Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis 9004103929, 9789004103924

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IDEAS IN GOD ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT EDITED BY

HEIKO A. OBERMAN, Tucson, Arizona IN COOPERATION WITH HENRY CHADWICK, Cambridge JAROSLAV PEUKAN, New Haven, Connecticut BRIAN TIERNEY, Ithaka, New York ARJO VANDERJAGT, Groningen

VOLUME LXIX

VIVIAN BOlAND OP

IDEAS IN GOD ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

IDEAS IN GOD ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS SOURCES AND SYNTHESIS

BY

VIVIAN BOLAND OP

E.]. BRILL LEIDEN . NEW YORK· KOLN 1996

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Boland, Vivian. Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas : sources and synthesis / by Vivian Boland. p. em. - (Studies in the history of Christian thought, ISSN 0081-8607 ; v. 69) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9004103929 (alk. paper) 1. God-Gmniscience-History of doctrines-Middle Ages, 600-1500. 2. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274--Contributions in doctrine of God's omniscience. I. Tide. II. Series. BT131.B65 1996 23I'.4-dc20 95-53243 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Eioheitsaufnahme Boland, Vivian. Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas : sources and synthesis / by Vivian Boland. - Leiden ; New York; Koln : Brill, 1996 (Studies in the history of Christian thought ; Vol. 69) ISBN 90-04-10392-9 NE:GT ISSN 0081-8607 ISBN 90 04 10392 9 (0

Copyright 1996 by EJ. Brill, I..eiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this puhlication may be reproduted, translaJed, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, plwtocopying, recording or otherwise, witJwut prior written pamission from the publisher. Authorization to photocl# items for inJmzal or personal use isgranted by EJ. Brill provided that the appropriate fies are paid directlJ to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Darwers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRlNfED IN THE NETHERLANDS

This work is dedicated to myparents Paddy and Maura Boland whofirst taught me aboutGod

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface.............................................................................

xi

xii

Abbreviations INIRODUCTION: 'TIlE THOUGHrS OF GOD"

A. God's Knowledge of Creation . .. ... ... . .. ..................... ........ B. The Divine "Ideas" C. Thomas Aquinas on the Ideas D. The Sources of Saint Thomas's Thought ........... .. ....... .. ... .. .. E. Outline of the Thesis ..

3 5 6 9 12

PART I: TIlE SOURCES

Chapter One: The Ideas in the Divine Mind A. Plato's Timaeus B. The Platonist Tradition C. Philo: Plato among the Jews ... ... .. .. .. ... ....... ... ... ...... ........ . D. Augustine: Plato among the Christians Conclusion to Chapter One. .

17 22 28 33 47

Chapter Two: The Ideas are the Divine Mind A. Plotinus 1. Introduction ...... . .... ... .... .. ....... .. .... .. .. ... ... ......... ...... 2. Plotinian No\)(; 3. Sources of Plotinus on No\)(;

49 50 58

B. Latin Christian Neoplatonism 1. The Religious Quest, Pagan and Christian... .. ............. ...... 2. Marius Victorinus on the Trinity 3. Augustine on the Trinity ... .. ... .. ... .... ... ... .... ..... ... ..... .... 4. Augustine on Creation: Rationes Aeternae and Yerbum 5. The Trinity, Creation and the Ideas 6. Boethius

Chapter Three: The Vision of Dionysius- Divine Ideas and Divine Attributes A. The Theology of Dionysius 1. The Corpus Areopagiticwn 2. The Status of A'irro-Realities in Divine Names

65 68 70 78 85 88

. 94 96

viii

CONTENTS

3. The Transcendent God, Cause of All 4. Divine Names II 5. Participations, Gifts, Powers , Causes.......... .... .. ... .... . .. .. 6. The Names of God - Divine Names IV-XIII ......... . .. . ..... . .. 7. I1apa&i:Yl!a-ra- The Divine Ideas . .. ... ... .. ... .... ....... ... ..

98 100 103 104 111

B. The Philosophy of Proelus Introduction .. .... .. ... .. . .... . .. . ... . ... ... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... . ... .. . .. 1. Henads, Participation, Causality 2. Proclus on the Ideas

115 117 122

C. Dionysius and Proelus Introduction .. ... ... .. ... 1. Objective Links 2. A Radical Difference 3. The Mystery "Hidden Amid the Revelation" 4. The Dionys ian Tradition Conclusion to Chapter Three. ...... ..... .. . ... . ... ........ ... .... .. .... ...

130 131 133 138 143 146

Chapter Four: The Aristote lian Tradition and the Divine Ideas Introduction

147

A. The Philosophy of Aristotle 1. Aristotle's Critique of Plato 's Theory of Ideas 2. Aristotle's Account of First Principles 3. Aristotle on Intelligence .. .

148 153 163

B. The Aristotelian Tradition 1. Pagan Peripatetics ... . ...... ... . .. .. .. ... ..... . .. . .. . 2. Islamic Philosophers ... ..... ....... . ... .... ...... .. .... .. ... . ..... .. 3. Christian Aristotelians.. . .. . .. .. . .... ... .. . .. . .. . ... .. . ... .. ..... .. .

173 176 185

PART II: TIIE SYNTHESIS

Chapter Five: Divine Knowledge and Divine Ideas Introduction.. ... .. . ... ... .. ...... .. .. ... ... ... .... . .. .. ... ... ... ..... ... . .. .. A. Divine Knowledge... .. .

195 196

B. Saint Thomas on the Divine Ideas 1. In I Sententiarum 36 on the Divine Ideas .. ...... .. . .. .... .. . ... . 201 2. Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate 3 on the Divine Ideas. .. 205 3. Summa Theologiae 1,15 on the Divine Ideas 210 C. The Disappearance of the Ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles 1. Revisions and Dating 2. Summa Contra Gentiles: On Divine Kno wledge.. . .. .. ... .. ... 3. The Suppressed Autograph of the Summa Contra Gentiles..

2 14 216 221

ix

CONTENTS

D. The Extent of the Ideas 1. Ideas of Individuals. .... . .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. . .. .. .. . ... .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. 2. An Idea of Materia Prima? 3. Ideas of Possibles 4. Ideas of Accidents 5. An Idea of Evil? Conclusion to Chapter Five.. .. ... .. .. . .. .... .. .. .. . .. ... . ... .. . .. . .. . .. ... .

226 227 230 231 232 233

Chapter Six: The Word, Creation, Providence and the Ideas A. The Word of God and the Ideas 1.The Word of the Father .. ..... . .. .. . ... ... .... .. . .... .. .... .. .... .. . 2. The Word of Creation .. .. ..... .. ... . ..... .. ..... . ...... ... .. . ..... . . 3. The Word in Creation 4. Word and Idea

235 238 241 245

B. The Ideas in the Theology of Creation 1. Characteristics ofIntelligent Causality 2. Ideas in Practical and Speculative Knowledge ...... .... .. . ..... 3. The Ideas and God's Will 4. God as Exemplar Cause. ... .... ... ... .. .. .. .. ... ... .. .... .. .. .. .. .. 5. Rationes as Attributes and Rationes Rerum 6. A Comment on Participation ... ... .... .. .. . .. .. .. ... .. . .. .. .. .. .. ..

249 251 253 255 257 259

C. Providence and the Ideas 1. Providence-A Philosophical and Theological Issue 2. Providence and God's Will 3. The Variety and Beauty of Creation 4. Participating in Providence

262 264 264 266

5 . Providence and the Ideas

. .. . ..

.. .. . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . ..

D. The Wise Love of God Chapter Seven : The Tradition of Divine Ideas and its Transformation in the Synthes is of Saint Thomas Introduction .. .. . .. . ... ... .. . .... ... . .. . ... ... . .. . .. ... ... ... ... . .. ... . .. ... ..

268

270

274

A. Saint Thomas and Augustine on Knowledge 1.Saint Thomas' Debt to Augustine 275 2. Saint Thomas ' Critical Acceptance of Augustine ... ..... .. . .... 276 3. The Ideas in Creaturely Knowledge 277 B. Saint Thomas and Aristotle on the Good Introduction ... . .. . .... ... .. .... .. . ... .. . .. .... .. . .. .. . ... .. .... 1.Saint Thomas's Knowledge of Plato through Aristotle 2. Plato, Aristotle and Saint Thomas on the Good 3. Aristotle on God, Creation and Providence ... ... .. ... .. .. ..... . . 4. An Acceptable Theory of Ideas.. .... .... .. .. .... .. ... ..... . . ... ...

284 285 288 292 295

x

CONTENTS

C. Saint Thomas and Dionysius on Being Introduction.......... ............ ..................... ................... 1. The CreativeCausality of God 2. Rejectionof DiverseCausal Principles... ... ............... .. .... 3. The Ai>'to-Realities 4. Divine Names XI.6 5. Ai>'to-Realities as Exemplars 6. The Likeness of God in Things

2':l7 2':l7

299 300 301 302 303

D. Super Librum de Causis- Towards a Final Resolution Introduction....................... .... ... .... ... ......... .... .. ... .... .. 306 1. A CorrectTheodicy 3m 2. Sourcesof SaintThomasin In Librum de Causis 310 3. Towardsa Final Resolution .... .... ... ............ ................. 310 GENERAL CONCLUSION

Part One : The Sources ........... .. .. .. ...... .. .... ... ... .. .... ................ Part Two : The Synthesis... .. .. .. .. ... .. .... .. ... ......... .. .. ..... ...... .....

315 323

Bibliography.... .... .. .. ... ... .. ..... .. ........ ......... ............. .... .. ... ... 333 General Index. ......... .. .. ... .. ... .. .. ..... .. ...... .... ... .... ...... .... ... ... .. 345

PREFACE This study is a slightly revised version of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas in Rome, the Angelicum, and publicly defended there on December 19, 1992. The initial stimulus for the thesis came from my participation in post-graduate seminars on Neoplatonism and Christian mysticism directed by Noel Dermot O'Donoghue ODC at the University of Edinburgh between 1978 and 1981. I was able to return to the thesis while living in Rome from 1983 to 1985. During that time Edward Booth OP of the Leonine Commission at Grottaferrata helped me to appreciate the full extent of the task I had taken on and was unfailingly generous with his time, knowledge and advice. The thesis was finally completed between 1990 and 1992 and I am especially grateful to Benoit Duroux OP for his kindness and wisdom in guiding my work to a conclusion, however provisional. I am indebted to many others for encouragement and help along the way. I would like to thank in particular Geraldine Mitchell who tracked down a copy of Vigener, De Ideis Divinis (1869) in Berlin, Joanne Adams, then of the Warburg Institute in London, who helped me with some of the more obscure pieces of the bibliography and Gerard J.Norton OP who helped with some of the biblical material used in the Introduction. Many anonymous librarians helped in ways that they will never know, at the Angelicum and Antonianum libraries as well as at the libraries of the Gregorian University, the French School and the American Academy in Rome, at the library of the Leonine Commission, Grottaferrata and at the University Library in Cambridge. I thank my Dominican confreres for their patience with me and for releasing me from other duties in order to pursue my research. The communities at Edinburgh, Newbridge, Cambridge, Tallaght and San Clemente, Rome all received me kindly and provided the conditions necessary for dedication to study. Finally I thank Professor H.A.Oberman for his kind assessment of my work and for agreeing to include it in the series Studies in the History of Christian Thought. Saint Mary's Tallaght August 8, 1995 Feast of Saint Dominic

Vivian Boland OP

ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviations for titles of periodicals are those used in Rassegna di Letteratura Tomistica [= RLT] and/or Repertoire bibliographique de la Philosophie [= RBP] . In addition the following abbreviations have been used: MOICf:

Edward Booth OP: Aristotelian AporeticOntology in Islamicand Christian Thinkers [Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought III:20 . Cambridge UniversityPress 1983]. ACPA: AmericanCatholicPbilosophical Association ACPQ: American CatholicPbilosophical Quarterly AttiNap: Atti del Congresso Internazionale {RomalNapoli: /7-24 Aprile 1974]: Tommaso d'Aquinonel suo Settimo Centenario [Napoli 1975] AugMag: AugustinusMagister Congres international augustinien, Paris, 21-24 sett, 1954. Voll I-II: Communications. Vol ill: Acts AugSt AugustinianStudies BCE: Before the common era (= BC) CCSUCCL: CorpusChristianorum, SeriesLatina CE: Common era (= AD) cm...GEMP: The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy led. A.H.Annstrong, CambridgeUniversity Press 1967] Dodds : Proclus: TheElements ofTheology [Oxford 1933. Republished 1963]. Dorrie Festschrift: Platonismus und Christentum. [Festschrift filr Heinrich Dorrie. Herausgegeben von Horst-Dieter Blume und Friedheim Mann. Jahrbuch ffir Antike und Christentum. Erganzungsband 10: 1983. Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munster Westfalen] MG : Martin Grabmann: Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichteder Scholastik und Mystik [Munich 1926 [I]; 1936 [II]; 1956 [Ill]] PG: Migne: Patrologia Graeca PL: Migne: Patrologia Latina RE: Pauly-Wissowa:Realencyclopddie der ClassischenAltertumswissenschaft Saffrey: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de CQJlSis Expositio [Textus PhilosophiciFriburgenses 415: FribourglLouvain1954]. StAng: Studia Universitatis S.Thomae de Urbe StPat Studia Patristica Toronto Studies: St Thomas Aquinas Commemorative Studies Foreword by Etienne Gilson [Toronto: PontificalInstitute of Medieval Studies 1974 2 vols]

INTRODUCTION

Gracias quiero dar al divino Laberinto de los efectos y de las causas Por la diversidad de las criaturas Que forman este singular universo, Por la razon, que no cesara de sonar Con un plano dellaberinto... Jorge Luis Borges OtroPoema de los Dones

INTRODUCfION "THE THOUGHfS OF GOD"

A. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF CREATION

Psalm 139 is among the finest witnesses in the Bible to God's knowledge a creation in all its detail and variety . The Lord searches and knows when we sit or walk, discerns our purpose from afar and knows every detail of our conduct. Before a word is on my tongue, the psalmist says, you know it, 0 Lord. through and through. There is no comer of the creation where one may hide since the Lord knows the furthest reaches of it. In all places God guides and upholds creation. Likewise when we were being fashioned in secret and moulded in the depths of the earth, the Lord knew it. It was he who knit me together in my mother's womb and all my days were written in (his) book, decreed before one of them came into being . I thank you for the wonder ofmy being, the psalmist continues, for the wonders ofall your creation. Finally he cries out: To me how mysteriousyour thoughts, the sum of them not to be numbered. If I count them they are more than the sand; to finish, I must be eternallike you. Psalm 139 speaks of God's eternal and mysterious knowledge of all he has made, of God's thoughts and decrees in relation to creation and of God's presence to each last detail of it' . Other Old Testament texts repeat these themes. God knows all that is 2• The thoughts and decrees of God are mysterious and impenetrable-. God is present in every moment and comer of creatiorr' . For Old Testament theologies of the Word and Wisdom of God, the hymns in praise of wisdom which are found in Job 28, Proverbs 8, Wisdom 6-9 and Sirach 24 are of particular importance. Israel's reflection on the mystery of I I use the Jerusalem Bible and Grail translations of Psalm 139. The numbering of the Psalms is that used in TheJerusalem Bible and RevisedStandardVersion . 22 Kgs 19:27; Job 7:17-20 [where God's scrutiny is threatening); 31 :4; Pss 17:3; 26 :2; 33:13-15 [cited in SummaTheologiae (=ST) I,14,13,sc); 44:21; 94:10£ [cited in ST 1,14,14,se) ; Prov 16:2 [cited in ST I,14,II,se]; Sir 23:20 [cited in Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (= QD de Ver) 3,3 ad sci] and Jer 12:3. 3 Jdt 8:14; Job 11:7-10 ; 23:8-17 [once again the mood is threatening] ; Pss 40:5; 92:5; 131:1; Wis 9:13-18 ; Qoh3:11; 8:17; 11:5; Sir 16:26-27; 18:1-7; Dan 2:20-22. 4 Job 10:8-12 ; 14:5; 26:6-14; 34 :13 [cited in ST 1,22,3,se]; Ps 31 :15; Wis 1:7; 7:16; Sir 16:17-19; Jer 23:23-24. In the Book of Job see the speeches of Elihu, Job 32 -37, and the speeches of Yahweh , Job 38-41.

4

INIRODUcnON

God's creative plans and purposes reaches its highest point in these poems. This mystery is only known through wisdom who is God 's child, consort or craftsman, the breath of God's mouth, the first thing created, the one through whom God creates all things . Wisdom shares herself with human beings, calling them to her feast and teaching them something of the order and meaning which God has placed within creation. Wisdom is that order and meaning who yet calls to human persons and addresses them with concern, delight and love>, The later wisdom literature harmonises the instructions of the wisdom teachers with Yahwistic traditions of salvation history. The plans and purposes of God are seen to have been revealed to Israel in the gift of Torah 6. These themes continue in the New Testament where they are radically transformed. Jesus speaks of the providential care of the Father for all that is. Every hair on your head has been counted, he reassures the disciples. Not one sparrow falls to the ground without your Father knowing since not one sparrow is forgotten in God's sight 7. The good shepherd knows his sheep and calls each one by its names. Psalm 139:16 speaks of a book in which all is written down, a book which is often referred to through the Old Testament and in the New? . But there is more. For the New Testament writers Jesus Christ is the Son of God who fulfills beyond all expectation the promises held out by the sapiential poetry of the Old Testament Jesus is the wisdom of the Father who reveals the mind of God and accomplishes God 's purposes for the people and for creation. This is central in Johannine and Pauline theology as well as for the other New Testament writers for whom the mystery of God's eternal plan of creation and redemption is revealed and accomplished in Jesus. As firstborn of all creation and firstborn from the dead Jesus is our leader and saviour, our exemplar and pattem'P, In the words of Ephesians 2:10, We are God's work of art, created in Christ Jesus to live the good life as from the beginning he had meant us to live it

S Prov 1:20-33, for example,and for God's word in creation: Gen 1:1-4; Ps 119:89-91 and Wis 9: 1. See Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in Israel [London 1972]pp.144-76,292-93,298-304. Von Rad stresses that the wisdom teachers hymn the divine glory, speaking of the mystery in poeticfonn: pp.12-13,24ff,293,316. We will see that a similaruse of the term hymn is ofimporlance for Ps.Dionysius: see ChapterThree below. 6 Deut 4:6 [cited in STJ ,I,6,sc]; 30:11-14 [theWord as Wisdom]; Ps 119; Sir 24:23-27 and Bar 3:9-4:4. 7 Matt 10:29-30; Luke 12:6-7. See also Matt 5:25-34;Luke 12:22-31; 21:18; Heb 4:12-13 [citedin STJ ,14,5,scand 14,6,sc]. S John 10:2-5,14-15,27. 9 Pss 69:28; 109:IS; Dan 7:10; 12:I; Mal 3:16;Luke 10:20; Rev 3:5; 13:8; 17:8; 20:12. 10 Matt 11:19,25-27; Luke 10:21-22; 11:49; John 1.1-18; Rom 8; 11:33-36 [cited in STJ,14.1,sc]; 1 Cor 1:17-2:16 [2:11 is cited in STJ ,14,2,sc];Eph 1:3-14; 3:8-11; Col 1:15-20; 3:1O;Heb 1:1-4; 2:10-18; James 1:16-18.

''TIlE rnOUGlITS OF GOD"

5

B. THE DIVINE "IDEAS"

The hellenisation of Christian theology is often regarded as an unfortunate development. "Classical theism", the doctrine of God which emerged in the patristic and medieval periods using platonist and then aristotelian philosophy, is sometimes judged to be the supreme example of this sad marriage of Christian faith and Greek philosophy!'. What has the unmoved mover of Aristotle to do with God who is love? What has Plato's ideal Beauty or the One beyond all particular phenomena to do with the Creator and Lord of all things? What has Saint Thomas's notion of ipsum essesubsistens to do with the Father of Jesus who provides for all creatures? This criticism of hellenisation normally depends on a sharp contrast between Hebrew and Greek ways of thinking, the argument being that to accept Greek ways of thought is to betray Hebrew, and therefore biblical, ways of thought. This sharp contrast, which often becomes a caricature, has itself been severely criticised. "Hellenism" is already in question in the Bible especially in later books like Sirach and Wisdom. The relation between Greek and Hebrew thought has been variously understood and the sharp Hebrew-Greek contrast says more about modem thought than it does about the Bible or about classical theologies. The use of this contrast has had detrimental effects on biblical interpretation itself, the place where it ought to be of most use 12. The present study addresses itself to one aspect of this hellenisation of Christian theology. With regard to God's knowledge of creation, a fascinating tension is set up between the Christian conviction that God's knowledge must extend to the last and least fragment of the creation, and the philosophical requirement that genuine knowledge be intellectual, abstract and universal. For Aristotle the intellectual knowledge of individual things is one of "the greatest difficulties" . For Christian and other monotheistic believers using philosophical resources , the simplicity and unity of God must somehow be reconciled with God's creative and providential knowledge of a vast multiplicity of creatures. II See John Macquarrie, In Search of Deity [London: SCM 1988] and John J.O'Donnell, The Mysteryof the TriuneGod [London : Sheed and Ward , 1988]. It might be more accurate to say

'monotheistic faith ' since Islamic and Jewish theologians and philosophers contributed to the development of ' classical theism' . t2 Thorlief Boman, Das hebrdische Denken im Vergleich mit dem Griechischen [GOttingen: 1954, 196Q2][English translation by Jules L.Moreau, Hebrew Thought compared with Greek, London 1960] gives a full exposition of the modern contrasting of Hebrew and Greek thought and appeals for a synthesis of the two types of thinking . For a critique of the use of this contrast see James Barr, The Semantics of BiblicalLanguage [London 1961, 1983 2] pp.8-20 and Old and New in Interpretation. A Study of the Two Testaments [London 1966] pp.34-64. See also Dianne Bergant CSA, What are they saying about Wisdom Literaturei [New York/Ramsey 1984] pp.68,71-75 and Von Rad , Wisdom in Israel, pp.7,12-14,156,159,161-62 ,168,170,29495,305,313,318. Von Rad refers to a possible parallel between Prov 8.15-16, Cicero and Posidonius: op.cit., p.I59, n.16 .,

6

INfRODUCIlON

The notion of ideas in the mind of God by means of which God creates and knows what he creates became an integral part of the classical theism of theologians like Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas. At some indeterminate date, long before Augustine, the originally transcendent ideas of Plato were placed within a divine intelligence. Christian theologians accepted the challenge posed by this move which had profound implications not only for the pagan philosophical inheritance but for a theology that would be faithful to revelation. A study of the doctrine of divine ideas highlights contrasts between what scripture teaches about God's knowledge and providential care and what the philosophical schools taught about the divine and about knowledge. It throws light also on the more general question of the relation between the requirements of Christian faith and the content of philosophical ideas. While such contrasts and questions undoubtedly exist, many of the scriptural texts already referred to speak of God 's wisdom and knowledge in terms that were relatively easily combined with philosophical discourse about God. For Christian theologians, their account of the one God came to include the doctrine of divine ideas, a doctrine judged necessary to explain God's knowledge in creating and in providing for what is created. In the light of the ideas God creates and the ideas explain God's knowledge of things other than Himself. The intelligibility and value of the created order derive ultimately from the divine ideas. Classical theism did not believe that the absolute simplicity of God was threatened by the plurality which seemed to be involved in speaking of divine ideas. C. THOMAS AQUINAS ON TIIE IDEAS

The writings of Saint Thomas may fairly be regarded as a high-point in the de velopment of Christian theism. The notion of divine ideas is found frequently in his works. Lengthy expositions of the doctrine are found in his Commentary on the Sentences /.36, in Quaestiones Disputatae de Veri/ate 3 and in Summa Theologiae / ./5. Another account is found in a discarded draft of Summa Contra Gentiles 1.54. In these explicit treatments of the ideas the immediate context is always his account of divine knowledge. There are however many other places in his writings and a variety of contexts in which he appeals to the divine ideas. Yet it is precisely in interpreting the thought of Saint Thomas that serious questions about the function and even necessity of the divine ideas arise. A number of works devoted to the question were published in the 19th century . By and large these are enthusiastic about the notion of divine ideas, arguing that in spite of its platonic provenance the doctrine has an essential place in the Christian exemplarism of Saint Thomas 13. The contribution of recent scholar13 See note (2) to Chapter Five below for the works of Vigener [1869] . Van Den Berg [1872] . Vespignani [1887]. Lipperheide [1890] and Dubois [1897].

''TIlE THOUGHfS OF GOD"

7

ship consists in a series of brief articles which often fail to explore the wider contexts in which the doctrine of the divine ideas is situated's. Important interpreters of Saint Thomas disagree about the need and function of this notion in his writings. Whereas for Albert the Great "to deny the divine ideas is to deny the Son of God" a modem student of medieval philosophy describes the doctrine of divine ideas as a "useless fiction" 15. Some believe that Saint Thomas's understanding of God was such as to render the notion of divine ideas redundant. The logic of his theology, with its unambiguous insistence on the absolute simplicity of God , ought to have eliminated any consideration of the divine ideas from his writings. Thus Gilson and Sertillanges believe the doctrine to be useless and even dangerous, threatening the fine statements on the simplicity of God which Saint Thomas makes throughout his writings. They attribute the survival of the notion in his three major theological works to Saint Thomas's deference to Saint Augustine and to the philosophical language current in the 13th century. On this view the doctrine of divine ideas plays no essential part in the theology of Saint Thomas'e, This raises a problem. If the doctrine is either useless or dangerous or both why did Saint Thomas not see this? Is deference to Augustine or to the philosophical language current at his time a sufficient explanation of his continued use of the notion of ideas? Saint Thomas frequently shows himself to be quite independent both of Augustine and of his contemporaries. The fact that he is by no means an uncritical student of Augustine and that he was engaged in radically revising the philosophical resources deemed suitable for use in Christian theology does not seem to weigh with proponents of this view. Those who ar gue that the notion of divine ideas is unnecessary and dangerous fail to explain why Saint Thomas himself did not see this!", Others, most notably Geiger, believe that the notion of divine ideas survives throughout the corpus of Saint Thomas 's writings because it has an essential 14 See note (2) 15 Albert gives

to Chapter Five below for 3 listing of these articles. Augustine's De Civitate Dei as the source of this comment In I Sent d35, E, 3.7, 4th authority. St Thomas says it is from De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXlll.46: In I Sent 36,2, sc [p.839] and QD de Ver 3,l,sc 1. It is not found in Augustine's writings at all and disappears from St Thomas's later texts on the ideas : QD de Ver 3 .1, note to line 94 in Leonine edition. The comment that the doctrine is 3 ' useless fiction' is from E. de Bruyne, S.Thomas d'Aquin [paris 1928] p.lSS. t6 Etienne Gilson, Introduction a la philosophie chretienne [paris 1960] pp.170-83, especial1y pp.174-75; Le Thomisme [paris 1965] pp.I46-48, where the doctrine of ST 1,15 is simply recounted without discussion; History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages [London: Sheed and Ward 1955] pp.71-72,592 with n.18, which gives a more positive view of the ideas in Thomism; A.D. Sertillanges OP, Somme theologique, traduction francaise [Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, Paris, 1926] tome II, pp.403-05; S.Thomas d'Aquin (19254) I, pp .210 38 ,275; Le christianisme et les philosophes [pari s 1939] I,pp.273 -76. See John L. Farthing, 'The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St Thomas', Thorn 49 (1985) 220. 17 M.-D.Chenu OP argues that ST 1,1,8-10 was written out of deference to tradition and that in time the doctrines contained there disappear from St Thomas's writings: AIIDLMA 2 (1927) 69 [see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 225].

8

INIRODUcnON

function and plays a systematic role in his theology's, For Geiger the function of this doctrine is to avoid a contradiction between the simplicity of the divine knowledge and the multiplicity of what is known. The challenge for Geiger is to show how a multiplicity of ideas in God does not jeopardise the absolute simplicity of God which is so clearly taught in Saint Thomas's writings 19. My purpose is to try and discover what Saint Thomas believed to have been preserved in the relationship between God and creation by the doctrine of divine ideas. The doctrine is rightly understood as an aspect of a wider and deeper problematic involving the ancient question of one and many, the simplicity of the divine essence with a multiplicity of divine attributes, the simple unknowability of God and a multiplicity of divine names, the simple source of all perfections and the varied communication of those perfections to creatures, the simple knowledge of God and the multiplicity of ideas by which he creates and provides for the world. Some commentators have already drawn attention to this wider and deeper context 20• It is not enough simply to note the changes in the theory of knowledge which Saint Thomas made in order to speak of God's knowledge since in his theology the ideas have an ontological and not just an epistemological function 21. If there is disagreement on the meaning and function of the divine ideas in the theology of Saint Thomas, there is agreement that more work should be done on the questions-, It is unlikely that the notion of divine ideas survives in the writings of Saint Thomas purely out of deference to Augustine and the tradition. Although treated in the context of God's knowledge the notion of divine ideas is part of his account of the relation of God and creation, of the divine communication of being, goodness and intelligibility. Christian faith in God's knowledge of, and providential responsibility for, all things as well as the conviction that God created all things by His Word obliged Saint Thomas to speak of divine ideas if he was to be faithful to the substance and not just to the language of the theological traditions of which he was heir.

18 L.-B . Geiger OP, 'Us idees divines dans l'oeuvre de S.Thomas', in Toronto Studies I, 175-209. See also M.-D.Pbilippe , sere 30 (1965) 24. 19 Geiger, 'Les idees divines' , p.l79 and 'Us redactions successives de Contra Gentiles 1.53 d'apres l'autographe', in Saint Thomas d'Aquinaujourd'hui [Bruges 1963] 221-40. 20 W .Norris Clarke, 'Th e problem of the reality and multiplicity of divine ideas in Christian neoplatonism', in Dominic J.O'Meara, 00., Neoplatonism and Christian Thought [Norfolk, Virginia: International Society for Neoplalonic Studies, 1982] pp.I09-IO,1l3-14,121 -25 and Vincent P.Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas', NS 42 (1968) pp.I72,I88: the multiplicity and unity of the divine ideas is 'a sort of paradigm of all theological discourse' . 21 Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas', p.I86: 'Thomas's gnoseological analysis' gives ' no real answers' and Farthing, 'The Problem of Divine Exemplarity', pp.185,195,22 1. 22 Thomas Gornall SJ says that 'the full history of the doctrine remains to be written': Summa Theologiae. English translation edited by Thomas Gilby OP . Vol 4: Knowledee in God (1,14-18) [London and New York 1964] p.xxii. Geiger outlines the areas which would have to be dealt with by 'me etude complete' : 'Us idees divines,' p.I85.

''1HE TIlOUGHTS

OF GOD"

9

D. THE SOURCES OF SAINf lHOMAS'S THOUGHT

A full account of the doctrine of divine ideas in Saint Thomas's writings will consist of an historical overview of the various systems of thought in which he encountered this notion as well as an account of his appropriation of it in terms of the systematic function he assigns it in his own theology. The texts in which he deals explicitly with the ideas provide an introduction to the variety of traditions which flow into his work on this point. He speaks of the divine ideas as the rationes of created things like 'human being' and 'horse'. He refers frequently to the artist or maker who conceives the idea of his work in his mind before executing it in practice. But he speaks also in very different terms of the divine ideas as attributes such as 'being ', 'life' and 'intelligence', divine attributes which are also perfections or exemplars in which created reality participates. Behind this difference in terminology stand two distinct traditions, for one of which the ideas are in the divine mind while the other sees clearly that whatever is in the divine mind is the divine mind. The divine ideas were traditionally associated with the divine attribute of knowledge . But Saint Thomas saw that they must be understood, in some sense, as divine attributes through which the one and simple God who is self-sharing goodness enables created reality to participate in the fulness of His own perfection. The question of divine ideas is the question of one and many in the context of divine knowledge . But it is also in other words the question of Being and beings, of Goodness itself and the many instances of participated goodness which this world is. Recent work on the platonist sources of Saint Thomas, particularly on his contact with Proclus via Dionysius and Liber de Causis, has encouraged a reassessment of the structure of his theological synthesis. This historical work is relevant to a reconsideration of the divine ideas in the thought of Saint Thomas . Research in recent decades has helped to clarify the history and influence of platonist and neoplatonist philosophy in the middle ages>, Editions and transla2J See especially RKlibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages (London: The Warburg Institute, 1939, 1951 2 and Mlinchen 19813) ; The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the MiddleAges with a new preface and four supplementary chapters together with Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance with a new introductory preface [Kraus International Publications, 1982]. References to Klibansky, Continuity, are to this 1982 edition. For a conspectus of Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi see Klibansky, Continuity, pp.5,49-54. For bibliography on this point see F.A.Cunningham, 'Averroes

vs.Avicenna on Being', NS 48 (1974) p.I93, notes 44-46 and Rosa Padellaro De Angelis, L'influenza del pensiero neoplatonico sulfa metafisica di S.Tommaso d'Aquino [Roma: Abete, 1981] pp.17-18, notes 6-9. Important articles on medieval platonism published between 1916 and 1966 have been collected by Werner Beierwaltes, Plaumismus in der Philosophie des Miuelaiters [Wege der Forschung , Band CXCVII . Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969]. See also: M. de Wulf, 'Courants doctrinaux dans la philosophie europeenne du xns sieele", RNP 33 (1932) 5-20; E.Gilson, BT IV (1934) 87-91; E.Gilson, 'Le christianisme et la tradition philosophique ', RSPf 30 (1941-42) 249-66; H.-D,Saffrey . BT VIII (1947-53) 303-18; F.Brunner, 'Le confiit des tendances platoniciennes et aristoteliciennes au

10

INlRODUCI10N

tions, in particular of the works of Plotinus and Proclus, have contributed greatly to a renewed appreciation of neoplatonism-", On the question of platonism and neoplatonism in Saint Thomas much work has also been done. Early in this century it was already an important theme among students of Saint Thornas->, Study of what was called the 'platonism of Saint Thomas' was given fresh impetus by the publication of major works on participation by Fabro and Geiger, an impetus which has been maintainede. Understanding the platonism moyen age' , RTP 5 (1955) 179-92. K1ibansky distinguishes platonism and neoplatonism in medieval philosophy : Continu ity, pp.27-29. Lipperheide (1890) [see note (2) to Chapter Five below] is noteworthy for its recognition of the importance of neoplatonist sources. See also Sergio Rabade Romeo, 'Neoplatonismo 0 Neoplatonismos Medievales?' , EstFiI 8 (1959) 407 -17 ; ES.Schmitt, ' Anselm und der (Neu-)Platonismus ' Analecta Anselmiana 1 (1969) 39-71 and R.lmbach , 'Le (neo-jplatonisme medieval, Proclus latin et l'ecole dominicaine allemande ' , RTP 110 (1978) 427-48. 24 Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena . An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition [Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und rnittelalterlichen Philosophie VITI. Leiden, Brill, 1978] pp .7-13 summarises the study of neoplatonism since the Second World War following on E.R.Dodds' edition of Proclus' The Elements of Theology [Oxford 1933. Republished 1963]. Earlier works such as Thomas Whittaker. The Neo-Platonists [Cambridge University Press 1901]; A.E.Taylor, 'The Philosophy of Proclus', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XVIII (1917-18) 600-35 ; W .R.Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus [The Gifford Lectures 1917-18. 3rd edition: London 1929]; Emile Brehier, La Philosophie de Plotin [paris 1928] and Rene Arnou, La desir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin [Alean 1921. Deuxieme edition revue et corrigee par Paul Henry: Presses de l'Universite Gregorienne. Rome. 1967] remain useful although they ante-date critical editions and even good translations of the works of Plotinus and Proclus. Translations of the Enneads into French (E.Brehier) and English (S.MacKenna) in the early decades of this century helped the growth of interest in neoplatonism . 2S C.Huit. 'Les elements platoniciens de la doctrine de SiThomas', RevThom 19 (1911) 725 66. For contributions on this question published between 1890 and 1940 and the progressive reassessment of scholastic thought which they brought about see M.-D.Chenu. 'L'equilibre de la scolastique medievale", RSPT 29 (1940) 304-12. See also the relevant sections of BT and RLT . 26 Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione seconda S.Tommaso d 'Aquino , Sagg io d'introduzione anal itica al pens iero tomista [Milano. Vita e Pensiero, 1939; Torino 19502] ; L.-B .Geiger. La participat ion dans la philosophie de saint Thomas d 'Aquin [Bibliotheque thomiste XXIII, Paris, Vrin, 1942] . Fabro continued his researches with Participation et Causalite selon S.Thomas d 'Aquin [Louvain-Paris 1961]. Note also: Th .Deman, 'Socrate dans l'oeuvre de s.Thomas d'Aquin', RSPT 29 (1940) 177-205, especially pp.177-78, n.L, and pp .200-01 . n.2; C.Mazzantini, ' Platonismo e Aristotelismo nella Filosofia dell 'Aquinate', Sal 3 (1941) 242-58; Anton CPegis, ' Cosmogony and Knowledge ' . Thought 18 (1943) 643-64. 19 (1944) 269-90; Al.ittle, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism [Dublin 1949]; Rcl.Henle, ' Saint Thomas' Methodology in the Treatment of "Positiones" with particular refer ence to "Positiones Platonicae'" . Greg 36 (1955) 391-409; R.J.Henle . Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study ofthe "Plato " and "Platonici " Texts in the Writings oj Saint Thomas [The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff, 1956. Reprinted 1970]; Victor White, 'The Platonic Tradition in St Thomas Aquinas'. in God the Unknown [London 1956] pp.62-71; C.Vansteenkiste, 'Platone e S.Tommaso·. Ang 34 (1957) 318-28 ; Klaus Kremer, Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin [Leiden, Brill, 1966. With additions and corrections: Leiden, Brill, 1971]; J.A.Weisheipl, 'Thomas' Evaluation of Plato and Aristotle', NS 48 (1974) 100-24; C.Giacon, '11 P1atonismo di Aristotele e S.Tommaso·, DC 27 (1975) 1,153-70; A.von Ivanka, 'S .Thomas platonisanl', AttiNap I, 256-57; P.Faucon De Boylesve, Les aspects neoplatoniciens de la dactrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin [LilIe: Universite III et Paris : Champion.

"TI-IE TIlOUGHfS OF GOD"

11

of Aquinas means studying the importance for him of neoplatonist thinkers like Augustine, Dionysius, Boethius and the author of liber de Causis as well as his contact with Plato through the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, Macrobius and Calcidius. The 13th century rediscovery of Aristotle in the West was made possible by Latin translations of Arabic versions of Aristotle and of commentaries on his works by Islamic philosophers. These translations already testify to more or less successful syntheses of neoplatonist, peripatetic and stoic ideas. The Islamic philosophers shared with Christians a monotheistic religious faith and struggled with the problematic of one and many in a way that parallels the work of Christian theologians. The Islamic writers introduced a radical Aristotelian tradition to the Christian West, a fact which is of great significance for understanding Saint Thomas's work27 • The question of the divine ideas is related to that of the divine attributes and the work of Harry A.Wolfson on medieval understandings of the divine attributes must be acknowledged here 28. The concern of this work is distinct though related. The notion of ideas is an aspect of one of the divine attributes, that of knowledge. However, particularly for the Dionysian tradition, the ideas and attributes cannot be considered without reference to each other and are even regarded as equivalent. For that tradition the ideas can only be God in his perfection(s) and gift(s). As one part of a theological synthesis is re-assessed the whole must be understood afresh. The implications of recent study of medieval platonism and neoplatonism for Saint Thomas's thought as a whole have not yet been worked out 29 . If the doctrine of divine ideas raises questions about the hellenisation of Christian theology, it also raises questions about Saint Thomas 's philosophical synthesis. What kind of balance of aristotelian and platonist elements is it? There is no agreement about the answer to that question.". It seems clear that Saint Thomas's philosophical and theological system cannot be understood without reference to neoplatonism any more than it can be understood without 1975] and Edward Booth, 'Conciliazioni ontologiche delle tradizioni platonica e aristotelica in sant'Alberto e san Tommaso', in Sant'Alberto Magno : l'uomo e il pensatore [Studia Universitatis S.Thomae in Urbe 15: Massimo, Milano, 1982] 59-81. 27 On these points see Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers [Cambridge Studies in Medieval life and Thought. Third Series . Volume 20. Cambridge University Press 1983] [hereafter: AAOICT], pp.25 -27,56-65,89-94,I56-62. For Islamic philosophers see section B 2 of Chapter Four below . 28 See his collected articles, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion. Volumes I and II , edited by Isadore Twersky and George HWilliams [Cambridge (Mass .), Harvard University Press, 1973 and 1977] and note particularly 'St Thomas on Divine Attributes' in Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson de I'Acadimie Francoise [Toronto and Paris 1959], pp.673700 and ' Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas', J.Hist.Ideas 22 (1961) 332. 29 Beierwaltes, Platonismus, p.viii. 30 Compare for example Weisheipl, 'Thomas' evaluation', pp.lOI -03,I24, with Faucon, Les aspects and von Ivanka, ' S.Thomas platonisant', pp.256-S7.

