Hybrid Warfare: Future and Technologies (Edition ZfAS) 365835108X, 9783658351083

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Edition ZfAS

Ralph Thiele Editor

Hybrid Warfare Future and Technologies 2. Auflage

Edition ZfAS Reihe herausgegeben von Thomas Jäger, Insititut für Politische Wissenschaft, Universität zu Köln, Köln, Germany

Die Edition ZfAS wird parallel zur Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ZfAS) publiziert. Die ZfAS ist die Zeitschrift für theoriegeleitete und empirisch gehaltvolle Analysen aus den Politikbereichen der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, die Außenwirtschafts- und Kulturpolitik ebenso umfasst wie Fragen der Inneren Sicherheit. In der Edition ZfAS werden innovative Forschungsergebnisse publiziert, die den strengen Qualitätsmaßstäben für die Publikation von Manuskripten in der Zeitschrift standhalten. Da die Zahl solcher Beiträge die Möglichkeiten der Publikation in der Zeitschrift mittlerweile übersteigt, wurde mit der Edition ZfAS ein neues Forum geschaffen, in dem Bände zu zentralen Themenschwerpunkten ergänzend zur Zeitschrift im Verlagsprogramm von Springer VS publiziert werden. Die Bände erscheinen in deutscher oder englischer Sprache.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/15739

Ralph Thiele Editor

Hybrid Warfare Future and Technologies

Editor Ralph Thiele StratByrd Consulting Nickenich, Germany

Edition ZfAS ISBN 978-3-658-35108-3 ISBN 978-3-658-35109-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Lektorat: Jan Treibel This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Foreword

In the context of international tensions or low intensity conflicts, the term hybrid warfare has increasingly gained prominence. Even though a viable definition of this term has not yet been established internationally, this book makes a remarkable proposal in this regard. In particular, it not only helps to shed light on the wide spectrum of means of hybrid warfare, it also outlines how this new form of conflict will change the nature of war in the next decades. Hybrid wars often root in conflicts owing to overpopulation, religious differences, the struggle of ethnic and religious minorities for self-determination and independence or related to the destruction of the natural foundations of life. Such conflicts are also the breeding ground for the great powers’ struggle over zones of influence and regional powers’ proxy wars over regional dominance. The Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov is considered the spiritual father of the concept of hybrid warfare. As early as in 2013, he pointed out that uprisings and internal conflicts are the initial spark for hybrid wars. This warfare is characterized by a wide spectrum of military, paramilitary and economic measures as well as the offensive use of information technology. His respective conceptual considerations have become known as the Gerasimov doctrine. The application of the Gerasimov Doctrine has been observed in the conflicts in North Africa, the Near and Middle East and in Ukraine. Due to the dramatic advances in information technology, the focus in hybrid warfare has shifted to the use of Cyber Attacks in recent years. Cyber Attacks in connection with emerging and disruptive technologies give hybrid warfare a new quality. Globalization, digitalization and advanced technologies have improved the standard of living, particularly of the United States and Europe. At the same time, new vulnerabilities of open and democratic societies have been created. It is these vulnerabilities that opponents target and exploit.

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With these new possibilities, hybrid war has become an essential tool in conflicts between the great powers. As the rivalry between these powers, namely the United States, China and Russia intensified in recent years, the application of hybrid war intensified. The exponential advances in digitalization primarily benefit China and the United States. Russia has also made significant progress. Hybrid warfare has the major advantage that it can be employed below the threshold of open war, as measures can be adapted to the respective situation in terms of the means used, the intensity and the degree of damage to be inflicted on the other side. The pertinence of this development is illustrated by the fact that the United States accuse Russia of having penetrated a large number of U.S. government agencies and of undermining NATO through intimidation and active measures. Only a few days after taking office, US President Biden raised the profile of cyber affairs in the American government by appointing the first Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology. In addition to that, he launched an urgent initiative to improve the capability, readiness and resilience in cyberspace. Massive attacks of disruption against political systems, governments, the economy, transport, energy and information systems of open societies are able to partially or completely paralyze a country or an alliance. This is an undeclared war, and the enemy cannot—or at least not immediately—be identified. The attack can be limited and selective, but it can be expanded and reinforced at any time. A response in kind, however, is no effective option. Hybrid warfare can be more successful in the long run than the use of military forces. In the past few decades, the strategic principle of deterrence has been an integral part of Western strategy. Deterrence works when a potential aggressor faces greater disadvantages than possible advantages from a conflict. In hybrid warfare, deterrence does not work. It is therefore important to invest in new technologies in order to strengthen the economic power and thus the resilience predominantly of the European Union and NATO member states. There is a plethora of emerging and disruptive technologies. NATO considers data, artificial intelligence, autonomy, space, hypersonics to be predominantly disruptive, whereas quantum computing, biotechnology and advanced materials are rather emerging, the latter hence requiring more time before their disruptive effect is felt in military capabilities. (NATO STO 2020). Emerging and disruptive technologies make it possible to initiate hybrid warfare with the aim of achieving already decisive advantages over an adversary before military combat operations of open war have started. They also create the necessary prerequisites to achieve comprehensive situational awareness and

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information superiority. Through the targeted use of cyber and information technologies to deceive and confuse up to the elimination of the opposing command and information systems, the opponent can be weakened in the initial phase of a war to such an extent that the following military measures can be carried out with significantly lower risk and higher chances of success. In all wars, exponential technological developments have played a major role, if they decisively changed at least one of the strategic factors of time, space and power for the benefit of a warring party. In the 20th century, it was airplanes that changed time and space and were employed with the aim of destroying the enemy’s industrial and economic base. The invention of missiles had an even greater influence, given their intercontinental range and as a carrier system for nuclear warheads with immense destructive power, which enabled the strategy of deterrence through a second-strike capability. As effective as this strategy is to this day, it is morally dubious. Robotics, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and hypersonic weapon systems will be decisive in high-intensity military conflicts of the future. While missiles follow a ballistic trajectory and can therefore be detected by early warning systems and thus also fought, hypersonic weapon systems are manoeuvrable and can either be programmed accordingly or change their course spontaneously. They can carry nuclear warheads or conventionally destroy their targets using the kinetic energy of their speed. Due to their high speed, manoeuvrability and low altitude, hypersonic weapon systems are difficult to detect and to date practically impossible to defend against. With this book, Ralph Thiele has created a standard work on hybrid warfare. It is comprehensive in showing how political rivalries and conflicts will be carried out in the future using a wide range of emerging and disruptive technologies. The author also outlines how open societies, and especially Western democracies, can protect themselves against hybrid attacks and actively defend themselves. The European Union and NATO should take up these proposals as soon as possible. For Europe, this is a decisive prerequisite for a policy of political, economic and military self-assertion in the new power arithmetic of the global rivalry between the great powers. General (ret.) Harald Kujat

Preface

Hybrid Warfare is an old phenomenon, which today is significantly empowered by new technological developments. New technologies, with their disruptive potential, have a catalytic effect on hybrid means, methods, tactics and strategies. They improve the starting conditions for hybrid action, expand the arsenal of hybrid players and thus help to increase the reach of their activities as well as their prospects of success. It is worrying, that they provide offensive options in particular. At the same time, new technological developments may offer options to better identify, understand, defend against and counter hybrid attacks. Most importantly new technological trends increasingly turn technology into a ‘battlespace’ for hybrid confrontation as such. Against this backdrop, technology constitutes an additional domain and a possibility for hybrid actors to horizontally extend the ‘battlespace’. The technological domain may even turn into the centre of gravity in a hybrid confrontation. In order to prevent, defend against and—if necessary—counter and outmanoeuvre hybrid opponents, it is therefore important for political, civilian and military leaders and decision-makers, as well as for industry and academia, to develop a common and comprehensive understanding of the implications of new technologies in a hybrid threats/warfare context. With this in mind, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and its Community of Interest on Strategy and Defence

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(COI S&D)1 initiated and conducted the Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies (HYFUTEC) project with the primary goal of delivering recommendations to Western policymakers regarding the crucial intersection of technology and the hybrid threats/warfare-complex. The project aims at enhanced awareness and understanding of the implications of new technologies and their disruptive potential in a hybrid threats/warfare context. This is considered to be particularly important for political, civilian and military leaders, decision-makers and conceptual planners, as well as for industry and academia. In this sense HYFUTEC provides a “bridging function” between the technological revolution on the one side and the “world of hybrid threats/ warfare” on the other, with “translation efforts” in both directions. Four modules have structured the project: First, a broad “future & technology horizon scan”, second, the respective “assessment regarding hybrid warfare and related strategies” based on own conceptual work, third, a special focus on “selected most relevant trends” and finally, the deduction of “implications for security policy, military and defence” for EU, NATO and member states. It was launched in 2019 with a series of events in Helsinki, Berlin, Vienna and Stockholm. Within its broad future & technology horizon scanning, the project has identified 19 technological trends with urgent and profound implications for the evolution of hybrid threats, conflict and warfare. In 2020 and 2021 HYFUTEC was successfully tested as an educational tool at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu. Main findings of the project were presented and discussed in the ‘Mind the Gaps’ HYFUTEC online symposium in September 2020. This symposium marked the finalization of the HYFUTEC project-phase and the transition to HYFUTEC as a continued work strand for COI Strategy & Defence. 1

The Germany-led Community of Interest on Strategy & Defence—established in August 2018—focuses on hybrid warfare, related strategies and the resulting implications for security policy, the military and defence. It aims at uncovering the essence and nature of hybrid warfare as well as the logic and pattern of hybrid strategies in order to develop a solid conceptual/analytical framework as a basis for the assessment of current and future hybrid warfare situations and their practical implications. COI S&D follows an interdisciplinary, practical as well as academic-based approach, combining empirical evidence with the theory of war and strategy. In order to cover the different angles and perspectives of the topic COI S&D follows and integrates five interconnected Lines of Effort (LoE): 1) Strategy, 2) War, 3) Cases, 4) Technology, and 5) Peace. HYFUTEC is one out of four crosscutting work strands which are currently spear-heading COI S&D’s endeavours. COI S&D overarching objective is to contribute to the education of common and comprehensive understanding and judgment of Participating States, EU and NATO regarding the hybrid threats/conflict/warfare-complex as a precondition for improved situational awareness as well as for joint and comprehensive action in defence and response.

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During the course of the project, experts and practitioners from a wide range of backgrounds, including chancelleries, ministries of defence, interior and foreign affairs; diplomats; the intelligence community; other governmental and international agencies, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC); further national and international research centres; think tanks; academia; and the private sector shared insights, inputs, presentations and information and discussed findings in a series of workshops throughout Europe. Their wealth of knowledge ensured that the findings are based upon profound, comprehensive expertise. Altogether, the HYFUTEC network assembled more than 260 experts from academia and industry from 27 participating states as well as representatives from NATO and EU institutions. This monograph reflects findings of the project Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies commissioned and chaired by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE) and its Community of Interest Strategy and Defence (COI S&D) in close cooperation with StratByrd Consulting from December 2018 until September 2020. It takes a look at the broader context of hybrid warfare based on conceptual considerations as outlined in chapter two “Introduction to Hybrid Warfare”. It identifies likely hybrid actors and their approaches. It highlights the role of digitalisation and how the evolving Revolutions in Military Affairs may affect—and will likely further develop within—the hybrid threats/warfare context. A future & technology horizon scan delivers a broad perspective on relevant trends; disruptive potential; threats, risks and actors; the use of force and warfare options; and the potential for security and defence. Particular relevant trends are followed-up in 19 selected technologies and assessed in the light of hybrid warfare and related strategies. Five of these technologies—fifth generation technology standard for cellular networks (5G), artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum sciences and new developments in space—are additionally covered in more depth in the annexes. The assessment regarding hybrid warfare and related strategies puts focus on conceptual perspectives of manoeuvring in the hybrid conflict/warfare space to include activities in operational and strategic domains, such as land, sea, air, outer space, and cyber. Implications for security policy, military and defence are analysed. Conceptual, technological and organisational recommendations are derived to further in NATO, EU and member states governmental, academic and private sector perspectives on the issues of hybrid warfare. Driven by the catalytic effect of new technologies, hybrid threats and hybrid warfare can be expected to become long-term strategic challenges. It is therefore paramount to develop a comprehensive understanding of their technological

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dimension. As the technological revolution unfolds with unprecedented speed, this requires continued efforts and a flexible and comprehensive approach of all relevant stakeholders in a whole of government, state and society approach. For this reason, it is important for EU, NATO and member states with all relevant players, entities and stakeholders to develop a solid understanding of new technologies, their future trends and disruptive potential for hybrid scenarios, before—hopefully not—being confronted with their hybrid warfare implications. The HYFUTEC project as reflected in this monograph intends to provide a contribution in this sense. We are grateful to everyone who contributed to this project, supported its events, enabled discussion and exchange of minds and provided input and expertise from various fields. Special thanks go to Marina Dane, ie-editing.com, for manuscript editing and project support and to Colonel Dr. Anton Dengg for supporting the project as subject matter expert. The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in this monograph belong solely to the authors. Dr. Johann Schmid Director COI Strategy and Defence (COI S&D) The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) Helsinki, FIN Ralph Thiele Managing Director StratByrd Consulting Andernach, GER

Summary

At a time of global competition for security architectures, trade and investment regimes, and leadership in new technologies, hybrid scenarios below the threshold of war are gaining rapidly in importance. Hybrid warfare has evolved into an effective, apparently low-risk instrument of power. Russia, China, Iran and further governmental and nongovernmental actors are making skilful use of inexpensive, commercially available, emerging technologies to further their own ambitions and power objectives. They integrate civil and military competition at every level, including the development of their international trade, investment, national technology base, and political and diplomatic activities. Not only great powers are challenged, but simply everyone—larger and small states, businesses, societies and ordinary citizen. Peace and freedom, rules-based order and democracy, prosperity and a self-determined way of life are at stake. China and Russia have narrowed their technological gap over the past two decades, in some cases by turning to commercially available technologies more quickly and effectively than their Western competitors and by accelerating their own innovation in the armed forces. In particular China has undertaken impressive steps towards technological leadership. It already has a head start on AI and 5G and is well underway to dominating other technologies such as microelectronics and quantum computing. Together with Russia it is playing a sophisticated game, using technological innovation as a way of advancing own goals without having to resort to war. The panoply of dynamic, and especially digital technological developments on the horizon indicates that the portfolio of hybrid threats will expand rapidly. Future & technology horizon scanning has identified 19 technological trends relevant for the evolution of hybrid scenarios as well as for possibilities to

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counter hybrid adversaries, namely: artificial intelligence; 5G; autonomous systems; biotechnology; cloud computing; communications; cyber and electronic warfare; distributed ledger; directed energy, extended reality; hypersonics; internet of things; additive manufacturing; microelectronics; nano-materials; quantum sciences; nuclear modernisation; space assets; and ubiquitous sensors. It is important to understand that these technologies become particularly powerful in their mutually reinforcing systemic interplay. Emerging technologies have been extending the battlespace as they strengthen hybrid actors by not only create new vulnerabilities but also facilitate their exploitation. The return of mass to the battlespace via swarms of drones and virtual cyber robots illustrates the revolutionary dimension of impending change. In particular dual/multiple use technologies with miniaturization and automatization have been key drivers of this development. Many of these are accessible, affordable, easy to handle, to transport, to hide and to use. This enables hybrid strategies that exploit ambiguities and avoid direct confrontation e.g., by weaponizing social media, using proxy-actors, or disrupting the enemy’s cognitive and trust system. As these technologies are available also for non-state or even individual actors this tendency may even further increase the number of hybrid actors. In conjunction with globalization, not only the spectrum of hybrid actors is growing, but also the impact and reach of their activities. Attackers in particular will benefit from the innovation dynamic. We can expect disruptive technologies to provide a variety of actors with additional, powerful options for targeting in the context of hybrid campaigns people, assets, critical infrastructures, complex systems and processes virtually and physically, with little risk of attribution or immediate retaliation. Those who are best able to anticipate and exploit technological developments will have a clear advantage. Effective countermeasures and resilience are still struggling to find their bearings. Resilience requires a whole-of-society approach and a comprehensive design that permanently seeks to reduce weak and fractured areas and strengthens social cohesion. This has become even more important, as in key technologies—with a few exceptions, such as nuclear, hypersonic, and electronic warfare—the commercial sector drives technology areas that are critical to security and defence, such as 5G, autonomous systems, biotechnology, cyber, augmented reality, artificial intelligence, laser technologies, quantum technologies, robotics, and space technologies. In Western democracies, the required spin-off is not yet well organized in terms of defence technologies. Judgment in this regard is still on shaky ground, leading to inadequate mission concepts and requirements documentation. Serious Western capability gaps have emerged, both at the lower (hybrid threats) and the upper (hypersonic and advanced nuclear weapons) ends of

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the conflict spectrum. They open the door for coercion and blackmailing. Opponents such as Russia, China or Iran will foreseeably use political, informational, criminal, and infrastructural means, as well as economic intimidation and manipulation, to discover and exploit Western vulnerabilities. However, digitalization and new technologies do not only come with negatives. They have been driving the creation of wealth globally. They also provide effective options to better identify, defend against and counter hybrid challenges. For example, AI could contribute to improve multi-domain situational awareness in a hybrid conflict/warfare environment. It broadly enables modelling of own vulnerabilities or hybrid attack vectors. Disruptive and radically improved technologies will enable networks of sensors and effectors to vastly accelerate the cycle of multi-domain target detection, evaluation, decision-making and action. They also support the employment of serious gaming to better prepare decision-makers to effectively deal with emerging complex, hybrid systems-of-systems challenges. While we can expect hybrid warfare to become a long-term strategic challenge, the avantgarde of innovation is already setting course for a post-digital era. Neither the European Union nor the USA will be able to win the technological competition on their own. Transatlantic partners should meet Russia’s technological challenges and China’s technological rise together. The EU, NATO and member nations would be well advised to reflect their strategic ambitions not only in economic strength, but also in the technological portfolio of their armed forces. The capability of NATO, the EU and member nations to accelerate innovation would form an integral part of strengthening democracy and ensuring prosperity, security and defence.

Contents

1 Competition and Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Thiele 2 Introduction to Hybrid Warfare – A Framework for comprehensive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Johann Schmid

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3 Likely Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Thiele

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4 Technology as Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Thiele

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5 Nineteen Technologies in Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Thiele

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6 Manoeuvring in the Hybrid Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Thiele

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7 Avenues to Adapt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Thiele

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8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Thiele

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Annex 1—Fifth Generation Mobile Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Annex 2—Artificial Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Annex 3—Autonomous Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Annex 4—Quantum Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Annex 5—SPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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About the Authors

Ralph D. Thiele, is President of EuroDefense, Germany, Chairman PoliticalMilitary Society, Germany and Managing Director StratByrd Consulting, Germany. In his military career, Ralph Thiele has served in major national and international security and military policy, planning and academic assignments, including on the Planning Staff of the Minister of Defence, in the Private Office of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as Chief of Staff at the NATO Defense College, as Commander of the Bundeswehr Centre for Transformation and as Director of Teaching at the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College. In his honorary and business functions he advices on Defence Innovation and Cyber issues in times of digital transformation. He has been frequently consulting, publishing and lecturing in Europe, America and Asia. Dr. Johann Schmid, held the position of Director COI Strategy and Defence at The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki (Finland) from Aug 2018 to Sept 2021. In this function he initiated the project on Hybrid Warfare Future and Technologies (HYFUTEC). As an officer in the German armed forces, Dr. Schmid has worked in various fields within the organisation ever since, including different functions/missions within the fighting force of the army, assignments for NATO, as well as for academia. From 2014 to 2018, he served within the political department of the DEU Ministry of Defence. His academic work focuses on the theory of war with a special focus on hybrid warfare.

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Abbreviations

5G A2/AD ACT AI AIS AM AR ASAT AUV BMI BMS BRI C2 C4I C4ISR CBRN CDE CEO C-IED CIS CoE CoG COI COI S&D

Fifth Generation technology standard for cellular networks Anti-Access/Areal Denial Allied Command Transformation Artificial Intelligence Automatic Identification System Additive Manufacturing Augmented Reality Anti-Satellite Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Brain–Machine Interface Battlefield Management System Belt and Road Initiative Command and Control Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Concept Development & Experimentation Chief Executive Officer Counter Improvised Explosive Device Combat Information Systems Centre of Excellence Centre of Gravity Community of Interest Community of Interest Strategy & Defence

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COMINT COPD COTS COVID-19 CSAR CSBA CSIS DARPA DC/AC DEW DIME DLT DNA DoD DOTMPLF EDA ELINT EMP EMS EO EOD EU EW FIN FSB GAN GEO GEOINT GIS GNC GNSS GPS GRU GSM HALE HMT HYFUTEC Hybrid COE

Abbreviations

Communications Intelligence Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Commercial Off-The-Shelf Coronavirus Disease 2019 Combat Search And Rescue (US) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Center for Strategic and International Studies Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Direct Current to Alternating Current Directed-energy Weapons Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic Distributed Ledger Technology Deoxyribonucleic Acid Department of Defense Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities European Defence Agency Electronic Intelligence Electromagnetic Pulse Electromagnetic Spectrum Electro-Optic Explosive Ordnance Disposal European Union Electronic Warfare Finland Federalnaja sluschba besopasnosti Rossijskoi Federazii Generative Adversarial Networks Geostationary Orbit Geospatial Intelligence Geographic Information Systems Guidance, Navigation and Control Global Navigation Satellite System Global Positioning System Glawnoje Raswedywatelnoje Uprawlenije Global System for Mobile Communications High Altitude Long Endurance Human-Machine-Teaming Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

Abbreviations

ICT IISS INF IO IoBT IoT IP IR IRGC IRCM ISAR ISIS ISR ISTAR IT JEDI JRC JSTARS LED LEO MASINT MCM MDA MEO MR M&S NATO NCW NGO NIST NSA NUAS NWCC OODA OSINT PGM PMESII QKD PaaS

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Information and Communication Technology International Institute for Strategic Studies Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Illuminator of Opportunities Internet of Battle Things Internet of Things Intellectual Property Infrared Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Infrared Countermeasures Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Information Technology Joint Enterprise Defence Infrastructure Joint Research Centre Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System Light-Emitting Diode Low Earth Orbit Measurement and Signature Intelligence Mine Countermeasures Maritime Domain Awareness Medium Earth Orbit Mixed Reality Modelling & Simulation North Atlantic Treaty Organization Network Centric Warfare Non-Governmental Organisation National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency Nano Unmanned Aerial Systems NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Open Source Intelligence Precision-guided Munition Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information Quantum Key Distribution Platform as a Service

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PLA PLASSF RAS R&D RF RMA RPAS SaaS SAR SCADA SIGINT SOCMINT STO NATO TTX UAS UAV UCAV US USD WMN VR XR

Abbreviations

People’s Liberation Army PLA Strategic Support Force Robotic and Autonomous Systems Research and Development Radio Frequency Revolution in Military Affairs Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Software as a Service Search-And-Rescue Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Signal Intelligence Social Media Intelligence Science & Technology Organization NATO Table Top Exercise Unmanned Aircraft System Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle United States United States Dollar Wireless Mesh Networks Virtual Reality Extended Reality

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

4.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 A.1

Military-centric warfare versus hybrid warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hybrid warfare and the concept of interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The “paradoxical” trinity of hybrid warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military & non-military methods in interstate conflict. Source Gerasimov’s chart on the Change of Character of War. Translated by Charles Bartles. Bilban/ Grininger (eds.): Mythos “Gerasimov-Doktrin. Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 2/2019” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military & non-military methods in interstate conflict (2) Source Gerasimov’s chart on the Change of Character of War. Translated by Charles Bartles. Bilban/Grininger (eds.): Mythos “Gerasimov-Doktrin. Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 2/2019” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Change in the character of warfare Source Gerasimov’s chart on the Change of Character of War. Translated by Charles Bartles. Bilban/ Grininger (eds.): Mythos “Gerasimov-Doktrin. Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 2/2019” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Countering prior RMAs © Peter Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multiple centres of gravity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Towards an adaptive and agile multidomain situational . . . . . Cyber simulation for high-level decisionmakers . . . . . . . . . . . . Crisis room social media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Space related cyber-attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1

Competition and Conflict Ralph Thiele

Abstract

This chapter introduces the relevance of hybrid warfare for security architectures, trade and investment regimes, and leadership in new technologies in the context of global competition. Hybrid scenarios below the threshold of war are gaining rapidly in importance. Hybrid warfare has evolved into an effective, apparently low-risk instrument of power. Hybrid activities succeed in deceiving opponents by technology supported concealment of own intentions and capabilities. The Corona pandemic is but an example how man-made or natural disasters may present a disastrous fit for hybrid aggression. A huge wave of technological innovation is racing across all domains - land, air, sea, space and cyberspace. There is no sign of it slowing down. States, economies, and societies are benefiting from these innovations while developing dependencies on, for example, electronic media, including internet networks and ubiquitous hardware and software. In this technologically dynamic advancing world, competition and conflict differ from previous experiences. The race is driving cross-domain networking and the virtualization of functions in societies, business and armed forces. It combines virtual worlds and reality, private and professional life with each other. Geopolitical actors such as Russia and China, have integrated civil and military competition at every level, to include the development of their international

R. Thiele (B) StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_1

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trade, investment, national technology base, and political and diplomatic activities. Boundaries between civil and military competition and conflict have become fluid. As a defining feature of this development, hybrid warfare has emerged—an increasingly preferred form of conflict; a quasi-new threat standard for the state, economy, armed forces and society, down to the individual. State and economic actors, as well as organized crime and terrorists, see profitable opportunities here to assert their own ambitions with a limited risk of detection and sanction. Carl von Clausewitz proves relevant once again: “War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.” (Clausewitz, 2006, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 2)

In his book On War the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz dealt with military strategy, purpose, aims and means in warfare and in particular the use of military instruments of power. He understood: “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.” (Clausewitz, 2006, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 24)

Also, hybrid actors intend to compel their opponents to fulfil their will. Yet, in hybrid warfare the spectrum of means has grown. It further includes diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power. It applies systemic capabilities and new technologies to boost efficiency with the goal of achieving military superiority, or victory by multidimensional means. This is a threat to NATO, to the EU as a collective whole, to member states individually, and to their wider neighbourhood. Hybrid warfare constantly changes purpose, aims and means. It involves a creative mix of old and new strategies, traditional and high-tech weapon systems, overlapping diplomatic, informational, military, criminal and terroristic methods applied by state and non-state actors. It plays off elements of politics and psychology. It expands the battlefield into a multi-domain battlespace and also emphasises cognitive, non-kinetic and non-military means. The main focus of confrontation is shifting towards a widespread application of non-military instruments of power, often addressing the protest potential of the population. “All war is hybrid, but there is also a specific hybrid way of conducting war.” (Schmid, 2019, pp. 16)

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Ambiguity, uncertainty and risk are commonplace in war. In hybrid warfare the protagonists deliberately aim to deceive the enemy and the international community by the guileful concealment of their own intentions and capabilities. To this end, hybrid warfare makes targeted use of the diffuse interfaces between peace and war, between national and international responsibilities, etc. by challenging traditional responsibilities and competencies. This covert approach makes it particularly difficult for the attacked states to respond, as hybrid attacks do not show up on the screens of security organisations. To them, individual events may seem insignificant. It is only when connecting these events that one can detect a hybrid campaign. This leads to a dangerous vacuum in which there is a lack of adequate understanding, operational concepts, procedures and means of action. In the face of the rapidly growing prevalence and sophistication of hybrid threats, there is, at the risk of truism, an urgency for policy- and decision-makers to act. Johann Schmid has highlighted the characteristics of hybrid warfare (Schmid, 2016, pp. 119) • The Centre of Gravity (CoG) is civil. Conflict resolution is sought primarily politically and non-militarily through an intelligent orchestration of various civil and military means and methods. The military component, including covertly operating special forces, subversion or regular armed forces, merely lends the necessary emphasis to activities in the non-military fields in which decisions are sought. The attacker creates new facts by acting quickly and unexpectedly. • State and social order and cohesion are the primary targets of attack. Successfully meeting such challenges, which often lie at the interface between traditional areas of responsibility, may require the orchestrated involvement of several governmental departments. The resulting ambiguity makes it difficult for the victim of an attack, or for the international community, to react quickly and decisively. • The combination and entanglement of different categories and means creates new forms of warfare. Hybrid warfare turns out to be a highly creative combination of irregular, subversive and propagandistic means and methods with conventional conflict management. Large-scale disinformation campaigns and the use of social media to dominate political discourse, or to radicalise, recruit and control proxy actors are used as vehicles for hybrid threats. • Hybrid aggression and its targets are difficult to detect. The aggressor aims to subversively undermine another state and uses strategies of obfuscation to hinder decision-making processes. The variety of hybrid tactics obscures the

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fact that their use and the effects they produce are well thought out. The individual elements of the attack appear outwardly to be only vaguely connected. In fact, they are building blocks of a carefully designed plan, whose aggressive objectives only become apparent in the overall view of the elements. Hybrid threats include conventional military activities; armed actions; interference in elections and political processes; the use of economic coercion; the spread of disinformation campaigns; the infiltration of irregular forces at the borders; kinetic, electronic and cyber strikes against civil and military infrastructure, or against government networks and the banking system; attacks on trade routes; contactless combat with long-range precision strikes; the employment of Non-Line-of-Sight weapons, drones, swarms of drones and rapidly moving forces against civilian and military targets; deniability through proxies; Anti-Access/Areal Denial in selected domains; deployment of classical defence operations; and even the use of electromagnetic pulse weapons, used to cripple entire networks without the adverse effects of nuclear fall-out and destruction. Hybrid attacks can be inexpensive, may incur little risk and can still prove to be highly effective. Hybrid attackers are applying game-changing new technologies for hybrid aggression. Their progress in this domain has been swift. Conversely, NATO, the EU, and member states have only slowly begun to respond in the development of countermeasures. With the help of modern technological capabilities, actors such as Russia, China, and Iran are focussing primarily on forms of intervention which fall below the threshold of war. They choose strategies and approaches to which Western democracies have not yet found an appropriate response. The basic reasoning of opponents is based on the assumption that their own national goals cannot be achieved by means of conflict with Western opponents if their own strategic approaches are congruent with Western expectations and plans. Instead, they must innovate. It is against this backdrop that hybrid approaches have developed. For several years already, in the Baltic, Central and Eastern European states, Russia has been employing and training hybrid contingencies openly using disinformation, cyber-attacks and military threats to undermine these states and their security, and thus training respective capabilities so to speak ‘on the job’. Meanwhile, an increasingly self-confident China has been securing its access to strategic locations, economic sectors and critical raw materials through financial investments in ports, airlines, hotels and utilities. Equally, China’s cyber capabilities are more than impressive. In recent years, both states have intensified their cooperation in order to increase their power and influence. Both rely on

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hybrid strategies. Hybrid threats have become a notable challenge facing Western democracies. Major powers are not the only ones to use hybrid instruments; smaller states and non-state actors both use visible and invisible means to achieve their goals below the threshold of armed conflict. A number of Western democracies have also been running hybrid campaigns, or have at least undertaken activities that can be interpreted as hybrid campaigns. In his widely noticed lecture of January 2013 (Gerasimov, 2013), titled Fundamental tendencies in the development of forms and methods of deployment of the armed forces and urgent tasks of military science to improve them, General Valery Gerasimov, highlighted his respective observations and conclusions from Western actors’ behaviour and approaches. The Russian Chief of General Staff described these as a potent, complex variation of warfare. His well-structured findings and conceptual considerations have become the foundation of what later became known as the Gerasimov Doctrine (Galeotti, 2018). The rise of hybrid threats has, in particular, been facilitated by new technologies. The panoply of dynamic technological developments on the horizon indicates, moreover, that the portfolio of hybrid threats will rapidly expand. Computers are getting faster and more powerful. Political, economic, social, and—last but not least—defence and security developments are all determined, more than ever, by the production, extraction and use of data. Through the Internet of Things, people and machines connect symbiotically and form powerful teams. Breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and sensor technology multiply the capabilities of security actors. Quantum sciences may soon become another applicable disruptive technology. Communication technologies carry and fuel this development. Biowarfare could well become another hybrid angle of attack. The ongoing corona pandemic has revealed gaps in the context of public health and related supply chains, and the fragility of global economic dependencies. Additionally, the pandemic has further highlighted how vulnerable nation states, their societies and critical infrastructures are to malicious hybrid activities by criminal or state actors. Under the guise of the pandemic, a broad spectrum of hybrid activities has emerged, especially in the cyber domain. The cyber domain has become a particularly conspicuous hybrid tool. Activities here have focussed on the dissemination of false—and even criminal—narratives and information. In the context of social engineering, there have been targeted governmental attacks on individuals and employees of companies and public institutions, all of whom currently work, largely unprotected, from home. Russia, China and Iran have once again been particularly dynamic actors. Of particular note are Russian hybrid activities in the Czech Republic—which

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include the threat of poisoning up to three Prague mayors by an agent from Russia’s FSB counter-intelligence agency in connection with cyber-attacks on a Prague hospital and the city’s airport even in the midst of the pandemic (Associated Press 2020). Further, there has also been evidence of a cautious increase in foreign investment in technology companies, which play an important role in the implementation of defence innovations (Insinna, 2020). It appears that hybrid warfare and the Corona pandemic present a disastrous fit. What geopolitical consequences this combination will have remains to be seen. Even before the pandemic, Europe’s political landscape was already undergoing profound changes. Russia has been using hybrid and military force to further its interests. Moscow and Beijing have used economic means, cyber activities, and social media to sow discord within and between nationsand to steal intellectual property. Populist movements, often supported by Moscow, undermine the social support for both the European Union and NATO. Some observers expect the global increase in disintegration and insecurity of recent years to be further exacerbated by the corona pandemic. They predict a further increase in the great power rivalry between the United States (US) and China, combined with a continued relative loss of power on the part of the US; a further rise in nationalism; a growing number of fragile and ungovernable states; and, in connection with the latter, an increase in poverty, migratory pressure, and conflictboth internal and interstate (Kreft, 2020, pp. 2). Against this backdrop, it is likely that the post-Corona NATO, EU and member states will view security issues from a different perspective. The discussed possibility alone that Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) could originate from a bio-laboratory increases the urgency of preparing for pandemic and bio-warfare scenarios, quite regardless of the truth of that allegation (Reuters, 2020). As the economic fragility of many countries is being further shaken by the pandemic, it goes without saying that this will have consequences for defence expenditure and the operational readiness of NATO, the EU, and its member states’ armed forces. The question then arises as to what this means for NATO and the EU’s future shaping-power with regard to political strategies, economic and defence policies, as well as for transatlantic cohesion and solidarity. In particular, the decoupling initiated by the US may receive even more tailwind from the corona pandemic, initially in the medical and pharmaceutical sector, but more worrisome also in the field of new technologies in general (Kreft, 2020, pp. 7). A common transatlantic technology agenda may be required to counterbalance this trend. In fact, Heads of State and Government participating in the NATO summit in Brussels 14 June 2021 agreed to foster technological cooperation among Allies in NATO, 2021, 6. d.).

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Technology matters. It is a decisive multiplier for attackers and defenders alike. Yet, NATO, the EU, their member states and authorities still remain seemingly overburdened. There are considerable gaps in terms of concepts and capabilities. Nations must therefore develop capabilities to identify, understand and manage hybrid threats, both individually and in their entirety. They need instruments that are at least equal to those of their attackers. As technologies and capabilities continue to evolve at an ever-faster pace, continuous innovation is the key to continued success in dealing with hybrid threats. Accordingly, technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructures, space etc. are no longer simply industrial or private sector topics. Rather, they have become strategic infrastructure, which is ultimately the basis for security and prosperity. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrel, has rightly noted that Europe is increasingly confronted with principles of power, and concludes: “Europeans must deal with the world as it is, not as they wish it to be. And that means relearning the language of power and combining the European Union’s resources in a way that maximises their geopolitical impact.” (Borrel, 2020)

Both the EU and NATO have repeatedly noted the high relevance of hybrid threats in the context of emerging disruptive technologies. Nevertheless, knowledge of these interrelationships is not very widespread on the political, civil and military executive floors of both organisations. This should change as soon as possible. They must become sovereign actors who know and can use all the necessary instruments of power to effectively counter hybrid threats (Schmid, 2019, pp. 13). Yet, if it is time to act, for Europe, for NATO, for our nationswho is to act? If the given technological revolution must be orchestratedby whom should it be orchestrated? Responsibilities need to be defined. Orchestration in authoritarian states such as Russia or China is not a problemneither legally, nor politically, nor ethically speaking. But in democratic nations, can we afford to allow this to be a different matter? In countering hybrid warfare, there is more at stake than “prepare – deter – defend”, as NATO is called upon to do. What exactly the impact of such an orchestration may be will depend on the dynamics of technological innovation, and on the appropriate adaptation of our civil societies, in particular how such an orchestration can be managed in accordance with the respect for democratic values and human rights. In the upcoming period, the cohesion and solidarity of NATO and EU member states is set to undergo a stress test. There are already cracks. This is also a cause for concern because cohesion and solidarity have been the glue of the West throughout the

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Cold War era. If, from the perspective of individual states, differences now overshadow similarities, danger is imminent, not least because hybrid aggressors will see this as a key attack vector (Loon, 2019). At the 2020 Munich Security Conference, Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger warned of the efficiency of Russian foreign and security policy. He described it as the result of a state power that knows how to use its limited diplomatic, economic and military resources in a well-informed and wisely coordinated manner. It is true that the combined expenditure of the EU member states is several times greater than Russia’s defence budget. However, it is not just a matter of numbers, but rather of the effective use of available resources. It will be quite a challenge for the EU to develop a common foreign and security policy, which comes close in effectiveness to that of Russia under President Putin (Seidt, 2020, pp. 7). And the Chinese challenge is certainly not smaller. In this situation, the geopolitical competition between powers is likely to intensify.

References Associated Press. (2020). Czech-Russian Relations Plunge Amid Differences Over History. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/05/08/world/europe/apeu-czech-russia-tensions.html. Accessed: 8 May 2020. Borrel, J. (2020). Embracing Europe’s Power. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syn dicate.org/commentary/embracing-europe-s-power-by-josep-borrell-2020-02. Accessed: 3 Feb 2020. Clausewitz, C. von.(2006). On War. Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. https://www.gutenb erg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm. Accessed: 15 Jun 2020. Galeotti, M. (2018). I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’. Foreign Policy. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021. Gerasimov, V. (2013). Tsennost nauki v predvidenii, in: Voenno-promyshlenniy kurer. Moscow. Valeriy Gerasimov: Tsennost nauki v predvidenii, in: Voenno-promyshlenniy kurer. Moscow, No. 8 (476). https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. Accessed: 4 Feb 2021. Insinna, V. (2020). Pentagon reports boost in predatory foreign investment to US tech firms amid pandemic. C4ISRnet. May 6, 2020. Accessed 8 June 2021. https://www.c4isrnet. com/unmanned/2020/05/06/pentagon-reports-boost-in-predatory-foreign-investment-tous-tech-firms-since-pandemic-start/. Accessed: 8 Jun 2021. Kreft, H. (2020). Chinas Maskendiplomatie. Denkwürdigkeiten Nr. 116. Berlin. https://www. pmg-ev.com/wp-content/uploads/2020-116-Denkwuerdigkeiten02-2.pdf. Accessed: 3 Feb 2020. Loon, T. van. (2019). Manoeuvring in the Hybrid Environment. On the Importance of Cooperation, Resilience and Strategic Thinking. Militaire Spectator. https://www.mil

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itairespectator.nl/thema/strategie-internationale-samenwerking/artikel/manoeuvring-hyb rid-environment. Accessed: 2 Feb 2021. NATO. (2021). Brussels Summit Communiqué. Press Release. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/news_185000.htm. Accessed: 15 Jun 2021. Reuters. (2020). Trump says U.S. investigating whether the virus came from Wuhan lab. The New York Times. April 15, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/04/ 15/world/asia/15reuters-health-coronavirus-trump-china.html?referringSource=articl eShare. Accessed: 2 May 2020. Schmid, J. (2016). ‘Hybride Kriegführung und das “Center of Gravity” der Entscheidung’. In: S+F, Sicherheit und FriedenSecurity and Peace 34 (2). Baden-Baden: Nomos. 2016, ISSN 0175–274X, pp. 114–120. Schmid, J. (2019). ‘The hybrid face of warfare in the 21st century’. Maanpuolustus, #127, 8 March 2019, Helsinki (FIN). https://www.maanpuolustus-lehti.fi/the-hybrid-face-of-war fare-in-the-21st-century/. Accessed: 29 May 2019. Seidt, H.-U. (2020) Russlands Verfassung. Denkwürdigkeiten Nr. 117. Mai 2020. https:// www.pmg-ev.com/wp-content/uploads/2020-117-Denkwuerdigkeiten-3.pdf. Accessed: 3 Feb 2021.

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Introduction to Hybrid Warfare – A Framework for comprehensive Analysis Johann Schmid Abstract

This chapter provides a conceptual introduction to Hybrid warfare as a framework for comprehensive analysis. It conceptualises hybrid warfare as a specific style of warfare, strategic in nature and in contrast to ‘military-centric warfare’ as its counterpart. Hybrid warfare extends the battlespace by making use of different domains and dimensions, operates in the grey zones of various interfaces and creatively combines the use of force with a broad spectrum of non-military instruments and vectors of power. Based on these three key characteristics it can be defined as follows: Hybrid warfare is a creative act of force combining a broad spectrum of military and non-military instruments and vectors of power on an extended multi-domain battlespace while ambiguously operating in the shadow/grey-zones of blurred interfaces (particularly between war and peace, friend and foe, internal and external security) with the ultimate goal to enable an own decision of a confrontation primarily on non-military centers of gravity while preventing being militarily overthrown or compelled by the enemy. “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative

J. Schmid (B) Director COI Strategy and Defence (COI S&D), The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), Helsinki, Finland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_2

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J. Schmid spirit is free to roam; and of its elements of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” (Clausewitz, 1832/1993, On War, I, 1, pp. 101) “Therefore, it is said that victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.” (Sun Tzu, (c. 5th century BC), 2000, pp. 57)

2.1

Hybrid Warfare in a Nutshell

• Definition Comprehensive definition of hybrid warfare as a specific style of warfare and in contrast to ‘military-centric warfare’ as its’ counterpart: Hybrid warfare is a creative act of force combining a broad spectrum of military and non-military instruments and vectors of power on an extended multidomain battlespace—ranging from politics, diplomacy, information, economy, technology, military and society to dimensions like culture, psychology, legitimacy and morale—while ambiguously operating in the shadow/grey-zones of blurred interfaces—between war and peace, friend and foe, internal and external relations, civil and military as well as state and non-state actors and fields of responsibilities—with the ultimate goal to enable an own decision of the confrontation primarily on non-military centres of gravity while preventing being militarily overthrown or compelled by the enemy. • Key characteristics Hybrid warfare is a specific style of warfare and strategic in nature. It extends the battlespace by making use of different domains and dimensions. It creatively combines the use of force with a broad spectrum of non-military instruments and vectors of power. It goes along with a preference towards non-linear, unorthodox and tendentially limited use of force approaches combining the tailored use of hard, soft and smart power elements with symmetric as well as asymmetric means and methods. At the same time, hybrid warfare is war potentially including all levels of escalation, from subversion and destabilisation to the use of military force in all its possible manifestations. Hybrid warfare in the narrower sense, as all war is hybrid, and in contrast to its ‘counterpart’—‘military centric warfare’— can be described by three key characteristics and their hybrid orchestration. In their combination they form a ‘threefold hybridity’:

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• Field of decision: The first key characteristic is related to the field of decision. In this regard it can be identified that hybrid warfare extends the battlespace not only vertically but also horizontally by exploiting a broad spectrum of domains and dimensions as battlefields in their own right to conduct and decide a confrontation. They range from politics, diplomacy, information, economy, technology, military and society to dimensions like culture, psychology, legitimacy and morale and include all potential sources of power. Despite its use of force component, hybrid warfare tries to reach the decision of a war/confrontation as such primarily on a broad spectrum of non-military centres of gravity. In contrast to ‘military-centric warfare’, hybrid warfare operates with multiple, integrated and shifting military as well as non-military centres of gravity. Based on this, Hybrid warfare may also appear as ‘Mosaic-Warfare’ or ‘MultiDomain-Warfare’ as it extends the battlespace and integrates different domains— as “battlefields” in their own right with each other by multi- and cross-domain operations. • Conduct of operations: The second key characteristic is related to the conduct of operations. Referring to this, hybrid warfare operates in the shadows/grey areas of various interfaces, e.g., between war and peace, friend and foe, internal and external relations, civil and military as well as state and non-state actors and fields of responsibilities and finally in between reality and propaganda as well as between the virtual and the real world. By operating at such interfaces, hybrid warfare blurs traditional lines of order and responsibilities while heading for their subsequent dissolution. Though hybrid warfare creates ambiguity, makes attribution difficult, paralyses the decisionmaking process of an opponent and limits his options to respond. At the same time the approach heads at avoiding to be confronted with the opponents’ strengths while exploiting his vulnerabilities in the grey areas of interfaces. This is the main way of how “hybridity” is created in hybrid warfare. Based on these perspectives, hybrid warfare may also appear as ‘ShadowWarfare’ or ‘Grey-Zone Warfare’. • Employment of means and methods:

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The third key characteristic is related to the employment of means and methods. Concerning this matter hybrid warfare creatively combines and makes parallel use of different civil and military, regular and irregular, symmetric and asymmetric, open and covert, as well as legal and illegal instruments, means, methods, tactics, strategies, concepts and modes of warfare. It creates ever new mixed hybrid forms designed and tailored to hit at vulnerable interfaces by simultaneously exploiting multiple attack vectors. The approach can be compared with the creation of a “Swiss-pocket knife” where the knife, as a symbol for the military component is an important element, but just one element in the context of a broad variety of hard, soft and smart power tools and instruments. Based on this, Hybrid Warfare may also appear as ‘Multi-Vector-Warfare’ as it creatively combines soft, hard and smart power means and methods. At the same time, it may appear as ‘Multi-Mode Warfare’ as it combines different, regular and irregular, open and covert, symmetric and asymmetric, modes of warfare which might be seen separately from each other in a more traditional way of thinking. • Interaction These three characteristics are closely interlinked and form a threefold “hybridity” of hybrid warfare in the form of a hybrid combination and interplay of different domains, interfaces and vectors. They interact closely. The purpose of the hybrid orchestration of employed means and methods is to make operating in selected fields of action and along various vectors of action in the grey area of intersections possible in the first place. Operating in the grey areas of different intersections in turn has the purpose of creating ambiguities, complicating attribution and paralysing the adversary’s decision-making process to prevent, undermine or paralyse defence measures and responses. It is also intended to expose and target the adversary’s specific vulnerabilities, which are often located especially at unprotected intersections, and to shift the decision of the entire conflict to gravitational fields where one’s own strength meets the adversary’s weakness. Creating ambiguity thus becomes a means of paralysing the adversary. The result of this is an interconnected and dynamic interaction pattern of the various fields of action in which wars and conflicts can be conducted. In contrast to ‘military-centric warfare’, the various fields are not hierarchically oriented towards a military decision of the war or conflict. Instead, the military becomes an enabling element of the general decision that is sought primarily on other (non-military) gravitational fields. Indirect, covert, nonlinear, unconventional and

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asymmetric action are integral parts of hybrid strategies. These may be planned, develop gradually or even come about by chance. In their hybrid orchestration, these three characteristics form the essence of hybrid warfare in the narrower sense: They can be considered as the ‘marvellous or paradoxical trinity of hybrid warfare’. These conceptual considerations are to be understood as a contribution to help improve the judgement of political and military leaders, decision-makers, analysts as well as conceptual thinkers and to analyse the continuously emerging “new” empirical manifestations of hybrid warfare and their associated strategic approaches.

2.2

Hybrid Warfare—A Multidomain Challenge for the EU, NATO and their Member States1

“The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. (…)”. Gerasimov, Valery Vasilyevich, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, speech in front of Russian offices, February 2013.2

Hybrid warfare of the type that was demonstrated, for example, on the Ukrainian battlefield, if carried out against European countries, would pose a particular challenge for Europe and the crisis management and defence of both NATO and the EU. Although it may seem unlikely from today’s perspective, in an extreme case, NATO’s military defence and deterrence posture could be bypassed by subversive means in a ‘downward or horizontal escalation mode’. This may include possible 1

This paragraph builds on and further develops (Schmid, 2019b). The speech was published in the ‘Military-Industrial Courier’ (VPK), a Russian-language military specialist journal, on 27 February 2013 (Gerasimov, 2013, pp. 3). The journalist Robert Coalson created a rough translation of the article in English and initially published it on his Facebook page on 21 June 2014 and later in the Huffington Post (Coalson, 2014). Gerasimov updated his views on 2 March 2019, again speaking at the Academy of Military Science in a conference on future wars, armed conflict and other issues in the sphere of defense. He highlighted the need to prepare to fight different types of battles while using military and non-military means. In particular, he emphasized the need for achieving technical, technological and organizational supremacy over any potential adversary (Felgenhauer, 2019).

