (1785–1850), such as translations from The Chinese Repository, copies of geographies and histories written by Protestant missionaries, maps and diagrams of ships and weapons, and the Gazetteer of the Four Continents (Sizhou zhi ഋᐎᘇ) that Lin had written based on translations from Hugh Murray’s Encyclopedia of Geography (1834). On the impressive number of works on the geography of China and foreign countries available in late Qing China, cf. the list in Draft History of the Qing (Qingshigao) (vol. 146): 4287–4305. The following discussion is based on Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). She points out in this monograph that the impact of Western geographical knowledge is often overestimated and that Chinese geographical writings were the most important sources influencing Wei’s perception of the changing power relations.

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His description of maritime Asia is, on a very obvious level, very traditional because it reproduces the tributary hierarchy of Ming dynasty (by treating China as the supreme overlord in the Asian political order) and is strangely devoid of the European notion of equal nation-states (where each has its own distinct borders). The true contribution of Wei Yuan was to introduce global geography to China by presenting a world map with two hemispheres.66 The second well-known work on geography appearing in the aftermath of the First Opium War was the ten-volume opus by Xu Jiyu ᗀ㒬⮜, titled A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe ♋ሠᘇ⮕, 1848). Although sharing the shortcomings of the Treatise, it realized that the Confucian image of China as a supreme power and civilizational center of the world was no longer tenable. The empire was now thrown into a world of competing nationstates that did not care about morality or virtue but that were plainly interested in the extension of economic and military power.67 By removing China—the Middle Kingdom—from the center of the world, Xu arrived at creating a new world order without neglecting the pride he felt for his country. However, he avoided comparing China to the powerful Western nations in a too-obvious way. Although his book includes a map of the Qing empire, he is not keen on bothering with details on Chinese geography: there was a common knowledge about the territories being under Qing control, as well as its borders, mountains, and rivers. The true legacy of his work is the tracing of the world in terms of political divisions, diffferentiating between the ‘rude barbarians’ and the non-Chinese who had accepted the benefijits of Chinese civilization. This was nothing new and conformed well to the sinocentric worldview, but in the writings of Xu, the latter category was further divided into two groups, namely, those states who were conforming to Sinocentrism (by paying tribute to the Chinese emperor) and those that were based on non-Chinese civilization, such as Europe, America, and India. Xu thereby managed to create a world

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Haiguo tuzhi 3, 13b–14. For the hemispherical map, see the introduction in this book. Xu’s work exerted considerable influence. In 1866 it was reprinted and assigned as a textbook in the College of Foreign Languages (Tongwenguan ਼᮷佘), the institution established 1862 in Beijing for training Chinese offfijicials in foreign afffairs. In the following decades, the book was used as a primary on the West by Guo Songtao 䜝᎙⠮ (1818–1891), the fijirst Chinese diplomat abroad who served as ambassador to England and France from 1877 through 1879. In the 1890s, then, the book was well received by reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. Cf. Sung-t’ao Kuo, Hsi-hung Liu, and Te-i Chang, The First Chinese Embassy to the West: The Journals of Kuo-Sung-T‘ao, Liu Hsi-Hung and Chang Te-Yi, trans. J.D. Frodsham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); Feng Chen, Die Entdeckung des Westens (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2001).

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with a pluralism of cultures and civilizations, with each having its own right of existence. Similar to Wei Yuan, a Chinese territory (opposed to non-Chinese territories) is awkwardly absent in the maps of Xu. A comparison of Europe and China at that time shows that there was still no concept of national boundaries. China is divided into provinces as Europe is in nation-states.68 Therefore, these boundaries are no more than boundaries in an administrative sense. They certainly do not create national territories by implying ontological characteristics. In other words, maps that were able to provide a cartographic imaginary in terms of national representation and to create a sense of Chinese particularity in the world were still lacking.69 This situation was lamented by Liang Qichao in 1896 when he wrote that there is not one good map of China. The map compiled by Hu Linyi70 is considered as being the best, however, it contains so many mistakes, that these cannot be counted. Recently, for the Statutes (huidian) which are to be newly compiled every province has dispatched specialized offfijicers in order to conduct a survey. Since these, however, often copy from old maps; these new maps cannot be very accurate. For this reason it is imperative that everybody who wants to peruse maps use the ones translated from Western languages.71 One of the maps translated from Western languages that came to enjoy a widespread popularity was published after newspainting became a new genre in Chinese media in the 1870s. In September 1876, Ernest Major, the editor of the newspaper Shanghai Daily (Shenbao ⭣๡), published the hand-colored, copper-engraved Complete Map of East Asia (Yaxiyazhou dongbu yudi quantu

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See the discussion of this map in the introductory chapter of this work. Additionally, Feng Guifen demanded better and more precise maps; see Feng Guifen 俞Ṳ㣜, Hui ditu yi 㒚ൠെ䆠, in Jiaobinlu kangyi ṑ䛐ᔜᣇ䆠 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1998), 105–107. Hu Linyi 㜑᷇㘬 (1812–1861) was a general and statesman who assisted Zeng Guofan in the fijight against the Taiping. Hu sponsored the editing of the Map of the Qing Empire and Neighboring Regions (Huangchao Zhongwai yitong yutu ⲷᵍѝཆа㎡䕯െ), which was based on the Qianlong map of the empire. Liang Qichao, Du xixueshu fa 䆰㾯ᆨᴨ⌅, in Xixue shumubiao 㾯ᆨᴨⴞ㺘, in Zhixue congshu chuji 䌚ᆨ਒ᴨࡍ䳶, comp. Zhixuehui 䌚ᆨᴳ (Wuchang), 1897; translation taken from Amelung, “New Maps for the Modernizing State,” 705.

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ӎ㍠ӎ⍢ᶡ䜘䕯ൠ‫ޘ‬െ).72 Measuring a height of 110 centimeters and a width of 155 centimeters, it had a considerable size, implying that it was meant to be hung on the wall. Rudolf Wagner showed how this map was the fijirst map of East Asia created based on geographic surveys and that included Chinese place names.73 This illustration placed China in a part of the world called East Asia, or Yaxiya dongbu, that is now divided into single nation-states, each defijined by clear and obvious borders. The East Asia Journal (Dongyabao ᶡӎ๡) then published in 1898 a map of East Asia that inherited this tradition of drawing maps with delineated borders that coincided with the boundaries of nations. By using bold lines, China is positioned in the center of East Asia. Timothy Richard (1845–1919), the British Baptist missionary to China, published in the monthly journal Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao 㩜഻‫ޜ‬๡) a map called Full Map of the Great Qing (Da Qingguo quantu བྷ␵഻‫ޘ‬െ). This map greatly resembles the one in the Dongyabao and does not warrant any further explanation, with the sole exception that, here again, provincial boundaries are included but this time in a diffferent manner than national boundaries.74 While the distribution of the Shenbao cannot be underestimated75 it is unclear how great its impact really was (in the case of the Dongyabao and Wanguo gongbao the distribution is even more uncertain). It is undoubtedly an early example of nonimperial cartography, but the fijirst systematic appropriation of Western cartographic techniques in the modern sense actually occurred in the late 1890s when tens of thousands Chinese went to Japan to study after the Sino-Japanese War.76 Among those students, the fijield of geography very

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Advertisement Shenbao, September 9, 1876. I thank Rudolf Wagner for pointing this map out to me. The discussion on this and the following map has profijited from two important publications of Wagner, which are Rudolf G. Wagner, “Joining the Global Imaginaire: The Shanghai Illustrated Newspaper Dianshizhai huabao,” in Joining the Global Public: Word, Image, and City in Early Chinese Newspapers, 1870–1910, ed. Rudolf G. Wagner (Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2007), 105–174; and Wagner, “China ‘Asleep’ and ‘Awakening.’ ” See Wanguo gongbao No. 130, Nov. 1899. Wagner showed that the map sold in many thousand copies, see Wagner, “Joining the Global Imaginaire: The Shanghai Illustrated Newspaper Dianshizhai huabao.” Paula Harrell, Sowing the Seeds of Change: Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, 1895–1905 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Sanetō Keishū ታ⮮ᕺ⑲, Chūgokujin— Nihon ryūgakushi ਛ࿖ੱ̣ᣣᧄ⇐ቇผ (Tōkyō: Kuroshio shuppan, 1981); Douglas R. Reynolds, China, 1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Abe Hiroshi 䱯䜘⌻, Chūgoku no kindai kyōiku to Meiji Nihon ਛ࿖ߩㄭઍᢎ⢒ߣ᣿ᴦᣣᧄ (Tōkyō: Fukumura shuppansha, 1990).

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soon enjoyed considerable popularity. The students had access to hitherto unknown mapping techniques and modern cartography. In January 1904, because of the simultaneous modernization of the education system in the wake of the promulgation of the Regulations for Modern Schools (Zouding xuetang zhangcheng ཿᇊᆨาㄐ〻), this knowledge enjoyed a dissemination that was not limited to Chinese abroad.77 At that time, the nationalist movement linked the urge to produce and circulate modern cartographic knowledge to the nation-building project by arguing that this knowledge was vital to the survival of the Chinese nation. In the case of Zhejiang Province, the provincial association (tongxianghui ਼䜹ᴳ) complained 1903 in its journal Tide of Zhejiang (Zhejiangchao) that there was virtually no knowledge on the geography, economy, and military situation in their home province. For improving this situation, the editors urged their readers to provide knowledge, and decided to start with the publication of maps of the province’s prefectures.78 While their effforts of so-called ‘modern surveying’ are undoubtedly part of the nation-building process, this does not mean that reformers and modernizers at the end of the Qing era had a clear understanding how maps actually worked. The need to apply principles of modern mapping when striving for a high degree of fijidelity in representing geographical reality had already started, during the Tongzhi reign, to publish maps of all areas of the empire that were to follow new standards (including standardized symbols on the maps, a fijixed format of explanations, the employment of a northern direction, and the requirement that maps should be based on exact measurements of latitude and longitude, etc.). This contributed to the emergence of new maps, creating even a “modern cartographic trade” in the 1890s. Yet, not all provinces were able to comply within the required one-year period, and indeed, the quality of the maps varied according to the province. These maps from the Huidianguan 77 

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The majority of textbooks—especially history textbooks of the early twentieth century— contain maps of either China or East Asia. Some of them are demarcating territorial losses and the changes of territorial integrity after the Opium Wars. For a list of textbooks, see Huang Donglan, Shinmatsu minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkanhyōshō. The contribution of the Chinese students in Japan cannot be underestimated. When Lu Xun studied in Japan, he came across a map denoting Chinese mineral resources that had been compiled by the Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources under the Japanese Ministry of Commerce. He made copies of this map and distributed them in China in 1906. The title of Lu’s copy was “Map of Chinese Mineral Resources—A Must for the Citizen” (Guomin bixie: Zhongguo kuangchan quantu ഻≁ᗵᬅ: ѝ഻⽖䨏‫ޘ‬െ), see Gu Lang 亗⨵ and Zhou Shuren ઘ⁩Ӫ, Guomin bixie: Zhongguo kuangchan quantu ഻≁ᗵᬅ: ѝ഻⽖䨏‫ޘ‬െ (Shanghai: unknown publisher, 1906). Cf. the description of this map by Amelung, “New Maps for the Modernizing State.”

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Figure 5

Map of Quzhou Prefecture in Zhejiang province, 1903.79

ᴳި佘 survey started under Tongzhi were thus still far from truly modern.80

As a consequence, the early twentieth century observed new calls for mapping China, such as in the case of the Zhejiangchao. The maps in this journal resembled European maps, being drawn with a uniformity of scale, situating the north at the top of the map, and including a map legend that explains 79  80 

Zhejiangchao no. 9 (1903). Publisher unknown. Current copyright holder for this image could not be found. Amelung, “New Maps for the Modernizing State.”

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information on towns and cities, rivers, mountains, administrative boundaries on the subprefectural level, and telegraph lines. Knowledge of one’s own native country by a thorough surveying was considered vital for both modernization and survival of the nation. Thus, the editors argued, self-government (zizhi 㠚⋫) was precondition for obtaining freedom (ziyou 㠚⭡), and if history, geography, and customs of one’s country were unknown, self-government could not be established.81 Accordingly, the “Preface of the Research Bureau of the Zhejiang Provincial Association” (Zhejiang Tongxianghui diaochabu xuli ⎉⊏਼䜹ᴳ䃯ḕ䜘᭽ֻ) emphasized that each of its members had the duty to do research on the economic and social situation at home.82 As a result, the Zhejiangchao published the reports of research teams.83 These reports list for instance details on the sale and daily profijit of opium in cities and counties of Zhejiang province, provide a list of Christian churches in Shanyin and Huiji Counties of Shaoxing Prefecture, details on sale of journals and newspapers in Hangzhou, a list of banks and fijinancial agencies in Hangzhou, a list of agricultural products of Xinchang County, a description of educational institutions in Ruian County of Wenzhou Prefecture, brothels and opium houses in Qingtian County, and so forth.84 Lu Xun 冟䗵 (1881–1936) supported this kind of research, as he—himself being from Zhejiang—was highly convinced that a country could only be considered civilized (wenming ᮷᰾) if it had exact maps of its territory at its command.85 Because the maps in the Zhejiangchao had mainly administrative purposes on a local and regional level in mind and did not aim at defijining China’s boundaries, their possible impact on the national cartography remained limited. With the rising national consciousness, national maps instead became far more politically relevant for creating new imaginaries of China. Similar to the imperial maps dating from the Qianlong and Kangxi eras, national maps had strategic and ideological aims that warrant our attention. Yet, I am less interested in geographic maps than in cultural-political maps that propagate 81  82  83 

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Zhejiangchao fakanci ⎉⊏▞Ⲭ࠺䂎, in Zhejiangchao, no. 1 (1903), 2. Cf. the annex on the last pages of Zhejiangchao, no. 2 (1903). Similar reports (diaochahui gao 䃯ḕᴳは) are published in the journal Hubei Student World (Hubei xueshengjie) and Jiangsu, the journal of the Jiangsu provincial association (all appearing in 1903). See here Zhejiangchao, no. 1, 169; Zhejiangchao, no. 2, 179–80; Zhejiangchao, no. 3, 195–96; Zhejiangchao, no. 3, 196–99; Zhejiangchao, no. 4, 165–76; Zhejiangchao, no. 4, 165–76; Zhejiangchao, no. 4, 165–76, Zhejiangchao, no. 4, 177–84; Zhejiangchao, no. 6, 167–79 (all appearing in 1903). Lu Xun, “Short Discussion on Geology in China (Zhongguo dizhi lüelun ѝ഻ൠ䌚⮕䄆),” in Zhejiangchao, no. 8 (1903).

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certain identities by creating a geobody (i.e., went much further than surveying maps). According to Winichakul, maps represent a geobody understand territory as a living organism that—due to the normative implications of the geobody itself—is the source of pride, loyalty, love, passion, bias, hatred, reason, and unreason. Describing the nation as a given unity surrounded by others, the map uses distinct us-versus-them representations. This discursive move can also be observed in the creation of maps that depicted China as a nation-state that was on the brink of extinction. It was conceived as an organic entity, whose survival in the Darwinist fijight depended on acquisition and protection of territory. Seen from this perspective it is not surprising that Liang Qichao had a biological understanding of the nation (nation as geobody) that had been nurtured by his reading of Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Thomas Buckle and Herbert Spencer. His radical concept of geography, however, has yet to be considered in another context. His journal Xinmin congbao, a periodical of the reformist group published between 1902 and 1907 in Yokohama, conceptualizes China in a very ambiguous way with regard to territoriality. On one hand, the fijirst issue of the Xinmin congbao carried Liang’s most important writing on historiography, the New Historiography (Xin shixue), arguing that imperial tradition of compiling history only knew the dynasty, not the nation-state. Influenced by European works on modern historiography, he developed here a linear-progressive understanding of history that was concerned with changing China from an empire to a nation, replacing the subject of history—the dynasty and its emperor—with the citizen and his nation.86 On the other hand, the map on the front cover produces a diffferent image of China. It includes Outer Mongolia, regions of Central Asia, and Manchuria but seems to forfeit Korea and Taiwan (areas abandoned by the Qing diplomat Li Hongzhang ᵾ卫ㄐ [1823–1901] when negotiating unequal treaties). Even more, it lacks distinct boundaries between single countries outside China. 86 

Cf. here Tang, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity; and Joseph Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959). For Liang, the function of history is to be defijined as follows: “History is the broadest and most vital discipline of all knowledge. It is the mirror reflecting the nation; it is also the source of patriotism. For the facts that nationalism is flourishing in today’s Europe and that all the other countries are making daily progress toward civilization, history writing proudly claims a great responsibility. Therefore, one has to worry only when the discipline of history is lacking in one’s country. If there is one, how cannot the nation be united, and social administration evolve? Yet, with all the abundance of historiography in our country, we still have an impoverished present. Why should that be so?” (Xin shixue, translation quoted after Tang, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity, 62).

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While the area of China is depicted in red, there is an obvious lack of consciousness that the world consists of a variety of nation-states, each with its own legitimate right to exist and to be represented in the international society. In other words, Liang’s map still situates China in a global order characterized by the dichotomy of civilization and barbarism, thus difffering little from the imperial maps discussed earlier. His imperial representation of China simply functions as an icon that construes the image of a homogeneous collective called China while, nonetheless, standing in stark contrast to the nationalist thinking ascribed to him in the decade after his flight to Japan in September 1898. Taking into consideration that modern principles of cartography were introduced to China twenty years earlier87 and that Liang had access to a great variety of maps during his stay in Japan, the nature of this map is difffijicult to understand. It would be too easy to explain it as the product of blurred cartography, a cartography that does not diffferentiate between imperial and national maps because of the lack of conceptual clarity. The dichotomy of both kinds of maps perceived here reflects to some extent the modernization paradigm that holds, on one hand, that accurate maps depicting geographic reality are more progressive and necessary for establishing a modern state and, on the other hand, that national maps are to replace their imperial predecessors. However, it is, in fact, hard to distinguish between national and imperial mapping. Generally, one might argue that national mapping deals with the mapping of the core territory of nation-state, whereas the latter type of map includes territorial possessions overseas, as it has been the case with European colonial empires. These maps difffer only in their spatial dimension, having either a regional or a global dimension. It is difffijicult to share such a view; for example, Russian Siberia and nineteenth-century western North America, as well as eighteenth-century China, were regions with no clear or stable geographic divide between a possible national core territory and an imperial periphery. German maps on Prussia, Alsace, and the Kiautschou Bay function similarly, each portraying power, describing limits and extensions of political rule. Matthew Edney’s critical distinction between national and imperial maps lying in the scope of spatial discourse is thus not tenable. Applying the criteria who is mapping, who is being mapped, and for what kind of sociopolitical purpose, he defijines an imperial map of a territory as not made “for the benefijits of the territory’s inhabitants—who do not participate within and remain largely ignorant of the discourse—but for a knowing, empowered, imperial audience.” Imperial mapping is thus an “ironic act.” Describing cartographic science as “a crucial marker of diffference between Europeans (the knowing Self) and 87 

Amelung, “New Maps for the Modernizing State.”

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non-Europeans (the unknowing Other),”88 Edney links imperial mapping to the exercise of power and authority. Although he holds that there is no discernible diffference between cartographic practice of imperial and nonimperial maps, he perceives imperial maps as created by the exclusion of native peoples from the cartographic discourse, with the empire defijined by inequality, subordination, and distinction. This conclusion is valid in the context of European colonization but also holds for the Chinese context in the centuries before 1900, turning the maps of the Kangxi and Qianlong eras into imperial maps. In contrast to Edney, however, I argue that there is no qualitative diffference between national and imperial maps. One might wonder how the imperial exercise of power and authority difffers from mapping mythically homogeneous nationstates that have obscured signifijicant cultural, economic, and social diffferences within its community in the process of their formation. In terms of spatiality, on the contrary, there is—especially in the case of China—an obvious diffference. A national map depicts territory, delineated clearly by (national) boundaries, while imperial maps represent space in which dimensions are marked by fluid boundaries, often understood—as seen—in terms of barbarism and civilization or development and nondevelopment (by opening up new regions and adding them to the empire). This is reflected in the map of Liang Qichao and caused by the continuing influence of cosmography in twentieth-century maps that entail two diffferent readings of space, in other words, the fluid frontiers of imperial China and the distinct national boundaries conforming to the rules of the international global society.89 The blurred cartography continues to exist in the following years, also in maps that appear after the Xinhai Revolution on a large scale in books, journals, and school textbooks. In the process of disseminating geographical knowledge and knowledge on the Chinese role in the international community, the two decades after 1911 witnessed a virtual explosion of nationalist geography education, combined with the state-sponsored publication of national maps by government agencies and commercial presses for both classroom use and public consumption. It was a common characteristic of most of these maps that they show graphically how Chinese boundaries were violated and how its territory was lost. This is especially the case with maps of national shame (guochi ഻ᚕ) that aimed at installing a patriotic spirit among the population of the young republic.90 The printing of such maps 88  89  90 

Edney in Akerman, The Imperial Map, 6, 13. Cf. also Edney, Mapping an Empire. Huang Donglan, Shinmatsu minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkanhyōshō. The fijirst time a loss of territory was linked to national shame in a school textbook happened in the 1905 Newest Geography Textbook (Zuixin dili jiaokeshu ᴰᯠൠ⨶ᮉ、ᴨ),

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began after the submission of the Twenty-One Demands by Japan in 1915 that threatened to partition the republic and gained a political signifijicance so far unprecedented. The demands became public almost immediately despite the effforts of the Japanese ambassador Hioki Eki ᰕ㖞⳺ (1861–1926) to maintain their secrecy. Yet, the full document was not only known by US offfijicials (the diplomat Wellington Koo 亗㏝䡎 [1887–1985] met with Paul Reinsch [1869–1923], the American minister to Peking, almost every night during the negotiations) but was also made public by American journalists in early 1915,91 and they were even leaked by the Chinese press itself. Chow Tse-tsung has shown that this was a deliberate act of Yuan Shikai 㺱цࠡ (1859–1916). Yuan wanted to use the foreign and Chinese press for moral support, as well as win over the Western powers.92 As a reaction, the Japanese foreign minister Baron Katō Takaaki ࣐㰔儈᰾ (1860–1926) asked the Chinese government to censor its press. In a meeting between Hioki and the newly appointed Chinese foreign minister Lu Zhengxiang 䲨ᗥ⾕ (1871–1949),93 the latter replied to the complaint of the ambassador that “times have changed from the days of the

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edited by Xie Hongben 䅍⍚䋱 (see Huang Donglan, Shinmatsu minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkanhyōshō, 93). William Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives, no. 29 (2004): 199–218, considers humiliation to be an integral part of the construction of Chinese nationalism. He analyses the book A Record of National Humiliation: Pictures and Stories of China’s Century (1998), cf. Zhou Shan ઘኡ and Zhang Chunbo ᕐ᱕⌒, ed., Tushuo Zhonghua bainian guochilu മ䈤ѝ ॾⲮᒤഭ㙫ᖅ (Lanzhou: Gansu shaonian ertong chubanshe, 1998). Responsible for this act was Carl Crow (1884–1945), an American journalist and the Far Eastern representative and chair of the Committee on Public Information (Compub), America’s wartime propaganda organization in Shanghai. He describes the leaking and the impact thereof on public opinion in China in his reminiscences I Speak for the Chinese (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937). See also Paul French, Carl Crow: A Tough Old China Hand: The Life, Times, and Adventures of an American in Shanghai (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006); and Toshihiro Yamagoshi ኡ㞠᭿ላ, The Media Wars: Launching the May Fourth Movement: World War I and the American Propaganda Activities in China, Led by P.S. Reinsch and Carl Crow, digital source, 2010: http://www.geocities.jp/crow1919jp/ may_4th/english/may4th_e.html (last access January 26, 2016). Especially Britain and America. Cf. also Gu Weijun huiyilu 1, 119–27; Paul Samuel Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 141. Born in 1871 to a father who worked for Protestant missionaries, Lu was educated in foreign languages and worked as an interpreter for the Chinese legation in St. Petersburg. He was later the fijirst minister abroad to advise the emperor to abdicate after he had supported the Xinhai revolution as an ardent believer in the modernization of China.

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Manchus, and now there is freedom of the press in China.”94 In fact there was, of course, no true freedom of the press under Yuan’s rule. The earliest organized anti-Japanese protests, however, took place in Japan: in 1915 the majority of Chinese foreign students studied in Japan. They were especially sensitive to the humiliation of their country, a phenomenon that occurred often and found its reflection in the Japanese media.95 After the news of the Demands became public, three thousand students rallied in Tōkyō on February 11, 1915. Two representatives were sent to Beijing to urge the government to refuse the demands.96 In the United States, student groups cabled Yuan to reject the unjustifijied demands and appealed to their fellow students to join the national cause. Students at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology formed a National Defence Society and even published a journal called National Defence Monthly that discussed weaponry. At the same time, Chinese merchants in America favored the idea of boycotting Japanese goods, a plan immediately conveyed to their compatriots in China by cable.97 The protest movement continued to grow, in Japan and the United States, as well as China, where thirty thousand people, organized by the Citizens’ Association of Comrades against Japan (Guomin dui Ri tongzhihui ഻≁ሽᰕ਼ᘇᴳ) rallied in the International Settlement on March 18, 1915. Following this rally in Shanghai, the protest spread quickly to the major cities in southern China and into the north. The participation of bankers, who refused to grant credits to companies specializing in Japanese products, resulted in an immediate stop or sharp trade drop. Signs reading “Don’t forget the National Humiliation” (wuwang guochi यᘈ ഻ᚕ) appeared ubiquitously: the slogan was painted on walls, coined in trademarks, and imprinted on stationary.

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96 

97 

Minutes of Sino-Japanese Negotiations, February 22, 1915, 145–56, here quoted after Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 21. Sanetō Keishū ᇏ㰔ᚥ⿰, Nitchū hi yūkō no rekishi ᰕѝ䶎৻ྭȃ↤ਢ (Tōkyō: Asahi shinbunsha, 1973); Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Shenbao, May 19, 1915, 10. Cf. also Shibao, February 21, 1915, 4; March 2, 1915, 2; March 6, 1915, 3. They also asked for permission to return to China, which was required because many students enjoyed government scholarships. Their petition to return was rejected, and after the demands were accepted by Yuan Shikai, four thousand students who had left for China in the meanwhile were forced to return to continue their studies in Japan. Chow, The May Fourth Movement, 26; Luo Zhitian, “National Humiliation and National Assertion,” 302.

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The public reaction to the demands—as has the whole May Fourth Movement—has long since been considered as having contributed to the rise of nationalist sentiments in early republican China. The majority of historians shares this view,98 given the fact that despite the political chaos and the warlord rule 1915 was the fijirst time in modern Chinese history that public opinion had an opportunity to express itself and its patriotic concerns.99 The loud cry of the intelligentsia conveying a feeling of public humiliation was widely heard throughout the country. All the newspapers expressed strong anti-Japanese feelings, the president’s palace was flooded with letters and telegrams urging Yuan to protect China at any cost, and his failure to do so resulted in a nationwide national shame movement. When Yuan Shikai ordered the provincial authorities to put an end to the boycott on March 25, 1915 (after public indignation had reached its climax) the movement turned against him. The dates of May 7 (the day the Japanese ultimatum was made public) and May 9 (the day Yuan accepted the demands)100 were declared “Commemoration Day of National Humiliation.”101 On May 20, 1915, 98 

See Chi, China Diplomacy, 1914–1918; Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement; Wang Yunsheng ⦻㣨⭏, Liushi nian lai Zhongguo yu Riben ‫ॱޝ‬ᒤֶѝ഻㠷ᰕᵜ. 7 vols. (Tianjin: Dagongbaoshe, 1934; reprinted in Beijing, 1980); and Li Yushu ᵾ∃▽, Zhong-Ri ershiyi tiao jiaoshe ѝᰕҼॱаọӔ⎹ (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1966). The one exception is Luo Zhitian, “National Humiliation and National Assertion: The Chinese Response to the Twenty-One Demands,” Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 2 (1993): 297–319, who harbors doubts on this interpretation. He provides an overview on the various anti-Japanese rallies and boycotts during that time, which were in most cases organized by provincial and city chambers of commerce and educational associations. 99  On the contrary, foreign papers such as the Times, Associated Press, and others withheld the news for two weeks. Cf. Jerome Ch’en, Yuan Shih-kai (Taipei: Rainbow-Bridge Book Co., 1961; reprint 1980), 152–53. 100  Facing British warnings and American pressure—as well as an internal power struggle— Japan signifijicantly altered their demands, and a reduced set of “Thirteen Demands” was transmitted on May 7 in the form of an ultimatum, with a two-day deadline for response. Yuan Shikai, competing with other local warlords to become the ruler of all China, was not in a position to risk war with Japan and accepted appeasement, a tactic that was followed by his successors. On May 9, Yuan accepted at 1:00 p.m. all the terms (without consent of parliament as required in the constitution as the parliament had already been dissolved) and signed the fijinal form of the treaty on May 25. Wilson responded to Yuan’s capitulation with a note on May 11, stating that the agreement violated American treaties and the rights of American citizens, China’s political and territorial integrity, and fijinally the Open Door Policy. 101  As stated by Zhang Shizhao ㄐ༛䠇 (1881–1973) in The Tiger Magazine (Jiayin zazhi ⭢ᇵ 䴌䂼). Cf. Zhang Shizhao, Shiju tongyan ᱲተⰋ䀰, in Jiayin, May 9, 1915 (Zhang Shizhao

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the Jiangsu Society for Education ( Jiangsu jiaoyuhui ⊏㰷ᮉ㛢ᴳ) informed every school in the province that from now on, May 9 would be the day of national shame to be commemorated each year. The Shanghai paper Citizen’s Daily (Guomin ribao ഻≁ᰕ๡) carried speeches and calls to students to engage in fijight against aggression from outside by raising the national flag and singing the national anthem.102 In June the minister of education, Tang Hualong ⒟ ॆ喽 (1874–1918), emphasized the signifijicance of spiritual education (jingshen jiaoyu ㋮⾎ᮉ㛢) for wiping out national humiliation.103 The ministry accordingly informed all provincial governors, and in Beijing for instance, pupils started reading the ultimatum aloud every day so they would not forget.104 While Luo Zhitian contended that the nationalist sentiment ended soon and that by September 1915 discussion of national humiliation in the newspapers had ceased (partly even before the end of the negotiations, presumably because of the apathy of the Chinese people toward political afffairs, as quanji 3, 370–77). On the topos of national humiliation, cf. Paul Cohen, “Remembering and Forgetting National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China,” Twentieth-Century China 27, no. 2 (2002): 1–39; Callahan, “National Insecurities”; James L. Hevia, “Remembering the Century of Humiliation: The Yuanming Gardens and Dagu Forts Museums,” in Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia, ed. Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 192–208; and Robert Culp, Articulating citizenship: civic education and student politics in Southeastern China, 1912–1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 80–84; 217–20. 102  Guomin ribao, May 10, 1917. For a general description of activities taking place on May 9, 1917, cf. Sun Xiangmei ᆛ俉ẵ, Minguo shiqi de guochi jinianri ≁഻ᱲᵏⲴ഻ᚕ㌰ᘥᰕ, in Zhongshan fengyu, no. 4 (2007): 16–19. For a detailed analysis on the development of national shame education in early Republican China, cf. Zhang Yihong ᕐ䙨㓒, Minguo qianqi xuexiao guochi jiaoyu de xingqi yu fazhan ≁ഭࡽᵏᆖṑഭ㙫ᮉ㛢Ⲵ‫ޤ‬䎧оਁ ኅ, in Guangxi shehui kexue, no. 12 (2006): 192–94; Huang Donglan, Shinmatsu minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkanhyōshō; and Callahan, China. 103  Tang had studied law at Hōsei University in Tōkyō from 1906 to 1908, founded the Education Society among the Chinese students in Japan, and published the Education Journal ( Jiaoyu zazhi ᮉ㛢䴌䂼). After his return to China, he fijirst engaged in local and provincial politics before being appointed to the provisional government in Nanking in 1912. In 1914 he became minister of education. When Japanese newspapers such as Osaka Mainichi shinbun བྷ䱚⇾ᰕᯠ㚎 and Tōkyō Nichinichi shinbun ᶡӜᰕᰕᯠ㚎 reported on anti-Japanese schoolbooks in China, the Japanese government demanded the prohibition of their use and publication. Tang replied that these books were simply side readers that did not enjoy offfijicial approval. Under the policy of freedom of publication in the Republic, the government was unable to prohibit the publication of these books. Cf. Jiaoyu zazhi VII, no. 6 (June 1915): 41; and VI, no. 8, 72–73, 69 (August 1914). 104  Li Xin ᵾᯠ and Li Zongyi ᵾᇇа, ed., Zhonghua minguo shi ѝ㨟≁഻ਢ, series II, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 566.

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Luo suspects),105 a closer look at offfijicial and nonofffijicial publications shows otherwise. In fact, the national humiliation movement did not stop suddenly, nor did it lose its zeal. It was surpassed by the anti-Japanese voices in journals and newspapers such as Eastern Times (Shibao ᱲ๡), Shanghai Daily (Shenbao ⭣๡), and Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi ᶡᯩ䴌䂼), each reporting the newest aggression toward China and the servile attitude of Chinese politicians. In addition—as shown above—the nationwide distribution of maps of national shame assured the movement’s continuous influence.106 These cases show that although the consciousness of national humiliation was generally present, it difffered decisively in the various strata of Chinese society, despite the intensive propaganda effforts of both state authorities and intellectuals in the public sphere. For state authorities, it served distinct political aims and was thus incessantly propagated. To give an example, History of National Humiliation was the title of various, state-approved textbooks from the 1920s and 1930s. As early as July 1915, a national curriculum for national humiliation education was announced which was soon followed by according humiliation history and geography textbooks, among them most prominently Hou Hongjian ‫ן‬卫䪁 (Three Principles: National Studies, National Humiliation and Hard Work, 1915), Lü Simian ੅ᙍࣹ (A Short History of National Humiliation, 1929), Jiang Gongsheng 㪻᚝᲏ (History of National Humiliation, 1927), and the Short History of National Humiliation: New Edition, edited by Cao Zengmei ᴩ໎㖾 and Huang Xiaoxian 哴ᆍ‫( ݸ‬1932). In addition, works appeared such as the Lessons from Lost Countries—Supplemented by a Record of National Shame by Duan Ruli⇥⊍傚 (1915), the Research Abstract on the History of National Humiliation of China by Zhou Bingyi ઘ⿹ᖌ (1936), and the influential textbook by Jia Yijun 䍮䙨ੋ, titled Geography of China’s National Humiliation (1930). This two-decade-long tradition of publishing books and maps of national humiliation left a legacy that still today is typical for the Chinese 105  Luo also mentions a banquet held in a Japanese club in Beijing on May 9, 1916, where Chinese and Japanese correspondents participated. Cf. Shibao, May 8, 1916, p. 7; May 11, 1916, p. 4. For his assessment see Luo Zhitian, “National Humiliation and National Assertion.” 106  In contrast, intellectual journals such as the New Youth (Xin Qingnian ᯠ䶂ᒤ) and New Tide (Xinchao ᯠ▞) were much less radical than the mainstream media and, generally speaking, did not discuss the Twenty-One Demands or openly propagate sentiments of national shame. Accordingly, both journals were rather devoid of open anti-Japanese sentiments. This has something to do with the fact that the intellectuals enjoyed close relations with their Japanese colleagues who did not share the political views of the military clique.

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self-perception.107 Although China, a long-independent nation, is proud of its long history and its civilization’s achievements, the national humiliation education is actually expanding and still an important part of political propaganda and identity construction in today’s China. National humiliation is here a moral discourse that fijigures the glorious Chinese civilization threatened by barbarians.108 The fijirst and foremost danger is—as exemplifijied in the textbooks and maps of national humiliation—the fear of loss of territory, and the obsession with an inviolable and pristine territory found its most distinct expressions in the maps of national shame. Though Chinese nationalism appears at fijirst sight as a territorial nationalism, the country’s self-perception at the time was still awkwardly nonterritorial; even though the Twenty-One Demands were equated to the downfall of the Chinese nation, the maps of China appearing after 1915 continued to perpetuate the characteristics of the map on the front cover of the Xinmin congbao.109 The following map dating from 1929 is a vivid example (see Figure 6). It uses boundaries to construct a space called China that is conceived as national, and with these maps, the space can be encoded. By using diffferent colors, the map contrasts the territory under the control with the red-marked areas lost to the imperial powers. These areas—here considered part of China— are East Turkistan, Nepal, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Korea, and the area north of the Amur. Mongolia, on the other hand, is—in 1929—still imprinted in yellow, thus considered as being under control of the Chinese government.110 107  See, for example, the recent publications Chen Yumei 䱸⦹ẵ, Mingji lishi, wuwang guochi 䬝䇠শਢयᘈഭ㙫 (Guiyang: Guizhou daxue chubanshe, 2009); and Zhang Minghua ᕐ䬝ॾ, Guochi—Guohun ഭ㙫·ഭ兲 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2009). 108  In China, Callahan points out that this way of arguing justifijies the Chinese claim to be inherently peaceful and to understand its rise merely as a “peaceful rising” (heping jueqi ઼ᒣፋ䎧). For the discourse of national humiliation in China today, see its recent renaissance since the 1990s, when it was made an important part of the Patriotic Education Campaign. Cf. Zhao Suisheng, “A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302. 109  In addition, by using the term Zhonghua ѝ㨟 to denote China these maps structure the world according to the categories of civilization and barbarism, making it thus difffijicult to defijine the country as either an empire or a nation. This is a characteristic of political thinking, which until today haunts the Chinese effforts of self-representation, and the according ambiguity is reflected in the mapping process. 110  Mongolia had declared its independence during the collapse of the Qing in 1911 but had to struggle until 1921 to fijirmly establish de facto independence from the Republic of China, which claimed Mongolia as part of its own territory. In 1919 Chinese troops occupied the country again, until their defeat in late 1920, which was achieved by Soviet support.

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Figure 6

149

Map of Chinese National Humiliation (Zhonghua guochi ditu ѝ㨟഻ᚕൠെ), 1929.111

This limitation notwithstanding, the map is a normative one. It is not a factual but an emotionalized geographical representation of the nation that functions by explicitly appealing to morality. The boundaries used are boundaries defijined by the categories of barbarism and civilization, or national shame and national pride. To choose one of these categories is a highly moralized issue. This interpretation is more than obvious when considering that this map is not merely a political one (as the referral to nationalist ideology might imply), but an epistemological one, for it describes where China ought to be (and not where it currently is). By applying a metageographical approach, it can be shown how this map is loaded with national sentiments to a degree that it is no longer a rationalized description of factual reality. Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen have shown that virtually no map offfers a true cartographic representation of geographic reality. All maps are situated in distinct cultural and political contexts, and this is 111  Map of China’s National Humiliation (Zhonghua guochi ditu ѝ㨟഻ᚕൠെ) (Beijing: Hebei sheng Gongshangting, Minguo 18, 1929). Map. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2007628129 (accessed April 30, 2016).

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not only the case of maps that depict strange or unusual forms of cartography. Similar to sinocentric maps of imperial China, which tended to be more fluid in character than mathematically correct, the maps of national shame describe a target state, not an actual state of political reality. Accordingly, the shame maps had clear educational purposes (in the true Confucian sense), for they aimed at installing the population with the correct national consciousness that should drive them to political action of restoring lost territories.112 In terms of territoriality, this map is thus—though being deeply embedded in the ideology of nationalism—orienting itself toward to the imperial expansion of the past. When comparing it to contemporary maps—that still claim territories not under full control and command such as the South China Sea—one can easily observe that by today some of the lost territories depicted in 1929 are now forgotten. This territorial amnesia pertains to areas such as Vietnam, the Korean Peninsula, Nepal, Myanmar, and Bhutan. On the one hand, the maps of national shame depict the spatial designation of China as something stable and unchanging. Yet on the other hand—as Huang Donglan has shown—there was no clear agreement of which territories were lost, the extent of territorial claims of the maps actually was expanding in the 1920s and 1930s.113 Furthermore, it is quite telling that the use of distinct colors (red, white, and yellow) strengthened the emotional attachment to the map. Although boundaries were already used before, the use of colored printing facilitated an emotional reading of that map: lost territories were much more discernible than before. As argued by William Callahan, the Map of China’s National Humiliation of 1927 (shown in Figure 7) reproduced the logic of imperial maps but in a more direct and obvious way. Like the maps presented earlier, this map works with a variety of diffferent colors to show the shrinking of Chinese territory. Although titled Map of China’s National Humiliation, it reasserts the imperial cartography of hierarchical concentric circles on a modern map. In its conception, it difffers little from those maps already produced in the Qing dynasty. It is signifijicant that the outer ring—much larger than on any other map—is labeled the “old national boundary,” thereby implying that there is no substantial diffference between China as a nation-state and an empire. The quest for territorial continuity is further substantiated by the inset box, listing fijifteen lost “homeland territories,” fijifteen lost “vassals,” four “territorial concessions,”

112  Considering that, today, Taiwan still enjoys diffferent colorings on maps depending on the origin of the map, this is not a thing of the past. 113  Huang Donglan, Shinmatsu minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkanhyōshō.

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Figure 7

151

Map of China’s National Humiliation (Zhongguo guochi ditu ѝ഻഻ᚕൠെ), 1927.114

and another fourteen lost and disputed “maritime territories.”115 While some of these “lost territories” have in the meantime been returned to China 114  Map of the National Shame of China, reprint (Zhongguo guochi ditu, zaiban ѝ഻഻ᚕൠ െˈ޽⡸). (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1927). Taken from Callahan, “The Cartography of National Humiliation and the Emergence of China’s Geobody,” 155. Callahan names Chinese University of Hong Kong as source of this map, but the map itself has no listed author. 115  In the 1930s China had already lost more than half its territory so that the Geography of China’s National Humiliation (1930) textbook emphasized the need to “compile a geographical record of the rise and fall of our country to craft a government policy to save it” (Jia Yijun 䍮䙨ੋ, Zhongguo guochi dili ѝ഻഻ᚕൠ⨶ [Beijing: Wenhua xueshe yinxing, 1930], 1; translation taken from William Callahan, “The Cartography of National Humiliation and the Emergence of China’s Geobody,” Public Culture 21, no. 1 [2009]: 156). It lists in detail the various forms of territorial loss, thereby providing a “true encyclopedia

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(Hong Kong, 1997; Macao, 1999), other territorial claims seem outdated (regions in Southeast Asia, parts of Russia and Mongolia, and Korea). For the nationalist Chinese, however, the political purpose of such illustrations was more than self-explicatory. The political urge to protect the territorial/spatial extension of China is also made explicit in the constitutions of the Republic. The draft constitution of 1913 and the constitutions of 1914, 1923, 1946, and 1947 state that the Chinese territory shall remain unchanged and inherit the expansion of Qing dynasty.

Defijinitions of Territory in Chinese Constitutions, 1912–1947116 Constitution

Date of Promulgation

Defijinition of Chinese Territory

ѝ㨟≁഻㠘ᱲ㌴⌅ ㅜйọ

1912

ѝ㨟≁഻么൏⛪ҼॱҼ㹼ⴱǃ‫ޗ‬ཆ 㫉ਔǃ㾯㯿ǃ䶂⎧DŽ

ཙ໷២㥹 ㅜҼọ

1913

ѝ㨟≁഻഻൏‫ަ׍‬പᴹѻ⮶ฏDŽ഻ ൏৺ަ॰ࢳԕ⌅ᖻнᗇ䆺ᴤѻDŽ

ѝ㨟≁഻㌴⌅ ㅜйọ

1914

ѝ㨟≁഻ѻ么൏‫׍‬ᗎࡽᑍ഻ᡰᴹѻ ⮶ฏDŽ

ᴩ䥅២⌅ ㅜйọ

1923

ѝ㨟≁഻഻൏‫ަ׍‬പᴹѻ⮶ฏDŽ഻ ൏৺ަ॰ࢳԕ⌅ᖻнᗇ䆺ᴤѻDŽ

ѝ㨟≁഻䁃᭯ᱲᵏ㌴⌅ ㅜаọ

1931

ѝ㨟≁഻么൏⛪਴ⴱ৺㫉ਔ㾯㯿DŽ

of lost territories.” The list of “lost territories” includes Bhutan, the Ryūkyū Islands, Nepal, Sakhalin, Kazakhstan, and the Khanate of Kokand. Similar lists are provided in publications such as Shen Liangqi ⊸ӞἘ, ed., Speeches on National Shame (Guochi yanshuo ഻ᚕ╄䃚) (Zhongguo tushu bianyishe, 1920); and Shen Wenjun ⊸᮷☜, ed., Extended History of National Shame (Zengding guochi xiaoshi ໎䀲഻ᚕሿਢ) (Shanghai, Zhongguo tushu gongsi heji 1925); among others. 116  This overview is taken from Zhang Jinfan, Zhongguo xianfa shi ѝഭᇚ⌅ਢ (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2005). The Peking Daily News reports with regard to the constitution of 1914 that “the sovereign territory of the Republic of China continues to be the same as the domain of the former Empire.” Cf. “The Constitutional Compact of the Chung Hua Min Kuo,” bilingual ed., Peking Daily News, May 1, 1914, chap. 1, article 3.

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153

Constitution

Date of Promulgation

Defijinition of Chinese Territory

ӄӄ២㥹 ㅜഋọ

1936

ѝ㨟≁഻么൏⛪˖⊏㰷ǃ⎉⊏ǃ ⊏㾯ǃ⒆ेǃ⒆ইǃഋᐍǃ㾯ᓧǃ ⋣ेⴱǃኡᶡǃኡ㾯ǃ⋣ইǃ 䲍㾯ǃ⭈㚵ǃ䶂⎧ǃ⾿ᔪǃᔓᶡǃ ᔓ㾯ǃ䴢ইǃ䋤ᐎǃ䚬ሗǃਹ᷇ǃ 唁喽⊏ǃ⟡⋣ǃሏ૸⡮ǃ㎿䚐ǃ ሗ༿ǃᯠ⮶ǃ㫉ਔǃ㾯㯿ㅹപᴹѻ ⮶ฏDŽѝ㨟≁഻么൏ˈ䶎㏃഻≁བྷ ᴳ䆠⊪нᗇ䆺ᴤDŽ

᭯঄២㥹 ㅜഋọ

1946

ѝ㨟≁഻么൏ˈ‫ަ׍‬പᴹѻ⮶ฏˈ 䶎‫⌅׍‬ᖻнᗇ䆺ᴤѻDŽ

ѝ㨟≁഻២⌅ㅜഋọ

1947

ѝ㨟≁഻么൏ˈ‫ަ׍‬പᴹѻ⮶ฏˈ 䶎㏃഻≁བྷᴳѻ⊪䆠ˈнᗇ䆺ᴤ ѻDŽ

In general, national humiliation maps sought to combine the imperial territory with modern, scientifijic maps. From this kind of maps, there emerged a conception of China that defijined the country in national terms on the basis of territoriality, a conception that cannot do without the lost territories. The political signifijicance of this quest converged well with the main characteristic of the political ideology nationalism, which propagates the mantra of “China belongs to the Chinese,” with national sovereignty as the powerful ostensory. However, the maps of national shame had to obscure diffferences between China as nation-state and empire to function properly—as shown in the case of the Map of China’s National Humiliation (1927)—even if nationalist thinking made it necessary to propagate a consciousness of territory defijined by cartographic means that reflect national boundaries depicting friend and foe. When transforming the once borderless tianxia—the all-under-heaven—from a universalist Confucian cosmology into a world order based on the particularistic nation-state, these categories of belonging and non-belonging, or friend and foe, experienced a deep epistemological change, leading fijinally to the emergence of ontologically defijined enemies (or hostis) that were unknown to

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traditional China. This change was caused by the insight that the most urgent issue of late imperial and early Republican China was actually territorial integrity, an insight that soon developed into a factual fear among both Chinese thinkers and their Japanese coevals. This development proved—as I am going to show in the remaining part of this chapter—that the Chinese nationalism was not only territorial in nature, but also experienced—in the course of World War I—a spatial turn that came to reframe the relation between national sovereignty and territory vis-à-vis space. It should later result into an imaginary of global order that promised to provide a diffferent solution to the question of how to deal with the hostis.

4.2

Territorial Integrity and the Fear of Partition in China

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fear that the country was to be divided among the imperialist powers was omnipresent among Chinese intellectuals and political thinkers, often described by the political metaphor partitioning China like a melon. This imminent danger was an issue that was also widely discussed among Japanese thinkers. Shortly after the occupation of Kiautschou Bay by the German imperial army in November 1897 and after Russia ensured its control over Port Arthur in the following March, the Japanese reaction did not wait for long. In October 1898 the Oriental Association (Tōhō kyōkai ᶡ䛖঄Պ) declared at a meeting at the Imperial Hotel in Tōkyō that its aim was to preserve the territorial integrity of China (Shina hozen ᭟䛓‫)ޘ؍‬. On this occasion, the prime minister of Japan, Marquis Ōkuma Shigenobu བྷ䲸䟽ؑ (1838–1922), gave a speech titled “On the Territorial Integrity of China” (Shina hozenron ᭟䛓‫ޘ؍‬䄆). In his speech, he declared the fate of China being a central concern for Japan. Among the various problems the neighboring empire was facing at that time was the Russian expansion into its territory since the reign of Emperor Kangxi. The acquisition of Chinese territory and the opening of its ports for foreign trade by European forces since the 1840s have importuned the great country, which once possessed a territory and population as big as the whole of Europe and ten times bigger than that of Japan. By arguing that the fact that China is currently not fully governed Ōkuma suggests that its decline is self-induced: its ups and downs in history were not the result of outside pressure, and its fijinal nemesis was not caused by foreign powers but by the Chinese themselves. Thus, it was the task and duty of the Japanese empire to aid and protect China by bringing Western civilization to China without having the intention of annexing, especially when considering that the Russian activities in East Asia were of great

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concern for both countries.117 Western literature mentions this notion as the Ōkuma doctrine: “Foreign minister Ōkuma Shigenobu contributed a rationale for government policy with this ‘Ōkuma Doctrine’ under which Japan, long a recipient of China’s culture and spirit in the past, would now repay its debt by holding the West at bay to provide the time necessary for China to reorganize under new leadership”, as Marius Jansen put it once.118 To do so promoting mutual understanding and improvement in relations between both countries was considered important. This was the declared view of Prince Konoe Atsumaro 䘁㺎㈔哯 (1863–1904), who founded the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tō-A dōbunkai ᶡӌ਼᮷Պ) in the same year.119 He proposed in his essay “An Argument for a League of those Belonging to the Same Race” (Dōjinshu dōmei ron ਼Ӫぞ਼ⴏ䄆, 1898) to create such an alliance. Konoe and his association insisted on the urgency of preserving the territorial integrity of the Qing empire, by helping both Korea and China in their modernization. After his well-known meeting with Kang Youwei in November 1898, where he introduced his vision of the Asian Monroe Doctrine to Kang, he published a critical article in Current Discussions in East Asia (Tō-A jiron ᶡӌ ᱲ䄆). Titled “The Position of the Empire and Modern Politicians” (Teikoku no chii to gendai no seijika ᑍഭȃսൠǽ⨮ԓȃ᭯⋫ᇦ), the article discussed the danger of partition that in the course of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 appeared 117  Ōkuma cautioned to accept the Russian proposal of global disarmament, as the Russians’ intentions were not fully clear. For the speech, see Ōkuma Shigenobu བྷ䲸䟽ؑ, Shina hozenron ᭟䛓‫ޘ؍‬䄆, in Ōkuma haku enzetsu shū, 20–38. 118  Marius B. Jansen, “Japan and the Revolution of 1911,” in The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 346 (vol. 2, part 2). Ōkuma mentioned nothing of “holding the West at bay” but suggested to cooperate with the Western powers (Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period, 122–25). Given the fact that he had already been criticized for being too weak in dealing with the Western powers, his conciliatory attitude in this speech was not fully supported by the audience. 119  The antecedent organization, the Dōbunkai ਼᮷Պ, was founded in June 1898 and later merged, in November 1898, with the Tō-A kai ᶡӌՊ to become the Tō-A dōbunkai ᶡӌ਼᮷Պ. In 1900 the Tō-A dōbunkai opened a college in Nanking called the East Asia Common Cultural College (Tō-A dōbun shoin ᶡӌ਼᮷ᴨ䲒), which recruited students from Japan wishing to learn the Chinese language and culture, and fijinanced a school in Tōkyō for Chinese students seeking higher education in Japan. For the origins and aims of the college, cf. Douglas R. Reynolds, “Chinese Area Studies in Prewar China: Japan’s Tōa Dōbun Shoin in Shanghai, 1900–1945,” The Journal of Asian Studies 45, no. 5 (1986): 945–70. The East Asian Common Culture Society is discussed in detail in Yamamoto Shigeki ኡᵜ㤲⁩, Konoe Atsumaro—sono Meiji kokkakan to Ajiakan 䘁㺋㈔哯̣̣Dz ȃ᰾⋫ഭᇦ㿣ǽȪɀȪ㿣 (Kyōto: Minerva, 2001), chapter 4.