12

IN1RODUCTION

reference to Christian faith . In anthropology, psychology, epistemology and moral philosophy Saint Thomas is remarkably faithful to Aristotle. But his theology continues to depend significantly on neoplatonism especially as it came to him through the writings of Dionysius". Geiger indicates the range of issues to which a consideration of the divine ideas must lead: the relations between Greek wisdom and speculative knowledge on the one hand and the revelation of a free creation on the other, the balancing of Aristotelian and neoplatonic elements, the themes of creation and providence, the expression of creatures in the word, the theme of exemplar causality and the question of intermediary creationv . A further related aspect which cannot be followed up within the limits of this study is the contribution of neoplatonism to the Christian tradition of speculative mysticism and the relation of St Thomas's theology to that tradition. It is well known that the philosophical school to which Christian mystical writing is most deeply indebted is neoplatonism and the writers of the German Dominican school from Albert the Great to Eckhart continue to pursue that interest in Proclus which characterised Saint Thomas in the last years of his life. The importance of Ps.Dionysius for Christian mysticism in all periods is well known->, E OlTITJNE OF THE THEsIS

This work is in two parts . The first part explores the traditions about the divine ideas in philosophers and theologians whose work was important in the formation of the doctrine of Saint Thomas either directly or indirectly. It is not an attempt at a comprehensive history of the notion of ideas but a reading of earlier

31 Saint Thomas writes : Haec igitur Platonicorum ratio fidei non consonai nee veritati , quantum ad hoc quod continet de speciebus naiuralibus separaus, sed quantum ad id quod dicebant de primo rerum Principio, verissima est eorum opinio et fidei christianae consona- In de Div Nom , proemium. Cf ST 1,84,4. 32 'Les idees divines', pp.1S4-85 with n.22 and p.208. See also Grabmann, 'Des heiligen Augustinus Quaestio de Ideis ', MG II 25-34 . 33 For some of the issues involved see Conrad Pepler OP, The Basis ofthe Mysticism of S/ Thomas (Aquinas Paper No 21, London 1953). See Dictionnaire de Spiritualite3 .318-429 for the influence of Ps.Dionysius in the West ; Padellaro de Angelis, L 'infiuenza del pensiero neoplatonico , pp.8Off for the relation of mystical themes such as 'the uight' and 'the cloud' to negative theology; Padellaro de Angelis, op.cit., pp.16,20,24 for the mysticism of St Thomas having its roots in the neoplatonism of Proclus via Ps.Dionys ius; for St Thomas and Eckhart see Benedict M.Ashley OP, 'Three Strands in the Thought of Eckhart, the Scholastic Theologian', Thom 42 (1978) 226-39 ; H .Fischer, 'Thomas von Aquin und Meister Eckhart', TP 49 (1974) and Loris Sturlese , 'Albert der Grosse und die deutsche philosophiscbe Kultur des Mittelalters', FZPf 28 (1981) 133-47 who identifies two interpretations of Albert in the 14th century, the one Thomistic and the other more ' neoplatonic' via Eckhart; for Plotinus, Saint Thomas and Saint John of the Cross see Eugene A.Maio, St John of the Cross-the Imagery of Eros (Madrid 1973) ; M .de Corte, ' L 'experience mystique chez PlOOn et chez saint Jean de la Croix', EtCarm 20/2 (1935) 210ff and R. Garrigou-Lagrange OP, Perfection chretienne et contemplation selon Thomas et Jean (1923).

"TI-IElHOUGHfS OF GOD"

13

traditions in the light of Saint Thomas's dependence on them . Nor is it a straightforwardly chronological account for it attempts to re-create the way in which those traditions became available to Saint Thomas. Chapter One traces the development of the notion of ideas from Plato through Middle Platonism and the Later Academy. At some point the ideas were placed within the divine intelligence and in this form the doctrine was happily used by Philo and Augustine . For this strand of the tradition the ideas are in the divine mind in a way that is analogous to the ideas of artists or makers as they set about conceiving, planning and executing their work. Chapter Two considers the distinctive understanding of Nous which is found in the Enneads of Plotinus and which marks a significant development within platonism . For Plotinus whatever is in the divine mind is the divine mind, but his second hypostasis did not attain the absolute simplicity and unity of the One. The emergence of what is called neoplatonism provided a fresh challenge to Christian thinkers like Marius Victorinus, Augustine and Boethius in whose teachings about the Tr inity and Creation we find a new and specifically Christian problematic of one and many. This means a new context also for the doctrine of ideas. Chapter Three examines the teaching of Dionysius the Areopagite about ' being-itself' , 'life-itself', 'wisdom-itself', realities which seem to mediate between the uncreated perfection of God and the participated perfections of creatures. Although basically a Christian theological thinker Dionysius is much indebted to the philosophy of Proclus. The dionysian vision sees the exemplars in terms of God's attributes, gifts and names and with it Christian theology begins to appropriate "the ideas are the divine mind". The philosophy of Aristotle plays a crucial role in the story of the divine ideas although the truth of this remained largely hidden to Latin thinkers until his philosophy and the commentaries of the peripatetics became available through Latin translations of Islamic thinkers. Chapter Four considers Aristotle's understanding of generation and production and his account of nous in Metaphysics A and De Anima III which were central to the development of middle platonist and neoplatonist solutions . His accounts of artificial making and of self-thinking thought were crucial in the development of both strands of the tradition to which Saint Thomas is heir: "the ideas are in the divine mind" and "the ideas are the divine mind". The aim of the second part is to examine the meaning and function of the notion of divine ideas in the theology of Saint Thomas himself. Chapter Five considers those texts-In I Sent 36, QD de VeT 3 and ST,I,15-in which he deals explicitly with the doctrine of divine ideas. He argues that there are ideas in God, that there is a plurality of ideas, and that whatever has being in any way has a corresponding idea in God. Against this background the disappearance of the ideas in SCG I is puzzling and deserves attention. The immediate context of Saint Thomas's treatment of the ideas is his account of the divine attribute of knowledge. Chapter Six shows how the notion is

14

INTRODUCTION

essentially related to doctrines which are at the heart of his theological synthesis: his teaching about the Word of God, about divine causality in creation and about divine providence. This underlines the necessary place which the ideas have for Saint Thomas and makes clear that the notion has a systematic function in his theology. Chapter Seven examines the extent to which Saint Thomas revised and corrected what he received from Aristotle and from the platonist tradition, from Augustine and from Dionysius. His final resolution of the problem of one and many is the context for examining the ongoing usefulness of the notion of divine ideas. In his work of re-shaping Christian theology and harnassing the philosophical resources, the most radical criterion for Saint Thomas is always and simply the fides catholica.

PART ONE

THE SOURCES

Leva dunque, lettore, a I'alte rote meco la vista, dritto a quella parte dove l'un mota e l'altro si percuote; e n comincia a vagheggiar ne I'arte di quel maestro che dentro a se I'ama, tanto che mai da lei l'occhio non parte. Dante Alighieri

Paradiso. Canto X

CHAPTER ONE

THE IDEAS IN THE DIVINE MIND

A. PLATO'S TIMAEUS

Plato [c.428-c.348 BCE] developed a theory of forms or ideas which he understood as being beyond the sensible and changeable world on a level that was ontologically more real than the world visible to physical eyes. In Phaedo l00A-lOID he explains the epistemological requirements which led to his postulation of the ideas. In passages such as Cratylus 439C-440B , Phaedrus 246 250, Symposium 210-212 and Republic V.478A-E. VI. VII.508C-517C the doctrine is fully formed and explains not only Imowledge but also degrees of being, value, beauty and goodness. The Parmenides seems to mark a crisis in Plato 's thinking. In it he subjects his own theory to a radical critique [l30BffJ. However, passages from later dialogues such as Sophist 248Eff, Statesman 285Eff, 269D. 300C, Philebus 26Aff, 59Aff and Laws 859E. 965Bff continue to use the theory, confirming its place in Plato's mature philosophy 1. Of greatest interest from our point of view is Plato's dialogue Timaeus, his account of the making of the universe which gives a good summary of his mature thought on the ideas. It has been argued that the cosmological function of the ideas, their function as archetypes in the making of sensible things, is the fina elaboration of his theory of ideas. Timaeus is the place where this elaboration takes place-, This dialogue was destined to playa key role in determining the popular understanding of Plato's philosophy for many centuries. It was one of the very few of his works which was in any way known to the Middle Ages thanks to a Latin translation by Calcidius and to summaries and fragments in Cicero and

1 A good introduction to the study of Plato is Cornelia J. De Vogel, Rethinking Plato and Platonism [Leiden, Brill, 1986], especially pp.3-155 on Plato-scholarship in the 20th century. For the gnoseological, axiological and cosmological functions of the platonic ideas see Joseph Moreau, 'The Platonic Idea and its ThreefoldFunction: A Synthesis', IPQ 9 (1969) 477-517. The distinction is useful though the various functions overlap: St Thomas, In XII Meta §§1368,1381,1427,1429,1432,1434-35,1643. That there was debate about the theory of ideas within Plato's dialogueswas unknown to the Latin middleages:Jean-Marie Paisse, 'Le platonisme, une philosophieproblematique', RMM74 (1969) 154-57. 2 Moreau, 'The PlatonicIdea', 477f,491,504,507.

18

CHAPfERONE

other Latin authors-, Through Philo and later Greek transmitters of philosophical ideas the teachings of the Timaeus were known to the Fathers of the Church and the dialogue is of great importance for the Christian platonism of the 12th century school of Chartres. Through translations and synopses of Timaeus as well as commentaries on it, many aspects of platonist philosophy were transmitted to the Middle Ages . At the same time the wisdom hymns of the Old Testament, particularly that of Job 28, speak of wisdom as originally autonomous, a heavenly, pre-existent and independent entity side by side with God and to which God alone had access. It is easy to see how biblical wisdom, spoken of in this way, might be brought into relation with the teachings of

Timaeuss. The Timaeus was often interpreted crudely, without regard to its mythological form or to Plato's own reticence to claim too much for what is said in it. In the summary that follows these two points are kept in mind>,

Timaeus 27C-47E: creation is a workofintelligence and care Has the world always existed without beginning or was it created with a beginning? It must have been created, says Plato, because all sensible reality is in a process of creation or becoming [yev£O'lC;]. What is created must have a cause though the creator of the universe [6 lhlJ.LlO'llpy6c;] is beyond our capacity to know or describe [27C-28C]. Plato refers throughout to the demiurge [ollJ.Ltoupy6c;] who is responsible for the order in creation and for making it as good as it can possibly be. The demiurge did this using the ideas as the paradigm or pattern for its work. The demiurge is also father [XlX't,;p], creator [0''llv8eiC;], maker [XOl1'J't11XT\V Be au Kat Ext 'tOtC; 'tE'tpaffi 'tT\v KOOIl0'l> llopq>T\v oouvat - 5.9.3.29-30] 10. Nous is the place of the forms or ideas [1.6.9.34-37; 5.1.7.30-31; 5.5 .6]. It is the source of all that comes after it and gives the formative principles [oi. A.oYOt] to soul as art gives reasons to the soul of the artist II. Aoyoc; is a seed, a unity which becomes multiplicity, a melody or concord in which vouc; and cXvaylCll [necessity] come together [see Timaeus and 3.7.11]. Everything is weaker as it advances towards matter and expands instead of abiding in unity. The beauty in art is better than the beauty in stone which is 9 See Plato , Symposium 2JOA-212A; RAmou, rrpa~l~ et 8eop,a chez Plotin [paris 1921; Rome 1972] p.16; Amou, Le Desirde Dieu; passim. and especially 193-229 and Rist, TheRoad to Reality, 53-65 . For the ascent of the soul see Enneads 13; 1.6; 2.9.16-18; 3.5; 5.1; 5.9; 6.9 and the great treatise 3.8/5.8/5.5/2.9 [chronologically treatises 30-33]. On the latter see Vincenzo Cilento, Plotino - PaideiaAmignostica. Ricostruzione d'un unicoscritto da Enneadi tus. V.B. V.5./l.9 [Firenze 1971] and Schwyzer, RE 506.59 ; 529.22ff. 10 Brehier, Enneades, ad loc., notes that the expression jLopCPTtv Sotlval often used by Plotinus may be the origin of Avicenna's notion of a datorformarum, an hypostasis immediately superior to matter . Plotinus usually assigns the functions of the demiurge to nous but sometimes to soul or a part of soul: see 5.1.10.30-31 and CI-ll-GEMP, 101. 11 Enneads 2.4.12; 2.9 .4; 3.5.9; 3.7.11; 3.8 .1-5; 3.9.1; 3.9.6; 4.3.9; 4.3 .11; 5.8.1. See Armstrong, Loeb III, pAlO, n.1; Brehier, The Philosophy of Plotinus, 172-73 and J.Moreau, 'Plotin et la tradition hellenique' • RevlntPllil 24 (1970) n.92, 174. For the difficult notion of ').Jyyoc, in Plotinus' philosophy, see Rist, TheRoad to Reality, pp.84-102.

52

QIAPfERlWO

derived from that prior beauty through the mind of the craftsman [5.8.1]. Art imitates nature which is itself an imitation although art reaches beyond nature to the A.Oy01 from which nature also derives [5.8.1-3; 5.9 .5.37ff] 12. Soul is an architect which possesses A.Oy01 and which makes according to forms [eUhll. From 'form within' soul brings about 'form without' [1.6.3-4] and gives to what comes after it what it receives from nous. Soul remembers the intelligibles [Ta VOTJTa], thinks them and is near them. It knows them by being them even if this is in "a rather dim way" [4.6.3]. Nous is the demiurge [5.1.8.6]13 who makes according to the abiding pattern it has in itself [TO EV cxmco 7tcxp and neoplatonism always sought a reconciliation of these two. Porphyry refused to follow Plotinus in rejecting the categories of Aristotle for those of Plat053. Augustine, following Porphyry's Concordance, says that Plato and Aristotle teach the one philosophy54. Plotinus himself interprets Plato with an eye on Aristotle [see, for exampie, 6.7.30]. Peripatetic positions are subjected to close scrutiny in the Enneads . Some aristotelian solutions are accepted although the peripatetics and the stoics usually consitute ''the opposition" in the debates of Plotinus. Porphyry says that Aristotle's Metaphysics is practically entirely condensed in the Enneads [VP 14] and the Nichomachean Ethics and De Anima are of great importance also. Plotinus depends on Aristotle in discussing the SOUl55, happiness's and the good'", the system of the heavens 58 and the meaning of matter", time, number and eternityw, intelligence and intellectual principlesst, the categories of

51 MiIller, 'Orientalisches?', 70; Heinemann. 'Ammonios Sakkas', 10.13,16. 26; Henry, Plotin et l'Occident, 2; Wallis, Neoplatonism, 23ff; Schwyzer, RE 478 and Armstrong , 'The Background', p.414 [comment ofR.Harder]. Wolfson suggests that Ammonius would have pre sented Plotinus with a paganised version of a Christian account of the ideas: 'Extradeical and Intradeicallnterpretations'. pp.16-17. 52 Schwyzer, RE 524 .36-38; 524.58ff; Szlezak, Platon und Aristoteles, deals with the sources ofPlotinus' thought on pp.14-51 and at p.19, n.31 points out the predominance of references to and citations of Plato over those of Aristotle [Henry-Schwyzer: Plotini Opera Ill, IndexFontium]. Szlezak does not accept that Plotinus believed in the compatibility of Plato and Aristotle. See also Arnou, Le Desir de Dieu, 283f. 53 Enneads 6.1-3. Schwyzer, RE 582.30-32; Wallis, Neoplatonism.23-25. 54 ContraAcademicos 3.42. See R.Walzer, 'Porphyry and the Arabic Tradition ', Entretiens Hardt XII (1965) pp.285,288-89. 55 Compare EnneadsI.l.l ; 1.1.4 and 4.7.2 with De Anima 408bl-29 and 412317-28; Enneads6.7.4 with Metaphysics 1029bl -1030a14. 56 Compare Enneads 1.4.1; 1.5.1 and 1.5.4 with Nicomachean Ethics I098b21 ; 1100al01101311 and 1153blO-12. 57 Compare Enneads 1.7.1; 6.7.19 and 6.7.27 with Nicomachean Ethics 1177aI2-17; 1094a1-4; 1098a16-17; 1174a6-8. 58 Compare Enneads 2.1.2 with De Caelo 270blff and Meteorologica 355a13-15; Enneads 2.2.1 with De Anima 407a6-bl2 and De Caelo 279a17-18 and 284a27-35. There may also be Aristotelian influence in Enneads 3.2.3.3Off. 59 Compare Enneads 1.8.11; 2.4.1; 2.4.6-7 and 2.4.14 with Physics 192a2-33 and Metaphysics 988a27f and 1069b20-23. 60 Compare Enneads 3.7.4.43-44; 3.7.6.22-36; 3.7.9 and 3.7.12-13 with Physics 217b-224a and De Caelo 279a25-28; Enneads 6.2.10 with Metaphysics 1088a6. 61 Compare Enneads 5.1.9 with Metaphysics 1072a26; -b20 and 1073a32-34; Enneads 5.3 especially 5.3 .13.14 with Metaphysics 1072b20 and 1074bI5-75a11 especially 1074b33; Enneads 5.5.1 with Metaphysics A.7 [1072b24-30] and A.9 [1074bI8-21] ; Enneads 5.5.2.14 with Metaphysics 1074bI7; Enneads 5.6.6 with De Anima 412; Enneads 5.4.2; 5.9.5 and 6.6.6 with De Anima 43031-5 and 431bl7 but Enneads 6.7.37 with Metaphysics 1074b17-35. Wallis, Neoplaionism, p.5 lists the relevant aristotelian texts as De Anima III.2 [425bI2ff]; III.4 [429b26ff] and Metaphysics A.9 [1074b33ff]. See also Armstrong. Loeb V. p.149. n.I ; pp.212f, n.2 and De Anima 11.5 [417b7].

62

OIAPfERlWO

being 62, free will 63 and the divine64. Peripatetic thinkers such as Aspasius, Adrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias were studied in the school of Plotinus

[VP 14]65. The thought of Aristotle is a key factor in the development of Plotinus' doctrine of nous». In Enneads 5.1.8-9 Aristotle is the only philosopher after Plato to be mentioned in regard to knowledge of the intelligible world. Plotinus simply comments that Aristotle understood it differently to Plato [5.1.9.1 1]67. Plotinus' own account of nous is in conscious opposition to Aristotle's in Enneads 5.1.9; 5.5.1 and 6.7.37-42. In his understanding of intellect's selfknowing Plotinus uses Aristotle's thought as relayed through the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisiasw, Plotinus describes nous as "form of forms" [£too1tEPOOO10V apXTJ Kal oooia Kal ainov.

1HE VISION OFDIONYSIUS oinc ovta~]"IO. Elsewhere he writes about "the shining well-spring of all.. single and simple, forever the same and forever overflowing .. that Light which forever unfolds and bestows its gifts upon all beings .. no strange gods were in command here"!' . In one sense these auto-expressions are used divinely and causally [Selic& Xp6vov-DN X.3 (940A)]. To call God peace is to refer to the unity he enjoys far beyond all things-'', Holiness, royalty, dominion and deity exist transcendently and simply in God [DN XII.3 (969CD-972A)]. God is one or perfect because, containing all things, he reaches beyond them?', But for Dionysius this transcendent God is the cause and principle of all that is and of the qualities of all things. Though not one of the many, this One pre-

13 De ldeis Divinis, 82. On a twofold meaning of per se, as cause or subsistence, and as ratio universalis , see op.cit, p.83 14 See ON I.1 (588B) : Eltb:Elva; 1.5 (593C) : auto liE OMEV ~ ltCtvtWV ultEpouoi~ E~l1Pll/lEVOV; IV.1 (693B) : c':upopi~oualV; IV.16 (713C) : lXaxE't~ al'tia; also V.8 (824AB); VII .2 (869BC) ; XII .4 (972B) . For Eltb:Elva tils oUai~ see P1alo, Republic 509B. Plotinus also uses terms prefixed by UltEP-: Schwyzer, RE 52531-34. See also Lilla, 'Introduzione", 547f. IS ON V.l (816B) : it ultl;;pOUalov oooia UltEPOUGl~' Ep IV (I072A-C) speaks of Jesus as truly God, transcending all, a ' being beyond being' . On God as 'not being' , avoool~ or /lit lSv, see ON I.1 (588B) ; IV.3 (697A) ; IV.7 (704B) ; IV.18 (716A) ; IV.19 (716A) and CH IV.l (1770) and pp.107-09 below . Cf Lilla, 'Introduzione', p.548 , n.76; Corsini,lliratiato, pp.81, n.12, 108, 109 (a superabundance), 110 and Gersh, From Iamblichus, p.158 and 205-06,n.9. 16 ON V.2 (816C): autoultEpouoiov. a CH 11.3 (14OC). 17 ON VI.1 (856B): it UltEP ~witv it 9Eia ~Wt1 ; ON VII.l (865B): UltEP ltIXaav coeiev: ON VII.l (868A) : it UltEpaocp~ .. altla. 18 ON VII.2 (869A): tTlltCtvtWV E~l1PllJ1.EV1] yvoxm; VIII.l (889C) : E~l1PllJ1.EVll and VIII. 1 (889D) : UltEP£XWV. altElpOOuva/l~. 19 ON IX.6 (913CD) . CfThomas, In I Sent 48,1,1 ad 4; Corsini, ll traitato ; pp.45,151ff. 20 ON XI.1 (949B): lil· UltEpjlOA.t1V tTls ltCtvta UltEPEXOuallS tvcOOE~ . 21 ON XIII .1 (977B) : aUtOtEA.ES .. Kal ~ UltEptEA.ES Kata to ltCXvtWV illtEptxov and ~ ltCtvta tv tautCfl ltpoEXOV. On aUtOtEA.ES see Gersh, From lamblichus, 182-83 and Thivierge,

n

Le Commentaire , 53-67.

TIlE VISION OF DIONYSIUS

99

contains all things, the many who participate in him22• All that exists depends totally on God, for causality is "the most divine quality'c; lXyaSo't'l1't'oc; uxap~lC;] God is the cause of all beings by the very fact of his existences", God's goodness explains the procession of creatures from God which supplies us with the names of God drawn from the qualities of creatures-'', The emanation [xp608oc;]29 of God is a bounteousact which includes the incarnation as God's clearest manifestation". The purpose of ON is to celebrate as far as is possible the emanation of the absolute divine essence into the universe of things" . In his parndoxical style Oionysius writes as folIows about God's transcendance and causality: .. scripture itselfasserts that Godis dissimilar and thathe is not to be compared withanything, thathe is different from everything and,stranger yet,thatthereis noneat alI like him. Nevertheless words of this sortdo not contradict the simi1arity of things to him, forthe verysame things are both similar anddissimilar to God[C5lLolll SEep Kill eXv6lLOlll]. Theyare similar to himto the extentthat they sharewhatcannot be shared [Kll'teX 't'l1V Ev&ExolL£VllV 'tou eXlLllL£'tOll lLilLlllJlV]. 22 DN 1.7 (597A): EV EaUtft tCx ISvta ltpoEiA,1]IpE. See DN II.ll (649C); IV.7 (704A); V.8 (824B); VI.3 (8518); VII.2 (868D-869C: on God's knowledge); VIII.2 (889D); VIII.6 (893C); IX.4 (9I2C); IX.10 (917A) and XIII.2 (977C-980A), especially OUK fan to ltaV'tCl>V altlov ~v trov ltOA,A.roV ~v (977C). 23 DN IV.21 (724A): ltEpl auto to ltaV'tCl>V 9Et6tatov tTtv altiav. God is cause and cause of all: Corsini, 11 trauato, p.63,n.44and p.14I, withreferences. 24DN 1.3(589B);II.II (649B). See Lilla, 'Introduzione", 548-49. 25 DN 1.7(596CD-597A). See also DN V.1O (825BC). 26 DN 1.4 (589D); II.l (637C); II.ll (649B); IV.10 (7~B) ; IX.5 (913B); XIII.3 (98IA). 27 DN 1.5 (593C): aut/?! t/?! Elvat ltavtCl>v EO'tl trov 1SV'tCl>v altia. See CH IV.I (1770) : 'the being of all is the deity beyond being' and des Places, 'La theologie negative', p.89 and p.92,n.66. 28 DN 1.6 (596A). See also DN 1.5(593CD): tTtv Cxya9cxpxIKTtv tije; 9EapXiac; ltp6vOlavEK ltaV'tCl>v trov alttatrov U/LVlltEOV. Cf Thivierge, Le Commentaire, 67-81. 29 DN II.5 (64ID). Dionysius uses the term lto60liocfor the procession of persons in God and for the procession of creaturesfrom God: DN 1.4(589D-592B); VII.3 (869D-872B); MT 3 (1033A-D). CfThomas' use of processio in STJJ.7 and 44 and pp.l36-38 below. 30 DN 1.4 (592A-B) and II.6 (644C-D). Balthasar writes: 'the union of the world and God, which is already philosophically the only possiblejustification of its multiplicity and its existence' is brought to completion preciselyin the Incarnation, the efficacy of which is continued in the sacraments, above all in the eucharist' [The Glory of the Lord, p.17?]. 31 DN V.1 (816B): tTtv ouatoltotOV £ie; tCx ISvta ltavta tije; 9EapXtKijc; oualapxiac; ltp60liov u/Lvijaat. While not an inventionof Dionysiushe makes the term 9EapXtK6e; his own. It means of or belonging to the Godhead[9Eapxiaj, the source or principle of deity. Dionysius uses it very frequently and in many contexts. Here it refers to the being or substance of God. For the full range of his use of it see Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v. 9EaPXtKOn- See also Gersh, From Iamblichus, pp.161,165. 171-72,179,182.

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They are dissimilar to him in that as effects they fall so very far shortof their Cause andareinfinitely andincomparably subordinate to him32.

4. DivineNames, Chapter II The two senses in whichthe a\rro-expressions are used characterise all theologicallanguage. Dionysius says that theology uses the divine names either in an undifferentiated [itVroJ.1EV~] way, "without distinctions" and so referring to God in his simple and absolute transcendence, or in a differentiated [OtalC£lCptJ.1EV~] way, "with distinctions" and so referringto God as Trinity or as Creator and Redeemers', This is a distinction within cataphatic theology, it seems. All the divine names, in their "true and divine significance", apply to the entire Godheadts. Undifferentiated names ['t''t6'tTl~], a oneness above unity [i) U1tEP £vapx1.av Ev6'tTl~], nameless and full of names ['to VOOU~EV(J) ~iCX]II2. As human thought [6 etv8p', 148 Guthrie, pp3Z3-27. See De An HI.S [430310,13]. 149 Booth, 'St Augustine's ', pp.l11-32; Ross, pp.1S3,182-83 and Guthrie, pp.327-30. ISO Booth, 'St Augustine's ', pp.l07,121. See pp.I63,16S above. 151 Booth, 'StAugustine's ', p.122, referring to De An III.4[429bS-1O]. 152 Booth, 'St Augustine's ', p.l27, and see the summary onpp.128-32. 153 Booth, 'St Augustine's ', pp.70,96. See atpage 164 above, with note 106. 154 Ross, pp.132-33,146-S3. Chen refers to Aristotle's "intellectual realism", 'Aristotle's Analysis' , p.139,n.41, whereas Booth, 'St Augustine's ', pp.1l4,122, says that ~ "creares'tvonrov making possible their subsequent identification.

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It is not possible here to enter further into these discussions. It remains for us to note how these texts of Aristotle on intelligence might be related to the doctrine of the divine ideas. The second part of this chapter will show how they were, in fact, so related by peripatetic philosophers. The God of Aristotle and the Divine Ideas: II W.K.e.Guthrie speaks of Aristotle's

extraordinary conception of the Divine Intellect which is the ultimate cause of the universe, while remaining completely indifferent to its existence or non-exis tencel55. Having no doctrine of creation, Aristotle believes that being as being has no origin. What has an origin and requires explanation is the intelligibility and continuity of the universe. The prime mover is its final cause but not its master and the world remains unknown to him who is pure intelligibility. In any case there are things it is better not to know, says Aristotle! His god anchors the intelligibility and order of a world which becomes within the eternal givenness of its being. He is its model rather than its goal and the exemplar but not the cause of its being. This god is not in any sense will or power, and because he is his own end it would be absurd to speak of love in relation to him. There is no question of him exerting himself and taking thought as Plato's mythical demiurge does and in this respect the god of Aristotle is closer to the One of neoplatonism 156. Aristotle does not regard the ideas as the object of God's thought. For Plato the ideas transcend the divine mind whereas for Aristotle God does not think of them at a1l 157 . The ultimate principle of Metaphysics A [VOTlO"tC; voTtcrec.oc; VOTlcrtC;] is normally taken as a divine thinking intent on nothing but itself, but Aristotle's identification of VOTl'teX with YoU'. For Christians John of Scythopolis [fl. c.530 CEl defended the orthodoxy of Dionysius and for philosophers he clarified the affinities of Dionysius with Plato. Dionysius follows Plato in calling the forms 1tO:p', 27(1977) 76. 222 CHLGEMP, p.48I. 223 Booth, AAOICf, pp.60-61 and 'John Philoponos', p.409. 224 Booth, AAOICf, pp.63,89-94 and 'John Philoponos' , p.410: 'Through the standing which he gave to radical aristotelian ontology, John Philoponos had ensured that it would be transmitted ultimately toIbn Sina and, especially, Ibn Rushd' . See also CHLGEMP, 648-51. 225 CHLGEMP, pp.473-77, referring especially to PG 4.329D3-6. See Gersh, From lamhlichus, pp.264-66; Balthasar, 'Das Scholienwerk' , p35 and Chapter Three , pp.1l1-12,13536,144 with note 288 above on the ideas as 'paradigms' and 'willings' for Dionysius and his school. 226 CHLGEMP, pp.485-9 I.

THE ARISTOTEUAN TRADmON

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eastern ones. It was during this period that many of Aristotle's works were translated into Syriac and Arabic. The 9th century saw a revival of scholarship in both Arab and Byzantine empires but it was not until the 13th century that many of the works of Aristotle became available in Latin translation-t", Aristotle's logical works were already known through Boethius and translations of Porphyry. There was significant if fragmentary knowledge of Aristotle through writers and doxographers like CiceroZ28 and from the debates of the neoplatonic commentators. But the 13th century recovery of Aristotle in the West clarified many issues in the history of philosophy while raising fundamental questions about the way in which that history had been understood until then. Saint Albert the Great was the enthusiastic leader of this fresh attempt to integrate the philosophy of Aristotle with Christian theology. Albert the Great [c.1200 - 1280]229 Albert's range of interests recalls that of Aristotle whose works he began to read while still a young man. Later he studied the new Aristotle with the Islamic commentaries and he composed his own commentaries on Aristotle between 1250 and 1270. He lectured against 'Averroism' but defended the study of Aristotle, arguing that philosophers must be met with philosophical arguments and not with censures. For Albert perfection in philosophy meant knowing both Plato and Aristotle. Recent study of Albert's followers in the German Dominican school has highlighted the platonist affinities of his teaching 23o• Of particular importance was Eriugena whom Albert knew through the Dionysian corpus available at Paris in

227 Huby, 'The Transmission of Aristotle's Writings', pp.251-57. The table she gives on p.255 is a striking illustration of the complexity of the question. She concludes that 'the libraries in Rome probably perished completely .. some copies from Athens may have found their way to Constantinople .. the tradition of Alexandria was continued by the Arabs. But the ances tor, more or less immediate, of most of our extant manuscripts of Aristotle must be manuscripts rediscovered in Constantinople in the ninth century or later' (p.254) . On the Syrian peripatetics see Booth, AAOICT, pp.61-65 and see also AAOICT, pp.I56-62. 228 Ross, p.8 and Guthrie , pp.73-82. In Cicero's time the writings of Aristotle became available at Rome and he comments on Aristotle 's style and method [Guthrie, pp.53-59,61 ,63]. For Augustine and Aristotle see Booth, 'St Augustine's ', pp.70-1 04 and Merlan, Monopsychism , pp.59.(jl,TI-81,88-90. 229 For biography and bibliography: Simon Tugwell OP, Albert and Thomas : Selected Writings [paulist Press, New York : 1988] [= Tugwell], 1-129. See also James AWeisheipl OP, 'Albertus Magnus and the Oxford Platonists' ,PACPA 32 (1958) 124-39. 230 Albert on Plato and Aristotle: Liber I Metaphysicorum, Tr .V, cap.XV [Borgnet VI, pp.l11-13] and Liber Xl 1= A} Metaphysicorum, Tr .I1I, cap.VII [Borgnet VI, pp.685-87]. See Klibansky, Continuity, pp.61-62; Booth , AAOICT, pp.I63-204 and Tugwell, pp.38-39. Albert knew the Moerbeke translation of Proclus' Elements of Theology but only his Summa Theologiae is influenced by it: R.Kaiser, ' Die Benutzung proklischer Schriften durch Albert den Grossen', Arch.Gesch.Philos. 45 (1963) 1-22. On the 'German Dominican school' see Imbach, 'Le (neo-jplatonisme medieval', 427-48.

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the 13th century. Albert uses eriugenian teachings throughout his career and also composed his own commentaries on CA 231. For Albert the affirmative naming of God is based on the analogy between God and creatures which is that of exemplar and image232• He says of human knowledge of God: Intellectus creatus secundum naturalia sua non habet proportionem ad cognoscendum Deum; secundum tamen quod iuvatur per illuminationes sive theophanias descendentes a Deo, efficitur proportionatum, non quidem ad videndum quid est Deus, sed ad videndumipsum attingendo substantiam ejus secundum quod ipse se ostenditsub tali vel tali ratione233 .

Albert's "bold and generous eclecticism" 234 Albert's account of how intellect functions and how it comes to know God is "Aristotelian with a strong dose of Neoplatonism, both Dionysian and Islamic" (Tugwell). On the one hand the mind acquires knowledge from things and only knows itself by becoming an object of understanding to itself. On the other hand the light of the agent intellect must be directed by the light of the uncreated intellect. The human intellect is the first image in space and time of the light of the first cause and is therefore a likeness of everything that comes into being through that light. It enfolds all things because it is both an image of the first cause and joined to space and time. From its own 'self-possession' the human intellect may ascend from its own light to the light of intelligence and from there to God 's intellect23s • This combination of aristotelian and neoplatonist themes is very clear in Albert's Commentary on Metaphysics A236 where he explains the production and coherence of things in terms of an "irradiation" of form from the first cause through different levels of intelligence. The view that form is only evoked

231 Tugwell, pp.39-95,116-29; Dondaine, Le Corpus Dionysien, pp.84-89,125-28,137-39; Clll-GEMP, p.532; Sheldon-Williams, 'Eriugena and Citeaux', p.78 and Francis Ruello, 'Le Commentaire du Divinis Nominibus de Denys par Albert Ie Grand: Problemes de methode' , Archde Phil 43 (1980)589-613. 232 Ruello, 'Le Commentairedu Divinis Nominibus '; pp.599, 603 referring to Albert, In de Div Nom 1.57. See also Albert, In de Div Nom 1.1; 1.3; 11.63 and In I Sent 36, A, a.3 [Borgnet XXVI, pp.208-11]. 233 Albert, In de Div Nom 1.21 [CologneEdition XXXVII, pp.IO-II]. See Tugwell, p.85; Dondaine, Le Corpus Dionysien, p.127,n.I58 and Ruello, ' Le Commentaire du Divinis Nominibus", pp.6OOfT. 234 Booth,AAOICT, p.204. 23S Tugwell, pp.55-62, gives the relevant texts from Albert. See Avicenna's account of in telligences [p.181 above] and Albert, Liber Xl 1= Al Metaphysicorum , Tr.I, cap.IX [Borgnet VI, pp.595-98]; r-n. cap.XI [pp.628-30] and Tr.III, cap.I-II [pp.676-SO]. 236 LiberXl 1= Al Metaphysicorum [BorgnetVI, pp.581-687]. For its dating see Weisheipl, 'Albertus Magnus' , pp.I28-29. On medieval translationsof Aristotle's Metaphysics see Jacob Teicher, 'Alberto Magno e it CommentoMedio di Averroe sulla 'Metafisica", SIFC 11 (1934) 201-16.

TIlE ARISTOTEUAN lRADmON

189

[educitur] from potency to act by an appropriate moving cause is Aristotel ians" as is the view that the formative power is in things sicut ars in intellectu artificiS238• This is true of those higher intelligences which surround [ambit] the forms as well as of the human craftsman whose intellect is the form and species of what he makes. It is true also of the formative power of the seed pre-containing its species membrorum which is, he says, how Plato understood the idea or universal: it is ante res et praehabet fonnas eorumm. The view that the first mover moves as light illuminates or as heat heats is clearly neoplatonicsw. But Albert says that the causality of the first cause is more like this than it is like the sculptor making: per essentiam propriam movet primus motor, et ipse est forma omnium eorum quae sunt per ipsum unus et simplexindivisibilis, sicut virtus formativain semine per essentiam est formaomnium membrorum in corporequae intus et extra facit241. He often uses the image of the sun whose one and indivisible light is more divided the further from its source it is. It is the same, he says, with the irradiatio formarum through the intelligencesw', His account of the chain of intelligences is clearly dependent on Avicenna243, down to the last intelligence which is the agent intellect enlightening and acting upon human souls 244• The Peripatetics confine themselves to what can be proven by reason and so do not go beyond the first mover, says Albert245• But there is an irradiation of the superior light over the inferior of which the philosophers do not speak since it requires other principles, of which they were unaware, drawn from the revelation of the spirit and religious faith 246•

Divine Knowledge and the Ideas The human intellect depends for its being [secundum esse] on the thing known. The intellect of the separated substance is causa rei and so the thing known de237

Liber XI f= Al Metaphysicorum Tr.I , cap.vm [Borgnet VI, pp.592-95] . For Averroes

see pp.I82-85 above.

238 Liber XI f= Al Metaphysicorum, Tr.I, cap.!X [Borgnet VI, p.598b] , on Meta,\3 [1070326-30], and Tr.I, capXI [Borgnet VI, p.60Sa]. 239 Liber XI f= A] Metaphysicorum, Tr.II, cap.vm [Borgnet VI, pp.624b-625a]. See also capXI fpp.629a-630a] and capXII fp.632a]. 240 LiberXI f= Al Metaphysicorum, Tr.II, cap.I [Borgnet VI, pp. 610b-{j12b]. 241 Liber XI f= Al Metaphysicorum, Tr .II, cap.1I [Borgnet VI, p.613a-b] and cap .VI fp.620a -b]. Note cap .VI fp.620a] : the first substance, essentialiter agens .. expandit se per omnes intellectuales intellectus . Booth describes Albert's system as 'logico-emanationist' : AAOICf, pp.I63-SO. 242 Liber XI f= Al Metaphysicorum, Tr.II , capXIX [Borgnet VI, p.641b] and cap.XXI fp.64Sa]. 243 Liber XI f= AI Metaphysicorum, Tr .II, cap.XX [Borgnet VI, pp.643a-644b]. See also cap.XXI-XXV fpp.644-53]. 244 LiberXI f= Al Metaphysicorum, Tr.III, cap.VI [Borgnet VI, p.684b]. 245 LiberXI f= Al Metaphysicorum, Tr.II, cap.Xll [Borgnet VI, p.632b]: ante primum mo-

toremnihil esseponebant. 246 LiberXI f= Al Metaphysicorum, Tr.II, cap.XXI [Borgnet VI, pp.645b-646a].

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pends on it sicut artijiciata dependent ad intellectum artificis. In separated substances intellectus, id quod intelligitur and ipsa actio intellectus quae intelligentia vocatur are all one. Human intelligence when it is actually knowing achieves a unity of intellectus and id quod intelligitur but the complete unity just described is not found there 247 • In knowing himself God knows he is the cause of all things and so knows all things. Neither angelic nor human knowledge are univocal with the knowledge of the Creator but they imitate it as far as they can 248 • God's knowledge is per seipsum and is not drawn from things. Therefore it is not particular and is always actual and active for the only potency in God is potentia activa , To the objection that to know by species or ideas renders knowledge habitual Albert replies that this is so only when they actualise knowledge which is not the case with divine knowledge 249• Intelligence is always plena formis but this does not make it composite because it pre-contains things virtually, as a principle or cause. Nor are the forms added to intelligence since ipsa essentia ejus est forma omnium illorum29J• He describes the first substance as: fontalis plenitudo omnium formarum quae fluunt ab ipso, sicut intellectus artificis est fODS formarum artificialium.

The parallel is not complete because the craftsman's intellect is not substantially the form of what he makes whereas the divine intellect is. There idem est

intellectus intelligens, et mediumquo intelligit quod est speciessuiipsius, et res intellecta. What the divine intellect contemplates is itself, says Albert the disciple of Aristotles". In his commentary on Dionysius' Mystical Theology Albert says that God not only has the idea of everything but that God is the idea of everything. A human craftsman may have the idea of the knife but he is not that idea. Things like asses and stones imitate God and are formed by God's idea but they do not pre-exist in God. The names of such things are predicated causally but not es sentially of God. Things like goodness and wisdom imitate God as image or likeness and pre-exist primarily in God. The names of such things are predicated essentially and causally of God. The distinction corresponds to that between the Augustinian notion of the rationes ideales and the Dionysian notion Al Metaphysicorum, Tr.Il, cap.XXX [Borgnet VI, pp.66Ob-66la). Albert, In I Sent 35. A. a.I [Borgnet XXVI. pp.176-77] and 36. A, a5 [pp.212-13]. St Thomas explicitly says scientiaanalogice dicitur de Deo et creatura. While this is in the background in Albert [especially ad 1 and ad 3 to 35.A.a I]. he never makes it explicit. For Albert' s commentary on In I Sent 35-36 see Borgnet XXVI, pp.l74-225. 249 In I Senl35, A, 3.2 [pp.178-82]. 250 Liber XI (= Al Metapbysicorum; Tr.Il, cap.XIX [Borgnet VI. p.64lb] and cap.XXI [p.645a). 251 Liber XI (= Al Metaphysicorum , Tr .ll, cap.VII [Borgnet VI. p.62Ib). Of course God is not the essential form of anything as Albert makes clear in Summa theologiae 1.20 [Borgnet XXXI. pp.139-42). 247 LiberXI (= 248

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of ideas as exemplar perfections. Albert does not advert to this but simply refers once more to Aristotle's comments about the form pre-existing in the soul of the artificer 252• There must be ideas in the divine mind says Albert unless we want to say that God creates the world without the ratio by which he knows it. The argument is that of Augustine in De Div Qq LXXXlII.46. The ideas do not introduce multiplicity into God since in God the relationship [respectus] with creatures is secundum rationem and is simply one although it signifies a multiplicitytv. Properly speaking ideas belong to the practical intellect and are many from the manifold relationship to God of the things he creates: ex relatione ideatorum ad ipsumt», In one sense there is only one idea which is identical with the divine essence and the divine intellect, and it is better to speak of 'the idea of many things' than to speak of 'many ideas'. Certainly 'the saints' prefer to speak of pluralitas than of plures in relation to the ideas 255• Sapientia, ars, verbum and scientia belong more to the one who is wise, who speaks, etc., and so are used of God only in the singular whereas idea,ratio,paradigma and exemplar consignify the plurality of created things 256• Drawing on philosophical and theological sources Albert thus sets down the elements of the problematic concerning ideas in God as it was at the time of Saint Thomas. Albert's combination of Aristotle and Dionysius in developing the augustinian tradition of the ideas in God was to bear much fruit in the synthesis of his greatest student. As Albert speaks of them , the rationes in God have a degree of independence from each other and in relation to creation. He says that they pre-exist in God sicut universale praehabens rem257 and he accepts the principle of pluralised emanations. For him esse is the proper effect of God because God alone causes it and it serves as a subject for the perfections added by other agents. By contrast Saint Thomas harmonises being and creation perfectly, esse is God 's proper effect because God's nature is to exist, God's perfectly simple essence contains all the rationes in itself and all perfections are unified in the all-embracing communication of esse from God 258 • 252 Albert, De Mystica Theologia , Cap.I, §3 [Borgnet XIV, p.825] referring to Aristotle, Meta Z.7 [1032bI2-14]. 253 In I Sent 35 , E, a.7 [pp.189-91]. See Albert, Summa theologiae, 11.4.1 , a.l, part.iv ; a.2 [Borgnet XXXII , p.70-77]. 254 In I Sent 35,E,a.8 [p.192]. See Albert, Summa theologiae, 1.55.1-11 [Borgnet XXXI , pp.554-66] : as exemplaria rerum in mentedivina the ideas are primordiales et jontales causae creatorum but, as Augustine says, rationes omnium creatorum sunt idemquod ipsa mens divina [p.561]. Albert refers to Augustine's comment quidquidin Deo est, Deusest [p.563]. 255 In I Sent 35,E ,a.9 [pp.I92-95]. See also 36,A,a.3 [pp.208-11] ; 36 ,B,a.7 [pp.216-18] and 36 ,C,a8 [pp.2l8-20]. 256 In I Sent 35,F ,a.14 [pp.202-03]. 257 In de Div Nom [Cologne Edition XXXVII, p.324b]. See Booth, AAOICT, p.235. 258 See Edward Booth, 'Conciliazioni Ontologiche delle Tradizioni Platonica e Aristotelica in Sant'Alberto e San Tommaso', in Sant'Alberto Magno. L'uomo e il pensatore [Studia Universitatis S.Thomae in Urbe 15. Massimo , Milano 1982], pp.67-68 ; AAOICT, pp.I99204,229,231-36 and Leo Sweeney SI, 'The Meaning of Esse in Albert the Great's texts on ere-

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Besides the texts of Augustine and Dionysius, the entire range of authors used by Saint Thomas dealt with the question of divine intelligence and divine ideas. For many of these authors Aristotle is their most important source whether directly or indirectly through developments of his thought in the peripatetic and neoplatonist commentators. But religious thinkers, Islamic and Christian, were aware of serious limitations in Aristotle's views, particularly in regard to God's knowledge of created things and his providential care for them. In that context the notion of ideas in the mind of God continued to be of importance, the philosophical facilities for this being found either in pagan neoplatonist attempts to reconcile Plato and Aristotle or in Christian neoplatonist corrections introduced by, for example, Dionysius. Aristotle's view of the form in the soul of the artisan was more and more confidently applied to God who for Muslim and Christian alike is the creator and Lord of all things. It is not therefore correct to say that Saint Thomas dealt with the divine ideas only because Augustine did. All that he was taught and all that he read agreed that this was an essential part of the doctrine of God as creator. As we shall see in the second part of this work, Saint Thomas devoted much time and energy towards developing a proper understanding of it

ation in Summa de Creaturis and Scripta super Sententias', in Albert the Great. Commemorative Essays, edited by F.P.Kovach andR.W.Shahan [University of Oklahoma Press 19801,pp.91-92,94.