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threats from within, for example as a result of long-term subversion, infiltration, propaganda, destabilization or internal disintegration. Such hybrid threat- and attack-vectors may combine multiple domains and dimensions including e.g., politics, diplomacy, information, media, intelligence, economy, finance, infrastructure, technology, society, culture, law, psychology, legitimacy or morale—as elements of horizontal hybrid escalation. The military domain with its “operational sub-domains”—air, land, sea, cyberspace and space—being part of them. With their security and defence policy primarily oriented towards external threats, neither NATO nor the EU would be prepared, able or ostensibly entitled to protect their member states, as well as themselves as organizations, against such challenges at the blurred interfaces of war and peace, friend and foe, internal and external security as well as of civil and military fields of responsibilities on multi-domain-battlefields. At the same time, in a world of growing insecurity and global power shifts, dividing lines within EU and NATO and particularly within the societies of their member states are growing and deepening. Social and cultural tensions, radical ideologies, illegal migration, demographic transformation, eroding respect towards state authorities, organized crime and on top the insecurity created by the current COVID-19 crisis situation function as catalysts in the convergence of hybrid risk factors. They create additional lines of conflict and thus provide additional starting points and leverage for hybrid action. This exposes numerous vulnerabilities on multiple domains that can be exploited by all kinds of hybrid actors—internal and external, state as well as non-state—from various directions, not only or primarily from Russia. However, military strength provides additional opportunities to exploit hybrid methods, even without the active use of force. Military escalation potential or dominance by its mere existence would support any kind of subversive or horizontal hybrid activities on non-military domains. In this context it has to be highlighted that losing the technological edge could create a severe risk for EU, NATO and their member states. As their military strength and defensive posture builds to a large degree on technological superiority, losing this advantage could create a “solidarity gap” for the collective defence of Europe as it would increase the risk and “price” of transatlantic engagement. As a result, European nations could be threatened by hybrid methods of warfare with growing credibility. The same counts for their civil engagements and military operations abroad. Electronic warfare as well as drone- and counter-drone warfare capabilities would be examples for technological fields where potential hybrid challengers might already move way ahead of “western” capabilities.

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However, it is worthwhile to remember that success in hybrid warfare depends on certain preconditions that don’t automatically apply to any situation. For example, the Crimea scenario (2014) could not be implemented elsewhere in offhand manner. The war in Donbas already demonstrated the limitations of such an approach. The Ukraine case, however, illustrates another important relationship (Schmid, 2019a, pp. 5–15). The more closely connected and interwoven a country’s relations with its adversary, and the more pronounced their mutual dependencies on multiple domains and dimensions, the more potential starting points there are for hybrid methods of warfare, which will also tend to be more successful as a consequence. For this reason, globalization, close international interaction and interconnected societies—as positive and desirable as these developments may be—have the potential to open up additional starting points for hybrid methods of warfare. This could make hybrid warfare a particularly favoured means among former (alleged) friends (as Ukraine and Russia had been), within the framework of intrastate conflicts, and especially in inner-state and civil wars. Open, democratic societies that lack strategic vigilance are particularly vulnerable to such hybrid methods of warfare.

2.3

The Use of Force and the Nature of Conflict3

Hybrid warfare represents the ‘all-inclusive package’ of ‘hybrid threats’ in a wider sense. It includes the ‘hard end’ in the escalation spectrum of ‘hybrid challenges’. While it potentially makes use of all strategic domains and sources of power—politics, diplomacy, intelligence, information, economy, finance, technology, military, society, culture, psychology, legitimacy, morale and others—hybrid warfare includes the use of force as its defining element. From terrorism, terror, sabotage and subversion, to guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare and even the nuclear domain, all possible levels of vertical escalation can be included or even combined. Through its ‘use of force’ component, hybrid warfare constitutes the most challenging and vital scenarios in the wider spectrum of hybrid conflict. It combines the tailored use of ‘hard power’ with the deployment of a broad spectrum of ‘soft power’ elements through the creative exercise of ‘smart power’. In this connection the use of force is not only an additional element in a hybrid threat scenario, it changes the entire nature of the conflict and turns it into war. Therefore, whatever counts for war counts for hybrid warfare in particular. For 3

This paragraph builds on (Schmid, 2019c).

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this reason, hybrid warfare can also be considered ‘a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means’, or as ‘an act of force to compel an enemy to do one’s own will’ (Clausewitz, 1832/1993, pp. 83, 99). In addition, although hybrid warfare has implications for the operational and tactical level, it is primarily of a strategic nature. Hybrid warfare can start long before the ‘shooting war’ begins, and in an extreme case it even offers the option to win a war despite military defeat (Schmid, 2021 and 2017b). Therefore, whatever counts for strategy—particularly ‘grand strategy’—counts for hybrid warfare strategy in particular. It ‘is about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest’. With L. Freedman can be perceived as ‘the art of creating power’ (L. Freedman, Strategy, pp. xii). As a result, war and strategy do not need to be redefined to conceptualize hybrid warfare. In addition, it is important to note that hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon. It has existed throughout the entire history of warfare. However, while far from novel in its essence, the empirical manifestation of hybrid warfare can be surprisingly new and differ significantly from case to case. This makes identification and understanding particularly challenging. Awareness is the first precondition for addressing this challenge.

2.4

The Phenomenon: Hybrid Warfare on the Ukrainian Battlefield—Building Theory Based on Empirical Evidence4

With the takeover of Crimea by masked Russian soldiers/fighters without national insignia in February/March 2014, and with the Kremlin initially denying its involvement, war became ‘hybrid’ in our minds. The ensuing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, with separatism supported by neighbouring countries and the armed establishment and military securing of pseudo-state people’s republics, including recourse to pro-Russian fighters ‘on holiday’, has reinforced the impression of a hybrid form of warfare, raising the question: What is hybrid warfare? It seems helpful to start by considering what does not define hybrid warfare: outward appearances such as wearing face-masks or going without national insignia, as well as asymmetric, irregular or terrorist actions, may regularly accompany hybrid warfare, but are not in themselves sufficient indications of hybrid warfare in the narrower sense. Nevertheless, both the uniformed masked (‘green’) men without national insignia in Crimea, and the irregular pro-Russian 4

This paragraph builds on elements of (Schmid, 2019a). Cf. (Schmid, 2016).

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separatist fighters in Eastern Ukraine, represent two key characteristics of hybrid warfare. Firstly, they represent the dissolution of fixed categories of order, and hybrid actors’ tendency to deliberately operate at the various interfaces of traditional areas of responsibility, thereby creating vulnerabilities while systematically attacking them. The resulting ambiguity prevents, paralyses or impedes a fast, unified response either from the adversary or the international community. It is particularly important to consider the following interfaces: • Between war and peace: War is not declared or even necessarily fought, yet the ‘conqueror’ takes whatever he wants. Fast, unexpected actions of a political, military, clandestine or propaganda-related nature leave behind a new set of circumstances (‘fait accompli’). • Between friend and foe: Who is the actual adversary? Hybrid actors operate in such a way that they can deny their actions with a certain amount of plausibility, or at least so that the actions cannot be clearly attributed to them in due time (‘plausible deniability’). Opposing forces are not necessarily fought, but rather sometimes disarmed and ‘motivated’ to join the hybrid actor’s own ranks through a combination of financial incentives, threat and pressure. • Between intrastate and interstate conflicts and therefore between domestic and external security, involving state, non-state and pseudo-state actors: The fact that the external attacker was already in the country and allied with local actors raises the question as to whether Ukraine was defending its domestic or external security. Who are the separatists in Eastern Ukraine? Domestic or foreign? State or non-state actors? Which domestic or external security forces can respond appropriately or are even available for this purpose? What political and legal obstacles are associated with a governmental response by Ukraine? Ukraine’s paralysis in winter/spring 2014 was no accident. It was primarily caused by these vulnerabilities, which were deliberately created and exploited along various interfaces. At the same time, it is evident that actions like those in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine were only possible under very specific conditions that cannot readily be applied to other situations. Secondly, the uniformed masked men without national insignia in Crimea and the pro-Russian separatist fighters in Eastern Ukraine constitute the creative combination and interrelation of different categories, means and modes of warfare. This is both the second key characteristic of hybrid warfare, and an illustration of the range of creative ways in which ‘hybrid actions’ can take shape. In this regard,

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it is important to consider aspects such as the combination and interrelation of irregular and conventional forms and concepts: the pseudo-state separatists in Eastern Ukraine primarily drew on irregular, subversive and propaganda-related means and methods. However, behind these separatists loomed Russia’s (state) conventional military and nuclear threat scenario. What is significant in addition is the fact that the military elements of Russia’s actions visible from outside were, and are intended, not so much to decide the conflict but to secure a decision already achieved in other fields—through subversive, clandestine, propaganda-related or political means. This demonstrates that from the very beginning, Russia was not primarily pursuing a decision on this conflict in military terms. Accordingly, the focus on a broad and flexible spectrum of non-military ‘centres of gravity’ for deciding the conflict and reaching own political goals becomes the most pivotal point in explaining the hybrid form of Russia’s and pro-Russian separatist actions involving Ukraine. Overall, these actions are marked by holistic, cross-level orchestration of different civilian and military concepts, means and methods combined in an unconventional, nonlinear and scalable manner. Along with other objectives, they were and are intended to blur the line between war and peace, friend and foe, domestic and external security, and between the use of civilian and military means, as well as between state and non-state actors. These operations target the vulnerable interfaces of traditional categories of order and areas of responsibility. Fast political, clandestine, military and other actions create a new set of circumstances (Crimea) and put the actors taking them in a grey area—at least for a certain amount of time—while paralysing or impeding possible responses. In the background, Russia was and is maintaining a substantial conventional and nuclear military threat scenario, which ostentatiously demonstrates its own escalation dominance through activities such as extensive military exercises.

2.5

Conceptual Understanding of Hybrid Warfare5

The main characteristics specific to hybrid warfare, as demonstrated for example on the Ukrainian battlefield, are neither wearing masks and going without national insignia, nor generally covert or irregular military action. These characteristics are merely the symptoms or side effects that can be empirically observed from outside. After all, what renders warfare hybrid is not something we can see. 5

This chapter builds on and further develops (Schmid, 2019b and 2019c). Cf. (Schmid, 2017a).

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While relevant in themselves, large-scale use of disinformation and propaganda, creating ambiguity and widespread use of subversive or clandestine means to destabilize the opponent, are also only partial characteristics of a hybrid grand strategy. The decisive factor is the ‘hybrid’ orchestration of these elements in an overall strategic approach, and their dynamic and flexible orientation towards a broad spectrum of primarily non-military ‘centres of gravity’ for deciding the confrontation/war. Not only a general statement about war, but also three main characteristics and tendencies specific to the identification of the nature of hybrid warfare can be derived from these observations. General statement: In principle, every war exhibits hybrid dimensions and elements, on the one hand to the extent that it proceeds from a political rationale or motive—namely one that exists independently of the war itself—and, on the other, because war is, as a rule, not conducted in purely military terms, but rather in many other fields and domains (including politics, diplomacy, the economy, technology or information). In this respect, war is inherently hybrid—as is clear even in the Clausewitzian sense of ‘a continuation of policy by other means’ (Clausewitz, 1832/1993, pp. 101). However, a specific hybrid way of conducting war can be identified. Hybrid warfare in the narrower sense. This specific hybrid style of warfare combines the tailored use of hard, soft and smart power elements with symmetric as well as asymmetric means and methods. It potentially includes all levels of vertical escalation from subversion and destabilization to the use of military force in all is possible manifestations. Most importantly it extends the battlespace horizontally by making flexible use of multiple—military as well as non-military—domains and dimensions. In order to conceptualize hybrid warfare, it is particularly important to distinguish it from its counterpart—‘conventional’ or more precisely ‘military-centric warfare’.6 To be understood as a form of warfare that aims for an overall military decision of a confrontation primarily by military means and methods on a military battlefield. The main distinguishing feature here is the question regarding the centre of gravity on which the war is to be decided. In contrast to ‘military-centric warfare’, the centre of gravity in hybrid warfare is not primarily located in the military domain. This hybrid warfare in the narrower 6

To be understood as the form of warfare with its centre of gravity primarily focused on an overall military decision of a war/conflict and with a military decision on the military battlefield being able to decide the entire war. E.g., along the lines of the Falklands War (1982), the Gulf War (1991), big portions of the Napoleonic Wars or both world wars. A bias in such thinking makes it at the same time more difficult to understand the specific logic of hybrid forms of warfare. As ‘conventional’ is a relative term the concept ‘military centric warfare’ is used to describe the counterpart of hybrid warfare more precisely. Compare (Schmid, 2020).

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sense is of a strategic nature and can be identified by three key characteristics and their hybrid orchestration: • Field of decision: Focussing the decision of war/conflict as such primarily on a broad spectrum of non-military centres of gravity. Hereby making use of multiple and shifting centres of gravity in a flexible and dynamic manner. The domains exploited as centres of gravity can include political will, mental resistance, social coherence, information, the economy, technology, culture, psychology, legitimacy or morale, for example. In this context, the entire range of military means and methods, tactics and strategies can be employed and combined without pursuing decision of the conflict primarily in the military domain. Hence, success in hybrid warfare does not necessarily require an overall military victory (Fig. 2.1).

Fig. 2.1 Military-centric warfare versus hybrid warfare

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• Conduct of operations: Operating in the shadow/grey area of various interfaces, such as between war and peace, friend and foe, internal and external security, civil and military domains, state and non-state actors in order to blur traditional lines of order and responsibilities and to contribute to their subsequent dissolution. The resulting ambiguities are intended to paralyse, limit or impede a response from the opposing side as they make attribution difficult. At the same time such an approach intends to cause interface challenges for the opponent and to expose his most critical vulnerabilities while exploiting them at the same time through tailored and targeted attack. To paralyse the opponent’s decision-making process, limiting his options to respond while avoiding, to be confronted by his strengths can be considered as the overarching goal of such an approach. Hybrid operations/attacks in this context are tailored and designed to exploit the specific vulnerabilities of the opponent and to hit targeted interfaces primarily in a non-linear or unorthodox way (Fig. 2.2). • Employment of means and methods: Utilizing a creative combination, hybrid orchestration and the parallel use of different civil and military, regular and irregular, open as well as covert means, methods, tactics, strategies, concepts and modes of warfare across all relevant strategic domains, thereby creating ‘ever-new’ mixed hybrid forms. Conventional, regular and symmetric forms and concepts are interwoven with irregular, asymmetric, nonlinear or unorthodox categories to form a strategic hybrid amalgam. In some cases, this process takes place across different levels within an area of operations and may involve state, non-state or pseudo-state actors. Both open as well as covert or concealed forms and methods come into play. The ‘new’ hybrid forms that result are generally difficult to clearly identify or understand in terms of their patterns, rationales and logic. This fact favours the element of surprise, while making defence, response and the development of appropriate counterstrategies more difficult. In short: The employment of means and methods intends to combine the tailored use of hard power with a broad spectrum of soft power elements by the creative use of smart power in order to enable operations at targeted interfaces (Fig. 2.2).

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Fig. 2.2 Hybrid warfare and the concept of interfaces

Interaction: These three characteristic features form a triple hybridity and interact closely. The purpose of this hybrid orchestration of employed means and methods is to make operating in selected fields of action and along various vectors of action in the grey area of intersections possible in the first place. Following the basic principle of a Swiss pocket knife, various instruments, means and methods are precisely combined and interwoven with each other so as to enable tailored operations at those intersections considered to be relevant. The knife as a symbol of military means and methods does not necessarily take centre stage, however. It is only one element in a spectrum of a various combinations of means and methods. Operating in the grey area of different intersections has the purpose of creating ambiguities, complicating attribution and paralysing the adversary’s decision-making process to prevent, undermine or paralyse defence measures and responses. It is also intended to expose and target the adversary’s specific vulnerabilities, which are often located especially at unprotected intersections, and to shift the decision of the entire conflict to gravitational fields where one’s own strength meets the adversary’s weakness. Creating ambiguity thus becomes a means of paralysing the adversary.

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The result of this is an interconnected and dynamic interaction pattern of the various fields of action in which wars and conflicts can be conducted. In contrast to ‘military-centric warfare’, the various fields are not hierarchically oriented towards a military decision of the war or conflict. Instead, the military becomes an enabling element of the general decision that is sought primarily on other (non-military) gravitational fields. Indirect, covert, nonlinear, unconventional and asymmetric action are integral parts of hybrid strategies. These may be planned, develop gradually or even come about by chance. In their hybrid orchestration, these three characteristics form the essence of hybrid warfare in the narrower sense: They can be considered as the ‘marvellous or paradoxical trinity of hybrid warfare’. These conceptual considerations are to be understood as a contribution to help improve the judgement of political and military decision-makers and analyse the continuously emerging “new” empirical manifestations of hybrid warfare and their associated strategic approaches (Fig. 2.3).

Fig. 2.3 The “paradoxical” trinity of hybrid warfare

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Even though hybrid warfare is not fundamentally new, the variety of its manifestations that can be creatively designed through hybrid orchestration is. This means that hybrid warfare does not present a fundamentally ‘new challenge’, nor can the phenomenon be tied to specific outward appearances such as wearing face-masks or going without national insignia. The deciding factor is orchestrating the various concepts, means and methods within the framework of a hybrid grand strategy. While hybrid warfare actors generally resort to creative and indirect strategies of limited warfare and a limited use of military force, it must be emphasized that hybrid warfare potentially includes all levels of escalation. Friction and uncertainty are always part of the game and the perceived manageable use of force may get out of control. Due to its focus on a broad spectrum of non-military centres of gravity, however, a military decision as such is not necessarily required for hybrid warfare actors to achieve their political goals. As happened in Donbas or during the Second Indochina War (Schmid, 2021, pp. 54–67; Cf. Schmid, 2017b), militarily it may be sufficient for the hybrid warfare actor to prevent his opponent from deciding the war on the military battlefield, while seeking a decision himself on a non-military centre of gravity. Morale and legitimacy can become strong weapons in this context. In this way, the military becomes a supporting element in the ‘orchestra’ of an overall decision of the conflict, which, though drawing on the entire range of civilian and military means and methods and all possible strategic dimensions and areas, is primarily pursued in non-military fields.7 Flexibly focussing the decision of a war/conflict on a broad spectrum of non-military centres of gravity is therefore the first and most fundamental characteristic of hybrid warfare in the narrower sense and the one that distinguishes it from what can be called military centric warfare. With its ability to cause ambiguity by silently operating in the grey areas of interfaces, while concealing or plausibly denying an actor’s intent and role as a party to the conflict, combined with a limited use of force only as a last step, hybrid warfare offers huge potential for surprise and offensive action, even against militarily superior opponents (‘underdog strategy’). By following a longterm, indirect or masked ‘salami tactics’ approach or, conversely, by conducting rapid, unexpected offensive operations (‘fait accompli’), hybrid warfare actors can create new sets of circumstances that are almost impossible to be changed afterwards without undue effort. Hence, the offensive power of hybrid warfare 7

Conversely, this does not, however, mean that each case in which the military has a supportive role and is employed in other fields is already a case of hybrid warfare.

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presents the defender with a particular challenge: being taken by surprise without even recognizing that one is under hybrid attack until it is too late. Such a surprise could also be carried out indirectly, in slow motion and over a long period of time. Hybrid warfare generally favours the offensive. Hence, countering hybrid warfare successfully in the long run requires far more forces, resources and efforts than offensive hybrid operations do. Against this backdrop and in light of the dynamic, multifaceted nature of hybrid warfare, the crux of meeting this challenge will be to identify and understand in due time its ever-changing, multiple and often disguised appearances, as well as the pattern and strategic rationale behind it. It is impossible to respond appropriately unless the strategies and methods of a certain hybrid warfare actor are identified and understood comprehensively and early enough. Accordingly, in addition to long-term measures to build resilience, the ability to constantly perform in-depth analyses of specific war/conflict situations, related actors and strategies will become a key capability in countering and responding to hybrid methods of warfare. A comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare and a related education of judgement, not least to prevent over-interpretation and overreaction, are decisive. For this reason, scholarship and the building of the respective analytical capabilities will play a vital role in meeting this challenge. The conceptual understanding of hybrid warfare briefly outlined in this chapter can serve as an analytical framework for considering and assessing this breed of warfare and related strategies in current and future situations.

2.6

Implications for Europe8

Hybrid warfare is a specific style of warfare which, if used offensively, could become a game changer for Europe’s—EU, NATO, member states—security and defence. It particularly provides challenges at the interfaces between war and peace, friend and foe, internal and external security, state and non-state actors, as well as between civil and military domains. The challenges include regular and irregular means and methods and different attack-vectors on multiple domains (Schmid, 2019b). As hybrid warfare may include conventional combat at all stages of escalation against a militarily symmetric or even superior opponent, the EU, NATO and the member states must re-evaluate their conventional warfare capabilities to provide national and collective defence, while at the same time protecting themselves 8

This paragraph further develops elements of (Schmid, 2019b).

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against downward and horizontal escalation and threats from within, in the form of subversion, destabilisation or disintegration. It may seem paradoxical that the challenge of hybrid warfare highlights, among other things, the necessity to reestablish substantial conventional warfare capabilities based on state-of-the-art technology. In addition, countering hybrid warfare requires the ability to protect vulnerable interfaces and to operate in their grey areas by adopting a truly comprehensive approach. This includes a whole-of- government approach, a whole-ofnation/society approach, as well as international cooperation and coordination, particularly between EU and NATO. In this context, a whole-of-European-Union and a whole-of-NATO approach, with all relevant entities being on board in a coordinated manner, would be of paramount importance. Countering hybrid adversaries on multidomain battlefields is neither exclusively nor primarily a soldiers’ task. Hybrid Warfare is characterized by multiple and shifting centres of gravity while creatively making use of multi-vector attacks on various domains and dimensions. To counter this style of warfare thus calls for a comprehensive hybrid answer on all relevant domains. A broad variety of civil as well as military, state as well as non-state actors including industry, academia and the private sector combined with close international cooperation and coordination need to be included. To strengthen one´s own multidomain situational awareness-picture would be a necessary precondition to enable comprehensive understanding and response.

2.7

Outlook

Empowered by globalization and new technologies and inspired by the “promise”/perception of unpretentious political success at supposedly manageable military risk and political cost, it can be expected, that the future of war to a large degree will be hybrid warfare (Schmid, 2019d). As demonstrated on the Ukrainian battlefield, for example, or by the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in a different empirical manifestation, hybrid forms of warfare appear to offer unpretentious political success by smart recourse to a limited, deniable and supposedly manageable use of force. They are conducted on interconnected multidomain battlefields: From the battlefield of ideas and ideologies and the fight for the “hearts and minds” of the people to the field of economic and financial pressure, from the diplomatic parquet to the military battlefield, not forgetting about the competitive spaces of information, law, technology, norms, values and psychological sentiment and many more.

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Hybrid warfare creatively combines different battlefields on multiple domains through multi vector attacks and by the dynamic use of multi- and crossdomain operations. Therefore, hybrid warfare may appear as “mosaic warfare” on interconnected multidomain battlefields. Today hybrid warfare is particularly empowered by globalization and new technologies as catalysts (Schmid & Thiele, 2019). Technological trends such as artificial intelligence (Thiele, 2020a), quantum sciences (Thiele, 2020b), 5G technology, space assets, drones and autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, extended reality or ubiquitous sensors open up new avenues for hybrid action in the grey zones of interfaces between various domains and dimensions. New technologies with their disruptive potential are not only providing and improving means and methods for hybrid as well as for counter-hybrid action but increasingly turning technology into a ‘battlespace’ for hybrid confrontation as such. In this sense technology constitutes an additional domain and a possibility for hybrid actors to horizontally extend the ‘battlespace’. The technological domain may even become the centre of gravity in a hybrid threat/warfare confrontation. The insecurity created by the current COVID-19 crisis situation in addition improves the starting conditions for hybrid action. The assumption that the risk of military escalation and political damage could be kept within limits in hybrid warfare may at the same time increase the likelihood of its offensive use. For this reason, it is more than likely that multidomain hybrid shadow-warfare in its various manifestations will shape the ‘face of war’ in the twenty-first century. Clearly, it offers offensive options in particular. However, the assumption that the use of force and the risk of escalation could be limited, and political damage manageable, might be misplaced, as uncertainties, friction and the tendency to go to extremes are essential characteristics of the nature of war. The combination of supposedly unpretentious political success and manageable risk makes hybrid warfare particularly dangerous. Moreover, by adopting a silent, covert and indirect approach that fosters ambiguity and makes attribution difficult, hybrid warfare actors may achieve their political goals and change the status quo of a given political situation inconspicuously (salami tactics), or unexpectedly by surprise (fait accompli) before the victim even realizes they are under hybrid attack. The current COVID-19 crisis situation provides additional opportunities in this regard as it increases global insecurity on multiple domains, from public health to politics, from the economy to society and finally to global power politics and geostrategic confrontation. With this in mind, it is high time that the EU, NATO and their member states improved their common and comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare as a

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multidomain strategic challenge simultaneously employed on multiple interconnected battlefields. Connecting respective dots on different domains with each other is therefore essential to discover the hybrid strategies behind. Indeed, such an understanding is a precondition for joint and comprehensive action in defence and response, as well as for deterring, preventing and containing the offensive use of hybrid warfare in the first place. Building the respective analytical capabilities, and educating the judgement of political leaders and decision-makers accordingly, would naturally be the first step in countering hybrid warfare. To develop a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare as a creative combination and dynamic integration of different battlefields on multiple—military as well as non-military—domains with multiple and shifting centres of gravity would be a most promising starting point in this regard. Fundamental inspiration as to why defence- and peace-oriented nations and organizations in particular should care about war—and therefore also about hybrid warfare—was provided by the Prussian general and philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz almost 200 years ago: “War serves the purpose of the defense more than that of the aggressor. It is only aggression that calls forth defense, and war along with it. The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words, it is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war.” (Clausewitz, 1832/1993, pp. 444)

The subsequent Hybrid Warfare Matrix provides an Analytical Framework to assess the level of “Hybridity” in a specific war/conflict/threat situation.

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The Hybrid Warfare Matrix

Key characteristics related to:

Key characteristics of Hybrid Warfare (HW) Specifics of the hybrid style of warfare

Sub-categorization

Assessing the level of “Hybridity” in specific cases: “HW Checklist”

1. Field of Decision

• HW extends the battlespace and makes flexible use of a broad spectrum of domains & dimensions: • = > e.g., politics, information, economy, technology, society, culture, psychology, legitimacy, morale • Despite its use of force component) focuses the decision of a war as such primarily on a broad spectrum of multiple, integrated and shifting non-military centres of gravity (CoG)

HW = Mosaic-Warfare! • as it extends the battlespace • and combines/integrates different domains as “battlefields” • by multi- and cross-domain operations HW = Multi-Domain-Warfare!

• Domains & dimensions involved? • Intensity of integration: multi-/cross-domain operations? • Where is the CoG? • Are there multiple CoG? • Is the CoG shifting? • Role of the use of force component?

2. Conduct of Operations

• HW operates in the shadows/grey areas of various interfaces, e.g.: war-peace, friend-foe, internal–external, civil-military, state-non-state, reality/truth-fiction/propaganda, virtual-real world • Thus, blurring traditional lines of order/responsibilities while heading for their subsequent dissolution • Creating ambiguity, making attribution difficult • Paralysing the decision-making process of an opponent • Limiting his options to respond • = creating “hybridity”!

HW = Shadow-Warfare! • as it operates in the grey zones of various interfaces HW = Grey-Zone Warfare!

• Interfaces involved? • Which traditional lines of order are blurred? • Level of ambiguity? • Level of deniability? • Level of attribution? • Paralysation of decision making? • Options to respond?

3. Employment of Means & Methods

• HW creatively combines and makes parallel use of different civil/military, regular/irregular, open/covert, legal/illegal instruments, means, methods, tactics, strategies and concepts and modes of warfare • It creates ever new mixed hybrid forms designed/tailored to hit at vulnerable interfaces! • = > compare “Swiss-Pocket-Knife”! • Multiple attack vectors!

HW = Multi-Vector-Warfare! • as it creatively combines soft, hard and smart power means and methods as well as different strategies, concepts and modes of warfare • Hybrid orchestration HW = Multi-Mode Warfare!

• Exploitation of HW-toolbox? • Instruments, means & methods used? • Tactics, strategies, operational concepts involved/blurred? • How are multiple vectors combined?

References Coalson, R. (2014, February 9, updated 2014, November 2). Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin’s plan for Ukraine. Huffington Post. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/valery-gerasi mov-putin-ukraine_b_5748480?utm_hp_ref=world. Accessed 6 June 2021. Felgenhauer, P. (2019, March 7). A new version of the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’? Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16(32). https://jamestown.org/program/a-new-version-of-the-gerasimovdoctrine/. Accessed 8 Feb 2021.

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Freedman, L. (2013). Strategy. A history. Oxford. Gerasimov, V. V. (2013, February 27). HAUKI B PPEDBIDEHII. ‘Military-Industrial Courier’ (VPK), no. 8 (476), p. 3. http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476. pdf. Accessed 31 May 2017. Schmid, J. (2016): ‘Hybride Kriegführung und das “Center of Gravity” der Entscheidung’. S+F, Sicherheit und Frieden – Security and Peace, 34(2), 114–120. ISSN 0175-274X. Schmid, J. (2017a). Konfliktfeld Ukraine: Hybride Schattenkriegführung und das ´Center of Gravity´ der Entscheidung. In H.-G. Ehrhart (Ed.), Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert (p. 141–162). Nomos (ISBN 978-3-8487-4114-4, eISBN 978-3-8452-8432-1). Schmid, J. (2017b). Hybride Kriegführung in Vietnam – Strategie und das Center of Gravity der Entscheidung. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ZFAS), 10(3), 373–390. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-017-0659-4. Schmid, J. (2019a). Hybrid warfare on the Ukrainian battlefield: developing theory based on empirical evidence. Sciendo: Journal on Baltic Security, Tartu, 5(1), 5–15. ISSN: 2382-9230. https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/jobs/5/1/article-p5.xml?lan guage=en. Accessed 16. Feb 2021. Schmid, J. (2019b): ‘The hybrid face of warfare in the 21st century’. Maanpuolustus, #127, 8 March 2019, Helsinki (FIN). https://www.maanpuolustus-lehti.fi/the-hybrid-face-of-war fare-in-the-21st-century/ . Accessed 29 May 2019. Schmid, J. (2019c). Hybrid Warfare—A very short introduction. COI S&D Conception Paper. Helsinki. ISBN: 978-952-7282-20-5. Schmid, J. (2019d). COI S&D Inspiration paper, The hybrid face of warfare. Helsinki. ISBN: 978-952-7282-17-5. Schmid, J. (2020). Der Archetypus hybrider Kriegführung. Hybride Kriegführung vs. militärisch zentrierte Kriegführung. Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ), 5(2020), 570–579. ISSN 0048-1440. Schmid, J. (2021). Hybrid Warfare in Vietnam—How to win a war despite military defeat. In: ISPAIM—Monitor Strategic 2–4/2020, B. Nr. 17/02.12.2020/0691, Bucuresti, 23. Feb 2021, p. 54–67. https://ispaim.mapn.ro/app/webroot/fileslib/upload/files/Monitor%20Stra tegic/ms342020.pdf. Schmid, J., & Thiele, R. (2019). Hybrid warfare – Orchestrating the technology revolution. In: R. Ondrejcsak & T. H. Lippert (Eds.),STRATPOL. NATO at 70: Outline of the Alliance today and tomorrow. Sun, T. (c. 5th century BC; 2000). The Art of War. Complete Texts and Commentaries, Translated by Thomas Cleary, Shambhalla, Boston. Thiele, R. (2020a). Artificial intelligence—A key enabler of Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 6, Helsinki, March 2020, ISBN 978-952-7282-311. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-6-artificial-intellige nce-a-key-enabler-of-hybrid-warfare/. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021. Thiele, R. (2020b). Quantum sciences—a disruptive innovation in hybrid warfare. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 7, Helsinki, March 2020, ISBN 978-952-7282-32-8. von Clausewitz, C. (1832; 1993). On war, trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press.

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Likely Actors Ralph Thiele

Abstract

This chapter discusses in particular hybrid activities and approaches by three key hybrid actors: Russia, China, Iran. These are making skilful use of inexpensive, commercially available, emerging technologies to further their own ambitions and power objectives. It is pointed out that not only great powers are challenged, but simply everyone—larger and small states, businesses, societies and ordinary citizen. China and Russia have narrowed their technological gap over the past two decades. In particular China has undertaken impressive steps towards technological leadership. It already has a lead on AI and 5G and is well underway to dominating technologies such as microelectronics and quantum computing. Together with Russia it is playing a sophisticated game, using technological innovation as a way of advancing own goals without having to resort to war. Three countries stand out in terms of the quantity and quality of government-led hybrid operations—Russia, China, and Iran. These three are of particular relevance to the European theatre: Russia and Iran because of their neighbourhood, China because of its global reach in all domains. Of course, hybrid warfare is not their exclusive remit. In particular smaller—to include Western—states can be expected to apply hybrid instruments of power. Access to disruptive technologies will likely influence their behavioural patterns. Additionally, a variety of non-state actors is engaged in this activity, as are terrorists, criminals and private actors to include state-supported proxies that are R. Thiele (B) StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_3

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increasingly acting on behalf of states (Meessen et al., 2020, pp. 18). In looking ahead, the stature of private companies as emerging actors employing hybrid threats will increase—whether under government pressure, as public private partnership contributors or even in an own role. Already today companies such as the Chinese Ali Baba or the US Amazon own more data—i.e. the new oil—than eager collecting countries like China or the US (Torossian et al., 2020). However, were a hierarchy to be drawn, China would emerge as the most powerful, followed by Russia and Iran. Generally speaking, most hybrid actors will have carefully studied the operational approaches of NATO, the EU and especially of the US. They know that excellence in Western warfare is focussed on power projection, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), joint and combined operations, joint fire, knowledge and decision superiority, etc. To avoid the use of similar, albeit likely inferior, concepts addressing Western military power, hybrid warfare offers such actors a promising alternative. To this end, they keep developing their respective capabilities. As technology plays a decisive role in this, NATO, the EU and their respective member states are being challenged to keep pace with their opponents’ science and technology. Both Russia and China emphasise the importance of information warfare. While much of the West’s attention is focussed on China’s modernisation in classic conventional categories, China has also developed significant capabilities in information warfare. These include, in particular, cyber capabilities and electronic warfare. Other hybrid tools applied by China include economic coercion to intimidate neighbours and competitors, and the expansion of its A2/AD capabilities in the South China Sea. North Korea’s offensive actions include cyber and hybrid attacks, as well as a number of surprise raids on South Korea. Iran continues strengthening proxies through training and arming to promote its national interests in the Middle East. It is involved—in company with intelligence services from other nations—in ongoing hacking attempts targeting pharmaceutical companies to steal information about COVID-19. As the Security and Defence Policy of NATO, the EU, their member states and allies is focussed primarily on the membership area and its neighbourhood, this chapter focusses on Russia, a geographically European neighbour; Iran, whose activities have immediate knock-on effects on European nations; and China, the latter having boosted its presence in the Euro-Atlantic area.

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Russia’s approach to Hybrid Warfare

In the great power competition, Vladimir Putin has employed hybrid means to expand Russia’s reach. In the Russian system, the president directs foreign policy and ensures that the organs of state authority work together in a coordinated manner (Seidt, 2020, pp. 1, 2). From a strong defensive position, he aims to maintain and expand Russia’s international influence. (Voennaya, 2014). The Russian President heads the foreign and security policy power centre of the Russian state, the Security Council. The Chief of General Staff of the Russian armed forces is a member of the Security Council. Since November 2012, Valery Gerasimov has been Chief of General Staff. He was responsible for the operational planning of the occupation of Crimea in 2014, as well as for the preparation and implementation of the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015. His annual keynote address to the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences is of similar significance to the senior staff of the armed forces as the President’s political message on the state of the nation (Seidt, 2020, pp. 4). In January 2013, at the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences, shortly after his nomination by President Putin, Gerasimov delivered a first keynote speech of particular importance. He addressed representatives of the government and the leadership of the armed forces, detailing his perspective (Galeotti, 2018) on the Arab Spring uprisings, and on Ukraine’s Maidan revolt. Gerasimov described the future of war in the twenty-first century as a multidimensional conflict based on the art of deceiving the enemy—and the international community as a whole—by concealing the capabilities deployed, and one’s own goals for action (Fig. 3.1). Gerasimov outlined the threats facing Russia from the perspective of its political leadership. He described a potent, complex variation of warfare, where an opponent can rapidly escalate conflict methods at his disposal: “The role of non-military means to achieve political and strategic goals has increased, and in a number of cases their effectiveness has far outstripped armed violence. The focus of the methods used in the confrontation is shifting towards a widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures that exploit the protest potential of the population. … All of these elements may be complemented by covert military measures, including actions by special forces. The open use of force under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis management is only a step in the process, if needed to achieve success in the conflict.” (Gerasimov, 2013)

To Gerasimov, operational concepts of leading states highlight that the achievement of information superiority will foreseeably become an indispensable prerequisite for

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Fig. 3.1 Military & non-military methods in interstate conflict. Source Gerasimov’s chart on the Change of Character of War. Translated by Charles Bartles. Bilban/ Grininger (eds.): Mythos “Gerasimov-Doktrin. Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 2/2019”

successful operations (Gerasimov, 2017). Classical forces, and means of psychological influence, such as information technology, are used simultaneously. Media and social networks are decisive instruments in this context. In a hybrid conflict, mass communication channels are widely used to spread propaganda and false information. Non-military forms and combat equipment acquire a highly effective and sometimes violent nature through the use of unprecedented technological developments. Through a clever strategy, a cumulative systemic effect can be achieved, leading to the collapse of the targeted state in the areas of energy, banking, economy, and information. Gerasimov’s considerations correspond to the doctrine of hybridism developed in the US under President George W. Bush. According to this doctrine, conventional and unconventional means are mixed in the international competition of the twenty-first century. Economic wars, sanctions, calls for boycotts, disinformation and propaganda, cyber wars and covert military force are used, and combined, in accordance with the situation and interests at hand. This blurs the legal boundary under international law between prohibited perfidy and permitted cunning (Seidt, 2020, pp. 5; Fig. 3.2).

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Fig. 3.2 Military & non-military methods in interstate conflict (2) Source Gerasimov’s chart on the Change of Character of War. Translated by Charles Bartles. Bilban/Grininger (eds.): Mythos “Gerasimov-Doktrin. Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 2/2019”

Against this backdrop, the Russian operations during the occupation of the Crimea one year after Gerasimov’s speech was a revealing example of hybrid warfare. Using the hybrid warfare model to advance its goals, Russia exploited strategic ambiguity through a blend of soft and hard power. Russia pursued its objectives by instigating local sympathisers, and by deploying special forces without insignia and with a low footprint in order to support the narrative of local resistance. This allowed the Russian leadership to overtly deny direct military intervention. Meanwhile, Russia flooded the region with illegal weapons; used mercenaries to destroy regional infrastructure; weakened the local economy; and blocked state functions, such as law enforcement, justice and social welfare. In so doing, it caused a refugee crisis. Obviously, this approach worked well in the Crimea as it was in part supported by local population. In the Donbass it worked less well. Ukrainian military success against the separatists needed to be stopped by Russian military. Six factors contributed to Russia’s effectiveness in the Ukraine.

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• The strategic surprise of the Russian intervention. • Thorough conceptual and operational preparation, including respective training and exercises. • Operational agility and the readiness to learn, on the Russian side. • The respective lack of preparation, capabilities and resilience, on the Ukrainian side. • A lack of trust in their own government (due to corruption and weak governmental performance) and consequently a lack of societal resilience, on the Ukrainian side. • Unpreparedness of international partners to support the Ukraine with adequate means. It is quite remarkable that even the non-military instruments of Russian power politics proved to be well-prepared for hybrid warfare. Civilian actions were wellorchestrated with the military forces. Russian investments, trade and financial transactions were systematically used to influence economic and political elites. Links to Russian organised crime, local Ukrainian criminal actors, and religious institutions were activated with the aim of increasing ethnic tensions and fuelling campaigns for minority rights. In addition, there were massive cyber-attacks on selected targets. Russia exploited traditional and social media, using them massively to strengthen pro-Russian positions. Avatars—actors with sham identities—discredited relevant public figures espousing critical positions on Russia online. Mass communication channels widely disseminated propaganda and false information (Bartosh, 2020). Indeed, Russia has perfected the interplay between traditional and social media. By now, Russia’s internet-based propaganda has reached a level that is both state of the art in its skill, and art of the state in its origin. A particularly insidious detail being that they have transformed a strength of liberal democracies—open debate—into a weakness (Lobo, 2018). On 2 March 2019, Gerasimov addressed the Academy of Military Science again (Gerasimov, 2019) and gave a lecture on the development of military strategy under modern, hybrid conditions. He. “underscored the (Russian) view of indirect activity, the use of whole of government activities as a part of the spectrum of warfare” (Scaparrotti, 2021, pp. 22)

and called to prepare for armed conflicts of a new type, with classical and asymmetrical approaches, with the probable enemies using both military and non-military means. He also stressed to exploit information superiority—based on the readiness

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of the command systems and the full support and covert provision of the necessary groups. Gerasimov concluded (Fig. 3.3): “Modern weapons are so high-tech and complex; it is impossible to expand their production promptly when military hostilities have commenced. It is imperative that everything we need be produced and supplied to troops in peacetime. We must, by all means, achieve technical, technological and organisational supremacy over any potential adversary” (Felgenhauer, 2019).

He further noted that the accomplishment of tasks to protect and promote national interests outside Russia should be carried out within the framework of a strategy of limited actions. A self-sufficient group of forces with high mobility, created specifically for hybrid tasks, should make the greatest contribution. Its tasks would be aimed in particular at information superiority, combatting enemy command systems, and providing covertly deployed forces. The most important preconditions for the implementation of this strategy are the conquest and maintenance of information superiority based on the readiness of the command systems, and the full support and covert provision of the necessary groups. Gerasimov sees the destabilization of the state’s internal security through sabotage and terrorist activities as a characteristic feature of modern military conflicts. In particular, information warfare is gaining importance here as a very special field

Fig. 3.3 Change in the character of warfare Source Gerasimov’s chart on the Change of Character of War. Translated by Charles Bartles. Bilban/ Grininger (eds.): Mythos “Gerasimov-Doktrin. Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 2/2019”

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of confrontation. The new reality of a future war requires the transfer of military actions to this sphere—both in offence and defence. In view of this, Russia has developed impressive capabilities in electronic and cyber warfare. From Russian perspective, electronic and cyber belong to holistic concept of information warfare. Psychological and information operations are joined by computer networks operations and electronic warfare (Connel & Vogler, 2016, pp. 2). In the military context, cyber operations provide non-kinetic measures to achieve politico-strategic goals. They broaden operational flexibility and keep the risk low for large-scale military confrontation or unacceptable costs. Of course, cyber operations also serve intelligence, espionage, propaganda and further goals. “For more than a decade, cyber operations linked to Russia’s military intelligence agency have disrupted elections, damaged economies, and endangered people in dozens of countries. Among much else, they have twice turned off the lights in Ukraine, unleashed a globally destructive wiper, and leaked information to smear athletic associations, journalists, and politicians.”(Booz Allen Hamilton, 2020, pp. 1)

In the coming years, Russian information warfare will challenge NATO’s operational concepts. Military operations are conducted under increasingly complex conditions. The electronic magnetic spectrum will have a key role. Russia’s rapid evolving capabilities have enabled its forces to block and jam NATO communications, radar and further sensor systems. In particular, they can challenge UAV operations (McDermott, 2017, pp. 24). The integration of cyber and electromagnetic spectrum capabilities has put Russia into a position where it may deceive NATO and EU military decision-makers. A key role will have the Russian approach of integrating air defence capability and cyber operations to enforce its multidomain anti-access/area-denial strategy (Spring-Glace, 2019). In Ukraine, social media-based, narrative-focussed Russian attacks, including disinformation have become common. The ubiquity and anonymity of internet communications has offered Russia new opportunities for information warfare. Among the relevant developments in this arena has been the rise of professional trolls and other opinion agents. The modern challenges in dealing with Anti-Access/Area Denial environments have brought electronic warfare back to the forefront. This applies, in particular, to hybrid challenges that emphasise ambiguity. For example, in Russian campaigns between August 2014 and January 2015, the Russian armed forces needed to run two large-scale offensives, involving thousands of troops, to salvage the military situation and enable Moscow to negotiate favourable ceasefire agreements at Minsk. Supported by electronic warfare and ISR Russian forces

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could sustain a small footprint. Anti-air systems and sophisticated electronic warfare equipment kept the Ukrainian air force off the battlefield. Long-range systems deterred escalation to include Western military intervention. Russia’s engagement in Syria has become another experimentation field for Russian-style hybrid warfare. In order to stabilise Syria as a hub of strategic importance vis-à-vis international attempts to overthrow the Assad regime, Russia adopted a hybrid low-risk, low-cost strategy based on “combined airpower and ground manoeuvre to overwhelm a divided enemy. … Moscow relied on Syrian army forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other militias and private military contractors as the main ground manoeuvre elements. The Russian air force and navy supported these forces by conducting strikes from fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, ships, and submarines.” (Jones, 2020, pp. 16)

Additionally, specialised ground forces got involved, such as: artillery, forward air controllers, military police, special forces, as well as civil-military units, such as reconciliation centres. The campaign itself employed further complementary, and increasingly betterorchestrated hybrid tools, such as propaganda, disinformation and diplomatic initiatives, as well as proxies from Syria itself, and from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, etc. The lessons Russia learnt in this engagement have been highlighted in a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study on Moscow’s War in Syria, i.e. “Russia’s development of advanced command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) field systems on the battlefield, providing data to enable a higher throughput of airstrikes. These systems were integrated into Russia’s overarching systems of ‘reconnaissance strike complexes’ (RSCs). Russia continually rotated mid- to senior-level leadership to the Syrian theater of operations. Officers received valuable experience on the ground in advisory or leadership roles, which will likely impact Russian personnel decisions and thinking for years to come.” (Jones, 2020, pp. 3)

It is also interesting to note how elegantly “Russia took advantage of rifts and seams between European countries and the United States, as well as within and between U.S. government agencies.” (Jones, 2020, pp. 70)

This should serve as a reminder that Western allies must improve development and orchestration of own policies and performance in dealing with Russian hybrid campaigns. As Putin’s foreign policy instruments adapt and orient themselves towards the elevation of hybrid war to strategic doctrine, Russian action outside its own

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national borders will likely build in Russia’s theatres of interest on an important role of the armed forces—alternatively of proxies and private military contractors. The energy lever may serve as a geopolitical weapon with which to pressure Europe and China. Disinformation campaigns will aim to weaken Wester resilience and further Russia’s narratives. In this context of great uncertainty, the long-term impacts of the coronavirus pandemic could be an unexpected assist to Russia. The pandemic has boosted Russian disinformation activities and its employment of hybrid tactics. Their hacking activities have reached such a scale that the US National Security Agency (NSA) felt compelled to issue a public warning about the activities of the Sandworm Team, a group of GRU hackers who have been targeting email servers around the world possibly in preparation of a major strike on entire email systems (Barnes & Sanger, 2020). There have been Russian cyber-attacks on employees of US companies in their home offices to exploit vulnerabilities in their corporate networks. Obviously, there have also been Russian preparations to influence the US elections in November 2020 (Sanger et al., 2020). Since January 2020, Russia has been pursuing a hybrid strategy to further its influence and destabilise Western democracies. On the one hand, pro-Kremlin outlets are spreading corona-related disinformation to stir panic among Western (social) media and aggravate the public health situation in European countries by heightening anxiety and distrust in domestic authorities and institutions. This includes narratives of Corona as a man-made virus and biological weapon of the global elites. On the other hand, Russia presents itself as in control of its own public health situation, and engages in open virus diplomacy, lending medical support to Italy, for example. Moreover, it openly emphasises the success of its autocratic system in fighting COVID-19 in contrast to other and democratic states (König, 2020). The global spread of the virus has begun to raise questions about the development model of globalisation and has highlighted the risks of an industrial, commercial and financial chain on a global scale. Any rethinking of economic and political globalism would favour Russia’s conservative and revisionist international vision, such as a partial return to the closure of borders; a reduction in international mobility; and a revival of autarchic systems with regional hegemonic projections. Such shifts would benefit Moscow, playing to its idea of a world divided into spheres of influence, and its ancestral desire to close ranks.