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bigger than ever. It was argued by the East Asian Common Culture Society that assistance to China was therefore indispensable. This message was communicated to the Chinese, and the call for the preservation of territorial integrity of China evolved into the basic political principle of the Society. In 1901 Sun Yat-sen reacted to the Japanese concerns when he published the essay “A Combined Discussion on the Preservation and Partition of China” (Zhina baoquan fenge helun ᭟䛓‫ࢢ࠶ޘ؍‬ਸ䄆),120 which was originally addressed to a Japanese audience when published in the Journal of the Oriental Association (Tōhō kyōkai kaihō ᶡ䛖঄ՊՊ๡).121 This journal—highly influential at that time—aimed at helping neighboring countries to modernize, enabling them to resist Western pressure and maintain the balance of power.122 Sun argues in his essay that the idea of partition was mainly found 120  Three diffferent versions of this text were published: the fijirst one on December 20, 1901, in the Tōhō kyōkai kaihō (no. 82); the second one two years later on September 21, 1903, in the journal Jiangsu (no. 6); and the third one as the offfijicial one—it is based on Sun’s manuscript—published 1973 in Guofu quanji. For a comparison of the three versions, see Matsuo Yōji ᶮቮ⌻Ҽ, Shina hozen bunkatsu gōron shoban idō taishōhyō ᭟䛓‫ࢢ࠶ޘ؍‬ ਸ䄆䄨⡸⮠਼ሮ➗㺘, in Son Bun kenkyū, no. 1 (1996): 8–12; and Hazama Naoki ⤝䯃 ⴤ⁩, “Shina hozen bunkatsu gōron” wo meguru jakkan no mondai “᭟䛓‫ࢢ࠶ޘ؍‬ਸ䄆” ȧȖǥȠ㤕ᒢȃ୿乼, in Son Bun to kakyō ᆛ᮷ǽ㨟‫܁‬, ed. Nihon Son Bun kenkyūkai ᰕᵜᆛ᮷⹄ウՊ and Kōbe kakyō kajin kenkyūkai ⾎ᡨ㨟‫܁‬㨟Ӫ⹄ウՊ (Tōkyō: Kyūko shoin, 1999), 67–80. A Japanese translation by Kondō Kuniyasu can be found in Genten Chūgoku kindai shisōshi (vol. 3): 379–90. 121  The society was closely associated with Sun, as it published in July 1900 his Map on the Current Situation of China (Zhina xianshi ditu ᭟䛓⨮ऒൠെ), and in January 1902 Liang Qichao became a member. The society published in its gazette the Japanese translation of Liang’s text On the Source of China’s Weakness (Zhongguo jiruo suyuanlun ѝ഻ぽᕡ ⓟⓀ䄆), which had originally appeared in the Qingyibao (nos. 77–84) in 1901. In 1896 the society also published a Japanese translation of Alfred Mahan’s work The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, under the title On the History of Naval Power (Kaijō kenryoku shiron ⎧к⁙࣋ਢ䄆). 122  Initiated by some Old China hands, the primary aim of the society was to provide information: “Although we have people who are familiar with things from the faraway West, there are none with a thorough knowledge of conditions in the various Asian countries nearby” (Harrell, Sowing the Seeds of Change, 21). The provision of new knowledge aimed at encouraging Japanese trade and settlement in China. The new organization enjoyed soon extensive support from all social circles. By summer 1891 membership was around three hundred, and on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War almost one thousand. Among its members were liberal and conservative politicians, journalists, adventure-seekers, and entrepreneurs, such as the politicians Ōkuma Shigenobu and Konoe Atsumaro, the journalist Kuga Katsunan 䲨㗟ই, the Liberal Party radical Ōi Kentarō བྷӅ២ཚ䛾 (1843–1922), and Arao Sei 㦂ቮ␵ (1859–1896, the well-known promoter of expanded Sino-Japanese

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among Westerners who were convinced that due to the population size of the Chinese and their diligent character, a rise was expected in the future, and in a world characterized by competition and social Darwinism, the downfall of the European civilization was predictable: one day, China would become as powerful as the empire of Genghis Khan once was. To prevent such a development, the powers favored a partition of China, which eventually led to the scramble for concessions in the 1890s. On the contrary, those defending the idea of maintaining the territorial integrity hold that China is the oldest civilization in world, possessing a huge potential of talented men and a splendid moral. To preserve world peace, it would be in the interest of all powers to preserve the territorial integrity, Sun points out. Appealing to his Japanese readers, he states that Japan should consider this aim to be possible: if only the reform movement is continued, China’s doors are kept open, its natural resources are tapped and commercial activities intensifijied.123 If however China were divided among the European powers, Japan would certainly face an uncertain future because its small territory and dense population limited its chances of development, and Japan—being weak—would eventually share the same fate. To limit the greedy ambitions of the Europeans, he proposed an alliance between Japan and Russia. Territories in the east, namely, Ili, Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria would then be under Russian control, and Japan would obtain Korea, as well as the Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian.124

trade). Further important members were Shiga Shigetaka ᘇ䋰䟽ᰲ (1863–1927), Inoue Tetsujirō Ӆкଢ⅑䛾 (1856–1944), Komura Jutarō ሿᶁ༭ཚ䛾 (1855–1911, graduate of Harvard Law School and later foreign minister during the Russo-Japanese War), and Tōyama Mitsuru 九ኡ⒰ (1855–1944, the leader of Japan’s ultranationalist movement). For an overview on the association’s activities, cf. Kuzuu Yoshihisa, Tō-A senkaku shishi kiden ᶡӌ‫ݸ‬㿊ᘇ༛䁈Ս, vol. 1, 417–19. 123  For ensuring the Japanese support for his revolutionary movement, however, it is important to note that Sun’s refusal to openly demand a territorial integrity of China reflects his opposition to the current Manchu rule. Being a member of the anti-Manchu movement himself, his vision of a new China did not include the Manchus or the Han offfijicials in the service of the dynasty. He therefore makes clear that seen from the national situation of China, there is no reason for arguing in favor of maintaining the territorial integrity in total and inheriting the territory of the empire. After the downfall of the Qing, his position changed, though. 124  In the same way as Sun, Liang Qichao concurred to the idea of preserving territorial integrity, declaring the Open Door Policy of the United States a great and glorious policy. Cf. “On today’s good international treatment of China (Lun jinri geguo dai Zhongguo zhi shanfa 䄆Ӻᰕ਴഻ᖵѝ഻ѻழ⌅),” in Qingyibao, nos. 53 and 55, August 5, 1900. Cf. also Yinbingshi wenji, 807–809.

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Sun’s proposal at fijirst sight seems to contradict his aim of territorial integrity, but his text was published by an organization that had by then already embraced pan-Asianist ideas. As earlier research has shown,125 the rhetoric of Japanese pan-Asianism emphasized that its primary aim was to protect East Asian nations. Thus, it is also not surprising that in the years after the downfall of the Qing empire, a number of Japanese thinkers were busy warning against an imminent partition, such as the journalist and later politician Date Genichirō Ժ䚄Ⓚа䛾 (1874–1961), who justifijied Japanese intervention in his work The New China (Shin Shina ᯠ᭟䛓, 1914) for similar reasons. In the same year, the lawyer and politician Imai Yoshiyuki ӺӅహᒨ (1878–1951) wrote in his book The Rivalry of the Foreign Powers in China (Shina ni okeru rekkyō no kyōsō ᭟䛓ȀᯬǦȠࡇᕧȃㄦҹ, 1914)126 that because of the lack of patriotism, corruption, and a weak military spirit among the Chinese partition was inevitable. In his conclusion, Imai declared that Japan was an influential factor in the question if China was going to be partitioned or kept its integrity. One of the most widely discussed publications in China at that time that focused on the issue of partition was written by the sinologist Nakajima Tan ѝጦㄟ (1859–1930). He shared some of the arguments Ōkuma presented in 1898, but in his highly controversial book, Partition, the Fate of China (Shina bunkatsu no unmei ᭟䛓࠶ࢢȃ䙻ભ, published in October 1912), he went one step further and introduced the notion of space as an alternative way of organizing international relations in East Asia.127 His book was soon translated into Chinese by the Beiyang Society of Law and Political Science128 under the title

125  Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931–1945; Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism; and Brij Tankha, Okakura Tenshin and Pan-Asianism (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2009). 126  Imai was invited by the Chinese government to teach at the Beiyang College of Law and Political Science and was befriended by Yoshino Sakuzō ਹ䟾֌䙐 (1878–1933), the father of Japanese Taishō democracy. His book On International Law in China (Shina kokusaihō ron ᭟䛓ഭ䳋⌅䄆) was translated as Zhonghua guojifa and discussed by Li Dazhao. As a professor of law, Imai reminded his students in this book that the most important task is to remove extraterritorial jurisdiction—only then can unequal treaties be abolished. Cf. Zhonghua guojifa yixu ѝ㨟഻䳋⌅䆟᭽, April 1915, in Li Dazhao quanji (vol. 1). 127  A kanyaku version followed in January 1913, published under the name Kotani Yasutarō ሿ䉧‫؍‬ཚ䛾. In contrast to the quick circulation of this book in China, the Japanese reaction was quite low. This was due to the fact that Nakajima was no accepted scholar (characterizing himself as a rural scholar) and that his writing style in elegant kanbun was at that time no longer popular among the Japanese elite. Further, the quality of his book was not very high: being written in just six weeks, it contains many flaws and contradictions that were not corrected before printing. 128  Beiyang fazheng xuehui े⌻⌅᭯ᆨᴳ, founded in 1912 in Tianjin.

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A Refutation of Partition, the Fate of China (Zhina fenge zhi mingyun boyi ᭟䛓࠶ࢢѻ䙻ભ俱䆠), appearing on the Chinese book market just two months after the original.129 The Japanese Major General Utsunomiya Tarō ᆷ䜭ᇞཚ䛾 (1861–1922) wrote shortly afterward in a report to war minister Uehara Yūsaku к৏ࣷ֌ (1856–1933)130 that the publication of the book had met fijierce resistance on the side of Chinese students residing in Japan, who not only bought dozens of copies of the book but also sent them to Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai, among others.131 In the end, the efffect of the book was to speed up of the North–South peace negotiations after the Xinhai Revolution, i.e. after Sun had recognized that the danger for the country was somewhere else. In fact, in the annex to the Chinese version, the translators argued that despite the fact that China and Japan shared the same culture, were geographically close to each other and had long and intensive historical relations, the Japanese foreign policy cannot be trusted, as the neighboring country was involved in the partitioning. In their analysis, the translators even went so far as to claim that the partition was not on the political agenda of England, Germany, America, and France: only Japan and Russia could be considered an enemy of China.132 Nakajima presents in his book a highly negative judgement of Yuan Shikai, who since his time as the Chinese representative in Korea was deemed a deceitful small man (㘫㾶䂀ⅪȃሿӪ) and did not possess the qualities of great men such as Napoleon Bonaparte, Oliver Cromwell, or George Washington. The same judgment is applied to Sun Yat-sen, whom Nakajima also despised because after calling for a republican revolution around the world for the last two decades, he had compromised with Yuan. Thereby, the old autocratic system was reestablished instead of being abolished. In the fourth chapter, Nakajima explains that the ability of Yuan and Sun—as well as of the Chinese 129  The translation was organized under the auspices of Li Dazhao while he was enrolled at the Beiyang College of Law and Political Science. This school was modeled on modern Japanese education methods. Li studied here for six years (1907–1913)—political economy, Japanese, and English—before leaving for Japan in 1913 and enrolling at Waseda University in Tōkyō. 130  The son of a samurai of the Kagoshima Clan graduated from the military academy in 1879 and went to France to study in 1881. After serving in the Russo-Japanese War as a stafff offfijicer in the Fourth Army, Uehara became war minister in the second Saionji cabinet in 1912. 131  Gotō Nobuko ᖼ㰔ᔦᆀ, Nakajima Tan “Shina bunkatsu no unmei” to sono shūhen: Ajiashugisha no sentaku ѝጦㄟǍ᭟䛓࠶ࢢȃ䙻ભǎǽDzȃઘ䗪: ȪɀȪѫ㗙㘵 ȃ䚨ᣎ (2 parts), in Jinbun kagaku ronshū—Ningen jōhō gakka hen (Shinshū daigaku), no. 39 (2005): 180. 132  Cf. ibid., 185.

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people—to maintain a republican political system is greatly overestimated. This is because the social system (politics, law, morals, religion, and customs) was so corrupt that a refreshing change, in the form of a revolution, was not probable. Influenced by its political tradition of the last two thousand years, he writes, the Chinese people were rather inclined to favor the autocratic system. The true reason for the Chinese not being able to found and maintain a republic, according to Nakajima, was the fact that their literacy was remarkably low, as was the dissemination of knowledge. Thus, even if Sun advocated liberty and equality, such a system would be difffijicult to install. As a result, the Chinese would knuckle down to interventions of foreign powers, which, sooner or later, led to partition. In the last chapter of the fijirst part of the book, Nakajima provides three distinct reasons why he believed that a partition is inevitable. First, the imperial powers were currently engaging in obtaining parts of China for their own needs. Examples are the Russian support for the independence of Outer Mongolia, the British intrusion into Tibet, and of course the French invasion of the province Yunnan in South China. If Tibet and Mongolia should one day become separated from Chinese territory, the Japanese sphere of influence in China would be menaced, and therefore, an intervention, he warned, was imperative. In other words, Japan should participate in the partition. Second, although the Western powers had agreed on territorial integrity, he doubted the efffectiveness of such policy, claiming that it certainly did not serve Chinese interests but was aimed at providing advantages for each of the powers. The Western powers’ interests certainly possessed a greater signifijicance than the well-being of China. Third, he added, there were two kinds of partition, namely, a visible and an invisible one, an observation that greatly resembles the one made by Liang Qichao in 1899.133 The prediction of a partition caused Nakajima to develop possible scenarios for Japan. At fijirst sight, it would seem wise for his country to engage in the partition, instead of watching the Western powers taking control over China. A Japanese engagement, he envisioned, should have at its core the Monroe Doctrine: just as America was thought to be the America of the Americans, Asia should be the Asia of the Asians. Such a conclusion, which in itself is a new geopolitical order, resulted from the common view that the yellow race—sharing race, culture, language, and other characteristics—should 133  As shown in the introduction of this book Liang diffferentiated between physical and nonphysical partition (ᴹᖒѻ⬌࠶ˈ❑ᖒѻ⬌࠶), with the latter being more dangerous because the people are less aware of it. For Liang’s analysis see Guafen weiyan ⬌࠶ড 䀰, in Qingyibao, nos. 15, 16, 17, 23 (May–August 1899) (here taken from Yinbingshi wenji, 872–86).

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unite in the fijight against the white race and form a strong alliance (kōshu rentairon 哴ぞ䙓ᑟ䄆). The Asian Monroe Doctrine seemed to offfer here a practical solution to Nakajima, who feared that if China should be under foreign control, then Japan would be the next target of the white race. It was thus vital to preserve the territorial integrity of China by means of the doctrine. It goes without saying that the Chinese translation of Nakajima’s work saw this line of arguments critical and pointed out that the Asian Monroe Doctrine would be nothing less than the Japanese efffort to claim China for itself. Why else would the author have forgotten to mention the Japanese activities in China when describing foreign aggression?134 The suspicion was soon proved true when Japan submitted the Twenty-One Demands. For Nakajima, the intervention on the continent was—due to his country’s success in modernization—a natural duty. With the European powers engaged in World War I, it was now the opportunity to transfer East Asia into a shared sphere under Japanese leadership and thereby close the space to further Western aggression and colonization. The pan-Asian discourse, however, was not aiming at a simple spatial reconfijiguration by redefijining physical boundaries on geographical maps. It was also to a further extent considered to be an alternative to the radical nationalism that since its arrival in the late nineteenth century had created polities based on ontological diffferences defijining who or what territory was part of the national collective. Pan-Asianism was here an efffort of coming to terms with this radicalism, as it promised to establish a new (yet highly idealized) order devoid of war and conflict by resolving enmity between nations and creating harmony. To do so, it was, fijirst and foremost, necessary to defijine the real enemy. For pan-Asian thinkers, this enemy could only be found outside East Asia.

134  In regard to Great Britain, the Chinese version of Nakajima’s work negates the territorial ambitions of Britain as predicted by Nakajima, arguing that the power aimed instead at economic opportunities, not territorial expansion.

Chapter 5

Fighting the White Peril: Japan’s Turn to Spatiality In America, as in Australia there is a violent prejudice against John Chinaman. He pilfers, we are told; he lies, he is dirty, he smokes opium, is full of bestial vices—a pagan, and—what is more important—yellow! —Sir Charles Dilke, 18701

∵ 5.1

The White Peril: Placing the Outside Enemy

In 1906 the nationalist thinker Wang Jingwei ⊚㋮㺋 (1883–1944) refuted the Japanese fear that the anti-Manchu revolution—the main cause of Sun Yatsen’s Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui ਼ⴏᴳ)—would lead to a partition of China.2 During the heyday of the Han-nationalist movement, both foreign and Chinese thinkers generally assumed that a racial revolution would cause chaos and unrest in China, giving rise to intervention from outside and thus resulting in the inevitable partition. Wang denied the causality of such “partitionism” (guafenzhuyi ⬌࠶ѫ㗙). For him, the true danger was the incapable and weak Qing government.3 He reassured his readers in a contribution to the People’s Journal (Minbao ≁๡) that even if it were toppled, the agreements 1  Charles Dilke, Greater Britain (London: Macmillan, 1870), 190. 2  The article titled “A Rebuttal of the Thought That Revolution Can Lead to Partition (Bo geming keyi zhao guafen shuo 俱䶙ભਟԕਜ⬌࠶䃚)” appeared in Minbao, no. 6 (July 1906). In Republican China Wang became a leading politician of the Kuomintang, fijirst leaning toward its left wing, yet after failing effforts to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party he developed a strong anti-communist attitude and decided to collaborate with the Japanese occupiers in the 1940s when being president of the Republic (1940–1944), a decision for which he was later judged a national traitor. 3  Wang argues that the events of the last decades have proven this clearly: under the regime of emperor Daoguang 䚃‫( ݹ‬reign 1821–1850), China lost the First Opium War; under Xianfeng ૨䊀 (reign 1850–1861), the Second Opium War (1856–1860), which resulted in the destruction of the Imperial Summer Palaces by the Anglo-French forces; and under the current emperor Guangxu ‫ݹ‬㐂 (reign 1875–1908), China experienced both the defeat in the SinoJapanese War (1894) and the occupation of its capital in the course of suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1900). ©

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and treaties with the foreign powers remained valid because according to the principles of international law rights and duties agreed on in treaties were independent of governmental changes. Anyone arguing diffferently was simply ignorant of international law. If now the revolution of the anti-Manchurian movement succeeded, it would surely lead to a more pronounced modernization and strengthening of China. This again might cause a downfall of the West (or at least limit its opportunities), but this is not necessarily a disadvantage for the European countries, he is convinced. Sun Yat-sen had developed similar arguments in a piece he published 1904 in English titled “The True Solution of Chinese Question: An Appeal to the People of the United States.” In this article, he tried to convince the Americans that the problems in the Far East were a vital concern for the commerce of the United States, especially when it became a direct neighbor of China after its annexation of the Philippines. He reminded the Americans that his country enjoyed a huge population and abundant natural resources, both providing the necessary conditions for a future development, but only if partition was prevented. That some foreigners tried to impede the development of China was in his view purely the result of the yellow peril narrative that became popular after Japan had defeated China ten years prior. The Europeans realized that their supremacy in Asia, and soon in the whole world, was in danger. Within only thirty years, a country once despised and considered insignifijicant on the global scale had developed a modern army, able to defeat an empire such as China. This more than convincing proof of Japanese vitality basically initialized the rise of the yellow peril scare.4

4  There is an abundance of literature on the yellow peril that shall not be repeated in detail. For a general introduction, cf. Heinz Gollwitzer, Die Gelbe Gefahr: Geschichte eines Schlagwortes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962); Thompson, The Yellow Peril 1890–1924; Masako Hayashi, “Geistesgeschichtliche Beziehungen Japan—Deutschland: Eine Auswertung der Zeitschrift Taiyō,” Japanstudien: Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts fur Japanstudien der PhilippFranz-von-Siebold-Stiftung, no. 8 (1996): 31–52. For a more recent assessment, see Yamamuro Shin’ichi ኡᇔؑа, Shisō kadai toshite no Ajia—kijiku, rensa, tōki ᙍᜣ䃢乼ǽǬǻȃȪ ɀȪ: ส䔨ί䙓䧆ίᣅԱ (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2001), 54–77; and Yang Ruisong ὺ⪎ ᶮ, “  ‘Thou Have Yellow Peril as an Omen, Thou Have the Racial Power’: ‘Yellow Peril’ and the Imaged Community of the Modern Chinese Nation ⡮ᴹ哳⾽ѻ‫ˈݶݸ‬⡮ᴹぞ᯿ѻ ऒ濘˖“哳⾽”㠷䘁ԓѝ഻഻᯿‫਼ޡ‬億ᜣ‫ۿ‬,” Zhengzhi daxue lishi xuebao, no. 26 (2006): 65–108. The classical text on the yellow peril at the beginning of the twentieth century is Hermann von Samson-Himmelstjerna, Die Gelbe Gefahr als Moralproblem (Berlin: Deutscher Kolonial-Verlag, 1902). For the Japanese reaction to the European propaganda of yellow peril, cf. Sven Saaler, Kiro ni tatsu Nihon gaikō—Dai ichiji sekai taisen ni okeru jinshū tōsōron to Doitsu tōzenron ዀ䐟Ȁ・ǹᰕᵜཆӔDŽㅜа⅑ц⭼བྷᡖȀǟǦȠNjӪぞ䰈ҹ䄆njǽ Nj⦘䙨ᶡ╨䄆nj, Kan-Nihonkai kenkyū, no. 8 (2002): 1–20; Saaler, Pan-Asianism in Modern

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There were only few voices in early twentieth century who thought otherwise. The American diplomat and Old China hand Paul Reinsch (1869–1923) dismissed the peril as illusionary, arguing that “no more fantastic idea has ever played a part in serious politics than that of the military Yellow Peril,” explaining that “we need not consider the natural barrier erected against such an invasion, nor the fact that in the methods of modern warfare the defensive is relatively far stronger than the attack; but there is in present Oriental conditions and ideas not a vestige that can justly be used as a basis for alarmist prophecies. Neither China, India, nor Japan has ever engaged in offfensive war of conquest; even the last great war was practically forced upon Japan by the Russian advance . . . There is no irrepressible conflict between Oriental and Western civilization.”5 Such an attitude, which not only perpetuated the pacifijist bias but also saw the responsibility for peace and war on the side of the Western powers, was among Western thinkers truly rare in the fijirst decade of the twentieth century. Reinsch’s coeval John Otway Percy Bland, who, in 1912, criticized the peril as an invention by yellow journalists, objected to the common fear that a future China would menace world peace: the only thing to fear was the relentless endurance and industriousness of its people. Despite these cautious warnings, the dogma of the yellow peril—no matter if conceived as a military, racial, cultural, or economic peril—had an unprecedented political efffect that in turn was constitutive for a recalibration of international relations with and within East Asia.6 The British historian Charles Pearson (1830–1894), based on his reading of Benjamin Kidd (1858–1916), argued by pointing out that because of his own personal experiences, he was convinced of the white man’s inability to live permanently in the tropics and simultaneously keep the qualities that made his race superior.7 Considering that the colored people Japanese History; Saaler, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Emergence of the Notion of the ‘Clash of Races’ in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05, vol. II: The Nichinan Papers, ed. John W.M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba (Folkestone/Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 274–89. For a Chinese overview on the history of the yellow peril, cf. Lü Pu ੲ⎖, ed., Huanghuolun lishi ziliao xuanjiNj哴⾨䇪njশਢ䍴ᯉ䘹䗁 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1979). A very instructive graphical analysis of the peril can be found in Sepp Linhart, “Dainty Japanese” or Yellow Peril? Western War-Postcards 1900– 1945 (Wien: Lit Verlag, 2005); and Lorraine Dong and Philip P. Choy, The Coming Man: 19th Century American Perceptions of the Chinese (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995). 5  Paul Samuel Reinsch, The Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East (Boston: Houghton Miffflin, 1911), 34–35. 6  In 1894 trade unions and businessmen in Europe and the United States feared that the rise of Asia might lead to a replacement of workers, diminish their trade opportunities, and, fijinally, endanger their living standards (Gollwitzer, Die Gelbe Gefahr, 25–28). 7  Benjamin Kidd, The Control of the Tropics (New York: Macmillan, 1898).

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could out multiply the white race, it was more than probable to Pearson that the development of his civilization had come to an end and was in danger to be replaced by the civilization of the yellow race. His distinct biogeographical determinism made him considerably pessimistic with regard to the future of the white race.8 This view was shared by Hermann Brunnhofer (1841–1916), a historian who made the yellow peril idea a global phenomenon. According to him, the SinoJapanese War was a signifijicant turning point, resulting in the rise of a new world power, namely, a pan-Asian movement under Japanese leadership. At the time, Brunnhofer published a newspaper article titled “Ein ostasiatischer Dreierbund—Die buddhistische Weltpropaganda” (“An East Asian Tripartite Alliance: The Buddhist World Propaganda”). In it, he warned that Japan could conclude a formal alliance with Korea and China to establish a new hegemony that would stretch as far as Southeast Asia.9 Observing the geopolitical changes in East Asia after the Tripartite Intervention in April 1895, the German kaiser Wilhelm II (1859–1941) ordered a painting from the court painter Hermann

8  For Thompson, Pearson was “among the earliest of the articulate yellow perilists of this period” (Thompson, The Yellow Peril 1890–1924, 21). Thompson’s work covers mainly the American yellow peril discourse from 1890 to 1924. 9  According to Brunnhofer, Buddhism could possibly turn out to be a helpful tool to instigate the Asian people in times of war. For him, the Theosophical Society of Henry Steel Olcott and H.P. Blavatskij in Madras was the center of the Buddhist world mission. Just one year earlier, in 1893, the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago had already shown the worldwide ambitions of Buddhism: “Der Buddhismus ist also im Begrifffe, eine politische Weltmacht zu werden. Wenn es aber Japan gelingt, die Länder des Buddhismus zu einem religionspolitischen Bunde zu vereinigen, so drohen der europäisch-christlichen Welt Gefahren, von denen sie sich bis jetzt nicht hat träumen lassen. Denn die Folge eines Zusammenschlusses der buddhistischen Staaten zu gemeinsamer religionspolitischer Aktion wäre der Zusammenbruch der christlich-europäischen Mission in Ostasien, einer Institution, die, wie sattsam bekannt, in China, Japan und Hinterindien zu allen Zeiten nur mit Hilfe der europäischen Wafffengewalt aufrechterhalten werden konnte. Es ist aber gar nicht ausgeschlossen, daß der ostasiatische Dreibund verlange, die abendländische Welt müsse, wenn sie Missionäre des Christentums in buddhistische Länder schicken wolle, ihrerseits Gegenrecht halten und Sendboten des Buddhismus im Bereiche des Christentums zulassen” (quoted from Gollwitzer, Die Gelbe Gefahr, 108; cf. also H. Brunnhofer, Rußlands Hand über Asien. Historisch-geographische Essays zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des russischen Reichsgedankens [St. Petersburg: Typographie der Typ-Actien-Gesellschaft, 1897], 24–29). Brunnhofer forecasts the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which as a concept was created and promulgated during the Shōwa era (1926–1989) as an efffort of Japanese government and military to create a self-sufffijicient block of Asian nations led by the Japanese and free of Western powers. It was, however, not based on Buddhism or “racial instincts.”

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Figure 8

“Völker Europas, wahrt Eure heiligsten Güter,” painted by Herman Knackfuss, 1895.10

Knackfuß (1848–1915), which was based on a sketch from Wilhelm himself.11 The painting depicts Archangel Michael, the patron of the German people, showing the European nations that the danger—the Chinese Buddha—looms large in the East. The highly allegorical commentary placed under the picture “European Nations! Protect your dearest goods!” clearly reflects his intentions. Wilhelm II sent this picture fijirst instance his cousin, Tsar Nicholas II, thereby telling his cousin that he thought of Russia as being assigned the task to defend Europe from the attack of the Asian hordes. Also published in various journals and newspapers, the picture had a considerable impact on public opinion,12 even 10  11 

12 

Herman Knackfuss. Völker Europas, wahrt Eure heiligsten Güter. 1895. New York Public Library, New York City. Harper’s Weekly, vol. 42, no. 2144 (January 22, 1898), p. 76. The editors of the journal Living Age stated in an editorial on January 8, 1898, that the kaiser—who was the fijirst one to use the expression “Gelbe Gefahr” in offfijicial statements— had been inspired by Charles Pearson’s National Life and Character, dating from 1893. Pearson’s work was again a reaction to the Frontier Thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932). Wilhelm II also sent a copy to Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) and U.S. president William McKinley (1843–1901). For its appearance in newspapers and journals, see, for example, “The Far Eastern Situation from a German Standpoint,” Review of Reviews, no. 13 (January

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outside Europe and North America. In June 1895, the People’s Newspaper (Kokumin shinbun ഭ≁ᯠ㚎) in Japan informed its readers that the rise of the yellow race frightened the European people,13 and in January 1896, the Knackfuß painting became known in Japan when the newspaper presented a rough sketch to its readers.14 In the eyes of the Japanese, the slogan of the yellow peril was surely not meant to include only the Chinese, but also referred to their country.15 Among the white race, it was a common fear that a modernized Japan, if allied to the populous China, could resist European colonial control and—in a further step—might even strike back, such as the Huns had done before.16 A fijirst impression of what might happen in such a case occurred in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion. When it was quelled down by the EightNation Alliance the response did not wait for long. Shortly after the sacking of Peking in 1900, the magazine Qingyibao brought a translation of short piece taken from a Japanese newspaper that described the barbarian brutality of the Alliance.17 It was obvious to the author that the slogan of “Yellow Peril” just served one purpose, namely, the annihilation of the yellow race. The white race of the European powers had already joined forces to do so, and it would be wise to establish an alliance of the yellow race as a kind of countermeasure.18 This observation was also shared by the Dutch political cartoonist Johan Coenraad Brakensiek (1858–1940), who, in June 1900, published a caricature in a Dutch weekly journal called De Amsterdammer that turned the symbolism of the aforementioned Knackfuß painting upside down.

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15  16  17  18 

1896): 3–4; Arthur J. Brown, New Forces in Old China: An Unwelcome but Inevitable Awakening (New York: F.H. Revell Company, 1904), 318–19; “The Emperor William’s Cartoon: Nations of Europe! Join in Defense of Your Faith and Your Home!” Review of Reviews, no. 13 (January 1896): frontispiece. Cf. Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period, 45. For an illustrative example, see the discussion in Kodera Kenkichi ሿሪ䅉ਹ, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆 (Tōkyō: Hōbunkan, 1916), 391–456. This was comparatively quick, as Zachmann has shown: the Russian tsar received his copy in September 1895 and Bismarck at Christmas 1895 (Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period, 46). One decade later, the discrimination of the Japanese in the United States (commencing in 1905) strengthened this view. Saaler, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Emergence of the Notion of the ‘Clash of Races’ in Japanese Foreign Policy.” The article however forgets to mention that Japan provided the largest contingent of soldiers in the Eight-Nation Alliance. The European Powers and Humanity (Ouzhou lieguo yu rendao ↀ⍢ࡇ഻㠷Ӫ䚃), in Qingyibao, no. 59 (1900).

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Figure 9

Confucius: “Volkeren van Azie, verdedigt uwe heilige goederen!”, 1900.19

Published weeks before Wilhelm’s infamous Hun speech delivered to German troops who were departing for China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion, Brakensiek’s picture depicts Confucius as the leader of the Asian people who are assembled in the name of the dragon to fijight against the foreign gunboats approaching Asia from the ocean. That Brakensiek considers the white peril to be more problematic than the yellow peril is more than obvious. Although unknown in East Asia, this caricature reflects how the European reaction to the Boxer Rebellion caused the emergence of a new global enemy conception, namely, the white peril. It was shared in both Europe and East Asia as shows the translation of an excerpt from a text of Sir Robert Hart (1835–1911)20 done by Liang Qichao in his 1901 article “On a New Method of Annihilating

19 

20 

This caricature can be found in the collection by John Grand-Carteret, Chinois d’Europe et chinois d’Asie: documents illustrés pour servir à l’histoire des chinoiseries de la politique européenne de 1842 à 1900 (Paris: Librairie illustrée Montgredien, 1900), 34. See also http:// gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k63508640/f46.image (last access September 1, 2014). This image is according to the webpage of the Bibliothèque nationale de France in a public domain. Copyright for this image has been acquired. Inspector general of China’s Imperial Maritime Custom Service (IMCS) from 1863 to 1911.

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a Country” (Mieguo xinfa lun ⓵഻ᯠ⌅䄆).21 In the following years, various journals carried similar articles on the white peril, with the Diplomatic Review (Waijiaobao ཆӔ๡) focusing on the Anglo-Saxon peril and the Alarming Bell Daily ( Jingzhong Ribao 䆖䩈ᰕ๡) on the Russian peril.22 In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the American missionary Sidney Lewis Gulick (1860–1945) even published a monograph on this topic. The introduction reads “For the fijirst time in history has an Asiatic people successfully faced a white foe. The Russo-Japanese war marks an era, therefore, in the history of the Far East, and of the world, for now begins a readjustment of the balance of power among the nations, a readjustment which promises to halt the territorial expansion of the white races and to check their racial pride.”23 The referral to the issue of race in this quotation—certainly very common at the time of writing due to the extremely popularity of social Darwinist conception of race by both Chinese and Japanese thinkers24—is symptomatic in the creation of a world order based on new assessments of friend and foe. Gulick observes the aggressive expansion of European imperialism to the Far East since the Opium Wars was soon to reach its climax, “for are not the nations of Europe defijinitely planning the division of China among themselves?”25 In the end, the cause of the current war is the white peril, Gulick points out.26 It is thus also no wonder that the Boxer uprising happened in China, for the Chinese were simply fijighting against all the public bads imported by the foreigners. The yellow peril is just a reaction to the white aggression, with the latter being the true scapegoat: 21 

22 

23 

24  25  26 

Liang Qichao quanji (vol. 1): 472–73. Liang quotes from Robert Hart, These from the Land of Sinim: Essays on the Chinese Question (London: Chapman & Hall, 1901), 48–54. In his essays, Hart expresses his understanding of the Chinese radical position toward European aggression, describing it as a natural reaction to the yellow peril narrative. On the Anglo-Saxon Peril (Lun Yinggelusaxun huo 䄆㤡Ṭ冟᫂䚌⾽), in Waijiaobao, no. 83 (1904): 659–60; On the White Peril (Lun baihuo 䄆ⲭ⾽), in Jingzhong Ribao (May 5, 1904); The Russian Peril (E huo ‫)⾽״‬, in Jingzhong Ribao (May 2, 1904). Sidney Lewis Gulick, White Peril in the Far East: An Interpretation of the Signifijicance of the Russo-Japanese War (London: F.H. Revell Company, 1905), 5. Despite the positive assessment here at fijirst sight, Gulick preserves his sense of racial superiority, pointing further out that while “emphasis is laid on the peril to the Far East of the white man’s ambitions and methods,” it is also obvious that “justice to white races . . . demands recognition also of the blessings they confer upon those lands. In a real sense the white peril is becoming the white blessing of the Orient” (6). See here James Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). Ibid., 165. The white peril is yet not limited to politics or military but also pertains to the commercial and industrial fijields. Cf. Gulick, White Peril in the Far East, 166–67.

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Is there then no yellow peril? Yes, assuredly, but not such as diplomats fear or magazines describe. The yellow peril is a correlate to the white peril. Let the present trend of things go on unchecked; let the partition of China take place; let the white man seize the reins of authority in all the principal posts in China; let him develop railroads, banks, mines and factories; let him take the proceeds of his enterprises to his native lands; let him carry on all these enterprises with the selfijish zeal, and insolent manner now common to the white man in the East, disdaining the coolie, compelling him by brute force to do his will, regarding him as a tool, a beast, disregarding his interests and his rights as a man; then will arise a yellow peril indeed.27 For the white race there is just one solution, namely, to abandon its sense of racial superiority, its right to rule the world, and its intention to subordinate and exploit the colored people. It was obvious to Gulick and his contemporaries that such hopes were too naïve, and the outbreak of a direct conflict between both races was to be expected. In a special issue in 1908, the widely read Japanese magazine The Sun (Taiyō ཚ䲭) issued a warning that a clash might result from the intensifying racial competition between the races. The issue, bearing the title “The Clash of the Yellow and the White Man” (Kōhakujin no shōtotsu 哴ⲭӪȃ㺍ケ), was published anonymously and contained a reprint of the famous Knackfuß painting. Its aim was, as the authors stated directly, to raise the consciousness about the problem of the white peril. The magazine introduced in this issue also the idea of a harmonization of the Western and Eastern civilization (Tōzai bunmei chōwaron ᶡ㾯᮷᰾䃯઼䄆), an idea propagated by the Japanese statesman Ōkuma Shigenobu བྷ➺䟽ؑ (1838–1922) in later years. However, the authors of the Taiyō considered such a harmonization impossible to achieve because of fundamental diffferences in the character of both races. In other words, “if the European nations (sho-kokumin) with their white-centred self-conceit challenge the Orient or aim at replacing Asian civilization with European civilization, then the clash of the two will eventually not be avoidable anymore.”28 The same fear is a phenomenon ubiquitous in journals and newspapers in the fijirst decade of the twentieth century, such as in 27  28 

Gulick, White Peril in the Far East, 167–68. Taiyō, 1908, 192; translation taken from Saaler, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Emergence of the Notion of the ‘Clash of Races’ in Japanese Foreign Policy,” 280. There were, however, also voices in Japan negating the existence of a yellow peril, declaring it an “evil propaganda” of the West. Cf. Torsten Weber, “Unter dem Banner des Asianismus: Transnationale Dimensionen des japanischen Asianismus-Diskurses der

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the 1907 book The Coming War between the Yellow and White Peril (Kōka hakkō mirai no taisen 哴⾽ⲭ⾽ᵚᶕѻབྷᡖ), written by Chiba Shūho ॳ㩹⿰⎖ and Tanaka Karō ⭠ѝ㣡⎚, and in various issues of the Waseda Academic Journal (Waseda gakuhō), for instance.29 In 1913 the publisher of the prestigious journal Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi), Zhang Xichen ㄐ䥛⩋ (1889–1969) presented a Chinese translation of a Japanese article titled “A History of the White Peril” (Baihuoshi ⲭ⾽ਢ). It picked up the topic of the white peril and warned its readers that the Asian nations were under great pressure. Current examples were the treatment of Chinese and Japanese in California, the aggressive spatial expansion of the United States in the Americas and the Pacifijic region, and, fijinally, the discriminating treatment of peoples in Australia, India, and Africa. The conclusion for the Asian people would be to unite to build an alliance against the white peril and to reclaim Asia for the Asians.30 In the same year, Nagai Ryūtarō ≨Ӆḣ ཚ䛾 (1881–1944), the pan-Asian thinker and follower of Ōkuma Shigenobu, published an English piece titled The White Peril (1913), in which he expresses his disappointment with the so-called civilized nations that were continuing their expansionist policies by occupying and appropriating the lands of the noncivilized nations in the name of progress and self-defense. Observing the imperialist aggression of Christian nations—Nagai himself was once heavily influenced by the humanitarian message of Christianity—his former conviction that all men are of equal moral worth was utterly shattered, because the English and later the Americans did not honor these ideals, which they originally had propagated. In contrast to many others who cautioned against the white peril, Nagai’s criticism had its origin in his commitment to the value of human equality rather than in racial resentments. He was not a lonely voice in an environment that steadfastly referred to the white peril when prophesizing the downfall of the Japanese nation.

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Taishō-Zeit (1912–1926),” Comparativ—Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung (Asianismen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert) 18, no. 6 (2008): 42, 46–49. To name a few, there are articles by Kubo Tenzui ѵ‫؍‬ཙ䲻, “The Prediction of a Yellow Peril (Kōka no yosoku 哴⾽ȃҸ⑜),” in Waseda gakuhō, no. 79 (January 25, 1903): 12–22; Mori Rintarō ἞᷇ཚ䛾, “An Outline of the Yellow Peril Discussion (Kōkaron kōgai 哴⾽䄆ệᾲ),” Waseda gakuhō, no. 101 (1904): 7–12; no. 102 (1904): 1–7; no. 104 (1904): 1–8; Demetrius C. Boulger, “The Illness of the Yellow Peril (Kōkabyō 哴⾽⯵),” Waseda gakuhō, no. 99 (1904): 31–46. The contribution by Mori Rintarō provides a detailed overview on the discussion of the yellow peril in Europe, beginning with Samson-Himmelstjerna and his book Die Gelbe Gefahr als Moralproblem. Zhang Xichen ㄐ䥛⩋, “The History of the White Peril (Baihuoshi ⲭ⾽ਢ),” Dongfang zazhi 3, no. 10 (1913): 13–23.

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The possibility of a racial clash was also the concern of the Japanese military. In October 1911, Major General Utsunomiya Tarō wrote in his diary that ⲭӪऒ࣋ȃᶡ╨Ȅ↢ǽ‫ޡ‬Ȁ⳺džᙕȀǃц⭼‫ޘ‬䶒ぽⲮѝȃ‫ॱޛ‬ӄȄᰒȀަ༏ ᯝȀᑠǬǃNjɪɵɋȻnjǃNjɐɲɥɲnjȃёൠӖሶǪȀᣈȡǻަᦼ㼑Ȁ‫ޕ‬ ȞȨǽǬǹϒǗȡǨǽȄǃ⨮Ȁ੮Ӫ⵬ࡽȃһᇏȀǬǻǃⲭӪӌ䶎࡙࣐ǃⲭ Ӫӌ㊣࡙࣐㤕ǤȄⲭӪ☐ᐎㅹǿȠᖬㅹȃ⨶ᜣȄᴰᰙ↶ǽ⨮ᇏȀ䘁ǠǤǃⲭ Ӫц⭼ǿȠᖬㅹᴰ㍲ȃ⨶ᜣǪǝӖሶǪȀᇏ䳋୿乼ȃㇴഢȀ‫ޕ‬ȞȨǽǮȠDŽ

The territory ruled by the white man (hakujin) is expanding to the East faster and faster year by year. The white man already rules 85 per cent of earth, and due to the colonization of Morocco and Tripolis, this percentage will increase even further. This fact is right before our eyes and cannot be overlooked. The white man is very close to its ideal of a white man’s Africa, a white man’s America, and a white man’s Australia. Today, even the possibility of a white man’s world must be considered as real.31 As a solution, Utsunomiya advocated a closer relationship between China and Japan or, alternatively—if cooperation failed—a Japanese domination of China.32 As Saaler shows, Utsunomiya was not an isolated thinker but part of the right-wing pan-Asian movement that aimed for the establishment of a Japan-led Asia, while preserving the territorial integrity of China. During the World War I, as a result of Japan’s negative experience with European 31 

32 

Utsunomiya Tarō ᆷ䜭ᇞཚ䛾, Nihon rikugun to Ajia seisaku—Rikugun taishō Utsunomiya Tarō nikki ᰕᵜ䲨䓽ǽȪɀȪ᭯ㆆ: 䲨䓽བྷሶᆷ䜭ᇞཚ䛾ᰕ䁈, 3 vols., ed. Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai ᆷ䜭ᇞཚ䛾䯒‫ײ‬䋷ᯉ⹄ウՊ (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2007), 1: 483–84; translation taken from Saaler, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Emergence of the Notion of the ‘Clash of Races’ in Japanese Foreign Policy,” 280–81. The Japanese scholar Ōyama Ikuo (1880–1955), a well-known left-liberal politician and professor at Waseda University, contradicts the widespread belief that the Asianism is a reaction to the white peril. According to him, the war of races is a wrong assumption, and if some Japanese are now propagating their plan to oust the whites and recover Asia for the Asians under Japanese leadership, their project is nothing more than falling into the trap the white races had constructed with their propaganda of the yellow peril. Ōyama cautions against the ideology of Asianism because Japan had already achieved so much during the course of its modernization that an engagement in Asian afffairs would do more harm than good. Cf. Ōyama Ikuo བྷኡ䛱ཛ, Dai ajiashugi no unmei ikan བྷȪɀȪ ѫ㗙ȃ䙻ભྲօ, in Shin Nihon 6, no. 3 (March 1916): 18–30 (the Shin Nihon [New Japan] was a journal edited by Nagai Ryūtarō). A translation of this text by Zhang Xichen ㄐ䥛 ⩋ appeared under the title Da Yaxiyazhuyi zhi yunming བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙ѻ䙻ભ in the journal Dongfang zazhi 13, no. 5 (May 1916): 16–19.

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modernity, it was pan-Asianism that aimed at replacing the global order based on the nation-state by a spatial order under Japanese hegemony. The motivation—and intrinsic justifijication—to do so was the conviction that Japan had achieved a sufffijicient degree of modernization that, from its own view, should no longer be restricted to the islands or its colonies. For the romantic vision of pan-Asianism, this new order was characterized by a high degree of solidarity that was thought to transcend narrow national interests even after Japan’s expansionist turn to the continent.

5.2

Japan’s Attitude toward its Asian Neighbors until 1894 Japan presents a rare and interesting example of the passage of a state from the oriental to the European class. By virtue of treaties already concluded with the leading Christian states of Europe and America she will shortly be freed from the institution of consular jurisdiction, and in her recent war with China she displayed both the disposition and in the main the ability to observe western rules concerning war and neutrality. —John Westlake

… A law-abiding spirit, especially in war, has been from ancient times, as history shows, a characteristic of Japan. Thirty years have elapsed since this characteristic, combined with eagerness to introduce European civilization, induced Japan to issue very stringent and systematic military laws, instructions and acts. More recently she, for similar reasons, became a party to international conventions and declarations with the most benevolent intentions. —Takahashi Sakue33

∵ The genesis of modern thinking in Japan inherited, according to the fijindings of Maruyama Masao, the powerful legacy of rationalism and humanism left 33 

The fijirst quote is taken from the preface to Takahashi, Cases on International Law During the Chino-Japanese War, written by John Westlake; the second is from Takahashi himself (xvi; 1).

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behind by neo-Confucian thought. According to its rationalism, the world is intelligible and the way (dao/dō 䚃) is something accessible for human beings. Neo-Confucian humanism claimed that it was able to produce a balance at the heart of the individual, the family, the realm, and the cosmos, as most pronouncedly put forward in the Confucian classic, the Great Learning (Daxue). The responsibility for sustaining this balance is a profoundly human one.34 At one time, the optimism of the philosophical world model of Zhu Xi ᵡ⟩ (1130–1200) was able to contribute to the stability of society. At the end of the Tokugawa period, however, when the black ships of Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Uraga Bay in 1853, forcing the Tokugawa shogunate to sign unequal treaties and to open the country to the outside world (kaikoku 䮻ഭ), the optimism lost its persuasive power. With Western civilization entering Japan, fundamental questions emerged among scholars and offfijicials. Could or should the human desire be eliminated, and was the rational principle called li/ri ⨶ still powerful enough to govern all things? In other words, would a cultivation of personal life and regulation of the family ipso facto result in a well-ordered state and peace in the world, or not? The questioning of the NeoConfucian mode of thought led in the consequence to its dissolution,35 which was quicker and more profound than in the case of China, where this occurred only a half century later. In the Meiji period, negotiating with the West turned out to be a difffijicult task. It led to various proposals among thinkers of how and to what degree they should accept Western civilization, with some eventually adopting foreign military technology to preserve Japanese spirituality (Tōyō dōtoku, Seiyō geijutsu ᶡ ⌻䚃ᗣǃ㾯⌻㣨㺃). Yet, this did not solve the problem of how to deal with the West in such way that the long-proven conception of world order was not questioned beyond its existence. When the tairō of the shogunate, Ii Naosuke ӅԺ ⴤᕬ (1815–1860), signed in June 1858 a trade treaty with the United States (the Harris Treaty) without having obtained the approval of the Tennō as stipulated by law, he was heavily criticized by Yoshida Shōin ਹ⭠ᶮ䲠 (1830–1859), the son of a samurai in the last days of the Tokugawa shogunate and an educator and activist actively supporting the Meiji Restoration.36 Yoshida considered

34  35  36 

Maruyama Masao, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), esp. 19–69. Ibid. After travels throughout Japan to study and his failed attempt to get aboard the ship of Commodore Perry, Yoshida was confijined to his native fijief, where he founded a private school and taught the Chinese classics, especially the idealism of Mencius, who asserted the inherent worth of the individual and the opposition to arbitrary authority. Among his pupils were Itō Hirobumi Ժ㰔ঊ᮷ (1841–1909), the founder of the Japanese

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the act of Ii to be disrespectful, and as consequence joined the sonnō jōi movement ሺ⦻ᭈཧ (“revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians”), thereby trying to maintain the old order. His proposal for a strong foreign policy, however, was no longer just defensive. A proper defense of Japan also required territorial/ spatial expansion, as he argued, “to protect the country well is not merely to prevent it from losing the position it holds, but to add to it the positions which it does not hold.” This meant expansion in its proper sense: “taking advantage of favorable opportunities, we will seize Manchuria, thus coming face to face with Russia; regaining Korea, we will keep watch on China; taking the islands to the South, we will advance on India.”37 Building on his distinction between the civilized and the barbarian (ka-i no ben 㨟ཧȃᔱ) Yoshida developed a strong antiforeignism that helped to substantiate his call for the protection of Japanese spiritual and ethical values from foreign aggression. For this juxtaposition of Japan and the Western world, Yoshida has been called one of the founders of nationalist thinking in Japan,38 and it is obvious why. He arrived at creating a national consciousness that was defijined by the introduction of ontological diffferences that delineated Japan from foreign countries. In fact, Yoshida’s contribution to the intellectual transformation of Japan as a particular and superior country was part and parcel of a fundamental repositioning on a global scale. Harry Harootunian has observed in this context the irony of history that when Japan opened itself to the outer world after three hundred years of isolation, its reverence for China and its civilizational achievements faded, which, among Tokugawa thinkers, referred to a China removed from any historicity.39 The renunciation of China as the ideal civilization— that the Tokugawa intellectuals still had preached—was the precondition for

37  38  39 

constitution; Kido Kōin ᵘᡨᆍ‫( ݱ‬1833–77), the key fijigure in the dismantling of feudalism; and Yamagata Aritomo ኡ㑓ᴹᴻ (1838–1922), the founder of the modern Japanese army. Yoshida was executed in 1859, after his plan to assassinate the shogun’s emissary to the imperial court was detected. The emissary was sent to the court by Ii Naosuke for securing the emperor’s approval for a treaty with the United States, which the Kōmei Tennō (1831–1867) did not grant. On the role of Yoshida Shōin, cf. H. Van Straelen, Yoshida Shōin, Forerunner of the Meiji Restauration: A Biographical Study (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952); David M. Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 82–105, 161–92. On the influence of Yoshida Shōin on China, cf. Guo Lianyou 䜝䘎 ৻, Jitian Songyin yu jindai Zhongguo ਹ⭠ᶮ䱤о䘁ԓѝഭ (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2007). Quoted in Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan, 173–74. Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan. Harry Harootunian, “The Functions of China in Tokugawa Thought,” in The Chinese and the Japanese—Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 9–36.

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Japan’s turn to Europe: both Yoshida and his mentor, the scholar, politician and expert for Dutch Learning (rangaku 㱝ᆨ) Sakuma Shōzan րѵ䯃䊑ኡ (1811–1864), emphasized the need to master Western military technology and to establish maritime defense.40 The repositioning of Japan found its clearest expression in the thinking of Fukuzawa Yukichi ⾿⋒䄝ਹ (1835–1901), who denounced Chinese culture and preferred a Westernization that was unprecedented in any Asian country to that time. Fukuzawa, the paramount leader of modernization in Meiji Japan, regarded the immobile and backward Qing empire as an example of how not to behave not in a global society characterized by social Darwinism and fijierce competition among the nations. In his major works Encouragement of Learning (Gakumon no susume ᆖ୿ȃǮϒȖ, 1872–1876) and An Outline of a Theory of Civilization (Bunmeiron no gairyaku ᮷ ᰾䄆ѻᾲ⮗, 1875) he developed a compelling narrative of civilization according to which the standard of civilization depended on the equal distribution of wealth. However, because he could not fully agree with the historian Henry Thomas Buckle—the essence of civilization being for him founded in the qualities of mind and spirit (seishin ㋮⾎) and allowing refijinement and development—Fukuzawa was able to create a teleology that explains why Japan—the Confucian country—had fallen behind in comparison to the European nationstates. For him, Japan had to renounce the Chinese spirit and traditional moral before being able to become a nation on a par with the West. According to Mizoguchi Yūzō (2004), Fukuzawa’s narrative structured the later self-perception of Japan and its perception of other nations during the entire twentieth century. With its victory against Qing China (1894–1895) and Russia (1904–1905), Japan had proved that its modernization policies since the inauguration of the Meiji Tennō seemed overly successful, eventually confijirming a sense of superiority that pushed Japan to export its model to both neighboring countries and Southeast Asia. Factual history proved later that China and Korea had to pay a high price for accepting the Japanese role model, because its transfer met considerable obstacles and led to the intervention of the Japanese Imperial Army, resulting in occupation and terror outside Japan. Mizoguchi considers Fukuzawa responsible for this moral justifijication of intervention in China and Korea, because it was most prominently formulated in his infamous text An Argument for Leaving Asia (Datsu-A ron 㝡ӌ䄆).41 In this short but influential article he complains that 40  41 

See Sakuma’s book Eight Policies for the Defense of the Sea (Kaibō hassaku ⎧䱢‫ޛ‬ㆆ), published in 1842. Dating from March 16, 1885. For an English translation, cf. Fukuzawa Yukichi, “An Argument for Leaving Asia,” in Japan: A Documentary History, vol. II, The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present, ed. David J. Lu (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 351–53.

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China despises modern (i.e., European) civilization, limiting the education of their people to Confucianism and disregarding scientifijic principles. As a result, their attitudes morally collapse, which eventually leads to the downfall of China.42 Japan, on the contrary, was successful in surviving the social Darwinist struggle for existence ( jakuniku kyōshoku ᕡ㚹ᕧ伏).43 The urge to become strong and rich surpassed all other needs because even international law was not able to protect weaker nations, Fukuzawa argued. The failure of the Iwakura Mission ዙ‫֯ع‬ㇰഓ (1871–1873) to achieve treaty revisions for instance, as a condition for the country’s development, national security and independence based on the recognized principles of international law, proved that this approach was more than questionable. While visiting Berlin, the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck had advised the mission on March 15, 1873 that it would be better not to rely on international law for protection but, rather, to enforce the installment of a strong army. In 1878, Fukuzawa enforced this idea by pointing out in his piece Popular Theory of the State’s Rights (Tsūzoku kokkenron 䙊؇ഭ⁙䄆) that ㎀ተӺɖ⿭⦓ц⭼ɓࠖȿɎDŽDŽDŽ䃎ɓӁȷǃ䚃ҼɌǃ⇪ Ɂɐ⇪ȽɳϒɖɧɐDŽDŽDŽ઼㿚ᶑ㌴ɐӁȬзഭ‫⌅ޜ‬ɐӁ Ȭǃ⭊Ɉ㖾ɒɳȴྲȷɒɴɑɪǃୟཆ䶒ɖܰᔿ਽ⴞɖɧɓ ȿɎǃӔ䳋ɖᇏɗ⁙ေɺҹɚ࡙⳺ɺ䋚ɳɓ䙾ȵɂDŽDŽDŽ Ⲯᐫɖзഭ‫⌅ޜ‬ɗᮠ䮰ɖབྷ⹢ɓ㤕ȳɂǃᒮ޺ɖ઼㿚ᶑ㌴ɗаㆀɖᕮ㯜ɓ㤕 ȳɂDŽDŽDŽ਴ഭӔ䳋ɖ䚃ҼɌǃ⓵ɤɁɐ⓵ɤȽɳɳɖɧɐӁȬɎਟɒɲDŽ

in the end, in our brutal world today there are . . . to put it plainly just two ways, namely to kill or to be killed. . . . “Treaties of Friendship and Commerce” and the “Law of Nations” are very beautiful phrases indeed, but they are merely polite way of talking. The true principles of foreign intercourse are nothing more than to fijight for power and to forage for profijit. . . . One hundred volumes of books on international law do not equal several big cannons, and multiple amity treaties do not equal a

42 

43 

For a newer discussion of Fukuzawa’s An Argument for Leaving Asia, see Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Blowing Up a Double Portrait in Black and White: The Concept of Asia in the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Okakura Tenshin,” Positions 15, no. 2 (2007): 345–68; and Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period. For a discussion on the consequences of Fukuzawa’s text for international relations in Asia, cf. Sun Ge, “The Discussion of Asia and Our Predicament,” trans. Viren Murthy, Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 3, no. 1 (2003): 31–44. “Deciding our Course of Action Abroad (Taigai no shintai ሮཆɖ䙢䘰),” in Jiji shinpō (November 28, 1897), in Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū (vol. 16), 163.

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container of gun powder, . . . In the intercourse of nations, there are two ways, namely to annihilate or to be annihilated.44 According to this logic, a nation that fails to modernize and strengthen is despicable and needs to face the consequences of being annihilated. This kind of thinking was the reason why Fukuzawa called his fellow countrymen to leave Asia behind. In this context, China became a symbol of stagnancy, underdevelopment, and barbarianism, or simply Japan’s Orient. In contrast, Japan turned out to be progressive and civilized, or just modern.45 During the 1880s, this view gained much ground among intellectuals of the Meiji period. In one of the bestsellers on political philosophy at that time, A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government (Sansuijin keirin mondō й䞄Ӫ ㍼㏨୿ㆄ, 1887) written by the liberal thinker Nakae Chōmin ѝ⊏‫( ≁ݶ‬1847– 1901), three drunkards as representatives of the opposing modes of thought of the time discuss the role of European values and the issue of militarization in a world characterized by social Darwinism. The book puts forward the key question of how Japan can assume a role as a propagator of nationalism in Asia without following European nationalism.46 In his work, Nakae—the “Rousseau of the East” (a moniker he earned because of his translation of Du contrat social in 1882)—describes a meeting of the host Master Nankai (Nankai sensei ই⎧ ‫)⭏ݸ‬, the Gentleman of Western Learning (Yōgaku shinshi ⌻ᆖ㍣༛), and the Champion of the East (Tōyō gōketsu ᶡ⌻䊚‫)ہ‬. The idealist Gentleman— dressing in the European style and advocating the political values of post1789 France, considers democracy as the fundamental precondition for world peace. The other two drunkards share the view that the Gentleman’s ideas were scholarly but impractical, and his interlocutor Champion—a nationalist 44 

45 

46 

Fukuzawa Yukichi ⾿⋒䄝ਹ, Tsūzoku kokkenron 䙊؇ഭ⁙䄆 (Tōkyō: Keiō gijuku shuppansha, 1878), 95–97; partial translation provided by John Peter Stern, The Japanese Interpretation of the “Law of Nations,” 1854–1874 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 136. Mizoguchi, in his book The Chinese Impact (Chūgoku no shōgeki ѝഭȃ㺍᪳), points out that due to Fukuzawa’s editorial, Japan had through the whole twentieth century appeared more modern and progressive than China, a view that is shared by many Japanese as well as Chinese. Yet, leaving the realm of Chinese civilization and entering the civilization of Western Europe does not simply mean to move from point A to point B but to move from an underdeveloped civilization to a developed one. It clearly involves a judgment on superiority and inferiority, a view strongly criticized by Mizoguchi. Cf. also Tanaka, Japan’s Orient. For a biography of Nakae, cf. the introduction in Nakae Chōmin, A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government, trans. Nobuko Tsukui (Boston: Weatherhill, 1984).