PART TWO

THE SYNTHESIS

... multum est delectabile scire scientiam omnium rerum, quae in mundo sunt; et ideo videre dispositionem divinae providentiae est maxime delectabile. Thomas Aquinas

In Psalmos Davidis Expositio XXVI,3

CHAPTER FIVE DIVINE KNOWLEDGEAND DIVINE IDEAS The second part of this work is concerned with Saint Thomas' understanding and use of the notion of ideas in Godt. In dealing with the divine attribute of I The standard bibliography for Thomas Aquinas is Rassegna di Letteratura Tomist ica [formerly Bulletin Thomiste] , in progress. For the works of Saint Thomas and their dating see P.Synave OP, 'Le Catalogue Officiel des Oeuvres de S.Thomas d' Aquin' , AHDLMA 3 (1928) 25-103 ; I.T.Eschmann , 'A Catalogue of St Thomas's Works: Bibliographical Notes', in E.Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aqu inas [New York 1956], 381-439; J.A.Weisheipl OP, Friar Thomas d'Aquino. His Life , Thought and Works [Oxford 1975. Washington 19832, with Corrigenda and Addenda], pp.355405; Cornelio Fabro, Introduzione a San Tommaso [Milano 1983] pp.20,47-67 and RLT XVIII, n.77, pp.4345. On the progress of the Leonine Edition see ' Les editions actuelles des oeuvres de S.Thomas', BT (1927-28) pp.[225]-[228]; BT (1930) pp.[63]-[64]; C.Vansteenkiste OP, 'L' edizione Leonina delle Opere di S.Tommaso', DTP 76 (1973) 365-84; Pierre-M. de Contenson, ' Principles, Methods and Problems of the Critical Edition of the Works of Saint Thomas as presented in the 'Leonine Edition", Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 36 (1974) 342-Q4; Pierre-M de Contenson, 'Documents sur les origines et les premieres annees de la Commission Leonine' , Toronto Studies 11,331-388; Fernand van Steenberghen, ' L' edition leonine des oeuvres de saint Thomas', RPL 72 (1974) 510; ' La Commission Leonine pour l'~dition des oeuvres de S.Thomas d'Aquin", Analecta S.O.P. 47 (1983) 72-83. On the question of divine ideas in Saini Thomas : Engelbertus Antonius Josephus Vigener, De ldeis Divinis, Commentaiio Philosophica etc. [Miinster. Ex typographia Josephi Krick: MDCCCLXIX]; Alfonso Maria Vespignani, Dell 'esemplarismo divino. Saggio teoretico secondo i principi scientifici dell 'Aquinate [parma 1887] [written in response to criticisms of Rosmini directed against St Thomas]; Victor Lipperheide, Thomas von Aquino und die platonische ldeenlehre. Eine kritische Abhandlung von Dr.Victor Lipperheide [M.Rieger'sche Universitats-Buchhandlung: Munchen 1890]; Em . Dubois C.Ss.R., De Exemplar ismo Divino seu Doctrina de trino ordine exemplari et de trino rerum omnium ordine exemplato [Romae 1897]; Constantius Van Den Berg OP, De ideis Divinis, seu de Divina Essentia, prout est omnium rerum idea et primum exemplar, juxta Doctrinam Doctoris Angelici , Divi Thomae Aquinatis, contra Pantheismum praesertim Idealisticum, aliosque errores modernos ; authore fr .P.C van den Berg OP [Prostat Buscoduci 1872]; P.Garin, La theorie de l'ldee suivantl'Ecole thomiste. Etude d'apres les textes [paris 1932] [concentrates on the idea in hu man knowledge: see c.-R. ofD.M. de PetterOP, BT (1933) 689-97]; P.S. Vallaro OP, 'La dottrina Tomistica sulle idee e sulla loro origine' , Angelicwn 22 (1945) 116-49; J.Bauer, ' Die Ideenlehre Platons im Urteil des Aquinaten', Salzburger Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und Psychologie 3 (1959) 56-74; Joseph Owens C.Ss.R., 'Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea', MSt 21 (1959) 211-23 [but the divine ideas are prior to common natures: see p.222]; K.Kawada, 'The Theory of Ideas of Thomas Aquinas' , SMT (Tokyo) 1 (1958) 65-81,159 [see BTAM 8 (1959) n.95O, pp.317-18 ; BT XI (1960-62) n.220, p.89]; Bernard Lonergan SJ, Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas [Edited by David B.Burrell CSC: University of Notre Dame Press , Notre Dame: 1967]; Vincent P.Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas' , NS 42 (1968) 171-201; L.-B. Geiger OP, 'Les idees divines dans l'oeuvre de S.Thomas' , Toronto Studies I , 175-209 [dealing with the divine ideas simply as 'objects of divine knowledge'. not with all the issues raised by the notion] ; Gianni Baget-Bozzo, 'La Teologia delle Idee Divine in San

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CHAPrERRVE

knowledge Saint Thomas considers the question of the ideas ex professo . He argues that there must be ideas in God, that there must be a plurality of ideas in God and that whatever has being in any way must have some corresponding idea in God [the present chapter]. The notion of ideas in God remains essential in his treatments of central theological themes, a fact which underlines the necessary place which the notion has for him [Chapter Six]. We will explore finally how Saint Thomas corrected the material he received from earlier writers, thought the issues through afresh and integrated what he had received within an original theological synthesis [Chapter Seven]

A. DIVINE KNOWLEDGE Saint Thomas says that because it is a perfection knowledge must be found in God2. He demonstrates this by following the three ways to knowledge about God which he had learned from Dionysius>, The via negativa strips everything creaturely from our notion of God and enables us to think of him as pure act and immaterial. Since intelligibility is directly proportionate to immateriality, God must be both intelligible and intelligenr', The via per causalitatem means that God must be intelligent and purpoTOIIlIDllllO', RFNS 66 (1974) 295-311 ; Lawrence Dewan OP, ' St Thomas , Ideas, and Immediate Knowledge', Dialogue 18 (1979) 392-404; John F.Wippel, ' The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles according to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines' , Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981) 729-58; W .Norris Clarke SJ, 'The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism', in Dominic J.O'Meara (Ed .), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought [International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Norfolk, Virginia: 1982], pp.l09-27,256-58; Mark DJordan, 'The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas' , Review of Metaphysics 38 (1984) 17-32 ; John L.Farthing, ' The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St Thomas', Thom 49 (1985) 183-222; James Ross, 'Aquinas' Exemplarism; Aquinas' Voluntarism', ACPQ 64 (1990) 171-98; Armand Maurer, 'James Ross on the Divine Ideas: A Reply', ACPQ 65 (1991) 213-20 ; Lawrence Dewan OP, 'St Thomas, James Ross, and Exemplarism: A Reply', ACPQ 65 (1991) 221-34; James Ross , 'Response to Maurer and Dewan', ACPQ 65 (1991) 235-43 and Alice Ramos, 'The Divine Ideas and the Intelligibility of Creation : A Way Towards Universal Signification in Aquinas' , DC 44 (1991) 250-65. 2 The most important texts on God's knowledge: In I Sent 35; 36,1 ; QD de Ver 2 ; ST J,14 and SCG 1,44-59. For knowledge in God as a perfection: SCG 1.44,377. See SCG 1.28; 1.31 and Aristotle, De Anima III.8 [431b21]. 3 In I Sent 35,1 ,I,scl,sc2 and in c [pp.808,809-lO]. St Thomas refers to DN VII3 (872A) . Cf STJ ,84,7 ad 3. The idea of the three ways to God is found in Albinus, Didaskalikos X, where they are entitled the ways of analogy, of eminentia and of negatio , It is found also in Celsus and its origin seems to be in Plato [Republic VI-VII and Parmenides]: see des Places, ' Etudes recentes',p354. 4 In I Sent, 35,1 ,1 in c [p.809] and ad 3 [p.812] . ST J ,14,1 develops the argument 'immateriality therefore knowledge' relying on Aristotle's De Anima. See also ST J ,84,2 in c and QD de Ver 2,2 in c [lines 163-65,172-73]: secundum ordinem immaierialitaus in rebus secundum hoc in eis natura cognitionis invenitur ... similiter est etiam ordo in cognoscibilibus. Thus God, in fine separationis a materia, is maxime cognoscitivus et maxime cognoscibilis [lines 182-85] . Since formae intellectae in actu jiunt unum cum intellectu actu intelligente ,

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sive. Because God is a conscious maker who assigns their goals and activities to things he must have knowledge. Every agent acts for some goal and God as first cause must act for his own purposes'. The via per eminentiam means that the closer a being is to the first the more it participates in what the first has in a supreme way. The order of knowers is such a series and so there is some preeminent form of knowledge in G0d6. If intellect is denied of God, as it is in Liber de Causis, this is only to indicate that God is far beyond what knowledge refers to in creatures'. The terms for "knowledge" [scientia, cognitio, intelligere] are used analogically of God and of creatures. There is no basis for univocity which sharing in a common form would support but neither is it simply equivocation because we really do know something of God's knowledge even though we cannot comprehend it. We can make deductions about divine intelligence from human intelligence [SCG 1.53] even though "the whole critique of knowledge finds its ultimate explanation in the theory of the divine knowledge'v, The analogy is based on the creature imitating God to the extent that it can [quantum potesu". As with all analogical predication the language we use of God's knowledge must be carefully qualified to. Considering all that we have seen in Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes and Albert, it comes as no surprise when Saint Thomas asserts that God's understanding [intelligere] is his essence: Quicquidautemest in 000, est divinaessentia. Intelligere ergo Dei est divina essentia, et divinum esse, et ipse Deus: nam Deus est sua essentia et suum esse [SCG 1.45,383. See also 1.21-23].

God's complete immateriality implies his intelligence: SCG 1.44,376. St Thomas argues from the Platonic self-moved mover [SCG 1.44,373] and the Aristotelian unmoved mover [SCG 1.44,374] to intelligence in God [see SCG 1.13,90]. On this see also QO de Ver 2,2 in c [lines 134-48]; SCG 11.75;STJ .79,3 and Lonergan. Verbum. pp.143-51. 5 QO de Ver 2,3 in c [lines 211-34]; 2,4 in c [lines 116-81]; SCG 1.44,378. See also SCG

1.16.

6 In I Sent 35.1,1 in c [pp.809-IO]; SCG 1.44,379. See STJ,2,3: the quintavia for the via per causalitatem and the quarta via for the via per eminentiam, with Geiger . La Participation. p.243. n.2. The three ways of knowing God are also used at STJ .12,12; 13,1; 13,8 ad 2; 13.10

adS. , In I Sent 35,1.1 ad 1 [p.81O]. See In L de C, prop.6 (Saffrey, p.42) and ON VII.1 (865C). For Liber de Causis and its use by St Thomas see Chapter Seven, O. below. Further arguments for knowledge in God: seQ 1.44. 8 In I Sent 35.1,4 in c [pp.819-20]; 36,1.1 in c [p.831). The final comment is Pierre Rousselot's: The Intellectualism ofSt Thomas [London 1935] p.222 [ET of L'intellectualisme de Saint Thomas (paris : Beauchesne 19363)] . a work which provides invaluable background for the notion of divine ideas . 9 In I Sent 35,1.4 in c and ad 6 [pp.820.821], the latter referring to ON IX.6 (913C). 10 In I Sent 35,1,5 [pp.821-23]: God's knowledge is not properly described as 'universal'. 'particular'. 'potential' or ' habitual' but is properly spoken of as in actu. a also In I Sent 36,1,1 ad 1 [p.832] and Chapter Six. B, below, on ' The Theology of Creation' .

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CHAPTER FlVE

God knows himself perfectly. His essence is the intelligible species by which he knows and because he is totally immaterial he is completely one with himself. Therefore in him intelligibilis and intelligens are perfectly one. The highest perfection for creatures is to know God [intelligere Deum] and so God, who is the highest intelligence and the highest intelligible, maxime seipsum imelligit» , God's knowledge is founded on the perfection of his being: tanta est autem virtus Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo [ST,I,14,3]. Because God is responsible for creating and guiding a multiplicity of things his knowledge extends to things other than himself, extending as far as his causality: intantum se extendit scientia Dei. inquantum se extendit eius causalitas't, Saint Thomas writes: cum Deus cognoscitres per essentiam suam quae est causa rerum, eodem modo cognoscitres quo modoesse rebustradidit 13. God is responsible for the being of things and it is in virtue of a things's 'being' that it participates in a 'likeness of God' . God is prima causa effectiva omnium entium and knows himself as such>. Because God's esse is his intelligere his effects pre-exist in him secundum modum intelligibilem, in ipso eius intelligere. God sees himself in himself per essentiam suam and so he sees other things non in ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentiasua continet similitudinem alio-

rum ab ipso15.

This does not mean that God does not know things as they are in themselves, only that he knows them through himself. His causality and therefore also his knowledge extends to things in their particularity [secundum quod sunt individuatae per materiam-In I Sent 36,1,1]. Philosophers had difficulties about God's knowledge because they did not accept that God works immediately in everything, that his creative power extends to everything including matter and that everything participates in the divine essence which is the principle and likeness of all that is in things whether material or formal's, God is causa totius quod in re est'", totius rei auctor, responsible not only for forms and powers but II SCQ 1.47. Note especially §398: Ex hoealiquid actuimelligitUT quodintelleetus in actuet intelleetum in actu unum sunt, Divinus autem tntellectus estsemper intellectus in actu. See De

Anima ill. 12 In I Sent 35,1 ,2 [pp.813-15] ; ST,1,14,11. For God's knowledge, in the sense of scient ia approbaitonis, as causa rerum see ST,1,14,8. 13 ST,1,14,9 ad 2 and In I Senl36,1,1 in e [p.832]. 14 See ST,1,14,5. referring to 1,14,2-3 and 1,2,3, and SCQ 1,49,412: God is

causa essendi aJiis per suam essentiam , On SCQ 1.49,411 as an interpretation of Metaphysics Lambda see p.61,n .2 of Mare edition [see note 92 below]. On SCG 1.49.412 and 414 [to know the canse is to know its effects] see Anal Post 1.2 [71b9-11] with Thomas's commentary, 1.4 (31-32) . 15 ST,1,14,5 in e. See also ad 2 and ad 3 ; 14,4 and SeQ 1.49,413. 16 In I Sent 35,1 ,2 se2 and ad 2 [pp.814,815]; 35,1,3 in e and ad 2 [pp.816-17,818]; 35,1,5 ad 1 [pp.822-23] and 36,1,1 in e [p.832]. See also ST,1,14,6; 14,8; 14,11 and 44.2 in c; Henle, Saint Thomas and Plaionism, pp.358-59;450,n .58 and D, below. 'The Extent of the Ideas' . 17 In I Sent 35,1,5 ad 1 [pp.822-23]; 36,1.1 ad 3 and ad 4 [p.833] and ST,1,44.2 in e.

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for the receptive potency of matter itself1 8• Because of his unique causality God knows things not just in fieri but in their esse and in their essential, constitutive principles 19. God knows all singular things, something that is required by Christian belief in providence", God knows many things but his knowing is not determined by receiving the forms of things. Rather does he know per essentiam suam .. quae est similitudo omnium rerum», God knows all things per unum medium simplicissimum, quod est sua essentiau, and non est in intellectu eius aliqua species praeter ipsam divinam essentiam>, God does not draw his knowledge from anything outside himself: Non est igitur Deus in potentia intelligens, aut de novo aliquid intelligere incipiens, vel quamcumque mutationem aut compositionem in intelligendo habens 24.

For Saint Thomas, the fact that God's knowledge extends as far as his causality means God's knowledge reaches to the least traces of being. Because it is not actualised, specified or determined in any way from outside, but is a knowledge of Himself and of all things per essentiam suam, God's knowledge must be simple, eternal, unvarying and actual25• God knows all things simultaneouslyw

18 In

II Sent 18,1,2 in c [pp.451-53] .

19 QD de Ver 2,3 ad 20 ; 2,4 in c [lines 126-69]; SCG 1.50,422 and 427: to know something

perfectly is to know its ultimate perfections quae sunt praecipuaillius rei .. quibus perficuur

proprium esseeius. 20 QD de Ver 2,5 in c [lines 246-76] ; 2,7 in c [lines 82-94] ; STJ,14,l1; SCG 1.50,419 and 428 referring to Genesis 1.31 and Hebrews 4.13. See Chapter Six, C. below, 'Providence and the Ideas' . 21 In I Sent 35 ,1,2 in c. St Thomas refers to Metaphysics A.9 [I074bI5-35]: see In XII Meta §§ 2600-17. That the divine essence is similitude omnium rerum is introduced from elsewhere. 22 In I Sent 35,1,2 ad 4 [p.815]. See In I Sent 36,1,1 ad 1 [p.832] and 38 ,1,2 ad 2 [p.902] . 23 SCGI.46. 24 SCG 1.45,388. See In I Sent 36,1 2 ad 2 [pp.834-35] and QD de Ver 2,3 ad 1. There cannot be potency or accident in God : SCG 1.13; 1.16 and 1.23. 25 Identical with the divine being, the divine knowledge is simplex, aeternum et invariabile, et actu tantum existens [SCG 1.45,388] and is always actual [I.56]. See ST 1,1,3 ad 2 [God's knowledge is unaet simplex omnium]; 1,10 in c and 14,1 ad 2 [omnia simul suo intellectu comprehendit]; 84,2 in c: Hoc autemest proprium Dei, ut sua essentia sit immaterialiter com-

prehensivaomnium, prout effectusvirtutepraeexistunt in causa. Solus igitur Deusper essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autemanimahumana, nequeetiam angelus . That effects preexist virtually in their cause is neoplatooist and is found in Proclus and Dionysius: see Gersh, FromIamblichus, pp.ll7ff and Chapter Three above, pp.l04-lO,121 -22. For St Thomas knowl edge is proportionate to immateriality: see note 4 on pp.I%-97 above and Compendium Theologiae c.28 [§S7]. See also In I Sent35,l ,l ad 2 [p.811]; 38,1,2 in c [p.901] ; SCG 1.18; 1.45 and 1.48. On God not being determined in any way: In I Sent 35 ,1,2 [pp .813-15]; 35,1,5 [pp.821-23] and Peter Lombard citing Augustine at 35 , Divisio Textus [p.805]. See also QD de Ver 2,1 in c and ad 6; 2,5 ad 15 and ad 16 and 2,14 in c. 26 SCG 1.55,457 and 459 . which originally included a reference to God seeing all things in the mirror of his own essence: 23*312-28. Further arguments for God's simultaneous knowledge: 5CG 1.55.460-64.

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and his knowledge is intellectual not ratiocinative or discursive-", Because the divine essence is exemplar omnium multiplicium et compositorum, in knowing himself God knows all multiplicity and composition including the truth that is expressed in statements-s, God has a proper knowledge of things, knowing them not only in terms of what they have in common but as distinct from one another and from Him . God therefore knows things secundum proprias rationes earum which are in God secundum potentiam activam because God is the principle of all being-", This is why Saint Thomas cannot speak of God's knowledge without referring to the ideas or rationes: Deus cognoscit res in propria natura si ista determinatio referatur ad cognitionem ex parte cogniti; si autem loquamurde cognitione ex parte cognoscentis sic cognoscit res in idea, id est per ideam quae est similitudoomnium quae sunt in re, et accidentalium et essentialium,quamvis ipsa non sit accidens rei neque essentia eius, sicut etiam similitudo rei in intellectu nostro non est accidentalis vel essentialis ipsi rei sed similitudovel essentiae vel accidentis [QD de Ver 2,4 ad 6].

For Saint Thomas an account of the divine knowledge leads naturally, therefore, to a consideration of the ideas. B. SAINT THOMAS ON THE DIVINE IDEAS Saint Thomas gives an account of the divine ideas in three major works, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate and Summa Theologiae . In I Sent 36 is his first treatment of the question. In QD de Ver 3 he clarifies and develops his account on the basis of a distinction between species quo and species quod in the process of understanding. In ST 1,15 he is particularly concerned with the issue of plurality and unity . A text on the divine ideas in the suppressed autograph of Summa Contra Gentiles I, also part of a consideration of divine knowledge, deserves consideration also .

27 SCG 1.57 and ST 1,14,7. God knows everything uno intuitu and not by combining and dividing as human beings do: SCG 1.58 and 1.55. See ON VII.3 [8728]; In de Div Nom §723 and SCG 1I.68,1453a; 11.91,1775; III .49,2271 and III .97,2725. See Boethius, Philosophiae Consolat ionis Libri Quinque V, pr.4 [Buchner, pp .I03-06] for intellectus higher than ratio in the human being. 28 SCG 1.58.492 and 1.59. The suppressed autograph of SCG 1.57 speaks of the happiness of God knowing himself and everything else simpliciter intuendo : 23*b49-61. God knows enuntiabilia: In I Sent 38,1,3 [pp.902-04] and ST 1,14,14. 29 ST 1,14 ,6 [referring to being, life and intelligence]; QO de Ver 2,4-5 and SCG 1.50,419,423-25 (see SCG 1.13; 11.15).

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1. In I Sententiarum 36 on the Divine Ideas The Sentences of Peter Lombard was the basic textbook of theology through the middle ages . Its commentators dealt with the divine ideas at distinctions 35 and 36 of the first book 30 although the association of the ideas with the attribute of knowledge may not have become firmly established in systematic theology until the 12th century'", Saint Thomas follows this tradition and deals with the ideas for the first time in In I Sent 36,2 32•

Are thereIdeas in God? Saint Thomas' argument for ideas in God is in three parts. Firstly, philosophers and theologians agree on the two-fold existence of the forms of artificial things, in the mind of their maker and in actual products. They agree also on an analogous two-fold being of the forms of natural things, in potentia activa and in their actual existence. Whereas for Averroes the former refers to the existence of forms in the movers of the universe for Christians it can only refer to the ex istence of the forms of things in God 33• These are the ideas: the forms of things existing as formae operativae in the mind of God the creator'", Saint Thomas uses the traditional image of the artisan conceiving the idea of his work beforehand and says that the application of this image to God and his ideas comes from the philosophers". 30 Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi, In I urn, dXXXVI, nn.4-8 [Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, Tom.Xll, Quarrachi 1951, pp.357-60]; Bonaventure, In I Sent, 35 [S.Bonaventurae Opera Theologica Selecta, Tom .I, Quarrachi 1934, pp.477-92]; Albertus Magnus, In I Sent, 35.E,aa.7-10 [Borgnet, XXVI, pp.I8996]. 31 Grabmann thinks Peter Lombard was responsible for linking the ideas with the divine attribute of knowledge : 'Des heiligen Augustinus' , MG II, pp.25-34. Geiger believes that this link was made after Peter Lombard, probably beginning with Alexander of Hales ['Les idees divi nes' , p.I87, n.29] whereas H.Pinard regards Augustine as the first to make it ['Creauon' , DTC III.2,2155]. 32 There is no critical edition of Thomas's Commentary on the Sentences. I have used the four volume edition of Mandonnet-Moos [paris 1929-]: pages numbers after references are to the relevant volume. The Scriptum super librosSententiarum is an early work, written while St Thomas was a bachelor or sententarius at Paris and revised by him later when he taught in Rome in 1265-66: see L.E .Boyle OP, ' Alia Lectura Fratris Thome', MSt 45 (1983) 418-29. Fabro dates the Scriptum to 1254-56, Weisheipl to 1252-56. 33 In I Sent 36,2,1 sc l, sc2 and in c [p.839]. See Aristotle, Meta VII.7-9 and 1\.3-4 with Albert's commentary on XII .4 [1070b33 -34] , Liber Xl I> Al Metaphysicorum, tr.I, c.IX [Borgnet VI, p.598] and Augustine, De Div Qq LXXXlll.46. St Thomas wrongly attributes the phrase ' whoever denies the ideas denies the Son of God' to this work of Augustine. See Introduction, p.7 above with note IS, and Weisheipl , Friar Thomas d'Aquino, pp .73-74. For potentiaacuva see Gersh, From lamblichus, pp.27-32. 34 In I Sent 36 ,2,1 sc2 [p.839]: nihil aliuddicimus ideas, nisi formas rerum in Deo existentes; 36,2,1 in c [p.839]: formas rerum in Deoexistentes ideas dicimus quaesunt sicutformae

operativae .

3S In I Sent 35.1,3 in c [p.8l4]; 36,1,1 in c [p.832]; 36,1,3 ad 3 [p.837] and QD de Pot 1,5 arg.ll

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Next Saint Thomas cites a passage from Dionysius who, he says, was speaking of the divine ideas when he wrote: Exemplaria dicimus substantificas rationes existentiurn in Deo uniformiter praeexistentes,quas theologia praedefinitiones vocal, et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium praelt£pou(Jl~ is translated as substantialis and not supersubstantiaJis as it is here , lines 252-53 . 57 Augustine: QD de Ver 3,I,scl,sc5,sc7,sc9,sclO [the latter referring to Augustine, Conf X.17 (pL32.790)] . Also 3,1 [lines 16Off]and QD de Ver 10,9 [line SO). Boethius : Phi/osophiae Consolationis Ill, poem 9 [pL 63.758 ; Biichner, pp.56-57] ; Obertello, Severino Boezio, pp.21819, lines 6-8, and Appendice I, pp.407-16 and Chapter Two, pp.88-92 above. Anselm: QD de Ver 3,1 obj 10 [citing Monologion 31 (Schmitt, p.50Jines 7-9)]; ad 10 and se 8. 58 QD de Ver 3,1 arg 4 and ad 4: inconveniens est ponere ideas rerum naturaJium esse per se subsistentes, non est autem inconveniens ponereeas in mentedivina. The argument follows since it is contrarationemformarum naturaJium quod ex se ipsis immateriaJes sint [loe.cit.). For St Thomas's critical use of Aristotle see Chapter Seven, B, below, 'Saint Thomas and Aristotle on the Good' and note In I Sent 36,2,1 ad I [p.840). Aristotle himself would not have accepted this as a solution : see in Chapter Four above , p.l63 with note 100. 59 QD de Ver 3,1 obj 5 and ad 5. 60 QD de Vee 3,2 [lines 108-24, with note to line 108]. For Clement see DN V.9 (824D) . See also QD de Ver3,7 [lines 52-55].

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God is concerned [lines 124-41]. Since what is essential is prior to what is accidentals! something cannot belong accidentally to the first cause and essentially to the second cause. Because the diversity of created reality must be pre-defined by God [praedijfinita ab eo-the phrase is from Dionysius], it is necessary to posit in God singulorum proprias rationes or, in other words, plures ideae [lines 141-57]. In explaining the mode of this plurality Saint Thomas says that form may be present in intellect either as principium or as terminus of the act of understanding. As principiumactus intelligendi form belongs to the knower as a knower and is the likeness in the knower of the object known. As terminus actus intelligendi form is thought up [excogitat] by, for example, a maker who in his knowing thinks up the form of a house. In this sense form is devised and produced by the act of knowing and therefore cannot be the first principle specifying that act [primum quo intelligatur]. In this sense form is not the principle of the act of knowing but is an object known by means of which the knower does something [intellectum ut quo intelligens aliquidoperatur]. However, the form as terminus actus intelligendi is also a form by which the knower knows [secundum quo intelligitur] since by the thought-up form fforma excogitata] the maker knows what he means to produce. The species which informs the speculative intellect so that it actually knows is the first principle by which the act of knowledge is specified [primum quo intelligitur]. This is the form as principium actus intelligendi. But once it is so actualised the intellect may proceed to fashion the quiddity of things, combining and dividing, and thinking-up what is then a product of the intellect [quoddam operatum ipsius]. This in its turn is a form by means of which an exterior reality is known so that the thought-up form becomes in its tum the principle by which the act of knowledge is specified [secundum quo intelligitur]62 .

If an intellect were to produce something in its own likeness the intellectus artificis itself would be the idea of what is produced, not as what understands [intellectus] but as what is understood [intellectum]. When a maker produces something in the likeness of something other than himself, what he produces may be either a perfect or an imperfect image of the exemplar. A perfect image has as its idea the form of the thing imitated. An imperfect image has as its idea not simply the form of the thing imitated but that form together with a determi-

example Physics 11.6[198a5-IO]. See also In LdeC, prop.l [Saffrey, pp.4-10). QD de Ver 3.2 [lines 158-83] and ad 9. See Geiger . 'Les idees divines'. pp.191-92; 197,n.59 and the development of St Thomas' use of this distinction in the redactions of SCG 1.53: pp.217-21 below. In I Sent 35.1,2 in c [pp.814-15]: understanding is like seeing in which there is a species in the eye, and a thing outside which is seen through that species , and this can be applied 10 God's knowledge. 61 For 62

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nate measure in accordance with which the image falls short of such perfect imitatiorre. God's activity is always intelligent fper intellectum omnia operans] and he produces all things in the likeness of his own essence. God 's essence is therefore the idea of things [idea rerum] not as essence but as understood [non quidem ut est essentia sed ut est intellecta]. Because creatures are not a perfect im age of the divine essence, the idea rerum is not the divine essence simply but includes the degree to which creatures imitate or fall short of that essence: essentia non accipitur absolute ab inteIlectudivino ut idea rerum sed cum proportione creaturae fiendae ad ipsam divinam essentiam secundum quod deficit ab ea vel imitaturipsam64. Each thing [unaquaeque] imitates the divine essence in a way proper to itself since each thing has a unique esse [unicuique sit esse distinctum ab altera]. The divine essence, understood along with the different relations of things to it [cointellectis diversis proportionibus rerum ad earn], is the idea of every single thing [idea uniuscuiusque rei]. Since there is a diversity in these relations there must be many ideas although from the point of view of the essence est una omnium. The plurality of ideas arises from the diverse relations of creatures to that essence [lines 209-19] .

Comment on QDde Ver3,2 Saint Thomas argues that there must be a plurality of ideas if God knows and is responsible for the diversity of created reality. The problem is to understand the mode of this plurality in such a way that the absolute simplicity of the divine essence is not threatened. He believes that the distinction between form as 'principle' of knowledge and form as 'object' of knowledge helps towards such an understanding. Intellect is capable of excogitating a multiplicity of forms which are objects but also principles of its knowledge. This means that there can be a plurality within intellect which specifies intellect's knowing but which does not determine intellect from without because the plurality is produced by intellect itself. Geiger believes that Saint Thomas here uses the distinction of form as principle of knowing and form as object of knowing only to show the possibility of using a model produced by the knower . It is only with the development of the notion of intentio in seG I, he says, that Saint Thomas applies the distinction of a primum intellectum and a secundum intellectum to the specific problem of the plurality of divine ideas 65• But that problem is precisely the concern of QD de Ver 3,2 also. Saint Thomas accepts that human intellect is actualised by forms 63 cum proportione determinata secundum quam exemplatum a principali exemplari deft ceret vel imitarentu r: see 3.2 [lines 183-200] and Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas ', pp.195-200. 64 QD de Vcr 3,2 [lines 205-09]. See Baget-Bozzo, 'La Teologia delle Idee Divine ' , pp.305(fl.

65 Geiger , 'Les idees divines' , pp.l94-97,200-04. See pp.216-21 below.

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which it encounters in reality but is also capable of self-actualisation, of thinking up forms which are objects of its knowledge but which are also, in a secondary sense, principles specifying and actualising that knowledge . He applies this to the divine intellect in order to show how a plurality of ideas need not multiply intellect itself. His reference to an intellect producing something in its own image seems to refer only to God, although the text in which he mentions it expresses an interiority proper to intellectual substances generally in view of their capacity for self-knowledge: si autem intellectus artificisa1iquod artificiatum produceret ad sirnilitudinem sui ipsius, tunc quidem ipse intellectus artificis esset idea, non quidem ut est intellectussed in quantum est intellectum [lines 183-88]. All knowledge in God is self-knowledge because God knows all things through their similitudo which is his own essence. God is one with that by which he knows the creature [ipse est idem re cum eo]66. His knowledge originates entirely within himself, is not perfected by anything outside himself and may be understood in terms of his self-knowledges", The divine essence as known is the idea of all things while the plurality of ideas arises from the imperfect imitations of that essence which creatures are. Although the relation of God to the creature is not 'real' in God it is ' notional' for us and so can be in God's mind too: intelligitrespectum rerum ad essentiam suam,et sic respectus illi sunt in Deo ut intellecti ab ipso 68. Saint Thomas explains the unity and simplicity of the divine knowledge and the plurality of ideas in the light of the unity and simplicity of the divine essence and the plurality of creatures made in the image of God. His argument based on the presence and function of form within the process of understanding develops a distinction hinted at in In I Sent 36,2,2 69• Although Saint Thomas makes no reference to texts of Aristotle in speaking of this distinction, it is clear that he is developing and adapting Aristotle's account of intelligence in an original way in order to explain the plurality of ideas70 . The notion of esse is mentioned briefly but significantly. The uniquely proper esse of each single thing is the ultimate explanation of the plurality of

66

QD de Vcr 3,2 [lines 202-(»] and 3,1 ad 11 [line 372] . See also 3,2 ad 9.

67 QD de Vcr 2,3 ad

1.

68 QD de Ver 3,2 ad 8. According to Gornall, p.xxiii , 'St Thomas's true thought on the

question of the ideas is to be found in De Ver 3,2 : the true meaning is that the multitude of Ideas is not a matter of a multiple relation of the divine intellect to creatures but of creatures to God, and that God knows the creatures and the relations' . St Thomas teaches that the relationship between creatures and God is real in the creature but not real in God : see p.213 with note 85 below . 69 QD de Vcr 3" ad II ; 3,2 ad 9. See p.203 with note 44 above. 70 Geiger, 'Les idl!es divines' , pp.I90-97 and Chapter Four , pp.I63-73 above.

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ideas which are creativae et productivae rerum". Esse is the effect proper to God . This brief reference is a clear reminder that the broader context within which the problematic of the ideas must be set is the theology of creation itself.

3. Summa Theologiae 1,15 on the Divine Ideas Earlier introductions to theology were complicated by the multiplication of useless questions, says Saint Thomas, whose aim in Summa Theologiae is to present Christian doctrine briefly and clearly as far as the material will allow it 72 • Not far into that work he deals once more with the ideas. After the divine substance, he says, we must consider the divine activity and in the first place God's immanent activity which , since God is an intelligent being, means his knowing and willing. Because all knowledge entails the object known being in the knower, the divine ideas must be considered primarily in the context of divine knowing since they are rationes rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente . A consideration of divine knowledge must therefore include a treatment of the ideas?'. This is what ST,I,15 does?',

Are there Ideas in God? ST,I,15,1 says that there are ideas in the divine mind . Idea in Greek corresponds to forma in Latin and by 'idea' is meant the form of something somehow existing apart from that thing.", Such a form can have two functions, either

See QD de Ver 3,2 [lines 209-12] and 3,1 ad 5: see p.2OS above. ST,I,pro!. See L.E .Boyle, The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas [The Etienne Gilson Series 5. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies 1982]. ST I is dated to 1266-68 : Weisheipl, op.cit., pp.360-62; Fabro, op.cit., p.50; Boyle , op.cit., pp.7-8,14 and RLT XVIII, p.44. For the structure of ST see ST 1,2 pro!., and Lll , pro!.; M.-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas [Chicago 1964] pp.297-322 ; M.-D. Chenu , 'L'Evangelisme de Saint Thomas d' Aquin', RSPT 58 (1974) 391-403 and G.Lafont, Structures et Methode dans fa Somme Theologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin [Paris , Desclee de Brouwer: 1961], pp.1534,469-94. 73 ST,I,14pro!. That the question of the ideas is part of a full account of God's knowledge is clear from ST,1,16 pro!. A treatise de Deo Uno dealing with the essential constitutive qualities of divinity is first found in Proclus and becomes part of Christian theology through Dionysius according to SafTrey-Westerink, Theol Plat , pp.LXllI, CLXXXVill-CXCn. See also Hankey, God in Himselfand Karl Rahner, The Trinity [English translation by Joseph Donceel: London 1970], pp .I5-21. Whether ST,1,2ff constitutes a distinct tract de Deo Uno remains an open question. 74 Translations, commentaries and notes on ST,1,15 include: Cajelan, Commentaria in ST,I,15 , in Leonine Edition, Vol.IV [Rome 1888] pp.I99-205; M.-D.Philippe, 'Etude de la Somme Theologique (38e leeon): Question XV: Les Idees Divines' , BCTC 30 (1965) 14-25; Gornall, pp.xxii-xxiii and 62-73; A.D.Sertillanges, S.Thomas d'Aquin . Somme Theologique. Dieu: tome II (1a.12-17) [Editions de la Revue des Jeunes : Paris-Toumai-Rome 1933] pp.24561,360-63 . See also M.-J.Nicolas, ' Vocabulaire de la Somme Theologique' in Thomas d'Aquin. Somme theologique. Tome I [paris: Les Editions du Cerf 1984] pp.l05-06 (idee), 99 (concept) and 103 (exemplaire) . 7S ST,1,15,1 in c. The Piana and Leonine editions read per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existemes . Some MSS have per se exislentes , a reading which 71

72

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as an exemplar or pattern of the thing whose form it is said to be, or as a principIe of knowledge in the sense that the forms of knowable things are said to be in the knower. In both senses it is necessary to speak of ideas in God. Saint Thomas explains why: In omnibus enim quae non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse finem generationis cujuscumque. Agens autem non ageret propter formam, nisi inquantum sirnilitudo formae est in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. In quibusdam enim agentibus praeexistit similitudo rei fiendae secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quae agunt per naturam: sicut homo generat hominem et ignis ignem. In quibusdam vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quae agunt per intellectum: sicut similitudo domus praeexistit in mente aedificatoris. Et haec potest dici idea domus; quia artifex intendit domum assimilare formae quam mente concepit. Quia igitur mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma , ad cujus similitudinem mundus est factus ; et in hoc consistit ratio Ideae'".

In keeping with his intention in composing ST, this is a clear summary of the longer argument given in QD de Ver 3,1. Saint Thomas adds a few further remarks. In support of the view that the idea cannot exist outside God he appeals to Aristotle who criticised Plato for regarding the ideas as existing per se and not in the intellect [in imellectui?', Nor does the idea introduce multiplicity into the divine essence or replace the divine essence because idea in Deo nihil aliud est quam ejus essentia, which essence is similitudo omnium reruml".