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Iran, Proxies and Responses

In 2003, a US-led international coalition reached the Iraqi capital Baghdad within a few weeks—a military victory that followed an eight-year bloody war between Iran and Iraq. Iran understood fast. It needed a new strategy. “Within months, Iran had executed the initial stages of an aggressive hybrid-warfare strategy aimed at frustrating US objectives in Iraq, while simultaneously attempting to reshape Iraq’s political dynamic to favour Iran. The campaign drew upon a military doctrine that acknowledged Iran’s conventional military weakness and avoided direct confrontation with powerful adversaries. The doctrine eschewed operations that might invite heavy casualties and instead focused on the use of unconventional forces and proxies.” (IISS, 2019b)

From an Iranian perspective, hybrid warfare allows smaller, occasional attacks that do not necessarily provoke a larger response, but still have the potential to wear down opponents in the long term (Cordesman, 2019). Iran’s tools of hybrid warfare include (IISS, 2019b): • Financial and material support, including in communications and cyber applications; • Training of proxies—on the ground or in Iran; • Provision of small contingents of own or Lebanese Hezbollah specialists; • Support with modern equipment and armament, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), rocket technology and remote-controlled boats; • Deployment of special forces and cyber-attacks; • Attacks by naval, air and/or missile forces; • Attacks by ships not directly attributable to the Iranian armed forces and government; • False flag attacks; • Use of soft power; • Denial of involvement. Iranian strategy and action are guided by the Iranian constitution. It rejects. “… any kind of domination, both its exercise and submission to it; the preservation of the all-inclusive independence of the country and its territorial integrity [and] nonalignment in relation to the domineering powers”. (IISS, 2019b)

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The US, and particular important neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and Israel are addressed by the term domineering powers. The Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a key instrument in the pursuit of Iran’s strategic goals, especially with regard to land access to the Mediterranean. At present, there is a unique opportunity for Iran to expand westwards, as the broad US-led anti-Iran coalition is weakening. The Iranian strategic approach has so far proven to be effective. It has exploited opportunities to increase Iranian influence and power in the region. Iran dominates access to the Strait of Hormuz (Oliver, 2019). Its military strength is focussed on asymmetric warfare capabilities. These include ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, as well as inexpensive and flexible speedboats that impress even powerful opponents, such as the US Navy through swarm attacks. Even small anti-ship missiles may have a penetrating effect. Additional highly effective methods include: unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), submersibles and small radio-controlled boats filled with explosives, as well as modern, intelligent mines along tanker routes. A considerable list of showcase experiences has since demonstrated these capabilities (Philipps, 2020). Close cooperation with proxies is a key element of Iran’s strategy. Iran maintains an impressive network throughout the region, to include the Syrian Assad regime in Syria, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and also several Palestinian groups. The Quds Force, an elite wing of the IRGC, has developed Iraqi Shiite militias into effective combat forces. These militias are closely allied with the Iranian government and form a force of more than a quarter of a million fighters (Hicks, 2019, pp. 10, 11). Of course, there is always a risk that extremist groups will carry out attacks on their own and thereby draw Iran, or other states, into the conflict. Daesh (or ISIS) is such an example. They profited indirectly from Iranian hybrid activities as Iran further developed the hybrid capabilities of Hezbollah, Iran’s favourite proxy. Crossovers meant Daesh was able to develop (Jasper & Moreland, 2014): • Creative tactical approaches: using both traditional military units and semiautonomous cells. These use a creative mix of conventional and unconventional tactical approaches and own a wide range of armament. This starts with improvised explosive devices and mines, but also includes anti-tank systems and drones. • Flexible, agile responses: integrating new resources rapidly into its strategy, operational and tactical concepts, organisation and existing formations. • Strategic communication: communicating the own ideology to the whole world through deliberately cruel acts of violence, thus not only spreading fear and terror

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among the affected population, but also unsettling people and governments in far-flung regions. • Thoughtful propaganda: furnishing campaigns in social media with clear and easily understandable messages intended to motivate people to kill, and to help recruit fighters. Elaborately produced films take the conflict from the battlefield into the living rooms and children’s rooms of interested people all over the world. Manipulative narratives provide meaning and purpose, especially in the face of the modern West’s dilution of values. • Criminal activities: securing urgently needed financial resources to include black market deals in oil, grains and antiques. Another sinister income comes from extortion and ransom demands. With the multitude of actors in the region, as long as Iran denies its involvement, the barriers to an own or international military reaction are high, especially since such a reaction ultimately bears a considerable risk of escalation (Cordesman, 2019). Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu detailed his view of this situation in October 2019: “The current focus of aggression in the Middle East is the Iranian regime in Tehran. Iran is striving to tighten its grip on Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip. It is constantly arming its metastases with dangerous weapons and is attacking freedom of navigation in international shipping routes”. (Bodansky, 2019)

Conversely, the Iranian view—in this case articulated by Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces—sees matters thus: “In spite of all the sanctions and economic pressures, the Iranian nation has carried on well and actively pursued the strategy of resistance.” (MNA, 2020)

For Iran, an important strategic goal is within reach—namely pushing the US out of the Middle East. Were this to occur, Iran could soon replace the US as the dominant power in the region. Among Iran’s preferred hybrid tools, cyber plays a particular role. It clearly strengthens the country’s hybrid options. Iran’s cyber approach has been targeting Iran’s regional opponents and their allies. Cyberspace provides Iran with a significantly extended—indeed, global—action spectrum. Iran employs own state cyber capabilities, but has also outsourced capabilities to non-state actors. In view of this, Iranian cyber and information operations have rapidly gained in relevance and effectiveness. Ever more Iranian hackers are targeting individuals, companies

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and government agencies around the world, although most attacks are primarily concentrated on the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Israel are the preferred targets, but some attacks also target the United States. Iran also uses sophisticated cyber-techniques for espionage operations. Indeed, espionage against regional rivals and promoting international hybrid war campaigns are among Iran’s priorities. At the international level, these capabilities have played a major role in Iran’s credible establishment as a regional powerhouse (Hicks, 2019, pp. 11). The findings of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) present a telling picture: “In 2011–12, and in addition to the similarly tasked IRGC Cyber Defence Command already in place, Iran established its Joint Chiefs of Staff Cyber Command, tasked with thwarting attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities and coordinating national cyber warfare and information security. In 2015, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed a Supreme Council for Cyber Space, reportedly a policymaking and supervisory body. Between 2009–10 and 2019, and often via non-state proxies such as the Iranian Cyber Army, Iran has invested heavily in developing and using cyber capabilities, for propaganda, intelligence exploitation and disruption.” (IISS, 2019b)

Another current focus of the Iranian government is the identification of critical vulnerabilities in own infrastructure so as to improve respective cyber defence capabilities. Apparently, information operations on Western social media platforms have also gained in importance (IISS, 2019b). The corona pandemic has further encouraged Iran to experiment, in a relatively uninhibited manner, with hybrid cyber means. This includes espionage operations on employees of the US drug manufacturer Gilead Sciences Inc. while the company is struggling to develop a vaccine to treat the COVID-19 virus (Stubbs & Bing, 2020). The primary goal, however, being to strengthen Iran’s geopolitical influence in the Region. As the Middle East is a crowded, heterogeneous society, and non-state actors such as Daesh or other sectarian groups are also misusing the Coronavirus crisis to strengthen their own influence. They deliberately blur the boundaries between true and false information by mixing their own narratives with frequently visited contents of social media and thus carry out propaganda for their own purposes (König, 2020). Other states in the region have used corona-related disinformation campaigns to stir up pro-Iranian and anti-Iranian sentiments. Equally, anti-Western or anti-EU sentiment is also being consciously stirred up in the region by means of the Coronavirus crisis. During the past decade, Iran has provided Lebanese Hezbollah with cyber-tools and has also trained them to improve their capabilities as cyber-actors. It is still unclear to what extent Iran has shared some of its cyber capabilities with further

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proxies, and what kind of cyber cooperation has developed with Russia against the backdrop of their military cooperation in Syria. Certainly, any cooperation between Iran and Russia on hybrid warfare would require utmost attention. More recently, space has become another domain of Iranian hybrid engagement. From the perspective of hybrid warfare, space is not only a key factor for reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence and communication, it also provides a whole range of entry points for hybrid aggression with significant economic and security implications. In the past, Iran has repeatedly demonstrated capabilities to disrupt or prevent the use of space. In April 2020, it launched its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit (Hicks, 2019, pp. 11). Israel sets an important example in assessing Iran’s—and its proxies’—hybrid warfare capabilities, and ways to counter them. Israel has been dealing with colonial wars, irregular warfare, low-intensity warfare, unrestricted warfare, and hybrid warfare—since before its existence. With the end of the First Gulf War, Israeli leaders very quickly understood that in future they would have to prepare themselves less for large-scale aggression, and more for short-term small-scale conflicts. This new situation was met by the establishment of a new regional home front command. Furthermore, the tasks of the armed forces’ intelligence service were restructured. The introduction of a systemic analysis focussing on systems with cross-functional and cross-national portfolios was the focus of the realignment (Hicks, 2019, pp. 10, 11). In view of the dark and ugly realities of the region, and against the backdrop of hybrid warfare by Iran and its proxies, Israel faces the challenge of developing conceptual approaches that offer solutions, or at least which temporarily postpone difficult situations. The aim is to achieve the best results with the lowest possible casualty toll. Discovering an enemy military target and finally destroying it through an attack or a raid is the duty. Dealing with the intended and unintended consequences of the attack, however, is the real challenge. Accordingly, Israel’s first priority is to understand the immensely complex and diverse web of population groups, tribes, nationalities and minorities in the region, and then to deal with each of these groups in an appropriate manner. No less important is knowledge and understanding of the diverse and often contradictory heritage, goals, policies and doctrines of the emerging regional powers and their many representatives. What are the priorities, characteristics, charisma and related traits of their leaders and commanders? In view of this complex, multivariate field of action, the strategic importance of inter-agency integration in the fight against hybrid aggression is growing. The question Israel faces is of how to confront highly determined, well-equipped and

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trained governmental and non-governmental actors, while at the same time protecting the civilian population in the vicinity from harm. As long as there is little hope of a long-term political solution, Israel’s defence is primarily aimed at preventing the outbreak of another major war. In pragmatic terms, this means that Israel uses punitive military strikes to achieve, however many times necessary, a temporary cessation of hostilities. In Israel’s view, the concept of a modern, Western-style democratic Arab state has foundered. It does not view the emerging regional powers, and the small groups and militias they harbour, as either viable or legitimate negotiating partners. Israel considers these powers—mainly Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—legitimising themselves through traditional Islam, supported by the region’s grassroots. On this basis, they succeed comparatively easily in recruiting people to fight under their flags. Israel, on the other hand, has to contend with typically Western complicating factors, including in particular the growing reluctance of society to accept both civilian and military casualties. Society is dominated by a narrative that is created in the social media and is determined by images and emotions, to which both population and politicians reflexively react. The politicians’ primary aim is to appease angry social media and the militant groups which shout the loudest; consequently, they put the expert analysis of facts, data and national interests in second place. As a democracy and Western nation, and deep dependence on Wester support, Israel has repeatedly become a victim of this phenomenon, even changing military plans at short notice for fear of a narrative reaction. Israel’s current strategic approach focusses on preventing a consolidation of regional hegemony by emerging powers, and the extremist and/or terrorist organisations they represent. In particular, their aim is to prevent and deter these forces from attacking the strategic heartland and civilian population of Israel. At the same time, local groups and minorities outside Israel are supported wherever possible so that they can take their destiny into their own hands, thereby promoting the long-term stability of the country. Israel is pursuing creative solutions for long-term relations with its local population. They are to be strengthened politically, economically, culturally and militarily so that they can take care of themselves and prevent anti-Israeli forces from using their living space as a springboard for anti-Israeli undertakings or operations. Israeli operations are primarily based on superior intelligence, focussing on the comprehensive collection and analysis of knowledge about the region. This intelligence advantage manifests itself in the conduct of special operations, both overt and covert, precision strikes, and a variety of soft power actions, ranging from support for friendly local forces/units to humanitarian aid and the provision of cultural or

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even religious assistance. The primary goal of these operations is to prevent hostilities from Israel’s enemies, notably by proactively stifling their opportunities to attack. With regard to major aggressions, Israel’s primary aim is to end them as soon as possible. Their declared strategic goal is to deprive the aggressor of the ability to fight against Israel for a very long time. To bring this about, some of the most important targets of Israeli operations are enemy headquarters, their control and communications facilities, logistically important locations such as roads and airports, as well as storage facilities for high-value weapons systems, especially missiles and drones. Since occupying and holding enemy areas is not a viable option, Israel’s strategy is to strike again and again to prevent, or at least slow down, the reconstruction of facilities and the refilling of arsenals. At the same time, Israel’s defence capabilities are being continuously improved. In the best case, it is possible to keep the number of victims and damage among the civilian population as low as possible so that the political leadership does not have to react with massive violence to every terrorist provocation. Taken all together, this is a machine in perpetual motion, occupied in a race to apply new technologies. The Israeli intelligence service has recently become concerned that Iran may be planning a large-scale aggression. The only manner in which this could be decisively prevented would be if the region’s groups and minorities were to reject the presence of Iran and its proxies in their midst. But generating such a situation might take more time than is available. Until such a time, Israel considers that there is a great danger that Iran and its proxies will strike pre-emptively and trigger a full-scale regional war. This is all the more relevant given the fact that the US is currently withdrawing from the region, and is therefore unlikely to be able to curb Iran in the foreseeable future. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf sheikdoms are watching developments with unease. Were such a situation truly to unfold, Europe would then be significantly confronted with Iran’s hybrid capabilities. In order to prevent Israel from being left on its own, this would be the time for Europe to make a lasting contribution to the stabilisation of the region.

3.3

China’s Go Game

Among the countries engaged in hybrid operations, China stands out in terms of military transformation and technological advancement. Hybrid warfare is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. A particular interesting root is the Go game. It reflects Chinese philosophy, warfare and strategic thinking, somewhat like Chess reflects Western strategic approaches. David Lai argues straight forward.

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And this may be necessary. While the Chinese place great emphasis on strategy, the West relies more on its military capabilities. NATO and EU have to watch out in the context of hybrid warfare, as the Chinese approach is part of a long-term politico-strategic concept that builds upon, and goes beyond, information warfare. This involves operations which are integrated, orchestrated and interdepartmental, covering diplomatic and economic measures, media manipulation, and assorted legal activities. It covers a broad spectrum of intelligence and military actions, employing tools in the air, land, sea, space and cyber domains, including the electromagnetic spectrum. To this end, China has launched an ambitious military modernisation programme featuring fifth generation aircraft, aircraft carriers, rail guns and ballistic missiles. But, akin to Russia, it has also emphasised the special importance of information warfare, and developed significant electronic warfare and cyber warfare capabilities (Office, 2019, pp. 64, 65). The quality, depth, width and reach of this remarkable spectrum of capabilities has a possibly disastrous effect, from a Western point of view, when our security, interests, partners and friends are affected. When combatants are involved in hybrid campaigns, they enjoy a powerful umbrella as they are protected by China’s extensive networked sensor, weapons and electronic warfare systems. Any Western intervention would—similarly to the situation with Russia—require suppressing these networks militarily, thus running the risk of significant escalation (Clark et al., 2017, pp. 6). The Chinese approach to hybrid warfare confronts the opponents with the dilemma of: either giving in, and resolutely ignoring low-intensity aggression despite the threat posed, or, conversely, not—and thereby escalating the conflict. For alliances and organisations such as NATO and the EU, dealing with this inauspicious choice creates the further problem of crumbling internal cohesion and solidarity. The Armed Forces in China received their principal guidance already in 2003 with the Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army. These address three, combined types of warfare: • psychological warfare, which involves military and diplomatic measures designed to break the will of the opponent; • opinion warfare, here above all media manipulation, fake news, with the aim of influencing domestic as well as international audiences; and • legal warfare, this is about the use of international norms to support one’s own goals (Miracola, 2018).

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Consequently, China’s hybrid campaigns aim to divide opponents and undermine their positions, and usually extend over long periods of time. Of particular note is the Chinese manner of viewing hybrid warfare campaigns in terms of spaces of geopolitical importance, i.e. starting by occupying spaces that are not well protected or respected by opponents. While China is focussing on establishing a lasting geopolitical positional advantage, it is also taking care to avoid defeat—in particular any form of defeat that could threaten the sustainability of the long-term campaign. At its core, the aim is to shape an opponent’s decision-making process in such a way that said opponent loses the will to fight (Babbage, 2019, pp. 1–4). The dynamic technological progress of recent years makes this classic war goal a technically and practically feasible task. China is characterised by exceptional patience and perseverance in the implementation of its strategic goals. It uses a carefully orchestrated sequence of various political, non-military and informational activities, which in turn are based on a broad spectrum of civil, paramilitary and military capabilities, carefully orchestrated in multidimensional, integrated campaigns. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is structured to support these campaigns under direct party control and, learning from the experience of ongoing operations, is constantly adapting for future operations to achieve the best possible match between political and informational warfare. Western governments and authorities, suffering from a comparatively short-term focus, are not necessarily familiar with such an approach. It makes the timely perception of hybrid campaigns difficult. A Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) analysis has detailed this approach: “Many Chinese hybrid operations can be described as echeloned offensives. They often begin in a very modest and almost inconsequential manner and gradually expand in nature, scale, and sometimes in pace to adopt a completely different character that is often of great strategic importance. These operations sometimes achieve fait accompli outcomes which China’s opponents have great difficulty reversing.” (Babbage, 2019, pp. ii)

Once achieved, China will encourage opponent decision-makers to accept the new facts. Cyber warfare is a key component of China’s hybrid panoply. Its cyber-espionage and offensive operations capabilities have remarkably grown. As a result, new threats to targets in the Asia–Pacific region in particular have emerged. However, they are also noticeable in the Euro-Atlantic region. The Chinese Ministry of State Security has chiefly developed into an extremely capable player in cyberspace, distinguished by its sophistication and operational capabilities. The ministry has launched

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several campaigns that pursue economic and general political, military and strategic objectives. “Meanwhile, as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) prepares to ‘fight and win’ in an era of ‘informatised’ warfare, in response to Xi’s call to become a ‘worldwide first-class military’.” (IISS, 2019a)

China’s strategic focus has so far been on its cleverly gauged tactical approaches, primarily within its geopolitical neighbourhood. The U.S. DoD Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 states: “China’s leaders use tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s strategic objectives. Activities are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea as well as along its borders with India and Bhutan”. (Office, 2019, pp. 15)

To achieve its goal of dominating the South China Sea, China has deployed anti-ship missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles to the Spratly Islands. But it has also employed hybrid warfare. Through application of a salami tactics to gain control over disputed areas, China has built artificial islands thus avoiding to provoke a military escalation. It has been deploying its so-called maritime militia that harass the naval forces and coastal protection of other countries by deploying civilian fishermen who, if necessary, turn into active marines or are protected by Chinese warships that appear unexpectedly. In this way, they can combine conventional and unconventional military operations as required—little blue men, in a manner not dissimilar to that of their counterpart of little green men that showed up in Ukraine (Miracola, 2018). China’s cyber warfare targets areas as diverse as internet infrastructure, armed forces and foreign policy, intelligence and reconnaissance, spying on research, development and innovation, especially in information technology companies, military capabilities in cyberspace and related strategic approaches (Jinghua, 2019). Proxies are employed to support the cyber force, gaining influence, gaining access, etc. “China’s state-owned enterprises for example have been involved in building, funding and/or operating maritime ports in Asia, Africa and Europe and enable China to extract intelligence, to block e.g. NATO vessels from accessing services (e.g. at Djibouti), and to use ports to dock military vessels.” (Hicks, 2019, pp. 8).

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Chinese information operations are not as obvious as Russian ones. Nevertheless, China’s industrial espionage, for example, is very active. From the Chinese point of view, Europe is a soft target, easy to access and thus a constant object of cyber-attacks on industry and research institutions. Strategic investments in key technological industries are also part of the Chinese hybrid portfolio (NCSC, 2018, pp. 6). As the country has numerous state-owned enterprises and also considerable influence upon private business and industry, it can selectively drive investments of considerable interest and establish hidden digital controls in both emerging and established markets. Its own rapid advances in new technologies, combined with aggressive market tactics, are also having an impact. Many competitors have suffered from intellectual property theft and cyber-attacks. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a vivid example of how China is realising its strategic objectives via incremental steps. The Chinese leadership has promoted the Initiative since autumn 2013. The project is intended to open land and sea routes connecting China, Africa and Europe, and was recently extended to include the Arctic and Latin America. The goal of the initiative is to develop, in all domains, China’s potential to succeed: via land, sea, space, in the cyber domain, in critical resources and infrastructures, with critical technologies and respective industrial and defence/security related capabilities. Control over vast amounts of infrastructures and enterprises, personnel and data enables the Chinese government to pursue strategic objectives of a global scale. If China succeeds in leading global 5G networks this will be another important multiplier. Already today the Western strategic economic dependence on China in terms of being net importer of particular goods is remarkable. The Henry Jackson Society has pointed in a recent report at disturbing facts. “Australia is strategically dependent on China for 595 categories; Canada, 367; New Zealand, 513; the UK, 229; and the US, 414.” (Rogers et al., 2020, pp. 5)

Step by step, NATO and EU member states have moved into a situation in which China has not only secured critical raw materials, but also dominates a whole range of finished products. From Asia, we are familiar with the Chinese tendency to sanction the prosperity of those who accompany their policies with critical remarks. Clearly, for Western democracies, dependence on an authoritarian system that openly aims to secure global technological dominance is of considerable geopolitical risk. The coronavirus pandemic has cast a disquieting light on the consequences of the West’s economic dependence on the People’s Republic of China. Since January 2020, the Chinese government has been conducting disinformation campaigns on this matter both at home and abroad. Like Russia, China presents itself as a superior

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political system in the fight against the pandemic. In addition, false narratives are being spread, attributing the origin of the virus to other countries (König, 2020). NATO, the EU and member nations have noticed the serious risks that outsourcing to China can bring to global supply chains, and the dangers created by giving the Chinese Communist Party monopoly power over essential goods and services. These experiences have prompted Western governments to consider that it is very important to be able to produce strategic goods themselves. They have also been reminded of the risks of doing business with China, such as cyberattacks, corporate espionage, IP theft and silent takeover of critical infrastructures. While China’s campaigns have up to now focussed on its strategic neighbourhood, we can expect it to expand its reach and use of hybrid tactics.

References Babbage, R. (2019). Stealing a March. Chinese hybrid warfare in the indo-pacific: Issues and options for allied defense planners. CSBA 2019. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/docume nts/Stealing_a_March_Final.pdf . Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Barnes, J., & Sanger, D. (2020, 28 May). U.S. Accuses Russian Military hackers of attack on email servers. NYT. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/nsa-russian-hack. html?referringSource=articleShare. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. Bartosh, A. (2020). Fenomen “tumana voyny” issledovaniyu ne poddaetsya. Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 27, 2018. http://www.ng.ru/armies/2018-08-27/7_7297_war.html. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. Bodansky, Y. (2019, October 21). Iran prepares for war with Israel. Oilprice.. https://oil price.com/Energy/Energy-General/Iran-Prepares-For-War-With-Israel.html?utm_sou rce=browser&utm_medium=push_notification&utm_campaign=vwo_notification_157 1699132&_p_c=1. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Booz Allen Hamilton. (2020). Bearing witness: Uncovering the logic behind Russian military cyber operations. https://hardenedbsd.org/~shawn/bearing-witness-uncovering-the-logicbehind-russian-military-cyber-operations-2020.pdf. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. Clark, B., Gunzinger, M., & Sloman, J. (2017). Winning in the gray zone. Using electromagnetic warfare to regain escalation dominance. CSBA 2017. https://csbaonline.org/res earch/publications/winning-in-the-gray-zone-using-electromagnetic-warfare-to-regainescalation. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Connell, M., & Vogler, S. (2016). Russia’s approach to cyber warfare. Center for naval analyses. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1019062.pdf. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. Cordesman, A. (2019). The strategic threat from Iranian hybrid warfare in the Gulf. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-threat-iranian-hybrid-warfare-gulf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Felgenhauer, P. (2019, March 7). A new version of the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’? Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16(32). https://jamestown.org/program/a-new-version-of-the-gerasimovdoctrine/. Accessed 8 Feb 2021.

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Galeotti, M. (2018). I’m sorry for creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’. Foreign policy. https://for eignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. Accessed 17 Feb 2021. Gerasimov, V. (2013). Tsennost nauki v predvidenii, in: Voenno-promyshlenniy kurer. Moscow. Valeriy Gerasimov: Tsennost nauki v predvidenii, in: Voenno-promyshlenniy kurer. Moscow, 8(476). https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. Accessed 4 Feb 2021. Gerasimov, V. (2017, March 15). Mir na granach voyny. Voenno-promyshlennsy kurer. https:// vpk-news.ru/articles/35591. Gerasimov, V. (2019, March). Lecture on 2 March 2019. Vektory razvitiya voennoy strategii. Krasnaya Zvezda. http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/?attempt=1. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. Hicks, K. (2019, July). By other means Part I. CSIS. https://csis-website-prod.s3.ama zonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Hicks_GrayZone_interior_v4_FULL_WEB_0.pdf. Access:ed 9 Feb 2021. IISS. (2019a, May). Asia Pacific regional security assessment 2019. https://www.iiss.org/ publications/strategic-dossiers/asiapacific-regional-security-assessment-2019/rsa19-07chapter-5. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. IISS. (2019b, November). Irans networks of influence in the Middle East. https://www.iiss. org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-03-ch-1-tehrans-strategic-intent. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Jasper, S., & Moreland, S. (2014). The Islamic state is a hybrid threat: Why does that matter? Small wars journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-islamic-state-is-a-hybrid-thr eat-why-does-that-matter. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Jinghua, L. (2019, April 1). What are China’s cyber capabilities and intentions? What are China’s cyber capabilities and intentions? https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/01/ what-are-china-s-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions-pub-78734. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Jones, S. G. (2020, May). Moscow’s war in Syria. CSIS. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazon aws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_MoscowsWarinSyria_WEB_update.pdf. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. König, F. (2020, April 14). How a virus is raising questions about cyberspace, nonconventional threats and hybrid warfare. Aspenia online. https://aspeniaonline.it/howa-virus-is-raising-questions-about-cyberspace-non-conventional-threats-and-hybrid-war fare/. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. Lai, D. (2004). Learning from the stones: A Go approach to mastering Chinas’s strategic concept, shi. Carlisle. https://fas.org/man/eprint/lai.pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Lobo, S. (2018). Russische Propaganda Putins Geniestreich. Spiegel Online. http://www. spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/wladimir-putins-wirkmaechtige-propaganda-in-sozialenmedien-a-1240829.html . Accessed 8 Feb 2018. McDermott, R. N. (2017). Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities to 2025. RKK ICDS. https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_War fare_to_2025.pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Meessen, R., Torossian, B., & Bekkers, F. (2020, February). A horizon scan of trends and developments in hybrid conflicts set to shape 2020 and beyond. TNO. https://hcss.nl/ sites/default/files/files/reports/Horizon%20scan%20Hybrid%20Trends%20and%20Deve lopments%20%282002%29.pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021.

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Miracola, S. (2018, December 21). Chinese hybrid warfare. ISPI. https://www.ispionline.it/ en/pubblicazione/chinese-hybrid-warfare-21853. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. MNA. (2020). General Bagheri lauds Iranians’ active resistance against US hostilities. https:// en.mehrnews.com/news/157824/Gen-Bagheri-lauds-Iranians-active-resistance-againstUS-hostilities. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. NCSC. National Counterintelligence and Security Center. (2018). Foreign economic espionage in cyberspace. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724economic-espionage-pub.pdf . Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2019). Annual report to congress. Military and security developments involving the people’s republic of China 2019, Washington. https://media. defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_R EPORT.pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Oliver. (2019). Iranian hybrid warfare. Wavell room. https://wavellroom.com/2019/07/13/ira nian-hybrid-warfare-military-response-deterence-options/. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Philipps, J. (2020). Iran’s naval provocations are designed to boost the revolutionary guards. The heritage foundation. https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/irans-navalprovocations-are-designed-boost-the-revolutionary-guards. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Rogers, J., Foxall, A., Henderson, M., & Armstrong, S. (2020, May). Breaking the China supply chain: How the ‘Five Eyes’ can decouple from strategic dependency. https://henryjack sonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Breaking-the-China-Chain.pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Sanger, D., Schmitt, E., & Wong, E. (2020, June 2). As virus toll preoccupies U.S., Rivals test limits of American Power. NYT. Scaparrotti, C. M. (2021, March 5). Transcript. Hearing to receive testimony on United States European Command and United States Transportation command in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2020 and the future years defense program. Tuesday. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-19_03-05-19.pdf. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. Seidt, H.-U. (2020, Mai) Russlands Verfassung. Denkwürdigkeiten Nr. 117. https://www.pmgev.com/wp-content/uploads/2020-117-Denkwuerdigkeiten-3.pdf Accessed 3 Feb 2021. Spring-Glace, Morgan J. (2019). Return of Ground-Based Electronic Warfare Platforms and Force Structure. Military Review. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/MilitaryReview/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2019/Spring-Glace-Electronic-Warfare/. Accessed 8 Feb 2021.

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Stubbs, J., Bing, C. (2020, May 8). Exclusive: Iran-linked hackers recently targeted coronavirus drugmaker Gilead—sources. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcarecoronavirus-gilead-iran-ex-idUSKBN22K2EV. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Torossian, B., Görder, T., & Fagliano, L. (2020). Hybrid conflict: Neither war, nor peace. Strategic monitor 2019–2020. The Hague, Netherlands: The Hague Centre For Strategic Studies. https://www.hcss.nl/pub/2019/strategic-monitor-2019-2020/hybrid-conflict/. Accessed 8 Feb 2021. van Loon, T. (2019). Manoeuvring in the hybrid environment. On the importance of cooperation, resilience and strategic thinking. Militaire spectator. https://www.militairespecta tor.nl/thema/strategie-internationale-samenwerking/artikel/manoeuvring-hybrid-enviro nment. Accessed 2 Feb 2021. Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii. (2014). Section 15. Rossiyskaya gazeta. https://rg. ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html. Accessed 5 Feb 2021.

4

Technology as Driver Ralph Thiele

Abstract

This chapter addresses technologies, related capabilities and skills that are developing at full tilt. They are game-changers in many ways. The digital transformation and its role at the intersection of emerging technologies and with view to the rise of hybrid threats is discussed, also regarding a further revolution in military affairs. The panoply of dynamic, and especially digital, technological developments on the horizon indicates, that the portfolio of hybrid threats will expand rapidly. Nations and organisations that are best able to anticipate and exploit technological opportunities will likely have a decisive advantage in future competitions, crises and conflicts. Russia, China and other hybrid actors have recently both modernised their armed forces, and also developed remarkable hybrid capabilities. Be it Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and Georgia, or China’s activities in the South China Sea, or Iran’s aggressive attitude in the Gulf region—all underscore a worrying development. The combination of limited political and military objectives, combined with lowintensity, hybrid warfare based on new technologies, leaves even a world power like the United States with few opportunities to actively support those of its partners and friends which may find themselves under pressure from aggressive neighbours. Against the backdrop of powerful technologies, hybrid threats that are designed to pursue political and military objectives without reaching a level of violence that would justify a large-scale military response have become a novel, very demanding R. Thiele (B) StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_4

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challenge. They can seriously hamper responses by NATO, the EU and their member states. Dynamic and profound technological change is currently creating significant opportunities, and driving increasingly complex, ambiguous and potentially destabilising global threats. Related new technologies may advance current capabilities to enable another revolution in military affairs. Such considerations have been reflected in several national technology strategies, including a recently released report from NATO’s science and technology organisation detailing the innovations that are likely to alter the way NATO militaries will operate in future: “(These new) Technologies … are bound to increase the Alliance’s operational and organisational effectiveness through the development of a knowledge and decision advantage; leveraging of emergent trusted data sources; increased effectiveness of mesh capabilities across all operational domains and instruments of power; and, adapting to a future security environment replete with cheap, distributed and globally available technologies.” (NATO STO, 2020, pp. VI, VII)

We can also expect disruptive technologies to present governmental and nongovernmental actors with additional, powerful options for virtually and physically targeting opponents and their centres of gravity in the context of hybrid campaigns, with little risk of attribution or immediate retaliation.

4.1

Digital Transformation

In the past decades, the global economy has been in a phase of transformation from the industrial to the information age. Digitalisation (Fiott, 2020, pp. 2–5) enables a systemic approach to realise own political and strategic goals by employing diverse combinations of power instruments to collect information, and target opponents’ centres of gravity in society and economy, infrastructure and defence, etc. It is particularly at the intersection of developments in technologies, such as in the interplay of Big Data, Artificial Intelligence (AI), 5G networks and the Internet of Things, and a range of interrelated digital developments, that new hybrid threats have been emerging. In Digitalisation, value creation follows technology; the economy follows value creation; politics, which includes the legal system, follows the economy. Industry and the armed forces use the same available technologies. Alvin and Heidi Toffler have been studying the impact of the digital revolution on human society and the economy since the 1970s. Their conclusion is

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“… that the ways in which we create wealth and the ways in which we wage war are inextricably linked”. (Toffler et al., 1995, pp. 73)

Unfortunately, NATO and the European Union have been slow to cope with the leap from the analogue to the digital world. The technologies of the digital age have plunged NATO/EU, swiftly and largely unexpectedly, into virtual space. Powerful processing and storage devices, and global information and communication infrastructures enable timely planning, geolocation and comprehensive communication. This has far-reaching consequences for politics, economy, society and the private life of every individual. Currently, the real and virtual worlds are converging to form an Internet of Things. Almost four billion people are connected via the Internet. This connectivity enables states and individuals to employ all instruments of power: diplomacy, information, military and economy. The backbone of the digital age is the Internet, a global infrastructure for the transfer of information, a complex system of systems. Via data and communication networks, computers and automation are coming together in a new way with remotecontrolled robotics. Cyberspace provides access to a wealth of information. Its processes make it possible to create value or cause damage even without the use of material. With the Internet as its backbone, it is populated by applications such as the World Wide Web, e-mail, cloud services or the Internet of Things. Other products and services such as global navigation satellite systems, sensors, software platforms, algorithms and artificial intelligence offer enormous potential for value creation, but also for destruction and unwanted control. New technologies and digitalisation are the price of admission to participate competently and self-determinedly in economic and social networks today. They are also increasingly dominating core issues of security and defence policy. Information and communication technologies (ICT) have opened up new possibilities for collecting, storing, manipulating, using and distributing data and information, as well as for creating knowledge. They have become a key factor in all humancontrolled processes as they provide access to information and enable individuals, interest groups, companies and governments to exert global influence. “Today the nation’s power—militarily as economically—rests on data. Via data and communication networks, computers and automation come together in a new way with remotely connected robotics. In a world of constant connectivity, data is the new oil. And networks are the new oil rigs. Just as crude oil needs to be refined to create usable products like gasoline, data needs to be refined to deliver actionable information.” (Schmid & Thiele, 2019, pp. 223)

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Today, data is of more importance, and of a greater mass than ever before. Owning data is at the very core of digitalisation. It allows to access, structure, evaluate, and distribute data. In a world of constant connectivity, data is the new oil and networks are the new oil rigs. Consequently, data needs to be refined to deliver actionable information. Data come from inside and outside organisations. They may be structured, i.e. transactions, invoices, receipts, orders, reports—or unstructured, i.e. tweets, videos, blogs, and so forth. This flow of data provides valuable insights into the operation of governmental and non-governmental organisations, their larger ecosystem, as well as regarding individuals of relevance to own objectives. New technologies enable to find and track these data and make their inherent information actionable. Information can be requested, acquired, evaluated, condensed, merged, made available and used for one’s own operations. Moreover, this information is of a better quality and more up-to-date than ever before. This accelerates planning and decision-making processes and leads to superior effectiveness in operations. The vertical integration of all processes—the continuous cycle from situational awareness, through operational planning and resource management, to the mission itself and mission evaluation—is revolutionising command and control of armed forces. Accordingly, the armed forces of many countries are undergoing a process of change in order to capitalise on the opportunities offered by the digital world. Terms such as networked operations management and force transformation highlight this. Concepts of electronic and information warfare have emerged. They pave the way for future hybrid scenarios. In order to make decisions today, political, civilian and military leaders have to combine capabilities of two different ages—the industrial and the information age. The direction they take and the quality of their decisions will ultimately determine the outcome of every contest. Dealing adequately with hybrid warfare implies an understanding of the complexity of the digital world, and the need to include the abstract cyberspace into our traditional security thinking. ‘Systems of systems’ thinking is key, as hybrid actors fuse military and non-military, physical and virtual means. Until recently, the physical element dominated in military conflicts. Hybrid threats combine industrial and informational capabilities, and hybrid warfare takes place both in the real and virtual worlds. The real-world segment is given over to conventional military power. The physical dimension of hybrid warfare is well understood by many decision-makers and actors in the system, as conventional warfare largely uses technologies of the industrial age. Mechanical systems embody and deliver military clout. However, their hierarchically organised structures are

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problematic when taken as a basis for the use and storage of information, because they embody a system that is known to be slow. In contrast, the virtual world of the information age is often difficult to understand. Operations in computers and networks usually surprise with their real effects being felt merely at the end of the process. Only a systemic approach reveals the connections between the physical and the virtual realm and enables timely foresight and warnings. To this end, NATO and EU armed forces have structured a business model on modern, interoperable, scalable and service-oriented ICT. Its key elements include Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, situational awareness, high-end analysis and evaluation, planning and targeting, and precision strike capabilities. Tremendous computing power and ubiquitous connectivity, powerful processing and storage devices and global infrastructures providing timing, geolocation and communication have changed our political, societal and economic systems. Warfare has equally been changed. Data arrive on specialised secure military channels, via open intelligence found on the internet or in media reports. Data is being generated and acquired from an immensely diverse and Herculean mass of platforms—airborne, satellite, submarine, surface ship, and soldier-borne. Appropriately employed ICT is nowadays decisive for the outcome of war and war-like operations (Schmid & Thiele, 2019, pp. 223). Digitalisation also empowers non-military operations to achieve war-like effects It provides access to information and enables individuals, interest groups, and states to be influenced on a global scale. ICT has become the underpinning of modern warfare, and while it greatly contributes to the array of hybrid threats, it also harbours the potential to effectively counter them. Hybrid warfare is a multi-domain warfare. Integrated complex hybrid campaigns involve operations in several domains. This requires the means to provide command and control of all the actors and forces employed in those different domains. To adequately ensure command and control, focus shifts from platforms to systems. With ongoing digitalisation, new technology enables the improved and synergetic linkage of sea, land-based, aerospace and space systems, not only combining their effectiveness, but also compensating for their individual vulnerabilities. Information age technologies will enable highly inter-connected, inter-dependent distributed operations. Successfully meeting hybrid challenges will require better and broader multidomain situational awareness than in the past, building on integrated intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike, and manoeuvre capabilities. Along with the increasing digitalisation of armed forces, in particular the increasingly data-supported command and control, the term Command, Control,

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Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) is used. C4I can be imagined as a number of networks—in space, in communication space, in cyberspace, on and under water, on land and in the air. These networks arch around the world. The system is flexible, agile and highly adaptable and can be concentrated wherever crises occur and relevant actors need to be employed. C4I architectures and processes serve as an indispensable basis for Networked Operations. These are based on the technical networking of soldiers and intelligent platforms, such as vehicles, ships, submarines, aircraft, unmanned reconnaissance and sensor systems and effectors. As the modern, multi-domain battlespace becomes increasingly complex, this technical networking provides for an environment, where militaries can boost decision-making, enhance situational awareness and increase mission effectiveness. C4I delivers Situational Awareness when and where it’s needed. The objective being to obtain a comprehensive, precise picture of the situation, improve decisionmaking and deliver unmatched impact on opponents’ core capabilities. Every day, defence and intelligence decision-makers are faced with the difficult task of finding actionable data in a constantly-expanding sea of information. The enormous capacity for analysis and evaluation associated with Big Data and AI, near real-time or even real-time situational awareness vastly increases the agility of forces in manoeuvring and responding. Communication is the fundamental component of C4I. Communication capacity must allow for a distributive, all-domain connectivity that is difficult to attack, and self-healing if damaged. Beyond terrestrial communication infrastructure, satellite communication provides a crucial backbone for evolving global communications networks, as they deliver anywhere and anytime the data and information needed. Satellite systems provide C4I with a maintenance-free medium. As such, they have become the vertebrae which enable high mobility, quick deployment, wide geographical coverage, and independence of terrestrial infrastructure. Cyber plays a constitutive role in applying and ensuring C4I capabilities. It is a critical facilitator, and integral part, of multidomain command and control. The cyberspace—broadly defined as cyber, the electromagnetic spectrum, space and even the social media environment—has emerged as the absolute and unsurpassed enabler of hybrid threats. It is equally indispensable to the fight against them. To this end, the interface between defence, intelligence, and cyber becomes increasingly important. Cyber is the centrepiece of an intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance complex. This has consequences for the C4I architecture and processes. As the highly networked military platforms and weapons systems of

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high-tech armed forces are dependent on the use of information and communication systems with regard, inter alia, to military decision-making processes—the availability, confidentiality and integrity of information is indispensable. NATO’s C4I-based business model has been the organisation’s key source of superior capabilities and decision-making. It is the main reason for the professional respect it is accorded by opponents. The ability to harness the rapidly growing flood of data will determine the success of future military operations, and thus the military strength of the West. Digitalisation and ’systems of systems’ thinking have so far been a source of strength for NATO, the EU and member nations. This is a strong foundation upon which to continue to build, as opponents increasingly attempt to win their battles below the threshold of war.

4.2

Revolutions in Military Affairs

Armed forces around the world have embarked on a transformation process over the past few decades, taking advantage of the capabilities of the digital world. Dynamic emerging technologies have become the catalyst for numerous changes, which may play key roles in enabling hybrid warfare actors. Identifying and classifying militarily relevant technologies is no easy task in the midst of the current technological developments—which are both fast-moving and vast in number. Many advanced technologies are initially more commercial than military in nature. Their new and potentially significant applications for hybrid warfare and beyond must be carefully analysed, and, if necessary, speedily implemented (Fig. 4.1). For decades, the West could rely on superior quality instead of mass in military technology. The numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact states was balanced by far-reaching sensors, precision-guided weapons and superior command and control systems. Today, while requirements continue to grow, the Western lead in military technology is dwindling (Haas, 2019). To understand the impact of technology on upcoming hybrid security challenges—and to determine what the strategic and operational implications are, be they on the nature of military command and control, capacities needed, or required training and education—it is important to look at past military technological transformations of war. Technology affects war since time immemorial. Yet, it is particularly since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, that science and technology, as we today understand it, significantly shifted the nature of war into the contemporary. In turn, today, in the face of altering sets of security and defence challenges, the major powers of the past and present-day have had to struggle to adapt their military establishments.

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Fig. 4.1 Countering prior RMAs © Peter Wilson

Four revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) have been broadly discussed, particular in US literature. RMAs are defined as disruptive technologies rendering existing military concepts and capabilities obsolete (Wilson, 2019c). • RMA I is warfare fought with combat vehicles and industrial production as it emerged out of the second half of World War I. • RMA II is the insurgent way of war that emerged out of the Sino-Japanese war during the 1930s and led to successful seizure of power by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. • RMA III comprises the use, and the threat of use, of nuclear weapons and their long-range means of delivery. It was the dominating theme of the Cold War and has gained new prominence with the threat of upcoming new nuclear states. • RMA IV is the way of war fought with all of the manifestations of the digital age, including precision-guided munitions, active and passive sensors, cyberspace, and robotics. It covers the development of command, control, communications, computer (C4) and Information Technology, and includes the prospect of autonomous robotic warfare (Schmid & Thiele, 2019, pp. 223).

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Currently, the most technologically dynamic way of war is RMA IV, which is still well underway given the rapidity of Moore’s Law. The American engineer Gordon Moore observed that the “number of transistors on a computer chip was doubling about every 18–24 months.” (Britannica, 2021)

Since its emergence in the digital wellspring of the 1990s, the key feature of RMA IV is the military exploitation of advances in mobile sensors, communications, computers, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs). These IT-enabled military technological innovations have been driven by very different strategic imperatives. Insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st century, have predominantly relied upon RMA II, i.e. Maoist-style revolutionary warfare. The initial US response was of massive intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan with large combat manoeuvre units, primarily equipped with the tools and techniques of RMA I. This approach was supplemented with significant investments in RMA IV tools and techniques to defeat the insurgents’ use of improvised explosive devices as a major technique of attrition warfare. A parallel campaign aimed to eviscerate the senior leadership of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and of its allies located outside of South Asia was also led. This has resulted in the development of the combined use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and highly trained Special Forces. Given their problematic experience with large-scale military interventions, and RMA-I-type expeditionary forces, the US Administration later relied increasingly on the tools and techniques of RMA IV to contain if not destroy the operational capacity of the Al Qaida global insurgency to include Daesh terrorists in Iraq and Syria. Russia, China, Iran and other countries were swift to analyse the advancement in US military technology in terms of situational awareness provided by the then experimental Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and precision-guided weapons systems, wrapped into new operational concepts, and displayed during the 1991 Gulf War. Their conclusion from this analysis was to seriously invest in emerging technologies, as well as to restructure their forces and processes, and undertake their own military modernisation. Potentially disruptive technologies have been smartly integrated into their strategies and military capabilities. This includes the concept of hybrid warfare. Today they constitute a new strategic challenge to the West, e.g. information warfare, including cyber and electronic warfare. Russia has been the pacing threat; it is now joined in that category by China. While it is understood that Russia and China

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fight different wars with different armies, both have leveraged new technologies to expand the battlefield, blurring the distinction between peace and war, in multidomains, i.e. air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. China has trained and deployed its armed forces with modern RMA-I technologies, and it is also exploiting the advances in RMA-IV. This includes significant investments in long-range strike systems to create large weapons system platforms with high survivability and accuracy, improved missile defence systems, and robust offensive capabilities for space and cyberspace operations. Russia and China combine the possibilities of the new technologies with their own conceptual development and strategic orientation and use the associated new capabilities to restrict NATO and the EU in their freedom of operation through multi-layered stand-off in all domains. The military challenge will be to maintain the coherence of own operations. Soon we can expect China and Russia to be capable to fully exploit the tools and techniques of RMA-IV. Their anti-access and area denial systems have been designed to rapidly inflict unacceptable losses on NATO and EU armed forces. We will see smaller contingencies, which are capable of fighting on an expanded battlefield. As near-peer states readily compete below the threshold of armed conflict they have made deterrence even more challenging (TRADOC, 2018, pp. vi). Western armed forces have not kept pace with these developments; friendly forces may find themselves at risk; homelands, which have long been considered safe, may soon face greater uncertainty. Against this backdrop, anti-access (A2) and area denial (AD) challenges have become a centrepiece of Western defence considerations not only in conventional warfare. This focus also needs to apply to hybrid warfare, as this new state of affairs may be tested first of all in hybrid warfare campaigns. Smaller contingencies have the potential to become the greatest sources of concern. NATO and the EU will have to upscale their technological progress in order to quickly catch up. Until then, one must expect that hybrid aggressors will attempt to undermine the US’ solidarity-based support for Europe, exploiting the conventional deficits of NATO and the EU to do so. The current renaissance of nuclear weapons (RMA-III) increases the hybrid scope for intimidation and blackmail. Moreover, it is currently completely unclear whether—and above all how—NATO will succeed in closing the growing nuclear gap so as to ensure continued and extended deterrence, protecting Europe primarily by nestling beneath the US military umbrella. Yet, the Europeans should not rely on the US as the ultimate guarantor of nuclear power, especially in a situation where blackmail against European member states could only be answered, at the level of strategic weapons systems, with a nuclear option. This is particularly true in the case of a hybrid security gap. As new nuclear powers are emerging in the European neighbourhood, including Saudi Arabia and

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Iran, the risks grow. Hybrid campaigns may contribute to miscalculation and unintended escalation. This holds the potential to transform attempts at intimidation and blackmail into conventional crises, and hence even into major conflicts between nuclear powers (Olshausen, 2020, pp. 11). It is at this sensitive juncture, and in the context of the ongoing technological revolution, that the next revolution in military affairs may be identified—RMA V (Callinan et al., 2019, pp. 44). It comprises four major components: C4, Intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), Information Warfare and Integrated Logistics. C4 comprises command and control (C2), communications, computers. ISR has space, airborne, seaborne, ground and cyber components. System integration is a key feature. The most important capability will be to degrade the opponent’s situational awareness. In enabling this development, new technologies have a key role. They will alter and enable to rapidly accelerate planning, targeting, and decision-making processes in military operations (Atherton, 2019). While digital challenges have already placed enormous demands on politics and society, the economy and defence, the world already appears to be heading for a post-digital era (Accenture, 2019, pp. 2). Hybrid warfare will likely use a creative mix of RMA I to RMA V to pursue its objectives. It is expected that hybrid attackers will model their targets, and use these models to develop their attack strategies. Most of the data needed for this is openly accessible. Aggressors find it online, including information about critical infrastructures, personal information from social media accounts, corporate data, and information about politics and administration. It is an unfortunate irony that the open societies of the West are particularly vulnerable to such attacks given the easy and free availability of this information. Horizon scanning requires an examination of major geo-strategic and geoeconomic trends, potential shocks, and discontinuities to the international system, and their impact on the possible features of RMA V—and its impact, in turn, on the conduct of future war. An inadvertent accelerant for this military-technological competition between the major powers will be the very likely explosive and dramatic development of a number of globally powerful dual-purpose technologies.

References Accenture. (2019). The post-digital era is upon us. Are you ready for what’s next? Accenture technology vision. https://www.accenture.com/t20190201T224653Z__w__/us-en/_ acnmedia/PDF-94/Accenture-TechVision-2019-Tech-Trends-Report.pdf. Accessed: 30. Jan. 2020.

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Atherton, K. D. (2019). In this league, drone races are won by brainwaves alone. C4ISRNET. https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2019/04/26/league-races-dro nes-by-brainwaves-alone/. Accessed: 3. Feb. 2021. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. (2021). “Moore’s law”. Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/technology/Moores-law. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. Callinan, M. et al. (2019). Defence and security R&D: A sovereign strategic advantage. https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-01/SR%20133%20Defence% 20and%20security%20R%26D.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=FYI&dm_i=1ZJ N,63GYS,RBW1B5,NXX58,1. Accessed: 9. Feb. 2021. Fiott, D. (2020). Digitalizing defence: Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the cloud. ISS. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%204% 20Defence.pdf. Accessed: 17. Feb. 2021. Haas, M. (2019). Der westliche Vorsprung in der Militärtechnologie schwindet. Neue Zürcher Zeitung. https://www.nzz.ch/international/militaer-technologie-westlicher-vorsprung-sch windet-ld.1474351. Accessed: 9 Feb 2019. NATO STO. (2020). Science & Technology Trends: 2020–2040. https://www.nato.int/nato_s tatic_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf. Accessed: 3. Feb. 2021. Olshausen, K. (2020). Nukleare Herausforderungen – Nukleare Anforderungen. Denkwürdigkeiten No. 115. https://www.pmg-ev.com/denkwuerdigkeiten-nr-115-februar-20/. Accessed: 9. Feb. 2020. Schmid, J., & Thiele, R. (2019). Hybrid warfare – Orchestrating the technology revolution. In R. Ondrejcsak, & T.H. Lippert (Eds.), STRATPOL. NATO at 70: Outline of the alliance today and tomorrow. Toffler, A., Toffler, A., & Toffler, H. (1995). War and anti war: Making sense of today’s global chaos. New York. TRADOC. (2018). The U.S. army in multi-domain operations 2028. TP 525-3-1, GL-7. https:// info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-MultidomainOps2028.pdf. Accessed: 8. Feb. 2021. Wilson, P. (2019). The Eurasian four ring circus and the long war against Salafist jihadism rapidly emerging military technological trends and capabilities. RAND Arroyo Center.