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thinker fijirst considering the fate of Japan as an independent nation—reasons in the second part of the discourse that it is brute force ruling the evolutionary process (democracy thus being a false promise), and that international law is unreliable for the protection of small (i.e., weak) nations. Champion further reasons that if one intends to remove tradition—as a kind of cancer—and save the country with military power, than this is opposed to the proposal of Gentleman who wishes to adopt democracy and abolish the armed forces. The removal is, however, not just limited to Japan but also extends to the continent. A Japanese intervention was thus, in the pan-Asian sense, desirable. In quite a similar way, the member of the Liberal Party and later speaker of the House of Representatives, Sugita Teiichi ᵹ⭠ᇊа (1851–1929), had warned in 1884, one year before An Argument for Leaving Asia was published, against too much attachment to Europe.47 In his article The Policy for Making Asia Rise (Kō-A saku 㠸ӎㆆ) he warns that 哴㢢Ӫぞɗˈሷɓⲭ㢢Ӫぞɓ૜ɧⴑȽɴɻɐɁDŽ ཉɓ㚎ȷˈᖬɗ㠚⭡ɺᝋ ȿˈᒣㅹɗྭɨɐˈӺަ㠚⭡ɺᝋȿˈᒣㅹɺྭɨɖ᡻ɺԕɎˈতɎԆӪɖ 㠚⭡ɺ⇪ȶˈᒣㅹɺࢍȸɐɗˈᣁɪօɖᗳɆɬDŽ‫ٷ‬Ԕˈᖬɗ㠚⭡ɖ‫؍‬䆧㘵 ɺԕɎˈ㠚ɱ䂷ちɁɳɪˈ੮䕙ɗሗɵ㠚⭡ɖ⹤༎㘵ɐ䂅ɃȾɳɺᗇɂDŽѻ ɓ৽ȿˈᡁȴӎ㍠ӎɖ䄨䛖ɇɳˈଷ喂⴨‫׍‬ɲ䕹䓺⴨᧕Ɂɳɖ㿰Ȫɳɓɪ‫ײ‬ ɗɱɂˈ‫ػ‬dž࠶䴒ˈ⮠ฏ㩜䟼ɖᙍɺ⛪ȿˈ∛ɪ਼ぞ⴨ៀȿ਼঴⴨ᮁɝɖᘥ ɒȷˈতɎᖬɖ䆾ᮥɇɳˈↀ⍢䄨഻ɖ൷ऒ࣋ɓ‫ي‬Ɏˈ㓄ȳɓަɖ⇈ை佈㜸 ɺ‫؍‬Ɍɺᗇɳɗˈ䉸ɓ‫قۮ‬ɖ⭊ȿȵɪɖɒɱɂɬDŽDŽDŽ੮䕙਼ᘇ❑լɒɲɐ 䴆ɪˈཉɓ㙺ϒȳᰕᵜɖ≁℺ɺѫᕥɁDŽᱟɰɲᴤɓа↕ɺ䙢ɩɎཙൠɖ‫ޜ‬ 䚃ɓสȵˈ㠚⭡ɖ₴ɺӎ㍠ӎɓ伋ɘȿˈӎ㍠ӎ‫ޘ‬⍢ˈгܴ㩜≁ᮨˈॳⲮᒤ ԕֶခ᚟ঁቸɖ䘧དྷɺ᭚⹤ȿˈⲭ㢢Ӫぞȴˈ‫߼מ‬㭁ធɖ㗎䗡ɺ⍇䴚ȿˈ㠚 ⭡䮻᰾ɖᯠҮඔɺ䮻䰒ɃɂɻɘȪɳօɱɂDŽ

The yellow race is about to be devoured by the white. We used to be told that the white race loves freedom and values equality. It is very curious that they then proceed to subvert freedom and deprive others of equality. The may boast that they are the guardians of liberty, but I am more inclined to conclude that they are actually its destroyers. While the countries of Asia are inseparably bound to a common destiny, our thoughts are thousands of miles apart; we lack mutual empathy as members of a common race, and any spirit of mutual aid, despite the fact that we face 47 

For a biography of Sugita, cf. Fuse Teiichirō ᐳᯭ䋎а䛾, A Biography of Sugita Teiichi (Sugita Teiichi kun den ᵹ⭠ᇊаੋՍ) (Tōkyō: Sakura shinbunsha, 1903); and the entry in Kuzuu Yoshihisa, Tō-A senkaku shishi kiden ᶡӌ‫ݸ‬㿊ᘇ༛䁈Ս, 3: 753–54.

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the same difffijiculties. Under such circumstances, it is only by virtue of the balance of power among our enemies, the European nations, that we Asians are able to maintain a semblance of life. How can we allow ourselves to fall into such a convoluted state? . . . While we are far from wise, my colleagues and I have been calling for recognition of Japanese civil rights. Now we must go even further, and appeal for freedom throughout Asia under the banner of universal justice, dispelling the illusions that have caused the seven hundred million people of Asia to temporize and act with servility for hundreds of years. We must cast offf the shame of past insults at the hands of the white race, and take steps to usher in a new age of freedom and enlightenment.48 It is obvious that the humiliation of the yellow race by the aggression of the white race is unheard, as he had already noted in his 1880 piece On the Restoration of Asia (Tōyō kaifukuron ᶡ⌻എᗙ䄆).49 Sugita, himself a member of the civil rights movement in Meiji Japan, was convinced that the liberation of the Asian people from autocracy is only possible if Japan fulfijilled its responsibility to help both China and Korea; after all, the countries of Asia are inseparably bound to a common destiny, and mutual aid and assistance is the solution to the current situation. Sugita’s vision of Asianism as presented in The Policy for Making Asia Rise is based on the insight that only a close alliance can provide for the necessary strengthening of Asia. When the Sino-French War of 1884–1885 broke out, Sugita set out for Shanghai, where he set up the Oriental Academy (Tōyō gakkan ᶡ⌻ᆖ佘).50 Before going to China, he envisioned a Sino-Japanese alliance that would have been able to provide the Asian countries with sufffijicient resources and power to resist the pressure of the encroaching European imperialism. His hopes, however, were deceived after his fijirst travel to China in 1884. Returning to Japan, he wrote in his Impressions of Travel in China (Yūshin yokan 䙺␵佈ᝏ) that the Western powers were 48 

49 

50 

Translation taken from Bunsō Hashikawa, “Japanese Perspectives on Asia,” in The Chinese and the Japanese—Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 331–32; Japanese original in Saiga Hakuai 䴌䋰ঊᝋ, Sugita Kakuzan-ō ᵹ⭠厹ኡ㗱 (Tōkyō: Kakuzankai, 1928), 543–44. Sugita Teiichi ᵹ⭠ᇊа, The New Theory of Statecraft (Keisei shinron) ㍼цᯠ䄆 (Fukuiken: Namiyori mura, 1880), 11–14. This book, in which the piece On the Restoration of Asia appeared, influenced the Chinese reformers Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Huang Zunxian (1848–1905). The Oriental Academy—the predecessor of the later Institute for Sino-Japanese Trade (Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūjo ᰕ␵䋯᱃⹄ウᡰ)—was established in order to educate talents for the modernization of China.

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competing fijiercely to ensure their national interests each, and he wondered when Japan would become the next victim. Instead, Japan would be wise to participate in this struggle rather than sitting aside and watching.51 Sugita’s critical stance towards the West was considerably strengthened by the experience of World War I, making him in later years an ardent supporter of pan-Asian thinking.52 At this time, he was particularly troubled by the racial discrimination against Japanese immigrants to the United States, Australia, and Canada. In 1919 he became one of the leaders and a guest speaker at the founding rally of the League to Abolish Racial Discrimination ( Jinshūteki sabetsu teppai dōmei daikai ӪぞⲴᐞࡕ᫔ᓳ਼ⴏབྷՊ).53 This league advocated the inclusion of the aforementioned nondiscrimination clause in the charter of the League of Nations and opposed the idea of Japan joining the League of Nations if the nondiscrimination clause was rejected. For him, the racial equality clause was indispensable if a league was to be successful. If the West should not grant it, Asian solidarity in the fijight against Western hegemony was for him the logical consequence. In 1924 Sugita’s vision culminated in his article “An Argument for Uniting Greater Asia” (Dai–Ajia gasshōron བྷӌ㍠ӌਸᗃ䄆) where he argued that “our Great Asia (waga Dai–Ajia) must by all means unite now against the excessive tyranny of the white people (hakujin), and begin to resist.”54 He points out that he had proposed a unity (gasshō) of Great Asia already forty years ago (in his Making Asia Rise). His enmity toward the white 51 

52 

53 

54 

Saiga, Sugita Kakuzan-ō ᵹ⭠厹ኡ㗱, 582f. Many pan-Asian societies shared this kind of thinking, aiming at creating and legitimizing Japanese hegemony in East Asia, which later resulted in the Japanese expansionism in the decades after 1915. In this context, the lieutenant Arao Sei (1859–1896), who came to China in 1886 on a spy mission for the army general stafff, played a key role in formulating these ideas, which were later taken up by the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tō-A dōbunkai), founded by Konoe Atsumaro. By this time, he had already become an influential and well-known politician, being a former member (1890–1911) and president of the Lower House of the Diet (1906–1908) and a member of the House of Peers since 1911. This rally was attended by a variety of pan-Asian organizations. For instance, Ōkawa Shūmei attended as a representative of the newly founded All Asian Society (Zen Ajiakai ‫ޘ‬ӌ㍠ӌՊ), and members of the Kokuryūkai and the Gen’yōsha were also present. The Kokuryūkai’s organ Ajia jiron covered the rally in great detail; cf. the various articles in Ajia jiron dating from March and April 1919. On the Japanese proposal of racial equality, see Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge, 1998). Published in the journal Oriental Culture (Tōyō bunka ᶡ⌻᮷ॆ). See Sugita Teiichi ᵹ⭠ᇊа, Dai–Ajia gasshōron བྷӌ㍠ӌਸᗃ䄆, in Tōyō bunka, no. 8 (1924): 7; translation taken from Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, vol. 1, 265 (translation by Saaler).

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race was motivated by an experience he had while traveling to Shanghai. When he wanted to enter a city park in Shanghai, he noticed a sign at the entrance, saying “No Chinese allowed.”55 For him, this was an alarming sign, urging the peoples of Great Asia to wake up and the countries of Great Asia to form a union (renmei 䙓ⴏ). To sum up, from his early writings in 1884, Sugita develops the vision of a global order characterized by the powerful symbol of race. He complains about racial discrimination Japanese and Asian people experience in Asia and abroad. He makes it overtly clear that this was unacceptable if Asia was to survive the imperialist aggression of the white race. By juxtaposing both races, he succeeds in creating a shared enemy. China, Japan, and Korea have the moral duty of resisting the aggression, an idea later taken up by Takeuchi Yoshimi ㄩ ޵ྭ (1910–1977) in his pleading for Asianism.56 However, as Japanese scholars—especially since the 1890s—did not have a proper understanding of the term Asia, a variety of Asianisms were coexisting, either complementing or even contradicting each other. I show that this was the major reason why both intellectuals and politicians—although using the same tongue—disagreed on how to deal with the prime Asian power that once had been the leading civilization but was now in clear decline. One way to defijine an adequate relationship to China was to declare Asia for the Asians (in the sense of the Monroe Doctrine), which should become the leading principle in the fijield of foreign politics.

55 

56 

This experiences reminds of a similar sign in Shanghai that interdicted park access for Chinese and dogs. As shown by Ishikawa Yoshihiro, this sign is actually a myth invented by Chinese nationalists trying to install a feeling of humiliation. Cf. Ishikawa Yoshihiro ⸣ᐍ⾾⎙, Huaren yu gou bude runei gaoshipai wentikaoNj㨟Ӫ㠷⤇нᗇ‫޵ޕ‬nj੺⽪ ⡼୿乼㘳, in Sixiang, zhengquan yu shehui liliang (lishizu) ᙍᜣǃ᭯℺㠷⽮ᴳ࣋䟿 (↧ਢ㍴), ed. Huang Kewu 哳‫( ↖ݻ‬Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2002), 137–56. For an introduction to Takeuchi, see Richard F. Calichman, Takeuchi Yoshimi: Displacing the West (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Christian Uhl, Wer war Takeuchi Yoshimis Lu Xun? Ein Annäherungsversuch an ein Monument der japanischen Sinologie (München: iudicium, 2003); and Matsumoto Kenichi ᶮᵜ‫ڕ‬а, ed., Takeuchi Yoshimi “Nihon no Ajiashugi” seidoku ㄩ޵ྭNjᰕᵜȃȪɀȪѫ㗙nj㋮䃝 (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2000). The standard volume on his Asianism is Takeuchi, Ajiashugi ȪɀȪѫ㗙.

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183

Pan-Asian Thinking and the Rise of the Asian Monroe Doctrine

The fijirst time that Japanese scholars were calling for an Asian Monroe Doctrine can be found in the Party Magazine of the Liberal Party, in which Morimoto Shun ἞ᵜ倯 (?–?) demanded its offfijicial announcement in 1894 (ᡁ䛖Ȅӌ㍠ӌȀᯬǙǻɪɻɵόѫ㗙ȃᇏ㹼ȧᇓ䀰ǮȎǬ).57 This move had been caused by recent developments in Korea, where the Qing army had just landed, thereby leading to questions about the sovereignty of the Hermit kingdom. Morimoto was of the opinion that Japan should answer the call for support issued by the Korean king and protect their sovereignty. Four years later support was extended to China. When Kang Youwei and his disciple Liang Qichao arrived in Japan after the coup d’état by powerful conservative opponents led by Empress Dowager Cixi in late 1898 as a reaction to the Hundred Days’ Reform movement, Konoe Atsumaro met Kang in Tōkyō, telling him that ᶡ⌻Ȅᶡ⌻ȃᶡ⌻ǿȟDŽᶡ⌻Ӫ⤜ȟᶡ⌻୿乼ȧ⊪ǮȠȃ⁙࡙ǿǠȠȎǠȞ ǯDŽ㊣ᐎɪɻɵόѫ㗙ǃ㫻Ǭ↔᜿ȀཆǿȞǯDŽᶡ⌻Ȁᯬǻӌ㍠ӌȃɪɻɵ όѫ㗙ȧᇏ㹼ǮȠȃ㗙उǃᇏȀǠϒȟǻ䋤ᡁё䛖Ӫȃ㛙ȀǗȟDŽ

Asia is the Asia of the Asians. Only the East Asians shall have the right to solve the problems in East Asia. The American Monroe Doctrine is here clearly no exception. The duty of implementing an Asian Monroe Doctrine in East Asia is in fact the task of our both countries.58 Konoe equated the Asian Monroe Doctrine clearly with its predecessor, the American Monroe Doctrine of 1823. His proposal of the Asian Monroe Doctrine is a reaction to the growing conflict he observes between the white and yellow race. In January of the same year, Konoe had published a text titled “On the Necessity of a Same-Race Alliance: Research on the China Question” (Dōjinshū dōmei, tsuke Shina mondai kenkyū no hitsuyō ਼Ӫぞ਼ⴏǃ䱴᭟䛓୿乼⹄ウȃ ᗵ㾱) in the magazine Taiyō, in which he cautioned against the Yellow Peril propaganda, arguing that the Tripartite Intervention would undoubtedly lead to a partition of China and, resulting from that, a clash between the white and 57 

58 

Party Magazine of the Liberal Party, No. 65, published on July 25, 1894. Here quoted after Furuya Tetsuo ਔቻଢཛ, Ajiashugi to sono shūhen ȪɀȪѫ㗙ǽDzȃઘ䗪, in Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki 䘁ԓᰕᵜȃȪɀȪ䂽䆈 (Kyōto: Kyōto daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 1994), 51. Konoe Atsumaro nikki, 2:195. On the meeting between Konoe and Kang, see Yamamoto Shigeki, Konoe Atsumaro, 107–109.

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the yellow race. For Asia, there would be no other solution than the creation of a deep solidarity among the Chinese and Japanese, and this was the message he communicated to Kang.59 It needs to be pointed here that Konoe’s famous declaration that “East Asia is the East Asia of East Asia” (ᶡ⌻Ȅᶡ⌻ȃᶡ⌻ǿȟ) was a result of the rising geopolitical consciousness in Japan caused by the 1898 Spanish-American War. These developments caused however no crisis in Japan because of its successful modernization in the past. Being less concerned with its territoriality at that time it is not surprising why in Japan the slogan “Japan is the Japan of the Japanese”—a tautological defijinition of territoriality—was largely absent. This notwithstanding, Konoe disavowed his original idea when founding the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tō-A Dōbunkai ᶡӌ਼᮷Պ) on November 2, 1898. As president of the new society, he declared, “Today, I no longer claim that, because our empire and China share a common culture and a common race (dōbun dōshu ਼᮷਼ぞ), our empire should volunteer to shoulder China’s fate by itself. I say that we should merely consider our own empire’s destiny, decide an appropriate policy with a sense of urgency, respond to the opportunities and watch the changes around us, act with swift determination and thereby secure the advantages of the moment.”60 In 1899, Kang’s disciple Liang Qichao—whose own vision of pan-Asianism was strongly influenced by his contacts to Ōkuma Shigenobu, Konoe Atsumaro, and Kashiwabara Buntarō ᷿৏᮷ཚ䛾 (1869–1936) (Ōkuma’s go-between to Liang)—published a piece on the advantages of learning Japanese, in which he pointed out that Japan and China were indeed brethren nations that need to help each other to preserve the independence of the yellow race. Sharing the solidarity spirit envisioned by Konoe in the fijirst place, he emphasized that the patriotic citizen of China should learn Japanese, and the patriotic Japanese should learn Chinese.61 Liang shared with his Japanese friends the conviction 59

60 

61 

For Konoe’s article in the journal Taiyō, cf. Aibara Shigeki ⴨৏㤲⁩, Konoe Atsumaro to Shina hozenron 䘁㺋㈔哯ǽ᭟䛓‫ޘ؍‬䄆, in Kindai Nihon no Ajiakan 䘁ԓᰕᵜȃȪ ɀȪ㿣, ed. Okamoto Kōji ዑᵜᒨ⋫ (Kyōto: Minerva, 1998), 51–78. In the end, his 1898 article is widely considered the manifesto of his pan-Asian ideology. Zachmann, in China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period, points out that the historical signifijicance of this text is rather overrated, as it gained attention due to its prominent authorship and less due to its content. Konoe Atsumaro, The Situation of the Empire and Modern Politicians (Teikoku no ichi to gendai no seijika ᑍഭȃսൠǽ⨮ԓȃ᭯⋫ᇦ), in Tō-A jiron, no. 1 (1898): 5–7, here taken from Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, vol. 1, 88–89 (translation by Zachmann). On the Advantages of Learning Japanese (Lun xue ribenwen zhi yi 䄆ᆨᰕᵜ᮷ѻ⳺), in Yinbingshi wenji, 3: 1372–73. Original published in Qingyibao, no. 10 (April 1, 1899).

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that the Western imperialism was the greatest danger to peace in East Asia and that a close alliance of all yellow nations was indispensable,62 even though he suspected that the Japanese ambitions to become the new regional power might have negative consequences for China (as implied in Konoe’s quote above). He could thus not fully support the idea of an Asian Monroe Doctrine given the suspicion that it might be a cover for Japan’s quest for hegemony. The problem was recognized by the historian Ukita Kazutami ⎞⭠઼≁ (1860– 1946) who, fearing a lack of support for Japan’s foreign policy, stated in 1901 that an Asian Monroe Doctrine might be difffijicult to establish. He instead proposed a distinct form of Japanese imperialism that might offfer a solution to the threatening and imminent war: ӺDzȡᰕᵜȄ㤡ഭȃǩǽǤᵜ䜘ǽἽ≁ൠǽȃ䯒‫ײ‬ȧ㏺ᇶǿȞǬȖȨǡǴȖ 㤡ഭ⍱ȃᑍഭѫ㗙ȧୡ䚃ǮȎǢȀ䶎ǯDŽ৸䵢ഭȃྲǤ⎧кȀケࠪǬ޵ഭȃ 䮻ⲪȧᡀቡǰȨǡ⛪Ȗ䵢ഭ⍱ȃᑍഭѫ㗙ȧࠪᕥǮȎǢȀ䶎ǯDŽ৸Ǵ㊣ഭȃ ྲǤ⅗⍢䄨ഭ㤕ǤȄӌ㊣࡙࣐བྷ䲨䄨ഭȀᒢ␹ǰǫȠԓȟȀ⅗㊣䄨ഭǡӌ㍠ ӌȃབྷ䲨Ȁᒢ␹ǮȠȧ䁡ǪǯǃᱟȃྲǢȄᱟȡᰕᵜȀሮǬǻᮥ᜿ȧⲪ㺘Ǯ Ƞ㘵ǽǮDŽཛȡӌ㍠ӌȄӌ㍠ӌӪȃӌ㍠ӌǿȟǽӁȊDŽᰕᵜ⍱ȃɪɻɵό ѫ㗙ȧᨀ䆠ǰȨǽǮȠȗᱲᵏᰒȀᖼȡǴȠȧླྀօǰȨDŽᰕᵜǡӺୡ䚃ǮȠ ǨǽȧᗇȎǢୟаȃᑍഭѫ㗙Ȅഭ䳋⌅кȃਸ᜿ȀสǢ⅗㊣䄨ഭȀੁǸǻॱ ࠶㠚ഭӪ≁ȃ⁙࡙ȧᤑᕥǬǃ৸Ǵӌ㍠ӌ䄨ഭȃ⤜・ȧᢦἽǰȨDŽ

[I]t is now not up to Japan to proclaim a British imperialism, which has close links between the homeland and its colonies. Nor should Japan propose a Russian imperialism which aims at naval supremacy and development of one’s own country, and Japan should also not—like America who do not let the Europeans intervene on the American continent—interdict the European nations to intervene on the Asian continent, because by doing so it would mean to evoke hostile intentions towards Japan. We have to say that Asia is the Asia of the Asians. Even if we declared a Japanese Monroe Doctrine, it would to our greatest regret be too late for that. The only imperialism Japan can currently proclaim is—based upon the consent of international law—to sufffijiciently expand the rights of its 62 

This view was heavily influenced by Liang’s reading of a bestseller by Shiba Shirō (1853– 1922), the political novel Strange Encounters with Beautiful Women (Kajin no kigu ֣Ӫ ѻཷ䙷) (1885–1897, incomplete). A Chinese translation appeared immediately after his arrival in Japan in the Qingyibao. On the origin and impact of this novel as well as for a biography of Shiba, cf. Atsuko Sakaki, “Kajin no Kigū: The Meiji Political Novel and the Boundaries of Literature,” Monumenta Nipponica 55, no. 1 (2000): 83–108.

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own people at the expense of America and Europe, and to nurture the independence of the Asian countries.63 Ukita’s imperialism is thus primarily a moral obligation. Although this sounded compelling for many Japanese in the political and military circles the vision of a shared Asian community soon met resistance on the side of Chinese, who had demasked the Asianism as another form of hegemony, such as in the case of Li Dazhao ᵾབྷ䠇 (1889–1927), who had been a student of Ukita in Japan from 1913 to 1916. In his writings before the end of World War I, Li navigated between the ideals of national self-determination and the call for an Asian federation or union that would be a fijirst step to socialist internationalism.64 He tried to solve the conundrum by diffferentiating between New Asianism (Xin Yaxiyazhuyi ᯠӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙) and Greater Asianism (Da Yaxiyazhuyi བྷӎ ㍠ӎѫ㗙). For him, Greater Asianism was synonymous with the annexation of China and the realization of a Greater Japanism that, although claiming to fend offf the Americans and Europeans, achieved nothing more than subjugating China and the rest of Asia to Japan, a critique Li had already leveled in 1917 in his article “Greater Asianism” (Da Yaxiyazhuyi) published in The Tiger Magazine (Jiayin zazhi ⭢ᇵ䴌䂼).65 However, even an Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine did not promise a solution because it merely disguised imperialist ambitions. In an early piece on the Monroe Doctrine in the Far East, Li criticized the Japanese ambitions to fijight against European imperialism. Whereas the original Monroe Doctrine was a legitimate reaction to the Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, Li explicitly warned against the application of this doctrine in Asia.66 As a consequence, he rejected any pan-ism movement, which he considered aimed at

63  64 

65 

66 

See Ukita Kazutami ⎞⭠઼≁, Imperialism and Education (Teikokushugi to kyōiku ᑍഭ ѫ㗙ǽᮉ㛢) (Tōkyō: Minyūsha, 1901), 35–36. During his stay in Japan, Li contributed various articles on political science and economics to The Tiger Magazine (Jiayin zazhi ⭢ᇵ䴌䂼) of Zhang Shizhao (1881–1973). His writings in the journal New Youth (Xin Qingnian) praised the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia as a victory for the common people and helped introduce Marxism to China. This was a direct reply to Wakamiya Unosuke’s 㤕ᇞটѻࣙ contribution in the journal Chūō kōron titled “What is Great Asianism?” (Dai Ajiashugi to wa nan zo ya བྷӌ㍠ӌѫ 㗙ǽȄօdzș, April 1917). Wakamiya Unosuke (1872–1938) was a journalist and critic. He was enrolled in German studies as a young man, later studying and living in the United States (1898–1907). Li Dazhao ᵾབྷ䠇, “The Monroe Doctrine of the Far East (Jidong Menluozhuyi ᾥᶡ‫ف‬㖵 ѫ㗙),” in Jiayin, February 21, 1917; here taken from Li Dazhao quanji, 1: 290–91.

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nothing more than brutal autocracy.67 Accordingly, Li concludes that Japanese Asianism was not about returning Asia back into the hands of the Asian people but turning Asia into the Asia of the Japanese. Greater Asianism was not a peaceful doctrine but an aggressive one; it was not a doctrine of national selfdetermination but an imperialist doctrine that inevitably destroyed the world. Instead of following Japanese thinkers such as Tokutomi Sohō (1863–1957) and Ukita Kazutami (1860–1946), who argued for an alliance between China and Japan while keeping the status quo, Asia should follow a doctrine of New Asianism and establish an Asian Union that had national liberation as its foundation and would later evolve into a World Union, the true source of happiness for humankind, Li argued.68 Trying to fijigure out which kind of new Asianism should suit China best, Li discussed in his pre-1919 writings the ideas of his former teacher at Waseda University in detail, taking up Ukita’s diffferent concepts of Asianism. According to Hashikawa Bunsō these concepts show that Japan actually developed two trends of pan-Asianism, the conception of a more homogenous union with Japan as its paramount leader (the New Asianism, shin ajiashugi ᯠӌ㍠ӌѫ㗙), and the solidarity-oriented, nondominating version of Japan’s role in reviving Asia (the Old Asianism, kyū ajiashugi ᰗӌ㍠ӌѫ 㗙).69 Ukita’s own Asianism—the Newest Asianism (shin shin ajiashugi ᯠᯠ ӌ㍠ӌѫ㗙)—, however, went even further when imagining a social-utopian Asianism simultaneously emerged that was understood as an intermediate step in the development to a global internationalism based on the true ideal of equality and national self-determination.70 As shown above, the Marxist Li Dazhao shared this vision of a peaceful Asianism, difffering from the more aggressive or interventionist counterpart.71 Yet, while the aggressive Asianism 67 

68 

69  70 

71 

Cf. his articles “The Failure of Pan . . . ism and the Victory of Democracy (Pan . . . ism zhi shibai yu Democracy zhi shengli, Pan . . . ism ѻཡᮇ㠷 Democracy ѻऍ࡙),” July 15, 1918, Taipingyang 1, no. 10 (July 15, 1918); and “The Victory of the People (Shumin de shengli ᓦ ≁Ⲵऍ࡙),” Xin Qingnian 5, no. 5 (November 15, 1915). For a more detailed analysis of the Japanese influence on Li, cf. Andō Hikotarō ᆹ㰔ᖖ ཚ䛾, Nihon ryūgaku jidai no Ri Daishō ᰕᵜ⮉ᆖᱲԓȃᵾབྷ䠇, in Shakai kagaku tōkyū 36, no. 2 (1990): 1–26. Hashikawa Bunsō ⁻ᐍ᮷й, Nihon rōmanha hihan josetsu ᰕᵜ⎚ᴬ⍮ᢩࡔᒿ䃜 (Tōkyō: Miraisha, 1965). See here Ukita Kazutami ⎞⭠઼≁, “Shin Ajiashugi—Tōyō Monrōshugi no shin kaishaku ᯠӌ㍠ӌѫ㗙―ᶡ⌻ɪɻɵόѫ㗙ȃᯠ䀓䟸,” in Taiyō, 24, no. 9 (September 1918): 2–17. Li’s diffferentiation between a Greater and New Asianism partly resembles Sun Yat-sen’s later discussion of the rule of might and the rule of right (badao 䵨䚃, wangdao ⦻䚃).

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was more prominent among Japanese politicians and the military, because it resonated better with their imperialist ambitions on the continent in the coming decades, the solidarity-oriented Asianism caused the majority of Japanese intellectuals criticize their country’s spatial ambitions in the decades before World War I. One of the fijirst Japanese intellectuals who discussed the Monroe Doctrine critically was Tokutomi Sohō, the editor of the influential newspaper Kokumin shinbun, whose vision of the Chinese fate was highly influential at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Geopolitical Thought of Tokutomi Sohō and the Fate of China Before World War I, the Japanese intellectual and journalist Tokutomi Sohō ᗣᇼ㰷ጠ (1863–1957) was a declared opponent of the Asian Monroe Doctrine.72 In his early years as a political thinker, Tokutomi shared the ideas of British liberalism and their dominant social theory of natural rights. His intensive reading of Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology in August 1884, however, let him cast aside his belief that constitutional representative government with an administration being just and impartial according to law was able to guarantee equal rights and opportunities for each citizen. In late 1885 Tokutomi worked out his new ideas in a book titled The Future Japan (Shōrai no Nihon

72 

Considering that Sun and Li had been in contact with each other since 1919 and that Sun’s writings on Asianism took on a more critical air precisely in April 1919, the influence of Li can be suspected (cf. Guan Wei ‫ޣ‬Տ, Lun Li Dazhao de Xin Yaxiyazhuyi—jian tan Sun Zhongshan Da Yazhouzhuyi zhi bianqian 䇪ᵾབྷ䪺Ⲵᯠӊ㓶ӊѫѹ—ެ䈸ᆉѝኡ བྷӊ⍢ѫѹѻਈ䗱, in Beifang luncong, no. 6 [2003]: 51–55; and Maruyama Matsuyuki Ѩኡᶮᒨ, Ajia—nashionarizumu no ichi genkei—Ri Daishō no Ajia ron ni tsuite Ȫɀ Ȫίɒȿɯɒɲɂɨȃа৏ර—ᵾབྷ䠇ȃȪɀȪ䄆ȀǹǙǻ, in Rekishi hyōron, no. 113 [1960]). For a similar discussion of diffferent kinds of Asianism, cf. also Takeuchi, Ajiashugi; and Takeuchi Yoshimi, Japan in Asien—Geschichtsdenken und Kulturkritik nach 1945, trans. and ed. Wolfgang Seifert and Christian Uhl (München: Iudicium, 2005). Stemming from a samurai-ranked family and having studied English at the Kumamoto Yōgakkō ➺ᵜ⌻ᆖṑ, Tokutomi established in 1887 the Minyūsha Publishing Company, which produced Japan’s fijirst general news magazine, The People’s Friend (Kokumin no tomo ഭ≁ѻ৻, 1887–1898). The Minyūsha also published a variety of political books, an English-language version of the Kokumin no tomo (The Far East, 1896–1898), and one of the most influential newspapers in early-twentieth-century Japan, the Kokumin shinbun ഭ≁ᯠ㚎 (1890–1929). For more details on the political life of Tokutomi, cf. the studies by John D. Pierson, Tokutomi Soho, 1863–1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Sinh Vinh, Tokutomi Soho (1863–1957): The Later Career (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1986); and the chapter in Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism.

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ሶᶕȃᰕᵜ), in which he proposed a laissez-faire economy because free trade

would create economic growth and thus bring about a peaceful world.73 The Future Japan begins with the proposition that the primary and most fundamental concern of every individual and society was survival. Imitating the analytical framework in Spencer’s Principles, Tokutomi holds that there were two major means for survival, namely, developing the military potential of the state and developing the productive forces in commerce and industry. While the military society was highly authoritarian and aristocratic (whereas the political and economic power was in the hands of few), a society focusing on the development of economy was democratic and peaceful. Tokutomi points out that it was now up to Japan to choose its type of society. Considering the fact that the military society had been predominant throughout history (the book contains one chapter describing the world as a world of violence, wanryoku sekai 㞅࣋ц⭼) and facing the growing expansion of the European imperialist states, it seemed at fijirst sight wise for Japan to develop in the same direction: “The present-day world is one in which the civilized peoples tyrannically destroy savage peoples . . . The European countries stand at the very pinnacle of violence and base themselves on the doctrine of force. India, alas, has been destroyed. Burma will be next. The remaining countries will be independent in name only. What is the outlook for Persia? For China? Korea? And even Japan? The future will be extremely critical. This, I feel, is unbearable.”74 Despite the rampant militarism of his time, Tokutomi was cautious not to advocate the development of great military strength for Japan. Referring again to Spencer, he states that by now, militarism had reached its pinnacle and was beginning to decline. According to his logic of historical progress, wealth was necessary to establish a militarily strong state. Only wealthy nations were able to sustain a large military establishment and to engage in modern warfare on a global scale. To obtain the necessary wealth, a society had to expand its economic production and commerce. The process of acquiring wealth, however, erodes the military’s standing in society gradually. This is because production and military are mutually incompatible: when one advances, the other has to

73 

74 

Tokutomi was influenced by Spencer’s theory of evolution, Mill’s utilitarianism, the principles of free trade, and of noninterventionism of Cobden’s and Bright’s Manchester school, as he noted in his autobiography (Tokutomi Iichirō ᗣᇼ⥚а䛾, Sohō jiden 㰷ጠ 㠚ۣ [Tōkyō: Chūō kōron, 1935], 209). Tokutomi Iichirō ᗣᇼ⥚а䛾, Shōrai no Nihon ሶᶕѻᰕᵜ (Tōkyō: Keizai zasshi sha, 1886), 22, 52–53; translation taken from Kōsaka Masaaki, Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era (Tōkyō: Pan-Pacifijic Press, 1958), 209.

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retreat.75 Such a conclusion was also valid on a global scale. The expansion of production and commerce necessitates a growing cooperation among the nations (as in the form of cooperative trade agreements), and the recent technological advances in travel (steamships, railroads) and communication (telegraphs, mail, and newspapers) were making both production and travel part of daily life. If commerce expanded and continuous progress was achieved, he asserts, it could strengthen democratic structures and thus contribute to the establishment of peace among the nations, he is convinced. In the long run, Tokutomi was unable to uphold his idealism because the harsh reality of international afffairs proved otherwise. In the spring of 1895, he traveled to the Liaodong Peninsula in China and inspected the territory Japan had recently gained from China according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In the beginning, he was full of hope that this territorial acquisition was the start for developing the continent. His belief in the gospel of world trade (bōeki sekai no fukuin 䋯᱃ц⭼ȃ⾿丣) lost its persuasion when he returned to Port Arthur (Lüshun) after traveling one week through the area and fijinding out that the Tripartite Intervention had forced Japan to return the newly annexed territory to China. Russia—with its own aims to establish a sphere of influence in China—had persuaded France and Germany to put diplomatic pressure on Japan, citing possible dangers for the stability of China. After the last Japanese troops left in December, the Tsarist regime—much to the consternation of Japan—moved its troops to occupy the entire Liaodong Peninsula and fortifijied Port Arthur. When writing his 1913 book A Personal Opinion on Emerging Problems (Jimu ikkagen ᱲउаᇦ䀰), Tokutomi remembered how he had then accepted the gospel of power (chikara no fukuin ࣋ȃ⾿丣) instead. He had understood that principles without power (muryoku na dōri ❑࣋ǿ䚃⨶)— in other words, moral ideals without the backing of physical force—were meaningless. He remembers vividly that in his emotional upheaval after the Tripartite Intervention, he went to the beach along Lüshun Bay to collect some sand in his handkerchief before returning to Japan.76 75  76 

See the corresponding chapter “A Peaceful World (Heiwa seikai ᒣ઼ц⭼),” in Shōrai no Nihon ሶᶕѻᰕᵜ, 53–103. See Tokutomi Sohō shū ᗣᇼ㰷ጠ䳶 (Tōkyō: Chikuma shobō, 1974), 276. In his autobiography, Tokutomi describes his disillusionment: “The retrocession of Liaodong shaped the destiny of my whole life; after I heard it I was spiritually a diffferent person. . . . Previously I had learned from books, but during the 1894–95 war I learned for the fijirst time from reality. . . . The influence of this war completely transcended the influence of Spencer, Cobden and Bright” (Tokutomi, Sohō jiden 㰷ጠ㠚ۣ; translation taken from Alistair Swale, “Tokutomi Sohō and the Problem of the Nation-state in an Imperialist World,” in Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood,

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The ensuing events proved to him that the government under the premier Itō Hirobumi Ժ㰔ঊ᮷ (1841–1909) failed to secure Japanese interests on the continent.77 Although Tokutomi’s point of criticism was less the Tripartite Powers than Itō Hirobumi and his cabinet,78 the radical change of the international situation made him rethink his former attitude toward Japan’s prospects as a civil and democratic society. The intervention changed his political views fundamentally. By the late 1890s, Tokutomi had replaced his vision of a liberal Japan with the ideal of a strong, centralized state that advocated an interventionist policy, especially with regard to the international situation. He favored a policy of vigorous imperialist expansion and the building of a powerful military. In his newspaper, the Kokumin shinbun, he further expressed a growing aggressive attitude, and the fact that he openly supported the military rearmament of the second Yamagata cabinet (1898–1900),79 as well as the Katsura cabinet (1901–1906),80 made him well-known as a nationalist thinker.

77 

78 

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or World Citizenship? ed. Dick Stegewerns (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 73. Wada Mamoru ઼⭠ᆸ, Kindai Nihon to Tokutomi Sohō 䘁ԓᰕᵜǽᗣᇼ㰷ጠ (Tōkyō: Ocha no mizu shobō, 1990), has shown that the influence of Spencer, Cobden, and Bright did not vanish suddenly but, rather, was part of the notable emergence of Tokutomi’s nationalism starting from 1890, as it was an extension of the Cobden notion of commercial competition. Tokutomi’s disappointment was so big that he decided to support Matsukata Masayoshi ᶮᯩ↓㣣 (1835–1924)—who became prime minister in 1896—and Ōkuma Shigenobu. His support for these two went so far that he agreed on becoming an advisor to the Home Ministry after his return from a trip to Europe and America in July 1897. This change of position damaged his reputation enormously, being criticized as a man without principles, or apostate (hensetsukan ༹ㇰ╒). As a consequence, the popularity of his publishing house, the Minyūsha, dropped radically, causing him to lay offf stafff and cease publication of all periodicals, including the Kokumin no tomo. He quit his job when Ōkuma resigned in November and Matsukata left in December of that year. Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Imperialism in a Nutshell: Conflict and the ‘Concert of Powers’ in the Tripartite Intervention, 1895,” in Japanstudien: Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts für Asienstudien 17 (2005): 57–82, also makes this point. Yamagata Aritomo ኡ㑓ᴹᴻ (1838–1922) formed his fijirst cabinet (December 1889–May 1891) in 1889 and successively held important posts including justice minister and war minister in the second Itō cabinet (August 1892–August 1896). He was chairman of the Privy Council and commander of the First Army during the Sino-Japanese War. In 1898 he formed his second cabinet. During the Russo-Japanese War, he commanded operations as chief of the General Stafff. Katsura Tarō Ṳཚ䛾 (1847–1913) was a samurai before the Meiji period and later became war minister (1898–1901) and prime minister (1901–1906). Before starting his political career, he was sent twice to Germany to study military strategy (1870–73, 1884). In 1906 he had to resign due to the public protest against the Treaty of Portsmouth.

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This fundamental transformation of Tokutomi has been discussed widely by historians, who for most part agree that it was a reaction to the changes that took place in the general public opinion when, after thirty years of intensive reforms, Meiji Japan met the fijirst obstacles on its way to becoming a modern, strong nation. Combining anxieties about Japan’s standing in the world, the growing rivalry with China for influence in Korea before 1894 and the frustration with the results of the Tripartite Intervention created in Japan a rising nationalist mood that even Tokutomi could not resist.81 His turn toward the state as the primary force in politics not only resulted in the call for a strong central state but also allowed interventionism and expansionism to become part of foreign politics. His call for an overseas expansion completed his new worldview: expansion would provide his country with a necessary outlet for social tension and overpopulation that had developed since the beginning of the Meiji era. His expansion was still supposed to be a peaceful one by means of migration, trade, and colonization (yet close to spatial ambitions as emphasized in modern geopolitics).82 This peaceful attitude changed when Tokutomi wrote The Japanese and the Chinese (Nihonjin to Chūgokujin ᰕᵜӪǽѝഭӪ, 1904), in which he quotes the prediction of the English journalist Sir Henry Norman (1858–1939) that in the future, Japan would defeat Russia and begin a new global age by becoming a leading power.83 According to Norman, Japan’s rise would destroy European 81 

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On the rise of nationalism during the 1890s in Japan, cf. Kenneth Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885–1895 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969). For Tokutomi and his attitude to the nation-state, cf. Swale, “Tokutomi Sohō and the Problem of the Nation-State in an Imperialist World.” “The New Homeland of the Japanese Race (Nihon jinshu no shin kokyō ᰕᵜӪぞȃᯠ᭵ 䜧),” in Kokumin no tomo, June 13, 1890; “New Guidelines in Foreign Policies (Taigai seisaku no hōshin ሮཆ᭯ㆆȃᯩ䠍),” in Kokumin no tomo, August 3, 1891; “The Thought of a Maritime People (Kaikoku jinmin no shisō ⎧ഭӪ≁ȃᙍᜣ),” in Kokumin no tomo, May 3, 1893. This text appeared originally as an article in the Kokumin Shinbun and was republished in 1904 in the Nichiyō kōdan ᰕᴌ䅋໷. Sir Henry Norman (1858–1939), who had been working for several years on the editorial stafff of the Pall Mall Gazette and later at the News Chronicle and New York Times, had travelled widely in China, Russia, Japan, Siam, Malaya, and Central Asia in the 1890s. As a result of his travels, he published two important books, The Real Japan (1891) and The Peoples and Politics of the Far East (1895). For Norman’s appraisal of the military development of Japan, cf. his book The Real Japan (1891/1909), esp. 107–34, and the chapter “Asia for the Asiatics?” in Henry Norman, The Peoples and Politics of the Far East: Travels and Studies in the British, French, Spanish and Portuguese Colonies, Siberia, China, Japan, Korea, Siam and Malaya (London: T.F. Unwin, 1895), 394–406.

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hegemony. European powers were already facing resistance against their brutal and oppressive rule throughout their colonial territories (including China, the Philippines, Turkey, India, Egypt, Afghanistan, and others). According to Norman, it was the task of Japan to give assistance in the reform of China in the fijields of politics, law, education and fijinances. In a second step, the establishment of an army and navy was to be realized under the control of the Japanese. Even if the Westerners opposed, Japan should not waver. Though such an approach might be a good idea, Tokutomi points out that Norman did not understand very much of Asia. It would be overbearing to assume that Japan could create a second Japan by its reforms in China. Surely Japan’s power for doing so was clearly overestimated, Tokutomi argues.84 When recognizing the U.S. expansion into the Pacifijic Ocean on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine and when the Japanese government signed the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, many Japanese felt the growing pressure from abroad. The nation felt betrayed by the own state that had agreed to the disappointing terms in the treaty, and as a consequence, the Hibiya Riots broke out in September of the same year, not only strengthening the national consciousness but creating a strong sentiment that Japan should participate in the struggle for concessions and colonies and thereby became a regional power by going beyond its limited territory. Though fijirst criticizing the American version of the Monroe Doctrine in his Personal Opinion on Emerging Problems (1913)— arguing that this doctrine, despite its defensive character, was actually a reckless policy endangering the tranquility of the Pacifijic region85—Tokutomi just three years later called for an Asian Monroe Doctrine that he described as a counter-measure: ӌ㍠ӌɪɻɵόѫ㗙ǽȄǃӌ㍠ӌȃһȄӌ㍠ӌӪȀȝȟǻѻȧࠖ⨶ǮȠȃ ѫ㗙ҏDŽӌ㍠ӌӪǽӁȊȗᰕᵜഭ≁ԕཆȀȄᐞᇴȟ↔ȃԫउȀ㟪ȠȎǢ䋷 ṬǿǬǽǰȅǃӌ㍠ӌɪɻɵόѫ㗙ȄǃণǶᰕᵜӪȀȝȟǻǃӌ㍠ӌȧࠖ ⨶ǮȠȀѫ㗙ҏDŽ䃔䀓ǮȠयȡǃ੮ӪȄӌ㍠ӌȝȟⲭӪȧ俶䙀ǮȠǠྲ 84 

85 

The text The Japanese and the Chinese presents a very negative picture of China, which is in contrast to Tokutomi’s pride for Japan, for which he assesses a strong martial spirit. For the Japanese, their martial spirit is so apparent that he sympathizes one year later with the soldiers who have been sent to Manchuria in the course of the war with Russia. He is proud that the soldiers abroad and the people at home stand resolutely together, embodying the perfect national spirit. See “Compatriots during the Invasion (Ensei no dōhō 䚐ᖱȃ਼㜎),” in Nichiyō kōdan, no. 6 (1905): 19–25. Cf. also “Spiritual Elements in a Victory (Shōri ni okeru seishinteki yōso ऍ࡙ȀᯬǦȠ㋮⾎Ⲵ㾱㍐),” in Nichiyō kōdan, no. 7 (1906): 57–62. Tokutomi Iichirō ᗣᇼ⥚а䛾, Jimu ikkagen ᱲउаᇦ䀰 (Tōkyō: Minyūsha, 1913), 333.

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Chapter 5 Ǣǃ‫⤝ٿ‬ǿȠ᜿㾻ȧᴹǮȠȗȃȀǗȞǮDŽնǴⲭӪȃ঴ӻȀǿȞȁ䗴ȃһ ҏǃ㠚୿ȃ⅗付ȧ䏻ᡸȧ㮙ᦳǮȠ䗴ȃһҏDŽ

The meaning of the Asian Monroe Doctrine is to put Asian matters into the hands of the Asian people. If one assumes that the Asian people— except the Japanese people—do not possess the qualifijication to shoulder this task, the Asian Monroe Doctrine means that Asia is a matter of the Japanese. Without misunderstanding, in the same way that my people that is going to expel the white race from Asia, it does not have a narrowminded intention. But I do not intend to cause trouble to the White race, I simply want to sweep away our own questionable Europeanization.86 Thus, the duty of the Japanese empire, Tokutomi argues. Japan has the obligation to play an active role in driving away the European aggression because it possesses the qualifijication to do so. As Li Jingxi points out, Asianism and the Asian Monroe Doctrine are often considered identical in the Tokutomi’s thinking. However, whereas Asianism aimed at creating a solidarity of Asian countries in their common fijight against European and American imperialism, the Asian Monroe Doctor was clearly an ideology negating the solidarity and favoring a Japanese imperialism in Asia, in other words, an ideology that leaves Asia behind and confijirms Japanese leadership in the East Asian space.87 The Asian Monroe Doctrine appears here as hegemonic thought, which is symptomatic for a nation with imperial aspirations. It is from now on that Tokutomi actively propagates this doctrine, which often is ascribed, above all, to him.88 His Asian Monroe Doctrine—actually a disguised Greater Asianism—developed into an imperialism,89 something 86 

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The Youth of Taishō Japan and the Prospects of the Empire (Taishō no seinen to teikoku no zento བྷ↓ȃ䶂ᒤǽᑍഭȃࡽ䙄). See Tokutomi Sohō shū, 230, and also the discussion in Ukita Kazutami ⎞⭠઼≁, “Shin Ajiashugi—Tōyō Monrōshugi no shin kaishaku ᯠӌ ㍠ӌѫ㗙―ᶡ⌻ɪɻɵόѫ㗙ȃᯠ䀓䟸” in Taiyō 24, no. 9 (September 1918): 4. See Li Jingxi ᵾӜ䥛, “Tokutomi Sohō no Ajia Monrōshugi ᗣᇼ㰷ጠȃӌ㍠ӌɪɻɵό ѫ㗙,” in Waseda seiji kōhō kenkyū, no. 73 (2003): 201–35. His most radical point of critique concerns the deceitful attitude of the white race, which propagates egalitarianism and fraternity as universal values but only claims those for the own race. In 1916 Tokutomi presents in his book On the History of the Political Situation of the Taishō Period (Taishō seikyokushi ron) a short summary of his standpoint concerning the Asian Monroe Doctrine, which he considered indispensable after Germany and the United States had proven to be the prime enemies of China. Observing the war raging in Europe, it is more than evident that Japan should accept its role as leader in Asia and pursue the

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that Li Dazhao realized in January 1919 when writing his article “Greater Asianism and New Asianism.”90 If Japan wanted to survive in a hostile environment and not be at the mercy of the other powers, so Tokutomi, it needed to follow this path of imperialism. The explicit aim of this imperialism would be to develop the nation, obtain access to the continental space, and improve the national fate.91 Concerning the direction of expansion Tokutomi disagreed with the then-popular doctrine of Maintain the North and Advance to the South (hokushu nanshin ेᆸই䙢)92 and preferred an advance to the north: ᰕᵜȃ䱢ᗑȄˈᵍ凞ȀǟǙǻǬˈᵍ凞ȃ䱢ᗑȄˈই⒰ᐎȀǟǙǻǬˈই⒰ ᐎȃ䱢ᗑȄˈ޵㫉ਔȀǟǙǻǮDŽǨȡᇏȀ᭫᪳Ⲵ䱢ᗑȃ⵬ⴞȀǬǻˈঈȀ Ǩȃа⛩ȝȟǮȠȗˈ⒰㫉ȃ㍼௦Ȅˈ⊪Ǭǻ䯁তǮȎǠȞǫȠҏDŽ

The defense of Japan depends on Korea, the defense of Korea depends on Southern Manchuria, and the defense of Southern Manchuria depends on Inner Mongolia. If one considers this aggressive defense actually to be of central signifijicance, then alone from this point of view the management of Manchuria and Mongolia can under no circumstances be neglected.93

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Monroe Doctrine. See Tokutomi Iichirō ᗣᇼ⥚а䛾, Taishō seikyokushi ron བྷ↓᭯ተਢ 䄆 (Tōkyō: Minyūsha, 1916), 400–403. Li Dazhao ᵾབྷ䠇, “Great Asianism and New Asianism (Da Yaxiyazhuyi yu xin Yaxiyazhuyi བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙㠷ᯠӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙),” in Guomin zazhi ഻≁䴌䂼, February 1, 1919, here taken from Li Dazhao quanji, 2: 269–271. Tokutomi, Jimu ikkagen ᱲउаᇦ䀰, 150. This Southern Expansion Doctrine (Nanshinron ই䙢䄆) was a doctrine popular among those in favor of economic expansion to the south, such as Fukumoto Nichinan ⾿ᵜᰕ ই (1857–1921), Takekoshi Yosaburō ㄩ䎺ой䛾 (1865–1950), and Shiga Shigetaka ᘇ䋰 䟽ᰲ (1863–1927). The doctrine was adopted as national policy with the call for the New Order in East Asia (Tō-A shin jitsujō ᶡӌᯠ〙ᒿ) in 1936. Tokutomi, Jimu ikkagen ᱲउаᇦ䀰, 162. Kuga Katsunan experienced a similar genesis when he changed his policy of keeping the north and advancing to the south (hokushu nanshin ेᆸই䙢) to keeping the south and advancing to the north (nanshu hokushin ইᆸे䙢) after the failure of the Korean Gabo Reforms (1894–1896). See here Kotera Masakazu ሿሪ↓а, Kuga Katsunan no taigairon: Meijiki no nashionarizumu kenkyū (2) 䲨㗟ইȃሮཆ䄆: ᰾⋫ᵏȃɒȿɯɒɲɂɨ⹄ウ (2), in Kyōto kyōiku daigaku kiyō—jinbun, shakai, no. 49 (1976): 135–47; Ebara Yoshiyasu ま৏ழᗣ, Nisshin sengo ni okeru Kuga Katsunan no taigai seisakuron ᰕ␵ᡖᖼȀǟǦȠ䲨㗟ইȃሮཆ᭯ㆆ䄆, in Nihon rekishi, no. 541 (1993): 78–93; Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period; and Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Lob der Gegenrestauration: das Staatsverständnis Kuga

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If Manchuria and Mongolia were to be abandoned, Korea would follow closely, and this would be fatal for Japan. Tokutomi explained this in 1894 with the urgent necessity to provide Japan with a sufffijicient living space (Lebensraum) when he published his book An Argument in Favor of the Expansion of a Great Japan (Dai Nihon bōchō ron བྷᰕᵜ㟘㝩䄆). A strong and vital Japan thus needed space to develop, and the direction to turn to was Korea and North China.94 The only threat to Japan was the Russian expansion to the East, when considering the national defense.95 However, recalling the 1879 visit by the former US president Ulysses Grant (1822–1885, 18th President of the United States [1869–77]), who had communicated to the Meiji Tennō his hope that Japan continued its modernization and became a developed country able to prevent other nations to intervene, Tokutomi identifijied another danger. He was ambivalent toward Grant’s view. On one hand, he was grateful for the American support, but on the other hand, the president’s comments hurt his national self-esteem, saying that Japan was no truly independent country (after all, extraterritorial jurisdiction and the loss of customs authority still limited Japanese self-governance). As a consequence, the major foe in his Argument in Favor of the Expansion of a Great Japan was neither China nor Korea (the regions Japanese expansion was directed at) but, rather, the West. The central motive of this text was fijirst of all the restoration of Japanese national self-esteem and accordingly, the true meaning of the campaign against China in the war of 1894 was the restoration of Japan, its self-defense, and, of course, securing Korean independence, as well as the punishment for China’s unduly behavior, Tokutomi writes.96 In this context, Japan even had to fulfijill its mission to spread civilization and to extend its own progress to the neighboring countries. This burden should be shouldered by Japan without hesitation, and it was necessary despite the good qualities of the Chinese and their culture that he

94 

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Katsunans (1857–1907),” in Staatsverständnis in Ostasien, ed. Lee Eun-Jeung and Thomas Fröhlich (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), 45–68. Tokutomi Iichirō ᗣᇼ⥚а䛾, Dai Nippon bōchōron བྷᰕᵜ㟘㝩䄆 (Tōkyō: Minyūsha, 1894), 9–10. For his campaign directed against European foreigners living in Japan, cf. Sawada Jirō ◔⭠⅑䛾, Tokutomi Sohō no Dai Nihon bōchōron to Amerika—Meiji 20 nendai wo chūshin ni ᗣᇼ㰷ጠȃབྷᰕᵜ㟘㝩䄆ǽȪɩɲȳ—᰾⋫ 20  ᒤԓȧѝᗳȀ, in Dōshisha Amerika kenkyū, no. 41 (2005): 28–29. Cf. “Discussing the National Defense of Japan (Nihon no kokubō wo ronsu ᰕᵜȃഭ䱢ȧ 䄆Ǯ),” in Kokumin no tomo, no. 26 (July 20, 1888): 11–12. Tokutomi Iichirō ᗣᇼ⥚а䛾, Dai Nippon bōchōron བྷᰕᵜ㟘㝩䄆, 85–89. Here Tokutomi presents a rather negative assessment on the opening of Japan, which he compares to a forced marriage (i.e. a marriage that is not based on mutual agreement and thus is a form of rape).