Is there a PluralityofIdeas in God? The diversity of creatures is an ordered diversity constituting a cosmos. This order as a whole must be the special object of God's intention and cannot be an incidental result produced by a succession of agents. It must fall within the intention of the principal agent. An architect cannot plan a house without knowing what is special to each part of it and because God intends and creates the entire ordered universe he must possess not only the ratio of the whole but the propriae rationes omnium rerum. Therefore there is a plurality of ideas in God 79. is followed by Sertillanges in Latin but which he translates as ' Ia forme des choses existant hors des choses memes' (op.cit, p.246). 76 ST,1,15,1 in c. See QD de Vee3,1 [lines 183-261]. The analogy of the artifex is used already in ST,1,14,8 in c and ad 3; 14,11 in c: 14,12 ad3. God is the intelligent cause of creation: ST,1,19,4; 44,3; 46,1; 47,1. 77 ST,1,15,1 ad 1. See Chapter Four, pp.I48 -53 above with St Thomas, In XII Meta §§23134,407-09,1362; Dionysius, DN VII.2 [868C] and St Thomas, In de Div Nom §719. Note that Aristotle's view is that the ideas must be placed in intellectu, St Thomas's view that they must be placed in mente divino. 78 ST,1,15,1 ad 3. See Cajetan, Commentaria in ST,I,15,1, §§VI-IX. 79 ST,1,15,2 in c. For ' the good of the order of the universe' see Aristotle, Metaphysics A.1O [1075aI3] with St Thomas, In XII Meta §§2627-31; QD de Pot 3,16 in c and Sertillanges , Somme Theologique , p.362, n.[145]. For the ' emanation of creative principles' see Avicenna, Metaphysica lX.4 [in Chapter Four, p.181 above]; In I Sent 35,1,3 in c [p.817]; 35,1,3 ad 3 [p.818]; 35,1,5 ad I [pp.822-23]; 36,1,1 in c [pp.830-31]; QD de Ver 3,2 [lines 108-57];

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To show how this plurality does not jeopardise the divine simplicity Saint Thomas uses the distinction already applied in QD de Ver 3,2. The idea of a work is in the mind of the maker not as a principle of knowledge [qua intelligitur] but as an object of knowledge [quod intelligitur]. It is not contrary to the divine simplicity that God should know many things whereas it would be con trary to God's simplicity if his mind were informed by many species. The plurality of ideas in the divine mind is a plurality of objects of knowledge rut intel lectae ab ipso], not a plurality of principles of knowledge [(jormae) faciens intellectum in actu], and so the divine simplicity is not threatened so. God knows his essence perfectly, in every way in which it can be known, in itself and in whatever ways it may be imitated by participation by creatures [secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis]. Every single creature [unaquaeque creatural has a unique species because it participates in a particular way in a likeness of the divine essence. God knows his essence as thus imitable by this particular creature and so knows his essence as the proper ratio and idea of that creature. This is true for all creatures and so God knows the rationes proprias of many things which means plures ideaes). Saint Thomas develops the main arguments of ST,I,15,2 in the replies to the objections. While the divine essence is simply one there are many ideas because the idea refers not to the essence as essence but insofar as it is the likeness or ratio of this or that thing. There is a plurality of ideas because there are many rationes known in this way from the one essence fplures rationes intellectae ex una essentia]82. God's wisdom or art is one because it is that by which rut quo] he knows. Idea refers to an object of his knowledge rut quod]. God knows many things by one act [uno intelligit multa] and he knows them not just in themsel ves but in their intelligibility [secundum quod intellecta sunt]. This is what it means to know the rationes of things. The builder knowing the form of a house which exists in material reality is said to know the house. When however he knows the STj ,14,6; 45,5 and 47,1 and p.206 wiih note 60 above. See also Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas', pp.I87-88. 80 STj,15,2 in e. See QD de Ver 3,2 [lines 158-83]; Quodlibe1 5,9 in e; 7,1,3 ad 3; SertiUanges, Somme Theologique , pp.252-53 (where he gives more a paraphrase than a translation of ibis passage) and Cajetan, Commentaria in ST.l,15,§V and Commenlaria in ST.l.15.2,§§V-Vll. St Thomas links the plurality of the ideas wiih iheir nature as principles of knowledge in ibis sense: Sertillanges, op.cit., pp.360-61 [St Thomas uses the term principium cognoscendi to refer eiiher to quo or to quod intelligitur J 81 ST,I ,15,2 in c. See QD de Ver 3,2 [lines 212-19]; Cajetan, Commentaria in ST.l.15.1,§VllI and Geiger, 'Les idees divines', p.206,n.81. Also STJ,14,6 in e: Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit, secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem par ticipat, Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret , nisi cognosceret quomodocumque par ticipabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio: nee eliam ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos essendi; 47,1 in c and ad 2. 82 STj ,15,2 ad 1. Also 14,6 ad 3: the divine essence is ratio uniuscuiusque, secundum quod diversimode est parlicipabilis vel imitabilis a diversis creaturis .

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form of a house as observed by himself rut a se speculatam], so that he knows himself knowing it [ex eo quod intelligit se intelligere eam], then he knows the idea or ratio of the house. Because God not only knows many things by his essence but also knows himself knowing many things by his essence, he knows plures rationes rerum. In the divine intellect there are therefore plures ideas ..

ut intellectasw. The divine essence has the meaning of idea when it is compared to other things but this cannot mean that created reality determines God in any way or introduces something into God. The relationships which explain the plurality of ideas are caused, not by created things, but by the divine intellect comparing God's essence to things 84• The relationships [respectus] which multiply the ideas are in God, not in created things, but they are not real relationships in God as are those by which the Persons of the Trinity are distinguished. They are relationships within God's knowledge [respectus intellecti a Deo] and the rationes rerum differ from his essence secundum rationem tantuni»,

Comment on ST 1,15,1-2 In Saint Thomas' comment that every single creature has a unique species because it participates in a particular way in a likeness of the divine essence, we can detect a development of his remark in QD de Ver 3,2 that the esse of each particular thing is the ultimate basis for the plurality of ideas in God. He speaks from a position in which each concrete detail of the creation is known to God and he does so for reasons both theological and philosophical. Christian faith requires it and a radical aristotelian ontology of the concrete and the particular supports it. Is it likely that so soon into a work whose aim was to avoid useless questions, Saint Thomas would include just such a useless question? Yet some have claimed that ST,I,15 is at best redundant and at worst misleadingw. ST I itself 1!3 STJ,15,2 ad 2. See 28,4 ad 3: respectus idealessunt ut intellecti a Deo. Undeex eorum pluraIitate nonsequiturquodsintpluresrelationesin Deo,sed quodDeuscognoscitplures relationes: Responsio ad loannem Vercellensem de Artieulis cvm, q.66 (§893): the plurality of ideas is because God knows the multitude of respectus between himself and creatures: ideas nihilaIiudsunt quamrationes rerum. proutsunt intellectae a Deo [cf BT Vll , n.50 on the text]; q.67 (§894): the ideas do not imply any real distinction in God sed quodplura intelliguntur ah ipso; QD de Ver 7.1 ad 5: in Deo huiusmodi rationesrerumnon differunt ah eius essentiasecundumrem sed secundum rationem tantum and In III Sent 14,2,2 in c. See also Geiger. 'Les idees divines'. p.206,n.81 and Cajetan, Commentaria in ST,l,15,2,§X, 'Secundo' and §IX: it is because Godis an intelligent agent that his essence is imitable as an exemplar.

84 STj,15,2 ad3.

85 STJ,15,2 ad 4 and 44,3 in c. STJ ,6,2 ad I is a crucial text: Relatio autemqua aIiquid de Deo diciturrelative ad creaturas, non est realiter in Deo,sed in creatura; in Deo vero secundumrationem. See QD de Ver 4,5 [lines 112-32]; STJ,13 ,7; In I Sent 26,2,3 ad 1 and ad 2 and the texts cited in note 83 above. 86 Geiger , ' Les idees divines'. p.206. Gornall, p.xxii, wonders whether the doctrine of the ideas is a statement or an explanation of God's knowledge of finite things. actual and possible. On this see the Introduction above. pp.6-8.

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says that an explanation of the rationes in God is part of a full account of divine knowledge. The ideas are neither an optional extra nor simply a detail in Saint Thomas's theory of knowledge. In fact , it has been argued, they constitute such a vital element in his theological and religious vision that without them the full intelligibility of the Summa Theologiae is lost Cette pleniere intelligibilite nous mene effectivement jusqu'aux idees divines, vrai lieu spirituel et scientifique de la theologie; car elle comporte simultanement une explication rationnelle des choses, puisee precisement dans ces natures, et une explication religieuse, puisqueces natures realisent en elles-memes et dans leur destinee une idee divine. Deja Ie neoplatonisme antique avait tente d'identifier Ie principe d'explication rationnelle des choses et Ie principe de la vie religieuse. Le pantheisme avait compromis cette tentative; saint Thomas saura, sans rien sacrifier de la personnalitetranscendentede Dieu, principe et fin de toutes choses, tirer tous les benefices et toute la verite de la doctrine de I'emanation et du retour". If this is true of Summa Theologiae, another major work, the Summa Contra Gentiles, seems to testify to a definitive disappearance of the doctrine of divine ideas from Saint Thomas' account of divine knowledge. We turn next to the questions raised by that disappearance. C. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE IDEAS IN SUMMA CONTRA

GENTILES Saint Thomas' account of divine knowledge in SCG I makes no significant use of the notion of ideas in God. If, as has been argued, SCG I is to be dated later than ST 1,15 it would mean that Saint Thomas dropped the notion of div ine ideas in the last of his systematic works . The surviving autograph of SCG I [Vat.iat.9850] shows that it was extensively revised and re-ordered, and that this work of revision affected particularly the chapters dealing with divine knowledge.

1. Revisionsand Dating SCG is usually dated between 1257 when QD de Ver was composed and 1266 when ST was begun 88• The ink and parchment used in the surviving autograph indicate a change of location at folio 14. This was in the summer of 1259 when

87 M.-D.Cbenu OP, Introduct ion a l'etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin [Univers ite de Montreal . Publications de I'Institut d'Etudes Medievales XI. Montreal/Paris 1954 2] pp.267-68. For ancient neoplatonism he refers to E.Brehier. Le Neoplatonisme, in La tradition philosoph ique etla pensee francaise [paris 1922] p.40. L.-B.Geiger OP, ' L' homme image de Dieu, A propos de Summa Theologiae la ,93,4'. RFNS 66 (1974) 511-32 develops these remarks of Cheou. See also Rousselot, The IntellectualismofSt Thomas. pp.217-23. 88 Weisbeipl, Friar Thomas d'Aqu ino, pp.130-34,359-60 accepts the traditional view and dates SCG between 1258 and 1264, as does Fabro, lntroduzione, pp.50,61-62 [between 1259 and 1264]

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Saint Thomas left Paris for Italy89. At the point where he left off in Paris and took up again in Italy , three redactions of SCG 1.53 are found . It seems that the first and second of these were composed at Paris and were the last things written by Saint Thomas before his departure for Italy . The third redaction, what we know as SCG 1.53, was composed in Italy. The first two are in Saint Thomas' hand but the third and final version is in the hand of a secretary and was in serted in the margin of f.l4v 90• The first 53 chapters of SCQ I were composed in a first redaction at Paris before the summer of 1259. A revision of these chapters plus the composition of the rest of SCG was made in Italy from 1260 onwards. Gauthier takes the witness of Ptolemy of Lucca, that Saint Thomas was working on SCG in Italy between 1260 and 1264, as reliable and the work would have been finished completely before 1265-67 9 1• This dating was challenged on the basis of doctrinal evolution, of Saint Thomas's relation to Avicenna and of his use of his own commentary on Aristotle's Physics as well as his use of the Liber de Bona Fortuna . A late date was suggested, during Saint Thomas's second Parisian regency [1269 - 1272]92. This late dating of SCQ has not found much support and would call for a complete reappraisal of the chronology of Saint Thomas' works 93 • A later dating would have important implications for the question of the divine ideas. If one believes that the logic of his theology ought to have carried Saint Thomas beyond the notion of divine ideas, then their disappearance in an SCG dated

89 On the dating of SCG : Saint Thomas d 'Aquin. Contra Gentiles Livre Premier. Texte de I'Edition Leonine. Introduction de A.Gauthier. Traduction de R.Bernier et M .Corvez [Lethielleux 1961], pp.20-59; Leonine edition, t.XIII [Rome 1918], pp.VII-XI,xXXVIIIXXXIX, and t.XIV [Rome 1926], pp.VIII-XXI, with their appendices ; A.Dondaine, Secretaires de S.Thomas [Rome 1956], pp.185-86. 90 The text is published in Leonine edition, t.XIII, pp.20*a46-21 *a51. At first Gauthier believed that only the first redaction was done at Paris [op.cit., pp.32-33] but later he and P.Gils came to agree with Geiger that the first two redactions were done at Paris and the final version in Italy : see Geiger, ' Les redactions successives de Contra Gentiles 1,53 d'apres I'autographe", in Saint Thomas d 'Aquin aujourd 'hui [Bruges 1963], p.221,n.3. 91 Gauthier, op.cit., pp.32-59. 92 D.Peter Marc OSB in S.Thomae Aquinatis Liber de Veritale Cathol icae fide i contra errores Infidelium qui dicitur Summa contra Gentiles. Vol I: Introductio . Cura et studio Petri Marc OSB. Coadiuv . Ceslao Pera OP et Petro Caramello [Augustae Taurinorum, Marietti I Paris, Lethielleux: 1967]. On chronology Marc prefers the authority of Bernard Gui to that of Ptolemy of Lucca : pp.8Off. 93 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d 'Aquino, p.131. Marc's arguments were rejected by C.Vansteenkisle OP,Angelicum 45 (1968) 353 -55 and are not accepted by Weisheipl or Fabro : see note 88 above. Thomas Murphy SJ , ' The Date and Purpose of the Contra Gentiles', Heythrop Journal 10 (1969) 405-15 , allows some weight to Marc's thesis but it is unfavourably received in RLT II,n.67,pp.51-56; IV,n .76,pp .47-48 and by Bernard P.McSbane OP. The Chapters on the Goodness and Unity of God in the first book ofthe Summa Contra Gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas according to the Autograph [Unpublished diss. Fribourg-Suisse 1972] pp .9,19. On the implications of a late dating for the doctrine of the ideas: Geiger. 'Les idees divines' , p.204.

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after ST I might be taken as yet another example of doctrinal evolution-which would in turn support the later dating. I do not intend to propose such an argument here. The case for the traditional dating seems stronger than any argument which has been brought against it. This means that some reason other than doctrinal evolution must explain the disappearance of the divine ideas in SCG I.

2, Summa Contra Gentiles on DivineKnowledge SCG /.50-52 SCG 1.50 says that God has a proper knowledge of things, knowing them as distinct from one another and from him . This is to know things secundum proprias rationesearum because all things are present in the divine power by their forms [secundum propriasformas] 94. Saint Thomas seems to be approaching the question of the divine ideas in his usual way: Divina autem natura communicabilis est per similitudinem. Scit ergo Deus quot modis eius essentiae a1iquid simile esse potest. Sed ex hoc sunt diversitates forMarum quod divinam essentiam res diversimode imitantur: unde Philosophus formam naturalem divinam quoddam nominat. Deus igitur de rebus habet cognitionem secundum proprias formas95. SCG 1.51-52 faces the obvious difficulty this raises: how is the divine simplicity, so carefully and consistently guarded in SCG I, to be reconciled with God's proper knowledge of a multiplicity of things according to their proper formae or rationes? God is absolutely simple without composition, corporeality, multiplicity or accident. He is not dependent on anything or specified by anything. Nevertheless his knowledge is truly knowledge. As the creator he knows all that exists prior to its coming into existence and he knows the multiplicity of which he is the cause'". Plato's proposal of separately existing forms of natural things might avoid introducing multiplicity or accidentality into God, but it makes God dependent for his knowledge, and therefore for his being, on a realm of forms outside him self97. This cannot be since everything apart from God, including such a realm of forms, must be caused by God and by his intellect. It is no solution to locate the forms within a second intellect. The only way out of the dilemma is to locate the realm of forms within the divine intellect itself98. 94

49). 95 96

sca1.50,419,423-25. See sca1.13 and11.15; QD de Ver2,4-5 and In L de C,I.10 (248sco 1.50,426 sco 1.51,429-30,432-35; 1.52,437-40. See sco 1.18; 1.20; 1.23; 1.42; 1.48 and,from the

suppressed autograph, 20*a7-12. Geiger, 'Les idees divines', p.I98. says that SCG 1.51-54 'formentun blocqui interrompt l'expose'. 97 sca 1.51,432. In any case the forms of natural things cannot exist without matter and cannot be understood without mailer: 1.51,431. 98 See sca1.51,433; 1.52,436-40; 11.15 and11.23-24. Note1.51,435: lntellectum oporlel esse in intelligente. Non igitur sufficit ponere formas rerum per se existentes extra intellectum div-

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sea

1.53: The FinalRedaction There are three redactions of what finally became SeQ 1.53. Here we examine the chapter as it now stands before giving an account of the earlier redactions. Making projections from human to divine intelligence is valid insofar as it is possible [53.442]. In human knowing the object known is present in the intellect not in its proper nature but by a species or representative likeness, its form in a different mode of being, by means of which the intellect is actualised [per quamfit intellectus in actu]. Understanding by means of this species is an im manent act but related to the object known [quae intelligitur] because the species which is principium intellectualis operationis is a likeness of the external thing [similitudo illius- 53.442]. This is the familiar doctrine of the species impressa. The intellect, formed in its act of understanding by this species impressa , then forms in itself quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio[53.443]. By means of this intentio, intellect can know things in their absence, as imagination does, or in abstraction from material conditions, something that is proper to intellect While the species impressa is a principle of understanding quaefacit intellectum in actu, the intentio is the product or term of intellectual activity. Both intentio and species are a likeness [similitudo] of the thing known and because the speciesintelligibilis which is the principle of understanding is similitudo rei exterioris, the intentio formed by intellect is also in the likeness of that thing [illi rei similem]. So: ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formandohuiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelllgat'". Saint Thomas now applies this distinction to divine knowledge [53.445]. The only species by which the divine intellect understands is the divine essence itself which is similitudo omnium rerum . The intentio or ratio or, Saint Thomas now uses another term, the verbum produced by the divine intellect in knowing itself is the image not only of the divine intellect but also of everything of which the divine essence is the image: sequitur quod conceptio intellectus divini, prout seipsum intelligit, quae est verbum ipsius, non solum sit similitudoipsius Dei intellecti, sed etiam omnium quorum est divina essentiasimilitudo. Sic ergo per unamspeciemintelligibilem,

inum ad hoc quod Deus multitudinem rerum intelligat, sed oportet quodsint in ipso intellectu divino; and 1.60,504: the truth of something is its imitation of its own proper ratioquae est in mentedivina. 99 SCG 1.53,444. For another use of intentio to distinguish the meaning of a truth or falsehood from its existence in a mind see In I Sent 19.5,3 ad 3 and A.Maurer. 'St Thomas and Eternal Troths' , MSt 32 (1970) 95ff.

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quae est divina essentia, et per unam intentionem intellectam, quae est verbum divinum,multapossunta Deo intelligi 100. The distinction between form as principle of knowledge [quo intelligitur] and form as object of knowledge [quod intelligitur], already used in QD de Ver 3,2 and ST 1,15, is also used here but expressed in terms of the verbum produced by the intellect. Saint Thomas applies it to both human and divine intelIigence . In the latter case the verbum explains how a multiplicity of objects known does not introduce composition to the divine intellect 101.

SCG 1.53: First Redaction The discarded versions of SeG 1.53 provide a unique opportunity to see Saint Thomas 'at work' . They witness to the development of his theory of knowledge and highlight his concerns in applying that theory to God l O2• The first redaction of seG 1.53 is confident that, from human knowledge, we can have some understanding of how God knows a multiplicity of things absque sui intellectus compositione [20*a49-52]. When the human intellect knows something outside itself, the form in intellect is the principle and not the object of intellect's knowledge [non " ut quod .. sed ut quo intelligitur]. It can become an object of intellect's knowing when by reflection [per quandam rej1exionem], intellect knows its own activity and the principle by which it knows [species qua intelligit]. From the form by which it is first formed, intellect can arrive at another intelIigible form which is per intellectum formata and is the object of its knowledge [quodintelligitur]. This is true of speculative and practical intellect and to some extent also of imagination [20*a53-20*b31]. In knowing its thought-up forms [secundorum cognitorum] intellect has a twofold intelIigible form, one qua intelligit tantum and the other qua intelligitet quae intelligitur simul. In knowing objects outside itself tprimorum intellecto100 SCG 1.53,445 [see Leonine edition, lXIII, 21*003-68]; 1.29 and 1.46. On the possibility of moving from human to divine knowing see In I Sent 36 ,1,1 in c [p.831]: quamvis scientia

Dei sit aIterius modi a scientia nostra, tamenper scientiam nostramaIiqualiter devenimus in scientiam Dei. For things of which God's intellect is capable but ours is not: In I Sen138,l ,5 in c, ad 2 and ad 7 fpp.909-12,915] ; 39,1,3 in c, ad 5 and ad 7 [pp.925-26]; QD de Ver 2,12 in c [all things are present for God]. Note also the commenl of Rousselot cited on p.197 above at note 8 101 SCG 1.53,444. For Geiger the presence of verbum is the principle of the move from human to divine knowledge : 'Les redactions successives', pp.221-40. The comment is on p.238 where he also says thai in the final redaction of 1.53 the doctrine of the word appears avec nettete See also ' Les idees divines', pp.200-04, especially p.20l. If one could date when St Thomas's theology of the Word took its definitive form one could also date SCG 1.53: Geiger , 'Les redactions successives' , p.239. The brief comments of SCG 1.53 are developed at length in SCG IV.U: see Chapter Six, A, below, 'The Word of Godand the Ideas'. 102 The first redaction is found in Leonine Edition , tXIII, pp.20*a47-21*a3 and the second redaction in Leonine Edition, t.XIII, p.21*a5-5l. For the first redaction, see Geiger, 'Les redactions successives' , pp.222-29,234-37: it was written prior to QD de Ver 4,2 in c (p.237). For the second redaction see Geiger, art.cit., pp.230-32 . For SCG 1,53 see Geiger, art.cit., pp.232-34,238-39 : it was written after QD de Ver 4,2 in c and 4.4ff in which 'Ia doctrine est loin d'y avoir atteint Ie meme degre de perfection' (p.239).

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rum) there is one form qua intelligitur which, in the second operation of the intellect, per quam intellectus supra seipsum redlt, becomes also quod intelligitur. By the form which is the principle of its knowing [species qua intelligit), the intellect knows it is in conformity with what is known [20*b32-42] . The divine intellect differs from the human intellect in simplicity and order. For the divine intellect the divine essence is the only species qua intelligitur. The human intellect is characterised by multiplicity and composition in its knowledge of a variety of things but the divine intellect, knowing all through one species, is not. The human intellect knows firstly the external object and in a second moment supra se redeundo knows itself knowing. God however knows himself firstly and other things per posterius : secundumquod, intelligendo essentiam suam,intelligitrespectus qui eius ad alia sunt vel esse possunt ... Deus igitur per essentiamsuam non solum suam essentiam cognoscit, sed respectus eius ad omniaquae sunt [20*1>49-59]. Considered in itself the divine essence is prima species qua intelligitur. Considered as understood in itself, the divine essence is that cuius cognitio 44-48]. 117 According

toStThomas Aristotle says (inMeta VII [= Z) that the material house comes

a domoquaeest in mente: see Chapter Four atpp.I53-54 above. 118 Meta

a.l [993b30-31]. For the distinction between ens quod est in mente and ens quod dividiturper x genera rerum, StThomas refers toMeta VI.2 and VI.4 and rejects a naively realistic view. 120 See In I Sent 36,2,1 [pp.838-40]. ForAverroes see Chapter Four, p.182 with note 208 above and forAristotle see Chapter Four atpp.l53-54 above. 119

121 Boethius: quia ex multitudine jormarum intellectarum a Deo rerum prodiit multitudo [Arismetic ., inprine.]and Chapter Two, pp.88-92 above. Augustine: Chapter One above, pp.3847and Chapter Two above, pp.70-88. Paul: Romans 11.36. John: John 13-4. See also Chapter

Six, A,below, 'The Word of God and the Ideas'.

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Things have a more noble existence in God since res in Deo non sunt aliud quamdivina essentia . According to Anselm the creature in the creator is creantis essentiatu. Material things exist more nobly even in the human intellect, where they exist immaterially, than in themselves, where they exist materially. For Plato the ideal man is more true than the man existing in materia. He was of course mistaken to regard the ideas as existing perse, says Saint Thomas, but he touched the truth if only remotely [a veritate coactus eam a longe tangens]. However, the existence of material things in the divine mind or in the human mind, nobler though it is, is not their essesimpliciter, quia ibi non habent proprium esse suae naturae, ex quo dicuntur esse simpliciter, sed quoddam esse nobilius [22*a25-27].

Whydo the IdeasDisappear in SCGI54? This fine synthesis of the doctrine of divine ideas, appealing to most of Saint Thomas's preferred authorities and sources, is replaced in the final text by SCG 1.54.452-54. In that final text, as we have seen, the term idea occurs once in ref erence to the views of Plato [54.454]. We have no evidence that Saint Thomas omitted the text here in order to re-introduce it later l 23• In fact there is no more suitable location for an account of the ideas as his other writings testify . What could have happened to make Saint Thomas omit this account of the rationes rerum in the divine intellect, arguably his finest statement of the doctrine? There are indications that, in re-writing SCG I, Saint Thomas was highly sensitive to anything that would threaten the divine simplicity'>', Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of ideas came to weigh more heavily with him as he

set about re-writing sea I in Italy after 1260. In the light of that critique the text he suppressed perhaps seemed too platonic. His statement, secundum hunc modum verificatur quod Plato dixit de ydeis may have been an expression of fright rather than joy if a fresh reading of Aristotle was reminding him of the dangers in Plato's theory of ideas l 25 . A platonic understanding of the ideas 122 Anselm: see note 57 at p.206 above. In his commentary on the Gospel of John, St Thomas says creatura in Deo est creatrix essentia: see Chapter Six, Abelow, especially pp.243-45. 123 As happened to the chapters on the life and happiness of God, originally inserted between SOO 1.44 and 1.45 but now to be found at 1.97-102. Of three sections originally belonging after SCG 1.49 and 1.54, two survive as 1.55 and 1.56 while the third, like the present passage, disappears entirely: Leonine Edition, t.XIII, pp.l6*-17* and 22*a37-22*b72. 124 In the course of re-writing SCG I St Thomas avoided speaking of a multiplicity of forms: in 1.51,430 multa intellecta and ista intellecta replace formae multorum intellectorum and formae illae [19*b74-75; 20*31]. In 20*a7-12 [originally between 1.51,430 and 431] alia intelligibilia replaces formae aliorum intelligibilium. A change from pluralitas seu distinctio rationum to rationes rerum at 1.54,452 (lines 9-10) [22*a31] confirms his concern about anything that would threaten the divine simplicity, a concern to which the second redaction of SCG 1.53 bears clearest testimony. 125 It seems likely that Saint Thomas was using some new edition of Aristotle's Metaphysics: the corrections to SCG 1.57,479; 1.59,494 [24*b37]; 1.60,504 [25*a33-34] and 1.61,508 [25*a57-58] concern the numbering of the books of the Metaphysics.

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would undermine the reality of the material creation and Saint Thomas's final comment, that the esse naturale of things is their esse simpliciter even though their existence in God's mind is an esse nobilius, reflects an ontology that is clearly not platonic. What we are witnessing in the suppression of the first redaction of SCG 1.54 is, perhaps, Saint Thomas becoming aware of a tension between that understanding of the divine ideas for which they are in the divine mind as the ideas are in the mind of an artist or craftsman, and the neoplatonist understanding for which the ideas in the divine mind are the divine mind. We have seen that Aristotle stands at the head of both of these understandings with his notion of the form in the mind of the artist and his understanding of (divine) intelligence in which thinking, object of thought and act of thinking are identical. A Christian correction of neoplatonism had already been proposed by Dionysius. Saint Thomas is deeply influenced by both Dionysius and Aristotle as he composes SCG I and his own correction of the platonic notion of the ideas is in the direction which he believed to have been indicated by Dionysius and Aristotle together. It has been commented that in SCG 1.53-54 "one comes to sense most clearly that the doctrine of divine ideas is logically peripheral to Saint Thomas' treatment of the question of God's knowledge" 126. It is difficult to see how this can be true when, not many years later, Saint Thomas returns to the theme in ST 1,15. In any case the ideas do not serve an epistemological function only in the thought of Saint Thomas but must be understood also in the light of ontological considerations'P,

D.THEEXTENT OFTHEIDEAS The question "of what are there ideas?" is a classical one for the platonic tradition beginning with Plato himselP28. In answering it Saint Thomas applies two criteria: God's knowledge extends as far as his bestowal of being and there is an idea in God of everything that he knows. A distinction between a broad sense of idea as ratio or similitudo and a strict sense of idea as exemplar or forma [QD

'The Problem of Divine Exemplarity', p.214 Farthing, 'The Problem of Divine Exemplarity' , pp.I85,195,214,221. See Chapter Six and Chapter Seven below for Jhefull context and significance of JhedocJrinefor St Thomas. It should be noted that JhedocJrine of Jheideas in God is absent from Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia where one would, perhaps, have expected it to appear: see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino , pp.200ff. The much shorter, and unfinished, Compendium Theolog iae likewise makes no use of Jhe docJrinebut neiJherdoes it include a treatment of God's knowledge. 128 Plato, Parmenides 130BD; Aristotle, Metaphys ics 0..9 [990a33-991a32] ; Plotinus , Enneads V.7; VI.7 and Proclus, CP Book III Cousin 815-833 [Dillon pp.1SO-55,179-92]. See Gersh. From lamblichus, pp.88-90; Lipperheide, Thomas von Aquino, pp.l03-11 and Dubois, De Exemplarismo Divino, pp.92-95. 126 Farthing, 127

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de Ver 3,3] helps him to respond to difficulties 129. It is a distinction which emerges from his combining of Augustinian and Dionysian traditions.

1. Ideas ofIndividuals Saint Thomas says that God knows things in their particularity, singularity and concrete uniqueness 130. God knows singulars because he knows whatever has being and universalia .. non sunt res subsistentes, sed habent esse solum in singularibus, ut probatur in Vll Metaphysicaev" , No clearer statement of his acceptance of radical aristotelian ontology is possible. The quid est is the concrete and in following Aristotle in this way Saint Thomas' account of the divine ideas is characterised by what has been called "the radical intelligibility of the singular" 132. Philosophers believed that ideas of individuals entailed impossible consequences: an infinity of ideas, a plurality of forms and the impossibility of fortuitous events 133. For Plato the intention of nature is the species and not the individual as such and so he excluded ideas of

individuals'>, Saint Thomas says

129 For the reach of God's knowledge see SCG 1.63-71 and on the extent of the ideas see STJ,15,3 andQD de Ver 3,4-8. See also ST 1,79,11. 130 See SCG 1.63-64 and pp.I96-200 above. Note also SCG 1.6S,537: the divine intellect contains the likeness of all things usque ad rerum minima, ad quae pertingit sua causaJitas. 13t SCG 1.65, especially §S30. The reference is to MewphysicsZ.13 [1038b8-1S]. See In XII Meta §§1570-74 and, on God 's knowledge of singulars, QD de Ver 2.5; 2,7; STJ,14,11; SCG 1.65. 132 Jordan, 'The Intelligibility of the World' , p.24. For the significances of quid est or "t\ ilv see QD de Ver 15,2 ad 3. Compare Jaeger's comments about Aristotle: see Chapter Four, p.I73, note 161 above. t33QD de Ver 3,8. Already at QD de Ver 3,2 sc 3 St Thomas refers to Augustine, Epist 14.4 [CSEL XXXIV (1895) pp.34-35; PL 33.80] which states that just as there is not one ratio of angle and square neither is there one ratio of man and this man: see Chapter One, p.43 above. Aristotelian-inspired epistemology has difficulties explaining real (universal and immaterial) knowledge of individual (particular and material) things. It is Aristotle's greatest difficulty as we have seen: Chapter Four, pp.l54-56 above. Booth, AAOICT, pp.I4-15,17,25, refers to 'the intractable question of a structuring that comprehends individuality with definability' (p.17). See also In I Sent 36.1.1 [pp.829-33]; 36 ,2 3 ad 3 [p.845]; Quodlibet 8,1,2; STJ,14,2 ; 14,11 and lS,3 ad 4. Also relevant is Rousselot, The Intellectualism ofSt Thomas, pp.111-32, especially: ' the intuition of real external being in its individuality is wanting to human knowledge. St Thomas was aware of this. Many who came after him failed to see the the essential difference between intuition and discursive reasoning because they had no proper grasp of what is meant by intellectual possession of reality' (p.132), and Joseph Owens C.Ss.R., 'Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea' , MSt 21 (1959) 211-23. On the distinction intellectus I ratio see Rousselot, op.cit., pp.63-85. t34 STJ,15,3 arg 4 and ad 4. See Henle. Saint Thomas and Platonism, ST [7],p.211. Note also QD de Ver 1.S [line 379 with note]; 3,8 [lines 40-63] ; Plato. Philebus 16DE; Aristotle , Metaphysics a .6 [987b1-14.988a7-11] and1.9 [99Ob29] with St Thomas , In XII Meta §219, and Sertillanges, SommeTheologique, pp.362-63, n.[ISO].

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that in the strict sense of exemplar there is no idea of a genus apart from a specific realisation of that genus. In an early work he writes: exemplar quod est in mente divina primo naturam speciei respicit in qualibet creatura 135.

But in his maturer work he says that because God's providence extends to individual things there must be ideas of individuals and not just of species: Nos autem ponimus Deum causam esse singularis et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, ponimus etiam quod per divinam providentiam diffiniuntur omnia singularia, et ideo oportet nos etiam singularium ponere ideasl 36 .

Individual differences originate from matter of which there is an idea in a qualified sense [see below] and so there are ideas of individuals in some sense. With the conviction that God is cognitor et operator singularium Saint Thomas cuts through the doubts and hesitations of the philosophers on the question of ideas of individuals [QD de Ver 3,8 sc 1]. Still he says that there are in God rationes rerum magiscommunium which have a greater extension than (rationes) minus communiavt. Higher natures know a greater variety and multiplicity of things in a simpler and more unified way than lower natures do 138• In the strict sense of idea as the exemplar of something as it is in esse productibilis there is one idea of individual, species and genus. In the broad sense of idea as ratio or similitudo there are distinct ideas corresponding to the distinct considerations of genus, species and individ ual 139 •

2. An IdeaofMateria Prima? God's knowledge of singulars presupposes his knowledge of materia primaw'. The analogy of the human craftsman suffers from the limitation that his idea is 135 Quodlibet S,1,2 in c

(dating from 1257). providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species . sed ad singularia, ut infra dice tur - ST.I,15,3 ad 4. See ST.1,22,2-3; QD de Ver 3,8 [lines 64-68] and In I Sent 36.2,3 ad 3 [p.845]. For nos au/em ponimus see also QD de Ver 3,5.35-36; 3.7.58 and note 142 below. For diffiniuntur see DN V.S [S24C]. For Augustine's witness to this point see ST.1,103,5 sc. For God's knowledge of individuals see In I Sent 36,1.1 [pp.829-33]; ST.I.14.11 and 16,1. For God's providence extending to individuals see In I Sent 39,2.2 [pp.929-36]; QD de Ver 5,3; ST.1.103,5-6 and In de Div Nom §596. See also Lipperheide, Thomas von Aquino , p.llO. 137 QuodlibetS,!,l ad 2. As an example he contrasts a mathematical idea with the idea of a stone. 138 In de Div Nom §726; SeG 1.65,534 and ST.1,84.1 ad 2: higher knowers know all that lower knowers do excellentiori modo. See QD de Ver 10,5 ad 6; ST 1,57,2; QD de Ver 2,5 and ST.1,14,11. It is clearly a neoplatonist principle applied to knowledge. 139 QD de Ver 3,S ad 2. There is nothing fortuitous for the agent who ' pre-knows' all things (ad 3) and 'mongrel' beings have as their idea the idea of their 'male' cause (ad 4). 140 QD de Ver 2,5 [lines 311-13]: intellectus divinus qui habet stmtlitudinem materiae, quamvis immaterialiter, potest singularia cognoscere . See ST.1.26,4 ad 2. The human intellect does not know singulars: QD de Ver 2,5 ad 1, ad 13 and ad 17; 2,6; Quodlibet 7.1,3 in c. On human, angelic and divine knowledge of material things: QD de Ver 10,4. See George 136 Sed

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the cause only of the form of what is made. Through it he knows the form but it is only through sensation that he knows it as this particular house made from these particular materials. The divine idea however is the cause of everything, matter as well as fonn. Therefore God per ideam non tantum eognoscit naturam rei, sed etiam bane rem esse in tali tempore,et omneseonditiones quae consequuntur rem vel ex parte materiaevel ex parte formae l 4 1. Though known by God, materia prima is by definition formless and therefore seems incapable of having an idea. For Plato matter and the ideas are concausal and therefore exclusive of each other. For the Christian faith, matter also is created by God since creation is ex nihilo. But it is created only and always along with some form , As there is in God an idea of the composite thing, so there must also be some idea of matter 142. Saint Thomas describes the being of materia prima in a number of ways. As the least perfect grade of being, esse in potentia, its corresponding idea in God is the least perfect example of an idea l43• Of itself materia prima has neither being nor knowabilityw'. It is ens in potentia 145 and has esse debilevw. But be-

P.Klubertanz SJ, ' St Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular', NS 26 (1952) 135-66 and Francisco L.Peccorini, 'Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suarez and Recent Interpreters' , Thom 38 (1974) 606-55. 141 In I Sent 38 ,1,3 ad 2 [p.904). See QD de Ver 2,7 ad 6; Quodlibet 8,1,2 in c; ST ,1,14,6; 44,2 and see pp.I98-99 with notes 16-20 above. Note Quodlibet 7,1,3: unde rationesideales in

mente ipsius existentesnon solumsunt efficacesad cognitionem universalium, sed etiam ad singularia cognoscendaa Deo and ST,1,14,11 in c: Cum enim [Deus]sciat alia a se per essentiam suam, inquantum est similitudorerum velutprincipiumactivumearum, necesseest quod essentia sua sit principiumsufficienscognoscendi omnia quaeper ipsumfiunt, non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientiaartificis,si esset productiva totius rei, et nonformoe tantum. 142 ST,1,15,3 ad 3: nos ponimus. See 1,15,3 in c; In I Sent 36,2,3 ad 2 [pp.844-45) ; QD de Ver 3,5 sc 1 and in c [lines 28-36] and QD de Pot 3,1 ad 12 and ad 13. For the Christian doctrine of creation : Ambrose, In Hexaem , 1,1 [PL 14.123]; Calcidius, In Tim PI 298 [11,245) and Peter Lombard, Lib Sent 11,1,1. See also Aristotle , Metaphysics a.6 [987b18-21 ,988a7-14]; a .to (987b20] and Physics 1.8 [187al7]. For the emergence of the doctrine of creaiio ex nihilo see Chapter One, pp.35-36 above. 143 In I Sent 36,2,3 ad 2 [pp.844-45]: in se vero habet esse imperfectum secundum ultimum

gradum essendi,qui est esse in potentia. 144 ST 1,15,3 ad 3: Nam materia secundum se nequeesse habet,nequecognoscibilis est. 145 See StAlbert, In XI [= A] Metaphys , tr.I, cap.IV [Borgnet VI.586] and St Thomas , In de Div Nom §§606,610,628,641 ; DN V.8 [821C] and In de Div Nom §655. For materia as ens in potentia andforma as magis ens quam ipsa see St Thomas, In XII Meta, §§1278,1292,I293, 1687,1806,1831,1848, 2305,2369£f,2433,2437 and SCG 1.65,531-32. 146 QD de Ver 2,11 ad 5: ipsum non ens ens dicitur analogice, ut patet in IV Metaphysicae [the reference is to Metaphysics r .l (lOO3bl0»). See also QD de Ver 3,5 ad 1; In I Sent 36 ,2,2 in c [p.842]: ex hoc efficitur alius respectusessentiaedivinae ad ea quae habent tantum esse et ad ea quae habentesse et vivere, et similiterad ea quae diversimode esse habent; QD de Pot 7,2 ad 9 and Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas', pp.I93,195 with n.74.

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cause God's causality extends as far as materia prima, his knowledge must do so too and therefore there is an idea of materia prima in God147. Everything created participates in being in a way that is tenuous and infinitely inferior to the way in which God exists. Participated being plus habetde non esse quam de esse and this is true even of supposedly separate forms which, though immaterial, would still be participans ipsum esse 148. At the same time every being, no matter how imperfect, is modelled on the first being [a primo ente exemplariter deducitur] and so the divine essence is also similitudo materiae 149. There is the faintest reflection of form in matter because it has debile esse and even though it cannot exist without form. To the extent that it has esse it is an image of the first being and as such supports some similitudo in

000 150 • Rousselot writes: We must admit, then, individualised matter has its own type in God which is somethingincommunicable and, like itself, incomplete and substantiallydistinct from the form which imparts being to it. We are here at the very antipodes of universalisation, and are in the presenceof what may be consideredthe most difficult case for an idea which is at once subjectivelyspiritualand objectively particularlSI . Saint Thomas concludes: in the strict sense of exemplar there is no idea of materia prima in God since it is not productibilis in esse apart from form. In this sense there is an idea of matter only in composito. In the broad sense of ratio one can speak of an idea of materia prima in God 152. 147 QDde Ver3,5 [lines 37-39]: necesseest ponere quod aJiquo modo sit eius idea in Deo, cum quicquid ab ipso caustuursimilitudinem ipsiusutcumqueretineat, It seems to bebased on Augustine, ConfXII.7 [pL32.828) as referred to in ST,1,44,2 sc. ForStThomas's understandingof materia seealso QD de Ver2,6ad 1 [lines 96-119] andST1,85,1ad 2. 148 QD de Ver2,3ad 16: illudesse quodhabetcum a Deo sit a Deocognoscitur. See QD de

Malo 16,3 in c andIn Booth de Hebdom 1,2, §§34-35. 149 In I Sent 3,3,3 ad 2. SeeSeQ 1.65,540 : id quo intellectus divinus intelligit, etsi immate-

riale sit, est tamen et materiae et formae similitudo , sicut primum principium productivum

utriusque. A broad sense of exemplar shows how angelic essences might beregarded as exem plaria materialium rerum but not as the divine essence is: QD de Ver 8,8 ad 1. Rousselot

warns: 'We mustnot confound thetheory of universal symbolism with thedoctrine of theistic

exemplarism; according to which themost spiritual beings themselves have their archetypes in thebosom of theWord': The Intellectualism ofSt Thomas, p.I60,n.24. Ontheuseof symbols in theology see Rousellot, op.cit., pp.147-67. 150 QDde Ver3,5 ad I; QDde Pot3,1 ad 12: materiaprima habetsimilitudinem cum Deo in quantumens, non in quantum ens actu. Namens, communeest quodammodo potentiae et aclui andad 13. StThomas's developed understanding of esse corrects earlier references to ens in potentia: Sertillanges, Somme Theologique, p.362, n.[149] and Caj etan, Commentaria in ST,I,15,3, §IV. 151 The Intellectualism ofSt Thomas, p.117. 152 QD de Ver3,5 [lines 40-50]; ad sc I, ad sc 2 [matter is pars essentiaetotius]; ad 4 and QDde Pot3,1ad 13 [strictly speaking there is noideaof matter because ideais formafactiva].