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Nineteen Technologies in Focus Ralph Thiele

Abstract

This chapter highlights the dwindling Western lead in military technology, particularly at a time where armed forces are confronted with dynamic developing emerging and disruptive technologies that are likely to drive developments in hybrid warfare in the forthcoming years. 19 technologies have been identified as particularly relevant for the evolution of hybrid challenges, conflict and warfare namely: 5G, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnology, cloud computing, communication networks, cyber and electronic warfare, distributed ledger, directed energy, extended reality, hypersonics, internet of things, microelectronics, nano-materials, nuclear modernisation, quantum sciences, space assets, and ubiquitous sensors. It appears that in several of these technologies Russia and China already have an edge with regard to military applications in hybrid warfare. Armed forces around the world are being confronted by dynamic developing technologies, which are catalysing change in numerous areas, and which may play key roles in enabling hybrid warfare actors. While the requirements grow, the Western lead in military technology is dwindling (Haas, 2019). Where is the development of disruptive technologies going, and how fast? And how will it empower hybrid warfare? The upcoming RMA V will certainly be shaped by more than one single factor. Disruptive technologies will be its driving force. But it is the interplay R. Thiele (B) StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_5

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between evolving technologies, related weapons, military structures, processes and doctrine which will ultimately be key. A former US Secretary of Defence put it this way: “Exploiting the revolution in military affairs requires not only technological innovation but also the development of operational concepts, undertaking organizational adaptations, and training and experimentation to transform a country’s military force.” (Rumsfeld, 2001, pp. 6)

Hybrid warfare will prove a field of front-end experimentation. If applied successfully, we will see proven technologies enter the standard inventory of armed forces (Roy, 2004, pp. 153/154). Among these, prominent examples of advanced capabilities will be: swarms of robotic systems, laser weapons and communications, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned submarines. The growing clout of both China and Russia will raise the stakes. The Hybrid Centre of Excellence Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies project has identified 19 relevant technologies (Schmid & Thiele, 2019, pp. 222– 225) as particularly relevant for the evolution of hybrid threats, namely: 5G; additive manufacturing; artificial intelligence; autonomous systems; biotechnology; cloud computing; communications; cyber and electronic warfare; distributed ledger; extended reality; hypersonics; internet of things; microelectronics; nanomaterials; nuclear modernisation; quantum sciences; space assets; and ubiquitous sensors. These emerging technologies are likely to drive developments in hybrid warfare in the forthcoming years. Seven of these technologies would appear to have a prominent role: 5G; artificial intelligence; autonomous systems; cyber and electronic warfare; extended reality; quantum sciences and space.

5.1

Fifth-Generation Technology

The fifth-generation technology standard for cellular networks (5G) is a groundbreaking new technology; it holds the potential to become a General-Purpose Technology analogous to electricity. 5G enables the use of compute-intensive technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, facial recognition and cryptography using mobile devices across the network, thus opening the door to a wide range of new applications and propelling new technologies’ inherent power to their apex. 5G networks will enable providers to drastically expand consumer services, to include video streaming, connected devices in the context of smart homes, smart

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city applications, new industrial applications, autonomous vehicles, the Internet of Things and advanced data analysis. Not only speed, but also latency, capacity, power consumption and a number of supported connections will be exponentially improved. 5G enables further digitisation, and the ensuing economic and social progress therefrom. 5G-enabled and/or -reliant governmental networks, utilities, transportation networks, healthcare and other services will form new critical infrastructure (European Commission, 2018). The extremely low latency of 5G enables real-time command and control applications, the transmission of sensor data collected by drones from mission areas to analysis centres around the world, and the use of services such as Extended Reality and Tactical Internet in missions. Network function virtualisation, new radio, and security enhancements present mission opportunities. 5G will reach critical processes. However, its network properties in conjunction with the foreseeable multitude of applications will offer malicious actors numerous entry points. This is already ensured by the major role that software plays in the 5G infrastructure. For instance, some equipment will be sensitive to hybrid interventions, and the increased role of software in 5G equipment will similarly increase vulnerability (NIS, 2019, pp. 19–24). Moreover, 5G capability is inextricably linked with cutting-edge microelectronics, where respective industrial capabilities have moved towards China. It can be expected that this country will continue its aggressive market tactics that have exposed other countries and industries to intellectual property theft, debt traps, loss of market competition, cyber-attacks, and further breaches. Particular threat vectors to 5 G infrastructure include policy and standards, the supply chain, and systems architecture (CISA, 2021, pp. 1–3). It is worth highlighting that although speedy implementation and competitive pricing are important, security is paramount. Ensuring the integrity and availability of 5G networks vis-à-vis hybrid threats will be of concern, in addition to the existing worries regarding confidentiality and privacy requirements. In sum, 5G will provide a key infrastructure for hybrid warfare as it: • • • •

Enables the use of computer-intensive new technologies; Provides ubiquitous connectivity for people and devices; Enables real-time command and control applications; Provides for increased spectrum-sharing, and high bandwidth transmission with Low-Probability-of-Intercept, -Detection and -Jamming characteristics; • Can build on 5G satellite options vis-à-vis the requirements of military operations in vast and wide rural areas, and broadens the scope of employment of autonomous systems in multi domains;

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• Constitutes an attractive target for sabotage, hacking and denial of service. 5G-enabled and/or -reliant governmental networks, utilities, and services will form new critical infrastructure; • Will increase the overall attack surface. Growing number of potential entry points for hybrid attackers. Vulnerabilities include supply chain, cyber, radio frequency and electronic warfare. Challenged availability, confidentiality and integrity of networks. • Offers location tracking to monitor individuals based on location, track and intercept, or to disconnect phones at suitable times of need; • Will likely be susceptible to espionage, disruption or alteration; • Grants, to the dominant provider of 5G technology, control and power, which could ultimately be used for leverage in hybrid contingencies; • Poses – to countries deciding to go with Huawei – the risk of being particularly exposed to Chinese and Chinese proxies’ espionage and interference, including the risks of a shutdown of specific IoT applications and networks at their disposal in a hybrid campaign. • Artificial intelligence and machine learning will likely serve to help mitigating security risks.

5.2

Additive Manufacturing

Additive Manufacturing (AM) is a significant technological innovation. It addresses the process of creating three-dimensional solid objects of practically any shape from digital models. It uses an additive material process, to produce objects layer by layer (NATO STO, 2020, pp. 22). It offers the possibility to produce on-site, and on-demand. The system uses a range of very different technologies, each with different properties in terms of materials, capabilities, etc. Given its aptitude for rapid, delocalised and flexible manufacturing, AM will become a key enabling technology to improve competitiveness in plenty of applications. It will fundamentally alter the nature of supply chains by moving data and raw materials instead of physical goods (Lous et al, 2014, pp. 4). AM capabilities are particular applicable for prototyping, limited production runs, and specialised designs are becoming widely available (NATO STO, 2020, pp. 22). To the armed forces, AM is recognised as a disruptive technology that can materially enhance military capabilities. It is recognised as a cutting-edge technology which can both cut the costs and lead-time, while improving the performance of products and supply chains. Additive manufacturing on-demand improves

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supply-chain reactivity and reduces the inventory, the obsolescence risks, and the overall costs. The more the technology matures in the fields of multi-material deposition and adaptive material solutions, the better it will print using available materials. Printing electronics into complex-shaped structures will, for example, allow unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to be entirely additively manufactured on-site, and thus swiftly available for combatants. The capabilities of AM are evolving rapidly. Developing capabilities have become mobile. They cover an increasing range of materials, and can print a full spectrum of options, ranging from concrete objects to living cells. In the near future AM will even operate at the molecular level (Tumbleston et al, 2015, pp. 1349). In the context of hybrid campaigns, mobile labs could be deployed to quickly manufacture parts, equipment or weapons, including drones equipped with munitions, or chemical-biological-agents, as required. Self-sufficiency is undoubtedly a tactical advantage during hybrid operations, and an important way to reduce the logistical footprint. In particular, non-governmental actors that have traditionally struggled with their logistical requirements will likely become more effective. In sum, hybrid actors will profit from AM as it: • Is easy to use. Hybrid actors can employ commercially available 3D printers, which have the potential to build sophisticated items; • Reduces costs and increases operational flexibility; • Provides easy access to a spectrum of weapons, as it offers a rapid, flexible, decentralised production capability, covering a wide range of end products, from firearms, IEDs, task-tailored weapons (NATO STO, 2020, pp. 64, 65), to bombs and drones; • Provides equipment, weapons, and repair parts on-demand, on-scene; • Opens creative, new approaches to the tactical adaptation of equipment; • Has a high utility for hybrid actors because they depend on agility and flexibility. They might be the first to effectively integrate AM as a standard into their concepts (Farina, 2020); • Significantly reduces the logistical footprint; • Ensures unchallenged border crossing (Lous et al, 2014, pp. 2); • Is difficult to track; • Extends the operational life of complex systems.

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5.3

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) is no longer a future scenario. It has arrived – in government and society, in economy and defence. AI is a key – possibly the most powerful – technology of digitalisation (Harhoff et al, 2018, pp. 6). It complements and extends human capabilities to a degree that was, until recently, unimaginable. AI is used to find the best allocation of scarce resources to goals or other tasks. Optimisation algorithms can help to identify key points in time and/or space worth monitoring, and if real-time tracking is possible, immediate reallocation options can be generated. Three characteristics of AI should be emphasised. It: • unlocks the full potential of data. Many answers are contained in the data. AI helps to uncover them; • makes existing products and systems more intelligent; • learns and adapts. As it finds structures and regularities in data, the algorithms acquire new skills. Driven by data and algorithms, AI will affect almost every aspect of life, from developing more effective ways to educate people, to changing the way they earn money, to defending against attacks in virtually any domain (Schmidt & Work, 2019). Consequently, as Eric Schmidt and Bob Work have pointed out in their final report of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence that. “AI systems will … be used in the pursuit of power. We fear AI tools will be weapons of first resort in future conflicts. AI will not stay in the domain of superpowers or the realm of science fiction.” (Schmidt, 2021, pp. 1)

Clearly, AI is dual-use, often open-source, and diffusing rapidly. AI has increased the complexity of warfare. It offers a broad spectrum of possibilities for reducing the human workload, while providing superior capabilities to complement the individual human work. AI-enabled autonomous tools will become ‘useful teammates’ for human beings. Due to AI, new human–machine teams will be able to perform their functions in a superior manner. Machine learning plays a particular role. Defence and security organisations apply machine learning and machine vision software to permanently update knowledge about the operational environment. New capabilities have emerged with the introduction of deep learning combined with the free availability of large amounts of data and increased processing ability (Masuhr, 2019, pp. 4).

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AI will benefit military applications from the tactical to the strategic level, particularly by analysing big data, optimising processes, and supporting planning. AI-enabled systems are capable of multi-tasking, and can collect, categorise and transmit data, signals, images and video collected by drones, according to the requirements of multiple users (Masuhr, 2019, pp. 2). This will vastly accelerate decision-making processes and lead to the achievement of multi-domain situational awareness, using any available data source in a structured way. AI-enabled technologies will likely ease logistical burdens and enhance combat reaction times, force protection, and sustainment (Horowitz, 2018). AI’s potential to simplify and streamline processes has made its introduction and use a key priority for armed forces. It has the potential to put NATO and the EU’s operations, and their capability portfolio, on a new footing. AI will be the linchpin to achieving military superiority via the use of data, i.e. to fuse it into relevant information, usable knowledge, finally translating into decision advantage. In future, when facial recognition, biometrics, and signature recognition technologies are ubiquitous, it will be much harder to hide soldiers, proxies or their equipment. Special operations forces (SOF) will also greatly benefit from AI, using it for a range of tasks, such as language translation, or scanning captured laptops and mobile phones. Visualisation software will display tactical information to include SOF-peculiar data, such as population dynamics, social media trends, sentiment analysis and other social markers. AI may also help SOF to overcome jamming or detect new electromagnetic threats. It will enable aerial and ground robots to take over more demanding missions. Consequently, AI will also push the envelope in hybrid warfare. With a far more extensive AI-enabled intelligence-gathering, processing, and exploitation Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) -loop, a nation-state can do much to fight against hybrid insurgents (Egel et al, 2019). However, since AI-capable weapons are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain, they will also be accessible to non-state actors and proxies. Some states could even deliberately provide such actors with these capabilities, as they have previously done with conventional weapons (Egel et al, 2019). Of concern is that Russia and China have an edge and advance quicker on AI battlefield technology compared to armed forces in NATO and EU. Russia for example concentrates on equipping soldiers with information management tools to ensure maximum access to relevant data in order to achieve information dominance in military operations (Eversden, 2021). In hybrid warfare, AI technologies will likely:

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• Benefit C4I in all domains – land, air, sea, space, cyber space. Provides capability to significantly improve situational awareness at all levels; • Improve and strengthen intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); • Act as virtual assistants for decision support and recommended courses of action (COA), via the use of trusted AI-enabled autonomous systems. Virtual teammates will support human analysts in dealing with complex facts, which: improves warning and risk management; supports complex planning processes; and delivers reliable predictions on logistical patterns, COAs etc.; • Increase operational tempo and targeting, finding the best assignment of scarce resources to targets. Pattern recognition and reasoning algorithms will combine available information to form coherent proposals; • Boost defensive and offensive cyber operations and electronic warfare capabilities; • Boost the development and scaling of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons; • Enable new generations of improvised explosive devices; • Support/improve extended reality applications; • Optimise/enable/revolutionise logistical processes (see also additive manufacturing). They will enable new levels of predictive maintenance, efficient shipping, and autonomous transport; • Elevate wargaming, simulation, and training to new levels. Enable autonomous decision-making for robotic, platform based or (digital) agent-based autonomous systems; • Enable human–machine teaming; • Weaponise information through deep fakes and development of hybrid-warfare countermeasures. • Advances in speech processing and synthesis technology will provide for the realistic simulation of friendly and enemy personnel. Hybrid aggressors may take advantage of poorly constructed or poisoned data sets.

5.4

Autonomous Systems

Autonomous Systems are on the rise. They include unmanned aircraft systems, robots, aircraft, ships, vehicles and appliances. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, deep learning and big data are developing in parallel with, and in complementarity to, autonomous systems.

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“Autonomy is the ability of a system to respond to uncertain situations by independently composing and selecting among different courses of action in order to accomplish goals based on knowledge and a contextual understanding of the world, itself, and the situation.” (NATO STO, 2020, pp. 16)

AI supports the spectrum from semi-autonomous to fully autonomous systems. These can be used in the domains of land, air, sea, space and cyberspace (Burke, 2020). AI will be used for the flight control systems of swarms and the pre-processing of permanently gained sensor data. The manual data cycle (assess – process – distribute) takes too long and leads to information becoming obsolete by the time it is actionable in a hybrid warfare scenario, or a highly dynamic battlefield. The US Air Force future long-range strike aircraft, which replaces the B-2 stealth bomber, will be able to operate both with and without crew. Unmanned trucks and other supply vehicles have been designed to perform “dirty, dull and dangerous” battlefield tasks. Related dynamics will evolve with the growing use of Drone Swarms (Hruska, 2018), in which multiple unmanned vehicles control themselves. The rise of low-cost drones has enabled the mass deployment of autonomous drones, particularly by state actors aiming to use unconventional means to wage hybrid warfare. “The increased use of AI will enable autonomous systems capable of significantly more sophisticated decision making, self-directed activity and, at the same time, increasingly complex man-machine teaming. Such increased used of intelligent agents will dramatically expand into our synthetic realities, including cyber, battle networks … and digital social networks. Autonomous agents will provide rapid analysis, advice and courses-of-action for strategic-operational-tactical planning, allowing for increased OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop effectiveness …” (NATO STO, 2020, pp. 9).

For the foreseeable future, Human–Machine-Teaming (HMT) appears set to become a critical capability for future military operations in all domains. The US Army, for example, is expected to assign HMT a broader role in the further development of its multi-domain battle concept (Pomerleau, 2017). In future scenarios it can be assumed that a manned system will be escorted by swarms of unmanned systems. In this constellation, a manned platform usually has the lead and gives the unmanned system(s) order-related higher commands. This ability is the link between the manned and unmanned systems. The systems – especially when in swarms – can independently interact with each other. The mission lead will remain at the manned system to ensure the “human in the loop” doctrine.

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Virtual cyber-robots are used alongside intelligent physical autonomous systems. They protect communication and information. They analyse data and merge information. They protect technical systems against attack by means of electronic warfare. Autonomous Cyber-AI can detect what is “normal” in their networks, and thereby identify unknown threats at an early stage and react to them autonomously before damage occurs. Developments are moving towards AI-driven cyber-attacks, where malware will have the ability to self-propagate via a series of autonomous decisions and intelligently tailor itself to the parameters of infected systems; that is to say, in future algorithms will fight algorithms. Those autonomous systems with the best AI will win. This is a particular challenge in hybrid contingencies. As Sanjay Aurora, Managing Director, Asia Pacific, Darktrace, has pointed out: “Attackers can use AI to bypass traditional security tools and slowly and subtly cause instrumental damage to the operations of the infrastructure – all whilst going undetected. These attacks have the potential to compromise our most critical infrastructure by turning off the lights, disrupting transport systems, and ultimately threatening public safety. The past year has shown us that geopolitical tensions are beginning to be played out in cyberspace. Nation states will have to be on high alert to protect their energy grids, manufacturing plants, and airports from sophisticated cyber-threats.” (Aurora, 2019)

Consequently, early detection and action/reaction will be of increasing importance to prevent attacks from doing harm. Organisations need to be capable of autonomous response. Real and virtual autonomous systems can already work together effectively today (Tucker, 2018). Innovation in autonomous systems is moving fast. Developments include: new materials and designs to enhance utility and efficiency; new capabilities, especially stealth and strike; and diffusion of advanced capabilities. Biomimicry – incorporating animal attributes into drone- and platform-design is a growing area of drone research. For hybrid actors, modern technologies make it possible, for example, to equip drones in an autonomous mode for longer ranges with powerful sensors, electromagnetic or kinetic agents. They can also use the drones to spy on, detect and track people, or to combat or damage critical infrastructure. Autonomy and distance allow them to operate undercover, and it is difficult to trace their origin back to specific actors or persons. This makes autonomous drones particularly attractive for hybrid missions. Criminal and terrorist actors will doubtless also appreciate the combination of options available with the added benefit of stealth deployment.

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On the higher end of autonomous drones, development is progressing rapidly. There are reports about the employment of lethal drones of Turkish origin in Libya in spring 2021 (Michel, 2021). Stealth drones of medium and large size are difficult to detect by radar systems. They can be employed for covert intelligence and surveillance operations, a crucial component of hybrid operations. China appears to be currently leading the advancement. Its stealthy DR-8 drone, displayed during the military parade held as part of China’s celebrations for 70 years of Communist Party rule in September 2019, attracted much international interest (CNN, 2019). Russia, meanwhile, has employed small drones to target Daesh individuals, primarily in July 2019. According to the US Centre for Naval Analyses, these Russian drones are very difficult to detect and interdict, and can be employed to target small groups or individuals (Ioanes, 2019). In the Persian Gulf, drone attacks have practically become a standard in hybrid warfare. Drones are used covertly and without attribution as part of hybrid warfare campaigns. But obviously this works in both directions. In combination with good intelligence and electronic warfare, the current operations in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Nagorno-Karabakhhave also demonstrated the superiority of offensively used, low-cost autonomous systems over first-class, high-priced Russian air defence systems (Sprengel, 2021). The fact that the offensive is winning here gives an indication of the need for innovation in the respective NATO and EU capability portfolio. When it comes to expensive air defence systems, low-cost attack drones are obviously winning the battle (Parachini & Wilson, 2020). In hybrid warfare, autonomous systems: • Will be used and employed by non-state actors with increased numbers and effectiveness. Attribution and ownership will be difficult to determine, while tactical, operational or strategic objectives can be met; • Will cover missions in the air, land, sea, space and cyberspace domains; • Can be expected to become particularly attractive as ISR and delivery platforms for hybrid actors. Their employment will also cover targeting, logistics, and of course cyber operations. Mini, micro and nano unmanned x vehicles (UxVs), i.e. aerial, surface, undersea, ground, have become an emerging solution for an increasing range of military missions, including tactical ISR, urban warfare, deception operations, and battle damage assessment; • Will cover a broad employment spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic, electromagnetic and directed energy weapons etc. With regard to offensive and defensive cyber operations they will become state of the art; • Will prove particularly capable and effective when using swarming concepts.

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5.5

Biotechnology

Biotechnology is the field of technological innovation based on biology. It combines advances in the life sciences with the disruptive possibilities offered by data processing and artificial intelligence, gene and cell technology, as well as the chemical sciences. The results achieved are impressive, occurring in sectors such as immunology, genetic therapies and biological weapons. It is becoming possible to rewrite an existing organism’s DNA. This remarkable development will significantly impact economies and societies, security and defence (McKinsey, 2020). The range of applications is enormous, ranging from advanced microelectronics to agricultural products (Segars, 2018, pp. 4). In the future it will be possible to identify people via the ears, nose, body odour or even via the patterns of veins (Moren, 2014). Portable self-monitoring devices enable the monitoring of basic vital functions. Brain implants could improve cognitive functions such as memory and thus enhance the human ability to learn (Cohen, 2013). For the military, as a US national security analysis forum highlighted: “Biotechnology … has become an increasingly agile platform for developing new types of soldier enhancements. As such, the field offers novel opportunities for improving warfighter survivability on the battlefield.” (DiEuliis, 2018)

These developments also affect hybrid warfare as they include bio-warfare and terrorism, medical measures, and human enhancements, to name but a few. Possible applications include a surprisingly wide range of materials and sensors needed in military systems such as biological resins which can be used in the manufacture of drones, aircraft and ships (DiEuliis, 2018). Applications relating to biological warfare, however, are naturally of particular concern. It is worth noting that: • • • •

Powerful active ingredients are already available. Natural infectious pathogens could be used to generate epidemics. Pathogens can be produced in large quantities at very short notice. Classification is difficult because the active ingredients can be genetically modified (HQ SACT, 2012, pp. 28).

Today, biotechnology has critical knowledge about the genetic vulnerability of humans. This allows to target individual people or groups with specific genetic characteristics (Ladetto, 2015, p.38). In bio-defence, advances in technology have

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provided for improvements in vaccine development against. To the armed forces, the development of combination vaccines that eliminate the need for multiple vaccinations is of particular importance. Computer simulations support these innovations by providing insights into the efficiency of treatments (HQ SACT, 2012, pp. 25). Obviously, innovations in the life sciences are associated with risks. The COVID-19 pandemic, and its possible link to the Chinese laboratory in Wuhan, has brought the possible effects of genetically modified germs into the limelight. An article in the UK weekly The Mail on Sunday recently revealed the funding of the US National Institute of Health for bat coronavirus research in the Wuhan Institute of Virology (Owen, 2020). A number of events occurred which led the US to outsource this research to Wuhan. In 2014, the US government had placed a voluntary moratorium that stopped federal funding for so-called ‘gain-of-function studies’ that was triggered by laboratory accidents at the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention earlier that year (Kaiser & Malakoff, 2014). Two laboratories had to be closed and some biological transports stopped after incidents occurred. Highly pathogenic microbes appear to have been carelessly transported or disposed of in federal laboratories, including the shipment of live anthrax. With the moratorium in the US, the corona research was outsourced to the Chinese laboratory in Wuhan, which is now the focus of investigations into the possible release of COVID-19 and the cause of the global pandemic (Lin, 2020). This is just one contemporary example of the hazards biotechnology engenders. This being said, biotechnology as well offers considerable opportunities (HQ SACT, 2012, pp. 27). From a hybrid warfare perspective, • the greatest threat comes with bioterrorism, i.e. targeting individuals, groups or entire societies. This certainly needs to be closely monitored. Further applications will include: • • • •

Human enhancements; Biomarkers; Medical measures; and Monitoring devices.

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5.6

Cloud Computing

Effectively dealing with data is essential to success in future hybrid warfare. Conceptually speaking, the military objective as regards data is to achieve near real-time access to it, as well as to leverage it for sensors, shooters, and command & control. As the US Army’s chief information officer phrased it: “We truly believe [data] is the ammunition of the future fight. You can argue that when you look at the National Defense Strategy it’s the currency that we’re going to need to fight and win in this era of great power competition.” (Pomerleau, 2020)

The term cloud computing basically describes various options for outsourcing or consolidating the IT capacities of a given user. The cloud supports the professional storage, and use, of huge amounts of data hosted on several different sources, in a shared environment. Especially large data techniques and AI are employed. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has provided a broadly accepted definition: “Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” (Mell & Grance, 2011)

The military needs the cloud to make the defence sector more efficient and to protect it better against cyber threats, while simultaneously reducing costs. The cloud provides key digital technologies of connectivity, IoT, Big Data, cybersecurity, and cross-domain analysis. It uses advanced capabilities such as machine learning and AI to meet military requirements, especially in multi-domain operations (Burke, 2020). Cloud computing will enable defence and security actors to access, analyse, evaluate and disseminate data from the back-office desk to the tactical edge. Using commercial cloud technologies provides for digital networks with the most advanced capabilities, thereby strengthening the efficiency, effectiveness and resilience of military actors. The tactical cloud has become a critical enabler, bringing power to the edge – the enduring promise of the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept. NCW aims at achieving a decisive advantage in military operations through the networking of sensors, effectors, and command & control. Through the cloud, tools become available for the evaluation of heterogeneous data thus providing for predictive analyses of tactical situations. The increased effectiveness will drive an

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accelerated OODA loop, also amplifying the precision of effectors, as they can build on improved exploitation of intelligence and real-time information sharing. The resulting situational awareness will be a critical factor for achieving decision superiority (Gros, 2019). The tactical cloud has the capability to excel primarily under limited communications conditions. Yet there are considerable challenges to overcome (Rozsnyai, 2016). These include cybersecurity, connectivity, interoperability, standards, and information sharing. Particular attention needs to be given to cyber-electronic threats, as the cloud increases the exposure of those who build their mission effectiveness on cloud features. In particular, offensive cyber threats could potentially affect the entire cloud. Tactical networks depend on wireless satellite and surface-to-surface links to ensure units on the move receive all the information and IT services they need. Even most modern systems are vulnerable. Multiple interconnections provide attack vectors for cyber intrusions into the cloud, and the greater the interconnections, the higher the risk of systemic paralysis of own advanced, cloud-dependant capabilities (Gros, 2019). NATO, the EU and their respective member states must, however, further develop cloud capabilities. The cloud has become an essential element with regard to defence capabilities. This view has also been expressed in the US, where the Department of Defence has contracted Microsoft to overhaul its entire IT infrastructure, creating a globally available and responsive network. This includes enhanced cyber defences and robust encryption in order to set up a Joint Enterprise Defence Infrastructure (JEDI). Among the Pentagon’s key objectives for JEDI is the ability to apply modern technologies, such as AI and machine learning, to its defence operations. Microsoft has also been asked to provide tactical edge devices. To this end, Microsoft Azure has come forward with a military-rugged version of a Data Box for employment at the tactical edge. In hybrid warfare, we can expect that aggressors: • Will get what they need through the web; • Are capable of operating at a distance from home infrastructure for extended periods of time, and in limited communications conditions; • Will be backed by cloud services that bring actionable information to them in the attempt to achieve decision superiority regarding their mission objectives, while ensuring a small footprint – which is an eminent requirement for hybrid operations; • Will be equipped with Network Enabled Capabilities, through the support of the tactical cloud;

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• Will operate with real-time intelligence to plan their next move; • Will strive to draw from the cloud to improve their own capability portfolio. The cloud will likely become an essential part of future hybrid operations.

5.7

Communications

In the digital information age, mission success depends to a large degree on real-time information exchange. While command & control, under the C4ISR umbrella, ensures all functions necessary – from planning through to mission execution and post-strike-evaluation – communications and computers provide the reliable and secure means of communication and automated data processing tools required to create a collaborative environment fitting the complex desiderata of high connectivity (Thiele, 2019d, pp. 2). Modern communications technologies have been leveraged to better manage information, conduct operations, and manage people, assets, and supplies (Bierer, 2019, pp. 1). Yet, within both the EU and NATO, many requirements of connectivity, and access to trusted and timely information on the battlefield, have not been met. As such, NATO and EU armed forces often lack basic levels of connectivity needed to accomplish their objectives. “Realizing simultaneous cross-domain operations will require a new approach to battle management and the supporting command and control (C2) architecture required to rapidly find, fix, and finish large sets of adversary mobile targets. Today, such synchronization at speed is difficult if not impossible. Military decision makers are dependent on legacy C2 systems impeded by multiple barriers, including those between domains, classification levels, the Services themselves, and our allies.” (Niewood et al, 2019, pp. 2)

In future, battlefield communications technology needs to provide resilient, secure connectivity in demanding situations, as well as the capabilities required to deter complex, burdensome, multi-domain threats. The challenge is clear: communications need to provide armed forces with a decisive means to link operational planning with relevant ISR in order to collect critical information about opponent activities, provide superior situational awareness, and feed operational decision-making (Thiele, 2019d, pp. 5). As unmanned platforms, cyber systems and human–machine teaming become prevalent, the effectiveness of operational units will be determined by how fast, and how securely, data and information can be processed and transmitted. Ubiquitous, reliable and secure communications have become a critical enabler for an

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interdepartmental, joint, and networked multi-domain operational environment (Sprecher & Parsa, 2018, pp. 16). On the multi-domain battlefield, every soldier, platform, and weapons system should be digitally linked in strong, federated communication and information systems networks (Thiele, 2019a, pp. 5). Securing connectivity increasingly necessitates the successful implementation of cloud-enabled technologies. Together with AI and machine learning capabilities, cloud-enabled technologies will be critical for enhancing and accelerating decision-making capabilities and paving the way towards the Internet of Battle Things (IoBT). In order to fully leverage these technologies, i.e. to make the IoBT a reality and to ensure ubiquitous and secure connectivity, armed forces must have access to a highly capable satellite and terrestrial network (Bierer, 2019, pp. 8). Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) will provide a tactical boost to connectivity. Even single devices with an Internet connection can be extended via ad-hoc loops of wireless connectivity. The result is intelligent networks of wireless devices with forming, dispersing and self-healing capabilities. This considerably extends the geographic range of WMN-equipped vehicles, drones and further systems (Parvin, 2019). As the development of C4ISR systems progresses, so do the requirements for data transmission, computing and storage capacity, and operating devices in vehicles. Consequently, there is a requirement to address high-performance, low power embedded processing, and develop algorithms for resource allocation, self-configuring, and self-healing networks. Novel technologies aim to optimise network resources, data throughput and spectrum management, including for operations in a contested environment, for distributed applications, or sensing (Tsirlis, 2020). Military network modernisation must be able to keep pace with the innovation dynamics in commercial technologies. Only with increasing reliance on private sector capabilities in satellite communications, tactical networking, cyber security and cloud-based systems will it be possible to bring – as is required – power to the edge, thereby ensuring mission success across the current and future technologydriven battlespace (Bierer, 2019, pp. 6). With the accelerating pace of innovation, technologies have become more sophisticated and easier to access. The risk of falling behind opponents is unequivocal. Out-innovating competitors in a period of dynamic technological change has become quite a challenge, in particular as they already have an edge in a number of technologies – such as EW, QKD, etc. – and are striving for even more. Against this backdrop, resiliency in contested environments has become a critical priority as new communications technologies enter the armed forces.

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As communication technology is developing rapidly, this creates new vulnerabilities. 5G is one example. As the introduction of 5G networks opens a new era in military communications – including the prospect of reliable and secure communication even in remote areas – new cyber threats are emerging in their wake, including signal jamming and interception (Tunnicliffe, 2019). Hybrid actors will target NATO and EU C4ISR as well as further hybrid campaign objectives, while taking advantage of: • • • •

5G capability to bring power to the edge; WMNs; Quantum Key Distribution communication; Opportunities provided by distributed ledger technology (DLT), and postquantum cryptography.

5.8

Cyber Capabilities

Cyber has become a major enabler of hybrid threats. It is a globally relevant technology, based upon an ICT infrastructure of „... interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.“ (Department of Defense, 2020, p.55)

The connectivity of cyber offers a broad variety of opportunities and risks. It enables governments, organisations and individuals to act in the entire DIME spectrum of national power, i.e. diplomacy, information, military and economy. Cyber threats originate from individuals, criminal networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), governmental and other international actors. Cyber actors also employ proxies for their purposes, such as hackers, criminals and terrorists, who of course occasionally pursue agendas of their own. In the context of hybrid warfare, NATO and the EU must take on opponents who, for some time now, have been tapping own state, military and industrial networks, as well as critical infrastructures for weak points, in order to exploit them for their own purposes (NATO, 2018). Cyber offers them a panoply of options, such as vast espionage capabilities, and the flexibility to attack at both centres of gravity and times of their choice. Propaganda is another area which can be well supported by cyber, as media can be employed for influencing public opinion. Growing, unmanageable amounts

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of information, combined with rumours, misinformation and disinformation can deepen existing rifts in society and increase problems. This is where Russia and China have developed excellence. The spread of misinformation and disinformation about the corona virus, for instance, underlines their remarkable ability to sow tension, and manipulate reactions abroad, whilst simultaneously controlling the flow of information and narrative in their own countries (Wolff, 2020). Cyber threats are complex and diffuse. Often insiders are involved, e.g. a developer or a service employee who inadvertently, or purposefully, introduces malware into the network via a USB stick. The attacks can be intentional and malicious, or merely negligent and down to error. New vulnerabilities are discovered and published daily. This creates new areas of attack enabling hostile actors to penetrate networks. The technologies for cyber-attacks are developing rapidly. The attacks are becoming more professional. They are supported by national intelligence services or organised crime. Easy-to-use attack tools, which are available on the black market, increase the effectiveness of said attacks. Many attacks cannot be detected by classic anti-virus software and firewalls; some even remain hidden from sophisticated intrusion prevention systems. The combination of new technologies it complements, and the multitude of attack vectors it enables, makes cyber – and all its ramifications – both a very valuable tool, and a very significant threat. In the course of the development of offensive cyber options, AI is also increasingly being used. Hybrid attackers want to use AI to develop malware against which it is impossible to protect oneself, and also to develop high-end monitoring, detection and reconfiguration tools. That this also increases the challenge of attribution, given the weak signal character of hybrid activity, is very welcome to hybrid actors. Cyberspace is now at the centre of almost all pivotal areas of military activity; without it, modern military operations would be impossible (Crowther, 2018, pg.83). In the hybrid context, sophisticated attacks aim in particular at C4ISR structures, which can be carried out quickly, with limited effort, and with foreseeably disastrous effects. The military command and decision-making processes of NATO and the EU, alongside their highly networked military platforms and weapons systems, depend on the availability, confidentiality and integrity of information. Elements of offensive cyber-operations include reconnaissance, intrusion, escalation of privileges, and the placement of payloads. They are directed at military, governmental and possibly also civilian targets, such as critical infrastructures. These attacks aim to cause confusion, damage data and networks, computers and weapon systems, and disrupt services. Offensive actors mostly

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follow a cyber kill chain: from discovery to probing, penetrating then escalating user privileges, expanding their attack, persisting through defences, and finally executing their exploit. They fully understand the NATO and EU reliance on C4ISR, and consider them to be attractive targets for disruption and exploitation. Cyber-attacks are designed to fulfil specified tasks and objectives. In a denialof-service attack, the target is flooded with data, which crashes a machine or network due to overload, and must be shut down. Advanced persistent threats have turned out to be particular challenging. They aim to gain unnoticed access to a network in order to steal data undetected for a long period of time. In the military context, such forms of attack are used to disrupt opponents’ computer networks, or to obtain important information from opponents’ servers and systems (GAO, 2017, pp. 30). Another worrisome application is micro-targeting, where neuro-hacking is used to target selected individuals. Virtual and human analysts study the vulnerabilities of their target. The amount and quality of accessible information on social networking sites is copious. As such, the information available on social media can be used to create target profiles; sensors and micro-drones can then, via a selection and monitoring system, spy on, or even neutralise targets on demand. Even for technologically advanced states, it is no easy task to reliably protect their own economy and national command & control structures against such threats. In hybrid warfare, operations must succeed in an increasingly complex, multidomain operational environment. As Russia and China set the standard when it comes to hybrid warfare, it is judicious to take a look at their respective cyber strategies. By 2030, China is hoping to achieve sovereignty in cyberspace by combining military and civil capabilities (Nouwens & Legarda, 2018, pp. 8). Russia is working on the RU Net – a form of domestic Internet under Russian control. With these goals in mind, both China and Russia are restricting external access to national critical IT infrastructure and data. China’s declared aim for quantum hegemony, including unhackable communication, is supposed to complement its own digital sovereignty (Kupfer & Ohlberg, 2019, pp. 32, 33). When analysing both countries’ cyber capabilities, it is not enough to look at them in isolation. In contrast to the West, their analyses and aims are based on a broad understanding of information warfare. Their doctrine does not separate information operations, electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations. Based on a broad, overarching approach, it rather strives to deceive and confuse the military decision-makers of opposing forces at all levels through a combination of cyber, information, and EW capabilities. The remarkable technological advances both countries have made in EW will enable their armed forces to jam, disrupt,

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and interfere with critical NATO capabilities. An increasing convergence of Russian and Chinese concepts in the field of EW, cyber and information warfare is foreseeable. This development will mercilessly expose gaps in the concepts and procedures of NATO and the EU, and should push for a sense of urgency in bringing EW capabilities back to the forefront of own conceptual considerations. It appears NATO and the EU, and respective member nations, have fallen behind states such as Russia and China both in the cyber domain and in EW, both conceptually and operationally (Department of Defense, 2018b, pp. 1). As such, both countries may use hybrid approaches to weaken and blackmail NATO and the EU, particularly in smaller contingencies. Among the most challenging of potential scenarios confronting NATO and the EU is their opponents’ ability to threaten access and freedom of manoeuvre in key areas through Anti-Access/Area Denial postures. Here, it is of increasing importance to possess cyberspace capabilities in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the opponent’s command and control system and degrade the opponent’s A2/AD posture. This approach includes the employment of EW measures that merge with offensive cyber capabilities. Spectrum warfare combines cyber and EW into a new, crucial capability for mission success (Wilson, 2019b). In hybrid warfare we can expect cyber actors to: • Have a full comprehension of the tactical and operational opportunities and challenges of cyber capabilities; • Collect data and model targets; • Manipulate information, information systems, and/or networks; • Degrade, disrupt, or destroy networks with a preference for critical infrastructure, tactical networks and 5G; • Target NATO/ EU C4ISR, and attack command & control networks; • Employ offensive cyber tools; • Steal secrets, interrupt data, sow confusion, and damage computers; • Sabotage critical infrastructure; • Undermine decision-making and damage trust in political and military leadership; • Shape cognition; conduct cyber surveillance and reconnaissance; prepare the operational environment; • Employ cyber agents in order to run cyber offensive and defensive operations in an autonomous fashion; • Micro target individuals of particular interest; • Make use of the convergence between cyber and EW, but also with AI, autonomous systems, and space assets.

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Directed Energy

As robotics and autonomous systems become more and more essential on the battlefield, the requirement to protect own forces grows. New laser weapons and further directed energy systems will complement or replace existing weapons systems in order to protect ships from missiles, and drones or soldiers from enemy mortars. These new weapons will radically alter combat for they operate silently, invisibly, and at the speed of light (Allison, 2017). There are two basic forms of directed energy weapons that armed forces have so far focussed upon: • High energy lasers – these can heat structural parts of targeted systems to such a degree that they become unstable, or are destroyed. • High-power microwaves – these disrupt or destroy the functionality of electronic systems. Their principle of operation is to couple microwaves of sufficient intensity into an enemy system, temporarily or permanently damaging its electronics in order to thwart its mission. Both basic forms are suitable for offensive and defensive tasks. They pose a particularly serious threat to most of the subsystems of the C4ISR structure on which armed forces rely in operations (Wilson, 2019a). Principal interest has also been given to Particle Beam Weapons. Yet, it appears the research and development into these will take considerable time before relevant capabilities are achieved (Nizokami, 2019). High-energy lasers and high-power microwaves promise superior performance in the ISR compound. They can accelerate the OODA-loop by enabling own forces to identify, track, and target threats before targets can respond. They are seen as an urgently needed defence system for combatting missiles, and low-cost UAVs, individually or in swarms. Realistic employment aspirations for the near future include capabilities to disable boats, or shoot down missiles by overheating their electronics or destroying their sensors. They are also the best hope for successfully combatting hypersonic weapons. A whole range of directed-energy weapons (DEW) offers promising applications; some are even already in use, or at the procurement phase. These include, for example, DEW for the short-range defence of ships. Aircraft can employ DEW to defend against air defence missiles. Ground vehicles need them to fight mortars, drones, rotary wing aircraft, missiles and other immediate threats. An important advantage of DEW is their applicability in scenarios where non-lethal capabilities are required. They can, moreover, be used with high precision and

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with scalable effect. As such, they can, for instance, be used to destroy the engines of pirate boats, or to render other systems or even weapons harmless. Military planners also see potential applications for laser systems to protect fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters from shoulder-mounted missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. DEW are also expected to be employed in space. Laser weapons have already become a reality in the US Navy. A number of systems have been tested and will soon be put into operation (O’Rourke, 2020). The US Army has purchased a 60-kilowatt laser from Lockheed Martin, while the Navy has contracted Lockheed for the delivery of laser weapon systems for integration into combat ships. The Air Force research laboratory is to develop a high-power laser for tests on a tactical combat aircraft by 2021 (Larter, 2019). The US Special Operations Command has successfully tested fully integrated high-energy lasers on an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter (Army Recognition, 2019b). Meanwhile, Russia and China are also entering the DEW fray. Already in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly, the existence of Peresvet laser weapons. In 2020 in Sochi he highlighted. “… that laser systems will determine the potential of the army and navy for the entire 21st century.” (EurAsian, 2018)

Similarly, upcoming Chinese DEW threats to US satellites have been revealed in the 2019 Defence Intelligence Agency Report Challenges to Security in Space that sees. “… China pursuing laser weapons to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors.” (DIA, 2019, pp. 20)

The report also expects China to. “… field a ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and by the mid-to-late 2020s” (DIA, 2019, pp. 20)

A threat may even be developing to structures of non-optical satellites in view of upcoming higher power systems.

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From the very beginning, power has been the key challenge in the development of DEW and will continue to determine the possibilities for their future employment. Remarkable progress has been made. High-energy lasers have become available in a variety of power ranges to suit the demanding application spectrum. Increasingly, it is also becoming possible to set up powerful lasers on mobile platforms. Yet, compared to low-cost, high-value systems such as UAVs, DEW must also become low-cost weapons in order to seriously counter such threats. One cost advantage is certainly that DEW require far less logistical support than conventional kinetic weapons systems (Wilson, 2019a). To speed-up the pace of development, armed forces have been working closely with industry, academia, and international partners. Rapid prototyping will likely have a positive effect on the commercial sector, as traditional prime contractors and system integrators are particularly interested to integrate DEW subsystems on their platforms. In addition, there is a growing requirement to protect civilian facilities, such as airports. Having low-cost drones shutting down international airports at a cost of millions is simply unacceptable (Hecht, 2020). Consequently, much of the technological advancement in the field of DEW is coming from commercial applications. Once DEW are deployed on mobile platforms, there will be remarkable tactical advantages for hybrid actors, who will seek to use them, particularly in the event of covert operations. Being silent and invisible, attribution will be a challenge. Important operational options envisaged are, inter alia: • The employment of attack helicopters to attack critical infrastructure or moving targets without attribution; • Defence against artillery, mortars, UAVs, rotary-wing aircraft, rockets, and other proximate threats.

5.10

Distributed Ledger Technology

Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) are expanding networks which provide a vast array of new capabilities, eliminating, for instance, the need for trusted third parties. They have become a source of truth. Greater security is provided due to the ledgers’ decentralised nature, and immutable character. They give control of all their information and transactions to users, thus promoting transparency (Rothrie, 2018). DLTs allow decentralisation of computing power across multiple nodes, which can, for instance, be used for battleship control systems. They also facilitate

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increased reach-back-office efficiency and automation, thus helping to further reduce the footprint of intervention contingencies. Recent research indicates that there will be plenty of related applications in the C4I context, with a focus on: cyber operations; secure messaging; secure and resilient communications; and the networking of IoBT. Together with other new technologies, such as cloud computing, AI, QKD, and post-quantum encryption, it will become possible to ensure trusted communications and data exchange. As a consequence, DLT could see considerable employment within the armed forces. DLT has a particular edge in logistical processes. It provides for the optimisation of supply chain management, and enables tracking of parts in real-time (Gupta, 2018). As data security is a top issue for most contractors, cybersecurity is another possible application. The use of private or consortium blockchains is well suited to amplify security, in particular when dealing with confidential content. The dual-use application of blockchain, i.e. for both military and civilian purposes, makes the technology very attractive for employment in hybrid warfare (Matisek & VornDick, 2019, pp. 5). DLT could support cross-organisational data-exchange, and decentralised command structures, thus providing for agility in setting up encrypted communications, and immutable transaction records. As in enterprise blockchain, a practical approach could implement only some of the elements of a complete blockchain. Everyone with permissioned access would see the same information, and integration is simplified by having a single shared blockchain. In the future, as complementary technologies such as AI and IoT/IoBT begin to evolve, this approach could be expanded (Burke, 2020). NATO and the EU can expect hybrid actors to disruptively employ DLT, likely to: • Provide advanced cryptographic capabilities for both offensive and defensive purposes; • Fund proxies, including extremist organisations, via cryptocurrencies Matisek, 2021); • Support espionage purposes, as hybrid aggressors could transfer, via cryptocurrencies, significant, and practically untraceable sums of money to individuals and proxies; • Conduct public opinion warfare, provoking political polarisation and fragmentation to substantially undermine the government, the military, and the entire society; • Enhance multiple security and military applications – from logistics to secure communications to intelligence operations; • Protect their secrets via impenetrable blockchain security protocols.

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5.11

Extended Reality

While in the real world there are objects and persons that we can directly grasp with our senses, virtual reality is a place that does not physically exist. It is a place simulated by computer programmes. It can only be perceived with the help of a medium constructed for this purpose. The abstract realm is sometimes difficult to grasp, even for experts of the information age. Immersive technologies help to visualise data and information. With their help, the user can immerse himself in virtual events, find his way around them, and connect virtual and reality in a targeted manner. In the future, the brain could even be connected to various technologies via so-called Human Machine Interfaces (HMI), allowing the direct exchange of information between humans and machines. Progress in so-called full immersion technologies and neurosciences show that in the future, humans may be connected to computers. Immersive technologies either fully reproduce reality – Virtual Reality (VR), or enrich it with selected virtual information – Mixed Reality (MR). In contrast to an ordinary computer game, VR is displayed three-dimensionally and usually in a 360-degree view. This supports the authenticity of the simulation. Augmented Reality (AR) is part of Mixed Reality. Here, you encounter elements from both worlds. You are in the real world, but with the help of AR, virtual elements are displayed. Extended Reality (XR) is an umbrella term. It covers technologies combining real and virtual environments. The current developments are breath-taking. “We are entering a post-digital era where emerging technologies such as XR are driving the next waves of innovation and growth…” (Accenture, 2019)

Immersive technologies are booming in several industries and businesses. AR supports the doctor, the technician, the architect, the logistician, etc. during operations, repairs, maintenance and logistics. VR and AR have become an integral part of training and education. At large logistics companies and car manufacturers, various portable devices – so-called wearables – for displaying production data, or storage locations, have long been part of everyday work life, i.e. in the form of data-glasses or other display solutions, worn by workers as head- or body-wear in logistics or on the production line. In the automotive industry, or in fighter planes, AR is used to display data conveniently in so-called head-up displays, with information about speed, rpm and much more.

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Given that industry and armed forces now use the same technology portfolio, the armed forces no longer view VR as a curiosity from the world of commercial games, but instead as a very real and cutting-edge technology that promises ground-breaking advances in situation awareness and deployment, training and planning, logistics and medical procedures. By coupling virtual and real-world data, soldiers can more easily move through difficult terrain, explore the operational area of friendly troops, or reported threats, and train for foreseeable missions. The training applications of immersive technologies are particularly convincing. With XR, medical, maintenance or other specialised procedures can be tested and practiced. XR can help to prepare military personnel in an affordable way for complex, demanding missions while delivering realistic experiences. For example, troops can be placed virtually in the middle of an urban firefight, in a tense situation controlling large crowds of people, or in a building full of enemy soldiers. Even scenarios involving radiological threats are conceivable (Army Recognition, 2019a). Gen. James McConville, the US Army’s Chief of Staff, stated recently before the Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Armed Services Committee: “This … technology … is going to transform the way we train soldiers and the way soldiers operate in combat”. (Lacdan, 2019)

Enabling services are just being established on global markets. The new mobile phone standard 5G opens up new possibilities for immersive technologies, as these require a lot of data in a short time. Information can be transmitted in real-time with fast reactions. This opens up countless new fields of application. For example, edge computing platforms enable the command and control of automated guided vehicles, real-time communication between robots and AR, and VR edge applications (Janakiram, 2020). These support XR features such as Digital Twins. For example, when a new frigate enters the design phase in the future, XR will soon enable developers to work and experiment with its digital twin throughout its life cycle. For hybrid attacks digital twins of (modelled) targets will transform training for and operations in hybrid campaigns. A look into the future: one can assume that holograms will soon be ready for use (Fink, 2017). Soon it will be possible to manipulate perceptions; new environments will be created that are hardly distinguishable from reality. Perhaps virtual tanks and virtual boats will soon be driving side by side with real weapons systems. Or they may be used to confuse and deceive enemy forces.