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identifijies as absolute reliability in commercial transactions, resilience, and perseverance, among others, as Tokutomi analyses. This positive assessment notwithstanding, he points out in his 1899 essay “Society and Personalities” (Shakai to jinbutsu ⽮ՊǽӪ⢙) that these good qualities might turn into a dangerous thing if the territorial integrity of China was not assured: 㤕Ǭ␵ഭ࠶ࢢǰȞȡǃ᭯⋫Ⲵൠണȝȟˈ᭟䛓ᑍഭǿȠȗȃ⎸⓵ǮȠǿȞ Ȅˈ᭟䛓Ӫぞȃц⭼ȀᯬǦȠऒ࣋ȄˈDzȃᱲȝȟаኔ໇࣐ǬᶕȠਟǬDŽа Ǵȇ᭟䛓Ӫǡ⥦ཚӪ਼ ˈަȃഭᇦǿǢȗȃǽǿȞȄǃDzȡǽDzᖬㅹȄц ⭼਴ഭȃᇴ⭏㸢ǽǿȟˈԕǻDzȃေ⾿ȧǃᖬㅹǠ⍱⮉ǮȠഭȀ䙎ȊǮȠ șǃᯝdžѾǽǬǻ⯁ȧᇩȡǪȠșDŽᱲǽǬǻࣤ‫۽‬㘵ǽǬǻǃᱲǽǬǻȄ䋷 ᵜᇦǽǬǻǃᱲǽǬǻȄ୶ᾝ㘵ǽǬǻDŽ㾱ǮȠȀᖬㅹȄᮠȃкȀᯬǙǻǃ⥦ ཚӪȀӄॱ‫ؽ‬ǮDŽ⋱Ȩșަȃц⭼ȃ ᙆǽǿȠਟǢӪぞⲴ⢩ᙗȄǃሗȢᖬ ㅹȀཊǢȀᯬǻȧșDŽ

If China is being divided up and efffaced from the political map as the Chinese empire, the influence of the Chinese race in the world from that time on will increase even further. Once the Chinese, like the Jews, will have lost their state, there is absolutely no doubt that, like them, they will become parasites in every country of the world and will exercise pressure and benefijicence on the country where they temporarily reside, at times as workers, at times as fijinanciers, and at times as traders. In any case, numerically speaking, they excel the Jews by fijifty times. Not to speak of their racial characteristics which will set the world atremble.97 Tokutomi abhors this vision of chaos and calls for a more active role of Japan as peacekeeper in East Asia, which—as he argues in his book A Personal Opinion on Emerging Problems—means that Japan has to follow the path of imperialism if it wants to develop its country, expand its territory and to improve its national fate. However, for being more successful, the mission civilisatrice had to be justifijied diffferently to avoid the suspicion of Japanese hegemony in East Asia. In other words, Japan could not simply reproduce the Western imperialism for its own purposes.

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Tokutomi Iichirō ᗣᇼ⥚а䛾, Shakai to jinbutsu ⽮ՊǽӪ⢙ (Tōkyō: Minyūsha, 1899), 84–85; translation Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period, 41.

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The Harmonious Concord of East Asia in the Eyes of Tarui Tōkichi In 1893, the pan-Asian thinker Tarui Tōkichi Ӆ㰔ਹ (1850–1922) published his Arguments on Behalf of the Union of the Great East (Daitō gappō ron བྷᶡਸ䛖䄆).98 In his writing, Tarui, similar to the “romantic” political thinkers such as Okakura Tenshin ዑ‫ع‬ཙᗳ (1862–1913), emphasized the need to resist Westernization by achieving “Asian unity” and “Asian solidarity” (Ajia rentai).99 According to Hiraishi Naoaki, Tarui’s idea of a union (rentai 䙓ᑟ) took the European notion of federation as a role model. While the great ancient empires of Europe (Rome, Egypt, and Persia) possessed a relatively high level of culture in comparison to neighboring countries that were also in control of vast territories, they did not reach the highest stage of development, much like the current situation with Russia and the Qing empires. This is because their strength is primarily a military one, and not one that is based on cooperation. Germany and the United States are here an enlightening example for Tarui: both achieve great results based on concord (kyōwa ঄઼): ઼ҏ㘵ཙлѻ䚄䚃DŽཙൠ䯃䉸ᴹ઼㘼нᡀ㘵DŽਸ䛖ѻࡦ࿻Ҿᐼ㠈഻DŽ㘼⨮ᱲ ↀ㖾䄨഻ਆࡦҾ↔ҏཊ⸓DŽ

Union is universal reason in the world. Could not anything at all be accomplished by union? The system of federated states has its origin in Greece, and many Western countries today model their systems after Greece. 㠸ަ഻ѻㆆ㧛ྲਸ䛖ѻࡦҏDŽ㾯Ӫཉ⭘↔ࡦԕ㠸ަ഻ˈ‫≁ަ؍‬DŽᡁᶡӪӖᇌ ਆ↔ࡦԕ㠸ᡁ഻ҏDŽӺ䜥‫ׯ‬䴫ؑ䩥䚃⊭㡩ަԆⲮ㡜һ⢙ᰒਆѻↀ㖾㘼ᵚਆ㠸 ഻ᆹ≁ѻབྷ䀸㘵DŽ䉸䶎‫ަݸ‬䕅ᖼަ䟽ѾDŽ

98 

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Tarui published this text under the name Morimoto Tōkichi because he was running for parliament, and as his family did not qualify for taxation, he wanted to secure his right to run by being temporarily adopted by the family Morimoto. For a discussion of this text see Hatsuse Ryūhei ࡍ♜喽ᒣ, “Ajiashugi to Tarui Tōkichi ȪɀȪѫ㗙ǽӅ㰔ਹ,” in Hiroshima heiwa kagaku 1 (1977): 111–37; and Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea, 91–99. Cf. Wada Mamoru, Kindai Nihon to Tokutomi Sohō 䘁ԓᰕᵜǽᗣᇼ㰷ጠ, and the corresponding chapters in Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism. On the rentai discourse in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan, cf. Hiraishi Naoaki ᒣ⸣ⴤᱝ, “Kindai Nihon no Ajiashugi— Meijiki no shorinen wo chūshin ni 䘁ԓᰕᵜȃȪɀȪѫ㗙―᰾⋫ᵏȃ䄨⨶ᘥȧ ѝᗳȀ,” in Kindaikazō (Ajia kara kangaeru 5) 䘁ԓॆ‫( ۿ‬ȪɀȪǠȞ㘳ǝȠ5), ed. Mizoguchi Yūzō Ⓧਓ䳴й, Hamashita Takeshi ⎌л↖ᘇ, Hiraishi Naoaki ᒣ⸣ⴤᱝ, and Miyajima Hiroshi ᇞᎻঊਢ (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1994), 65–91.

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Nothing can be better than the federal system as the policy for leading the country to prosperity. The Westerners, working within this system, have developed their countries and supported their people. We in the East had better adopt that system to lead our countries to prosperity. We have already imported postal service, telegraph, railways, steamships and many other things from the West. Yet we have not imported the general policy of developing the country and ensuring peace for the people. Does not this mean that we are giving priority to the unimportant and deferring the important?100 Tarui points out that—together with Great Britain—Germany and the United States were all three federal systems whose federations were each grounded on a peaceful and voluntary accord and were able to take into consideration the wishes of each particular group within the union, that is forming a larger group without damaging the equality of its constituents or contradicting each other’s interests.101 In the case of East Asia, a true union would only work with the notion of harmony, if it were to repel the Western powers: 㤕ਸ⡢а഻঄࣋ᶡੁࡷᑝধӎ㍠ӎव㠹ᆷ޵Ӗн䴓DŽ㘼䀸нࠪҾ↔㘵ˈᶡӎ ѻᒨҏDŽDŽDŽᡁѻᡰ䮧㘵а઼㎀ਸѻᙗᛵҏDŽ㘼ᖬѻᡰ䮧㘵⦘・н㖸ѻ≓䊑 ҏDŽᖬӺ㐤⼘Ⲯ㰍ᾥཊऍ㇇㘼ᡁӺᰕѻ䀸൘Ҿ‫ݸ‬伺ᡁᡰ䮧ԕപަᵜ䙢㠷ᖬㄦ ⡝ԕ䆺᭫ᆸѻऒDŽ

If all Europe forms a federation and advances eastwards in cooperation, European will not fijind it very difffijicult to control the whole of Asia and unify all the world. It is lucky for East Asia that they do not adopt such a 100  Tarui Tōkichi Ӆ㰔ਹ, Daitō gappō ron བྷᶡਸ䛖䄆 (Tōkyō: Chōryō shorin, 1893), 2; 117 (both translations taken from Tadashi Suzuki, “Profijile of Asian Minded Man—IX—Tarui Tōkichi,” The Developing Economies 6, no. 1 (1968): 93. The fijirst draft of his Arguments was lost in 1885 when Tarui was charged with complicity in the Osaka incident. While detained, his manuscript was confijiscated and destroyed by the authorities. In 1890 he wrote a second draft in classical Chinese and published it serially in the magazine Freedom and Equality (Jiyū byōdō keirin 㠚⭡ᒣㅹ㍼㏨) in 1893. It was written in Chinese because its intended audience was Korea (and only partly China). Takeuchi Yoshimi argued in his 1963 essay “The Japanese Asianism” (Nihon no Ajiashugi ᰕᵜȃ ȪɀȪѫ㗙) that Tarui’s union was to include only Japan and Korea, and not the Qing empire. 101  Tarui, Daitō gappō ron བྷᶡਸ䛖䄆, 114–15. Tarui’s ubiquitous quotations of Western thinkers in this context show that his Arguments cannot just simply be conceived as an Asianist text directed against the West.

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plan . . . We in the East have the advantage of harmony and unity in our nature, while they in the West have the advantage of the independence of their spirit. By virtue of training in many arts, they have many chances of success. Our strategy today is therefore to develop what is to our advantage; to consolidate the foothold, and then to proceed to compete with them, thereby changing the position of defense into that of offfense.102 In the end, however, mutual consent was an illusion, even if Tarui declared that “a union is feasible when the two countries are in harmony (ਸ䛖㘵⭡‫ޙ‬഻ѻ ‫઼ޡ‬㘼ᡀ)” and assumed that a union would be false if one country is deprived of the right of self-government and independence.103 It was important for him to note that a union would not constitute an obstacle to the political ideal of national sovereignty: ཛѫ℺ҏ㘵䄲഻ᇦ㠚㜭㲅⨶޵ཆѻһ㘼н㚬ભᯬԆ䛖ҏDŽ㠚ѫҏ㘵䄲ަ‫ޘ‬ᴹ ѫ℺ҏDŽ᭵䴆䙢䋒к഻ަ‫ޘ‬ѫ℺㘵㠚ѫ഻ҏDŽ䴆н䙢䋒ަ‫׍‬Ԇ഻ԕ㹼ަ℺㘵 䄲ѻॺѫ഻DŽᱟ㩜഻ѻ䙊㗙ҏDŽ

Sovereignty means that a state handles his own domestic and foreign afffairs without intervention from other states. Self-government means to fully exercise one’s sovereignty. Therefore, even if it is a tributary state that cedes one’s full sovereignty to a superior state, it is a self-governing state. And even if it does not offfer tribute, but relies on other states while exercising its sovereignty, it enjoys a limited sovereignty. This is a universal principle of all states.104 Tarui’s proposal to form a union of the Great East, however, did not include China because there was no way of securing mutual consent, as he put it. At the end of the nineteenth century, China was still occupied by a people from outside (the Manchus). First, the dominated ethnicities would have to regain their sovereignty before being able to enter a union. In other words, the Han Chinese, the Mongols, and the Tibetans were not able to join a union as they had no possibility to express their free opinion on the matter: after all, the Qing 102  Ibid., 33–34; translation taken from Tadashi Suzuki, “Profijile of Asian Minded Man—IX— Tarui Tōkichi,” 94. 103  Tarui, Daitō gappō ron བྷᶡਸ䛖䄆, 114. In fact, to claim that “we in the East have the advantage of harmony and unity in nature” is either a very naïve view or is just intended to comfort neighboring countries. 104  Ibid., 106–07.

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did not annex the states of Tartary, Mongolia, and Tibet through consultation, so there was no equality of rights.105 Despite the non-inclusion of China in the union, Tarui’s proposal was well received among the Chinese, even more than in Japan, where the book was considered of being of no great value.106 In a diary entry from September 8, 1898, the later minister of education in Republican China, Cai Yuanpei 㭑‫ݳ‬ษ (1868–1940) praised the book in a review as an excellent one, emphasizing Tarui’s proposal of a union, which—if later enhanced by China—would be an efffective countermeasure to European imperialism.107 In addition, the fact that Tarui envisioned a harmonious interdependence of all political bodies which included the diffferent societies (and not just the sovereign states), his project of the union of the Great East was going much further than the Japan-centered versions of pan-Asianism. By depicting the Great East as a utopian place of equality, there was no room for separately perceived sovereignties of either Japan or Korea. Restricting the primary role of statehood meant to dissolve the national space—called Japan or Korea—and replace it by a regional model without any hierarchical distinctions. He writes, 㫻ᖬ↔਼ㅹ㘵Ӕ䳋ѻ䙊㗙ҏDŽ᭵䃚㩜഻‫⌅ޜ‬㘵нԕ൏ൠབྷሿӪ≁ཊሑ・ѻ䲾 ㍊ҏDŽӺнᬊ‫ޙ‬഻ѻ㠺㲏DŽሸ⭘བྷᶡа䃎DŽԕߐ‫ޙ‬഻㘵DŽⅢ䚯↔ჼ㙣DŽↀ⍢ 㚟ਸ䄨䛖Ӗᆈ㠺਽Ҿ਴ᐎDŽ㘼ߐ㑭ちҾަкDŽӺ‫ޙ‬഻ѻਸ䛖Ӗ਴⭘㠺㲏DŽ㑭 ѻԕབྷᶡѻ㲏ࡷһփみ⮦㘼❑ᗙ ჼ䳉ਟ⭏Ҿަ䯃ҏDŽ

Equality for both sides is truly the principle of exchange. International law does not posit national hierarchies based on territorial size or the size of populations. I will not rely on the old names for the countries, and in the hope of avoiding any discrimination, I will designate the two countries under a new unifijied name: Daitō. In the federated countries of Europe as well, the name of each state continues to exist while a general name overarches all. Should the two countries unify now and use Daitō to

105  Ibid., 132–38. 106 Hiraishi, Kindai Nihon no Ajiashugi. 107  Cai Yuanpei, Senben Danfang “Dadong hebanglun” yuehou ἞ᵜѩ㣣ljབྷᶡਸ䛖䄆NJ 䯢ᖼ, in Cai Yuanpei quanji (Hangzhou: Zhejiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997), vol. 1, 226–27. In his review, Cai also refers to the Chinese publication of this work, which was reproduced by Chen Gaodi 䲣儈ㅜ in Shanghai in 1898 under the title The New Meaning of a Union of the Great East (Dadong hebang xinyi བྷᶡਸ䛖ᯠ㗙). The preface of this translation was written by Liang Qichao.

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name them both while also continuing to use their respective old names, they will avoid discord amongst themselves.108 Tarui evokes here the teachings of international law as one legitimating mean for creating a harmonious unity of Japan and Korea, while negating both as sovereign countries. He expresses the hope that European international law could be transformed into a truly cosmopolitan law that could also be applied to Asian countries. Considering that Tarui’s proposal implied rejecting both Europeanization and colonization and attaining a distinct place in international politics, it is no surprise that decades later, his union of the Great East met the approval of the Japanese intellectual and sinologist Takeuchi Yoshimi ㄩ޵ྭ (1910–1977). Tarui’s call for an international revolution aimed at destroying the prerogatives of the European states and establishing an alternative to the current system of international law of European origin was, in many regards, similar to the major tenet of Takeuchi’s postwar thinking, namely, the notion of resistance. This notion, the central characteristic of the latter’s vision of modernity, implied that Japan had to overcome the modernity as defijined by Europe (kindai no chōkoku 䘁ԓȃ䎵‫ )ݻ‬and to create a modernity of its own.109 By favoring an alliance of the yellow against the white people Tarui did not just call for a defensive measure based on the widespread social Darwinist thinking of his time, but—as his positive attitude to the political organization of the West shows—a form of resistance that stems from a man who had been awakened by the universal ideas of government taught by the West as opposed to the reactionary Confucian type of government. In sum, both Tokutomi’s and Tarui’s political thinking exhibit a strong geopolitical character (even if the expansion occurred in the name of China and Korea) and is a clear prove that non-imperial nations are able to develop geopolitical ambitions, while empires—such as China—clearly do not. As shown 108  Tarui, Daitō gappō ron བྷᶡਸ䛖䄆, 6; translation taken from Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea, 98. 109  Takeuchi, however, was mistaken in thinking that Tarui’s vision of the union was devoid of elements of Western thinking (in contrast to Nakae Chōmin, Ōi Kentarō, and Fukuzawa Yukichi; cf. Takeuchi Yoshimi, Japan in Asien, 156–57). In fact, Tarui was not totally opposed to taking over achievements of European modernity, cf. Tarui, Daitō gappō ron བྷᶡਸ䛖䄆, 117–18. For Takeuchi, see Takeuchi Yoshimi ㄩ޵ྭ, Kaisetsu—Ajiashugi no tenbō 䀓䃜ίȪɀȪѫ㗙ȃኅᵋ, in Gendai Nihon shisō daikei 9—Ajiashugi ⨮ԓᰕᵜ ᙍᜣབྷ㌫ 9ίȪɀȪѫ㗙 (Tōkyō: Chikuma shobō, 1963), 36; and Takeuchi Yoshimi ㄩ޵ྭ, The Japanese Asianism (Nihon no Ajiashugi, 1963), in Takeuchi Yoshimi “Nihon no Ajiashugi” seidoku ㄩ޵ྭNjᰕᵜȃȪɀȪѫ㗙nj㋮䃝, ed. Matsumoto Kenichi (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2000), 1–88.

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earlier, any kind of geopolitical thinking is going beyond the limited territory of nations (which is defijined by exact boundaries). Geopolitical thinking makes only sense in case of states that have imperial ambitions (by striving to acquire Lebensraum). Those states emphasize spatial relationships and the distribution of political power created by international relationships, and they consider geography to be the most influential factor in the growth and decline of (national) power, whereas imperial and postimperial states do not have such ambitions, for them space is considered a given fact that cannot be questioned. It is thus also not surprising that the rising engagement on the continent was conceived as a natural outgrowth of Japan’s antimodern modernization. Takeuchi Yoshimi argues here rightly in his 1963 anthology that Asianism is not an ideology, but a trend that is impossible to distinguish between invasion (shinryaku ‫ )⮕ץ‬and solidarity (rentai 䙓ᑟ), which is an interpretation that he traces back to his reading of both Fukuzawa and Tarui. In his view, the victories in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War strengthened Japanese solidarity with Asia, which, in the Fifteen Years’ War between China and Japan (1931–1945), changed into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an alternative order in East Asia. For Takeuchi, there is qualitative diffference between Asia and Europe created by the diffferences in historical development. Asia and Europe are not simply geographical concepts, but concepts that fundamentally oppose each other. This idea is central to Kodera Kenkichi, a politician and legal scholar who, during World War I, proposed a new geopolitical order in East Asia.

5.4

Japanese Pan-Asianism during World War I and Beyond

In 1916 Kodera Kenkichi ሿሪ䅉ਹ (1877–1949) published his magnum opus, the 1,300-page Treatise on Greater Asianism (Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ 㗙䄆). Kodera, who had studied international law and international relations for almost a decade in Germany and who had been a politician and long-term member of the Lower House of Imperial Japanese Diet, formulated in this book a Greater Asianism that paralleled similar pan-ideologies in Europe and elsewhere.110 He emphasized the long tradition of discriminatory Western racism and its close relationship to imperialism. He was further convinced that 110

Kodera had studied law and political science at Columbia University and Johns Hopkins University. In 1902 he continued his studies at Heidelberg University under the guidance of Georg Jellinek, a well-known expert in international law. He later spent considerable time in Vienna (1903–1904) and Geneva (1906–1907).

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the current global situation—sooner or later—resulted in a fundamental clash of races. The only feasible prevention of such an event would for Japan to ally itself with the yellow race and to form a global force that resists the West.111 It is quite revealing that the introduction to his book starts with the discussion of the yellow peril whose discourse in Western countries seems to have incited the writing of his Treatise (the related racial discrimination of Japanese and Chinese is an experience Kodera, like many others, had during his studies abroad). He points out, ཷǿȠૹDŽӌ㍠ӌȧ㎡保㤕ǤȄ༃‫ق‬ǬǴȠↀ㖵ᐤ⍢ȀᐢȀ哴⾽䄆ȃೲǤǬ ǻⲭ㢢ӪぞȀᖱᴽ৸ȄေಷǪȡǹǹǗȠᴹ㢢Ӫぞ䯃Ȁᵚǵⲭ⾽ȧબȋ㘵ȃ ሑǢǽșDŽ㘼ȗ哴⾽Ȅ冈དྷȀ䙾ǯǬǻǃⲭ⾽ȄһᇏǿȟDŽ

Isn’t it strange? In Europe, which controls Asia at will and has completely subdued it, these days we hear voices that warn of a yellow peril (kōka). However, among the colored races, which are subjugated and threatened by the white race, hardly a peep against the white peril can be heard. Yet while there can be no doubt that the yellow peril is nothing more than a bad dream, the white peril is a reality.112 This judgment is the point of departure for his following argumentation. He is convinced that the white peril (hakka ⲭ⾽) could only be stopped when the yellow race united, starting with a close Sino-Japanese cooperation. For this sake, Japan should become the educator (kyōikusha ᮉ㛢㘵) for China and later the whole of Asia and introduce Western modern civilization and technology to the Asian countries so that a “glorious new Asian civilization under Japanese leadership and guidance” could be established.113 In other words, his warning of the white peril is not simply a counter-discourse (as it had been the case with the caricature of Brakensiek and the related popular writings of that

111  According to Saaler’s “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan,” this book was the fijirst attempt to defijine Asianism, and it was Kodera who used the term Ajiashugi for the fijirst time in a major work. Kodera also brought the ideology of Asianism closer to party politics and government circles in Japan. 112  Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 1; Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan,” 1269. 113  Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 13, 81, 231, 258, 1127–30. To promote his views among neighboring countries, his book was translated into Chinese and published in Shanghai in 1918; however, the book’s proposal itself was not particularly well received.

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time), but an insight that had—when recognizing the events of the ongoing World War I—much larger consequences. For Kodera, the social Darwinist fijight of the races showed that eternal peace is impossible (zettai heiwa no fukanō ㎦ሮᒣ઼ȃнਟ㜭). In the coming future, he writes, small and weak countries are not able to continue to exist in between the great powers, and a status of neutrality will not help. In fact, even the great powers will either fall or rise in the current world situation. The next power to fall and become prey to imperialism in Kodera’s eyes is China. The ongoing war thus does not only concern Europe but is also an actual danger for Asia: if the United States should enter the war, this would render the China problem much more complicated than it already is, he determined. To prevent the balance of power in the Pacifijic Ocean from breaking apart, Kodera called for promoting China’s modernization and reform and securing its territorial integrity, and this was the highest mission (saikō shimei ᴰ儈֯ભ) of Japan. It was Japan’s imperative right to relieve East Asia from the pressure of the white race by becoming the regional leader.114 Finally, his country would—together with the other Asian nations—create a new, glorious Asian civilization (idai naru Ajiateki shin bunmei o kensetsu ‫ٹ‬བྷǿȠӌ㍠ӌⲴᯠ᮷᰾ȧᔪ䁝). At the end of the introduction to his opus, Kodera states directly that the Asianism he is propagating is nothing less than the slogan “Asia is the Asia of the Asians.”115 Emphasizing that blood is thicker than water, Kodera was strongly influenced by racial theories of the latter half of the nineteenth century and now tried to apply this ideology to the Asian context, arguing that if the Europeans and Americans (the latter with their Monroe Doctrine) were installing a panideology, why should Asia not do the same?116 In the end, his idea of Asianism was not only a reflection to the other prevailing pan-ideologies but, rather, the consequence of his insight that the earlier promises of European international law to bring that stability and peace remained unfulfijilled. In fact, the World War had destroyed international law and global order, with Germany as the major culprit. In a work on the origins of World War I, Kodera accuses the German emperor of imitating Napoleon in his longing to establish 114 Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 469–70. 115  Ibid., 13. As Sven Saaler has shown in detail, this slogan was a reflection to the various trends of cooperation and integration across the world that Kodera had observed during his period of study abroad. Pan-Americanism, pan-Slavism, and pan-Germanism were all popular ideologies in the non-Asian world at that time. See Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 2–3, 258–59. 116  For an overview on the influence of Kodera’s work on Japanese intellectuals, cf. Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan,” 1281–87.

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a world empire.117 The German behavior shows that international law and treaties were once considered the fundament of peace, but this was a wrong belief. Referring to the current history of Bavaria and Luxembourg, he argues that the great powers often disregard the sovereignty of neutral states. This is due to the fact that international politics is not subordinated to law, but subject to actual force (as the sinking of the Lusitania by German submarines in 1915 had shown convincingly). The German historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834– 1896), whose work Politik (1897–1898) Kodera quotes at length, proclaimed that the state is the most signifijicant form political order. It is thus the duty of the people to protect it from intervention from outside: The States in the Holy Alliance had driven the idea of interference with the party quarrels of their neighbours much too far. They had declared that the interests of public order required that the Great Powers should be entitled to intervene if the peace of a State were disturbed from beneath, by popular risings. What could be more unjust than this principle, which allowed interference in the case of a national upheaval, but withheld it if a Government was attacked from without? The Quadruple Alliance came to be looked upon, justly, in the light of a police force, oppressive to the liberty of nations.118 As a consequence of this thinking, Treitschke argues that “in order to make no mistake as to the real meaning of international law, we must always remember that it must not run counter to the nature of the State. No State can reasonably be asked to adopt a course which would lead it to destroy itself. Likewise every State in the comity of nations must retain the attributes of sovereignty whose defence is its highest duty even in its international relations.”119 In other words, the international law does not possess ultimate validity that could limit or restrict actions of the state: “It is not possible to lay down any fijixed principles for international policy, for, as we have seen, the unconditional doctrine of intervention is as false as its antithesis. Every State may be placed 117  Kodera Kenkichi ሿሪ䅉ਹ, The True Reason for Chaos in Europe and the Battles of the Powers (Ōshū tairan no shinin to kōsen rekkoku ⅗⍢བྷҡȃⵏഐǽӔᡖࡇഭ) (Tōkyō: Taishō shoin, 1915), 6–7. 118  Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, trans. Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 580–81. However, the opposite liberal position of nonintervention is for Treitschke also not tenable. If a neighboring state becomes a menace for another state’s existence, intervention is considered necessary. 119  Ibid., 595.

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in a position where the party strifes of another country are a menace to its own freedom.” Accordingly, “no Courts of Arbitration will ever succeed in banishing war from the world. It is absolutely impossible for the other members of the group of nations to take an impartial view of any question vitally afffecting one of their number.”120 Thus, it is no wonder that Treitschke considered war to be both justifijiable and moral. The ideal of perpetual peace is then not only impossible (as shown in the previous quote of Kodera) but immoral as well, and Treitschke refutes that international law has any function in regulating the behavior among states.121 Kodera concludes from his discussion of the German historian that the ongoing war is a conflict between violence and justice (bōryoku to seigi to no shōtotsu ᳤࣋ǽ↓㗙ȃ㺍ケ), but he comes to a diffferent conclusion than Treitschke. Showing a great deal of contempt for a German naval ship that had recently not shied away from pretending to be a British ship by raising a British flag Kodera equals this behavior with a total loss of moral sense, a situation that even international law cannot remedy.122 Similar to Kuga Katsunan 䲨㗟ই (1857–1907), the Japanese journalist and member of the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tō-A dōbunkai),123 Kodera observes here that the European nations dismiss the universal character of international law when it becomes an obstacle to their own interests. In his work On the Origins of Politics and on International Law (Gensei oyobi kokusairon ৏᭯৺ഭ䳋䄆, 1893), Kuga pointed out that international law is a law defijined by Europeans nations who are Christian countries inhabited by

120  Ibid., 608; see also 598–99. 121 Cf. also the interpretation of Kodera in Kodera, Ōshū tairan no shinin to kōsen rekkoku ⅗ ⍢བྷҡȃⵏഐǽӔᡖࡇഭ, 7; and Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 33. 122  The hint at the moral decay is an argument often heard among Japanese and Chinese intellectuals who in the course of the war had lost their conviction that Europe was the most advanced civilization. Cf. Kodera, Ōshū tairan no shinin to kōsen rekkoku ⅗⍢བྷ ҡȃⵏഐǽӔᡖࡇഭ, 330–31. Similar Liang Qichao in his Record of My Impressions on A Tour of Europe (Ouyou xinyinglu ↀ⑨ᗳᖡ䤴). 123  Kuga worked at the documentation bureau of the Grand Council in 1883 and became an editing section chief at the Cabinet Gazette Bureau in 1885. In the following years, he increasingly expressed opposition to the westernization of the Meiji government. Discontent with their policies and their weakness in the negotiations on the revision of unequal treaties, he resigned in 1888. After that, Kuga founded the Tōkyō Telegram (Tōkyō Denpō ᶡӜ䴫๡), which was retitled Japan (Nihon ᰕᵜ) in the following year. Nihon aimed at recovering Japanese culture as a reaction to the westernization in the wake of the Meiji reform movement. For a comprehensive introduction to Kuga’s view on foreign politics, cf. Kotera, Kuga Katsunan no taigairon; and Ebara, Nisshin sengo ni okeru Kuga Katsunan no taigai seisakuron ᰕ␵ᡖᖼȀǟǦȠ䲨㗟ইȃሮཆ᭯ㆆ䄆.

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the white race. At fijirst sight, its intention is to offfer norms and regulations for the intercourse between diffferent nations, in trade, diplomacy and other kinds of exchange. In fact, however, it is confijined to the European hemisphere and is hardly applicable to the Asian countries. It is purely the family law of European nations (ഭ䳋⌅Ȅ⅗Ӫȃᇦ⌅Ȁ䙾ǣǪȠȃȔ). This meant that the Asian nations had three choices. First, to become—similar to Africa— European colonies; second, to enjoy the grace of international law by means of Westernization (ōka wo hakaru ⅗ॆȧണȠ); or, third, as the current system of international law is just the prerevolutionary system,124 to lead an international revolution and destroy the prerogatives of the European states. Kuga offfers these three possibilities although for him, only the third is the true alternative. He expresses the hope that the family law (kahō ᇦ⌅) is transformed into a cosmopolitan law (sekaihō ц⭼⌅) that included those countries that were already colonized or soon faced colonization. Japan should transform the Eurocentric international law into a just and rational way (seiri kōdō ↓⨶ ‫ޜ‬䚃), ruling international behavior without being restricted to racial or national boundaries. This would then be a true universal international law, a law that would restore true morality in international afffairs. It is compelling to observe here that Kuga still believed in the capability of international law (if adjusted to the new global situation) to secure world peace. His optimism is shared by Kodera, who, in his book on Asianism, describes the effforts of Russia, France, England, and Japan to reinstall the authority of international law. However, both thinkers difffer on spatial terms. While Kuga afffijirmed that international law applies to single states, Kodera introduced space as a new category into the fijield of international relations. 124  Here Kuga refers to the Meiji Revolution, which destroyed the prerogatives of the Japanese nobility and conceded rights to the common population. The former unjust and unequal social structure was thus destroyed. The current international situation where European nations enjoy special rights and privileges reminds him of that prerevolutionary time. As an example, he quotes the principle of extraterritoriality, which puts foreign nationals abroad under the jurisdiction of their home country and not under that of the government where they are residing. This is clearly a violation of sovereignty rights. Cf. the chapter “International Law” in Kuga Katsunan 䲨㗟ই, Gensei oyobi kokusairon ৏ ᭯৺ഭ䳋䄆 (Tōkyō: Nihon shinbunsha, 1893), 60. Kuga’s argument is obviously taken from Fukuzawa Yukichi, who in 1881 observed in his well-known book Brief Comments on Current Afffairs ( Jiji shōgen ᱲһሿ䀰) that the international law of the Europeans and their emphasis on the balance of power are tenets only valid in the Western world of Christian nations. In the rest of the world, brute force prevails, and it was naïve to hope that sympathy of the Europeans helped any Asian country (Fukuzawa Yukichi ⾿⋒䄝ਹ, Jiji shōgen ᱲһሿ䀰 [Tōkyō: Fukuzawa Yukichi zōhan, 1881], chapter 4).

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He argues that the true Japanese contribution for a future postwar global society is to tear down the walls between China and Japan and—by imitating the Monroe Doctrine—creating a new union based on an Asianist ideology.125 Although seeing Asianism as a resistance against European modernity, Kodera is well aware of the fact that it might also encounter resistance on the side of the neighboring countries, especially China. He therefore reminds the reader of a speech Sun Yat-sen gave at a banquet organized by the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tō-A dōbunkai) in Tōkyō on February 15, 1913, in Japan, during which he proposed a close cooperation of the Chinese and Japanese people: after all, both nations are brethren sharing a cultural and racial origin; thus, a union would be more than natural and could also evolve into a basis for world peace.126 Taking Asian identity (dōshū dōbun)127 as a natural basis for Asianism, Kodera proposes four consecutive stages of integration: (1) the unifijication (tōitsu ㎡а) of Japan and China, with Japan being the strongest and China the largest country in East Asia; (2) the inclusion (hōyō वᇩ) of other independent states of the Mongol race (for Kodera, the core of the yellow race); (3) the integration (tōgō ㎡ਸ) of other members of the Mongol race living under the rule of diffferent races; and (4) the enlargement of these three policies to include other ethnicities throughout the whole of Asia.128 His vision of Asia is clearly characterized by his intention to establish a regional union that is characterized by cooperation (Nisshi teikei ᰕ᭟ᨀᩪ) and amity (Nisshi 125  Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 1008–1009. Kodera discusses the Monroe Doctrine again in his translation of the study The Problem of Japan, written by Sidney Osborne in 1918. Osborne pointed out that “the Monroe Doctrine is not a doctrine. It is a fact. If it exists at all, it does not exist in theory, but in fact, nor need there be any real question as to its meaning. It has more than once passed through the fijires of trial, and all experiments made to test its actuality have demonstrated that it possesses life, health, and force behind it.” For the translation, cf. Kodera Kenkichi ሿሪ䅉ਹ, The Problem of Japan among the Great Powers (Rekkyōkan no Nihon mondai ࡇᕧ䯃ȃᰕᵜ୿乼 [Tōkyō: Hirobunkan, 1919]), 223. 126  Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 1016–1018. For Sun’s speech, cf. China and Japan Must Cooperate (Zhong Ri xu huxiang tixie ѝᰕ丸ӂ⴨ᨀᩪ), in Guofu quanji (vol. 2): 325–26. As a second reference, Kodera introduces a certain Hu Ying 㜑⪋ (1886– 1933), who had formerly studied military sciences in Japan, quoting him at length with his treatise on amity between China and Japan (Ri-Zhi qinshanlun ᰕ᭟㿚ழ䄆). See Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 1019–21. The original article of Hu Ying appeared in the journal Zhina 4, no. 6. 127  Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 460. Cf. Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan.” 128  Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 270.

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shinzen ᰕ᭟㿚ழ). However, such a union was only possible if the territorial integrity of China (Shina hozen) was guaranteed, which, for Japan, was a heavy and troublesome burden.129 It demanded from China to give up its present principle of foreign policy of “allying with the far, resisting the near” (enkō kinkō 䚐Ӕ䘁᭫) and admit Japan’s special position (tokushu chi’i ⢩↺ൠ ս) in Manchuria. This meant that the call for integrity was limited to China proper (Shina hondo ᭟䛓ᵜ൏), which referred to the eighteen provinces that had been under central rule since the Ming dynasty. Territories later acquired by the Qing empire—its external possessions such as Mongolia, Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Tibet (gaihan ཆ㰙)—were open to foreign powers.130 The aim was obvious: only if Korea, Manchuria, and eventually Siberia were under strict Japanese control would it enable Japan to gain the sufffijicient economic and military strength to help China in maintaining its territorial integrity.131 By restricting the principles of territorial integrity to the Chinese mainland and excluding the outer provinces Kodera tried to confijirm that Japan enjoyed certain economic and judicial rights in the northeast of China. Despite its territorial claims, however, these rights do not entail territorial rights. Avery Kolers argues in this regard that political theory has been silent in the discussion of territorial rights because these rights themselves do not exist. His ethnogeographic approach holds that land is conceptualized in a culturally specifijic way, which is by defijining ontologies of land and the human relationship to it. That the Japanese claims could hardly be substantiated is obvious. Given the cultural, political, and ethnic diffferences between the Japanese islands and the continent, it is difffijicult to construe familiarities or even a shared identity that would turn Korea and Manchuria into something specifijically Japanese. The integration of these territories into the Japanese realm does not follow the logic of national territories, nor does it constitute a territory in the proper 129  Ibid., 1063fff. In 1906 Tokutomi Sohō had already pointed out in reference to Rudyard Kipling (1868–1936) that not only did the white man have to carry his burden when pursuing his mission civilisatrice but that the Yamato race, as the leader of the yellow race, had the same duty. See Tokutomi, “The Burden of the Yellow Man (Kōjin no omoni 哴Ӫ ȃ䟽㦧),” in Nichiyō kōdan, no. 7 (1906): 239–43. More precisely, the title of the former source should be “The Burden of Japan.” Cf. also Tokutomi, Shōri no omoni ऍ࡙ȃ䟽㦧, in Nichiyō kōdan, no. 7 (1906): 97–101. 130  Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 1005, 1100. 131  Kodera argues that “Japan cannot reach economic independence without China, and China cannot reach political independence without Japan” (ᰕᵜȄ᭟䛓ȧ䴒ȡǻȄ㍼ ␸ⲴȀ⤜・ǮȠ㜭Ȅǯǃ᭟䛓Ȅᰕᵜȧ䴒ȡǻȄ᭯⋫ⲴȀ⤜・ǮȠ㜭ȄǫȠ 䙻ભȀ൘ȟ). Kodera, Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆, 75; cf. also 1260; translation taken from Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan,” 1276.

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sense, as shown by the concentrated effforts of Japanese historians making Manchukuo a distinct state separated from the rest of China.132 These effforts were far from convincing and were easily demasked as ideological constructs by the Chinese. While it is common knowledge that territory and property rights are closely related to each other, the question of whether Manchuria is part of Japan (and, if so, to what extent?) can only be answered in a geopolitical sense. As shown with the reference to Hardt’s and Negri’s concept of modern Empire geopolitical thinking makes only sense in the cases of states that have Imperial ambitions. On the contrary, imperial and postimperial states do not have such ambitions; for them, space is considered a given fact that cannot be questioned. It is for this reason that the notion of a transnational spatial ideology such as pan-Asianism was strange and largely absent in the Chinese context, while enjoying a much larger popularity among Japanese thinkers: they felt the urgent need to protect their nation by expanding into other spaces, and not by pursuing territorial expansions. Thus, it comes also as no surprise that when World War I broke out in Europe, Japan—entering the war based on the Anglo–Japanese Alliance—sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding that the leased territory of Kiautschou be transferred to Japan. The young Taishō empire considered itself to be the legitimate heir to all German interests, yet its justifijication for this move was that it declared it did not have any territorial ambitions: only military considerations forced it to station troops along the railway from Qingdao to Jinan. After the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Lu Zongyu 䲨ᇇ䕯 (1876–1958),133 was informed in Tōkyō accordingly, Yuan Shikai—unable to withstand the pressure—gave in to the demands on August 31, 1914. The following day Japanese troops moved in. Although Japan promised at the same time that the bay area would eventually be restored to China,134 this was doubted from the beginning. After all, it had attacked a neutral country, which was a violation of international

132  Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefijield, 2004). 133  Lu studied political economy at the Waseda University in Tōkyō from 1899 to 1902. From 1912 on, he was fijinancial advisor to the Republican government, and from 1913 to 1916, he was ambassador to Japan. Lu was responsible for defijining the eastern part of Shandong to become a war zone and for declaring Chinese neutrality in the war. He died in 1958 in Japan. 134  “Japanese Ultimatum to Germany,” in Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 2: 1167.

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law.135 China could also not expect much help from the Great Powers because when the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917 the Wilson administration became more conciliatory toward Japan. It decided to solve the tensions that had arisen since the Russo-Japanese War and had found a new apex with the Twenty-One Demands. Japan’s geographic position and growing economic and military strength gave it the means to interfere with American trade, by taking advantage of the European involvement in the war and replacing the European competitors from the world market.136 The rapidly growing Japanese expansion in the Far East was clearly endangering the US Open Door Policy, which pushed the United States to renegotiate Japanese and American interests in China. In the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (Ishii-Ranshingu Kyōtei ⸣Ӆίɱɻȿɻȸ঄ᇊ), a diplomatic note signed between the United States and Japan on November 2, 1917, both countries resolved their dispute.137 Agreeing to uphold the Open Door Policy, the note said that “the territorial sovereignty of China . . . remains unimpaired” and that both countries agreed to oppose “to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would afffect the independence or territorial integrity of China.”138 By acknowledging that Japan had “special interests” in China because of its geographic proximity, the note was, in efffect, a contradiction to the Open Door Policy. However, Lansing and Ishii, while agreeing on this term, had entirely diffferent concepts in mind. Secretary Lansing understood that the expression referred particularly to the commercial and industrial advantage that Japan enjoyed in China because of its geographical position and that the words had

135  The Kiao Chou Question (editorial), in The Chinese Students’ Monthly X, no. 1 (October 1914); Suh Hu (Hu Shi), Japan and Kiao-Chou, in The Chinese Students’ Monthly X, no. 1 (October 1914): 27. Cf. also the assessment by Wellington Koo in Gu Weijun huiyilu, 1: 119–20. 136  For example, when a revision in freight rates on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway occurred—which would discriminate against American merchandise—the United States argued that this behavior was a violation of earlier Japanese pledges to maintain John Hay’s fijirst “Open Door” notes. On this matter, cf. Paul H. Clyde, “An Episode in American-Japanese Relations: The Manchurian Freight Rates Controversy,” Far Eastern Review XXVI (1930): 410–12, 480–82. 137  The agreement is named after its signatories, namely the United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing (1864–1928; Secretary of State from 1915 to 1920) and the Japanese special envoy Ishii Kikujirō ⸣Ӆ㧺⅑䛾 (1866–1945). 138  The China White Paper (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1949), 437. Cf. also “Exchange of Notes between the United States and Japan Concerning Their Mutual Interest Relating to the Republic of China,” The American Journal of International Law 12, no. 1 (January 1918): 1–3.

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no political signifijicance. The Japanese, however, had realized that the United States—alone among the other powers—preferred to limit Japanese expansionism. The Taishō government was convinced that such a restriction was clearly damaging their national interests, with both South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia being indispensable for the country’s development.139 The Lansing-Ishii Agreement set an end to these tensions, by trying to strengthen a principle that organized international relations according to geopolitical arguments, arguing that territorial propinquity creates special relations, which are reflected in the establishment of a new spatial order.140 The United States acknowledged the predominant position of Japan in East Asia, a position it had achieved by leaving Asia behind and therefore becoming a full member of the international community. Though the acknowledgment of Japanese special interests contradicted Wilson’s intention to defend China’s administrative and territorial integrity, Lansing recommended the agreement as wise policy, as he was convinced that economic and strategic considerations made it necessary for a great power to maintain control over areas adjacent to its borders. In the way as the United States exerted hegemonic control over the Caribbean region, Japan should in the Far East control a geopolitical space defijined and protected by a Monroe Doctrine of its own. Lansing further doubted that the United States would ever be able to destroy its rival’s spheres of influence because Japan regarded Eastern Inner Mongolia, South Manchuria, and Shandong as vital to its national interests: the Japanese prime minister Yamagata Aritomo ኡ㑓ᴹᴻ (1838–1922) had called in 1890, when speaking to the fijirst Imperial Diet, for the defense of Japan’s “cordons of sovereignty,” that is, the defense of the home islands, and equally on the defense of its “cordons of interest”, or seimeisen ⭏ભ㐊, which were situated in Korea and the adjacent Chinese areas. In 1914, the State Department received warnings that a challenge to Japanese superior position in Manchuria and Shandong would probably result in an intensifijied troop transport to China.141 This 139  Burton F. Beers, “Robert Lansing’s Proposed Bargain with Japan,” The Pacifijic Historical Review 26, no. 4 (1957): 391–400. 140  The Secretary of State William Bryan communicated to President Wilson in March 1915 that the American government “frankly recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts.” See Bryan to Wilson, March 6, 1915, Bryan Papers, Letterbook, December 1, 1914–June 8, 1915. See also Paul H. Clyde, “The Open Door in Relation to the Twenty-one Demands,” Pacifijic Afffairs III (1920): 830–41. 141  John V.A. MacMurray (Charge d’Afffairs, Peking Legation) to Bryan, September 10, 1914, United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement (Washington, 1928), 186. Here taken from https://history.state. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914Supp (File No. 763.72111/490, last access April 14, 2016).

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cautious assessment of the Japanese position in China was also the reason why, in March 1915, the United States protested against only those of the demands that afffected areas of China outside the established Japanese spheres of influence.142 With the Lansing–Ishii Agreement confijirming Japan’s hegemonic position in Asia Chinese thinkers who cared about the fate of their nation soon lost their trust in the principles of international law temporarily, such as Chen Duxiu 䲣⦘⿰ (1879–1942) and Li Dazhao ᵾབྷ䠇 (1888–1927), for instance. Yet if China joined the war on the side of the allied forces, both trusted that Shandong was returned properly.143 The reason for such optimism was the rise of a new hope, embodied by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, that promised to trump the Agreement and to fijinally end all wars by redefijining the normative function of international law. The Fourteen Points and Their Impact in East Asia In a speech delivered to a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson presented his famous Fourteen Points which assured that the Great War was fought for a moral cause and that the intervention of the United States would bring lasting peace to Europe. The most important points were that diplomacy should from now on proceed frankly and in public view (as secret diplomacy had been the major reason for the outbreak of the World War). These points were expected to develop into new universal principles transforming the world order fundamentally. In his address, “A World League for Peace”—also known as “Peace without Victory”—which had been the most detailed plan for a postwar world order issued by any statesman until that time, Wilson developed the Monroe Doctrine into a principle that was no longer spatial (as it originally had been) but territorial. The doctrine was to be made into a “doctrine of the world” so that “every people should be left free to 142  The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was abrogated in April 1923, when it was replaced by the Nine-Power Treaty. The Nine-Power Treaty was a treaty afffijirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China as part of the Open Door Policy, signed by all attendees of the Washington Naval Conference on February 6, 1922. On the cancelling of the agreement, cf. “Exchange of Notes between the United States and Japan Canceling the LansingIshii Agreement of November 2, 1917,” The American Journal of International Law 17, no. 3 (July 1923), 137. 143  On China’s motivation for entering the war on the Allied side, see Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Stephen G. Craft, “Angling for an Invitation to Paris: China’s Entry into the First World War,” International History Review 16, no. 1 (1994): 1–24.

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determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.”144 In the preface of the fijirst issue of Weekly Critique (Meizhou pinglun ⇿䙡䂅 䄆), Chen Duxiu, the editor of this journal and dean of letters at the University of Beijing, lauded the visionary Fourteen Points as they installed hope into the minds of the Chinese to end extraterritoriality and warlord government. He wrote that the American president was fundamentally restructuring the nature of international politics and explained that the meaning of the Points was that right ruled over might, both in relations between states and in relations between peoples and their governments. For this achievement, Chen hailed Wilson as the “number one good man in the world”,145 and the journalist Hollington K. Tong 㪓亅‫( ݹ‬1887–1971) characterized Wilson as the “best qualifijied statesman to assume the role of champion of human rights generally and of the rights of China in particular.” Tong pointed further out in an essay published in Millard’s Review at the time of the Peace Conference in Versailles that President Wilson is a wonderful man, having a fijirm grasp of the world situation and knowing exactly how to deal with it. That is why he is to-day heading the movement to make the world safe for democracy. President Wilson is kind hearted in dealing with a weak and oppressed nation; just in his relationship with a strong power; and extremely severe in his treatment of predatory countries. I have not met him, but his picture as

144  Wilson defijines “peace without victory” in this address in the following way: “It must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor’s terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifijice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefijit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance” (“Address of the President of the United States Delivered to the Senate of the United States,” January 22, 1917). 145  Editorial in Meizhou Pinglun, December 22, 1918 (fijirst issue of this journal). Chen states that the aim of this editorial is to oppose brute force and uphold universal principles, as it is no better reflected than in Wilson, who speaks with the moral passion of a Christian junzi.

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thrown on the screen, or shown in the magazines—serene, resolute, fearless, and yet gentle, reasonable and friendly—shows that he is not a man who temporizes. On the contrary, he is spiritual, fair-minded and fijirm in his determination.146 This judgment was also shared by a Chinese, who wrote a letter to the editors of the New York Times when word came out that Wilson was to attend the conference: The world is tired of wars, and China is tired of humiliation. The spirit of the glorious victory of the war indicates the birth of a universal feeling that imperialism of any description must be totally condemned and cast away as a dead theory of the bygone generation. The goal of the peace conference now assembled in Paris, exemplifijied by President Wilson’s lofty ideals and enlightened principles, promises . . . to usher in an upright new regime of nationalism and internationalism, based on right and justice. With this spirit and toward this goal China has ample justifijications to claim a readjustment that would give her an honorable place among the family of nations. Such a readjustment China claims not only in her own interest, to which she is legally and morally entitled, but also in the interests of world peace.147 The popularity of the Fourteen Points in China was the result of the American propaganda organized by Carl Crow, the Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information (CPI), and Paul Reinsch, the American minister to Peking.148 Because the “large part of our propaganda” was based 146  Hollington K. Tong, “What Can President Wilson Do for China?” Millard’s Review (November 16, 1918): 431–34. This article also appeared in Chinese translation in the Shanghai daily Shibao on December 18, 1918, under the title “China and the Peace Conference (Zhongguo yu heping huiyi ѝ഻㠷઼ᒣᴳ䆠).” 147  K.P. Wang to the New York Times, February 2, 1919. 148  The popularity of the Fourteen Points in China was the result of the American propaganda organized by Carl Crow, the Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information (CPI), and Paul Reinsch, the American Minister to Peking. For the American propaganda, see George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Yamagoshi, The Media Wars; Carl Crow, China Takes Her Place (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944); Jiang Menglin 㭓དྷ哏, Meiguo zongtong Weierxun canzhan yanshuo 㖾഻㑭㎡ေ⡮䚌 ৳ᡠ╄䃜 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1918); Hans Schmidt, “Democracy for China:

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on Wilson’s pronouncements, Carl Crow noted that “it was quite natural that our work should result in the aggrandizement of Wilson as a man—the creation of a superhero who was declaimed by the world as a new deliverer.”149 Because of this propaganda, the Chinese felt confijident that Wilson’s ideal of self-determination and the rights of the weak nations against powerful ones would enable them to restore their territorial sovereignty in Shandong.150 The Allied victory was believed to be a victory of democracy over despotism, with war having destroyed the ideas and practices of secret diplomacy, violation of law and military intervention into politics. The fascination for Wilson—eloquently shown by Erez Manela and Xu Guoqi—was not limited to China but was also shared by politicians and intellectuals in Japan, such as Ōkuma Shigenobu བྷ䲸䟽ؑ (1838–1922) and Yoshino Sakuzō ਹ䟾֌䙐 (1878–1933). For Ōkuma, the core issue for the nations assembled in Versailles was to resolve the problem of racial discrimination, and even though the Racial Equality Proposal proposed by Japan at the peace conference in Versailles failed to be included as an amendment to the charter of the League of Nations151 (due to the opposition of Wilson) he did not hesitate to praise the Fourteen Points in his 1919 book Racial Problems (Jinshu mondai Ӫぞ୿乼). He is convinced that these points would provide the world with a strong foundation for achieving the ideal of eternal peace. For the same reasons did Yoshino Sakuzō support the political ideology of national self-determination.152 In December 1916 he became aware of

149 

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151  152 

American Propaganda and the May Fourth Movement,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 1 (1998): 1–28; and Qian Zhixiu 䥒Ც‫؞‬, Meiguo zongtong Weierxun heyi yanshuo 㖾഻㑭㎡ေ⡮ 䚌઼䆠╄䃜 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1919). Carl Crow, President Wilson’s Eyes and Ears in China, 1918–19, n.d., typewritten, 15 pp., Carl Crow MSS, folder 48, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri– Columbia, here taken from Schmidt, “Democracy for China,” 1. In the same way, the people in Europe who sufffered under the German aggression generally welcomed Wilson’s intervention, though state leaders such as Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando were skeptical of the applicability of Wilsonian idealism. Cf. Irwin Unger, These United States: The Questions of Our Past (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007), 561. For the background and impact of the Racial Equality Proposal, see Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality. Yoshino, the father of Japanese Taishō democracy, pointed out that Japan advanced democracy at home but exerted imperialism abroad. Being a professor at Tōkyō Imperial University, Yoshino had contacts with Chinese and Korean students and sympathized with the anti-Japanese movements in both countries. It was obvious for him that the MayFourth Movement in China was not directed against Japan itself but against its aggressive behavior. For a detailed analysis of his political thinking, cf. Mitani Taiichirō й䉧ཚа䛾,

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the American president who—just four months before declaring war—had announced his appeal to a Peace without Victory. Yoshino very quickly accepted the contribution of Wilson, judging that in the past, postwar peace did not result from the total defeat of one party but, rather, from the inability of both parties to continue war at some point in time (mostly because of materiel constraints). Such a peace is just a temporary compromise, and not a solution in itself. Feelings of revenge and hate would still remain, even in the case of a total defeat of one party. International relations in the aftermath of war are thus still defijined by might.153 Wilson’s proposal—despite its abstract character and lack of concrete details— offfered for Yoshino a new approach to build a peaceful world order. He accordingly praised the plan of establishing an international league for peace. It should serve as a foundation of international democracy, leading to an international equality of nations but also the true establishment of democracy in every state.154 This is due to the fact that only a just society can contribute to an international order characterized by freedom, equality, and justice, just as Wilson had envisioned when applying the principles of domestic policies to the international arena. In January 1919, Yoshino expressed in a lengthy piece, titled “A League of Nations Is Possible” (Kokusai renmei wa kanō nari ഭ䳋㚟ⴏȄਟ㜭ǿȟ), his fijirm belief in that league. With war being tragic and costly, he preferred the ideal of eternal peace, as propagated by Immanuel Kant, and favored the elevation of international law to a powerful weapon, thereby protecting smaller nations against aggression emanating from the great powers.155 However, during the ensuing months, the negotiations in Versailles showed that this idealism had no true chance of transforming the international order to a better one. Although Yoshino tried to approach Li Dazhao in his effforts to strengthen cooperation with China (a precondition for peace, he believed), Taishō demokurashii ron: Yoshino Sakuzō no jidai to sono ato བྷ↓ɏɪȷɱȿό䄆˖ਹ 䟾֌䙐ȃᱲԓǽDzȃᖼ (Tōkyō: Chūō kōronsha, 1974). 153  Yoshino Sakuzō, “From Imperialism to International Democracy (Teikokushugi yori kokusai minshushugi e ᑍഭѫ㗙ȝȟഭ䳋≁ѫѫ㗙ȍ),” Yoshino Sakuzō senshū 6 (1919): 35–70 (the original appeared in the journal Rokugo zasshi in June–July 1919). For his discussion on peace without victory, cf. his series of articles titled “Shandong Question (Santō mondai ኡᶡ୿乼),” which appeared between May 20 and 26, 1919, in the Ōsaka mainichi shinbun, in Yoshino Sakuzō senshū 9: 228–29. 154  On his admiration for Wilson, cf. Yoshino Sakuzō, “International Peace and Thought (Kokusai heiwa to shisō ഭ䳋ᒣ઼ᙍᜣ),” in Yoshino Sakuzō senshū 6 (1921): 180–91. 155  After all, national sovereignty is always limited when international treaties are concluded. See Yoshino Sakuzō, “A League of Nations Is Possible (Kokusai renmei wa kanō nari ഭ䳋 㚟ⴏȄਟ㜭ǿȟ),” in Yoshino Sakuzō senshū 6 (1919): 3–13.