See Bauer, 'Die IdeenIehre Platens',pp.72-74 andBranick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas', p.195,n.74: thevery factthatan ideacan signify matter in anysense shows thattheideas arenot forms - esseis notdirectly other than mailer as form is.

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3. Ideas ofPossibles Just as a human craftsman knows forms which will never be realised in the material world, so God knows things that are merely possible [SCG 1.66, especially §543]. Again Saint Thomas applies the criteria that God's knowledge extends as far as his bestowal of being and that he has ideas of all that he knows. God knows all that he can do and therefore he knows possibles. So there must be ideas of possibles in Godl S3• Dionysius however seems to exclude ideas of possibles by confining the ideas to God's actual practical knowledge: what the divine will has decided to bring into being at some time l54 • It is true, says Saint Thomas, that possibles remain indeterminate and that what actually was, is or will be is determined ex proposito divinae voluntatis. The ideas of possibles are correspondingly inde terminate. Saint Thomas appeals to his distinction between a broad and a strict sense of idea. As a principle of making or generation the idea is an exemplar and belongs to practical knowledge, he says. In this sense the idea is related to everything God makes in time. As a principle of knowledge the idea is a ratio and belongs also to speculative knowledge. In this sense the idea is related to everything God knows, even if it is never made in time. But God has ideas of all that he knows, the divine ideas having the same extent or reach as the divine knowledge itself. So in the strict sense of exemplar there is no idea of possibles in God whereas in the broad sense of ratio there are ideas of possibles in God 155 • The divine will is involved with possibles in the sense that God wills that he be capable of producing such things and that he know how to produce them. Dionysius speaks of the exemplar not as praedifjiniens et efficiens [pre-defining and effecting] but as diffinitiva et effectiva [definitive and effective] to indicate that the strict meaning of exemplar refers to actual determination and production and its broader meaning to possible determination and production 156. God knows non-beings as having being in some way, either in his power or in their own causes or, in the case of those that actually come to be in some time, in themselves 157. 153 QD de Vet 3,6 se 1. See QD de Ver 2,8 [lines 45-48,78-81] ; 3,3 [lines 95-100,12732 ,167-68]; 3,6 [lines 35-41] and STJ ,14.9. 154 ST 1.15,3 arg 2 and ad 2 ; QD de Ver 2,8 ad 3 and 3,6 especially arg 3 . In the text of ST J,15,3 arg 2 there is a strong MS tradition in favour of divinae voluntaJis [ACDGpBab]. 155 ST,I.15,3 ad 2; QD de POI 1,5 ad 11; Quodlibet 5.9 in e ; QD de Ver 2,8 ad 3; 3,6 [lines 41-47] and STJ,22,2 in e. 156 QD de Ver 3,6 ad 3 and QD de Pot 1,5 ad 10: rationes illas, dequibusDionysius loquitur {DN Vi, intelligit esse produclivas existentium absolute, non solum autem eorum quae nunc sunt in actu. Idea in the full sense requires reference to God 's will. The strict sense of idea in eludes virtual practical knowledge according to QD de Ver 3,3 in e (in fine) . See Chapter Six , B , below , on 'The Ideas in the Theology of Creation', and Dewan, 'St Thomas, James Ross, and

Exemplarism', p.233. 157 SCG 1.66,553. For God's knowledge of non-being: QD de Ver 3,4 ad 2 and ad 7; In I Sent 38,1 ,4 [pp.905-06]; ST J,14,9 and Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas', pp.195ff.

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In speaking about God's knowledge of possibles Saint Thomas frequently appeals to a distinction between two kinds of knowledge. Of things which at some time really exist God has what he terms scientia visionis. Though essentially one, this is a distinct knowledge of things involving distinct rationes ideales and is a proper seeing of what exists outside the one who sees. Of possibles God has what Saint Thomas calls simplex intelligentia, God knowing them in knowing his own power. Never having distinct being, they are not known as distinct things and so God knows them not per ideas distinctas but per cognitionem suae potentiae in qua sunt. This is a knowledge of what does not exist outside the seer l SS• The line to be walked is a fine one: how to explain things in such a way that the ideas do not come to be regarded as creaturely determinants of God's knowledge.

4. Ideas ofAccidents If God knows all things this must include accidents. Yet Plato denied that there could be ideas of accidents'P, If perfect esse belongs to the composite of matter, form and accidents so too does the idea in the full sense of the term. But to the extent that accidents have esse by imitating the divine essence their idea must be in God 160. God is the immediate cause of every single thing and works immediately in every single thing. This includes secondary causes whose effects come about through his predefining decision. This means that secondary beings as well as first beings have ideas corresponding to them in God 16 1• So the ideas extend to accidents as well as to substances.

ISS In III Sent 14,2,2 in e: diverse respectus means diverse rationes and therefore proper ideas. See also QD de Ver 2,7 ad 6; STJ,14,9; In I Sent 38,1,4 £pp.90.>06]; 39,1 ,2 [pp.922-24] and SCG 1.66,550-51 : notitia visionis and notitia simplicis intelligentiae. God knows infinites with scientia simplicis intelligentiae: SCG 1.69,590. For the problem of the possibles see

Lawrence Dewan OP , 'St Thomas and the Possibles', NS 53 (1979) 76 -85 ; Wippel, 'Th e Reality of Nonexisting Possibles'; Ross, 'Aquinas' Exemplarism; Aquinas' Voluntarism' ; Maurer, 'James Ross on the Divine Ideas '; Dewan, 'St Thomas, James Ross , and Exemplarism' and Ross, 'Response to Maurer and Dewan ' . 159 ST J,15,3 arg 4 and ad 4. See QD de Ver 3,5 [lines 28-29] ; 3 ,7 se 1 and in e [lines 42-58] and In I Sent 36,2,3 ad 4 (p.845). St Thomas refers to Augustine, De Div Qq LXXX/ll .46. See Aristotle, Meta a .9; a .I4-15 [99Ob27,991b6]; B.8 [99900] and Nie Eth 1.6 [1096317] ; Thomas, In XII Meta, §§10.13-17 ; Plato , Phaedo 99E-l00DE; Euthyphro 6DE. The views of the philosopher Clement [ON V.9 (824D)] are equivalent to those of Plato : QD de Ver 3 ,2 [lines 117-24] and 3,7 [lines 52-55] . 160 In I Sent 36,1,3 ad 4 [pp.837-38] ; 36,2,3 se and ad 4 [pp.844-45]; QD de Ver 3 ,6 se 1; 3,7 [lines 58ft]; SCG 11.22 [omneens inquantum habetesse, sit ei (Deo)simile]; QD de Pot 3,1 ad 12 and ST J,14,3 in e. See also DN VII.2 [868D-869C] with In de Div Nom §§717-26, espe cially §724. Accident is ens in alio: SCG 1.65,531 and 532. 161 QD de Ver 3,7 [lines 61-62]: ~ eiuspraediffinitioneproveniant. As before ' we' refers to the Christian tradition including St Thomas and Dionysius as the content and terminology make clear: see DN V.8 [824C] and note 142 on p.228 above . For the same doctrine, that God oper ates in everything, see also ST J ,105,5 ; SCG III.67; QD de Ver 3,7 ad 1 and QD de Pot 3,7 .

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The ideas of accidents correspond to the being of accidents 162. Proper accidents are included in the idea of the subject itself whereas accidents supervening on a subject have a distinct idea in God. To the extent that they are forms there must be divine ideas corresponding to accidents 163. In the broad sense of ratio there are ideas in God corresponding to both kinds of accidents 164. In this sense the idea is similitudo omniumquae sunt in re, et accidentalium et essentialium. In knowing his own essence God knows the essences of all things as well as quaecumque eis accidere possuntv».

5. An Idea ofEvil? God's active power and therefore his knowledge extend usque ad remotissima , even to the least worthy parts of the universe [vilia]. Evil [malum] too is known by God not per propriam rationem but along with the ratio of good. Evil is simply privatio debitae perfectionis and is knowable only as privatio boni since this is what it iSI66• Neither in the strict sense of exemplar or the broad sense of ratio is there an idea of evil in God 167. Nothing in God could be the principle of evil. For Dionysius the idea is praedifftnitio divinae voluntatis and since the divine will is directed only to what is good, there can be no idea of evil in God 168. Ratio indicates form whereas evil means formlessness , what escapes completely from participation in the divinity 169. There is no nature to evil by which it participates in God or accepts God's likeness'?', 162 QD de Vcr 2,4 ad 6; ST).,77,6; In XII Meta §2420. 163 QD de Ver 3 ,7 sc 2 and in c [lines 66-89] and ad 3; ST J,15,3 ad 4 and In I Sent 36,2,3 ad 4 [p.845]: accidents are in some sense imitaiio or participaiio of the divine essence . 164 QD de Vcr 3,3 [lines 143ff] ; 3,7 in c [lines 89-99] and ad 2; and Aristotle, Metaphysics a .14 [990b27] . 165QD de Ver 2,4 ad 6; STJ,14,14 in c andad 2. 166See SCG 1.70-71, especially §§593,605-07,616. For the sense in which God knows evil see In I Sent 36,1 ,2 [pp.833-35]. There is no sense in which evil is present in the divine essence or 'in God ' . The fact that evil is known by God though not caused by him means that God's knowledge is not the cause of things simpliciter : In I Sent 38 ,1,1 in c and ad 1 [pp.898-99]; QD de Ver 2,15 ad 1. See Chapter Six, B, below, 'The Ideas in the Theology of Creation'. 167STJ,15,3 ad 1. See In I Sent 36 ,1,2 in c, ad 3 and ad 4 [pp.834 ,835]; 36,2,3 ad 1 [p.844] ; ST J,14,10 and 19,9 and QD de Ver 3,4 esp. ad 3 and ad 7: negationeset privationes non sunt

nisi entia rationls. 168QD de Ver 3,4 sc 2 and in c [lines 66-80, with note to line 74]. See DN V.8 [824C]. The tradition that evil is a privation of good [In I Sent 36,2 3 ad 1 (p.844) for example] can be traced through Dionysius' treatment of evil in DN IV, to Proclus' De Malorum Subsistentia on the one hand [influential in DN IV. 17ff: cf Pera edit., In de Div Nom, 375-98 and D.Isaac, C.Steel: Proclus: Trois etudes sur la providence. lI/: De l'existence du mal [paris 1982]], and to Augustine's De naJura boni on the other [quoted by St Thomas at QD de Ver 3 ,4 sc 3 and obj 3: malum est privatio speciei, modi et ordinis (c.4 [pL 42.553])] and which may be compared with Augustine, Enchiridion c.ll [pL 40.236] as well as STJ.II,84,3 ad 2; QD de Ver 2, IS [line 19] and In I Sent 38,1,1 ad 3 [pp.899-900]. That evil has no efficient cause and cannol be 'i ntended' confutes Manicbeism says St Thomas: In I Sent 39,2,2 in c [p.931]. 169 QD de Ver 3,4 [lines 66-80 , with note to line 74]. 170QD de Ver 3,4 ad 2; QD de Pot 3,1 ad 14.

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Whatever being there is in evil actions is good and to that extent is from God. For example, malum poenae, the evil of punishment, belongs sub ratione ordinisjustitiae and as such is good with a corresponding idea in God'?'. There are some evils that God can be said to choose in willing the goods on which they follow or that God can be said to allow for the sake of the whole 172. To know light is to know darkness as its absence. One can speak of an idea of evil through its opposite. Evil is not the opposite of God's goodness, which can suffer no privation , but is opposed to the good of creatures. If God knew only himself he would not know evil but because he knows beings which can undergo privation , necesse est ut cognoscat privationes oppositas et mala op-

positaparticularibus bonis 173. Conclusion A few basic principles thus allow Saint Thomas to chart the extent of the divine ideas. It is important to note how consistently and significantly the requirements of the Christian faith guide his solutions to these traditional platonic aporia. CONCLUSION TO CHAPI'ER RVE

In his major systematic works, Saint Thomas ' account of divine knowledge includes an explanation of the divine ideas. The question of simplicity and plurality thereby raised is not due simply to the limitations of human language in speaking of God. The divine essence really is imitable in the myriad of ways in which God knows it to be imitable 'I", SCG I guards the divine simplicity in a masterly way. Its redactions and revisions testify to the development of the no171 QD de Ver 3,4 ad 5 and ad 8: the question of God 's punishmenl points towards the relation of God's providence to the divine knowledge and ideas . See ST l,15,3 ad 4; 22,2 ; 49,2 and Chapter Six, C, below, on 'Pro vidence and the Ideas ' . 172 ST l ,I ,2,3 ad I; 19,9; 22,2 ad 2 and In de Div Nom §543. 173 DN IV .30-31 and VII.2 [869BC] and Plotinus, Enneads 1.8.9 and 4.8.7: we know evil from good , vice through virtue . St Thomas argues thus at In I Sent 36,1,2 in c and ad 4 [pp.83435]. See also In I Sent 36,2,3 ad 1 [p.844] and QD de Ver 2,11 ad 5 ; 2,15 ad 4 and SCG 1.71,614. QD de Ver 2,15 argues from Aristotle that to know something means knowing its negation or privation. There is no trace there of the argument from Dionysius and even where he is mentioned (arg 2) the response is from Aristotle- non ens est quoddamodo ens-so that evil is in some sense knowable and true (ad 2). QD de Ver 3,4 likewise has no trace of the argument from Dionysius, but it returns in ST l ,14,1O. 174 QD de Pot 3,16 ad 14: isti diversi respectus ad creaturam non solum sunt in intellectu

nostro, sed etiam in intellectu divino. Nee tamen diversa aliqua sunt in intelleetu divino, in quibus Deus intelligat; quia intelligit tantum uno, quod est sua essentia; sed sunt ibi multa, ut ab ipso intellecta. Sicut enim nos intelligimus quodereaturapotest Deum multipliciterimitari, ita et Deus hoc intelligit;et per eonsequens intelligit diversos respectusereaturae ad Deum. See also QD de Pot 7,6 ad 5; In de Div Nom §665; Quodlibet 4,1 ,1 ad 2 and In III Sent 14,2,2 in c. See Sertillanges, Somme Theologique, p.361, n.[142] . Note also Quodlibet 4 ,1,1 in c: se-

cundum hoc sunt plures ideae, secundumquod intelligitur divina essentiasecundumdiversos respectusquos res habent ad ipsam, eamdiversimode imitantes.

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tion of verbum . And yet old questions remain while new ones arise. Is the verbum one or many? Has the problem of simplicity and plurality been simply shifted from the divine essence to the divine word, one intentio intellecta containing the many rationes known to God? And can such questions be answered without reference to 'divine ideas'? If not, how are the ideas distinguished from the Eternal Word which proceeds in that act of self-knowing in virtue of which God knows himself and all things in himself? If they are distinguished from the Divine Word, how are the ideas then to be related to it? An examination of these questions is the first task awaiting us in the next chapter. It is necessary to speak of 'idea' in God in two senses, as a principle of knowledge and as an exemplar [ST 1,15,1 in c]. Because God's effects pre-exist in him secundum modum intelligibilem, the divine essence which is identical with the divine intelligere is similitudo omnium rerum. God's essence is not only the likeness, it is also the principle of everything that is made. For the dionysian vision particularly the exemplars are the perfections of life, intelligence, being and goodness, divine attributes in which God, as the creative source and cause of all things, enables his creatures to participate. The second task of the next chapter is to examine Saint Thomas' theology of creation in or der to see more clearly how the ideas function as exemplars in his system. We have seen also that the requirements of Christian faith constitute the most significant factor in Saint Thomas' account of the extent of the ideas. God's bestowal of being and God's knowledge reach to the last and least of things and the divine ideas must, somehow, extend as far 175• This, again, points us towards the theology of creation and providence, something Saint Thomas does explicitly at the end of ST 1,15: the doctrine of the ideas opens onto the question of divine providence [15,3 ad 4]. The third task awaiting us in the next chapter is then to examine Saint Thomas' theology of providence and to relate it to the doctrine of divine ideas. This chapter has been concerned with the immediate context of Saint Thomas' accounts of the divine ideas, his treatment of the divine attribute of knowledge. But the doctrine of the ideas must also be situated within its systematic context. This means relating it to central doctrines of Saint Thomas' theological synthesis-his theology of the Word of God, his theology of creation and of divine providence-in order to define more clearly the meaning and function of that doctrine within his synthesis.

175 See

pp .225-33 above .

CHAPTER SIX

THE WORD, CREATION, PROVIDENCE ANDTHE IDEAS

A. THE WORDOF GOD AND THE IDEAS In the successive redactions of Summa Contra Gentiles 1.53, the plurality of ideas is secondary to the single verbum which is produced by the divine intellect. God is able to know a multitude of objects by one principle of intellection and without a multiplication of actualising principles'. The distinction of 'the form by which knowledge comes about' and 'the form which is known' is crucial to this development and is fundamental to Saint Thomas' theology of the Word of God. Its use in that theology poses a fresh challenge to the traditional understanding of a plurality of ideas in God. 1. The Word of the Father Generation ofthe Word For Saint Thomas every nature is fruitful and generates, emanates or proceeds in some way. The higher a nature is, the more intimate to it is what emanates from it [SeG IV. 11,3461]2. The highest and most perfect grade of life is intellectuallife since intellectus in seipsum reflectitur et seipsum intelligere potest. The highest perfection of intellectual life is God

in quo non est aliud intelligere et aliud esse .. et ita oportet quod intentio intellecta in Deo sit ipsadivinaessentia [IV.I 1,3465]3. This identity of intentio intellecta and essentia is unique to God. In human beings intentio intellecta, which is id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re inI Geiger, 'Les idees divines' , pp.202-03: SCG 1.53-54 shows that for St Thomas the formation of the word by the intellect is the means for giving 'une solution plus nette au probleme de la multiplicite des objets connus par Dieu' . See QD de Ver 3,2 ; ST,1,15,2 and Quodlibet 5.9. 2 SCG IV.11,3461: Marc Ed., Vol III, p.432 gives a text of St Bonaventute on twelve kinds of generation in creatures which point to the eternal generation in God. See ST,I,42,2 ad I ; 1,19,2 in c: res enimnaturalis nonsolumhabetnaturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni .. sed etiam ut proprium bonum in alia diffundat secundum quod possibi/e est, and Aristotle, Physics II.1 [l92b8-193al0]. Of St Thomas' accounts of the Divine Word, SCG IV.11ffis here taken as the basic one while reference is made to his other accounts where appropriate . 3 Intentio inte//ecta has already been explained as quandam intentionem rei inte/lectae quae est ratio ipsius quam significatdefinitio - SCG 1.53,443. See Marc Ed., Vol III, p.265, note 3; Rousselot, TheIntellectualism ofSt Thomas and Chapter Five. pp.214-25 above.

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tellecta, is neither the thing itself that is understood nor the substance of the in tellect but is quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta [IV.l1,3466]4. In God, because esse and intelligere are identical, the intentio intellecta is ipse eius intellectus. In God intellectus, et res quae intelligitur, et intentio intellecta are all one [IV .l1,3467]. Saint Thomas credits Aristotle with seeing this identity in God of intellectus, intelligens and intellectum>. Generation in God, therefore, is secundum intellectualem emanationem [IV .ll,3468]. In knowing himself, God is in himself as intellectum in intelli gente. However [i]ntelleetum .. in intelligente est intentio intelleeta et verbum . Est igitur in Deo intelligente seipsum Verbum Dei quasi Deus intelleetus: sicut verbum lapidis in intelleetu est lapis intellectus [IV. 11,3469, referring to John 1.1, ' the Word was with God']. Because the divine intellect is always actual and has always known itself, the divine Word is co-eternal with God quia intellectus in actu numquam est sine verbcs. Because God knows himself uno et simplici intuitu there is only one Word of God [IV . 13,3485, referring to John 1.14,18]7.

The Word ofGod Is God God's Word is God eternally. Unlike the intentio intellecta of the human intellect, the divine Word is res in natura existens et subsistens and shares the divine essence in eadem natura numeros. The Word is God secundum essentiam

suam and not participative as angels and human beings can be said to be divine 9. The fulness of God is contained in the Word and yet the Father is not diminished by the generation of the Word, quia nee etiam apud nos desinit esse propria natura in re quae intelligitur, ex hoc quod verbum nostri intelleetus ex ipsa re intellecta habet ut intelligibiliter eandem naturam contineat [SCG IV. 14,3.500].

4 See Quodlibet5,5,2 and QD de Ver4,1. 5 Super Evangelium SJoannis Leetura I,I,§65; SCG 11.98,1845 and QD de Ver 4,2 ad 5. This identity is a characteristicof divine intelligence not of humanintelligence or of intelligence as such according to Lonergan: 'it is in the self-possessionof understandingas the ground of possible conceptualizationthat one may best discern what is meant by saying that the self-expression of understandingis an emanatio intelligibilis, a processionfrom knowledge as knowledge, and because of knowledge as knowledge' [Verbum, p.42], but [p.71] ' except in divine self-knowledge' the esse naturale of a thing 'is not identical with knowing it' . On procession and the metaphysical notions it presupposes see Lonergan, op.cit., pp.98-140,I97-201. On interpretingAristotleon intelligencesee ChapterFour, pp.170-72above. 6 SCG IV.11,3470; IV.14,3499. 7 The Word alone proceeds per viam intellectus, quiaprocedit ab uno says St Thomas in QD de Ver4,3 in c. See QD de Ver4,2 ad 7 for the differencebetween verbum andamor in God. S See SCG IV.11,3465 and 3466, 3471 [referring to John l.l, ' the Word was God'] and 3472, with note I, p.267, Marc Ed., Vol III. See also SCG1.13;1.16; 1.22; 1.45,383; IV.14,3502 and 3509; Super Evang.Ioann. I,I,§28: quicquidest in naturaDei, est Deus, and I.I ,§46. 9 Super EvangJoann. I,I ,§57.

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It was customary for the Greeks to signify the separation and elevation of something by adding the article to its name, says Saint Thomas . The platonists, wishing to highlight separated substances like 'separated good' and 'separated man' used the expressions ' the good in itself' [ly per se bonum] and 'the man in itself' [lyper se hominem]. So too Saint John signifies the separation and exalted nature of the Word of God by adding the article to A6'Y~, as if he were to write in Latin ly verbum [6 A6'Y~]IO. Everything is simply one in God but notionally [ad rationem] something can pertain to God's subsistence, essence or esse. Intelligens, intelligere and intentio intellecta [Verbum] are the same reality but one can speak of what pertains ad rationem intelligentis, ad rationem eius quod est intelligere or ad rationem intentionis intellectae sive Verbi. Saint Thomas says it belongs to the meaning of the latter quod procedatab intelligente secundum suum intelligere, cum sit quasi terminus intellectualisoperationis: intellectus enim intelligendo concipit et format intentionem sive rationem intellectam, quaeest interiusverbum[IV.11,3473]. Proceeding from God's intelligere, the Word is related to God knowing sicut ad eum a quo est. To be ab alio deductam is what it means to be a word [QD de Ver 4,4 ad 3]. So while intelligens, intelligere and Verbum are essentially one in God and each is God, remanet tamen .. distinctiorelationis, prout Verbumreferturad concipientemut a quo est [IV. 11,3473, referring to John 1.1-2, 'the Word was God' and 'was in the beginning withGod']. The only thing that distinguishes this Word from the sayer is that the Word is ab ipso. Everything attributed to God speaking [the Father] is attributed to the Word of God [the Son] and vice versa, except 'ab eo sit Verbum ' which is proper to the Father and 'esse a Deo dicente' which is proper to the Son [IV.13,3487] 11.

The Word - Imageand Exemplar A word or similitudo inwardly conceived may be either an 'exemplar' or an 'image'. The similitudo artificiati in the craftsman's mind is an exemplar because it is principium operationis for the production of the artijiciatum or exemplatum. The similitudo of natural things in the human mind is an imago because it is related to that of which it is the likeness ut ad suumprincipium. Saint Thomas speaks of the Word of God not only in relation to the Father but also in relation to creatures. In knowing himself God knows all other things and his knowledge is the principle of all things . Thus the Divine Word is exemplar in relation to creation and imago in relation to the Father: 10 Super Evang.loann., I,I,§33 . The definite article "ly" was beginning to be used in Latin at the time of St Thomas. 11 See also seQ IV. 13,3486; 3488 ; IV. 14,3502 and QD de Pot 9,5 ad 13. Relations in God are real [secundum rem] and not just notional [nonsolo intellectu] - see IV. 14,3506-07.

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Verbum Dei comparetur ad res alias intellectas a Deo sicut exemplar ; et ad ipsum Deum, cuius est Verbum, sicut eius imago [lV .ll,3474, referring to Colossians 1.15, 'he is the image of the invisible GOlf].

The Word is the image of the substance of what is known. He is therefore the image of God 's essence and bears "the very stamp of his nature" ffigura substantiaeDei - IV,1l,3475, with Hebrews 1.3]. One who shares the same nature as what it images is not only imago , he is also Son, Filius [IV.ll,3476, referring to Psalm 2.7, 'the Lord said to me, you are my son').

The Word Manifests the Sayer The conceived word is quaedam manifestatio sapientiae intelligentis. As the divine wisdom, the Word is called lux because it is a pure act of knowledge and is called splendor because splendour is the manifestation of light [IV.12,3483, referring to Hebrews 1.3 and John 17.6]. This aspect of manifestation is better expressed by Verbum than by Filius, says Saint Thomas, and is firstly the manifestation of the Father to Himself'tt. As the splendour of the Father by which he knows himself, the Word manifests the Father to Himself interiorly before manifesting Him to us in the Incarnation 13. But the Word is also conceptus Dei by which [quo] God knows both himself and other things. Expressing the Father perfectly, the Word expresses all creation perfectly because in knowing himself the Father knows all things . The Word expresses perfectly all that is in God whether of Himself, or of persons, or of creaturesw, So we can say that the Word manifests the Father to the Father, manifests the Father to creatures, and manifests creatures to the Father: verbum non solum importat rationem originis et imitationis sed etiam manifestationis, et hoc modo Verbum est aIiquo modo creaturae, in quantum scilicet per Verbum creatura manifestatur 'A

This means that the Word of God is also, in some sense, the Word of creation.

2. The Worda/Creation

Creation - The Worda/the Worda/God The conceived likeness or intentio intellecta is like an interior word which can be signified by an exterior and vocalised word. This expressed word may be termed verbumverbi because it is interioris verbiostensivum: Sic igitur non solum div ini intellectus conceptio dicitur Verbum, quod est Filius, sed etiam explicatio divini conceptus per opera exteriora, verbum Verbi nomi12 Super Evangloann., I,I,§31.

Super ad Hebraeos I,2,§26: Verbum ergo Pairis, quod est quidamconceptus intellectus eius, est splendorsapientiae, qua se cognoscit. Et ideoApostolusFilius vocalsplendoremgloriae, id est, divinaeclaraenotitiae. See also QD de Ver4,1 ad 5. 13

14 Super ad Hebr XI,2,§564 on Hebrews 113; QD de Vcr 4,4 in c and Super Evang.Ioann., I.l,§27. IS QD de Ver 4,4 ad 6. See also ad 7.

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natur .. quia scilicetper virtutes creaturarum explicantur divinaeconceptionis effectu in rebus [SCGIV.13,3489, referring to Hebrews 1.3and Psalm 148.8]. Elsewhere Saint Thomas writes: omnescreaturaenihilaliud sunt quam realisquaedam expressioet repraesentatio eorum quae in conceptione diviniVerbi comprehenduntur [SCGIV.42,3803]. From our point of view the external word [verbum vocale] is known first. It manifests the verbum interius which is, however, naturally prior utpote exterioris causa et eJficiens etjinalis. Developing some comments of Augustine Saint Thomas speaks of three words: verbum cordis which is sine voce, verbum interius or exemplar which is imago vocis, and verbum vocis which is exterius expressum. The order verbum cordis, verbum interius, verbum vocis corresponds to the order artifex, exemplar, artificiatum. Verbum vocis refers to creatures and is only used metaphorically of God. So too, he says, is imagovocis or verbuminterius "which refers to the ideas". But verbum cordis is used properly of God and refers to the Son 16. Because God knows all things in knowing himself and because the Word is conceived in that self-knowing, the Word is Verbum omniumrerum. He is the Word 'of God' in proceeding from Him and he is the Word 'of things' not as proceeding from them but as being the ratio perfecta of all that has been made [IV.13,3490a] 17. Because God has a proper knowledge of all things, the Word is singulorum ratio [lV.13,3490b]l8.

The Word of God as RatioRerum There are many texts in which Saint Thomas refers to the Word of God as the ratio of created things. Any intellectual agent acts per rationem rerumfactarum quam apud se habet [SCG IV. 13,3491]. Many scripture passages [for example, John 1.23; Genesis 1.3,6; Psalms 30.9; 148.5; Sirach 1.10 and Hebrews 11.3] teach that, in creating, God made all things by his Word quod est ratio rerum factarum ab ipso. God spoke and they were made, quia Verbum produxit, per quod res in esse produxit, sicut per earum rationemperfectam [IV.13,3491]. The Word is also conceptum Dei, as Boethius says, Saint Thomas adding that

16 QD de Ver 4,1 in c [lines 175-229]. Parallel texts are ST,1,34,l and Super ad Hebr I,l,§ 15. St Thomas distinguishes the Father's command to the Son quid dicam, imerius, et quid loquar, exterius - Super Evang.Ioann. XII,8,§1723 . On verbumcordis see also ST ,1,27,1. The distinction of ' internal reason' and 'expressed reason' is already found in Stoicism : J.P.Mackey, The Christian Experience.ofGod as Trinity [London 1983] p.127; p.288,n.83. But Augustine goes beyond Stoicism, speaking of a ' third word' which St Thomas refers to as verbumcordis: see Lonergan, Verbum, pp X-XIII (for Augustine) and 1-11 (on inner and outer words , in general , in Aquinas) . See also Vigener, De ldeis Divinis, pp.92-93 and, for Augustine, Chapter Two, pp.78-SO above. 17 SCG IV.l1,3474; ST,1,34,3 and Super Evang.Ioann . I,l,§35: the Word was 'in the begin ning' principium rerum,per modumsapientiae, quaeest ratioeorum quae fiunt. 18 SCG 1.50 and Chapter Five, pp.225-33 above on 'The Extent of the Ideas' .

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creation corresponds to the Word , id est conceptum Dei, sicut artijiciatum arti suaet".

The ratio artificiati in the craftsman's mind is an intelligible form by means of which he acts. A non-subsistent form cannot act but is that quo agens agit. In the case of the Word of God however cum sit subsistens,l!ii!, non solum per ipsum aliquid agitur [IV.13,3493, referring to Proverbs 8.30 and John 5.17]. In his commentary on the Gospel of John Saint Thomas says that the Latin term verbum may seem restrictive when its Greek counterpart AOYCX; can mean either ratio or verbum. Ratio refers to the concept in the mind without reference to any external event whereas verbum implies a reference to external matters. The ancient Latin translation of AOYCX; was verbum since what is intended is not only the existence of the Son in the Father but also the potentiaoperativa of the Son qua per ipsumfacta sunt omnia». He writes Quicumque enim aliquid facit, oportet quod iIIud praeconcipiatin sua sapientia, quae est forma et ratio rei factae: sicut forma in mente artificis praeconcepta est ratio arcae faciendae. Sic ergo Deus nihil facit nisi per conceptum sui intellectus, qui est sapientia ab aetemo concepta, scilicet Dei Verbum, et Dei Filius: et ideo impossibile est quod aliquid faciat nisi per Filium. Unde Augustinus De Trinitate dicit quod Verbum est ars plena omnium rationum viventium. Et sic patet quod omnia quae Pater facit, facit per ipsunr" . In and by his Word God creates all things . In the terminology sanctified by Scripture and by theological tradition the Word is the conceptum, ars and sapientia of the Father and the ratio.forma and verbum of all things . This can also be expressed by saying that in the Word who is the ratio of all things are found the rationes of all things, the rationes in menteParris which we call the ideas 22 •

RationesRerumin the Word Hebrews 11.3b says that 'what is seen was made out of things which do not appear'. Saint Thomas understands this to be equivalent to the view of the ancient philosophers, ex nihilo nihil fit. Some believed that everything was already contained in everything else, some said that generation took place by a latitatio fonnarum, the platonists suggested the ideas and A vicenna an intelligence. These were all suggestions as to how visible things were made ex invisibilibus rationibus idealibus. For us though, says Saint Thomas, the invisible rationes ideales, which in reality are all one and the same, are yet somehow distinct in the Word of God: Nos autem dicimus ... quod ex invisibilibus rationibus idealibus in Verba Dei, per quod omnia facta sunt, res visibiles suot productae. Quae rationes, et si ~: 19 SCG11.23; Super ad Hebr XI,2,§564 and In II Sent, pro!. ForBoethius see Philosophiae Consolationis Ill, poem IX (Buchner, pp.56-57]. 20 SuperEvang.Ioann. I,l,§32. 21 Super Evang.Ioann. I,12,§77. See also §§87and 90. 22 SuperEvang.Ioann. XII,8,§1723.

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aliter idem sunt, tamen per diversos respectus connotatos respectu creaturae differuntsecundumrationem . Undealia rationeconditusest homo,et alia equus, ut dicit Augustinusin !ibro LXXXIII Quaestionum. Sic ergo saecula aptata sunt verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus rationibus idealibus in verbo Dei, visibilia, id est omnis creatura, jieren(13 . He interprets the phrase 'first-born of all creation' [Colossians 1.15] to mean that the Son is begotten as the principle of all creatures. The platonists believed in ideas, he says , in which things participated and so came to be, but 'we have one Word of God, the Son, in place of their ideas'. As the artisan makes his product to participate in a preconceived form iforma et ratio rei factae] God makes all things through his eternal wisdom which is conceptum sui intellectus: quia sapientia Dei se habetad res creatas,sicut ars aedificatoris ad domum factam. This wisdom in God is the Word in whom all things are created as in an exemplar 24 • Creation is the image of the Son. As a word of God [verbum vocis] creation is like the Word of God [verbum cordis] but not vice versa because they are related as effect and cause. The Word is similitudo creaturae not as its image but as its exemplar containing the ideas [rerum similitudines] 25. Here Saint Thomas' account of the Word of God, developed mainly in his New Testament commentaries, connects explicitly with his treatments of the divine ideas , developed mainly in his systematic theological works.

3. The Word in Creation The Word ofGod is the Wisdom ofGod His development of Aristotle's account of intelligence allows Saint Thomas to speak of the procession of the Word of God and of the existence of ideas in God. Augustine's theology of Divine Wisdom allows Saint Thomas to speak of creation as the work of God's Wisdom or Word. This theology is biblical, originating in the wisdom literature of the Hebrew scriptures and developed christologically in the Johannine and Pauline writings-e. In its Christian development it 23 Super ad Hebr XI,2,§565. St Thomas allows that all things are made ex materiaprima but hoc est satis ruditerdictum,licetsit verum: it is crude even if true, 24 SuperEpistolam ad Colossenses Lectura 1.4 [on Colossians 1.lS-17] §§34-35,37 . See also Super ad Hebr XI,2 [on Hebrews 11.2-7] §564 and Super Evang.Ioann. I,2,§§77 ,fr7,90.

25 QD de Ver 4,4 ad 2: the Word is immutable, the creatures mutable, but it is enough that the word of the Word conform by representation not necessarily by nature with its exemplar. Vigener , De ldeis Divinis, p.35 writes: ' sicut voces ab homine formatae sunt signa (verba) intellectualis scientiae, ita creaturae a Deo conditae sunt signa (verba) sapientiae eius' , He refers to ST JII,12,3 ad 2. Creatures are comparable to the multiple and imperfect discourse which ex presses the fulness of an idea according to L.-B . Geiger, ' Dissimilitude, Transcendance et Perfection du Principe Divin . Apories et Solutions' , Dialogue (1962) pp.33-34. 26 Sirach 23.20 speaks of God's knowledge of the universe before and after it was created: QD de Ver 3,3 ad sc 1. In Daniel 13.42 Susanna prays to God who discerns what is secret and is aware of all things before they come to be: DN VII.2 [868CD) and In de Div Nom §723. Wisdom 9.9 refers to God's wisdom who knows his works and was with him when he made the

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centres particularly on the prologue of the Gospel of John and the qualities there attributed to the Logos: being, life, light. For thinkers well acquainted with the philosophical tradition it was an easy step to associate this gospel text with the triad of being-life-intelligence. The Word is described as the 'wisdom' of God. For Saint Thomas, wisdom means self-knowledge. Intellectual life is the highest grade of life because it is capable of reflecting and knowing itself. In QD de Ver 3,2 the interiority of intellect is seen in its capacity for self-knowledge. Because he knows himself God is said to be sapiens and because he knows other things God is said to be intelligens et scienst", In philosophical terms, God knows all things in knowing his own essence . In biblical-theological terms it is in God's self-knowing that the Word is conceived and all things are known, the Word manifesting the Father to the Father before manifesting him to creatures and creatures to him 28 • The Word generated in God's self-knowledge is tanquam sapienter mente divina conceptum and is properly described as concepta seu genita Sapientia». It refers primarily to God's self-knowledge but the term 'wisdom' can also be used for wisdom's effects, per modum quo effectus nomen causae sibi assumit30• The Word in Creation: Being, light and Beauty As we have seen, the Word is both image and exemplar, the image of the Father and the exemplar of creation". The Word operates in creation in the way appropriate to God, with the uniquely divine causality of creating, operating intrinsically and not extrinsically, causing esse: Creare autem est dare esse rei creatae. Cum ergo esse sit intimum cuilibet rei , Deus, qui operando dat esse, operatur in rebus ut intimus agens. In mundo ergo erat [Verbum] ut dans esse mundo32.

world : Super Evang.Ioann. Prol., §7. The New Testament interprets Hebrew notions of God's wisdom in creation in terms of Christ the Son of God and Word of the Father through whom all things were made : John 1.1ff; Hebrews 4.13; 11.3; 1 Corinthians 130 (on which see Maximus Conf, Ambig 7 [10810», Colossians 1.15ff, etc, For sapiential theology in St Thomas's pauline commentaries see Wac1aw Swierzawski, 'God and the Mystery of His Wisdom in the Pauline Commentaries of Saint Thomas Aquinas', DTP 74 (1971) 466-500. See also pp.3-4 in the Introduction above. 27 In I Sent 35,1,1 ad 5. For God's self-knowledge [= wisdom] see QD de Ver 2.2; In XII Meta XII,11 especially §§2619-20; SCG 1.48 and ST,1,14,2in c. 28 See pp.235-36,238 with note 13 and p.239 with note 17 above. 29 SCG IV.12,3482, referring to 1 Corinthians 1.24. On genitasapientia see Augustine, De Trin, VII,2,3; St Thomas, In I Sent 27,2,2, arg 5, in c and ad 5 [pp.657,660.661] ; ST,1,34,1 ad 2 ; 39,8 ad3 ; 11.11,45,6 and Lonergan , Verbwn , p.89,n.200. 30 See SCG IV.12, referring to Sirach 1.9-10 and Hebrews 1.1-3: etiam explicatio divinae

sapientiaeper opus in rebuscreatisDei sapientiadicatur, 31 See pp.237-38 above and note ST ,1,3,8 ad 2: Verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est pars compositi. 32 Super Evang.Ioann. I,S,§133.

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As the true light the Word of God is in the world as its efficient and conserving cause. The statement of John 1.3b, 'without him nothing was made', means that all things need the Word for their coming to be and for their conservation in being33 • The Word is the 'light' of things which is taken to refer to the intelligibility of creation, its being in accordance with reason. But the actuality of things is itself a kind of light says Saint Thomas: ipsaactualitas rei est quodam lumenipSiUS 34• Because the Word is perfectly all that the Father is and represents the Father perfectly he is characterised by clarity and light. For Saint Thomas beauty has to do with reason and the other knowing powers. As 'splendour of the intellect' beauty is rightly appropriated to the Word in diviniss».

Creation in the Word: All arelife in Him The statement of John 1.4a, 'what was made was life in him', means that all things pre-exist in the Word36• Saint Thomas follows Augustine and considers things in their created existence [in seipsis] and in their pre-existence in Verbo where they are not just living things but 'are life'. Just as esse and intelligere are identical in God so life and essence are identical: quicquidest in Deo est sua essentia. All effects, whether natural or voluntary, pre-exist in their cause. This pre-existence is according to the capacity of the cause and not according to the proper being of the effects. Since the cause of all God's effects is vita quaedam et ars plena rationum viventium creatures must pre-exist in God as life37. Because creatures are life in the Word, Saint Thomas says, creatura in Deo est creatrix essentia'". Aristotle's view that life and intelligence are identical can be combined with what Augustine says. Because God is ipsumsuum intelligere he must also be most fully living [suum vivere]39. Since everything is in God ut intellectum this means ut ipsum vivere vel vitaeius. It follows that all things made by God are ipsavitadivina , Things are said to be "in God" in two ways. In propriis naturis they are contained and conserved by divine power. They are also in God sicut in 33 Super Evang.Ioann. 1,5,§135. See Super ad Hebr 1,2,§§30-33 and SCG IV.13,3492: as everythingis made so everythingis couservedin being per Verbum: IV.13,3489and III.65, referring to Psalm 32.6 and Hebrews 1.3. 34 In L de C, prop.6 [Saffrey45.13-14]. 35 STJ,39,8 ; In I Sent 3,2, Expositio Primae Partis Textus [p.l06]; 31,2,1 in c [p.724] and 36,1,3 ad 5 [p.838]. For St Thomas on beauty see ST,1,5,4 ad 1; 11.11,27,1 ad 3; 142,2; 142,4; 145,2; 180,2ad 3 and DN IV.5-7 withIn de Div Nom IV,ll.~. 36 St Thomas takes John 1.4awith 1.3: ' what was made was life in him' . On the punctuation see Super Evang.Ioann. 1,2,§§89-94. 37 As the effects of the sun pre-existin the sun: SuperEvang.Ioann. 1,2,§§90-91. 38 Super Evang.Ioann. 1,2,§91. For creatrix essentia see In I Sent36,1,3 ad 1 [p.836]; QD de Pot 3,5 ad 2; 3,16 ad 24 and ST,111,4,5 ad 2. Augustine speaks of substantia creatrixmundi: Epist 187,14.18. For a similarexpressionin Auselmsee p.224 above with note 122. 39 ST,1,18,3 in c and ad 2; 18,4 in c. See Metaphysics A.7 [1072b26-27]. For ST I life is a quality of intelligence and so q.18 follows on qq.14-17. See 1,14,prol and U8,prol: intelligere viventiumesse, and Rousselot, TheIntellectualismof St Thomas, pp.17,20-21.