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XR becomes an indispensable multiplier for other data intensive technologies. This also holds dangers, especially as the technology is only just emerging. XR applications are based on huge amounts of very detailed and personal data about what people do, what they look at, and even what they feel, at any given moment. This data can be distorted or misused. Fake data and information can be used to create fake, formative experiences, which risks putting our emotions under considerable stress. Thus, someone may possibly become an unconscious victim of sustained manipulation (Lawrence, 2019). Hybrid actors may have interest in these very features, as they provide for: • Confusing opponents; • Manipulating emotions and stress of individuals and groups; • Applications such as head-up or head-mounted displays for improved situational awareness; • Assisting planners and mission rehearsal for realistic, cost-effective training environments; • Higher effectiveness of human–machine teaming and employing autonomous systems; • Improved response times via neurological interfaces.

5.12

Hypersonics

Hypersonic weapons fly extremely fast at speeds of Mach 5, and above. A hypersonic vehicle may be an aeroplane, missile or spacecraft. They have the potential to become strategic game changers. The old and well-established rules of strategic stability no longer apply. And there are no new ones yet (Besser et al., 2017). Hypersonic weapons are ultra-fast and recent technological developments provide for controlled flight. There are two types: • Hypersonic Glide Vehicles Gliding vehicles are launched with high-speed boosters. They separate, and then glide through the upper atmosphere before hitting their targets. They may reach top speeds of Mach 25; • Hypersonic Cruise Missiles are using an advanced propulsion - supersonic combusting ramjets (scramjet) (Cummings, 2019). Potential targets are boundless, and may include terrorists, critical C4ISR facilities, nuclear strike facilities and platforms, or indeed – because of the enormous speed and impact of hypersonic missiles – bunkers and aircraft carriers. Their

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ability to strike targets with enormous speed and precision, provides for overcoming missile defence systems or A2/AD challenges. While ballistic missiles are clearly visible on radar, and their trajectory can be calculated, that of hypersonic weapons can neither be seen nor measured. Not only do they have a much flatter trajectory, but they are also faster, more manoeuvrable, and can evade enemy air defence; they are more accurate, difficult to detect and difficult to combat. In such a situation, the attacker not only has a weapon that is difficult to defeat, but also the advantage of surprise. In the best case, the opponent has only minutes to react appropriately, and could well be forced to rely on AI alone. Given their enormous speed, hypersonic weapons rely primarily on kinetic effects. They may also carry nuclear or non-nuclear warheads. Their unique tactical characteristics, such as speed, manoeuvrability and the capability to penetrate all currently deployed missile shields makes countermeasures challenging. Against swarms or salvos of hypersonic weapons there is currently no viable protection. As the deployment of advanced hypersonic weapons systems grows, the lack of available countermeasures is of concern. Currently under discussion are glide breakers, electronic countermeasures, and directed energy systems. Sensors in low-earth orbit could provide for early warning, tracking and also targeting functions (Smith, 2019). Hybrid attacks could well be another way to disrupt fielded hypersonic capabilities. Currently, 23 Nations have demonstrated varying degrees of expertise in hypersonic technology (Dolan et al, 2019). Several have invested billions into the development of hypersonic weapons Roblin, 2020). China and Russia are so far in the lead in the race towards hypersonic capabilities (Stone, 2020). Both states have successfully tested several hypersonic glide vehicles. Both have started fielding operational capabilities. While Russia has been developing hypersonic weapons such as the Avangard, the Tsirkon, and the Kinzhal to be capable of evading NATO missile defence systems and restoring its sense of strategic balance, China aims at balancing US capabilities for pre-emptive strikes on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting infrastructure (Aarten, 2020). A hypersonic capability would provide China with options for simultaneously striking ships, land forces, and joint command & control functions, keeping competitors cautious to engage wherever China has stakes. The US aim at deploying their hypersonic capabilities between 2023 and 2028. As a background paper from the US Congressional Research Service indicates: “Unlike China and Russia, the United States is not currently developing hypersonic weapons for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will

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likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.” (Sayler, 2020, pp. 1)

The Pentagon hopes to establish a so-called Prompt Global Strike capability that enables the US to destroy critical adversary strategic weapons and A2/AD swiftly and precisely, wherever needed. To this end, it has been developing a broad spectrum of hypersonic weapons since the early 2000s with a particular focus on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. The former Commander US Strategic Command has described US requirements: “We need a conventional prompt global strike capability. … Conventional hypersonic strike weapons could meet this requirement and provide responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” (Hyten, 2019)

Because of their fundamental strategic relevance NATO or EU hypersonic weapons and A2/AD capabilities will likely become high priority targets of hybrid warfare. Once fielded, opponents may employ hypersonic weapons to establish new facts via eliminating critical air defence infrastructure, or punishing land and maritime reaction force spearheads.

5.13

Internet of (Battle)Things

The Internet of Things (IoT) networks a wide range of technologies and applications with the Internet – not only computers, but also other hardware, including drones, household appliances, medical devices, power sources, network technologies, sensors, ships and smartphones, as well as software technologies and products. IoT applications are significantly diversified – many of them collect data from IoT sensors, analyse data in the cloud, and generate feedback. Advanced IoT applications automatically optimise the operation of computers and networks. The weak points of IoT so far are security, energy management, and interoperability of manufacturer-specific applications. IoT is expected to grow rapidly: by 2030, 500 billion objects are expected to be networked with each other (FinExtra, 2020). The growth of IoT in civilian applications offers new options for hybrid warfare, especially in the cyber-domain. Thus, there are additional and new vulnerabilities for cyber-attacks, especially for those which involve social manipulation. IoT will enable a far more comprehensive use of the information space.

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A number of states – namely Russia, China, Iran and North Korea – are attempting to limit this development through the establishment of national firewalls. However, together with their efforts to suppress what they view as the negative dimensions of these developments, these states are also at the forefront of their exploitation, and use the information space to exert influence, both at home and abroad. Trolling, triggering, and disinformation campaigns have become increasingly efficient. The growing number of nodes creates new vulnerabilities. This is a particular cause for concern when devices with limited security features are networked. With a rapidly growing range of IoT devices and the advent of edge computing, this can hardly be avoided. In combination with increasingly user-defined data processing and the potential for direct targeting at the individual level, this opens up the possibility of manipulating sensitive information. At the system level, hybrid aggressors are now able to trigger considerable economic and social disruption, often taking the shape of cyber threats (Maschmeyer, 2020). In order to protect against this development, military organisations will be involved in the safeguarding of critical infrastructure, such as power grids, pipelines and production facilities. State security actors can also help defend transport and health systems against cyber-terrorism threats. The current IoT and edge computing developments increase the risks that hybrid actors will, in particular, use personal devices to gain access to personal information for the coercion or blackmail of individuals. China, for example, uses IoT access as a means of social control. Facial recognition software and data analysis enable surveillance and censorship. At the same time, they are useful as tools for data collection and manipulation. On the political-strategic level, they are capable of creating social and economic dependencies, and instrumentalising these for own objectives (Pollpeter, 2015, pp. 140). Russia is using IoT for cognitive hacking, thus improving its capabilities in the fields of disinformation as well as falsification of information during transmission between devices. Cognitive hacking aims to manipulate people’s perception and behaviour. This is done through traditional news channels, but also increasingly successfully via social media. The possibilities for cognitive hacking are becoming more and more diverse. Distorted and false texts, images, videos and audio are transformed into weapons. Intelligent machines identify promising individuals and groups of people and, if necessary, adjust corresponding campaigns in real time (Waltzmann, 2017, pp. 5). In particular, AI algorithms help to test influencing techniques on millions of people in real time to determine which contents

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appeal to target groups, and which do not (Paul & Posard, 2020). The combination of IoT and AI edge computing could drastically increase the impact of hybrid attacks. In defence and security, IoT offers considerable potential for new applications. The number of systems and devices integrated into military networks has been increasing rapidly. The enormous growth of IoT applications for industry and consumers will foreseeably reduce costs. At the same time, IoT expands the range of new solutions for military applications. A particular beneficiary of IoT, in view of its connections and feedback possibilities, is the OODA-loop. Not only does the response-time behaviour from detection to engagement of targets – kinetically or otherwise – accelerate, but planning and logistical tasks can also be optimised, following examples in the commercial industry. Other foreseeable benefits include friend-enemy detection, access control to military facilities or protected areas, and the surveillance of areas and building complexes. Numerous armed forces and security actors already have a wealth of experience in applying IoT-related technologies. Networked aircraft, ships, land vehicles, weapons and further systems all routinely collect and exchange data and information. Often, even individual assemblies, such as engines, transmissions and actuators have sensors that communicate with service personnel and logisticians. Autonomous technologies and monitoring systems are already frequently reliant on IoT connectivity. Advances in network and sensor technology enable more and more military equipment – and even the soldiers themselves – to be integrated into the network. In addition, broadly networked sensors and analysis instruments make it possible for the first time to generate comprehensive, real-time multidomain operational pictures and situational awareness. Military applications, obviously have to take even more precautions against security risks than industrial applications. They need to be capable to perform under specific, and often demanding, environmental conditions as soldiers are regularly exposed to dust, dirt, heat, water, and extreme weather conditions (Cavender, 2019). Consequently, armed forces have created their own version of IoT, namely the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT). The current development aims to build an “… actively expanding network of sensors, wearables, and other IoT devices that use cloud and edge computing to create a cohesive fighting force.” (Cavender, 2019)

Networks can and must forward ever greater amounts of data and information. They provide soldiers at all military levels with a potentially decisive informationand knowledge-advantage. At the same time, they increase the effectiveness of the

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systems and equipment used, including headsets, virtual team mates for analysis and planning, etc. IoBT networks will support robots that can fly, crawl, walk and dive, as well as autonomous programmes that will be used in computers and networks to protect communication, check facts, forward information, and protect specific systems from opponent malware. Alongside traditional sensor technology, ‘wearables’, i.e. wearable sensors, have also become an important subsystem within IoBT, and will considerably extend digital connectivity. These already exist in the shape of biosensors worn on the body, which detect and transmit data on heart rate and fluid balance. In the future, wearables could help to reduce the number of casualties in combat by ensuring faster and more targeted medical care of wounded soldiers on the battlefield. To prevent dismounted soldiers from carrying more weight, designers of wearables have been developing solutions to reduce pack weight while providing new capabilities, and improving connectivity, safety and effectiveness. With IoBT, large numbers of drones can be deployed over vast areas; they then deliver their live video feeds to those with tactical or operational information needs. Enhanced multi-domain situational awareness can be provided to analysts, operators, and decision makers to ensure that everyone has the same view of a given situation. Indispensable high-strength, high-reliability broadband internet service with consistent, reliable coverage is now provided by MEO and LEO satellites. It is clear that the explosive IoBT growth could create new cyber vulnerabilities, especially if unauthorised devices are involved. Autonomous solutions will have to be used for protection if security is to keep pace with the speed at which new devices are integrated into IoBT. Altogether, NATO and the EU will be challenged by hybrid aggressors that will likely use IoT/IoBT functions to: • Expand the envelope, depth and effectiveness of their aggressions. Situational awareness, connectivity, employment of sensors and effectors will, in particular, benefit; • Increase the impact of hybrid aggression through a combination of IoT, edge computing, cyber and AI; • Direct targeting at the individual level, including the manipulation of sensitive information; • Target at the political-strategic level, with the objective of economic and societal disruption; • Engage in cyber aggression and social manipulation; • Address edge nodes for cyber intrusions.

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5.14

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Microelectronics

Microelectronic chips are essentially integrated electrical circuits. They regulate energy consumption and perform complex calculations. Microelectronic systems can be found in practically all areas of modern life. They are fundamental, performance-enhancing components of industry and commerce; they fuel mobility and sensor technology, in communication and diagnostic systems or in the control of networks. They are found in smartphones and computers, digital cameras and navigation systems, flat screens and sensors. Microelectronics is a key technology for innovation and digitalisation. The convergence of production and information technologies in Industry 4.0 requires hardware based on complex microelectronic systems for the acquisition, processing and exchange of data and for the control of devices. This places great demands on their performance, reliability, robustness and energy efficiency (BMBF, 2019, pp. 8). Advances in microelectronics technology enable cost-effective miniaturisation with low power consumption, and enable a wide range of IoT and AI applications. These advances are leading to a number of key innovations in a number of fields, such as: data storage, for instance, hybrid cloud storage; next generation displays, such as micro-LED displays; wireless charging; flexible electronics; and much more. In the context of AI, new products and services are emerging in data storage, intelligent antennas and networks, touch technology and wearables, or even wireless charging. Innovation, capacity increases and cost reductions in microelectronics not only lead to increasingly compact and powerful hardware, but also to qualitative improvements in how people and computers can interact. This development has major impacts on a diverse array sectors, from education to banking, to aerospace and defence (Mathew, 2020). In armed forces, microelectronics is used in practically all systems, as pressure sensors, accelerometers, transistors and semiconductors. Amongst other things, it is used in space-based navigation, radar, and command and control applications. Numerous systems, such as rockets, jet fighters and even atomic bombs, are controlled by electronic devices. The military dependency on advanced microelectronics touches upon critical technologies such as: • • • •

Artificial Intelligence & Autonomous Systems Communications & Directed Energy Cyber & Quantum Hypersonics & Outer Space

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The reliable performance of electronic assemblies is therefore essential. This also applies to cyber security, since hardware is a particularly effective attack vector for hybrid threats. Military systems must be reliably protected against enemy attacks and sabotage. It is essential that armed forces can trust microelectronics in their defence and security systems. Consequently, the US military has moved microelectronics to the first priority among the advanced technologies. The US Department of Defense has invested more than 8 billion USD to upgrade microelectronics with advanced technologies. At the same time this project underscores the growing convergence of embedded microelectronics, new technologies, and the Internet of Battle Things (IoBT) (McCaney, 2018). Indeed, with the relocation of manufacturing to Asia – especially China – and the high proportion of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products used in the defence sector, secure access to, and reliability of, advanced microelectronics is becoming an increasing problem, also from a cyber-security perspective. The risk of manipulation is clear and may also gain a role in the context of hybrid warfare, in particular for preparing hybrid contingencies (Bratton, 2020). Moreover, these risks also affect the area of critical infrastructures. The opportunity for sabotage and blackmail, e.g. with regard to the supply of components, is wide open. China’s declared goal of dominating the production of microelectronics worldwide by 2030 increases Western security concerns, as does Russia’s ambition for power. Both these considerations raise the need for an independent access to secure, high-performance microelectronics. Against this backdrop, NATO and EU member states should develop economically competitive manufacturing capacities of their own, especially with regard to space-based applications and technology for electronic warfare. We can expect hybrid actors to prepare and employ hardware for sabotage and cyber intrusion in the context of hybrid warfare. As the experiences with the corona pandemic illustrate, microelectronics – given their overwhelming production in China – could also be used in a given context for coercion and blackmailing purposes.

5.15

Nanomaterials

In view of their formable physical, chemical and biological properties, nanomaterials are of great importance for technological progress. The substantial performance improvements this technology brings about are of extraordinary benefit to the economy, society, security and defence (Jeevanandam et al, 2018).

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With dimensions between 1 and 100 nm, nanomaterials are phenomenally small. This provides them with unique properties which outperform conventional materials. Their enhanced mechanical, electrical, optical and thermal characteristics will likely fire game-changing developments in many sectors. More than 60 nations have established research programmes, some with a centralised, coordinated governmental focus, others in favour of a market-oriented approach, with a focus on areas such as healthcare technologies. Market demands have ensured that research into nanomaterials remains highly active. A key challenge has been to transfer proven technologies to the market, i.e. establishing cost-effective manufacturing processes (Sargent, 2016, pp. 16). Naturally, the military sector has a high interest to integrate the potential of nanotechnology into military applications. Nanomaterials can have a major impact on the properties of military platforms, systems, and equipment (Chakravorty, 2019). Nanotechnology can provide operational forces with better protection, greater endurance, and simplified logistics (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006, pp. 35). We can expect that hybrid players will make use of the available nanotechnologies, as these provide optimal support for their covert activities to include: • Flexible, intelligent textiles; clothing with greater tolerance to temperature changes and with integrated sensors; protection against bullets, grenade fragments, bio and chemical agents, i.e. nano-size umbrellas that seal the fabric’s pores, making it impervious to chemicals and pathogens. Vehicle armour, shields, and protective enclosures. Intelligent, lightweight, antiballistic helmets with integrated sensor arrays; • Nano-fibres in the uniform that become a tourniquet, if a soldier is wounded, so as to reduce blood-loss before treatment; augmentation of human performance; • Lighter tanks, thus allowing greater numbers in transport aircrafts; lighter, faster aircraft which use less fuel, etc.; • Nano-particles on ammunition enabling greater penetration against armour; • Coatings that do not degrade; scratch-resistant surfaces; stronger and thinner glass; protective layer to sensitive surfaces; corrosion prevention; self-repair, select removal; • Nano-particles scattering light and Infra-Red, thus providing stealth capability to soldiers, systems and equipment,10 • Biological- and chemical-sensitive nano-sensors that detect toxic environments;

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• Detection of structural and functional micro-anomalies; • Nano vehicles with indoor and outdoor ISR ability, thus enhancing the operational effectiveness of soldiers and first responders; • Protective coating of carbon nanotubes enabling hypersonic platforms to survive the intense heat generated at five times + the speed of sound (Tucker, 2019).

5.16

Nuclear Modernisation

As the recent uniquely to the deterrence states, “… nuclear capabilities … contribute uniquely to the deterrence of both nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. They are essential for these purposes and will be so for the foreseeable future.” (DoD, 2018a, pp. VI)

The ultimate security of NATO and EU member states rests in US hands with its nuclear security guarantee. The US’ nuclear deterrent is rapidly becoming obsolete, while Russia and China have just spent a great deal modernising and expanding their nuclear forces, adding hypersonic systems. Modernisation of US nuclear forces has thus become a matter of urgency so as to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent. Vice Admiral Dave Kriete, deputy commander of US Strategic Command highlighted recently: “We go to great lengths to ensure that every one of those weapons systems, regardless of how old they may be or how long they’ve been in service, will always, always get the job done if ever called upon to do so, … but we can’t maintain those standards with the current weapon systems forever.” (Tadjdeh, 2020)

The current challenge is to replace several components at the same time. This includes the renewal of the nuclear-forces-related command and information systems. The aftermath of the corona pandemic, with considerable upcoming budget cuts, may hamper or at least complicate the US modernisation process. Meanwhile, Russia has been modernising its nuclear arsenal along with its other strategic systems. It wants to maintain and even expand its advantage for its nuclear doctrine of limited use of nuclear weapons. We are now faced with a revisionist, offensive Russia, which has been comprehensively modernising its armed forces for many years, and has also adapted its nuclear concepts and weapons systems to the altered geopolitical situation. The nuclear potential of tactical,

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sub-strategic and strategic ranges, and land-, air-, and sea-based systems in combination with modern conventional weapons forms the basis for Russia’s ability and willingness to intervene in its neighbourhood, and to extend its influence through intimidation and blackmail. China is not inferior to Russia in this respect and has further expanded the capabilities of its already considerable nuclear forces. Quantitatively, these can be expected to double within the next decade. In qualitative terms, China’s impressive capabilities are a cause for concern; these include global-range hypersonic missiles, and multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (Geller, 2020). Moreover, the continued, creeping proliferation of nuclear capabilities in other non-P5 countries is of growing concern. For example, the nuclear ambitions of states such as North Korea or Iran are not only problematic for immediate neighbours, but also pose considerable challenges to regional and global security. Iran could achieve nuclear capabilities within just one year. The country already has the necessary proven delivery systems. Nuclear terrorism constitutes a serious threat in the context of the proliferation of nuclear capabilities (DoD, 2018b, pp. 20). At present, it is completely unclear whether and, above all, how NATO and the EU aim to close the nuclear gap that has arisen through Russia’s nuclear investments in a way that can guarantee extended deterrence through the potential of the US for Europe in the future. For European allies, it is very risky not to put the US as the ultimate nuclear guarantor power in a situation where nuclear blackmail against regional member states would only have to be answered with a nuclear option at the level of strategic weapons systems. In the context of hybrid aggression, it must be clear that purely defensive and exclusively conventional measures are not sufficient to prevent nuclear powers from using their nuclear medium-range potential for intimidation, blackmail or threat. Russia e.g. could carry out a hybrid campaign against NATO in the form of a rapid landing attack by camouflaged forces, reinforced by medium-range missiles. Since NATO currently has serious conventional shortfalls along its border with Russia, NATO forces would not be able to easily defend their territory in such a scenario. With medium-range missiles having been exempted from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia now has a strategic advantage when hybrid actions of cloaked forces are protected by nuclear armed medium-range missiles. At the high end of hybrid warfare is the attack on armed forces and civilian critical infrastructure with a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The employment of nuclear EMP technology is part of the military doctrines, plans and

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exercises of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. A nuclear explosion at an altitude of 30 kms or more has a catastrophic effect on any electronic components within range. At an explosion height of 30 kms, this range has an effective radius on the ground of about 600 kms; at an altitude of 400 kms, of about 2,200 kms. Since direct harmful effects on humans are not to be expected, opponents regard such an attack as an offensive act below the threshold of nuclear warfare (Cooper, 2017).

5.17

Quantum Sciences

Quantum sciences deal with emerging technologies harnessing the properties of quantum physics to enable new capabilities. The potential of quantum technologies is enormous – whether for information transmission and processing, for high-precision measurement and imaging processes, or for the simulation of complex systems. Using quantum methods will provide significant improvements in terms of sensitivity, accuracy, speed, or ease of use. However, quantum technologies are still at an incipient phase of development. With the rise of quantum, there will be a magnum leap in computing, communication, cryptography, navigation, and sensing capabilities; this will enable hybrid actors to further push the envelope of hybrid aggression. Quantum will bring about very unique capabilities, but will also act as an accelerator of already existing technologies, such as nano, bio, cyber, and encryption. This dual-effect will strengthen the tools available to hybrid actors significantly, as well as over a longer timeframe. Quantum systems can be used with utmost precision to measure physical quantities, such as pressure, temperature, position, time, speed, acceleration, electric and magnetic fields or gravity. Defence and national security are likely to be among the first domains to adopt emerging quantum technologies: particularly quantum-enabled clocks, navigators, imaging and sensors that will enable the long-range detection of aircraft, submarines or even activities below the earth’s surface. Quantum sciences will enable powerful networks of sensors and shooters to rapidly accelerate the process of detecting, evaluating, targeting, and delivering effects in both the virtual and the physical domains. They will also enable hybrid actors to engage in stealthy operations. Quantum technologies will significantly improve the speed of data computation and processing, which will affect the employment of unmanned and autonomous military platforms, enabling decisions to be taken more swiftly, and allowing for multiple targets to be engaged with at once. They will likely be

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employed at various stages of the design of new weapons systems, new materials, and even in the development of new strategies, operational and tactical concepts. Specific benefits for hybrid actors include: AI algorithms; accurate navigation, even within buildings, without the need for Global Positioning System (GPS) signals; and highly secure encryption for communications satellites. There are already known quantum algorithms which would break existing forms of encryption. Several countries have begun to collect encrypted foreign communications with the expectation that they will be able to decode these within the next decade. In response, researchers are developing quantum-safe cryptography, which uses mechanisms to replace the current public key schemes. In quantum cryptography or Quantum Key Distribution, the key to secret information is generated on the basis of individual quantum states. Quantum encryption will provide for trusted encrypted communications as any attempted eavesdropping will be instantly revealed. QKD and post-quantum encryption will, thus, significantly increase combatants’ ability to ensure trusted communications and data storage. Quantum Computing will enable unprecedented processing power, thus allowing for the processing of volumes of data, and solving classes of problems that by far exceed the capacity of classical computers. This will drastically improve situational awareness of multi-domain battlefields. (Sputnik, 2017). Military application include the capability to easily hack into opponents’ encrypted servers, or national infrastructure systems. Conversely, this may also provide access for malicious actors into protected NATO and EU networks, and to silently take over their critical infrastructures. Usable quantum computing can be expected within the next two decades, depending on applications. Significant technical challenges need yet to be overcome, before operational systems can be developed and deployed. Once achieved, this will boost C4ISR capabilities (NATO STO, 2020, pp. 81). “Over a 15-20 year horizon, quantum technologies will greatly increase C4ISR data collection, processing and exploitation capabilities, through greatly increased sensor capabilities, secure communications, and computing. In particular, quantum computing may greatly increase modelling & simulation speed and fidelity for predictive analytics, and enable a quantum approach to deep learning neural networks for greatly enhanced AI.” (NATO STO, 2020, pp. VII)

The time frame available for the deployment of countermeasures to safeguard against these upcoming threats – that would constitute a disastrous capability in the hand of hybrid opponents – is, necessarily, shorter than that of the technology’s development, i.e. up to 10 years.

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Hybrid actors will likely use quantum technologies to: • Accelerate other technologies, such as nano, bio, cyber, etc. and consequently strengthen their capability spectrum in hybrid campaigns; • Build on enormously improved computing, communication, cryptography, navigation, and sensing capabilities so as to push the envelope of hybrid aggression; • Increase the effectiveness of underwater warfare capabilities via gravimetric, magnetic or acoustic sensors; • Make stealth technologies obsolete, using Quantum Radar to provide highly accurate target identification; • Crack current encryption techniques and encrypted data; • Engage in clandestine operations to coerce and sabotage by using the electromagnetic spectrum; • Communicate through unbreakable quantum key encryption.

5.18

Space Assets

Hardly anything fascinates as much as outer space. Human steps on the moon will soon be followed by further steps on asteroids, and perhaps on Mars. In the meantime, the space sector is growing extraordinarily fast. Space offers a highly innovative environment. It is a significant part of digitisation and Industry 4.0. Satellites have become a critical infrastructure that enables television, telecommunications, the internet of things (IoT), trade and financial networks to function. Space, space technologies and space data are becoming increasingly important for the functioning of the modern economy. They drive future economic growth and help the economy to improve products and services. This development comes at a time when Industry 4.0 is revolutionising collaboration, production, services and the basis for successful competition. Space applications are both a prerequisite and key driver for future technologies such as 5G, additive manufacturing, autonomous systems, AI, IoT, and many others. Development in these areas has profited from a long evolution; revolutionary changes in economic and military capabilities are now upcoming, and will have a considerable impact over the next decade. Evolving technologies have brought space capability into the reach of states, international organisations, corporations and individuals that a decade ago had no realistic ambition in this regard. In 2019, there were 101 government and private space launches worldwide. The United

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States had 21 launches, China 34, Russia 25, Europe, India and New Zealand each 6 (Krebs, 2020). With a growing share of participation, the commercial sector has become an integral part of space operations – and 75 percent of space industry revenues are commercial (Ross, 2019). Modern satellites, for example the modern O3bconstellation - part of the Luxembourg based SES group, a large satellite operator -, have proven that they can deliver immense bandwidth, telecommunications and Internet connectivity services at a fibre-like speed across the globe for regional networks, also providing on-the-spot and difficult-to-jam comms for demanding mobile users, such as special forces. Their orbit includes a low latency needed for real-time applications in 5G networks and reduced propagation loss. Hybrid actors may take advantage of this capability for the employment of edge applications. These satellites support supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and other global asset-tracking applications today, and can scale to support future machine-to-machine (IoT) communications. The unhindered access to – and freedom to operate in – space is of vital importance to nations and international organisations, such as NATO and the European Union (Thiele, 2019c). For security and defence forces, space-based capabilities enable: high mobility and precision; quick deployment; wide geographical coverage; independence from terrestrial infrastructure; secure high bandwidth; highly scalable content distribution; and the connection of fixed and on-the-move 5G network sites. Given the critical role of space-based capabilities, space will inevitably have a superior role in future conflicts, including hybrid warfare. Consequently, NATO and the EU will build their military strength to a large extent on space-based C4ISR. Together with timing and navigation, it is central to many of NATO’s existing capabilities. This use of space and space-derived data will increase over the next two decades, enabling powerful and ubiquitous C4ISR capabilities. This trend will be further reinforced with upcoming quantum technologies which promise, in the same timeframe, significantly improved sensor capabilities through a new class of space-based sensors, as well as secure communication and data processing based on QKD. Opponents understand this well. Space has become their centre of gravity for downgrading Western C4ISR. For a long time, space used to be an ecosystem of its own, and much left to its own devices. However, as more and more countries and commercial firms have begun participating in satellite construction, space launch, space exploration, etc. nations have detected that there is no fence in space (Thiele, 2019c). Russian and Chinese satellites have repeatedly demonstrated their capabilities for precise manoeuvres in space. These capabilities make it possible, for

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example, to maintain satellites in space, but also offer the option of destroying enemy satellites without so much as kinetic impact (DIA, 2019, pp. 28, 29). Anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities with ground-launched missiles remain a particular threat. China, Russia, and a number of other nations have demonstrated their ASAT capability – the most recent of which being India, which tested its first ASAT missile in March 2019. Against this backdrop, it can be expected that manoeuvring warfare will also unfold in space in the future, as spacecraft will be able to manoeuvre and fight (Thiele, 2019c). Yet, deliberate attack from an opponent is not the only threat to own space applications. Space is becoming increasingly congested – both with large constellations of small satellites, which are being used more and more, and with millions of pieces of mostly very small space debris. Given their enormous speed, even very small objects can cause a huge amount of damage, therefore magnifying the problems faced by satellites. Indeed, were a satellite to collide with debris – just as if it were to be hit by an ASAT missile – the collision could render its orbits unusable. Hybrid threats are paramount. The space environment is particularly vulnerable to hybrid threats, such as spying, or service interruption. Upcoming challenges cross-cut space and cyber domains. Actors can use offensive cyberspace capabilities, and other hybrid means, to enable a range of reversible to non-reversible effects against space systems. There are plenty of access points to be exploited – including the antennae on the satellites, the ground stations, and the earth-based user terminals. Attacks range from stealing data, to sending fake or corrupt data, to a complete shutdown of all the satellite’s operations. It is increasingly understood that space assets have been vulnerable to hybrid attacks for far too long (DIA, 2019, pp. 8). In future we can expect hybrid actors to: • Exploit space capabilities as a rapidly evolving operational environment for – Improved situational awareness, supporting operational effectiveness with near real-time assessments, and providing actionable data for high-precision targeting; – Space based ISR; – Edge computing and new disruptive technologies via space-based 5G – Employment of drones and other autonomous systems; – Secure communications, including space-based QKD; – Disrupting critical infrastructures, such as power grids, telecommunications networks, transportation systems, water services, or financial and banking operations;

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• Attempt to downgrade Western space-based C4ISR; • Undertake cyber-attacks against space infrastructure, such as ground stations and earth-based user terminals, for: spying, stealing data, sending fake or corrupt data, or service interruption; • Sabotage Western satellite navigation systems, and employ jamming and spoofing of GPS signals against airborne threats.

5.19

Ubiquitous Sensors

Sensors are ubiquitous. The term ubiquitous refers to the incredibly large, omnipresent variety of physical, virtual and human sensors, and sensor networks. They cost-effectively detect a greater number of things, over greater distances, with greater depth of resolution, and in real-time than ever before in human history. The world is becoming one giant sensor. There’s hardly any place left to hide. The categories and capabilities of sensors are endless: • • • • • • • • • •

Human, physical, and virtual; Cognitive, embedded, living and bio; AI on sensors, distributed and networked; Radar and radio; Optical/ infrared/ultraviolet; Magnetic detectors and sonars; Biological and chemical; Acoustic, gravimetric, magnetic and electronic warfare; Ultra-sensitive and quantum; Gravity, magnetic and electronic warfare.

Both military leaders and hybrid actors appreciate this capability of looking at the world through the lenses of sensor networks, as opposed to via individual platforms. This provides for better-coordinated, faster, and more effective operations in all domains. Targets can be located and tracked. Sensors deliver relevant battlespace information on terrain and weather, the location and disposition of civilian populations, key infrastructure, and tracking of own troops. With the growing importance of virtual capabilities, the internet and computer networks provide further spaces for sensing. Sensors provide information about all the above.

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As regards the multi-domain battlespace, progress is occurring at a moderately fast pace. Biological detection sensor systems, able to detect and identify potential pathogens, are coming to the fore. Radar is making forward strides. Synthetic-aperture radar can be used to detect moving objects as the exploitation of available data has improved. Coupled with AI analysis, data from different sensors can be combined, processed and made useful for a specific user’s needs. Smaller radars can be networked, thus delivering the capability of larger systems. This allows UAS swarms to be equipped with tracking capabilities that otherwise would require large systems (Seligman, 2018, pp. 23, 24). Quantum sensors may be among the first usable applications of quantum science. Quantum radar, for example, will enable outstandingly accurate target identification – even vis-à-vis applied stealth technologies – and covert identification and surveillance. With the impending capacity boom in communications satellites (LEO and MEO) and the introduction of 5G, the data highway will be ready to reach users worldwide at broadband speeds. The integration of data and information collected from media and social media in ISR and also target planning will take the traditional understanding of ISR skills to a new level (Smagh, 2020). The fusion of traditional sensor data with information from media and social networks will open up a new dimension for the extraction of actionable information. A comparably important effect can be expected in the context of electronic warfare. The offensive and defensive applications are becoming more and more sophisticated, and also more difficult to detect (Spreckelsen, 2018). Since practically all major powers are investing in this field, challenges of a new category are emerging. Radar and electronic warfare technologies make important contributions to the toolbox of hybrid warfare. At the same time, they must be well-protected against hybrid threats, since they work with very sensitive data. Manipulation or theft of reference data by intruders or blackmailed personnel must be avoided at all costs in order to ensure reliable classification results. Consequently, we can expect hybrid actors to make use the broad spectrum of possibilities sensors offer in support of their goals. The tools of information warfare, i.e. cyber and electronic warfare, may gain a commensurate emphasis.

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Rothrie, S. (2018). Blockchain Military Applications – the Future Tech of the Armed Forces. Retrieved June 25, 2018, from https://coincentral.com/blockchain-military-applicationsthe-future-tech-of-the-armed-forces/. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Roy, R. (2004). Strategic Decision Making – Applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Springer. Rumsfeld, D. H. (2001). Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington. D.C. www.comw. org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Sargent Jr, J. F. (2016). Nanotechnology: A Policy Prime. Congressional Research Service. http://nanotech.lawbc.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/864/2016/07/00186783.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2016. Sayler, K. M. (2020). Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2020. Schmid, J., & Thiele, R. (2019). Hybrid Warfare – Orchestrating the Technology Revolution. In R. Ondrejcsak & T. H. Lippert (Eds.), STRATPOL. NATO at 70: Outline of the Alliance today and tomorrow. Schmidt, E., et at. (2021). Final Report. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Dig ital-1.pdf. Accessed 16 Jun 2021. Schmidt, E., & Work, R. (2019). In Search of Ideas: The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Wants You. War on the Rocks, 18 Jul 2019. Segars, A. H. (2018). Seven Technologies Remaking the World. MIT 2018. https://sloanr eview.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/00c59a8098.pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Seligman, L. (2018). U.S. Air Force’s Future Battlefield Edge Hinges on MQ-9 Reaper. Aviation Week and Space Technology. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/09/FP_20181218_defense_advances_pt2.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Simonis, F., & Schilthuizen, St. (2006). Nano Technology: Innovation, Opportunities for Tomorrow’s Defence. TNO SCIENCE and Industry, 2006. http:// www.futuretechnolog ycenter.eu/downloads/nanobook.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Smith, R. J. (2019). Hypersonic Missiles Are Unstoppable. And They’re Starting a New Global Arms Race. Retrieved June 19, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/ magazine/hypersonic-missiles.html. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Sprecher, A., & Parsa, S. (2018). Gateway to Multi-Domain Command and Control. JAPCC Journal Edition 25, 2018. https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J25_screen. pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Sprengel, Frank Christian. (2021). Drones in hybrid warfare: Lessons from current battlefields. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 10. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-wor king-paper-10-drones-in-hybrid-warfare-lessons-from-current-battlefields/. Accessed 16 Jun 2021. Tadjdeh, Y. (2020). Military Facing Tight Deadlines to Modernize Nuclear Triad. National Defense Magazine. Retrieved January 31, 2020 from https://www.nationaldefensemag azine.org/articles/2020/1/31/military-facing-tight-deadlines-to-modernize-nuclear-triad. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Thiele, R. (2019a). Game Changer “Cyber” – Towards New Economics of Space? ISPSW. https://www.ispsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/626_Thiele.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2021.

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Thiele, R. (2019b). Hybrid Warfare - Future & Technologies (HYFUTEC). Inspiration Paper no. 2 (updated): Hybrid Warfare – Future & Technologies Horizon Scan & Assessment Helsinki, Sept. 2019. Thiele, R. (2019c). Space and Hybrid Warfare – Part One. Spacewatch Global. 2019. https:// spacewatch.global/2019/12/spacewatch-oped-space-in-hybrid-warfare/. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Thiele, R. (2019d). Towards Integrated C4I – NATO Experience in Building C4I Systems. ISPSW. January 2018. https://www.ispsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/531_Thiele. pdf. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Thiele, R. (2020a). Artificial Intelligence – A key enabler of Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 6, Helsinki, March 2020, ISBN 978–952–7282–31– 1. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-6-artificial-intellige nce-a-key-enabler-of-hybrid-warfare/. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021. Thiele, R. (2020b). Quantum Sciences – a disruptive innovation in hybrid warfare. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 7, Helsinki, March 2020, ISBN 978–952–7282–32–8. Tsirlis, C. (2020). Spectrum Contested Environments. Marine Corps. https://mca-marines. org/gazette/spectrum-contested-environments/. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Tucker, P. (2019). Nanotechnology Is Shaping the Hypersonics Race. Defense One. Retrieved November 18, 2019, from https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/11/nanotechn ology-shaping-hypersonics-race/161377/. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Tucker, P. (2018). The U.S. Military’s Drone Swarm Strategy Just Passed a Key Test. Nextgov. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2018/11/ us-militarys-drone-swarm-strategy-just-passed-key-test/153026/. Accessed 9 Feb 2021. Tumbleston, J. R., Shirvanyants, D., Ermoshkin, N., Janusziewicz, R., Johnson, A. R., Kelly, D., Chen, K., Pinschmidt, R., Rolland, J. P., Ermoshkin, A., & Samulski, E. T. (2015). Continuous Liquid Interface Production of 3D Objects. Science, 347(6228), 1349–1352. Tunnicliffe, A. (2019). The next frontier of military communications. Army Technology. https://www.army-technology.com/features/future-military-communications/. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. von Spreckelsen, M. (2018). Electronic Warfare – The Forgotten Discipline. Winter 2018. https://www.japcc.org/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Waltzman, R. (2017). Rand. The Weaponization of Information: The Need for Cognitive Security. RAND. Wilson, J. R. (2019a). Directed-energy weapons taking big steps forward. Military Aerospace. Retrieved July 1, 2019, from https://www.militaryaerospace.com/unmanned/article/140 36378/directedenergy-weapons-taking-big-steps-forward. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Wilson, J. R. (2019b). Electronic warfare on the ground. Military Aerospace. https://www.mil itaryaerospace.com/home/article/16709607/electronic-warfare-on-the-ground. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. Wolff, J. (2020). How Russia and China Are Manipulating Coronavirus Conversations Online. Retrieved March 4, 2020 from https://slate.com/technology/2020/03/coronavirus-chinarussia-misinformation-censorship.html. Accessed 15 Feb 2021.

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Manoeuvring in the Hybrid Space Ralph Thiele

Abstract

This chapter discusses the conceptual challenges of hybrid warfare and emphasizes the cognitive domain. It points at the risk that hybrid actors such as Russia and China own concepts and means to undermine through hybrid warfare the solidarity of NATO allies and partners, and the challenges of chasing shifting Centres of Gravity and outmanoeuvring opponents in multi-domain security challenges and conflicts. It highlights the requirement to building multi-domain situational awareness, developing a cross-domain targeting process, and enabling leadership of all echelons to meet hybrid challenges via serious gaming. Options for building stress- and shock-proof resilience are discussed. Technologies, and their related capabilities and skills, are developing at full tilt. They are driving the current global changes in economic and political power, value chains, social and societal processes. They are game-changers in many ways. Health, development, climate and environment are also affected. We are at the edge of great shifts, and the ubiquitous corona pandemic may even act as a catalyst for innovation dynamics. Change is coming faster than expected.

R. Thiele (B) StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_6

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Solidarity at Risk

Hybrid actors such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea—to an extent also their paramilitary proxies, terrorists, criminal groups and further actors—are making skilful use of inexpensive, commercially available technologies for their own power and security policy objectives. Surprising though it is to many observers, China and Russia have not only become military, but also technological rivals of the West. They have combined the possibilities of new technologies with the further development of their operational concepts across all operational domains—space, cyber, air, sea and land. In particular, they have developed capabilities in the field of anti-access and area denial, to include ballistic and cruise missiles, cyber, and electronic warfare. Today, they can seriously compete with NATO and EU capabilities. The 2018 US National Defense Strategy supports this finding: “The security environment is … affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war. The drive to develop new technologies is relentless, expanding to more actors with lower barriers of entry, and moving at accelerating speed. New technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology— the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future. New commercial technology will change society and, ultimately, the character of war.” (DoD, 2018c, pp. 3)

The Western competitive advantage hasn’t merely diminished; in fact, opponents are beginning to gain an edge. This is especially the case in high-end technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, big data, cyber, hypersonics, microelectronics, quantum technologies, sensor technology, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare provides a particularly prominent illustration. In the early 1990s, NATO’s armed forces were still the undisputed world leaders in this field. Today, their respective capabilities have atrophied, while Russia and China have impressively developed theirs. This enables Russia and China to protect low-intensity military and paramilitary operations with networks of sensors, air defence and offensive weapons that enable highly effective, precise attacks. In order to safeguard their own response capabilities to a given hybrid threat, NATO and the EU would have to suppress or pre-emptively eliminate enemy A2/AD capabilities. This, in turn, not only is a capability challenge, but could as well set off an unwanted escalation chain. A major problem here is that not only are NATO’s capabilities inadequate, but there is also a conceptual gap. On the political and civil side, leaders have

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not yet taken control of dealing with hybrid campaigning. They do not have neither own comprehensive multi-domain situational awareness nor effective tools in dealing with hybrid campaigns. National vulnerabilities haven´t been identified thoroughly. Resilience has considerable growth potential as the setbacks in handling of the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted. The terrible experience with the pandemic gives an idea of what would happen if, in addition to the present set of problems, electricity, food, water, and medical or Internet services were no longer widely available. A focused cyber-attack in the context of a hybrid campaign could prevent a wide range of basic services required for a functioning economy and society, administration and armed forces (Barno & Bensabel, 2020). On the military side, Major NATO Commanders have not yet found a hinge to integrate hybrid warfare requirements into their operational concepts. Intelligence services still hesitate to share mission critical information. Training and exercises still need a long way to go to prepare well for hybrid, multi-domain engagement. Decision-making processes do not sufficiently consider hybrid warfare related requirements in particular with view to comprehensiveness, dynamics and speed. Readiness and preparedness of NATO forces have improved, but there remain significant deficiencies. To make matters worse, a capability gap—with view to developing/proliferating nuclear, hypersonic, cyber and space capabilities—has also opened up at the upper end of the conflict spectrum. When the European security environment is beset by hybrid threats, we can expect opponents to use—on top of relevant military instruments of power— political, informational, criminal, and infrastructural means, as well as economic intimidation and manipulation to detect and exploit Western weaknesses. Technological progress has extended the battle space to new domains and employment possibilities, and allowed for the expansion of grey areas between established zones of responsibility, within which hybrid warfare thrives. The high dynamics of innovation fire the rates of change. Yet, as Julian Lindley-French states rightfully: “Today’s NATO is still far too analogue, and insufficiently digital.” (Lindley-French, 2020)

This also applies to the European Union not only with view to the broad member nations overlap. At present, there is a serious risk that hybrid warfare may essentially undermine the solidarity of NATO allies and partners. Closing existing gaps should be a top political and military priority, because to do so will take a decade,

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or even longer, and can only be successful, if NATO and the EU have a clear vision of their respective concepts. Until then, hybrid aggressors can blackmail the Alliance, widen the scope for hybrid action, and challenge NATO and EU solidarity. NATO and the EU urgently need to counteract this danger. Strategy, policy, and operational concepts must evolve and adapt to take account of this new reality.

6.2

Chasing CoGs

NATO’s long-standing lead in security, defence and deterrence no longer exists. There is an eroding competitive edge. Countries like Russia, China and Iran have caught up, and in a number of capabilities, have even overtaken NATO’s position. In addition, there is a confusing spectrum of actors, whose potential for action is fuelled by new technologies that are often of dual civil and military use. Both NATO and the EU are aware that the grey areas between military and non-military responsibilities are growing. Space, cyberspace and also information space are cross-cutting domains, where the traditional division of tasks overlap, making targeted political and military action more difficult. These domains cannot be limited either geographically or functionally. States such as Russia, China and Iran are already today—in the run-up to possible future crises—trying to shape the area of operations through hybrid means to their advantage. They target in multiple domains the inherent vulnerabilities of NATO, the EU and the societies of the member states. Cohesion in Western societies, solidarity between allies and partners, critical infrastructure, and the Western C4ISR backbone are their primary targets. A creeping infiltration of critical infrastructures cannot be ruled out. Added to this come the theft of intellectual property and the purchase of top technological skills. With a view to future conflicts, it will be increasingly important to shape the expanding battle space according to one’s own needs, and to deny this ability to the opponent. As countries such as Russia and China pursue ambitious military modernisation programmes, and invest in highly disruptive technologies, such as hypersonic, robotics, AI and quantum technology, NATO may end up with an insoluble mix of problems. This will include: A2/AD paralysis, a fragile C4ISR infrastructure, infiltrated critical infrastructure, and the threat of hard-tocontrol long-range strike systems. Business as usual will not be able to meet these challenges successfully. Johann Schmid of Hybrid CoE has highlighted:

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“There is a growing sense that hybrid forms of warfare will shape the face of war in the 21st century. They seem to offer unpretentious political success by smart recourse to limited, deniable and supposedly manageable use of force. The assumption that the risk of military escalation and political damage could be kept within limits may at the same time increase the likelihood of the offensive use of hybrid forms of warfare.” (Schmid, 2019b, pp. 5)

Hybrid threats in general and hybrid warfare in particular can be expected to become a long-term strategic challenge for NATO, the EU and its member states. They will be of considerable importance for concepts, planning and decision-making processes. Conceptually, and with view to capabilities, there is a considerable amount of catching up to do—not only with regard to the future role of armed forces, but also with regard to non-military and political decision-making processes, and the means and instruments of power required for this. At the 2015 Wales Summit, NATO responded to the altered requirements with a strategic approach to countering hybrid warfare. Its response centred on the experiences with Russian hybrid tactics against Ukraine in early 2014. “By overtly and covertly employing military and paramilitary forces, supplying separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine, staging cyber-attacks, withholding energy supplies, and waging a massive propaganda campaign, Russia provided a textbook example of how non-traditional warfare could be employed effectively to achieve political objectives.” (Rühle & Roberts, 2019, pp. 7)

Against this backdrop, the three core elements of preparation, deterrence and defence have reflected the initial strategic response of NATO to hybrid threats. Additionally, with a view to counteracting hybrid threats, improving resilience, and sharing knowledge and expertise, NATO strives for cooperation with the EU; with key partners such as Finland, Sweden and Ukraine; with academic centres of excellence; and with the private sector (NATO, 2019). From the experience of the past five years, it has become apparent that NATO’s approach needs further development and refinement. The requirements for preparation, deterrence, and defence need to be reassessed. This is, to some extent, being done: NATO’s Chiefs of Defence adopted a new military strategy in May of 2019. This strategy defines the Alliance’s strategic military objectives and their intended implementation. It focusses on the Alliance’s military instruments of power under two perspectives: What is to be done here and now against known threats? What capabilities need to be built in the next 20 years?