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his effforts were curtailed by the Japanese government.156 The idealism of both was utterly shattered when the Versailles Peace Conference was concluded by violating one of Wilson’s central points, namely, that of abolishing secret treaties. In a text titled “Secret Diplomacy and the Robbers’ World” (Mimi waijiao yu qiangdao shijie 〈ᇶཆӔ㠷ᕧⴌц⭼), Li directly makes secret diplomacy responsible for the fatal decision to resolve the Shandong question in favor of Japan on the grounds of a secret treaty concluded in February/March 1917 among Japan, England, France, Russia, and Italy.157 With the Points being no more than an illusion, Li could not but wonder—despite the compliments the French president addressed to Wilson—how the American president could be content with such a peace, which one could only call a false peace (weihe ܎઼).158 This fundamental change in Li’s thinking—his turning away from both Wilson’s idealism and the embracement of the internationalism of Lenin and Trotsky instead—has often been interpreted as a result of the devastating decision on the Shandong question in Versailles, in which China had moral principles on its side while Japan relied on realities of power.159

156  Yoshino Sakuzō, “Anti-Japanese Harassment in China and Ways of Fundamental Solution (Shina no hai-Nichiteki sōjō to konponteki kaiketsusaku ᭟䛓ȃᧂᰕⲴ偂ᬮǽṩᵜⲴ䀓 ⊪ㆆ),” in Tōhō jiron (July 1919). Cf. also Yoshino Sakuzō senshū 9: 245–54. 157  For Chen Duxiu, however, one was to criticize the conciliatory attitude of the Chinese government toward Japan. The president or premier was not to blame but Japanese aggression and the government. In this situation, Chinese judicial courts should not indict protesting students but rather persecute the traitors, Chen argued. The reason this did not happen was the lack of patriotism and unity among the Chinese people. Cf. Chen Duxiu, “The Fundamental Evil in the Diplomacy towards Japan (Dui Ri waijiao de genben zuie ሽᰕཆӔⲴṩᵜ㖚ᜑ),” in Meizhou pinglun, no. 21 (May 11, 1919): 2–3. For Li Dazhao’s position, see Li Dazhao, Mimi waijiao yu qiangdao shijie, in Meizhou pinglun (May 18, 1919) (also in Li Dazhao quanji, 2:337–39). For a full German translation of this central text, cf. Li Da-zhao, Im Kampf für ein sozialistisches China (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1969), 66–69. 158  Li Dazhao ᵾབྷ䠇, “How about President Wilson’s Regrets? (Wei xiansheng gankai heru? ေ‫⭏ݸ‬ᝏមօྲ),” in Meizhou pinglun, no. 28 (June 29, 1919), in Li Dazhao quanji, 2: 353. 159  In the end, the victory of the October Revolution and the rise of Bolshevism resulted in a left turn in Chinese political thinking, causing Li to call for a united front of Asian people against the so-called European imperialist robbers in the months before May 1919. See Demetrio Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question (1917–1928) (Genève: Librairie E. Droz, 1957); Manela, The Wilsonian Moment; and Bruce A. Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).

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This resulted in a deep feeling of disappointment.160 It continued to rule China’s foreign policy behavior and thinking far beyond the foundation of the League of Nations in January, 1920. Later conflicts and wars showed that the League was in fact to remain a rather powerless organization that—especially in the 1930s—proved more and more unable to maintain world peace.161 According to Edward Carr, a blind belief in idealism had led to the breakdown of the Versailles system that then caused the outbreak of World War II (a central topic in his 1939 book The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939). The Versailles system was based on the belief in three idealist topoi, which were international organization, international law and military disarmament. When Japanese aggression toward the continent became more and more apparent, the nonpresence of these three elements of the then-widespread idealism proved fatal for Chinese national sovereignty. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria after the Mukden Incident in September 1931 and the installation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 caused China to appeal to the League of Nations that was however unable to restore the status ante. Japan’s withdrawal from the League fijinally showed the Chinese that “the League of Nations is an organization that is a body of all the imperialists, a tool to oppress colonies and to divide up weak and small nations,” as pointed out by the political columnist Yan Cheng in October 1932 in the Weekly Journal for National Salvation (Jiuguo xunkan

160  This insight was one that was not necessarily sudden, yet unexpected. While the public opinion was anxious to see the implementation of Wilson’s principles for China, the Chinese delegates to Versailles soon discovered that their aspirations had to face the severe reality of power politics. When the great powers decided during the preliminary discussions to grant China two seats at the conference plenary—and thereby giving it the status of a minor power—the delegates complained that China, with its considerably larger territory and huge population, was put on the same level as Greece and Poland, and even below that of Brazil and Belgium. Even more disappointing for the Chinese delegates was the fact that the primary aggressor in East Asia—Japan—was to gain fijive seats and to have the right to participate in all sessions of the conference (and not only those that concerned its interests, as was the case with China). Cf. the chapter “China’s Place among Nations,” in Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 99–117. 161  The literature on the League of Nations and the Sino-Japanese controversy is immense; therefore, I list here only the most important sources: Ian Hill Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931–1933 (New York: K. Paul International, 1992); Thomas W. Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008); Westel Woodbury Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935); Stefan Hell, Der Mandschurei-Konflikt: Japan, China und der Völkerbund 1931 bis 1933 (Tübingen: Universitas, 1999).

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ᮁ഻ᰜ࠺).162 One year later, the Jiuguo xunkan published a piece arguing that

the Japanese proposal of pan-Asianism might be a viable alternative to the League of Nations. Although there was no consensus on how far to compromise with Japanese conceptions of global order, the fact alone that Wilsonism was not able to fulfijill the hopes pushed both Chinese and Japanese to imagine alternative forms of political order. Any pan-Asian movement in that time, however, had to address the issue if and to what extent—with the East Asian nations facing a considerable low level of civilization in the eyes of the Europeans—they should admitted among the ranks of the Western nations. The primary task was thus to remove East Asia from what was perceived as European control, or hegemony of the non-indigenous discipline of international law. Disillusionment with Wilsonism thus not only led to the submission to the reality of realism but also to more creative imagination of global order that, after the demise of idealism, could no longer be based on the nationstate as the primary form of politeia. A new actor had to be empowered to provide peace and stability to the region. While Japanese arrogance and insincerity were becoming more and more obvious (especially after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in September 1937), the Marco Polo Bridge Incident soon stripped the Japanese of any authority in determining or even prescribing how international relations in East Asia, as well as between Asia and Europe, were to be organized. This was also the case for those scholars who tried to develop diverging models of international relations that could, at least in principle, leave behind the weaknesses of the European models and concentrate on morality—Japan’s duty to help China and cooperation of both countries against the aggression of the white race, highlighting common culture and common race—as a means to create peace superior than the balance of power in classical realism. Influenced by these deliberations, legal scholars in Japan developed during the 1930s and 1940s a new theory of international relations that combined this morality with spatiality. For instance, Yasui Kaoru ᆹӅ䛱 (1907–1980), a legal scholar and ideologist of the Japanese war efffort, argued in his writings that classical international law was not universal, but particular and even a strategy of European imperialism.163 Influenced by the Japanese translations of 162  Jiuguo xunkan, no. 23 (October 10, 1932): 4; here taken from Mitter, “An Uneasy Engagement,” 215. 163  After World War II, Yasui experienced a radical change in political thinking when he joined the anti-atom bomb movement after 1945, subsequently began to emulate North Korean socialism, and supported the Juche idea, the offfijicial state ideology of North Korea. Cf. his book The North Korean Revolution and the Liberation of the People: The Embodiment

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Carl Schmitt and the two Soviet legal scholars Evgeny Alexandrovich Korovin (1892–1964) and Evgeny Bronislavovich Pashukanis (1891–1937),164 during the war, Yasui, a professor at the Imperial University of Tōkyō, and Tabata Shigejirō ⭠⮁㤲Ҽ䛾 (1911–2001) his colleague from Kyoto University, formulated the vision of a Greater East Asian International Law (Dai Tō-A kokusaihō བྷᶡӌ ഭ䳋⌅). During the 1940s, the Japan Association of International Law started the Series of the Greater East Asian International Law (Dai Tō-A kokusaihō sōsho བྷᶡӌഭ䳋⌅਒ᴨ), of which Yasui contributed the fijirst volume, namely, the important work Basic Concepts on the European Spatial International Law (Ōshū kōiki kokusaihō no kiso rinen ⅗ᐎᒳฏഭ䳋⌅ȃส⼾⨶ᘥ, 1942). This book is considered one of the most important publications on Carl Schmitt’s theory on international law in the Japanese academic world at that time. In this book, Yasui—himself a great admirer of the German scholar165—introduced the concepts of Großraum and konkrete Ordnung, both of which directed his critique of conventional international law. Yasui used Schmitt’s critique to develop an international law that fijitted the Greater East Asian area as a new order that had emancipated itself from the European rules.166 Tabata, on his account, created in his work The Plural Structure of International Legal Order (Kokusaihō chitsujo no tagenteki kōsei ഭ䳋⌅〙ᒿȃཊ‫Ⲵݳ‬Ώᡀ, 1942–1943), a model of international order that, at its theoretical core, questioned the universality of European international law. The fact that Eastern states were integrated into the discipline of European international law did not necessarily mean that international law was to be considered universal. It only meant that these states had agreed to follow certain rules, but this did not prevent them from developing theories of their own, Tabata argued. Similar to the writings of his coeval Matsushita Masatoshi ᶮл↓ሯ (1901–1986), he based his critique not only on epistemological grounds but also on geopolitical ones. Matsushita, who had written the second book in the 1940s series under the title Basic of the Juche Ideology (Chōsen kakumei no ningen kaihō: Chuche shisō no gugen ᵍ凞䶙 ભǽӪ䯃䀓᭮˖ɉɭɉȯᙍᜣȃާ⨮), published by Yūzankaku shuppan (Tōkyō) in 1980. 164  Deeply entrenched in Marxist theory, Pashukanis understood that “modern international law is the legal form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves for domination over the rest of the world.” He further argues that “international law owes its existence to the fact that the bourgeoisie exercises its domination over the proletariat and over the colonial countries” (Evgeny Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law [New York: Academic Press, 1980], 168–83, 184–85). 165  Cf. Yasui Kaoru ᆹӅ䛱, Ōshū kōiki kokusaihō no kiso rinen ⅗ᐎᒳฏഭ䳋⌅ȃส⼾⨶ ᘥ (Tōkyō: Yuhikaku, 1942), 106. 166  Ibid., 3.

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Concepts on the American Spatial International Law (Beishū kōiki kokusaihō no kiso rinen ㊣⍢ᒳฏഭ䳋⌅ȃส⼾⨶ᘥ, 1942, the title being very close to the fijirst book by Yasui), offfered a more positive analysis of the American Monroe Doctrine because he had valued the good neighbor policy of the United States since the early 1930s. By doing so, he was able to introduce American notion of space for the creation of a new order in East Asia. In wartime Japan, regionalism enjoyed great popularity not only because of panAsianism but also because of the writings of Carl Schmitt. According to his Großraumtheorie, regional blocs defijined international relations, and these blocs were to replace the system of sovereign nation-states. Arguing likewise, Tabata considered the Greater Space to be a more appropriate alternative and preferred an ontologically plural form of international order to the Kelsenian theory of epistemologically single and integrated one. By linking the plural structure to Greater Spaces, he arrived at creating blocs that each had their own kind of international law, which was for Asia the aforementioned Greater East Asian International Law (Dai Tō-A kokusaihō བྷᶡӌഭ䳋⌅). Although directed against Western hegemony, this law was actually no true alternative. In the end, Yasui’s reading of Schmitt—coupled with the impact Haushofer had on Japanese geopolitical discourse—helped to imagine a new order that was both ideology and camouflage for Japanese imperial ambitions, given the self-ascribed moral duty to help neighboring countries in their fijight against the White race (as the post-1945 critique of pan-Asianism has shown, such as in the case of Takeuchi Yoshimi). In 1943, however, a Chinese legal scholar named Luo Mengce 㖵དྷ޺ (1906– 1991)167 was able to imagine a truly alternative model of world order that combined morality with spatiality diffferently, and more convincingly, as I argue in the following part. Luo Mengce propagated an order whose core element is derived from ancient political philosophy, which is the notion of all-underheaven, or tianxia. This model can be understood properly if situated in the Chinese political tradition that saw the creation of order as a metapolitical act that could be achieved by an adequate moral perfection. I show in the next chapter that the recourse to ancient tradition is not simply a return to the past but also an intellectual efffort to make an active contribution to a better 167  After graduating from Henan University with a bachelor’s degree in law in 1931 and receiving a master’s degree in pedagogy from the Beiping Pedagogical University, Luo went to Great Britain to continue his studies in law. Because of his academic achievements, he was named a member of the Royal Academy but returned to China in 1939 due to the war with Japan and became a professor of law at various universities in China. In 1949 he left for Hong Kong.

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world order, instead of passively accepting the rules of international society. It is also more than postcolonial resistance against the discipline of international law that Japan had so perfectly adapted for its own imperialist ambitions. On the contrary, Luo’s proposal of a true all-under-heaven proved to be less problematic because it was—at least on epistemological grounds—able to avoid the suspicion of hegemony (contrary to Japan), even though it constituted a normative turn that was thought to be restored on an ecumenical scale. The reason therefore was that this tianxia model entailed the possibility of transforming the enemy into a friend and thereby creating a more humane community than in the case of pan-Asianism. For being able to do so Luo and his later supporters had to turn a blind eye to the radical enemy discourse in the late imperial era that built on both indigenous and non-indigenous traditions.

Chapter 6

Pacifying the Hostis: China’s Return to Ecumenical Morality The preceding chapters on national mapping and the pan-Asian fijight against the outside enemy—that is, the white peril—have shown that the division of the world into separate nation-states along the lines of ethnicity, race or civilization proved to be a failure because nationalist thinking created—not only in East Asia—national egoisms causing conflict and war on a global level. Since the late nineteenth century Chinese and Japanese thinkers became aware that even the modern discipline of international law was unable to provide a solution, as shows the disappointment with Wilsonian idealism. As a consequence thereof, political thinkers in the Republican era turned to their own philosophical tradition that appeared as a more promising way of achieving world peace. Contrary to Western civilization that was held solely responsible for the wrongdoings of the irreconcilable hostis in both national and international afffairs, the Confucian conception of morality was believed to dissolve the ontologies of exclusionary friend and foe, which included notions of enmity within and without China. Originally imperial China considered the way of organizing the world according to these ontologies—if not unknown—unnecessary because social order itself was devoid of boundaries. If one accepted the universal values defijined by Confucian civil theology (Ziviltheologie, Weber-Schäfer), one could cross the boundary between Chineseness and non-Chineseness. Consequently, barbarians were also able to become members of the Chinese tianxia and thus, in principle, did not experience discrimination or exclusion. The cosmological order is described by a profound presence of tolerance that favored pacifijism over war and never developed an inhumane notion of the irreconcilable, or absolute enemy. The most commonly named reason for this assessment is the central concept of humanity, or ren ӱ, said to permeate the whole cosmos.1 1  Accordingly, the single man does not achieve his personhood (Menschsein) by his individual self but due to his integration into the social context of his collective. Ren as humanity is thus not implying the abstract notion in the tradition of European humanism. This interpretation is based on the assumption that with moral values confijined to the mantic sphere, there is no breakthrough of abstract conceptions of morality imaginable. By grounding historic truth into the mantic order, traditional China was not able to develop an epistemology as

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This ideational interpretation has long been the core feature of the so-called pacifijist bias of Confucianism. According to Fairbank, “Warfare was disesteemed in Confucianism. . . . The resort to warfare (wu) was an admission of bankruptcy in the pursuit of wen civility or culture. Consequently, it should be a last resort. . . . Herein lies the pacifijist bias of the Chinese tradition. . . . Expansion through wen. . . was natural and proper; whereas expansion by wu, brute force and conquest, was never to be condoned.”2 China was deemed incapable of developing into a militarist society because state behavior was defijined by this pacifijist culture.3 As shown by Wang Yuankang, this assessment is highly problematic because pre-nineteenth century China was very well able to resort to means of force when facing security issues at home and abroad. Its realpolitik—including actions of territorial acquisition, enemy destruction, and total military victory—seemed to contradict the Confucian principle of benevolent rule. On a conceptual level however, the situation looked diffferently. While Confucian culture has little influence over the country’s strategic behavior, it served in times of weakness as a culturally acceptable justifijication for military restraint. This justifijication described a political ideal that each emperor was obliged to fulfijill because only by exerting benevolence to the world did a harmonious and peaceful world order seem possible. Pacifijism served here merely as a rhetorical strategy (as it does today). This ideal was so central to the Chinese self-understanding that— even when only evoked when deemed strategically necessary—it guided the political thinking of both the emperor and the literati. Astonishingly, this ideal was shared by both Han-Chinese and non-Han-Chinese dynasties, with the Manchurian Qing being the dynasty possessing an extraordinarily sophisticated understanding of Confucianism as a universal ideology being fully

did Hellas. As argued by Rolf Trauzettel, this overarching mantic cosmology was also a major reason why an autonomous subject did not emerge in China. See “Denken die Chinesen anders? Komparatistische Thesen zur chinesischen Philosophiegeschichte (Do the Chinese Think Diffferently? Comparatistic Theses in the History of Chinese Philosophy),” Saeculum 41, no. 2 (1990): 79–99. 2  John K. Fairbank, “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 7–9. 3  A point strongly made by Zhao Tingyang. See especially his recent publications, such as Zhao, The Politics of Everyone (Meigeren de zhengzhi ⇿њӪⲴ᭯⋫). On recent assessment of the pacifijist bias see Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism; Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989 (London: Routledge, 2001); and Wang Yuan-kang, Harmony and War.

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detached from ethnic, cultural, or religious issues, as the Qing’s discourse on Confucian morality has shown.4 It comes thus to no surprise that with the dominance of this pacifijist and benevolent ideal in Confucian political thinking it was rather impossible to defijine an absolute enemy in the Christian, ontological sense. Given the fact that the notion of evil (e ᜑ) did not have a theological foundation in traditional China, the enemy was always a relative one, one that could be taught the benefijits of Confucianism and thus be transformed (hua ॆ) accordingly.5 Deeply entrenched in such a world order, the resistance against either tyrant rulers on the inside or enemies from outside did not have an ethical foundation, because it was considered self-evident. The resistance was directed against the tyrant ruler as a person, and not in the sense of a resistance that aimed for the replacement of the sociopolitical order. With the arrival of the nation-state as an alternative political order things changed decisively. The new order was highly particularistic in character and necessitated clear distinctions between oneself and the other, or foreign and domestic. New at this point of time is that the categorizations are no longer nonexclusive, but are instead perceived as an essentialist given. These categorizations offfered the possibility of resistance becoming systematic and allowing for according notions of the absolute enemy. In the late imperial era, the defijinition of enemies became constitutive for providing a well-founded and legitimate sense of collective consciousness, thus also the emergence of the yellow and white peril discourse and the creation of national maps (and maps of national humiliation) in the fijirst decades of the twentieth century. In domestic politics nationalist ideology turned against the racial enemy for harming national interest, which were in the late Qing the Manchus who either weakened or opposed the modernization ambitions (e.g., Empress Dowager Cixi ᘏ①, 1835–1908). The racial nationalism of that time was a Han nationalism in which the radical thinker Zou Rong ㈅ኈ (1885–1905) even called for genocide of the Manchus in order to restore the rule of the Han Chinese.6

4  Cf. here exemplarily the conciliatory inquisition case of Zeng Jing under the rule of emperor Yongzheng discussed in chapter 2. See also Matten, “The Worship of General Yue Fei (1103– 1142) and His Problematic Creation as a National Hero in Twentieth Century China.” 5  In its proper sense, e was often contrasted to what is mei 㖾, or beautiful, and it also contrasted to virtue (de ᗧ), implying that chaos (luan Ҳ) needs to be ordered (zhi ⋫). 6  Cf. Tsou Jung, The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903 (translated and annotated by John Lust) (The Hague: Mouton & Co, 1968).

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To interpret this paradigmatic change—as the existing research literature does—as a result of introducing a new world order conception (i.e., nationalism) to a civilization defijined by civil, and not political, theology is undoubtedly one way of understanding the great transformation of political thinking after the Western impact. Yet, it does only tell one part of the story. Given the fact that contemporary scholars such as Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong (whose views are discussed later on) consider the emergence of a radical or absolute enemy to be exclusively a particularity of Western civilization (tracing it back to the Christian belief) and instead emphasize the tolerant character of Chinese political thinking by cherishing the superiority of Confucian pacifijism, making clear how the dichotomy of friend and foe can actually be applied to China is imperative. I argue that the pacifijist bias still present in numerous recent publications is not only misrepresenting historical reality, but also based on a very narrow reading of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political, and reduces the philosophical understanding of the friend–foe distinction unnecessarily, as I show in this chapter. In fact, Schmitt tried to apply the distinction in the political fijield as the general principle that under certain circumstances can lead to the irreducible conflicts resulting in war and physical extermination of the enemy. Yet, this radicalness should not be confused with moral, aesthetic, or economic issues, because [t]he distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association of dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw on all those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions. The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions.7

7  Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George D. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 27. The German original reads: “Die Unterscheidung zwischen Freund und Feind hat den Sinn, den äußeren Intensitätsgrad einer Verbindung oder Trennung, einer Assoziation oder Dissoziation zu bezeichnen; sie kann theoretisch und praktisch bestehen, ohne daß gleichzeitig alle jene moralischen, ästhetischen, ökonomischen oder anderen Unterscheidungen zur Anwendung kommen müssen. Der politische Feind braucht nicht moralisch böse, er muß nicht ästhetisch häßlich sein; er muß nicht als wirtschaftlicher Konkurrent auftreten, und es kann sogar vorteilhaft scheinen, mit ihm Geschäfte zu machen” (Carl Schmitt, Der Begrifff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien [Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009], 26).

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The distinction of friend and foe is fundamental and substantial for the defijinition of the political, for it is indispensable for creating and sustaining political order: It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps fijinds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or hopes that the antithesis will one day vanish from the world, or whether it is perhaps sound pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor with normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend and enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere.8 It is quite telling that the defijinition of the enemy is not understood normatively, as often held by scholars,9 nor is it a contrafactual construction.10 Rather, the use of hostis and amicus in political discourse is a fundamental principle for creating order. What interests here is—as emphasized by Schmitt—the degree of association or dissociation, and not so much the question if an enmity is considered to be irreconcilable or not. If the degree of intensity of enmity rises,

8 

9  10 

Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 28. The German original reads: “Ob man es aber für verwerflich hält oder nicht und vielleicht einen atavistischen Rest barbarischer Zeiten darin fijindet, dass die Völker sich immer noch wirklich nach Freund und Feind gruppieren, oder hoffft, die Unterscheidung werde eines Tages von der Erde verschwinden, ob es vielleicht gut und richtig ist, aus erzieherischen Gründen zu fijingieren, dass es überhaupt keine Feinde mehr gibt, alles das kommt hier nicht in Betracht. Hier handelt es sich nicht um Fiktionen und Normativitäten, sondern um die seinsmäßige Wirklichkeit und die reale Möglichkeit dieser Unterscheidung. Man kann jene Hofffnungen und erzieherischen Bestrebungen teilen oder nicht; dass die Völker sich nach dem Gegensatz von Freund und Feind gruppieren, dass dieser Gegensatz auch heute noch wirklich und für jedes politisch existierende Volk als reale Möglichkeit gegeben ist, kann man vernünftigerweise nicht leugnen” (Schmitt, Der Begrifff des Politischen, 27). See, for instance, Münkler, Imperien; and Zhao Tingyang, Meigeren de zhengzhi ⇿њӪⲴ᭯⋫. The view that the enemy is not a contrafactual construction is shared by Michaela Rissing and Thilo Rissing, Politische Theologie: Schmitt, Derrida, Metz (Paderborn, München: FinkVerlag, 2009).

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it simply reveals that a collective feels a stronger urge to create order by distinguishing its members from nonmembers (i.e., to raise political consciousness). In its most extreme form, the wish for distinction can also include the physical annihilation of the enemy, but this is only a discretionary provision, not a necessary one. In other words, it is not surprising that radical, irreconcilable defijinitions of the enemy actually did exist in China. When showing in the following how these radical notions became constitutive for the selfdefijinition and political action in the late Qing, it is important to point out that the enemy appears not just as the personal enemy (inimicus) as it had been in earlier dynasties, but as the political enemy (hostis), insofar as the defijinition of the enemy was an intrinsic element not only of nationalist ideology, but also appeared as a constitutive element of the modern political itself. Seen from this perspective it is no longer necessary to intentionally purporting the picture of a benevolent and peace-loving ancient and medieval China. The use of force in maintaining social and political order is certainly a longstanding tenet in the legalist tradition. Chinese rulers often resorted to it when quelling domestic revolt and maintaining border security, as the long list of wars led against domestic and foreign enemies, especially since the Song dynasty, shows.11 Instead of overestimating the peaceful character of Confucianism (particularly in Confucian works that see the kingly way, wangdao ₺㆏, as the best way to rule) the very existence of military and legalist writings and the fact that the prescriptions in these writings were more often than not readily adopted when deemed necessary shows that the traditional approach to force is close to the Western notion of realism.12 To some extent, the later Qing dynasty shared this notion. Rule and territorial conquest of the invading Manchurian tribe in the mid-seventeenth century—and during the glorious rule of the three major emperors of the eighteenth century— was a key issue in founding the Qing empire. Considering that in the mideighteenth century, the Qing prevented an alliance between Russia and the Zunghar Khanate empire directed against the Manchu (for it sought to protect its northern border) shows that its quest for territorial control was politically

11 

12 

For a list of wars in Chinese history—which were of course not all defensive wars— cf. Zhongguo lidai zhanzheng nianbiao ѝഭশԓᡈҹᒤ㺘, 2 vols. (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2003). Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Current IR theory on China shares Johnston’s conclusion that realism is prevailing in Chinese history. For a more detailed discussion on the assumed pacifijism in Confucianism see the chapter “Excursus: The Renaissance of Tianxia in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought” in this book.

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motivated, as it continued the divide-and-rule policy of the Ming. In the end, the Qing conquered the Zunghar kingdom with brute force, resulting in the annihilation of about 80 percent of its population during the mid-1750s. From the perspective of the Qing, this did not constitute a moral problem in the effforts to consciously create and sustain a functioning empire. This massacre notwithstanding, the discussion of the role of Confucian orthopraxy in Qing’s effforts to defijine China as a multiethnic empire did not translate into a radical notion of enmity: the high Qing considered in fact differences in culture, ethnicity, and religion only of little signifijicance,13 insofar as its understanding of enmity was fairly diffferent from Plato’s stark dichotomy of inimicus and hostis who interpreted the conflict among the Greeks with the notion of discord, and only that between Hellenes and barbarians as war.14 Accordingly, I argue that the conscious and radical exclusion of enemies from one’s own politeia was something that emerged only in the nineteenth century. This was achieved by combining the political exclusion of the enemy with fijirst traditional demonological practices (in the case of the Taiping) and later with European ideologies such as racism and nationalism. I aim to prove this by analyzing discourses on the enemy in the late Qing that helped to radically transform the traditional world order and to establish a new non-ecumenical political order (yet only prevailed temporarily). A detailed knowledge of these discourses is indispensable for understanding the transformation of the Confucian cosmology into a world order characterized by a civil theology of a diffferent, non-normative kind of international law; a law that despite its high promises was not able to reconcile enemies in the course of the twentieth century, even though Confucian philosophers such as Luo Mengce—and later Zhao Tingyang15—hoped for it.

13 

14  15 

This has already been analyzed in detail by Pamela Crossley, Mark Elliott and Marc Andre Matten. See Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Thinking About Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” Late Imperial China 11, no. 1 (1990): 1–35; Mark C. Elliott, “Manchu (Re)Defijinitions of the Nation in the Early Qing,” Indiana East Asian Working Papers Series on Language and Politics in Modern China 7, no. 46 (1996): 46–78; and Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen. Similar to the interpretation of Koselleck, “The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetrical Counterconcepts”; cf. also Schmitt, Der Begrifff des Politischen. For a recent assertion of this idealized notion, cf. Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 202–05. Zhao’s interpretation is closely linked to his discussion of tianxia as an alternative political order, as I show in the following chapter.

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The Scary Demon: Reconciling the Inside Enemy

The Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864)—led by the heterodox Christian convert Hong Xiuquan ⍚⿰‫( ޘ‬1814–1864) against the ruling Qing dynasty—aimed at establishing a heavenly kingdom on earth with a full set of modern and imperial institutions that were to replace the existing order.16 In his book The Taiping Heavenly Sun (Taiping tianri ཚᒣ⣑ᰕ),17 Hong described that he felt in his dream that he was transported to heaven, where he met a venerable old man, whom he later identifijied as God (Huangdi, i.e., the Christian God). The Old Father, as he was also called, complained to Hong that humankind had fallen away from him and had forgotten that he had created the earth and was their father. The demons had taken control of the earth and—seen from his position in heaven—even started to invade heaven. He points out that men have mostly lost their original heart (benxin ᵜᗳ), now indulging in consumption of wine, women, opium, and general debauchery. To solve this problem, God handed Hong a sword with which to annihilate the demons and a seal by which he was protected from evil spirits.18 Hong’s vision is clearly influenced by elements of Christian belief, as existing research shows. In 1847, he studied with American Baptist Issachar Roberts (1802–1871) for two months, during which time he gained most of his knowledge of Christianity, especially the Old Testament.19 This caused Hong to 16 

17  18 

19 

Mizoguchi, “A Search for the Perspective on the Studies of East Asia” and Chūgoku no shōgeki ѝഭȃ㺍᪳. The origins and political program of this rebellious movement have so far been the object of analysis by many authors, among them most prominently Rudolf Wagner, Barend ter Haar, Thomas Reilly, Franz Michael, and Vincent Shih, to name several. None of them, however, has approached the movement from a perspective that considers their concept of enmity and its implications for the dissolution of the traditional world order. Written in 1848, the extant copy dates from 1862. For a detailed analysis of the visions of Hong Xiuquan, cf. Theodore Hamberg, The Visions of Hung-Siu-tshuen, and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection (Hong Kong: Printed at the China Mail Offfijice, 1854); J.C. Cheng, Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion 1850–1864 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1963); Rudolf G. Wagner, Reenacting the Heavenly Vision: The Role of Religion in the Taiping Rebellion (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1982); and Ichiko Chūzō ᐲਔᇉй, Kō Shūzen no gensō ⍚⿰‫ޘ‬ȃᒫᜣ (Tōkyō: Kyūko shoin, 1989). P.M. Yap, “The Mental Illness of Hung Hsiu-ch’uan, Leader of the Taiping Rebellion,” Far Eastern Quarterly 13 (1954): 287–304, traces the rebellion not to European imperialism (as the Marxist historiography does), nor to the pressures of overpopulation, corruption, or protonationalism, but to the mental illness of Hong. On the Christian influence on Hong Xiuquan, cf. Eugene Powers Boardman, Christian Influence upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion 1851–1864 (Madison: University

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develop a profound division of humankind formerly unknown to Confucian thinking.20 Although in principle all true human beings were children of God, some were deluded, Hong believed, and this necessitated an intervention. The deluded were to be liberated from demonic influence and reeducated (which included to silence the Confucians). His vision however included all “human beings” as God’s children: Hong was to rule the ten thousand states (i.e., the whole world), not just China. On the orders of God, he began his battle with the demons and those who had been under a demonic influence. People who had just been deluded by the demons should not be punished but, rather, should be seized and freed from their delusion without being punished: they were later to be made part of the social community of the Taiping. This approach was still very much in line with the traditional, borderless tianxia characterized by Sinocentrism. Those, however, who had helped the Manchu demons (such as the offfijicials in the service of the Qing) should be treated like the demons themselves, namely, killed and/or annihilated (a call already issued by earlier triads in the eighteenth century). A closer look at the central writings of the Taiping shows that this enmity was so radical and irreconcilable that there emerged suddenly non-Chinese communities with whom it was not only improper to have contact with or who were to be held at bay at any price, but who were so ontologically diffferent that any acceptance was considered impossible. In other words, the Manchu were not relative enemies anymore but absolute ones. By making enmity an ontological issue, the foe became irreconcilable and could no longer be part of the known world. In this respect, the Taiping difffered decisively from Carl Schmitt who in his pre-1933 works on political theology defijined the enemy as someone who is “in a specially intense way, existentially something diffferent and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”21 The enemy is determined here as one that is substantially necessary for imaging the political. It is thus neither necessary nor wise to demonize the enemy, even an existential enemy has the right to exist, and has to be treated properly (Hegung des Feindes).

20 

21 

of Wisconsin Press, 1952), and chapter 7 in Vincent Y.C. Shih, The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretations, and Influences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967). As argued in the text Taiping tianri ཚᒣᄤᰕ, in Xiang Da ੁ䚄, ed., Taiping tianguo ཚᒣཙ഻, 8 vols. (Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguangshe, 1953), 2: 639f. For a translation, see Wagner, Reenacting the Heavenly Vision, 28. Cf. also Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, 3 vols. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), 63f. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27. Cf. also the discussion in Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss und “Der Begrifff des Politischen”: Zu einem Dialog unter Abwesenden (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1998).

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Considering that Schmitt abhorred religious wars, it is safe to conclude that the Taiping’s attitude toward the enemy was far more radical here, which could also be explained by the fact that their ideology was not purely utopian but based on a deep belief of non-contingency. To remove the enemy was for them less an option than a moral duty. This is also obvious in the terminology used by the Taiping.22 The central term used for enemy is yao ࿆, which, in its classical notion, refers to the unrestrained and relentless character of the demonic enemy.23 The demonic character is thus closely related to the Confucian morality (which itself is to a high degree contingent).24 It also entails the notion of treason: bianyao 䆺࿆—to become a demon—is understood as becoming a renegade or a traitor who is so radical that humanity is removed from the excluded group.25 As a consequence, the Taiping referred to offfijicials and soldiers in the service of the Manchu state to as yaotou ࿆九.26 Their written publications were called yaoshu ࿆ᴨ; their utterances, yaohua ࿆䂡; and their place of residence (especially with regard to the capital Beijing and the military garrisons), yaoxue ࿆イ. The term yao was even applied to local bandits and Triad enemies.27 For the Taiping, their declared holy mission to annihilate all the demons was unquestioned, no matter where they resided. Accordingly, 22  23 

24 

25 

26  27 

For the political language of the Taiping, cf. the comprehensive and detailed semantic lexicon Taiping Tianguo ciyu huishi ᄥᐔᄤ࿖孵宕㯯慲 (1984). The Kangxi dictionary lists a quote taken from the Zuozhuan, the earliest Chinese work of history (covering the period from 722 bc to 468 ad), reading “if man forfeits his (Confucian) morality, demons emerge” (ӪỴᑨࡷ࿆㠸). This quotation is part of the history of the vassal state under the rule of Duke Zhuang of Lu 冟㦺‫( ޜ‬reign 693–662 bc) and refers to events in the year 680 bc; cf. Zuozhuan 8, no. 10: 155. The translation of Legge reads: “When men abandon the constant course of virtue, then monstrosities appear” (Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5: 91–92). The Zhongyong chapter in the Classic of the Rites ⿞䁈ѝᓨ reads: “When the state collapses, then there are surely omens of misfortune” (഻ᇦሷӑˈᗵᴹ࿆ᆭ). In Confucian belief the state was believed to collapse when the ruler and his ministers did not live up to the minimum requirements of morality. Yao can further be translated as strange, weird, supernatural, or goblin, phantom (as does Mathews in his dictionary). Similar defijinitions of the demon can be found in both traditions of Daoism and Buddhism. For the Six Dynasties period, Mu-chou Poo reports that the fear of evil spirits and demons was a common experience of the population. See Mu-chou Poo, “Images and Ritual Treatment of Dangerous Spirits,” in Early Chinese Religion—Part two: The Period of Division (220–589 AD), ed. John Lagerwey and Lü Pengzhi (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1075–1094. Tianxiong shengzhi ᄤఱ⡛ᣦ, 41 (local offfijicial and soldiers as demons in 1850), 58, 59, 81, 91, 93, 94. Tianxiong shengzhi ᄤఱ⡛ᣦ, 71, 78 (bandits); Hamberg, The Visions of Hung-Siu-tshuen, and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection, 55–56 (triads).

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every religious service was concluded with the call to “annihilate all demons!” (shajin yaomo ⇪ⴑ࿆冄). The “Imperially Approved Text A Hero’s Return to Truth” (Qinding yingjie guizhen ᱄ቯ⧷வᱩ⌀) compiled by Hong Rengan ᵩੳ₾ (1822–1864) further mentions the political mission to kill the Manchu (dayao ䷳࿆) by arguing that ᡁѝ䛖བྷ഻ˈ䄆ӪཊࡷᴹҼॱ‫ؽ‬Ҿ䷳࿆ˈ䄆ൠᔓࡷᴹг‫ؽ‬Ҿ┯⍢ˈ❑ླྀ‫ػ‬ ‫ػ‬ཊ䙀ᵛ⍱ˈቁ≲ᘐᆍབྷ㗙ˈ㘼৽ਇࡦҾ॰॰ѻ䷳࿆ˈሖኜн⭈нᘯ ѻᾥDŽ

our China is a great country, our people are in number twenty times more than the Tartar demons, in terms of territory, and our territory is seven times greater than Manchuria. However, most of us are engaged in pursuing small things, and only few of us are striving for the great principles of loyalty and fijilial piety. For this reason, we are subjected to the rule of the insignifijicant Tartar demons. This is truly extremely unbearable and hateful.28 Barend ter Haar observes here that the “original perception of local deities as demonic beings was translated into a much more active scenario, in which demons were real people.”29 The Taiping leaders “demonstrate that the demonological paradigm is not restricted to an insulated religious sphere of conceptions and practices, but encompassed the whole of society. The paradigm defijines threats in terms of very real, violent, and bloodthirsty demons who have to be combated with equally real and bloody violence or incorporated by means of bloody sacrifijice.”30 He shows in this context that the messianic 28  29 

30 

Taiping tianguo congshu ᄥᐔᄤ࿡ฌᦠ, 1070–71. Barend J. ter Haar, “China’s Inner Demons: The Political Impact of the Demonological Paradigm,” China Information XI, nos. 2/3 (1996): 74. Ter Haar notes that exorcism was quite common among Hakka (with those to be initiated in exorcist ritual knowledge receiving a personal army of divine soldiers and generals) and that it was “quite natural for Hakka people to be knowledgeable about demonological rituals.” Ibid., 62. The demonological paradigm enjoyed an impressive continuity in twentiethcentury China. In the campaign against the Four Olds (si jiu ྾ᣥ), which was directed against Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) published an editorial titled “Sweep Away All Ox Ghosts and Snake Spirits” (Hengsao yiqie niugui sheshen ᮮ㈓৻ಾ‐㝩Ⱜ␹) on June 1, 1966. The campaign applied the demonological paradigm to the class struggle, resulting in the killing of many class enemies. For further insights, cf. Barend ter Haar, “China’s Inner Demons: The Political Impact of the Demonological Paradigm,” in China’s Great Proletarian Revolution:

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demonological paradigm distinguishes itself from the ordinary demonological paradigm, namely, by the scale of the imminent attacks (encompassing the entire cultured world) and by placing events in a specifijic chronological and administrative context of dates and locations. The enemy turns political during the Qing because the demonological (or religious) becomes political by the act of removing the theological dimension.31 Here, political is understood in a largely radical sense because with the lack of a transcendental authority (God), the ideal society could be achieved by any means. The religiosity of the Taiping is in the proper sense “non-transcendental” because the relation to the divine is curtailed (and does not disappear).32 In the end, the Taiping formed a heterodoxy that aimed at establishing an alternative political order. By forming such heterodoxy, they were able to create a powerful dichotomy that resembles the notion of asymmetrical counterconcepts as formulated by Reinhart Koselleck, yet rested on a diffferent terminology. While in the case of ancient Greece there was still a general recognition of the barbarian by the Hellene (combined, of course, with a distinct sense of superiority), this general recognition that was believed to be part and parcel of the tianxia dissipated in the following century: Similar to the Christian for whom the heathen was a threat that needed to be combated (leading again to a negation of the other), the Taiping created asymmetrical counterconcepts that possessed radical notions of animosity.33

31 

32 

33 

Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives (London: Rowman & Littlefijield, 2002), 27–68. This claim can be substantiated by recalling that during the Ming dynasty—whose founder Zhu Yuanzhang ᵡ‫( ⪻ݳ‬1328–1398, reign 1368–1398) himself was a Buddhist monk—secret societies such as the White Lotus were practically inactive: Zhu had led the rebellion against the Mongolian Yuan dynasty, and Buddhists were not persecuted during the Ming. See Fei-Ling Davis, Primitive Revolutionaries of China: A Study of Secret Societies in the Late Nineteenth Century (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai’i, 1971), 64–66. The secularization of political relations is thus not equal to the death of God (Nietzsche) but rather resembles “God’s decapitation” (Dekapitation Gottes, here Erich Voegelin, Die Politischen Religionen [Wien: Bermann-Fischer Verlag, 1938]; see also Assmann, Politische Theologie zwischen Ägypten und Israel, 30). Voegelin’s observation corresponds well to the analysis of the political radicalization in the Taiping movement. For the Taiping, life was dominated by religion, and, similar to the case of the Hebrews, all judgments were divine judgments and all duties divine commandments, and their society was permeated by a religious atmosphere. For Shih, this observation is crucial: the Christian element served as the unifying ideology and helped the Taiping distinguish themselves from all other forms of previous rebellion (cf. Shih, The Taiping Ideology, 3–30). In late imperial China, these were the Manchus; in Republican China, these were the national traitors (hanjian ṽᅞ); and in Maoist China, the party declared war on the class enemy.

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A few decades later the enmity against the Manchu gained another quality when the idea of ethnicity and race were introduced to the Han-Chinese. Their racial nationalism in the late nineteenth century continued sharing the Taiping’s transformation of the Manchu from a religious to a political enemy, yet the concept of the nation introduced in the late 1890s changed the spatial dimension of the enemy. While the Taiping still aimed at transforming the ten thousand states in their effforts to create order, nationalist thinkers of the late Qing—backed up by European (scientifijic) theory, i.e. their reception of social Darwinism,—only cared about their nation-state. In the end, one of the most radical nationalist in the last years of the Qing Zhang Taiyan was able to laude the Taiping no longer as mere rebels of the tianxia, but as loyal fijighters for the national cause of the Han.34 In a speech in 1902 commemorating the downfall of the Ming dynasty 242 years before, Zhang compared this event with the suppression and extinction of the Han race. His grief for the downfall of the Ming is so prevailing that he emphasizes that the Manchus, not European imperialism, are the primary danger for China.35 Zhang shares the conviction of the Taiping that the restoration of the Ming is not just a religious aim but a declared political one: not the grief over the deceased emperor is expressed here with the call for “Overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming” ( fan Qing fu Ming ෻ᷡᓳ᣿), but the fate of the modern nation-state—a different political order—is here at stake. The enmity against the Manchu in the years after the suppressed Hundred Days’ Reform movement and the failed Boxer Rebellion was becoming more and more present in the political discourse and developed into the fijirst form of nationalism in modern China. By introducing a new political language to Chinese society this nationalism was able to defijine the nation with the help of both race and lineage,36 as it was 34  35 

36 

For his assessment of the Taiping, see the introduction to his Book of Raillery (Qiushu 䀴ᴨ), in Zhang Taiyan quanji, 3: 121. Manifesto of the Meeting to Commemorate the 242nd Anniversary of China’s Death (Zhongxia wangguo erbai sishier nian jinianhui shu ਛᄐ੢࿡ੑ⊖྾චੑᐕ♿ᐕᦩᦠ), in Zhang Taiyan quanji, 4: 188. See James Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin; Wong, Search for Modern Nationalism; Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (London: Hurst & Company, 1992); Edward J.M. Rhoads, Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Wang Chunxia ⦻᱕䵎, Pai-Man yu minzuzhuyi ᧂ┑о≁᯿ѫѹ (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005); and Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen. The exclusion of the Manchus was contested by less radical thinkers of the late Qing period, such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. For example, Kang argued in his opus magnum, the Book of Great Unity (Datongshu), that lineage was actually an unreliable criterion for defijining membership to the Chinese nation. Cf. “A Letter to Chinese Merchants in North and

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in the case of thinkers such as Liu Shipei ഏᏧၭ (1884–1919), Chen Tianhua 㒸ᄤ⪇ (1875–1905), Song Jiaoren ቡᢎੳ (1882–1913), Ou Jujia ᱏ᭗↲ (1858– 1912), Huang Xing ⥝ (1874–1916), and Tao Chengzhang 㒻ᚑ┨ (1878–1912), among others. They all created a vision of China that excluded the Manchus as a diffferent race. In the nationalist treatise The Alarm Bell ( Jingshizhong ⼊਎應, 1903), Chen Tianhua argued most radically, ਚᴹѝ഻ᗎֶн⸕ᴹぞ᯿Ⲵ࠶ࡕˈ㫉ਔǃ┯⍢ֶҶˈ➗ֻ⮦‫ޥ‬㌽㌗ˈ㾯⌻ ӪֶҶˈҏ➗ֻ⮦‫ޥ‬㌽㌗ˈDŽDŽDŽ⿭⦨ҏ⸕਴亗㠚ᐡⲴ਼ぞˈѝ഻Ӫⵏᱟ 䙓⿭⦨䜭нྲҶDŽ؇䃎䃚ᗇྭˈӪн㿚ཆဃˈ‫ޙ‬ဃ⴨⡝ˈаᇊᱟᒛ਼ဃˈ ᯧ⋂ᴹᒛཆဃⲴDŽնᱟᒣᑨⲴဃˈ䜭ᱟᗎаဃ࠶ֶࠪⲴDŽ╒ぞᱟа‫ػ‬ བྷဃˈ哳ᑍᱟа‫ػ‬བྷ࿻⾆ˈࠑн਼╒ぞˈнᱟ哳ᑍⲴᆀᆛⲴˈ㎡㎡ 䜭ᱟཆဃˈᯧнਟᒛԆⲴˈ㤕ᒛҶԆˈᱟн㾱⾆ᇇҶ֐н㾱⾆ᇇⲴӪˈቡᱟ ⮌⭏DŽ

Only the Chinese do not know racial (zhongzu) distinctions. . . . When the Mongols and the Manchus came, they provided them with military service and paid taxes. When the Westerners (xiyang ren) came, they served in their army and paid taxes. . . Even animals know how to protect their own species; the Chinese are not even animals! As the old saying goes: no one loves people of other surnames (waixing). In case of a feud between two lineages, one always fijights on the side of his kinsmen. But all the ordinary xing originated in one xing. Hanzhong is a large xing; the Yellow Emperor is the grand fijirst ancestor (da shizu). All those who are not Hanzhong are not the descendants of Huangdi. They belonged of other surnames. One must not help them. If you do, you abandon your ancestors (zuzhong [sic]) and you are animals!37

37 

South America Explaining that China Can Only Establish a Constitution, but not Engage in Revolution (Da Nanbei Meizhou zhu Huashang lun Zhongguo zhi kexing lixian bu kexing geming shu ㆄইे㖾⍢䄨㨟୶䄆ѝ഻ਚਟ㹼・២нਟ㹼䶙ભᴨ),” in Kang Youwei zhenglun ji, 487; Laurence G. Thompson, Ta t’ung shu: The One-World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-wei (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958). Jingshizhong, 86–87; translation taken from Chow Kai-wing, Narrating Nation, Race and National Culture, 56–57. Chen Tianhua wrote this piece in late 1903 as a reaction to the Russian advance into Manchuria. This quote is an obvious expression of racism, despite the fact that—in diffference to Europe—phenotypical characteristics such as skin color did not play a role when defijining the race: the only measurable distinction in late Qing China was considered to be lineage.

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In 1905, Liu Shipei demanded the expulsion of the Manchus from HanChinese territory, thereby allowing for two diffferent territories that could co-exist (contrary to the vision of the Taiping). In his eyes, “the Han possess a distinct character, therefore they will—whatever race it might be—expulse those who have occupied our territory” (╒᯿㘵ᴹ⢩・ѻ ㋮⾎㘵ҏ᭵❑䄆օぞօ᯿‫ᦞޕ‬ѝ഻‫ޕ‬ᬊং⛪╒᯿ᡰᧂ).38 His coeval Song Jiaoren shared this view when he published his “History of the Conquest of China by the Han” (Hanzu qinlüeshi ╒᯿‫⮕ץ‬ਢ), which praises the military character of the Han.39 In the end, the anti-Manchurian nationalism succeeded in creating the notion of an ontological enemy that is irreconcilable, as Zou Rong ㈅ኈ (1885–1905), the disciple of Zhang Taiyan, put it in his pamphlet The Revolutionary Army (Gemingjun 䶙ભ䓽, 1903): аǃѝ഻⡢ѝ഻Ӫѻѝ഻ˈᡁ਼㜎Ⲷ丸㠚䂽⛪㠚ᐡⲴ╒ぞѝ഻Ӫѻѝ഻DŽ аǃн䁡⮠ぞӪ⋮ḃᡁѝ഻㎢∛℺࣋DŽ аǃᡰᴹᴽᗎ┯⍢Ӫѻ㗙उˈаᖻ䣧⎸⓵DŽ аǃ‫┯ق᧘ݸ‬⍢Ӫᡰ・ेӜѻ䟾㹫᭯ᓌDŽ аǃ偵䙀ትտѝ഻ѝѻ┯⍢Ӫˈᡆ⇪ԕ๡ӷDŽ аǃ䂵⇪┯⍢Ӫᡰ・ѻⲷᑍˈԕܶ㩜цнᗙᴹሸࡦѻੋѫDŽ

China is the China of the Chinese. Fellow countrymen, you must all recognize the China of the Chinese of the Han race. Not to allow any alien race to lay their hands on the least rights of our China. Any obligations subordinating people to the Manchus are one and all annulled. First, to overthrow the barbaric government set up by the Manchus in Peking. To expel the Manchus settled in China or kill them in order to revenge ourselves. To kill the emperor set up by the Manchus as a warning to the myriad generations that despotic government is not to be revived.40 It was now time to ᦳ䲔ᮨॳᒤぞぞѻሸࡦ᭯億ˈ㝛৫ᮨॳᒤぞぞѻྤ䳨ᙗ䌚ˈ䂵㎅ӄⲮ㩜 ᴹཷᣛ∋䔹䀂ѻ┯⍢᯿ˈ⍇ⴑҼⲮ‫ॱޝ‬ᒤ⇈ឈ㲀䞧ѻབྷᚕ䗡ˈ֯ѝ ഻བྷ䲨ᡀҮ␘൏ˈ哳ᑍᆀᆛⲶ㨟ⴋ乃DŽ

38  39  40 

History of the Chinese Nation (Zhongguo minzu zhi ਛ࿡᳃ᣖᔒ), in Liu Shipei quanji, 1: 622. Hanzu qinlüe shi, in Ershi shiji zhi Zhina, 1: 35–36. Tsou Jung, The Revolutionary Army, 42, 123.

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sweep away millennia of despotism in all its forms, throw offf millennia of slavishness, annihilate the fijive million and more of the furry and horned Manchu race, cleanse ourselves of 260 years of harsh an unremitting pain, so that the soil of Chinese subcontinent is made immaculate, and the descendants of the Yellow Emperor will all become George Washingtons.41 Zou develops a highly radical notion of the enemy that is distinctly political. It holds that there are diffferent territories, and each territory should form an ethnic homogeneous nation-state. His call for a revenge for the occupation of China turns the Manchus into a political enemy (hostis) where enmity is no longer a relative one but a more radical, ontological one (and, in contrast to the Taiping, no longer religiously founded). This enmity was however a rather short interlude that ceded when the political necessity for the existence of an enemy disappeared (i.e., when the Han regained their prime position), the disappearance of the political notion of enemy meant, to some extent, a return to the imperial age, when the multiethnic character of the republic was recognized (again) and when universal values of Confucianism—instead of a commitment to a single ethnicity—ruled the political realm.42 The enemy in the inner-Chinese context was no longer ontological; instead, it was soon replaced by an outside enemy that was considered more dangerous for the future of the nation, namely the white peril that endangered the physical survival of the Chinese nation. After the disappointment with international law as a regime to create global peace and order, the literati and offfijicials had to develop strategies of how to deal with foreigners that not only rejected the superiority of the Confucian world order but also created new racial hierarchies that justifijied imperialist ambitions as well as had far-reaching geopolitical implications. They did so by harking back to traditional ways of dealing with enemies that in times of China’s weakness were not willing to conform to non-Western ideals of world order that could possibly dissolve the enmities and achieve a truly peaceful world.

41  42 

Ibid., 1, 58. As I have shown elsewhere, see Matten, Die Grenzen des Chinesischen, and “China is the China of the Chinese.”

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241

Datong and the Idea of Universal Harmony in International Society I was twenty-seven sui. . . when I wrote the Ta-t’ung shu, thinking then that I had to wait a century before I would see its fulfijillment. Unexpectedly, within thirty-fijive years the League of Nations was formed and I personally witness the realization of Ta-t’ung. —Kang Youwei, Preface to the Datongshu (1919)43

∵ Kang Youwei proposed in his most famous script, The Book of Great Unity (Datongshu བྷ਼ᴨ),44 a utopian future world that would establish a liberal society without social, racial, and other boundaries. According to him, these boundaries ( jie ⭼) were to be abolished because they created division and thus opposition (in terms of country, class, races, sex, family, livelihood, and administration), resulting again in conflict, sufffering and war. The Datongshu—considered by many historians as iconoclastic45—aimed at the perfection of human nature. If one removed the barriers that caused suffering and ensured every person twenty years of physical security, moral training, and education; and arranged society so that every person had an equal standing, there would be no reason why human nature should not become perfected. Situating himself in the Confucian classics of the New Text School 43 

44 

45 

Translation taken from Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858–1927 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), 411. The ideas of this book appeared in lecture notes from 1884. Encouraged by his students, Kang worked on this book for the next two decades, but it was not until his exile in India (1901–1902) that he fijinished the fijirst draft. The fijirst two chapters of the book were published in Japan in the 1900s, but the whole book wasn’t published in its entirety until 1935, about seven years after his death. On the uncertainty of its date of compilation and publication, cf. Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World, 45fff., and the lengthy discussion in Tang Zhijun ⒟ᘇ䡎, Gailiang yu geming de Zhongguo qinghuai: Kang Youwei yu Zhang Taiyan ᭩㢟㠷䶙ભⲴѝ഻ᛵᠧ: ᓧᴹ⡢⥜ㄐཚ⚾ (Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan, 1990), 88–103. See the discussion in Axel Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte: zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer modernen Identität für China (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997); and Thompson, Ta t’ung shu.

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Kang envisions a clear notion of evolution and progress where in the fijield of politics a constitutionalist system follows a despotic one, and the fijinal stage is an anarchic order where all state authorities disappear and an age of freedom and harmony emerges.46 Improvement of the human condition is instead only possible if one possesses a correct understanding of universal sufffering. Good and evil are universal principles that are not restricted to single races or nations: ᭵⸕ழᜑ䴓ᇊˈᱟ䶎䳘ᱲDŽᜏᱟ䶎ழᜑⲶ⭡Ӫ⭏ˈ‫⨶ޜ‬Ӗ⭡ӪᇊDŽᡁܰ െѻˈࠑᴹᇣҾӪ㘵ࡷ⛪䶎ˈ❑ᇣҾӪ㘵ࡷ⛪ᱟDŽ

Thus we know that what constitutes “good” and “evil” is difffijicult to determine, and “right” and “wrong” take their meaning from the times. However, “right” and “wrong,” “good” and “evil,” all take their meaning from human life; universal principles likewise are determined from the circumstances of the times. As I fijigure it, whatever is injurious to man is wrong; whatever is not injurious to man is right.47 In his Datongshu, Kang projects this insight onto the global level. Being convinced that that man-made laws should be applied in accordance with the notion of equality and that each law that was considered to be a universal law that had to be applied without the slightest exception,48 the rules regulating human behavior cannot be restricted to single individuals or collectives. The aim is rather to create a society where “the world was shared by all alike” (tianxia

46 

47 

48 

To talk about datong here meant to set an end to moral cosmology, an end of Confucianism as a backward political ideology, and surely an end to the Confucian social system. In this sense, Kang can certainly be judged an iconoclast. His teleological reading of the three ages (sanshi ਃ਎) has to a great extent been influenced by Yan Fu’s translation of Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, thereby introducing social Darwinist thinking into the Confucian tradition, cf. Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World, 51, 72–78; Chang Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 50–52. Datongshu, Xinbu, chap. 14; cf. Kang Youwei ᐽ᦭ὑ, Datongshu ᄢหᦠ (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1998), 341. Translation taken from Thompson, Ta t’ung shu, 252. Richard C. Howard, “K’ang Yu-wei (1858–1927): His Intellectual Background and Early Thought,” in Confucian Personalities, ed. A.F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 311–15.