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cognoscente or per proprius rationes. These rationes are identical with the divine essence and in this way things are life in God 4O• Correspondingly, things are known by God in two ways, in themselves and in Himself in their proper rationes. Things which are intellectually made exist in the intellectual ratio before they exist in seipsis. The Word of God is ratio omniumeorum quae a Deo sunt facta and therefore all things made by God pre-exist in the Word before they exist in their proper natures. This pre-existence is according to the capacity of the Word: Res igitur intelligendae sunt in Verbo Dei praeextitisse secundum modumVerbi ipsius. Est autem modus ipsius Verbi quod sit unum, simplex, immateria/e, et non solum vivens, sed etiam vita: cum sit suum esse. Oportet igitur quod res factae a Deo praeextiterint in Verbo Dei ab aeterno, immaterialiter, et absque omni eompositione, et quod nihil aliud in eo sintquam ipsum Verbum, quodest

vita41•

But there are two ways of being in the Word, sicut id quod Verbum cognoscit and sicut id quodper Verbum dicitur. In the first way even possibles which are never realised can be present and known. Speaking however refers to execution and to action because speech orders what we conceive in the mind. Just as God has disposed [disponit) only what was, is or will be, so he has spoken only what was, is or will be. Verbum necessarily includes a reference to execution and to action, something that is not true of scientia, ars, idea vel ratio. These terms therefore do not have precisely the same meaning as verbumv, The idea in the mind of the maker has esse intelligibile and Augustine's phrase area in mente artificis vivit is to be understood in terms of esse intelligibile», On account of this esse spirituale vel immateriale God's knowledge of things through their species in the divine mind is better than knowledge of them through their essence-s,

40 In I Sent36-37, especially Lombard's text [p.846] and In I Sent 37, Divisio Textus [p.854]]; QD de Ver 4.8;QDde Pot3,16ad 24andST,1,18,4 ad I. Note alsoST,1,18,4 ad 2: exemplata and exemplar conform secundum rationemformae butoot secundum modumessendi

.. unde et rationesrerumquae in seipsisnon vivunt, in mentedivinasunt vita, quia in mente divina habentesse divinum.

41 SCG IV.13,3494, referring to John 1.3-4. SeealsoSCG 11.15,930; IV.4,336&: andSuper Evang.Ioann. I,2,§§89-94. 42 QDde Ver4,7 in c [lines 28-48]. SeeLonergan, Verbum, pp.I24-28,139-40, especially pp.126-27: 'while wehave seen that the terms, operatio andactio, sometimes mean simply act or being in act andsometimes mean theexercise of efficient causality, we now find that the precision of trinitarian theory led Aquinas to distinguish exactly between these two meanings with regard to theoperation or action of intellect; when that operation is meant in thesense of act,it is termed intelligere; butwhen byoperation is meant that oneactis grounding another, it is termed dicere'. Lonergan refers to QD de Ver 4,2 ad 4 andad 5; QDde Pot9,9 ad 8 and ST,1.34,1ad2 and ad 3. Seealsonote 57onp.247 below. 43 QDde Ver 4,8ad2. See also ad 3: things arelifein God is appropriated to theWord, God as vita rerum is appropriated to the Spirit 44 QDdeVer3,1 ad 2. Seealso ad 3 and 4,6 ad I andad2. QDdeVer 2,3 ad 2 clarifies how God knows things inhimself and in themselves.

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Created things have a higher mode of being in the divine mind, a more true being [verius esse], esse increatum. But creatures whose essential nature includes physical being exist more truly in their created physical state than in the divine mind 4s• Saint Thomas makes a distinction. As regards veritas rei creatures are more true [verius] in Verbo than in themselves. As regards veritas praedicationis creatures are more true [verius] in themselves than in Yerbo'". Creatures in the Word have nobler operations than they have in their proper being because in the Word they are effectivae rerum et operationum ipsarum". There is even a sense in which they bring themselves to life48. Because of his understanding of the communication and participation of esse Saint Thomas can regard material things as more truly themselves in their material existence than in their existence in God's mind whereas for Plato and Augustine things were simply more truly themselves in their superior mode of being 49• The prologue of the Gospel of John teaches that the Word is the source of being, life and inteIligence for creatures. God knows all that He has created and the creation is eternalIy present in God as life and light in the Word.

4. Wordand Idea Saint Thomas uses the same philosophical resources in speaking of the generation of the Eternal Word as he does in speaking of the plurality of ideas in God. He moves easily from speaking of the Word of God as ratio rerum to speaking

4S QD de Ver 4,6 sc2 and ad 2; STJ.18,4 ad 3 and 1,84,7 in c. Note especially In I Sent 36,1,3 arg2 and ad 2 [pp.836-37] : in esse creato minus est de veritateessendi quam in esse increato; proper natural existence surpasses existence in soul because it is substantial as distinct from accidental existence; existence in soul surpasses proper natural existence because it is intellectual as distinct from material existence and in this sense a thing can have truer esse where it is per similitudinem thanit has in itself; and QD de Ver 4,6 ad 3: things are in the potentia octiva of the Word which is more perfect than the act which is its effect; and see Vigener , De ldeis Divinis, pp.l0lff. 46 QD de Ver 4,6 in c. See QD de Ver 8,16 ad 11. 47 QD de Ver4,6 ad 4. 48 QD de Ver 4,8 in c: ex hoc quod similitudo creaturaein Verbaest productiva et motiva

creaturae in propria natura existentis, quodammodo contingit ut creaturase ipsam moveai et ad esse producat, in quantumscilicetproduciturin esse et movetura sua similitudinein Verbo existente,et ita similitudocreaturaein Verbo est quoddam modo creaturaevtta. Eckhart developed ideas like this in a direction that goes beyond St Thomas although Vigener, De ldeis Divinis, argues that mystics like Eckhart and Cusanus were faithful to the teaching of the scholastic theologians and to Augustine: pp.89,n.81 and 96-111. 49 QD de Ver 4 ,6 scz , ad 2 and ad 5; 4,8 ad 1; ST 1,18,4 ad 3 and 1,84,7 in c. See Gerald B.Phelan, 'The Being of Creatures', Proceedings ACPA 31 (1957) 118-25; Baget-Bozzo, ' La Teologia delle Idee Divine' , pp.308-11; Norris Clarke, 'The problem of the reality and multiplicity' , pp.118-20,12 1-24 and Edith Stein, Endliches und EwigesSein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs tum Sinn des Seins [Edith Steins Werke . Herausgegeben von Dr.L.Gelber und P.fr.Romaeus Leuven OCD. Band II. Nauwelaerts, Louvain I Herder, Freiburg 1950], pp.93-116,325-26: philosophy and theology must help each other in explaining the being and intelligibility of all things; the presence of the divine Ideas in the Word of God is crucial to her view on created be ing ; the Logos has a 'double-face' , a mediating role.

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of the Word as the place where the rationes rerum or the ideas are located. How then does he distinguish the Word and the ideas and how does he relate them? The most fundamental difference is that the Word is a subsistent divine Person and the ideas are ways in which God knows his essence to be imitable by creatures. Early in his career Saint Thomas believed that the term verbum could be used essentially as well as personally of GodS. Later he accepted that it is only properly used of God when it is used personally. According to a manuscript in Lincoln College, Oxford, Saint Thomas had changed his mind on this by the time he came to teach in Rome in 1265-66. With regard to his earlier view, that manuscript comments: communitas Parisiensis modo tenetquoduerbum tantum personaliter dicatur, et quod etiamfrater Thomas modo in hoc eonsentit- non quod distinetio hie posita [i.e. in In I Sent 27] sit erronea sed quia saneti communiter non utuntur hoc nomine nisi personaliter-". A short time later Saint Thomas himself writes: nomen Verbi in divinis, si proprie sumatur, est nomen personale, et nullomodo essentiale 52. The term idea on the other hand is only used essentially of God. Unlike personal names, names used essentially do not indicate any real plurality sed solum pluralitas quae est secundum intelligentiae rationem». Thus God may be described as primum exemplar omnium and even as idea plurium for idea is used of the divine essence but Yerbum refers ad personam», As rationes diversarum rerum the ideas are distinguished notionally. The Divine Persons are distinguished both notionally and really, a distinction which is obviously greater: major est distinetio personarum in Deo quam rationum tdealtum». Persons, properties and attributes are in the divine essence as belonging to God's esse and are therefore also in God's knowledge. All other S InI Sent 27;1.,2 inc [p.659]. See Geiger, 'Les redactions successives' , pp.236-37. 51 Lincoln College, MsLat95, fol.81vab. Forthedetails see L.E.Boyle OP. 'Alia Lectura Fratris Thome', MSt 45(1983) 424-25. 52 ST,1,34,1 in c. See also 34,1ad3 and 34,3 ad4. InQD deVer 4;1. hehad largely come to this later view though still arguing foranessential use of verbum: in c, in fine; ad sc 1-4. See Geiger. 'Lesredactions successives' , p.237 and dela Vaissiere, 'Le sense dumot ' Verbemental" .

53 Quodlibet 4,1.1 ad3. See Lonergan. Verbum. pp.191-96. 54 QD deVer 4,4ad4 and ad 5. See ST,I.14.6; 1,14.11; 1,44,3 in

c: in divinosapientiasunt rationesomniumrerum:quas supra(q.l i.a.l) diximus ideas.id estformas exemplares in mente divino existentes. Quae quidem, licet multiplicentursecundum respectum ad res. tamen non sunt rea/iter aliud a divino essentia, prout eius similitudoa diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplaromnium; 1,47.1 ; QD dePot3,16ad 13: licet forma intel/ectus divini sit una tantum secundum rem. est tamenmultiplex rationesecundumdiversosrespectus ad creaturam, prout scilicetintelliguntur creaturae diversimode formam divini intellectus imitari; InIISent 18.2.2inc: secundum hoc multitudoa Deoprocessit,prout se intel/exit ut ideamplurium, id est ut participabilem diversimoda imitatione; Quodlibet 4.1.1 in c and Cajetan, Commentaria in ST,l.15.2 .§X, 'Primo' . 55 In ill Sent 1,2,1 sc3. referring toDe Div Qq lXXX111.46.

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things except evil are in God's knowledge and are therefore in God in the sense that they are within his activity as the source of all thingsS6• The idea then refers primarily to creatures whereas the Word includes such a reference secondarily. Because idea signifies primarily the respectus ad creaturam the ideas are many. Because verbum signifies primarily the relationship to the sayer, and signifies creatures only in a consequent sense, the Word is one. There are therefore many ideas but only one Word for all creatures 57. Furthermore creatures are many because they are imperfect representations of the divine exemplar whereas the Son, a perfect representation, is only one: imago increata, quae est perfecta, est una tantum. Sed nulla creatura repraesentat perfecte exemplar primum, quod est divina essentia. Et ideo potest per multa repraesentari. - Et tamen, secundum quod ideae dicuntur exemplaria, pluralitati rerum correspondet in mente divina pluralitas idearum'",

The Word is that per quodfacta sunt omnia and the ideas are that ad quosfacta sunt omnia59. Anselm seems to argue that the ideas are redundant if everything is made through the Word. Saint Thomas interprets him to mean that the Word does not draw its likeness to things from things but that the forms of things are drawn from the Word: Verbum non est similitudo rerum sed res sunt imitationes Verbi. This does not make the ideas redundant, argues Saint Thomas, since an idea is forma quamaliquidimitaturs". Distinguishing and relating the Word and the ideas means bringing together discourse about the Persons in God and discourse about the divine essences'. The ideas concern the divine essence but are appropriated to the second person of the Trinity, the Word who is 'between' the Father and the creature but not

56 In I Sent 36,1,3 [pp.835-38] . See QD de Ver 3,6 ad 2. 57 QD de Ver 4,4 ad 5; 4,5 ; STJ,34,3 ad 4 and note QD de POl 9,9 ad 22: relaiiones ideales

sunt Dei ad ill quod est extra, scilicet ad creaturas; et ideoper eas non distinguunturpersonae in divinis. Nevertheless St Thomas says elsewhere that 'word' includes a reference to execution but 'idea' or ratio does not: see the texts referred to in note 20 on p.240 and note 42 on p.244 above, as well as those referred to here and ST J,34,3 in c and ad 2 also. A number of distinctions must be kept in mind : between the cognitive and 'factive' aspects of the word, between nantes predicated temporally of God and those not so predicated, between the word uttered and what is uttered in the word. The notes in T.C.O'Brien, St Thomas AquinasSummaTheologiae. Volume 7 (10.33-43): Father, Son and HolyGhost [London and New York 1976], pp.36-41 are useful in this regard . 58 ST J,47, 1 ad 2. See also STJ.25,6 ad 2; QD de Pot 3,16 ad 12 and QD de Ver 2,4 ad 2. 59 QD de Ver 3,1 obj 10; in c and 4,4. 60 QD de Ver3,1 ad 1O.0bj 10 cites Monologion 31 [Schmitt, p.50,lines 6-7]. At QD de Ver 3,1 sc 8 and 4,1 ad 1 St Thomas uses Aristotle to correct John Damascene and Anselm. The question of one Word and many ideas is highlighted by St Anselm : Vigener, De Ideis Divinis, pp.83-85. For this issue in St Thomas see Vigener, pp.89-93 and Van den Berg, De ideis Dtvinis , pp.69-70 . See also Geiger , 'Les idees divines' , p.203, n.74, and Farthing , 'The Problem of Divine Exemplarity' , p.221 : ' The relation of the ideas to the Verbum bridges the gap between the epistemological and metaphysical functions of the doctrine (of divine ideas)' . 61 ST,I.2, pro!.

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'between' God and the creature because the Word is God 62• In stressing the divinity of the Word, Saint Thomas maintains a clear distinction between uncreated and created reality. The Word proceeding from the Father, in which He knows Himself, is also the Word of creation by means of which God knows and creates all things 63• The Word is ratio omnium rerum but this does not make the doctrine of divine ideas redundant. God knows the multiplicity of ways in which His perfection may be imitated and this knowing is the plurality of ideas in God. The Word in which God knows himself, and therefore knows all things, the Word by which God creates all things, is thus the "place" of the rationes re-

rum. B. THE IDEAS IN THE THEOLOGY OF CREATION

Saint Thomas believes it is necessary to speak of the ideas not only because God knows a multiplicity of things but because God knows all things precisely as their creator. He makes this point repeatedly in the texts we have examined . The idea or similitudo rerum in the divine intellect is factiva rei64. The rationes are in God secundum potentiam activam because God is the principle of all being 65• He describes the ideas as creativae et productivae rerum and asformae operativaew. The diverse relations of creatures to God, which are the basis of the ideas, are founded ultimately on the unique act of being proper to each individual thing and for which each thing is immediately indebted to God67. A reason why the ideas do not figure prominently in SCG 1,53-54 may be because Saint Thomas's concern there is specifically with God as knower and not yet 62 QD de Ver 4,1 ad 3 . See also ad 4. On appropriation see QD de Ver 7;3 and In 1 Sent 36,1;3 arg 5 and ad 5 [p.838], which explains how Father, Son and Holy Spirit are appropriately involved in creation, the Spirit in ipso, the Son per ipsum and the Father ex ipso. Note also QD de Ver 1,7 in c which says that veritas, properly speaking, is used essentially of God and is appropriated to the person of the Son, whereas metaphorically it is used personally of the Son . The neoplatonist tradition used 'implication' or 'predominance' where the Christians used 'appropriation' : see Chapter Two above, p.69 with note 1O\. 63 Note Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas', 179-82 [a distinction of objective and subjective aspects of a concept helps St Thomas to distinguish ideas and Word in God, but must be transcended to explain how ideas represent both a multitude of creatures and the perfect unity of the divine essence] and pp .I86-87 [all knowledge in God is explained in terms of self knowledge). See also note 57 above . The generation of the Word is natural [per similitudinem naturae ipsius producentis] while the production of creatures is per potentiamrationalem in similitudinemideaeexistentis in mentedivina: In I Sent 7,1,1 in c and Super ad Col\,4 (00.3435) . The Second Person as Son proceeds naturally from the Father and as Word proceeds per modumintellectus: QD de Ver 4,4 in c. 64 QD de Ver 2,5 in c [lines 277-313]. See Chapter Five above, p.l98 with notes 15 and 16 and p.l99 with note 21. 65 SCG 1.50,425 . 66 QD de Ver 3,1 ad 5; In I Sent 36,2,1 in c [p.839). 67 QD de Pot 6,6 ad 5: ipse Deus, qui est esse tantum, est quodammodo speciesomniumformarumsubsistentium quaeesseparticipant et nonsum suumesse. See QD de Ver 3,2 in c [lines 209-12].

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with God as maker. The arguments of QD de Ver 3,1-2 and ST 1,15,1-2 on the other hand are based on the fact that because God is creator and maker of all things he must have ideas of all things. The divine essence is both similitudo and principium of all that is created.

1. Characteristics ofIntelligent Causality To speak of God as 'cause' is subject to the limitations of any talk about God. For God to cause is simply for an effect to be and God is extrinsically designated as cause. On occasion Saint Thomas says that activity is predicated of God and of natural things quasi aequivocew. God is not a univocal cause which means that the popular image of the sun is an inadequate symbol of His causality69. Effects must be like their causes but if an agent is in no genus its effect cannot be like it either specifically or generically but only secundum aliqualem

analogiamv. Still, divine causality must be more like the kind of causality found in intelligent agents than the kind found in natural causes. Creation comes about neither by necessity nor by chance but is planned, ordered and wise. God is its in telligent cause who creates by intellect and free will and not by natural necessity?'. In support Saint Thomas can quote Aristotle who says that art imitates nature and that omne opus naturae dicitur esse opus intelligentiaelt, Voluntary action is superior to natural action. Material causes have potentia and virtus, act by natural necessity and have only one pre-determined effect. By contrast, intelligent causes have scientia and voluntas, act per voluntatem and have a variety of effects'P. As an intelligent cause the divine intellect is not restricted to one pre-determined effect. In fact God's causality extends to everything to which the ratio entis is not repugnant. On the basis of the principle that agens agit sibi simile every effect pre-exists according to some likeness in its cause and the cause leaves traces of itself

68 In this follow ing Averroes : see Responsio ad loannem Vercellensem de Articulis CVlll 1,§817: God is creaturarum causaeffectiva aequivoca. 69 QD de Ver 5,2 argl and ad 1. 70 ST J ,4,3 in c. See also 1,4,2 and 1,6,2. On agens analogicum see ST J ,I3,5 ad I and on univocal and analogical causes STJ ,44,3 in c. 71 QD de Pot 3,15 and ST,I,l9,4. 72 QD de Vcr 3.1 [lines 208 with note] and 3,2 sc5. See Chapter Four above, p.161 for a cosmological argwnent in Aristotle and p.262 with note 148 below. 73 In I Sent 35, Divisio Textus fp.806). In I Sent deals with scientia Dei (35-41), then potentia Dei (42-44) and then (voluntos or) bonitas Dei (45fO, because knowledge embraces more than power and power more than goodness. See also ST J ,19,4 in c. Avicenna was mistaken in believing that intelligent causes are confined to producing one effect as material causes are: St Thomas, In XII Meta XI,ix,§§2559-60; In II Sent 18,2,2 in c; SCG 11.22,988 and 11.23,989-90 . See also SCG 11.23,996-998 and ST,I.lI,50,3 .

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in its effects74 • God knows all things because all are in him intellectually or immaterially: Cum igitur Deus sit per essentiam suam intelligens .. oportet quod similitudo effectus sui sit in eo per modum intelligibilem. Igitur per intellectum agit .. mediante voluntate 75.

In acting by intellect and will, cognoscendo et volendo operando, God is acting according to his nature because the divine esse is ipsum eius imelligeret». Like intellect, will is not confined to determinate effects and just as things do not proceed from God either ex necessitate naturae or ex necessitate scientiae neither do they proceed ex necessitate divinae voluntatis. Rather do they proceed ex eius libera dtsposttione?', As God knows other things in knowing himself, so he wills other things in willing his own goodness. God wills other things inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam participare. God does not will anything apart from himself with absolute necessity but the multiplicity of things willed by God is not repugnant to the divine simplicity". Natural causes require intelligent and voluntary causes to set their goals for them. God contains totam perjectionem essendi and acts by the determination of his intellect and will. His effects pre-exist in him and proceed from him secundum modumintelligibilem and this means also per modum voluntatis since will is the inclination to carry out what the intellect conceives. Therefore God's will is the cause of things and all necessity is subject to that will 79• Will orders knowledge and things proceed from God 's knowledge when God has determined they will. God 's knowledge is causa rerum only with reference also to God's will 80 • 74 SCG 1.40; ST J.6.4 and QD de Ver 21,4 . For uses of agens agit sibi simile see SCG 1.49.413 [Marc Ed., Vol II. p.61,n.4] and QD de Ver 2,3 [line 240]. See also SCG 1.8,48 [Marc Ed., Vol II, p.II,n.3]; 1.17,140 [p.25,n.5] and 1.26,24 75 SCG 1.49,413 and 11.23,991. Cf SCG 1.45; 1.61,512; 1.62,519; 11.24 and QD de Ver 2,3 [lines 235-61] . For things being received per modumrecipienlis see QD de Ver 1,2 arg 3 [line 18 with note]. 76 ST J,19,4 ad 2. On intellect and essence in God see Vespignani, De/l'esemp/arismo divino, Cap .III,pp.77-116 ; Lipperheide, Thomas vonAquino. pp.46-83 and Branick, 'The Unity of the Divine Ideas'. pp.l74-75. 77 SCG 11.27. especially §§1044-45; 11.9 and 11.23.993 , citing Meta IX [=VIII].8 [1050813 b2]. 78 ST J ,19,2 in c. ad 2 and ad 3. See 1.19.5 in c and SCG 1.75. especially §§643.645; SCG 1.81; QD de Pot 3 .15; STJ,19,4; SCG 1.77 especially §§657-58 and STJ,19.2 ad 4. 79 ST J,19,4; 23,4 ad 1 and SCG 1.78,664. Note In XII Meta XII,vii.§2535: cum Aristoteles

hie dicat, quod necessilas primi motus non est necessilas absoluta, sed necessitas, quae est ex fine. finis autem principium est, quodpostea nominalDeum, inquantum attenditurper motum assimi/atioad ipsum: assimilatio autemad id quodest volens. et intelligens, cuiusmodi ostendit esse Deum,aitenditur secundum volunuuem et tntelligentiam. sicut artificiata assimi/antur artifici. inquantum in eis vo/untasartificis adimp/etur: sequiturquod tota necessitas primi motus subiaceatvoluntati Dei. 80 In I Sent 39,1,1 in c, ad 1 and ad 4 and QD de Ver 2,14 in c, where he adds a reference to secondary causality. See also QD de Ver 2,1 ad 8; 2,4 ad 5; 2.13 [lines 103-144]; 2,14 ad 2; ST J,14.8 and 1,19,11 ad 1.

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God is not a univocal agent and his effect is always less than his power, coming about secundum imperium voluntatis et ordinem sapientiae", The 'Catholic faith' teaches that God's will decides the limits of created realities and that his wisdom determines their order'Z. Creation is the product of an intelligence that is also self-sharing goodness83.

2. Ideas in Practical and Speculative Knowledge Theology is speculative and practical sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit et ea quae facit 84 • The distinction of practical and speculative knowledge is found very frequently in the writings of Saint Thomas and his application of it to the divine ideas illustrates how the various functions of the platonic idea survived in medieval thought", Saint Thomas always maintained that the idea belongs to both practical and speculative knowledge in God 86• Common usage and authoritative texts from Augustine, Aristotle and Dionysius might be taken to mean that the ideas belong exclusively to practical knowledge'", Speculative ideas are gathered from things whereas practical ideas are directed towards things and the latter seems more appropriate to divine knowledge's, In any case how can the idea in God's practical intellect be distinguished from that in his speculative intellect? How can the idea as principium essendi be distinguished from the idea as principium cognoscendi when these principles are identical in God?89 Speculative knowledge and practical knowledge, he says , are distinguished by their ends, speculative knowledge being concerned with veritas absolute and

81 ST,1,25,1 ad 4; ST,1,3,5;25,2 ad 1 and ad 3; QD de Pot 1,1 ad 8. God's freedom in creating presupposes the doctrine of uncreated possibles according to Lawrence Dewan OP, 'St Thomas and the Possibles', 76-85. 82 SCG 11.26,1034-38,1041 citing Wisdom 11.21. See ST,1,25.3: God's omnipotence means he can do all that can be done; SCG 11.22: his perfect active power extends to all that is not repugnant to the fact that God is esse in ac/u; ST,1,19,4in c: voluntas igiturDei est causarerum and QD dePot 1,1 ad8. 83 Moreau, 'The Platonic Idea', p.479. See SCG 11.23,994 citing Meta XI [=XII] .IO [1075all-15]. 84 ST,1,1,4 in c. See also 1,14,16. 85 The cosmological [= practical?] function of the ideas goes beyond the gnoseological [= speculative?] function and implies their axiological [= moral?] meaning: Moreau, 'The Platonic Idea', p.516 . In Super Evang.Ioaun. §§1286,2265 St Thomas distinguishes 'affective' and ' speculative' knowledge 86 In I Sent 36.2,1 in c [pp.839-40] is the earliest, and QD de Ver 3,3 the principal, treatment of this point. See Dewan, 'St Thomas , James Ross, and Exemplarism ', pp.226-29 and Geiger, 'Les idees divines', pp.I83-85. 87 QD de Ver3,3 arg 1-4 and 9. 88 QD de Ver 3.3, arg 5. 89 QD de Ver 3,3, arg 6-7. For the Aristotelian source of these arguments see QD de Ver 1,5 [line 424 with note] and 8,11 [line 25 with note]. See Meta a.I[993b30-31] and In XII Meta §§291-98.

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practical knowledge with operation. Practical knowledge is 'actual' [an artisan proposes to introduce the form he has conceived into matter] or 'habitual' or 'virtual' [an artisan has conceived a form and knows how he could introduce it into matter but does not intend to do so]. Speculative knowledge is of things which are beyond the knower's capacity to produce [human beings know natural things] or of activities within the capacity of the knower but without the intention of producing them 91. God's knowledge of creation is causativa rerum and must involve these four kinds of knowledge because the perfections of creatures are found eminently in GOO 92• God's knowledge is 'actual practical knowledge' of what he has decided is to be and 'virtual practical knowledge' of what could be but never actually is. God 's knowledge is 'speculative', knowing things not just as producible by himself but from every conceivable point of view and there are things [e.g. evil] which God knows of which his knowledge is not the cause 93• Within God's knowledge , where ought the idea be located? Saint Thomas appeals once more to the distinction of idea in the strict sense asforma or exemplar and idea in the broader sense as ratio or similitudo. This distinction is based, he says , on a twofold reference [duplex respectus] which forms have. Idea asforma or exemplar properly indicates that which is formed according to it [knowledge to knower, for example] and always implies causality either intrinsic or exemplar". Idea as ratio or similitudo has this reference but indicates also that which is outside [knowledge to what is knowable, for example] and in this case causality is not implied's', In its strict sense as exemplar the idea belongs in actual or virtual practical knowledge secundum quam aliquidformari potestn, In its broad sense as ratio the idea is used also of purely speculative knowledge97. Saint Thomas suggests that the term idea be restricted to actual or virtual practical knowledge while the 90 QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 85-89]. referring to De Anima m.w [433aI4-15] and Meta a .l [993b20-21]. 91 QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 89 -121] ; 3.5 in c [lines SO-55] and ad 3 ; In de Div Nom §§29598,355. 92 In I Sent 35.1.1 ad 2 [p.811] and ad 5 [p.813]. See Chapter Five above. p.l96 wiIh note 2. 93 QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 12242]. See also 2.8 [lines 8-91] . 94 QD de Ver3,3 [lines 156-60]: est enimjorma quodammodo causa eius quod secundum

ipsam formaua, sive taJisjormatiofiat per modum inhaerentiae ut injormis tntrinsecis, siveper modumimitationis ut injormis exemplaribus. 95 QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 161-63]. using comments of Augustine about the idea as forma; ratio and similitudo. 96

QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 163-68] and ad 3.

97 QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 168-71] and ad sc2. See ST,1.44,3 sc and 47,1 ad 2 for the identifi-

cation of exemplar and idea. and QD de Ver 8.8 ad 1 and ST,1.15,3 for a strict and a broad sense of exemplar. The distinction of a strict and a broad seuse of idea proves very useful to St Thomas particularly in regard to the extent of the ideas: QD de Ver 2.8 ad 3; 3,4 [lines 66-80]; 3,5 [lines 4O.SO]; 3,6 [lines 35-36] and 3,7 [lines 70.89-90]. See Chapter Five , D, above. pp.225-33, and Dewan, 'St Thomas, Ideas , and Immediate Knowledge', pp.393-94. As noted above (p.226) the distinction testifies to St Thomas' synthesis of Augustinian and Dionysian traditious.

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terms ratio and similitudo be used for both practical and speculative knowledge 98.

3. The Ideas and God's Will The idea belongs to intelligent causality which, as explained above, involves willing as well as understanding. Saint Thomas comments: forma intelIigibilis non nominat principium actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per volun tatem99 .

Because intelligent causality involves the will, God's knowledge is the cause of things ad modum practicae cognitionisvs. Intellect , will and power are one in God, but speculative intellect says nothing about operation 101. In its strict sense the idea pertains to practical knowledge. Dionysius describes the exemplars as "divine and good willings" [divinae et bonae voluntates] 102. Saint Thomas' own

98 QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 171-74]. See also ad 7 [of course there is no sense in which created effects could be princ ipia cognoscendi for the divine knowledge: 3,6 sc2] . The replies to the objections in QD de Ver 3,3 illustrate St Thomas's understanding of the difference between practical and speculative knowledge : see especially 3,3 ad 4 , ad 5, ad 6 and ad 9. It is difficult to reconcile the ways in which practical and speculative knowledge are distinguished in QD de Ver 2.8 and 3,3 . QD de Ver 3,3 [line 168] says that virtual practical knowledge is quodam modo speculativa. According to 2,8 in c [lines 43Jll the artisan has a twofold knowledge de operabili . One is speculative, a knowledge of the rationes operis which does not extend to activity and the other is practical . a knowledge which extends the rationes operis to the goal of the ac tivity. Practical knowledge follows on speculative knowledge which can therefore exist without it as when an artisan knows things he does not intend to make. He may know such things in potentia sua or. if they are beyond his capacity to make, tn fine suo [Nic Eth VI.lO (1144a31); VII.8 (1151aI6)]. God [lines 73ff] knows non-beings, a knowledge which is quasi practica in the case of things which at some time were, are or will be and quasi speculativa in the case of things which are merely possible. One can say that God intuits possibles in sua potentia since there is nothing which he cannot do but it is better to say that he intuits them in sua bonitate. God 's goodness is the end of all that he does and he knows many ways in which his goodness can be communicated other than those in which it is communicated to things past, present and future . See Dewan . 'St Thomas , James Ross, and Exemplarism', p.228,n.14, who notes the difficulty of reconciling 2,8 and 3,3 but simply says that '3,3 is the ex projesso treatment of the di vine ideas ' . It has been commented that the Christian theological completion of Greek philosophy is made possible by a move from divine self-knowledge to divine self-love , which can also be described as a move from the primacy of speculative knowledge to the primacy of practical knowledge: see Patrick Madigan SJ, Christian Revelation and the Completion of the Aristotelian Revolution [University Press of America, LanhamlNew York/London 1988], p.119. On this , note St Thomas' comment in In II Sent., prol., [p.2]: aperta enim manu clave amoris, creaturae prodierunt. 99 QD de Ver 3 ,1 [lines 159-223] and ST,1,15,1. See also SCQ 1.61,512; 62,519; 11.24 and ST,1,14,8 in c. 100 SCQ 1.65,535 [part of his argument for God's knowledge of singulars] . 101 ST 1,19,4 ad 4 and 1,25,5 ad 1. 102 DN V.8 [824C] quoted in In I Sent 36,2,1 in c [p.839] and QD de Ver3,1 [line 251].

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treatment of the ideas opens onto the question of God's providence, of what God has actually brought into being by his will 103. The will is concerned with agibilia which perfect the agent [immanent activity] and factibilia which perfect the product [transitive activity]. Created things are sicutfactae: Factibilium autem ratio est ars, sicut Philosophus dicit. Comparantur igitur omnes res creatae ad Deum sicut artificiata ad artificem . Sed artifex per ordinem suae sapientiae et intellectus artificiata in esse producit. Ergo et Deus omnes creaturas per ordinem sui intellectus fecitl~.

Unlike making, creating or governing, however, 'willing' implies no necessary reference beyond the agent: Nec est simile de relatione volentis ad volitum, et creantis ad creatum, et facientis ad factum, aut Domini ad subiectam creaturam . Narn velie est actio in volente manens: unde non cogit intelligi aliquid extra existens. Sed facere et creare et gubemare significant actionem terminatam ad exteriorem effectum, sine cuius existentia huiusmodi actio non potest intelligi lOS. Nevertheless God's will is the deciding factor between things which remain merely possible and things which at some time had, have or will have actual existence lO6. In its strict sense as exemplar there is no idea of what remains merely possible but the difficulty of applying distinctions drawn from human knowledge to divine knowledge is obvious: utrum eorum quae nee sunt, nee erunt, nee fuerunt, quae tamen Deus facere potest, sit idea . Videtur dicendurn, quod si idea secundum completam rationem accipiatur, scilicet secundum quod idea nominat formam artis, non solum intel;: lectu excogitatam. sed etiarn per voluntatem ad opus ordinatam, sic praedicta non babent ideam ; si vero accipiatur secundum imperfectam rationem, prout scilicet est solum excogitata in intellectu artificis, sic habent ideam . Patet enim in artifice creato quod excogitat aliquas operationes quas numquarn operari intendit. In Deo vero quidquid ipse cognoscit, est in eo per modum excogitati; 103 See STJ.15,3 ad 4; 22,2; 49.2 and QD de Ver3.4 ad 8; pp.261-70belowand Rousselot, The Intellectualism ofSt Thomas, pp.203-16.

I~ SCQ 11.24.1006. The reference is to Nic Eth Vl.4 [114Oa3-5] and, onceagain in SCQ, St Thomasmakesno reference to the ideas. 105 SCQ 1.79,675. 106 QD de Ver 3,3 ad sci and lines 123-32:actual existence is decided proposiito suae voluntatis (line 125). See 3.6 [lines35-47]; In de Div Nom §665: i//ae igitur solae rationes intellectae a Deo exemplar ia dici possunt, ad quarum imitationem vult res in esse producere and especiallyIn I Sent 38,1,1 in c: the causality of divine knowledge, like causalitas artificis per artem suam , involvesscientia and volun/as with the latter having principalitas causal itatts; ad I: like scientia artificis God's knowledge is causeof thingsonly whenwill is added; ad 4: because it is concerned withfinis ut bonum, voluntas is not only a cause in the full sense but is causa causarum and so absolutely speaking voluntas Dei causa rerum dicitur; and ad 6: creatures come from God not by natural necessity or per necessitatem scientiae but per libertatem

voluntatis in qua completur ratio causalitatis; et ideo non quandocumque scivit creavit. sed quandocumque voluit . Note also STJ,7,4 in c: omne creatum sub aliqua certa intentione creantis comprehenditur: non enim in vanum agens aliquod operatur. Uncle necesse est quod sub certo numero omnia creata comprehendatur; QD de Ver2,1 ad8 and 2.13; and STJ .19,3-4.

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cum in ipso non differat cognoscere actu et habitu. Ipse enim novit totam potentiam suam, et quidquid potest: unde omnium quae wtest habet rationes quasi excogitatas 107.

What is merely possible falls under God's will since in willing his own power, God wills all that he is capable of doing. At the same time, when he actually brings something into existence God does not come to know what he did not know before. The idea by which he knows is essentially one and while another respectus can be added to the divine knowledge no form can be added to it. The idea, like knowing, is subject to the freedom of the will and is always connected with some intention to produce something for some purpose'w, It cannot be said either of the act of knowing or of the idea that "it is in God but was not before" and yet both knowing and the idea are within God's freedom [tamen respectu utriusque potest designari libertas voluntatis )109.

4. Godas Exemplar Cause We have seen how Saint Thomas emphasises that divine causality is more like the kind of causality found in intelligent agents than that found in natural causes . Nevertheless, and particularly in his commentary on the Sentences, he speaks of God as the exemplar form of things in a twofold sense, as exemplaris forma rerum, non tantum quantum ad ea quae sunt in sapientia sua, scilicet secundum rationes ideales, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt in natura sua, scilicet attributa I 10.

In another text he writes:

107 QD de Pot 1.5 ad 11. See also QD de Ver 2,8 ad 3: si idea sit forma cognitionis practicae, sicut magis est in communi usu loquentium, sic non est idea nisi eorum quae fuerunt vel sunt vel erunt; si autem sit forma etiam speculativae cognitionis, sic nihil prohibet etiam aliorum quae non fuerunt nee sunt nee erunt esse ideam ; 2.10 ad se 1 and 3.6 . Dubois . De Exemplarismo Divino says: 'ideae sunt Dei Forma ab ipso objective cognita , non tantum ut supremum atque infinitum omnis perfectionis Exemplar, infinite imitabile iunumeris modis possibilibus , sed etiam ut rea1iter ac finite imitandum modis a divina voluntate determinatis, scilicet in certa mensura, in certo numero et in certo pondere seu ordine; ita ut varii isti modi divinae imitationis sint omnium rerum faetibilium rationes in scientia Dei speculativa, et sint in scientia Dei practica prototypi seu exemplaria omnium rerum ab ipso faciendarum vel factarum' (p.86). The ideas thus belong primarily to practical knowledge, secondarily to speculative knowledge (op.cit.,p.88). Van den Berg. De ideis Divinis , says: ' Itaque dum de Ideis Divinis instituimus sermonem, non de ideis pure speculativis, sed practicis, non prout sunt pura principia cognitionis, sed prout sunt principia operationis, non prout ad puram speculationem, sed et ad actum habent ordinem, prout sunt rerum architypae et exemplaria potissimum consideramus' (p.14). On ideas of possibles see Chapter Five, pp.230-31 above. 108 QD de Ver 3,6 sc 2. See 3,1; In I Sent 39.1,2 arg 1 and ad 1 [pp.922,923] and Quodlibet 4.1,1 in c. Virtual practical knowledge is included in the strict sense of idea since God wills his capacity to produce what remains merely possible: QD de Ver 3,3 [lines 167.{i8]. 109 In I Sent 39,1,2 ad 1. See QD de Ver 2.10 ad sc 1. I to In I Sent 2,1,2 in c [pp.62-63]. See also In II Sent 18,1,2; STJ,84,2 ad 3 and Vigener, De Ideis Divinis p.29-43.

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similitudo operis potest dici ad operantem dupliciter: aut quantum ad id quod habet in natura sua, sicut homogenerathominem; aut quantumad id quod habet in intellectu suo, sicut artificiatum ab artifice in similitudinemartis suae procedit. Utroque modo procedit creatura a Deo in similitudinem ejus. Primo modo,quia ab ente sunt entia, et a vivo viventia. Secundomodo,quia procedunt a rationibus idealibus'U . And yet again: exemplar rerum est in Deo dupliciter. Vel quantumad id quod est in intellectu suo, et sic secundum ideasest exemplar intellectus divinusomniumquae ab ipso sunt, sicut intellectus artificis per formam artis omnium artificiatorum. Vel quantumad id quod est in naturasua, sicut rationesuae bonitatis qua est bonus, est exemplaromnisbonitatis, et similiterest de veritatell2. In a work which comes from the mid-point of his writing career, 1265-1266, he writes that the analogical likeness between creatures and God is twofold since the creature imitates the divine idea and resembles the divine nature: Et hoc dicitur uno modo in quantum res creatae imitantursuo modo ideam divinae mentis, sicut artificiata formam quae est in mente artificis. Alio modo secundum quod res creatae ipsi naturae divinae quodammodo similantur, prout a primoente alia sunt entia,et a bonobona,et sic de aliis113. God is the first and only exemplar of everything [creaturae exemplar] 114. While God's action in all things is simply one it is diversified secundum rationem, on the basis of diverse attributes and ideas [a ratione diversorum attributorum vel diversarum idearum] liS. Thus, as Geiger says , God is exemplar cause in two radically different ways because participation is 'in the divine idea' and 'in the divine nature' 116 . We have seen that the Dionysian tradition regarded the attributes and the exemplars or ideas as practically equivalent'!", In the commentary on the Sentences Saint Thomas remains close to this tradition. Not surprising y then, he speaks of God as exemplar cause both in virtue of the ideas in God's mind and in virtue of the perfections of God's nature 118. However Saint Thomas' account of divine causality in Summa Theologiae is significantly different. In ST 1,44 he continues to understand God as primum exemplar omnium. This is because in divina sapientiasunt rationes omnium rerum,quas supra diximus ideas, idest formas exemplares in mentedivina existentes. Quae quidemlicet multiplicentur

In II Sent 16,1,2 ad2. 19,5,2 ad4. 113 QD de Pot3,4ad 9. 114 QD de Ver4,4ad 5 andQuodlibet 4,1,1 in c. 115 In I Sent 17,2,2 ad 2 [pp.416-17]. 116 La Participation, p.233,n.1. 117 See Chapter Three at pp.l l0,138-42 above. 118 Th. Delvigne, 'L'inspiration propre du traite deDieu dans IeCommentaire des Sentences desaint Thomas', BT3 (1931-33) 119*-122*. III

112 InI Sent

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secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout ejus similitudoa diversis participari potest diversimode U? While there is no reference to participation in the divine attributes Saint Thomas does speak of God's 'efficient' causality in relation to all being and of the 'final' causality of God's goodness: necesse est .. quod omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi ... causari ab uno primo ente quod perfectissimeest 120 ... primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem a1icujus finis, sed intenditsolum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est ejus bonitas. Et unaquaequecreatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium121. The other aspect of exemplar causality-the imitation of the divine nature or of the divine attributes-is now shared between God's efficient and final causality. Final causality is related to exemplar causality because the purpose of production is the generated form insofar as it is similitudo formae generantis, quod suam similitudinem communicare intenditl 22 • Efficient causality is explained in terms of the single communication of the fundamental perfection of esse. There are some hints of the earlier view although any possible misunderstanding in terms of formal causality is clearly excluded: all things come from the di vine wisdom per quamdam imitationem sicut a primo principio effectivo et formali, prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia anijicis 123 , and the godhead is esse omnium effective et exemplariter, non autem per essentiamue.