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Now the political side has to catch up and provide further guidance. Dealing with hybrid threats requires a broad range of capabilities beyond those of the armed forces. The strategic focus of hybrid warfare—in contrast to conventional/military-centric warfare (Schmid, 2019a, pp. 14)—is not primarily military. For this reason, NATO needs the EU as well as the competent participation of individual member states in order to deal effectively with hybrid challenges. Combining very different sets of capabilities, and integrating different fields of responsibilities between the EU and NATO in a complementary cooperation will likely be key to future success. In view of these requirements, strategic, operational and tactical concepts must be developed that also serve non-military leadership well, and represent a convincing approach to guaranteeing peace, security and defence capabilities in a context of stability and prosperity. Since hybrid warfare seeks political success through an intelligent, limited, possibly deniable and controllable use of instruments of power (Schmid, 2019c, pp. 11), the conceptual challenge is to provide political and military decision-makers with optimal support in protecting their own Centres of Gravity and influencing—while, if necessary, disabling—the CoGs of opposing actors. The concept of a Centre of Gravity (CoG) in conflict, introduced by Carl von Clausewitz, has evolved and been established as a core element of military doctrine. To Clausewitz the opponent’s CoG is “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.” (Clausewitz, 1832, 1993, pp. 567)

Clausewitz defines war as an act of violence to impose one’s own will on the opponent. He bases his definition on an understanding of war between equal opponents (Herberg-Rothe, 2008, pp. 53), who in principle respect each other’s political, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. However, as Herberg-Rothe points out, in the face of globalisation and digitalisation, conflicts are more likely to occur between opponents with different cultural or ethnic backgrounds. Here, the imposition of one’s own will on the opponent can easily be misunderstood as an attempt to eliminate the community and identity of the other. In order to deter or successfully resist hybrid aggression, it will be important to deprive the opponent of his physical and moral freedom of action without attacking the sources of his power and the order of his society (Fig. 6.1). Dealing with hybrid aggression in the CoG context means setting limits to the opponent. It should also leave room for own action and resistance as HerbergRothe suggests (Herberg-Rothe, 2008, pp. 53). The approach should be based

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Fig. 6.1 Multiple centres of gravity

on respect for different social and cultural foundations. Shouldn’t NATO and the EU consider—as during the Cold War—to explore cooperation opportunities also with opponents such as Russia, China and Iran? It is obvious that we need to understand their cultural and historical backgrounds, in order to successfully contain hybrid aggression. In practical terms, this means to build knowledge and understanding of the diverse and often contradictory heritage, goals, policies and doctrines of the involved actors in order to achieve decision superiority (HerbergRothe, 2008, pp. 53). The challenge is one of limiting the opponent’s instruments of power in such a way that he can no longer enforce his will, keeping him physically and morally from continuing his aggression, and from achieving his envisaged objectives. Consequently, political, civil and military elites in democratic societies need to be prepared, and to become conceptually and culturally cognisant so as to keep opponents unable to impose their will via hybrid means. Joseph Strange and Richard Iron have suggested that there could exist multiple CoGs and that these could even change in different phases of a campaign (Strange & Iron, 2004, pp. 20). In their view, CoGs don’t represent characteristics by themselves, but rather have inherent characteristics or critical capabilities that enable them to be sources of power (Strange, 1996, pp. 4). Strange argues that each CoG is linked to supporting core capabilities. Along such links there would be key vulnerabilities. Attacking these vulnerabilities weakens the links, and thus the respective CoG (Strange, 1996, pp. 55).

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Outmanoeuvring Opponents

Hybrid warfare allows for multiple means of attacking the opponent’s CoGs. Johann Schmid of Hybrid CoE notes: “Flexibly focussing the decision of a war/conflict on a broad spectrum of non-military centres of gravity is therefore the first and most fundamental characteristic of ‘hybrid warfare’ in the narrower sense and the one that distinguishes it from what can be called ‘(conventional) military-centric warfare’.” (Schmid, 2019a, pp. 5) “Making use of multiple and shifting centres of gravity in a flexible and dynamic manner [is part of such an approach]” (Schmid, 2019a, pp. 15)

Hybrid aggressors employ their considerable capabilities in pursuit of hybrid objectives both in and beyond traditional domains, i.e. air, land and sea, and new domains, such as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. Without clearcut own dominance, the challenge is to outmanoeuvre opponents across the given multitude of domains. First and foremost, this requires a conceptual shift towards developing respective synergetic, multi-domain capabilities providing for sustained, agile and flexible operations. Because of its comprehensive format, the currently established operational planning process in NATO and the EU, based on the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information) construct focusing on those six domains as engagement space, could indeed support a strategic approach, which addresses a hexagon of CoGs at the operational level SHAPE, 2013, pp. 1–9). In his opening remarks to the Chiefs of Transformation Conference 2019, Général André Lanata, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, framed what interrelated trends will likely shape armed conflict in the future: • “Blurred lines between peace, crisis and war, further complicated by the increasing difficulty in detecting and attributing hostile actions, • Conflict extending into new domains such as Cyber, Space or Information sphere, • Effects combining in several domains, • The multiplication of actors in theatre—regular forces, armed militia, civilian populations, NGOs, etc. • The acceleration of time and of tempo, especially in the infosphere, which directly influences the outcome of a crisis today, and, tomorrow, into the kinetic realm with hypersonic weapons …

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I also expect further development of hybrid scenarios in which information warfare and cyber effects will be combined to circumvent our superiority using new technologies, which are now available to everybody.” (Lanata, 2019, pp. 9)

In meeting hybrid threats, one would look—in offence and defence—to address political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, and informational CoGs. Critical vulnerabilities and interface links need to be identified and protected by adequate diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) instruments of power so as to affect the opponent’s behaviour, while protecting own CoGs. It is precisely this interagency integration and orchestration of instruments which renders the comprehensive approach a fitting foundation for manoeuvring in the multi-domain hybrid environment. Over the past decades we have learnt that US doctrine eventually finds its way into the conceptual frameworks of both NATO and member nations. The US Army already has expended considerable thought on Multi-Domain Operations which may prove helpful in developing respective conceptual guidance for NATO and the EU. The US concept describes multi-domain operations as: “Operations conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces to overcome an adversary’s (or enemy’s) strengths by presenting them with several operational and/or tactical dilemmas through the combined application of calibrated force posture; employment of multi-domain formations; and convergence of capabilities across domains, environments, and functions in time and spaces to achieve operational and tactical objectives.” (TRADOC, 2018, pp. 98)

Consequently, multi-domain operations in hybrid campaigns involve outmanoeuvring an opponent in an expanded battle space thus covering the entire CoG hexagon. They aim at disrupting opponent cohesion and his OODA-loop. They are supposed to skilful challenge the opponent simultaneously with an unsolvable variety of problems in different domains, thereby overburdening and finally outmanoeuvring him (Taylor & Kay, 2019). Since hybrid warfare aims to win without a fight, i.e. via blackmail, coercion, unconventional and information warfare etc., the field of confrontation will likely extend to the entire DIME spectrum. Consequently, the political and military leadership needs valid options to include instruments of power across the DIME spectrum for achieving a decision-making advantage in hybrid campaigns, while preventing an escalation into larger armed conflict. This does not mean, however, that hybrid attacks cannot include military intervention, or be used as a precursor to it. While military contributions aim at deterrence and defence in order to ensure that hybrid attacks do not escalate into military confrontation, however,

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if necessary, the attacked party should be able to intervene in a militarily dominant manner at any time, should the hybrid aggression escalate. Consequently, it should be noted that: “military strength provides additional opportunities to exploit hybrid methods, even without the active use of force … [therefore] military escalation potential or dominance by its mere existence would support any kind of subversive hybrid activities.” (Schmid, 2019c, pp. 2)

At the core of own multi-domain capabilities is a synchronisation and optimisation of effects from multiple domains to affect the CoGs of the opponent. In doing so, particularly valuable sub-components, such as opponent A2/AD systems, are to be disintegrated, and lines of communication interrupted. Obvious targets would be command and information systems, intelligence capabilities, and critical infrastructures. This should lead to a fast collapse of opponent capabilities including his will to fight. NATO and the EU should build up robust multi-domain operational capabilities, so as to secure Western superiority even in the face of military escalation. Chinese or Russian sensor and weapons networks could be neutralized by small attacks. An extensive, large-scale destruction of enemy A2/AD capabilities could be avoided. Campaigns promoting escalation could be avoided. Outmanoeuvring opponents in multi-domain operations builds on the backbone of powerful, resilient own C4ISR infrastructure that can withstand attacks from cyberspace, outer space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Own armed forces must be protected by a robust air defence system, and must be able to continue to fight efficiently, even in the event of heavily degraded C4ISR infrastructure, especially to detect, identify, locate, track and incapacitate opponent mobile military assets. (Schmid, 2019c, pp. 2). General Sir Nick Carter, the Chief of the UK Defence Staff, in December 2019, called for: “… capabilities we need to operate successfully in this sub-threshold context (or grey zone as some call it)—including space, cyber, special operations and information operations. … Modern manoeuvre in any domain will only be enabled by effects from all domains.” (Carter, 2019)

In Carter’s view, transitioning from the industrial age Joint Force to the Information Age’s Integrated Force, and thus achieving multi-domain effect, is a logical move. He further highlights that an integrated force is necessary in order to be prepared conceptually, technologically and organisationally for a broad spectrum

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of operations, with numerous contingencies. As the increasing emergence of new forms of low-intensity hybrid aggression by no means precludes the possibility of a large-scale war, NATO, the EU, and their respective member states, would be well advised to prepare for the challenges in areas where their opponents are already particularly well-prepared, i.e. outer space, cyber space, the electromagnetic spectrum and information operations.

6.4

Multi-domain Situational Awareness

In hybrid warfare, political and military decision-makers can only make accurate decisions if they comprehensively understand the operational environment, including all relevant domains. This includes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, outer-space, and the global media landscape, which itself includes an endless variety of social media. In order to outmanoeuvre hybrid opponents, decision-makers need an adaptive and agile situational awareness so that they can act in a targeted and effective manner. The detection of hybrid aggression is the first challenge. A wealth of sensors, technologies, Big Data, AI, evaluation algorithms, and quality open-source information can be used to generate an instructive comprehensive situational picture, which portrays patterns of life, human terrain and anomaly detection (Fig. 6.2). In hybrid warfare, particular attention needs to be given to possibly manipulated data. In such cases, statistical methods may be used as an effective countermeasure. Since the data is online and, hence, constantly changing, an iterative learning cycle can adapt the underlying knowledge base to the current situation. Anomaly detection will take a central part, as covert actions and operations are a defining characteristic of the hybrid environment. Next to rule-based systems and statistical approaches, AI algorithms and methods further widen the possibilities to distinguish the anomalous data imprint of a relevant action versus normal patterns. For example, deep neural nets, that are designed to identify certain objects in images can be adapted to recognise known complex patterns in sensor data and, thereby, flag unknown and potentially anomalous relationships in a new dataset. Via a combination of knowledge- and learning-based systems of experts, and machine learning, it will soon be possible to support AI-based systems for the entire OODA loop. Emerging technologies, such as advanced modelling, Big Data analysis, AI, and machine learning, are instrumental in building a cross-domain capability to tackle hybrid challenges, and generate an adaptive and agile Multi-domain Situational Awareness.

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Fig. 6.2 Towards an adaptive and agile multidomain situational

Big Data is characterised by the so-called three Vs: • Volume—massive size of data, generated by all kinds of sources; • Velocity—fast data generation by online systems and sensors; and • Variety—different types of data, structured, semi-structured, or unstructured. With a view to hybrid contingencies, two additional Vs are of importance: • Veracity—whether or not the data is intentionally manipulated. This is of special importance with regard to hybrid offensive techniques; and • Visualisation—this is the best way to enable informed decisions in a Big Data/AI environment. Big Data has benefitted from hardware advances, as developments are fast and allow to process data very cost-efficiently. Advanced analytical techniques are key, such as AI, where the dynamic development of algorithms is driven by significant investments. In many cases, these algorithms are published as open source and can, hence, be adapted to specific challenges and/or incorporated into own solutions. The challenge has become one of merging data from different

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silos; integrating stand-alone solutions into a cooperative, well-functioning, intelligent system, capable of providing lessons learnt from past hybrid attacks; and identifying, within ongoing hybrid campaigns, signs of • Anomalous behaviour; • Indicators of malign activity across the PMESII domain, not just conventional military activity, but also activities, such as microtargeting in social media, deep fakes, and technology-sharing between hybrid actors; and • Effective multi-domain defence strategies, and ways and means to enhance resilience. Three components need particular focus: • Data fusion and knowledge base as foundation of any data-driven approach In order to get a comprehensive and relevant situational picture it is of importance to integrate disparate sources of information into a cohesive, common, relevant, actionable product. To this end, available data sources need to be prepared in such a way as to be applicable for analytical methods. This requires, for example, the fusion of high volumes of data sources, independent from system and structure. Data will be retrieved and blended from databases, including time series, texts, images, videos, audios, logs, etc. These data need to be enriched with further, external information, such as geo-locations. This, in turn, may require open source intelligence to collect and accumulate further information from the internet (social media, news, etc.), periodically, or on demand. The structuring of data into underlying objects and relations between objects allows to work more efficiently with data and to generate a knowledge base. • Real-time analytics and anomaly detection will be key elements to uncover hidden operations With sensors (Internet of Things), people (social media), systems (Logs), mobiles (locations), and further data sources all generating continuous and/or event driven data, the capability of (pre)processing online data streams will be pivotal to a situational awareness. Such processing alerts to certain actions, flags complex events, or points out new developments. • Modern visualisation techniques such as Extended Reality Since, on the one hand, data is far too large to query each detail and, on the other hand, many

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effective algorithms are too complex to directly deliver explainable effects, displaying data in a proper manner is an essential part of the process. Data visualisation combines multiple sources of information to provide for a better understanding of complex, hybrid activities. Along the processing chain to a decision, there will be different objectives to be fulfilled: – Domain experts require easy-to-handle, yet powerful tools to visually analyse data for patterns, acceleration and anomalies. – Operators need well designed dashboards for monitoring purposes. – Informed decision-making requires aggregating the insights from analysis and monitoring them, so as to provide a clear-cut picture. Therefore, visual tools are needed, with the ability to represent large: • Spatial data—which may indicate geographical accumulations; • Sequential data—which may reveal changes and trends, in particular as relates to hybrid warfare; and • Relational data—which may convey underlying dependencies. Features such as filters, aggregations, annotations, links to fundamental data, distance measurements, etc. have to be specialised for big data applications so as to support respective objectives. It is not easy to meet the situational awareness requirements of very different national and international actors. However, Big Data and AI in particular enable adaptive and agile interdepartmental, multinational and multi-domain operations management from a common, integrated, reliable data base. This is a key source where decisions advantage comes from.

6.5

Cognitive Dimension

Cognitive elements have always been important in wars. Digitalization and the grown importance of data, information and knowledge give them an even more prominent role in Hybrid Warfare. Power and influence interact closely. The context-related perception of a given power constellation by political and social influencers of a state ultimately determines whether and how much instruments of power can and will be used (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cullen, 2016, pp. 2). Against this background, the cognitive synergies that are or can only be generated by hybrid actors must be taken into account. A point in case has become

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media/social media. In hybrid warfare, social media have developed into a valuable source of information, an important creative space, and even a destructive weapon. The massive potential to influence information in media, social media, and multi-media has already led to their weaponisation, thus opening up a whole new toolbox in support of opponents’ objectives. Referring again to General Sir Nick Carter: “The pervasiveness of information and the pace of technological change are transforming the character of warfare and providing new ways to execute … authoritarian political warfare including information operations, espionage, assassinations, cyber, the theft of intellectual property, economic inducement, the utilisation of proxies and deniable para military forces, old fashioned military coercion, using much improved conventional capability, and, of course, lawfare—all of which is backed by clever propaganda and fake news to help justify these actions.” (Carter, 2019)

Ensuring the identification of lies, working towards their deconstruction, and developing own narratives will become key challenges in the cognitive domain. In the era of fake news, hybrid forces have sought to trigger riots and protest movements by the use of new media, causing a loss of efficacy of government action. Leveraging the power of the internet and social media serves as a powerful force multiplier, enabling the spread of propaganda and terror, influencing political outcomes, and, as Islamic State successfully demonstrated, enabling recruitment in an increasingly globalised world. The Baltic states, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are under constant Russian hybrid fire by all technological means, with special use of media and social media. There are also on-going hybrid campaigns in other countries, which utilise the media, as well as cyber and economic domains to drive civil unrest and protest movements, e.g. in Venezuela and Pakistan. Social media consist of a variety of networks. They use web-based and highly mobile technologies. This creates highly interactive platforms. Individuals, groups and organisations frequently use this opportunity to exchange information, jointly create and modify content, play games, and so forth. Applications include social networks, blogs, content communities, instant messaging, online games and more (Huk et al., 2018). Social media have profoundly changed communication in politics, business and society. They have long since had considerable effects on and within armed forces. They have significant divergences from traditional paper-based or electronic media, such as newspapers, radio and television broadcasts—for example, in terms of quality, range, frequency, usability, immediacy and sustainability. An important differentiating feature is the transfer model. With traditional media,

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one source has many recipients. In social media, the system is dialogical; there are many sources, with many recipients. Unfortunately, the general structure of social media platforms is vulnerable to the spread of fake messages. For hybrid actors, it is of particular importance that false and misleading information can be consistently and rapidly disseminated via social media. Since a manual content factcheck is very time-consuming and laborious, many false claims find their way into traditional media, or simply become viral on social media alone. Through social media, false information can become an effective, low-cost weapon of hybrid warfare. Campaigns to spread propaganda and disinformation can, as a means of information warfare, prevent political and military leadership from taking necessary decisions or enforcing important measures. Hybrid actors cleverly adapt to the information environment of their target groups, and orchestrate highly effective physical as well as virtual measures. Fake pictures, fake reports, the spreading of rumours and other methods of manipulation belong to the established tools of the trade. Most of the processes and technologies used have been developed, and proven themselves, in the private sector for marketing purposes. Here, AI technologies prove to be effect multipliers. Especially in the context of deep fakes, they create ever new and more perfect possibilities of deception. Deep Fakes can exchange faces and voices in pictures or videos in an absolutely realistic way. AI ensures that a replacement image covers the original image from every perspective. In the military context, both individuals and weapons systems can be projected into a landscape, thereby deceiving opponents and their sensors in a sustainable way. Russia excels in this field. Its skill lies in particular e in the optimisation of the use of established technologies, which it uses to achieve strategic effects through targeted disinformation (Polyakova, 2018). The ability to create ever more realistic deep fakes, i.e. fake photos, audio and video, supports information operations like never before. Previous deep fakes can be uncovered by experts using forensic analysis tools. However, the technology is advancing so quickly and so far, that even highly developed forensic technologies can now be fooled. With advances in connectivity, IoT, and edge computing, AI could be used to manipulate the digital footprint of individuals. This opens up a broad potential for faking compromising situations. For example, there are reports for targeted influence or blackmail in the context of the use of Zoom software for online conferences (Sayler, 2020, pp. 16). In between, precision marketing techniques have become available for hybrid attacks. Certain persons or groups of persons can be specifically sought out and addressed and influenced with individually tailored messages. They are tracked

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down and addressed via social media platforms, online, via mobile phone, Internet browsers, and other data traces. Neurohacking allows to manipulate even the desires and emotional needs of people by influencing their mental state and emotional tendencies. Emotional-metric algorithms can be used to simultaneously record or interpret the emotions of millions of people. Virtual agents will take a lot of work off hybrid opponents (Mazarr et al., 2019, pp. 67). By combining information from social and other media, as well as spatial information about targets from ubiquitous sensors, it is becoming increasingly easy to precisely locate and, if necessary, neutralise individual persons. Such individual, tailored precision attacks are also feasible against infrastructure or weapon systems, for example the remote-controlled cutting of the power supply line of a radar system. Media Mining is a necessary and available tool to detect and fight fake messages. Through Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), it supports automatic speech recognition, media monitoring and analysis. Such systems can also display data from traditional media, internet articles, satellite television, social media, etc. to provide real-time information on the development of crisis situations. When AIsupported, these technologies become even more powerful, and help government organisations and intelligence services to ensure the truthfulness and trustworthiness of their sources, and to maintain control over the process of intelligence gathering and transmission (Svetoka, 2016, pp. 13, 14). We can expect hybrid actors to use traditional and social media for: • Intelligence Operations—in particular collecting and analysing Open Source Information; • Targeting individuals and critical infrastructure—i.e. for social engineering; for manipulating the digital footprint of individuals for coercion and blackmailing purposes; for tailored precision attacks on infrastructure or weapon systems; • Command & Control purposes—as social media provide an easy to use communication infrastructure; • Psychological Warfare Operations—to reach target groups with false and misleading information to influence societies’ values, perceptions, and motivations.

6.6

Cross-Domain ISTAR

The requirement to generate understanding of the operational environment, across the physical, virtual and cognitive domains has become more vital than ever.

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When planning agile operations against hybrid aggressors, decision-makers must have a full overview of the effects of adversarial hybrid activities on their own concept of operations/CoGs and vice versa. Developing understanding is critical in order to be in a position to detail which actionable information ISR has to deliver in hybrid contingencies; who has to collect, fuse, evaluate and act; and what own possibilities are available to affect opponents CoGs. A cross-domain Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) system employing kinetic and non-kinetic effects has to deliver. We can expect a tough struggle for superiority in the information realm, the electromagnetic spectrum, in outer space and cyberspace. Potential targets are predominantly complex systems. Hybrid aggressors will develop models their perceived targets and use them to make an attack. They will find much of the information needed openly available on the internet, including information about critical infrastructures, personal information from social media accounts, corporate data, and information about politics and administration. This increases the vulnerability of NATO, the EU, and respective member nations. It is, thus, critically important to also model own vulnerabilities and design response functions, i.e. a defence system in the virtual world (Theile, 2019). Modelling a potential target allows for the analysis of vulnerabilities, and thus for the development of protective measures. In concrete terms it is impossible for a human to: • Overview the system and at the same time keep an understanding of all the details of the system; and, • Find and retrieve system information without a computer-stored model. Hybrid threats fuse industrial age techniques with cyber operations. They use a system of selected visible and clandestine actions, including social engineering. The attack system is almost invisible and the target is well-defined. Protective measures for potential targets include: • Strengthening system architecture; • Modelling of vulnerabilities on a system level; • Improving public awareness. In modelling, plenty of problems have yet to be resolved. Models must: • Reflect real-world problems with real-world data feeds (closed loop), going beyond classical abstract simulation procedures and tactics training;

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• Provide (real-time) prediction of future events and decision-support capability for human operators; • Enable automatic alert and response if in closed loop with live sensors and actors. Several questions still need to be answered with regard to modelling, such as: • Which data is available for modelling or training (labelling) of deep neural network (DNN) models? • What is the validation (trust) level of data? • What data abstraction level is sufficient? • What events and variables should be considered, i.e. how should one train and feed the DNN model (supervised vs unsupervised training, stochastic training)? • What model complexity can be understood by a human, and handled by machine resources? Targeting has to translate the vision and intention of the political and military leadership into an effect on the opponent’s decision-making process. Crossdomain Intelligence, Surveillance, and Targeting should synchronise intelligence and operational planning in order to produce the desired effects through a timesensitive, near real-time targeting of kinetic and non-kinetic effects (NCIA, 2021). The process itself follows in principle the OODA-Loop which is key to manoeuvre warfare. The US Army has most recently taken an important step to succeed in the direction. “Using an elastic ensemble of hardware and software configurable to brigade, division or corps levels TITAN (Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node) requirement will accept intelligence from diverse sources not necessarily organic to that echelon. These could include ‘national, commercial and joint sensors across all domains,’ … TITAN will process this intelligence into targets for engagement.” (Withington, 2021)

The nature of hybrid threats requires deep, broad and comprehensive views over extended timescales, across actors, regions and issues. Change detection and deep analysis of actors, regions and issues over longer periods of time may indicate what is going on. Technologies such as Big Data and AI have large potential to enable a new depth in identifying, tracking and countering hybrid threats. At the same these very technologies enable new hybrid challenges from technologically advanced opponents (Kania, 2019).

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Multi-domain operations effectively require a continuous feedback loop between political objectives and operations. Intelligence permanently feeds this loop, ensuring decision-makers and operators have the information they need to adjust nimbly. Virtually every form of technical intelligence profits from new technologies to include the emerging fields of cyber and social media intelligence to name a few (Millicent, 2019): • Communications (COMINT)—interception of radio messages, telephone calls, e-mails; • Electronic (ELINT)—for example radar waves; • Geospatial (GEOINT)—determination of locations using satellite images, aerial photographs, survey results or geodata; • Measurements and signature (MASINT)—technical recording and scientific evaluation, of the consequences of weapons tests or industrial activities with the help of radars, highly sensitive microphones, nuclear sensors etc.; • Open source (OSINT)—collects data from open or publicly available sources; • Signal (SIGINT)—recorded data streams searched for specific contents. Particular relevant in combination with cyber and electromagnetic systems vis-à-vis the rapid rise of EW. In hybrid warfare these INTs will see an unprecedented employment. Emerging technologies are key to make ever-growing data actionable “The future of analysis will be shaped by the powerful and potentially disruptive effects of AI, big data, and machine learning on what has long been an intimately scaled human endeavor.” (Gartin, 2019)

New technologies help to collect, analyse, evaluate, and disseminate related data. The integration of new technologies such as ubiquitous sensors, and advanced algorithms in connection with 5G, cloud applications and edge computing into the support of decision making and operational planning provides real-time, relevant and very precise insights into the action portfolio of hybrid actors, and gives own decision makers an advantage in outmanoeuvring hybrid opponents. Extended reality helps to visualize situations and findings for decision-makers. They will help boost capabilities in areas such as predictive analysis and long-range foresight (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2018). This is particularly valuable when it allows NATO, EU, and partners to act in advance of threats or to seize opportunities. Cross Domain ISTAR aims at the dynamic, agile and coordinated employment of virtual and real platforms, sensors and systems through the support of a wide

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range of staff functions. In other words, providing the right information, to the right person, at the right time, in the right format. 5G, AI, Big Data, Cloud, Communication, Cyber, Io(B)T, and Space technologies all have important roles within the process. AI and Big Data technologies (NATO STO, 2018, pp. 4–6), in particular, can significantly strengthen and speed-up decision-making on targeting throughout the command cycle as they: • Support human analysts in the design of target system models; • Process large amounts of data from a wide variety of information sources through pattern recognition algorithms; • Structure information elements via reasoning algorithms into a coherent whole; • Provide virtual team-mates to assist human analysts in interpreting complex situations; • Generate and evaluate proposals for courses of action; • Help improving strengths and reducing weaknesses of plans; Point at optimum assignment of scarce resources to targets or other tasks.

6.7

Gaming for Excellence

The intent to outmanoeuvre capable opponents raises the stakes for own decisionmaking. The kind of hybrid warfare tactics applied by Russia to seize Crimea and the Eastern part of Ukraine, have included a whole set of surprises, such as paralysing decision-making through deception, cultivating instability in ethnic communities, denying access to the area, and escalating with special forces and conventional troops. Russia demonstrated how subtle and concealed hybrid attacks may offer a systematic strategic advantage for the aggressor. The increasingly complex requirements in the context of hybrid warfare suggest that decision-makers need to have a thorough understanding of hybrid actors, threats, risks and applied concepts, as well as of NATO and EU capabilities and know-how in order to competently meet hybrid challenges. This suggests the establishment of an authoritative simulation capability in the context of serious gaming thus promoting conceptual thinking, and developing needed skills. This capability should be viewed as a critical tool for strategic, operational, and technological innovation (Development, 2017, pp. 18) (Fig. 6.3). The term Serious Games is used to identify games and game environments that are developed for purposes other than entertainment. Serious games are about

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Fig. 6.3 Cyber simulation for high-level decisionmakers

understanding, about ideas, about decision-making and most of all about people. They help participants to understand real-world conflicts. Their advantage is to bring the human element into a problem—in this case into dealing with hybrid contingencies. The primary focus of serious games is to support education and training. With regard to hybrid contingencies, serious gaming could provide for an experience of how a campaign of undermining actions by the attacker would affect almost all institutions, thus highlighting that virtually every stakeholder is vulnerable, and that well-orchestrated cooperation is essential. Awareness of this necessity is still lacking, as ministries and governmental agencies are primarily focussed on detecting and tackling threats strictly within their own organisations. Serious gaming could therefore trigger the development of more effective concepts and strategies (Caffrey, 2019, pp. 175). Simulations are efficient tools for realistically testing hybrid campaigns. Simulation-based serious games would aim at supporting (future) high-level policy-, decision-makers, and planners in complex hybrid contingencies across a wide-range of domains. Game-based approaches provide for meaningful experiences, as participants would be able to obtain a comprehensive perception of a given issue, and thus a better grasp of complex security challenges (SolinskaNowakb et al., 2018). Serious gaming would be essential both for improving understanding of complex, uncertain environments, and the changing character of security challenges and technologies.

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As meaningful as it is to explore specific questions with tailor-made simulations, in hybrid warfare the necessary synergy is only achieved through a comprehensive simulation network, i.e. the creation of a federation—a cooperating combination of simulations. Such a holistic Systems of Systems would represent current and future conceivable hybrid threats and enables different simulations to communicate with each other. The technologies required to create such federations are affordable, already available, and are constantly being improved upon. Modelling & simulation (M&S) for hybrid warfare would cover a very complex set of topics, from social media to special forces engagement, from strategic foresight to cyber operations. It requires the employed models to be particularly dynamic and interactive. An interdepartmental, joint, combined, multi-domain model of hybrid actors and own capabilities should, thus, be created. This model could then also be useful later when assessing and updating current deployment plans (Solinska-Nowakb et al., 2018). What is crucial is the combination of human decision-makers with models of hybrid approaches and capabilities. In view of these considerations, NATO and the EU should make use of cyber, cognitive, and strategic foresight models. A modular growing approach ensures the enduring benefit of serious gaming.

6.8

Stress- and Shock-Proof

Democratic Western societies offer multiple targets for hybrid aggressors. For instance, a successful hybrid attack on energy, transport, banking, or space could bring a major spectrum of public and private services to a standstill. This is further aggravated by the extremely difficult attribution of hybrid aggression—anyone can attack from anywhere. The resulting ambiguity challenges the achievement of an adequate response, in particular by governments and multinational organisations bound by consensus. There are lessons to be learnt from previous decades in terms of resilience. For example, the Civil-Military Exercises (CIMEX) undertaken up to the end of the 1980s were enormously beneficial to the quality of civil-military cooperation, especially at the municipal and state levels. Already during the Cold War, resilience was designed to anticipate and cushion serious disruptions to critical supply services. Since then, however, such capabilities have been neglected, and are now virtually non-existent. Consequently, NATO and the EU are entering the defence against hybrid threats somewhat unprepared. The political culture and bureaucratic structures

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Fig. 6.4 Crisis room social media

and processes of Western democracies are not particularly suited to bridging the gaps between traditional departmental communication channels, which are frequently narrow and not cross-cutting. The way in which the ongoing corona pandemic, the migration crisis and the terrorist threat have been dealt with in NATO and EU member states illustrates that the instruments available to the state are inadequate in the face of such challenges (Fig. 6.4). Strengthening resilience means reducing the potential benefits enjoyed by attackers. Against the backdrop of highly innovative hybrid attackers and dynamically developing new technologies, resilience requires a comprehensive, agile design. In particular, the cooperation and orchestrated action of civil and private, government and military sectors needs to excel. Only by identifying key vulnerabilities and associated risks, synchronising interdepartmental decision-making, and improving military sustainability and civilian preparedness, can the consequences of hybrid attacks be mitigated and own resilience strengthened. The modelling and simulation of such competencies will play an important role. Clearly, the military and civilian sectors must both become much more stressand shock-proof. An initiative by the Rockefeller foundation points at a possible direction regarding how resilience could be fostered in a structured way. Following the experiences of Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy in 2013, the Foundation started a 100 Resilient Cities initiative:

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“to help more cities build resilience to the physical, social, and economic challenges that are a growing part of the 21st century.” (Rockefeller, 2013)

The list of participating cities has become long—assembling 98 cities from 40 countries, including London, Mexico City, New York and Singapore. Rockefeller provided the cities with financial, logistical and expert support, to: • Establish a Chief Resilience Officer in each city in charge of resilience efforts; • Develop a robust resilience strategy; • Access solutions, service providers, and partners for help with development and implementation of resilience strategies; and, • Establish a global network of likeminded cities for mutual support and learning from each other’s experiences. The initiative has meanwhile merged into a Global Resilient Cities Network, and Rockefeller has dropped out as key sponsor (Global Resilience, 2020). The upcoming NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept has similar goals, on a larger scale. It may be of value to consider how NATO and EU resilience-related initiatives could match up with, and build upon, the lessons learnt from the 100 Resilient cities initiative (Ransom, 2019). The Capstone concept has noted three focus areas so far: • Critical infrastructures are the foundation of a functioning society. Civilian support and infrastructure, transport and logistical supply need to be capable of functioning reliably even in the face of hybrid threats and attacks. • Military forces and capabilities are supposed to become more operational and redundant even under stress and shock. Since the performance of the military in NATO and the EU is largely based on infrastructure and logistical services from the private sector, their resilience is a particular bottleneck. Consequently, the challenge is to absorb damaging events without lastingly impairing the functioning of the state, economy and society. This requires structures that perform well vis-à-vis known challenges, and which prove adaptable to unknown ones. As new technologies are increasingly becoming a critical infrastructure in and of themselves, and operational effectiveness has become reliant on technology, this puts a premium on a much closer cooperation of the military with the private sector. Private ownership of critical infrastructure also points in this direction. In the defence industrial base, many technologies are dual-use, i.e. in both the civil and military sectors. This makes these technologies even

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more attractive for the theft of know-how, but also as a gateway for cyberattacks. The ever-closer cooperation between the civil and military sectors has taken the vulnerabilities of the civil sector right into the heart of the armed forces as Admiral (ret.) Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), has noted: “We ought to be very concerned in particular about our electric grid and our financial system, both of which are targets of China and Russia …”. (Ackerman, 2020)

• Civil and military resilience needs to become mutually supportive to prevent hybrid opponents from exploiting the vulnerabilities of civil infrastructure and society. So far, one weakness is the absence of appropriate domestic instruments: both state and economy are not yet sufficiently equipped to deal with hybrid threats. Partnerships and increased engagement with the private sector will have to ensure the economy’s resilience to hybrid infiltration. NATO and the EU must work on this together. Scenario-based simulation exercises can serve as a catalyst for civil-military cooperation. The establishment of Chief Resilience Officers in NATO, the EU, and respective member states would be a step in the right direction. This would allow diverse stakeholders, such as government and military officials, the private sector, NGOs, associations and civil society to cooperate in order to strengthen resilience in projects with cross-functional effects. The upcoming NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept with its double approach of employing low hanging fruits in the short-term and developing—with a 20year perspective—next generation capabilities will need an equivalent ‘Capstone Concept’ on the civil side, as hybrid threats are manifesting themselves particularly in civil venues. The focus of hybrid attacks on civilian CoGs places special demands on a highly professional leadership of both political and civil elites in the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. All would be well-advised to develop an advanced understanding of how to deal with hybrid threats. New technologies will have an important role to play—both in threats and in solutions to fight them. Generally, this development points to a direction where Civil Defence and Counterterrorism will enjoy a larger share in future governmental security and defence budgets.

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Solinska-Nowakb, A., Magnuszewskia, P., Curlc, M., Frencha, A., Keatinga, A., Mochizukia, J., Liua, W., Mechlera, R., Kulakowskab, M., & Jarzabek, L. (2018). An overview of serious games for disaster risk management – Prospects and limitations for informing actions to arrest increasing risk. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31. https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2212420917304090?token=33CE09B0F840 D25170EA6F4A79F35D0476AAACF600830BB991822A8E6BC88B0ED7CD4EFD 314761D38FB883CD4F46865F. Accessed: 16. Feb. 2021. Strange, J. (1996). Centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation so that we can all speak the same language. Perspectives on warfighting series. https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Read ing/3B_COG_and_Critical_Vulnerabilities.pdf. Accessed: 15. Feb. 2021. Strange, J. L., & Iron, R. (2004). Centre of gravity: What Clausewitz really meant. Joint Force Quarterly, 35. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520980.pdf. Accessed: 16. Feb. 2021. Svetoka, S. (2016). Social media as a tool of hybrid warfare. NATO StratCom COE Riga. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved= 2ahUKEwjqtaKVmu7uAhXR5KQKHY6qBW8QFjAAegQIARAC&url=https%3A% 2F%2Fwww.stratcomcoe.org%2Fdownload%2Ffile%2Ffid%2F5314&usg=AOvVaw 00o3oYB5I7EmfomPEuOS_q. Accessed: 16. Feb. 2021. Taylor, C., & Kay, L. (2019). Putting the enemy between a rock and a hard place: Multidomain operations in practice. Modern War Institute. https://mwi.usma.edu/. Accessed: 16. Feb. 2021. The Rockefeller Foundation. (2013). 100 resilient cities. https://www.rockefellerfoundation. org/100-resilient-cities/. Accessed: 16. Feb. 2021. Theile, B. (2019). Hybrid warfare in the 21st century. Information and communications technology as key enabler. TRADOC. (2018). The U.S. army in multi-domain operations 2028. TP 525-3-1, GL-7. https:// info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-MultidomainOps2028.pdf. Accessed: 8. Feb. 2021. Withington, T. (2021). Thinking together. Armada International. https://armadainternationalcom.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/armadainternational.com/2021/02/thinking-together/?amp. Accessed: 16. Feb. 2021.

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Avenues to Adapt Ralph Thiele

Abstract

The chapter discusses possible responses NATO and EU and member states could choose to meet the growing challenges of hybrid warfare. Focus is on crossdomain concepts, the necessary technological edge and organisational measures. Here the valuable role of the European Defence Agency and the EU Joint Research Centre are highlighted, also the important role of the private sector as key driver of innovation and the urgent requirement to prepare decision-makers and their staffs to for their challenging tasks of meeting multi-domain hybrid warfare. Hybrid opponents make creative use of new technologies to achieve their objectives. NATO, the EU, and respective member states should also use the opportunities these very same technologies offer to successfully resist such hybrid opponents. At the NATO 70th anniversary celebrations in December 2019 in London, UK defence secretary Ben Wallace pointed out: “NATO is now looking at the ways in which new and emerging technologies will continue to change the threat landscape …. We must understand these challenges are what we face today and we must adapt accordingly. … Maintaining our technological edge is the only way we can avoid obsolescence and deliver on our most important pledge—keeping our people safe.” (Wallace, 2019).

R. Thiele (B) StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_7

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Subsequent recommendations suggest avenues to adapt concepts, to employ new and emerging technologies, and to take key organisational measures with the goal of successfully meeting emerging hybrid challenges.

7.1

Cross-domain Concepts

Hybrid opponents have studied Western strategies and approaches, and have exploited conceptual and resulting capabilities gaps, particularly in the information domain, in A2/AD, and in the electromagnetic spectrum with modern technological capabilities. These gaps open the floodgates to coercion and blackmailing by malicious actors, thus putting own cohesion and solidarity at risk. NATO, the EU, and respective member states need to further strengthen their comprehensive approach in order to exploit the full scope of their respective and combined strengths. They should develop a common understanding on how to deal with hybrid threats/warfare and take bold steps to close existing conceptual and capability gaps. NATO and EU policies, strategic considerations, and operational concepts need to address actual and upcoming hybrid threats, and translate opportunities into options that enable the successful deterrence, resistance and countering of hybrid aggression. Malicious, hybrid activities in a multi-domain battlespace constitute a particular strategic challenge, as they are difficult to track and it takes quite an effort to identify them as pieces of a comprehensive campaign. New technologies enable the identification, tracking, and countering of clandestine hybrid offences through multiple and shifting CoGs. Consequently, a Centre of Gravity approach appears well-suited for countering hybrid challenges. This approach delivers a comprehensive strategic situational picture, and enables decision-makers to stay focussed and capable of putting the full puzzle together, thus denying potential benefits to aggressors, and rather confronting them with severe consequences. It would, in particular, help to assign responsibilities: to determine who feeds which contents into multi-domain situational awareness, and to employ instruments of power in a well-orchestrated fashion. With a view to the expanded scope of CoGs, it is recommended to concert their DIME spectrum of instruments of power in order to better deter, resist and counter hybrid challenges as part of their day-to-day business. To this end member state governments should facilitate: • Superior analytical strength in order to detect vulnerabilities and threats;

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• Enduring strategic direction to steer long-term processes in order to increase resilience; • Institutional authority in order to address critical developments and unresolved lack of resilience at governmental level; • Permanent interministerial/interagency working body of Network-Keepers, immediately ready to fully engage in the whole of government as well as whole of society approach; • Single Point of Contact for all international levels detailing the specific national strategy for countering hybrid threats. To develop own capabilities capable of neutralising Chinese or Russian sensors and weapons networks that threaten Western responses in hybrid warfare and small contingencies by small, effective attacks own technology-related scepticism of political decision-makers, and resulting lack of focussed investment need to be overcome. NATO and the EU should strive for an operational position where they can overburden hybrid opponents, disrupt their OODA-loop, and blind their situational awareness. To this end, multi-domain operations aiming at outmanoeuvring a technologically sophisticated opponent with a preference for clandestine operations across an expanded battlespace would provide for a broader move towards integrated campaigning across the affected CoGs. Today, when it comes to hybrid warfare, NATO, the EU, and their member states still have difficulty in recognising, identifying, and attributing hybrid threats or attacks early on. This clearly degrades their ability to deter or combat them effectively. An adaptive and agile multi-domain situational awareness has become an essential foundation for effective political and military decision-making, and thus as a precondition to outmanoeuvring any hybrid opponent. To overcome existing limitations, they need to build an agile culture of collecting and sharing data, information, and evaluation of ongoing hybrid campaigns as a major element of the own approach towards countering hybrid warfare. New technologies are particularly helpful in providing inputs, analysis, evaluation and distribution for a common relevant situational picture that includes seemingly separate actions and events as part of a comprehensive hybrid strategy. The need to share has been sufficiently discussed for two decades. Now it is time to act. A cross-domain ISTAR capability is needed to effectively ensure coordinated employment of both kinetic and non-kinetic means, virtual and real platforms, sensors and effectors. When planning agile operations against hybrid aggressors, decision-makers must have a full overview of the potential effects of adversarial hybrid activities on their own concept of operations/CoGs and vice versa. As the hybrid warfare engagement space is cross-departmental and multinational, this has

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to be reflected in own defensive and offensive measures to be taken. This includes developing the capability and capacity to target in a time-sensitive manner multiple, multi-domain hybrid threats once they have been identified and attributed. Expanded resilience should ensure that not only military forces and capabilities stay operational and redundant in hybrid campaigns, but also civilian support and infrastructure, transport and logistical supply. Armed forces performance depends on these elements. Governments and international organisations need to leverage private sector capacity to counter hybrid challenges, including its capability to attribute attacks, to trace cyber incidents, and inform the public (Romanosky & Boudreaux, 2019). Private entities that have become strategic targets require protection as they run and own critical infrastructures and provide masses of functions and data that business and governments have an interest in. In turn, civil society must rely on support from the armed forces in the event of natural or man-made disasters. The private sector needs to ensure the resilience of the economy to malicious hybrid attacks thus enabling to withstand a hybrid attack and to quickly recover and rebuild own systems’ and critical infrastructure’s functionality. Analytical instruments for the early and thorough identification, analysis and comprehension of respective developments are needed, given the fact that progressing incrementally towards a threatening situation is a key strength of hybrid methods and tactics. Understanding the threat is essential. This includes: • developing an awareness of own vulnerabilities; • understanding motives and modes of employment; and • detecting the threat, i.e. developing all-domain situational awareness. In the face of highly innovative hybrid attackers, own structures and processes need to permanently seek to reduce weak and fractured areas, and strengthen social cohesion by leveraging new technologies. Resilience tools need to be further developed and deployed across governmental agencies. Modelling own and opponents’ vulnerabilities is recommended to address challenges and opportunities. The establishment of Chief Resilience Officers is suggested with the function of getting diverse stakeholders such as government and military officials, the private sector, NGOs, associations and civil society to cooperate in order to strengthen resilience in projects with cross-functional effects.

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Technological Edge

Innovation is fast-moving. Of the 19 technologies highlighted before seven stand out, as 5G, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Systems, Cyber, Extended Reality, Quantum, and Space hold particular potential to intensify hybrid challenges. The increasing utility of hybrid warfare is fuelled by these trends. Opponents have managed to benefit remarkably well of commercial available state-of-the-art technologies while NATO, EU and member states armed forces still struggle to in-source their inherent potential. The ongoing deployment of 5G requires focus in order to build a critical 5G infrastructure in Europe. This should largely be based on a strong European industrial backbone. The heated debate on the possible role of Huawei in 5G deployment highlights its importance for security and defence. 5G will soon become the backbone of system-critical communication structures and processes in NATO and EU member states. Real-time command & control should have focus in early applications. Cybersecurity is of particular concern. Vis-à-vis the indispensable availability, confidentiality and integrity of information on 5G networks there is cause for concern regarding hardware and software-based cyber-threats from hybrid actors such as China. A 5G first policy for infrastructure upgrades is suggested to ensure that relevant capabilities become available soon. This infrastructure should be quantum-proof from the outset. A few quantum capabilities will soon be ready for the market. A common public–private innovation test environment is proposed. The private sector could experiment with different solutions in governmental and/or military facilities. Governmental and military stakeholders, in turn, could experiment with new applications to include cyber security measures. Competence in AI has become a fundamental prerequisite for military success. Employing AI unlocks the full potential of data to enable strategic foresight; to improve decision-making; to feed situational awareness; to enable ISTAR; to enable cyber & electronic warfare capabilities; and to enable human–machine-teaming. With a view to hybrid warfare challenges AI will support: • Semi-automated preparation and enrichment of data, and the extraction of information from the merging of data in order to reduce the human workload and enable multi-domain situational awareness. Data need to be recognised as critical resources. Practices for their collection and curation need to be institutionalised. • Finding patterns in data, detecting anomalies, and developing evidence-oriented proposals for decisions from the flood of data.

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• Automating and increasing process efficiency through optimising ongoing processing and analysis processes. This includes rule-based expert systems that allow a priori knowledge to be integrated into processing. AI-related research and development projects need to be prioritised in order to benefit from private industry innovation, and cooperation across the armed forces, security and defence agencies, the private sector, and academia and in order to develop the necessary data culture and architecture. AI-related industrial know-how requires protection. Recruitment of personnel capable of leveraging AI capabilities is critical. The deployment of real and virtual autonomous systems—operationally, technologically, organisationally and politically—requires increased focus. Low-cost autonomous systems will be employed in growing quantities, thus bringing the perspective of future masses of autonomous systems to be dealt with. Autonomous systems will be likely considered as expendables in critical missions, for example in electronic warfare. Concept development and experimentation (CDE) should explore employment options, including swarming. Collaboration and teaming is needed across the armed forces with security and defence agencies, the private sector, and academia to exploit the enormous potential of commercial markets. Cyber and Electronic Warfare belong to the core of Operational Art and need to be given due recognition in their role within the operational value chain as these constitute major enablers of hybrid threats. In particular, armed forces should invest in the convergence between cyber and EW, the so-called spectrum warfare that combines cyber and EW into a new, crucial capability for mission success. Defensive and offensive cyber tools need to be developed, operators to be trained for the full spectrum of tactical and operational opportunities, including the targeting of command & control systems; computer and sensor networks; software for aircraft, artillery, drones, and missiles; as well as protecting own information systems and networks from manipulation and disruption to include the protection of systemsrelated industrial know-how. Addressing barriers regarding interaction with the private sector includes interagency, interdepartmental, public–private, and multinational information sharing. Capabilities need to be established which enable the preparation of the operational environment for own operations in the cyber domain and the electromagnetic spectrum, such as the collection of data and the modelling of targets regarding opponents’ command & control networks, critical infrastructure, tactical networks and further vulnerabilities, but also capabilities for cyber intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to support such a process.

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Extended Reality will enable to leverage ground-breaking advances in situational awareness, planning, training and operations, as well as logistics and medical surgeries. An extended ecosystem of relevant experts across sectors and disciplines should foster XR innovation in a culture of responsibility that integrates ethical principles from the very outset. Initial focus should be on training and education. Further recommended focus areas are the upcoming human–machine-teaming and utilisation of digital twins. A broad roll-out of XR applications should be supported by powerful new infrastructures, such as 5G networks. It has become time to prepare the transition to postquantum cryptography to replace current public key schemes. There is a serious threat of quantum computers against information security. Several countries have already begun to collect encrypted foreign communications with the expectation that they will be able to decode these based on quantum technologies within the next decade. Hybrid opponents, such as China or Russia, may attempt a silent takeover of critical infrastructures. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) need to support own operations. Quantum encryption allows for encrypted communications between parties, instantly revealing any attempted eavesdropping. QKD and post-quantum encryption will, thus, significantly increase own ability to ensure trusted communications and data storage. Given the enormous potential of upcoming quantum technologies, accelerated quantum research and development benefitting from partnerships between industry, academia, and government is highly recommended. Leveraging the remarkable potential of space assets to strengthen the C4I backbone should also be prioritised to include space situational awareness, timing, navigation and earth observation, thus providing for range, mobility and precision. Employment AI and Big Data allows to leverage the huge amounts of data transported by satellites to enable a level of actionable information that has previously been unobtainable. Concept development & experimentation should be employed to identify low hanging fruits as—with upcoming Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) capabilities—the space revolution takes place. Partnerships with the private sector and include SMEs and Start-ups promise high pay offs as these drive the present innovation boom. There is a premium on the protection of space infrastructure. In particular, cyber security of space infrastructure needs to become a focus area as vulnerabilities there constitute an Achilles heel of present space capabilities.