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wei gong ཙл⡢‫)ޜ‬.49 Accordingly, the love toward diffferent social groups is not graded but universal. This universalization of moral values—justifijied by his concept of “Heavenly citizen”—thus also includes Western liberal ideals, such as individual liberty, freedom, and equality that are all natural corollaries of Confucian humanity, ren. In the end, there is only one world society in which all men are one (renren ru yi ӪӪྲа); where there are no diffferences between high and low, rich and poor; and where there are no diffferences in race or sex (❑䋤䋺ѻ࠶ˈ❑䋗ᇼѻㅹˈ❑Ӫぞѻ↺ˈ❑⭧ྣѻ⮠)50, resulting in the imagining of a world order devoid of enemies. What happens here is the disappearance of asymmetric counter-concepts which in terms of national and racial boundaries also caused the dissolution of the ontological character of enemies. When Woodrow Wilson proposed the League of Nations under the impression of the disaster caused by World War I (the fijirst truly global war that was, in China, conceived as a downfall of European civilization given the brutality and inhumanity of the war) Kang immediately recognized that this was a new hope for his utopian datong and supported Wilson whole-heartedly. He succeeded not only in adapting Confucianism to the necessities of a new world but also in locating this new universalism in China’s own tradition: the fijirst manuscript of his Datongshu bore the title “Universal Principles of Humanity” (renlei gongli Ӫ于‫)⨶ޜ‬, meaning that he anticipated the arrival of a world government already in the 1880s. This was some years earlier than the convening of the First Hague Conference in 1899, where similar ideas were discussed and declared.51 It is also quite telling in this context that Wilson’s proposal addresses the fijirst of the boundaries to be removed in Kang’s utopia is the national boundary (guojie ഻⭼), resulting in a political order in which there are no single (nation-)states anymore. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the publication of the fijirst two parts of the Datongshu, one dating from 1913 and the other from 1919, included

49 

50 

51 

This famous quotation from The Evolution of Rites (Liyun ⑥ㆇ) in the Book of Rites (Liji ⑥⸥), later appropriated by Sun Yat-sen, reads in length: “when the Great Way was practiced, the world was shared by all alike” (dadao zhi xing ye, tianxia wei gong བྷ䚃ѻ㹼ҏˈཙл⡢‫)ޜ‬. As argued in his comment to The Evolution of Rites where Kang identifijies Confucius’s Way of Great Unity (datong zhi dao ᄢหਯ㆏). He wrote this comment in 1884. See Kang Youwei, Datongshu, 39. The convention of this conference regulated pacifijic settlement of international disputes, defijined laws and customs of war on land, adapted the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864 to maritime warfare, and provided some declarations on the use of inhuman weapons.

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both the fijirst two parts (i.e., the chapter discussing universal sufffering and the chapter on the abolition of national boundaries).52 In the end, it was not difffijicult for the Chinese representatives at the Paris Peace Conference to endorse the League of Nations. The parallels were so obvious for Kang and his contemporaries that they widely used the term datong for rendering League of Nations into Chinese, for example, as wanguo datongmeng 㩜഻བྷ਼ⴏ or guoji datongmeng ഻䳋བྷ਼ⴏ.53 In their pamphlet China and the League of Nations, the diplomats Wellington Koo 㘈⛽㊼ (1888– 1985) and Chengting Thomas Wang ⦻↓ᔧ (1882–1961) echoed Kang’s vision of the league as the culmination of the classical ideal datong. Both Koo and Wang hoped to dissolve the tensions that were caused by asymmetrical concepts by installing normative spheres of human coexistence, such as international law. Being educated in both worlds—the Western as well as the Eastern—they had the sincere wish to integrate China into the family of nations and make it a fully accepted member, with all its rights and duties. They imagined Wilson’s proposal for a League of Nations as the best way to achieve this aim. In their pamphlet, published during their time in Paris, Koo refers to the datong ideal, comparing Wilson to Confucius: Confucius saw, just as the illustrious author of the present League of Nations has seen, the danger to civilization and humanity involved in the continued existence of such a sad plight of constant war, and therefore spared no efffort in emphasizing the need of creating and preserving a new order of things which would ensure universal peace. Although his appeals to the princes and the people did not succeed in bringing about many concrete results in his own age, his ideals and principles have sur-

52 

53 

Because Kang was convinced that the world was not mature enough to understand or enjoy his thoughts on the datong, he also did not agree on an English translation of the fijirst chapters, as proposed by the German-American sinologist Friedrich Hirth (1845–1927) and even by Woodrow Wilson himself (Thompson, Ta t’ung shu, 27). Liang Qichao, for instance, calls the League of Nations Guoji datongmeng in a speech where he urges China to participate actively in its establishment, for it offfers a realistic possibility to achieve the utopia. Cf. Liang Qichao, “Liang Rengong zai xieyue guomin xiehui zhi yanshuo ằԫ‫ޜ‬൘঄㌴഻≁঄ᴳѻ╄䃚,” in Dongfang zazhi 2, no. 16 (1919): 167–69. Likewise, Yang Chao refers in a communication to Liang Qichao, dating February 18, 1919, to the League of Nations as wanguo datongmeng, in Waijiaobu Archive, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, WJB RG 03–37, box 26, folder 2 (here taken from Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 258).

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vived him from generation to generation, and been deeply inculcated on the minds of the Chinese people.54 In their eyes, Wilson’s vision of a harmonious world order was the fijinal stage of the datong project, and the establishment of the league the fulfijillment of Confucian ideals. Likewise, Cai Yuanpei, then the President of Peking University, supported the idea by founding a Union for Supporting the League of Nations (Guoji lianmeng tongzhihui ഻䳋㚟ⴏ਼ᘇᴳ).55 Jiang Menglin 㭓དྷ哏, in his introductory remarks to the translation of Wilson’s Wartime Speeches, lauded the president’s proposal, arguing that with the League, datong would fijinally become a political reality.56 Indeed the year 1918 saw the emergence of a Wilson fever that was discussed nationwide. For the most ardent Wilsonian at that time, the philosopher and diplomat Hu Shi 㜑䚙 (1891–1962), the American president’s idealism of developing a world with greater international justice by strengthening equality in foreign politics was not to be doubted.57 He was convinced that Wilson could achieve the ideal of merging high principles with practical politics (similar to the Confucian ideal of the scholar-offfijicial) on a global level. Wilson was a man who made “philosophical ideas the basis of politics, so that although he enters into the political arena, he maintains his uprightness and stresses human principles in all things.”58 Already in July 1914, Hu wrote in a small piece on Wilson that the American president was a great politician and idealist. In a speech

54  55 

56  57 

58 

Wellington V.K. Koo and Cheng-ting T. Wang, China and the League of Nations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919), 2. Founding members of the Union for Supporting the League of Nations were, among others, Xiong Xiling ➺ᐼ喑, Zhang Jian ᕥ䄷 (1853–1926), and Cai Yuanpei, and later Liang Qichao and Hu Shi. Cf. On the Origin of the Union for Supporting the League of Nations (Guoji lianmeng tongzhihui yuanqi ഻䳋㚟ⴏ਼ᘇᴳ㐓䎧), in Cai Yuanpei quanji, 3: 536–40. Hu Shi praised this Union as an organization that would “open a new era in international relations.” Cf. Hu Shi liuxue riji 㜑䚙⮉ᆨᰕ䁈, 4 vols. (Taibei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1959), 1080–82, 1083–85. See here Jiang Menglin, Meiguo zongtong Weierxun canzhan yanshuo 㖾഻㑭㎡ ေ⡮䚌৳ᡠ╄䃜, as well as the discussion in Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. As a member and delegate of the Cornell Cosmopolitan Club, Hu had once been received in Washington by President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. Cf. Efijisio Giglio-Tos, Appel pour le Désarmement et our la Paix: Les Pionniers de la Société Des Nations et de la Fraternité Internationale; d‘après les archives de la “Corda Fratres,” Fédération Internationale des Etudiants, 1898–1931 (Torino: Tipografijica A. Kluc, 1931), 174, 177, 178. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, 108.

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given on Independence Day 1914, Wilson had emphasized that the golden rule, “What thou avoidest sufffering thyself seek not to impose on others,” should apply to international politics.59 Whereas former president Roosevelt had upheld the principle of supervising and directing the afffairs of the people (as laid down in the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Dotrine), Wilson preferred to establish conditions under which the people would be free to manage their own afffairs, Hu Shi argued.60 Liang Qichao supported this positive view, pointing out in the article “World Peace and China” that “the essence of our sages’ teaching is that ‘we should govern the country well in order to secure the peace of the whole world’. . . Our political thought had always been based on this kind of universalism.” When the datong is reached, the “diffferent peoples of the world will work together for the common good as members of one organization.” Liang concluded his discussion with the hint that “as far as China is concerned, I can say without the slightest hesitation that we are in favor of the formation of a League of Nations also to a man.”61 Kang Youwei shared the enthusiasm of his son-in-law (although he had earlier strongly opposed Chinese participation in the war) and urged the Beijing government to make use of the opportunity posed by the peace conference to help create a new world order: “I never dreamed I would have the good luck to see the formation of a League of Nations in my own days. The impossible is about to happen. You can’t imagine my happiness.”62 Eight years earlier, Kang still had wondered about the true intentions when the United States had conquered the Philippines and forcefully continued

59  60 

61 

62 

Wilson (Weierxun ေ⡮䚌), July 12, 1914, in Hu Shi liuxue riji, 300–301. The Great Purpose of Speeches by Wilson and Roosevelt (Weierxun yu Luosifu yanshuo zhi dazhi ေ⡮䚌㠷㖵ᯟ⾿╄䃜ѻབྷᰘ), July 12, 1914, in Hu Shi liuxue riji, 300. On Hu’s afffection to pacifijism and humanism, cf. also the discussion in Jerome Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 52–61. Liang wrote this article in late December 1918 on his way to Paris, where he served as an unofffijicial advisor to the Chinese delegation. English and French versions were distributed in Paris in February 1919. Cf. Liang Qichao, China and the League of Nations (Beijing: The Society for the Study of International Relations, 1918). The article was also published in Chenbao, June 10–17, 1919. Liang further discusses the Chinese origins of this new universalism in his Impressions of a Trip to Europe (Ouyou xinyinglu ↀ䙺ᗳᖡ䤴), cf. Liang Qichao quanji, 5: 3030–32. Hollington Tong, “Kang Yu-wei as Chinese Advocate of the League of Nations,” Millard’s Review 7, no. 10 (February 8, 1919), 342–45. Here quoted from Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War, 254.

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its intrusion into the Pacifijic region,63 but now he was deeply impressed with Wilson and, through the establishment of the League of Nations under the president’s global leadership, saw the chance that by his own utopian vision of datong could fijinally become reality. The Great Community as Model of International Society By holding that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy Wilsonism resembled the neo-Confucian ideal of commitment to moral values that are able to create world peace (tianxia ping ཙлᒣ) by transcending religious, political, and ethnic particularities. The perceived proximity to Confucian morality not only contributed much to the attractiveness of Wilsonian idealism in China but also left a signifijicant legacy that became the foundation of a new school of international relations in the past decades. The most recent theory of international relations that incorporates idealism as a core element is the English School. Its founder, Hedley Bull, when writing about the idealist doctrines in the 1920s and 1930s, noted, By the ‘idealists’ we have in mind writers such as Sir Alfred Zimmern, S.H. Bailey, Philip Noel-Baker, and David Mitrany in the United Kingdom, and James T. Shotwell, Pitman Potter, and Parker T. Moon in the United States. . . . The distinctive characteristic of these writers was their belief in progress: the belief, in particular, that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of ‘the international mind’, the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teaching, it was in fact being transformed; and that their responsibility as students of international relations was to assist this march of progress to overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill will, and the sinister interests that stood in its way.64

63  64 

Kang Youwei, Saving the Nation from Extinction ( Jiuwang lun ᮁӑ䄆), in Kang Youwei zhenglun ji (1911): 653. Hedley Bull, “The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969,” in The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969, ed. B. Porter (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 33–34.

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In his 1977 book The Anarchical Society, Bull defijines international order not only as a system of states but also as a society of states. International order is a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary goals of international society. He perceives the system of states as anarchical in that sense that there is no higher level of authority over states, each state has ultimate sovereignty over its citizens within its borders, and the system forms a society characterized by common rules and institutions that provide order to the international arena.65 For Bull, rules are perceived as means to form a society of states. These states have a sufffijicient degree of interaction and exert impact on each other’s decisions so that they behave as parts of a whole. He points out that according to the position of legal realism American international law scholars consider law to be a social process, particularly as a process of decision-making that is authoritative and efffective. They reject the idea of international law as a body of rules because this process of authoritative decision-making is not purely the application of existing rules, but is shaped by social, moral, and political considerations in the process of decision-making itself. In Chinese terms, this would mean to give social-moral rules or obligations (li ⑥) priority over legal rules ( fa ᴺ). The discussion on Confucian orthopraxy has shown further that creating order (zhi ᴦ) is a metapolitical act that, according to philosophers such as Kang Youwei, shall with the rise of the datong to a new global principle no longer be restricted to inside China. To prefer morality over legal rules (again) was in the wake of World War I an insight that difffered from the previous historical experiences in modern China (and Japan), which saw sanctions, coercion, and force as the prime elements of international law. In the doctrine of John Austin, law is described as “the command of the sovereign.”66 Since there is no true sovereign in international society, it is hard to imagine international law beyond the realm of force, and this explains the disappointment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when law was seen as a “crooked strategy.” In their worship of Wilson, those in favor of the datong were much closer to the legal philosopher Herbert Lional Adolphus Hart (1907–1992), who contended that a legal system is characterized not by the presence of a sovereign that is able to back up rules with force, but by the union of primary and 65 

66 

By defijining the international society as a collective governed by shared norms, the English School can rightly be called a forerunner of constructivist IR theory, as observed by Timothy Dunne, “The Social Construction of International Society,” European Journal of International Relations, no. 1 (1995): 367–89. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954; originally published in 1832), lecture vi.

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secondary rules. Primary rules are rules that directly shape human behavior by restricting violence, protecting property or enforcing contracts. Secondary rules are rules about rules. They do not regulate behavior directly (by imposing duties) but confer powers on human beings “to introduce new primary rules, to extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their operations.”67 At the end of World War I, it was exactly Wilson’s League of Nations that should have generated this union. If the applicability of primary rules can be granted, they can also be revoked. The latter case was a widely discussed issue among late Qing intellectuals who could not understand why China was considered outside the scope of international law. The later events in World War I were to prove them right. In their eyes, the omnipresent conflict between violence and justice can only be resolved sufffijiciently if there is an institution that restricts the actions of the strong powers and protects the interests of the weak ones. If there were such an institution, or in the parlance of Hart a set of secondary rules, peace and harmony among the nations were deemed possible. Wilson’s proposal to establish a League of Nations aimed at providing the legislative, executive and judicial powers necessary to enforce international law (i.e., beyond the self-interest of the great powers). The League was to become the new world government, invested with sufffijicient power and strength to supervise the correct application of law when resolving conflicts in international society, and for these reasons Wilsonian idealism, as I have shown, enjoyed great popularity in Europe as well as in East Asia, even if Wilson’s referral to the Monroe Doctrine implied the installment of a new hegemony. In the end his idealism failed to provide a functioning set of secondary rules that would have made China an equal and fully accepted member of international society. In 1943, however, a new efffort was started to create a vision of international society that included—or, rather, that originated in—the Confucian tradition. These effforts, started by Luo Mengce, had a profound impact on Chinese self-perception that until today has not receded, but has caused contemporary scholars in IR theory such as Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong to welcome the English School as being culturally sensitive. 67 

Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 79. For Hart, it is possible to imagine societies that work with primary rules alone, but these societies in most cases have certain defects in creating a functioning society, and the remedy lies in supplementing rules about rules. This is due to the fact that primary rules have a static character, which makes it impossible to deliberately adapt rules to changing circumstances.

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6.3

Going beyond the Nation-State: Tianxia as Alternative World Order in Twentieth-Century China

According to the contemporary political philosopher Li Yangfan, the notion of tianxia is the most central idea in Chinese political culture that distinguishes it from its European counterpart.68 He states that while the latter is characterized by a political order based on fijixed territorial boundaries, the Chinese version is a global vision of order, being all-encompassing and integrating differences. The international environment appears here less competitive and more oriented to values of cooperation and peace. Contrary to this—as the previous chapters have shown in detail— since the nineteenth century, China has been more obsessed with national sovereignty than most of the colonized countries, and this explains why its foreign policy has, for most of the time, been oriented toward the realist motives of national strength, power, and security (and even earlier when considering the fijindings of Wang Yuan-kang and Alastair Johnston). The question is how to explain this obvious contradiction that both Levenson with his culturalism–nationalism thesis and Fairbank with his Western impact–Chinese response paradigm did not discuss. In fact, Li’s observation holds true for a number of twentieth-century scholars who, despite their earlier fascination for Western conceptions of modernity and national statehood,69 later argued more or less strongly for a return to the tianxia as the higher and more superior form of political order. At fijirst sight, this call seems to be nothing short of a postcolonial self-assertion in a world that is more and more organized according to one sole set of norms. If this were the case, we could easily dismiss this return to the past as an ideological efffort that would not persist for long if subjected to analytical scrutiny. Yet, the turn to tianxia is more complex. For example, the Republican jurist and pedagogue Luo Mengce 㖵དྷ޺ (1906–1991) published in March 1941 in the Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi) an article titled “Chinese History has surpassed Western History” (Zhongguo lishi zoudaole xiyang lishi de qiantou ѝ഻↧ਢ䎠ࡠҶ㾯⌻↧ਢⲴࡽ九).70 By praising the peaceful and nonaggressive mind-set of East Asian cultures that consider men in all four regions of 68  69  70 

Li Yangfan ᵾᢜᐶ, ““Tianxia” guanniankao “ཙл” 㿲ᘥ㘳,” in Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu, no. 1 (2002): 108–17. Cf. Luo Zhitian, “From ‘tianxia’ (All under Heaven) to ‘the World’: Changes in Late Qing Intellectuals’ Conceptions of Human Society,” Social Sciences in China 29, no. 2 (2008): 96. Written on occasion of the offfijicial foundation of the Dongfang wenhua xiehui ᶡᯩ᮷ॆ঄ᴳ in Chongqing, which was headed by Guo Chuntao 䜝᱕☔ (1895–1950), a KMT politician.

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the world to be family members (sihai weijia ഋ⎧⛪ᇦ), he arrives at creating a clear dichotomy of Western and Eastern cultures that is reasoned by referring to their diffferent history, culture, lifestyles, and moral values. For instance, whereas Chinese poems described emotions, Western poems praised war battles and victorious heroes; whereas Chinese were vegetarians and led frugal lives, Europeans were insatiable; and even diffferences in clothing could tell who is more civilized and advanced. These cultural essentialisms are—Luo is sure to mention this—not just his own inventions: he quotes Rudyard Kipling’s famous The Ballad of East and West, whose well-known opening line reads “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” Nevertheless, Luo spends the remaining part of his article on proving not how the two are diffferent, but why. Following geodeterminist arguments he views Western and Chinese societies as influenced during their genesis by natural factors, leading to diffferent expressions in culture, philosophy, and politics. While farmers form Chinese history, sailors make Western history, with the former being eager to harmonize with nature, and the other ambitious to conquer and control nature.71 The superiority of Chinese culture is then proved by descriptions how Chinese farmers live in harmony with nature and society according to the Golden Rule ( ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren ᐡᡰнឮˈयᯭᯬӪ). The sailor, on the contrary, is someone who is actively fijighting for his personal interests and behaves according to the rules of social Darwinism (tianyan taotai, shizhe shengcun ཙ╄␈⊠ˈ䚙㘵⭏ᆈ). To put in a nutshell, the West is aggressive and militaristic, which leads to war, and the East—in other words, China—is peaceful, tolerant and integrating (he ਸ), and its pursuit of integration leads to ultimate peace (taiping ཚᒣ). For this reason, war has been the exception and peace the norm in Chinese history, Luo concludes.72

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There is an interesting parallel to this dichotomy. According to Christopher Connery, Carl Schmitt wrote his Land und Meer as a response to the geostrategic thinking of Alfred Mahan. If this interpretation is correct, it positions a telluric Schmitt against an oceanic Mahan, with the former pursuing the sacredness of boundaries (i.e., a stable order), and the latter preferring the open sea as a space devoid of rules and free of any kind of state authority. See Christopher L. Connery, “Ideologies of Land and Sea: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Carl Schmitt, and the Shaping of Global Myth Elements.” This cultural ideologem is still considered valid today, as reported in the 1998 National Defense White Paper: “The defensive nature of China’s national defense policy also springs from the country’s historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with 5,000 years of civilization, and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated ‘associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbors’, which shows that throughout history the Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for

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In the following, I analyze his writings that, while idealizing the Confucian past, made a signifijicant contribution that reinvigorated the concept of tianxia as a means to achieve lasting peace. Luo argues for tianxia being a superior form of world order based on moral refijinement, one that is able to avoid the shortcomings of an order characterized by contractual peace (an idea taken up recently by the contemporary political philosopher Zhao Tingyang).73 Luo Mengce and His Tianxia-State (tianxia guo ᄤਅ࿡) Thinking On the occasion of the treaties concluded between Great Britain and the United States in January 1943, ending their exterritorial rights in China, Luo Mengce published several journal articles and even a full-fledged monograph that aimed at convincing Japan to imitate the Euro-American concessions, instead of continuing its aggressive attacks on the continent. In one of his fijirst articles in 1943, titled “On Empire, Nation-state and Tianxia-State” (Lu diguo, zuguo yu tianxiaguo 䄆 “ᑍ഻”, “᯿഻” 㠷 “ཙл഻”), he describes three possible forms of political order. Next to the traditional empire—defijined by one ethnic group (minzu) controlling and ruling over other ethnicities—and the nation-state (where nation and state are congruent), there is one other form of order that has long been forgotten, namely, the tianxia-state (ཙл഻).74 While empire and nation-state are familiar concepts, Luo points out, his proposal of the tianxia-state is not, and it needs to be established as a new epistemological category of statehood. In contrast to the Near and Middle East (where one empire followed another) and Europe (where nation-states were fijighting one another after the demise of the last empire), China had experienced a diffferent political evolution, one characterized by the notion of continuity and the kingly way (wangdao ⦻䚃)75 that preferred integration and harmony over rivalry and bloody competition. This order is called the tianxia-state, on which

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relations of friendship with the people of other countries” (Information Offfijice of the State Council, White Paper on China’s National Defense [Beijing: Xinhua, 1998]). Yet, while both thinkers share the ideal of tianxia, they difffer in confijidence toward this ambitious project, with Luo eager to establish the true tianxia immediately and Zhao being less optimistic, for tianxia is a rather utopian project in the latter’s eyes. Luo Mengce 㖵དྷ޺, “Lun “diguo”, “zuguo” yu “tianxiaguo” 䄆“ᑍ഻”, “᯿഻”㠷“ཙл഻”,” in Xin zhengzhi ᯠ᭯⋫ 7, no. 1 (1943): 44. Though not explicitly, Luo opposes the kingly way, or the rule of the right, to the way of the hegemon, or rule of might (badao). This categorization of rule goes back to the classical reference in Mencius 2A3, where the diffference between a chieftain of the princes

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Luo wrote in 1943 a full-fledged monograph titled On China (Zhongguolun ѝ഻䄆). In it, he interprets the Chinese quest for liberation and independence as a heroic and legitimate enterprise, even if foreign powers often express their fears that a postwar China might become an imperial power longing for the establishment of a world empire of its own. These fears, however, cannot be substantiated, Luo writes, because they are simply foreign propaganda, as emphasized by several Chinese journalists in their efffort to propagate a sound and proper nationalism. The declared aim of his book is to convince the foreign powers that China’s fijight for liberation and freedom does not attempt to reestablish the Mongolian world empire but to ensure the equal standing of a democratic China in the world. The only way to achieve this is to ensure to know oneself and the other (zhiji zhibi ⸕ᐡ⸕ᖬ).76 This book is written exactly for the epistemological purpose of understanding properly what China actually is and to communicate this knowledge to the outside world. In his eyes, the Confucian state enjoyed a civilizational superiority shared even by barbarians, and it was more than normal to assimilate neighboring ethnicities. After all, China was incessantly behaving according to the ethics of reciprocity. This, again, enabled it to gain a distinct sense of self-assertion considered more important than the acceptance by neighboring states. This self-assertion was transdynastic: each dynasty had a diffferent name, but its core was the political order and the cultural values of China; thus, they were part of the Chinese state. Accordingly, when the people of Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties were naming themselves the “Great Han”, the “Great Tang,” the “Great Song,” or the “Great Ming,” they were not simply referring to the dynasty but experienced themselves as the political representative of China in their period (Zhongguo zhi guo ਛ࿡ਯ࿡). With the arrival of European civilization, however, this self-perception experienced a drastic change, resulting in self-descriptions as “China is a nation with fijive thousand years of history,” “China is an old empire,” “China is a backward country,” or “China is a weak nation.” These characterizations, Luo points out, are meaningless because they do not aptly describe China and even pose a danger to its current self-description. This is especially the case

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(ruling by force) and a sovereign of the kingdom (ruling by virtue) is made. Cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 196–97. This is a quotation from Sunzi’s The Art of War ᆛᆀ‫( ⌅ޥ‬chapter Mougong 䄰᭫). Luo implies here that if one knows the enemy and knows oneself, one does not need to fear the result of a hundred battles.

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with Chinese thinkers educated in the West. Accepting the political order of European provenance—the nation-state—as the sole legitimate order, they propagate a narrow, monoethnic state that does not match the situation of their country. Luo rejects this kind of thinking as it implies to measure China according to Western principles. For China, he concludes, it is important to note that it is neither a nation-state nor an empire: ѝ഻ᡆNjѝ഻ѻ഻njˈ൘䙾৫ˈᡆਟ䃚аⴤࡠ⨮൘ˈнᱟа‫ػ‬Nj᯿഻nj ˄≁᯿഻ᇦ˅ˈҏнᱟа‫ػ‬Njᑍ഻njˈ㘼ᱟа‫ػ‬䎵Nj᯿഻nj৽Njᑍ഻nj ⲴǍ഻ᇦǎ㘼ᱟа‫ػ‬Ǎ഻ᇦǎˈ৸ᱟа‫ػ‬Ǎཙлǎˈüü㘼ᱟа ‫ػ‬Ǎཙл億㌫ǎˈǍཙл₏ΏǎᡆǍཙл഻ᇦǎDŽᜏަྩᱟа‫ػ‬Ǎཙл 億㌫ǎˈǍཙл₏ΏǎˈǍཙл഻ᇦǎˈྩ᡽нᱟа‫⤩ػ‬䳈Ⲵ ᧂԆⲴNj᯿഻njˈҏ᡽нᱟа‫ػ‬ᖱᴽ䧞༃ᔿⲴNjᑍ഻njDŽ

China, or the Middle country, was in the past—one can even say until today—neither a nation nor an empire, but a state that both exceeded the nation and behaved anti-imperial. It is a state and a tianxia. It forms a tianxia system, a tianxia institution, or a tianxia-state. By simply being a tianxia system, a tianxia institution, or a tianxia-state, China is not a narrow-minded and xenophobic nation, and by no means an oppressive empire.77 Luo tries to position his country between the exaggerated, chauvinist nationalism of the European nation-states and the aggressive, Mongolian type of empire (currently often perceived as the yellow peril), claiming that the tianxia is the most exalted political principle. Based on moral values such as sincerity (zhengxin ↓ᗳ), righteousness (chengyi 䃐᜿), self-cultivation (xiushen ‫؞‬䓛), stabilizing the family (qijia 啺ᇦ), and ordering the state (zhiguo ⋫഻), the world was to be made peaceful (ping tianxia ᒣཙл), resulting in a polity where the Great Way was practiced and where the world was shared by all alike (བྷ䚃ѻ㹼ҏˈཙл⡢‫)ޜ‬.78 Luo further points out that the Chinese already

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Luo Mengce 㖵དྷ޺, Zhongguolun ѝ഻䄆 (Chongqing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1943), 12. For an impressive yet questionable efffort to exploit the latter quotation (taken from the Book of Rites) and the famous catena in the Great Learning (Daxue), cf. the serial article by Yang Fuli ὺᗙ⿞, The Nine Aspects for Realizing the Ideology of the New Citizen ᯠ≁ѫ㗙ሖ䑀ọⴞѻаˉҍ (1939). The series of articles are subtitled—in their chronological order—with investigating things (gewu Ṭ⢙), obtaining knowledge (zhizhi 㠤⸕), being sincere (chengyi 䃐᜿), being upright (zhengxin ↓ᗳ), self-cultivation

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commonly accepted this ideal long before it was propagated by Confucian scholars. In other words, the Chinese had already realized a political tianxia, an economic tianxia, and a cultural tianxia, which were passed down from dynasty to dynasty. Drawing a conclusion, Luo defijines China as a tolerant and magnanimous country, as an ecumenical state (tianxia guojia) that downplays the signifijicance of diffferences in culture and ethnicity. With China now being a singular state based on universal values transcending the borders of nations, cultures, and ethnic groups, China is termed a tianxiaguo ཙл഻, or an ecumenical state (tianxia guojia ᄤਅ࿡ኅ). Luo admits that this term is unusual and certainly unfamiliar to both Chinese and Europeans, but it is a political term of Chinese origin, describing aptly the position of China in the global order. It is necessary and advisable for Europeans to accept this new term in their own political terminology, which has so far remained purely European.79 Luo commits here the mistake of essentializing Europe, assuming that the quest of each European nation to establish its own nation-state is a common characteristic trait while forgetting that this ideal politeia has only emerged in the wake of the French Revolution (1789) and that the notion of ecumenical statehood also has its European counterpart.80 What is more important to him is the observation that the replacement of the imperial system with the international system is no sign of civilizational or political progress. Contrary to Europe, Luo Mengce contends, both China and Russia have developed diffferently. In the latter case, the Great Russian Empire—possessing half a Western and half an Eastern character—has left the European model of historical development. Under the influence of the Soviet system, it has arrived

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(xiushen ‫؞‬䓛), ordering the family (qijia 啺ᇦ), getting acquainted with the home region (qinxiang 㿚䜹), governing the country (zhiguo ⋫഻), and bringing peace to the world (ping tianxia ᒣཙл) (published in the journal Xinmin zhoukan ᯠ≁䙡࠺, from issue 30 to 41). The Xinmin zhoukan was a journal published by the Chinese New Citizen Society (Zhonghua minguo xinminhui ѝ㨟≁഻ᯠ≁ᴳ) from March 1938 up to December 1939. With its orientation being anticommunist, it favored cooperation with the Japanese. This is for Luo a given fact and nothing Europe needs to be criticized for. The acceptance of the European discipline of political science in the latter half of the nineteenth century was for him historically justifijied but now needs to be complemented. He difffers in this judgment decisively from postcolonial authors. Medieval Europeans considered divine (supernatural) and material things a part of the same continuum, and, accordingly, rule was imagined to migrate from one emperor to another beyond national, religious, or ethnic afffijiliations. The occident has thus also witnessed a translatio imperii. The notion of translatio imperii was brought to my attention by Michael Lackner.

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at the realization of national self-determination (minzu zijue ≁᯿㠚⊪), creating a federal system and thus developing to an ecumenical state (tianxia guo zhi guojia ཙл഻ѻ഻ᇦ) that resembles to some extent the Chinese traditional fengjian system, emphasizing local autonomy. China, on the other hand, has at least in theory tried to enter the new world order based on the nation-state. The failures in reform, the continuing Westernization, as well as the incessant aggression of Western imperialism, made it soon clear that modernization according to the European model was no solution (Luo goes even one step further in the last chapter of his book to call the modernization movement a huge failure). The true solution to the problems of China is the implementation of the Three People’s Principles, proposed by Sun Yat-sen as part of a philosophy to make China a free, prosperous, and powerful nation. The emergence of these principles in China, Luo states, is not accidental. When Sun had once declared that the three principles are the means to save China ( й≁ѫ㗙ቡᱟᮁ഻ѫ㗙), he was referring not to the Western notion of state when talking of guo but to the Chinese politeia of Zhongguo zhi guo ਛ࿡ਯ࿡ or Zhongguo tianxia guo ਛ࿡ᄤਅ࿡. Although Sun is not using the according terms, Luo is convinced that he is referring to it, as Sun has often pointed out that the Chinese state was diffferent from the European one.81 As for his nationalism (minzuzhuyi ᳃ᣖਥ⟵), it is an encompassing nationalism not based on a chauvinist ethnocentrism aimed at creating an ethnically homogeneous collective, but is an ideology based on the development of a national consciousness that unites all ethnic groups in their fijight against imperialist aggression. In the same way, the call for minquanzhuyi ≁℺ѫ㗙—the people’s power—is not aimed at securing the interests of the rule of the bourgeois class. Finally, his call for a better livelihood of the people (minshengzhuyi ≁⭏ѫ㗙) is a socialism not restricted to single classes or states, but a true and all-encompassing ideal (datongzhuyi བྷ਼ѫ㗙), which in the end results in a universalism with Chinese characteristics (tianxia weigong ཙл⛪‫)ޜ‬. Luo’s referral to this ecumenic universalism is not simply a vision that has its roots in the ancient traditions (exemplifijied by his reference to the datong ideal), but one that is directed into the future, and one that is seemingly a concrete political project. In his book On China, Luo is very self-confijident, for he has no reason to doubt that tianxia is a realistic 81 

Cf. Sun’s argument in his work Sanminzhuyi: Sun Yat-sen (1927): The Three Principles of the People (San min chu i) (with two supplementary chapters by President Chiang Kai-shek, translated into English by Frank W. Price) (Taibei: China Publishing Co, 1927), 2.

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possibility. By locating it in the ancient past (where the tianxia was assumed to have existed as a functioning political order) and by assuring the superiority of Chinese (moral) values the tianxia can no longer be considered utopian but applies to the whole world, where universal rule (dayitong བྷа㎡) is supposed to be unlimited and not bound to a given territory or space. Quite similarly, Kang Youwei’s datong theory is less utopian than a clear commitment to modernization (in contrast to Thomas Morus and the thinkers in his tradition who have treated utopia as a place removed from the known world, thus more an illusion than real). Thus, it is no wonder that his Datongshu includes a complete, realistic planning of how to create the new society,82 and this is not limited to China, insofar as Kang is part of a development in the twentieth century that has witnessed the disappearance of utopian thinking.83 However, if a modernization discourse fails to fulfijill its promise of introducing universal norms and rules—and this includes the implementation of universal norms in international relations—then utopia faces a true chance to return to the realm of political thinking, especially when postmodern thinking rejects universal modernity and argues for plurality. After all, the uncertainties of historical development caused by the impact of postmodernity led to a crisis, which caused scholars to rethink of how to imagine a better world. One striking example is the contemporary political philosopher Zhao Tingyang who interprets the current global order as a “bad world” (huai shijie), characterized by incessant conflicts and war. He understands his proposal for a tianxia as a legitimate form of resistance against the Western form of political order, even though it probably has to remain utopian: because the global world has not reached the postnational stage yet (or in other words, modernization is still confijined to the nation-state) the idea of tianxia can merely be a philosophical thought, yet one probably with deep insights and possible consequences for imaginations of world order.

82  83 

Equally realistic is the pedagogue, journalist, and politician Liu Renhang in his 1926 work, Outline for a Great Community in the East (Dongfang datong xuean ᶡᯩབྷ਼ᆨṸ). As argued by Zhang Pengsong ᕐᖝᶮ, Wutuobang yujingxia de xiandaixing fansi Ѽᢈ䛖䈝ຳлⲴ⧠ԓᙗ৽ᙍ (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2010). For a fascinating discussion on the nonetheless necessary persistence of utopian thought, cf. Oskar Negt, Nur noch Utopien sind realistische Interventionen (Göttingen: Steidl, 2012).

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Excursus: The Renaissance of Tianxia in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought Ā䟽ᙍѝഭāⲴশਢ᜿ѹ൘Ҿ䈅മᚒ༽ѝഭ㠚ᐡⲴᙍᜣ㜭࣋ˈ䇙ѝഭ䟽 ᯠᔰ࿻ᙍᜣˈ䟽ᯠᔪ・㠚ᐡⲴᙍᜣṶ઼ᷦสᵜ㿲ᘥˈ䟽ᯠࡋ䙐 㠚ᐡⲴц⭼㿲ǃԧ٬㿲઼ᯩ⌅䇪ˈ䟽ᯠᙍ㘳㠚䓛оц⭼ˈҏቡᱟ৫ ᙍ㘳ѝഭⲴࡽ䙄ǃᵚᶕ⨶ᘥԕ৺൘ц⭼ѝⲴ֌⭘о䍓ԫDŽ

The historical meaning of “rethinking China” is to try to restore the abilities of China’s own thought, to let China start to think anew, to let her establish again her own thought framework and fundamental concepts, to let her create again her own world view, standard of values and methodologies, so that it is able to rethink herself and the world; i.e. to reflect China’s prospects, her future ideals, as well as its role and responsibility in the world. —Zhao Tingyang84

∵ In April 2005 Zhao Tingyang 䎥≰䱣, a philosopher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, published a book that quickly gained much attention in both academic and nonacademic circles. Titled The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution (Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun ཙлփ㌫˖ц⭼ࡦᓖଢᆖሬ䇪), it offfers a distinct Chinese model of world order that is thought to replace the Eurocentric one. It was successful because it seemed to nurture and strengthen the assumption of Chinese superiority, both in the fijield of realpolitik (economics and military) and in the fijield of culture, where, since the 1990s, China had enjoyed an enormous renaissance of, among others, Confucian tradition. In his book, Zhao aims at restoring ancient cultural capital with Chinese characteristics, even if it meant to misrepresent historical reality and came along with a number of conceptual ambiguities, as I show in the following part. By reevaluating the political thought of the Zhou dynasty, Zhao hopes to offfer a Chinese-style solution to global problems by claiming to be able to combine the contradictory discourses of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, there seeming to be able to even overcome the past memory of national shame 84 

Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 7.

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and yellow/white peril discourse. The political intentions of this work, however, are obvious and unquestionable. In the introduction of his book, Zhao mentions Edward Said (1935–2003), admitting that he was motivated by Said’s postcolonial concerns.85 In his eyes, the past two centuries made his country accept Western theories as the sole source of universal truth, thereby not only doing signifijicant harm to the Chinese tradition but also impeding China from contributing to the construction of a truly international order. His tianxia model intended to correct these shortcomings by restoring a Chinese mode of thinking, a Chinese morality, and a Chinese political philosophy on a global scale, as he puts it. This view was nourished by the assumption that the particularistic order of nation-states is responsible for rivalry and the subsequent consequences. Opposed to this model, the tianxia tixi ཙл億㌫ is a political worldview (zhengzhi shijieguan ᭯⋫ц⭼㿰) that has its origin in traditional philosophy, where tianxia—the all-under-heaven—is understood as the highest political entity. While close to the proposal of Luo Mengce (whom he does not quote) Zhao presents a much more systematic defijinition of tianxia: 1.

2.

3.

It is a geographical notion that refers to the all-under-heaven, that is, the di (earth) in the traditional triad of tian (heaven), di (earth), and ren (people). It is understood in a psychological sense, referring to the mentality of all human beings (minxin ≁ᗳ). Having supreme power over the geographical tianxia is not simply de tianxia ᗇཙл (to acquire the world) but also to enjoy the support of those inhabiting the tianxia. Tianxia is grasped in an ethical-political sense, meaning that it is conceptualized as a Utopia where everybody treats each other like members of one family. This is influenced by the ideal of great community (datong) and certainly includes the imagination of a “world government.”86

Compared with the Western idea of “the world” (shijie ц⭼), the Chinese notion of tianxia is taken as a philosophical rather than scientifijic idea (i.e., a politeia that is all-inclusive and does not divide humankind based on political, religious, cultural, or ethnic categories). This drive for division has caused Western political philosophy to be unable to solve global problems, let alone maintain peace in international relations, because its political thinking is

85  86 

Zhao mentions Edward Said en passant only and does not engage into a detailed discussion. On these three characteristics, cf. the discussion in Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 41–42.

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confijined to the nation-state, and its perspective cannot transcend the nation.87 Here, Zhao points out, the highest form of political order is the nation-state, even if conceived in terms of spatially organized empire (diguo ᑍ഻), and the world is simply a geographical concept, but not a political one.88 Accordingly, the Western conviction that its values are universal is hardly acceptable by non-Western nations, because these universal values lack a truly global perspective. In addition, by stating that world is a scientifijic idea (implying that it is inferior to the Chinese tianxia) he arrives at rejecting European modernity, but also at creating a sense of superiority that seems to be induced by his pride on Chinese civilization. It is thus not surprising to fijind that for Zhao China difffers from the West because already Laozi had called for seeing the all-under-heaven with an according perspective. This argument, taken from the Daodejing, is problematic, as pointed out by William Callahan in his 2005 analysis of Zhao’s work. Zhao’s reading of chapter 54 of the Daodejing explains this passage by stating that one has to “use the world (tianxia) to examine the world (tianxia)” (ԕཙл㿰ཙл).89 This view is however not fully correct. Considering the greater context of this passage, the chapter actually takes a diffferent perspective by taking a bottom-up-approach, declaring that one “uses the self to examine the self, uses the family to examine the family, uses the neighborhood to examine the neighborhood, and uses the world to examine the world (᡿એりⷹり㧘એኅⷹኅ㧘એ悱ⷹ悱㧘એ࿡ⷹ࿡㧘એᄤਅⷹ ᄤਅ).”90 One begins with the self, and not with the world when pursuing moral perfection. The tianxia is simply the fijinal stage of socialization, and not prioritized over any other kind of space. Contrary to this, Zhao argues that “while you can’t easily sacrifijice the needs of units at one level for the interests of a unit at another level, at the same time, it also signifijies that the superior levels have to exist, and that common interest comes from them more

87 

88 

89  90 

On a semantical level one might point out that the character jie in the word shijie can also be translated as border or boundary. See here the discussion of Kang Youwei’s datong above. Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 120. Barabantseva has argued that tianxia and shijie actually do not oppose each other; see William Callahan and Elena Barabantseva, ed., China orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 187–91. Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 18. Daodejing, chapter 54, Chinese original quoted from James Legge, The Tao Te Ching (Waiheke Island: Floating Press, 1891).

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than from the units at the inferior levels.”91 His view is close to the common interpretation of the Great Learning (Daxue) that links the pacifijication of the tianxia, the government of states and the properly ordering of families. As shown in the second chapter of this book, the conceptualization of political order—if closely read—neither prioritizes nor privileges the top over the bottom sphere. This obvious misreading—similar to a number of cases in recent political-philosophical scholarship in China—can undoubtedly be explained by a lack of philological scrutiny whereby classical texts are not taken as texts containing an abstract truth that might or might not be applied to solve problems of the contemporary world, but are rather taken as concrete recipes for creating order, as I show in the following discussion of recent scholarly works that try to revigorate tianxia. In fact, Zhao is with his discussion of tianxia very close to the fijindings of Yan Xuetong 䰾ᆖ䙊, who emphasizes morality being central to humane authority. In the writings of Xunzi, humane authority means that a state gains support by people at home and abroad, which again legitimizes the state.92 Yan declares in his writings on pre-Qin thinkers dealing with issues of international relations that he is convinced that shifts and changes in international relations during the Warring States period were not so much matters of military or economic strength but, rather, were defijined by ideas. Concepts and morality were of much greater concern to these thinkers, and if one was able to integrate these ideas into the fijield of international relations theory (the central idea being that the basis of international authority in pre-Qin era is the moral level of the leading state), the discipline of international relations would gain a lot: The theory of hegemonic stability in contemporary international relations theory has overlooked the relationship between the nature of hegemonic power and the stability of the international order . . . According to the pre-Qin thinkers’ way of thinking, we can suppose that the level of morality of the hegemon is related to the degree of stability of the international system and the length of time of its endurance.93

91  92  93 

Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 62. The translation is taken from Callahan, Tianxia, Empire and the World, 11. Cf. here chapter 2 in Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 65. For a short description on how China is to achieve these aims, cf. Yan’s contribution in the New York Times titled “How China Can Defeat America,” November 21, 2011, digital source, http://www

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In other words, the moral character of tianxia can and should be transformed into a global principle to achieve peace and stability. In Yan’s view, a similar observation can be made in the European context, where Great Britain was gentler in its colonial policy than France, thus having less frequent violent opposition in its colonies. Despite being a realist in terms of international relations theory, Yan emphasizes that international power is determined by political power and that morally informed political leadership determines the latter. In the end, states relying on morality are more likely to succeed in international politics than those that prefer tyrannical hegemony or rely on economic or military power.94 After all, as long as the international system determined by domination and hierarchy persists, it is only morality that might be the greatest hope for achieving a truly peaceful and harmonious world. The emphasis on moral perfection is so strongly emphasized by both Yan and Zhao because, according to the Confucian conviction, peace is impossible if governance (and this includes world governance) does not imitate the family model. Exposure to politically defijined morality—from all-under-heaven to the nation-state and then to the family—is de rigueur: It is argued that political governance must be efffectively transposable from the highest to the lowest levels, since smaller political societies are always conditioned by greater ones. This means that the order and peace of larger political societies is always the necessary guarantee for that of smaller ones. Mozi (468–376 bc) argued that disorder in the world is caused by conflicting interests and opinions; order can only be brought about by political leadership.95 The world is too big to be managed by only the highest form of government. It should hence be divided into many substates and other smaller units, so that good governance may follow when a political institution is transposed “from superior to inferior levels, rather than vice-versa.” This is thus a descending order from “allunder-heaven” to nation-states to families.96

94 

95  96 

.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/opinion/how-china-can-defeat-america.html?pagewanted=all (last access January 26, 2016). Accordingly, China will only be successful in replacing the United States as the world’s leading state when the international community believes that China is more responsible than the United States—and when its morality has proven superior. Zhao refers here to the third book in the Mozi, titled Identifijication with the Superior (Shangtongቊ਼). Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-Heaven (Tian-xia),” 13. This argument is closely related to his understanding of Chinese philosophy, which involves a metaphysic of relations instead of an ontology of being. In Chinese philosophy, there can

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This quote not only shows that any kind of order is categorically hierarchical but also that creating order is a metapolitical act: to create order (zhi) is a concrete act of regulating social behavior in a top-down manner. With creating order being an imperative act that is indispensable to the individual, a lack thereof results not in a world in chaos (luanshi ੊਎) but, rather, a nonworld ( fei shijie 㕖਎⇇),97 and the current world, Zhao points out, is still a nonworld, and not a true political existence.98 Putting the whole problem on a global scale, Zhao found that true problem is not one of failed states but one of a failed world. People are well aware of the fact what needs to be done for the nation but are unsure how to create a world suitable for each. The latter is a more serious problem because no country could possibly be successful or survive in failed world.99 Instead of concentrating on peace and safety for single nations, Zhao tries to develop a world order that is able to leave behind the thinking in terms of territoriality and to grasp the problems from a global perspective, or, as he points out, the tianxia concept focuses more on worldness than on state or international politics. He further argues that [o]ver the last few decades, the term “world politics” has become increasingly popular, and is understood as meaning something more than just “international politics.” This change was late in coming, but nevertheless signifijicant, even though its understanding of politics is not so original. World politics is still interpreted within the framework of internationality, and the idea of ‘worldness’ is still lacking. A world theory is impossible until the world’s universal well-being takes priority over that of the nation-state.100 be no thing “in itself,” since any thing is by nature defijined in terms of relations with other things. With regard to Zhao’s world philosophy, this means that harmony is a principle for relations between things. Trauzettel, in “Individuum und Heteronomie: Historische Aspekte des Verhältnisses von Individuum und Gesellschaft in China,” has described the metaphysic of relations as the central diffference to European tradition that has since ancient Greece emphasized autonomy of the individual instead of heteronomy. 97  Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 37. 98  Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 21. 99  With regard to the recent wars fought by America in the name of freedom, liberty, and democracy, Zhao points out quite sarcastically that American leadership will eventually result in a failed world, which is much worse than simply failed states. Cf. Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-Heaven (Tian-xia),” and the similar, somewhat questionable assessment by Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 100  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-Heaven (Tian-xia),” 6.

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Zhao diffferentiates in this context between state politics (guojia zhengzhi ഻ᇦ᭯⋫), international politics (guoji zhengzhi ഻䳋᭯⋫), and world politics (shijie zhengzhi ц⭼᭯⋫), and only the latter is fully devoid of particular interests and exclusively concerned with global problems.101 The failure of political philosophers to create an entity that deserves to be called world (and not nonworld) is, for Zhao, caused by the political ignorance of the idea of mundus qua mundus. So far, the concept of nation-state has convinced people to believe in either universalism or pluralism. The former is defijined as a form of aggressive behavior of the most-developed countries that act according to their national interests, and the latter is an attitude that, again, puts the interests of the less-developed or oppressed nations in the foreground. In both cases, narrowminded nationalism is the driving force of political behavior. Contrary to this, a truly functioning political systems needs to be generally accepted by enjoying universal efffectiveness in the political realm and complete transitivity. In other words, Zhao argues, it needs to be communicated to each political level that goes beyond the nation-state. The need to do so has been the result of the globalization, when political issues are no longer discussed in terms of single states but are of global signifijicance. Zhao’s proposal entails a distinct critique of the Western model of liberal democracy.102 With regard to the recent wars fought by America in the name of freedom and democracy, he openly warns against a preferential treatment of American values. He justifijies his call for a for a tianxia system

101  Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 316. 102  A point taken up by Bell in one of his newest publications, where he questions the universal character of Western liberal democracy and warns against a depreciation of nonEuropean traditions (cf. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy). While in principle this point is correct, it construes a form of modernity that is—despite its improvements at fijirst sight—highly problematic, because the Confucian notion of democracy here discriminates the individual vis-à-vis the collective, or greater good. For Bell and his coeval Yan Xuetong, Western-style democracy is problematic because the will of the majority may not be moral. This is the case when a majority favors racism, imperialism, or fascism, or when it neglects long-term interests of mankind (e.g., global warming) by privileging short-term interests (economic growth). While this argument is in principle correct, one might wonder why China—despite claiming to do so—does not share a greater burden of responsibility. For this argument on the flaws of Western democracy, cf. Yan Xuetong and Daniel Bell, “A Confucian Constitution for China,” New York Times, July 10, 2012. The idea of constitutional Confucianism with a trilateral parliament system goes back to Jiang Qing; see Jiang Qing, “From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism,” in The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, ed. Ruiping Fan (New York: Springer, 2011), 17–32.

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by referring to postcolonial arguments that criticize the notion of right (as an ontological category) in what he calls “Western” theories of international relations. If, as he puts it, individual rights (or national rights) are thought to be of supreme signifijicance, then this will undoubtedly result in conflict and war. This is the case with an overtly emphasis on national sovereignty, as well as with human rights interventions.103 The underlying assumption is here that these rights are of Western origin and inapplicable to non-Western areas, because it would only oppose East and West and reproduce what Carl Schmitt has assumingly done with his distinctions between friend and foe.104 Western political life thus inevitably results in conflict, Zhao argues. Contrary to this, Chinese political philosophy has been able to create a world order that is all-inclusive (i.e., one where diffference is not ontological). The tianxia belongs to all the people of the tianxia (tianxia shi tianxiaren de tianxia ཙлᱟཙлӪⲴཙл 105, which is a formulation very close to the well-known “China belongs to the Chinese” or “Asia is the Asia of the Asians” phrases that had their origin in the Monroe Doctrine, yet one without any reference to territoriality or spatiality. By doing so, the distinctions between self and other, or inside and outside, are more relative than absolute. In contrast to Zhao’s reasoning, however, the discussion of enmity in late imperial China has shown that the late nineteenth century undoubtedly witnessed the emergence of ontologically defijined enmity with collectives that was considered irreconcilable. Indeed, the Taiping, the anti-Manchurian movement and those who warned against the white peril largely asked for—or feared—that either side would face physical extinction. Being himself caught in the pacifijist bias, Zhao approaches the issue in an ahistorical manner when claiming that the ethical logic of the tianxia106 has since ancient times been characterized by the idea of inclusion, or baoman 㘻ṩ. This idea argues that the world cannot be analyzed by the concept of shijie (this European concept is simply a geographic one) but only by taking an all-comprehensive perspective that rests on tianxia. Heaven is impartial (tianxia wusi ᄤᧄή⑳) and does not know any outsider (tianxia wuwai ᄤਅήᄖ). Consequently, Chinese tradition does not know heresy, or enemy thinking in terms of Carl Schmitt, or radical and inhuman nationalism.107 103  Cf. the corresponding chapter in Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy, 52–83. 104  This is the position of Zhao Tingyang. Compared with Schmitt’s concept of the enemy, as discussed in the previous chapter, Zhao possesses only a very simplistic understanding of Carl Schmitt. 105  Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 32. 106  Ibid., 41, 77. 107  Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 92–93.

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Inclusion means tolerance, and the openness of tianxia allowed non-Chinese becoming Chinese, such as during the Yuan and Qing dynasties.108 Zhao’s normative call for inclusion resonates well with the notion of a harmonious society in current China, or with the effforts of international relations specialists to create a harmonious world order that does not pursue the practice of distinguishing between amicus and hostis, but aims at transforming enemies into friends (huadi weiyou ൻᢜὑ෹).109 This transformation is achieved by going beyond the dichotomy of peace and war, and indeed, for Zhao peace resulting from war is no true solution to the existing conflicts: Neither war nor peace is the best solution to the problems of conflicts. We all know that war is notorious for its destruction and also, unfortunately, self-destruction. Beyond the concepts of war and peace, ‘harmony’ seeks reasonable resolutions of conflicts and stable security by building truly reliable correlations that mutually benefijit in long-term, as well as reciprocal acceptance of the other’s values. It is obvious that harmony is a higher goal than peace, since peace would be a by-product of harmony.110 True peace is in the eyes of Zhao not simply the absence of war but only achieved if harmony replaces contractual peace. While the latter case would be content to declare peace on the basis of rules as laid down in international law (ending a war with a peace treaty, for instance), harmony cannot 108  This also explains quite convincingly, Zhao says, the phenomenon of westernization in China, where foreign thinking is easily accepted. 109  Zhao, Tianxia tixi, 33. Although presented here as a traditional political philosophy, it is intriguing that this proverb cannot be found in the writings of ancient philosophers; it is also not traceable in the dynastic histories, it is rather a proof of the over-all prevailing pacifijist bias. A similar saying, “to bury the hatchet” ॆᒢᠸ⛪⦹ᑋ, can be traced back to the Han Feizi 㖧㕖ሶ, where it reads in the chapter Yuandaoxun ৏䚃䁃: “In ancient times, Emperor Kun of Hsia built a towering wall; but the Lords rebelled and the distant people became suspicious and wily. And so Yü, seeing the opposition of the kingdoms, rased this wall to the ground and fijilled in the moats, scattered the wealth accumulated, burnt the implements of war and administered the empire on the principles of virtue, not of force. As a result, the distant people brought their tributes and the barbarian tribes their offferings. The concord sealed at the conclave of the Lords, at T‛u Shan, resulted in valuable tributes from myriad kingdoms” (᱄㘵༿凰֌йԎѻ෾, 䄨‫ן‬㛼ѻ, ⎧ཆᴹ⤑ᗳDŽ⿩⸕ཙлѻ਋ҏ, ѳ༎෾ᒣ⊐, ᮓ䋑⢙, ❊⭢‫ޥ‬, ᯭѻԕᗧ, ⎧ཆ䌃Կ, ഋཧ㌽㚧, ਸ䄨‫ן‬Ҿງኡ, ว⦹ᑋ㘵㩜഻). Translation by Evan Morgan, Tao, the Great Luminant (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1933), 7. 110  Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, ed., Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and Perspectives (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2012), 48.