5. Rationes as Attributes and Rationes Rerum Saint Thomas uses those terms found in seG 1.53 - conceptio, definitia, intentio intellecta and especialIy ratio - to refer both to the divine attributes and to the di vine ideas'>. The ideas and the attributes are equivalent in pagan and in ST,1,44.3 in c. ST,1,44,1 in c. 121 ST,1,44,4 in c. 122 ST,1,44,4 ad 2. See also 1,6,1 in c and note the comment of Thomas Gilby OP : 'The end of an action is the agent, not as the subject of the effect but as having the form communicated' [St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae. Volume 8 (la.44-49) Creation, Variety. and Evil [London and New York 1967] note 'h ' on p.22]. 123 ST,1,9,1ad 2. 124 ST,1.3,8 ad 1. See also ad 2 and, in ChapterTItree above, note 78 on p.l~. 125 For St Thomas on divine attributes see especially In I Sent 2,1,3 [pp.63-72] with A.Dondaine OP , 'Saint Thomas et la dispute des attributs divins (I Sent, d.2, a.3). Authenticite et origine', Arch Frat Praed 8 (1938) 253-62 ; Henry Anstryn Wolfson , 'St Thomas on Divine Attributes ' , in Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson de l'Academie Francoise [Toronto/Paris 1959] , 673 -700 and B.-M.Lemaigre OP , ' Perfection de Dieu et Multiplicite des Attributs Divins ', RSPf 50 (1966) 198-227. In I Sent 2,1,3 is St Thomas ' most important treatment of the question of divine attribut es. It is a text which he added to his commentary while teaching in Rome in 1265-1267 and he describes it as crucial to understanding the entire first book of the 119

120

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Christian neoplatonism and there is an early text where Saint Thomas seems simply to identify the divine ideas and the divine attributes'w. He explains the multiplicity of ideas in a way that is analogous to his explanation of the plurality of attributes and the plurality of divine names is established on the same 00sis 127. But the ideas and the attributes are not simply equivalent for Saint Thomas. The attributes involve no necessary reference beyond the divine essence and are not multiplied even though God is compared to creatures according to them: goodness making good things and wisdom making wise people. The ideas however, if the meaning of idea is to be formally complete, must involve a reference beyond the divine essence to the relations in which the creatures stand towards it 128. This plurality of ideas does not multiply the divine essence itself but only the relations of creatures to it for the rationes rerum or ideas are in God notionally [in intellectu] 129. The rationes as referring to divine attributes have their basis in God's perfection [in re]l30. The absolute simplicity of the divine nature is in no way jeopardised since the predication of a plurality of attributes is subject to the limitations of analogy:

Sentences: In I Sent 2,1,3 in c [p.66). It is a lengthier account of the issues already treated in 2,1 ,2 and it completes and corrects 2,1,2 as well as 22,1,3 and other earl ier texts: Lemaigre, p.204. See also Responsio ad loannem Vercellensem de Articulis GVlll , 1-3 [§§816-24]; 51 [§878] and SCG 1.53,443 and 445. 126 In I Sent 17,2,2 ad 2 [pp.416-17]. See also In I Sent 2,1,2 in c [pp.62-63] . On the equivalence of ideas and attributes: Eriugena combined Augustine, De Div Qq LXXXlll.46 with the Greek neoplatonic tradition on the attributes of God : Gersh, From Iamblichus , p.I60,n.I56 and see Chapter Three at pp.145-46 above. On Dionysius see Gersh , op .cit., pp .Ll ; 153ff; 249 (n.212) and for neoplatouism generally see Geiger, ' Les idees divines ', p.189 ,n.36 . For the same association in Christian theology see Vigener, De Ideis Divinis, pp.70-71. Wolfson asserts that St Thomas identifies the ' ideas' , 'names' and 'attributes' in God: ' Extradeical and Intradeica1 Interpretations' , p.25 but this is too simple . St Thomas' view is always more nuanced as well as being subject to change during the course of his writing career: see above on 'God as Exemplar Cause' . 127 In I Sent 36,2,2 in c [p.842], on the divine ideas, appeals to 2,1,3 [pp.63-72] on the divine attributes, as does 22,1,3 [pp.536-39], on the divine names . 128 In I Sent 19,5,3 ad 2 [p.496] . 129 QD de Ver 3,2,ad 2, ad 3, ad 6 and ad 7. The distinction of persons in God is entirely different to the plurality either of attributes or of ideas : QD de Ver 3,2 ad 1. 130 On God's perfection as the basis for many attributes : In I Sent 2,1,3 in c [pp.69-71] . See QD de Ver 1,1 ad 12; ST,I ,26,2 ; In I Sent 2,1,3 sc 4 , ad 4 and ad 5 [pp.65,72]; SCG 1.31; ST J,13,4 ad 3 ; SCG 136 and QD de Pot 7,6. Lemaigre comments: 'La cause propre de la mul tiplicite des noms divins et des concepts est notre esprit qui ne peut saisir Dieu qu' A travers ses effets. Mais Dieu est Ie fondement de cette multiplicite, en ce qu'il correspond dans sa perfection simple A la multiplicite de nos concepts' - 'Perfection de Dieu ' , p.221. God is radix of the multiplicity of divine names: QD de Pot 7,6 and causaveritatis: QD de Pot 1,1 ad 12.

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creatura autem quantumcumque imitetur Deum non tamen potest pertingere ad hoc ut eadem ratione aliquid sibi conveniat qua convenit Deo ." sicut impossible est quod ad idem esse perveniat 131. As the work of intelligence creation involves the ideas in the divine mind. As an imitation of the divine perfection creation manifests the divine attributes. Along with the multiplicity of divine attributes and the plurality of divine names, a plurality of rationes ideales is therefore another, related, instance of a fundamental problematic of simplicity and complexity, of one and many, which puzzles the human intellect as it seeks to understand the mystery of God. Well aware of this problematic Saint Thomas suggests a number of images for the manifold un ity of God l32 but adds that these images are quite inadequate for representing the divine simplicity: in nulla re creata invenitur aliquid simile divinae simplicitati, ut habens sit id quo habetur; omnia enim similia quae possent induci vel de punctis vel de differentiis existentibus in genere , plus habent de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine ; et ideo magis abducunt a veritate quam in verum intellectum inducant 133.

6. A Comment on Participation The notion of participation is fundamental to Saint Thomas' understanding of causality and analogy and major works of thomistic interpretation in this century have centred on it 134• Dionysius speaks of participation in terms of similarity or resemblance [K. These formae influxae are not creati ve as the divine ideas are but they are similes formis creatricibus in their capacity to represent created things and are analogically the image of the rationes ideales in the divine mind. The divine ideas cannot be known perfectly by means of these for mae influxae but singular things can be perfectly comprehended by them since they are higher than the things of which the divine ideas are the rationes idealesSf'.

SCG IV.13,3495. referring to John 1.4. See SCG III .67 and 75. QD de Ver 8.4 ; STJ.12.7-1O. SOIn III Sent 14,2.2 in c [p.448 with n.?] and QD de Ver 8,4. 51 On the knowledge of the separated soul : QD de Ver 19 and ST J.89. See Gilson. 'Pourquoi S.Thomas·. pp .119-20. For St Thomas misinterpreting Augustine on this point: Chroust, ' The Meaning of Some Quotations'• pp.27ff. 52 QD de Ver 8.11 ad 12: on the difference between angelic knowledge and that of the separated soul . See also QD de Anima 15. especially obj 11; STJ .89,3 and QD de Ver 19.2 in c. 53QD de Anima 15 in c. ad 9. ad 11. ad 13. ad 15. ad 20 and ad 21. See also QD de Ver 19.2 in c and STJ .89,1 ad 3. 54 See QD de Anima 15 ad 18. for example. in comparison with the body of the article. ad 3. ad 8 and ad 9. as well as STJ .84.7. Pegis, At the Origins. shows how St Thomas ' understanding of the union of body and soul is original both in aristotelian and in Christian terms . 55 QD de Anima 20 ad 6; 15 ad II. 56 QD de Anima 20 ad 8 and ad 9. 48

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Concluding Comment We can say, then, that Saint Thomas presents us with a theory of illumination not of the occasionalist type associated with medieval augustinianism but of a Christianised aristotelian type in which the creature's participation in the divine light, the intellectus agens, is an enduring natural gift. In speaking of the intellectus agens he brings together augustinian and aristotelian elements. The intellectus agens is the light in which we see things (Aristotle) but is also a sun or source of light (Plato) as well as a participation in God's own intellectual light (Augustinej'", A similar confluence of traditions is seen in his account of the soul's self-knowledge58. The role which he assigns to the divine ideas in creaturely knowledge illustrates how Saint Thomas used what he received from Augustine and integrated it in an account of knowledge which is at once philosophically coherent and faithful to Christian convictions.

B. SAINT THOMAS AND ARISTOTLE ON THE GOOD Early in his career Saint Thomas believed that Aristotle, developing Plato's own thinking , placed the ideas in the divine intelligence. We have seen how Aristotle's philosophy does indeed stand at the head of the twofold tradition about the divine ideas which means that there is a spark of intuitive truth in Saint Thomas's early view59• He writes: Aristoteles vero posuit in Deo rationes omnium rerum, et intellectus, et intelligens, et intellectum 60.

quod idem est in Deo

57 ST,1,79,4. See Anton Pegis, At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man [The Saint Augustine Lecture 1962: New York/London 1963]; Charles J.O'Neil, ' St Thomas and the Nature of Man', Proceedings of the ACPA (1951) 41-66; Gorce, 'L'activite constructrice', 2240; Joseph de Sainte-Marie, 'De la psychologie de la connaissance', 3-46; J.Vande Wiele, 'Le probleme de la verite ontologique dans la philosophie de saint Thomas'. RPL 52 (1954) 521-71 ; Lonergan, Verbum, pp .75-88;188-89 and Oeser , Begriff und Systematik der Abstrakiion , pp .216 -26 . Nevertheless ST,I.79,3 in c bears witness to profound differences between Augnstine and Thomas? See Chroust, ' The Meaning of Some Quotations ' , pp.34-35 and Gilson, 'Pourquoi S.Thomas'. For Moreau, ' The Platonic Idea', 479-80, the platonic theory of ideas hangs on their gnoseological function but this is their least adequate function for the ThornistlAristotelian tradition . See Joseph de Sainte-Marie, 'De la psychologie de la connaissance', p.24 and also ST,1,65,4 in c and ad 2 with Thomas R.Heath OP, ' Saint Thomas and the Aristotelian Metaphysics: Some Observations', NS 34 (1960) 438-60, on p.453. 58 See Chapter Six above , pp.241-42 especially at note 28 , and Bremond, 'L'augustinisme de saint Thomas'. S9 See Victor White OP , ' The Platonic Tradition in St Thomas Aquinas', in God the Unknown [London 1956], p.67; Chapter Two above, note 50 on p.60 and note 5 above on p.275. 60 Super Evang.Ioann.l,1,§65. See In I Sent 35,1,1 ad 3 and ad 4; ST,1,14,2 and In XII Meta §§2536-42,2602-14. In saying that in God essence and thought are the same St Thomas appeals also to texts of Augustine: ST J,14,4,sc; De Trin VII.2 [pL 42 .936] ; VII . I [42.936] ; VI.4 [42.927] and see Chroust , 'The Meaning of Some Quotations ', p.28.

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1. SaintThomas' Knowledge of Plato through Aristotle» From the Metaphysics Saint Thomas learned that Plato and his followers postulated the ideas firstly in order to explain universal knowledge of particular things 62• For them natural things come about through participation in the ideas and human knowledge is ex impressione formarum idealium in animas lWStrass«. Knowledge is a kind of reminiscence of what is known naturally ex impressione formarum separatarum». Plato regarded the form or idea as one and indivisible and as more true and more real than material things 65• Secondly Plato attributed a cosmological and generative function to the ideas in order to explain being and becoming. Sensible things have being propter[ideas J because the ideas are causae essendi and secundum [ideas J because the ideas are eorum exemplariaw. Plato explained the relation between the separated forms and material reality in terms of participations". The ideas are exempla, exemplares or formae because the idea is an extrinsic formal cause ad cuiussimilitudinem resfieri dicttur». Saint Thomas also knew how Aristotle criticised Plato's theory of ideas 69• As cosmological or generative principles Plato's ideas are criticised on three counts, says Saint Thomast'', Firstly, the essence of a thing [quod quid erat 61 See especially Meta 1.6 with St Thomas' commentary, In XII Meta §§152-76 and Meta III.6 with In XII Meta §§515-18. St Thomas did not know Meta M and N. The Metaphysics commentaryis dated after 1266: Fabro.lntroduzione, p.50 [1266-72];Weisheipl, FriarThomas d 'Aquino, p.379 [1269-72];Heath, art.cit., p.455,n.55 [1266 or after). For St Thomas's knowledge of Plato through Aristotle's critique of the platonic theory of ideas: In XII Meta [= In Duodecim Libris Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio. Ed. M.-R.Cathala OP (Marietti , Turin and Rome, 1950)]1.6§§151-70; 1.9§§208-67;III.2 §§403,407-09; III.6 §517; VII.6 §§1356-76; VII.8 §§1417-35,1470; VII.I4-15 §§1592-1627; VIIl.3 §1722 and XU §§21S8-60. See Vespignani, Dell'esemplarismo divino, cap.I, pp.9-49 and Lipperheide, Thomas von Aquin, pp.8-24. 62 In I Sent 19,5,3 ad3 [pp.496-97]; STJ,84,1 in c; Metaphysics 1.6 [987b31-32] with In XII Meta §164 [see §668]; In Post Anal 1,16,140-41 (6-7) ; In Physic 11,3,162 (6). See Maurer, 'St Thomas and Eternal Truths', 98-99,101 and Cunningham, 'Averroes vs. Avicenna on Being' , NS 48 (1974) 198,note 77. Note also STJ,SS,3 ad 1; SCG 11.77,1584and III.84,2S93 63 In Post Anal 1,1,8(8). See also STJ,79,3 in c; 1,84,4in c; 1,84,6in c; QD de An 3 ad 8. 64 In Post Anal 1,1,8 (8); In XII Meta §§153,164,1368; SCG 11.83,16743-] with §2160. 73 See Metaphysics III.I [9951>34-35] with In XII Meta §360 and In XII Meta §§ 1719,219091,2143 . Cfln Physic 11.5,179(4). 74 Metaphysics III.4 [999bI6] with In XII Meta §§447-53 . See also VII.6, VII. 10, VIII.6 with §§1762 -64 and XII.3-4 with §1907. There is a variety of ' figures' in Metaphysics VII: Booth, AAOICf, pp.IO-18. 7S Metaphysics 1.9 [991a8-14,19-20 ,b3-9] with In XII Meta §§225-29. See also V.24 and XIII.5. For St Thomas, Aristotle's concern is the reality of secondary causality : §§237-38,1738. 76 Metaphysics VII.7-8 with In XII Meta §§1381,1417,1423-33. See also VIII.3 with §§1715-16 ; XII.3 [1070316-30] with §2454; XII.5 [1071a13-36] with §§2480-85 ; XII.10 with §§2657-60. 77 In XII Meta §1432. 78 Metaphysics 1.9 [especially 991310-22,27-29]. See also VII.8, VIII.6 [especially 1045aI420], XIII.5 and In II Sent 1,1,1 ad 5 [p.16]. See QD de An 11 in c; SCG, suppressed autograph of 11.52, Leonine edition , lXIII, 2.56/22; and In XII Meta §1623 for other problems in platonic exemplarism. Aristotle is particularly scathing about Plato's notion of participation: 1.9 [991310-22,992324-29], VIII.6 [1045b7-12], XIII.7 [1082b3-4: Plato is forced into 'fiction' by what is brought in forcibly to suit a hypothesis]. 79 Metaphysics 1.9 [990b2-4,17-22; 991a8-14 ; 992324-29; 992b6-9]; III.2 [997a34-997b12] ; VII.16; XI.2; XIII.9 [1086b2-13]. 80 Metaphysics VII.IO with In XII Meta §§1467-81. On the 'third man ' argument: VII.13 with §§ 1586-87; XI.l with §2160; XIII.4. Also In XII Meta §§222-24,418,2143 ,2554; In I Sent 37,3 1 ad 6; SCG 1.51,431; STJ,84,1 in c; De Gen et Corr 1,3,25 (8); In Physic 11,3,162 (6); III,6,331 (6) and IV,3,431 (10).

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From Aristotle's account of the history of philosophy Saint Thomas concludes that the natural philosophers were more "experienced" than the platonists because they attended more to sensible and natural things. They were in a better position to discover the principles of sensible things, they use the term species to refer to the intrins ic formal cause rather than the extrinsic cause or exemplum, and they regarded matter as a unitary first principle rather than the source of diversity and even of evil as Plato did 81• Saint Thomas knew that Aristotle also rejected Plato's theory because it failed to explain knowledge as Plato wanted it to do. Aristotle recognized the difficulty of trying to expla in true knowledge of substances but believed that Plato's theory of ideas which were both universal, and separable and individual, was impossible. The platonic view would mean that universals are known to us without the induction deemed necessary by Aristotle, that we can know things we have never sensed and that we can, by understanding their essential natures, know separated substances which transcend sensible reality82. Knowledge must be universal but the separation presupposed by the universal is the cause of the objections raised to the theory of ideas83. Aristotle and Saint Thomas agree with Plato's association of immateriality and intelligibility's, They agree that true knowledge entails universals and a kind of demonstration which would be free of the mutability and particularity of sensible things 85. But Aristotle refused to accept separately exist ing abstractions which he believed to exist only in the intellect's, A universal need not be unum extra multa, a one prior to the many, as the platonists thought. It is rather unum in multis et de multis, properly universal and properly predicated of many things87. The universal does not exist in rerum natura and is posterius not prior as Plato says88. A separately existing idea will have to be singular itself and it is therefore difficult to see how it can be a universal predicable of many things'", It is sensible things we want to understand in any case, says Aristotle, and it is no help towards this to know other entities separated from them90 . Instead of sensible things being known through the knowledge of separated substances it is the

81 In XII Meta §§166-68,170,173,764 ; De Gen et Carr 1,3,25 (8) ; In Physic 1,8,55 (3) ; II,5,179 (4). 82 In Post Anal 1,30,254 (7); SCG II.2 and ST ,1,88,2. See QD de An 3 ad 8, in c. 83 Metaphysics III .4 [999a24-29]; XI.2 [1060bI9-23] with In XII Meta §2188; XIII.10 [1087a13]. 84 In I Sent 35,1,1 ad 3; QD de Ver 2,2 [lines 138-42]; SCG II.75; ST,I,14,1 ; 1,79,3 ; 1,84,2 in

85 In Post Anal, 1,19,166 (8). 86 In Peri Henn 1,2,15 (5); ST,I,44,3 ad 2 and QD de An 3 ad 8 fn In Post Anal 1,19,166 (8). 88 In Post Anal 1,33,286 (9); In de An 1,1 (nn.12-13); ST,1,44,3 ad 3. 89 De Unitate Intel/ectus, cap.5; De naturageneris, cap.4, §503. 90 Metaphysics 1.9 [991aI2-14] with In XII Meta §227; 1.9 [992b21-993alO]

See ST ,1,84,1 in c and QD de Ver 10,6 in c.

with §§268 -72.

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latter which are known from the knowledge of sensible things?' . Because of materiality philosophers found it impossible to define individual things92• Plato spoke of the ideas as individuals and so they are equally impossible to know and define - but this was the reason why Plato postulated them in the first place 93• For Saint Thomas the intellectus agens is Aristotle's alternative explanation of how a universal knowledge of particular things is possible, although certain ways of understanding the intellectus agens were equivalent to Plato's theory of the ideas?', Saint Thomas was aware of passages in Aristotle's writings which gave a more sympathetic reading of Plato's philosophy and for which various explanations have been offered 95• He also sensed that Aristotle is to be received cautiously in what he says about Plato's philosophy. He is not therefore an uncritical reader of Aristotle on Plato and is aware of Aristotle's interest in defining himself in relation to Plato 96• In any case Aristotle himself continued to recognise the need for principles apart from matter and stayed with Plato wherever he could 97.

2. Plato, Aristotleand Saint Thomas on the Good Having dealt with Saint Thomas' appropriation of what Aristotle taught him about the gnoseological and cosmological functions of Plato's ideas it remains to examine his assessement of their 'axiological' function. It has been claimed that Saint Thomas is a platonist and not an aristotelian in his understanding of goodness 98.

91 Metaphysics VII. 17 [104Ia6-9] with In XII Meta §1648. See §§1990-91; STJ,I8,4 ad 3 and 1.84,7-8. 92 Metaphysics VII.15 [1039b27-1040a7] with In XII Meta §§I609-11. 93 Metaphysics VII.15 [104OaS-I04Ob4] with In XII Meta §§I606,1612-18.1627. See also §§1720-21.1826,I846 and QD de Malo 16.11 in c; STJ.84,4. 94 In Post Anal 1,1,8 (8); QD de Virt 8 in c; SCG 11.77,1584 ; III.76.1564; 111.84,2539; ST J.79,3 in c ; 1,84,3-5; 1.84,6 in c and 1.85. Avicenna: QD de Virt 8 in c; QD de An 3 in c; 3 ad 17; SCG 111.76.1564; ST J.79,4; 1.84,4 in c; 1,84,4 ad 3. Augustine: ST J.84,5. See also pp.27981 above . 95 On Aristotle 's "platonism" see note 8 to Chapter Four above, p.136. and Carlo Giacon SJ. 'II Platonismo di Aristotele e S.Tommaso', DC 27 (1975) 153-70. 96 See Th .Deman OP, ' Remarques critiques de S.Thomas sur Aristote interprete de Platon', RSPf 30 (1941-42) 133-48, with the texts cited there and also In XII Meta §§37I,1959. On St Thomas' technique in handling doctrinal positions-assessing, refuting and using them-see R.J .Henle SJ. ' Saint Thomas' Methodology in the Treatment of ' Positiones' with Particular Reference to ' Positiones Platonicae", Greg 36 (1955) 391-409. 97 See Metaphysics m .2 with In XII Meta §§350-351 ; IV.5 with §§667-68,690; VII .2 [l028b30] with §§1268-69 ; VII.3 with §1296 ; VII.16 with §§163 1-47; Vm.2 with §1685 and VIII.6 with §§1758,1762-64 . See also §§359,385,398,436-38,593 and 1177. 98 Andre von Ivanka , for example. argues that St Thomas formally contradicts Aristotle's comment about the good not being some common element answering to one idea: ' S.Th omas platonisant' , AttiNap 1,256-57. See also J.Owens, The Doctr ine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics [Toronto 1951,1957] pp.53ff; 396-97 with note 14. Von Ivanka uses ST J ,6 I ad 2

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In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle denies that there is one common idea of good [communis idea bonorum] just as he denies that there is an idea of ens communer'. He gives many arguments to show that per se bonum is not to be understood in a platonic sense as aliquid commune velut una idea communis omnium bonorum HlO. Saint Thomas says that this rejection of a platonic idea of the good is not a rejection of a separate good on which all goodness depends: Aristoteles non intendit improbare opinionem Platonis quantum ad hoc quod ponebat unum bonum separatum, a quo dependeret omnia bona. Nam ipse Aristoteles in duodecimo Metaphysicorum ponit quoddam bonum separatum a toto universo, ad quod totum universum ordinatur, sicut exercitus ad bonum ducis. Improbat autem opinionem Platonis quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat bonum separatum esse quamdamideam communemomnium bonorum101. Furthermore, says Saint Thomas, illud bonum separatum, quod est causa omnium bonorum, oportet ponere in altiori gradu bonitatis, quam ea quae apud nos sunt, eo quod est ultimus finis omnium lO2• For Saint Thomas Aristotle's concern in the Nicomachean Ethics is to exclude Plato's common idea of the good while leaving space for one separated first principle of goodness which, far from threatening the goodness inherent in things, actually establishes and supports that goodness. The predication of 'good' of particular goods and of per se bonum is not to be understood equivocallyl03. Rather is the term 'good' predicated of many things analogically on the basis of a relationship [proportio] among them, namely inquantum omnia bona dependent ab uno primo bonitatis principio, vel inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Non enim voluit Aristoteles quod illud bonum separatum sit idea et ratio omnium bonorum,sed principiumet finisHl4 . Among the different relationships on which analogical predication may be established the most appropriate for ' the good' is that of a common relationship to

and SCG III .19 but does not comment on Metaphysics A, on St Thomas 's commentary on it or on Nicomachean Ethics1.6-8. 99 Eth Nic 1.6 [l096a23ff]: especially 1096b25 : 'The good, therefore, is not something common answering to one Idea'. As St Thomas knew it: Non igitur est bonum commune quid secundumunam ideam. See Sent Lib Ethic 1,6,§§80-82 [lines 98-168) and QD de Malo 1,2 ad

4. 100

Sent Lib Ethic 1,7,§§84-94 [lines 18-167] ; §96 [lines 209-13) and 1,8,§§97-98 [lines 1-

34]. 101 Sent Lib Ethic 1,6,§79 [Marietti) [lines 87-96: Leonine) . See In XII Meta XII, 12,§§26272663 . St Thomas here appeals to Aristotle at his most 'platonic': see Chapter Four, note 8 on p.l48 above, on Aristotle's supposed platonism and the explanations which have been offered

forit. 102 Sent Lib Ethic 1,7,§84 [lines 18-22]. Here as elsewhere, e.g. 1,7,§96 [lines 198-213) , St Thomas reads Eth Nic in the light of Metaphysics A. 1m Sent Lib Ethic 1,6,§§79-82 [lines 76-169] and I,7,§§83-96 [lines 1-213]. 1M Sent Lib Ethic I,7,§96 [lines 201-06).

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diverse subjects. This kind of analogy is preferred because it best preserves the goodness inherent in all things: Ideo autem hunc ... modum praefert, quia accipitur secundum bonitateminhaerentem rebus, [alteri] modi secundumbonitatemseparatama qua non ita proprie aliquiddenominatur 105. While Aristotle rejects the platonic notion of unum bonum, Saint Thomas believes that he accepts a separate summum bonum: quia autem nihil est bonum nisi in quantumest quaedamsimilitudoet participatio summi boni, ipsumsummumbonum quodammodoappetiturin quolibet bono et sic potest did quod unum bonumest quod omniaappetunt106• Saint Thomas believes that Aristotle's critique of Plato's idea of the good in no way touches the Christian belief in a good God from whom all good gifts come and whose own goodness is not simply the idea or ratio of all goodnesses. In Metaphysics A.lO Aristotle says that the good of the universe is located both in the order of its parts and as something separate in its leader. In fact it is more in the latter than in the former because "the order depends on the leader", a phrase which Saint Thomas takes as referring to the dependence of creation on God 107 • Aristotle is here speaking of "what all call God", says Saint Thomas : [t]otus enim ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicatur in universo ordinatoid quod est in intellectuet voluntateprimi moventis. Et sic oportet,quod a primomovente sit tota ordinatiouniversi 1~. Saint Thomas is perhaps more ready in his other works than in the aristotelian commentaries to recognise the platonic features of this account. Thus he de scribes as irrationabilis Plato's view of the species of natural things existing separately and per se, but Plato's view that there is a first which by its essence is being and good and which we call God is absolute verum. Moreover it is a view with which Aristotle agrees, he says, and he himself appeals to a text in Aristotle to this effect in the quarta via argument for demonstrating that there is a God 109. It is true to say that a thing is good by participating in the first essential being and goodness. In this sense it is good by God's goodness sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo etfinali totiusbonitatis 110. On the principle that omne

105 Sent Lib Ethic I,7,§96 [lines 209-13). 106 Sent 107

Ub EthicI,I,§ II [lines 175-83).

Metaphysics A.1O [1075all-15]. See also A.4 [1070b34-35]; A.5 [1071a33-36]; A.6

[1071bI4-17; lO72aI5-17] and A.8 [1074a35-36] and In XII Meta XII,10,§2629-31. Dependence is a favourite word with Saint Thomas for the relationship of creation. lOS In XII Meta XII,IO,§2631. See Dionysius on exemplars as 'willings' and St Thomas, De SubstantiisSeparaiis,IX. 109 Super Evang.Ioann., prol. ,§5 acknowledges that this is a platonic view. STJ,2,3 in c relies on Metaphysics a.2 [993b24-27] . See also STJ,6,4 in c; 103,2-3; SCG 1.13,113 and QD de Ver21,4. 110 STJ,6,4 in c and SCG 1,40.

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agens agit sibi simile the first goodness must leave its mark in its effects. The goodness of each good thing is sicutforma inhaerente per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditam. It is true therefore that each thing is good per bonitatem primam and that this first goodness is exemplar et effectivum omnis bonitatiserealae . Saint Thomas says: Et quantum ad hoc opinioPlatonissustineripotest. Sic igitur dicimus secundum communem opinionem, quod omnia sunt bona creata bonitate formaliter sicut forma inhaerente, bonitate vero increata sicut forma exemplari 111.

This view is associated with Augustine who followed Plato's opinions to the extent that the truth of the faith would allow itll2. Augustine is to be interpreted as follows: ut ipsa divina bonitas dicatur esse bonum omnis boni in quantum est causa effi ciens prima et exemplaris omnis boni, sine hoc quod excludatur bonitas creata, qua creaturae denominantur bonae sicut forma inhaerente -P,

So there is a supreme uncreated goodness on which all goodnesses depend and good things are inherently good. For the followers of Gilbert Porretanus human goodness is good bonitate prima but is not inherent 114. According to Saint Thomas this was precisely the view Aristotle was criticising when he argued that the quiddities and forms of things are not separate but insunt ipsis rebus particularibusn>. Gilbert would have earned Saint Thomas' criticism also for seeming to detach divine attributes such as goodness from the divine essence itself, regarding it as a 'form in God' rather than God himself'us. It follows that God may be described as goodness itself [ipsa bonitas], as the highest good [summum bonum] and as the good in everything that is good [omnis boni bonum] 117. God is good per essentiam and creatures per participationem . This participated goodness of creatures is an image of God who, as their ultimate end, bestows their goodness on all things ll 8 . The goodness of

God, concerned with the good of the universe, reaches to particular things which receive their goodness, as they receive their esse, from God 1l 9. There is III QD de Ver21,4 [lines 203-17] . 112

QD de Ver 21,4 ad 3. See De Trin VIII,3 ,4-5; De Lib Arbit, 11,16,44; 17,45 [pL 32 .1264-

65]. 113 QD de Ver 21,4 ad 3. STJ ,103,6 in c says that things are not just in se bonum but aliis causa bonitatis: see Chapter Six, pp.267-68 above . On God as exemplar cause see Chapter Six,

pp.255-57 above . t t4 QD de Ver 21,4 [lines 150-79]. 115 QD de Ver 21,4 [lines 180-202]. See Metaphysics VII.14 [1039a24ffl, Eth Nic 1.7 [l096b2Off] and note 104 above . 116 See Wolfson, 'Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations', pp.23-24. I t7 SCG 1.38-39. For God as summum bonum Saint Thomas argues from participation and causality: SCG 1.41; STJ,6,2; 6,4 arg 1 and SCG 1.40. He relies on Augustine, De Trin VIII.3 [pL 42.949] and Dionysius, DN 11.1 [efln de Div Nom §1l7]. 118 SCG 1.40,326-27 and III.!7; STJ ,6,3. t19 SCG 1.78,662. See also §§663 [citing Metaphysics A] and 664-66 [God as universalis causatotiusuniversi wills singular goods-referring to SCG 1.65; 1.72 and Genesis 1.4,31].

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no created goodness existing between the uncreated goodness of God and the created goodnesses of things 120. His understanding of uncreated and created goodness shows how Saint Thomas transforms philosophical material in the service of Christian theology . He believes he is faithful to Aristotle for whom particular things have an inherent goodness through their dependence on a supreme good which gives finality and order to the universe. At the same time he recognises the compatibility with Christian faith of much of what Plato says about the first and separate Good. His own view is neither simply platonic nor simply aristotelian but belongs within the tradition of Christian theology as his use of texts from Augustine and Dionysius makes clear. Aristotle teaches that there is a supreme goodness on which all goodnesses depend and that good things are inherently good. Using that teaching Saint Thomas distinguishes the one separated good from which everything depends, spoken of by Plato and in Metaphysics A, from a common and separate idea of all goods, a notion rejected by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics I 121, This teaching supported Saint Thomas in his Christian conviction about the coherent reality and inherent goodness of created things, a conviction which obliged him to correct the platonic tradition on the ideas in the way that he did l 22• 'Separate' is acceptable, it seems, if it is God in his transcendent causality that is meant, a causality which ensures that created reality inherently 'is', 'is good' and ' is knowing' within a relationship of total dependence on the creating cause. 3. Aristotle on God, Creation and Providence

Intelligible substances are the first concern of the science which Aristotle called metaphysics and he speaks of there being necessarily a first truth and a first being 123, Saint Thomas says that Aristotle and Plato agree that all things depend on one supremely perfect first being'>. Aristotle's theological views as ex-

de Ver 21,4 ad 4. Sent lib Ethic I,6,§79 [lines 87-96], quoted on p.289 above at note 101, is the key passage in Sent Lib Ethic 1.6-8. St Thomas interprets Dionysius in the same way : see 'Saint Thomas and Dionysius on Being' pp.297-306 below and note in particular QD de Ver 21,4 ad 7 where St Thomas draws a parallel between the communication of goodness and the communication of esse, between created and uncreated goodness and being. 122 See the suppressed autograph of SeQ 1.54: Chapter Five, pp.221-25 above; White, 'The Platonic Tradition in St Thomas Aquinas'. pp.62-71 and 'An Acceptable Theory ofIdeas' below. pp.29S-96. 123 Metaphysics IV and In XII Meta §§476,546. See also Metaphysics VII .3 with In XII Meta §1299 ; VII.ll with §1526 and XIII.I0; III.2 with §§3SO-51; VII.17 with §§I648ff; IX.l with §§1770-71 ; IX .8 with §1866; IX.I0 with §§1911, 1916; XU with §§2146,2153,2155. 2158-59; XI.2 with §§2175,2178-79; XI.6 with §2233 ; XI.7 with §§2259 ,2261 -65,2266-67; XII.4 with §2474; XII.6-7; XII.8 with §2S96; XII.lO with §26S6. 124 ST,1.44.1 in c. As he believed them to be in agreement about the nature of spiritual sub stances : De Sub Sep III. 120 QD 121

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pressed in Metaphysics A and Physics VIII are frequently cited by Saint Thomas who interprets the rest of Aristotle 's philosophy in the light of these texts l 25• But Aristotle did not arrive at the idea of creation as Christian theology understands it. His god does not create the universe out of nothing, does not know lower beings and therefore, it seems, cannot exercise any kind of providence over them . Saint Thomas provides a treatment of fate and providence where Aristotle seems either to have no sense of these or to be mistaken about them 126. Yet , as noted already, Saint Thomas defends Aristotle against the charge of having denied providence and, basing himself on Metaphysics A.lO, argues that Plato and Aristotle are in agreement also on the question of providence 127. Aristotle's concern to explain movement and change within an eternally existing world does not mean that his philosophy cannot be used in a theology of creation. Indeed it is often argued that a doctrine of creation is the logical completion of Aristotle's thought , formally implied by his metaphysics although not explicit in his writings, and that his thought provides facilities which serve the Christian doctrine of creation 128. Anton Pegis writes: "Aristotle's prime mover was a God of sorts, since he was a first and unmoved source of motion, and this St Thomas did not deny; but he was not a first principle of being, and this St Thomas did not assert in the name of Aristotle in commenting on Metaphysics XlI." Saint Thomas, he continues, says that Plato and Aristotle did not rise to the origin of being, that is, they had no doctrine of creation, but they did provide the principles from which a doctrine of creation could be reached 129.

125For example In XII Meta §§2490-91,2517. For the importance of Book Lambda in St Thomas's understanding of the Metaphysics see In XII Meta §§422,455,501 ,522,563,1188 , 1268-69.1646. He refers often to Physics VIII for Aristotle's account of the first mover: In XII Meta §§667-68,690,744-48,841,1155,1160-68,1352,1412,1525-26. See Reale , pp.296-97,31220 where his view of the relation of PhysicsVIII and Metaphysics 11. coincides with that of St Thomas; Heath, 'Saint Thomas and the Aristotelian Metaphysics '. 438 -60 and Pegis, 'The Coherence', 67-117 . See also Chapter Four. pp.161-63 above. t26 Metaphysics VI.3 with In XII Meta §§1202-22; In I Sent 39,2,2 in c [pp.930-31]. t27 See Chapter Six, page 262 at note 149 above, and De Sub Sep III.6Off referring to Metaphysics 11. .10 [1075a11 -25]. See now L.Dewan OPt 'St Thomas. Aristotle and Creation' . Dionysius 15 (1991) 81-90. 128 See Evan Steenberghen, 'The Problem of the Existence of God in Saint Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle', Rev Meta 29 (1973-74) 554-68; P.Augustus

Boscardin,DottrinaTomista della Creazione e Libro Dodicesimo della Metafisica Aristotelica [Dissertatio ad Lauream in facultate Philosophica apud Pontificiam Universitatem S.Thomae de Urbe. Asolo (freviso) 1966]. especially pp.l0l-l11; Ross, p.I84; Jacques Chevalier, 'Trois Conferences d'Oxford-Aristote et Saint Thomas d' Aquin ou l'idee de creation', Les Lettres 14 (1927) 423-47; Lagrange. ' Comment s'est transformee', p.237 and especially R.Jolivet, ' Aristote et la notion de creation', RSPT 19 (1930) 5-50,209-34 [Aristotle lacks a notion of free causality in God but St Thomas deduces it from his text - pp.224, 225,n.l - and corrects Aristotle by Aristotle himself - pp.233-35]. See also St Thomas. In XII Meta §2499. 129 Pegis, 'The Coherence ' , pp.l07,1l4,1l5,n.143 referring to STJ,44,2 and De Sub Sep IX. Johnson disagrees: ' Aquinas 's Changing Evaluation' , pp.81,87. For Aristotle's 'theology' see Chapter Four above, pp.I60-61 and 172-73.

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Saint Thomas interprets those texts in Aristotle which deny to God any knowledge of the world to mean that God knows all things not from the things themselves but in knowing his own essence l30• It is because his effects are contained in him as in their cause that God knows all things in knowing himself: principiata continentur in virtute principii .. cum igitur a primo principio, quod est Deus, dependeat caelum et tota natura .. patet quod Deus cognoscendo seipsum omnia cognoscit-". On the basis of Metaphysics A.7 Saint Thomas says that God must know all things if his intelligere is his esse . God's esse is the universal source of all esse and God's intelligere is, as it were, the universalis radix intelligendi which comprehends all intelligence 132. Because God knows all, his providence extends to alP33. Likewise he interprets Aristotle as not excluding God's knowledge of vilia even though Aristotle says that the unmoved mover knows nothing except his own thinking and that in any case there are some things which it is better not to know: Nam ibi intendit ostendere quod divinus intellectus non cognoscit aliud a se quod sit sui intellectus perfectio quasi principale cognitum. Et secundum hunc modum dicit quod vilia melius ignorantur quam cognoscuntur: quando scilicet est alia cognitio vilium et nobilium, et vilium consideratioconsiderationem nobiliumimpeditl34 . In other places too Saint Thomas corrects and completes the philosophy of Aristotle. He applies to God a comment of Aristotle's about perfection, going beyond the sense of Aristotle's text l 35 • In speaking of generation by natural agents Saint Thomas makes it clear that the natural agent can act only under the omnipotent power of God: in sua actione est quasi instrumentum ipsius Dei agentis, qui etiam materiam condidit,et formae potentiam dedit136. He adds the example of exemplar and image to Aristotle's list of relative terms 137. He uses the example of Creator and creature to illustrate a point about

130Metaphysics A.7,9 with Jolivel, pp.221-23. See Guthrie, p.261,n .2 and Pegis, p.105 [St Thomas interprets A.7 in the light of De AnimaIll .If) [433b13-18]: In XII Meta §2520]. 131 STJ,57,2 in c and QD de Pot 3,16 arg 23 and ad 23. See De An 1,5,10 [410b4] ; Metaphysics m .4 [1000b5] ; In XII Meta §§2614-17 on 1074b33-35 and RLT IV (1974) n.607,p.211. 132 De Sub Sep XIV, especially lines 198-209. 133 De Sub Sep XV. 134 SCG 1.70. See Metaphysics A.9 [1074b29-34] and In XII Meta §2616. 135 Metaphysics V.16 [102Ib3Off] with In XII Meta §104O. 136 In IT Sent 1,1,1 in c; 1,1,4 ad 4. By contrast note In XU Meta §§667-68,690 in which St Thomas seems more radically Aristotelian than Aristotle himself, and §1758. 137 Metaphysics V.15 [1021a26-102lbll] with In XII Meta §1027.

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substance and accident l38• He uses Aristotle's understanding of causality as efficient, final and formal in a way that goes beyond Aristotle's meaning 139. Arguments of the quarta via type, arguing from degrees of value to the existence of a highest value in each series, are popularly regarded as platonic. In the context of such arguments, however, Saint Thomas normally appeals to Aristotle who argues that in any series there must be a corresponding first of that series who is the cause of the rest and has in a supreme way the quality which is common to all members of the series l40 • On this basis, for example, Saint Thomas says that Aristotle proves the unity of God 141. 4. An Acceptable Theory ofIdeas

Saint Thomas was convinced that Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of ideas do not tell against the notion of ideas in the divine mind. In his commentary on Metaphysics A.9 he writes: Sciendum autem quod ilia ratio, etsi destruat exemplaria separata a Platone posita, non tamen removet divinam scientiam esse rerum omnium exemplarem l42. He says that in Augustine's account of God creating all things according to different rationes aliqualiter salvatur Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, secundum quas formarentur omnia quae in rebusmaterialibus existunt143. Saint Thomas agrees with Aristotle 's rejection of the platonic notion of participation and of separated exemplars, because these notions destroy the integrity of secondary causalityw', But this does not prevent him from accepting participation and exemplarity in relation to God and creation. He returns often to the metaphor of an artifex who makes things according to the ideas contained within himself [sicut artificiata in mente artificisi , a point he takes from

138 In

XII Meta § 1352.