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Organisational Measures

The operational relevance of new technologies vis-à-vis hybrid challenges has become obvious. NATO and the EU’s armed forces need to take organisational measures to stay ahead of the digital curve. There is reason for urgency. Hybrid offenders such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have been developing robust and diverse technology portfolios. Consequently, hybrid campaigns will require focused innovation as their expanded, variable, multi-domain shape raises the stakes for needed responses. Translating these technologies into viable capabilities is an important hurdle to overcome. It requires to orchestrate and accelerate innovation in NATO, the EU, and respective member states. There are a number of key success factors that can be built upon including: • Meaningful and coherent task design; • Attractive NATO/EU-wide cooperation ventures with the involvement of large companies and start-ups, other departments and research institutions; • NATO/EU-wide coordination in order to meet challenging requirements; • Portfolio flexibility in order to quickly adapt to altering conditions; • Modularity/Extensibility that provides for expansion of internal structures, tasks, resources and budget. To close existing capability gaps and to drive innovation on behalf of NATO and the EU, agencies such as the NATO Science & Technology Organisation, the European Defence Agency, and the EU Joint Research Centre should focus on furthering highly disruptive projects, i.e. identifying and funding programmes and projects with high disruptive potential in the area of applied research, technology and product development. In delineating and establishing an orchestrated, well-defined role for these agencies, experiences from the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) model—a proven, effective inside-out method of driving disruptive innovation from government and defence to the rest of the economy and vice versa—should be customised for the NATO/EU framework. A decentralised model of national innovation acceleration centres under the umbrella of NATO/EU lead agencies could foresee the European Defence Agency to engage in collaborative projects, fostering the rapid establishment of an adaptive and agile situational awareness, and a cross-domain ISTAR capability, as well as further developing the C4I backbone needed to excel in multi-domain operations. The EDA already plays an important role in developing EU members’ military instruments of power and applying technology to capability. It is also responsible for the

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development and coordination of EU and NATO capabilities in areas of common interest, such as hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks. The Joint Research Centre would be excellently suited to deliver advice on innovation acceleration with a view to the further development of non-military instruments of power. The JRC is already providing scientific service and related knowledge to the EU Commission. It should further technological competence covering the 19 technologies highlighted in this book with a focus on 5G; artificial intelligence; autonomous systems; cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum; extended reality; quantum sciences and space. Close cooperation with the NATO Science & Technology Organisation and organisations of member nations would be of clear mutual benefit vis-à-vis the urgently needed innovation acceleration ecosystem. Together they should develop a modelling & simulation environment that federates existing capabilities in NATO and provides training and education, enabling improved development, planning, and operations. The role of the private sector in the realm of hybrid challenges keeps growing. Expanded productive cooperation with industry and research centres has become a permanent necessity and should be reflected in organisational structures and processes. Consequently, leveraging the commercial sector to support acquisition, defence-specific research and development has growth potential. Exploitation of state-of-the-art technology requires great flexibility, so as to apply the latest technological leap at any stage of the technology or product’s life-cycle; the military procurement system must adapt to reflect this. Upcoming reductions in defence spending will further increase the role of the commercial sector in defence research and development. The multitude of new technologies available entails an increase in complexity on the system level. This requires system integration capabilities on the industrial side and design thinking on the governmental side. Focus upon long-term acquisition strategies is required, to ensure a viable organic industrial base for future security and defence requirements. A focussed involvement of SMEs showing the potential for disruptive innovation is key to stay in step with innovation dynamics. Serious gaming for political, civilian and military elites needs to become an indispensable, permanent tool for preparing key decision-makers and their staffs for their challenging tasks of meeting multi-domain hybrid warfare. Serious gaming will strengthen their ability to understand the issues, implications, challenges and options that arise from technological developments in the context of hybrid campaigns. It will strengthen their skills to effectively deal with hybrid aggression. The ambition to outmanoeuvre capable opponents raises the stakes for own decision-making,

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especially in view of the high level of preparation shown by leadership of hybrid opponents. In designing a federation of regular TTX/serious games based on hybrid scenarios to improve judgement skills at the politico-strategic and operational levels, vis-à-vis hybrid contingencies and associated disruptive technologies, the goal is to enhance the cognitive flexibility of higher-level civilian and military decision-makers; to foster players’ flexible thinking and thus improve their adaptability (Hartmann & Allen, 2017). In particular, the design would aim to: • Improve understanding of complex, uncertain situations and processes in hybrid contingencies, as well as of new features, methods and techniques; • Assess the operational/strategic impacts of disruptive technology trends and respective future challenges; and • Reflect, experiment and identify how to employ new opportunities. Using safe-to-fail environments would allow participants to practice, experiment and innovate thus creating experiential learning opportunities, helping to develop a shared narrative about situations and tasks that personnel might face in a real hybrid contingency. Respective supporting technologies such as modelling and simulation are available and affordable. New technological possibilities, such as 5G, edge computing and XR ease their broad-scale employment.

References Hartman, F., & Allen, G. (2017). Introduction to serious games to enhance fefense capabilities—modeling & simulation. Journal of Cyber Security and Information Systems. https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/introduction-to-serious-games-to-enh ance-defense-capabilities-modeling-simulation-special-edition/. Accessed: 3 Feb 2017. Romanosky, S., & Boudreaux, B. (2019). Private sector attribution of cyber incidents: Benefits and risks to the U.S. Government. Working Paper. California, United States of America: RAND corporation. 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1 267.html. Accessed: 5 May 2020. Wallace, B. (2019). Hybrid warfare is the new reality NATO must plan for says UK defence secretary. SC Magazine UK. https://www.scmagazineuk.com/hybrid-warfarenew-reality-nato-plan-says-uk-defence-secretary/article/1667665. Accessed: 5 Jan 2020.

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Conclusions Ralph Thiele

Abstract

The chapter draws the conclusions from the observations and analysis provided by this book. In sum: Hybrid warfare can be expected to become a long-term strategic challenge. It has evolved into an effective, apparently lowrisk instrument of power of malicious actors. This threatens NATO, the EU as a collective whole, member states individually, and their wider neighbourhood. This, however, does not only come with negatives. Digitalisation and new technologies have been driving the creation of wealth globally with some disruptive effects. Thus, the capability of NATO, the EU and member nations to accelerate innovation forms an integral part of ensuring prosperity, security and defence. Hybrid warfare can be expected to become a long-term strategic challenge. It has evolved into an effective, apparently low-risk instrument of power of malicious actors. This threatens NATO, the EU as a collective whole, member states individually, and their wider neighbourhood. This, however, does not only come with negatives. Digitalisation and new technologies have been driving the creation of wealth globally with some disruptive effects. Thus, the capability of NATO, the EU and member nations to accelerate innovation forms an integral part of ensuring prosperity, security and defence.

R. Thiele (B) StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0_8

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Technologies, and related capabilities and skills, are developing at full tilt. They are game-changers in many ways. The rise of hybrid threats has been particularly facilitated by new and emerging technologies. The panoply of dynamic, and especially digital, technological developments on the horizon indicates, moreover, that the portfolio of hybrid threats will expand rapidly. Computers are getting faster and more powerful. Political, economic, social, and—last but not least—defence and security developments are all determined by the production, extraction and use of data. Through the Internet of Things, people and machines connect symbiotically and form powerful teams. Breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and sensor technology multiply the capabilities of security actors. Quantum sciences may soon become another applicable, and potentially disruptive, technology. Communication technologies carry and fuel this development. We can expect disruptive technologies to provide a variety of actors with additional, powerful options for virtually and physically targeting people and assets in the context of hybrid campaigns, with little risk of attribution or immediate retaliation. Nations and organisations that are best able to anticipate and exploit technological opportunities will likely have a decisive advantage in future competitions, crises and conflicts. During the Hybrid COE project Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies participants have identified 19 technologies as particularly relevant for the evolution of hybrid challenges, conflict and warfare namely: 5G, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnology, cloud computing, communication networks, cyber and electronic warfare, distributed ledger, directed energy, extended reality, hypersonics, internet of things, microelectronics, nanomaterials, nuclear modernisation, quantum sciences, space assets, and ubiquitous sensors. These emerging technologies are likely to drive developments in hybrid warfare in the forthcoming years. Seven of these technologies have been selected as having an especially prominent role: • 5G—the upcoming 5th generation mobile radio brings computing power to the edge; “5G first” policy for infrastructure upgrades recommended; watch out for hard- and software based cyber threats from malicious actors; • Artificial Intelligence—unlocks the full potential of data; first choice for strategic foresight; improving decision-making; situational awareness; targeting; and human–machine-teaming; • Autonomous Systems—indispensable capability in virtual and physical applications; bring masses to the battlespace and may be employed as expendables in critical missions;

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• Cyber and Electronic Warfare—cyber is a major enabler of hybrid threats; spectrum warfare combines cyber and EW into a new, crucial capability for mission success; • Extended Reality—visualises data and information, and structures interaction between the virtual and analogue worlds through digital technology; transforms training for and operations in hybrid campaigns by provision of digital twins; • Quantum Sciences—key source of future disruptive capabilities; Quantum Key Distribution has already arrived; watch out for silent takeover of civilian and military critical infrastructure by malicious actors. • Space—upcoming Low Earth Orbit and Medium Earth Orbit capabilities are about to multiply outer space assets, related bandwidth and sensor capabilities; enables global connectivity; particularly vulnerable to hybrid offences. Digitalisation is the price of admission to participate competently and selfdeterminedly in economic and social networks today. It is also, increasingly, a core issue of security and defence policy. A technologically smarter and connected world affects how wars will be fought in the future. The extremely dynamic, ongoing technology race is driving cross-domain networking and the virtualization of functions in armed forces and societies. It combines virtual worlds and reality, private and professional life with each other. The capacity to own—and the ability to access, organise, interpret, and distribute—data are at the very core of digitalisation. In a world of constant connectivity, data is the new oil and networks are the new oil rigs. Consequently, data needs to be refined to deliver actionable information. The capability to make information actionable have become of decisive importance to military operations. New smart and digital technologies enable to find and track these data and make their inherent information actionable. This provides new opportunities in a positive sense, but at the same time opens up a broad spectrum of potential hybrid attack vectors. In the recent past, actors such as Russia and China have repeatedly demonstrated that physical presence is no longer needed to achieve considerable tactical, operational and even politico-strategic objectives with relatively low risk of attribution and a low use of resources. Along with the dynamically developing digitalisation, armed forces build military operations increasingly on a data-driven, flexible, agile and highly adaptable backbone comprising command & control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). The ability to harness the rapidly growing flood of data will determine the success of future military operations, and thus the military strength of the West. NATO and the EU have been slow to cope with the leap from

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the analogue to the digital world. This needs to change as NATO’s C4I-based business model is the organisation’s key source of superior capabilities and decision-making. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) V is developing in the context of hybrid warfare. RMA V could have four major components: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR); C4; Information Warfare; and Integrated Logistics. System integration is a key feature. It is expected that hybrid attackers will model their targets, and use these models to develop their attack strategies. The most important capability will be to turn off the enemy’s situational awareness system, while effectively and permanently protecting one’s own system. By paving the way for RMAs, new technologies are about to transform warfare radically. Hybrid actors will likely use a creative mix of RMA I to RMA V to pursue their objectives. Hybrid actors are focussing primarily on forms of intervention which fall below the threshold of openly declared war, comprising unconventional and multi-dimensional methods. They choose strategies and approaches to which Western democracies have not yet found an appropriate response, and they employ modern technological capabilities. Several countries stand out in terms of the quantity and quality of government-led hybrid operations, e.g. Russia, China, and Iran. Of course, hybrid warfare is not their exclusive remit. Smaller states— including Western ones—can likewise be expected to apply hybrid instruments of power. Access to disruptive technologies will likely influence their behavioural patterns. Additionally, also a variety of non-state actors is engaged in hybrid activities, including terrorists, criminals, and private actors, of which some are state-supported proxies that are increasingly acting on behalf of governments. Looking ahead, the stature of private companies as emerging actors employing hybrid threats will increase—whether under government pressure, as public private partnership contributors or even in a role of their own making. Conceptual- and capabilities-gaps of the West have been exploited, and will be likely exploited further, by hybrid actors. Several of them are making skilful use of inexpensive, commercially available technologies to further their own ambitions and power objectives. China and Russia in particular have not only become military, but also technological rivals of the West—and are beginning to gain an edge. This is especially the case with regard to high-end technologies, such as: 5G, artificial intelligence, big data, autonomous systems, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum, hypersonics, microelectronics, quantum and sensor technologies, and space. Shaping the hybrid battlespace to their advantage is already today at the fulcrum of policy for states such as Russia, China and Iran; their success would

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be an augury of future crises. These states target the inherent vulnerabilities of NATO, the EU and member states in multiple domains, including but not limited to: cohesion within Western societies, solidarity between allies and partners, critical infrastructure, and the Western C4I backbone. Combining the possibilities of new technologies and the further development of operational concepts has been key to the successful Russian and Chinese rise in military capabilities across all operational domains—space, cyber, air, sea and land— and lies at the very core of their excellence in hybrid warfare. In particular, they have developed capabilities in the field of anti-access and area denial, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive cyber weapons, and electronic warfare. They have developed the capability to protect low-intensity military and paramilitary operations with networks of sensors, air defence and offensive weapons that enable highly effective, precise attacks. In order to safeguard their own response capabilities against hybrid threats, NATO and the EU would have to suppress or pre-emptively neutralise enemy A2/AD capabilities. This not only poses a capability challenge, but could also set off an unwanted escalation chain. Western cohesion and solidarity are at risk. Until the given conceptual and capability gaps are overcome, hybrid aggressors can widen the scope for hybrid action, blackmail NATO, the EU and individual member states, and may essentially undermine the cohesion and solidarity of NATO and EU members and partners. Neither the political nor the military leadership of NATO and the EU have yet succeeded to integrate hybrid warfare requirements into their strategic and operational concepts. Strategy needs to provide optimal support to political, civilian and military decision-makers in protecting their own Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information Centres of Gravity and in influencing—or, if necessary, disabling—the CoGs of opposing actors. Hybrid warfare allows opponents means of attacking NATO and EU members’ CoGs in an agile and adaptive manner. Effectively dealing with multiple and shifting CoGs in defence and offence in a flexible and dynamic manner needs to form the core of the Western strategic response. Since hybrid warfare seeks political success through an intelligent recourse to limited, deniable and supposedly manageable use of instruments of power, the challenge is to deny potential benefits to aggressors, and rather to confront them with severe consequences. Multi-domain operations aim at outmanoeuvring an opponent across an expanded battlespace. They cover the entire CoG spectrum and aim at overburdening opponents, disrupting their cohesion and their Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop. Because of its comprehensive format, the established NATO Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive—which is

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based on the PMESII construct—could indeed underpin the described conceptual approach. As the increasing emergence of new forms of low-intensity hybrid aggression by no means precludes the possibility of a large-scale war, NATO, the EU, and their respective member states, would be well-advised to prepare for the challenges in focus areas where their opponents are already well ahead, i.e. information operations, cyber space, the electromagnetic spectrum and outer space. To address hybrid threats in terms of offensive and defensive operations, action would need to be taken in political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, and informational CoGs. Critical vulnerabilities and interface links need to be identified and protected. Adequate Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) instruments of power should be able to influence the opponent’s behaviour. NATO and the EU need to build up robust multi-domain operational capabilities, so as to secure Western superiority even in the face of military escalation. Such capabilities would enable NATO and the EU to neutralise Chinese or Russian sensor- and weapons-networks via small attacks in contrast to an extensive, large-scale destruction of enemy A2/AD capabilities. In this manner, fully-fledged military escalation and conventional warfare scenarios could be avoided. Situational awareness is the competency, for political and military decisionmakers, to perceive the elements in their environment, and employ given instruments of power in a targeted and effective manner. In order to outmanoeuvre hybrid opponents, situational awareness should be adaptive and agile. Decision-makers can only make accurate decisions if they fully understand the operational environment and all relevant domains. This includes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, outer-space, and the global media landscape, which itself includes an endless variety of social media, outlets and actors. The weaponisation of information and the media has opened a whole new toolbox in support of hybrid warfare. Traditional, social and multi-media have developed into a valuable source of information, an important creative space, and even a destructive weapon when malicious actors harness their massive potential to influence information in media, social media, and multi-media, which frequently takes the form of disinformation campaigns. Additionally, by combining information from social and other media, as well as spatial information about targets from ubiquitous sensors, it is becoming increasingly easy to precisely locate and, if necessary, attack individual persons, infrastructure or weapons systems. Countering hybrid threats builds on a cross-domain targeting process. Following the identification and attribution of hybrid challenges, targeting is a key operational requirement, to be carried out with kinetic or non-kinetic means. When planning agile operations against hybrid aggressors, decision-makers must have a

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full overview of the potential effects of adversarial hybrid activities on their own concept of operations/CoGs and vice versa. Developing understanding through a broad spectrum of intelligence systems (COMINT (Communication Intelligence), ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence), MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence), OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), SIGINT (Signal Intelligence), SOCMINT (Social Media Intelligence) etc.) is critical in order to successfully determine which actionable information Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) has to deliver in hybrid contingencies. As the hybrid warfare engagement space is cross-departmental and multinational, this has to be reflected in any defensive and offensive measures taken. A cross/multidomain Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) process is needed to effectively ensure virtual and real platforms’ coordinated employment of sensors and effectors. We can expect a tough struggle for superiority in the information realm, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and in outer space. Serious gaming is required so as to prepare political, civil and military elites in democratic societies, both conceptually and culturally, in order to effectively hinder opponents from imposing their will via hybrid means. Serious gaming suggests the establishment of an authoritative modelling & simulation capability based on the possibilities of new technologies such as 5G, AI and extended reality, thus promoting conceptual thinking, decision superiority and developing needed skills. To competently address and counter hybrid challenges, decisionmakers need to have a thorough understanding of hybrid actors, threats, risks and applied concepts, as well as of NATO and EU capabilities, and need to be able to employ them in an effective, well-orchestrated manner. Resilience presents a key means to reduce the vulnerability and attack surface that hybrid attackers may exploit. As open, democratic Western societies offer multiple targets for hybrid aggressors: • Critical infrastructures need to become capable of functioning reliably, also in the face of hybrid threats and attacks, as they are the foundation of a functioning society; • Military forces and capabilities need to design and adapt operational readiness and a degree of redundancy that also works under stress and shock. As new technologies are increasingly becoming a critical infrastructure in themselves, and operational effectiveness has become reliant on technology, this puts a premium on a much closer cooperation of the military with the private sector. Growing military dependence on a broad spectrum of logistical and critical infrastructure services from the private sector reiterates this need;

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• Military and civilian resilience need to become mutually supportive so as to prevent hybrid opponents from exploiting the vulnerabilities of civil infrastructure and society. In the face of highly innovative hybrid attackers, and dynamically developing new technologies, resilience requires a “whole of society” approach and a comprehensive design that permanently seeks to reduce weak and fractured areas and strengthens social cohesion. In particular, coordination and cooperation need to be strengthened across civil and private, government and military sectors. Modelling own and opponents’ vulnerabilities helps to address challenges and opportunities. NATO and the EU would be well-advised to develop a common understanding of how to deal with hybrid threats/warfare, and to better concert their respective instruments of power. Given hybrid challenges and opportunities—strategy, concepts and concrete initiatives need to translate into capabilities, which empower members for the successful resistance and countering of hybrid aggression. Five main recommendations are offered for the consideration of policymakers: • Addresshybrid warfare issues in NATO and EU policy, strategy and operational concepts Opponents are currently in a better position to implement available modern technologies through intelligent transfer into military capabilities. In particular, they can conduct hybrid destabilization operations below the threshold of war and derive political and military benefits from this. NATO and EU conceptual gaps and resulting capability gaps (A2/AD; electronic warfare) with regard to hybrid warfare challenges open the floodgates to coercion and blackmailing by malicious actors, thus putting own cohesion and solidarity at risk. • Underpinown conceptual approaches with innovative capabilities Both in the short and long term, innovative capabilities can only be acquired through close cooperation with research institutes and the private sector, since these own the core of technological development, and thus shape current disruptive innovation dynamics. In the short-term, the focus should be on lowhanging fruits, i.e. those technologies that are already available or are about to become available, such as 5G, AI, autonomous systems, and space technology. In an operational environment of constant connectivity—with data as the new oil and networks as the new oil rigs—this focus would be particular instrumental for refining data and delivering actionable information. The long-term challenge is to build an innovation acceleration ecosystem that continuously enhances the own capability portfolio. Here, the technology spectrum is much broader and covers the full set of 19 highlighted technologies.

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• Build multi-domain situational awareness and cross-domain ISTAR capabilities as key assets in the toolbox of NATO and the EU Operational planning and intelligence cycles need to be synchronized and enable superior decision-making in multi-domain manoeuvres. As prototypes and related technologies are already available, the task now is to kick-off and track the process. Political, civil and military leadership need to articulate clear requests about the type of information and knowledge they need as a basis for decision-making at the political-strategic and operational levels to meet hybrid threats. • Prepare political, civil and military elites for hybrid challenges through serious gaming The uncharted territory of hybrid warfare in the information age requires a serious move vis-à-vis the decisive, educated leadership of hybrid opponents. The ambition to outmanoeuvre capable opponents raises the stakes for own decision-making. New technological possibilities are available and affordable. • Drive innovation and capability developments vialead institutions Innovation acceleration requires focus and competence. The European Defence Agency already plays an important role in developing EU members’ military instruments of power. It is also responsible for the development and coordination of EU and NATO capabilities in areas of common interest, such as hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks. Consequently, EDA is perfectly suited to engage in collaborative projects, fostering the rapid establishment of an adaptive and agile situational awareness, a cross-domain ISTAR capability, and to further develop the C4I backbone needed to excel in multi-domain operations. As the Joint Research Centre is providing scientific service and related knowledge to the EU Commission, it should cover the highlighted 19 technologies with a focus on: 5G; artificial intelligence; autonomous systems; cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum; extended reality; quantum sciences and space. In this context, it should deliver advice on innovation acceleration with a view to the further development of non-military instruments of power. Both organisations should develop a key role in the urgently needed innovation acceleration ecosystem. They should also oversee the urgent establishment of a modelling and simulation federation enabling serious gaming for political, civilian and military elites dealing with hybrid warfare. Close cooperation with the NATO Science & Technology Organisation and organisations of member nations would be of clear benefit, due to overlapping competences.

Annex 1—Fifth Generation Mobile Radio

Abstract This annex provides a comprehensive view on the particular importance of 5th generation (5G) mobile radio technology in the context of hybrid warfare. 5G it is discussed in the broader context of science, technology, business, security and defence. Particular focus is given to integrity and availability, advance security and defence applications, and capabilities delivered from space. The enormous revenue to be expected will drive a highly dynamic market access. Opportunities and risks are discussed.

5G is the fifth generation of cellular network technology and supports highspeed telecommunications. Its outstanding features are: • An extremely mobile broadband for entertainment, social networking and multimedia communication with high-definition video channels; • Machine communication with coverage for huge quantities of devices; • Monitoring and control of industrial workflows in real time, with very low latency and high reliability. The upcoming 5th generation (5G) mobile radio is a new technology enabling the use of compute-intensive technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, facial recognition and cryptography using mobile devices across

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0

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the network. Speed, latency, capacity and power consumption will all be greatly improved. 5G enables further digitisation, and thereby economic and social progress, delivering power to the edges. It will provide a key infrastructure for hybrid warfare, and significantly enhance the capabilities of security actors—both in offence and defence. It is a long-term project. Its development and deployment are expected to last until 2035, although the 5G roll-out should be accomplished by 2022 for the most part (Blackman & Forge, 2019, pp. 29). This puts a premium on rapid decision-making with a view to policy and standardisation. Today, mobile broadband has been established on a global scale. Since the first mobile phones were introduced in the 1980s, telecommunications operators have expanded coverage and improved services. The first-generation networks only supported mobile voice calls with limited coverage and capacity. This shortcoming was largely overcome with second (2G), third (3G) and fourth generation (4G) networks. With each new generation, the speed, capacity and range of services provided improved (CRA, 2019, pp. 6). 5G networks will be cloud-based, meaning that their infrastructure is composed of interconnected data centres. These provide a virtualisation environment, where network functions are virtual, running on a shared infrastructure that provides virtualised computer, networking and storage resources. Its vast potential for supporting new goods and services may elevate 5G to become a generalpurpose technology (GPT) (Findlay, 2019), laying the foundation for huge waves of economic growth, transforming society and the economy. Examples for GPT include the steam engine, the railways, electricity, the automobile, the computer, the Internet, and Artificial Intelligence. 5G-enabled and/or -reliant governmental networks, utilities, transportation networks, healthcare and other services will form new critical infrastructure (European Commission, 2019).

Integrity and Availability Whereas cyber-attacks used to be primarily aimed at the theft of intellectual properties, blackmail and unauthorised access to databases, in a 5G environment there is much more at stake. In hybrid warfare, state actors and their proxies attempt to embed themselves unnoticed within the critical infrastructures of their opponents in order to cause lasting damage to their functions, if necessary. In view of the central importance of 5G networks for key governmental functions, economies and societies, devastating effects are possible. Rash investments thus create easy,

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welcome access for hybrid aggressors. New 5G features in the network architecture, the wide range of services and applications, and the increased role of software in 5G equipment will increase the overall attack surface, i.e. the number of potential entry points for hybrid attackers (NIS, 2019, pp. 19–24). In its risk assessment of the cybersecurity of 5G networks, the European Union has urged member states to consider an array of nontechnical questions about potential vendors’ headquarters, relationships with host governments, surveillance rules, and prospects for legal recourse in the event of espionage, sabotage, or coercion. 5G security challenges are mainly linked to: • the availability and integrity of the networks, in addition to confidentiality and privacy concerns; • the increased importance of software, and the wide range of services and applications enabled by 5G networks; and • the complexity of the interlinkages between suppliers and operators, and the degree of dependency on individual suppliers (NIS, 2019). Threat scenarios targeting 5G networks of particular concern include: • local or global 5G network disruption; • spying on, modification of, or rerouting of the traffic/data in the 5G network infrastructure; • destruction or alteration of connected digital infrastructures or information systems through the 5G networks. Consequently, the integrity, availability, and cyber security of 5G networks is of paramount importance (NIS, 2019). Swift and/or inexpensive implementation cannot be allowed to supplant these concerns.

Advanced Security and Defence Applications We can expect an extended use of commercial 5G infrastructures for security and military purposes. For security and defence actors—including those responsible for hybrid action—5G will provide ubiquitous connectivity. Joseph Evans, technical director for 5G in the US Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering highlighted recently that it.

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“… offers high speeds, quicker response times and it can handle many more wireless devices than 4G technology.” (Stone, 2019)

5G network technologies provide access to advanced communications and networking with significantly improved data rates (Schneider, 2019), low latency, and significant energy savings over existing 4G networks (DOD, 2019). The extremely low latency of 5G enables real-time command and control applications, the transmission of sensor data collected by drones from mission areas to analysis centres around the world, and the use of services such as Extended Reality and Tactical Internet in missions. Network function virtualisation, new radio, and security enhancements present mission opportunities, for example, for increased spectrum-sharing, and high bandwidth transmission. Security actors that master ubiquitous connectivity will be particularly successful in meeting and countering hybrid threats. The real challenge will be to exploit the full potential of 5G for one’s own operations, while at the same time denying this to opponents (Stone, 2019). The armed forces and the private sector would both benefit from closer cooperation, since the military cannot afford to have its own comprehensive networks. Shared experience could provide both sides with important insights into the requirements to ensure an efficient and secure 5G ecosystem.

Capabilities Delivered From Space Commercially there are unprecedented opportunities for global communications, particularly vis-à-vis the requirements of military operations in vast and wide non-urban areas. The European Space Agency (ESA) and the European space industry have formed an initiative to jointly promote the use of satellites for 5G, aiming at developing the key technologies and standards needed to enable the seamless integration of satellite solutions into future 5G networks. Together with satellite operators, service providers and manufacturers, ESA coordinates projects with the European Commission’s existing 5G initiatives, including other European, national and international initiatives (ESA, 2017). Satellites will contribute significantly to innovative business models. Many of the 5G applications with a corresponding return on investment cannot be provided via terrestrial networks alone. New applications in transport, media and entertainment, energy, agriculture, health, factories of the future, public safety, security and defence are pending. For the timely deployment of 5G in European space, the European Union plans to invest up to EUR 700 million under the

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5G Public–Private Partnership. The EU expects industry to invest more than five times this amount. Space-based capabilities are required in particular by critical communications services in remote regions, IoT connectivity, and the operation of autonomous systems in all domains. Artificial Intelligence and machine learning will enhance performance. Hybrid actors will benefit from this development, as will government actors fighting hybrid threats.

A Money Machine for the Market Leader The global race by technology companies in the 5G market is open. Digital transformation pioneers such as former Alphabet CEO Eric Schmidt and LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman recently stressed in a report for the US government that the 5G market leader can expect hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue, and millions of new jobs over the next decade, and will set the standards for the rest of the world. The financial commitment in the race for 5G is extremely costly, as the technology—far more complex than before—requires a much denser network of base stations to deliver the required performance. The European Commission estimates that it will cost around EUR 500 billion (Blackman & Forge, 2019, pp. 6) to achieve its connectivity targets for 2025 (Sorkin, 2019). China’s goal in introducing 5G is not only to generate revenue in the domestic market and improve the performance of its industry, but to become the world’s leading supplier of telecommunications equipment (CRA, 2019, pp. 2). 5G technology is seen as both a product of, and a catalyst for China’s remarkable economic growth since 1979—a foundational element of the country’s booming economic and military power. In the US, the private sector is currently driving national strategic approaches. So far, the government has failed to develop a holistic, well-coordinated solution that will sustainably support the development of 5G. Several factors hamper the efficient use of 5G, including the complex process of frequency allocation, local opposition to antenna placement, and trade restrictions. The Japanese government had adopted a 5G roadmap aimed at implementation until the Olympic Games, originally planned for mid-2020. In addition, largevolume budgets were also set aside for research and funding (Blackman & Forge, 2019, pp. 23). South Korea has the ambition to be globally the first country to deploy 5G throughout the state. The government has been working closely with the major telecommunications providers and also wants to use the technology to improve the competitiveness of its own industry (CRA, 2019, pp. 31).

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Compared to other leading countries and economies, Europe has a good starting position in 5G development. European consortia are well positioned in many respects. This is underlined by an advanced pilot programme and the existing consensus on spectrum allocation. Europe is home to major technologies and equipment providers, as well as the main technical standards organisations, including the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), a worldwide cooperation of standardisation bodies for mobile standardisation. Consequently, investments in 5G technologies would pay off for European security actors. These investments would allow them to leverage the dynamic spectrum across a multi-domain hybrid battle-space.

Opportunities and Risks A recent report of the US Defense Science Board points out that along with the implementation of 5G technologies. “… there are inherent risks with regard to supply chain, cyber, radio frequency/electronic warfare and virtual/physical vulnerabilities.” (DSB, 2019, pp. 11, 12)

5G networks must be quantum-secure from the outset, otherwise they will have to be upgraded or even renewed in about a decade (Herman, 2019). In particular, mission criticality and acceptable risk must be at the core of 5G implementation planning (Pomerleau, 2019). Another element which should be closely monitored is whether human exposure to electromagnetic radiation remains within acceptable limits. While 5G is opening up numerous new applications for government and private use, it is simultaneously emerging as an increasingly attractive target for hybrid aggression. Not only are vulnerabilities growing, but so is the potential damage. 5G offers hybrid aggressors a wide range of approaches and targets. At the same time, it is crucial for the successful combatting of hybrid threats. With 5G, hybrid aggressors can monitor targets better than ever before, discrediting, tracking and intercepting them, and allowing, interrupting or even forging their IT-supported communication (Leake, 2019). As 5G networks are largely software-based, risks associated with inadequate software development processes are particularly serious. Hybrid players find it comparatively easy to use or even maliciously install backdoors in products

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without being noticed. Basic technical management functions of networks are becoming increasingly sensitive. Mobile network operators are becoming increasingly dependent on suppliers, which in turn increases the risk of a possible interruption in supply. These systemic vulnerabilities must be addressed at an early stage. 5G capability is inextricably linked with cutting-edge microelectronics, where respective industrial capabilities have moved towards China. China’s rapid advancements in technology combined with its aggressive market tactics have exposed countries and industries to intellectual property theft, debt traps, loss of market competition, cyber-attacks, and breaches. Vis-à-vis increasing hybrid threats, NATO and EU member states need to regain their own capacities. The integration of the private and public use of 5G creates a level of security in which police or military communications can hide from the public eye—providing that they cannot be seen or isolated. Conversely, a particularly dangerous hybrid threat to 5G networks is posed by states and state-supported actors with advanced cyber capabilities. Subcontractors, such as manufacturers of 5G network components or maintenance contractors, may also pose a threat, in particular if they can be pressured by states, as in the case of Huawei. China’s intended 5G dominance, strategically planned right from the introduction of this technology, effectively gives the country and its intelligence services control over vast amounts of personal and governmental, health and financial data that can prove very useful in the context of hybrid aggression and, if necessary, as a means of pressure. Regardless of China’s aspirations and actions, however, dependence on a singular supplier could have significant political consequences (Lucas, 2019). Whether or not NATO and EU member states will succeed in implementing secure and effective 5G networks will be a decisive factor for their future security and prosperity. China’s Huawei is currently setting the pace as market leader, with the Scandinavians Ericsson and Nokia, second and third, respectively. Arguably— if not incontrovertibly—the most sensible answer to 5G security questions is to strengthen Europe’s position in the market. Recommendations

• Make 5G a European industrial backbone. • Accelerate 5G deployment.

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• Build critical 5G infrastructure in Europe, relying predominantly on European/Western industries, such as the Swedish company Ericsson and the Finnish company Nokia. • Develop hardened and secure 5G technologies and infrastructure with specific attention to supply chains. • Apply a ‘5G first’ policy for infrastructure upgrades and recapitalisation. • Build 5G Quantum-safe from the outset. • Create a public-private innovation test-bed environment. • Develop applications tailored to missions in hybrid contingencies. • Strengthen European position in the market.

5G takeaways

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

New ground-breaking technology; Significantly improved data rates; Enables compute-intensive new technologies, such as AI and quantum; Backbone of digitised economies and societies. Forms new critical infrastructure shared by friends and foes. Added value via space-based 5G. Enormous financial stakes. European industrial actors are second and third in the market. Technological leadership of opponents may lead to unforeseen risks. Extended use of commercial 5G infrastructures for security/military purposes. States and state-sponsored actors constitute the most dangerous threat. Particular challenges in the areas of cyber security, spectrum management, network optimisation and supply chains. Integrity and availability of 5G networks will be of major concern. Speedy implementation is important, but security is paramount.

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Annex 2—Artificial Intelligence1

Abstract This annex provides a comprehensive view on the particular importance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a key technology of digitalisation in the context of hybrid warfare. AI is discussed in the broader context of science, technology, business, security and defence. Particular focus is given to big data, machine learning, and its potential to support predictive analytics. Competitors and vulnerabilities are addressed in the context of potential operational benefits. Opportunities and risks are discussed. In sum: it can be expected that AI will push the envelope in hybrid warfare. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a key technology of digitalisation (Harhoff et al., 2018, pp. 6). The technology is currently developing at a tremendous pace. The US Department of Defense refers to AI as “the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence – for example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action – whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems.” (DoD, 2019)

As digitalisation puts traditional economic sectors under pressure to transform, this pressure will intensify as new added-value comes from utilising data in combination with AI systems. Driven by data and algorithms, AI will affect almost every aspect of life, from developing more effective ways to educate people, to changing the way they earn money, to defending against attacks in virtually any domain (Schmidt & Work, 2019). AI has increased the complexity of warfare. It 1 This expanded paper has been published as Working Paper 6 by the Hybrid COE (Thiele, 2020).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0

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offers a broad spectrum of possibilities for reducing the human workload and providing superior capabilities to complement the work of the individual. AI-driven autonomous tools will become ‘useful teammates’ for human beings, rather than tools used by them. Artificial intelligence is an umbrella term that covers methods that aim to automate decision-making processes that traditionally require the use of human intelligence, such as recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action. Fuelled by sensors and data digitisation, AI predicts outcomes, thereby enabling better-informed, data-driven decisions. At present, trained algorithms act as black boxes, i.e. systems which can be viewed in terms of inputs and outputs, with opacity as regards their internal workings. These algorithms can, as such, be characterised by excellence or by errors, or be deliberately manipulated. It will be crucial to ensure that the development and integration steps of AI are openly comprehensible and verifiable so as to avoid misuse by criminals, terrorists or actors with malicious intent or disposition.

Machine Learning Machine learning plays a particular role in AI. Defence and security organisations apply machine learning and machine vision software to permanently update knowledge about the operational environment. New capabilities have emerged with the introduction of deep learning combined with the free availability of large amounts of data and increased processing ability; these capabilities have enhanced force protection, sustainment, and logistics (Masuhr, 2019, pp. 4). The US military already uses AI in the context of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and sensors. This enables it to make professional use of unstructured data sources, including full-motion video, or comparable approaches to the automated exploitation of audio and text. In this way, reaction times can be dramatically reduced without compromising precision. At the same time, the AI-driven integration of real-time data provides for a better understanding of behavioural patterns, structures and processes, as well as of technological relationships (Egel et al., 2019).

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AI-based image processing can identify and categorise enormous quantities of surveillance video/images captured by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for example. The algorithm behind the software is not only able to identify relevant objects and anomalies in the video/image material for which it has been trained, but it also alerts analysts to a human operator and points them to marked objects (Roth, 2019). Machine learning facilitates greater precision. It complements human assessments and predictions. It has the potential to accelerate decision-making as it enables decision-makers to analyse and understand security related developments faster and better than before. At present, a particular challenge is to ensure the absence of biases or analytical errors in machine learning. The findings will lead to a judgement, who exactly should have access to AI, and would thus contextualise it and interpret its results (Merz, 2019).

Predictive Predictive analytics is an important feature of AI that renders information actionable (Millicent, 2019). For example, AI can pool vast amounts of data, such as messages, reports, charts, spreadsheets, telephone records, sensor data etc. The pooling of data helps to detect unseen patterns, and aids in criminal, terrorist or hybrid warfare investigations. This will prove particularly valuable in hybrid contingencies when it is crucial to uncover the opponent’s shifting/altering centres of gravity. For example, by correlating information, predictive analytics models may provide support in the search for signs of planned criminal or terrorist attacks, such as the purchase of weapon- or bomb-making material. In this way, they would contribute significantly to preventing the execution of criminal or terroristic plans from the outset (Roth, 2019). In border security, AI enables large areas to be monitored and, if necessary, relevant objects to be detected and marked using compact, lightweight radar systems, which can be installed, for example, in drones. This significantly improves the situation overview along unclear borders. AI-supported software aids in the assessment of travellers using standard Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record. This helps to match data at security and border checkpoints. It may also improve the speed at which governmental agencies can generate predictive models of risk for incoming travellers (Millicent, 2019). With AI, real and virtual exercises can be made much more realistic and demanding. In this way, personnel can be better prepared for complex operations. This is particularly important when it comes to hybrid warfare scenarios, where

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trainees can learn to act flexibly and dynamically against opponents through AI-supported modelling and simulation. Particularly when combined with rapid developments in augmented reality, AI will significantly improve realism in tactical training, forming the basis for operational concepts to be further developed (Roth, 2019).

Operational Benefits NATO and the EU—as well as hybrid aggressors—can expect vast and diverse operational benefits from AI (Fawkes & Menzel, 2018). These include: • superior decision-making through actionable data and information; • a reduction in administrative and staff work through predictive logistics; • improved ISR capabilities and risk reduction through autonomous systems. Developments point in particular to further improvements in the performance of unmanned systems and to the optimisation of data and information-processing capability within military C4I systems. As the number of platforms, and thus the number of sensors on the battlefield, has increased—and as the sensors themselves have become increasingly technologically sophisticated—the demands for their evaluation have also increased (PWC, 2018). Information overload has become a real problem. AI-driven intelligent and automated evaluation provides for evaluating and processing all relevant data and applying these in a timely and effective manner. Generally, it can be expected that AI will help the armed forces to collect, categorise, analyse and evaluate data much faster and efficient than before. Its potential to simplify and streamline processes has made the introduction and use of AI a key priority for armed forces. AI-enabled systems are multi-tasking capable and can collect, categorise and transmit data, signals, images and video collected by drones according to the requirements of multiple users (Masuhr, 2019, pp. 2). AI will benefit military applications from the strategic to the tactical level, particularly by analysing big data, optimising processes, and supporting strategic and operational planning. This will vastly accelerate decision-making processes and lead to the achievement of multi-domain situational awareness, using any available data source in a structured way. AI-enabled technologies will likely ease logistical burdens, and accelerate combat reaction times (Horowitz, 2018).

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At the political-strategic level, AI-enabled systems could support complex simulations, particularly as regards ongoing crises in real time, with a view to scrutinising hybrid opponents that are thinking and acting in complex and dynamic ways. At the operational level, the possibility to feed less structured data of a greater volume into C4I systems can enable faster and better decisions to be made, as AI can ensure that decision-makers are only supplied with relevant information without being distracted by complex computer interfaces. At the tactical level, AI may provide improved and faster situational awareness for the crews of combat vehicles. It can automate threat detection by recognising persons or object types, as well as by recognising potentially dangerous behaviours. Additionally, the system can use AI to record information in the form of natural speech, digitise it, and make it available to the system in a pre-processed form, thereby significantly increasing efficiency (Roth, 2019).

Driven by Civil Technology Also, with regard to AI, defence technology is driven by civil technology, traded in private markets. This fact points at the requirement to develop an AI ecosystem with strong networks between science and economic actors, encompassing the full spectrum from start-ups to big companies to society at large. “As AI moves towards more artificial general intelligence-types of comprehensive solutions, the still relatively neat lines between defence and non-defence technologies and applications that we still see today are likely to blur even more. … Defense and security AI-augmented technologies and applications will increasingly be able to draw from the core technologies and applications developed by their civilian counterparts for totally unrelated purposes.” (Spiegeleire et al., 2017, pp. 16)

The dual-use character of AI, namely the simultaneous suitability of technologies for civil and military purposes, makes it imperative for governments to seek a close exchange with industry and research. The armed forces must try to adapt the disruptive, rapidly changing civil technologies as quickly and efficiently as possible in order not to lag behind. This requires careful calibration as to the extent to which internal processes, organisational structures and doctrines—all of which have evolved over long periods of time—could and should be replaced. Alongside the technological and organisational components, the legal, ethical and, perhaps most importantly, the political dimensions must also be taken into account.

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Competitors China is currently restructuring its armed forces using an AI-based approach (Engstrom, 2018, pp. 77, 78). The use of dual technologies is intended to ensure a systemic superiority based on processing power, data encryption and the ability to control own data and information systems, while having access to opponents’ data. The same applies principally to Russia. Of particular concern is that Russia and China apparently advance quicker on AI battlefield technology compared to armed forces in NATO and EU. As Moscow is struggling with structural and financial difficulties that stand in the way of first-class AI research, Russia is focussing AI applications on hybrid influencing and information warfare. However, it should be noted that Russia has started equipping soldiers with information management tools to ensure maximum access to relevant data in order to achieve information dominance in military operations (Eversden, 2021). These difficulties notwithstanding, there are a number of Russian projects aiming at integrating AI in a remarkable range of weapons, from smaller firearms to the Armata T-15 tank. Essentially, this involves the integration of AI features into target definition and decision-making. Russian development and application of military robotics, unmanned drones and ground vehicles also rely on the integration of AI. Russia’s Tactical Missiles Corporation is working on AI guided missiles that can determine their own direction (Horowitz et al., 2018, pp. 17). In the Middle East, Iran is leading in AI research and development. Iran focusses primarily on the integration of AI into low-cost technologies (Stein et al., 2019). The operational focus on AI applications in the context of drones and swarming techniques is obvious. AI is also increasingly integrated into Iranian platforms. There are reports that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is practicing attack operations in which AI coordinates boats, aircraft, tanks and drones in a broad-based attack (Rubin, 2020).

Vulnerable Since AI-capable weapons are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain, they will also be accessible to non-state actors and proxies. Some states could even deliberately provide such actors with these capabilities, as they have previously done with conventional weapons (Rubin, 2020). Furthermore, due to the open availability of most developments of AI, and their ease of implementation, these technologies—and therefore the capability to adapt them in the military context—will sooner or later be available to any opponent. These AI capabilities

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will constitute significant threats to those parts of NATO/EU economies, infrastructure, and populations that are most vulnerable to disruption, subversion and further hybrid threats. As opponents will likely use all available tools in a wellorchestrated, synchronised manner, the response must be similarly comprehensive and well-orchestrated (Mehta, 2018). As a recent Rand study highlighted, with the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and vis-à-vis increasingly algorithmic and big-data-driven processes: “Aggressors will increasingly have the opportunity not merely to spread disinformation or favorable narratives or to damage physical infrastructure, but to skew and damage the functioning of the massive databases, algorithms and networks of computerized or computer-dependent things on which modern societies will utterly depend.” (Mazarr et al., 2019, pp. xiii)

Actually, a shift from the manipulation of messages and narratives towards the manipulation of data, algorithms, and networks may occur.

Hybrid Warfare In hybrid warfare, AI will push the envelope. It will drive an evolution: information and knowledge dominance will decisively increase the speed, precision, and efficacy with which said information is made actionable. AI will excel particularly in the context of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and sensors. It enables professional use of unstructured data sources, including fullmotion video, or comparable approaches to the automated exploitation of audio and text. AI will also enable group behaviours to be mimicked, influenced, and altered, thereby shaping the social and economic effects of hybrid conflict. In future, when facial recognition, biometrics, and signature recognition technologies are ubiquitous, it will be much harder to hide soldiers, proxies or their equipment. With a far more extensive AI-enabled intelligence-gathering, processing, and exploitation OODA—Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA)-loop, a nation-state can do much to fight against hybrid insurgents. AI Takeaways

• One of the key enabling technologies of digitalisation. • Priority for armed forces as well as intelligence.

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• Machine learning and algorithms have a particular role. • Predictive analytics is an important particular feature. • Upcoming challenges and opportunities cross-cut existing technologies across all military & intelligence branches. • Likely beneficial to C4I, cyber operations, decision-making, electronic warfare, autonomous systems & swarms, extended reality as well as to logistics, operational tempo & targeting, predictions & risk management, simulation and training, and situational awareness. • Defence technology is driven by civil technology. • Governments lean on commercial sector. • Technological leadership of opponents may lead to unforeseen risks.

Recommendations

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Employ the game-changing attributes of AI as an enabler. Integrate AI into operations and keep the Human-in-the-loop. Institutionalise AI as a part of doctrine, strategy, and tactics. Standardize data and adopt cloud services. Carry out regular portfolio reviews of integrated and joint investments in AI. Establish certification processes. Prioritise AI-related research and development projects. Protect AI-related industrial know-how. Enhance collaboration and teaming across the armed forces, security and defence agencies, the private sector, and academia. Recruit, develop, retain, and enable personnel capable of leveraging AI capabilities. Make security- and defence-related data available to the AI ecosystem; Build appropriate databases to train the tools. Draw on the blended skillset of data scientists, operators, and intelligence professionals. Develop AI employment, technologically, organisationally and politically. Invest in oversight.

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References (DoD) Department of Defense. (2019). Summary of the DoD artificial intelligence strategy. 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/200208 8963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDFhttps://media.def ense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STR ATEGY.PDF. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Egel, D., Robinson, E., Cleveland, C. T., & Oates, C. (2019). AI and irregular warfare: An evolution, not a revolution. War on the rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/ai-and-irregular-warfare-an-evo lution-not-a-revolution/. Accessed: 9 Feb 2019. Engstrom, J. (2018). Systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare: How the Chinese peoples liberation Army seeks to wage modern warfare. Santa Monika: RAND, 2018. file:///Users/ralphthiele/Downloads/RAND_RR1708.pdf. Accessed: 16 Feb Eversden, A. (2021). A warning to DoD: Russia advances quicker than expected on AI, battlefield tech. C4ISRnet. https://www.c4isrnet.com/artifi cial-intelligence/2021/05/24/a-warning-to-dod-russia-advances-quicker-thanexpected-on-ai-battlefield-tech/. Accessed: 16 Jun 2021. Fawkes, A. J., & Martin, M. (2018). The future role of artificial intelligence – Military opportunities and challenges. JAPCC Journal 27, 2018. https://www. japcc.org/the-future-role-of-artificial-intelligence/. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Harhoff, D., Heumann, S., Jentzsch, N., & Lorenz, P. (2018). Outline for a German strategy for artificial intelligence. https://www.ip.mpg.de/filead min/ipmpg/content/aktuelles/Outline_for_a_German_Artificial_Intelligence_ Strategy.pdf. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. Horowitz, M. C. (2018). The promise and peril of military applications of artificial intelligence. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin. org/2018/04/the-promise-and-peril-of-military-applications-of-artificial-intell igence/. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. Horowitz, M. et al. (2018). Strategic competition in an era of artificial intelligence. Center for a New American security. Washington, DC. July 2018. 15-17. http://files.cnas.org.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CNAS-Strate gic-Competition-in-an-Era-of-AI-July-2018_v2.pdf. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Masuhr, N. (2019). AI in military enabling applications. CSS analyses in security Policy No. 251. October 2019. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/ special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse251-EN. pdf. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021.

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Mazarr, M. J., Bauer, R., Casey, A., Heintz, S., & Matthews, L. (2019). The emerging risk of virtual societal warfare. Research Reports. California, United States of America: RAND Corporation, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/res earch_reports/RR2714.html. Access: 3 Feb 2021 Mehta, A. (2018). AI makes Mattis question ‘fundamental’ beliefs about war. C4ISRNET. February 17, 2018. https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2018/ 02/17/ai-makes-mattis-question-fundamental-beliefs-about-war/. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Merz, F. AI in Military Enabling Applications. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 251. October 2019. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse251-EN.pdf. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021. Millicent, A. (2019). Big data in the Military. Emerj. May 8, 2019. https:// emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/big-data-military/. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. PWC. (2018). Nations will spar over AI. AI predictions. 2018. https://www. pwc.com/us/en/services/consulting/library/artificial-intelligence-predictions/aiarms-race.html. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Roth, M. (2019). Artificial intelligence in the military – An overview of capabilities. February 22, 2019. https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-int elligence-in-the-military-an-overview-of-capabilities/. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Rubin, M. (2020). Robotics are making Iran’s military more dangerous than ever. The National Interest. https://www.aei.org/op-eds/robotics-are-makingirans-military-more-dangerous-than-ever/. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Schmidt, E., & Work, R. (2019). In search of ideas: The National Security Commission on artificial intelligence wants you. War on the Rocks, July 18, 2019. De Spiegeleire, S., Maas, M., & Sweijs,T. (2017). Artificial Intelligence and the future of defense: Strategic implications for small- and medium-sized force providers. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). https:// www.academia.edu/33046810/Artificial_Intelligence_and_the_Future_of_Def ense_Strategic_Implications_For_Small-_to_Medium-Sized_Force_Providers? email_work_card=view-paper. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Stein, A., Tabatabia, A., & Ostovar, A. (2019).The Iranian way of war. Foreign policy research. https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/09/roundtable-theiranian-way-of-war/. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. Thiele, R. (2020). Artificial Intelligence – A key enabler of hybrid warfare. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 6, Helsinki, March 2020, ISBN 978-952-728231-1. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-6-artifi cial-intelligence-a-key-enabler-of-hybrid-warfare/. Access: 17 Feb 2021.