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forcefully—or by a higher institution—created, but has to evolve. To prefer harmony is a very idealist position and resembles to some extent the proposal of Woodrow Wilson that a “Peace without Victory” should conclude World War I, where a peace imposed by the victor would “leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand.”111 Yet, there is a signifijicant diffference between Zhao and Wilson. Whereas the US president still hoped to actively achieve “a peace between equals,” Zhao needs to sustain—at least on a rhetorical level—the dichotomy of “East” and “West.” With the United States being primus inter pares in the Westphalian international order, and with constant wars among nations, this European order is certainly not ideal, because there are, in fact, no equal partners, as imagined by Wilson. Because of this, Zhao’s critique is justifijied. Yet, he is unable to explain of how to communicate his new ideal to the world society. Emphasizing that moral qualities of the ruler are the fijirst priority of statecraft112 and that China is unable to develop into a militarist society due its pacifijist culture is by no means sufffijicient.113 That China is not perceived as a threat because of the “Peaceful Orientation of Chinese Civilization,”114 and that Oriental pacifijism (Dongfang hepingzhuyi ᧲ᣇ๺ᐔਥ⟵)—a popular phrase used in countering the China threat theory—is a legitimate alternative is merely a naïve self-perception.115 This is also true even though the famous historian of China and Southeast Asia, Wang Gungwu ⦻䎃ᱞ, recently pointed out in a publication on the renewal of the Chinese state that tianxia could impossibly be equaled to the notion of empire because 111  Address of the President of the United States Delivered to the Senate of the United States, January 22, 1917. 112  To quote Mencius “The benevolent man has no enemy under heaven.” See Mencius 7B3, ӱӪ❑ᮥҾཙл. 113  According to Wang, Harmony and War, this culture rests on the four central features of the culture of antimilitarism, defensive grand strategies, the theory of just war, and limited war aims. It is quite telling that the comprehensive English-language RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism does not discuss war in Confucian thought. 114  Li Shaojun ᵾቁߋ, “Lun Zhongguo wenming de heping neihan: cong chuantong dao xianshi: dui Zhongguo weixie lun de huida 䇪ѝഭ᮷᰾Ⲵ઼ᒣ޵⏥˖ӾՐ 㔏ࡠ⧠ᇎ˖ሩѝഭေ㛱䇪Ⲵഎㆄ,” Guoji jingji pinglun, no. 19 (1999): 30–33. 115  Prominent here is Liu Zhiguang ࡈᘇ‫ݹ‬, Dongfang hepingzhuyi: qiyuan, liubian ji zouxiang ьᯩ઼ᒣѫѹ: Ⓚ䎧, ⍱ਈ৺䎠ੁ (Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1992). The fear of a new yellow peril discourse in the West is one reason why the Chinese government replaced its slogan of peaceful rise (heping jueqi ઼ᒣፋ䎧) with peaceful development (heping fazhan ઼ᒣਁኅ).

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[e]mpires stand for conquest, dominance and control, although the degree of actual control may vary from one empire to the next. Tianxia, in contrast, depicts an enlightened realm that Confucian thinkers and mandarins raised to one of universal values that determined who was civilized and who was not. It is not easy to separate tianxia from the Chinese idea of empire because tianxia was also used to describe the foundation of the Qin-Han Empire. By itself, tianxia was an abstract notion embodying the idea of a superior moral authority that guided behavior in a civilized world.116 This optimistic interpretation of Confucianism is problematic, as research from the last two decades has shown. In an ideal world, the Confucians were certainly convinced that war was not necessary, neither for protection nor for the sake of territorial expansion. Yet, this did not prevent Chinese strategic culture from acting according to the dictates of realpolitik, based on the parabellum strategic culture deeply entrenched in its military culture.117 Accordingly, military writings of imperial China often argued to eliminate security threats by the use of force—and as decribed by Johnston in his analysis of the Seven Military Classics (Wujing qishu ᱞ⛫৾ᦠ, a collection of military texts compiled in the eleventh century)—the parabellum strategy has persisted until today. In other words, the often-quoted and highly idealized discourse of benevolence and antimilitarism appears here as a tale that does not correspond to actual political behavior, and Zhao Tingyang is no exception when trying to revigorate the tianxia ideal for contemporary world politics. Next to his naïve optimism based on a wrong interpretation of Chinese history, Zhao’s proposal harbors another weakness. In his effforts to formulate a world theory that deserves to be called this way because it aims at removing nationalism, international competition and rivalry he fails to properly grasp the historicity of tianxia. For instance, when claiming that heaven is able to provide a true solution because it entails the “exclusion of nothing and

116  Wang Gungwu, Renewal: The Chinese State and the New Global History (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2013), 132. 117  For this reason, the Confucian classics also discuss issues war, such as the need for a well-trained army (Lunyu 13/30), or fortifijied boundaries (Mencius 1B20). In their attempt to historicize Confucius, E. Bruce Brooks and Taeko A. Brooks go even one step further by claiming that the real Confucius was a warrior. The view of Confucius as a scholar and philosopher then only emerged after his death. Cf. Brooks and Brooks, The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and his Successors (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 270–317.

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nobody,” or the “inclusion of all peoples and all lands,”118 he quotes as evidence the Book of Songs (Shijing ⹞⛫) and the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government (Zizhi tongjian ⾗ᴦㅢ㐓) by Sima Guang ม㚍శ (1019–1086). However, his quotes are highly selective, and what is missing is the contextualization of the ideas described in the quotes presented here.119 This is, however, a typical Chinese way of using historical sources for today’s purposes, or make the past serve the present (gu wei jin yong ฎ῰੹↪), without reflecting on issues of conceptual history or historical and social contexts.120 His eclectic reading is in stark contrast to the fijindings of Quentin Skinner, who, in his seminal text “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” contradicts Arthur Lovejoy: to speak of “The Great Chain of Being” is to defijine the idea of a chain as a real, continuous thing, always present and waiting for the historian to pick it up and make connections that are not linked to the actual reality: “For Skinner, ideas have no lasting history but only a momentary performative role, and when the language act is played out, the idea leaves the stage and the curtain drops. The notion that ideas persist over time is ‘spurious,’ and historians who think they are tracing such ideas ‘never go right.’ ”121 The diffference in 118  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-Heaven (Tian-xia),” 10. 119  The attempt of reverting to ancient traditions during the course of modernization is, of course, nothing new, considering that Liang Qichao had already argued for a reevaluation of pre-Qin political thought in his monograph History of Pre-Qin Political Thought (Xian-Qin zhengzhi sixiangshi ‫〖ݸ‬᭯⋫ᙍᜣਢ, published in 1922). Liang points out that the pre-Qin philosophers’ idea of “all-under-heaven” refers to the whole of humanity and is not limited to a single state or nation. It was a kind of universalism, characterized by the Mencius’s answer when being asked by king Xiang of Liang “How can all-under-heaven be settled? It can be settled by being united” (Mencius 1A6, the full quote reads: ᆏᆀ㾻ằ㽴⦻DŽࠪˈ䃎Ӫᴠ˖NjᵋѻнլӪੋˈቡѻ㘼н㾻ᡰ ⭿✹DŽং❦୿ᴠ˖ǍཙлᜑѾᇊ˛ǎ੮ሽᴠ˖ǍᇊҾаDŽǎnj). For the translation see Legge, The Chinese Classics, 136. 120  According to Anne-Marie Brady (and I do not have found a diffferent view) gu wei jin yong is a slogan coined by Mao Zedong in 1956 during a talk to musicians in August 1956. See Mao Zedong, “Tong yinyue gongzuozhe tanhua ห㖸ᮔᎿ૞⠪⺣⹤,” August 24, 1956, in Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian 1915–1992 ਛ࿖౒ṏౄትỈᎿ૞ᢥ₂徱亾 1915㧙1992, 4 vols., ed. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting, Zhongyang dang’anguan bianyanbu ਛ౒ਛᄩትỈㇱ≆౏⌭, ਛᄩ᪌᩺椮亾⎇ㇱ (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1996), vol. 3, 1168–1174. See also AnneMarie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China—Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic (London: Routledge & Littlefijield, 2003). 121  See John Patrick Diggins, “Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Challenge of Intellectual History,” Journal of the History of Ideas (2006): 184. Diggins quotes here from Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History & Theory 8 (1969): 3–53.

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talking about liberty fijive hundred years ago and liberty today is huge, and so is the case for the notion of tianxia in the Zhou dynasty and today. There are no perennial ideas, no concepts or doctrines that transcend time and place. On the contrary, meaning can be found in texts only (especially those characterized by a great time distance) by means of contextualization122, or as Janssen put it in his critique of Skinner and Pocock: Not through searching for historical perennial issues are texts from the past made relevant for the present, but rather by showing them as instances of an engagement in politics in the fullest sense—that is, through entering into speech or discourse as a means more appropriate to the likes of men than violence—can modern political theorists gain from history a sense of precisely what this engagement they call politics involves.123 Zhao Tingyang, on the contrary, fails to do so. His political-philosophical writings are, in general written in a tone that as if the texts of the past reveal some historical-cum-political truth that a reader of these texts simply has to fijind and apply them to the present. His selective use of ancient values such as the “allunder-heaven” is no exception. He too easily relates the pre-Qin conception of this idea with that of contemporary age, instead of considering the various reinterpretations this concept has enjoyed since then (most notably in Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties). By making tianxia perennial, Zhao arrives not only at making this idea applicable to the current situations, but—by opposing it to the European tradition—seems to imply that European ideas such as liberalism, rights, individual autonomy, and sovereignty are perennial ideas, too. To the contrary, the discipline of the history of ideas has convincingly shown that this way of thinking is far from historically true. The fact that in the Chinese context, past and present are consciously related to each other by means of straightforward analogies can easily be explained by the lack of historism, but there is another side of the story: the belief that Chinese civilization has enjoyed a continuity of several thousand years, which again proves its superiority (e.g., considering the pacifijist bias). While this view is easily demasked as some form of ideology, Zhao is deeply convinced of its historical truth. For him, tianxia is a perennial idea because it is less an abstract idea than one that 122  See here David Runciman, “History of political thought: the state of the discipline,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2001. 123  Janssen, Peter L., “Political Thought as Traditionary Action: The Critical Response to Skinner and Pocock,” History and Theory (1985): 125.

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relates directly to a social experience common to all men. Through its universal character, tianxia is able to include all peoples and lands, and therefore China rejects the domination of any particular religion and any notion of a “chosen people”, because the world is structured like a family, with the declared aim of being home to all people.124 To conclude, Zhao Tingyang pursues here a highly philosophical ideal that tries to restructure the world order. Although the realization of this ideal is uncertain, the proposal is more than just a mere philosophical reflection. Being a result of his postcolonial concerns, Zhao’s ideal enjoys (moral) legitimacy in the eyes of his coevals and thus needs to be taken seriously. Indeed, the current discussions on China becoming a new power in global relations, the expectations of both experts and layperson range from responsible power to new world hegemon. A close reading of Zhao shows that he is well aware of the China threat fear that is often expressed in Western media. When declaring that tianxia should be the remedy to the global problems, the issue of hegemony—and especially imperial hegemony—is obviously a great concern. To understand these debates and their political signifijicance, some conceptual clarifijications are necessary: Is Zhao’s proposal of tianxia a classical empire? Does it share the hegemonic character of past empires or not? In the fijield of political science, the defijinition of both concepts is still under discussion, and there have been no satisfactory results so far.125 Being fully conscious that his proposal of tianxia as an alternative to the nation-state might encounter resistance, he is sure to clarify that this proposal does not aim at reviving the old empire (as does Luo Mengce). Accordingly, he diffferentiates in his writings between empire and tianxia, namely, by grasping diguo as a concept (gainian ᾲᘥ) and tianxia as a rational thought (linian ⨶ᘥ). The major diffference is that the latter describes an ideal order, or one 124  Zhao quotes here the famous story in the Lüshi chunqiu where one man of Jing lost a bow but was not worried because he was convinced that another man of Jing was to fijind it (㥺Ӫᴹ䚪ᕃ㘵ˈ㘼н㛟㍒ˈᴠ˖Nj㥺Ӫ䚪ѻˈ㥺Ӫᗇѻˈ৸օ㍒✹˛njᆄᆀ 㚎ѻᴠ˖Nj৫ަǍ㥺ǎ㘼ਟ⸓DŽnj㘱㙳㚎ѻᴠ˖Nj৫ަǍӪǎ㘼ਟ⸓DŽnj᭵ 㘱㙳ࡷ㠣‫)⸓ޜ‬. Cf. Lüshi chunqiu, chapter Guigong 䋤‫ޜ‬. For his discussion, see Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 91. 125  These are Hardt and Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Ulrich Menzel, Zwischen Idealismus und Realismus: Die Lehre von den Internationalen Beziehungen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001); Ulrich Menzel, Paradoxien der neuen Weltordnung: Politische Essays (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004); Münkler, Imperien; Heinrich Triepel, Die Hegemonie: Ein Buch von führenden Staaten (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1938); and Peter Zarrow, After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885–1924 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

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that is to be assessed positively. Accordingly, he deviates from Hardt and Negri, who conceive of today’s Empire as a diffferent one from European imperialism, one that is mainly produced in American constitutionalism where the call for unlimited globalization has induced the decline of the nation-state that might result in the emergence of empires such as China. It is questionable if and to what extent the future Chinese empire will resemble the European empires such as Germany, France, or Great Britain (as often implied) or not, if one recalls that the twenty-fijirst century is, except for the all-pervading nationalism, devoid of any greater ideology. Seen from the angle of political science, the diffferentiation between gainian and linian is a promising approach according to current debates in China on the possibility of non-“Western” international relations theory.126 Based on the long tradition of Confucian political thought and assured of Confucianism being pacifijist, the call for tianxia is convincing because this rational thought is devoid of any negative or questionable content. The reasons have been analyzed earlier. It remains to be asked how such a rational thought can be propagated successfully also among those countries that have so far not been able to enjoy the “blessings” of Confucianism. For if postcolonial concerns are the sole ground for doing so, such a propagation will most likely fail and thus needs to be communicated in a less political way. One promising way to do so is by concentrating on nonpolitical aspects (similar to the ongoing effforts of the current Chinese government to propagate Confucian culture worldwide). For Zhao, however, the issue at stake here is not simply culture but, fijirst and foremost, morality.127 As much as there are morally good individuals, there are morally good rulers, and if each is willing to behave accordingly, an advanced global civilization is possible. Zhao argues that because of its overwhelming attractiveness, imagining individuals or collectives who oppose this rational thought is difffijicult. He admits that the idea of moral rule is difffijicult to realize because of the limited, or narrowminded, character of the human being (particularly when taking into account here that the subject of politics is the people, min ≁). In the end, egoism and the charm of material profijit prevent the human to put moral over material interests. Likewise, even if the ruler was a philosopher, he or she might not be 126  These effforts are partly motivated by postcolonial concerns but not exclusively, as shown by Nele Noesselt, “Is there a ‘Chinese School’ of IR?” GIGA Working Paper, no. 188 (2012), digital source, taken from https://giga.hamburg/de/publication/is-there-a%E2%80%9Cchinese-school%E2%80%9D-of-ir (last access January 26, 2016). 127  Moral strategy is to secure a fair distribution of both economic profijit and political power. In the latter case, Zhao favors an alliance of ruler and scholar elite similar to the philosopher kings, the rulers of Plato’s utopian Kallipolis.

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able to live up to his or her moral standards, because it would mean to share both power and influence with others, which is something that can hardly be expected from someone who is the ruler. If morality regulates the relation between government and the people, the second primary principle necessary for establishing a functioning system is the notion of harmony, or he ઼. It regulates the relations between individuals with diffferent interests and is more able to resolve conflicts caused by egoism than the notion of equality, communism, social welfare, or individual rights.128 The underlying assumption is here that the worldly phenomena are determined by their relationship to each other (‫ޣ‬㌫ߣᇊһ⢙). In other words, coexistence precedes pure existence (‫ޡ‬ᆈ[coexistence]ᡀҶᆈ൘[existence]Ⲵ‫ߣݸ‬ᶑԦ).129 He secures cooperation and balance of interests, both economic and psychological interests, and cooperation is a more appropriate means than launching wars in the name of peace and freedom.130 Harmony is the principle of coexistence that involves metaphysics of relations rather than ontology of being. The problem of a being as a thing “in itself” is unreasonable because a thing is construed by its relationships, or in other words, “[r]elations are thus the ontological condition for a thing to be present as such; so much so that existence presupposes coexistence, and co-existence determines existence.”131 Philosophically speaking, such an interpretation sounds promising (yet idealistic), because it prefers mutual consent to one-sided, egoistic demands. However, we should not forget that this interpretation has to be seen in its 128  He ઼ is defijined here by a variety of quotes taken from classical writings, such as the Shangshu ዏᦠ, Zuozhuan Ꮐொ, Shijing ⹞⛫, and the Guoyu ࿡⺆, among others; cf. Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 116–17. 129  Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 118. This is a typical Confucian argument that limits the application of rights discourse, or, to put it in other words, the ritual (li) leaves no room for the notion of right ( fa), as argued by Trauzettel, “Individuum und Heteronomie,” and the Bonn School. Cf. also Hans Georg Möller, “Menschenrechte, Missionare, Menzius: Überlegungen angesichts der Frage nach der Kompatibilität von Konfuzianismus und Menschenrechten,” in Menschenrechte in Ostasien, ed. G. Schubert (Tübingen: Mohr und Siebeck, 1999); and the various contributions in the volume by Z. Wesolowski, ed., Symposiums-Beiträge: Drittes Internationales Symposium der Katholischen Fu Jen Universität: Personen- und Individuumsbegrifff in China und im Westen—Der Beitrag der Bonner Sinologischen Schule um Professor Rolf Trauzettel (Taipei: Institut Monumenta Serica, 2006). 130  In his reasoning for tianxia, Zhao emphasizes the essential diffference between harmony and sameness (going back to the classical sequence in the Lunyu 13/23, ੋᆀ઼㘼н਼ˈሿӪ਼㘼н઼). Whereas harmony aims for mutual improvement among diffferent things, sameness reduces everything to one possible outcome. 131  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia),” 15.

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rightful historical and cultural context. While the moral duty to cooperate with the other is seemingly something universal (who would openly negate that?), it—from its Confucian background—deprives the individual of his or her autonomy, because the greater good of the collective is the central problem, not the individual right or interest.132 Without overemphasizing a dichotomy between the Confucian orient and Christian occident, I need to emphasize that this point is one of the central weaknesses of Zhao Tingyang’s thought. It is hard to imagine how those countries that conceive of international relations in a less relational and more ontological sense could accept his premises. This is also the reason why Zhao—although reflecting deeply on the impossibilities to actually realize a tianxia that can solve the problems of war and peace—in the end, he remains rather philosophical, unable to clarify how and by what means the tianxia thought is made global. His pride on the philosophical tradition (a tradition that he assumes but not proves by an highly eclectic approach) may very well be explained by the need for self-assertion in a globalizing world, yet does not mean that Zhao can be considered a nationalist thinker. For him, tianxia is a kind of natural, unquestionable order that has been developed during the Zhou dynasty and persisted until today, yet without being implemented actively or by force (which would have contradicted the pacifijism identifijied in the Confucian tradition). Indeed, Zhao shares this passivity when unable to imagine a possible institutionalization of tianxia, which would meant to institutionalize morality. The most promising way would certainly be a top-down approach, where reading and teaching of Confucian classics such as the Great Learning and the Analects is made obligatory. The propagation of universal Chinese values in non-Confucian societies, however, would expose this endeavor to the suspicion of ideology. An active approach is thus not possible, and Zhao can only hope that the tianxia thinking is successfully disseminated outside China by its inherent attractive character. Anything else would be an expression of cultural hegemony, and this is a problem strictly avoided. If this were the case, then the current ambitions of a rising China to gain global influence would be largely overestimated. Indeed, fearing to be seen as a danger to regional and global peace, the current regime emphasizes regularly

132  Trauzettel, “Individuum und Heteronomie.” This is not only a problem for a nonConfucian but also for the Chinese themselves, considering the continuing infringement of rights in various regards.

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that its military spending is little compared to other developed countries,133 and that it rather concentrates on cultural investments ranging from Confucius Institutes to the establishment of media that aim at a global audience by using English, French, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian. Joseph Nye has called this latter strategy soft power,134 believing that “seduction is always more efffective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.”135 One central element of soft power is culture that has advanced to a central role, made possible by the stunning career of both postmodern and postcolonial theory. They have created a ubiquitous cultural relativism that has left behind the once-cherished hierarchy of cultures defijined by their developmental stage. As this hierarchy was deeply entrenched in the discourse of modernity, it once created a nonegalitarian Eurocentric order of the world. Nowadays, such a hierarchy is unthinkable, and accordingly, culture has become apolitical while turning into a much less problematic issue than a century ago. However, this is only true for its conceptualization. The fact that it plays today more and more a role as soft power shows that there is still a political potential, one that, more often than not, is exerted yet not always openly admitted. This is how a soft power works, and power has become more clandestine and deceptive, compared to the nature of hard powers of the past. For these reasons, culture should not be underestimated. If tianxia—surely philosophical in the eyes of Zhao Tingyang—is grasped as a cultural phenomenon, and considering his ambition to propagate tianxia values on a global scale, one needs to ask if it is a strategic behavior aiming at establishing a hegemony or if it is even an imperial project, to put it more negatively. While the cultural hegemony of the United States is in most parts of the world accepted (or at least tolerated, even though that needs to be questioned from time to time), the case for China does look diffferent. This does not only pertain to the influential role of China in world economics but 133  On the Chinese displeasure to pursue hegemony as a characteristic of its culture and history, cf. the one-sided and highly arguable text by Dan Xingwu ն‫ޤ‬ᛏ, “Zhong Xi zhengzhi wenhua yu huayu tixi zhong de baquan—Zhong Xi baquanguan bijiao ѝ㾯᭯⋫᮷ॆо䈍䈝փ㌫ѝⲴ䵨ᵳ—ѝ㾯䵨ᵳ㿲∄䖳,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no. 9 (2004): 14–19; and further Li Baojun ᵾᇍ‫ ׺‬and Li Zhiyong ᵾᘇ≨, “Hexie shjieguan yu baquan wendinglun—yixiang bijiao fenxi ઼䉀ц⭼㿲о䵨ᵳっᇊ䇪— а亩∄䖳࠶᷀,” Jiaoxue yu yanjiu, no. 6 (2008): 79–85. 134  Power is defijined as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants,” here taken from Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Afffairs, 2004), 2. 135  Ibid., x.

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is also discernible with regard to culture. With its cultural production growing in the last decades, the effforts of the Chinese government are often suspected to be propaganda organs.136 The issue at stake is not whether these activities are acts of propaganda, but why—as correctly pointed out by Daniel Bell— there is obviously a double standard, preferring the United States over China.137 A more objective analysis would surely put things right, making it clear that this will not necessarily lead to a clash of civilizations, yet the Chinese ambitions for a hegemony and/or imperiality need to be taken seriously.

136  See, e.g., the discussion by Kam Louie, “Confucius the Chameleon: Dubious Envoy for ‘Brand China,’ ”Boundary 2 38, no. 1 (2011): 77–100. 137  Daniel Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy.

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Lessons from the Past: Visions of World Order Today The effforts to imagine alternative forms of world order in the decades after World War I had—as shown by Edward Carr in his work The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939—a decisive impact on the development of international relations theory that still today can be felt. The critical attitude of Luo Mengce was indeed caused by a doubt of the universal legitimacy of international law. However, his doubt is not simply motivated by postcolonial concerns that try overcome legal orientalism but also tries to carve out the real problems in the fijield of international relations: in other words, problems that are not only Chinese problems but are also global problems that warrant attention by both East and West. To be able to make a true contribution, he infused Confucian elements into the Eurocentric discipline of international relations, thereby probing how far human ideas influence conceptions of world order. In the past decade, similar effforts have been made by scholars such as Qin Yaqing, Yan Xuetong and Zhao Tingyang, who in their numerous publications tried to combine the rise of China with a new commitment to elements of ancient Chinese culture, thereby profoundly transforming the diffferent schools of IR theory.1 In most cases, their world order proposals—being fully in line with the principles of social constructivism—possess a highly normative character and therefore share the character of the idealism school in international theories. Whereas realist theory is more descriptive and has submitted to the belief that order depends on hegemonic power, idealist theory intends to actively change the existing order and propose a better one. Thus, it comes to no surprise that idealism often falls back on normative and moral arguments. For instance, Luo has emphasized in his writings that although there are conventions and pacts that prohibit war (and each reasonable human being would consent to these rules), yet war still takes place. The central problem is here the lack of powerful institutions that can enforce observance of international law, a problem that Woodrow Wilson wanted to solve by the League of Nations. However, the inability of realist theory to go beyond national interests is the main reason why, for example, Zhao Tingyang considers the existing 1  For a comprehensive overview on the history and the development of the IR discipline in China since 1978, cf. Noesselt, Alternative Weltordnungsmodelle?

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international state system a failure where even a truly global institution such as the United Nations fails to act properly because each of its members speaks in the name of one’s own national interests.2 He therefore proposes that international behavior should be organized diffferently by introducing utopian elements, among which are in his case referrals to soft power and the belief in the superiority of Chinese political tradition that had resisted to replace morality with norms (i.e., international law) as Europe had done. That these norms were not able to prevent both imperialism and colonization in later decades is, in their eyes, the shameful proof that it has an inherent weakness. The call to integrate the tianxia discourse of ancient China as a concrete concept into international relations theory should offfer a solution to this weakness. Yet, this endeavor is no easy task because—and this is generally true for the twentieth century—there have been only few genuine effforts to defijine tianxia in a sense that it could possibly become a shared political concept. In one case, Luo has presented it as a true alternative to European models of political order, i.e., opposed to both the nation-state and the modern Empire. For Zhao, that tianxia—although long conceived as an imperial order— cannot simply imitate the Empire as imagined by Hardt and Negri is more than obvious. There is a fundamental diffference between imperial empires and modern Empires. The former, as argued earlier, have a clear conception of the area under their rule, but their territory, as opposed to that of the nationstate, is not exclusive. Boundaries are subject to the actual political or military power of the ruler. Modern Empires are obsessed with the acquisition and/ or control of territory that is beyond their limited territory, for example, by formulating a Monroe Doctrine or creating Greater Spaces. Considering that Luo wrote his Zhongguolun for criticizing the imperialism of Japan and the West it is clear that avoiding the suspicion of non-justifijied territorial ambitions was imperative in proposing any kind of political order that goes beyond the nation-state. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Zhao fully avoids talking about territoriality and spatiality. He is rather busy with rationalizing tianxia,

2  Post-1945 and especially post-1989 global society has made some substantive progress with the foundation of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court. The problem with these institutions is nevertheless either the institutional partiality of the former two (where the fijive permanent members of the UN Security Council have a veto right, thus making the enforcement of World Court rulings difffijicult) or the lack of acceptance of the latter one by some great powers such as the United States, Russia, and China. For an overview on national interest in the Chinese case, see the study by Yan Xuetong 䰾ᆖ䙊, Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi ѝഭഭᇦ࡙⳺࠶᷀ (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1996).

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which is part of the ongoing effforts among scholars and thinkers to restore Chinese exceptionalism, ranging from ideological endeavors such as “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Deng Xiaoping) and “harmonious society” (Hu Jintao) to Chinese conceptions of democracy (Jiang Qing), and fijinally the call for a Chinese School of International Relations theory (Zhang Xiaoming, Qin Yaqing).3 While the former two address primarily a Chinese audience, the latter two also aim at shaping global opinion (this resonates well with Beijing’s growing global political influence). The call for pursuing an essentialized exceptionalism is to some extent similar to the often criticized American exceptionalism, and—on the surface—seems to aim at replacing Eurocentrism with Sinocentrism, arguing that a morally superior China is more able to solve global problems than a hypocrite, highly moralized America that is leading wars in name of democracy. However, this replacement is no true progress because their call for a harmonious world with Chinese characteristics— what we might call a teleological narrative of Sinocentrism—shares the same structural characteristics as the imperial tianxia thought. The question remains: What qualitative progress can actually be made? That is, how can a sinocentric system be able to provide democratic structures of international society and thereby create a more peaceful international environment? This 3  Qin Yaqing points out that a Chinese School of IR theory would be a very promising solution to the world’s problems. He explains its lack with three reasons: (1) the lack of international consciousness in the traditional Chinese worldview, (2) the dominance of Western IR theory in the Chinese discourse, and (3) the absence of a consistent theoretical core in Chinese IR research. For a discussion on these issues, cf. Qin Yaqing, “Why is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacifijic 7, no. 3 (2007): 313–40. The question if China has developed an IR theory of its own has during the past few decades been heatedly discussed among Chinese scholars—especially among older generation scholars educated in socialist IR theory—who claim that the Maoist period has already seen Chinese theories ranging from the theory of trends in international relations, the paper-tiger theory, the theory of uneven development, the theory of intermediate zones (between the two superpowers), to the theory of hegemonism, the Three-Worlds theory, and the peaceful coexistence theory. As correctly analyzed by Song Xinning, “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics,” these so-called theories are more often than not merely strategic policies, because they do not convincingly explain the distribution of power in international relations. Current thinkers in the fijield of IR theory, such as Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong, are far more creative in their political philosophy because they face—compared to their predecessors who were limited due to ideology, dominance of policy-oriented research, and the influence of the state—fewer restrictions in thinking by situating themselves in the pre-Qin period. It is interesting to observe here that Zhao remains in that era and does not build on discourses of the Republican period, like Luo Mengce, who had put forward similar views with his tianxiaguo.

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issue is directly linked to the problem of China’s political modernization in the twentieth century. Ranging from revolution and a radical break with the past to the current effforts of restoring traditional political values, the discipline of political philosophy has experienced strange repercussions, leaving it in the twenty-fijirst century with the seemingly only alternative, namely, the return to the past. With the past being a foreign country, this return is somewhat diffijicult. The observable proposals of political modernity, which are motivated by postcolonial concerns, are effforts to reconcile both tradition and modernity and Chinese and Western thinking, which makes them vulnerable for more or less evident contradictions that are difffijicult to resolve. The concluding part of this book intends to elaborate on the impact of these effforts with regard to the structuring of international relations characterized by the interplay between realism that emphasizes the need for hard power and constructivist theory that also allows human ideas (i.e., soft power) as influential factors. In truth, the rise and fall of great powers does not hinge only on the material resources they have at disposal. If this were the case, the fate of each power would be fairly predictable. Likewise, postcolonial states tend to avoid materialist determinism as the sole model of explanation because both the colonial experience as well as the relative material weakness resulting thereof (in terms of economy, military, and political capability) are most likely unable to provide opportunity or incentives for political action. Although engaging in a sweeping modernization program aiming at improving this situation, for those states, reconsidering cultural and/or social aspects when intending to strengthen the international standing of the state—which is a result of the cultural turn—is more promising. As a consequence, the current discussions on international relations theory in mainland China focus on social constructivism, particular on that of Alexander Wendt, who argues that the acting of states is not only influenced by structures, but also by processes.4 He refutes the neorealist paradigm that in an anarchic system the cooperation of states is only the exception to the rule by pointing out the central weakness of rationalism, because this school holds that “[r]egimes cannot change identities and interests if the latter are taken as given. Because of this rationalist legacy, despite increasingly numerous and 4  A classic example in this context is the observation—also made by Alexander Wendt (“Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 [1992]: 391–425)—that similar structures do not necessitate the same patterns of behavior. The international society, in fact, feels more endangered by fijive North Korean nuclear weapons than by fijive hundred in the possession of Great Britain, despite the much larger deadly potential of the latter.

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rich studies of complex learning in foreign policy, neoliberals lack a systematic theory of how such changes occur and thus must privilege realist insights about structure while advancing their own insights about process.”5 Contrary to this, states are able to change not only their behavior in interaction and learning processes but also their identities and interests. Accordingly, states are able to cooperate, as well as to act egoistically. Opposed to the teachings of neorealism, Wendt is convinced that the current global society has the potential to improve international relations despite its anarchic character. After all, self-help and power politics do not follow logically from anarchy because they are institutions of anarchy (not its essential features). If, in an anarchical system, actual political behavior can be formed by identities and interests, by either an evolution of cooperation and by intentional effforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities, identities are not ontologically given but are inherently relational. This enables the introduction of behavioral norms into the fijield and allows for the evolution of the international system from a Hobbesian to a Lockean and then, fijinally, to a Kantian system.6 Only in the latter system does cooperation prevail over conflict and friendship made into the primary principle, not enmity, which, understandably, has so far exerted the greater influence on international relations scholarship. Although there is no teleological development of states from Hobbesian to Lockean and Kantian state system, it is normatively speaking obvious that the degree of enmity declines from the Hobbesian to Lockean system, and then vanishes in the Kantian culture. In other words, enmity is turned into amity.7 While it is surely difffijicult, if not impossible, to realize such a transformation (no matter how much one wishes for it), Zhao Tingyang comes to similar conclusions in his Investigations of the Bad World (Huai shijie yanjiu). For him, friendship is the key factor in building an international society that is not based on the notion of right (Locke) but on morality, and morality is derived from metaphysics of relations in Chinese philosophy rather than from the ontology of being in the European tradition.8 Indeed, social constructivism holds that identities are inherently relational—rightly because identities are social constructs. Both institution and 5  Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 393. 6  As Wendt argues in his monograph Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 7  A point also rightly observed by Yan Xuetong. 8  It is not fully clear what he means by metaphysics of relations. Compared to the European counterpart, however, it seems that he shares the Confucian idea where creating order is a metapolitical issue defijined by the concrete act of regulating social behavior.

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identities are thus not a historical or social given, and if rules and norms of international behavior do not exist per se (as for example put down in international law), then any mode of cooperation is imaginable, and one possible way to do so is the imaginary of tianxia, which in the writings of Zhao is conceived as a valuable contribution to creating order in international society.9 In other words, he shares—although not explicitly—some assumptions of the English school that has caused a sociological turn in international relations theory. The main reason, therefore, was the discontent of its proponents, most prominently Hedley Bull, with international relations theory neglecting historical analysis. The English school judged the American trend to distinguish international relations from other disciplines such as history, law, and philosophy critically and resisted the social science approach that favored testable theories and statistics instead of ideas. In addition, the declared aim of the school was to soften the diffferences between realism and liberalism.10 Chinese scholars in international relations theory, such as Zhang Xiaoming, share this critique by pointing out that the West neglected the past when explaining the present. The reconsideration of the past as an important resource for explaining behavior was the reason why the English school argued strongly for the integration of (human) ideas into the fijield of international relations theory, what Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong (among others) are currently aiming at. Both are convinced that order in world politics can be maintained only if there is a set of rules that organizes international behavior. Rules by themselves are mere intellectual constructs and are for this reason unable to exist and to function convincingly. Generally, rules are imperative principles that defijine what kind of behavior is permissible and thus govern individuals and collective to behave in prescribed ways. Rules can have the status of law, morality, or customs.11 With regard to international law as the most prominent form of rules in twentieth-century international politics, it is understandable why those critical of it are fond of the English school. This is normally explained by its cultural sensitivity. The English School was able to offfer a viable alternative to both realism and idealism of the past because social constructivism removed Eurocentrism, and it empowered the non-Western nations to par9  10  11 

Strictly speaking, then, Zhao’s precautious reservation that his tianxia is rather utopian cannot be upheld. Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (New York: Palgrave, 1998). For a characterization of rules in the English School, cf. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 56–57.

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ticipate actively in the creation of an international society that was devoid of hegemony because of its anarchical character; that is, it was free of any overarching authority or institution that enforced decisions.12 The popularity of the English school notwithstanding, William Callahan warns that this should not be assessed too positively.13 Contrary to the recent effforts of appropriating this school he sees that there still is a problem with hegemoniality. It is caused not only by its far-reaching entanglement with the logic of nation-states, but also by the rules of the empire in the historical reality of the European continent. The concept of international society uses namely “standards of civilization” as a way to draw borders between the subjects and objects of international relations.14 In its parlance, the English 12 

13  14 

Zhang Yongjin, “The ‘English School’ in China,” lists three diffferent reasons why the English School is so popular among Chinese IR theorists. First, there is its emphasis on the continuity of international history and the history of ideas (and not realist power in the tradition of positivism and materialism as favored by American scholars). Second, the English School enjoys popularity because it asks big questions and tries to combine both historical and philosophical perspectives (an approach familiar to Chinese scholars). And third, Chinese IR scholars are well aware of the dominance of Western theoretical discourse that started in 1978 when the fijirst writings on IR theory were translated and made available to a Chinese audience. For an overview of the development of international relations theory in China since 1978, cf. Qin Yaqing, “Development of International Relations Theory in China,” International Studies 46, nos. 1–2 (2009): 185–201; and Song Xinning, “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics.” Qin admits that since 1978, the primary model of orientation in the Chinese international relations debate was the United States. The introduction of Western theoretical discourse on IR included translations of writings of Hans Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, Kenneth Waltz, Stanley Hofffman, Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph Nye (1978–1991); before that, there was virtually no transfer of foreign IR theories to China), and later (i.e., 1991–2000) Alexander Wendt and Immanuel Wallenstein became prominent. Only since the last decade did Chinese scholars become creative in formulating their own IR theories; see Noesselt, Alternative Weltordnungsmodelle? and “Is There a ‘Chinese School’ of IR?” William Callahan, “Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the English School,” Global Society 18, no. 4 (2004): 305–23. According to Gerrit Gong (a student of Bull and member of the English School), in the eighteenth century, China started to become a part of the family of nations by slowly accepting the standard of civilization set forth by the European powers. This approach shares some weaknesses of classical modernization theory that equaled modernity to Westernization (by, e.g., demanding adherence to international law and treaties when engaging in foreign relations). Due to the lacking insight into postcolonial theory when Gong published his PhD thesis in 1984, his monograph was barely critical when compared to the later works of James Hevia and Lydia Liu. In the eyes of today’s general public abroad, China is still considered to be insufffijiciently civilized to be fully accepted into

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school diffferentiates between developed states of Europe and the backward colonies outside Europe (i.e., not race or nation but class is the decisive factor). In other words, international ethics does not organize world politics, but international society is based on etiquette, thereby imitating aristocratic attitudes. Hence, the English school can be considered a conservative way of thinking, one that is less advanced than postcolonial ways of thinking. After all, the English school pursues a nationalization of international theory, providing each nation with its own theory of international relations.15 The notion of hegemony is here clearly not absent, for in scholarly research, epistemological and methodological hegemony has replaced military and economic hegemony (but this is simply a result of the fijindings of poststructuralism that the exertion of power is ubiquitous). If Luo Mengce and Zhao Tingyang are proposing to organize international relations by human ideas they share the imperial knowledge practices of Eurocentrism. By conceiving international society as a means to create order they forget that the order itself is highly selective: not all states are accepted being part of the society, and those that want need to convince the members to meet certain standards. Hence, order does not exist by itself, but is a man-made construct that includes as well as excludes, even if it claims to prevent a “clash of civilization” because there is only one international standard (i.e., one civilization left). To avoid this clash is in fact the hope of Zhao and the reason why he proposes the tianxia system as a political order leaving behind the cleavages caused by the norm of the nation-state. Yet,

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the family of nations. This reflects the civilizational hierarchy of the nineteenth century that still persists today. Hedley Bull made a similar assessment by arguing that China could only become a member of international society after having accepted some general guidelines created and propagated by the European powers (among them most prominently the discipline of international law). Cf. here Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ed., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 117–27. Bull has also written the preface to Gerrit W. Gong, “China’s Entry into International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society. See Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire—China and Japan’s encounter with European international society (London: Routledge, 2009); and also the discussion in Zhang Xiaoming, Guoji guanxi Yingguo xuepai—lishi, lilun yu Zhongguoguan ഭ䱵‫ޣ‬㌫㤡ഭᆖ⍮: শਢǃ⨶䇪оѝഭ㿲. This makes little sense, because if this approach is further pursued, then there would also be the need for a philosophy/history/sociology with Chinese characteristics, which would impede academic discourse in every discipline. However, the need for a Chinese IR is deeply felt in Chinese academia, because as “a rapidly rising major power it is unacceptable that China does not have its own [IR] theory,” as voiced by Qiu Yuanping, vice director of the Foreign Offfijice of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (here taken from Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 200).

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the moral rules that need to become standard for establishing tianxia cannot do so without epistemological hegemony: the rules are prescribed by Chinese tradition. However, the political program of tianxia—while perceived as hegemony by those to be included into the Chinese ecumene—can merely be considered a form of implicit hegemony, for if tianxia is the better alternative (which still needs to be proved), then what about cultures that question tianxia’s superiority and favor values contrary to that of tianxia?16 The central task would then be to convince other cultures that being inside of tianxia is better than being outside, to communicate that tianxia is a community that shares positive and negative experiences, and fijinally to make sure that each culture can keep its autonomy, create shared universal values, and thus turn enemies into friends. One reason why European nations very likely will not accept the idea of tianxia is certainly their Eurocentric arrogance that tends to consider Chinese proposals of political values unreasonable or problematic (similar to the rejection of other values, may it be Chinese human rights or Chinese-style democracy17), yet in the case of tianxia one needs to point out that even neighboring countries of China tend to rather not accept the great power’s harmonious (or harmonizing) foreign policy (and these countries certainly cannot be accused of being Eurocentric). From a Chinese perspective, however, the acceptance of tianxia does not constitute a major problem. Ideally, it has to be emulated by those outside of it, which is nothing short of the famous catena in the Great Learning characterized by a concentric hierarchy where the moral values emanate from the inside to the outside, or from the individual to the collective (in an ideal society). At fijirst sight, the hegemony of tianxia thus remains, even if Zhao replaces his top-down approach by the inverse approach in the Great Learning. The reason therefore is quite simple: as long as the participants in the international order are defijined ontologically (not relational),18 the contribution of Chinese tradition cannot get rid of the suspicion of hegemony, even if it is only implicit. The issue at stake here is if Zhao can avoid this suspicion while maintaining his hopes for successful soft-power-politics in a time when the pursuit for hard power in a rising China is still overtly present.

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17  18 

On his account, Zhao points out that the acceptance of his tianxia idea by the Western world is very likely; for a harmonious world (hexie shijie) it would be a sufffijicient incentive. Cf. his short comment in the newspaper Beijing Ribao, November 27, 2006, titled Hexie shijie de tifa meiyou shenme butuo Nj઼宸਎⇇‫⊛ޠ‬ឭᴺᴚ᦭ੲਇᅷ. See here the numerous publications by Daniel Bell, for instance. If the new order is based on relations instead of ontologies, it also appears more democratic, as is the hope of Zhao, Tianxia tixi.

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Conceptually speaking: is China in the near future restoring its empire of the past, or becoming a new hegemon?

7.1

Overcoming Hegemoniality What is wrong with dominance in the service of sound principles and high ideals? —William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan19

∵ Conceptually, there is a signifijicant diffference between imperiality and hegemony. According to Herfried Münkler, a historical-empirical perspective enables to understand the political order of the empire—that is related to both these concepts—more adequately. In typical understanding, an empire is often conceived as an imperial center exploiting the periphery by applying means of power and colonialization, with regions closer to the center being under stricter control than those farther away.20 Research on imperialism21 has already shown that those empires are not likely to survive in the long run because investments always exceed yield.22 Another characteristic of empires is their semipermeability. Leaving the empire (e.g., for traders) is easier than being incorporated. In the latter case, the paying of taxes, the acceptance of the legal system and of course the acceptance of the emperor or state authority is indispensable. In the Chinese case, barbarians—living in the 19 

20  21 

22 

William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan, The War over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), 112. Kristol and Kaplan are both neoconservative thinkers who consider that—being obsessed with a China threat—U.S. supremacy is essential for achieving world peace. Münkler, Imperien. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Imperialismustheorien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980); Anneli Wallentowitz, “Grundzüge der Diskussion über Imperialismus in Japan,” in Geschichtswissenschaft in Japan: Themen, Ansätze und Theorien, ed. Hans Martin Krämer, Tino Schölz, and Sebastian Conrad (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 65–86; Wallentowitz, “Imperialismus” in der japanischen Sprache am Übergang vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed., Imperialismus: Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1970). As pointed out by John A. Hobson (1858–1940) in his discussion of economic imperialism. Cf. Münkler, Imperien, 38.

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periphery—had to be sinicized, or civilized (less positively, assimilated), to become part of the empire. This empire was, however, not an imperialist one. It was merely imperial, with its policy being mainly concentrated on the center and only concerned with the periphery when necessary, as in the case of the territorial/spatial expansion of the Qing dynasty in the eighteenth century (exemplifijied by the conquest of the Zunghar kingdom and the negotiations of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk). Politically, the newly acquired regions were politically and militarily controlled by the Qing court, but the actual contact between center and periphery was mainly confijined to trade.23 Generally, although empires have a rather loose control over their periphery, they can still be hegemonic by means of cultural, military, or economic expansion into the periphery. In this respect, hegemony can be understood as “potential imperiality”24 or as “imperialism with good manners.”25 To put it into the words of Robert Keohane, “[t]he hegemon plays a distinctive role, providing its partners with leadership in return for deference; but, unlike an imperial power, it cannot make and enforce rules without a certain degree of consent from other sovereign states.”26 According to Chalmers Johnson, there is no substantial diffference between hegemony and empire, even if one admits that a hegemon can provide public goods such as increased stability and peace (in terms of the Hegemony Stability Theory that goes back to Charles Kindleberger). Often, authors use hegemony as a term for imperialism without colonies, but this is plainly a euphemism.27 Michael Mann points out that hegemony is a form of order characterized by rules, whereas an empire does not feel bound by rules.28 In other words, both terms are simply linguistic variations, with no further epistemological insights. In the Chinese case, a similar conclusion may be drawn when defijining wangdao as (civilizational) imperiality and badao as political hegemony. The decision for either empire or hegemony would here be a moral decision. The central questions for a new imagination of world order are when imperiality does turn into hegemony and what the actual reasons are. This interpretation, however, rests on the assumption that the political order of East Asia is structured similarly to that of Europe, where hegemony is 23  24  25  26 

27  28 

Perdue, China Marches West. Münkler, Imperien, 69. Georg Schwarzenberger, “Hegemonial Intervention,” in Yearbook of World Afffairs, vol. 13 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959), 236–65. Robert O. Keohane, “Hegemony in the World Political Economy,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 293. Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York : Metropolitan Books, 2004), chapter 1. Michael Mann, The Incoherent Empire (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 265.

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considered a historical given, which, again, is because it is a system of rivaling states (that from a sinocentric perspective was absent). Even if we admit that Europe and China share a hierarchical structure of their international system, the understanding and evaluation of hegemony difffers. For this reason, some remarks on its conceptual history are necessary. Hegemony—a term that was detached from its Greek terminological context in the nineteenth century and then transferred to the European present29— became a political concept in Heinrich Triepel’s 1938 volume Die Hegemonie— Ein Buch von führenden Staaten. In its original conception, hegemony was defijined as “guided balance,” and only in later periods was it more and more negatively connotated. Since the early twentieth century, hegemony is commonly defijined as an indirect form of dominance in which the hegemon—the leading political actor—rules subordinate states by means of power rather than by direct military force (e.g., intervention and occupation). In general, hegemony is now understood as an expansion of power to territories and peoples that do not belong to the realm of the hegemonic power.30 It also rejects interventions from rival hegemons or powers into the issues of the subordinate state or region. The classical example is the creation of American hegemony with the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine.31 Hegemony is thus always defijined with reference to the notion of space. With the Monroe Doctrine, the United States became the protector of the independence of all American states, including those in Middle and South America, and later in the Pacifijic. America claimed to protect the self-determination right of each state within its realm that stretched farther than the national territory.32 The same observation is valid for the Japanese empire during the 1930s and 1940s that claimed to protect the independence of the states on the Asian continent. The term independence does not entail full freedom of action but is meant to prevent a reduction of international law competence, its “theoretical legal competence.”33 Facing the existence of hegemony in international relations and its strong hierarchical character, and considering the rise of national self-determination as the major principle of international relations during the course of the twentieth century, it could be argued that any kind of hegemony is to be proscribed by according stipulations in the codex of international law (after all, intervention 29  30  31  32  33 

Geschichtliche Grundbegrifffe, 4: 172. For a positive judgment of hegemony, see the study by Triepel, Die Hegemonie. His assessment is, however, precarious, given the time it was written. Triepel, Die Hegemonie, 398–412. For a critical, yet not fully impartial, assessment of American hegemony in past few decades, cf. Mann, The Incoherent Empire, and Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire. Triepel, Die Hegemonie, 308–309.

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and occupation are already proscribed). The establishment of any hegemony would then be impossible, and the conflicts caused by it would disappear. The question is if this is truly possible, or not. Classical realism argues that it is impossible to imagine a world of states equally powerful. There will always be states that are economically richer, militarily stronger, or both. The only way to deal with this situation is to secure a balance that does not call for a distribution of power but that prohibits the accumulation of overwhelming power. This also allows the appearance of great powers (as forcefully argued by both Triepel and Schmitt). Conclusively, hegemony can be tamed but surely not be avoided. The fact that hegemony is something unavoidable in Western political thinking has something to do with the fact that Western political theory situates hegemony at the pinnacle of the structure of political power. It is thus the highest form of international power and, morally, is fully acceptable (when it provides stability, for instance). In Chinese political philosophy, the situation looks diffferent where the preference for the tianxia idea (conceived as wangdao) as opposed to hegemony is more than obvious. Hegemony does not correspond to the ideal of morally defijined humane authority, which was a political ideal that was universal and did not recognize other authorities than that of the emperor, tianzi. As a ruler, he was supposed to rule without force and rule alone as a morally defijined role model for the whole cosmos. This was a naturally given order that was hardly conceived of as problematic, and even the tribute system—itself highly hierarchical—was perceived as normality and in no way as an expression of hegemony.34 Such is the view of the realist thinker Yan Xuetong who in his publications is busy to declare the superiority of the Chinese vision of world order, where the Zhou dynasty (ca. 1046–256 bc) had already established a system that resembled the British Commonwealth, where the queen was the head of the Commonwealth but its members were still equal and independent. In his eyes, pre-Qin thinkers hold that international leadership can provide for stability because they do not rely solely on the strength of hard power but clearly diffferentiate between state power and international authority (in contrast to European thinkers). Power can—because of its coerciveness—never be convincing and will inevitably lead to conflict. Authority builds on trust and is the strength of legitimacy. Yan argues that “[g]iven the absence of world government, the nature of international leadership is one of authority rather than 34 

The problem of hegemony arose only in the Warring States period, where diffferent states were fijighting for their own hegemony. For a discussion of the political regress since the downfall of the Zhou, cf. the fijifth chapter, “Order and Chaos (Zhi yu luan ⋫оҡ),” in Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu.

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power.”35 For Confucian thinkers, the basis of humane authority is the moral level of theory leading state (or ruler), something that at fijirst sight seems to resemble the view of American neoconservative thinkers that positioned the United States as a “benevolent empire” (i.e., hegemon). However, their hegemonic power lacks a concept of international benevolent authority. More often than not, how their hegemonic power could contribute to international order is unclear. In fact, the degree of stability of the international system should correlate positively to the level of morality of the hegemon, as does humane authority. By preferring humane authority, Yan avoids the more problematic term hegemony, as American hegemony, although contributing to stability until the end of the Cold War, is now more and more seen critically. Even though Yan’s proposal can easily be termed a postcolonial urge of self-assertion, the diffferentiation between the kingly way, or the rule of the right (wangdao), and the way of the hegemon, or rule of might (badao), has, since its inception in the writings of Mencius,36 been a core element of Confucian political theory in the twentieth century. It served as a legitimation of Kuomintang rule when one considers the political writings of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and was even appropriated by Japanese thinkers in their the construction of a panAsian community and the puppet regime Manchukuo.37

35 

36 

37 

Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 64. Here Yan difffers from his earlier writings, where he had insisted—heavily influenced by realist theory—that power should not be neglected as a political factor. Cf. Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi ѝഭഭᇦ࡙⳺࠶᷀, and Yan Xuetong, Meiguo baquan yu Zhongguo anquan 㖾ഭ䵨ᵳоѝഭᆹ‫( ޘ‬Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2000). Mencius 2A3 reads: “Mencius said, ‘He who, using force, makes a pretence to benevolence is the leader of the princes. A leader of the princes requires a large kingdom. He who, using virtue, practises benevolence is the sovereign of the kingdom. To become the sovereign of the kingdom, a prince need not wait for a large kingdom. T’ang did it with only seventy lî, and king Wan with only a hundred. When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because their strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts’ core they are pleased, and sincerely submit, as was the case with the seventy disciples in their submission to Confucius. What is said in the Book of Poetry, ‘From the west, from the east, from the south, from the north, there was not one who thought of refusing submission,’ is an illustration of this” (Legge, The Chinese Classics, 196–97) (emphasis in the original). The works discussing the use of wangdao and badao as ideological principles by both Chinese and Japanese are manifold; see, for example, Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity; Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism; and Chen Deren 䲣ᗣӱ and Yasui Sankichi ᆹӅйਹ, ed., Son Bun kōen “Dai Ajiashugi” shiryōshū: 1924-nen 11-gatsu Nihon to Chūgoku

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The dichotomy of kingly and hegemonial ruler can thus undoubtedly be understood as a perennial idea, an idea that has survived until today, considering that Luo Mengce and Zhao Tingyang make similar claims of returning to the Zhou. This return is not a pursuit of a new hegemony (or a hegemonic peace, as argued by William Callahan) because hegemony is in their eyes defijined as leadership against the interests of others.38 In their perception, the issue at stake here is that a world order based on tianxia would be so superior that any resistance against it would make no sense: tianxia refers to the moral leadership in the interests of the others. If its universal values are shared by each (which is a rather naïve hope), there is no pressure or enforced leadership as in the sense of hegemony. In other words, according to the Confucian philosophy hegemony based on moral universalism is no hegemony anymore, but conceived as a natural state of order.39 To conclude, the tianxia idea as proposed by Luo and Zhao is no more than the efffort to create a more democratic world order (democratic not in the original sense, admittedly) where hegemonies ultimately disappear. They thereby want to make a valuable contribution to the fijield of political philosophy and to position China as a responsible global power in the world that pursues an “imperialism by invitation.” Although this sounds quite similar to the characterization of American foreign policies, it is not wholly true. Historically being itself a victim of imperialism, for China, assuming such a role is impossible. Zhao represent here an imperial attitude that does not endorse imperialist policies, but is rather a “benevolent imperial attitude” (not an imperialist one!), one that imitates American behavior in Europe after 1945, where the United States secured peace by taking over a greater responsibility.40 If China’s current aim is to become the next superpower, it can either choose to be a humane state or a hegemonic state. In the latter case, China would need to imitate the US model, and this could have two consequences: the world would plunge

38  39 

40 

no kiro ᆛ᮷̡䅋╄NjབྷȪɀȪѫ㗙nj䋷ᯉ䳶: 1924 ᒤ 11 ᴸᰕᵜǽѝഭȃዀ䐟 (Kyōto: Hōritsu bunkasha, 1989). Therefore, hegemonic systems are also more belligerent than imperial orders, cf. Münkler, Imperien, 67–69. In other words—when recalling the fijindings of Kindleberger—the provision of public goods can be achieved without facing a free rider problem: there is no materialism, rivalry, or pursuit of egoistic aims due to the overall insight in the superiority of the tianxia system. It is also an issue of prestige, showing that imperialist policies are not just motivated economically. A typical example is Queen Victoria (1819–1901), who became the emperor of India in April 1876, not for securing economic advantages but for boosting political prestige.