Physics n .7 [198a23-25] as applied in QD de Ver 3,1,sc 3: trescausaeinciduntin unam, scilicet efficiens.finalis etformaJis; sed Deusest causaeificiensetfinaJisrerum; ergo etiam est causaforma/is exemplaris: non enimpotest esseforma quae sit pars rei. For other corrections 139

of Aristotle see Heath, art.cit., pp.457ff. 140 ST J ,2,3 in c, quarta via. See Plato's Symposium and Aristotle, Metaphysics a.1 [993b23-31] with St Thomas, In XII Meta §§291-98; IV.4 (1OO9al] with §§658ff, especially §659. In his commentary on Liber de Causisand in De Substantiis Seperatis St Thomas makes frequent appeal to this principle from Meta a . See p.290 above with note 109. 14 1 ST JI .II,I,8 arg I, referring to Metaphysics XII. 10 [107004]. 142 In XII Meta §233. See In I Sent 36,2,1 arg I and ad I [pp.838,840] and QD de Ver 3.1 arg 4 and ad 4. 143 SeQ 1.54,454. 144 In XII Meta §§231-32,238,259 ,1738.

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Aristotle's account of artificial production but which is easily transposed to the level of the Creator-God145. So while Saint Thomas generally accepted the Aristotelian critique of platonic exemplarism he believed that it left untouched his own theology of one divine exemplar l46. A notion of participation remains central for him in spite of Aristotle's curt dismissal of it in some parts of the Metaphysics 147. For Saint Thomas there is unum principium primum extrarem, quodest agens, et exem-

plar, etfinisl48• In the Physics Aristotle says "we admit that there is something divine, good and desirable". Commenting on this text Saint Thomas speaks of form as divine because it indicates actuality: forma est quoddam divinum et optimum et appetibile. Divinum quidem est, quia omnisforma est quaedam participatio similitudinis divini esse, quod est actus purus : unumquodque enim in tantum est actu in quantum habet formam l49.

Clearly Saint Thomas does not limit himself to repeating Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of ideas. There is something praetermateriam he says in commenting Metaphysics Z.16 but this is not forma rerum sensibilium. There is a sense in which Plato's view is correct because species ideales are separate from singular things but not as separately existing substances 150. Saint Thomas can even agree with Plato in the face of Aristotle's criticisrns-" and the requirements of Christian faith ultimately determine his interpretation of Aristotle as of all his sources 152. While Aristotle's rejection of Plato's theory of ideas is correct it leaves untouched the Christian theological understanding of creative divine ideas which are responsible for the entire being of things and not only, as Plato would have it, for the essence of things1S3.

145 Metaphysics VII.7-9; XI.9 with InXII Meta §§2297-98; XII.3 [1070a13-19]; XII.9 with §2619. See also §§377,1957-59,2444,244748 and ST,1,15,1 inc.On it see In I Sent 36,1,1 in c [p.832]; 36,2,1 in c [p.839] and AAOICf, pp.I82-83,n.69,200-01 ; QD de Pot1,5 arg 11 citing De Gener Animal II.1 and Chapter Four atpp.I60-61 above. 146 In XII Meta §§233,2514,2454 and InPhysic 1,15,140 (12). 147 Metaphysics 1.6 [987b11-12] with In XII Meta §156; 1.6 [987b31-32] with §164. See Heath, 'Saint Thomas and the Aristotelian Metaphysics', p.457 and Chapter Six, pp.259-61 above. 148 In II Sent, I, Exp.Text., [p.43]. 149 Physics1.9[192a16-17] with InPhysic }J.15 (135). 150 InXII Meta §§1642,2190-91. 151 InXII Meta §§385,455,2541-43.576. 152 In XII Meta §§465, 469, SOl, 1202-22, 1536, 1575-76, 1581,1957-59, 1973,2140,226163,2289,2401,2499,2541-43,2560-62,2614-16,2663. t53 SeeA.Pegis. 'Cosmogony and Knowledge. II: The Dilemma of Composite Essences', Thought 19(1944) 269-90, especially pp.283-9O.

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C. SAINT THOMAS AND DIONYSIUS ON BEING We have seen how Saint Thomas , in speaking of the divine ideas, uses a text from the Divine Names of Dionysius. This text [DN V.8] is cited in his earlier treatments of the question , in In I Sent 36 and QD de Ver 3 and is referred to again in ST 1,15. Dionysius was a most significant influence not only for Saint Thomas' understanding of the ideas in God but for his theological synthesis generally 154. Saint Thomas' understanding of Dionysius changed during the course of his career. His early comment that Dionysius fere ubiquesequiturAristotelem contains an important insight since Dionysius is one of those figures in whom radical aristotelian ontology re-appears-A Later Saint Thomas says that Dionysius in plurimisfuit sectatorsententiae platonicae or plerumque utiturstilo et modo

loquendi quo utebantur platonici'». Here we will examine Saint Thomas ' commentary on the Divine Names to see how he accepts and corrects what Dionysius has to say about the exemplars or rationes in God. The commentary probably dates from the early 1260's and so comes from the midpoint of Saint Thomas' teaching career P", In his introductory remarks Saint Thomas mentions an important principle for his interpretation of platonism: Haec igitur Platonieorum ratio fidei non eonsonat nee veritati , quantum ad hoc quod continet de speeiebus naturalibus separatis, sed quantum ad id quod dieebant de primo rerum Principio, verissima est eorum opinio et fidei ehristianae eonsona 158.

1. The Creative Causality oj God Saint Thomas accepts the way in which the platonici speak of the final causality of the good (§§94-95] but he excludes any suggestion of necessary emanation and defends free creation (§88]. He notes that, in using the sun's radiance as an

154 St Thomas cites Dionysius more than 1700 times . 410 in ST alone, and this is almost as often as he cites Augustine: Doherty . ' St Thomas and the Pseudo-Dionysian Symbol of Light' . p.189.n.39. For St Thomas's use of the DN V.8 text on the exemplars see Chapter Five. pp.202.204-05.205-06 above. and for the meaning of this text within the Dionysian theology see Chapter Three, pp.95-115 above. 155In II Sent 14,1.2 [p.350]. That St Thomas at that stage of his career still believed Liber de Causis to be aristotelian would have supported this view: see , for example, In I Sent 22.1.1 arg I [p.53I]. See Booth, AAOlCT. pp.220-21. 156 QD de Malo 16,1 ad 3 and In de Div Nom. proem .•Ita) and see §634. 157 For the dating see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino , p.382 [Rome, 1265-67] ; Fabre, lntroduzione, p.53 [1261-68] and Pera, In de Div Nom , p.xxi [Rome. 1265-66] . On the commentaries of St Thomas and St Albert see Booth. AAOlCT. pp.220-36. 158 In de Div Nom. proem . III what follows. all references are to In de Div Nom unless otherwise noted .

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analogy for God sharing his goodness, Dionysius does not repeat the phrase non ratiocinans aut praeeligens [ou A.OYll;;6~EVO~ ft 1tPO. Aristotle is a key figure in the development of Plotinus' understanding of nous, a point that receives fuller at tention later in this work. Although Augustine is influenced by neoplatonist philosophy in many important ways, his understanding of the rationes aeternae in the divine mind does not seem to have been directly affected by it and remains, we have argued, 'middle platonist' . What Augustine does add are important theological considerations. In his work the Christian doctrines of creation and of the Trinity es tablish a radically new context within which the rationes rerum in mente divina must be understood. Plotinus distinguished the One who is absolutely simple and beyond nous from nous which comes after the One and whose multiplicity arises from its attempt to reflect the rich fullness of the One. This solution was not open to Augustine as soon as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity became basic to his thinking about God. Likewise Augustine's understanding of cre ation is radically different from Plotinus' understanding of how all things de pend on the One. The personalising of God in Augustine's thought, where selfconsciousness is no longer considered a weakness, means that creation can be understood as resulting from God's knowledge and will, from God's wisdom and love. For Augustine the ideas are the eternal rationes rerum according to which all things are created. They are contained in the Word who is the wisdom or art of the Father. Augustine shows no awareness of Plotinus' philosophical criticisms of the 'demiurgic' understanding of the ideas although for theological reasons he shares the conviction that the ideas are the divine mind. Whatever God has, God is, he says. The ideas have been 'swallowed up' in the Word of God and a new problematic has emerged as a result. The question of the multiplicity which this seems to introduce to the divine substance must be faced sooner or later. Plotinus' solution of subordinated hypostases is not available and Christians must face the question of a multiplicity of ideas in the supreme principle. 1 Enneads

5.8.7.14. Armstrong,CHGLEMP, 245 3 See p.58 above. 2

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319

For Augustine the problematic of one-and-many is subsumed into Trinitarian theology. It is the Trinity in its entirety which creates and yet the ideas are 'placed' in the Word of God. But the Word is identical with the divine substance and the unity of the attributes predicated of God flows from the unity in being [esse. essential of the Divine Persons. As it is with being in the Trinity, so is it with all other attributes in God. Although all the elements of the problematic associated with the divine ideas are present in his writings Augustine never directly addresses the question of a multiplicity of rationes within the absolute simplicity of God and to the extent that he does not his account remains 'middle platonist' . This question does not gain Augustine's explicit attention as it does that of Saint Thomas. While Augustine devotes much thought to the question of the Trinity he simply ignores the problem raised by a multiplicity of ideas within the simplicity of God. On this point Augustine does not directly face the questions which the neoplatonist philosophy of nous was to raise for later Christian thinkers. There are two reasons for including Plotinus in this study. The first is his importance for Christian neoplatonists, in particular for Augustine, Boethius and Dionysius whose writings Saint Thomas knew and used. The second is because his distinctive understanding of nous depends on those parts of the philosophy of Aristotle which only became known in the West in the 13th century. Plotinus' understanding of nous as a uni-plurality made up of the forms or ideas of all things was transmitted and developed by the neoplatonist philosophers, especially in their commentaries on Plato's Parmenides. This later neoplatonist philosophy made its most significant entry into the Christian tradition in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite who was a student of Proclus. Proclus developed a systematic account of procession and return, of emanation and participation, of one and many. He carries the teachings of later neoplatonism to their logical conclusion. Because for Proclus 'all is in all' the ideas are to be found at all levels of reality in a way that is appropriate to each level. But the fundamental distinction of uncreated reality and created reality is not to be found in his system. What he calls 'creating' is, like everything else in his system, 'shared out' among the different levels. For Proclus the ideas or paradigms are also creative causes. In this Proclus spells out the implications of the doctrine of Plotinus that the ideas are the divine mind: the ideas can no longer be understood simply as static patterns but must be understood as dynamic and creative forces. Of course for Proclus the One remains beyond all multiplicity and participation - although through the notion of the henads even 'oneness' is shared by every level of the system. In Dionysius all these issues take a fresh tum. He was a heterodox neoplatonist, accused of parricide by the neoplatonist philosophers', but an orthodox Christian who revolutionised the exegesis of Plato's Parmenides by identifying the "One who is not" and "the One who is". the first two hypotheses of Plato's 4

Epistle VII.

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dialogue which the neoplatonists had hypostasised. This move gives his theology its distinctive "tension" of affirmation and negation, of transcendence and creative causality and helps to explain how, for Dionysius, the theological project must involve a number of 'moments' which he describes as positive, negative and mystical theologies. For Dionysius God knows all there is because, in his goodness, God has communicated being to all things, to the very extreme limits of the universe. In the same act of bestowing being immediately on everything, God knows everything through their pre-existence in him and their derivation from him. Along with being God communicates all other attributes: life, intelligence, unity, peace, and so on. Dionysius speaks of aU'to-realities or "things in themselves", being-itself, life-itself, wisdom-itself and so on, which refer both to God and to the perfections or "providences" by means of which God bestows his gifts on creatures. These are also called 7tapaoei:Yl1a'ta the exemplars or ideas whereby God brings about what he has willed to bring about. These amo-realities do not con stitute a separate ontological level in Dionysius' understanding although he does tend to speak of them as if they constituted a 'mediating' level between God and created things . Scholars speak of an unresolved 'ambivalence' , 'tension', 'fluctuation' or 'oscillation' in the thought of Dionysius. Dionysius says clearly that he does not think of the aU'to-realities as many things but holds that 'there is one God for all these good processions' who is the possessor of the divine names of which he speaks>, The divine exemplars are various aspects of God's unique and generous perfection. divine gifts and providences whereby creatures are enabled to participate in God who surpasses these gifts and providences. They are not intermediate beings or lesser gods but the principles and willings whereby creation participates in the infinite source of all perfection. Balthasar has summarised things well in saying that Dionysius sees but one reality 'between' God and individual things, intelligible reality which is both revelatory of God and explanatory of the sensible world of which it is the paradigmatic cause. Dionysius' way of speaking highlights the fact that the question of a plurality of ideas in the divine mind is just one instance of a more fundamental problematic, that of the multiplicity of divine attributes in the unity of the divine substance , that of the relation between the creator and his creation which is real in the creature but not a cause of multiplicity in God. The dionysian vision sees the exemplars in terms of God's attributes, gifts and names and with it Christian theology begins to appropriate the plotinian side of the twofold tradition, "the ideas are the divine mind". This is not simply equivalent to how Plotinus or Proclus might have understood such a phrase, placing the ideas in the nous below the One, since for Dionysius the triune Godhead is beyond all things in a way that is distinctively Christian. 5

ON V.2 (8160).

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The dionysian understanding of the exemplars is the most significant development in the Christian re-evaluation of the doctrine of divine ideas between Augustine and Saint Thomas although, in his theology of creation and of the Trinity, Augustine anticipates some of what we find in Dionysius . Dionysius and his disciples transmitted to later generations an understanding of the divine ideas which had therefore been twice refined: by developments within platonism itself and by the demands made on pagan philosophy if it was to serve the truth of Christian faith. With Dionysius the full extent of the challenge which the doctrine of divine ideas represents for Christian theology becomes fully clear for the first time. Plotinus helped to establish the tradition that "the ideas are the divine mind" but the most important philosophical source for his understanding of nous is Aristotle whose comments about divine and human intelligence in Metaphysics A and De Anima III were crucial for the later history of peripatetic philosophy and for the emergence of neoplatonism. Aristotle had already spoken of the identity of thinking and its object. The first immaterial substance of which he speaks is engaged in just one activity, a thinking which is a thinking of thinking. Aristotle assigns to intellect a creative role in the construction of its own objects. He laid down certain conditions of divine knowing, above all that the divine, in knowing, does not receive specification from outside itself. He had spoken also of the first mover as a principle 'whose very substance is actuality', the 'actuality of thought which is life' 6. Our judgement is that it is Aristotle, above all in his account of self-thinking thought, who stands at the head of the tradition that "the ideas are the divine mind". Aristotle, we argued, can also be regarded as standing at the head of the tradition that "the ideas are in the divine mind". It is likely that his criticisms of Plato's theory of ideas helped to provoke the original placing of the ideas within a divine mind. His alternative account of the principles which explain generation and production speaks of the form in the mind or soul of the craftsman or agent who must actually have and be in some sense whatever he brings about in external reality. Hence the phrases which recur so frequently in Saint Thomas' writings, domus a domo in mente and sicut artificiata in mente artificis, are both traceable to Aristotle. In this way Aristotle gave philosophical support to the popular metaphor of the artist or maker in whose mind the forms pre-exist. Aristotle , for Saint Thomas "the philosopher", is therefore the key figure in the twofold tradition about the divine ideas which we have identified. The Latin middle ages recovered much of Greek philosophy which was not available in the West before then. This included works of Aristotle which travelled through Syriac, Arabic, and finally Latin translations. This material came to the West along with the commentaries of neoplatonist and Islamic philosophers who helped to develop what they had received. The radical ontology of the peripatetic tradition provided a philosophical appreciation of the concrete 6

Metaphysics A.6 [l071b20] and A .7 [1072b27].

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and the individual, something which was already presupposed by the religious doctrines of creation and providence . The recovered aristotelian material included his critique of the theory of separated forms. Unfortunately medieval thinkers were unaware of Plato's own, more searching, critique of the theory of ideas, above all as found in the Parmenides. Christian theologians used the philosophy of Aristotle from the patristic period onwards . Boethius, Dionysius, John Philoponus and even Augustine knew Aristotle and were variously indebted to him. 'Christian aristotelianism' was given fresh impetus in the thirteenth century, particularly with the work of Albertus Magnus. Islamic thinkers, working within a monotheistic theological context similar to the Christian one, had already used Aristotle's philosophy in dealing with questions about God, creation and the ideas. Albert and Thomas had the writings of Avicenna and the commentaries of Averroes and shared with them a concern that divine knowledge, divine ideas and the divine attributes be understood in such a way that the divine simplicity would not be prejudiced. The theme of divine self-knowledge, which was already available to medieval Christian thinkers in the writings of Augustine, was further strengthened by the teaching of Aristotle in his Metaphysics. For Christian thinkers also the context of the problematic remained a Trinitarian one in which the Word, who is the ' art' and 'wisdom' of the Father and the 'place of the ideas' , shares the one divine substance with the Father. The philosophy of Aristotle therefore played a crucial role- I would suggest the crucial role-in the story of the divine ideas, although the truth of this remained hidden until his own works and those of the commentators became available to the Latin world. Aristotle combined a highly spiritualised understanding of intelligence with a radical empiricism and a fascination with the particularity of things. These were aspects of his thought with which Christian theologians were in immediate and profound sympathy. It has been pointed out that the 'historian-archivist approach' in studies such as the present one has severe limitations", It is not sufficient simply to note the recurrence of words, phrases, images and analogies because their meaning changes according to the overall vision or synthesis within which they are used. The 'stimulation of hermeneutical philosophy' , which protects against these limitations, is accepted throughout this work. This is why the philosophies of Plotinus, Proclus and Aristotle as well as the theologies of Augustine and Dionysius have been examined at some length. The meaning of what may seem like a familiar and recurring notion is refined and sometimes radically altered as it is used by original and creative thinkers. In charting the history of the notion of divine ideas we have seen the hermeneutical shifts which mark that history: from Plato to middle platonism. from middle platonism to neoplatonism under aristotelian stimulus. from pagan philosophy to Christian theology in its 7 Booth, 'St Augustine's ', Augustiniana 27 (1977) pp.77-79, 88,n.66, 97. See also Merlan , Monopsychism, p.52.

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Augustinian and Dionysian forms, as well as its use in Jewish and Islamic thinkers. PARTTwo: THESYNIHESIS Saint Thomas deals with the question of the ideas in three of his major theological works. In each case his account of the ideas follows immediately on his consideration of the divine attribute of knowledge. A close study of these texts is the first step in our exploration of the persistence and function of the doctrine of divine ideas in his writings. In his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard Saint Thomas brings together the augustinian tradition about the rationes aeternae in the mind of God and the dionysian tradition of exemplaria according to which God creates all things. Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate contains his longest treatment of the question in which he seeks to combine rather than simply to juxtapose the augustinian and dionysian traditions about the ideas. In his best-known work, the Summa Theologiae, he deals with the ideas once again and integrates what he had received from earlier writers in a fresh, synthetic view of the question. Another text on the ideas is found in a discarded draft of the Summa Contra Gentiles . The disappearance of the ideas from this important work is striking , raising questions which we have attempted to answer above8. At first Saint Thomas gives arguments from authority for the necessity of ideas in God. Augustine, Dionysius, Averroes: all seem to agree that this is an aspect of how one must speak about God. Later Saint Thomas develops his own arguments for the ideas. It is necessary to speak of the divine ideas for two reasons, he says, because God knows all there is and because God is the exemplar of all there is. God's knowledge is that of the intelligent cause of all things. It is a knowledge which is not gathered from those things but which is available to God in his knowledge of himself. As the source of everything God knows all of which he is capable and all for which he is responsible . The model, pattern, archetype, paradigm or idea for the creation: where can it be except in God and what can it be except God since whatever is in God, is God and whatever God has, God is. Only the divine essence itself, therefore, can be the species by means of which God knows and the exemplar with a view to which God creates. The reason why we speak of 'ideas' rather than 'idea' is because the term refers to the multiplicity of ways in which creatures participate or imitate the divine essence. It may seem that this implies there are ideas in God because there are creatures and not vice versa, that some kind of plurality is introduced to the divine essence because of the multiplicity of creatures. Saint Thomas cannot allow that the creature is responsible for placing something in the divine

8

See pp.224-25 above .

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essence and at the same time he always maintains that there is a plurality of ideas. A distinction between the species which enters into a knower so that he comes to know and the species which a knower can invent or produce within himself allows Saint Thomas to speak of a plurality of ideas in God without that plurality affecting the simplicity of the divine essence. The divine essence itself is the only species, in the first sense, in God, the species which is the principle causing God's knowledge. The species which is an object of knowledge, pro duced by the knower from within himself, does not affect the divine simplicity. This is how he describes the ideas, as rationes intellectae, 'understandings' . There is a plurality of respectus, 'considerations' or 'regards', whereby creatures are related to God. What God knows in the divine ideas is this plurality of respectus according to which his essence, the single principle of his knowledge and the single exemplar of all things, is imitable by creatures. As well as the question 'are there ideas', and the question 'is there a plurality of ideas', Saint Thomas considers another traditional platonist question, 'of what are there ideas'. In answering it he says that God bestows being on all things , that God's knowledge is co-extensive with that bestowal of being and that the ideas are co-extensive with that knowledge. This amounts to saying that everything that is, insofar as it is, has some corresponding idea in God who is the only source of being. A distinction between a broad sense of idea as ratio or similitudo and a strict sense as exemplar or forma enables Saint Thomas to clarify the sense in which God has an idea of everything that, through God's power, is, was, will be, or could possibly have been. In spite of these texts some interpreters of Saint Thomas claim that his doctrine of divine ideas is, at best, redundant because it adds nothing of importance to his theology, or is, at worst, dangerous, because it seems to threaten the absolute simplicity of God which is so well established by Saint Thomas throughout his writings . Was it not simply the authority of Saint Augustine which made it impossible for Saint Thomas to ignore the doctrine of the ideasj? Such doubts and hesitations provided one stimulus for our exploration of this doctrine in the writings of Saint Thomas . In response to them we can say this: as well as the texts of Saint Thomas which are relevant to the question of the ideas because they include explicit treatments of the theme, there are many other places in which the doctrine is used and a number of significant contexts in which the doctrine plays an essential part. In particular it became clear to us that his accounts of the Word of God, of creation and of providence, teachings which are among the most central to Christian theology, are never dealt with by Saint Thomas without appeal to the doctrine of the ideas. In speaking about the Word of God Saint Thomas applies to the theological tradition philosophical ideas about knowledge which he has already used in his explanation of the ideas. The Word is generated eternally within God who is the highest form of life, intellectual life. What is generated within God is therefore 9 See pp.6-8 above .

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intellectual, a Word who is the image of the Father, the perfect likeness of the divine nature, an equal Son with the Father. In the divine Word God knows himself and, Augustine and Aristotle together affirm it, in knowing himself God knows all things. So the Word who is the image of the Father is also the exemplar of creation. It is in and through the Word that God creates all things and knows all things. The Word 'speaks', Saint Thomas says, manifesting the Father to himself, manifesting the Father to creation and manifesting creation to the Father. The Word may be described as the verbum cordis of the Father, the ideas as the 'inner word' or verbum interius in God, and creation as the ' word of the Word', verbum Verbi . When used in relation to God the latter two phrases are used metaphorically, Saint Thomas adds, whereas the first, verbum cordis , applies properly to God and refers to the Son. In these terms the ideas are 'between' the Word of the heart and the word expressed in creation and the order between these three 'words' corresponds to the order artifex, exemplar and artificiatum. For Saint Thomas the Word as exemplar of creation may be described as the ratio of all things and the 'place' where the rationes are located. Although Saint Thomas clearly emphasises that all operations of God ad extra are the work of the entire Trinity, the appropriation of aspects of God's work to the divine Persons individually is reasonable. So he appropriates to the Word the function within creation of sustaining things in being, of giving them life and of enlightening them. Beauty, order, wisdom, reasonableness , light and life: these are qualities found in creation because creation is the work of the Father through his Word. The Christian theology of the Word of God is easily associated with the philosophical tradition at this point. Many philosophers used the triad of being-life-intelligence when speaking about the divine. Saint Thomas was aware of Aristotle's use of it in Metaphysics A and would have encountered it also in the writings of Augustine and Dionysius. He was not aware, as we are, of its background in Plato and Plotinus. Following Augustine Saint Thomas reflects on a phrase in the prologue of Saint John's gospel, that ' all are life in the Word'. Creatures pre-exist in some way in God and are pre-contained in the divine wisdom and knowledge . But how is this to be understood? We have seen that in wrestling with this question Saint Thomas distances himself from Augustine (and so from Plato) and is not happy with the assertion that the existence of creatures 'there' is simply better than their existence 'here'. A number of distinctions are required since, if it is true that the existence of creatures in the Word is a very noble thing, it is only 'here' that creatures exist in their proper natures. It is a point at which Saint Thomas ' shows his hand' as a thinker who prefers an aristotelian to a platonist ontology. Another central theological teaching of Saint Thomas which cannot be understood without reference to the divine ideas is his theology of creation. When we say that God is the 'cause' of all things we must understood this in the first place by analogy with the work of intelligent rather than natural causes. In other

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words the agency involved presupposes intelligence and decision, understanding and deliberation, intellect and will, wisdom and love. There is no necessity of any kind involved and Saint Thomas is required to speak of God's knowledge, God's will and God's love in order to give a satisfactory account of creation. In human Icnowing there is a distinction of practical and speculative Icnowledge which Saint Thomas believes can be usefully applied to the divine knowledge also because whatever is a 'perfection' in creation must be found in some pre-eminent way in God. He appeals again to the distinction between exemplar and ratio. In the former, strict sense the 'idea' in God refers to God's practical knowledge, to what God might or does in fact bring to pass. In the latter, broader sense the 'idea' in God refers to God's speculative Icnowledge also. His assigning of the idea in the strict sense to God's practical Icnowledge is a reminder of the ancient association of the term with the making of things. A further aspect of his theology of creation explored in this work is his developing understanding of God's exemplar causality. Saint Thomas spealcs of the divine essence as the ratio and exemplar of all things. In some early texts, under Dionysian influence, he happily spealcs of two kinds of participation in God on the part of creatures, in the divine nature and in the divine ideas. In his commentary on Dionysius' Divine Names Saint Thomas says that God causes all things per ipsum esse, which means per intellectum et voluntatem since this is God's nature. But God also causes per modum similitudinisw so that creatures are, somehow, 'like God' . In later texts he prefers to speak: of God's efficient and final causality and to explain God's exemplar causality in terms of those. The divine attributes, those qualities which characterise the divine essence are, like the divine ideas, termed rationes by Saint Thomas. This could be the source of some confusion because, for him, the attributes are not simply equiva lent to the ideas. The attributes are many because our minds are weak: in trying to grasp the divine nature and because God's perfection is so rich. The attributes are about God himself whereas the ideas refer to God's Icnowledge of the ways in which creation is related to him and the ways in which creation imitates the perfection of the divine essence. The neoplatonist tradition tends to identify the two as Dionysius does. Saint Thomas keeps the two distinct although they are related. The 'horse' of De DiversisQuaestionibus LXXXlII.46 must bear some responsibility here, for he reminded Saint Thomas of the twofold tradition about the ideas which made it impossible for him simply to identify divine attributes and divine ideas. The ratio vitae, he says in an early text, is in God in a different way to the forma equi. While both can be described as ideas only the first can be described as an attribute. Another related issue is the question of Saint Thomas' understanding of participation which has been the subject of extensive scholarly work in this 10 In de Div Nom §§409.639

CONCLUSION

327

century. It is beyond the scope of the present work to enter into this question in any greater detail than has been possible, but it is appropriate to signal here the importance of the work which has been done in that area. The third central theological teaching for which the doctrine of the divine ideas is essential to Saint Thomas is the theology of providence. He indicates this himself at the end of ST 1,15. The great philosophical text for medieval reflection on providence was Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae. Christian faith taught that God had a particular care for the details of his creation and for the progress of its history. This faith obliged theologians like Augustine and Saint Thomas to assess what the philosophers had to offer on this question and to revise it, even radically, if that was what the faith required. The metaphor of the artist, craftsman or architect appears again in this context. So does the reference to God's will and to God's practical knowledge, since providence is concerned with the destiny of all that God has actually brought into being. For Dionysius the exemplars are not only A.6yot or rationes , but also 8EA:fU.la/tcx, good and divine willings or predestinations. Saint Thomas says that God precontains not only the rationes omnium rerum, the ideas of all things but the rationes omnium agendorum, the ideas of all actions. Although this puts the tradi tional understanding of the ideas under great pressure Saint Thomas continues to speak of them. Henri Bergson spoke of an understanding of eternal archetypes or platonic ideas which he termed la maladie des archetypes , an understanding which issued in fatalism, determin ism and ultimately atheism, a sickness which he argued was to be found in certain Islamic as well as Greek philosophers. This maladie is addressed by Saint Thomas' corrections of Greek philosophy on the strength of his Christian faith and humanism 11. Nowhere is this more clearly to be seen than in his treatment of providence. If the creation is to reflect the richness of God's goodness then creation must be characterised by variety and beauty, says Saint Thomas . One aspect of this variety and beauty must be that there will be creatures who represent God precisely as the wise and loving bestower of goodness. Far from condemning creation to fatalism, to a slavish living out of some ideal which is already established in some other place, Saint Thomas' understanding of providence demands the creature who will be a participant in providence, a sharer in God's work of guiding and ruling creation. The privilege of the intelligent creature, Saint Thomas says, is to be capable of seeing the intelligence and goodness with which the Word of God has estab lished the creation and which the Word has given to the creation. This means coming to understand, however faintly, something of the wisdom and love of the Creator. The intelligence and goodness which the human mind detects in the variety and multiplicity of the world points to, but does not comprehend, the absolutely simple intelligence and goodness of God who in his self-knowledge 11 Gorce, ' L 'activi te constructrice', pp.25,27,36-40. We have seen St Thomas rule out this kind of interpretation: see pp.266-68 and p.270 with note 199 above.

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CONCLUSION

knows the variety of ways in which his essence is imitable. If the rational crea ture knows something of this order in creation, he also has some responsibility for the destiny of creation. As providentiae particeps, the image of God within creation, the rational creature is intelligent and free, capable in his turn and at his level of establishing goodness. A further stimulus for this work was the desire to know to what extent Saint Thomas was aware of the neoplatonist tradition in philosophy, what he learned from it and how he responded to it. The final part of our examination of his writings deals with his relationship with Augustine, Aristotle and Dionysius, his major sources for the doctrine of the ideas and related concerns. It is clear immediately that Saint Thomas is not a slavish follower of any of them but that he receives whatever he does receive in a critical way, something which is, of course, true of any major thinker. He was a great reader of texts and many of his works take the form of commentaries upon the writings of others . In each case he seeks to interpret what he reads as faithfully as he can, to explain it clearly, to accept all that he can even if it requires an interpretation which we might consider kind and to reject clearly but decisively whatever he judges unacceptable. He is highly sensitive to contexts, to the nature of texts and to the concerns of the different authors. In spite of the ways in which Saint Thomas distances himself from some of Augustine's views, the bishop of Hippo remains a major source for Saint Thomas' knowledge of philosophy and theology. In this work we examined their views on knowledge as a test-case for assessing their relationship. Both accept in principle the possibility of creaturely knowledge in rationibus aeternis but Saint Thomas works out the details of this in a way that is quite different to Augustine. Both would say that human intellectual activity involves a kind of illumination or enlightenment because it is, ultimately, a participation in divine intelligence. For Saint Thomas this is especially clear in the functioning of the intellectus agens which he understands, not as an occasional or adventitious gift from God, but as an enduring capacity within human nature for appropriate in tellectual activity. His acquaintance with, and acceptance of, aristotelian epis temology explains his differences with Augustine on human knowledge. At the same time the augustinian elements in Saint Thomas' own view have not been highlighted as they should, perhaps because of a too facile identification of Augustine as a platonist and Saint Thomas as an aristotelian. Some tensions remain in Saint Thomas' account of these matters, however, notably in what he says about the knowledge of the separated soul. As regards Aristotle also, Saint Thomas is a careful receiver. He defends Aristotle on the question of providence and yet in his commentary on the Metaphysics feels obliged to add a long discourse on the subject which is not supported by the text on which he is workingts. We took Saint Thomas' treatment of goodness as a test-case for the critical quality of this relationship. 12 In XII Meta §§1210-22on Metaphysics

E.2.

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Aristotle is at his most anti-platonic in a passage of the Nicomachean Ethics where he argues that there cannot be a separated ideaof 'good'. In Metaphysics A.lO , however, he speaks of the good of the universe existing apart, in its leader, as well as being inherent in the order of the universe itself and in Metaphysics ex.I he says there must be a 'first' in any series which is the cause of the quality shared by the members of that series. These are texts to which Saint Thomas frequently makes appeal and he does so particularly in regard to the good. There is a summum bonum, he says, transcendent and separated , on which all created goodness depends. Plato speaks in this way as does Aristotle in the Metaphysics. Yet he knew well that in the Ethics Aristotle criticises Plato for suggesting that there is a separated, common idea of the good. Saint Thomas distinguishes a bonumcommune existing apart from all good things and a summum bonum existing apart from all good things. Two different kinds of separability or transcendence are involved. Saint Thomas believes that Aristotle and Plato are in agreement about the kind of transcendence that is acceptable, the transcendence of the creator God who is good beyond all created goodness , who is the first Good and who is at the same time, and properly understood, the goodness in all that is good. Saint Thomas is indebted to Plato as well as to Aristotle for his philosophical account of goodness and, although much of his knowledge of Plato is through Aristotle, he knows that Aristotle is to be received cautiously in what he says about Plato. Aristotle's arguments against Plato's theory of the ideas are correct, Saint Thomas believes, but they do not tell against the kind of exemplarism which he wishes to maintain, the exemplarity of God's knowledge and essence in relation to all things. In the introduction to his commentary on the Divine Names of Dionysius, Saint Thomas returns to this point. The platonists, he says, are reliable in what they say about the supreme principle while being mistaken about the separated forms of natural things. Dionysius himself is, for Saint Thomas, a most reliable source although he warns against the dangers inherent in Dionysius' platonic language. The unique and transcendent causality of God as the creator is unambiguously taught by Dionysius. The neoplatonist hierarchy of diverse causal principles is unambiguously rejected by Dionysius. The common natures of things like being, goodness and intelligence, do not exist in themselves as created realities. As really distinct and separate these are names for God himself. As found within created reality and participated there, these natures 'as such' exist only secundum rationem. As noted already Dionysius identifies the divine attributes and the divine ideas, something which Saint Thomas, with an eye to Augustine's text, cannot simply do even though the same term [rationes] is used for attributes and for ideas. Saint Thomas is indebted to Dionysius for the meaning which he assigns to the term 'idea' when taken in its strict sense as exemplar. Taking the term with this meaning is of great importance for a number of aspects of this study: the extent of the ideas, the ideas and God's will, the ideas in practical and speculative knowledge,

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Saint Thomas' commentary on Liberde Causis contains his final treatment of the issue of simplicity and multiplicity. It is a work which testifies to his growing knowledge of the history of philosophy, in particular a clearer awareness of the distinction between Plato and platonists, especially Proclus. One can only wonder how his understanding of that history would have been affected if he had lived another few years and been able to read William of Moerbeke's translation of Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides. As in his commentary on the Divine Names, Saint Thomas in his commentary on Liber de Causis again clearly rejects the platonic pantheon of diverse causal principles but now not only because it threatens the simplicity of God but because it undermines the ontological integrity of created things. God is ipsum esse subsistens and so the bestowal of being, esse, the work of creating is proper and unique to God. God is simply one and distinction is found only in the order of intellects, souls and bodies, he says. Diversity is found in things but this is within God's intention who, though perfectly simple in himself, creates diversity 'for the completion of the cosmos' . If created things receive one perfection from one cause and another perfection from another cause this not only involves the unacceptable position of diverse causal principles already rejected, it undermines the unity of created things themselves who would thus be indebted to a variety of causes, owing different aspects of their nature to different principles. So the single principle of all things is God who gives being, esse, to all creatures and along with it bestows on them whatever other gifts creatures have. There is therefore a striking unification of all the divine gifts in God who pre-contains all perfection and in the single communication of esse to creatures in which all other gifts which are essential to their nature are bestowed on them also by the one God. The metaphysics of esse which is contained in his commentary on Liber de Causis is not something new in Saint Thomas' thought although it is strikingly asserted there. It is clearly present in Dionysius already: note for example the hymnic description in Divine Names V.4-5 of God as first being, source of all being and of all aspects and qualities of beings l 3 • It owes something to Augustine too who, like Dionysius, uses Exodus 3.14 to speak of God as being and who explains the identity of all the divine attributes within the Trinity on the basis of the unity of the Persons in being. Saint Thomas' concern with the unity or ontological coherence of created things is supported by the radical aristotelian tradition which so emphasises the ontological weight of concrete, individual things. Dionysius speaks of God present in his creating power to the very limits of being. God's 'justice', he says, ensures that each thing receives according to its dignity and place in the scheme of things, and that each thing receives its independent activity from God. God's 'immutability' means that each thing is consistently maintained in the goods which are appropriate to it. God's 'peace' guards each separate individuality. 13 See

pp.l07-09 above.

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All of this, Saint Thomas says, is in accordance with what ' the faith' requires. This is an essential criterion always as he charts a course through various strands of thought: what is in accordance with the teaching of the faith and what is not in accordance with that teaching. The faith teaches that God alone is the creator of all things, that there is no intermediate level of created/creating substances, that God's bestowal of esse means he is responsible for everything there is in things, that God's knowledge therefore extends to the very least traces of existing things, that divine providence includes within its concern the last and least details of the created world, 'drops of rain and grains of sand' . In his commentary on Colossians, a work which is contemporary with the commentary on Liber de Causis, Saint Thomas says ab uno principio res habent quicquid in eis perjectionis est. Saint Thomas believes that Aristotle and Dionysius together serve the Christian faith by providing intellectual resources for understanding something of the unity and simplicity of God who is responsible for the multiplicity and variety of creation, who knows that multiplicity and pre-contains it within himself. The doctrine of the divine ideas is one aspect of the question of unity and multiplicity and leads directly, as we have seen, to a consideration of the fundamental issues associated with it. The doctrine of the ideas as we find it in Saint Thomas reminds us that God is intelligent and wise. It reminds us that God is the exemplar of everything there is. It reminds us that the variety and beauty of the creation has a consistency, meaning and value which is inherent to itself even while creation remains radically dependent on God for everything, a radical dependence which is expressed in terms of esse and its communication . The doctrine of the ideas reminds us that it is not only general essences or natures that reflect the divine nature but that each single thing is, in some way, a trace of God: it is established in being by God with all its qualities and activities and is within the knowledge and plan of God. Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of ideas do not affect the notion of creative divine ideas which explain not only the essence of things, as Plato wanted, but the being itself of things as Saint Thomas explains. The doctrine of the ideas as we find it in Saint Thomas expresses the conviction that the being and therefore the truth of this world and its history cannot be understood without reference to the wise love of God which originates and sustains it. The ideas in God are rationes intellectae, 'understandings' . A contemporary philosopher of religion writes: 'the question of meaning ... is void and illegitimate unless a channel is open to us whereby we can make contact with the eternal repository of meanings' 14. The platonic temptation is to abstract the order of intelligence and goodness from its setting and to regard it as 'really real' in that abstracted condition. For Saint Thomas God is the transcendent cause of all things, the 'eternal repository' of the meaning and value of all created reality. Creation is however established by

14 Leszek Kolakowski,

Religion [London1982],p.155.

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God with inherent meaning and value so that the way in which we are uplifted to the eternal repository is through its created representation. It would be foolish indeed to claim to know much about the mind of God or to think that a complete theory will involve our occupation of that mind 15. Although the writings of Saint Thomas have often been 'systematised', and the literary form of many of them invites 'scholasticisation' , his thought is anything but a closed system. It is more helpful to imagine his work as a sustained, ongoing conversation and reflection within the great tradition of philosophy and theology. He himself does not think in terms of'-isms' -aristotelianism, pla tonism, neoplatonism-which is, in any case, a way of speaking that is distinc tively modem. It would be a grave injustice to tum Saint Thomas' own thought into just such an '-ism' when he himself prefers to speak of communities and traditions of thinking and reading, of teaching and learning: platonists, aristotelians, the Christian church, and others. Our point of entry into Saint Thomas' thought, the largely overlooked question of ideas, has led us to a complex of issues which arise both from the variety of his sources and from the reality itself with which we were dealing. Some points of difficulty remain at the end of this work which might well be clarified by further study but which testify also to the fact that the mystery of God must remain elusive for us. Saint Thomas' theology of the Word of God, for example, where Trinitarian discourse meets discourse about the one God, is an area that would repay further investigation. The texts in which he distinguishes the Word and the ideas reveal some of the difficulties involved in combining biblical-theological discourse about the Trinity with philosophical-theological discourse about the one God. Old and familiar questions about theological language, about the attributes and names of God, about creation as an imitation of God and therefore a 'book' which speaks the divine mystery: all this deserves further attention. The account of the divine ideas developed by Saint Thomas using philosophical and theological resources provided by Aristotle, Dionysius and Augustine might usefully be placed alongside the biblical understanding of dabar, a word which not only says but also effects something. The understanding of creation and its history proposed by Saint Thomas in speaking of the divine ideas is illuminated and reinforced in the mystery of the Incarnation in which the Word, the place of the ideas through whom all things were made, became flesh. Ultimately it is in Christ, the incarnate Word who is the icon of the Father [eixdrv TOU BEOU], that the uncreated God and his created world meet most intimately 16.

15 Romans 11.34: ' Who has known the mind of the Lord?' 16 Colossians

1.15-20.

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