Annex 3—Autonomous Systems

Abstract This annex provides a comprehensive view on the particular importance of autonomous systems as a key technology of digitalisation in the context of hybrid warfare. Autonomous systems are discussed in the broader context of science, technology, business, security and defence. Particular focus is given to drones as spearheads to the given dynamic development, to swarming, virtual robots and human–machine teams. Opportunities and risks are discussed. In sum: it can be expected that AI will push the envelope in hybrid warfare. In sum: all domains hold plenty of options for the engagement of autonomous systems in hybrid warfare. Whether in cars, airplanes, household appliances, stock trading or on battlefields—crawling, running, moving, swimming, diving and flying systems, machines, devices and software are integrating more and more intelligence and autonomy into their functionality, and thus into our daily lives. And they are proliferating. Autonomous systems perceive, learn, think and act on their own. They solve complex tasks and respond intelligently to unforeseeable events. We are contemporary witnesses and co-creators, objects and beneficiaries of rapid technological development. Autonomous systems use Artificial Intelligence (AI) to take over tasks that were previously performed by humans. AI provides the core technologies for machine learning and cyber security—functions that are essential for the further development and deployment of autonomous systems. AI algorithms allow autonomous systems to interact naturally with people and, in general, with their environments. This not only improves productivity and resource utilisation, but also mobility and quality of life.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0

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“Autonomy is the ability of a system to respond to uncertain situations by independently composing and selecting among different courses of action in order to accomplish goals based on knowledge and a contextual understanding of the world, itself, and the situation.” (NATO STO, 2020, pp. 16) In production plants, fleets of intelligent robots work together and interact flexibly with human employees. Autonomous warehouse logistics solutions, unmanned cargo ships, intelligent networks, networked household appliances and household robots with social competence have long been available. Most of online traffic is already generated by so-called bots. This is an indication that there are also fraudulent autonomous systems, i.e. intelligent software that pretends to be human users, and uses malicious software to attack systems, disrupt their operation, or collect or even steal information.

Spearheads Drones have established themselves around the world in the past two decades, forming the spearhead of autonomous development. Comparable to autonomous driving, the AI of a drone is trained in a structured learning process. A human operator first controls the drone to collect visual and spatial data from the cameras and light detection and ranging systems. Objects in the resulting images, such as walls, mountains or cliffs, are labelled and then pass through the learning algorithm developed for the drone’s operation. The AI supports the pre-processing of the permanently acquired sensor data and the flight control systems. Not only large-scale industry and governmental institutions, but also mediumsized companies, small businesses and engineering firms benefit from drones and their ability to survey large areas quickly and cost-effectively without extensive personnel deployment. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) enable the detection, collection and analysis of processes that have an impact on settlement areas, traffic routes and infrastructure. This includes, for example, the detection and evaluation of damage caused by avalanches, landslides, debris flows and floods. They warn of catastrophes, speed up rescue and recovery operations, or bring medicines to inaccessible areas. In traffic monitoring, drones collect real-time information on road traffic. Compared to conventional systems, they are very flexible and cost-effective in monitoring large continuous sections of road, or concentrating on a specific

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road segment. They perform comparable tasks for police, fire brigade and border patrol. Drones provide research teams with comprehensive data sets. In risk management, they provide insurance companies with an overview of hail damage. In the construction industry, they monitor construction sites in real time. They inspect power and gas lines at lower cost and much faster than conventional inspection methods. In agriculture, drones support harvest management and irrigation planning, e.g. through aerial and thermal imaging. They take over surveying work. On the basis of the collected data, 3D models are created that very realistically visualise data on growing areas, fields or forests. In this way, fields and forests can be digitised, areas optimised, and production increased. Multispectral cameras provide information about the vital condition of plants, or the composition of the soil. In addition to information on plant health, possible crop yield, soil composition, surface moisture, drainage or drought damage can also be evaluated and documented. Drones can also be used as spray drones in difficult soil conditions, and are much more efficient than conventional soil spraying. Even postal and parcel services use drones for their tasks. DHL, a logistics giant, has successfully tested the delivery capabilities of parcel drones to end customers in Reit im Winkl, a village in Southern Germany. The yellow–red aircraft shuttles back and forth between the village and Winklmoosalm, a nearby ski area. Meanwhile, the logistics drone of the US helicopter specialist Bell Textron is scheduled to join the US Group’s logistics service in the first quarter of 2020. And as recently as May 2020, UPS also received approval from the responsible US regulatory authority, the FAA, to set up an entire fleet of drone transport. So far, drones are still overtaxed to be successfully used in city traffic. But AI should change that. Researchers at the University of Zurich have developed an artificial neural network that learns in a similar way to the human brain. The researchers are feeding this AI with thousands of videos of car and bicycle drivers behaving exemplarily in traffic. Over time, the algorithm learns to derive rules of behaviour—it understands how to follow roads without getting into oncoming traffic, and how to stop in time before obstacles such as pedestrians, vehicles and road works. It learns to solve complex tasks by means of numerous training examples. This enables the drone to fly around both static and dynamic obstacles in road traffic, and to adjust its speed autonomously.

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Swarms and Human–Machine Teams In light of these developments, it is no surprise that autonomous systems are also on the rise in the military domain. We are currently experiencing a fundamental change in the way progressive armed forces fight. Many armed forces, and even irregular actors such as terrorists, already have unmanned systems that crawl, swim and fly, which are being used in mine clearance, surveillance and fire support. Advances in sensor technology, robotics and computers are enabling the development of a whole new class of systems. With the further development of autonomous systems, whole swarms of intelligent systems will work together in future (Hruska, 2018), including interconnected drones, jets, ships and other systems (Burke, 2020). In these swarms, multiple unmanned vehicles control themselves, and independently interact with each other. As such, AI will ensure that the flight control systems of entire swarms can be orchestrated, and that permanently acquired sensor data can be processed in real time. In this way, swarms have developed into networked, mobile, autonomous sensor and effector platforms. To develop more efficient and accurate swarm cooperation algorithms—which lead to better performance and faster response—advanced machine learning algorithms will be required. AI supports the spectrum from semi-autonomous to fully autonomous systems as the manual data cycle takes too much time both in hybrid warfare scenarios and in highly dynamic battle-spaces. The US Air Force future long-range strike aircraft, which replaces the B-2 stealth bomber, will be able to operate both with and without crew. Unmanned trucks and other supply vehicles have been designed to perform dirty, dull and dangerous battlefield tasks. For the foreseeable future, Human–Machine-Teaming (HMT) appears set to become a critical capability for future military operations in all domains. Up to now, autonomous systems lack the robustness and flexibility of human intelligence. In future conflicts, unmanned autonomous systems will act as part of a team in close cooperation with human decision-makers and emergency services. In principle, autonomous drones take over the boring and dangerous mission tasks; humans maintain command of the control functions, and concentrate on the cognitively demanding tasks. The US Army, for example, is expected to assign HMT a broader role in the further development of its multi-domain battle concept (Pomerleau, 2017). In future scenarios, it can be assumed that a manned system will be escorted by swarms of unmanned systems, with the mission lead remaining at the manned end. What the use of intelligent and autonomous systems can mean for critical infrastructure and military operations was demonstrated in 2019 by the air strikes

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on oil facilities in Abqaiq and Churais in Saudi Arabia. Analysis of satellite images point at nineteen individual strikes. The drones used had an estimated purchase price of around EUR 14,000 each. The attack inflicted so much damage on Saudi Arabia’s oil industry that Aramco’s production was cut by half. The effect extended all the way to filling stations in Europe. A UN investigation was not able to confirm about the origin of the drone attack; Iran was suspected, but no conclusive evidence was found.

Virtual Robots Virtual cyber-robots can also be used alongside intelligent physical autonomous systems. They have several functions: they can protect communication and information, as well as technical systems against attacks by means of electronic warfare; they can also analyse data and merge information. Autonomous CyberAI can detect what is normal in their networks and thus identify unknown threats at an early stage and react to them autonomously before damage occurs. In future, algorithms will fight against algorithms. Developments are moving towards AI-driven cyber-attacks, where malware will have the ability to selfpropagate via a series of autonomous decisions and intelligently tailor itself to the parameters of the infected systems. Those autonomous systems with the best AI will win. This is a particular challenge in hybrid contingencies. As Sanjay Aurora, Managing Director, Asia Pacific, Darktrace, has pointed out: “Attackers can use AI to bypass traditional security tools and slowly and subtly cause instrumental damage to the operations of the infrastructure – all whilst going undetected. These attacks have the potential to compromise our most critical infrastructure by turning off the lights, disrupting transport systems, and ultimately threatening public safety. The past year has shown us that geopolitical tensions are beginning to be played out in cyberspace. Nation states will have to be on high alert to protect their energy grids, manufacturing plants, and airports from sophisticated cyber-threats.” (Aurora, 2019)

Consequently, early detection and action/reaction will be of increasing importance to prevent attacks from doing harm. Organisations need to be capable of autonomous response.

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Innovation Innovation in unmanned systems is moving fast. Developments include new materials and designs to enhance utility and efficiency; new capabilities, especially stealth and strike; and diffusion of advanced capabilities. Biomimicry—incorporating animal attributes into drone- and platform-design is a growing area of drone research. Unlike earlier breakthrough technologies, such as stealth or precision-guided weapons that originated in secret military laboratories, most of the innovation in autonomous systems today is driven by the commercial sector. States are no longer the main drivers of disruptive security and defence technologies. Information technology alone fuels much of the development that makes autonomy possible—improved sensors, faster processing, lower-cost inertial navigation and miniaturisation. Against this backdrop, mankind must hurry if it purports to fulfil its managerial role competently. Autonomous systems are both an opportunity and a challenge for industry and the armed forces, the state and society. Real and virtual autonomous systems can already work together effectively today (Tucker, 2018). For hybrid actors, modern technologies make it possible, for example, to equip drones in an autonomous mode for longer ranges with powerful sensors, electromagnetic or kinetic agents. They can also use the drones to spy on, detect and track people, or to combat or damage critical infrastructure. Autonomy and distance allow them to operate undercover. It is difficult to trace their origin back to specific actors or persons. This makes autonomous drones particularly attractive for hybrid missions. Criminal and terrorist actors will doubtless also appreciate the combination of options available with the added benefit of stealth deployment. On the higher end of autonomous drones, the development is progressing rapidly. Stealth drones of medium and large size are difficult to detect by radar systems. They can be employed for covert intelligence and surveillance operations, a crucial component of hybrid operations. China appears to be currently leading the advancement. Its stealthy DR-8 drone, displayed during a military parade in September 2019, attracted much international interest (CNN, 2019). By the early 2020s, China is expected to operate large unmanned and potentially armed submarines around the world, aimed at opponent forces in disputed area (Chen, 2018). Russia, meanwhile, is expected to build, and is looking to operate, large nuclear-powered unmanned submarines, (Gady, 2019) theoretically capable of carrying nuclear weapons (DOD, 2018, pp. 6). Both Moscow and Beijing are also prioritising unmanned robot tanks, with Russia testing its latest version in operations in Syria. Russia has also employed small drones to target Daesh

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individuals, primarily in July 2019. According to the US Centre for Naval Analyses, these Russian drones are very difficult to detect and interdict, and can be employed to target small groups or individuals (Ioanes, 2019). In sum, all domains hold plenty of options for the engagement of autonomous systems in hybrid warfare. NATO and the EU need to be prepared to deal with these dangerous threats. Recommendations

• Develop autonomous systems employment operationally, technologically, organisationally and politically. • Carry out regular portfolio reviews of integrated and joint investments in autonomous systems. Maintain vigilance upon electronic warfare. • Encourage concept development and experimentation (CDE) of employment options, including swarming. • Prioritise research and development projects. As developments are driven by the commercial sector, it is of importance to enhance collaboration and teaming across the armed forces, as well as security and defence agencies with the private sector, and academia to exploit the enormous potential of commercial markets. • Establish certification processes. • Explore options for countermeasures. • Keep the Human-in-the-loop. • Protect autonomous systems-related industrial know-how.

Hybrid Warfare Takeaways

• Benefits C4ISR and covers missions in all domains. • Can be expected to become a particularly attractive ISR and delivery platforms for hybrid actors. • Boosts the effectiveness and precision of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons. Increases operational tempo and time sensitive targeting. Attribution and ownership will be difficult to determine.

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• Mini, micro and nano unmanned x vehicles (UxVs), i.e. aerial, surface, undersea, ground, have become an emerging solution for an increasing range of military missions, including tactical ISR, urban warfare, deception operations. and battle damage assessment. • Covers a broad spectrum of hard and soft kill options, such as electronic countermeasures, cyber, kinetic kills, directed energy weapons, interceptor swarms, and deception. With regard to offensive and defensive cyber operations, they will become state of the art. Can be employed for electronic counter-measures, for example, to jam adversarial sensors and take out communications between unmanned aerial assets and their respective control units. • Can be used to attack an adversary’s embarking speed boat fleet. Further mission options include mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface warfare. • Will prove particularly capable and effective when using swarming concepts. • Autonomous systems could be employed as agile mines to protect perimeters around own assets; identify and attack missile and air defence sites; support maritime interception and search for enemy submarines; explore buildings and track combatants or civilians in urban areas; disorient attacking forces; confuse and jam enemy radars; infiltrate command networks. • Employs human-machine teaming.

References Aurora, S. ( 2019). Autonomous Cyber AI is revolutionizing cyber defense. https://www.cisomag.com/autonomous-cyber-defense/. Accessed: 3 Feb 2019. Burke, B. (2020). Gartner: Top 10 strategic technology trends in 2020. Computer Weekly. January 2, 2020. https://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/ Gartner-Top-10-strategic-technology-trends-in-2020?src=6059371&asrc=EM_ ERU_124712826&utm_content=eru-rd2-rcpB&utm_medium=EM&utm_sou rce=ERU&utm_campaign=20200312_ERU%20Transmission%20for%2003/ 12/2020%20(UserUniverse:%20717797. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. Chen, S. (2018). China military develops robotic submarines to launch a new era of sea power. 29 Sep, 2018. South China Morning

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Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2156361/china-develo ping-unmanned-ai-submarines-launch-new-era-sea-power. Accessed: 15 Feb 2021. CNN. (2019). China shows off new stealth drones. https://edition.cnn.com/ asia/live-news/china-hong-kong-oct-1-live-intl-hnk/h_1ba984e1cf9a9976964 8fe35eb06cec5. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. (DoD) Department of Defense. (2018). Nuclear Posture Review. Washington 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. Accessed: 15 Feb 2021. Hruska, J. (2018). Think one military drone is bad? Drone swarms are terrifyingly difficult to stop. Extreme Tech. https://www.extremetech.com/ext reme/265216-think-one-military-drone-bad-drone-swarms-terrifyingly-diffic ult-stop. Accessed: 15 Feb 2021. Pomerleau, M. (2020). Multidomain operations are driving the Army to the cloud. C4ISRNET. https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/2017/08/ 31/armys-multidomain-battle-brings-manned-unmanned-teaming-to-the-fore/. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. Tucker, P. (2018). The U.S. Military’s drone swarm strategy just passed a key test. Nextgov. November 26, 2018. https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/ 2017/08/31/armys-multidomain-battle-brings-manned-unmanned-teaming-tothe-forehttps://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2018/11/us-militarys-droneswarm-strategy-just-passed-key-test/153026/. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021.

Annex 4—Quantum Sciences2

Abstract This annex provides a comprehensive view on the particular importance of quantum science applications as an emerging key technology in the context of hybrid warfare. Quantum science applications are discussed in the broader context of science, technology, business, security and defence. Particular focus is given to broad technological spectrum of new and enhanced, game-changing capabilities coming up, its likely disruptive effects and observations on the ongoing quantum race taking place on global scale. Opportunities and risks are discussed. Of particular concern is the risk of loss of technological leadership and silent take-over of critical infrastructures. In sum: q uantum science will likely have deep impact on warfare to include hybrid warfare. While most institutions, organisations and companies are still struggling with digitisation, a new computing paradigm is emerging (Inglesant et al., 2016, pp. 11). Quantum physics research has turned the established notions of nature’s basic laws upside down. Quantum sciences deal with emerging technologies, harnessing the properties of quantum physics to enable new capabilities. These technologies will enable the performance of electronics to increase beyond Moore’s Law—which already states that we can expect the speed and capability of our computers to double every couple of years—and we will pay less for them (European Commission, 2018). On the one hand, quantum sciences create qualitatively new capabilities. On the other hand, e.g. by using quantum computers, functionalities of already existing conventional technologies can be significantly improved in terms of 2

This expanded paper has also been published as Working Paper 7 by the Hybrid COE (Thiele, 2020). © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0

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sensitivity, accuracy, speed or user-friendliness (Inglesant et al., 2016, pp. 4). Technologies, such as nano, bio, IT, and neuro will be accelerated by the advent of quantum. Consequently, hybrid actors will be significantly strengthened in their grey zone activities. We will see, in particular, enormously improved computing, communication, cryptography, navigation, sensing and timing capabilities that will enable hybrid actors to push the envelope of hybrid aggression (Underwood, 2020). Quantum technology is a field of technology in which the effects of quantum physics are translated into practical applications with disruption potential. By controlling individual quanta and exploiting their characteristics, quantum technology can pave the way for future technologies, particularly in computation, communications, cryptography, imaging, materials, sensing, positioning, navigation and timing. The rate of progress isn’t calculable as the deployability of systems ranges from ‘nearly ready’ to ‘hard-to-predict’. The timeframe for usable quantum computing (QC) is 5–20 years, depending on applications. The timeframe for the deployment of countermeasures is much shorter, namely up to 10 years. In view of this, there is a massive rush to invest in the respective hardware and software for these multiple technologies, namely in China, Russia and the US. Quantum sciences will enable powerful networks of sensors and shooters to rapidly accelerate the process of detecting, evaluating, targeting, and delivering effects in both the virtual and the physical domains. They will enable hybrid actors to engage in stealthy operations, such as clandestine operations to influence, coerce, sabotage or communicate in the electromagnetic spectrum. At the same time, they may enable aggressors to unveil the stealth technologies of NATO and the EU, to bypass network security in real time, and to take over critical infrastructures. In view of this, NATO, the EU, and their member states run the risk of: • • • •

Loss of technological leadership; Loss of cryptographic infrastructure; Loss of signals intelligence (SIGINT); A silent takeover of civilian and military critical infrastructure.

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Disruptive Effects The quantum world is bizarre. It does not adequately accord with our own experiences in our social and professional lives; this dissonance will complicate competent governance. Quantum particles can be in two places at the same time. They can pass through walls. They master teleportation. They are highly sensitive: even the slightest contact with the outside world is enough for them to collapse. This is the challenge for the construction of the quantum computer: protecting quantum states and simultaneously controlling and manipulating them. Researchers all over the world are working on this, and they are making promising progress. For decision-makers, it will be quite a challenge to think through, judge and orchestrate the development of this new ecosystem. In past decades, quantum technologies of the First Quantum Revolution, such as smartphones or the internet have been used in everyday life. All microelectronics are based on chips, inside which quantum physical processes are used. Lasers emit light quanta with a very specific energy. Now, with the Second Quantum Revolution, a new technological performance class is emerging, offering the potential for game-changing new products for business and industry, as well as for government and defence applications. While economic applications are still years away, there will clearly be a disruptive effect (IISS, 2019). QC will enable unprecedented processing power, allowing for the processing of volumes of data, and for the resolution of classes of problems that far exceed the capacity of classic computers. QC will likely be used to either speed up computations deep inside current machine learning, or deep learning algorithms, or to provide for completely different and much more efficient algorithms. There are already known quantum algorithms that would break existing forms of internet encryption. Several countries have begun to collect encrypted foreign communications with the expectation that they will be able to decode these within the next decade. In response, researchers are developing ‘post-quantum’ or quantumsafe cryptography, which uses classic mechanisms to replace current public key schemes. Encryption with quantum physical properties guarantees absolute security during data transmission. The respective protection of critical infrastructures would gain enormously, because manipulation or external control—for example, of autonomous systems, nuclear power plants, or power grids—would no longer be possible. Quantum communication technologies enable new forms of secure communications, such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-enabled cryptography. QKD already works (ESA, 2018).

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Quantum metrology and sensing promises unprecedented levels of resolution, sensitivity and accuracy. High-precision gravitational sensors will be capable of detecting hidden objects or cavities behind buildings, underground, underwater, or in the air, such as submarines or stealth aircraft. The high sensitivity and precision of inertial measurements, even during acceleration and rotation, provides for accurate and non-manipulable navigation systems, which can be used in aviation, space travel and shipping, as well as for autonomous driving, and even for navigation inside buildings. High-precision clocks can be used to synchronise large data networks or radio telescopes, to improve time scales, and for global satellite navigation. Quantum Imaging will be capable of detecting gases, and of detecting objects around corners, through buildings, fog, smoke, or dust; it will also be able to build images under conditions of very low light.

Game-changing Capabilities Defence and national security are likely to be among the first domains to adopt emerging quantum technologies, particularly quantum-enabled clocks, quantum navigators, quantum gravity sensors and quantum imaging. This technological leap is expected to have far-reaching effects for military forces, intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies. Fully capable QC is still some years away, but early forms of it, and of quantum simulation, are already available. Specific benefits for hybrid contingencies include AI algorithms, highly secure encryption for communications satellites, and accurate navigation that does not require GPS signals. Quantum, as all new disruptive technologies, will thus provide both offensive and defensive hybrid capabilities. Cyber-actors may gain the ability to use quantum computers to hack into encrypted military servers, and into the servers controlling the national infrastructure systems of opponents—however this behaviour will not go unchecked, and with superior capabilities, may even be prevented. For aircraft and spacecraft design and operation, the advent of quantum could lead to dramatic improvements in stealth and agility both in the aerobatic sense and in the sense of mission versatility. The speed of data computation and processing, which quantum systems will significantly improve, will affect the work of unmanned and autonomous military platforms, enabling decisions to be taken more swiftly, making work more accurate, and allowing for multiple targets to be engaged with at once. Also, from a Russian and Chinese perspective, quantum computers will make it possible to grasp multi-domain situation developments much better than before

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(Sputnik, 2017). Intelligence communities can employ these technologies to achieve information superiority, collating public and secret information to automatically discover when adversarial entities have both the intention and resources to offensively engage.

The Quantum Race A number of nations are currently investing heavily in quantum research in the hope of deriving economic and military benefits. China is positioning itself as a powerhouse in quantum science (Kania & Castello, 2018). For example, it has already registered more patents than the U S in the fields of quantum communication and cryptography. Chinese researchers are extremely successful in basic research and in the development of quantum technologies. These include quantum cryptography, communications and QC, as well as quantum radar, sensor technology, imaging, metrology and navigation (Giles, 2019). “Already in 2016, Beijing launched the world’s first quantum satellite, which teleported a photon to Earth in 2017. … The planned USD 10 billion National Laboratory for Quantum Information Sciences in Hefei, Anhui province, will lead the nation’s drive for quantum computing and sensing.” (IISS, 2019)

Obviously, China has managed to cultivate close working relationships between government research institutes, universities, and companies, such as the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) and the China Electronics Technology Group (CETC). Russia is also investing in quantum technologies. It has created a dedicated Russian quantum centre, but is lagging behind China and the US. However, President Vladimir Putin is said to have increased the budget for research and development (R&D) by around USD 3 billion, some of which may certainly be attributed to the quantum technologies sector (Giles, 2019). The US government has invested more than 200 million USD in quantum research in the last four years. Another US$250 million have been provided in 2018 by the Department of Energy and the National Science Foundation. The aim of this funding measure is to support research projects in the fields of quantum sensing, computing and communications. In addition, the U.S. Army Research Bureau has sponsored research in the field of quantum informatics (European Commission, 2019).

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The private sector, meanwhile, should not be underestimated. Companies like Google, IBM, Intel and Microsoft have been conducting quantum research for almost a decade. Together with the Canadian company, D-Wave Systems, they lead the West in the development of quantum computers. The European Union has a good starting position for the development of quantum technologies. Europe is the world leader in quantum physics—with around 50 per cent of all scientific publications and almost 40 per cent of all researchers in this field. In October 2018, the European Commission launched the Quantum Technology Flagship Programme, which is designed to support over 5000 of Europe’s leading researchers in the field of quantum technology over the next ten years. The programme aims to develop a quantum network in Europe, in which quantum computers, simulators and sensors are interconnected via quantum communication networks. This is intended to kick-start a competitive European quantum industry, with research results becoming available as commercial applications (IISS, 2019). This is imperative as—in contrast to the situation in China and the US— industrial actors in Europe are not yet participating in the quantum race. There are hardly any companies that invest in hardware or offer components. Early involvement would be better. For example, the 5G networks currently being developed need to be quantum-resistant and quantum-capable from the outset, otherwise they may be obsolete in ten to fifteen years (Herman, 2019). This would entail the rapid destruction and replacement of very expensive infrastructure, such as fibre optic networks. Even today, encryption methods should be able to withstand the potentiality of quantum technologies. Quantum Takeaways

• Enables game-changing capabilities in computing, communication, cryptography, navigation, and sensing, thus enhancing the spectrum and reach of hybrid threats. • Accelerates other technologies, including Cyber, AI, and XR, thus expanding hybrid warfare effects in offence and defence. • Defence and national security are likely to adopt emerging quantum technologies, particularly quantum-enabled clocks, quantum navigators, quantum gravity sensors and quantum imaging.

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• Specific benefits for hybrid contingencies include AI algorithms, highly secure encryption (QKD) for communications satellites and accurate navigation. • Industrial actors in Europe are not yet participating in the quantum race. • Technological leadership of opponents may lead to unforeseen hybrid warfare capabilities. • There is a risk of loss of technological leadership, of cryptographic infrastructure and of signals intelligence (SIGINT). • Protection of critical infrastructure and long-term secrets is time-critical. Up to 10 years are left for the deployment of countermeasures. • Worst case: Silent takeover of critical infrastructure (civilian and military).

Recommendations

• • • • • • • • • • •

Strengthen core research programmes. Identify, prioritise, and coordinate investment. Push QKD to support own operations. Develop a quantum-smart workforce capable of dealing with evolving quantum-related hybrid threats. Foster convergent, trans-sector approaches. Deepen governmental engagement with the quantum industry. Increase investment in joint quantum technology research centres through partnerships between industry, academia, and government to accelerate pre-competitive quantum research and development. Identify critically needed infrastructure. With a view to long-term information security, start a process to make cryptographic infrastructures quantum secure. Establish end-user testbed facilities along with training and engagement. Seek to increase international cooperation with like-minded industry and governments. Monitor international actors’ strengths and focus areas, to identify gaps and opportunities.

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References ESA. (2018). Space photons bring a new dimension to cryptography. 5 May 2018. https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integr ated_Applications/Space_photons_bring_a_new_dimension_to_cryptography. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021. European Commission. (2018). Quantum technologies flagship. Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/quantum-technologies. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021. European Commission. (2019). Member states publish a report on EU coordinated risk assessment of 5G networks security. Press release by the European Commission and the finnish presidency of the council of the EU. Brussels, October 9, 2019. https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-6049_en. html. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. Giles, M. (2019). The US and China are in a quantum arms race that will transform warfare. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/ 2019/01/03/137969/us-china-quantum-arms-race/. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021. Herman, A. (2019). How America can still win the battle for 5G. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/arthurherman/2019/03/26/how-americacan-still-win-the-battle-for-5g/#16dd3cf066ed. Accessed: 16 Feb 2021. IISS. (2019). The Military balance 2019. Quantum computing and defence. February 2019. pp. 18–20. https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-bal ance/the-military-balance-2019/quantum-computing-and-defence. Accessed: 9 Feb 2021. Inglesant, P., Jirotka, M., & Hartswood, M. (2016). Responsible innovation in quantum technologies applied to defence and national security. Oxford 2016. https://nqit.ox.ac.uk/sites/www.nqit.ox.ac.uk/files/2018-11/Responsible%20I nnovation%20in%20Quantum%20Technologies%20applied%20to%20Defe nce%20and%20National%20Security%20PDFNov18.pdf. Accessed: 17 Feb 2020. Kania, E. B., & Castello, J. (2018). Quantum hegemony? China’s ambitions and the challenge to U.S. Innovation leadership. Center for a New American Security. September 12, 2018. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ quantum-hegemony. Accessed: 15 Jun 2021 Sputnik. (2017). Quantum computing arms race takes shape as China, US, Russia Vie for supremacy. May 11, 2017. https://sputniknews.com/military/ 201705111053523495-quantum-computing-military-applications-analysis/. Accessed: 15 Feb 2021.

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Thiele, R. (2020). Quantum sciences – A disruptive innovation in hybrid warfare. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 7, Helsinki, March 2020 Underwood, K. (2020). Quantum science information matters. June 1, 2020. https://www.afcea.org/content/quantum-information-science-matters. Accessed: 17 Feb 2021.

Annex 5—SPACE3

Abstract This annex provides a comprehensive view on the particular importance of space applications as a key technology in the context of hybrid warfare. Space applications are discussed in the broader context of science, technology, business, security and defence. Particular focus is given to the enormous potential for SMEs to contribute to the extremely dynamic involvement of space into business, social, security and military applications. Consequently, new space and network enable operations are discussed, the close relationship of space and cyber, the directing role of investment, the vulnerability of space assets to include ground infrastructure and of course, particular hybrid challenges such as quantum key distribution. In sum: as space infrastructure increasingly constitutes the backbone of business and security/defence applications, space infrastructure constitutes a particular attractive target for hybrid aggression. Space infrastructure constitutes an attractive target for hybrid attacks. Satellites enable internet, television, communication, trade, and financial networks to function. Navigation and weather monitoring, military and intelligence systems, all of these and more have components in the space domain. For half a century, innovation in space meant scaling-up technologies from the Apollo era. Ever larger, more durable, multi-billion-dollar satellites were created from space-qualified subsystems, militarised and full of redundancies for operations of forty years or more. Participation in such projects was reserved for a few elite organisations, and for large corporations that could afford to employ hundreds of aerospace engineers. Governments and military agencies set the direction and provided large-volume budgets. 3

This Annex includes parts of a previous research (Thiele, 2019).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 R. Thiele (ed.), Hybrid Warfare, Edition ZfAS, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0

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This scenario has changed radically. Evolving technologies have brought space capability into the reach of states, international organisations, corporations and individuals that a decade ago had no realistic ambitions in this regard. In 2019, there were 101 government and private space launches worldwide. The United States had 21 launches, China 34, Russia 25, while Europe, India and New Zealand each had 6, alongside record numbers of commercial launches (Krebs, 2020). More than 80 countries have entered the global space industry. These countries have realised that space is a strategic industry that creates a highly technical workforce, triggering spinoff technologies and economic growth. Seventy-five percent of space industry revenues are commercial (Ross, 2019). Consequently, satellites are no longer the exclusive domain of rival superpowers, but rather a business opportunity based on falling technology costs. As access to space gets cheaper, satellites are becoming mass-produced devices. Commercial space companies entering the space sector have stimulated innovation with new business models and the integration of disruptive technologies (ESRE, 2017, pp. 5). They are fielding hundreds of small, cheap satellites. Companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin are building cheaper, reusable rockets to add as many as 100 new satellites with every launch. Soon, there will be thousands of such satellites, providing links, eyes and ears over the entire world, including low earth orbit nano -satellites for navigation and communications, surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence and missile warning. The satellite industry itself is sandwiched between several waves of rapid, concomitant changes: to the commercial, civil, and defence markets. This transformation has been brought about by the confluence of several factors: remarkable improvements in the operational capability of small satellites, together with reductions in their cost; the even more significant reduction in the cost of access to space; as well as a massive influx of private capital. Through these developments, the envelope for hybrid intervention is expanding.

NEO in Space Space-based information and communication services are key to military systems and platforms. Consequently, the unhindered access to—and freedom to operate in—space is of vital importance to international organisations, such as NATO and the European Union and their member nations (EDA, 2018, pp. 9). The defence and security community has recognised the contribution of the powerful emerging space capabilities of Network Enabled Operations (NEO). Military command &

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control use space-based systems, coupled with meshed networks systems, to support deployed operations as these enable data-exchange in difficult environments. Space-based capabilities are independent from terrestrial infrastructure, and as such enable high mobility, wide geographical coverage and precision. They provide secure high bandwidth and the connection of fixed and on-the-move 5G networks (Leonard, 2018). Space systems imagery, and geolocation services allow actors to access and fuse data and information in near real-time. Chinese and Russian military doctrines underline the importance of space for modern warfare. Both states want to use their own capabilities to limit the military effectiveness of the US and its allies, and have implemented this goal by means of military reorganisation in 2015. Both countries have developed robust and efficient capabilities, including space-based ISR, as well as improvements to space launchers and satellite navigation constellations. These provide for monitoring enemy forces and deploying own forces in a targeted manner. The Chinese and Russian space surveillance networks are ideally suited to search for, track, and classify third countries satellites. Both states have an impressive portfolio of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, energy weapons and groundbased ASAT missiles. Significantly, in terms of hybrid warfare, Iran and North Korea also both use space-based services, and have repeatedly demonstrated their jamming capabilities (DIA, 2019, pp. III). NATO has only recently discovered space as an operational domain, though it has built own C4ISR capabilities decades ago, on a predominantly US backbone. NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated in late 2019, “Making space an operational domain will help us ensure all aspects are taken into account to ensure the success of our missions …”. (Boffey, 2019)

NATO and the EU have developed their military strength to a large extent on space-based C4ISR. Together with timing and navigation, space is central to many of NATO’s existing capabilities. This use of space and space-derived data will likely increase over the next two decades, particularly when reinforced with upcoming quantum technologies. Obviously, significantly improved sensor capabilities can be expected through a new class of space-based sensors, as well as secure communication and data processing based on QKD. In Europe, in the past, three flagship programmes—Copernicus, Galileo, Egnos—have been at the fore of its space activities. With view to upcoming challenges the EU strives in particular for high-quality, and secure space-related data and services as well as leading role for the EU in the space sector (Council of the EU, 2019).

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Open for Business Satellite communications have fuelled the majority of commercial growth since the 1980s. This development will also drive progress as regards government and defence usage in the upcoming decade as their demand for satellite communications is constantly increasing—from a level of approximately 35Gbps today to a projected 150Gbps and over by 2025 (Biewer, 2019). Additionally, comes the rapidly growing global demand for earth observation data and the increasing demand for highly accurate satellite navigation systems providing significant potential for the development of new products and services. Both large companies and start-ups are investing in space as a promising business sector. The massive increase in satellite capacity will continue to change the ways in which satellite operators can sell capacity to end users. Whether it’s cloud networks, flexible capacity, dynamic beam-switching ground terminals, or other aspects, satellite operators and the ensuing value chain are rapidly developing new technologies that will allow satellites to become ever more attractive to a wider market. Naturally, this is also broadening the envelope for hybrid vulnerabilities. GEO satcom operators have developed wholly new satellite designs, fleet architectures, and ways of engaging with customers that enable greater systemlevel flexibility and responsiveness. Established satcom operators, such as SES with o3B and its MEO fleet, and Telesat with their planned LEO constellation, have developed digital-enabled satellites for medium and low earth orbit (MEO and LEO). Further impressive projects have been developed by newcomers, such as One Web, Starlink (SpaceX) and Kuiper (Amazon). These developments highlight the ongoing transformation in space, and constitute a significant upgrade from geostationary earth orbit (GEO) satellites. Clearly, small and nanosatellites will populate LEO in the coming years. They have evolved from ‘toys’ produced in small university laboratories to highly sophisticated, software-defined supercomputers in space, capable of fielding giant networks of sensors, listening-in to the radio-frequency emissions of Earth, or capturing ‘signals of opportunity’ generated by other satellites in space. The sector is characterised by rapid evolution and constant improvement. For instance, Spire Global has launched 20 generations of its LEMUR 3U multi-payload spacecraft in a mere 8 years. With the expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT)—in sectors as diverse as defence and security, transport, oil and gas, and agriculture—business-critical information from tens of millions of objects will need to be sent to and from areas that are not served by terrestrial networks. LEO is particularly well-suited

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to narrowband connectivity, processing signals emitted by connected objects. It offers a satellite link anywhere in the world, complementing low-power, widearea, wireless technology (LPWA) IoT terrestrial networks, without increasing the cost or energy consumption of the objects. MEO is becoming popular, as the O3b constellation has proven that they can deliver immense bandwidth, telecommunications and Internet connectivity services at a fibre-like speed across the globe for regional networks, but also on-the-spot and difficult to jam connections for diverse mobile users, such as special forces and passengers on cruise ships. This orbit includes a low latency needed for real-time applications in 5G networks and reduced propagation loss. Hybrid actors may take advantage of this capability for the employment of edge applications. Satellites deliver 5G capability. They support SCADA and other global asset tracking applications today, and can scale to support future machine-to-machine (IoT) communications. Already in the near future satellites will contribute significantly to innovative business models in 5G. New applications in transport, media and entertainment, energy, agriculture, health and factories of the future, public safety, security and defence are all in the pipeline. The close proximity of LEOs and MEOs to Earth allows them to deliver ultrahigh bandwidth to customers. MEOs and LEOs support real-time command & control. They transport data from UAVs and ISR systems to analysis centres in headquarters anywhere in the world. The use of AI and Big Data will simplify the use of satellite imagery solutions to track and counter terrestrial threats— a capability that may serve hybrid aggressors as well as those security forces fighting hybrid aggression. Laser communication will be a game-changer for the satellite imagery industry. The integration of satellite IoT and the Galileo navigation system will improve the performance of drones used mainly for surveillance and tracking the movements of various military assets. Secure embassy communications, police, intelligence and special forces requirements are perfect fits. Satellite technology is also evolving to play a larger role in Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The use of small and nanosatellite constellations is rapidly increasing due to their low cost to manufacture and launch. They are being deployed for use in domains such as remote sensing, spectrum monitoring or IoT, generating vast amounts of data of high value to commercial and institutional customers. This an environment where hybrid activities thrive perfectly well. In fact, the US National Security Agency (NSA) is using AI to analyse strange behaviours in small satellite employment, in order to be able to detect signs of misuse, i.e. should they be

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brought under opponents’ control. A concerning fact is that they have found several small satellites displaying unusual behaviours, thus suggesting questionable employment (Tucker, 2019).

New Space Race The rapid improvements in space capabilities, coupled with the dynamic growth of related low-cost services have urged many nations to equip their defence forces with space applications (DIA, 2019, pp. 13). The US is focussed on maintaining leadership in space as it considers space as of vital national interest. In December 2019, the US Congress authorised building the United States Space Force. Its mission will be to: • run the existing constellation of US military satellites that are currently managed by the services; • operate the military’s launch facilities; • execute financial planning and programming to purchase satellites and ground support equipment; and • train a specialised cadre of space officers and enlisted personnel (Stavridis 2019). China has expanded its space capabilities by several orders of magnitude. The scale of Chinese investment surpasses that of all other nations. China is the lead rocket-launch nation in the world. It operates two space stations, and has landed a lunar rover on the far side of the moon. In 2018, the country conducted 25 per cent more orbital launches than the US. Counterspace capabilities are of particular interest to China. In 2018 alone, it tested several ASAT. Long gone is the Soviet Union’s Cold War era dominance in the space domain. Yet, Russia remains a prominent space power. Since the mid-2000s, Russia has started modernising many of its languishing space capabilities. It appears that it is currently developing ASAT weapons, ground- and air-based laser weapons, and a network of electronic weapons, supported by capable offensive cyber capabilities, targeting satellite systems and related ground stations.

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Focus and Investment The more space is used for security purposes, the more infrastructures and services must be secure and reliable (Schrogl, 2020). This links with other initiatives of the European Commission, for instance on critical infrastructures and technologies, cyber-security, or quantum technologies. Consequently, the EU aims to translate the upcoming hybrid and disruptive technological challenges into viable, security/defence capabilities, which also yield dividends on both European and global markets. This calls for an orchestrated, focussed and engaged investment in research & development in order to ensure that innovation responds to security and military needs, enhancing the capacity to manage space technologies and protect critical space infrastructures. The space industry benefits from advanced technologies, capabilities, business models and services. These include: • • • • • •

Real-time, multi-domain Space Situational Awareness; Automated cyber forensics and analytics; Autonomous and automated space systems; Digital beam forming, able to reconfigure SAT footprints as missions require; On-board resilience and self-healing satellites; New concepts in space-ground operations, i.e. enhanced predictive technologies, or dynamic encryption; • Hardware products, such as flat panel antennas (FPA), that will increase the efficiency of satellite communication on-the-move demand for armed forces; • Predictive and automated threat analysis, advanced data analytics; • Advanced quantum capabilities in the areas of computing and cryptography. There is a premium on disruptive and game-changing technologies that are autonomous, reconfigurable, agile and adaptable. This development comes at a time where Industry 4.0 is revolutionising collaboration, production and services. Integration of satellite Internet of Things (IoT) and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constitute a valuable capability to loop hardware products in both remote and extreme environments (Fraire et al., 2019, pp. 2). Critical assets for intelligence agencies can be integrated with terrestrial communications to improvise hybrid connectivity through low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) devices (Feeko, 2019). Satellite IoT will also pave the way for more advanced hardware solutions, such as Flat Panel Antennas (FPA). Though the software industry is already moving at a rapid pace, hardware

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solutions with respect to crisis and security management will further accelerate the growth of satellite IoT and GNSS (Lucas-Sabola et al., 2018). In particular, the reprogrammable wave has started hitting both commercial and military markets. Reprogrammable satellites will be taking over the traditional/fixed satellites in the coming decade. They render satellite usage more flexible. Yet, they also open new attack vectors for hybrid strikes. For example, Eutelsat is gearing up for the 2020 launch of its Eutelsat Quantum satellite with in-orbit reprogrammable features (Eutelsat, 2021). The company is addressing both government and commercial markets. Advantages include flexibility and cost-effectiveness due to multiple applications. Limitations include the requirement for high-level end-to-end encryption due to the possibility of an external breach. Massive investment in cybersecurity and ground control capabilities has, thus, become necessary. The market entry of traditional satellite operators like Iridium, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat might ensure a healthy competition for New Space companies with satellite IoT models. Yet, investment in developing critical hardware, such as sensors, may also increase the overall cost. Given hardware-related cyber vulnerabilities, the challenge of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability will grow. These challenges will provide a playing field for hybrid aggressors. With the proposals made by the EU Space Programme and the European Defence Fund, the EU has provided a promising foundation for dealing with such issues. These proposals link with other initiatives of the European Commission, for instance on critical infrastructures, cyber-security or quantum technologies. Further important initiatives include a project for the development of a satellitebased QKD system and service architecture by Luxembourg based SES and partners—supported by the European Space Agency (ESA), or the intended deployment of a satellite QKD testbed by the UK in a collaborative initiative with the government of Singapore (UKRI, 2018). Governmental Satellite Communications (GOVSATCOM) is another key space initiative of the EU at the crossroads of space, security and defence to ensure reliable, secure and cost-effective satellite communication services in both the civil and military environment. Still, there is growth potential regarding concepts, budgets and speedy delivery of capabilities vis-à-vis very dynamically developing technologies and growing hybrid threats, especially for the satellite cyber-security segment. Satellite IoT and GNSS will provide more sophisticated connectivity as well as geolocation services for military users. Software-defined approaches for satellite technology will also prove to be a breakthrough element for both commercial and military markets.

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NATO, the EU and their respective member nations would be well-advised to increase their investment in space-related research and development (R&D) activities. Innovation needs to be upscaled, taking advantage of disruptive technologies such as AI, robotics, 5G or quantum for space capabilities. Hybrid and further threats to security and defence are real—and are growing fast.

No Fence in Space The unhindered access to—and freedom to operate in—space is of vital importance to nations and international organisations, such as NATO and the EU (EDA, 2018, pp. 8). So far, the near impossibility of refuelling spacecraft has largely limited them to orbiting the earth. But as it becomes feasible not only to refuel spacecraft mid-flight, but also to build and service satellites in space, process data in orbit, and capture resources and energy in space for use in space—space operations will become less dependent on earth. Serious threats to space infrastructure are relatively new phenomena. For a long time, space used to be an ecosystem of its own. As more countries and commercial firms have begun participating in satellite construction, space launch, space exploration, and so forth, new risks and threats have also emerged for space-enabled services. Today, it is increasingly understood that space assets have been vulnerable to kinetic, non-kinetic and hybrid attacks for far too long. Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has recently developed a taxonomy of space weapons (Harrison, 2020). • Earth-to-space kinetic Physical systems launched from Earth. The US, Russia, China and India have proven such capability. Anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles—designed to destroy satellites without placing the weapon system or any of its components into orbit. China, Russia (in April 2020 again), also India (in March 2019) have demonstrated their respective ASAT capabilities, and continue to develop them. • Earth-to-space non-kinetic Jammers, laser dazzlers or cyberattacks launched from Earth. The goal is to interfere, temporarily or permanently, with satellite capability. This capability is owned by many states, including the US, Russia, China and Iran. • Space-to-space kinetic

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Physical systems launched from other satellites physically intercepting satellites in order to disrupt or destroy them. Russia has proven this capability during the Cold War. China has recently been developing such capabilities. • Space-to-space non-kinetic Disruption of space-based systems from another satellite using non-kinetic means, for example high-powered microwaves, jammers etc. This also includes robotic technology for satellite servicing and repair (DIA, 2019, pp. 10). The French Minister of Defence accused Russia of performing this kind of action in 2018, thus triggering France to seriously invest in its space capabilities. In fact, Russian and Chinese satellites have repeatedly demonstrated their capabilities for precise manoeuvres in space. Against this backdrop, it can be expected that manoeuvring warfare will also unfold in space in the future. Spacecraft will be able to manoeuvre and fight (Thiele, 2019). • Space-to-Earth kinetic Ability to impact a terrestrial target from space. There is no open knowledge on the availability of such capabilities. • Space-to-Earth non-kinetic A system that could impact a terrestrial target by means of jamming laser spacecraft, or ballistic missiles. These may include Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), i.e. lasers, high-power microwaves, and other types of radiofrequency weapons. With the masses of small satellites that will populate space in the future, space debris will also increase rapidly. Given their enormous speed, even very small objects can cause a huge amount of damage. The risk of collision with debris— akin to that of being hit by an ASAT missile—therefore magnifies the problem of congestion, and could render orbits unusable. This is why the capability of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) has gained in relevance in order to deliver detailed knowledge of any given space object’s location, and to ensure the ability to track and predict its future location (Fig. A.1 ).

Hybrid Challenges The space environment is particularly vulnerable to hybrid threats, such as spying or service interruption. Even in peacetime, space assets can be degraded by hybrid attacks. As such, space has increasingly become a prioritised target in hybrid warfare. Actors can use offensive cyberspace capabilities and other hybrid means to enable a range of reversible to non-reversible effects against space systems. In

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Fig. A.1 Space related cyber-attack vectors

particular, hybrid warfare allows for the diffusion of opponents’ SSA via information operations, i.e. psychological operations, electronic warfare, and cyber operations. In fact, upcoming challenges cross-cut space and cyber domains. Ground-based space infrastructure is particular vulnerable to cyber-attacks. There are plenty of access points which can be attacked—including the antennae on the satellites, the ground stations, and the earth-based user terminals. Such attacks range from exploiting the physical vulnerabilities of a ground site to electronic warfare, to disrupting the connection between the space segment and the operator. The use of satellite applications for commercial and defence sectors presents numerous opportunities. An increasing number of hybrid actors may take advantage of these, and thus present considerable challenges to NATO, the EU and respective member nations. In a number of critical space technologies, such as quantum, cyber and electronic warfare, states such as China and Russia already have an edge over the West, and this tends to increase due to the proliferating effect such technologies have upon each other. China’s success in satellite-based QKD—delivering next-generation encryption keys to networks in geographically dispersed areas—is a shining example of what should be expected. It enables hybrid actors to communicate securely, and with global reach, in an unbreakable format.

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Space Takeaways

• Superior role of space in future conflicts, including hybrid contingencies; • Satellites are becoming mass-produced, inexpensive systems; • Space is a strategic industry; • Private sector is driving innovation; • Governments lean on the commercial sector; • The space environment is particularly vulnerable to hybrid threats, such as spying or service interruption; • Space has become the centre of gravity for downgrading Western C4ISR; • Satellites are a shared military-commercial critical infrastructure; • Hybrid warfare can degrade space capabilities already in peacetime; • The envelope for hybrid intervention is expanding; • Communications and navigation systems are highly vulnerable to hybrid attacks; • Upcoming challenges cross-cut space and cyber domains; • New concepts needed to meet an evolving counter-space challenge; • Technological leadership of opponents may lead to unforeseen risks.

Recommendations

• • • • • • • •

Prepare for the Space Wave. Enhance the capacity for Europe to manage space technologies. Protect critical infrastructures in space. Ensure secured communication for private and governmental applications. Build Space Situational Awareness and Tracking capabilities. Increase the investment in R&D activities of the EU’s military space technology. Ensure that innovation responds to imminent security and military needs and also addresses hybrid threats. Take advantage of disruptive technologies such as AI, robotics, miniaturisation, 5G or quantum for space capabilities.

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• • • •

Promote innovation in hardware products such as FPA. Develop a security and defence dimension for Galileo and Copernicus. Boost SME/Start-up integration. Leverage technologies through partnerships, i.e. intra-European cooperation, but also with distant partners, such as Australia and New Zealand. • Develop concepts, technology roadmaps, budgets and speedy delivery of capabilities vis-à-vis fast-growing hybrid threats.

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