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again into a situation similar to the Cold War, in which two superpowers would rival each other, or China would replace the United States and the world order remained unchanged. If China wants to become a true superpower, it can only do so by relying on moral authority (i.e., becoming a state that is a role model for other states).41 The question remains however how to install the tianxia system efffectively. Considering its anti-Eurocentric standing and its intention to dissolve the nation-state system (a system that has actually been extraordinarily successful and even survived the impact of postcolonial critique), it might be futile to reflect on what needs to be done to successfully convince non-Chinese of this moral world order, what might range from culturalizing political values to generosity in the distribution of economic and social wealth, to name a few. But this would be, as Zhao rightfully acknowledges, a rather wishful utopia, one quite close to the utopianism of Edward Carr.42 Thus, it comes as no surprise that Zhao disregards the issue of agency and sees his writings merely as contribution to political creativity, not as a concrete political program. In popular writings on nationalism however—especially those discussing the rise of China—the situation looks diffferently. In 2010, the senior colonel of the People’s Liberation Army and professor at Beijing’s National Defense University, Liu Mingfu ೊ᣿⑔, argued in his best-selling book, China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Age, that China is currently surpassing the United States in many respects. The book focuses on the question whether China was to become a dangerous or responsible global power in the twenty-fijirst century. The author’s declared aim is to make China the strongest country in the world that is supposed to take over American leadership, and this is unquestionable because for him socialism with Chinese characteristics has proven to be superior to American liberal capitalism.43 41  42 

43 

This argument is taken from Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. For Carr, utopianism is moving toward a goal “even if [the] goal is never fully attained or attainable.” See Edward H. Carr, “The Moral Foundations for World Order,” in Foundations for World Order, ed. E.L. Woodward (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1949), 72. This is surely a very simplistic argument. In fact, a great power is not defijined by its material wealth and military strength alone. For being accepted as a great power, a state has to ensure legitimacy and authority. It can claim great power status, but becoming a member of the great powers club is a social category that depends on the recognition of the other powers. As long as this recognition is not given, possession of wealth and force is insufffijicient (and quite depressing if effforts of modernization are not appreciated). See Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?” International Afffairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 1–19.

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The rise of China can however only be a peaceful rise, sharing Hu Jintao’s statement to the 17th CCP Congress who had assured that China was not to become a hegemonic or expansionist power, but also by pointing out the long tradition of China following the kingly way (wangdao).44 Liu warns to misjudge the Chinese rise because in 1924, Sun Yat-sen had already declared that China had inherited the Confucian Golden Rule, or ethic of reciprocity, that would make it impossible to purposely create enemies.45 To properly answer the question if it is actually possible to create a world without enemies we need to go back to the issue of territoriality/spatiality and ask how the hegemony of tianxia—if it is one at all—relates to geopolitical thought.

7.2

The Spatiality of Tianxia and the Dissolution of Ontological Enemies

In precolonial East Asia, international relations were organized in a hierarchical way, with China—being the most advanced state in terms of military, politics and economy—at the top of the political order and commanding the tributary states at the periphery.46 Being praised for its two-thousand-year existence it has often been argued that this system has been responsible for the continuous peace and stability in East Asia.47 The integration of neighboring countries into the Chinese world order allowed each dynasty to expand its influence beyond the own borders. Although it is correct to state that this order did not entail any geopolitical elements (geopolitics defijined as going beyond national boundaries, as argued earlier), the traditional tianxia system resembles the normative order as proposed by Zhao Tingyang and Luo Mengce. 44 

45 

46  47 

See here also the programmatic speech of Hu Jintao 㜑䭖⏋, Nuli jianshe chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie shijie: Zai Lianheguo chengli 60 zhounian shounao huiyishang de jianghua ࣚ࣋ᔪ䇮ᤱѵ઼ᒣˈ‫਼ޡ‬㑱㦓Ⲵ઼䉀ц⭼˖൘㚄ਸഭᡀ・ 60 ઘᒤ俆㝁Պ䇞кⲴ䇢䈍, in Renmin Ribao, September 16, 2009; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi ѝॾӪ≁‫઼ޡ‬ഭഭ࣑䲒ᯠ䰫࣎‫ޜ‬ᇔ, Zhongguo de heping fazhan ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣਁኅ (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2011). Liu Mingfu ࡈ᰾⾿, Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguo shidai de daguo siwei zhanlüe dingwei ѝഭỖ˖ਾ㖾ഭᰦԓⲴབྷഭᙍ㔤ᡈ⮕ᇊս (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 2010), chapter 4. See David C. Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); see also Wang Gungwu, Renewal: The Chinese State and the New Global History.

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However, what is neglected in this context is the explicit discussion of the concept of territory/space. As it has been shown in chapter 4 international society and tianxia are nonterritorial (i.e., do not know or simply refute the notion of bounded space as expressed in the concept of the nation-state). In concordance with the earlier discussion of space and territory one might argue that tianxia—idealized as a form of international society and thus close to the arguments of the English School—is not a territorial, but spatial concept. To be more precise, Zhao explicitly refutes Giddens’s notion of territory as a bounded power container, arguing implicitly for detaching politics from territory and applying the morality of tianxia to the whole world (the opposite of the nonworld, fei shijie 㕖਎⇇). He thereby goes beyond any territorial limitations, which is nothing less than an expression of geopolitical thought, if it were pursued actively. As shown earlier, he hesitates to do so because of the actual fear of being accused of cultural or ideological hegemony. The penetration of space beyond the existing territorial borders of China is here not an economic or military matter but one of moral authority. In other words, although the mode of spatial politics has changed, its nature has not. If tianxia is thought to be a viable alternative in creating a world society devoid of war and conflict, the question is, how are conflicts resolved in the continuous process of establishing tianxia? This question pertains to the previous problem in the history of international relations how to act and react in times of conflict. Originally, the only acceptable agents in the pursuit of global ethics were states, and even this was not for sure, as argued by William Connolly: “The idea of ‘responsibility’ itself is a locus of persistent instability and contestation in late-modern discourse.”48 He assures that the issue of responsibility depends on its situation in place and time, and this includes the question of the nature of international morality. In 1939 Edward Carr had already pointed out that it is difffijicult to determine if states can actually behave morally, given the fact that they are fijictitious entities.49 Although Woodrow Wilson had expressed in his address to Congress on the declaration of war in April 1917 his conviction that “[w]e are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states,”50 the then-prevailing realism 48  49  50 

William E. Connolly, Identity/Diffference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 111. Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Perennial, 2001), 146–62. Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 69 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 41: 523–27.

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in international relations prevented that moral obligations were binding on states (likewise, the utopian view that states and individuals had to follow the same moral obligations was not successful in imaging a new international order), as Carr put it. For Connolly, responsibility in international behavior is always defijined by the particular situation, and this follows the permutations of daily politics. The incentive for one power to become a hegemon depends on how this role benefijits the hegemon. For instance, Noam Chomsky has shown how the defijinition of who is evil and who is good changed constantly, always depending on the actual needs and fears of one power. In his discussion, the United States can behave as a hegemon if necessary for the protection of national interests (and thus intervene into the politics of another state). Thus, hegemony becomes something highly arbitrary, as is their international behavior in general.51 Whereas the United States are fully aware of being a hegemonic actor (pursuing their hegemony for a better world), the tianxia system consciously tries to avoid this.52 Instead, it tries to present itself as a true alternative to the hegemonic world order based on regulations and rules laid down in international law, instead of succeeding the Pax Americana.53 It is for this reason also that the rise of China and its transformation to a great power (daguo ᄢ࿡) is hardly considered problematic in China’s public opinion, but rather seen as a kind of natural development (a view that is by no means exceptional). To be more precise, according to the tianxia idea such a system does not only avoid, but is even incapable of being hegemonic. The installment of such a system would go hand in hand with the dissolution of the state as political agent. A worldly world would do without states, and precisely this removes the possibility of being a hegemon. Yet, this idealized system does not solve the actual problems. If conflicts do not occur among states, they do among races, social classes, or religious groups. There is still the need for one agent to take over responsibility, and if the state unequivocally no longer exists, who would

51 

52  53 

Consider here the ever changing alliances the United States have concluded with other actors, for instance, by once providing the Afghan Mujahedeen guerrilla movement with weapons during the Soviet occupation and later fijighting against their successors. Cf. Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. This to an extent—at least on the rhetorical level—that one might wonder if China could be the Empire at all that Hardt and Negri had in mind. In historical retrospect, the Pax Americana (1945–1971) succeeded the Pax Britannica (1815–1914) and is likely to be replaced by a Pax Sinica. For this issue, see Clark, Hegemony in International Society, and Clark, “China and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?” International Afffairs 87, no. 1 (2011): 13–28.

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replace it?54 A very idealist answer to this question would be that every individual has to take responsibility for the other (in Zhao’s parlance, everybody treats one another like members of one family). In the end, reducing ethical behavior to the individual level produces omnipresent intervention by individuals because there is no mediating level such as society, the state, or any other form of collective. With reference to the French philosopher Levinas we can conclude here that the reductionist defijinition of agency creates an inescapability of responsibility. He points out that there is no choice for the individual to decide where to be responsible and where not. In other words, responsibility is no longer territorialized—as in the nation-state system—but deterritorialized and thus omnipresent.55 As shown earlier the Chinese responsibility to contribute to a functioning global order is seen by Zhao not only as highly necessary, but also as largely unproblematic due to the non-explicit need to defijine agency (unlike Levinas). Therefore hegemony is not an issue because the perceived hegemony of tianxia is, fijirst, not an economic or military one but at the utmost a cultural one. Second, tianxia would only be hegemonic if it forced others to accept the values identifijied by tianxia. By masking those values as universal ones, however, one arrives not only at positively reevaluating Chinese tradition (making it superior to its European counterpart) but also at avoiding the suspicion of coercion.56 On the contrary, the American effforts to spread liberal democracy in the former communist countries in Eastern Europe is a kind of hegemony that aims at installing a Pax Americana that implicitly views China as the next candidate for democracy, as the scholar Wang Hui has pointed out. In this context, the enforced democratization is conceived as a form of unacceptable hegemony; Wang calls the American ambition yexin 䟾ᗳ (i.e., wild ambition, which in the Chinese language is a pejorative term).57 In his eyes, it is nothing less than true 54 

55 

56 

57 

It is also for this reason that Carol Bell highly doubted in the 1980s that China could become a member of the international society, for it was still clinging to the MarxistLeninist belief that the state is going to wither away (see her contribution in Bull and Watson, The Expansion of International Society). Cf. here the discussion by David Campbell (“Deterritorialization of Responsibility”) in David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, ed., Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 29–56. After all, the declared aim should be to universalize the Confucian heritage, if China’s harmonious world diplomacy is to succeed, as argued by Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Cf. Wang Hui ⦻ᲆ, “Meiguo duiwai ganyu de xin quxiang 㖾ഭሩཆᒢ亴Ⲵᯠ䎻ੁ,” Guoji guanxi xueyuan xuebao, no. 1 (2000): 15–20.

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realism where national interests dictate how to act. For very obvious reasons, China cannot tread down the same path. Therefore, any reference to a Pax Sinica (Zhongguo zhishi ѝ഻⋫ц)—where China, as the hegemon in charge, provides stability and prosperity—is seen critical in Chinese writings on international relations thought.58 If we admit the possibility that the tianxia system might offfer a viable alternative—for it is less utopian than idealism and less violent than realism— its assumed moral superiority can only be relativized if one recalls its epistemological hegemony. For sure, this hegemony is a diffferent one than the one mentioned before. This is because tianxia is considered less problematic because it refrains from power politics. To some degree, the implied hegemony seems more benign than coercive, but if this were the case, even the culturally most sensitive school of international relations theory—the English School— needs to take hegemony more serious. While Hedley Bull himself denied that there was such a “beast,” recent scholarship has started to provide a fuller and more colorful picture that goes beyond the often assumed dichotomy of hegemony and explicit pacifijism.59 Given the aversion against the former in the writings of Zhao Tingyang and Luo Mengce, tianxia cannot be described as a form of hegemonic peace (contrary to the view of Callahan), because it is not only trying to overcome the nation-state system but also the state system (i.e., removing the possibility of hegemony in general). From a purely philosophical standpoint, hegemony becomes obsolete. To be sure, Zhao’s argument can only be understood properly if one recalls his unlikely proposal of dissolution of the nation-state system. Only then does his proposal make sense. It would be too easy to dismiss his proposal as a purely rhetorical strategy. Considering his more than critical attitude toward politics (his dislike for Carl Schmitt is more than obvious, as I show in the following), it seems wiser to judge the signifijicance of the tianxia system by scrutinizing its possible contribution to a Pax Sinica that is—in contrast to its preceding global principles of stability—non-hierarchical. The Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana pursued stability without forgetting their own national interests in the process of providing public goods to the world society. Their hegemony was—more or less—accepted by those who enjoyed the fruits of the public goods, and these goods were by no means solely material ones. The Pax Japonica was here by no means an exception. Starting in 1898 it had formulated a Monroe Doctrine for Asia and—despite the strong realist motivations in the quest for an expanded Lebensraum in Korea, Taiwan and Northeast China—continuously 58  59 

See here Li Baojun and Li Zhiyong, Hexie shjieguan yu baquan wendinglun. For the “beast,” see Clark, Hegemony in International Society, v.

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emphasized its moral duty to help the neighboring countries in their modernization and thereby shake offf the yoke of the Western imperialist nations. The question remains how these diffferent pax difffer from the ideal of tianxia? In the 1930s and 1940s the Kyoto school offfered a highly philosophical answer to the question of whether Japan, and by proxy East Asia, should accept the European model of international law as a means to create a global order that could enjoy peace and stability. Yet, because being member of the international society depended on the civilizational status, both Japan and China had problems to prevail when competing with “truly” modern nations. Diplomatic negotiations—though well able to minimize war—were never a sure guarantee to either avoid war, economic or political pressure. Judged from the historical experiences of China, Zhao points out that diplomacy is not a sufffijicient means to organize an international system: it presents no true advantage in the shaping of international relations because it shares the same structural characteristics as war by using conspiracy, deception, and power as means of negotiation.60 The Monroe Doctrine—despite promising national self-determination and protection against intervention from outside—was no exception. Its hegemonic character prevented the doctrine from becoming a universally accepted principle, despite the effforts to make it part of the discipline of international law. Those countries that were not able to enjoy the fruits of the hegemonic stability tended to reject this spatially defijined order, primarily because this order was not able to clarify convincingly how national territories (defijined by the tenets of traditional international law) and ambitions that covered a space larger than the limited territory could be related with each other without causing conflict. What is true is that a hegemon needs societal endorsement to become an accepted leader (like the United States was considered a leader of the free world during the Cold War era). This endorsement could, however, not be taken for granted.

60 

Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu, 313.

Conclusion In conclusion, I want to argue that the true character of hegemony can only be understood sufffijiciently if the concept of space is considered adequately. In general, international relations theory tends to neglect issues of territoriality and spatiality. Though national power and resources are relevant for the survival of the state, territorial dimensions of the nation are taken for granted and its spatial imaginaries are more often than not forgotten (strangely enough, however, because we have seen how important national cartography is).1 In the prenational era, both China and Japan had only a very weak understanding of the notions of territoriality and spatiality. Whereas in the Chinese case the world was organized as a whole that conceived of China as the pinnacle of human civilization, Japan was, because of geographical and political reasons, instead uninterested in defijining the actual extension of its territory. When the ideal of the nation-state entered the minds of the literati and scholars in East Asia, strenuous effforts were made to defijine nationality and national territory by delimiting it from other nations and their territories. An important contribution made international law that perceived the inviolability of national sovereignty as the most central concern of each nation. Most exemplary were the compilation of maps that depicted national territories and simultaneously defijined who belonged to the nation and who did not. After a successful political and military modernization, Japan made great effforts in becoming a responsible great power that should participate in the balance of power and thereby—ideally—provide stability both regionally and globally. It thus tried to take over the role of a master in Asia that should help less-developed nations in modernizing and being liberated from European imperialism and colonialism. It showed huge ambitions in gaining access to space that could strengthen and support the modernization of the homeland. The greater space it acquired since the occupation of Korea in 1905 served as a living space that could only be controlled by a strong sense of hegemony.2 Accordingly, space reflects also the hierarchy inherent in hegemony defijined by the binary logic of modernity (self vs. other).3 In addition, it defijines geopolitics as a rationalized efffort to claim space beyond the own territory. 1  The only exception is social constructivism, in which territory is understood in terms of identity yet not as an explicit rationale for IR behavior. For an example, see Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 211–14. 2  Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. 3  See Hardt and Negri, Empire, 139.

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During the twentieth century, China, on the contrary, tried to regain the imperial status it lost in 1912 when turning the empire into a republic. During the fijirst decades after its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, intellectuals made great effforts to establish a territorial ontology that should help to turn China into a modern nation-state. Inheriting a multiethnic empire, the young republic faced great difffijiculties in defijining who belonged to China, and how far its territory should stretch. In the 1910s and 1920s, the latter question became a much larger problem because it involved the interests and ambitions of the great powers, resulting eventually in the nation-wide production of maps of national shame. Recognizing early that a Chinese Monroe Doctrine would make little sense as long as China was unable to stand up and to protect its national interests, intellectuals such as Luo Mengce presented an alternative form of political order that was diffferent from both territory and space. This tianxia was by no means a geopolitical space. It is described as all-encompassing and all-inclusive (thus doing without outsiders, heresy, or ontological enemies), tolerant, and integrating diffferences. It pursues the ideal of dayitong ᄢ৻⛔, in other words, to create a political collective whose members are not defijined by racial, ethnic, or religious diffferences. In this context, it is important to point out that territoriality does not constitute a problem in the tianxia world order, and it is thus not surprising to observe that there is no Chinese discourse on a possible Pax Sinica during the larger part of the twentieth century that could try to replace the Pax Japonica or Pax Americana. Accordingly, although the tianxia—as imagined by Luo and Zhao—is itself hierarchical, it is not hegemonic. If this were the case, it would beg the question, how can one understand it as a legitimate and reasonable project? The solution to this conundrum is that tianxia needs to be seen as an ecumenical order characterized by a merely epistemological hegemony. In the writings of Zhao Tingyang, the tianxia appears more utopian than in the case of the rather naïve conception during the imperial age, which again makes the currently pursued order resemble a Reich in terms of teleology.4 In addition, contrary to the notions of national sovereignty and geopolitical control that are based on the binary logic—which is even the case with the Monroe Doctrine that by presenting itself as an alternative to international law tried to replace one hierarchy by another—tianxia is diffferent. It consciously removes the binary structure according to which both territory and space are subordinated to specifijic forms of hierarchy. Japan was a diffferent case. Because of the early and speedy maturation of the nation, it became quicker an accepted member of international society 4  Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik.

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(by also adhering to the rules of the international community) than China, although the latter experienced a much greater pressure to Westernize. Because Japan was able to pursue its nation-building quicker and more thoroughly, it was also, to a larger extent, perceptible to geopolitical thought. With regard to the Asian Monroe Doctrine, Japan was—contrary to China—able to develop a distinct hegemony because it founded its Asian Monroe Doctrine on the civilizational superiority it had developed since the war victories in the 1890s and 1900s. When coupled with the comparatively early maturation of the nation-state, Japan was able to develop a geopolitical tradition that not only claimed Asia for the Asians under Japanese leadership (which happened as early as 1898 when Prince Konoe Atsumaro had founded the pan-Asian East Asia Common Culture Association and told Kang Youwei in November of that year that the Asian Monroe Doctrine would be the solution to the problems of China and Japan), but also prevented a widespread popularity of the slogan “Japan is the Japan of the Japanese.” Awkwardly this slogan was largely absent in nationalist discourses, whereas China—a latecomer in modernization and victim of imperialist aggression—had to ensure that its national interests were protected. For China, this was less an issue of who was able to provide hegemonic stability but was, rather, a moral issue that clearly did not entail geopolitical aspirations. Because of the blurred understanding of both nation-state and empire (exemplifijied by the maps of national shame), China did not have any understanding of what it meant to go beyond one’s national boundaries. In other words, from a political philosophy perspective developing an actively pursued ideology such as the Japanese Asian Monroe Doctrine that understood itself as a hegemonial project in installing a new regional order was no true concern. Accordingly, tianxia can only be understood as a kind of epistemological hegemony. It simply defijines what an adequate order is without explicitly providing an answer of how to reach this ideal. Given the fact that tianxia presents itself as a natural order where the propagation of its moral values is supposed to happen without resorting to force or violence, as the pacifijism of Confucian culture implies, one might wonder if—and to what extent— the idea of the tianxia system can still be considered to be political. Yet, the fact that the creation of order is emphasized as a prerequisite for achieving peace and stability shows that tianxia still is. This is because creating order (zhi) was always conceived as a political act in China. To create order (zhi) is a concrete act of regulating social behavior, which is compulsory for the individual, for whom a vision of order is always a cosmic one, or a metapolitical (and not metaphysical) one. Because social agency plays a central role here (as shown by the reception of the Daxue and Daodejing) it allows to dissolute the

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distinction between friend and foe and is fijinally able to avoid all wars by removing rivalries and enmity. In this regard, it goes much further than the proposal by Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, an order without the distinction of amicus and hostis was only possible in terms of cultural relativism (what he despised), but the concept of the enemy is never removed, even in liberal societies. According to Zhao Tingyang, Schmitt’s concept of the enemy helps to explain the political traditions and the political consciousness of both Europe and the Arabian world but can hardly be applied to China. The reason therefore is that the concept of the enemy in China has never been considered an absolute or never-changing concept. It is even not a priori concept, but has to be grasped as a situational fact (qingjingxing shishi ᛵᲟᙗһᇎ).5 The defijinition of the enemy is not an ontological, but a relational defijinition, and thus, a transformation of the other from foe to friend is possible, as Zhao puts it. Opposed to this, however, is the belief in Christianity to be able to reconstruct the soul (zaizao xinling ޽䙐ᗳ⚥), which is a policy surpassed by no other in terms of power and dangerous impact. It tries to solve problems of power and profijit, which is not simply a solution by satisfying needs and wishes but also going hand in hand with the extinction of viewpoints and wishes. Religion is thus according to Zhao nothing more than spiritual autocracy, even the highest form of autocracy, thereby causing the full politicization of social life. With its claim of universality, it eventually causes a disintegration of the world, society and culture and thus leading to eternal conflicts. For him, the four political inventions of Christianity were spiritual management (xinling guanli ᗳ⚥㇑⨶), propaganda (xuanchuan ᇓՐ), masses (qunzhong 㗔Շ), and the notion of the absolute enemy ( juedui diren 㔍ሩ᭼Ӫ). Zhao presents here a very narrow understanding of the Christian belief when he claims that belief is contrary to thinking and equals its so-called propaganda with brainwashing. His intention is clearly to construct a dichotomy that aims at increasing the value of his own conception of political order. It is thus politically motivated and can hardly be taken seriously. However, what has to be scrutinized in detail is his concept of the absolute enemy. Influenced by Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, it constitutes in Zhao’s writings the major diffference between the Chinese and the “Western” civilization. While the West cannot do without association or dissociation (the disappearance of the political would be the consequence), the tianxia appears here as an all-inclusive natural given. From Schmitt’s perspective the effforts to remove the friend-foe dichotomy leads to the dissolution of the political. The consequences thereof are more than obvious. In the context of international 5  Zhao, Meigeren de zhengzhi ⇿њӪⲴ᭯⋫, 15–16.

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politics, the dissolution of the political would namely go hand in hand with the abandonment of national sovereignty. With humankind being the sole collective actor after transforming each enemy into a friend, there is no need to defijine either national collective or national territory. All boundaries disappear, which has two fundamental consequences. First, the discipline of international law ceases to exist (because unnecessary in a world without national sovereignty). Second, the totality of tianxia based on the incorporation of differences and the idea of inclusion removes in principle the necessary precondition for the political defijined by association and dissociation. Zhao now pursues exactly what Schmitt abhors: a world without enemies. While it is on moral grounds understandable why one would prefer such a world, his proposal is based on two errors. First, he is mistaken to claim that Christianity does not know the value of tolerance and thereby felt obliged to fijight the absolute enemy, in some cases until his annihilation; in fact, Matthew 5:43–45 tells otherwise.6 In addition, he construes his world without enemies as a result of the superiority of Chinese political-philosophical tradition.7 By negating the existence of ontologically defijined enemies—or, as termed by him, absolute enemies—Zhao arrives not only at uncritically purporting the pacifijist bias of the Confucian tradition but also succeeds in erasing the numerous conflicts of the recent past. There is no mentioning of social6  Matthew 5:43–45 reads: “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who spitefully use you and persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father in heaven; for He makes His sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust” (New King James Version). In fact, “Love thy enemy” refers in the Greek original to “diligite inimicos vestros” and not “diligite hostes vestros” (Matthew 5:44, Luke 6:27). For a discussion of the “love thy enemy” in the thinking of Carl Schmitt, see Raphael Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden: Eine deutsche Rechtslehre (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), 305–309. 7  It is quite revealing that Zhao Tingyang holds the Christian tradition responsible for the emergence of the “bad world” (huai shijie). He even declares that due to the isolationist character of Western culture caused by the exclusive character of Christianity (itself claiming to be in the possession of ultimate truth), Western culture hasn’t accepted any other cultural influence since the successful propagation of Christian belief (Zhao, Meigeren de zhengzhi, 120–21). By implying that the bad had been imported to China after the Opium Wars by the ideologies of racism, social Darwinism, and nationalism (all European concepts), he positions himself fijinely into the postcolonial setting. However, it would be too easy to claim that the emergence of an ontological enemy in the nineteenth century is simply the result of the arrival of Western thought. Though the Christian doctrine played an important role in the Taiping movement, Hong Xiuquan’s vision of the enemy was—as seen—also to a large extent influenced by the demonological paradigm of the indigenous cosmology.

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Darwinist racism in the antimanchurian movement of the late Qing or the demonological paradigm in the radicalized ideology of the Taiping. He even succeeds in a revision of the enmity discourse of the post-1949 period, where Mao Zedong had—based on his two primary writings dealing with enmity, one being On Contradiction (August 1937) and the other On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (February 1957)—reproduced the hostis– inimicus dichotomy. In both writings Mao diffferentiated clearly between nonantagonistic and antagonistic contradictions, or relative and absolute enemies, where in the latter case he argued for annihilation (and sometimes even physical destruction) of the enemy, thus, in truth, being nothing short of the ontologically defijined enemy in the Christian tradition. Given now that Zhao’s publications are mainly dealing with philosophical problems it might seem to be understandable that he neglects to discuss the signifijicance of historical events. He—as does Luo Mengce—bases his pride on the Chinese tradition on the political philosophy of the tianxia thought, by which they tend to eliminate (consciously or not) memories of ruthless enemies in the recent history, no matter if religious or racial, domestic or foreign enemies. By preferring the kingly way over the way of the hegemon, these historical experiences appear as a temporary aberration that is closely linked to the era when the nation-state was pursued as the primary model of political order. To downplay the conflicts of the past or to placing responsibility for them outside China means in this context nothing less than that the tianxia model is constructed as a form of resistance against European modernity. At fijirst sight, it tries to create a diffferent world order that dissolves the power of the ruling binary structure of the modern world order (modern vs. traditional; male vs. female; First vs. Third World; outside vs. inside etc.). It does so by setting “diffferences to play across boundaries”8 to destroy the boundaries that are hold responsible for the hierarchy created by European Enlightenment.9 In contrast to Yasui Kaoru who had been eager to create a Greater East Asian International Law (Dai Tō-A kokusaihō), and in contrast to the effforts to create more than one Monroe Doctrine in the fijirst half of the twentieth century, the tianxia thought simply goes beyond the binary logic by dissolving the very origin of modern thinking (i.e., the nation-state). It is thus more thorough than any postcolonial discourse (e.g., Homi Bhabha) because it does not replace one binary with another (a more just or democratic one) but by denying its logic in total.

8  Jane Flax, Displaced Subjects (London: Routledge, 1993), 91. 9  Hardt and Negri, Empire, 137–59.

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Yet, despite this highly creative advance in political theory, the tianxia proposal is nothing more than a wishful imaginary, which is for two reasons. First, the Western order of nation-states is still considered to be the norm in international relations, and it is unlike to be replaced soon. Second, the developments in the recent decades have shown that the belief in national strength has also not weakened in China. Even more so do the geopolitical ambitions of China in the South China Sea and also Africa prove that China is not likely to maintain its ideal, and it would be too naïve to believe it would give up its ambitions. However, this question of realpolitik does not preoccupy the minds of philosophers who are currently busy revigorating the ancient ideal of tianxia.

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Index A Combined Discussion on the Preservation and Partition of China (Zhina baoquan fenge helun ᭟䛓‫ࢢ࠶ޘ؍‬ਸ䄆  156 Academy of Current Afffairs (Shiwu xuetang ᱲउᆨา) 1, 2n7 Akiyama Masanosuke ⿻ኡ䳵ѻӻ 95 Alarming Bell Daily (Jingzhong Ribao 䆖䩈ᰕ๡) 169 Amur River Society (Kokuryūkai 唂喽Պ) 90–91 Analects (Lunyu 䄆䃎) 33–34, 36n11, 274 Antiforeign Sentiments and International Law (Paiwai yu guojifa ᧂཆ㠷഻䳋⌅) 88–96 Anti-Russia Society (Tairo dōshikai ሮ䵢਼ᘇՊ) 93n45 Arguments on Behalf of the Union of the Great East (Daitō gappō ron བྷᶡਸ䛖䄆) 198–202 Asian Monroe Doctrine 19, 21, 24–25, 155, 161, 183, 185, 188, 193, 194–95, 301 Asianism 172n32, 180, 182, 186–88, 194–195, 203, 204n111, 205, 208–09 association 24, 54–55, 56n70, 145n98, 155, 157n122, 228–29, 302–03 badao 䵨䚃 24, 28, 188n71, 252n75, 287, 290 Basic Concepts on the American Spatial International Law (Beishū kōiki kokusaihō no kiso rinen ㊣⍢ᒳฏഭ䳋⌅ȃส⼾⨶ ᘥ  222–23 Basic Concepts on the European Spatial International Law (Ōshū kōiki kokusaihō no kiso rinen ⅗ᐎᒳฏഭ䳋⌅ȃส⼾⨶ᘥ  222 Beijing 3, 7, 100n67, 114, 134n67, 144, 146, 215, 234, 246, 279, 292 bianjiang 䚺⮶ 127 bianjie 䚺⭼ 128 bianjing 䚺ຳ 128 Bismarck, Otto von 130, 166n12, 167n14, 177 Bluntschli, Johann Caspar 140 Brakensiek, Johan Coenraad 167–68, 204 Braudel, Fernand 17 Brunnhofer, Hermann 165

Buckle, Henry Thomas 131, 140, 176 Bull, Hedley 47–48, 247–48, 282, 283n14, 297 Burlingame, Anson 82 Cai Yuanpei 㭑‫ݳ‬ษ 10n22, 127n46, 201, 245 Carr, Edward 220, 277, 292, 294–95 cartography 68n97, 118n15, 119–21, 125, 136–37, 139, 141, 142, 150, 299 Chen Baozhen 䲣ሦ㇤ 1 Chen Duxiu 䲣⦘⿰ 214–15, 219n157 Chen Lifu 䲣・ཛ 61 Chen Tianhua 䲣ཙ㨟 238 Chiang Kai-shek 㭓ӻ⸣ 60, 74, 84n19, 290 Chiba Shūho ॳ㩹⿰⎖ 171 Citizen’s Daily (Guomin ribao ഻≁ᰕ๡) 146 Cixi ᝸⿗, Empress Dowager 183, 227 Collected Statutes of the Great Qing (Da Qing huidian བྷ␵ᴳި) 122–23 Complete Map of East Asia (Yaxiyazhou dongbu yudi quantu ӎ㍠ӎ⍢ᶡ䜘䕯ൠ ‫ޘ‬െ  135–36 Comrades’ Society for a Strong Foreign Policy (Taigaikō dōshikai ሮཆ⺜਼ᘇՊ) 92 concord (kyōwa ঄઼) 198, 266n109 Confucius Kongzi ᆄᆀ 33–35, 168, 243n50, 244, 268n117, 274–75, 290n36 Crow, Carl 143n91, 216–17 culturalism 50n50, 250 Current Discussions in East Asia (Tō-A jiron ᶡӌᱲ䄆) 155 Daodejing 䚃ᗧ㏃ 260, 301 Date Genichirō Ժ䚄Ⓚа䛾 158 datong བྷ਼ 78, 242n46, 243–46, 248, 257, 259 datongzhuyi བྷ਼ѫ㗙 256 Record of How Great Righteousness awakens the Misguided (Dayi juemilu བྷ㗙㿪䘧䤴 38–39 Die Xuesheng ஻㹰⭏ 93 Diplomatic Review (Waijiaobao ཆӔ๡) 106, 110, 169 dissociation 53–54, 228–29, 302–03 dōbun dōshu ਼᮷਼ぞ 20, 184 Duan Ruli ⇥⊍傚 147

358 East Asia Common Culture Association (Tō-A dōbunkai ᶡӌ਼᮷Պ) 93n45, 155, 181n51, 184, 207, 209, 301 East Asia Cooperative Community (Tō-A kyōdōtai ᶡӌ‫਼ޡ‬փ) 24 East Asia Journal (Dongyabao ᶡӎ๡) 136 East Asian Times (Yadong shibao ӎᶡᱲ๡) 105 Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi ᶡᯩ䴌䂼) 147, 171, 250 Eastern Times (Shibao ᱲ๡) 147 empire (diguo ᑍ഻) 4, 6, 8n19, 10n24, 11, 24, 32–37, 40, 41n24, 43, 46–47, 51–52, 56, 59, 61, 63–64, 74–77, 84, 88, 90–91, 93n45, 94, 95n50, 95n53, 97, 100, 104, 107, 112–13, 116–19, 122–28, 134, 137, 140–42, 148n109, 150, 152n116, 153–55, 157–58, 163, 176, 184, 194, 197–98, 199n100, 202, 206, 210–11, 230–31, 252–55, 259, 266n109, 267, 271, 278, 283, 286–88, 290, 295n52, 300–01 enemy 17, 21, 36, 54n67, 102, 159, 161, 168, 182, 224–231, 233–34, 236–237, 239–40, 253n76, 265, 267n112, 302–04 ethnicity 19, 44, 65, 123, 129, 225, 231, 237, 240, 255 Eurocentrism 117n11, 279, 283–84 exterritoriality/extraterritoriality 15, 81, 83n15, 84n19, 85–86, 89, 113, 208n124, 215 Fairbank, John K. 41n26, 42n28, 43n33, 49, 226, 250 family of nations 15, 47, 81, 83, 85, 216, 244, 283n14 foreign concessions (zujie 』⭼) 90, 92n42 Foucault, Michel 121, 122n28 Fourteen Points 214–17 Fukuzawa Yukichi ⾿⋒䄝ਹ 112, 176, 208n124 Full Map of the Great Qing (Da Qingguo quantu བྷ␵഻‫ޘ‬െ) 136 Gazetteer of the Great Qing Unifijication (Da Qing yitong zhi བྷ␵а㎡ᘇ  122, 123n32 Gazetteer of the Unifijied Great Ming (Da Ming yitong zhi བྷ᰾а㎡ᘇ) 122 Genyōsha ⦴⌻⽮ 92 geobody 131, 140

Index geopolitics 17–18, 21–26, 100, 192, 293, 299 Great Learning (Daxue བྷᆨ) 51–52, 55–57, 59–63, 74, 174, 260, 274, 285, 301 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Tō-A kyōeiken བྷᶡӌ‫ޡ‬Ḵി) 24, 27, 103n74, 165n9, 203 Greater East Asian International Law (Dai Tō-A kokusaihō བྷᶡӌഭ䳋⌅) 222–23, 304 Greater Space (Großraum) 21–21, 101–02, 110, 222–23, 278, 299 Grotius, Hugo 80 Gu Yanwu 亗⚾↖ 37 Gulick, Sidney Lewis 169–70 Hall, William Edward 83, 89n37 harmony 28, 50, 161, 199, 200, 242, 249, 251, 262n96, 266, 272–73 Haushofer, Karl 21n27, 22–24, 101, 223 hegemony 9, 24, 44, 77, 90, 97–98, 113, 115, 165, 173, 181, 185–186, 193, 197, 221, 223–224, 249, 271, 274–276, 283–291, 293–297, 299–301 Hioki Eki ᰕ㖞⳺ 143 Hirano Yoshitarō ᒣ䟾㗙ཚ䛾 24n41 History of the Conquest of China by the Han (Hanzu qinlüeshi ╒᯿‫⮕ץ‬ਢ) 239 Hong Rengan ⍚ӱ⧅ 235 Hong Xiuquan ⍚⿰‫ ޘ‬232, 303n7 Hou Hongjian ‫ן‬卫䪁 147 Hu Hanmin 㜑╒≁ 88–96, 112, 130 Hu Shi 㜑䚙 245–46 Huang Xing 哳㠸 238 Huang Zunxian 哳䚥២ 1, 180n49 Huizong ᗭᇇ (Emperor of the Song) 36–37 Hunan Educational Journal (Xiangxuebao ⒈ᆨ๡) 1 Ii Naosuke ӅԺⴤᕬ 174–75 Imai Yoshiyuki ӺӅహᒨ 158 imperialism 2, 14, 19–20, 22, 25, 27–29, 32, 45, 57, 62, 63n82, 97, 101, 105, 106–10, 123n33, 169, 180, 185–86, 194–95, 197, 201, 203–05, 216, 217n152, 221, 232n18, 237, 256, 264n102, 271, 278, 286–87, 299 imperiality 276, 286–87 international law 12, 14–16, 18–19, 21, 25–26, 29, 44, 46, 56, 67, 78, 79, 80–90, 94–97, 277–78, 282, 101–03, 108, 110, 112–13, 115, 128n50, 130, 163, 177, 179, 185, 201–203,

Index 205–08, 214, 218, 220–25, 231, 240, 244, 248–49, 266, 277–78, 282, 283n14, 288, 295, 298–300, 303–04 intervention 3, 13n3, 19n21, 25, 88, 91, 93, 97, 102, 110, 158, 160–61, 176, 179, 190–92, 200, 206, 214, 217, 233, 264, 288, 296, 298 Investigations of the Bad World (Huai shijie yanjiu ൿц⭼⹄ウ  281 Itō Hirobumi Ժ㰔ঊ᮷ 174n36, 191 Itsubi-Society ᰕᵜ҉ᵚՊ 105 Iwakura Mission ዙ‫֯ع‬ㇰഓ 177 Japanese Geopolitical Society (Chiseigaku kyōkai ൠ᭯ᆖ঄Պ) 24 Jiang Gongsheng 㪻᚝᲏ 147 Jiang Menglin 㭓དྷ哏 245 jiangyu ⮶ฏ 126, 128 Journal of the Oriental Association (Tōhō kyōkai kaihō ᶡ䛖঄ՊՊ๡) 156 Kang Youwei ᓧᴹ⛪ 75, 78, 108n97, 134n67, 155, 180n49, 183, 237n36, 241, 246, 248, 257, 259n87, 301 Kangxi ᓧ⟉ (Emperor of the Qing) 63n83, 118n15, 139, 142, 154 Kant, Immanuel 218 Kashiwabara Buntarō ᷿৏᮷ཚ䛾 184 Katō Takaaki ࣐㰔儈᰾ 143 Kiakhta 63–64, 117n14 Kipling, Rudyard 210n129, 251 Kjellén, Rudolf 21n27, 101 Knackfuß, Hermann 165–67, 170 Kodera Kenkichi ሿሪ䅉ਹ 203–10 kōdō ⲷ䚃 24 kokutai ഭփ 24 Komaki Saneshige ሿ⢗ሖ㑱 24 Konoe Atsumaro 䘁㺎㈔哯 92, 93n45, 108n97, 155, 156n122, 181n51, 183–84, 301 Koo, Wellington 亗㏝䡎 143, 244 Korovin, Evgeny Alexandrovich 222 Koselleck, Reinhart 66, 236 Kuga Katsunan 䲨㗟ই 156n122, 195n93, 207 Lansing-Ishii Agreement 212–14 League of Nations 25, 56, 181, 217–218, 220–221, 241, 243–246, 249, 277 legitimacy 35, 38, 114, 119n22, 125, 271, 277, 289, 292n43

359 Li Dazhao ᵾབྷ䠇 158n126, 159n129, 186–88, 195, 214, 218 Li Hongzhang ᵾ卫ㄐ 10n24, 140 Liang Qichao ằஃ䎵 1, 2n7, 10, 45, 48–49, 56, 59, 75, 87, 94n48, 105, 106, 112, 118, 131, 134n67, 135, 140, 142, 156n121, 157n124, 160, 168, 183–84, 237n36, 244n53, 245n55, 246, 268n119 Liu Mingfu ࡈ᰾⾿ 292 Liu Shipei ࢹᑛษ 238, 239 Long Jiangong 喽ެ‫ ޜ‬3 Lü Simian ੅ᙍࣹ 147 Lu Xun 冟䗵 137n78, 139 Lu Zhengxiang 䲨ᗥ⾕ 143 Lu Zongyu 䲨ᇇ䕯 211 Luo Mengce 㖵དྷ޺ 223, 231, 249–56, 259, 271, 277, 279n3, 284, 291, 293, 297, 300, 304 Mackinder, Halford J. 21, 101–05 Mahan, Alfred T. 99–106, 156n121, 251n71 Major, Ernest 135 Manchukuo 123n31, 211, 220, 290 Mao Zedong ∋◔ᶡ 3, 269n120, 304 Map of a Full View of the Imperial Realm (Huangyu quanlantu ⲷ䕯‫ޘ‬㿭െ  122, 124–25 Map of Chinese National Humiliation (Zhonghua guochi ditu ѝ㨟഻ᚕൠെ) 149 Map of China’s National Humiliation (Zhongguo guochi ditu ѝ഻഻ᚕൠെ) 151 Map of the Current Situation (Shiju quantu ᱲተ‫ޘ‬െ  8 Martin, William Alexander Parsons 82, 84n18, 95n50 Matsubara Kazuo ᶮ৏а䳴 96 Matsushita Masatoshi ᶮл↓ሯ 222 May-Fourth Movement 75, 145, 217n152 McKinley, William 107, 166n12 Mencius ᆏᆀ 000 minquanzhuyi ≁℺ѫ㗙 256 minshengzhuyi ≁⭏ѫ㗙 256 minzu ≁᯿ 46, 49n47, 252, 255 minzu guojia ≁᯿഻ᇦ 254 Mizoguchi Yūzō Ⓧਓ䳴й 176 Monroe Doctrine 3, 4, 19, 21, 24–25, 29, 95–111, 155, 160–61, 183, 185–86, 188,

360 Monroe Doctrine (cont.) 193–94, 205, 209, 213–14, 223, 249, 265, 278, 288, 297–98, 300–01, 304 Monroe, James 96, 97 morality  31, 35, 38, 45n38, 46, 49–50, 55, 57–59, 61–62, 80, 134, 149, 208, 221, 223, 225, 227, 234, 247–48, 259, 261–62, 272, 274, 278, 281–82, 290, 294 Morimoto Shun ἞ᵜ倯 183 Nagai Ryūtarō ≨Ӆḣཚ䛾 171 Nakae Chōmin ѝ⊏‫ ≁ݶ‬178, 202n109 Nakajima Tan ѝጦㄟ 158–61 Nanjing 84n19 national humiliation, national shame (guochi ഻ᚕ) 6, 142, 144–50, 153, 227, 258, 300, 301 national identity 65, 67n96, 112n2 national self-determination (minzu zijue ≁᯿㠚⊪) 13–14, 130, 186–87, 217, 255, 288, 298 national sovereignty (zhuquan ѫ℺) 3, 4, 7, 11–13, 14n6, 18, 32, 73, 79, 81, 82n11, 86n26, 88, 96, 98, 111, 115, 126, 130–31, 153–54, 200, 218n155, 220, 250, 264, 299, 300, 303 nationalism 5–11, 22n30, 25, 29, 44–46, 49n47, 50n50, 57, 59–60, 65–67, 70–72, 78, 96, 105, 109n99, 140n86, 148, 150, 153–54, 161, 178, 191n76, 192n81, 216, 227–28, 231, 237, 239, 250, 253–54, 256, 258, 264–65, 268, 272, 292, 303n7 Nerchinsk 42n49, 62–63, 117–18, 123, 128, 287 New Asianism (shin ajiashugi ᯠӌ㍠ӌѫ㗙  186–87, 195 New Life Movement Campaign (Xinshenghuo yundong ᯠ⭏⍫䙻अ  60 New Order in East Asia (Tō-A shin jitsujō ᶡӌᯠ〙ᒿ) 195n92, 223 Newest Asianism (shin shin ajiashugi ᯠᯠӌ㍠ӌѫ㗙  187 Nishida Kitarō 㾯⭠ᒮཊ䛾 20 nomos 50, 51, 54n67, 62, 102–03 Norman, Sir Henry 192–93 Nye, Joseph 275, 283n12 Okakura Tenshin ዑ‫ع‬ཙᗳ 198 Ōkuma Shigenobu བྷ䲸䟽ؑ 154–55, 156n122, 170–71, 184, 191n77, 217

Index Old Asianism (kyū ajiashugi ᰗӌ㍠ӌѫ㗙  187 On China (Zhongguolun ѝ഻䄆) 13n1, 253–57, 278 On the Origins of Politics and on International Law (Gensei oyobi kokusairon ৏᭯৺ഭ䳋䄆) 207 Open Door Policy 89, 93, 101n68, 145n100, 157n124, 212, 214n142 Oriental Academy (Tōyō gakkan ᶡ⌻ᆖ佘) 180 Oriental Association (Tōhō kyōkai ᶡ䛖঄Պ) 105, 154, 156 Oriental pacifijism (Dongfang hepingzhuyi ᶡᯩ઼ᒣѫ㗙) 267 Ou Jujia ↀῈ⭢ 2n7, 238 Ozawa Katsurō ሿ⋒䉱䛾 105 Pacifijic Society (Taiheiyō kyōkai ཚᒣ⌻঄Պ) 24 pacifijism 28, 77, 225–26, 228, 230n12, 246n60, 267, 274, 297, 301 pacifijist bias 35, 164, 226, 228, 265, 266n109, 270, 303 Pan-Asianism 12, 20, 22n34, 29, 78, 98, 107n91, 158, 161, 173, 184, 187, 201, 211, 221, 223–24 Partition (of China) 7, 8n20, 10, 105, 143, 156–60, 162–63, 170, 183 Pashukanis, Evgeny Bronislavovich 222 patriotism 2n6, 8n20, 140n86, 158, 219n157 people (renmin Ӫ≁) 4, 11, 130 People’s Journal (Minbao ≁๡) 88, 94, 162 People’s Newspaper (Kokumin shinbun ഭ≁ᯠ㚎) 167, 188, 191, 192n83 Qianlong Ү䲶 (Emperor of the Qing) 41n24, 80, 124n39, 139, 142 Qinzong Ⅽᇇ (Emperor of the Song) 37 Ratzel, Friedrich 17, 21–23, 101 Regulations for Modern Schools (Zouding xuetang zhangcheng ཿᇊᆨาㄐ〻) 137 Reinsch, Paul 143, 164, 216 ren ӱ 57, 225, 243, 267 Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao 㩜഻‫ޜ‬๡) 136 Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui ਼ⴏᴳ) 162 Richard, Paul 23

Index ritual (li ⿞) 36, 43n33, 50, 62, 79, 235n29, 273n129 Roosevelt, Theodore 84n19, 97–99, 102, 110, 245 Rōyama Masamichi 㹏ኡ᭯䚃 24 Said, Edward 258 Sakuma Shōzan րѵ䯃䊑ኡ 176 Schmitt, Carl 16, 21n26, 23–24, 54–55, 101–02, 222–23, 228–29, 233, 251n71, 265, 289, 297, 302–03 Shanghai 86n27, 105, 143n91, 144, 146, 180, 182, 201n107, 204n113 Shanghai Daily (Shenbao ⭣๡) 135–136, 147, 216n146 Shiga Shigetaka ᘇ䋰䟽ᰲ 131, 156n122, 195n92 shijie ц⭼ 46, 59, 219, 257–259, 263, 265, 281, 285n16, 294, 303n7 Sima Guang ਨ俜‫ ݹ‬268 Sinocentrism 37, 41–43, 53, 62, 113, 117n14, 127n45, 134, 233, 279 Sino-Japanese amity (Nisshi shinzen ᰕ᭟㿚ழ) 209 Sino-Japanese cooperation (Nisshi teikei ᰕ᭟ᨀᩪ) 204, 209 social Darwinism 2, 20, 44, 73, 131, 157, 176, 178, 237, 251, 303n7 solidarity (rentai 䙓ᑟ) 203 Song Jiaoren ᆻᮉӱ 238, 239 sonnō jōi ሺ⦻ᭈཧ 175 space 4, 16–22, 25–28, 30, 44, 68–69, 71–72, 74, 76–77, 79, 88, 92–94, 96, 98–99, 101, 103–04, 106n89, 110, 112, 116, 120–30, 142, 148, 154, 158, 161, 194–96, 201, 203, 208, 211, 213, 223, 251n71, 256, 260, 288, 294, 298, 299–300 spatiality  11, 18, 21, 27, 63, 65n89, 68n100, 75–77, 81, 90, 110, 112, 115, 142, 221, 223, 265, 278, 293, 299 spheres of influence (shili fanwei ऒ࣋ㇴഽ 90, 112, 213–14 Sugita Teiichi ᵹ⭠ᇊа 179 Sun Yat-sen ᆛ䙨ԉ (Zhongshan ѝኡ) 3n8, 8n18, 23, 45, 57, 74, 88, 156, 159, 163, 187n71, 209, 242n49, 256, 290, 293 Tabata Shigejirō ⭠⮁㤲Ҽ䛾 222 taiping ཚᒣ 1n2, 135n70, 231–37, 239–40, 251, 265, 303n7, 304

361 Takahashi Sakue 儈⁻֌㺋 89n37, 90n38, 173 Takeuchi Yoshimi ㄩ޵ྭ 182, 199n100, 202–03, 223 Tanaka Karō ⭠ѝ㣡⎚ 171 Tang Hualong ⒟ॆ喽 146 Tang Mingrui ⒟਽⶯ 98 Tao Chengzhang 䲦ᡀㄐ 238 Tarui Tōkichi Ӆ㰔ਹ 198, 199n100 territorial sovereignty 15, 89, 96, 121, 130, 212, 217 territoriality 4, 11, 18, 27, 44, 62–63, 66–68, 72–73, 75, 77, 81, 108, 110, 112, 124, 128n49, 128n50, 130–31, 140, 150, 153, 184, 263, 265, 278, 293, 299–300 territory (lingtu 么൏) 4, 6, 8, 11, 16–19, 21, 25–27, 29–30, 40, 44, 49, 54, 64n86, 65–77, 88–90, 94, 103, 105–07, 109, 112, 115, 121–23, 126–31, 132n61, 135, 139–42, 148, 149n110, 150, 151n115, 152–54, 157, 160–61, 172, 190, 193, 197, 203, 210–11, 215n144, 220n160, 235, 239–40, 256, 278, 288, 294, 298, 299–300, 303 The China Discussion (Qingyibao ␵䆠๡) 106, 109n100, 156n121, 167, 185n62 The Navy (Haijun ⎧䓽) 95n52, 105 The Plural Structure of International Legal Order (Kokusaihō chitsujo no tagenteki kōsei ഭ䳋⌅〙ᒿȃཊ‫Ⲵݳ‬Ώᡀ   222 The Revolutionary Army (Gemingjun 䶙ભ䓽) 239 The Tiger Magazine (Jiayin zazhi ⭢ᇵ䴌䂼) 186 Three Principles of the People (Sanminzhuyi й≁ѫ㗙  45n36, 57 tianxia ཙл 8n19, 12, 28–29, 32–38, 45–55, 57, 59–63, 65, 75, 77, 112, 114, 153, 223–25, 231n15, 233, 236–37, 247, 250, 252–61, 263–72, 273n130, 274–75, 278–79, 282, 285, 289, 291–98, 300–05 tianxia tixi ཙлփ㌫ 258–59 tianxia weigong ཙл⛪‫ ޜ‬256 tianxiaguo ཙл഻ 252, 255, 279n3 Tide of Zhejiang (Zhejiangchao ⎉⊏▞) 95, 107–09, 137–39 Tokutomi Sohō ᗣᇼ㰷ጠ 187–88, 210n129 Tomizu Kanjin ᡨ≤ላӪ 92 Tong, Hollington K. 㪓亅‫ ݹ‬215 Tōyama Mitsuru 九ኡ⒰ 92, 157n122

362

Index

Treatise on Greater Asianism (Dai Ajiashugi ron བྷӎ㍠ӎѫ㗙䄆) 203–210 tribute system 41–44, 63, 117n14, 289 Triepel, Heinrich 288–89 Tse Tsan Tai (Xie Zuantai) 䅍㓈⌠ 8 Tsou Jung 䝂ᇩ (s. Zou Rong) 227, 239

Xinhai Revolution (Xinhai geming 䗋ӕ䶙ભ) 4, 45, 88, 142, 143n93, 159 Xinmin congbao ᯠ≁਒๡ 110n102, 131–132, 140, 148 Xiong Xiling ➺ᐼ喑 1, 245n55 Xu Jiyu ᗀ㒬⮜ 4, 10, 65, 134

Uchida Ryōhei ޵⭠㢟ᒣ 90 Uehara Yūsaku к৏ࣷ֌ 159 Ukita Kazutami ⎞⭠઼≁ 185, 187 union, solidarity (rentai 䙓ᑟ) 198 universal law 84, 242 universal rule (dayitong བྷа㎡) 41, 96, 256, 300 Utsunomiya Tarō ᆷ䜭ᇞཚ䛾 159, 172

Yamagata Aritomo ኡ㑓ᴹᴻ 175n36, 191n79, 213 Yan Fu ೤ᗙ 45, 242n46 Yan Xuetong 䰾ᆖ䙊 16n10, 228, 249, 261, 264n102, 277, 279n3, 281n7, 282, 289, 290n35 Yang Du ὺᓖ 48 Yang Shouren ὺᆸӱ 2 yao ࿆ 234 Yasui Kaoru ᆹӅ䛱 20, 23n37, 221, 304 yellow peril 163–65, 167–70, 171n29, 172n32, 183, 204, 254, 267n115 Yongzheng 䳽↓ (Emperor of the Qing) 000 Yoshino Sakuzō ਹ䟾֌䙐 158n126, 217 Yuan Shikai 㺱цࠡ 143, 144n96, 145, 159, 211

Versailles 57, 215, 217–20 Wang, Chengting Thomas ⦻↓ᔧ 244 Wang Gungwu ⦻䎃↖ 43, 267 Wang Jingwei ⊚㋮㺋 162 wangdao ⦻䚃 28, 187n71, 230, 252, 287, 289–90, 293 wanguo 㩜഻ 46 Washington, George 159, 240 Wei Yuan 兿Ⓚ 65, 133–34 Wendt, Alexander 280–81, 283n12 wenming ᮷᰾ 139 Wheaton, Henry 14, 46, 81–86, 90n38 white peril 168–72, 204, 225, 227, 240, 258, 265 Wilhelm II (German kaiser) 165–66 Wilson, Woodrow 25, 78, 98, 145n100, 212–19, 220n160, 243–46, 248–49, 266–67, 277, 294 world shijie ц⭼ 46, 259 World War I 23, 25, 27, 55, 59, 75, 78, 98, 99n62, 154, 161, 172, 181, 186, 188, 203, 205, 211, 243, 248, 249, 266, 277 World War II 22, 220, 221n163

Zeng Jing ᴮ䶌 38, 227n4 Zhang Shizhao ㄐ༛䠇 145n101, 186n64 Zhang Sigui ᕥᯟṲ 86 Zhang Taiyan ㄐཚ⚾ (Binglin ⛣哏) 73, 237, 239 Zhang Xichen ㄐ䥛⩋ 171, 172n32 Zhao Tingyang 䎥≰䱣 16n10, 28n49, 54n66, 55n68, 226n3, 228, 231, 249, 252, 258–76, 277, 279n3, 281–82, 284, 291, 293, 297, 300, 302, 303n7 Zheng Guanying 䝝㿰៹ 86–87 Zhu Xi ᵡ⟩ 174 Zou Rong 䝂ᇩ (s. Tsou Jung) 227, 239